[Senate Prints 112-35]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
112th Congress S. Prt.
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 112-35
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THE GULF SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: PARTNERSHIP WITH THE GULF COOPERATION
COUNCIL
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A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
Second Session
June 19, 2012
Available via World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Historical Context............................................... 7
GCC Case Studies................................................. 9
Analysis and Recommendations..................................... 19
Conclusion....................................................... 30
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washingston, DC, June 19, 2012.
Dear Colleagues: Home to more than half of the world's oil
reserves and over a third of its natural gas, the stability of
the Persian Gulf is critical to the global economy. A
confluence of events in the Middle East--the withdrawal of
American troops from Iraq, the Arab Revolutions in 2011, and
the ongoing concerns over Iran's nuclear program--have raised
questions about the security of the Gulf region, as well as our
relations with the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC).
Last year, I instructed two of my staff members to examine
the United States evolving security relations with the GCC
countries, including the challenges and opportunities in
promoting American interests and supporting regional security
in the Gulf region. I hope that this report and the
recommendations contained within will be useful to our
colleagues in Congress and to the public in considering this
strategically important region.
Sincerely,
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.
(v)
THE GULF SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: PARTNERSHIP WITH THE GULF COOPERATION
COUNCIL
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Executive Summary
On 18 December 2011, the last convoy of American soldiers
left Iraq in accordance with the 2008 bilateral security
agreement.\1\ With declarations of ``America's Pacific
Century'' signaling an overdue rebalancing of the United
States' strategic priorities, the departure of almost 50,000
U.S. troops raises questions about the security of the Gulf
region they leave behind.
Home to more than half of the world's oil reserves and over
a third of its natural gas,\2\ the stability of the Persian
Gulf is critical to the global economy. However, the region
faces a myriad of political and security challenges, from the
Iranian nuclear program to the threat of terrorism to the
political crisis in Bahrain.
In this volatile environment, the Obama administration is
working to update the security architecture of the Persian Gulf
to promote regional stability, provide a counterweight to Iran,
and reassure partners and adversaries alike of American
resolve. Iran and Iraq have long been the Gulf region's
preeminent military powers. But the centerpiece of this
framework is deepening security cooperation, both bilateral and
multilateral, with the six states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. Though still in its nascent
stages, this initiative is in many respects a continuation of
the Gulf Security Dialogue, which began in 2006 as an effort to
coordinate common defense initiatives between the United States
and the GCC but was conducted mostly through bilateral
channels. On 31 March 2012, the United States and the Gulf
states participated in the inaugural session of the Strategic
Cooperation Forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, designed to
formalize multilateral coordination on security and economic
issues and further broaden strategic ties.
In an age of austerity, effective policymaking requires a
careful calibration between means and ends. U.S. leaders should
balance international security interests with domestic fiscal
constraints. In the Gulf, a region of acute strategic
importance to the United States, a security architecture should
be erected on three pillars: (1) a small but capable U.S.
military presence; (2) increased burden-sharing as GCC partners
contribute to their own regional security and stability; and
(3) steady diplomatic engagement with the GCC to promote
improved governance, economic diversification, and human
rights.
The United States maintains a relatively small but
effective residual military footprint throughout the Gulf. To
sustain this presence, the United States relies on access to
bases such as Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, Camp Arifjan in
Kuwait, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and Naval Support Activity
in Bahrain. The Gulf states provide much of the infrastructure
and transit authority essential to U.S. military missions,
including NATO operations in Afghanistan. In return, they
benefit from the American security presence. The Obama
administration has sought to shape the U.S. force posture in
the region to be both militarily effective and financially
sustainable. However, policy makers are likely to face
difficult decisions about the size of that presence in the
future.
To maintain a right-sized American security footprint in
the Gulf, the United States should continue to promote a degree
of burden-sharing with GCC states. These partnerships are
facilitated largely through U.S. security assistance--equipping
and training foreign security forces through the sale, grant,
loan, or transfer of defense articles or equipment. From Fiscal
Year (FY) 2007 to 2010 alone, the six states of the GCC agreed
to the purchase of more U.S. defense articles and services
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program--over $26.7
billion--than any other region in the world.\3\ This trend is
expected to continue: in FY 2011, the Obama Administration
announced that it had agreed to a $29.4 billion sale of fighter
aircraft to Saudi Arabia, the single largest arms sale in the
history of the United States.\4\ The United States provides
security assistance not only to improve partner capacity but
also to build relationships and interoperability through
training and sustainment support. Security assistance can help
promote burden-sharing and advance U.S. objectives in the
region, but it is not a panacea. It must be carefully
implemented to encourage regional stability and protect
Israel's qualitative military edge.
The promotion of human rights and good governance is also
important to Americans' self-identity and, thus, an element of
any effort to develop a security architecture in the Gulf. The
United States should not be silent on human rights issues but
rather raise them in a consistent and appropriate manner.
Governments that address the aspirations and grievances of
their people are more stable over the long term and
consequently better security partners for the United States.
However, the United States Government should be prudent about
interfering in other nations' domestic matters. Bahrain, in
particular, presents Washington with a difficult policy
challenge.
This report examines how the United States should seek to
balance these dynamics to promote American interests and
support regional security, at a time of unprecedented upheaval.
Two Foreign Relations Committee staff members traveled to the
six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as Iraq in
2011 and 2012 to investigate the Persian Gulf security
framework. Here are the principal policy challenges they have
identified:
Challenge 1: Policymakers must strike a balance between
security interests and the promotion of fundamental freedoms.
While the United States has significant economic and security
interests in the Gulf, it should not be seen as opposed to
popular reform efforts.
Recommendation: The United States should leverage its
strategic position to be a steady force for moderation,
stability, and nonsectarianism, through patient and
persistent engagement in support of human rights. The
United States should not be quick to rescind security
assurances or assistance in response to human rights
abuses, but should evaluate each case on its own
merits. U.S. Government officials should use these
tools to advance human rights through careful
diplomacy. Consistency is a hallmark of a successful
security partnership. Nonetheless, there should be
redlines associated with the U.S. security agreements
in the Gulf, like elsewhere. The United States should
make clear that states must not use arms procured from
the United States against their own people engaged in
peaceful assembly or exploit the U.S. security umbrella
as protection for belligerent action against their
neighbors.
Challenge 2: While the GCC is becoming a more independent
and effective actor, the United States remains crucial to the
region's stability. The Gulf monarchies have for centuries
depended on outside security guarantors, a role played by the
United States since the British left in 1971. They have emerged
from this historic dependency, and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the
UAE, in particular, are playing more prominent roles on the
regional and even global stage.
Recommendation: The United States should seek to
remain a central part of the Gulf security framework.
The administration should encourage the development of
institutions like the GCC and Arab League, while
seeking to strengthen bilateral ties. However, the GCC
is not a monolith, and a multilateral architecture must
accommodate the significant differences among the Gulf
states. The United States has a unique diplomatic and
security role to play in the GCC. To protect its
regional security interests, the United States should
seek to reinforce its position as a core interlocutor
around which intra-GCC security is organized, through
robust diplomatic and economic engagement, military-to-
military cooperation, and security assistance. However,
there is some concern in various GCC capitals that the
United States has not been forthcoming enough in
communicating its vision of how it would like this
cooperation to evolve amidst the political turmoil of
the Arab Awakening. American officials should seek to
ameliorate these concerns by more clearly articulating
to its GCC partners the United States vision for a Gulf
security framework, as well as its strategic priorities
for the broader region.
Challenge 3: The Gulf region's tremendous hydrocarbon
resources and strong macroeconomic growth in recent years mask
structural human capital and unemployment challenges that could
cause longer term problems. The use of expatriate labor over
the last several decades has helped the region to quickly
develop an advanced infrastructure, but it has led to an
underdevelopment of the region's local human capital.
Recommendation: The United States should work with
GCC states to promote economic reform and
diversification, as well as increased trade relations.
The Gulf states have recognized this dilemma and to
varying degrees have sought to diversify their
economies and better prepare their workforces for the
global marketplace. To help the GCC countries tackle
their structural unemployment and underemployment, the
United States should focus on educational and labor
reforms, as well as the promotion of entrepreneurship.
Challenge 4: The United States must carefully shape its
military presence so as not to create a popular backlash, while
retaining the capability to protect the free flow of critical
natural resources and to provide a counterbalance to Iran.
Earlier American deployments in Saudi Arabia and Iraq generated
violent local opposition. What the West views as a deterrent
against aggression could also be misconstrued or portrayed as
an occupying presence.
Recommendation: The United States should preserve the
model of ``lily pad'' bases throughout the Gulf, which
permits the rapid escalation of military force in case
of emergency. The Obama administration has adopted this
architecture by retaining only essential personnel in
the region while ensuring access to critical hubs such
as Camp Arifjan, Al Udeid, Al Dhafra, Jebel Ali, and
Naval Support Activity Bahrain. An agile footprint
enables the United States to quickly deploy its
superior conventional force should conflict arise,
without maintaining a costly and unsustainable
presence. Sustaining physical infrastructure and
enabling functions such as intelligence, surveillance,
and logistics, while keeping certain war reserve
materiel forward positioned, is more important than
deploying large numbers of U.S. forces.
Challenge 5: Although the UAE and Qatar have demonstrated a
willingness to operate in the coalition environment, most Gulf
states are not yet fully capable of independently sustaining
significant tactical support to the United States in times of
crisis. U.S. leaders should not expect more from the Gulf
states than they are capable of or willing to provide. They
must be careful not to upset a volatile region by introducing,
through security assistance, overwhelming offensive military
capabilities that could lead to an arms race.
Recommendation: The U.S. Government should continue
to cultivate the capabilities of GCC partners in select
defensive missions, such as missile defense, combat air
patrol, and maritime security, while building capacity
through deployments in other theaters such as Libya and
Afghanistan. Burden-sharing does not imply that the
United States is abandoning the region or relinquishing
its role as a security guarantor. Rather, it is
intended to deepen strategic ties with the Gulf by
improving the competencies of the GCC states through
joint exercises, security assistance, and training.
Over time, these partnerships can improve the
effectiveness of Gulf militaries, promote trust, and
instill professional military values such as respect
for civilian authority, human rights, and the rule-of-
law. However, the Obama administration should carefully
consider what missions it expects the Gulf states to
execute effectively.
Challenge 6: The United States must determine how much
security assistance to provide to its Gulf partners. The Gulf
states--in particular, Saudi Arabia and the UAE--are prolific
buyers of U.S. arms, but they are also willing to buy from
other international sellers. That does not mean however, the
United States should grant whatever capabilities to the GCC
states that they desire.
Recommendation: The United States should continue to
supply Gulf partners with security assistance that
supports a comprehensive strategy for regional arms
sales to ensure a stable security architecture. The
United States derives a number of benefits from
supplying the GCC states with defense materiel and
training: interoperability, access, leverage,
relationships, and regional balance. But the United
States should be scrupulous in determining which
weapons systems to sell in order to (1) ensure that
sales contribute to regional security and do not weaken
the position of Israel, (2) support the legitimate
defense requirements of Gulf partners, (3) prevent a
regional arms race, and (4) protect its technological
superiority.\5\
Challenge 7: Relations between the Gulf monarchies and Iraq
remain cool. There has been a tendency of some Arab states to
remain disengaged from Iraq, largely over its relations with
Iran. Unfortunately, this tendency has had the effect of
pushing Iraq closer to Iran.
Recommendation: The United States should promote the
gradual political reintegration of Iraq into the Arab
fold. Iraq's Arab League presidency in 2012 is an
opportunity for the United States to promote a gradual
rebalancing of the Gulf's security architecture,
improved counterterrorism cooperation between Iraq and
the GCC, and a reduction in sectarian tensions. In
particular, in light of reciprocal visits by Kuwaiti
Emir Sheikh Sabah and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki, there may be opportunities for progress on the
outstanding bilateral issues dating to the 1990 Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, including border demarcation, war
reparations, and the disposition of missing Kuwaiti
citizens.
