[Senate Prints 112-39]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
112th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session 112-39
_______________________________________________________________________
SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN AID
MAY NO LONGER BE ENOUGH
__________
A MINORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
Second Session
September 19, 2012 deg.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
76-002 WASHINGTON : 2012
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Summary.......................................................... 1
Background....................................................... 2
Financial Situation.............................................. 3
Lebanon.......................................................... 3
Jordan........................................................... 4
Turkey........................................................... 6
Syria............................................................ 7
Conclusion....................................................... 10
Map--``Syria: Numbers and Locations of People Fleeing Internal
Violence''..................................................... 12
(iii)
?
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, September 19, 2012.
Dear Colleagues: The transitions in the Middle East as part
of the ``Arab Spring'' have been relatively peaceful--except in
Syria, where more than 20,000 have been killed in fighting
between forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad and those rising up
against him. Not only have thousands been killed, hundreds of
thousands of refugees have fled across Syria's borders and more
than one million Internally Displaced Persons seek shelter with
family and friends inside Syria either as they flee the
fighting or because their homes and livelihoods have been
destroyed.
Syria's neighbors are greatly impacted as refugees stream
across borders looking for food and shelter. The situation is
even more complicated as some nations allow opposition forces
to recuperate inside their borders before returning to Syria to
re-engage in the fighting. Allegations of arms shipments and
possible training of anti-Assad forces muddy the waters
further.
Policy makers must recognize that Assad continues in power
primarily because he has the full military and financial
backing of Iran and the diplomatic support of Russia and China
which have successfully blocked any major action against Syria
in the United Nations Security Council. With Iraq (which is
roughly two-thirds Shiite Muslim) leaning more and more to
Tehran as a natural co-religionist ally, Iran's influence under
the current circumstances could create a crescent of power
running from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Tehran.
Syria is a majority Sunni state, yet is ruled by Assad who
is a Shia-affiliated Alawi. Alawis comprise only 10 percent of
Syria's population. Sensing his weakness, and wanting to aid
their fellow Sunnis, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have begun to
send arms to Assad's opponents. Turkey has demonstrated its
willingness to allow the use of its territory as a base for the
Syrian opposition, or to at least turn a blind eye. Syria has
thus become a proxy war against Iran.
In the midst of this, more than 250,000 refugees have fled
Syria to neighboring countries, each of which offers a varying
mixture of tolerance, indifference and active assistance either
through their own governments or the international community.
Providing them food, shelter and security is beginning to
strain both the international community and the host countries
which have their own economic and domestic political pressures.
(v)
Almost all parties agree that bringing the crisis in Syria
to a rapid conclusion by removing Assad from power is in
everyone's best interest as it will allow refugees to return
and hopefully diminish the role of armed groups in forming a
new government. Original hopes that he would go quietly into
exile have been shattered as the brutality of his forces makes
military defeat the only real alternative. One of the biggest
unknowns is whether Syrians will refrain from mass retribution
against the entire Alawi community for ``guilt by association''
with Assad and his cronies. Paradoxically, such possible wide-
scale violence not only threatens to turn Syria into another
faction-riven state such as today's Lebanon, but the fear of
massacres is one of the tools Assad is using to convince his
fellow Alawis to fight with him to the end.
In order to understand the situation on the ground more
fully and to assess the possible options for U.S. policy, I
asked Paul Foldi of my Foreign Relations Committee staff to
visit the region. He traveled to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey
August 29-September 8. As detailed more fully in the following
report, Mr. Foldi found there are three possible courses for
future U.S. action, each with risks and benefits.
Continue supplying humanitarian aid only.--This would keep
the U.S. out of the conflict. But some argue that, as
happened in Bosnia, our decision not to take sides in
spite of a clear preponderance of aggression on the
part of one side prolongs the suffering and allows the
malefactors to commit even greater human rights
violations. In this case, Assad long ago threw away any
bid for international support with indiscriminant
shelling, bombing and killing of civilians.
Impose a no fly zone.--Supporters say it will provide both
a humanitarian safe haven for refugees and neutralize
the value of Assad's superior fighter planes, bombers
and helicopters. Critics point out that Assad's highly
capable air defenses would make enforcement costly and
potentially lethal and that similar zones in Iraq did
nothing to assist Saddam's opponents.
