[Senate Prints 112-44]
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112th Congress }                                           {    S. Prt.
 2d Session    }            COMMITTEE PRINT                {    112-44
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                        CHINA'S IMPACT ON KOREAN
                       PENINSULA UNIFICATION AND
                        QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE

                               __________

                        A MINORITY STAFF REPORT

                      PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      One Hundred Twelfth Congress

                             Second Session

                           December 11, 2012



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                COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS          

            JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman          
BARBARA BOXER, California            RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois          JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico                MIKE LEE, Utah
              William C. Danvers, Staff Director          
       Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director          

                             (ii)          




                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v
Background.......................................................     1
Introduction.....................................................     1
Questions for the Senate.........................................     2
China's Historic Claims Throughout Time..........................     2
The Recent Past..................................................     3
Today............................................................     4
Institutional Policy Coordination Between China and North Korea..     4
The Move Toward Economic Integration-The Making of a 21st Century 
  Tributary Province.............................................     5
Points of China-North Korea Commercial Intersection..............     5
A Magnet for China-North Korea's Natural Resources-Mining and 
  Rare Earth Materials...........................................     8
Unintended Consequences by and for North Korea...................     9
Is The Trend of North Korea Becoming a Chinese Protectorate and 
  Economic Colony Irreversible?..................................    10
In Summary.......................................................    10
Acknowledgements and Appreciation................................    11

                               Appendixes

Appendix I.--Bibliography........................................    17
Appendix II.--Congressional Research Service Memorandum to 
  Senator Lugar Regarding China's Perspective on Historical 
  Borders on the Korean Peninsula................................    21
Appendix III.--Korean Perspectives on Historical Change in the 
  Borders between Korea and China: A Review and Comments on the 
  Congressional Research Service Memorandum of March 9, 2012.....    33
Appendix IV.--``Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: 
  New Insights into DPRK Regime Dynamics'' John S. Park, Ph.D., 
  November 27, 2012..............................................    69

                                 (iii)












                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                 Washington, DC, December 11, 2012.
    Dear Colleagues: When we consider the possible unification 
of the Korean Peninsula at some time in the future, the German 
model of unification often comes to mind. The purpose of the 
attached report is to alert Members that another outcome is 
possible.
    China's historical claims to territory within the borders 
of the Korean Peninsula and the expanding investment by China 
within North Korea point to a situation where China may attempt 
to manage, if not oppose, the process of Korean Peninsula 
unification.The attached report includes extensive information 
regarding China's trade and economic interaction with North 
Korea and the growing investment by Chinese companies inside 
North Korea.
    For historical perspective, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee staff obtained information about Chinese claims that 
parts of the Korean Peninsula were historically part of China, 
and South Korean assessments about those claims. The 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) was asked to write about 
how China presents its historic claims to the Korean Peninsula 
so that Members would be alerted to this situation. The 
Northeast Asia History Foundation in Seoul greatly assisted by 
providing South Korea's view of China's historic claims. 
Neither the committee nor I take any position on the disputes 
over the history of the Korean Peninsula discussed in this 
report.
    Important questions are raised toward the beginning of the 
attached report for the Senate's consideration regarding 
prospects for unification, the significance to the United 
States and our overall Korea policy.
    I would like to express appreciation to several scholars on 
North Korean affairs (referenced in the Appendix section) who 
assisted Keith Luse and other Committee staff in the 
development of this report, which may be a helpful future 
reference on Korean Peninsula unification.
            Sincerely,
                                          Richard G. Lugar,
                                                    Ranking Member.

                                  (v)

                        CHINA'S IMPACT ON KOREAN

                       PENINSULA UNIFICATION AND

                        QUESTIONS FOR THE SENATE


          ``Pyongyang today looks more like a tidy Chinese 
        provincial city than the Spartan capital of the world's 
        last Stalinist state.'' \1\

                               Background

    For some time, China has been viewed by the West as the 
main intermediary with North Korea. The West has believed with 
some justification that because China serves as a lifeline and 
benevolent provider for the North, it would leverage that role 
to influence North Korea's decision--making process in such 
matters as nuclear weapons development, nuclear tests, missile 
launches and other areas of international concern.
    In recent years, as official Washington has assessed 
denuclearization prospects in North Korea, it has viewed the 
China factor with varying degrees of hope, anticipation, and 
dismay. China's willingness and desire to chair and manage the 
Six Party Talks process was accepted with optimism by many in 
the White House and the Congress. Reality has however begun to 
come to the forefront. The interests of China and the United 
States related to North Korea--regional stability vs. 
denuclearization--are not the same. In looking to the future, 
for similar reasons, China is a wild card on the subject of 
Korean Peninsula Unification--an eventuality that Chinese 
leaders may determine they cannot allow.

                              Introduction

    When Members of the U.S. Senate consider prospects for 
unification of the Korean Peninsula, they often reflect upon 
the demise of the East German government and the unification of 
East and West Germany, anticipating a similar outcome on the 
Korean Peninsula.
    However, another outcome is possible.
    China's historical claims to territory within the borders 
of contemporary North Korea (and across parts of the entire 
Peninsula) and the expanding economic footprint of China in the 
North are among the factors creating a dynamic that leads away 
from eventual Peninsula unification.
    Whether the impetus for unification is the warming of 
relations between the North and the South, accompanied by 
accelerated commercial and other activities, or an abrupt 
seismic event within North Korea contributing to the demise of 
the present government, China could attempt to manage, and 
conceivably block the unification process. While working to 
safeguard its own commercial assets, and to assert its right to 
preserve the northern part of the peninsula within China's 
sphere of influence, Beijing might seek to defend its actions 
as necessary to ensure regional stability. (Another important 
point to note is that increased economic cooperation between 
China and North Korea benefits China's own development as well 
and enhances China's access to North Korean natural resources 
for energy and other purposes.) \2\
    The possible presence of American military personnel north 
of the 38th Parallel does not conform to China's definition of 
regional stability and is unacceptable to most Chinese 
officials.


          ``The conventional thinking in China is that it 
        benefits from the maintenance of a divided peninsula 
        and a fraternally allied socialist state on its 
        border.'' \3\


    As noted in the Interim Report of the University of 
Southern California (USC) Center for Strategic & International 
Studies (CSIS) regarding Challenges for Korean Unification 
Planning, ``There has been a traditional resistance to talking 
openly about unification scenarios. Policy-makers and scholars 
avoid the issue for fear of diplomatic fallout from China or 
the DPRK or because it operates in the realm of meaningless 
speculation and punditry. The absence of such discussion is a 
recipe for disaster.'' \4\ (emphasis added)
    The preparation of this report revealed a series of 
questions for Members.

                        Questions for the Senate

   What are the foreign policy and national defense 
        implications for the United States of an ongoing 
        divided Korean Peninsula in comparison to a unified 
        Peninsula?

   What are the origins of resistance, and in some cases 
        outright opposition to unification within South Korea?

   Is China's incremental economic integration with North 
        Korea similar to its intent for relations with South 
        Korea?

   What is in the best interest of the United States--to 
        pursue multilateral ``Six Party Talks'' with North 
        Korea or engage in bilateral negotiations between the 
        U.S. and North Korea, having separate and concurrent 
        consultations with South Korea, Japan, China and 
        Russia? Or is a ``third way'' preferable?

                China's Historic Claims Throughout Time

          `` . . . disputes (between China and South Korea), 
        have become intense and frequent over the past several 
        years as China has increasingly asserted cultural 
        hegemony, or Sinocentrism, commensurate with its 
        ascendancy in the global economy and politics.'' \5\


    To document China's long-term interest in and claims on the 
Korean Peninsula, the Committee obtained South Korean and 
Chinese perspectives on the issue.
    The Congressional Research Service (CRS) was asked to 
provide information about Chinese claims that territory on the 
Korean Peninsula was historically part of China, with a focus 
on maps published in the People's Republic of China depicting 
those claims. The CRS memorandum, authored by Susan V. 
Lawrence, a CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs, discusses several 
works of state-supported Chinese scholarship on the subject, 
including maps depicting borders on the Peninsula at points in 
history between 475 B.C. and 1982 A.D. The CRS memorandum is 
included in an appendix to this report.
    Yong Ho Kim, Director of the Office of Policy Planning of 
the Northeast Asia History Foundation in Seoul, was the point 
person for a team of Korean experts who provided analysis on 
behalf of the Republic of Korea regarding the Chinese 
perspective on this issue. The Foundation's report is also 
included in an appendix to this report.
    China's historic claims on the Peninsula raise the 
possibility of future Chinese intervention in the Korean 
unification process.

                            The Recent Past

    The 1976 Area Handbook for North Korea prepared by Foreign 
Area Studies program of The American University provides an 
overview of China-North Korea relations following the Korean 
War. Excerpts included below provide important background:


   During the last six decades, China and North Korea have 
        experienced a generally amiable relationship deemed of 
        mutual benefit. China's intervention in the Korean War 
        prevented the almost certain demise of North Korea as 
        an independent state, and in the postwar years 
        stationed troops inside North Korea until 1958. In 
        1961, North Korea and China signed a treaty of 
        friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.

   As North Korean-Soviet relations cooled, North Korea 
        maintained an active relationship with China. In the 
        early 1960's, Kim Il-Sung supported China verbally 
        during the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian 
        border conflict of 1962. ``It was against this backdrop 
        of comradeship that an old border dispute between the 
        Chinese and Koreans over Mount Paektu (Paektu-san) was 
        reportedly settled when the PRC Chief of State, Liu 
        Shao-chi, visited Pyongyang in September 1963. At that 
        time, the PRC apparently recognized North Korean 
        sovereignty over much of the disputed 100-square-mile 
        area involving Mount Paektu, a major concession to the 
        Koreans.''

   Following Premier Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, the Soviet 
        Union took a more conciliatory approach to North Korea 
        which was immediately noticed by the Chinese. There 
        were mild tremors in the relationship which became more 
        publicly apparent e.g. in 1965 when the North Korean 
        Embassy in Moscow reported that Peking had claimed the 
        Mount Paektu area as ``compensation'' for its military 
        intervention and assistance during the Korean War; and 
        in 1967 the Chinese Red Guards alleged that Kim Il-Sung 
        had been arrested by his army following a coup. In 1969 
        North Korea-Chinese relations began to improve and in 
        1970 Premier Chou En-lai paid a state visit to North 
        Korea where he heralded a new era of cordiality and 
        mutual cooperation.

   Warm relations between North Korea and China continued in 
        the 1970's with evidence that Pyongyang was taking an 
        ``evenhanded or independent posture toward Peking and 
        Moscow.'' During a nine-day visit to China in 1975, the 
        two sides reaffirmed a ``blood-sealed militant 
        friendship.'' \6\


    Disputes about the Korea-China borderline are historic and 
endless. Complicating analysis of research on borders is the 
fact that authoritative sources within China do not always 
agree.\7\ The attached analysis and documentation of China's 
numerous historic claims on the Korean Peninsula may mean that 
many within Chinese leadership circles believe that areas of 
the Koreas (North and South), are in fact, part of China.
    Through the careful review of Chinese and Korean sources, 
analysts have documented China's tenacious commitment to 
viewing parts of the Korean Peninsula as historically its own. 
Any future success at negotiations between North Korea and the 
United States, or with North Korea in a Six-Party or other 
multilateral context, is unlikely to change China's perspective 
of its paternal role with North Korea. China is likely to 
resist direct or indirect challenges to its preferred status 
quo.

                                 Today

    Chinese officials are prepared to take action as they deem 
necessary to preserve regional stability, (especially stability 
along the border with North Korea). Chinese officials earlier 
informed Senate Foreign Relations' Committee staff that China 
reserved the right to place troops across the border inside 
North Korea to prevent hungry or impoverished North Koreans 
from fleeing into China. These plans have been described not as 
an invasion, but as a pre-emptive move that would be taken in 
consultation with North Korean authorities. In addition, China 
has contingency plan options to respond unilaterally to 
situations within North Korea which Chinese officials might 
deem as potentially destabilizing.

                   Institutional Policy Coordination 
                     Between China and North Korea

    There are multiple examples of increased policy 
coordination between China and North Korea at the institutional 
level. Examples include:


   Strategic consultations between senior leaders.

   Policy discussions and harmonization at the inter-party, 
        inter-military, inter-governmental and inter-
        ministerial levels and exchanges between provincial and 
        local authorities (party, people's committees, mass 
        public organizations, civil groups, etc.)

   Chinese advisory role and sharing of technical expertise at 
        the sub-ministerial and sub-agency level, including 
        regular exchanges and technical assistance at the vice-
        ministerial level (e.g. agriculture, electric power, 
        light industry, banking, transportation, etc.)

   Sharing of managerial control at mainstream North Korean 
        enterprises with Chinese stakes.\8\


    In addition, during 2011, China's Ambassador in Pyongyan, 
Liu Hongcai, ``had an extraordinarily active year, . . . both 
as a facilitator of exchanges and as a support base for 
managing the comprehensive contacts between Chinese leaders and 
the full range of DPRK elites at the top ranks of leadership.'' 
\9\


          But even more significant than the Ambassador's 
        public schedule is the reach of the embassy into the 
        top echelons of North Korea's elite leadership during 
        visits by Chinese senior officials . . . as well as 
        efforts by the embassy to follow-up with Kim Jong-il to 
        schedule various special occasions following his visits 
        to China.\10\

           The Move Toward Economic Integration--The Making 
                  of a 21st Century Tributary Province

           . . . keeping Pyongyang afloat is not only an 
        immediate consideration, but also a long-term security 
        hedge (for China).\11\


    For over a decade, Chinese authorities ``have attempted to 
put the economic relationship with North Korea on a market 
basis by reducing the amount of subsidies provided to North 
Korea from China's central, provincial and local governments.'' 
North Korean leaders rejected this approach preferring the 
subsidies over assuming political risks accompanying economic 
reform.\12\
    The more recent China-launched investment and trade 
offensive directed at North Korea reflects an incremental 
economic integration with the North and is reminiscent of 
similar situations involving other sovereign states bordering 
China including Cambodia and Laos. However, North Korea 
represents a point of unique anxiety for Chinese officials' who 
are determined to preserve what they call ``regional 
stability.'' China's active facilitation of closer economic 
ties with North Korea supports China's economy while quietly 
establishing an extensive business and trade infrastructure 
within North Korea that China will be prepared to protect, if 
ever necessary.


          . . . a significant challenge for future North-South 
        relations is the dominance of China in North Korea's 
        current external economic relations and the diversity 
        and genuinely commercial motivations for the rapidly 
        expanding trade and investment activities along the 
        China border. These are indicators of a process of 
        economic integration underway....The large ethnic 
        Korean population on the Chinese side of the border 
        also provides a fertile soil to nurture this process of 
        gradual economic integration in the border areas.\13\

          Points of China-North Korea Commercial Intersection

    The October 2009 visit to North Korea by Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao was a benchmark event which leveraged Communist 
Party of China (CPC) ties with the Workers' Party of Korea 
(WPK) ``to deepen (the) bilateral commercial relationship for 
mutual benefit. Beijing shored up (the) stability of (the) Kim 
Jong-il regime and Pyongyang agreed to jointly develop DPRK 
natural resources--inputs which will significantly aid 
sustainable economic development of (the) PRC's three 
northeastern provinces.'' \14\
    It is important to note that it is difficult to obtain 
accurate information regarding the status of North Korea's 
economy or precise figures on the sources and amounts of 
Chinese investment in North Korea.


          There is more going on than meets the eye, both 
        positively and negatively. It is very unusual for 
        Chinese firms to complain publicly about their hosts, 
        as Xiyang did, especially in sensitive situations. Most 
        likely, this was the culmination of a number of 
        fundamental problems. The North Koreans have shown no 
        sign they understand what a commercial contract is. The 
        notion of $7 billion in pending Chinese investment is 
        thus difficult to accept. Moreover, some sources, 
        notably in South Korea have a record of exaggeration 
        when it comes to DPRK economic reporting.
          On the other hand, the scope of the land leases, 
        infrastructure development (drop in the bucket though 
        it is), and mining operations indicate that the UN 
        figure for investment stock is too low. It should 
        either be read as excluding non-monetary transactions 
        or representing nominal prices far below those even in 
        other poor economies. Trade figures are similarly too 
        low.\15\


   In March of 2012, the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) 
        published new foreign investment laws for the two 
        special economic zones North Korea is promoting on the 
        Chinese border--Rason as well as the Hwanggumpyong and 
        Wihwa Islands Zone.\16\ (Since 1993, North Korean laws 
        governing the status of the special economic zones 
        (SEZs) have been amended six times in an effort to 
        improve incentives for foreign investors).\17\ A joint 
        China-North Korea Committee oversees the development of 
        the two special (SEZs). ``SEZs are acceptable to the 
        North Korean government because they are relatively 
        easy to control.'' \18\

   Rason (the combined towns of Rajin and Sonbong) was 
        established as an SEZ in 1991. While the North Koreans 
        have tried to attract investment there with poor 
        results in the past, a new push is now underway.\19\

   In 2011, China's Shangdi Guanqun Investment Company signed 
        a letter of intent with North Korea's Investment and 
        Development Group for an investment of $2 billion in 
        the Rason Industrial Zone.\20\

   The road to the Chinese border from the Rason Economic Zone 
        is now finished, cutting a 3-hour journey to under 50 
        minutes. The road has also improved connectivity 
        between regions in the Special Economic Zone for local 
        citizens.\21\


    North Korea's Joint-Venture & Investment Commission, 
designed by the North Korean government to attract foreign 
investment, signed an agreement in September with the Chinese 
Overseas Investment Federation to jointly launch the ``Special 
Funds for North Korean Investments'' project, supported by (US 
$480 million) from Chinese sources.\22\
    The lack of electricity is a major challenge to Chinese 
expansion along the border and within North Korea -a drag on 
investment in production factories. The lack of a credible plan 
for infrastructure investment in the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa 
Islands zone is a major obstacle as well.\23\


           . . . integration of North Korea's economy and 
        China's northeastern provinces, particularly the 
        provinces of Liaoning and Jilin, ensure that Northeast 
        China will pay a significant price should North Korea 
        implode. Economic stability in these ``rust belt'' 
        provinces, part of the struggling industrial region 
        known informally in the West as Manchuria, is a key 
        concern for Beijing.\24\


   The proportion of North Korea's total foreign trade that is 
        accounted for by China-North Korea trade increased to 
        more than 60% in 2011.\25\

   Chinese visitors are one of North Korea's key sources of 
        foreign currency. Sixty thousand to seventy thousand 
        Chinese tourists visited North Korea in 2011 compared 
        to an estimated 40,000 visitors from China in 2010.\26\

   China, along with Germany, France and South Korea are among 
        the countries producing clothing in North Korea for 
        export. Tens of thousands of North Koreans, many highly 
        skilled, are employed by companies from these 
        countries.\27\

   In August of 2012, a high level North Korean delegation 
        visited China to develop consensus on renewed 
        cooperation in key sectors of North Korea's economy 
        including emphasis on the development of economic zones 
        along the China-North Korea border.


