[Senate Prints 113-30]
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113th Congress  }                                {      S. Prt.
                           COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session      }                                {      113-30                                     
_______________________________________________________________________
                                  

                         THE EVOLVING CONGRESS

                               ----------                              

                 COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

                          UNITED STATES SENATE






[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]





                             DECEMBER 2014



                            PREPARED BY THE

                     Congressional Research Service

                          Library of Congress

 










                                                                 
113th Congress  }                                {      S. Prt.
                           COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session      }                                {      113-30                                                                 
_______________________________________________________________________
 
                         THE EVOLVING CONGRESS

                               __________

                 COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

                          UNITED STATES SENATE


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                             DECEMBER 2014



                            PREPARED BY THE

                     Congressional Research Service

                          Library of Congress
                          
                                  ______

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

89-394 PDF                     WASHINGTON : 2014 
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                          LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                    Congressional Research Service,
                                   The Library of Congress,
                                 Washington, DC, November 12, 2014.

Hon. Charles E. Schumer,
Chairman, Committee on Rules and Administration, U.S. Senate

    Dear Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to submit the study 
entitled ``The Evolving Congress,'' which was prepared by the 
Congressional Research Service.
    This compendium of 22 reports was written by staff of the 
Government and Finance Division during the CRS centennial year. 
It is a fitting contribution by the Service whose mission is 
not only to analyze the domestic and international issues that 
impact the legislative agenda but also to advise on the future 
organization and operations of Congress and the institution's 
policymaking process. The goal of this project is to inform the 
legislative debate moving forward by examining how and why 
Congress evolved over the previous decades to where it is 
today.
    In addition to the analysts and information professionals 
who prepared the various pieces that make up ``The Evolving 
Congress,'' the project was coordinated and reviewed by 
Government and Finance Division staff, including Pamela 
Jackson, Walter J. Oleszek, John Haskell, Michael L. Koempel, 
Matthew E. Glassman, James Saturno, and Robert Jay Dilger. I 
trust the committee will find the study thought provoking and 
valuable as you consider issues of congressional operations. It 
should also serve the wider audience of congressional scholars 
and all those interested in the history and processes of the 
First Branch.

            Sincerely,
                                          Dr. Mary Mazanec,
                                                          Director.
                                PREFACE

                              ----------                              

    For 100 years, the Congressional Research Service has been 
charged with providing nonpartisan and authoritative research 
and analysis to inform the legislative debate in Congress. This 
has involved a wide range of services, such as written reports 
on issues and the legislative process, consultations with 
Members and their staff, seminars on policy and procedural 
matters, and congressional testimony. In recent years, CRS has 
expanded its service by providing a wider range of electronic 
products and enhancing its Web site to facilitate ease of 
Member and staff use.
    For this congressional committee print, the Government and 
Finance Division at CRS took a step back from its intensive 
day-to-day service to Congress to analyze important trends in 
the evolution of the institution--its organization and 
policymaking process--over the last many decades. Changes in 
the political landscape, technology, and representational norms 
have required Congress to evolve as the Nation's most 
democratic national institution of governance. The essays in 
this print demonstrate that Congress has been a flexible 
institution that has changed markedly in recent years in 
response to the social and political environment.
    In assessing Congress, it is also important to be mindful 
of what has not changed. For one thing, the institution has 
always been subject to criticism, as described by Walter 
Oleszek in one of the two overview pieces in Part I of this 
committee print, ``The Evolving Congress: Overview and Analysis 
of the Modern Era.'' Often the criticism centers around so-
called ``gridlock'' on major issues. But it bears mentioning 
that the constitutional design, another constant, militates 
against speed and efficiency and in favor of deliberation.
    That Congress is not moving fast enough on certain issues 
to satisfy certain observers overlooks the fact that, 
historically, major legislation has almost always taken time to 
enact. Civil rights and Medicare both required debate and 
deliberation stretching over multiple Congresses before 
enactment. Today, the big policy debates are every bit as 
complex as those were, and in some respects may be more so 
given rapidly evolving technologies and the international 
dimension of so many issues. Cybersecurity, environment 
challenges, fiscal pressures from entitlements, and immigration 
reform, to name a few, present daunting challenges to lawmakers 
in the coming years.
    Partisanship is also a constant. Indeed the current level 
of partisanship that is often decried--characterized by the 
relative ideological homogeneity within the two parties along 
with the ideological distance between them--is by no means 
unprecedented. It is also true that contemporary polarization 
is a reflection of a principled struggle over the proper role 
of the Federal Government. A serious debate is taking place in 
Congress that reflects disagreement and unease throughout the 
country, and there is nothing ``wrong'' or ``broken'' about 
that debate.
    However, this era of strong partisanship is likely no more 
permanent than others in the past. New issues and new movements 
inevitably disrupt the status quo in the country, the Congress, 
and the party system. Witness the impact of the rise of the 
Progressives early in the 20th century, changes in the 
composition of both parties as a result of the civil rights 
movement, and controversial Supreme Court decisions in the 
1960s, 1970s, and beyond, as well as the effect of the tax 
revolt in the late 1970s.
    After Walter Oleszek's piece, Michael Koempel looks broadly 
at how the job of a Member has evolved in the last half 
century. He addresses the dramatic changes in the information 
environment, resulting in increased demands from constituents; 
the social changes that have profoundly affected the context of 
representation; and the way the campaign environment--increased 
costs and fundraising pressures--has evolved. These changes, 
together with the evolution of the party coalitions and the 
environment of partisanship described by Oleszek, have led to a 
different context for the consideration of legislation. Koempel 
describes how the roles of party leaders and committees in both 
Chambers have evolved; even the way legislation is handled on 
the floors of the two Chambers is different in important ways 
now than it was 30, 40, or 50 years ago. The message: the life 
of Members, with respect to both their legislative and 
representational roles, has changed in irrevocable ways since 
the 1960s and 1970s.
    Part II of the print, ``The Members of Congress,'' building 
on Oleszek's and Koempel's contributions, includes several 
reports describing specific aspects of the life of a Member of 
Congress. Matthew Glassman considers how social media may 
affect Members in the performance of their representative role. 
Mark Oleszek takes a different tack in assessing the life of a 
Member, by investigating the nature of relationships in the 
Senate over the last 30 years. He finds that collaborative 
relationships are central to lawmaking but that opportunities 
to work together have decreased in recent years.
    Jennifer Williams, Ida Brudnick, and Jennifer Manning 
examine the changing demographics of the congressional 
membership, a membership that is much more diverse than 
previously, but which still is not representative of the Nation 
in significant ways. Brudnick separately details how 
congressional staffing has evolved over time, with implications 
for how Members do their work.
    Kevin Coleman and Sam Garrett write about the changing 
environment in congressional election campaigns in recent 
decades. They note in detail the differences in the campaign 
context 50 years ago or so and now, but ultimately conclude 
that the fundamentals of campaigns are the same--candidates 
still need to identify, communicate with, and motivate 
potential voters. New technologies and other innovations in 
electioneering are merely means to the same end.
    Jessica Gerrity analyzes the public's view of Congress over 
the last 40 years. She concludes that Congress' consistently 
low popularity is, in part, due to factors beyond its control, 
but at the same time may have systemic consequences. At the end 
of this group of reports, Jacob Straus wades into the question 
of measuring the productivity of one Congress against another. 
His contribution is that glib representations of a given 
Congress' productivity, or lack thereof, not only ignore 
methodological complexities, but also generally fail to 
consider that any such judgments are inherently value-laden.
    Part III, ``The Institutional Congress,'' looks in detail 
at developments in the legislative process. The Constitution is 
nearly silent on how Congress needs to go about its legislative 
and oversight responsibilities. Like the life of a Member, the 
legislative process itself has evolved in significant ways. 
Even what is thought of as ``regular order'' is far from static 
when viewed through a historical lens.
    Megan Lynch and Mark Oleszek consider developments in the 
use of special rules in the House. Authorizing legislation is, 
of course, the legal foundation for the actions of executive 
branch agencies. Jessica Tollestrup details notable changes in 
the structure, content, and frequency of authorizations in the 
last few decades. In recent years in particular, Congress has 
attempted to embed transparency in agency operations, as 
described by Clinton Brass and Wendy Ginsberg. This topic is 
likely an area of continued reexamination for Congress going 
forward.
    An important question that faces Congress on a regular 
basis is how to organize for legislative business. The action 
in this area revolves around the relative roles of party 
leadership and committees in the development and processing of 
legislation. Judy Schneider delves into the implications for 
Members and the policymaking process of the increased control 
that party leaders exert over some aspects of the process.
    Part IV, ``Policymaking Case Studies,'' aims to shed light 
on the various ways policy is made in the current Congress, and 
how that has evolved. In different ways, these case studies of 
congressional policymaking show that the institution is fully 
capable in different ways of addressing the competing demands 
of a diverse nation.
    For example, Edward Murphy and Eric Weiss describe 
Congress' response to financial crises. In 2008, for example, 
we see that Congress' hands are neither tied nor forced by 
policies and institutions put in place by previous Congresses; 
in fact, Congress proves able to pass far-reaching legislation 
even in an era of supposed legislative gridlock. Similarly, 
post-9/11, Congress acted forcefully in various ways, including 
by creating the Department of Homeland Security. William 
Painter describes the creation of the new department and what, 
in retrospect, that experience tells us.
    In another report, Colleen Shogan studies the passage of 
the defense authorization bill. How does this massive 
undertaking happen on an annual basis when many other 
reauthorization efforts stall out? Robert Dilger and Sean Lowry 
consider the case of small business policy, where creative 
approaches to the legislative process have at times yielded 
public law. Jennifer Williams describes a particular case 
involving congressional actions to direct Census Bureau policy 
through appropriations legislation. This reflects a trend of 
congressional direction coming through appropriations bills 
instead of authorizations. Other reports cover Congress' 
evolving role in responding to disasters (Bruce Lindsay and 
Francis McCarthy), and the evolution of block grants as a 
policy instrument (Eugene Boyd and Natalie Keegan).
    Two reports look at tax policy--Molly Sherlock discusses 
rule-driven policy in the case of so-called ``tax extenders,'' 
and Jane Gravelle reminds readers that comprehensive tax reform 
is not something that happens easily. In fact, her historical 
analysis reveals that there are identifiable preconditions for 
tax reform that, by and large, are not currently in place. The 
idea commonly put forward that Congress is ``overdue'' to enact 
comprehensive reform ignores not just history, but also the 
nature of the particular tax issues facing lawmakers today.
    As noted earlier, Congress faces major challenges going 
forward in a complex and interdependent world. Its decisions, 
given its central role in the policymaking process, will 
profoundly affect the future of the Nation. With this committee 
print, CRS is fulfilling its traditional role of informing 
Congress on the domestic and international challenges that lie 
ahead, as well as assessing the future character of the 
institution and its policymaking process. The CRS goal is to 
enrich this debate by examining how and why Congress evolved to 
where it is today.
    This committee print could not have happened without the 
efforts behind the scenes of Pamela Jackson, Walter J. Oleszek, 
Michael L. Koempel, Matthew E. Glassman, James Saturno, and 
Robert Jay Dilger, as well as two former CRS staffers, Jessica 
C. Gerrity and Kevin Kosar. Karen Wirt and Tamera Wells-Lee, 
along with Suzanne Kayne of the Government Printing Office, 
worked long hours to enable the print to come together. In 
addition, Amber Wilhelm, assisted by Jamie Hutchinson, brought 
order to the production of graphics, and numerous editors 
polished the final products. Of course, as always, the real 
work of fulfilling the CRS mission to inform Congress was 
performed by the analysts and specialists who wrote the 
products whose contributions are described above.

                                              John Haskell,
               Assistant Director, Government and Finance Division.















                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page

Letter of Submittal..............................................   iii
Preface, by John Haskell.........................................     v

I. Overview
    The Evolving Congress: Overview and Analysis of the Modern 
      Era, by Walter J. Oleszek..................................     3
    Being a Member of Congress: Some Notable Changes During the 
      Last Half Century, by Michael L. Koempel...................    61

II. The Members of Congress
    Tweet Your Congressman: The Rise of Electronic Communications 
      in Congress, by Matthew E. Glassman........................    95
    Collaborative Relationships and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate: 
      A Perspective Drawn from Firsthand Accounts, by Mark J. 
      Oleszek....................................................   107
    The 113th Congress and the U.S. Population: Discussion and 
      Analysis of Selected Characteristics, by Jennifer D. 
      Williams, Ida A. Brudnick, and Jennifer E. Manning.........   129
    Congressional Staffing: The Continuity of Change and Reform, 
      by Ida A. Brudnick.........................................   145
    The Unchanging Nature of Congressional Elections, by Kevin J. 
      Coleman and R. Sam Garrett.................................   163
    Understanding Congressional Approval: Public Opinion from 
      1974 to 2014, by Jessica C. Gerrity........................   189
    Comparing Modern Congresses: Can Productivity Be Measured?, 
      by Jacob R. Straus.........................................   217

III. The Institutional Congress
    Recent Innovations in Special Rules in the House of 
      Representatives, by Megan S. Lynch and Mark J. Oleszek.....   245
    Changes in the Purposes and Frequency of Authorizations of 
      Appropriations, by Jessica Tollestrup......................   259
    Congress Evolving in the Face of Complexity: Legislative 
      Efforts to Embed Transparency, Participation, and 
      Representation in Agency Operations, by Clinton T. Brass 
      and Wendy Ginsberg.........................................   281
    Committee Assignments and Party Leadership: An Analysis of 
      Developments in the Modern Congress, by Judy Schneider.....   299

IV. Policymaking Case Studies
    Congress and Financial Crises, by Edward V. Murphy and N. 
      Eric Weiss.................................................   325
    Shocks to the System: Congress and the Establishment of the 
      Department of Homeland Security, by William L. Painter.....   353
    Like Clockwork: Senate Consideration of the National Defense 
      Authorization Act, by Colleen J. Shogan....................   369
    The SBA and Small Business Policymaking in Congress, by 
      Robert Jay Dilger and Sean Lowry...........................   383
    Use of the Appropriations Process to Influence Census Bureau 
      Policy: The Case of Adjustment, by Jennifer D. Williams....   399
    The Evolution of U.S. Disaster Relief Policy, by Bruce R. 
      Lindsay and Francis X. McCarthy............................   413
    Congress' Role in the Evolution of Federal Block Grants as a 
      Policy Instrument: From Community Development to Homeland 
      Security, by Eugene Boyd and Natalie Keegan................   425
IV. Policymaking Case Studies--Continued
    The Tax Extenders: How Congressional Rules and Outside 
      Interests Shape Policy, by Molly F. Sherlock...............   441
    The Dynamics of Congressional Policymaking: Tax Reform, by 
      Jane G. Gravelle...........................................   457


      
=======================================================================




                             I. OVERVIEW

=======================================================================



     The Evolving Congress: Overview and Analysis of the Modern Era

                           Walter J. Oleszek

           Senior Specialist in American National Government

                              ----------                              


        Congress is an institution that constantly undergoes 
        change. Sometimes the changes are big and sometimes 
        they are small. The changes are driven by a variety of 
        external and internal factors, many of which are 
        highlighted in this report. The report's basic purpose 
        is to analyze the relationship between two main centers 
        of power in the House and Senate: committee power and 
        party power. Sometimes one center of power appears to 
        dominate in shaping policies; at other times it is the 
        other, or both might be in some degree of equilibrium. 
        Specifically, the report focuses on the configuration 
        of internal power in the House: from the party 
        government era (1890-1910), to the committee government 
        period (1920-the early 1970s), to the subcommittee 
        government stage (1970s-1980s), and the 
        recentralization of authority in the party leadership 
        (1990s). Comparable eras are examined for the Senate, 
        with significant attention given to the 1950s Senate, 
        the ``individualist'' Senate (1960s-1990s), to the 
        polarized Senate (1990s-    ) of today. The time 
        periods for the different House and Senate eras are 
        approximations. The report closes with an assessment of 
        the tension between gridlock and governance in the 
        contemporary Congress.

    To celebrate the centenary of the Congressional Research 
Service (1914-2014), analysts in the Government and Finance 
Division prepared a series of reports to highlight the evolving 
character and role of the legislative branch. The Founders 
expected Congress to be the ``first branch'' of government. 
Consider that half the words in the U.S. Constitution define 
the roles and responsibilities of the Nation's bicameral 
national legislature. Congress was granted ``all legislative 
powers'' as well as explicit authority (article I, section 8) 
to make ``all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution'' all the powers enumerated in the 
Constitution (the power to tax, spend, borrow, and to create 
executive offices and inferior courts, for example). Congress 
also has implied powers, such as the authority to investigate 
and oversee the administration of laws. Provisions in the 
Constitution and the 17th Amendment also provide for the 
election of House and Senate Members.
    In brief, Congress' pivotal role in the Nation's separation 
of powers system, with its panoply of ``checks and balances''--
overlapping powers accorded the three branches, such as the 
ability of the President to veto bills passed by Congress, 
subject to an override by a two-thirds vote of each Chamber--is 
rooted in the Constitution. In the view of a congressional 
scholar:

    The Constitution has successfully provided two features of 
national political life that seem unassailable. The first is a 
Congress that is institutionally robust and capable of 
gathering information and seeking opinions independently of the 
president [and initiating legislation in its own right]. The 
second is that Congress is . . . linked directly to the people 
through elections. The president is a stronger rival than he 
once was, but he is not the only game in town. It is that 
unbreakable electoral link that provides [Congress's] 
continuing legitimacy, ensuring real political power.\1\
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    \1\ Charles Stewart III, ``Congress and the Constitutional 
System,'' in Paul Quirk and Sarah Binder, eds., The Legislative Branch 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 30.

    Despite Congress' prominent place in the Nation's 
separation of powers system, public criticism of the 
legislative branch has been common since its creation. Many 
factors account for this recurrent pattern, such as people's 
dislike of various features of the lawmaking process 
(arguments, partisan conflicts, imperfect solutions, and so 
on). As two scholars have noted, Congress is ``structured to 
embody what we dislike about modern democratic government, 
which is almost everything.'' \2\ Various lawmakers also 
express disappointment in Congress' performance, while many 
commentators regularly call our contemporary national 
legislature broken, overly partisan, unproductive, or 
dysfunctional. There are also Members who state that Congress 
is functioning as the Framers intended despite the stalemates 
(policy and procedural), delays, and conflicts that 
understandably suffuse the lawmaking process.\3\
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    \2\ John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public 
Enemy (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 
158. See also the related CRS centennial report in this volume, 
Understanding Congressional Approval: Public Opinion from 1974 to 2014, 
by Jessica C. Gerrity.
    \3\ Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, despite the many 
controversies that occur in the Chamber, stated: ``Congress is not 
broke. Congress works the way it should. Does that mean it is always a 
very pleasant, happy place? Do I wish it weren't as difficult as it has 
been in the last few months? I wish it was much better than that. That 
is where we are . . . . Through all the years and conflicts we have 
had, we have been able to come together and reach reasonable 
conclusions. The great experiment that started in 1787 has been very 
successful . . . .'' Congressional Record, v. 157, August 1, 2011, p. 
S5156.
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    In a country as diverse as the United States, with scores 
of competing interests, it is not easy for elected 
representatives to come together to enact legislation that 
promotes, as noted in The Federalist (No. 57), ``the common 
good of the society.'' What constitutes the ``common good'' is 
not self-evident and is open to profound disagreement, 
especially when the two parties--as in today's Congress--are 
sharply divided by philosophical, ideological, geographical, 
and political differences. One consequence: confrontation 
rather than compromise creates considerable turbulence and 
uncertainty in congressional policymaking.
    That Congress has shortcomings goes without saying. 
Lawmakers themselves are cognizant of institutional ailments 
and regularly propose ways to improve the organization and 
operation of the House or Senate, as the case might be. From 
its earliest days, many Members have worked to improve and 
strengthen Congress' fundamental responsibilities--lawmaking, 
representation, and oversight--so Members might better address 
and resolve the Nation's pressing problems. Although 
frustrations, disputations, and conflicts typically accompany 
consequential initiatives to revamp legislative structures and 
operations, change and innovation are part of Congress' DNA. 
These attributes enable Congress to remain a vital and 
effective instrument of governance.
    While Congress cannot resolve every national or 
international problem, its record of achievement over 200 years 
merits high praise--the Bill of Rights; the elevation of public 
health as a national priority and the provision of resources to 
treat many diseases; the creation of a system of land-grant 
colleges and universities; the construction of an interstate 
highway system; a strong military; and so on. If laws failed to 
ameliorate problems or even make them worse, the Nation's open 
system enables feedback from Members, attentive constituents, 
outside groups, and others that can prompt corrective actions 
by the legislative branch. Constituents often overlook or 
simply do not appreciate or recognize the legislature's many 
accomplishments and how these attainments affect their lives. 
As a Congressman pointed out:

    [A] group of constituents visiting my [district] office 
told me that Congress was irrelevant. So I asked them a few 
questions. How had they gotten to my office? On the interstate 
highway, they said. Had any of them gone to the local 
university? Yes, they said, admitting they'd got help from 
federal student loans. Did any of them have grandparents on 
Social Security and Medicare? Well sure, they replied, picking 
up on where I was headed. Their lives had been profoundly 
affected by Congress. They just hadn't focused on all the 
connections before.\4\
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    \4\ Lee Hamilton, ``What I Wish Political Scientists Would Teach 
About Congress,'' PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 33, December 
2000, p. 758. Hamilton was a Member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives for 34 years (1965-1999). Currently, he is the director 
of the Center on Congress at Indiana University.

    The focus and connection of the reports in this committee 
print are to demonstrate that Congress plays a multiplicity of 
crucial roles in the Nation's constitutional system; that it is 
responsive to constructive criticism; that it can mediate 
conflicts and differences in the polity; that it regularly 
strives to strengthen its legislative, representative, and 
oversight functions; that it can produce effective and 
innovative policies; that it is a vital check on the 
``Presidential branch'' of government; and that it is 
responsive to the concerns and needs of constituents, American 
society, and the world community.
    Important to emphasize is that Congress has always been 
subject to various criticisms, some warranted and some not. 
Today, a major criticism is that Congress cannot address a 
plethora of pressing national problems because it is often in a 
state of policymaking paralysis. Two points about national 
policymaking merit mention. First, consequential laws are the 
product of the House, the Senate, and the President. No single 
elective unit or person can make laws on their own. Second, as 
James Madison stated in The Federalist (No. 52), Congress is 
``a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person.'' If 
the people are divided on what they want done to resolve major 
national problems, then their divisions will manifest 
themselves in Congress. In the view of former Speaker Carl 
Albert (1973-1977), major legislative accomplishments occur 
``only because the American people had reached that point in 
their history where they wanted them done.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Congressional Record, v. 112, May 23, 1966, p. 10637.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This report analyzes the evolution of Congress: how and why 
it constantly adapts to new circumstances, issues, and 
problems. For example, the ``regular order'' of policymaking in 
one era is often displaced in whole or in part by a new 
``regular order,'' commonly prompted by an array of external 
and internal developments. The report's principal focus, then, 
is institutional change: how the House and Senate have evolved 
as policymaking assemblies, especially with regard to the role 
of parties and committees. Selected historical changes in the 
membership makeup of Congress, such as the professionalization 
of lawmakers' careers, are also included in the discussion.
    The report is structured to examine several objectives. 
First, it begins with a discussion of some of the external and 
internal forces that commonly trigger major revisions to the 
distribution of power in the House and Senate. These drivers of 
change typically involve the combination of external stimuli 
and internal advocates. Both act as catalysts to bring about 
fundamental congressional change: for example, a new 
equilibrium of power that replaces or modifies the previous 
one. Second, because the election of new lawmakers is sometimes 
a major factor in instigating congressional alterations, the 
next section addresses selected changes in the membership and 
career patterns of lawmakers.
    Third, the report provides an overview of the evolution of 
power in the House, and suggests why different institutional 
patterns of policymaking periodically emerge in the Chamber. 
Specifically, this part examines the evolution of the House 
from an era of ``party government''--the speakerships of Thomas 
Reed (1889-1891; 1895-1899) and Joseph Cannon (1903-1911)--to 
``committee government'' (roughly 1920-1970) to ``subcommittee 
government'' (the 1970s to the early 1980s). These governing 
models reflect the central tendency of each era rather than a 
time when party leaders, committee chairs, or subcommittee 
chairs totally dominated Chamber proceedings. After all, 
parties need committees to review and process legislation, and 
committees need party leaders to schedule and structure 
proceedings on the floor.
    The fourth objective, encompassing two sections of the 
report, is an examination of the reemergence of strong party 
leadership, focusing on the speakerships of Newt Gingrich 
(1995-1999), Dennis Hastert (1999-2007) and Nancy Pelosi (2007-
2011). The speakership of John Boehner (2011-    ) is also 
briefly noted.
    Fifth, the report provides an overview of three Senate 
eras: the 1950s Senate, the individualist Senate (1960s to 
1980s), and the polarized Senate of today. (The time periods 
specified for these eras, as for the House, are 
approximations.) Sixth, several summary observations conclude 
the report.

                   I. Drivers of Congressional Change

    Congress and its membership are constantly changing and 
adapting to various conditions, pressures, and forces. Every 
election cycle, for instance, produces large or small changes 
in the makeup of the House and Senate membership and in the 
salience of various issues. Historical circumstances can also 
provoke legislative change. Consider enactment of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the first comprehensive 
reform in Congress' history. Many leaders inside and outside 
Congress expressed concern about the condition of the 
legislative branch. During the Depression and New Deal period 
of the 1930s, they had witnessed a dramatic increase in the 
authority of the executive branch. Then, on the eve of World 
War II, they watched the rapid fall of many European 
parliamentary systems to Hitler's military onslaught.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ As Representative (later Senator) A.S. Mike Monroney, the vice 
chairman of the joint committee that drafted the 1946 LRA, pointed out, 
``[I]n almost every country of the world, the parliamentary system has 
failed. In countries where dictators have taken over, it has always 
been because the parliamentary systems have proved their inability to 
cope with the complex and difficult problems that face modern society. 
That is the real significance of congressional reorganization. An 
effective and efficient Congress is our first bulwark against 
dictatorship and the leading institution we have today to protect our 
liberties and democracy.'' See A.S. Mike Monroney, ``The Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946: A First Appraisal,'' in A.S. Mike Monroney, 
et al., eds., The Strengthening of American Political Institutions 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949), p. 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a result, public interest in congressional 
reorganization became widespread among lawmakers, in the press 
and popular journals, and on the radio. Academics, led by the 
Committee on Congress of the American Political Science 
Association, prepared reports on ways to improve Congress. They 
also mobilized scholarly and public support for congressional 
reform. These conditions provided the incentive and motivation 
for numerous Members in both parties and Chambers to come 
together to strengthen their own branch of government.

                            External Forces

    Many other external and internal developments can impel 
institutional change. Three are noted for illustrative 
purposes. First, new media technologies have altered how 
lawmakers communicate with their constituents and with each 
other. For example, the late Senator Edward Kennedy lamented 
the decline of face-to-face interactions with colleagues as 
lawmakers increasingly ``speak'' to each other 24/7 via various 
social media.\7\ A House chair said he reached out to 
constituents with a social media campaign, ``lending his voice 
to an `explainer' video walking laymen through the ins and outs 
of reauthorizing water infrastructure projects.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ John Stanton, ``Kennedy Memoir Recalls Chummy Senate,'' Roll 
Call, September 15, 2009, p. 26.
    \8\ Emma Dumain and Nathan Hurst, ``House GOP Sees Water Bill as 
Post-Earmark Success,'' Roll Call, May 19, 2014, p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, global events constantly impact Congress' agenda 
and activities. The agenda of the contemporary Congress, for 
example, is replete with issues such as the humanitarian crisis 
associated with the large number of child immigrants from 
Central America fleeing violence and crossing the Nation's 
southwestern border; civil wars in Iraq and Syria; an assertive 
China; or Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggressive actions 
against Ukraine.
    Third, unlike the post-World War II era when there were 
liberals and conservatives in both parties, today, as a current 
Senator noted, ``most Democrats are far left; most Republicans 
are to the right.'' \9\ Centrist lawmakers are a vanishing 
breed on Capitol Hill. This development occurred over time, but 
the political reality today is that Democratic and Republican 
lawmakers have intense disagreements on a host of domestic and 
international issues. These divergent perspectives reflect the 
views of their respective electoral coalitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Kathy Kiely and Wendy Koch, ``Committee Shaped by Party Ties,'' 
USA Today, October 5, 1998, p. 2A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The South, for instance, was once a solid Democratic 
region. Today, the South--a region generally reputed for being 
antitax, promilitary, strongly evangelical, and antilabor, for 
example--is a GOP stronghold triggered by events such as the 
civil rights movement, the rise of the religious right, changes 
in societal attitudes and values, and demonstrations against 
the Vietnam war. Conservative southern Democrats switched 
parties to become conservative Republicans. The result: a 
partisan regional realignment that has ``southernized'' the 
Republican Party on Capitol Hill. The switch in party dominance 
in the South also moved the Democratic Party in a more liberal 
direction.
    In brief, the two major parties differ racially (a large 
percentage of Democrats are nonwhite, Republicans are 
predominately white); culturally (for example, Democrats tend 
to favor same-sex marriage, many Republicans do not); and 
ideologically (Democrats favor an activist government, 
Republicans prefer to shrink the role of the government). 
Unsurprisingly, constituents in ``red'' and ``blue'' States 
vote for lawmakers who strongly support their values and policy 
preferences. The result of the sharp divide between the two 
parties is often policy gridlock, triggered by the inability of 
Democrats and Republicans to resolve their differences by 
compromise. Add to this perplexity a constitutional separation 
of powers system that ``was not designed to work under 
conditions of intense partisan polarization.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Alan I. Abramowitz, ``The Electoral Roots of America's 
Dysfunctional Government,'' Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 43, 
December 2013, p. 727.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            Internal Forces

    Institutional change is fostered by a number of internal 
challenges and concerns. For example, aggressive Presidents can 
provoke legislative change, especially if they take actions 
perceived as undermining Congress' constitutional prerogatives. 
When President Richard Nixon clashed with Congress over 
spending priorities by impounding (refusing to spend) funds for 
programs he disliked--even though he had signed them into law--
it prompted Congress to reclaim its budgetary prerogatives by 
enacting a landmark overhaul of its budgetary system: the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 
President Nixon's impoundments, wrote a scholar, were 
``designed to rewrite national policy at the expense of 
congressional power and intent.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Allen Schick, Congress and Money (Washington, DC: Urban 
Institute Press, 1980), p. 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    House and Senate changes are also advanced by individual 
lawmakers, ad hoc groups, and by each congressional party. 
There is little doubt that strong-willed and change-oriented 
individuals have always influenced public policy and played 
major roles in promoting legislative change. Many people may 
have forgotten that, over the decades, many reform-oriented 
lawmakers promoted major revisions in how Congress operates in 
making decisions. These lawmakers include Senator Robert La 
Follette, Jr., and Representative Monroney (authors of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946); Representatives 
Richard Bolling (a champion of budget and committee reform in 
1973-1974) and David Dreier (a leader in revamping House rules 
when Republicans won control of that Chamber in 1994); and 
Senators Adlai Stevenson, Jr. (chair of the Senate panel that 
revamped committee jurisdictions in 1977) and Howard Baker, Jr. 
(a strong advocate of televising Senate floor proceedings, 
which occurred in 1986). The evolution of Congress is shaped in 
large measure by the people elected to serve in the House and 
Senate and their commitment to improving and strengthening the 
legislative branch.

                II. Membership Composition: Then and Now

    The membership characteristics and party affiliations of 
the people who served in the House and Senate in 1953 and 2013 
are highlighted in Table 1. The table contrasts individual 
attributes of the people who served in those years. Generally, 
changes in the composition of the House and Senate occur 
slowly; however, when the makeup does exhibit major change, it 
suggests that larger economic, political, and social forces are 
underway in the electorate--an increase in the minority 
population and its access to and interest in civic 
participation, for example. Broad societal developments may (1) 
influence who seeks to serve in Congress, (2) shape the agenda 
priorities of the House and Senate, and (3) reveal shifts in 
the regional composition of the two parties. Three features of 
Congress' composition--the number of lawyer-politicians, its 
gender and ethnic diversity, and the professionalization (a 
full-time occupation) of legislative careers--spotlight 
important membership patterns and trends.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ See the related CRS centennial report in this volume, The 
113th Congress and the U.S. Population: Discussion and Analysis of 
Selected Characteristics, by Jennifer D. Williams, Ida A. Brudnick, and 
Jennifer E. Manning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          The Legal Profession

     Lawyers have usually dominated the membership of both 
Chambers. As one account noted, ``From 1780 to 1930, two thirds 
of senators and about half the House of Representatives were 
lawyers.'' \13\ The actual proportion varies over time. For 
example, in the 105th House (1997-1999), Members with business 
backgrounds (181) outnumbered lawyers (172) ``for the first 
time since Congressional Quarterly began keeping records of 
Members' occupations in 1953.'' \14\ However, lawyers 
outnumbered business people in the Senate, keeping Members with 
law degrees as the number one occupation in the 105th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Mark C. Miller, ``Lawyers in Congress: What Difference Does It 
Make?'' Congress & The Presidency, vol. 10, spring 1993, p. 2. Also see 
Mark C. Miller, The High Priests of American Politics: The Role of 
Lawyers in American Political Institutions (Knoxville, TN: University 
of Tennessee Press, 1995).
    \14\ Allan Freeman, ``Lawyers Take a Back Seat in the 105th 
Congress,'' CQ Weekly, January 4, 1997, p. 27.


      Table 1. Selected Characteristics of Congress, 1953 and 2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Category                     Year     House    Senate
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ethnicity:
  Hispanic/Latino Americans.................    1953         1         1
                                                2013        31         4
 
  African Americans.........................    1953         2         0
                                                2013        40         1
 
  American Indian/Native Americans..........    1953         0         0
                                                2013         2         0
 
  Asian Pacific Americans...................    1953         0         0
                                                2013        10         1
Gender:
  Women.....................................    1953        11         1
                                                2013        78        20
Occupations:
  Attorneys.................................    1953       249        59
                                                2013       156        55
 
  Physicians................................    1953         5         0
                                                2013        16         2
Party Affiliation:
  Democrats.................................    1953       213        47
                                                2013       201        53
 
  Republicans...............................    1953       221        48
                                                2013       234        45
 
  Independents..............................    1953         1         1
                                                2013         0         2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: ``How Congress is Different These Days,'' U.S. News and World
  Report, Jan. 30, 1978, p. 32. Current data compiled by Jennifer E.
  Manning, Information Research Specialist, Knowledge Service Group,
  CRS.


    Constituents seem to believe that, more than other 
occupations, lawyers have the requisite training to make laws, 
such as indepth knowledge of the U.S. Constitution and 
heightened capacity to understand the procedures and rules that 
shape substantive decisions. Lawyers also have certain 
political marketing advantages. An observation about lawyers 
made by a House Member in 1897 still retains some currency 
today. He wrote: ``If [a lawyer] is reasonably successful his 
name is constantly in the newspapers published in his locality, 
and he generally needs no introduction to the people of his 
congressional district. When a vacancy occurs in the 
representation he is likely to have friends everywhere who are 
zealous in promoting his cause.'' \15\ Lawyers are also viewed 
as skilled in advocacy, argumentation, and persuasion, 
qualities viewed as essential to the lawmaking process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Representative William H. Moody, ``Lawyers in Congress,'' The 
Illustrated American, October 23, 1897, p. 523.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the significant number of lawyers in Congress, 
contemporary Congresses have witnessed a large number of 
Members elected with an array of different occupational 
experiences and professions. They are also not all career 
politicians. There have been actors, athletes, and astronauts 
who have served in Congress, not to mention physicians, 
professors, teachers, military officers, or journalists.\16\ 
Compared to earlier eras, there is a broader cross section of 
Americans that run and win seats in Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ David T. Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Diversity

    White males have been overrepresented in the House and 
Senate from its very beginning. By contrast, women have always 
been underrepresented in the House and Senate. Remember that 
only with the ratification of the 19th Amendment in 1920 did 
women attain the right to vote. That amendment stated: ``The 
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of sex.'' In 1917, GOP Representative Jeannette Rankin 
of Montana, an activist in the women's suffrage movement, 
became the first woman to be elected to Congress. Montana was 
among several States, prior to the ratification of the 19th 
Amendment, that had granted women the right to vote.
    Today, there are a record number of women in the 113th 
Congress (2013-2015), which also includes African American, 
Hispanic American, and Asian/Pacific Islander women. At the 
start of the 113th Congress, there were 78 females in the House 
and 20 in the Senate, still far below their proportion (over 50 
percent) in the general population. Although there have been 
elections called the ``Year of the Woman,'' as in 1992, the 
influx of female lawmakers has occurred slowly, in part because 
of the power of incumbency (most Members are male), family 
choices, and a shortage of competitive seats. Nonetheless, the 
role of women in today's Congress and in the workforce has 
changed significantly. A historic event occurred in January 
2007 when Democratic Representative Nancy Pelosi of California 
was elected to be the first female Speaker in the House's 
history. During the 1920s, women lawmakers ``were a curiosity 
both for their male colleagues and the national press, which 
devoted considerable attention to their arrival.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Women in Congress, 1917-2006 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), p. 
2. This volume was prepared under the direction of the U.S. Committee 
on House Administration and by the Office of History and Preservation, 
Office of the Clerk of the House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A profile of congressional Members makes plain that 
America's major ethnic groups--African Americans, Hispanics, 
and Asians--are underrepresented in Congress. The recent 
decennial census of 2010 indicated that African Americans 
constitute about 13 percent of the overall population and 10 
percent of Congress; Hispanics are near 17 percent of the 
national population and around 7 percent of Congress' 
membership; and Asians are about 3 percent of Congress' 
membership but around 5 percent of the national population. 
Despite the obstacles each group has confronted in winning 
seats in Congress, such as bigotry and ``Jim Crow'' laws, there 
has been progress (albeit slow).
    Important to note is a recent and historic House membership 
change. In 2013, the Democratic Party was reshaped 
demographically: it became a ``majority-minority'' party. More 
than half of House Democrats are women, African Americans, 
Hispanics, and Asians. A significant consequence of the change 
is that women and ethnic minorities inform the policymaking 
process in a manner that a Chamber filled almost exclusively 
with white men cannot.

            The Professionalization of Congressional Service

    The career patterns of lawmakers have undergone over time a 
number of important changes that have transformed the work and 
role of both Congress and its Members. A brief ``then'' (the 
19th century and early part of the 20th century) and ``now'' 
comparison highlights several developments that led to today's 
professionalized Congress. Among the changes worth noting are 
these two.

                   part-time to full-time institution

    Congress functioned largely as a part-time institution 
until around the post-World War II era. One rough indicator of 
the shift to a full-time institution is to compare the date of 
a Congress' beginning and the date of its adjournment.\18\ By 
the 86th Congress (1959-1961), setting aside the war years 
(1941-1945), Congress always adjourned during the fall or the 
winter months, at times late in December and even into January 
3 of the new year. A major contributor to year-round sessions 
was an increase in and the complexity of Congress' workload, 
triggered by events such as wars and economic crises. 
Unsurprisingly, a full-time Congress places large demands on 
today's lawmakers. They must handle the requirements of 
policymaking and oversight while in Washington, DC (often on a 
Tuesday to Thursday schedule), as well as return to their 
district or State regularly to serve the needs of their 
constituents. Lawmakers today work an average of 70 hours per 
week. As the wife of a former Senator noted: ``It is a 24/7/365 
[day] position.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ This information is available in the statistical part of the 
Official Congressional Directory, 113th Congress, which is published by 
the U.S. Government Printing Office.
    \19\ Quoted in Life in Congress: The Member Perspective, A Joint 
Research Report by the Congressional Management Foundation and the 
Society for Human Resource Management, 2013, p. 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By comparison, consider the comments of Representative 
Joseph Martin, who served continuously in the House for 42 
years (1925 to 1967), including stints as Speaker during the 
80th (1947-1949) and 83d (1953-1955) Congresses. Contrasting 
the House when he was first elected to the House at the end of 
his career, Martin stated:

    The great difference between life in Congress a generation 
ago and life there now was the absence then of the immense 
pressures that came with the Depression, World War II, Korea, 
and the Cold War. Foreign affairs were an inconsequential 
problem in Congress in the 1920s. For one week the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee debated to the exclusion of all other 
matters the question of authorizing a $20,000 appropriation for 
an international poultry show in Tulsa. This item, which we 
finally approved, was about the most important issue that came 
before the committee in the whole session.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Joseph Martin, My Fifty Years in Politics (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., 1960), p. 47.

    Today's year-round Congress grapples with numerous global, 
technological, and domestic issues that surely would surprise 
former Speaker Martin, from climate change to same-sex marriage 
to net neutrality to the threat of terrorist attacks on the 
United States. Unsurprisingly, large increases in the Nation's 
population contributed to an expansion of Congress' agenda and 
gradual increases in the size of the House (hikes in 
population) \21\ and the Senate (the admission of new States). 
The Nation's population surged from 76 million in 1900 to 152 
million in 1950 and more than doubled again to 310 million in 
2010. One result of the population increases: there was a 
concomitant buildup of legislative staff for Members, 
committees, party leaders, and various administrative units 
(the Clerk of the House, the Secretary of the Senate, the 
Capitol Police, the legislative support units, and so on).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ In 1911, the size of the House was statutorily set at 435.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Committees, party entities, and parliamentary procedures 
have also evolved since the First Congress. From reliance on 
temporary select committees used by both Chambers in their 
early days, the House and Senate established permanent (or 
standing) committees. For example, in 1816 the Senate 
established a system of permanent committees ``whose basic 
structural philosophy has remained unchanged to this day.'' 
\22\ The idea of ``structural philosophy'' means that 
committees were created to address Congress' expanding workload 
through a division of labor. Committees also enabled lawmakers 
to develop the specialized expertise required to make informed 
public policy. A number of Senate standing committees created 
in 1816 exist in both Chambers today, such as panels dealing 
with foreign relations, commerce, the judiciary, and military 
affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Walter Kravitz, ``Evolution of the Senate's Committee 
System,'' The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, vol. 411, January 1974, p. 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             length of member service: yesteryear and today

    Common during Congress' first several decades was a large 
turnover in the membership of each Chamber following every 
election.\23\ ``Very high turnover and resignations,'' wrote a 
political scientist, ``were hallmarks of the national Senate 
and House of Representatives throughout the entire pre-Civil 
War period.'' \24\ Setting aside the First Congress, when 
everyone was a newcomer, ``turnover of House members exceeded 
fifty per cent in fifteen elections--the last of which was held 
in 1882.'' \25\ As for the Senate, prior to 1875, ``the average 
senator served four years; after 1893, this figure doubled.'' 
\26\ On the other hand, there were famous Senators (Daniel 
Webster,  Henry  Clay,  and  John  Calhoun,  for  example)  who 
served in five consecutive pre-Civil War Congresses. After the 
Civil War and Reconstruction, lengthy service in the Senate was 
not unusual. By the end of the 19th century, Missouri Senator 
``Thomas Hart Benton's record of 30 years of service [1821-
1851] was beaten . . . .'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Something that merits brief mention is the large number of 
contested election cases that occurred during the 19th century, 
gradually declining in both Chambers by the start of the 20th century. 
The U.S. Constitution (article I, section 5) states: ``Each House shall 
be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own 
Members . . . .'' During the latter part of the 19th century, evidence 
suggests that the majority party in the House prevailed in these 
contests as a way to boost their partisan edge in the Chamber. As 
Speaker Thomas B. Reed wrote in 1890: ``The decision of election cases 
invariably increases the majority of the party which organizes the 
House, and which . . . appoints the majority of the Committee on 
Elections,'' the panel that reviewed contested election cases. Thomas 
B. Reed, ``Contested Elections,'' The North American Review, vol. CLI 
(1890), p. 114. For a detailed study of House election contests, see 
Jeffrey A. Jenkins, ``Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the 
House of Representatives, 1789-2002,'' Studies in American Political 
Development, vol. 18, fall 2004, pp. 112-135; and Matthew N. Green, 
``Race, Party, and Contested Elections to the U.S. House of 
Representatives,'' Polity, vol. 39, April 2007, pp. 155-178. 
Partisanship also influenced the outcome of election contests in the 
Senate, but to a lesser extent than in the House. Prior to the direct 
election of Senators in 1913 (the 17th Amendment), there were a number 
of election contests involving Senators-elect who either bribed State 
legislators ``or voters in state legislative elections.'' Jeffrey A. 
Jenkins, ``Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the Senate, 
1789-2002,'' Studies in American Political Development, vol. 19, spring 
2005, p. 57. Professor Jenkins' two articles contain an array of data 
to support his analysis of the contested election process.
    \24\ H. Douglas Price, Explorations in the Evolution of Congress 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Institute of Governmental 
Studies Press, 1998), p. 54.
    \25\ Nelson W. Polsby, ``The Institutionalization of the U.S. House 
of Representatives,'' American Political Science Review, vol. 62, March 
1968, p. 146.
    \26\ Thomas E. Mann, ``United States Congressmen in Comparative 
Perspective,'' in Ezra N. Suleiman, ed., Parliaments and 
Parliamentarians in Democratic Politics (New York: Holmes & Meier, 
1986), p. 232.
    \27\ Price, Explorations in the Evolution of Congress, p. 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One reason for the rapid turnover of pre-Civil War House 
Members was the ``rotation principle''--Members served a term 
or two and voluntarily chose not to run for reelection. Lengthy 
service in the House ``was disregarded by many citizens, was 
feared by others as conducive to an aristocracy of 
officeholders, or was deemed noxious for incumbents themselves 
because `power was too apt to turn the head.' '' \28\ By the 
end of the 19th century, the rotation principle gradually gave 
way to membership stability because politicians and voters 
alike recognized the value of careerism ``as the national 
government became the center of policy-making. A 
nationalization of politics led to the formation of a political 
career structure in which the Senate and House ranked high on 
the hierarchy of public offices.'' \29\ The emergence of one-
party States and districts--the South after the Civil War, for 
example--also facilitated the reelection of lawmakers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Ibid., p. 87. Abraham Lincoln observed the rotation principle 
and served but a single House term.
    \29\ Mann, ``United States Congressmen in Comparative 
Perspective,'' p. 233.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In today's year-round Congress, longevity of service is 
quite common in the contemporary House and Senate, but is 
subject to change with the infusion every election cycle of new 
lawmakers in both Chambers. Democratic Representative John 
Dingell, Jr., of Michigan is the longest serving Member of 
Congress ever. He was elected in 1955 in a special election and 
announced that he would voluntarily retire at the end of the 
113th Congress (2013-2015) after 59 years of consecutive 
service. Representative Dingell broke the congressional 
longevity record of over 57 consecutive years set by Senator 
Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, who also served in the U.S. 
House from 1953 to 1959 and then in the Senate until his death 
in June 2010.
    The rise of the seniority system (discussed below) and the 
power of incumbency also contributed to the attractiveness of 
continuous legislative service. Incumbency is powerful in that 
incumbent House and Senate legislators running for reelection 
are hard to defeat, with a reelection rate of over 90 percent 
quite common for the House but with somewhat more fluctuation 
for Senate incumbents. Importantly, House and Senate incumbents 
usually enjoy a number of advantages over challengers, such as 
name recognition, staff resources, access to the media, and the 
ability to raise significant campaign funds.

          III. The Evolution of Power in the House, 1880-1975

    Two traditional centers of power in the House (and Senate) 
are committees and parties. During certain historical eras, 
party leaders are the major legislative actors rather than the 
committee chairs, or vice versa. A prominent scholarly theory--
called ``conditional party government''--explains why party 
(centralized authority) or committee (decentralized authority) 
government commonly characterize legislative dynamics on 
Capitol Hill.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ See David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform 
House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The theory posits that two conditions must exist for party 
government. First, each party must be internally united in 
their policy preferences and political values. Second, the 
policy preferences and political values of one party must be 
sharply divergent from the other party's. If these two 
conditions are present, rank-and-file partisans will empower 
and support the agenda put forth by their top leaders. In 
contrast, if the two parties are each riven by internal 
conflicts and disagreements over policy and other matters--
conditions that promote cross-party coalitions as the pattern 
in enacting consequential legislation--then committee 
government is the norm. Under committee government, rank-and-
file lawmakers are unwilling to cede power to their top 
leaders. Why? Party leaders might exercise their authority in a 
manner detrimental to Members' legislative, political, and 
career interests.
    In brief, there is an inverse relationship between party 
power and committee power. ``That is, the party's power `waxes 
and wanes' with the committee power.'' \31\ A back-and-forth 
pattern between a centralized (party) and decentralized 
(committee) House of Representatives characterizes the 1880 to 
1975 period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ David W. Brady, ``After the Big Bang House Battles Focused on 
Committee Issues,'' Public Affairs Report, March 1991, p. 8. This 
publication is produced by the Institute of Governmental Studies, 
University of California, Berkeley.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  The Party Government Era (1880-1910)

    During the period from the late 1880s to 1910, two powerful 
Speakers, Thomas Reed and Joseph Cannon, dominated House 
proceedings by centralizing power in the speakership. Among 
their parliamentary powers were these: each determined the 
agenda and schedule of the House; referred measures to the 
standing committees; appointed Members to the standing 
committees; exercised as Presiding Officer an unappealable 
right of recognition; and, importantly, each chaired the Rules 
Committee, which establishes the conditions for debating and 
amending legislation.
    It was common also during this era for other top party 
leaders (the majority leader and majority whip, for example) to 
chair important committees, such as Appropriations and Ways and 
Means. Having top party leaders chair influential committees 
promoted and strengthened party government. In addition, as the 
Nation moved from an agricultural to an industrial society, the 
constituency bases of the two parties largely reflected that 
divide. As two scholars concluded, ``the high levels of party 
voting in the 1890-1910 era were largely the result of the 
polarization of congressional parties along both an 
agriculture-industrial continuum and sectional lines plus the 
political power inherent in the centralized leadership in the 
House.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ David W. Brady and Phillip Althoff, ``Party Voting in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1890-1910: Elements of a Responsible Party 
System,'' Journal of Politics, vol. 36, August 1974, p. 773. Also see 
David Brady, Richard Brody, and David Epstein, ``Heterogeneous Parties 
and Political Organization: The U.S. Senate, 1880-1920,'' Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 14, May 1989, pp. 205-250.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             speaker reed (1889-1891; 1895-1897; 1897-1899)

    Reed preferred that his party should govern without much 
consideration of minority party viewpoints. He acted to ensure 
that result by riveting into the House rulebook the principle 
of ``majority rule.'' For decades, an obstructionist tactic in 
the House was called ``the disappearing quorum,'' which 
undermined the ability of the majority party to take action on 
its agenda. Under the Constitution, a quorum is a majority of 
the membership. Until the speakership of Reed, a quorum meant 
those who answered to their names during rollcall votes. As a 
dilatory tactic, lawmakers who wanted to block action refused 
to answer rollcalls even though they were present in the 
Chamber. On January 29-30, 1890, Reed ended the practice by 
directing the Clerk to record Members as present in the Chamber 
even if they did not vote, thus determining the presence of a 
constitutional quorum. He also refused to entertain motions 
that he deemed dilatory.
    Despite the uproar over his actions to end the disappearing 
quorum, the House adopted on February 14, 1890, a major 
overhaul of House rules--called the ``Reed Rules''--that 
strengthened the concept of party governance. Even before he 
became Speaker three different times, he stressed that the 
majority party must be responsible for governance. Reed said: 
``The best system is to have one party govern and the other 
party watch, and on general principles I think it would be 
better for us to govern and the Democrats to watch.'' \33\ 
There is little doubt that Speaker Reed's rules and rulings 
dramatically altered House procedures and processes. As one 
account noted, the ``Reed Rules'' changed ``the way in which 
the House did business [more than] a century ago, [and] they 
continue to shape the House today.'' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Samuel W. McCall, The Life of Thomas Brackett Reed (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1914), pp. 82-83. Also see William A. Robinson, 
Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian (New York: Dodd Mead, 1930).
    \34\ History of the United States House of Representatives, 1789-
1994, H. Doc. 103-324 (Washington, DC: GPO: 1994), p. 180.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       speaker cannon (1903-1911)

    Cannon was also a strong proponent of party government. He 
had the same parliamentary prerogatives as Speaker Reed, but 
Speaker Cannon exercised his procedural powers in a more heavy-
handed (some would say ``dictatorial'') fashion. In effect, 
party government under Cannon became one-man rule (dubbed 
``Cannonism'' by his opponents). As Democratic Representative 
David DeArmond of Missouri said about the Speaker's control of 
the Rules Committee:

    The Committee on Rules as now constituted is not really a 
committee. Nominally it consists of the Speaker and two of his 
party associates, of his own selection, and two minority 
Representatives . . . . This so-called committee has no regular 
meeting days, or weeks, or months--it convenes upon call of the 
Speaker. It does not deliberate or in fact determine anything. 
When the Speaker has determined to do something, with his 
committee as the instrument to be employed, the Rules Committee 
is called to meet in the Speaker's room, and his decision . . . 
is put forth as the decision of the committee. Then, there is 
presented in the House by one of the Speaker's Rules Committee 
automatons ``a privileged report from the Committee on Rules,'' 
and the Speaker's party friends are called upon to enforce by 
vote of the House the Speaker's decree. It would be precisely 
the same thing, in effect, though less artful, if the Speaker 
personally, officially, and directly were to make his own 
report of his own action and submit to a vote of the House the 
question of making his action the action of the House.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Congressional Record, vol. 44, March 1, 1909, p. 3569.

    Numerous Democratic minority Members expressed dismay at 
Speaker Cannon's autocratic leadership style. For example, he 
determined when or if legislation would reach the floor and 
removed lawmakers and chairs from committees if they did not do 
his bidding. Dissatisfaction with Cannon's leadership began 
steadily to increase; moreover, there were growing numbers of 
``insurgent'' (progressive) Republicans entering the House. It 
was the Progressive era in the Nation (1890-1920), and a 
reform-minded President, Theodore Roosevelt, was in the White 
House for part of that time (1901-1909).
    Scores of progressive initiatives were proposed to address 
corporate greed, political corruption, unsafe and unsanitary 
workplace conditions, child labor, and other matters. Although 
Speaker Cannon voted against numerous progressive measures (for 
example, legislation to require pure food and drugs, 
restrictions on child labor, and meat inspections), many made 
it into law. Why? As a scholar of the speakership explained: 
``As powerful as he was, Cannon had to calculate the costs and 
benefits of opposing the popular Roosevelt and the increasingly 
progressive mood of the country.'' In short, Speaker Cannon 
``could not unilaterally stand in the way of the majority 
sentiment of the country without jeopardizing his own 
position.'' \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the end, a combination of factors led to Cannon's 
downfall: his opposition to progressive policies supported by 
many voters, fissures within GOP ranks (``regulars'' versus 
insurgents) that weakened the Speaker's centralized control, 
and his abusive use of parliamentary prerogatives. These 
factors led to a historic ``revolt'' of 1910. Insurgent 
Republicans and minority Democrats combined in March 1910 to 
bring to a close this period of party government in the House. 
For example, the Speaker was subsequently removed as chair of 
the Rules Committee and stripped of his committee assignment 
prerogative.\37\ One analyst stated succinctly that the 
conclusion of the Cannon period ushered in a different era. 
``As Mr. Cannon's gavel fell, an epoch in the long . . . 
history of the American House of Representatives came to an 
end. A new era had begun.'' \38\ There was a brief period of 
party caucus government that followed, but it was soon replaced 
by a ``new era in which [the House] most resembled a set of 
feudal baronies.'' \39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ The story of the revolt against Speaker Cannon has been told 
many times in various books, articles, and newspapers. See, for 
example, Charles O. Jones, ``Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An 
Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives,'' 
Journal of Politics, vol. 30, August 1968, pp. 617-646.
    \38\ George Rothwell Brown, The Leadership of Congress 
(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1922), p. 152.
    \39\ Peters, The American Speakership, p. 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              The Era of Committee Government (1915-1969)

     With the end of the strong speakership era, and the 
limited duration of the ``King Caucus'' regime,\40\ a new 
governing order gradually took hold. The House transitioned 
from a centralized, partisan, and hierarchical pattern during 
the Reed and Cannon eras to a pattern characterized by 
decentralization, bipartisanship, and negotiation. One 
manifestation of this development was ending the practice that 
allowed the top party leaders also to chair the most 
influential committees. To simplify, the central party leaders 
lost power and the committee chairs gained power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ The era of caucus governance, dubbed ``King Caucus'' by 
journalists, occurred after the 1910 ``revolt,'' the year Democrats won 
control of the House. The Democratic electoral victory was attributed 
in part to public dismay with ``Cannonism.'' From mainly 1911 to 1915, 
the House Democratic caucus exercised significant policymaking 
authority. Major measures were first considered in the Democratic 
caucus and required a two-thirds vote of the membership before they 
could be taken up in the House. On the tariff revision of 1913, for 
example, a scholar noted that the ``majority party leaders in the 
House, through their Majority Leader, [Oscar] Underwood [of Alabama], 
resorted to the caucus, where . . . the proposed tariff bill was to be 
given pre-consideration and members attending bound by the [required 
two-thirds] caucus vote to vote with the majority of their party when 
the schedule should reach a vote on the floor of the House.'' See 
Elston Roady, Party Regularity in the Sixty-third Congress (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Illinois, 1951), p. 29. Majority Leader 
Underwood--who also chaired the Ways and Means Committee during this 
period--along with other party chieftains exercised significant 
influence in ``King Caucus,'' because they awed the ``other members 
into submission by their supposed control over the three necessities of 
congressional existence--perquisites, patronage, and `pork.' '' See 
Wilder Haines, ``The Congressional Caucus of Today,'' American 
Political Science Review, vol. 9, November 1915, p. 701. Caucus 
governance was a brief period, in part because President Woodrow 
Wilson--an admirer of the British parliamentary model--devised a party 
program and exercised strong leadership from the White House to advance 
it through the Democratic House and Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With the Speaker shorn of the committee appointment 
prerogative, Democrats assigned that responsibility to their 
party colleagues on the Ways and Means Committee, where it 
remained until 1974. (In that year, Democrats placed the 
assignment function for their Members in a party panel--the 
Steering and Policy Committee, where it remains to this day.) 
Republicans, after the 1910 revolt, placed the assignment 
function in their party leader for a few years. In 1916, 
Republicans created a party assignment panel that had weighted 
voting: a GOP member of the so-called Committee on Committees 
cast as many votes as there were Republicans in his State 
delegation, a big State advantage in shaping committee 
membership. (In 1995, Speaker Gingrich renamed his party 
assignment panel the Steering Committee, transformed it into a 
leadership-dominated panel, made the Speaker its chair, and 
granted the Speaker the right to cast the most votes--five--of 
any panel member.)
    Two key components undergirded the new House committee 
governing system: (1) the rise of a seniority custom that over 
time became rigid in determining who became a committee chair, 
and (2) the powerful role assumed by the Rules Committee in 
recommending how, when, or whether legislation would be taken 
up by the House. A new balance of power now existed between 
party leaders and the committee chairs, with the chairs having 
the most leverage. Party leaders had little choice but to work 
with the chairs and ranking members as well as the rank-and-
file of both parties, given the overlap of liberals and 
conservatives in each party. Bargaining and accommodating were 
the modus operandi of party leaders. They worked to broker 
deals with the committee chairs--who could deliver votes to 
enact legislation.

                          committee seniority

    Congressional experts offer various reasons to explain why 
seniority became the critical factor in determining committee 
leaders. (Seniority meant during this era that a Member of the 
majority party who served longer and more continuously on a 
committee than any other majority party colleague would become 
the committee's chair.) Some suggest that the 1910 ``revolt,'' 
which removed the committee appointment prerogative from the 
Speaker, prompted both parties to focus on seniority in 
designating committee chairs. ``Strict seniority,'' wrote a 
scholar, ``which had meant almost nothing in the House [from 
its beginning], had come to mean almost everything in naming 
committee chairmen and ranking members by 1920.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ H. Douglas Price, ``Congress and the Evolution of Legislative 
`Professionalism,' '' in Norman J. Ornstein, ed., Congress in Change 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 17. Also see Polsby, ``The 
Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives,'' pp. 144-
168.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Others point to the rise of ``careerism'' as an important 
factor. As several scholars have noted, ``The Congress of the 
1800s was infused with `new blood' each election, but by 1920 
it had been transformed from a body of amateur members to a 
modern legislature of professional politicians with established 
careers in Washington.'' \42\ Some also imply that the 1896 
electoral realignment of the two parties--GOP dominance in most 
of the country with the South in Democratic hands--created safe 
seats for most incumbents, which ensured their reelection every 
2 years. Another explanation for careerism is the rise of party 
primaries in the States. With primaries, voters--not party 
bosses--would determine which candidates should represent them 
in the House, with their ``political contract'' subject to 
renewal every 2 years for good service.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ See, for example, David Brady, Kara Buckley, and Douglas 
Rivers, ``The Roots of Careerism in the House of Representatives,'' 
paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, September 1-4, 1994, New York City, p. 2.
    \43\ For a review of the various reasons for careerism, see David 
Brady, Kara Buckley, and Douglas Rivers, ``The Roots of Careerism in 
the U.S. House of Representatives,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
vol. 24, November 1999, pp. 489-510.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Whatever conditions led to seniority, it soon became an 
automatic and nearly inviolable method for naming the committee 
chairs regardless of which party was in the majority.\44\ And 
the chairs asserted authority independent of their party. 
Moreover, senility, party loyalty, exceptional ability, or 
various infirmities mattered not in who became a committee 
chair. As a Texas lawmaker explained in 1938: ``If you were the 
next man in line, you got it--that was the way the unvarying 
[seniority] rule was.'' \45\ To be sure, many of the chairs 
exuded an arrogance of power in how they ran their committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ See Nelson Polsby, Miriam Gallagher, and Barry Rundquist, 
``The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of 
Representatives,'' American Political Science Review, vol. 63, 
September 1969, pp. 787-807; Michael Abram and Joseph Cooper, ``The 
Rise of Seniority in the House of Representatives,'' Polity, vol. 1, 
fall 1968, pp. 35-51; David Vogler, ``Flexibility in the Congressional 
Seniority System,'' Polity, summer 1970, pp. 494-507; Raymond E. 
Wolfinger and Joan Heifetz, ``Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in 
Congress,'' American Political Science Review, vol. 59, June 1965, pp. 
337-349; and James K. Pollock, ``Seniority Rule in Congress,'' The 
North American Review, vol. 222, December-January-February 1925-1926, 
pp. 235-245.
    \45\ Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), p. 541.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, when Lyndon Johnson was assigned in 1937 to 
the Committee on Naval Affairs, the chair was Carl Vinson of 
Georgia, who ran the committee with an iron hand. When Johnson 
tried to question witnesses at a hearing, Chairman Vinson 
cracked his gavel and recessed the hearing. He took Johnson 
into the back room and explained, ``We have a rule in this 
committee,'' he said. ``In [the] first year on the committee, a 
member [is] allowed to ask one question; in his second year, 
two, and so on.'' \46\ Still, most lawmakers supported the 
rigid nature of seniority for two key reasons: (1) it minimized 
intraparty discord that would be created by competitive 
politicking for these positions, and (2) it prevented outside 
entities, including the President, from trying to promote as 
chairs lawmakers sympathetic to their goals and interests.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Ibid., p. 537.
    \47\ In the contemporary House, racial minorities typically support 
the rigid application of seniority in naming committee chairs or 
committee ranking members. As one account noted, seniority is a 
``sensitive issue for the Congressional Black Caucus and Hispanic 
caucuses, whose members believe that giving deference to tenure is the 
only way to protect minority members from slights, accidental or 
intentional, in getting promoted on Capitol Hill.'' See Emma Dumain, 
``Pelosi Ignites Caucus by Choosing Side in Ranking Member Battle,'' 
Roll Call, March 3, 2014, p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is little question that committee chairmen had 
complete control of their panel's agenda, resources, 
subcommittee structure, and staffing, as well as a large say in 
which Members might be appointed to their panel. Frequently, 
the chair and ranking minority member worked cooperatively to 
shape the measures reported from their committee because they 
shared common ideological and policy views. In 1937, after 
President Franklin Roosevelt's unsuccessful attempt to ``pack'' 
the Supreme Court, an unofficial and informal ``conservative 
coalition'' of Republicans and southern Democrats emerged to 
thwart progressive legislation advocated by Presidents and 
northern liberal lawmakers (for instance, civil rights).\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ James T. Patterson, ``A Conservative Coalition Forms in 
Congress, 1933-1939,'' The Journal of American History, vol. 52, March 
1966, pp. 757-772. By the 1990s, the conservative coalition was in 
decline as conservative southern Democrats were defeated, to be 
replaced by conservative Republicans. Congressional Quarterly ended its 
annual tabulation of conservative coalition votes after the 105th 
Congress (1997-1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Party leaders such as Speaker Sam Rayburn (1940-1947; 1949-
1953; 1955-1961), the most influential Speaker of the committee 
government period, had to bargain, cajole, and persuade the 
committee chairs, mainly southern Democrats at the time, to 
follow his lead. Majority party leaders simply lacked the means 
to require the autonomous chairs to implement an agenda of 
party-preferred priorities. The chairs were too influential, 
the central party leadership too weak, and the party itself was 
split into a southern conservative faction and a northern 
liberal faction. As Representative Richard Bolling, a protege 
of Speaker Rayburn and one of the ablest legislators of the 
20th century, wrote in 1964:

    A modern Democratic Speaker is something like a feudal 
king--he is first in the land; he receives elaborate homage and 
respect; but he is dependent on powerful lords, usually 
committee chairmen, who are basically hostile to the objectives 
of the National Democratic Party and the Speaker . . . . 
Rayburn was frequently at odds with the committee oligarchs, 
who rule their own committees with the assured arrogance of 
absolute monarchs.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Richard Bolling, House Out of Order (New York: E.P. Dutton & 
Co., Inc., 1966), p. 70.

    One of the ``absolute monarchs'' was the chair of the House 
Rules Committee. A classic example of the authority exercised 
by some Rules chairs shows in a comment made by Philip 
Campbell, who headed the panel during the 66th and 67th 
Congresses (1919-1923). A resolution authorizing an 
investigation was supported by many Members, including 
lawmakers on the Rules Committee. At a meeting of his panel, 
Chairman Campbell told his Rules colleagues: ``You can go to 
[hell]. It makes no difference what a majority of you decide; 
if it meets with my disapproval, it shall not be done; I am the 
Committee; in me reposes absolute obstructive powers.'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Floyd M. Riddick, Congressional Procedure (Boston: Chapman and 
Grimes Publishers, 1941), p. 95. Riddick enjoyed a noteworthy career in 
the U.S. Senate. He became Assistant Senate Parliamentarian and served 
in that capacity from 1951 to 1964. In 1964, he became Senate 
Parliamentarian, a post he held for a decade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         house rules committee

    In the decades that followed the 1910 revolt, the chair of 
the Rules Committee, as illustrated by the Campbell example, 
exercised significant independent influence in determining 
whether legislation reached the floor for consideration by the 
full membership. Most measures reported by committees have no 
ready access--a privileged right-of-way (or ``green light'')--
to the House floor. The way committees acquire this privileged 
access is to go to the Rules Committee and request that the 
panel issue a ``special rule'' (a House resolution) that would 
make their bill in order for floor action. If the Rules 
Committee grants the special rule and it is adopted by majority 
vote of the House, the legislation made in order by the special 
rule is considered by the membership. In short, the Rules 
Committee is strategically positioned to control the flow of 
legislation to the floor, as well as to determine how long 
measures may be debated and, importantly, whether they may even 
be amended by the rank-and-file membership.
    Traditionally, the Rules Committee had a disproportionate 
ratio of majority to minority members, regardless of which 
party controlled the House. The reason: the panel's important 
scheduling role. Despite the Rules Committee membership (eight 
majority to four minority after World War II), the bipartisan 
conservative coalition was much in evidence. It was often the 
case that two conservative Democrats would vote with 
Republicans to create a 6 to 6 tie vote. In legislative 
assemblies like the House, tie votes lose. A particularly 
formidable Rules Committee chair, Howard W. Smith (1955-1967), 
was the leader of the conservative coalition on his panel.

                         the smith chairmanship

    ``Judge'' Smith, as his colleagues called him, presided 
over his committee with an iron hand. He was neither a 
``traffic cop'' regulating the flow of bills to the floor nor 
an agent of the majority leadership. Instead, he firmly 
believed Rules should decide the merit and substance of 
legislation. Accordingly, he often blocked measures he 
disapproved of and advanced those he favored. An ardent 
opponent of civil rights legislation, Smith sometimes refused 
to schedule meetings to consider those matters. On one 
occasion, when the Speaker was looking for Smith, a colleague 
informed Rayburn that Smith had to leave Washington to tend to 
a barn that had burned down on his farm. Speaker Rayburn 
exclaimed: ``I knew Howard Smith would do almost anything to 
block a civil rights bill, but I never knew he would resort to 
arson.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Alfred Steinberg, Sam Rayburn (New York: Hawthorn Books, 
1975), p. 313.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the Rules Committee lacks authority to amend 
bills, the Smith-led panel bargained with committee leaders for 
changes in legislation in return for granting rules. Although 
many lawmakers were upset with the blocking actions of Chairman 
Smith, there was no real challenge to his leadership until the 
1960 election when John F. Kennedy was elected President on his 
New Frontier Program.
    The President, Speaker Rayburn, and many Members who 
supported the New Frontier Program realized that Kennedy's 
initiatives would be blocked by the Rules Committee. Thus, a 
strategy was devised by the Kennedy-Rayburn forces to enlarge 
(``pack'') the panel to 15 from 12 members, adding 2 Democrats 
sympathetic to President Kennedy's program and 1 Republican. 
The expansion resulted from a titanic battle between Speaker 
Rayburn and Chairman Smith. The Rayburn-Kennedy forces won, but 
only by the narrow vote of 217 to 212, which underscored the 
political power of the Rules chair. Smith remained chair, and 
the panel still retained influence, in part because the new 
Democratic members did not always support granting rules for 
liberal legislation.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ A compelling account of the enlargement of the Rules Committee 
is found in Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, The House of 
Representatives (New York: David McKay Co., 1963), Chap. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   reform sentiment begins to blossom

    A group of liberal Democrats--frustrated with their party 
leaders, the committee chairs, and the Rules Committee--
organized the Democratic Study Group (DSG) in 1959.\53\ For the 
next few decades, it was this informal group--bolstered by the 
influx of liberal Democrats--that developed the ideas and 
mobilized the votes to shift committee government to 
subcommittee government.\54\ In addition, the DSG was 
instrumental in winning adoption of changes that strengthened 
the Democratic leadership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ See Mark Ferber, ``The Formation of the Democratic Study 
Group,'' in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., Congressional Behavior (New York: 
Random House, 1971), pp. 249-269.
    \54\ Special mention should be accorded to Richard Conlon, the 
executive director of the Democratic Study Group from 1971-1988, when 
he lost his life in a boating accident. Former Democratic 
Representative David Obey, a DSG member, said: ``I don't think it would 
be possible to find any congressman or staff member on the Hill who had 
as much of an impact as Dick did.'' Another Democrat, Tony Coelho of 
California, stated that Conlon ``enjoyed such credibility with so many 
House members that virtually no major legislation could pass without 
his personal support.'' The quotations are taken from Nelson W. Polsby, 
How Congress Evolves, Social Bases of Institutional Change (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 205-206.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As for reducing the power of the chairs, the DSG recognized 
that the best way to revamp the seniority system was to avoid 
amending House rules, which would involve the conservative 
coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans. Instead, they 
revived use of the Democratic caucus--the highest partisan 
instrumentality, where the reformers had the votes--to enact 
party rules that would hold the committee chairs accountable 
for their actions or inactions.
    The thrust of the changes was to shatter the ability of the 
``old bulls'' to stymie action on liberal legislation (consumer 
protection and environmental bills, for example).\55\ Under 
party rules adopted during the 1970s, committee chairs had to 
stand for separate, secret ballot election within the confines 
of the Democratic caucus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ There was even at least one public law that curbed the 
authority of the committee chairs: the Legislative Reorganization Act 
of 1970. That act ``required committees to adopt written rules, so that 
members would know their rights and might adopt rules to curb specific 
abuses. It also prohibited general, but not specific, proxies [absentee 
voting] in committee votes, to prevent their indiscriminate use by 
chairs and other members.'' See Walter Kravitz, ``The Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 15, 
August 1990, p. 377. Another key 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act 
change was to permit recorded votes in the Committee of the Whole, the 
principal amending forum in the House. Prior to the change, votes on 
amendments were recorded without names, such as 150 yea to 250 nay. The 
change enabled party leaders to exert greater control over floor 
decisionmaking by knowing which lawmakers voted as their leaders 
wanted, and who had not yet voted and thus needed to be ``whipped'' to 
the floor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A dramatic example of the secret ballot's use occurred 
following the November 1974 elections when the 75 newly elected 
Democrats joined with reform-minded colleagues to oust 3 
autocratic and conservative committee chairs, all from the 
South. The three were replaced by northern liberals. This 
action underscored that Members chair committees at the 
sufferance of the party caucus, not by their seniority; hence, 
chairs must be accountable and responsive to the policy 
preferences of the majority party or face possible ouster by 
secret vote of their party colleagues.
    Paradoxically, the Democratic reforms contained both 
decentralizing and centralizing tendencies. The changes both 
dispersed power to subcommittees and to rank-and-file Members, 
and enhanced the power of the majority party leadership and the 
Democratic caucus. Reform-minded lawmakers saw no disconnect 
between the two tendencies. Decentralization granted rank-and-
file lawmakers wider opportunities to influence policy, while 
centralization promoted the leadership's enactment of those 
policies, which included party-preferred priorities.

                        leadership prerogatives

    The majority leadership acquired during the 1970-1975 
period an array of resources that augmented their influence. A 
particularly important party rule was adopted in January 1975. 
The Speaker won the right to name the chair and the majority 
party members of the Rules Committee, subject to ratification 
of the party caucus. Henceforth, Rules became known as ``the 
Speaker's committee,'' which strengthened the Speaker's agenda-
setting and scheduling prerogatives. The Speaker also took 
charge of the committee assignment process. In 1974 the 
committee assignment function was removed from the charge of 
Ways and Means Democrats and transferred to a strengthened 
Steering and Policy Committee, chaired by the Speaker and 
composed of many supporters of the Speaker.
    In 1975, by House rule, the Speaker also won the authority 
to refer bills to more than one committee, called multiple 
referrals (ending in part a standing committee's jurisdictional 
monopoly of a policy domain). The Speaker could in addition 
specify deadlines for committee action on legislation. The 
Speaker won authority in House rules to create ad hoc temporary 
committees, which he used to create the Ad Hoc Energy Committee 
in 1977 to coordinate and draft legislation in response to 
President Jimmy Carter's energy plans, which crosscut the 
jurisdiction of several standing committees.\56\ Add to all 
this a formidable whip system that works to mobilize the votes 
to enact the party's agenda. (In the majority after 1994, 
Republican Speakers have also had comparable prerogatives.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Bruce I. Oppenheimer, ``Policy Effects of U.S. House Reform: 
Decentralization and the Capacity to Resolve Energy Issues,'' 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 5, February 1980, pp. 5-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              The Subcommittee Government Era (1970-1980)

    The DSG reformers used the party caucus to win a large 
number of party rule changes that shifted power from committee 
chairs to subcommittee chairs. First, however, the reformers 
had to convince Speaker John McCormack to hold regular monthly 
meetings of the caucus, which occurred in 1969. For decades the 
caucus was largely moribund because Speakers preferred not to 
convene party meetings. Speaker Rayburn ``never made much use 
of the Democratic caucus or other institutional leadership 
devices, preferring to handle leadership problems in his own 
way.'' \57\ Representative Bolling wrote that the Speaker chose 
not to use the caucus to avoid clashes over civil rights 
between the northern and southern wings of the party.\58\ With 
the monthly caucus meetings, Democratic caucus rules were 
amended to address numerous reform topics advanced by the DSG. 
The years from 1970 to 1975 constitute the high water mark for 
``spreading the action'' to numerous subcommittees. Two 
changes, one in 1971 and the other in 1973, highlight the shift 
from committee to subcommittee government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ Hugh Bone, Party Committees and National Politics (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1958), p. 168.
    \58\ Bolling, House Out of Order, p. 66. Jerry Voorhis of 
California, who served in the House from 1937 to 1947, noted that 
Democratic caucuses had been ``almost non-existent, except for 
occasions when it was necessary to choose a majority leader or a 
candidate for Speaker or to elect a member of the Ways and Means 
Committee.'' See Jerry Voorhis, Confessions of a Congressman (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1947), p. 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                  1971

    In 1971, the Democratic caucus adopted an important party 
rules change. It stated that ``no Member shall be chairman of 
more than one legislative subcommittee.'' The purpose of this 
rule was to create additional committee leadership 
opportunities for relatively junior members of the party. 
Before the adoption of this rule, some Democratic committee 
leaders chaired as many as four subcommittees. Three major 
consequences flowed from this party rule: (1) the ``reform 
itself brought in a minimum of sixteen new subcommittee 
chairmen; (2) the reform spread power to younger, less senior 
Members; and (3) the reform improved the lot of non-Southern 
and liberal Democrats.'' \59\ In short, the thrust of these 
changes was to further decentralize policymaking power to more 
Democratic Members. As Speaker Carl Albert stated: ``Today, in 
the 21 standing committees of the House, no fewer than 113 
Congressmen hold subcommittee chairmanships, an unprecedented 
distribution of legislative responsibility to more than 25 
percent of the entire House of Representatives.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ For a detailed account of these developments, see Norman J. 
Ornstein, ``Causes and Consequences of Congressional Change: 
Subcommittee Reforms in the House of Representatives, 1970-1973,'' in 
Norman J. Ornstein, Congress in Change: Evolution & Reform (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1975), pp. 102-103.
    \60\ Congressional Record, v. 117, August 3, 1971, p. E7690.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                  1973

    Two conditions facilitated the adoption of additional party 
reforms: the election of new Democrats receptive to change, and 
the defeat or retirement of tradition-bound Members. Another 
significant party reform was the subcommittee ``bill of 
rights'' that strengthened the independence of subcommittees 
and provided for a more equitable distribution of choice 
subcommittee positions between junior and senior committee 
members. Specifically, the subcommittee ``bill of rights'' 
established a mini-Democratic caucus on each standing committee 
to meet prior to the full committee's organizational session at 
the start of a new Congress to select subcommittee chairs; 
determine subcommittee jurisdictions; establish party ratios on 
subcommittees that generally reflected the ratio in the full 
House; ensure that each subcommittee had an adequate budget and 
staff to discharge its responsibilities for legislation and 
oversight; and guarantee all Members a major subcommittee 
assignment insofar as vacancies are available. In addition, the 
reforms made clear that chairs must refer legislation to 
subcommittees within 2 weeks, unless the full committee 
determined otherwise. In short, the subcommittee bill of rights 
enhanced the role of these panels, strengthened their autonomy, 
and reduced the authority of the committee chairs. On the other 
hand, the bill of rights ushered in a new era of centralized 
leadership control.

                   IV. Prelude to Centralized Control

    Reining in the powers of the committee chairs fostered a 
more open policymaking process that was welcomed by Members. A 
participatory ethos permeated the House as rank-and-file 
lawmakers played a larger role in legislative decisionmaking in 
committee and on the floor. Many newly elected lawmakers--a 
``new breed''--dismissed out of hand the old ``go along, get 
along'' attitude of the Rayburn era; they were 
antiestablishment and media-savvy, and wanted to shake up the 
established legislative order.\61\ And many newer Members had 
the staff resources, subcommittee leadership positions, and 
encouragement from outside interest groups to assume a larger 
role in legislative decisionmaking. As a scholar recounted, 
there was an ``explosion of floor amendments'' in the 
House.\62\ To a large extent, the floor became the Chamber's 
center of action and contention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ An important change that facilitated the election of change-
oriented lawmakers involved the U.S. Supreme Court. During the 1960s 
(and after), the Court made a series of landmark decisions that 
required House districts to be substantially equal in population: the 
so-called ``one person, one vote'' principle. A major effect of these 
decisions was to reduce the number of rural districts and to increase 
the number of urban and suburban districts.
    \62\ See Steven S. Smith, Call to Order: Floor Politics in the 
House and Senate (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), p. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These various developments--the end of the committee 
oligarchic system, the election of a new generation of change-
oriented lawmakers, more pressure groups skilled in advocacy on 
Capitol Hill and in Members' constituencies, the rise of new 
and complex issues, and the proliferation of competing centers 
of power on Capitol Hill--combined to make the job of 
governance difficult for the Democratic majority. It was simply 
harder for majority party leaders to achieve legislative 
accomplishments for two key reasons: (1) lawmakers in their own 
party wanted to offer scores of amendments to legislation, 
creating uncertainty as to their policy and political 
implications; and (2) the election of new Republicans who 
worked constantly to undermine and uproot Democratic control of 
the House. A GOP freshman elected in 1978, Newt Gingrich of 
Georgia, was especially skilled in frustrating and angering the 
Democratic majority.

                The Influence of Representative Gingrich

    Gingrich and his initially small band of allies, which grew 
over time, devised a strategy to take over the House. 
Gingrich's plan included: employ the Chamber's parliamentary 
procedures to frustrate the best-laid procedural and policy 
plans of the Democratic majority; offer ``November amendments'' 
to force vulnerable Democrats to vote on electorally ``hot 
button'' issues that could cause them political grief in the 
next election; recruit and train challengers to Democratic 
incumbents; and use a nonlegislative debate period at the end 
of the day when floor business had concluded to launch 
political and policy attacks over C-SPAN (the Cable Satellite 
Public Affairs Network) against Democratic leaders and their 
management of the House. (Coincidentally, Gingrich entered the 
House as a freshman when C-SPAN in 1979 began gavel-to-gavel 
coverage of the Chamber's floor proceedings.)
    ``Conflict equals exposure equals power'' was part of 
Gingrich's formula for winning GOP control of the House.\63\ 
Regularly, House Republicans castigated the Democrats for 
``abuse of power and [treated] their misdeeds'' as equivalent 
to the ``biggest scandals in American history.'' \64\ 
Representative Gingrich even devised an approach--using ethics 
as a partisan weapon--to compel Speaker Jim Wright (1987-1989) 
to resign from the House. After Speaker Wright's resignation, a 
Democratic chair from Texas, Jack Brooks, exclaimed: ``There's 
an evil wind blowing in the halls of Congress today that's 
reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition.'' \65\ To many 
Democrats, the Gingrich game plan seemed directed at 
delegitimizing and denigrating Democratic control of the 
House.\66\ In Speaker Wright's view, ``Torpedoing Congress and 
blaming the Democrats has been Newt's route to power.'' \67\ 
From Representative Gingrich's perspective, an aggressive and 
militant approach toward the Democratic majority would catapult 
Republicans into the majority. As Gingrich stated, ``I'm tough 
in the House, because when I arrived, the Republican Party was 
a soft institution that lacked the tradition of fighting. You 
had to have somebody who was willing to fight.'' \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Howard Fineman, ``For the Son of C-Span, Exposure Equals 
Power,'' Newsweek, April 3, 1989, p. 23.
    \64\ David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, ``Tell Newt To Shut 
Up!'' (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 6.
    \65\ Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein, Storming the Gates, Protest 
Politics and the Republican Revival (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1996), p. 125.
    \66\ In the opinion of former Representative Barney Frank, Gingrich 
``transformed American politics from one in which people presume the 
good will of their opponents, even as they disagreed, into one in which 
people treated the people with whom they disagreed as bad and 
immoral.'' See Andrew Goldman, ``The Not-So-Retiring Barney Frank,'' 
The New York Times Magazine, January 22, 2012, p. 12.
    \67\ Balz and Brownstein, Storming the Gates, p. 125.
    \68\ Ronald Brownstein, The Second Civil War: How Extreme 
Partisanship Has Paralyzed Washington and Polarized America (New York: 
The Penguin Press, 2007), pp. 137-138.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Democrats Respond

    By the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the Democratic-led 
House confronted an array of new challenges, compounded by the 
election in 1980 of Ronald Reagan as President. President 
Reagan's agenda was anathema to many Democrats: cut taxes, 
increase funding for the military, and slash the size of the 
Federal Government. Noteworthy, with Reagan in the White House 
and Republicans in control of the Senate (1981-1987), Speaker 
Thomas ``Tip'' O'Neill (1977-1987) assumed the role of national 
party spokesperson for the Democratic Party, expanding the 
Speaker's public ``messaging'' role then and now.
    To counter the GOP's agenda from the Reagan White House and 
the Gingrich-led tactics in the House, Democratic Speakers 
(O'Neill, Wright, and Tom Foley, 1989-1995), urged on by their 
rank-and-file Members, developed new strategies to achieve 
their policy goals. In effect, the decentralizing thrust of the 
earlier reforms gradually gave way to a new configuration of 
internal power: the recentralization of authority in the 
majority party leadership. In short, the ``postreform 
Congress'' was in the process of being replaced by another 
governing model: the ``postreform-reform Congress.''
    The Rules Committee played a pivotal role in strengthening 
the Speaker and the Democratic leadership. The panel developed 
an array of innovative special rules that granted majority 
party leaders greater control over floor procedures, such as 
keeping unfriendly amendments off the floor, those designed to 
embarrass majority lawmakers or to eviscerate majority party 
initiatives. In short, innovative special rules were devised to 
produce greater certainty in a more conflict-ridden and 
unpredictable environment.\69\ By limiting and structuring 
amendment choices--if any were allowed at all (a closed rule)--
the majority party skewed the procedural playing field to get 
the policy outcomes it wanted. Innovative special rules 
contributed to the sharp rise in rancorous partisanship. 
Minority Republicans complained loudly about the lack of 
democracy in the House. Procedural warfare between the majority 
and minority parties became intense and commonplace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Stanley Bach and Steven S. Smith, Managing Uncertainty in the 
House of Representatives: Adaptation and Innovation in Special Rules 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 An Earthquake Election: November 1994

    In a dramatic change of power, the 1994 midterm elections 
produced a resounding victory for Republicans. Long dubbed the 
``permanent minority'' by various analysts and commentators, 
the GOP won control of the House for the first time in 40 
years. And the nemesis of House Democrats, Newt Gingrich, 
became the Speaker. The 1994 election also saw Republicans 
sweep the Senate and win 14 gubernatorial contests. In fact, no 
GOP House Member, Senator, or Governor running for reelection 
was turned out of office. Only Democratic incumbents were 
targeted for defeat by the voters. As one defeated House 
Democrat said: ``People thought they knew who to blame [for the 
country's economic and social problems] and they did it with a 
vengeance.'' \70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Edward Walsh, ``Democrats Seeking Reversal of Fortune in House 
Races,'' The Washington Post, September 10, 1995, p. A6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many reasons accounted for the Democrats' defeat and the 
GOP's landslide victory. One was voter disgruntlement with 
President Clinton's agenda, such as the administration's failed 
attempt to revamp the Nation's health care system. Another was 
the public's dismay with partisan bickering and policy gridlock 
and its outrage over a ``House bank'' scandal that provoked 
scathing political commentary and negative editorials. For 
example, a lead editorial about the 103d Congress (1993-1995) 
in The Washington Post had the headline: ``Perhaps the Worst 
Congress.'' It stated: ``This will go down in the record books 
as perhaps the worst Congress--least effective, most 
destructive, nastiest--in 50 years.'' \71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ ``Perhaps the Worst Congress,'' The Washington Post, October 
7, 1994, p. A24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   V. The Return of Party Government

    From at least the 104th Congress (1995-1997) forward, the 
House has functioned in the manner implied by the conditional 
party government theory: like a parliamentary or quasi-
parliamentary body. Recall that the theory states that rank-
and-file lawmakers support strong party leaders and 
organizations when the party is united on its policy 
preferences. In addition, those preferences must diverge 
significantly from the other party's. When those conditions 
exist, the House functions in a strong leadership environment. 
If they do not exist, when there is little homogeneity of 
policy and ideological agreement within each party, the House 
operates in a weak leadership environment. Think of Speakers 
like Rayburn during the 1950s: they had to win the support of 
committee chairs and senior lawmakers, including liberal and 
conservative centrists in each party, to enact legislation.
    Today, the House is as partisan and polarized as the 
Congresses that preceded the Civil War. On the partisan side, 
there are record levels of party unity on key votes.\72\ Like 
parliamentary bodies, on numerous issues a majority of 
Republicans vote on one side and a majority of Democrats on the 
other side. Party unity occurs regularly because the two 
parties exhibit a high degree of ideological cohesion, which 
reflects the electoral bases of the two parties. Voters who 
share ``blue'' or ``red'' policy and ideological views now 
align either with the Democratic or Republican Parties. 
Regularly, voters cast straight party-line votes in 
congressional and Presidential elections.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ John Cranford, ``Hard Lines Made Harder,'' CQ Weekly, February 
3, 2014, pp. 168-201.
    \73\ Gary C. Jacobson, ``Partisan Polarization in American 
Politics: A Background Paper, Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 43, 
December 2013, p. 700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The beliefs of American voters ``have grown more internally 
consistent, more distinctive between parties, and more 
predictive of voting in national elections.'' Unsurprisingly, 
voters have joined or voted with the political party most in 
line with their views and values, and this reality has ``given 
the congressional parties more internally homogenous, 
divergent, and polarized electoral bases.'' \74\ By contrast, 
it was common in the post-World War II Congresses that liberal 
and conservative lawmakers were plentiful in both major 
parties. That condition is not the case today.\75\ In its place 
are two parties with sharply different and distinct world views 
on a host of issues, many tied to the role and reach of the 
national government. Finding majority consensus in this 
environment can be a difficult, time-consuming, and sometimes 
fruitless process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Ibid., p. 691.
    \75\ One analysis found that, during the last 30 years, centrists 
in the U.S. House have largely disappeared. ``In 1982, 344 out of 435 
House members were viewed as being in the ideological middle, drawing 
equally from both parties. In 2012, only 13 House members were 
classified as being in the middle.'' See Michael Kranish, ``Ideas 
Abound for Breaking Logjam, but D.C. Isn't Listening,'' The Boston 
Globe, August 8, 2013, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Compromise Under Stress

    One result of polarization is not only that bargains and 
compromises are much harder to achieve today, but 
anticompromise sentiment is evident in Congress and in the 
country. As a House Republican remarked, ``When it comes to 
compromise, half of a bad deal is still a bad deal.'' \76\ An 
analyst concluded that a number of Members and outside groups 
are ``ideologically opposed to compromise. They have made a 
reasoned judgment that compromise has served the country and 
the Constitution poorly.'' \77\ [emphasis in original] Many 
lawmakers also worry that if they work with opposition party 
Members to craft policy compromises, they will be challenged in 
the next primary election by someone more liberal (the 
Democratic worry) or more conservative (the GOP concern) than 
they are.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ Meredith Shiner, ``The Speaker of the Unruly,'' CQ Weekly, 
September 10, 2012, p. 1834.
    \77\ Jonathan Rauch, ``Rescuing Compromise,'' National Affairs, 
fall 2013, p. 121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet despite acrimonious partisanship, and the reelection 
interests of Members and the two parties, a fundamental job of 
the Speaker is to search for common ground within the majority 
party, between the two parties and Chambers, with the White 
House, and with outside interests. Otherwise, legislative 
accomplishments will be few and far between. As a seasoned 
journalist explained:

    There is one unavoidable fact about legislating in a 
democratic system. No single person, faction, or interest can 
get everything it wants. Legislating inevitably means 
compromising, except in the rare circumstances when consensus 
is so strong that one dominant view can prevail with ease.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ Robert Kaiser, Act of Congress: How America's Essential 
Institution Works, and How It Doesn't (New York: Knopf, 2013), p. 174.

    Bipartisan compromises may be good or bad, but they cannot 
be achieved if the two parties emulate parliamentary systems: 
one party governs and the other opposes. The Nation's 
congressional-Presidential system, with its many checks and 
balances, usually blocks governance exclusively by the majority 
party. Recall that the Constitution does not make lawmaking 
easy, in part to ensure deliberation, the ventilation of 
diverse views, and the consent of the governed. One elective 
branch cannot impose its will on the others, even if controlled 
by the same party.
    How, when, or if to make a deal--to balance compromise with 
conviction, party loyalty with constituency opinion--rests to a 
large extent on the talents of party leaders. Compromises may 
``leave everyone unhappy to a degree,'' stated a House Member, 
``but also with something they wanted.'' \79\ To be sure, party 
leaders may want to follow a ``no compromise'' strategy on 
certain measures or matters. Inaction rather than action may 
serve their policy, partisan, and political interests. A 
Congress castigated as ``do nothing'' depends on whether one 
agrees with the lack of action on various policy matters. As a 
Member of the current House Republican majority pointed out, 
the membership is ``stopping bad legislation and initiatives,'' 
which is plainly doing something rather than nothing.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ Lee H. Hamilton, ``We Need To Embrace Compromise, Not Insult 
It,'' The Center on Congress at Indiana University, May 16, 2011, p. 2.
    \80\ Billy House, ``Doing Nothing Is--to Some--Doing Something,'' 
National Journal Daily, July 9, 2014, pp. 1, 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A ``no compromise'' strategy is sometimes employed by the 
minority party to foil favorable action on priorities of the 
opposition party. The minority's electoral goal: to permit 
minority party Members and outside supporters to campaign 
against the majority party in the next election for presiding 
over a so-called ``do nothing'' Congress. Whether gridlock on a 
measure is better than compromise might depend on whether party 
leaders believe they can get a better deal by waiting, or 
whether they prefer no deal in order to engage in ``contrast 
politics'' on the campaign trail.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ For an excellent analysis of ``getting to yes'' in Congress, 
see Sarah A. Binder and Frances E. Lee, ``Making Deals in Congress,'' 
in Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin, eds., Negotiating Agreement in 
Politics (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 
2013), pp. 54-72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Three recent Speakers--Republicans Newt Gingrich (1995-
1999) and Dennis Hastert (1999-2007), and Democrat Nancy Pelosi 
(2007-2011)--consolidated in their hands procedural, political, 
and policy control of the House. Much has been written about 
their respective speakerships,\82\ so only a few pertinent 
observations will be made about each leader. Unlike earlier 
eras, the portfolio of contemporary Speakers is much more 
extensive. The job today involves more than presiding over the 
House, referring measures to the appropriate committees, or 
naming lawmakers to serve on conference committees. Speakers 
now must exercise political and policy leadership inside and 
outside Congress; act as their party's public spokesperson; 
recruit, fundraise, and campaign for their party's candidates; 
develop legislative and political strategies for the party they 
head; and develop and promote the party's message and ``brand'' 
to the general public in a 24/7 communications environment. 
Party leaders use the media to complement their legislative 
strategies, generate grassroots support for policy initiatives, 
respond to partisan criticisms, and promote their agenda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ See, for example, Balz and Brownstein, Storming the Gates; 
Jonathan Franzen, ``The Listener: How Did a Former Wrestling Coach End 
Up Running the House of Representatives?'' The New Yorker, October 6, 
2003, pp. 85-99; and Ronald M. Peters, Jr. and Cindy Simon Rosenthal, 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the New American Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      speaker gingrich (1995-1999)

    When Republicans won the House in November 1994, Newt 
Gingrich was the party's unanimous choice for Speaker. He was a 
unique Speaker in many respects. For a time in the mid-1990s, 
he rivaled the White House in setting the agenda of Congress 
and the Nation, functioning like a prime minister in a 
parliament. His initial agenda, which the party campaigned on, 
was the ``Contract with America.'' \83\ Consisting of ten broad 
policies, Gingrich promised that within the first 100 days of 
the 104th Congress (1995-1997), the GOP-controlled House would 
vote on every Contract item. The House accomplished the goal in 
less than 100 days. Nearly every Republican marched in lockstep 
to vote for the Contract proposals. Why? Three reasons account 
for the party unity. First, most Republicans believed that they 
were in the majority because of Gingrich's leadership. He 
recruited and trained many Members of his new majority and 
provided them with essential financial support. Second, GOP 
lawmakers were united in their support of the Contract 
proposals, such as adding a balanced budget amendment to the 
Constitution. Finally, the new GOP majority recognized that 
they needed to succeed at governance after 40 years in the 
minority. The GOP's responsibility for governing ``requires 
greater assets in the leader's office,'' said Gingrich.\84\ As 
for governance, Speaker Gingrich was instrumental in winning 
enactment of consequential measures in such areas as health 
care, the minimum wage, and welfare reform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ Some Democrats called the GOP plan the ``Contract on 
America.''
    \84\ David S. Cloud, ``Gingrich Clears the Path for Republican 
Advance,'' Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 19, 1994, p. 
3319.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A notable centralizing aspect of Gingrich's speakership was 
his influence over committees. Not only did Gingrich personally 
select specific Members to chair committees, ignoring seniority 
in the process, he also required the GOP members of the 
Appropriations Committee to sign a written pledge that they 
would heed the Republican leadership's directives for spending 
reductions. He often bypassed committees entirely by 
establishing leadership task forces to process legislation. 
Most significantly, he changed House rules to impose term 
limits of 6 years on all committee and subcommittee chairs so 
that no GOP chair could accumulate over time the influence to 
challenge the majority leadership.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ Some term-limited GOP chairs also decide to leave the House. 
Representative Dave Camp, MI, who chaired the influential Ways and 
Means Committee, announced that he would not seek reelection to the 
114th Congress (2015-2017). As one account noted, without special 
dispensation from Speaker Boehner, Camp ``would go back to being in the 
rank and file--a rough assignment for a veteran like Camp.'' See ``Dave 
Camp Won't Seek Reelection,'' Politico, April 1, 2014, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      speaker hastert (1999-2007)

    Hastert became Speaker following Gingrich's resignation 
from the House after the party's poor showing in the November 
1998 midterm elections. After the turmoil of the Gingrich 
years, Republicans selected the pragmatic Dennis Hastert to be 
Speaker, who retained the powers of his predecessor (enforcing 
term limits on the committee chairs and using the Rules 
Committee to achieve party objectives, for example). The 
longest serving GOP Speaker ever (1999-2007), Hastert exercised 
``top down'' command of the House and followed a partisan 
governing strategy. An example of his leadership influence over 
committees occurred when the Veterans' Affairs Committee chair 
at a Republican meeting criticized the party's budget 
resolution for not spending enough on veterans. Speaker Hastert 
``got up and shut him down,'' said a witness to the tongue 
lashing. ``I've never seen anything like that. It was 
scathing.'' \86\ When the chair continued his advocacy for more 
spending on veterans, the Speaker removed him as chair and even 
from the committee itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ Ben Pershing, ``Smith Spars with Leaders,'' Roll Call, March 
26, 2003, p. 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Speaker also articulated what became known as the 
informal ``Hastert rule.'' My role, he said, is ``to please the 
majority of your majority . . . . The job of the Speaker is not 
to expedite legislation that runs counter to the wishes of the 
majority of his majority.'' He added: ``I do not feel 
comfortable scheduling controversial legislation unless I know 
we have the votes on our side first.'' \87\ Thus, even if there 
was a bipartisan coalition to pass legislation, there was great 
reluctance on the part of Speaker Hastert to schedule floor 
action on those measures. To ensure that he had the votes, 
Speaker Hastert relied on one of the most influential majority 
whips and then majority leader ever--Tom DeLay of Texas--to 
enforce party discipline. His nickname was ``The Hammer,'' 
which highlighted DeLay's persuasive techniques. And with 
President George W. Bush in the White House, House Republicans 
worked to stay united in backing administration proposals. A 
major policy success of Speaker Hastert's was winning enactment 
into law (2003) of the most significant change to Medicare (a 
prescription drug benefit for seniors) since Medicare was 
created during the administration of President Lyndon Johnson.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, ``Reflections on the Role of the 
Speaker in the Modern Day House of Representatives,'' The Cannon 
Centenary Conference, H. Doc. 108-204 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), p. 
62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       speaker pelosi (2007-2011)

    Nancy Pelosi, analysts suggest, was the most formidable 
Speaker in decades, even exceeding the ``top down,'' 
centralized style of her two immediate predecessors. A hands-on 
and results-oriented leader, she spent considerable time 
listening to and wooing her rank-and-file colleagues to support 
party-preferred policies. To be sure, she was not reluctant to 
give directions and deadlines to her standing committee chairs 
and to bring priority legislation to the floor with special 
rules that limited amendment opportunities for the minority 
party.
    Her persuasiveness is illustrated by these two examples, 
both involving President Obama's landmark, but controversial, 
health care overhaul (the Affordable Care Act) that was enacted 
into law in 2010 when the government was unified for a time 
under Democratic control. First, when an aide mentioned that 
the party whips needed to get busy and lobby 68 wavering 
Democrats who were worried about their reelection if they voted 
for the President's health overhaul, Speaker Pelosi responded, 
``I'll take all sixty-eight.'' \88\ Second, when things looked 
particularly bleak for passage of the Affordable Care Act \89\ 
and the White House was contemplating moving away from a 
comprehensive change and proposing a pared-back health bill, it 
was Speaker Pelosi who said no to any ``kiddie-care'' plan. 
``We will go through the gate. If the gate is closed,'' she 
exclaimed, ``we will go over the fence. If the fence is too 
high, we will pole vault in. If that doesn't work, we will 
parachute in. But we are going to get [comprehensive] health 
care reform passed.'' \90\ Her Senate counterpart, Majority 
Leader Harry Reid, summed up Pelosi's leadership style: ``She 
runs the House with an iron hand.'' \91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Jeff Zeleny, and Carl Hulse, ``The Long 
Road Back,'' The New York Times, March 21, 2010, p. A1.
    \89\ Democrats lost their filibuster-proof, 60-vote margin in the 
Senate when Republican Scott Brown won a special election in January 
2010 to replace Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, who had died.
    \90\ Stolberg, Zeleny, and Hulse, The Long Road Back, p. A1.
    \91\ Congressional Record, v. 153, December 5, 2007, p. 32124.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      speaker boehner (2011-    )

    Historians and others will assess Speaker John Boehner's 
leadership approach and legislative record when he leaves 
office. For now, three general and tentative observations seem 
pertinent. First, after serving with the three previous 
Speakers, Boehner wanted to avoid managing the House in a ``top 
down'' command style. He preferred to decentralize authority to 
the committees and follow a more participatory approach to 
lawmaking. He had some successes in employing this approach, 
but not as many as he would like for a key reason: the lack of 
followers. ``I've never been shy about leading,'' said Speaker 
Boehner. ``But you know, leaders need followers.'' \92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Darren Samuelsohn, ``Boehner: House GOP Like `218 Frogs in a 
Wheelbarrow,' '' Politico, May 21, 2012, p. 11. Despite the Speaker's 
problems winning the votes of some GOP newcomers, a journalist noted 
that he ``taught them there's only so much you can do when you control 
the House, but not the Senate or White House, and a GOP Conference that 
is divided does even less.'' See AB Stoddard, ``Boehner: A True 
Leader,'' The Hill, February 13, 2014, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, one of the two conditions essential to strong 
speakerships, according to the conditional party government 
model, is sometimes not present in House GOP ranks: internal 
cohesion and unity on leadership-preferred objectives. House 
Republicans at times seem more fractured and factionalized than 
in the Gingrich and Hastert eras. This hampers Speaker 
Boehner's ability to lead his party in an ideologically charged 
House. A former House GOP majority leader, Dick Armey of Texas 
(1995-2003), suggested that Speaker Boehner confronts a more 
difficult governing environment than faced by either Speakers 
Gingrich or Hastert. ``In the old days, the minority tried to 
create chaos and the majority tried to create a functioning 
majority to get things done,'' he said. ``Lately we got both 
the majority and the minority trying to create chaos, and a 
public very upset that these guys can't get anything done.'' 
\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ Jill Lawrence, ``Former House Leaders Say Current Group Has It 
Rough,'' National Journal Daily, September 23, 2013, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, it is hard to advance GOP priorities into law when 
Democrats control the Senate and the White House. Absent 
tripartite consensus, legislative gridlock predominates on many 
critical issues. Moreover, influential outside conservative 
groups and media commentators often demand that House 
Republicans remain ideologically pure on many issues or face 
primary challengers recruited and financed by various 
conservative entities.

                     VI. Major Senate Developments

    Constitutionally, the Senate is different from the House in 
many respects: size, term, and constituency, for example. It 
also seems to be a more tradition-bound institution than the 
House. For example, the ``majority rule'' House permitted 
gavel-to-gavel coverage of its floor proceedings over C-SPAN 
much sooner than the Senate. Seven years after the House began 
televised coverage of their proceedings, the Senate followed 
suit in 1986.\94\ Staggered elections--only one-third of the 
Senate membership is up for reelection every 2 years--no doubt 
tempers the passions and pressures for major institutional 
change. Newly elected, reform-minded Senators join two-thirds 
of the Senate's membership that ran for election or reelection 
when institutional renewal was not an issue that resonated with 
the public. Moreover, the ability of a single Senator or small 
group of lawmakers to block unwanted innovations, through 
prolonged debate (the filibuster) or other dilatory tactics, 
means that legislative changes are likely to occur 
incrementally and only with the consent of at least a 
supermajority of Senators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ Richard F. Fenno, ``The Senate Through the Looking Glass: The 
Debate over Television,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 14, 
August 1989, pp. 313-348.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On the other hand, the Senate, like the House, is 
constantly evolving as new lawmakers are sworn in, veteran 
Members retire, and outside developments (elections, wars, 
economic crises, and so on) influence Chamber and Member 
activity. There are also historic parallels between the two 
Chambers. The Senate had an early ``party government'' era 
(from about 1890 to 1910) that approximated that of Speaker Joe 
Cannon's. Instead of Cannon's one-man rule, four GOP Senators 
and their allies exercised oligarchic control over Senate 
proceedings, with Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island (1881-1911) 
their leader. (The press dubbed his leadership ``Aldrichism.'') 
The other three GOP Senators were William Allison of Iowa, 
Orville Platt of Connecticut, and John Spooner of Wisconsin.
    The four, along with their allies (many the products of 
State party machines \95\), chaired or were members of the most 
important Senate committees. For example, Senator Aldrich 
chaired the Finance Committee (the other three were also 
members of the panel) and Allison chaired Appropriations. 
Members of this group also chaired the party caucus, controlled 
the committee assignment process, and dominated the party panel 
(the Steering Committee) concerned with scheduling 
legislation.\96\ As a legislative historian stated, ``Never 
before in the history of the Senate were the outstanding 
committees so monopolized by the party leaders.'' \97\ 
Bolstering party government was the 1894-1896 electoral 
realignment, which ``yielded two homogeneous Senate parties 
with distinctly different electoral bases and different policy 
positions.'' \98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ Much of the 19th century was the era of party machines, or 
``bossism,'' in States and localities around the Nation. They 
controlled nominations to public offices and turned out their 
supporters at election time. There was intense electoral competition 
between the parties to control political offices to reap the benefits 
of patronage. Issues were of less importance than control of the 
``spoils system.'' See David Brady, ``In Their Heyday, Parties Ran on 
Patronage and Provided Candidate Insurance,'' Public Affairs Report, 
winter 2000, pp. 1, 6-8.
    \96\ David J. Rothman, Politics and Power: The United States 
Senate, 1869-1901 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 
48.
    \97\ Ibid., p. 58.
    \98\ David Brady, Richard Brody, and David Epstein, ``Heterogeneous 
Parties and Political Organization: The U.S. Senate, 1880-1920,'' 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 14, May 1989, p. 207. The elections 
of 1894, which produced large GOP majorities in the House (246R, 104D) 
and Senate (44R, 30D), and 1896 (Republican William McKinley was 
elected President) produced what scholars call an electoral 
realignment. In brief, realignments mean that numerous voters opt to 
change their support for one party and shift it to the other. The 
result is that the ``gaining'' party dominates the political 
environment for a relatively long period of time. In this case, 
Republicans held the White House and Congress for most of the time 
between 1896 and the 1932 election of Democrat Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt as President. Roosevelt's election ushered in another 
electoral realignment: a long period of Democratic control of the White 
House and Congress. During Senator Aldrich's time, Republican States 
were largely industrialized and urban and located in the East and 
Midwest; Democratic States were mainly rural and situated in the South 
and border States. Among the issues that divided the parties were their 
views on the money supply--a gold (contraction) versus silver 
(expansion) standard--and the tariff, protective as favored by 
Republicans, lower as favored by Democrats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Aldrichism'' held sway in the Chamber from the late 1890s 
until Senator Aldrich voluntarily retired in 1911, the last of 
the big four to depart the Senate. Under Aldrichism, ``members' 
policy preferences were realized through strict party 
control.'' \99\ Senator Aldrich not only combined party and 
committee leadership, but his persuasive skills and knowledge 
of how to win the support of party colleagues is reminiscent of 
Lyndon Johnson's leadership of the Senate from 1955 to 1960. As 
a commentator of the time said about Senator Aldrich, he paid
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ Brady, Brody, and Epstein, ``Heterogeneous Parties and 
Political Organization,'' p. 213.

close attention to everything pertaining to the Senate. He was 
always in the Senate or near at hand, and he always knew what 
was going on, either by personal observation or through the 
activities of a number of lieutenants who were glad to help him 
. . . . [He] made it a point to see many Senators each day. He 
rarely remained in his own seat, but was forever on the move, 
oftentimes on the Democratic side. [His personality was such] 
that he completely captivated men when he wanted to secure 
their support for any purpose.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Arthur Wallace Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, A Personal 
Narrative, Covering a Third of a Century, 1888-1921, vol. 2 (New York: 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1922), pp. 63-64.

    Another contemporary of Senator Aldrich added: ``Many 
reasons have been given for the almost singular power Mr. 
Aldrich displays in his capacity as party manager in the 
Senate, but the most that can be said about the secret of his 
success is, perhaps, that he is a natural manipulator of men 
and measures.'' \101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ Orlando O. Stealey, Twenty Years in the Press Gallery (New 
York: Publishers Printing Co., 1906), p. 178.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The oligarchic system of party rule led by Senator Aldrich 
``swiftly disintegrated'' by the early 1920s. ``It had been 
severely strained for several years by the growing number of 
insurgents in the party.'' \102\ In its place came Senates, 
such as those of the 1950s, characterized by features such as 
the diffusion of authority to senior lawmakers and conservative 
committee chairs. In short, committees again became primary 
centers of power, even with a formidable majority leader, 
Lyndon Johnson, steering the Senate. Democrats controlled the 
House and Senate during the 1950s, except for the 83d Congress 
(1953-1955), when Dwight Eisenhower was President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ Randall B. Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1969), p. 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            The 1950s Senate

    Three key features characterized the Senate of the 1950s. 
First, an array of informal norms and folkways governed the 
behavior of most Senators. Second, powerful committee chairmen, 
called the ``inner club,'' dominated policymaking. Third, 
Majority Leader Johnson exercised significant authority in 
shaping the Senate's activities. Johnson is often viewed as the 
most powerful majority leader in U.S. history, a post which 
became institutionalized sometime during the early 20th 
century.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ See Walter J. Oleszek, ``John Worth Kern: Portrait of a Floor 
Leader,'' in Richard A. Baker and Roger H. Davidson, eds., First Among 
Equals: Outstanding Senate Leaders of the Twentieth Century 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1991), pp. 7-37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           norms and folkways

    Political scientist Donald Matthews wrote one of the most 
important books about the 1950s Senate. His analysis stressed 
the key role of the Chamber's unwritten norms and folkways in 
shaping policymaking and the workings of the Senate.\104\ The 
norms and folkways included:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1960).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Apprenticeship
    New Senators should first spend time learning how the 
Chamber functions before participating in committee and floor 
matters in an active and sustained way. They should also give 
deference to the Chamber's committee and party leaders.
Specialization
    Senators should concentrate on the issues that come before 
the committees on which they serve and on those matters that 
affect their home State.
Legislative work
    Senators should focus on their legislative work rather than 
seek publicity. Senators were to be ``work horses'' not ``show 
horses.''
Courtesy
    Senators should treat all their colleagues respectfully and 
not engage in personal attacks or criticisms of them.
Reciprocity
    Senators should assist colleagues whenever that is 
feasible. This norm includes a two-way exchange: Senators who 
are aided are obliged to provide assistance in return.
Institutional patriotism
    Senators should defend the prestige and prerogatives of the 
Senate from those who would unfairly castigate its role and 
work. They were ``expected to revere the Senate's personnel, 
organization, and folkways and to champion them to the outside 
world.'' \105\ (To be sure, there were Senators who ignored the 
unwritten norms and folkways.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ Ibid., p. 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Procedural restraint
    Senators should exercise restraint in use of their large 
procedural prerogatives and employ them only in rare 
circumstances.
    Many of these norms no longer apply as they once did, but 
at least one appears relevant in today's Senate: 
apprenticeship. Most new Senators take some time to ``learn the 
ropes'' of the Senate, with some seeking to observe an 
apprenticeship period. In the latter camp can be well-known, 
newly elected Senators, such as Hillary Clinton and Al Franken. 
To avoid upstaging their less famous colleagues, both 
deliberately and quietly went about the process of meeting 
their colleagues and learning Senate practices and procedures. 
Each, for example, paid their respects to Senator Byrd of West 
Virginia, the longest serving Senator ever, deferred to for his 
extensive knowledge of the Senate's history, traditions, and 
procedures.
    The other norms and folkways gradually went into decline 
for several reasons, such as activist Senators who from the 
start of their careers advocated action on their portfolio of 
issues,\106\ and the transformation of Washington's policy 
community with ``wall-to-wall'' interest groups devoting 
considerable time and resources to persuading Senators to 
become advocates for their cause.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ Michael Foley, The New Senate: Liberal Influence on a 
Conservative Institution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980).
    \107\ Barbara Sinclair, The Transformation of the U.S. Senate 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         ``the `inner club' ''

    This phrase was popularized in a 1956 book written by 
journalist William S. White titled Citadel: The Story of the 
U.S. Senate. The club consisted mainly of senior Democratic 
Senators from the South and senior Republican Senators from the 
Midwest and New England, who dominated the inner workings of 
the Senate. Everyone not in the inner club, ``an organism 
without name or charter, without officers, without a list of 
membership, without a wholly conscious being at all,'' was in 
the outer club.\108\ The inner club, according to White, 
dominated the Senate's culture and policymaking, often from 
their perch as committee chairs. Majority Leader Johnson even 
gave copies of Citadel to newly elected Senators, so they would 
develop an understanding of what was expected of them, which 
was to follow Speaker Sam Rayburn's quip--``to get along, go 
along'' with the priorities of inner club members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ William S. White, Citadel, The Story of the U.S. Senate (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prominent club members included Senators Richard Russell, 
Russell Long, Styles Bridges, and Robert Taft. Lawmakers in the 
inner club dominated the levers of power in the Senate. To be 
sure, there were mavericks and outsiders who neither 
genuflected to members of the inner club nor observed regularly 
the norms and folkways identified by Professor Matthews.\109\ 
Noteworthy is that some scholars challenge the notion that 
there was ``an all-powerful inner club,'' given the gradual 
``progressive centralization of power in the hands of the 
Majority Leader.'' \110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ Ralph K. Huitt, ``The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative 
Role,'' American Political Science Review, vol. 55, September 1961, pp. 
566-575.
    \110\ Nelson W. Polsby, ``Goodbye to the Inner Club,'' in Nelson W. 
Polsby, ed., Congressional Behavior (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 
107, 109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  majority leader johnson (1955-1960)

    Scores of analysts have examined the period when Lyndon 
Johnson was the Senate's majority leader (1955-1960), perhaps 
the most skilled majority leader ever. (Johnson also served as 
minority leader during the 83d Congress, 1953-1955). Noted 
historian Robert A. Caro, a Pulitzer Prize winner, has spent 
much of his adult life writing multiple books that examine the 
political career and roles of Johnson, including Master of the 
Senate (2002), the third volume.\111\ In Caro's view, Majority 
Leader Johnson was a legislative and political genius who knew 
how to mobilize votes and make the Senate work by passing 
legislation. Although critics said many of his bills were 
``empty ships'' without much substance, they fail to consider 
Johnson's achievements in promoting policy consensus by 
reconciling the liberal northern and conservative southern 
wings of the Democratic Party.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\ Robert A. Caro, Master of the Senate (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2002).
    \112\ Foley, The New Senate, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Johnson's mastery of the Senate was facilitated by three 
factors: (1) a Republican was in the White House, Dwight 
Eisenhower, which gave Johnson wider latitude to exercise 
independent leadership; (2) he maintained close ties with 
powerful leaders from the South, such as Johnson's mentor 
Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, while he did not alienate 
liberal Senators (Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, for example) 
and reached out to them for support; and (3) his shrewd 
political intellect and instincts, focus on getting results, 
and sheer drive to be the Senate's most ``powerful persuader.'' 
\113\ As Johnson told an aide, ``I do understand power, 
whatever else may be said about me. I know where to look for 
it, and how to use it.'' \114\ Johnson also knew how and when 
to look to the conservative coalition for support in moving the 
Senate's business. (Recall that the ``conservative coalition'' 
was an informal alliance between Republicans and southern 
Democrats.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \113\ Howard E. Shuman, ``Lyndon B. Johnson: The Senate's Powerful 
Persuader,'' in Baker and Davidson, eds., First Among Equals: 
Outstanding Senate Leaders of the Twentieth Century, p. 199. Also see 
Ralph K. Huitt, ``Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate,'' American 
Political Science Review, vol. 55, June 1961, pp. 333-344.
    \114\ Caro, Master of the Senate, p. xx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A leader with a domineering style, legendary arm-twisting 
abilities, and parliamentary resourcefulness, Johnson could 
often secure the legislative outcomes he wanted in the standing 
committees (through allies on those panels) and in the Chamber 
as well. As a liberal Democrat on the Steering Committee (the 
committee assignment panel) said about Majority Leader Johnson: 
he ``would come into the Steering Committee with his list, and 
that would be it. He'd just tell the Steering Committee who 
would be on [the committees]. [We] had no function at all.'' 
\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ Norman Ornstein, Robert L. Peabody, and David W. Rohde, ``The 
Changing Senate: From the 1950s to the 1970s,'' in Lawrence C. Dodd and 
Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1977), p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Democratic leader also ``regulated carefully the timing 
and pace of the floor debate, stalling for time when additional 
votes were needed and driving the issue to a conclusion when 
victory was assured.'' \116\ He limited opportunities for 
lengthy debate--a fundamental feature of the Senate--by 
specifying in unanimous consent agreements ``the precise time 
that a vote would occur.'' \117\ Senator Johnson's power began 
to wane after the 1958 midterm elections, however. Northern 
Democratic Senators, many liberal and activist-minded, now 
exceeded the number of southerners ``by 41 seats to 24 seats.'' 
\118\ One result: Johnson was more responsive to the reformist 
goals of liberals in both parties, especially since he was 
angling to win the 1960 Presidential nomination. In 1961, he 
took the oath of office as Vice President of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\ John G. Stewart, ``Two Strategies of Leadership: Johnson and 
Mansfield,'' in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., Congressional Behavior (New 
York: Random House, 1971), p. 67.
    \117\ Ibid., p. 68. Also see Smith, Call to Order, pp. 99-101.
    \118\ Foley, The New Senate, p. 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  The Individualist Senate (1961-1990)

    The roots of the individualist Senate can be traced to the 
late 1950s when junior Senators as well as several seasoned 
lawmakers began to rebel against the seniority system and urge 
rule changes that would facilitate enactment of civil rights, 
labor, and other legislation. As a congressional scholar noted, 
``the Senate transformed itself from an inward-looking, 
committee- and seniority-dominated institution in which 
influence and resources were unequally distributed to an 
individualist, outward-looking institution with a much more 
equal distribution of resources . . . . [Moreover, in] neither 
the old nor the new Senate did party play a major role.'' \119\ 
In short, gone was the communitarian, small-town character of 
the Senate of the 1950s with its norms, folkways, and 
hierarchical structure. It was replaced by a system--still 
prominent today--that granted wide opportunities to rank-and-
file Senators to influence virtually any policy area. As a 
commentator noted, the Senate is ``increasingly a place where 
it's easier for a single lawmaker to stop a bill in its tracks 
than to get it passed by bringing others on board.'' \120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \119\ Barbara Sinclair, ``Congressional Reform,'' in Julian E. 
Zelizer, ed., The American Congress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 
p. 631.
    \120\ Rebecca Kaplan, ``Hatch as Hatch Can,'' National Journal, May 
18, 2013, p. 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A number of external forces accelerated the transition to 
an individualistic Senate. For example, interest group activity 
surged in the Nation's Capital given the activism and expansion 
of the Federal Government (the Great Society, for instance). As 
James Q. Wilson, a political scientist, pointed out: ``Once 
politics was about only a few things; today, it is about nearly 
everything.'' \121\ New issues and problems emerged on the 
agenda of Congress and the national government--affirmative 
action, automobile safety, abortion, the Vietnam war, gasoline 
lines, environmental protection, women's rights, and so on--
which motivated Senators to respond to their constituents, to 
the importuning of lobbyists, and to the needs of the country 
by, for example, introducing bills and holding hearings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \121\ Quoted in Robert J. Samuelson, ``Suicidal Politics,'' The 
Washington Post, April 11, 2011, p. A13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A relatively closed and insular Senate became a more open, 
permeable, and unpredictable policymaking institution. The 
press and media increased its coverage and scrutiny of 
Congress. The institution became a more visible and critical 
center of action in numerous policy areas, including 
legislative-executive conflicts over war powers and Federal 
spending. Senators also acquired additional staff resources, 
including access to experts in new legislative support units 
(for example, the Congressional Budget Office, created in 
1974). With more staff, Members had wider opportunities to 
become engaged in substantive areas beyond the jurisdictional 
domains of the committees on which they served. Legislative 
staff also assumed more responsibility in the lawmaking process 
given heightened demands on the time of Senators--fundraising, 
campaigning, and meeting with constituents as well as dealing 
with an array of complex issues in committee and on the floor. 
As a result, professional staffers often took the lead in 
negotiating policy differences with the aides of other 
Senators, drafting legislation, acting as procedural advisers, 
preparing reports, and so on.

                  other consequences of individualism

    An analysis of the individualistic Senate by a 
congressional journalist identified four other consequences of 
the Senate's transition from a place where comradeship and 
friendly relationships were commonplace to an institution of 
semistrangers where ``individual rights, not community feeling, 
is the most precious commodity.'' \122\ First, there is little 
socializing among Senators. Members' schedules are simply too 
replete with numerous meetings, fundraising, visiting with 
constituents, or traveling back and forth to their States. 
Without personal and social connections, trust is hard to 
develop between and among Senators, and trust is essential to 
the compromise-making process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \122\ Alan Ehrenhalt, ``In the Senate of the '80s, Team Spirit Has 
Given Way to the Rule of Individuals,'' Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report, September 4, 1982, p. 2175.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, civility and courtesy declined with a resultant 
uptick in acerbic words and criticisms of a personal nature. 
The erosion of civility compounds the difficulty of reaching 
consensus on issues and promotes partisan bickering. A GOP 
Senator who voluntarily retired expressed dismay with the 
atmosphere of the Senate. ``We've ratched up the violence of 
our words. I don't like the milieu. Now it all [is about] who's 
winners and who's the losers.'' \123\ Absent civility, it 
becomes harder for Senators to achieve consensus on resolving 
the Nation's problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ James M. Perry, ``Moderate Republicans Look Like a Dying 
Breed as Standard Bearers Forsake Acrimonious Senate,'' Wall Street 
Journal, December 28, 1995, p. A8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, Senators, like House Members, are constantly running 
for reelection (the ``permanent campaign''), mindful that their 
actions and votes are subject to intensive monitoring by 
pressure groups, the media, and the attentive public, 
particularly people who vote in party primaries. Vast sums of 
money are spent by scores of groups, wealthy individuals, and 
party organizations to fund attack-oriented campaigns, engage 
in issue advocacy, energize supporters to vote on Election Day, 
and, of course, to influence congressional decisionmaking.
    Lawmakers, too, devote considerable time to ``dialing for 
dollars.'' As a Senator explained: ``I don't worry about money 
influencing our votes. I don't think that happens. But I worry 
about the energy it takes. We're out there raising money all 
the time. We don't sit down and talk to each other very much 
anymore. We don't have time. I just don't know how people find 
the time to think or reflect.'' \124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \124\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fourth, individual Senators obstructed the Senate with 
scores of parliamentary maneuvers. ``There is today more power 
in the hands of a single person, more leverage to impede the 
process, than there used to be,'' exclaimed a Senator. ``We've 
given far too much power to the impeders.'' \125\ Peer pressure 
is often unable to get the impeders to stop their dilatory 
actions. A Senator who often exploited Senate rules to 
frustrate Chamber action either for substantive, political, or 
campaign purposes explained: ``If I'm not the most popular guy 
in the Senate--well, I can live with that.'' \126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ Ehrenhalt, ``In the Senate of the '80s,'' p. 2179.
    \126\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            individualism and majority leader mike mansfield

    An observation about the individualist Senate is important 
to underscore. The Senator who succeeded Lyndon Johnson as 
party leader was Democrat Mike Mansfield of Montana, the 
longest serving (1961-1977) majority leader in the Senate's 
history. His actions and decisions facilitated establishment of 
the individualistic Senate. In Mansfield's view, there was no 
``inner club'' in the Senate, because every Senator had equal 
rights and responsibilities. As he stated: ``[T]here's no 
`inner club' in the Senate any more. That's the way it should 
be. Nobody is telling anybody else what to do.'' \127\ A senior 
Senate aide explained that Senator Mansfield's ``principal duty 
was to maintain a system which permitted individual, coequal 
senators the opportunity to conduct their affairs in whatever 
ways they deemed appropriate.'' \128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \127\ ``Why Congress Is In the Doghouse, Interview With the 
Majority Leader,'' U.S. News & World Report, August 16, 1976, p. 27.
    \128\ Stewart, ``Two Strategies of Leadership,'' p. 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mansfield's restrained leadership style, in sharp contrast 
to Johnson's assertive leadership approach, promoted the 
individualism that remains a prime feature of today's Senate. 
As congressional scholar Ross Baker concluded about the 
Mansfield years: ``Much criticism of the modern Senate is, in 
effect, a commentary on institutional features that emerged 
during Mansfield's term as majority leader. The hyper-
individualism, the ability of willful or obstructionist members 
to hold the institution hostage at times to their own petty 
interests, the [enlargement] of Senate staff and their 
assumption of unprecedented, even unwarranted, authority, are 
all developments of [Senator] Mansfield.'' \129\ Added a 
congressional scholar, ``[A]s the Mansfield era came to an end, 
Senate individualism was reaching a fever pitch.'' \130\ 
Interviewed at age 96, Mansfield was asked for his view of 
``the state of Congress in 2000.'' He said in part: ``There's a 
lack of compatibility among and between members. There's an 
individualism to an extent I never thought was possible.'' 
\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \129\ Ross K. Baker, ``Mike Mansfield and the Birth of the Modern 
Senate,'' First Among Equals, p. 293. Also see Francis R. Valeo, Mike 
Mansfield, Majority Leader: A Different Kind of Senate, 1961-1976 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).
    \130\ Steven S. Smith, The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of 
Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2014), p. 118.
    \131\ Dan Carney, ``Mansfield on Leadership, Teamwork and 
`Individualism' in Congress,'' CQ Weekly, January 29, 2000, p. 164.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mansfield's successor as party leader, Senator Byrd of West 
Virginia, also catered to the individual needs and requests of 
Members. One of his important jobs, he said, was to wait upon 
and accommodate his partisan colleagues. ``I often say when I 
am to fill out a form and the form says `occupation,' I should 
put `slave.' '' Senator Byrd also called himself the 
``mitigator'' for the ``individual ills and problems of 
individual Members.'' \132\ To be sure, Majority Leader Byrd 
(1977-1981; 1987-1989), one of the Senate's most accomplished 
parliamentary experts ever, could play ``procedural hard ball'' 
if circumstances warranted that approach. Senator Byrd also 
served as minority leader (1981-1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\ The first quote is from the Congressional Record, v. 126, 
April 18, 1980, p. 8352. The second is found in the Congressional 
Record, vol. 126, May 2, 1980, p. 9759.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    The Polarized Senate (1990-    )

    Legislating in the modern Senate can be a difficult 
enterprise given its emphasis on ``minority rule''--the right 
of Senators to debate at length (the filibuster) and to offer 
nonrelevant amendments. The Senate's procedural differences 
with the ``majority rule'' House mean that bipartisanship is 
usually more important to attain in the upper Chamber than in 
the lower Chamber. Unless a broad bipartisan consensus exists 
or there is a voting supermajority, enacting legislation or 
approving nominations can often be an arduous and lengthy task. 
To overcome obstructionism, a regular and routine occurrence, 
is the cost today of doing legislative business. The 
individualism that permeates the Chamber and--since the 1990s--
the sharper partisanship that pervades the Senate means that 
bipartisan collaboration and compromise are much harder to 
attain than previously. In short, the combination of heightened 
individualism, sharper partisanship, and the Chamber's 
permissive rules underscore the policymaking challenges that 
confront the contemporary Senate.
    One consequence is that the party leadership's influence 
over policymaking is ascendant compared to the role of 
committees. Majority party leaders are not reluctant to bypass 
committee consideration of legislation or take the lead in 
writing bills or amendments. Moreover, it is easier for them, 
as well as for individual Members, to use available procedures 
to circumvent committee consideration and place measures 
directly on the legislative calendar. (There is no guarantee 
that these measures will be taken up, however.) Worth mention 
is that Senate Republicans, but not Democrats, impose term 
limits on their Members--6 years as a chair and 6 years as a 
ranking lawmaker--thus limiting their ability to accumulate the 
authority and clout of committee leaders from earlier eras.
    The ``little legislatures'' (committees) are not 
unimportant, simply less important than the role of party 
leaders. The leaders are in charge of legislating on most 
measures or matters. Among other things, party leaders are 
responsible for legislative strategy, the party's agenda and 
message, fundraising, fostering party consensus and unity, 
communications, and, importantly, winning or holding majority 
control of their Chamber. In the judgment of one analyst, in 
``the new political order, nothing is more important than 
either winning or holding a majority . . . so anything that 
prevents the other party from capturing or holding a majority 
is justified, even necessary.'' \133\ Senator Byrd expressed 
this sentiment in stronger language:  ``Party!  It  doesn't  
make  any  difference  how  many political corpses you trample 
on or walk over to get your party on top. The object is to win 
the next election. The object is to be able to say . . . `Our 
party will be in control.' '' \134\ Added Senator Olympia Snowe 
of Maine, ``Congress is becoming more like a parliamentary 
system where everyone votes with their party and those in 
charge employ every possible tactic to block the other side.'' 
\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Charlie Cook, ``Blocking the Vote,'' National Journal, July 
26, 2014, p. 15.
    \134\ Melissa Healy, ``Robert Byrd,'' Los Angeles Times, January 
30, 1995, p. A12.
    \135\ Kaiser, An Act of Congress, p. 381.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many reasons and trends account for the uptick in 
partisanship and the sharp ideological divide that 
characterizes the contemporary Senate. Several of these 
include:

                    partisan and ideological sorting

    A long-term trend underway for many years has been the 
partisan and ideological sorting that has occurred in each 
party and in the country. ``Knowing whether a person is a 
Republican or a Democrat today tells you far more about their 
views on many issues than it did in previous eras.'' \136\ One 
result is that bipartisan coalitions on major measures, common 
during the post-World War II period, are hard to forge in the 
absence of ideological overlap--conservatives and liberals in 
both parties. One analyst dubbed the post-World War II period 
``the age of bargaining,'' in which ``the two parties, both 
representing ideologically diverse coalitions, regularly 
reached agreements that blurred the differences between them.'' 
\137\ The Congresses of the bargaining era are largely 
outliers. In most historical eras, Congress and the country 
exhibited strong partisan and policy disagreements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\ Shankar Vedantan, ``My Team vs. Your Team: The Political 
Arena Lives Up to Its Name,'' The Washington Post, September 29, 2008, 
p. A6. Political scientists, psychologists, and others have suggested 
that ``our brains are hardwired for partisanship.'' They are engaged in 
trying to understand ``what exactly makes us so vulnerable to 
partisanship.'' See Brian Resnick, ``The Battle for Your Brain,'' 
National Journal, September 20, 2014, pp. 12-18. After reviewing the 
literature on the ``political brain,'' a science journalist concluded: 
``A large body of political scientists and political psychologists now 
concur that liberals and conservatives disagree about politics in part 
because they are different people at the level of personality, 
psychology, and even traits like physiology and personality.'' David 
Sherman and Leaf Van Boven, ``Why We Can't Just Get Along,'' Los 
Angeles Times, September 25, 2014, online edition.
    \137\ Ronald Brownstein, ``Then and Now,'' National Journal, 
December 15, 2012, p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Consider the years leading up to the Civil War (recall the 
severe beating of Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts 
administered by the cane-wielding Representative Preston Brooks 
of South Carolina); the late 19th and early 20th century splits 
in Congress and the country between rural and urban and labor 
and industrial interests; the clashes over the prohibition of 
intoxicating liquors, which in 1919 was embedded as the 18th 
Amendment to the Constitution and then repealed in 1933 by the 
21st Amendment; the struggle for civil rights in the 1960s that 
included the murders of national leaders, the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy, and riots in city streets; the anti-
Vietnam war movement of the 1970s, which included the shootings 
of Kent State (Ohio) students protesting the war; or today's 
strong public and partisan differences over immigration, 
foreign policy, and the role of government, for example.
    Today, the disagreements between the parties are so wide 
and strong, a seemingly unbridgeable chasm on many issues 
(Obamacare would be a prime example), that stalemate and 
deadlock pervade Congress as well as relations between the 
legislative and executive branches. Public officials even 
suggest that legislative gridlock could threaten national 
security if Congress cannot act to address national and 
international emergencies, such as the threat of terrorist 
attacks on the homeland. Pollsters have found widespread 
pessimism in the country about the state of the Nation, 
provoked by a number of factors that include the perception 
that the Nation's governing institutions are in constant 
gridlock. The pessimism of the public occurs because citizens 
are ``reacting, in part, to the breakdown of the political 
system, which leaves people quite rationally worried about 
American decline and the Nation's diminishing ability to 
weather [and deal with] crises.'' \138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \138\ Cited in Dana Milbank, ``A Dying American Optimism,'' The 
Washington Post, August 13, 2014, p. A19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              geographic and residential self-segregating

    Studies have shown that like-minded individuals and 
families prefer to live in or move to States (``red'' or 
``blue,'' for example) and communities where people share 
similar lifestyles, values, interests, and political 
views.\139\ More and more people are living in ``landslide 
counties'' that vote either Democratic or Republican. Living in 
homogeneous communities reinforces peoples' shared political 
beliefs and biases. As analysts have found, ``the country may 
be more diverse than ever from coast to coast,'' but it is 
``filled with people who live alike, think alike, and vote 
alike.'' \140\ Or as a political pollster stated, ``If voters 
are seeking an explanation for hyper-partisanship and 
dysfunction, they ought to look down the street.'' \141\ Polls 
even show that liberal and conservative voters ``would be 
unhappy if their children married someone with a different 
political viewpoint. The result isn't just polarized politics, 
but an increasingly divided society.'' \142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \139\ See Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-
Minded Americans Is Tearing Us Apart (New York: Mariner Books, 2009). 
One scholar found that in ``1960, 5 percent of Republicans and 4 
percent of Democrats said they would feel `displeased' if their son or 
daughter married outside their political party. By 2010, those numbers 
had reached 49 percent and 33 percent.'' He concluded that ``partyism 
is extending well beyond politics into people's behavior in daily 
life.'' See Cass R. Sunstein, ``Partyism Now Trumps Racism,'' 
BloombergView, September 22, 2014, pp. 1, 3. This article can be found 
at http://bloombergview.com/articles. Another study found that 
Americans are ``self-sorting, not only along racial lines but also 
along educational and income ones, particularly in our big cities.'' 
Important cultural consequences flow from this development. ``People 
who live in ethnically diverse streets are less racially prejudiced 
than individuals living in highly segregated areas and their increased 
tolerance is due directly to the experience of a more integrated 
society.'' Charles M. Blow, ``The Self-Sort,'' The New York Times, 
April 12, 2014, p. A19. Worth noting is that a free smartphone app 
(BuyPartisan) allows supermarket shoppers to purchase products that 
comport with their political beliefs by learning ``the political 
leanings of the makers of supermarket items.'' The developer of the 
smartphone application said, ``We're trying to make every day election 
day for people.'' See Rebecca Bratek, ``Taking Politics Shopping,'' Los 
Angeles Times, August 25, 2014, online edition. In the view of an 
election analyst, ``Politics hangs on culture and lifestyle more than 
policy.'' See Laura Meckler and Dante Chinni, ``How Where We Live 
Deepens the Nation's Partisan Split,'' Wall Street Journal, March 21, 
2014, p. A10.
    \140\ David Wasserman, ``Parallel Universes,'' National Journal, 
December 15, 2012, p. 18.
    \141\ Sheryl Gay Stolbert, ``You Want Compromise? Sure You Do,'' 
The New York Times, August 14, 2011, p. SR5.
    \142\ Nate Cohn, ``Polarization: It's Everywhere,'' The New York 
Times, June 12, 2014, p. A3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Tellingly, people who live in homogeneous neighborhoods are 
more engaged in political activities than those who reside in 
diverse neighborhoods.\143\ ``Political activism is much easier 
when you're surrounded by like-minded others,'' said a 
political scientist.\144\ These are the individuals who often 
contribute to campaigns, vote in primaries, work on campaigns, 
and look askance at compromise. People in heterogeneous 
communities may steer clear of discussions of politics to avoid 
provoking anger and hard feelings with their friends and 
neighbors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \143\ Stolbert, ``You Want Compromise? Sure You Do,'' p. SR5.
    \144\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             partisan media

    There are so many partisan and dueling 24/7 media outlets 
that individuals can tune in to liberal or conservative 
channels where contrary views are neither exposed nor 
considered and where compromise is disparaged, sometimes by 
shrill commentary. To attract a wide audience, these media 
outlets are in the business of amplifying party and policy 
disagreements. Typically, people select media programs that 
bolster and reinforce their views; they do not routinely sample 
a variety of news sources that expose them to contrary 
political perspectives. And ``many of those drawn to the most 
partisan shows have an outsized impact on politics, talking to 
their friends and neighbors about public affairs and signing up 
for campaign work.'' \145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \145\ Michael Kranish, ``The Role of Partisan Media,'' The Boston 
Globe, October 6, 2013, p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  interest groups and ``think tanks''

    There are numerous interest groups largely aligned with 
each party that monitor the work, ideological purity, and votes 
of Members. If Members deviate from the groups' programs and 
preferences, the lawmakers face the threat of a primary 
challenge from candidates more liberal or more conservative 
than they are. ``In a partisan atmosphere,'' remarked a GOP 
Senator, ``it's hard to help the other side without being 
accused [by well-financed ideological groups] of aiding and 
comforting the enemy.'' \146\ On the other hand, advocacy 
groups can enable individual lawmakers to exercise outsized 
influence in Congress if these Members are able to energize and 
mobilize outside groups and grassroots supporters to back their 
legislative causes and strategies. As the leader of a 
conservative advocacy group said about two Senate Republicans: 
``They are recognizing [that] political power today doesn't lie 
in Washington, it lies around the country.'' \147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \146\ Darren Samuelsohn, Politico, June 28, 2010, p. 10.
    \147\ Susan Ferrechio, ``Political Power Isn't Just for Party 
Leaders Anymore,'' WashingtonExaminer.Com, September 30, 2013, p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As for think tanks, they are part of elaborate 
infrastructure of groups and organizations that support the 
agenda and goals of each party. On the liberal side, for 
instance, is the Center for American Progress; on the 
conservative side is The Heritage Foundation. An objective of 
these think tanks is to prepare scholarly reports that advocate 
for and support the partisan agenda of the Democratic or 
Republican Parties. As a founder of a partisan think tank said: 
``This is your [party's] objective. Now go do the analysis.'' 
\148\ Little surprise that ``facts'' are often in strong 
dispute between the two parties, which compounds the difficulty 
of resolving policy differences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \148\ Bryan Bender, ``Many D.C. Think Tanks Now Players in Partisan 
Wars,'' The Boston Globe, August 11, 2013, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          electoral volatility

    Today's Senate is subject to rather frequent shifts of 
party control compared to the 26 years that Democrats held the 
Senate (1955-1981). For example, for the period from the 103d 
Congress (1993-1995) to the 113th Congress (2013-2015), 
Democrats have been the majority party six times and 
Republicans five times, often with rather slim majorities. The 
constant struggle to hold or win power means that there is 
little incentive for whichever party is in the minority to work 
with the majority party to enact consequential legislation. If 
major measures regularly pass with bipartisan majorities, that 
might indicate to many voters that ``staying the course'' is 
what's required at election time rather than ``it's time for a 
change.'' According to one analyst, ``Narrow majorities 
inherently encourage partisan conflict. When control is always 
within reach, the minority party loses the incentive to help 
mint legislative accomplishments that fortify the brittle 
majority.'' \149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \149\ Ronald Brownstein, ``The Volatile Senate,'' National Journal, 
September 20, 2014, p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     benefits of party polarization

    Some analysts suggest that the distinct and widely known 
views of the two parties enable voters to hold each of them 
accountable for their actions or inactions. Not too long ago, 
during the 1950s and 1960s, for example, people could say that 
there wasn't a dime's worth of difference between the two 
parties. That is not the case today. Voters have a real choice 
in choosing the party and the candidates that best represent 
their policy preferences and values. Then-Representative 
Richard Cheney (1979-1989) said as a minority Member: 
``Polarization often has very beneficial results. If everything 
is handled through compromise and conciliation, if there are no 
real issues dividing us from Democrats, why should the country 
change and make us the majority?'' \150\ Moreover, too many 
compromises can produce inadequate laws that reflect the lowest 
common denominator of legislating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \150\ Quoted in Fred Barnes, ``Raging Representatives,'' The New 
Republic, June 3, 1985, p. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Polarization has other real and potential benefits. It can 
promote voter turnout. Partisan stalemates can prevent mistakes 
that could occur if bills were passed without adequate 
deliberation and amendment opportunities for each party. In 
short, legislative deadlock may be the best option absent 
consensus in Congress and the country over how to address 
consequential issues and problems.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \151\ See W. Lee Rawls, In Praise of Deadlock: How Partisan 
Struggle Makes Better Laws (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A compelling counterpoint is that in a ``party-polarized 
chamber where the Senate minority party demonstrates the sort 
of disciplined opposition that one sees in parliamentary out 
parties, a Senate majority has extraordinary difficulty either 
recruiting bipartisan support or governing alone.'' \152\ The 
extraordinary difficulty occurs in large measure because of the 
Senate's procedural rules. Every Senator is well positioned to 
stymie Senate decisionmaking. For example, the Senate has only 
one formal rule (Rule XXII) to end debate. It must invoke a 
procedure called cloture (closure of debate) to bring debate 
and voting to an eventual end. However, cloture requires 60 of 
100 votes to invoke for most measures and matters, and it is a 
time-consuming process that can take several days. Generally, 
the Senate functions best when every Member agrees by unanimous 
consent to a procedural framework for considering measures and 
matters. Two words--``I object''--block that approach, however.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \152\ Frances E. Lee, ``Senate Deliberation and the Future of 
Congressional Power,'' Political Science & Politics, vol. 43, April 
2010, p. 227.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    beyond ideology: the ``reboot''

    Important to note is that the struggle between the parties 
involves more than ideological differences, because not all 
issues arouse the ideological passions of Senators.\153\ For 
example, the Senate in mid-March 2014 enacted legislation by a 
96 to 2 vote to provide additional funds for pediatric medical 
research.\154\ The pediatric measure was part of a deliberate 
bipartisan strategy (called the ``reboot'') by the bipartisan 
party leaders to end Senate gridlock, pass legislation, and 
demonstrate that the Senate can govern during a time when 
lawmakers regularly employ their procedural prerogatives to 
frustrate Senate action on legislation and nominations. The 
reboot meant that measures that ``had bipartisan authorship, 
had already gone through committees, and had the support of the 
committees' chairmen and ranking Republicans'' would be 
scheduled for floor action.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\ ``Beyond Ideology'' is the title of a book by Professor 
Frances E. Lee of the University of Maryland. Her study underscores 
that every vote in the Senate is not ideologically based. See Frances 
E. Lee, Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the 
U.S. Senate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
    \154\ Congressional Record, v. 160, March 13, 2014, p. S1617.
    \155\ Jonathan Weisman, ``Process `Reboot' Aims to End Senate 
Gridlock,'' The New York Times, March 3, 2014, p. A15. Also see Ed 
O'Keefe and Paul Kane, ``From Unlikely Pair a Plan to Restore 
Tradition--and Bipartisanship,'' The Washington Post, March 11, 2014, 
p. A5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The reboot was an attempt to return to the ``regular 
order.'' This ambiguous and variable term generally means that 
measures are introduced and referred to the appropriate 
committee, voted out by a majority on the committee, and then 
brought to the floor under an open amendment and deliberative 
process that also ensures real minority party participation. 
The leaders of the reboot initiative wanted to demonstrate to 
newcomers how the Senate is expected to legislate, without 
being regularly embroiled in procedural gridlock and policy 
stalemate. As Senator Barbara Mikulski, the chair of the 
Appropriations Committee and a principal advocate of the reboot 
approach, stated: ``This is one of the first times in a couple 
of years where we have had an open amendment process, and in 
some ways we're getting adjusted to how that actually works.'' 
\156\ The bipartisan reboot initiative, however, lasted only a 
few weeks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \156\ Quoted in a speech by Senator Charles Grassley, Congressional 
Record, March 13, 2014, p. S16745. Also see Tamar Hallerman, ``Tapping 
Back in to Regular Order,'' CQ Weekly, April 7, 2014, pp. 538-545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     the return of partisan warfare

    The two parties soon focused on their struggle either to 
hold power or to win it back. A consequence of this political 
reality is that numerous issues are left unresolved or unacted 
upon. If legislation is enacted into law, such as the 
Affordable Care Act, the opposition party may try to foil its 
effective implementation, work to repeal and replace the 
statute, or challenge it in the Federal judiciary or the court 
of public opinion. According to a political strategist, the two 
parties are ``more interested in pursuing partisan, short-term 
advantage than they are in building consensus and solving 
national problems that require immediate action.'' \157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ Douglas E. Schoen, ``A Country on the Wrong Track,'' The 
Washington Times, August 11, 2014, p. B1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The partisan tactics available to each party are many, as 
pointed out by political scientist Frances E. Lee. ``In seeking 
to advance their collective interests of winning elections and 
wielding power, legislative partisans stir up controversy. They 
impeach one another's motives and accuse one another of 
incompetence and corruption, not always on strong evidence. 
They exploit the floor agenda for public relations, touting 
their successes, embarrassing their opponents, and generally 
propagandizing for their own party's benefit. They actively 
seek out policy disagreements that can be politically useful in 
distinguishing themselves from their partisan opponents.'' 
\158\ Perhaps no surprise, then, that this partisan behavior 
provokes procedural ``hard ball'' tactics. In effect, recent 
Senates have witnessed the emergence of a ``new procedural 
normal.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \158\ Lee, Beyond Ideology, p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              the emergence of a ``new procedural normal''

    There is arguably a ``new procedural normal'' in the 
Senate, which coexists in uneasy tension with the regular 
order. This procedural duality is something akin to the 
``layering'' of the landmark 1974 Budget Act atop the 
traditional authorization and appropriations processes.\159\ It 
also emulates a ``two track'' scheduling system in the Senate: 
measures that enjoy broad support are taken up during a session 
day on one track (in the morning, for example) and measures 
subject to dilatory tactics are slated for consideration on the 
second track (in the afternoon, for instance).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \159\ House and Senate rules create a distinction between 
authorizations and appropriations. Authorizations establish, continue, 
or modify Federal programs and entities, and they allow them to be 
funded. Appropriations (spending bills) fund authorized Federal 
agencies and programs. For various reasons, such as an overly 
fragmented legislative budget process, Congress passed the 1974 Budget 
Act. Among other things, it created House and Senate Budget Committees 
that usually prepare an annual concurrent budget resolution that, if 
adopted, establishes Congress' framework for considering revenue, 
spending, and budget-related legislation. However, Congress did not 
institute this fiscal reorganization by abolishing the authorization 
and appropriations processes. Such an attempt would have pitted the 
most powerful committees and Members against one another and 
jeopardized any chance of realizing budgetary reform. Instead, Congress 
added another budget ``layer'' to those already in place in the House 
and Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The origins of the new procedural normal stem from the 
willingness of Members and the two parties to use their 
procedural prerogatives to the limit to advance their 
legislative and political goals. A gridlocked Senate might be 
the opposition's goal. The majority's failure to pass 
legislation is the minority's success. On the other hand, the 
majority leader's job is to win Senate action on the party's 
agenda. The party leader also wants to protect his electorally 
vulnerable Members from casting tough votes on campaign-
inspired amendments that challengers can use in attack ads 
against incumbents.
    Thus, the perception or reality of minority obstructionism 
provokes parliamentary maneuvers by the majority leader that 
typically restrict the minority's amendment and debate 
opportunities. These actions give rise to angry responses from 
the opposition. They charge that the majority party's tactics 
are destroying the Senate. ``Throughout its history, all 
senators have had two essential opportunities to participate: 
the right to offer amendments to legislation and the right to 
unlimited debate,'' explained a senior GOP Senator. ``The 
current Senate majority has attacked both of these rights 
relentlessly.'' \160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \160\ Orrin G. Hatch, ``Destroying the Senate--and Our Liberties,'' 
The Washington Times, August 4, 2014, p. B1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Three principal motivations trigger these back-and-forth 
partisan and procedural clashes. First, Democrats want to make 
laws by achieving favorable action on their own and President 
Obama's priorities. Republicans often want to stop Democratic-
preferred priorities from becoming laws because they strongly 
disagree with them. Second, inaction also works to the GOP's 
electoral advantage as a campaign theme against the ``do 
nothing'' Democratic Senate. Moreover, the next election could 
make the minority the majority party. In that case, many of the 
former majority party's proposals would simply be ignored or 
rejected out of hand.
    Third, the Senate has a long tradition of allowing 
extensive debate and permitting nonrelevant amendments. From 
the majority leader's perspective, opposition party Senators 
want an open amendment process to force political votes, 
embarrass the majority party, waste the Senate's time, and 
derail the legislation. The majority leader often states that 
he would agree to negotiate a reasonable number of relevant 
amendments to legislation. He says, however, that he does not 
get much help from the minority leadership in reaching 
agreements to process legislation because of strong disputes 
within that party.\161\ Even if minority Members have the 
chance to offer a number of amendments to pending legislation, 
asserts the majority leader, many in the opposition still vote 
against the bill on final passage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \161\ Manu Raju and Burgess Everett, ``Reid Defends Leadership of 
the Senate,'' Politico, March 6, 2014, p. 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senate Republicans view things differently. They see a 
dramatic erosion of the right of Senators to offer a reasonable 
number of amendments to legislation, including nonrelevant 
amendments. They dislike intensely the idea that the majority 
leader acts like a ``one-person House Rules Committee,'' 
preclearing only certain GOP amendments for floor action. 
Republicans frequently remind the majority leader that the 
Senate was designed to act slowly and deliberately, practices 
that allow the views of the minority Members and the people 
they represent to be heard rather than ignored. GOP leaders 
also stress that no change in Senate rules is required to make 
the Senate work in a more collegial and productive fashion. 
``This does not require a change of rules,'' remarked Senator 
Lamar Alexander, echoing the sentiment of GOP leader Mitch 
McConnell. ``This requires a change of behavior--some on our 
part on this side of the aisle, but a great deal of behavior'' 
on the part of the majority leader, who sets the Senate's 
agenda.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \162\ Congressional Record, v. 160, January 8, 2014, p. S113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This clash of views reflects an age-old source of 
procedural tension in the Senate: how best to protect the 
traditional right of the minority (an individual, a small 
group, or the minority party) to debate and amend legislation 
while ensuring the right of the majority to decide and vote on 
measures and matters. In the view of Senator Charles Schumer, 
two things are required to get the Senate back to the art of 
legislating. ``One, an ability to offer amendments. But second, 
an ability to vote on final passage, have an up-or-down vote on 
final passage once those amendments are disposed of one way or 
the other.'' \163\ Minority party Members view matters 
differently. ``Today, it is, shut up, sit down, don't offer 
amendments,'' stated Senator Dan Coats. The Senate has become 
the ``world's least deliberative body, not the most 
deliberative body.'' \164\ As another Senator exclaimed: ``If a 
Senator cannot offer an amendment, why vote to cut off debate 
and go to final passage?'' \165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\ Ibid., January 14, 2014, p. S303.
    \164\ Ibid., May 14, 2014, p. S3008.
    \165\ Congressional Record, vol. 156, December 21, 2010, p. S10855. 
The Senator was Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Schumer's aspirations are hard to realize given 
acrimonious partisanship, divided government, and the 
exploitation of the Senate's permissive rules by each party. 
For the majority, this often means restricting the minority's 
ability to offer nonrelevant amendments. For the vote-short 
minority, it can mean using a panoply of procedures, such as 
threatening or using the filibuster, to impede or prevent 
decisionmaking. One consequence of this parliamentary dynamic 
is the emergence of a new procedural normal that has reshaped 
the upper House's governance in significant ways. Among its 
more prominent features, in no special order, are these six: 
\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \166\ For more detail on these procedures, see Walter J. Oleszek, 
Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 9th ed. (Washington, 
DC: Sage, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Filling the amendment tree
    By precedent, the majority leader has the right of first 
recognition if no Senator is holding the floor. The recognition 
prerogative enables the majority leader to offer amendment 
after amendment until all eligible amendments based on Senate 
precedent have been offered to a bill. At that point, the 
amendment process is ``frozen.'' Filling the tree by the 
majority leader has surged in recent years to prevent the 
minority from offering political message amendments that could 
cause electoral grief for majority Members up for reelection. 
Genuine efforts to improve the substance of legislation through 
amendments are also foreclosed by this tactic.
Budgeting
    In recent years, Congress has been unable to enact what was 
once routine: the 12 annual appropriations (spending) bills 
funding the government by the start of a new fiscal year. 
Delays are common because of conflicts over spending for 
various programs and priorities. The result: the Federal 
Government frequently operates on continuing resolutions, 
sometimes for only a few weeks at a time, that keep the 
government funded until individual spending bills or an omnibus 
appropriations measure is crafted that might be composed of 
several unacted-upon appropriations measures.
Conference committees
    Once called the ``third house of Congress,'' a conference 
panel--composed of House conferees and Senate conferees--was 
typically created ad hoc from members of the committees of 
jurisdiction to resolve bicameral differences on legislation 
when the House and Senate passed dissimilar versions of the 
same bill. Use of conference committees has declined over the 
years in large measure because their creation can be blocked in 
the Senate by extended debate. Moreover, when the production of 
laws is low, as in the 113th Congress (2013-2014), there is 
little need to create these panels.
Cloture votes
    There has been a marked increase in the number of cloture 
votes. For instance, they surged from 61 in the 107th Congress 
(2001-2003) to 112 in the 110th Congress (2007-2008).\167\ Part 
of the explanation for the increase is the coordinated and 
orchestrated use of partisan filibusters by the minority 
leadership rather than, as before, individual Senators engaged 
in prolonged debate. For his part, the majority leader often 
files cloture if there is an objection made when he offers a 
debatable motion to bring a measure to the floor. GOP Senators 
complain that cloture is filed even before debate has begun. 
Moreover, they object to the majority leader's requests to 
bring legislation to the floor under conditions that prevent 
Republicans from offering relevant and nonrelevant amendments 
of their choosing to legislation. To be sure, the majority 
leader strongly defends his management of the Senate and 
laments the unwillingness of the minority to engage in 
negotiations with him.\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \167\ According to Majority Leader Reid, Minority Leader McConnell 
has ``orchestrated 442 filibusters since Obama took office.'' McConnell 
disputes that number citing Reid's erroneous methodology: counting the 
filing of cloture motions as equivalent to filibusters. See Jonathan 
Martin, ``Kentucky Derby,'' The New York Times Magazine, August 31, 
2014, p. 40.
    \168\ Manu Raju and Burgess Everett, ``Reid Defends Leadership of 
the Senate,'' Politico, March 6, 2014, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 60-vote Senate
    Majority votes have traditionally been common in the Senate 
to pass measures or matters, except for those supermajority 
requirements specified in the Constitution, laws, or Senate 
rules. Today, there is a new normal: 60 votes are required for 
enacting virtually all types of measures. It has become an 
institutionalized norm, replacing the majoritarian standard. 
The usual practice is for the 60-vote requirement to be 
specified in unanimous consent agreements for the enactment of 
measures and amendments. The new voting standard serves the 
interests of both parties: the majority is assured a direct 
vote in its policy alternative and a unified minority with 41 
or more votes can prevent adoption of proposals they dislike.
The ``nuclear option''
    On November 21, 2013, the Senate adopted a historic new 
Senate precedent that established majority cloture--rather than 
Rule XXII's requirement of 60 votes--to end filibusters on 
executive and judicial nominees, excepting only the Supreme 
Court.\169\ In the Senate, a precedent can be established by 
majority vote when the Senate overturns a ruling of the 
Presiding Officer. Once created, precedents trump formal Senate 
rules. In this instance, the nuclear option had the effect of 
``amending'' the supermajority provision for cloture in Rule 
XXII without changing the text of that rule. Tellingly, a 
higher 67-vote requirement is imposed by Rule XXII to end 
filibusters on proposals to amend Senate rules. ``Amending by 
precedent'' bypasses that requirement entirely and accomplishes 
what amounts to rules changes by majority vote. Senator Reid 
employed the controversial so-called nuclear option because he 
was frustrated that Republicans were undermining the Senate's 
constitutional ``advice and consent'' responsibility by 
filibustering President Obama's executive and, particularly, 
judicial branch nominees. Party leaders have long known about 
the nuclear option, and sometimes employed it on comparatively 
less consequential matters, but only in the polarized Senate 
was it actually used by the majority party in a carefully 
orchestrated process. The effect of the nuclear option was 
twofold: it increased significantly Senate approval of the 
President's nominees, and it provoked procedural retribution by 
the GOP.\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \169\ On November 21, 2013, Majority Leader Reid raised a point of 
order that ``the vote on cloture under rule XXII for all nominations 
other than for the Supreme Court of the United States is by majority 
vote.'' For the procedural details associated with the establishment of 
the new authoritative precedent, see Congressional Record, vol. 159, 
November 21, 2013, pp. S8416-S8418.
    \170\ Burgess Everett, ``How Going Nuclear Unclogged the Senate,'' 
Politico, August 22, 2014, p. 2. Worth mention is a procedure called 
``reconciliation''; it was adopted as part of the landmark 1974 Budget 
Act. Its purpose is to bring existing law into conformity with the 
current budget resolution. Procedurally, reconciliation is of especial 
importance in the Senate because reconciliation measures are treated 
differently than are other bills and amendments under terms outlined in 
the 1974 Budget Act. These measures, and amendments thereto, cannot be 
filibustered, amendments must be germane, and passage requires a 
majority. It is not surprising that proposals, such as various 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act, are sometimes attached to 
filibuster-proof reconciliation bills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To govern the contemporary Senate means that extraordinary 
procedures are often used by the majority party if legislation 
is to have a chance to become public law. In response, the 
minority party castigates the majority for its untoward actions 
and employs its formidable parliamentary resources to frustrate 
the majority's actions. When delay and stalemate result, both 
parties use the media to try to win the ``blame game'' in the 
court of public opinion. To be sure, each party accuses the 
other of blocking measures by abusing their parliamentary 
prerogatives.
    Among the consequences of partisan procedural maneuvers and 
counterresponses are an emphasis on political messaging and 
campaigning by legislating; an inability to address serious 
national problems; popular opinion ratings for the legislative 
branch in the single digits or low teens; and a decline of 
trust among lawmakers. In the view of former Senate Majority 
Leader Tom Daschle (2001-2002), ``Because we can't bond, we 
can't trust. Because we can't trust, we can't cooperate. 
Because we can't cooperate, we become dysfunctional.'' \171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \171\ David Rogers, ``The Lost Senate,'' Politico, October 9, 2009, 
p. 14. Also see Norm Ornstein, ``Trust Is Not Enough,'' National 
Journal Daily, October 1, 2014, pp. 9-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       VII. Summary Observations

    Three summary observations are useful to end with and each 
will be discussed in separate parts. The first reviews several 
of the concerns commonly made about the current era of sharper 
partisanship. The second focuses on the various types of 
internal and external changes that have been proposed to 
ameliorate the conditions that have given rise to the party 
polarization that affects governance. The third part suggests 
that given the Nation's constitutional system of separate 
institutions sharing and competing for power, and the features 
of the conditional party government model, it is almost 
inevitable that Congress will experience variable degrees of 
legislative gridlock and stalemate. After all, one job of 
Congress is to stop bad ideas from being law. Gridlock to one 
Member may be viewed as success to another.