Train and arm the opposition.--Saudi Arabia and Qatar are
already providing light arms, but in order to allow
anti-Assad forces to succeed, they will need to be able
to neutralize his air power with anti-aircraft weapons.
The U.S. has provided such equipment to other
insurgents in the past with mixed results. In this
case, Turkey would be especially leery that such arms
might fall into the hands of guerilla groups it is
already fighting.
I hope you will find this report useful as we attempt to
address this crisis.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN AID MAY
NO LONGER BE ENOUGH
Summary
More than an estimated 250,000 Syrian refugees are now
testing the stability of its neighbors Lebanon, Jordan and
Turkey. While each country has its own strains, Jordan is the
nearest to an actual breaking point both financially and on the
humanitarian front. Turkey has valiantly tried to handle the
issue on its own but it must now ask for more and more
international assistance. Somewhat surprisingly, Lebanon, with
its already chaotic sectarian issues, seems the least impacted
by the refugees for now. Nonetheless, if allowed to continue,
governments in Jordan certainly, and Turkey possibly, could
fall if refugee waves continue.
Foreign Relations Committee staff traveled to each of these
countries to meet with local political leaders, international
aid workers and NGOs, and American State Department officials
to assess the crisis. Visits and meetings were held in Beirut,
Lebanon; Amman, Jordan, Za'atri and Cyber City Refugee Camps in
Jordan; Istanbul, Turkey, Turkish Refugee Camps in Hatay
Province next to the Syrian border, and Ankara, Turkey, from
August 29 to September 8, 2012.
With Saudi Arabia and Qatar supplying arms for Assad's
loose-knit opponents known as the Free Syria Army and Iran
fully supporting Assad with weapons and funds, this civil war
has, de facto, become a proxy war against Iran. U.S. policy
makers must now decide if the potential for regional
destabilization as a result of unabated refugee flows will be
less costly in long run than greater U.S. military involvement
in the short run--either through a NATO No-Fly-Zone (originally
requested by Turkey) or more significant arms and training to
the FSA than they currently receive. Risks are inherent either
way. A prolonged war, in addition to the mounting humanitarian
costs, will also permit the increased entrenched
factionalization of both the military and political opposition.
NATO involvement will be costly in terms of armaments expended
and possible causalities or prisoners. U.S.-provided weapons
and training may drag other nations into the conflict and could
result in arms falling into the wrong hands.
Background
(in millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Syrian Existing
Total Refugees/ Iraqi Palestinians
Population IDPs Refugees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Syria\1\ 21 1.2 1.0 0.5
Lebanon 4.3 0.070 0.1 0.450
Jordan 6.2 0.087 0.4 2.0
Turkey 0.75 0.080 nominal N/A
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\1\ Figures come from USAID Syria Fact Sheet # 3; September 5, 2012:
http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/
disaster_assistance/countries/syria/template/fs_sr/fy2012/
syria_ce_fs03_09-05-2012.pdf
August saw the highest monthly outflow of refugees from
Syria--over 100,000. The actual number for each country
fluctuates wildly (``official`` numbers come from the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) list of registered refugees,
but because there are no visa requirements for Syrians to enter
these three countries, these numbers are undoubtedly low; some
say as many as 140,000 are currently in Jordan). Many refugees
arrive wounded, either because they were fired upon by Syrian
security forces as they attempted to escape or because they are
wounded combatants. Border crossings open and close with great
irregularity, forcing many refugees to use as active or
abandoned smuggling routes, gaps in fences where fences exist,
or just crossing miles of trackless desert. There are even
reports of refugees wounded in minefields along parts of the
border.\2\
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\2\ See the State Department's Humanitarian Information Unit's map
from September 12, 2012 at the end of this report for more information.
Updated maps and information can be found at https://hiu.state.gov/
pages/home.aspx
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Depending on the security situation, many Syrian refugees
return home temporarily to check on family (or fight) and
depart again when the situation deteriorates. This transient
aspect of the refugees can result in double or even triple
counting. In addition to this recent influx, Lebanon and Jordan
are host to large number of Iraqis displaced in the last decade
and Palestinians who arrived decades ago and who have remained
for the multiple generations that have been born since.