MAP: The Gulf Cooperation Council
Source: The Perry-Castaeda Library Map Collection, The
University of Texas at Austin, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/
Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2010 Report on
Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and
Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts
*With the exception of the ``GCC'' grouping, which is drawn out
of the ``Middle East and North Africa,'' the regional
categories are equivalent to those used by the U.S. State
Department.
Source: 2010-2011 Report on Foreign Military Training and
Department of Defense Engagement Activities of Interest
Historical Context
The sheikhdoms of the Arabian Peninsula date back hundreds
of years, but with the notable exception of Oman, they only
emerged as modern states in the 20th century. Lacking permanent
borders and formal bureaucracies, the tribes relied upon
outside protectors for the provision of security, including the
Ottomans, the Portuguese, and for roughly 150 years, the
British.
The British sought to protect trade routes between India
and the United Kingdom, to expand their regional hegemony, and
to project force against their ``Great Game'' rivals, the
Russian and Ottoman empires. But the local sheikhdoms sought
protection as well, as the British took on defense
responsibilities through a series of treaties with all of the
present-day GCC states, except Saudi Arabia.
Collectively, these treaties--with Oman in 1829, the
Trucial States (now the UAE) in 1835, Bahrain in 1861, Kuwait
in 1899, and Qatar in 1916--became known as the Maritime Truce.
During this period, the local sheikhs generally benefited from
increased trade and stability, and when the British left in
1971, it was to ease the financial burden of maintaining a
presence in the Gulf, rather than at the insistence of the
rulers.\6\
The U.S. presence in the Gulf is commonly dated to December
1879, when the USS Ticonderoga, a steam-powered veteran of the
Civil War, transited the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian
Gulf. Commercial quantities of oil were discovered in Bahrain
in 1932 and Standard Oil arrived in the Gulf in 1933, beginning
the dramatic regional transformation from desert shipping hub
to global energy provider. In 1948, the United States
established the Middle East Force--a small presence in Bahrain
on a British naval base--to protect ships along the coast of
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The force, although much evolved,
remains to the present.\7\
The Gulf's importance to U.S. strategic interests became
apparent with the articulation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969
and the Carter Doctrine in 1980. The Nixon Doctrine called on
U.S. allies to contribute to their own security with the aid of
American security assistance. The ``Twin Pillars'' policy was a
natural outgrowth of the Nixon administration's efforts to
protect American power. Under this policy, the United States
relied on Saudi Arabia and Iran to provide for much of the
region's security and serve as bulwarks against Soviet
expansion. At his 1980 State of the Union address, in reaction
to the 1979 Iranian revolution, President Carter articulated
his own doctrine: ``An attempt by any outside force to gain
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America,
and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force.'' \8\ Together, these two doctrines
provided a strategic framework for the growing arms sales to
the region in the 1970s and the expansion of the U.S. military
presence in the 1990s.
Prior to 1990, the Gulf states preferred an ``over the
horizon'' American presence. That changed with the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. Even though the six Gulf monarchies signed
a mutual defense pact in 1990, they played a minor role in
Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi aggression
in 1991. Afterward, the United States signed Defense
Cooperation Agreements with Bahrain in 1991 (the Fifth Fleet
was reactivated in 1995), Qatar in 1992 (U.S. Central Command
headquarters was established in 2002), and the UAE in 1994.
Additionally, all six GCC states negotiated or re-negotiated
access agreements for U.S. forces during this period.\9\
Although most of the Gulf states historically relied on
outside security guarantors through bilateral relationships,
they have in recent decades also sought closer regional
coordination. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in
1981, galvanized by regional events such as the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, and the Iran-Iraq
``Tanker War.'' But the Gulf states were careful not to offend
their more powerful neighbors, Iran and Iraq. In fact, the GCC
Charter, still in effect today, focused entirely on nonsecurity
issues. In 1984, the Peninsula Shield Force was created, but it
was a virtual coalition with no real integration.
Before the 1991 Persian Gulf War, there had been a tendency
for successive administrations to seek a relative power balance
between Iran and Iraq. However, in 1993 the Clinton
administration concluded that both Iran and Iraq were hostile
to American interests in the Gulf and announced a policy of
``dual containment.'' As a senior White House official
described it at the time, ``as long as we are able to maintain
our military presence in the region, as long as we succeed in
restricting the military ambitions of both Iraq and Iran, and
as long as we can rely on our regional allies Egypt, Israel,
Saudi Arabia and the GCC, and Turkey to preserve a balance of
power in our favor in the wider Middle East region, we will
have the means to counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes.''
\10\
After the 2003 Iraq War, the United States effectively
dismantled the Iraqi military. In 2006, the Bush administration
began the Gulf Security Dialogue to coordinate common defense
initiatives between the United States and the GCC and to
promote more robust cooperation among the GCC states
themselves. Today, Iraq remains politically volatile, while
Iran has become politically isolated. At the same time, the GCC
states are emerging from their historic security dependency. In
particular, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates
are playing larger roles on the regional and even global stage,
taking leadership roles in regional crises such as Libya,
Syria, and Yemen. Their relationships with the United States
are maturing even as they expand their economic ties with Asia.
This evolution takes place against the backdrop of a region
in the midst of historic change. Bahrain faced a large-scale
popular uprising in 2011 that continues, and protest movements
have occurred in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. The UAE and
Qatar are the only Arab countries that have not faced
significant displays of public unrest since 2011. It does not
seem a stretch to posit, however, that the Arab Awakening will
have profound and lasting implications for the entire Arab
world, including to varying degrees on all six Gulf monarchies.
The GCC remains a fundamentally asymmetric organization,
with Saudi Arabia accounting for roughly half of the gross
domestic product of the Arabian Peninsula, two-thirds its
population, and four-fifths its landmass. Despite recent
discussions among GCC members about the possibility of
transitioning to a Gulf union,\11\ this asymmetry creates a
structural constraint on the willingness of some of the smaller
states to engage in further regional integration. Perhaps not
accidentally, it is the smaller Gulf states--Qatar, Kuwait, the
UAE, and Bahrain--that have a relatively larger U.S. military
presence, particularly after the post-9/11 withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Saudi Arabia.
gcc case studies
As the Obama administration seeks to promote a regional
security architecture in the Gulf, it faces a number of
challenges. The GCC is becoming a more energetic actor on the
regional stage, but at times, its states lag in the
implementation of governance and human rights reforms. U.S.
policymakers should continue to engage Gulf partners on these
issues. A residual American military presence in the Gulf and
increased burden-sharing with GCC states are fundamental
components of such a framework. However, the United States must
also carefully shape its military footprint to protect the
free-flow of critical natural resources and promote regional
stability while not creating a popular backlash. Through
security assistance, the U.S. Government should provide its GCC
partners with defense capabilities required to promote
interoperability, but it must be careful not to destabilize the
Gulf's security balance by provoking an arms race. The
following case studies examine the individual Gulf states to
further explore these dynamics.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is the dominant power in the Arabian
Peninsula--culturally, geographically, demographically, and
economically. Home to Islam's two holiest sites in Mecca and
Medina, the Kingdom exercises a unique influence throughout the
Muslim world. Saudi Arabia's estimated proven reserves of oil
are almost 265 billion barrels, nearly 20 percent of the
world's total,\12\ and, as the only country with significant
spare production capacity, Saudi Arabia has also been referred
to as the ``central banker of oil.'' \13\
Saudi Arabia has no political parties, trade unions or an
elected parliament, and almost no civil society. The United
States has concerns about the status of women, the lack of
religious freedoms, and human rights restrictions. Since
September 11, U.S. officials have also expressed concern about
Saudi support for religious groups outside the Kingdom which
support intolerance. However, the socioeconomic transformation
of the country in the 20th century was astounding considering
that King Abdullah's father King Abdul-Aziz, who founded Saudi
Arabia in 1932, reportedly carried the Kingdom's entire
treasury in camel saddlebags.\14\
According to some observers in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom
may have reached a demographic inflection point.\15\ Sixty
percent of the Saudi population is younger than 21 and for
several years a majority of the Kingdom's college graduates
have been women. Meanwhile, the Kingdom will likely face a
generational shift in leadership in the years ahead that could
have profound effects on the politics of the Arabian Peninsula.
The U.S.--Saudi relationship is symbolically dated to the
landmark meeting between President Franklin Roosevelt and King
Abdul-Aziz on February 14, 1945 aboard the U.S.S. Quincy in the
Suez Canal. However, like any long relationship, it has endured
its ups and downs. The spring of 2011 was a period of relative
strain, with the Saudis and Americans clearly pursuing
differing policies in Egypt and Bahrain. This divergence
however, was not nearly as severe as the 1973 Oil Embargo or
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. By most accounts,
the relationship is back on more solid footing, though Saudi
Arabia is keen to continue diversifying its relationships by
expanding its ties with China and other East Asian economic
powers.\16\
U.S. Military Presence: Although the United States
maintained a troop presence in Saudi Arabia prior to
the Gulf War, the deployment reached its zenith in
1991, with over 550,000 coalition forces mobilized in
support of operations in Iraq.\17\ From 1992-2003, U.S.
forces continued to maintain a residual footprint in
Saudi Arabia, but in August 1996, Osama bin Laden
declared war against the United States in the Kingdom.
Subsequently, U.S. forces were victims of significant
terrorist attacks.\18\ Sensitive to perceptions of an
overt American military presence in ``the Land of the
Two Holy Mosques,'' U.S. personnel and combat equipment
were withdrawn from Saudi soil by the end of 2003.\19\
Now security cooperation is facilitated by a relatively
small contingent of U.S. military officers and
contractors who work with the Saudi Ministry of
Defense, Ministry of Interior, and the Saudi Arabian
National Guard.
Saudi Military: The Saudi military is by far the
largest within the GCC, numbering approximately 233,500
active-duty troops.\20\ The Saudi Arabian National
Guard is a separate military force and a pillar of the
regime, recruited predominantly from tribes loyal to
the royal family and numbering over 100,000
members.\21\ Since the fall of Saddam, the Saudi
military is the Gulf region's geo-political
counterweight to Iran, though the Kingdom has not
historically sought to project military force outside
the Arabian Peninsula. Despite employing some of the
most advanced equipment in the region--Patriot missile
defense batteries, Typhoon and F-15 fighter aircraft,
airborne refueling capability, M1-A2 Abrams tanks, and
AH-64 attack helicopters--the Saudi military continues
to face challenges developing proficiency in defense
planning and sustainment.