                      Consequences of Polarization

    Congressional change reveals that regular order in 
lawmaking is a flexible construct. Today, it is common in both 
Chambers for lawmakers to harken back to the regular order of 
the ``good old days,'' the so-called ``textbook Congress'': 
committee review of measures, adequate floor debate and 
amendments by both parties, and so on.\172\ To be sure, the 
textbook or conventional model of lawmaking has been followed 
to varying degrees in each of the different House and Senate 
eras. But as Majority Leader Reid replied to a Member praising 
the virtues of the textbook approach, ``[T]hat was then, this 
is now.'' \173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \172\ See Kenneth A. Shepsle, ``The Changing Textbook Congress,'' 
in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., Can the Government Govern? 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), pp. 238-266.
    \173\ Congressional Record, vol. 159, November 19, 2013, p. S8180.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    And ``now'' in both Chambers means that legislating by 
committee is often minimized or bypassed, with the top party 
leaders in each Chamber taking the lead in crafting party-
preferred priorities. Debate and amendments are commonly 
limited in both Chambers, often to protect vulnerable lawmakers 
from casting tough votes and to prevent the opposition from 
offering proposals that undermine the priorities of the 
majority party. Conference committees are seldom convened, in 
part because of bicameral stalemates on legislation. Governing 
often occurs by brinksmanship with Congress lurching from one 
crisis to another. Legislative action on major issues is often 
postponed. Any of the 12 appropriations bills to fund the 
government are seldom enacted by the start of the fiscal year 
(October 1). Forging compromise on many key bills is sometimes 
impossible to achieve when many Members view negotiations as a 
sellout and a violation of their principles and their promises 
to constituents.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \174\ Former House GOP leader (1981-1994) Robert Michel of Illinois 
made this observation about principles and compromises: ``[Y]ou just 
can't go around shouting your principles, you have to subject those 
principles to the test of open debate against those [who] don't share 
those principles.'' He added: ``But true debate is not principled 
unless the `Golden Rule' is applied, which simply means that you treat 
your fellow Members the same way you want to be treated.'' Ed O'Keefe 
and Philip Rucker, ``Tom Foley Remembered, as His Colleagues Beg for 
Civility,'' The Washington Post, October 30, 2013, p. A3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A consequence of all this is that other institutions--the 
Supreme Court, the Federal Reserve, the States, and Federal 
agencies--begin to make decisions that arguably should be made 
by Congress. In his 2014 State of the Union Address, President 
Obama said if Congress gridlocked on his agenda, he would 
simply bypass the legislative branch and use his executive 
powers to make policy. ``America does not stand still--and 
neither will I,'' he said. ``So wherever I can take steps 
without legislation to expand opportunity for more American 
families, that's what I'm going to do.'' The President said 
that he would use the ``pen and phone'' to advance his agenda 
(Executive orders and signing statements, for example), and he 
has, much to the consternation of many lawmakers in both 
Chambers and parties. As policymaking authority moves away from 
its important place in Congress to other institutions, many of 
which comprise unelected officials who operate with little 
transparency and accountability, then representative government 
of the people, by the people, and for the people is eroded.
    Unknown is how long the current extremely partisan House 
and Senate and the polarized, sorted electorate might remain in 
place. As a political scientist pointed out, ``Voters have got 
better sorted by party; parties have got better sorted by 
ideology; and parties have got more ideological.'' \175\ 
Another political scientist contends that, today, 
``partisanship, ideology, and issue preferences go together in 
a way that they did not in the mid-20th century. While issues 
and ideology used to crosscut the partisan distribution [for 
example, many supporters and opponents of civil rights in the 
1960s were in the Democratic Party], today they reinforce it.'' 
\176\ It is impossible to predict whether these polarizing 
conditions are temporary, semipermanent, or permanent. On the 
other hand, it is possible to predict with certainty that, as 
President John F. Kennedy stated in his 1962 State of the Union 
Message to Congress: ``The one unchangeable certainty is that 
nothing is unchangeable or certain.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \175\ Jill Lepore, ``Long Division,'' The New Yorker, December 2, 
2013, p. 76.
    \176\ Quote is from political scientist Morris Fiorina in Suzanne 
Weiss, ``A Peak of Partisanship,'' State Legislatures, July/August 
2014, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          Congress and Change

    If legislative change is inevitable, at some point a 
different congressional context or dynamic will surely emerge, 
perhaps driven by an electorate upset with the congressional 
status quo or the emergence of new social, technological, 
economic, and political conditions. Major legislative change is 
regularly triggered by developments in the larger political 
system. Given public and Member interest in change, there is no 
shortage of options to strengthen Congress' capacity to address 
the Nation's problems, often by minimizing the forces and 
processes that ostensibly contribute to gridlock. A few 
examples of external and internal options illustrate the nature 
of the suggestions. Important to note is that many of these 
reform ideas are unlikely to occur for various reasons--
difficulty of achievement, uncertainty and skepticism about 
their effectiveness, or scant support in Congress and the 
country.

                            external changes

    One set of options involves expanding the composition of 
the electorate, for example, by increasing the incentives for 
people to vote in primary and general elections. A key reason: 
political professionals for both parties typically work to turn 
out their supporters and suppress those who would vote for the 
opposition. Partisan interest groups work ``to keep 
independents, swing voters and occasional voters home . . . . 
They would like nothing better than to have elections 
determined by whichever side can muster more of its true 
believers.'' \177\ Changing the electorate might work to 
alleviate this partisan reality. One proposal is to follow the 
mandatory voting model of Australia: require registered voters 
to pay a fine if they do not vote or provide a reason for not 
doing so (illness, for example). After decades of experience, 
Australia has a ``turnout rate of more than 95 percent,'' with 
about 3 percent opting to vote for ``none of the above.'' \178\ 
A related alternative to expand the electorate is to make 
voters eligible to win a cash lottery: ``Vote and You Could Win 
Thousands!'' The chair of the Ethics Commission of Los Angeles 
City has suggested this approach as a way to increase voter 
turnout.\179\ On the other hand, encouraging people to vote by 
offering them a chance to win a lottery has downsides. For 
example, this proposal might lure to the polls the most 
uninformed and uninterested individuals.\180\ Other ways to 
encourage more people to vote might be to make election day a 
Federal holiday, promote weekend voting, or encourage the 
States to consider innovative options for people to cast their 
votes.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \177\ Opinion, ``5 Reasons the Midterms Matter,'' USA Today, 
September 2, 2014, p. 6A.
    \178\ Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It's Even Worse Than 
It Looks (New York: Basic Books, 2012), p. 141. Chapters 4 through 7 of 
this book present an array of electoral, political, and institutional 
reforms.
    \179\ Interview with Nathan Hochman, the chair of the Los Angeles 
Ethics Commission, ``Bucks for Ballots?'' Los Angeles Times, August 27, 
2014, online edition.
    \180\ George F. Will, ``A Perfectly Awful Idea: Pay Voters,'' The 
Washington Post, September 21, 2014, p. A23.
    \181\ Katy Owens Hubler, ``Voting: What's Next?'' State 
Legislatures, July/August 2014, pp. 59-61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another set of options removes the House redistricting 
process from State legislatures. The objective is to end 
partisan gerrymanders by State legislatures and, for example, 
assign that responsibility to an outside independent and 
bipartisan commission of private citizens. The purposes of the 
redistricting option are twofold: first, to increase the 
opportunity for centrists to win office and to minimize the 
election of Members who are too far left or too far right; 
second, to strive to make House districts more competitive 
electorally (as already mentioned, over 90 percent of House 
incumbents are regularly reelected). Scholars, however, suggest 
that redistricting may have limited impact on polarization of 
the House, noting that the Senate's extreme partisanship 
mirrors the House. Moreover, States with only one House Member 
are as sharply partisan as those represented by several 
Members.
    A third set of options is to encourage the States to 
establish new forms of primaries in which more voters can 
participate. For example, everyone who is running, regardless 
of party, appears on the ballot. The top two vote-gatherers 
advance to the general election, even if that means a contest 
between two Democrats or two Republicans. A principal advocate 
of this approach, which is observed by California, Louisiana, 
and Washington State, suggests that it would ``encourage more 
participation in primaries'' and ``remove the incentive that 
pushes our politicians to kowtow to the [extreme] factions of 
their party'' that vote in the usually low turnout party 
primaries.\182\ Scholars doubt ``that changes in primary 
participation can explain the polarizing trends of the past 
three decades.'' \183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \182\ Charles E. Schumer, ``End Partisan Primaries, Save America,'' 
The New York Times, July 22, 2014, p. A19. Also see Reid Wilson, ``To 
Cure Rampant Partisanship, Empower Voters in the Middle,'' The 
Washington Post, October 19, 2013, p. A5.
    \183\ Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty, ``Causes and Consequences 
of Polarization,'' in Negotiating Agreement in Politics, p. 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            internal changes

    Examples of internal changes that Congress might undertake 
include these three. First, one suggestion is to move the House 
and Senate away from their current ``Tuesday to Thursday'' 
weekly work pattern. Members arrive in Washington, DC, from 
their States or districts on Monday, concentrate their manifold 
responsibilities in 3 days, and depart on Thursday evening or 
Friday to go home to meet with constituents and engage in other 
representational activities, to travel elsewhere to fundraise, 
to campaign for others or their party, or to raise their 
national visibility.\184\ A recommendation is for each Chamber 
to employ a coordinated Monday through Friday work schedule for 
3 out of 4 weeks, with the 4th week set aside exclusively for 
constituency work back home or other congressional activities. 
One benefit of maximizing their time in Washington, say 
proponents of this approach, is that Members would have more 
opportunities to develop bipartisan collaborative relationships 
that might facilitate lawmaking and oversight (the review of 
executive branch performance). On the other hand, voters seem 
to want lawmakers to spend more time in their States or 
districts.\185\ Technology might be able to accommodate the 
clash between what some lawmakers might prefer (more time in 
Washington) or the country might need versus what their 
constituents want (more time at home).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \184\ Representative Dingell of Michigan explained why bipartisan 
collegiality is hard to come by in today's Congress: ``We hit town on a 
Monday or Tuesday afternoon, we vote at 6:30, and one of the first 
things we're doing is checking to see about getting a plane back to the 
district. Families don't get to know each other, members don't get to 
know each other. The things that used to pull us together--the 
association of the families, the gym of the House--they don't do this 
anymore, and so the members don't [get] the closeness and we don't get 
trust.'' Ashley Parker, ``From `a Child of the House' to the Longest-
Serving Member,'' The New York Times, June 6, 2013, p. A14. Today, 
Members' families do not usually move to the Washington, DC, area for 
various reasons: to avoid campaign charges that they've ``gone 
Washington,'' the high cost of housing in the DC area, concerns about 
uprooting their children, or the fact that many women are now in the 
workforce and reluctant to leave their home-State jobs.
    \185\ The 3:1 schedule is difficult to implement for various 
reasons, but perhaps none more important than electoral. As a GOP House 
Member stated: ``The more time members stay away from their districts, 
the worse it is for them politically. Few constituents expect to agree 
with their member on all or even most things, but they do get upset if 
the member does not listen or seems not to be listening to them.'' 
Added a Democratic lawmaker, a 5-day work schedule ``leaves you 
vulnerable to a challenger who will be at home `in touch with his 
constituents.' '' The quotations are from Nathan L. Gonzales, ``Why 
Democrats and Republicans Can't Be Friends,'' Roll Call, July 8, 2014, 
online edition. Also see Mark S. Mellman, ``Socializing and 
Polarizing,'' The Hill, April 9, 2014, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, time is perhaps the most valuable commodity of 
lawmakers: there is just too little of it for all their 
responsibilities. For example, new issues constantly make it to 
Congress' agenda, many quite complex. The time available to 
read, study, and reflect on emerging, let alone emergent, 
issues is all too brief. As former Senate Majority Leader 
George Mitchell (1989-1995), pointed out, ``What we do not lack 
is the means by which to learn about issues. There is no 
shortage of information. There is a shortage of time.'' \186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \186\ Congressional Record, v. 135, October 20, 1989, p. 25359.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In brief, Congress might consider ways beyond scheduling 
changes to reconfigure what it does now to determine if more 
time could be made available to Members and the institution if 
certain activities occurred over a longer period, such as 
biennial rather than annual appropriations and budget 
resolutions. Some current work requirements might even be 
eliminated or assigned to other entities. With more time, 
lawmakers might have more opportunities to get to really know 
Members of the opposition party, to socialize together, and to 
develop the trust that allows for bipartisanship cooperation on 
a range of issues.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \187\ Worth noting is neither polarization nor bipartisanship is 
any guarantee that effective legislation would pass Congress. 
Worthwhile measures could pass in either circumstance. However, since 
neither party has a monopoly on good ideas, bipartisanship might at 
least provide a broader range of views on how to resolve pressing 
national issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, an approach that might be the easiest--or hardest--
to accomplish is to persuade a critical mass of lawmakers in 
both Chambers that cooperation and compromise are necessary to 
resolving national problems, especially in the Nation's 
congressional-Presidential system of government. Absent a 
landslide electoral victory--or perhaps several in a row--that 
would allow one party to govern on its own, Members might be 
persuaded that neither party, nor a faction therein, can impose 
its agenda on the other. Persuasion is likely to come over 
time, as it has in the past, from a combination of internal 
legislative leadership and outside pressures from the 
citizenry. Acts of bipartisanship between and among Members 
might also slowly change the polarized culture of Congress. As 
James Madison noted, ``It takes time to persuade men [and 
women] to do even what is for their own good.'' \188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \188\ Clinton W. Ensign, Inscriptions of a Nation (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1994), p. 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        gridlock and governance

    When the six-decade veteran of the House, John Dingell, 
announced that he would not seek reelection to the 114th 
Congress (2015-2017), he expressed strong dismay because of its 
overly partisan culture and the unwillingness of Members to 
compromise their differences to achieve policy results. ``I 
find serving in the House to be obnoxious,'' declared Dingell. 
``It's become very hard because of the acrimony and bitterness, 
both in Congress and in the streets.'' \189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \189\ Karen Tumulty and Paul Kane, ``Legislative Giant Leaving a 
Changed Congress,'' The Washington Post, February 25, 2014, p. A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In contrast, when Henry Waxman of California, Dingell's 
four-decade Democratic colleague, announced his retirement from 
the House, his perspective on the institution was significantly 
different from Congress' longest serving lawmaker. ``There are 
elements of Congress today that I do not like,'' remarked 
Waxman. ``But I am not leaving out of frustration with 
Congress.'' Patience and persistence are essential to 
lawmaking, said Waxman, ``[Y]ou outlast [the opposition]. You 
keep working. You keep looking for combinations.'' He added:

    Even in today's environment, there are opportunities to 
make real progress. [In the 112th Congress], I worked with 
Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate to pass 
legislation that will ease the nation's growing spectrum 
shortage, spur innovation in new ``Super WiFi'' technologies, 
and create a national broadband network for first responders. 
[In 2013], I worked on a bipartisan basis to enact legislation 
strengthening FDA's authority to stop dangerous drug 
compounding and to track pharmaceuticals through the supply 
chain.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \190\ Representative Henry Waxman, ``Rep. Henry A. Waxman Announces 
Plans to Retire from Congress,'' press release, January 30, 2014, p. 5.

    Who is right? \191\ The short answer is, perhaps, both. 
Five considerations might help to explain the duality of Member 
perspectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \191\ See William F. Connelly, Jr., ``Does James Madison Still Rule 
America?'' Extensions, summer 2014, pp. 10-15. Professor Connelly posed 
the question, ``Who is right?'' in this article. Extensions is a 
publication of the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies 
Center at the University of Oklahoma.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, the constitutional system, by design, makes 
lawmaking difficult whether the United States has a divided or 
unified government. Interbranch and bicameral cooperation and 
conflict are endemic to a system that requires the approval of 
the three elective branches before an idea becomes law. 
Considerable time might pass--years or decades at times--before 
Congress and the country, not to mention the White House, 
finally reach a policymaking consensus. There are occasions 
when Congress acts quickly to address national or international 
crises. Yet one task of representative government is to 
``refine and enlarge the public views,'' as Madison wrote in 
The Federalist (No. 10) deg.. However, if the 
electorate is conflicted on various issues (immigration reform, 
climate change), that reality will be reflected in Congress. In 
the view of a congressional scholar, ``Gridlock does not 
reflect a failure of democratic representation--gridlock 
reflects effective representation of diverging 
constituencies.'' \192\ In short, the Nation's constitutional 
system permits both gridlock and governance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \192\ Abramowitz, ``The Electoral Roots of America's Dysfunctional 
Government,'' p. 728.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, given the conditional party government model in 
which the two parties each exhibit strong ideological unity but 
diverge widely on their policy objectives, Congress emulates at 
times a parliamentary or semiparliamentary system. The minority 
party opposes, while the majority party strives to govern. With 
different parties in charge of the House and Senate, each 
Chamber enacts legislation that remains unacted-upon by the 
other body.\193\ The Chamber that passes many measures can 
argue that it is productive; the other Chamber might contend 
that it, too, is productive by blocking ``message bills'' that 
have no chance of becoming law. Governance in this environment 
becomes problematic because the minority party, especially in 
the Senate, has the procedural tools to stymie the majority 
party's agenda. How, when, or if the conditional party 
government model will change is unclear, but elections are a 
major part of the answer. As GOP Representative James A. 
Garfield of Ohio wrote in 1877, ``the people are responsible 
for the character of their Congress.'' \194\ (In 1881, Garfield 
became the 20th President of the United States.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \193\ Philip Bump, ``Legislative Inaction: So What Else Is New?'' 
The Washington Post, August 10, 2014, p. A2. Also see Stephen Dinan, 
``Do-Something Congress Keeps on Going,'' The Washington Times, 
September 9, 2014, p. A1.
    \194\ James A. Garfield, ``A Century of Congress,'' The Atlantic 
Monthly, vol. 40, July 1877, p. 63. In the view of Representative John 
Dingell, ``there's only one group of people'' that can change Congress 
and ``that's the voters. If they want [Congress] to change, it will 
change.'' Tumulty and Kane, ``Legislative Giant Leaving a Changed 
Congress,'' p. A4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, Congress and the country have gone through many 
other contentious partisan eras. A noted historian called the 
years from 1830 to the 1900s ``The Partisan Era.'' \195\ For 
example, Cornell University history professor Joel Silbey found 
that in the 1840s, ``partisan unity on policy was very high in 
both houses . . . . On tariff and banking bills and other 
economic legislation, on questions of territorial expansion, 
and on most new issues added to the mix, each party was able to 
mobilize the mass of its Members to vote the party line.'' 
\196\ Today's partisan era pales in comparison to the years 
leading up to the Civil War (1861-1865).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \195\ Julian E. Zelizer, ed., The American Congress (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 2004), p. 131.
    \196\ Joel H. Silbey, ``Congress in a Partisan Political Era,'' in 
The American Congress, p. 145.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fast forward to the 20th century to remember the political 
divisions in Congress and the country between rural and urban 
interests and over the New Deal, the Vietnam war, and the 
struggle for civil rights for African Americans. Partisan 
clashes within and outside Congress, and the rivalry and 
gridlock they can promote, have been ``a prime catalyst 
propelling the values, ideas, and policies through which 
American consensus has emerged . . . . Partisan competition has 
been at the center of our struggle to advance as a people and a 
nation. It has been our most important engine for adaptation 
and change--one that remains in full motion.'' \197\ As a 
scholar and top-ranking 30-year staff member of the House 
wrote, Congress and the country ``have endured much more 
partisan, raucous, and rancorous times [over its history], and 
both have emerged the better for it.'' \198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \197\ John L. Hilley, The Challenge of Legislation: Bipartisanship 
in a Partisan World (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 
2008), p. 229.
    \198\ Donald R. Wolfensberger, Congress & the People: Deliberative 
Democracy on Trial (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2000), pp. 282-283. Worth noting is that, periodically, scholars, 
lawmakers, and journalists lament that Congress is not performing as 
well as it might. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, these 
individuals argued for a more disciplined and responsible party system. 
The titles of their books said it all: The Deadlock of Democracy 
(1963), by James McGregor Burns; Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill 
(1964), by Robert Bendiner; Congress: The Sapless Branch (1964), by 
Senator Joseph S. Clark; or House Out Of Order (1965), by 
Representative Richard Bolling. Decades later with two polarized 
parties in Congress, a number of books have been written that express 
dismay at this development. Some titles include The Broken Branch 
(2006), by Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein; Fight Club Politics (2006), 
by Juliet Eilperin; and The Second Civil War (2007), by Ronald 
Brownstein. See Rawls, In Praise of Deadlock, pp. 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fourth, today's Congress confronts an array of complexities 
that make lawmaking more difficult than in previous periods. 
Take the environment, for example. It was once conceived as 
primarily a local or regional issue. To many, it is now a 
planetary challenge. Problems seem harder (terrorism, 
cybersecurity, entitlement reform) to resolve, many have global 
dimensions, and the politics are harder in a nation of over 300 
million people, many represented by numerous interest groups. 
Add to these matters divided government; lack of trust among 
lawmakers; \199\ technology (the Internet, social media, email, 
blogs) that is used, for instance, to frame issues to the 
advantage of partisan viewpoints; fiscal deficits; and the 
competing visions of the two parties as to what constitutes 
``good governance.'' Repealing laws or enacting laws sometimes 
seems to be in conflict as to which should take priority in the 
contemporary House and Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \199\ According to Democratic Senator Martin Heinrich of New 
Mexico, the problem on Capitol Hill is less about ideology and more 
about the reality that lawmakers ``don't trust each other enough to 
work together. A lot of our predecessors were from very different 
ideological places, but they had a personal trust so that they could 
negotiate in good faith.'' He added that the lack of trust ``is really 
caustic to the functionality of this place.'' Dana Milbank, ``Building 
Trust, One Palm Frond at a Time,'' The Washington Post, September 21, 
2014, p. A21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fifth, to a large extent, what shapes the broad policy and 
political context in Congress and the country is the perennial 
and ongoing debate about the role of the central government. 
This issue divided our Founding Fathers--Jefferson favored a 
limited role, and Hamilton an energetic role, for the national 
government. Today, Democrats generally favor an activist, 
problem-solving national government that expands individual 
opportunities; Republicans generally emphasize problem solving 
by the private sector and localities and the values of personal 
freedom and responsibility. Public controversy about the 
national government's size and role is never-ending. It is an 
unresolvable debate that has raged for over 200 years and 
contributes to the acrimonious partisanship dividing the two 
parties and their respective electoral coalitions.
    To conclude: Congress is an institution constantly in flux. 
It remains, however, the world's most influential legislative 
assembly, able to check and balance a powerful executive, to 
initiate policies of its own, and to oversee executive branch 
performance. The policy and political struggles among the 
elective units are permanent features of the Nation's 
constitutional system that continue to shape the evolution and 
work of Congress. Change, in brief, is a permanent feature of 
democratic legislative assemblies. As Thomas Jefferson 
emphasized, ``[A]s new discoveries are made, new truths 
discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change in 
circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with 
the times.'' \200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \200\ Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, The Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, Memorial Edition, vol. 15 (Washington, DC: The Thomas 
Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 1904), p. 41.


 Being a Member of Congress: Some Notable Changes During the Last Half 
                                Century

                           Michael L. Koempel

           Senior Specialist in American National Government

                              ----------                              


        Notable changes have occurred in Congress' evolution 
        from the immediately past congressional era (generally, 
        the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s) to the Congress we know 
        today. These changes have affected Members' experience 
        of their congressional service. Over time, both 
        Chambers developed strategies to reduce the quantity of 
        time given over to legislative work in order to 
        accommodate Members' other duties. Members have met the 
        challenges of constituent relations with information 
        technology, and must now deal with lobbying campaigns 
        directed at their constituents. To accommodate their 
        electoral goals, Members now typically spend a part of 
        nearly every day they are in Washington, DC, raising 
        campaign money. Many Members have chosen to reside in 
        their States or districts to accommodate spouses with 
        careers and to retain their network of social and 
        financial support.

                              Introduction

    This report describes some of the notable changes that have 
occurred in Congress' evolution from the immediately past 
congressional era (generally, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s) to 
the Congress we know today, and reflects upon the impact of 
these changes on Members of Congress and their service.
    The changes and reflections are divided into four topics: 
legislative, representational, political, and personal. For 
each topic, the report discusses one, two, or three aspects of 
service in Congress. It provides an overview of each aspect in 
the earlier era, identifies some of the reasons for change or 
evolution, and briefly explains that aspect of service in 
today's Congress.
    The report demonstrates that change of all sorts, internal 
and external, has affected Congress. Congress today reflects 
shifts in the United States and the world since the 1960s.
    Congress is in a new era, for many reasons, and a new 
framework for understanding it should be considered. Proposals 
for change, reform, or new procedures must be appropriate to 
the new framework. This report is only an introduction to the 
changes Congress has undergone and is neither comprehensive nor 
exhaustive.
    For an analysis of Congress' institutional evolution, see 
the companion CRS centennial report in this volume, The 
Evolving Congress: Overview and Analysis of the Modern Era, by 
Walter J. Oleszek.

                      Legislative Responsibilities

    Today, Members of Congress spend less time in Washington, 
DC, and in session than they did in the previous era. Rather 
than meet 5 or even 4 full days a week, week after week, both 
Chambers tend to set initial votes for a given week to occur 
late on a Monday, allowing Members to travel from their States 
or districts that day. Final votes for weekly sessions 
frequently end Thursday afternoon, in time for Members to make 
late-afternoon and evening flights to the west coast, or by 
midday Friday. Friday sessions might also be held, but often 
without votes being scheduled. Votes drive attendance.
    In addition, Congress has taken more frequent and longer 
recesses, also called district or State work periods, leaving 
Members additional time in their States or districts or to 
undertake other work, such as fundraising and campaign trips on 
their own behalf or on behalf of current or possible future 
colleagues.
    A Member's legislative work in committee, on the floor, and 
with colleagues and Washington staff is packed into the 
Tuesday-to-Thursday timeframe in fewer weeks of session than in 
the previous era.
    The process of compacting the time consumed by legislative 
workload did not begin recently. During the 1970s, the 
legislative workload left little time for Members' other 
duties, such as travel to home States and districts, and their 
personal wishes, such as family time. There were many votes, 
quorum calls, and committee hearings. Over time, both Chambers 
developed strategies to reduce the quantity of time given over 
to legislative work to allow more time for Members' other 
duties and personal wishes. There was a great desire on 
Members' part for more efficiency and predictability in 
scheduling and processing legislation.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ On a related subject, see the companion CRS centennial report 
in this volume, Comparing Modern Congresses: Can Productivity Be 
Measured?, by Jacob R. Straus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         On the House and Senate Floors, a Drive for Efficiency

    The Senate in 1964 made history when, for the first time, 
it voted to end a filibuster on civil rights. The June 10 vote 
was 71-29, four more ``yeas'' than were necessary for cloture. 
The vote ended a 57-day filibuster and came 74 days after the 
House-passed bill was first brought before the Senate.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ ``Civil Rights Act of 1964,'' in Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, 1964, vol. XX (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 
1965), p. 338. For an example of the conditions that may be needed for 
major legislation to be enacted, see the companion CRS centennial 
report in this volume, The Dynamics of Congressional Policymaking: Tax 
Reform, by Jane G. Gravelle.

    It is difficult today to imagine a debate lasting so long 
or the Senate or the House being in session for so long without 
a several-day or weeklong recess. In the Senate in the 
preceding era, Senators' rights to debate and offer amendments 
to amendments and nongermane amendments prevailed.\3\ In the 
House, few measures were considered under the suspension of the 
rules procedure. Most legislation was considered under an 
``open'' special rule, under which all amendments not violating 
a House rule could be offered and then debated for as long as 
another Member sought 5 minutes of debate time.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Another aspect of change in the Senate is explored in the 
companion CRS centennial report in this volume, Collaborative 
Relationships and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate: A Perspective Drawn 
from Firsthand Accounts, by Mark J. Oleszek.
    \4\ See Walter Kravitz, Congressional Quarterly's American 
Congressional Dictionary, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001), p. 
223:
    ``Rule--(2) In the House, a privileged simple resolution proposed 
by the Rules Committee that provides methods and conditions for floor 
consideration of a measure or, rarely, several measures. The resolution 
is also called a special rule, special order, or order of business 
resolution. With few exceptions, major nonprivileged bills are taken up 
under the terms of such resolutions that the House has approved. 
Explicitly or implicitly, a special rule can temporarily waive any rule 
of the House or any statutory rule during consideration of a measure, 
but it may not set aside . . . a motion to recommit, or a 
constitutional requirement.
    ``The common terms for different types of rules usually reflect 
their treatment of amendments. An open rule puts no limit on the number 
of amendments that may be offered, providing the amendments do not 
violate a rule or practice of the House. A closed rule, sometimes 
called a gag rule, permits no amendments or only those offered by the 
reporting committee. A modified rule permits some amendments but not 
others. According to Deschler-Brown Precedents, a modified open rule 
permits any germane amendment except certain designated ones, while a 
modified closed rule prohibits the offering of amendments except those 
it designates. Some rules ban amendments to certain parts of a measure 
but not to other parts.''finagled deg.
    \5\ Well into the 1970s, tax bills were routinely considered on the 
floor under a closed rule. In that instance, the reform or change that 
occurred was to consider them on the floor under what was termed a 
modified closed rule, which today would be referred to as a structured 
rule, under which only amendments listed in the rule or the 
accompanying Rules Committee report were in order. See, for example, 
``House Passes Wide-Ranging Tax Revision Bill,'' in Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, 1975, vol. XXXI (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1976), pp. 151-152.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In both Chambers, it was common for specific bills to 
consume days (in the House) or more than a week (in the Senate) 
of floortime. Members spoke on the floor and voted often. These 
circumstances are not unknown in the contemporary House and 
Senate; they have simply become less common.
    Beginning in the 1970s, both Chambers developed strategies 
to reduce the legislative workload on the floor and the time it 
consumed, which freed Members to pursue their many other duties 
and addressed their desire for added personal time. Gradually, 
Members gained the time they needed for other responsibilities, 
although apparently not personal time (see ``Personal Impact of 
Congressional Service'' below). In the House, changes that 
increased the Chamber's efficiency in managing its legislative 
workload included:
   making the motion to suspend the rules in order--originally 
        on alternate Mondays, and then gradually expanding it to its 
        status today, where it is in order on Mondays, Tuesdays, and 
        Wednesdays;
   barring commemorative legislation;
   experimenting with special rules that were alternatives to 
        open rules, such as preprinting rules, modified open rules, and 
        modified closed rules,\5\ eventually settling on structured 
        rules as the most common form of special rule that is used;
   restricting to very few occasions the ability of a Member to 
        make a point of order that a quorum is not present;
   permitting cluster voting and 5-minute and 2-minute voting;
   limiting the number of 1-minute speeches and the time 
        available for special order speeches;
   allowing only full-text substitutes to annual concurrent 
        resolutions on the budget; and
   eliminating the second annual (autumn) concurrent resolution 
        on the budget required by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
        (P.L. 93-344).
    In the Senate, changes and innovations that increased the 
Chamber's efficiency in managing its legislative workload 
included:
   cutting to three-fifths of the membership, from two-thirds 
        voting, the number of Senators' votes required to invoke 
        cloture; \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ The Senate has also recently established a precedent allowing a 
majority vote to invoke cloture on executive and judicial nominations, 
except nominations to the Supreme Court. For an examination of this 
precedent and its operation in the 113th Congress, see CRS Report 
R43331, Majority Cloture for Nominations: Implications and the 
``Nuclear'' Proceedings, by Valerie Heitshusen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   restricting debate time and other elements of consideration 
        after cloture has been invoked to prevent so-called postcloture 
        filibusters; \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy 
Process, 9th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2014), p. 315.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   creating the two-track system for consideration of one or 
        more bills at the same time (e.g., one in the morning and one 
        in the afternoon) so that a measure or amendment being debated 
        extensively does not halt the Senate's consideration of other 
        legislation; \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ The Senate has operated on more than two tracks. For instance, 
it has divided a day into three tracks, with a different bill on each 
track.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   expanding the use of unanimous consent agreements to 
        structure the Senate's consideration of measures and other 
        matters;
   permitting ``side-by-side'' consideration of amendments;
   using cluster voting;
   developing the ``hotline'' to allow routine legislation and 
        nominations to be quickly approved; and
   adopting the Byrd rule to exclude extraneous matter from 
        reconciliation bills and resolutions.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ After the late Senator Robert Byrd, who first offered the 
amendment disallowing extraneous matter. For an examination of the Byrd 
rule, see CRS Report RL30862, The Budget Reconciliation Process: The 
Senate's ``Byrd Rule,'' by Bill Heniff, Jr.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Through these changes, Representatives and Senators gained 
a degree of efficiency and predictability in the workload on 
the Chambers' floors. In the House, a great deal of legislation 
is now considered under the suspension of the rules procedure. 
Its use of structured special rules means that most measures 
for which there is an amendment process can be completely 
considered in less than a day. In the Senate, noncontroversial 
legislation and nominations may be considered and agreed to by 
unanimous consent, taking just a few minutes of the Senate's 
time. Other legislation and nominations nonetheless require 
considerable floortime. When the Senate is able to reach 
unanimous consent on a comprehensive set of procedures or on 
consecutive iterative sets of procedures for considering 
legislation or nominations, it can move methodically through 
its workload.
    Members, however, have given up perquisites and privileges 
over this long period. To be able to complete floor 
consideration of a major piece of legislation in a day or less, 
Representatives have fewer opportunities to offer first-degree 
amendments, and they have largely lost the ability to offer 
substitute and second-degree amendments. Fewer Representatives 
are able to speak because amendment debate is often limited to 
10 minutes, putting more pressure on the 1 hour allowed for 
debate on a special rule and the usual 1 hour of general debate 
allowed on a measure before the amendment process begins.
    Senators, too, have fewer opportunities to offer amendments 
because leadership over the last decade or more has become 
increasingly reluctant to bring measures to the floor in the 
absence of a unanimous consent agreement on the amendment 
process.\10\ Although Senators and leadership have many 
purposes in wanting to extend or curtail the amendment process, 
one concern they share is the time that will be consumed and 
the impact of an extended debate on the Senate's workload and 
individual Senators' other duties.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ ``No Democratic members of the class of 2012 have ever 
received a vote on their amendments on the Senate floor.'' Burgess 
Everett, ``Senate Democrats push back on gridlock,'' Politico, June 26, 
2014, at http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/washington-gridlock-
108330.html.
    \11\ See the companion CRS centennial report in this volume, The 
Evolving Congress: Overview and Analysis of the Modern Era, by Walter 
J. Oleszek; the CRS Web site, for numerous products on House and Senate 
procedures, many of which are hyperlinked on a page called 
Congressional Operations, at http://www.crs.gov/Analysis/CongOps.aspx; 
and Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   In Committees, a Reduction of Time

    The . . . [House Education and Labor] Committee marked up 
H.R. 2362 [the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 
ESEA] in executive sessions between Feb. 25 and March 2. [The 
committee markups occurred Thursday, February 25; Friday, 
February 26; Saturday, February 27; and Tuesday, March 2.] On 
March 2 it ordered the bill reported with amendments on a 23-8 
vote.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ ``First General School Aid Bill Enacted,'' in Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, 1965, vol. XXI (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1966), p. 275; and ``House Committees,'' Daily Digest, 
Congressional Record, vol. 120, part 23 (February 25, 1965), pp. D72, 
D76, D80.

    Committees in the two Chambers serve both similar and 
dissimilar purposes. A committee is the forum in which Members 
develop expertise on specific policy issues, legislation, and 
laws. A committee is also the forum for Members closest to 
particular policy issues to serve as the Chambers' eyes and 
ears through hearings and other means and to determine how to 
address an issue--through hearings, an investigation, a staff 
study, a letter to the President or a Cabinet secretary, a site 
visit, legislation, or another mechanism. If legislation is 
needed, committees draft it or choose from the alternatives 
that have been introduced, and they mark up and report 
measures.
    Committees also reflect the dissimilarities of their parent 
Chambers. In the majoritarian House, Members' opportunities to 
offer amendments on the floor are routinely limited. Even if a 
Member's amendment is made in order, it must usually attract a 
significant number of majority votes to win, whether the 
proponent is a majority- or minority-party Member. Members, 
therefore, seek to have their policy choices, large or small, 
included in committee-reported measures. Committee-reported 
legislation may be approved by the House without extensive 
amendments.
    In the Senate, where rules and traditions favor the rights 
of individual Senators, any Senator may be an important player 
on the Senate floor on any piece of legislation or any 
nomination if he or she wishes to be. Committee-reported 
legislation may be approved by the Senate only after extensive 
amendments, including consideration and possible adoption of 
nonrelevant or nongermane amendments.
    The same issue of time consumed by the legislative workload 
on the floor of the two Chambers was also a concern within 
committees in the earlier era. This concern was magnified when 
the Chambers adopted reforms to open most committee and 
conference meetings to public and media attendance. The 
legislative workload took too much time, to the detriment of 
time available for Members' other duties and personal wishes. 
It was common for committee hearings to be held at the request 
of individual committee members to satisfy a political or 
constituency need, in addition to hearings preparatory for 
markup of the numerous new, annual, and biennial authorization 
bills that Congress regularly considered in the 1970s. Markups 
often took more than 1 day and, for the most important 
authorization bills, might consume a number of days over a 
month or more. The example of the ESEA markup was typical, not 
exceptional. These circumstances are not unknown in the 
contemporary House and Senate; they have simply become less 
common.
    Over time, Members and committees developed a number of 
strategies to reduce the time consumed by their legislative 
workload in committee. These include procedural changes, such 
as
   In the House, rather than using an introduced measure as the 
        markup vehicle, the majority might employ an amendment in the 
        nature of a substitute on which the majority can quickly end 
        the markup process and move to a vote to report if the minority 
        seeks to extend consideration. Alternately, or in addition, 
        committees might use an amendment roster, potentially limiting 
        the amendments that may be considered.
   In the Senate, a committee might use negotiation before 
        markup and unanimous consent at markup to agree quickly to 
        committee members' amendments, deferring amendments that cannot 
        be negotiated and agreed to by unanimous consent to the Senate 
        floor, where they could potentially be offered if the sponsor 
        chooses. Alternately, or in addition, committee members might 
        agree to the concept or principle of one or more amendments, 
        with drafting delegated to committee staff and legislative 
        counsel.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See, for example, Robert G. Kaiser, ``Even when it succeeds, 
Congress fails,'' The Washington Post, May 26, 2013, p. B4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Changes have also occurred in practice, such 
as:finagled deg.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Concerning the funding of House and Senate staffs, see the 
companion CRS centennial report in this volume, Congressional Staffing: 
The Continuity of Change and Reform, by Ida A. Brudnick.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Members declining to ask for hearings,
   staff receiving briefings from agency officials in lieu of 
        hearings,
   staff briefing committee members in lieu of hearings,
   premarkup exchanges among staff to narrow the set of 
        decisions for committee members,\14\
   a decline in the number of authorization bills,
   fewer subcommittee markups, and
   less legislation reported to the parent Chamber.
    Three other important changes have affected committees. 
First, committees' sizes have increased. More Members serve on 
each committee, and more Members have multiple committee 
assignments. Committees and their members are therefore 
affected by the difficulty of Members juggling conflicting 
hearings and meetings, by the loss of flexibility and 
spontaneity associated with having a greater number of members 
on a committee, and by committee members not knowing each other 
well. Members might also be discouraged from attending hearings 
by the amount of time it takes for each member of a committee 
to have time for questions or the opportunity to ask a new 
question late in a hearing. Members' time to make opening 
statements, ask additional questions at hearings, or offer or 
debate amendments at markup may be inhibited by the 
practicalities of completing the task at hand. Public 
attendance at committee meetings may also be affected, where 
committee daises have expanded into public seating areas to 
accommodate larger committee memberships.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ For additional information on committee sizes and ratios, see 
CRS Report R41501, House Legislative Procedures and House Committee 
Organization: Options for Change in the 112th Congress, by Judy 
Schneider and Michael L. Koempel. See also CRS Report RL34752, Senate 
Committee Party Ratios: 98th-112th Congresses, by Matthew E. Glassman; 
and CRS Report R40478, House Committee Party Ratios: 98th-113th 
Congresses, by Matthew E. Glassman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, committees' work products are less influential when 
the majority Chamber leadership wishes to consider legislation. 
In the House, the Rules Committee might be asked by leadership 
to bypass committees or to make in order for floor 
consideration a committee-reported measure that includes 
substantive changes or even leadership's own version of a 
measure. In the Senate, the majority leader might choose a 
legislative vehicle for floor consideration different from one 
reported by a committee. Alternatively, he might choose a 
measure that was placed on the Senate Calendar in lieu of 
committee consideration, or he might choose an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, which he might offer by taking 
advantage of his priority of recognition.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ For an example of the ways in which the House and Senate may 
choose a legislative vehicle for floor consideration, see the companion 
CRS centennial report in this volume, Shocks to the System: Congress 
and the Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, by 
William L. Painter. For an example of policymaking that occurred 
through the appropriations process rather than the authorization 
process, see the companion CRS centennial report in this volume, Use of 
the Appropriations Process to Influence Census Bureau Policy: The Case 
of Adjustment, by Jennifer D. Williams.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A third change affects Members who chair committees or 
serve as ranking minority members, although House Republican 
chairs and ranking minority members are much more dramatically 
affected than Senate Republican chairs and ranking minority 
members. That change is term limits. Under the House rule, a 
Member serving for 6 years as a chair, as a chair and ranking 
minority member, or as a ranking minority member must give up 
that chairmanship or ranking minority member slot.\17\ 
Democrats kept this House rule for the 110th Congress but 
repealed it for the 111th Congress; Republicans reinstated the 
rule in the 112th Congress.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ House rules, under both Democratic and Republican control, 
have limited service on the Budget and Intelligence Committees. House 
rules also exempted the chair of the Rules Committee from a term limit.
    \18\ Committee service is also not necessarily the path to Chamber 
leadership that it once was. See, for example, Janet Hook, ``Kevin 
McCarthy's Rise Shows New Path to Power in Congress,'' Wall Street 
Journal, June 16, 2014, at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/06/16/
kevin-mccarthys-rise-shows-new-path-to-power-in-congress/tab/print.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the Senate, the term-limit rule is a Republican 
Conference rule only and allows a Republican Senator to serve 6 
years as a chair and 6 years as a ranking minority member 
before he or she is precluded from one or both of the two top 
places on a committee. In addition to the distinction in 
tolling service separately for chairing and serving as ranking 
minority member, senior Senators can relatively easily assert 
their seniority to claim a chairmanship or ranking minority 
member position on the committee of their choice when they are 
the most senior on two or more committees.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ For an examination of the committee assignment and chair 
selection processes in the two Chambers, see the companion CRS 
centennial report in this volume, Committee Assignments and Party 
Leadership: An Analysis of Developments in the Modern Congress, by Judy 
Schneider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another traditional responsibility of committee members is 
to serve as conferees on House-Senate conference committees, 
seeking to reconcile differences between House-passed and 
Senate-passed companion legislation. In the past era, it was 
common in the last months of each session of Congress for a 
dozen or more conference committees to be working more or less 
simultaneously. Conference committees have become much less 
common, with the House and Senate preferring the less time-
consuming approach of agreeing to a measure as passed by the 
other Chamber or the alternative of exchanging amendments, a 
process called amendments between the Houses (or, popularly, 
``ping pong'').\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ For an explanation of how the House and Senate may come to 
agreement, see CRS Report 98-696, Resolving Legislative Differences in 
Congress: Conference Committees and Amendments Between the Houses, by 
Elizabeth Rybicki.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Whether the process of amendments between the Houses or a 
formal conference committee is used, the practice has evolved 
that most of the work of reconciling differences is conducted 
by the chairs and majority staff of the committees of 
jurisdiction. The ranking minority members and minority staffs 
of the same committees might also participate. House and Senate 
party leaders are often key players in resolving bicameral 
differences on major legislation. Some conferees might also be 
appointed to provide the Members with visibility. If a 
conference has been convened, it might meet just once, to 
approve agreements, or twice, initially to make opening 
statements and later to approve agreements.
    Again, these changes have afforded Members more time for 
their other duties and personal wishes. Committees have become 
quite efficient: there is less committee work, and what work 
remains is conducted in less time. Many hearings and markups 
still take place, and some hearings and markups cover multiple 
committee meetings, but committee work simply consumes less 
time in the contemporary Congress than it did in the previous 
era.
    These changes have come at a cost to Members, however, who 
have lost some of what could be one of the most satisfying 
parts of being a Member of Congress. It is through committee 
work that Members have traditionally developed deep expertise 
in policy subjects, administrative feasibility, costs, 
federalism, and other aspects of drafting legislation. 
Committee sessions and work have also been forums for forming 
working relationships, both within one's own party and across 
the aisle. Committees have been a principal source of Congress' 
influence over and knowledge of the Executive's administration 
of laws. The work and relationships forged in committees have 
also traditionally been a bulwark against Congress being misled 
by executive officials or lobbyists and an asset in effectively 
representing a Member's constituents. If expertise and 
relationships are a desirable goal of committee work, it is 
challenging to develop them with limited time in Washington and 
limited time for a committee's legislative workload.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ The House has held several ``civility retreats,'' starting in 
the 1990s, in an attempt to help Members and their spouses get to know 
each other and decrease some of the acrimony present in debate and 
relationships. For the organizers' discussion of the first retreat, see 
Representative David Skaggs, ``A Successful Bipartisan Retreat,'' 
special order speech, Congressional Record, vol. 143, part 3 (March 19, 
1997), p. 4337.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                For Oversight, Delegation to the Public

    [The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970] authorized citizens 
or groups to bring suits in Federal courts against either the 
administrator, over failure to perform specified duties, or 
alleged violators, including government agencies.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ ``Clean Air Bill Cleared with Auto Emission Deadline,'' in 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970, vol. XXVI (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1971), p. 475.

    One of the most important roles and powers of committees is 
their authority to conduct oversight--to learn, with subpoena 
authority if necessary, about the conduct of the Executive and 
the conduct of private entities or citizens. Oversight is often 
conducted in anticipation of lawmaking. The Federal Government 
is vast, however, and the Nation complex, so that congressional 
committees, even working week after week, would be unable to 
keep up with this responsibility.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ There is some distinction between committees' oversight and 
investigations. Congressional Quarterly's American Congressional 
Dictionary defines oversight as:
    ``Congressional review of the way in which federal agencies 
implement laws--for instance, to ensure that they are carrying out the 
intent of Congress and to inquire into the efficiency of the 
implementation and the effectiveness of the law. The Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 defined oversight as the function of 
exercising continuous watchfulness over the execution of the laws by 
the executive branch.
    ``The rules of both houses assign this responsibility to their 
standing committees and direct them to determine, on the basis of their 
reviews, whether laws within their respective jurisdictions should be 
changed or if additional laws are necessary. The function is also 
sometimes called legislative review.''
    Congressional Quarterly's American Congressional Dictionary defines 
investigative power as:
    ``The authority of Congress and its committees to pursue 
investigations. Congress's investigative power has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court but limited to matters `related to, and in furtherance 
of, a legitimate task of the Congress.' Standing committees in both 
houses are authorized to investigate matters within their 
jurisdictions. Major investigations are sometimes conducted by 
temporary select, special, or joint committees established by 
resolutions for that purpose.'' Congressional Quarterly's American 
Congressional Dictionary, pp. 126; 170-171.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress, consequently, has enabled the public and the 
media to assist it in fulfilling its oversight role. Over the 
last 50 years, Congress has created new entities and 
requirements, such as inspectors general and the Freedom of 
Information Act. These innovations supplemented older entities 
and requirements, such as the Government Accountability Office 
and publication in the Federal Register. Congress has also 
established new oversight mechanisms available to the public. 
These include requirements for public participation and for 
comment periods on proposed government decisionmaking. They 
also include the establishment of Federal causes of action, 
such as those included in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 
to take Federal agencies to court over their implementation of 
a law,\24\ a traditional inquiry of congressional oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ ``To sue in federal court, plaintiffs must have a `cause of 
action.' The term has a special, particularized meaning in federal 
litigation . . . . In federal litigation . . . a party has a cause of 
action only if his or her legal rights have been violated and he or she 
has a recognized constitutional and/or statutory right to redress the 
violation by bringing an affirmative action in federal court.'' 
``Chapter 5: Causes of Action,'' in Federal Practice Manual for Legal 
Aid Attorneys, ed. Jeffrey S. Guttman (Chicago: Sargent Shriver Center 
on National Poverty Law, 2014), at http://federalpracticemanual.org/
node/27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressional committees often conduct oversight that 
informs Congress and the public, influences governmental and 
private behavior, and can lead to the dismissal of Federal 
officials or the prosecution of entities and individuals for 
criminal violations of law. Oversight has also often led to the 
enactment of key Federal laws, such as the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 following the Watergate 
investigations or the Taxpayer Bill of Rights following 
investigations of Internal Revenue Service abuses. The Honest 
Leadership and Open Government Act followed investigations 
surrounding lobbyist Jack Abramoff. Individual Members also 
sometimes conduct effective and influential oversight through 
their personal offices.
    It is challenging to undertake oversight when the time 
available is limited. Oversight is the hard work that precedes 
government reform, when that is the goal of a Member. It 
creates a base of information to identify duplication, 
outdatedness, lack of accountability, or unworkability and, 
from a different perspective, opportunities for improving, 
delegating to other levels of government, or repealing or 
reforming laws. Having conducted oversight, as well, proponents 
of change are ready with ideas when opportunities for 
legislative action arise. Oversight is also another means by 
which committee members build deep expertise, establish working 
relationships with their colleagues, and attract a national 
following for their issues and career paths.

                   Representational Responsibilities

    A Senator faces many challenges in providing representation 
and services to a whole State. California, the largest State in 
population, is one notable example, where its Senators 
represent more than 38 million people. The Pacific Ocean States 
far from Washington, DC, are other noteworthy examples: Alaska 
has an enormous landmass and Hawaii is an archipelago, so 
travel from one part of either State to another part is likely 
to require air travel.
    A Representative faces different challenges. The average 
population of a congressional district is nearly 711,000, based 
on the 2010 census, an increase of nearly 64,000 since the 2000 
census. Responsiveness to that many constituents can be 
difficult for any Representative whose staff has been limited, 
since 1975, to 18. A State such as Montana presents a different 
challenge for its Representative. Montana's population is too 
small, relative to that of other States, for a second 
congressional district, leaving the one Representative with a 
district of just under 1 million inhabitants in the fourth-
largest State in terms of geographic area.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Kristin D. Burnett, 2010 Census Briefs, Congressional 
Apportionment, U.S. Census Bureau, C2010BR-08, Washington, DC, November 
2011, p. 1, at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-
08.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1970, the population of California was just under 20 
million and the average congressional district population was 
465,000.\26\ The population changes between this earlier 
congressional era and 2010 dramatize the potential growth in 
the constituent workload.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ 1970 Census of Population, Supplementary Report: 1970 
Population of Congressional Districts for the 93rd Congress, U.S. 
Census Bureau, Washington, DC, October 1972, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the same time that State and district populations were 
increasing, the number of a Member's constituents was 
outgrowing congressional offices' clerical capacity. Widespread 
automation of office equipment and the advent of information 
technology came to the rescue on Capitol Hill. Today, 
congressional offices and constituents can virtually converse 
through Web sites, email, and social media. The deregulation of 
airlines and advances in jetliner design and technology enabled 
Members of Congress first to become regular travelers to their 
States and districts and later to commute to Washington, DC, as 
many Members do today.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ A sitting Member of Congress, Representative Morris Udall, 
published a guide in 1970 for new Representatives. He said this about 
Representatives' travel allowance:
    ``Each member is entitled to compensation for one round trip to his 
district per month, plus one additional trip to cover costs of travel 
to and from Washington at the beginning and end of each session. Thus, 
if Congress is in session nine months during the year, the member is 
entitled to reimbursement for ten round trips between the Capitol and 
his district. The allowance for one of these is determined at the rate 
of twenty cents per mile via the most direct highway route. The 
allowance for the other round trips is twelve cents per mile or the 
price of commercial travel. No compensation is allowed for 
transportation of family or household goods.''
    Donald G. Tacheron and Morris K. Udall, The Job of the Congressman: 
An introduction to service in the U.S. House of Representatives, 2d ed. 
(Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc., 1970), pp. 58-59. At 
that time, expenditures for specific activities were tightly regulated 
in the House and Senate. The expectation for travel was that Members 
would live in Washington and travel home occasionally, as permitted by 
expenditure limitations. The extra trip, the 10th trip in the example, 
allowed Members who maintained residences in their home district to 
travel there at the end of one session and then return to Washington 
for the beginning of the next session. (Representative Udall was the 
father of Senator Mark Udall and the uncle of Senator Tom Udall.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          Using Technology to Steal the March on Constituents

    Then:

    This is our Flexowriter. The paper tape is pasted together 
at the ends to make a continuous loop. The letter is on the 
tape, you just position a piece of letterhead under the roller. 
After you start a letter, the automatic typing will stop three 
times. The first time, you type in the inside address. The 
second time, you type in the appropriate salutation. The third 
time, the letter will be finished and you load a new piece of 
letterhead for the next letter. We have about 350 postcards 
from dairy farmers. Get to work.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ For some background on Flexowriters, see Lawrence O'Kane, 
``Computer a Help to `Friendly Doc,' '' The New York Times, May 22, 
1966, available online in ProQuest Historical Newspapers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            --A first day on the job in a House 
office in 1969

    Now:

    I have one ambition: to retire before it becomes essential 
to tweet.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Tweet quoted in: Patrick Johnson, ``More politicians using 
social media including blogs, Facebook and Twitter to connect with 
constituents,'' The (Springfield, MA) Republican, March 19, 2010, at 
http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2010/03/
more_politicians_using_social. html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            --Then-Representative Barney Frank

    Today, it is difficult to imagine that, in 1970, 18 percent 
of the American workforce consisted of clerical workers--
typists, stenographers, cashiers, and bookkeepers. These 
positions were required to keep up with the volume of paperwork 
in offices.\30\ Congressional offices, including committee 
offices, were not different, with many House offices having a 
staff that was perhaps half professional and half secretarial. 
Many Senators' offices had an even larger proportion of 
clerical staff. In the American workforce, 79 percent of 
clerical workers were women.\31\ Again, the situation was not 
different--and was perhaps even more exaggerated--on Capitol 
Hill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Roslyn Feldberg and Evelyn Glenn, ``Clerical Workers,'' in 
Working Women: A Study of Women in Paid Jobs, ed. Ann Seidman (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 318.
    \31\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At that time, congressional offices received mail only 
through the U.S. Postal Service, with Western Union's then-new 
Mailgram composing a relatively small portion of mail volume. 
Few constituents called Washington, DC, offices because of the 
cost of a long-distance phone call. Something new was beginning 
to happen, however. It was called ``grassroots lobbying.'' 
Proponents or opponents of legislation or programs--those who 
wanted to ``ban the can'' (soda and beer cans), ``defund the 
SST'' (supersonic transport plane program), strengthen or 
loosen auto emission standards, and ``end the war'' (Vietnam 
war), for example--started sending large volumes of letters and 
postcards to congressional offices and making many phone calls 
to them. The representational environment now included larger 
State and district populations, increasingly motivated 
constituents, and contentious issues and problems not easily 
solved (such as the 1973 oil embargo and resulting petroleum 
shortages and price shocks). Constituent contact began to 
outrun the capacity of congressional offices' clerical 
operations.
    Congressional offices responded first by acquiring 
automated office machines, like the Flexowriter,\32\ and then 
began moving through various ever-improving mail management 
systems. The Republican majority in the House in 1995 coincided 
with new sophistication in information technology for the 
office environment and the advent of the World Wide Web (the 
Web). Building on the foundation laid by the House 
Administration Committee, the new majority on the renamed House 
Oversight Committee made widespread standardization, use, and 
management of information technology a priority and a 
reality.\33\ Senators' offices had gotten an earlier start, 
with Senator Mark Hatfield having ``automated information 
management systems in his offices on Capitol Hill and in 
Oregon'' by the mid-1970s.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Congressional offices were also adopters of autopens.
    \33\ For a chronicle of the use of automation and information 
technology in the House, see ``Transparency and Technology 
Computerization'' in U.S. Congress, House Committee on House 
Administration, A History of the Committee on House Administration, 
1947-2012, committee print, 112th Cong., 2d sess., 2012, pp. 221-237; 
other sections of this committee history also address this topic.
    \34\ See U.S. Senate, Senate Historical Office, ``The Senate's Need 
to Modernize: The Culver Commission, 1976,'' at http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/idea_of_the_senate/1976 CulverComm.htm. See also 
the recollection of Senator Edward Kennedy's former systems 
administrator on the launch of Senator Kennedy's Web site in 1994, the 
first of any Member of Congress: Chris Casey, ``20 Years Ago Today--Sen 
Kennedy Announces 1st Congressional Website,'' at http://casey.com/
blog/2014/06/02/20-years-ago-today-sen-kennedy-announces-1st-
congressional-website.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress has come a long way since the House began 
electronic voting on January 23, 1973. The first cablecasts of 
floor proceedings on C-SPAN began March 19, 1979, for the House 
and June 2, 1986, for the Senate.\35\ Gavel-to-gavel coverage 
brought Congress to American homes, directly and through debate 
excerpts incorporated into televised newscasts. The next great 
leap for the public came in the form of the THOMAS Web site 
under the aegis of the Library of Congress, which went live on 
January 4, 1995. It allowed the public to research for itself 
what was happening in Congress. The increased use of 
information technology within Congress, such as for the 
publication of documents or webcasting, further enabled the 
public to keep abreast of congressional activity. The 
experience for Members and staff was to hear from constituents 
immediately about speeches, votes, and pending legislation on 
the floor and in committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ For a sense of Members' response to being televised, see Linda 
Greenhouse, ``Congress; TV: The Senate Grins and Bravely Tries to Bear 
It,'' The New York Times, May 2, 1986, at http://www.nytimes.com/1986/
05/02/us/congress-tv-the-senate-grins-and-bravely-tries-to-bear-
it.html. For the interview of a former Representative who was part of a 
group that first recognized the potential power of C-SPAN, see PBS, 
``The Long March of Newt Gingrich,'' interview with Vin Weber, 
Frontline, 1995, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/newt/
newtintwshtml/weber.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Web, the widespread use of information technology in 
the House and Senate, and the arrival of Members and staff who 
had firsthand familiarity as users of information technology 
completed a transformation. Congressional offices moved from 
trying to keep up with the volume of constituent contacts to 
actively engaging constituents.\36\ Although the 20 million 
pieces of postal mail sent annually to Congress 20 years ago 
have become 300 million communications, mostly emails, sent 
annually to Congress today, information technology allows 
congressional offices to manage the load. The Congressional 
Management Foundation (CMF) has indicated that, with an 
appropriate mail management system, ``85% of mail can be 
comfortably processed in 5 days or less, using pre-approved 
form letters.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Members now receive smartphones and other electronic devices 
operating within the House and Senate firewalls during their early 
orientation. Staff are also issued electronic devices.
    \37\ ``Mail Management,'' Congressional Management Foundation 
(CMF), at http://www. congressfoundation.org/component/content/article/
107. For a better understanding of the impact of the constituent 
communications workload on a congressional office, see CMF, 
Communicating with Congress: How Citizen Advocacy Is Changing Mail 
Operations on Capitol Hill, Washington, DC, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressional Web sites are now universal, although they 
vary in their quality and utility to constituents. Members at 
first also turned to blogs, and many now have a strong social 
media presence. Members' use of video on congressional Web 
sites and YouTube is widespread, and they employ other 
technology to conduct remote ``townhalls'' and meetings with 
constituents.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ For an exploration of Members' use of information technology 
and social media in their constituent service, see the companion CRS 
centennial report in this volume, Tweet Your Congressman: The Rise of 
Electronic Communications in Congress, by Matthew E. Glassman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another CMF study found that Representatives rate ``staying 
in touch with [their] constituents'' as most critical to their 
job satisfaction.\39\ As former Representative Lee Hamilton has 
noted, however, legislators enter these exchanges with one hand 
tied behind their backs:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ CMF, Life in Congress: The Member Perspective, Washington, DC, 
2013, pp. 24-26. For a perspective on how the public views Congress, 
however, see the companion CRS centennial report in this volume, 
Understanding Congressional Approval: Public Opinion from 1974 to 2014, 
by Jessica C. Gerrity.

    I do know--on the basis of several thousand public meetings 
over three decades--that the lack of public understanding about 
the institution is huge.
    That lack of understanding among ordinary Americans 
concerns me deeply because it increases the public's suspicions 
and cynicism about the Congress, weakens the relationship 
between voters and their representatives, makes it harder for 
public officials to govern, and prevents our representative 
democracy from working the way it should.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Lee Hamilton, ``What I Wish Political Scientists Would Teach 
about Congress,'' PS: Political Science & Politics, December 2000, p. 
757.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              Keeping Danger at Bay: Security for Congress

    [Tuesday, November 8, 1983] An explosion apparently caused 
by a bomb shook the Senate side of the Capitol Monday night, 
ripping out the mahogany doors leading to the office of the 
Senate minority leader and filling the corridors with smoke . . 
. . A group calling itself the Armed Resistance Unit claimed 
responsibility for the explosion in a telephone call to The 
Washington Post . . . . The motive was to protest the American-
led invasion of Grenada . . . .
    The explosion occurred three weeks after a tourist walked 
into the House gallery with a homemade bomb under his shirt. 
The police arrested the man . . . . [He] wanted to address 
Congress about world hunger . . . .
    Monday night's explosion was not the first at the Capitol. 
In 1971, a dynamite bomb went off in an unmarked first-floor 
bathroom, also on the Senate side. It crumbled walls and 
shattered windows . . . . The Weather Underground, a radical 
group, later claimed responsibility . . . and said it was a 
protest against ``the Nixon involvement in Laos.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Robert Pear, ``Bomb Explodes in Senate's Wing of Capitol; No 
Injuries Reported,'' The New York Times, November 8, 1983, at http://
www.nytimes.com/1983/11/08/us/bomb-explodes-in- senate-s-wing-of-
capitol-no-injuries-reported.html.

    By their status, public officials and public buildings are 
targets of people with malicious intent. The excerpt above 
lists three events, one in 1971 and two in 1983. Yet, examples 
of violence against Members of Congress and the Capitol complex 
go back further. One of the most notorious occurred March 1, 
1954, when four Puerto Rican nationalists opened fire from the 
House gallery on Members on the floor. Five Representatives 
were wounded, one critically, but all survived.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ U.S. House, Clerk of the House, History, Art & Archives, 
Historical Highlights, ``Four Puerto Rican nationalists opened fire 
onto the House Floor,'' at http://history.house.gov/Historical-
Highlights/1951-2000/Four-Puerto-Rican-nationalists-opened-fire-onto-
the-House-Floor. An interesting footnote to this event is that two of 
the House pages who helped evacuate injured Members were Bill Emerson 
and Paul Kanjorski, future Representatives from Missouri and 
Pennsylvania, respectively. Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite that tragedy and succeeding events, an amazing 
trait of that period was how open the Capitol complex remained 
and how unobtrusive security was. The East Plaza was 
essentially a parking lot, which did not change until 
construction began for the Capitol Visitor Center. During the 
evening in that earlier time, a visitor could drive onto the 
East Plaza, park, and walk around the Capitol, taking in the 
view of the Mall and the city under the night sky. A visitor 
could also enter the Capitol at night to sit in the House or 
Senate gallery when these Chambers were in session or drive 
into the Russell Building courtyard, although a Capitol Police 
officer would probably ask the visitor to state his or her 
business. During the day, most areas of the Capitol itself were 
open to unaccompanied visitors. Congressional staff were issued 
an ID, which most kept in their desks as mementos of their time 
in a congressional office.
    Security was unobtrusive. The Capitol Police comprised 
professional officers and part-time staff, one of whom was 
future Majority Leader Harry Reid. Then-private citizen Reid's 
experience as an officer in the 1960s was a common one among 
the Capitol Police officers of those decades. The Washington, 
DC, area law schools had both day and night programs. A number 
of the officers, like Senator Reid, were young men enrolled in 
law school, taking advantage of the day and night class 
offerings. They supported themselves and their families by 
working part time as Capitol Police officers. It was a common 
sight to walk around the Capitol complex, especially in the 
evenings, and see officers at desks reading their 
casebooks.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ U.S. Senator Harry Reid, ``About Senator Harry Reid,'' 
biographical statement, 2014, at http://www.reid.senate.gov/about.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Security began to increase in the 1980s. Three events 
seemed to be turning points in how Members' concerns changed 
and how contemporary security measures took root. The first 
occurred July 24, 1998, when Officer Jacob Chestnut and 
Detective John Gibson of the Capitol Police were killed in the 
line of duty seeking to protect people in the Capitol from a 
mentally disturbed gunman. The second momentous event was the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the crash of 
United Airlines Flight 93 near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. It is 
believed that the Capitol was the terrorists' target.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ National Park Service, Sources and Detailed Information, 
``Flight 93 National Memorial, Pennsylvania,'' September 12, 2014, at 
http://www.nps.gov/flni/historyculture/sources-and- detailed-
information.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The final event personalized the danger for every Member of 
Congress--the attempted assassination of Representative 
Gabrielle Giffords on January 8, 2011. Representative Giffords 
was left critically injured, 13 others were injured, and 6 were 
killed. Representative Giffords was conducting a constituent 
event in her district, outside a grocery store in suburban 
Tucson, Arizona. Representative Giffords called this kind of 
event ``Congress on Your Corner,'' and it was the kind of event 
and kind of danger to which every Member of Congress could 
relate.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ ``This Day in History--Jan 8, 2011: Congresswoman Gabrielle 
Giffords injured in shooting rampage,'' History, at http://
www.history.com/this-day-in-history/congresswoman-gabrielle- giffords-
injured-in-shooting-rampage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Strengthening security for Members has become essential. 
The presence and watchfulness of the Capitol Police is manifest 
throughout the Capitol complex. The construction of the Capitol 
Visitor Center, street closings, and the diversion of trucks 
and buses from neighboring streets offer additional security. 
Security or security procedures have been extended to Members 
traveling as groups, to individual Members who have been 
threatened, to congressional leaders, and to State and district 
offices. Anyone but a Member entering a building in the Capitol 
complex must be screened. Visitors may enter the Capitol for 
public tours only through the Capitol Visitor Center or, if 
they have business in the Capitol, when escorted.\46\ Members, 
staff, and visitors are safer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Certain regular visitors to the Capitol, such as reporters, 
are credentialed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Members' continuing concern seems to be less about their 
own safety than the openness of the Capitol complex to 
visitors. One Member summarized many Members' views: ``It's 
always safest just to not let people in. And this is the 
people's House. You can't have that.'' \47\ As the people's 
representatives, Members do not want to cut themselves off from 
the public or to exclude the public from the Capitol or 
congressional office buildings. Yet, security officials' 
concerns continue. A former Senate Sergeant at Arms, who was 
also the former chief of the Capitol Police, has said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Representative Jason Chaffetz, quoted in: Chad Pergram, ``The 
Speaker's Lobby: Intruder Alert,'' Fox News, September 24, 2014.

    The tough position law enforcement has with these iconic 
sites is how you balance making it very open yet defending 
against anything. The big difference is that the White House 
has a fence. That gives you a chance to respond. You can get 
right up to the edge of the Capitol. To me, it makes a lot more 
sense on [Capitol] Hill to put a fence around the four corners. 
And then you have free access to the entire complex and not 
worry about a knife or a gun or a suicide bombing.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Terrance Gainer, quoted in: ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       Political Responsibilities

    As a concept, politics encompasses more than running for 
office or trying to get majority support for a vote in the 
House or Senate. For most people today, ``political system'' 
might better describe the larger concept. Among the many 
changes within the political system between the eras under 
comparison, two aspects stand out because of the exponential 
growth of their size and impact.
    Campaigns have expanded greatly in several ways. Candidates 
are almost never their own campaign managers. Campaign staffing 
no longer solely comprises volunteers, and advertising no 
longer consists largely of yard signs and newspaper 
endorsements. It is unlikely an individual running for Congress 
today would be able to compete for election if he or she made a 
decision or announcement to run just before Labor Day of 
election year, the long-ago traditional start of active 
campaigning.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Special circumstances, however, could affect the start of a 
campaign, such as the death or resignation of a candidate or a 
nominee's late decision not to run.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although volunteers, perhaps numbering in the hundreds or 
thousands, are indeed vital to a modern campaign's success, a 
full-time, professional apparatus is also essential to a 
campaign today. This apparatus includes campaign managers, 
pollsters, media consultants (including a creative team and 
media buyers), social media specialists, webmasters, direct 
mail specialists, volunteer coordinators, fundraisers, 
treasurers, and others. A campaign must buy tv and radio 
advertising, and it must place advertising in numerous places--
on billboards, in newspapers, on Web sites and in social media, 
and elsewhere. A candidate needs to travel around the State or 
district, perhaps by plane or campaign bus. Candidates may need 
to fly out of State to attend fundraisers and meet national 
party officials in Washington, DC. A campaign takes money--an 
increasing sum of money, it seems, in each successive primary 
and general election.
    In the earlier era, once elected to Congress, a Member 
would be most visible in his or her legislative work and 
constituent service, for most of 2 years if serving as a 
Representative or at least 4 years if serving as a Senator, 
before facing the voters again. Congress in the 1970s often did 
not adjourn until mid- or late October before an election. 
Today, by contrast, incoming Members often hold fundraisers 
during Congress' early organization meetings.

                     The Daily Grind of Fundraising

    [Then four-term U.S. Senator William] Proxmire spent 
$145.10 in breezing to reelection in 1982.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ The Associated Press, ``Trying to Succeed Frugal Proxmire, 
Candidates Spend Freely,'' The New York Times, September 12, 1988, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/12/us/trying-to- succeed-frugal-
proxmire-candidates-spend-freely.html.

    In today's campaign argot, one would probably say that 
Senator Proxmire had a strong brand. He did. However, he 
initially ran in 1957.\51\ He won his early elections when tv 
advertising for a congressional campaign was unheard-of. There 
were three networks and no cable, people were still acquiring 
their first-ever tv sets, newspapers dominated as people's 
source of information, and reporting was respectful of 
officeholders. It was relatively easy for a major-party 
candidate to become known. Senator Proxmire also found ways to 
stand out among his colleagues. For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Senator Proxmire was first elected in a special election for a 
vacancy caused by the death of Senator Joseph McCarthy.

    Even though he regularly wins re-election with more than 60 
percent of the vote, Proxmire acts like a man constantly on the 
verge of electoral extinction. He is almost always perceived to 
be campaigning, whether he is shaking a thousand hands over a 
weekend in Wisconsin or pleading for dairy price supports on 
the Senate floor.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ ``Wisconsin--Senior Senator: William D. Proxmire,'' in 
Politics in America, Members of Congress In Washington and At Home, ed. 
Alan Ehrenhalt (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1983), p. 
1636.

    By the time Senator Proxmire ran for reelection in 1982, he 
had already served in the Senate for 26 years. He had been 
chair of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
and was known nationally for the Golden Fleece Award.\53\ He 
also had a strong network of State supporters. Senator Proxmire 
had a solid brand in Wisconsin and, as a result, won reelection 
with nearly 65 percent of the vote after having spent just 
$145.10.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ An ``award'' the Senator handed out monthly to draw attention 
to an activity he considered to be wasting tax dollars.
    \54\ ``Wisconsin--Senior Senator: William D. Proxmire,'' in 
Politics in America, Members of Congress In Washington and At Home, p. 
1636.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Six years later, Senator Proxmire did not seek reelection. 
In the 1988 election cycle, the average winning Senate 
candidate spent $3,746,225. Senator Proxmire's campaign 
spending was an anomaly among Senate races in 1982; it was a 
historical event by 1988. In the 2012 election cycle, the 
average winning Senate candidate spent $10,351,556, and the 
average winning House candidate spent $1,596,953.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ In 2014 constant dollars, the amount spent in 1988 was 
$7,533,617. For information on campaign finance and, over the last 
century, election campaigns for Congress, see the companion CRS 
centennial report in this volume, The Unchanging Nature of 
Congressional Elections, by Kevin J. Coleman and R. Sam Garrett.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the earlier congressional era, incumbents, challengers, 
and candidates for open seats spent relatively little time on 
fundraising. Campaigning was largely grounded in a corps of 
volunteer supporters. It relied to a great extent on 
inexpensive advertising, like lawn signs, and on free media 
coverage of a campaign. Information sources were exponentially 
fewer than today, and it was easy for a potential voter to 
learn about candidates from those sources. Candidates, with 
free media coverage, faced little information clutter to break 
through. Retail politics (in those days, ``shoe leather'' 
politics) was ascendant, although parties and patronage still 
played important roles in some States and districts. Split-
ticket voting was relatively common.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ See, for example, Robert J. Dinkin, Campaigning in America: A 
History of Election Practices (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), pp. 
159-180.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Members of Congress and candidates for Congress face a much 
different campaign environment today. In the intervening years, 
network and cable television have become important to all 
congressional campaigns. In expensive, high-population media 
markets, a campaign will buy time even though the cost can be 
daunting. Yet, some portion of that advertising is perceived as 
being ``wasted'' on voters living in the same media market but 
in a different State or district. These disadvantages drive 
campaigns to find additional channels to reach voters, for 
example, with tailored messages to targeted viewers of specific 
cable channels, and, now, through social media and the use of 
campaign software. The challenge for candidates today is to 
break through the information clutter and obtain attention from 
voters in their busy lives. Advertising, and specifically tv 
advertising, composes the largest budget item for most 
campaigns.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ See, for example, Joseph Mercurio, ``Media Buying in Political 
Campaigns: Broadcast Television Remains King,'' Campaigns & Elections, 
February 28, 2011, at http://www.campaignsand elections.com/magazine/
1910/media-buying-in-political-campaigns-broadcast-television-remains- 
king.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The campaign season is also longer. A candidate, including 
a sitting Member running for reelection, now typically 
announces that he or she is running early in the election year 
or perhaps earlier than that. The candidate may also need to 
run two campaigns, a primary campaign and, if successful, a 
general election campaign. Over the last decades, many States 
have moved primaries earlier in the year, and few States still 
hold congressional primaries in September of the election year. 
Sitting Members running for reelection are therefore trying to 
keep up with legislative work and voting while running in a 
possibly contentious primary. An earlier primary also means 
campaigning must begin in the year prior to the election year. 
In addition, Senate campaigns have become so expensive that 
Senators have found it necessary to raise funds through all 6 
years of their terms. Candidates for the Senate often make a 
decision to run around the time of the preceding election.
    At least three other factors have pushed the start date of 
campaigns earlier. First, outside groups have begun advertising 
their views about candidates early in the election year, 
attempting to bolster or tear down a candidate. A candidate who 
waits to respond risks voters' impressions hardening. Second, 
some States begin early voting in September, and most States 
that have early voting begin in October. As a result, there is 
not a time in contemporary campaigning at which a candidate may 
make a closing argument to voters. He or she must make closing 
arguments prior to early voting and all through the last weeks 
of the campaign prior to election day. The candidate must also 
have a strategy for ``turning out'' early and absentee voters. 
Third, candidates receive advantageous advertising rates on 
television early in an election year and find it beneficial to 
reserve time for the autumn in advance.
    Candidates, including candidates with a legislative record 
in Congress or a State legislature, face two other challenges: 
to be noticed by voters and to control the campaign narrative. 
The former might be accomplished by the quantity and quality of 
advertising, and the latter might be accomplished with deftness 
in responding to opponents' advertising. Party and independent 
groups advertising for and against the candidate offer an 
opportunity in their support and a threat in their opposition. 
To break through and control a campaign narrative, the 
candidate must be well funded.
    In addition to fundraising for one's own campaign, 
incumbent Members are expected to raise money ``for the team'' 
by contributing substantially to the relevant party and Chamber 
campaign committees. Many Members also have their own 
leadership PAC (political action committee), which is separate 
from their campaign account. Leadership PACs provide Members 
with another channel for assisting incumbent colleagues or 
their party's candidates. Fundraising can be a factor in a 
Member being selected for a Chamber or committee leadership 
position.
    All of these factors, and others, require a Member of 
Congress or a candidate for Congress to raise a large amount of 
campaign funds.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ See, for example, Kate Ackley, ``Despite Trips, No Downtime 
for Donors,'' Roll Call, June 5, 2013, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When in Washington, DC, Members of Congress spend time 
fundraising. A Member visits his or her political party's 
building near Capitol Hill to make fundraising phone calls, 
make fundraising contacts by an electronic medium, or attend 
fundraising receptions. Members make calls and contacts on 
their own behalf or on behalf of their party. Fundraising 
cannot be conducted in a Federal building, including using a 
telephone in a Federal building.
    Receptions and other forms of fundraisers (e.g., at 
sporting or entertainment events) are scheduled nearly every 
day that Members are in Washington. They take place at 
locations throughout the city, in both the morning and evening. 
A Member might hold or be the beneficiary of a fundraiser, or 
he or she might sponsor or cosponsor a fundraiser for a 
colleague or party candidate. Contributors are attracted to 
contribute to a candidate and attend a reception when several 
Members of Congress will be in attendance, sometimes listed as 
sponsors of the reception. Members are expected to engage in 
this collegial activity, especially because they may want their 
colleagues' reciprocity.
    Members must also spend time fundraising when they are in 
their home States or districts, seeking to ensure that a solid 
percentage of their campaign funds is raised within their home 
State and thereby demonstrating local support. As mentioned 
above, candidates for Congress might also travel to other 
States for fundraising meetings and events.
    Interestingly, the Congressional Management Foundation 
(CMF) survey for its Life in Congress study found that 43 
percent of Representatives believed ``they spend too little 
time on political/campaign work.'' \59\ Respondents to CMF's 
questionnaire also indicated that they spent 17 percent of 
their time in Washington, DC, and 18 percent of their time in 
their districts on political/campaign work.\60\ Of course, 
``political/campaign work'' includes more than fundraising. The 
number of respondents to CMF's survey was small, relative to 
the size of the House, but participation by Members in their 
first three terms was relatively significant.\61\ In some news 
reports, Members have variously stated that they relish, 
endure, or dislike the activity of fundraising and the amount 
of time that it takes.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ CMF, Life in Congress, pp. 24-25.
    \60\ Ibid., p. 18.
    \61\ Median service in the House is three terms.
    \62\ See, for example, Tracy Jan, ``For freshman in Congress, focus 
is on raising money,'' The Boston Globe, May 12, 2013, at http://
www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/05/11/freshman-lawmakers-are-
introduced-permanent-hunt-for-campaign-money/YQMMMoqCNxGKh2h0tOIF9 H/
story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fundraising takes the time and personal attention of 
Members, which has consequences for the legislative process. 
For example, as one group of former Members, current and former 
congressional staff, scholars, and other Congress-watchers 
observed:

    Schedules, processes and procedures within the Congress are 
designed to accommodate members in pursuit of their reelection 
goals, enabling them to devote maximum time to raising 
necessary campaign funds, mending fences and building political 
support back home.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Donald R. Wolfensberger, Getting Back to Legislating, 
Bipartisan Policy Center & The Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, 
November 27, 2012, pp. 1-2. See also Kate Ackley, ``Who Has Time for 
Legislating Anyway?,'' CQ Roll Call, July 16, 2014, pp. 3, 11.

    The schedules mentioned in this observation seem to refer 
to the time allowed in the congressional schedule for 
representational responsibilities and fundraising. The 
processes and procedures alluded to appear to refer to the 
types of legislation the majority brings to the House and 
Senate floors and to the types of amendments minority-party 
Members seek to offer or the procedural tactics they employ. 
Distinctions between the parties in their policy preferences, 
coherence within the parties, and strong party leadership 
generate voter interest and passion.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ See the companion CRS centennial report in this volume, The 
Evolving Congress: Overview and Analysis of the Modern Era, by Walter 
J. Oleszek.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In seeking to explain this development, one scholar noted 
the connection between Woodrow Wilson's famed book, 
Congressional Government, originally published in 1885, and 
Speaker Newt Gingrich's changes to the institutional management 
of the House:

    Wilson's book reads like a field manual for Gingrich's 
experiment in congressional party government . . . . The 
Woodrow Wilson of Congressional Government and Speaker Newt 
Gingrich both admired the parliamentary ideal and tended to see 
Congress as central to our constitutional system, with 
presidents as mere administrators . . . . Both Wilson and 
Gingrich disliked standing committee dominance of the 
legislative process and sought to elevate the role of 
legislative parties.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ William F. Connolly, Jr., ``Introduction,'' Congressional 
Government: A Study in American Politics (1885; Piscataway, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002). For an explanation and discussion of 
conditional party government and of earlier actions by the House 
Democratic Caucus that presaged changes made by Speaker Gingrich, see 
John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, ``The Logic of Conditional Party 
Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection,'' at http://
themonkeycage.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/aldrich-and-rohde.pdf.

    A Pew Research study released in June 2014 entitled 
Political Polarization in the American Public found that 
respondents who were most consistently liberal (12 percent of 
the public) and most consistently conservative (9 percent of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the public) were--

    [on] measure after measure--whether primary voting, writing 
letters to officials, volunteering for or donating to a 
campaign . . . more actively involved in politics, amplifying 
the voices that are least willing to see the parties meet each 
other halfway.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Political 
Polarization in the American Public, Washington, DC, June 12, 2014, at 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political- polarization-in-the-
american-public. In addition, The New York Times reported:
    ``For all the talk about how partisan polarization is overwhelming 
Washington, there is another powerful, overlapping force at play: 
Voters who are not deeply rooted [in a geographic place] increasingly 
view politics through a generic national lens.''
    Ashley Parker and Jonathan Martin, ``Population Shifts Turning All 
Politics National,'' The New York Times, June 15, 2014, at http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/us/population-shifts- turning-all-politics-
national.html.

    A Member's experience in the legislative process, then, is 
likely to be part of a cycle of reinforcement between actions 
in the Member's Chamber and passion among those voters who are 
a party's most active and strongest supporters and who also are 
its most liberal or most conservative adherents.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ For most Members of both parties, this cycle of reinforcement 
will appear politically well grounded. One analysis of the 2012 
election showed there are only 26 congressional districts in which 
voters supported President Obama or Mitt Romney but elected a 
Representative of the opposite party (17 districts that Obama won and 9 
districts that Romney won). Clark Bensen, Presidential Results by 
Congressional Districts, Politidata, Corinth, VT, April 4, 2013, p. 3. 
A National Journal study found there were only 2 Democratic 
Representatives in the 113th Congress who were more conservative than 
the most liberal Republicans and only 3 Republicans who were more 
liberal than the most conservative Democrats. There was no overlap 
among Senators. Josh Kraushaar, ``The End of Moderation,'' National 
Journal, February 8, 2014, pp. 22-23. Census data and campaign software 
have also provided legislators and others planning redistricting with 
sensitive tools to seek, if desired, a partisan tilt in a State's 
districts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet, Members find many voters unhappy with this cycle of 
reinforcement. As the Pew study noted, 46 percent of Democrats 
and Democratic-leaners (Americans who ``have attitudes and 
behaviors that are very similar to those of partisans'') and 50 
percent of Republicans and Republican-leaners prefer an outcome 
on policy issues between President Obama and congressional 
Republicans ``to split the difference at exactly 50/50.'' \68\ 
Political scientist Gary Jacobson explained the problem for 
Members and candidates and for all who watch Congress:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Political 
Polarization in the American Public.

    [The political center] does not form a potentially coherent 
coalition around which some political entrepreneur might build 
a centrist party. People in it are more susceptible to short-
term political tides (because they are less partisan and 
ideological) and thus help to swing elections.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Quoted in: Don Balz, ``What's left of the political center?,'' 
The Washington Post, July 16, 2014, p. 2. This cycle of reinforcement 
might be part of the explanation for public approval of Congress, which 
is explored in the companion CRS centennial report in this volume, 
Understanding Congressional Approval: Public Opinion from 1974 to 2014, 
by Jessica C. Gerrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Getting It from All Sides: Lobbying Inside and Outside Washington, DC

    Some Congressmen reacted furiously when antiwar lobbyists 
recently published their non-record votes on key amendments 
offered by doves to a defense bill. [Prior to a House rules 
change in 1971, recorded votes were not taken in the Committee 
of the Whole; so-called gallery watchers attempted to record 
Representatives' positions as the Members filed past tellers 
(Members or clerks serving as vote counters) to be counted for 
and against amendments.]
    ``I received your stupid letter in which you indicated that 
your snoopers who were sitting in the House gallery during 
debate on the military procurement bill recorded me as being 
absent on five different votes.'' \70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Letter from unnamed Member to an antiwar lobbyist, quoted in: 
Norman C. Miller, ``Some in House Seek To End Practice of Nonrecord 
Voting,'' Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1970, pp. 1, 3.

    Until the 1970s, lobbying was largely quiet, behind-the-
scenes, and reactive. There were also relatively few 
practitioners. Members learned of the views of the AFL-CIO, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Farmers Union, and other trade 
associations through hearings testimony and quotations in 
newspapers. Members and their spouses might be entertained at 
dinners, on weekend trips to hunting lodges, at golf clubs, and 
in other ways. Members could accept honoraria and travel 
expenses for speeches and appearances at meetings, conventions, 
and other gatherings of trade associations, and other 
groups.\71\ A former Member, reflecting on changes to 
congressional ethical norms, mentioned some of the forums for 
Member-lobbyist interactions in that era:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ For one Senator's perspective on lobbying and its history, see 
U.S. Congress, Senate, The Senate, 1789-1989, Addresses on the History 
of the United States Senate, by Senator Robert C. Byrd, 100th Cong., 
1st sess., S. Doc. 100-20, vol. II (Washington: GPO, 1991), pp. 491-
508. See also a Member's perspective in 1970 on home-State lobbyists 
and Washington lobbyists in Donald G. Tacheron and Morris K. Udall, The 
Job of the Congressman, pp. 85-89.

    Golf outings, vacations in the islands with honoraria-
attached speeches, dinners at Washington's best restaurants, 
and entertainment at the Kennedy Center are all part of the 
past now. Honoraria for speeches ended with the last large 
congressional pay raise for House members . . . . More 
recently, the House became totally spooked by adverse publicity 
regarding influence peddling and cut off accepting lunches and 
dinners.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ G. William Whitehurst, ``Lobbies and Political Action 
Committees; A Congressman's Perspective,'' in Inside the House: Former 
Members Reveal How Congress Really Works, ed. Lou Frey, Jr. and Michael 
T. Hayes (Lanham, MD: U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress 
and University Press of America, 2001), p. 211. The first ban on 
honoraria, alluded to in the text, took effect in 1991.

    Lobbying was already beginning to change, however. New 
issues had arisen, with new ways of bringing congressional 
attention to them, and many new actors began lobbying. Two 
books helped initiate these changes: The Other America: Poverty 
in the United States, by Michael Harrington, published in 1962, 
and Unsafe at Any Speed, by Ralph Nader, published in 1965. The 
former contributed to President Lyndon Johnson's War on 
Poverty, and the latter contributed to a new law, the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. Both books helped 
stimulate the launch of ``public interest'' organizations and 
lobbying for laws and regulatory actions favorable to 
consumers, the environment, low-income people, women's rights, 
and other interests that had not previously been widely 
represented in Washington, DC. Public interest lobbying drew 
new people to Washington to work on behalf of many causes, with 
the so-called Nader's Raiders emblematic of the new actors.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ In response to a damning ``Nader's Raiders'' report on the 
Federal Trade Commission, President Richard Nixon asked the American 
Bar Association to evaluate the commission's activities and make 
recommendations. For background on these events, see Arthur John Keefe, 
``Is the Federal Trade Commission Here To Stay?,'' American Bar 
Association Journal, February 1970, p. 188. One of the Raiders listed 
in the article was the future son-in-law of President Nixon and future 
chair of the Republican Party in New York; another was the great-
grandson of President William Howard Taft and a future general counsel 
of the Department of Defense; and yet another was a future member of 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For current examples of public 
interest lobbying, see, for example, Fawn Johnson, ``Lessons of 
Lobbying,'' National Journal, January 7, 2012, p. 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the legislative activism of the 1970s, trade 
associations, businesses, and other groups drew on their long 
histories and on the strategies of the public interest groups 
to become proactive. More businesses opened their own lobbying 
offices, not relying solely on trade associations. Trade 
associations, businesses, and other groups formed coalitions 
around single issues.\74\ They organized their own grassroots 
lobbying, including ``fly-ins'' for State or district 
residents, such as nurses, auto dealers, or independent 
bankers, to lobby their own Members of Congress in Washington 
on their specific set of policy concerns.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Representatives of foreign governments and businesses have 
long had a presence in Washington lobbying and are regulated under the 
Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and other laws. A recent article 
explained a newer aspect of foreign agents' lobbying in their funding 
or contracting with U.S. think tanks. See Eric Lipton, Brooke Williams, 
and Nicholas Confessore, ``Foreign Powers Buy Influence At Think 
Tanks,'' The New York Times, September 7, 2014, pp. 1, 22.
    \75\ See, for example, Byron Tau and Anna Palmer, ``Boggs Helped 
Create the Modern World of Lobbying,'' Politico, September 16, 2014, 
pp. 1, 33; and Kate Ackley, ``Special Interests Descend on the Hill,'' 
CQ Roll Call, April 2, 2012, at http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_119/
street-talk-special-interests-descend-on-capitol-hill-213586-1.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The purpose of lobbying is straightforward--to persuade one 
or more Members of Congress to take a legal action, such as to 
obtain or prevent sponsorship of a bill or amendment or to vote 
for or against a proposition in committee or on the floor. 
Citizens and Members of Congress can lose track of the value of 
lobbying. Yet, for lobbyists and the interests they represent, 
critical matters are at stake, such as a company's ability to 
make a profit, a labor union's advocacy for workers' rights, 
disabled citizens' access to transportation, a citizen group's 
desire for a sufficient water supply, a municipality's access 
to a Federal grant, a small business' ability to compete for a 
Federal contract, and so on.
    Reactive lobbying has evolved today to become targeted 
media campaigns on specific issues, bills, nominations, and 
votes. From each lobbyist's perspective, irrespective of the 
business, public, or other interest represented, Members and 
their constituents must read and hear about their principal's 
concerns or perspectives both in Washington and in their home 
districts and States.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ See, for example, Thomas B. Edsall, ``The Unlobbyists,'' The 
New York Times, December 31, 2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/
01/opinion/edsall-the-unlobbyists.html?module=Search 
&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C(%221%22%3A%22RI%3A6%22).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When they are working in Washington, Members are recipients 
of direct lobbying, both by professional lobbyists and by home 
State members of national and State groups. The latter might be 
participating in a fly-in or in a national convention being 
held in Washington. Members in Washington also see the results 
of grassroots lobbying campaigns in their emails, letters, and 
social media exchanges.\77\ As noted above (see ``Using 
Technology to Steal the March on Constituents''), Members and 
their staffs must manage and respond to constituents' contact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ See, for example, Holly Yeager, ``The changing business of 
influence,'' The Washington Post, February 23, 2014, pp. G1, G5; and 
Thomas B. Edsall, ``The Shadow Lobbyist,'' The New York Times, April 
25, 2013, at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/the-
shadow-lobbyist/?module=Search& 
mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C(%221%22%3A%22RI%3A6%22).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the last two decades or more, however, Members have 
spent more time in their States and districts. Technology has 
also advanced, allowing lobbying campaigns to reach like-minded 
constituents and seek their action at just the right time. 
Organizations that lobby or assist in lobbying campaigns have 
also grown in sophistication. In combination, these changes 
have resulted in lobbying campaigns to influence Members being 
waged as much in States and districts as in Washington.
    One of the earliest and best-known national campaigns of 
this sort was waged in opposition to President Bill Clinton's 
health care reform plan in 1993 and 1994 by the Health 
Insurance Association of America. In the series of ``Harry and 
Louise'' ads, which ran on television and were featured in 
radio and newspaper formats, the actors expressed their 
concerns over the President's proposal and urged viewers to 
express theirs.
    These lobbying campaigns have also been localized and 
targeted at specific Members viewed as persuadable to support 
or oppose a proposition or as able to be pressured if enough 
constituents were persuaded by a media campaign to make their 
views known to the Member. These media campaigns occur year 
round as different issues come to the fore and have been 
financed by national and State political parties, interest and 
advocacy groups, and individuals or groups of individuals of 
all political stripes. Other groups employ an array of tools in 
their efforts to ensure orthodoxy and consistency in Members' 
legislative actions, consistent with the political views of 
these Democratic or Republican groups.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ See, for example, Josh Kraushaar, ``Growth Industry,'' 
National Journal, September 17, 2011, pp. 28-33; Julianna Gruenwald, 
``What's Next in the SOPA Opera Melodrama,'' National Journal Daily, 
January 23, 2012, at http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/what-s-next-
in-the-sopa-opera-melodrama-20120122; and Kate Tummarello, ``An Open 
Process for OPEN Measure,'' Roll Call, February 6, 2012, pp. 3, 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An example of a targeted media campaign occurred several 
years ago, when legislation was introduced in the Senate to 
repeal the Federal estate tax. Radio and television campaigns 
were waged in Maine, South Dakota, and Montana in an attempt to 
favorably influence public opinion and, through public opinion, 
the Senators from those States. As a Senate vote approached, a 
group opposed to repeal waged a media campaign in Arkansas, 
Montana, and Nebraska in an attempt to influence public opinion 
there, and, through it, the Senators from those States.
    Lobbying campaigns are abetted by the variety of media 
operating today. The media comprise well-educated, aggressive 
reporters, editors, bloggers, social media trendsetters, radio 
and tv personalities, and other commentators, all of whom can 
define issues in ways critical to the success or failure of a 
lobbying campaign and quickly publicize upcoming votes, 
congressional favors to special interests, positions taken by 
Members of Congress, proponents' and opponents' views, and 
other information.
    With the surge in social media's importance over the last 
few years, newer and less expensive channels exist to reach 
constituents. Lobbying campaigns ask constituents to contact a 
Member, attend a townhall meeting or ``supermarket Saturday,'' 
or share their views with social media friends. Members take 
seriously the letters, postcards, faxes, emails, social media 
exchanges, phone calls, office visits, remarks at townhall 
meetings, signs at parades, plant visits, and other contacts 
they have with constituents.\79\ Although specific individual 
communications or office visits might make a compelling case on 
a particular issue, Members take note of the volume of 
constituent calls and letters as part of their decisionmaking, 
even when a lobbyist's grassroots campaign stimulated the 
outpouring of constituent communication.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ See, for example, Andrew Joseph, ``Transportation Lobbying 
Groups Follow Lawmakers Home,'' National Journal, February 24, 2012, at 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/blogs/influencealley/2012/02/
transportation-lobbying-groups-follow-lawmakers-home-24.
    \80\ For additional discussion of lobbying and lobbying campaigns, 
see Judy Schneider and Michael L. Koempel, Congressional Deskbook: The 
Practical and Comprehensive Guide to Congress, 6th ed. (Alexandria, VA: 
TheCapitol.Net, 2012), pp. 73-83; and Michael L. Koempel and Judy 
Schneider, Congressional Deskbook: The Practical and Comprehensive 
Guide to Congress, 5th ed. (Alexandria, VA: TheCapitol.Net, 2007), pp. 
83-92.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lobbyists have long sought to influence laws that Congress 
and the President have already enacted, looking to affect an 
existing law's implementation, possible amendment or repeal, 
and potential funding. The lobbyists might be acting on behalf 
of individuals, groups, municipalities, businesses, and others 
that have been directly affected by this exercise of Federal 
authority. In the 1960s and 1970s, a second principal purpose 
of lobbying emerged as lobbyists become more active in seeking 
to prompt Congress and the President to enact new laws. 
Inaction is also a decision, and individuals, groups, 
municipalities, businesses, and others may be affected by 
Congress not having enacted laws on certain subjects.

                Personal Impact of Congressional Service

    The CMF study of 2013, cited earlier, largely confirmed 
what was reported 15 years ago about the work schedule of 
Members of Congress in a study by the Pew Research Center for 
the People & the Press. In its survey, CMF found that Members 
of the House work about 70 hours a week when Congress is in 
session and about 59 hours a week when Congress is not in 
session. The Pew study in 1998 found that 70 percent of 
Senators and Representatives worked 70 or more hours a week.
    The CMF study compared Members' work lives with a study of 
high-earning, private-sector employees across multiple 
industries that appeared in the Harvard Business Review in 
2006. A subset of these employees was identified as having 
``extreme jobs'' with 70-hour workweeks. Traits of those jobs 
that are shared by Members in their work included:
   unpredictable flow of work,
   fast-paced work under tight deadlines,
   work-related events outside regular work hours,
   availability to clients 24/7
   large amounts of travel, and
   physical presence at workplace at least 10 hours a day.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ CMF, Life in Congress, pp. 10, 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the CMF study, 86 percent of Members responded that they 
``feel they spend too little time with family and friends and 
too little time on other personal activities.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Ibid., p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Well into the 1990s, the vast majority of Members had 
residences in the Washington area, and their families lived 
there. Members with children sent them to local public and 
private schools. Members socialized with each other and had 
friendships in their neighborhoods and among people with whom 
they worked or attended religious services, whom they met 
through their children's school, who were from the same State, 
and so on. Air travel was not particularly easy, and Members 
were limited in the number of trips or the spending available 
for travel, even to their home States and districts. Perhaps 
the most distinctive difference from today's congressional 
environment was that Members largely had their weekends to 
themselves.

    [Now-Senator] Mike Lee and Josh Reid, then both 11-year-old 
sons of political fathers transplanted in Washington, quickly 
bonded. [Lee was the son of President Ronald Reagan's U.S. 
Solicitor General Rex Lee, and Reid was the son of then-
Representative Harry Reid.]
    ``I've always known since I was 11 years old, when I first 
met the man, that we were on opposite sides of the issues,'' 
Lee added. ``It is weird to now be in the same body as him. I 
wouldn't blame him if he still saw me as an 11-year-old.'' \83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ Philip Rucker, ``Sen. Mike Lee: A political insider refashions 
himself as tea party revolutionary,'' The Washington Post, February 4, 
2011, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/sen-mike-lee-a-
political-insider-refashions-himself-as-tea-party-revolutionary/2011/
02/04/AB zV3xQ_story.html.

    This situation began to change in the 1990s as Members, 
wishing to maintain better contact with their constituents, 
began to travel home more frequently. As described earlier, 
constituents had become more politically active, which included 
wanting to see their Members of Congress face-to-face (see, 
above, ``Using Technology to Steal the March on 
Constituents''). Air travel became easier and congressional 
travel allowances more generous. By the mid-1990s, with the 
influx of new Members and the encouragement of some Members 
serving in congressional leadership, many Members, particularly 
in the House, began to keep their residences in their home 
States and districts and commute to Washington. First votes are 
now scheduled Monday evenings and last votes Thursday 
afternoons or Friday mornings to accommodate Members' travel.
    Now, few Representatives live in the Washington, DC, area 
with their families.\84\ They rent or share apartments; some 
even spend overnights on cots or sofas in their offices. Some 
Senators have also made the choice to live in their home States 
and commute to Washington. For all Members, some time is spent 
almost every week flying to and from Washington.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ For some Members, residing with their family in Washington, 
DC, is a necessity when travel to their home State or district is time 
consuming and their children are very young. See, for example, Fawn 
Johnson, ``I Want More Hours in the Day,'' National Journal, July 12, 
2012, at http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/mcmorris-rodgers-i-
want-more-hours-in-the-day-20120 712.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The dearth of personal time in Washington, small number of 
social settings involving families, multitude of social 
activities involving fundraising, reduced time spent in 
committees with relatively small memberships, demands of media 
for access, and other changes mean that there are fewer 
opportunities for Members to get to know each other well, 
especially across the aisle.\85\ This situation concerns many 
who are studying Congress and seeking changes or ways that 
partisanship could be reduced or the decisionmaking process 
enhanced. They believe the fact that many Members do not know 
each other well contributes negatively to the contemporary 
congressional environment.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ For an analysis of what has changed in today's congressional 
milieu that affects lawmaking, and why, see the companion CRS 
centennial report in this volume, Collaborative Relationships and 
Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate: A Perspective Drawn from Firsthand 
Accounts, by Mark J. Oleszek.
    \86\ See, for example, Commission on Political Reform, Governing in 
a Polarized America: A Bipartisan Blueprint to Strengthen Our 
Democracy, Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, DC, July 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Something else has changed besides Members' desire to be in 
their home State or district, and their constituency's demand 
for their presence. In proposing changes to the congressional 
schedule or Members' opportunities to get to know each other 
better, the effect on Members' families must be considered. For 
example, some have proposed a scheduled change of 3 weeks a 
month of work in Washington and 1 week a month back in a 
Member's home State or district. That model may not work for 
Members and their families.
    In the 1970s, the spouses of Members, who were nearly all 
wives of Members, were often full-time homemakers. Most raised 
their children while their Member spouses attended the long 
daily sessions of committees and their Chamber on Capitol Hill. 
Many congressional wives had very active lives outside the home 
and were involved with volunteer activities, organizations such 
as the Congressional Club for congressional wives, and other 
interests.\87\ With changing social characteristics and 
employment opportunities in the 1970s and 1980s, wives of long-
serving or older Members began their own careers in the 
Washington area. Younger wives expected to have a job or a 
career as well as a family role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ Additional clubs exist for spouses, both nonpartisan and 
partisan. For background, see Nikki Schwab, ``Sign of the Times: 
Husbands Happily Join Senate Spouses,'' U.S. News & World Report, 
September 22, 2014; and Emily Heil, ``Cathy Boozman Seeks to Unite GOP 
Spouses,'' Roll Call, January 17, 2011, at http://www.rollcall.com/
news/-202524-1.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Today, the option of living in Washington, DC, is not 
attractive to many congressional families. The area is 
extraordinarily expensive compared with most of the places from 
which Members are elected. Many spouses have their own careers 
in their home cities and towns, and a number are partners or 
owners of businesses. For many families today, finding 
childcare is a daunting task. Once a family has a good 
arrangement, it is loath to leave it. Families are also part of 
a local society--the spouses' families, friends, and colleagues 
from different areas of their lives. Spouses are active in 
local groups, such as churches, schools, charitable 
organizations, and so on. To move to Washington is to give up a 
large network that supports a family both financially and 
socially.

                        A Concluding Observation

    The impending retirement of Representative John Dingell, 
dean of the House, is a clear signal that Congress has fully 
entered another new era in its 225-year evolution. The arc of 
Mr. Dingell's life to his retirement is an apt metaphor for 
making some concluding observations to this report, which has 
described some notable changes that have occurred in Congress 
over the past 50 years and their impact on congressional 
service.
    Mr. Dingell grew up in Washington, DC, the son of a U.S. 
Representative. The senior Representative Dingell had won his 
seat in the House in the same election as Franklin Roosevelt 
won his first term as President. As an adolescent, John Dingell 
became a House page. He was present on the House floor on 
December 8, 1941, when President Roosevelt delivered his Infamy 
Speech seeking a congressional declaration of war against 
Japan. At the age of 18 in 1944, Mr. Dingell enlisted in the 
U.S. Army. His own House service began in 1955, when he won a 
special election as a Democrat after his father's death.
    When Mr. Dingell entered the House, Representative Sam 
Rayburn, the Texas Democrat who had taken office in 1913, was 
Speaker. Representative Joseph Martin of Massachusetts, first 
elected in 1924 and a former Republican Speaker, was minority 
leader. Of the 19 standing House committees, 14 were chaired by 
Southern and Border State Democrats. Five were chaired by 
Northern Democrats, one of which was the Committee on Un-
American Activities (HUAC). Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas was 
Senate majority leader, and Senator William Knowland of 
California was Senate minority leader. Dwight Eisenhower was in 
the 3d year of his first term as President.
    Longevity of service in the House and Senate was common in 
this earlier era.
    In the 1970s and 1980s, Mr. Dingell epitomized a Congress 
that asserted itself as a coequal branch of the national 
government. He served first as chair of the Energy and Power 
Subcommittee of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. 
He became chair of the renamed Energy and Commerce Committee in 
1981 and served concurrently as chair of its Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee. He aggressively and famously 
conducted oversight of the executive branch on matters ranging 
from hazardous waste cleanup to pesticide residues in food to 
inferior prescription drugs to Pentagon spending to deceitful 
university billing for research grants.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ From 1981 through 1986, Democrats controlled the House, 
Republicans controlled the Senate, and Republican Ronald Reagan was 
President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Dingell was recognized for his ability to assert his 
committee's jurisdiction and to steer legislation through the 
House and through conferences with the Senate as well as for 
his knowledge of legislative procedure. In testimony before the 
House Rules Committee, he once observed, ``If you let me write 
procedure and I let you write substance, I'll screw you every 
time.'' \89\ He was a committee baron in an era when committee 
chairs were the central figures of Congress, even as party 
leaders' influence and control were growing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ ``Michigan--16th District: John D. Dingell,'' in Politics in 
America: 1990, The 101st Congress, ed. Phil Duncan (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1989), p. 769.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On February 11, 2009, Mr. Dingell became the longest 
serving Representative in history, and, on June 7, 2013, he 
became the longest serving Member of Congress in history.
    Many aspects of Mr. Dingell's career are traits of the 
congressional era that is now rapidly passing. These traits 
include personal memory of World War II and the dawn of the 
cold war, Members and their families living year round in 
Washington, long congressional careers for Members and staff, 
weekly 5-day meetings of the House and Senate, decentralized 
power within Congress, and time for collegial and personal 
relationships and reflection.
    Members sitting in the incoming 114th Congress will not 
likely match Mr. Dingell's longevity or his institutional or 
personal memories. Only 26 Members would have been old enough 
as children to remember World War II.\90\ Only a few Members 
will have served during the first 33 years of Mr. Dingell's 
career. Assuming all senior Members running for reelection win 
their races for the 114th Congress, only 12 Members would have 
served in Congress during the congressional reform decade of 
the 1970s.\91\ Only an additional 29 Members would have begun 
their service during the Ronald Reagan Presidency.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ Eleven Senators and 15 Representatives.
    \91\ Three Senators, 4 Senators who were then serving in the House, 
and 5 Representatives. Only Representative John Conyers' congressional 
service would have begun in the 1960s.
    \92\ Five Senators, 11 Senators who were then Representatives, and 
13 Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Congress that has evolved over the 1990s and 2000s is 
markedly different from the one of this immediately past 
congressional era. The shared memory of Members in the 
contemporary Congress is of wars without a decisive end,\93\ 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continuing 
threat of ethnic and religious fanaticism. The shared 
experience is of Members spending as little as 3 days a week at 
work in Washington, DC, of power converging in party 
leadership, and of long days working in congressional districts 
and home States. Large amounts of time spent fundraising, 
higher turnover in membership and staff, round-the-clock media 
relations and media engagement, and little personal time are 
other experiences common to contemporary Members.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ Wars beginning with the Korean war. See, for example, David 
Ignatius, ``Hemmed in by a limited war,'' The Washington Post, October 
10, 2014, p. A-21.
    \94\ For an examination of the sociodemographic characteristics of 
the 113th Congress, see the companion CRS centennial report in this 
volume, The 113th Congress and the U.S. Population: Discussion and 
Analysis of Selected Characteristics, by Jennifer D. Williams, Ida A. 
Brudnick, and Jennifer E. Manning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, changes in the House and Senate as legislative 
bodies have affected the experience of being a Member of 
Congress. Earlier, committee markups of important legislation 
might consume meetings of several or many days over the course 
of weeks. Today, for even the most important bills, markups are 
generally completed in a day or less. The House in the earlier 
era used open and modified open special rules to consider 
measures on the floor. The Senate innovated a two-track system 
to allow it to process one or more pieces of legislation in a 
relatively routine manner at the same time as it allowed 
extensive debate and amendment of controversial legislation or 
controversial amendments to a measure (see ``On the House and 
Senate Floors, a Drive for Efficiency,'' above). In the last 
two decades, the House has turned more often to the use of the 
suspension of the rules procedure and of structured and closed 
rules to process measures on the House floor, whereas the 
Senate has seen an increase in the requirement for 60 votes on 
motions, including motions to amend, and in majority leaders 
filing cloture petitions and using their priority of 
recognition to ``fill the amendment tree.'' \95\ In sum, it has 
become more difficult for Members to engage in the legislative 
process with more than their votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ See Congressional Quarterly's American Congressional 
Dictionary, p. 8.
    ``Amendment Tree--A diagram showing the number and types of 
amendments that the rules and practices of a house permit to be offered 
to a measure before any of the amendments is voted on. It shows the 
relationship of one amendment to the others, and it may also indicate 
the degree of each amendment, whether it is a perfecting or substitute 
amendment, the order in which amendments may be offered, and the order 
in which they are put to a vote. The same type of diagram can be used 
to display an actual amendment situation.''
    When a majority leader fills the amendment tree, he uses his 
priority of recognition to be recognized after he offers one amendment 
to offer another, until the branches of the relevant amendment tree are 
filled with amendments, thereby blocking any other Senator from 
offering an amendment. The majority leader must also follow additional 
procedures to successfully implement this procedural strategy, as 
explained in CRS Report RS22854, Filling the Amendment Tree in the 
Senate, by Christopher M. Davis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The past era was one in which legislating was more visible 
to the public--recall C-SPAN coverage of Congress--than the 
election politics present in the legislative process. The 
current era is one in which election politics seems more 
visible in the legislative process than Congress' legislative 
accomplishments.\96\ In the past era, a Member of Congress' 
life was centered in Washington and in the Member's work in 
committees and on the floor.\97\ In the current era, a Member 
of Congress' life is centered in the Member's district or 
State, maintaining contact with its residents, interest groups, 
and politicians.\98\ A significant amount of time at home and 
in Washington is spent fundraising. Workweeks in Washington are 
relatively brief, and election politics imbues legislative 
work.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ For foundational studies of the relationship between election 
politics and political behavior, see Richard F. Fenno, Home Style: 
House Members in Their Districts (New York: HarperCollins, 1978); David 
R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1974); and David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the 
Post-Reform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
    \97\ In his book, The Job of the Congressman, Representative Udall 
included a study on the ``congressional office work load,'' based on a 
survey conducted under the ``auspices of the American Political Science 
Association.'' Part of the study estimated the time an ``average 
Congressman'' spent performing various roles in the course of a week. 
Of the 59.3 hour average workweek, a Representative could expect to 
spend 15.3 hours (25.8 percent of the Member's time) on the House floor 
and 7.1 hours (12.0 percent) in committee. Donald G. Tacheron and 
Morris K. Udall, The Job of the Congressman, p. 303.
    \98\ A Member may have many reasons for keeping contact with State 
legislators and other politicians, including the political support they 
might provide. With State legislators' terms limited in some States, in 
addition, there may be more potential candidates for Congress.
    \99\ See, for example, the analysis of ``cultural changes'' within 
Congress in Donald R. Wolfensberger, Getting Back to Legislating: 
Reflections of a Congressional Working Group, pp. 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The past era and the current era presumably manifest the 
political climate of the country at their respective times. In 
delivering the Pi Sigma Alpha lecture to an annual meeting of 
the American Political Science Association in 2000, former 
Representative Lee Hamilton explained the situation this way:

    Many Americans think that reasonable people agree on the 
solutions to major national problems, and they see no good 
reason for Congress not to implement such a consensus. Yet, the 
truth is there is far less consensus in the country than is 
often thought. Survey after survey shows that Americans don't 
even agree on what are the most important issues facing the 
country, let alone the best way to solve them. People 
misunderstand Congress' role if they demand that Congress be a 
model of efficiency and quick action. Congress can work quickly 
if a broad consensus exists in the country. But such a 
consensus is rare--especially on the tough issues at the 
forefront of public life today. Usually, Congress must build a 
consensus. It cannot simply impose one on the American people.
    The quest for consensus can be painfully slow, and even 
exasperating, but it is the only way to resolve disputes 
peacefully and produce policies that reflect the varied 
perspectives of our diverse citizenry.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Lee Hamilton, ``What I Wish Political Scientists Would Teach 
about Congress,'' p. 760. See also Nora Caplan-Bricker, ``Party of 
One,'' National Journal, October 4, 2014, pp. 28-35.

    In the 1960s and 1970s, voters in election after election 
sent Democratic majorities to Congress that would pass large 
numbers of health, education, environmental, employment, civil 
rights, and other bills and fund an expanding Federal portfolio 
of responsibilities. The emphasis changed with the election of 
a Republican Senate and a Republican President in the 1980s--to 
enacting tax cuts and tax reform, implementing Social Security 
reform, increasing military spending, controlling domestic 
spending, and so on--but Congress acted on many bills. Under 
both President George H.W. Bush and President Bill Clinton, 
Congress was controlled by the other party, but Congress and 
the President enacted both major and routine legislation. 
Compromise was an essential element in putting together voting 
majorities in committees and in the House and Senate and in 
reaching agreement between Congress and the President.\101\ 
Congress reflected the political climate of the times.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ From 1969 through 1976, Democrats controlled Congress and 
Republicans occupied the White House. From 1977 through 1980, Democrats 
controlled both of the elected branches. From 1981 through 1986, 
Republicans controlled the Senate and the White House, and Democrats 
controlled the House. Democrats took back the Senate in the 1986 
election, but President George H.W. Bush won the 1988 election to 
continue Republican control of the White House. Under each of these 
arrangements, significant legislation was enacted but accommodation 
between the parties and within the parties was essential to agreement. 
See the Congressional Quarterly Inc. series Congress and the Nation, 
vols. III-X (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 1989, 
1993, 1997, and 2001).
    \102\ Various studies show the ideological and party overlap and 
distance between the parties. Congressional parties in the 1960s, 
1970s, and beyond were ``big tent'' parties comprising liberals, 
moderates, and conservatives. See, for example, The Brookings 
Institution, ``Historical House Ideology and Party Unity, 35th-112th 
Congress (1857-2012), an online interactive graphic, at http://
www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2013/historical-house-ideology-
and-party-unity; and the annual Congressional Quarterly vote studies, 
which appear in CQ's annual almanacs (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 
Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the contemporary era, voters are polarized and unable to 
consistently send majorities to Congress with any mandate to 
move government in a specific direction. According to the study 
of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press entitled 
Political Polarization in the American Public, released in June 
2014:
   Democrats and Republicans are more ideologically divided 
        than they were even 20 years ago, which means that the 
        ``ideological overlap between the two parties has diminished: 
        Today, 92% of Republicans are to the right of the median 
        Democrat, and 94% of Democrats are to the left of the median 
        Republican.''
   27 percent of Democrats ``see the Republican Party as a 
        threat to the nation's well-being,'' and 36 percent of 
        Republicans ``see the Democratic Party as a threat to the 
        nation's well-being.''
   The 12 percent of the public that is most consistently 
        liberal and the 9 percent of the public that is most 
        consistently conservative, as noted earlier, on ``measure after 
        measure--whether primary voting, writing letters to officials, 
        volunteering for or donating to a campaign . . . are more 
        actively involved in politics, amplifying the voices that are 
        least willing to see the parties meet each other halfway.''
   46 percent of Democrats and Democratic-leaners (Americans 
        who ``have attitudes and behaviors that are very similar to 
        those of partisans'') and 50 percent of Republicans and 
        Republican-leaners prefer an outcome on policy issues between 
        President Obama and congressional Republicans ``to split the 
        difference at exactly 50/50.'' Yet, ``consistent liberals say 
        Obama should get two-thirds of what he wants,'' and 
        ``consistent conservatives say . . . congressional Republicans 
        should get 66% of what they want.'' \103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Political 
Polarization in the American Public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Congress of the contemporary era reflects voters' lack 
of consensus. President George W. Bush and, during his first 2 
years in office, President Barack Obama, with Congresses under 
the control of their own party, passed both major and routine 
legislation. Party unity, however, increased during the first 
decade of the 21st century. Some of the major legislation 
passed during President Obama's first 2 years in office did so 
with exclusive or near-exclusive Democratic Members' votes. It 
became more difficult in the 112th Congress and the 113th 
Congress, with split party control of Congress and high party 
unity, to pass companion bills in the two Chambers. The 
visibility of electoral politics in the legislative process 
appears to respond to today's political climate.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ For a perspective on how eras with consensus and lacking 
consensus are manifestations of the Founding Fathers' constitutional 
design, see William F. Connolly, Jr., ``Does James Madison Still Rule 
America?,'' Extensions, A Journal of the Carl Albert Congressional 
Research and Studies Center, summer 2014, pp. 10-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress seems to have fully entered another new era of its 
225-year evolution, which began on April 1 and April 6, 1789, 
when a quorum of the House and a quorum of the Senate, 
respectively, were achieved and the First Congress convened. 
Speculation as to how long the current era will last or what 
the transition to and contours of the next congressional era 
will be is beyond the scope of this report.


      
=======================================================================




                      II. THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

=======================================================================



   Tweet Your Congressman: The Rise of Electronic Communications in 
                                Congress

                          Matthew E. Glassman

                        Analyst on the Congress

                              ----------                              


        Constituent communications serve a vital role in 
        legislative government. Although virtually all Members 
        continue to use traditional modes of constituent 
        communication, such as postal mail and face-to-face 
        meetings, the use of new electronic communications 
        technology is dramatically increasing. The rise of 
        electronic communications has altered the traditional 
        patterns of communication between Members and 
        constituents. These changes have a variety of 
        implications for the practice of legislative politics 
        on Capitol Hill, ranging from the organization of 
        Member office operations to the Members' perception of 
        their constituency and understanding of their 
        representational role.

                              Introduction

    Constituent communications serve a vital role in 
representative government. If information about legislative 
activity cannot easily flow from Members to constituents, 
citizens will be less capable of drawing policy judgments 
regarding congressional actions, or electoral judgments of 
their Members. Likewise, if constituents cannot easily 
communicate their preferences to Members, congressional action 
is less likely to reflect popular opinion. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that Member-constituent communication is 
one of the basic building blocks of a representative democracy.
    Throughout American history, concerns about these vital 
democratic connections underpinned the existence of the 
franking privilege, which for much of the 19th century allowed 
not only Members to send mail without personal cost, but also 
constituents to send mail to Congress free of charge. 
Technological changes during the 19th and early 20th 
centuries--most notably the rise of mass newspapers, the 
invention of the telephone, and advances in transportation that 
allowed Members to travel more easily--aided Members and 
constituents in exchanging information with each other. Until 
the late 20th century, most Member-constituent communications 
comprised these four forms of communication--postal mail, 
telephone calls, press releases, and face-to-face meetings.
    Although virtually all Members continue to use these 
traditional modes of constituent communication, the use of new 
electronic communications technology is dramatically 
increasing. For example, prior to 1995, there were virtually no 
email exchanges between Members and constituents. In 2011, over 
243 million emails were received by the House of 
Representatives, more than 20 times the amount of postal mail 
received. Conversely, the amount of postal mail sent to 
Congress dropped by more than 50 percent during the same time 
period. Member official Web sites, blogs, YouTube channels, and 
Facebook pages--all nonexistent 20 years ago--also receive 
significant traffic. In less than 20 years, the entire nature 
of Member-constituent communication has been transformed, 
perhaps more than in any other period in American history.
    The rise of such electronic communication has altered the 
traditional patterns of communication between Members and 
constituents. Electronic technology has reduced the marginal 
cost of constituent communications; unlike postal letters, 
Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed 
cost, and constituents can reach Members at virtually zero 
cost. Likewise, the relay of information from Capitol Hill to 
the rest of the country (and vice versa) has been reduced, 
timewise, to basically zero. As soon as something happens in 
Congress, it is known everywhere in real time. Finally, Members 
can reach large numbers of citizens who are not their own 
constituents.
    These changes have wide-ranging implications for the 
practice of legislative politics on Capitol Hill. They are 
altering how Members organize their personal offices. They are 
impacting how Members manage their legislative activities on 
and off the floor. And, perhaps most importantly, they are 
transforming the very nature of representation in the United 
States, as Members become less bound to their geographic 
constituencies and can more easily engage wider, nongeographic 
political and policy constituencies.
    This report is divided into four parts. First, it discusses 
the role of constituent communications in a representative 
democracy and briefly reviews the historical development of 
constituent communications in the United States. Second, it 
reviews the rise of electronic communications in Congress since 
1995. It then discusses how electronic communications differ 
from traditional constituent communications. Finally, it 
examines some of the institutional and representational 
implications of these changes.

                       Constituent Communications

    Constituent communications serve a vital role in 
representative government. In early America, concerns about 
these vital democratic connections underpinned the existence of 
the franking privilege. The franking privilege has its roots in 
the 17th century. The British House of Commons instituted it in 
1660, and free mail was available to many officials under the 
colonial postal system.\1\ In 1775, the First Continental 
Congress passed legislation giving Members mailing privileges 
so they could communicate with their constituents as well as 
giving free mailing privileges to soldiers.\2\ In 1782, under 
the Articles of Confederation, Congress granted Members of the 
Continental Congress, heads of various departments, and 
military officers the right to send and receive letters, 
packets, and dispatches under the frank.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Post Office Act, 12 Charles II (1660); and Carl H. Scheele, A 
Short History of the Mail Service (Washington, DC: Smithsonian 
Institution Press, 1970), pp. 47-55.
    \2\ Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 34 vols., ed. 
Worthington C. Ford et al. (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1968), 
vol. 3, p. 342 (November 8, 1775).
    \3\ Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, vol. 23, pp. 
670-679 (October 18, 1782).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the adoption of the Constitution, the First Congress 
passed legislation for the establishment of Federal post 
offices, which contained language continuing the franking 
privilege as enacted under the Articles of Confederation.\4\ 
Under the Post Office Act of 1792, Members could send and 
receive under their frank all letters and packets up to 2 
ounces in weight while Congress was in session.\5\ Subsequent 
legislation extended Member use of the frank to a specific 
number of days before and after a session, first by 10 days in 
1810, then by 30 days in 1816, and finally to 60 days in 
1825.\6\ The act of 1825 also provided for the unlimited 
franking of newspapers and documents printed by Congress, 
regardless of weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Act of Congress, September 22, 1789, 1 Stat. 70. See also Act 
of Congress, August 4, 1790, 1 Stat. 178; and Act of Congress, March 3, 
1791, 1 Stat. 218.
    \5\ Act of Congress, February 20, 1792, 1 Stat. 232, 237.
    \6\ Act of Congress, May 1, 1810, 2 Stat. 592, 600; Act of 
Congress, April 9, 1816, 3 Stat. 264, 265; and Act of Congress, March 
3, 1825, 4 Stat. 102, 110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Scholarly work suggests that franked mail played an 
important role in national politics during the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries.\7\ In 1782, James Madison described the 
postal system as the ``principal channel'' that provided 
citizens with information about public affairs.\8\ Members 
mailed copies of acts, bills, government reports, and speeches, 
serving as a distributor for government information and a proxy 
for the then-nonexistent Washington press corps, providing 
local newspapers across the country with information on 
Washington politics.\9\ Because franking statutes allowed 
Members to both send and receive franked mail during much of 
the 19th century, constituents could also mail letters to their 
Senators and Representatives for free.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American Postal 
Service From Franklin to Morse (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1995); Edward G. Daniel, ``United States Postal Service and 
Postal Policy, 1789-1861'' (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1941); and 
Ross Allan McReynolds, ``History of the United States Post Office, 
1607-1931,'' (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1935).
    \8\ James Madison, ``Notes on Debates,'' December 6, 1782, in 
William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., Papers of James Madison (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), vol. 5, p. 372.
    \9\ John, Spreading the News: The American Postal Service From 
Franklin to Morse, p. 57.
    \10\ In addition, the Post Office Department did not require 
prepayment for mail until January 1, 1856. See Act of Congress, March 
3, 1855, 10 Stat. 642.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Historically, the franking privilege was seen as a right of 
the constituents, not of the Members.\11\ When the franking 
statutes were first revised in 1792, a proponent argued that 
``the privilege of franking was granted to the Members . . . as 
a benefit to their constituents.'' \12\ More generally, 
President Andrew Jackson suggested that the Post Office 
Department itself was an important element of a democratic 
republic:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Daniel, ``United States Postal Service and Postal Policy,'' p. 
446.
    \12\ House debate, Annals of Congress, vol. 3, December 16, 1792, 
pp. 252-253.

    This Department is chiefly important as a means of 
diffusing knowledge. It is to the body politic what the veins 
and arteries are to the natural--carrying, conveying, rapidly 
and regularly to the remotest parts of the system correct 
information of the operations of the Government, and bringing 
back to it the wishes and the feelings of the people.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ U.S. Congress, Senate, Message from the President of the 
United States, to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of 
the First Session of the Twenty-first Congress, 21st Cong., 1st sess., 
S. Doc. 1 (Washington, DC: Duff Green, 1830), p. 18.

    Even in the modern era, in addition to direct 
communications with constituents about matters of public 
concern, proponents of franking argue that free use of the 
mails allows Members to inform their constituents about 
upcoming townhall meetings, important developments in Congress, 
and other civic concerns. Without a method of directly reaching 
his or her constituents, proponents maintain that a Member 
would be forced to rely on intermediaries in the media or 
significant personal costs in order to publicize information 
the Member wished the constituents to receive.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Alfred A. Porro and Stuart A. Ascher, ``The Case for the 
Congressional Franking Privilege,'' University of Toledo Law Review, 
vol. 5 (winter 1974), pp. 280-281.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Technological changes during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries--most notably the rise of mass newspapers, the 
invention of the telephone, and advances in transportation that 
allowed Members to travel more easily--aided Members and 
constituents in exchanging information with each other. Until 
the late 20th century, the vast majority of Member-constituent 
communications comprised these four forms of communication--
postal mail, telephone calls, press releases, and face-to-face 
meetings.
    Contemporary law and Chamber regulations continue to 
reflect the belief that these traditional forms of Member-
constituent communication are vital to the functioning of our 
representative system. By law, Representatives and Senators are 
provided an annual allowance that may be used to frank letters, 
make long distance phone calls, travel to and from their 
districts for the purpose of interacting with constituents, buy 
office equipment that supports their constituent contact, and 
pay for other office expenses.

                 The Rise of Electronic Communications

    Although all Members continue to use traditional modes of 
constituent communication, they have many more choices and 
options available to communicate with constituents than they 
did 20 years ago. In addition to traditional modes of 
communication such as townhall meetings, telephone calls, and 
postal mail, Members can now reach their constituents via 
email, Web sites, tele-townhalls, online videos, social 
networking sites, and other electronic-based communication 
applications. Likewise, constituents can take advantage of 
these new mediums as well.
    There is overwhelming evidence that both Members and 
constituents are taking advantage of these new mediums; the use 
of new electronic communications technology is dramatically 
increasing.\15\ On the constituent side, email has now become, 
far and away, the preferred form of communication with 
Congress. Prior to 1995, there were virtually no email 
exchanges between Members and constituents.\16\ By 2011, over 
243 million emails were received by the House of 
Representatives, more than 20 times the amount of postal mail 
received.\17\ Similar growth was seen in incoming Senate 
electronic mail, with over 90 million emails received in 
2011.\18\ Figure 1 shows the rapid growth of email from 
constituents to Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ For journalistic accounts of the rise of electronic 
communications in Congress, see Elizabeth Brotherton, ``A Different 
Kind of Revolution; Technology Redefines Constituent Outreach,'' Roll 
Call, September 10, 2007, p. 1; Amy Doolittle, ``31 Days, 32 Million 
Messages,'' Politico, February 27, 2007, p. 1; Jonathan Kaplan, ``2008 
Candidates search Web for next new thing,'' The Hill, November 29, 
2006, p. 6; David Haase, ``Twitter: One More Medium, Much Shorter 
Messages,'' Roll Call, July 23, 2009, p. 4; and Daniel de Vise, 
``Tweeting Their Own Horns,'' The Washington Post, September 20, 2009, 
p. A13.
    \16\ Chris Casey, The Hill on the Net: Congress Enters the 
Information Age (Chestnut Hill, MA: Academic Press, Inc., 1996), pp. 
29-35.
    \17\ Data provided by the Office of the Chief Administrative 
Officer, House of Representatives, for all external emails sent to 
House users. These data do not include internal emails sent from one 
House user to another. Data for 2012 and 2013 are not yet available.
    \18\ Data provided by the Office of the Sergeant-At-Arms, Senate, 
for all external emails sent to Senate users. These data do not include 
internal emails sent from one Senate user to another. Data for 2012 and 
2013 are not yet available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         Figure 1. Email and Postal Mail to Congress, 1995-2011


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



    Source: Data provided by the House CAO and Office of the Senate 
Sergeant-At-Arms.

    Note: These data do not include internal emails sent from one 
congressional user to another.

    In comparison, the amount of postal mail sent to Congress 
has dropped by more than 50 percent during the same time 
period, from almost 53 million pieces of mail in 1995 to less 
than 22 million pieces in 2011.\19\ But it has been replaced by 
over 300 million emails. In fact, postal mail is now just 7 
percent of all mail coming to Capitol Hill, and that 7 percent 
is equal to more than half of the mail received in Congress in 
1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Data provided by the Office of the Chief Administrative 
Officer of the House of Representatives and the Office of the Secretary 
of the Senate. See also Kathy Goldschmidt and Leslie Ochreiter, 
Communicating with Congress: How the Internet Has Changed Citizen 
Identification, Congressional Management Foundation (Washington, DC), 
at http://nposoapbox.s3.amazonaws. com/cmfweb/
CWC_CitizenEngagement.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Communications from Congress have seen a similar 
transformation. Figure 2 reports the volume of quarterly mass 
postal mailings in the House from 1997 to 2008, and then the 
quarterly volume of all mass communications (which include 
postal mailing) from 2009 to 2013. Mass communications are 
defined by the House as ``unsolicited communication of 
substantially identical content to 500 or more persons in a 
session of Congress,'' which includes things like mass 
unsolicited emails, Web or print advertisements, radio spots, 
and newspaper inserts.

  Figure 2. House Mass Mail (FY97-FY09) and Mass Communications (FY09-
                                 FY13)

         Millions of Items of Mass Mail and Mass Communications
         
  [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]       
         
         
    Source: CRS analysis of CAO data.

    As shown in the graph, mass postal mail volumes follow a 
familiar pattern of peaking in the last quarter of the first 
year of each Congress (from the December newsletters) and then 
again in the period preceding the general election. They then 
drop off in the Chamberwide prohibited period (late third 
quarter and early fourth quarter of election years) and the 
lame duck fourth quarter of a Congress, as well as the first 
quarter of a new Congress. In the first Congress in which mass 
communications were tracked--the 111th Congress, 2009-2011--a 
similar pattern was observed, albeit at a naturally greater 
scale (since mass communications are inclusive of mass 
mailings). But then in 2011, in the first session of the 112th 
Congress, mass communications exploded, to roughly 10 times the 
volume of mass communications sent in the first quarter of 
2009.
    At the same time that Member use of email communications is 
increasing, the use of franked mail is at record lows. The 
total cost of franked mail coming out of Congress (adjusted for 
inflation) is at its lowest point since Congress began 
reimbursing the Post Office for congressional mail costs in 
FY1954. In nominal dollars, franked mail costs were down to 
$7.6 million in FY2013, from a high of over $113 million in 
FY1988.
    This decline in expenditures on postal mail is largely due 
to reform efforts in the late 1980s, including public 
disclosure of mail costs for individual Members and direct 
charging of Members' budgets for the cost of mail they send. 
However, nominal mail costs have also declined over 60 percent 
in the past 10 years, from $19.3 million in FY2003 to $7.6 
million in FY2013. Adjusted for inflation, this is over a two-
thirds decrease in mail expenditures.
    In addition to the rise of email, the official Web sites, 
blogs, YouTube channels, and Facebook pages of Members--all 
nonexistent 20 years ago--also receive significant traffic.\20\ 
As of January 24, 2012, a total of 426 of 541 Members of 
Congress (78.7 percent) had an official congressional account 
registered with Twitter, and 472 Members (87.2 percent) had an 
official congressional account registered on Facebook. Figure 3 
shows the proportion of Members in the House and Senate who had 
an official account with Twitter, Facebook, both, or neither, 
as of January 24, 2012, respectively. These numbers reflect an 
increase in adoption over the previous two years. As of 
September 2009, only 205 Members--39 Senators and 166 
Representatives (a total of 38 percent)--had been registered 
with Twitter.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ A survey of the YouTube Senate Hub homepage (http://
www.YouTube.com/user/senatehub) finds a large range in the number of 
views each video has received. Some videos have only a few dozen views 
while others have received tens of thousands of views.
    \21\ For information on Member adoption of Twitter, see CRS Report 
R41066, Social Networking and Constituent Communications: Member Use of 
Twitter During a Two-Month Period in the 111th Congress, by Matthew E. 
Glassman, Jacob R. Straus, and Colleen J. Shogan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Figure 3. Twitter and Facebook: House and Senate Adoption Proportions

                         As of January 24, 2012

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Source: LBJ School of Public Affairs and CRS data analysis.

                The Nature of Electronic Communications

    The rise of such electronic communication has altered the 
traditional patterns of communication between Members and 
constituents. Technology has reduced the marginal cost of 
constituent communications; unlike postal letters, Members can 
reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost, and 
constituents can reach Members at virtually zero cost.\22\ 
Likewise, the relay of information from Capitol Hill to the 
rest of the country (and vice versa) has been reduced, 
timewise, to basically zero. As soon as something happens in 
Congress, it is known everywhere in real time. Finally, Members 
can reach large numbers of citizens who are not their own 
constituents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ This substantially differentiates electronic mail from franked 
mail, which does incur a marginal cost. See CRS Report RL34188, 
Congressional Official Mail Costs, by Matthew E. Glassman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               Electronic Communications Are Inexpensive

    The representational communication activities of both 
Members and constituents are constrained by cost. 
Representatives and Senators are given a fixed amount of 
money--known as the Members' Representational Allowance (MRA) 
in the House and the Senators' Official Personnel and Office 
Expense Account (SOPOEA) in the Senate--for the hiring of 
staff, travel expenses to and from their district or State, 
constituent communications, and other office expenses.\23\ 
Prior to the rise of electronic communications, this budget was 
a significant constraint; postal mail and long distance phone 
calls have a stable marginal cost. Likewise, constituents were 
constrained by their own personal financial budget; the 
marginal value of a phone call or letter to Congress had to be 
weighed against the marginal value of any other use of the same 
money. In effect, both Members and constituents were 
constrained to communicate with each other only when the cost 
of communication was outweighed by the importance of the 
communication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ For more information on the MRA and SOPOEA, see CRS Report 
RL30064, Congressional Salaries and Allowances, by Ida A. Brudnick.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Electronic communications have virtually no direct marginal 
cost. Once a Member or constituent pays the startup and 
recurring costs of owning a computer, there is no further 
financial cost for each individual email communication between 
them. Almost all electronic communication media--be it email, 
social media, tele-townhalls, Web advertisements, and so 
forth--tend to have fixed capital or startup costs, but are 
then largely free on the margin. The result is that, for both 
Member and constituent, the only marginal cost to sending an 
additional communication is a time cost. Direct financial costs 
have been largely eliminated.

                   Electronic Communications Are Fast

    Electronic communications are faster than traditional forms 
of Member-constituent communications. This is obvious, but it 
has several important implications for how congressional 
offices choose to use it and how it shapes their communications 
strategy. In the past, if Members wanted to send out time-
sensitive communications on congressional action, the best 
outlet was probably a faxed press release to the media, perhaps 
to the local newspapers serving their district or State. There 
was no point in trying to send postal mail directly to 
constituents at that speed. Now, however, Members can update 
constituents on floor activity or other business instantly, 
using subscribed email lists or social media. Likewise, 
constituents can use email and social media to contact Members 
in real time.
    This advantage changes not only how quickly information can 
be shared but also the types of information Members and 
constituents might provide each other. In the past, real time 
information about an upcoming amendment on the floor might not 
have been possible to communicate; the vote might have taken 
place before the Member could alert the constituents about it, 
or before constituents could communicate preferences to the 
Member. With the rise of electronic communications, 
constituents and Members can easily share information about 
such an amendment in real time.

        Electronic Communications Interact with a Wider Audience

    Perhaps the greatest difference between traditional 
constituent communications and electronic communications is the 
change in the constituents themselves. Traditionally, Members 
could only reach citizens who were actually their electoral 
constituents. Following a Federal court action (Coalition to 
End the Permanent Government v. Marvin T. Runyon, et al., 979 
F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), the rules of the House were amended 
to restrict Members from sending franked mail outside of their 
districts. Even if it was not cost-prohibitive, it would not be 
possible for a Member to reach a wider-than-district audience 
using postal mail.
    Electronic communications, however, are not so limited. 
Members can build email subscriber lists--many offer such 
subscriptions immediately upon an individual entering their Web 
site--and the use of social media tools like Facebook, Twitter, 
and YouTube allows Members to broadcast and interact with a 
potential constituency far wider than their geographic 
district. This does, however, create some potential 
difficulties for Members who would prefer to only communicate 
with their electoral constituents; unlike a postal address, an 
email account or a Facebook account is not attached to a 
geographic location.

             The Implications of Electronic Communications

    The rise of electronic constituent communications has wide-
ranging implications for the practice of legislative politics. 
It is altering how Members organize and manage their personal 
offices. It is impacting the ability of Members to gather 
support for political and policy goals. And, perhaps most 
important, it is transforming the very nature of representation 
in the United States. Each of these sets of changes will be 
discussed below.

                   Changing Member Office Operations

    There are at least three important effects of the rise of 
electronic communications on Member office operations. First, 
as described above, the number of incoming emails to Congress 
in 2011 was more than 10 times as great as the number of pieces 
of postal mail in 1995. This, however, is almost certainly due 
to the elimination of a marginal cost for constituents to 
communicate their preferences to Members. There is virtually no 
marginal financial cost to sending an email, and email also has 
less time costs than sending traditional postal mail, 
particularly when the messages are produced and distributed by 
groups, and only forwarded on to Congress by individual 
citizens.
    In effect, the intensity threshold at which a constituent 
will express a preference to a Member has been greatly reduced. 
Before electronic communications, Members could expect that any 
constituent willing to spend the time and money to write them 
had a pretty strong preference or opinion about the subject 
matter. Members can no longer count on the same level of 
intensity. In effect, congressional offices receive more 
constituent opinion, but have less ability to determine the 
intensity of the opinion.
    Second, this explosion of incoming email puts more pressure 
on congressional staff. Constituent or interest group service 
and communications is an important aspect of what goes on in 
Members' personal offices, but it is far from the only thing 
that goes on. To the degree that more staff time needs to be 
allocated to the collection, processing, and responding tasks 
associated with incoming communications, less time can be 
allocated to policy or other work, or staffers need to put in 
more hours. And while the number of staffers working in 
personal offices has increased modestly in the last generation 
(about a 6 percent increase in Members' offices since 1982), 
the prospects, in the near term, for a significant increase--
namely the proposition of a substantial increase in 
Representatives' MRAs or Senators' SOPOEA--seem quite dim.
    Third, the speed of electronic communication has changed 
expectations. The ability to reach constituents in real time 
has created, for some constituents, an expectation that Members 
will use electronic communications to rapidly respond to both 
inquiries and congressional action. Whereas in the past Members 
may have had days to consider how they would present issues or 
voting decisions to constituents, in many cases they are now 
expected to provide the same in a matter of hours. Similarly, 
the rise of social media--particularly Facebook and Twitter--
has put pressure on Members to craft very short responses to 
issues that often are complicated. The pressure to craft 
succinct, social-media-ready communications means that Members 
are often left unable to explain nuances or complexities of 
issues to the degree that they might like.

                 Changing the Nature of Representation

    The rise of electronic communications has radically 
increased the opportunities for surrogate representation. 
Political scientist Jane Mansbridge has defined surrogate 
representation as happening when Members represent constituents 
outside their district.\24\ In the traditional formulation, 
this often happens around specific issues with dispersed 
national constituencies: for example, former Representative 
Dennis Kucinich representing antiwar advocates, former 
Representative Barney Frank representing gay rights advocates, 
or Representative Chris Smith representing prolife advocates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Jane Mansbridge, ``Rethinking Representation,'' American 
Political Science Review, vol. 97 (November 2003), pp. 515-528.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prior to the rise of electronic communications, few Members 
were engaged in such surrogate activities. They simply did not 
have the resource capacity. Representatives were (and still 
are) barred from sending franked postal mail outside of their 
districts. The only way to get a national audience was to get 
on television--which usually meant having at least the power of 
a committee chair, or doing something extraordinarily 
provocative. And it would have been unusual to suggest spending 
any significant portion of campaign money on outside-the-
district or outside-the-State activities.
    Electronic communications have rearranged this playing 
field. Even backbench Members can gather a national following 
with relative ease, and at virtually no cost. The zero marginal 
cost of the Internet, and in particular the social media 
applications like Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook, have opened 
up opportunities. Any Member can stake out an issue, make a 
concerted effort to become a national leader on the issue, and 
have some chance of success, all without expending almost any 
marginal resources.
    For individual Members, there are clear benefits for this: 
national leadership on one or more issues means a higher 
political profile both inside and outside the House or Senate, 
more campaign fundraising opportunities, and greater 
opportunity to influence public policy. While there is little 
hard empirical evidence, it does seem as if Members are 
beginning to alter their representational strategies around 
these facts: connecting themselves to national movements, 
inserting themselves more often into national policy debates, 
and modifying their fundraising strategies to more 
optimistically look for out-of-district and out-of-State money. 
And the more that Members engage in surrogate representation, 
the less time they have to engage in traditional district and 
State representation. In effect, electronic communication may 
be having a nationalizing effect on representation.
    Certain things, of course, have not changed. The most 
important is that only people in a district or State can vote 
for a Member of Congress. But there are other important things, 
too: district offices have to be in the district, franked mail 
still can only go to the district, and so forth. So the 
electoral connection, and most of the resources available to 
maintain it, are still tied squarely to a district or State. 
And this means that Members will always be tied, first and 
foremost, to a geographic district or State. The electoral 
constituency that the Member has--the geographic constituency 
in his or her district or State--still rules. But it may not be 
the largest constituency the Member sees anymore when he or she 
looks back home from Washington. The national constituency may 
now enter the Member's thinking--whether he or she wants it or 
not; whether he or she knows it or not--in a way that 
fundamentally rearranges the lens through which the Member sees 
the home district or State.
    This potentially has implications. The most important thing 
that comes to mind is that the Member may now have greater 
incentives than ever to try and shape his or her district or 
State in a more national mold. This would be akin to 
Mansbridge's idea of ``educating'' the constituency under an 
anticipatory representation model.\25\ But it might just be a 
Member choosing to frame issues in the district or State in a 
national way, or choosing to emphasize national over local 
issues when communicating to the district or State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Under an ``anticipatory'' theory of voting, voters (and thus 
candidates for office) concern themselves with how the candidates will 
respond to future issues or votes. Contrast this with a 
``retrospective'' theory, in which voters reward or punish incumbent 
representatives for past behavior. Under an anticipatory theory, 
representatives have the opportunity to alter the views of the 
electorate by providing them information that may affect the next 
election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, scholars of Congress and the Presidency have 
argued that the rise of mass media, particularly television, 
has given the President a comparative advantage over 
Congress.\26\ While the President can employ the resources of 
the executive branch to promote his unitary message, individual 
Members of Congress lack the institutional resources to compete 
with the President, and Congress as a whole lacks a unity of 
message.\27\ The rise of electronic communications have 
arguably allowed Congress, as a sum of its Members, to have a 
more influential voice in public political debates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Samuel Kernell and Gary C. Jacobson, ``Congress and the 
Presidency as News in the Nineteenth Century,'' The Journal of 
Politics, vol. 49, no. 4, November 1987, pp. 1016-1035. See also John 
Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1995), pp. 45-47.
    \27\ Kernell and Jacobson, ``Congress and the Presidency,'' p. 
1017.







    Collaborative Relationships and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate: A 
               Perspective Drawn from Firsthand Accounts

                            Mark J. Oleszek

            Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process

                              ----------                              


        This report explores the nature of collaboration in the 
        Senate using firsthand accounts drawn from 16 personal 
        interviews the author conducted with current and former 
        Senators and members of their senior staff. These 16 
        individuals provided useful perspective into the 
        considerations Senators make when deciding whether or 
        not to partner with a colleague, the incentives and 
        pressures they experience when doing so, and how 
        opportunities for collaborative relationships to 
        develop have shifted over time in response to broader 
        changes taking place in American politics. Most 
        respondents consider the collaborations that Senators 
        undertake with one another as central to Senate 
        lawmaking, but the consensus view among them is that 
        working collaboratively, especially across the aisle, 
        is harder than ever in today's Senate. This comes 
        despite the fact that, as one chief of staff put it: 
        ``In the Senate, there is no magical crank to make 
        things happen. It's all about relationships.''

                              Introduction

    Political observers and even some Senators have 
characterized the contemporary U.S. Senate as broken, 
dysfunctional, angry, and ungovernable. ``I think the problem 
is that we've lost the capacity to actually legislate,'' 
lamented Senator Olympia Snowe shortly before announcing her 
retirement from the Chamber.\1\ In the view of her former 
colleague Evan Bayh, who also opted to retire rather than seek 
reelection to the 112th Congress (2011-2012):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Jennifer Senior, ``Mr. Woebegone Goes to Washington,'' New York 
Times Magazine, April 4, 2010.

    There are many causes for the dysfunction: strident 
partisanship, unyielding ideology, a corrosive system of 
campaign financing, gerrymandering of House districts, endless 
filibusters, holds on executive appointments in the Senate, 
dwindling social interaction between Senators of opposing 
parties and a caucus system that promotes party unity at the 
expense of bipartisan consensus.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Evan Bayh, ``Why I'm Leaving the Senate,'' New York Times, 
February 21, 2010, E-9.

    ``It has gotten so bad now,'' observed Senate scholar Ross 
Baker, ``that Republicans don't want to be seen publicly in the 
presence of Democrats or have a Democrat profess friendship for 
them or vice versa.'' \3\ ``If Senators can't get along, how 
can they govern?,'' Politico's David Rogers asked 
rhetorically.\4\ Recent outbreaks of incivility, even 
hostility, between Senate colleagues reflect how norms of 
behavior that might have been common during an earlier era have 
shifted over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ David M. Herszenhorn, ``In Senate Health Vote, a New Partisan 
Vitriol,'' New York Times, December 24, 2009, A-1.
    \4\ David Rogers, ``The Lost Senate,'' Politico, October 9, 2009, 
p. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This report begins with a discussion of how social dynamics 
inside the Senate have changed in recent decades, while 
subsequent sections draw upon a set of 16 personal interviews 
the author conducted with current and former Senators and their 
senior-level staff aides on the topic of their own 
collaborative experiences. These 16 individuals provided useful 
perspective into the considerations Senators make when deciding 
whether or not to partner with a colleague, the incentives and 
pressures they experience when doing so, and how opportunities 
for collaborative relationships to develop have shifted over 
time in response to broader changes taking place in American 
politics.

                             The Inner Club

    During the 1950s, scholars described the Senate as a 
communal legislative environment that favored accommodation and 
compromise over conflict and division. Stylized views of the 
midcentury Senate depicted an inward-looking institution where 
Senators acted in accordance with an informal code of 
behavioral norms set forth by an ``Inner Club'' of mostly 
Southern Democrats who effectively ran the Chamber.\5\ Senators 
who served at that time were said to exercise greater restraint 
in the use of their individual prerogatives in deference to 
their colleagues and in recognition of the Senate's need to 
process its workload. Senators were also expected to 
accommodate one another whenever possible, with an 
understanding that they would be repaid in kind at a later 
time. Junior Senators were to be ``seen and not heard'' until 
they accumulated enough policy expertise through committee work 
to make thoughtful contributions to policy debates. This 
apprenticeship period also provided them with a greater ability 
to specialize in the policy areas of greatest importance to the 
States they represented. Personal attacks were frowned upon, 
and Senators avoided involvement in political campaigns against 
their colleagues. They were ``institutional patriots'' first, 
who considered such actions beneath the dignity of the Senate 
and detrimental to the lawmaking process. This was an era, 
according to one political scientist, in which Senators 
displayed a ``spirit of accommodation.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ On midcentury Senate norms of behavior, see Donald R. Matthews, 
U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Random House, 1960); and 
William S. White, Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1956). For a critical assessment of these 
perspectives, see Eric Schickler, ``The U.S. Senate in the Mid-20th 
Century,'' presented at the Robert C. Dole Conference on the Senate, 
University of Kansas, March 25-26, 2010.
    \6\ Ralph K. Huitt, ``The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative 
Role,'' American Political Science Review, vol. 55, no. 3 (September 
1961), pp. 566-575. See footnote 5 for citations to works by Matthews 
and White.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the ``go along, get along'' style of the 
midcentury Senate has always been somewhat overstated, 
behavioral norms such as those described above can serve as an 
important counterweight to institutional rules and precedents 
that, if invoked, make it difficult for Senators to approve 
measures absent supermajority support to end a filibuster. As 
Robert Axelrod has observed, informal norms of cooperation can 
arise as a solution to behavior that is individually rational 
(such as a heavy reliance on parliamentary prerogatives for 
individual gain) but collectively irrational (such as 
legislative unresponsiveness brought about by an escalating 
procedural arms race).\7\ Absent these folkways or other 
mechanisms of cohesion, Senate lawmaking becomes that much more 
difficult to accomplish.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Robert Axelrod, ``An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,'' American 
Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1095-
1111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Evolution of the Senate

    Where camaraderie and accommodation might have carried the 
day during an earlier era, by the 1970s few remnants of the 
Inner Club remained. As Nelson W. Polsby observed at that time:

    We are in the midst of a profound change in the role of the 
Senate in the political system, from an intensely private and 
conservative body to a very public and progressive one; from 
one focused on the virtues of age and experience to one devoted 
to the young, the vigorous, and the ambitious.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Nelson W. Polsby, ``Goodbye to the Inner Club,'' in Polsby, 
ed., Congressional Behavior (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 105.

    In contrast to the Inner Club era of the 1950s, since the 
1970s Senators have become more inclined to employ the full 
range of their procedural prerogatives for personal or partisan 
gain. The proliferation of dilatory behavior in the modern 
Senate has been well documented, and scholars now characterize 
the institution as partisan and individualistic.\9\ That the 
Senate at midcentury differs considerably from the contemporary 
body should come as no great surprise. In the interim, the 
United States has undergone a number of dramatic and 
transformative events, including a shocking Presidential 
assassination, a political scandal of epic proportions, the 
Vietnam war, a civil rights crusade, the women's movement, an 
explosion in interest group activity on Capitol Hill, an 
expansion in the size and reach of the Federal Government, a 
political realignment in the South from a Democratic stronghold 
to a largely GOP bastion, a revolution in information and 
communications technology, an expanded world market for U.S. 
goods and services, a domestic and international environment 
plagued by the threat of terrorism, and the near-collapse of 
the U.S. financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the upsurge in 
dilatory behavior in the contemporary Senate. See especially Barbara 
Sinclair, The Transformation of the U.S. Senate (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989); Sarah Binder and Steven S. Smith, 
Politics or Principle: Filibustering in the Senate (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1997); Eric Schickler and Gregory J. Wawro, 
Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox 
Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress, 4th ed. 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011); and Steven S. Smith, The Senate 
Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate 
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the changing times, as Senator Dick Durbin 
explained, ``The reality of passing legislation on Capitol Hill 
deals a lot with people. If you don't understand the people and 
the power they have, you're not likely to succeed.'' \10\ Three 
political scientists put it this way:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Ian Gaff and Mary Lynn Jones, ``Lessons About Congress Not 
Taught in School,'' The Hill, August 7, 2002, p. 13.

    The legislature is a highly interactive collectivity. Its 
institutional life gravitates around two poles: one the nexus 
of the representative and the represented and the other the 
networks of affect and respect among legislators 
themselves.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Gregory A. Caldeira, John Clark, and Samuel C. Patterson, 
``Political Respect in the Legislature,'' Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 1 (February 1993), p. 3.

    The first nexus of legislative life--between lawmakers and 
constituents--was covered masterfully by Richard Fenno in a 
series of important works on the ``home styles'' of 
Representatives and Senators, including book-length studies of 
Senators Arlen Specter, Dan Quayle, John Glenn, and Pete 
Dominici.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ See Richard Fenno, Learning to Legislate: The Senate Education 
of Arlen Specter (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1991); Richard Fenno, The 
Making of a Senator: Dan Quayle (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989); 
Richard Fenno, The Presidential Odyssey of John Glenn (Washington, DC: 
CQ Press, 1990); and Richard Fenno, The Emergence of a Senate Leader: 
Pete Domenici and the Reagan Budget (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This report examines the second nexus of institutional life 
in the Senate, or what might be called the ``collaborative 
dimension'' of Senate lawmaking--the ways in which Senators 
have interacted with one another over time, and the importance 
of those interactions to the Senate's lawmaking process. In a 
Chamber that favors individual expression over leadership 
direction, attention must be paid to the interactions that 
occur among Senators themselves.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Reflecting this reality of senatorial life, Mike Mansfield 
often referred to himself as ``first among equals'' during his tenure 
as majority leader. Trent Lott compared his experience in that position 
to ``herding cats,'' while Howard Baker described Senate leadership as 
``pushing a wet noodle.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are good reasons to expect collaborative 
relationships to play an especially important role in the 
Senate as compared to the House. The Senate is smaller in size, 
usually more collegial in tone, and has parliamentary rules 
that encourage Senators to work together. With 6-year terms in 
office, Senators have more time and a greater opportunity to 
interact with colleagues in meaningful ways. Senators also 
enjoy significant influence in national policymaking regardless 
of their status in the majority, and even a single Senator can 
slow legislative action considerably using a wide range of 
dilatory motions and tactics.\14\ As Senator Lindsay Graham put 
it, ``In the Senate, you cannot be dealt out of the card game . 
. . The rules of the Senate allow people who are concerned and 
passionate to have their say.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ For more on the procedural prerogatives of individual 
Senators, see CRS Report RL30360, Filibusters and Cloture in the 
Senate, by Richard S. Beth and Valerie Heitshusen; CRS Report RL30850, 
Minority Rights and Senate Procedures, by Judy Schneider; and CRS 
Report R43563, ``Holds'' in the Senate, by Mark J. Oleszek.
    \15\ Emily Pierce, ``Lindsey Graham: Pushing the Envelope,'' Roll 
Call, July 8, 2004, p. 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Collaborative relationships seem to serve as a basic 
ingredient of Senate lawmaking, but anecdotal evidence suggests 
a decline over time in the ability and willingness of Senators 
to work together. ``Lost are the car pools, weekend parties and 
potluck dinners that brought Senators together,'' wrote 
Politico's David Rogers, a longtime observer of the 
institution.\16\ A consequence of this development was 
explained by former Majority Leader Tom Daschle: ``Because we 
can't bond, we can't trust. Because we can't trust, we can't 
cooperate. Because we can't cooperate, we become 
dysfunctional.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ David Rogers, ``The Lost Senate,'' Politico, October 9, 2009, 
p. 13.
    \17\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For all its challenges, Senate lawmaking continues to 
demand--barring any sudden rules changes--a high level of 
collaboration among its membership for legislation of any 
substance to pass the Chamber. Accordingly, the interactions 
that occur and the relationships that develop between and among 
Senate colleagues can play an important role in shaping 
opportunities for collaboration and collective action to occur. 
After all, lawmaking is an inherently social activity, so the 
ability and willingness that Senators have to work together can 
inform our understanding of the Senate's unique legislative 
process. According to former Senator Joseph Biden:

    A personal relationship is what allows you to go after 
someone hammer and tongs on one issue and still find common 
ground on the next. It is the grease that lubricates this 
incredible system we have. It is what allows you to see the 
world from another person's perspective and allows them to take 
the time to see it from yours. [The Senate] has left me with 
the conviction that personal relationship is the one thing that 
unlocks the true potential of this place. Every good thing that 
I have seen happen here, every bold step taken in 36-plus years 
I have been here, came not from the application of pressure by 
interest groups but through the maturation of personal 
relationships.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 155 (January 15, 
2009), p. S405.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Research Strategy

    This report seeks to assess the collaborative dimension of 
Senate lawmaking and how the opportunities that Senators have 
to work together have changed over time. To do so, the author 
has drawn upon a set of 16 personal interviews conducted in 
July and August 2009 with 9 current and former Senators and 7 
current and former senior staff aides. Indepth interviews with 
those who possess a keen longitudinal perspective of the 
institution--and an understanding of the challenges Senators 
confront in the conduct of their official duties--allow for a 
useful discussion of the topic of collaboration. Each interview 
began with the following question designed to elicit the most 
desirable attributes Senators look for in a colleague:

        Question 1: What attributes do you look for when 
        deciding to partner with another Senator?

