[Senate Prints 112-39]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



112th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
                            COMMITTEE PRINT                     
 2d Session                                                      112-39
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                        SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN AID 
                        MAY NO LONGER BE ENOUGH

                               __________

                        A MINORITY STAFF REPORT

                      PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      One Hundred Twelfth Congress

                             Second Session

                    September 19, 2012 deg.

                                     





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                COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS          

            JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman          
BARBARA BOXER, California            RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois          JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico                MIKE LEE, Utah
              William C. Danvers, Staff Director          
       Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director          

                             (ii)          
?



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v
Summary..........................................................     1
Background.......................................................     2
Financial Situation..............................................     3
Lebanon..........................................................     3
Jordan...........................................................     4
Turkey...........................................................     6
Syria............................................................     7
Conclusion.......................................................    10
Map--``Syria: Numbers and Locations of People Fleeing Internal 
  Violence''.....................................................    12

                                 (iii)
?

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                Washington, DC, September 19, 2012.
    Dear Colleagues: The transitions in the Middle East as part 
of the ``Arab Spring'' have been relatively peaceful--except in 
Syria, where more than 20,000 have been killed in fighting 
between forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad and those rising up 
against him. Not only have thousands been killed, hundreds of 
thousands of refugees have fled across Syria's borders and more 
than one million Internally Displaced Persons seek shelter with 
family and friends inside Syria either as they flee the 
fighting or because their homes and livelihoods have been 
destroyed.
    Syria's neighbors are greatly impacted as refugees stream 
across borders looking for food and shelter. The situation is 
even more complicated as some nations allow opposition forces 
to recuperate inside their borders before returning to Syria to 
re-engage in the fighting. Allegations of arms shipments and 
possible training of anti-Assad forces muddy the waters 
further.
    Policy makers must recognize that Assad continues in power 
primarily because he has the full military and financial 
backing of Iran and the diplomatic support of Russia and China 
which have successfully blocked any major action against Syria 
in the United Nations Security Council. With Iraq (which is 
roughly two-thirds Shiite Muslim) leaning more and more to 
Tehran as a natural co-religionist ally, Iran's influence under 
the current circumstances could create a crescent of power 
running from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Tehran.
    Syria is a majority Sunni state, yet is ruled by Assad who 
is a Shia-affiliated Alawi. Alawis comprise only 10 percent of 
Syria's population. Sensing his weakness, and wanting to aid 
their fellow Sunnis, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have begun to 
send arms to Assad's opponents. Turkey has demonstrated its 
willingness to allow the use of its territory as a base for the 
Syrian opposition, or to at least turn a blind eye. Syria has 
thus become a proxy war against Iran.
    In the midst of this, more than 250,000 refugees have fled 
Syria to neighboring countries, each of which offers a varying 
mixture of tolerance, indifference and active assistance either 
through their own governments or the international community. 
Providing them food, shelter and security is beginning to 
strain both the international community and the host countries 
which have their own economic and domestic political pressures.


                                  (v)