U.S. Security Assistance and Training: Despite the
sometimes-strained relationship, Saudi Arabia remains a
major recipient of U.S. security assistance. In fiscal
year 2010, Saudi Arabia agreed to over $2 billion in
U.S. Foreign Military Sales and $409 million in Foreign
Military Construction Agreements.\22\ From 2007 to
2010, Saudi Arabia agreed to purchase $13.8 billion in
U.S. defense articles and services--more than any other
nation in the world.\23\ These acquisitions included
some of the most technologically advanced weapon
systems available for export. In 2010, the Obama
administration announced the potential sales of UH-60
Blackhawk and AH-64 Apache helicopters.\24\ In December
2011, the administration announced that it had agreed
to a foreign military sale with Saudi Arabia consisting
of 84 F-15SA fighter aircraft, upgrades to its existing
fleet of 70 F-15s, and a significant air-to-air and
air-to-ground ordnance package.\25\ The sale, worth $29
billion, is the largest to a single recipient in the
history of the United States. Although Congress did not
block the sale, 198 Members wrote the administration in
November 2010 to express concern over how the transfer
of such sophisticated arms would impact the regional
security balance.\26\
In fiscal year 2010, 1,571 Saudi students were trained at
a value of $69.5 million in such competencies as
maintenance, English language, communications,
logistics, financial management, and intelligence
through U.S. security cooperation programs.\27\ Ninety-
four percent of the students were trained through the
Foreign Military Sales programs. In past years, the
Saudi Air Force has also participated in joint training
such as Red Flag--a massive air combat exercise--at
Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.\28\ Saudi Arabia has
at times received a nominal amount of International
Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance,
typically $10,000 or less, so that it can qualify for
reduced pricing on U.S. training associated with
Foreign Military Sales.\29\
A May 2008 U.S.-Saudi technical cooperation agreement
laid the groundwork for collaboration on critical
infrastructure protection and border and maritime
security. The agreement facilitated the Saudi's
purchase of U.S. technical support through government
contractors or U.S. private entities. The U.S. Central
Command has also reportedly worked with Saudi Special
Forces to improve their ability to protect oil
infrastructure and future energy sites.\30\
Kuwait
Kuwait's political culture has its roots in the diwaniya--
traditional salons hosted by prominent members of society that
remain important venues for discussing and debating social and
political issues. Even prior to the Arab Awakening, Kuwait's
National Assembly was among the more dynamic parliaments in the
Arab world. In 2006, after the death of the long-ruling Emir
Jaber al-Sabah, it effectively forced the incoming emir, who
was seriously ill, to abdicate; in November 2011, Prime
Minister Nasser al-Sabah resigned amid strong parliamentary
pressure. While public protests also contributed to the Prime
Minister's resignation, they centered on demands for
transparency and reform rather than a replacement of the
political order.\31\
Kuwait's geography renders it susceptible to external
influence: it shares a long border with Iraq, and Kuwait City
is only about 50 miles from Iran. Unlike other Arab Gulf
states, Kuwait has traditionally perceived Iraq as its biggest
security threat. Most Kuwaitis old enough to remember the
August 1990 Iraqi invasion know someone who was killed,
imprisoned, or injured. But in recent years, there has been a
dramatic shift in Kuwait's threat perception; in line with the
thinking in other Gulf states, concerns about Iran now
predominate.\32\
Kuwait takes a more restrained approach to regional affairs
than some of its neighbors and generally aligns its foreign
policy with that of Saudi Arabia. Its purchases of U.S. arms
are significant, though modest in comparison to Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates. Kuwait is especially keen to
maintain a significant U.S. military presence. In fact, the
Kuwaiti public perception of the United States is more positive
than any other Gulf country, dating back to the U.S.-led
liberation of Kuwait in 1991. Kuwait paid over $16 billion to
compensate coalition efforts for costs incurred during Desert
Shield and Desert Storm and $350 million for Operation Southern
Watch.\33\ In 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait a
major non-NATO ally.
U.S. Military Presence: A U.S.-Kuwaiti defense
agreement signed in 1991 and extended in 2001 provides
a framework that guards the legal rights of American
troops and promotes military cooperation. When U.S.
troops departed Iraq at the end of 2011, Kuwait
welcomed a more enduring American footprint. Currently,
there are approximately 15,000 U.S. forces in Kuwait,
but the number is likely to decrease to 13,500. Kuwaiti
bases such as Camp Arifjan, Ali Al Salem Air Field, and
Camp Buehring offer the United States major staging
hubs, training ranges, and logistical support for
regional operations. U.S. forces also operate Patriot
missile batteries in Kuwait, which are vital to theater
missile defense.\34\
Kuwaiti Military: The Kuwaiti military has made
strides toward modernizing its force, and it is much
improved in the area of missile defense, regularly
competing against U.S.-manned Patriot batteries in
training simulations. However, the small combined Army,
Navy, and Air Force--close to 15,500 active duty troops
\35\--still relies on U.S. assistance in sustainment,
logistics, maintenance, and intelligence fusion. To
improve its capabilities, the Kuwaiti military is a
willing recipient of U.S. training. In the words of one
U.S. military officer, ``Their appetite for partnership
exceeds our ability to provide it.'' \36\ Kuwait has
also increasingly demonstrated a willingness to
participate in international coalitions. In 2012, ahead
of their regularly scheduled rotation, Kuwait assumed
the lead of Combined Task Force-152, a 25-nation
coalition dedicated to maritime security operations in
the Persian Gulf.\37\
U.S. Security Assistance and Training: Kuwait has
procured major weapon systems from the United States
including M1A2 tanks, Patriot air-defense missile
systems, and F/A-18 fighter aircraft. In fiscal year
2010, Kuwait agreed to purchase $1.6 billion of defense
articles and services through the Foreign Military
Sales program.\38\
Kuwait is not a recipient of U.S. grant assistance such
as International Military Education and Training
(IMET). However, through the Foreign Military Sales
program in fiscal year 2010, 216 Kuwaiti military
students were educated in proficiencies from
intelligence to pilot training at a value of $9.7
million.\39\ Moreover, the Kuwaiti Government often
uses its national funds to send officials to attend
professional military schools and short-term training
courses in the United States.\40\
Bahrain
Bahrain presents Washington with a difficult policy
challenge. The Kingdom remains an important strategic partner--
one of two Gulf countries designated as a major non-NATO ally.
During the 13-year reign of King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa,
Bahrain had undertaken some reform and managed to build a
reputation as a regional trading and banking hub, attracting
foreign companies, Gulf tourists, and an annual Formula One
Grand Prix (which was cancelled in 2011). Yet, the unrest that
began in 2011 shows few signs of abating.
Protests broke out in Bahrain on 14 February 2011, inspired
by popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. The protests began
peacefully, but over time the situation deteriorated. On March
14, the six GCC nations unanimously agreed to deploy Peninsula
Shield forces to Bahrain, and a state of emergency was
declared. GCC forces remained garrisoned, but in the ensuing
crackdown there were widespread reports of excessive violence
against unarmed protestors.\41\
In his 19 May 2011 speech on the Middle East, President
Obama was critical of the crackdown, noting ``you can't have a
real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in
jail.'' Meanwhile, in September 2011, Congress was notified of
the Obama administration's intent to sell armored vehicles and
optically-tracked wire-guided missiles to Bahrain for an
estimated cost of $53 million dollars.\42\ The announcement
elicited significant opposition from activists and human rights
groups in Washington and resolutions condemning the sale were
introduced in both the Senate and House of Representatives. The
U.S. State Department put a temporary hold on the vehicle and
missile transfer and paused security assistance in general to
Bahrain.\43\ The Obama administration then determined it would
proceed with the transfer of certain ``equipment needed for
Bahrain's external defense and support of Fifth Fleet
operations.'' \44\
Amid a growing international outcry, King Hamad appointed
the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), comprised
of prominent international experts and led by renowned
Egyptian-American jurist M. Cherif Bassiouni. On 23 November
2011 the Commission released a 500-page report, examining in
detail the events of February and March 2011. While the report
found that the protesters shared some responsibility for the
unrest, including targeting the Sunni community, security
forces, and South Asian guest workers, the BICI report sharply
criticized the government for subjecting detainees to ``torture
and other forms of physical and psychological abuse'' and for a
``culture of impunity'' within Bahrain's security forces. It
also could not establish ``a discernible link'' between the
events of February and March 2011 and Iran.\45\
Human rights groups and political analysts remain concerned
about Bahrain's trajectory. According to a 16 April 2012 press
release from International Crisis Group, ``A genuine dialogue
between the regime and the opposition and a decision to fully
carry out the [BICI report]--not half-hearted measures and not
a policy of denial--are needed to halt this deterioration.''
\46\ The United States should continue to encourage efforts to
start such a dialogue and to promote moderate figures within
the ruling family, including Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-
Khalifa, as well as within the political opposition.
U.S. Military Presence: The United States security
relationship with Bahrain dates back to 1948, with the
establishment of the Middle East Force, a precursor to
today's Fifth Fleet. The U.S. Navy leased part of the
former British base in 1971, when Bahrain achieved
formal independence. During the Persian Gulf War,
Bahrain was home to 17,500 U.S. troops and 250
aircraft.\47\ Bahrain signed a defense agreement with
the United States in 1991, which still provides U.S.
forces extensive access to military facilities,
permission to store munitions, and establishes the
groundwork for joint military training and exercises.
By 1995, the U.S. Fifth Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command, operating from their headquarters in
Bahrain, were managing the Navy's rotationally deployed
assets to the Gulf.
Naval facilities in Bahrain, renamed Naval Support
Activity, now span 60 acres and house roughly 6,000
military personnel and civilian employees.\48\ The
Kingdom's ports regularly host U.S. carrier and
amphibious battle groups and are the enduring home to
U.S. Navy assets such as minesweepers and costal patrol
boats. The United States has made a significant
investment in military facilities, commencing a 5-year
$580 million U.S.-funded construction project in
2010.\49\ Additionally, Bahrain is the base of
international coalitions Combined Task Forces 151 and
152--partnerships dedicated to counter-piracy and
maritime security cooperation.
Bahraini Military: Bahrain retains the smallest
military force in the GCC at approximately 8,200 active
duty troops,\50\ many of whom are apparently
noncitizens from South Asia. The Bahraini force employs
a small fleet of American-made F-5s and F-16s; an
American-made frigate; a number of coastal patrol
vessels and amphibious landing craft; and transport and
attack helicopters. Twice, in 2008 and 2010, the
Bahraini military assumed command of Combined Task
Force-152, and in 2009, they deployed 100 police
officers on a 2-year rotation to Afghanistan--the only
other GCC country besides the UAE to make such a
commitment.\51\ Bahrain has also deployed its frigate
in support of U.S. operations in the Gulf. However, the
Kingdom remains dependent on the United States and its
GCC allies for external security. Bahraini forces
leverage U.S. expertise during joint exercises such as
Neon Response, a November 2011 bilateral engagement
that facilitated explosive ordnance and disposal
training.\52\
U.S. Security Assistance and Training: The largest
beneficiary of U.S. grant security assistance among the
GCC States, Bahrain is slated to receive approximately
$500,000 in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related assistance (NADR); $700,000 in
International Military Education and Training (IMET);
and $10 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) in
fiscal year 2012.\53\ Bahrain agreed to purchase close
to $91 million in U.S. defense equipment and training
through Foreign Military Sales in fiscal year 2010,\54\
and in fiscal year 2011, it was granted U.S. Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) worth more than $55 million.\55\
Training has also been a significant component of U.S.
security assistance to Bahrain. In fiscal year 2010,
253 students were trained in competencies such as
maritime security, leadership, maintenance, and
counterterrorism at a value of $2.8 million.\56\
Qatar
Qatar is the world's wealthiest state on a per-capita
basis, with only about 250,000 citizens and the third-largest
natural gas reserves. It has successfully translated this
extraordinary wealth into outsized regional, and even global,
political influence.
Home to al-Jazeera, Qatar presided over the United Nations
General Assembly in 2011, and was recently awarded the 2022
FIFA World Cup. It applauded the resignation of Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak, played a critical role in supporting
the Libyan Transitional National Council, and has been at the
vanguard of Arab efforts to isolate Syria--despite previously
enjoying warm bilateral relations. It has also played an
important regional mediation role in places as varied as Sudan,
Yemen, Lebanon, Eritrea, and Palestine.
Qatar shares with Iran the North Field/South Pars
reservoir, the largest gas field in the world. As a result,
Qatar seeks to minimize tensions with its northern neighbor.
However, the two countries have been notably at odds over
Syria, which could raise bilateral tensions over time.
U.S. Military Presence: In the aftermath of the
liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Qatar granted U.S. forces
substantial access to its military facilities.\57\ The
following year, the two countries solidified their
defense relationship by signing a cooperation
agreement. Qatar invested $1 billion in the 1990s to
expand Al Udeid Air Base. Now, with its 15,000-foot
runway and considerable store of war reserve material,
it is a critical logistical hub for regional
operations. Although Qatar subsidizes much of the
American presence, the United States has also invested
in Qatar's security infrastructure. From 2003 to 2010,
Congress authorized over $394 million for military
construction projects.\58\ Home to approximately 7,500
American troops,\59\ Qatar is the forward deployed base
of the U.S. Central Command and the Combined Air and
Space Operations Center (CAOC). At the CAOC, U.S.
military officials manage airspace authority, air
defense, electronic warfare, and personnel recovery in
20 regional countries, including Afghanistan.