    Identifying these attributes can help explain differences 
in Senators' collaborative tendencies. Previous research in 
political science has suggested that factors such as trust, 
respect, and a reputation for dependability underlie patterns 
of political influence in the Chamber, and Senators tend to 
agree.\19\ As Senator Robert Dole told Politico's Rogers:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ For more on how trust and respect underlie patterns of 
political influence in a legislature, see Harold D. Lasswell and 
Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New York: Free Press, 1950).

    I think success depends on developing relationships, 
keeping your word. If I gave my word to Ted Kennedy that 
tomorrow you can offer your amendment, and somebody rushes up 
to me, like Bill Frist, and says, ``I've got that amendment--I 
want to offer that amendment''--if you go tell Kennedy, ``I'm 
sorry, I made a mistake,'' you're finished. Not quite, but 
you're on the edge. Why should he trust you the next time? I 
think that's the key.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ David Rogers, ``Dole: Success Depends on Keeping Your Word,'' 
Politico, October 9, 2009, p. 7.

    Broader developments in American politics also are likely 
to shape the opportunities and incentives Senators have to work 
together. With growing ideological polarization in the Senate 
and less policy overlap between the two major parties, Senators 
might be expected to experience greater difficulties in 
building collaborative relationships with their colleagues, 
especially with those from across the aisle. Questions 2 and 3 
asked respondents to assess the ways in which the Senate has 
evolved in recent years and what consequences, if any, recent 
developments have had on prospects for meaningful collaboration 
to occur between and among Senators. Those questions read as 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
follows:

        Question 2: How would you characterize legislative life 
        in the Senate today compared to when you arrived?

        Question 3: What changes, if any, have affected the 
        ability of Senators to work together?

    It should be noted that the 16 Senators and senior staff 
aides who agreed to the interview request do not constitute a 
representative sample of viewpoints on this subject. Of the 
nine Senators interviewed, three served in the 113th Congress 
(2013-2014), including a Southern Republican, a mid-Atlantic 
Democrat, and a Midwestern Democrat. Also interviewed were 
three senior staff aides--two legislative directors and one 
chief of staff--who are or were employed by a Northeastern 
Republican, an Independent, and the Democratic leadership. To 
explore collaboration from both a longitudinal and cross-
sectional perspective, former Senators and senior staff who 
remained active in political life were also contacted. Trolling 
the highest echelons of prominent lobbying firms and trade 
associations netted seven additional participants in close 
proximity to Capitol Hill. Three were former Senators, 
including a former majority leader. Two were top Democratic 
floor aides, one of whom served as party secretary. Another two 
respondents were longtime GOP chiefs of staff.
    Three former Senators no longer active in public life also 
agreed to be interviewed. One traveled from Maryland for a 
meeting on Capitol Hill, while another welcomed the author into 
his home. Mobility issues constrained the third Senator from 
meeting in person so the interview was conducted over the 
telephone. These Senators were found in the telephone directory 
encompassing residents of Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, 
DC. In all, the sample contained nine current and former 
Senators, one current chief of staff, two former chiefs of 
staff, two legislative directors, and two former floor aides to 
the Democratic leadership. Of these 16 respondents, 4 were 
Republicans, 11 were Democrats, and 1 was an Independent. 
Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 2 hours in length, with 
the average interview lasting 67 minutes. These were 
semistructured and confidential interviews conducted on the 
basis of the three questions listed above.
    While not representative in the statistical sense, these 16 
interviewees provided useful perspective into the incentives 
and pressures Senators experience when collaborating with 
colleagues, how prospects for collaboration might have shifted 
over time, and why that might be the case. Overall, this was a 
relatively veteran group with decades of Senate experience. Of 
the 16 respondents, 12 served in the Senate in excess of 10 
years. Participating Senators served for an average of 16 years 
in the Chamber--two spent in excess of 30 years apiece in 
public life--while the average staff aide had 17 years of 
Senate experience. One respondent was elected to the Senate in 
the 1960s, seven began their Senate careers in the 1970s, three 
started in the 1980s, two in the 1990s, and three in the 2000s. 
The next section considers responses to question 1 on the 
attributes Senators desire in a colleague, and subsequent 
sections address questions 2 and 3 on the nature of senatorial 
life and how collaborative opportunities may have shifted over 
time.

              What Underlies a Collaborative Relationship?

    Of the many personal attributes that might encourage a 
working relationship to develop between Senators, 
trustworthiness, respect for opposing viewpoints, and a 
reputation for dependability were cited most frequently by 
respondents. ``Trust and respect are vital to a sound working 
relationship,'' a former Senator explained. ``Collaboration is 
conditional on trust and respect,'' said another. ``You have to 
know each other.'' ``Trust underpins collaboration in the 
Senate,'' reiterated a third respondent. A former chief of 
staff shared this view:

    Trust and respect are absolutely vital to the Senate. Guys 
like Ted Kennedy, Howard Baker, Thad Cochran, Mark Hatfield, 
and Orrin Hatch are sought out because they're honest, they're 
dependable.

    One respondent illustrated the importance of trust in 
Senate lawmaking by recalling an exchange between Senate 
leaders Howard Baker and Robert Byrd that occurred in 1981 
after Republicans gained control of the Chamber. ``You know 
Senate rules better than I do,'' said Baker to Byrd, ``so I'll 
make you a deal. I won't surprise you if you don't surprise 
me.'' With his encyclopedic knowledge of Senate rules, Byrd 
might have been predisposed to decline the deal, knowing that 
he might be able to outmaneuver the relatively inexperienced 
Baker during procedural negotiations between the two leaders. 
``Let me think about it,'' Senator Byrd replied.
    Byrd caught up with Baker 2 hours later. ``You've got a 
deal,'' he said. According to this respondent, ``by honoring 
the agreement, Baker and Byrd established a great deal of trust 
and respect for one another.'' Subsequent interviews confirm a 
sound working relationship between the two former Senate 
leaders. One of Byrd's top floor aides described his boss' 
relationship with Baker as ``very close.'' Of all the 
collaborations that occur in the Senate at any given time--
between committee chairmen and ranking members; between 
Senators who share a policy interest; between Senators of the 
same party, the same State, or neighboring States; or between 
Senators of different parties--the most consequential might be 
the relationship that exists between the two Senate leaders. 
The vital role Senate leaders play in managing the agenda, 
protecting the interests of their conferences, and negotiating 
with their leadership counterparts across the aisle--tasks that 
often demand constant communication between them--provides each 
with a strong incentive to maintain a sound working 
relationship with the other.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ One respondent illustrated the importance of a sound working 
relationship between party leaders by recalling a 3-week period in 2000 
in which then-Minority Whip Harry Reid managed the Senate on behalf of 
then-Majority Whip Mitch McConnell, his cross-party colleague in the 
leadership. ``When Majority Whip McConnell had heart problems [in 
2000], Reid effectively ran the floor. Would that happen today?'' the 
respondent asked rhetorically.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Trust, respect, and dependability (or some combination 
thereof) were identified by virtually all respondents as 
essential components to meaningful collaboration. Attributes 
such as a Senator's reputation for thoroughness and diligence 
were also reported as basic to a successful partnership. ``I 
seek out Senators who are thorough and hardworking and who 
follow through on commitments, like Carl Levin and Ted 
Kennedy,'' explained a liberal Senator. ``If Carl and I came to 
different conclusions on an issue, I would reconsider my 
position.''
    One Midwesterner expressed a great deal of difficulty 
working with moderate colleagues because ``they often feel 
cross-pressured and sometimes have trouble following through on 
a commitment.'' Other respondents also commented on the 
inability of some moderates to follow through on previous 
agreements. ``Moderates can be the hardest to work with because 
they are the ones who change their tune most often,'' one said. 
A liberal Senator even said he preferred working with 
conservatives because, unlike moderates, ``their political 
ideals won't be called into question.''
    The degree to which a Senator is openminded and personally 
compatible with others is also thought to foster collaboration. 
Here, especially high marks go to Majority Leader Baker. 
``Baker didn't dismiss anyone's opinion,'' one respondent 
explained. ``He would at least listen to all his colleagues.'' 
``I have enormous respect [for Baker],'' one of his Democratic 
colleagues stated, who also mentioned that ``his support of the 
Panama Canal cost him politically but was the right thing to do 
for the country.'' To another Senator, ``the compatibility 
between Baker and Muskie was instrumental to passage of the 
Clean Air Act [of 1970].''
    If personal compatibility and openmindedness promote 
collaboration, then their absence can produce the opposite 
outcome. ``Some people are off the table immediately,'' 
reported a legislative director. ``I've seen [the Senator] say, 
`I can't work with so and so' and that was it.'' Another 
respondent revealed that ``[the Senator] just went on a codel 
[a congressional delegation traveling overseas] with a guy who 
was a total [expletive], so there's no way we're cosponsoring 
anything of his for awhile.''
    Other respondents cited an inability to compromise as a key 
reason to avoid working with a colleague. ``You have to be 
willing to jettison a little piece of your ideology to find 
compromise,'' one respondent said. ``Compromise is the hallmark 
of the American political system,'' explained a former Senator. 
But in his view, ``a new breed of Senators made compromise more 
difficult.'' Especially harsh criticism was directed at so-
called true-believers, identified by interviewees as those 
whose ideological beliefs are so rigid as to prevent 
compromise. According to one GOP chief of staff, ``True 
believers are among the hardest to work with.'' A Democratic 
respondent had this to say:

    There are more true believers today that can make 
collaboration and compromise difficult. If you're a true 
believer, then you're less likely to compromise with those of a 
different philosophy. True believers are not amenable to 
compromise.

    Another respondent viewed Ted Kennedy as the gold standard 
when it came to his ability to compromise:

    If Ted was around today, the health care debate would be 
different. More than anyone else, Ted ha[d] the credibility to 
strike a compromise with Republicans without losing the support 
of Democratic allies.

    The attributes Senators most desire in a colleague seem to 
appear today as they did 30 years ago. Ross Baker interviewed 
25 Senators from 1977 to 1979 in conjunction with his book-
length study of the Senate and made this observation:

    When Senators were asked what qualities they prized most 
highly in a colleague, certain adjectives occurred more 
frequently than others. These qualities were dependability and 
reliability, trustworthiness (sometimes expressed as 
``integrity'' or ``honesty''), and intelligence. Also mentioned 
prominently, but somewhat less frequently, were dedication, 
hard work, and courage. A premium was clearly placed by these 
Senators on traits that could redound to their own political 
benefit, or at least not cause them to be cast into jeopardy. 
The quality of being a person of one's word, of not going back 
on an agreement, of not making another Senator appear foolish, 
of not gulling a colleague or leading him on--these were the 
traits most valued.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Ross K. Baker, Friend and Foe in the U.S. Senate (Acton, MA: 
Copley Publishing, 1999), p. 62.

    Of course, Senators do not interact with one another in a 
vacuum, so it stands to reason that broader shifts in American 
politics would impact the opportunities Senators have to work 
collaboratively. Political and environmental changes affecting 
collaboration that were cited most frequently in response to 
questions 2 and 3 are considered in the next section.

               Factors Affecting Collaboration Over Time

    As the political environment around it changes, so too does 
the Senate. ``Everybody will agree that the Senate has 
changed,'' remarked a veteran chief of staff, ``but we've 
changed too.'' Or, as one Senator explained, ``the Senate 
becomes a reflection of what goes on outside its Chambers.'' 
Senators and senior staff aides attribute contemporary change 
in the Senate to a variety of factors; the most frequently 
cited are identified in Table 1. Respondents report that 
prospects for collaboration tend to vary on the basis of three 
interrelated sets of developments in the contemporary Senate: 
fewer opportunities for meaningful collegial interactions to 
occur, greater ideological polarization, and a more assertive 
Senate leadership operation brought about by a rise in dilatory 
behavior.
    It should be noted that interconnections are likely to 
exist among these three developments. With increasing 
ideological polarization, for instance, Senators are likely to 
have a more difficult time finding common ground across party 
lines, giving them fewer occasions to work together. Plus, with 
less interaction and more polarization, Senate leaders, 
especially those on the majority side, might face added 
pressure to find new ways of doing business to get things done. 
An assertive leadership operation, however, has its own 
consequences--Senators take seriously their right to debate and 
offer amendments--so efforts by the leadership to force their 
hands are often met with howls of protest and dilatory tactics 
that can further exacerbate tensions between and among 
Senators. While interconnections exist among these three 
developments, the report discusses each separately as they 
relate to prospects for collaboration. Graphically, the impact 
of these developments on collaboration can be displayed in the 
following way:

   Interaction +  Polarization +  
              Leadership =  Collaboration

      Table 1. Factors cited as most consequential to collaboration
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Number of
                                        Factor identified     citations
                                                             (out of 16)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less collegial interaction.........  Fewer families in DC..           10
                                     Fundraising demands...            6
                                     Congressional                     6
                                      delegations.
                                     Committee                         3
                                      participation.
                                     Orientation programs..            2
 
More ideological polarization......  More House Members....            9
                                     Fewer Governors.......            3
                                     Interest groups.......            3
                                     Primary voters........            3
                                     Redistricting.........            2
 
More assertive leaders.............  More dilatory behavior            7
                                     Amending strategies...            6
                                     Leadership behavior...            6
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Fewer Collegial Interactions

    To many respondents, withering senatorial interaction 
characterizes life on Capitol Hill. ``Today there are fewer 
opportunities for personal relationships,'' said a longtime GOP 
Senator. A two-term Democrat explained, ``There are far fewer 
genuine friendships today because Senators don't see each other 
socially anymore.'' One Senator revealed, ``I don't know my 
colleagues today like I used to,'' while another considered the 
lack of interaction alarming. In his view, ``Today, there is 
very little socialization. The lack of close friendships is a 
huge factor in degrading the institution.''

                      senators and their families

    During an earlier era, Senators were said to have more time 
and a greater inclination to have substantive exchanges with 
their colleagues. One reason for this, some respondents noted, 
is that it was more common then for Senators to bring their 
families with them to Washington, DC, and live within close 
proximity to one another. ``Back when I served we all knew each 
other, and we knew each other's families. Our children went to 
school together,'' recalled one Senator, while another fondly 
remembered how Ted Kennedy would play host to Senators and 
their families. ``During the summer he would invite us over and 
we'd go to the [National] Mall to enjoy music,'' said this 
respondent. One Senator explained that these interactions are 
why ``it's important for the families of Senators to live in 
Washington.''
    Socializing before or after hours used to happen more often 
in the Senate than it does now, according to respondents. ``In 
the evenings, Senators would hang around for a few pops,'' 
recalled one respondent. An especially popular gathering spot 
was the office of the secretary for the majority. The 
hospitable Stanley Kimmitt--secretary for the majority from 
1977 to 1981--welcomed all comers in the late afternoon. 
``These informal gatherings [at Kimmitt's office] were never 
announced but everyone knew about them, and all Senators were 
welcome,'' remembered a veteran leadership floor aide. To 
another respondent, these gatherings illustrate how ``booze can 
help smooth the legislative process.''
    Senators who preferred different company could mingle at 
Minority Leader Everett Dirksen's Capitol office. Dirksen 
``would hold an open house each afternoon around 4 p.m. to talk 
about upcoming legislation and share war stories,'' one 
respondent said. ``Birch Bayh, Ted Kennedy, and I came often 
and we bonded.'' Other respondents said that Senator Hank Brown 
hosted bridge games at his home each week; Senators Mike 
Mansfield and George Aiken met for breakfast nearly every 
morning; and Senators Ted Stevens and Ed Muskie carpooled to 
the Capitol Building each morning the Senate was in session. 
One respondent made this observation:

    A few decades ago it was common practice to disagree by day 
and share a drink or a meal by night, as embodied in the 
relationship between Tip O'Neill and Ronald Reagan, or between 
Tip O'Neill and Bob Michel.

    Today's Senate, by comparison, ``is less social and less 
personal,'' which ``leads to problems,'' stated a chief of 
staff. One reason for this, according to some respondents, is 
that Senators spend less and less time in Washington. And the 
less they are there, the fewer occasions they have to interact 
with one another. One former Senator expressed this view 
bluntly:

    Collaboration is more difficult today for a whole host of 
reasons, beginning with the fact that Senators don't live in 
Washington to the same degree they once did. This is a full-
time job that can't be accomplished with part-time attendance.

    Another Senator explained the challenge this way:

    Senators have fewer opportunities these days to get to know 
one another because they come in on Monday and leave on 
Thursday. Many Senators don't bring their families to DC, which 
creates added pressures to get back to their home States. As a 
result, Senators and their families don't socialize like they 
once did, which makes it harder to find legislative support, 
especially bipartisan support.

    A former majority leader expressed considerable difficulty 
scheduling votes because ``the amount of time that Senators 
spend in [Washington] DC has declined.'' He continued by saying 
that ``Wednesday is the best day to hold a vote because most 
everyone will be in town. Thursday is the second-best day. 
Monday is the worst and Friday is bad too.''

                              fundraising

    Some respondents attributed the paucity of social 
interaction today to the exorbitant amounts of time and effort 
they spend fundraising. As campaign costs have skyrocketed in 
recent decades--most noticeably in States containing or 
adjoining expensive media markets--an activity that was once 
relegated to the final 2 years of a Senator's 6-year term now 
begins right from the start. ``Senators start the campaign as 
soon as they get reelected,'' explained a senior aide. ``This 
wasn't always the case.'' One respondent reported that ``more 
and more the focus is on fundraising and maintaining high 
visibility.'' Another Senator shared this view:

    Nowadays, Senators spend too much time raising money. When 
I began my career [in the 1970s], I would raise money only 
during the final 2 years of my term, but that is not feasible 
today. The notion of a 6-year term with the first 4 years 
devoid of campaigning is simply not the case anymore.

    Senators generally viewed fundraising as unpleasant and 
distracting--or worse. ``Perpetual campaigning undermines 
bonding,'' said one Senator. Another reported, ``It's the money 
and the failure to create community that makes policymaking 
increasingly difficult.'' One Senator lamented that ``we never 
stop running.'' To him, ``raising money and constantly 
campaigning is poisonous to the political process.'' Another 
respondent pointed out that ``Senators spend one-third of their 
time on fundraising. The flow of money into campaigns ruined 
everything.''

                        committee participation

    Other respondents lamented a decline in committee 
participation as a barrier to meaningful interaction. This 
development represents a loss in the view of one respondent, 
because some of the most important collaborative relationships 
are borne in committee. As he explained, ``Kennedy and Hatch, 
Kennedy and Enzi, Leahy and Specter, Frist and Kennedy, 
Grassley and Baucus, Kerry and Lugar--these relationships 
developed in committee.'' One former Senator lamented what he 
considered a lack of sustained and indepth attention to 
committee work today:

    When I served [in the late 1960s], Senators were limited to 
two major committee assignments and two minor ones. Now you're 
on 4 major committees and up to 12 subcommittees. Back then 
everybody would have at least one good committee assignment 
where they could study the issues and specialize. Now 
committees have huge staffs to compensate for the numerous 
assignments of each Senator. It's too much to keep up with.

    Another respondent, a former chief of staff to the 
Appropriations Committee, shared similar views:

    In the Appropriations Committee, we took great pride in the 
process. We would sit in conference [with the House], 3 
Senators and 70 House Members, which was long and tedious but 
we did it. Now staff handles all the negotiations. It's Kabuki 
theater. Everyone sits at the conference table for a short 
period of time and then everyone adjourns to let staff handle 
the details. The disengagement by Members is deplorable in my 
view.

                       congressional delegations

    Beyond interactions that occur in committee, some of the 
best opportunities Senators say they have to interact with 
colleagues occur on congressional delegation missions abroad 
(or ``codels''). Some respondents described meeting colleagues 
on these trips they were previously unfamiliar with but who 
later became close allies. One former Senator had this to say 
about the benefits these missions provide:

    I'm a huge believer in the trips because they provided 
opportunities to bond. And bonding is essential to compromise. 
Close ties develop on these trips, which are essential to the 
process, because when you bond you're more likely to listen to 
the other side.

    ``Codels help us bond,'' reiterated another respondent. As 
another Senator reported, ``The drop in codels means that there 
are fewer opportunities for meeting colleagues. Now only a few 
key events for meeting colleagues remain--the White House 
Christmas party, the summer barbeque, and dinner with the 
Supreme Court.'' A similar view was shared by another 
respondent:

    Codels provide one of the few remaining opportunities for 
Senators and their families to get to know one another. We need 
more codels. This is one of the few opportunities [Senators] 
have to talk to each other.

                          orientation programs

    Two respondents identified orientation programs for new 
Members of Congress as especially important venues for 
developing relationships and learning how to perform in a new 
position.\23\ One Senator viewed his orientation experience 
this way:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ During an orientation program for new Members in 2004, the 
wives of newly elected Senators Barack Obama and Tom Coburn formed a 
bond that materialized into a working relationship between their 
husbands. Senators Obama and Coburn, ideological opposites by almost 
any measure, collaborated on a range of issues and proposals, including 
the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, a bill that 
created a searchable database of Federal spending. That bill (S. 2590) 
was signed into law by President George W. Bush on September 26, 2006.

    When I was elected to the House in 1982, I was invited to 
Harvard for an issues conference for new Members. Boxer, Reid, 
Richardson, Spratt, Durbin, McCain, Ridge, Casey, DeWine--we 
all attended the same conference. We stayed in the same hotel. 
We ate our meals together. We socialized together. We attended 
meetings together. The entire experience allowed for a great 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
deal of bonding.

    Many of these opportunities have now become a thing of the 
past. As one Senator explained, ``When I got to the Senate, I 
asked Mark Pryor about orientation. He told me there's not much 
of one in the Senate.'' The Senator viewed this as problematic 
because ``collaboration can't happen without some familiarity 
of one's colleagues.'' He then recounted an effort to 
compensate for this perceived deficiency:

    It was during a breakfast with David Broder, George 
Voinovich, Lamar Alexander, Bob Dole, and Tom Daschle that we 
talked about ways to bridge the partisan divide and decided to 
put together a ``new Senators'' school. The idea was for 
Senators and their families to live in close proximity for a 
period of time to allow them to get to know each other before 
starting work. We wanted them to all share the same bathroom, 
so to speak. The first year was 2006 and we had eight 
Republicans and two Democrats, including a fellow from Oklahoma 
named Coburn and a junior Senator from Illinois. And you know 
what happened? Coburn and Obama hit it off and remain close 
friends today.

                     More Ideological Polarization

    With fewer ideological moderates in the Senate and a 
widening chasm between the views of each party's conference, 
Senators and senior staff say they have a harder time finding 
colleagues with whom to work than they once did, especially 
those from the other party. Ideological polarization, in the 
view of one Senator, helps explain why ``cross-party 
collaboration has decreased noticeably'' during his 30 years in 
office. Another Senator explained, ``Ideological polarization 
hurts the ability of Senators to collaborate because it makes 
it harder to find common ground.'' Of course, as noted earlier, 
others expressed difficulty in working with moderates because 
those Senators were said to ``change their tune most often.'' 
Respondents attributed the rise of polarization inside the 
Senate to several key developments, including an influx of more 
ideological Members into the Senate from the House, a more 
combative and conflict-driven media, and a greater reliance by 
Senators on the interest group community for political and 
financial resources.

                             house members

    To be sure, the modern Senate has long been populated by 
former House Members, but many respondents viewed ideological 
polarity as a natural consequence of more Members of the House 
gaining election to the Senate and ascending the ranks of the 
party leadership. ``House Members are educated in madrassas 
where the singular and dominant ideology is reelection,'' 
explained a former Republican Senator. ``Then they bring that 
over here [to the Senate].'' According to another Senator, when 
House Members from ``boutique districts'' arrive to the Senate, 
``their mindset remains the same.'' Redistricting, in his view, 
contributes to polarization by creating ``a new kind of elected 
official who wins [comfortably] in the House and comes to the 
Senate to do battle.'' In the view of this Senator, ideological 
lines became more pronounced ``during the mid-1990s, [when] 
there was a mass exodus of moderates from the Senate and they 
were all replaced by those at the ideological extremes.'' 
``This new breed of Senator,'' in the view of one chief of 
staff, ``made compromise more difficult.'' Another Senator 
explained that ``since 1994, a number of House Members have 
been elected to the Senate, but the Senate requires a different 
mentality than the House.''
    What William White once called the ``Senate type''--``a man 
for whom the Senate as an institution is a career in itself, a 
life in itself and an end in itself''--seems less fitting 
today.\24\ One respondent familiar with White's work made this 
point directly while others expressed a similar sentiment by 
contrasting Senators who formerly served in the House with 
those who were once Governors. Former House Members were said 
to pursue a more ideological agenda upon entering the Senate in 
comparison to former Governors because, according to a chief of 
staff, ``Governors are used to governing and working with the 
other party.'' This respondent considered it a troubling 
development that ``there are fewer former Governors in the 
Senate than there used to be.'' ``Of all my friends in the 
Senate who also served as Governors, not a single one of them 
would rather be a Senator than a Governor,'' one respondent 
explained. In the experience of this former Governor turned 
Senator, life in the Senate became increasingly ideological and 
more difficult to endure over the course of his career. ``I was 
much happier as a Governor than as a Senator,'' he said, 
``because as Governor I could play a more pragmatic role in 
public affairs.'' This view was shared by a veteran chief of 
staff who said that ``Governors don't like it here.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ White, Citadel, p. 84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 media

    Several respondents also highlighted changes in how the 
print and electronic media cover campaigns, elections, and the 
political process as a consequential hindrance to 
collaboration. On this point, the views of one former Senator 
were typical:

    Politics is much meaner today. Campaigning has devolved 
into what can be featured in 30-second negative advertisements, 
so Senators are continually concerned about their actions being 
used against them down the line. This harms the ability of 
Senators to achieve common ends.

    Around-the-clock media coverage emphasizing conflict over 
compromise means that ``Senators are watching their step 
constantly'' and ``focus a great deal on the possibility of 
attack ads,'' according to a former Senator who considers 
negative campaigning destructive to collegial interaction. He 
continued by saying that ``as soon as they are sworn in, 
Senators assume defensive postures and work to cover their 
[expletive],'' because ``the nature of politics today is all 
about attack ads,'' which ``negatively affect governing'' and 
cause ``the loss of bipartisanship'' in the Senate.
    ``The press is after serial panic,'' explained a former GOP 
chief of staff who considers the media biased in favor of 
conflict and entertainment. As he sees it, ``cable news gets 
two hedgehogs to square off, but we need more foxes like Walter 
Cronkite.'' During Cronkite's era, news broadcasts were just 
that: broadly cast to a wide audience. Nowadays broadcasting 
seems to have been replaced by ``narrowcasting,'' whereby media 
outlets tailor their informational content to smaller and more 
homogeneous segments of the American public. The prevalence of 
narrowcasting on cable news, the radio, and the Internet led a 
former majority leader to remark that today's media ``is 
driving the bitterness and the degradation of civility.''

                            interest groups

    Even more troubling to some respondents is the relationship 
that exists between Senators and interest groups, especially 
when it comes to campaign financing.\25\ Lobbyists ``make a 
living by keeping Members of Congress happy with campaign 
money,'' explained a former chief of staff. ``The constant 
quest for campaign dollars is detrimental to the ability of the 
political system to reach compromise, [because] once the 
lobbyists come in, positions among Senators tend to stiffen.'' 
He also made this observation:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ For more information on the proliferation of interest group 
activity on Capitol Hill in recent decades, see Allan J. Cigler and 
Burdett A. Loomis, Interest Group Politics, 7th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 2006).

    There are way too many spokesmen for national groups. 
Interest groups and their spokesmen in the Senate harden their 
issue positions to prevent compromise, which undermines the 
work of the Senate. The key to the Senate is the ability to 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
bargain.

    One Senator reported that over the course of his 30-year 
career, ``pressures on Senators intensified tremendously during 
my time in office as constituent groups and political money 
people began to dominate.'' Another expressed concern at 
dramatic increases in campaign costs, because, in his view, the 
exorbitant cost of campaigning for a Senate seat encourages 
close relationships to develop between elected officials and 
well-financed interest groups. ``Normal citizens can't run for 
office. To run, you have to be financially wealthy or obligate 
yourself to special interests,'' he lamented. ``As parties 
decline, interest groups take over,'' another Senator 
explained.

                             primary voters

    Other respondents correlate polarization in the Senate with 
the ideological intensity of voters in primary elections. In 
comparison to general election voters, primary voters are more 
active politically and tend to hold more polarized ideological 
views.\26\ To win primary elections, candidates must appeal to 
this set of voters or risk losing their seats to more 
ideologically suitable challengers. As one senior Republican 
explained, ``We've empowered the ideologues, which drove Arlen 
Specter to make the choice he made.'' Rather than face 
Pennsylvania's GOP primary voters in a race against a more 
conservative challenger, Specter, a five-term Senator, shed his 
Republican affiliation and competed in the Democratic primary 
instead. Viewed as a moderate, polls showed Specter trailing by 
15 points among Republican primary voters at the time he 
departed the party, a clear sign of trouble ahead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ See, for instance, Pew Research Center for the People & the 
Press, ``Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing 
Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, 
Compromise and Everyday Life,'' Washington, DC, June 12, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Assertive Senate Leadership

    Withering social interaction, heightened ideological 
polarization, or some combination of the two were cited by 
nearly all respondents as key influences that negatively affect 
collaborative opportunities, especially across the aisle. A 
third development respondents cited, also negative, involves 
the rise of obstructionism and the corresponding efforts Senate 
leaders have taken to exert some control over the Senate's 
agenda. While Senate leaders do not possess the impressive 
variety of parliamentary powers their counterparts in the House 
command, they now appear more willing to use the procedural 
advantages they have at their disposal to overcome dilatory 
behavior. Some respondents report that this kind of leadership 
behavior can inflame hostilities within the Chamber.
    Contemporary Senate leaders have colorfully compared the 
challenge of Senate leadership to such metaphorical tasks as 
``pushing a wet noodle'' (Howard Baker), ``herding cats'' 
(Trent Lott), or ``loading frogs into a wheelbarrow'' (Tom 
Daschle).\27\ In Bob Dole's view, ``there's a lot of free 
spirits in the Senate. About 100 of them.'' \28\ To be sure, 
building coalitions around shared goals takes a great deal of 
time and energy, especially in an institution that favors 
individual expression over leadership direction. Senators who 
find themselves on the receiving end of an objectionable 
leadership directive usually have recourse to delay or 
reconsider action, a conundrum for the leadership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ On the role Senate leaders play and the challenges they 
confront in managing the Chamber, see Steven S. Smith, Party Influence 
in Congress (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Brendan 
J. Doherty, ``Meeting the Challenges of Senate Leadership,'' PS: 
Political Science & Politics (April 2007), pp. 422-424.
    \28\ Alan Ehrenhalt, ``Senate Leader's Job: Curbing 
Individualism,'' Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, April 7, 1984, 
p. 819.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           dilatory behavior

    As ideological lines have sharpened between the two Senate 
parties in recent years, dilatory behaviors have increased 
dramatically. ``The filibuster [and its threat] is tremendously 
overused,'' explained a 30-year veteran of the Chamber. ``Now 
the minority insists on 60 votes before anything is actually 
considered, which leaves no room for adjustment. But the 
majority won't give [the filibuster] up because it might find 
itself in the minority one day.'' The majority leader can 
counter dilatory actions with his own ``hardball'' procedural 
maneuvers, such as ``filling the amendment tree'' to forestall 
amending opportunities during floor consideration.
    As Senators have become more willing to use the full range 
of parliamentary tools they each possess, a corresponding 
effort has been made by Senate leaders to find new ways to move 
legislation and other matters through the Chamber. In the view 
of some respondents, heightened interparty competition over 
agenda control creates a strain on relationships that hinders 
collaborative efforts from taking place, especially across 
party lines. The emergence of a more confrontational Senate, 
they say, can be blamed on what they characterize as an overuse 
of Senate procedure for individual or partisan gain, an ``abuse 
of procedural strategy'' in the view of one former majority 
leader. Continuing conflict on issues of civil rights; the 
election of younger, more ideological, and more assertive 
Senators (many of whom ascended to leadership positions); and 
polarization between the two parties created what one 
respondent called a ``procedural arms race'' over control of 
the Senate agenda. A chief of staff to a recent majority leader 
contrasted this procedural environment with what his boss' 
predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, confronted:

    Johnson wouldn't bring anything to the floor without a time 
agreement, and Baker moved on unless amendments were offered in 
a timely manner. Today's environment is different. Non-germane 
amendments are important weapons of the minority party. The 
strategy now is: ``You give us votes on our [non-germane] 
amendments, and we'll give you a time agreement.''

                          amending strategies

    The Senate's amendment procedures allow Senators to propose 
any number of changes to a bill, including those that are 
unrelated (nongermane) to the matter at hand. As Senators move 
further apart from one another socially and ideologically, they 
appear more willing to use the Senate's permissive amending 
rules to force votes on controversial items that they think 
will give them an advantage over the opposition come election 
time. As a top aide to the Democratic leadership explained:

    Depending on majority status, floor strategies are driven 
by the need to avoid tough votes or force tough votes. Now we 
have ``message amendments,'' which is a relatively new concept 
here. Those amendments are written with a 30-second campaign 
advertisement in mind.

    Many so-called ``message amendments''--nonrelevant 
amendments crafted for political messaging purposes--``are more 
geared toward superficial issues that divide Senators for 
political gain rather than policy improvement,'' according to 
one veteran Senator.\29\ In his view, the amending activity 
that occurs today is motivated more by partisan considerations 
than a genuine desire to improve a bill. ``Amendments used to 
be about the substance of the bill,'' he explained. ``They used 
to be serious. It's an entirely different proposition now.'' He 
also made a distinction between ``substantive'' or ``serious'' 
amendments--amendments motivated by a desire to improve 
legislation--and ``superficial'' amendments designed ``just to 
hit political buttons.'' Another respondent, a two-term 
Democrat, expressed dismay that ``a huge amount of time is 
spent crafting amendments to divide Senators for purposes of 
election.'' A former chief of staff to several Republican 
Senators offered more animated remarks. As he put it, ``What 
kills you is a string of votes on a reconciliation bill 
designed to divide Senators every which way. Most of these 
amendments deal with social issues or the party message and not 
the underlying bill.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ For additional insight into the strategic considerations and 
procedural tactics congressional leaders employ to send political 
messages to voters, see C. Lawrence Evans, ``Committees, Leaders, and 
Message Politics,'' in Congress Reconsidered, 7th ed., Lawrence C. Dodd 
and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unless Senators can agree to limitations on amending 
activity ahead of time, preserving the content of legislation 
from nongermane amendments can be a challenge for the 
leadership. A former chief of staff to Majority Leader Bill 
Frist illustrated this point by recalling a recent effort by 
Senate Democrats to force action on a number of amendments 
opposed by the leadership. ``[Senator] Lugar brought out a 
nothing State Department authorization bill in 2003, and we let 
it go for a day or two,'' he reported. ``Nongermane amendments 
came out from everywhere, so much so that we had to pull the 
bill down.'' Another chief of staff recalled a similar 
instance. ``We put the bill up for 30 days and people were 
bringing amendments by constantly,'' he said. ``It was a total 
mess.''

                          leadership behavior

    Reacting to the explosive growth of nongermane amending 
activity in recent decades, Senate leaders have sought new ways 
to exercise control over the agenda. Perhaps the most 
controversial way they do this is to block the consideration of 
objectionable (often nongermane) amendments by ``filling the 
amendment tree'' on pending legislation, using the majority 
leader's right to first recognition on the Senate floor. 
Several respondents suggested that Majority Leader Byrd first 
developed this procedural innovation in the 1980s, and the 
tactic caught on because, as one Senator noted, ``When one side 
adopts a tactic, the other side adapts.''
    Another respondent, a former party secretary, explained how 
an increasingly partisan and assertive leadership operation 
emerged over the course of his 30-year career. ``I could count 
on one hand the number of times that George Mitchell filled the 
tree,'' he stated. ``Even then, it was done only in 
consultation with the minority leader and when the Senate faced 
a serious time constraint.''
    In previous years the Senate routinely considered 
amendments ``side by side.'' Under this arrangement, floor 
amendments proposed by the majority and minority parties would 
be debated at the same time, allowing for some comparison to 
occur between the merits of various proposals before they were 
put to a vote. This provided all Senators with a greater voice, 
a chance to advance their own policy ideas, an opportunity to 
gain a ``clean'' vote (no second-degree amendments were 
permitted), and, arguably, more incentive to allow the debate 
to move forward. In the view of a former top aide to Majority 
Leader Frist, the procedural innovations made by recent Senate 
leaders to retain some control over amending activity and 
debate--for example, more cloture petitions, full amendment 
trees, omnibus bills, and use of reconciliation--are natural 
reactions to dramatic increases in dilatory behavior.
    In addition to the procedural innovations they have made in 
recent years, Senate leaders appear more dedicated to the task 
of maintaining a unified caucus across a wide range of policy 
fronts. ``Leaders place enormous pressure on Senators regarding 
votes and the Senate schedule,'' a former majority leader 
explained. Another Senator characterized today's Senate parties 
as ``cheerleading camps.'' One respondent expressed similar 
disdain for leadership efforts to keep Senators ``on message.'' 
``We go to the message meetings to learn about the upcoming 
schedule and not to learn how to regurgitate the party message 
that week,'' he said.

                Collaborative Relationships in Lawmaking

    Most respondents (with one exception) consider the 
relationships Senators have with one another as central to 
Senate lawmaking, but the consensus view among them is that 
working collaboratively, especially across the aisle, is harder 
than ever in today's Senate. With fewer occasions for collegial 
interactions, greater ideological polarization between the two 
parties, and a more assertive leadership operation, the 
incentives and opportunities Senators have to work together 
appear limited. ``It's a bad, bad situation out there,'' 
observed one Senator when asked about prospects for 
collaboration. ``There is so much partisanship that it is hard 
to compromise.'' One respondent indicated that ``a lot boils 
down to friendship [in the Senate], but opportunities have 
diminished over the years.'' In the view of one chief of staff:

    The fundamental exchange of views is defunct, which 
produces a chilling effect on collaboration. Shouting down 
colleagues has replaced efforts to listen to them. The 
lubricants of relationships don't exist today.

    Some amount of cooperation is usually required for 
legislation of any real substance to pass the Senate. 
Respondents conveyed this point using a range of examples, 
three of which were especially revealing. The first illustrates 
how personal relationships can promote cooperation among 
colleagues during Senate deliberations, while the second and 
third examples demonstrate the important role collaborative 
relationships can play in Senate lawmaking.
    During the 1970s, on mornings the Senate was in session, 
Senator Ed Muskie, a liberal from Maine, and Senator Ted 
Stevens, a conservative from Alaska, carpooled together to the 
U.S. Capitol. Despite their political differences, these rides 
allowed them to develop a close relationship and a willingness 
to help one another. In the car one morning, Stevens asked 
Muskie to call up an amendment on his behalf to protect Alaskan 
fisheries, a key source of economic activity in his State, 
during debate on an energy and water appropriations bill. A 
markup session scheduled in one of Stevens' committees would 
prevent him from offering his amendment ahead of the final vote 
scheduled later that day. ``Of course,'' agreed Muskie.
    After getting sidetracked during the day, Muskie simply 
forgot to introduce his colleague's amendment as he had agreed 
to do. By the time Stevens' committee adjourned, the final vote 
was already underway. Upon reaching the floor and realizing 
that his amendment was missing from the bill and time for its 
consideration had expired, the fiery Stevens went to Muskie and 
asked, ``How could you forget to do this?'' Stevens then 
unleashed a torrent of frustration using language that 
attracted notice. Hearing the exchange between an aggrieved 
Stevens and an apologetic Muskie, Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield approached the two and admonished Stevens for his 
choice of language. ``We don't use profanity on the Senate 
floor,'' the majority leader told Stevens. At that point Muskie 
intervened to accept responsibility and explained to the 
majority leader that it was his fault for failing to honor a 
commitment he made to his colleague.
    ``Well, in that case,'' said Mansfield as he returned to 
his desk to try to remedy the problem. As Senators mingled 
about the well of the Chamber waiting to vote, Mansfield sought 
recognition from the Presiding Officer and made an unusual 
request for any Senator to make while a vote was already 
underway. What happened next was unprecedented. First, the 
majority leader suspended the vote. Then he asked his 
colleagues, most of whom were present on the floor, to accept a 
unanimous consent request adding the Stevens amendment as 
currently written to the appropriations bill without debate. 
Hearing no objection, the Stevens amendment was adopted by 
voice vote and folded into the bill. The majority leader then 
resumed the vote, and the energy and water appropriations bill 
passed.
    To be sure, suspending a vote midstream to add an amendment 
without debate and resuming the vote on a now-amended bill is 
in violation of Senate rules. The lesson here, however, is that 
Senator Mansfield considered it an offense for Senator Muskie 
to have failed to protect the parliamentary rights of his 
colleague to amend legislation, as he had agreed to do. 
Mansfield's decision to allow a junior Senator of the minority 
party to amend an appropriations bill at the very last minute--
all because Muskie forgot to carry through on a prior 
commitment--illustrates how relationships within the Chamber 
can promote a spirit of cooperation among colleagues and a more 
inclusive deliberative process. Worth noting is that Senators 
Muskie and Stevens continued to carpool together after this 
episode.
    Another respondent, a liberal member of the Judiciary 
Committee during the 1960s, also depicted a more accommodating 
and cooperative period in the Senate by recalling an instance 
in which he and other liberal members of the committee drafted 
legislation to do away with the ``blue-ribbon'' jury selection 
process that was common in many parts of the South. In their 
view, the blue-ribbon process conflicted with the civil rights 
of the accused, often African Americans, because those juries 
were hand picked by prominent citizens and governing elites. 
Since average citizens, including many African Americans, were 
not allowed to serve on these juries, liberals on the committee 
believed that blue-ribbon panels perpetuated racial 
discrimination.
    Two prominent Senators stood in the way of this proposal: 
Roman Hruska, who served as ranking minority member of a key 
judiciary subcommittee, and committee member Strom Thurmond--
neither of whom was especially sympathetic to civil rights. As 
the Senator explained, ``We sent something up that would have 
done away with the blue ribbon jury selection system, but with 
Hruska and Thurmond on the committee, that bill was dead as a 
doornail. So I sat down with Hruska and we talked about holding 
hearings and working together on jury reform. And we did.'' In 
this instance, collaboration was possible only because ``we [in 
committee] promised to work very hard not to embarrass each 
other.'' To minimize the expected political outcry from Senate 
conservatives, they agreed to a deal whereby the liberal 
proposal would be considered on a day when Hruska and his 
fellow conservatives were ``out of town.'' The Senator 
explained that by working together in this way:

    We hashed out a jury reform bill that came out of 
subcommittee unanimously. It passed the full committee 
unanimously. And it enjoyed overwhelming support on the Senate 
floor. That's the way it worked, and that's the way it should 
work.

    Important collaborations occur outside the Senate as well. 
According to one respondent, the close working relationship 
between Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar was formed when 
they both attended a weeklong educational seminar held in 
Budapest, Hungary, in 1983. The purpose of the seminar, 
according to a former Senator who ran this session and many 
others like it, was to educate lawmakers on nuclear arms 
issues. ``I wanted to change the situation that existed at the 
time where political leaders did not know preeminent experts 
across a wide range of issues,'' he said, while also 
acknowledging that his seminars ``had the effect of bringing 
Members from different parties together around the same table 
for a healthy exchange of ideas.'' The 1983 seminar in 
Budapest, for instance, allowed Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to 
develop the groundwork for what later became the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, a program enacted in 1992 
to secure and dismantle nuclear weapons located in former 
Soviet states. ``That [Nunn-Lugar] and many other major laws 
were inspired by collaboration among participants in the 
program,'' he reported.
    These instances of Senate lawmaking reflect a more 
collaborative era in the Senate, a time when Senators had close 
relationships with each other and were more accommodating to 
one another than they seem to be today. The successful outcomes 
achieved through each of these legislative efforts--to protect 
fisheries in Alaska, to ensure fairness in jury selection, and 
to safeguard nuclear weapons following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union--were facilitated in part by relationships between 
Senators of different parties. These personal relationships 
were able to develop through some frequency of interaction, 
whether in the car on their daily commute to the Capitol, in 
the committee room, or on a congressional delegation to 
Budapest.
    As fewer occasions exist today for these kinds of 
interactions to occur, which most respondents cited as being 
the case, Senators have a more difficult time working with and 
trusting their colleagues. The absence of collaborative 
relationships built on trust--and avenues to pursue that 
virtue--exacerbates polarization between the two parties and 
dampens prospects for collaboration to occur. To achieve some 
measure of cooperation in the face of these challenges, one 
former Senator suggested that ``the solution has to involve 
inclusion.'' In his view, ``What we need is more 
bipartisanship, not less. More collaboration, not less. More 
friendships, not less.'' Or, as one chief of staff put it: ``In 
the Senate, there is no magical crank to make things happen. 
It's all about relationships.''
    For the past several decades, the spatial model of 
legislative behavior has been the main conceptual frame for 
understanding legislative outcomes. That model emphasizes 
legislators as free-floating and independent ideal points in 
policy space. What is missing from spatial theory is the 
essential social nature of legislative life. As Richard Fenno, 
Nelson W. Polsby, John Kingdon, Charles O. Jones, and other 
congressional scholars of their generation demonstrated, the 
interactions that occur between and among lawmakers are 
important and can create opportunities for collective action 
and legislative accomplishment that might not exist in the 
absence of collaborative relationships.


The 113th Congress and the U.S. Population: Discussion and Analysis of 
                        Selected Characteristics

                          Jennifer D. Williams

               Specialist in American National Government

                                  and

                            Ida A. Brudnick

                       Specialist on the Congress

                                  and

                          Jennifer E. Manning

                    Information Research Specialist

                              ----------                              


        Sociodemographic comparisons between Members of the 
        113th Congress as of January 2013 and the U.S. 
        population show that Members had a higher median age 
        than the larger population and were more likely to be 
        males; to be non-Hispanic whites; and to have higher 
        educational attainment and occupational levels (for 
        Members, their prior occupations). Members also were 
        more likely to report religious affiliations, 
        particularly Protestant, and to report having served in 
        the military. The data on age, educational attainment, 
        and occupational levels indicate that Members have the 
        life experiences and qualifications to be expected of 
        those chosen for some of the most demanding national 
        offices. A look at Members over time shows that they 
        have become more diverse in gender, race, ethnicity, 
        and religion. What Members' sociodemographic 
        characteristics mean for their political behavior and 
        policy outcomes remains a matter for further scholarly 
        investigation.

                              Introduction

    This report compares certain sociodemographic 
characteristics of Members of the 113th Congress with those of 
the contemporary U.S. population, after citing the principal 
sources and limitations of the data used for the comparisons. 
The basic characteristics of age, sex, race, and ethnicity are 
discussed, along with education, occupation, religion, and 
military service. The report next examines Members' 
sociodemographic characteristics over time--considering, for 
example, their increasing racial and ethnic diversity as well 
as the growing number of women in Congress. Finally, it notes 
that students of Congress have examined, but not determined, 
whether Members' sociodemographic characteristics influence 
their political behavior and legislative effectiveness.

          Methodology, Data Sources, and Data Limitations \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The sociodemographic comparisons of the 113th Congress with the 
U.S. population were written by Jennifer D. Williams. Data about 
Members of the 113th Congress were provided by Jennifer E. Manning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The comparisons that follow between Members and the larger 
U.S. population reflect the composition of Congress when it was 
seated on January 3, 2013. The House has 435 seats for 
Representatives and 6 seats for Delegates and the Resident 
Commissioner of Puerto Rico. Computations relating to all House 
Members (including Delegates and the Resident Commissioner) are 
thus based on 441 seats; computations concerning 
Representatives only are based on 435 seats. Computations 
concerning the Senate are based on its 100 seats. Where noted, 
computations for the 113th Congress may be based on the number 
of House seats with or without Delegates, plus the 100 Senate 
seats.
    The ultimate source of data about Members is the Members 
themselves. The U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey 
(ACS) \2\ is a major source of data concerning the makeup of 
the general population. ACS respondents provide information 
about themselves and those living with them. Unlike the data 
for Members, however, the ACS data are sample-survey estimates 
and are subject to sampling error. Below are some other points 
to note about the data; several additional points are discussed 
as the data are presented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ For a discussion of the ACS and ACS data, see CRS Report 
R41532, The American Community Survey: Development, Implementation, and 
Issues for Congress, by Jennifer D. Williams.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Occupational data for Members refer to their occupations 
before they were seated in the 113th Congress. The occupational 
categories used by the Census Bureau do not correspond exactly 
to those reported by Members, nor does the way the ACS presents 
data on military service exactly match what is reported for 
Members.
    Because the Census Bureau does not collect data on 
religion, the religious-affiliation data for the U.S. 
population are from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.

                                  Age

    The median \3\ age of the U.S. population in 2013 was 37.6 
years,\4\ compared with 57.5 years for Representatives and 61.7 
years for Senators at the beginning of the 113th Congress.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The median is the midpoint of a distribution, such as an age 
distribution. Half the values lie above the median, and half below. 
Stated another way, the median is ``the middle item of a set of numbers 
when the items are ranked in order of magnitude.'' Kenneth J. Meier and 
Jeffrey L. Brudney, Applied Statistics for Public Administration 
(Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Co., 1987), p. 23.
    \4\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, ``As the Nation Ages, Seven States 
Become Younger, Census Bureau Reports,'' press release CB14-118, June 
26, 2014, at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/ releases/archives/
population/cb14-118.html.
    \5\ CRS Report R42365, Representatives and Senators: Trends in 
Member Characteristics Since 1945, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen, p. 
3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several factors help explain why Representatives and 
Senators have higher median ages than the U.S. population.
    The Census Bureau computes median age based on the ages of 
the entire resident population--from newborn infants to the 
most aged elderly. Members of Congress, in contrast, are an 
age-restricted group. Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution 
stipulates that ``No Person shall be a Representative who shall 
not have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been 
seven Years a Citizen of the United States . . . .'' In 
accordance with Article 1, Section 3, ``No Person shall be a 
Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, 
and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States . . . .'' 
These limits were established at a time of high mortality and 
low life expectancy. Despite the fact that many in the general 
population did not achieve longevity, those who held high 
office were expected to have been U.S. citizens for substantial 
lengths of time and to have acquired a degree of maturity and 
experience reflected in the minimum ages for congressional 
service.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See, for example, comments by the legal scholar and U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story (1779-1845) regarding the minimum 
ages for Representatives and Senators, in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph 
Lerner, eds., The Founders' Constitution, Article I, Section 2, clause 
2, vol. 2, document 10,  616; and Article I, Section 3, clause 3, vol. 
2, document 2,  727 (Chicago, IL and Indianapolis, IN: University of 
Chicago and Liberty Fund), at http://press-pubs. uchicago.edu/
founders/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, the median age of the U.S. population is affected 
by fertility, but the median ages of Representatives and 
Senators are not. Populations with higher fertility rates tend 
to have younger age structures. The U.S. population is aging 
not only because people live longer than was historically the 
case, but also because fertility rates are relatively low, as 
compared with fertility rates in many developing countries 
today. Representatives and Senators may have higher median ages 
partly because of their length of congressional service--a 
median of 6.0 years for Representatives, 6.0 years for 
Senators, and the same for Congress overall \7\ --their ages 
when first elected to Congress, or both, in addition to 
contemporary life expectancy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Calculations are as of the commencement of the 113th Congress. 
Median service in the House, beginning on January 3, 2007, was 6.0 
years, or three terms completed; in the Senate, beginning on January 3, 
2007, 6.0 years, or one term completed; and in Congress, beginning on 
January 3, 2007, 6.0 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Immigration also affects the age structure of the U.S. 
population, but not of Congress, in two ways. Immigrants, who 
are often young, add themselves to the population, and any 
children they have after settling in their adopted country are 
added as well. Without immigration, the median age of the U.S. 
population likely would be higher than it is, but the median 
ages of Representatives and Senators would be unaffected.

                                  Sex

    Although women constituted about one-half of the U.S. 
population in 2013 (50.8 percent female versus 49.2 percent 
male),\8\ they were not quite one-fifth (18.3 percent) of 
Representatives and Senators in January 2013. Nevertheless, the 
new 113th Congress had a record-high number of women. The House 
of Representatives was 17.9 percent female, with 78 women (not 
including 3 female Delegates); 20 female Senators made up 20 
percent of that Chamber. The female Delegates plus 
Representatives yielded a total of 81 women in the House and 
101 in Congress, so that women accounted for 18.4 percent of 
the House and 18.7 percent of Congress.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, ``USA QuickFacts,'' at http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
    \9\ CRS Report RL30261, Women in the United States Congress, 1917-
2014: Biographical and Committee Assignment Information, and Listings 
by State and Congress, by Jennifer E. Manning and Ida A. Brudnick, p. 
1. See also CRS Report R43244, Women in the United States Congress: 
Historical Overview, Tables, and Discussion, by Jennifer E. Manning, 
Colleen J. Shogan, and Ida A. Brudnick.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Race and Ethnicity

    According to the Census Bureau's latest population 
estimates, Hispanics or Latinos (hereafter, Hispanics) were the 
largest minority group in the United States in 2013, making up 
17.1 percent of the total population. The bureau, following the 
Office of Management and Budget's designations of race and 
ethnicity for Federal reporting purposes, considers Hispanics 
to be an ethnic group whose members may be of any race. Thus, 
all racial groups can include certain numbers of Hispanics.
    Whites were the largest racial group in 2013, constituting 
77.7 percent of the U.S. population. Blacks or African 
Americans accounted for 13.2 percent; Asians, 5.3 percent; 
Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders, 0.2 percent (0.23 
percent); and American Indians and Alaska Natives, 1.2 percent. 
People classified as belonging to two or more races were 2.4 
percent of the total.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, ``Facts for Features,'' CB14-FF.17, 
June 26, 2014, at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
facts_for_features_special_editions/cb14-ff17. html; and American 
FactFinder, ``2013 Population Estimates,'' PEP ALL6N, at http://fact 
finder2.census.gov/rest/dnldController/deliver?_ts=425572753058.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Removing Hispanics from each of the racial categories (as 
examples, non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks or 
African Americans) lowers these proportions. Without Hispanics, 
whites were 62.6 percent of the total U.S. population in 2013; 
blacks or African Americans, 12.4 percent; Asians, 5.1 percent; 
Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders, nearly 0.2 
percent (0.17 percent); American Indians and Alaska Natives, 
0.7 percent; and people of two or more races, 2.0 percent.\11\ 
The sum of these percentages, added to the 17.1 percent who 
were Hispanic, equaled the total population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, ``2013 Population Estimates,'' 
PEPSR6H, at http://factfinder2. census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following data for Congress are as of January 2013 and, 
except where noted, present racial categories separately from 
Hispanic ethnicity. The data indicate that the new Congress had 
a higher proportion of non-Hispanic whites than the U.S. 
population and lower proportions of most non-Hispanic racial 
minorities, as well as of Hispanics. Only the small non-
Hispanic Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander category 
constituted about the same proportion of Representatives plus 
Senators (0.19 percent) as of the U.S. population (0.17 
percent).
    The 113th Congress was sworn in with 452 white Members, 
with 357, including 1 Delegate, in the House and 95 in the 
Senate. They constituted 81.0 percent of the House, 95.0 
percent of the Senate, and 83.5 percent of Congress. 
Subtracting the Delegate left 356 white Representatives. They 
made up 81.8 percent of the House and, with the 95 Senators, 
84.3 percent of Congress.
    The House had 41 black or African American Members, 
constituting 9.3 percent of the House; the Senate included one 
black or African American Member, who was 1.0 percent of the 
Senate; and Congress had 42, constituting 7.8 percent of 
Congress. Two of the 41 in the House were Delegates. The 
remaining 39 Representatives accounted for 9.0 percent of the 
House; they plus the Senator were 7.5 percent of Congress.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ For changes after January 2013, see CRS Report R42964, 
Membership of the 113th Congress: A Profile, by Jennifer E. Manning, p. 
8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nine Asian Members, including eight Representatives and one 
Senator, made up 1.8 percent of the House, 1.0 percent of the 
Senate, and 1.7 percent of Congress.
    Three Members belonged to the Native Hawaiian and other 
Pacific Islander racial category. All were in the House, and 
all were Pacific Islanders. Two were Delegates, one of whom 
also was Hispanic. The three made up 0.7 percent of the House 
and 0.6 percent of Congress. Not including Delegates, the House 
was 0.2 percent (0.23 percent) Pacific Islander, and this 
category constituted not quite 0.2 percent (0.19 percent) of 
Congress.
    Two Representatives and no Senators belonged to the 
American Indian and Alaska Native racial category. Both were 
enrolled members of American Indian tribes. They accounted for 
0.5 percent of the House and 0.4 percent of Congress.
    One Representative and no Senators reported being of two 
races. This Member, who was black or African American and 
Asian, accounted for 0.2 percent of the House and just under 
0.2 percent of Congress.
    As of January 2013, the House had 30 Hispanics, and the 
Senate had 3. The House number included one Delegate, who also 
was a Pacific Islander in the Native Hawaiian and other Pacific 
Islander racial category, and the Puerto Rican Resident 
Commissioner. The 30 Hispanic Members constituted 6.8 percent 
of the House. Hispanics made up 3.0 percent of the Senate and 
6.1 percent of Congress. Minus the single Delegate and the 
Resident Commissioner, 28 Hispanics accounted for 6.4 percent 
of the House; they plus the 3 Senators made up 5.8 percent of 
Congress.

                         Educational Attainment

    Educational attainment data for the U.S. population aged 25 
years and older (hereafter, the U.S. adult population) from the 
2012 ACS \13\ provide the most recent estimates available for 
comparison with Members' educational levels in January 
2013.\14\ The data show that Members generally had greater 
educational attainment than the U.S. adult population and, 
thus, could be expected to have achieved higher occupational 
levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, American FactFinder, ``2012 
American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Educational Attainment,'' 
table S1501, at http://factfinder2.census.gov/rest/dnldController/
deliver?_ts=426614212350.
    \14\ The educational and occupational data for Members are from CRS 
Report R42964, Membership of the 113th Congress: A Profile, by Jennifer 
E. Manning; and CQ Roll Call Member Profiles, on the CQ.com 
subscription database, at http://www.cq.com/members/home.do.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2012, bachelor's degrees were the highest level of 
education attained by 18.2 percent of the U.S. adult 
population. Another 10.9 percent had gone on to earn graduate 
or professional degrees, for a total of 29.1 percent with at 
least bachelor's degrees. In contrast, almost all Members of 
the newly seated 113th Congress (93.0 percent of those in the 
House and 99.0 percent of Senators) held bachelor's degrees; 
about two-thirds of House Members (296, or 67.1 percent) and 
almost three-fourths of Senators (74, or 74.0 percent) had 
graduate or professional educations beyond the bachelor's 
level.
   Master's degrees were the highest degrees earned by 85 House 
        Members (19.3 percent of the House) and 14 Senators (14.0 
        percent of the Senate).
   Twenty of those in the House (4.5 percent), but no Senators, 
        had doctoral degrees.
   Well over one-third of House Members (169, or 38.3 percent) 
        and more than one-half of Senators (57, or 57.0 percent) had 
        law degrees.
   The 113th Congress included 22 House Members (5.0 percent of 
        the House) and 3 Senators (3.0 percent of the Senate) with 
        medical degrees.
    Associate's degrees were the highest degrees earned by 8.0 
percent of the U.S. adult population, compared with seven House 
Members (1.6 percent of the House) and no Senators. In 
addition, one House Member (0.2 percent of the House) was 
licensed as a practical nurse.
    Whereas 28.0 percent of the U.S. adult population had ended 
their formal educations with high school diplomas, 21 House 
Members (4.8 percent of the House) and 1 Senator (1.0 percent 
of the Senate) did not have postsecondary educations.

                               Occupation

    In 2012, according to estimates for that year from the 
ACS,\15\ 40.2 percent of full-time, year-round U.S. civilian 
workers at least 16 years old (hereafter, U.S. workers) were in 
the broad occupational category of management, business, 
science, and arts, which encompasses generally higher level 
occupations than other categories; 14.1 percent were in service 
occupations; 23.4 percent did sales and office work; 9.4 
percent were in natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance occupations; and 12.9 percent were in production, 
transportation, and material moving occupations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, American FactFinder, ``2012 
American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates,'' table S2402, at http://
factfinder2.census.gov/rest/dnldController/deliver?_ts= 426784298875.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These categories can be broken down to allow somewhat more 
specific, though limited, comparisons between the occupations 
of U.S. workers and those of Members before being seated in the 
113th Congress. Whereas the ACS estimates refer to occupations 
as of 2012 and report only one occupation per worker, a given 
Member might have noted more than one prior occupation or an 
occupation that was not the most recent one preceding his or 
her service in the 113th Congress.\16\ The numbers and 
percentages of Members in different occupations, therefore, 
should be read with the understanding that some multiple 
counting has occurred and that the data pertain to various past 
years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ CRS Report R42964, Membership of the 113th Congress: A 
Profile, by Jennifer E. Manning, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As was consistent with their educational attainment (see 
``Educational Attainment'' above), Members of the incoming 
113th Congress tended to have had higher level past occupations 
than U.S. workers generally had. With relatively few 
exceptions, the prior occupations that Members reported--and 
all four of their most frequently reported occupations, 
identified in the bulleted list below--correspond to 
subcategories under the largest ACS category of management, 
business, science, and arts occupations. Specifically:
   226 Members, 184 House Members (41.7 percent of the House) 
        and 42 Senators (42.0 percent of the Senate), reported 
        occupations in public service or politics;
   214 Members, 187 House Members (42.4 percent of the House) 
        and 27 Senators (27.0 percent of the Senate), noted business 
        occupations;
   211 Members, 156 House Members (35.4 percent of the House) 
        and 55 Senators (55.0 percent of the Senate), reported law; and
   92 Members, 77 House Members (17.5 percent of the House) and 
        15 Senators (15.0 percent of the Senate), cited education.
    The closest comparisons that can be made with U.S. workers 
in ACS occupational subcategories of management, business, 
science, and arts show 1.8 percent in community and social 
services occupations; 5.6 percent in business and financial 
operations occupations; 1.4 percent in legal occupations; and 
5.1 percent in education, training, and library occupations--
all lower than the proportions reported for Members in similar 
positions.
    As for Members' occupations outside the management, 
business, science, and arts category:
   31 Members, 26 House Members (5.9 percent of the House) and 
        5 Senators (5.0 percent of the Senate), reported agricultural 
        occupations;
   21 Members, 17 House Members (3.9 percent of the House) and 
        4 Senators (4.0 percent of the Senate), reported labor or blue 
        collar occupations;
   21 Members, 16 House Members (3.6 percent of the House) and 
        5 Senators (5.0 percent of the Senate), noted homemaker or 
        domestic occupations;
   15 Members, 14 House Members (3.2 percent of the House) and 
        1 Senator (1.0 percent of the Senate), reported secretarial or 
        clerical work;
   9 Members, 8 House Members (1.8 percent of the House) and 1 
        Senator (1.0 percent of the Senate), cited military 
        occupations; and
   5 Members, all in the House (1.1 percent of the House), 
        reported law enforcement work.
    Insofar as the data allow comparisons between Members and 
U.S. workers, they suggest that U.S. workers were more likely 
to have been in certain roughly similar occupations outside the 
management, business, science, and arts category and less 
likely to have been in certain others. In particular, U.S. 
workers were less concentrated in farming, fishing, and 
forestry occupations than Members were in agriculture. In one 
occupation, law enforcement, House Members and U.S. workers 
were similarly represented. Of U.S. workers:
   0.6 percent had farming, fishing, and forestry occupations;
   21.7 percent had construction and extraction occupations; 
        installation, maintenance, and repair occupations; or 
        production, transportation, and material moving occupations 
        (the closest approximation to labor or blue collar work);
   2.5 percent were in personal care and service occupations (a 
        possible substitute for domestic work; the ACS estimates do not 
        include homemaking because it is not paid employment);
   13.5 percent held office and administrative support 
        positions; and
   1.3 percent were law enforcement workers, including 
        supervisors.
    The table from which the above percentages were computed 
does not include the military. Another ACS table, however, 
shows that, of civilians aged 18 years and older, 8.9 percent 
had served on active duty in the military at some past time 
\17\ (see the discussion of ``Military Service'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, American FactFinder, ``2012 
American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Veteran Status,'' table 
S2101, at http://factfinder2.census.gov/rest/dnld Controller/
deliver?_ts=427395255958.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                Religion

    The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life has observed that 
``changes in the religious makeup of Congress during the last 
half-century mirror broader changes in American society. 
Congress, like the nation as a whole, has become much less 
Protestant and more religiously diverse.'' \18\ One notable 
difference between Congress and the U.S. adult population, 
however, is that almost every Member declares a religious 
affiliation. In 2012, 20.0 percent of U.S. adults reported 
being unaffiliated; the proportion for Members of the incoming 
113th Congress was 0.2 percent.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ The Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion and Public Life, 
``Faith on the Hill: the Religious Composition of the 113th Congress,'' 
at http://www.pewforum.org/2012/11/16/faith-on-the-hill-the-religious-
composition-of-the-113th-congress/, p. 9.
    \19\ Ibid., pp. 2-3. Data for the 113th Congress, reflecting the 
533 Representatives and Senators sworn in on January 3, 2013, were 
collected by CQ Roll Call and the Pew Forum. Survey data on U.S. adults 
were collected from January to August 2012 by the Pew Research Center 
for the People & the Press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Below is a breakdown of U.S. adults in 2012 and Members in 
January 2013 by religious denomination. It indicates that just 
under one-half of U.S. adults, but a slight majority of 
Members, were Protestant. Members also were somewhat more 
likely to be Catholic, Jewish, or--in the Senate--Mormon. About 
1.0 percent or fewer of U.S. adults and Members were Orthodox 
Christian, Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu, or Unitarian Universalist.
   Protestant: 48.0 percent of U.S. adults and 56.1 percent of 
        Congress (57.0 percent of Representatives and 52.0 percent of 
        Senators)
   Catholic: 22.0 percent and 30.6 percent (31.4 percent of 
        Representatives and 27.0 percent of Senators)
   Jewish: 2.0 percent and 6.2 percent (5.1 percent of 
        Representatives and 11.0 percent of Senators)
   Mormon: 2.0 percent and 2.8 percent (1.8 percent of 
        Representatives and 7.0 percent of Senators)
   Orthodox Christian: 1.0 percent and 0.9 percent (1.2 percent 
        of Representatives and no Senators)
   Buddhist: 1.0 percent and 0.6 percent (0.5 percent of 
        Representatives and 1.0 percent of Senators)
   Muslim: 1.0 percent and 0.4 percent (0.5 percent of 
        Representatives and no Senators)
   Hindu: <1.0 percent and 0.2 percent (0.2 percent of 
        Representatives and no Senators)
   Unitarian Universalist: <1.0 percent and 0.2 percent (0.2 
        percent of Representatives and no Senators)
    Baptists, the largest Protestant group, accounted for 17.0 
percent of U.S. adults in 2007 \20\ and 13.7 percent of Members 
in January 2013. Disaggregation by Chamber, however, shows that 
14.8 percent of Representatives, but 9.0 percent of Senators, 
were Baptist; Senators, as indicated below, were more likely to 
be Presbyterian.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ The most recent available data on U.S. adults by groups within 
the Protestant denomination are from the Pew Forum's ``U.S. Religious 
Landscape Survey,'' conducted in 2007. The survey report was published 
in 2008, at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-
landscape-study-full.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other Protestant affiliations reported by more than 1.0 
percent of U.S. adults and Members were:
   Methodist: 6.0 percent of U.S. adults and 8.6 percent of 
        Members (8.8 percent of Representatives and 8.0 percent of 
        Senators);
   Presbyterian: 3.0 percent and 8.1 percent (6.5 percent of 
        Representatives and 15.0 percent of Senators);
   Anglican/Episcopal: 2.0 percent and 7.3 percent (8.1 percent 
        of Representatives and 4.0 percent of Senators); and
   Lutheran: 5.0 percent and 4.3 percent (4.2 percent of 
        Representatives and 5.0 percent of Senators).
    Pentecostal Protestants accounted for 4.0 percent of U.S. 
adults--more than Presbyterians or Anglicans/Episcopalians--but 
only 0.2 percent of Members (0.2 percent of Representatives and 
no Senators).

                            Military Service

    According to a previously cited 2012 ACS estimate, 8.9 
percent of U.S. civilians aged 18 years and older were 
veterans; that is, they had served on active duty in the 
military but were no longer in this status when they filled out 
the survey.\21\ The ACS definition of ``veterans,'' besides 
excluding current active-duty service members, also excludes 
those who served in the National Guard or Reserves but were 
never on active duty. The ACS estimate of veterans, in other 
words, is not an estimate of all those in the U.S. population 
who have ever served in the military.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, American FactFinder, ``2012 
American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Veteran Status,'' table 
S2101, at http://factfinder2.census.gov/rest/dnld Controller/
deliver?_ts=427395255958.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Veterans' periods of service included:
   World War II, for 7.5 percent of veterans;
   the Korean war era, 10.9 percent;
   the Vietnam war era, 34.9 percent;
   the Gulf war period, August 1990 to August 2001, 17.1 
        percent; and
   the Gulf war period, September 2001 or later, 12.9 percent.
    The Census Bureau pointed out that these categories ``are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. Veterans may have served in 
more than one period.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When the 113th Congress was seated, 108 (20.0 percent) of 
its Members had been in the military.\23\ Although this 
proportion is more than double the ACS-estimated percentage of 
veterans in the U.S. adult civilian population in 2012, the ACS 
estimate, as explained above, does not cover all those in that 
year who had past or ongoing military experience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ The military service data for Members are from CRS Report 
R42964, Membership of the 113th Congress: A Profile, by Jennifer E. 
Manning; CQ Roll Call, ``113th Congress: House Military Veterans,'' at 
http://www.cq.com/members/factfilereport.do?report=mff-house-veterans; 
and CQ Roll Call, ``113th Congress: Senate Military Veterans,'' at 
http://www.cq.com/members/factfilereport.do?report=mff-senate-veterans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House included 90 Members who had been, or still were, 
in the military (20.4 percent of the House), and the Senate had 
18 (18.0 percent of the Senate). Some of them, like some 
veterans estimated by the ACS, served during more than one 
period.
    The periods for House Members' military service spanned:
   World War II, for 2 Members (2.2 percent of House service 
        members);
   the Korean war era, 2 (5.6 percent);
   the Vietnam war era, 41 (45.6 percent);
   the first Gulf war, 1990 to 1991, 22 (24.4 percent); and
   the second Gulf war, beginning after September 11, 2001, 29 
        (32.2 percent).
    Senators' periods of military service included:
   World War II, for 1 Senator \24\ (5.6 percent of Senate 
        service members);
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ The Senator died on June 3, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   the Korean war era, none;
   the Vietnam war era, 11 (61.1 percent);
   the first Gulf war, 1990-1991, 4 (22.2 percent); and
   the second Gulf war, beginning after September 11, 2001, 3 
        (16.7 percent).

        Members' Sociodemographic Characteristics over Time \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ This section and the following two sections were written by 
Ida A. Brudnick.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the following section, CRS Report R42365, 
Representatives and Senators: Trends in Member Characteristics 
Since 1945,\26\ is the primary source for analysis. That report 
reflected the composition of the 113th Congress when it was 
seated on January 3, 2013. Four hundred thirty-three 
Representatives and 100 Senators were sworn in that day, and 
these numbers were used to calculate the sociodemographic 
characteristics appearing in Representatives and Senators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ CRS Report R42365, Representatives and Senators: Trends in 
Member Characteristics Since 1945, coordinated by R. Eric Petersen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The preceding section illustrates some differences between 
Members of Congress and the U.S. population overall. A look at 
earlier Congresses demonstrates that this is not a new 
phenomenon. Furthermore, Congress has become more diverse over 
time across many demographic characteristics, especially in 
recent decades.
    Until 1917, for example, no women served in Congress (and, 
of course, none could vote in Federal elections until 1920). 
The percentage of women in the House doubled from approximately 
5 percent as late as the 99th Congress (1985-1987) to more than 
10 percent in the 103d Congress (1993-1995) before reaching 
nearly 15 percent at the beginning of the 109th Congress (2005-
2007) and 17.9 percent at the beginning of the 113th Congress.
    Women did not hold 2 percent of the seats in the Senate 
until the 87th Congress, and they did not surpass this number 
until the beginning of the 103d Congress, when their percentage 
tripled to 6 percent. The number of female Senators has 
remained steady or grown ever since, and Senate membership in 
the 113th Congress is 20 percent female. The 113th Congress has 
the highest number of female Representatives and Senators ever 
to serve.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ In addition to CRS Report R42365, Representatives and 
Senators: Trends in Member Characteristics Since 1945, coordinated by 
R. Eric Petersen, see CRS Report R43244, Women in the United States 
Congress: Historical Overview, Tables, and Discussion, by Jennifer E. 
Manning, Colleen J. Shogan, and Ida A. Brudnick.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, although the racial and ethnic makeup of 
Congress remains less diverse than that of the general public, 
recent Congresses have shown some changes. The House of 
Representatives was more than 95 percent white until the 93d 
Congress and more than 90 percent white until the 103d 
Congress. Whites make up 82.2 percent of the House in the 113th 
Congress,\28\ a record low.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ This computation is based on a total of 433 Representatives 
sworn in on January 3, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second-largest group in the 113th Congress is African 
Americans. No African American served until the 41st Congress, 
and no African Americans served from the 57th through the 71st 
Congresses. After accounting for just under 0.5 percent of the 
House at the beginning of the 79th Congress, African American 
Members increased to a high of 9.7 percent at the outset of the 
112th Congress, and then decreased slightly to 9.0 percent at 
the outset of the 113th Congress. No more than 1 percent of 
Senators at the beginning of any Congress identified as African 
American. Many of the African American individuals who have 
served in Congress have done so in the modern era; according to 
the Clerk of the House and the House Historian's offices, 
``Forty-four of the 140 African Americans who have served in 
Congress [31 percent] are current Members.'' \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ U.S. House of Representatives, ``History, Art, & Archives,'' 
at http://history.house.gov/ Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/
Historical-Data/Historical-Data--Nav.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The percentage of Representatives who have identified as 
Hispanic has grown from 0.2 percent at the beginning of the 
79th Congress to a record high of 6.7 percent in the 113th 
Congress.\30\ In the same period, the percentage of Senators 
identifying as Hispanic has ranged from a low of 0 percent 
(95th-108th Congresses) to a high of 3 percent at the outset of 
the 110th, 111th, and 113th Congresses. As with African 
Americans, many of the Hispanic Members have served more 
recently. According to one history, ``Fifty-four of the 91 
Hispanic Americans who served in Congress through 2012--nearly 
60 percent--were seated after 1977.'' \31\ This study also 
found more recent geographic diversity among this group, 
stating ``in the 1970s, for the first time, Hispanic Members 
were elected from states outside the Southwest, including New 
York, New Jersey, and Illinois.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Includes a Senator of Portuguese heritage. As above, this 
computation is based on a total of 433 Representatives sworn in on 
January 3, 2013.
    \31\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, 
Hispanic Americans in Congress, prepared by the Office of the Historian 
and the Office of the Clerk, 113th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2014), p. 7
    \32\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some historical differences described in this report are 
more persistent. For example, studies have found that Congress 
has always had many lawyers. One study found that of the 65 
Representatives in the First Congress, 24 were lawyers.\33\ 
Another found that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ George B. Galloway, ``Precedents Established in the First 
Congress,'' The Western Political Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3 (September 
1958), pp. 454-468.

    (d)uring the first decade of the 19th century, lawyers 
accounted for slightly more than 40% of the individuals 
entering House service. During the 1840s and 1850s, the 
comparable group exceeded 65 percent. The proportion of lawyers 
entering Congress decreased very gradually thereafter, with a 
noticeable dip occurring by the 1930s. By the 1950s the 
percentage of lawyers among those entering the House was only 
some 7 percentage points greater than the average found in the 
first three decades of the nation's history.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Allan G. Bogue, Jerome M. Clubb, Carroll R. McKibbin, and 
Santa A. Traugott, ``Members of the House of Representatives and the 
Process of Modernization,'' Journal of American History, vol. 53 
(September 1976), p. 285. See also Donald R. Matthews, ``Legislative 
Recruitment and Legislative Careers,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, 
vol. 9, no. 4 (November 1984), pp. 547-585.

    At the beginning of the 113th Congress, 38.3 percent of the 
House and 57 percent of Senators had law degrees.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Members with law degrees may not have listed the practice of 
law as an occupation, which was analyzed above (see ``Occupation'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Educational attainment has increased for the Nation over 
time, and the degrees attained by Members have also increased 
and continue to exceed those of the overall population. This 
difference is particularly prevalent in the number of Members 
holding graduate degrees.

 Members' Sociodemographic Characteristics: Challenges in Compilation 
                   and Choosing the Right Comparison

    As this report demonstrates, the sociodemographic 
characteristics of Members of Congress vary from those of the 
U.S. population in many ways. The scope of these differences, 
however, is difficult to measure due to methodological 
challenges, and the significance is difficult to assess for 
more theoretical reasons. Students of Congress have examined 
these differences, including whether they are a new or 
persistent phenomenon and what they mean for the 
representativeness of government.
    As discussed in CRS Report R42365, Representatives and 
Senators: Trends in Member Characteristics Since 1945, numerous 
methodological challenges complicate any analysis of Members' 
sociodemographic characteristics. The disclosure, for example, 
of details of a Member's race, education, previous occupation, 
religion, or other characteristics has been voluntary, and no 
official, authoritative source has collected Member 
characteristics data in a consistent manner over time. Direct 
comparisons between Members and the population at large may 
also be difficult to make due to a lack of comparable data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau, as evident from the careful 
explanations given to comparisons in the preceding sections. 
For example, although a Member may be able to list multiple 
responses for a particular characteristic--like occupation--in 
an official biography, the Census Bureau may report only one 
for respondents to the agency's questionnaires.
    Furthermore, Members are often compared with the entire 
population, but they are elected by a smaller group of voters. 
Because some researchers suggest that policy outcomes represent 
the preferences of the median voter, some argue that 
comparisons between the median Member of Congress and the 
median voter may be more useful than comparisons with the 
population overall.\36\ Additionally, differences between 
Members and the general population may occur for logical or 
unavoidable reasons--for example, Members must reach the 
required age set forth in the Constitution, but the population 
at large contains Americans of all ages. Comparisons limited to 
voters, however, also present methodological challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ See, for example, Anthony Downs, ``An Economic Theory of 
Political Action in a Democracy,'' Journal of Political Economy, vol. 
65 (1957), pp. 135-150; and Keith Krehbiel, ``Legislative 
Organization,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 18 (2004), pp. 
113-128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Assessing the Significance of Differences in Sociodemographic 
        Characteristics Between Congress and the U.S. Population

    Scholars of Congress have long taken an interest in the 
backgrounds of Members of Congress. Much of their research has 
attempted to measure the impact of gender, race, religion, and 
veteran status. Many of these studies contrast descriptive 
representation (i.e., numerical representation) and substantive 
representation (i.e., representation of interests) \37\ and 
seek to determine whether descriptive representation increases 
or, by concentrating support, decreases substantive 
representation.\38\ Students of Congress have also sought to 
determine any link between sociodemographic characteristics and 
political behavior and policy outcomes. For example, they have 
examined whether these characteristics influence:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ See, for example, Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967).
    \38\ See, for example, David Lublin, The Paradox of Representation: 
Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).finagled footnote 
39 deg.
    \39\ See, for example, for women: Kathryn Pearson and Logan Dancey, 
``Elevating Women's Voices in Congress: Speech Participation in the 
House of Representatives,'' Political Research Quarterly, vol. 64 
(December 2011), pp. 910-923; and Kathryn Pearson and Logan Dancey, 
``Speaking for the Underrepresented in the House of Representatives: 
Voicing Women's Interests in a Partisan Era,'' Politics & Gender, vol. 
7 (December 2011), pp. 493-519.
    See, for example, for African Americans: Charles Tien and Dena 
Levy, ``The Influence of African Americans on Congress: A Content 
Analysis of the Civil Rights Debates,'' Du Bois Review, vol. 5, no. 1 
(2008), pp. 115-135; and Katrina L. Gamble, ``Black Political 
Representation: An Examination of Legislative Activity within U.S. 
House Committees,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 3 
(August 2007), pp. 421-447.
    See, for example, for social status and wealth: Nicholas Carnes, 
``Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in 
Congress Matter?'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, issue 1 
(February 2012), pp. 5-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   official actions like rollcall voting, the sponsorship of 
        amendments, committee participation, bill introduction and 
        cosponsorship, and speeches; \39\
   support for specific policies, such as whether veteran 
        status influences views about when and how to use military 
        force, or whether sociodemographic characteristics influence 
        international as well as domestic policy; \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ See, for example, Allan G. Bogue, Jerome M. Clubb, Carroll R. 
McKibbin, and Santa A. Traugott, ``Members of the House of 
Representatives and the Process of Modernization,'' Journal of American 
History, vol. 53 (September 1976), p. 285; William T. Bianco, ``Last 
Post for `The Greatest Generation': The Policy Implications of the 
Decline of Military Experience in the U.S. Congress,'' Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 1 (February 2005), pp. 85-102; 
Christopher Gelpi and Peter D. Feaver, ``Speak Softly and Carry a Big 
Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force,'' 
American Political Science Review, vol. 96 (2002), pp. 779-793; and 
Joseph Uscinski, Michael S. Rocca, Gabriel R. Sanchez, and Marina 
Brenden, ``Congress and Foreign Policy: Congressional Action on the 
Darfur Genocide,'' PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 42, no. 3 
(July 2009), pp. 489-496.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   effectiveness in achieving Members' legislative agenda, 
        including the distribution of Federal funding or the passage of 
        bills; \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ See, for example, Christian R. Grose, Congress in Black and 
White: Race and Representation in Washington and At Home (Cambridge, 
United Kingdom, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Members' understanding of their constituencies and whom they 
        represent, and whether they represent only their geographic 
        constituents or also see themselves as representatives of their 
        demographic group; \42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ See, for example, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Going Home: Black 
Representatives and Their Constituencies (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003); James B. Johnson and Philip E. Secret, ``Focus 
and Style Representational Roles of Congressional Black and Hispanic 
Caucus Members,'' Journal of Black Studies, vol. 26, no. 3 (January 
1996), pp. 245-273; and Jessica C. Gerrity, Tracy Osborn, and Jeannette 
Morehouse Mendez, ``Women and Representation: A Different View of the 
District?'' Politics & Gender, vol. 3 (June 2007), pp. 179-200.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   relationships among Members, including how they build 
        support for policy positions, relate to colleagues, build 
        coalitions, and decide whether to join congressional caucuses; 
        \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ See, for example, Jason P. Casellas, ``Coalitions in the 
House? The Election of Minorities to State Legislatures and Congress,'' 
Political Research Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 1 (March 2009), pp. 120-131; 
Tracy L. Osborn, How Women Represent Women: Political Parties, Gender, 
and Representation in the State Legislatures (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); and James M. McCormick and Neil J. Mitchell, 
``Commitments, Transnational Interests, and Congress: Who Joins the 
Congressional Human Rights Caucus?'' Political Research Quarterly, vol. 
60, no. 4 (December 2007), pp. 579-592.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   attitudes of constituents regarding representation, 
        constituency service expectations, approval of representative 
        institutions, and turnout; \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ See, for example, John D. Griffin and Michael Keane, 
``Descriptive Representation and the Composition of African American 
Turnout,'' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 50, no. 4 
(October 2006), pp. 998-1012; and Thomas L. Brunell, Christopher J. 
Anderson, and Rachel K. Cremona, ``Descriptive Representation, District 
Demography, and Attitudes toward Congress among African Americans,'' 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 2 (May 2008), pp. 223-244.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   recruitment, including who runs for office and barriers to 
        entry; \45\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ See, for example, Samuel Kernell, ``Toward Understanding 19th 
Century Congressional Careers: Ambition, Competition, and Rotation,'' 
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 21, no. 4 (November 1977), 
pp. 669-693; Robert G. Brookshire and Dean F. Duncan III, 
``Congressional Career Patterns and Party Systems,'' Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 1 (February 1983), pp. 65-78; and Donald 
R. Matthews, ``Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers,'' 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 4 (November 1984), pp. 547-
585.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   career patterns, including tenure and decisions to run for 
        reelection or seek committee assignments \46\ and leadership 
        roles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ See, for example, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in 
Committees (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); Scott A. Frisch and Sean Q. 
Kelly, Committee Assignment Politics in the U.S. House of 
Representatives (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006); and 
Kerry Haynie, ``African Americans and the new politics of inclusion: A 
representational dilemma?'' in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, 8th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 2005), pp. 395-409.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additional research in many of these areas is needed to 
assess more fully the impact of Members' sociodemographic 
characteristics and their relationship to the representation of 
interests. Members may have multiple influences or goals for 
any particular action. \47\ Additionally, with limited Members 
belonging to certain groups and the need to control for other 
factors, such as majority and seniority status or regional or 
district characteristics, isolating the importance of Members' 
sociodemographic characteristics remains a challenge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    The extent to which Members of the 113th Congress can be 
compared with the contemporary U.S. population is somewhat 
restricted by data limitations. Nevertheless, certain 
comparisons are possible.
    These comparisons indicate that Members have a higher 
median age than the larger population and are more likely to be 
males; to be non-Hispanic whites; and to have higher 
educational attainment and occupational levels (which, for 
Members, refer to their prior occupations). Current Members 
also are more likely to report religious affiliations, 
particularly Protestant, and to report having served in the 
military. The data on age, educational attainment, and 
occupational levels indicate that Members have the life 
experiences and qualifications to be expected of those chosen 
for some of the most demanding national offices.
    A look at Members over time shows that they have become 
more diverse in race, ethnicity, and religion. The 113th 
Congress also includes a record-high number of women.
    What Members' sociodemographic characteristics mean for 
their political behavior and policy outcomes remains a matter 
for further scholarly investigation.
















      Congressional Staffing: The Continuity of Change and Reform

                            Ida A. Brudnick

                       Specialist on the Congress

                              ----------                              


        Over the last century, the professional staff support 
        available to assist Members, collectively or 
        individually, in navigating their roles and 
        responsibilities has transformed to respond to the 
        changing world. The support structure for Congress has 
        evolved alongside broader changes within Congress and 
        the United States. Numerous scholars have examined 
        congressional staffing and support, attempting to 
        assess its impact on the legislative branch and the 
        political process. While much of the seminal literature 
        on congressional staffing is decades old, many of the 
        principal questions remain the same. Reform efforts 
        have had a substantial impact on the operation of 
        offices and agencies established to support Members, 
        while also highlighting enduring, intractable 
        challenges related to staffing and information needs. 
        The exploration of these previous research and reform 
        efforts demonstrate continuity in concerns related to 
        the operation and internal workings of Congress. They 
        also demonstrate that efforts to ``fix'' the internal 
        workings of Congress are not new. Rather, each reform 
        effort is a continuation of the search for the optimal 
        resources to ensure an independent, accountable, and 
        effective legislative branch.

                              Introduction

    Over the past century, the professional staff support 
available to assist Members, collectively or individually, in 
navigating their roles and responsibilities has been 
transformed to respond to the changing world. This assistance 
includes personal office staff, committees, and officers and 
support agencies that perform legislative, administrative, 
financial, historical, ceremonial, and security functions. Over 
time, Congress has worked to determine the amount and type of 
assistance necessary for a well-informed and well-administered 
Congress, as well as rules and laws for its regulation. 
Congress has also regularly expressed interest in developing 
its own independent sources of information to help combat the 
informational advantage of the executive branch.
    The operation of the congressional support structure is 
particularly significant because individual Members of Congress 
are political and electoral entrepreneurs. Each Member obtains 
his or her seat through election in a single-Member district, 
rather than through a list in a proportional representation, 
parliamentary-style system. The American electoral system 
allows each Member freedom to represent constituents in the 
manner he or she judges best. This representation often 
requires constituency services, while it also encourages 
Members to acquire expertise on a wide variety of issues. Work 
on bills, committees, and speeches may be made in conjunction 
with the party apparatus, but each Member is also an 
entrepreneur in the policy, constituency, and press arenas. 
Members may develop their own bills, amendments, questions for 
witnesses at hearings, floor speeches, and media operations. 
Since each Member must chart his or her own congressional 
career, access to information and support as well as an ability 
to use it effectively is a significant factor in shaping a 
Member's impact. Since staffing and other resources are not 
without limit, determinations made regarding the distribution 
of resources may affect the distribution of influence.
    This report first places changes to congressional support 
in context with the changing national political and economic 
arena. It then introduces the academic literature on the 
influence of congressional staff and the role of policy 
analysis, presenting the major areas of inquiry. Finally, it 
provides an overview of previous reform efforts and 
illustrative examples of changes to congressional support and 
the role of policy analysis, as well as a brief discussion of 
recent data.
    The exploration of previous research and of reform efforts 
demonstrates the continuity in concerns related to the 
operation and internal workings of Congress. It also 
demonstrates that efforts to ``fix'' the internal workings of 
Congress are not new. Rather, each reform effort is a 
continuation of the search for the optimal resources to ensure 
an independent, accountable, and effective legislative branch.

      Support in a Changing National Political and Economic Arena

    A continuous transformation in the breadth of issues to 
which Congress must respond, conditions in the Nation, and the 
sources of information have spurred changes to Congress' 
internal structure. Efforts to reform the internal workings of 
Congress have often coincided with or followed a crisis or 
major national event--for example, World War II or Watergate--
or were intertwined with social and policy changes--for 
example, the civil rights movement. Other times, major changes 
have been made in response to perceived deficiencies or 
dysfunction in Congress or in an effort to challenge the 
executive branch. Members, for example, may search for ways to 
exert influence in a policy area or make their jobs easier, or 
they may wish to respond to public criticism or concern. 
Sometimes, targeted reforms have affected or expanded one type 
of support--for example, for Members or committees--and 
sometimes changes have been the result of broader or more 
comprehensive efforts.
    One hundred years ago, the United States was still debating 
its place in the world, while today it is firmly established as 
a superpower. Questions related to international commitments, 
debated in the era surrounding World War I, have given way to 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple international treaties 
and organizations, and trade issues. Aviation was then in its 
infancy, and technology supporting computers and the Internet 
was decades away. Transportation advances have made it possible 
for Members to return to their States or districts each week, 
rather than only at long recesses or at the end of a session. 
This has changed expectations related to contact with 
constituents and altered calculations related to relocating a 
Member's family. Timely news can be obtained from across the 
Nation and abroad, and the instant dissemination of information 
made possible by the 24-hour news cycle and social media has 
also changed how Members receive their news and communicate 
with their constituents.
    The Nation itself is far larger than it was only 100 years 
ago. According to the 1910 census, the Nation had 92 million 
residents. The 2010 census reported a national population of 
over 308 million, an increase of 235 percent. Congress, 
however, has not grown proportionally. The House, with its 435 
voting Members, has maintained the same size as it did after 
the 1910 census.\1\ The Senate, to accommodate new States 
entering the Union, has grown slightly, from 92 seats in 1910 
(61st Congress) to 100 seats by 1959 (86th Congress).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The size was established by P.L. 5, 37 Stat. 13, ch. 5, August 
3, 1911, and the Permanent Apportionment Act, P.L. 13, 46 Stat. 21, ch. 
28, June 18, 1929. For a discussion of the incorporation of 
Representatives following the admission of States, and a list of 
apportionment by State, see http://history.house.gov/Institution/
Apportionment/Apportionment/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The economy has grown far larger and more complex since the 
Great Depression. Since 1929, according to the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, the Nation's real GDP has grown almost 1,400 
percent. Since 1940, government receipts have grown more than 
2,600 percent and outlays by more than 2,200 percent in 
constant dollars.
    Congress must also oversee a much larger executive branch 
than it did in the pre-World War II period. According to the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), civilian executive branch 
employment grew from 443,000 to 1,374,000 from 1940 until 2012, 
an increase of 210 percent. In comparison, House and Senate 
staff grew from approximately 5,600 employees in 1954 to 
approximately 17,000.\2\ In recent years, the legislative 
branch has employed approximately 30,000 employees, making it 
approximately 2 percent the size of the civilian executive 
branch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ CRS Report R40056, Legislative Branch Staffing, 1954-2007, by 
R. Eric Petersen (archived; available from author).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While difficulties abound in attempting to assess 
congressional workload, by at least one measure--the number of 
rollcall votes--the job has changed dramatically. The number of 
rollcall votes in the first session of the 113th Congress was 
more than double the number in the first session of the 80th 
Congress (1947) in both the House and Senate.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ ``Resume of Congressional Activity,'' Congressional Record, 
vol. 94, part 14 (December 31, 1948), pp. D537-D538; and ``Resume of 
Congressional Activity,'' Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 
160, February 27, 2014, p. D195.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The support structure for Congress has evolved alongside 
these broader changes within Congress and the Nation.

   Assessing the Impact of Congressional Staff and Support: Areas of 
                                Research

    Numerous scholars have examined congressional staffing and 
support, attempting to assess its impact on the legislative 
branch and the political process. While much of the seminal 
literature on congressional staffing is decades old, many of 
the principal questions remain the same.
    Some studies have scrutinized staff influence on the 
legislative process, including their accountability, autonomy, 
influence, and partisanship.\4\ This research, drawing on 
principal-agent theory, examines whether staff drive the 
political agenda or merely respond to the direction of the 
elected officials. This literature has examined the role of 
staff in a representative democracy--including whether too much 
power or decisionmaking has been delegated to staff. It has 
examined the desirability of partisan versus nonpartisan staff 
on congressional committees, as well as the role of 
professional, expert staff in a partisan environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ See, for example, Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives: 
Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government (New 
York: Basic Books Inc., 1980); Barbara S. Romzek, ``Accountability of 
Congressional Staff,'' Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory: J-PART, vol. 10, no. 2 (April 2000), pp. 413-446; George K. 
Yin, ``Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff,'' Notre Dame Law 
Review, vol. 88 (2013), p. 2287; Christine DeGregorio, ``Staff 
Utilization in the U.S. Congress: Committee Chairs and Senior Aides,'' 
Polity, vol. 28, no. 2 (winter 1995), pp. 261-275; James D. Cochrane, 
``Partisan Aspects of Congressional Committee Staffing,'' The Western 
Political Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 2 (June 1964), pp. 338-348; and David 
E. Price, ``Professionals and `Entrepreneurs': Staff Orientations and 
Policy Making on Three Senate Committees,'' The Journal of Politics, 
vol. 33, no. 2 (May 1971), pp. 316-336.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other studies have examined:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See, for example, Barbara S. Romzek and Jennifer A. Utter, 
``Congressional Legislative Staff: Political Professionals or Clerks?'' 
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 41, no. 4 (October 1997), 
pp. 1251-1279; Barbara S. Romzek and Jennifer A. Utter, ``Career 
Dynamics of Congressional Legislative Staff: Preliminary Profile and 
Research Questions,'' Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory: J-PART, vol. 6, no. 3 (July 1996), pp. 415-442; David L. Leal 
and Frederick M. Hess, ``Who Chooses Experience? Examining the Use of 
Veteran Staff by House Freshmen,'' Polity, vol. 36, no. 4 (July 2004), 
pp. 651-664; John R. Johannes, ``Casework as a Technique of U.S. 
Congressional Oversight of the Executive,'' Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 3 (August 1979), pp. 325-351; Christine 
DeGregorio, ``Professionals in the U.S. Congress: An Analysis of 
Working Styles,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4 
(November 1988), pp. 459-476; and CRS Report RL34545, Congressional 
Staff: Duties and Functions of Selected Positions, by R. Eric Petersen.
    \6\ See, for example, Linda Cohen Bell and Cindy Simon Rosenthal, 
``From Passive to Active Representation: The Case of Women 
Congressional Staff,'' Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory: J-PART, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2003), pp. 65-81; Sally 
Friedman and Robert T. Nakamura, ``The Representation of Women on U.S. 
Senate Committee Staffs,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 
3 (August 1991), pp. 407-427; Christian R. Grose, Maruice Mangum, and 
Christopher Martin, ``Race, Political Empowerment, and Constituency 
Service: Descriptive Representation and the Hiring of African-American 
Congressional Staff,'' Polity, vol. 39, no. 4 (October 2007), pp. 449-
478; John Johannes, ``Women as Congressional Staffers: Does It Make a 
Difference?'' Women & Politics, vol. 4, no. 2 (June 1984), pp. 69-81; 
David Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999); and Congressional Hispanic Staff 
Association, ``Unrepresented: A Blueprint for Solving the Diversity 
Crisis on Capitol Hill,'' February 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   job duties in a Member office, career trajectories, and 
        turnover rates; \5\
   the diversity of congressional staff, including questions of 
        descriptive versus substantive representation and whether the 
        presence of women and minorities on congressional staffs 
        affects policy outcomes; \6\
   the size and cost of congressional staffing; \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See, for example, Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond, 
``The Growth of Congressional Staffs,'' Proceedings of the Academy of 
Political Science, vol. 32, no. 1 (1975), pp. 112-124; Gladys M. 
Kammerer, ``The Record of Congress in Committee Staffing,'' American 
Political Science Review, vol. 45, no. 4 (December, 1951), pp. 1126-
1136; CRS Report R41366, House of Representatives and Senate Staff 
Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2010, 
by R. Eric Petersen, Parker H. Reynolds, and Amber Hope Wilhelm; and 
CRS Report R43557, Legislative Branch: FY2015 Appropriations, by R. 
Eric Petersen and Ida A. Brudnick.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   the internal distribution of staff, including allocation 
        among Member, committee, and leadership offices, or between 
        Washington, DC, and the district or State offices; \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Samuel C. Patterson, ``The Professional Staffs of Congressional 
Committees,'' Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1 (March 
1970), pp. 22-37; and Steven H. Schiff and Steven S. Smith, 
``Generational Change and the Allocation of Staff in the U.S. 
Congress,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 8, no. 3 (August 1983), 
pp. 457-467.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   the impact of the legislative branch having its own sources 
        of information and analysis, including who provides this 
        information and how political actors consume it; \9\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Charles O. Jones, ``Why Congress Can't Do Policy Analysis,'' 
Policy Studies Review Annual (1977), p. 224; Bruce Bimber, 
``Information as a Factor in Congressional Politics,'' Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 4 (November 1991), pp. 585-605; and 
David Whiteman, ``The Fate of Policy Analysis in Congressional Decision 
Making: Three Types of Use in Committees,'' The Western Political 
Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2 (June 1985), pp. 294-311.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   broad examinations of the significance of congressional 
        staff.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Lindsay Rogers, ``The Staffing of Congress,'' Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 1 (March 1941), pp. 1-22; Kenneth 
Kofmehl, Professional Staffs of Congress (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue 
University Press, 1962); Susan Webb Hammond, ``Legislative Staffs,'' 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 2 (May 1984), pp. 271-317; 
Susan Webb Hammond, ``Recent Research on Legislative Staffs,'' 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 4 (November 1996), pp. 543-
576; Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond, Congressional Staffs: 
The Invisible Force in American Lawmaking (New York: Free Press, 1977); 
Michael J. Malbin, Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and 
the Future of Representative Government (New York: Basic Books Inc., 
1980); and Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, Committees in 
Congress, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The goal of a well-informed and well-administered 
legislature has long been appreciated, even if the means of 
achieving it have not been agreed upon. One congressional 
observer, in 1941, stated:

    That the legislative branch of government should have 
``modern tools'' and an ``up-to-date organization'' so that it 
may ``go forward efficiently'' is . . . essential. Over the 
years the work of Congress has become increasingly technical 
and burdensome. The annual statute book grows in size. Sessions 
are longer. More and more numerous become the administrative 
agencies which seek funds and require scrutiny. Naturally, 
therefore, the staff of Congress has grown larger. To its cost, 
numbers, duties and potentialities little attention has as yet 
been paid--even by Congress.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Lindsay Rogers, ``The Staffing of Congress,'' Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 1 (March 1941), p. 1.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another early study, a decade later, echoed the sentiment:

    The point had been made repeatedly by critics within and 
outside the Congress that its standing committees must be 
equipped with first-rate professional staffs if they are to 
make intelligent legislative decisions on the increasingly 
complex and technical problems presented to the legislators for 
solution. Reliance upon executive branch research studies or 
upon the detail of executive agency technicians to the 
committees was held by many to be fraught with the danger of 
injecting special pleading and biases for the increasing number 
of administration-sponsored bills. For Congress to function as 
a coequal partner with the executive in the legislative 
process, these critics deemed it essential that Congress 
empower itself to obtain its own independent staff services and 
that it pay adequately for them.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Gladys M. Kammerer, ``The Record of Congress in Committee 
Staffing,'' American Political Science Review, vol. 45, no. 4 (December 
1951), pp. 1126-1136.

    The move to better equip Congress, however, was not without 
its critics. Another major study, in 1962, articulated concerns 
that began to be raised about the then-increasing size and role 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of the support network:

    If a little staffing is good, it does not necessarily 
follow that a whole lot more is better. Too much staffing for 
the right purposes contains the threat of 
overinstitutionalizing the legislators and of impeding the 
operations of the whole staff. And any--much less a great deal 
of--staff for the wrong purposes not only interferes with the 
functioning of the part of the staff engaged in desirable work 
but also has adverse repercussions on the entire system of 
government. Similar considerations apply to the types of staff 
personnel Congress should or should not employ.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Kenneth Kofmehl, Professional Staffs of Congress (West 
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1962), p. 5.

    What one paper from 1989 summarized as the ``perennial 
congressional staff problem--how to get members of Congress the 
information they need, when they need it, and in a form they 
can use'' remains salient today.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ James M. Verdier, ``Policy Analysis for Congress: Lengthening 
the Time Horizon,'' Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 8, 
no. 1 (1989), pp. 46-52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Staffing Congress: Regular Reform Efforts, Persistent Challenges, and 
                            Recurring Themes

    The first bills providing for regular dedicated committee 
staff, assigned to the Senate Finance Committee and the House 
Ways and Means Committee, date to the 1850s.\15\ Senators were 
first provided with assistance in 1884, and Members of the 
House were first provided with an allowance for clerks in 
1893.\16\ Determining the appropriate staffing and 
informational support for Congress has consumed considerable 
debate ever since.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ 11 Stat. 103, an act making appropriations for the 
legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of government for the 
year ending June 30, 1857. This act also provided funding for ``clerks 
to committees'' in the House and Senate, but separately specified a 
salary for clerks of the Finance and Ways and Means Committees as well 
as the House Committee on Claims.
    \16\ 23 Stat. 249 and 27 Stat. 757.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Calls for additional staff have generally cited the 
workload of Members, the ever-increasing scope of the issues 
confronting Congress and the Nation, and the need for adequate 
oversight of the executive. Over the years, concerns related to 
the adequacy of funds available for staffing, efforts to retain 
experienced staff, and salary ceilings have played out against 
concerns about limiting cost and objections that the use of 
staff might delegate too much power.
    Reform efforts have had a substantial impact on the 
operation of offices and agencies established to support 
Members, while also highlighting enduring, intractable 
challenges related to staffing and information needs. What is 
the appropriate staffing level? How much does this support 
cost? What should be the split between Member, committee, and 
leadership offices as well as the majority and minority or the 
Washington, DC, and district or State offices? What are the 
appropriate roles and duties of staff, and how can they help to 
ensure an effective legislature? How should the conditions of 
employment, included in House and Senate Rules and statutes, be 
structured to provide maximum flexibility while ensuring 
accountability of staff and employing officials?
    Many concerns currently cited by some contemporary 
observers--time pressures, votes held with little time for 
consideration or study by Members, an information imbalance 
with the executive branch, and overload of information--were 
the same as those cited by reformers in Congress nearly 50 
years ago.\17\ Similarly, reform efforts over the years often 
have cited, as one commission did in the 1970s, ``the 
increasing breadth, depth, and complexity of the tasks of'' 
Members at that time and the need for a ``modern management 
structure'' in response.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress, Organization of Congress, hearings pursuant to S. Con. Res. 
2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), pp. 2308-2322.
    \18\ U.S. Congress, Senate, Toward a Modern Senate: Final Report of 
the Commission on the Operation of the Senate, 94th Cong., 2d sess., S. 
Doc. 94-278 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. ix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most, if not all, of the major overarching congressional 
reform efforts of the past century have had an administrative 
and staffing component. This remains true even where the main 
focus of legislation was other issues, like the committee 
system (including jurisdiction and seniority), procedure, or 
budget and appropriations. Whether advocating for increased 
support, decreased cost, more accountability, or altering the 
balance between minority and majority interests, reformers have 
all shown an appreciation for the central role of support in 
shaping the congressional environment and creating 
opportunities for majorities, minorities, committees, and 
individual Members to effect change. The repeated efforts--
including illustrative examples described below--as well as 
their mixed record of legislative success, demonstrate the 
near-constant interest in internal practices as well as 
challenges to institutional change and recurring themes.
    The conclusion of World War II provided an opportunity for 
Congress to examine and streamline its internal operations. H. 
Con. Res. 18 established the Joint Committee on the 
Organization of Congress (JCOC) in February 1945, with a 
mandate to ``make a full and complete study of the organization 
and operation of the Congress of the United States and . . . 
recommend improvements in such . . . .'' The JCOC then held 
numerous hearings, during which testimony was received about 
manpower and resource shortages affecting Congress during the 
war. The challenges were both acute and mundane. The Architect 
of the Capitol, for example, provided a full list of projects 
for completion as soon as war conditions would permit, 
including work to the roof of the House and Senate wings of the 
Capitol,\19\ while the House Disbursing Officer testified, 
``When this war is over we . . . will have to buy a large 
number of new typewriters.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress, Organization of Congress, hearings pursuant to H. Con. Res. 
18, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1945), p. 56.
    \20\ Ibid., p. 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The JCOC also discussed the use of patronage to fill 
administrative positions, including its effect on efficiency, 
security, and operations. Deschler's Precedents of the U.S. 
House of Representatives notes that as early as 1911 an 
informal Patronage Committee, nominated by the Committee on 
Committees and elected by the majority caucus, divided 
patronage positions among the majority Members.\21\ Similarly, 
according to Senate oral histories, ``patronage dictated all 
Senate staff appointments in the years before the Second World 
War.'' \22\ Patronage employees could be removed from their 
positions by the respective patronage committees for cause, or 
by the appointing Member at will. Although the patronage system 
persisted within many congressional support offices for decades 
thereafter,\23\ the JCOC hearings presented some of the first 
inquiries into the desirability of moving toward a more 
professional staff support system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Lewis Deschler, Deschler's Precedents of the U.S. House of 
Representatives (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), vol. 1, pp. 199 200.
    \22\ ``Darrell St. Claire: Assistant Secretary of the Senate,'' 
Oral History Interviews, December 1976 to April 1978, Senate Historical 
Office, Washington, DC, at http://www.senate.gov/artand history/
history/resources/pdf/StClaire_Preface.pdf.
    \23\ Secretary of the Senate, Senate History, at http://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ common/briefing/
secretary_senate.htm; and Francis R. Valeo, Oral History Interviews, 
October 17, 1985, Senate Historical Office, Washington, DC, at http://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ history/resources/pdf/
OralHistory_ValeoFrancisR.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The JCOC also examined support for individual Members. 
Remarks by the House Disbursing Officer during a 1945 hearing 
demonstrate the central role Members have always had in guiding 
staffing, retaining their discretion as independently elected 
representatives of their constituents. He stated:

    [Y]ou cannot lose track of the fact that a Member of 
Congress or Senator has the power to make personal selection of 
his own staff and he is the judge of the type of people he can 
or cannot have, and you cannot very well tie his hands.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress, Organization of Congress, hearings pursuant to H. Con. Res. 
18, 79th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1945), p. 18.

    Efforts to examine staffing then, as has been necessary in 
the decades since, had to consider how to properly balance the 
independence of Members and chairs to choose their own staff 
and determine their roles and duties while establishing basic 
ground rules.
    The report also included a recommendation that each 
Representative and Senator be

authorized to employ a high-caliber administrative assistant at 
an annual salary of $8,000 to assume nonlegislative duties now 
interfering with the proper study and consideration of national 
legislation.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ U.S. Congress, House, Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress, Organization of Congress, 79th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 1675 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1946), p. 15.

    The appropriate salary level for congressional aides, and 
competition with the executive branch and private sector for 
experienced staff, was discussed by Senators and 
Representatives during the JCOC hearings--a concern which 
continues to persist today.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ The relative compensation of executive and legislative branch 
staff has been discussed, for example, during the FY2005 Senate hearing 
(U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 
Legislative Branch, Legislative Branch Appropriations for FY2005, 
hearings, 108th Cong., 2d sess. [Washington, DC: GPO, 2004], pp. 46, 
102-103); the FY2010 House hearing (U.S. Congress, House Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Legislative 
Branch Appropriations for 2010, hearings, part 2, 111th Cong., 1st 
sess. [Washington, DC: GPO, 2009], pp. 462-463, 473); and the FY2015 
House hearing (U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, 
Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, Legislative Branch 
Appropriations for 2015, hearings, part 2, 113th Cong., 2d sess. 
[Washington, DC: GPO, 2008], p. 278); and has prompted various staff 
compensation studies conducted by both Chambers. These periodic 
compensation studies date to at least the early 1980s in both the House 
and Senate, with the most recent Senate study in 2006 and House study 
in 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the JCOC eventually opted not to adjust the 
``clerk hire allowance,'' it did lay the groundwork for 
expansion.\27\ Legislative Reference Service (LRS) Senior 
Specialist and JCOC staff director George Galloway later stated 
that ``more and better staff aids for members and committees of 
Congress were a major objective of the Act, and much progress 
in the staffing of Congress has been achieved.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ P.L. 79-663, 60 Stat. 911, ch. 870 (August 8, 1946); P.L. 81-
430, 63 Stat. 974, ch. 783 (October 28, 1949); and P.L. 81-121, sec. 4, 
63 Stat. 265, ch. 238 (June 23, 1949). See also U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on House Administration, A History of the Committee on House 
Administration, 1947-2012, committee print, 112th Cong., 2d sess., May 
23, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), p. 185.
    \28\ George B. Galloway, ``The Operation of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946,'' American Political Science Review, vol. 
45 (March 1951), p. 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The JCOC report did directly address committee staffs, 
however. It stated that the proposed reorganization bill would:

    [E]xpand the present meager staff facilities of our 
standing committees, which are the real workshops of Congress . 
. . authorize the standing committees of both Houses to 
exercise the continuous surveillance of the execution of the 
laws by the administrative agencies within their jurisdiction . 
. . and strengthen the legislative reference and legislative 
counsel services which are our own unbiased research and legal 
arms.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, committee print, 79th 
Cong., 2d sess., July 22, 1946 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1946), p. 4.

    While not addressing all questions raised during the JCOC 
hearings, the resulting Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
devoted part of Title II to ``statutory provisions relating to 
congressional personnel.'' It guaranteed staff for standing 
committees, provided statutory authority for the Legislative 
Reference Service (predecessor of the Congressional Research 
Service), and increased the authorization for the Legislative 
Counsel.\30\ It also established the baseline for future reform 
efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ P.L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 834, August 2, 1946.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the 1950s and 1960s, numerous bills were introduced to 
revise the 1946 act or otherwise alter congressional 
support.\31\ A reestablished JCOC--which was authorized to, 
among other things, examine the ``employment and remuneration 
of officers and employees of the respective Houses and officers 
and employees of the committees and members of Congress''--
issued multiple reports in 1965 and 1966.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ See, for example: H.R. 2066 (87th Cong.); and S. Con. Res. 1 
and S. 177 (88th Cong.).
    \32\ S. Con. Res. 2, 89th Cong.; U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on 
the Organization of Congress, Organization of Congress, interim report 
pursuant to S. Con. Res. 2, 89th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 89-426 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1965); and U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the 
Organization of Congress, Organization of Congress, Final Report, 
report to accompany S. Con. Res. 2, S. Rept. 89-1414, 89th Cong., 2d 
sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The extensive hearings and reports examined the 
availability of independent information for congressional 
consumption as well as Congress' ability to manage and process 
it. One report, which also addressed various procedural, 
ethics-related, and lobby issues, included recommendations for 
improving office staff and allowances, strengthening the 
Legislative Reference Service, improving ``Capitol housekeeping 
functions,'' and scheduling.
    With respect to the allocation of resources within 
committees, it stated:

    It is fundamental to our legislative system that the 
opposition have adequate resources to prepare informed dissent 
or alternative courses of action. All sides of an issue need to 
be forcefully presented.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress, Organization of Congress, Final Report, report to accompany 
S. Con. Res. 2, S. Rept. 89-1414, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1965), p. 22.

    The report also addressed support for individual Members, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
stating:

    The primary function of the legislator is to legislate. He 
cannot be effective unless he carefully analyzes issues being 
considered in committee and gives adequate consideration to 
floor matters prior to vote. This requires qualified staff 
assistance to condense and distill the voluminous quantity of 
information available to him.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Ibid., p. 37.

    Concerns over the roles and duties of Members and, by 
inference, their staff were also addressed by the JCOC. With 
some Members noting a perceived tension between the legislative 
and constituency service roles of a Member office and questions 
regarding the proportion of time Members and their staff can 
spend on each, the JCOC examined proposals for delegating 
casework to an administrative counsel or ombudsman. It 
concluded, however, ``We believe that casework is a proper 
function of an individual Member of Congress and should not be 
delegated to an administrative body.'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Ibid., p. 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although no legislation was enacted that year, pressure for 
congressional reform only grew,\36\ and numerous bills were 
introduced.\37\ Other legislation considered during that time 
period included the House Employees Position Classification Act 
of 1964, which further regularized and standardized the support 
offices' staffing structure. A governmentwide antinepotism law 
enacted in 1967, partially in response to a series of articles 
chastising some Members for their employment practices, further 
spurred the institutionalization and professionalization of 
Congress.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ See, for example, Julian E. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill: The 
Struggle to Reform Congress and its Consequences, 1948-2000 (Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Christopher J. 
Deering and Steven S. Smith, Committees in Congress, 3d ed. 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997).
    \37\ See, for example: H.R. 2594, H.R. 2595, H.R. 17138, H.R. 
17873, and S. 355 (89th Cong.); and H.R. 10748, H.R. 12570, and H.R. 
15687 (90th Cong.).
    \38\ P.L. 88-652, 78 Stat. 1079 (October 13, 1964), 2 U.S.C.  291; 
and the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, P.L. 90-206, 81 
Stat. 640 (December 16, 1967), 5 U.S.C.  3110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The interest both among Members and in the press on 
internal operations subsequently culminated in the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970. As with the 1946 act, the 1970 act 
addressed numerous support issues. Title III, ``Sources of 
Information,'' addressed ensuring that Congress had the 
appropriate tools for a well-functioning legislature. The House 
report stated:

    Among the multitude of responsibilities Congress explicitly 
or implicitly assigns to its committees, none is more vital 
than that of keeping watch over the administration of the laws. 
That responsibility encompasses not only the duty of 
determining whether existing programs are being administered in 
accordance with congressional intent but also of exploring the 
advisability of modifying or even of abolishing such 
programs.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970, report to accompany H.R. 17654, 91st Cong., 
2d sess., H. Rept. 91-1215 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1970), p. 17.

    The report concluded, ``. . . while the quality of the 
staffs is high, their numbers are insufficient to meet the 
increasing workload of the committees they serve.'' \40\ It 
proposed an increase to the number of permanent professional 
and clerical staff for standing committees as well as for 
minority staffs and also provided for their training. It also 
recommended reconstituting the Legislative Reference Service as 
the Congressional Research Service, stipulating that House 
officers had authority over the employees in their offices and 
changing payroll practices to require a more transparent gross 
annual salary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Ibid., p. 15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Concern about congressional support and accompanying reform 
efforts did not subside, however, with multiple additional 
examinations in the 1970s of the size and distribution of staff 
and recognition of this link to the distribution of influence. 
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 established a new support 
agency--the Congressional Budget Office--as well as new Budget 
Committees in the House and Senate to provide Congress with its 
own source of budgetary expertise. In the House, the Democratic 
Caucus' Subcommittee Bill of Rights of 1973 and proposals from 
examinations of the committee system, led by Representatives 
Richard Bolling of Missouri and Julia Butler Hansen of 
Washington, each had a resource component. The Subcommittee 
Bill of Rights and Representative Hansen's proposals, included 
as changes to the Democratic Caucus rules, addressed staffing 
for subcommittee chairs. H. Res. 1248, an alternate to 
proposals put forth by Representative Bolling, also looked at 
committee staffing and minority assistance.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Christopher J. Deering and Steven S. Smith, Committees in 
Congress, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997), chap. 2 (``Evolution 
and Change in Committees'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The report issued by Representative Bolling's Select 
Committee on Committees on March 21, 1974, stated that ``no 
longer simply an asset, committee staffs have become 
essential,'' and proposed further increases in the number of 
professional and clerical staff, as well as ensuring staffing 
and resources to the minority.\42\ Stating ``the management of 
information, the utilization of available space, and the 
further development of administrative services are all critical 
to the operations of the House of Representatives,'' \43\ it 
also proposed a House Commission on Information and a House 
Commission on Administrative Services and Facilities. The 
subsequently created commission, the House Commission on 
Information and Facilities, issued a more-than-200-page report 
in December 1976.\44\ It concluded that ``the chief information 
need in the House . . . is not more information but better 
information, better in terms of organization, coordination, 
accessibility, delivery, and usability.'' \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Committees, Committee 
Reform Amendments of 1974, report to accompany H. Res. 988, 93d Cong., 
2d sess., H. Rept. 93-916 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974).
    \43\ Ibid., p. 6.
    \44\ U.S. Congress, House Commission on Information and Facilities, 
Final Report of the House Commission on Information and Facilities, 
95th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 95-22 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976).
    \45\ Ibid., p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Subsequently, the House Commission on Administrative Review 
(also known as the Obey Commission) \46\ included in its final 
report an approximately 500-page section on administrative 
reorganization. This report, issued in 1977, touched upon all 
aspects of administration, financial management, support 
agencies, computers and printing, procurement, and facilities 
management. In introducing specific recommendations, the report 
stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ This commission was established by H. Res. 1368 (94th Cong.), 
agreed to July 1, 1976, and known by the name of its chair, 
Representative David Obey.

    [T]he effectiveness and efficiency with which [the House's] 
various support units operate has a critical impact on the 
ability of Members and committees to do their jobs and, 
consequently, on the ability of the House to carry out its 
legislative and representative responsibilities under the 
Constitution.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ U.S. Congress, Commission on Administrative Review, Final 
Report of the Commission on Administrative Review, 95th Cong., 1st 
sess., H. Doc. 95-272 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), p. 96.

    Shortly after, a new House Select Committee on Committees 
was established by H. Res. 118, agreed to on March 20, 1979. 
The minority views section of its 1980 report stated that ``the 
means by which an institution carries on its work significantly 
influences, oh, ok deg. the quality of its product.'' 
\48\ Although it focused largely on jurisdictional and 
procedural issues, the select committee also addressed numerous 
staffing concerns, including an examination of committee 
staffing, funding, and administration. It looked specifically 
at the increase in committee staff since 1946, proposals for a 
ceiling on the number of staff, and allocations for the 
minority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ U.S Congress, Select Committee on Committees, Final Report of 
the Select Committee on Committees, 96th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 96-
866 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980), p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate considered similar reforms in a number of 
studies and proposals in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It 
authorized Senators to hire staff for the purpose of assisting 
with committee work, for example, although cost and space 
concerns scaled back some of the more ambitious proposals.\49\ 
The Commission on the Operation of the Senate (also known as 
the Culver Commission) was authorized on July 29, 1975, with a 
mandate to examine the entirety of the internal support 
structure.\50\ The commission's final report, entitled ``Toward 
a Modern Senate,'' examined ``the increasing breadth, depth, 
and complexity of the tasks of Senators today.'' \51\ It then 
addressed ``basic services . . . the availability and use of 
space . . . how to use modern technology more effectively to 
provide information to Members . . . and how to improve the 
services provided by congressional support agencies.'' \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 
Additional Senate Committee Employees, report to accompany S. Res. 60, 
94th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 94-185 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975); and 
FY1978 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, P.L. 95-94, 91 Stat. 662 
(August 5, 1977), 2 U.S.C.  4332.
    \50\ S. Res. 227 (94th Cong.); the commission was known by the name 
of the Senator who sponsored the resolution establishing it, Senator 
John Culver.
    \51\ U.S. Congress, Senate, Toward a Modern Senate: Final Report of 
the Commission on the Operation of the Senate, 94th Cong., 2d sess., S. 
Doc. 94-278 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), p. ix.
    \52\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The recommendations of the parallel Temporary Select 
Committee to Study the Senate Committee System (also known as 
the Stevenson Committee), which was authorized on March 31, 
1976, also commented on committee funding and staffing.\53\ The 
Senate Rules and Administration Committee, which was examining 
major changes to the Senate's rules, examined some of these 
proposed reforms, as well as the division of staff between the 
majority and minority, during hearings on a major rules change 
package. Some of these recommendations, including those 
pertaining to the relative size of majority and minority staff, 
were included in S. Res. 4, considered for the 95th Congress 
and agreed to on February 4, 1977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ S. Res. 109 (94th Cong.); U.S. Congress, Senate Temporary 
Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee System, Operation of the 
Senate Committee System: Staffing, Scheduling, Communications, 
Procedures, and Special Functions, 95th Cong., 1st sess., January 1, 
1977 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977); the committee was known by the name 
of its chair, Senator Adlai Stevenson III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A few years later, the Study Group on Senate Practices and 
Procedures (the Pearson-Ribicoff Group) was established 
pursuant to S. Res. 392, agreed to May 11, 1982. As with some 
of the previous studies, it focused mainly on procedure, but 
still devoted a section to reforming staffing. It proposed 
prohibiting staffing for subcommittees, hoping that this would 
result in a reduction of workload by forcing most work to go 
through full committees.\54\ A hearing on the study group's 
recommendations was held on May 9, 1983, by the Committee on 
Rules and Administration, but no further action was taken at 
that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 
Report of the Study Group on Senate Practices and Procedures to the 
Committee on Rules and Administration, committee print, prepared by 
Study Group on Senate Practices and Procedures, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 
S. Prt. 98-242 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), p. 17; the study group was 
known by the names of its bipartisan leaders, Senators Abraham Ribicoff 
and James Pearson.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By the early 1990s, Congress again embarked on a joint 
effort to study congressional reform. The increasing 
technological complexity of House and Senate operations, as 
well as some scandals in the 1990s relating to management 
problems at the House Bank and the House Post Office that 
received widespread media attention, placed enhanced scrutiny 
on internal processes, bringing about further reforms to 
congressional administration.
    The JCOC, which was reestablished with H. Con. Res. 192 
(102d Congress), included an examination of staffing and 
administration policies. As the final report of the JCOC 
stated:

    [A]lthough the Joint Committee did not hold hearings 
specifically dedicated to the issue of congressional staff, 
witness after witness addressed the subject in conjunction with 
other reform concerns. Indeed, the hearing record is replete 
with references to congressional staff in the areas of reducing 
staff, allocating staff between majority and minority parties, 
and use of associate staff among other things.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ U.S. Congress, Organization of the Congress, Final Report of 
the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, 103d Cong., 1st 
sess., H. Rept. 103-413, vol. II, and S. Rept. 103-215, vol. II 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1993), p. 72.

    The JCOC called for staffing reductions in the legislative 
branch equal to those proposed for the executive branch, as 
well as periodic reauthorizations for congressional support 
agencies. S. 1824 and H.R. 3801, both entitled the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1994, were introduced in the Senate and 
House, respectively, and hearings were held in both Chambers.
    The Senate reported its bill (S. Rept. 103-297), and the 
House held a markup of its bill, but neither piece of 
legislation became law. The JCOC bills came on the heels of 
additional measures, including H. Res. 419 (103d Congress), the 
Republican Reform Task Force Proposal, and a number of bills 
applying workplace laws to Congress introduced in the 102d and 
103d Congresses.\56\ Subsequently, the proposal for staff 
reductions was incorporated into the FY1994 Legislative Branch 
Appropriations Act, which mandated a 4 percent decrease in 
full-time equivalent employees.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ In the 103d Congress, see, for example, H.R. 107, H.R. 137, 
H.R. 246, H.R. 349, H.R. 2729, H.R. 4822, H.R. 4892, S. 1439, and S. 
2071. In the 102d Congress, see, for example, H.R. 3734 and H.R. 4894.
    \57\ P.L. 103-69, sec. 307, 107 Stat. 710 (August 11, 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The mid-1990s saw continued efforts to ensure 
accountability of congressional support services. The September 
27, 1994, ``Contract with America'' promised, for example, the 
reduction of committee staff by one-third. The House rules 
subsequently adopted for the 104th Congress (1995-1996) 
mandated the committee staff reduction; changed the 
administration of the House in creating a new elected officer, 
the House Chief Administrative Officer (CAO); abolished the 
positions of Doorkeeper and Director of Non-Legislative and 
Financial Services; reorganized functions assigned to existing 
House officers; and required an audit by the House Inspector 
General.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ H. Res. 6, agreed to January 5, 1995. See also U.S. Congress, 
Committee on House Oversight, Report on the Activities of the Committee 
on House Oversight of the House of Representatives during the One 
Hundred Fourth Congress, 104th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 104-885 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House of Representatives Administrative Reform 
Technical Corrections Act of 1995 further altered internal 
House operations. Broader changes in the legislative branch, 
including the abolishment of one support agency--the Office of 
Technology Assessment--as well as the enactment of the 
Congressional Accountability Act further altered legislative 
branch employment and support generally.
    By the end of the next decade, another effort to curb 
government spending led to calls for Congress to lead by 
example and cut its own staffing and budget. Many accounts were 
reduced, and further reductions were implemented with the March 
1, 2013, sequestration.

     By the Numbers: Attempts to Assess the Staffing Landscape and 
                               Challenges

    Despite the near-constant attention, assessing change over 
time of the congressional support apparatus is challenging for 
many reasons. Official, consistent staffing data are generally 
not available. As an independent branch of government, the 
legislative branch often does not have the same reporting 
requirements as the executive branch.\59\ Various sources may 
be consulted, although they sometimes offer conflicting 
historical data. In addition, changes in office and account 
structure may complicate comparisons over time.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ No single official source of staff levels over time exists, 
either overall or by office type. For example, the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) maintains a quarterly ``Employment & Trends, Table 9--
Federal Civilian Employment and Payroll (in thousands of dollars) by 
Branch, Selected Agency, and Area'' publication as well as tables on 
``Executive Branch Civilian Employment Since 1940'' and ``Total 
Government Employment Since 1962'' (although the first contains an 
asterisk indicating ``*Preliminary or Previous Quarter's Employment or 
Payroll Totals (or Portions Thereof) Were Used for Current Quarter'' 
and the latter combines legislative and judicial branch data).
    For early estimates of Member and committee staff, see Harrison W. 
Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond, Congressional Staffs: The Invisible 
Force in American Lawmaking (New York: Free Press, 1977), table 3, p. 
171; and George B. Galloway, ``The Operation of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946,'' American Political Science Review, vol. 
45 (March 1951), p. 54. For more recent estimates using payroll or 
telephone entries, see Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, Michael J. 
Malbin, et al., Vital Statistics on Congress, A Joint Effort from The 
Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, 
Washington, DC, July 2013, chapter 5, at http://www.brookings.edu/
research/reports/2013/07/vital-statistics-congress-mann-ornstein; and 
CRS Report R41366, House of Representatives and Senate Staff Levels in 
Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2010, by R. Eric 
Petersen, Parker H. Reynolds, and Amber Hope Wilhelm.
    \60\ In the House, for example, the account structure for funding 
Member office staff changed with the establishment of the Members' 
representational allowance (CRS Report R40962, Members' 
Representational Allowance: History and Usage, by Ida A. Brudnick); 
committee staff changed with the elimination in the 104th Congress of 
the distinction between statutory and investigative staff; and some 
staff have been transferred from the payroll of the Clerk of the House 
to a leadership office (P.L. 104-53, 109 Stat. 519 [November 19, 1995]; 
and P.L. 107-68, 115 Stat. 572 [November 12, 2001], 2 U.S.C.  5123 
note).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, the unit of comparison--for example, whether 
one looks at just Member, committee, and leadership offices, 
the House and Senate Chambers, or the entirety of the 
legislative branch--must be chosen, with benefits and drawbacks 
of each approach. A narrow focus on the level of support 
provided one type of office may obscure larger changes to the 
institution. On the other hand, a broad examination may not 
take into account the peculiarities of the congressional 
environment or technological or internal changes. Additionally, 
in an environment where offices enjoy a great degree of freedom 
in determining their needs, allocating their resources, and 
setting the terms and conditions of employment, funding and 
staffing data may present different pictures. Furthermore, in 
the congressional environment, duties and influence may be more 
nuanced than any quantitative picture may present. Available 
information, however, does present a mixed picture on the 
changes in congressional resources over time.
    The statutory maximum full-time staffers authorized for 
individual Members of the House, which grew steadily between 
1893 and the 1970s to reach 18 persons, has not been changed 
since.\61\ This unchanged staff ceiling is notable given the 
vast changes in the size of the average congressional district 
during this period. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, over 
the past century, the ``average size of a congressional 
district based on the 2010 Census apportionment population will 
be 710,767, more than triple the average district size of 
210,328 based on the 1910 Census apportionment.'' \62\ The 
average congressional district population size was 469,088 in 
1970, as the House was setting the limit on Members' personal 
staff. From the 1970 census through the 2010 census, the 
average congressional district population increased by 52 
percent.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ For a more extensive discussion, see U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on House Administration, A History of the Committee on House 
Administration, 1947-2012, committee print, 112th Cong., 2d sess., May 
23, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013).
    \62\ U.S. Census Bureau, ``Congressional Apportionment,'' 2010 
Census Briefs, issued November 2011, at http://www.census.gov/prod/
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-08.pdf.
    \63\ U.S. Census Bureau, ``Apportionment Data,'' at http://
www.census.gov/2010census/data/ apportionment-data.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the Senate provides an authorized dollar amount but 
not a maximum authorized staff level, according to figures 
included in the annual Senate Appropriations Committee reports, 
the number of staff in individual Senators' offices in 2014 is 
near the 1985 level.\64\ Similarly sized staffs must respond to 
far more constituents in both Chambers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Legislative 
Branch Appropriations, 2015, report to accompany H.R. 4487, 113th 
Cong., 2d sess., June 19, 2014, S. Rept. 113-196 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2014), p. 22; and ``U.S. Senate Senator's staff as of September 30, 
1985-94 and March 31, 1995,'' table in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee 
on Appropriations, Legislative Branch Appropriations, 1996, report to 
accompany H.R. 1854, 104th Cong., 1st sess., July 18, 1996, S. Rept. 
104-114 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), pp. 25-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Various estimates also indicate a smaller House and Senate 
staff than existed three decades ago. One study, for example, 
found that House committee staffs decreased nearly 28 percent 
from 1977 to 2009, while Senate committee staffs increased 
(nearly 15 percent), albeit at a much slower pace than other 
categories of Senate offices. Between 1977 and 2009, according 
to this study, however, the number of House staff grew 
approximately 11 percent. The number of Senate staff grew 
approximately 80 percent, although it still had nearly 40 
percent fewer staff than the House. This trend is also evident 
in the executive branch, which, according to OPM data, has 
nearly 23 percent fewer staff than it did in 1977.
    The appropriation for the House Members' representational 
allowance (MRA) in constant dollars varied little from FY1996 
to FY2001, before increasing for about a decade. It then fell 
each year in constant dollars from FY2011 through FY2013, with 
the FY2013 level approximately equivalent to the FY1996 level 
in purchasing power.\65\ The Senators' Official Personnel and 
Office Expense Account (SOPOEA) was similarly reduced each year 
from FY2010 through FY2013, with the FY2013 level approximately 
equivalent to the FY2006 level.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ See ``Figure 1. Fiscal Year Appropriations for the Members' 
Representational Allowance'' in CRS Report R40962, Members' 
Representational Allowance: History and Usage, by Ida A. Brudnick.
    \66\ See also language in P.L. 112-10, enacted on April 11, 2011, 
stating that ``each Senator's official personnel and office expense 
allowance (including the allowance for administrative and clerical 
assistance, the salaries allowance for legislative assistance to 
Senators, as authorized by the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 
1978 (P.L. 95-94), and the office expense allowance for each Senator's 
office for each State) in effect immediately before the date of 
enactment of this section shall be reduced by 5 percent.'' Similarly, 
each Member's MRA for 2012, for example, was ``88.92% of the amount 
authorized in 2010 . . . in accordance with a 5% reduction to the 2010 
authorization mandated in House Resolution 22, agreed to on January 6, 
2011, and a 6.4% reduction to the 2011 authorization as reflected in 
H.R. 2055, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74).'' 
Individual MRAs for 2013 were further reduced by 8.2 percent. (U.S. 
Congress, House, Statement of Disbursements of the House, as compiled 
by the Chief Administrative Officer, from January 1, 2012, to March 31, 
2012, part 3 of 3, 112th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. 112-106 (Washington, 
DC: GPO, 2012), p. 3225.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Legislative branch appropriations overall decreased each 
year from FY2010 through FY2013, and related reductions were 
seen in the funding for many Member, committee, leadership, 
officer, and support agency accounts in the 112th and 113th 
Congresses (2011-2014).\67\ Furthermore, in constant dollars, 
the FY2014 appropriation was smaller than the appropriation for 
FY2004.\68\ Legislative branch resources can also be placed in 
context of the larger Federal budget, where, since at least 
1976, it has composed approximately 0.4 percent of total 
discretionary budget authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ H. Res. 22 (112th Cong.); and P.L. 112-74, P.L. 112-74, P.L. 
113-6, and P.L. 113-76.
    \68\ Table 3. Legislative Branch Appropriations, FY2004-FY2014 
(budget authority in billions of dollars), in CRS Report R43557, 
Legislative Branch: FY2015 Appropriations, by R. Eric Petersen and Ida 
A. Brudnick.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    A historical examination of the efforts to reform the 
congressional staff network demonstrates a continuity in the 
concerns related to the operation and internal functioning of 
Congress--time pressures; obtaining, organizing, and processing 
information; division of resources; and cost, oversight, and 
accountability--as well as to the proposed solutions. Whether 
as part of more comprehensive reviews of congressional support 
or in more targeted studies of individual offices or issues of 
concern, debates related to congressional reform have uniformly 
contained a discussion of staff and information needs. Many of 
the concerns identified, and the solutions proposed, however, 
have changed little since the early days of congressional 
staffing.
    Although the examples of proposed reforms mentioned in this 
report met with varying legislative success, they demonstrate 
the continued congressional interest and struggles in Congress 
in examining its own practices, determining the appropriate 
level and type of support, and efficiently managing taxpayer 
resources.
    Overall, Congress has attempted to ensure the independence 
of Members and chairs to choose their own staff and determine 
their roles and duties while establishing basic ground rules 
and remaining aware of cost and accountability considerations 
throughout the legislative branch. Congress has also worked to 
determine how to allocate limited resources among Members, 
committees, leaders, and support offices. As Congress looks 
ahead to the next century, the details of staffing concerns may 
vary as new challenges and technologies arise, but many of 
these fundamental questions will remain.






            The Unchanging Nature of Congressional Elections

                            Kevin J. Coleman

                          Analyst in Elections

                                  and

                             R. Sam Garrett

               Specialist in American National Government

                              ----------                              


        Major elements of congressional elections remain 
        remarkably consistent despite profound changes to the 
        social and political environment in the past century. 
        The country's population is vastly different as the 
        result of immigration and natural growth; the role of 
        the political parties in elections is diminished--but 
        still vital--as the candidates themselves have taken 
        over their campaigns; and the campaign finance system 
        has been significantly transformed, with vast amounts 
        spent in each election cycle. And yet, congressional 
        campaigns are relatively unchanged in important ways. 
        The goal of campaigning continues to be an effort to 
        persuade voters one by one. Even election outcomes are 
        relatively consistent: the two parties continue to 
        dominate elections; incumbents are routinely reelected; 
        and voter participation is fairly stable. After a 
        century of extraordinary change, congressional 
        campaigns are different than in the past in certain 
        respects, while they also retain key, unchanged 
        characteristics that have simply been adapted to a 
        modern era.

                              Introduction

    The United States has experienced vast changes in the past 
century, so it would seem a foregone conclusion that the means 
of getting elected to Congress would have undergone vast 
changes as well. In some respects this is true. The average 
population of a congressional district was 280,675 in 1930, 
while it is more than 2\1/2\ times that number today at 
710,767.\1\ The two political parties once vetted the 
candidates and were deeply involved in congressional campaigns, 
particularly campaign messaging. Candidates today run 
independently of the parties. Changes in technology and 
especially fundraising have transformed the political 
landscape. Television and the Internet became widely available 
in the 1940s and 1990s, respectively, and were soon adapted to 
political use, greatly increasing a candidate's ability to 
connect with voters. In the closing months of a single 2014 
Senate race, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee 
(DSCC) announced plans to spend $9.1 million in broadcast ads. 
That amount was only slightly less than the estimated $9.8 
million that campaigns spent nationwide on broadcast 
advertising in 1956.\2\ Changes in election laws have also 
expanded the electorate to include women, younger voters, 
African Americans, and language minorities, and have made 
registration and voting increasingly easy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The House size was set at 435 in 1911; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Apportionment Data, http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/
apportionment-data-text.php.
    \2\ Alexis Levinson, ``Senate Democrats Launch $9.1 Million Ad Buy 
in North Carolina,'' Roll Call, August 13, 2014, at http://
atr.rollcall.com/senate-democrats-launch-9-1-million-ad-buy-in-north-
carolina/. As noted later in this report, the 1956 estimate should be 
treated with caution, although it is useful for historical comparison.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other changes that have affected congressional elections 
include the growth of the national population and its increased 
heterogeneity as the result of immigration and a decline in 
white birth rates. Internal shifts have also realigned 
population groups within the country, and the regional bases of 
the political parties have changed as well. Finally, election 
outcomes are different in some respects, particularly regarding 
turnover in House seats and a decline in the number of 
competitive House races.
    And yet, congressional campaigns are relatively unchanged 
in important ways. The simplest rule of getting elected remains 
the same as ever: turn out more voters than one's opponent, 
preferably by making personal contact with as many of them as 
possible. This tenet was reflected in a recent observation by a 
member of the House leadership regarding the current cycle: 
``Just run your race, get out your vote, go door to door, 
everybody you meet will vote for you, by and large.'' \3\ To 
use an analogy, if one could watch a professional baseball game 
from 1914, it might appear to be quite different from today's 
game--from the crowd and venue to the smaller size of the 
players, their equipment and uniforms, and so on--yet the game 
itself would be instantly recognizable.\4\ The core elements 
are enduring. Congressional elections are a national pastime 
perhaps slightly less beloved, but with similar constancy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Ed O'Keefe, ``With `Action Plan,' Democrats hope to grab 
voters' attention,'' The Washington Post, July 16, 2014, p. A6.
    \4\ Fenway Park in Boston opened in 1912 with a seating capacity of 
11,000; Wrigley Field opened in Chicago in 1914 as Weeghman Park with a 
seating capacity of 14,000; today's ballparks vary in size from 31,042 
(Tropicana Field) to 56,000 (Dodger Stadium). With respect to player 
size, SB Nation, an online sports network, found that the average 
height and weight of a major league player has increased about 7 
percent and 14 percent, respectively, since the 1870s; at http://
www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2011/4/19/2114631/the-changing-size-of-mlb-
players-1870-2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although new campaign techniques and technologies developed 
at a rapid pace beginning in the mid-20th century, they have 
been adopted slowly, at times, and have tended to supplement, 
rather than replace, traditional grassroots organizing.\5\ An 
early assessment of the use of the Internet as a campaign tool 
noted that, while it would be useful in many aspects of 
campaigns, ``[t]he Internet will not produce the mobilization 
of voters long predicted.'' \6\ Even election outcomes have 
been relatively consistent in certain respects. The two parties 
continue to completely dominate elections, for example. There 
are currently two Members of Congress who are Independents. The 
last time there were more than two Members who were not major 
party members was 1950, when there were three, but in most 
years there were none.\7\ Recent incumbent reelection rates are 
consistently in the 80s and 90s in percentage terms (although 
Senate rates are more irregular), similar to what they were in 
the 1960s. Using a different measure, high-turnover elections 
were more common in the early decades of the 20th century than 
they have been since the 1950s. For example, Republicans gained 
control of the House for the first time since 1952 when they 
picked up 54 seats in the 1994 election. The 2010 election was 
similarly a high-turnover election when Republicans picked up 
64 seats. The next highest number of seats gained since 1980 
was 34 (for Republicans, which resulted in a 243-192 partisan 
lineup in favor of the Democrats). By way of comparison, 
between 1900 and 1950, there were 11 elections in which 1 party 
or the other gained at least 34 seats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ For example, the American Institute of Public Opinion, 
eventually known as the Gallup Organization, was founded in 1935, but 
the widespread use of polls in campaigns to shape messaging and tactics 
did not occur until the late 1960s and early 1970s. See http://
www.gallup.com/corporate/21364/George-Gallup-19011984.aspx; and Sasha 
Issenberg, The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of Winning Campaigns 
(New York: Broadway Books, 2012), p. 108.
    \6\ Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis, Campaigning Online: The 
Internet in U.S. Elections (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
pp. 166-167.
    \7\ Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on 
American Politics, 2013-2014 (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013), pp. 
30-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This report discusses some profound changes to the 
campaigns and elections environment, while it also discusses 
some of the ways that congressional campaigns have not changed, 
but have simply been adapted to a modern era. The following 
pages highlight four major themes: (1) the environment in which 
congressional campaigns are waged; (2) campaign finance; (3) 
electoral outcomes; and (4) voters. The report is not intended 
to be exhaustive. Rather, the discussion seeks to illustrate 
the evolution of congressional campaigns. In doing so, the 
report provides congressional readers with a resource for 
understanding how the contests that decide the membership of 
the House and Senate have evolved over the past century to 
include thousands of candidates, millions of voters, and 
billions of dollars.

                        The Campaign Environment

                           Population Changes

    Based on population, the America that existed in the late 
19th century was an entirely different country from the one 
that entered the Great Depression in 1929, and not simply 
because there were more people. A massive surge in immigration 
during that period transformed the Nation in a way that would 
be difficult to overstate. About 25 million Europeans emigrated 
to the United States between 1880 and 1924,\8\ most of whom 
arrived from countries other than the ``old immigrant'' nations 
of Great Britain, Germany, and Ireland. Over 1 million 
immigrants arrived in 1906 and again in 1907, for example, 
mostly from the central and southern European countries of 
Austria, Hungary, Russia, and Italy (over 700,000 in 1906 and 
over 800,000 in 1907). Fewer than 300,000 had departed for the 
United States in that 2-year period from Great Britain, 
Germany, and Ireland. That trend continued until the 
Immigration Restriction Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 
1924 capped the number of immigrants from a country at 3 
percent and 2 percent, respectively, of the number of persons 
from that country who were living in the United States in 1890.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 
1970, Bicentennial Edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 1975), pp. 105-106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The high water mark for the foreign-born population of the 
United States occurred in 1930, according to the Census Bureau, 
when 14 million out of the total population of 122 million were 
born outside the country.\9\ The number of naturalized persons 
in 1930 was 7.9 million, meaning that a sizeable number were at 
least theoretically eligible to vote in elections. Furthermore, 
a number of Southern and Midwestern States permitted 
noncitizens to vote in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
In fact, the 19 States that allowed noncitizens to vote during 
that time had repealed earlier laws that banned noncitizen 
voting.\10\ In the South, the intent was to recruit Democratic 
Party supporters and rebuild the labor base after the Civil War 
and, in the West and Midwest; to promote westward expansion by 
conferring voting rights before citizenship had been attained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to 
the Present, ed. Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. 
Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Prichard Sutch, Gavin Wright, Millennial 
Edition, vol. 1 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 1-
166.
    \10\ The States that repealed such voting laws between 1868 and 
1926 were Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming; Jerrold G. Rusk, A Statistical History of the American 
Electorate (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001), pp. 16-17, 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Internal population migrations also altered the social and 
political landscape, particularly the Great Migration of the 
early 20th century. Until the migration began around 1910, the 
black population of the country was almost entirely southern. A 
variety of factors stimulated black migration from the rural 
South to the cities of the Northeast and Midwest between 1910 
and 1970, particularly the mechanization of harvesting cotton, 
racial segregation and violence, and the need for workers in 
the growing economies of industrial cities, first as 
immigration from Europe declined at the outset of World War I 
and again as the country prepared for World War II.
    In 1900, over 7 million (7,126,617) blacks lived in the 
former Confederate States of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The number living in 
New England; the Middle Atlantic States of New York, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania; and the Midwestern (industrial) 
States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin was 
642,862.\11\ By 1970, the number of blacks in the 
aforementioned Southern States was 10,188,000, and in the 
Northern States it was 8,218,000.\12\ Consequently, it was 
``one of the largest and most rapid mass internal movements of 
people in history--perhaps the greatest not caused by the 
immediate threat of execution or starvation.'' \13\ The Great 
Migration reshaped American society and politics in the North 
and the South--and eventually other regions of the country--and 
it placed race relations at the center of leading national 
issues, rather than one that had been mostly confined to the 
South. Today there are 25 majority African American 
congressional districts in a cross section of States.\14\ 
(There are also 55 districts across the country in which the 
combined minority group populations--African American, 
Hispanic, and Asian--constitute the majority within the 
district and whites are the minority).\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 1939, 61st ed. (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1940), pp. 14-15.
    \12\ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 101st ed. 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1980), p. 36.
    \13\ Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration 
and How It Changed America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), p. 6.
    \14\ The States in which there is a majority African American 
congressional district are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia; 
see Vital Statistics on American Politics, 2013-2014, pp. 48-52.
    \15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another spike in immigration that began in the 1960s 
resulted in a burgeoning Hispanic and Asian American and 
Pacific Islander population. Changes in U.S. immigration laws 
as well as political and economic unrest in some Asian and 
Latin American countries brought millions of immigrants in the 
ensuing decades. In 1950, the Hispanic population was just over 
3.2 million.\16\ As of the 2010 Census, there were 50.5 million 
\17\ people of Hispanic origin in the United States--or 16 
percent of the total population--as the result of immigration 
and a high birth rate. Regarding the geographic distribution of 
Hispanics, 77 percent live in the West and South; there are 33 
congressional districts in which they are the majority of the 
population, all but 4 of which are in Southern and Western 
States.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Historical Statistics of the United States, pp. 1-177.
    \17\ U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, The Hispanic 
Population: 2010, May 2011, p. 2.
    \18\ There is one majority Hispanic district in Illinois, one in 
New Jersey, and two in New York; see Vital Statistics on American 
Politics, 2013-2014, pp.48-52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Likewise, the Asian population of the United States has 
increased rapidly since 1960, when it was 877,934.\19\ Today, 
Asians are the fastest growing segment of the U.S. population. 
While the total population grew by 9.7 percent between 2000 and 
2010, the Asian population increased by 43 percent to 14.7 
million.\20\ There is one majority Asian congressional 
district, in Hawaii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Herbert R. Barringer, Robert W. Gardner, and Michael J. Levin, 
Asians and Pacific Islanders in the United States (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1993), p. 39.
    \20\ U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, The Asian 
Population: 2010, March 2012, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 20th century transformation of the national population 
has profoundly shaped congressional elections, as the 
electorate has become more diverse and political issues have 
been shaped by changes in demographics. At least two trends 
from the previous 100 years--immigration and rapidly increasing 
minority populations--are likely to continue for some time in 
the present century.

