[Senate Prints 112-32]
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112th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
 1st Session                COMMITTEE PRINT                      112-32
_______________________________________________________________________


                    CENTRAL ASIA AND THE TRANSITION 
                             IN AFGHANISTAN

                               __________

                        A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT

                      PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      One Hundred Twelfth Congress

                             First Session

                           December 19, 2011




       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


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                COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS          

            JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman          
BARBARA BOXER, California            RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois          JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico                MIKE LEE, Utah
              William C. Danvers, Staff Director          
       Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director          

                             (ii)          




                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v
Executive Summary................................................     1
Appreciating the Challenges of Central Asia......................     3
Central Asia's Role in Supplying U.S. and Coalition Troops in 
  Afghanistan....................................................     5
Striking a Balance between Security and Political Priorities.....     7
Translating the New Silk Road Vision into a Strategy.............     9
Assessing the Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative...........    11
Securing Central Asia's Southern Borders.........................    12

                               Appendixes

Appendix I.--English Language Training...........................    17
Appendix II.--Remembering Osh....................................    18
Appendix III.--Tajikistan: A Closer Look.........................    19
Appendix IV.--Total U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Central Asia, 
  Pakistan, and Afghanistan, FY 2001-2010 (millions).............    20
Appendix V.--U.S. Budgeted Peace & Security Assistance vs. Total 
  Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001-2010 (millions)............    21
Appendix VI.--U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001-2010......    22
Appendix VII.--Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
  Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan...................................    23




                                 (iii)


                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                 Washington, DC, December 19, 2011.
    Dear Colleagues: This report by the committee's majority 
staff is part of an ongoing examination of U.S. engagement in 
Afghanistan and the broader region. It takes a close look at 
the link between developing a comprehensive Central Asia 
strategy and U.S. initiatives to promote peace and stability in 
Afghanistan and the region. It is based on a field visit by the 
committee's majority staff to Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in October 2011, as well as 
extensive staff meetings with experts and policymakers in 
Washington, D.C.
    Central Asia is critical to the outcome in Afghanistan. The 
Northern Distribution Network and Manas Transit Center play 
vital roles in supporting NATO and U.S.-led coalition 
operations. Going forward, the challenge for the United States 
is to strike a balance between its short-term, war-fighting 
needs and long-term interests in promoting a stable, 
prosperous, and democratic Central Asia.
    Given the U.S. strategic interests at stake, this report 
provides constructive and timely recommendations for the Obama 
administration as it works to use our resources to achieve core 
U.S. policy objectives.
            Sincerely,
                                             John F. Kerry,
                                                          Chairman.

                                  (v)


 
                    CENTRAL ASIA AND THE TRANSITION 
                             IN AFGHANISTAN

                              ----------                              


                           Executive Summary

    Central Asia, which includes the countries of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is on the 
frontlines of the war in Afghanistan. Three of the five 
countries share a long and porous border with Afghanistan, and 
the region is bound to its southern neighbor by ties of 
ethnicity, culture, history, politics, and language. They are 
also connected by flows of militant groups and illicit 
narcotics. Of all Afghanistan's neighbors, the greatest focus 
has rightly been on Pakistan, whose internal dynamics have the 
most profound effect on regional stability. But what happens in 
Central Asia will also affect the outcome in Afghanistan.
    As the United States plans for the 2014 transition, Central 
Asia will continue to play a critical role in stabilization 
efforts and our broader regional strategy. Central Asian 
countries facilitate the movement of troops and non-lethal 
supplies into Afghanistan. Kazakhstan provides robust economic 
and humanitarian aid and recently hosted a meeting of the 
International Contact Group in the lead-up to the Bonn 
conference. Several countries, notably Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Turkmenistan, are exporting cheap electricity, and 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have expressed interest in helping 
advance a peace process in Afghanistan.
    The legacy of the Soviet Union's precipitous withdrawal 
from Afghanistan looms large in the minds and perspectives of 
leaders in Central Asia. Leaders in the region want to see a 
stable Afghanistan, one that does not fall prey again to the 
abusive practices of the Taliban. However, they are looking for 
reassurance that the United States and its partners have a 
political strategy to end the war and bring lasting peace. 
Officials with many governments told committee staff they fear 
the transition will increase drug trafficking and leave behind 
a security vacuum that extremist groups, such as the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), are 
eager to fill. Tajikistan remains the weakest link in Central 
Asia, and instability there would affect the entire region.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See Appendix III for a discussion on militancy in Tajikistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. role in Afghanistan is changing, but Washington 
should repeatedly stress that its engagement is not ending. 
Afghanistan's neighbors fear the 2014 security transition and 
withdrawal of coalition forces could mean abandonment. The 
United States must keep working to change the narrative by 
making it clear that we will protect our long-term interests in 
the region. The top priority is regional stability, and that is 
why 2014 will mark the beginning of a new phase of U.S. 
engagement in the region. The U.S. military will continue to 
work with the Afghan National Security Forces to prevent the 
return of terrorist safe havens. Much as it is doing in Iraq, 
the United States will remain vigorously engaged on security, 
governance, and economic and social development.
    American strategy is focused on Central Asia in part as a 
response to the challenges of transiting supplies through 
Pakistan for the Afghan war. Since 2009, the United States has 
increasingly relied on a series of commercial air and ground 
routes called the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) that 
carry non-lethal supplies from Europe to U.S. and coalition 
troops in Afghanistan through Russia, the Caucasus, and Central 
Asia. The NDN is a critical component in supporting coalition 
operations in Afghanistan and requires support from countries 
like Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, the United States relies on the 
Manas Transit Center as the premier air mobility hub for 
operations in Afghanistan. The Transit Center is the entry and 
exit point for virtually all coalition forces in Afghanistan 
and is a major and vital mission. Maintaining the Center 
requires active diplomatic and policy engagement with 
Kyrgyzstan's leadership.
    Building political support in Central Asia for coalition 
efforts in Afghanistan has been challenging. In many cases, the 
United States is forced to rely on highly corrupt, 
authoritarian governments in countries whose populations are 
suspicious of U.S. intentions. Russia has deep ties in this 
region and fears American military encirclement. For their 
part, Chinese strategists are leery of permanent U.S. bases on 
China's border, but they are even more nervous about the risk 
of instability in Afghanistan should the United States and its 
partners fail to help stabilize the country.
    To strengthen U.S. engagement with Central Asian countries, 
the Obama administration has launched Annual Bilateral 
Consultations (ABCs) that meet regularly and provide an 
important platform for discussions on a range of issues from 
security to human rights. The administration is complementing 
this high-level political engagement with the ``New Silk Road'' 
(NSR) initiative, a vision of regional economic integration 
that it hopes will connect Afghanistan with its neighbors in 
South and Central Asia. The administration is also focused on 
combating drug trafficking, which poses a serious threat to 
regional stability, through new regional programs such as the 
Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative. Known as CACI, this 
initiative seeks to build task forces throughout the region to 
share sensitive information and coordinate joint operations.
    As the United States prepares for the 2014 transition in 
Afghanistan and continues to engage with countries in Central 
Asia, this report offers three overarching recommendations for 
U.S. policy:


 (1) Strike a balance between security and political priorities 
        in Central Asia. As the United States increases 
        security cooperation with the countries of Central Asia 
        to support efforts in Afghanistan, it must also lay the 
        foundation for a long-term strategy that sustains these 
        gains and protects U.S. interests in the region. 
        Security assistance has an important role to play, but 
        the United States should continue promoting political 
        and economic reform by making greater investments where 
        possible in democracy and governance, public health, 
        economic assistance, and English language training.\2\ 
        Given the tight fiscal climate, the administration 
        should consider using existing Afghanistan resources on 
        cross-border projects that promote regional stability 
        for Afghanistan and its neighbors. It should also 
        prioritize and increase assistance to Tajikistan and 
        Kyrgyzstan, given their fragility and importance for 
        broader regional stability.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See Appendix I for a discussion on expanding English language 
training in Central Asia.
    \3\ See Appendixes II and III for a discussion on the 2010 violence 
in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and militancy in Tajikistan.

 (2) Translate the New Silk Road (NSR) vision into a working 
        strategy for the broader region beyond Afghanistan. 
        This will require identifying needs, available 
        resources, U.S. comparative advantages, and the 
        economic reforms regional governments must take to 
        support increased trade and investment. Connecting 
        Central to South Asia via Afghanistan will be 
        challenging in light of the barriers to continental 
        transport and trade, including the lack of regional 
        cooperation. NSR will not be a panacea for 
        Afghanistan's economic woes, but it offers a vision for 
        the region that has the potential to foster private 
        sector investment if projects are prioritized and steps 
        are taken to create an enabling environment. The United 
        States can play a vital role by supporting political 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        and economic reform and leveraging its resources.

 (3) Link the regional Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative 
        (CACI) with bilateral initiatives that offer traction, 
        given the constraints on regional cooperation. CACI 
        provides an important vision for reform and information 
        sharing to tackle narcotics trafficking in the region. 
        While there is demand for such an initiative among 
        local agencies with a mandate to combat the drug trade, 
        significant challenges remain. Regional cooperation has 
        a checkered history in this part of the world. 
        Corruption is widespread and prospects for the task 
        forces remain unclear, given the lack of political 
        will. The administration should consider piloting the 
        task forces in countries where they stand the greatest 
        chance of success, which will require a comparative 
        regional assessment of efforts to combat the drug 
        trade. It should also scale up cross-border operations 
        between Central Asian and Afghan law enforcement and 
        military officials, including joint training 
        activities.

              Appreciating the Challenges of Central Asia

    Central Asia occupies a unique position on the map, sitting 
at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Given its history, 
politics, and culture, a regional strategy should take into 
account the following realities:


   Central Asian states have similarities, but they are not 
        homogeneous. While countries such as Kazakhstan and 
        Turkmenistan can trade on massive energy reserves, 
        others like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are fragile 
        states that rely on external resources for their 
        survival. Border security varies greatly. Tajikistan's 
        borders are largely ``green'' zones, allowing militants 
        and narcotics to flow virtually unimpeded across them. 
        Uzbekistan is contiguous to all other Central Asian 
        states and Afghanistan. It maintains highly controlled 
        borders, including land mines along its border with 
        Tajikistan. Kyrgyzstan is the lone parliamentary 
        democracy in an otherwise autocratic region, but its 
        institutions are brittle and ethnic tensions simmer 
        just beneath the surface.

   Key Central Asian militant groups are based in Pakistan and 
        fight in Afghanistan. Groups such as the Islamic 
        Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union 
        (IJU), which trace their roots to Central Asia, are 
        based in North Waziristan, Pakistan. They have 
        conducted attacks in Afghanistan and have ties to the 
        Taliban and Haqqani network. Both groups continue to 
        pose a threat to stability in Afghanistan. Central 
        Asian governments fear that these groups, which 
        entertain ambitions of establishing a caliphate in 
        Central Asia, will thrive as the United States draws 
        down its military presence in Afghanistan.

   Weak political will and limited capacity facilitate 
        narcotics flows. According to U.S. officials, an 
        estimated 30 percent of narcotics flow from Afghanistan 
        to Russia via Central Asia, mostly through Tajikistan. 
        Despite multiple initiatives, counternarcotics efforts 
        have been hampered by rampant corruption, weak 
        political will, limited human capacity, and porous 
        borders. Russia, China, Iran, and the European Union 
        all share American concerns about the narcotics flows, 
        creating potential for greater cooperation and 
        coordination.