    Although unlikely to facilitate system-wide DPRK economic 
reform in the near-term, Beijing's Sunshine Policy appears to 
be sufficient to bolster the stability of the new regime 
through the immediate benefits that the Kim Jong-un leadership 
can realize from preferential commercial arrangements with PRC 
partners. In practice, the Communist Party of China is bailing 
out the Workers' Party of Korea via political and commercial 
arrangements.\28\


   Since earlier this year, China has issued over 40,000 work 
        visas for North Koreans to work in three Northeast 
        provinces: Jilin, Lianoning and Heilongjiang.\29\ (Some 
        suggest that whether or not this number of visas has 
        been issued, the number of North Koreans presently 
        working in China may be fewer than 40,000).

   Press reports suggest that China and North Korea have 
        reportedly agreed on a labor program under which China 
        would take anywhere from 40,000 to 120,000 North 
        Koreans to work in factories as industrial trainees and 
        to work in the hospitality industry.\30\


    (North Korea has also increased the number of workers at 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex which is managed by South Korean 
companies. Over 46,400 North Korean workers were at the 
industrial park in February, 2012, compared to 42,415 over a 
year ago. South Korean companies have reportedly asked North 
Korea for an additional 20,000 workers for the Kaesong Complex. 
North Korean workers at Kaesong, in China, in Mongolia and 
other countries provide millions of dollars of annual income 
for the North Korean government).\31\


   China has gained the rights to use North Korea's port of 
        Chongjin on the East China Sea. The agreement 
        reportedly provides China with the rights to use two 
        wharves at Chongjin for 30 years which are capable of 
        processing 7 million tons of cargo on an annual 
        basis.\32\

   Total accumulated FDI in North Korea reached $1.475 billion 
        in 2010--according to the United Nations Conference on 
        Trade and Development.\33\

   Nearly $7 billion of additional FDI ``is in the works as 
        Chinese infrastructure companies plan new ports, 
        highways and power plants, according to Samsung 
        Economic Research Institute in Seoul.'' \34\

   As of 2010, 138 Chinese companies were registered as doing 
        business in North Korea.\35\


    The North Korea-China trade and economic interaction is 
augmented by a network of state trading companies in North 
Korea with affiliations to the Worker's Party of Korea, the 
Korean People's Army and North Korea's Cabinet. ``While 
financial sanctions continue to dominate (the) U.S. approach to 
dealing with (the) DPRK, PRC companies have been deepening 
their interactions with (the) DPRK state trading companies 
operating in China.'' \36\
    All of the indications about expanding Chinese investment 
in North Korea do not mask the enormous challenges to investors 
resulting from the lack of transparency and rule of law in 
North Korea. Actions by the North Korean government to revise 
investment law do not compensate for the challenges to 
investors posed by some North Korean officials or business 
people making their own rules and issuing new demands on an 
individual deal basis. There have been multiple reports in 2012 
of Chinese partners pulling out of deals due to friction with 
their North Korean business partners or government officials.


          North Korea does not have a good reputation in 
        honoring contracts, and surveys of Chinese investors 
        and traders with North Korea have documented both the 
        risks they face and mitigation strategies that have 
        been adopted by those choosing to invest and trade.\37\

 A Magnet for China--North Korea's Natural Resources--Mining and Rare 
                            Earth Materials

    North Korea has sizeable deposits of over 200 different 
minerals including coal, iron ore, magnesite, gold ore, zinc 
ore, copper ore, limestone, molybdenum and graphite. It is 
estimated that North Korea has up to 20 million tons of rare 
earth materials (rem) deposits.\38\
    Using 2008 as the base year, one estimate projected the 
potential value for key mineral deposits in the North at over 
$6 trillion. Exports of rare metals to China in 2009 stood at 
$16 million.\39\ A 2012 report suggests that North Korea's 
underground mineral resources amount to nearly $10 
trillion.\40\
    A November, 2011, North Korean science journal article 
identified the ``main industrial rare earth materials in North 
Korea as monazite, bastnasite, cerium pyrochlore and 
britholite, while secondary minerals include fergusonite, 
gadolinite and cerite. The genetic-petrographic types of rem 
deposits are deposits related to laurvikites, placer deposits, 
apogranite deposits and pegmatite deposits. Laurvikites and 
placer deposits are large-scale deposits and main industrial 
genetic types that are widely distributed.'' \41\
    As North Korea seeks outside assistance related to its 
mining projects China is an attractive partner for joint 
operations. ( North Korea's main gold mine in Unsan County, 
North Pyongyang province, was originally opened by a United 
States company in 1896.) \42\
    Forty-one percent of the Chinese companies registered as 
doing business in North Korea in 2010 extract coal, iron, zinc, 
nickel, gold and other minerals.\43\
    North Korea mining projects announced or underway include 
the following.


   Beijing Bao Wian Hung Chang International Trading Ltd and 
        North Korea reportedly signed a deal to develop three 
        mines in North Korea--one gold and two iron-ore.\44\

   In 2007, the DPRK Ministry of Mining Industries and the 
        Wanxiang Resources Limited Company of China established 
        Hyesan-China Joint Venture Mineral Company. Copper ore 
        production from the Hyesan Youth Mine goes to China. 
        North Korean and Chinese workers completed a 
        modernization project of the mine in September of 
        2011.\45\ The Hyesan Youth Mine reportedly has an 
        annual capacity of 50 to 70,000 tons of copper 
        concentrate that is expected to contain 20-30% copper 
        with all of it to be sold to China.\46\ Also, China has 
        reportedly invested $860 million in the mines under 
        this joint venture and holds a 51% stake.\47\

   Four Chinese corporations acquired 50-year development 
        rights to Musan Iron Mine according to the ROK's ``The 
        Institute for Far Eastern Studies.'' \48\ 120 tons of 
        iron ore are reportedly exported to China annually from 
        the Musan Mine which is believed to be the largest 
        outdoor mine in Asia.

   Chinese, South Korean and about 30 European companies have 
        invested in copper and gold mines in North Korea, as 
        well as factories producing medications and blue jeans, 
        and even Internet Service.\49\

             Unintended Consequences by and for North Korea

    North Korean leaders' steady refusal to give up their 
nuclear weapons program continually has diminished prospects 
for economic development assistance from international 
financial institutions, the United States and other countries. 
This economic estrangement, combined with South Korea's policy 
of disengagement from North Korea\50\ has resulted in the 
growing economic and other assistance from China.
    This scenario is not particularly discomforting to Chinese 
leaders who carefully managed the Six Party Talks process to 
maintain ``balance''--preserving regional stability. Chinese 
leaders have adeptly cajoled or pressed North Korean leaders 
according to the situation at hand--in response to Beijing's 
own ``loss of face'' when North Korea proceeded with a nuclear 
test, for instance, as a result of U.S. impatience with the 
North.
    As a former State Department official with long experience 
in Korea noted, ``The day China decides to break with the DPRK 
and the moment the PRC decides that a reunified Korean 
Peninsula (under Seoul's aegis) is more in its interest than a 
divided peninsula, that is when the process of Korea's national 
unification will begin in earnest, and there will be little the 
DPRK can do to sustain itself as an independent entity. It is 
for that reason that the North has been extremely cautious in 
its ties with Beijing.  . . . China is the DPRK's lifeline and 
insurance policy, which for a nationalistic North Korea is 
something that necessarily sticks in the craw, but it is a fact 
of life.''

    Is the Trend of North Korea becoming a Chinese protectorate and 
                     economic colony irreversible?

    Some would suggest that the present trend is not 
necessarily irreversible, as there ``is no love lost between 
Pyongyang and Beijing. The North Koreans are intensely 
nationalistic and do not want to become overly dependent on 
Beijing. And there are many in China who warn that North Korea 
is a strategic liability.'' \51\
    In addition, it is important to note that North-South 
relations impact the degree to which North Korea engages (or 
needs to engage) China. Will a new government in the Republic 
of Korea seek closer relations with the North?
    However, these points do not counter the reality of China's 
historic claims to the Korean Peninsula and that China views 
the North Korea as a ``strategic buffer against a unified, pro-
American Korea.'' \52\

                               In Summary

    In the event the unification of the Peninsula does proceed 
in some manner, and/or there is a collapse of the North Korean 
government unification will be complicated. Depending on the 
circumstances that prompt a move toward unification, would 
consensus be achieved among key players (including China, the 
U.S. and South Korea), to focus on ``securing stability on the 
Peninsula versus creating legitimacy?'' \53\
    The findings of the USC-CSIS interim study on Korean 
Peninsula unification were that ``for the Korean case, finding 
the balance between stability and legitimacy . . . becomes key. 
First-movers into a collapse of the DPRK may be trying to act 
in the name of efficiency, but will they necessarily be seen as 
legitimate? South Korea undeniably sees itself as the only 
legitimate party with the authority to act. But China is likely 
to focus legitimacy on a UN process that is protracted. China 
is therefore likely to focus on a longer time line for 
intervention and would only see a UN process as legitimate. 
This fits with the Chinese proclivity to be good at investing 
in the status quo rather than reacting to rapid change. The 
United States and the ROK, conversely, are better at responding 
to crises and trying to shape the outcome.'' \54\

                   Acknowledgements and appreciation

    Special thanks to those persons who assisted with the 
preparation of the report. They include Bradley O. Babson, SFRC 
colleague Jay Branegan, Victor Cha, Alexander Mansourov, Marcus 
Noland, John Park, Derek Scissors, and Scott Snyder.

    Also, deep appreciation is in order to Susan Lawrence at 
the Congressional Research Service and Yong Ho Kim of the 
Northeast Asia Foundation in Seoul.

    Bradley Babson, Chair of the DPRK Economic Forum at the 
U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS

    Jay Branegan, Senior Professional Staff Member, U.S. Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee

    Victor Cha, Senior Advisor and Korea Chair, CSIS

    Joseph DeTrani, former Special Envoy for the Six Party 
Talks with North Korea

    Ben Dolven, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional 
Research Service

    Nicole Dube, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee

    Daniel Gestal, Intern, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee

    Mr. Jimin Ha, Economic Researcher, Embassy of Korea, 
Washington, D.C.

    Stephan Haggard, Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor, 
University of California, San Diego Graduate School of 
International Relations and Pacific Studies

    Chris Hudnut, Intern, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

    Frank Jannuzi, former East Asia Foreign Policy Adviser to 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry

    Professor Chung Jae Jeong, former President of the 
Northeast Asian History Foundation.

    Yong Ho Kim, Director of the Office of Policy Planning, 
Northeast Asian History Foundation

    Karin Lee, Executive Director, National Committee on North 
Korea, Washington, D.C.

    Jongjoo Lee, Unification Attache, Embassy of the Republic 
of Korea, Washington, D.C.

    Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Ph.D., Visiting Scholar, U.S.-Korea 
Institute at SAIS, John Hopkins University

    Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional 
Research Service

    Nicholas McCormick, Staff Assistant, U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee

    Marcus Noland, Deputy Director, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Washington, D.C.

    Open Source Center, Washington, D.C.

    Han S. Park, Director of The Center for the Study of Global 
Issues (Globis), University Professor of Public and 
International Affairs, University of Georgia

    John Park, Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies 
Program, MIT

    Evans Revere, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings 
Institution

    Derek Scissors, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage 
Foundation

    Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korean Studies and 
Director, Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign 
Relations

    Henning Speck, First Secretary, Political Affairs, Embassy 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, Washington, D.C.

    David Straub, Associate Director, Korean Studies Program, 
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 
Stanford University

    Sue Terry, Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University 
Weatherhead East Asian Institute

    Alex Utsey, Staff Assistant, Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee

    Professor Donald S. Zagoria, Senior Vice President, 
National Committee on American Foreign Policy






--------------

Notes:

  \1\ ``The View from Pyongyang,'' Charles K. Armstrong, The New York 
        Times, August 15, 2012.

  \2\ ``Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, A Report 
        of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies,'' Bonnie S. Glaser 
        and Brittany Billingsley, Principal Authors, and Stephen 
        Haggard, Marcus Noland and Scott Snyder, Contributing Authors, 
        November 2012.

  \3\ Avoiding the Apocalypse, Marcus Noland, Institute for 
        International Economics, Washington, D.C. , June, 2000, p. 372.

  \4\ ``Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, Justice, Markets, 
        Health, Refugees and Civil-Military Transitions--An Interim 
        Report of the USC-CSIS Joint Study, The Korea Project: Planning 
        for the Long Term,'' Victor Cha and David Kang, Principal 
        Investigators, December, 2011.

  \5\ ``Spats Mar 20 Years of China Ties,'' The Korea Herald, August 8, 
        2012.

  \6\ Area Handbook for North Korea, Nena Vreeland, Rinn-Sup Shinn, 
        Peter Just, Philip W. Moelle, Foreign American Studies of the 
        American University, 1976, p. 206.

  \7\ ``China's Perspective on Historical Borders on the Korean 
        Peninsula,'' Congressional Research Service, Susan V. Lawrence, 
        Specialist in Asian Affairs, March 9, 2011.

  \8\ Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Ph.D., Visiting Scholar, U.S.-Korea 
        Institute at SAIS, John Hopkins University.

  \9\ ``Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, A Report 
        of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies,'' Bonnie S. Glaser 
        and Brittany Billinglsey, Principal Authors; Stephan Haggard, 
        Marcus Noland and Scott Snyder, Contributing Authors, November 
        2012.

 \10\ Ibid.

 \11\ Alliance Diversification & the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security 
        Relationship, Charles M. Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis, James L. 
        Scoff and Toshi Yoshihara, The Institute for Foreign Policy 
        Analysis, Inc., p. 137

 \12\ China's Rise and the Two Koreas, Scott Snyder, Lynee Rienner, 
        Publishers, London, 2009, p. 146

 \13\ ``South-North Relations: Present Situation and Future Challenges 
        and Opportunities,'' Bradley O. Babson (A paper prepared for 
        presentation at the IGE/KEXIM/KDI/PIEE Conference on 
        Unification and the Korean Economy, October 22, 2012).

 \14\ ``Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New Insights 
        into DPRK Regime Dynamics,'' presentation by John S. Park, 
        Ph.D., Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies Program, 
        MIT Associate, Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy 
        School, November 27, 2012.

 \15\ Derek Scissors, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation.

 \16\ ``Will North Korea's Plans for Foreign Investment Make it a More 
        Prosperous Nation?''; Bradley O. Babson, 38 North, May 2, 2012.

 \17\ Ibid.

 \18\ ``North Korea-China Special Economic Zones,'' East Asia Forum, 
        Andrei Landov, July 14, 2011.

 \19\ ``Tending a Small Patch of Capitalism in North Korea,'' The New 
        York Times, Edward Wong, October 12, 2011.

 \20\ ``Chinese Firm to Invest in North Korea,'' Jay Solomon and Jeremy 
        Page, The Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2011.

 \21\ ``The Honeymoon Period is Over,'' CHOSON EXCHANGE, Andray 
        Abrahamian, August, 2012.

 \22\ ``China Eyes Big Investment Opportunities in North Korea,'' 
        Economic Observer, Chen Young, November 6, 2012.

 \23\ Bradley Babson, Chair of the DPRK Economic Forum at the U.S.-
        Korea Institute at SAIS.

 \24\ ``China's Cheonan Dilemma,'' Drew Thompson, Foreign Policy, June 
        7, 2010.

 \25\ ``North Korean Economy: Can They `Open the Door to Being a Strong 
        and Prosperous Great Power,' '' Jin Meihua, Beijing Shijie 
        Zhishi, June 16, 2012.

 \26\ ``North Korean Minders Endure Chinese Invasion,'' Asia Times 
        Online, Yvonne Su, November 8, 2012.

 \27\ ``Garment Production in North Korea,'' 38 North, Paul Tija, 
        August 30, 2012.

 \28\ John Park, Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies 
        Program, MIT, email content to Keith Luse, August 17, 2012.

 \29\ ``Garment Production in North Korea,'' 38 North, Paul Tija, 
        August 30, 2012.

 \30\ ``145 North Korean Laborers Work at Garment Factory at China 
        Border Town,'' Kyodo News article as appeared in The Mainichi, 
        July 31, 2012. Also, ``120,000 North Koreans to work in 
        China,'' China Daily Mail, August 2, 2012.

 \31\ ``North Korea Keeps Sending More Workers to Kaesong Complex,'' 
        Chosun Ilbo, May 17, 2011.

 \32\ ``China Gains Use of Another N. Korean Port,'' Chosun Ilbo, 
        September 11, 2012.

 \33\ ``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?''; Dexter Roberts, 
        Bloomberg Businessweek, January 19, 2012.

 \34\ Ibid.

 \35\ ``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?,'' Dexter Roberts, 
        Bloomberg Businessweek, January 19, 2012.

 \36\ ``Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New Insights 
        into DPRK Regime Dynamics,'' John S. Park, Ph.D., Stanton 
        Junior Faculty Fellow, Security Studies Program, MIT Associate, 
        Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy School, November 27, 
        2012.

 \37\ ``Will North Korea's Plans for Foreign Investment Make it a More 
        Prosperous Nation?''; Bradley O. Babson, 38 North, May 2, 
        2012--``Silent Partners: Chinese Joint Ventures in North 
        Korea,'' Drew Thompson, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, February 
        2012; and Stephen Haggard, Jennifer Lee and Marcus Noland, 
        ``Integration in the Absence of Institutions: China-North Korea 
        Border Exchange,'' Working Paper 11-13, Peterson Institute for 
        International Economics, August, 2011.

 \38\ ``Could North Korea Be the Next Rare Earth Powerhouse?''; Rare 
        Earth Investing News, Adam Currie, August 20, 2012.

 \39\ Ibid.

 \40\ ``North Korea's Mineral Resources Potentially Worth $9.7 
        Trillion,'' The Korea Times, August 26, 2012.

 \41\ ``Main Rare-Earth Element Mineral of Our Country and Its 
        Metallogeny,'' Kim Il-so'ng Chonghap Taehak Hakpo: Chayo'n 
        Kwahak, Han Ryong-ryo'n and Ryang Mun-hyon, November 20, 2011.

 \42\ ``North Korea's Golden Path to Security,'' Asia Times Online, 
        Bertil Lintner, January 18, 2007.

 \43\ ``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?''; Dexter Roberts, 
        Bloomberg Businessweek, January 19, 2012.