                     The Electorate and Voting Laws

    The electorate has expanded significantly in the past 
century, following the removal of voting restrictions based on 
sex, race, and age. Women gained the right to vote in 1920, 
when the 19th Amendment was ratified. The Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (P.L. 89-110) secured voting rights for African Americans, 
nearly 100 years after the adoption of the 15th Amendment that 
stated ``the right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any 
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.'' \21\ The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975 
required that bilingual election materials be made available in 
certain jurisdictions if a language minority was 5 percent of 
the population and the illiteracy rate in English for the group 
exceeded the national rate. The 26th Amendment extended the 
vote to 18-year-olds in 1971; until then, most States set the 
voting age at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ For additional information, see CRS Report R43626, The Voting 
Rights Act of 1965: Background and Overview, by Kevin J. Coleman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to laws and amendments that established 
universal suffrage, voting itself has generally become easier 
and more convenient. The National Voter Registration Act of 
1993, the ``motor-voter'' law (P.L. 103-31), made voter 
registration available at motor vehicle agencies in every 
State.\22\ A series of laws expanded voting opportunities for 
members of the uniformed services and overseas citizens, 
including the Soldier Voting Act of 1942 (P.L. 77-712), the 
Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 (P.L. 84-296), the 
Overseas Citizens Voting Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-203), and the 
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 
(P.L. 99-410).\23\ Finally, State-enacted innovations that have 
increased voter convenience, such as ``no excuse'' absentee, 
permanent absentee, and early voting, have flourished since 
2000, although some States have recently enacted changes to 
restrict voter registration and early voting or to require some 
type of identification for voting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ For additional information, see CRS Report R40609, The 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993: History, Implementation, and 
Effects, by Royce Crocker.
    \23\ For additional information, see CRS Report RS20764, The 
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act: Overview and 
Issues, by Kevin J. Coleman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressional elections have also been affected by court 
rulings and Federal legislative action regarding the 
redistricting process.\24\ Beginning with Baker v. Carr \25\ in 
1962 and followed by a series of subsequent cases, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has established rules or constraints for the 
States in drawing congressional district boundaries.\26\ In 
addition, the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, 
established the principle of preventing the dilution of 
minority voting power in elections.\27\ The Supreme Court 
recognized the application of that principle to redistricting 
in Thornburg v. Gingles \28\ in 1986. As a result of the 
various Supreme Court cases, what had previously been a largely 
political process administered by the States is subject to such 
considerations as creating equal district populations, avoiding 
minority vote dilution, compactness, and contiguousness. The 
characteristics of each congressional district, in turn, have 
obvious practical implications for the candidates who contest 
elections within them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ For additional information, see CRS Report R42831, 
Congressional Redistricting: An Overview, by Royce Crocker.
    \25\ 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
    \26\ Baker v. Carr established that the redistricting process was 
justiciable and first applied to redistricting of U.S. House seats in 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
    \27\ For additional information, see CRS Report R42482, 
Congressional Redistricting and the Voting Rights Act: A Legal 
Overview, by L. Paige Whitaker; and CRS Report R43626, The Voting 
Rights Act of 1965: Background and Overview, by Kevin J. Coleman.
    \28\ 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     Parties and Campaign Messaging

    Until relatively recently, what were once party-dominated, 
largely nationalized contests have become what are commonly 
called ``candidate-centered'' campaigns. In the early 1900s, 
individual candidates might well have had little role in their 
own campaigns. In fact, individuality in congressional 
campaigns in general was scarce historically. As early as 1866, 
House Republicans formed a precursor to the National Republican 
Congressional Committee (NRCC) to balance Presidential 
influence over party campaign themes. Democrats followed suit 
shortly thereafter, solidifying an era of party-dominated 
campaigning.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Robin Kolodny, Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign 
Committees in American Politics (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1998), p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Especially in major cities in the industrial Midwest and 
along the east coast--such as Chicago, Cleveland, Kansas City, 
New York, and, most famously, Boston--campaigns were largely a 
product of entrenched machine politics. Machines were primarily 
a Democratic, urban phenomenon, although a few well-known 
Republican machines thrived elsewhere (such as in Nassau 
County, New York, and Orange County, California).\30\ Parties 
maintained their grip on power through patronage. At the height 
of their power, machines constituted ``informal 
government[s],'' controlling up to 35,000 public-sector jobs in 
Chicago, for example, and far more votes secured through ethnic 
and neighborhood loyalties.\31\ Officeholders and candidates 
were also expected to make payments that amounted to ``an 
informal tax system to sustain parties.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ For an overview, see, for example, Marjorie Randon Hershey, 
Party Politics in America, 12th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2007), pp. 52-
54.
    \31\ Ibid., p. 53.
    \32\ Mark Wahlgren Summers, `` `To Make the Wheels Revolve We Must 
Have Grease': Barrel Politics in the Gilded Age,'' The Journal of 
Policy History, vol. 14, no. 1 (2002), p. 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By the mid-20th century, Progressive Era reforms had 
weakened parties' roles in orchestrating individual campaigns. 
Increasingly, voters took their cues from radio, television, 
and civic organizations rather than from the comparatively 
insular world of ward-based politics. Parties also struggled to 
appeal to an increasingly diverse group of voters, influenced 
by developments such as changes in immigration, the Great 
Migration of southern blacks to northern cities, and the civil 
rights movement.
    Campaign operations were changing, too. As party influence 
over individual campaigns waned, a new style of campaigning, 
known as ``candidate-centered campaigning,'' emerged. At least 
two elements were central to the candidate-centered campaign: 
broadcast political advertising and political consulting. Both 
helped candidates adapt to changing environments.
    New forms of campaigning required more complexity than in 
the past. ``Old styles of campaigning--through rallies and 
other events--did not work.'' \33\ New technologies, including 
computerized polling analysis, broadcasting, and specialized 
political professionals and detailed campaign plans became the 
norm. The shift from print advertising to radio and television 
required substantial spending. Nationwide, campaigns at all 
levels spent an estimated $9.8 million in 1956--an amount that 
more than tripled to $32 million within a decade.\34\ Ever 
since, broadcast advertising generally has been the largest 
budget item in House and Senate campaigns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Robert J. Dinkin, Campaigning in America: A History of 
Election Practices (New York: Greenwood, 1989), p. 159.
    \34\ These estimates are attributed to reports filed with the Clerk 
of the House, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Citizens' 
Research Foundation, and appear in Statistical Abstract of the United 
States 1970 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1970), 
Table 526, p. 372. It is important to note that, although these data 
provide historical reference points, systematic and reliable campaign 
finance data did not become available until after Congress mandated 
reporting in the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and, in 
particular, subsequent amendments. Effective September 2014, FECA is 
codified at 52 U.S.C.  30101 et seq. (previously at 2 U.S.C.  431 et 
seq.). When adjusted for inflation to 2014, the figures in the text 
would be approximately $86 million and $235 million respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As broadcast advertising became more important, a new class 
of political professionals emerged to help candidates and 
parties appeal to voters through new media. Political 
consulting emerged as a distinct profession as early as the 
1930s, but grew steadily beginning in the 1960s, largely as a 
result of media consulting.\35\ As consultant influence 
increased, tension sometimes emerged between party officials 
and these autonomous political professionals, who are typically 
affiliated with a party but often work for multiple clients 
simultaneously as independent contractors. For some, 
consultants represented a threat to parties as a repository of 
cohesive campaign strategy and organizational wisdom. As 
discussed below, particularly by the 1980s, many also believed 
that political action committees (PACs) undermined parties' 
financial influence in congressional elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ For an overview of the development of political consulting, 
see, for example, David A. Dulio, For Better or Worse? How Political 
Consultants are Changing Elections in the United States (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2004); Stephen K. Medvic, Political 
Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections (Columbus, OH: The Ohio 
State University Press, 2001); and Larry J. Sabato, The Rise of 
Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections (New York: Basic 
Books, 1981).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The rise of broadcast advertising was just one of the major 
mid-century changes that many observers believed was upending 
established campaign practices. Even traditional political 
institutions were allegedly undermined by candidate-centered 
campaigning. Since at least the 1950s, some observers had 
warned that parties risked extinction as major players in 
congressional elections. Also, in the 1950s scholars feared 
that interest groups devoted to a narrow set of policy issues 
threatened party vitality. By the 1960s, sharp increases in the 
number of Americans who claimed to be politically 
``independent'' were allegedly responsible for weakening 
parties, particularly because research suggested that those who 
declined to identify with a party were politically 
disengaged.\36\ Not only did those calling themselves ``strong 
partisans'' fall steadily, but also more voters believed that 
they were rejecting party labels altogether by identifying as 
``independents.'' This trend was particularly pronounced 
between 1964 and 1974, when prominent social science polling 
showed a jump in ``independent'' voters from 23 percent to 38 
percent respectively, possibly attributed to social unrest 
surrounding the Vietnam war and declining trust in government 
following Watergate.\37\ Nonetheless, subsequent research 
revealed that even those who viewed themselves as dedicated 
``independents'' usually continued to hold solidly partisan 
policy positions that affected their voting behavior.\38\ The 
number of independents has been roughly steady since the 
Watergate era.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter: An Abridgement (New 
York: Wiley, 1964), p. 83.
    \37\ The cited polling data are from Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, 
and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 49. Other parts of the book discuss 
public reaction to Vietnam and Watergate.
    \38\ Bruce E. Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992).
    \39\ Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al., The American Voter Revisited 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008), pp. 126-127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Over time, the two major parties adapted to developments in 
the congressional campaign environment. By the 1980s, the 
national party committees, in particular, adapted from their 
previous, hierarchical structures to focus more on providing 
specific services to individual campaigns.\40\ This ``party 
service'' model included technical assistance such as polling, 
data analysis, and training. Parties also continued to play a 
central role in recruiting candidates. Despite some simmering 
tensions, most observers agreed by the 2000s that parties and 
consultants accommodated each other through an informal 
division of labor. As one parties scholar observed recently, 
``By the time their decay had become the central theme of books 
and articles about parties . . . there were clear signs of 
resurgence. The parties have grown into different types of 
organizations than they once were, but . . . they continue to 
be a vital part of the American political landscape.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ For an overview of this literature and period, see, for 
example, Paul S. Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).
    \41\ Marjorie Randon Hershey, Party Politics in America, 12th ed. 
(New York: Pearson, 2007), p. 303.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 The Political Geography of the Parties

    The regional bases of the Democratic and Republican Parties 
have changed significantly since the 1960s. The most noteworthy 
shift in regional strength was the transformation of the South 
from Democratic to Republican domination. After the 1960 
election, Democrats held 99 of 106 House seats and all 22 
Senate seats in Southern States.\42\ Following the 2012 
election, Republicans held 98 House seats and Democrats held 
40, and Republicans held 16 of 22 Senate seats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ The States discussed are the 11 former Confederate States, 
including Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 
Republicans captured single seats in Florida, North Carolina, and 
Texas, and two seats in both Tennessee and Virginia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The political transformation of the South occurred slowly 
in the early decades of the 20th century and gathered momentum 
in the 1948 Presidential election. The Democratic Governor of 
South Carolina, Strom Thurmond, ran an insurgent Presidential 
campaign largely in opposition to the emerging Truman 
administration position on civil rights as well as in support 
of ``States' rights.'' As the Dixiecrat candidate,\43\ Thurmond 
won all of the electoral votes in Alabama, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina as well as 1 electoral vote in 
Tennessee (39 in total).\44\ The reversal in political 
dominance in the South accelerated as the civil rights movement 
gained momentum and the Democrats' grip on the Solid South in 
Presidential elections eroded in successive elections. With 
Governor Ronald Reagan's election to the Presidency, the 
defection of the Reagan Democrats in the South (and elsewhere) 
heralded the end of a Democratic Party that had been anchored 
there for more than a century. Democrats became the party that 
was primarily bicoastal and urban, while the Republican Party 
drifted away from its northeastern and midwestern roots and 
became firmly planted in Southern and Western States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Governor Thurmond ran as a Democrat in Alabama, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina, and as the States' Rights Party 
candidate in other States in the South.
    \44\ Guide to U.S. Elections, ed. John L. Moore, 3d ed. 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), pp. 320-322, 399.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             Campaign Money

    Taking stock of a recently concluded election, a prominent 
author concluded that money corrupted the political process. 
Voters were forced to choose between two similar parties and 
constant fundraising cheapened candidates and voters. ``In our 
elections, which are the foundation of our whole governmental 
structure, we treat offices as things to be paid for,'' he 
lamented. Similar themes appear on editorial pages and in 
popular debate today, but they are not new. In fact, the author 
was economist and one-time New York mayoral candidate Henry 
George. His essay appeared not in 2014 or even after the 
Supreme Court's landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision in 1976, but 
in 1883.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Henry George, ``Money in Elections,'' The North American 
Review, March 1883, p. 206. George's son, Henry George, Jr. was a U.S. 
Representative from New York (1911-1915). See Biographical Directory of 
the United States Congress, at http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/ 
biodisplay.pl?index=G000126.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    George wrote at the beginning of the Progressive Era, a 
period marked by major social and governmental changes that 
emphasized electoral reform and transparency. Most notably, 
making connections to campaign finance, politicians such as 
Theodore Roosevelt raised an alarm about the growing gap 
between the haves and have-nots in American society. Similar 
themes appeared in congressional debate over campaign finance 
bills in 1956, 1973, and 2014--just to name a few.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ In these cases, the debate concerned legislation proposing 
public financing of congressional campaigns, but campaign finance 
topics tend to include recurring themes. See R. Sam Garrett, ``Back to 
the Future? The Quest for Public Financing of Congressional 
Campaigns,'' in Public Financing in American Elections, ed. Costas 
Panagopoulos (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), pp. 11-35. 
On campaign finance legislative history generally, see, for example, 
Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: The Making of Federal 
Campaign Finance Law (New York: Praeger, 1988); and Raymond J. La Raja, 
Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Criticism of private money in politics has not been limited 
to Presidential campaigns. In 1922, the Senate settled an 
election contest between Henry Ford and Truman H. Newberry.\47\ 
Campaign spending featured prominently in the case, rooted in 
the 1918 Michigan Senate race. After a long investigation, the 
Senate seated Newberry, but ``condemn[ed]'' the $195,000 spent 
on his primary campaign and determined that the amount was 
``contrary to sound public policy [and] harmful to the honor 
and dignity of the Senate.'' \48\ Recapping the episode a 
decade later, Louise Overacker, one of the first scholars to 
study campaign finance, observed: ``Current protests against 
the use of money in the United States leave one with the 
impression that we are facing an entirely new form of political 
corruption. Such is far from the case.'' \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ For a historical overview, see Paula Baker, Curbing Campaign 
Cash: Henry Ford, Truman Newberry, and the Politics of Progressive 
Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012); and Anne M. 
Butler and Wendy Wolff, United States Senate Election, Expulsion and 
Censure Cases 1793-1990 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), pp. 302-305.
    \48\ ``Michigan Senatorial Election,'' Congressional Record, vol. 
62, part 2 (January 12, 1922), p. 1116.
    \49\ Louise Overacker, Money in Elections (New York: Macmillan, 
1932), p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed it was.\50\ Following kickback scandals during the 
Civil War and even earlier, Congress began to regulate Federal 
campaign finance in 1867 by protecting navy yard workers from 
required political contributions and from being fired for their 
political beliefs.\51\ Campaign finance regulation became more 
engrained with the Pendleton Act in 1883.\52\ The legislation 
is best known for establishing the civil service system, but, 
in a nod to campaign finance, also barred the making of 
political contributions in exchange for Federal jobs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Although the Progressive Era marked the first time in which 
Congress enacted major campaign finance legislation, some legislative 
proposals and oversight predated the period. See, for example, Robert 
E. Mutch, ``The First Federal Campaign Finance Bills,'' The Journal of 
Policy History, vol. 14, no. 1 (2002), pp. 30-48. For additional 
historical discussion of the evolution of campaign finance law and 
policy, see Anthony Corrado et al., The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 7-47. See 
also, for example, Kurt Hohenstein, Coining Corruption: The Making of 
the American Campaign Finance System (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2007); Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts; and 
Raymond J. La Raja, Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and 
Campaign Finance Reform (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
2008), pp. 43-80.
    \51\ 39th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 2, 1867), p. 492.
    \52\ 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress first enacted major campaign finance limits in 
1907, when the Tillman Act prohibited corporations and national 
banks from making contributions in Federal elections.\53\ 
Congress extended the prohibition to unions in 1943 and 
1947.\54\ Through the 1947 act, Congress also prohibited 
corporations and unions from making expenditures to influence 
Federal elections.\55\ Despite establishing initial reporting 
requirements and later--invalidated spending limits in the 
1910s and 1920s, modern campaign finance law and regulation 
affecting congressional campaigns did not emerge until the 
1970s.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
    \54\ 57 Stat. 167 (1943); 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
    \55\ This is the Taft-Hartley Act, also known as the Labor 
Management Relations Act. The relevant expenditure prohibition (61 
Stat. 159 (1947)) amended the 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act (43 
Stat. 1074 (1925)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First enacted in 1971 and substantially amended in 1974, 
1976, and 1979, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) 
remains the foundation of the Nation's campaign finance law. 
Most notably, FECA established modern contribution limits and 
reporting requirements. Individuals were permitted to 
contribute $1,000 per election to individual congressional and 
Presidential candidates.\56\ Subsequent amendments to FECA 
played a major role in shaping campaign finance policy as it is 
understood today. After the 1974 amendments were enacted, the 
first in a series of prominent legal challenges came before the 
Supreme Court.\57\ In its landmark Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 
ruling, the Court declared mandatory spending limits 
unconstitutional (except for publicly financed Presidential 
candidates) and invalidated the original appointment structure 
for the Federal Election Commission (FEC).\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Congress did not raise the individual limit until 2002 when it 
enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA).
    \57\ For additional information, see CRS Report RL30669, The 
Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Buckley v. Valeo and 
Its Supreme Court Progeny, by L. Paige Whitaker.
    \58\ 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Little in campaign finance policy or law changed for a 
generation thereafter. Congress did not substantially revisit 
campaign finance law until 2002, when it enacted the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA). The Supreme Court also largely 
maintained the status quo throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but 
began actively revisiting campaign finance law after Congress 
enacted BCRA. Still the Court did not significantly alter the 
legal environment facing congressional campaigns until 2010, 
when the Citizens United decision permitted corporations and 
unions to spend their treasury funds advocating for election or 
defeat of particular candidates.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             The Cost of Congressional Elections Over Time

    Perhaps no other area of congressional campaigns has 
changed more in recent decades than the amount of money 
required to run for office. Figure 1 below shows a conservative 
summary of House and Senate campaign expenditures between the 
1974 and 2012 election cycles. The figure includes only 
candidate spending, only major-party candidates, and only those 
who advanced to the general election. Even with these caveats 
and when adjusting for inflation, the almost 40 years between 
1974 and 2012 saw major increases in campaign spending. The 
increase for both House and Senate campaigns was almost 2,000 
percent (about 350 percent when adjusted for inflation).\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Information in this section is based on CRS calculations using 
data in Norman J. Ornstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress (2013), 
Table 3-5, at http://www.brookings.edu/research/ reports/2013/07/vital-
statistics-congress-campaign-finance-mann-ornstein. Inflation-
adjustment calculations were made to May 2014 from data in U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, CPI Detailed Report: Data for May 2014, 
Washington, DC, May 2014, Table 24, at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/
cpid1405.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Costs for individual campaigns also increased rapidly. As 
Table 1 below shows, the increase in expenditures for House and 
Senate campaigns has consistently outpaced inflation. Average 
(mean) winning House candidates in 2012 spent more than three 
times as did their predecessors in 1986.\61\ Even when adjusted 
for inflation, average expenditures more than doubled. Spending 
in Senate races shows a similar trend.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ FEC data on spending by winning campaigns are generally only 
uniformly available since 1986, as shown in the table. A review of 
previous data suggests that the trend dates to at least the mid-1970s, 
when FECA first mandated systematic reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As high as candidate-campaign spending is, it is important 
to note that it represents only a relatively small component of 
total spending affecting House and Senate campaigns. The data 
in the table do not reflect spending by parties, political 
action committees, or ``outside groups.'' Also important, 
although virtually all fundraising and spending surrounding 
congressional campaigns is controversial, it is not universally 
criticized. Particularly in the post-Citizens United 
environment, some observers argue that American politics needs 
more money, not less. Opponents strongly disagree. As the next 
section discusses, whatever one's position on ``outside money'' 
in congressional elections, this noncandidate activity has been 
some of the most consequential and controversial funding in 
American elections.

   Figure 1. Total House and Senate Campaign Expenditures, 1974-2012

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Source: CRS calculations using data in Norman J. Ornstein et 
al., Vital Statistics on Congress (2013), Table 3-5, at http://
www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/07/vital-statistics-congress-
campaign-finance-mann-ornstein. Inflation-adjustment calculations were 
made to May 2014 from data in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI 
Detailed Report: Data for May 2014, Washington, DC, May 2014, Table 24, 
at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1405.pdf.

               The Struggle to Regulate ``Outside Money''

    FECA supporters hoped that the new law would limit the 
amounts of money surrounding campaigns, including House and 
Senate races, and reduce the risk of potential corruption by 
more thoroughly documenting campaign transactions. Almost 
immediately, parts of the regulatory structure FECA established 
faced serious challenges. In particular, once the Buckley 
decision drew a distinction between contributions and 
expenditures, Congress' policy options for capping the amount 
spent in elections or who could participate were substantially 
limited. Specifically, the Court found that Congress could cap 
individual contributions because they presented a sufficient 
risk of corruption. Expenditures generally could not be 
limited, provided that they were independent from candidates, 
although corporations, unions, and national banks remained 
prohibited from using their treasury funds to advocate for or 
against candidates (a prohibition later overturned by Citizens 
United). So began a heated debate that continues today about 
whether independent spending in campaigns is protected 
political speech or distorts the democratic process. Even as 
that debate unfolded, it quickly became clear that Buckley 
opened the door to ``outside'' spending not envisioned when 
Congress enacted FECA. The kind of money now permitted had 
changed from the pre-Buckley days, but the debate the money 
fueled was not all that different from concerns first raised 
during the Progressive Era.


                  Table 1. Mean Expenditures for Winning House and Senate Campaigns, 1986-2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       House                         Senate
                                                      winners     House winners      winners     Senate winners
                  Election cycle                      current        constant        current    constant dollars
                                                      dollars        dollars         dollars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986..............................................     $359,577      $780,505.19    $3,067,559     $6,658,506.26
1988..............................................      400,386       805,171.85     3,746,225      7,533,617.31
1990..............................................      423,245       770,390.10     3,298,324      6,003,605.81
1992..............................................      556,475       943,588.04     3,353,115      5,685,716.74
1994..............................................      541,121       868,641.61     4,488,195      7,204,734.08
1996..............................................      686,198     1,040,449.36     3,921,653      5,946,215.73
1998..............................................      677,807       989,265.55     4,655,806      6,795,191.70
2000..............................................      845,907     1,168,648.73     7,198,423      9,944,859.36
2002..............................................      911,644     1,205,559.39     3,728,644      4,930,764.03
2004..............................................    1,038,391     1,307,745.88     7,183,825      9,047,284.11
2006..............................................    1,259,791     1,486,628.37     8,835,416     10,426,316.80
2008..............................................    1,362,239     1,505,212.15     7,500,052      8,287,215.33
2010..............................................    1,434,760     1,565,329.11     8,993,945      9,812,431.28
2012..............................................    1,596,953     1,654,725.81    10,351,556     10,726,043.24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Norman J. Ornstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress (2013), Table 3-1, at http://www.brookings.edu/
  research/reports/2013/07/vital-statistics-congress-campaign-finance-mann-ornstein. CRS adjusted current
  dollars to constant dollars (May 2014) using data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Detailed Report:
  Data for May 2014, Washington, DC, May 2014, Table 24, at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1405.pdf.
 
Notes: The data reflect only candidates who competed in the general election. The Senate mean for 2000 is
  unusually large because of heavy spending in the New Jersey and New York Senate races. Without these two
  outlier cases, the mean would be approximately $4.7 million in current dollars. See the cited source for
  additional notes.


    Although ``outside money'' is a commonly used term in 
campaign finance circles, it is a term of art without specific 
meaning. Generally, it implies money spent by those other than 
candidate campaigns, and perhaps by political parties. Such 
spending can take many forms and can be regulated in different 
ways. This report does not intend to address them all.\62\ 
Instead, it discusses selected developments that were and are 
particularly consequential for House and Senate campaigns. The 
next sections first explore PACs as a challenge to the campaign 
environment Congress sought to create with FECA. Discussions of 
major legal changes and subsequent spending from super PACs and 
other groups in the 2000s follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ For additional discussion, see CRS Report R41542, The State of 
Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress, 
by R. Sam Garrett, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent 
Developments and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett; and CRS Report 
R43719, Campaign Finance: Constitutionality of Limits on Contributions 
and Expenditures, by L. Paige Whitaker.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      political action committees

    Political action committees (PACs) permitted corporations, 
unions, and other groups an indirect route for making campaign 
contributions and independent expenditures calling for election 
or defeat of particular candidates. Although PACs could not use 
their treasury funds to support most PAC operations, 
businesses, unions, or other groups could sponsor PACs--to 
which their employees or members could make voluntary 
contributions.
    Many observers saw PACs as one of the first major threats 
to the effectiveness of individual contribution limits that 
Congress had enacted in FECA. Unions engaged in PAC-like 
activity as early as the 1950s, but the groups did not become 
an established part of the congressional elections landscape 
until later. PACs as they are known today (although not 
including super PACs) emerged in the mid-1970s after an FEC 
advisory opinion permitted the Sun Oil Corporation to establish 
a separate fund to make expenditures and contributions despite 
FECA's prohibition on spending corporate treasury funds in U.S. 
elections.\63\ Congress codified the PAC model in the 1976 and 
1979 FECA amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ The Sun Oil advisory opinion (AO) is 1975-23 (November 24, 
1975). For additional discussion of PAC development, see, for example, 
David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, The Money Chase: Congressional 
Campaign Finance Reform (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
1990); and Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Throughout the 1980s, PAC spending was controversial, as 
many believed the committees represented a loophole in the ban 
on corporate and union treasury spending, even though PAC funds 
must come from voluntary contributions rather than corporate or 
union treasury funds. PACs also were the major vehicle by which 
funds often derided as ``special interest'' money flowed into 
congressional elections following FECA's enactment. These 
developments launched a decades-long debate, which continues to 
this day, about whether PACs were the product of genuine 
``grassroots'' advocacy or thinly veiled corporate and union 
attempts to influence elections. Those favoring and opposing 
PACs also argued over whether the groups distorted the policy 
process by pressuring lawmakers to support ``special 
interests'' or whether they filled gaps left by allegedly 
declining political parties and provided an outlet for diverse 
interests.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ See, for example, archived CRS Report 84-87 GOV, Political 
Action Committees: Their Evolution, Growth, and Implications for the 
Political System, by Joseph E. Cantor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the controversy surrounding PACs, they quickly 
became a reality of congressional elections. PACs were 
particularly generous to incumbents. During the 1980s, House 
and Senate incumbents relied on PACs for one-quarter to one-
half of their campaign contributions.\65\ The number of 
registered PACs more than doubled between 1976 and 1984, from 
about 1,150 to more than 4,000.\66\ Still, PACs did not grow 
exponentially. To use an analogy, once PACs took off, they 
leveled off. As Figure 2 below shows, the number of corporate 
and labor PACs has remained fairly stable from the beginning, 
and especially after 1984. A generation later, in 2010, the 
total number of PACs increased when super PACs emerged 
following the Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission and the lower-court case SpeechNow 
(discussed below). The traditional PACs that developed in the 
1970s and 1980s, however, remained stable. In this sense, there 
is no doubt that PACs changed congressional elections. But, 
once the change occurred, PACs became standard fare for those 
hoping to influence congressional elections, controversy 
notwithstanding. Other forms of outside money have similarly 
become accepted, if controversial, mainstays in congressional 
elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, The Money Chase: 
Congressional Campaign Finance Reform (Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1990), pp. 82-83.
    \66\ Data in this section come from CRS analysis of data in Federal 
Election Commission, ``PAC Count--1974 to Present,'' press release, 
July 2014, at http://www.fec.gov/press/summaries/2011/
2011paccount.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   Figure 2. Number of Federal Political Action Committees, 1976-2014
 
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Source: CRS figure based on analysis of data in Federal 
Election Commission, ``PAC Count--1974 to Present,'' press release, 
July 2014, at http://www.fec.gov/press/summaries/2011/
2011paccount.shtml.

    Notes: The FEC data cited above include additional PAC types not 
shown in the figure, although they are reflected in the totals.

   the next generation of independent spending: the 1990s and beyond

    By the 1990s, attention began to shift to other perceived 
loopholes in FECA. Two issues--soft money and issue advocacy 
(issue advertising)--were especially prominent.\67\ ``Soft 
money'' is a term of art referring to funds generally perceived 
to influence elections but not regulated by campaign finance 
law. Although generally banned in Federal elections today (as a 
result of BCRA, discussed below), soft money came principally 
in the form of large contributions from otherwise prohibited 
sources, and went to party committees for ``party-building'' 
activities that indirectly supported elections. Party 
facilities, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns, and other 
efforts were all fueled by hundreds of millions of dollars in 
soft money during the 1980s and 1990s. Because these funds were 
allocated to State parties or non-Federal accounts of national 
parties, with consent from the FEC, they were largely 
unregulated for Federal purposes, even though they played an 
increasingly prominent role in the infrastructure that tacitly 
surrounded House and Senate campaigns. Parties typically found 
raising soft money easier than ``hard money,'' which was 
subject to limits on sources and amounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ Parts of this section are adapted from material in CRS Report 
R41542, The State of Campaign Finance Policy: Recent Developments and 
Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett; and CRS Report R42042, Super 
PACs in Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam 
Garrett.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Parties also found ways to use soft money to indirectly 
bolster their candidates.\68\ In particular, during the 1990s, 
parties found a new outlet for soft money: ``issue advocacy.'' 
These advertisements, typically aired on radio and television, 
traditionally fell outside FECA regulation because they praised 
or criticized a Federal candidate--often by urging voters to 
contact the candidate--but did not explicitly call for election 
or defeat of the candidate. By 2002, the last election cycle in 
which soft money was permitted, Democratic and Republican Party 
committees raised almost $500 million in soft money. That 
amount was almost double what the two parties had raised just 4 
years earlier.\69\ In fact, Democrats--who typically enjoyed a 
soft-money advantage over Republicans--raised more soft money 
than hard.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ For an overview, particularly during the final election cycle 
in which soft money was permitted, see David B. Magleby and Nicole 
Carlisle Squires, ``Party Money in the 2002 Congressional Elections,'' 
in The Last Hurrah: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2002 
Congressional Elections, ed. David B. Magleby and J. Quin Monson 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press), pp. 36-62.
    \69\ Federal Election Commission, ``Party Committees Raise More 
Than $1 Billion in 2001-2002,'' press release, March 20, 2003, at 
http://fec.gov/press/press2003/20030320party/20030103party.html.
    \70\ Democratic Party committees raised $246.1 million in soft 
money compared with $217.2 million in hard money. See ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to these and other developments, Congress 
enacted major campaign finance legislation for the first time 
in a generation.\71\ Among other provisions, BCRA, enacted in 
2002, banned national parties, Federal candidates, and 
officeholders from raising soft money in Federal elections; 
increased most contribution limits; and placed additional 
restrictions on preelection issue advocacy.\72\ Specifically, 
the act's electioneering communications provision prohibited 
corporations and unions from using their treasury funds to air 
broadcast ads referring to clearly identified Federal 
candidates within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a 
primary election or caucus. As a consequence, if corporations 
or unions wanted to engage in communications that mentioned 
Federal candidates during preelection periods, they had to do 
so through PACs, which were subject to limits on contribution 
sources and amounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Congress approved limited public financing legislation in 
1992, but President George H.W. Bush vetoed the measure. For additional 
discussion, see CRS Report RL33814, Public Financing of Congressional 
Campaigns: Overview and Analysis, by R. Sam Garrett.
    \72\ BCRA, also known as ``McCain-Feingold'' for its principal 
Senate sponsors, John McCain and Russell Feingold, is P.L. 107-155; 116 
Stat. 81. BCRA (2002) amended FECA. Effective September 2014, FECA is 
codified at 52 U.S.C.  30101 et seq. (previously at 2 U.S.C.  431 et 
seq.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Opponents of the legislation, including Senator Mitch 
McConnell, immediately filed suit, arguing that BCRA's 
provisions inhibited political speech. They also raised 
concerns that BCRA would inhibit parties by tacitly encouraging 
money to flow away from the old channel of soft money and 
toward arguably less regulated sources, such as tax-exempt 
organizations. Surprising many observers, the Supreme Court 
upheld most of BCRA in McConnell v. FEC (2003).\73\ Over time, 
though, the Court held aspects of BCRA unconstitutional as 
applied to specific circumstances. These included a 2008 ruling 
related to additional fundraising permitted for congressional 
candidates facing self-financed opponents and a 2007 ruling on 
the electioneering communication provision's restrictions on 
advertising by a 501(c)(4) advocacy organization.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ 540 U.S. 93 (2003). For additional discussion, see CRS Report 
RL32245, Campaign Finance Law: A Legal Analysis of the Supreme Court 
Ruling in McConnell v. FEC, by L. Paige Whitaker; and CRS Report 
RL30669, The Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Regulation: Buckley 
v. Valeo and Its Supreme Court Progeny, by L. Paige Whitaker.
    \74\ For additional discussion, see CRS Report RS22920, Campaign 
Finance Law and the Constitutionality of the ``Millionaire's 
Amendment'': An Analysis of Davis v. Federal Election Commission, by L. 
Paige Whitaker; CRS Report RS22687, The Constitutionality of Regulating 
Political Advertisements: An Analysis of Federal Election Commission v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., by L. Paige Whitaker; and CRS Report 
RL34324, Campaign Finance: Legislative Developments and Policy Issues 
in the 110th Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most significant blow to BCRA, and a major change in 
Federal campaign finance law, occurred in 2010. In Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court lifted the 
bans on corporate and union treasury expenditures discussed 
above and enacted in 1947.\75\ Citizens United also invalidated 
the hard-money requirement in BCRA's electioneering 
communication provision. Consequently, for the first time in 
modern history, corporations and unions were free to use their 
own funds to expressly call for election or defeat of Federal 
candidates. Another major change in the campaign finance 
landscape followed a few months after Citizens United. In 
SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that contributions to 
PACs that make only independent expenditures cannot be 
limited--a development that led to formation of ``super PACs.'' 
\76\ Coupled with increasing use of tax-exempt 501(c)(4) social 
welfare organizations and 501(c)(6) trade associations, 
regulated primarily under tax law rather than election law, 
individuals, unions, and corporations now had major new outlets 
to affect Federal elections. Reflecting concerns that had been 
present during the Progressive Era, much of the debate 
surrounding super PACs and 501(c) organizations has concerned 
unlimited contributions to the groups and, in some cases, 
limited donor disclosure.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ Citizens United is 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). For a legal analysis 
of the case, see CRS Report R41045, The Constitutionality of Regulating 
Corporate Expenditures: A Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in 
Citizens United v. FEC, by L. Paige Whitaker.
    \76\ For additional discussion of SpeechNow, see CRS Report 
RS22895, 527 Groups and Campaign Activity: Analysis Under Campaign 
Finance and Tax Laws, by L. Paige Whitaker and Erika K. Lunder. On 
super PACs, see CRS Report R42042, Super PACs in Federal Elections: 
Overview and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
    \77\ For additional discussion of donor disclosure and the 
relationships between super PACs and 501(c) organizations, see CRS 
Report R42042, Super PACs in Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for 
Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In general, few corporations and unions have chosen to make 
independent expenditures using their treasury funds. Super 
PACs, 501(c) organizations, and individuals, however, have 
chosen to spend freely on House and Senate contests. In the 
roughly 10 months in which super PAC independent spending was 
permitted during the 2010 election cycle, super PACs spent more 
than $90 million, most of which went toward advocating the 
election or defeat of House and Senate candidates. By 2012, 
super PACs spent almost $800 million. Although much of that 
spending went toward the Presidential race, super PACs spent as 
much as $15 million on individual Senate contests.\78\ 
Altogether, parties, PACs, individuals, and other groups spent 
$1.25 billion on independent expenditures in all Federal races 
in 2012. House and Senate candidates, by comparison, spent not 
much more--about $1.8 billion.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ This information appears in CRS Report R42042, Super PACs in 
Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett.
    \79\ These data come from FEC statistical summaries for the 2012 
election cycle at http://fec.gov/press/
campaign_finance_statistics.shtml.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Change and Continuity in Congressional Campaign Finance

    The amounts of money raised and spent in congressional 
campaigns have changed dramatically. Fundamentally, though, 
campaign funds are used to buy the same thing they always have: 
efforts to win more votes than an opponent on Election Day. In 
a briefing ahead of the 2014 elections, for example, the 
national Republican Party committees and their State 
legislative and gubernatorial counterparts announced plans to 
spend hundreds of millions of dollars in the closing weeks of 
the election cycle. Like Democrats, the GOP planned to target 
its spending on voter-contact efforts powered by technological 
innovations such as smartphones and real-time data 
analysis.\80\ The methods of voter contact, number of voters 
contacted, and costs might have been new, but the goals were 
not. Tens of thousands of precinct captains were key players in 
collecting and acting on the expensive, technical data--just as 
they had been for more than a century.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ Jennifer Kerns, ``Republicans Are Ready for the 2014 
Midterms,'' The Washington Times, July 18, 2014, p. B3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Then, as now, the media and other observers have 
nonetheless criticized fundraising practices and campaign 
finance policy positions among members of both parties. One of 
the most troubling consequences of outside money, for some 
observers, has been the loss of candidate control over the 
campaign environment. PACs in the 1970s, soft money and issue 
advocacy in the 1980s and 1990s, and express advocacy by 
501(c)s and super PACs in the 2000s, all limited candidate 
influence over the campaign environment by introducing new and, 
sometimes overwhelming, money and political messages. Although 
the specifics differ from those of the 1950s, observers 
continue to worry about the future of political parties. As 
funding by nonparty and noncandidate forces increases, recent 
media accounts and political professionals suggest that 
candidates might become--or already are--periphery players in 
their own campaigns.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ See, for example, Ashley Parker, ``Outside Money Drives a 
Deluge of Political Ads,'' The New York Times, July 27, 2014, p. A1, 
New York edition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the preceding discussion shows, the rules surrounding 
campaign finance regulation have changed, and in some cases, so 
have the players. Nonetheless, the same major elements of the 
policy debate remain in campaign finance today as were in place 
a century ago. Who should be permitted to raise and spend money 
in House and Senate campaigns? Where should that money come 
from? How much information about donors should be disclosed and 
how often? Should spending be treated differently from 
contributions? Most of these questions are just as relevant 
today than they were during the early 1900s, if not before.

                           Campaign Outcomes

    One way in which congressional elections today are 
different from the past can be seen in the recent tendency for 
the outcome to result in divided, rather than unified, 
government. One party or the other was more likely to control 
simultaneously the House, Senate, and White House in the years 
before 1950 than since. Between 1900 and 1950, both political 
branches were under one party's control 80 percent of the time, 
compared to 41 percent since 1950.\82\ The last time one party 
controlled both Chambers and the White House for an entire 
Presidential term was during the Carter administration, during 
the 95th and 96th Congresses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on 
American Politics, 2013-2014 (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013), pp. 
36-37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another difference is a decline in the number of 
congressional districts in which the parties are competitive. 
Redistricting trends in recent decades have meant that, when 
some States draw new congressional district boundaries after a 
decennial census, a cooperative effort to protect incumbents 
and maintain the status quo has meant that the number of truly 
competitive districts has declined.\83\ For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ See CRS Report R42831, Congressional Redistricting: An 
Overview, by Royce Crocker.

    In 1992, there were 103 members of the House of 
Representatives elected from what might be called swing 
districts: those in which the margin in the presidential race 
was within five percentage points of the national result. But 
based on an analysis of this year's presidential returns, I 
estimate that there are only 35 such Congressional districts 
remaining, barely a third of the total 20 years ago.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ Nate Silver, ``As Swing Districts Dwindle, Can a Divided House 
Stand?'' The New York Times, December 27, 2012.

    For the 2014 election, the Cook Political Report estimated 
that 365 House seats were ``solid'' for either Democrats or 
Republicans, while another 50 were ``likely'' wins for one 
party or the other because one party had an advantage in the 
district. As a result, the number of races that were rated 
competitive in the summer before the election was 20.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ ``2014 House Race Ratings for August 8, 2014,'' The Cook 
Political Report, August 8, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The number of seats gained in the House by one party or the 
other has been generally lower in recent decades. As an 
approximate measure of political volatility, there was greater 
turnover in congressional seats in the first half of the 20th 
century than today, despite the widely held impression that 
political polarization is greater today than in the past.\86\ 
Using the mid-century mark as an arbitrary dividing line, 
between 1950 and 2012 (62 years), there were 7 elections in 
which one party or the other gained at least 34 seats 
(Republicans gained 34 seats in the ``Reagan Revolution'' that 
began in 1980, which resulted in a 243-192 partisan lineup in 
favor of the Democrats). Table 2 (below) provides a list of 11 
elections between 1900 and 1950 (50 years) in which one party 
gained at least 34 seats, as well as the 7 corresponding 
elections between 1952 and 2012.\87\ The comparative number of 
seats gained was also higher before 1950: 43-93 in the earlier 
period and 34-64 between 1952 and 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ Some observers have argued that the deep partisan divide often 
referenced in the media is inaccurate; see, for example, Morris P. 
Fiorina, with Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy Pope, Culture War? The Myth 
of a Polarized America (New York, Pearson Longman, 2006).
    \87\ Stanley and Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics, pp. 
27-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The reelection rate of incumbent Members of the House has 
remained fairly steady throughout the last five decades. In 
1960, 94 percent of House incumbents and 97 percent of Senate 
incumbents were reelected. In 2012, 93 percent of House 
incumbents and 95 percent of Senate incumbents were 
reelected.\88\ The House incumbent reelection rate has dropped 
below 90 percent three times since 1960, in 1964, 1974, and 
2010. Senate incumbent reelection rates have been more 
volatile, dropping at times to 64 percent (in 1976 and 1980), 
but in the 80 to 99 percent range in 20 of 27 elections since 
1960.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Ibid., pp. 45-47.


 Table 2. High-Turnover Elections in the U.S. House, 1900-1950 and 1952-
                                  2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Seats
                 Year                            Party            gained
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1900-1950
    1904.............................  Republicans.............       43
    1910.............................  Democrats...............       56
    1912.............................  Democrats...............       62
    1914.............................  Republicans.............       66
    1920.............................  Republicans.............       63
    1922.............................  Democrats...............       75
    1930.............................  Democrats...............       53
    1932.............................  Democrats...............       93
    1938.............................  Republicans.............       80
    1946.............................  Republicans.............       56
    1948.............................  Democrats...............       75
 
1952-2012
    1958.............................  Democrats...............       49
    1964.............................  Democrats...............       37
    1966.............................  Republicans.............       47
    1974.............................  Democrats...............       48
    1980.............................  Republicans.............       34
    1994.............................  Republicans.............       54
    2010.............................  Republicans.............       64
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on
  American Politics, 2013-2014 (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013), pp.
  27-31.


    Despite the ability to identify potential voters using 
sophisticated data collection and analysis, persuade them 
through focus group-tested campaign advertising and messaging, 
and drive them to the polls with get-out-the-vote plans that 
unfold with military precision, voter turnout has remained 
relatively constant in the modern campaign era. In the 1960 
Presidential election, voter turnout was 63.8 percent of the 
voting-eligible population,\89\ the highest level of 
participation in the modern era. Beginning in 1972--the 1st 
year in which 18- to 20-year-olds were eligible to 
participate--turnout declined to 56.2 percent and didn't exceed 
60 percent again until 2004, when it was 60.1 percent. In the 
last 2 elections, it was 61.6 percent (the 4th highest in the 
14 elections of the modern era) and 58.2 percent in 2012. (See 
Figure 3.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ Stanley and Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics, pp. 
4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Turnout in congressional elections, in somewhat similar 
fashion, began to decline and has recently increased again 
slightly. In 1966 it was 48.7 percent and exceeded 40 percent 
twice in the next five elections, when it was 47.3 percent in 
1970 and 42.1 percent in 1982. In recent elections it was: 39.5 
percent in 2002, 40.4 percent in 2006, and 41 percent in 2010. 
(See Figure 4.)

      Figure 3. Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections, 1960-2012

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: CRS figure based on data appearing in Harold W. Stanley 
and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics, 2013-2014 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013), pp. 4-5.


     Figure 4. Voter Turnout in Congressional Elections, 1962-2010


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: CRS figure based on data appearing in Harold W. Stanley 
and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics, 2013-2014 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2013), pp. 4-5.

                          Campaigns and Voters

    There is a natural assumption that the present is modern 
and advanced and the past is outdated and obsolete. New 
concepts of communication, technology, and media replace old 
ways and the result is not just improved, but usually 
noticeably superior. In the realm of election campaigns, the 
term ``modern'' has been used for decades, as the ``modern 
campaign'' era arrived unofficially with the televised Nixon-
Kennedy debates in the 1960 Presidential election. And yet, 
years before that contest, the hallmarks of the ``modern'' 
campaign were already present, at least in Texas, as described 
here:

    Scientific polling, techniques of organization and of media 
manipulation--of the use of advertising firms, public relations 
specialists, media experts from outside the political 
apparatus, of the use of electronic media . . . not only for 
speeches but for advertising to influence voters--the mature 
flowering of all these devices dates, in Texas and the 
Southwest, from Lyndon Johnson's 1948 [Senate] campaign.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), p. xxxiii.

    The seeming sophistication of the Johnson campaign, or at 
least the effectiveness of the technology employed in it, may 
have been overstated.\91\ Even today, elections are not likely 
to be won on Twitter or Facebook, valuable as these and other 
social media might be for fundraising and reaching certain 
segments of the population via the Internet. New campaign tools 
and technologies tend to be developed over time alongside 
traditional methods, such as phone calls, door-to-door 
canvassing, and campaign literature and messaging. For example, 
the much-praised Obama reelection team ``had more than 100 
operatives working with their data to allow them to make more 
informed decisions. Still, by their own admission, they largely 
operated by the seat of their pants when it came to crunching, 
honing, and optimizing digital advertising.'' \92\ Campaigns 
rely on a field operation to identify and turn out voters, much 
as they always have. As one campaign consultant who has worked 
for State and Federal candidates observed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ See Bruce E. Altschuler, ``Lyndon Johnson: Campaign 
Innovator?,'' PS: Political Science & Politics, vol. 24, no. 1 (March 
1991), pp. 42-44, who suggested that the purported sophistication of 
the Johnson campaign was inaccurate.
    \92\ Brian Donahue, ``The Software Upgrade Election,'' Campaigns & 
Elections, November/December 2013, p. 45.

    What's fascinating is that while technology has changed 
since 1789, campaigns really haven't . . . . Turn out your 
base, target potential crossover votes with a compelling 
message, build coalitions, highlight your opponent's 
weaknesses.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ John Bicknell, ``Over Lincoln's Shoulder: The five ex-
presidents who badgered the man trying to save their country,'' Roll 
Call, June 17, 2014.

    Making contact with voters is vital, whether by phone, 
door-to-door canvassing, or with literature, email, or new 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
media. A recent book on campaigning noted:

    Everything we know from basically 15 years of field 
experiments shows that high-quality, face-to-face contacts for 
a volunteer living in the same community as the voter is the 
best way to turn somebody out . . . .\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ Mara Liasson, Democrats Count on the Fine Art of Field 
Operations, National Public Radio, March 24, 2014.

    Consequently, campaigns continue to invest in time-honored, 
low-tech methods of voter contact. As if to underscore the 
point, the gubernatorial campaign of Republican-turned-Democrat 
Charlie Crist boasted to The Washington Post in August 2014 
that ``its volunteers have already knocked on 700,000 Florida 
doors--far surpassing the 200,000 that Romney's campaign had 
reached by this point in the 2012 election.'' \95\ Despite 
ever-increasing sophistication in campaign techniques to target 
and persuade voters, elections are, as they have always been, 
somewhat unpredictable:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ Karen Tumulty, ``Charlie Crist, Rick Scott battle for every 
Florida vote,'' The Washington Post, August 25, 2014.

    The people who explain politics for a living--the 
politicians themselves, their advisers, the media who cover 
them--love to reach tidy conclusions . . . . Elections are 
decided by charismatic personalities, strategic maneuvers, the 
power of rhetoric, the zeitgeist of the political moment. The 
explainers cloak themselves in the loose-fitting theories 
because they offer a narrative comfort, unlike the more honest 
acknowledgement that elections hinge on the motivations of 
millions of individual beings and their messy, illogical, often 
unknowable psychologies.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Sasha Issenberg, The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of 
Winning Campaigns (New York: Broadway Books, 2012), p. 3.

    In an age when data collection is unrelenting and 
expanding, and campaign technologies and social media are 
changing with each election cycle, it may be useful to recall 
that the art of campaigning is, after all, simply an effort to 
persuade voters one by one.

                               Conclusion

    This report has suggested that fundamental aspects of 
congressional elections remain largely unchanged from a century 
ago. Some notable changes must nonetheless be acknowledged. 
Even where there has been notable change, the roots of major 
elements of modern congressional elections rest firmly in 
entrenched political practices. The themes that have organized 
the discussion reveal both consistency and change. Overall, 
though, House and Senate campaigns remain much as they always 
were. Factors such as immigration, migration within the United 
States, and enactment of modern voting laws have substantially 
changed congressional campaigns. Despite changes in techniques 
and technology, however, campaigns remain about connecting with 
voters and asking for their support. Campaign finance 
represents one of the greatest areas of change in the past 
century. Some forms of independent spending that are now common 
were rare or nonexistent in previous decades. Amounts of money 
in campaigns overall are up significantly with no sign of 
decline. Despite these changes in the amounts and sources of 
money, however, major issues in campaign finance policy--such 
as who should be permitted to influence elections, how, and 
when--remain constant. Electoral outcomes generally are more 
stable today than they were before 1950. At the same time, 
incumbents are overwhelmingly reelected. With respect to voter 
interest in elections, turnout has remained relatively stable 
for decades.
    To return to the analogy of watching a baseball game today 
compared with one in 1914, the equipment and environment have 
changed. Newly introduced instant replay provides more 
technical accuracy, just as computerized polling and data 
analysis permits microtargeting of individual communities or 
voters. Still, games are won and lost with balls, strikes, 
hits, and runs. Campaigning still depends on getting voters to 
the polls and convincing them to cast ballots one way or 
another. No amount of money, from candidates, parties, or 
outside groups, can substitute for good campaign management and 
appealing candidates. Congressional elections might be less 
popular than the national pastime, but they are no less 
enduring.







 Understanding Congressional Approval: Public Opinion from 1974 to 2014

                           Jessica C. Gerrity

                        Section Research Manager

                              ----------                              


        The aggregate findings in this report suggest that 
        Congress, the institution, and the individuals who 
        compose it, are far from popular. Yet, Congress may not 
        be directly responsible for some of the factors that 
        influence the public's assessment of the legislative 
        branch. Regardless, to combat the negative effects of 
        the public's low regard for Congress and government 
        generally, whether a result of its own actions or 
        exogenous factors like the economy or international and 
        national events, Congress may wish to consider ways to 
        encourage the public to learn more about the 
        legislative branch and the legislative process, 
        designate individuals to speak on behalf of the 
        institution, and otherwise improve communications with 
        the public.

                              Introduction

    According to a September 8, 2014, Gallup Poll release, just 
14 percent of the public approved of the job Congress was 
doing. This is up from the 9 percent mark set in November 2013. 
That Congress, designed to be the branch of government most 
responsive to public opinion, received such low marks from the 
public and routinely serves as discussion fodder for 
journalists and scholars, is not surprising, given Americans' 
propensity to skepticism about politics.\1\ Yet, identifying 
exactly why the public's marks for Congress periodically reach 
such low points, such as is currently the case, let alone 
devising solutions to address potential problems, is a 
challenge. Congress is the branch of government directly 
responsible for lawmaking, and many Members of Congress are 
reelected in uncompetitive elections. Yet, more focused 
research suggests that Americans have a love/hate relationship 
with the processes that the Nation's Founders believed would 
protect democracy--compromise, debate, and bargaining.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, ``Introduction, 
Studying the American People's Attitudes Toward Government,'' in What 
Is It About Government that Americans Dislike, ed. John R. Hibbing and 
Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), pp. 1-7; also, see at http://www.publicpolling.com/main/
2013/01/congress-less-popular-than-cockroaches-traffic-jams.html.
    \2\ See Mark D. Ramirez, ``The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict on 
Congressional Approval,'' The American Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 53, no. 3 (July 2009), pp. 629, 681-694; on the concept and 
meanings of ``compromise,'' see Alin Fumurescu, Compromise, A Political 
and Philosophical History (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), pp. 1-6, passim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Low approval of Congress may or may not be here to stay. 
Aggregated polling data over the past 40 years suggests that 
approval could rebound from its current nadir. Regardless of 
how favorable or unfavorable the public's evaluation of the 
legislative branch is at a given time, Congress, unlike the 
President, is ill equipped to respond to the public's 
discontent. While a President may also suffer from poor marks 
from the public, the President typically enjoys a healthy 
favorable margin over the legislative branch. A June 12, 2014, 
Gallup Poll found that 52 percent of the public viewed 
President Obama unfavorably. While giving him a net favorable 
rating of ^5 percent (47 percent have a favorable rating), his 
lowest to date, defenders of Congress would find this approval 
rating enviable.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Jeffrey M. Jones, ``Americans' Ratings of President Obama's 
Image at New Lows,'' The Gallup Poll, June 12, 2014, at http://
www.gallup.com/poll/171473/americans-ratings-president-obama-image-new-
lows.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President, armed with a press secretary, press office, 
and communications team, is arguably well positioned to respond 
to criticism, and in some cases to stave it off. Congress, on 
the other hand, has at least 535 press secretaries for 
individual Senators and Representatives, whose primary job is 
to articulate a message effectively on behalf of their 
individual bosses, sometimes at the expense of the institution. 
Indeed, many Members have found it effective to run against the 
institution in their electoral campaigns--Send Candidate A to 
Washington, DC, and she'll keep those ``bums'' in line! Rarely 
do campaign advertisements proclaim, Send Candidate B to 
Congress to join his esteemed colleagues in important 
policymaking!
    What does low public job approval of Congress, which has 
ebbed and flowed a great deal since it was first measured by 
public opinion polling firms in a consistent manner in the mid-
1970s, mean for Congress and the people who work for Congress? 
\4\ Former Representative Lee Hamilton has argued, in How 
Congress Works and Why You Should Care: ``In a representative 
democracy like ours, in which Congress must reflect the views 
and interests of the American people as it frames the basic 
laws of the land, it really does matter what people think about 
Congress.'' \5\ Some scholars argue that distrust and 
disapproval of government has consequences for behaviors that 
are important to the viability of the political system, such as 
voting and other forms of political participation. Moreover, as 
some political scientists argue, dissatisfaction with Congress 
(and other government institutions) leads to decreased 
tendencies to comply with laws, run for elected office, or 
engage in the political process; there is, therefore, cause for 
Congress to be concerned with low approval of the 
institution.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Prior to Gallup introducing the question in 1974, the exact 
question about job approval had not been used in a consistent manner, 
but there had been earlier attempts at measuring congressional 
performance.
    \5\ Lee H. Hamilton, How Congress Works and Why You Should Care 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 75-76.
    \6\ John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy: 
Americans' Beliefs about How Government Should Work (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 210.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            Report Overview

    There are a number of reasons the public is dissatisfied 
with Congress and American political institutions. As two 
scholars of public opinion of Congress have explained, ``while 
disgust with Congress is widespread, people differ in their 
actual level of support and in the reasons behind their 
evaluations of Congress.'' \7\ First, the report draws on the 
results of over 1,000 public opinion polls from a number of 
sources--ABC, CBS, Gallup, Fox, etc.--all available on the 
subscription database, IPOLL, at the Roper Center, to display 
polling results on public attitudes about the job performance 
of Congress over the period 1974 to 2014.\8\ Second, given this 
trend of disapproval in the evaluation of Congress, the report 
discusses the research on public evaluations of Congress. 
Third, the report examines some possible attitudinal correlates 
of the public's views of Congress, the institution, including 
economic attitudinal data from the Survey of Consumers, 
conducted by the University of Michigan.\9\ In addition, other 
correlates are examined and discussed. Appendix A provides a 
discussion of the methodology used to calculate the annual 
averages for all measures shown in the report. It also 
discusses how the concept of correlation is used in the report. 
Appendix B displays the tables upon which the graphs are based.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ John. R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public 
Enemy: Public Attitudes toward American Political Institutions 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 106.
    \8\ The Roper Center of Public Opinion Research is located at the 
University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut. For a description of 
its holdings, see http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/about_roper.html. 
The Roper Center's IPOLL database contains the results of national 
surveys conducted as far back as 1935. The database itself consists of 
the results of over 600,000 questions. See http://
www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html.
    \9\ See Survey of Consumers, University of Michigan, at http://
www.sca.isr.umich.edu/. The Survey of Consumers has been conducted by 
the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan since 1946. 
Each month, questions about personal finances, business conditions, and 
future buying plans are posed to a national probability sample of 500 
adults to measure consumer confidence. Also, see http://
press.sca.isr.umich.edu/press/about_survey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                Congressional Job Approval, 1974 to 2014

    Over the past 40 years, many polling organizations have 
tracked congressional job performance by posing the question, 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling 
its job?, to national probability samples of Americans. 
Approval of the job that Congress is doing has ebbed and 
flowed, but, until recently, has not dropped lower than the 
high teens.
    Figure 1 shows, over the period 1974 to 2014, the annual 
average percentage of respondents approving of the job Congress 
has been doing.\10\ The data show that, over this period, 
Americans have not held Congress in especially high regard--on 
average, congressional job approval is 32 percent over the 40-
year period. While approval has varied over the years, it 
appears to be in its worst decline since September 2001. Before 
examining the data, it is helpful to briefly provide some 
historical context to select high and low points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ See Appendix A for a discussion of how the annual percentages 
were calculated. Note that comprehensive and comparable data on job 
approval are available beginning in 1974, and, as a result, this is 
where discussion can begin. But as indicated in footnote 4 above, 
polling organizations had asked questions of the public about the 
Congress prior to this year. However, these questions tended to vary a 
good deal in content or wording.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An examination of Figure 1 and Table B-1 appears to 
indicate three periods of low levels of job approval and two 
periods of relatively high approval. The first low period 
appears to clump in the period 1974 to 1983, with the lowest 
point, 19 percent, occurring in 1979. The entire period was 
characterized by the resignation of a disgraced President, two 
oil crises, two economic recessions, the Iranian hostage 
situation, high unemployment, and high inflation. Any or all of 
these might have had an impact on the lowering levels of trust 
in government institutions, including Congress.
    The second period characterized by lower levels of job 
approval was the period 1992 to 1994. With respect to Congress, 
this particular period was characterized by scandals, resulting 
in a large amount of negative media coverage and, ultimately, 
the convictions of several Members of Congress. The final low 
job approval period shown in the graph stretches from 2006 to 
the present, and covers the period which some have referred to 
as the ``Great Recession'' (2007-2009). In addition, due to 
partisan balance in the Congress, unusually high levels of 
partisanship, and what the media have often portrayed, rightly 
or wrongly, as a political stalemate in which Congress has been 
unable to get but a few major tasks done, this period has 
marked a low point in congressional job approval over the 40-
year period for which we have measures.
    On the other hand, there have been several high points in 
the 40 years that job approval has been measured. The first 
high period appears to have occurred during the mid- to late-
1980s. Similarly, the public's approval of how the Congress was 
handling its job peaked during the period 1998 to 2002. In both 
cases, there was underlying positive economic growth occurring. 
In addition, these were periods where Congress was shown to be 
conducting its constitutionally specified job, investigating 
the actions of the President. Support for Congress (as well as 
for President George W. Bush) would, of course, show up in the 
polls after September 11, 2001, as the public saw the Congress 
and the President working together to deal with that crisis and 
its aftermath.
    As noted, Figure 1 shows the annual average congressional 
job approval from 1974 to 2014. The annual average approval 
shown here is an average of all of the congressional approval/
disapproval questions asked in a given year.\11\ Some 
noteworthy points of interest in Figure 1 (also see Table B-1) 
include the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ See Table B-1 for the specific percentages shown in Figure 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   The average job approval over the past 40 years was 32 
        percent.
   The highest approval seen over this time period was 53.4 
        percent in 1985. The lowest was 12.9 percent in 2014.
   Over the past 40 years, the average annual congressional job 
        approval dropped below 20 percent seven times--instances where 
        20 percent or fewer Americans approved of the way Congress was 
        handling its job. Four of the years in which approval crept 
        below 20 percent occurred in the past 4 years, 2011-2014. In 
        1979, 1992, and 2008 congressional approval also was at or just 
        under 20 percent.
   In 2011, congressional approval dropped to 17.6 percent and 
        has continued to decline, to 14.6 percent in 2012 and 14.4 
        percent in 2013; it dropped to 12.9 percent, a new historical 
        low annual average, in 2014.
   Congressional approval has been greater than 50 percent only 
        four times in the past 40 years--1985, 1987, 2001, and 2002.

  Figure 1. Annual Average Percentage Approving of Congressional Job 
                              Performance

                               1974-2014


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: Roper Center IPOLL Database with annual percentage 
estimates calculated by CRS. Also, see Table B-1 for the actual values.

    The threshold boundaries, below 30 percent approval and 
above 45 percent, are useful ``markers'' for organizing this 
discussion of the information displayed in Figure 1, but 
different cutoff points could be selected for discussion and 
may yield different conclusions.
    First, consider the earliest low-approval year, 1979. That 
year, only 19 percent of the public approved of Congress,\12\ 
which was controlled in both Chambers by the Democrats. 
Democratic President Jimmy Carter, losing popularity himself, 
struggled, along with Congress, to deal with the Iran hostage 
crisis (November), the 1979 energy crisis, the 1979 economic 
recession, and the nuclear powerplant meltdown at Three Mile 
Island. These events are standouts in terms of the type of 
major political events impacting the American psyche. It is 
certainly plausible to conclude that the Nation endured a good 
deal of stress in 1979 that would have influenced the public's 
support for governmental institutions. In the 1980 election, 
Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter. In addition, while 
Democrats retained their control of the House, Republicans 
gained a net of 35 seats, and Republicans gained control of the 
Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ There was only a single survey conducted in that year in which 
the congressional job approval question was posed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressional approval also dropped to 20 percent in 1992 
following a brief recession starting in 1990, with effects 
lingering into the early 1990s. At the same time, this period 
(1992-1994) marked the so-called ``bank check-bouncing'' 
scandal as well as the ``Congressional Post Office'' scandal. 
As would be expected for such newsworthy events, media coverage 
was extensive and placed the whole Congress in a negative 
light. Ultimately, some Members were indicted and convicted.
    The final low job approval period shown on the graph 
stretches from 2006 to the present. This period clearly 
encompasses the disastrous economic period from 2007 to 2009, 
often referred to as the ``Great Recession.'' However, what 
also has been noted by some has been the period after the 
recession, which has seen the most significant drop in the 
percentage of the public viewing the performance of Congress in 
a positive light. While media coverage has not been so intense 
or as negative as it was during earlier scandals, it has been 
relentless in pointing to lack of productivity by the 
Congress.\13\ Given the partisan balance in Congress and the 
high levels of partisan discord, the media have often 
portrayed, rightly or wrongly, Congress as ``do-nothing,'' 
accomplishing little, or in a state of stalemate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Ezra Klein, Wonkblog, ``14 Reasons why this is the worst 
Congress ever,'' The Washington Post, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-why-this-is-the-worst-congress-
ever/. Also, see the companion CRS centennial report in this volume, 
Comparing Modern Congresses: Can Productivity Be Measured?, by Jacob R. 
Straus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Conversely, periods of high approval seem to have happened 
during times of economic growth--1985-1987 and 1998-2002. 
Previous research has found that the public is strongly 
influenced by the Nation's economic condition and not as much 
by their personal economic well-being.\14\ Political scientists 
Virginia Chanley, Thomas Rudolph, and Wendy Rahn wrote, ``When 
economic times are good and the public is less focused on 
problems within the nation, citizens express greater confidence 
in the people running the institutions of government.'' \15\ 
This explanation seems, in part, to corroborate the approval 
trend in Figure 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy, pp. 70-71; 
and Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Keiwiet, ``Sociotropic Politics: 
The American Case,'' British Journal of Political Science, vol. 11, no. 
2 (April 1981), pp. 129-161.
    \15\ Virginia A. Chanley, Thomas J. Rudolph, and Wendy M. Rahn, 
``Public Trust in the Government in the Reagan Years and Beyond,'' in 
What Is It About Congress that Americans Dislike?, ed. John R. Hibbing 
and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), p. 77. For evidence that the public is more 
likely to rely on evaluations of their own pocketbook, see Thomas J. 
Rudolph, ``The Economic Sources of Congressional Approval,'' 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 4 (November 2002), pp. 577-
599.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On the other hand, during these same periods, Congress was 
involved in, and performing, its constitutionally mandated 
check on the executive branch. In the first period (1985-1987), 
Congress spent a good deal of time in media-covered hearings 
investigating the ``Iran-Contra Affair.'' In the earlier years 
of the second period (1998-2002), Congress was involved in the 
impeachment and trial of a President. Media coverage was 
extensive, and showed Congress ``doing its job.'' It appears 
that, in part, the trends noted in the graph may reflect this 
fact.
    Yet, it is notable that as the economy has recovered since 
the 2008 recession, approval of congressional job performance 
has remained low and has not risen along with indicators of 
fiscal recovery. The 2008 recession was, by most standards, 
more severe than any recession since the 1930s Great 
Depression, making it plausible that the American public would 
be slow to recover from its economic weariness. On the other 
hand, the level of stalemate in the legislative branch noted by 
the media since the 2010 congressional elections is equally 
likely to contribute to negative feelings about Congress.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Drew DeSilver, ``Congress ends least-productive year in recent 
history,'' Fact Tank, Pew Research Center, December 23, 2013, at http:/
/www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/23/congress-ends-least-
productive-year-in-recent-history.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What Figure 1, centering on the ebbs and flows of the 
public's views of job approval of Congress, appears to suggest 
is that, on the one hand, the views of the public about 
government and about Congress in particular are, in part, 
connected with exogenous factors (the conditions of the 
economy, and international and national events) that set the 
tone or milieu for the times and for the public's views. At the 
same time, direct action by Congress, whether viewed as 
positive or as negative, often combined with media exposure, 
also may have an influence on how the public evaluates 
Congress. The next section attempts to provide a better 
understanding of how such an evaluation process occurs.

            Explaining the Public's Evaluations of Congress

    The discussion in this section of the report briefly 
reviews three broad theoretical frameworks used to explain why 
the public generally disapproves of the legislative branch. 
First, policy explanations posit that people match their 
expectations of what and how much they think Congress should be 
doing with what Congress is doing. Disapproval occurs when 
expectations do not match perception. Second, process 
explanations suggest that people are generally dissatisfied 
with the core tendencies of the democratic legislative process: 
deliberation, debate, compromise, and disagreement. To the 
extent that disagreement and discord in Congress increase, so 
too does the public's low regard for the institution. Third, 
exogenous factors explanations deg. posit that outside 
factors such as the economy, international conflict, 
Presidential approval, and the general state of national 
affairs color individuals' perceptions and trust in government. 
When there is a perception that, both domestically and 
internationally, ``things are going well,'' generally, the 
public will be more likely to display confidence in government.

      Policy Explanations: Is Legislative Productivity the Issue?

    Scholars of public opinion have traditionally turned to 
policy explanations to help understand why the public views the 
government the way it does.\17\ Policy explanations for 
governmental support are grounded in the notion that elected 
officials produce policies in exchange for the public's 
support. When the public finds the policies their government is 
producing disagreeable, they reduce or withdraw their support, 
and the government in turn may respond by producing more 
favorable public policies.\18\ Policy explanations for 
government dissatisfaction predict that citizens develop policy 
preferences on one or more policy issues and then seek out 
candidates and parties whose policy priorities most closely 
match those preferences through their campaign promises, party 
platforms, and voting records. This may happen prospectively or 
retrospectively; that is, voters may attempt to identify a 
candidate who most closely adheres to their policy agenda or, 
alternately, voters may also decide that the incumbent no 
longer matches their preferences and cast their votes for 
someone new in the next election.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ For two examples of this approach, see Anthony Downs, An 
Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); and 
Benjamin I. Paige and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty 
Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1992).
    \18\ For a general explanation, see Paige and Shapiro, The Rational 
Public, especially the introductory chapter.
    \19\ For example, three prominent political scientists discuss 
conceptualization of policy explanations. V.O. Key argues that citizens 
vote retrospectively, as they are concerned with real policy outcomes. 
See Valdimer Orlando Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationality 
in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1966). 
Anthony Downs makes the case that citizens only use the past to 
evaluate what a party will do in the future. See Downs, Economic 
Theory. Morris Fiorina develops an argument that retrospective voting 
is based on expectations about future well-being and evaluations of a 
party's past performance. See Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in 
American National Elections (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1981).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    General dissatisfaction with governmental institutions like 
Congress is thought by some to follow a similar path--people 
evaluate their own policy preferences and then compare them to 
the policy outputs generated by the current Congress. The 
presumption is that people will support an institution that 
produces the kinds of policies that they find most agreeable 
and oppose an institution that produces policies that do not 
resemble their own policy priorities. This expectation is 
theoretically attractive, but it hinges on the public's ability 
to draw distinctions and assign credit and blame to 
legislators, political parties, and institutions.
    Given that so few bills introduced in Congress make it into 
law, and perhaps even fewer bills introduced in Congress 
receive attention by the media, it is a challenge for citizens 
to keep track of policy outputs. The legislative branch, by the 
Founders' intent, is designed to stymie more legislation than 
it passes, which makes it a challenge for even the most adept 
congressional observers to measure policy output at any given 
time.\20\ Only about 6 percent of bills introduced in Congress 
get enacted into law. As a result, even though Members of 
Congress expend a lot of energy advancing their own and their 
colleagues' legislative goals, they spend more time blocking or 
being indifferent to other Members' legislative efforts, 
especially when those efforts conflict with their partisan and 
personal goals. This behavior may be seen by the public as 
negative and not productive in that the end result is not 
necessarily passing legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ See the companion CRS centennial report in this volume, 
Comparing Modern Congresses: Can Productivity Be Measured?, by Jacob R. 
Straus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Further complicating matters, it is less arduous for the 
media to cover legislative strategy--who said what and who 
countered with what--than it is to cover the substance of a 
policy proposal. Policy proposals constantly change. As a 
result, journalists covering Capitol Hill must expend a great 
deal of effort and resources to stay abreast of changes in 
policy proposals. On the other hand, staying on top of the 
players in the debate themselves and the interplay over an 
issue may be less burdensome and more newsworthy. To the extent 
that the public learns about Congress from the media, the 
capacity and the ability of the media to paint an accurate 
picture of policy productivity must be weighed. Finally, the 
effects of policy proposals are often not felt until years 
after Congress passes a law. This makes it even harder for 
citizens to assign credit and blame to particular Members of 
Congress, or to a political party, as power is transferred from 
one party to another. In addition, the composition of one 
Congress is usually not the same as Congresses following it. 
For an assessment as complex as an evaluation of the entire 
legislative branch, evidence suggests that other factors (see 
below, ``Some Correlates of Congressional Job Approval at the 
Aggregate Level''), beyond policy considerations, play an 
equally important, if not more important role, in citizens' 
evaluations.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ David C. Kimball and Samuel C. Patterson, ``Living Up to 
Expectations: Public Attitudes toward Congress,'' The Journal of 
Politics, vol. 59, no. 3 (August 1997), pp. 701-728.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Process Explanations: Is the Legislative Process the Issue?

    In addition to policy explanations, several scholars have 
put forth process explanations. While the public certainly has 
expectations about how Members of Congress should behave in 
their role as representatives and conduct themselves in 
general, research also suggests that the public is especially 
disgruntled with the legislative process more generally. Focus 
group research reveals that some Americans loathe compromise, 
debate, and bargaining--fundamental characteristics of the 
democratic process and characteristics of the modern 
Congress.\22\ Political scientists John R. Hibbing and 
Elizabeth Theiss-Morse wrote: ``Thus, people's reactions to 
processes significantly affect their approval of Congress, the 
institution that the people believe most publicly displays 
those processes most reprehensible to them: bickering, 
compromise, inefficiency, selling out to special interests.'' 
\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy, pp. 1-21.
    \23\ Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy, p. 82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What explains Americans' disdain for the democratic 
process? Somewhere along the way, discussion, deliberation, and 
compromise came to be perceived as haggling, bickering, and 
arguing and not the democratic process at work. Rather than 
focus on institutional outputs, it has been found that people 
are more likely to focus on the process that was used to 
generate policies. Moreover, the legislative process, as of 
late, has been characterized by increasingly partisan conflict 
as polarization in Congress has increased. Political scientist 
Mark Ramirez concluded in a paper published in 2009: ``The 
results here show a link between partisan conflict among 
members of Congress, and public evaluations of the institution 
across time.'' \24\ This research strongly suggested that the 
more conflict is observed or perceived in Congress, the less 
the public approves of Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Ramirez, ``The Dynamics of Partisan Conflict,'' pp. 629, 681-
694.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another reason the public may focus on the process by which 
laws are produced may be that critiquing the process requires 
less information. The legislative process, while potentially 
complicated, does not fluctuate a great deal over time. The key 
players and their formal roles do not change quickly, unlike 
the substance and volume of policy proposals.
    It may also be the case that the public and the media have 
come to rely more on process considerations than policy 
evaluations because the process has become more salient to the 
legislative branch itself. The national news media report a 
great deal on partisan disagreements in Congress. A viewer can 
miss the nuance of each party's and individual Member's 
positions on specific tax, trade, or spending legislation but 
still understand that the parties are battling over these 
issues. Scholars also argue that an increased reliance over the 
past three decades on special rules in the House to achieve 
legislative goals rather than compromise and negotiation has 
become the norm, rather than the exception.\25\ In sum, process 
considerations may be more readily available to citizens as the 
media devote more time to heated debates and partisan battles 
over Chamber rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking, 4th ed. (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2011), especially chapter 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Exogenous Factors Explanations: Is Approval Outside Congress' Control?

    While the policy and process explanations discussed above 
point to factors that are ostensibly within Congress' control, 
a good deal of political science research points to factors 
outside of Congress' control that appear to affect the way the 
public evaluates the legislative branch. Some research suggests 
that variables exogenous to Congress, such as Presidential 
approval, the presence of international conflict, and the 
performance of the economy, influence the public's opinion of 
the legislative branch.
    Approval of congressional performance appears to decline 
when economic conditions are poor, or when there is antagonism 
between the President and Congress. Approval (both 
congressional and Presidential), however, tends to increase 
``as the public rallies to support the political system during 
international crisis.'' \26\ This rally-around-the-flag 
phenomenon explains why, for example, approval for the 
legislative branch increased following the terrorist attacks on 
the United States on September 11, 2001. Citizens tend to 
support government when under attack, particularly in the early 
months of a conflict; or when the country is under duress as 
after natural disasters, they look to leaders to address crises 
and solve problems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Glenn R. Parker, ``Some Themes in Congressional 
Unpopularity,'' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 21, no. 1 
(February 1977), pp. 93-109, 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Presidential approval may have an effect on the way the 
public assesses the legislative branch as a decline in 
Presidential popularity tends to speak to an accumulation of 
policy discontent. In this case, the blame for the country's 
problems is spread across the branches of government. Some of 
the same variables that appear to influence the direction of 
Presidential approval appear to affect congressional approval. 
Some studies suggest that the strength of the economy, the 
occurrence of international conflict, and trust in government 
generally appear to influence both congressional and 
Presidential approval.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Some Correlates of Congressional Job Approval at the Aggregate Level 
                                  \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ For a discussion of how the term ``correlation'' is used in 
this report, see Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The factors potentially influencing congressional approval 
discussed above, while not explored in statistical models in 
this report, provide a context for congressional approval data 
presented below. Explaining the highs and lows of congressional 
approval is not as simple as identifying one institution, 
policy output, or event. Rather, the public's approval of 
Congress is complicated and multifaceted.

         The Economic Correlates of Congressional Job Approval

    Eleven annual economic measures were created spanning the 
period 1970 to 2014. For each, to the extent possible, values 
were aggregated over months, quarters, and years. Two of the 
measures, real GNP and unemployment rates, were taken from the 
appropriate government agencies (Bureau of Economic Analysis 
and Bureau of Labor Statistics, respectively). The other nine 
measures were economic attitudinal measures contained in the 
Survey of Consumers conducted by the Survey Research Center at 
the University of Michigan. Each of these measures of economic 
activity or attitudes was correlated over the timespan 1974 to 
2014 as part of the process of determining if there was a 
relationship between economic trends or the perception of 
economic trends and the percentage of congressional job 
approval for the time period.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Table B-7 in Appendix B. For a discussion of how the term 
``correlation'' is used in this report, see Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There was some correlation between congressional job 
approval and percentage change in real GNP (0.217) or 
unemployment (^0.457). The correlations for the various 
economic attitudinal measures and congressional job approval 
ranged from a low of ^0.089 to a high of 0.741. Five of the 
eight economic attitudinal variables examined show correlations 
with congressional job approval in the range 0.652 to 0.741, 
thus reinforcing the view that, at least, the perception of 
``good economic times'' has a strong positive effect on how one 
relates to the government. However, one of the five economic 
attitudinal variables is especially interesting as it combines 
economics with government and displays the highest correlation 
of all variables examined. The trend in that economic 
attitudinal variable, along with the trend in congressional job 
approval, is displayed in Figure 2, below.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ See Table B-7. For a discussion of how the term 
``correlation'' is used in this report, see Appendix A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Figure 2 provides some visibility into the notion that 
Americans' evaluations of the job Congress is doing is closely 
tied to their evaluations of how well the government is doing 
on economic indicators. Figure 2 plots congressional approval 
against survey data from the University of Michigan's Survey of 
Consumers (1970-2014). Specifically the survey question reads:

    As to the economic policy of the government--I mean steps 
taken to fight inflation or unemployment--would you say the 
government is doing a good job, only fair, or a poor job?

    Figure 2, which displays the annual percentage of persons 
saying the government is doing a ``good job,'' shows how 
closely these two measures of the public's approval track one 
another. The correlation between these two is relatively high 
at 0.741.\31\ The other notable observation from Figure 2 is 
that, since 2000, both congressional approval and the 
percentage of people saying the government is doing a ``good 
job'' handling the economy has been consecutively lower over 
the past 4 years.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ See Table B-7. For a discussion of how the term 
``correlation'' is used in this report, see Appendix A.
    \32\ See Table B-2 for the specific values used in Figure 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, while sometimes slight, the percentage of 
persons indicating that the government is doing a good job with 
the economy is always less than the percentage of the 
population approving of the job Congress is doing. This 
suggests that, as far as the public is concerned, what Congress 
does is not the only factor determining whether or not the 
government does a good job on economic policy. This, if true, 
is relatively sophisticated thinking.

   Figure 2. Annual Average Percentage Congressional Approval Versus 
                Government Doing ``Good Job'' on Economy

                               1970-2014

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Source: For congressional approval statistics, see Roper Center 
IPOLL database; annual estimates calculated by CRS; for ``Government 
Doing A Good Job on Economic Policy,'' see Survey of Consumers, 
University of Michigan.

                Congressional and Presidential Approval

    Most researchers consider that, at least in the eyes of the 
public, the institution of the Presidency is different from 
that of Congress. However, both are aspects of the Federal 
Government, so it should come as little surprise that the 
approval of the job of one may be, in some fashion, related to 
the job approval of the other. Figure 3 plots the annual 
average Presidential job approval (1970-2014) and annual 
average congressional job approval (1974-2014). The first thing 
to note is that the President consistently enjoys a more robust 
approval rating than Congress over the time period 
examined.\33\ The lowest that Presidential approval has dropped 
since 1970 was to 34 percent in 2007. The second year in which 
Presidential approval was nearly that low was 1974, the year 
Richard Nixon resigned the Presidency following the Watergate 
scandal of 1972-74 and was then pardoned by President Ford. The 
second notable observation in Figure 3 is that congressional 
approval and Presidential approval track each other closely. 
The two measures depicted on the graph are strongly correlated 
(0.665).\34\ Figure 3 shows that, when the public is unhappy 
with Presidential performance, they appear to be unhappy with 
congressional performance as well.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ The Supreme Court, not pictured in Figure 3, typically comes 
out ahead of the President.
    \34\ See Table B-7. For a discussion of how the term 
``correlation'' is used in this report, see Appendix A.
    \35\ Table B-3 for the specific values used in Figure 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Are Presidential approval and congressional approval 
related, or do people tend to evaluate these institutions 
separately? Some research conducted by political scientists 
suggests that individuals' assessments of the President appear 
to play a role in explaining congressional approval. One theory 
suggests that citizens cognitively link their support for 
different institutions, and that citizens' approval or 
disapproval of the President is an important predictor of their 
support for Congress.\36\ Other scholars posit that, while 
Presidential approval may not play a significant independent 
role in explaining congressional approval, the two institutions 
are linked by ``a responsibility shared by each institution for 
the overall health of the economy.'' \37\ Still, more recent 
research draws an even finer distinction and finds that 
individuals who are poorly informed about Congress are more 
likely to use their assessment of the President to also assess 
Congress, as Presidential approval is a more readily available 
evaluative factor.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ See Parker, ``Some Themes in Congressional Unpopularity,'' pp. 
93-109.
    \37\ Robert H. Durr, John B. Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht, 
``Explaining Congressional Approval,'' American Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 41, no. 1 (January 1997), pp. 175-207, 195.
    \38\ Jeffrey J. Mondak, Edward G. Carmines, Robert Huckfeldt, Dona-
Gene Mitchell, and Scot Schraufnagel, ``Does Familiarity Breed 
Contempt? The Impact of Information on Mass Attitudes toward 
Congress,'' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 51, no. 1 
(January 2007), pp. 34-48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Why does the President consistently receive higher job 
approval marks than does Congress? One reason may be that the 
President is one person and is armed with a press secretary and 
a small army of communications staff working to push his 
preferred message on a given day, week, or month. Congress 
projects at least 535 separate voices, some unified and others 
quite distinct. For this simple reason, the President typically 
enjoys an advantage in agenda setting and issue framing, an 
observation borne out in Figure 3. Hence, while the public may 
view unfavorably the entire operation of the Federal 
Government, they appear to be consistently harsher on Congress 
than the President.
    With this dynamic of shared responsibility in mind, it 
seems intuitive that the public's support for the President and 
for Congress under divided government might decrease support 
for the institutions.\39\ Yet, research suggests that this is 
only the case for a small subset of citizens, those who are 
knowledgeable about politics and who strongly identify with one 
of the two major political parties. Rather, political scientist 
Jeffrey Bernstein observed, ``Most citizens rate the two 
institutions while wearing a set of blinders, thinking the 
worst of the political system and the institutions that 
comprise it.'' \40\ Partisan control of the branches of 
government does not appear to be a driving force, but partisan 
discord does appear to negatively affect the public's 
assessment of Congress. So, while most of the public may not 
pay close attention to who holds the majority, they do assign 
blame to the Congress for the bickering that may result when 
the branches of government are controlled by different parties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ United government is a condition in which one political party 
controls the White House and both Chambers of Congress. Divided 
government is when the White House and one or both Chambers of Congress 
are controlled by different parties.
    \40\ Jeffrey Bernstein, ``Linking Presidential and Congressional 
Approval During Unified and Divided Governments,'' in What is it About 
Government that Americans Dislike?, ed. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, pp. 
98-117, 115.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Figure 3. Annual Average Percentage Job Approval-Congress Versus the 
                               President

                               1970-2014

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: Roper Center IPOLL Database with annual percentage 
estimates calculated by CRS; for Presidential approval, restricted to 
Gallup Polls.

      Assessment of Individual Members of Congress Versus Congress

    It has been observed that the relationship of the public to 
their own Representative is different from that of their 
relationship to the institution called Congress. In 1975, 
political scientist Richard Fenno identified an interesting 
phenomenon, later deemed ``Fenno's Paradox'': ``We do, it 
appears, love our Congressmen. On the other hand, it seems 
equally clear that we do not love our Congress.'' \41\ This 
phenomenon emerges in Figure 4, where it is clear that the 
public has held its own Member of Congress in much higher 
regard than it has held Congress as a whole. Incumbent Members 
of Congress generally enjoy high reelection rates, typically 
above 90 percent. This phenomenon often is chalked up to the 
inherent difficulty in assigning blame for dissatisfaction or 
credit for satisfaction to any single legislator. And until 
recently, the public was content to assign the majority of any 
blame onto the institution or ``other Members.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Richard. F. Fenno, Jr. ``If, as Ralph Nader Says, Congress is 
`the Broken Branch,' How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?'' in 
Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform, ed. Norm Ornstein (New York, 
Praeger: 1975), pp. 275-287.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While this dynamic has held for the past 40 years, the 
tides appear to be turning. In 2014, for the first time in the 
history of reliable polling, we now see a majority of Americans 
disapproving of their own Member of Congress (not shown in 
Figure 4 or in Table B-4).\42\ The consequence or inconsequence 
of this new downturn in public opinion will not be fully 
apparent until the conclusion of the 2014 midterm elections, 
but research suggests that a dramatic decrease in congressional 
approval generally may portend electoral upheaval as the public 
desires to ``vote the incumbent out.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Peyton M. Craighill and Scott Clement, ``A Majority of People 
Don't Like Their Own Member of Congress. For the First Time Ever,'' The 
Washington Post, August 5, 2014, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/08/05/a-majority-of-people-dont-like-their-own-
congressman-for-the-first-time-ever/. This poll result was not included 
in Table B-4 or in Figure 4, as it was not available when the data were 
compiled.
    \43\ Jack Citrin and Samantha Luks, ``Political Trust Revisited: 
Deja Vu All Over Again,'' in What is it About Government that Americans 
Dislike?, ed. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, pp. 9-27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Figure 4. Annual Average Percentage Job Approval-Congress Versus Own 
                             Representative

                               1974-2014

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: Roper Center IPOLL Database with annual estimates 
calculated by CRS.

    Figure 5 reinforces the view that a decrease in approval 
may portend an electoral upheaval. The graph shows support for 
reelecting one's own Member as compared to reelecting the whole 
Congress. Again, members of the public appear to hold their own 
Member of Congress in greater regard than they do Congress as a 
whole. However, since 2010, on average, a majority of 
respondents to these surveys have favored ``electing someone 
else'' when asked about their own Representatives. With the 
exception of a single survey in 1990, the surveys indicated 
that a majority of the public from 1992 to 2009, on average, 
consistently supported the reelection of their own Member.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ See Table B-5 for the specific values used in Figure 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             Congressional Approval and Trust in Government

    In 1958, the researchers at the University of Michigan 
conducting the 1958 American National Election Study included 
the first trust-in-government question on the survey, 
attempting to measure how often respondents felt they could 
trust the government in Washington to do the right thing.\45\ 
Figure 6 plots the annual percentages approving the job that 
Congress is doing and the annual percentages of the public who 
felt they could trust the government in Washington ``always'' 
or ``most of the time'' to do what was right. These two 
measures, while related to one another, are distinct.\46\ 
Congressional approval measures the public's approval of the 
job that Congress is doing. Trust in government is more 
general, and measures a respondent's trust in the entire 
national government. The results in Figure 6 demonstrate that 
congressional approval and trust in government track very 
closely.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ The question read: ``How much of the time do you think you can 
trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about 
always, most of the time or only some of the time?'' For questions and 
results from 1958 to 2008, see http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/
toptable/tab5a_1.htm.
    \46\ The correlation between the two sets of annual percentages is 
0.707. See Table B-6. For a discussion of how the term ``correlation'' 
is used in this report, see Appendix A.
    \47\ See Table B-6 for the specific values used in Figure 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Figure 5. Annual Average Percentage Favoring Reelecting Own 
               Representative Versus Reelecting Congress

                               1978-2014

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Source: Roper Center IPOLL database with annual estimates 
calculated by CRS.

    According to three scholars who study trust in governmental 
institutions, competence is ``at the center of understanding 
public perceptions of trust in government.'' Furthermore, these 
same authors have written, ``When economic times are good and 
the public is less focused on problems within the nation, 
citizens express greater confidence in the people running the 
institutions of government.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Virginia A. Chanley, Thomas J. Rudolph, and Wendy M. Rahn, 
``Public Trust in Government in the Reagan Years and Beyond,'' in What 
is it About Government that Americans Dislike?, ed. Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, pp. 59-79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Americans' level of trust in government has dropped 
substantially over the past 50 years. While almost 80 percent 
of Americans trusted the Federal Government in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, by the 1990s that number had plummeted to a 
mere 20-30 percent. And it continues to decline.\49\ In 
statistical models, job approval of Congress turns out to be a 
robust predictor of trust in government. This appeared 
especially to be the case in the 1990s, likely due to 
heightened attention to conflict between the executive and 
legislative branches and the involvement of some prominent 
legislators in a variety of high-profile scandals.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Jack Citrin and Samantha Luks, ``Political Trust Revisited,'' 
in What is it About Government that Americans Dislike?, ed. Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse, pp. 9-27.
    \50\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are several implications for declining trust in 
government. First, political mistrust appears to be a catalyst 
for voting against the incumbent President or his party's 
candidate.\51\ Hence, rising mistrust may account for electoral 
change and, as a result, more partisan discord in government. 
Second, trust is also important when policies, enacted by the 
government, require cooperation and sacrifice, as the public is 
more likely to voluntarily follow the law when they trust the 
laws and those making them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Ibid., p. 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Figure 6. Annual Average Percentage Congressional Job Approval Versus 
                          Trust in Government

                               1970-2014

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: Roper Center IPOLL Database with annual percentage 
estimates calculated by CRS.

                               Conclusion

    Representative government thrives when the represented 
approve of and trust the institutions and Members therein who 
represent them. To the extent that support for the legislative 
branch is low, the United States runs the risk that citizens' 
disengagement from the institutions of government will result 
in a political system that produces policy outcomes that do not 
reflect citizen preferences. To the extent that citizens' 
unfavorable ratings of the legislative branch are based on a 
deep-seated dissatisfaction with democratic principles like 
debate and deliberation, as previous research has suggested, 
the remedy to congressional disapproval is essential but not 
entirely clear.
    Americans have a decidedly negative view of Congress--the 
data presented here show that the public does not hold the 
institution in high regard, even more so when compared to the 
other branches of the Federal Government. Over the 40-year time 
period examined, the public's negative feelings about Congress 
are strongly and positively correlated with a lack of trust in 
government and a lack of confidence in the Federal Government's 
ability to handle the economy. The public's low regard for the 
legislative branch, however, is today at a historic low, and, 
for the first time since reliable polling data have been 
available, a majority of the public does not have confidence in 
their own Member of Congress. And, perhaps more consequentially 
for the stability of the institution, since 2010, on average, a 
majority of survey respondents have favored ``electing someone 
else'' than their own Representatives.
    What explains this lackluster support for the legislative 
branch and, more important, the consistent decline over the 
past 4 years? Political science research suggests that 
Americans do not understand the legislative process, either due 
to the complexity of the process; the media's role in 
emphasizing negative aspects of Congress' Members and work; or 
inadequate education of the public by Congress and others about 
what Congress does, how it does its job, and why it functions 
as it does. One finding that emerges consistently in research, 
however, is that Americans are not convinced that negotiating, 
debate, and the back and forth that is required of legislators 
on Capitol Hill is even necessary; they instead regard it as 
undesirable and symptomatic of institutional dysfunction. As 
Lee Hamilton explained, ``One of the ironies about Congress is 
that while the legislative system put in place by the framers 
has served our nation well for more than two hundred years, 
many of its essential components are not all that popular with 
the general public. Americans like quick action rather than 
delay.'' \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Lee H. Hamilton, How Congress Works and Why You Should Care, 
p. 117.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Representation, of course, is a two-way street and requires 
the participation and voice of the represented and 
Representatives and Senators. As two political scientists 
concluded: ``The real failure of the American people is not 
that they are unable to recall the name of the secretary of 
state, that they do not know how many senators represent each 
state....'' Rather, ``citizens' big failure is that they lack 
an appreciation for the ugliness of democracy.'' \53\ The 
public has difficulty in tolerating the bickering and 
negotiation among Members of Congress--characteristics of the 
institution that only appear to be increasing with increasing 
polarization in Congress and the Nation as a whole--because 
they do not understand why it is a necessary component of the 
democratic legislative process. Both Congress and the public 
might consider ways to improve communication and understanding 
of the legislative branch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, Stealth Democracy, p. 157.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    That the public receives most of its information about 
Congress from the news media is potentially problematic if the 
information tends to be more negative and focused on scandal 
and partisan rancor. A recent well-known Capitol Hill political 
analyst, Stuart Rothenberg, lamented in an August 12, 2014, 
Roll Call article that the news media are partly to blame for 
Americans' belief that Congress is unproductive and 
dysfunctional. Rothenberg wrote:

    Journalists and talking heads tell voters over and over 
that Congress is inept, even corrupt, and when we ask them what 
they think about Congress, they call Congress inept and even 
corrupt. And then we report back that Americans think Congress 
is inept and even corrupt. It's a never-ending feedback loop 
that reinforces the conventional wisdom.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ Stuart Rothenberg, ``Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Might Be Why 
Americans Hate Congress,'' Roll Call, August 12, 2014, at http://
blogs.rollcall.com/rothenblog/self-fulfilling-prophecy-might-be-why-
americans-hate-congress/?dcz=.

    Congress has a communications challenge, both with regard 
to the public and the press. Unlike the Office of the 
President, Congress does not speak with one voice; it has more 
than 535 voices that are often at odds with one another. The 
public and the media must make sense of these many different 
voices. Moreover, congressional candidates often run against 
the institution as a way to garner campaign support and 
attention. One potential solution is for Congress to devote 
more time and resources to informing the public about core 
tenets of the legislative process and encourage informed, 
intelligent public participation.
    The last eloquent defender of Congress as an institution, 
Senator Robert Byrd from West Virginia, used his floor 
speeches, committee work, and press relationships to educate 
the public, the media, and his colleagues about the Senate and 
Congress. Congress needs new advocates, individuals to explain 
what it does and why it does it--persons to make clear that, 
given the diverse interests of a large Nation, the only way to 
settle issues is through debate, rancor, and compromise. The 
process is neither neat nor elegant to most people, but the 
alternatives of top-down or secret authoritarian systems are 
not something that most people in this country would like to 
see. With all their other duties, sitting Members may not be 
able to take on this additional duty. But what about the many 
former Members? They know the institution, perhaps better than 
others.

                 Appendix A. Some Methodological Issues

    The data used in this report are based on the results of 
many public opinion surveys conducted over the past 40 years, 
derived either from the IPOLL database at the Roper Center 
(Congressional Job Approval, Job Approval of Own 
Representative, Presidential Approval, Re-Elect Own 
Representative, Re-Elect Congress, and Trust in Government) or 
from the Survey of Consumers at the University of Michigan (Job 
Approval of Government in Conducting Economic Policy).

                      Calculating the Percentages

    Data from the Survey of Consumers were available as the 
results from each individual monthly survey, combined into 
quarterly summaries or combined into yearly summaries. Data, in 
the form of percentage responses to the specific questions 
posed in a survey, from the IPOLL database were available only 
individually for each survey. Each question's result came from 
a separate survey with a starting date of interviewing and an 
ending date of interviewing, and with a specific sample size 
associated with it. For example, the earliest results posing 
the question about congressional job performance were from a 
Gallup survey conducted between April 12, 1974, and April 15, 
1974, with a sample of size 1,621 respondents. The results of 
the survey shown in the IPOLL database indicated that 30 
percent approved of the job Congress was doing, 47 percent 
disapproved of the job, and 23 percent responded that they did 
not know. Given these results, it was easy to estimate that the 
number of respondents who approved was 486, who disapproved was 
762, and who did not know was 373.
    This same calculation was performed on each of the results 
from each of the surveys asking the congressional job approval 
question over the period 1974 to 2014--well over 1,000 surveys.
    Yearly percentage estimates were then calculated in the 
following way: Based on the survey interview ending-date year, 
the estimated number of respondents for each of the categories 
(Approve, Disapprove, and Did Not Know) was summed over all 
surveys conducted within each year. Based on these numbers for 
the entire year, the yearly percentages for each of the 40 
years were easily calculated. Quarterly percentage estimates 
were calculated similarly, but for each of 160 quarters.
    The annual percentages for each of the other questions (Job 
Approval of Own Representative, Presidential Approval, Re-Elect 
Own Representative, Re-Elect Congress, and Trust in Government) 
were calculated in exactly the same way.

         Statistical Correlational Analysis Used in the Report

    Correlation analysis is a statistical technique that can 
show whether and how strongly pairs of variables may be 
related. In surveying individual respondents, a correlational 
analysis can show whether or not respondents who hold a 
particular view on one subject also hold a particular view on 
other topics or have certain characteristics. In a longitudinal 
analysis with aggregate measures, the attempt is to see whether 
one measure of a phenomenon moves, over the time period, in the 
same way that another phenomenon moves (positive correlation), 
in a completely opposite way (negative correlation), or that 
the two phenomena move in relative random ways (no 
correlation).
    There are a variety of statistical measures that purport to 
measure association and correlation. However, in this analysis, 
the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient statistic 
was chosen to examine the relationship among the variable 
examined. The Pearson r or r, as it is often referred to, 
measures the linear dependence of two variables. The value of 
the statistic ranges from 1 (perfect positive correlation) to 
^1 (perfect negative correlation), with a 0 value indicating no 
correlation.
    While the statistic can be used to test a null hypothesis 
or to construct confidence intervals, it is used in this report 
in a purely descriptive way. The correlational analysis is 
meant to suggest that the correlates examined in the report are 
worth looking at empirically, even though there is a good deal 
of evidence at the microlevel that the factors examined are 
related, and relatively decent theoretical reasons for the 
choice of the variables.
    While the interpretation of the statistic is somewhat 
arbitrary, for this analysis with this level of aggregation, 
``high'' correlations would fall in the range 0.7 to 1.0 or 
^0.7 to ^1.0, while ``low'' correlations would fall in the 
range 0.3 to ^0.3 (see Table B-7).
    There are some cautions with any correlational analysis 
that need to be highlighted:
   Correlation never is enough to prove causation. The fact 
        that two variables have a correlation of 1 does not say 
        anything about one variable causing another.
   Especially with respect to time-related or longitudinal 
        analysis, the correlation of one variable with another can mean 
        nothing. Many different phenomena increase or decrease over 
        time. Without some legitimate theoretical reason to think that 
        there is a relationship, such correlations may just be 
        silly.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ For some rather funny correlations, see ``Spurious 
Correlations,'' at http://www.tylervigen. com/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   The Pearson Correlation Coefficient is a measure of linear 
        dependence between two variables. This means that it is useful 
        in measuring a straight-line relationship between two 
        phenomena. As one goes up, the other goes up (or down) as well. 
        If the relationship between two variables is, in fact, 
        curvilinear, then the Pearson Correlation Coefficient is likely 
        to suggest that there is no relationship. There is no linear 
        relationship, but there is a curvilinear one.
    The statistic as it is used in this analysis is not meant 
to suggest causality, but is based on empirical research and a 
reasonably solid theoretical foundation.

                           Appendix B. Tables

                 Table B-1. Annual Average Percentage of Congressional Job Approval-Disapproval
                                                    1970-1974
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Percent         Percent      Percent don't    Sample size
                   Survey year                       approving     disapproving       know-no     for surveys in
                                                     Congress        Congress         opinion          year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970............................................  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............
1971............................................  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............
1972............................................  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............
1973............................................  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............
1974............................................           37.30           41.40           21.30           4,797
1975............................................           31.80           51.50           16.70           6,248
1976............................................           24.00           58.00           18.00           1,538
1977............................................           34.70           44.40           20.90          10,685
1978............................................           29.60           50.60           19.80           7,524
1979............................................           19.00           61.00           20.00           1,511
1980............................................           28.80           53.30           17.90           3,269
1981............................................           36.10           33.70           30.20           2,934
1982............................................           29.00           54.00           17.00           1,504
1983............................................           33.00           43.00           24.00           1,517
1984............................................  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............
1985............................................           53.40           35.90           10.70           3,495
1986............................................           42.00           37.00           21.00           1,552
1987............................................           50.40           43.60            6.00           2,518
1988............................................           42.60           48.60            8.80           2,508
1989............................................           47.40           46.40            6.20           8,867
1990............................................           30.50           61.30            8.20          16,702
1991............................................           37.60           52.20           10.20          13,189
1992............................................           20.20           72.20            7.60          12,282
1993............................................           27.50           62.10           10.40          23,776
1994............................................           27.20           63.40            9.40          34,883
1995............................................           34.50           53.60           11.80          47,253
1996............................................           31.90           57.60           10.50          32,402
1997............................................           39.50           49.40           11.10          37,889
1998............................................           48.20           41.60           10.10          71,451
1999............................................           43.10           47.00            9.90          48,667
2000............................................           46.30           41.40           12.20          15,101
2001............................................           51.90           35.20           12.90          34,866
2002............................................           51.30           36.80           11.90          36,271
2003............................................           44.20           45.00           10.90          25,374
2004............................................           41.80           48.70            9.50          18,213
2005............................................           35.30           55.20            9.50          47,372
2006............................................           28.80           63.20            7.90          65,418
2007............................................           29.20           61.40            9.40          65,164
2008............................................           19.70           72.40            7.90          36,733
2009............................................           29.50           61.70            8.80          41,873
2010............................................           21.00           73.10            5.90          49,656
2011............................................           17.60           76.50            5.90          44,333
2012............................................           14.60           78.70            6.70          31,711
2013............................................           14.40           80.50            5.10          43,530
2014............................................           12.90           82.00            5.10           7,606
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Roper Center IPOLL Database, with all calculations performed by CRS.
 
Note: In general, the question posed was: ``Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its
  job?''


   Table B-2. Annual Average Percentage of Congressional Approval Versus Saying the Federal Government Is Doing a ``Good-Poor'' Job on Economic Policy
                                                                        1970-2014
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                                Sample
                                                                                            Percent     Percent     Percent    Sample sizes     sizes
                                                                  Percent      Percent      saying      saying      saying         for         opinions
                          Survey year                            approving  disapproving  government  government  government  congressional   about the
                                                                  Congress    Congress    doing good  doing fair  doing poor    approval-     government
                                                                                              job         job         job      disapproval     economic
                                                                                                                                   data      policy data
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970...........................................................  .........  ............      16.47       46.04       27.05   .............        2,739
1971...........................................................  .........  ............      20.73       47.16       24.51   .............        3,889
1972...........................................................  .........  ............      19.94       53.76       20.45   .............        4,939
1973...........................................................  .........  ............      13.71       45.75       35.05   .............        5,587
1974...........................................................      37.30       41.40         6.79       43.79       42.63           4,797        5,817
1975...........................................................      31.80       51.50         6.28       50.67       38.74           6,248        5,575
1976...........................................................      24.00       58.00        11.89       54.16       27.85           1,538        5,443
1977...........................................................      34.70       44.40        18.28       56.82       18.02          10,685        5,067
1978...........................................................      29.60       50.60        10.98       55.14       29.77           7,524       11,186
1979...........................................................      19.00       61.00         8.49       48.58       39.24           1,511       12,960
1980...........................................................      28.80       53.30         8.40       46.21       42.28           3,269        8,675
1981...........................................................      36.10       33.70        25.35       45.80       24.22           2,934        8,273
1982...........................................................      29.00       54.00        20.09       44.59       32.17           1,504        8,318
1983...........................................................      33.00       43.00        23.22       49.52       25.17           1,517        8,356
1984...........................................................  .........  ............      31.51       47.74       18.83   .............        8,301
1985...........................................................      53.40       35.90        29.52       49.76       18.53           3,495        7,836
1986...........................................................      42.00       37.00        27.77       50.61       19.66           1,552        7,878
1987...........................................................      50.40       43.60        21.73       51.97       24.03           2,518        7,377
1988...........................................................      42.60       48.60        22.91       53.01       22.24           2,508        6,016
1989...........................................................      47.40       46.40        20.40       56.18       20.82           8,867        6,024
1990...........................................................      30.5        61.3         15          55.06       28.1           16,702        6,032
1991...........................................................      37.6        52.2         11.23       54.17       32.4           13,189        6,053
1992...........................................................      20.2        72.2          6.72       42.81       48.97          12,282        6,040
1993...........................................................      27.5        62.1         12.02       50.4        34.05          23,776        6,058
1994...........................................................      27.2        63.4         15.98       55.71       26.07          34,883        6,069
1995...........................................................      34.5        53.6         16.82       54.93       26.18          47,253        6,024
1996...........................................................      31.9        57.6         19.91       53.45       24.9           32,402        6,008
1997...........................................................      39.5        49.4         26.82       53.85       17.24          37,889        6,002
1998...........................................................      48.2        41.6         41.49       44.88       10.58          71,451        6,011
1999...........................................................      43.1        47           42.17       45.15       10.68          48,667        5,995
2000...........................................................      46.3        41.4         43.65       44.49        9.82          15,101        6,020
2001...........................................................      51.9        35.2         33.1        48.23       14.05          34,866        6,013
2002...........................................................      51.3        36.8         27.73       51.19       18.07          36,271        6,011
2003...........................................................      44.2        45           21.23       48.07       28.9           25,374        6,014
2004...........................................................      41.8        48.7         22.65       47.42       28.74          18,213        6,040
2005...........................................................      35.3        55.2         19.16       48.3        31.63          47,372        6,029
2006...........................................................      28.8        63.2         17.49       47.41       33.93          65,418        6,015
2007...........................................................      29.2        61.4         17.44       48.57       32.64          65,164        6,045
2008...........................................................      19.7        72.4          7.46       43.33       47.73          36,733        6,044
2009...........................................................      29.5        61.7         19.59       45.54       32.97          41,873        6,054
2010...........................................................      21          73.1         13.98       45.57       39.66          49,656        6,067
2011...........................................................      17.6        76.5         10.99       41.59       46.32          44,333        6,013
2012...........................................................      14.6        78.7         12.77       42.63       43.24          31,711        6,054
2013...........................................................      14.4        80.5         12.14       41.17       45.58          43,530        6,036
2014...........................................................      12.9        82            7.92       42.97       48.91           7,606          505
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: For congressional approval-disapproval data, see Roper Center IPOLL database, with all calculations performed by CRS; for good-poor job on
  economic policy, see Survey of Consumer Reports, University of Michigan.
 
Notes: In general, the question about congressional approval-disapproval was: ``Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job?''
  The question about economic policy was: ``As to the economic policy of the government--I mean steps taken to fight inflation or unemployment--would
  you say the government is doing a good job, only fair or a poor job?''


                  Table B-3. Annual Average Percentage Job Approval--Congress Versus President
                                                    1970-2014
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Sample sizes     Sample
                                                                                           for        sizes for
                                     Percent      Percent     Percent      Percent    congressional   President
            Survey year             approving  disapproving  approving  disapproving    approval-     approval-
                                     Congress    Congress    President    President    disapproval   disapproval
                                                                                           data          data
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970..............................  .........  ............     56.8         29.3     .............      27,549
1971..............................  .........  ............     50.1         37.1     .............      20,277
1972..............................  .........  ............     56.4         33.2     .............      15,146
1973..............................  .........  ............     41.8         47.3     .............      30,830
1974..............................      37.3         41.4       35.2         49.5           4,797        36,851
1975..............................      31.8         51.5       43           40.5           6,248        29,508
1976..............................      24           58         47.6         39             1,538        13,952
1977..............................      34.7         44.4       62.5         19.8          10,685        36,603
1978..............................      29.6         50.6       46           38.3           7,524        45,778
1979..............................      19           61         36.9         49.6           1,511        39,486
1980..............................      28.8         53.3       41.1         47.7           3,269        26,897
1981..............................      36.1         33.7       57.4         28.6           2,934        30,639
1982..............................      29           54         44.1         45.7           1,504        29,617
1983..............................      33           43         43.2         45.9           1,517        41,162
1984..............................  .........  ............     54.8         36.1     .............      30,422
1985..............................      53.4         35.9       60.3         30.2           3,495        25,110
1986..............................      42           37         62.5         28             1,552        17,585
1987..............................      50.4         43.6       49.5         41.3           2,518        29,711
1988..............................      42.6         48.6       51.7         38.5           2,508        15,815
1989..............................      47.4         46.4       62.9         17.2           8,867        25,444
1990..............................      30.5         61.3       66           22.5          16,702        52,418
1991..............................      37.6         52.2       71.7         20.7          13,189        51,627
1992..............................      20.2         72.2       38.9         53.1          12,282        40,527
1993..............................      27.5         62.1       48.8         39.1          23,776        39,611
1994..............................      27.2         63.4       46.8         44            34,883        39,628
1995..............................      34.5         53.6       47.2         41.3          47,253        35,723
1996..............................      31.9         57.6       54.2         36.1          32,402        36,659
1997..............................      39.5         49.4       58.3         31.8          37,889        26,027
1998..............................      48.2         41.6       63.8         31.7          71,451        41,868
1999..............................      43.1         47         61.2         35            48,667        37,029
2000..............................      46.3         41.4       60           36            15,101        29,782
2001..............................      51.9         35.2       66.3         24.5          34,866        33,089
2002..............................      51.3         36.8       72.4         22.2          36,271        44,439
2003..............................      44.2         45         60.5         35.4          25,374        41,367
2004..............................      41.8         48.7       50.8         46            18,213        39,580
2005..............................      35.3         55.2       45.8         50.5          47,372        42,643
2006..............................      28.8         63.2       38           57.7          65,418        28,631
2007..............................      29.2         61.4       33.6         62.1          65,164        27,291
2008..............................      19.7         72.4       29.9         65.3          36,733        36,137
2009..............................      29.5         61.7       58.3         33.8          41,873        55,607
2010..............................      21           73.1       47           47            49,656        44,805
2011..............................      17.6         76.5       44.9         48.2          44,333        47,523
2012..............................      14.6         78.7       48.6         45.6          31,711        62,590
2013..............................      14.4         80.5       46.8         46.9          43,530        69,072
2014..............................      12.9         82         42.4         52             7,606         9,725
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Roper Center IPOLL database, with all calculations performed by CRS.
 
Notes: In general, the question about Congress was: ``Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is
  handling its job?'' In general, the question about the President was: ``Do you approve or disapprove of the
  way [name of President] is handling his job as President?''


                                       Table B-4. Annual Average Job Approval--Congress Versus Own Representative
                                                                        1974-2014
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                            Sample sizes   Sample sizes
                                                                                                               Percent          for           for own
                                                                   Percent      Percent        Percent      disapproving   congressional  Representative
                          Survey Year                             approving  disapproving   approving own        own         approval-       approval-
                                                                  Congress     Congress    Representative  Representative   disapproval     disapproval
                                                                                                                                data           data
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970...........................................................  ..........  ............  ..............  ..............  .............  ..............
1971...........................................................  ..........  ............  ..............  ..............  .............  ..............
1972...........................................................  ..........  ............  ..............  ..............  .............  ..............
1973...........................................................  ..........  ............  ..............  ..............  .............  ..............
1974...........................................................       37.30        41.40   ..............  ..............         4,797   ..............
1975...........................................................       31.80        51.50   ..............  ..............         6,248   ..............
1976...........................................................       24.00        58.00   ..............  ..............         1,538   ..............
1977...........................................................       34.70        44.40   ..............  ..............        10,685   ..............
1978...........................................................       29.60        50.60          60.70           21.00           7,524          4,395
1979...........................................................       19.00        61.00   ..............  ..............         1,511   ..............
1980...........................................................       28.80        53.30          61.00           18.00           3,269          1,769
1981...........................................................       36.10        33.70   ..............  ..............         2,934   ..............
1982...........................................................       29.00        54.00   ..............  ..............         1,504   ..............
1983...........................................................       33.00        43.00   ..............  ..............         1,517   ..............
1984...........................................................  ..........  ............  ..............  ..............  .............  ..............
1985...........................................................       53.40        35.90   ..............  ..............         3,495   ..............
1986...........................................................       42.00        37.00          59.00           23.00           1,552          2,006
1987...........................................................       50.40        43.60   ..............  ..............         2,518   ..............
1988...........................................................       42.60        48.60   ..............  ..............         2,508   ..............
1989...........................................................       47.40        46.40          71.00           18.00           8,867          1,513
1990...........................................................       30.50        61.30          56.80           28.80          16,702          8,732
1991...........................................................       37.60        52.20          60.40           27.00          13,189          5,839
1992...........................................................       20.20        72.20          52.30           33.90          12,282         10,464
1993...........................................................       27.50        62.10          59.50           26.20          23,776          2,844
1994...........................................................       27.20        63.40          55.30           31.50          34,883          9,844
1995...........................................................       34.50        53.60          60.00           22.00          47,253          1,190
1996...........................................................       31.90        57.60          61.00           23.00          32,402          1,479
1997...........................................................       39.50        49.40   ..............  ..............        37,889   ..............
1998...........................................................       48.20        41.60          67.40           18.10          71,451         11,564
1999...........................................................       43.10        47.00          70.00           21.00          48,667          1,505
2000...........................................................       46.30        41.40   ..............  ..............        15,101   ..............
2001...........................................................       51.90        35.20   ..............  ..............        34,866   ..............
2002...........................................................       51.30        36.80          65.70           24.20          36,271          3,518
2003...........................................................       44.20        45.00   ..............  ..............        25,374   ..............
2004...........................................................       41.80        48.70   ..............  ..............        18,213   ..............
2005...........................................................       35.30        55.20          59.10           27.50          47,372          6,262
2006...........................................................       28.80        63.20          56.30           29.00          65,418         24,651
2007...........................................................       29.20        61.40          54.70           24.00          65,164          5,350
2008...........................................................       19.70        72.40          48.70           29.30          36,733          5,471
2009...........................................................       29.50        61.70   ..............  ..............        41,873   ..............
2010...........................................................       21.00        73.10          45.70           39.20          49,656         11,680
2011...........................................................       17.60        76.50          39.00           33.00          44,333          1,000
2012...........................................................       14.60        78.70   ..............  ..............        31,711   ..............
2013...........................................................       14.40        80.50          44.20           37.90          43,530          4,295
2014...........................................................       12.90        82.00   ..............  ..............         7,606   ..............
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Roper Center IPOLL database, with all calculations performed by CRS.
 
Notes: In general, the question about Congress was: ``Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is handling its job?'' In general, the question
  about one's own Representative was: ``Do you approve or disapprove of the way your own Representative is handling his or her job?''


     Table B-5. Annual Average Percentage Favoring Reelecting Own Representative Versus Reelecting Congress
                                                    1978-2014
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Percent                            Sample sizes     Sample
                                   Percent favor     favor      Percent     Percent   for reelecting   sizes for
           Survey year            reelecting own   electing    favoring    opposing         own       reelecting
                                  Representative    someone   reelecting  reelecting  Representative   Congress
                                                     else      Congress    Congress        data          data
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1971............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1972............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1973............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1974............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1975............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1976............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1977............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1978............................         46.00         19.00  ..........  ..........         1,451    ..........
1979............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1980............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1981............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1982............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1983............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1984............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1985............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1986............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1987............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1988............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1989............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1990............................         40.20         47.10       20.00       67.00         4,647           960
1991............................  ..............  ..........  ..........  ..........  ..............  ..........
1992............................         50.20         35.30       33.90       51.20        25,727        13,590
1993............................         54.10         29.90       38.50       46.50         5,147         2,025
1994............................         44.80         40.30       34.30       52.60        27,721        10,666
1995............................         59.00         29.30       36.70       50.00         3,203         3,203
1996............................         60.60         19.40       50.30       31.40         9,987         6,595
1997............................         53.30         31.20       50.60       32.20         4,415         2,889
1998............................         56.30         28.00       40.80       41.60        16,819        11,598
1999............................         51.30         37.10       41.00       47.00         2,051           846
2000............................         61.20         16.20       50.60       31.60         9,199         3,522
2001............................         64.00         20.00       51.00       31.00           814           814
2002............................         56.70         25.20       43.60       39.60         6,481         4,158
2003............................         64.00         22.00       51.00       35.00         1,004         1,004
2004............................         56.90         23.80       51.00       33.00         1,883         1,013
2005............................         53.60         32.60       40.20       46.20         3,192         2,190
2006............................         51.70         32.30       34.20       52.20        20,369        20,455
2007............................         60.00         31.80       41.40       51.00         1,521         1,521
2008............................         59.10         24.70       37.30       49.00         4,179         4,179
2009............................         41.50         39.60       34.00       53.00         8,547         1,516
2010............................         41.70         44.10       25.70       62.70        38,898        22,483
2011............................         40.60         47.40       17.20       73.00        12,230         9,183
2012............................         44.50         43.20       37.00       54.00         6,254         1,536
2013............................         36.20         54.30       29.00       65.40         4,992         3,423
2014............................         35.30         54.40       19.00       70.00         3,081         1,018
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Roper Center IPOLL database, with all calculations performed by CRS.
 
Notes: In general, the question about one's own Representative was: ``Right now, do you think your
  representative in Congress should be re-elected or do you think another candidate would do a better job?'' In
  general, the question about reelecting the Congress was: ``Regardless about how you feel about your own
  Representative, would you like to see most members of Congress re-elected in the next Congressional election,
  or not?''


                 Table B-6. Annual Average Congressional Job Approval Versus Trust in Government
                                                    1970-2014
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Percent     Percent    Sample sizes
                                                                  trust       trust         for         Sample
                                       Percent      Percent    government  government  congressional   sizes for
            Survey year               approving  disapproving   always or    some of     approval-     trust in
                                      Congress     Congress      most of    the time    disapproval   government
                                                                the time    or never        data         data
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1970...............................  ..........  ............       52.97       44.02  .............       1,497
1971...............................  ..........  ............  ..........  ..........  .............  ..........
1972...............................  ..........  ............       53.01       45.02  .............       2,279
1973...............................  ..........  ............  ..........  ..........  .............  ..........
1974...............................       37.30        41.40        35.26       63.11         4,797        3,988
1975...............................       31.80        51.50   ..........  ..........         6,248   ..........
1976...............................       24.00        58.00        35.15       61.71         1,538        8,999
1977...............................       34.70        44.40        33.53       62.96        10,685        3,310
1978...............................       29.60        50.60        34.43       63.76         7,524        7,053
1979...............................       19.00        61.00        32.50       65.20         1,511       12,851
1980...............................       28.80        53.30        32.58       64.68         3,269        7,554
1981...............................       36.10        33.70   ..........  ..........         2,934   ..........
1982...............................       29.00        54.00        32.98       65.03         1,504        1,401
1983...............................       33.00        43.00        47.10       49.42         1,517        2,238
1984...............................  ..........  ............       45.23       52.75  .............       3,270
1985...............................       53.40        35.90        43.23       54.94         3,495        9,064
1986...............................       42.00        37.00        41.50       56.61         1,552        4,856
1987...............................       50.40        43.60        42.52       55.74         2,518        9,588
1988...............................       42.60        48.60        39.56       59.29         2,508        5,912
1989...............................       47.40        46.40        38.96       59.07         8,867        3,758
1990...............................       30.50        61.30        33.92       64.03        16,702       20,826
1991...............................       37.60        52.20        35.46       63.71        13,189        7,611
1992...............................       20.20        72.20        23.39       75.15        12,282       11,866
1993...............................       27.50        62.10        20.11       78.86        23,776       14,632
1994...............................       27.20        63.40        21.74       77.95        34,883       18,179
1995...............................       34.50        53.60        20.98       78.26        47,253       13,535
1996...............................       31.90        57.60        28.48       69.84        32,402        8,140
1997...............................       39.50        49.40        27.16       72.13        37,889        6,462
1998...............................       48.20        41.60        28.60       69.91        71,451       16,442
1999...............................       43.10        47.00        31.96       67.20        48,667       22,349
2000...............................       46.30        41.40        34.47       64.50        15,101       10,911
2001...............................       51.90        35.20        44.70       54.17        34,866       14,930
2002...............................       51.30        36.80        42.19       56.32        36,271       18,921
2003...............................       44.20        45.00        37.86       61.16        25,374       10,099
2004...............................       41.80        48.70        36.65       61.63        18,213        7,323
2005...............................       35.30        55.20        30.54       68.36        47,372        6,897
2006...............................       28.80        63.20        32.04       67.01        65,418        9,189
2007...............................       29.20        61.40        25.40       74.09        65,164        7,857
2008...............................       19.70        72.40        22.31       75.61        36,733        5,396
2009...............................       29.50        61.70        26.02       72.40        41,873       11,337
2010...............................       21.00        73.10        21.03       77.95        49,656       22,256
2011...............................       17.60        76.50        21.01       77.71        44,333       13,556
2012...............................       14.60        78.70   ..........  ..........        31,711   ..........
2013...............................       14.40        80.50        19.83       78.81        43,530       11,918
2014...............................       12.90        82.00   ..........  ..........         7,606   ..........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Roper Center IPOLL database, with all calculations performed by CRS.
 
Notes: In general, the question about Congress was: ``Do you approve or disapprove of the way Congress is
  handling its job?'' In general, the question about trust was: ``Generally speaking, how much of the time do
  you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right--just about always, most of the time,
  or only some of the time, or hardly ever?''


 Table B-7. Correlates with Annual Percentage Congressional Job Approval
                                1974-2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Pearson
                                                         correlates with
                                                             annual
           Political and economic variables                percentage
                                                          congressional
                                                          job approval
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual percent trust government always or most of time             0.707
Annual percent Presidential job approval..............             0.665
Annual percent unemployment (BLS).....................            ^0.457
Annual percent change in real GDP (BEA)...............             0.217
Annual percent change in unemployment (BLS)...........            ^0.060
Annual Index of Consumer Sentiment*...................             0.652
Annual percent current financial situation better off              0.665
 than year ago........................................
Annual percent expected change in financial situation              0.738
 better off than year ago.............................
Annual percent expected change in family income up in              0.696
 1 or 2 years.........................................
Annual percent saying government doing a good job                  0.741
 fighting inflation and unemployment..................
Annual percent saying current business conditions                  0.252
 better now than year ago.............................
Annual percent expected change in prices same or down              0.145
 in next 12 months....................................
Annual percent saying unemployment will be less in                ^0.089
 next 12 months.......................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*The Index of Consumer Sentiment is constructed using the results of
  five of the survey's questions: Present and Future Personal Financial
  Situation, Present and Future Business Conditions, and Good/Bad Time
  to Purchase Durable Goods. For a detailed description of the
  construction of the index, see ``Index Calculation,'' at Survey of
  Consumers Web site at http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/survey-info.php.
 
Source: Unemployment and Percent Change in Unemployment from U.S. Bureau
  of Labor Statistics (BLS), Percent Change in Real GDP from U.S. Bureau
  of Economic Analysis (BEA), Trust in Government and Presidential Job
  Approval from Roper Center IPOLL database; CRS computed yearly
  percentage estimates. All economic attitudinal variables from Survey
  of Consumers, University of Michigan.



       Comparing Modern Congresses: Can Productivity Be Measured?

                            Jacob R. Straus

                        Analyst on the Congress

                              ----------                              


        Historically, scholars, the media, and even Members of 
        Congress have attempted to compare the productivity of 
        one Congress against another, often using a variety of 
        methods. This report examines the three most common 
        methods--legislation introduced, public laws enacted, 
        and landmark legislation--which each demonstrate a 
        different assessment of congressional activity over a 
        2-year period. The result of this analysis shows that 
        the three metrics, when used alone, may fail to account 
        for the complexity inherent in developing policy in the 
        American system.

                              Introduction

    In September 2012, Representative Steny Hoyer, the House 
minority whip, issued a press release calling the 112th 
Congress (2011-2013) the ``Least Productive in a Generation.'' 
\1\ To support his statement, he quoted a New York Times 
article on the subject, which stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. Congress, House, Office of the Democratic Whip, 
``Republican-Led 112th Congress Least Productive in a Generation,'' 
press release, 112th Cong., 2d sess., September 19, 2012, at http://
www.democraticwhip.gov/print/15750.

    The 112th Congress is set to enter the Congressional record 
books as the least productive body in a generation, passing a 
mere 173 public laws as of last month. That was well below the 
906 enacted from January 1947 through December 1948 by the body 
President Harry S. Truman referred to as the ``do-nothing'' 
Congress, and far fewer than even a single session of many 
prior Congresses.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Ibid., quoting Jennifer Steinhauer, ``Congress Nearing End of 
Session Where Partisan Input Impeded Output,'' The New York Times, 
September 18, 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/us/politics/
congress-nears-end-of-least-productive-session.html_r=0.

    Representative Hoyer was not alone in his criticism of 
Congress. Speaker John Boehner, in an interview with CBS News 
reporter Bob Schieffer on Face the Nation, answered a question 
about whether the 112th Congress was the least productive in 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
history.

    Schieffer: Any way you cut it, and whoever's fault it is, 
you have presided over what [is] perhaps the least productive 
and certainly one of the least popular Congresses in history.
    Boehner: Well, Bob, we should not be judged on how many new 
laws we create. We ought to be judged on how many laws that we 
repeal. We've got more laws than the administration could ever 
enforce. And so we don't do commemorative bills on the floor. 
We don't do all that nonsense. We deal with what the American 
people want us to deal with. Unpopular? Yes. Why? We're in a 
divided government. We're fighting for what we believe in. 
Sometimes, you know, the American people don't like this 
mess.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Speaker of the House of Representatives John Boehner, interview 
by Bob Schieffer, Face the Nation, CBS, transcript, July 21, 2013, at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/new/face-the-nation- transcripts-july-21-2013-
boehner-and-snyder.

    Both Representative Hoyer and Speaker Boehner highlighted 
the same themes, but arrived at the label of ``unproductive'' 
in different ways. Why did they disagree on the productivity of 
Congress? While politics plays a role in perceptions of 
Congress as a productive or unproductive institution, political 
viewpoints are not the only factor that have caused recent 
Congresses to be labeled as ``do-nothing'' Congresses.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ For example, see Alan Silverleib, ``Obama, Truman, and the `Do-
Nothing' Congress,'' CNN.com, December 27, 2011, at http://www.cnn.com/
2011/12/27/politics/obama-do-nothing- congress; Allison Brennan and 
Halimah Abdullah, ``Congress: Same Hours, Half the Work,'' CNN.com, 
June 19, 2012, at http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/19/politics/congress-
productivity; Philip Bump, ``Here's Yet Another Way of Looking at How 
Unproductive Congress Is,'' washingtonpost.com, May 17, 2014, at http:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/05/17/heres-yet-another-
way-of-looking-at-how-unproductive-congress-is; Derek Willis, ``A Do-
Nothing Congress? Well, Pretty Close,'' TheNewYorkTimes.com, May 28, 
2014, at http://nyti.ms/1mAeyBj; and Aaron Blake, ``Gridlock in 
Congress? It's Probably Even Worse Than You Think,'' 
washingtonpost.com, May 29, 2014, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/05/29/gridlock-in-congress-its-probably-even-
worse-than-you-think.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Labeling a particular Congress ``do-nothing'' is not a new 
idea. As Representative Hoyer alluded to, the label was first 
applied to the 80th Congress (1947-1949) by President Harry 
Truman. The 80th Congress was the first post-war and post-New 
Deal Congress. It was also the first Republican-controlled 
Congress since 1931. The policy orientation of the Republican 
majority, coupled with the goals of a new, previously unelected 
President, provided the basis for disagreements between the 
Truman White House and Congress. Throughout the 80th Congress, 
Republicans sought to roll back aspects of the New Deal, while, 
at the same time, President Truman wanted to expand its 
scope.\5\ It was against this backdrop that Truman coined the 
term ``do-nothing'' Congress to describe what he perceived was 
a Congress mired in partisan opposition and incapable of making 
decisions or meeting for a long enough period of time to 
introduce, debate, and pass legislation.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Barton J. Bernstein, ``Introduction,'' in Politics and Policies 
of the Truman Administration, ed. Barton J. Bernstein (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 3-14
    \6\ Barton J. Bernstein, ``The Ambiguous Legacy: The Truman 
Administration and Civil Rights,'' in Politics and Policies of the 
Truman Administration, p. 290; and David McCullough, Truman (New York: 
Touchstone Simon & Schuster, 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since its first use by Truman, the term ``do-nothing'' has 
become part of popular political culture, as a catchy synonym 
for unproductive, and has been applied to succeeding Congresses 
with varying success as a synonym for political agreement or 
disagreement. Reality dictates, however, that all Congresses 
cannot be ``do-nothing.'' If that were the case, important 
legislation enacted and other congressional actions occurring 
since the 80th Congress would not have taken place. Whether a 
specific Congress should be labeled as unproductive, however, 
is debatable.
    The decision to apply a label of productivity to a given 
Congress can be based on attempts to quantify congressional 
activity. For example, in a 2012 Roll Call article, journalists 
Jonathan Strong and Humberto Sanchez wrote that the 112th 
Congress was ``on track to be the least productive in modern 
history,'' and, as of September 13, 2012, they reported that it 
had produced only 90 laws on 636 House passed measures and 635 
Senate passed measures.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Jonathan Strong and Humberto Sanchez, ``Congress on Pace to Be 
Least Productive.'' Roll Call, September 13, 2012, at http://
www.rollcall.com/features/Guide-to-Congress_2012/guide/Congress-On-
Pace-to-Be-Least-Productive-217538-1.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Tom Coburn used the lens of public perception when 
he attempted to define productivity in the 2012 edition of his 
Wastebook, which highlighted examples of what the Senator 
believed were ``wasteful and low-priority spending.'' \8\ In 
his summary of the 112th Congress, Senator Coburn stated that 
``Congress is on pace to make history [for] the least 
productive year since 1947, with just 61 bills passed and made 
law in 2012 to date.'' Senator Coburn also observed that 
``[t]he inability of Congress to get things done has resulted 
in the lowest public approval in the nearly four decades the 
rating has been measured by Gallup. A stunning 83 percent 
disapprove of `the way Congress is doing its job.' '' \9\ 
However, productivity--the subject of this paper--is defined, 
Senator Coburn understood that public perception of 
congressional activity is part of judging one Congress against 
another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ U.S. Congress, Senator Tom Coburn, ``Coburn Releases Annual 
Wastebook Highlighting Most Egregious Spending of 2013,'' press 
release, December 17, 2013, at http://www.coburn.senate. gov/public/
index.cfm/pressreleases?ContentRecord_id=e7359436-1572-414e-8acc-
0222cad1c7d5.
    \9\ U.S. Congress, Senator Tom Coburn, Wastebook 2012, October 
2012, at http://www.coburn. senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b7b23f66-2d60-4d5a-8bc5-8522c7e1a40e.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The desire to assess the productivity of Congress predates 
even the 80th Congress. The Founding Fathers believed that 
enacting legislation for many public policy issues would be a 
difficult and incremental task. In Federalist 63, James Madison 
described two purposes of the legislative branch of government:

    The objects of government may be divided into two general 
classes: the one depending on measures which have singly an 
immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a 
succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures, which 
have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ James Madison, ``Federalist No. 63, The Senate Continued,'' 
The Federalist Papers, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/
fed_63.html.

    Dealing with the first purpose is potentially easier, with 
universal support and little opposition to the enactment of new 
public policies. Proposing legislation that focuses on the 
second purpose takes public and private deliberation and 
compromise over time--potentially over multiple Congresses--to 
come to a workable policy solution. This latter purpose might 
be thought of as great objects or landmark legislation.
    In many ways, the modern Congress operates with both 
purposes in mind. Many bills and resolutions pass the House and 
Senate with little or no opposition. Other matters, however, 
require the use of significant floor time and may not be 
accomplished in a single Congress. For example, proposals to 
create universal or near-universal access to health care 
started long before the Affordable Care Act was considered by 
the 111th Congress (2009-2011).\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Mark J. Oleszek and Walter J. Oleszek, ``Legislative Sausage-
Making: Health Care Reform in the 111th Congress,'' in Party and 
Procedure in the United States Congress, ed. Jacob R. Straus (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), pp. 253-286.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, by many measures, the 111th Congress was 
considered successful, with the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act and other Obama administration priorities.\12\ In the 
November 2010 election, however, the Republicans campaigned 
against many of these legislative actions and won control of 
the House and cut the Democratic majority in the Senate.\13\ 
Examining only the 111th Congress, some might conclude that the 
Democrats were punished for being productive.\14\ Others might 
suggest that having Democratic control of the House, Senate, 
and White House led to policies that were out of step with the 
American public. Still others might conclude that the very 
democratic nature of American political institutions inherently 
leads to the use of aggressive power to pass the majority 
party's agenda, regardless of which party is in the 
majority.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ David A. Fahrenthold, Philip Rucker, and Felicia Sonmez, 
``Stormy 111th Congress Was Still the Most Productive in Decades,'' The 
Washington Post, December 23, 2010, p. A3, at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/22/
AR2010122205620_pf.html.
    \13\ Andrew E. Busch, ``The 2010 Midterm Elections: An Overview,'' 
The Forum, vol. 8, no. 4 (January 2011), Article 2; and Matthew N. 
Green, ``2010 Midterm Election,'' in The Obama Presidency: A 
Preliminary Assessment, ed. Robert P. Watson, Jack Covarrubias, Tom 
Lansford, and Douglas M. Brattebo (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2012), pp. 129-142.
    \14\ Christopher F. Karpowitz, J. Quin Monson, Kelly D. Patterson, 
and Jeremy C. Pope, ``Tea Time in America? The Impact of the Tea Party 
Movement on the 2010 Midterm Elections,'' PS: Political Science & 
Politics, vol. 44, no. 2 (April 2011), pp. 303-309.
    \15\ Barbara Sinclair, ``Question: What's Wrong with Congress? 
Answer: It's a Democratic Legislature,'' Boston University Law Review, 
vol. 89, no. 2 (April 2009), p. 393.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The legislative branch lends itself to comparison precisely 
because its processes and outcomes can be quantified. Over 
time, the need to understand congressional productivity and the 
desire to compare one Congress against another appears to have 
increased. Regardless of where an individual might stand on the 
popularity or democratic proclivities of a given Congress, 
citizens seem to be more dissatisfied today.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Gallup, ``Congressional Job Approval Ratings Trend (1974-
Present),'' Congress and the Public, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/
1600/congress-public.aspx. See also the companion CRS centennial report 
in this volume, Understanding Congressional Approval: Public Opinion 
from 1974 to 2014, by Jessica C. Gerrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To better understand the metrics used to compare one 
Congress against another, this report asks the question: ``What 
is productivity?'' The report begins by defining congressional 
productivity. Next, the three most common comparative methods 
are discussed in detail, including advantages and disadvantages 
of these measures. Following this analysis, a brief discussion 
of other potential measures is provided. Finally, the report 
ends with an analysis of factors that could affect the 
comparison of congressional productivity over time.

                  How Has Productivity Been Measured?

    According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, productivity 
is defined as ``the rate at which goods are produced or work is 
completed.'' \17\ In the business world, understanding 
productivity can be a relatively easy task. For example, if a 
marketing firm is able to drive new customers to a client's 
business, the firm is often considered to be a productive 
marketer.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Merriam-Webster Dictionary, ``Productivity,'' at http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/productivity.
    \18\ Roland T. Rust, Tim Ambler, Gregory S. Carpenter, V. Kumar, 
and Rajendra K. Srivastava, ``Measuring Marketing Productivity: Current 
Knowledge and Future Directions,'' Journal of Marketing, vol. 68, no. 4 
(October 2004), pp. 79-86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the legislative context, defining productivity is more 
difficult. The legislative process is inherently about words 
and ideas advocated for by people, both Members of Congress and 
constituents. Congress is structured to make public policy from 
disparate inputs in a limited amount of time. Rather than 
negotiate and pass laws behind closed doors, Congress is 
instead asked to conduct its business in a responsible, 
deliberative, inclusive, and public manner.\19\ Consequently, 
the desire to assess a particular Congress and its productivity 
has resulted in disagreement on the best and most effective 
metrics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Barbara Sinclair, ``Question: What's Wrong with Congress? 
Answer: It's a Democratic Legislature,'' Boston University Law Review, 
p. 389.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The disagreement extends to studies comparing Congresses, 
which can be divided into two groups: studies of individual 
Members of Congress, which are described briefly here, and 
studies of Congress as an institution, which concern the 
balance of this report.

                Assessing Individual Members of Congress

    Many studies have focused on individual legislators and 
either their success or productivity. It is important to note 
that productivity and success are not--and should not be--
interchangeable terms. Whereas studies of legislative success 
primarily attempt to determine whether individual Members are 
able to implement a specific policy agenda, legislative 
productivity attempts to understand how individual Members of 
Congress compare across time.

                             member success

    Legislative success is a term that is generally used to 
describe the ability of an individual Member to promote 
measures that meet his or her stated political agenda. For 
Members, individual success can be difficult to quantify 
because what is successful to one legislator might be a failure 
to another.\20\ Because of the personal nature of success, some 
studies have used reelection as a proxy for being a successful 
legislator.\21\ Other studies have used the passage of bills 
sponsored by a legislator as the ultimate measure of success 
within the House or Senate.\22\ Still others have examined 
whether ``positive action'' (e.g., bill movement through the 
legislative process) marks success.\23\ Regardless of the 
definition of success, the focus of this field of study on the 
goals of an individual Member of Congress makes comparisons 
across Congresses impossible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ For example, see Barbara Sinclair, ``An Effective Congress and 
Effective Members: What Does It Take?,'' PS: Political Science & 
Politics, vol. 29, no. 3 (1996), pp. 435-439.
    \21\ David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).
    \22\ Mark C. Ellickson, ``Pathways to Legislative Success: A Path 
Analytic Study of the Missouri House of Representatives,'' Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 285-302.
    \23\ William Anderson, Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, and Valeria N. 
Sinclair-Chapman, ``The Keys to Legislative Success in the U.S. House 
of Representatives,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 3 
(August 2003), pp. 357-386; and Michael Edmund O'Neill, ``A Legislative 
Scorecard for the United States Senate: Evaluating Legislative 
Productivity,'' Journal of Legislation, vol. 36, no. 2 (2010), pp. 297-
374.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Studies of individual Members' productivity focus either on 
productivity as a factor in reelection or, more commonly, on 
trying to ignore reelection to understand Members' behavior. As 
an example of the former, political scientist Robert E. Hogan 
studied how elections reward or punish legislators on their 
policy activities while in office. He found that incumbent 
legislators often struggled to determine constituents' policy 
preferences. As a result, a Member could be punished 
electorally for misunderstanding or ignoring the partisan base 
and attempting to connect with the average (median) voter in 
the district.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Robert E. Hogan, ``Policy Responsiveness and Incumbent 
Reelection in State Legislatures,'' American Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 52, no. 4 (2008), pp. 910-925.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other studies have explicitly examined the productivity for 
individual Members without using reelection as the Member's 
underlying goal. Perhaps the most famous examination of a 
Member and his desire for good public policy over potential 
reelection was Richard Fenno's examination of Senator Claiborne 
Pell. Fenno described Pell as an individual who had ``put 
together such a strong Senate record of legislative 
accomplishment . . . that he inoculated himself against the 
late-blooming, media-generated charge of ineffectiveness,'' 
\25\ and was consistently reelected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Senators on the Campaign Trail: The 
Politics of Representation (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1996), pp. 239 and 254.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          member productivity

    Another study analyzed the behavior and productivity of 
older legislators. This study examined ``whether old 
legislators were more or less productive than younger 
legislators in sponsoring legislation'' by assessing ``their 
relative effectiveness in seeing such legislation through to 
enactment.'' This study found that, while older legislators had 
an increase in absences and introduced fewer bills than their 
younger colleagues, they had a higher ratio of bills 
passed.\26\ The study potentially suggests that, as Members age 
and their electoral concerns lessen, they look for opportunity 
to introduce legislation where they feel they can succeed 
instead of introducing bills on a variety of subjects. Taking 
the example of long-serving Members further, since they 
introduce fewer bills, they might be seen as less productive. 
On the other hand, since their success rate in enacting bills 
is higher, they might be seen as more productive. This 
illustrates the difficulty in determining whether one 
legislator is more productive than another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Alfred P. Fengler, ``Legislative Productivity of Elderly 
Legislators,'' Polity, vol. 18, no. 2 (1980), p. 328.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       Assessing the Institution

    Assessing the success or productivity of individual Members 
of Congress does not provide a clear way to compare the 
productivity of one Congress against another. The comparison of 
Congresses is the goal of many studies, however, but there is 
no agreement on what quantitative measures might be best for 
understanding the legislative process and evaluating 
congressional output over a 2-year period.
    Some of the first examinations of legislative productivity 
focused on counting the number of significant pieces of 
legislation enacted during a Congress. The most famous of these 
studies was conducted by political scientist David Mayhew in 
his effort to understand divided government--when one political 
party controls the White House and one political party controls 
at least one Chamber of Congress. To gather his list of seminal 
laws, Mayhew consulted The New York Times and The Washington 
Post end-of-session and end-of-Congress wrap-up articles to 
determine the most important pieces of legislation enacted 
during a particular Congress.\27\ Mayhew's lists, which are 
discussed below in more detail in ``Landmark Legislation,'' 
resulted in other studies of significant legislation, which all 
remarked on the impact of divided government on the enactment 
of public policy and congressional productivity.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, 
and Investigations 1946-1990 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1991), pp. 34-50.
    \28\ See, for example, Sean Q. Kelly, ``Divided We Govern? A 
Reassessment,'' Polity, vol. 25, no. 3 (spring 1993), pp. 475-484; and 
William Howell, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles Riemann, 
``Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 
1945-94,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2 (May 2000), 
pp. 285-312.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Understanding significant or landmark legislation is only 
one way to quantify congressional activities. The legislative 
process lends itself to many potential comparative measures. As 
political scientists John Owens and Burdett Loomis highlighted: 
``The legislative process in Congress is deliberately 
cumbersome.'' Further, they noted that the legislative process 
contains many steps. These include:

    (1) bill introduction; (2) referral to committee(s) and 
subcommittee(s); (3) requests for reports from executive 
agencies; (4) hearings; (5) mark-ups (bill-writing); (6) 
reports to the House or Senate; (7) requests for a special 
procedural rule in the [H]ouse . . . or consideration in the 
Senate from the majority leader; (8) floor debate in both 
chambers . . .; (9) a House-Senate conference committee to 
resolve House-Senate differences; and (10) the presidential 
signature or veto, which if denied requires even more 
steps.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ John E. Owens and Burdett A. Loomis, ``Qualified 
Exceptionalism: The US Congress in Comparative Perspective,'' Journal 
of Legislative Studies, vol. 12, no. 3/4 (2006), p. 268.

    Each step in this process provides an opportunity to 
collect data and compare one Congress against another. While 
each step in the legislative process can tell part of the story 
of congressional productivity, some measures potentially tell a 
more interesting story than others. Congressional literature 
has not come to a consensus on how to measure institutional 
productivity.

                        Measures of Productivity

    Since President Truman first applied the ``do-nothing'' 
label to the 80th Congress, efforts have been made to measure 
the productivity of Congress. From a review of political 
science research, three main measures emerged as the most 
common to evaluate the productivity of Congress. These are:
   legislation introduced;
   public laws enacted; and
   landmark legislation.
    Individually, each measure has potential advantages and 
disadvantages for assessing congressional productivity. Each 
measure most clearly represents one of the concepts referenced 
in the Introduction. These were Senator Coburn's concept of 
public perception in his Wastebook (legislation introduced); 
President Truman's ``do-nothing'' label and political agreement 
or disagreement (public laws); or James Madison's concept of 
great objects in his description of the legislative process 
(landmark legislation). While each concept is more clearly tied 
to one measure, each also has elements of the other measures 
present in its view of Congress.

                         Legislation Introduced

    Each Congress, thousands of bills and resolutions are 
introduced in the House and Senate. Members introduce 
legislation for a variety of purposes. Some Members introduce 
bills and resolutions to claim credit for a public policy idea 
\30\ or to signal to constituents their position on an 
issue.\31\ Other Members introduce legislation to further their 
public policy agendas.\32\ Using legislative introduction could 
provide a way to examine the productivity of any given 
Congress. Using the number of bills and resolutions introduced 
could also provide a glimpse into how the public perceives 
congressional productivity. When more bills are introduced, 
Congress might be perceived as more productive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Scott Thomas and Bernard Grofman, ``The Effects of 
Congressional Rules About Bill Cosponsorship on Duplicate Bills: 
Changing Incentives for Credit Claiming,'' Public Choice, vol. 75, no. 
1 (1993), pp. 93-98.
    \31\ Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Setting the Agenda: 
Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stephen Jessee and Neil 
Malhotra, ``Are Congressional Leaders Middlepersons or Extremists? 
Yes,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 3 (August 2010), pp. 
361-392; and James M. McCormick and Neil J. Mitchell, ``Commitments, 
Transnational Interests, and Congress: Who Joins the Congressional 
Human Rights Caucus?,'' Political Research Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 4 
(2007), pp. 579-592.
    \32\ Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Senators on the Campaign Trail; and 
James L. Payne, ``Show Horses and Work Horses in the U.S. House of 
Representatives,'' Polity, vol. 12, no. 3 (1980), p. 429.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Legislative introduction might be a proxy for congressional 
productivity. An examination of the number of measures 
introduced highlights the legislative activity of Congress and 
how often Members of Congress decide to initiate the 
legislative process. While few bills and resolutions will be 
debated and voted on, the mere process of introduction is one 
of the essential parts of a Member's responsibility. Without 
the introduction of legislation, the process of creating new 
laws cannot begin.
    An examination of bill introduction as a measure of 
potential productivity reveals variation over in the number of 
bills and resolutions introduced between the 80th Congress and 
the 112th Congress. Using the ``Resume of Congressional 
Activity,'' published in the Congressional Record at the end of 
each session of Congress, data were collected on the number of 
bills and resolutions introduced in the House and Senate. 
Figure 1 shows the total number of measures introduced between 
the 80th and 112th Congresses.
    As shown in Figure 1, the number of bills and resolutions 
introduced in the House and Senate ranged from 7,400 total 
measures in the 104th Congress (1995-1997) to 29,133 measures 
in the 90th Congress (1967-1969). In the House, the fewest 
measures were introduced in the 104th Congress (4,739) and the 
most in the 90th Congress (24,227). For the Senate the fewest 
measures were introduced in the 104th Congress (2,661) and the 
most (5,466) in the 91st Congress (1969-1971). Using only the 
number of measures introduced, a case could be made that the 
104th Congress was the least productive and the 90th Congress 
was the most productive.
    Several observations can be made from the introduction of 
bills and resolutions. First, combining the introduction of 
measures for both the House and Senate (i.e., using a total 
number of measures introduced) could miss nuances between 
legislative consideration in the House and Senate. Generally, 
while the basic reasons to introduce a measure are the same 
regardless of Chamber, House Members have been found to be 
freer to introduce bills and resolutions--regardless of whether 
these measures have a chance to pass the Chamber--than 
Senators,\33\ who are more constrained by institutional and 
political factors.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Joseph Cooper and Cheryl D. Young, ``Bill Introduction in the 
Nineteenth Century: A Study of Institutional Change,'' Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1 (February 1989), pp. 67-105.
    \34\ Wendy J. Schiller, ``Senators and Political Entrepreneurs: 
Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas,'' American Journal 
of Political Science, vol. 39, no. 1 (February 1995), pp. 186-203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Figure 1. Bills and Resolutions Introduced in the House and Senate, 
                         80th to 112th Congress

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Source: U.S. Congress, Clerk of the House of Representatives, 
``Resumewrite change on galleys add accents? deg. of 
Congressional Activity,'' Congressional Activity, at http://
library.clerk.house.gov/resume.aspx; and U.S. Congress, Secretary of 
the Senate, ``Resume of Congressional Activity,'' Statistics & Lists, 
at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/two_column_table/
Resumes.htm.

    Second, historically, bills and resolutions were often 
introduced as part of responding to constituents and being 
visible in the district or State.\35\ For example, former 
Representative Lou Frey, Jr. described his process for staking 
out positions on which he could introduce, and hopefully pass, 
legislation as a minority party member. He struck a balance 
between responding to constituent needs, regional concerns, 
lobbyists' demands, and broader national issues. Frey believed 
that a combination of these introduction strategies led to 
being an effective legislator.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, The Personal 
Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 27.
    \36\ Lou Frey, Jr., ``Legislative Entrepreneurship: Different 
Strategies for Different Issues,'' in Inside the House: Former Members 
Reveal How Congress Really Works, ed. Lou Frey, Jr., and Michael T. 
Hayes (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), pp. 261-273.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, in recent years, the number of private bills 
introduced has declined significantly. Private bills are 
legislation that ``applies to one or more specified persons, 
corporations, institutions, or other entities, usually to grant 
relief when no other legal remedy is available to them. Many 
private bills deal with claims against the federal government, 
immigration and naturalization cases, and land titles.'' \37\ 
Since the 80th Congress, the number of private bills enacted 
has ranged from zero in the 110th Congress (2007-2009) to 1,103 
in the 81st Congress (1949-1951), with a median of 123 private 
laws and an average of 269.\38\ A reduction in the number of 
private bills accounts for some of the decrease in total 
measures introduced. Since the 1940s, Congress has taken many 
steps to reduce the need to introduce and enact private bills 
through immigration reform, the empowerment of the executive 
branch to mitigate certain individual claims against the 
government, and a reform of congressional operations to deal 
with issues that historically required private laws.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Walter Kravitz, Congressional Quarterly's American 
Congressional Dictionary, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001), p. 
187.
    \38\ Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, Michael J. Malbin, and 
Andrew Rugg, Vital Statistics on Congress (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 2013), chapter 6, table 4, at http://
www.brookings.edu/vitalstats.
    \39\ Jeffrey S. Hill and Kenneth C. Williams, ``The Decline of 
Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision 
to Delegate,'' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 4 
(November 1993), pp. 1012-1015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fourth, determining productivity based on legislative 
introduction might ignore important changes to the rules of the 
House that influenced the introduction of legislation. The 
number of bills introduced each Congress changed with the 90th 
Congress.\40\ At that time, House rules were amended to permit 
bill cosponsors, but limited the number to 25.\41\ 
Consequently, if a measure had more than 25 cosponsors--
including the original sponsor--additional, identical bills 
were introduced for each group of 24 cosponsors (in addition to 
the measure's sponsor).\42\ As shown in Figure 1 at line 1, the 
number of measures introduced jumped at the time of the change 
in the cosponsorship rule between the 89th Congress (1965-1967) 
and the 90th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ U.S. Congress, House, ``Rule XII, clause 7,'' Constitution, 
Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives of the 
United States One Hundred Twelfth Congress, 111th Cong., 2d sess., H. 
Doc. 111-157 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011),  825, p. 620.
    \41\ H. Res. 42 (90th Cong.), agreed to April 25, 1967. For more 
information, see Representative William Colmer et al., ``To Amend the 
Rules of the House of Representatives,'' Congressional Record, vol. 
113, part 8 (April 25, 1967), pp. 10708-10712. Prior to agreeing to H. 
Res. 42, House rules did not permit cosponsorship or joint introduction 
of legislation. For more information, see U.S. Congress, House, 
Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United 
States, vol. VII, prepared by Clarence Cannon (Washington, DC: GPO, 
1935),  1029, p. 160.
    \42\ U.S. Congress, House, Deschler's Precedents of the United 
States House of Representatives, vol. 4, prepared by Lewis Deschler, 
parliamentarian, 94th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. 94-661 (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1976), ch. 16,  2.2, pp. 207-208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House further amended cosponsorship rules late in the 
95th Congress (1977-1979) to allow unlimited cosponsors on a 
single piece measure.\43\ Subsequently, comparing Congresses by 
the number of measures introduced became problematic. As Figure 
1 shows at line 2, the number of measures introduced declined 
following the 95th Congress, when the rule change became 
effective. Since the rules change, when a Member wants to 
cosponsor a bill or resolution after its introduction, his or 
her name is published in the Congressional Record.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ H. Res. 86 (95th Congress), agreed to October 10, 1978. H. 
Res. 86 did not become effective until the beginning of the 96th 
Congress (1979-1981) in January 1979. For more information, see 
Representative Gillis Long, ``Amending Rules Concerning Cosponsorship 
of Public Bills and Resolutions,'' Congressional Record, vol. 124, part 
26 (October 10, 1978), pp. 34929-34930.
    \44\ For more information on bill cosponsorship, see CRS Report 
RS22477, Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of House Bills, by Mark J. 
Oleszek.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The reduction in the number of measures introduced since 
the 95th Congress does not necessarily indicate that Members of 
Congress have become less interested in introducing bills and 
resolutions. Instead, it reflects, in part, that duplicative 
measures were no longer required to accept cosponsorships. 
Because of cosponsorship reform, comparing Congress by the 
number of measures introduced might not provide a clear picture 
of what any particular Congress accomplished.
    More recent rules changes in the House have also served to 
reduce the introduction and consideration of date-specific 
commemorations. For example, in the 104th Congress, the House 
adopted a new rule to prohibit the introduction and 
consideration of date-specific commemorative legislation.\45\ 
This rule has reduced the number of resolutions introduced and 
considered by the House to honor individuals, groups, and 
events. As a result, the number of bills and resolutions 
introduced to recognize commemorations has decreased and the 
number of such bills considered on the House floor has been 
reduced to almost zero. This could be another factor in the 
decline of measures introduced and public laws enacted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ House Rule XII, clause 5. For more information, see CRS Report 
R43539, Commemorations in Congress: Options for Honoring Individuals, 
Groups, and Events, coordinated by Jacob R. Straus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In sum, examining the number of bills and resolutions 
introduced can be a useful tool for understanding individual 
Member engagement in the legislative process and the potential 
congressional workload. The greater the number of bills 
introduced in a given Congress, the greater the potential 
workload for that Congress and, potentially, the greater the 
set of ideas to draw on. While a particular Congress would not 
be able to address every bill introduced, and many of these 
bills are substantively similar, the House or Senate cannot 
take up a measure without it first being introduced, even if 
the committee process is eliminated or truncated. Bill and 
resolution introduction, therefore, may be a proxy for 
engagement in the legislative process.

                              Public Laws

    Laws passed by Congress are an attractive measure of 
productivity because they are the basis of policy creation, a 
potentially basic concept by which to judge a specific 
Congress. Public laws also could serve as a proxy for political 
agreement or disagreement. When more public laws are enacted, 
political actors (i.e., the House, Senate, and the President) 
agree on policy changes. When fewer public laws are signed by 
the President, at least one actor disagrees with the others.
    A public law is created when both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate pass identical legislation in 
the same legislative vehicle and it is signed by the 
President.\46\ Measuring the number of public laws in each 
Congress is an easy task as all public laws are published--in 
the order they were enacted--in the United States Statutes at 
Large. For example, Public Law (P.L.) 110-181, the ``National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,'' was the 181st 
law signed by President George W. Bush as passed by the 110th 
Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy 
Process, 9th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2014), pp. 25-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Using the Statutes at Large, which have been published 
through 2008, supplemented by the Legislative Information 
System at the Library of Congress, a list of total public laws 
per Congress was produced. Figure 2 shows the number of public 
laws enacted between the 80th Congress and the 112th Congress. 
During this time period, the average number of public laws 
enacted each Congress was 622. The 84th Congress (1955-1957) 
had the most enacted laws (1,028), while the 112th Congress had 
the fewest (283).

         Figure 2. Public Laws Enacted, 80th to 112th Congress

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: United States Statutes at Large and the Legislative 
Information System (http:// congress.gov).

    If public laws are used to compare Congresses, the 84th 
Congress would be the most productive, while the 112th Congress 
the least. While this might be true, just examining public laws 
does not provide a complete picture of the internal workings of 
Congress during this time period or the political climate in 
Washington, DC. For example, during the 84th Congress, 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was in the last 2 years of his 
first term, and the Democrats controlled both the House and 
Senate. Comparatively, the 112th Congress represented the last 
2 years of President Barack Obama's first term, and the 
Republicans controlled the House and the Democrats controlled 
the Senate.
    While it is possible that the 84th Congress was the most 
productive and the 112th Congress the least, many Congresses 
present interesting anomalies. For example, the 97th Congress 
(1981-1983) marked the beginning of President Reagan's first 
term in office; Republican control of the Senate; and the 
enactment of tax reform measures, spending cuts, industry 
deregulation, and additional defense spending.\47\ Even with 
these enacted measures, the 97th Congress is ranked as the 
seventh least productive in Figure 2. Conversely, during the 
106th Congress (1999-2001), the greatest number of public laws 
was enacted in the last 10 Congresses, but few of its measures 
were major endeavors. Instead, the focus of the 106th Congress 
was President Clinton's impeachment trial in the Senate and an 
overhaul of financial services laws.\48\ That the passage of 
major legislation does not match the total number of public 
laws enacted will be addressed further in the ``Landmark 
Legislation'' section below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ U.S. Congress, House, Office of the Historian, ``97th Congress 
(1981-1983),'' Congress Profiles, at http://history.house.gov/
Congressional-Overview/Profiles/97th/.
    \48\ U.S. Congress, House, Office of the Historian, ``106th 
Congress (1999-2001),'' Congress Profiles, at http://history.house.gov/
Congressional-Overview/Profiles/106th/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Aside from the identification of which Congress produced 
the most or fewest public laws, Figure 2 shows a longer term 
decline in public laws enacted over the last 60 years. Several 
factors could have caused the overall decline in the number of 
public laws enacted. These include rules changes, the 
filibuster, Senate advice and consent, divided government, 
political polarization, omnibus legislation, and policy riders 
in appropriations legislation.
    Since the 80th Congress, many aspects of congressional 
operations, administration, and procedures have changed. These 
changes were spurred in 1970 by the enactment of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act.\49\ The Legislative 
Reorganization Act ``made House and Senate processes more 
transparent by making all committee hearings (excluding 
national security meetings and appropriations) public, as well 
as by permitting televised broadcasts of many of these 
committee hearings.'' \50\ These rules changes provided for new 
ways to consider legislation on the floor and provided new 
technology to record votes in the House.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ P.L. 91-510; 84 Stat. 1140 (October 26, 1970).
    \50\ U.S. Congress, House, Office of the Historian, ``The 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970,'' Historical Highlights, at 
http://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1951-2000/The- 
Legislative-Reorganization-Act-of-1970.
    \51\ For example, the adoption of electronic voting and rules 
changes in the House eventually sped up the voting process of 30 to 45 
minutes per roll call to 15 minutes or less. As a result of the time 
savings, the House had the ability to record Members votes more often 
and potentially consider more bills than was possible before. For more 
information, see Jacob R. Straus, ``Let's Vote: The Rise and Impact of 
Roll Call Votes in the Age of Electronic Voting,'' in Party and 
Procedure in the United States Congress, pp. 101-123; and CRS Report 
R41862, Electronic Voting System in the House of Representatives: 
History and Usage, by Jacob R. Straus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the Legislative Reorganization Act, later 
changes, and exogenous developments, the House and Senate have 
altered the way legislation is considered. In the House, the 
use of structured special rules has increased.\52\ The use of 
special rules to control the length of debate and the number of 
amendments in order has provided the House majority party with 
the ability to more tightly control the legislative agenda.\53\ 
The number of special rules has also decreased, resulting in 
fewer measures considered by the House and therefore eligible 
for potential presentation to the President for his signature. 
Additionally, the scheduling of legislation under suspension of 
the rules--a procedure for noncontroversial measures that 
requires a two-thirds vote of the House for passage and does 
not allow floor amendments--has increased.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Barbara Sinclair, ``House Special Rules and the Institutional 
Design Controversy,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 4 
(November 1994), pp. 477-494; and Douglas Dion and John D. Huber, 
``Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules,'' Journal of 
Politics, vol. 58, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 25-53.
    \53\ Joshua Huder and Marian Currinder, ``The Hastert Rule Is 
Severely Limiting Speaker John Boehner's Ability to Negotiate a 
Compromise over the Shutdown,'' London School of Economics American 
Politics and Policy Blog (October 4, 2013), at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
usappblog/2013/10/04/hastert-rule/.
    \54\ For example, see CRS Report R40829, How Legislation Is Brought 
to the House Floor: A Snapshot of Recent Parliamentary Practice in the 
111th Congress (2009-2010), by Christopher M. Davis; and CRS Report 
R43039, How Legislation Is Brought to the House Floor: A Snapshot of 
Parliamentary Practice in the 112th Congress (2011-2012), by 
Christopher M. Davis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the Senate, threats of the filibuster and an increased 
use of cloture votes may have contributed to the decrease in 
the number of public laws enacted. In recent years, the 
majority leader has increasingly turned to the cloture rule--
the process whereby Senators can end a filibuster, or threat of 
a filibuster, on legislation with a three-fifths (60 vote) 
majority.\55\ Since this threshold can sometimes be difficult 
to obtain, and once invoked a maximum of 30 hours of debate 
begins, the Senate majority leader will often choose carefully 
which bills to bring to the floor. Consequently, the number of 
bills for which the majority leader wishes to try to achieve a 
60 vote threshold and overcome the threat of a filibuster can 
dictate the potential number of bills that receive floor 
consideration and have the possibly of becoming law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ For more information on cloture and the filibuster, see CRS 
Report RL30360, Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate, by Richard S. 
Beth and Valerie Heitshusen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Further, counts of measures introduced, public laws 
enacted, and landmark legislation do not take into 
consideration one of the major constitutional duties of the 
Senate--confirming Presidential executive and judicial branch 
nominees.\56\ The Senate spends a significant amount of time 
considering executive branch and judicial nominees, with each 
nominee potentially requiring floor time for a recorded vote. 
For example, in the second session of the 112th Congress, the 
Senate received 23,803 nominations and carried over 667 
nominations from the first session. Of these 24,470 nominations 
pending, 24,296 (99 percent) were confirmed by the Senate.\57\ 
While the Senate does not provide the number of nominees 
debated and voted on the Senate floor, it must still process 
tens of thousands of nominations and decide whether a unanimous 
consent agreement can be reached or if a vote is necessary. The 
latter process can detract from floor time available for the 
consideration of legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ U.S. Constitution, Article II, section 2, clause 2.
    \57\ ``Resume of Congressional Activities, Second Session of the 
One Hundred Twelfth Congress,'' Congressional Record, daily digest, 
vol. 158, daily edition (January 3, 2013), p. D11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Divided government--where one political party controls the 
White House and the other political party controls at least one 
Chamber of Congress--is a well-studied phenomenon.\58\ The 
impact of divided government on the policy process, however, is 
undecided, with some believing it has a negative impact on 
governance \59\ and others believing that it can help promote 
compromise.\60\ Examining the impact of divided government on 
public laws shows no discernible trend in its impact on the 
enactment of laws. For example, numerous laws were enacted in 
the 84th-86th Congresses (1955-1961) when the Democrats were 
the majority party in the House and Senate and President 
Eisenhower, a Republican, was in the White House. Similarly, 
President Reagan never enjoyed a Republican majority in both 
the House and Senate, but still saw more than 600 public laws 
enacted in each of the last three Congresses of his 
administration (98th-100th Congresses; 1983-1989). An 
examination of the data in Figure 2 suggests that divided 
government is likely not a factor in the reduced number of 
public laws enacted over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, 
and Investigations 1946-1990; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government, 2d 
ed. (New York: Longman Press, 2002); Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, 
The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); 
and Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, The President in the Legislative 
Arena (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
    \59\ David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, ``Divided Government and 
the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical 
Test,'' Journal of Politics, vol. 58, no. 2 (May 1996), pp. 373-397; 
and Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, ``Divided Government and 
U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence,'' International Organization, 
vol. 48, no. 4 (autumn 1994), pp. 595-632.
    \60\ Cynthia J. Bowling and Margaret R. Ferguson, ``Divided 
Government, Interest Representation, and Policy Differences: Competing 
Explanations of Gridlock in the Fifty States,'' Journal of Politics, 
vol. 63, no. 1 (February 2001), pp. 182-206.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Political polarization--the ideological ``distance'' 
between median members of both parties in Congress--is another 
possible reason for the variation in the number of public laws 
enacted.\61\ Congress today is more ideologically polarized 
than it was in the 1950s, and the number of public laws has 
decreased. An increase in polarization could lead to less 
agreement on the substance of legislation and fewer bills being 
presented to the President for his signature. Political 
polarization, however, has always existed at some level. 
Whether or not the difference between Republicans and Democrats 
in the 112th Congress is greater or less than in previous 
Congresses, the decreased number of public laws enacted since 
the 80th Congress has presented fewer opportunities for the two 
parties to agree on legislation to present to the President 
and, therefore, possibly be signed into law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ ``An Update on Political Polarization through the 112th 
Congress,'' voteview blog, January 16, 2013, at http://voteview.com/
blog/?p=726. Also, see Sarah A. Binder, Stalemate: Causes and 
Consequences of Legislative Gridlock (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Omnibus'' legislation--``a measure that combines the 
provision of several disparate subjects into a single and often 
lengthy bill'' \62\ --is yet another possible explanation for 
the decrease in the number of public laws. Using the number of 
public laws counts each law equally, regardless of the number 
of bills that might have been combined to create the measure. 
Because omnibus legislation contains multiple bills in one 
legislative vehicle, it is only counted once, when it might 
have been counted as more than one if each measure had been 
enacted individually. For example, P.L. 111-11, the Omnibus 
Public Land Management Act of 2009,\63\ contained 160 
individual legislative proposals,\64\ which ``protect more than 
1,000 miles of river through the National Wild and Scenic River 
System, and designate thousands of miles of trails for the 
National Park System.'' \65\ Instead of counting each of the 
160 measures individually, they are instead counted as a single 
public law. Omnibus measures can be a powerful compromise tool 
which often requires Members of Congress to vote for measures 
that they might oppose individually.\66\ Because omnibus 
measures are only counted once, when they are enacted, they can 
lower the total number of bills enacted and make a particular 
Congress appear less productive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Walter Kravitz, American Congressional Dictionary, p. 162.
    \63\ P.L. 111-11; 123 Stat. 991 (March 30, 2009).
    \64\ ``Obama Signs Sweeping Public Land Reform Legislation,'' 
CNN.com, March 30, 2009, at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/30/
obama.lands.bill/.
    \65\ U.S. President (Obama), ``Statement on Signing the Omnibus 
Public Land Management Act of 2009,'' Public Papers of the Presidents 
of the United States: Barack Obama, 2009, Book 1--January 20 to June 
30, 2009 (Washington: GPO, 2010), pp. 379-380.
    \66\ Glen S. Krutz, Hitching a Ride: Omnibus Legislating in the 
U.S. Congress (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2001), 
pp. 78 and 126.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In recent years, Congress has more frequently used policy 
riders or limitation amendments--``provisions that negatively 
restrict the amount, purpose, or availability of appropriations 
funds without changing existing law'' \67\--to constrain or 
restrict executive action. The use of these riders allows 
Congress to clearly indicate its intent on how money should or 
should not be spent and can ``hide'' otherwise policy-related 
legislation within appropriations bills. Similar to the 
potential miscounting of policy initiatives with omnibus 
legislation, a straight count of public laws will not consider 
policy riders or limitation amendments that could alter 
administrative programs by their inclusion in appropriations 
legislation. Further, the subject of the riders is not 
necessarily limited in scope. For example, ``Congress has used 
appropriations riders to deprive former slaves of the right to 
vote, to protect farm subsidies from executive scrutiny, to 
prevent the President from making recess appointments, to enter 
into the conduct of negotiations with foreign powers, and to 
remove suspected Communists from the federal payroll.'' \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ Jessica Tollestrup, ``The Appropriations Process and 
Limitation Amendments: A Case Study on Party Politics and the House 
Floor,'' in Party and Procedure in the United States Congress, ed. 
Jacob R. Straus (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), p. 61.
    \68\ Jacques B. LeBoeuf, ``Limitations on the Use of Appropriations 
Riders by Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes,'' Hasting 
Constitutional Law Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 2 (winter 1992), pp. 460-
461.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In sum, numerous factors could contribute to the decline in 
public laws. When evaluating congressional productivity based 
on this metric, consideration of rules changes, the filibuster, 
Senate advice and consent, divided government, political 
polarization, omnibus legislation, and policy riders are 
important for context. By considering these factors, it is 
possible to understand that Congress does not operate in a 
vacuum and that multiple factors can influence whether a bill 
becomes law. For example, fewer public laws might be enacted 
because of increased partisanship or divided government. On the 
other hand, the rise in the use of omnibus legislation and 
policy riders--especially for measures that might have been 
enacted as stand-alone laws in past decades--has also 
contributed to the decline in public laws. Taken alone, none of 
these factors adequately describes a decline in productivity, 
but considered together more rigorous conclusions might be 
drawn.