Qatari Military: Qatar maintains a small but
professional military force. With 11,800 active duty
troops, it retains the second smallest active duty
military in the GCC.\60\ Qatar lacks an integrated air
defense system, and with a small fleet of coastal
combatants and fighter aircraft it relies on American
capabilities for its self-defense. Although its
officers are well regarded, a military career is not
highly sought after by Qatari youth. In an attempt to
make military service more attractive, the officer
corps recently received a pay increase of 120
percent.\61\
Qatar has demonstrated a willingness to operate in the
coalition environment. After natural disasters in Haiti
and Pakistan, Qatar was among the first to deploy
humanitarian supplies aboard its American-made C-17s.
In addition to supplying $400 million to arm and train
the Libyan resistance, Qatar provided Special Forces to
lead the rebels in their August 2011 assault on
Tripoli.\62\ Although Qatari fighter jets played a
nominal part in air operations over Libya, one U.S.
military official described Qatar's overall political
and military contribution to the Libya effort as
``nothing short of decisive.'' \63\
U.S. Security Assistance and Training: Qatar has
traditionally relied on the French for its military
equipment,\64\ but as the relationship with the United
States develops, it is increasingly willing to procure
American-made weapons including fighter aircraft and
missile defense systems. In fiscal year 2010, Qatar
agreed to purchase $16.8 million in U.S. defense goods
through the Foreign Military Sales program.\65\
Sensitive to what they perceive as costly
administration fees, Qatar has been more inclined to
acquire military equipment through the Direct
Commercial Sales program although, with improved
bilateral government-to-government relations, there are
indications that this trend may be changing.\66\
In fiscal year 2010, Qatar educated 205 students through
U.S. military training programs, 35 percent of whom
participated in programs through Foreign Military Sales
at a value of $5.8 million.\67\ Qatar also spent a
significant amount of its national funds to provide
U.S. training for students in skills from operational
planning to leadership.\68\
The United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates is a unique federal state,
comprised of seven emirates ruled by hereditary royal families.
Known as the Trucial States before the UAE became fully
independent in 1971, the federation slowly emerged through a
series of treaties signed between individual sheikhdoms and the
United Kingdom during the 150 year British protectorate
period.\69\ Abu Dhabi, the capital, is the country's center of
political, economic, and cultural gravity. Dubai is an open,
cosmopolitan city that has emerged in recent decades as a
global business and tourism hub, though it was hard hit by the
global financial downturn.
On 12 April 2012, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
visited the island of Abu Musa, one of three Gulf islands
subject to a longtime territorial dispute between Iran and the
UAE. In response to this provocative act, the UAE condemned the
visit in the ``strongest possible terms'' and recalled its
ambassador to Tehran.\70\
The UAE has not faced significant public pressure since the
Arab revolutions began in 2011, but a number of bloggers and
activists have faced criminal charges.\71\ In March 2012, the
National Democratic Institute closed its offices in Dubai after
its license was revoked, and Gallup and the Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung, a German organization affiliated with Chancellor
Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Party, announced the
closure of their Abu Dhabi offices.
U.S. Military Presence: The UAE first turned to the
United States as a guarantor of security during the
1991 Persian Gulf War with Iraq. In 1994, the UAE
signed a bilateral defense pact with the United States
that outlined a status of forces agreement and laid the
groundwork for increased defense cooperation.\72\ The
relationship has since flourished, with the UAE's
installations now home to a sizable U.S. footprint of
almost 3,000 troops.\73\ The Emirates directly support
much of the American presence by subsidizing facilities
expansion and upgrades. More U.S. Navy ships visit the
port at Jebel Ali than any other port outside the
United States, and Al Dhafra Air Base retains U.S.
fighter, attack, and reconnaissance aircraft. Like a
number of other GCC States, the UAE also hosts U.S.
Patriot missile batteries.\74\
Emirati Military: With approximately 51,000 active
duty troops,\75\ the UAE's military capabilities are
second to none in the region.\76\ U.S. military
officials assert that operators of the UAE Hawk
surface-to-air missile system are ``on par with their
U.S. counterparts'', and that UAE fighter pilots are
``combat ready.'' \77\ The UAE, which has NATO observer
status, dedicated two squadrons of fighter aircraft to
operations in Libya. In addition to the important
statement made by the commitment, the UAE pilots proved
to be capable tacticians and contributed to coalition
air-to-ground strike operations. The UAE also retains a
250-troop contingent in Afghanistan dedicated to
security, humanitarian aid, and development.\78\
Despite a number of recent setbacks and a strained
U.S.-Afghanistan relationship, the UAE is poised to
assume additional responsibilities in support of
coalition efforts.
U.S. Security Assistance and Training: The UAE is a
major recipient of U.S. defense equipment, having
purchased in recent years F-16 fighter jets, Apache
attack helicopters, Patriot and Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems, and a bevy of
advanced munitions.\79\ From 2007 to 2010, the UAE
agreed to acquire more U.S. defense articles and
services through the Foreign Military Sales program--
$10.4 billion--than any other country in the world with
the exception of Saudi Arabia.\80\
The purchase of U.S. weapons systems also contributes to
the training of Emirati military students. In fiscal
year 2010, 359 students were trained at a cost of $19.3
million through U.S. security cooperation programs--96
percent of whom received their training as part of the
Foreign Military Sales program.\81\
At the Air Warfare Center in Al Dhafra, the UAE and U.S.
forces conduct extensive training exercises focused on
command and control, early warning, air and missile
defense, intelligence, and logistics. Biannually, the
UAE hosts an advanced aviation seminar in offensive and
defensive tactics, which includes two weeks of
academics and four weeks of flying.\82\ There are 7
participating nations, 42 fighter aircraft platforms,
and 3 helicopter types, facilitated by U.S. and French
refueling, command, communications, and control assets.
Graduates of the course include Qatari, Emirati, and
Jordanian pilots.
The UAE is also host to the Integrated Air Missile
Defense Center, the region's premier training facility
of its kind. It not only facilitates U.S.-UAE
interoperability but also U.S.-GCC coalition building.
The United States and the GCC train in advanced tactics
against ballistic missile, cruise missile, and airborne
threats.\83\ In October 2011, for the first time, the
GCC states participated in Falcon Shield, an integrated
missile defense exercise with the United States.
The UAE has also hosted the Eagle Resolve multilateral
exercise, which utilizes state of the art laboratory
facilities to train participants in chemical,
biological, and radiological defense and border
security. The head of Central Command, General James
Mattis said, ``Eagle Resolve will allow us to operate
together as a team--it brings the U.S. forces an
opportunity to learn from our Gulf partners and they
from us in this regard, practicing how we will protect
the region's populations if threatened.'' \84\
Oman
With a rich history little known in the United States, a
strategic location whose territorial waters contain the major
navigable shipping lanes of the Strait of Hormuz, and a
population that is neither predominantly Sunni nor Shiite, the
Sultanate of Oman has carved out a unique position within the
GCC.\85\ Sultan Qaboos bin Said is popular with the Omani
people and enjoys a reputation in the region as a strategic
thinker. During his 40-year reign, though a period which also
coincides with its relatively modest oil discoveries, Oman has
made noteworthy social and economic strides. It has quadrupled
literacy rates and increased life expectancy by some 27 years.
Oman was rated by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) as having enjoyed the greatest improvement in its Human
Development Index score of any country in the world between
1970 and 2010.\86\
Oman generally seeks accommodation with its neighbors,
though it occasionally breaks with the Arab consensus. For
example, unlike most Arab League members, Oman maintained
relations with Egypt after the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel.
Oman is one of the few states that enjoys close relations with
both Iran and the United States, demonstrated by the
Sultanate's role in securing the release of the three American
hikers who were imprisoned in Iran.\87\
U.S. Military Presence: Oman formalized defense ties
with the United States--the first Gulf country to do
so--after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. It was from the
Omani air base on Masirah Island in 1980, that the
Carter administration staged a failed attempt to rescue
American hostages held in Iran. During the 1980's Iran-
Iraq War, U.S. forces used Omani installations as a
base for maritime patrol and tanker support. In the
early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan, over 4,000 American troops and critical
equipment, including a B-1 bomber aircraft, were
positioned in Oman. A 2010 security agreement permits
the United States to retain a small military footprint
and grants U.S. forces access, on a prearranged basis,
to military facilities in Masirah, Muscat, and
Thumrait.\88\
Omani Military: Numbering approximately 43,000, the
Omani military is the third-largest among GCC
states.\89\ With historical ties to the British, much
of the Omani military inventory comes from the United
Kingdom. However, Oman's forces are increasingly
looking for American equipment and training. For
example, in 2012, U.S. Army forces teamed with the
Royal Army of Oman during a 2-week training exercise--
Inferno Creek--that focused on infantry tactics at the
squadron and platoon level.\90\
U.S. Security Assistance and Training: Oman, unlike
most of its Gulf partners, is a recipient of U.S. grant
security assistance, albeit at modest levels. In fiscal
year 2012, the U.S. committed approximately $1.5
million in Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining,
and Related (NADR) funds, $1.65 million in
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
assistance, and approximately $8 million in Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) to Oman.\91\
Compared to its GCC counterparts, Oman has historically
procured fewer U.S. weapons systems. In fiscal year
2010, Oman agreed to purchase $13.9 million in defense
articles and services through the Foreign Military
Sales program.\92\ However, a number of larger
potential transfers were notified to Congress in 2010
and 2011 with a more significant price tag and a more
robust support and training package. These agreements
include missile components of a ground-based integrated
air defense system totaling $1.2 billion and new
acquisitions of F-16 fighter aircraft for as much as
$3.5 billion.\93\
The Sultanate's forces are regular participants in U.S.
training evolutions. The Royal Air Force of Oman hosts
exercises with the U.S. Navy and Air Force, and there
is a possibility the Omanis will participate in
advanced airborne combat exercises held in the United
States. In fiscal year 2010, 291 Omani military
students were trained through U.S. security cooperation
programs in intelligence, leadership, logistics,
procurement, maritime security, and counter-terrorism
at a value of $2.8 million.\94\
Analysis and Recommendations
The U.S. Government cannot rely on a single policy
prescription to promote regional stability in the Gulf region.
Instead, it will have to assess complicated intra-GCC dynamics
to formulate a comprehensive strategy that promotes American
values and supports regional security--in the midst of
extraordinary tumult.
challenge 1: preserving u.s. security interests
and promoting democratic values
Policymakers must strike a balance between security
interests and the promotion of fundamental freedoms. While the
United States has significant economic and security interests
in the Gulf, it should not be seen as opposed to popular reform
efforts.
The United States and the world's primary strategic
interest in the Persian Gulf is economic. Fifty-four percent of
the world's proven oil reserves and 40 percent of its proven
natural gas reserves are located in the Gulf region. In 2011,
only about 16 percent of the United States imported crude oil
originated from the GCC or Iraq.\95\ But crude oil is an
international commodity, and in recent years the market has
been tight. Given the political volatility of the Middle East
and the volume of oil originating there--in 2011, almost 20
percent of all traded oil transited the Strait of Hormuz \96\--
oil markets seem to be particularly sensitive to political
developments in the Gulf. Thus, at a time of tenuous economic
recovery in the United States and globally, there is a
correlation between stability in the Gulf and the United States
economic health.
Energy security is not the only American interest in the
Gulf region. The promotion of human rights and good governance
is undeniably an important component of American self-identity.
Because of the Gulf states' enormous petrochemical wealth and
relatively small populations, calls for democratic reform had,
at least until the Arab Awakening, been relatively muted. But
communities of activists and reformers exist in all of the
countries and they have often been poorly treated. U.S.
officials should be cautious about engaging in domestic affairs
of other countries, but should not shy away from speaking out
publicly on behalf of those seeking reform. Indeed, governments
that address the aspirations and grievances of their people are
more stable over the long term and consequently better security
partners for the United States.
However, the United States needs to be careful not to be
perceived as undertaking a capricious or erratic policy.
Abandoning allies is a strategy that is unlikely to advance the
United States long-term interests. The United States derives
significant leverage from being the prime security provider for
the Gulf region. While American military hardware remains the
most desirable in the world, European, Russian or Chinese
equipment may be seen as more appealing if it does not come
with strings attached. Pressure and disengagement are important
tools in the diplomatic toolkit, but if used improperly, they
can also lead to a loss of influence.