Most Syrian refugees in Lebanon are not in camps but live
with family members, friends, or rent housing. In Turkey,
refugees are mainly in well laid out camps (some tents, many in
converted/subdivided warehouses) with older camps near the
border, newer ones farther away. Jordan has a mix, though
almost all new arrivals are going into camps (the largest of
25,000+ is a dusty, desolate U.N. camp called Za'atri that
staff visited). Roaming Syrian populations inside their own
country (Internally Displaced Persons ``IDPs'') cluster near
the Turkish border awaiting entry or seeking protection or
shelter with relations in other parts of Syria.
As with all refugee situations, children are the most
vulnerable and stressed, both in terms of missing parents and
inadequate educational/recreational opportunities. Bored
children, especially adolescents, trapped inside walled or
fenced facilities are particularly prone to venting their
frustration through violence when cajoled or provoked by a few
malcontents. Soccer balls and school books are just as
necessary as food and shelter.
Financial Situation
To date the U.S. has offered $103 million in regional
assistance, primarily to the World Food Program (WFP) and to
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The U.S. also
just finalized $100 million in Direct Budget Support to
Jordan.\3\ Jordan, always cash-strapped, has still not received
the $1 billion in direct support it gets every year from Saudi
Arabia, and the government, in conjunction with the U.N.,
issued an international appeal at the beginning of September
for $700 million to help with the crisis.\4\ Turkey has spent
more than $300 million of its own resources on the refugees. It
is unclear when Assad will run out of money. Estimates
fluctuate wildly, and some speculate he will be broke by the
end of the year due to a burn rate of up to $1billion/month,
but these figures are pure guesswork at this point. Others
contend he has money squirreled away or that Iran might be
willing to fund him.
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\3\ http://jordan.usembassy.gov/pr_100_million_asst_072212.html
\4\ ``Jordan, U.N. Appeal for $700 Million To Help Deal With
Refugees'' Washington Post; September 1, 2012: http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle--east/jordan-un-appeal-for-700-
million-to-help-deal-with-influx-of-syrian-refugees/2012/09/01/
d544891c-f431-11e1-b74c-84ed55e0300b_story.html
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Lebanon
Lebanon's capital Beirut remains relatively calm due in
part to the government's official policy of ``disassociation''
with the Syrian crisis--a policy brought about because Iran's
client Hezbollah forms part of the Lebanese government. This
policy has not prevented sectarian fighting from spilling over
into Tripoli in the north as rivals mirror the fighting just
across the border. Occasionally, cross-border firing and even
shelling has taken place, so far with no major consequences.
Lebanon's politics are so chaotic that the Syrian refugees are
actually a boon to business. An earlier spate of kidnappings of
Lebanese inside Syria resulted in tit-for-tat kidnappings
inside Lebanon. This led most Gulf countries to urge their
citizens to flee or to avoid tourism-dependent Lebanon. Well-
off Syrian refugees have filled much of that void, renting
vacant apartments with year-long leases, to the point that
rents are escalating. For those without such funds, Lebanon was
able to convert many empty schools into temporary shelters, yet
school is about to start and it is not clear where those
families will move to once displaced.\5\
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\5\ ``Aid Agencies Scrambling to Relocate Refugees from Schools''
Voice of America: August 31, 2012: http://www.voanews.com/content/aid-
agencies-scramblint-to-relocate-refugees-from-syrian-schools/
1499528.html
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Lebanon's multi-racial/multi-ethnic nature resulting from
intermarriages between tribes and sects has created safe-havens
for those Syrians who are able to stay with family. Depending
on the level of Syrian military/police checkpoints--some of
which require a bribe to pass and some which do not--as well as
Hezbollah checkpoints in Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley,
Damascus to Beirut is but a short, 50 mile car ride. This
proximity has allowed many Syrians to return temporarily to
their capital or nearby towns.
Palestinian issues continue to plague Lebanon. Funds are
still lacking for the final rebuilding phase of a large section
of an UNRWA ``camp'' (no tents, but an entire urban
neighborhood) that was destroyed by the Lebanese army in 2007
in a firefight which displaced 30,000.\6\ Palestinians had
limited property and work rights in Syria; they have far fewer
in Lebanon. Housing options for them are limited absent the
rebuilding of the destroyed neighborhood and as Palestinians,
according to treaty, can only receive assistance from UNRWA,
not UNHCR.