   Russia and China maintain a strong presence in Central 
        Asia. China, in particular, is extending its economic 
        reach, while Iran, South Korea, India, Japan, and 
        Turkey are also playing greater roles. Russia is 
        attempting to expand its influence through a network of 
        military bases, commercial agreements, and new 
        political alliances, and may redeploy Russian troops to 
        the Tajik-Afghan border as the United States draws down 
        in Afghanistan. China is consolidating its economic and 
        political power in Central Asia through no-strings-
        attached lend-
        ing policies, financial investments, and infrastructure 
        projects. Its export-import bank extended a $5 billion 
        line of credit to Kazakhstan's state-owned Development 
        Bank and an additional $5 billion to Kazmunaigaz, a 
        state-run gas company. China provided Turkmenistan with 
        a $4.1 billion loan to develop the vast South Yolotan 
        gas field and is responsible for several major energy 
        and transport projects in Tajikistan.

   Regional rivalries within Central Asia lead to zero-sum 
        thinking. Regional rivalries such as those between 
        Tajikistan's President Emomali Rahmon and Uzbekistan's 
        President Islam Kar-
        imov are endemic in Central Asia. There is a growing 
        trust deficit among its political leaders, many of whom 
        see international relations as a zero-sum game. 
        Governments seem to care less about growing the pie and 
        more about how big their slice will be, making regional 
        initiatives difficult to pursue.

   Key countries lack enabling economic environments. 
        Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are some of 
        the toughest places to do business in the world. 
        Corruption is rife throughout the region and 
        institutional and bureaucratic obstacles create 
        systemic delays. For example, the World Bank's 2012 
        Doing Business report finds that it takes 71 days to 
        export an item from Uzbekistan and 92 days to import 
        one, compared to an average of 10 and 11 days, 
        respectively, for Organization for Economic Co-
        operation and Development (OECD) countries. Without a 
        serious reform commitment, governments in the region 
        will have a difficult time implementing economic 
        initiatives that link Central and South Asia.

   Human rights are a pressing concern. The State Department's 
        Country Reports on Human Rights Practices consistently 
        document serious human rights problems throughout the 
        region. Progress will depend on public pressure and 
        quiet, persistent engagement that emphasizes the 
        economic and social benefits of respecting fundamental 
        human rights. Uzbekistan, in particular, will require a 
        careful balancing of priorities, given its central role 
        in supporting the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). 
        It has made some modest progress in recent years such 
        as allowing the International Committee of the Red 
        Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons. Unfortunately, such 
        steps continue to be overshadowed by the country's 
        significant human rights concerns, including torture in 
        pre-trial detention facilities, imprisonment of human 
        rights defenders, forced child labor in the cotton 
        fields, and government restrictions on religious 
        freedom. Nevertheless, it is in the United States' 
        interest to engage with such admittedly authoritarian 
        countries on the full range of bilateral priorities, 
        including security, good governance, human rights, 
        trade, and investment.

   Governments are cracking down on religious freedom. Islam 
        is flourishing in Central Asia, but countries such as 
        Tajikistan are limiting its free expression by 
        monitoring Friday sermons, recalling students studying 
        at religious institutions abroad, and prohibiting most 
        children under the age of 18 from attending religious 
        services at mosques. These restrictions, along with a 
        stifling political climate and limited economic 
        opportunities, could drive many organizations 
        underground. This threatens to radicalize a younger 
        population whose active participation in society is 
        vital to promoting economic growth, political reform, 
        and moderation.

          Central Asia's Role in Supplying U.S. and Coalition 
                         Troops in Afghanistan

    Since 2009, the United States has steadily increased 
traffic on the NDN, a major logistical accomplishment that has 
resulted in a series of commercial air and ground routes that 
supply NATO and U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Close to 75 
percent of ground sustainment cargo is now shipped via the NDN. 
According to U.S. Transportation Command, an estimated 40 
percent of all cargo transits the NDN, 31 percent is shipped by 
air, and the remaining 29 percent goes through Pakistan.
    The NDN comprises three principal land routes: one 
stretching from the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti, through 
Baku, Azerbaijan, across the Caspian Sea, and into Central 
Asia; one from the Latvian port of Riga through Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; and a final route that originates 
in Latvia and travels through Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and passes into Afghanistan via Tajikistan. An estimated 70 
percent of cargo transiting the NDN enters at Uzbekistan's 
Hairaton Gate.
    The NDN has allowed the United States to diversify its 
supply routes into Afghanistan, instead of relying solely on 
Pakistan for transit. Whereas in 2009, about 90 percent of U.S. 
non-military supplies for Afghanistan transited through the 
Pakistani port city of Karachi, today, more non-lethal cargo is 
shipped to Afghanistan via the NDN than through Pakistan.
    The NDN is not a perfect substitute for the current supply 
routes in Pakistan. The NDN only allows for one-way transit of 
goods to Afghanistan, though discussions are reportedly 
underway to expand the NDN to support two-way transit of cargo 
leaving Afghanistan via the northern routes. The NDN also only 
allows for the transit of non-lethal supplies, such as cement, 
lumber, blast barriers, septic tanks, and matting. Sensitive 
and high-technology equipment is transported by airlift. 
Moreover, the NDN is not cheap. It costs roughly an additional 
$10,000 per twenty-foot container to ship via the NDN instead 
of Pakistan. But airlifting supplies directly into Afghanistan 
remains the most expensive option, which costs an estimated 
$40,000 more per twenty-foot container, according to U.S. 
Transportation Command.
    In addition to the NDN, the United States relies on the 
Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan as the premier air mobility 
hub for operations in Afghanistan. The Transit Center is the 
entry and exit point for virtually all coalition forces. The 
Center enables critical missions, including aerial refueling 
and medical evacuations. About 13 million pounds of cargo 
transit the Center each month, and it consumes one million 
gallons of fuel every two days. In short, this is a major and 
vital mission.
    Keeping Manas operational has been a challenge. In 2006, 
Kyrgyzstan requested a significant increase in lease payments 
from the United States for use of Manas. A settlement was 
reached later that year, including an announcement that the 
United States would provide $150 million in total assistance 
and compensation. In 2009, Kyrgyzstan's then President 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev announced that he intended to close Manas, 
reportedly bowing in large part to pressure from the Russians 
who offered Bakiyev a mixture of loans and grants for budget 
stabilization. The United States concluded a five-year 
agreement with Kyrgyzstan in 2009 to keep operations running, 
increasing its rent payment from $17.4 million to $60 million 
per year. However, suspicions in Kyrgyzstan regarding the U.S. 
presence at Manas run deep, and the Transit Center is 
frequently part of domestic public debate.
    Besides supporting the NDN and Manas Transit Center, most 
governments in Central Asia have granted U.S. and coalition 
forces over-flight rights. Russia has permitted over-flights 
since 2009, and Kazakhstan signed an air transit agreement with 
the United States in 2010.