Amid relatively high sectarian tensions in the Middle
East--a consequence of violence in Iraq and, more recently, in
Syria, and growing concerns about Iran--the United States
should encourage its partners, including in the Gulf region, to
pursue nonsectarian policies. While the United States
relationship with Iran is antagonistic, it should continue to
emphasize its desire for a diplomatic outcome and be careful to
avoid being drawn into a sectarian rivalry. Just as senior
American officials distinguish between the Iranian people and
their government, so too must they be careful not to view Arab
Shiites as a monolithic community.
Recommendation: The United States should leverage its
strategic position to be a steady force for moderation,
stability, and nonsectarianism, through patient and
persistent engagement in support of human rights. The
United States should not rush to rescind security
assurances or assistance in response to human rights
abuses, but should evaluate each case on its own
merits. U.S. Government officials should use these
tools to advance human rights through careful
diplomacy. Consistency is a hallmark of a successful
security partnership. Nonetheless, there should be
redlines associated with the U.S. security agreements
in the Gulf, like elsewhere. The United States should
make clear that states must not use arms procured from
the United States against their own people engaged in
peaceful assembly or exploit the U.S. security umbrella
as protection for belligerent action against their
neighbors.
challenge 2: the composition of the gulf security framework
While the GCC is becoming a more independent and effective
actor, the United States remains crucial to the region's
stability. The Gulf monarchies have for centuries depended on
outside security guarantors, a role played by the United States
since the British left in 1971. Recently, they have emerged
from this historic dependency. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE,
in particular, are playing more prominent roles on the regional
and even global stage.
While the GCC's role in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait was
fairly marginal, Qatar's and the UAE's participation in the
2011 NATO campaign in Libya was more robust, even though the
campaign was of far less strategic significance to the Gulf
states. The GCC is also becoming more active politically,
emerging as a critical subgroup of the Arab League. The GCC
pushed for Arab endorsement for military action in Libya, was
instrumental in the political transition in Yemen, and has been
at the vanguard of Arab action in Syria. The GCC's Peninsula
Shield action in Bahrain is another example of the Gulf states
operating together, though this operation seems to have
complicated prospects for political compromise in Bahrain.
However, intra-GCC security cooperation is still heavily
reliant on American leadership. For the GCC to be effective, it
will have to become increasingly interoperable. But there are
significant limitations on Gulf states' willingness to
integrate. Thus, the emerging Gulf security architecture is
likely to involve the United States in a significant role
coordinating regional cooperation. That role makes the United
States crucial to the viability of a security framework, a
position the U.S. Government should seek to reinforce in a
region where so many vital national security interests are at
stake.
U.S. diplomatic engagement with the GCC will be vital to
the future of the Gulf, but security cooperation is likely to
be the cornerstone of a stable regional framework. Through
joint exercises, training evolutions, bilateral exchanges, and
security assistance the United States can build the capacity of
GCC partners to shape the Gulf security architecture to be
mutually beneficial to American and regional interests. As the
world's predominant power, the United States should regularly
facilitate such interaction on a multilateral and bilateral
basis. Although much of the U.S. engagement to foster a
symbiotic relationship takes place between militaries, the
State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs should
continue to play a central role. Diplomats must coordinate the
final policy determinations for the region by effectively
gauging the dynamics that contribute to U.S. national security
interests, including economics, security, human rights,
development, and governance.
Recommendation: The United States should seek to
remain a central part of the Gulf security framework.
The administration should encourage the development of
institutions like the GCC and Arab League, while
seeking to strengthen bilateral ties. However, the GCC
is not a monolith, and a multilateral architecture must
accommodate the significant differences among the Gulf
states. The United States has a unique diplomatic and
security role to play in the GCC. To protect its
regional security interests, the United States should
seek to reinforce its position as a core interlocutor
around which intra-GCC security is organized, through
robust diplomatic and economic engagement, military-to-
military cooperation, and security assistance. However,
there is concern in various GCC capitals that the
United States has not been forthcoming enough in
communicating its vision of how it would like this
cooperation to evolve amidst the political turmoil of
the Arab Awakening. American officials should seek to
ameliorate these concerns by more clearly articulating
to its GCC partners the United States vision for a Gulf
security framework, as well as its strategic priorities
for the broader region.
challenge 3: economic diversification
The Gulf region's tremendous hydrocarbon resources and
strong macroeconomic growth in recent years mask structural
human capital and unemployment challenges that could cause
longer term problems. The use of expatriate labor over the last
several decades has helped the region to quickly develop an
advanced infrastructure, but it has led to an underdevelopment
of the region's local human capital.
The Gulf is the world's richest region and has enjoyed
strong macroeconomic growth in recent years, due primarily to
high oil prices. On the surface, the Gulf economies are
booming. While the unrest in Bahrain caused significant
economic damage and the continuing fall-out of Dubai's 2008
real estate crash has slowed the UAE's growth, as a whole the
GCC region enjoyed an estimated 6.8 percent growth in real GDP
in 2011 and forecasts suggest approximately 4 percent growth in
2012 and 2013. With the exception of Bahrain, the GCC countries
have recorded large budget surpluses in recent years, and are
likely to remain in surplus in 2012, despite lower oil
prices.\97\
But this wealth is unevenly distributed and has led to
undiversified economies. Bahrain and to a lesser extent Oman
lack the immense hydrocarbon wealth of their neighbors. Even in
Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, an extraordinarily high standard of
living masks structural human capital and unemployment
challenges that could cause longer term problems. Because the
economies are heavily dependent on hydrocarbons, sectors other
than construction, consumables and finance are crowed out,
leading to concerns that the region is spending beyond its
means.
According to Mahmoud El-Gamal and Amy Jaffe of Rice
University, the Gulf states are ``consuming the region's
nonrenewable capital, instead of finding smooth paths for
sustainable consumption and investment.'' El-Gamal and Jaffe
argue that the spending of hydrocarbon rents results in stark
inequalities in wealth and perpetuates the cycle of speculative
financial and construction bubbles based on the volatility of
oil and gas markets.\98\
Bahrain, Oman, the UAE and Saudi Arabia all suffer from
double-digit unemployment.\99\ For example, according to a 2010
study by Booz and Company, 48 percent of Saudi citizens aged
between 20 and 24, and 31 percent between 25 and 29, were
unemployed.\100\ Unemployment disproportionately affects women
and those under 30 years old, and often lasts for extended
periods of time. Public spending alone is unlikely to meet the
social and economic demands of these constituencies.
Multiple factors contribute to this structural unemployment
problem. While small and medium enterprises constitute a
majority of private firms in developed countries, they account
for only a minimal share of the overall economic output of the
Gulf region.\101\ Public sector employment across the GCC
crowds out the private sector, especially when vast numbers of
expatriates from across the Middle East and beyond, many of
them highly skilled, are willing to work for lesser wages. This
use of expatriate labor over the last several decades has
helped the region to quickly develop an advanced
infrastructure, but it has also contributed to a significant
under-investment in the region's indigenous human capital.\102\
The Gulf states have recognized this dilemma and to varying
degrees have sought to diversify their economies and better
prepare their workforces for the global marketplace. Across the
region, a number of high-profile educational initiatives have
been undertaken, including the founding of Saudi Arabia's first
coeducational university, King Abdullah University of Science
and Technology; the creation of Education City in Qatar, which
hosts branch campuses of six American universities, including
Georgetown, Carnegie Mellon and Northwestern Universities; and
the establishment of a number of American branch campuses in
the UAE, including New York University and Rochester Institute
of Technology.
Dubai's economy was originally built on the hydrocarbon
sector, but oil and gas sales now account for less than 6
percent of the economy.\103\ Although it will take the city
several years to fully recover from the 2008 real estate crash,
the city has managed to transform itself into an international
hub for commerce, finance and tourism, boasting a world-class
airline and the largest man-made harbor on the planet. While
Dubai's model is unlikely to be fully replicated elsewhere, it
is an indication that the creation of free trade zones and
reducing barriers to entry can stimulate the non-hydrocarbon
sector.
Similarly, while Oman is culturally more conservative than
Dubai, the country has made noteworthy social and economic
strides in the last four decades. It has quadrupled literacy
rates and increased life expectancy by approximately 27 years.
Oman was rated by the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) as having enjoyed the greatest improvement in its Human
Development Index score of any country in the world between
1970 and 2010.\104\
Recommendation: The United States should work with
GCC states to promote economic reform and
diversification, as well as increased trade relations.
To help the GCC countries tackle their structural
unemployment and underemployment challenges, the United
States should focus on educational and labor reforms,
as well as the promotion of entrepreneurship. Trade
promotion is also an important tool for the
administration. The United States currently has Free
Trade Agreements with Bahrain and Oman, and Ambassador
Ronald Kirk, the U.S. Trade Representative, has cited
the need to increase trade with the GCC, as it
``continues to develop as a regional organization,
aiming to harmonize standards, import regulations, and
conformity assessment systems affecting U.S. trade.''
\105\ At the first meeting of the Strategic Cooperation
Forum between the United States and the GCC in Riyadh
on 31 March 2012, progress was made toward a ``GCC-U.S.
Framework Agreement on Trade, Economic, Investment, and
Technical Cooperation.'' \106\
challenge 4: u.s. military presence in the gulf
The United States should carefully shape and balance its
military presence to protect the free-flow of critical natural
resources and to provide a counterbalance to Iran.
Even as the war in Iraq has come to an end and the
coalition footprint in Afghanistan is on a downward trajectory,
the Persian Gulf remains a focal point for the American
military. Bases located throughout the region provide staging
and logistical functions and serve as command and control nerve
centers.
Amid the possibility of a conflict against Iran in the
region, it is imperative that the U.S. military appropriately
shape the size and structure of its presence in the Gulf. A
2010 Department of Defense report illustrates that Iran retains
a significant conventional military. Iran's population is twice
that of the combined GCC countries, and with ground forces
numbering over 350,000, approximately 1,800 tanks, over 300
fighter aircraft, and capable air defenses, the Iranian
military would pose a significant threat to the Gulf states
should conflict arise.\107\ Iran also has a ballistic missile
capability with enough range to target regional allies,
including Israel, and a number of coastal defense cruise
missiles designed to prevent access to the Persian Gulf.
Perhaps Iran's most viable capability is its ability to wage
asymmetric warfare throughout the region. The Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps' elite unit, the Quds Force, is an
active sponsor of terrorist activity, aiding Shia militants in
Iraq, insurgents in Afghanistan, and Hezbollah and Hamas in the
Levant. Iran's fleet of small patrol craft is also capable of
mining the Strait of Hormuz and conducting swarming maritime
tactics.
From its height in 1991, with over half a million forces,
the American military footprint in the Persian Gulf is now much
reduced. Thousands of military personnel remain in Kuwait,
Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar. But more important than the number
of U.S. forces in the region is the access that the United
States retains to critical basing infrastructure.
Kuwait is home to facilities including Camp Arifjan, Ali Al
Salem Air Field, and Camp Buehring which offer the United
States major staging points and training ranges for regional
operations. In Qatar, Al Udeid Air Base is a major logistical
hub and operation center. In the UAE, American forces use Al
Dhafra Air Base to stage fighter, attack, and reconnaissance
aircraft. The UAE port at Jebel Ali, large enough to
accommodate an aircraft carrier, is host to more American
military ship visits than any other port outside the United
States. Even the smallest GCC country, Bahrain, houses naval
facilities that span 60 acres and is a regular host to U.S.
carrier and amphibious battle groups, minesweepers, and coastal
patrol craft. The United States also maintains an integrated
missile defense system in the Gulf with Patriot batteries
located in a number of GCC States. Moreover, GCC partners
subsidize much of the U.S. presence on their soil.