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\6\ Reconstruction of the Nahrel-Bared Camp & UNRWA Compound:
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011042974549.pdf
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Jordan
U.S. Embassy officials praised the Jordanian Armed Forces
(JAF) for doing all it can to assist Syrian refugees. The JAF
welcomes them at the border, and in the beginning, men and
officers fed refugees out of their own rations. The U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) is now providing JAF with
additional humanitarian equipment to assist with refugee
management. Wide-scale allegations of Jordanian authorities
seizing refugee travel docs are denied by the government. Such
allegations are no surprise and indeed may have occurred early
in the crisis as overwhelmed border officials quite conceivably
tossed passports/ID cards into boxes with the hopes of sorting
them out later. However, the matter now needs to be redressed
quickly--both to return rightful property but, more
importantly, to allow Syrians needed documents to return home.
Jordan's scarce water resources are strained under any
conditions and many have long blamed Syria for stealing more
than its share from the Yarmouk tributary of the Jordan River
that forms the north-west most portion of the Jordan's border
with Syria. Hosting 100,000+ Syrians will only compound this,
especially as many Syrians appear not always sympathetic to the
demands of water conservation required in Jordan's more arid
environment. Additionally, Jordan's sluggish economy and
allegations of high-level economic corruption are straining
domestic forces. This could easily lead to either 1) the
refugees rioting themselves over mistreatment or 2) inflame
popular protests against a king and government that is
perceived as aiding refugees while ignoring the plight of its
own citizens. While the King seems to understand the message
behind the Arab Spring, he has not been able to make sufficient
reforms to quell growing unrest. To compensate, or, as his
domestic critics would charge, curry favor in order to prop up
his rule, King Abdullah has been extremely accommodating to
U.S. requests during this crisis.
Even Jordan, with its long history of tolerating large
foreign-born populations, has its limits. Thus some six weeks
ago it began planning a massive camp to house the latest influx
of refugees. Called Za'atri, and located near Jordan's north-
west border with Syria, the camp has ballooned to well over
25,000 refugees with upwards of 1,000 arriving daily.
Administered by UNHCR with help from UNICEF, the World Food
Program (WFP), Save the Children and a host of other donors,
the tented camp quickly got out of hand. Conditions in the
older half of the camp are particularly dire as well-meaning
engineers graded the ground to allow for flat surfaces, but
this only displaced the thin layer of topsoil and created a
desolate and dusty environment instead. The U.S., particularly
DoD, was able to apply some rapid funding to procure truckloads
of gravel which are now being used in the newer portions of the
camp (called Za'atri 2, 3, etc.) and keep the dust down quite
well. Many of the refugees are from Syria's upper and middle
class. Staff spoke with lawyers and doctors who fled with
nothing but who are beginning to chafe at their conditions.
At Za'atri, the food and water demands of the camp are
insatiable and are straining relations with nearby towns and
villages which fear that scarce resources will soon disappear.
Communal kitchens are being constructed in Za'atri to alleviate
the current dietary monotony, but establishing a food voucher
system to allow camp residents to purchase what they want to
cook will take time. Refugees are provided with a solar powered
lamp, mattresses, blankets and a few other household items.
Latrines and showers use gravity tanks and are surprisingly
hygienic given the environment and constant usage. Security is
an issue as an earlier riot injured several police officers
(who, with great discipline, refused to attack the mob), but
the police now refuse to patrol the camp.
A lucky few families have small 9x18 single room trailers
instead of tents. While these provide better living than tents,
it is a matter of scale. The trailers are more permanent, and
could be transported back to Syria if needed; however, for the
price of one trailer, UNHCR can provide 4-5 tents. The approach
of winter--bitterly cold in the desert--also means additional
resources will have to be spent for heaters and extra tarps to
winterize tents.