    Almost all parties agree that bringing the crisis in Syria 
to a rapid conclusion by removing Assad from power is in 
everyone's best interest as it will allow refugees to return 
and hopefully diminish the role of armed groups in forming a 
new government. Original hopes that he would go quietly into 
exile have been shattered as the brutality of his forces makes 
military defeat the only real alternative. One of the biggest 
unknowns is whether Syrians will refrain from mass retribution 
against the entire Alawi community for ``guilt by association'' 
with Assad and his cronies. Paradoxically, such possible wide-
scale violence not only threatens to turn Syria into another 
faction-riven state such as today's Lebanon, but the fear of 
massacres is one of the tools Assad is using to convince his 
fellow Alawis to fight with him to the end.
    In order to understand the situation on the ground more 
fully and to assess the possible options for U.S. policy, I 
asked Paul Foldi of my Foreign Relations Committee staff to 
visit the region. He traveled to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey 
August 29-September 8. As detailed more fully in the following 
report, Mr. Foldi found there are three possible courses for 
future U.S. action, each with risks and benefits.
   Continue supplying humanitarian aid only.--This would keep 
        the U.S. out of the conflict. But some argue that, as 
        happened in Bosnia, our decision not to take sides in 
        spite of a clear preponderance of aggression on the 
        part of one side prolongs the suffering and allows the 
        malefactors to commit even greater human rights 
        violations. In this case, Assad long ago threw away any 
        bid for international support with indiscriminant 
        shelling, bombing and killing of civilians.
   Impose a no fly zone.--Supporters say it will provide both 
        a humanitarian safe haven for refugees and neutralize 
        the value of Assad's superior fighter planes, bombers 
        and helicopters. Critics point out that Assad's highly 
        capable air defenses would make enforcement costly and 
        potentially lethal and that similar zones in Iraq did 
        nothing to assist Saddam's opponents.
   Train and arm the opposition.--Saudi Arabia and Qatar are 
        already providing light arms, but in order to allow 
        anti-Assad forces to succeed, they will need to be able 
        to neutralize his air power with anti-aircraft weapons. 
        The U.S. has provided such equipment to other 
        insurgents in the past with mixed results. In this 
        case, Turkey would be especially leery that such arms 
        might fall into the hands of guerilla groups it is 
        already fighting.

     I hope you will find this report useful as we attempt to 
address this crisis.
            Sincerely,
                                          Richard G. Lugar,
                                                    Ranking Member.
                      SYRIA: HUMANITARIAN AID MAY
                          NO LONGER BE ENOUGH

                                Summary

     More than an estimated 250,000 Syrian refugees are now 
testing the stability of its neighbors Lebanon, Jordan and 
Turkey. While each country has its own strains, Jordan is the 
nearest to an actual breaking point both financially and on the 
humanitarian front. Turkey has valiantly tried to handle the 
issue on its own but it must now ask for more and more 
international assistance. Somewhat surprisingly, Lebanon, with 
its already chaotic sectarian issues, seems the least impacted 
by the refugees for now. Nonetheless, if allowed to continue, 
governments in Jordan certainly, and Turkey possibly, could 
fall if refugee waves continue.
    Foreign Relations Committee staff traveled to each of these 
countries to meet with local political leaders, international 
aid workers and NGOs, and American State Department officials 
to assess the crisis. Visits and meetings were held in Beirut, 
Lebanon; Amman, Jordan, Za'atri and Cyber City Refugee Camps in 
Jordan; Istanbul, Turkey, Turkish Refugee Camps in Hatay 
Province next to the Syrian border, and Ankara, Turkey, from 
August 29 to September 8, 2012.
    With Saudi Arabia and Qatar supplying arms for Assad's 
loose-knit opponents known as the Free Syria Army and Iran 
fully supporting Assad with weapons and funds, this civil war 
has, de facto, become a proxy war against Iran. U.S. policy 
makers must now decide if the potential for regional 
destabilization as a result of unabated refugee flows will be 
less costly in long run than greater U.S. military involvement 
in the short run--either through a NATO No-Fly-Zone (originally 
requested by Turkey) or more significant arms and training to 
the FSA than they currently receive. Risks are inherent either 
way. A prolonged war, in addition to the mounting humanitarian 
costs, will also permit the increased entrenched 
factionalization of both the military and political opposition. 
NATO involvement will be costly in terms of armaments expended 
and possible causalities or prisoners. U.S.-provided weapons 
and training may drag other nations into the conflict and could 
result in arms falling into the wrong hands.