 \44\ ``North Korea, China Agree to Jointly Develop Three Mines in 
        North Korea,'' Yonhap, August 9, 2012; and ``North Korea Deal 
        to Allow Chinese Company to Develop 3 Mines,'' ROK Daily, 
        August 10, 2012.

 \45\ ``Work on Border Bridge Source of Conflict Between PRC, DPRK,'' 
        ROK Online Daily, November 1, 2011, and ``Modernization Project 
        and Joint Venture Company Go Operational,'' KCNA, September 19, 
        2011.

 \46\ ``China-N.Korean JV starts production at Copper Mine,'' Reuters, 
        September 20, 2011.

 \47\ ``North Korea, China Agree to Jointly Develop Three Mines in 
        North Korea,'' Yonhap, August 9, 2012.

 \48\ ``Increase in DPRK's Mineral Resources Exports to China Expected 
        Again this Year,'' The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 
        February 24, 2011.

 \49\ ``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?,'' Bloomberg Business 
        Week, Dexter Roberts, January 19, 2012.

 \50\ ``Changes in the North Korean Economy in the Next 5-10 Years,'' 
        Bradley O. Babson, October 18, 2012.

 \51\ Professor Donald S. Zagoria, Senior Vice President, National 
        Committee on American Foreign Policy.

 \52\ Ibid.

 \53\ ``Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, An Interim Report 
        of the USC-CSIS Joint Study, The Korea Project: Planning for 
        the Long Term,'' pp. 7,8, December 2011, Victor Cha and David 
        Kang, Principal Investigators.

 \54\ Ibid.
?

      

=======================================================================


                          A P P E N D I X E S

=======================================================================

                       APPENDIX I.--BIBLIOGRAPHY

    Alliance Diversification & the Future of the U.S.-Korean 
Security Relationship, Charles M. Perry, Jacquelyn K. Davis, 
James L. Schoff, and Toshi Yoshihara, The Institute for Foreign 
Policy Analysis, Inc.,221 pp.

    Area Handbook for North Korea, 1969, Rinn-Sup Shinn, 
Foreign Area Studies, The American University, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 481 pp.

    Area Handbook for North Korea, 1976, Rinn-Sup Shinn, Nena 
Vreeland, Peter Just, Phillip W. Moeller, Foreign Area Studies, 
The American University, U.S. Government Printing Office, 394 
pp.

    Avoiding the Apocalypse, Marcus Noland, Institute for 
International Economics, Washington, D.C., June, 2000.

    ``North Korean Economy: Can They Open the Door to Being a 
Strong and Prosperous Great Power", Jin Meihua, Beijing "Shijie 
Zhishi", June 16, 2012.

    ``Challenges for Korean Unification Planning, An Interim 
Report of the USC-CSIS Joint Study, The Korea Project: Planning 
for the Long Term", pp. 7 and 8, Victor Cha and David Kang, 
Principal Investigators.

    ``Changes in the North Korean Economy in the Next 5-10 
Years", Bradley O. Babson, October 18, 2012.

    ``China Eyes Big Investment Opportunities in North Korea", 
`Economic Observer', Chen Young, November 6, 2012.

    ``China Gains Use of Another North Korean Port", `Chosun 
Ilbo', September 11, 2012.

    ``China-North Korea Relations", Dick K. Nanto, Specialist 
in Industry and Trade; Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian 
Affairs, "Congressional Research Service", December 28, 2010.

    ``China-North Korean JV Starts Production at Copper Mine", 
`Reuters', September 20, 2011.

    ``China Offers North Korea security from any US Attack", 
Ching Cheong, The Straits Times Interactive, May 3, 2003.

    ``China's Perspective on Historical Borders on the Korean 
Peninsula,'' Congressional Research Service, Susan V. Lawrence, 
Specialist in Asian Affairs, March 9, 2011.

    China's Rise and the Two Koreas, Scott Snyder, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 2009.

    ``China's North Korea Policy, Assessing Interests and 
Influences", Bates Gill, United States Institute of Peace 
Special Report, July, 2011.

    ``Chinese Firm to Invest in North Korea", `The Wall Street 
Journal', Jay Solomon and Jeremy Page, January 19, 2011.

    ``Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments 
in North Korea", Daniel Gearin, Research Fellow, U.S. - China 
Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Backgrounder, 
October 20, 2010.

    Cold War International History Project -BULLETIN-New 
Evidence on North Korea, Christian Friedrich Ostermann, Editor; 
Kathryn Weathersby, Co-Editor, Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, Winter 2003-Spring 2004.

    ``Could North Korea Be the Next Rare Earth Powerhouse?", 
`Rare Earth Investing News', Adam Currie, August 20, 2012.

    Do You Know About Korea? Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, Pyongyang, 1989.

    ``Garment Production in North Korea", '38 North', Paul 
Tija, August 30, 2012.

    ``Increase in DPRK's Mineral Resources Exports to China 
Expected Again this Year", The Institute for Far Eastern 
Studies, February 24, 2011.

    ``Integration in the Absence of Institutions: China-North 
Korea Border Exchange", Working Paper 11-13, Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, Stephen Haggard, Jennifer Lee and 
Marcus Noland, August, 2011.

    ``International Workshop on Foreign Relations of the Two 
Koreas during the Cold War Era", The Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars and The Institute for Far 
Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, May 11, 2006, Seoul.

    Korean Unification and the Neighboring Powers, KINU 
Unification Forum 2010, Choi Jinwook, Editor, NEULPUMPLUS, 
2011.

    ``Main Rare Earth Element Minerals of our Country and its 
Metallogeny", `Kim Il-so'ng Chonghap Taehak Hapko: Chayo'n 
Kwahak', Han Ryong-ryo'n and Ryang Mun-hyo'n, November 20, 
2011.

    ``Modernization Project and Joint Venture Company Go 
Operational", `KCNA', September 19, 2011.

    ``North Korea, China Agree to Jointly Develop Three Mines 
in North Korea", `Yonhap', August 9, 2012.

    ``North Korea - China Special Economic Zones", `East Asia 
Forum', Andrei Lankov, July 14, 2011.

    ``North Korea Deal to Allow Chinese Company to Develop 3 
Mines", `ROK Daily', August 10, 2012.

    North Korea International Documentation Project, The 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, 
D.C..

    ``North Korea Keeps Sending More Workers to Kaesong 
Complex", `Chosun Ilbo', May 17, 2011.

    ``North Korea, New Land of Opportunity?", `Bloomberg 
Businessweek', January 19, 2012.

    ``North Korean Economy: Can They `Open the Door to Being a 
Strong and Prosperous Great Power'", `Beijing Shijie Zhisi', 
Jim Meihua, June 16, 2012.

    ``North Korean Minders Endure Chinese Invasion", `Asia 
Times Online', Yvonne Su, November 8, 2012.

    ``North Korea's Golden Path to Security", `Asia Times 
Online', Bertil Lintner, January 18, 2007.

    ``North Korea's Growing Trade Dependency on China: Mixed 
Strategic Implications", Scott A. Snyder, "Asia Unbound", 
Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2012.

    ``North Korea's Mineral Resources Potentially Worth $9.7 
Trillion", The Korea Times, August 26, 2012.

    ``Path Emergence on the Korean Peninsula: From Division to 
Unification", Ki-Joon Hong, "Pacific Focus, The Journal of 
International Studies", Inha University, 2012.

    ``Prospects from Korean Unification", Colonel, Australian 
Army David Coghlan, Strategic Studies Institute, United States 
Army War College, April, 2008.

    ``Reading Current & Future Commercial Tea Leaves: New 
Insights into DPRK Regime Dynamics", John S. Park, Ph.D., 
Harvard Kennedy School of Government, November 27, 2012.

    Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation, Jeffrey 
Knopf, Editor, Stanford Security Studies, 2012.

    ``Silent Partners, Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea", 
U.S. - Korea Institute at SAIS, Drew Thompson, February, 2011, 


    ``South-North Relations: Present Situation and Future 
Challenges and Opportunities,'' Bradley O. Babson, ``A paper 
prepared for presentation at the IGE/KEXIM/KDI/PIEE Conference 
on Unification and the Korean Economy,'' October 22, 2012.

    ``Spats Mar 20 Years of China Ties,'' The Korea Herald, 
August 8, 2012.

    ``Status and Future of the North Korean Minerals Sector,'' 
Edward Yoon, Nautilus Institute, January 6, 2011.

    ``Tending a Small Patch of Capitalism in North Korea,'' The 
New York Times, Edward Wong, October 12, 2011.

    ``The Honeymoon Period is Over,'' A Short Report on Rason 
Special Economic Zone, Andray Abrahamian, CHOSUN EXCHANGE, 
August, 2012.

    The Impossible State, North Korea, Past and Future, Victor 
Cha, Harper Collins Publishers, 2012.

    The Peninsula Question, A Chronicle of the Second Korean 
Nuclear Crisis, Yoichi Funabashi, The Brookings Institution, 
2007.

    The United States and The Korean Problem, Documents 1943-
1953, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Alexander Wiley, 
Chairman, 1953, AMS Press, New York.

    ``The View from Pyongyang,'' The New York Times, Charles K. 
Armstrong, August 15, 2012.

    Triad Track-II Seminar on Peace Building and Reintegration 
of the Korean Peninsula, Center for the Study of Global Issues, 
School of Public and International Affairs, The University of 
Georgia, October 17-20, 2011.

    US-China Relations and Korean Unification, KINU Unification 
Forum 2011, Choi Jinwook, Korea Institute for National 
Unification, 2011.

    ``USGS 2007 Minerals Yearbook for North Korea,'' U.S. 
Geological Survey, December, 2009.

    U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, Council on Foreign 
Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 64, Charles L. 
Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Hairs, Scott A. Snyder, 
Project Director, 2010, 85 pp.

    ``Will North Korean's Plans for Foreign Investment Make it 
a More Prosperous Nation?'', 38 North, Bradley O. Babson, May 
2, 2012.

    ``Work on Border Bridge Source of Conflict Between PRC, 
DPRK,'' ROK Online Daily, November 1, 2011.
  APPENDIX II.--CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MEMORANDUM TO SENATOR 
LUGAR REGARDING CHINA'S PERSPECTIVE ON HISTORICAL BORDERS ON THE KOREAN 
                               PENINSULA

                                                      March 9, 2012
    This memo responds to your request for information about 
areas of the present-day Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) and Republic of Korea (ROK) that the People's Republic 
of China (PRC) considers to have once been parts of China. Per 
your request, the memo includes detailed discussion of Chinese 
maps showing those claims and also examines other state-
supported PRC scholarship on this subject. CRS was asked only 
to summarize PRC state-supported scholarship, so this memo does 
not reflect scholarship by experts from the ROK, DPRK or other 
countries.
    This memo provides both Chinese and Korean names for 
ancient kingdoms and certain place names, with the Chinese 
listed first because of the memo's focus on PRC claims.

                                Overview

    Since the early years of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC), the Chinese government has devoted significant resources 
to research on China's historic borders. In promoting such 
research, the Chinese government has appeared to be driven by 
several motivations:


   The Chinese government sees the research as contributing to 
        national unity and the ``stability and development of 
        China's border areas.'' With non-Han Chinese ethnic 
        minorities occupying large swathes of territory within 
        the borders of the PRC, the government appears to 
        believe that research showing border areas as 
        historically part of China can help solidify those 
        areas' sense of belonging to the PRC, and undermine any 
        calls for such areas to break away from the PRC.

   The Chinese government seeks to amass historic evidence to 
        rebuff any claims by other nations to what the PRC 
        considers to be its territory. For Chinese 
        policymakers, memories remain fresh of Japan's efforts 
        to justify its invasion of China in the first half of 
        the 20th century on the basis, in part, of claims to 
        ancient kingdoms. China has commissioned historical 
        research to defend all its sovereignty claims and has 
        deployed historians to help make the historical case 
        for its sovereignty over contested territory in such 
        places as the South China Sea.

   The government seeks to foster patriotism by highlighting 
        what many in China see as the indignities that a weak 
        China suffered in the 19th and 20th centuries at the 
        hands of imperialist powers, and contrasting those 
        humiliations with what the PRC portrays as its vigorous 
        defense of Chinese territorial integrity and 
        sovereignty. The indignities highlighted include 
        ``unequal treaties'' that forced China to cede 
        territory and acquiesce to foreign exploitation of 
        Chinese resources.


    This memo presents PRC views about the history of the 
Chinese land border with North Korea. It does so by examining 
three significant works of state-sponsored PRC scholarship 
chronicling China's historic borders. The first work of PRC 
scholarship examined is an eight-volume set of maps, published 
in the 1980s as The Historical Atlas of China. Thirty-nine maps 
from the Atlas, depicting areas of the Korean peninsula over 
the course of a millennium and a half, are discussed. The 
second work of PRC scholarship examined is a 67-page chapter on 
the Chinese-Korean border included in History of China's Modern 
Borders, a two-volume study charting the history of China's 
land and maritime borders. It was published in 2006. The third 
work examined is an essay in a 2003 volume, Research on China's 
Northeast Borderland, published by the Northeast Project, a 
collaboration among the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and 
the Communist Party Committees of three provinces. The essay, 
``Certain Issues in Gaogouli Research,'' explores the political 
motivation for Chinese scholarship on an ancient kingdom known 
in Chinese as Gaogouli and in Korean as Koguryo. The Koguryo 
kingdom once straddled the present day Chinese-North Korean 
border. Chinese scholars associated with the Northeast Project 
consider the kingdom to have been Chinese; Koreans consider it 
to have been Korean.
    In summary, the first PRC work examined, The Historical 
Atlas of China, depicts Chinese territory as having once 
extended along the western half of the Korean peninsula all the 
way to the peninsula's southern tip. It also presents as 
historically parts of China a number of ancient kingdoms that 
many Koreans consider to have been Korean. Such an approach has 
raised concerns among China's neighbors that China may be 
seeking to rob them of their history. China's historical claims 
have also raised fears among some of China's neighbors that 
China may be seeking to lay the groundwork for possible future 
territorial claims on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere. China 
shares land borders with 14 countries. Listed by geographic 
location, they are North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Bhutan, 
Nepal, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia. In addition, China claims 
maritime territory that is also claimed by one or more of eight 
governments: Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the 
Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
    The opening chapter of the second PRC work examined, the 
History of China's Modern Borders, presents the view that the 
contours of the current Chinese-North Korean border were 
largely settled in the 15th century, during the Ming Dynasty, 
when Chinese and Korean rulers agreed that the Tumen/Tuman and 
Yalu/Amnok Rivers should form their border. It describes 
disagreement, however, between China and Korea over where the 
border lies in the short stretch of territory between the 
sources of the two rivers. The chapter also covers what the 
author describes as China's uphill struggles in the late 19th 
century and early 20th century to persuade Korea, Japan, and 
Russia to accept and respect the Tumen/Tuman River and Yalu/
Amnok River borders. History of China's Modern Borders suggests 
a strong current Chinese commitment to the Tumen/Tuman and 
Yalu/Amnok River borders, but suggests some Chinese 
dissatisfaction about the status of the border with North Korea 
in the territory between the two rivers.
    The third PRC work examined, the essay in Research on 
China's Northeast Borderland on the political motivations for 
China's research on the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom, portrays 
China's research as primarily defensive in nature, intended to 
fend off potential efforts by North Korea to claim territory in 
the present PRC. The author appears to undercut his argument 
that the research is defensive, however, when he urges Chinese 
scholars to document Chinese claims to other ancient kingdoms 
on the Korean Peninsula, too, including those kingdoms that 
occupied the southern end of the peninsula, far from the 
current Chinese-North Korean border.
    Complicating analysis of this state-supported research on 
China's historical borders is the fact that authoritative 
sources do not always agree. While the essayist on the 
Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom insists that the kingdom was always 
Chinese, for example, The Historical Atlas of China depicts the 
kingdom, in different periods, as having been under the 
jurisdiction of the central Chinese regime, having been a 
Chinese border minority-controlled territory, and having been 
an independent, non-Chinese kingdom.