                  Striking a Balance Between Security 
                        and Political Priorities

    As the United States increases security cooperation with 
the countries of Central Asia to support efforts in 
Afghanistan, it must also lay the foundation for a long-term 
strategy that sustains these gains and protects U.S. interests 
in the region.
    Achieving our security goals and promoting good governance 
and human rights are not mutually exclusive. In fact, security 
and political engagement are complementary strategies that are 
more likely to be effective when pursued together. For example, 
promoting economic reforms that focus on removing barriers to 
continental transport and trade will not only benefit local 
economies; it will also help support the NDN. The NDN, in turn, 
can drive economic reform as local economies work to improve 
purchasing standards and local governments cooperate to keep 
the NDN up and running.
    Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, the Manas Transit Center provides 
vital support to U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan. 
It also promotes stability through its theatre security 
cooperation division, which helps build ties with the local 
community through humanitarian assistance, military-to-military 
operations, and social cultural operations. Kyrgyzstan recently 
participated in the first peaceful and democratic transition of 
power in Central Asia, and the United States is actively 
supporting its democratic transition. Through investments in 
parliamentary strengthening and public health, good governance 
and economic growth, we have managed to promote political 
reform as we continue operations at the Manas Transit Center.
    Striking the right balance between U.S. security and 
political priorities will require greater investments in U.S. 
civilian assistance. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the most 
fragile states in the region and U.S. assistance there can make 
a real difference.\4\ The United States should consider 
increasing its investments in democracy and governance, public 
health programs, economic assistance, and English language 
training\5\ to augment its security assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ See Appendixes II and III for a discussion on the 2010 violence 
in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and militancy in Tajikistan.
    \5\ See Appendix I for a discussion on expanding English language 
training in Central Asia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Civilian assistance for all countries in Central Asia was 
$186.2 million in FY 2010 and is on a downward trajectory.\6\ 
Peace and security assistance to the region, which includes 
funds from the national defense 050 account and smaller amounts 
from the foreign assistance 150 account, increased from $70 
million in FY 2001 to $257 million in FY 2010, though it too 
may actually be declining. Overall, U.S. assistance to the 
countries of Central Asia is relatively small compared to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In FY 2010, for example, total U.S. 
assistance to Central Asia, including both the function 150 and 
050 accounts, amounted to just under three percent ($436.24 
million) of what we spent in Afghanistan ($14.78 billion). \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ The $186.2 million figure includes funds from the AEECA account 
and other Function 150 programs. For more information, see: Jim Nichol, 
``Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. 
Interests,'' Congressional Research Service, RL33458, October 12, 2011, 
p. 53.
    \7\ See Appendixes IV, V, and VI for budget numbers and charts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given the tight fiscal climate in the United States, the 
administration should consider using existing Afghanistan 
resources on cross-border projects that promote regional 
stability to the benefit of both Afghanistan and its northern 
neighbors. For a relatively small amount of money, such 
projects can reinforce cooperation between Afghanistan and 
Central Asian states and deliver immediate results. These 
projects could include:


   Scaling up cross-border electricity projects, such as Pamir 
        Energy. This public-private partnership supplies 
        electricity to an estimated 85 percent of the Gorno-
        Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast in Tajikistan as well as 
        to several districts in northern Afghanistan;

   Expanding joint training sessions between Afghan and Tajik 
        military and law enforcement officials at the U.S.-
        funded facility in Khorog and the National Border Guard 
        Academy in Dushanbe, as well as considering similar 
        programs between Uzbek officials and their Afghan 
        counterparts;

   Implementing cross-border community border guarding 
        programs, including more targeted training for 
        populations living on the border, organizing joint 
        training study tours, focusing on community policing 
        and cross-border training of border guards and Ministry 
        of Interior police in the region on vehicle inspection 
        best practices, crime scene evidence gathering, 
        emergency response, human rights, and interrogation and 
        interview techniques;

   Promoting cross-border working groups with provincial 
        governments in Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, 
        Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, strengthening sub-national 
        governance on both sides of the border;

   Funding cross-border initiatives to tackle multi-drug 
        resistant and extensively resistant tuberculosis (TB). 
        The Central Asian states have some of the highest rates 
        of TB in the world. Cross-border initiatives could help 
        control TB infection rates and spur innovative and 
        sustainable programming;

   Encouraging cross-border health programs by facilitating 
        the exchange of medical professionals;

   Facilitating exchanges between women-led Tajik and Afghan 
        non-governmental organizations. Tajikistan has 
        experienced civil war in the recent past and its people 
        are familiar with the challenges and opportunities of 
        reconciliation. Women, in particular, can play a 
        critical role in laying the groundwork for a 
        comprehensive peace process;

   Integrating Afghanistan's youth into existing programs in 
        Central Asia that promote economic development, such as 
        Junior Achievement programs, and expanding vocational 
        training opportunities to teach vocational and 
        agricultural skills to populations on the border to 
        provide economic opportunities and help stabilize the 
        region; and

   Supporting American-style summer camps for Afghan and 
        Central Asian youth similar to the successful Camp 
        America model in the Isfara and Rasht regions of 
        Tajikistan. The curriculum can include sports, English 
        language, leadership, critical thinking, and team 
        building, with a focus on addressing the roots of 
        terrorism before they take hold in regions vulnerable 
        to extremism.