                               Background


                              (in millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                New Syrian     Existing
                     Total       Refugees/       Iraqi      Palestinians
                  Population       IDPs        Refugees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Syria\1\                  21           1.2           1.0            0.5
Lebanon                  4.3         0.070           0.1          0.450
Jordan                   6.2         0.087           0.4            2.0
Turkey                  0.75         0.080       nominal            N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Figures come from USAID Syria Fact Sheet # 3; September 5, 2012:
  http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/
  disaster_assistance/countries/syria/template/fs_sr/fy2012/
  syria_ce_fs03_09-05-2012.pdf



    August saw the highest monthly outflow of refugees from 
Syria--over 100,000. The actual number for each country 
fluctuates wildly (``official`` numbers come from the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) list of registered refugees, 
but because there are no visa requirements for Syrians to enter 
these three countries, these numbers are undoubtedly low; some 
say as many as 140,000 are currently in Jordan). Many refugees 
arrive wounded, either because they were fired upon by Syrian 
security forces as they attempted to escape or because they are 
wounded combatants. Border crossings open and close with great 
irregularity, forcing many refugees to use as active or 
abandoned smuggling routes, gaps in fences where fences exist, 
or just crossing miles of trackless desert. There are even 
reports of refugees wounded in minefields along parts of the 
border.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See the State Department's Humanitarian Information Unit's map 
from September 12, 2012 at the end of this report for more information. 
Updated maps and information can be found at https://hiu.state.gov/
pages/home.aspx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Depending on the security situation, many Syrian refugees 
return home temporarily to check on family (or fight) and 
depart again when the situation deteriorates. This transient 
aspect of the refugees can result in double or even triple 
counting. In addition to this recent influx, Lebanon and Jordan 
are host to large number of Iraqis displaced in the last decade 
and Palestinians who arrived decades ago and who have remained 
for the multiple generations that have been born since.
    Most Syrian refugees in Lebanon are not in camps but live 
with family members, friends, or rent housing. In Turkey, 
refugees are mainly in well laid out camps (some tents, many in 
converted/subdivided warehouses) with older camps near the 
border, newer ones farther away. Jordan has a mix, though 
almost all new arrivals are going into camps (the largest of 
25,000+ is a dusty, desolate U.N. camp called Za'atri that 
staff visited). Roaming Syrian populations inside their own 
country (Internally Displaced Persons ``IDPs'') cluster near 
the Turkish border awaiting entry or seeking protection or 
shelter with relations in other parts of Syria.
    As with all refugee situations, children are the most 
vulnerable and stressed, both in terms of missing parents and 
inadequate educational/recreational opportunities. Bored 
children, especially adolescents, trapped inside walled or 
fenced facilities are particularly prone to venting their 
frustration through violence when cajoled or provoked by a few 
malcontents. Soccer balls and school books are just as 
necessary as food and shelter.

                          Financial Situation

    To date the U.S. has offered $103 million in regional 
assistance, primarily to the World Food Program (WFP) and to 
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The U.S. also 
just finalized $100 million in Direct Budget Support to 
Jordan.\3\ Jordan, always cash-strapped, has still not received 
the $1 billion in direct support it gets every year from Saudi 
Arabia, and the government, in conjunction with the U.N., 
issued an international appeal at the beginning of September 
for $700 million to help with the crisis.\4\ Turkey has spent 
more than $300 million of its own resources on the refugees. It 
is unclear when Assad will run out of money. Estimates 
fluctuate wildly, and some speculate he will be broke by the 
end of the year due to a burn rate of up to $1billion/month, 
but these figures are pure guesswork at this point. Others 
contend he has money squirreled away or that Iran might be 
willing to fund him.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ http://jordan.usembassy.gov/pr_100_million_asst_072212.html
    \4\ ``Jordan, U.N. Appeal for $700 Million To Help Deal With 
Refugees'' Washington Post; September 1, 2012: http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle--east/jordan-un-appeal-for-700-
million-to-help-deal-with-influx-of-syrian-refugees/2012/09/01/
d544891c-f431-11e1-b74c-84ed55e0300b_story.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                Lebanon