              1. The Historical Atlas of China (1982-1987)

    In 1954, just five years after the Communist Party took 
power in China, the official Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) 
launched a major project to update maps depicting Chinese 
territory over the centuries. The project ultimately lasted 
three decades and involved more than 100 scholars from a dozen 
institutions. In the project's later years, sponsorship shifted 
from one official research institution, CAS, to another, the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The project 
culminated in the publication of an eight-volume atlas set, The 
Historical Atlas of China, the last volume of which was 
released in 1987. China's premier modern cartographer, Tan 
Qixiang, served as the chief editor for all eight volumes, as 
well as for The Concise Historical Atlas of China, based on the 
eight volume set and published in 1991.\1\ The Historical Atlas 
of China and The Concise Historical Atlas of China, both 
published by the official Cartographic Publishing House, are 
considered the most authoritative maps of China's historical 
borders yet produced in the People's Republic of China.
    The scope of The Historical Atlas of China is considerably 
broader than the most ambitious previous effort to compile 
historical maps of China, undertaken by the celebrated Qing 
Dynasty cartographer Yang Shoujing. In a foreword to the first 
volume of The Historical Atlas of China, Chief Editor Tan notes 
that Yang's maps, ``were limited to areas under the direct 
jurisdiction of central China regimes, and what they actually 
gave was an incomplete picture even of the central China 
regimes.'' In contrast, Tan explains, the compilers of the PRC-
era The Historical Atlas of China embarked on their work under 
the principle that, ``our great motherland has been the joint 
creation by dozens of nationalities, of which all the national 
minorities constitute an inseparable part of China no matter 
what historical period they existed in and what form of regime 
they established, independent or in vassalage to the existing 
central China regime. The scope and range our maps cover should 
include all their distribution areas and the territories of the 
regimes they founded.'' \2\
    Much of the controversy that has attended Chinese 
scholarship on China's historical borders stems from this 
decision to characterize as part of China all territory once 
occupied by ethnic minorities that are now part of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), even if those ethnic minorities' 
kingdoms were once independent. Visually, The Historical Atlas 
of China distinguishes between the territory of ``the central 
China administration'' and areas occupied by ``China's border 
minorities'' by depicting them in different colors. The 
compilers of The Historical Atlas of China make clear, however, 
that they consider both categories of territory to make up the 
contours of ``China'' in each historical period.
The Historical Atlas of China's Treatment of the Korean Peninsula
    Of the 304 maps in The Historical Atlas of China, several 
dozen include the Korean Peninsula. The maps show Chinese 
territory extending the furthest south on the peninsula in the 
Tang Dynasty (618-906). A map for 669 AD, after the Tang allied 
with the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom to defeat the Gaogouli/Koguryo 
Kingdom, shows Tang territory extending along the west side of 
the peninsula to the peninsula's far southern tip. (The Xinluo/
Silla Kingdom is shown controlling the eastern side of the 
peninsula.)
    For many hundreds of years, the maps show Chinese territory 
covering all or part of the northern half of the peninsula, to 
between approximately 37 and 40 degrees north latitude. The 
maps indicate that today's border between China and the DPRK, 
which follows the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, was 
largely established as the border between China and Korea by 
1433, during the Ming Dynasty.
    A narrative of the territorial shifts over the centuries, 
as depicted by the maps in The Historical Atlas of China, 
follows below. The maps are discussed chronologically, from 
earliest history to most recent. CRS numbering is followed, in 
parentheses, by location of the maps in the Atlas.
    Maps 1 and 2 (Vol. I, Maps 31-32 and 41-42), from the 
Warring States Period (approx. B.C. 475-B.C. 221), show the 
course of a series of stone and earthen fortifications that 
later came to be considered part of the Great Wall of China. 
The maps show the fortifications extending well south of the 
Yalu/Amnok River into the current territory of the DPRK.
    Maps 3 and 4 (Vol. II, Maps 3-4 and 9-10) show the first 
borders of a central Chinese administration, the Qin Dynasty 
(B.C. 221-B.C. 206 BC). The maps show the fortifications 
extending still further south, to approximately 39 degrees 
north latitude (also known as the 39th parallel), stopping just 
short of today's Pyongyang. The maps indicate that the Qin 
state encompassed the full area inside the fortifications. The 
Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is listed on the map as Chinese border 
minority territory, although the map does not mark its borders.
    Maps 5 and 6 (Vol. II, Maps 13-14 and 27-28), depicting the 
Western Han Dynasty (B.C. 206-A.D. 8), show the territory of 
the central Western Han state extending down the full width of 
the peninsula to south of the 38th parallel, just north of 
today's Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is depicted as part 
of the central Western Han state, with Map 6 showing the 
kingdom's borders within the central Western Han state. In 
yellow shading, map 5 shows much of today's Northeast China, 
including the modern Chinese cities of Changchun, Harbin, and 
Yanji, as occupied by Chinese border minorities, outside of the 
borders of the central Chinese administration.
    Maps 7 and 8 (Vol. II, Maps 40-41 and 61-62), depicting the 
Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220), show the central Eastern Han 
state occupying the western part of the Korean peninsula to 
just south of the 38th parallel. The eastern boundary of the 
Eastern Han's territory on the peninsula is depicted as being 
at roughly 127 degrees east longitude. In these maps, the 
Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is again depicted as outside the 
borders of the central Chinese administration. The border 
between the Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom and a more northerly 
kingdom, known in Chinese as Fuyu and in Korean as Puyo, is not 
marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as occupied by Chinese 
border minorities.
    In Maps 9 and 10 (Vol. III, Maps 3-4 and 13-14), which 
depict China's borders in A.D. 262, during the Three Kingdoms 
Period, the Wei Kingdom's territory is shown as extending 
across the full width of the Korean Peninsula down to below the 
38th parallel. Gaogouli/Koguryo is depicted as Chinese border 
minority territory just outside the territory of the Wei 
Kingdom. As before, the border between the Gaogouli/Koguryo and 
Fuyu/ Puyo Kingdoms is not marked, but both kingdoms are 
depicted as the territory of Chinese border minorities. Maps 11 
and 12 (Vol. III, Maps 33-34 and 41-42), show China's borders 
19 years later, in 281, and depict the borders on the Korean 
Peninsula as largely unchanged.
    Map 13 (Vol. IV, Map 3-4) shows China's borders in the year 
382, during the turbulent Eastern Jin and 16 Kingdoms Period. 
The territory of the Former Qin rulers, shown in bright yellow, 
is depicted as extending only a little east of today's Chinese 
border city of Dandong. The area controlled by Chinese border 
minorities is, however, shown in mustard yellow as extending 
down the peninsula to an east-west line that includes today's 
Seoul. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is shown as part of this 
Chinese border minority territory.
    Maps 14 through 19 (Vol. IV, Maps 17-18, 19-20, 21-22, and 
23-24, and Vol. V, Maps 3-4 and 19-20), showing China's borders 
in 449, 497, 546, 572, and 612, show a major retreat of Chinese 
control on the Korean Peninsula. In these maps, the Gaogouli/
Koguryo Kingdom is depicted as being in control of much of the 
peninsula and, significantly, as being non-Chinese. Non-Chinese 
territory under Koguryo control is shown as extending as far 
north as the current Chinese city of Changchun.
    Map 20 (Vol. V, Map 32-33), depicting the situation in 669, 
during the Tang Dynasty, shows a dramatic territorial shift. 
After the Tang allied with the kingdom of Xinluo/Silla to 
defeat the Gaogouli/Koguryo and Baiji/Paekche kingdoms, the map 
shows Tang territory extending all the way to the southern tip 
of the Korean Peninsula, with Xinluo/Silla-controlled territory 
on the east side of the peninsula depicted as non-Chinese. This 
was the only time over the centuries that the maps show Chinese 
territory extending so far south on the peninsula.
    Maps 21 and 22 (Vol. V, Maps 34-35 and 50-51) show a very 
different situation just 72 years later, in 741. Here, the Tang 
Dynasty's territory has shrunk back to north of what is now 
known in Chinese as the Datong Jiang, and in Korean as the 
Taedong River, leaving today's Pyongyang in Chinese Tang 
Dynasty territory. The Korean peninsula south of that line is 
shown to be the non-Chinese territory of the Xinluo/Silla.
    Map 23 (Vol. V, Map 36-37), showing the situation in 820, 
depicts Tang territory on the peninsula as having receded 
further, to include only a small portion of the northwest side 
of the peninsula, including Pyongyang. The map shows the 
current Chinese cities of Dandong and Shenyang as being part of 
central Tang Dynasty territory, but shows today's Chinese 
cities of Changchun and Yanji and areas north as being the 
territory of Chinese border minorities.
    Map 24 (Vol. V, Map 82-83) shows the situation in 943, 
during the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period. It depicts 
the Liao Dynasty, also known as the Khitan Empire after its 
ethnic-Khitan founders, as controlling a broad swath of 
territory north of the Korean Peninsula. The Liao's border with 
Korea is depicted as being well south of the Yalu/Amnok and 
Tumen/Tuman Rivers, following a curved line whose northern tip 
is just below the 40th parallel. The peninsula south of that 
line is shown as non-Chinese Gaoli/Koryo territory.
    Maps 25 through 29 (Vol. VI, Maps 3-4, 8-9, 42-43, 48-49, 
and 44-45), covering the years 1111, 1142, 1189, and 1208, show 
the Korean peninsula as non-Chinese territory under Gaoli/ 
Koryo rule up to a line just north of the 40th parallel.
    Map 30 (Vol. VII, Map 3-4), depicting the situation in 
1280, during the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty, shows the Chinese 
border further south, just north of Kaesong.
    Maps 31 and 32 (Vol. VII, Maps 5-6 and 13-14), showing the 
situation in 1330, still during the Yuan Dynasty, depict the 
border as having crept north again, to just above the 40th 
parallel on the west, though Yuan Dynasty territory is shown 
extending below the 40th parallel on the east.
    Maps 33-38 (Vol. VII, Maps 40-41, 42-43, and Vol. VIII, 
Maps 10-11, 3-4, 12-13, and 5-6), showing the years 1433, 1582, 
1820, and 1908, depict Chinese territory as ending at the Yalu/
Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, the rivers that form all but a 
small portion of the modern border between China and North 
Korea.
    Vol. VII, Map 1-2, the final map in the set, shows the 
territory of the People's Republic of China as of 1982.

                 Continuity with the Republic of China

    To probe whether The Historical Atlas of China represented 
a departure from claims made by the PRC's predecessor regime, 
the Republic of China (ROC), CRS examined a set of four maps 
commissioned by the ROC's Ministry of Education and printed in 
1947 for use in Chinese classrooms.\3\ The maps provide a crude 
snapshot of the territory ascribed to various Chinese dynasties 
and show a significant degree of continuity between Chinese 
claims during the PRC and ROC eras. The first map, depicting 
the territory of China's Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 AD), shows 
the Han border extending to a line south of present-day Seoul. 
The second map, depicting the territory of the Chinese Tang 
Dynasty (618-907), shows Chinese control extending down the 
west side of the Korean Peninsula to the peninsula's southern 
tip. The third map, showing the territory of the Yuan Dynasty 
(1271-1368), depicts the Yuan border extending to a line south 
of Pyongyang and north of Kaesong. The final map, depicting the 
territory of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), shows the Chinese 
border with the DPRK largely as it is today.

              2. History of China's Modern Borders (2006)

    In 1983, as work on the Historical Atlas of China was 
winding down, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
established a new research center focused on study of China's 
historical borders, the Research Center for Chinese Borderland 
History and Geography (Zhongguo Bianjiang Shi Di Yanjiu 
Zhongxin). The center's Chinese-language website portrays the 
center's goals as including ``to inherit and carry forward the 
great heritage of China's borderland history and geography and 
the patriotic tradition of the Chinese peoples,'' and to ``make 
contributions to the safeguarding of national unity and the 
stability and development of China's border areas.'' \4\
    According to the Research Center's website, the center 
currently has 32 staff and is divided into several research 
sections, including sections focused on China's northeast and 
northern borders, its northwestern borders, its southwestern 
and maritime borders, and ``theoretical'' questions related to 
borders. The center has also established ``work stations'' in 
Yunnan Province (which borders Vietnam, Laos, and Burma), 
China's northeast (which borders North Korea and Russia), 
Xinjiang (which borders Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and areas of Kashmir controlled by 
Pakistan and India), and Guangxi (which borders Vietnam). In 
addition, the center oversees an ``Information Center on 
China's History and Culture,'' a ``Research Center on 
Xinjiang's Development,'' and a ``Research Base on Conditions 
along China's Northeast Border.''
    In 2007, the Research Center produced a 1,228-page two-
volume study charting the history of all China's land and 
maritime borders, History of China's Modern Borders. \5\ It is 
in some ways the textual counterpart to The Historical Atlas of 
China. The study was originally launched as a high profile 
project for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences during the 
1986-1990 Seventh Five-Year Plan, and took two decades to 
complete.\6\ A top UK-based expert on the relationship between 
Chinese maps and national identity refers to it as a 
``standard-setting'' work.\7\
    In a preface, the chief editor of History of China's Modern 
Borders, Lu Yiran, describes the study as being intended to 
``make people understand how China's modern borders were 
formed, how the imperialist powers cut up and occupied China's 
territory, how the corrupt Chinese [Qing Dynasty] government 
was forced to conclude and sign unequal treaties, and how the 
Chinese people struggled to safeguard the country's territory 
and sovereignty.'' Lu wrote that a major goal for the book was 
``to sum up lessons from historical experiences.'' \8\
Treatment of the Chinese-Korean Border in History of China's Modern 
        Borders
    The opening chapter in History of China's Modern Borders is 
a 67-page exposition on the Chinese-Korean border, written by 
Yang Zhaoquan, a researcher with the Korean Studies Institute 
of the Jilin Province Academy of Social Sciences.\9\ The 
chapter begins in 668, the year that the Chinese Tang Dynasty 
allied with the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom to defeat the Gaogouli/
Koguryo Kingdom. It describes how the Tang established 
administrative control over the area previously occupied by the 
Gaogouli/Koguryo, and made Pyongyang its local capital. After 
the alliance between the Tang and the Xinluo/Silla broke down, 
the chapter relates that the Tang was forced in 676 to move its 
local capital north. By 735, the Tang was forced to cede all 
territory south of the Datong/Taedong River to the Xinluo/
Silla. The border moved north again some 200 years later, after 
the collapse of the Tang in 907 and the Xinluo/Silla in 936. 
The chapter records the border as following its present course, 
along the Yalu/Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, as of 1440, during 
the Chinese Ming Dynasty.
    Yang nonetheless devotes considerable space to 
controversies over the border that arose in later centuries. In 
the 18th century, the Chinese and Korean governments found 
themselves at odds over the course of the border in the short 
stretch of territory between the starting points of the Yalu/
Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, both of which originate in 
streams that flow from the Changbai Mountains. Yang writes that 
in 1712, the Qing Emperor Kangxi sent a local official to 
inspect the area in the company of a Korean official. They 
placed a boundary marker between the rivers, on a ridge near 
the peak of what China calls Xiao Bai Shan and Koreans call 
Mount Sobaek in the Changbai Mountains. Characters carved on 
the marker noted that the Yalu/Amnok River lay to the marker's 
west and the Tumen/Tuman River to its east. Yang relates, 
however, that in 1885, when Chinese Qing Dynasty officials 
attempted to work with Korean officials to demarcate the 
border, teams sent to scout for the marker found it in a 
different spot. The Qing government charged that it had been 
intentionally moved in order to influence decisions about which 
of the streams that feed the Yalu/Amnok and the Tumen/Tuman 
Rivers should be considered their ``true'' headwater streams 
for boundary purposes.
    China's position, according to Yang, was that the Tumen/
Tuman River has three headwater streams, the Xidou Shui, 
Hongdan Shui, and Hongtu Shui, and that only the Hongdan Shui 
lies to the east of the original site of the 1712 marker, the 
direction in which the marker indicated that the Tumen River 
flowed. The Qing government thus believed that the Hongdan Shui 
should form the border. The Korean position, however, was that 
the Hong Tu Shan Shui, should be recognized as the headwater 
stream, and form the border. In 1887, the Qing government 
proposed what Yang describes as a compromise, suggesting that 
another stream, the Shiyi Shui, known in Korean as the Sogul, 
be deemed the headwater stream of the Tumen/Tuman River and 
form the boundary between the two countries. In 1889, with no 
agreement on which stream should be deemed the headwater 
stream, the Qing Emperor Guangxu ordered the erection of ten 
boundary markers, starting at the Shiyi/Sogul stream. Yang 
reports, however, that Koreans destroyed the boundary markers 
shortly after they were installed. The dispute went unresolved.
    Another dispute that erupted in the late 1800s centered on 
the question of whether the Tumen River should, in fact, be 
considered the boundary between China and Korea. The Korean 
side asserted that what it called the Tuman River was not the 
Tumen River that formed the border, opening the door to claims 
that territory north of the Tumen/Tuman River, including the 
ethnic Korean area around Yanji, was not in fact Chinese. Japan 
later adopted the same position. Yang chronicles Korean 
attempts to assert control over areas north of both the Yalu/
Amnok and Tumen/Tuman Rivers, and Russian and then Japanese 
moves to abet those efforts. At the turn of the 20th century, 
Japan, Yang observes, was keen to gain control of Chinese 
Yanbian as a ``back door'' for its planned expansion into 
China.
    The chapter ends with discussion of a 1909 treaty between 
China and Japan. Japan had by then turned Korea into a 
protectorate, and was on the verge of annexing it. In the 1909 
treaty, Japan ultimately recognized the Tumen/Tuman River as 
forming part of the border between China and Korea. It also 
specifically agreed that this part of the border ran from the 
1712 border marker to the Shiyi/Sogul stream and along the 
stream to the Tumen/Tuman River. In exchange for that 
recognition, China granted Japan a broad array of rights in 
Chinese territory, including the right to open trading posts 
and establish consulates and sub-consulates. China also agreed 
to extend a railway to the Korean border, where it would link 
up with a railway on the Korean side. Yang notes that this 
agreement facilitated Japan's later transport of troops to 
occupy northeast China.
    In documenting China's struggles in the 19th and 20th 
century to secure agreement that the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok 
Rivers form the border between China and Korea, Yang appears to 
signal a strong continuing Chinese commitment to those river 
borders. From Yang's account, China's position on the stretch 
of territory between the Tumen/Tuman and Yalu/Amnok Rivers may 
be less clear. The issue is significant not for strategic 
reasons, but because the area in question is in the Changbai/
Choson'gul Mountains, which Chinese consider the mythical 
birthplace of the ancestors of the Manchu Emperors, and Koreans 
consider the birthplace of the Korean people. The official 
biography of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il lists him as 
having been born on Mt. Paektu, the tallest peak in the 
mountain range, although most scholars believe he was actually 
born in Russia.