          Translating the New Silk Road Vision Into A Strategy

    The United States has a vested interest in promoting 
regional economic integration, which could catalyze political 
reform and reinforce efforts to stop illicit traffic and 
militant activity at Afghanistan's borders. As cited in a World 
Bank report, landlocked countries can face average growth rates 
that are about 1.5 percentage points lower because of 
transaction costs and other inefficiencies such as 
unpredictability in transportation time.
    In July 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced 
the New Silk Road (NSR) initiative, a long-term economic vision 

to transform Afghanistan into a hub of transport and trade, 
connecting markets in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central 

Asia. Some of the proposed NSR projects include completing the 
Afghan Ring Road; establishing rail links between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan; completing the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-
India (TAPI) pipeline; and creating a regional electricity 
market by establishing a transmission line between Central Asia 
and South Asia (CASA-1000).
    NSR requires U.S. leadership, not necessarily an infusion 
of new U.S. funds. It will instead involve cooperation from 
multilateral development banks, foreign donors, regional 
governments, and the private sector. NSR has been 
enthusiastically welcomed by governments in Afghanistan and 
Central Asia who want to connect to markets in Europe and Asia 
and appreciate American attention to their economic challenges.
    However, connecting Central to South Asia via Afghanistan 
will be challenging in light of the barriers to continental 
transport and trade, including the lack of regional 
cooperation. NSR will not be a panacea for Afghanistan's 
economic woes, but it does offer a vision for the broader 
region that could foster private sector investment if projects 
are prioritized and steps are taken to create an enabling 
environment. The United States can play a vital role by 
supporting political and economic reform and leveraging its 
resources.
    Going forward, the administration should consider the 
following questions in implementing NSR:


   What are the right priorities and timelines? How is the 
        United States prioritizing projects and coordinating 
        with multilateral donors and foreign companies who are 
        already vested in this effort? Should the United States 
        cast a broad net, or focus on a few specific projects 
        that stand the greatest chance of success? How do we 
        implement quick-impact projects that show results, 
        while focusing on the longer-term conditions that 
        create an enabling economic environment?

   What is the right balance between ``hardware'' and 
        ``software''? One study cited by the Central Asia-
        Caucasus Institute estimates that about 60 percent of 
        the time required to ship goods from Bishkek, 
        Kyrgyzstan through Kazakhstan to Novosibirsk, Russia is 
        spent at two border crossings, comprising 64 percent of 
        the total cost. What is the right balance between 
        ``hardware'' projects like big-ticket infrastructure 
        and ``software'' improvements such as customs and legal 
        reforms that focus on removing barriers to continental 
        transport and trade?

   Should NSR be regional or continental in scope? South and 
        Central Asia are part of a broader continental economy. 
        How can the United States augment its relationships in 
        Central Asia to include allies such as Japan, South 
        Korea, and India? The United States has engaged in 
        policy discussions with these countries on Central 
        Asia. How can we build on relationships with partners 
        and allies to secure international support for trade 
        and investment in Central Asia?


    For NSR to succeed, the administration should incorporate 
lessons learned from previous U.S. attempts to promote regional 
economic integration in Central Asia. In 2006, the State 
Department advanced a vision to link Central Asia with 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, while also expanding 
continental trade. The United States also signed a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the countries of 
Central Asia in 2004. These initiatives were promising, but the 
same obstacles that stymied progress then still exist in 
Central Asia today, including lack of regional cooperation, 
corruption, inhospitable business climates, regional rivalries, 
and the unfavorable cost differential between continental and 
maritime trade.
    This report recommends the following six-pronged approach 
for NSR:


 (1) Appreciate the region's challenges: Internal divisions, 
        corruption, and poor business climates limit prospects 
        for regional integration. A NSR strategy must take into 
        account the differences among the Central Asian states, 
        as well as their shared past. The region has yet to 
        develop a culture of private enterprise and evolving 
        one will take time. Bringing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
        the rest of South Asia into the fold will make 
        attracting private sector investment all the more 
        necessary, and all the more challenging.

 (2) Get local buy-in: Local governments need to do their part, 
        enacting the kind of macroeconomic reforms that will be 
        required for regional integration to take shape. The 
        United States and other partners can aid this effort 
        through capacity-building programs and technical 
        assistance.

 (3) Engage the private sector: NSR is intended to be locally 
        owned and privately financed, spurring completion of 
        several major energy and infrastructure projects across 
        the region. What is needed now is a strategy for 
        engaging the private sector, given the hesitation of 
        investors to commit to a region where incomes are low, 
        political risks are high, and the logistical challenges 
        are great.

 (4) Focus on software: NSR is a generational vision for the 
        entire region. It should not simply be a means to cope 
        with the economic impact of transition in Afghanistan. 
        Creating an enabling environment for private sector-
        led, export-oriented growth by removing the impediments 
        to continental transport and trade, including customs 
        and legal reforms, trade facilitation, and border 
        management, should be an urgent priority.

 (5) Get real results quickly: Most of the projects envisioned 
        under the new strategy will take three to ten years to 
        yield results. However, there are some projects that 
        can deliver in the near term, demonstrate the potential 
        of this strategy, and help broaden political support to 
        sustain longer-term U.S. engagement. At the tactical 
        level, for example, the United States could speed 
        implementation of a few ``demonstration projects,'' 
        such as using its convening power to open a transport 
        corridor between Central Asia and the port of Gwadar in 
        Pakistan.