The governments of Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain are
pleased to accommodate U.S. forces, but care must be taken to
ensure that U.S. forces keep a low profile and do not violate
traditional local social mores. Historically, U.S. troops
stationed in the Gulf have been victim to terrorist attacks and
central to Osama bin Laden's argument that the United States
was an occupier of sacred Muslim lands. While the American
presence extends a security umbrella, it is also important to
maintain the appearance of an ``over the horizon'' force--one
that stays just far enough out of sight to avoid the image of
an occupying power.
Recommendation: The United States should preserve the
model of ``lily pad'' bases throughout the Gulf, which
permits rapid escalations of military force in case of
emergency. The Obama administration has adopted this
architecture by retaining only essential personnel in
the region while ensuring access to critical hubs such
as Camp Arifjan, Al Udeid, Al Dhafra, Jebel Ali, and
Naval Support Activity Bahrain. Such an agile footprint
enables the United States to quickly deploy its
superior conventional force should conflict arise,
without maintaining a costly and unsustainable
presence. Sustaining physical infrastructure and
enabling functions such as intelligence, surveillance,
and logistics, while keeping certain war reserve
materiel forward positioned, is more important than
deploying large numbers of U.S. forces.
challenge 5: burden-sharing with gcc partners
Although the UAE and Qatar have demonstrated a willingness
to operate in the coalition environment, most Gulf states are
not yet fully capable of independently providing tactical
support to the United States in times of crisis. U.S. leaders
should not expect more from the Gulf states than they are
capable of or willing to provide, and they must be careful not
to upset a volatile region by introducing, through security
assistance, overwhelming offensive military capabilities that
could lead to an arms race.
After a decade of war and unbridled spending on defense as
the world's primary security guarantor, the United States will
have to chart a more sustainable course. The U.S. military
retains a significant advantage in conventional capability
relative to allies and adversaries alike. Technologically, U.S.
equipment is state-of-the-art; its troops are the most well-
trained in the world; and only the U.S. military can integrate
coalition efforts on a broad scale with its unique command and
control structure. Yet, even the U.S. military cannot be
everywhere at once. The foundation for a sustainable security
architecture will be continued American military dominance, but
U.S. leaders must also leverage the support of regional allies.
Burden-sharing lightens the yoke of U.S. responsibility and
represents a more financially justifiable model of
international security.
There is a new equilibrium in the Middle East, as the Arab
Awakening, immense oil and gas reserves, and the war in Iraq
have shifted the center of gravity towards the Gulf states. The
GCC has shown an increased willingness to operate on the
international scene. In support of NATO efforts in Libya, the
UAE demonstrated it was a capable ally in strike operations.
Qatari forces, although still evolving as an air power, played
a critical role on the ground, aiding the Libyan opposition in
their march towards Tripoli. Kuwaiti missile defense
capabilities are much improved as operators have made
significant strides in their training. With a significant
threat from al Qaeda still in the region, Saudi Arabia and Oman
are vital partners in counterterrorism operations. Even the
small Kingdom of Bahrain has shown the ability to operate in
the maritime coastal patrol environment.
The United States can leverage the burgeoning capabilities
of its GCC allies, but there are potential pitfalls. U.S.
leaders must be sensitive not to expect more from the Gulf
states than they are capable or willing to provide. They must
be careful not to upset a volatile region by introducing,
through security assistance, overwhelming offensive military
capabilities that could lead to an arms race. The GCC States
are still developing faculties to maintain equipment,
logistically support forces, and provide command, control, and
intelligence fusion. Although the relationship has grown, the
Gulf states' interests are not always aligned with those of the
United States. Nevertheless, an equilibrium can exist between
regional security responsibilities and the role Gulf states are
willing and able to play. Developing key defensive
proficiencies in the Gulf states will allow them to provide for
their own legitimate security needs, while contributing to U.S.
theater plans.
Foremost among these capabilities is missile defense, an
inherently defensive mission. Interoperability in this regime
will improve U.S. defense-in-depth. In other words, U.S.
capabilities will become more robust by supporting partner
capacity. However, when U.S. leaders transfer security
responsibility to GCC partners, they must make sure technical
agreements are firmly in place to provide the necessary access
to U.S. operators.
At the Integrated Air Missile Defense Center in the UAE,
the United States is building the capacity of its GCC partners
to engage it advanced tactics against ballistic missile, cruise
missile, and airborne threats. In October 2011, all the GCC
states took part in Falcon Shield, an integrated missile
defense exercise showcasing these skills with the United
States.
Another capability that can be improved is airpower such as
airlift, combat air patrol and, in select circumstances where
adept allies prove their competency, air strike. Airpower can
be used both defensively and offensively, so it must be
developed cautiously. However, Gulf states such as the UAE and
Qatar have already contributed airpower to coalition efforts,
and therefore, merit additional training to improve their
capacity for future internationally sanctioned initiatives.
Airlift is another niche competency that GCC states can
develop. Qatar deployed humanitarian supplies--aboard its
American-made C-17s--to countries like Pakistan, Haiti, and
Sudan suffering catastrophes. With additional assets and
training, the Gulf states can expand their role in these types
of missions. Finally, the GCC States can improve in the
innately defensive role of air combat patrol--the use of
fighter aircraft to safeguard international borders and
national assets. At the Air Warfare Center in Al Dhafra, the
United States is helping to build these skills through joint
exercises and training.
GCC allies can also effectively contribute to maritime
security by developing competencies in demining, coastal
patrol, and counterpiracy. These aptitudes are necessary to
maintain the free flow of commerce, undergird counterterrorism
efforts, and protect the coastal borders of the Gulf states.
Based in Bahrain, Combined Task Force 151--dedicated to
counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of
Somalia--and Combined Task Force 152--responsible for theater
security cooperation and maritime security--are international
efforts to share maritime security responsibilities in the
Gulf. Through these coalitions, the United States is
establishing common tactics, techniques, and procedures that
advance the GCC States' ability to operate in coalition
environments.
Recommendation: The U.S. Government should continue
to cultivate the capabilities of GCC partners in select
defensive missions, such as missile defense, combat air
patrol, and maritime security, while building capacity
through deployments in other theaters such as Libya and
Afghanistan. Burden-sharing does not imply that the
United States is abandoning the region or relinquishing
its role as a security guarantor. Rather, it is
intended to deepen strategic ties with the Gulf by
building the competencies of the GCC States through
joint exercises, security assistance, and training.
Over time, these partnerships can improve the
effectiveness of Gulf militaries, promote trust, and
provide for the transfer of American political-military
values such as respect for civilian authority, human
rights, and the rule-of-law. However, the Obama
administration should carefully consider what missions
it expects the Gulf states to execute effectively.
challenge 6: security assistance
The United States should carefully determine how much
security assistance to provide to its Gulf partners. The Gulf
states--in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE--are prolific
buyers of U.S. arms, but they are also willing to buy from
other international sellers. That does not mean however, the
United States should grant whatever capabilities to the GCC
States that they desire.
Security assistance--the equipping or training of foreign
security forces through the sale, grant, loan, or transfer of
defense articles or equipment--is a central means by which the
United States will build an effective security framework in the
Gulf. Since the Second World War, the United States has used
its industrial capability to provide for the legitimate defense
needs of friendly countries and further its national security
objectives abroad.
Traditional forms of security assistance afford the U.S.
Department of State with management and oversight
responsibility and the U.S. Department of Defense with
implementation authority. Congress plays an important role in
the security assistance process as well. In addition to
authorizing and appropriating grant funding, it must be
notified if arms sales exceed certain monetary thresholds.\108\
This oversight role provides Congress with the ability to
influence, and potentially block, arms sales. Thus, while the
process can be cumbersome and time-consuming, there is an
essential whole-of-government approach to the policy
formulation, implementation, and oversight of security
assistance.
Traditional forms of security assistance include Foreign
Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), Foreign
Military Financing (FMF), International Military Training and
Education (IMET), and Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related assistance (NADR).\109\ The FMS program
allows countries to purchase U.S. arms, equipment, services,
and training with the U.S. government acting as a broker
between the recipient nation and U.S. defense contractors. DCS
affords foreign buyers the ability to negotiate directly with
U.S. defense contractors for the purchase of military
equipment, which is ultimately licensed by the U.S. Government
for sale.\110\ FMF is grant funding for use by recipient
nations to purchase U.S. defense goods through FMS or DCS. IMET
is grant funding that provides training to foreign security
forces and officials. Finally, NADR is grant assistance that
aids in a variety of initiatives from arms control to
counterterrorism.
From 2007-2010, the six states of the GCC agreed to the
purchase of more U.S. defense articles and services through the
Foreign Military Sales program--over $26.7 billion--than any
other region in the world. The United States has sold or
granted significant military capabilities to the Gulf states
including fighter-attack aircraft, airlift, missile defense
systems, tanks, armored vehicles, and a panoply of advanced
armaments. In fiscal year 2010 alone, the United States
licensed hundreds of millions of dollars in defense articles
and services to the Gulf states through Direct Commercial
Sales,\111\ and through foreign military education the United
States trained over 2,900 students from the GCC States at an
estimated value of $111 million.
Recommendation: The United States should continue to
supply Gulf partners with security assistance that
supports a comprehensive strategy for regional arms
sales to ensure a stable security architecture.
However, the United States should be scrupulous in
determining which weapons systems to sell in order to
(1) ensure that sales contribute to regional security
and do not weaken the position of Israel, (2) support
the legitimate defense requirements of Gulf partners,
(3) prevent a regional arms race, and (4) protect its
technological superiority.\112\
The United States derives five principal benefits
from the transfer of defense equipment and training:
Interoperability: Security assistance allows the
United States to leverage the manpower, regional
expertise, and willingness of GCC States to conduct
joint operations. When the United States provides
regional allies with military equipment that is
interoperable with American systems, it can improve the
effectiveness and situational awareness of both the
recipient and the United States. Moreover, the training
and sustainment services that accompany these sales
convey to allies the common tactics and procedures that
become the foundation of coalition operations.
Access: Security assistance is a powerful lever that
provides U.S. security forces access to basing rights
and privileged passage through critical transit routes.
This access has allowed the United States to support
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and permits an
enduring presence in the region in support of U.S.
national interests.
Leverage: The ``total package'' approach that
includes the transfer of U.S. weapons and technology to
GCC partners incorporates not only equipment but also
training, supplies, and replacement parts. Thus,
reliance on U.S. support becomes vital for the
continued effective operation of defense articles. This
provision allows the U.S. Government to reevaluate if a
particular arms sale is in the best interest of
national security long after the initial transfer
occurs.
Relationships: Training associated with security
assistance provides the foundation of the military-to-
military cooperation and reinforces political
relationships. These associations help U.S. trainers
impart values to recipient military officials such as
respect for civilian authority. Moreover, such
cooperation gives the United States a keen awareness of
the competencies of its partners.
Regional Balance: The provision of security
assistance to the GCC States can help balance regional
security. The infusion of certain weapons and
competences could prove to be an effective deterrent
against Iran. However, security assistance should be
offered with caution to avoid compromising U.S.
technological advantages, exacerbating intrastate
conflict, or provoking a regional arms race. The United
States must maintain the quantitative military edge of
Israel by carefully weighing all potential arms sales
to the region.
challenge 7: iraq integration
Relations between the Gulf monarchies and Iraq remain cool.
There has been a tendency of some Arab states to remain
disengaged from Iraq, largely over its relations with Iran.
Unfortunately, this tendency has had the effect of pushing Iraq
closer to Iran.
Since the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the GCC has generally
had poor relations with Iraq. Despite their animosity towards
Saddam Hussein, most Gulf states had reservations about the
2003 invasion of Iraq, and since then, Saudi Arabia in
particular has been deeply concerned about Iran's influence on
Baghdad.\113\ Unfortunately, this tendency to disengage from
Iraq seems to have actually reinforced Iran's role, since it
leaves Turkey, which is not inclined to pursue sectarian
policies, as the only other regional power deeply engaged in
Iraq.
In recent months, however, there have been signs that the
Gulf states are slowly changing their policies out of necessity
due to the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq.