    Lebanon's capital Beirut remains relatively calm due in 
part to the government's official policy of ``disassociation'' 
with the Syrian crisis--a policy brought about because Iran's 
client Hezbollah forms part of the Lebanese government. This 
policy has not prevented sectarian fighting from spilling over 
into Tripoli in the north as rivals mirror the fighting just 
across the border. Occasionally, cross-border firing and even 
shelling has taken place, so far with no major consequences. 
Lebanon's politics are so chaotic that the Syrian refugees are 
actually a boon to business. An earlier spate of kidnappings of 
Lebanese inside Syria resulted in tit-for-tat kidnappings 
inside Lebanon. This led most Gulf countries to urge their 
citizens to flee or to avoid tourism-dependent Lebanon. Well-
off Syrian refugees have filled much of that void, renting 
vacant apartments with year-long leases, to the point that 
rents are escalating. For those without such funds, Lebanon was 
able to convert many empty schools into temporary shelters, yet 
school is about to start and it is not clear where those 
families will move to once displaced.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ ``Aid Agencies Scrambling to Relocate Refugees from Schools'' 
Voice of America: August 31, 2012: http://www.voanews.com/content/aid-
agencies-scramblint-to-relocate-refugees-from-syrian-schools/
1499528.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lebanon's multi-racial/multi-ethnic nature resulting from 
intermarriages between tribes and sects has created safe-havens 
for those Syrians who are able to stay with family. Depending 
on the level of Syrian military/police checkpoints--some of 
which require a bribe to pass and some which do not--as well as 
Hezbollah checkpoints in Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley, 
Damascus to Beirut is but a short, 50 mile car ride. This 
proximity has allowed many Syrians to return temporarily to 
their capital or nearby towns.

    Palestinian issues continue to plague Lebanon. Funds are 
still lacking for the final rebuilding phase of a large section 
of an UNRWA ``camp'' (no tents, but an entire urban 
neighborhood) that was destroyed by the Lebanese army in 2007 
in a firefight which displaced 30,000.\6\ Palestinians had 
limited property and work rights in Syria; they have far fewer 
in Lebanon. Housing options for them are limited absent the 
rebuilding of the destroyed neighborhood and as Palestinians, 
according to treaty, can only receive assistance from UNRWA, 
not UNHCR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Reconstruction of the Nahrel-Bared Camp & UNRWA Compound: 
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011042974549.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 Jordan

    U.S. Embassy officials praised the Jordanian Armed Forces 
(JAF) for doing all it can to assist Syrian refugees. The JAF 
welcomes them at the border, and in the beginning, men and 
officers fed refugees out of their own rations. The U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) is now providing JAF with 
additional humanitarian equipment to assist with refugee 
management. Wide-scale allegations of Jordanian authorities 
seizing refugee travel docs are denied by the government. Such 
allegations are no surprise and indeed may have occurred early 
in the crisis as overwhelmed border officials quite conceivably 
tossed passports/ID cards into boxes with the hopes of sorting 
them out later. However, the matter now needs to be redressed 
quickly--both to return rightful property but, more 
importantly, to allow Syrians needed documents to return home.

    Jordan's scarce water resources are strained under any 
conditions and many have long blamed Syria for stealing more 
than its share from the Yarmouk tributary of the Jordan River 
that forms the north-west most portion of the Jordan's border 
with Syria. Hosting 100,000+ Syrians will only compound this, 
especially as many Syrians appear not always sympathetic to the 
demands of water conservation required in Jordan's more arid 
environment. Additionally, Jordan's sluggish economy and 
allegations of high-level economic corruption are straining 
domestic forces. This could easily lead to either 1) the 
refugees rioting themselves over mistreatment or 2) inflame 
popular protests against a king and government that is 
perceived as aiding refugees while ignoring the plight of its 
own citizens. While the King seems to understand the message 
behind the Arab Spring, he has not been able to make sufficient 
reforms to quell growing unrest. To compensate, or, as his 
domestic critics would charge, curry favor in order to prop up 
his rule, King Abdullah has been extremely accommodating to 
U.S. requests during this crisis.