 (6) Communicate intentions clearly: The United States should 
        be mindful of creating expectations that cannot be 
        fulfilled. A strategic communications strategy should 
        clearly articulate how NSR will be implemented, what 
        role the United States and other donors will play, what 
        steps regional governments must take, how projects are 
        being prioritized, the timeframe for implementation, 
        and how the private sector is engaged. This strategy 
        should also take into account the most effective means 
        of communicating in these countries.

         Assessing the Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative

    Militant activity and a lack of economic opportunity are 
not the only threats to regional stability. Drug trafficking 
and the corruption that it creates pose an equally serious 
challenge. Afghanistan is the epicenter of the drug problem. 
Production of opium decreased in Afghanistan by almost 50 
percent in 2010, according to the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), but prices have proved less elastic. 
This has allowed the Taliban and other criminal actors to 
exploit stockpiles from earlier harvests to maintain high 
profit margins. Drugs have become a source of income for 
insurgent groups, with the Taliban reaping tens to possibly 
hundreds of millions of dollars each year from the drug trade.
    In June 2011, the State Department launched a new $4.1 
million initiative known as ``CACI,'' or the Central Asia 
Counternarcotics Initiative, to build local capacity and 
stimulate regional cooperation on counternarcotics. CACI seeks 
to establish vetted units and build counternarcotics task 
forces in the five Central Asian countries, linking them with 
existing task forces in Russia and Afghanistan. The U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the State Department's 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 
(INL) will implement the initiative.
    CACI provides an important vision for encouraging greater 
reform and information sharing across the region. As one U.S. 
official put it, ``we are planting a seed with CACI,'' which 
could eventually grow into an effective investigative network 
for sharing information and conducting joint operations across 
the entire supply chain.
    While there is demand for such an initiative among local 
agencies with a mandate to combat the drug trade, significant 
challenges remain. Regional cooperation has a checkered history 
in this part of the world. Central Asia is home to a wealth of 
regional organizations and initiatives, many of which have 
failed to achieve their stated goals. Corruption is widespread 
and prospects for the vetted units remain unclear, given the 
lack of political will in several Central Asian countries.
    To succeed, CACI will need to be coordinated across a range 
of interagency and intergovernmental counternarcotics 
initiatives. In FY 2010, the United States spent an estimated 
$69 million on counternarcotics in Central Asia through various 
Defense Department and State Department security assistance 
programs. The international community and regional 
organizations have also devoted considerable resources to the 
counternarcotics effort and launched a variety of initiatives, 
including the UNODC's Paris Pact-mandated ``Rainbow Strategy,'' 
the NATO-Russia Council Project on Counternarcotics, and 
various initiatives within the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO).
    Going forward, the administration should consider:


   Applying regional labels to new initiatives with caution, 
        given the structural constraints on regional 
        cooperation in Central Asia;

   Piloting vetted units in countries where they stand the 
        greatest chance of success, which will require a 
        comparative regional assessment of efforts to combat 
        the drug trade;

   Scaling up cross-border operations between Central Asian 
        and Afghan law enforcement and military officials, 
        including joint training activities; and

   Investing in informal working groups, like the Northern 
        Route Working Group (NRWG), to improve information 
        sharing and coordinate joint operations and regional 
        and international counternarcotics efforts. The NRWG 
        was established in 2010 to coordinate joint 
        counternarcotics investigations in northern 
        Afghanistan. It is composed of the Russian Federal Drug 
        Control Service, Tajikistan Drug Control Service, 
        Kyrgyzstan Drug Control Service, and DEA Country 
        Offices in Dushanbe, Kabul, and Moscow.

                Securing Central Asia's Southern Borders

    To support counternarcotics efforts, the United States 
should continue to shore up the borders between Central Asia 
and Afghanistan. Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan is 
particularly long, porous, and thinly guarded. Unmanned 
sections are known as ``green borders,'' where virtually anyone 
can cross by river raft, donkey, or truck. Some areas of the 
border are protected by fences and border patrols, but many 
sections are left wide open.
    According to officials in the region, most smuggling occurs 
at official points of entry and there is credible evidence that 
Tajik authorities look the other way, with some actively 
facilitating the drug trade. Tajik authorities told committee 
staff they make seizures about three to four times a year, with 
the last significant seizure in Dushanbe at the end of 2009, 
when the Tajik Ministry of Interior reportedly seized a large 
shipment of drugs coming from the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 
Oblast.
    Cross-border cooperation between Tajikistan and Afghanistan 
leaves room for improvement. Weak local government and 
corruption on both sides of the border are obstacles to 
effective border management. The Government of Tajikistan has 
relations with the Afghan border police, including regular 
meetings. They have agreements in place on exchanging 
information, but effective joint cooperation must be 
strengthened.
    The United States is actively working with the Tajik 
government to improve border security. It is constructing or 
refurbishing border guard facilities, providing training for 
Tajik and Afghan border guards at a U.S.-funded facility in 
Khorog, and implementing programs on police reform, rule of 
law, judicial training, prosecutorial training, trafficking in 
persons, domestic violence, and drug demand reduction. The 
United States also provides basic equipment to Tajik border 
guards.
    There are three steps the United States could take to build 
on its efforts to improve border security in Tajikistan and the 
wider region:


   Improve and share data collection: It is hard to have a 
        genuine discussion and debate about the narcotics 
        problem when our local partners lack publicly 
        accessible and consistent information on the drug 
        trade. According to Tajik Ministry of Interior 
        estimates, they seize about 70 to 80 percent of all 
        drugs that pass through Tajikistan each year, with only 
        10 percent of drugs produced in Afghanistan transiting 
        Central Asia. The UNODC estimates that as much as 25 to 
        30 percent of the drugs produced in Afghanistan transit 
        Central Asia. Experts estimate that roughly five to ten 
        percent of these flows are seized.