                          Landmark Legislation

    At the conclusion of the 111th Congress, The Washington 
Post reported that Congress had just completed one of its most 
productive 2-year periods in decades and was ``[a] Congress 
that . . . passed more landmark legislation than any since the 
era of Lyndon B. Johnson's `Great Society.' '' \69\ By using 
landmark legislation as a comparative tool, The Washington Post 
adopted a strategy previously used by political scientists and 
historians in an effort to understand the enactment of major 
legislation over time. Landmark legislation also reflects 
Madison's concept of great objects or matters expressed in 
Federalist 63. Landmark laws are the difficult objects that can 
take multiple Congresses to enact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ David A. Fahrenthold, Philip Rucker, and Felicia Sonmez, 
``Stormy 111th Congress Was Still the Most Productive in Decades.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Major pieces of legislation have been passed in almost all 
periods of American history. Perhaps the seminal effort to 
analyze these measures was undertaken by David Mayhew in 
Divided We Govern.\70\ Using New York Times and Washington Post 
articles to provide contemporary analysis of laws and the 
``long-term perspectives of policy specialists about what 
enactments have counted most in their area,'' Mayhew developed 
a list of 186 landmark laws passed by Congress between the 92d 
Congress and, in his work's second edition, the 107th 
Congress.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, 
and Investigations 1946-1990, p. 44. Also, see David R. Mayhew, ``The 
Least Productive Congress in History?,'' Politico.com, December 23, 
2013, at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/12/least-
productive-congress-in-history-101476.html#.U7r01ig1NlE.
    \71\ David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, 
and Investigations, 1946-2002, 2d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mayhew's 1991 landmark study has been the basis of many 
other examinations of how often important laws were enacted. 
One of the potential challenges for using Mayhew's analysis to 
determine productivity is identifying important legislation. 
For example, in 2000, a study determined that divided 
government (i.e., the President and at least one Chamber of 
Congress are from different political parties) ``depress(es) 
the production of landmark legislation by about 30 percent, at 
least when productivity is measured on the basis of 
contemporaneous perceptions of important legislation.'' \72\ 
This last point is important. Most measures of productivity, no 
matter how robust the analysis, are dependent on determining 
what is important at the time of passage, not several years or 
decades in the future. Using Mayhew's methodology, the 106th 
Congress had the fewest landmark laws with 6 and the 93d 
Congress (1973-1975) had the most with 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ William Howell, Scott Adler, Charles Cameron, and Charles 
Riemann, ``Divided Government and the Legislative Productivity of 
Congress, 1945-1994.'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2 
(May 2000), p. 302.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Former CRS specialist Stephen Stathis also compiled a list 
of all major legislation enacted between the 1st and 107th 
Congresses.\73\ Stathis compiled his list by searching for 
legislation that had ``withstood the test of history or so 
dramatically altered the perception of the role of government 
that they may be considered of enduring importance.'' \74\ 
Overall, Stathis identified 327 landmark bills. Using Stathis' 
methodology, the 106th Congress had the fewest landmark laws 
with 12 and the 95th Congress had the most with 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ Stephen W. Stathis, Landmark Legislation, 1774-2002 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003).
    \74\ To compile his list of landmark legislation, Stathis states 
that he examined the U.S. Congressional Serial Set, the Annals of 
Congress, Register of Debates, Congressional Globe, Congressional 
Record, committee hearing transcripts, committee prints, and a ``broad 
range of biographies and specialized works on American history and 
politics . . . .'' Stephen W. Stathis, Landmark Legislation, 1774-2002, 
pp. v-vi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In contrast to Mayhew and Stathis, Lawrence Dodd and Scot 
Schraufnagel drew on seven histories of Congress, the 
Presidency, or the United States and six encyclopedias to 
create a list of landmark legislation.\75\ To qualify as a 
landmark, a law must have been mentioned in ``four or more 
sources, at least one of which was in a Congress-specific 
publication.'' \76\ Using Dodd and Schraufnagel's analysis, the 
98th Congress (1983-1985) and the 102d Congress (1991-1993) 
were tied with the fewest landmark laws (2 each) and the 93d 
Congress had the most with 11. Figure 3 lists the number of 
landmark laws per Congress identified by Mayhew, Stathis, and 
Dodd and Schraufnagel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ Lawrence C. Dodd and Scot Schraufnagel, ``Congress and the 
Policy Paradox: Party Polarization, Member Incivility, and Enactment of 
Landmark Legislation,'' Congress & The Presidency, vol. 39, no. 1 
(2012), pp. 109-132.
    \76\ Ibid., p. 117.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         Figure 3. Landmark Legislation, 80th to 107th Congress

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, 
Lawmaking, and Investigations 1946-1990 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1991); David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, 
Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-2002, 2d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2005); Stephen W. Stathis, Landmark Legislation, 
1774-2002 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003); and Lawrence C. Dodd and 
Scot Schraufnagel, ``Congress and the Polarity Paradox: Party 
Polarization, Member Incivility and Enactment of Landmark Legislation, 
1891-1994.'' Congress & the Presidency, vol. 39, no. 1 (2012): 109-132.

    Regardless of the methodology employed, evaluating 
legislative productivity based on landmark legislation is 
potentially problematic. As can be seen from the data, scholars 
cannot agree on the number of landmark laws in a given 
Congress. This attests to the subjectivity of counting landmark 
legislation and makes it an unclear measure of legislative 
productivity. While Mayhew and Stathis might agree that the 
106th Congress passed the fewest landmark laws, Dodd and 
Schraufnagel identify the 98th and 102d as having the fewest. 
The same issue appears for identifying the most productive 
Congress. Mayhew and Dodd and Schraufnagel agree that the 93d 
Congress was the most productive, while Stathis identified the 
95th Congress.
    Evaluating congressional productivity using landmark 
legislation provides an opportunity to understand when major 
changes are made to public policy and law. American history is 
defined by the passage of many laws. For example, during the 
recent economic crisis, some observers suggested that Congress 
model a tax reform plan after the Tax Reform Act of 1986,\77\ 
because ``[Reagan] was the last president to preside over a 
significant tax reform, one that . . . lower[ed] tax rates and 
close[d] loopholes.'' \78\ Regardless of the politics of 1986, 
the fondness with which the Tax Reform Act has been remembered 
illustrates the power that landmark legislation can have over 
the legislative process and debate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ P.L. 99-514; 100 Stat. 2085 (October 22, 1986).
    \78\ Floyd Norris, ``Tax Reform Might Start With a Look Back to 
'86,'' TheNewYorkTimes.com, November 22, 2012, at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/business/a-starting-point-for-tax- reform-
what-reagan-did.html?pagewanted=all.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Just because a Congress has few landmark laws does not 
necessarily mean it was not productive. For example, it is 
possible that a particular Congress not taking action in a 
policy area could constitute a landmark action. For example, 
between the mid-1960s and 2013, the Senate ``has never failed 
to pass a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).'' \79\ If 
the Senate chose not to pass the NDAA in the future, Congress 
could be seen as maintaining the status quo on defense-related 
policy. Regardless of the short-term impact of such a decision, 
in the future scholars could look back on that decision and 
assert that Congress made a strategic shift by not doing 
something.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ Colleen Shogan, ``Defense Authorization: The Senate's Last 
Best Hope,'' in Party and Procedure in the United States Congress, ed. 
Jacob R. Straus (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), p. 195.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Understanding the long-term impact of public laws aids the 
analysis of whether a law is landmark. Political scientist 
Michael O'Neill summarized this point when he said that ``the 
true effect of a legislative change may not be known or fully 
understood until years after the fact.'' \80\ Subsequently, any 
new or reevaluation of a particular Congress may result in laws 
being added or dropped depending on the methodology employed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ Michael Edmund O'Neill, ``A Legislative Scorecard for the 
United States Senate: Evaluating Legislative Productivity.'' Journal of 
Legislation, vol. 36, no. 2 (2010), p. 310.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                Other Possible Measures of Productivity

    Legislation introduced, public laws enacted, and landmark 
legislation have been the three primary methods used to measure 
congressional productivity. In addition to these three, 
however, there are several other possible ways to measure 
congressional productivity. These include rollcall votes, 
committee meetings and hearings, Congressional Record pages, 
days in session, and pages in the U.S. Statutes at Large.

                             rollcall votes

    Rollcall votes are recorded votes--most often by electronic 
means in the House and always by calling the roll in the 
Senate--that allow individual Members to ``go on the record'' 
on a particular piece of legislation or question.\81\ 
Historically, rollcall voting studies have focused on voting by 
individual groups of legislators and how gender, specific 
policy subjects, the White House, and constituents can 
influence Members' votes.\82\ Additionally, many studies focus 
on political parties and how often Democrats and Republicans 
oppose each other.\83\ There are few rollcall studies that 
focus on the institution as a whole.\84\ Using rollcall votes 
to measure congressional productivity could illustrate how 
often Members decide that a record of the vote is necessary. 
The decision to record a vote could be political, or it could 
signal the importance of the measure being considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ Jacob R. Straus, ``Let's Vote: The Rise and Impact of Roll 
Call Votes in the Age of Electronic Voting,'' in Party and Procedure in 
the United States Congress, pp. 101-123.
    \82\ See, for example, Brian Frederick, ``Gender and Patterns of 
Roll Call Voting in the U.S. Senate,'' Congress & the Presidency, vol. 
37, no. 2 (2010), pp. 103-124; Tao Xie, ``Congressional Roll Call 
Voting on China Trade Policy,'' American Politics Research, vol. 34, 
no. 6 (November 2006), pp. 732-758; Richard S. Conley and Richard M. 
Yon, 2007, ``The `Hidden Hand' and White House Roll-Call Predictions: 
Legislative Liaison in the Eisenhower White House, 83d-84th 
Congresses,'' Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 2 (June 
2007), pp. 291-312; and Stephen Ansolabehere and Philip Edward Jones, 
``Constituents' Response to Congressional Roll-Call Voting,'' American 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 54, no. 3 (July 2010), pp. 583-597.
    \83\ See, for example, Matthew J. Lebo, Adam J. McGlynn, and 
Gregory Koger, ``Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in 
Congress, 1789-2000,'' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 51, 
no. 3 (July 2007), pp. 464-481; Edward B. Hasecke and Jason D. Mycoff, 
``Party Loyalty and Legislative Success: Are Loyal Majority Party 
Members More Successful in the U.S. House of Representatives?,'' 
Political Research Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 4 (December 2007), pp. 607-
617; and David W. Rhode, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 8.
    \84\ Jacob R. Straus, ``Let's Vote: The Rise and Impact of Roll 
Call Votes in the Age of Electronic Voting,'' in Party and Procedure in 
the United States Congress, p. 110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because the number of rollcall votes taken in a given 
Congress is a function of requests for recorded votes by 
individual Members of Congress, the number of votes taken in a 
particular Congress is not necessarily indicative of how much 
work is being conducted or its substance. Examining the number 
of rollcall votes helps explain the number of times a recorded 
vote was taken, but it does not provide information on the type 
of vote. Further, as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act 
of 1970,\85\ House rules were amended to allow rollcall votes 
on amendments in the Committee of the Whole beginning in 1971. 
Allowing rollcall votes on amendments increased the potential 
number of rollcall votes per Congress by the number of 
amendments considered in the House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ P.L. 91-510; 84 Stat. 1140 (October 26, 1970).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several questions about the nature of the vote are also 
relevant if rollcall votes are used as a measure of 
productivity. Was the vote procedural (e.g., previous question 
or to table) or was it for final passage or to agree to an 
amendment? Without context, understanding the importance of a 
rollcall vote is not possible. Additionally, multiple pieces of 
legislation pass or are defeated in the House or Senate by 
voice vote or unanimous consent. In these cases, legislative 
action has occurred, but no vote has been taken. Using rollcall 
votes alone as a measure of productivity would not capture 
those actions.

                          committee activities

    Outside of floor activities, much of Congress' work occurs 
in committee. Committee activity can be generally summarized 
into two categories: meetings--which include hearings and 
legislative markups--and committee publications.\86\ Examining 
the productivity of committees could provide another metric for 
comparing overall congressional productivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ Roger H. Davidson, Walter J. Oleszek, Frances E. Lee, and Eric 
Schickler, Congress and Its Members, 14th ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 
2013), pp. 163-165.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hearings serve many purposes,\87\ including providing 
opportunities to gather information,\88\ make policy,\89\ and 
conduct oversight of the executive branch.\90\ Examining the 
number of hearings in a given Congress could give insight into 
the number of issues that the House or Senate examined, 
including issues that might not receive floor attention. These 
could include oversight of various executive branch functions, 
examinations into relevant policy issues, and the consideration 
of legislation through hearings and markups. As congressional 
rules governing committee meetings have changed, however, the 
number of meetings may have also changed. For example, past 
practice prohibited committees from meeting concurrently with 
House floor activities without a special dispensation from the 
House. In the 105th Congress (1997-1999), H. Res. 5 amended the 
rules of the House to allow committees to meet without 
obtaining special leave.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ John Baughman, Common Ground: Committee Politics in the U.S. 
House of Representatives (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2006).
    \88\ Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, ``Information and 
Congressional Hearings,'' American Journal of Political Science, vol. 
44, no. 1 (2000), pp. 51-65.
    \89\ David E. Price, ``Policy Making in Congressional Committees: 
The Impact of `Environmental Factors,' '' American Political Science 
Review, vol. 72, no. 2 (1978), pp. 548-574; and Kevin M. Leyden, 
``Interest Group Resources and Testimony at Congressional Hearings,'' 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3 (August 1995), pp. 431-
439.
    \90\ Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, ``Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,'' American 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 1 (February 1984), pp. 165-
179; and Michael J. Scicchitano, ``Congressional Oversight: The Case of 
the Clean Air Act,'' Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3 
(1986), pp. 393-407.
    \91\ CRS Report RL33610, A Retrospective of House Rules Changes 
Since the 104th Congress through the 109th Congress, by Michael L. 
Koempel and Judy Schneider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An alternative measure of committee activity is to examine 
the number of committee publications in each Congress or the 
number of pages published in committee reports, prints, and 
documents. Reports are ``a committee document that accompanies 
a reported measure. It describes the measure, the committee's 
views on it, its costs, and the changes it proposed to make in 
existing law.'' \92\ Committee prints are documents ``printed 
either for the use of a committee or for other informational 
purposes.'' \93\ Committee documents are miscellaneous items 
that are not necessarily committee reports or committee prints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Walter Kravitz, American Congressional Dictionary, p. 212.
    \93\ Walter Kravitz, American Congressional Dictionary, p. 51. For 
example, committee rules are generally published as a committee print.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An examination of the number of committee publications or 
the number of pages contained in those publications could 
provide a metric for congressional productivity across both 
legislative and nonlegislative activities. Changes in the 
administrative rules of Congress, especially in the House, 
however, could make such an analysis difficult. For example, 
beginning in the 92d Congress (1971-1973), House rules were 
amended to require that all House committees submit a biennial 
report of its activities to the House.\94\ That provision was 
further amended in the 112th Congress to require semi-annual 
reports,\95\ and amended further in the 113th Congress to 
require annual reports.\96\ Because of these changes, 
committees are to submit more activity reports to the House and 
the number of total reports may have increased. Even with an 
increase in the number of reports, however, the actual 
legislative and oversight work of the committees may or may not 
have increased. It should also be noted that there has been a 
decline in recent years in the number of some types of 
committee publications with committees using electronic formats 
as committee records in some instances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ P.L. 91-510,  118(b); 84 Stat. 1140 (October 26, 1970).
    \95\ H. Res. 5 (112th Congress), agreed to January 5, 2011. ``Rules 
of the House,'' Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (January 
5, 2011), p. H8.
    \96\ H. Res. 5 (113th Congress), agreed to January 3, 2013. ``Rules 
of the House,'' Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 159 (January 
3, 2013), p. H6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       congressional record pages

    To assess the productivity of the House or Senate in its 
entirety, one possible measure is to examine the number of 
pages printed in the Congressional Record. Since the 
Congressional Record is a ``. . . substantially verbatim 
account of daily proceedings on the Senate [or House] floor,'' 
\97\ the number of pages printed in the Record might provide a 
good approximation of the depth of debate in the House or 
Senate. The greater the number of pages that are devoted to 
debate on legislative matters, the more importance might be 
placed upon those subjects and the House or Senate's 
consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of the Senate, 
``Congressional Record,'' Senate Glossary, at http://www.senate.gov/
reference/glossary_term/congressional_record.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Congressional Record, however, is not just a record of 
debate. As political scientist Howard Mantel described it in 
the 1950s, it also:

summarizes activities of Congressional committees; it is 
replete with editorial opinion gleaned from the great and the 
not-so-great newspapers of America; and it is dotted with such 
sundry items as poetry, both professional and homespun, high 
school essays on ``what democracy means to me,'' the results of 
a particular congressman's public opinion polls, letters-to-
the-editor and other miscellany, ad infinitum. The 
Congressional Record serves also as a local tabloid of events 
on Capitol Hill, recording, for example, the menu and agenda 
for the serving of the Second Senate Salad, an epicurean 
concoction combining the finest in back home specialties, to be 
offered in ``the world's largest salad bowl . . . 3 feet wide 
and 14 inches deep.'' \98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ Howard N. Mantel, ``The Congressional Record: Fact or Fiction 
of the Legislative Process,'' Western Political Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 
4 (December 1959), p. 981.

    Since many nonlegislative items are added to the Record on 
any given day, a straight count of the number of pages per 
Congress would not necessarily reflect on that Congress' 
productivity. Instead, a separate count, removing the 
miscellaneous material, would likely be necessary to get a true 
sense of the time spent on debate in the Chambers. Removing the 
potentially extraneous materials, however, would potentially 
edit out the context of the day and could, in the Senate, 
remove material that was provided on the floor during the 
pursuit of a filibuster. That material could be an important 
part of the debating tactics afforded individual Senators.

                            days in session

    Similar to counting the number of pages in the 
Congressional Record, another potential measure of 
congressional productivity is the number of days spent in 
session. The number of days spent in session has long been used 
as a measure of legislative professionalism in the States, with 
more days in session indicative of a professional legislature 
and fewer of an impermanent institution.\99\ How the House and 
Senate choose to allocate their floor time could be a proxy for 
the amount of time spent on conducting their business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ For example, see Peverill Squire, ``Measuring State 
Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited,'' State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2 (June 2007), pp. 211-227.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pursuant to Article I, section 5, clause 4 of the 
Constitution, neither Chamber may take a break of more than 3 
days without the consent of the other.\100\ Consequently, in 
the absence of a concurrent resolution authorizing the recess 
of both the House and Senate, both Chambers will hold periodic 
pro forma sessions--a ``brief meeting of the Senate [or House], 
. . . sometimes only a few minutes in duration'' \101\ --to 
ensure compliance with the Constitution. In recent years, in an 
effort to prevent the President from making recess 
appointments,\102\ agreement on a concurrent resolution 
granting a recess has been rare, and the use of pro forma 
sessions has increased. Each pro forma session counts as a full 
legislative day. Thus, counting the number of days in session, 
when many pro forma sessions are held, could lead to an 
increase in the number of days in session, without a 
corresponding increase in the consideration of legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 5, clause 4.
    \101\ U.S. Senate, Secretary of the Senate, ``Pro forma session,'' 
Senate Glossary, at http://www. senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/
pro_forma_session.htm.
    \102\ For more information, see CRS Report RS21308, Recess 
Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions, by Henry B. Hogue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          Concluding Analysis

    Measuring congressional productivity is much more complex 
than generally recognized and invariably fraught with 
interpretive challenges. As this discussion of individual 
measures has shown, each has advantages and disadvantages that 
make using them individually potentially problematic. While 
legislation introduced, public laws enacted, and landmark 
legislation all provide one piece of the overall picture of 
congressional productivity, none by itself may suffice to 
evaluate a particular Congress.
    Regardless of whether one Congress should be judged against 
another, it is an activity in which many continue to engage. 
Overall, the measures examined in this report could be 
interpreted by some to reveal that contemporary Congresses 
appear to be less productive than historical Congresses. If it 
is true that contemporary Congresses are less productive, what 
factors might have caused this evolution?
    In the Introduction, three possible explanations were 
offered on why assessing congressional productivity might be 
important. They were Senator Coburn's idea of public perception 
as expressed in his Wastebook, President Truman's concept of 
political agreement in labeling the 80th Congress the ``do-
nothing'' Congress, and James Madison's dichotomy of ``easy'' 
and ``great'' objects of legislation written about in 
Federalist 63.
    As discussed above, each of the three explanations most 
clearly represents one of the three measures discussed in this 
report: legislative introduction, public laws, and landmark 
legislation. While each concept has been more clearly tied to a 
particular measure, each also has elements of the other 
measures present in its view of Congress. Further, each change 
to the operation or ability of Congress to pass legislation is 
important. To best compare congressional productivity, these 
measures (and potentially others discussed above under ``Other 
Possible Measures of Productivity'') are best used in tandem. 
By combining measures of analysis, it might be possible to 
incorporate the political (dis)agreement (Truman), public 
perception (Coburn), and great objects (Madison) explanations 
of congressional productivity to make comparisons across time.
    Several advantages could result from using these 
explanations together. First, Congress is a dynamic institution 
that was designed to change over time. As political scientist 
Lawrence Dodd stated: change, whether expected or unexpected, 
``can best be understood not as aberrations in our politics but 
as the natural, long-term outgrowth of three factors: the goals 
and strategies that politicians bring to congressional 
politics, the shifting societal contexts that they confront, 
and the changing ideas about politics that they experiment with 
as they pursue their goals and address societal problems.'' 
\103\ Because Congress is constantly changing, understanding 
that the legislative process in 1948 is not the same as in 2014 
is an important finding. Understanding the context of how 
Members of Congress come to agreement on measures with each 
other and with the President in each of these time periods 
bears on impressions of whether Congress is productive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ Lawrence C. Dodd, ``Re-Envisioning Congress: Theoretical 
Perspectives on Congressional Change--2004,'' in Congress Reconsidered, 
8th ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, DC: 
CQ Press, 2005), pp. 411-412.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, Members of Congress respond to constituent demands, 
and as constituent demands change, so do the responses of 
Members of Congress. In a June 2014 survey, Gallup reported: 
``Seven percent of American say they have `a great deal' or 
`quite a lot' of confidence in Congress as an American 
institution, down from the previous low of 10% in 2013.'' \104\ 
When public perception of Congress is juxtaposed against the 
decline in bills introduced, public laws enacted, and landmark 
legislation, some might conclude that public approval is linked 
with these measures. The decline of these measures could be in 
response to low approval ratings, with individual Members of 
Congress more concerned about their individual reelection than 
any specific policy initiative.\105\ Conversely, public 
approval of Congress may have declined as the measures of 
congressional productivity have also declined. In other words, 
the public might be reacting to a perceived lack of 
productivity with lower public opinion ratings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ Rebecca Riffkin, ``Public Faith in Congress Falls Again, Hits 
Historic Low,'' Gallup.com, June 19, 2014, at http://www.gallup.com/
poll/171710/public-faith-congress-falls-again-hits- historic-low.aspx.
    \105\ David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Public perception, however, is not just about polling 
numbers. It is also possible that congressional productivity 
mirrors public expectations for Congress. In 1982, journalist 
Albert Hunt wrote a piece for Washingtonian magazine entitled, 
``In Defense of a Messy Congress.'' In this article, he 
suggested that Congress should struggle through policy issues 
in order to get the policy right. ``The simple fact is that 
Congress isn't supposed to operate neatly, efficiently, or 
expeditiously. Any system of checks and balances has built-in 
tensions and rough edges'' [emphasis in original].\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ Albert R. Hunt, ``In Defense of a Messy Congress,'' 
Washingtonian (September 1982), p. 182.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If Hunt's analysis is correct, then the American public 
might want a Congress that requires significant time to pass 
public policy and looks unproductive at times. The public might 
want a robust minority that is able to prevent measures from 
becoming law without significant cooperation and compromise 
between the parties. If, in an effort to appear more productive 
and pass more laws, the House and Senate rewrote their rules to 
provide for additional majority party control of the 
legislative agenda--in a manner more similar to the British 
parliamentary system--the majority would have carte blanche to 
enact whatever measures it wanted. Precisely because of a 
``messy'' system, Congress is deliberate, and major policy 
changes can take years, or decades, to be enacted. If more laws 
were enacted, Congress might meet citizens' goals for a more 
active legislature or it could be imposing majoritarian rule, 
one of James Madison's fears espoused in Federalist 10.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ James Madison, ``Federalist No. 10: The Same Subject 
Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and 
Insurrection,'' Federalist Papers, at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/
histdox/fed_10.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, passing major landmark legislation, or ``great 
objects,'' is a long and tedious process and can be tied to 
public perception. As Senate staffer and political scientist 
James Wallner attested: ``Public perceptions of Congress echo 
the popular critique that the Senate is beset by gridlock and 
thus is dysfunctional.'' \108\ Further, dysfunction by its very 
nature prohibits passage or lengthens the amount of time 
required to pass landmark legislation. Increasing the amount of 
time required to pass landmark legislation, however, could be a 
feature of the deliberative process Americans are so often 
proud of when describing the government and reflects the desire 
for a ``messy'' system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ James I. Wallner, The Death of Deliberation: Partisanship and 
Polarization in the United States Senate (Lanham, MD: Lexington Press, 
2013), p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, when considering political (dis)agreement, public 
perception, and great objects in tandem, one can observe that 
policy development and productivity exists within each 
Congress. Senator Edward Kennedy knew this to be true and wrote 
in his memoir that advancing health care reform would take time 
to craft the right policy. It was the length of time, however, 
that upon reflection surprised him.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ Edward M. Kennedy, True Compass (New York: Twelve Books, 
2009), pp. 299-300.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Time is a valuable commodity in government. Members of 
Congress may measure time not just in days, weeks, or months, 
but also in the time between elections. When policy develops 
slowly, claiming credit for incremental movement can be 
difficult. Instead, it is easier to say that a Congress did or 
did not do something within its 2-year window than it is to 
view the arc of policy development over time. Balancing 
political (dis)agreement, public perception, and great objects 
is not an easy proposition. But when understanding the 
development of public policy and the role of any given 
Congress, considering all three concepts--displayed through the 
introduction of legislation, enactment of public laws, and 
passing of landmark legislation--Congress may not look quite as 
unproductive as popular sentiment holds.
    Some measures used to assess congressional productivity and 
compare Congresses may fail to account for the complexity 
inherent in developing policy in a representative democracy 
with separated powers. Judging congressional productivity, 
therefore, is inherently rife with judgment calls and is a 
value-laden and ideological effort. This is personified in the 
opposite views that Representative Hoyer and Speaker Boehner 
took in assessing the 112th Congress. Congress might be judged 
on how many laws it does pass or how many it repeals, but 
ultimately, an assessment of productivity is highly subjective.


      
=======================================================================




                    III. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONGRESS

=======================================================================



  Recent Innovations in Special Rules in the House of Representatives

                             Megan S. Lynch

            Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process

                                  and

                            Mark J. Oleszek

            Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process

                              ----------                              


        In the modern Congress, the Rules Committee is more 
        than just a gatekeeper providing the means for allowing 
        the House to consider legislation. The committee acts 
        as an arm of the House majority leadership through 
        which they can use the power of the majority to control 
        myriad aspects of scheduling and consideration. This 
        chapter covers recent innovations used by the Rules 
        Committee to solve problems and further the procedural 
        and political goals of the majority.

        Special Rules as Problem-Solvers for the Majority Party

    Thousands of legislative proposals are introduced in 
Congress each year, many of which are considered at length by 
one or more congressional committees. A relative few are 
brought to the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives for 
consideration by the entire body. The leadership of the House 
must therefore make choices regarding what proposals the House 
will consider, when it will do so, and what procedural 
restrictions will be imposed.
    The role of the Rules Committee is to work with the House 
leadership to manage the efficient use of time spent by the 
House in the consideration of measures on the floor. In doing 
this, it is responsible for creating situations that benefit 
the majority party, both procedurally and politically, through 
the use of special rules.
    Originally, the Rules Committee was not a standing 
committee but a select committee tasked with drafting the rules 
of the House at the beginning of a Congress. By the end of the 
19th century, the Rules Committee had become a standing 
committee with the task of reporting resolutions providing the 
means for considering a measure not otherwise eligible for 
floor consideration.\1\ In more recent decades, the Rules 
Committee has been more than just a gatekeeper providing the 
means for allowing the House to consider legislation. The 
committee acts as an arm of the leadership through which they 
can use the power of the majority to control myriad aspects of 
scheduling and consideration that allows for an efficient use 
of floor time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, A History of the 
Committee on Rules, 1st-97th Congress 1789-1981, committee print, 97th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1983, 99-451. In Managing Uncertainty in the House of 
Representatives: Adaption and Innovation in Special Rules (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution, 1988), Stanley Bach and Steven Smith provide 
an account of the history and development of special rules and the 
provisions they contain. See also Stanley Bach, ``From Special Orders 
to Special Rules: Pictures of House Procedure in Transition,'' at 
http://www.stanistan.org/docs/1/4.pdf.




                        What is a special rule?

          A special rule, often referred to simply as a 
            ``rule,'' is a House resolution reported from 
            the House Rules Committee. Once adopted by the 
            House, a special rule has two key functions: 
            (1) to enable the House to consider the measure 
            specified, and (2) to set terms for considering 
            it.



    The kinds of provisions contained in special rules have 
changed over the years, largely in response to the composition 
and needs of House majorities at various points in time. 
Special rules have come to regulate a greater share of floor 
activity than they once did, including the legislative text 
that will be considered on the floor, how long it will be 
debated, and to what extent it may be amended. Special rules 
may also allow actions that would otherwise not be in order by 
providing a waiver of House rules so that Members may not raise 
points of order that they could otherwise make.
    Special rules may include any number of provisions that 
will prevent or resolve problems for a majority party. As 
described below, these may relate to managing committee 
relations, structuring votes, enhancing transparency, or 
attempting to control interactions with the Senate. The 
committee has developed such provisions in order to assist 
lawmakers in managing an increasingly difficult lawmaking 
environment.
    The close connection that exists between the House's 
majority leadership and the Rules Committee is maintained in 
two important ways. First, under party rules, the Speaker and 
the minority leader directly nominate their respective party 
members to the committee, subject to a vote of approval from 
the party caucus or conference. Second, on the Rules Committee, 
the majority party enjoys a fixed membership advantage of nine 
to four. This deliberate partisan imbalance reflects the vital 
role the Rules Committee plays in managing the House's floor 
agenda and defining the policy choices that come before the 
Chamber.
    Special rules have included a number of innovations in 
recent years that have affected the work of the House. This 
report examines four that illustrate how provisions in special 
rules can produce consequences, procedural and political, that 
are favorable to the majority party.

 Provisions Providing for Consideration of Multiple Measures (Compound 
                                 Rules)

    Traditionally, provisions of a special rule have governed 
the consideration of a single measure or matter on the House 
floor. If the Rules Committee wanted to make additional items 
privileged for floor consideration, it would usually initiate a 
new round of committee deliberations and report a special rule 
for each additional measure. While this generally remains the 
case today, it has become increasingly common for the committee 
to provide for the separate consideration of two or more 
distinct measures in a single ``compound'' rule. If adopted, a 
compound rule sets the stage for legislative action to occur on 
multiple measures in much the same way as would a series of 
special rules individually tailored to each measure and adopted 
separately. Take, for instance, House Resolution 727, a 
compound rule adopted during the 113th Congress (2013-2014). A 
portion of that rule appears in Figure 1.

                        Figure 1. Compound Rule

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Source: H. Res. 727 (113th Congress).

    Section 1 of H. Res. 727 sets forth legislative procedures 
for the consideration of H.R. 2, a bill ``to remove federal 
government obstacles to the production of more domestic 
energy,'' and for other purposes, while section 2 creates floor 
procedures to handle H.R. 4, a bill making ``revisions to 
federal law to improve the conditions necessary for economic 
growth and job creation, and for other purposes.'' When the 
House adopted H. Res. 727 by a 227 to 193 vote on September 18, 
2014, both measures became eligible for consideration under the 
terms of the special rule. The House went on to pass both H.R. 
2 and H.R. 4 later that day in accordance with the provisions 
of the special rule.
    Compound rules are not new to the present Congress. Eight 
such rules were granted during the 104th Congress (1995-1996), 
but until the 111th Congress (2009-2010), the number of 
compound rules per Congress remained fairly steady with no 
clear trend evident over time. Since then, however, there has 
been a significant increase in their usage, both in terms of 
the total number of compound rules per Congress and as a 
percentage of all special rules reported during each 2-year 
period. This upward trend is shown in Table 1.


                     Table 1. Compound Special Rules
                                1995-2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Compound
                                            Total    Number   rules as a
                                           number      of     percentage
            Congress (years)                 of     compound   of total
                                           special   special    special
                                            rules     rules      rules
------------------------------------------------------------------------
104th (1995-1996).......................       230         8        3.5
105th (1997-1998).......................       207         9        4.3
106th (1999-2000).......................       267         7        2.6
107th (2001-2002).......................       191         3        1.6
108th (2003-2004).......................       192         8        4.2
109th (2005-2006).......................       193         6        3.1
110th (2007-2008).......................       220         7        3.2
111th (2009-2010).......................       165        12        7.3
112th (2011-2012).......................       129        33       25.6
113th Congress, 1st session (2013)......        54        20       37.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Data in Table 1 were drawn primarily from Rules Committee
  activity reports. Those reports summarize the work of the committee
  during each Congress and are available for download from the
  committee's Web site at http://rules.house.gov/resources. Each
  compound rule identified in an activity report was cross-checked using
  the Legislative Information System of Congress (LIS), an online
  database of congressional activity that includes the text of each
  resolution the committee reported. Activity reports also list the
  total number of special rules the Rules Committee granted during each
  2-year period.


    Compound rules may offer several advantages to a majority 
party and Members generally. For one, compound rules can add 
predictability to the House schedule because they identify two 
(or more) measures eligible for possible floor consideration 
rather than a single measure. Knowing what comes next might 
make it easier for Members to prepare for debate and amendment 
on the House floor.
    Compound rules can also expedite business by reducing the 
amount of floor time spent debating special rules. By setting 
aside the traditional ``one rule for one bill'' pattern, less 
time is spent debating special rules, and more time may be 
spent on other business. By combining these measures into a 
single special rule, the Rules Committee can reduce the number 
of opportunities for a minority party to address underlying 
procedural restrictions or the policy embodied in any single 
underlying measures. Simply put, there is less debate time on 
the floor when compound rules are used. In addition, compound 
rules result in fewer opportunities to vote on the previous 
question, a vote the minority party often characterizes (during 
debate on a rule) as a vote on a particular policy proposal.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ After an hour of debate on a special rule, a Member from the 
majority party typically moves the previous question, a motion that 
proposes to end consideration of a matter and move to a final vote. If 
the previous question motion were to fail, the minority floor manager 
would control an hour of debate time and could offer amendments to the 
special rule. While the previous question is almost invariably agreed 
to, Members from the minority party will often urge colleagues to vote 
``no'' on the previous question so that the special rule could be 
altered to allow a different legislative proposal to come to the floor. 
During debate on the rule, they may characterize the vote on the 
previous question as being a vote on the stated legislative proposal. 
The Rules Committee describes such a scenario on page 2 of the 
following: http://rules.house.gov/sites/ republicans.rules.house.gov/
files/112-BT-RulesComm-20110706.pdf. For more information on the 
previous question, see CRS Report R43424, Considering Legislation on 
the House Floor: Common Practices in Brief, by Elizabeth Rybicki.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Reducing the number of special rules reported may also 
provide advantages to the members of the Rules Committee by 
reducing the number of meetings or amount of time devoted to 
committee hearings and markups. Although service on the Rules 
Committee was historically an exclusive assignment for Members 
of both parties, preventing them from serving on other House 
committees, Members now routinely serve on other committees as 
well. These additional assignments may create new pressures, 
responsibilities and scheduling demands, so that compound rules 
may be seen as a solution to scheduling difficulties because 
they allow the committee in a single meeting to set legislative 
procedures governing the consideration of multiple measures.

 Provisions Providing for the Single Engrossment of Multiple Measures 
                          (Engrossment Rules)

    Once a bill or joint resolution has passed the House, an 
engrossed copy of the legislation is prepared and certified by 
the Clerk of the House before being sent to the Senate.\3\ 
Occasionally, special rules will include provisions that 
instruct the Clerk to perform particular actions during this 
process--specifically, to combine the texts of multiple 
separately passed bills into a single measure for transmission 
to the Senate.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ For more information on engrossment, see CRS Report 98-826, 
Engrossment, Enrollment, and Presentation of Legislation, by R. Eric 
Petersen.
    \4\ The Rules Committee formally refers to these as rules that 
include ``provisions providing for the engrossment of multiple 
measures.'' Informally, however, these are often referred to by Members 
and staff as ``MIRV'' rules, MIRV being an acronym used in the military 
to describe a missile containing multiple independently targetable 
reentry vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Figure 2 displays language often used to this effect, which 
in this case was drawn from section 3 of H. Res. 245, an 
engrossment rule adopted during the 112th Congress (2011-2012). 
The language of H. Res. 245 directs the Clerk to combine the 
texts of two separate bills, H.R. 1229 and H.R. 1230, into a 
single measure and make the formatting adjustments necessary to 
render a single, seamless, and internally consistent piece of 
legislation. The combined product is not subject to an 
additional vote by the House. Engrossment rules typically also 
contain additional language that permanently and adversely 
disposes of those measures combined in this way (like H.R. 1230 
in Figure 2) by laying them on the table. This ensures that no 
further action will be taken in relation to those tabled 
measures.
    As shown in Table 2, the use of such provisions has been on 
an upward trajectory in recent years.
    There are many possible reasons why a special rule that 
includes a provision providing for the engrossment of multiple 
measures might be used, one of which is clearly contemplated in 
the rules of the House. Specifically, Rule XXI, clause 
10(b)(2)--referred to as the Cut-as-You-Go, or CutGo, rule--
references such a special rule in providing guidance for its 
enforcement. The CutGo rule generally prohibits consideration 
of legislation in the House if it would have the net effect of 
increasing total direct spending over two specified periods.\5\ 
The rule, however, also provides that a separately passed 
measure to be added during engrossment pursuant to a special 
rule can act as an offset to such an increase. In this way, it 
is possible to have one measure act as a budgetary offset for 
another measure, even though the measures are considered and 
passed separately by the House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ The periods are (1) the current year, the budget year, and the 
4 fiscal years following the budget year; and (2) the current year, the 
budget year, and the 9 fiscal years following that budget year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       Figure 2. Engrossment Rule

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: H. Res. 245 (112th Congress).

    For example, in the 112th Congress, the special rule H. 
Res. 245 provided that during engrossment of H.R. 1229, a bill 
to amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Clerk was 
to add the text of H.R. 1230, a bill to require the Secretary 
of the Interior to conduct certain offshore oil and gas lease 
sales, and for other purposes. The Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) estimated that H.R. 1229 as reported (which was the form 
passed by the House) would increase direct spending over one of 
the two relevant periods.\6\ CBO estimated, however, that the 
other measure, H.R. 1230, would decrease mandatory spending by 
a greater amount over the same period.\7\ This meant that, when 
combined, the bills were projected to have the net effect of 
reducing mandatory spending in the relevant periods and 
therefore would not violate the CutGo rule.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ The period of the current year, the budget year, and 4 fiscal 
years following the budget year.
    \7\ The CBO cost estimate pertained to the bill as reported, which 
was the form as passed by the House.
    \8\ As stated in H. Rept. 112-73, the committee report accompanying 
H. Res. 245, when referring to the budgetary effects of H.R. 1229, 
``This budgetary violation will be cured when, pursuant to the 
resolution, H.R. 1230 is added as new matter at the end of H.R. 1229. 
In accordance with clause 10(b) of rule XXI, the provisions of H.R. 
1230 will offset the breach in allocation of entitlement authority for 
a total net reduction in direct spending of $34 million over the 2011-
2021 period.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Allowing the House to consider measures separately, both in 
committee and on the House floor, may also allow majority 
leadership to keep the question of germaneness more narrowly 
focused: The broader a measure is at the time of its 
consideration, the more likely an amendment can be germane to 
its text. This might enable the majority leadership to keep 
consideration of alternatives, including motions to recommit 
with instructions, restricted to more narrow questions and not 
affect the content of the measure as sent to the Senate.


                   Table 2. Engrossment Special Rules
                                1995-2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Engrossment
                                       Total     Number of    rules as a
                                     number of  engrossment   percentage
          Congress (years)            special     special      of total
                                       rules       rules       special
                                                                rules
------------------------------------------------------------------------
104th (1995-1996)..................        230           1          0.4
105th (1997-1998)..................        207           2          0.9
106th (1999-2000)..................        267           3          1.1
107th (2001-2002)..................        191           0          0.0
108th (2003-2004)..................        192           4          2.1
109th (2005-2006)..................        193           4          2.1
110th (2007-2008)..................        220           6          2.7
111th (2009-2010)..................        165           9          5.5
112th (2011-2012)..................        129           5          3.9
113th Congress, 1st session (2013).         54           4          7.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Data in Table 2 were drawn primarily from Rules Committee
  activity reports. Those reports, which summarize the work of the
  committee during each 2-year period, identify various provisions in
  special rules including those that ``provide for the engrossment of
  multiple measures.'' Each engrossment rule listed in an activity
  report was cross-checked using the Legislative Information System of
  Congress (LIS).


    Engrossment rules may also be used to provide enhanced 
control over the number of House-passed measures that are 
available for Senate action. This is especially pertinent to 
revenue measures, because the U.S. Constitution requires those 
measures to originate in the House.\9\ The Senate may not 
originate revenue bills, but it is free to amend such measures 
sent to it by the House. For example, it may be that the House 
wants to consider and vote on several revenue issues 
separately, both in committee and on the House floor. The 
engrossment of multiple measures, then, can be used as a way to 
allow this while simultaneously limiting the number of revenue 
bills available to the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ The ``origination clause'' of the U.S. Constitution is found in 
Article 1, section 7, clause 1. For more information on the effect of 
this clause on the consideration of revenue measures, see CRS Report 
RL31399, The Origination Clause of the U.S. Constitution: 
Interpretation and Enforcement, by James V. Saturno.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By combining measures separately passed in the House, 
engrossment rules may also increase the likelihood of Senate 
action on a particular issue or expand the scope of matters to 
be negotiated in the resolution of bicameral differences. In 
this way, engrossment rules can create opportunities for 
compromise that might not otherwise exist.

   Provisions Referring to Legislative Text Within a Committee Print 
                        (Committee Print Rules)

    Whereas the two innovations described above concern the 
provisions in the special rule, this innovation concerns the 
form in which the Rules Committee prescribes the text for 
consideration by the House. In that sense, this innovation is a 
new method for performing what has been one of the committee's 
traditional tasks: establishing the legislative text for 
consideration.
    When the Rules Committee crafts a special rule, it has a 
variety of ways it can specify the legislative text to be 
considered. The rule itself can specify the legislative 
language by referring to a specific measure as introduced, 
reported by committee, or as modified by other legislative 
language that appears elsewhere. Until recently, if this 
language was extensive, it would appear in the text of the 
committee report accompanying the special rule, providing the 
benefit of allowing the House to see the new legislative text 
prior to its consideration.
    By establishing the legislative text eligible for floor 
consideration, the Rules Committee can address any number of 
policy or political challenges that require the House majority 
leadership, often with the support of relevant committee 
chairs, to facilitate their lawmaking goals. For example, the 
Rules Committee can make adjustments to committee-reported 
language in order to incorporate the recommendations of another 
committee that shares jurisdiction over the underlying measure 
or otherwise satisfy policy choices favored by the majority.
    In the case that the legislative text set forth in the 
special rule combines several measures (or portions of 
measures) reported by committee, the special rule can provide 
several of the same advantages as a compound rule, as described 
above. By combining several measures into a single bill, the 
Rules Committee can decrease time spent on the floor and reduce 
the number of opportunities for the minority party to address 
the policy embodied in the underlying measures. For example, 
the minority is guaranteed a motion to recommit on each 
individual bill considered by the House. If fewer separate 
measures are considered on the House floor, the minority party 
will have fewer opportunities to get a vote on its policy 
preferences.\10\ Also, similar to special rules that include 
engrossment provisions, described above, combining measures for 
floor consideration can allow measures to be considered 
separately in committee, allowing committee leadership to keep 
the question of germaneness more narrowly focused yet allow 
several bills to be combined postcommittee so that less time is 
used for floor consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The motion to recommit is typically offered after the previous 
question has been ordered on a measure but before the House votes on 
final passage. Preference in recognition for offering a motion to 
recommit is given to a member of the minority party who is opposed to 
the bill. A motion to recommit may have various procedural effects, 
including amending an underlying measure, sending it to one or more 
committees, providing additional time for its consideration, or 
potentially disposing of the legislation. The motion to recommit might 
also have political effects. For more information on the motion to 
recommit, see CRS Report RL34757, The Motion to Recommit in the House 
of Representatives: Effects and Recent Trends, by Megan S. Lynch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recently, however, it has become common for the Rules 
Committee to provide the text to be considered in the form of a 
Rules Committee print. In many cases, a Rules Committee print 
contains language that is identical to a committee-reported 
bill. Rules Committee Print 113-48, for instance, mirrors 
exactly the text of H.R. 6, which was reported by the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce on June 19, 2014. Although the language 
of both measures is equivalent, selecting a Rules Committee 
print as the basis for debate and amendment offers several 
advantages to the majority leadership and Members generally. 
First, and perhaps most important, Rules Committee prints made 
in order under the terms of a special rule can be easily 
located and retrieved in portable document format (PDF) from 
the Rules Committee Web site for inspection by all Members, as 
well as the general public. Transparency in lawmaking can be 
enhanced when the Rules Committee acts as a legislative 
clearinghouse in this way. Second, Rules Committee staff can 
quickly post the text of a measure online in the form of a 
Rules Committee print. This can be especially beneficial to 
Members who intend to offer amendments because page and line 
numbers in a Rules Committee print are fixed at the outset, 
whereas additional time is occasionally needed for the 
Government Printing Office (GPO) to publish and distribute new 
or revised committee reports. In this way, use of the committee 
prints may be related to the pledge articulated by the majority 
party that the text of any measure considered on the House 
floor will be made available 3 days before consideration.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ The majority party pledge includes the following language, 
``Read the Bill. We will ensure that bills are debated and discussed in 
the public square by publishing the text online for at least three days 
before coming up for a vote in the House of Representatives. No more 
hiding legislative language from the minority party, opponents, and the 
public. Legislation should be understood by all interested parties 
before it is voted on.'' from page 33 at the following http://
www.gop.gov/resources/library/documents/pledge/a-pledge-to-america.pdf. 
Pursuant to this pledge, the legislative text is made available at 
http://docs.house.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    Figure 3. Committee-Print Rule 

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Source: H. Res. 636 (113th Congress).

    Figures displayed in Table 3 illustrate the number and 
percentage of ``Print Rule''--defined here as special rules 
that set a Rules Committee print as the text for floor 
consideration--in relation to the total number of special rules 
granted by the Rules Committee since the beginning of the 104th 
Congress (1995-1996). As indicated in Table 3, such committee 
print rules have become increasingly common.


                 Table 3. Committee Print Special Rules
                                1995-2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Print
                                           Total   Number of  rules as a
                                          number   committee  percentage
            Congress (years)                of       print      of all
                                          special   special     special
                                           rules     rules       rules
------------------------------------------------------------------------
104th (1995-1996)......................       230          0          0
105th (1997-1998)......................       207          0          0
106th (1999-2000)......................       267          1          0
107th (2001-2002)......................       191          0          0
108th (2003-2004)......................       192          1          1
109th (2005-2006)......................       193          3          2
110th (2007-2008)......................       220          0          0
111th (2009-2010)......................       165          0          0
112th (2011-2012)......................       129         27         21
113th Congress, 1st session (2013).....        54         22         41
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Data displayed in Table 3 were drawn from the Legislative
  Information System (LIS) by searching the text of House resolutions
  for the phrase ``Rules Committee print'' without word variants.
  Figures on the total number of special rules granted during each 2-
  year period were drawn from Rules Committee activity reports for that
  Congress (or session of Congress).

     New Provisions Restricting the Consideration of Amendments on 
                          Appropriations Bills

    Another example of innovation in special rules occurred in 
the 113th Congress (2013-2014) when the Rules Committee 
reported special rules that establish a new way to regulate the 
amendment process on appropriations measures. It appears that 
this was done to accomplish multiple goals set out by the 
majority leadership: to allow an open amending process and to 
make more efficient use of floor time.
    Customarily, when Members consider a measure for amendment 
under the terms of a special rule, it is done in one of two 
ways.
    First, an ``open'' special rule would allow amendments to 
be considered under the ``5-minute'' rule, meaning that any 
Member may offer an amendment that is otherwise in order under 
the standing rules of the House. The Member offering the 
amendment is recognized for 5 minutes to speak in favor, after 
which an opponent can be recognized to speak against the 
amendment for 5 minutes. In this situation, other Members may 
also offer ``pro forma'' amendments, which allow them to secure 
an additional 5 minutes to speak on the amendment. Typically, 
there is no limit on the number of pro forma amendments that 
can be offered. Under an open rule, pending first degree 
amendments are also, prior to being voted on, subject to 
amendments in the second degree. Eleven of the 12 regular 
appropriations bills are traditionally considered under an open 
rule when brought to the floor for consideration.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ The legislative branch appropriations bill is the exception: 
It is typically brought to the floor under a ``structured'' special 
rule, which specifies what amendments will be in order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Alternatively, the Rules Committee can limit the amendments 
that are in order by reporting a ``structured'' special rule. 
In current practice, when they do this, they typically prohibit 
second degree amendments and restrict debate on an amendment to 
10 minutes, divided equally between the proponent and an 
opponent of the amendment. The proponent and opponent 
``control'' the time, meaning that they may reserve the balance 
of their time in order to alternate speaking and that other 
Members can speak on the amendment only if they have been 
yielded time by the proponent or opponent controlling time. No 
pro forma amendments are in order.
    The recently reported provision of special rules on 
appropriations bills embodies a hybrid of these two typical 
amending scenarios.\13\ While the rule allows for any Member to 
offer an amendment to the bill, it prohibits second degree 
amendments and significantly restricts debate on any amendment. 
As in a structured rule, such rules provide 10 minutes for 
debate equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
opponent of the amendment, but they prohibit pro forma 
amendments, meaning no Member can secure 5 additional minutes 
to speak as a matter of right so that any Members wishing to 
speak on an amendment must be yielded time from either the 
proponent or an opponent. These rules do provide an exception, 
however, and grant up to 10 pro forma amendments to each the 
chair and ranking minority member of the Appropriations 
Committee (or their respective designees) to use while 
addressing any amendments during consideration of the 
underlying bill.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ The Rules Committee has described these rules as ``modified-
open'' rules, which presumably adds to the definition of modified-open 
rules presently encompassing rules that (1) place an overall time cap 
on the consideration of all amendments or (2) require amendments to be 
preprinted.
    \14\ H. Res. 616 (113th Congress), H. Res. 628 (113th Congress), H. 
Res. 641 (113th Congress), H. Res. 661 (113th Congress).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In a letter to the Rules Committee chairman, the 
Appropriations Committee chairman specifically requested such 
language in a special rule:

    In addition, in order to assure completion of the bill in a 
reasonable amount of time, I believe providing additional 
measures to help facilitate orderly and expedited debate would 
be useful . . . . The benefits of assuring each bill progresses 
through the amendment process in a timely manner will be the 
opportunities to consider additional appropriations bills on 
the floor and to allow members to have their input on those 
bills as well. It is my desire to bring all twelve 
appropriations bills to the floor, if possible, and I believe 
these additional measures will help make that possible.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Harold Rogers, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, 
letter to the Honorable Pete Sessions, chairman of the House Rules 
Committee, June 9, 2014.

    While it is unusual for a special rule to provide for such 
an amending scenario, such a situation has sometimes been 
agreed to under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement 
after a bill has been brought to the floor.\16\ During the 
Rules Committee markup, a majority party Member stated, ``While 
not our usual process, this procedure balances the need for any 
Member to offer any amendment to the bill with the need to 
complete our work.'' A Member from the minority party, however, 
expressed concern that while such restrictions had previously 
occasionally been
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Representative Frank Wolf, ``Limiting Amendment Debate during 
Further Consideration of House Debate on H.R. 4660, Commerce, Justice, 
Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015,'' House debate, 
Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 160, May 29, 2014, p. H4955.

done by unanimous consent, what you are doing with this 
appropriations bill now is you are instituting a 10-minute time 
limit on each amendment, five minutes on each side, you are 
eliminating pro forma amendments which will also limit debate 
severely, and to suggest that we are going to have a serious 
discussion on child nutrition standards in schools with five 
minutes on each side, I think is absurd. This is an intentional 
attempt to limit debate on a very, very important bill.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ House Rules Committee markup on H. Res. 616 for H.R. 4800, 
June 17, 2014, at http://rules.house.gov/video/rules-committee-hearing-
hr-4870-and-senate-amendment-hr-3230.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Figure 4. Rule with New Provision Restricting the Amendment Process

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Source: H. Res. 616 (113th Congress).

                     The Ever-Changing Special Rule

    An examination of special rules over the past century 
reveals that their contents consistently evolve. The primary 
role of the Rules Committee is to create situations that 
benefit the majority party, both procedurally and politically, 
and to accomplish this, the Rules Committee continually 
develops innovative provisions to include in special rules. 
Likewise, once a provision ceases to be useful to the majority 
for any variety of reasons, the Rules Committee will likely 
abandon it.
    Sometimes provisions are used only temporarily because they 
cease to be useful in achieving the goals of the majority or 
represent solutions to things that are no longer viewed as 
problems. Sometimes provisions are replaced by a provision that 
the majority party prefers instead. For example, beginning in 
the 1980s, the Rules Committee sometimes reported special rules 
that included a provision allowing the House to consider a 
series of several alternative amendments to the same text. The 
provision specified that if more than one amendment achieved a 
majority vote, it would be the last one adopted that would be 
considered as agreed to. These special rules, referred to as 
king-of-the-hill rules, became relatively popular until they 
were replaced in the mid-1990s by what were referred to as 
queen-of-the-hill rules. These rules included a similar 
provision that would allow the House to consider several 
alternative amendments to the same text, but the amendment to 
achieve the greatest number of votes (assuming it was at least 
a majority) would be considered as adopted. Queen-of-the-hill 
rules were used sparingly and ceased being used at all after 
2002.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ For a discussion of such rules, see James Saturno, ``Toppling 
the King of the Hill: Understanding Innovation in House Practice,'' in 
Jacob Straus, Party and Procedure in the United States Congress 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the Rules Committee discontinues the use of any 
provisions that it no longer finds useful, it may be that 
provisions cease to be included for another reason. If used 
routinely enough, provisions included in special rules may 
ultimately be folded into the House standing rules so that it 
is no longer necessary to include them in a special rule. For 
example, during the 104th, 105th, and 106th Congresses (1995-
2000), special rules commonly included a provision providing 
the chairman of the Committee of the Whole the authority to 
postpone and cluster recorded votes.\19\ In the 107th Congress 
(2001-2002), this authority was integrated into the standing 
rules of the House as House Rule XVIII, clause 6(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ For more information, see U.S. Congress, Constitution, 
Jefferson's Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, H. Doc. 
112-161,  984, 112th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: GPO, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because new provisions are regularly introduced and phased 
out as necessary to facilitate the work of the majority party, 
it is important to view any current trends of provisions in 
special rules with the understanding that, since their 
inception, special rules have continually evolved in substance 
and construction and will likely continue to do so.







      Changes in the Purposes and Frequency of Authorizations of 
                             Appropriations

                           Jessica Tollestrup

            Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process

                              ----------                              


        The form and content of authorization laws and their 
        role in budgetary decisionmaking has varied greatly 
        over time. In the 19th century, authorizations were 
        primarily used for the initial establishment of 
        programs while control over the details of particular 
        activities and amounts was achieved through the annual 
        appropriations process. During the mid-20th century, 
        however, the legislative committees began to include 
        provisions that explicitly authorized appropriations in 
        authorization acts as a means of influencing budgetary 
        outcomes, both with respect to the action of the 
        appropriators and for the agencies under their 
        jurisdiction. In addition, these committees began to 
        establish periodic schedules of review for certain 
        agencies so that it became necessary to enact 
        reauthorizations on an annual or multiyear basis. As 
        these practices have continued to evolve in more recent 
        years, the congressional reauthorization process has 
        again shifted to being more policy focused, with less 
        of an emphasis on funding levels or periodic 
        reauthorization schedules. This chapter discusses 
        general themes that underlie this evolution, and 
        illustrates them with three case studies on the 
        authorizations of appropriations for the National 
        Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space 
        Administration, and the Peace Corps.

                              Introduction

    A basic principle underlying the congressional budget 
process is the separation between money and policy decisions. 
One means through which this division of labor has been 
observed is through congressional rules and practices that 
distinguish between provisions that establish the activities of 
government and those that fund those activities--
``authorizations'' and ``appropriations,'' respectively.\1\ An 
authorization generally provides legal authority for the 
government to act, usually by establishing, continuing, or 
restricting a Federal agency, program, policy, project, or 
activity. It may also, explicitly or implicitly, authorize 
subsequent congressional action to provide appropriations for 
those purposes. By itself, however, an authorization does not 
provide funding for government activities. An appropriation 
generally provides both the legal authority to obligate future 
payments from the Treasury, and the ability to make subsequent 
payments to satisfy those obligations. Since the adoption of a 
formal rule in the House in 1835, the distinction between 
authorizations and appropriations has been based on limiting 
the provisions of appropriations measures to funding those 
programs or activities previously established by law. The form 
in which those programs or activities are established, however, 
is not prescribed by House or Senate rules or practices, so the 
language and specificity of such provisions has varied greatly 
over time.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The current congressional practices and legal principles 
associated with authorizations and appropriations are summarized in CRS 
Report R42098, Authorization of Appropriations: Procedural and Legal 
Issues, by Jessica Tollestrup and Brian T. Yeh.
    \2\ This report's summary of the general development of these 
congressional rules and practices is largely based on Alan Schick, 
Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets: The Development of Spending 
Decision-making in Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 1984 
(hereinafter, Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets); and Louis 
Fisher, ``Annual Authorizations: Durable Roadblocks to Biennial 
Budgeting,'' Public Budgeting and Finance, spring 1983 (hereinafter, 
``Annual Authorizations'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the 19th century, authorizations generally were used 
for the initial establishment of programs, while control over 
the details of particular activities and amounts was achieved 
through the annual appropriations process. Authorization laws 
were enacted on a permanent basis to provide broad grants of 
authority to government departments and agencies. In these 
laws, the authorization of subsequent congressional action to 
provide appropriations was implied and did not include specific 
amounts to be appropriated. That is, the general authorization 
in these laws included both the legal authority to act, as well 
as the authority under congressional rules to appropriate funds 
for such activities. Temporary authorizations were rare and 
were generally reserved for programs that were intended to be 
of a limited duration. In contrast, annually enacted 
appropriations laws contained the details as to what agencies 
were able to do and how much they would have to spend.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets, p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Developments in the House and Senate committee systems that 
occurred during this same period also served to strengthen this 
authorization-appropriations distinction. From the earliest 
Congresses the ``legislative committees'' had jurisdiction over 
authorization measures while the House Ways and Means Committee 
and Senate Finance Committee were responsible for most 
appropriations bills. During the Civil War, however, when the 
workload of these committees and size of Federal expenditures 
increased considerably, both Chambers chose to create separate 
appropriations committees that would be responsible for the 
annual appropriations measures.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ The House Appropriations Committee was established in 1865; the 
Senate Appropriations Committee was established in 1867. The events 
leading to the establishment of these committees are discussed in 
Charles H. Stewart, III, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the 
Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives, 1885-1921 (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 53-83; and U.S. 
Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations: 1867-
2008, 110th Cong., 2d Sess., Doc. No. 14 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), 
pp. 4-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the size and scope of Federal Government activities 
increased during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the 
congressional practices related to authorizations and 
appropriations began to change. Authorization laws began to 
specify the details of broad classes of Federal Government 
programs and activities in consolidated legislation, instead of 
in multiple pieces of stand-alone legislation that addressed 
only some aspects of such programs and activities. At about the 
same time, appropriations, which used to be almost entirely 
comprised of specific line items, shifted to more general lump 
sums for purposes that were usually identified simply by 
referencing the statutory authorization. In other words, 
appropriations began to rely on the authorization statutes to 
specify and limit how the funds would be used. Although 
jurisdiction over some appropriations was dispersed during the 
late 19th century, Congress continued to keep appropriations 
separate and distinct from authorizations.\5\ The 
reconsolidation of appropriations jurisdiction, and the 
reorganization of regular annual appropriations bills in the 
House in 1920 (and in the Senate in 1922), also reinforced this 
distinction.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Stewart, pp. 89-132.
    \6\ Background on these changes is provided in U.S. House of 
Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, A Concise History of the 
House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 111th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), pp. 7-11; U.S. Senate, Committee on 
Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations: 1867-2008, 110th Cong., 2d 
Sess., Doc. No 14 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), pp. 9-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The choice to separate money and policy decisions and vest 
control over them in different congressional committees has 
meant longstanding tensions between the authorization and 
appropriations processes. In terms of both what the Federal 
Government should do and at what level its activities should be 
funded, these tensions have significantly influenced how the 
processes have evolved, as each attempts to exercise a greater 
role in congressional and agency funding decisions. In the 
early 20th century, as a consequence of the changes that were 
discussed in the previous paragraph, the legislative committees 
began to assert their role in fiscal decisionmaking through two 
particular mechanisms. First, the committees began to include 
provisions that explicitly authorized appropriations in 
authorization acts, such as language that ``hereby authorized 
to be appropriated'' for certain purposes. Second, associated 
with these provisions, the committees began to conduct reviews 
and enact revisions to authorization laws for certain agencies 
and departments on periodic schedules, instead of on an as-
needed basis.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets, pp. 28-31, 37-41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This report discusses general principles in how the 
language concerning the purposes and frequency of 
authorizations of appropriations has changed over the past 
century. These general principles are illustrated through case 
studies on the authorizations of appropriations that were 
enacted during this period for three agencies: the National 
Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, and the Peace Corps.

          Evolution of Authorizations during the 20th Century

    Coincident with the enactment of the Budget and Accounting 
Act of 1921, jurisdiction over general appropriations increased 
the role of the appropriations committees in congressional 
decisions about spending. In response, the legislative 
committees began to explore new legislative language that would 
influence budgetary outcomes, both with respect to the action 
of the appropriators, and also in their oversight of the 
agencies under their jurisdiction. This resulted in significant 
changes in the content and timing of authorization laws over 
the next several decades.

         Emergence of Explicit Authorizations of Appropriations

    The first significant change in the form of authorization 
laws occurred after the 1920s, when they began to include 
provisions that explicitly ``authorized to be appropriated'' 
future budgetary resources tied to certain purposes. By one 
estimate, this practice grew so rapidly that in 1937, there 
were more than 100 measures enacted into law with explicit 
authorizations of appropriations for definite amounts.\8\ At a 
minimum, such provisions were a recommendation of the 
legislative committees as to the level of future 
appropriations. This practice, however, had broader 
implications for the role of the legislative committees in 
budgetary decisionmaking because existing House and Senate 
rules that prohibited appropriations not authorized by law had 
to be applied in new ways.\9\ Although these prohibitions were 
longstanding, having been first adopted during the previous 
century, authorization provisions that established an entity, 
project, or activity were considered to be sufficient to 
implicitly authorize subsequent appropriations under the terms 
of these rules.\10\ However, when the legislative committees 
started to include explicit provisions authorizing 
appropriations, this effectively enabled them to create 
procedural ceilings on subsequent appropriations, and thus 
exert greater influence over subsequent funding decisions.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Ibid., pp. 28-29.
    \9\ These prohibitions are currently located in House Rule 
XXI(2)(a) and Senate Rule XVI(1). For further information on the 
operation of these rules, see CRS Report R42098, Authorization of 
Appropriations: Procedural and Legal Issues, by Jessica Tollestrup and 
Brian T. Yeh, pp. 4-8.
    \10\ The first formal rules that required a prior authorization by 
law for appropriations were adopted by the House in 1837. The Senate 
followed suit with the adoption of its first formal rules on the topic 
in 1850. Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets, pp. 7, 9, 11, and 
15-17.
    \11\ The legislative committees also employed other mechanisms 
during this period to influence fiscal decisionmaking, such as so-
called ``backdoor spending,'' which included borrowing authority, 
contract authority, mandatory entitlements, and permanent 
appropriations. For a further discussion of these and other such 
mechanisms, see Louis Fisher, ``The Authorization-Appropriation Process 
in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices,'' Catholic University 
Law Review, Vol. 29, 1979-1980, pp. 51-105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As language specifically authorizing appropriations was 
increasingly used, various practices started to emerge. First, 
the legislative committees began to authorize definite amounts 
to be appropriated for specific fiscal years. In their early 
use, such provisions were typically tied to minor or temporary 
programs. Second, because provisions that limited the amount or 
duration of future appropriations were considered to be 
inappropriate for permanent or large-scale government programs, 
provisions authorizing appropriations for ``such sums as are 
necessary'' were typically used for such programs. These 
provisions were also used to address multiple programs under 
the auspices of a single agency.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Ibid, pp. 28-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Periodic Reauthorization

    At the end of World War II, an estimated 5 percent of 
programs, excluding one-time projects, had explicit 
authorizations of appropriations that applied to specific 
fiscal years.\13\ Over the postwar period, however, as the 
legislative committees continued to increase their use of such 
provisions, they began to apply such provisions to programs of 
a larger scale or permanent nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee 
on Budget, Management, and Expenditures, Improving Congressional 
Control over the Budget, Committee Print, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Washington, DC: GPO), 1973, p. 262 (hereinafter, Improving 
Congressional Control over the Budget).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The types of provisions periodically authorizing 
appropriations that were developed during this period have 
continued to be used through the present day. These provisions 
generally indicate two schedules of legislative review: 
``annual'' and ``multiyear.'' Annual authorizations of 
appropriations explicitly authorize appropriations for a single 
fiscal year. Multiyear authorizations of appropriations 
explicitly authorize appropriations for more than 1 fiscal year 
at a time (typically between 2 and 5).

                         annual authorizations

    As the legislative committees began to experiment with 
provisions authorizing appropriations for a single fiscal year, 
one motivation was to better oversee and influence agency 
spending decisions. Annual authorizations of appropriations 
were first applied to newly created agencies or programs, in 
part because these annual provisions were believed to encourage 
close review and oversight early in an agency's or program's 
development.\14\ Later, in response to perceived issues with 
existing agencies or the congressional oversight of them, 
legislative committees sometimes added annual authorization 
provisions to the underlying statute governing these agencies, 
thereby converting them to an annual reauthorization 
schedule.\15\ For example, annual authorizations were used in 
some instances for programs or agencies that were undergoing 
``rapidly changing conditions,'' giving the legislative 
committees the opportunity to weigh in on a frequent basis.\16\ 
Programs that had a direct effect on States or districts, such 
as those that govern military construction or grants, also were 
candidates for annual authorizations. Legislative committees 
often sought close oversight of such programs because of the 
constituency issues involved and a desire to address any 
problems as they arose.\17\ As a consequence of this frequent 
legislative attention, agencies subject to annual 
reauthorization tended to experience more incremental program 
changes in their authorizing laws when compared to those 
agencies on a longer reauthorization schedule.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ ``Annual Authorizations,'' p. 34.
    \15\ Ibid., p. 37.
    \16\ Ibid., p. 31.
    \17\ Ibid., p. 30.
    \18\ Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets, p. 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another motivation for the legislative committees to choose 
annual authorization schedules during the post-World War II 
period was dissatisfaction with the funding levels or program 
structure as provided through the congressional appropriations 
process.\19\ At this time, the authorization laws that were 
enacted on an as-needed basis tended to be focused primarily on 
policy issues and not budgetary decisionmaking. In addition, 
any authorized levels for future fiscal years might have been 
considered to be less relevant when it came time to appropriate 
due to changing congressional priorities. Under an annual 
authorization approach, however, the congressional debate over 
the funding levels in the context of the authorization for that 
fiscal year would occur more immediately ahead of the 
consideration of appropriations for those programs. This 
sequence and timing of events--authorizations are to precede 
appropriations--was believed to provide the legislative 
committees with greater leverage to prevent their framework and 
authorized funding levels from being disregarded during 
subsequent appropriations decisionmaking.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Ibid., p. 39.
    \20\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The proportion of agencies that were subject to annual 
reauthorizations expanded significantly during the mid-20th 
century. Prior to 1950, military construction and mutual 
security were the only annual authorizations, both constituting 
the conversion of a permanent authorization to a temporary one. 
A few programs were added to that list in the 1950s, but it was 
not until two decades later that a number of both small- and 
large-scale government programs, such as the remaining 
activities of the Department of Defense authorization, the 
Department of Justice, and the Department of State, were added 
to the group of government programs that received an annual 
authorization in response to developments such as the Vietnam 
war.\21\ Also during this period, the number of annual 
authorizations that applied only to some programs within an 
agency was expanded to include additional programs or 
activities of a like character.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ ``Annual Authorizations,'' pp. 26-27.
    \22\ For example, within the Department of Defense, the first 
temporary authorization was for military construction, and then the 
practice was expanded sequentially to military procurement, research 
and development, the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration, and 
then finally to military operation and maintenance. ``Annual 
Authorizations,'' p. 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        multiyear authorizations

    During the same period that annual authorizations of 
appropriations were increasingly used, provisions authorizing 
appropriations on a multiyear basis to facilitate a longer term 
reauthorization schedule were also enacted. The length of these 
schedules varied, from as little as 2 fiscal years to 5 or 
more. The agency oversight motivations for the legislative 
committees to adopt such a schedule were similar to those for 
an annual reauthorization, with some exceptions.\23\ For 
example, a legislative committee might choose a multiyear 
reauthorization schedule over an annual one if it believed that 
a program or agency required a comprehensive reevaluation of 
its activities and objectives on longer time intervals. Also, 
as a consequence of the greater time allotted by this schedule, 
multiyear reauthorizations tended to involve more widespread 
policy changes per reauthorization law when compared to annual 
reauthorizations.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Improving Congressional Control over the Budget, p. 261.
    \24\ Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets, p. 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As was the case for annual authorizations, multiyear 
authorizations may have been motivated, in some instances, by 
dissatisfaction on the part of the legislative committees with 
the funding that was being provided in appropriations. In many 
cases, multiyear authorizations assumed some degree of a 
funding increase over the period covered by the authorization, 
and so their enactment had the potential to build congressional 
support for such an increase. In many such cases, however, the 
difference between the amounts authorized and that ultimately 
appropriated increased in the latter years, perhaps because the 
congressional vote on authorization levels was neither recent, 
nor in the context of current funding constraints.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Improving Congressional Control over the Budget, p. 268; 
Legislation, Appropriations, and Budgets, p. 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  Summary of Most Recent Developments

    Starting in the 1980s, some of the programs that had been 
subject to an annual or short-term authorization schedule were 
changed to longer term multiyear schedules.\26\ Others had 
authorizations that expired for a number of fiscal years 
between reauthorizations, or were not renewed at all.\27\ With 
the formation of new agencies, it has been most typical that 
only specific activities within them, as opposed to the entire 
agency, have been given explicit authorizations of 
appropriations.\28\ For example, while some of the agencies and 
activities created or consolidated by the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) were already subject to temporary 
authorizations of appropriations, there were few provisions 
explicitly authorizing appropriations for the new agencies and 
activities included in the act, and none that were effective on 
an annual basis. In general, the reauthorization process for 
many agencies and programs has become more focused on 
addressing policy concerns, with less of an emphasis on funding 
level or the legislative committee's role in budgetary 
decisionmaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ For example, both the NSF and NASA were transitioned to 
multiyear schedules, as discussed in the sections below.
    \27\ One potential measure of the extent to which previously 
routine authorizations of appropriations for programs have expired is 
the enactment of appropriations for such programs. CBO is required to 
compile this information each year under section 202(e)(3) of the 
Congressional Budget Act. For FY1988, CBO identified a total of 45 laws 
with expired authorizations of appropriations (CBO, Report on 
Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations, January 15, 
1988). That total grew to 270 such laws for FY2014 (CBO, Unauthorized 
Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations, February 21, 2014).
    \28\ See, for example, the data on James M. Cox, An Analysis of the 
Congressional Reauthorization Process (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 
pp. 55-59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Various reasons have been suggested for the shift to longer 
term reauthorization schedules and the gaps between 
reauthorization intervals. For example, some have argued that 
reauthorization legislation was effectively ``crowded out'' by 
new mechanisms for budgetary decisionmaking (such as the budget 
resolution and reconciliation) and were given less of a 
priority in the congressional calendar. Others began to express 
concern that annual authorizations led to a perception that 
they were merely duplicate votes for Members on funding levels 
for Federal Government activities.\29\ In addition, continued 
delays in the enactment of reauthorization legislation, which 
affected Congress' ability to consider and enact appropriations 
measures in a timely manner, were also a likely factor.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ For a discussion of these and other reasons for this shift, 
see, for example, Alan Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, 
Process, 3d Ed. (Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 
pp. 200-202; Lawrence J. Haas, ``Unauthorized Action,'' National 
Journal, January 2, 1988, p. 17.
    \30\ This is illustrated by the NSF and NASA case studies below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   Changes to Authorizations of Appropriations in Practice: Selected 
                                Examples

    The historical development of the form and timing of 
authorizations over the past century has been characterized by 
a number of themes:
   The legislative committee's adoption of an annual 
        reauthorization schedule was due to a desire for increased 
        involvement in both agency and congressional budgetary 
        decisions. The motivation for increased agency involvement was 
        typically because the agency was new or because annual 
        authorizations were believed to strengthen Congress' oversight 
        functions.
   Annual authorizations tended to be characterized by 
        incremental program changes, whereas multiyear authorizations 
        tended to involve widespread policy changes.
   The amounts authorized in annual measures tended to be more 
        similar to the amount eventually appropriated when compared to 
        multiyear authorizations. The out-years of multiyear 
        authorizations tended to be characterized by a growing gap 
        between the amount authorized and the amount appropriated.
    To illustrate one or more of these general themes, the 
following subsections summarize aspects of the authorization 
histories of the National Science Foundation, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Peace Corps. 
These three agencies were selected because they have 
experienced variation in the purposes and frequency of their 
explicit authorizations of appropriations since their 
establishment. These case studies also discuss the reasons for 
the shifts to the new authorization schemes, such as the 
legislative committee's decisions to review and make policy 
changes to the program on a less frequent schedule, or 
difficulties enacting annual authorizations prior to 
appropriations. During this period, the form of the 
authorization laws governing these agencies changed in a number 
of other significant ways that affected the ability of the 
legislative committees to influence budgetary outcomes, which 
are not discussed in this report. This report only summarizes 
the general trends associated with the timing and purposes of 
these reauthorizations to provide a basis for further research 
and understanding.

                      National Science Foundation

    The National Science Foundation (NSF) was established in 
1950, but was not reauthorized on a periodic basis until 1968, 
when a requirement for specific authorization of appropriations 
each future fiscal year became law. Authorizations of 
appropriations were enacted annually covering a single fiscal 
year from FY1969 through FY1982, and intermittently through 
FY1988. Starting in FY1989, the agency has been reauthorized 
for periods of between 3 and 5 fiscal years, with some lapses 
in authorization between those multiyear laws. The most recent 
reauthorization was from FY2011 through FY2013.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ For an overview of historical policy issues associated with 
the NSF and its authorization, see CRS Report R43585, The National 
Science Foundation: Background and Selected Policy Issues, by Heather 
B. Gonzalez.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     establishment and transition to a permanent authorization of 
                             appropriations

    The NSF was established by the National Science Foundation 
Act on May 10, 1950 (S. 247; P.L. 81-507). During congressional 
consideration in the 81st Congress, both the Senate and House 
proposals (S. 287, H.R. 12, and H.R. 359, 81st Congress) 
contained provisions providing a permanent indefinite 
authorization of appropriations for the agency. During debate 
on the House floor, however, the bill was amended to provide a 
definite authorization of appropriations for FY1951, and a $15 
million authorization for each fiscal year thereafter. The 
rationale for this approach was that it would promote increased 
agency fiscal accountability to Congress, because the agency 
would be required to justify to Congress a higher authorization 
level once its annual budgetary needs exceeded $15 million.\32\ 
The House version of that provision was subsequently enacted 
into law.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 96, part 2 (February 
28, 1950), p. 2517. Although the form and frequency of reauthorization 
has shifted over the history of the NSF, the President's budget 
submission has typically played a significant role in budgetary 
decisionmaking. For further information, see CRS Report R43585, The 
National Science Foundation: Background and Selected Policy Issues, by 
Heather B. Gonzalez.
    \33\ P.L. 81-507, Sec. 16(a), ``To enable the Foundation to carry 
out its powers and duties, there is hereby authorized to be 
appropriated to the Foundation, out of any money in the Treasury not 
otherwise appropriated, not to exceed $500,000 for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 1951, and not to exceed $15,000,000 for each fiscal 
year thereafter.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The first reauthorization was enacted 3 years later, on 
August 8, 1953 (S. 32; P.L. 83-223). This law replaced the $15 
million authorization limit with an indefinite authorization of 
appropriations. The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee 
report accompanying S. 32 (83d Congress) explained that this 
indefinite authorization was to provide the NSF greater 
flexibility in both its annual budget request and fiscal 
planning for its operations. Because the committee believed 
that removing this limitation would not lead to an overall 
increase in government research expenditures, this change to 
the law was recommended.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ S. Rept. 83-396, pp. 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There were no further laws authorizing NSF appropriations 
for the next 15 years. During that period, the few laws that 
made any changes to the statutory programs and policies 
governing the NSF typically included only minor modifications 
to existing programs and policies.\35\ The more significant 
changes to the NSF came through administration action, such as 
executive orders and the Government Reorganization Plan No. 2 
of 1962.\36\ Legislative committee oversight of the agency 
occurred on a more informal basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ See, for example, P.L. 85-510, which related to weather 
modification, and P.L. 85-864, which related to science information.
    \36\ See, for example, Executive Order 10521 (March 17, 1954), 
which broadened the NSF's role to encompass national scientific 
policymaking, and Executive Order 10807 (March 29, 1962) which 
refocused the Foundation's mission on original research. See also 
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1962, June 8, 1962 (27 Federal Register 
5419), which transferred elements of governmentwide policymaking and 
program evaluation from the NSF to a new Office of Science and 
Technology. For background on reorganization plans, see CRS Report 
R42852, Presidential Reorganization Authority: History, Recent 
Initiatives, and Options for Congress, by Henry B. Hogue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  transition to annual reauthorization

    Starting in 1965, the House Committee on Science and 
Astronautics began a 3-year review of the NSF to write a new 
charter for the agency. This review involved hearings, studies, 
and a subcommittee report that was to be the basis of the 
committee's eventual legislative proposal.\37\ In 1967, the 
committee report accompanying H.R. 5404 (90th Congress) 
explained a variety of motivations for this review and the 
recommended changes to the agency:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ This process is discussed in U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on Science and Technology, Toward the Endless Frontier: 
History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 1959-79, Committee 
Print (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980), p. 143 (hereinafter, House Science 
Committee History).

    A significant change began to take place in the post-
Sputnik era. From a technological point of view, public opinion 
crystallized around the concept that basic science was no 
longer an ancillary, but a primary, instrument needed to guard 
the public safety, health and economy . . . . It becomes 
apparent, upon review of the hearings en bloc, that the most 
crucial point--in fact, what some would call the essence of the 
bill--was the issue of policy control [of the National Science 
Board]. [H. Rept. 90-34, pp. 2 and 13] \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Congressional concern over policy control had been in 
existence almost since the establishment of the NSF. For background on 
these concerns, see House Science Committee History.

    While the changes to the NSF proposed by the House did not 
involve any alterations to the current authorization of 
appropriations, the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee 
amended H.R. 5404 to include both a definite authorization of 
appropriations for FY1969 and a permanent requirement for a 
specific authorization of appropriations for every fiscal year 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
thereafter:

    The committee is concerned that there has been no thorough 
review of the authorization for NSF since the passage in 1950 
of the National Science Foundation Act. During this period, the 
appropriations have grown from $225,000 in 1951 to $495 million 
in 1968--a more than 2,000-fold increase. The committee 
believes that a change to annual authorization is desirable, 
and provides for this in section 13 of the bill. An 
authorization of $523 million is provided for fiscal year 1969. 
This committee will set authorizations for future years after 
appropriate hearings. [S. Rept. 90-1137, p. 19] \39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ For further background on the FY1969 annual authorization, see 
House Science Committee History, p. 146.

    The ability for annual authorizations to influence 
subsequent funding decisions is affected by the extent to which 
they are enacted ahead of appropriations. After the NSF's 
requirement for an annual authorization was enacted (P.L. 90-
407),\40\ the 15 subsequent annual reauthorizations became law 
an average of almost 1 month after the beginning of the fiscal 
year, and only three times were they enacted before the 
beginning of the fiscal year (FY1978, FY1980, and FY1986).\41\ 
The enactment of appropriations, however, usually waited until 
the annual authorization was completed, with only 3 of the 15 
being enacted ahead of it (FY1972, FY1977, and FY1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ P.L. 90-407, Sec. 14(a), ``To enable the Foundation to carry 
out its powers and duties, there is hereby authorized to be 
appropriated to the foundation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1969, the sum of $525,000,000; but for the fiscal year ending June 30, 
1970, and each subsequent fiscal year, only such sums may be 
appropriated as the Congress may hereafter authorize by law.'' At the 
time that the requirement for an annual authorization was being debated 
by Congress, both the Johnson administration and the House 
Appropriations Committee expressed concerns that an annual schedule 
might delay the enactment of appropriations (S. Rept. 90-1137, p. 34 
and floor debate (114 Congressional Record part 15, June 27, 1968, 90th 
Cong, 2d sess., p. 19068)).
    \41\ These laws were for each fiscal year from FY1970 to FY1982, 
FY1987, and FY1988. No reauthorization laws were enacted for the fiscal 
years from FY1983 to FY1986; the reason for this lapse in authorization 
does not appear to have been related to any disputes over the time 
interval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In general, these annual authorizations were followed by 
appropriations that were at somewhat lower levels than the 
amount authorized.\42\ Of the 12 annual authorizations that 
were enacted prior to appropriations, all but one (FY1986; P.L. 
99-383) subsequently received lower levels of 
appropriations.\43\ In those 11 instances, the amount 
appropriated was an average of almost 7 percent lower than the 
amount authorized, ranging from about 1 percent lower in FY1980 
to almost 24 percent lower in FY1969.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ The amount appropriated each fiscal year upon which these and 
similar calculations in this report are based from National Science 
Foundation, Budget Internet Information System, ``NSF Requests and 
Appropriations History,'' NSF.gov, (http://dellweb.bfa.nsf.gov/
NSFRqstAppropHist/NSFRequestsandAppropriationsHistory.pdf), and 
additional data compiled in CRS Report R43585, The National Science 
Foundation: Background and Selected Policy Issues, by Heather B. 
Gonzalez.
    \43\ In FY1986, the amount of appropriations exceeded the 
authorized level by less than 1 percent.
    \44\ Despite the fact that the amounts annually appropriated tended 
to be less than the authorization, however, the amount of such annual 
appropriations doubled twice in the decades between FY1970 and FY1988.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                transition to multiyear reauthorization

    Starting in 1977, Congress began to actively debate 
transitioning the NSF to a multiyear authorization of 
appropriations. This change was advocated by the Carter 
administration and some Senators on the Committee on Human 
Resources because it was believed that a multiyear 
authorization would promote continuity for planning basic 
research and more time to assess the effectiveness of 
programs.\45\ Many members of the House Science Committee 
argued, however, that an annual authorization would promote 
better congressional control and oversight of the 
foundation.\46\ Although the conference report for the FY1978 
reauthorization addressed the possibility of a 2-year 
authorization of appropriations, it concluded that it was not 
suitable at that time.\47\ The following fiscal year, while the 
Senate committee proposed authorizations of appropriations for 
both FY1979 and FY1980 (S. 2549), authorization levels for only 
a single fiscal year were ultimately enacted into law (P.L. 96-
44). Over the next 10 years, most legislative proposals covered 
only a single fiscal year, and all that were enacted were 
annual in nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ U.S. Senate, Committee on Human Resources, Subcommittee on 
Health and Scientific Research, ``National Science Foundation 
Authorization Legislation, 1977,'' March 1 and 3, 1977 (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1977), p. 112 and 117.
    \46\ House Science Committee History, pp. 537-538.
    \47\ H. Rept. 95-509, pp. 7-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In FY1989, both the House and Senate proposed multiyear 
authorizations, and the enacted law authorized appropriations 
through FY1993 (P.L. 100-570). One of the primary purposes of 
this reauthorization was to promote the ``doubling'' of the NSF 
budget over the next 5 fiscal years and to establish a program 
directed at academic facility modernization. The next 
reauthorization, for FY1998-FY2000, authorized modest increases 
for the agency--about 10 percent in FY1999 and growth slightly 
above projected inflation in FY2000 (P.L. 105-207).\48\ The 
next reauthorization advocated more substantial increases in 
the agency budget--from about $5 billion in FY2003 to almost 
$10 billion in FY2007 (P.L. 107-368). The two most recent laws, 
for FY2008-FY2010 and FY2011-FY2013, were enacted as part of 
the America COMPETES Act and its reauthorization, which broadly 
sought to invest in innovation and improve U.S. 
competitiveness. It authorized funds for research and 
development in the physical sciences and engineering, as well 
as certain science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) education programs.\49\ Both reauthorizations 
recommended appropriations at a rate to double agency funding 
over a 7-year period starting in FY2008, and an 11-year period 
starting in FY2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ The authorizations of appropriations in P.L. 105-207 were 
effectively for 2 fiscal years because they were enacted over 9 months 
after the start of FY1998.
    \49\ P.L. 110-69 and P.L. 111-358. For information on the other 
agencies that were reauthorized as part of these laws, see CRS Report 
RL34328, America COMPETES Act: Programs, Funding, and Selected Issues, 
by Deborah D. Stine, and CRS Report R41819, Reauthorization of the 
America COMPETES Act: Selected Policy Provisions, Funding, and 
Implementation Issues, by Heather B. Gonzalez.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When compared to the period for which the NSF was 
authorized on an annual basis, NSF appropriations after FY1989 
tended to be much lower than the amount authorized. Gaps 
between the authorization and subsequent appropriations also 
widened in the latter years of the authorization period, 
particularly when the authorization assumed significant 
budgetary increases over that multiyear period. For example, 
for FY1989-FY1993, the first attempt at doubling, the 
difference between the authorization and subsequent 
appropriations began as about 6 percent for FY1989 and 
increased to 22 percent by FY1993.\50\ The more modest 
increases proposed by the FY1998 reauthorization resulted in a 
much smaller appropriations gap--almost 3 percent less than the 
authorized level for FY1999, and almost 1 percent more than 
authorized for FY2000. Even though the projected increases in 
the two most recent doubling proposals (FY2008-FY2010 and 
FY2011-FY2013) were over a longer time horizon, these also 
experienced increasing gaps in the outyears.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Actual annual appropriations during this 5-year period 
experienced about a 70-percent increase, but fell short of the doubling 
goal.
    \51\ For FY2008, appropriations were 7.2 percent less than the 
authorization, but were 15 percent less 2 years later. The gap between 
the authorization and appropriation was about 8 percent in FY2011, and 
grew to about 17 percent in FY2013. The actual increase in 
appropriations between FY2008 and FY2013 was about 12 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             National Aeronautics and Space Administration

    The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
transitioned to an annual authorization schedule 3 years after 
it was established in 1958, and was reauthorized each fiscal 
year from FY1961 through FY1986. Starting in FY1982, however, 
the agency's annual authorization schedule began to experience 
increasing delays, culminating in a 6-year gap in 
reauthorization from FY1994 through FY1999. In recent years, 
the agency has been periodically reauthorized for between 1 and 
3 fiscal years, with the most recent reauthorization covering 
FY2011-FY2013.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ For an overview of historical policy issues associated with 
NASA and its authorization, see CRS Report R43144, NASA: Issues for 
Authorization, Appropriations, and Oversight in the 113th Congress, by 
Daniel Morgan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         establishment and transition to annual reauthorization

    When the National Aeronautics and Space Act (``the Space 
Act,'' P.L. 85-568) established NASA in 1958, it explicitly 
authorized permanent, indefinite appropriations for agency 
operations. It also required specific authorization for capital 
expenditures.\53\ At the beginning of the 85th Congress, a few 
months prior to the enactment of the Space Act, the House had 
established the Committee on Science and Astronautics (now 
Science, Space, and Technology) to oversee this new agency. The 
Senate also created the Committee on Aeronautical and Space 
Sciences for a similar purpose.\54\ As these new committees 
were developing an understanding of NASA's programmatic 
capabilities and fiscal requirements, it was thought that 
frequent reauthorization was a process through which this 
understanding could be achieved more expeditiously.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ P.L. 85-568, Sec. 307(a), ``There are hereby authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this Act, 
except that nothing in this Act shall authorize the appropriation of 
any amount for (1) the acquisition or condemnation of any real 
property, or (2) any other item of a capital nature (such as plant or 
facility acquisition, construction, or expansion) which exceeds 
$250,000. Sums appropriated pursuant to this subsection for the 
construction of facilities, or for research and development activities, 
shall remain available until expended.''
    \54\ Jurisdiction over NASA was transferred to the Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation Committee when the Senate Science Committee 
was dissolved in 1977.
    \55\ Thomas P. Jahnige, ``The Congressional Committee System and 
the Oversight Process: Congress and NASA,'' Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2 (June 1968), pp. 222-239.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NASA's transition to an annual authorization of 
appropriations occurred in stages over the next few years. 
First, the FY1958 supplemental appropriations bill for NASA 
(P.L. 85-766) included a provision that required the enactment 
of a specific authorization of appropriations for each fiscal 
year through the end of FY1960. As initially drafted, this 
provision provided a permanent requirement for a specific 
authorization, under the rationale that such a requirement, 
which would presumably have been carried out through an annual 
reauthorization schedule, would provide accountability and 
oversight to the legislative committees of jurisdiction. The 
provision was revised prior to enactment to allow a 1-year 
trial run of the concept after criticism that it would place an 
unnecessary burden on NASA and lead to duplication in 
congressional efforts.\56\ The first reauthorization of NASA, 
for FY1959 supplemental appropriations, did not address the 
general requirement for specific authorization, set to expire 
the following fiscal year (P.L. 86-12). In the process of 
considering reauthorization legislation for FY1960, however, 
both the House and Senate proposed extensions of the specific 
requirement for the purpose of imposing an annual authorization 
process. The House Science Committee, in H.R. 7007 (86th 
Congress), included an extension of the requirement through 
FY1965.\57\ Subsequently, the Senate Science Committee removed 
the House's termination date for the provision:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ The negotiations and various congressional perspectives on 
this requirement are discussed in House Science Committee History, p. 
24.
    \57\ The House rationale for this provision is discussed in H. 
Rept. 86-321, p. 35.

    Because of the nature of the space program, rapid and 
substantial changes as to magnitude, direction, and detail can 
be expected to continue indefinitely. For this reason the 
committee deleted the terminal date of July 30, 1965, on the 
authorization requirement, thereby making the requirement of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
indefinite duration. [S. Rept. 86-332, p. 47]

    The same arguments that had been made against the temporary 
requirement were made against making it permanent--in 
particular, that an annual reauthorization process for the 
agency would lead to delays in the completion of annual 
appropriations.\58\ Nevertheless, the enacted law included the 
Senate's version, and this requirement has continued to apply 
to NASA appropriations to the present day.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Ibid., p. 49-50.
    \59\ P.L. 86-45, Sec. 4, ``Notwithstanding the provisions of any 
other law, no appropriation may be made to the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration unless previously authorized by legislation 
hereafter enacted by the Congress.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For FY1961 through FY1981, NASA was reauthorized on an 
annual basis, and the appropriations authorized by these annual 
laws almost always covered only a single fiscal year.\60\ On 
average, the annual reauthorizations were enacted after the 
beginning of the fiscal year just over half of the time during 
this period. However, they were enacted ahead of appropriations 
each fiscal year except for FY1979 (P.L. 95-401), which was 
signed into law on the same day as the appropriations measure. 
On average, these reauthorizations were enacted about 2 months 
in advance of appropriations (67 days).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ The one exception occurred in the FY1976 reauthorization (P.L. 
94-39), which authorized appropriations for FY1976 and FY1977 for 
specific categories in both the research and development, and 
construction/facilities accounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The consistent enactment of annual authorizations in 
advance of appropriations may have been a factor in minimizing 
the difference between the total amount authorized and the 
funding subsequently provided. The amount of appropriations was 
on average less than 1 percent below the authorized level for 
the agency.\61\ The most that appropriations ever exceeded the 
authorized level was almost 6 percent in FY1980; the most they 
fell short of the authorization was also almost 6 percent in 
FY1968. In total, for 13 out of the 20 fiscal years during this 
period, the amount authorized was higher than the amount 
appropriated. In the remaining 7 fiscal years, the 
appropriations equaled or exceeded the authorized level.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ A list of authorization and appropriations laws was provided 
by the NASA Office of Legislative Reference and Analysis. The 
appropriated amounts used for the calculations in this section of the 
report are from National Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, 
2008, Appendix D-1A, p. 146.
    \62\ During the early part of this period, until FY1970, the agency 
budget increased more than sevenfold. Although this budgetary growth 
slowed considerably during the next 10 fiscal years, the increase over 
that period was still about 63 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In general, NASA tended to receive program direction from 
Congress through authorization report language, as well as the 
appropriations process during this period. Substantive, 
nonadministrative policy changes to the agency or associated 
programs were only occasionally enacted through the annual 
reauthorizations. For example, the FY1976 law (P.L. 94-39) 
enacted a new program authorization for upper atmospheric 
research. Occasionally, changes to the agency or its associated 
programs would also occur as part of broader laws that covered 
multiple agencies, such as the Government Employees Salary 
Reform Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-426) and the Electric Vehicle 
Research, Development, and Demonstration Act (P.L. 94-413).

                 transition to periodic reauthorization

    During the 1980s, space-related public policy concerns 
rapidly expanded into new areas. Some significant events for 
NASA included the completion of the first Space Shuttle 
Columbia flight on April 12, 1984, and President Reagan's 
announcement of plans to build a space station within the next 
decade.\63\ Stand-alone authorization laws initiating new 
programs that involved NASA were also enacted. For example, the 
Commercial Space Launch Act (P.L. 98-575), which created a 
government entity to regulate private launch companies, was 
enacted in 1984. Other issues related to international 
cooperation became both more important and controversial.\64\ 
NASA reauthorizations were increasingly used as a means to 
enact significant space policy changes or expansions of NASA. 
For example, the FY1985 reauthorization established the 
National Commission on Space (P.L. 98-361), an advisory body to 
develop a long-term national space strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ For further information, see Roger Launius, Colin Fries, and 
Abe Gibson, ``Defining Events in NASA History, 1958-2006,'' National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, updated January 2, 2012, 
available at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/40thann/
define.htm.
    \64\ For example, at the beginning of the Reagan Presidency, the 
administration decided to cancel the International Solar Polar Mission, 
which was to have involved the construction of two spacecraft by NASA 
and the European Space Agency. The conference report accompanying the 
FY1982 and FY1983 reauthorizations expressed disapproval of the ISPM 
cancellation (H. Rept. 97-351, p. 9; H. Rept. 97-897, p. 8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The increasing focus on space policy, as well as the fiscal 
constraints affecting Federal budgeting during this era, may 
have both been factors in the delays in completing NASA 
reauthorization laws after FY1981.\65\ In general, 
reauthorizations after this time were enacted much closer to 
appropriations than in the first two decades of the agency--2 
days ahead of the appropriation in FY1982, 15 days behind the 
appropriation in FY1983, 27 days ahead in FY1985, 2 days ahead 
in FY1985, and 10 days behind in FY1986. In FY1987, no 
reauthorization was enacted, because H.R. 5495 (99th Congress) 
was pocket vetoed by the President over the inclusion of 
provisions that would reestablish the National Aeronautics and 
Space Council.\66\ The broader policy context for this dispute 
related to the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion, which had 
occurred 9 months before the start of the fiscal year, and 
congressional dissatisfaction with the administration's 
response to it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ The effect of these fiscal constraints on the NASA 
authorization is discussed, for example, in H. Rept. 97-351, p. 8, and 
H. Rept. 99-379, p. 9.
    \66\ President Reagan explained this veto thus: ``The establishment 
of a National Space Council in the Executive Office of the President 
would constitute unacceptable interference with my discretion and 
flexibility in organizing and managing the Executive Office as I 
consider appropriate.'' (President Ronald Reagan, ``Memorandum of 
Disapproval of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Funding Bill,'' November 14, 1986.) The congressional rationale for 
this council is discussed in H. Rept 99-829, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the latter part of the 1980s, reauthorization laws 
continued to address broad space policy issues. They also 
experienced further delays in enactment. While the FY1988 
reauthorization was enacted 54 days ahead of appropriations, 
for all other fiscal years through FY1993, the reauthorization 
was enacted an average of about 42 days after appropriations. 
No reauthorization was enacted at all for FY1990, as the House 
and Senate failed to resolve their differences over their 
respective versions of the legislation (H.R. 1759 and S. 916, 
101st Congress).
    Perhaps related to these difficulties in enacting 
reauthorizations in a timely manner, the House Science 
Committee started in FY1989 to propose authorizations of 
appropriations for 3 fiscal year periods for many major 
activities, such as line items under the research and 
development and space flight accounts. These multiyear 
reauthorizations also typically included proposals for long-
term program or policy initiatives. In contrast, the Senate 
Commerce Committee versions continued to recommend 
authorizations of appropriations for a single fiscal year only, 
and tended to include fewer long-term policy proposals.
    While the authorizations continued to provide funding 
amounts for a single fiscal year,\67\ the groundwork was laid 
for a longer term authorization schedule through other means. 
For example, the FY1989 reauthorization required NASA to 
compile a 5-year capital development plan and a 10-year 
strategic plan. The act also directed that, starting in FY1990, 
NASA submit a 3-year budget request. In FY1992, this directive 
appears to have been superseded by a new requirement for a 5-
year budget submission for all programs that exceed $200 
million (P.L. 102-195).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ An exception to this was in FY1989, when the Space Station was 
reauthorized for FY1989-FY1991 (P.L. 100-685).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the past 15 years, NASA reauthorizations have been 
enacted on a periodic basis, typically covering more than a 
single fiscal year, but not on any set schedule. These laws 
were often in response to policy developments instigated by the 
administration, such as the Vision for Space Exploration 
program in 2004.\68\ For the FY2000-FY2002 reauthorization 
(P.L. 106-391), the multiyear interval for reauthorization 
appears to have been uncontroversial, as both the House (H.R. 
1654) and Senate (S. 342) versions authorized appropriations 
for that 3-year period. The second reauthorization to be 
enacted during this period was for FY2007-FY2008 (P.L. 109-
155).\69\ While the House version (H.R. 3070) provided a 2-year 
authorization of appropriations, the Senate version (S. 1281) 
had authorizations on a longer time horizon, through FY2010. 
For the FY2009 reauthorization, both the House and Senate 
versions proposed funding amounts for only a single fiscal year 
(P.L. 110-422; H.R. 6063, 110th Congress). The most recent 
reauthorization law covered 3 fiscal years, FY2011-FY2013 (P.L. 
111-267).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ For further information, see CRS Report R43144, NASA: Issues 
for Authorization, Appropriations, and Oversight in the 113th Congress, 
by Daniel Morgan.
    \69\ For FY2003-FY2006, little congressional action occurred to 
reauthorize NASA, and no such laws were enacted. In the 107th Congress, 
no action occurred on attempts to reauthorize in the House or the 
Senate. In the 108th Congress, the Senate Commerce Committee reported 
S. 2541, to reauthorize appropriations for FY2005-FY2009, but no 
further action occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Along with the trend toward the periodic enactment of 
multiyear reauthorizations, there has been an increase in the 
difference between the amounts that were authorized and those 
that were subsequently appropriated. Appropriations for FY2001 
and FY2002, enacted after the FY2000-FY2002 reauthorization, 
were slightly higher than the authorization. However, the gap 
between authorizations and appropriations became more 
pronounced during the FY2007-FY2008 period. The FY2009 
reauthorization, enacted 15 days after the appropriations bill, 
was almost 14 percent higher than the actual funding level. And 
even though the FY2011-FY2013 reauthorization was enacted about 
5 months ahead of appropriations for FY2011, appropriations 
subsequently enacted were about 3 percent lower than the 
authorization in FY2011, 9 percent lower than the authorization 
in FY2012, and over 12 percent lower than the authorization in 
FY2013.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ This calculation does not include the reduction in FY2013 
appropriations due to the sequester ordered on March 1, 2013. In total, 
the appropriations increase between FY2001 and FY2013 was about 22 
percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              Peace Corps

    Appropriations for the Peace Corps were annually authorized 
each fiscal year--from its establishment in 1961 through 
FY1981. Starting with the FY1982 reauthorization, which was for 
a 2 fiscal year period, the agency began to experience gaps in 
its enactment of reauthorization and it transitioned to a 
multiyear schedule. Since that time, reauthorizations of 
appropriations have been enacted intermittently, most recently 
for the FY2000-FY2003 time period, but not thereafter.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ For an overview of historical policy issues associated with 
the Peace Corps and its authorization, see CRS Report 98-215, The Peace 
Corps: Background and Issues for Congress, by Curt Tarnoff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            establishment and early annual reauthorizations

    The Peace Corps was permanently established through the 
Peace Corps Act, which was enacted on September 22, 1961 (P.L. 
87-293).\72\ That act carried a provision that authorized a 
specific sum for FY1962 Peace Corps appropriations.\73\ While 
this provision arguably indicated congressional intent to 
reauthorize the agency the following fiscal year, there appears 
to have been little discussion in the legislative history of 
the act of any potential annual schedule for 
reauthorization.\74\ In the broader context of foreign affairs 
authorization laws that were enacted during this period, 
congressional review of those programs and any associated 
legislative action had tended to occur on an as-needed basis. 
In addition, until the enactment of P.L. 91-671, which imposed 
a general requirement for explicit authorizations of 
appropriations on foreign affairs spending, few explicit 
authorizations of appropriations had ever been enacted for 
ongoing programs.\75\ Consequently, the motivation for an 
annual schedule, at least initially, appears to have been 
driven by the newness of the agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ The Peace Corps was first established on a temporary basis 
through Executive Order 10924 on March 1, 1961.
    \73\ P.L. 87-293, Sec. 3(b), ``There is hereby authorized to be 
appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1962 not to exceed 
$40,000,000 to carry out the purposes of this Act.''
    \74\ For example, the reauthorization schedule was not discussed at 
any of the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings on establishing the 
Peace Corps, nor was it addressed in the conference report for H.R. 
7500. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
The Peace Corps, House Hearings, August 11 and 15, 1961 (Washington, 
DC: GPO, 1961); H. Rept. 97-1237.
    \75\ P.L. 91-672, the Foreign Military Sales Act amendments 
contained the following provisions, codified at 22 U.S.C. 2412(a): 
``Notwithstanding any provision of law enacted before January 12, 1971, 
no money appropriated for foreign assistance (including foreign 
military sales) shall be available for obligation or expenditure--(1) 
unless the appropriation thereof has been previously authorized by law; 
or (2) in excess of an amount previously prescribed by law.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following year, the first reauthorization law for the 
Peace Corps was enacted, consisting of a single sentence that 
provided a definite authorization of appropriations for FY1963 
(P.L. 87-442). In the lengthy report accompanying H.R. 10700, 
the committee explained the purpose of this legislation:

    The situation confronting the committee and the Congress is 
that there appear to be no developments during the first year 
of operation which give rise to any question as to the 
soundness of the Peace Corps concept, or which indicate that 
its program is too ambitious. The record of the managers of the 
Peace Corps merits continued confidence.
    The basic problem is, therefore, whether or not the 
requested authorization of $63,750,000 is justified. The 
committee has considered the method by which the financial 
requirements for fiscal 1963 were calculated, the nature of the 
programs to be financed and the foreign policy problems which 
confront the United States in the various countries involved. 
On the basis of this analysis, the planned rate of expansion 
appears to be realistic, the cost estimates reasonable, and the 
authorization requested to be justified. [H. Rept. 87-1470, p. 
4]

    The committee's report language also discussed the work of 
the Peace Corps the previous fiscal year, and potential 
developments for the upcoming fiscal year.
    Over the next 15 years, FY1964-FY1979, the agency was 
reauthorized on an annual basis, almost always through a stand-
alone authorization law.\76\ About half the reauthorization 
laws during this period only updated the prior authorization of 
appropriations with regard to the fiscal year and amount, 
leaving the other parts of the law largely unchanged. In these 
instances, however, the House Foreign Affairs and Senate 
Foreign Relations Committees often used reauthorization as an 
opportunity to communicate to both Congress and the agency 
their assessment of a wide variety of other agency issues. For 
example, the Senate report language associated with the 
reauthorization for FY1969 addressed issues such as the current 
status of Peace Corps agency and volunteer operations, as well 
as ongoing committee concern related to the administrative 
costs associated with various programs.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ Only the FY1973 Peace Corps reauthorization was enacted as 
part of an omnibus reauthorization act, Title IV of the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-352).
    \77\ S. Rept. 90-1095.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The annual reauthorization process was also used to 
implement changes in the underlying law, often in response to 
new developments within the agency. For example, in 1971 the 
Peace Corps was merged into a new volunteer service agency 
called ACTION.\78\ Although the Peace Corps' underlying mission 
remained the same, the annual authorization process, both 
before and after 1971, was used to oversee and structure its 
merger with ACTION and to review other agency concerns. In the 
FY1970 reauthorization (P.L. 99-199), provisions were included 
to restrict the use of Peace Corps funds for other volunteer 
and training programs. And the FY1975 and FY1976 
reauthorizations (P.L. 93-302 and P.L. 94-76) mandated 
statutory transfers of Peace Corps appropriations to finance 
increases in certain volunteer benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ This reorganization was made effective by Executive Order 
11603, which was issued pursuant to Reorganization Plan 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Both the frequency of the reauthorization and its funding 
specificity were viewed by Congress as important tools of 
agency oversight. Late in this period, there was some dispute 
between Congress and the President with regard to both issues. 
In FY1977, the President's budget submission requested a 2-year 
authorization for the Peace Corps, with a definite amount for 
FY1977 and such sums as may be necessary for FY1978. The House 
Foreign Affairs Committee responded to the administration's 
request in the committee report accompanying H.R. 12226:

    The Executive Branch requested a two-year authorization for 
the Peace Corps--$67,155,000 for fiscal 1977 and such sums as 
may be necessary for fiscal 1978. Because the Committee has 
believed that such open-ended authorizations are unwise and 
because it was not possible for the Peace Corps to come forward 
with a firm fiscal 1978 figure, the authorization was limited 
to a single year. [H. Rept. 94-874, p. 3]

    The Senate version provided a definite 1-year authorization 
of appropriations and did not comment on the administration's 
proposal.\79\ The administration requested a ``such sums'' 2-
year authorization of appropriations the following year, which 
was also rejected by the House and the Senate. The next year, 
when this 2-year proposal was suggested and rejected yet 
another time, the Senate noted, ``Each year the Peace Corps has 
submitted a request for an open-ended authorization, and each 
year the Congress has rejected these requests on the basis that 
congressional oversight responsibilities are best exercised 
through the annual authorization and appropriations 
processes.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ S. Rept. 94-757.
    \80\ S. Rept. 95-807, p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               transition to intermittent reauthorization

    Starting in FY1980, a number of significant changes for the 
Peace Corps occurred, both in terms of its status as an agency 
as well as congressional practices associated with its 
reauthorization. After the Peace Corps was reestablished as an 
independent agency, provisions in the FY1981 reauthorization 
further facilitated this transition (P.L. 96-533), and 
subsequent reauthorizations became focused on new policy 
developments within the agency.\81\ During this period, 
Congress also experimented with changes in the vehicle and 
timing of the reauthorization. The first such change occurred 
with the FY1980 and FY1981 reauthorizations (P.L. 96-53 and 
P.L. 96-533), where the Peace Corps was reauthorized as part of 
a larger omnibus foreign aid vehicle. The FY1981 
reauthorization was notable for at least two other reasons. 
First, it was enacted after the start of the fiscal year, on 
December 16, 1980, which was much later than was typical. 
Second, it was enacted on the same day as FY1981 Peace Corps 
appropriations. The next reauthorization, also enacted on the 
same day as FY1982 appropriations, included further changes in 
practice, in authorizing appropriations for both FY1982 and 
FY1983 (P.L. 97-133). While there was no indication given at 
that time of a broader change in the authorization interval, 
the next authorization of appropriations was also for 2 fiscal 
years (FY1986 and FY1987), and was enacted after almost a 4-
year lapse.\82\ These authorized levels were updated a year 
later through a provision in the foreign relations 
reauthorization.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ The Peace Corps was reestablished as an independent agency by 
Executive Order 12137 on May 16, 1979.
    \82\ The Senate version, S. 960, carried an authorization of 
appropriations for FY1986 only, while the House version carried a 2-
year authorization of appropriations. In the conference report, the 
committee explained, ``The Senate bill contained authorizations for 
only fiscal year 1986, while the House amendment authorized funds for 
both fiscal year 1986 and 1987. The executive branch requested such 
sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 1987. The committee of 
conference agreed to extend the fiscal year 1986 authorization to 
fiscal year 1987, at the same levels. The Committees on Foreign Affairs 
of the House and Foreign Relations of the Senate will give full 
consideration to any additional recommendations by the executive branch 
for fiscal year 1987 [H. Rept. 99-237, p. 108].''
    \83\ This provision was added during the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee markup of the foreign relations reauthorization (S. Rept. 99-
304, p. 25) and was enacted into law unchanged (P.L. 99-399).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There appear to be a number of factors that could account 
for these significant changes in practice. First, with the 
Peace Corps reorganization at the beginning of the decade, the 
focus of each reauthorization increasingly addressed agency 
policy concerns, and the practice of enacting laws that only 
authorized appropriations was generally discontinued. Second, 
the change in the vehicle to a multiagency foreign aid 
authorization may have also affected the frequency of the 
authorization, both because the foreign aid authorizations 
tended to authorize multiyear appropriations for other 
programs, and the potential for delays due to policy disputes 
unrelated to the Peace Corps. Finally, both the late enactment 
of the authorizations compared to appropriations, and the gaps 
in the authorization of appropriations, may have also further 
undermined the role of provisions explicitly authorizing 
appropriations in influencing budgetary decisionmaking.
    Over the past 25 years, efforts to reauthorize the Peace 
Corps have occurred on an irregular basis. Moreover, these 
authorization measures have often been primarily directed at 
policy concerns with the agency, as opposed to reauthorizing 
appropriations. For FY1993, a stand-alone law (P.L. 102-565) 
was enacted that both reauthorized appropriations and 
established the Peace Corps foreign exchange fluctuations 
account. This law had been enacted about 1 month after the 
Peace Corps appropriations for that fiscal year; the amounts 
authorized and appropriated were identical. About 18 months 
later, provisions were carried in the FY1995/FY1996 Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act that provided a 2-year 
authorization of appropriations for the Peace Corps, along with 
minor technical changes to the program (P.L. 103-236). The most 
recent authorization of appropriations enacted for the Peace 
Corps covered 4 fiscal years, FY2000-FY2003 (P.L. 106-30), but 
the primary purpose of this law was to authorize the expansion 
of the Peace Corps beyond the goal of 10,000 volunteers and 
make technical updates. Since that time, legislation that would 
reauthorize appropriations for the Peace Corps has received 
little congressional action.\84\ The most recent law to make 
major program changes to the Peace Corps, involving volunteer 
safety, included no provisions authorizing appropriations (P.L. 
112-57).\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ See, for example, S. 12 (107th Cong.), S. 1426 (112th Cong.), 
and H.R. 2583 (112th Cong.).
    \85\ For a discussion of these issues, see CRS Report RS21168, The 
Peace Corps: Current Issues, by Curt Tarnoff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    The evolution in the form of authorizations during the 20th 
century allowed the legislative committees to not only address 
policy questions but also to exercise a greater role in 
congressional and agency funding decisions. While these 
committees have a number of tools at their disposal with which 
to exercise this influence, one such tool that was chosen and 
developed during this period was the use of explicit 
authorizations of appropriations. As the needs of these 
committees and Congress have changed over time, the extent to 
which this tool has been used has also shifted.
    The legislative committees' desire for increased 
involvement in both agency and congressional budgetary 
decisions was a significant factor in the adoption of periodic 
reauthorization schedules, and played a role in the 
authorizations for all three agencies in this study. The Peace 
Corps and NASA received annual authorization schedules soon 
after being created as a means to facilitate congressional 
oversight during this critical time in the agency's 
development. While the transition to an annual reauthorization 
for the NSF occurred many years after the agency's 
establishment, it too was motivated by oversight concerns that 
had developed in the interim. For all three agencies, annual 
authorizations also had the advantage of allowing the 
legislative committees to formally weigh in on the agency's 
budgetary needs each fiscal year through the legislative 
process.
    During the period prior to the 1980s, the annual 
authorizations for the NSF, NASA, and Peace Corps were all 
characterized by relatively incremental program changes, with 
the more significant alterations generally being made outside 
the annual reauthorization process. As the NSF and NASA 
transitioned to a more long-term reauthorization schedule over 
the past 30 years, their reauthorization laws have become more 
policy-focused and contain more instances of significant 
program changes. This transition in the focus of 
reauthorizations was even more pronounced for the Peace Corps, 
with reauthorizations during the past few decades being enacted 
intermittently, and recent legislative proposals to make 
significant program changes containing no explicit 
authorizations of appropriations.
    In general, the evolution of authorizations in recent years 
has moved away from annual reauthorizations to longer periods. 
This has allowed Congress to address some criticisms about the 
impact of lapsed authorizations and focus instead on policy 
issues. This evolution parallels larger institutional patterns 
of change and innovation and the development of institutional 
capacity. In general, the choice of certain institutional tools 
over others may be driven both by the requirements of a 
particular context, as well as a need to serve broader 
purposes.\86\ The extent to which the separation between the 
authorization and appropriations processes continues to be a 
feature of congressional rules and practices, and the balance 
that results from the tension this separation creates will 
likely shift again and lead to further procedural adaptations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ Eric Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), pp. 15-18.







  Congress Evolving in the Face of Complexity: Legislative Efforts to 
    Embed Transparency, Participation, and Representation in Agency 
                               Operations

                            Clinton T. Brass

          Specialist in Government Organization and Management

                                  and

                             Wendy Ginsberg

                Analyst in American National Government

                              ----------                              


        In the last 100 years, the evolving scope and 
        increasing complexity of the Federal Government have 
        prompted concerns about how Congress could continue to 
        fulfill its constitutional duties. In response to real 
        and perceived pressures, Congress passed measures that 
        embedded values of transparency, participation, and 
        representation into agencies' day-to-day activities. In 
        combination with the advent of inexpensive 
        communications technologies, the laws have changed how 
        Congress, agencies, and non-Federal stakeholders may 
        engage one another. This evolution has implications for 
        the lawmaking, oversight, and representational work of 
        Congress--ranging from workload pressures to power 
        relationships with the President.

                              Introduction

    On December 10, 1934, an Assistant Attorney General (AG) of 
the Department of Justice appeared before the Supreme Court. He 
was defending the constitutionality of several parts of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), a key component of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal.\1\ On that day of 
oral argument, however, the Justices intensely questioned the 
Assistant AG on a matter outside of the case's constitutional 
core. They pressed him about a particular regulatory provision 
that was related to the implementation of NIRA. Unbeknownst to 
many inside and outside the government, the provision had been 
inadvertently omitted when a revised version of the regulation 
was sent to the printer. Consequently, the government had been 
seeking to enforce a regulatory provision that did not exist. 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis pressed the Assistant AG, pointedly 
asking if there was any way for a person to find the contents 
of a regulation when it was issued. ``I think it would be 
rather difficult,'' the Assistant AG said.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ For discussion of the proceedings, see U.S. National Archives 
and Records Administration (hereinafter NARA), Office of the Federal 
Register, ``A Brief History Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the 
Publication of the First Issue of the Federal Register,'' 2006, p. 2, 
at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/the-federal-register/
history.pdf; and Lotte E. Feinberg, ``Mr. Justice Brandeis and the 
Creation of the Federal Register,'' in Transparency and Secrecy, ed. 
Suzanne J. Piotrowski (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 76-90.
    \2\ Lotte E. Feinberg, ``Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Creation of 
the Federal Register,'' p. 77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The embarrassing incident demonstrated to many observers an 
increasing need for the public--and Federal agencies 
themselves--to have a formal system for tracking agency actions 
and rules.\3\ It was a catalyst for the enactment of the 
Federal Register Act and the creation of the Federal Register, 
the ``daily newspaper of the Federal government.'' \4\ The 
publication provides information on and access to Federal 
agency regulations, proposed regulations and public notices, 
Executive orders, proclamations, and other documents. In 
combination with several statutory requirements, the Federal 
Register allows Congress and the public to track certain 
executive branch actions and policy choices and participate 
formally in the regulatory process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Harold C. Relyea, ``The Federal Register: Origins, Formulation, 
Realization, and Heritage,'' Government Information Quarterly, vol. 28, 
no. 3 (July 2011), pp. 295-302.
    \4\ 49 Stat. 500 (1935). For the quoted text, see NARA, ``Federal 
Register: About the Federal Register,'' at http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/the-federal-register/about.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The story of the Federal Register Act exemplifies a broader 
theme of how Congress has adapted agencies' structures and 
operations over time. As multiple examples show, Congress has 
passed many laws that embed values of transparency, 
participation, and representation into agency activities. 
Congress passed these measures as one strategy, among others, 
to help address the increasing size, scope, and complexity of 
the Federal Government. This strategy, particularly when 
combined with the advent of inexpensive communications and 
information technologies, has substantially changed how 
Congress, agencies, and non-Federal stakeholders (e.g., 
advocacy groups, businesses, State and local governments, and 
citizens) may engage one another during the course of agencies' 
day-to-day operations. In turn, these changes in interactions 
have implications for the lawmaking, oversight, and 
representational work of Members of Congress.
    This report proceeds in three parts. First, the report 
provides historical context, including discussion of several 
strategies that Congress employed in the last century to adapt 
to the increasing complexity of government activities. Next, 
the report focuses in more depth on one of these strategies, 
under which Congress passed measures to embed transparency, 
participation, and representation into the day-to-day 
operations of agencies--albeit with some important 
constraints.\5\ Through these laws, Congress also sought to 
enhance its capacity by enlisting public participation in 
oversight and policymaking processes. Finally, building on this 
foundation, the report highlights potential implications of 
increased engagement by non-Federal stakeholders. In this 
context, the report also identifies several tradeoffs that 
Members face in their representational, oversight, and 
lawmaking work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ For example, laws such as the Privacy Act and Budget and 
Accounting Act channel how information may be developed, used, shared, 
and withheld from release, as discussed later in the report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   Historical Context: Congress Adapts to Evolving Expectations and 
                                Demands

                    Beginning with the Constitution

    By design, elections are not the only time when members of 
the public may interact formally with their elected 
representatives. Rather, the Framers of the Constitution 
perceived a need to protect the right of the American people to 
``petition the Government for a redress of grievances.'' \6\ In 
other words, the Constitution foresees the involvement of non-
Federal stakeholders in myriad policy deliberations, where they 
may attempt to influence decisionmaking in both the legislative 
and executive branches. Yet it has taken time and experience 
for Congress to evaluate how to put the Constitution into 
governing practice to facilitate involvement of these 
stakeholders in day-to-day policy deliberations, such as 
through the enactment of statutes and the pursuit of other 
congressional activities, including oversight.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ U.S. Constitution, Amendment I.
    \7\ With regard to oversight, many tools, including hearings and 
investigative reports, may be employed with a significant public role 
in mind. See CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual, by 
Todd Garvey et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    From the inception of the Federal Government, Congress has 
taken steps to require agencies to make certain information and 
records available to Congress and the public.\8\ As the 
responsibilities of the Federal Government evolved over time, 
so have the perceived needs of Congress, agencies, and 
interested non-Federal stakeholders. It could be argued, 
however, that a turning point arrived gradually with the 
approach of the 20th century.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ For discussion of reporting requirements, including what may be 
the first reporting requirement passed in 1789 by the First Congress, 
see CRS Report R42490, Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements: 
Annual Process Under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), by 
Clinton T. Brass.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  Increasing Challenges of Complexity

    A century after the Constitution's ratification, the United 
States faced mounting challenges. The Nation's geographic reach 
had expanded across the North American continent. The United 
States also experienced rapid population growth, driven in part 
by extensive immigration.\9\ Furthermore, numerous developments 
in the 19th and 20th centuries prompted the voting public and 
policymakers to support efforts--in fits and starts, and 
sometimes following considerable opposition--to expand the 
Federal Government's duties. These developments included, among 
other things, industrialization, urbanization, efforts to 
combat the Great Depression, two world wars, and the increasing 
complexity of domestic issues.\10\ As a result, the scope of 
the Federal Government's activities increased substantially to 
confront these and other challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ The population of the United States doubled between 1850 and 
1880, from 23 million to 50 million people, and doubled again between 
1880 and 1920, rising to 106 million. U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, ``History: Fast Facts,'' at http://
www.census.gov/ history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/.
    \10\ For discussion, see Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American 
State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and CRS 
Report RL30808, Government at the Dawn of the 21st Century: A Status 
Report, by Harold C. Relyea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Federal Government's increasing duties and size 
presented challenges and opportunities for agencies, Congress, 
and the public--including questions about how government as a 
whole could cope with increasing complexity. Congress responded 
to this challenge initially with efforts to build 
administrative capacity within the executive branch--such as 
creating new agencies, assigning additional responsibilities to 
existing agencies, or establishing agency procedures.\11\ Over 
time, however, the increased size, complexity, and reliance 
upon capacity in the executive branch generated new 
challenges.\12\ Among other things, these challenges raised 
questions about how Congress could inform itself and fulfill 
its multiple constitutional responsibilities--representing the 
people, conducting oversight, making laws, etc.--in a rapidly 
evolving environment. In one scholar's view:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ For examples, see discussion in Skowronek, Building a New 
American State.
    \12\ For discussion, see ibid., pp. 290-292; Peri E. Arnold, Making 
the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905-
1996, 2d ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 81-
117; and David H. Rosenbloom, Building a Legislative-Centered Public 
Administration: Congress and the Administrative State, 1946-1999 
(Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2000).

    By 1946, Congress's traditional place in the constitutional 
separation of powers had been thoroughly upset by the vast 
growth in the size and power of the federal bureaucracy during 
the New Deal and World War II. Congress had become a delegator, 
vesting much of its legislative authority in administrative 
agencies, and a great deal of the initiative for policy making 
and budgeting had passed to the executive branch.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Rosenbloom, Building a Legislative-Centered Public 
Administration, p. 1.

    Furthermore, some observers expressed concerns about the 
public's role in this new environment, including the public's 
ability to access information and inform policymaking 
processes.\14\ On one hand, many observers perceived agencies 
and civil servants as needing flexibility and effective tools 
to address complex and changing policy problems. Yet many also 
worried about Congress and non-Federal stakeholders having 
adequate transparency into, and influence over, the activities 
and decisionmaking of agencies. Observers saw non-Federal 
stakeholders as having little recourse to affect policy and 
hold government accountable when agencies wielded considerable 
discretion under existing laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ For an illustration of these concerns in the legislative 
history of the Administrative Procedure Act (60 Stat. 237 (1946)), see 
George B. Shepherd, ``Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics,'' Northwestern University Law 
Review, vol. 90, no. 4 (1996), pp. 1557-1683.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         Strategies in Response

    In the last 100 years, Congress responded to these 
concerns. Congress adapted to increasing size, scope, and 
complexity in the executive branch by passing laws that used at 
least three general strategies:
   shifting workload to the executive and judicial branches, 
        while seeking to maintain stewardship of policy through the 
        design of relevant statutes and institutions; \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ For example, laws that shifted some workload to other branches 
include the Budget and Accounting Act (42 Stat. 20 (1921)), as 
discussed later in this report, and the Federal Tort Claims Act (60 
Stat. 842 (1946), Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1946). Until the Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted, a person who 
suffered personal injury or property damage as the result of a Federal 
employee's negligence or misconduct had no judicial remedy. Such a 
person's only remedy was to seek to have a private claim bill 
introduced in Congress. See CRS Report RL30795, General Management 
Laws: A Compendium, by Clinton T. Brass et al., section titled 
``Federal Tort Claims Act,'' by Henry Cohen. As Congress delegated 
authorities to agencies in the face of complexity, Congress also sought 
to structure many agencies to promote their independence from undesired 
influence. For example, see CRS Report R43391, Independence of Federal 
Financial Regulators, by Henry B. Hogue, Marc Labonte, and Baird Webel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   building capacity in the legislative branch, such as through 
        hiring staff and establishing support agencies; \16\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ For example, a key law that built capacity in the legislative 
branch was the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812), 
which, among other things, for the first time authorized permanent 
professional and clerical staff for congressional committees. Congress 
also established the Legislative Reference Service in 1914 (later 
redesignated as the Congressional Research Service with an expanded 
policy analysis role), the General Accounting Office in 1921 (later 
given new responsibilities and eventually redesignated as the 
Government Accountability Office), and the Congressional Budget Office 
in 1974.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   embedding legislative values of transparency, participation, 
        and representation into the day-to-day operations of Federal 
        agencies.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ For a book-length account of all three strategies, especially 
from the perspective of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 and 
the Administrative Procedure Act, see Rosenbloom, Building a 
Legislative-Centered Public Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Employing these strategies, Congress established numerous 
statutory mechanisms to help address complexity in governance. 
These included laws that cover executive agencies broadly and 
bring some regularity to their operations.\18\ Some of the laws 
drew on Congress' initial approach of building capacity in the 
executive branch. Many of the laws also employed one or more of 
the additional three strategies to help Congress grapple with 
challenges of an increasing workload, difficulty in accessing 
information, and maintaining control of agencies. In all of 
these efforts, Congress navigated through an environment of 
potential cooperation or competition with the President over 
policy outcomes.\19\ These concerns continued through the 
balance of the 20th century and beyond, even after Federal 
revenues and spending stabilized as a proportion of the economy 
in the decades after 1950.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ For a survey, see CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: 
A Compendium, by Clinton T. Brass et al. Most subsequently were 
amended, and some were later codified in the U.S. Code.
    \19\ For related discussion, see CRS Report RL32388, General 
Management Laws: Major Themes and Management Policy Options, by Clinton 
T. Brass.
    \20\ For a table that shows how Federal receipts and outlays have 
varied as a proportion of gross domestic product from 1930 to the 
present, see U.S. Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget (hereinafter OMB), Historical Tables--Budget of 
the U.S. Government, FY2015 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2014), pp. 26-27. 
Some observers view these proportions as proxy measures of the size of 
the Federal Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In particular, the third strategy of passing laws to embed 
transparency, participation, and representation into agency 
operations--the primary focus of this report--has, in 
combination with technological developments, substantially 
changed how Congress, agencies, and non-Federal stakeholders 
engage one another. Under these laws, which were enacted over a 
period of decades, non-Federal stakeholders increasingly could 
inform themselves and seize opportunities to communicate with 
their government. Furthermore, Congress could rely to some 
extent on non-Federal stakeholders to raise flags if government 
institutions misbehaved in exercising the discretion they were 
granted under law. These new points of access set up a dynamic 
where, in the views of two scholars, it was indeed possible 
that:

    the bureaucracy might not pursue Congress's goals. But 
citizens and interest groups can be counted on to sound an 
alarm in most cases in which the bureaucracy has arguably 
violated Congress's goals. Then Congress can intervene to 
rectify the violation. Congress has not necessarily 
relinquished legislative responsibility to anyone else. It has 
just found a more efficient way to legislate.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, ``Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,'' American 
Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 1 (February 1984), p. 175.

    In addition, as communication and information technologies 
transformed over time from the telegraph to email, technologies 
have also become less costly, more capable, and more pervasive.
    It has become easier for non-Federal stakeholders to use 
the avenues provided by these laws to inform themselves, 
organize, and engage with agencies and Members of Congress. For 
example, stakeholders may scrutinize publicly available reports 
from agencies and comment on proposed regulations; non-Federal 
policy experts may serve on agencies' advisory committees; and 
anyone may request certain Federal records without justifying 
the need for the request. Large databases also have been placed 
on the Internet for perusal by organized interests and everyday 
citizens. The next section of this report highlights several 
laws that illustrate this trend.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ The discussions of the first two laws, below, are lengthier 
than the others, because they help illustrate how the strategy of 
embedding legislative values into agency operations could be pursued 
simultaneously with other strategies (e.g., the Budget and Accounting 
Act of 1921, which both shed congressional workload and established 
capacity in the legislative and executive branches) or pursued in 
response to previous lawmaking (e.g., the Federal Register Act, 
responding to previous delegations of rulemaking authority to 
agencies).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Examples of Laws That Embedded Transparency, Participation, and 
                             Representation

    The laws described below illustrate how Congress sought to 
embed transparency, participation, and representation into the 
operations of executive agencies. This list draws on previous 
CRS research and is not exhaustive of all possible 
examples.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Many of the laws also are discussed in Rosenbloom, Building a 
Legislative-Centered Public Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ 42 Stat. 20, later amended and codified in Title 31, U.S. 
Code. This paragraph draws in part on CRS Report RL30795, General 
Management Laws: A Compendium, by Clinton T. Brass et al., section 
titled ``Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,'' by James Saturno.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An early milestone of Congress' efforts to embed 
transparency into agency operations arguably was enactment of 
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which, among other 
things, centralized some aspects of budget formulation with the 
President. Notably, the law grew in part out of Progressive Era 
views that sought to place more trust and authority in 
administrative processes and institutions. In addition, the 
machinery of the Federal Government had been heavily strained 
during World War I (1914-1918), when Federal spending increased 
markedly.\25\ At that time, Congress did not have extensive 
staff resources and support agencies to help it cope with these 
heightened demands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process, 
3d ed. (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2007), p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response, Congress focused on building institutions and 
processes in the executive branch. Notably, Congress 
accompanied this approach with parallel efforts to shift some 
workload to the executive branch, build capacity in the 
legislative branch, and increase the transparency of government 
finances. Congressional proponents of the law argued in favor 
of a process where the President would receive, consider, and 
modify executive agency budget requests (``estimates''), and 
then submit a consolidated budget proposal to Congress.\26\ 
Individual agencies would no longer be allowed to send budget 
requests directly to Congress unless the House or Senate asked 
for such a request. Proponents argued that ``the estimates for 
appropriations will come to Congress after a more mature 
deliberation by an official who has the power to coordinate and 
consolidate governmental activities and to revise the 
estimates.'' \27\ In the face of what today might be called 
information overload, proponents added that ``[t]he proposed 
plan . . . will unquestionably greatly reduce the drudgery of 
committees in making inquiry into [agencies' budget] 
estimates.'' \28\ In response to criticisms that such a change 
would abdicate legislative prerogatives or shift power to the 
President, proponents asserted that ``the proposed law does not 
change in the slightest degree the duty of Congress to make the 
minutest examination of the budget.'' \29\ To support Congress 
in undertaking this duty, the law established numerous 
reporting requirements that provided budget transparency for a 
broader public audience. The law also established a new agency 
in the legislative branch--the General Accounting Office (GAO), 
now the Government Accountability Office--to assist Congress in 
focusing on accountability.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ The act established the Bureau of the Budget in the Treasury 
Department to assist the President with this work. The bureau later was 
transferred to the Executive Office of the President and eventually was 
designated the Office of Management and Budget. See CRS Report RS21665, 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB): A Brief Overview, by Clinton T. 
Brass.
    \27\ U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on the Budget, National 
Budget System, report to accompany H.R. 9783, 66th Cong., 1st sess., H. 
Rept. 362 (Washington, DC: GPO, October 8, 1919), p. 7.
    \28\ Ibid.
    \29\ Proponents also claimed: ``The bill does not in the slightest 
degree give the Executive any greater power than he now has over the 
consideration of appropriations by Congress.'' Ibid. Nevertheless, most 
scholarship has concluded that the law gave the President more power 
over the appropriations process than before, in part through increased 
control of information coming from agencies. For example, see Kenneth 
R. Mayer and Thomas J. Weko, ``The Institutionalization of Power,'' in 
Robert Y. Shapiro, Martha Joynt Kumar, and Lawrence R. Jacobs, eds., 
Presidential Power: Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 193-198.
    \30\ Concerns about Congress' access to information from executive 
agencies eventually prompted Congress to increase its own capacity to 
scrutinize the President's proposals. See George B. Galloway, ``The 
Operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,'' American 
Political Science Review, vol. 45, no. 1 (March 1951), pp. 64-65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       Federal Register Act \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Originally enacted in 1935 (49 Stat. 500); codified at 44 
U.S.C. Chapter 15. This section draws in part on CRS Report RL32240, 
The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview, coordinated by Maeve P. 
Carey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A notable accelerant to Congress' efforts to embed 
legislative values in agency operations arrived a decade later 
with the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, as the 
administration and Congress responded to major crises of the 
time, including the Great Depression.\32\ The President's New 
Deal program responded energetically. Among other things, 
President Roosevelt's ``legislative triumphs in the famous 
Hundred Days of 1933 laid the groundwork for an explosion of 
administrative law in addition to the tidal wave of such 
pronouncements he generated from the White House and the 
existing regulatory agencies.'' \33\ These developments led to 
enactment of the Federal Register Act, which in 1935 became one 
in a succession of prominent laws that, in turn, shone a light 
on administrative bureaucracies and their activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ After the First World War, expansion of the Federal Government 
slowed, and then increased again during the Great Depression to 
``combat the national economic emergency.'' See CRS Report RL30808, 
Government at the Dawn of the 21st Century: A Status Report, by Harold 
C. Relyea. In the Great Depression, real gross domestic product plunged 
by 30 percent, and unemployment reached 25 percent. See CRS Report 
R41332, Economic Recovery: Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth in a Post-
Crisis Economy, by Craig K. Elwell.
    \33\ Relyea, ``The Federal Register: Origins, Formulation, 
Realization, and Heritage,'' p. 297.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Federal Register Act established a uniform system for 
handling agency regulations by requiring (1) the filing of 
documents with the Office of the Federal Register; (2) the 
placement of documents for public inspection; (3) publication 
of the documents in a new government periodical, the Federal 
Register; and (4) after a 1937 amendment, permanent 
codification of regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR).\34\ Publication of a regulation in the Federal Register 
provides official notice of its existence and contents. Other 
documents that are published in the Federal Register include 
presidential proclamations and Executive orders, notices, and 
any documents that the President or Congress requires to be 
published. The Federal Register is published each business day, 
and is available electronically.\35\ In these ways, the 
publication provides a mechanism by which citizens, businesses, 
and other non-Federal stakeholders can track the activities of 
Federal agencies that may affect them. The regulatory process 
that plays out in the Federal Register provides Congress an 
opportunity to oversee implementation of the laws it enacts, 
and the Federal Register furthermore provides a common source 
of information that fosters interaction among agencies, 
Congress, and non-Federal stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ For access to the CFR, see U.S. Government Printing Office 
(GPO), Code of Federal Regulations (Annual Edition), at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collectionCfr.action?collection Code=CFR.
    \35\ GPO, Federal Register, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/
collection.action?collectionCode= FR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                Administrative Procedure Act (APA) \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Originally enacted in 1946 (P.L. 79-404; 60 Stat. 237); 
codified at 5 U.S.C.  551 et seq. This paragraph draws in part on CRS 
Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium, by Clinton T. 
Brass et al., section titled ``Administrative Procedure Act,'' by 
Morton Rosenberg and T.J. Halstead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) became law in 1946, 
after what one scholar called the ``bitter compromise of [a] 
fierce political battle'' over administrative reform in the 
wake of the New Deal.\37\ The major contribution of the act was 
to establish for the first time minimum procedural requirements 
for certain types of agency decisionmaking. Its general 
purposes were to (1) require agencies to keep the public 
currently informed of agency organization, procedures, and 
rules; (2) provide for public participation in the rulemaking 
process; (3) prescribe uniform standards for the conduct of 
formal rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings; and (4) restate 
the law of judicial review of agency action. A series of 
subsequent judicial decisions and statutes expanded both the 
obligations of agencies and the role of reviewing courts. The 
result has been the transformation of ``informal'' rulemaking--
also known as ``notice and comment'' rulemaking--into an on-
the-record proceeding that has fostered widespread public 
participation.\38\ With some frequency, Congress has supplanted 
the APA's executive branch-wide requirements with more explicit 
directives for particular agencies and programs. This kind of 
legislation often has been aimed at formalizing procedural 
protections to promote public participation in certain agency 
policymaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Shepherd, ``Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics,'' p. 1681. The scholar added that 
``[t]he APA was an important and clear example of an attempt to 
influence [policy] outcomes by means of procedural requirements.''
    \38\ For discussion of the present-day rulemaking process, see CRS 
Report RL32240, The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview, 
coordinated by Maeve P. Carey. In a typical case of informal 
rulemaking, when an agency publishes a proposed rule, it also solicits 
comments from the public. The agency then considers the comments, 
develops a final rule, and publishes both the agency's response to the 
comments and the final rule in the Federal Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) \39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Originally enacted in 1966 (P.L. 89-487; 80 Stat. 250); 
codified at 5 U.S.C.  552. For more information about the law, see CRS 
Report R41933, The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): Background, 
Legislation, and Policy Issues, by Wendy Ginsberg.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA). The legislation was considered in Congress in the face 
of considerable opposition by executive departments and 
agencies.\40\ FOIA enables any person to request, without 
explanation or justification, access to existing, identifiable, 
and unpublished executive branch agency records. The law, which 
contains provisions that acknowledge legitimate reasons for 
government secrecy and information protection, specifies nine 
categories of information that may be exempted from the rule of 
disclosure. Disputes over the accessibility of requested 
records may be settled, according to the provisions of the act, 
in Federal court, or may be mediated in the Office of 
Government Information Services (OGIS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ For discussion of the impact of this opposition on the law's 
early implementation, see CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: 
A Compendium, by Clinton T. Brass et al., section titled ``Freedom of 
Information Act,'' by Harold C. Relyea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Originally enacted in 1972 (P.L. 92-463; 86 Stat. 770); 
located at 5 U.S.C. Appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
in 1972, prompted by a concern by many citizens and Members of 
Congress that existing executive branch advisory bodies were 
duplicative, inefficient, and lacked adequate oversight; did 
not adequately represent the public interest; and too often 
held meetings that were closed to the public.\42\ FACA provides 
a formal process by which non-Federal stakeholders or policy 
experts can provide advice and opinions to the Federal 
Government. FACA requires that an advisory committee's 
membership be ``fairly balanced in terms of the points of view 
represented,'' and that the advice provided by committees be 
objective and accessible to the public. Additionally, FACA 
requires that committee meetings be open to the public, unless 
the material discussed meets certain requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on 
Government Operations, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, report to 
accompany S. 3529, 92d Cong., 2nd sess., S. Rept. 92-1098 (Washington, 
DC: GPO, 1972), pp. 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            Privacy Act \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Originally enacted in 1974 (P.L. 93-579; 88 Stat. 1896); 
codified at 5 U.S.C.  552a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Legislated in 1974, the Privacy Act arose in the context of 
several contemporaneous events that prompted congressional 
interest in securing personal privacy. The law provides U.S. 
citizens or permanent resident aliens presumptive access to 
personally identifiable files on themselves held by Federal 
agencies--generally excepting law enforcement and intelligence 
entities. The statute specifies seven types of information that 
may be exempted from the rule of access. Where a file subject 
contends that a record contains inaccurate information about 
that individual, the act allows correction through a request to 
the agency that possesses the record. Disputes over the 
accessibility or accuracy of personally identifiable files may 
be pursued in Federal court.

                  Government in the Sunshine Act \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Originally enacted in 1976 (P.L. 94-409; 90 Stat. 1241); 
codified at 5 U.S.C.  552b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Enacted in 1976, the government in the Sunshine Act was 
intended to open the policymaking deliberations of any agency 
headed by a ``collegial body''--such as boards, commissions, or 
councils--to public scrutiny. One scholar characterized the law 
as ``premised on the concept that the multi-headed regulatory 
agencies are very much legislative extensions, or subordinate 
arms of the Congress,'' citing the congressional debate when 
FACA was considered.\45\ Pursuant to the statute, agencies are 
required to publish advance notice of impending meetings and 
make those meetings publicly accessible. The act includes 10 
conditions under which agency meetings are to be exempted from 
the act. Disputes over proper public notice of such meetings or 
the propriety of closing a deliberation may be pursued in 
Federal court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Rosenbloom, Building a Legislative-Centered Public 
Administration, p. 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Statutory Exceptions to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

    As discussed earlier, the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 
took steps toward increasing transparency. The law also 
established a process that many observers later perceived as 
enabling the President in practice to control the nature of 
information that agencies release to Congress and the 
public.\46\ In response, over a period of years, Congress 
passed multiple exceptions to the act. These statutory 
provisions authorized certain agencies to submit budget 
requests or other information directly to Congress, without 
modification by the President or the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB).\47\ The statutory provisions vary considerably 
and cover agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, Federal Election Commission, and Social Security 
Administration. In some cases, the President statutorily is 
required to include the agency's request in the President's 
budget proposal without revision. Alternatively, an agency may 
be required to submit its budget request to Congress 
concurrently when it submits a request to the President or 
OMB.\48\ In most of these cases, agencies effectively may 
bypass OMB and the President, communicating their views 
directly to Congress as well as to the broader public rather 
than only though the filter of the President's policy 
preferences, thereby, arguably, opening part of the budget 
formulation process to additional transparency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ For example, see the dialog between Senator Edmund S. Muskie 
and then-Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Roy L. Ash in 
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Amending the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, hearing on S. 1214, 93d Cong., 1st 
sess., April 27, 1973 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973), pp. 30-34, in which 
the Senator cited cases of OMB and agencies withholding certain budget-
related information from congressional requesters and public view.
    \47\ OMB assembled a list of such agencies in 2001 along with 
relevant statutory citations. OMB's list includes agencies that submit 
budget requests directly to Congress, even without explicit statutory 
authorization. The document was released after a Freedom of Information 
Act court case. For the OMB list, see Public Citizen, ``Public Citizen, 
Inc. v. Office of Management and Budget (OMB),'' at http://
www.citizen.org/litigation/forms/cases/getlinkforcase.cfm?cID=379.
    \48\ In that situation, the President may submit a separate request 
to Congress later, as part of the President's consolidated proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and GPRA 
                Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ GPRA, P.L. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993); and GPRAMA, P.L. 111-
352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). This section draws in part on CRS Report 
R42379, Changes to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): 
Overview of the New Framework of Products and Processes, by Clinton T. 
Brass.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Enacted in 1993, the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) arrived in the wake of the ``reinventing government'' 
movement and other influences. The law was regarded as a 
watershed for the Federal Government. For the first time, most 
executive agencies were statutorily required to articulate 
mission statements, set goals, measure performance, and report 
the information to Congress and the public.\50\ Agencies 
submitted this information in three major products: (1) 
multiyear strategic plans, which were required to be revised 
with a minimum frequency of every 3 years, (2) annual plans to 
accompany agency budget requests, and (3) retrospective annual 
reports. The law also required agencies to consult with 
Congress and non-Federal stakeholders when developing their 
strategic plans. Congress significantly revised the law with 
passage of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA). Among 
other things, GPRAMA required OMB to create a public Web site 
to house performance information, which OMB established as 
Performance.gov. GPRAMA also included more specific 
requirements for agencies' consultations with Congress, but 
reduced the required frequency of certain agency consultations 
with non-Federal stakeholders.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ GPRA stood in contrast with past efforts that Presidents 
pursued on their own initiative using available authority. These 
initiatives, however, were abandoned with changes in administration, or 
due to a perception of unrealistic ambitions or a lack of congressional 
buy-in.
    \51\ When an agency develops or makes adjustments to its strategic 
plan, the agency is required to consult with ``entities potentially 
affected by or interested in such a plan.'' The reduction in required 
frequency occurred due to GPRAMA realigning the process of updating 
agency strategic plans to coincide with the first year of Presidential 
terms, once every 4 years, instead of the more staggered term of every 
3 years under GPRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) and Digital 
          Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act) \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ FFATA was originally enacted in 2006 (P.L. 109-282, 120 Stat. 
1186) and subsequently amended, including in 2014 by the DATA Act (P.L. 
113-101, 128 Stat. 1146). This section draws in part on CRS Report 
RL33680, The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act: 
Background, Overview, and Implementation Issues, by Garrett Hatch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress passed the Federal Funding Accountability and 
Transparency Act (FFATA) in 2006. According to the law's 
supporters, FFATA was an attempt to reduce ``wasteful and 
unnecessary spending,'' including spending on funds earmarked 
for special projects.\53\ The legislation required OMB to 
establish a publicly available, searchable Web site containing 
information about Federal grants, contracts, and other forms of 
assistance. OMB eventually established the Web site as 
USAspending.gov. Using this database, supporters asserted, a 
citizen or watchdog group would be able to determine how much 
money was given to which organizations, and for what purposes. 
The premise of the new law was that, by making the details of 
Federal spending available to the public, government officials 
would be less likely to fund projects that might be perceived 
as wasteful. In addition, supporters suggested that the new 
database would enable the public to become more involved in the 
discussion of Federal spending priorities. In 2014, Congress 
significantly amended FFATA with passage of the DATA Act. Among 
other things, FFATA as amended requires the Secretary of the 
Treasury and Director of OMB to establish governmentwide 
financial data standards. In addition, the amended law requires 
online reporting of extensive data on budget execution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) \54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ P.L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). This section draws on CRS 
Report R40572, General Oversight Provisions in the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA): Requirements and Related Issues, 
by Clinton T. Brass.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the wake of a rapidly deteriorating economic picture and 
a recession that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) called 
the most severe since World War II, Congress passed the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009. The law 
was intended in substantial part to function as a fiscal 
stimulus to the economy through discretionary spending, 
mandatory spending, and revenue provisions.\55\ To mitigate the 
risk of such a large and sudden infusion of funding being 
managed imprudently, Congress included extensive oversight-
related provisions in the legislation. After markup of a draft 
version of ARRA, the House Committee on Appropriations 
characterized the legislation as providing ``unprecedented 
accountability,'' saying ARRA's ``historic level of 
transparency, oversight and accountability will help guarantee 
taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and Americans can see results 
for their investment.'' As enacted, ARRA required, among other 
things, that a Web site be established to serve as a focal 
point for many of the law's extensive reporting requirements. 
The Web site was established as Recovery.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ CRS Report R40537, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (P.L. 111-5): Summary and Legislative History, by Clinton T. Brass 
et al. CBO later estimated that the law would increase budget deficits 
by about $830 billion over a 10-year period, thereby diminishing the 
effects of the recession on economic output and unemployment. See U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office (hereinafter CBO), Estimated Impact of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic 
Output from October 2012 Through December 2012, February 2013, pp. 1 
and 3, at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
43945-ARRA.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Potential Issues Relating to Increased Stakeholder Engagement

    In response to the increasing complexity of governance, 
Congress has pursued multiple strategies in its efforts to 
fulfill its constitutional duties, as noted earlier in this 
report. These strategies have included (1) shifting certain 
work to other branches, under detailed statutory and 
institutional frameworks, (2) building capacity in the 
legislative branch, and (3) fostering more extensive engagement 
between agencies and non-Federal stakeholders by embedding 
legislative values into agency operations.\56\ The third 
strategy--the primary emphasis of this report--may raise 
ongoing issues for Congress, as Congress addresses its own 
institutional needs and the perceived needs of diverse 
stakeholders.\57\ At least three broad issues, discussed in the 
sections below, may arise from increased stakeholder 
engagement.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ In practice, the strategy of embedding transparency, 
participation, and representation in agency operations may be pursued 
in combination with one or both of the first two strategies. When 
several strategies are pursued, they may interact with each other. For 
example, efforts to build capacity in the executive branch might be 
accompanied by workload shedding (e.g., delegation of certain 
rulemaking authority to an agency that is somewhat insulated from 
Presidential influence), requirements for additional transparency or 
public participation, and new roles or responsibilities for 
institutions in the legislative branch, to facilitate Congress' work.
    \57\ Complexity in governance may affect agencies, Congress, and 
the President in their day-to-day duties. Complexity similarly may 
affect non-Federal stakeholders as well, as shown in the events that 
led to enactment of the Federal Register Act. Historically, Congress 
has been concerned at times with the needs of each of these actors when 
it considered legislation to make policy changes, establish 
institutions, and specify how institutions are required to operate. 
Establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau within the 
Federal Reserve System is a recent example of how Congress has built 
capacity to address a perception of the public's information needs. For 
discussion of the agency's statutory purpose and structure, see CRS 
Report R42572, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal 
Analysis, by David H. Carpenter.
    \58\ As illustrated in the sections below, Congress and other 
stakeholders may experience any of several dynamics. These include 
facing ``information overload,'' building capacity to produce and 
process information, and controlling the flow of information. One group 
of scholars described information overload as ``[occurring] when the 
amount of input to a system exceeds its processing capacity. . . . 
Consequently, when information overload occurs, it is likely that a 
reduction in decision quality will occur.'' See Cheri Speier, Joseph S. 
Valacich, and Iris Vessey, ``The Influence of Task Interruption on 
Individual Decision Making: An Information Overload Perspective,'' 
Decision Sciences, vol. 30, no. 2 (spring 1999), p. 338 (citations 
omitted from quoted text).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Efforts to Promote Stakeholder Engagement May Contribute to Information 
                       Overload and Impose Costs

    In the face of complexity in governance, Congress may pass 
legislation to build capacity in the executive branch and, at 
the same time, open up agency activities to public engagement. 
As a result, Federal law provides non-Federal stakeholders many 
opportunities to gain insight into detailed aspects of agency 
operations, formally express views, receive responses from the 
agencies, and bring outstanding concerns to Members of 
Congress. Members, in turn, may engage agencies and 
stakeholders when they undertake their legislative duties--
including representation, oversight, and lawmaking. These 
interactions may bring benefits for Congress in terms of 
dealing with information overload, conducting oversight, and 
exercising influence over the ways in which agencies implement 
policy.
    At the same time, however, the interactions may produce 
significant side effects, including a deluge of information and 
additional workload. With the advent of inexpensive and 
pervasive communications and information technologies, the 
nature of engagement has changed substantially over the last 
century. New technologies can assist in facilitating wide 
dissemination of information and rapid communication, 
potentially leaving Members of Congress in a maelstrom of 
information and viewpoints. On one hand, information from and 
engagement with stakeholders may assist Members in evaluating 
policy options in their legislative work. On the other hand, 
non-Federal stakeholder expectations for congressional 
engagement also may present complex issues and tradeoffs for 
Congress--especially when considering how Members can best use 
finite time and staffing resources. For example, with increased 
access to agency operations and data, members of the public may 
increase the frequency with which they petition their 
representatives. As Federal data sources proliferate in areas 
such as Medicare, Federal grants, and budget execution, Members 
and their staff may face corresponding increases in workload 
pressures.\59\ Consequently, additional transparency and 
participation may bring ``opportunity costs,'' where some 
observers may believe that time and staff should be used in 
other and perhaps more effective ways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ For discussion of potential contemporary sources of this sort 
of workload, see CRS Report IN10012, CMS Releases Medicare Physician 
Data: Proceed with Caution, by Jim Hahn; and CRS Report IN10101, 
Transparency in Grants Administration: Implementing Relevant Provisions 
of the DATA Act, by Natalie Keegan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Still other tradeoffs may arise when the topic of costs is 
considered. Building capacity within agencies to facilitate the 
promotion of transparency, for example, may involve substantial 
costs for information technology systems.\60\ In addition, 
requirements for additional transparency, participation, or 
representation may have nonfinancial costs. As noted in another 
CRS report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ For example, CBO estimated that a proposed version of the DATA 
Act would cost $300 million over a 5-year period. See CBO, S. 994, DATA 
Act, as Ordered Reported by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs on November 6, 2013, December 5, 2013, at 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44933.

scrutiny that results from reporting may have side effects. If 
an agency's reporting omits major aspects of an agency's or 
program's mission, officials may face incentives to concentrate 
on reported tasks and not others that are integral to 
accomplishing the mission. Other potential consequences of 
scrutiny might include delays in the completion of tasks, 
increases in time that personnel spend responding to scrutiny 
rather than performing regular duties, and reduced creativity 
in addressing challenges.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ CRS Report R42490, Reexamination of Agency Reporting 
Requirements: Annual Process Under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 
(GPRAMA), by Clinton T. Brass (footnotes omitted from quoted text).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   Creating Capacity and Transparency May Have Implications for How 
             Information Is Controlled and Who Controls It

    Congress has legislated in many ways to address its own 
perceived and evolving needs. Congress also has legislated to 
address its perception of the needs of agencies and the 
President to cope with increasing complexity in governance. In 
some cases, Congress initially established considerable 
capacity in the executive branch, such as with the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921 and additional laws during and after the 
New Deal. Over time, however, many observers argued that 
vesting more responsibilities in the executive branch as a 
stand-alone strategy was not sufficient. Agencies and the 
President, for example, could operate within somewhat of a 
black box, with substantial control over the types and extent 
of information they released. When this lack of transparency 
became a concern, Congress responded with a variety of laws 
like those described earlier in this report.
    Nevertheless, congressional efforts to increase 
transparency might facilitate simultaneous efforts to increase 
or centralize Presidential power--as experience with the Budget 
and Accounting Act (budget formulation) and the Administrative 
Procedure Act (rulemaking) arguably demonstrate.\62\ In these 
two cases, transparency could be used by the institutional 
presidency (e.g., OMB) in attempts to control the actions of 
agencies and to promote the President's policy agenda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ For discussion of OMB's role on behalf of the President in 
rulemaking, see CRS Report RL32397, Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, coordinated by Maeve P. 
Carey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similar issues might arise in other contexts, as well. As 
noted earlier in this report with respect to the GPRA 
Modernization Act, for example, the new law realigned the 
process of updating agency strategic plans to coincide with the 
first year of Presidential terms, once every 4 years, instead 
of once every 3 years under previous law (irrespective of when 
a new President arrives).\63\ As a result, GPRAMA's new timing 
framework reduces the required frequency of agencies' 
consultations with non-Federal stakeholders and, furthermore, 
appears to nest these consultations (and congressional 
consultations) within the 1st year of a President's term. 
During the first year of a Presidential term, Presidents 
traditionally are focused on influencing agencies to adopt the 
President's policy preferences. As a consequence, OMB's ability 
to influence or direct the choices of agencies and the 
information that they present may be enhanced in comparison 
with previous law.\64\ The implications of GPRAMA's timing 
change remain to be seen, including regarding agencies' 
responsiveness to Congress and non-Federal stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Continuing from previous law under GPRA, when an agency 
develops or makes adjustments to its strategic plan, GPRAMA requires 
the agency to consult with ``entities potentially affected by or 
interested in such a plan.''
    \64\ For discussion, see CRS Report R42379, Changes to the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New 
Framework of Products and Processes, by Clinton T. Brass.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Transparency, Participation, and Representation, but for Whom?

