[Senate Prints 112-25]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
112th Congress
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
112-25
_______________________________________________________________________
ENHANCING NON-PROLIFERATION
PARTNERSHIPS IN THE
BLACK SEA REGION
__________
A MINORITY STAFF REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
First Session
September 27, 2011
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-115 WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal.......................................... v
Introduction................................................... 1
Background..................................................... 3
Ukraine...................................................... 3
Moldova...................................................... 5
Recommendations................................................ 7
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, September 27, 2011.
Dear Colleagues: In July 2011, I directed my Senate Foreign
Relations Committee professional staff for European affairs to
travel to the Black Sea region to assess the recent seizure of
weapons grade highly-enriched uranium-235 (HEU) in Moldova and
U.S. assistance programs to counter the threat of loose nuclear
material. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency Project Officer
for Ukraine joined the delegation.
The Government of Moldova should be commended for
interrupting an extremely troubling illicit sale of fissile
material. The 9 kg of HEU on offer would have fetched $30
million on the black market and contributed significantly to
the 25 kg of HEU necessary to fashion a small nuclear weapon.
The sellers also claimed to possess plutonium, an even more
disturbing proliferation material. The interrupted sale was the
19th publicly known interdiction of fissile material since
1993. Destined for criminal or terrorist elements in North
Africa, this interdiction demonstrates that the threat of loose
nuclear material remains a central U.S. national security
challenge and that the creation of layered U.S. defenses
overseas against nuclear threats through the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and other U.S. assistance
programs remains unfinished. Several apparent links to the
Russian Federation suggest that continued cooperation to
strengthen its nuclear security, law enforcement, and export
control policies, laws, and culture remains an urgent priority.
The United States should intensify Nunn-Lugar WMD
Proliferation Prevention Program (WMD-PPP) work with Moldova in
light of two attempted sales over the last year of material
purported by the sellers to be HEU. Our partners in Ukraine
should be encouraged to also eliminate the bureaucratic delays
that may hinder new phases of highly successful WMD-PPP
programs, as well as the prompt removal of all HEU from
Ukraine. Even as our non-proliferation work continues with
these partners, the United States must also continue to
highlight troubling developments in the realm of civil rights,
political prosecutions, and the rule of law.
This staff report examines current non-proliferation
programs in the northern Black Sea region and offers tangible
recommendations to the United States and our partners for
enhancing this cooperation. I welcome any comments you may
have.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
(v)
ENHANCING NON-PROLIFERATION PARTNERSHIPS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION
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At the direction of Senator Richard G. Lugar, Ranking
Republican Member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(SFRC), a delegation of minority SFRC professional staff and
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) personnel\1\ traveled to
the Black Sea region to assess non-proliferation cooperation in
light of several recent interdictions of uranium on the black
market. The delegation visited Ukraine (Kyiv, the Chernobyl
Exclusion Zone, and Odessa) and Chisinau, Moldova. The purpose
of the trip was to:
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\1\ This report does not reflect the views of the Department of
Defense and was prepared solely by Senate Foreign Relations Committee
staff.
Examine two recent seizures of uranium in Moldova, one of
which was highly-enriched and usable in a nuclear
weapon;
Assess ongoing efforts to combat and interdict illicit WMD
materials and components;
Discuss prospects for enhancing non-proliferation
partnerships in a region still plagued by porous
borders and large amounts of fissile material.
Introduction
On June 27, 2011, Moldovan officials arrested six persons
in Chisinau purporting to possess 9 kilograms of highly-
enriched uranium-235 (HEU), material for a nuclear weapon or
dirty bomb, in an attempted sale for =23 million ($30 million).
Plutonium, an even more troubling proliferation material, was
also on offer. During the arrest, a vial containing 4.4 grams
of highly-enriched uranium-235 (HEU) oxide was purchased in a
fake sale for =420,000 ($600,000) in a sting operation
organized by officers from the Moldovan Ministry of Internal
Affairs, some of whom had coincidentally received routine
counterproliferation training in the United States only weeks
earlier. The sellers sought ``non-Western'' buyers; one
potential buyer, currently being sought, has been identified as
a resident of a country of North Africa. Should the existence
of a legitimate buyer (or middleman) from a region with a
history of terror cells be confirmed, then the case would be
substantially more alarming than other recent fissile material
interdictions, where official agents were the sole potential
buyers.\2\
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\2\ See, e.g., Lawrence Scott Sheets, ``A Smuggler's Story,'' The
Atlantic, April 2008.