   3. Research on China's Northeast Borderland (2003) and the Essay, 
               ``Certain Questions in Gaogouli Research''

    One of the Research Center for Chinese Borderland History 
and Geography's most controversial projects has been its 
``Northeast Borderland History and Current Situation Series 
Research Project,'' launched in February 2002 and known in 
abbreviated form as the ``Northeast Project.'' The project is a 
collaboration among the Research Center and the Communist Party 
committees of China's three northeastern provinces, Jilin, 
Liaoning, and Heilongjiang. The center's website portrays the 
project as a response to challenges presented by ``some 
countries' research institutions and scholars with ulterior 
motives engaging in `research' on historical relations that 
distorts historical facts, and a few politicians with political 
purposes publicly promoting all sorts of fallacies, creating 
chaos.'' Among the Northeast Project's goals is to, ``further 
safeguard the stability of the Northeast border areas.'' \10\
    Controversy has sprung from efforts by scholars associated 
with the project to claim the ancient kingdom of Gaogouli or 
Koguryo as Chinese, rather than Korean. Critics in South Korea, 
in particular, have castigated such efforts as a Chinese 
attempt to steal Korean history. Some critics have worried 
openly about whether the Chinese interest in the Gaogouli/
Koguryo may presage a future Chinese attempt to make a history-
based claim to territory on the Korean Peninsula.
    In 2003, the Northeast Project published Research on 
China's Northeast Borderland, a collection of papers from a 
conference held a year earlier. The collection includes a 
revealing essay by a Chinese scholar presenting an explanation 
for the new scholarly interest in China in the Gaogouli/
Koguryo, a kingdom that collapsed more than 1,300 years ago. In 
``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,'' author Jiang 
Weidong of the Northeast Asia Research Institute at Changchun 
Normal University in China's Jilin Province insists that the 
research is defensive in nature, intended to guard against 
territorial claims to parts of the present-day PRC primarily 
from China's ostensible ally, North Korea. \11\ Jiang writes 
that Chinese concerns about North Korean intentions toward 
Chinese territory have been longstanding, but that for many 
years, they took a back seat to the Chinese leadership's 
insistence on the need to emphasize the friendship between the 
Chinese and North Korean peoples. The implication of his 
account is that the friendship has now frayed sufficiently to 
allow such concerns to be aired openly.
    Jiang makes no bones about his position that the Gaogouli/
Koguryo Kingdom was Chinese. It was ``an ancient local regime 
of our country whose people were mainly ethnic Han migrants,'' 
he writes. He adds, ``Because of geography, their economy and 
culture could not keep pace with the interior. Gradually, they 
became indigenized and the central plains dynasties came to see 
them as Yi and Di tribes.'' Jiang charges that Korean efforts 
to claim the kingdom as Korean are a legacy of imperial 
Japanese scholarship, which sought to develop pseudo-historical 
justifications for Japan's invasion of China. Japan, Jiang 
says, worked hard to develop a theory that Japanese and Koreans 
were of shared ancestry, and then sought to claim for Korea the 
ancient kingdoms of Gaogouli/Koguryo, Baiji/Paekche, and Bohai/
Parhae in order to provide historical cover for Japanese 
expansion into northeast China. The Gaogouli/Koguryo and Bohai/
Parhae kingdoms were particularly important because their 
territories extended well into areas of northeast China that 
Japan coveted.
    After Japan's defeat in World War II, Jiang writes, North 
Korean scholars picked up the research into the ancient 
kingdoms. Meanwhile, Chinese scholars hands were tied, he 
laments, because China and North Korea shared a special 
relationship as socialist allies, and any research that might 
``harm Chinese-Korean relations'' was restricted, including 
research on ancient Korean history.
    Jiang reports that North Korea sent scholars to China after 
1960 to gather materials about the ancient kingdoms. He names 
one such North Korean scholar, Ri Jirin (known in China as Li 
Zhilin), who spent five years at Peking University, with the 
years unspecified. Jiang tells us that Ri's Chinese advisor 
reported serious concerns about the direction of Ri's work, but 
was ignored. Ri's Chinese advisor warned his superiors that in 
researching the ancient kingdoms, Ri had come to see ancient 
Chinese rulers as having ``invaded'' Korean territories, Jiang 
tells us. Ri, the advisor reported, became focused on 
``recovering lost lands'' from China.
    Jiang does not present any further information about North 
Korean scholarship, except to assert that North Korean scholars 
are particularly fixated on the Gaogouli/Koguryo. They see 
their country, Jiang claims, as the successor to a proud 
Koguryo regime that shared their capital, Pyongyang, boldly 
expanded its territory in the Wei and Jin Dynasties, and for a 
period stood as an equal to the Chinese Sui and Tang Dynasties. 
Jiang quotes Ri's Peking University advisor as warning that 
while North Korean scholars' desire to ``recover lost lands'' 
might not now amount to anything, if such positions are not 
countered, North Koreans might in future generations ``use this 
excuse to grab territory.'' Jiang reports approvingly that 
China's government has come to recognize the dangers of 
allowing Japanese and Korean scholarship on the ancient 
kingdoms to go unchallenged, and has lifted taboos on Chinese 
scholarship on the ancient kingdoms.
    In an exhortation that may alarm China's neighbors, 
especially South Koreans, Jiang concludes by urging his 
academic colleagues not to neglect research on the ancient 
Baiji/Paekche Kingdom, which once occupied the southwestern 
part of the Korean Peninsula. ``We must not abandon it because 
its territory is not in our possession today,'' Jiang writes. 
Jiang also urges his colleagues to study the Xinluo/Silla 
Kingdom, saying, ``We cannot, because it is the predecessor of 
a Korean nation today, overlook the fact that it was 
subordinate to us in the Sui, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing 
[Dynasties].''






--------------
Notes:

  \1\ The Historical Atlas of China (Zhongguo lishi ditu ji), ed. Tan 
        Qixiang, vols. 1-8, Cartographic Publishing House (Ditu 
        chubanshe), 1982-1987. A Concise Historical Atlas of China 
        (Jianming zhongguo lishi ditu), ed. Tan Qixiang, Cartographic 
        Publishing House (Ditu chubanshe), 1991. Information about the 
        project that produced the atlas is drawn from Tan Qixiang's 
        forewords to Volumes 1 and 8.

  \2\ Tan Qixiang, ``Forward,'' in The Historical Atlas of China, Vol. 
        1 (Cartographic Publishing House, 1982), p. 3. The forward is 
        published in both Chinese and English. The quote here is from 
        the English-language version.

  \3\ Lu Dianyang, ed., Maps of the Territory of the Han and Tang at 
        their Height (HanTang shengshi jiangyu tu) and Maps of the Yuan 
        and Qing at their Height (Yuan Qing shengshi jiangyu tu), 
        commissioned by the Ministry of Education (Republic of China), 
        Yaguang xingdi xueshe chubanshe, 1947. Chiang Kai-shek's 
        Republic of China was in power in mainland China until 1949, 
        when it fled to Taiwan, leaving Mao Zedong's Communists to 
        proclaim the People's Republic of China on the mainland.

  \4\ ``A Brief Introduction to the Research Center for Chinese 
        Borderland History and Geography,'' accessed at http://
        bjzs.cass.cn/news/129888.htm.

  \5\ History of China's Borders (Zhongguo jindai bianjie shi), ed. Lu 
        Yiran (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 2007).

  \6\ Lu Yiran, ``Preface,'' in History of China's Borders (Zhongguo 
        jindai bianjie shi), vol. 1 (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 
        2007), p. 7.

  \7\ William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford 
        University Press, 2010), p. 114.

  \8\ Lu Yiran, ``Preface,'' in History of China's Borders (Zhongguo 
        jindai bianjie shi), vol. 1 (Sichuan People's Publishing House, 
        2007), p. 5.

  \9\ Yang Zhaoquan, ``The Chinese-Korean Border,'' in History of 
        China's Borders (Zhongguo jindai bianjie shi), vol. 1 (Sichuan 
        People's Publishing House, 2007), pp. 3-70.

 \10\ ``A Brief Introduction to the Northeast Project (Dongbei 
        gongcheng jianjie),'' accessed at http://bjzx.cass.cn.

 \11\ Jiang Weidong, ``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research (Gaogouli 
        yanjiu de ruogan wenti),'' in Research on China's Northeast 
        Borderland (Zhongguo dongbei bianjiang yanjiu), ed. Ma Dazheng, 
        Beijing: China Social Sciences Press (Zhongguo shehui kexue 
        chubanshe), August 2003, p. 149-161.
APPENDIX III.--KOREAN PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORICAL CHANGE IN THE BORDERS 
  BETWEEN KOREA AND CHINA: A REVIEW AND COMMENTS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL 
              RESEARCH SERVICE MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 9, 2012

          Explanation of the Format of the Review and Comments

    This text treats historical border issues between Korea and 
China from ancient times to the early twentieth century. The 
historical sources used for research in this topic were written 
in Chinese characters, and typically in Chinese grammar. 
However, place names had different pronunciations, and thus 
different names, in the Chinese and Korean languages. 
Presenting those pronunciations in English thus has posed 
important problems of representation. The explanations below 
will introduce how these issues have been resolved for this 
text.
    Korean words have been romanized using the McCune-
Reischauer System. The government of the Republic of Korea uses 
a different system (Revised Romanization), but for this text 
the Northeast Asian History Foundation has chosen to use the 
system preferred by many scholars writing in English. Chinese 
words have been romanized through the Pinyin system.
    For the names of rivers and mountains in the border area 
between today's Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the 
People's Republic of China, the following pattern has been 
used. The Korean name is provided first and then followed by 
the Chinese name in parentheses. For example, the river called 
Amnok in Korean and Yalu in Chinese is written as ``Amnok 
(Yalu) River.'' The mountain called Paektu in Korean and 
Changbai in Chinese is written as ``Mt. Paektu (Mt. 
Changbai).'' Foreign-language terms in parentheses are preceded 
with ``C.'' or with ``K.'' so to identify the language (Chinese 
or Korean) and are italicized.
    At the end of this text is an Appendix. Here are found 
three sections, a collection of maps compiled by the Northeast 
Asian History Foundation that is called ``Borders between Korea 
and China in Historical Maps of Korea,'' a list of Korean reign 
periods and their dates, and a glossary of terms that appear in 
this text.

          Introduction: The Purpose of the Review and Comments

    The Northeast Asian History Foundation, which has prepared 
``South Korean Perspectives on Historical Change in the Borders 
between Korea and China: A Review and Comments on the 
Congressional Research Service Memorandum of March 9, 2012,'' 
is the representative South Korean research institute for 
research in the histories of Northeast Asian countries and 
peoples. It has launched various academic projects to move 
beyond history issues between Korea and China or between Korea 
and Japan, and endeavors to construct stronger relationships of 
amicability and cooperation between and among these countries.
    The Review and Comments has been prepared for the following 
purposes.
    First, the Northeast Asian HIstory Foundation agrees with 
the critical view of the CRS Memorandum of March 9, 2012, that 
the way in which the government of the People's Republic of 
China (hereafter as ``PRC'') understands the historical borders 
between Korea and China by relying solely upon Chinese 
historical maps and scholarship can result in incomplete 
research.
    Second, we present the standard view in academic circles in 
the Republic of Korea on the historical borders between Korea 
and China by utilizing primary resources and research from such 
academic fields as history, archaeology, anthropology, and 
geography.
    Third, in so doing we have prepared the Review and Comments 
to develop a fact-based understanding of how the borders 
between Korea and China have changed over time and how they 
have been represented in maps.

             Outline of the Review and Comments Regarding 
                           the CRS Memorandum

1. The Historical Atlas of China
    The CRS Memorandum concentrated on three texts recently 
published in the PRC in Chinese and one report issued by the 
United States Department of State which treat China's 
historical borders. These four texts are The Historical Atlas 
of China (C. Zhongguo lishi ditu ji, 1982-1987; hereafter as 
``the Atlas''), History of China's Modern Borders, vol. 1 (C. 
Zhongguo jindai bianjieshi, 2007), Research on China's 
Northeast Borderland (Zhongguo dongbei bianjiang yanjiu, 2003), 
and the Department of State's International Boundary Study 
(1962). More specifically, the CRS Memorandum concentrated on 
one chapter from each of the latter two Chinese-language books. 
From History of China's Modern Borders was used Yang Zhaoquan's 
chapter entitled ``Zhongguo yu Chaoxian de bianjie'' (The 
Chinese-Korean Border). And from Research on China's Northeast 
Borderland was used Jiang Weidong's ``Gaogouli yanjiu de luogan 
wenti'' (Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research). The sections 
of these four texts that focused on historical borders with 
Korea will be treated separately. Presented below are brief 
introductions to these texts and the issues that they raise.
    The Atlas is a collection of historical maps published in 
an atlas format in the PRC, and is the atlas that has been most 
widely used in that country. The most important problem in this 
work is in the inclusion of areas that belonged to neighboring 
countries and peoples in the past. This problem stems from the 
three China-centered interpretations outlined below.
    First, the Atlas depicts in a sweeping manner the borders 
of Chinese countries by the standard of their greatest 
territorial size as achieved through war. This means that all 
of the histories of the peoples who lived in the territory that 
is now contemporary China are China's history. Such an approach 
may lead readers of the Atlas to misconstrue the territory of 
neighboring countries or peoples under the occupation or 
influence of a Chinese country as being a fixed territory.
    Second, in the Atlas, the process of determining borders 
follows the military activities of Chinese governments to the 
neglect of such aspects of history as the lives of local people 
and the exercise of dominance. Most of the military engagements 
of Chinese governments with countries in the Korean Peninsula 
and in Manchuria resulted in short-term military occupations. 
Nevertheless, the Atlas demarcates the occupied areas of those 
countries as the territory of the Chinese countries. As a 
result, those areas are marked as if they had been directly 
controlled for a long period of time by Chinese governments. 
Also important is that the counties and prefectures that 
Chinese governments established in the northern part of the 
Korean Peninsula and in Manchuria were frontier counties and 
prefectures, and thus differed from those administrative units 
in China. The occupied lands were controlled in strategic areas 
whose defense was protected by fortresses, and along traffic 
routes that connected those areas. The Atlas errs in 
considering the frontier counties and prefectures, which were 
far from direct Chinese rule, as having been administered 
through the same type of direct control as were those in China.
    Third, the Atlas merges non-Han Chinese peoples, which were 
ethnically, historically, and culturally different from 
Chinese, and their territories into the current boundary of the 
PRC under the principle of the ``unified multi-ethnic country'' 
(C. tongyi de duominzu guojia). For example, the Jurchens, who 
resided in areas between Liao (916-1125) of Kara Khitan 
ethnicity and Koryo (918-1392), were a third force that did not 
belong to either country but still were included in a Chinese 
country's territory in these Chinese maps.
2. Chapter One of History of China's Modern Borders
    The CRS Memorandum introduces the debate over the borders 
that followed the Amnok (C. Yalu) River, Mt. Paektu (Mt. 
Changbai; C. Changbai-shan), and the Tuman (C. Tumen) River 
based upon Yang Zhaoquan's ``The Chinese-Korean Border,'' which 
is chapter one in History of China's Modern Borders, and 
focuses on China's effort to secure the border. Seen from South 
Korean scholarship, this chapter has three important problems.
    First, by describing the establishment of the Amnok (Yalu) 
River-Tuman (Tumen) River formed through the expansion of 
territory under Ming China's rule in the fifteenth century, the 
chapter passes over the fact that the domain of Ming China 
(1368-1644) was limited in this region to the southern part of 
the Liaodong River and to the western downstream area of the 
Amnok River.
    Second, without referencing historical sources, this 
chapter describes the original location of the Mt. Paektu 
boundary marker erected in 1712 as being on Mt. Sobaek. And it 
states that the determination of the border between Choson and 
Qing China as being along the Mt. Sobaek-Sogol River (Mt. 
Xiaobai-Shiyi Stream; C. Xiaobai-shan, Shiyishui) resulted from 
the border conference held between the two countries in 1887. 
This claim overlooks the fact that the border between Choson 
and Qing China had already been decided as following the Amnok 
(Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River in 
1712.
    Third, by highlighting the efforts of China in defending 
the Tuman (Tumen) River border in the negotiations held between 
Qing China and Japan from 1905 to 1907, this chapter discounts 
the fact that the Kando (C. Jiandao) Agreement between Qing 
China and Japan in 1909 excluded Korea, which should have been 
a participant because this issue treated the border between 
Korea and Qing China.
3. ``Certain Questions in Gaogouli Research,'' in Research on China's 
        Northeast Borderland
    The Chinese scholar Jiang Weidong argues in his chapter 
``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research'' in Research on 
China's Northeast Borderland that Koguryo (C. Gaogouli) was 
``an ancient local regime of our country whose people were 
mainly ethnic Han migrants.'' (CRS Memorandum, 9.)
    However, Yemaek tribes established Koguryo (?-668). 
Differing from the Mo people who were active in northern China, 
these tribes came from a non-Han Chinese Dongyi people living 
in the Liaodong Peninsula and the northern and central areas of 
the Korean Peninsula. PRC scholarship believes the Mo or the 
Gaoyi people that appear in ancient Chinese sources to be the 
ethnic origin of Koguryo. However, there is from 1,500 years to 
2,000 years between the historical activities of the Mo and 
Gaoyi peoples and the establishment of Koguryo.
    Further, there is little archaeological evidence through 
which the Mo and Gaoyi peoples may be linked to Koguryo. As 
Koguryo expanded, some Han Chinese people became Koguryo 
people, but their numbers are thought to have been small 
compared to the Koguryo population.
    That is, Koguryo was a different country from the 
contemporary Han Chinese countries. The ancient Chinese 
records, too, relate distinctions between Koguryo and these 
Chinese governments. In the ``Records of the Dongyi People'' in 
the Book of Wei (C. Dongyi zhuan, in Wei shu), which was 
included in the History of the Three Kingdoms (C. Sanguo zhi), 
one of the Chinese dynastic histories, are entries regarding 
Puyo (C. Fuyu), Koguryo, Ye, Eastern Okcho, Mahan, Chinhan, 
Pyonhan, and Wa (ancient Japan).
    The ``Records of the Dongyi People'' describes the Dongyi 
as peoples having histories that differed from those of Wei 
China (220-265), Shu China (221-263), and Wu China (229-280). 
This pattern in the historiography on the historical 
governments in Manchuria and in the northern part of the Korean 
Peninsula continued into later historical records in 
traditional China. Further, the ``Records of the Dongyi 
People'' recorded the heaven-worship ceremonies of the Puyo, 
Koguryo, Ye, and Mahan peoples. Those descriptions show that 
these peoples sought to communicate directly with heaven and 
endeavored to introduce a means of receiving divine legitimacy. 
In other words, these four governments each formed a polity 
that was neither a vassal state nor a satellite regime of 
Chinese governments.
4. The United States Department of State International Boundary Study
    Noting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter 
as ``DPRK'')-PRC boundary treaty in 1962 and the DPRK-PRC 
border protocol in 1964, the CRS Memorandum notes the 
unresolved sovereignty over some sand islets. The 1962 treaty 
was of great significance in that it not only succeeded to the 
boundary conference held between Choson and Qing China in the 
1880s, but also finalized the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu 
(Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River border between the DPRK and 
the PRC in the form of a modern treaty. The sovereignty of 451 
islands and islets (264 to the DPRK, 187 to the PRC) along the 
Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman (Tumen) River was determined 
as recorded in the List of Sovereignty of Islands and Islets 
attached to the 1964 protocol.
5. Outline of Korean Historical Maps Accompanying the Review and 
        Comments
    Regarding the dispute over historical borders between Korea 
and China in the modern period, a problem that emerges in the 
PRC scholarship is the inclusion of historical areas with 
unclear borders or buffer zones that were not clearly 
determined in terms of sovereignty.
    The Northeast Asian History Foundation has for several 
years compiled historical maps of Northeast Asia, including 
East Asia and Central Asia, in order to reflect research in 
other countries and to provide more accurate and impartial 
historical maps of the region. For this Review and Comments the 
Foundation has prepared a set of twelve historical maps. These 
twelve maps show historical borders between Korea and China 
over the past 2,000 years. They are intended to assist in 
clarifying issues of interpretation introduced above and 
discussed in further detail below. Readers of this Review and 
Comments are encouraged to consult these maps, as they read the 
Review and Comments. This set of maps, entitled ``Borders 
between Korea and China in Historical Maps of Korea,'' may be 
found in the Appendix. The maps are divided into four groups 
according to the standard periodization of Korean history. This 
periodization, too, may be found in the Appendix. These four 
groups are introduced in the following paragraphs.
    Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4 mark the territories and borders of Old 
Choson (K. Kojoson) and the Four Han Chinese Commanderies (K. 
Hansagun). The earliest chapter of Korean history started with 
the foundation of Old Choson, which controlled the northwestern 
part of the Korean Peninsula and the northern part of the 
Liaodong Peninsula. This country was destroyed by Han China in 
108 BCE. Han China then established four commanderies in this 
large area. These administrative units, which differed from the 
county-prefecture system for local administration in Han China, 
were used for temporary purposes. The extent of Han China's 
territorial control was limited to the main fortresses and the 
traffic routes connecting these military facilities. In 82 BCE, 
or about twenty-five years after the establishment of these 
commanderies, two of them were closed, and the Hyondo 
Commandery (C. Xuantu-jun) was later pushed back into the 
Liaodong area. In 313 CE, the Nangnang Commandery (C. Lelang-
jun) was destroyed by Koguryo. And in 314, a new commandery, 
the Taebang Commandery (C. Taifang-jun), which was not 
established by Han China, was driven out by Paekche (?-660).
    Maps 5, 6, and 7 cover the periods of Koguryo, the 
unification of the Three Kingdoms, and Parhae (698-926). The 
western border of Koguryo during the reign of King Kwanggaet'o 
(r. 391-412) was the Liao River, and it remained there until 
the collapse of Koguryo in 668. The allied forces of Tang China 
(618-960) and Silla (?-935) destroyed Paekche in 660 and 
Koguryo in 668. Tang China established the Ungjin Commandery 
(C. Xiongjin dudufu) in the former territory of Paekche and the 
Andong Commandery (C. Andong duhufu) in the former territory of 
Koguryo for military purposes. As the Andong Commandery was 
moved to the Liaodong Peninsula in 676, the influence of Tang 
China withered in the former Koguryo territory east of the 
Liaodong area. In 698, Parhae (C. Bohai) was established under 
the leadership of the former Koguryo people in the former 
territory of Koguryo. Parhae followed Koguryo as an independent 
state. During the reign of King Son (r. 818-830), Parhae 
achieved its largest size, facing Tang China along the Liao 
River and the Khitans north of the Liao River.
    Maps 8, 9, and 10 chart the borders between Korea and China 
during the Koryo period (918-1392) in Korean history. In its 
first years, Koryo established a local administration system in 
which the northern frontier was settled along the southern 
shore of the Taedong River (C. Datong-jiang) and Wonsan Bay. In 
the early eleventh century, the mouth of the Amnok River became 
the border between Koryo and the Khitans. One century later, 
the military expedition of Yun Kwan (d. 1111) led Koryo to 
achieve tighter control over the Jurchens in the Mt. Paektu and 
upper Tuman River areas. During the Mongol Intervention of 1259 
to 1356, the area north of Ch'ollyong was left under the direct 
control of the Mongols. These areas were later restored to 
Koryo during the reign of King Kongmin (r. 1351-1374).
    Maps 11 and 12 depict the borders between Korea and Ming 
China and between Korea and Qing China during the Choson period 
(1392-1910). In its first decades the Choson government 
expanded its northern frontier to the Amnok (Yalu) River in the 
northwest and to the coast of Hamgyong Province in the 
northeast. In the fifteenth century, the border extended along 
the full lengths of the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman 
(Tumen) River. In 1712, with the placement of the Mt. Paektu 
(Mt. Changbai) boundary marker, the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. 
Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-Tuman (Tumen) River border was confirmed. 
The border treaty between the DPRK and the PRC in 1962 and the 
border protocol between these same two governments in 1964 
reaffirmed the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-
Tuman (Tumen) River border, and this remains the boundary 
between the DPRK and the PRC today.