    When a person speaks about transparency, participation, and 
representation, a key question may be asked: For whom? Recent 
developments in the executive branch help to illustrate how 
this question may raise issues for Congress in its multifaceted 
work. To some extent, the congressional strategy of embedding 
transparency, participation, and representation into the 
operations of government has been embraced by the executive 
branch. Recent government actions have adopted new technologies 
that offer a more proactive form of access to executive branch 
operations and policymaking. For example, in 2009, the Obama 
administration unveiled its Open Government Directive, which 
requires, among other things, that agencies release a variety 
of datasets to the public.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ For discussion of the directive, see CRS Report R42817, 
Government Transparency and Secrecy: An Examination of Meaning and Its 
Use in the Executive Branch, by Wendy Ginsberg et al. The directive 
required agencies to place three ``high value'' datasets on the 
Data.gov Web site. The directive also discussed the use of other public 
venues for government data, including USAspending.gov and Recovery.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With a multitude of newly released datasets and other 
information available to the public, the administration stated 
that it will be the duty of the public to keep agency 
performance in check.\66\ This ``crowdsourcing,'' or using the 
collective opinions of a mass, online audience, may improve the 
quality of data that is released to the public by allowing more 
people to search through datasets. Reliance upon crowdsourcing, 
however, may give those members of the public with more time 
and resources more opportunity to review and analyze Federal 
data, effectively privileging certain groups.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ At a December 10, 2009, Senate Budget Committee Task Force on 
Government Performance hearing, both of the Obama administration's 
witnesses said that watchdog groups and members of the public would 
enforce agency accountability. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the 
Budget, Task Force on Government Performance, Data-Driven Performance: 
Using Technology to Deliver Results, 111th Cong., 1st sess., December 
10, 2009, at http://www.budget.senate.gov/democratic/public/index.cfm/
hearings?ID=7c1b89ca-d5cb-4c13-a3b3-f6f842a02d57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Access to these datasets also may prompt additional 
questions or concerns. Several might be highlighted.
   Releasing these datasets to the public assumes that the 
        public and oversight bodies have the knowledge, capacity, and 
        resources to evaluate the data, offer valid insights, and reach 
        replicable results and verifiable conclusions.
   Inadvertent or purposeful manipulation of the datasets may 
        allow certain groups or individuals to present unclear or 
        skewed interpretations of government data.
   As agencies release hundreds or thousands of datasets, users 
        may need specialized knowledge to identify appropriate datasets 
        to meet their needs.
   Counterintuitively, this releasing of vast amounts of data 
        may make public access and participation more difficult, adding 
        to the aforementioned information overload. For example, public 
        users and Members of Congress may have to sift through 
        extensive information or thousands of datasets to find what 
        they need to answer their policy questions.
   Federal and non-Federal stakeholders may not be familiar 
        with the datasets held by each agency, or may not be aware of 
        unique sensitivities of these data.
   There may be significant costs associated with adapting 
        certain datasets and vernacular to more standardized and 
        accessible formats.
   A related oversight issue may arise. Executive branch 
        agencies may be releasing only certain information and 
        datasets, while keeping others from public view for a variety 
        of potential reasons that might or might not raise 
        concerns.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ For discussion, see CRS Report R42817, Government Transparency 
and Secrecy: An Examination of Meaning and Its Use in the Executive 
Branch, by Wendy Ginsberg et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Over time, changing circumstances and technologies also may 
change the practical meanings of access and participation. As 
noted earlier, FACA allows members of the public to participate 
in the policymaking process. The law requires agencies to 
provide public access to meetings. If a member of the public is 
unable to attend the meeting, he or she can access meeting 
records. In many cases, Federal agencies are using new 
technology to make meetings and records more accessible. For 
example, some agencies place committee records online and make 
audio or video recordings of the meetings available online. 
Additionally, some departments or agencies, including the 
Department of Health and Human Services, webcast many meetings 
and permit online audience members to submit questions to 
committees in real time. These new methods of access and 
participation, however, may raise new considerations for 
Congress. For example, does providing public online access 
allow agencies to hold meetings in inconvenient or publicly 
inaccessible locations, thereby limiting in-person access? Does 
providing electronic access privilege those with online access 
or higher Internet bandwidth? Questions like these seem likely 
to continue to arise in many contexts.

        Concluding Observations: Looking Back and Looking Ahead

    The Federal Government has experienced considerable 
evolution in the last century. The last hundred years were a 
period when Congress took many steps to embed transparency, 
participation, and representation into the ways in which 
agencies operate--increasing the intensity with which agencies 
interact with non-Federal stakeholders. The pace of change 
facing the Federal Government and the Nation at large appears 
to continue unabated. Consequently, Congress may see an ongoing 
need to revisit the ways in which agencies operate.
    Changes in political and social context--as well as 
leveraging of new technologies--have provided more 
opportunities for, and presented additional complexities to, 
public engagement with the government. For example, Congress 
has amended the Freedom of Information Act several times, 
including in one instance to expand the definition of 
``representative of the news media'' to include activities 
associated with bloggers.\68\ Yet just as transparency, 
participation, and representation have transformed many aspects 
of how the public may engage with agencies, increased public 
engagement simultaneously raises issues for Congress in its 
varied lawmaking, representational, and oversight work. As time 
passes, it appears likely that Congress will wrestle with many 
of the same issues and tradeoffs, but in new guises.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ P.L. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007). Status as a 
representative of the news media reduces the fees affiliated with 
processing a request for records, compared to other types of 
requesters.






Committee Assignments and Party Leadership: An Analysis of Developments 
                         in the Modern Congress

                             Judy Schneider

                       Specialist on the Congress

                              ----------                              


        House and Senate rules, supplemented by party rules and 
        practices, have changed many times since the First 
        Congress. Changes have been made in management of the 
        system, assignment decisions, and chair selection in a 
        manner that allows committees to perform their work yet 
        serves the evolving goals of party leaders and 
        individual Members alike. However, it seems evident 
        that, over the last 20 years or so party leaders have 
        become frustrated with rank-and-file Members; rank-and-
        file Members have become frustrated with committee 
        leaders; and committee leaders have become frustrated 
        with party leaders. This frustration often leads to 
        blaming the system, whether it is a system of strong 
        committees or strong party leaders. How to lessen the 
        frustration without destroying a system that seems to 
        have worked for over 200 years is a continuing 
        struggle.

                              Introduction

    Numerous House and Senate rules address the committee 
system, including membership, leadership, jurisdiction, and 
referral. Party caucus and conference rules also govern the 
organization and structure of committees. In addition, many 
party rules supplement or even circumvent Chamber rules to 
reflect, for example, the size of the majority and the 
political and other needs of both the majority party and its 
individual members. Finally, the appointment of committee 
members and the selection of most committee chairs is 
essentially a party function rather than a Chamber or 
individual committee function.
    Chamber and party rules and practices on organizing the 
committee system have changed many times over more than two 
centuries. Party leaders and party members have promoted or 
made changes in order to manage the committee system, 
assignments to committees, and chair selection in a manner that 
allows committees to perform their policy work while serving 
the goals of party leaders and individual Members alike.
    Congress has two main centers of power: committees and 
parties. A key objective of this report is to assess their 
relationship.
    The report is organized into eight discrete but generally 
interconnected sections. The first three sections provide a 
brief historical overview of the committee system. The first 
section discusses committee organization from the First 
Congress (1789) and ends prior to the adoption of the 
Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA) of 1946 in the 79th 
Congress. The second section examines changes to the committee 
system made by the 1946 LRA as well as those included in the 
LRA of 1970. The third section focuses on committee system 
reforms after 1970. Special emphasis on the process for 
assigning Representatives and Senators to committees is 
provided in these sections as well as throughout the report.
    The fourth section deals with committee jurisdiction, the 
referral of legislation to committees, and their relationship 
to Members' committee assignments. A principal motivation for 
Members in seeking assignment to a specific committee is the 
committee's jurisdiction. Referrals of legislation are based on 
this jurisdiction.
    The fifth section provides a detailed review of the 
committee assignment process for Members of the House and 
Senate. The sixth section takes up the selection of committee 
chairs. These two sections overlap. Members have goals in 
seeking committee assignments, and party leaders often have 
different goals in making those assignments. The process for 
assigning Members to committee and selecting committee chairs 
has undergone many changes in the modern era. For example, 
majority party members for many decades ascended to 
chairmanships by being the lawmaker with the most years of 
continuous service on a committee. That has changed in 
contemporary times.
    The fifth and sixth sections (on committee assignments and 
committee chair selection, respectively) also explain the 
changes in the two processes and examine some of the potential 
tensions between individual Members' goals and party leaders' 
goals in both procedures.
    The report concludes with two interrelated sections. The 
seventh section analyzes a number of structural issues (the 
assignment process, for example) inherent to the development of 
the committee system. The eighth ties together some of the 
overarching themes reflected in this report. The basic message 
is that the committee system keeps evolving to accommodate the 
work of Congress and the goals of individual Members and party 
leaders.

         Committee Organization: 1st Congress to 79th Congress

    Woodrow Wilson, in his seminal work Congressional 
Government, stated that the Congress sits not for serious 
discussion but to sanction the conclusions of its 
committees.\1\ The organizational structure of the modern 
committees in the House of Representatives and Senate might 
have had its origins in the First Congress, but little remains 
from that period. Committees, then and now, vary in their 
structure, the scope of their activities, and the political 
environment in which they operate. Much of this variety 
accommodates the needs of a Member's party, the Member's party 
leadership, and the individual members of a committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (1885; repr., 
Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the earliest Congresses, the House would resolve into a 
Committee of the Whole to decide the general principles of 
legislation and then create a temporary select committee to 
draft a final product. Several hundred select or special 
committees were created during the first several Congresses. 
The transition to standing committees, however, began almost 
immediately. The Committee on Elections was created in 1789; 
the Committee on Commerce and Manufacturers and the Committee 
on Revision of the Laws were created in 1795. The Ways and 
Means Committee was established 7 years later, although it 
existed as a select committee beginning in 1789, was dissolved 
soon thereafter, and was then again reestablished as a select 
committee in 1795. Judiciary was established in 1813 and 
Agriculture in 1820. By 1900, the House had 58 standing 
committees; 30 years later it had 67 standing committees. In 
1927, the House abolished several panels by merging them into 
one committee.
    The Senate's early history was similar. Hundreds of 
temporary, ad hoc panels were created to draft legislation, 
make policy recommendations, or both, but a transition to 
standing committees commenced early in the Senate's history. As 
in the House, a Committee on Elections was created in 1789. In 
1816, the Senate created its first standing legislative 
committees: Foreign Relations, Finance, Commerce and 
Manufactures, Military Affairs, Militia, Naval Affairs, Public 
Lands, Claims, Judiciary, Post Office and Post Roads, Pensions, 
and District of Columbia.\2\ By 1844 there were 27 standing 
committees, by 1898 there were 49 standing panels, and by 1920 
there were 74. A Senate reorganization in 1921 abolished 41 
committees, mainly those that had been moribund for years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ There were four standing housekeeping committees established 
prior to 1816: Enrolled Bills was created in 1789, Engrossed Bills in 
1806, Library in 1806, and Audit and Control of the Contingent Expenses 
of the Senate in 1807.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Each Chamber created an Appropriations Committee, in part 
to manage the debts incurred from the Civil War. The House 
created its panel in 1865 in order to alleviate the legislative 
burden on the Committee on Ways and Means, which already had 
responsibility for among the most complex and important 
legislation: taxes, tariffs, and spending. The Senate followed 
suit in 1867 in order to ease a similar burden on the Finance 
Committee.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The role of both Appropriations Committees has changed through 
time. For example, in 1885 in the House and in 1899 in the Senate, the 
panels had most appropriations measures removed from their 
jurisdiction. It was not until the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 
that the Appropriations Committees gained back authority over the 
appropriations process as it is recognized today. The 1921 act also 
created the Bureau of the Budget, the precursor of the Office of 
Management and Budget, and the General Accounting Office, now known as 
the Government Accountability Office. See also CRS Report RL31572, 
Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes from 1920 to 
2013, by Jessica Tollestrup.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Standing committees arose early, as it became apparent that 
continuing to create a select committee for each legislative 
proposal was administratively difficult. It also meant that 
each Chamber had to consider an issue at least twice: first to 
create the select committee and then to debate the proposal 
itself. Standing committees, as permanent entities, provided 
continuity from one Congress to the next, and the incoming 
Members could develop expertise over time through service on 
permanent committees.

          Legislative Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970 \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ See CRS Report RL31835, Reorganization of the House of 
Representatives: Modern Reform Efforts, by Judy Schneider, Betsy 
Palmer, and Christopher M. Davis; and CRS Report RL32112, 
Reorganization of the Senate: Modern Reform Efforts, by Judy Schneider 
et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As World War II drew to a close, Members realized that the 
impact of the Depression of the 1930s and war in the 1940s 
necessitated a review of the Federal Government structure, 
which had seen an explosion in the number of departments, 
agencies, and programs during those years. Members also 
recognized the need to review Congress' own organization and 
structure and created a Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress to do an extensive examination of the organization and 
operation of Congress.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Congress 2 years later enacted legislation, signed by President 
Harry Truman, to similarly evaluate the executive branch. The 
legislation created the Commission on Organization of the Executive 
Branch of the Government, known as the Hoover Commission, after its 
chair, former President Herbert Hoover.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 601) is 
the seminal law affecting the committee system in the House and 
Senate. Its immense scope was unprecedented. The objectives of 
the legislation included streamlining and simplifying the 
committee structure, eliminating the use of select committees, 
clarifying committee responsibilities, defining the 
jurisdiction for each panel, and reducing potential 
jurisdictional disputes. Never before had Congress made such 
broad changes in its organization, administration, procedures, 
resources, and workload management. Never before had Congress 
so radically restructured its committee system, and never 
before had the two Chambers worked so broadly in tandem.
    The measure consolidated the 33 Senate standing committees 
to 15 and the 48 House standing committees to 19. The measure 
imposed limitations on the number of panels on which Members 
could serve, provided for professional committee staff,\6\ and 
exhorted committees to increase oversight of the executive 
branch, among other things. In the two Congresses following 
passage of this expansive legislation, no challenges were 
levied to it, nor were changes made to it, even though one of 
the two Congresses was controlled by Democrats and the other by 
Republicans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See the companion CRS centennial report in this volume, 
Congressional Staffing: The Continuity of Change and Reform, by Ida A. 
Brudnick.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When the 80th Congress convened in January 1947, 
implementation of the act was foremost in each Chamber's and 
each party's mind. Republicans gained control of both Houses 
for the first time since 1931, making committee membership 
changes necessitated by the committee consolidation easier to 
accomplish. In the House, 102 Members of the 79th Congress did 
not return. In the Senate, 22 Senators whose terms were 
expiring did not return.
    Prior to the legislation, House standing committees ranged 
in size from 2 to 42 members, with a committee having an 
average of 19 members. Under the act, 15 of the standing 
committees had an average of 25 members. Before the act, Senate 
standing committees ranged in size from 3 to 25 members, with 
an average of 15 members. Under the act, all the Senate 
standing committees had 13 members--except Appropriations, 
which had 21, compared to 25 prior to the act.
    Before the act, each Senator was entitled to serve on five 
standing committees: three so-called major committees and two 
so-called minor committees. Under the act, Senators were 
limited to service on no more than two standing committees, 
although some exemptions were allowed. House Members were 
limited to service on just one standing committee.
    In the years following the implementation of the 1946 act, 
policy issues continued to grow in complexity and visibility, 
and some Members wanted to be involved in all aspects of an 
issue. Several panels created subcommittees in order to 
circumvent the literal jurisdictional terms included in the 
1946 act, but committee chairs took over some of those 
chairmanships as well.
    Congress again created a Joint Committee on the 
Organization of Congress, and the resulting Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510) was the second time in 
history that Congress adopted a measure to alter its 
organization and operations. Although not as extensive as the 
1946 law with respect to the organization of committees, some 
changes were included.\7\ Several changes to the committee 
system were important, nonetheless, including creation of a 
Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee with jurisdiction taken from 
other panels and responsibility for urban affairs policy given 
to the renamed Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Most of the changes related to the committee system affected 
committee rules, committee hearings and meetings, and committee 
reports. The requirement for committees to adopt rules was in part a 
means to curb the committee chairs' largely unfettered authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With civil rights legislation in the forefront and Southern 
Senators blocking legislation, the debate in the joint 
committee provided an outlet for those Members who supported 
civil rights legislation to limit the multiple roles of civil 
rights opponents. Senate committee sizes were reduced, and 
Senators were limited to service on two major committees and 
one minor one. A Senator could hold only one committee 
chairmanship and not more than one subcommittee chairmanship on 
any major committee. Four committees--eventually known as the 
``Super A'' or ``Big Four'' committees--were singled out, and 
Senators could serve on only one such committee.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ The Super A committees for both parties were Appropriations, 
Armed Services, Finance, and Foreign Relations. Democrats removed the 
Foreign Relations Committee from this category in recent years. See 
``Assignment limitations'' under Senate below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  Committee System Reforms After 1970

    The House and Senate committee systems of the LRAs needed 
adaptation to the new policy issues of the 1970s and later. 
Moreover, there was an influx of younger Members who did not 
want to wait decades to hold a position of power on a 
committee. Efforts to reform the committee system in the House 
in 1974 and 1980, however, saw limited success. The House 
Democratic caucus made numerous changes affecting its committee 
assignment system, perhaps the most important being disallowing 
the chair of a major committee from serving on another 
committee. Nevertheless, some changes related to policy issues 
were made in the House before and after 1970: A new Committee 
on Science and Astronautics had been created in 1958, a 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) was 
created in 1967, and a Committee on the Budget was created in 
1974. A new standing Committee on Homeland Security was created 
in 2005, after two Congresses in which a Select Committee on 
Homeland Security existed.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ In the 107th Congress, a select committee comprising leaders 
from both parties was charged with drafting the organic legislation for 
the proposed Department of Homeland Security. In the 108th Congress, a 
new select committee provided oversight of the new department and was 
directed to make recommendations to the House on creating a standing 
Homeland Security Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Efforts to reform the Senate committee system in 1977 were 
more successful, with, among other changes, six panels 
abolished. As in the House, a Committee on the Budget was 
created in 1974. A 1984 Senate attempt to address changes to 
the Senate assignment process was less successful.\10\ In 2004, 
the Senate modified the jurisdiction of its Committee on 
Governmental Affairs and renamed the committee as the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, effective in 
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Seventeen committee slots were eliminated. See CRS Report 
RL32112, Reorganization of the Senate: Modern Reform Efforts, by Judy 
Schneider et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A third Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress was 
created in 1992. House Members advocated limiting committee 
assignments and reducing the number of subcommittees. Senators 
also advocated reducing the number of subcommittees and 
limiting the number of committee and subcommittee assignments. 
Neither Chamber took action on the recommendations,\11\ 
although, when the next Congress convened and Republicans took 
control of both Chambers, many of the recommendations were 
revisited and several were adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ In the House, however, four select committees--service on 
which did not count against committee assignment limits--were 
abolished.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One major change in the committee system during the post-
1970 era was the growth of subcommittees. It could be argued 
that the power of committee chairs--most of whom were selected 
by some mechanism employed by party leadership--was curbed. 
However, because party leadership had a limited role in the 
selection of subcommittee leaders, subcommittee leaders 
acquired added power vis-a-vis committee chairs. That has 
changed, at least in the House, where party rules require that 
subcommittee leaders of some powerful committees be approved by 
a party's assignment entity and confirmed by a vote of the full 
caucus or conference.
    Committees' and Members' policy workloads continued to 
increase, and Congress as a whole was seeking to assert 
congressional authority vis-a-vis the President. Members were 
stretched in their ability to keep up with their committee and 
subcommittee work. Newer Members wanted more opportunities to 
serve on committees, exercise influence over policy areas, and 
chair subcommittees, opportunities that were in part blocked by 
senior Members' multiple committee assignments and senior 
committee positions. Some Members, therefore, again pushed for 
limits on committee assignments.
    The 1946 act, and succeeding revisions in the structure and 
rules of each Chamber, changed many things about Congress as an 
institution and about the committee system specifically. 
However, the foundation laid in the 1946 LRA is, in most 
respects, still intact.

                       Jurisdiction and Referral

    Perhaps no characteristic of the committee system is more 
critical than its jurisdictional structure--the way control 
over policy subjects is divided and distributed. Both House and 
Senate rules address the jurisdiction of each committee and how 
measures are referred to committee. Members often seek 
committee assignments based on the language of these rules. 
House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV designate the subject matter 
within the purview of each committee. However, House and Senate 
jurisdictional language is broad and reflects an era in which 
governmental activity was not so extensive and relations among 
policies were not so intertwined as now. As noted earlier, much 
of this language emanated from the 1946 LRA, with subsequent 
changes enacted without reference to a comprehensive 
perspective through time. Topic omissions and a lack of 
clarity, as well as overlapping jurisdiction among committees 
in some areas, exist. Precedent, therefore, also plays a role 
in determining a committee's jurisdiction over a particular 
issue.
    Referral of measures is formally the responsibility of the 
Presiding Officer in each Chamber, although in practice the 
Chamber's Parliamentarian assumes this responsibility. In the 
House, a referral is made to the panel with ``primary'' 
responsibility, with an allowance for measures to be referred 
to other panels in a ``sequential'' manner. The Presiding 
Officer also has authority to impose time limits on panels 
receiving a referral.\12\ In 2003, the Speaker of the House was 
also authorized to refer measures without the designation of a 
primary committee under ``exceptional circumstances.'' It 
appears that this authority has been exercised only once.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Prior to 1995, measures could be referred simultaneously to 
two or more committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Formal agreements among committees, referred to as 
memoranda of understanding, often supplement the language in 
Rule X to assist in determining a referral. Competition among 
committees occurs, especially related to measures that in the 
past had been jointly referred or issues of breadth and 
complexity.\13\ For example, Medicare Part A is within the 
jurisdiction of one committee, and Medicare Part B is within 
the jurisdiction of a different committee. For a Member seeking 
assignment to a panel responsible for health care, to which 
panel would he or she seek assignment? Relatedly, if a 
comprehensive health care measure were introduced, which panel 
would be deemed primary, and which would receive a sequential 
referral?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See CRS Report 98-175, House Committee Jurisdiction and 
Referral: Rules and Practice, by Judy Schneider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the Senate, a referral is made to the committee with 
``predominant'' jurisdiction; referral to additional committees 
is rare. In fact, Senate leaders have authority (assuming 
unanimous consent cannot be attained) to refer a measure to 
more than one panel by motion. This procedure has never been 
invoked.\14\ Many Senators, staff, and advocates understand 
that a desired legislative outcome can be influenced by 
creative drafting in order to have a measure referred to a 
friendly or unfriendly committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See CRS Report 98-242, Committee Jurisdiction and Referral in 
the Senate, by Judy Schneider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, is tobacco an agricultural commodity, an issue 
within the purview of a largely friendly Agriculture Committee? 
Or is tobacco a health risk, an issue within the predominant 
responsibility of a generally unfriendly Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee? Or is the 
issue one related to advertising, such as on a billboard near 
an elementary school, an issue generally considered by the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, a panel 
that has shown both sympathy and hostility on tobacco issues? 
Would a Senator who represents a tobacco State but is 
antismoking try to serve on the HELP Committee rather than the 
Agriculture Committee? Might that same Senator, if appointed to 
the Agriculture Committee, draft tobacco legislation in such a 
way as to have it referred to the HELP or Commerce Committee?
    House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV contain broad terms and do 
not describe specific programs, as the examples of Medicare and 
tobacco demonstrate. When Members seek assignments, they do so 
based on their understanding and interpretation of their 
Chambers' jurisdictional rules. The referral systems in the two 
Chambers, however, give leadership discretion to refer 
legislation in a manner to influence a measure's fate. Leaders 
can use both referrals and assignments to enhance their 
influence over committees and the committees' work.

                      Committee Assignment Process

    The importance of a Member's committee assignment relates 
to the Member's attitude toward his or her legislative role, 
the Member's perception of district or State needs, and the 
Member's own ambitions. A Member must balance realistic goals 
with political reality--the needs of the leadership and the 
issues that must be addressed versus those that are ``hot,'' 
the latter of which are most visible to constituents, 
lobbyists, and the press. Further, committee jurisdictional 
alignment provides Members an incentive to obtain assignment to 
a panel in line with the subjects the Member wishes to pursue 
legislatively or to pursue other opportunities an assignment 
may provide.
    Various factors govern assignment decisions. For the party 
entity or party leader deciding assignments, those factors 
might include party loyalty, regional considerations, personal 
preference, and leadership preference. (Additional factors are 
listed below under ``Party Organizations Making Committee 
Assignments.'') For the individual Member, additional factors 
include professional background, personal interest, the 
politics of other Members of a committee, and the ability to 
raise money for reelection.
    At the beginning of a new Congress, resolutions containing 
committee rosters are adopted in each Chamber. The rosters 
reflect the party caucus or conference actions regarding both 
committee assignments and seniority on each committee. Although 
Members can change committees throughout their careers, most 
remain on one or more of the committees to which they were 
initially assigned, in part to gain seniority and eventually to 
try to get a leadership position on that committee (chair or 
ranking minority member). There are, nonetheless, examples of 
Members who seek assignment to a less desirable panel because 
the more senior members of these panels are closer to 
retirement, meaning the opportunity for advancement might come 
sooner than on a committee with younger leaders and leaders-in-
waiting.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Three examples of senior House Members of a recent era 
changing committees after many years of service include Omar Burleson, 
who moved to the Ways and Means Committee after 22 years (and having 
held the chairmanship of the House Administration Committee); Edith 
Green, who moved to the Appropriations Committee after 19 years of 
House service; and Otis Pike, who moved to the Ways and Means Committee 
after 15 years of House service. In recent Congresses, in contrast, 
some freshmen Members have become subcommittee chairs or ranking 
minority members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It was once true that only Members from the Far West and 
Rocky Mountain States were assigned to panels dealing with 
public lands, and only farmers and ranchers were placed on 
panels dealing with agriculture. The story of former 
Representative Shirley Chisholm speaks to a change in 
assignment requests and the appointment of Members that began 
in the late 1960s. Although she was from a very urban district 
in New York City, Representative Chisholm was assigned to the 
Committee on Agriculture because of its jurisdiction over food 
stamps and other food programs. She protested. Leadership 
responded to her protestations and reassigned her to the 
Veterans' Affairs Committee until the following Congress when 
she received assignment to the panel she had originally sought, 
Education and Labor.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Chisholm reportedly responded to her party leadership with the 
following retort: ``Apparently all they know here in Washington about 
Brooklyn is that a tree grew there.'' Several years later, Chisholm was 
assigned to the Committee on Rules, an arm of the party leadership. See 
James Barron, ``Shirley Chisholm, `Unbossed' Pioneer in Congress, Is 
Dead at 80,'' New York Times, January 3, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, the Armed Services Committees in both Chambers 
traditionally had more conservative Members assigned to it. 
That too began to change when more liberal Members were 
assigned to the panel as the Nation began to view the war in 
Vietnam more critically. The Judiciary Committee in each 
Chamber traditionally had only Members with law degrees 
appointed to it. That, too, has changed. Representative Sonny 
Bono, for example, argued that his understanding of copyright 
law was more practical than that of most lawyers; he was 
assigned to the Judiciary Committee. Senator Al Franken, also 
not an attorney, made a similar case for his assignment to the 
Judiciary Committee.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Senate Democratic rules generally prohibit Senators from the 
same State from serving on the same committee. This did not impede 
Senator Franken in being appointed to the Judiciary Committee, on which 
his senior State colleague already served.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the examples of Senator Franken and Representative Bono 
attest, their desire to serve on particular committees caused 
the leadership to break tradition when confronted with the 
desires of Members who were well-known public figures. Other 
nonlawyers also sought assignment to the Chambers' Judiciary 
Committees but were not accommodated. Antiwar Members could be 
assigned to the House Armed Services Committee, but their small 
number could not outvote the majority of prodefense committee 
members. A Member attracting public attention, such as 
Representative Chisholm, was accommodated, but other Members 
who manage to attract public attention could irritate 
leadership sufficiently that they might be removed from the 
committee or committees to which they were originally assigned 
or be placed on less desirous committees with less influence 
over policy issues that matter to leadership. Leaders have 
other options, too, such as assigning an outspoken Member to a 
committee that limits the Member's visibility, such as the 
Intelligence Committee.

                             Size and Ratio

    The Constitution is silent on committees. A House rule did 
exist that established the size of committees; however, that 
rule was removed with adoption of the Committee Reform 
Amendments of 1974, the so-called Bolling committee 
reforms.\18\ Committee sizes are included in Senate rules, 
although they are often ignored. The standing rules of each 
Chamber are silent regarding party ratios on committees. 
Currently, soon after the biennial election, party leaders in 
each Chamber meet to negotiate individual committee sizes and 
party ratios. In recent years, actual negotiation has been 
conducted by Senate party leaders but infrequently by House 
party leaders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ H. Res. 988, agreed to October 8, 1974. Section 301 deleted 
the size rule. Representative Richard Bolling, coauthor with 
Representative David Martin of the resolution to create a select 
committee to study the committee system, served as chair of the select 
committee, and Representative Martin served as the ranking Republican.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Parties in both Chambers strive to draft tentative 
committee sizes and ratios prior to the organization meetings 
held in late November or early December. Sometimes, however, 
this process extends into the new Congress.
    Committee sizes are largely static, with ratios tending to 
reflect party strength in a Chamber.\19\ In the Senate, the 
ratio is generally uniform among committees. In the House, that 
is not the case. For example, the Committee on Rules has a 
ratio of two to one, plus one, and both the Appropriations and 
Energy and Commerce Committees have had, in recent Congresses, 
ratios that gave the majority party more seats than would 
reflect party strength. Both the Appropriations Committee and 
Energy and Commerce Committee have extensive jurisdictional 
portfolios, are perceived as important policy avenues for a 
leadership agenda, and are seen as useful assignments for 
access to the ability to raise campaign funds. In both 
Chambers, committee size and ratio have also been altered to 
accommodate the wishes of an individual Member or the needs of 
the respective party leaders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ See CRS Report R40478, House Committee Party Ratios: 98th-
113th Congresses, by Matthew E. Glassman; and CRS Report RL34752, 
Senate Committee Party Ratios: 98th-112th Congresses, by Matthew E. 
Glassman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Each Chamber has constitutional authority to make its own 
rules, which includes organizing the committee system. In 1981, 
House Republicans sought to change the ratios on four 
committees (Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means) 
by offering an amendment to the resolution adopting the rules 
of the House for that Congress. The amendment failed, with one 
Democrat supporting the Republican amendment. Republicans then 
filed a lawsuit against the Democratic leadership, claiming 
violations of the Constitution harming minority party Members 
and their constituents, who were denied proportional 
representation on committees. The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia dismissed the case on October 8, 1981, 
holding committee organization was an internal matter under 
separation of powers; the dismissal was upheld on appeal.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once sizes and ratios are determined, the committee 
assignment process begins in earnest. A combination of Chamber 
and party rules govern how many and what types of committees a 
Member may serve on.

                     Earlier Assignment Procedures

    In 1789, in the First Congress, members of so-called 
important House committees were elected by ballot, although the 
Speaker was charged with making assignments to panels with 
fewer than three members. Beginning in 1790, pursuant to House 
rule, all committee members, regardless of party, were 
appointed by the Speaker of the House, although allowance was 
made for the House majority to question the Speaker's 
selections. Despite several attempts to curb the Speaker's sole 
power to make committee assignments, his authority remained in 
place until the so-called ``revolt of 1910'' and the overthrow 
of Speaker Joseph Cannon's autocratic reign.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ The major complaints against Speaker Cannon included that he 
delayed making committee assignments, appointed only political allies 
to important panels, and violated seniority in making assignments and 
selecting committee chairs. See the companion CRS centennial report in 
this volume, The Evolving Congress: Overview and Analysis of the Modern 
Era, by Walter J. Oleszek.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Subsequently, Democrats and Republicans chose different 
methods for making committee assignments. Democrats on the 
House Ways and Means Committee acquired responsibility for 
making all Democratic committee assignments in the House from 
1911 until 1975. (After the 1910 revolt, Speakers gradually 
gained influence in the appointment of majority party Members 
to the Rules Committee.) The Democratic Members of the Ways and 
Means Committee were selected by the entire Democratic caucus, 
and the party leader, by tradition, was chair of the 
committee.\22\ Further, Ways and Means Committee members were 
not allowed to serve on other House committees, essentially the 
beginning of designating ``exclusive'' committees, as explained 
below (``Assignment Limitations'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Many scholars do not agree with the importance of this change. 
Some contend that authority merely shifted to the majority leader from 
the Speaker of the House. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Giant Jigsaw 
Puzzle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 25-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    House Republican committee assignments were made by the 
floor leader from 1911 to 1919 and then transferred in 1917 to 
a newly created Committee on Committees. This entity allowed a 
Republican Representative from each State delegation to serve, 
and each Member had as many votes as there were Republicans in 
the State's delegation.
    The Republican Conference in 1917 dictated that no floor 
leader could also chair a legislative committee, in effect 
severing the connection with the chairmanship of the Committee 
on Ways and Means. Soon thereafter, the Democrats adopted 
similar rules.
    In the early Congresses, assignment of Senators to panels 
was a haphazard affair. In fact, the majority party in the 
Senate did not necessarily control the majority of seats: 
Assignments were made by a vote of the entire Senate 
membership. In 1823, the Presiding Officer was given the 
authority to appoint committee members.\23\ This approach was 
not used in 1825 but was reinstated in 1826. In 1828, the 
assignment authority was granted to the President pro tempore. 
Beginning in 1833, however, Senate committee members were 
determined by ballot in each session of Congress, with the 
committee member who received the most votes during balloting 
named as committee chair.\24\ This approach was not used 
between 1837 and 1845, when it was waived by unanimous consent, 
but was reinstated in 1845. In 1846, the Senate defeated an 
attempt to allow the Vice President to make committee 
assignments. The majority leader, with the agreement of the 
minority leader, then submitted a list of committee members 
ranked by committee seniority. The practice of submitting lists 
continues today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ That same year, the Senate rejected a proposal that would have 
allowed the full Senate to choose the chairs of the most important 
committees, and those chairs would then have had the power to make all 
other committee assignments.
    \24\ Lauros Grant McConachie, Congressional Committees: A Study of 
the Origins and Development of Our National and Local Legislative 
Methods (New York: Crowell, 1898), p. 323.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Party Organizations Making Committee Assignments

    Today, recommendations for assignment of party members to 
serve on committees are made by party entities:
   For the Senate Democrats, a Steering and Coordination 
        Committee
   For the Senate Republicans, a Committee on Committees
   For the House Democrats, a Steering and Policy Committee
   For the House Republicans, a Steering Committee
    Constituted prior to the early organization meetings 
traditionally held in November and December, members of these 
groups are appointed by the respective party leader within any 
constraint of party caucus or conference rules. Membership on 
these panels may vary each Congress, but the panels generally 
are structured to give the party leadership considerable 
influence.
    The party committees recommend committee slates, generally 
by secret ballot, to the respective full caucus or conference, 
which typically ratifies them. House and Senate resolutions 
reflecting the recommendations are then presented by each party 
entity and adopted without debate or amendment by the 
respective Chamber.
    In making recommendations to the full party caucus or 
conference, several factors influence assignment decisions, 
including the number of vacancies on each committee, the number 
of Members competing for those vacancies, and Chamber rules 
regarding limitations on each committee. Also taken into 
account are the Member's seniority, background, ideology, 
electoral margin, and leadership support and preference. 
Geographic balance is often considered as well. Additional 
factors were listed above (``Committee Assignment Process'').

                                 House

    The Democratic Steering Committee was created in 1933 and 
existed until the end of the 1950s, although it was mostly 
dormant throughout this period. Congressional scholars have 
suggested that under a strong Speaker, such as Sam Rayburn of 
Texas, a personal relationship was preferable to a formal 
structure. In 1962, at the request of party liberals, the 
Steering Committee was reestablished, although its 
responsibilities were unclear.\25\ In 1973, it was 
reconstituted as the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee 
and, in 1974, was given authority to recommend committee 
assignments and committee and some subcommittee leaders. In 
1994, with the Democrats now in the minority, the panel was 
divided into a Steering Committee and a distinct Policy 
Committee; in 2003, although Democrats were still in the 
minority, the panel was recombined into a Steering and Policy 
Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of 
Representatives (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Currently, the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee 
comprises regionally elected Members, top party and committee 
leaders, a representative of the freshmen class, and up to 16 
Members appointed by the Democratic leader. Each member has one 
vote.
    The precursor to the Republican Steering Committee was 
established in 1919 as a Committee on Committees, comprising 
Republicans representing each State that had elected at least 
one Republican to the House; each State delegation selected its 
representative on the Committee on Committees. Starting in 
1953, a subcommittee of the Committee on Committees was created 
and given responsibility for making committee assignments. The 
Republican leader selected the subcommittee members. It 
comprised only Members from States with the largest Republican 
delegations: New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, California, 
Illinois, Michigan, and New Jersey. The Republican leader did 
not have a vote, and the number of votes cast by each other 
member equaled the number of Republican Members in a State's 
delegation. In 1965, the Committee on Committees was 
restructured and reconstituted as an Executive Committee, 
retaining its responsibility for making committee assignments. 
Although membership on the Executive Committee changed, the 
Executive Committee structure remained unchanged until the 
100th Congress (1987-1989).
    In the 100th Congress, the Republican leader appointed a 
Task Force on Conference Rules and Procedures, which in turn 
created a Subcommittee on Committee Assignments to review and 
possibly reform the assignment process and the Executive 
Committee structure. The subcommittee recommended making the 
Republican leader a voting member of the Executive Committee, 
electing regional representatives based on compact State 
groupings, and providing representation for freshmen and women 
Members. In the following Congress, the Executive Committee was 
renamed the Committee on Committees. When Republicans gained 
control of the majority in 1995, the Committee on Committees 
was renamed the Steering Committee, and the party leadership 
influence over committee assignments was strengthened.
    Currently, the Republican Steering Committee comprises 
regionally elected Members, top party and committee leaders, a 
representative of the sophomore class, and one or more 
representatives of the freshmen class. The Speaker has five 
votes, the majority leader has two votes, and other members 
have one vote each.

                         assignment limitations

    Party rules, rather than Chamber rules, categorize 
committees. Both parties designate Appropriations, Energy and 
Commerce, Financial Services, Rules, and Ways and Means as 
exclusive committees. For the Democrats, however, Energy and 
Commerce is deemed exclusive only for Members named in and 
after the 104th Congress, and Financial Services is deemed 
exclusive only for Members named in and after the 109th 
Congress.
    Under Chamber rules, and in some cases supplemented by 
party rules, Members may serve on two standing committees. 
Waivers are routinely granted by the Democratic Steering and 
Policy Committee and the Republican Steering Committee to allow 
Members to serve on three or, in some cases, four standing 
committees, but waivers are intended to be temporary for one or 
perhaps two Congresses. There are nonetheless exceptions. Both 
parties limit service to one exclusive committee, but waivers 
are also granted to Members assigned to an exclusive committee.
    Service on the House Administration and Budget Committees 
are exempt from service limitations for Democrats, and 
Republicans are entitled to take a leave of absence and accrue 
seniority while serving on the Rules Committee. Both parties 
entitle their Members to serve on two nonexclusive committees.
    Service on the Ethics Committee is exempted from assignment 
limits for both Democrats and Republicans, although service on 
the Ethics Committee is limited to three Congresses in the last 
five. Service on the Budget Committee is limited to no more 
than four Congresses in the last six, and service on the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has the same 
limitation. As with service on other panels, waivers are often 
granted.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ See CRS Report 98-151, House Committees: Categories and Rules 
for Committee Assignments, by Judy Schneider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 Senate

    As noted above, each party creates a panel to assist in the 
assignment process. Democratic Steering and Coordination 
Committee members are appointed by the Democratic leader, and 
each member has one vote. Republican Committee on Committees 
members are appointed by the Republican leader, and each member 
has one vote.
    In 2004, Senate Republicans amended conference rules to 
allow the majority leader to fill half of the seats on the 
``Super A'' committees as vacancies occurred. The remaining 
vacancies would be filled by seniority.\27\ Super A committees 
are explained immediately below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Veronica Olesksyn, ``Loyalty and Political Needs Shape Makeup 
of Committees,'' CQ Weekly, April 11, 2005, pp. 894-896.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         assignment limitations

    Senate rules categorize committees as ``A,'' ``B,'' and 
``C.'' Most standing committees are considered A committees. 
The B category also includes standing panels as well as one 
special and one joint committee. The B panels are not perceived 
as desirable as the A committees. The C committees are the 
remaining joint committees, the Indian Affairs Committee, and 
the Select Ethics Committee. Each party designates several 
committees as ``Super A.'' The panels designated as Super A 
have changed through time. For the Democrats, these panels are 
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Finance. (The Foreign 
Relations Committee lost Super A status in recent years.) For 
the Republicans, these panels are Appropriations, Armed 
Services, Finance, and Foreign Relations.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ See CRS Report 98-183, Senate Committees: Categories and Rules 
for Committee Assignments, by Judy Schneider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senators must serve on two A committees,\29\ may serve on 
one B committee, and may serve on as many C committees as they 
want. Senators who serve on a Super A panel are not supposed to 
serve on a second Super A committee, pursuant to party rules. 
However, waivers are often granted to permit Senators to serve 
on additional panels within each category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ The so-called Johnson rule, begun in 1953 under Majority 
Leader Lyndon Johnson, guaranteed that each Democratic freshmen Senator 
would serve on at least one major committee assignment. Republicans 
adopted their own version of the Johnson rule in 1965. A Republican 
addition provided that no Republican serving on a Super A committee may 
serve on a second Super A committee until all other Republicans were 
offered the opportunity to serve on the panel. The Republican rule was 
called the Javits rule after Senator Jacob Javits, who chaired the 
entity that drafted it, although the name is rarely used today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Republican Conference rules prohibit Senators from the same 
State from serving on the same committee, while Democratic 
practice, rather than rule, shows traditional adherence to the 
same principle. Again, waivers are often granted.

                     Committee Leadership Selection

    Both parties in each Chamber have formal rules for 
selecting committee leaders. Just as a Member's assignment can 
affect the path of his or her career, the selection of a 
committee leader can influence the agenda that the committee 
follows and how the committee leadership interacts with the 
minority party, his or her own party leadership, and the 
individual members of the committee. Who the committee leader 
is can ultimately determine the fate of legislation within that 
panel's purview. There are Members who seek assignment to a 
panel because of who the committee leader is, and there are 
other Members who choose not to seek assignment to a particular 
panel for the same reason.
    For much of the Nation's history, committee chairs were 
powerful figures. By the 1970s, however, that power was 
beginning to erode. The Steering Committees in each Chamber 
exercised more control over the selection of committee leaders, 
and the seniority system was not routinely followed. The 
balance of power changed from committee chairs to party 
leaders, especially in the House in 1995, when Speaker Newt 
Gingrich greatly de-emphasized seniority and the role of the 
Steering Committee and named committee chairs of his choosing. 
His successor, Dennis Hastert, employed the Steering Committee 
but had applicants for each chairmanship ``audition'' and 
respond to questions from the panel. It has been reported that 
the questions went beyond policy goals and addressed, for 
example, money raised for the campaign committees and loyalty 
to the party's policy agenda.
    Perhaps nothing better exemplifies this era (and the 
relationship between committee jurisdiction, party leadership, 
and committee assignment) than the selection of the chair of 
the Energy and Commerce Committee in the 107th Congress (2001-
2003). Furthermore, when the House adopted its rules at the 
convening of the 107th Congress, the rules shifted the 
jurisdiction over insurance and securities from the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce to the Banking and Financial Services 
Committee, which was renamed the Committee on Financial 
Services.
    Representative Billy Tauzin, formerly a Democrat who 
changed parties in 1995, had served in Congress for 11 terms 
and on the Energy and Commerce Committee for 10 terms--but for 
more than seven terms as a Democrat. Speaker Gingrich had 
notified Tauzin that his tenure on the committee would count 
toward his seniority when he changed parties, and Speaker 
Hastert upheld this understanding. Representative Michael Oxley 
had served 10 terms in the House and 9 on the Energy and 
Commerce Committee. Speaker Hastert and the Steering Committee 
selected Tauzin to chair the Energy and Commerce Committee and 
Oxley to chair the Financial Services Committee, in part 
justifying the selections based on the jurisdictional 
changes.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ In addition, there were two other candidates for chair of the 
Banking Committee: Representatives Richard Baker and Marge Roukema. 
Roukema was more senior to Baker on the Banking Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Speaker John Boehner employs a Steering Committee--although 
with a modification from those of his predecessors. In the 
112th Congress, Speaker Boehner had four votes in the steering 
panel (the majority leader had two and everyone else had one), 
whereas in the 113th Congress, Speaker Boehner had five votes. 
It should be noted that Speaker Boehner had served as a 
committee chair and wanted to curb the top-down approach of his 
predecessors as Speaker by empowering his chairs and 
committees. At the start of the 113th Congress, Speaker Boehner 
used his votes on the Steering Committee to deal with several 
Members in the Republican Conference disfavored by the 
leadership and to remove them from committees they served on 
during the previous Congress.
    When the Democrats regained the House majority following 
the November 2006 elections, Speaker Nancy Pelosi retained a 
restructured Steering and Policy Committee but gave herself 
authority to appoint a specific number of members. When 
Representative Henry Waxman defeated the incumbent chair, John 
Dingell, for the Energy and Commerce Committee chairmanship in 
the 111th Congress (2009-2011), many attributed the defeat to 
the votes of members whom Speaker Pelosi had appointed to the 
Steering and Policy Committee.
    Both Senate Democrats and Republicans generally follow 
seniority in the selection of committee chairs. There are few 
exceptions to seniority as a determinant. Perhaps one of the 
most notable examples of the importance of seniority occurred 
in 1987, when the Republican members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee selected Senator Richard Lugar as their 
ranking minority member. The Senate Republican Conference 
overruled the selection and designated the more senior Senator 
Jesse Helms as the ranking member.
    Senate Republican Conference rules delineate limitations on 
the number and type of chairmanships a Republican Senator may 
hold. For example, a chair or ranking minority member of an A 
committee may not serve as chair or ranking member of any other 
committee--but the chair/ranking member of the Finance 
Committee may also chair the Joint Committee on Taxation. A 
chair or ranking member of a B committee may not serve as the 
chair or ranking member of any other committee, except that the 
chair or ranking member of the Rules and Administration 
Committee may serve in that role on the Joint Printing or Joint 
Library Committees. Senate Democratic Conference rules are not 
publicly available, so it is not known if they address similar 
issues.

             Chair and Ranking Minority Member Term Limits

    Both House and Senate Republicans impose term limitations 
on their committee leaders. In 1995, House Republicans adopted 
a House rule that limited committee and subcommittee chairs to 
three consecutive terms--in effect, 6 years. House Republican 
Conference rules apply term limitations to their Members if 
they served as ranking member when the party was in the 
minority. In 1999, House Republican leaders told their 
conference that chairs coming up against their term limits 
could audition to chair another panel, since the rule applied 
against chairing the same committee. When the Democrats 
regained the majority in 2007, they retained the rule but then 
repealed it 2 years later. When Republicans won the majority 
again, the rule was reinstated.\31\ House Democrats do not 
impose term limits on their committee leaders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ In 2005, the Committee on Rules was exempted from the 
limitation. Four years later, the exemption was repealed, but in 2011, 
it was restored.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1996, Senate Republicans adopted a 6-year term limit for 
committee chairs. After the Democrats took control of the 
Chamber in 2001, the Republicans modified their rule so that 
service as a ranking minority member did not count against the 
term limit as chair. The Senate Republican Conference also 
adopted a rule requiring election of a chair by secret ballot 
by both a committee's Republicans and by the full Republican 
Conference. Senate Democrats do not impose term limits on their 
committee leaders.

                 What It All Means and Questions Raised

    Congressional scholar Richard Fenno posited over 40 years 
ago that Members have multiple motivations that shape their 
decisions regarding what committee assignments to seek. These 
include reelection requirements, public policy needs, and 
influence within their parties and Chambers. The ``opportunity 
to achieve [these] goals varies widely among committees . . . . 
Members, therefore, match their individual patterns of 
aspiration to the diverse patterns of opportunity presented by 
[the] committees.'' \32\ Although not specifically listed in a 
priority order at the time it was written, the motivations 
appear to reflect an appropriate order for that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Richard Fenno, Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1973) pp. 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Almost 30 years after Fenno addressed the reasons Members 
seek assignment to various committees, Richard E. Cohen, a 
correspondent for the National Journal, wrote a series of 
articles on the decline of the committee system. He concluded 
that it does not matter what committee a Member serves on, 
since the increased political competition between the parties, 
the Chambers, and the legislative and executive branches 
contributed to the loss of committee power and the increase in 
power delegated to the party leadership.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Richard E. Cohen, ``Crumbling Committees,'' National Journal, 
August 4, 1990; and Richard E. Cohen, ``Crackup of the Committees,'' 
National Journal, July 31, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most observers of Congress--Members, former Members, 
congressional staff, lobbyists, journalists, and others--agree 
that both Fenno and Cohen are correct. Committees still matter, 
and assignment requests made by individual Members also matter. 
Party leaders matter also. Perhaps most important, leaders have 
power only if granted by individual Members, including 
committee leaders.
    As one Congress draws to a conclusion and another will soon 
thereafter begin, this report examines some of the concerns 
about the current state of the congressional committee system 
that these same observers raised earlier.

                      Size, Ratio, and Assignments

    As Members sought assignments to enable them to focus on 
their constituents, their own policy interests, their ability 
to influence policy, and the desires of their leadership, 
committee sizes have tended to grow in recent years in order to 
accommodate Members' goals. (At the request of some committee 
chairs, several House panels have shrunk in recent years. This, 
however, has caused the minority party to complain about their 
access to policymaking on those panels.)
    Most observers believe that committees, especially in the 
House, are too large and the ratios too skewed toward the 
majority on the most desirable panels. Large committees can 
often make it difficult to aggregate committee members' ideas 
and points of view into a coherent legislative policy. Reducing 
the size of committees could increase opportunities among 
committee members for more meaningful discussion. However, 
reducing committee sizes might have an adverse effect on 
Members' opportunities to be involved in issues important to 
them, their constituents, and the Nation.\34\ Limiting leaders' 
flexibility could create conflicts among party members 
interested in the same slot and might require additional 
bumping of committee members from panels to reflect party 
strength following an election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Members' desire to participate in a broad array of committee 
policymaking is a motivation behind both committee structure and the 
expanding number of assignments for Members. See CRS Report RL32661, 
House Committees: A Framework for Considering Jurisdictional 
Realignment, by Michael L. Koempel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The relationship between size and ratio is plain. Ratios 
reflect the understanding that the majority party should have 
the ability through its voting strength to have the dominant 
hand in policymaking. Minority members argue that they 
represent the same number of constituents as majority members 
and that not all policies are party driven. One of the most 
frequently mentioned solutions to the concern about equitable 
party ratios, especially in the House, is to make them fairly 
static on all committees and to alter them only in 
extraordinary circumstances. For example, the election of 
Members not affiliated with either Democrats or Republicans 
could allow those Members not to count in the ratio agreement. 
Another option is to have proportional ratios on all panels, 
although an additional majority seat could be added to the 
``Super A'' committees in the Senate and to the exclusive 
committees in the House.
    Changes in the numbers, types, and sizes of panels and 
limits on Members' assignments have been offered often but have 
been rejected or implemented with difficulty due in part to 
Members' interest in influencing policymaking through committee 
service. Changes might be easier to adopt if Members were not 
so attached to their committees--and for those who advocate 
rotation of committee membership, it is unclear (and untested) 
if that would have the desired effect without introducing 
additional problems. Any changes to the numbers and sizes of 
committees and assignment limitations would best be considered 
together so that decreases in some areas do not encourage 
increases in others.
    House and Senate rules and party caucus and conference 
rules detail the number and category of committees a Member can 
serve on. Both parties in both Chambers routinely grant waivers 
for Members to serve in violation of Chamber and party rules. 
The process for granting such waivers is often cloaked in 
secrecy. Would waivers be as prevalent if the process granting 
them were known? How would a Member explain why he or she did 
not receive a waiver when another colleague did? If the party 
machinery recommended granting a waiver, should the entire 
caucus or conference vote to confirm it?

                    rotation of committee membership

    Rotation of committee membership has been raised as a 
possibility almost since the beginning of the committee system. 
As discussed below, the House Budget Committee currently 
rotates its membership, and until recently, the Senate 
Intelligence Committee did as well.\35\ Term limits (how many 
years a Member could serve on each panel) could be listed in 
Chamber rules so all Members would know who was scheduled to 
leave a panel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ CRS Report RS21955, S.Res. 445: Senate Committee 
Reorganization for Homeland Security and Intelligence Matters, by Paul 
S. Rundquist and Christopher M. Davis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Supporters of rotation argue that oversight of the 
executive branch suffers when committee members who created a 
program are asked to question its value. Party leaders might 
have more flexibility in making committee assignments if they 
could anticipate which Members' terms would be up at what time. 
Supporters advocate rotation in order to allow new voices and 
fresh ideas to be brought up in committee. Relatedly, rotation 
would allow Members to have a more extensive understanding of a 
larger number of policy issues.
    Opponents of rotation note that Member expertise would 
suffer. That loss of expertise could diminish the quality of 
debate, both in committee and on the floor. Opponents also link 
the loss of expertise to the possible increase in reliance on 
congressional staff, or lobbyists, or agency or department 
personnel.

                         house budget committee

    The House Budget Committee presents a unique example of the 
possible issues related to committee assignments. House rules 
limit service to no more than four Congresses in a period of 
six Congresses. The restriction was changed in the 96th 
Congress to relax the limitation to three Congresses from two, 
in any period of five successive Congresses. As for an 
incumbent chair who had served on the panel for three 
Congresses and as chair for not more than one Congress, he 
would be eligible to serve as chair for an additional Congress. 
In the 104th Congress, the limitation was changed to four 
Congresses from three, in any period of six Congresses. This 
remains the current pattern today.
    It is clear that the assignment limitation for Members has 
been changed in many Congresses to accommodate individual 
Members. Members continue to seek assignment to the Budget 
Committee, and changing limitation rules seemingly confirm the 
panel's popularity. Is it worth considering if the House should 
remove the assignment limitation and make the House Budget 
Committee a permanent assignment, bringing it in line with the 
Senate Budget Committee?

                           Committee Leaders

    Committee chairs and ranking minority members are perceived 
as being part of the official leadership structure in their 
Chamber. However, they must also be responsive to the needs of 
their committee members. Shaping the environment of committee 
leaders are the structure of the party hierarchy, the 
requirements of the agenda, majority status within their own 
Chamber and with the other Chamber and White House, and the 
calendar itself: For example, is it an election year for that 
member or chair, or is it a Presidential election year? Some 
committee leaders may exert leadership because the party leader 
asks them to, or, alternatively, the party leader may request 
that committee leaders not take up a certain matter, which 
means the panel might lose visibility, prestige, and/or 
influence over a substantive issue.
    The process of selecting the committee leader surely 
affects his or her activity. Accordingly, the selection of 
committee leaders has always been a subject of discussion. 
Should the party leader unilaterally choose a committee leader, 
or should the party caucus or conference make that decision? 
Should the committee members select their leaders? Would the 
party caucus or conference or party leadership have any role in 
ratifying the selection? If not, should they? Should all panels 
be treated equally with the same selection approach? And, 
whichever way is selected, the key question remains: Would it 
make a difference? Would the policy outcome change? Would the 
committee's relationship with the party leadership differ?
    The issue of term limits for Republicans in both Chambers 
has occasioned the majority of discussion among Congress 
watchers. Senior Members serve on numerous committees and 
therefore could conceivably chair three different panels in 
distinct Congresses for a total of 18 years. (After reaching 
their 6-year limits as leaders of committees in the 112th 
Congress, several senior Members used their seniority on other 
panels to chair different committees in the 113th Congress. The 
effect was akin to a political game of ``musical chairs.'') 
Members who serve on only one committee, however, would be 
limited to only one opportunity to chair, especially if that 
Member served on an exclusive panel and did not seek a waiver 
from the Steering Committee to serve on an additional committee 
in what conference members would term a violation of the 
Republican Conference rule.) And if that Member served while in 
the minority in the House, he or she might get to chair a 
committee for only 2 years. Most agree that the 
responsibilities of a ranking member are quite different than 
those afforded a chair. For example, why are the Appropriations 
Committee and the Ways and Means Committee not subject to term 
limitations? Should those committee chairs be treated the same 
as the chair of the Small Business Committee, a panel with a 
comparatively smaller portfolio? What about the Agriculture 
Committee since, with term limitations, it is possible to 
control the agenda of two farm bills? Of course, prior to term 
limits it was possible to chair the Agriculture Committee, or 
any other panel, for decades.
    In 2005, the House agreed to its first exception to term 
limits by allowing the chair of the Rules Committee to be 
exempt from the three-term limit.\36\ Rather than grant the 
chair at that time a waiver, the House rules were amended to 
make the Rules Committee chair not subject to the limitation. 
In the previous Congress, the term limitation had been removed 
for the Speaker of the House. The term limit rule for the 
Speaker was instituted when Newt Gingrich became the leader of 
the 104th House (1995-1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ In the 108th Congress, a waiver was granted to the chair of 
the Intelligence Committee to serve an additional term. House rules at 
that time prohibited a Member from chairing the Intelligence Committee 
for more than two Congresses or being a member of the committee for 
more than three Congresses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The chairmanship and ranking minority member of the House 
Budget Committee also underwent changes to the term limit rule. 
In the 101st Congress, a minority member who had served for 
three terms was allowed to serve an additional term as ranking 
minority member. In the 102d Congress, the rule was amended to 
extend the waiver of the tenure restrictions for the ranking 
minority member. In the 103d Congress, the provision related to 
the ranking minority member was stricken as obsolete. In the 
104th Congress, an exception was made for an individual Member 
who had served as chair or ranking minority member during a 
fourth Congress--the Member could serve in either capacity 
during a fifth Congress, so long as he or she would not exceed 
two consecutive terms as chair or ranking minority member. The 
tenure limitation was suspended during the 106th Congress. In 
the 108th Congress, the tenure limitation for the chair and 
ranking minority member was replaced with a provision 
subjecting only the chair to the overall tenure limitation 
applicable to all other standing committee chairs.

                            Party Leadership

    ``The influence of the party leadership on the legislative 
committees . . . is suggestive, not coercive, informal, not 
official, tactful, not dictatorial.'' \37\ The strength and 
powers of party leaders have changed over time, usually related 
to shifts between committee government and party government, 
with a few periods of balance between committee and party 
government or, in some rare periods, shared power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on House Administration, 
History of the United States House of Representatives, prepared by 
George B. Galloway, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, H. Doc. 250 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), p. 105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Party leaders' influence on the committee system is 
formally limited to determining committee sizes and ratios 
(generally within the purview of the majority party, although 
negotiation does occur between Senate leaders) and determining 
the makeup of the party entity (if not within the sole 
authority of the party leader) that assigns committee members 
and, in some cases, identifies the committee leader.
    The party panels that recommend Members for assignments 
have limited opportunity to assign Members in accordance with 
upcoming policy issues and party needs. Instead, their emphasis 
is on accommodating Members' requests. This reality increases 
the possibilities that committees are unrepresentative of their 
parent Chambers and, by extension, the needs of their districts 
or States.
    Over the past 30 years, more and more legislation is being 
drafted by majority party leaders or a small cadre of Members 
loyal to those leaders. Committee hearings can be staged to 
make political points, and markups can be perfunctory, with the 
outcome almost predetermined. Many longtime Congress watchers 
can recall markups that continued for several days as Members 
debated scores of amendments from both parties.

                             Final Thoughts

    Many congressional scholars cite Woodrow Wilson's 
Congressional Government as the seminal work regarding the 
committee system. However, the text is often critical of the 
committee system, at times preferring a stronger party system 
and preferring party entities to committees to craft 
legislation. Wilson criticized committees as too beholden to 
lobbyists rather than their party leadership and, as such, 
often incapable of preparing legislation that advanced the 
majority party's agenda.
    In the introduction to a recent edition of Wilson's book, a 
professor and former House Republican staffer drew a comparison 
between Wilson's advocacy of party rather than committee 
government and former Speaker Newt Gingrich's approach to 
leadership. ``Wilson's book reads almost like a field manual 
for Gingrich's experiment in congressional party government.'' 
\38\ Speaker Gingrich appointed leadership task forces to 
circumvent the standing committees. When the committees were 
involved, they comprised chairs selected by the Speaker and 
populated by Members of his choosing. The Contract with America 
legislation was considered in the House without having had 
committee consideration and without any amendments allowed. The 
strengthened leadership at the expense of committees was not 
limited to the Republicans. When the Democrats retook control 
of the House in 2007, Speaker Nancy Pelosi brought the 
Democrats ``First 100 Hours'' agenda to the floor, bypassing 
committees and blocking amendments in the process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ William F. Connolly, Jr., Introduction to Woodrow Wilson, 
Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics, 15th ed. (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), p. ix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Concerns over Senate committees have focused on majority 
leaders' strategies and decisions. Some measures have been 
considered whether they have had committee consideration or 
not, and amendments have not been allowed as often as they once 
were. If amendments are allowed, no special consideration is 
given to the committee that could have considered the measure 
initially. Majority leaders have used their priority of 
recognition to ``fill the amendment tree,'' thereby denying 
Senators of both parties, as well as committee leaders, an 
opportunity to change legislation. For example, the majority 
leader's control over the agenda has enabled him to deny a vote 
to policies that might be difficult for vulnerable Senators up 
for reelection to vote for but are supported by the President.
    This is not a new phenomenon. In the 107th Congress (2001-
2003), for example, then-Majority Leader Tom Daschle brought an 
energy bill directly to the Senate floor, bypassing the Senate 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which contained a 
coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats willing to 
approve oil development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 
something Daschle did not want to happen.
    Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has stated that if the 
Republicans gain control of the Senate, they will return to 
regular order. Does that mean committee government rather than 
party government? Does that mean ratios reflecting party 
strength across all committees? Does that mean full and open 
floor debate with a promise to fill the amendment tree only in 
rare circumstances? Only time will tell if regular order is a 
promise that any majority leader can keep.
    It seems evident over the last 20 years or so that party 
leaders have become frustrated with rank-and-file Members, that 
rank-and-file Members have become frustrated with committee 
leaders, and committee leaders have become frustrated with 
party leaders. It is clear that tension exists between the 
Chambers, especially when there is split party control--whether 
between the Chambers or between the legislative and executive 
branches. Such tension and frustration often leads to blaming 
``the system,'' whether that system reflects a strong committee 
system or strong party leadership. The issue is how to 
structure or use the committee system and how to devise a 
method of assigning Members to committees that addresses 
concerns about the committee system. An assignment system 
should arguably also preserve the benefits of long committee 
tenure, such as the issue expertise and institutional memory 
that Members accrue.
    The Bipartisan Policy Center held a series of roundtables 
in 2011 to discuss the committee system. The discussion 
centered on the current political climate, which most 
participants and the public, according to most opinion polls, 
agree is toxic. Most roundtable participants agreed that the 
political climate could not and should not be addressed by 
structural or procedural changes. They agreed that it could be 
changed only by willingness among Members and party leaders to 
alter their behavior and by constituents demanding a change in 
behavior. However, it is worth considering whether Members take 
on too much--introducing too many measures, seeking too many 
committee and subcommittee assignments, offering too many 
amendments, and holding too many hearings. All of this 
legislative activity increases workload. Perhaps the 
congressional system, whatever the type, can handle the 
workload, but the real question may be: Should it have to? The 
problem, assuming there truly is one, may not be systemic but 
rather one of self-discipline among Members. If that is indeed 
the case, any change might not lessen the burden on Members and 
Congress but just redirect or aggravate an already contentious 
lawmaking process.


      
=======================================================================




                     IV. POLICYMAKING CASE STUDIES

=======================================================================



                     Congress and Financial Crises

                            Edward V. Murphy

                   Specialist in Financial Economics

                                  and

                             N. Eric Weiss

                   Specialist in Financial Economics

                              ----------                              


        The four case studies of congressional response during 
        financial crises described in this report (events from 
        the 1840s and the 1890s, as well as the Great 
        Depression and the 2008 financial crisis) illustrate 
        key characteristics of the policymaking process. Most 
        importantly, when financial crises happen, Congress' 
        hands are neither tied nor forced by policies and 
        institutions put in place by previous Congresses. In 
        the 2008 example, Congress proves able to pass far-
        reaching legislation, even though significant automatic 
        response mechanisms like the Federal Reserve were 
        already in place. Many of the temporary programs and 
        policies adopted in response to the mortgage crisis had 
        analogous temporary measures during prior crises.

                              Introduction

    In September 2008, the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
chairman of the Federal Reserve asked Congress for $700 billion 
to combat the financial crisis, asserting that the economy 
would collapse if Congress failed to act. Following the crisis, 
Congress passed legislation that granted powers to financial 
regulatory agencies intended to enable them to handle future 
crises without a similar request being made to Congress. The 
law included provisions designed to end market perceptions of 
too-big-to-fail (TBTF)--i.e., that because everyone knows that 
the negative repercussions of a firm's failure are not 
tolerable, the government must provide financial assistance to 
the firm if it gets in trouble.
    This report analyzes Congress during a financial crisis, 
with special emphasis on whether the existing regulatory 
framework (passed by a previous Congress) either ties Congress' 
hands or forces congressional action. Case studies of four 
financial crises--with examples of both congressional action 
and inaction--illustrate congressional discretion to change the 
rules of the game during financial crises. Because people often 
want temporary suspensions of the rules of the game during a 
crisis, preexisting rules are unlikely to be effective at 
either tying Congress' hands or forcing congressional action.
    This is a report about economic crisis response, not crisis 
prevention. Crisis prevention is relevant only to the extent 
that it is an integral part of the rules that exist prior to 
the start of whatever crisis Congress finds itself in. During 
an economic crisis, policymakers consider temporarily 
suspending some laws and creating one-time assistance programs. 
But even if Congress does nothing in response, the existing 
laws and programs continue to govern the outcome--in contrast 
to some other issues in which Congress must take periodic 
action to preserve the status quo (budgets and program 
reauthorizations, for example).
    People sometimes want one set of rules for standard 
conditions but a different set of rules for unusual conditions. 
For example, after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita wiped out 
communications and records in several States, some agencies 
temporarily suspended certain paperwork requirements related to 
refinancing mortgages.\1\ A financial crisis often has calls 
for similar suspensions of existing rules and policies or pleas 
for temporary one-time assistance to targeted groups. This 
report will examine economic policies considered by Congress 
during the containment phase of financial crises.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Public and 
Indian Housing Hurricane Recovery Resources, at http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_ indian_housing/publications/
hurricane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the time a financial crisis begins, most rules and 
agency authorities are a legacy of previous legislation. In 
constructing the economic rules of the game and authorizing 
agencies that administer economic policy, Congress and the 
President have typically consulted the leading economists of 
the day.\2\ Furthermore, many of the economic agencies were 
created following earlier financial crises and staffed by 
professional economists and lawyers. Yet during a financial 
crisis, people may still see some of the features of the 
existing economic policy framework as a hindrance (perhaps 
temporarily) rather than a help.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ For example, Congress established a National Monetary 
Commission following the panic of 1907. The commission was led by and 
staffed with prominent economists. The Federal Reserve Act followed 
many of the commission's recommendations. Congress created commissions 
to investigate the causes of the Great Depression and the 2007-2008 
recession.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is no criticism of economists to point out that despite 
their input at the rule-setting stage and in the administration 
of existing rules, bad economic events still happen. This 
report is not about identifying the correct set of economic 
policies according to current experts, because those rules 
(whatever they are at any given point in time) will most likely 
be subject to calls for suspension, alteration, or fundamental 
change. This report examines what economic policy issues have 
regularly come before Congress during financial panics, 
recessions, and depressions. This report does not address 
whether Congress could in various instances have done better.

                      Congress and Economic Policy

    Title I of the Constitution grants Congress a number of 
powers related to the economy: \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The report will at times refer to congressional powers pursuant 
to Title I of the Constitution. Such powers depend upon actions by the 
executive and judicial branch as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   To spend money, levy taxes, and borrow funds,
   To define currency and regulate its value,
   To regulate banks,
   To establish rules for bankruptcy, and
   To regulate interstate commerce.
    The first two powers loosely correspond to macroeconomic 
policies (fiscal policy and monetary policy). The others are 
microeconomic policies that some believe can have macroeconomic 
effects (financial market intervention, debt restructuring, and 
industrial policy).
    At any moment in time, the economy operates within a legal 
framework created by Congress, including rules and policies 
adopted by agencies to which Congress has delegated authority. 
For example, in the area of monetary policy, Congress has 
sometimes legislated the value of currency in terms of gold but 
has delegated to the Federal Reserve authority to affect the 
supply of obligations circulating as gold-backed currency. At 
other times, Congress has set the value of a dollar in terms of 
either gold or silver and has not delegated authority to 
regulate the supply of related obligations to any agency. 
Currently, there is no established value of the dollar, and 
Congress has delegated to the Federal Reserve authority to 
issue the notes circulating as dollars. In policy areas where 
Congress has delegated some of its authority, Congress oversees 
the actions of the agencies and can revise the delegated 
authority.
    An economic emergency typically results in calls for 
changes in the existing economic policy framework. People may 
wish Congress to facilitate expansion of the money supply 
(``easy money''), to restore ``sound money,'' or either to 
grant further discretion to the monetary authority or to clip 
its wings. People may call upon Congress to increase Federal 
spending and cut taxes, or Congress may be called upon to 
restore fiscal discipline and protect the creditworthiness of 
the United States. Congress may be asked to rescue banks, 
suspend banking operations, or facilitate the liquidation of 
distressed banks. Congress may be called upon to enact a 
mortgage moratorium, delay debt collection, or strengthen the 
ability of creditors to collect debts owed. Congress may be 
called upon to provide financial support to specific industries 
or to regulate some industries more stringently.
    Even if Congress does not change the fundamental economic 
rules, it still oversees the effectiveness of existing programs 
to address the economy during a financial crisis. For example, 
in addition to general monetary policy, the Federal Reserve is 
empowered to provide emergency lending to eligible borrowers 
based upon good collateral. During the crisis of 2008, the 
Federal Reserve established temporary programs to provide loans 
using a wider variety of collateral and to a wider variety of 
potential borrowers than it allows during normal times. 
Congress held numerous hearings in 2008 in which the Federal 
Reserve and other agencies were required to report on their 
activities, including the Federal Reserve's temporary liquidity 
programs.

                 Economic Hardship and Economic Crisis

    It may be useful to distinguish recessions and depressions 
from financial crises. A common quip is that a recession is 
when someone else loses his or her job, but a depression is 
when I lose my own job. A recession occurs when a broad range 
of economic indicators contract.\4\ A period of economic 
hardship may include more than one technical recession.\5\ A 
second downturn may occur before a nascent recovery can return 
an economy to full capacity. The United States has experienced 
several periods of high unemployment that have spanned multiple 
recessions and recoveries. The Great Depression is commonly 
dated from 1929 to 1941, even though the period 1933-1937 was 
technically a recovery, not a recession. Similarly, both the 
depression of the 1890s and the hardship of the early 1980s 
included double-dip recessions before full employment could be 
restored.\6\ The recession that began in December 2007 
officially ended in June 2009, even though unemployment has 
remained above full employment for more than 5 years, leading 
to the moniker the Great Recession.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) is considered 
the official arbiter of the dates of recessions and expansions. NBER 
tracks a variety of economic indicators and identifies peaks and 
troughs in business activity. Recessions last from a peak down to a 
trough. However, to the common person, the economic hardship associated 
with being near a trough may feel like a depression, even though it is 
technically not a recession. Dates and related information can be found 
at http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
    \5\ National Bureau of Economic Research, U.S. Business Cycle 
Expansions and Contractions, http://www.nber.org/cycles/
cyclesmain.html.
    \6\ Douglas Steeples and David Whitten, Democracy in Desperation: 
The Depression of 1893 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998).
    \7\ See, e.g., Stanley Fischer, ``The Great Recession: Moving 
Ahead,'' at http://www.federal reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
fischer20140811a.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A financial crisis is a widespread financial disruption 
characterized by falling asset prices, bankruptcies, 
insolvencies, and illiquidity. It may or may not precede or 
accompany a recession or depression. A financial crisis often 
includes sharp declines in asset prices (e.g., Dutch tulip 
bulbs in 1637), the sudden collapse of security prices (e.g., 
common stock), widespread suspensions of payments by key 
intermediaries (e.g., depository banks), or the failure of key 
providers of financial services. The uncertainty and chaos 
created during these sudden financial crises are called a 
panic. Some panics are followed by deep recessions (2008) or 
even depressions (1893, 1933). Others are not (1987, 1888).\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Bradford J. DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers, ``The Changing 
Cyclical Variability of Economic Activity in the United States,'' in 
The American Business Cycle: Continuity and Change, ed. R.J. Gordon 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 679-719.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Periodic economic hardship has been common in U.S. history. 
There were extended periods of economic hardship in the late 
1830s and early 1840s, the 1870s, and the 1890s. Since the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve in 1914, extended periods 
of economic weakness occurred in the 1930s, the late 1970s/
early 1980s, and the 2000s. Notable market crashes, financial 
panics, or bank runs include those of 1837, 1839, 1857, 1873, 
1893, 1907, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1987, and 2008.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Michael D. Bordo et al., ``Is the Crisis Problem Growing More 
Severe?'' Economic Policy, vol. 16 (August 2001), pp. 51-82. The dates 
and number of banking panics in the United States are sensitive to the 
definition used. Contemporaries often called a financial disruption a 
panic. Various attempts to identify panic dates with objective measures 
of asset prices have generally confirmed crises in 1837, 1839, 1857, 
1873, 1893, 1907, and 1930. Other dates often depend on the measure 
used. See Gary Gorton, ``Banking Panics and Business Cycles,'' Oxford 
Economic Papers, vol. 40 (1988), pp. 751-781.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During a financial panic, no one can know for certain if it 
will be followed by a recession or depression or have no 
effect. The credibility of experts, such as prominent 
economists, is likely to be tarnished at the same time that the 
panic hits, in part because it is likely that many of these 
experts contributed to the feeling of confidence in existing 
tools prior to the crisis. For example, many economists at the 
International Monetary Fund, the Federal Reserve, academia, and 
elsewhere believed that macroeconomic advances had created a 
Great Moderation among developed economies, perhaps 
contributing to overconfidence following the liquidity crunch 
that began in August 2007.\10\ Similar confidence in 
macroeconomic tools was expressed following Federal Reserve 
responses to recessions in the 1920s.\11\ Following the stock 
market crash of 1929, Irving Fisher, one of the greatest 
American economists of his generation, famously proclaimed the 
economy sound, damaging his reputation and personal fortune in 
the process.\12\ The point is not that economists are fallible 
like anyone else but that, in some cases, market prices are 
moving differently than experts predict or explain--which might 
be why there is a panic--which tends to diminish the 
credibility of these experts when they testify before or advise 
Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ For an example of a central bank official noting reduced 
macroeconomic volatility, see Ben S. Bernanke, ``The Great 
Moderation,'' at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/
20040220/.
    \11\ For an introduction to the role of expectations in the 
macroeconomy, see Sylvain Leduc, ``Confidence and the Business Cycle,'' 
FRBSF Economic Letter, November 2010, at http://www. frbsf.org/
economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2010/november/
confidence-business- cycle/.
    \12\ Robert Loring Allen, Irving Fisher: A Biography (Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The next section of this report connects congressional 
authorities to economic policies during financial crises. For 
each policy area, the section describes what it is in economic 
terms and briefly provides congressional context.

                       Congressional Policy Tools

                            Monetary Policy

    Economists define money as relatively safe assets that 
people rely upon to make payments or to hold as a short-term 
investment, i.e., liquidity.\13\ Monetary policy refers to 
actions taken to alter the money supply with the intent of 
influencing macroeconomic conditions, including real output, 
unemployment, and inflation.\14\ Congress has affected the 
money supply by redefining money to include a broader or 
narrower array of commodities (or none at all), revising or 
abandoning the ratio of current commodities to the dollar, 
creating obligations that others can use as collateral for 
issuing moneylike instruments, and regulating the ability of 
banks to maintain moneylike deposit or similar accounts on 
behalf of customers or investors. Congress delegated much of 
day-to-day monetary policy to the Federal Reserve. Currently, 
paper money is issued by the Federal Reserve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, What Is the 
Money Supply? Is It Important? at http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/
money_12845.htm.
    \14\ David Lindsey and Henry Wallich, Money: New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics (New York: Norton, 1987), pp. 229-243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For some economists, monetary conditions are the heart of 
most financial crises. In their research on U.S. monetary 
history, Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz noted that what 
distinguished depressions from recessions was the magnitude of 
the contraction of the money supply.\15\ More recently, 
scholars have emphasized that during the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, economies remained depressed as long as they had 
tight money policies and adhered to the gold standard but that 
recovery generally accelerated when countries abandoned gold 
and ``reflated.'' The United States devalued the dollar in 
terms of gold in 1933, and many economists believe that 
devaluation contributed to recovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History 
of the United States: 1867-1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1963).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unanticipated deflation can increase the real burden of 
debts. Such burdens may not be fully offset by gains to 
creditors if there are widespread defaults. Increasing the 
money supply may alleviate deflation. But one should not assume 
that these economists believe that only the absolute quantity 
of money matters. Rather, as economist Michael Bordo put it, 
``it is not monetary contraction but the public's apprehension 
that the availability of the means of payment is in doubt. That 
is the essence of the monetarist position.'' \16\ Furthermore, 
there may be conditions in which monetary policy becomes 
ineffective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Michael D. Bordo, ``Discussion: The Panic of 1873 and 
Financial Market Volatility and Panics before 1914,'' in Crashes and 
Panics: Lessons from History, ed. Eugene N. White (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 
1990), p. 128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             Fiscal Policy

    Fiscal policy is the government's actions to influence the 
macroeconomy by adjusting government spending and revenue.\17\ 
In particular, when there is underutilized productive capacity, 
such as in a recession, government can stimulate the economy by 
increasing budget deficits through spending more or taxing 
less.\18\ Fiscal policy has an automatic component because bad 
economic conditions reduce tax receipts and trigger increased 
spending on some programs even if Congress takes no action. For 
example, during the Great Depression, the largest contributor 
to Federal deficits was the automatic drop in revenue, not any 
action pursued by policymakers. In the view of modern 
economists, even the drop in revenues during the Great 
Depression was too small relative to the economy to have any 
meaningful effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ The most general constitutional provisions authorize Congress 
to tax, borrow, and spend (Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1 and 2, and 
Section 9, Clause 7).
    \18\ CRS Report RL33657, Running Deficits: Positives and Pitfalls, 
by D. Andrew Austin, and U.S. Congressional Budget Office, The Long-
Term Budget Outlook: July 2014, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/45471-Long-TermBudgetOutlook.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Federalism affects American fiscal policy. During some 
parts of the 19th century, State borrowing for development 
projects was expansionary, but fiscal surpluses at the Federal 
level were contractionary. Now that balanced budget 
requirements are the norm for States, expansionary Federal 
fiscal policy may be offset by tight State policies.\19\ 
Alternatively, Federal grants to States may help States avoid 
contractionary policies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Leslie McGranahan and Jacob Berman, ``Measuring Fiscal 
Impetus: The Great Recession,'' Economic Perspectives (Third Quarter 
2014), pp. 67-79, at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_ assets/
publications/economic_perspectives/2014/
3Q2014_part1_mcgranahan_berman.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 Bankruptcy Law and Debt Restructuring

    Financial crises and depressions typically include 
widespread debt defaults and declines in asset prices. 
Policymakers may wish to provide relief to people facing 
foreclosure and eviction. In addition to compassion for 
individuals, bankruptcy policy may have macroeconomic effects. 
Some economists believe that defaulting on debt can result in a 
balance sheet recession in which distressed households cut 
consumption, firms cut investment, and local governments cut 
spending in order to repair balance sheets damaged by declines 
in the price of assets.\20\ As each sector tries to reduce its 
net debt (de-leverage), total economic spending declines, 
potentially magnifying the economic contraction.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Marcus Miller and Joseph Stiglitz, ``Leverage and Asset 
Bubbles: Averting Armageddon with Chapter 11?,'' Economic Journal, vol. 
120, no. 544 (May 2005), pp. 500-518.
    \21\ Enrique G. Mendoza, ``Lessons from the Debt-Deflation Theory 
of Sudden Stops,'' American Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 2, (May 
2006), pp. 411-416.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bankruptcy laws may affect balance sheet recessions and the 
macroeconomy.\22\ People who are in default are often cut off 
from further credit because they are considered riskier 
borrowers. If so, then monetary policies that lower interest 
rates may not stimulate their consumption or investment. People 
who hold bonds similar to those defaulting may find it 
difficult to use their bonds as collateral for additional funds 
even if the specific bonds they are holding are not currently 
in default. Bankruptcy law may affect the speed in which 
distressed debt is resolved. Bankruptcy law may affect whether 
debtors who have defaulted get a fresh start and may begin 
spending on new produced goods and services if they have 
earnings--or if they would be required to pay old debts 
instead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ David Smith and Per Stromberg, ``Maximizing the Value of 
Distressed Assets: Bankruptcy Law and the Efficient Reorganization of 
Firms,'' Systemic Financial Crises, ed. Patrick Honohan and Luc Laeven 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          Banking Regulation and Financial Market Intervention

    Financial intervention refers to steps taken to stabilize 
the function of banks, which may include rescuing financial 
institutions from failure. Banks are the hubs of the payment 
system, meaning that many retail and commercial transactions 
are conducted by communications among deposit-taking financial 
institutions. The fractional reserve structure of depository 
institutions means that they also affect the money supply. When 
banks come under stress, they reduce their own lending, which 
reduces the money supply. Unfortunately, in the aggregate, this 
contraction in lending may come exactly when bank customers 
most need additional short-term financing.\23\ Banking 
regulation and financial market intervention refer to steps 
taken to ensure the continued functioning of the payment system 
and lending systems during a financial crisis and depression.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig, ``Bank Runs, Deposit 
Insurance, and Liquidity,'' Quarterly Review (winter 2000), at http://
www.minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2411.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Financial crises are challenging for banks and other 
financial intermediaries.\24\ If debtors are defaulting, then 
their lenders have an interruption in cash flow. If the banks 
and other intermediaries that provided the loans hold assets 
that are difficult to liquidate or became difficult to sell 
because of the crisis, then they will have difficulty honoring 
their own obligations. Since deposit accounts are bank 
obligations, financial crises often put stress on the 
depository system. Similar stress can be put on other 
transaction services provided by nondepositories. If people 
lose confidence in banks, they may withdraw their funds, 
endangering the health of the banks and potentially reducing 
the money supply by a multiple of the withdrawn funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Jean Tirole, Illiquidity and All Its Friends, Bank for 
International Settlements, Working Papers No. 303, March 2010, at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work303.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Congressional Policies During Selected Financial Crises

    This section provides illustrative examples of challenges 
to the economic rules of the game during selected financial 
crises and depressions. A discussion of multiple policy areas 
is provided only for the Great Depression and the Great 
Recession. Selected cases are presented to illustrate the 
policy issues repeatedly brought before Congress during times 
of economic stress. Congress retains the ability to change the 
fundamental rules of the economic game and has been called to 
do so during financial crises. Whether Congress might have made 
a different decision in light of current economic thought is 
not the focus of this report.
    The history is not provided to reveal a steady march toward 
economic enlightenment or a painstaking erection of 
macroeconomic safeguards; rather, the history demonstrates that 
Congress retains the authority to suspend or fundamentally 
change the economic rules of the game and will likely be called 
upon to do so in times of crisis, and its actions or inactions 
may ameliorate or prolong economic turmoil. Powers delegated to 
the Federal Reserve and other agencies can be expanded, 
amended, or rescinded. Similarly, whatever monetary standard 
Congress had established prior to the crisis can be 
strengthened, supplemented, or abandoned. If congressional 
deliberations create uncertainty and concern over future 
actions, the debate itself may contribute to temporary 
instability regardless of the ultimate vote.

                      The Depression of the 1840s

                   economic and institutional context

    Monetary policy, fiscal policy, the structure of the 
banking system, and bankruptcy law were all major issues during 
the 1840s, but this section will focus primarily on 
congressional influence over fiscal federalism. This case study 
illustrates continued congressional discretion in the face of 
TBTF. Congress faced an economic crisis in which State 
governments were defaulting on some of their debts. Congress 
considered intervening on behalf of State debt and established 
a commission to study the issue in great detail. Despite the 
commission's recommendation that State governments be assisted, 
Congress chose not to do so. Not only did Congress not pass 
financial assistance to the States, but it did pass legislation 
designed to prevent the executive branch from using the treaty 
process to assist foreign holders of State debt. The TBTF 
status of the States did not force Congress' hands.
    After a boom and bust in canal and railroad building, there 
were financial panics in 1837 and 1839. Economic problems 
persisted long after the panics.\25\ Land and agricultural 
prices declined, making it difficult for farmers to repay their 
debts. The failure of the second Bank of the United States in 
1838 disrupted the payment system because there was no central 
settlement and clearing system for the country as a whole. 
State governments experienced significant financial problems, 
because in many cases the States had issued bonds and created 
development banks to fund the failed canals and railroads.\26\ 
By the 1840s, nine States had suspended payment on their debts. 
Some European creditors had greater doubts about the viability 
of Federal debt; others wanted the Federal Government to assume 
the State debts, as had been done with Revolutionary War-era 
debts.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Peter Temin, The Jacksonian Economy (New York: Norton, 1969).
    \26\ John Joseph Wallis, The Depression of 1839 to 1843: States, 
Debts, Banks, University of Maryland, Working Paper, 2005.
    \27\ Jay Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign 
Relations in the Civil War Era, 1837-1873 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The early 1840s had an interesting political 
environment.\28\ The congressional majority often opposed 
President John Tyler, even though both were nominally of the 
same party. Tyler was not originally a Whig but had been added 
to the party ticket to broaden support for General William 
Henry Harrison. When President Harrison died shortly after 
inauguration, some members of Tyler's old party considered him 
a turncoat, while some in his new party referred to him as 
``His Accidency.'' At one point, his entire Cabinet except one 
resigned, and the House of Representatives began impeachment 
proceedings because of his use of the veto power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Frank Freidel and Hugh Sidey, The Presidents of the United 
States of America, White House Historical Association, 2006, summarized 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/johntyler.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           congressional deliberation, action, and oversight

    The depression of the 1840s illustrates the effect of 
federalism on fiscal policy. Debt defaults and suspensions by 
State governments were of concern to European investors, many 
of whom also funded Federal debt or were members of countries 
with other outstanding issues with the United States.\29\ 
Congressional documents indicate that some policymakers were 
concerned that State defaults could hurt the credit standing of 
the national government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ William English, ``Understanding the Cost of Sovereign 
Default: American State Debt in the 1840s,'' American Economic Review 
(March 1996), pp. 259-275.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although verbatim records of congressional debates were not 
kept at this time, there is evidence that the debate was 
vigorous. One faction of Congress favored Federal assistance to 
State governments and pointed out that Alexander Hamilton had 
orchestrated the assumption of State debts by the Federal 
Government. They also argued that paying the debts was good 
foreign policy. Another faction of Congress did not want 
solvent States to have to help pay the debts of States that had 
overbuilt during the canal and railroad boom.
    Congress authorized a major study of the State debt issue. 
The study, headed by Congressman William Cost-Johnson, was an 
indepth investigation into the causes and implications of 
economic distress in the States. The Johnson report recommended 
that Congress provide $200 million in aid to the States, a 
large sum at the time. Ultimately, Congress did not provide 
direct financial assistance to the States. With the Federal 
Government funded by tariffs, and State access to foreign 
credit markets impaired, fiscal policy was not used to address 
the depression of the 1840s.
    Although Congress has the power of the purse, some were 
concerned that the President might use the treaty process to 
assist the States.\30\ Many of the State debts were held by 
British creditors. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, the only 
Cabinet member not to resign, was negotiating with the British 
over a number of outstanding issues. British negotiator 
Ashburton was a financier with direct interest in State 
debts.\31\ The Senate passed a resolution to require the 
Secretary of State to provide assurance that State debts would 
not be included in negotiations with the British. The resulting 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty did not commit the Federal Government 
to assume or support State borrowing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy.
    \31\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other policy issues also came before Congress during the 
crisis. Congress considered but rejected the proposal to 
charter a third Bank of the United States. Although some 
regional payment systems evolved, banknotes from different 
parts of the country could exchange at a discount. Congress 
enacted a national bankruptcy law in 1841 to coordinate 
resolution of private debts and provide a fresh start for 
eligible borrowers. The bankruptcy law was repealed in 1843, 
making it effectively a temporary measure to address the 
crisis.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ The Federal Judicial Center maintains a brief history of the 
bankruptcy courts at http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/
courts_special_bank.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           The Panic of 1893 and the Depression of the 1890s

                   economic and institutional context

    Although fiscal policy, banking regulation, and bankruptcy 
were issues in the 1890s, this section will focus on 
deliberations related to monetary policy. This case study 
illustrates Congress' continued discretion over monetary policy 
even when some might think commitment to the gold standard tied 
Congress' hands. Just as the case study for the 1840s showed 
that Congress considered changing fiscal policy but chose not 
to, the case study for the 1890s shows that Congress considered 
changing monetary policy but chose not to. Yet even though 
Congress did not change the monetary standard during the 1890s, 
the deliberations themselves may have had real effects.
    Several of America's major trading partners entered 
recessions in the early 1890s, but the United States was not 
affected until after the panic of 1893, which initiated a 
period of economic slack that lasted until 1897.\33\ Although 
exact unemployment statistics are not available, what can be 
said with some confidence is that unemployment was below 5 
percent during 1890-1892, began rising in 1893, then remained 
above 10 percent between 1894 and 1898.\34\ Perhaps because the 
early stages of the recession were international in scope, 
international capital flows did not provide relief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ The NBER identifies two different recessions during the 
depression of the 1890s. National Bureau of Economic Research, U.S. 
Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, at http://www.nber.org/
cycles.html.
    \34\ Christina Romer, ``Spurious Volatility in Historical 
Unemployment Data,'' Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, no. 1 
(February 1986), pp. 1-37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the time, the United States was part of the 
international gold standard. Because the dollar was defined in 
terms of gold and the pound and other currencies were defined 
in terms of gold, the result was a system of fixed exchange 
rates for participating countries. In addition to tying the 
dollar to a fixed ratio of gold (and excluding silver and other 
metals), the United States also committed to converting dollars 
to gold for certain international transactions. Because of the 
economic stress during the financial crisis and depression, 
Treasury borrowed four times during 1893-1897 in order to 
maintain the monetary gold reserves required under the 
international gold standard.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ David Whitten, ``Depression of 1893,'' EH Net Encyclopedia, at 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-depression-of-1893/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    American participation in the gold standard (1873-1933) 
created rules for domestic and international monetary 
policy.\36\ During the first part of the gold standard era 
(1873-1914), the notes of private banks circulated as money, 
and the private banks promised to convert the currency on 
demand. During the second part (1914-1933), the Federal Reserve 
took over the role of note issuer and assumed the associated 
obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ For a brief history of the rules of the gold standard, see 
Barry Eichengreen, ``Globalizing Capital: A History of the 
International Monetary System,'' Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 
26, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 589-591.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Joining the gold standard had required congressional 
action.\37\ Various Mint Acts from 1792 onward defined the 
value of the dollar in terms of both gold and silver. At any 
moment in time, the proportion of circulating coins that were 
gold or silver depended on the relative price of the two 
metals. During times in which silver coins did not circulate, 
the de facto backing of the currency was effectively gold, even 
if the legal status of silver coins had not yet been altered. 
In 1873, during a time in which silver coins did not circulate, 
the Mint Act of that year did not provide for the coinage of 
silver. While this was a change in its legal status, it was not 
a change in its de facto status in 1873. Populists would later 
call the 1873 Mint Act the ``Crime of '73.'' \38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ For a legal history, see Edwin Vieira, Jr., ``The Forgotten 
Role of the Constitution in Monetary Law,'' Texas Review of Law and 
Politics, vol. 77, no. 2 (1997-1998), pp.77-128, at http://
www.fame.org/PDF/viera_Texas_law.pdf.
    \38\ Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, pp. 113-116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some might argue that participation in the gold standard 
tied policymakers' hands. However, Congress had several avenues 
to change monetary policy. First, Congress could have amended 
the Mint Act to coin silver or other metals or to have fiat 
currency (unbacked). Second, Congress could have taken the 
extreme step of denying Treasury the ability to borrow to meet 
the commitments of the international gold standard. Third, 
Congress could have announced intentions to remain on the gold 
standard in the long run but suspended convertibility 
temporarily (as was sometimes done during wars). Fourth, 
Federal bank regulators in the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) could have used their bank regulatory powers to 
affect bank-created money and employ their influence with the 
banks' clearinghouses to affect the liquidity banks needed for 
interbank transactions.

           congressional deliberation, action, and oversight

    Opponents of the gold standard organized a national 
movement that resulted in the Populist Party. The Populist 
movement's challenge to ``sound money'' policies made the U.S. 
commitment to gold anything but certain at the time, perhaps 
best exemplified by Congressman William Jennings Bryan's famous 
``Cross of Gold'' speech. Bryan and the Populists argued that 
tight monetary policy exacerbated the depression, in part 
because deflation increased the real burden of debts. In the 
Populists' view, indebted farmers were being ``crucified on a 
cross of gold'' as real interest rates rose and commodity 
prices fell.
    Populists and sympathizers in the Republican and Democratic 
Parties called upon Congress to expand the money supply in 
order to combat deflation and the depression.\39\ Congress 
could affect the supply of money even under the gold standard. 
For example, government silver purchases could expand the money 
supply by exchanging a safe financial asset that could be used 
as loan collateral (the silver certificate) for a commodity 
(silver) that could not.\40\ Opponents of monetizing silver, 
including Presidents Grover Cleveland and William McKinley, 
argued that the United States should not leave the gold 
standard unilaterally because it would destabilize the dollar 
in international financial transactions, among other 
concerns.\41\ President Cleveland took it a step further and 
advocated repealing the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 to 
support the gold standard. In 1893, Congress concurred and 
repealed the act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
    \40\ Richard C.K. Burdekin and Marc D. Weidenmier, `` `Non-
Traditional' Open Market Operations: Lessons from FDR's Silver Purchase 
Program,'' Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies, Working 
Paper Series 2005-08, 2005, at http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/
rdschool/ papers/2005-08.pdf.
    \41\ Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, p. 118.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Whether good policy or bad policy, the debates surrounding 
the gold standard may themselves have been destabilizing. At 
the time, economist John B. Clark argued that uncertainty 
surrounding monetary discretion would contribute to debt binges 
and financial instability.\42\ Some critics have argued that 
the monetary uncertainty accompanying the political debates and 
the prospects of a Bryan victory in the Presidential election 
of 1896 contributed to the economic downturn of that year. They 
point to the second recession, which occurred only in the 
United States. The depression had been international until 
then.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ John B. Clark, ``The After Effects of Free Coinage of 
Silver,'' Political Science Quarterly, vol. 11, no. 3 (September 1896), 
pp. 493-501.
    \43\ Whitten, ``The Depression of 1893.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some modern economists are more sympathetic to Bryan's 
monetary positions. Economist Hugh Rockoff characterizes 
Bryan's ideas: ``Bryan's monetary thought was surprisingly 
sophisticated and . . . on most issues his positions, in the 
light of modern monetary theory, compare favorably with those 
of his `sound money' opponents.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Hugh Rockoff, ``The Wizard of Oz as a Monetary Allegory,'' 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, no. 4 (August 1990), pp. 739-
760.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress considered changing the rules of the game. An 
example of congressional deliberations can be found in a 
December 16, 1897, hearing before the House Committee on 
Banking and Currency.\45\ The committee debated a bill to 
reform banking regulation and currency laws such that private 
banknotes would continue to circulate as currency but would 
have a guarantee from Treasury in the form of a national 
redemption fund. The bill would have also required Treasury to 
purchase silver as under the Silver Purchase Act of 1890. 
According to the congressional testimony of Treasury Secretary 
William Windom, the idea was to even more strongly commit to 
the gold standard but to do so in a way that did not reduce the 
national money supply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Hearings and Arguments on Proposed Changes in the Currency System of 
the United States, 55th Cong., 1897-1898 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1898).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other congressional deliberations concerned more specific 
features of the financial system. For example, some Congressmen 
criticized Treasury borrowing to meet international 
obligations. The Congressional Record documents them 
complaining that the President was hiding profligate spending 
and attributing it to the requirement to maintain gold 
reserves. In modern terms, we might say they were pointing out 
that money is fungible.
    In the end, the United States abided by the rules of the 
gold standard. However, doing so was by no means assured in the 
case of the monetary base, because returning to the pre-1873 
Mint Act was a viable alternative. Furthermore, the need to 
borrow to meet international requirements of the gold standard 
required continued congressional consent during the crisis.
    Although this section focused on monetary policy, the other 
three policy areas were also deliberated. Several State 
governments were again in danger of defaulting on their debts. 
Banking regulation was also an issue because obstacles to 
interstate banking had led to western mortgage debt being 
wrapped in securities called debentures and sold by trusts to 
eastern banks and investors. When western debt defaults rose 
during the 1890s, securities markets transmitted the distress 
to eastern banks and other financial institutions.\46\ Congress 
responded to distressed businesses by passing another 
bankruptcy act. Unlike earlier temporary bankruptcy statutes in 
1801 and 1841, this one was made permanent and is the 
foundation of the current bankruptcy code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Andrew M. Davis, U.S. Congress, Senate National Monetary 
Commission, The National Banking System, 61st Cong., 2d sess., 582 
(Washington: GPO, 1910-1911); and Kenneth A. Snowden, The Anatomy of a 
Residential Mortgage Crisis: A Look Back to the 1930s, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, July 2010, http://www.nber.org/papers/w16244.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following another panic in 1907, Congress created the 
National Monetary Commission to consider monetary reforms.\47\ 
The result was the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, whose purpose 
was, in part, to foster monetary and banking stability by 
creating a more elastic currency. In deliberating the Federal 
Reserve Act, older Senators discussed the 1890s mortgage 
debentures problems, and the original Federal Reserve Act 
expressly included trusts in the definition of a bank and 
allowed trusts to be members of the system.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ O.M.W. Sprague, U.S. Congress, Senate National Monetary 
Commission, History of Crises under the National Banking System, 61st 
Cong., 2d sess., Document 538 (Washington: GPO, 1910).
    \48\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Hearings, H.R. 7837 (S. 2639), 63d Cong., 1st sess., September 2, 1913, 
Document 232 (Washington: GPO, 1913).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          The Great Depression

                   economic and institutional context

    The Great Depression was an extended period (1929-1941) of 
high unemployment and a variety of fluctuations including 
financial shocks and a short, modest recovery. There had been a 
boom period in the 1920s. The stock market crashed in 1929, 
borrowers defaulted, banks failed, and industrial firms laid 
off workers. Commodity prices collapsed, farm values declined, 
and many farms went into foreclosure. Nonbank financial 
institutions failed because they could not raise sufficient 
funds by liquidating the securities they held as collateral 
because of declines in financial markets. More than 12,000 
banks failed.
    In September and October 1929, the New York Stock Exchange 
started a decline that continued until July 1932, when it had 
fallen 89 percent from its high. It did not recover to the 
September 1929 level until November 1954. Although the 1929 
stock market crash may have signaled the beginning of the 
Depression in the United States, economic contraction was 
actually a worldwide event that had begun earlier in other 
locations.
    In 1933, the trough of the Great Depression, real gross 
domestic product (GDP)--production of final goods and services 
adjusted for inflation--was down 26.7 percent of its previous 
peak in 1929. By way of comparison, the trough in the recent 
recession was in 2009, when real GDP had declined by 3.1 
percent from its peak. In the Great Depression, unemployment 
peaked at 24.9 percent in 1933.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ For an indepth analysis of unemployment in the Great 
Depression and the Great Recession, see CRS Report R40655, The Labor 
Market During the Great Depression and the Current Recession, by Linda 
Levine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prices as measured by the Consumer Price Index declined. 
Most economists consider deflation to be a greater problem than 
price level increases of a similar scale, because it can set in 
motion a vicious cycle of economic decline. Falling prices 
encourage consumers and businesses to postpone purchases 
because things will be cheaper to buy in the future. When 
prices are broadly declining, nominal wages and nominal 
business revenues tend to fall. This discourages consumer 
borrowing because it will be more difficult to pay back the 
loan out of lower incomes. Businesses are also discouraged from 
borrowing, because when their revenues decline, there is less 
need to borrow and repaying the loans will be more difficult. 
In 1929, there was no change in prices, but in 1931 the price 
level fell by 7 percent. Between 1929 and 1932, prices fell 16 
percent. Until early 1933, prices continued to fall but then 
began a general (but not uniform) increase.

           congressional deliberation, action, and oversight

    At the outset of the Great Depression, the country already 
had a financial regulatory framework designed for crisis 
response. The OCC had been created following the panic of 1857 
with banking and currency related powers, and the Federal 
Reserve had been created following the panic of 1907 with 
monetary policy powers. The bankruptcy law enacted during the 
depression of the 1890s was still in effect. The case studies 
in this section illustrate continued congressional discretion 
and examples of Congress choosing to change the rules (often 
temporarily), even if the rules of the game already encompass a 
response mechanism. Congress retained discretion and did take 
action to change the authorities and programs in place before 
the crisis.
    Many comparisons have been made between the recent Great 
Recession and the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although there 
may be a common belief that Congress during the Hoover 
administration did nothing, historians are well aware that 
Congress took numerous steps during the deepest parts of the 
Depression (1930-1933). Because several policymakers during the 
2007-2009 crisis consciously referenced lessons from the Great 
Depression in their own policy responses, this section and the 
section for the 2000s will treat each of the four policy areas 
separately. A comprehensive list of all congressional policies 
during the two periods would take many pages, so these sections 
merely provide illustrative examples.
Fiscal policy
    With the end of World War I in 1918, the government's 
military expenditures declined, and the Federal Government 
began to run a budget surplus. Until the stock market crash of 
October 1929, the 1920s--sometimes called the ``Roaring 
Twenties'' \50\ --were a time of general economic growth and 
prosperity in the United States and internationally. To balance 
the budget, Congress had cut taxes with the Revenue Act of 
1921,\51\ the Revenue Act of 1924,\52\ the Revenue Act of 
1926,\53\ and the Revenue Act of 1928.\54\ Treasury Secretary 
Andrew Mellon proposed further cuts in 1929, but Congress 
rejected them.\55\ Some Members of Congress objected to these 
tax cuts. For example, Senator Robert La Follette argued 
against the tax cuts on the grounds that they favored 
corporations and high-income individuals because income taxes 
were levied only on high-income households at that time.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ The phrase ``Roaring Twenties'' is something of a misnomer, 
because there were three recessions in the decade before the official 
start of the Great Depression in August 1929.
    \51\ 42 Stat. 227; New York Times, ``Conferees Finish Work on Tax 
Bill,'' November 20, 1921, p. 14; and New York Times, ``Democrats 
Assail Tax Bill Changes,'' October 6, 1921, p. 4.
    \52\ 43 Stat. 253; New York Times, ``Tax Conferee Fight Fizzles in 
Senate: Democrats Abandon Fight for Majority of the Five Who Meet House 
Group Today,'' May 14, 1924, p. 21.
    \53\ 44 Stat. 9; W.M. Kiplinger, ``Prosperous America Cuts Taxes 
Again: New Law Relieves 2,000,000 People of Levy on Their Incomes,'' 
New York Times, February 28, 1926, p. 25.
    \54\ 45 Stat. 791; New York Times, ``Congress Voted $4,628,045,035: 
Largest Peace-Time Budget Exceeds Its Predecessor by $478,542,508,'' 
June 7, 1928, p. 4.
    \55\ New York Times, ``Hoover and Mellon Agreed on Tax Cut: White 
House Denies Reports of a Conflict on Possible Reductions,'' July 4, 
1929, p. 3.
    \56\ New York Times, ``La Follette Scores Relief Compromise,'' 
February 11, 1931, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once the Great Depression began, the Federal Government's 
budgets were in deficit under both Hoover and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. These deficits were primarily due to declining tax 
receipts as part of the automatic stabilizers. Federal 
spending, adjusted for deflation, increased. The budget 
deficits were too small relative to the economy for many modern 
economists to believe that they would have any meaningful 
expansionary effect.
    As the Great Depression deepened, the Hoover administration 
called on Congress to increase taxes. For example, in 1932, 
Secretary Mellon testified that there would be a $200 million 
budget deficit and that taxes should be increased to balance 
the budget.\57\ Congress debated the dangers of running a 
deficit and passed the Revenue Act of 1932 (P.L. 72-154), which 
increased income taxes on high-income households, the only ones 
paying income taxes in those days. Even after these tax 
increases, tax revenues continued to fall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ Roy G. Blakey and Gladys G. Blakey, The Federal Income Tax 
(New York: Longmas, Green and Company, 1940).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, to say that the Federal Government's budget was 
too small relative to the economy to have a meaningful effect 
is not the same as saying the government did not pursue any 
legislation that was technically expansionary (even if too 
small to matter in the aggregate). Although the real value 
(adjusted for inflation) of overall economic spending declined 
by nearly a third between 1929 and 1932, real Federal 
Government expenditures actually increased. However, this 
increase in Federal spending was partially offset by a decline 
in State and local government spending.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic 
Data, at http://research. stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FYFSD#. Converted 
to calendar years by CRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A number of employment programs were passed and signed into 
law or created by Executive order. Within the Roosevelt 
administration, there were debates over the goals of the 
programs.\59\ Some argued that their primary emphasis should be 
on employing those out of work, while others argued that the 
primary emphasis should be on building infrastructure at the 
least cost. In addition, Federal, State, and local governments 
provided direct relief to the unemployed. Legislation to create 
new infrastructure was controversial.\60\ President Hoover 
vetoed the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 as 
originally sent to him but signed an amended version (P.L. 72-
302). Other related bills never made it out of Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ See, for example, Lester V. Chandler, America's Greatest 
Depression 1929-1941 (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 193-194.
    \60\ Chandler, ``Chapter 11.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monetary policy
    Through the Federal Reserve Act, Congress had delegated 
much of monetary policy to the independent agency. During the 
1920s, the Federal Reserve had an active, countercyclical 
monetary policy that was credited with alleviating a recession 
in 1921, slowing overly rapid growth in early 1923, and 
prompting an expansion after the 1923-1924 recessions.\61\ 
These seeming policy successes and the relatively brisk 
economic growth during the 1920s caused some to believe that 
the Fed could stabilize the economy.\62\ In order to support 
Great Britain's attempt to resume convertibility to gold, the 
Federal Reserve eased monetary policy in the late 1920s. Some 
think that this may have contributed to an acceleration of 
asset prices in the United States.\63\ The Federal Reserve 
appears to have grown more confident during the 1920s that 
monetary policy could be used to stabilize the economy. When 
the stock market boom accelerated in the late 1920s, the 
Federal Reserve took actions to deflate the bubble.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, p. 296.
    \62\ Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the 
Great Depression, 1919-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
    \63\ Alan H. Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 1: 
1913-1951, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 139.
    \64\ James D. Hamilton, ``Monetary Factors in the Great 
Depression'' Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 19, no. 2 (March 
1987), pp. 145-169.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the administration of monetary policy had been 
delegated to the Federal Reserve, Congress still determined the 
definition of the dollar in terms of gold. In addition, 
Congress retained the power to alter the authority of the 
Federal Reserve and the OCC. Congress retained the power to 
provide financial support to banks and facilitate the 
resolution of failed banks.
    The collapse in growth of the money supply was caused by 
three distinct banking panics in 1930, 1931, and 1933. Bank 
suspensions and failures shrank the money supply directly by 
reducing checkable deposits. The Federal Reserve did not 
intervene aggressively to mitigate bank failures. Bank failures 
created practical obstacles for the extension of credit, such 
as the loss of borrower records, which reduced the potential 
effectiveness of monetary policies. This can be seen in the 33 
percent drop in the money supply in the United States, compared 
to a 13 percent drop in Canada during 1929-1933, which did not 
suffer similar waves of bank failures.\65\ Some economists 
believe that the Federal Reserve's decision to allow the money 
supply to drop contributed to the severity of the Depression in 
the United States, although the drop in economic activity was 
similar in both countries.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, p. 352
    \66\ The quantity theory of money states that MV = PY, or that the 
money supply times the velocity of money equals the price level times 
the economy's production (usually measured as real net national 
product, or NNP). The contraction of the real NNP was comparable in the 
United States and Canada (^53 percent vs. ^49 percent) because the bulk 
of the difference in MV = PY was borne by velocity (V, ^29 percent vs. 
^41 percent), instead of Y (NNP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As in the depression of the 1890s, the economic ``rules of 
the game'' purportedly limited the range of available policy 
actions. As in the 1890s, Congress retained the power to alter 
those rules. First, Congress could leave or suspend the gold 
standard and pursue expansionary monetary policies. Other 
countries did this. Second, Congress could alter the powers and 
authorities of the Federal Reserve and the OCC. Third, Congress 
could authorize direct assistance to banks or pass legislation 
facilitating orderly liquidation of banks.
    Many modern economists consider Federal Reserve inaction 
even within the constraints of the gold standard to be a factor 
in the duration and intensity of the Depression. Although the 
Federal Reserve took a number of steps to lower interest rates 
and make occasional open market purchases, the Fed quickly 
ceased because of fears of inflation or an international run on 
the dollar. To many modern observers, these fears seem like 
strange concerns, especially given the deflation of the time, 
although there was eventually a run on the dollar after the 
election results of 1932.
    The congressional role was largely one of oversight at the 
beginning of the Depression. Officials from the Fed and the OCC 
testified before Congress along with submission of their 
regular agency reports. Hearing transcripts reveal a variety of 
congressional concerns. For example, the international status 
of the dollar was regularly discussed. Other issues included 
the rules for membership of banks in the Federal Reserve 
System, the types of bank assets that could be used as 
collateral for loans from the Fed, and several structural 
issues that will be discussed in the banking section.
    As the Depression deepened and dragged on, there was 
legislation related to temporarily increasing the money supply. 
Senators William Borah and Carter Glass wanted to increase the 
supply of circulating safe assets that could be used as 
collateral for private loans. Recall that in addition to coin-
backed notes, transactions can be funded by loans against 
relatively safe collateral. In June 1932, the Senate Banking 
and Currency Committee reported out the Glass bill, which was 
designed to make Government bonds eligible to increase money in 
circulation in this manner. Although President Hoover opposed 
the approach as unnecessarily tying circulating medium to the 
existing supply of assets (unlike the Federal Reserve, which 
could adjust the money supply more elastically), the concept 
was enacted as part of the Federal Home Loan Bank bill 
(discussed more below) as the Glass-Borah rider.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ American Institute of Banking, ``Anti-Depression Legislation: 
A Study of Acts, Corporations, and Trends Growing Out of the `Battle 
with Depression,' '' December 1933, p. 73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the passage of the Glass-Borah rider, Congress 
broadened the authority of the Federal Reserve to expand the 
money supply. Glass had been a major figure in the 1914 
creation of the Federal Reserve. At the time of the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve, Glass had believed that a 
central bank should loan to banks only on good collateral, 
which was defined at the time as self-liquidating 
collateralized commercial credit and other real bills, not 
Government bonds.\68\ Under this real bills doctrine in 1914, 
the Federal Reserve could not use government debt for important 
monetary purposes, as it was thought that open market 
operations fueled ``speculation,'' not productive investment. 
By 1932, Glass and many others had changed their minds about 
the real bills doctrine, and Congress passed and Hoover signed 
legislation expanding the range of collateral eligible for Fed 
discounting and broadened the range of eligible collateral to 
include government debt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Meltzer, History of the Federal Reserve, pp. 138-139.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As in the 1890s, uncertainty about political outcomes could 
affect the credibility of the monetary standard. For example, 
at the time there was a 5-month gap between November elections 
and the inauguration of the President in March of the next 
year. Uncertainty about whether Roosevelt would remain on the 
gold standard caused international central banks to liquidate 
U.S. securities that they held in lieu of monetary gold. This 
was effectively a run on the dollar, and previous attempts to 
defend the dollar against such a run had contributed to 
monetary contraction. Domestically, bank depositors withdrew 
their funds, and several State banking systems collapsed. 
President Hoover asked President-elect Roosevelt to make an 
announcement that he would honor gold, but Roosevelt refused. 
In hindsight, the international central banks and domestic 
depositors who dumped dollars were correct in that President 
Roosevelt did devalue the dollar upon taking office.
    Congress included legislation that devalued the dollar in 
terms of gold in the emergency actions that accompanied FDR's 
first hundred days. As discussed in the general description of 
monetary policy, economists have noted that several countries 
experienced recoveries after abandoning the gold standard. 
Recovery for the United States also began after devaluation. In 
devaluing the dollar, the 1933 acts also abrogated gold-based 
cost-of-living adjustments in private debt contracts and in 
Treasury bonds. The gold index clause provision is relevant 
because otherwise the monetary revaluation would have been 
offset by matching debt-burden adjustments in contracts that 
had the clauses. The value of railroad bonds, U.S. Liberty 
bonds, and many other securities remained in doubt until the 
Supreme Court ruled against restitution for bondholders in 
1935.
Banking regulation and assistance \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ A detailed contemporary history of banking-related legislation 
was compiled by the American Institute of Banking in Anti-Depression 
Legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bank failures can exacerbate a recession in a number of 
ways. First, because deposits serve as money, and banks loan a 
fraction of their deposits, bank failures can shrink the money 
supply. Second, bank failures can impair the channels by which 
people desiring credit can access funds so that lower interest 
rates do not translate into more people taking out loans.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Ben S. Bernanke, ``Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis 
in the Propagation of the Great Depression,'' American Economic Review, 
vol. 73, no. 3 (June 1983), pp. 257-276.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress did not act immediately to address bank failures 
or the monetary contraction that those failures contributed to. 
However, as the Depression deepened, Congress took a number of 
actions to directly assist banks and other financial 
institutions while Hoover was President. In many cases, a 
coalition of progressive Republicans and Democrats helped to 
pass the legislation. During the Hoover administration, the 
chairman of Senate Banking and Currency, Republican Senator 
Peter Norbeck, had been active in creating direct government 
lending institutions and other financial assistance programs at 
the State level. He was part of the midwestern farm progressive 
wing deg. of the party and did not have ideological 
opposition to government intervention per se, although he 
thought State governments should take the lead in some areas. 
Senator Norbeck hired Ferdinand Pecora to begin analyzing the 
role of banking in the Depression, resulting in the Pecora 
Commission.
    Congress held hearings to try to diagnose the problems in 
banking. Congress may have had difficulty linking the bank 
failures of the early 1930s to problems with the macroeconomy 
because there had been many bank failures during the boom of 
the 1920s. For example, the head of the OCC testified to 
Congress in 1931 that the bank failures were due to the 
structure of the U.S. banking system rather than to monetary 
conditions. At the time, the United States still had thousands 
of small, undiversified regional banks, because most States 
prohibited branch banking. In the 1920s, before the Depression 
started, hundreds of banks failed each year. The head of the 
OCC testified before Congress that one solution to the banking 
problem would be to preempt State law and to allow branch 
banking. That is, he argued that the banks that were failing 
were inefficient and should be failing.
    By 1932, both Congress and the President were willing to 
take direct action to assist the banking system. One major 
change was Glass-Steagall I, which responded to ``toxic'' 
assets held in the banking system. Problems in securities 
markets had made some of the securities held by banks 
unmarketable. The crisis in securities-based lending was 
alleviated by expanding the range of collateral eligible for 
the Federal Reserve.
    Another measure that provided direct assistance to banks 
was the establishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC).\71\ Congress passed and Hoover signed legislation 
creating an agency with authority to provide direct financial 
assistance to struggling banks and other financial firms. At 
first, the RFC loaned money to banks. When Roosevelt took 
office, RFC assistance to banks was transformed more often to 
capital injections. The RFC eventually became a creditor to 
many kinds of financial institutions and entities, not just 
banks--including the State of Arkansas, whose entire debt was 
purchased for 1 year by the RFC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ A history of the RFC was written by its early official, Jesse 
Jones. Jones notes that during his 13-year tenure, each successive 
Congress broadened the powers of the RFC. See Jesse H. Jones, Fifty 
Billion Dollars: My Years with the RFC, 1936-1945 (New York: Macmillan, 
1951).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress also passed and Hoover signed another piece of 
legislation to give smaller financial institutions greater 
access to credit markets. The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) 
system was designed to allow banks and mortgage lenders to form 
what were essentially mutual associations to borrow through 
securities markets as a single entity. These FHLBs are 
government-sponsored banks that lend to bankers, not to 
individual household or business borrowers. Initial funding for 
the FHLB system came from the newly created RFC.
    Upon the election of Roosevelt and a new Congress, the 
United States took immediate new steps to address problems in 
the banking system. First, because the third wave of bank 
failures and the run on the dollar had occurred immediately 
prior to his inauguration, Roosevelt took a number of steps. He 
declared a banking holiday. The financial condition of all 
banks was reviewed, and only healthy banks were allowed to 
reopen. Roosevelt directed the RFC to switch from loans to 
capital injections, and he devalued the dollar in terms of gold 
internationally, which increased the real value of monetary 
reserves and stimulated net exports.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ The trade effect was likely minimal, because many countries 
enacted protective trade laws in response to the United States raising 
tariffs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress passed the Banking Act of 1935 (P.L. 73-66), which 
expanded the Federal Reserve's powers. It moved power from the 
regional banks to the Board of Governors and its chairman. The 
act also made the Fed independent of Treasury.
Bankruptcy and debt restructuring
    As in the 1890s, rapid deflation increased the real burden 
of debts as wages and prices fell while the nominal value of 
debts were unchanged. There were widespread business failures, 
farm foreclosures, municipal defaults, and personal 
insolvencies. Farm mortgages were particularly problematic to 
resolve. On the one hand, the decline in property values 
reduced the ability of lenders to recover the value of the loan 
through foreclosure so they might have been willing to work 
things out. On the other hand, problems in financial 
institutions' access to credit described above made it 
imperative to recover funds as quickly as possible. Similar 
tradeoffs existed for nonbank lenders as well.
    As farm foreclosures increased, several State governments 
began responding to farmers' concerns. Several States enacted a 
mortgage foreclosure moratorium, preventing lenders from 
seizing property. In some places private citizens reportedly 
tried to intimidate potential bidders at foreclosure sales so 
people could buy their properties back.
    Congressional action to address foreclosures was included 
in the Federal Home Loan Bank Act. The act included a temporary 
delay of foreclosure proceedings for certain banks. The newly 
created RFC could advance the funds to cover delayed payments 
to institutions that were joining the system.
    Debt restructuring was also affected by the method used to 
go off the gold standard. The gold acts did not just permit 
flexible exchange rates; they also invalidated gold index 
clauses. A gold index clause was similar to a cost-of-living 
adjustment. If the gold index clauses had not been invalidated, 
then when Congress revalued gold from 16:1 to 35:1, the balance 
for debts with gold clauses would have risen by 60 percent. 
Congress invalidated not only gold clauses in its own bonds but 
also such clauses in private contracts.
    Congress responded to the Great Depression with many other 
programs for specific economic sectors. Examples include the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act and the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, but this report is limited to the policy areas 
described in the introduction.

                     2000s and the Great Recession

                   economic and institutional context

    Like the Great Depression, the country already had a 
financial regulatory framework designed for crisis response at 
the outset of the Great Recession. In addition to the OCC and 
the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) was in place to prevent bank runs, and other agencies 
and legal frameworks were in place designed to facilitate 
confidence in financial markets and their continued 
functioning. Like the Great Depression section, the case 
studies in this section illustrate continued congressional 
discretion and examples of Congress choosing to change the 
rules of the game (often temporarily), even if the rules 
already encompass a response mechanism. Many congressional and 
agency actions taken to combat the Great Recession, including 
temporary measures, were analogous to similar actions during 
the Great Depression.
    Even though the legal framework differed in significant 
ways, some of the economic issues of the Great Recession of 
2007-2009 resemble those of prior depressions. A period of 
debt-funded expansion was followed by a financial crisis and a 
period of extended unemployment.\73\ Once the recession began, 
investment lagged despite low interest rates. As in the 1840s, 
State financial problems were a drag on fiscal policy. As in 
the 1890s, defaults on mortgages wrapped in securities 
transmitted losses through the capital markets. As in the 
1930s, when market transactions in the securities halted, it 
became difficult for financial institutions that held the 
securities to value them or to use them as collateral for 
loans. Like in the 1930s, there was a crash in the repurchase 
agreement market.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in the United States, The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report, January 2011, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf.
    \74\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By most measures, the Great Recession was milder than the 
Great Depression. Some of that difference may be due to 
differences in policy, but some of the difference may have been 
due to differences in the nature of the economic shocks that 
started the crises. Unemployment during the Great Recession 
peaked at less than half the peak of the Great Depression. 
Unlike the deflation of the Great Depression, the price level 
remained relatively stable during the Great Recession.
    During the 2000s, more of congressional emergency authority 
had been delegated to independent agencies than in prior 
crises. The Federal Reserve was given broad emergency lending 
powers in section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. Leaving the 
gold standard and eventually adopting floating exchange rates 
freed the Federal Reserve from some external constraints on 
monetary policy decisions.\75\ The FDIC existed to dissuade 
depositors from running on banks, and the FDIC had the 
authority to temporarily increase its coverage. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission could limit trading on certain stock 
transactions. These delegations meant that some rules could be 
changed even if Congress took no action, although Congress 
still conducts oversight. Policymakers in the agencies had more 
options available to them in the 2000s without having to ask 
for additional congressional authority or to negotiate 
internationally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ Domestic convertibility of gold was suspended in 1933. 
International convertibility was suspended in 1972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, key policymakers such as Federal Reserve 
chairman Ben Bernanke and Council of Economic Advisers chair 
Christina Romer had spent part of their academic careers 
studying the causes of the Great Depression. Bernanke and Romer 
both felt that tight monetary policy and Federal Reserve 
inaction had contributed to the Depression.\76\ Furthermore, 
they both believed that sustained recovery did not occur until 
the gold standard had been abandoned, increasing money flows in 
the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ Ben S. Bernanke, ``Remarks on Milton Friedman's Ninetieth 
Birthday,'' November 8, 2002, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021108/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           congressional deliberation, action, and oversight

Fiscal policy
    Federal fiscal policy was deliberately expansionary during 
the early stages of the mortgage crisis and the subsequent 
recession.\77\ The Federal Government's deficit increased 
during both the Great Depression and the Great Recession, 
although nearly twice as much during the Great Recession in 
relation to GDP.\78\ This expansionary set of policies at the 
Federal level was partially offset by tight conditions at the 
State level. As the economic malaise endured, Federal fiscal 
policies became less expansionary. This section of the report 
will focus on fiscal policies in three periods: (1) after 
mortgage turmoil began but before the financial panic in 
September 2008, (2) from the 2008 panic until the 2010 
elections, and (3) after 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ The formal macroeconomic theories of expansionary fiscal 
policy were not widely accepted until after the publication of John 
Maynard Keynes' General Theory in 1935. Although there were people who 
advocated deficit spending in recessions prior to 1935, they did not do 
so on Keynesian grounds. In contrast, policy discussions and 
congressional deliberations in the 2000s expressly considered the 
Keynesian framework for macroeconomic policy decisions.
    \78\ Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Net 
Federal Government Saving, downloaded from St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Bank, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/AFDEF. This is in 
current dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even before the beginning of a recession had been 
officially declared, policymakers took steps for expansionary 
fiscal policy. Turmoil in financial markets erupted during the 
summer of 2007, and policymakers began considering responses 
shortly thereafter. General economic conditions were flattening 
out, and a recession began in December. However, the formal 
dating of recessions is backward-looking, so in early 2008 no 
one knew that a recession had started. In order to reduce the 
risk of a recession, Congress enacted a tax cut in early 2008 
designed to maintain consumer spending. Despite this action, 
economic conditions continued to worsen, perhaps because this 
tax cut was relatively small as a share of GDP.
    Declines in State and local spending partially offset 
Federal fiscal actions throughout the period. Many States have 
balanced budget requirements in their State constitutions. 
State legislators are therefore unable to change their budget 
rules of the game merely through legislation. Many local 
governments rely on property taxes as a significant source of 
revenue, and these sources of funds were particularly hard hit 
when the housing bubble popped. As a result, many State and 
local governments were cutting spending and raising taxes when 
the Federal Government was increasing the size of its deficits. 
Furthermore, investor confidence in the creditworthiness of 
several State governments began to deteriorate, as measured by 
the spread between their borrowing costs and Federal borrowing 
costs and by the ratings agencies. California even temporarily 
issued its own monetary scrip in response to its budgetary 
woes.
    After the financial panic in September 2008 and the 
election of a new President with majorities in both Chambers of 
Congress of his own party, Federal fiscal policy became even 
more expansionary. In part, this was due to automatic 
stabilizers that act countercyclically and thus tend to 
increase Federal spending and reduce Federal tax receipts 
during a recession. However, it was also due in part to 
legislation designed to be expansionary.
    There were several fiscal policies designed to temporarily 
suspend rules. There was a temporary suspension of the 
collection of a portion of payroll taxes (P.L. 111-312). During 
the Great Recession, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(P.L. 111-5) \79\ was characterized as the primary stimulus 
bill. In addition to public works funding, it included tax 
cuts, provided money for expanded unemployment assistance, and 
granted financial support to State and local governments. There 
was also a temporary program for a special class of bonds to 
facilitate infrastructure spending (Build America bonds). Other 
programs, such as ``cash for clunkers'' and a first-time 
homebuyer tax credit, were targeted at specific economic 
sectors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ For more information, see CRS Report R40537, American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5): Summary and Legislative 
History, by Clinton T. Brass et al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the 2010 elections, which resulted in a Republican 
majority in the House and reintroduced divided government, 
fiscal policies became less expansionary.\80\ Concerned that 
continued Federal budget deficits would be a long-term problem, 
the Republican House negotiated for spending cuts during debt 
ceiling talks, resulting in legislation that capped 
discretionary spending. With Congress unable to reach a 
consensus during the appropriations process, a series of 
continuing budget resolutions effectively froze Federal 
spending for a time. Disagreements between the Republican House 
and the Democratic Senate and President resulted in a shutdown 
of the Federal Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ Because some government spending and tax receipts respond to 
economic conditions, there is an automatic stabilizer effect for fiscal 
policy. Fiscal policy becomes expansionary during recessions because 
deficits naturally grow and contractionary during booms as tax receipts 
generally rise. Economists therefore use a measure, called the full 
employment budget, to account for this natural fluctuation in the 
budget over the business cycle. As measured against the full employment 
budget, Federal fiscal policies after 2010 were contractionary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monetary policy
    The Federal Reserve under Bernanke deliberately rejected 
several policies of the 1930s in favor of more expansive 
programs.\81\ The Fed uses different tools in its various 
roles. To implement monetary policy, the Federal Reserve buys 
and sells Government bonds (i.e., conducts open market 
operations). As lender of last resort (LOLR), the Federal 
Reserve can provide emergency lending to distressed banks. To 
counter illiquidity in the financial system, the Federal 
Reserve can expand the types of collateral that it will lend 
against. The Federal Reserve used its existing authorities to 
take more aggressive action than it had taken in the 1930s.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ Ben S. Bernanke, ``Speech on Monetary Policy Since the Onset 
of the Crisis,'' August 31, 2012, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Federal Reserve used its LOLR powers to facilitate the 
rescue or sale of some distressed financial institutions. Under 
normal conditions, the LOLR authority is limited to commercial 
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. During 
the mortgage crisis, the Fed extended access to its LOLR 
facilities to nonmembers. In March 2008, the Fed provided a 
loan to assist JPMorgan in acquiring failing broker-dealer Bear 
Stearns. The Fed and JPMorgan loaned to a newly created entity 
called Maiden Lane, which held a pool of Bear Stearns assets 
for which JPMorgan took first loss and the Federal Reserve 
received senior treatment. The Federal Reserve considered using 
the Maiden Lane structure to intervene on behalf of the broker-
dealer Lehman Brothers in September 2008, but this did not 
happen. A financial panic occurred when the Lehman's bankruptcy 
was announced. The Federal Reserve used the Maiden Lane 
structure to intervene on behalf of the insurer AIG.
    The Federal Reserve used its authority to lend against good 
collateral to set up a number of temporary liquidity programs 
designed to address illiquid assets. As discussed above, the 
ability of securities to act as good collateral in private 
transactions erodes during a panic, including for nonbanks. If 
so, not only may aggregate credit decline, but specific lines 
of businesses that had relied on collateralized lending 
structures may be unable to roll over their debt to continue to 
finance existing operations. When trading in several classes of 
asset-backed securities (ABS) collapsed during the crisis, they 
could no longer be valued to be used as collateral for further 
loans. Although banks could use ABS as collateral, the Term 
Asset Loan Facility (TALF) enabled nonbanks that held ABS that 
had become toxic during the crisis to obtain short-term loans 
from the Fed. Like the expansion of LOLR powers, access to TALF 
was not limited to member banks of the Federal Reserve System.
    Since the start of the 2007-2008 recession, the Federal 
Reserve has used open market operations to lower interest rates 
and stimulate lending. With short-term interest rates almost 
zero, the Federal Reserve has taken a number of unprecedented 
additional steps to stimulate the economy. It has characterized 
these actions, including quantitative easing (QE), as both 
extraordinary and temporary. Under QE, the Federal Reserve 
purchased securities to expand its balance sheet (and the money 
supply) by purchasing longer term Treasury debt and mortgage-
related bonds and securities. The Federal Reserve also made 
swap arrangements with foreign central banks to make sure that 
dollars, which are the worldwide reserve currency, were 
available to the international finance system.
    In its oversight role, Congress called Fed officials to 
testify before committees to diagnose the economic problem and 
explain Federal Reserve actions (or inactions) to address the 
crisis. At times, some Members of Congress were dissatisfied 
with the level of information provided, and Congress ultimately 
passed legislation that provided greater oversight powers of 
certain Fed programs, including expanding Government 
Accountability Office audit power for some Fed functions. 
Dissatisfied with the ad hoc nature of the response to the 
financial crisis and convinced by Fed officials that lack of 
authority prevented further action, some Members of Congress 
called for expanding the Federal Reserve's powers and mission. 
For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) granted the Fed greater 
regulatory authority over some nonbank financial institutions, 
transferred some of the Fed's mortgage-related and consumer 
protection regulatory powers to a new agency, and eliminated 
the ability of the Fed to use a Maiden Lane-type structure for 
individual institutions. Proposals to alter the Fed's monetary 
policy mission, such as inflation targeting, were discussed but 
not enacted. Some Members of Congress expressed doubts about 
the effectiveness and longrun implications of QE and growing 
Federal debt.
Banking regulation and financial institution intervention
    As discussed above, the Federal Reserve used the Maiden 
Lane structure on an ad hoc basis to rescue some financial 
institutions. In some cases, these firms were performing money-
creation services similar to banks, but they were not chartered 
commercial banks and did not have direct access to some Federal 
Reserve facilities. In one example, broker-dealers used 
repurchase agreements to fund credit for other financial 
transactions. Refusal to roll over repurchase agreements has 
been likened to a run by bank depositors. Monetary conditions, 
if defined broadly enough to include credit generated through 
repurchase agreements, were more stringent than traditional 
measures might indicate. Also, two government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac--which served as 
intermediaries between mortgage markets and securities 
markets--became distressed.
    Congressional response took many forms, but in the interest 
of space, this report will focus on just a few. First, Congress 
enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA; 
P.L. 110-289). This act gave the Secretary of the Treasury 
authority to give direct financial assistance to the GSEs. 
Using this authority, Treasury and the newly created Federal 
Housing Finance Agency placed the GSEs in conservatorship. The 
panic of September 15, 2008, began less than 2 weeks after 
Treasury exercised its HERA powers.
    Congress also passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343). EESA was the primary tool for 
providing financial assistance to the banking system and 
related institutions. It was also used to assist automakers and 
some homeowners. EESA gave the Secretary of the Treasury 
temporary authority to acquire mortgage-related assets or any 
other asset that the Secretary believed could assist financial 
stability. Initially, EESA was used to inject capital into 
financial institutions by purchasing their preferred shares--
the Capital Purchase Program--and became colloquially known as 
the bank bailout, although the return was positive for the 
government. The EESA Capital Purchase Program included a wide 
variety of financial firms, from firms that formerly had been 
the broker-dealers in the repurchase agreement market to some 
very small community banks. It is worth noting that the first 
vote on EESA failed, and financial markets fell further upon 
the news.
    EESA also contained a provision related to money market 
mutual funds (MMFs). During the panic, one MMF ``broke the 
buck,'' meaning that investors lost principal in this usually 
safe liquid investment product. Investors then began 
withdrawing funds from MMFs more generally. Treasury exercised 
authority left over from the gold standard to announce a 
temporary guarantee program for MMFs. EESA included a provision 
to prevent further use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund as a 
guarantor of MMFs.
Bankruptcy and debt restructuring
    Congress confronted many issues related to the treatment of 
distressed debt, as might be expected in a crisis driven by 
mortgage defaults. Congress deliberated at least three areas of 
concern. First, as discussed in the Fed's LOLR role, 
policymakers were concerned about the resolution of nonbanks 
through the bankruptcy system. Second, the relatively large 
number of banks failing presented Congress with concerns over 
the financial soundness of the FDIC. Third, individual 
homeowners who were in default sought relief from lenders. 
Although mortgage foreclosure moratoriums were never enacted, 
delays of the foreclosure process were achieved through other 
means.
    Initially, policymakers created voluntary programs to 
encourage mortgage modification rather than foreclosure. For 
example, when house prices first began falling, the 
administration created the Hope Now Program to encourage 
voluntary modifications by mortgage servicers that acted on 
behalf of the owners of mortgage-backed securities. 
Dissatisfied with the results, Congress passed legislation to 
insulate mortgage servicers from potential investor lawsuits if 
they offered modifications before a homeowner missed payments.
    As bank failures increased, the FDIC inherited a portfolio 
of distressed mortgages owned by failed banks. In its role as 
receiver, the FDIC initiated a program of mortgage 
modifications for the loans it controlled. Called the IndyMac 
Program for one of the failed depository institutions, the FDIC 
program became a model for other Federal initiatives.
    Mortgage servicers were compelled to delay foreclosures in 
some cases and encouraged to in others. For example, Congress 
passed legislation requiring banks that participated in EESA to 
offer mortgage modifications. Similarly, the conservatorship of 
the GSEs was used as a vehicle for mortgage modification 
programs such as Home Affordable Refinance Program and Home 
Affordable Modification Program. In addition, mortgage 
modification policies were achieved by a negotiated settlement 
to end some lawsuits against the banks that had the largest 
share of the mortgage servicer business.

                               Conclusion

    Just as a glass may be described as half full or half 
empty, history may reveal continuity or change. The episodes 
described above contain some continuities. During financial 
crises, people have asked for temporary changes to the existing 
rules of the game. Furthermore, even though the institutional 
frameworks of 1840, 1893, 1930, and 2008 were vastly different, 
there are consistencies in the calling for Congress to adjust 
the budget and aid State governments, change the structure and 
mission of the central bank (or even to create one), provide 
financial assistance to distressed banks and financial firms, 
and change the laws for the treatment of bankrupt debtors. On 
the other hand, history also reveals change, as Congress has 
created agencies to which it has delegated authority. In times 
of crisis, Congress' initial reaction may be to exercise 
increased oversight, although Congress can and has changed the 
powers of agencies during financial crises.
    Despite precautions, bad economic events are likely to 
happen again in the future. Congress can expect to be called to 
consider temporarily suspending, or even fundamentally 
changing, the economic rules of the game. So long as the 
Constitution grants Congress the authority to deal with fiscal 
policy, monetary policy, banking regulation, and bankruptcy, a 
financial crisis will most likely result in calls to revisit 
the normal rules of the game.
    Historically, while Congress did not always make the same 
decisions in the financial crises discussed, Congress did 
deliberate similar issues. It is difficult to interpret 
congressional inaction for fiscal policy in the 1840s and 
monetary policy in the 1890s as inability to act, because 
Congress enacted other temporary measures (such as bankruptcy 
laws) during the same crises. Similarly, it is difficult to 
interpret congressional action to assist financial institutions 
during the 1930s and the 2000s as Congress' hands being forced, 
because there were potential actions Congress declined during 
the same crises.
    To the extent the past is a guide, one would expect people 
to petition Congress to use its powers to facilitate temporary 
changes to whatever rules are in place during the next economic 
crisis. Therefore, attempts by a current Congress to create a 
framework that would prevent a future Congress from having to 
deliberate on an unpopular financial rescue package during a 
future crisis is problematic. On the other hand, perceptions by 
market participants that Congress must act to save distressed 
firms may be frustrated, as illustrated by congressional defeat 
of the Johnson Plan during the 1840s, congressional defeat of 
the free silver movement during the 1890s, and congressional 
willingness to shut down the government in the 2000s. The 
express constitutional grant of authority to Congress over 
economic policy means that these issues are likely to be 
deliberated during a crisis no matter what the preexisting 
rules are, because people often want temporary changes to 
existing rules, but it does not commit Congress to either 
action or inaction during a crisis.







Shocks to the System: Congress and the Establishment of the Department 
                          of Homeland Security

                           William L. Painter

      Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy

                              ----------                              


        After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress passed a 
        massive executive branch reorganization, creating the 
        Department of Homeland Security. It pulled together 
        parts of 22 Federal agencies with over 170,000 
        employees and a budget of roughly $30 billion. Despite 
        the size and scope of the reorganization, the 
        legislation to establish it moved quickly through 
        Congress. It did so in a process galvanized by two 
        major shocks: the attacks themselves, and a reversal of 
        the White House position from opposing the 
        establishment of a new department to proposing one. 
        Some parts of Congress had already been working on this 
        idea. After the shock of the 9/11 attacks, those 
        efforts received greater attention. Once the 
        administration endorsed creation of a new department, 
        however, the work of the committees was largely set 
        aside. A more thorough debate at the time could have 
        developed a broader consensus over how to best address 
        homeland security issues, and preemptively resolved 
        some of the lingering questions that face Congress and 
        the department today. When Congress again finds itself 
        in the position of being pressed to act quickly on 
        complex, long-term organizational issues, it may be 
        worth considering the body's susceptibility to these 
        kinds of outside shocks, which may leave unresolved 
        issues and their avoidable consequences in its wake.

                              Introduction

    In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Congress undertook a series of actions aimed at shoring up the 
Nation's ability to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. 
Two supplemental appropriations were passed to fund response, 
recovery, and security efforts. Legislation to bail out the 
staggering airline industry was passed, as was legislation to 
establish the Transportation Security Administration. Congress 
enacted sweeping authorizations for the use of military force 
to bring the leaders of the organization that perpetrated the 
attacks to justice. The PATRIOT Act was signed into law, 
broadening the authority of the government to collect 
information.
    One of the most significant moves was the massive 
reorganization of the executive branch that created the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The legislation to 
create this department changed the face of government, pulling 
together parts of 22 Federal agencies with over 170,000 
employees and a budget of roughly $30 billion. Despite the size 
and scope of the reorganization, the legislation to establish 
it--the Homeland Security Act of 2002 \1\ --moved incredibly 
quickly through Congress. It did so in a process galvanized by 
two major shocks: the attacks themselves, and a reversal of the 
White House position from opposing the establishment of a new 
department to proposing one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ P.L. 107-296.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This report uses the backdrop of those events to illustrate 
how various internal factors--such as the congressional 
committees, calendar, and leadership--establish the pace and 
process of the debate on complex legislation, and how in a time 
of crisis, external shocks can impact that same pace and the 
outcome of that process.

                         The Pre-9/11 Congress

    In early September 2001, Congress was resuming debate on a 
number of issues, having just returned from an August break. A 
comprehensive energy policy bill, Social Security reform, the 
state of the economy, a shrinking budget surplus, and passage 
of appropriations legislation topped the agenda.
    Discussions of the changing threat environment were going 
on, but were not a primary concern of Congress. Much of these 
discussions had centered on reports by the U.S. Congressional 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction \2\ --also 
known as the Gilmore Commission--and the U.S. Commission on 
National Security/21st Century \3\ --also known as the Hart-
Rudman Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Reports available at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.html.
    \3\ Reports available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/
Reports/reports.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In December 2000, the Gilmore Commission released its 
second annual report, ``Toward a National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism.'' The report called for the creation of a 
``National Office for Combating Terrorism,'' which would be 
headed by a Senate-confirmed director who would formulate 
strategy and use the budget process to help coordinate the 
estimated 40 parts of the Federal Government involved in 
counterterrorism activities. However, the director would not 
have operational control of the various elements.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, ``Second Annual Report 
to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess 
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,'' 
December 15, 2000, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/
external/nsrd/terrpanel/terror2.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In January 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission released its 
third report in a series on American security policy in the 
21st century, entitled ``Roadmap for Security: An Imperative 
for Change.'' The report called for a number of actions to 
shore up American security and economic competitiveness. A 
warning in the series about the likelihood of a terrorist 
attack on American soil drew some attention. In March and April 
2001, House and Senate committees held hearings on the 
recommendations of the commissions.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See, for example: U.S. Congress, House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic 
Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, Combating 
Terrorism: Options to Improve Federal Response, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 
April 24, 2001, Serial No. 107-11 (Washington: GPO, 2002); and U.S. 
Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Homeland Defense: 
Exploring the Hart-Rudman Report, 107th Cong., 1st sess., April 3, 
2001, S. Hrg. 107-239 (Washington: GPO, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One of the Hart-Rudman recommendations was creation of ``a 
new National Homeland Security Agency to consolidate and refine 
the missions of the nearly two dozen disparate departments and 
agencies that have a role in U.S. homeland security today.'' 
\6\ As the constitutional authority to establish and organize 
agencies to carry out Federal laws lies with Congress,\7\ 
implementing this recommendation would require legislative 
action. Representative Mac Thornberry introduced a bill in the 
107th Congress--H.R. 1158--which would have established a 
National Homeland Security Agency, made up of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Customs Service, the 
Border Patrol, the U.S. Coast Guard, and parts of the 
Department of Commerce and Federal Bureau of Investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 
``Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,'' January, 
2001, p. iv.
    \7\ U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 18 (the 
``Necessary and Proper Clause'') and Article II, Section 2, clause 2 
(the ``Appointments Clause'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Representative Thornberry's approach was not the only 
recommendation on how to move forward. Representative Ike 
Skelton introduced H.R. 1292 (107th Congress) shortly 
thereafter, which would have provided direction to the White 
House to take a coordinated strategic approach to homeland 
security led from the White House and develop a comprehensive 
strategy for homeland security--a position more similar to the 
recommendation of the Gilmore Commission.
    Other thoughts of reorganization in what is now called 
homeland security had been percolating for much longer. One 
such concept concerned immigration and customs, where 
reorganization to present a single inspection at the border had 
been discussed. Multiple Federal agencies were then present at 
the border and lacked efficiency. One observer later noted that 
this idea had been discussed as far back as the Nixon 
administration.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, The Future of Homeland Security, The Evolution of 
the Homeland Security Department's Roles and Missions, 112th Cong., 2d 
sess., July 12, 2012, S. Hrg. 112-612 (Washington: GPO, 2012), p. 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Then four planes were hijacked, and three struck their 
targets. One of the 2,977 victims killed in the attacks was New 
York City Fire Department Special Operations Chief Ray Downey, 
a member of the Gilmore Commission, who was lost in the 
collapse of the World Trade Center.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
Responding to Homeland Threats: Is Our Government Organized for the 
Challenge?, 107th Cong., 1st sess., September 21, 2001, S. Hrg. 107-207 
(Washington: GPO, 2002), p. 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Among the effects of these attacks was an initial shock to 
Congress, which shook it out of its traditional pattern of 
operations. This shock drove homeland security policy matters 
from discussion on a more methodical strategic time horizon 
through the committee process to the daily agenda of every 
Member, with these issues being debated across the media as the 
public demanded action.

                           Congress Responds

    In the hours and days after the attacks, much of the 
partisan rhetoric that can characterize congressional debate 
was shelved. The immediate priorities in the wake of the 
attacks were summed up by one senior House staff member: 
Restore the Pentagon and New York; assess the readiness of 
Federal agencies to deal with the threat; secure the Capitol 
Complex; and establish a plan for the continuity of 
government.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Interview with Jim Dyer, former House Appropriations Committee 
staff director, January 16, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By the end of the 7-day period after the attacks, Congress 
had moved a number of pieces of legislation addressing those 
priorities: expediting benefit payments to public safety 
officers injured or killed in the attacks and aftermath; \11\ 
providing $40 billion in supplemental appropriations, at least 
half of which was to be for disaster recovery and assistance at 
the attack sites; \12\ and an authorization for the use of 
military force in response to the attacks.\13\ It took Congress 
and the White House just 2 days to enact legislation to provide 
support for the airline industry, which had faced significant 
business disruptions in the days following the attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ P.L. 107-37.
    \12\ P.L. 107-38.
    \13\ P.L. 107-40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    October 2001 saw Congress pass the USA PATRIOT Act,\14\ 
which included a broad range of changes to national security 
law, including expanded surveillance authorities, and 
additional tools to combat international money laundering and 
financing of terrorist activities. In the wake of the anthrax 
letters sent to Capitol Hill, additional funding for homeland 
defense was proposed in both the House and Senate. A tax relief 
bill for victims and areas affected by the attacks ultimately 
became law in early 2002,\15\ and unemployment assistance under 
the Stafford Act was extended in March 2002 by 13 weeks.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ P.L. 107-56.
    \15\ P.L. 107-134.
    \16\ P.L. 107-154.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the middle of all this legislative activity, initial 
positions on how to improve Federal-level homeland security 
coordination and policymaking were being staked out in the 
executive branch and Congress. On September 20, 2001, President 
George W. Bush announced that he would sign an Executive order 
establishing an Office of Homeland Security, to be headed by an 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, and a 
Homeland Security Council.\17\ The office's head was to be 
former Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge. On October 11, 2001, 3 
days after the President signed the Executive order, Senators 
Joseph Lieberman and Arlen Specter introduced S. 1534, to 
establish a ``Department of National Homeland Security,'' along 
the general lines of the Hart-Rudman Commission proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Executive Order 13228, ``Establishing the Office of Homeland 
Security and the Homeland Security Council,'' 66 Federal Register 
51812, October 8, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Press reports and congressional statements paint a picture 
of Governor Ridge's office being in an awkward position at 
best. His role was to coordinate efforts from the White House, 
but Governor Ridge lacked the authority needed to overcome 
bureaucratic obstacles or change the way the incumbent 
executive branch structure was addressing homeland security 
issues.\18\ The White House would not allow him to testify at 
hearings because his position was that of an advisor to the 
President, rather than the leader of a department established 
in law. A Governor Ridge-led attempt to restructure border-
serving agencies was unsuccessful as agencies defended their 
institutional ``turf.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ For example, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, Legislation to Establish a Department of National 
Homeland Security and a White House Office to Combat Terrorism, 107th 
Cong., 2d sess., April 11, 2002, S. Hrg. 107-472, p. 2 (Senator 
Lieberman's remarks), p. 25 (former Senator Warren Rudman's remarks), 
and p. 30 (Comptroller General David Walker's remarks).
    \19\ Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald, ``Department's Mission 
Was Undermined From Start,'' The Washington Post, December 22, 2005, p. 
A1, Final.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At a press briefing in March 2002, the administration 
publicly opposed the creation of a new department. Ari 
Fleischer, the President's spokesman, stated that the Office of 
Homeland Security was ``working extraordinarily well.'' 
Fleischer added, ``Creating a Cabinet post doesn't solve the 
problem'' of the need for a coordinated approach to homeland 
security.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, ``White House Holds Regular News 
Briefing,'' March 19, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    White House support was viewed as a key missing element by 
Senate proponents of reorganization. At a hearing in April 
2002, Senators expressed bipartisan support for a significant 
reorganization effort, but Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee Ranking Minority Member Fred Thompson noted in his 
opening statement the critical role of the White House in 
advancing any type of reorganization, and pleaded for a 
measured approach to reorganization, saying:

    I think we need to face up to the fact that to have any 
changes, we are going to have to work together with the White 
House to get them done. To have any real results, we are going 
to have to do it under the President's leadership . . . .
    I believe that because the job is so important, is so 
complex . . . that we need to give the administration a fair 
shot at coming forth with how they feel it ought to be done and 
see how that flies, what it looks like, and, to the extent we 
can see how it is working before we launch off into anything 
that would be extremely specific in the reorganizing or the 
reshuffling of the boxes.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ S. Hrg. 107-472, pp. 4-5.

    At that same hearing, Office of Management and Budget 
Director Mitch Daniels was more circumspect in his testimony 
than Fleischer had been as he described the administration's 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
position:

    As the President has said from the beginning and Governor 
Ridge has said, the current arrangement might remain the 
preference of the administration or it might change. The 
administration is very open to alternative arrangements and 
they are being looked at actively, as they have been from the 
outset. The national strategy that Governor Ridge's office is 
working on, we will speak to this and may well make 
recommendations to the President about an evolution of the 
initial organizational structure.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ S. Hrg. 107-472, p. 31.

    Senator Bob Graham noted at the hearing that the White 
House had asked the Senate to ``defer pursuing'' Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Lieberman's legislation 
several months before to allow Governor Ridge time to assume 
his position and to deal with pressing issues in the wake of 
the attacks. However, Senators' discussion at the hearing 
reflected a strong desire to move ahead with some type of 
reorganization legislation even without the blessing of the 
White House. In his oral testimony, former Senator Warren 
Rudman, cochair of the Hart-Rudman Commission, suggested 
consolidating a few Federal Government functions at first--what 
he termed ``the non-strategic, non-intelligence, non-law 
enforcement operation consolidated,'' essentially Federal 
response efforts and border protection.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ S. Hrg. 107-472, pp. 24-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the beginning of May 2002, Senators Lieberman, Specter 
and Lindsey Graham introduced S. 2542, which built on the 
original Lieberman-Specter bill, to incorporate additional 
legislative ideas that had come to the fore as the debate 
continued. Representative Thornberry introduced a related bill 
in the House--H.R. 4660--with a bipartisan group of original 
cosponsors, including Representatives Jim Davis, Jim Gibbons, 
Jane Harman, Tim Roemer, Christopher Shays, and Ellen Tauscher. 
Despite this activity, congressional consensus on broad 
homeland security reorganization remained elusive.
    Nonetheless, Congress continued to move legislation 
addressing homeland security functions. For example, in May, 
2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 
2002 \24\ was enacted, authorizing increases in Immigration and 
Naturalization Service investigators and authorizing 
information sharing and instituting reforms in several visa 
programs. In the course of House debate, Judiciary Committee 
Chairman James Sensenbrenner noted future plans for 
reorganization of immigration functions, saying: ``[Later], we 
will be dealing with the restructuring and reorganization of 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which is the most 
dysfunctional agency in the Federal Government.'' \25\ This 
particular sentiment was echoed by Senator Edward Kennedy, who 
noted that he and others had promoted previous efforts to 
restructure the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 
Neither Representative Sensenbrenner's nor Senator Kennedy's 
remarks raised comprehensive reorganization legislation as the 
vehicle for change.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ P.L. 107-173.
    \25\ Representative James Sensenbrenner, ``Enhanced Border Security 
and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001,'' House debate, Congressional 
Record, December 19, 2001, H10475.
    \26\ Senator Edward Kennedy, ``Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
Entry Reform Act of 2001,'' remarks in the Senate, Congressional 
Record, April 12, 2002, S2609.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       Reorganization Accelerates

    Unbeknownst to Congress, the administration had begun to 
develop its own plan for reorganization of executive branch 
agencies. A small group of administration staff met frequently 
with senior White House officials to determine what components 
of the Federal Government should be included in the new 
department. Secrecy was maintained to prevent development of 
bureaucratic opposition similar to that which had stifled 
border reorganization.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Glasser and Grunwald.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 6, 2002, President Bush publicly reversed the 
administration's previous opposition to the establishment of a 
new department with the release of his draft proposal for ``The 
Department of Homeland Security.'' The administration's vision 
of DHS was actually broader and more complex than original 
plans discussed by the Hart-Rudman Commission or embodied in 
congressional proposals. The administration's change of 
position fundamentally altered the political landscape facing 
legislative proposals to reorganize government to deter and 
better prepare for potential future terrorist attacks. There 
was momentum for action beyond the administration's initial 
steps. That momentum had been offset by a desire in some to see 
if those initial steps would be adequate, and a reluctance in 
others in the midst of a time of crisis to resist an 
administration that was very popular, and in some cases with 
which they were politically aligned. With the administration 
staking out a position in favor of a more extensive 
reorganization than embodied in the leading congressional 
proposals, those offsetting forces largely dissipated. Those 
who had been pushing for change were suddenly no longer 
debating the need to change, but were left to debate the 
appropriate extent of those changes--a very different topic.
    Days after the administration announced its proposal to 
establish a new department, House and Senate majority and 
minority leadership had established a framework plan for 
action. The House would introduce the President's proposed 
legislation and refer it to individual committees of 
jurisdiction. After a limited period of time, a final markup 
would be conducted by a House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security, headed by House Majority Leader Richard Armey. On 
June 13, 2002, Senator Majority Leader Tom Daschle outlined the 
Senate's strategy for passing the bill, which was based on 
considering an amendment to S. 2452 in July, then potentially 
conferencing legislation with the House in August, and voting 
on a final package in September. He emphasized, however, a 
desire ``to move deliberately, carefully, taking into account 
all the ideas that will be offered by the committees and by 
members.'' \28\ Even so, before a legislative draft had even 
been received, a suggested deadline of September 11, 2002, for 
completion of legislative action had been floated by House 
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ CQ Congressional Transcripts, ``Senate Majority Leader Daschle 
Holds News Conference,'' June 13, 2002, at http://www.cq.com/doc/
congressionaltranscripts-452688?2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Representative Harman reflected on the perceived importance 
of White House support at a 2012 hearing looking back on the 
evolution of homeland security, noting that they were willing 
to accept a fundamentally different approach to reorganization 
simply to accomplish what they saw as a critical need to 
establish a Federal homeland security function:

    As you know, I joined the hardy little band of legislators 
who thought a homeland security function made sense in the 
aftermath of 9/11--something far less ambitious than the plan 
ultimately sketched out by then-White House chief of staff Andy 
Card. We envisioned a cross-agency ``jointness'' similar to the 
2004 Intelligence Reform Act structure, which the three of us, 
and former Rep. Pete Hoekstra, negotiated. But I clearly recall 
our decision to embrace a much bigger concept--which the White 
House proposed--because that would ensure Presidential 
support.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ S. Hrg. 112-612, p. 154.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            The House Moves

    The rules of the House of Representatives allow a united 
majority to work its will rapidly. At the time, the House was 
controlled by the President's party.
    On June 18, 2002, the President submitted the legislative 
draft for implementing his proposal, which was introduced on 
June 24 as H.R. 5005. The bill was referred to 12 committees, 
which had until July 12 to mark up and report the bill with 
recommendations to a 13th committee--the House Select Committee 
on Homeland Security. Nine of the 12 did so. The House Select 
Committee on Homeland Security then conducted a final markup on 
July 19, reporting an amended bill on a party-line vote of five 
to four. The report was filed just before 2 a.m. on July 24, 
and the House took up the bill under a structured rule, which 
made 27 amendments in order on July 25. The bill passed the 
evening of July 26 by a vote of 295 to 132.
    This entire process took place in the span of 21 
legislative days.

                            The Senate Moves

    As Majority Leader Daschle had signaled, the Senate moved 
at a more deliberate pace. On July 24, 2002, the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee marked up an amendment to S. 
2452 drafted by Senator Lieberman. Although the Senate 
amendment was substantially similar to H.R. 5005 as introduced, 
differences remained on a number of issues, including which 
components would be included or excluded for the new 
department, whether DHS would have a coordinating role for 
homeland security policy or whether that responsibility would 
lie in a separate office, and policies on civil service 
protections and collective bargaining rights.
    The Senate did not take up reorganization legislation 
before the August recess, as it considered other legislation 
such as terrorism risk insurance, several appropriations bills, 
and the defense authorization bill for the coming fiscal year. 
The Senate began consideration of the homeland security bill on 
September 3, 2002, bringing up the Senate legislation as an 
amendment to House-passed H.R. 5005.
    Scores of amendments were offered as debate continued. On 
September 21, the President began to publicly pressure the 
Senate to complete its work on the bill through his weekly 
radio address:

    After less than a week of debate, the House of 
Representatives passed a good bill, a bill that gives me the 
flexibility to confront emerging threats quickly and 
effectively. Yet after 3 weeks of debate, the Senate has still 
not passed a bill I can sign. The legislation the Senate is 
debating is deeply flawed. The Senate bill would force the new 
Department to fight against terror threats with one hand tied 
behind its back. The Department of Homeland Security must be 
able to move people and resources quickly, to respond to 
threats immediately without being forced to comply with a thick 
book of bureaucratic rules.
    Yet the current Senate approach keeps in place a cumbersome 
process that can take 5 months to hire a needed employee and 18 
months to fire someone who is not doing his job. In the war on 
terror, this is time we do not have.
    Even worse, the Senate bill would weaken my existing 
authority to prohibit collective bargaining when national 
security is at stake. Every President since Jimmy Carter has 
had this very narrow authority throughout the Government, and I 
need this authority in the war on terror.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ U.S. President (G.W. Bush), ``The President's Radio Address,'' 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 38 (September 30, 
2002), p. 1594.