    Even Jordan, with its long history of tolerating large 
foreign-born populations, has its limits. Thus some six weeks 
ago it began planning a massive camp to house the latest influx 
of refugees. Called Za'atri, and located near Jordan's north-
west border with Syria, the camp has ballooned to well over 
25,000 refugees with upwards of 1,000 arriving daily. 
Administered by UNHCR with help from UNICEF, the World Food 
Program (WFP), Save the Children and a host of other donors, 
the tented camp quickly got out of hand. Conditions in the 
older half of the camp are particularly dire as well-meaning 
engineers graded the ground to allow for flat surfaces, but 
this only displaced the thin layer of topsoil and created a 
desolate and dusty environment instead. The U.S., particularly 
DoD, was able to apply some rapid funding to procure truckloads 
of gravel which are now being used in the newer portions of the 
camp (called Za'atri 2, 3, etc.) and keep the dust down quite 
well. Many of the refugees are from Syria's upper and middle 
class. Staff spoke with lawyers and doctors who fled with 
nothing but who are beginning to chafe at their conditions.

    At Za'atri, the food and water demands of the camp are 
insatiable and are straining relations with nearby towns and 
villages which fear that scarce resources will soon disappear. 
Communal kitchens are being constructed in Za'atri to alleviate 
the current dietary monotony, but establishing a food voucher 
system to allow camp residents to purchase what they want to 
cook will take time. Refugees are provided with a solar powered 
lamp, mattresses, blankets and a few other household items. 
Latrines and showers use gravity tanks and are surprisingly 
hygienic given the environment and constant usage. Security is 
an issue as an earlier riot injured several police officers 
(who, with great discipline, refused to attack the mob), but 
the police now refuse to patrol the camp.

    A lucky few families have small 9x18 single room trailers 
instead of tents. While these provide better living than tents, 
it is a matter of scale. The trailers are more permanent, and 
could be transported back to Syria if needed; however, for the 
price of one trailer, UNHCR can provide 4-5 tents. The approach 
of winter--bitterly cold in the desert--also means additional 
resources will have to be spent for heaters and extra tarps to 
winterize tents.


          

        
        

         Dust covered UNCHR tents in the original Za'atri camp



 (left) Container housing in Za'atri (right) Za'atri 2 Camp with U.S.-
                  provided gravel keeps the dust down

                                 Turkey

    Turkey's huge population means the actual number of 
refugees (or ``guests'' as they are officially called; 
``refugees'' is a loaded word for the Turks and verboten) is 
statistically insignificant. Turkey has spent $300 million thus 
far supporting these guests (MFA officials quoted $10 million 
to build a camp to house 10,000 and $3 million/month to operate 
it). Meanwhile the opposition party goads the government daily 
either for not doing enough to help the refugees or for 
questioning the abrupt about face on the country's formally 
cozy ties with the Assad regime. (Some observers believe 
Turkey's current stance against Syria is personal and comes 
from the rebuff Assad gave to Turkish PM Erdogan's suggestions 
to Assad for democratic reforms following the Arab Spring.)

    Turkey originally created a Cadillac of a camp when the 
refugee waves first hit. This is understandable for several 
reasons. Turkey's economy is booming, and the country wanted to 
show off its wealth and prestige accordingly.
    As the refuges continued to pour in, the Turks scaled back 
subsequent efforts, but compared to Za'atri, the camps in 
Turkey are still upscale. Staff visited an abandoned two-story 
warehouse that had been subdivided using sheetrock/drywall into 
multiple units, each with a door and window facing a common 
hall, with a stove and water jug, as well as an operating 
electric fan. While not paradise by any means, it is miles 
above Za'atri. Refugees are allowed to leave camp from 8am-8pm 
and local press reports said they were a boon to the Turkish 
agricultural industry. Those with money they brought or from 
friends were able to outfit their rooms as needed and one had 
even purchased an air conditioner.