                Review and Comments on Texts Published 
                   in the People's Republic of China

    The three texts introduced above that were published in the 
People's Republic of China are discussed in the sections that 
follow. Each section includes direct quotations from the CRS 
Memorandum that are then followed by analysis and discussion. 
These comments, analysis, and discussion are not critical of 
the CRS Memorandum. Rather, they focus upon the information and 
interpretations provided in the Chinese texts.
 1. The Historical Atlas of China
    ``Much of the controversy that has attended Chinese 
scholarship on China's historical borders stems from this 
decision to characterize as part of China all territory once 
occupied by ethnic minorities that are now part of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), even if those ethnic minorities' 
kingdoms were once independent. Visually, The Historical Atlas 
of China distinguishes between the territory of `the central 
China government' and areas occupied by `China's border 
minorities' by depicting them in different colors. The 
compilers of The Historical Atlas of China make clear, however, 
that they consider both categories of territory to make up the 
contours of `China' in each historical period.'' (CRS 
Memorandum, 3-4.)
    The Atlas's treatment of both the ``central Chinese 
administration'' region and the areas where ``China's border 
minorities'' lived as Chinese territory in each historical 
period may be questioned. For example, the Jurchens, situated 
between Liao and Koryo, did not belong to either Liao or Koryo. 
However, the Atlas includes the Jurchens in PRC territory. 
Since the 1980s, scholarship in the PRC has merged the history 
of foreign countries, such as Koguryo, into the history of 
China through the theory of the unified multi-ethnic country. 
As a result, areas that once were considered to be part of 
foreign histories have come to be incorporated into the history 
of China. Thus, the Atlas does not always reflect historical 
processes.
    ``Maps 1 and 2, from the Warring States Period (approx. 
B.C. 475-B.C. 221), show the course of a series of stone and 
earthen fortifications that later came to be considered part of 
the Great Wall of China. The maps show the fortifications 
extending well south of the Yalu River into the current 
territory of the DPRK.'' (CRS Memorandum, 4.)
    A key element in understanding the extent of the Great Wall 
is the location of the Taeryong River Long Wall (C. Daning-
jiang changcheng). Contrary to claims in PRC scholarship, this 
military fortification was not constructed by Chinese 
dynasties, but rather by Old Choson or by Koguryo in the 
northern half of the Korean Peninsula for defense against 
contemporary Chinese dynasties such as Yan, Qin, and Han. 
Objects appear infrequently in excavations there, but those 
items provide evidence of interactions between Korea and China 
in ancient times. It thus may be suggested that the argument 
that the Great Wall extended into the northwestern Korean 
Peninsula and that that area became part of Chinese territory 
in ancient times seems to lack empirical foundation.
    The assertion in PRC scholarship that the Great Wall was 
extended into the northwestern area of the Korean Peninsula in 
the Warring States Period (475 BCE-221 BCE) is predicated upon 
two facts. The first is that the Taeryong River Long Wall was 
part of the Great Wall. The second is that some excavated 
objects, which were made in Yan or in styles common in Yan, are 
occasionally found in the northwestern Korean Peninsula.
    However, scholarship published in the Republic of Korea 
believes that the Taeryong River Long Wall was constructed 
during the Old Choson period or the Koguryo period, and that 
the wall was used even during the Koryo period. Further, 
considering its location, this wall was designed to block 
enemies from the west to the east. The Yan, who resided 
northwest of the wall, cannot have been the people that 
constructed this impediment. Consequently, it is inaccurate to 
argue that this long wall was contructed by the Yan, that it 
was part of the Great Wall, and that the northwestern area of 
the Korean Peninsula was part of Yan territory.
    ``Maps 3 and 4 show the first borders of a central Chinese 
administration, Qin China (B.C. 221-B.C. 206). The maps show 
the fortifications extending still further south, to 
approximately 39 degrees north latitude (also known as the 39th 
parallel), stopping just short of today's Pyongyang. The maps 
indicate that the Qin state encompassed the full area inside 
the fortification. The Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is identified 
on the map as Chinese border minority territory, although the 
map does not mark its borders.'' (CRS Memorandum, 4.)
    The statement that the Great Wall was extended to 
P'yongyang during the Qin period is not accurate. This 
statement found in PRC scholarship is based upon unreliable 
documents. Historically, the northwestern part of the Korean 
Peninsula belonged to Old Choson in the early third century 
BCE. (See the commentary on maps 1 and 2 in ``Borders beween 
Korea and China in Historical Maps of Korea'' below.) Given the 
information in two Chinese texts, Treatise on the Xiongnu (C. 
Xiongnu liezhuan) and Biography of Meng Tian (C. Meng Tian 
liezhuan), which are included in Records of the Grand Historian 
(C. Shiji) by Sima Qian (circa 145 or 135 BCE-86 BCE), the area 
east of the Great Wall is believed to have been in today's 
Liaoyang, in Liaoning Province.
    Sources from later Chinese dynasties, however, sometimes 
wrote Jieshi instead of Liaodong, Nangnang instead of Jieshi, 
Koguryo instead of Nangnang, and P'yongyang instead of Koguryo. 
The inconsistent use of these place names in Chinese sources 
weakens the argument in PRC scholarship that the eastern end of 
the Great Wall reached P'yongyang. Further, it should also be 
noted that ``Jieshi'' was a common place name in ancient China, 
and may be seen in various locations in ancient Chinese 
sources. As a result, it is not accurate to describe Qin's 
borders as extending to 39 degrees north latitude and near to 
P'yongyang.
    ``Maps 5 and 6, depicting the Western Han Dynasty (B.C. 
206-A.D. 8), show the territory of the central Western Han 
state extending down the full width of the peninsula to south 
of the 38th parallel, just north of today's Seoul. The 
Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is depicted as part of the central 
Western Han state, with Map 6 showing the kingdom's borders 
within the central Western Han state. In yellow shading, map 5 
shows much of today's Northeast China, including the modern 
Chinese cities of Changchun, Harbin, and Yanji, as occupied by 
Chinese border minorities, and outside of the borders of the 
central Chinese administration.'' (CRS Memorandum, 4.)
    It is believed that the southernmost area of the four Han 
commanderies was in the Korean Peninsula, in the area of the 
Chaeryong River, Hwanghae Province (north of Mt. Myorak), and 
in northern Kangwon Province. The area south of the four Han 
commanderies was beyond the control of China. In general, 
little has been clarified regarding the relationship between 
early Koguryo and Han China's county-prefecture administration, 
and scholars have not reached any definite conclusions. 
However, it is important to note that, as in the case of Hyondo 
Commandery relocation in 75 BCE, the retreat of Han China's 
county-prefecture administration back to China coincided with 
the growth of Koguryo. The Atlas map which shows Koguryo in the 
territory of Western Han (202 BCE-9 CE) would thus seem to be 
out of historical context. And, such historical peoples as the 
Okchoand the Suksin (C. Sushen) lived in the Changchun, Harbin, 
and Yanji areas of the present-day PRC and were independent 
people that differed from Han China in ethnicity and in 
culture.
    The four Han commanderies, which were established after the 
collapse of Old Choson, did not last. The Chinbon (C. Zhenfan) 
Commandery and the Imtun (C. Lintun) Commandery were closed in 
82 BCE. The remaining prefectures attached to these two 
commanderies were incorporated into the Nangnang Commandery and 
the Hyondo Commandery. The influence of these county-prefecture 
areas was limited to the surrounding areas, and their 
administration tended to be loose and indirect. Therefore, Han 
China's territory cannot be marked as extending to the south of 
38 degrees north latitude. Specifically, Han China's influence 
could only cover the area between the Taedong River and the 
Chaeryong River, and part of the Hamhong Plain in the 
northwestern Korean Peninsula. Other areas should be described 
as the lands of indigenous peoples from the time of ancient 
Korea.
    To be discussed next are maps depicting the first three 
centuries of the Common Era.
    ``Maps 7 and 8, depicting the Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220), 
show the central Eastern Han state occupying the western part 
of the Korean peninsula to just south [of] the 38th parallel. 
The eastern boundary of the Eastern Han's territory on the 
peninsula is depicted as being at roughly 127 degrees east 
longitude. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo kingdom is again 
depicted as outside the borders of the central Chinese 
administration. The border between the Koguryo Kingdom and a 
more northerly kingdom, known in Chinese as Fuyu and in Korean 
as Buyeo or Puyo, is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted 
as occupied by Chinese border minorities.'' (CRS Memorandum, 4-
5.)
    During the Eastern Han period (25-220), the Nangnang 
Commandery could not extend southward to the Han River area. 
The growth of indigenous forces such as Koguryo accelerated the 
retreat of Han China's county-prefecture administration back to 
China. (The second relocation of Hyondo Commandery and the 
reduction of the area controlled by Nangnang Commandery were 
also caused by the expansion of Koguryo.) The description in 
the Atlas of Koguryo, Puyo, Umnu, and Okcho as border areas of 
Eastern Han points to an arbitrary interpretation based on the 
theory of the unified multi-ethnic country. This interpretation 
conflicts with historical facts, however. Koguryo, Puyo, and 
Okcho emerged from the Yemaek people and became part of the 
origins of the Korean people. Therefore, these peoples and 
countries are to be expressed as belonging to the realm of 
Korean history.
    The borders of China in the second half of the third 
century appear next. ``In maps 9 and 10, which depict China's 
borders in A.D. 262, during the Three Kingdoms Period, Wei 
Kingdom's territory is shown as extending across the full width 
of the Korean Peninsula down to south of the 38th parallel. 
Gaogouli/Koguryo is depicted as Chinese border minority 
territory just outside the territory of the Wei Kingdom. As 
before, the border between Gaogouli/Koguryo and Fuyu/Buyeo 
Kingdoms is not marked, but both kingdoms are depicted as the 
territory of Chinese bordere minorities.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
    The Atlas exaggerates the dominance of Wei in occupying the 
northern half of the Korean Peninsula. It is true that Wei 
occupied the Nangnang Commandery and Taebang Commandery areas, 
but these two commanderies each administered only six 
prefectures. Considering this, Wei's administration could not 
reach the middle of the Korean Peninsula. Thus the borders 
shown south of 38 degrees north latitude are inaccurate. 
Revision is also required of the depiction of the Ye area in 
the northeastern Korean Peninsula. The area is drawn as having 
been thoroughly controlled by the Nangnang Commandery when, in 
fact, the governance of the Nangnang Commandery centered mostly 
on the Pullae area. Further, the Umnu people, who were of 
Suksin ethnicity, cannot be placed into the history of the Han 
Chinese dynasties.
    ``In Maps 11 and 12, showing China's borders nineteen years 
later, in 281, the borders on the Korean Peninsula are shown as 
largely unchanged.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
    Long belonging to Koguryo, the northeastern Korean 
Peninsula should be depicted as territory of the Korean 
governments that followed Koguryo.
    ``Map 13 shows China's borders in the year 382, during the 
turbulent Eastern Jin and 16 Kingdoms Period. The territory of 
the Former Qin rulers, shown in bright yellow, is depicted as 
extending only a little east of today's Chinese border city of 
Dandong. The area controlled by Chinese border minorities is, 
however, shown in mustard yellow as extending down the 
peninsula to an east-west line that includes today's Seoul. The 
Gaogouli/Koguryo Kingdom is shown as part of this Chinese 
border minority territory.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
    Countries such as Koguryo, Puyo, Okcho, and Yemaek were 
important agents in Korean history. And the Khitan, Kumoxi, 
Rouran, and Didouyu belonged to neither traditional Korean 
history nor traditional Chinese history. The Atlas, however, 
places them in PRC territory or it ahistorically identifies 
them retrospectively as China's border minorities (as is seen 
in other maps in the Atlas, as well).
    ``Maps 14 through 19, showing China's borders in 449, 497, 
546, 572, and 612, show a major retreat of Chinese control on 
the Korean Peninsula. In these maps, the Gaogouli/Koguryo 
Kingdom is depicted as being in control of much of the 
peninsula and, significantly, as being non-Chinese. Non-Chinese 
territory under Koguryo control is shown as extending as far 
north as the current Chinese city of Changchun.'' (CRS 
Memorandum, 5.)
    Given that Koguryo continuously expanded its territory 
toward the northeast, as shown by its expedition against 
Eastern Puyo (?-410) and its control over the Malgals (C. Mohe) 
during the reign of King Kwanggaet'o, Koguryo's northeastern 
borders at that time should be corrected as in Map 5, ``Koguryo 
Territory Following the Reign of King Changsu (circa 450),'' 
compiled by the Northeast Asian History Foundation.
    ``Map 20, depicting the situation in 669, during the Tang 
Dynasty, shows a dramatic territorial shift. After the Tang 
allied with the kingdom of Xinluo/Silla to defeat Gaogouli/
Koguryo and Baiji/Paekje kingdoms, the map shows Tang territory 
extending all the way to the southern tip of the Korean 
Peninsula, with Xinluo/Silla-controlled territory on the east 
side of the peninsula depicted as non-Chinese. This was the 
only time over the centuries that the maps show Chinese 
territory extending so far south on the peninsula.'' (CRS 
Memorandum, 5.)
    After the war in the Korean peninsula that ended in 668, 
Tang China failed to integrate the former territories of 
Paekche and Koguryo into its own territory. It succeeded only 
in destroying these two dynasties and temporarily establishing 
administrative districts. Although Tang China's occupation of 
the Paekche and Koguryo capitals and the stationing of troops 
in those capitals cannot be regarded as territorial 
acquisition, Map 20 in the Atlas depicts the former land of 
these two countries as Chinese territory. The Atlas greatly 
exaggerates Tang China's boundaries.
    The Ungjin Commandery was established after the fall of 
Paekche in 660, but it does not appear in historical sources 
after 665. In this same period, a Silla province called Soburi 
appeared in former Paekche territory. Given this historical 
context, the Ungjin Commandery may be characterized as a 
headquarters for Tang Chinese troops during the war in the 
Korean Peninsula in the 660s. The Atlas inaccurately depicts a 
temporary occupation as complete control over the southwestern 
Korean Peninsula. While Tang destroyed Paekche in alliance with 
Silla and established the Ungjin Commandery, Silla's army was 
also stationed in former Paekche territory. Thus it cannot be 
said that Tang China occupied all of the former Paekche 
territory. Describing the Ungjin Commandery as Tang Chinese 
territory should be reconsidered. As a result of the war 
between Silla and Tang fought from 668 to 676, Silla occupied 
areas south of the Taedong River to the Wonsan Bay in the 
Korean Peninsula. The depiction of the areas south of the 
Taedong River as Tang China territory in Map 20 thus is not 
accurate.
    After the fall of Koguryo in 668, Tang China established 
the Andong Commandery in P'yongyang to govern the surrounding 
areas in a temporary form of administrative district. However, 
numerous attacks from military units organized by the former 
Koguryo army, and the Silla army compelled Tang China to 
relocate the Andong Commandery to Xincheng, in Liaoning 
Province, in 670 and then to Liaodong Fortress, in Liaoning 
Province, in 676.
    In 741, Tang China's territory stopped west of the Liao 
River, and thus did not reach the Taedong River in the present-
day DPRK. Parhae was east of the Liao River. This period is 
depicted in Map 21 of the Atlas. However, Map 21 does not 
include Parhae (698-926), a country which is part of Korean 
history. The period depicted in this map of Parhae's history is 
that of the reign of King Mun (r. 737-793), the country's third 
king. Most of the former Koguryo territory had been recovered 
during the reign of his predecessor, King Mu (r. 719-737). 
Thus, Tang China did not control any territory on the Korean 
Peninsula from the 670s on.
    Although scholars in the PRC identify Parhae as an ethnic 
minority state under Tang China, the following facts show that 
as a successor to Koguryo, Parhae was an independent state not 
subjugated by Tang China. First, Parhae called its ruler Great 
King, the Reverent, and Imperial Highness. Parhae also had its 
own reign names and posthumous epithets (or, temple names) for 
its rulers. Second, Parhae people were permitted to sit for the 
Tang government's special examination conducted only for 
foreigners. Third, Parhae placed the neighboring Malgals in a 
hierarchical relationship and had its own imperial government. 
Fourth, in official letters sent to the court of Japan at that 
time, the king of Parhae referred to himself as the ``King of 
Koryo'' or as the ``heavenly descendant,'' thus repeating the 
tradition of Puyo. Fifth, Parhae was a sovereign state that 
conducted independent diplomatic relations with neighboring 
countries, including Japan and Silla, as well as with Tang 
China.
    ``Map 23, showing the situation in 820, depicts Tang 
territory on the peninsula as having receded further, to 
include only a small portion of the northwest side of the 
peninsula, including Pyongyang. The map shows the current 
Chinese cities of Dandong and Shenyang as being part of central 
Tang Dynasty territory, but shows today's Chinese cities of 
Changchun and Yanji and areas north as being the territory of 
Chinese border minorities.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
    Around 820, the area extending from P'yongyang to the 
western coast of the Korean Peninsula and to the Liaodong 
Peninsula was under the control of Parhae, and not Tang China. 
The northeastern Korean Peninsula, Liaoning Province, Jilin 
Province, and Heilongjiang Province in the present-day PRC, and 
the Primorsky region of present-day Russia were also part of 
Parhae territory.
    ``Map 24 shows the situation in 943, during the Five 
Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms Period. It depicts the Liao Dynasty, 
also known as the Khitan Empire after its ethnic-Khitan 
founders, as controlling a broad swath of territory north of 
the Korean Peninsula. The Liao's border with Korea is depicted 
as being well south of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers, following a 
curved line whose northern tip is just below the 40th parallel. 
The peninsula south of that line is shown as non-Chinese, 
Gaoli/Koryo territory.'' (CRS Memorandum, 5.)
    After 933, Koryo territory was shaped by the lower reaches 
of the Amnok River and the Long Wall, which was in the Korean 
Peninsula. An important problem in setting the territory of 
Korea and China during the Koryo and early Choson periods in 
the Atlas is the absence of a buffer zone or a neuteral zone. 
In the early Koryo period, there were two groups of Jurchens 
living between Koryo and Liao (916-1125). The first group 
resided near Liao. The second group lived near the Koryo border 
and submitted to Koryo authority. If the first group were to 
belong to Liao, the second group must be included in Koryo 
territory. From the 1020s to the 1110s, Koryo significantly 
extended its influence to north of the Long Wall. During this 
period, Koryo ended the long state of hostilities with Liao and 
prepared a new stage of warfare with Qin (1115-1234), which was 
founded by Jurchens and had destroyed Liao.
    ``Maps 31 and 32, showing the situation in 1330, during the 
Yuan Dynasty, depict the border as having crept north again, to 
just above the 40th parallel to the west, though Yuan territory 
is shown extending below the 40th parallel to the east.'' (CRS 
Memorandum, 6.)
    In 1356, during the reign of King Kongmin, Koryo reclaimed 
the Ssangsong Commandery (C. Shuangcheng zongguanfu), which had 
earlier been incorporated into a frontier district of Yuan 
China. Koryo's territory now reached the Amnok (Yalu) River and 
the Tuman (Tumen) River.
    ``Maps 33-38, showing the years 1433, 1582, 1820, and 1908, 
depict Chinese territory as ending at the Yalu and Tumen 
Rivers, the rivers that formed all but a small portion of the 
modern border between China and North Korea.'' (CRS Memorandum, 
6.)
    In the early Choson period, during the reign of King Sejong 
(r. 1418-1450), specifically in the 1430s, Choson conquered 
Jurchen and established four counties in the upstream area of 
the Amnok (Yalu) River and six garrisons in the downstream area 
of the Tuman (Tumen) River, setting the two rivers as the 
country's northern borders. During this period, Ming China's 
control over the area north of the Great Wall was limited to 
the southern region of Liaodong and the western area of the 
downstream region of the Amnok (Yalu) River. The Jurchens 
conquered the whole of mainland China and established the Qing 
government in 1644, and the Amnok (Yalu) River and the Tuman 
(Tumen) River became settled as the border between Choson and 
Qing China in the mid-seventeenth century.
    Regarding text from ``Continuity with the Republic of 
China'' in the CRS Memorandum:
    ``Map B, depicting the territory of the Chinese Tang 
Dynasty (618-907), shows Chinese control extending down the 
west side of the Korean Peninsula to the peninsula's southern 
tip.'' (CRS Memorandum, 6.)
    Before its collapse in 668, Koguryo held the eastern part 
of Liaodong River and the northern part of Korean Peninsula as 
its territory. Later, these regions were taken over by Parhae 
(698-926). Tang China established the Ungjin Commandery after 
Silla and Tang together destroyed Paekche. However, Tang's 
military occupation in the former Paekche territory was 
temporary because Silla also stationed troops there. Regarding 
the former territory of Paekche in its entirety as Tang China's 
territory thus is not accurate.
    ``Map C, showing the territory of Yuan China (1271-1368), 
depicts the Yuan border as extending to a line south of 
Pyongyang and north of Kaesong.'' (CRS Memorandum, 6.)
    The Tongnyong Commandery (C. Dongning-fu), which was 
constructed by Yuan, was taken back by Koryo in 1290. Koryo 
also used force to restore the Ssangsong Commandery in 1356. 
Lacking information about this history provided in this Review 
and Comments, this map may misrepresent the areas as belonging 
entirely to Yuan China at that time.
2. Chapter One of History of China's Modern Borders
    In this section, the second of the three texts published in 
the People's Republic of China, History of China's Modern 
Borders, in particular, chapter one, ``The Chinese-Korean 
Border,'' will be discussed.
    In the first half of the fifteenth century, Choson 
established its northern borders along the Amnok (Yalu) and 
Tuman (Tumen) rivers after defeating Jurchen communities in 
that area. On the other hand, Ming China's control was limited 
only to the southern area of the Liaodong Peninsula and the 
area west of the downstream part of the Amnok (Yalu) River. 
Chapter One of History of China's Modern Borders describes from 
the perspective of China's territorial expansion the formation 
of the Amnok (Yalu) River-Tuman (Tumen) River border between 
Ming China and Choson in the early fifteenth century. PRC 
scholarship notes that the control of the Ming government's 
Nuergan Regional Military Commission (C. Nuergan dusi) which 
administered the Left Jianzhou Commandery (C. Jianzhou zuowei) 
reached the region north of the Amnok and Tuman rivers. 
However, as Ming China's control did not extend into Jurchen 
areas after the early fifteenth century, the view that Ming 
China and Choson then made these two rivers the border between 
their countries is inaccurate. According to Korean sources, 
during the reign of King Kongmin, the Koryo government 
established counties and prefectures for local administration 
and defense structures in the Amnok (Yalu) River area so that 
it controlled territory south of the Amnok (Yalu) River. Later, 
during the reign of King Sejong in the first half of the 
fifteenth century, the Choson government defeated Jurchen 
communities and then established four counties in the Amnok 
(Yalu) River's upstream area and six military garrisons in the 
downstream area of the Tuman (Tumen) River. In this way the 
Choson government extended its administrative control to the 
Amnok (Yalu) River and Tuman (Tumen) River areas.
    From the CRS Memorandum, item 1: ``In 1712 . . . [t]hey 
placed a boundary marker between the rivers, on a ridge near 
the peak of what China calls Xiao Bai Shan in the Changbai 
Mountains, known in Korean as the Choson'gul or Jangbaek. 
Characters carved on the marker noted that the Yalu River lay 
to the marker's west and the Tumen River to its east. Yang 
relates, however, that in 1885, when Chinese Qing Dynasty 
officials attempted to work with Korean officials to demarcate 
theborder, teams sent to scout for the marker found it in a 
different spot. The Qing government charged that it had been 
intentionally moved in order to influence decisions about which 
of the streams that feed the Yalu and the Tumen Rivers should 
be considered their `true' headwater streams for boundary 
purposes.'' (CRS Memorandum, 7-8.)
    PRC scholarship introduced the ``move of the Mt. Paektu 
boundary marker'' explanation according to which the marker was 
originally placed at the watershed of Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) 
but was later moved by Koreans to the southern foot of Mt. 
Paektu (Mt. Changbai). However, extant documents and historical 
maps concerning the erection of the boundary marker show that 
this explanation lacks supporting evidence. The ``Mt. Paektu 
Boundary Marker Map'' (K. Paektu-san chonggyebi to, 1712), held 
by the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies at Seoul 
National University, in the Republic of Korea, clearly portrays 
the boundary marker as a headwater marker (K. kangwonbi) at the 
southern foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai). Kim Chinam (1654-
1718) accompanied the Escort Commissioner Pak Kwon (1658-1715) 
in his capacity as First Chinese-language Translator (K. Susok 
t'ongyokkwan) at the time of the marker's placement. Kim Chinam 
left a detailed account in his Records of the Northern 
Expedition (K. Pukchong rok). This text related the negotiation 
process between the Chinese representative Mukedeng and the 
Korean representative Pak Kwon. Hong Set'ae (1653-1725) left 
Writings on Mt. Paektu (K. Paektu-san ki). In this travelogue 
based on information from Kim Kyongmun (dates unknown), who 
climbed Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) together with Mukedeng, Hong 
described the situation in which the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) 
boundary marker was erected. These documents describe clearly 
and concretely the process by which the boundary marker was 
erected. It thus is certain that the Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) 
boundary marker was located at the southern foot of Mt. Paektu 
(Mt. Changbai).
    The Korean historical map below, which was compiled in 
1712, shows the boundary marker on Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai) 
erected earlier that year. In this map, the boundary marker is 
clearly depicted as a headwater marker. Meanwhile, Mt. Sobaek 
(Mt. Xiaobai), drawn as a separate peak to the southwest of the 
marker, is next to Taegak Peak and Yonji Peak.