    On September 23, in a public speech, the President charged 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that when he had sought to address problems at the border:

    The House responded, but the Senate is more interested in 
special interests in Washington and not interested in the 
security of the American people. I will not accept a Department 
of Homeland Security that does not allow this president and 
future presidents to better keep the American people 
secure.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ CQ Newsmaker Transcripts, ``President Bush Delivers Remarks, 
Trenton, N.J.'' September 23, 2002, at http://www.cq.com/doc/
newsmakertranscripts-509452?26.

    After several attempts to obtain cloture and bring debate 
in the Senate to a close, the Senate moved on to other business 
after October 1.
    In his statements, the President distilled the debate to 
the discussion over civil service protections and collective 
bargaining rights for Federal employees--a smaller subset of 
issues than was under active consideration by the Senate. It 
can be argued that in the 2002 midterm congressional elections, 
the electorate in some cases saw Senate deliberations as a 
delay over a non-security-related issue rather than deliberate 
consideration of the broad range of issues before the Senate, 
or that the debate was less important than passage, and that 
this interpretation was a factor in some Republican victories 
in House and Senate races.

                             The Lame Duck

    The 107th Congress returned for a lame duck session after 
the elections, with Republican majorities in both Chambers in 
the 108th Congress on the horizon. Another version of 
legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security--H.R. 
5710--was introduced in the House on November 12, and, 
operating under a special rule that allowed no amendments, 
passed it the next day 299 to 121.
    Majority Leader Armey described the product and process 
during the debate on the rule:

    Mr. Speaker, . . . we have waited upon the other body in 
terms of our hopes to have this work completed, and just last 
Friday the President again challenged Congress to work on this 
bill. During this period of time, from last Friday until today, 
we have had extensive consultation between Members of this body 
on the select committee, the committee[s] of jurisdiction, the 
President, Members of the other body, and all of the committees 
that have jurisdiction on this bill.
    In light of some of the concerns that we knew were fairly 
well known to us on the other side of the building, we were 
able to very quickly move through those issues that still 
remain, fully vet them with all interested parties, including 
the committees of jurisdiction in both bodies, and work out 
what we believe will be in the form of the bill before us right 
now a bill that can comfortably pass both bodies and be sent to 
the President for signature.
    I should mention, Mr. Speaker, that this bill is 
essentially the same bill that was passed by the House of 
Representatives last July. There have been a few modifications 
that have been made to the bill but nothing that has not been 
fully vetted with the committees of jurisdiction and little 
that Members of this body will find objectionable.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Representative Richard Armey, ``Homeland Security Act of 
2002,'' House debate, Congressional Record, November 13, 2002, H8699.

    Representative Thornberry, having helped lead 
reorganization efforts prior to and after 9/11, added this 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
perspective:

    Mr. Speaker, having worked on this issue for close to 2 
years, I have had many doubts that it would ever come to this 
point; but now I believe it will happen.
    This is not a perfect bill, and it is relatively easy for 
me and others to find fault, ways that we wish it would be 
different. But all of those individual differences we may have 
with provisions are no competition in my mind to the fact that 
time is slipping by. If we do not do it this week, we are at 
least 3 months further along, 3 months during which our enemies 
are plotting and planning against us, more time during which we 
are not as prepared as we could and should be, more months 
where we are not making preparations to protect ourselves.
    Time is a critical factor. Just yesterday we had another 
threat, and whether it is bin Laden's voice or not, it is clear 
it is someone who intends to kill more Americans. He is very 
explicit in the threat. We cannot sit by and have differences 
over this provision or that provision keep us from acting.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Representative William Thornberry, ``Homeland Security Act of 
2002,'' House debate, Congressional Record, November 13, 2002, H8700.

    Senator Thompson offered the text of House-passed H.R. 5710 
as an amendment to the House-passed H.R. 5005, succeeded in 
getting cloture, defeated attempts to alter the amendment, and 
amended H.R. 5005 passed the Senate on November 19, 2002. On 
November 22, the House agreed by unanimous consent to the bill 
as it passed the Senate. President Bush signed the bill into 
law as the Homeland Security Act of 2002 \34\ on November 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ P.L. 107-296.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            After Enactment

    On the day the bill was signed, White House press secretary 
Fleischer sought to lower expectations and noted that patience 
would be required, saying that it would take ``a couple of 
years'' to build the capacity of the new department, stating 
``It's unreasonable to expect that because a new department has 
been created, America will change overnight.'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, from CQ Newsmaker 
Transcripts, ``White House Holds Regular News Briefing,'' November 25, 
2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With the enactment of the Homeland Security Act, a very 
ambitious schedule to stand up the department went into place, 
requiring the department to be established in 60 days and for 
the major operational components to be transferred by March 1, 
2003. Transitions were to be completed by September 1, 2003.
    Almost 10 years later, retired Coast Guard Commandant 
Admiral Thad Allen noted in testimony the complications this 
schedule posed for the new department:

    The legislation was passed between sessions of Congress, so 
there was no ability for the Senate to be empaneled and confirm 
appointees, although Secretary Ridge was done I believe a day 
before he was required to become the Secretary. We moved people 
over that had already been confirmed because we could do that. 
And it took up to a year to get some of the other senior 
leaders confirmed.
    We were in the middle of a fiscal year. There was no 
appropriation, so in addition to the money that was moved over 
from the legacy organizations from the Department where they 
were at, some of the new entities, we had to basically 
reprogram funds from across government. It was a fairly chaotic 
time to try and stand up the organic organization of the 
Department and put together a headquarters. Emblematic of that 
would be the location of the Department that still exists, the 
Nebraska Avenue complex, and the unfortunate situation where we 
are right now where we have been able to resolve the St. 
Elizabeths complex there.
    Because of that, what happened was we had the migration of 
22 agencies with legacy appropriations structures, legacy 
internal support structures, different shared services, and 
different mission support structures in the Departments where 
they came from. And because of that, a lot of the resources 
associated with how you actually run the components or need to 
run the Department rest in the components and still do today. 
And I am talking about things like human resource management, 
information technology (IT), property management, and so forth, 
the blocking and tackling of how you have to run an agency in 
government.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ S. Hrg. 112-612, p. 48.

    Congress was coming to grips with its own ``blocking and 
tackling'' as it began to consider how to oversee the new 
department. This was not an unexpected challenge. The day the 
administration announced its plan for the new department, House 
Republican Conference Chairman J.C. Watts noted that Congress 
had, to that point, held 125 hearings on homeland security 
since 9/11.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Geoff Earle and Mark Wegner, ``Turf Battle is on in Congress 
Over New Homeland Defense Agency,'' Government Executive, June 7, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On November 14, 2002, the House Republican Conference 
passed a resolution supporting amendment of the House rules 
``to consolidate the authorization and appropriations 
processes'' for homeland security in the House. On December 16, 
2002, House Republican leaders began to meet to determine how 
to conduct oversight of the new department.

                     The 108th Congress and Beyond

    While debates would continue on committee reorganization 
and jurisdiction, once the department stood up in 2003, 
congressional attention began shifting to conducting oversight 
of the new department rather than debating who should take the 
lead. The transition process created the administrative 
challenges noted in Admiral Allen's testimony above. Vacancies 
in management and support roles led to slow responses to 
congressional inquiries. Former DHS Inspector General Richard 
Skinner testified: ``We brought over all of the operational 
aspects of 22 different agencies, but we did not bring the 
management support functions to support those operations.'' 
\38\ Conceptual differences remained over the role of 
management: How strong should the secretary's office be, versus 
how autonomous should the operational components be? As the 
department stood up, shortfalls in needed operating funds for 
the Transportation Security Agency became clear and the FY2004 
budget request--its first--came to Congress with no 
justification documents to speak of.\39\ There was much for 
Congress to oversee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ S. Hrg. 112-612, p. 51.
    \39\ Dyer interview.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Analysis of the Conditions that Affected Congressional Action

    The story of the creation of DHS illuminates several 
factors that affect the flow of legislation and what can drive 
Congress to act in exceptional circumstances. The role of 
Congress in our system of government, and the functions of 
congressional committees, calendars, and leadership combine to 
form the underlying mechanism in which legislation proceeds or 
stalls.
    This mechanism does not operate in a vacuum. Part of the 
congressional role is its oversight relationship with the 
executive branch, and the political space that it shares with 
the President, especially at times when the public looks to the 
Federal Government for action.
    The legislative mechanism, in the case of the Homeland 
Security Act, was acted on by two significant external events: 
the 9/11 attacks, and the administration's announcement of its 
support or establishment of DHS. The impact of these forces 
accelerated the legislative process. Congress and the 
department have struggled with the legacy of this acceleration 
ever since.

                      The Congressional Mechanism

    As the legislative branch, Congress is charged with passing 
laws on the policy issues facing the United States. As a 
representative body, Congress is most driven to act on policy 
issues on which the U.S. citizenry focuses its attention. Prior 
to the 9/11 attacks, the issue of homeland security was just 
one of many topics of discussion, generally confined to the 
committees of central jurisdiction and not one on a fast track 
to legislative action. When the attacks shocked the U.S. 
citizenry, Congress was therefore cued to move legislation in 
response to it, although the complex policy issue of broad 
homeland security reorganization did not move as readily as the 
specific fixes for the airline industry, appropriations, and 
other elements.

                               committees

    Part of the reason the reorganization effort did not move 
through the process to floor consideration in the 8 months 
following 9/11 was the congressional committee structure. The 
Senate held numerous committee hearings on reorganization for 
homeland security in part because Lieberman was able to mark up 
his own bill--he chaired the committee that had predominant 
jurisdiction over its content. In the House, Representative 
Thornberry's bill went to the Committee on Government Reform.
    One key difference between the way committee referrals are 
handled in the House and Senate ensured the bills that moved 
through the House were limited in scope. In the Senate, the 
concept of predominant jurisdiction means bills are usually 
referred to a single committee depending on their content. In 
the House, when a bill addresses multiple issues, referrals to 
multiple committees are more common. For example, Chairman 
Sensenbrenner had noted the jurisdictional hurdles facing broad 
reform legislation in the House during the debate on the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 
explaining that jurisdictional issues prevented the bill from 
providing more personnel for the Customs Service, or requiring 
that manifests of vessels and airplanes arriving from and 
departing to international locales be filed with the 
immigration service.\40\ These moves, while popular, simply 
could not be done by his committee's bill because they were 
under the jurisdiction of other committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Representative James Sensenbrenner, ``Enhanced Border Security 
and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001,'' House debate, Congressional 
Record, December 19, 2001, p. H10472.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               calendars

    The congressional and electoral calendars provided 
relatively small windows of time to consider reorganization--if 
it was going to be done, it would have to be done quickly or 
wait until after the elections. As pressure built within 
Congress to go beyond what the White House had done already by 
mid-2002, only 6 months remained--June and July were 
traditionally dedicated to moving appropriations legislation in 
earnest and August is historically a month when Members are not 
at the Capitol. With very little floor time available and the 
partisan pressures of the election intruding, moving 
legislation would require significant pressure, which the White 
House announcement provided. Even with that impetus, the bill 
would not ultimately pass until after the election.

                               leadership

    The power of the leadership of Congress is the power to set 
the agenda. In the House during the initial debate over the 
appropriate response to 9/11, one could argue that the 
leadership was more willing to give a President from its own 
party time and authority to manage homeland security and 
potential reorganization as he saw fit, while at the same time, 
the Senate majority leadership was comfortable exploring 
alternative approaches without concern for how it might reflect 
on the administration.
    Although the majority may decide what comes to the floor of 
the House or Senate when, and under what terms it will be 
debated or amended (if at all), the minority's decision to 
cooperate (or not) and its coordination of a message can be 
significant in shaping the outcome, even if their proposals are 
voted down. In the wake of the shock of 9/11, the leadership in 
both Houses initially set a bipartisan tone, and procedural 
cooperation was given, which allowed bills to move swiftly. 
When the Bush administration shocked the system again by 
announcing its support for establishing a Department of 
Homeland Security, the accelerated procedures for consideration 
of the bill initially received bipartisan support. House 
Minority Leader Dick Gephardt suggested passage of the bill by 
September 11 should be a goal--a proposal that was embraced by 
the leaders of the other party. However, this change in tone 
would not survive the process of moving the bill through the 
House.
    As the accelerated process played out, the leadership of 
the House had significant control over the content of what 
would ultimately become the Homeland Security Act, and 
exercised that control to create a package that largely 
conformed to the President's wishes. The House majority leader 
introduced the President's legislation, and set the terms for 
expedited committee consideration. The majority party members 
of the ad hoc committee that ultimately produced the 
legislation were the House majority leader, the majority whip, 
the chairman and vice chairman of the Republican conference, 
and the chairman of the majority party's leadership 
meetings.\41\ Those members were the five votes to report out a 
bill that largely rejected the changes proposed by the nine 
committees that had marked up their portions of the bill. The 
Rules Committee then produced a rule that ensured swift floor 
debate and largely protected the content of the legislation, 
making only selected amendments in order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ The minority party was represented by the House minority whip, 
the chairman and vice chairman of the Democratic Caucus, and the 
assistant to the minority leader.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senate leadership wound up with less of a role in 
determining the content of the Homeland Security Act for 
several reasons--primarily because of the different way 
leadership power is exercised in the Senate as opposed to the 
House. For example, there is no rules committee that can limit 
amendments or debate in the Senate--so the Senate majority 
leader had much less leverage with which to work to move 
legislation. As the Homeland Security Act experience shows, the 
absence of minority support for cloture motions can stifle 
legislation. Where the House can push something through on a 
party-line vote, in the Senate, such plans are usually not 
realistic, given the power of an individual Senator to stall 
the process.
    The plan for action laid out by Majority Leader Daschle in 
June had proven overly optimistic, given the crowded Senate 
agenda, and the limited amount of time available prior to the 
election. The Senate as a result responded to the work product 
of the House that was based on the White House proposal. The 
House-passed bill arrived in the Senate days before the August 
recess, and was only under consideration for roughly 2 weeks 
before the impending elections made compromise more difficult 
and the process stalled.
    After the elections, the House and Senate leadership 
negotiated the final version of the bill--again, based on the 
House legislation--with the outgoing Senate majority in a 
significantly weakened position. That bill took 2 legislative 
days to pass the House, and 4 in the Senate. No attempts to 
amend the leadership-negotiated package were successful.

                            Outside Congress

    The existing executive branch structure laid the groundwork 
for the initial reorganization discussion--without homeland 
security functions being carried out across the government, 
there would have been no discussion of consolidation in the 
first place. The Gilmore Commission and Hart-Rudman Commission 
had pointed out to Congress the broad distribution of homeland 
security responsibility, and some in Congress were mulling 
solutions to that before 9/11. As noted above, dissatisfaction 
with border security agencies stretched back well before 9/11, 
and in the aftermath the INS was denounced on the House floor 
as being ``absolutely incompetent.'' \42\ Without congressional 
concern about structural inefficiencies to face the threat and 
dissatisfaction with the performance of some homeland security 
components, reorganization may not have so readily gained 
traction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Representative Tom Tancredo, ``Campaign Finance Reform; 
Immigration Reform,'' Special Orders, Congressional Record, February 
12, 2002, pp. H274-H279.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As often occurs in a time of national concern, the focus 
was on the White House for leadership. The ``bully pulpit'' of 
the White House at the time and the role of the President as a 
singular national executive--rather than a deliberative body--
placed him in a unique position to effectively define the 
national discussion. The President's address before Congress on 
September 20, 2001, the establishment of Governor Ridge's 
office in the White House, and the request for Congress to hold 
off on departmental reorganization at first stalled the gradual 
momentum that had been building in Congress toward 
reorganization. In September 2002, the administration's framing 
of the debate as being over labor issues narrowed the public 
debate to partisan issues surrounding the department's 
workforce when much else remained to be discussed.

                               Conclusion

    As the months unspooled and the 9/11 attacks began to move 
into the realm of historical rather than current events, even 
their powerful unifying effect could be seen to fade. By the 
midterm elections in 2002, congressional candidates faced 
negative ads that linked them to Osama bin Laden and Saddam 
Hussein because they held a different position on given 
security issues--an action that would have seemed unthinkable 
to most in the days after the attacks.\43\ In 2004 and 2005, 
the power of congressional committees was evident in the 
decisions that were made on congressional organization and 
oversight of the new department. Internal debates on DHS 
oversight continue today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ See Andy Barr, ``Cleland Ad Causes Trouble For Chambliss,'' 
Politico, November 12, 2008, at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1108/15561.html, and William M. Welch, ``Republicans Using Iraq issue 
to Slam Election Opponents,'' USA Today, October 13, 2002, at http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2002-10-13-iraq-politics_x.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As this report outlines, the existing congressional debate 
on how to best organize government to provide homeland security 
was accelerated by the 9/11 attacks and by the Bush 
administration reversing its opposition to the establishment of 
a new department. The power of congressional leadership to 
control debate (especially in the House), the leverage of the 
executive, and the pressures of the electoral calendar 
significantly contributed to the White House's ability to 
preserve much of the administration's original proposal 
throughout the legislative process.
    However, it was argued by some at the time that this speedy 
process resulted in the establishment of a less capable 
department, and it has been argued by some since that the 
department we have today may not be the ideal structure to 
promote homeland security. A more thorough debate at the time, 
taking advantage of the in-house expertise of congressional 
committees, could have developed a broader consensus over the 
structure of the department and the role of departmental 
management. Lingering questions over basic issues such as how 
to house the headquarters of the department have some of their 
roots in the lack of resolution to questions of just how robust 
the management cadre of the department should be. The Homeland 
Security Act's wholesale transfer of components and unresolved 
congressional tensions over committee jurisdiction have 
complicated reauthorization efforts.
    A more deliberate process, of course, could have stalled 
due to bureaucratic infighting, and no one can know how the 
last decade could have been different if DHS had been 
structured differently or not been stood up at all. The purpose 
of this kind of retrospective examination is not to determine 
what Congress should or should not have done--on the contrary, 
it is to understand how the Congress may act in crisis because 
of its structure and place in government. When Congress again 
finds itself in the position of being pressed to act with 
urgency on complex, long-term organizational issues, it may be 
worth considering the body's susceptibility to these outside 
shocks, which may speed an idea into law, but leave unresolved 
issues and their avoidable consequences in its wake.









     Like Clockwork: Senate Consideration of the National Defense 
                           Authorization Act

                           Colleen J. Shogan

                          Deputy Director, CRS

                              ----------                              


        For the past 53 years, the Senate has passed annually a 
        National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). At a time 
        when legislative activity in Congress has diminished, 
        the Senate continues to produce, without fail, a 
        mammoth annual bill that sets policy and authorized 
        spending levels for the U.S. military and the Pentagon. 
        How does this happen? What role do the practices, 
        procedures, and traditions of the Senate Armed Services 
        Committee (SASC) play in this unbroken record? This 
        report describes how the Senate Armed Services 
        Committee debates, drafts, and amends the NDAA. 
        Specific characteristics and practices unique to SASC 
        are discussed. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, the Senate 
        almost failed to pass the NDAA due, in part, to the 
        controversial debate concerning the ``Don't Ask, Don't 
        Tell'' (DADT) policy. A case study analyzes how SASC 
        overcame the challenges associated with the DADT debate 
        and relied upon its decades of fail-safe practices and 
        traditions to achieve Senate passage. The purpose of 
        this examination is to analyze the legislative 
        procedures of the SASC and determine if the norms and 
        operations of the committee could prove instructive to 
        other legislative arenas in Congress.

    Political scientists and congressional commentators have 
characterized the contemporary U.S. Senate as an institution 
crippled by gridlock, obstruction, and increased partisan 
battles.\1\ Nonetheless, for the past 53 years, the Senate has 
never failed to pass a National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA). The Senate has found ways, often creatively, to avoid a 
legislative impasse on NDAA. The subject of national defense is 
not without controversy. Through Vietnam, the cold war, two 
wars in Iraq, the global war on terrorism, Iran Contra, 
Tailhook, and numerous defense acquisition scandals, the NDAA 
has persevered. How does the NDAA endure, despite what many 
would consider highly improbable odds?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Gregory Koger, Filibustering: A Political History of 
Obstruction in the House and Senate (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2010); Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative 
Procedures in the U.S. Congress (Washington: CQ Press, 2000) and Sarah 
Binder and Steven S. Smith, Politics or Principle: Filibustering in the 
United States Senate (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This case study will examine a recent episode in which 
enactment of the NDAA was threatened.\2\ The repeal of the U.S. 
military's ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' (DADT) policy precipitated 
a potential breaking point in which Senate passage of the 
FY2011 NDAA seemed unlikely.\3\ However, despite the 
controversy concerning the legislation, the FY2011 NDAA became 
law. What legislative processes and practices enabled this to 
occur? How does the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) 
manage to produce a comprehensive authorization bill annually 
and facilitate its passage in the Senate, particularly in an 
era when ``filibusters and the prospect of filibusters shape 
much of the way in which the Senate does its work on the 
floor''?\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ This case study is based on research originally published as a 
book chapter in an edited volume. See Colleen J. Shogan, ``Defense 
Authorization: The Senate's Last Best Hope,'' Party and Procedure in 
the United States Congress, ed. Jacob Straus (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2012), pp. 195-215. The essay drew on 
interviews with numerous congressional staffers who work or worked on 
defense issues with the Senate Armed Services Committee. The author 
also previously worked for a Senator who served on the Armed Services 
Committee.
    \3\ A more recent and analogous example is the legislative debate 
concerning sexual assault in the military. The Senate Armed Services 
Committee debated various reform proposals during consideration of the 
FY2014 NDAA. Several hearings, at both the full and subcommittee 
levels, were held on the issue from March through June 2013. SASC 
Personnel Subcommittee Chair Kirsten Gillibrand added language in 
subcommittee markup to remove the chain of command from prosecution of 
felony crimes. In full committee markup, Chair Carl Levin's amendment 
was adopted, which changed the Gillibrand provision but required a 
senior officer in the chain of command to review any decision not to 
prosecute. It also made retaliatory action against a sexual assault 
victim a crime. When the NDAA reached the floor, both Senator 
Gillibrand and Senator Claire McCaskill offered amendments. Senator 
McCaskill's amendment aimed at strengthening Senator Levin's provisions 
but did not remove the chain of command from decisions concerning 
prosecution. A failed cloture vote on the underlying NDAA prevented 
votes on both proposals when the Majority Leader filled the amendment 
tree, but compromise language concerning military sexual assault 
appeared in the final ``pre-conferenced'' version of the NDAA. The 
Senate voted 84 to 15 to concur with the negotiated defense 
authorization language (H.R. 3304) in late December. In March 2014, the 
Senate debated the Gillibrand and McCaskill proposals as standalone 
bills. The Gillibrand bill (S. 1752) did not receive the required 60 
votes for cloture; Senator McCaskill's legislation (S. 1917) received 
cloture and subsequently passed the Senate.
    \4\ CRS Report RL30360, Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate, by 
Richard S. Beth and Valerie Heitshusen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             FY2011 NDAA: Ending ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell''

    Pressure to end the military ban on openly gay service 
members intensified after the 2008 election. Presidential 
candidate Barack Obama promised publicly during the campaign 
that he would end the practice of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell'' and 
support subsequent integration.\5\ As President, Obama included 
a statement of support for repeal in his 2010 State of the 
Union Address.\6\ Soon thereafter, the chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, testified before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee. In his opening remarks, Mullen 
stated that DADT ``forces young men and women to lie about who 
they are in order to defend their fellow citizens.'' He 
continued, ``For me, personally, it comes down to integrity.'' 
\7\ At the hearing, Mullen also revealed that a Pentagon report 
analyzing the potential effects of repealing the ban was 
scheduled for completion in December 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ ``Obama: Repeal of `don't ask, don't tell' possible.'' 
Associated Press, April 4, 2008, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/24046489/
#.U0wnkYWW_Qo.
    \6\ ``Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address.'' 
January 27, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-state-union-address.
    \7\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To Receive 
Testimony Related to the `Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy, 111th Cong., 
2d sess., February 2, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House of Representatives moved quickly, including 
repeal language during floor consideration of the FY2011 NDAA. 
On May 28, the House voted on final passage (229-186).\8\ On 
the same day, Senator Joseph Lieberman successfully offered an 
amendment in the closed full Senate Armed Services Committee 
markup of the FY2011 NDAA to add DADT repeal language to the 
bill. The amendment was adopted by a vote of 16 to 12; SASC 
later approved its marked-up version of the NDAA with a vote of 
18 to 10.\9\ For a bill that routinely garners unanimous or 
near-unanimous support moving out of committee, the split 
support in markup indicated that Senate floor adoption might 
prove challenging.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ House roll call vote no. 336, Congressional Record, May 28, 
2010, p. H4199.
    \9\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 111th Cong., 2d sess., 
June 4, 2010, S. Rept. 111-201 (Washington: GPO, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A cloture vote on the motion to proceed, requiring the 
support of 60 Senators, failed on September 21 by a tally of 56 
to 43.\10\ The prognosis for Senate passage of the FY2011 NDAA 
appeared unlikely. Since the bill had never proceeded to floor 
consideration, no Senators had benefited from the opportunity 
to offer amendments to the NDAA, as was routinely the case. 
With an extended recess planned before the November election, 
the only chance of NDAA passage was during the post-election 
``lame duck'' session. The typical 2-week floor process for the 
NDAA, which had previously allowed all Senators to file 
amendments to the bill, seemed out of the question in an 
abbreviated session at the end of a Congress. Given the 
opposition to the repeal of DADT and the proposed restrictions 
on the number of amendments that would be considered, the 
legislation's prospects seemed dim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Senate roll call vote no. 238, Congressional Record, September 
21, 2010, p. S7246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the bill's prospects changed when the Pentagon 
released a survey of military service members on November 30, 
2010.\11\ Its release was followed by 2 days of hearings in the 
SASC on the report. While both proponents and opponents of the 
repeal cited findings that supported their arguments, the 
survey showed that more than two-thirds of service members did 
not oppose openly gay men and women serving in the 
military.\12\ Those who supported the repeal of DADT believed 
that this finding would enable passage before adjournment. 
Nonetheless, when another cloture vote on the motion to proceed 
was taken, the tally fell 3 votes short of the required 60 
needed to proceed to consideration of the NDAA on the 
floor.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ The Honorable Jeh Charles Johnson and General Carter F. Ham, 
U.S. Army, Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated 
with a Repeal of ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' Department of Defense, 
Washington, DC, November 30, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/home/
features/2010/0610_dadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20101130%28secure-
hires%29.pdf.
    \12\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To receive 
testimony on the report of the Department of Defense Working Group that 
conducted a comprehensive review of the issues associated with a repeal 
of section 654 of title 10, United States Code, ``Policy Concerning 
Homosexuality in the Armed Forces,'' 111th Cong., 2d sess., December 2, 
2010.
    \13\ Senate roll call vote no. 270, Congressional Record, December 
9, 2010, p. S8683.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The strategic maneuvering enabled the repeal of DADT to 
pass the Senate on December 18, 2010, with a vote of 65 to 
31.\14\ Even though the controversy over DADT had been removed 
from consideration of the FY2011 NDAA, there was very little 
time left before the adjournment of the 111th Congress. The 
only realistic way forward was a final effort to pass the NDAA 
by unanimous consent on the Senate floor. The NDAA's final 
passage had never been secured previously by unanimous consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Senate roll call vote no. 281, Congressional Record, December 
18, 2010, p. S10684.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Lieberman and Senator Susan Collins decided to file 
stand-alone repeal legislation, S. 4022. Besides the inclusion 
of the DADT repeal language, the FY2011 NDAA had been fraught 
with controversy concerning the process for considering 
amendments, and also contained a controversial provision 
concerning abortions in military hospitals. Senators Collins 
and Lieberman reportedly believed that if they could secure a 
vote before adjournment on the stand-alone repeal, they stood a 
better chance for passage. It was possible that a separate 
legislative vehicle for DADT repeal would give the NDAA a 
better chance to proceed to Senate floor consideration.
    Realizing this might become the only option, SASC staff had 
begun to work with House Armed Services Committee staff weeks 
earlier to prepare an abbreviated ``pre-conference'' version of 
the NDAA. All controversial provisions, including the language 
that would have allowed privately funded abortions in military 
hospitals, were removed. The danger of moving the NDAA by 
unanimous consent on the Senate floor was that any Senator 
could object and prevent passage.\15\ Working closely with the 
minority, SASC Chair Carl Levin moved toward crafting a bill 
that he believed would not raise an objection to a motion to 
pass the bill by unanimous consent. On December 22, the FY2011 
NDAA passed the Senate by unanimous consent. The exchange on 
the floor between Chair Carl Levin and Ranking Member John 
McCain provides commentary concerning the unprecedented 
procedural scenario required for the bill's passage:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ For more information about unanimous consent agreements on the 
Senate floor, see CRS Report RS20594, How Unanimous Consent Agreements 
Regulate Senate Floor Action, by Richard S. Beth.

    Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in legislative session and in 
morning business, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 717, 
H.R. 6523, the Department of Defense authorization bill, that a 
Levin-McCain amendment that is at the desk be agreed to, the 
bill, as amended, be read the third time and passed, the 
motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no 
intervening action or debate, and that any statements related 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to the bill be printed in the Record.

    The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?

    Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not 
object, a lot of people may not understand that unanimous 
consent request that was just made by the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee.
    Am I correct, I ask my friend from Michigan, that this is 
in order to pass the National Defense Authorization Act? We 
have gone, I believe, 48 years and passed one, and there are 
vital programs, policies, and pay raises for the men and women 
in the military and other policy matters that are vital to 
successfully carrying out the two wars we are in and providing 
the men and women who are serving with the best possible 
equipment and capabilities to win those conflicts. Am I correct 
in assuming that is what this agreement is about?

    Mr. LEVIN. The Senator from Arizona is correct. It is the 
bill--slightly reduced to eliminate some of the controversial 
provisions, which would have prevented us from getting to this 
point, but this is the Defense authorization bill, and 90 to 95 
percent of the bill is the bill we worked so hard on in 
committee on a bipartisan basis. I am very certain that our men 
and women in uniform, as this Christmas season comes upon us, 
will be very grateful indeed that we did this in the 49th 
year--and if the House will move swiftly today and pass this 
bill, as we have done in the previous 48 years--passed an 
authorization bill--which is so essential to their success.

    Mr. McCAIN. I will not object.\16\

    Although the Senate had to resort to unconventional 
mechanisms, the controversy generated by the repeal of ``Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell'' did not derail passage of the FY2011 NDAA. 
The factors that enabled passage of previous defense 
authorization bills played an important role. In particular, 
when it came down to the final days before adjournment and it 
was apparent that the FY2011 NDAA could only move through the 
Senate by unanimous consent, staff needed to rely upon trusted 
bipartisan relationships to make the negotiations work. 
Committee leadership also worked diligently to ensure final 
passage on a carefully negotiated, abbreviated bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Senator Carl Levin and Senator John McCain, Senate debate, 
Congressional Record, December 22, 2010, p. S10936.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In a time period in which enacting authorization bills has 
become more challenging, how has the Senate continued to pass a 
national defense bill annually?\17\ The answer to this question 
is not a simple one. A complex mixture of committee traditions, 
processes, and a sense of a common mission concerning the 
overall purpose of the NDAA contribute to the outcome. These 
elements appear to work simultaneously. Thus, if one critical 
practice or process is altered, the outcome of future defense 
authorization bills could be affected. Subsequent sections 
provide a detailed description of Senate consideration of the 
NDAA and an analysis of several important factors that 
contribute to the consistent record of Senate NDAA passage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ See David Price, ``The Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Partisanship,'' The Boston Review, May/June 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Senate Armed Services and the NDAA

    To understand why the defense authorization bill passes the 
Senate every year, it is important to comprehend SASC's routine 
processes for considering the legislation.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ For a history describing the origins of the NDAA, see Raymond 
H. Dawson, ``Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense 
Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapons Systems,'' American 
Political Science Review, vol. 56, no. 1 (March 1962), pp. 42-57. For 
another depiction of defense committees at work in Congress, see Pat 
Towell, ``Congress and Defense,'' in Congress and the Politics of 
National Security, ed. David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The submission of the President's budget request is the 
initiating event. In early February, the President submits a 
budget request to Congress that includes the estimated cost of 
defense for the following fiscal year. At that time, SASC 
staffers receive the request and begin to analyze and evaluate 
the President's request for the allocation of defense dollars 
and resources. The Pentagon routinely sends briefers to 
Congress that week, who help both SASC and personal office 
military legislative assistants (known as MLAs) understand the 
broad, overarching budgetary message and some specifics, 
usually associated with major program changes or decisions. 
These meetings take place consistent with the bipartisan 
tradition of SASC; both majority and minority staff attend the 
same briefings and receive the same message from the executive 
branch, regardless of which party controls the Presidency or 
the Senate at the time.
    Soon after the budget submission, often only days after its 
receipt, SASC begins a series of hearings on the budget request 
and other major related issues. These hearings are an important 
part of the process. The first hearing features the Secretary 
of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who 
answer overall questions concerning the Nation's security 
posture, strategy, and budget challenges that may present 
themselves in the coming year. This hearing is followed by a 
number of more focused hearings with the combatant commanders 
(such as U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central 
Command), the service chiefs (such as Commandant of the U.S. 
Marine Corps), and the civilian department secretaries (such as 
the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force) as the witnesses.
    In each instance, issues concerning the geostrategic 
environment and the President's budget request are raised, as 
well as other concerns that might require legislative language 
in the upcoming fiscal year defense authorization bill. Other 
full committee hearings, often focused on intelligence or 
current U.S. military operations abroad, also take place in 
February and March. The full committee's hearing schedule is 
filled in the months of February, March, and April to guarantee 
that all components of the military have a chance to testify 
and that all Senators have a chance to ask questions about 
their policy and program recommendations. The pace is rapid, 
with at least one major hearing and often several hearings 
scheduled for each week.
    Given the high level of substance and the expansive 
territory each hearing must cover, the amount of preparation is 
considerable, both for professional committee staff and the 
MLAs. Given the current size of the committee, one round of 
questioning is common, and if time runs out, Senators may 
submit additional questions to the witnesses as QFRs (questions 
for the record), generating a subsequent written response. The 
motivation behind the large number of hearings, conducted 
annually, is to build as comprehensive a public record as 
possible with respect to the policy or budgetary issues that 
may be addressed by the annual defense authorization bill. 
Staffers use the hearings to flag important issues and receive 
civilian and military leadership positions on those issues that 
will likely require considerable discussion and debate during 
consideration of the NDAA. As the bill is subsequently drafted 
during the spring months, the hearing record serves as a 
repository of information for Senators and staff.
    In March, after the bulk of the full committee annual 
hearings are completed, the subcommittee hearing season begins. 
Subcommittees hold hearings concurrently with additional full 
committee hearings. As one might expect, the subcommittee 
hearings are more specialized, focused on their specific 
jurisdictional responsibilities, and allow further probing of 
issues raised at the full committee. Professional committee 
staff routinely provide the chair and ranking member of the 
subcommittee with a hearing schedule that combines both the 
particular interests of the Senators running the committee and 
the policy needs that require further scrutiny and debate. Most 
subcommittees conduct at least four hearings. Since the SASC 
uses the hearings as a way to build the record for the annual 
defense authorization bill, Senators who want to influence the 
bill in numerous areas usually find a way to attend as many 
hearings as possible. The record is critical, as the SASC 
treats it as a blueprint for the legislation. Issues that are 
flagged in subcommittee and committee hearings routinely find 
their way into the authorizing bill. Hearings can bring certain 
problems to light, and the hearing record is important as a 
repository of information that can inform subsequent 
legislative drafting.
    Hearings continue in the SASC throughout the year on a 
variety of topics relevant to the military and national 
security. The highest concentration of subcommittee and 
committee hearings concludes in mid-May. As the hearings end, 
intense preparation for the markup of the defense authorization 
bill begins.
    During this time, all Senators have the opportunity to make 
requests to the chair or ranking member concerning the contents 
of the bill. Senators usually construct a list of requests to 
the committee for inclusion. Most requests ask for adjustments 
to programs that have already been recommended for funding in 
the President's budget. SASC staff evaluate these requests, 
relying heavily on the Pentagon and the unfunded requirements 
lists compiled by each of the service chiefs and occasionally 
by a combatant commander. The majority's recommendations with 
regard to these requests are not required to be revealed to the 
minority or Members until just before the draft bill (known as 
the chairman's mark) is presented to the full committee at the 
beginning of markup.
    As the hearings are conducted in the spring, SASC staff 
work to produce a draft of the bill. Much of the work is done 
collaboratively, with both majority and minority committee 
staffers influencing the draft. Once the draft has been 
completed and receives the approval of the chair, a weeklong 
defense authorization markup is scheduled, usually near the end 
of spring or in early summer. Several days before the markup, 
committee staffers provide briefing binders, based on 
subcommittee jurisdiction, with draft language and funding 
tables with recommended authorization levels for 
appropriations, for Senators on the committee and their MLAs. 
Staffers from both sides of the aisle receive the briefing 
books at the same time. Previously, the briefing books were not 
allowed to leave the committee hearing room. MLAs who wanted to 
review the books in preparation for markup remained in the 
hearing room; no photocopying was allowed and electronic 
transmission was not permitted.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ For the FY2012 NDAA, a slight procedural change allowed MLAs 
to remove the briefing book from the Armed Services committee room and 
take it to the Senator's office for examination. A strict embargo of 
the information contained in the books still applied, and no electronic 
transmission of the books occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the days leading up to markup, MLAs work with committee 
staff to plan amendments their bosses intend to offer. If 
possible, compromises are often formulated prior to markup to 
ensure that fewer disagreements during the actual formal 
procedure require time and attention for debate and votes.
    Markup of specific portions of defense authorization begins 
at the subcommittee level on a Tuesday. All six subcommittee 
markups are usually conducted on Tuesday or early Wednesday. On 
Wednesday afternoon, the full committee markup commences, and 
lasts until the committee has finished marking up the bill. 
Usually, markup finishes by Friday of the same week. During the 
full committee markup, issues are raised for debate, and, if 
necessary, votes are taken if such issues were not resolved at 
the subcommittee level. Often, controversial issues were 
identified through the hearings that occurred earlier in the 
year. If there is a disagreement about a provision in the bill, 
the chair may set the issue aside and instruct staff to work 
with Senators with differing perspectives to reach agreement. 
During closed markup, brief ``adjournments'' are common. Staff 
and Senators are given the appropriate time to construct an 
acceptable compromise. If such agreement cannot be reached, 
formal committee votes are taken to decide what will and will 
not be included in the full committee's bill and report. The 
goal is to produce a committee bill in which a considerable 
majority of Senators on the SASC can support to move the bill 
out of markup and onto the floor for full Senate consideration.
    Historically, 2 weeks of floor time were reserved in the 
Senate for consideration of the defense authorization bill. 
During floor consideration, hundreds of amendments are often 
filed. Senators view the NDAA as a good opportunity to attach 
legislative language, sometimes unrelated to defense, to a bill 
likely to become law. Prior to cloture, Senate rules allow the 
consideration of nongermane amendments.
    Committee staffers from both sides of the aisle work with 
Senators (who often do not serve on the SASC) to consider 
amendments for which agreement can be achieved and included in 
the bill by unanimous consent as part of what is called a 
``manager's package'' of noncontroversial amendments. 
Compromising with Senators who wish to amend the bill on the 
floor is a time-tested stratagem; it gives Senators a stake in 
the bill, thereby helping secure their votes for cloture, if 
necessary, and final passage. A set of amendments from both 
sides of the aisle, which may require floor votes, is usually 
agreed to by unanimous consent prior to cloture. If cloture is 
invoked on the bill itself, amendments must be germane.\20\ In 
typical practice, the manager's package or packages move 
forward through unanimous consent, occasionally even after 
cloture, and then a vote for final passage is scheduled.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ CRS Report 98-780, Cloture: Its Effect on Senate Proceedings, 
by Walter J. Oleszek.
    \21\ In recent years, however, the routine processes of floor 
consideration of the NDAA described earlier have been disrupted due to 
attempts to attach controversial nondefense-related legislative 
language to the bill and the inability to reach unanimous consent on a 
manager's package.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After both Houses of Congress have considered and passed 
the bill on the floor, conference begins. Issues on which the 
House and Senate disagreed are divided into subcommittee 
jurisdictions and assigned to professional committee staffers 
who take the lead in the staff negotiations, with the House and 
Senate each explaining their positions. The vast majority of 
differences are resolved at the professional staff level.
    When committee staff cannot agree to a final position, the 
majority and minority staff directors try to reach a 
compromise. If they cannot agree, House Members and Senators 
discuss the issues at hand. Usually, there are only a small 
number of issues that require compromise. Signatures on the 
final conference report by a majority of conferees from the 
Senate and House are the final step in the process before 
sending the bill to the Chambers for final passage and then to 
the President for his signature.

                           Why Does It Work?

    The previous section describes the process in which the 
Senate considers the NDAA each year. But it elicits the 
question: why does it work? The rules governing passage of the 
defense authorization are the same as those for any other bill 
considered in the Senate. However, there are particular 
practices and unique characteristics that increase the 
likelihood of NDAA passage on an annual basis. These variables 
influencing the outcome are distinct and often work in tandem 
with each other to yield the desired outcome. Four primary 
reasons explain the NDAA's repeated successes: bipartisanship, 
routine committee processes, staff interactions, and closed 
markups.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ In the previously published version of this essay, the 4 
reasons for the NDAA's continued passage in the Senate originated from 
over 20 interviews with current and former Senate Armed Services 
Committee staff members and MLAs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             Bipartisanship

    Bipartisanship plays a key role in several ways. First, the 
subject matter itself is an issue that lends itself to 
bipartisanship. There is a deep sense among staff that they are 
working on a bill that improves the condition of those serving 
in the military, and without the bill, the lives of service 
members would be more difficult. There is a shared ethos of 
patriotism among those who work on the NDAA, both professional 
committee staff and MLAs. The inherent bipartisan belief in a 
shared mission is distinctive, and may have been even more 
influential in the past decade as the United States fought two 
wars.
    Besides the fact that both parties consider national 
security a priority, defense policymaking often cuts across 
partisan lines. Defense-related constituencies do not routinely 
align on a partisan basis. Rather, there are often parochial 
interests, such as the continued production of a weapons system 
or the closing of a military base, that converge geographically 
or along shared industries. Coalitions routinely arise along 
axes other than partisanship.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ On the relationship between geography and defense generally, 
see Thomas Carsey and Barry Rundquist, ``The Reciprocal Relationship 
between State Defense Interest and Committee Representation in 
Congress,'' Public Choice, vol. 99 (1999), pp. 455-463.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The bipartisan culture of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee developed incrementally over time. The chairs and 
ranking members of the committee historically set the precedent 
of a bipartisan approach and tone. Chairs served as an example 
in how they dealt with Senators from the minority party. Strong 
chairmen who believed that partisanship stopped at the water's 
edge contributed to the development and growth of the 
bipartisan SASC culture. Bipartisanship on the committee is 
easily detected during markup of the bill, when many issues are 
resolved amicably.
    Bipartisanship has policy effects, as well. For amendments 
to be accepted during markup or on the floor, compromises must 
take place that may require the majority to incorporate the 
views of the minority. Majority staff and MLAs adopt the 
practice of compromising on amendments so that minority 
concerns are addressed. A ``winner take all'' approach is rare.
    Finally, bipartisanship guides the ``building-block'' 
approach to the creation of the bill. When the professional 
staff work together to write the chairman's mark, they adopt a 
bipartisan approach, largely including provisions agreeable to 
both sides in the mark, and cautiously and infrequently 
including some that are not. Controversial language is debated 
during the full committee markup, and the most controversial 
provisions receive votes. However, some controversial issues in 
markup are deferred to floor consideration. At times, a Member 
may determine that a markup vote would be unsuccessful, so a 
strategic decision to file a floor amendment is made.
    This practice can be contrasted to that of including a 
number of controversial issues in the chairman's mark. If that 
occurs, Senators must rely on the amending process in markup to 
attempt removal of such measures. This can force Senators to 
make an ``up or down'' decision on the mark, sometimes without 
being able to vote on all controversial provisions. That 
approach can prove efficient, but restricts the choices of 
Senators and does not reliably result in consensus. In 
contrast, the SASC's ``building-block'' methodology starts with 
the premise of bipartisanship and agreement and proceeds from 
that starting point to add provisions after debate.

                      Routine Committee Processes

    Another distinctive feature of the NDAA is that the SASC 
uses a routine process each year in preparing the bill. Every 
year, the same hearings are held with the Secretary of Defense, 
the Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders, and service 
civilian and military leaders. Markup always takes place in 
late spring or early summer and employs a similar schedule. 
There are no surprises in the process of producing the bill. 
Staff and Senators know what to expect. After new staff and 
Senators complete the process once or twice, they understand 
how to participate fully in future bills. While the issues 
change, the process does not.
    Hearings are constructed as information-gathering exercises 
premised upon substantive inquiry. The panels in the SASC are 
used to create a public record in preparation for the drafting 
of the NDAA. The hearings illuminate the significant policy 
problems that must be addressed in the annual authorization 
bill. For example, in the FY2011 bill, the SASC held committee 
hearings on metrics for the Joint Strike Fighter, which 
resulted in bill language that created a matrix to evaluate the 
program's progress. Transcripts from the hearings assist in the 
production of the bill. Testimony can bring issues to light, 
such as low-performing schools for children in military 
families.
    The hearings also serve a policy purpose for the bill; they 
set the stage for the drafting, identify key issues that must 
be included, and give signals to the public about what the 
committee plans to address in the upcoming NDAA. The entire 
committee is structured around the completion of one major 
task, the NDAA. The routine nature of the process and the focus 
of the committee on this task play a significant role in its 
completion.

                           Staff Interactions

    Distinct from other aspects of bipartisanship is the role 
of staff. The unique, collegial relationships that exist 
between Senate staff who work on defense authorization issues 
contribute considerably to the routine passage of the bill.
    Why does this bipartisan collegiality exist? Part of the 
reason is that regardless of party affiliation, staff who work 
on the NDAA believe that their work is critically important to 
maintaining a strong national defense. They also agree that 
those who serve in the military deserve strong legislative 
support from Congress.
    Besides having common goals, Senate Armed Services 
Committee staff also share office space. Party affiliation 
determines seating within the suite, but everyone has the same 
door key to a shared office space. This type of office 
structure facilitates a bipartisan working environment. This 
unusual arrangement developed over time, but in large part was 
due to Chairman Richard Russell. Years earlier, he decided that 
instead of moving Armed Services Committee staff to the newly 
constructed Senate Office Building across the street, the 
committee would remain in its original location, even if the 
space was smaller.\24\ Since there was no room for separate 
partisan staffs in the office suite, the tradition of sitting 
together in a bipartisan fashion took root.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ The building in which SASC works was named for Senator Russell 
in 1972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Partially due to the friendly relations between staff of 
different parties, the longevity of committee staff is 
considerable. Over time, working relationships based on mutual 
trust can develop, since turnover is minimal.\25\ When a 
majority staffer tells his minority counterpart that he will 
include a particular provision in the chairman's mark of the 
bill, there is little doubt that the majority staffer will keep 
his word. If party control in the Senate flips the following 
year, reciprocal courtesy is standard operating procedure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ See Towell, p. 87, on this point. For example, in 2008, almost 
20 percent of the professional staff on SASC had worked on the 
committee for over 10 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to the seating arrangements, committee staffers 
conduct routine business in a bipartisan fashion. For example, 
staff travel together on trips abroad. This increases comity 
and lessens the likelihood of open disagreements. Furthermore, 
when the Pentagon provides briefings to committee staff, both 
the majority and minority often attend the same meeting. This 
enables both sides of the aisle to hear the same information 
and responses. The sheer amount of time spent with each other 
also enables a strong working relationship. A ``team effort'' 
approach is omnipresent.
    Collegiality is similarly exercised by MLAs. In the past, a 
bipartisan group of MLAs met regularly after work to discuss 
issues of importance and plan trips together. MLAs also trusted 
committee staff from both parties to work with them in crafting 
the NDAA. The trusting relationships between MLAs and committee 
staff help to facilitate substantive hearings in the early part 
of the process, and even more importantly, a smooth and 
efficient committee markup later in the year. Often, committee 
staff cannot accept the amendments submitted by MLAs for markup 
as prepared, but commit to working with them to craft 
compromise language that can be included in the bill as it 
moves out of committee. That commitment to working with 
personal office staff routinely on a bipartisan basis helps 
prevent the bill from stalling and keeps it moving toward 
Senate floor consideration.
    Armed Services staff and MLAs also operate within a focused 
and defined defense community. That interconnected community, 
which includes think tank scholars, select journalists, and 
industry representatives, is close-knit and typically 
collegial. The norms of bipartisanship extend beyond Capitol 
Hill, and provide a general professional arc of expectation 
concerning reasonable collaboration and reciprocity.

                             Closed Markup

    A key difference in the operations of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee's markup process compared to that of the 
House is the practice of conducting a closed markup of the 
NDAA.\26\ Only Senators and staff holding an appropriate 
security clearance attend the full committee markup. Decisions 
made in markup are not classified, but the discussions and the 
debate concerning such decisions can involve classified 
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ According to Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, 
committee hearings shall be open to the public. There are several 
exceptions to this rule, including ``secrets in the interests of 
national defense'' and ``information to the trade secrets of financial 
or commercial information.'' See http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the closed markup process, the public, lobbyists, 
and journalists are prohibited from entering the committee 
room. Usually, the chair and the ranking member stress to 
Senators and staff at the beginning of the subcommittee (if 
closed) and full committee markups the importance of compliance 
with the embargo of the contents of the chairman's mark and 
confidentiality during the committee's deliberations.
    The closed nature of the markup enables the committee to 
move from unclassified to classified deliberations quickly. If 
classified information or occasionally industry proprietary 
information is pertinent to a particular provision of the bill 
that is being considered during markup, the committee can 
discuss such details, since all participating staff possesses 
the necessary security clearances. The decisions made during 
the markup, however, are not classified, and are available to 
the public after completion, with the exception of the 
classified annex.
    The benefits of a closed process include an efficient and 
candid policymaking process. Without reporters or lobbyists in 
the room, Senators are free to debate difficult decisions and 
to compromise. If a provision is discussed in markup, it 
usually means that the committee staffers were unable to 
resolve differences on that provision prior to the mark, or it 
could mean that the chair's preference on a provision differs 
from those of others on the committee. Consequently, it is then 
up to the Senators, with the assistance of the committee staff 
and MLAs, to come up with a compromise solution or a way 
forward. When dealing with weapons systems and military 
procurement, these decisions often have parochial consequences 
for Senators on the committee. The closed markup allows 
Senators with those concerns to craft a deal with others on the 
committee that might be difficult if lobbyists or reporters 
were present. Compromise often requires some degree of 
anonymity, and the closed markup in the SASC is testimony to 
that reality.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ On the point about anonymity and compromise in Congress, see 
R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the past few years, a handful of Senators on the SASC 
have tried to change the closed markup process for the NDAA. 
They argue that an open process would be beneficial, pointing 
to the fact that the House Armed Services Committee does not 
close its markup of the NDAA. Efforts to increase funding for 
particular programs would be disclosed publicly. Advocates for 
an open markup argue that parochialism might lessen during an 
open session, and accountability for defense authorization 
spending would increase.
    Although full committee markup continues in closed session, 
each year the proponents of an open process gain more traction. 
In recent years, various advocacy groups have waged a public 
relations campaign to open the markup.\28\ In the FY2014 full 
committee markup, 2 hours of debate on provisions related to 
sexual assault in the military occurred in open session. For 
the FY2015 bill, four of the six subcommittee markups 
transpired in open session. Although the markups were held in 
open session, the contents of the subcommittee markup books 
were still embargoed and were not released publicly until the 
bill and its accompanying report were sent to the full Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ See ``Open NDAA'' at http://openndaa.org/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ramifications of moving to an open full committee 
markup are a point of contention. While the goal of an open 
markup is to increase transparency and accountability, others 
contend that it could have the opposite effect, leading to a 
reduction of vigorous debate and fewer compromises. An open 
markup could have other unintended consequences, such as 
pushing crucial decisions back to the proverbial smoke-filled 
room or facilitating greater influence on the part of interest 
groups and industry lobbyists.

                          Concluding Thoughts

    When considering the operations of Congress as a bicameral 
institution, the larger question is whether the practices and 
norms adopted by the Senate Armed Services Committee in its 
production of writing an annual defense authorization bill can 
be applied to other committees or policy areas.
    No particular committee or entity in Congress has a 
monopoly on bipartisanship. Within the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, bipartisanship is the norm among elected Senators, 
professional staff, and personal office legislative assistants. 
The bipartisanship is part of the committee's history and has 
persevered due to decades of a shared culture and philosophy. 
Bipartisanship is path-dependent in the SASC; past practices 
largely determine future behavior. However, other committees 
that may want to foster a similar culture could adopt several 
of the practices the SASC employs. Bipartisanship also starts 
at the top; the chair and ranking members can set the tone of a 
committee that could have lasting consequences on the 
operations and procedures of the panel. In the example of the 
FY2011 NDAA, in which final passage relied upon unanimous 
consent, bipartisanship and stripping out all controversial 
provisions fostered the shared trust between the majority and 
minority that made such an agreement possible.
    The SASC adopts a routine approach to the production of the 
NDAA each year. The predictability imposes certain constraints 
on those who work on the bill, but because the mechanics of 
production are kept relatively constant, the process is 
difficult to derail. The copious hearings conducted in the 
early part of the year help to identify the most critical 
issues facing the military. In FY2011, when a bill with fewer 
provisions had to move forward due to time constraints at the 
end of the Congress, committee staff were in a good position to 
prioritize the most critical issues that had generated a 
consensus agreement. Even though floor consideration in FY2011 
was severely truncated at the end, the NDAA was able to survive 
because the process behind it had been comprehensive. Other 
committees may produce more than one major piece of legislation 
in a given year, but the consensual ``building-block'' approach 
utilized by the SASC could be adopted, in modified form, to 
meet the needs of other authorizing committees.
    It is unlikely that the closed full committee markup in the 
SASC could be replicated in other committees. Rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate requires open committee meetings, 
except when a committee is scheduled to discuss matters of 
national security, law enforcement, finance, or governmental 
security.
    An analogy may be instructive. The Department of Defense, 
due to its size and critical mission, can be compared to a 
snowball rolling down a hill; it may encounter obstacles in its 
path, but the sheer force of its momentum is formidable. The 
NDAA keeps the snowball moving, and the processes and 
procedures in place at the SASC prevent it from breaking apart. 
The NDAA builds upon a stable foundation due to the nature of 
defense policy and the institutional magnitude of the Pentagon, 
but the specific actions taken by the SASC are consequential.
    It is important to note that when the NDAA has encountered 
recent difficulties in the Senate, those challenges occurred 
during floor consideration. A failure to reach a consensus on 
the floor concerning which amendments will receive time for 
debate, votes, or inclusion in a manager's package has 
complicated Senate passage of the bill.
    The historical practices of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in its annual production of the National Defense 
Authorization Act are worthy of attention. These norms and 
processes have not received considerable attention in the past 
from students of Congress or of defense policy. The unique 
success of this story warrants further consideration and study 
as representative and policymaking functions change over time. 
It also lends credence to the proposition that Congress is an 
evolving institution that can forge functional and creative 
solutions, rather than a fundamentally ``broken branch'' of 
government.


          The SBA and Small Business Policymaking in Congress

                           Robert Jay Dilger

           Senior Specialist in American National Government

                                  and

                               Sean Lowry

                       Analyst in Public Finance

                              ----------                              


        Prior to the 1960s, small business policymaking was 
        relatively noncontroversial; the Small Business 
        Administration's activities were relatively limited; 
        and congressional deliberations typically followed 
        regular order, featuring committee hearings, committee 
        markups, open floor debate, and a conference committee 
        to resolve any differences. Over time, the SBA's 
        mission has expanded beyond its original, 
        noncontroversial mandate of promoting competition in 
        private markets. This expansion enhanced the agency's 
        role in Federal economic policy, but also opened the 
        door to additional conflict. Today, small business 
        policymaking is increasingly characterized by partisan 
        differences, with many congressional Democrats viewing 
        the SBA as a vehicle to promote economic growth and job 
        creation, and many congressional Republicans objecting 
        to spending programs that increase the Federal deficit 
        or add to the Federal debt. Also, committee leaders and 
        others often seek alternative legislative means to 
        achieve their goals, for example attaching small 
        business provisions to bills considered ``must pass'' 
        legislation, such as national defense authorization and 
        appropriations bills. Thus, even in the most divided 
        and partisan circumstances, Congress finds a way to 
        pass small business legislation.

          The SBA and Small Business Policymaking in Congress

    From the depths of the Great Depression to today, assisting 
small business has emerged as a major issue for Congress, and a 
major point of contention. The growth of the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) from a nonpermanent agency with a 
relatively narrow, noncontroversial mandate to a permanent, 
Cabinet-level agency with a broad array of programs has created 
more opportunities for ideological and policy divisions around 
key issues of the day, such as the best means to promote 
economic recovery and growth while maintaining fiscal 
responsibility. The severity of these divisions has had a 
significant effect on the legislative process and small 
business policymaking in Congress.
    As will be discussed, in the past, especially under united 
government, small business policymaking often followed regular 
order, featuring committee hearings, followed by committee 
markups in both the House and Senate Small Business Committees, 
open floor debate in both Chambers, and a conference committee 
to resolve any differences on the legislation under 
consideration. Today, especially under divided government, it 
is less likely that small business policymaking will follow 
regular order. Instead, committee hearings and markups take 
place, but knowing that the other body is not likely to address 
the legislation there is less incentive to explore all sides of 
the issue--leading to an increased number of hearings that 
focus on the presentation of a particular viewpoint, rather 
than discussions of how to find a compromise solution. In 
addition, especially under divided government, committee 
leaders and others often seek alternative legislative means to 
achieve their goals, such as attaching small business 
legislation to other bills considered more likely to pass 
(e.g., national defense authorizations and appropriations 
bills). Thus, even in the most divided and partisan 
circumstances, Congress can still pass small business 
legislation. However, in the modern era, enacting major small 
business legislation is extremely difficult when Congress is 
divided, and partisan differences run deep.

  The Great Depression and the Origins of Modern Small Business Policy

    One of the earliest indications of congressional interest 
in assisting small businesses was the enactment of legislation 
(P.L. 72-2) during the Great Depression (on January 22, 1932), 
creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). The RFC 
was an independent Federal agency tasked with stabilizing 
financial markets and assisting businesses of all sizes to 
access capital through the provision of loans and the purchase 
of preferred stock, capital notes, and debentures. Although the 
RFC provided financial assistance to businesses of all sizes, 
President Herbert Hoover indicated in his signing statement 
that the RFC was:

    not created for the aid of big industries or big banks. 
Such institutions are amply able to take care of themselves. It 
is created for the support of the smaller banks and financial 
institutions, and through rendering their resources liquid to 
give renewed support to business, industry, and agriculture. It 
should give opportunity to mobilize the gigantic strength of 
our country for recovery.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Herbert Hoover, ``Statement About Signing the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation Act,'' January 22, 1932. Online by Gerhard Peters 
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=23210.

    President Hoover's statement reflected a prevailing 
national consensus that continues today: that Federal 
assistance to small businesses is justified because such 
assistance promotes competition in the private marketplace and, 
in turn, helps to prevent the adverse economic consequences 
that result from the formation of economic oligarchies and 
monopolies.
    Congress initially provided the RFC $500 million (over $80 
billion in 2013 dollars), with 10 percent of that amount set 
aside for the Secretary of Agriculture to provide financial and 
disaster assistance to farmers. The law required the RFC to 
give preference when awarding loans and advances to farmers who 
had experienced a crop failure during the Dust Bowl of 1931. 
Thus, from its beginning, the RFC was directed to provide both 
business and disaster assistance.
    Over time, Congress authorized an expansion of the RFC's 
activities. For example, immediately before and during World 
War II, the RFC, among other activities, financed plant 
conversions and new construction to enhance the nation's 
production of military and essential goods.\2\ After the war, 
the RFC's activities were limited primarily to making loans to 
businesses and providing disaster assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ James Butkiewicz, ``The Reconstruction Finance Corporation,'' 
at http://eh.net/encyclopedia/reconstruction-finance-corporation/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another early indication of congressional interest in 
assisting small business was the creation of the Senate Special 
Committee to Study and Survey Problems of Small Business 
Enterprises on October 8, 1940, and the House Select Committee 
on Small Business on December 4, 1941.\3\ These two committees, 
which were later provided permanent, standing committee status 
under new names, actively promoted small business interests in 
Congress by holding hearings and publishing reports designed to 
inform Congress on the problems faced by small businesses and 
their importance to the American economy.\4\ For example, the 
House Select Committee on Small Business was charged with the 
responsibility to determine whether small businesses ``are 
being adequately developed and utilized,'' what factors have 
hindered and are hindering small business development and 
utilization, whether adequate consideration is being given to 
small business needs, and to make recommendations to address 
``the post-war problems of small business.'' \5\ Both 
committees focused attention on the role of small businesses in 
preventing the formation of economic oligarchies and monopolies 
and ``predatory practices which threaten . . . the future of 
the free-enterprise system.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Senator James Murray, ``Survey of Problems of Small Business 
Enterprises, Senate Resolution 298, Calendar No. 2171,'' remarks in the 
Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 86, part 12 (October 8, 1940), pp. 
13365-13372; and Representative Adolph Sabath, ``Select Committee to 
Study Relationship of Defense Program to Small Business, House 
Resolution 294,'' House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 87, part 9 
(December 4, 1941), pp. 9418-9428.
    \4\ The Senate Special Committee was replaced by the Select 
Committee on Small Business on February 20, 1950, and that committee 
was renamed the Senate Committee on Small Business and provided 
permanent, standing committee status on March 25, 1981. On June 29, 
2001, the committee's name was changed to the Senate Committee on Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship. See Senator Kenneth Wherry, ``Creation 
of Standing Committee on Small Business, consideration of S. Res. 58,'' 
remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 96, 
part 2 (February 20, 1950), pp. 1920-1944; Senator Lowell Weicker, 
``Senate Resolution 101--Changing Status of Committee on Small Business 
to That of a Standing Committee,'' remarks in the Senate, Congressional 
Record, vol. 127, part 4 (March 25, 1981), pp. 5130-5132; and Senator 
John Kerry, ``Changing the Name of the Committee on Small Business to 
the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, S. Res. 123,'' 
remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, vol. 147, part 9 (June 29, 
2001), p. 12590. The House Select Committee on Small Business was made 
a permanent Select Committee on January 22, 1971, and provided 
permanent, standing committee status on October 8, 1974--effective 
January 1975. See Representative William Colmer, ``Rules of the House, 
H. Res. 5,'' House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 117, part 1 
(January 22, 1971), pp. 132-144; and U.S. Congress, House Select 
Committee on Committees, Committee Reform Amendments of 1974: 
Explanation of H. Res. 988 as Adopted by the House of Representatives, 
October 8, 1974, committee print, prepared by staff, 93d Cong., 2d 
sess., January 1, 1974, H. Prt. 93-962-8 (Washington: GPO, 1974), pp. 
3, 5, 50-51.
    \5\ Representative Adolph Sabath, ``Select Committee to Study 
Relationship of Defense Program to Small Business, House Resolution 
294,'' House debate, Congressional Record, vol. 87, part 9 (December 4, 
1941), p. 9418.
    \6\ U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Small Business, Annual 
Report, pursuant to H. Res. 18, 80th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 80-2466 
(Washington: GPO, 1948), p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           Authorization of the Small Business Administration

    In 1953, the Republican 83d Congress (1953-1955) decided to 
phase out the RFC, largely due to allegations of political 
favoritism in the granting of RFC loans and contracts.\7\ 
Enacted on July 30, 1953, Title 1 of P.L. 83-163, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act, provided a 
timeline to terminate the RFC's activities and to transfer its 
assets to other governmental agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Expenditures, Subcommittee 
on Investigations, Influence in Government Procurement, 82d Cong., 1st 
sess., September 13-15, 17, 19-21, 24-28, October 3-5, 1951 
(Washington: GPO, 1951); and U.S. Congress, Senate Banking and 
Currency, RFC Act Amendments of 1951, hearing on bills to amend the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 82d Cong., 1st sess., April 27, 
30, May 1, 2, 22-23 (Washington: GPO, 1951).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Concerned that small businesses might be harmed by the 
RFC's termination, especially given that the nation was 
experiencing a recession at the time (July 1953-May 1954), 
Title II of P.L. 83-163, the Small Business Act of 1953, 
authorized the creation of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), initially on a temporary, 2-year basis.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ P.L. 85-536, to amend the Small Business Act of 1953, enacted 
on July 18, 1958, made Title II of P.L. 83-163 a separate act to be 
known as the Small Business Act, and provided the SBA permanent 
statutory status.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Limited Scope, Limited Controversy

    The SBA's primary function, which is to enhance competition 
in the private marketplace by promoting the interests of small 
business, was, and remains, relatively noncontroversial. 
However, due to concerns about the political influence of 
larger businesses, small business advocates purposely limited 
the SBA's scope of operations, both to attract support for the 
agency's adoption and to minimize future partisan differences 
that could threaten the agency's survival. For example, 
statutory limits were placed on the amount of financial 
assistance the SBA could provide, and SBA loans could only be 
issued to borrowers who were unable to find credit on 
reasonable terms elsewhere.
    Like the RFC, the SBA was made an independent agency 
because, as the House Select Committee on Small Business put 
it, ``it is the feeling of this committee that such 
independence is absolutely essential and that the agency should 
be nonpartisan in nature, if small business is to receive 
proper recognition by the Government.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Small Business, Final 
Report, pursuant to H. Res. 22, 83d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. no. 2683 
(Washington: GPO, 1954), p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the time of the Small Business Act's enactment, most 
Members of Congress viewed the SBA's lending authority as the 
main way the agency would contribute to its mission. For 
example, in 1955, the Senate Select Committee on Small Business 
noted that:

    From the outset, the congressional sponsors of the 
legislation establishing the Small Business Administration were 
convinced that the agency's most important action program was 
in the field of financial assistance. Committee and floor 
discussion in both Houses indicated that the Members of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives felt that this 
organization was designed to take up at least part of the gap 
which would be left when the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation's authority came to an end. It was almost 
universally agreed that the legitimate credit needs of small 
businesses could not be met by private financial sources, and 
for that reason Congress authorized the SBA to make direct 
loans and to join banks in offering loans to those small 
concerns which were unable to find financing elsewhere.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 
Annual Report, 84th Cong., 1st sess., S. Rept. 84-129 (Washington: GPO, 
1955), p. 9.

    Although Congress authorized the SBA to provide access to 
capital to small businesses, it also indicated that the agency 
was not meant to supplant traditional lenders. Secretary of the 
Treasury George Humphrey testified before the Senate Committee 
on Banking and Currency that the Eisenhower administration 
supported the SBA's authorization. He further testified that 
the new agency should focus on the provision of guaranteed 
loans, as opposed to direct loans, to further ensure that it 
would supplement, and not compete with, private lenders.\11\ 
This belief led to the statutory requirement that the SBA can 
only provide business loans to small businesses that cannot 
obtain credit elsewhere on reasonable terms.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Ibid., pp. 547-548.
    \12\ As originally introduced by William Hill, chair of the House 
Select Committee To Conduct a Study and Investigate the Problems of 
Small Business, H.R. 5141, to create the Small Business Administration, 
would have provided the SBA permanent statutory authority and created a 
$500 million revolving fund to be used by the SBA for ``prime contract 
operations and loans''; it did not specify any direct or guaranteed 
loan limit ``with respect to any borrower.'' The bill, which, as 
amended, ultimately became the Small Business Act, restricted the SBA's 
authority to provide financial assistance to businesses that are deemed 
by the SBA to be small and unable to access credit elsewhere on 
reasonable terms. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and 
Currency, Creation of Small Business Administration, hearing on H.R. 
4090 and H.R. 5141, 83d Cong., 1st sess., May 14, 1953 (Washington: 
GPO, 1953), p. 8. For a discussion and analysis of the SBA's size 
standards, see CRS Report R40860, Small Business Size Standards: A 
Historical Analysis of Contemporary Issues, by Robert Jay Dilger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to financial assistance, the SBA inherited two 
preexisting Federal functions: disaster assistance from the 
RFC; and Federal contracting assistance from the RFC and the 
Small Defense Plants Administration. The SBA was also 
authorized to provide small businesses with management and 
technical training assistance. Together, these authorizations 
(the provision of financial assistance, contracting assistance, 
management and technical training assistance, and disaster 
assistance) were viewed as both necessary and sufficient to 
enable the SBA to meet its primary goal of enhancing the 
viability of small businesses and competitive markets.

  The SBA's Expanding Scope of Operations Leads to Increased Partisan 
                                Conflict

    During the early 1950s, the SBA's relatively limited scope 
resulted in small business policymaking in Congress being 
relatively low key and nonpartisan. The partisan composition of 
Congress at that time had relatively little impact on small 
business policymaking as most debates concerning the SBA were 
largely limited to determining the amount of money necessary to 
fully capitalize the SBA's business and disaster lending 
programs to meet existing demand.
    However, soon after its inception, policy debates over 
small business lending and the SBA's future began to shift from 
an almost exclusive focus on the relatively noncontroversial 
promotion of competitive markets to more partisan debates 
concerning the best way to create jobs and promote economic 
growth. This shift in focus was apparently triggered by two 
developments: a Federal Reserve Board report and Congress' 
reaction to a recession.\13\ The Federal Reserve Board report 
noted that the SBA did not [but should] provide equity 
financing--money provided in exchange for a share of ownership 
in the business.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ The recession lasted from August 1957 to April 1958.
    \14\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, Small 
Business Investment Act of 1958, report to accompany S. 3651, 85th 
Cong., 2d sess., June 30, 1958, H. Rept. 85-2060 (Washington: GPO, 
1958), pp. 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the Federal Reserve Board's report and 
concerned about the pace of the economic recovery from the 
recession, the Democratic 85th Congress (1957-1959), with broad 
support from both sides of the aisle, first provided the SBA 
permanent statutory authority (P.L. 85-536) and then approved 
P.L. 85-699, the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 
(SBIA).\15\ The act significantly expanded the SBA's scope of 
operations. Two key features of the SBA's expanded authority 
merit attention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ P.L. 85-536, to amend the Small Business Act of 1953, was 
enacted on July 18, 1958. It made Title II of P.L. 83-163 a separate 
act to be known as the Small Business Act. The House passed its version 
of the act (H.R. 7963) on June 25, 1958, by a vote of 393 to 2. The 
Senate passed the House bill, with amendments, on July 1, 1958, by 
voice vote. The conference agreement was passed by the House on July 
10, 1958, by voice vote; and by the Senate on July 11, 1958, by voice 
vote. P.L. 85-699 was enacted on August 21, 1958. The Senate passed its 
version of the act (S. 3651) on June 9, 1958, by voice vote. The House 
passed the Senate bill, with amendments, on July 23, 1958, by a vote of 
131 to 5. The conference agreement was passed by both the House and the 
Senate on August 7, 1958, by voice vote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, the SBIA authorized the SBA to create a venture 
capital investment program, later called the Small Business 
Investment Company (SBIC) program. The SBIC program was to 
``improve and stimulate the national economy in general and the 
small business segment thereof in particular'' by stimulating 
and supplementing ``the flow of private equity capital and long 
term loan funds which small business concerns need for the 
sound financing of their business operations and for their 
growth, expansion, and modernization, and which are not 
available in adequate supply.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ 15 U.S.C.  661. For further information and analysis 
concerning the SBA's SBIC program, see CRS Report R41456, SBA Small 
Business Investment Company Program, by Robert Jay Dilger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, the SBIA authorized a new small business lending 
program, now called the 504/Certified Development Company loan 
guaranty (504/CDC) program. The 504/CDC program provides long-
term fixed rate financing for major fixed assets, such as land, 
buildings, equipment, and machinery.\17\ In return for the 
financing, borrowers have to create a specified minimum number 
of jobs based on the size of the loan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ For further information and analysis concerning the SBA's 504/
CDC program, see CRS Report R41184, Small Business Administration 504/
CDC Loan Guaranty Program, by Robert Jay Dilger. Five for-profit CDCs 
that participated in predecessor CDC programs have been grandfathered 
into the current 504/CDC program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Overall, the expansion of the SBA's scope in 1958 to 
include venture capital and long-term lending was viewed as a 
means to assist in the promotion of free markets, to address 
market failures, and to enhance economic growth generally, and 
job growth specifically.
    The idea of expanding the SBA's scope to promote short-term 
job and economic growth, especially as a countercyclical policy 
tool during recessions, would later lead to heightened levels 
of partisan conflict over the coming decades. Most Democrats 
and advocates of demand side economics argue for the expansion 
of the SBA's programs as a vehicle to combat recessions.\18\ In 
contrast, most Republicans and advocates of supply side 
economics argue against these efforts, preferring lower taxes, 
reduced regulatory burden on business, and fiscal restraint as 
the best means to combat recessions.\19\ Also, as will be 
discussed, the relatively high subsidy costs associated with 
the SBA's direct lending program in the 1980s and 1990s and 
unprecedented losses in the SBIC's participating securities 
program during the early 2000s later led to increased partisan 
conflict over the extent of risk present in the SBA's loan and 
venture capital programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Demand-side economics is a school of macroeconomics that 
focuses on policies designed to stimulate aggregate demand, such as 
increased funding for infrastructure projects and spending programs 
targeted at lower income individuals who tend to spend the greatest 
portion of their income on consumer goods.
    \19\ Supply-side economics is a school of macroeconomics that 
focuses on policies designed to reduce barriers for people to produce 
(supply) goods and services as well as invest in capital, such as lower 
marginal Federal income tax rates and less business regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The SBA as a Tool to Address Discriminative Lending Practices

    In 1964, at the height of the civil rights movement in the 
United States, the SBA temporarily established the ``6 on 6'' 
pilot lending program. It provided loans of up to $6,000 for up 
to 6 years ``aimed specifically at disadvantaged potential 
entrepreneurs.'' \20\ This initiative was one of the earliest 
attempts by the SBA to address what many view as special 
impediments faced by minority entrepreneurs in accessing 
capital. The Democratic 88th Congress (1963-1965) also approved 
legislation to combat poverty and racial discrimination. One of 
these acts (P.L. 88-452, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964--
Title IV, Employment and Investment Incentives) authorized the 
director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, through the 
SBA, to provide what were subsequently called Economic 
Opportunity Loans (EOL).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Small Business, 
Subcommittee on Minority Small Business Enterprise, Government Minority 
Small Business Programs, hearing pursuant to H. Res. 5 and 19, 92d 
Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The EOL program became operational in January 1965, and 
continued through 1992 (the final EOL loan was disbursed in 
1996).\21\ Initially, the EOL program provided direct loans (of 
up to $25,000, with loan terms of up to 15 years) to assist 
small businesses and promote employment of the long-term 
unemployed. Starting in 1968, EOL loans increasingly were 
issued as guaranteed loans.\22\ Although the EOL program 
evolved over time, it remained focused on providing loans to 
low-income, minority-owned, very small businesses. The EOL 
program also provided management and technical training 
assistance to disadvantaged entrepreneurs.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ P.L. 93-386, the Small Business Amendments of 1974, formally 
transferred EOL program authority from the Office of Economic 
Opportunity to the SBA.
    \22\ The program's loan limits were increased by law from $25,000 
to $50,000 in 1972 and to $100,000 in 1976.
    \23\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Education and Labor, 
Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1967, hearing on H.R. 8311, 90th 
Cong., 1st sess., June 23, 1967 (Washington: GPO, 1967), pp. 1356-1362; 
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, Departments of Commerce, 
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
for 1993, 102d Cong., 2d sess., February 19, 1992 (Washington: GPO, 
1992), pp. 503-504; and U.S. General Accounting [now Accountability] 
Office, Most Borrowers of Economic Opportunity Loans Have Not Succeeded 
in Business, CED-81-3, December 8, 1980, pp. 1-8, at http://
www.gao.gov/assets/140/131190.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The EOL program and its successor, the Microloan program, 
broadened the SBA's scope of operations to include special 
efforts to address discriminative lending practices in the 
private sector.\24\ Over the years, a partisan debate has 
developed over whether special programs to aid specific 
demographic groups are necessary, duplicative of other 
programs, effective, or divert resources from the SBA's core 
mission.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ For further information and analysis concerning the SBA's 
Microloan program, see CRS Report R41057, Small Business Administration 
Microloan Program, by Robert Jay Dilger.
    \25\ For example, President George W. Bush proposed the elimination 
of all funding for the Microloan program in his FY2005, FY2006, and 
FY2007 budget requests to Congress, arguing that the 7(a) program was 
capable of serving the same clientele at a much lower cost. President 
Bush also proposed to terminate the Microloan program's marketing, 
management, and technical assistance grant program in his FY2008 and 
FY2009 budget requests to Congress. More recently, the House Committee 
on Small Business has recommended to the House Committee on the Budget 
that the SBA's various management and technical assistance training 
programs should be ``folded into the mission of the SBDC program or 
their responsibilities should be taken over by other agencies'' because 
they ``overlap each other and duplicate the educational services 
provided by other agencies.'' See U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 
Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2005, p. 334, at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/pdf/budget/sba.pdf; U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government: 
Fiscal Year 2006, p. 313, at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/
pdf/budget/sba.pdf; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the 
United States Government: Fiscal Year 2007, p. 283, at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/pdf/budget/sba.pdf; U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal 
Year 2008, pp. 139-140, at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/
budget/sba.pdf; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the 
United States Government: Fiscal Year 2009, p. 130, at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/budget/sba.pdf; and U.S. Congress, 
House Committee on Small Business, ``Views and Estimates of the 
Committee on Small Business on Matters to be set forth in the 
Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for FY2014,'' communication to the 
chairman, House Committee on the Budget, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 
February 27, 2013, at http://smallbusiness.house. gov/uploadedfiles/
revised_2014_views_and_estimates_document.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   The Divide Over Direct Loans and Increasing Costs to the Taxpayer

    The SBA has authority to make direct loans, both for 
disaster relief and for business purposes. During its first 40 
years, the SBA slowly redirected most of its business lending 
away from direct loans to guaranteed loans, primarily because 
the subsidy rate for direct loans was higher than the subsidy 
rate for guaranteed loans.\26\ For example, in FY1980, the SBA 
had authority for $301 million in direct lending and $3.6 
billion in guaranteed loans.\27\ During the 1980s and 1990s, 
direct business loan subsidy costs became a highly partisan 
issue. Many congressional Republicans viewed the elimination of 
SBA direct loans as a means to achieve budgetary savings that 
could be used to reduce the Federal deficit. Rather than 
increased spending, they supported tax reduction, business 
regulatory relief, and fiscal restraint as the best means to 
assist small businesses.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ The subsidy rate is primarily the difference between revenue 
generated from fees and net collateral liquidation and the costs of 
defaults.
    \27\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, Summary of 
Activities, 96th Cong., 2d sess., December 29, 1980, H. Rept. 96-1542 
(Washington: GPO, 1980), p. 9.
    \28\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Small Business, To Consider 
and Report to the Senate Budget Committee Recommendations for Small 
Business Administration Programs, 97th Cong., 1st sess., March 13, 1981 
(Washington: GPO, 1981), pp. 3-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1985, the Reagan administration proposed a 25-percent 
reduction in the SBA's direct lending authority, as a means to 
reduce loan subsidy costs. With the Republican Senate's 
support, the 99th Congress (1985-1987) passed legislation 
restricting the eligibility for SBA direct business loans. 
However, in a compromise with the Democratic House, SBA direct 
loan eligibility was retained for a few, specified types of 
small business owners.\29\ The Microloan program also retained 
eligibility for direct loans to SBA-certified lending 
intermediaries, which issue microloans to qualified 
individuals.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Small businesses owned by low-income individuals, Vietnam-era 
or disabled veterans, the handicapped or certain organizations 
employing them, or certified under the minority small business capital 
ownership development program or located in high-unemployment areas 
retained eligibility for direct loans.
    \30\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, Summary of 
Activities, 103d Cong., 2d sess., January 2, 1995, H. Rept. 103-885 
(Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 8; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on 
Small Business, Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal Year 1995 Budget for the 
Small Business Administration, 103d Cong., 2d sess., February 22, 1994, 
S. Hrg. 103-583 (Washington: GPO, 1994), p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Reagan administration also sought large reductions in 
the SBA's overall budget. On April 4, 1985, the Reagan White 
House announced that it had reached an agreement with Senate 
Republican Party leaders to freeze, reduce, or eliminate 47 
domestic programs. The SBA was included on the list for 
elimination.\31\ During subsequent budget negotiations with the 
Democratic House, the SBA was retained, but its funding was 
reduced from $1.25 billion in FY1985 to $714.4 million in 
FY1986.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Dorothy Collin, ``Reagan, GOP Cut Budget Deal,'' Chicago 
Tribune, April 5, 1985.
    \32\ The SBA's budget was further reduced to $613.7 million in 
FY1987, $428.3 million in FY1988, and $420.2 million in FY1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nine years later, on October 1, 1994, the Democratic 103d 
Congress (1993-1995), at the urging of the Clinton 
administration, further limited SBA direct business loan 
eligibility to Microloan program lending intermediaries and to 
small businesses owned by the disabled. Facing large budget 
deficits, Congress approved the proposal, primarily because the 
subsidy rate for the SBA's direct loans was ``10 to 15 times 
higher than [the subsidy rate for the SBA's] guaranty 
programs.'' \33\ SBA Administrator Erskine Bowles testified 
before the House Committee on Small Business that eliminating 
most of the SBA's direct business lending was necessary to 
``generate the most bang for the taxpayer's bucks.'' \34\ 
Funding to support direct business loans to the handicapped 
through the Handicapped Assistance (renamed the Disabled 
Assistance) Loan program ended in 1996.\35\ Other than disaster 
relief, the SBA currently offers direct business loans only to 
Microloan program lending intermediaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Small Business, Hearing on 
the Proposed Fiscal Year 1995 Budget for the Small Business 
Administration, 103d Cong., 2d sess., February 22, 1994, S. Hrg. 103-
583 (Washington: GPO, 1994), p. 20.
    \34\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, SBA's Budget 
for Fiscal Year 1995, 103d Cong., 2d sess., February 24, 1994, Serial 
No. 103-68 (Washington: GPO, 1994), p. 7. The SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty 
program ran out of budget authority in April 1993, causing a temporary 
shutdown of SBA 7(a) lending until a supplemental appropriation was 
enacted to restart the program. The 7(a) loan guaranty program's 
financing issues in 1993 most likely influenced congressional debate 
concerning the SBA's subsidy costs of direct lending. See U.S. 
Congress, Senate Committee on Small Business, Hearing on the Small 
Business Administration's FY1994 Budget, 103d Cong., 1st sess., July 
22, 1993, S. Hrg. 103-297 (Washington: GPO, 1993), pp. 4-14.
    \35\ The last loan issued under the Disabled Assistance Loan 
program was in FY1998. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small 
Business, Summary of Activities, 105th Cong., 2d sess., January 2, 
1999, H. Rept. 105-849 (Washington: GPO, 1999), p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Costly Lessons Learned from the Era of Participating Securities

    In 1994, the SBA established the congressionally authorized 
SBIC Participating Securities Program to encourage equity 
investments in startup and early stage small businesses.\36\ 
The program was designed to fill a perceived investment gap 
created by the SBIC program's focus on mid- and later-stage 
small businesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ P.L. 102-366, the Small Business Credit and Business 
Opportunity Enhancement Act of 1992 (Title IV, the Small Business 
Equity Enhancement Act of 1992) authorized the SBA to create the SBIC 
participating securities program. Participating securities are 
redeemable, preferred, equity-type securities issued by SBICs in the 
form of limited partnership interests, preferred stocks, or debentures 
with interest payable only to the extent of earnings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On October 1, 2004, President George W. Bush ordered the 
SBA to stop issuing new commitments for participation 
securities, beginning a process to end the program that is 
still underway.\37\ The Bush administration issued the order 
because the program experienced a paper loss of $2.7 billion 
during the early 2000s as investments in technology startup and 
early stage small businesses lost much of their stock value at 
that time.\38\ Congressional reaction to the Bush 
administration's decision reflected partisan differences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, Private 
Equity for Small Firms: The Importance of the Participating Securities 
Program, 109th Cong., 1st sess., April 13, 2005, Serial No. 109-10 
(Washington: GPO, 2005), pp. 5, 33; and U.S. Small Business 
Administration, ``SBIC Program: FAQs 7. What is the status of the 
Participating Securities Program?'' at http://www.sba.gov/content/faqs.
    \38\ U.S. Small Business Administration, ``Offering Circular, 
Guaranteed 4.727% Participating Securities Participation Certificates, 
Series SBIC-PS 2009-10 A,'' February 19, 2009, at http://www.sba.gov/
content/sbic-ps-2009-10-cusip-831641-ep6; U.S. Congress, Senate 
Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, The President's 
FY2006 Budget Request for the Small Business Administration, 109th 
Cong., 1st sess., February 17, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-47 (Washington: GPO, 
2005), pp. 6-14, 33-34, 118-119; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on 
Small Business, Proposed Legislative Remedy for the Participating 
Securities Program, 109th Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 2005, Serial No. 
109-27 (Washington: GPO, 2005), pp. 1-5, 11-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressional Republicans, the majority party in both 
Houses during the 108th (2003-2005) and 109th Congresses (2005-
2007), supported the Bush administration's decision to end the 
program. They initially proposed a replacement program 
featuring enhanced safeguards to reduce the risk of investment 
losses.\39\ The Bush administration expressed little enthusiasm 
for the proposal, arguing that it did not go far enough to 
prevent future losses.\40\ As a result, the proposal was 
dropped. Republicans on the House Committee on Small Business 
later proposed allowing the SBA to issue up to $300 million 
annually in participating securities, but that proposal was not 
supported by the Bush administration and it was not 
enacted.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ H.R. 3429, to amend the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 
to establish a participating debenture program, and its companion bill 
in the Senate (S. 1923, the Small Business Investment and Growth Act of 
2005) would have authorized the SBA to issue a deferred-interest 
debenture with accrued interest unconditionally payable by the SBIC 5 
years after issuance and semi-annually thereafter. Additional payments 
would have been required if the SBIC has gross receipts, as defined by 
the statute. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, 
Proposed Legislative Remedy for the Participating Securities Program, 
109th Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 2005, Serial No. 109-27 (Washington: 
GPO, 2005), p. 4.
    \40\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, Proposed 
Legislative Remedy for the Participating Securities Program, 109th 
Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 2005, Serial No. 109-27 (Washington: GPO, 
2005), pp. 3-5.
    \41\ H.R. 5352, the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2006, 
would have authorized the SBA to issue $300 million in participating 
securities in FY2007, FY2008, FY2009, and FY2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressional Democrats understood why the Bush 
administration ended the program, but they wanted it to be 
replaced. They advocated the creation of new venture capital 
programs targeting startups, early stage small businesses, and 
socially disadvantaged/minority small business owners; and the 
reinstatement of a revised participating securities program, 
with reforms designed to make it less likely to incur losses, 
but also with the recognition that appropriations may be 
necessary to subsidize the program.\42\ None of these proposals 
were enacted into law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ See H.R. 4565, the Angels Nurture Growing Entrepreneurs into 
Long-term Successes (ANGELS) Act; and H.R. 3567, the Small Business 
Investment Expansion Act of 2007. Also see U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Small Business, Private Equity for Small Firms: The 
Importance of the Participating Securities Program, 109th Cong., 1st 
sess., April 13, 2005 (Washington: GPO, 2005), pp. 3-5, 18-23, 30-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Today, the SBA's participating securities program's losses 
are often cited by congressional Republicans and others who 
argue that the SBA's scope of operations should be limited to 
protect taxpayers from being exposed to losses associated with 
its lending and venture capital programs.

   Austerity Versus Expansion in the Aftermath of the Great Recession

    Partisan differences concerning the SBA's future reached 
new heights during the 111th, 112th, and 113th Congresses. The 
magnitude of the economic difficulties resulting from the 
``Great Recession'' (December 2007 to June 2009) led most 
congressional Democrats to support legislative efforts to 
increase Federal Government spending, including increased 
spending for the SBA. Most congressional Republicans opposed 
these efforts, especially given the relatively large increases 
in the annual Federal deficit and in the Nation's debt during 
this time period. The defeat, retirement, and resignation of 
many political moderates from Congress during these Congresses 
further intensified partisan differences, and reduced the 
likelihood of achieving legislative compromises.
    These divisions also framed debates over small business 
policy, particularly in the realm of small business 
lending.\43\ During and immediately following the Great 
Recession, the SBA's guaranteed business lending programs, 
which in good economic times typically generate sufficient 
revenue from fees and collateral liquidations to pay for loan 
defaults, experienced funding shortfalls due to higher than 
anticipated loan defaults and lower than anticipated revenue 
from collateral liquidations (primarily due to falling 
commercial real estate values). Congress provided the SBA $83.0 
million in FY2010, $82.8 million in FY2011, $210.8 million in 
FY2012, $319.7 million in FY2013, and $111.6 million in FY2014 
to cover these expenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ For more analysis, see Rebel A. Cole, How Did the Financial 
Crisis Affect Small Business Lending in the United States?, U.S. Small 
Business Administration--Office of Advocacy, November 2012, at http://
www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/rs399tot.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many congressional Republicans have advocated policies to 
limit the SBA's loan losses. They often call into question the 
efficacy and efficiency of the SBA's lending programs given 
continued weakness in small business job growth and the 
magnitude of the loan losses. Many congressional Democrats have 
argued that policies to limit SBA loan losses typically involve 
reducing the SBA's scope of operations. They argue that such 
actions might harm the economic recovery.

  United Government in the 111th Congress: Priming the Pump for Small 
                            Business Lending

    The Democratic 111th Congress convened on January 3, 2009, 
2 years into the Great Recession. Some, including most 
congressional Democrats and President Barack Obama, argued that 
the SBA should be provided additional resources to assist small 
businesses in acquiring the capital necessary to start, 
continue, or expand their businesses and create jobs. The SBA's 
budget in FY2009 was $615.2 million. Most congressional 
Republicans disagreed. They advocated business tax reduction, 
financial credit market regulation reform, and Federal fiscal 
restraint as the best means to help small businesses further 
economic growth and job creation.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ U.S. Small Business Administration, ``Administration Announces 
New Small Business Commercial Real Estate and Working Capital 
Programs,'' February 5, 2010, at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/
files/sba_rcvry_factsheet_cre_refi.pdf; and Susan Eckerly, ``NFIB 
Responds to President's Small Business Lending Initiatives,'' 
Washington, DC, October 21, 2009, at http://www.nfib.com/newsroom/
newsroom-item/cmsid/50080/; and NFIB, ``Government Spending,'' 
Washington, DC, at http://www.nfib.com/issues-elections/issues-
elections-item/cmsid/49051/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With President Obama's support, Congress passed P.L. 111-5, 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) and 
P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (SBJA). Both 
measures passed the House and Senate with minimal GOP support. 
These acts made numerous changes to the SBA's programs in an 
effort to enhance small business access to capital. For 
example, ARRA provided the SBA an additional $730 million (more 
than doubling the agency's budget), including $375 million to 
temporarily subsidize SBA loan guaranty fees and increase the 
7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage 
to 90 percent.\45\ The fee reductions were designed to increase 
the demand for SBA guaranteed loans by reducing borrower costs; 
and the higher loan guaranty percentage was designed to 
increase the supply of SBA guaranteed loans by reducing private 
lender's exposure to the risk of losses in case of a default. 
Congress subsequently provided another $265 million and 
authorized the SBA to reprogram another $40 million to extend 
the fee reductions and loan modifications through May 31, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ ARRA affected many programs and agencies, and is expected to 
provide over $840 billion from FY2009 through FY2019, including $290.7 
billion for tax relief; $261.2 billion for contracts, grants, and 
loans; and $264.4 billion for entitlements. See The Recovery 
Accountability and Transparency Board, ``The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009,'' at http://www.recovery.gov/arra/
Transparency/fundingoverview/Pages/fundingbreakdown.aspx. The SBA's 
7(a) loan guaranty program provides an 85 percent guaranty for loans of 
$150,000 or less; and a 75 percent guaranty for loans greater than 
$150,000 to the statutory limit of $3.75 million (75 percent of $5 
million).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Among other things, the SBJA authorized a $30 billion Small 
Business Lending Fund to encourage community banks to provide 
small business loans ($4 billion was subsequently issued) and a 
$1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide 
funding to participating States with small business capital 
access programs. The act also provided $510 million to continue 
the SBA's fee reductions and loan modifications through 
December 31, 2010, and made numerous changes to the SBA's loan 
guaranty and contracting programs to enable the SBA to expand 
its assistance to small businesses.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Among other things, the SBJA authorized higher SBA loan 
limits, created new size standards to enable more small businesses to 
qualify for assistance, and provided about $12 billion in small 
business tax relief. P.L. 111-322, the Continuing Appropriations and 
Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the use of any 
funding remaining from the SBJA to extend the SBA fee reductions and 
loan modifications through March 4, 2011, or until the available 
funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Divided Government in the 112th and 113th Congresses: Impasse Inspires 
                               Ingenuity

    Partisan disagreement concerning the best way to assist 
small businesses following the Great Recession continued during 
the 112th and 113th Congresses. Both of these Congresses had a 
Republican majority in the House and a Democratic majority in 
the Senate. During the 112th Congress (2011-2013), the economic 
recovery was relatively slow and uneven across the Nation, 
unemployment remained at relatively high levels, and business 
credit markets remained tight. Although the economy improved 
somewhat during the 113th Congress (2013-2015), unemployment 
remained relatively high during the first session of the 
Congress and began to improve during the second session.
    The Nation's continuing economic difficulties led some, 
including most congressional Democrats and President Obama, to 
support another round of additional funding for the SBA as a 
means to spur economic growth and create jobs. However, as 
mentioned previously, the slow economic recovery also led to 
historically high default rates for the SBA's lending programs, 
making proposals to expand the SBA's scope of operations to 
foster economic growth and job creation more difficult for many 
congressional Republicans to accept.
    The Republican Party's majority status in the House during 
the 112th and 113th Congresses changed the political dynamic. A 
political deadlock ensued as bills seeking to expand the SBA's 
scope of operations were, for the most part, blocked by the 
House Committee on Small Business; and bills seeking to reduce 
the SBA's scope of operations were, for the most part, blocked 
by the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship.
    The close, longstanding personal relationship of Senator 
Mary Landrieu, then-chair of the Senate Committee on Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship, and Senator Olympia Snowe, then-
ranking member on the committee, helped to diffuse partisan 
conflict in that committee, at least to some extent.\47\ For 
example, during the 112th Congress, Senator Snowe cosponsored 
six bills introduced by Senator Landrieu, and Senator Landrieu 
cosponsored nine bills introduced by Senator Snowe. 
Nonetheless, during the 111th Congress, Senator Snowe strongly 
objected to portions of both ARRA and the SBJA (especially the 
Small Business Lending Fund), which were enacted despite the 
objections of many congressional Republicans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Senator Snowe was widely regarded as a pragmatic, political 
moderate, willing to work with both Democrats and Republicans on 
legislation. Also, Senator Snowe served on the Senate Committee on 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship from 2000 to 2003, as the 
committee's chair from 2003 to 2007, and as ranking member from 2007 
until her retirement from the Senate in 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The extent of the partisan division between the House and 
Senate Small Business Committees during the 112th Congress was 
highlighted by the inability of the two committees to agree on 
language to reauthorize the SBA. After agreeing to two short-
term reauthorizations early in the 112th Congress, disagreement 
over the SBA's future led to a breakdown in talks between the 
two committees concerning the SBA's statutory authorization, 
which expired on July 31, 2011.\48\ Since then, the two 
committees have not reopened discussions concerning the 
agency's statutory authorization. The SBA is able to continue 
operations through authority provided by appropriations acts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ P.L. 108-447, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 
provided reauthorization for the SBA for FY2005 and FY2006. That was 
the last long-term reauthorization provided to the SBA. Congress 
subsequently passed, and the President signed, 15 short-term 
reauthorizations for the SBA, including 2 short-term reauthorizations 
early in the 112th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although partisan differences between the House and Senate 
Small Business Committees prevented legislation from reaching 
the other body through the normal lawmaking process, the 
leaders of the two committees sought other ways to enact small 
business legislation. For example, during the 112th Congress, 
several bills supported by Representative Sam Graves, chair of 
the House Committee on Small Business, were included by the 
House Committee on Armed Services in their markup of H.R. 4310, 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) is the Federal Government's 
largest contractor, providing the House and Senate Committees 
on Armed Services jurisdiction over issues related to 
government contracting, including small business contracting. 
The annual National Defense Authorization Act is generally 
regarded as ``must-pass'' legislation.
    The small business provisions added to the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 affected Federal 
procurement center representatives; small business size 
standards; Federal agency contracting training requirements and 
acquisition planning; the Federal Government's procurement 
goals for contracts awarded to small businesses; the bundling 
of Federal contracts; the training and evaluation of senior 
executives; small business mentor-protege programs; limitations 
on subcontracting, penalties, and subcontracting plans; notices 
of subcontracting opportunities; publication of certain 
documents; and contract bundling. The Senate Committee on Armed 
Services added a provision affecting the SBA's HUBZone program, 
which was sponsored by Senator Sherrod Brown, who was not a 
member of the Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship.\49\ These provisions were generally 
considered to have little chance of passage because of the 
opposition of either the House or the Senate Small Business 
Committee. However, because these provisions were attached to a 
bill considered ``must-pass'' legislation, and that legislation 
was not subject to the review of the Small Business Committees, 
the added provisions were enacted into law (P.L. 112-239).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ The provision addressed the eligibility of BRAC base closure 
areas in the Historically Underutilized Business Zone Empowerment 
Contracting (HUBZone) program. The HUBZone program is a small business 
Federal contracting assistance program, administered by SBA, whose 
primary objective is creating jobs and increasing capital investment in 
distressed communities. It provides participating small businesses 
located in areas with low-income, high-poverty rates, or high-
unemployment rates with contracting opportunities in the form of ``set-
asides,'' sole-source awards, and price-evaluation preferences. For 
more information, see CRS Report R41268, Small Business Administration 
HUBZone Program, by Robert Jay Dilger.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the 113th Congress, two provisions sought by Senator 
Landrieu were included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2014 (P.L. 113-76), providing additional examples of using 
``must-pass'' legislation as a legislative vehicle to bypass 
the authorizing committees. One of the provisions increased the 
SBIC program's annual authorization to $4 billion from $3 
billion, and the other provided $8 million for the State Trade 
and Export Promotion (STEP) grant program for FY2015.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ For further information and analysis concerning the 
appropriations process, see CRS Report R42388, The Congressional 
Appropriations Process: An Introduction, by Jessica Tollestrup and CRS 
Report R42098, Authorization of Appropriations: Procedural and Legal 
Issues, by Jessica Tollestrup and Brian T. Yeh. For further information 
and analysis concerning the STEP program, see CRS Report R43155, Small 
Business Administration Trade and Export Promotion Programs, by Sean 
Lowry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               Conclusion

    Small business policymaking in Congress has evolved over 
time from a relatively bipartisan, noncontroversial 
policymaking environment to one that is increasingly 
characterized by partisan differences. Most Members agree that 
small businesses are important to the U.S. economy, but 
partisan differences emerge when considering the means to best 
help small businesses. These differences tend to become 
accentuated during economic downturns because many 
congressional Democrats view the SBA as a vehicle to promote 
economic growth and job creation, while many congressional 
Republicans object to spending programs that increase the 
Federal deficit or add to the Federal debt, preferring policies 
that reduce Federal taxes and business regulation. These 
partisan differences have become magnified in recent years 
given the magnitude of the Great Recession, increased attention 
to fiscal responsibility, and growth in overall Federal debt.
    In the past, small business policymaking often followed 
regular order, featuring committee hearings, followed by 
committee markups in both the House and Senate Small Business 
Committees, open floor debate in both Chambers, and a 
conference committee to resolve any differences on the 
legislation under consideration. Today, especially under 
divided government and in the absence of political moderates 
willing to work within and between the Small Business 
Committees, it is less likely that small business policymaking 
will follow regular order. Instead, committee hearings and 
markups take place, but knowing that the other body is not 
likely to address the legislation there is generally less 
incentive to explore all sides of the issue--leading to an 
increased number of hearings that focus on the presentation of 
a particular viewpoint, rather than discussions of how to find 
a compromise solution.
    In addition, committee leaders and others are now more 
likely to seek alternative legislative means to achieve their 
goals, such as attaching small business legislation to other 
bills considered ``must-pass'' legislation (e.g., national 
defense authorizations and appropriations bills). Thus, even in 
the most divided and partisan circumstances, Congress can still 
pass small business legislation. However, enacting major small 
business legislation on the scale of ARRA and the SBJA is 
extremely difficult when Congress is divided, and partisan 
differences run deep.


 Use of the Appropriations Process to Influence Census Bureau Policy: 
                         The Case of Adjustment

                          Jennifer D. Williams

               Specialist in American National Government

                              ----------                              


        Persistent differential undercounts of minorities and 
        less affluent U.S. residents in the decennial census--
        the greater tendency for the census to miss them than 
        to miss whites and wealthier people--occasioned much 
        past debate about using sample-survey estimates to 
        ``adjust'' the census statistically. This report 
        examines failed pro- and anti-adjustment bills in the 
        100th through 104th Congresses, then tracks H.R. 2267 
        (P.L. 105-119) from the 105th Congress, which funded 
        the Census Bureau in FY1998. Section 209 of the bill, 
        as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, then 
        strengthened during House consideration of H.R. 2267 
        and in conference committee, provided for expedited 
        judicial review of civil suits to block sampling. 
        Accordingly, on January 25, 1999, the Supreme Court 
        issued its decision in U.S. Department of Commerce v. 
        U.S. House of Representatives and Clinton v. Glavin 
        (525 U.S. 316, 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999)) that Section 195 
        of Title 13 U.S.C. banned incorporating sample-survey 
        results into the decennial census count for 
        apportionment. The Court declined to decide whether the 
        use of sampling prohibited under Section 195 would be 
        unconstitutional as well.

                               Background

    The decennial census is a cornerstone of representative 
government in the United States. The Constitution \1\ mandates 
a complete population count every 10 years so that the States 
can be assigned seats in the House of Representatives 
``according to their respective numbers . . . .'' The first 
census, in 1790, was overseen by Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson and conducted by U.S. marshals and their assistants. 
They reported a total of almost 4 million residents.\2\ From 
this beginning, the census has developed into a complex, 
multibillion-dollar operation conducted by the Bureau of the 
Census in the U.S. Department of Commerce. Census data not only 
are the basis for House apportionment and within-State 
redistricting, but also are essential for documenting the 
growth, distribution, and characteristics of the population. 
Besides being widely used by businesses, researchers, and all 
levels of government, census data are incorporated into certain 
formulas that allocate more than $450 billion per year in 
Federal program funds to States and localities. States, 
localities, and all population groups--racial minorities, 
Hispanics or Latinos (hereafter, Hispanics), and majority 
whites--have a considerable stake in being included in each 
census. To the extent that they are undercounted, they can lose 
representation and Federal money.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 2, clause 3, as modified 
by Section 2 of the 14th Amendment.
    \2\ The Census Bureau's history site states that ``As the nominal 
director of the 1790 census, Jefferson certified the combined local 
results reported by each marshal. He also shared President Washington's 
concern that the first census had significantly undercounted the 
population, perhaps by several hundred thousand residents.'' U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, ``Directors 1790-1810,'' at http://
www.census.gov/history/www/census_then_now/director_biographies/ 
directors_1790_-_1810.html. According to another source, the ``degree 
of responsibility'' of the Secretary of State for the 1790 census ``is 
not clear.'' A. Ross Eckler, The Bureau of the Census (New York: 
Praeger, 1972), p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the census has evolved during more than two 
centuries, broad congressional authority over it remains as 
stated in the Constitution: ``The actual Enumeration . . . 
shall be made . . . in such Manner as they [Congress] shall by 
Law direct.'' From the act of March 1, 1790, which specified 
how the first census was to be conducted and what information 
was to be collected, to the present, Congress has played an 
important role in census operations. Census law now is codified 
in Title 13 of the United States Code, which, among other 
provisions, delegates responsibility for the decennial count to 
the Secretary of Commerce and the ``Director of the Census,'' 
who ``shall perform such duties as may be imposed upon him by 
law, regulations, or orders of the Secretary.'' \3\ Congress at 
times proposes separate bills to alter aspects of the decennial 
census or other Census Bureau programs and holds oversight 
hearings to review the conduct of these programs. In addition, 
Congress affects the Bureau's operations through the 
appropriations process. As a former Bureau Director observed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 13 U.S.C.  21.

    The regular appearances before the House and Senate 
appropriations subcommittees are undoubtedly the most crucial 
of all the congressional contacts required of Census and 
[Commerce] Departmental staffs. The outcome of these hearings 
determines whether the bureau can undertake some or all of the 
new work that has been approved by the Department and the 
Office of Management and Budget. Ordinarily, adverse 
subcommittee actions are limited to the denial of some or all 
of the increases requested, and funds are usually granted to 
permit the continuation of all previously approved programs. In 
some cases, however, . . . funds may be cut below the level of 
the preceding year . . . . In view of the stakes involved, it 
is not surprising that agency preparations for the 
appropriation hearings extend over a number of weeks, with 
intensive briefing sessions and preparation of quite detailed 
back-up material for dealing with unforeseen inquiries.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ A. Ross Eckler, The Bureau of the Census (New York: Praeger, 
1972), pp. 146-147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Census Undercount and the Adjustment Debate in Congress

    In one notable example from the 1990s, the appropriations 
process wielded influence well beyond funding; it forced an 
abrupt change in the Census Bureau's 2000 census strategy and, 
from then to the present, largely settled an issue that 
previous legislation and litigation had not resolved. The issue 
was whether sampling in connection with the decennial census 
should occur in order to estimate and attempt to correct census 
miscounts (undercounts and overcounts)--that is, to ``adjust'' 
the census results.
    Of special concern were the persistent differential 
undercounts of minorities and less affluent members of 
society--the greater tendency for the census to miss them than 
to miss whites and wealthier people. Post-Enumeration Survey 
(PES) estimates of 1990 census coverage indicated a net 
percentage undercount of 0.7 percent for non-Hispanic whites, 
compared with 4.6 percent for blacks, 2.4 percent for Asians or 
Pacific Islanders,\5\ 12.2 percent for American Indians on 
reservations, and 5.0 percent for Hispanics. The net percentage 
undercount of the total population was estimated at 1.6 
percent.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ In 1997, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget revised the 
designations of race and Hispanic ethnicity for Federal reporting 
purposes. The category ``Asians or Pacific Islanders'' became 
``Asians'' and ``Native Hawaiians or other Pacific Islanders.'' U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget, ``Revisions to the Standards for the 
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity,'' 62 Federal 
Register 58789, October 30, 1997.
    \6\ CRS Report R40551, The 2010 Decennial Census: Background and 
Issues, by Jennifer D. Williams. The 1990 census undercount estimates 
reported here reflect revisions that the Bureau made after July 1990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher announced that the 
Census Bureau would not adjust the 1990 census numbers, a New 
York Times reporter responded as follows:

    The Commerce Department's decision not to adjust the 1990 
census upward is a special blow to New York City, Newark and 
other fiscally struggling cities in the region where local 
officials said their large populations of minorities, 
immigrants and homeless people were severely undercounted.
    New York City, for example, would have gained nearly 
230,000 people, increased its representation in the State 
Legislature and gained millions more dollars in Federal aid if 
the Census Bureau had adjusted its figure of about 7.3 million 
people. The city had estimated its population at 7.8 million to 
8 million.
    Similarly, the 1990 census shows Newark with 275,221 
residents, down from 329,248 in 1980 and thousands fewer than 
city officials believe.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Felicia R. Lee, ``No Census Adjustment Hits Big Cities Hard,'' 
New York Times, July 16, 1991, p. A16.

    The view from Indiana when adjustment was still a 
possibility was quite different, however. The U.S. General 
Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office) 
estimated that an adjusted 1990 census could mean a net loss to 
the State of $13.2 million per year in Federal Medicaid and 
social services block grant allocations.\8\ According to the 
Indianapolis Star:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Formula Programs: Adjusted 
Census Data Would Redistribute Small Percentage of Funds to States, 
GAO/GGD-92-12, November 1991, pp. 20-26. The $13.2 million net loss 
took into account an annual estimated gain of $11,000 in Federal 
highway aid to Indiana.

    Efforts to adjust the 1990 census figures after the count 
has been completed have Gov. Evan Bayh ``screaming bloody 
murder.''
    That was the governor's reaction Friday to a report by the 
federal General Accounting Office about a proposed adjustment 
to the figures. . . .
    Indiana's population would be increased very slightly by 
the adjustment. But the state's proportional share of 
population would decline, causing a drop-off of tax dollars 
from Washington.
    ``It's an outrage what Washington is proposing to do to 
Indiana,'' Bayh said. . . .
    ``The federal government, through some accounting 
chicanery, is proposing to take millions from Hoosier taxpayers 
. . . and is once again turning its back on Indiana.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Staff report, ``Bayh irate over plan to adjust '90 census,'' 
Indianapolis Star, November 23, 1991.

    The undercount issue had been contentious for decades. 
Supporters of adjustment argued that it was necessary to make 
the census more equitable for apportionment, redistricting, and 
other purposes. Opponents maintained that the procedure was 
flawed, subjective, or both and could leave the census 
vulnerable to political manipulation. The Commerce Department 
and the Census Bureau were sued, repeatedly but without success 
for the plaintiffs, over the 1980 and 1990 census undercounts.
    A series of pro- and anti-adjustment measures, summarized 
below, failed in the 100th through 104th Congresses.\10\ Unless 
otherwise noted, no action beyond committee and subcommittee 
referrals occurred on the proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ See CRS Report 94-89, Decennial Census Coverage: The 
Adjustment Issue, by Jennifer D. Williams; CRS Report 97-137, Census 
2000: The Sampling Debate, by Jennifer D. Williams; and CRS Report 
RL30182, Census 2000: Sampling as an Appropriations Issue in the 105th 
and 106th Congresses, by Jennifer D. Williams (archived reports, 
available from the author).finagling this footnote deg.
    \11\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Post Office and Civil 
Service, Subcommittee on Census and Population, The Decennial Census 
Improvement Act, hearing on H.R. 3511, 100th Cong., 2d sess., March 3, 
1988 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), pp. 1-2, 5, and 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             100th Congress

   H.R. 3511 (Dymally), to require adjustment to correct for 
        any census undercounts and overcounts, was introduced and 
        referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service on 
        October 20, 1987. The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on 
        Census and Population on October 25, 1987.
      At a subcommittee hearing on the bill, Chairman Mervyn Dymally 
        expressed his ``strong feelings'' about the ``historical, 
        substantial and disproportionate undercount of minorities and 
        the poor in the decennial census . . . . [T]he need to 
        guarantee equal representation under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
        the need to insure compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and 
        the need to properly allocate federal funds compel a 
        satisfactory solution to the problem of a differential 
        undercount.''
      Robert Ortner, as the Reagan administration's Undersecretary of 
        Commerce for Economic Affairs, testified in support of the 
        Commerce Department's decision against planning to adjust the 
        1990 census: ``There is no unique model or system that would 
        produce a set of data which all statisticians would support. 
        Different statisticians employ different methodologies and 
        derive different estimates of undercount or overcount. These 
        kinds of numbers are essentially judgmental and subjective. . . 
        .'' Dr. Ortner continued: ``Remember, Mr. Chairman, this is a 
        zero sum game. If I get more money or more representation, then 
        you lose on both of those counts . . . based on population 
        numbers created from sampling estimates[;] we can measure 
        sampling errors, but . . . nonsampling errors . . . have not 
        been dealt with.''
      Also testifying was Barbara Bailar, formerly the Census Bureau's 
        Associate Director for Statistical Standards and Methodology, 
        who had resigned from the Bureau over the adjustment issue. In 
        her assessment, ``The 1990 methods of estimating the 
        undercount, and hence for correcting the data, are far superior 
        to what they were in 1980. They can be used to make our census 
        counts much more accurate.'' \11\
   S. 1942 (Moynihan), a companion bill to H.R. 3511, was 
        introduced and referred to the Committee on Governmental 
        Affairs on December 11, 1987.

                             101st Congress

   H.R. 526 (Dymally), like H.R. 3511 in the 100th Congress, 
        would have required adjustment to correct any census 
        undercounts or overcounts. The bill was introduced and referred 
        to the Post Office and Civil Service Committee on January 19, 
        1989, and to the Census and Population Subcommittee on February 
        13, 1989. Unfavorable executive comment was received from the 
        Commerce Department on June 6, 1989.
   H.R. 5741 (Sawyer) would have amended Title 13 of the U.S. 
        Code to require the Commerce Secretary to determine whether the 
        tabulations of State populations from the 1990 census and 
        future censuses should be adjusted to correct any undercounts 
        or overcounts. The bill was introduced and referred to the Post 
        Office and Civil Service Committee on September 27, 1990.
   S. Res. 338 (Sasser) expressed the sense of the Senate that 
        the Commerce Department should use ``statistical correction 
        methodology to achieve a fair and accurate 1990 census.'' The 
        resolution was introduced and referred to the Governmental 
        Affairs Committee on October 11, 1990.
   S. 264 (Moynihan), a companion bill to H.R. 526, was 
        introduced and referred to the Governmental Affairs Committee 
        on January 25, 1989.

                             102d Congress

   H. Res. 214 (Payne) called for statistical adjustment of the 
        1990 census results to include people missed by the census. The 
        resolution was introduced and referred to the Post Office and 
        Civil Service Committee on August 2, 1991, and to the Census 
        and Population Subcommittee on August 12, 1991.
   H.R. 90 (Sawyer), like H.R. 5741 in the 101st Congress, 
        would have amended Title 13 of the U.S. Code to require the 
        Commerce Secretary to determine whether the tabulations of 
        State populations from the 1990 census and future censuses 
        should be adjusted to correct any undercounts or overcounts. 
        The bill was introduced and referred to the Post Office and 
        Civil Service Committee on January 3, 1991, and to the Census 
        and Population Subcommittee on January 31, 1991.
   H.R. 2316 (Coleman), to direct the Commerce Secretary to 
        take measures ensuring that 1990 census undercounts were 
        corrected, was introduced and referred to the Post Office and 
        Civil Service Committee on May 14, 1991, and to the Census and 
        Population Subcommittee on May 20, 1991.
   H.R. 2911 (Schumer) would have established a commission to 
        ``investigate and study'' the enumeration methods used in 1990, 
        including whether data obtained by these methods ``should be 
        subject to statistical adjustment and, if so, how such an 
        adjustment should be made. . . .'' The bill was introduced and 
        referred to the Post Office and Civil Service Committee on July 
        16, 1991, and to the Census and Population Subcommittee on July 
        22, 1991.
   H.R. 5478 (Moran) would have stipulated that adjusted 1990 
        census data be used to administer any Federal benefits program 
        requiring the use of the most recent census data. The bill was 
        introduced and referred to the Post Office and Civil Service 
        Committee on June 24, 1992, and to the Census and Population 
        Subcommittee on June 30, 1992.
   H.R. 5865 (Moody) would have prohibited the Commerce 
        Department and the Census Bureau from using appropriated funds 
        to adjust the 1990 census or any intercensal estimates. The 
        measure was introduced and referred to the Post Office and 
        Civil Service Committee on August 12, 1992, and to the Census 
        and Population Subcommittee on August 20, 1992.
   S.J. Res. 21 (Sasser), like S. Res. 338 in the 101st 
        Congress, expressed the sense of Congress that the Commerce 
        Department should use ``statistical correction methodology to 
        achieve a fair and accurate 1990 census.'' The resolution was 
        introduced and referred to the Governmental Affairs Committee 
        on January 14, 1991.
   S. 28 (Moynihan) would have amended Title 13 of the U.S. 
        Code to require that the Commerce Secretary adjust census data, 
        including 1990 census data, to correct any undercounts or 
        overcounts. The bill was introduced and referred to the 
        Governmental Affairs Committee on January 14, 1991.
   S. 1480 (Moynihan), a companion bill to H.R. 2911, was 
        introduced and referred to the Governmental Affairs Committee 
        on July 16, 1991.
   S. 3178 (Specter), a companion bill to H.R. 5865, was 
        introduced and referred to the Governmental Affairs Committee 
        on August 12, 1992.
   S. 3205 (Mack), a companion bill to H.R. 5478, was 
        introduced and referred to the Governmental Affairs Committee 
        on August 12, 1992.
   H.R. 2608 (Smith), FY1992 appropriations legislation for the 
        Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the judiciary, and 
        related agencies (CJS), passed the House on June 13, 1991, and 
        the Senate on July 31, 1991. Each Chamber agreed to the 
        conference report on H.R. 2608 (H. Rept. 102-233) on October 3, 
        1991, and the measure became law (P.L. 102-140) on October 28, 
        1991.
      Although H.R. 2608 was enacted without any adjustment-related 
        provision, the Senate, in its July 30, 1991, consideration of 
        the bill, had approved three amendments on the topic. They are 
        discussed below.
      S. Amdt. 933 (Hollings) was introduced and agreed to by voice 
        vote on July 30, 1991. S. Amdt. 934 (Hollings), amending S. 
        Amdt. 933, also was introduced and agreed to by voice vote on 
        this date. The text of the amendments (933 in roman and 934 in 
        italics) was: ``The decennial census of population of 1990 
        shall be adjusted to reflect the changes recommended on June 
        21, 1991, by the Post Enumeration Commission and the Director 
        of the Census, except that such adjustment shall not apply to 
        political reapportionment.''
      S. Amdt. 933, as amended by S. Amdt. 934, was then amended by S. 
        Amdt. 935 (Kohl), which was adopted by voice vote on July 30, 
        1991. S. Amdt. 935 stated: ``The Subcommittee on Government 
        Information and Regulation, of the Committee on Governmental 
        Affairs, shall report to the Senate on the use of the Post-
        Enumeration Survey of the 1990 Census for purposes other than 
        political apportionment and shall recommend such changes as 
        necessary. . . .''
        The conferees on H.R. 2608 deleted this provision, calling it 
        ``an internal Senate matter.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ ``Conference Report on H.R. 2608,'' Congressional Record, vol. 
137, part 17 (October 1, 1991), p. 24904.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Nonetheless, the Senate Subcommittee on Government Information 
        and Regulation did issue the February 1992 report called for by 
        S. Amdt. 935. The report alluded briefly to S. Amdts. 934 and 
        935:
            Senator Hollings, the subcommittee [c]hair, offered an 
            amendment that would require that adjusted census numbers 
            would be used for all purposes other than apportionment.
            Senator Kohl, as chair of the Governmental Affairs 
            Subcommittee on Government Information and Regulation, 
            argued that the adoption of such an amendment was 
            premature. It was clear that the adjusted numbers available 
            at that time were, for most purposes, less accurate than 
            the original count.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Government Information and Regulation, Dividing the 
Dollars: Issues in Adjusting Decennial Counts and Intercensal Estimates 
for Funds Distribution, committee print, 102d Cong., 2d sess., February 
1992, S. Prt. 102-83 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), p. 4.

      The report noted as well:
            The Census Bureau has continued to examine data from the 
            post-enumeration survey . . . . That research has shown the 
            wisdom of waiting to implement a census adjustment. The 
            July estimates were seriously flawed. Problems in matching 
            caused the undercount to be overstated in some areas. 
            Programing problems caused the total undercount to be 
            overstated. The undercount, as measured by the PES in July, 
            has been reduced by nearly 30 percent. . . .
            Yet, while some of the problems have been solved since 
            July, many of the most serious problems still remain. The 
            adjustment model remains sensitive and the results lack 
            robustness. . . . Whether the numbers are to be used for 
            apportionment, funds distribution, or redistricting, they 
            lack the necessary face validity. If adjusted census 
            numbers are used prematurely[,] there is the risk that the 
            basic credibility of the census itself will be 
            undermined.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Ibid., pp. 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             103d Congress

   H.R. 787 (Moran), like H.R. 5478 in the 102d Congress, would 
        have directed that adjusted 1990 census data be used to 
        administer any Federal benefits program requiring the use of 
        the most recent census data. The bill was introduced and 
        referred to the Post Office and Civil Service Committee on 
        February 3, 1993, and to the Census, Statistics, and Postal 
        Personnel Subcommittee on February 19, 1993.
   S. 307 (Mack), a companion bill to H.R. 787, was introduced 
        and referred to the Governmental Affairs Committee on February 
        3, 1993.

                             104th Congress

   H.R. 3598 (Petri), which would have amended Title 13 of the 
        U.S. Code to prohibit the use of sampling or other statistical 
        procedures to determine total State populations for House 
        apportionment, was introduced and referred to the Government 
        Reform and Oversight Committee on June 5, 1996.

 Adjustment as an Appropriations Issue: Congressional Response to the 
                          Plan for Census 2000

    As preparations for the 2000 census advanced during the 
Clinton administration, the Census Bureau announced, in the 
Plan for Census 2000, that it would conduct two new sample 
surveys intended to improve the enumeration.\15\ The first one, 
for nonresponse followup, would have collected data from a 
sample of housing units whose occupants had not completed their 
census forms. The second survey, for ``integrated coverage 
measurement'' (ICM), attracted greater congressional attention 
because it would have been used to correct census miscounts. 
Not by accident did more of that attention come from the House. 
As indicated, for example, by the discussion of three sampling-
related Senate amendments to H.R. 2608 in the 102d Congress, 
the Senate may show a definite interest in census matters, but 
the House's interest arguably may be keener and more direct, 
given that census results determine each State's number of 
House seats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, Plan for Census 2000, issued 
February 28, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the Census Bureau's announcement, the 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee, the Bureau's House 
oversight committee in the 104th Congress, stated its arguments 
for and against sampling in a report adopted on September 18, 
1996. A majority of the committee found that the Bureau 
``should not use sampling methods to complete or adjust the 
actual enumeration'' in 2000. They pointed to weaknesses in the 
sampling design, citing, for example, the concern of Kenneth 
Wachter, a professor of statistics and demography at the 
University of California-Berkeley, that heterogeneity would 
have been a problem if the 1990 census results had been 
adjusted and remained a problem for 2000.\16\ The majority also 
questioned whether anything other than a strict headcount for 
apportionment would be legal and constitutional, and whether 
sampling would undermine the quality of small-area data and 
public confidence in the census. Another concern expressed was 
the operational feasibility of completing two complex sample 
surveys by the December 31, 2000, legal deadline for producing 
official census numbers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Dr. Wachter was a member of the Commerce Secretary's Special 
Advisory Panel on Census Adjustment from 1989 to 1991. For ICM, the 
sampling universe was to be divided into demographic subgroups, or 
``post-strata,'' with certain characteristics, such as black male 
renters ages 30 to 49. An undercount rate was to be estimated for each 
post-stratum, ``then assumed to hold constant across relatively large 
geographical areas.'' Heterogeneity refers to the failure of ``these 
assumptions of constancy . . . .'' U.S. Congress, House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, Sampling and Statistical Adjustment in 
the Decennial Census: Fundamental Flaws, 104th Cong., 2d sess., H. 
Rept. 104-821 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In dissenting opinions, 18 committee members asserted that 
sampling was necessary to make the census more accurate, more 
equitable, and less expensive:

    Dr. Barbara Bryant, director of the Census Bureau under 
President [George H. W.] Bush, in testimony before the House 
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, said that the 
census had reached the limits of what could be done with 
traditional methods.\17\ Congress has called for a census that 
is less expensive and more accurate. Three separate panels of 
experts convened by the National Academy of Sciences \18\ have 
recommended the use of sampling and statistical methods to 
achieve these goals.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ See testimony of Barbara Bryant, Director, U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Post Office and Civil 
Service, Oversight Hearing to Review Census Adjustment Decision, 102d 
Cong., 1st sess., July 16, 1991 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), pp. 23 and 
26. The press, too, reported Dr. Bryant's assessment that adjustment 
would have improved 1990 census accuracy, on average. Barbara Vobejda, 
``Census Bureau Chief Disagreed with Mosbacher on Adjustments,'' 
Washington Post, July 17, 1991, p. A21.
    \18\ See Barry Edmonston and Charles L. Schultz, eds., Modernizing 
the U.S. Census, Panel on Census Requirements in the Year 2000 and 
Beyond, Committee on National Statistics, National Research Council, 
National Academy of Sciences (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
1995); and Duane L. Steffey and Norman M. Bradburn, eds., Counting 
People in the Information Age, Panel to Evaluate Alternative Census 
Methods, Committee on National Statistics, National Research Council, 
National Academy of Sciences (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 
1994). See also Andrew A. White and Keith F. Rust, eds., Preparing for 
the 2000 Census, Panel to Evaluate Alternative Census Methodologies, 
Committee on National Statistics, Commission on Behavioral and Social 
Sciences and Education, National Research Council, National Academy of 
Sciences (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997). The panel's 
first interim report, Sampling in the 2000 Census, was issued in 1996.
    \19\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, Sampling and Statistical Adjustment in the Decennial Census: 
Fundamental Flaws, 104th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 104-821 (Washington, 
DC: GPO, 1996), p. 23.

    Two bills in the 105th Congress, both referred to the House 
Government Reform and Oversight Committee without further 
action, addressed the adjustment issue with opposing 
objectives.
   H.R. 1178 (Maloney), introduced on March 20, 1997, would 
        have amended Title 13, Section 195, of the U.S. Code to clarify 
        that sampling could be used to improve census accuracy. Section 
        195 provides that ``Except for the determination of population 
        for purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress 
        among the several States, the Secretary shall, if he considers 
        it feasible, authorize the use of the statistical method known 
        as `sampling' in carrying out the provisions of this title.''
   H.R. 1220 (Petri), like H.R. 3589 in the 104th Congress, 
        would have prohibited the use of sampling or other statistical 
        procedures to determine total State populations for 
        apportionment. The bill was introduced on March 21, 1997.
    Because legislation to resolve the adjustment issue had 
failed consistently in earlier Congresses and continued to fail 
in the 105th Congress, and since adjustment of the 2000 census 
seemed imminent, the appropriations process in the 105th 
Congress became the main forum for the sampling debate.
    Congress approved H.R. 1469, FY1997 supplemental 
appropriations for disaster relief, on June 5, 1997. President 
Clinton vetoed the bill on June 9, 1997, in part because it 
contained House language to ban the use of sampling in any 
census to determine the apportionment population. A second 
bill, H.R. 1871, stipulated only that, within 30 days of 
enactment, the Commerce Department give Congress a detailed 
report on the proposed methods for conducting the 2000 census. 
The President signed this legislation on June 12, 1997 (P.L. 
105-18).
    On June 23 and July 24, 1997, Speaker Newt Gingrich entered 
into the Congressional Record two items from the Washington 
Times that expressed opposition to sampling for census 
adjustment. The first was an editorial that referenced 
President Clinton's favorable attitude toward adjustment in his 
remarks about the disaster relief legislation, then continued: 
``Why should a Republican Congress commit political suicide by 
relinquishing its authority over the census to a hyper-
politicized administration?'' \20\ The second entry was a 
letter to the editor by Matthew J. Glavin, president of the 
Southeastern Legal Foundation, who shortly thereafter became a 
plaintiff in one of the anti-adjustment lawsuits filed under 
Section 209 of P.L. 105-119 (discussed below). Mr. Glavin 
characterized adjustment as follows: ``Under this system, the 
Bureau would make its `best guess' as to where the population 
count was imagined to be low, add a magical percentage to the 
head count for that area, and apply those statistical 
percentages to similar areas across the nation.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ ``Politics and Census Numbers,'' Washington Times, June 12, 
1997, reprinted in Congressional Record, vol. 143, part 8 (June 23, 
1997), p. 11885.
    \21\ Matthew J. Glavin, ``Best-Guess U.S. Census?,'' letter to the 
editor, Washington Times, July 15, 1997, reprinted in Congressional 
Record, vol. 143, part 11 (July 24, 1997), p. 15767.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What happened next was a notable instance of Congress 
exercising its authority over an executive branch agency that 
was under the purview of the opposite party.
    On July 25, 1997, the House Appropriations Committee 
reported H.R. 2267, the FY1998 appropriations bill for the 
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the judiciary, and 
related agencies.\22\ The committee-approved bill withheld all 
but $100 million of the $381.8 million recommended for the 2000 
census, pending agreement between Congress and the 
administration on census methods. Agreement was to consist of 
an act authorizing these methods. The bill further stipulated 
that none of the $100 million could be spent to plan, test, or 
use sampling in the census to determine the apportionment 
population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Departments 
of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 1998, report to accompany H.R. 2267, 
105th Cong., 1st sess., H. Rept. 105-207 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), 
pp. 64-65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House passed H.R. 2267 on September 30, 1997, approving 
the full $381.8 million without the above Appropriations 
Committee limitations but with a new provision (Section 209) to 
counter the Bureau's sampling plans.
   Section 209 specified that ``Any person aggrieved by the use 
        of any statistical method in violation of the Constitution or 
        any provision of law, [in connection with the decennial census 
        to determine the population for apportionment or redistricting, 
        might] . . . in a civil action obtain declaratory, injunctive, 
        and any other appropriate relief against the use of such 
        method.''
   The civil action would be ``heard and determined'' by a 
        three-judge U.S. district court, and any order issued by the 
        court would be ``reviewable by appeal directly to the Supreme 
        Court of the United States.''
   A test of the method, such as in the dress rehearsal \23\ 
        for the 2000 census, would be considered equivalent to its use 
        in connection with the census.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ The dress rehearsal is a simulation of the census, conducted 
in test sites to see how well the process works and what modifications 
are needed. The 2000 census dress rehearsal took place in spring 1998. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, press release, July 8, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   An aggrieved person could include ``any resident of a State 
        whose congressional representation or district could be changed 
        as a result of the use of a statistical method . . ., any 
        Representative or Senator in Congress . . ., [and] either House 
        of Congress.''
    During House consideration of H.R. 2267, Representative 
Dennis Hastert had spoken in favor of the provision above, and 
Representative Alan Mollohan had spoken against it. He urged, 
instead, the adoption of the bipartisan Mollohan-Shays 
amendment, which contained the same adjustment-related language 
as in S. 1022, the Senate version of the FY1998 CJS 
appropriations legislation (discussed below). The Mollohan-
Shays amendment would have prohibited the Census Bureau from 
making ``irreversible'' plans for sampling in the census to 
determine the apportionment population but would have permitted 
sampling methods to be tested. To support his position, 
Representative Mollohan cited legal arguments and endorsements 
of sampling by organizations including the National Research 
Council and the American Statistical Association. Hastert 
expressed the opinion that sampling and adjustment would be 
illegal and unconstitutional. He stated, for example, ``If 
Congress had intended that sampling be used for 
reapportionment, they would have repealed Section 195 [of Title 
13 of the U.S. Code] . . . . They did not.'' \24\ The Mollohan-
Shays amendment was rejected, largely, but not entirely, along 
party lines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ House debate on H.R. 2267, Congressional Record, vol. 143, 
part 14 (September 30, 1997), p. 20845. The debate spanned pp. 20838-
20866.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on July 
16, 1997, and passed by the Senate on July 29, 1997, S. 1022 
approved the administration's $354.8 million request for census 
2000, with the proviso (Section 209) that the Bureau not make 
any ``irreversible'' census sampling plans.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Departments 
of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriation Bill, 1998, report to accompany S. 1022, 105th Cong., 1st 
sess., S. Rept. 105-48 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), p. 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The conference committee recommended $389.9 million for the 
2000 census in FY1998. Both Chambers agreed to the conference 
report \26\ on November 13, 1997, and President Clinton signed 
the legislation on November 26, 1997 (P.L. 105-119). Section 
209 of the conference report retained the House's provision for 
expedited judicial review of a civil suit brought by ``Any 
person aggrieved by the use of any statistical method,'' 
connected with the decennial census for apportionment or 
redistricting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, 1997, Making 
Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 
30, 1998, and for Other Purposes, conference report to accompany H.R. 
2267, H. Rept. 105-405, 105th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 
1997), pp. 43-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   New language in the conference report stated that the 
        Speaker of the House might initiate or join in the civil action 
        on behalf of the House.
   New as well in the report was the statement that the Census 
        Bureau's Report to Congress: The Plan for Census 2000 (which 
        was required by P.L. 105-18) and the Bureau's operational Plan 
        for Census 2000 ``shall be deemed to constitute the final 
        agency action regarding the use of statistical methods in the 
        2000 decennial census, thus making the question of their use in 
        such census sufficiently concrete and final to now be 
        reviewable in a judicial proceeding.''
   The conference committee observed that apportionment is 
        ``the sole constitutional purpose of the decennial enumeration 
        . . .''; that ``article I, section 2, clause 3 of the 
        Constitution clearly requires an `actual Enumeration' of the 
        population . . .''; and that ``the use of statistical sampling 
        or statistical adjustment in conjunction with an actual 
        enumeration to carry out the census with respect to any segment 
        of the population poses the risk of an inaccurate, invalid, and 
        unconstitutional census . . . .''
    Two civil suits brought under Section 209 received 
expedited judicial review. On January 25, 1999, the Supreme 
Court issued its decision in U.S. Department of Commerce v. 
U.S. House of Representatives and Clinton v. Glavin \27\ that 
Section 195 of Title 13 of the U.S. Code banned incorporating 
sample-survey results into the decennial census count for 
apportionment. The Court declined to decide whether the use of 
sampling prohibited under Section 195 would be unconstitutional 
as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ 525 U.S. 316, 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    Response to the Court's Decision

    In response to the Court's ruling, the Census Bureau 
canceled its sampling plans and revised its 2000 census 
strategy. The 106th Congress responded to the decision with two 
proposals. Representative Carolyn Maloney and Senator Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan introduced companion bills H.R. 548 and S. 355 
on February 3, 1999. They would have amended Title 13 of the 
U.S. Code to strike ``Except for the determination of 
population for purposes of apportionment of Representatives in 
Congress among the several States,'' from Section 195. Neither 
bill advanced beyond the referral stage.
    Representative Maloney introduced the same legislation in 
the 108th Congress as H.R. 1541 and in the 109th Congress as 
H.R. 564, also without success. No similar bills have been 
proposed since then.

         Census Coverage and the Adjustment Issue Then and Now

    Since 1990, the Bureau has shown progress in accurately 
counting the U.S. population, including minorities, despite the 
increasing size and diversity of the population. The 
differential undercount narrowed after 1990.
   Census 2000 Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation estimates 
        indicated a net percentage overcount of 0.49 percent for the 
        total population, 1.13 percent for non-Hispanic whites, 0.75 
        percent for non-Hispanic Asians, and 0.88 percent for American 
        Indians on reservations. The net percentage undercount of non-
        Hispanic blacks was 1.84 percent; of native Hawaiians or other 
        Pacific Islanders, 2.12 percent; of American Indians off 
        reservations, 0.62 percent; and of Hispanics, 0.71 percent.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, A.C.E. Revision II, Summary of 
Estimated Net Coverage, Memorandum Series PP-54, December 31, 2002, p. 
3. As previously noted, the presentation of data by race and ethnicity 
changed somewhat between the 1990 and 2000 censuses. The revision made 
certain categories (for example, blacks in 1990 versus non-Hispanic 
blacks in 2000) not perfectly comparable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Census Coverage Measurement results indicated a 2010 census 
        net percentage overcount of 0.01 percent for the total 
        population, 0.84 percent for non-Hispanic whites, and 1.95 
        percent for American Indians off reservations. The net 
        percentage undercount of non-Hispanic blacks was 2.07 percent; 
        of non-Hispanic Asians, 0.08 percent; of native Hawaiians or 
        other Pacific Islanders, 1.34 percent; of American Indians on 
        reservations, 4.88 percent; and of Hispanics, 1.54 percent.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ U.S. Bureau of the Census, ``2010 Census Coverage Measurement 
Results,'' news conference background material, May 22, 2012, pp. 11 
and 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sampling for census adjustment reemerged briefly as an 
issue in the 2009 Senate hearings on Gary Locke's nomination to 
be Commerce Secretary and that of Robert M. Groves to be Census 
Bureau Director.\30\ Each man assured the Senate committee 
considering his nomination that the Bureau would not conduct 
such an operation in connection with the 2010 census. Dr. 
Groves added that he had ``no plans'' to use sampling for 2020 
census adjustment, either.\31\ The Bureau likely will conduct a 
post-enumeration survey to assess 2020 census coverage, but 
without a sample size or design suitable for adjustment. There 
the matter stands, in accordance with the Supreme Court's 
January 25, 1999 ruling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Gary Locke served as Commerce Secretary from 2009 to 2011, and 
Robert M. Groves was Census Bureau Director from 2009 to 2012. At this 
writing, Penny Pritzker is the Secretary of Commerce, and the Bureau is 
headed by John H. Thompson.
    \31\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, ``Senator Hutchison Presses Commerce Nominee Locke to 
Ensure a Fair and Open Census Process,'' press release, March 18, 2009; 
and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Nomination of Robert M. Groves to Be Director of 
the Census, hearing, 111th Cong, 1st sess., May 15, 2009 (Washington, 
DC: 2009).





              The Evolution of U.S. Disaster Relief Policy

                            Bruce R. Lindsay

                Analyst in American National Government

                                  and

                          Francis X. McCarthy

                 Analyst in Emergency Management Policy

                              ----------                              


        Congress is constantly adapting to change and 
        redefining its role in response to developing 
        conditions and circumstances. A prime example of this 
        phenomenon is Congress' approach to disaster relief 
        policy from the 1800s to the present. The development 
        of disaster relief policy by the U.S. Congress has 
        evolved over many decades, frequently spurred by 
        different incidents. This evolution resulted in the 
        broad and arguably more flexible structure of disaster 
        assistance laws that exists today. There are three 
        features underlying the development of disaster relief 
        policy in the United States. First, the development of 
        a disaster policy framework in the United States has 
        been greatly influenced by particular disasters. 
        Second, Congress has demonstrated the capacity to learn 
        from disasters by initiating new policies. Third, at 
        the beginning of the 19th century, Congress viewed 
        response and recovery from incidents as the 
        responsibility of the State and local charitable 
        organizations. Beginning in the 1950s, Congress 
        redefined the Federal role substantially, and today the 
        Federal Government provides an increasing proportion of 
        disaster relief to States and localities for 
        emergencies and major disasters.

                              Introduction

    Congress is constantly adapting to change and redefining 
its role in a myriad of policy contexts and environments. New 
laws and policies have come about in response to developing 
conditions and circumstances. A prime example of this 
phenomenon is Congress' approach to disaster relief policy over 
the last two centuries.
    The development of disaster relief policy by the U.S. 
Congress has evolved over many decades, frequently spurred by 
different incidents. The executive actions in response to those 
incidents, along with congressional enactment of singular laws 
addressing specific disasters, eventually resulted in the broad 
and arguably more flexible structure of disaster assistance 
laws that exists today.
    There are three salient features that underlie the 
development of disaster relief policy in the United States. 
First, the establishment and development of a disaster policy 
framework in the United States has been greatly influenced and 
characterized by particular disasters--reforms in disaster 
policy during periods of quietude and in the absence of 
disaster have been rare. Thus, significant changes in disaster 
policy in the United States have been episodic in nature rather 
than incremental.
    Second, Congress has demonstrated the capacity to learn 
from disasters by initiating measures to address the 
consequences of catastrophic incidents including the problems, 
ineptitude, and disorganization associated with the response 
and recovery to those events. Some have lamented that the 
reforms usually occur after an incident. However, congressional 
changes in disaster policy are consistent with several policy 
process theories that postulate that reforms are most likely to 
occur when a ``focusing event'' causes citizens and 
policymakers to pay more attention to an issue or problem and 
seek solutions.
    Third, the contemporary Congress' stance on providing 
disaster relief is strikingly different from its predecessors'. 
Over the last two centuries Congress has dramatically redefined 
its role with respect to providing disaster relief to States 
and localities. At the beginning of the 19th century, Congress 
viewed the Federal role in disaster relief as limited at best--
response and recovery from disastrous incidents was the 
responsibility of State and local charitable organizations. By 
the 1950s, Congress had redefined the Federal role 
substantially, increasing the Federal proportion of disaster 
relief to States and localities for emergencies and major 
disasters.

                        Early Period: 1803-1948

    Prior to 1948, there was no overarching legislative or 
policy framework in the United States governing the 
distribution of aid or assistance after a disaster had 
occurred. Instead, Congress responded to each individual 
incident by providing assistance to States and localities on an 
ad hoc and incident-by-incident basis. For example, between 
1803--the 1st year Congress provided any kind of disaster 
relief--and 1947, Congress passed 128 disaster-specific bills 
to provide relief to States and localities.\1\ In many other 
cases, however, the Federal Government did not provide 
assistance.\2\ The Federal Government's refusal to provide 
relief and the ad hoc approach used by Congress prior to 1948 
reflects the dominant thinking at the time concerning the 
Federal Government's role in providing disaster relief. 
Congress often did not see a role for the Federal Government in 
supplementing or supporting States and localities after a 
disaster. Rather, Congress viewed disaster relief as the 
responsibility of States or, more often, local governments, 
communities, neighbors, and charities.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ David Butler, ``Focusing Events in the Early Twentieth Century: 
A Hurricane, Two Earthquakes, and A Pandemic,'' ed. Claire B. Rubin 
(Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute, 2007), p. 11. One example 
of Federal assistance is P.L. 59-16, which authorized the Secretary of 
War to purchase and distribute supplies to destitute people after the 
San Francisco earthquake and fire.
    \2\ For example, Federal assistance was not provided after the 
Johnstown, Pennsylvania, flood that killed 2,209 people on May 31, 
1889.
    \3\ Rutherford H. Platt, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of 
Extreme Natural Events (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Between 1927 and 1948 the limited role of the Federal 
Government in disaster recovery slowly evolved, as a growing 
body of knowledge of disasters, as well as the needs of 
communities and disaster victims, began to emerge as States and 
localities recovered from a series of disasters. Policymakers 
also began to notice that large-scale disasters, in particular, 
often had regional and national economic implications.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Jonas Elmerraji, ``Financial Effects Of Natural Disasters,'' 
Forbes, March 15, 2011, at http://www.forbes.com/sites/
greatspeculations/2011/03/15/financial-effects-of-natural-disasters/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1948 Congress deviated from the custom of passing 
individual laws for disaster relief by passing the first 
ordered and continued means of Federal disaster assistance. The 
1948 legislation entitled the Second Deficiency Appropriation 
Bill, 1948, enabled:

     . . . the President, through such agency or agencies as he 
may designate, and in such manner as he shall determine, to 
supplement the efforts and available resources of State and 
local governments or other agencies, whenever he finds that any 
flood, fire, hurricane, earthquake, or other catastrophe in any 
part of the United States is of sufficient severity and 
magnitude to warrant emergency assistance by the Federal 
Government in alleviating hardship, or suffering caused 
thereby, and if the governor of any State in which such 
catastrophe shall occur shall certify that such assistance is 
required, $500,000, to remain available until June 30, 1949 . . 
.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ P.L. 80-785, 62 Stat. 1031.

    According to the report accompanying the bill, the funds 
were appropriated to relieve distress caused by a flood in the 
Columbia River Valley. The legislative text of the bill, 
however, included a provision that permitted the funds to be 
used for ``similar incidents occurring elsewhere.'' \6\ Still, 
Congress retained its position with regard to the Federal 
Government's role in disasters. The report emphasized that, 
while sympathetic to pleas from States for Federal disaster 
assistance, recovery from disasters was primarily a local 
responsibility and that State and local resources should be 
used to ``whatever extent available before the federal 
government is expected to step in and render assistance.'' \7\ 
Accordingly, the bill provided funds for immediate and 
temporary needs and explicitly prohibited the use of the funds 
for permanent construction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ U.S. Congress, House Appropriations, Second Deficiency 
Appropriation Bill, 1948, To Accompany H.R. 6935, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 
June 15, 1948, 2348, p. 2.
    \7\ Ibid., p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

       Permanent Federal Disaster Relief Authority: 1950 to 1960

    The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-875) marks 
the beginning of a half-century of Federal laws, policies, and 
programs intended to reduce human suffering as well as soften 
the financial impacts of natural disasters on the American 
people and their communities.\8\ Interestingly, the Federal 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950 was not in response to a particular 
disaster. After World War II, concern over the possible use of 
atomic weapons and growing hostility between the United States 
and the Soviet Union gave rise to the cold war. As a 
consequence, disaster management in the United States was 
conceptualized and organized around two themes: (1) the threat 
of a nuclear war and (2) natural disasters. This duality was a 
foreshadowing of the split between homeland security and 
disaster recovery programs during the early years of this 
century.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Rutherford H. Platt, Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of 
Extreme Natural Events (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1999), p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several landmark Federal disaster laws and policies 
originate from attempts by lawmakers during this era to prepare 
the civilian population for a potential atomic attack and 
provide aid after a natural disaster. The most influential of 
these laws were the Civil Defense Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-920, 64 
Stat. 1245) and, in particular, the Federal Disaster Relief Act 
of 1950. These laws established a framework of Federal-to-State 
assistance to fund disaster and emergency activities.
    The systemization of Federal disaster relief has its roots 
in the Federal Disaster Relief Act. The Federal Disaster Relief 
Act of 1950 established much of the framework through which 
disaster policy is carried out in the United States. The report 
accompanying the underlying bill of the act stated that the:

purpose of the bill is to provide for an orderly and continuing 
method of rendering assistance to the states and local 
governments in alleviating suffering and damage resulting from 
a major peace time disaster and in restoring public facilities 
and in supplementing whatever aid the state or local 
governments can render themselves. Also it authorizes the 
President to coordinate the activities of all federal agencies 
in such an emergency. In the past, appropriations to the 
President have been made for relief from floods and snowstorms 
in particular areas without authorization, hence this bill is 
not novel legislation. The bill provides the framework for the 
federal government under which prompt action can be taken in 
meeting the needs of stricken areas, and it will establish a 
general government policy in respect to emergency relief in all 
future disasters, instead of meeting the problem after it 
occurs.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Public Works, Authorizing 
Federal Assistance to States and Local Governments in Major Disasters, 
committee print, 81st Cong., 2d sess., No. 2727, p. 2.

    The act put in place the standard process in which the 
Governors could ask the President for Federal disaster 
assistance for their respective States and provided an orderly, 
ongoing, and continuing means of Federal assistance to States 
and localities to alleviate suffering and damage that resulted 
from major disasters. Prior to the act, congressional action 
after each individual incident was needed to provide Federal 
aid. Once in place, the law authorized the President to make 
the decision to provide aid without the specific consent of 
Congress. This helped hasten aid to States and localities 
because Congress did not have to debate and vote on assistance 
after each incident.
    Congress believed, however, that the Federal Government 
should not fund permanent projects after disasters unless there 
was a direct threat to lives and personal property. The same 
report stated that the:

committee believes that restoration of local government 
facilities during a period in which there is no direct threat 
to lives and property is a responsibility of the local 
authorities.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Ibid., p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

             1960s-1970s: Modern Disaster Relief Management

    Once a framework of Federal-to-State disaster assistance 
had been constructed with the passage of the 1950 statute, the 
process of administering disaster relief was greatly influenced 
by a series of large incidents in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
The actual administration of the authority had been in the 
Executive Office under President Truman and President 
Eisenhower, who had melded together both civil defense and 
disaster relief functions.\11\ In 1962, President Kennedy sent 
the civil defense function to the Department of Defense and 
focused disaster coordination responsibilities in the Office of 
Emergency Planning (OEP) within the Executive Office of the 
President.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ President Dwight D. Eisenhower, ``Message of the President, 
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958,'' U.S. Code Home, at http://
law.justia.com/codres/us/titles5a/5a_4_62_2.html.
    \12\ Executive Order 11051, ``Prescribing Responsibilities of the 
Office of Emergency Planning in the Executive Office of the 
President,'' 27 Federal Register 9683, October 2, 1962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The disasters of the 1960s and early 1970s are often cited 
as the animating events that moved Congress toward enhancing 
and expanding disaster relief legislation. They include the 
Alaska earthquake of 1964; Hurricane Betsy's impact on New 
Orleans in 1965; the devastation caused by the Rapid City, 
South Dakota, flood of 1972; and the multistate damage 
triggered by Hurricane Agnes in 1972. These incidents received 
significant national attention and taken together contributed 
to an understanding of the vulnerability of States and 
communities, as well as the types of assistance that could be 
established in statute to effectuate a swifter and more 
comprehensive response.
    The first example is the Alaska earthquake in March 1964; 
an event that originally registered 9.2 on the Richter scale, 
with multiple aftershocks over 6.0.\13\ The devastation from 
the earthquake resulted in an Executive order \14\ by President 
Johnson that established the framework for Federal coordination 
of the response and recovery mission that, it can be argued, 
became the outline for disaster legislation that would follow 
in the ensuing decade. As one observer explained in a 
monograph:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ ``The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964,'' AEIC Alaska 
Earthquake Information Center, November 2002, at http://
www.aeic.alaska.edu/quakes/Alaska_1964_earthquake.html.
    \14\ Executive Order 11150, ``Establishing the Federal 
Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska,'' 4789 
Federal Register 4789, April 2, 1964.

    Forty years ago, President Lyndon B. Johnson showed how the 
federal government could both respond rapidly and rationally to 
a major natural disaster and, critically, draw up sensible 
legislation based on expert analyses to get the affected area 
back on its feet.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Kevin R. Kosar ``Rebuilding Hurricane-Devastated Areas--Why 
Not Follow LBJ's Lead?'' George Mason History News Network, January 25, 
2006, at http://hnn.us/article/16383.

    When Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans the following year, 
President Johnson again demonstrated the executive response 
that would become a hallmark of major national disasters. After 
observing media coverage of the storm's power on the three 
major networks of the day, and conferring with members of the 
Louisiana congressional delegation, Johnson headed down to 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
visit the impacted area.

    Approaching New Orleans, the 707 made a low pass over the 
city. On board, the delegation included Senator [Russell] Long 
and Representative Hale Boggs, who described the damage over 
the aircraft's public address system. After landing, with a 25 
m.p.h. wind still blowing and no power for the loudspeakers 
that had been set up, Johnson was forced to shout his arrival 
statement. His words nonetheless bordered on the poetic: ``I am 
here because I wanted to see with my own eyes what the unhappy 
alliance of wind and water have done to this land and its 
people.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Brian Williams, ``LBJ's Political Hurricane,'' New York Times, 
September 24, 2005, at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/24/opinion/
24williams.html?_r=0.

    But in addition to his political instincts, Johnson also 
demonstrated his belief in the use of assertive Federal 
Government action and resources. While such an approach would 
be a formula for conflicts in other domestic policy areas, the 
realm of disaster response has long been an area of, if not 
comity, at least general agreement of a shared responsibility.
    It was also during this timeframe that the Senate 
Environment and Public Works Committee gained jurisdiction of 
the disaster relief portfolio. The committee was a busy area of 
activity during this period that would culminate not only with 
comprehensive disaster relief legislation but also the Clean 
Air Act.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
``History and Recent Membership of the Committee on Environment and 
Public Works,'' at http://www.epw.senate.gov/comresources/
histmembership.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The response to Hurricane Betsy again initiated assistance 
from across the Federal Government. The post-Betsy activities, 
coupled with the Alaska earthquake paradigm, captured the 
interest and imagination of Congress. With the Disaster Relief 
Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-796), Congress:

made the most significant changes in policy in sixteen years. 
The statute authorized federal agencies to provide loans at 
below-market rates for as long as forty years, extended aid to 
unincorporated communities in rural areas, and created a new 
category of eligibility for public colleges and universities 
damaged by disasters. In addition, the 89th Congress took steps 
to improve administrative issues associated with federal 
disaster relief by linking civil defense warning systems with 
threats from natural disasters (a forerunner of the ``dual 
use'' or ``all hazards'' concepts developed later) and 
authorizing the president to coordinate federal assistance 
efforts.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Keith Bea, in Claire B. Rubin, Editor, Emergency Management: 
The American Experience 1900-2010 (CRC Press: Boca Raton, 2012).

    Within the same context of large disaster events, 2 years 
later Congress enacted the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP). Through P.L. 90-448, the flood insurance program has 
been both an important companion piece to disaster relief 
legislation and also, fundamentally, the beginning of Congress' 
interest in supporting mitigation measures to lessen the impact 
of disaster events. While the NFIP is an insurance program, it 
is also a mitigation program that encourages local actions to 
prevent future loss of life and property. Based on the work of 
two separate task forces \19\ that provided recommendations 
regarding the recurring threat of flood damage:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Robert E. Hinshaw, Living with Nature's Extremes: The Life of 
Gilbert Fowler White (Johnson Books: Boulder, 2006), p. 149.

    Congress attended to the recommendations that (1) 
communities be required to follow all floodplain management 
guidelines established by the FIA before being allowed to 
enroll in the insurance program and (2) that the cost of 
insuring any new construction in floodplains be actuarially 
based on the losses predicted for the new structure's locations 
and elevation.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Ibid., p. 155.

    The two pieces of legislation passed in the late 1960s were 
the pretext for the two seminal pieces that would follow in 
1970: the Disaster Relief Act of 1969 (P.L. 91-79) and the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-288), which became the 
core authorizing legislation for disaster response and 
recovery.\21\ P.L. 93-288 was enacted in the context of great 
disasters, such as Hurricane Agnes, that struck much of the 
east coast and posed significant problems that could not be 
addressed through existing authorities. Much of the legislation 
of the period in this area was enacted with bipartisan support. 
For example, legislation to liberalize forgiveness of SBA 
disaster loans and related disaster improvements passed the 
Senate on a vote of 76 to 2 and passed the House by a vote of 
359 to 1.\22\ Some of the tenor of the time was expressed by 
Senator George McGovern following the Rapid City flood in his 
home State of South Dakota. Through his contacts with his 
constituents, the Senator noted that their commentary:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ The Major Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments 
of 1987 renamed the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 as the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. With the 
creation of DHS, that responsibility was moved to the Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
    The Stafford Act constitutes the statutory authority for most 
Federal disaster response and recovery activities especially as they 
pertain to FEMA and FEMA programs.
    \22\ ``Liberalized Disaster Relief Loans Approved by Congress,'' CQ 
Almanac 1972, 28th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly 1973), 
at http://library/cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal72-1250657.

reveals frustration about buck-passing, about indifference, and 
it reveals a fear by many people that so very much has been 
lost that it will take 10 years, if not more, before the 
community gets back to normal. . . . The tools we have provided 
for disaster relief are woefully, tearfully, shamefully 
inadequate. We can afford to do better.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Ibid.

    This was also a period when the authority to coordinate the 
administration of disaster relief programs had changed under 
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973. The plan transferred the OEP 
from the White House to the Federal Disaster Assistance 
Administration (FDAA), which, like the Flood Insurance program, 
was then a part of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD).\24\ The placement at HUD emphasized not only 
the provision of temporary emergency housing assistance but 
also suggested an interest in overall recovery for communities 
hit by disasters and authorities necessary to achieve those 
goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ General Records of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (Record Group 207), 1931-1987, at http://www.archives.gov/
research/guide-fed-records-groups/207html.#207.7.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This also reflected a period of legislative activism to 
which disaster relief was not immune. As one observer noted:

even under a conservative president in Nixon, the federal 
disaster relief program expanded both in federal resources and 
funding consistently during this period. Both Hurricane Camille 
(1969), and Hurricane Agnes (1972), served as significant 
catalysts for this, but also, the liberal political context of 
this period coming just after the implementation of the Great 
Society program by Lyndon Johnson, and Nixon's own ambitions to 
be seen as a proactive leader despite the ideological 
contentions it spawned throughout his presidency, played into 
the expansion of the federal disaster relief program as 
well.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Daniel Nault, ``The Nixon Years: Examining the Evolution of 
Federal Disaster Relief Policy, 1969-1974'' (Union College, 2013), at 
http://hdl.handle.net/11024/23889.

    The 10-year period from 1964 to 1974 was a busy period for 
natural disaster incidents and Congress. During this timespan 
Congress appropriated significant amounts of funding and held 
hearings that contributed to an understanding of the form of 
legislation that could improve disaster relief activities. In 
that same period the executive branch was also challenged by 
the breadth and intensity of large disaster events. The 
imagination and elan that the Federal departments and agencies 
brought to this work also helped to inform the shape of the 
resulting legislation.
    During that period of time Congress passed multiple laws 
that constructed the disaster response and recovery framework 
that still exists today. In the ensuing 40 years there have 
been several important pieces of legislation that codified 
practices, expanded authorities, and improved accountability 
for the operations of disaster relief. But all of this work was 
building on the designs that were imprinted in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s when Congress determined that the response to 
disasters need not be episodic or transitory. Instead, Congress 
established the mechanisms, programs, and institutions that 
continue to supplement State and local governments, as well as 
the citizens in those communities who are challenged by 
disasters and their aftermath.