    Turkey's initial go-it-alone attitude has begun to waver, 
and the government let it be known that 100,000 refugees was a 
red-line for the government. Turkey recently asked UNHCR to 
become more involved in planning future sites, which UNHCR 
contends must be farther from the border--at least one day's 
walk--as this deters those inside from using a camp as a base 
of operations. UNHCR told staff that one current camp in Turkey 
was even found to have a tunnel under the border into Syria, it 
was so close.





        A Turkish warehouse converted to house Syrian ``guests''

    Keeping camps for refugees and not as an R-and-R spot for 
opposition fighters will not only allow better internal 
controls, but ensure the safety of non-combatants in the camp, 
according to UNHCR. Turkey's most recent efforts to move those 
refugees living in rented homes near the Syrian border into 
camps reflects Ankara's desire to know exactly who is inside 
their borders.\7\ However, any Turkish attempts to restrict 
young males from popping in and out of Syria--whether to fight 
or to check on family--will no doubt increase tensions inside 
the camps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ ``Turkey Shifts Syrian Refugees From Borders'' Voice of 
America, September 13, 2012: http://www.voanews.com/content/
turkey_shifts_syrian_refugees_from_broders/1507286.html

    In hopes of limiting the number of Syrian ``guests,'' 
Turkey has begun a novel approach known as ``Zero Point 
Distribution.'' Food and basic hygiene necessities are left 
right at the Syrian border (i.e.--the Zero Point) with the hope 
that Syrians will be able to subsist off this assistance yet 
remain in Syria. Staff visited a Zero Point distribution center 
located only a mile from the border and run by the Turkish Red 
Crescent which stockpiled bottled water, prepackaged boxes of 
food, even bags of American rice purchased on the local market. 
The aid is dropped off along the border, but not near official 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
crossings where it might fall into Syrian government hands.

                                 Syria

    The U.S. must decide the extent to which it wants to 
participate in the on-going proxy war against Iran, which is 
what Syria has become thanks to assistance from Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar to the Free Syria Army (FSA) versus Iranian\8\ (some 
add Chinese, possibly Russian) assistance to Syria. Defeating 
Assad is beating Tehran. With Iraq leaning ever more towards 
its Shiite neighbor to the East, it is in no one's interest to 
allow Tehran to have a geopolitical and actual terrorist 
crescent running from Tehran to Hezbollah/Hamas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ ``Iran's Revolutionary Guards Commander Says Its Troops In 
Syria" Reuters, September 16, 2012: http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/09/16/us-iran-syria-presence-idUSBRE88F04C2 0120916

    The U.S. so far has engaged officially only in humanitarian 
assistance (though some press reporting suggests otherwise.) 
\9\ However much the current levels of humanitarian and 
financial assistance are appreciated by senior politicians in 
the region, the populace little knows of U.S. efforts because 
it comes either as direct bilateral budgetary support or is 
diluted with other funds through U.N. agencies. Even though 
they have delivered only a few, the Saudi's promise of 
thousands of temporary trailers to shelter refugees has earned 
them wide praise in the Jordanian street.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ ``CIA Said To Be Steering Arms To Syrian Opposition'' New York 
Times; June 21, 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/21/world/
middleeast/cia-said-to-aid-in-steering-arms-to-syrian-
rebels.html?pagewanted=all

    Some argue that more overt U.S. assistance for the FSA will 
counter the perception that we did nothing to help oust 
Mubarak; these observers also contend U.S. military help would 
keep the FSA from being too beholden to Saudi and Qatari 
Wahhabists. Others say that, as recent tragic events suggest, 
our efforts in Libya have borne little pro-U.S. fruit and that 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
we could expect the same in Syria.

    There is no question the FSA is a loose coalition of forces 
whose only unifying factor is a desire to oust Assad via 
military means now that it is clear he will not go quietly. The 
FSA runs the gamut of idealistic students who took up arms 
after their peaceful demonstrations were fired upon to foreign 
Al Qaeda fighters looking for action to help their Sunni 
brethren. In between are Syrian army defectors, shop keepers 
and every other stratum of Syrian society.