Additionally, Iraq itself has modified some of its foreign
policy positions in order to have a successful Arab League
presidency, which it took over in March.\114\
In April, the annual Arab League summit was held in Iraq
for the first time since 1990, during which Iraq joined the
Arab League consensus on Syria. While Iraq is unlikely to join
Gulf states in directly providing assistance to the Syrian
opposition, the move does suggest that Iraq has moved away from
Iran, which continues to provide unconditional support for
President Bashar al-Assad. Though most GCC countries sent
relatively low-level delegations, the Kuwaiti Emir, Sheikh
Sabah al-Sabah, attended and was warmly welcomed by Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a symbolically important gesture that
marked the first visit by a Kuwaiti Emir to Iraq since the 1990
invasion. Earlier this year, Saudi Arabia named a nonresident
ambassador, also for the first time since 1990, and the UAE has
undertaken a nascent security dialogue with Iraq.
Recommendation: The United States should promote the
gradual political reintegration of Iraq into the Arab
fold. Iraq's Arab League presidency in 2012 is an
opportunity for the United States to promote a
rebalancing of the Gulf's security architecture,
improved counterterrorism cooperation between Iraq and
the GCC, and a reduction in sectarian tensions. In
particular, in light of reciprocal visits by Kuwaiti
Emir Sheikh Sabah and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki, there may be opportunities for progress on the
outstanding bilateral issues dating to the 1990 Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait, including border demarcation, war
reparations, and the disposition of missing Kuwaiti
citizens.
Conclusion
As extraordinary change sweeps the Middle East, the United
States is confronted with a shifting security landscape in the
Persian Gulf region. Despite this transformation, the rationale
for continued American engagement in the region is compelling.
The world's energy security is inextricably linked to the
Gulf's abundant supply of hydrocarbons. Iran, one of the United
States most pressing security threats, continues to defy
international condemnation in its pursuit of a nuclear
capability. The Arabian Peninsula remains both a potential
target and dangerous source of international terrorism. Many of
the Gulf states are still a base of operations for some of the
U.S. military's most critical missions from the war in
Afghanistan to counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden to
antiterrorism efforts throughout the Middle East.
With the withdrawal of American forces after more than 8
years of war in Iraq, U.S. policymakers need to erect a
security framework to protect American strategic interests and
signal to allies that the United States is not abandoning the
region. The United States is still a predominant power, but it
should not seek to establish stability in the Gulf on its own.
Thus, a Gulf security architecture should rely not only on the
U.S. military but also, the burgeoning security forces of the
GCC States.
However, as it increasingly looks to share security burdens
with GCC partners, the U.S. Government should be pragmatic in
developing capabilities that Gulf states can effectively
execute and that do not upset the regional balance of power.
The United States should carefully apportion security
assistance to the GCC States to buttress their capacity to
undertake defensive missions. Added benefits will accrue from
the provision of security assistance including increased
interoperability and access to basing infrastructure and
transit routes.
Even as partnerships with Gulf states improve, the U.S.
military should maintain a foothold in what is still a
dangerous neighborhood. The United States remains the only
country capable of coalescing disparate security forces into a
cohesive alliance.
U.S. interests are not limited to security alone. Intrinsic
to American exceptionalism is the persistent pursuit of
fundamental human rights. In a Gulf region where security
interests do not always converge with human rights concerns,
this requires delicate policy decisions. Through security
cooperation, U.S. officials have a forum to consistently engage
with GCC partners not only on defense issues, but also with
respect to key principles like civilian authority and the rule-
of-law. Through robust diplomacy, Americans can hope to
gradually change the regional landscape, and in turn promote
U.S. interests.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ Though implemented by the Obama Administration, the
bilateral security agreement was negotiated by the Bush
administration and signed in November 2008, shortly before the
Obama Administration took office.
\2\ According to the 2011 BP Statistical Review of World
Energy, at the end of 2010, the six GCC states plus Iraq and
Iran had 747 billion of the world's 1,383 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves (54%) and 75 trillion of the world's 187
trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas reserves (40%).
See: BP, ``Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011,''
http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview, accessed 28 February 2012.
\3\ See tables 1 and 2 after the executive summary. These
figures are based on data provided from the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency. See: Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and
Other Security Cooperation, Historical Facts as of 30 September
2010, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/
FiscalYearSeries-2010.pdf, accessed 10 November 2011.
\4\ U.S. Department of State, Press Releases: 2011, Special
Joint Press Briefing on U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, 29
December 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/12/
179777.htm, accessed 29 December 2011; Christopher Blanchard,
Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, Report RL33533
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 March
2011), 9.
\5\ The Arms Export Control Act explicitly states that no
defense articles or services shall be sold or leased to foreign
recipients unless ``the President finds that the furnishing of
defense articles and defense services to such a country or
international organization will strengthen the security of the
United States and promote world peace.'' See Eligibility for
Defense Services or Defense Articles, U.S. Code 22 (1976),
Sec. 2753.
\6\1A James Onley, ``Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-
1971: The Politics of Protection,'' Occasional Paper no. 4
(Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2009),http://
www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/qatar/cirs/
JamesOnleyCIRSOccasionalPaper2009.pdf, accessed 13 April 2012.
\7\ Robert Schneller, Jr. Anchor of Resolve: A History of U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet (Washington DC: Naval
Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 2007), http://
www.history.navy.mil/pubs/AnchorofResolve--web.pdf, accessed 13
April 2012.
\8\ Jimmy Carter, ``The State of the Union Address Delivered
Before a Joint Session of the Congress. January 23, 1980,'' The
American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa
Barbara, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=33079#axzz1spb4HZYc, accessed 22 April 2012.
\9\ Martin Indyk, ``U.S. Policy Priorities in the Gulf:
Challenges and Choices,'' in International Interests in the
Gulf Region (Abu Dhabi, UAE: Emirates Center for Strategic
Studies and Research, 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/views/
articles/indyk/20041231.pdf, accessed 13 April 2012.
\10\ Martin Indyk, ``The Clinton Administration's Approach to
the Middle East,'' Soref Symposium Keynote Address (Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC, 18 May 1993),
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-
clinton-administrations-approach-to-the-middle-east, accessed
13 April 2012.
\11\ At the GCC consultative summit in Riyadh in May, Saudi
Arabia proposed an evolution from cooperation council towards
union and a study of the proposal was approved. Though Bahrain
has publicly supported the idea, other GCC leaders have been
more cautious.
\12\ BP, ``Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011,''
accessed 28 February 2012.
\13\ As of March 2012, Saudi Arabia's daily oil production
averaged 9.9 million barrels per day. Saudi officials have
stated that the country is capable of producing 12.5 million
barrels per day. Martin Baccardax, ``Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-
Naimi Ready to Lift Crude Output, Calls Current Prices
`Unjustified,' '' International Business Times, 20 March 2012,
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/316880/20120320/oil-economy-
saudi-arabia-brent-crude.htm, accessed 13 April 2012.
\14\ Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money,
and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 284.
\15\ SFRC staff discussions, Riyadh, January 2012.
\16\ SFRC staff discussions, Riyadh, January 2012, and
Washington DC.
\17\ Sharon Otterman, Saudi Arabia: Withdrawal of U.S. Forces
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Publications, 2 May
2003), http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-withdrawl-
us-forces/p7739, accessed 11 February 2012.
\18\ PBS, ``Osama bin Laden v. the U.S.: Edicts and
Statements,'' in Frontline: Hunting Bin Laden, http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/
edicts.html#ixzz1piMOCaXR, accessed 13 April 2012. In 1995, a
car bomb in Riyadh killed five U.S. servicemen, and in 1996, 19
troops were killed in the bombing of the Khobar Towers.
Frequent deadly, though less spectacular, attacks continued
against American commercial and diplomatic interests--as well
as against Saudi and international interests--until 2004, when
Saudi counter-terrorism efforts against al-Qaeda began to get
the upper hand. See also Sharon Otterman, Saudi Arabia:
Withdrawal of U.S. Forces.
\19\ Kenneth Katzman, The Persian Gulf States: Issues for U.S.
Policy, 2006, Report RL31533 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, 21 August 2006), 8.
\20\ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), 328.
\21\ F. Gregory Gause III, ``Saudi Arabia in the New Middle
East,'' Council Special Report No. 63 (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 2011), 6-7. King Abdullah commanded the
National Guard for more than three decades, until his son
Prince Mutaib was appointed.
\22\ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military
Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security
Cooperation, Historical Facts as of 30 September 2010.
\23\ Richard Grimmett, U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and
Deliveries to Major Clients, 2003-2010, Report R42121
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 16 December
2011), 3.
\24\ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Arms Sales
Notifications, http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/36b--
index.htm, accessed 17 March 2012.
\25\ U.S. Department of State, Press Releases: 2011, Special
Joint Press Briefing on U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, 29
December 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/12/
179777.htm, accessed 29 December 2011.
\26\ Christopher Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S.
Relations, Report RL33533 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, 10 March 2011), 9.
\27\ U.S. Departments of Defense and State, Joint Report to
Congress Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As
Amended, and the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008: Foreign Military
Training, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, http://www.state.gov/t/
pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2011/index.htm, accessed 23 January 2012.
\28\ ``Saudi Aircraft Join in Air Force Exercise,'' Air Force
Times, 9 February 2008, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/
02/airforce--red--flag--080209w, accessed 11 March 2012.
\29\ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget
Justification, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional
Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2013, Washington DC, http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/185015.pdf, accessed 28
February 2012, 571; and Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
Security Assistance Management Manual, http://www.dsca.mil/
samm/Chapter%2010%20-%20International%20Training.pdf, 427.
\30\ Robert Burns, ``U.S. Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with
Saudis,'' Air Force Times, 19 May 2011, http://
www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/05/ap-us-quietly-expanding-
defense-ties-with-saudis-051911, accessed20 January 2012.
\31\ SFRC staff discussions, Kuwait, February 2012 and
Washington, DC.
\32\ SFRC staff discussions, Kuwait, February 2012.
\33\ Kenneth Katzman, Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S.
Policy, Report RS21513 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, February 8, 2012), 10-11.
\34\ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 2011, 318.
\35\ Ibid., 317-318.
\36\ SFRC staff discussions, Kuwait, February 2012.
\37\ Combined Maritime Forces, Kuwaiti Navy Leads Stakenet
Exercise, 16 February 2012, http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/
2012/02/16/kuwaiti-navy-leads-stakenet-exercise, accessed 16
February 2012.
\38\ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military
Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security
Cooperation, Historical Facts as of 30 September 2010.
\39\ Joint Report to Congress Pursuant to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, and the Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2008: Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2010 and
2011.
\40\ SFRC staff discussions, Kuwait, February 2012.
\41\ SFRC staff discussions, Bahrain, April 2011.
\42\ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Bahrain - M1152A1B2
HMMWVs and TOW-2A and TOW-2B Missiles, www.dsca.mil/
PressReleases/36-b/2011/Bahrain--10-71.pdf, accessed 17 March
2012.
\43\ John Donnelly, ``Amid the Arab Spring, A Balancing Act in
Bahrain,'' Congressional Quarterly, 5 November 2011, http://
public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-000003976649.html,
accessed 17 March 2012.
\44\ U.S. Department of State, Press Releases: 2012, Bahrain
Security Assistance, 27 January 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2012/01/182695.htm, accessed 27 January 2012.
\45\ Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Report of the
Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 23 November 2011,
http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf, accessed 12 April
2012, paragraphs 1240, 1584, 1694, and 1698.
\46\ International Crisis Group, Conflict Risk Alert: Bahrain,
16 April 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/
media-releases/2012/mena/conflict-risk-alert-bahrain.aspx,
accessed 22 April 2012.
\47\ Kenneth Katzman, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S.
Policy, Report 95-1013 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, 29 December 2011), 20-21.
\48\ Commander Navy Installations Command, CNIC/ Naval Support
Activity Bahrain, http://www.cnic.navy.mil/bahrain/, accessed
20 February 2012.
\49\ Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, 20.
\50\ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 2011, 305; SFRC staff discussion, Bahrain,
April 2011.
\51\ Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, 21.