 Map 1: Mt. Paektu Boundary Marker Map (K. Paektu-san chonggyebi to), 
  held at the Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, Seoul National 
                               University


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




    From the CRS Memorandum, item 2: ``China's position, 
according to Yang, was that the Tumen River has three headwater 
streams, the Xidou Shui, Hongdan Shui, and Hontu Shui, and that 
only the Hongdan Shui lies to the east of the original site of 
the 1712 marker, the direction in which the marker indicated 
that the Tumen River flowed. The Qing government thus believed 
that the Hongdan Shui should form the border. The Korean 
position, however, was that the Hong Tu Shan Shui, should be 
recognized as the headwater stream, and form the border. In 
1887, the Qing government proposed what Yang describes as a 
compromise, suggesting that another stream, the Shiyishui, 
known in Korean as the Sogul, be deemed the headwater stream of 
the Tumen River and form the boundary between the two 
countries. In 1889, with no agreement on which stream should be 
deemed the headwater stream, the Qing Emperor Guangxu ordered 
the erection of ten boundary markers, starting at the Shiyishui 
stream. Yang reports, however, that Koreans destroyed the 
boundary markers shortly after they were installed. The dispute 
went unresolved.'' (CRS Memorandum, 8.)
    PRC scholarship avers that Qing China erected ten border 
markers from Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) to the Sogol Stream 
(Shiyi Stream) soon after the 1887 Choson-Qing China Border 
Conference in order to prove the agreement of the two countries 
on the Mt. Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai)-Sogol Stream (Shiyi Stream) 
border. However, no official records from Qing China prove that 
these ten markers were erected. There is one record which 
indicates that a border-demarcation committee member petitioned 
the General of Jilin for placing ten border markers from Mt. 
Sobaek (Mt. Xiaobai) to the Musan area. Wu Luzhen (1880-1911), 
who was in charge of negotiations with Japan over Kando 
(Jiandao), conducted extensive research on border-related 
documents. His Yanji Border Issue Report (C. Yanji bianwu 
baogao) in 1908 states that the markers were prepared but not 
erected because Qing China and Choson failed to reach 
agreement. There is no record of discussion of the placement of 
ten border markers in Korean documents, either. Qing China 
requested that another border conference be held in 1888. These 
three facts also support the view that ten boundary markers 
were not erected.
    From the CRS Memorandum, item 3: ``The Chapter ends with 
discussion of the 1909 treaty between China and Japan. Japan 
had by then Korea into a protectorate, and was on the verge of 
annexing it. In the 1909 treaty, Japan ultimately recognized 
the Tumen River as forming part of the border between China and 
Korea. It also specifically agreed that this part of the border 
extended from the 1712 marker to the Shiyishui stream and along 
the stream to the Tumen River.'' (CRS Memorandum, 8.)
    PRC scholarship contends that the Tuman (Tumen) River 
border was determined in the Kando (Jiandao) Agreement of 1909. 
However, the Kando (Jiandao) Agreement is null and void on the 
grounds that it was concluded by Japan, which intended to 
occupy Manchuria, and without agreement from Choson, the very 
government with the authority to discuss such a border issue. 
In relation to this, another difficult point in this Chinese 
argument stems from the exclusion of Choson from involvement in 
this border issue. Moreover, Choson raised the question of the 
Tuman (Tumen) River border in order to solve the issue of 
immigrants moving to the north of the Tuman River, whereas 
Japan raised the question by opening the Kando (Jiandao) Police 
Substation at Longjing (K. Yongjong) in 1907 for the purpose of 
invading Manchuria. However, this agreement was signed without 
the participation of the Korean government during the 
negotiations and based upon the 1905 Protectorate Treaty, which 
had forcibly deprived Choson of its diplomatic rights.
    From the CRS Memorandum, item 4: ``In documenting China's 
struggles in the 19th and 20th century to secure agreement that 
the Tumen and Yalu Rivers form the border between China and 
Korea, Yang appears to signal a strong, continuing Chinese 
commitment to those river borders. From Yang's account, China's 
position on the stretch of territory between the Tumen and Yalu 
Rivers may be less clear. The issue is significant not for 
strategic reasons, but because the area in question is in the 
Changbai/Choson'gul Mountains, which Chinese consider the 
mythical birthplace of the ancestors of the Manchu Emperors and 
which Koreans consider the birthplace of the Korean people.'' 
(CRS Memorandum, 8-9.)
    Although the Amnok (Yalu) and Tuman (Tumen) rivers formed 
the border between Choson and Qing China from the seventeenth 
century, the drawing of the border at the headwater stream of 
the Tuman (Tumen) River had not been finalized. In 1712, Qing 
clarified the Amnok (Yalu) River-Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai)-
Tuman (Tumen) River border by erecting the Mt. Paektu (Mt. 
Changbai) boundary marker at the watershed running from the 
foot of Mt. Paektu (Mt. Changbai). During the Choson-Qing China 
border conference in the 1880s and during the negotiations over 
the Kando (Jiandao) issue from 1907 to 1909, the Tuman (Tumen) 
River border was at the core of the controversy. Mt. Paektu 
(Mt. Changbai) itself was not brought into the dispute. Insofar 
as the starting point of the border discussion was the Mt. 
Paektu (Mt. Changbai) boundary marker, it can be said that Mt. 
Paektu (Mt. Changbai) has been the border between Korea and 
China since that time.
3. ``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,'' in Research on China's 
        Northeast Borderland
    In this section, too, direct quotations from the CRS 
Memorandum are followed by comment and discussion.
    From the CRS Memorandum, item 5: ``In 2003, the Northeast 
Project published Research on China's Northeast Borderland, a 
collection of papers from a conference held a year earlier. The 
collection includes a revealing essay presenting a Chinese 
explanation for the new scholarly interest in the Gaogouli/
Koguryo, a kingdom that collapsed more than 1,300 years ago. In 
``Certain Questions on Gaogouli Research,'' author Jiang 
Weidong of the Northeast Asia Research Institute at Changchun 
Normal University, in China's Jilin Province, insists that the 
research is defensive in nature, intended to guard against 
territorial claims to parts ofthe present-day PRC primarily 
from China's ostensible ally, North Korea. Jiang writes that 
Chinese concerns about North Korean intentions toward Chinese 
territory have been longstanding, but for many years, they took 
a back seat to the Chinese leadership's insistence on the need 
to emphasize the friendship between the Chinese and North 
Korean peoples. The implication of his account is that the 
friendship has now frayed sufficiently to allow such concerns 
to be aired openly.'' (CRS Memorandum, 9.)
    Research by scholars in the PRC on the northeast region in 
the modern period began with Jin Yufu's Dongbei tongshi (A 
History of the Chinese Northeast, 1943), which was published 
before the founding of the PRC, and did not originate in 
concerns about the DPRK, the PRC's ally. Jin believed that 
territory is historically formed, thus expanding or diminishing 
over time. However, as PRC scholars promoted the theory of the 
unified multi-ethnic country in part so to revise the history 
of Koguryo, but inaccurately marked the current territory of 
the PRC as if it had been the territory of China in the past. 
However, no historical sources support this argument. This 
argument of scholars in the PRC may be a good example of how 
China has reduced and expanded the borders for political needs, 
but this interpretation ultimately is not accurate history.
    From the CRS Memorandum, item 6: ``Jiang charges that 
Korean efforts to claim the kingdom as Korean are a legacy of 
imperial Japanese scholarship, which sought to develop pseudo-
historical justifications for Japan's invasion of China. Japan, 
Jiang states, worked hard to develop a theory that Japanese and 
Koreans were of shared ancestry, and then sought to claim for 
Korea the ancient kingdoms of Gaogouli/Koguryo, Baiji/Paekje, 
and Bohai/Balhae in order to provide historical cover for 
Japanese expansion into northeast China. The Gaogouli/Koguryo 
and Bohai/Balhae kingdoms were particularly important because 
their territories extended well into areas of northeast China 
that Japan coveted.'' (CRS Memorandum, 9-10.)
    In the 1930s and 1940s, Japanese historians studied Koguryo 
history through the Manchuria-Choson view of northeast Asian 
history (J. Mansen shikan). This approach, which separated the 
history of Manchuria from those of the Chinese dynasties, 
juxtaposed Manchuria, Korea, and Japan in the same historical 
framework, which had been introduced for the ideological 
purposes of Japanese imperialism, and rationalized the 
occupation of Manchuria. Jin Yufu caught such intentions of 
Japanese scholarship and wrote, ``Koguryo was a local polity of 
ancient China,'' in order to stress that Manchuria and Chinese 
governments originally were a single historical community in 
the past. He also argued that the basic premise of research on 
Koguryo history should be predicated upon the exclusion of any 
political perspectives from the countries of China and Japan. 
Jin also wrote that Koguryo history should be seen only through 
historical facts.
    Regarding the history of Koguryo, scholars in the Republic 
of Korea are agreed that a) the growth and development 
proceeses in Koguryo emerged from the struggles with the local 
administration of Han China and from the withdrawal of Chinese 
administration from the Koguryo area; b) Koguryo, as an 
independent state, had its own reign names and royal succession 
system; c) Koguryo established tributary relationships with 
both the Southern and Northern dynasties in China based upon 
its own interests; d) Koguryo created a unique culture by 
incorporating Chinese and Central Asian cultures into its 
traditional culture; e) Koguryo had a Koguryo-centered world 
view that differed from those of contemporary Chinese 
governments; and f) the war between Koguryo and Tang China in 
the 660s was not a civil war but rather a war between two 
countries. Academics in the PRC had acknowledged these facts 
regarding Koguryo's history until the launch of the PRC 
government's Northeast Project in 2002.
    Having a history can occur only when later generations 
recognize that history as theirs, record that history, and have 
a clear sense of succession to that history. Considering this, 
attention must be paid to the fact that official records of 
traditional Chinese history have described Koguryo as a 
predecessor of Koryo since the History of Song (C. Songshi) was 
completed in the fourteenth century. As seen clearly in the 
Korean texts History of the Three Kingdoms (K. Samguk sagi) 
completed by Kim Pusik (1075-1151) in 1145 and Memorabilia of 
the Three Kingdoms (K. Samguk yusa) by Iryon (1206-1289) in 
1281, too, Korean historians in premodern times also depicted 
Koguryo as a central part of their history together with 
Paekche and Silla. The Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms 
presents the mythical leader Tangun of Old Choson as the 
founder of the Korean people, and Chumong, the founder of 
Koguryo, as the son of Tangun. That is, Korean historians in 
the Koryo period understood that their history flowed from Old 
Choson to Koguryo, and then to Koryo. That history subsequently 
continued from Koryo to Choson, a kingdom that was founded in 
1392. This perception of historical succession is clearly 
reflected in the English names of the two Koreas, the Republic 
of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. (The 
name ``Korea'' came from ``Koryo.'')
    From the CRS Memorandum, item 7: ``Jiang reports that North 
Korea sent scholars to China after 1960 to gather materials 
about the ancient kingdoms. He names one such North Korean 
scholar, Ri Ji-rin (known in China as Li Zhilin), who spent 
five years at Beijing University, with the years unspecified. 
Jiang tells us that Ri's Chinese advisor reported serious 
concerns about the direction of Ri's work, but was ignored. 
Ri's Chinese advisor warned his superiors that in researching 
the ancient kingdoms, Ri had come to see ancient Chinese rulers 
as having `invaded' Korean territories, Jiang tells us. Ri, the 
advisor reported, became focused on `recovering lost lands' 
from China.'' (CRS Memorandum, 10.)
    Based upon differences in the bronze relics and graves 
discovered in the Liaodong area from those found in the central 
plains of China, Ri Jirin argued that the center of Old Choson 
was in the Liaodong region. (See Map 1, ``The Territory of Old 
Choson.'') He believed that Old Choson territory extended 
across Liaodong and the northwestern Korean Peninsula, and at 
its peak reached the Daling River, which is west of the Liao 
River. However, Ri's book, Kojoson yongu (Studies in Old Choson 
History), which was published in 1963, does not urge the 
recovery of the ancient territory of Old Choson in the Liaodong 
region. Nevertheless, Ri's adviser at Beijing University and 
Jiang Weidong understood his argument as being for the purpose 
of territorial recovery. Their views, however, were assumptions 
that applied a Chinese perspective to Ri's research.
    From the CRS Memorandum, item 8: ``Jiang does not present 
any further information about North Korean scholarship, except 
to assert that North Korean scholars are particularly fixated 
on the Gaogouli/Koguryo. They see their country, Jiang claims, 
as the successor to a proud Koguryo regime that shared their 
capital, Pyongyang, boldly expanded its territory in the Wei 
and Jin Dynasties, and for a period stood as an equal to the 
Chinese Sui and Tang Dynasties. Jiang quotes Ri's Peking 
University advisor as warning that while North Korean scholars' 
desire to `recover lost lands' might not now amount to 
anything, if such positions are not countered, North Koreans 
might in future generations `use this excuse to grab 
territory.' Jiang reports approvingly that China's government 
has come to recognize the dangers of allowing Japanese and 
Korean scholarship on the ancient kingdoms to go unchallenged, 
and has lifted taboos on Chinese scholarship on the ancient 
kingdoms.'' (CRS Memorandum, 10.)
    The PRC's assertion that scholars in the Republic of Korea 
and the DPRK are studying Koguryo history in order to justify 
the future recovery of lost territory reveals a Chinese 
perspective in which the PRC government would in the future 
absorb the history of that area into Chinese territory. It 
would appear that scholars in the PRC seem to have considered 
an example from Japan, which developed the theory of the Imna 
Nihon-fu in order to rationalize a historical claim to 
territory in the Korean Peninsula. However, the basic 
perspective in the historical scholarship conducted by scholars 
in the Republic of Korea is that historical research should 
exclude political purposes and move forward based upon facts.
    From the CRS Memorandum, item 9: ``In an exhortation that 
may alarm China's neighbors, especially South Koreans, Jiang 
concludes by urging his academic colleagues not to neglect 
research on the ancient Baiji/Paekje Kingdom, which once 
occupied the southwestern part of the Korean Peninsula. `We 
must not abandon it because its territory is not in our 
possession today,' Jiang writes. Jiang also urges his 
colleagues to study the Xinluo/Silla Kingdom, saying, `We 
cannot, because it is the predecessor of a Korean nation today, 
overlook the fact that it was subordinate to us in the Sui, 
Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing [Dynasties].' '' (CRS Memorandum, 
10.)
    Jiang Weidong believed that Paekche and Silla, like 
Koguryo, were subordinate to Chinese dynasties because these 
two southern Korean kingdoms had tributary relationships with 
Chinese governments. However, scholars in the Republic of Korea 
believe that the tribute system in pre-modern East Asia was an 
international order for diplomatic relations and one form of 
trade. Viewing the international order and diplomatic relations 
between China and neighboring countries in pre-modern East Asia 
through the logic of subordination and dominance in the 
imperialist age does not correspond with historical facts.
    The CRS Memorandum makes the excellent point that Jiang 
contradicted his own argument regarding the defensive nature of 
the historical scholarship in the PRC when he urged his 
colleagues not to neglect research on several ancient kingdoms 
in the Korean Peninsula, including the kingdoms which had once 
ruled the southernmost part of the Korean Peninsula, far from 
the current border shared by the DPRK and the PRC.