    Politically, the opposition is just as splintered. The most 
prominent is the Syrian National Conference (SNC); however, the 
SNC is viewed inside Syria as a bunch of ex-pats who jet around 
the world decrying the situation but who are unable to provide 
the FSA with either weapons or funds from the Syrian diaspora 
or donor communities, and at the same time refuse to die in the 
rubble with the FSA. Given this military and political Tower of 
Babel, the real danger exists that an Assad-free Syria--far 
from controlling Lebanon as it used to--will become another 
Lebanon as those with the guns will make the rules.




 A gym near the Turkish/Syria border converted to a warehouse to store 
      items for Turkish Red Crescent's ``Zero Point Distribution''

    While staff heard from younger FSA members and some in the 
SNC that Assad's exit will bring an abrupt peace, most Syria 
watchers believe that the fighting is now tribal and sectarian. 
One interlocutor told staff of a comment from a foreign contact 
of Assad's. ``Before Ramadan in 2011, I was speaking to the 
leader of Syria; after Ramadan, I was speaking to the leaders 
of the Alawites.'' While they comprise barely 10% of Syria's 
population, virtually all military and political power 
concentrated in Alawite hands. As such, most observers believe 
they will now fight to the death to maintain power, and that 
their brutality to date means--regardless of their role--almost 
all will be rounded up and killed when Assad is defeated. Such 
a scenario is also used by Assad to sustain the Alawites in 
their fight against the opposition as he warns fellow clansmen 
they are in a literal matter of life and death.
    To combat the current political fragmentation, the U.S. 
State Department, through its Istanbul-based OSOS (Office of 
Syrian Opposition Support--a creation of State's bureau of 
Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)) is training Syrian 
activists in the use of secure communications and providing 
them with Arabic-language laptops and mobile satellite up-
links.\10\ This training is based upon the Obama 
administration's policy of ``non-lethal aid for non-lethal 
actors.'' The training--thus far in groups of a dozen--must be 
held in Istanbul, a city of 10 plus million, in order to 
provide both the trainers and the trainees greater anonymity. 
While it is certainly more expensive to run the training from 
Istanbul rather than closer to the border, this blending-in 
allows OSOS to keep a low profile and maintain better security. 
Trainers switch to another of the city's countless hotels every 
few sessions; such anonymity would be impossible in the tiny, 
tightly-knit villages near the border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Antennas provided are the size of dinner plates and therefore 
easily hidden on rooftops or balconies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Younger trainees (all of whom must be smuggled from Syria 
to Istanbul), however, want more than the limited data package 
offered with the computer/antenna. The YouTube generation 
believes it can win greater international support (and possibly 
intervention) by continual uploading of graphic videos showing 
Syrian atrocities. U.S. sponsored trainers stress there are 
already enough videos out there. They argue, rather, the need 
is to create nascent political networks using the equipment to 
link up with fellow activists in neighboring towns (instead of 
transmitting the large, and costly, video files which the OSOS 
package will not support). Trainers dangle rewards of increased 
data packages (which can be paid for in Istanbul) for activists 
who contact OSOS upon their return to Syria and report on their 
location, conditions, etc. OSOS will expand training to larger 
classes and more direct democratic transition activities in the 
coming weeks.
    As the friction with OSOS's support demonstrates, Assad 
opponents want more than just tents for refugees and laptops, 
they want the means to remove him militarily. While it is clear 
that Saudi Arabia and Qatar are providing arms to their Sunni 
co-religionists (primarily via Turkey, where U.S. press reports 
suggest the CIA is also involved in vetting and training), 
these light arms cannot counter Assad's superiority in 
artillery and fixed and rotary-wing air power. FSA and other 
forces want either a no-fly zone or the firepower to create 
their own.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ ``Syrian Rebels Get Influx Of Arms With Gulf Neighbors'' 