   Get back to brass tacks: Establishing elite investigatory 
        units, as envisioned under CACI, is a long-term goal. 
        In the near term, the United States should also focus 
        on the basics, working with the Government of 
        Tajikistan to improve standards and facilities for 
        interrogations, as well as to provide modern 
        communications equipment, rations, and vehicles for 
        border guards, customs service, and law enforcement 
        agencies.

   Increase Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) staff: DEA 
        maintains only a handful of narcotics officers in 
        Central Asia. By contrast, there are 81 DEA officers in 
        Afghanistan. The administration should consider a 
        modest increase in DEA's staff in Central Asia, given 
        the volume of narcotics that transits the Northern 
        Route and the challenges of coordinating an effective 
        response.
      
=======================================================================











                               APPENDIXES





=======================================================================

                 Appendix I.--English Language Training

    Across Central Asia, the English language is barely heard. 
This should concern the United States for three reasons: (1) 
fewer English-speakers means fewer opportunities for bilateral 
engagement, (2) fewer opportunities for engagement means less 
influence, and (3) less influence means reduced opportunities 
for trade and investment, as well as meaningful dialogue on 
human rights and legal reform.
    English language training is important for other countries, 
too. Conversational fluency in the English language is critical 
to participating in peacekeeping missions and joint military 
exercises, to say nothing of reaping the benefits of 
globalization. It is why countries like Kazakhstan have 
invested in English language training, with the ambitious goal 
of becoming trilingual in Kazakh, Russian, and English in 10 
years. The United States should seize the opportunity and 
expand English language training throughout the region.
    Increasing support for English language training in Central 
Asia would complement existing U.S. outreach efforts. Public 
diplomacy programs like the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) 
program have played an important role in fostering people-to-
people exchanges for high school students from Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The United States also 
teaches English through the International Military Education 
and Training (IMET) program, annual Fulbright scholarships, 
English Language Fellowship and Specialist programs, and the 
Peace Corps.
    Unfortunately, the Peace Corps' footprint in Central Asia 
is getting smaller. The Uzbekistan program ended in 2005, and 
the Peace Corps recently suspended its program in Kazakhstan, 
leaving just 89 volunteers in Kyrgyzstan and 25 in 
Turkmenistan. Tajikistan does not have a Peace Corps program, 
despite high-level interest from the United States.
    Expanding English language training requires unity of 
effort to succeed, particularly in a constrained fiscal 
environment. There is room for creativity in partnering with 
the private sector. For instance, in cooperation with the State 
Department, American companies could leverage their resources 
to bolster English language opportunities in Central Asia. This 
could be achieved with a minimal start-up investment from the 
U.S. Government. Public-private partnerships like the U.S.-
Kazakhstan Public-Private Economic Partnership Initiative 
(PPEPI) have delivered results. We should apply this model to 
our English language programs in Central Asia.

                     Appendix II.--Remembering Osh

    The ghosts of the 2010 violence in Kyrgyzstan, during which 
clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks left nearly 500 dead 
and hundreds of thousands displaced, still haunt the streets of 
Osh in the heart of the Ferghana Valley. Charred buildings and 
half-empty markets are stark reminders of the tensions that 
simmer just beneath the surface. Kyrgyzstan has taken some 
positive steps since the ouster of former President Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev last April, with credible parliamentary elections in 
October 2010, and a presidential election this fall. But much 
work remains to be done to consolidate Kyrgyzstan's democratic 
transition.
    Reconciliation initiatives have been slow to get off the 
ground. Officials have pledged reforms to encourage better 
inter-ethnic relations. But throughout the country, an uneasy 
fear pervades discussion of the future.
    Kyrgyzstan's halting strides toward democracy underscore 
the fragility of Afghanistan's northern flank. Many of the 
Central Asian countries labor under the constraints of 
artificially imposed borders and mismanagement of natural 
resources. The Ferghana Valley, which spans the countries of 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is one of the most 
densely populated and ethnically diverse areas in the world. It 
has been a hotbed of violence and instability, as well as a 
fertile recruiting ground for militant groups. Ferghana's 
diversity, economic potential, and local governance structures 
are sources of strength. But these rays of light have been 
overshadowed by social and cultural conflict.
    Remembering Osh is less a call to action than a caution 
against the tendency to assume we can ``fix'' what ails Central 
Asia. The United States can help, and in many respects, U.S. 
assistance can make a real difference. In Osh, for example, the 
United States could put more dollars behind youth sports 
centers and joint economic initiatives for ethnic Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks, as well as mobile health clinics that provide 
psychosocial support for families of the victims of last year's 
violence. But ultimately, it is the people of Central Asia that 
must lead the way to reconciliation, economic growth, and 
political reform.
    There is reason for hope. In Tokmok, a small town to the 
east of Bishkek, an elderly gentleman proudly cast his vote in 
this year's presidential election. ``Do you want to know whom 
I'm voting for?'' he asked his compatriots, to which they 
responded with cries of ``No, No.'' The gentleman raised his 
voice: ``I'm voting for peace and stability in Kyrgyzstan.''