                               Conclusion

    The Review and Comments has offered a Korean perspective on 
the historical borders between Korea and China. As shown above, 
this analysis sometimes matches and sometimes differs from 
those presented in the PRC. The Northeast Asian History 
Foundation believes that ongoing open dialogue among Korean and 
Chinese scholars will enhance discussion and contribute to 
future research on border issues in history, and enable 
countries in Northeast Asia to continue moving forward toward 
peace and cooperation.


                              ----------                              


                   BORDERS BETWEEN KOREA AND CHINA IN
                        HISTORICAL MAPS OF KOREA


                   Map 1: The Territory of Old Choson


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    Map 1 shows the territory of Old Choson, the earliest 
government in Korean history. It is believed that Old Choson 
controlled a considerable area of the Korean Peninsula and 
Manchuria (present-day Northeast China) in ancient times. It 
developed a polity which differed from and was independent of 
the Chinese dynasties at that time. As early as the third 
century BCE, its territory is believed to have concentrated in 
the northwestern part of the Korean Peninsula and the northern 
part of the Liaodong Peninsula.

        Map 2: The Clash between Old Choson and China (196 BCE)


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    Map 2 depicts Qin China's borders before the collapse of 
Old Choson in 108 BCE. P'aesu, generally considered to be the 
present-day Amnok River, formed the border between Old Choson 
and Han China.

    Map 3: The Territory of the Han Commanderies at the Time of the 
                    Collapse of Old Choson (108 BCE)


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    Map 3 shows the territory of the Four Han Commanderies 
after Old Choson's conquest by Han China in 108 BCE. These 
commanderies, including the Nangnang Commandery, were 
established in the former territory of Old Choson. Most of the 
Han Chinese commanderies were pushed into the Liaodong 
Peninsula by resistance from local residents, and, as in the 
case of the Nangnang Commandery, cultural and political 
attitudes of the Chinese were assimilated into local areas.

Map 4: The Territorial Decrease of the Han Commanderies and the Growth 
                        of Koguryo (ca. 106 CE)


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    Map 4 presents the situation in 106 CE when the Hyondo 
Commandery (C. Xuantu Commandery) was pushed into the Liaodong 
Peninsula while Koguryo controlled Manchuria and both sides of 
the Amnok (C. Yalu) River. In the eastern coastal area, Okcho 
and Eastern Ye (K. Dongye) emerged near Koguryo.

              Map 5: Koguryo Territory from the Reign of 
                       King Changsu (r. 413-491)


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    Map 5 shows the border with China at the time of Koguryo's 
greatest expanse. Koguryo restored the territory of Old Choson 
by expelling the Nangnang (C. Lelang) Commandery in 313 and the 
Taebang (C. Daifang) Commandery in 314. During the reign of 
King Kwanggaet'o (r. 391-412), Koguryo's western border reached 
the Liao River. Later, Koguryo conquered Puyo (C. Fuyu) in the 
Nongan (C. Nongan) area and constructed the Puyo fortress. Its 
northernmost border was thus established. Koguryo maintained 
this border until defeated in war in 668.

Map 6: The Territories of Silla and Tang China after the Relocation of 
                    the Andong Commandery (ca. 676)


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    Map 6 shows the period when the Andong Commandery moved to 
the Liaodong Peninsula and the influence of Tang China had 
completely waned. The Silla-Tang China forces defeated Paekche 
in 660 and Koguryo in 668. Tang China established the ongjin 
(C. Xiongnu) Commandery in the former territory of Paekche and 
the Andong (C. Andong) Commandery in the former territory of 
Koguryo. However, Tang China's control over these two areas was 
for the stationing of troops. Paekche and Koguryo people fought 
against the Tang troops, and even Silla started to gradually 
control area formerly held by Tang China. Later, Silla 
established Soburi Province in the former Paekche territory in 
671 in order to push out the ongjin Commandery. The Andong 
Commandery relocated to the Liaodong Peninsula in 676. This 
situation forced Tang China to wield a limited control over the 
Liaodong Peninsula. Subsequently, the Korean Peninsula was 
governed by two countries, Silla and Parhae.

            Map 7: The Border between Parhae and Tang China


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    Map 7 shows the border between Parhae and Tang China in 
698, the year Parhae was founded by former Koguryo people in 
the former territory of Koguryo, particularly in Manchuria. 
Part of Korean history, this country's territory also included 
area in the LiaodongPeninsula. As an independent state, Parhae 
inherited history and culture from Koguryo. During the reign of 
King Son (r. 818-830), Parhae achieved its greatest expansion, 
facing Tang China along the Liao River and the Khitans west of 
the Liao River.

             Map 8: The Northern Border in the Early Koryo 
                            Period, 940-1044


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    Map 8 traces territorial changes in the early Koryo period. 
Line I shows that in its early decades Koryo established local 
administration in the northern frontier area along the Taedong 
River and Wonsan Bay. Line II shows the Koryo-Khitan border 
around 1044. By this time, Koryo had secured the downstream 
area of the Amnok River, particularly the six garrison 
settlements east of the Amnok River, through warfare and 
negotiations with the Khitans. Line III highlights Koryo's 
indirect control over the Jurchens after the border settlement 
with the Khitans.

 Map 9: The Border and Area under the Indirect Control of Koryo in the 
                         Late Eleventh Century


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    Map 9 illustrates the borders of Koryo and the areas to the 
northeast that were under Koryo's indirect control in the late 
eleventh century. The black line marks the border and the red 
line marks the area where Koryo exercised indirect control over 
the Jurchens. In 1073, Koryo established fifteen garrison 
settlements up to the present-day Kyongsong area of northern 
Hamgyong Province, where resided Jurchen tribes that were 
either politically loyal to the Koryo court or generally 
submissive to Koryo authority.

            Map 10: The Northern Border of Koryo during the 
                    Mongol Intervention of 1259-1356


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    Map 10 represents the northern frontier of Koryo during the 
Mongol Intervention of 1259-1356. Koryo concluded a truce with 
the Mongols after a war that lasted thirty years. The areas 
north of Ch'ollyong, centering on the Ssangsong Commandery, 
were left under the direct control of the Mongols. Later, the 
region was restored through the military activities of King 
Kongmin (r. 1351-1374) in 1356.

                Map 11: The Land Border of Choson, 1392


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    Map 11 shows the border of Choson (1392-1910) in its first 
years. Subsequently, Choson expanded its northern frontier to 
the Amnok (Yalu) River in the northwest and to the coast of 
northern Hamgyong Province in the northeast. Meanwhile, in the 
fifteenth century, Ming China exerted direct influence over 
part of the Liaodong Peninsula. The border between Choson and 
Ming China was formed along the downstream area of the Amnok 
(Yalu) River at that time. The Jurchens in contemporary 
Manchuria were largely independent of both Choson and Ming 
China.

  Map 12: The Amnok River-Tuman River Border between Choson and Ming 
                    China in the Early Choson Period


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    Map 12 shows the Amnok (Yalu) River-Tuman (Tumen) River 
border between Choson and Ming China in the early Choson 
period. During the reign of King Sejong (r. 1418-1450), Choson 
built six garrisons after defeating several Jurchen communities 
in the Tuman (Tumen) River area and established four counties 
in the upstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River, thus setting 
the two rivers as its northern border. During this period, Ming 
China's control over the area north of the Great Wall was 
limited to part of the Liaodong Peninsula. And, as shown in the 
map, Ming China shared its western border with Choson in the 
downstream area of the Amnok (Yalu) River.

                                GLOSSARY


                             Korean Terms:


Place Names and General Terms:

    1905 Protectorate Treaty
    Amnok River C. Yalu River
    Andong Commandery C. Andong duhufu
    Ch'ollyong
    Chaeryong River
    Chinbon Commandery C. Zhenfan-jun
    Chinhan
    Choson 1392-1910
    Eastern Okcho
    Eastern Puyo
    Four Han Chinese Commanderies K. Hansagun
    four counties
    Hamgyong Province
    Hamhung Plain
    Hwanghae Province
    Hyondo Commandery C. Xuantu-jun
    Imtun Commandery C. Lintun-jun
    Kando (C. Jiandao) Agreement
    kangwon marker headwater marker
    Kangwon Province
    Koguryo (C. Gaogouli) ?-668
    Koryo , 918-1392
    Mahan
    Malgals C. Mohe
    Map of Mount Paektu Boundary Marker
    Mt. Myorak
    Mt. Paektu C. Changbai-shan,
    Mt. Paektu boundary marker
    Mt. Sobaek C. Mt. Xiaobai
    Musan
    Nangnang Commandery C. Lelang-jun
    Okcho
    Old Choson (K. Kojoson)
    P'yongyang
    Paekche C. Baiji, ?-660
    Parhae C. Bohai, 698-926
    Puyo C. Fuyu
    Pyonhan
    Records of the Northern Expedition  K. Pukchong rok
    History of the Three Kingdoms K. Samguk sagi
    Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms K. Samguk yusa
    Silla C. Xinluo -935
    six garrisons
    Sogul River C. Shiyi Stream
    Ssangsong Commandery C. Shuangcheng zongguanfu
    Susok t'ongyokkwan First Chinese-language Translator
    Suksin C. Sushen
    Taebang Commandery C. Taifang-jun
    Taedong River C. Datong-jiang
    Taegak Peak
    Taeryong River Long Wall C. Daning-jiang changcheng
    Tongnyong Commandery C. Dongning-fu
    Tuman River C. Tumen River
    Umnu
    Ungjin Commandery C. Xiongjin dudufu
    Wonsan Bay
    Writings on Mt. Paektu K. Paektu-san ki
    Ye
    Yemaek
    Yonji Peak

Personal Names:

    Hong Set'ae 1653-1725
    Iryon 1206-1289
    Kim Chinam 1654-1718
    Kim Kyongmun dates unknown
    Kim Pusik 1075-1151
    King Changsu, of Koguryo r. 413-491
    King Kongmin, of Koryo r. 1351-1374
    King Kwanggaet'o, of Koguryo r. 391-412
    King Mu, of Parhae r. 719-737
    King Mun, of Parhae r. 737-793
    King Sejong, of Choson r. 1418-1450
    King Son, of Parhae r. 818-830
    Pak Kwn 1658-1715
    Ri Jirin
    Yun Kwan d. 1111

Chinese Terms:

    Biography of Meng Tian C. Mengtian liezhuan
    Book of Wei  C. Wei shu
    Dongyi ``eastern barbarians''
    Eastern Han China
    Gaoyi people
    General of Jilin
    Heilongjiang Province
    History of Song C.  Songshi
    History of the Three Kingdoms C.  Sanguo zhi
    Jiandao K. Kando
    Jieshi
    Jilin Province
    Left Jianzhou Commandery C. Jianzhou zuowei
    Liaodong River
    Liaoning Province
    Liaoyang
    Longjing K. Yongjong,
    Ming China 1368-1644
    Mo people
    Nuergan Regional Military Commission C. Nuergan dusi
    Pullae
    Qin China 221 BCE-206 BCE
    Jin China 1115-1234
    Qing China 1644-1910
    Records of the Grand Historian C. Shiji
    Shu China , 221-263
    Tang China 618-960
    Treatise on the Xiongnu C. Xiongnu liezhuan
    ``unified multi-ethnic country'' C. tongyi de duominzu 
guojia,
    Wei China 220-265
    Western Han China BCE 206-CE 8
    Wu China 229-280
    Yan China
    Yanji Border Issue Report C. Yanji bianwu baogao

Personal Names:

    Jin Yufu 1887-1962
    Sima Qian circa 145 BCE or 135 BCE-86 BCE
    Mukedeng 1664-1735
    Jiang Weidong
    Wu Luzhen 1880-1911
    Yang Zhaoquan

Other Terms:

    Didouyu
    Jurchens
    Kara Khitan
    Kumoxi
    Liao 916-1125
    Manchuria-Choson View of Northeast Asian History J. Mansen-
shi kan
    Primorsky region
    Rouran
    Theory of the Imna Nihon-fu
    Wa

Periodization of Korean History

    Old Choson (K. Kojoson) ?-BCE 108
    Paekche ?-660
    The Three KingdomsKoguryo ?-668
     Silla ?-935
    Parhae 698-926
    Koryo 918-1392
    Choson 1392-1910
  APPENDIX IV.--``READING CURRENT & FUTURE COMMERCIAL TEA LEAVES: NEW 
INSIGHTS INTO DPRK REGIME DYNAMICS'' JOHN S. PARK, PH.D., NOVEMBER 27, 
                                  2012




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