\52\ Krishna Jackson, Press Release #151-11: U.S. Navy EOD and
Divers and Bahrain Defense Forces Strengthen Partnerships, U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command, 1 December 2011, http://
www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2011/151.html, accessed 29 December
2011.
\53\ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget
Justification, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional
Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2013, http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/185015.pdf, accessed 10 March 2012.
\54\ In past years, Bahrain has purchased advanced U.S. defense
equipment such as F-16s and air-to-air missiles. Defense
Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign
Military Construction Sales and Other Security Cooperation,
Historical Facts as of 30 September 2010.
\55\ In previous years, Bahrain received a U.S. frigate through
this program. U.S. Department of State, Report By The
Department of State Pursuant to Section 655 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended: Annual Report of Military
Assistance and Military Exports, Fiscal Year 2011.
\56\ Joint Report to Congress Pursuant to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, and the Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, 2008: Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2010 and
2011.
\57\ Christopher Blanchard, Qatar: Background and U.S.
Relations, Report RL31718 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, 16 May 2011), 8-9.
\58\ Ibid, 11-12.
\59\ U.S. Department of Defense, News Transcript: Media
Availability with Secretary Panetta en Route to Bali,
Indonesia, 21 October 2011, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4907, accessed 15 December 2011.
\60\ Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations, 9.
\61\ SFRC staff discussions, Qatar, February 2012.
\62\ Hugh Eakin, ``The Strange Power of Qatar,'' The New York
Review of Books, 27 October 2011, http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/2011/oct/27/strange-power-qatar/, accessed 15
April 2012.
\63\ SFRC staff discussion, Qatar, February 2012.
\64\ Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations, 9.
\65\ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military
Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security
Cooperation, Historical Facts as of 30 September 2010.
\66\ SFRC staff discussions, Qatar, February 2012.
\67\ Department of Defense and the Department of State, Joint
Report to Congress Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, As Amended, and the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008:
Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011.
\68\ SFRC staff discussion, Qatar, February 2012.
\69\ The seven Emirates are: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Fujairah,
Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Quwain. During the Trucial
period, there existed a number of other Sheikhdoms, which were
incorporated over time into these seven.
\70\ The three small islands of Abu Musa and Lesser and Greater
Tunb, which are strategically located near the Strait of
Hormuz, have been the subject of dispute since the formation of
the UAE in 1971. The UAE has called upon Iran to resolve the
dispute through direct negotiations or through the
International Court of Justice, but Iran has argued that the
Court does not have jurisdiction. See, Sultan al-Qassemi,
``Iran Picks Awkward Time to Escalate Gulf Tensions,'' Al-
Monitor, 13 April 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/
contents/articles/opinion/2012/al-monitor/iran-picks-awkward-
time-to-escal.html, accessed 22 April 2012.
\71\ After spending eight months in jail, the five were
pardoned and released one day after being convicted of anti-
state crimes. Al Jazeera, ``UAE pardons jailed activists,'' 28
November 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/
11/20111128135953601809.html, accessed 10 April 2012.
\72\ Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues
for U.S. Policy, Report RS21852 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, 23 December 2011), 11-12.
\73\ U.S. Department of Defense, News Transcript: Media
Availability with Secretary Panetta en Route to Bali,
Indonesia.
\74\ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance 2011, 335.
\75\ Ibid., 333.
\76\ Despite its tactical prowess, the UAE's military is still
developing logistics, maintenance, and support capabilities to
sustainment its modern military force.
\77\ SFRC staff discussion, UAE, February 2012.
\78\ The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy,
14.
\79\ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Arms Sales
Notifications, http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/ 36b/36b--
index.htm, accessed 22 January 2012.
\80\ Congressional Research Service, U.S. Arms Sales:
Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 2003-2010, 3.
\81\ Department of Defense and the Department of State, Joint
Report to Congress Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, As Amended, and the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008:
Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011.
\82\ SFRC staff discussion, UAE, February 2012.
\83\ Ibid.
\84\ United States Central Command, Eagle Resolve 2011 Begins
in United Arab Emirates, http://www.centcom.mil/press-releases/
eagle-resolve-2011-begins-in-united-arab-emirates, accessed 15
March 2012.
\85\ Self-governing since the 1740s, Oman maintained colonies
in the 18th and 19th century as far afield as Zanzibar in
present-day Tanzania and Gwadar in present-day Pakistan. A
majority of Omanis practice a form of Islam known as Ibadism,
distinct from both Sunni and Shi'a Islam. Ibadis trace their
lineage to the early decades after the death of the prophet
Mohammed.
\86\ United Nations Development Programme, ``Human Development
Report 2010: 20th Anniversary Edition,'' http://hdr.undp.org/
en/media/HDR--2010--EN--Complete--reprint.pdf, pages 29 and 54.
The Human Development Index is a composite measure of life
expectancy, educational attainment and income.
\87\ The three American hikers - Sarah Shourd, Shane Bauer, and
Josh Fattal - were arrested on 31 July 2009 by Iranian
officials in the border region between Iran and Iraq. Ms.
Shourd was released on 14 September 2010, and Mr. Bauer and Mr.
Fattal were released on 21 September 2011. In both instances,
President Obama personally thanked Omani officials, as well as
Swiss officials and others, for their efforts on the hikers'
behalf. See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
``Statement by the President on the Release of Shane Bauer and
Josh Fattal,'' 14 September 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2011/09/21/statement-president-release-shane-
bauer-and-josh-fattal; and The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, ``Statement by the President on the Release of Sarah
Shourd,'' http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/
14/statement-president-release-sarah-shourd, accessed on 12
April 2012.
\88\ Kenneth Katzman, Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy,
Report RS21534 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
13 January 2012), 8-9.
\89\ Ibid.
\90\ Brian Bierwith, ``Shaping the Environment: 1-94 Field
Artillery platoon builds relationships with Omani allies ring
combined training in a rugged landscape,'' Northwest Guardian,
1 March 2012, http://www.nwguardian.com/2012/03/01/12375/
shaping-the-environment.html, accessed 10 March 2012.
\91\ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget
Justification, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional
Perspectives, Fiscal Year 2013.
\92\ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military
Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security
Cooperation, Historical Facts as of 30 September 2010.
\93\ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Arms Sales
Notifications, http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/36b--
index.htm, 28 February 2012.
\94\ Department of Defense and the Department of State, Joint
Report to Congress Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, As Amended, and the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2008:
Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011.
\95\ According to U.S. Energy Information Agency data, the
United States imported 4.1 billion barrels of oil, of which 670
million came from the Persian Gulf, including 436 million
barrels from Saudi Arabia (10.5% of total imports), 168 million
from Iraq (4%), 70 million from Kuwait (1.7%), and marginal
amounts from Oman, the UAE, and Qatar. Other leading sources of
imported crude in 2011 include: Canada, 988 million barrels
(24%); Mexico, 440 million (10.6%); Venezuela, 345 million
(8.3%); Nigeria, 298 million (7.1%); and Russia, 227 million
(5.5%). See U.S. Energy Information Agency, U.S. Imports by
Country of Origin, http://205.254.135.7/dnav/pet/ pet--move--
impcus--a2--nus--ep00--im0--mbbl--a.htm, accessed 11 April
2012.
\96\ U.S. Energy Information Agency, Analysis Brief: World Oil
Transit Chokepoints, 20 December 2011, http://www.eia.gov/
countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=WOTC#hormuz, accessed 11
April 2012.
\97\ Simon Williams and Elizabeth Martins, ``Middle East
Economics Q1 2012: Who's at risk in 2012?'', HSBC Global
Research, March 2012, page 3, https://www.research.hsbc.com/
midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=1HRpM5uplF&n=317973.PDF, accessed 22
May 2012.
\98\ Mamoud el-Gamal and Amy Jaffe, ``Oil, Dollars, Debt, and
Crises: The Global Curse of Black Gold,'' Cambridge University
Press, 2010.
\99\ Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, ``Country
Comparison: Unemployment Rate,'' 2012, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/
2129rank.html, accessed 22 May 2012. Guillaume Desjardins,
``UAE Unemployment Is High, but Not for Lack of Jobs,''
cnbc.com, 27 September 2011, http://www.cnbc.com/id/44690025/
UAE--Unemployment--Is--High--but--Not--for--Lack--of--Jobs/
print/1/displaymode/1098/, accessed 22 May 2012.
\100\ Richard Shediac and Hatem Samman, ``Meeting the
Employment Challenge in the GCC: The Need for a Holistic
Strategy,'' Booz and Co., June 2010, page 3, http://
www.booz.com/media/uploads/Meeting--the--Employment--
Challenge--in--the--GCC.pdf, accessed 22 May 2012.
\101\ Ibid., page 7.
\102\ SFRC staff discussion, GCC, February 2012.
\103\ Jonathan Sheikh-Miller, ``Oil share dips in Dubai GDP,''
AMEInfo.com, 9 June 2007, http://www.ameinfo.com/cgi-bin/cms/
page.cgi?page=print;link=122863, accessed 22 May 2012.
\104\ United Nations Development Programme, ``Human Development
Report 2010: 20th Anniversary Edition,'' http://hdr.undp.org/
en/media/HDR--2010--EN--Complete--reprint.pdf, pages 29 and 54.
The Human Development Index is a composite measure of life
expectancy, educational attainment and income.
\105\ Ambassador Ronald Kirk, 2012 Trade Policy Agenda and 2011
Annual Report, United States Trade Representation, March 2012,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-
publications/2012-0, page 137-138, accessed 22 May 2012.
\106\ Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, First Ministerial Meeting
of GCC-U.S. Strategic Cooperation Forum Concludes, 1 April
2012, http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest--news/
news04011202.aspx, accessed 22 April 2012.
\107\ U.S. Department of Defense, Unclassified Report on
Military Power of Iran, April 2010, submitted pursuant to
Section 1245 of FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
111-84).
\108\ In the case of arms sales to most states, the President
must notify Congress of an agreement to sell major defense
equipment of $14 million or more, defense articles or services
for $50 million or more, or any design and construction
services for $200 million or more. Congress must also be
notified before the issuance of any export license for major
defense articles in excess of $14 million or other defense
articles or services in excess of $50 million. After receiving
such notification, Congress has 30 days to adopt a resolution
of disapproval objecting to the sale or the notification is
considered approved.
\109\ For additional information on U.S. security assistance,
see http://www.dsca.mil/pubs/29th%20Gbookv2.pdf
\110\ The U.S. government designates certain sensitive military
equipment as `Foreign Military Sale (FMS) only,' thereby
precluding its purchase through Direct Commercial Sale (DCS).
If a defense item is available through both FMS and DCS, it is
up to the recipient nation to determine which procurement route
they prefer. The FMS program requires administrative fees that
some countries view as burdensome. On the other hand, FMS sales
are brokered as part of a more bounded process that some states
favor to direct negotiations with U.S. contractors. FMS sales
also carry the weight and security of the U.S. government
behind them - a facet that some recipient countries find
comforting.
\111\ Although the U.S. State Department maintains a database
of defense licenses granted to foreign recipients, the database
does not separate those licenses from arms transfers authorized
for U.S. entities in those countries. Therefore, this report
does not capture the exact amount of defense articles and
equipment transferred to GCC States through DCS. See U.S.
Department of State, Report by the Department of State Pursuant
to Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As
Amended - Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations for Fiscal
Year 2010, Washington, DC, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/reports/
documents/rpt655--FY10.pdf, accessed 10 January 2012.
\112\ The Arms Export Control Act explicitly states that no
defense articles or services shall be sold or leased to foreign
recipients unless ``the President finds that the furnishing of
defense articles and defense services to such a country or
international organization will strengthen the security of the
United States and promote world peace.'' See Eligibility for
Defense Services or Defense Articles, U.S. Code 22 (1976),
Sec. 2753.
\113\ Roy Gutman, ``As U.S. departs Iraq, it leaves two allies
that aren't speaking,'' McClatchy Newspapers, 18 December 2011,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/12/18/v-print/133219/as-us-
departs-iraq-it-leaves-behind.html. Accessed April 15, 2012.
\114\ SFRC discussions, Baghdad, February 2012; Washington,
April 2012.