Dust covered UNCHR tents in the original Za'atri camp
(left) Container housing in Za'atri (right) Za'atri 2 Camp with U.S.-
provided gravel keeps the dust down
Turkey
Turkey's huge population means the actual number of
refugees (or ``guests'' as they are officially called;
``refugees'' is a loaded word for the Turks and verboten) is
statistically insignificant. Turkey has spent $300 million thus
far supporting these guests (MFA officials quoted $10 million
to build a camp to house 10,000 and $3 million/month to operate
it). Meanwhile the opposition party goads the government daily
either for not doing enough to help the refugees or for
questioning the abrupt about face on the country's formally
cozy ties with the Assad regime. (Some observers believe
Turkey's current stance against Syria is personal and comes
from the rebuff Assad gave to Turkish PM Erdogan's suggestions
to Assad for democratic reforms following the Arab Spring.)
Turkey originally created a Cadillac of a camp when the
refugee waves first hit. This is understandable for several
reasons. Turkey's economy is booming, and the country wanted to
show off its wealth and prestige accordingly.
As the refuges continued to pour in, the Turks scaled back
subsequent efforts, but compared to Za'atri, the camps in
Turkey are still upscale. Staff visited an abandoned two-story
warehouse that had been subdivided using sheetrock/drywall into
multiple units, each with a door and window facing a common
hall, with a stove and water jug, as well as an operating
electric fan. While not paradise by any means, it is miles
above Za'atri. Refugees are allowed to leave camp from 8am-8pm
and local press reports said they were a boon to the Turkish
agricultural industry. Those with money they brought or from
friends were able to outfit their rooms as needed and one had
even purchased an air conditioner.
Turkey's initial go-it-alone attitude has begun to waver,
and the government let it be known that 100,000 refugees was a
red-line for the government. Turkey recently asked UNHCR to
become more involved in planning future sites, which UNHCR
contends must be farther from the border--at least one day's
walk--as this deters those inside from using a camp as a base
of operations. UNHCR told staff that one current camp in Turkey
was even found to have a tunnel under the border into Syria, it
was so close.
A Turkish warehouse converted to house Syrian ``guests''
Keeping camps for refugees and not as an R-and-R spot for
opposition fighters will not only allow better internal
controls, but ensure the safety of non-combatants in the camp,
according to UNHCR. Turkey's most recent efforts to move those
refugees living in rented homes near the Syrian border into
camps reflects Ankara's desire to know exactly who is inside
their borders.\7\ However, any Turkish attempts to restrict
young males from popping in and out of Syria--whether to fight
or to check on family--will no doubt increase tensions inside
the camps.
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\7\ ``Turkey Shifts Syrian Refugees From Borders'' Voice of
America, September 13, 2012: http://www.voanews.com/content/
turkey_shifts_syrian_refugees_from_broders/1507286.html
In hopes of limiting the number of Syrian ``guests,''
Turkey has begun a novel approach known as ``Zero Point
Distribution.'' Food and basic hygiene necessities are left
right at the Syrian border (i.e.--the Zero Point) with the hope
that Syrians will be able to subsist off this assistance yet
remain in Syria. Staff visited a Zero Point distribution center
located only a mile from the border and run by the Turkish Red
Crescent which stockpiled bottled water, prepackaged boxes of
food, even bags of American rice purchased on the local market.
The aid is dropped off along the border, but not near official
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crossings where it might fall into Syrian government hands.
Syria
The U.S. must decide the extent to which it wants to
participate in the on-going proxy war against Iran, which is
what Syria has become thanks to assistance from Saudi Arabia
and Qatar to the Free Syria Army (FSA) versus Iranian\8\ (some
add Chinese, possibly Russian) assistance to Syria. Defeating
Assad is beating Tehran. With Iraq leaning ever more towards
its Shiite neighbor to the East, it is in no one's interest to
allow Tehran to have a geopolitical and actual terrorist
crescent running from Tehran to Hezbollah/Hamas.
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\8\ ``Iran's Revolutionary Guards Commander Says Its Troops In
Syria" Reuters, September 16, 2012: http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/09/16/us-iran-syria-presence-idUSBRE88F04C2 0120916
The U.S. so far has engaged officially only in humanitarian
assistance (though some press reporting suggests otherwise.)
\9\ However much the current levels of humanitarian and
financial assistance are appreciated by senior politicians in
the region, the populace little knows of U.S. efforts because
it comes either as direct bilateral budgetary support or is
diluted with other funds through U.N. agencies. Even though
they have delivered only a few, the Saudi's promise of
thousands of temporary trailers to shelter refugees has earned
them wide praise in the Jordanian street.