money, U.S. coordination" Washington Post; May 15, 2012: http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/syrian-rebels-get-
influx-of-arms-with-gulf-neighbors-money-us-coordination/2012/05/15/
gIQAds2TSU_story.html; "Turkey Calls For No Fly Zone" CBSNews.com; 
August 31, 2012: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202--162-57504064/turkey-
calls-for-syria-safe-zones-u.n-security-council-remains-unmoved/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some interlocutors staff spoke with contested the current 
DC-think which holds that a no-fly zone (NFZ) inside Syria is 
militarily impossible because Assad's air defenses are too 
tough. Supporters of a NFZ point out that most Syrian anti-
aircraft assets are concentrated near Damascus and while 
certainly not insignificant, are of an older Soviet quality. 
Thus, they say, an NFZ in the northwest of the country, 
including Aleppo, is not impossible. Opponents of a NFZ point 
to our experience in Iraq where decade-long northern and 
southern NFZs did little to allow Saddam's opponents to over-
throw him. They contend that a NFZ will do little to create a 
tipping point in favor of the FSA.
    The Turks do not want to impose a NFZ on their own for the 
same geo-political reason they do not wish to intercede alone 
on the ground to create a humanitarian Safe Zone: fear of 
allowing Assad to shift the fighting from Syrian-on-Syrian to 
Arab versus the dreaded Turk/Ottoman Empire of long ago. 
However, Turkey seems perfectly willing to play a greater role, 
as long as it has the political cover to do so. With continued 
Russian and Chinese obstruction in the U.N. Security Council, 
the only option would therefore be NATO. The June loss of a 
Turkish reconnaissance fighter over the Mediterranean had the 
potential to become a Gulf of Tonkin moment as Turkey quickly 
accepted Syrian claims to have shot it down, but NATO declined 
to get more involved.\12\ The sunken jet was recently 
discovered by the U.S. deep-sea robot company used to find the 
Titanic.\13\ Mechanical failure is also a possible cause of the 
crash, according to American interlocutors familiar with the 
incident who cautioned about a rush to judgment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ ``Ankara Vows To Take `Necessary Action' After Syria Shoots 
Down Turkish Jet'' The Guardian (UK); June 23, 2012: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/23/syria-shooting-down-turkish-jet
    \13\ ``Exploration Vessel Nautilus Locates Downed Turkish Jet'' 
Ocean Exploration Trust; July 11, 2012: http://
oceanexplorationtrust.com/press/20120711_Turkey.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is unclear if Ankara will continue to look for, or 
foment, an incident that would draw in NATO, but Turkey clearly 
has the military power to defeat Assad on its own. However, the 
military and current government are at odds with one another as 
hundreds of generals are on trial for an alleged 2003 coup 
attempt. Given this, Turkish PM Erdogan is more likely to rely 
on his Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO) 
instead to be the main contact with Syrian fighters inside 
Turkey and to work with the Saudis and Qataris to receive the 
arms shipments mentioned above and to turn them over to the 
Free Syria Army.

                               Conclusion

    With more than 20,000 dead so far in Syria, Assad must go 
sooner rather than later. In addition to the humanitarian 
catastrophe he has created, Syria's role as Iran's client has 
endangered our allies in the area and led to its support of 
groups actively seeking to kill Americans. America's current 
policy of only providing humanitarian assistance addresses real 
needs and is appreciated by our allies in the region. It does 
not address the issue of shortening the conflict. A NATO-
imposed no fly zone might tilt the military advantage in favor 
of the insurgents, but it may be deemed too costly or risky. 
Another option is to provide the FSA with arms capable of 
shooting down Syrian fixed and rotary wing aircraft. However, 
our own experience in providing MANPADs to various groups over 
the years has yielded mixed results. In this situation, Turkey 
could balk for fear that these weapons would fall into the 
hands of its Kurdish separatist insurgency--the PKK. Our own 
fears of Al-Qaeda affiliates achieving the same are not 
unwarranted. Supplying such weapons after careful vetting of 
the recipients might level the field enough to allow the 
uprising to succeed.





                                  