                Appendix III.--Tajikistan: A Closer Look

    Tajikistan is a weak state in a dangerous neighborhood. It 
lacks resources and shares a widely porous and vulnerable 
border with Afghanistan. Corruption is rife, and the country's 
institutions are brittle, raising concerns about its ability to 
manage political, economic, and humanitarian shocks.
    Militant ambushes against a convoy of government troops and 
a suicide bombing in the northern city of Khujand last year 
exposed Tajikistan's vulnerability to growing extremism at home 
and armed incursions from across the border in Afghanistan. 
Much of what passes for terrorist activity in the country may 
be local in nature, driven by those who have grown dissatisfied 
with electricity shortages, unemployment, corruption, abusive 
interrogation methods, and religious persecution. The IMU and 
other militant groups occasionally infiltrate the country, and 
there is some evidence to suggest that Tajikistan's northern 
Isfara district is at risk of becoming a haven for extremists. 
In the final analysis, however, the specter of Islamic 
radicalism may be a self-inflicted wound.
    Islam is flourishing in Tajikistan. Yet the government is 
limiting its free expression by monitoring Friday sermons, 
prohibiting most children under the age of 18 from attending 
religious services at mosques, and recalling students pursuing 
religious studies at institutions abroad. Government 
restrictions on religious expression, coupled with a lack of 
economic opportunity, could drive many organizations 
underground. This threatens to radicalize a younger population 
whose active participation in society is vital to promoting 
economic growth, political reform, and moderation.
    For Central Asia to remain part of the solution for 
Afghanistan and not the problem, its governments must address 
the shortcomings in their domestic security regimes. In 
addition to the human and social costs, the presence of 
radicalized and alienated populations in Central Asia could 
present the Taliban and other militant groups with ample 
opportunity to regenerate and spread their message from across 
the border.

Appendix IV.--Total U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Central Asia, Pakistan, 
                and Afghanistan, FY 2001-2010 (millions)



                                     

    Sources: For Afghanistan, FY 2002-2010, see: Curt Tarnoff, 
``Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,'' Congressional 
Research Service, R40699, August 19, 2011, p.16. For 
Afghanistan, FY 2001, see: Kenneth Katzman, ``Afghanistan: 
Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,'' 
Congressional Research Service, November 22, 2011, RL30588, p. 
75. For Pakistan, see: Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, 
``Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,'' Congressional Research 
Service, R41856, November 4, 2011, pp. 20-21. Data on total 
U.S. budgeted assistance to Central Asia compiled for Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim Nichol, 
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Congressional 
Research Service.

    Notes: Estimates for Afghanistan include total budget 
function 050 and function 150 assistance, FY 2001-2010. 
Estimates for Pakistan include total security and economic 
assistance, excluding Coalition Support Funds, FY 2001-2010. 
Estimates for Central Asia include assistance reported by all 
agencies and programs, FY 2001-2010.

   Appendix V.--U.S. Budgeted Peace & Security Assistance vs. Total 
          Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001-2010 (millions)



                                     

    Source: Data on total U.S. budgeted assistance and Peace 
and Security (P&S) assistance to Central Asia compiled for 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim 
Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the 
Congressional Research Service.

    Notes: Peace and Security assistance includes Department of 
Defense funding for combating weapons of mass destruction, 
counternarcotics, and stabilization operations and security 
sector reform (Section 1206); Department of Energy funding for 
combating weapons of mass destruction; and Department of State 
funding for International Military Education and Training 
(IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Non-Proliferation, 
Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), and 
Assistance to Eastern Europe and Central Asia (AEECA) funding 
for counterterrorism, transnational crime, counternarcotics, 
stabilization operations and security sector reform, combating 
weapons of mass destruction, and conflict mitigation and 
reconciliation.

                                               Appendix VI.--U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY 2001-2010
                                         Table 1: Total U.S. Assistance Budgeted for Central Asia, FY 2001-2010
                                                          (millions of dollars, by fiscal year)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              2001      2002      2003      2004      2005      2006      2007      2008      2009      2010      Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kazakhstan................................     80.01      97.4     97.88    111.00     84.91     80.06    165.55    179.52    219.02     157.9   1273.25
Kyrgyzstan................................     43.07     94.47     53.85     55.25     55.23     43.34     71.25     71.23    111.74    117.53    716.96
Tajikistan................................     76.48    136.34     48.71     53.01     65.69     42.81     48.44     67.33     65.60     82.99     687.4
Turkmenistan..............................     12.57     18.93     10.98     10.42     18.94     10.44     19.84     16.83     20.78     28.25    167.98
Uzbekistan................................     48.33    224.14     90.77     84.25     78.28     49.30     35.90     38.33     48.55     37.36    735.21
Regn......................................      7.57     13.88      9.99      3.41      4.67      5.23      7.59      6.66     25.61     12.21     96.82
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Total...................................    268.03    585.16    312.18    317.34    307.72    231.18    348.57     379.9     491.3    436.24   3677.62
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Data on total U.S. budgeted assistance to Central Asia compiled for Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim Nichol, Specialist
  in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service.
Notes: Estimates for Central Asia include assistance reported by all agencies and programs, FY 2001-2010.


                                    Table 2: U.S. Budgeted Peace & Security Assistance for Central Asia, FY 2001-2010
                                                          (millions of dollars, by fiscal year)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              2001      2002      2003      2004      2005      2006      2007      2008      2009      2010      Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kazakhstan................................     36.66     47.63     51.67     73.75     56.00     50.35     139.8     155.5     187.6    137.72    936.68
Kyrgyzstan................................      6.55     38.62     11.28     12.33     17.44     13.27     18.78     37.57     42.23     48.62    246.69
Tajikistan................................      0.75      21.6      1.62      7.88     28.99     10.00     17.49     30.48     25.50     31.48    175.79
Turkmenistan..............................      1.87      7.73      1.16      0.97      8.98      2.17      5.72      5.90      8.71      13.0     56.21
Uzbekistan................................     24.27     82.53     39.18     41.62     43.43     28.67     17.82     26.82     33.98     25.95    364.27
Regn......................................      0.30      0.00      0.12      0.00      0.91      0.68      3.60      2.13     19.21      0.75      27.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Total...................................      70.4     198.1     105.0     136.5     155.7     105.1     203.2     258.4     317.2    257.52   1807.34
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Data on U.S. budgeted peace and security assistance to Central Asia compiled for Senate Foreign Relations Committee majority staff by Jim
  Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service.

   Appendix VII.--Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
                      Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan





    Source: Jim Nichol, ``Central Asia: Regional Developments 
and Implications for U.S. Interests,'' Congressional Research 
Service, RL33458, October 12, 2011, p. 54, http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf.


                                  
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