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\9\ ``CIA Said To Be Steering Arms To Syrian Opposition'' New York
Times; June 21, 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/
middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-steering-arms-to-syrian-
rebels.html?pagewanted=all
Some argue that more overt U.S. assistance for the FSA will
counter the perception that we did nothing to help oust
Mubarak; these observers also contend U.S. military help would
keep the FSA from being too beholden to Saudi and Qatari
Wahhabists. Others say that, as recent tragic events suggest,
our efforts in Libya have borne little pro-U.S. fruit and that
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we could expect the same in Syria.
There is no question the FSA is a loose coalition of forces
whose only unifying factor is a desire to oust Assad via
military means now that it is clear he will not go quietly. The
FSA runs the gamut of idealistic students who took up arms
after their peaceful demonstrations were fired upon to foreign
Al Qaeda fighters looking for action to help their Sunni
brethren. In between are Syrian army defectors, shop keepers
and every other stratum of Syrian society.
Politically, the opposition is just as splintered. The most
prominent is the Syrian National Conference (SNC); however, the
SNC is viewed inside Syria as a bunch of ex-pats who jet around
the world decrying the situation but who are unable to provide
the FSA with either weapons or funds from the Syrian diaspora
or donor communities, and at the same time refuse to die in the
rubble with the FSA. Given this military and political Tower of
Babel, the real danger exists that an Assad-free Syria--far
from controlling Lebanon as it used to--will become another
Lebanon as those with the guns will make the rules.
A gym near the Turkish/Syria border converted to a warehouse to store
items for Turkish Red Crescent's ``Zero Point Distribution''
While staff heard from younger FSA members and some in the
SNC that Assad's exit will bring an abrupt peace, most Syria
watchers believe that the fighting is now tribal and sectarian.
One interlocutor told staff of a comment from a foreign contact
of Assad's. ``Before Ramadan in 2011, I was speaking to the
leader of Syria; after Ramadan, I was speaking to the leaders
of the Alawites.'' While they comprise barely 10% of Syria's
population, virtually all military and political power
concentrated in Alawite hands. As such, most observers believe
they will now fight to the death to maintain power, and that
their brutality to date means--regardless of their role--almost
all will be rounded up and killed when Assad is defeated. Such
a scenario is also used by Assad to sustain the Alawites in
their fight against the opposition as he warns fellow clansmen
they are in a literal matter of life and death.
To combat the current political fragmentation, the U.S.
State Department, through its Istanbul-based OSOS (Office of
Syrian Opposition Support--a creation of State's bureau of
Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)) is training Syrian
activists in the use of secure communications and providing
them with Arabic-language laptops and mobile satellite up-
links.\10\ This training is based upon the Obama
administration's policy of ``non-lethal aid for non-lethal
actors.'' The training--thus far in groups of a dozen--must be
held in Istanbul, a city of 10 plus million, in order to
provide both the trainers and the trainees greater anonymity.
While it is certainly more expensive to run the training from
Istanbul rather than closer to the border, this blending-in
allows OSOS to keep a low profile and maintain better security.
Trainers switch to another of the city's countless hotels every
few sessions; such anonymity would be impossible in the tiny,
tightly-knit villages near the border.
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\10\ Antennas provided are the size of dinner plates and therefore
easily hidden on rooftops or balconies.
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Younger trainees (all of whom must be smuggled from Syria
to Istanbul), however, want more than the limited data package
offered with the computer/antenna. The YouTube generation
believes it can win greater international support (and possibly
intervention) by continual uploading of graphic videos showing
Syrian atrocities. U.S. sponsored trainers stress there are
already enough videos out there. They argue, rather, the need
is to create nascent political networks using the equipment to
link up with fellow activists in neighboring towns (instead of
transmitting the large, and costly, video files which the OSOS
package will not support). Trainers dangle rewards of increased
data packages (which can be paid for in Istanbul) for activists
who contact OSOS upon their return to Syria and report on their
location, conditions, etc. OSOS will expand training to larger
classes and more direct democratic transition activities in the
coming weeks.