                The Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Another important development in this period was the birth 
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Prior to 
FEMA, civil emergency management programs and activities were 
scattered among five principal Federal departments and 
agencies. Adopting proposals set forth by the National 
Governors Association (NGA), President Carter submitted 
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978 to Congress for its approval. 
The NGA was especially interested in the creation of a focal 
point for Federal supplemental assistance. In the 
reorganization, the Federal Insurance Administrator 
(responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program), the 
National Fire Protection and Control Administration, the 
Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services 
Administration, and HUD's Federal Disaster Assistance 
Administration were all absorbed into FEMA. The Department of 
Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and its civil 
responsibilities were also transferred to FEMA.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Richard Sylves, Disaster Policy and Politics: Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), p. 
56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

   1988-2013: Quarter-Century of Stafford Revision and the Birth of 
                           Homeland Security

    The establishment of FEMA marked the beginning of a 
quiescent period in natural disaster policy activity. The years 
during President Reagan's administration were uneventful for 
natural disasters and, due to that dormant period and the 
Reagan administration's priorities, more emphasis and resources 
were placed, within FEMA, on nuclear war planning.
    However, during the decade of the 1980s there was one piece 
of significant disaster relief legislation, the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 
(P.L. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689, the Stafford Act),\27\ that 
codified some existing practices, such as the 75 percent 
Federal share for disaster programs, infrastructure repair, and 
the 18-month limit for temporary housing assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Vermont Senator Robert T. Stafford chaired the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW) from 1981 to 1987. As a 
tribute to him, P.L. 100-707 named the amended P.L. 93-288 in his 
honor. At the time, the EPW was the Senate authorizing committee for 
disaster relief legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The law also included important disaster concepts that 
remain a part of the suite of programs currently deployed in 
response to many disasters. Foremost among the provisions was 
Section 404.\28\ Other disaster programs added by the statute 
included the Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) Program and 
an expansion of the Crisis Counseling Program. The Stafford Act 
also included authorization of the small project grants that 
could be funded based on cost estimates, a forerunner of an 
approach that would be explored in ensuing disaster legislation 
for larger projects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ 42 U.S.C. 5170c. When enacted in P.L. 100-707 the cost share 
was 50 percent Federal and 50 percent State and local. This was amended 
during the Mississippi floods of 1993 to 75 percent Federal and 25 
percent State and local.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As previously noted, disaster relief policy has been marked 
by bipartisan accord both in substance and legislative process. 
The Stafford Act is striking in that regard since its chief 
sponsor was a House Member of the then-minority party--
Representative Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania. Mr. Ridge would go on 
to be a two-term Governor of Pennsylvania and the first 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, which now 
includes FEMA.
    While there was some criticism of FEMA's performance in 
response to Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 
in particular, the general perception of FEMA, both among 
Members of Congress and the public, changed during the Clinton 
administration. FEMA Director James Lee Witt was considered 
successful in reshaping the agency through an emphasis on a 
more timely response and improved partnership with the States. 
That assessment was held on both sides of the aisle in 
Congress: ``I haven't spent a lot of time complimenting the 
President on his appointments, but I sure did on this one,'' 
said Senator James Inhofe, an Oklahoma Republican.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Robert Block and Christopher Cooper, Disasters: Hurricane 
Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security (New York: Henry Holt, 
2006), p. 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FEMA's enhanced relationship with Congress was a result of 
its improved administration of the disaster response and 
recovery program. This change was expressed in the form of the 
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-390, 114 Stat. 1552, 
DMA2K). In line with FEMA's suggested direction, the law 
created incentives to lessening disaster risks:

    Witt urged the agency's officials to focus more on 
preventing the damage from disasters, through an 
intergovernmental and public-private effort. FEMA developed a 
``life-cycle'' model of disaster management. Disasters--and 
their costs--were the product of planning and mitigation that 
needed to begin far in advance of disasters and continue long 
after to prevent their recurrence.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Ibid., p. 62.

    Included in the legislation was a predisaster mitigation 
program that made funding available prior to, and not 
contingent on, a disaster event (now Section 203 of the 
Stafford Act). In addition, the law raised the amount of 
mitigation funds available in the Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program (HMGP) for those States with improved mitigation plans. 
The act also established a cost-estimating formula for large 
infrastructure repair or restoration projects that would permit 
FEMA to pay costs based on estimates rather than through the 
reimbursable process already in place.
    Interestingly some parts of DMA2K would be revisited in 
later legislation. For example, in order to meet ``pay-go'' 
provisions then in place,\31\ the act capped FEMA home repair 
assistance at $5,000 per household to offset increases in 
mitigation expenditures.\32\ While this limit reduced disaster 
assistance expenditures, the destructive impact of Hurricane 
Katrina demonstrated that the cap was a detriment to rapid 
repairs to make homes habitable, especially for those 
homeowners who had difficulty qualifying for loans to finish 
their repairs. The scope of devastation across five States 
impacted by Hurricane Katrina and the government's anemic 
response prompted Congress to taken action by enacting in the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (P.L. 109-295, 120 
Stat. 1355, PKEMRA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ For information on pay-go during this period, see CRS Report 
R41901, Statutory Budget Controls in Effect Between 1985 and 2002, by 
Megan Suzanne Lynch.
    \32\ P.L. 106-390, Section 408(c)(2)(C), 114 Stat. 1568.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The response to Hurricane Katrina was the first great 
challenge to FEMA since it became a part of the Department of 
Homeland Security in 2003.\33\ In fact, FEMA's role within DHS 
had been a matter of some debate. While some, such as the Hart-
Rudman Commission,\34\ thought FEMA was a natural fit within 
DHS, others were concerned that FEMA would lose its identity 
within the large, new institution. Certainly other parts of DHS 
(e.g., Secret Service and the Coast Guard) were subject to 
similar concerns of identity and function. FEMA, however, had a 
unique relationship with State and local governments that made 
the transition more of an open question. The post-Katrina 
reviews focused on this question. Just as FEMA was previously 
torn between civil defense and disaster relief, now the point 
of tension was between DHS' antiterrorism mission and FEMA's 
disaster response and recovery responsibilities. Some of the 
difficulties resulted from DHS' decision to take the lead on 
preparedness grants. This meant that, at the time of Katrina, 
FEMA was no longer directly involved in State preparedness 
efforts. As the Senate report on Hurricane Katrina explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ The Department of Homeland Security was established by P.L. 
107-296, the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
    \34\ U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, named after 
its chairs, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman. The commission 
recommended a new National Homeland Security Agency with FEMA as the 
key building block; Road Map for National Security: Imperative for 
Change, Phase III Report, p.15.

    FEMA was no longer able to influence activities tied to 
funding the states, including training, planning and 
exercising, or providing evaluation of such activities. This 
limitation of FEMA's role has hindered FEMA's relationship with 
the states. DHS's decision to separate preparedness from 
response was a mistake that hampered the alignment between the 
way preparedness is designed and the way response should 
operate.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Special Report 
of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC: 2006, p. 222.

    Among the many important changes made by PKEMRA was the 
transfer of preparedness grants back to FEMA to help the agency 
reestablish its relationships with the States. PKEMRA also 
clarified operational field authority and lifted the $5,000 cap 
for future disasters.\36\ In addition, the act reflected many 
of the hearings and fact-finding trips conducted by 
congressional committees after the Gulf storms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1448, amended Section 408(c) of the 
Stafford Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The multiple titles within PKEMRA addressed issues that had 
been raised during the troubled response to Katrina, including 
personnel challenges, procurement questions, delineation of 
FEMA's authority within DHS, people with disabilities, and many 
other topics that had arisen during the recovery. One example 
of the law's breadth and responsiveness to particular disaster 
situations was the establishment of case management services as 
an eligible State expense.
    The trend of legislation prompted by large events has 
continued, most recently with the passage of the Hurricane 
Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act (P.L. 113-2, SRIA). While 
the actual provisions regarding disaster policy again reflected 
bipartisan agreement, the pace and size of additional funding 
for the Sandy recovery was not without partisan debate.
    The law encompassed many parts of the recovery cycle. It 
encouraged incentives and pilot projects to speed up debris 
removal; included child care, for the first time, as an 
eligible expense under FEMA's Individual and Households (IHP) 
Program; and, perhaps most significantly, established in law 
the ability of Native American tribes to request help directly 
from the President rather than through State governments.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ For a detailed discussion of many of the provisions of P.L. 
113-2, see CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy Recovery 
Improvement Act of 2013, by Jared T. Brown, Edward C. Liu, and Francis 
X. McCarthy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    SRIA returned to the notion of alternative procedures for 
public assistance,\38\ including the use of estimates that had 
originally been provided to FEMA a dozen years earlier in 
DMA2K. This repeated underlining of such authority emphasized 
Congress' interest in streamlining the repairs to public 
infrastructure and its expectation that FEMA would implement 
such authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Public assistance (PA) provides government-to-government 
(Federal-to-State or local) disaster relief to subsidize much of the 
cost of repairing, rebuilding, or replacing damaged government or 
utility infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Concluding Observations

    Congress is not a static institution; rather it is a 
dynamic lawmaking body that changes with each election cycle 
but also in response to other pressures and influences.\39\ 
Disaster relief policy, in particular, demonstrates that 
Congress is an institution in which the mechanics of 
legislating reflect the responsiveness, openness, and 
pragmatism that is characteristic of American policymaking. The 
substantial overhaul of disaster relief reforms that took place 
over the last half century was, in large part, a reaction to 
certain disasters--yet it is an indication of how Congress 
becomes aware of problems and seeks solutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy 
Process, 3d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989), p. 283.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is also a reflection of the bipartisan nature of 
disaster relief policy. Current debates about disaster relief 
focus on actions, efficiency, the number of disaster 
declarations issued, and the size of subsequent Federal 
expenditures for disaster assistance. Congress does not often 
debate whether Federal assistance should be provided. 
Additionally, the impetus for disaster relief legislation 
inevitably leads back to the actual disaster events themselves. 
As disasters unfold in the future, Congress will likely 
continue to build on the existing framework established in the 
1950s and apply the lessons learned to refine existing programs 
and create new ones.






  Congress' Role in the Evolution of Federal Block Grants as a Policy 
      Instrument: From Community Development to Homeland Security

                              Eugene Boyd

         Analyst in Federalism and Economic Development Policy

                                  and

                             Natalie Keegan

         Analyst in Federalism and Emergency Management Policy

                              ----------                              


        Congressional passage of block grant legislation has 
        met with both success and failure. Using the CDBG 
        Program and proposals that would block grant State and 
        local preparedness grants as case studies, the report 
        identifies key elements that contribute to the 
        successful enactment of block grant legislation and 
        obstacles that may derail or delay passage. Successful 
        enactment of block grant legislation ideally requires 
        political urgency, congressional consensus, bipartisan 
        collaboration, and executive branch and interest group 
        support. Significant opposition from any of these 
        entities, or factions therein, particularly the 
        legislative branch, may delay or jeopardize passage of 
        legislation. In addition, any block grant proposal 
        faces double jeopardy in the absence of congressional 
        leadership support or by way of a potential 
        Presidential veto. Any successful block grant proposal 
        considered by Congress must overcome concerns about 
        grant transition and structure as well as the politics 
        of the block grant label.

                              Introduction

    Since 1966, with passage of the Comprehensive Health 
Services Act (P.L. 89-749) creating the Nation's first block 
grant, the Partnership in Health Program, Congress has used the 
block grant concept to provide assistance to State and local 
governments across a number of domestic policy areas (e.g., 
community development, income security, social services, 
education, transportation, juvenile justice, and job training). 
However, Congress' embrace of block grants as a policy 
implementation instrument has not been without controversies, 
contradictions, conflicts, or challenges. Block grants have 
been heralded by congressional supporters and others as a means 
of improving delivery of services through the consolidation of 
categorical programs and of effectuating the devolution of 
policy implementation authority to States and local 
governments. The block grant concept has also been denounced by 
detractors as facilitating a reduced Federal role as reflected 
in less prescriptive regulations, greater grantee discretion, 
and lower Federal funding amounts. In addition, critics of 
block grants question their ability to target assistance to 
areas of greatest need and their utility as an instrument of 
national policy, and they contend that these programs are 
difficult to evaluate.
    This report presents two case studies exploring Congress' 
role in the development, enactment, and continued support of 
the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program, which has 
been in existence for 40 years; and in the proposed, but not 
yet enacted, block granting/consolidation of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) State and local preparedness grants. 
The proposed block granting of the DHS preparedness grants is 
one of the most recent block grant initiatives to be considered 
by Congress. This comparison is used to illustrate how Congress 
as an institution has responded to block grant proposals and 
how that response has evolved over time.

                          Block Grants Defined

    In the Federal grant-in-aid universe, block grants lie 
somewhere between highly targeted and prescriptive categorical 
project grants--which are often, but not exclusively, awarded 
on a competitive basis--and the highly flexible, formula 
allocated, no-strings-attached general revenue sharing model.
    Block grants are distinguished from other Federal grant 
assistance by the following functional, structural, and 
managerial elements:
   Grants may be used to undertake a wide range of eligible 
        activities within a broadly defined functional area (i.e., 
        community development, social services).
   Grant recipients have discretion in the allocation of 
        resources to address local problems in line with national 
        objectives.
   Federal administrative requirements and oversight are kept 
        to a minimum to promote maximum flexibility in the use of funds 
        while intending to ensure that national objectives are met.
   Funds are generally awarded by formula (although some block 
        grants allow Federal agencies to allocate a small percentage of 
        the program's funds).
   Eligible grantees are typically States or local governments.
    Like general revenue sharing, block grants are designed to 
promote recipient discretion and flexibility in the mix of 
activities that may be funded. However, block grants, unlike 
general revenue sharing, require that funded activities address 
national objectives while meeting local needs and Federal 
requirements.

         Rationale Supporting Block Grants and Counterarguments

    Block grant advocates argue that block grants improve 
program performance by reducing administrative fragmentation 
associated with multiple categorical grants operating within a 
related policy area and by devolving programmatic authority to 
State and local government officials who, in their view, are 
better able than Federal officials to discern the most 
efficient and effective means to serve their State and their 
local communities. They argue that block grants:
   provide communities with greater certainty about the level 
        of Federal funding they should expect,
   distribute Federal funds to States or local governments 
        based on a formula intended to measure relative need,
   encourage local decisionmaking and priority setting by 
        allowing communities or State recipients broad discretion in 
        choosing activities and projects funded under the program while 
        minimizing Federal intrusion, and
   allow local officials to develop comprehensive long-term 
        plans in line with national objectives.
    Opponents argue that block grants:
   contain vague or unmeasurable goals;
   lack the specificity of single-purpose categorical grants;
   lead to possible funding reductions, particularly during 
        times of budgetary constraint; and
   redistribute decisionmaking authority to State or local 
        institutions.
    A 2004 assessment of block grants made the following 
observations:
   Initial funding of block grants has not been consistently 
        higher or lower than the programs they replaced. However, 
        funding tends to decline over time.
   Block grants may be subject to creeping categorization if 
        Congress enacts legislation with narrowly targeted programs 
        with the same objective as a categorical grant or sets aside 
        some portion of block grant for particular purposes.
   Implementation of new block grants has been smoothest when 
        and where States were responsible for administering the 
        programs they replaced.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Kenneth Finegold, Laura Wherry, and Stephanie Schardin, Block 
Grants: Historical Overview and Lessons Learned, Urban Institute, April 
2004, pp. 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Scholars contend that the decentralized nature of 
congressional decisionmaking and electoral politics also play a 
role in determining whether Congress decides to use categorical 
or block grants. The U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations noted that ``the fragmentation of 
responsibility in Congress inclines it toward the creation of a 
large number of specialized [categorical] grants, which may 
provide duplicative or even conflicting services.'' \2\ Another 
scholar has noted that Members of Congress have three primary 
objectives: achieving power, making ``good'' public policy, and 
getting reelected.\3\ He argued that Congress tends to favor 
categorical grants over block grants because categorical grants 
provide more opportunities for Members of Congress to claim 
electoral credit for authoring or supporting specific programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Categorical Grants: Their Role and Design, A-52 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
1978), pp. 55, 63-64.
    \3\ David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Block grants minimize the role of a Member of Congress in 
claiming ``particularized benefits'' in securing funds for a 
congressional district. These benefits have two properties: 
They are usually awarded to a specific individual group or 
geographic constituency, and they are usually distributed in a 
fashion so that the Member of Congress representing the 
benefited constituency can claim credit for the allocation. 
Congressional earmarks (or, more euphemistically, 
``congressionally directed spending'') and project-based, 
categorical grants are classic examples. Formula-based block 
grants minimize the ability of an individual Member to claim 
credit for securing funds since funds are to be allocated by 
formula. Block grants also minimize the role of the 
administering Federal agency in the awarding of grant funds. 
The formula-based nature of a block grant typically results in 
a reduced role in the allocation of funds for the administering 
Federal agency and a heightened role for local officials in the 
distribution of funds.
    Fear of the unknown is yet another reason for Members to 
favor categorical grants over block grants, particularly when 
block grants are used to facilitate the consolidation of 
activities funded under several categorical grant programs and 
do not include a hold harmless provision. Hold harmless 
provisions typically provide transition funding to assist State 
and local governments as the new program is implemented. Many 
of these issues and concerns came into play as Congress debated 
the enactment of the CDBG Program and, more recently, the 
creation of a homeland security preparedness block grant.

                      The Tale of Two Block Grants

    Congress' bicameral structure makes coalition building, 
collaboration, cooperation, and compromise important elements 
for the enactment of legislation. Proposals that lack political 
urgency, consensus, or the backing of committee chairmen or 
House or Senate leadership have little opportunity to move 
through the legislative process. Moreover, any proposal that 
successfully maneuvers through the legislative process faces 
the possibility of a Presidential veto if the administration is 
not also a partner in the process. In addition, the influence 
of organized interest groups in support or opposition to a 
proposal must be a part of the legislative calculus. All three 
of these players--Congress, the administration, and interest 
groups--played important roles in the enactment of the CDBG 
Program and the continued debate surrounding the block 
granting/consolidation of homeland security preparedness 
grants.
    By the early 1970s, there was near-universal agreement 
among Congress, the Nixon administration, and interest groups 
representing local governments that the then-current cadre of 
categorical grant programs addressing the social, demographic, 
economic, and physical development challenges facing the 
Nation's metropolitan communities were inadequate.\4\ The 
fragmented nature of Federal grant assistance, which was well 
documented during congressional hearings conducted during the 
89th Congress,\5\ coupled with concerns about the proper role 
of the Federal Government in addressing problems facing the 
Nation's urban areas, prompted renewed interest in grant 
consolidation proposals as a means to improve management 
efficiency, coordinate Federal assistance, and promote 
comprehensive long-term planning and redevelopment efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Congress' enactment of the CDBG Program was prompted by 
widespread dissatisfaction with the state of Federal grant assistance 
in general and community development policy in particular. Starting 
with the Housing Act of 1949 and the Urban Renewal Program, which 
authorized assistance to local governments for slum clearance and urban 
redevelopment, through the 1960s, which saw the enactment of the Model 
Cities Program and the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Federal community development assistance expanded in 
response to the problems facing the Nation's metropolitan communities. 
These included issues of physical decay, population and employment 
shifts, inadequate infrastructure, and the concentration and isolation 
of low-income and minority populations in central cities of 
metropolitan areas. To address these issues, Congress enacted a series 
of narrowly targeted, categorical or project-based programs intended to 
fund individual activities but generally lacking coordination among the 
programs.
    \5\ U.S. Congress, Senate Government Operations, Executive 
Reorganization, The Federal Role in Urban Affairs: Part 3, 89th Cong., 
2d sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966), p. 823 and various pages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By comparison, the call for the consolidation of State and 
local preparedness grants was part of a larger response to 
terrorist activities in the United States and abroad, including 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993, the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995, and 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.\6\ In 2000, the 
House approved by voice vote H.R. 4210. The bill would have 
created a President's Council on Domestic Terrorism 
Preparedness to recommend ways to strengthen interagency 
planning and coordination and to ``identify duplication, 
fragmentation, and overlap within federal terrorism 
preparedness programs and eliminate such duplication, 
fragmentation and overlap.'' The bill had strong bipartisan 
support and, like CDBG, was driven by the perceived need to 
address program fragmentation and create a more efficient and 
effective approach to preparedness:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ While earlier terrorist events, both here and abroad, may have 
resulted in congressional discussion of funding for domestic 
preparedness, the first proposal for a homeland security block grant 
did not occur until after 9/11. Congressional activity after the 9/11 
attacks also resulted in the creation of a new Cabinet department, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Shortly after DHS was created, 
the agency was tasked with administering several State and local 
preparedness grants. For the purposes of this report, discussion of 
consolidation of State and local preparedness grant programs is limited 
to the State and local preparedness grant programs administered by DHS.

    Implementation of this legislation will ultimately result 
in making the preparedness programs within the federal 
government more effective. The Committee anticipates that some 
programs will be eliminated or reworked according to the 
national plan. The outcome of this reorganization will result 
in the reduction of costs associated with providing duplicative 
or unnecessary training programs and response teams. 
Ultimately, the Committee believes this legislation will result 
in more efficient and effective federal effort to prepare the 
nation's emergency personnel against terrorist attacks.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2000, H. Rept. 
106-731, July 13, 2000, p. 11.

    The  legislation  was  not  enacted.  However,  in  the  
wake  of  the 9/11 terrorist attacks the following year, there 
was a renewed focus on Federal grant funding for domestic 
preparedness. Unlike CDBG, however, there was lack of consensus 
among affected interest groups concerning how State and local 
preparedness grants should be reformed.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Current discussions of the homeland security preparedness 
grants generally include the following grant programs administered by 
DHS: State Homeland Security, Urban Area Security Initiative, Non-
Profit Urban Area Security Initiative, Port Security, Operation 
Stonegarden, Citizen Corps, Metropolitan Medical Response Systems, 
Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program, Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention, Trucking Security, Intercity Bus Security, Rail Security, 
Buffer Zone Protection, Interoperable Communications, Regional 
Catastrophic Preparedness, REAL ID, and Emergency Operations Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      The Road to Enactment (CDBG)

    In 1971, fresh from a landslide reelection victory, 
President Richard Nixon and his administration launched an 
aggressive domestic policy agenda and christened it the New 
Federalism. It promised a devolution of power to lower levels 
of government, and thus closer to the people, by reversing what 
the President, in a 1969 speech on domestic policy, 
characterized as ``a third of a century of centralizing power 
and responsibility in Washington.'' The President claimed that 
this centralization had resulted in a Federal ``bureaucratic 
monstrosity, cumbersome, unresponsive, ineffective'' and ``a 
crisis of confidence in the capacity of government to do its 
job.'' \9\ Although President Nixon's domestic policy agenda 
called for the devolution of authority to localities and 
States, it did not embrace a complete disengagement by the 
national government from important domestic policy issues 
facing the Nation, including what many viewed as an urban 
crisis. Instead, the President's proposals were characterized 
as addressing the problems of a broken intergovernmental grant 
delivery system. Nowhere was that more evident than in the area 
of community development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ President Richard Nixon, ``Address to the Nation on Domestic 
Programs,'' August 8, 1969, at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=2191.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although congressional leaders of both parties agreed that 
existing programs addressing metropolitan needs were 
inadequate, reaching agreement on a legislative solution 
spanned 3 years and two Congresses before passage of the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-383). In 
the process, the administration's legislative fortunes would 
ebb and flow as it pushed Congress to enact its policy agenda 
that called for the consolidation of 129 categorical grant 
programs into what the Nixon administration termed 6 special 
revenue sharing programs, including community development.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The 6 special revenue sharing programs were (1) education (33 
programs), (2) transportation (26 programs), (3) urban community 
development (12 programs), (4) manpower training (17 programs), (5) 
rural community development (39 programs), and (6) law enforcement (2 
programs). The administration's proposal was a hybrid of the block 
grant concept that was first outlined as a recommendation of the 
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 
Commission Reports on Overseas Administration, Federal-State Relations, 
Federal Research, Vol. II, March 1949, p. 36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Nixon administration favored a no-strings attached, 
highly flexible grant format with minimal Federal restrictions 
and oversight it dubbed ``urban development special revenue 
sharing.'' The proposal, mentioned in President Nixon's 1971 
State of the Union Address,\11\ was outlined in detail in a 
March 1971 Special Message to Congress.\12\ The 
administration's proposal initially called for the 
consolidation of four programs administered by HUD, including 
urban renewal, Model Cities, water and sewer grants, and 
rehabilitation loans. It was later expanded to include 12 
programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ President Richard Nixon, ``Annual Message to the Congress on 
the State of the Union,'' at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=3110.
    \12\ President Richard Nixon, ``Special Message to the Congress on 
Special Revenue Sharing for Urban Community Development,'' March 5, 
1971, at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3339.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For its part, Congress favored a ``block grant'' approach 
that provided local officials with a high degree of discretion 
and flexibility in the mix of activities to be undertaken, as 
proposed by the administration, but included sufficient 
administrative controls and requirements to ensure that funds 
would be used to meet national objectives articulated in the 
act.\13\ It was this fundamental difference in approach that 
prevented the administration's special revenue sharing proposal 
from being enacted.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ For a review of CDBG funding history see CRS Report R43394, 
Community Development Block Grants: Recent Funding History, by Eugene 
Boyd.
    \14\ Despite Congress' embrace of block grants in the early 1970s, 
earlier block grant legislative proposals dating back to the 1950s 
failed to win congressional approval. U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, Block Grants: A Comparative Analysis, The 
Intergovernmental Grant System: An Assessment of Proposed Policies, 
October 1977, pp. 3-4, at http:// library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/
policy/A-60.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Nixon administration's proposal faced a skeptical 92d 
Congress, which was controlled by the opposite party, but one 
willing to engage in bipartisan policy deliberations. Although 
both Chambers reported omnibus housing bills out of 
subcommittees and committees of jurisdiction, with overwhelming 
bipartisan support, the full House failed to consider 
legislation before adjournment of the 92d Congress due to the 
actions of the House Rules Committee. By a vote of 9 to 5,\15\ 
the Rules Committee approved a motion to defer action on H.R. 
16704, the omnibus housing bill that would have authorized the 
creation of the program. Scholars and other observers have 
cited a number of reasons for the Rules Committee action, 
including the size (314 pages) and complexity of the bill, the 
short time available to consider the bill before adjournment, 
the lukewarm endorsement of the bill by House Banking and 
Currency Committee Chairman Wright Patman, and objections by 
civil rights organizations to the public housing provisions of 
the bill.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ The nine votes for the motion included five Democrats and four 
Republicans. Five Democrats favored moving the bill forward for floor 
consideration.
    \16\ ``Rules Committee Kills Housing-Urban Development Act,'' 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1972), p. 628.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Two years later, committee leaders in the 93d Congress and 
the administration again attempted to move community 
development reform legislation forward. Much of the heavy 
legislative lifting and responsibility for moving legislation 
forward to enactment were done by the chairmen of the House and 
Senate subcommittees of jurisdiction. In order to fashion a 
bill acceptable to all parties, the subcommittee chairs took 
several actions. These actions included seeking input from 
organizations representing local governments and negotiating 
with the White House and executive branch officials. The 
subcommittee chairs initially negotiated directly with the 
White House's domestic policy office and subsequently with the 
Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development--
as the White House became increasingly consumed and buffeted by 
the unfolding Watergate scandal that would lead to the first 
resignation of a U.S. President--in an attempt to reach 
agreement on legislation. The negotiations were intended to 
address fragmentation (which everyone agreed was necessary) 
while at the same time including sufficient safeguards to 
ensure that national objectives would be met (required to gain 
Democratic support).
    On February 27, 1974, Senator John Sparkman, chair of the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
introduced S. 3066, a comprehensive bill affecting many aspects 
of Federal housing and community development policy. The bill 
served as the legislative vehicle for enactment of the CDBG 
Program.\17\ The bill's community development provisions would 
have merged 10 urban community development categorical grants 
into a single block grant and provided that block grant a 2-
year funding cycle to ensure that local communities would have 
an ``assured and adequate level'' of funding.\18\ The bill's 
community development provisions were opposed by the 
administration, which preferred its special revenue sharing 
approach. The bill was reported by the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on February 27, 1974, and 
was passed by the Senate on March 11 by a vote of 76 to 11. 
Three months later, on June 20, the House passed its version of 
S. 3066, inserting the language of H.R. 15361, into the bill. 
The House bill would have merged seven urban community 
development categorical grants into a single block grant. 
Importantly, the block grant's distribution formula was 
developed in collaboration with the Secretary of the Department 
of Housing and Urban Affairs, which was seen as an attempt to 
avoid a threatened Presidential veto. The House and Senate 
versions of S. 3066 included significant differences in 
approach to Federal housing policy, and the bills differed in 
how the CDBG Program would be structured and financed. These 
differences were resolved in the conference agreement on August 
12, 1974.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ During the first session of the 93d Congress, at least six 
bills were introduced supporting community development consolidation 
and reform efforts, including the Nixon administration's Better 
Communities Act proposal (H.R. 7277); the Community Development 
Assistance Act of 1973 (S. 1744), sponsored by Senator Sparkman; and 
the Housing and Urban Development Act (H.R. 10036), sponsored by 
Representative William Barrett, the chairman of the House Subcommittee 
on Housing. Each of the proposals affirmed previously established 
positions. None of the bills was reported out of committee.
    \18\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Banking and Currency, 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 93d Cong., 2d sess., H. 
Rept. 93-693 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), p. 2.
    \19\ U.S. Congress, House Committee of Conference, Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, 93d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 93-
1279 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), pp. 1-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Final congressional approval of legislation creating the 
CDBG Program, which led to the termination of eight urban 
community development categorical grants, was achieved with 
passage of S. 3066, the Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1974.\20\ The act was signed into law as P.L. 93-383, by 
President Gerald Ford, on August 22, 1974, 2 weeks after the 
resignation of President Nixon in the wake of the Watergate 
crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ The categorical programs that were terminated and their 
activities included under the new block grant were (1) open space 
acquisition, (2) public facilities loans, (3) urban renewal, (4) water 
and sewer grants, (5) Model Cities, (6) Neighborhood Development 
Program grants, (7) neighborhood facilities grants, and (8) historic 
preservation grants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the lead up to the enactment of CDBG, there was 
universal consensus among all stakeholders--the administration, 
Congress, and interest groups--that reform was needed. It was 
the direction and design of reform that required compromise in 
order for reform to be enacted.

                         Not Yet Enacted (HSBG)

    Like CDBG, congressional leaders also agreed with the Bush 
administration's assessment that there was a need to improve 
the grant administration process for State and local 
preparedness grants. In his FY2002 budget request, President 
George W. Bush recommended grant consolidation in this issue 
area, noting that ``this budget reflects the Administration's 
commitment to giving state and local governments increased 
flexibility . . . . The Administration's efforts to improve the 
grant administration process will include efforts to 
consolidate grants that support programs with similar missions 
to create one flexible grant.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Budget of the United 
States Government, Fiscal Year 2002, 107th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 
107-3 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2003), p. 195. Notably, the FY2002 budget 
was submitted to Congress several months prior to the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On November 28, 2001, just weeks after the 9/11 attacks, 
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton introduced a bill, cosponsored 
by seven Democratic Senators, to establish the Homeland 
Security Block Grant (HSBG) to be administered by the Attorney 
General.\22\ According to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the 
HSBG was modeled after the CDBG:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ S. 1737 was introduced on November 28, 2001, and referred to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee.

    Under this legislation, cities, counties, and towns across 
America will be able to access Federal funds to help them 
improve security and public safety locally. Modeled after the 
Community Development Block Grant program, the Homeland 
Security Block Grant Act provides $3 billion in funding to 
communities, with 70 percent going directly to more than 1,000 
cities and counties across the United States. The remaining 30 
percent will be sent to the states, which will serve as a pass-
through for funds directed to smaller communities.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ U.S. Conference of Mayors, ``Homeland Security Block Grant 
Act,'' December 3, 2001, at http://www.usmayors.org/usmayornewspaper/
documents/12_03_01/security_block_grant2.asp.

    The bill was not reported out of committee.\24\ Senator 
Clinton reintroduced a revised version of the bill during the 
second session of the 107th Congress with nine Democratic 
cosponsors.\25\ The proposed block grant would have provided 
funds for a fairly broad range of homeland security activities, 
as determined by States and compiled into a statement of 
homeland security objectives, and was to be allocated at the 
States' discretion to local governments.\26\ Funds were to be 
allocated to the States based upon a formula that predominantly 
used population as the allocation criteria with the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the administering Federal 
agency. A companion bill was introduced the same day in the 
House of Representatives by Representative Michael McNulty with 
one Democratic cosponsor.\27\ In his FY2003 budget request, 
President Bush also proposed ``streamlining support of local 
law enforcement by consolidating duplicative programs'' through 
the First Responder Initiative, but an administration bill was 
never introduced.\28\ The bills were not reported out of 
committee despite support by congressional policymakers, the 
administration, and many stakeholders.\29\ This may have been 
due, in part, to disagreements about whether the grant funds 
should be awarded directly to local governments or funneled 
through the States.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ S. 1737 was endorsed by the National Association of Police 
Organizations, the International Association of Fire Fighters, the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs, and the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors.
    \25\ The bill was reintroduced as S. 2038, the Homeland Security 
Block Grant Act of 2002, on March 20, 2002, and referred to the Senate 
Committee on Environment and Public Works.
    \26\ The bill proposed funding for these categories of activities: 
additional law enforcement, fire, and emergency sources; purchasing 
personal protective equipment for first responders; improving cyber and 
infrastructure security, local emergency planning, information sharing, 
and coordination; establishing notification systems; improving threat 
communications systems; and devising homeland security plans.
    \27\ H.R. 4059, the Homeland Security Block Grant Act of 2002, was 
introduced on March 20, 2002, and referred to the House Transportation 
and Infrastructure Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, and the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee.
    \28\ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Budget of the United 
States Government, Fiscal Year 2003, 107th Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. 
107-59 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2003), p. 203.
    \29\ Tim Craig, ``More Money Needed for Terrorism Fight, O'Malley 
Tells Panel,'' Baltimore Sun, April 11, 2002.
    \30\ U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Homeland Security: 
Assessing the Needs of Local Law Enforcement, hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, 107th Congress, 2d Sess., S. Hrg. 107-
889, p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the absence of legislation authorizing a homeland 
security block grant, Congress continued to fund separate State 
and local preparedness grants through annual appropriations 
acts, and key stakeholders in the preparedness grants community 
continued to seek legislation to reduce program fragmentation 
in this policy area.\31\ Instead, in 2007, Congress enacted 
legislation (P.L. 110-53) that provided authorization for two 
of the largest homeland security grant programs that had 
previously existed solely through annual appropriations 
legislation.\32\ The authorizing legislation established an 
allocation formula for both programs that reinforced the 
States' dominant role in the administration of preparedness 
grants.\33\ Local government stakeholders had long advocated 
reforming State and local preparedness grants to provide direct 
assistance to the local level rather than going through the 
States. As a result, local government stakeholders continued to 
seek legislative reforms for these grants, even after the new 
authorizing legislation was implemented.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ During this time, the State and local preparedness grant 
programs were shifted several times throughout the components in DHS. 
For example, in 2006, the grants were administered by the Office of 
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, then in 2007 
the grants were moved to the Preparedness Directorate established by 
the FY2006 appropriations act, and in 2008, they were moved again to 
the Office of Grant Programs in FEMA.
    \32\ P.L. 110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act of 2007, authorized the Urban Area Security Initiative 
Grant Program and the State Homeland Security Grant Program.
    \33\ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, conference report 
to accompany H.R. 1, Report 110-259, p. 288.
    \34\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th 
Congress, 2d Sess., hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, 
Homeland Security: Assessing the Needs of Local Law Enforcement, S. 
Hrg. 107-889, p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unlike the deliberations that took place during 
consideration of the CDBG, the interest groups involved in the 
deliberations for a State and local preparedness block grant 
were divided, with State government officials advocating a 
continuation of their dominant role in the administration of 
the grants and local government officials advocating for more 
direct funding that bypassed States. This may help to explain 
why initial congressional interest in establishing a 
preparedness block grant gave way to a congressional focus on 
finding ways to achieve program efficiencies and stabilize 
funding levels rather than creating a traditional block 
grant.\35\ Another contributing factor is that the most recent 
consolidation initiative, proposed by the Obama administration, 
lacked the level of specificity seen in the bills introduced to 
create a community development block grant regarding how DHS 
would award funds. Notably, the administration did not use the 
term ``block grant'' to describe the proposal, making it 
difficult for stakeholders to understand how the proposal would 
work. This lack of specificity created confusion among 
stakeholders and Congress concerning how the administration's 
proposal would affect (1) the distribution of funds among 
jurisdictions, (2) funding for specific grant recipients, and 
(3) both current and future funding levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ For example, Senator Susan Collins introduced S. 1245, the 
Homeland Security Grant Enhancement Act of 2003, on June 12, 2003, to 
provide for homeland security grants coordination and simplification. 
The legislation did not create a block grant; rather, it sought to 
streamline the grant administration process. The legislation had strong 
bipartisan support and was reported by the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs (of which Senator Collins was chairwoman) but was 
not enacted. Subsequent legislation dealing with the efficiency of the 
homeland security grants were successful in getting enacted, such as 
P.L. 111-271, the Redundancy Elimination and Enhanced Performance for 
Preparedness Grants Act, which sought to identify and eliminate 
redundant reporting requirements and establish performance metrics for 
homeland security preparedness grants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, President Obama asked for $1.54 billion in his 
FY2013 budget request to establish a National Preparedness 
Grant Program (NPGP). The NPGP's vision document, released in 
February 2012, indicated that the new grant would ``consolidate 
[16] current grant programs . . . [to] enable grantees to 
develop and sustain core capacities outlined in the National 
Preparedness Goal instead of requiring grantees to meet the 
mandates from multiple, individual, often disconnected, grant 
programs.'' \36\ The vision document indicated that the grant 
would ``elevate national preparedness capabilities by focusing 
on regionally and nationally deployable assets,'' build and 
sustain core capabilities, and base funding allocations ``on 
prioritized core capacities as well as comprehensive threat/
risk assessments and gap analyses.'' \37\ The House 
Appropriations Committee provided the following reason for 
denying the administration's request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, FY2013 National 
Preparedness Grant Program Vision Document, February 2012, at https://
www.fema.gov/pdf/about/budget/fy13_national_ 
preparedness_grant_program_overview.pdf.
    \37\ Ibid., p. 4.

    In fiscal year 2013, FEMA proposed a new grant program 
called the National Preparedness Grant Program under State and 
Local Programs. This proposal is denied due to the lack of 
Congressional authorization and the lack of the necessary 
details that are required for the initiation of a new program 
to include grant guidance and implementation plans. The 
Department should work with the appropriate committees of 
jurisdiction to obtain the necessary authorizing legislation 
and to clearly define the Federal role and reassess the most 
effective delivery of support and resources to sustain and 
improve homeland security capabilities prior to submitting a 
budget request for such a program. Additionally, the Committee 
met with and heard testimony from numerous stakeholders that 
expressed concern not just with the grant proposal but also 
with the lack of stakeholder outreach prior to the program's 
introduction. The Committee considers this lack of outreach 
concerning and it should be addressed.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Department 
of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2013, report to accompany 
H.R. 5855, 112th Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 112-492 (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2012), p. 113.

    The Senate Appropriations Committee also did not endorse 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the proposal.

    The reform proposal in the budget leaves key questions 
unanswered, such as, how risk assessments will be used in 
determining the distribution of resources, and to whom Federal 
resources will be allocated. The Committee appreciates that the 
Department and FEMA are seeking stakeholder input to answer 
these key questions. However, until such questions can be 
answered, it is premature to approve the reform proposal.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Department 
of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2013, report to accompany S. 
3216, 112th Cong., 2d sess., S. Rept. 112-169 (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2012), p. 113.

    The Obama administration proposed the NPGP again in its 
FY2014 and FY2015 budget requests and received a similar 
response from Congress both times. The administration indicated 
that its FY2015 proposal included adjustments to respond to 
concerns raised by stakeholders. The administration stated that 
the consolidation was intended to address grant program 
administration, efficiency, and effectiveness issues. According 
to DHS, the consolidation of the State and local grant programs 
would:
   increase collaboration,
   eliminate the redundancies and requirements placed on both 
        the Federal Government and the grantees,
   provide greater certainty regarding the source and use of 
        funds, and
   more closely align program implementation with other FEMA 
        disaster grant programs.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency: State and Local Programs FY2015 Congressional Budget 
Justifications, pp. 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Stakeholders opposed the NPGP proposal primarily because 
they were worried that the consolidation could lead to reduced 
funding and because they believed that the existing grant 
program structure was ``working well by funneling funds to 
local areas to develop and implement local and regional 
responses to terrorism and other potential catastrophes.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Neil Bomberg, ``Funding Homeland Security Grants--The House, 
the Senate, and the Administration Take Different Approaches,'' 
National League of Cities, April 29, 2013, at http://www.nlc.org/media-
center/news-search/funding-homeland-security-grants-%E2%80%93-the-
house-the-senate-and-the-administration-take-different-approaches.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Concluding Observations

    The statute creating the CDBG Program was primarily the 
language and framework of the House Banking Committee's 
Subcommittee on Housing but included important elements of 
proposals approved by the Senate and put forth by the 
administration.\42\ Several issues had to be addressed in an 
effort to secure passage of the legislation, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ For a detailed discussion of the CDBG Program's origins and 
legislative history see U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, Community Development: The Workings of a Federal-Local Block 
Grant, The Intergovernmental Grant System: An Assessment and Proposed 
Policies (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1977), pp. 3-33, at http://
digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1364/m1/1/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   reaching agreement on the categorical programs that would be 
        terminated and activities folded into the new block grant,
   providing for the transition from the categorical programs 
        to a block grant through the inclusion of hold harmless 
        provision in the authorizing statute that allowed for the 
        phasing in of previously unfunded jurisdictions and the phasing 
        out of others,
   expanding the category of eligible entitlement communities 
        in order to win the support of urban county officials and 
        Members representing suburban congressional districts, and
   adopting a distribution formula that effectively measured 
        community development need.
    The CDBG Program won bipartisan congressional support 
facilitated by (1) the inclusion of metropolitan-based counties 
(urban counties) as entities eligible for direct, formula-based 
allocation and (2) the inclusion of a hold harmless provision 
intended to facilitate a 5-year transition from assistance 
previously received under the former categorical grants to the 
new block grant.
    The enactment of CDBG legislation in 1974 was a departure 
from the status quo of narrowly tailored and competitively 
awarded categorical grants and marked a fundamental change in 
the direction of Federal community development policy. The 
program's longevity--40 years and counting--and its popularity 
among Members of Congress can be attributable to several 
factors:
   The program's formula includes a minimum population-based 
        eligibility threshold that widens the base of congressional 
        support for the program.
   Since its passage, congressional support was strengthened by 
        the inclusion of a second formula in 1977,\43\ the direct 
        administration of funds by States starting in 1982,\44\ and the 
        grandfathering of entitlement communities that no longer meet 
        minimum population threshold for entitlement status.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Three years after its enactment, Congress moved to 
significantly reform the program, introducing a second allocation 
formula intended to address a regional bias in the first formula that 
favored communities in the South and West experiencing population 
growth and high levels of poverty. The new formula--which included 
poverty, housing built before 1940, and population growth lag--had the 
effect of boosting the share of funds allocated to entitlement 
communities in the Northeast and Midwest. Congress also added economic 
development activities carried out by nonprofit and community-based 
entities as a CDBG-eligible activity and created a new program--the 
competitively awarded, project-based Urban Development Action Grants--
under the same statute.
    \44\ In 1981, with the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act (P.L. 97-35), Congress shifted, at the option of each State, 
administrative responsibility for the small cities/nonentitlement 
component of the CDBG Program to States, including allowing States to 
establish the method for distributing funds within the State. Congress 
also increased the percentage of appropriated funds allocated to the 
State-administered program from 20 percent to 30 percent of the amount 
appropriated. This was a significant coup for State Governors who had 
complained that the program's then-current structure left them on the 
sidelines. Despite calls for changes in the distribution formula, 
Congress has made no additional changes to the allocation formula over 
the last 33 years of the program.
    \45\ The National Affordable Housing Act (P.L. 101-625) granted 
CDBG entitlement status to entitlement communities that no longer met 
the required population threshold if such communities had been so 
classified for at least 2 years. The net effect of this grandfathering 
provision--and the then-continued decline in funding for other 
community and regional development programs--was to increase reliance 
on the CDBG Program at a time when the number of entitlement 
communities was steadily increasing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   The program has extraordinary utility as a legislative 
        vehicle to respond to unanticipated events. Congress has used 
        the program on an ad hoc basis to respond to natural disasters, 
        terrorist attacks, and fiscal and financial crisis.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Examples of assistance outside the regular program include 
Hurricane Katrina, the Midwest floods of 2008 and Hurricane Sandy, the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
recession of 1982, and the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The program has withstood periodic calls for its 
elimination and reform with strong bipartisan support, 
including the Bush administration's 2006 Strengthening 
America's Communities Initiative, the House Budget Committee's 
effort during the FY2011 budget battle to eliminate the 
program, and, most recently, the Obama administration's 
proposals included in its FY2014 and FY2015 budget requests to 
reform the program's formula and eligibility requirements.
    By comparison, neither the proposed HSBG nor the NPGP 
consolidation initiative was enacted despite over 14 years of 
congressional debate. This could be, in part, because the 
proposals failed to address the key issues that traditionally 
arise in block grant debates:
   Congress and the administration never reached agreement 
        regarding which grant programs to consolidate.
   Both the HSBG and the NPGP failed to include provisions, 
        such as hold harmless provisions, to provide a transition from 
        the existing grant structure to the new grant program.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ A ``hold harmless'' provision allows existing grant recipients 
to be grandfathered into the new program either by maintaining past 
funding levels for a certain period of time or ensuring the recipient 
remain eligible under the new program regardless of eligibility 
provisions in the authorizing legislation for the new grant program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Neither proposal expanded the pool of recipients or provided 
        stability in funding that would have widened the stakeholder 
        support for the proposal.
   The proposed allocation formulas lacked sufficient detail to 
        determine how the program would impact stakeholders, thus 
        making it impossible to determine winners and losers.
    Although early proposals to establish a homeland security 
block grant failed, it could be argued that the authorization 
of the two largest State and local preparedness grants in 
2007--the Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program and the 
State Homeland Security Grant Program--essentially established 
two block grants, because:
   both programs allowed grant funds to be used for a wide 
        range of eligible activities within the broadly defined 
        functional area of preparedness,
   State grant recipients in both programs had discretion in 
        the allocation of resources to the local level in ways that 
        aligned with national objectives,
   efforts were made to streamline reporting requirements of 
        the programs and allow for flexibility in the use of funds,
   both programs utilized a formula-based allocation method, 
        and
   State and local governments were eligible recipients under 
        both programs.
    It is worth noting that neither program was referred to as 
a ``block grant'' despite meeting the traditional definition of 
a block grant. It is also noteworthy that since the programs 
were enacted in 2007, there have been no congressional 
initiatives to establish a homeland security block grant.
    Concerns about program fragmentation played a role both in 
the enactment of CDBG and proposals to consolidate State and 
local preparedness grants. However, unlike the deliberations 
that led to the CDBG, there was a lack of consensus among 
homeland security stakeholders concerning how to proceed. Local 
government stakeholders wanted more direct funding, while State 
government stakeholders wanted to continue the States' dominant 
role in allocating Federal funds. This may help to explain why 
efforts to create a comprehensive State and local preparedness 
block grant were not successful. Even though the State and 
local preparedness grants faced similar fragmentation issues 
when compared to CDBG, the fragmentation was not a critical 
element in the debate regarding consolidation. Like CDBG, the 
concern with efficiency in the administration of the grant 
programs was, and continues to be, widely discussed and has 
been emphasized by Congress and the administration as 
justification for various consolidation initiatives. While 
there appeared to be consensus among Congress, the 
administration, and stakeholders that there needed to be 
homeland security grant reform to address the efficiency 
issues, there was lack of consensus on the details necessary to 
establish a new program and lack of collaboration among the 
three in working out any points of disagreement.
    Fear of the unknown also played a role. Unlike CDBG, which 
featured detailed legislative proposals and introduced bills, 
the Obama administration's NPGP was presented more as a concept 
than as a bill. As a result, stakeholders worried about how 
they might be affected and, in the absence of specific 
provisions, were not willing to assume the risk inherent in 
allowing the administration to proceed with consolidation 
without specific authorizing legislation in place.
    As has been shown, enacting block grants is difficult. As 
scholars have noted, block grants lack some of the electoral 
benefits that categorical grants can provide, and they 
introduce an element of uncertainty in the policymaking 
process, especially in the absence of hold harmless provisions, 
that makes it more difficult for all stakeholders to support 
change in the absence of consensus. Consensus concerning the 
need to act, extensive collaboration, cooperation, and 
compromise were integral parts of the tale of CDBG, and they 
will continue to be key elements in the ongoing story of State 
and local preparedness grants.


The Tax Extenders: How Congressional Rules and Outside Interests Shape 
                                 Policy

                         Molly F. Sherlock \1\

            Coordinator of Division Research and Specialist

                              ----------                              


        Congress regularly acts to extend expired and expiring 
        provisions, colloquially referred to as ``tax 
        extenders.'' The first tax extenders package was passed 
        in the late 1980s. Extenders have regularly been 
        addressed by Congress since that time. Several factors 
        contributed to the enactment of temporary tax 
        provisions, including increased visibility of tax 
        expenditures in the Federal budget process, and budget 
        rules intended to achieve fiscal discipline. The 
        ``opportunity for review'' provided by sunsets is often 
        given as a rationale for having temporary tax 
        provisions, although review rarely occurs in practice. 
        The number of tax extenders has increased over time, 
        particularly in the 2000s. Tax extenders persist, in 
        part, because short-term extensions appear less costly 
        than long-term extensions. Individually, for certain 
        groups, extender provisions are popular policy, with 
        short-term extensions often perceived as better than 
        expiration. Hence, many expect regular short-term 
        extensions of expired and expiring provisions to 
        continue, despite agreement among many in Congress that 
        the practice is suboptimal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The author would like to thank Jane G. Gravelle, Steve Maguire, 
Bob Dilger, John Haskell, Kevin Kosar, and Walter J. Oleszek for 
helpful comments. The author would also like to thank Jared Nagel and 
Jennifer Teefy, information research specialists at CRS, for their 
assistance with background research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              Introduction

    The U.S. tax code is rife with sunset provisions. Fifty-
seven temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2013. Many 
expect that nearly all of these provisions will be temporarily 
extended before the end of 2014. Expired and expiring 
provisions that are regularly temporarily extended by Congress 
are colloquially referred to as ``tax extenders.''
    Many in Congress agree that the current and regular 
practice of extending expired tax provisions, often 
retroactively, is problematic. Senate Finance Committee 
Chairman Ron Wyden has noted that the ``stop and go nature [of 
extenders] obviously contributes to the lack of certainty and 
predictability America needs.'' Chairman Wyden stated firmly 
that the April 3, 2014 markup was the last time the Finance 
Committee would take up tax extenders, so long as he remains 
chairman.\2\ Orrin Hatch, Finance Committee Ranking Member, has 
expressed ``deep reservations about temporary tax policies.'' 
\3\ He also stated that Congress ``should not continue doing 
business as usual when it comes to extenders.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Open Executive 
Session to consider an original bill entitled ``Expiring Provisions 
Improvement Reform and Efficiency (EXPIRE) Act,'' 113th Cong., 2d 
sess., April 3, 2014, Opening Statement of Senator Ron Wyden, available 
at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
04032014%20extenders%20markup%20statement.pdf.
    \3\ Orrin Hatch, ``Small Business Jobs and Tax Relief Act--Motion 
to Proceed,'' Congressional Record, July 11, 2012, p. S4838.
    \4\ Orrin Hatch, ``Extension of Tax Extenders,'' Congressional 
Record, March 14, 2012, p. S1660.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The leadership of the House Committee on Ways and Means has 
also expressed frustration with the tax extenders practice. 
Chairman Dave Camp recently noted that tax extenders are one of 
the best examples of undesirable and unnecessary complexity in 
the tax code.\5\ Ranking Member Sander Levin has echoed a point 
raised by many, that permanent tax policy is preferable to 
frequent short-term extensions.\6\ Despite the view of many 
that temporarily extending expiring provisions is suboptimal 
tax policy, the practice is expected to continue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Opening Statement of Chairman Dave Camp at Hearing on the 
Benefits of Permanent Tax Policy for America's Job Creators, April 8, 
2014, available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=377136.
    \6\ Opening Statement of Ranking Member Sander Levin at Full 
Committee Hearing on Business Tax Provisions in the Camp Tax Plan, 
April 8, 2014, available at http://democrats. waysandmeans.house.gov/
press-release/opening-statement-ranking-member-sander-levin-full- 
committee-hearing-business-tax.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This research explores the historical origins and 
development of the ``tax extenders,'' paying particular 
attention to the role that Congress as an institution has 
played in creating this package of temporary tax policies. As 
argued below, the tax extenders are a consequence of 
policymaking in a constrained environment. In this case, a 
primary constraint is the budget rules Congress has imposed on 
itself. While the intent of budget rules was broader fiscal 
discipline, the tax extenders practice, to some degree, might 
be considered a byproduct of fiscal discipline efforts. Budget 
rules were one among many reasons why various provisions were 
made temporary rather than permanent when initially enacted. 
Budget rules have played a role not only in creating, but also 
in sustaining, this regularly occurring lawmaking ritual.
    Although budget rules were instrumental in shaping the tax 
extender practice in its current form, there are arguably other 
reasons that Congress continues to temporarily extend expiring 
tax provisions. While fiscal considerations remain important, 
recent experience has shown that Congress is not unwilling to 
enact deficit increasing, permanent, tax legislation. Does this 
suggest that the continuation of the tax extenders practice 
involves more than adherence to budgeting rules and 
conventions?
    Since the 1990s, political commentators have observed that 
tax extenders could provide a lobbying opportunity.\7\ Thus, 
temporary extenders are not only a convenient tool for reducing 
the apparent cost of tax breaks. With both internal and 
external forces that favor the tax extenders practice in its 
current form, despite acknowledgement of the extenders practice 
being problematic as tax policy, the practice may continue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ ``Washington Update--Asking for an Extension,'' National 
Journal, March 30, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following section explores the origins of tax extenders 
by looking at how certain tax expenditures became tax 
extenders. A history of tax extender legislation is then 
provided, which traces congressional action on tax extenders 
through periods of tight fiscal control and projected budget 
surpluses and exploring how tax extenders evolved into must-
pass legislation that is often not paid for. A brief discussion 
of the external influence interest groups have on the extenders 
practice is followed by concluding remarks.

                    The Origins of ``Tax Extenders''

    The practice of extending a group of expired or expiring 
temporary tax provisions began in the late 1980s, after the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86; P.L. 99-514). The Technical and 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA; P.L. 100-647) 
extended eight expiring tax provisions. These provisions were 
contained in a separate title, ``Extensions and Modifications 
of Expiring Tax Provisions.'' \8\ Although the relative merits 
of various temporary tax provisions were evaluated in the 100th 
Congress,\9\ the expiring provisions were ultimately given a 
uniform 1-year extension in TAMRA. The temporary extensions 
given to expiring provisions were criticized by some, with one 
tax aide noting that ``tax policy ha[d] become secondary to 
revenue.'' \10\ Despite this criticism, subsequent legislation 
continued the practice of grouping together expired or expiring 
temporary tax provisions for a short-term extension as tax 
extenders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Although temporary tax provisions had previously been extended, 
leading some to contend that the ``tax extender'' practice began in the 
late 1970s, TAMRA was the first time such provisions were considered as 
a group in a separate title.
    \9\ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on 
Taxation and Debt Management, Expiring Tax Provisions, 110th Cong., 2d 
sess., March 28, 1988, S. Hrg. 100-1002.
    \10\ Pat Jones, ``Tax Policy Considerations Triumphed in Technical 
Corrections Bill, Aides Say,'' Tax Notes Today, November 14, 1988.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The research tax credit, often cited as the longest 
standing tax extender, was one of the temporary tax provisions 
extended in TAMRA.\11\ The credit first entered the code as a 
temporary provision as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 (P.L. 97-34).\12\ The research tax credit included a 
sunset to allow Congress the ``opportunity to evaluate the 
operation and efficacy of the new credit.'' \13\ Although 
opportunity for evaluation was given as a policy rationale for 
the inclusion of a sunset for the research credit, other 
factors may have led to the enactment of other tax provisions 
on a temporary rather than permanent basis. The budget 
environment of the 1970s, and the circumstances surrounding the 
enactment of temporary tax expenditures during that decade, 
provides additional insight into the origins of the tax 
extenders practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ For a legislative history and more information, see CRS Report 
RL31181, Research Tax Credit: Current Law and Policy Issues for the 
113th Congress, by Gary Guenther.
    \12\ TRA86 made significant changes to the research tax credit and 
extended the credit through 1988.
    \13\ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, General 
Explanation of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, committee print, 97th 
Cong., December 29, 1981, JCS-71-81, p. 121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 From Tax Expenditures to Tax Extenders

    The first ``tax extenders'' package was passed in 1988, but 
the roots of the tax extenders practice can be traced to the 
budget policy of the 1970s. The major budget legislation of the 
1970s, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974 (P.L. 93-344), reflected an effort by Congress to gain 
more control over budget priorities.\14\ In the early 1970s, 
many in Congress objected to President Richard Nixon's refusal 
to spend certain appropriated funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ For additional discussion, see Allen Schick, The Federal 
Budget: Politics, Policy, and Process (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000), pp. 17-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress had become familiar with the concept of tax 
expenditures, and even made efforts to limit this form of tax 
policy, years earlier. The first tax expenditure estimates were 
voluntarily prepared by the Department of the Treasury in 
1968.\15\ Although the executive branch resisted regular 
publication of tax expenditure estimates, P.L. 93-344 required 
that tax expenditure estimates be included in the President's 
annual budget submission. With annual tax expenditure estimates 
available, and ``spending through the tax code'' more visible, 
questions soon arose as to whether tax expenditures should be 
subject to a more rigorous budget review process.\16\ Shortly 
after enactment of the 1974 Budget Act, a push began in 
Congress to enact ``sunset'' legislation. This effort was 
sustained into the late 1970s.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Tax expenditures are revenue losses resulting from tax 
provisions (e.g., credits, deductions, exclusions, reduced rates, 
deferrals) that provide special tax relief. Tax expenditures are often 
viewed as spending programs channeled through the tax code.
    \16\ ``Tax Expenditure Budget: Pluses and Minuses,'' Tax Notes, 
February 10, 1975, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Proposals in both the 94th and 95th Congresses (S. 2925 and 
S. 2, respectively), introduced by Senator Edmund Muskie, would 
have required 5-year termination dates for tax expenditures (in 
addition to periodic termination for authorized spending 
programs). The Sunset Act (S. 2) had 62 cosponsors, with 
support split across the 2 political parties. The poor fiscal 
climate and the public view of the government as bloated and 
inefficient contributed to the Carter administration's support 
of sunset laws.
    Although the Carter administration backed sunset 
legislation, support was not universal within the Democratic 
Party, particularly when it came to tax expenditures. Senator 
Russell B. Long, chairman of the Finance Committee, strongly 
opposed sunsets for tax expenditures. In his view, sunset 
legislation that included tax expenditures would create a path 
for ``backdoor'' tax increases, without the policy change being 
reviewed by the Finance Committee.\17\ Thus, tax expenditure 
sunsets could be seen as an encroachment on Finance Committee's 
jurisdiction. Senator Long also objected to sunset provisions 
because they would shift the burden of proof, reducing the 
power of the Finance Committee.\18\ When tax expenditures are 
permanent, the burden of challenging tax expenditures falls on 
the opponents, who have to come out in favor of repeal. Having 
tax expenditures automatically expire would require a 
filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and Presidential 
support to ensure extension.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Stanley Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel, ``The Tax Expenditure 
Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues,'' Boston College Law 
Review, vol. 20, no. 6 (January 1979), p. 332.
    \18\ Ibid., p. 333.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Long, with the support of other Finance Committee 
members, prevented the advancement of a tax expenditure sunset 
measure during consideration of the Revenue Act of 1978 (H.R. 
13511). Senator Long's motion to table an amendment offered by 
Senator John Glenn, to require periodic re-approval of all tax 
expenditures, was agreed to 50 to 41. Finance Committee members 
voted 11 to 2 in support of Chairman Long's motion.
    Although Chairman Long was successful at keeping tax 
expenditures out of the sunset bill (S. 2), and preventing 
across-the-board tax expenditure sunsets in other revenue 
measures, the idea of sunsets in the tax code had nonetheless 
been introduced.
    In the late 1970s, several new tax expenditure measures 
were enacted with sunsets. Revenue considerations were one of 
several reasons a new tax expenditure measure may have included 
a sunset. The Revenue Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-600) introduced an 
income exclusion for employer-provided educational assistance. 
The Senate version of the bill proposed the exclusion as a 
permanent provision.\19\ The House version of the 1978 tax cut 
act did not contain this particular provision, and the 
provision was made temporary as part of the conference 
agreement. The exclusion for employer-provided educational 
assistance was one of the many provisions scaled back in 
conference to reduce the overall budgetary cost of the bill. In 
this case, the provision was scaled back by including a sunset.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ The Carter administration did not approve of the Senate 
Finance Committee's version of the 1978 tax act, objecting to certain 
provisions related to capital gains and the bill's overall revenue 
cost. See ``Conferees OK College Tax Credit Plan of Up to $250,'' Los 
Angeles Times, September 29, 1978.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other temporary tax measures that were part of TAMRA, but 
enacted in the 1970s, include the exclusion for group prepaid 
legal services and the energy credit for solar and geothermal 
property. The exclusion for group prepaid legal services was 
enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-
455).\20\ In adopting this provision, Congress requested that 
the Departments of the Treasury and Labor study the provision, 
to evaluate the ``desirability and feasibility of continuing 
the benefits provided by [the] provision.'' \21\ Tax benefits 
designed to support emerging technologies, such as the energy 
credits for solar and geothermal property introduced as part of 
the Energy Tax Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-618), may have been enacted 
as temporary provisions, with the presumption that such 
incentives will be allowed to expire once the technology 
matures.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ The exclusion for group prepaid legal services expired June 
30, 1992.
    \21\ U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, General 
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, committee print, 94th Cong., 
December 29, 1976, JCS-33-76, pp. 668-671.
    \22\ The energy credit for solar and geothermal was not allowed to 
expire. Instead, the credit was made permanent as part of the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Tax policy change in the early 1980s made it more difficult 
to enact tax cuts. In addition to providing tax cuts, the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-34) indexed 
individual income tax parameters for inflation. Before 
indexation, inflation would cause individuals to ``creep'' into 
higher tax brackets over time. With bracket creep, increasing 
revenues provided a ``fiscal dividend'' that could be (and was) 
used to pay for tax cuts. Without inflation-induced income 
growth and the resulting bracket creep, revenues could not be 
expected to continually increase, making it harder to find 
revenue offsets for tax cuts (rate reductions or targeted 
preferences).\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ For further discussion, see the companion CRS centennial 
report in this volume, The Dynamics of Congressional Policymaking: Tax 
Reform, by Jane G. Gravelle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              Tax Extender Legislation and Fiscal Controls

    Chairman Long, in an effort to maintain the authority of 
the Finance Committee, was successful in preventing tax 
expenditure sunsets en masse. Nonetheless, for various reasons, 
sunsets crept into new tax expenditures enacted in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. With the enactment of TAMRA in 1988, the 
practice of regularly extending a package of expired or 
expiring provisions began. And thus the ``tax extenders'' came 
into being.
    Early tax extenders legislation was revenue neutral. The 
revenue cost of temporary tax extensions enacted in TAMRA was 
offset by various revenue-increasing provisions. Although TAMRA 
was enacted before the adoption of statutory pay-as-you-go 
(PAYGO) requirements, there was budget legislation in place to 
deter Congress from enacting deficit-increasing legislation. In 
response to the poor fiscal climate of the early 1980s, in 
1985, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act (P.L. 99-177), commonly known as the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act.\24\ GRH required annual reductions 
in budget deficits, with the ultimate goal of achieving a 
balanced budget. Under GRH, deficit limits were to be enforced 
by an automatic cancellation of budget resources, or a 
sequester order.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ The main sponsors of the legislation were Phil Gramm, Warren 
Rudman, and Ernest Hollings. For background, see CRS Report R41901, 
Statutory Budget Controls in Effect Between 1985 and 2002, by Megan S. 
Lynch.
    \25\ The initial GRH sequestration process was invalidated by the 
Supreme Court in Bowsher v. Synar. A revision was passed in 1987 (P.L. 
100-119).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Tax extenders were included in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989 (OBRA89; P.L. 101-239). Initially, 
the Bush administration did not support the inclusion of tax 
extenders. In testimony before the Finance Committee, a 
Treasury official noted that the administration believed that 
the expiring tax provisions were economically inefficient tools 
for achieving underlying policy objectives.\26\ OBRA89 as 
enacted, however, did include a 9-month extension of expiring 
tax provisions.\27\ On the whole, the reconciliation bill 
reduced the deficit. Reacting to the final legislation, Senate 
Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser observed ``it is superior 
to a full year of indiscriminate, mindless, across-the-board 
cuts.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ The Bush administration did, however, support making the 
research tax credit permanent. See ``Let Expiring Provisions Die, Says 
Treasury,'' Tax Notes, March 20, 1989, p. 1410 and Testimony of 
Department of the Treasury Tax Legislative Counsel Dana Trier, in U.S. 
Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, Revenue and Spending Proposals 
for Fiscal Year 1990, hearings, 101st Cong., 1st sess., March 14-15, 
1989, S. Hrg. 101-108 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995).
    \27\ A 6-month extension had been proposed in the Senate version of 
the bill, and a 1-year extension proposed in the House.
    \28\ By ``indiscriminate'' Chairman Sasser was referring to 
sequestration. ``Fini! Congress Passes $5.6 Billion Tax Bill,'' Tax 
Notes, November 27, 1989, p. 1039.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the threat of sequester may have influenced OBRA89 
negotiations, GRH ultimately failed to achieve deficit 
reduction targets. A key reason for this failure was the 
requirement that projected deficits, rather than actual 
deficits, achieve target levels. In effect, deficit targets 
were achieved on paper but not in reality. Congress responded 
to rising deficits by enacting the Budget Enforcement Act of 
1990 (BEA; P.L. 101-508). The BEA enacted statutory PAYGO 
rules, effectively requiring Congress to ``pay for'' changes in 
tax policy that would reduce Federal revenues, relative to 
current law. Like GRH, BEA constrained fiscal policy by 
imposing rules to confine Federal revenue policy 
decisionmaking. By enacting PAYGO, Congress effectively 
indicated that it believed it could not be trusted to maintain 
``revenue neutrality'' when it came to tax legislation.\29\ The 
BEA was included as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1990, which raised top income tax rates, extended 
expiring provisions for 1 year, and reduced expected budget 
deficits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Cheryl D. Block, ``Pathologies at the Intersection of the 
Budget and Tax Legislative Process,'' Boston College Law Review, vol. 
43, no. 4 (July 1, 2002), p. 884.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Tax Extension Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-227) was devoted 
exclusively to tax extenders. Both Ways and Means Committee 
Chairman Dan Rostenkowski and Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd 
Bentsen supported temporary tax extensions, but were reluctant 
to suggest revenue offsets as required under PAYGO.\30\ With 
limited offsets available, expiring tax provisions were 
extended for 6 months. Early in 1992, Chairman Rostenkowski 
called a series of hearings to evaluate tax extenders. As the 
chairman stated in his opening statement to one of the 
extenders hearings:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ ``The $1.7 Billion Question: What About Expiring Provisions?'' 
Tax Notes, October 14, 1991, p. 134.

    The burden is now on this committee to decide which of 
these provisions are worthwhile to find a way to pay for their 
permanent extension and to let the others expire. Each of the 
expiring provisions has its supporters. However, not all of 
these provisions have survived on their own merits. Some have 
enjoyed free rides as stowaways on the annual extenders 
package. The free ride stops here.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Permanent 
Extension of Certain Expiring Tax Provisions, Serial 102-83, 102d 
Cong., 2d sess., January 28, 29, and February 10, 1992.

    Chairman Rostenkowski indicated that the committee should 
take final action on extenders during the 102d Congress, ending 
the practice ``once and for all.'' \32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ultimately, no additional action was taken in the 102d 
Congress. Extenders were allowed to lapse after June 30, 1992. 
President William Clinton's first budget, released in February 
1993, proposed to make permanent a number of the expired tax 
provisions.\33\ Later the Clinton administration put forward a 
detailed tax plan, which also proposed making extenders 
permanent. Extenders were a less discussed part of the 
administration's overall tax proposal, which sought to reduce 
the deficit by increasing taxes on higher income taxpayers and 
impose a new broad-based energy tax (the Btu tax, which was 
ultimately replaced with a smaller gas tax increase in the 
Senate).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Department of the Treasury, Summary of the Administration's 
Revenue Proposals, Washington, DC, February 1993, http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/ General-
Explanations-FY1994.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration's proposal was introduced in the House 
as the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (H.R. 1960), 
sponsored by Chairman Rostenkowski. Although permanent 
extensions passed in the House, Finance Committee Democrats 
decided not to permanently extend most expired provisions,\34\ 
thus reducing the overall cost of these measures.\35\ Temporary 
extensions were included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993 (OBRA93; P.L. 103-66).\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Several ``extender'' provisions were made permanent in the 
OBRA93, including the low-income housing tax credit.
    \35\ ``Finance Committee Democrats Present Tax Plan,'' Tax Notes 
Today, June 18, 1993.
    \36\ The six provisions extended in OBRA93 were extended for 
varying lengths of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1995, it was expected that expired and expiring 
provisions would be rolled into reconciliation legislation. 
However, extenders were ultimately left out of the budget deal 
that emerged from the tense negotiations that occurred near the 
end of 1995 (a funding lapse resulted in two government 
shutdowns in late 1995, the second lasting into the beginning 
of 1996). During the mid-1990s, revenue considerations were the 
primary reason particular provisions were given temporary 
status.\37\ With regard to the 1995 debate surrounding 
extenders in the Senate, one tax aide noted that extenders 
could be revised and their cost ``dialed'' to fit the revenue 
needs of an overall tax package.\38\ In 1996, extenders were 
included as part of the Small Business and Job Protection Act 
(P.L. 104-188). The cost of the temporary tax extensions 
included in P.L. 104-188 were offset with other tax increases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ ``Expiring Provisions Never Die, They Just Become `Extenders,' 
'' Tax Notes Today, December 2, 1996.
    \38\ ``Finance Republicans `Finish' Tax Bill; Details Elusive,'' 
Tax Notes Today, October 16, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Temporary tax provisions were extended again in 1997 as 
part of the Taxpayer Relief Act (TRA97; P.L. 105-34). As a 
stand-alone package, the TRA97 decreased revenues. The costs of 
TRA97 were offset by spending reductions in another 1997 
reconciliation bill, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-
33).
    In 1998, extenders were again included in omnibus budget 
legislation (Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 1999 [P.L. 105-277]). Earlier in 1998, the 
House had passed extenders as a separate bill (H.R. 4738). The 
extenders bill had been introduced by Ways and Means Committee 
Chairman Bill Archer. It passed the House in a voice vote with 
no opposition during debate. Chairman Archer wanted extenders 
kept out of the omnibus package, preferring to address 
extenders as a separate measure. However, when it became 
evident that the Senate could not pass the House-passed 
extenders, it became clear that including extenders in the 
omnibus bill would ensure that the temporary provisions were 
extended. Expiring provisions were extended through June 30, 
1999, and the cost of extension was offset.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ `` `Monster' Budget Bill Signed; Applause is Muted,'' Tax 
Notes, October 26, 1998, p. 399.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the 1990s, the budget rules Congress had imposed on 
itself were working, at least in the sense that extensions of 
expiring tax provisions were part of legislative packages that 
did not add to the deficit (using conventional scorekeeping). 
Tax extenders had become an annual ritual. By the end of the 
1990s, the regular sunsetting of tax expenditure provisions did 
not appear to be a practice designed to allow Congress to 
evaluate the efficacy of expiring tax provisions. Instead, the 
annual termination of tax extenders was used to adhere to self-
imposed budgeting rules. The result was a set of complex, 
uncertain, and economically inefficient tax policies.
    Although temporary extensions of expiring tax provisions 
was the norm during the 1990s, the number of provisions 
extended as tax extenders had not changed substantially. In 
1988, nine provisions had been included in the section of TAMRA 
providing for ``extensions and modifications of expiring tax 
provisions.'' In 1998, 6 provisions were included in the title 
of P.L. 105-277 providing for an ``extension of expiring tax 
provisions,'' although that figure had increased to 11 when 
extenders were next addressed in 1999.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ This count excludes the reauthorization of the Generalized 
System of Preferences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Fiscal Discipline Unraveling

    Through the late 1990s, the budgetary cost of temporarily 
extending expired or expiring provisions was generally offset. 
On multiple occasions, extenders were included in major deficit 
reduction packages or omnibus budget legislation. In other 
instances, extenders were paid for through other tax increases. 
This changed in 1999, as legislative maneuvering allowed for 
the effective exemption of tax extenders from PAYGO.
    Budget surpluses in the late 1990s provided momentum for 
Republican-supported tax cuts. Ways and Means Committee 
Chairman Bill Archer and Finance Committee Chairman William 
Roth both proposed major tax reduction legislation, which 
became the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999. This 
legislation was passed by both Chambers, but was vetoed by 
President Clinton. The Clinton administration objected to tax 
relief legislation that did not meet PAYGO requirements.\41\ 
The Archer-Roth package had an estimated cost of $792 billion 
over 10 years.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Block, ``Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax 
Legislative Process,'' pp. 892-893.
    \42\ Joint Committee on Taxation, ``Estimated Budget Effects of the 
Conference Agreement for H.R. 2488,'' JCX-61-99R, August 5, 1999, 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func= startdown&id=2775.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After President Clinton vetoed the Taxpayer Refund and 
Relief Act, legislative attention turned to tax extenders. At 
issue was whether the extenders package should be paid for. In 
the Senate, Chairman Roth had initially pushed for a 5-year tax 
extenders package, but shortened the extension in response to 
concerns over the cost. The extenders package that was marked 
up by the Finance Committee was revenue neutral, with part of 
the cost offset by repealing a provision allowing for deferral 
of gain on nondealer installment sales for accrual method 
taxpayers.\43\ The extenders proposal that was marked up in the 
House did not include revenue offsets.\44\ The extenders 
package that emerged from conference was not fully paid for, 
but did include the installment sale repeal provision as a 
partial offset (the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives 
Improvement Act of 1999 [P.L. 106-170]).\45\ Treasury Secretary 
Lawrence H. Summers stated that although the administration 
``would ideally [have] liked to have seen the tax extenders 
legislation paid for in full,'' the circumstances surrounding 
tax extenders in 1999 led the administration to be willing to 
``accept the cost.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ An installment sale is a sale of property for which at least 
one payment is scheduled to be received after the tax year in which the 
sale occurred. Certain taxpayers are allowed to prorate profits from 
installment sales over the tax years in which payments are received. 
For additional background, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the 
Budget, Tax Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on 
Individual Provisions, committee print, prepared by the Congressional 
Research Service, 112th Cong., December 2012, S. Prt. 112-45, pp. 759-
771.
    \44\ Joint Committee on Taxation, ``Estimated Revenue Effects of 
Expiring Provisions Scheduled for Markup by the Committee on Ways and 
Means on September 24, 1999,'' JCX-65-99, September 23, 1999, https://
www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=2793.
    \45\ Block, ``Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax 
Legislative Process,'' pp. 893-894.
    \46\ Heidi R. Glenn, ``Extenders Bill Begins to Inspire Head-
Scratching,'' Tax Notes, December 27, 1999, p. 1618.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even the partial offset was short-lived. Chairman Archer 
urged the administration to provide relief from the installment 
sale repeal, and the administration conceded that the provision 
could have a negative impact on some small businesses. In 2000, 
Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Installment 
Tax Correction Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-573), which retroactively 
repealed the repeal (effectively reinstated), the installment 
sale method provision. Even though the Installment Tax 
Correction Act reduced receipts, Congress had already taken 
action to set PAYGO balances to zero for legislation enacted in 
FY2001.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 (P.L. 106-554) 
contained a ``directed scorekeeping'' measure that set PAYGO balances 
to zero for FY2001. With directed scorekeeping, Congress directs CBO 
(or OMB) on how to account for a various measure. Because PAYGO 
balances were set to zero in P.L. 106-554 for FY2001, the revenue cost 
of P.L. 106-573 was not required to be offset.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Budget rules did exert pressure on the tax extenders 
process in 1999, and may have prevented the longer term 
extension that was initially sought in the Senate. The actions 
taken by Congress in 2000, repealing the partial pay that was 
included in the 1999 tax extenders package, illustrates an 
inherent limitation in congressional rules. That is, budget 
rules and associated enforcement mechanisms are, as concluded 
by Block (2002), ``only as good as the congressional will to 
abide by [them].'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Block, ``Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax 
Legislative Process,'' p. 933.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 1999 and 2000 extenders process and related-legislative 
developments have been cited as an example of the shift in 
power away from individual Members of Congress to party 
leadership and executive officials.\49\ In 1999, Treasury 
Secretary Lawrence H. Summers was a key player in the 
negotiations that culminated in the final version of the 
extenders package. It was at his direction that the installment 
sale repeal was included as an offset. The extenders process in 
1999 was also an anomaly in that extenders were considered as a 
separate package. In several instances, extenders had simply 
been included in end-of-year tax legislation, not having been 
considered under ``regular order.'' Without consideration at 
the committee level, or when buried in part of large-scale 
budget or tax legislation that is negotiated in conference, 
there is less opportunity for Members outside of leadership to 
evaluate the extenders as a package, or review the relative 
merits of specific extender provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Block, ``Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax 
Legislative Process,'' pp. 909-910.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       Tax Extenders in the 2000s

    Tax policy in the early 2000s was dominated by the 2001/
2003 tax cuts. Extenders were allowed to expire at the end of 
2001 and were not included in the Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16), the 
first of the two major tax cuts signed into law by President 
George W. Bush. Although EGTRRA did not include extenders, the 
legislation did include sunsets for many of the tax provisions. 
There were two key reasons for including sunsets in EGTRRA: (1) 
to avoid having a reconciliation bill that would decrease 
revenues outside of the 10-year budget window, which would 
likely trigger a point of order under the Byrd rule in the 
Senate; and (2) to lower revenue losses in the bill.\50\ 
Sunsets may have been crafted as a response to the legislative 
and budget process, instead of on the basis of sound tax 
policy. Without sunsets, there was not a plausible path forward 
for the tax cuts in EGTRRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ For discussion on sunsets in EGTRRA, see Rebecca M. Kysar, 
``The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunsets in the Tax 
Code,'' Georgia Law Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (winter, 2006), pp. 335-405. 
The Byrd rule, named after its principal sponsor, Senator Robert C. 
Byrd, prohibits the Senate from considering ``extraneous matter'' as 
part of a reconciliation bill. ``Extraneous matter'' includes, among 
other things, provisions that would increase the deficit outside of the 
budget window. For more on the Byrd Rule, see CRS Report RL30862, The 
Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate's ``Byrd Rule,'' by Bill 
Heniff, Jr.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Tax extenders were included in the Job Creation and Worker 
Assistance Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-147), which enacted bonus 
depreciation as a ``temporary'' stimulus measure,\51\ provided 
additional temporary unemployment assistance, and extended tax 
relief to New York City in the wake of the 2001 terrorist 
attacks. There was substantial back-and-forth between leaders 
in both Chambers regarding the contents of the 2002 stimulus 
measure, but extenders were not a major part of the 
negotiation. During the 2002 stimulus negotiations, Finance 
Committee Chairman Charles Grassley observed that extenders 
were likely to be tacked on to any moving tax vehicle, stating, 
``There's no dispute about them going.'' \52\ Congress 
designated the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 
as an ``emergency requirement,'' exempting the cost of the 
legislation from the PAYGO process.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ For background on bonus depreciation in the tax extenders, see 
CRS Report R43432, Bonus Depreciation: Economic and Budgetary Issues, 
by Jane G. Gravelle.
    \52\ Patti Mohr and Warren Rojas, ``Senate Adds Small Business 
Expensing to Stimulus Package,'' Tax Notes Today, January 30, 2002.
    \53\ For more on emergency requirements in statutory PAYGO as in 
effect through 2002, see CRS Report R41005, The Statutory PAYGO Process 
for Budget Enforcement: 1991-2002, by Robert Keith. The BEA's statutory 
PAYGO requirement expired in 2002. A statutory PAYGO measure was 
enacted in 2010. Both Chambers have also created their own PAYGO rules. 
The Senate's PAYGO rules remain in effect, but the House removed PAYGO 
from its rulebook in 2011 (replacing it instead with a CUTGO rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2003, the Bush administration proposed another major 
``Jobs and Growth'' tax cut. In response to concerns from 
Senate moderates regarding the cost of the proposal, Finance 
Committee Chairman Grassley set a limit on the overall cost of 
the tax cuts that could be passed using reconciliation.\54\ 
Once again, costs were constrained by using and adjusting 
sunsets. While Congress passed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA; P.L. 108-27), there were a 
number of critics. Senator Olympia Snowe called the bill ``a 
trillion-dollar tax cut masquerading as a $350 billion tax 
cut.'' \55\ Even though tax extenders expired in 2003, they 
were not included in major 2003 tax legislation. The House 
passed a 1-year extension (H.R. 3521). On the Senate side, 
Chairman Grassley proposed a shorter extension that was fully 
offset (S. 1896). Finance Committee Ranking Member Max Baucus 
was an original cosponsor of S. 1896. Extenders were again 
taken up in 2004, and included as part of the Working Families 
Tax Relief Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-311).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ For discussion, see Kysar, ``The Sun Also Rises: The Political 
Economy of Sunsets in the Tax Code,'' pp. 378-382.
    \55\ Ibid., p. 381.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    EGTRRA and JGTRRA had introduced a number of sunsets that 
were beyond the scope of what typically had been considered tax 
extenders. By the mid-2000s, the extension of tax extenders 
began to occur within legislation extending the EGTRRA/JGTRRA 
sunsets (or preventing the automatic tax increase that would 
have occurred had these provisions been allowed to expire). The 
Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 extended EGTRRA/JGTRRA 
tax cuts, as well as extenders. There were no statutory PAYGO 
rules in place in 2004, and the Working Families Tax Relief Act 
of 2004 was enacted without offsets.
    In the 109th Congress (2005-2007), efforts were made in the 
Senate to evaluate certain extender provisions.\56\ 
Nevertheless, it was in the waning days of Congress that 
extenders were simply extended for 2 years, in a business-as-
usual fashion. Some energy-related provisions that were 
previously part of the extenders package had been addressed 
earlier in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). The 
rest of the extenders were addressed at the end of 2006, in the 
lame duck session. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 
(P.L. 109-432) included extenders, as well as several health 
and trade-related items. Upon passage in the House, Ways and 
Means Chairman William M. Thomas said, ``[t]his legislation 
reflects the must-do pieces of business we need to complete 
this year.'' While there was some debate regarding which 
nonextender measures might be included in the package, and how 
the tax provisions might be paid for, extenders were widely 
viewed as ``must pass,'' even if they were not going to be paid 
for.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ On March 16, 2005, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Chuck 
Grassley held a hearing, ``Expiring Tax Provisions: Live or Let Die.'' 
Hearing documents and testimony can be found at http://
www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=489b8874-f79a-3b8b-6f12-
9bec1647d515.
    \57\ There was some discussion of limiting extenders to 1 year, as 
opposed to 2 years. Reporting on this strategy suggests that a 1-year 
package was sought to ``make life difficult'' for Democrats who 
intended to reinstate PAYGO rules upon taking control of the Senate in 
2008. See Wesley Elmore, ``Some GOP Lawmakers Aim to Limit Extenders to 
One Year, Aide Says,'' Tax Notes Today, November 20, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2008, extenders were included in stimulus and financial 
rescue legislation (the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 [EESA; P.L. 110-343]). Fiscally conservative House 
Democrats, including members of the so called ``Blue Dog'' 
Coalition, objected to passing extenders without offsets. As a 
result, extenders legislation that was passed in the House 
(H.R. 7060) was fully paid for. The Senate objected to some of 
the offsets included in the House-passed bill. The Senate 
adopted an extenders package that was partially offset, enough 
to allow extenders to be included in the economic rescue 
package.
    With many of the tax cuts enacted in EGTRRA and JGTRRA set 
to expire at the end of 2010, and again at the end of 2012, 
addressing the sunsets associated with the tax extenders was a 
secondary focus. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) 
extended the EGTRRA/JGTRRA tax relief for 2 years, through 
2012. Extenders were included in this legislation. In 2012, 
when much of the tax relief that had first been provided in 
EGTRRA and JGTRRA was made permanent, tax extenders were once 
again granted a temporary extension (see the American Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 2012 [ATRA; P.L. 112-240]). ATRA was estimated to 
reduce revenues by $3.6 trillion over the 10-year budget 
window, increasing the deficit by $4.0 trillion over the same 
period.\58\ Much of this cost can be attributed to the 
permanent extension of tax cuts that were first enacted with 
sunsets in 2001 and 2003. Thus, in recent years, Congress had 
shown a willingness to forgo offsets to extend current tax 
policy, but not in the case of extenders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Congressional Budget Office, ``Estimate of the Budgetary 
Effects of H.R. 8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, as passed 
by the Senate on January 1, 2013,'' January 1, 2013, http://
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
American%20Taxpayer%20Relief%20 Act.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 2000s could also be dubbed the era of temporary tax 
provisions. It was under the shadow of EGTRRA and JGTRRA, and 
broader uncertainty about the structure of tax rates, that the 
number of temporary tax provisions included in the extenders 
substantially increased. As noted above, the 1999 tax extenders 
package included 11 extender provisions. In 2002, 14 provisions 
were included in the ``extension of certain expiring 
provisions,'' Title III of the Job Creation and Worker 
Assistance Act.\59\ By 2008, there were 32 individual and 
business provisions included as ``tax extensions'' in EESA. As 
noted earlier, 57 temporary provisions expired at the end of 
2013 (including disaster-related provisions), and it is 
expected that nearly all of these expired provisions will be 
further extended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ This count excludes the repeal of the requirement that 
terminals selling diesel fuel and kerosene must sell both dyed and 
undyed fuel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2014, Congress is once again considering the issue of 
tax extenders. Unlike in recent years, the consideration of 
extenders has not been overshadowed by other major sunsets in 
the tax code. There is, however, disagreement as to whether 
extenders should be continued as temporary provisions or select 
provisions granted permanent status. There are also opposing 
views regarding whether the cost of permanent extensions should 
be offset. The Committee on Finance, under the leadership of 
Chairman Ron Wyden, reported legislation that would extend most 
expiring provisions for 2 years. The Ways and Means Committee, 
under the leadership of Chairman Dave Camp, has considered a 
series of proposals that would make permanent certain 
provisions that are currently part of the extenders package. 
Chairman Camp's desire to make certain provisions permanent is 
also motivated by budgeting restrictions. Making expiring 
provisions permanent would reduce the tax revenue baseline, 
making it easier to design a revenue-neutral tax reform 
plan.\60\ While 2014 has brought more attention to extenders 
than has been given in recent years, it seems the practice may 
continue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Katy O'Donnell, ``Extenders Are Part of the Long Game in Tax 
Overhaul,'' Roll Call, July 16, 2014, http://www.rollcall.com/news/-
234880-1.html?pg=1&dczone=policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 Tax Extenders: Here for the Long Haul?

    Since the tax extenders practice began in the 1980s, 
numerous Members have vowed to end the uncertainty and stop the 
periodic, often retroactive, extensions of expiring provisions. 
One reason tax extenders have persisted is budgetary; short-
term extensions appear less costly than long-term extensions. 
Thus, fiscal conservatives from either party often have the 
power to block Congress from approving longer term or permanent 
extensions. A second reason tax extenders persist is also 
related to money. Tax extenders represent a lobbying 
opportunity.\61\ By the mid-1990s, as extenders had become tax 
policy ``business as usual,'' critics began to highlight the 
fundraising opportunities provided by the extenders 
process.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Legal scholar Rebecca M. Kysar has explored political-economy 
concerns related to sunsets in the tax code, particularly as related to 
lobbying and rent-seeking activities. See Kysar, ``The Sun Also Rises: 
The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code,'' pp. 335-
405 and Rebecca M. Kysar, ``Lasting Legislation,'' University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 159 (2011), pp. 1007-1068.
    \62\ ``Lobbyists See New Daylight for Extenders,'' Tax Notes Today, 
March 19, 1995. Jill Barshay, ``Temporary Tax Breaks Usually a 
Permanent Reality,'' CQ Weekly, November 15, 2003, p. 2831.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Industry groups that benefit from particular tax extender 
provisions hire lobbyists to ensure their targeted tax benefits 
are renewed. With extenders regularly scheduled to sunset, by 
the time one extension is passed, it is time to start pushing 
for the next round. Tax law professor Victor Fleischer recently 
wrote that ``lobbying over tax extenders is today's Gucci 
Gulch. The practice can be viewed as an innovative method for 
legislators to extract campaign contributions from interest 
groups and exert influence at a time when committee power is 
generally weak.'' \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Victor Fleischer, Tax Extenders, San Diego Legal Studies, 
Paper No. 14-159, April 24, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Concluding Remarks

    Congress' requiring of annual tax expenditure estimates 
brought attention to ``spending through the tax code'' in the 
form of tax breaks. The increased visibility of tax 
expenditures put pressure on Congress to limit their use, or, 
at the very least, limit their cost. Although late 1970s 
efforts to enact legislation that would sunset all tax 
expenditures was ultimately unsuccessful, for various reasons, 
sunsets began to find their way into newly enacted tax 
expenditures. With multiple provisions expiring at the same 
time, Congress enacted what might be considered the first ``tax 
extenders'' package in 1988, temporarily extending a group of 
expiring tax provisions.
    The ``opportunity for review'' provided by sunsets is often 
given as a rationale for having temporary tax provisions. While 
this may have been the case when certain tax expenditures were 
first adopted, the budget rules Congress imposed on itself 
ultimately contributed to what is now a regular ``tax 
extenders'' ritual. In the wake of the surpluses of the late 
1990s, budget rules were relaxed and fiscal discipline became 
less stringent. It was during the 2000s, in the tax-policy era 
following the 2001/2003 tax cuts, the number of temporary tax 
provisions included in the code substantially increased.
    In recent years, tax extenders have regularly been extended 
without being paid for. The willingness for Congress to enact 
deficit-increasing tax cuts in recent years, however, does not 
mean that the extenders are likely to be made permanent. While 
recently there have been renewed efforts in the House to make 
certain extenders permanent, this effort is being driven by 
policy principals as well as budgetary rules.
    Policymaking in practice is more than simply thinking about 
``good policy.'' Policy is made in a complex political 
environment. In the case of tax extenders, budget rules and 
procedures played an important role in the development of the 
practice. External forces have a vested interest in maintaining 
the status quo. Thus, in the case of tax extenders, tax policy 
principals are not the only factors driving congressional tax 
policymaking.

            Appendix. List of ``Tax Extenders'' Legislation

    There is no formal definition of ``tax extenders'' 
legislation. Over time, ``tax extenders'' legislation has come 
to be considered legislation that temporarily extends a group 
of expired or expiring provisions. Using this characterization, 
below is a list of what could be considered ``tax extenders'' 
legislation. Using this list, tax extenders have been addressed 
15 times. The package of provisions that are included in the 
tax extenders has changed over time, as Congress has added new 
temporary provisions to the code, and as certain provisions are 
either permanently extended or given temporary extension on 
other tax legislation.

   American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240)
   Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 
        Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312)
   Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343)
   Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-432)
   Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-311)
   Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
        147)
   Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 
        (P.L. 106-170)
   Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental 
        Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-277)
   Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34)
   Small Business and Job Protection Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-188)
   Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66)
   Tax Extension Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-227)
   Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508)
   Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-239)
   Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-
        647)












         The Dynamics of Congressional Policymaking: Tax Reform

                            Jane G. Gravelle

                  Senior Specialist in Economic Policy

                              ----------                              


        It is often suggested that an overhaul of the tax code 
        is badly needed and that a reform similar to that 
        achieved in 1986 is needed. But what is often 
        overlooked is how rare comprehensive tax reform is and, 
        especially, what conditions are associated with it. 
        Normally major changes are implemented by Congress only 
        after crises, such as war or economic upheaval. At the 
        very least, preconditions for reform include 
        Presidential leadership, insulation from political 
        pressures, strong congressional leadership, and 
        effective messaging--as pertained in 1986. Currently 
        these factors are largely absent, and, along with more 
        limited options for broadening the base, make the 
        prospects for reform much dimmer than many have 
        asserted.

                              Introduction

    The current drive for income tax reform might be dated from 
the formation of the President's Bipartisan Fiscal Commission 
(informally known as the Simpson-Bowles Commission \1\) in 
February 2010.\2\ Although the fundamental purpose of the 
commission was to deal with the deficit, it also had tax reform 
objectives. The commission's proposal in December 2010,\3\ 
however, included only a few specific income tax base-
broadening provisions, with a general reference to eliminating 
tax expenditures. It is possible, also, to look further back 
for the roots of the current tax reform movement. President 
Bush established a commission on tax reform in January 2005. 
The detailed report was issued at the end of 2005.\4\ Beginning 
in 2005, Senator Ron Wyden introduced a series of detailed tax 
reform proposals that would have broadened the revenue base.\5\ 
Whether the tax reform effort is 9 years old or 4, the latest 
significant development is the introduction, in February 2014, 
of Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp's proposed draft 
legislation, the Tax Reform Act of 2014.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The cochairmen of the commission were former Senator Alan 
Simpson and Erskine Bowles, former Chief of Staff in the Clinton 
administration.
    \2\ Many legislative proposals use the term tax reform. In this 
analysis, following political scientist John Witte, tax reform is 
identified as a proposal where the legislative changes in tax 
expenditures that raise revenue exceed those that reduce revenue. See 
John F. Witte, ``The Tax Reform Act of 1986: A New Era in Tax 
Politics?,'' American Politics Research, vol. 19, no. 4 (October, 
1991), pp. 438-457.
    \3\ National Fiscal Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 
The Moment of Truth, The White House, December 2010, http://
www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/
TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.
    \4\ The President's Advisory Commission on Tax Reform, Simple, 
Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax System, 2005, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/final- report/index.html.
    \5\ These bills include, from the 109th Congress through the 112th, 
S. 1927. S. 1111, S. 3018, and S. 727.
    \6\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, ``Camp 
Releases Tax Reform Plan to Strengthen the Economy and Make the Tax 
Code Simpler, Fairer and Flatter,'' press release, February 26, 2014, 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID= 
370987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86; P.L. 99-514), now almost 
30 years old, has often been proposed as a roadmap for tax 
reform. To understand the lessons of TRA86 for the challenges 
of policymaking today, it is useful to consider current tax 
reform activity through the prism of history. A historical 
review provides a reference point for comparing the scope of 
change under consideration and the types of events that 
surrounded major changes in taxes in the past. Virtually all 
scholars who have studied the history of tax policy in the 
United States have concluded, to some degree at least, that tax 
changes tend to be limited and incremental during normal 
economic and social times.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ The discussion of the early years of tax policy is based on a 
number of studies of the development of Federal taxes and the Federal 
income tax in particular. It includes Roy G. Blakey and Gladys C. 
Blakey, The Federal Income Tax (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1940); Randolph Paul, Taxation for Prosperity (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1947); Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in 
America (New York: Octagon Press, 1967); John F. Witte, The Politics 
and Development of the Federal Income Tax (Madison, Wisconsin: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1967); Sheldon D. Pollack, The Failure 
of U.S. Tax Policy (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1996); and W. Elliot Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America, 2d 
ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    That view tends to portray TRA86 as an anomaly that 
required a convergence of a number of conditions that do not 
appear to exist in the current tax reform effort.\8\ Among 
those conditions that have been identified as facilitating tax 
reform in 1986 are strong Presidential leadership, development 
of a plan without taking political pressures into account, 
beginning with a broad plan reflecting basic reform principles, 
and sheer luck. Moreover, in 1986 many more potential base-
broadening provisions existed than is the case today. 
Especially with respect to the corporate tax, the 1986 revision 
could be said to have picked the low hanging fruit, making base 
broadening more difficult.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ This view suggests that tax reform would be unlikely even if 
political polarization of Congress had not increased since 1986. For 
measures of increased polarization see Norman J. Ornstein et al., Vital 
Statistics on Congress: Data on the U.S. Congress--A Joint Effort from 
Brookings and the American Enterprise Institute, July 2013, http://
www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/07/vital-statistics-congress-
mann-ornstein. See also Drew DeSilver, Partisan Polarization, in 
Congress and Among Public, Is Greater Than Ever, Pew Research Center, 
July 17, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/17/
partisan-polarization-in-congress-and-among-public-is-greater-than-
ever/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This brief examination of the history of taxation and the 
lessons it holds for today begins with the birth of the Nation 
and the financial crisis the young country's central government 
faced. It continues through upheavals such as war and 
depression. Before examining TRA86 and its implications for the 
current tax reform effort, the next section is a review of the 
relatively stable and peaceful environment that persisted from 
the end of World War II through the adoption of TRA86. After 
discussing post-1986 tax changes, the report compares 
conditions surrounding the current tax reform effort with those 
in 1986.

                    Tax Regimes Through World War II

    Historian Elliot Brownlee identifies only five major tax 
regime changes, each associated with an external financial 
crisis.\9\ These crises include the constitutional crisis of 
the 1780s, the three great wars (the Civil War, World War I, 
and World War II), and the Great Depression.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America.
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               A Taxing Power for the Central Government

    The problems of a central government without the power to 
tax (and pay debts) became evident during the Revolutionary War 
and under the Articles of Confederation. It led to the 
formation of the first major tax regime. The Constitution 
provided the Federal Government authority to levy indirect 
taxes, such as tariffs and excise taxes. Through most of the 
early history of the Nation, the major source of tax revenue 
was tariffs. Internal taxes were unpopular with Western and 
Southern States, and an early excise tax on whiskey resulted in 
the ``whiskey rebellion'' of 1794 by farmers in the West and 
South. Taxes on distilled spirits, as well as most other excise 
taxes enacted by the Federalists, were repealed after Thomas 
Jefferson was elected President in 1800 (although they were 
temporarily reinstated during the War of 1812).
    The Constitution limited the taxing powers of the central 
government by allowing direct taxes (the poll and property 
taxes levied by the States) only if apportioned by the 
census.\10\ Whether that restriction was intended to apply to 
income taxes (which were not used at the time) is not clear. 
From time to time, the Federal Government used taxes 
apportioned by State population, including during the 
undeclared naval war with France (1798-1800), the War of 1812, 
and the Civil War.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ According to Brownlee (p. 20), there were fears that the 
central government could single out a particular industry or property 
to tax. Slaveholders were concerned about a tax on slaves, farmers 
about a tax based on acreage, and urban dwellers about a tax based on 
value. Ratner (p. 19) indicated that at the time direct taxes tended to 
be land and poll taxes, and the restriction was intended to prevent the 
wealthy industrial Northeast from putting the tax burden on sparsely 
populated agricultural States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             The Civil War

    The second major regime involved the need to finance the 
Civil War, which led to the adoption of the first income tax. 
Despite subsequent uncertainties about the constitutionality of 
the income tax, it was adopted in 1863 in the wake of rising 
war debt and declining tariff revenues. It remained in place 
until 1872. The Confederacy also adopted an income tax, 
although, according to Ratner, delays and failures in 
administration limited its effectiveness.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ See Ratner (pp. 100-110) for an analysis of finance in the 
Confederacy. War finance in the Confederacy is discussed in Gustavo A. 
Flores-Macias and Sarah Kreps, ``Political Parties at War: A Study of 
American War Finance,'' American Political Science Review, vol. 107, 
no. 4 (November 2013), pp. 833-848.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The inclusion of the income tax was, according to Blakey 
and Blakey, forced on Thaddeus Stevens, chairman of the Ways 
and Means Committee, who ``considered himself the ruler of the 
House.'' \12\ Stevens had proposed a tax on land (apportioned 
by the census) and an increase in tariffs, both of which were 
seen by western farmers as unfairly falling on them. The income 
tax partially offset the need for land tax revenues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Blakey and Blakey, The Federal Income Tax, p. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 The Modern Income Tax and World War I

    Brownlee does not consider the introduction of the income 
tax (the corporate tax in 1909 and the individual tax in 1913) 
as a major regime change; in his view, it was a small, almost 
token, tax at the time. Brownlee states that World War I 
provoked a new tax regime (see below). Others attach more 
significance to the birth of the modern income tax. It came 
about in a surprising fashion, with the first corporate tax 
enacted during Republican control of the government. These 
scholars attach considerable importance to the growing populist 
sentiment for an income tax.
    In 1894 an income tax had been adopted in the wake of the 
depression following the 1893 panic, but it was found 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1895.\13\ For years, 
southern and western Senators and Representatives introduced 
income tax proposals as many viewed the 1895 Supreme Court 
decision overturning the 1894 income tax to be in error. In 
1909 a group of insurgent Republicans joined with Democrats to 
increase pressure for an income tax. While they did not prevail 
in the House under the iron rule of Speaker Joseph Cannon, they 
appeared likely to win a vote for an income tax in the Senate. 
Nelson Aldrich, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, 
appealed to President Howard Taft. The positive response by 
President Taft contributed to the eventual compromise that led 
to the adoption in 1909 of the first corporate income tax. The 
corporate tax was introduced by Representative Sereno Payne 
(majority leader and chairman of the Ways and Means Committee) 
and Senator Aldrich in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act.\14\ The 
corporate tax and a proposed constitutional amendment to allow 
income taxes were advanced--with the support of President Taft 
and conservative Republicans--to deflect the growing pressure 
to enact a general income tax.\15\ The proposed constitutional 
amendment was viewed by many who supported it as a ``harmless 
gesture''; they believed that the amendment would not be 
ratified.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 
(1895).
    \14\ Aldrich stated, ``I shall vote for a corporation tax as a 
means to defeat the income tax.'' See Bennett D. Baack and Edward John 
Ray, ``Special Interests and the Adoption of the Income Tax in the 
United States,'' Journal of Economic History, vol. 45, no. 3 (September 
1985), p. 624.
    \15\ An account of the 1909 congressional deliberations that led to 
the corporate income tax is presented in considerable detail in Ratner, 
Taxation and Democracy in America, pp. 265-297, and in Blakey and 
Blakey, The Federal Income Tax, pp. 22-59.
    \16\ Paul, Taxation for Prosperity, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Upon ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, an 
income tax was enacted that year during the Wilson 
administration. It affected only high-income families. (The 
exemption for married couples was $538,000 in 2005 
dollars.\17\) Rates ranged from 1 percent to 7 percent. The 
1909 corporate tax had a significant exemption, but the 1913 
tax had no exemption, with a rate of 1 percent in both cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Jane Gravelle and Jennifer Gravelle, ``Taxing Poor Families: 
The Evolution of Treatment under the Federal Income Tax,'' Connecticut 
Public Interest Law Journal, vol. 7 (2008), p. 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Brownlee, the third crisis that produced a tax 
regime change was the fiscal demands of World War I. The war 
transformed a small, insignificant income tax into an important 
one. Consider changes in the Revenue Act of 1916. That act, 
adopted during the Wilson administration, increased tax rates 
on high-income Americans and corporations, including an excess 
profits tax on munitions makers. The excess profits tax was 
subsequently expanded and extended to all businesses, and the 
top rate of the individual tax, which began at 7 percent in 
1913, rose to 67 percent by 1917. The excess profits tax 
financed two-thirds of the cost of the war.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America, pp. 64-65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is some dispute among scholars as to whether the 
demands to break corporate privilege and ``soak the rich'' also 
played a role in the taxes on the wealthy and corporations. 
Brownlee supports that view. With respect to the corporate tax, 
he states that ``the question became one of whether the modern 
corporation was the central engine of productivity, which tax 
policy should reinforce, or whether it was an economic 
predator, which tax policy could and should tame.'' \19\ Views 
of the corporate tax that echo these issues are part of the 
current tax reform debate, especially with respect to 
multinational corporations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Ibid., p. 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Professor John Witte disagrees with the view that a ``soak 
the rich'' ideology, as opposed to revenue needs, played a 
role; he cites the financing demands of World War I and finds 
little evidence for a redistributional motive.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax, 
pp. 81-82. Brownlee (p. 60) describes influence of a group of 
Democratic insurgents (led by Representative Claude Kitchens of North 
Carolina, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee) to focus 
wartime finance on income taxes for the wealthy and corporations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the war, Republicans came to power and began the 
Mellon tax cuts of the 1920s (guided by Secretary of the 
Treasury Andrew Mellon). The excess profits tax, strongly 
opposed by business, was repealed, and top individual tax rates 
were cut (eventually from 73 percent to 24 percent). The 
ordinary corporate tax rate was retained. Yet the income tax 
was now an important revenue source, surpassing the previously 
dominant customs collections. The income tax was firmly 
ensconced in the Federal revenue system.

                          The Great Depression

    The Great Depression, according to Brownlee, was the fourth 
crisis that led to significant increases in income tax rates. 
As revenues dropped due to the reduction in economic activity 
and deficits increased, additional revenue was sought. (Note 
that current economic theory would counsel against such a tax 
increase in a depression, but at this time, the opposite view 
was dominant.) Individual income tax rates that had ranged from 
1 percent to 25 percent were increased to 4 percent to 63 
percent. Corporate rates were increased modestly, but 
exemptions (which had reappeared) were eliminated. An attempt 
to adopt a sales tax, proposed by Mellon and supported by 
President Hoover, was characterized by Ratner as a conflict 
between the ``soak the rich'' and sales tax advocates. It was 
soundly defeated in the House.\21\ Instead, income taxes under 
President Hoover were increased in the Revenue Act of 1932. A 
number of tax increases were enacted during the Depression, 
including higher corporate and individual income taxes, 
additional excise taxes, and payroll taxes to finance Social 
Security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in America, p. 446.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              World War II

    World War II transformed the landscape of taxation, 
converting the individual income tax from one confined largely 
to higher income taxpayers to a mass tax via several tax 
increases. Perhaps the most important tax increase was enacted 
in 1942. The number of taxable individuals rose from 3.6 
million in 1939 to 42.6 million in 1945 and the revenues from 
$2.2 billion to $35.1 billion.\22\ Legislation also 
substantially increased the corporate tax rate from a top rate 
of 19 percent to 40 percent. The changes in taxes, unlike those 
in World War I, were barely drawn back after the end of the 
war. By 1946, singles and small families below the poverty 
level paid income taxes. Individual income tax rates ranged 
from 19 percent to 86 percent.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America, p. 115.
    \23\ See Gravelle and Gravelle, ``Taxing Poor Families,'' p. 43 for 
exemptions and poverty levels by family size.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              Post-World War II to the 1986 Tax Reform Act

    Brownlee views the World War II changes as the last of the 
five major tax regimes.\24\ (Legislation since that time he 
categorizes as falling within a widely imposed income tax 
regime.) The period since World War II, as suggested by Witte 
as well, has also been characterized largely by incremental 
changes, including a long period when additional revenues from 
inflation and bracket creep were offset with tax reductions or 
the expansion of tax preferences. Witte argues that ``the 
legislative process seems effectively to filter out most 
proposals for radical changes in structure.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Other historical analyses accept a broader scope for events 
and external forces that caused disruptions in the ``normal'' 
environment. They cite the adoption of property taxes (and 
consideration of an income tax) during the undeclared naval war with 
France and the War of 1812. (The Mexican War was fought during an era 
of robust growth and, thus, robust tariff revenues.) The Nation also 
adopted an income tax in 1894, during the depression in the aftermath 
of the panic of 1893, but it was almost immediately found 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
    \25\ Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax, 
p. 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Compared to the drama of the first half of the 20th 
century, the tax revisions of the next 40 years were modest. 
The corporate rate was increased after World War II and then 
hovered at around 50 percent during most of this period until 
1986. Very high top individual rates (reaching 91 percent in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s) were in place. As inflation 
accumulated and accelerated, bracket creep from the graduated 
income tax yielded a fiscal dividend that was used for rate 
reduction (as in 1964 when individual tax rates of 20 percent 
to 91 percent were reduced to 14 percent to 70 percent). 
Responses to the fiscal dividend often resulted in bestowing 
tax benefits of various types to serve private interests.
    Between World War II and 1986, individual income taxes were 
about 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and that is 
where they stand currently. Bracket creep was offset by tax 
cuts. Professor Sheldon Pollock characterized this process of 
adjusting to bracket creep as ``pluralistic incrementalism.'' 
Because lawmakers act in multiple roles (representing 
constituents, party, and national policy) they can, in this 
view, undermine the stability and coherence of the tax 
system.\26\ The outcome, he argues, is a growth in tax 
preferences or the equivalent of spending through the tax 
system, currently referred to as tax expenditures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Pollock, The Failure of U.S. Tax Policy, p. 267.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One example of the presumably unintended consequences of 
this uncoordinated and incremental policymaking is that the 
cumulative effects of bracket creep, along with long periods 
with basic personal exemptions and standard deductions 
remaining unchanged, led to a tax eventually being imposed on 
those below the poverty level.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Gravelle and Gravelle, ``Taxing Poor Families.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another consequence was the decline in the importance of 
the corporate tax. Bracket creep did not affect corporate 
revenues where income is largely taxed at a flat rate. 
Nevertheless, corporations were recipients of tax preferences 
from the fiscal dividend as well, notably the investment credit 
enacted in the 1960s.\28\ At the end of World War II, the 
corporate tax ranged from 4 percent to 6 percent of GDP, 
eventually declining to around 2 percent (where it stands 
today).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ The investment credit was first enacted as a permanent 
provision, then a temporary one, and then a permanent one again.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Witte argues that before the 1980s only one act--the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 (P.L. 91-172)--could be considered tax 
reform. He considers the 1982 and 1984 acts as tax reform, 
although many of their provisions rolled back items that were 
adopted in 1981 (legislation he refers to as anti-tax reform). 
All of these, in his view, are dwarfed by TRA86.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Witte, ``The Tax Reform Act of 1986,'' p. 443.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many view TRA86 as the tax legislation that stands out in 
the post-World War II era. Also important to note is the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA; P.L. 97-34), which 
dramatically altered the policymaking process. It largely ended 
bracket creep due to inflation by indexing the rate 
structure.\30\ This action terminated, by and large, the era of 
easy finance and continual tax cuts. Income taxes could still 
rise relative to GDP with real growth and could rise or fall 
with income redistribution. However, the effects of inflation 
on bracket creep, which were significant in the late 1960s and 
1970s, no longer played a major role in influencing tax policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ The personal exemption was not indexed, although that revision 
occurred in TRA86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most significant changes since the end of World War II, 
according to Brownlee, occurred during the Reagan 
administration and culminated with TRA86 (in President Reagan's 
second term).\31\ In particular, Brownlee asserts that for the 
first time since World War II, TRA86 picked losers as well as 
winners. He does not perceive the act as a major taxation 
regime change, but he does recognize its importance as a 
consequential tax law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ History demonstrates that many Presidents find it difficult to 
enact consequential legislation in their second terms. TRA86 was an 
exception.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       The Tax Reform Act of 1986

    The supporters of tax reform sometimes refer to TRA86 as an 
example of how reform might be accomplished. This reform was 
not triggered by external crises. Significant budget problems 
had arisen as a result of tax cuts and increased spending in 
the early 1980s, but TRA86 was not aimed at raising revenue; it 
was revenue neutral (at least in the budget horizon).\32\ It 
was also not focused on redistribution; it was largely 
distributionally neutral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ A number of provisions in the bill had largely transitory 
revenue gains, and these provisions were associated with higher incomes 
and businesses. Thus TRA86 was not revenue neutral or distributionally 
neutral in the long run, although it was nearly so. See Jane G. 
Gravelle, ``Equity Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,'' Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 1 (winter 1992), pp. 27-44 for a 
discussion. This issue was not discussed during consideration of the 
act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TRA86 is well known as an achievement of tax reform because 
it was so unusual. The introduction by Albert Hunt to the book 
chronicling the passage of the act, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 
stated: ``The saga was all the more dramatic because it was 
unlikely.'' \33\ The authors of the book, Jeffrey Birnbaum and 
Alan Murray, state in the epilogue: ``How did it happen? What 
created this legislative miracle that defied all the lessons of 
policy science, logic and history?'' \34\ Pollack writes that 
TRA86 ``has been widely hailed as . . . the most significant 
tax reform legislation in the history of the federal income 
tax.'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Albert Hunt, introduction in Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. 
Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawyers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely 
Triumph of Tax Reform (New York: Random House, 1987).
    \34\ Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, epilogue.
    \35\ Pollack, The Failure of U.S. Tax Policy, p. 100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What did TRA86 do that was so remarkable? In understanding 
its achievement, it is important to remind ourselves of the 
lessons of history as presented, for example, by Brownlee. 
There was no fiscal crisis, no war, no depression to spur the 
legislation on, and it raised no revenue. By virtue of doing 
so, it had to pick losers to finance the gains of others. There 
was some public support for tax reform amid stories of 
corporations paying no tax and high-income individuals on 
expense accounts and investing in tax shelters. Tax reform 
never became, according to Birnbaum and Murray, an important 
issue with the public. It did, however, face hordes of special 
interests and lobbyists seeking to preserve their preferences. 
TRA86 was an anomaly. It was the first time in the then 75-year 
history of the modern income tax that external causes did not 
prompt major tax reform, and it has not been repeated for 
another 28 years.
    TRA86's revisions for the individual income tax included 
lowering the top marginal tax rate from 50 percent to 28 
percent (although there was a 33 percent bubble due to 
phaseouts) and flattening the rate structure to two statutory 
rates.\36\ It also removed those below the poverty line from 
the tax (except for singles), indexed elements of the earned 
income credit that had been initially adopted in 1975, and 
mitigated the tax burden for lower income families just above 
the poverty line by increasing the personal exemption and 
standard deduction.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ A bubble occurs with tax benefits, such as exemptions or lower 
rates, that are phased out. The loss of benefits as income rises is the 
same as a tax rate increase during the phaseout period.
    \37\ C. Eugene Steuerle, The Tax Decade (Washington, DC: Urban 
Institute Press, 1992), pp. 122-126; Gravelle and Gravelle, ``Taxing 
Poor Families.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These cuts were paid for by base-broadening provisions that 
included eliminating the itemized deductions for consumer 
credit and State and local sales taxes, capping the mortgage 
interest deduction, converting certain small deductions to 
itemized deductions, and adding floors to some itemized 
deductions. It eliminated individual retirement accounts 
(adopted in 1981) for higher income individuals with employer 
pensions. The flatter rate structure also led to eliminating 
income averaging and the second-earner deduction. It restricted 
tax-exempt State and local private activity bonds to limited 
uses and reined in tax shelters by adding limits on deductions 
of passive losses. These restrictions on passive losses, along 
with taxing capital gains at ordinary rates, were the major 
provisions offsetting rate reductions for high-income 
individuals.
    The changes in corporate (and business) taxes were, in some 
ways, more significant. ERTA included more rapid depreciation 
methods,\38\ which, combined with investment credits, produced 
negative tax rates for investment in equipment. The 1982 act 
reversed some of these provisions, but nevertheless, effective 
tax rates on equipment were 8 percent prior to TRA86, even 
though the statutory tax rate was 46 percent. Structures were 
effectively taxed at 34 percent and inventories at 54 percent. 
Repealing the investment credit and slowing depreciation 
slightly, combined with cutting the corporate tax rate to 34 
percent, brought these tax rates much closer together (30 
percent, 32 percent, and 41 percent).\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Depreciation allows the costs of assets that wear out to be 
deducted over time; when depreciation is allowed at a faster rate than 
the actual loss in value of the asset, a subsidy results that lowers 
effective tax rates.
    \39\ See estimated tax rates in Jane G. Gravelle, The Economic 
Effects of Taxing Capital Income (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), p. 
54. These rates are effective tax rates on new investment measuring the 
estimated share of the rate of return that is paid in taxes as a 
function of statutory tax rates, depreciation provisions, and 
investment subsidies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Witte summarizes the evaluation of the act by tax scholars, 
noting that many of them were as enthusiastic as politicians 
and reporters. Some, however, feel the historic importance of 
the act is overstated. Witte suggests that this view results 
largely from comparing the act to what theoretically could be 
accomplished, which is an unrealistic standard to judge a 
single piece of legislation against.
    As Witte describes,\40\ most scholars see TRA86 as an 
anomaly or an epiphenomenon in which political and economic 
factors intersected to create a unique environment that 
permitted tax reform.\41\ One economic factor was revenue 
neutrality. As a result of the fiscal deficit and the indexing 
of rate brackets, tax reform could not reduce taxes across the 
board, as had been the case in prior legislation. These 
factors, it is argued, repressed the temptations to add on tax 
breaks to a reform bill.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ This discussion is based on Witte, although Witte cites other 
scholars. See discussion in Witte, ``The Tax Reform Act of 1986.''
    \41\ Witte describes some alternative ways to view TRA86. One is a 
pendulum swing theory: the notion that tax reform was a reaction to 
policy moving too far in the other direction, beginning in the late 
1970s and followed by ERTA. This view would predict a revival of 
pressures to expand tax expenditures. The other view is of TRA as a 
policy watershed where the country would embark on a continued path of 
tax reform. The brief review of post-1986 history in the next section 
suggests that neither of these hypotheses appear to be the case. Some 
backpedaling occurred, but it was small and did not affect corporate 
and business reforms or tax shelters, nor did the country embark on 
further tax reform.
    \42\ Two other factors were (1) the agreement that marginal rates 
be cut substantially and (2) the desire to reduce taxes for the 
majority of individuals, which could be achieved only by increasing 
taxes on corporations and base broadening for high-income taxpayers. 
The dramatic reductions of corporate tax in ERTA, along with instances 
of large firms paying little or no taxes, made an increase in corporate 
taxes seem appropriate. (Corporate taxes had already fallen from 5 
percent of income in the postwar era to 2 percent; after ERTA, they 
were 1.5 percent.) Similarly, ERTA and the growth of tax shelters had 
made individual tax expenditures less defensible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As for political factors, there is virtually unanimous 
agreement that leadership and support by a powerful and popular 
President, Ronald Reagan, was crucial.\43\ While there were 
earlier congressional proposals (Senator Bill Bradley and 
Representative Dick Gephardt produced a proposal in 1982), 
these proposals did not gain traction for tax reform until the 
President supported these efforts. Hunt, in his introduction to 
Showdown at Gucci Gulch, identifies Bradley (as well as Reagan) 
as a pivotal figure: ``At every critical juncture Bradley 
stepped in to provide an important push; rarely has a 
legislator with no formal leadership role or committee 
chairmanship played such an instrumental role in a major piece 
of legislation.'' \44\ The 1984 report President Reagan 
commissioned from Treasury became the basis of negotiations 
between Congress and the White House. (In fact, Treasury 
produced two reports: Treasury I proposed an outright repeal of 
38 of 105 tax expenditures. It was never sent to Congress. 
Treasury II was a milder version of Treasury I.) The President 
continued to support the basic principles in Treasury I 
throughout congressional deliberations.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ This view is held by Witte and the tax scholars he references.
    \44\ Hunt, introduction in Showdown at Gucci Gulch, p. xiv.
    \45\ The commissioning of the report was originally motivated by a 
concern that the Democrats would appropriate tax reform as an issue in 
the Presidential campaign. See Pollack, The Failure of U.S. Tax Policy, 
p. 99. Pollack suggests that most Members did not take this initiative 
seriously. Some Democratic Members even laughed during the President's 
1984 State of the Union speech when he mentioned tax reform. But after 
that, tax reform took on a life of its own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    His support led to a response from Democratic leaders 
(Speaker Tip O'Neill and Ways and Means Chairman Dan 
Rostenkowski), who were not willing to concede the tax reform 
issue to the White House but embraced it. President Reagan 
reportedly also helped persuade 54 House Republicans to change 
their votes, permitting the bill to be adopted. The views 
described by Witte about the importance of the President were 
held by not only Witte and other scholars of the day--including 
Birnbaum and Murray--but also present-day tax historians. 
Historian Joseph Thorndike, for example, states that ``tax 
reform is the sort of heavy political lift that really does 
depend on presidential leadership. White House support is 
necessary, even if it's not sufficient.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ See Joseph Thorndike, ``The Last Time Everyone Gave Up on Tax 
Reform, It Actually Happened,'' Forbes, March 13, 2014, http://
www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/03/13/the-last-time-everyone-
gave-up-on-tax-reform-it-actually-happened/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Witte also cites the political approach at the Treasury 
Department of aiming for a comprehensive plan rather than a 
listing of loopholes. He also notes that many observers point 
to leadership in the White House, Treasury, and Congress, 
including the tax experts at Treasury and the chairmen of the 
tax writing committees, Representative Rostenkowski and Senator 
Bob Packwood. In particular, observers cite Packwood's support 
for tax reform when his committee was moving the other way.
    At the conclusion of his article, Witte identifies three 
particularly important factors that facilitate tax reform. The 
first is the support of the President, preferably a popular 
one, which he considers essential for success. The second is 
the development of tax reform in a way that is relatively 
insulated from the political process. (The 1984 process was a 
more closed and controlled one than had been the case in the 
past.) The third is beginning the process with a broad-based 
comprehensive package that changes the landscape from 
``politics as usual.'' The package, says Witte, must be broad 
enough that blocking the reforms and proposing antireform 
changes can be deflected by an appeal to collective sacrifice.
    Despite these conditions that permitted the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 to succeed, luck appeared to play a role as well. 
Birnbaum and Murray chronicle the many points where tax reform 
could have been derailed. President Reagan might not have 
proposed the tax reform study if he (and his strategist James 
Baker) had not feared in 1984 that the Walter Mondale 
Presidential campaign would appropriate the issue.\47\ The 
reaction by special interests to Treasury I could have 
persuaded the President to let the plan die. Tax reform almost 
stalled in the Ways and Means Committee when an amendment to 
restore a banking tax benefit was adopted. The process 
eventually continued with a withdrawal of that amendment but 
also an agreement to retain the itemized deduction for State 
and local taxes to gain further support in the committee. 
Senator Packwood was ready to abandon tax reform after the 
Senate Finance Committee began voting to restore preferences; 
he reportedly changed his mind after the famous ``two pitcher'' 
lunch at the Irish Times restaurant.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ In 1982, a proposal for a broad-based, low-rate tax reform had 
been introduced by Senator Bradley and Representative Gephardt, which 
was a ready-made plan the Democrats could endorse.
    \48\ At that lunch, Senator Packwood and his aide decided to 
propose a bold proposal with two rates and a low top rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In sum, tax reform appeared to rest not only on the right 
economic and political conditions but also on chance.

                 Policies Since the 1986 Tax Reform Act

    Some backpedaling on TRA86 occurred in the next 28 years, 
but it was small and hardly touched the corporate and business 
reforms or tax shelters.\49\ Nor has the country embarked on a 
continuation of tax reform. Rather, most of the period since 
TRA86 has seemed to focus on incremental tax changes but 
without the continual revenue gains from inflationary bracket 
creep that turned most tax changes into tax cuts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ In 1993 the depreciation period for nonresidential buildings 
was increased to pay for exempting realtors from the passive loss 
restriction. Also, as noted, the 34 percent corporate tax rate was 
increased to 35 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the George H.W. Bush administration, interest focused on 
rolling back the higher taxes on capital gains. This focus was 
based on arguments not central at the time of TRA86: that the 
taxes on additional realizations of gain induced by lower 
capital gains tax rates would offset or more than offset the 
revenue loss.\50\ Some of the initial empirical estimates by 
economists of these realizations responses were very large. 
However, as analytical techniques were refined, the estimates 
tend to become smaller. Treasury argued that a capital gains 
tax cut to 20 percent would raise, not lose, revenue. The Joint 
Committee on Taxation began to use large behavioral estimates 
in its revenue estimates, although they were not large enough 
to raise revenue but only not to lose much.\51\ In 1990, in a 
bill that raised revenue, the 33 percent bubble introduced in 
TRA86 was eliminated and the 15 percent, 33 percent, 28 percent 
marginal rate structure was replaced by a 15 percent, 28 
percent, 31 percent structure. Capital gains, however, were 
capped at 28 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ ERTA had been partly fueled by supply-side arguments that 
claimed that induced economic growth would offset much of the tax cut. 
This realizations argument was a more narrow type of supply-side 
argument that could be more easily justified.
    \51\ See CRS Report R41364, Capital Gains Tax Options: Behavioral 
Responses and Revenues, by Jane G. Gravelle, for a discussion of 
current empirical evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1993, during the Clinton administration, continued 
concerns about the deficit resulted in legislation that 
increased tax revenues. These revenues were obtained largely 
through rate increases. Two tax rates of 36 percent and 39.6 
percent were added, and the corporate rate was raised to 35 
percent.
    Some reversals happened in 1997, but they were delayed and 
small and did not touch TRA86's corporate and business reforms 
or tax shelters. The 1997 changes resulted in part from a 
promise by the President to cut taxes but also because 
Republicans controlled Congress, and they advocated tax cuts. A 
rapidly growing economy that pushed up income tax revenues 
facilitated a tax cut that was the largest since 1981 (although 
it was much smaller: only 0.3 percent of GDP). The 1997 
legislation cut the capital gains tax to 20 percent, increased 
the income limits on individual retirement accounts, and 
introduced the child credit and tuition tax credits.
    Robust economic growth and shifts in the income 
distribution led to higher income tax revenues. (Individual 
income tax receipts rose to 9.9 percent of GDP in 2000.) This 
growth in revenues resulted in another round of tax cuts, this 
time in 2001 under the George W. Bush administration. Cuts were 
largely in the form of rate reductions at the top. The top 
income tax rate was reduced to 35 percent, and the next three 
highest tax rates were cut by 3 percentage points. The tax cut 
(which was about 1.5 percent of GDP, compared to ERTA, which 
was about 4 percent of GDP) \52\ was phased in and was to 
sunset after 10 years to avoid the Byrd rule in the Senate. 
This budget rule, named after Senator Robert C. Byrd of West 
Virginia, allowed a point of order against any legislation that 
increased the deficit outside the 10-year budget window. 
Another tax cut, reducing tax rates on capital gains and 
dividends, was enacted in 2003. The individual income tax 
slipped to 6.7 percent of GDP by 2004, although it recovered, 
standing at 7.8 percent in 2007.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ C. Eugene Steuerle, ``The 2001 Tax Legislation from a Long 
Term Perspective,'' National Tax Journal, vol. 44 (September 2001), pp. 
427-432.
    \53\ President Bush also commissioned a study of tax reform, which 
was released in 2005. It contained a detailed blueprint, but no further 
action was taken. See the President's Advisory Commission on Tax 
Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax 
System, 2005, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/final-
report/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2007, a developing financial crisis and subsequent 
recession led to the enactment of a series of largely temporary 
tax cuts to combat the recession, including one under the Bush 
administration in 2008 and one under the Obama administration 
in 2009. Tax reform as an issue did not become a significant 
part of the legislative agenda until 2010. It remained an 
important topic of debate along with issues surrounding the 
slow recovery, the expiring tax cuts, and concerns about the 
deficit and future growth of the debt.

                   Tax Reform Developments, 2009-2014

                     The 111th Congress (2009-2010)

    During the first 2 years of the Obama administration, 
Democrats controlled Congress. There was no action on tax 
reform as Congress and the administration focused on enacting 
the President's health overhaul plan and antirecession stimulus 
proposals and dealing with the 2010 expiration of the Bush tax 
cuts (ultimately resolved with a 2-year extension). The 
President, however, included specific revenue-raising 
provisions in his first and successive budget outlines. Those 
provisions largely concerned corporations, mainly focusing on 
provisions to increase the taxation of foreign source income 
and income from fossil fuel production. He has also proposed 
some individual provisions, including limiting the value of 
itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers and taxing 
certain earnings of investment fund managers (``carried 
interest'') as ordinary income rather than as capital 
gains.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ The Treasury ``Green Books'' that outline tax proposals in the 
Presidents' budgets are at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Pages/general_explanation.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President also commissioned a report on tax options 
relating to simplification, compliance, and corporate taxation 
in March 2009, originally to be issued in December 2009. This 
report was delayed and eventually issued in August 2010. This 
report was also prepared by a commission, not Treasury, and was 
not a tax reform proposal but a review of options.\55\ It 
received relatively little attention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ The President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board, The Report 
on Tax Reform Options: Simplification, Compliance, and Corporate 
Taxation, August 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/PERAB_Tax_Reform_Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Fiscal Commission, established by Executive Order 13531 
in February 2010, was a bipartisan commission composed of 18 
members, mostly from Congress but also private individuals, 
including the cochairmen.\56\ Its objective was to deal with 
the deficit. At the end of 2010, its report was issued, 
although without enough of a majority to recommend its 
proposals. The report was not a detailed tax reform proposal 
(as was Treasury I). It included a few specific tax changes as 
illustrations with a general proposal to eliminate tax 
expenditures and lower rates (but with rates raised as tax 
expenditures were retained). It proposed to raise revenues. 
This lack of specifics has been characteristic of much of the 
current tax reform drive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ See http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/ for information on 
membership. See National Fiscal Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and 
Reform, The Moment of Truth, The White House, December 2010, http://
www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/The 
MomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     The 112th Congress (2011-2012)

    Republicans took control of the House in the aftermath of 
the 2010 elections. Tax policy was still largely focused on 
policies to help the economy recover from the recession and 
resolution of the Bush tax cuts, slated to expire at the end of 
2012.
    President Obama called for an overhaul of the tax code for 
both individuals and corporations in his 2011 State of the 
Union Address, but he provided no specifics. The House-passed 
budget resolution under Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan 
proposed a revenue-neutral tax reform with the top corporate 
and individual tax rates set at 25 percent; \57\ these 
proposals, which included no specific base-broadening 
provisions, continued to be included in subsequent House-passed 
budget resolutions. Both Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp and 
Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus held hearings on a 
number of tax reform topics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, The Path to 
Prosperity: Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Resolution, http://
budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pathtoprosperityfy2012.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In October 2011, Chairman Camp released a proposal for a 25 
percent corporate tax rate. His release also included a 
detailed draft proposal to establish a territorial corporate 
tax system--that is, to exclude active income of foreign 
subsidiaries from U.S. taxes.\58\ Much of the detail of the 
plan was to craft options to limit artificial profit shifting 
(i.e., moving profits abroad that should be reported as U.S. 
income). The plan and the options were specific and in draft 
legislative language. The draft included no corporate base-
broadening proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, ``Camp 
Releases International Tax Reform Discussion Draft,'' press release, 
October 26, 2011, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=266168. Current law taxes income of 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms, but the tax is deferred until the 
income is paid to the parent as a dividend. A territorial tax exempts 
this income.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2012, the President released a report outlining a 
framework for corporate tax reform.\59\ Although this report 
was not a fully detailed proposal, it contained a number of 
specific base-broadening provisions that had generally appeared 
in the President's annual budget submissions to Congress. The 
President's report also proposed other corporate reforms in 
general terms, such as less generous depreciation and 
restrictions on interest deductions. In the international area, 
it proposed a minimum tax on each foreign subsidiary, although 
it did not specify at what level the tax was to be set. It 
proposed to lower the corporate tax to 28 percent and to 25 
percent for manufacturing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ The President's Framework for Business Tax Reform: A Joint 
Report by The White House and the Department of the Treasury, February 
2010, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-
Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Republican majority in the House was concerned with the 
deficit, which had grown significantly during the recession. At 
the end of 2011, Congress set up a ``super committee'' to deal 
with budget gridlock. The committee did not deal with tax 
reform.
    The House budget resolution in 2012 continued to call for 
revenue-neutral tax reform with top rates of 25 percent. It 
added more details: only two rates, a repeal of the alternative 
minimum tax, and a territorial tax system for corporations.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, The Path to 
Prosperity: Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Resolution, http://
budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pathtoprosperity2013.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most 2012 tax policy was preoccupied with the expiration of 
a number of tax and spending provisions, including the Bush tax 
cuts and some antirecession stimulus provisions. President 
Obama supported making the Bush tax cuts permanent except for 
incomes over $250,000. The cuts were eventually made permanent 
but with retention of the higher top rates on very high-income 
individuals (married couples with taxable income of $450,000 or 
more). There were also tax reform proposals by the Presidential 
candidates, including the Republican nominee, Mitt Romney. His 
plan, like many other proposals, did not indicate specific 
base-broadening provisions. Other than continued hearings, no 
further congressional developments in tax reform occurred.

                     The 113th Congress (2013-2014)

    Much more activity on tax reform began in 2013. Early in 
2013, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Camp issued two more 
discussion drafts on financial products and small business. He 
also announced the formation of 11 bipartisan working groups to 
address different aspects of tax reform.\61\ The Senate Finance 
Committee also set up working groups. Chairman Baucus and 
Ranking Member Orrin Hatch released a number of option papers. 
Subsequently, Baucus released staff discussion drafts on 
international taxation, tax administration, cost recovery and 
tax accounting, and energy taxation in November and 
December.\62\ All but tax administration related to the 
corporate (or business) tax. The international taxation 
provisions proposed a current tax on foreign source income at a 
lower rate, similar to the proposals suggested in the Obama 
plan and likely to raise revenue from foreign source income. 
The intention of Chairman Baucus was to release additional 
discussion drafts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ See a list of actions taken by the Ways and Means Committee at 
http://waysandmeans. house.gov/taxreform/.
    \62\ See http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/
?id=4f681789-343a-401c-a752-516028838040.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House-passed budget resolution continued to support 
revenue-neutral tax reform and a maximum corporate rate of 25 
percent. The budget resolution no longer specified an 
individual top tax rate but suggested 25 percent as a target. 
The Senate-passed budget resolution for FY2014 specified 
revenue increases from taxes.
    Camp had indicated plans to mark up a bill in 2013 but 
ultimately did not.\63\ In February 2014, Camp released a draft 
of the bill. It appears unlikely that further action on tax 
reform will occur this year. For the individual tax, the 
proposal includes a number of provisions that tax reform 
analysts have advocated, such as eliminating personal 
exemptions, increasing the standard deduction and child 
credits, consolidating education benefits, and simplifying the 
capital gains and dividends tax preference. Camp's draft also 
reduces the earned income credit, increasing taxes on low 
income taxpayers in some cases. His proposal would also 
significantly reduce the number of itemizers by increasing the 
standard deduction, eliminating the deduction for State and 
local taxes, and curtailing or eliminating other itemized 
deductions. Chairman Camp's proposal also eliminates 
alternative minimum taxes, at a considerable revenue cost. The 
draft bill creates three rates: two regular rates of 10 percent 
and 25 percent and a surtax of 10 percentage points on modified 
income, leading to a top overall rate of 35 percent. The plan 
has a dramatic change in the corporate tax, eliminating the 
majority of tax expenditures while moving to a territorial 
system (with antiabuse provisions) and lowering the tax rate to 
25 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ There was speculation about the cause of the delay, with 
various people blaming the inability to garner support in the 
committee, loss of time due to the government shutdown, and lack of a 
go-ahead from the leadership. See Lindsey McPherson, ``Camp Hints at 
Tax Reform Delay as Baucus Weighs Options,'' Tax Notes, November 18, 
2013, pp. 699-700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Baucus, having announced in April 2013 that he 
would not run for reelection, was nominated to be Ambassador to 
China in November 2013 and resigned from the Senate on February 
6, 2014. The new chairman, Senator Ron Wyden, has a history of 
interest in tax reform. He has reportedly wondered whether some 
of the ideas in his tax reform proposal, introduced as S. 727 
in the previous Congress, could serve as the basis of tax 
reform efforts.\64\ S. 727 was cosponsored with Senators Dan 
Coats and Mark Begich and has some similarities and some 
differences with the Camp proposal. Wyden's bill had a top 
individual rate of 35 percent and a top rate of 24 percent for 
corporations. Like the Camp proposal, S. 727 was designed to be 
revenue and distributionally neutral.\65\ It also would have 
increased the standard deductions, but its major revenue 
raisers are from exclusions rather than itemized deductions. 
For the corporate tax, some revenue raisers are the same (such 
as slowing depreciation). The bill also would have disallowed 
deductions for the portion of interest reflecting inflation. A 
major difference with the Camp proposal is the ending of 
deferral so that income earned in foreign subsidiaries of U.S. 
firms would be taxed. This change, which is a major revenue-
raising provision, stands in the opposite direction of Camp's 
territorial tax.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ Lindsey McPherson, ``Wyden Previews Finance Committee's Tax 
Reform Plan,'' Tax Notes, April 7, 2014, p. 31.
    \65\ The revenue estimates for the proposal were prepared in 2010 
for the previous year's version. At that time the Bush tax cuts were 
still temporary, and it lost revenue compared to the official baseline 
(which assumed expiration) but raised revenue compared to a current 
policy baseline assuming tax provisions would be made permanent. It 
appears roughly revenue neutral. The estimates are on Senator Wyden's 
Web page at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=1ba9073f-9ee8-
4f8b-a2e3-2b70ebc96d35&download=1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    No further action on tax reform has occurred in this 
Congress. Instead, the tax writing committees focused on the 
tax extenders, a large group of tax provisions that regularly 
expire. In addition, on June 11, 2014, the Senate considered S. 
2432, sponsored by Senator Elizabeth Warren, which called for a 
minimum tax on incomes of $1 million or more. This minimum tax, 
with a rate of 30 percent, would apply to a broader base. The 
bill failed on a procedural vote (56 to 38).
    Beginning in the spring of 2014, Congress' attention turned 
to inversions, a growing tax avoidance practice employed by 
various businesses. The announcement by a number of U.S. firms 
of attempts or intentions to invert (i.e., move their 
headquarters abroad) by acquiring smaller foreign firms led to 
calls for legislation. While some argued that legislation 
tailored to this inversion problem was needed, others indicated 
that corporate reform to make the United States a more 
attractive location should be considered. The inversion problem 
increased Member and public interest in tax reform, or at least 
in corporate tax reform.
    The future of tax reform will be affected by changes in the 
leadership of each Chamber. Camp, who is term-limited in his 
chairmanship, has announced he will not run for the 114th 
Congress. His replacement as chairman is uncertain. There is 
speculation that Ryan, now chairman of the Budget Committee and 
a consistent supporter of tax reform, might become chairman if 
the Republicans retain the majority in the House.\66\ 
Similarly, Senator Wyden's tenure as chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee will depend on the outcome of the 2014 Senate 
elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Brian Faler, ``Paul Ryan Wants House Tax-Writing Gavel in 
2015,'' Politico, December 17, 2013, http://www.politico.com/story/
2013/12/paul-ryan-ways-and-means-committee-2014-101256. html. Ryan is 
currently the third-ranking member on the committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          Comparison of the Current Tax Reform Terrain to 1986

    Numerous political factors are considered to influence the 
success or failure of tax reform proposals. Professor Witte 
stressed three: (1) Presidential leadership, (2) some degree of 
insulation from political pressures, and (3) starting the tax 
reform debate with a comprehensive plan. In addition, 
congressional leadership and messaging are also critical to the 
fate of tax reform. As the following discussion suggests, these 
and other factors were present in 1986 but currently are not. 
In addition, the possibilities for base broadening are more 
limited today than they were in 1986, making the achievement of 
targeted lower tax rates virtually impossible.

                          Presidential Support

    Many observers agree that the most important factor in the 
success of TRA86 was the active leadership of President Reagan. 
While President Obama has supported tax reform in principle, he 
has not proposed a plan for individual income tax reform. 
However, he appears to support using tax increases on high-
income individuals for additional revenue. For business tax 
reform, he has some specific proposals, but many base-
broadening provisions have not been spelled out, and cost 
estimates have not been provided. President Obama does not 
appear to consider tax reform a priority, and this factor alone 
would suggest to many tax historians that the prospects for tax 
reform in the 114th Congress seem murky at best.

      Development of a Proposal Insulated from Political Pressure

    The initial development of a comprehensive proposal 
relatively insulated from political pressure may contribute to 
eventual enactment of tax reform in some form. Noteworthy is 
that the path to tax reform has always occurred in Congress 
without Presidential involvement. In the House, Camp's 2014 
proposal appeared to have considerable political input from 
hearings, invited comments on the territorial tax draft, and 
contacts with the working groups. At the same time, it is not 
clear how much these factors influenced legislation, although 
members of the working groups cite a number of provisions in 
Camp's bill influenced by them, such as keeping the tax 
preferences for oil and gas.\67\ Senate Finance Chairman Baucus 
did not produce a draft bill. Instead, his staff prepared a 
limited number of discussion drafts, also a process that 
invites political input. In short, the process in 2014 was 
different from that which produced the first draft of TRA86, 
which was prepared by technical experts away from pressure of 
lobbyists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ Lindsey McPherson, ``Ways and Means Working Groups Influenced 
Portions of Camp Tax Reform Draft,'' Tax Notes Today, March 18, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Initiation of a Broad Tax Proposal

    A factor that contributed to TRA86's success was beginning 
the process with a comprehensive proposal that changed politics 
as usual (by suggesting collective sacrifice). The Camp draft 
is broad, although it is much narrower than President Reagan's 
Treasury I. It is not clear whether the guiding principle of 
the Camp draft was to improve the tax code or find revenue-
raising provisions to permit predetermined conditions set in 
the House-passed budget resolution. Experts suggest that the 
budget resolution's provisions--revenue neutrality, a top tax 
rate of 25 percent, repeal of the alternative minimum tax, and 
a territorial tax--are almost impossible to comply with.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ See subsequent discussion of limitations on base-broadening 
provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         Leadership in Congress

    There is little doubt that leadership in Congress is 
critical to the fate of major tax reform measures. Recall the 
key roles in 1986 of Members such as Dan Rostenkowski, Bob 
Packwood, and Bill Bradley. It seems clear that Camp was a 
dedicated tax reformer who made the issue a top priority. He 
began working on tax reform in his 1st year as chairman by 
tackling the complex process of designing a territorial tax. 
Ultimately, he produced, with the aid of tax experts at the 
Joint Committee on Taxation and his own people, what was seen 
as impressive and detailed draft legislation. Yet he did not 
succeed in getting it to or through his committee. His 
counterpart in the Senate, Chairman Baucus, got a later start, 
with work beginning in 2013, but he had already announced in 
April that he would not run for reelection. Senator Baucus' 
early departure from the Senate as he was nominated for 
Ambassador to China basically ended his tax reform effort. 
However, his staff discussion papers offer some insight into 
what corporate revisions the Democrats might be willing to 
accept. The new Finance Committee chairman, Senator Wyden, 
expressed support for tax reform as he focused on an immediate 
issue when he became chair: the expiring tax provisions (or 
``extenders'').
    As a term-limited chairman, Camp has drawn the admiration 
of many observers for providing Members with a tax reform 
blueprint. Term limits mean that chairmen do not have the power 
they once had. One reporter writes: ``There was a time when any 
proposal by the Ways and Means Committee chairman would be 
viewed as a blueprint for legislation that would most likely 
become law. In those days, chairmen sometimes seemed to serve 
forever . . . . Next year, under the rules of the House 
Republican Caucus, he [Camp] will have to step down after four 
years as chairman.'' \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Floyd Norris, ``Republican's Tax Plan Awkwardly Aims at 
Rich,'' New York Times, March 6, 2014, at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
03/07/business/economy/from-an-unexpected-source-a-tax-proposal-that-
targets-the-rich.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A key difference from 1986 is that party leaders in today's 
House and Senate confront an array of difficulties that may 
limit their ability to back major tax reform. Compared to 1986, 
today the two parties are sharply divided in each Chamber. It 
is simply more difficult today compared to 1986 for House and 
Senate leaders to mobilize winning coalitions on consequential 
legislation.
    In 1986, many Members in both parties and Chambers 
supported tax reform. House Speaker Tip O'Neill was one of 
Rostenkowski's strongest supporters.\70\ Senate Majority Leader 
Robert Dole sat on the Finance Committee (and was a former 
chairman). As with many Finance members, he was skeptical of 
the prospects for tax reform. But he was involved in the 
process and embraced Packwood's new two-rate plan.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, p. 109.
    \71\ Ibid., pp. 5, 222-223.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In assessing today's prospects for tax reform, one reporter 
writes, ``The Camp proposal seems unlikely to go anywhere, in 
no small part because the House Republican leadership has gone 
out of its way to distance itself from the proposal, praising 
Mr. Camp for his diligence and calling it worthy of 
consideration but not getting close to an endorsement.'' \72\ 
Another writes that ``when Baucus and Hatch released a Dear 
Colleague letter noting their plans to take a `clean slate' 
approach to rewriting the tax code and soliciting ideas, 
[Senate Majority Leader Harry] Reid said he didn't even read 
the letter.'' \73\
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    \72\ Norris, ``Republican's Tax Plan Awkwardly Aims at Rich.''
    \73\ Lindsey McPherson, ``What Wyden Can Learn from Baucus's 
Tenure,'' Tax Notes, March 3, 2014, p. 915.
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                               Messaging

    Ronald Reagan's statement in his 1984 State of the Union 
Message proposing a tax reform plan spoke generally of 
fairness, simplicity, and incentives to growth. Messages 
associated with the contemporary efforts do not have such broad 
appeal. The Fiscal Commission, which proposed to use part of 
the base-broadening provisions to offset the deficit, was not 
primarily focused on tax reform and did not specify provisions. 
The first message on tax reform by the newly elected (in 2010) 
House Republicans--the only group to have actually achieved a 
tax reform plan (excluding Senator Wyden's independent efforts 
in years past)--was in the FY2012 budget resolution, titled 
``Pro-Growth Tax Reform.'' It went on to reference simplicity 
and fairness as goals for tax reform while setting the top 
rates of the individual and corporate tax to 25 percent. The 
FY2013 budget resolution recommended two rates, 10 percent and 
25 percent, and added repeal of the alternative minimum tax (a 
benefit for high-income families), and a territorial tax (a 
benefit for multinational firms). A tax reform plan that 
focuses on lower tax rates for high-income individuals and 
corporations, particularly multinational corporations, may send 
a message to the public with narrow appeal.
    These messages are different from the broad proposal of 
President Reagan, which outlined general principles. The 
contrast in messages was pointed out by Mark Weinberg, a tax 
expert with experience in the executive branch and on Capitol 
Hill. He stated that the tax reform effort in 1986 ``was driven 
in large part as simplification, and it was driven in large 
part by trying to get more fairness into the system.'' He was 
also reported to say that today tax reform is driven by 
companies concerned about global competitiveness and by 
politicians who want to raise more revenue to help reduce the 
Nation's debt.\74\
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    \74\ Amy S. Elliott, ``Mundaca Casts Doubt on Quick Passage of 
Corporate Tax Reform,'' Tax Notes, October 17, 2011, p 272.
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    There is certainly evidence that corporate tax concerns 
have taken priority over individual ones. President Obama has 
focused on corporate reform. A driving force for reform was the 
multinational corporations (especially in the pharmaceutical, 
high-tech, and financial industries). They have large amounts 
of income earned abroad and in tax haven jurisdictions abroad 
that they cannot return (or repatriate) without paying a 35 
percent U.S. tax. They first lobbied for a repatriation holiday 
with low taxes, but as evidence accrued that an earlier holiday 
had not led to additional investment, a stand-alone holiday 
became increasingly unlikely. Then efforts turned to a 
corporate tax reform that would lower rates, introduce a 
territorial tax so this issue would not occur in the future, 
and couple both with a lower tax rate on existing accumulated 
earnings.\75\ These are all features of the Camp draft.
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    \75\ See CRS Report R40178, Tax Cuts on Repatriation Earnings as 
Economic Stimulus: An Economic Analysis, by Donald J. Marples and Jane 
G. Gravelle and CRS Report RL34229, Corporate Tax Reform: Issues for 
Congress, by Jane G. Gravelle, for a discussion of these events.
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    Views on taxation of corporations differ, especially for 
multinational corporations. As noted during the passage of the 
Revenue Act of 1916, many asked: Are corporations engines of 
growth or predators? Currently, some argue that corporations 
need lower tax rates to attract foreign capital or to be 
competitive abroad. Others are concerned about firms that pay 
little or no tax because they have shifted profits abroad into 
tax havens. Firms such as Pfizer and Walgreens considering 
shifting their headquarters abroad (inversion) to avoid U.S. 
tax was seen, by some, as a reason to pursue more generous 
corporate tax rules and by others to adopt targeted legislation 
to prevent these activities.

           More Limited Potential Base-Broadening Provisions

    In addition to political factors that differ from 1986, the 
current tax reform effort also faces a much more difficult 
environment in a technical sense than was the case in 1986. One 
could argue that 1986 already picked the ``low hanging fruit,'' 
especially with respect to corporate tax reform. The 
elimination of the investment credit and a small change in 
depreciation in TRA86 were enough to finance most of the 12 
percentage point reduction in the corporate rate (from 46 
percent to 34 percent). By contrast, eliminating accelerated 
depreciation for the corporate sector would permit a permanent 
reduction of 2 to 3 percentage points in the long run. 
Eliminating every tax expenditure (except deferral of foreign 
source income) would permit roughly a 5 percentage point 
reduction in a long-run revenue-neutral change.\76\
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    \76\ These calculations are in CRS Report RL34229, Corporate Tax 
Reform: Issues for Congress, by Jane G. Gravelle.
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    On the individual side, two major provisions that offset 
the revenue loss from rate cuts for high-income individuals are 
not available: hikes in capital gains tax rates and 
restrictions on tax shelters. Although capital gains tax rates 
are currently lower than ordinary rates, scoring conventions 
that assume a tax increase will lead to a large contraction in 
the sales of assets and resulting gains mean that relatively 
little revenue would be projected to be raised from increasing 
capital gains tax rates. Many supporters of tax reform are 
unlikely to be interested in increasing tax rates on the return 
to savings and investment (such as capital gains and 
dividends), which constitute about one-third of tax 
expenditures. Many other provisions are problematic as base-
broadening provisions on a variety of grounds but largely 
because they are popular with a broad swath of the middle 
class.\77\
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    \77\ See CRS Report R42435, The Challenge of Individual Income Tax 
Reform: An Economic Analysis of Tax Base Broadening, by Jane G. 
Gravelle and Thomas L. Hungerford for a review of individual income tax 
expenditures. See also Michael J. Graetz, ``The Tax Reform Road Not 
Taken,'' National Tax Journal, vol. 67, no. 2 (June 2014), pp. 419-440, 
which discusses the inability of possible base-broadening provisions to 
allow significant rate reductions.
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    The Camp plan--the only fully specified tax reform proposal 
of the 113th Congress--reflects the struggle to find a revenue-
neutral plan that allows lowering the top tax rates for 
individuals and corporations to 25 percent (along with other 
restrictions that eventually appeared in the budget resolution, 
such as eliminating the alternative minimum tax and moving to a 
territorial tax). Certain aspects of the proposal illustrate 
the difficulty in achieving revenue neutrality with these 
goals: non-income tax revenue-raising provisions, the phase-in 
of revenue-losing provisions over time, revenue gains from 
transitory provisions, bubbles and surtaxes that raise marginal 
effective rates (for example, a 10 percentage point surtax on 
high-income taxpayers that raises the top rate from 25 percent 
to 35 percent), and the presence of revenue raisers that would 
probably not pass the test of good policy.\78\ There are many 
other provisions that may not survive the political process, 
such as the repeal of the itemized deduction for State and 
local taxes, a centerpiece of the individual reform plan. 
Estimates suggest that the plan loses revenue beyond the budget 
horizon (in the steady state): around 4.5 percent for the 
corporate income tax and more than 4 percent for the individual 
income tax.\79\
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    \78\ These issues are discussed in a variety of sources: Leonard 
Burman, ``Hidden Taxes in the Camp Proposal,'' February 27, 2014, 
http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2014/02/27/hidden-taxes-in-the-camp-
proposal/; Robert S. McIntyre, ``Camp Is Hiding the True Effects of His 
Tax Plan,'' Tax Notes, April 27, 2014, pp. 91-93, who calculates the 
effects for the second decade of the Camp plan, finding an average of 
$170 billion in losses per year (which would be roughly at 2028 levels 
of income); Joseph Rosenberg, ``How Does Dave Camp Pay for Individual 
Tax Cuts? By Raising Revenue from Corporations,'' Urban-Brookings Tax 
Policy Center, February 27, 2014, http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/
2014/02/27/how-does-dave-camp-pay-for-individual-tax-cuts-by-raising-
revenue-from-corporations/; Chye-Ching Huang, ``Camp Tax Reform Plan 
Likely Means Bigger Deficits After First Decade,'' Citizens for Budget 
Policies and Priorities, February 26, 2014, http://
www.offthechartsblog.org/camp-tax-reform-plan-likely-means-bigger-
deficits-after-first- decade/; Committee for a Responsible Federal 
Budget, ``Revenue Impacts of Camp's Tax Reform Proposal,'' February 26, 
2014, http://crfb.org/blogs/revenue-impacts-camps-tax-reform-proposal; 
statement of John S. Buckley in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the 
Budget, Supporting Broad-Based Economic Growth and Fiscal 
Responsibility Through a Fairer Tax Code, April 8, 2014, http://
www.budget.senate.gov/democratic/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=d7254a33-
dbd4-44c1-9fcc-7ea85f803f5e, which discusses the transitory effects of 
a number of business provisions. Examples of provisions that do not 
appear to pass the test for good policy are disallowing deductions of 
catastrophic medical expenses or personal casualty losses.
    \79\ The steady state occurs when all the transitional effects of 
changes have been completed and revenue relative to GDP has become 
constant. The revenue estimates for the Camp draft do not report 
corporate and noncorporate revenues separately. The estimate for the 
long-run steady-state losses relies on fully phased-in provisions and 
adjusts them for transitory effects. Noncorporate and corporate 
allocations and transitory effects were determined by comparing the 
revenue estimates with the tax expenditure estimates, which provide 
separate data and a steady-state estimate. Provisions that produce 
transitory effects include accelerated depreciation, capitalizing 
research and experimentation and advertising expenses, transitioning 
away from ``last in, first out,'' a one-time tax on existing 
accumulated foreign earnings, and requiring Roth IRAs and elective 
deferrals rather than traditional plans. Data on historical collections 
can be found in Congressional Budget Office, An Update to the Budget 
and Economic Outlook: 2014 to 2024, August 2014 release, at http://
www.cbo.gov/publication/45249. Data on future collections is from 
Congressional Budget Office, The Economic and Budget Outlook, February 
2014, at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/45010. Data on the revenue 
estimates of the Camp proposal and tax expenditures are from the Joint 
Committee on Taxation, ``Estimated Revenue Effects of the `Tax Reform 
Act of 2014,' '' February 26, 2014, JCX-20-14 and ``Estimates of 
Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2012-2017,'' JCS-1-13, 
February 1, 2013. JCT documents can be found at www.jct.gov. The 4.2 
percent calculation is understated because it treats timing effects 
associated with retirement accounts as having no effect when in fact 
they should lose revenue in the future. At 2023 income levels, these 
losses amount to $22 billion for corporations and at least $122 billion 
for individuals.
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                        Tax Reform Going Forward

    Tax reform is extremely difficult. Historically, major tax 
revision requires some external financial crisis or, some would 
say, a powerful social movement such as the Progressive 
movement at the turn of the 20th century. Otherwise, major tax 
reform is unlikely to occur. Rather, tax changes typically 
occur incrementally. The exception to that rule--TRA86--is 
widely viewed as an anomaly arising from an unusual combination 
of conditions.
    These conditions do not appear to be present in the current 
tax reform drive, making tax reform unlikely. Some of the 
barriers to tax reform are due to unrealistic expectations 
about how much corporate and individual tax rates could be 
reduced; some are due to the absence of Presidential support 
and strong endorsement by bipartisan congressional leadership; 
some are a consequence of a lack of a broad popular appeal.
    There is always the possibility that new chairmen of the 
tax writing committees and party leadership could come together 
to produce a tax reform plan or that the President or his 
successor could make tax reform a priority. The possibilities, 
however, were described by tax economist Martin Sullivan:

    What magic beans could be planted by a President Romney or 
a President Cruz/Paul/Jindal that would change the prospects 
for reform? After three years of good-faith effort by a well-
liked, hardworking chair, with all the technical expertise of 
the Ways and Means Committee and Joint Committee on Taxation 
staffs at his disposal, the best he could come up with was a 
plan that has antagonized almost every major business group 
inside the Beltway. And after being promised a top rate of 25 
percent, we get a thinly veiled top rate of 35 percent packaged 
as a 25 percent rate with a 10 percentage point surtax . . . .
    There is a chance that the Camp draft, like the plan 
released by Treasury in 1984, will serve as a first draft that 
determined lawmakers will revise and rework until they succeed 
in passing major legislation. But the political situation and 
the substance of law make tax reform far more difficult now 
than back then. It is much more likely that the next chair of 
the Ways and Means Committee--most likely Paul Ryan of 
Wisconsin--will see Camp's valiant attempt at reform as clear 
evidence that tax reform is a thankless and impossible 
task.\80\
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    \80\ Martin Sullivan, ``The Beginning of the End of Tax Reform,'' 
Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/02/28/the-
beginning-of-the-end-of-tax-reform/2/.

    It is possible that corporate tax reform could be 
considered separately to address the multiple concerns both 
parties have with the corporate tax in a global economy. 
President Obama has indicated interest in this area, and there 
may be some common ground for both Chambers and parties to 
reach consensus. But until expectations about rates meet with 
reality, broad tax reform seems impossible not just as a 
political matter but as a technical matter.