As the friction with OSOS's support demonstrates, Assad
opponents want more than just tents for refugees and laptops,
they want the means to remove him militarily. While it is clear
that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are providing arms to their Sunni
co-religionists (primarily via Turkey, where U.S. press reports
suggest the CIA is also involved in vetting and training),
these light arms cannot counter Assad's superiority in
artillery and fixed and rotary-wing air power. FSA and other
forces want either a no-fly zone or the firepower to create
their own.\11\
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\11\ ``Syrian Rebels Get Influx Of Arms With Gulf Neighbors''
money, U.S. coordination" Washington Post; May 15, 2012: http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-rebels-get-
influx-of-arms-with-gulf-neighbors-money-us-coordination/2012/05/15/
gIQAds2TSU_story.html; "Turkey Calls For No Fly Zone" CBSNews.com;
August 31, 2012: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202--162-57504064/turkey-
calls-for-syria-safe-zones-u.n-security-council-remains-unmoved/
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Some interlocutors staff spoke with contested the current
DC-think which holds that a no-fly zone (NFZ) inside Syria is
militarily impossible because Assad's air defenses are too
tough. Supporters of a NFZ point out that most Syrian anti-
aircraft assets are concentrated near Damascus and while
certainly not insignificant, are of an older Soviet quality.
Thus, they say, an NFZ in the northwest of the country,
including Aleppo, is not impossible. Opponents of a NFZ point
to our experience in Iraq where decade-long northern and
southern NFZs did little to allow Saddam's opponents to over-
throw him. They contend that a NFZ will do little to create a
tipping point in favor of the FSA.
The Turks do not want to impose a NFZ on their own for the
same geo-political reason they do not wish to intercede alone
on the ground to create a humanitarian Safe Zone: fear of
allowing Assad to shift the fighting from Syrian-on-Syrian to
Arab versus the dreaded Turk/Ottoman Empire of long ago.
However, Turkey seems perfectly willing to play a greater role,
as long as it has the political cover to do so. With continued
Russian and Chinese obstruction in the U.N. Security Council,
the only option would therefore be NATO. The June loss of a
Turkish reconnaissance fighter over the Mediterranean had the
potential to become a Gulf of Tonkin moment as Turkey quickly
accepted Syrian claims to have shot it down, but NATO declined
to get more involved.\12\ The sunken jet was recently
discovered by the U.S. deep-sea robot company used to find the
Titanic.\13\ Mechanical failure is also a possible cause of the
crash, according to American interlocutors familiar with the
incident who cautioned about a rush to judgment.
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\12\ ``Ankara Vows To Take `Necessary Action' After Syria Shoots
Down Turkish Jet'' The Guardian (UK); June 23, 2012: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/23/syria-shooting-down-turkish-jet
\13\ ``Exploration Vessel Nautilus Locates Downed Turkish Jet''
Ocean Exploration Trust; July 11, 2012: http://
oceanexplorationtrust.com/press/20120711_Turkey.htm
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It is unclear if Ankara will continue to look for, or
foment, an incident that would draw in NATO, but Turkey clearly
has the military power to defeat Assad on its own. However, the
military and current government are at odds with one another as
hundreds of generals are on trial for an alleged 2003 coup
attempt. Given this, Turkish PM Erdogan is more likely to rely
on his Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO)
instead to be the main contact with Syrian fighters inside
Turkey and to work with the Saudis and Qataris to receive the
arms shipments mentioned above and to turn them over to the
Free Syria Army.
Conclusion
With more than 20,000 dead so far in Syria, Assad must go
sooner rather than later. In addition to the humanitarian
catastrophe he has created, Syria's role as Iran's client has
endangered our allies in the area and led to its support of
groups actively seeking to kill Americans. America's current
policy of only providing humanitarian assistance addresses real
needs and is appreciated by our allies in the region. It does
not address the issue of shortening the conflict. A NATO-
imposed no fly zone might tilt the military advantage in favor
of the insurgents, but it may be deemed too costly or risky.
Another option is to provide the FSA with arms capable of
shooting down Syrian fixed and rotary wing aircraft. However,
our own experience in providing MANPADs to various groups over
the years has yielded mixed results. In this situation, Turkey
could balk for fear that these weapons would fall into the
hands of its Kurdish separatist insurgency--the PKK. Our own
fears of Al-Qaeda affiliates achieving the same are not
unwarranted. Supplying such weapons after careful vetting of
the recipients might level the field enough to allow the
uprising to succeed.