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Outside experts believe that the HEU oxide may have been
enriched at certain sites in Russia. The HEU transited through
Transnistria, the Russian-backed breakaway enclave of Moldova
with weak law enforcement and border security controls, and
several persons central to the sale were Transnistrian
residents. One theory is that the HEU arrived there by air from
Russia and was transported across the porous administrative
boundary line into Moldova proper. In addition to the North
African, Moldovan authorities are seeking one Russian national,
who was the alleged ringleader and fled from Transnistria to
Russia, where he and other cohorts are suspected by officials
to currently reside. Russian authorities have received official
notification of the arrests.
This operation is the second interdiction in Moldova of
uranium purported to be highly-enriched in the past year\3\ and
the 19th unclassified seizure of weapons grade plutonium or
uranium worldwide since 1993.\4\ Most experts agree that HEU
would be a terrorist organization's preferred bomb-making
material due to its widespread availability in more than 30
countries. The United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan each
reportedly possess more than 10,000 kg of HEU, whereas an HEU
bomb requires only 25 kg of HEU. A recent joint U.S.-Russia
Nuclear Terrorism Threat Assessment concluded that the most
plausible scenario for a terrorist-acquired nuclear weapon is
through ``theft or black-market purchase of previously stolen
nuclear material.''\5\
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\3\ In August 2010, sellers purporting to be in possession of
highly-enriched uranium were also arrested by Moldovan law enforcement,
but the resulting seizure turned out to be 7 kg of uranium-238 worth
approximately $11 million, which, though not fissile itself, can be
used to create fissile plutonium and has other weapons applications.
\4\ International Atomic Energy Agency, ``Illicit Trafficking
Database (ITDB) Fact Sheet.'' Some documents also cite 21 known cases
of weapons grade plutonium or uranium trafficking. Former Soviet and
Warsaw Pact nations have been the location of 10 of these unclassified
HEU and plutonium seizures.
\5\ Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, & Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies ``The U.S.-Russia
Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism,'' May 2011.
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These developments underscore that the threat posed to the
United States of America by loose nuclear material endures to
this day. U.S. efforts to create layered defenses, including at
known fissile material storage sites overseas, at foreign
customs and border inspection posts, and within the U.S.
homeland, should continue. As one Moldovan law enforcement
official noted, ``Because the United States is often the end
target of such illicit sales, we are happy to work with the
United States on these issues.''
But too often, bureaucratic delays in both the United
States and partner nations have hampered this cooperation. In
Ukraine, despite generous U.S. commitments to pay for the
removal of HEU fuel, replace the fuel with low enriched uranium
fuel, and pay for the construction of a neutron source facility
in Kharkiv, some in Ukraine's leadership have allowed tortuous
bureaucratic processes to dely implementation, including a
last-minute failure of the Ukrainian delegation to sign the
final bilateral HEU agreement in Vilnius with the U.S.
Secretary of State in July 2011. With respect to Moldova,
delays within the U.S. Department of Defense have inhibited
instructions to the Nunn-Lugar Program and DTRA implementers to
begin border security analysis.
Cooperation on non-proliferation should not constitute a
substitute for high-level engagement in public institution-
building and support for civil society, which remain acute
challenges in many countries in Eurasia, particularly Russia
and Ukraine.\6\ Still, non-proliferation cooperation that
advances the security of both the United States and our
partners and allies continues to create important stability in
our bilateral and regional relationships, particularly in
nations of the former Soviet Union where significant quantities
of WMD materials exist near porous borders.
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\6\ See, e.g., Freedom House, ``Sounding the Alarm: Protecting
Democracy in Ukraine,'' April 2011.
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This report assesses current non-proliferation cooperation
in the northern Black Sea region and recommends avenues for
enhancing these partnerships.
Background
ukraine
In light of its 2,800 mile border, including a vast Black
Sea coastline, Ukraine faces significant border security
challenges. These challenges are exacerbated by its lengthy
border with Russia, which dedicates few resources to
controlling this border.\7\ Much of Ukraine's border with
Russia and Belarus has also not yet been demarcated. Ukraine's
border concerns are further complicated on its western edge,
where Moldova's breakaway region of Transnistria provides weak
border controls and limited law enforcement, allowing for
increased ease of trade in illicit materials. In 2010,
Ukrainian border security officials reported a 10 percent
increase in interdictions of illicit drugs, radioactive
materials, and weapons compared to 2009 levels.
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\7\ Some Russian officials still insist that Ukraine remains merely
a frontier of greater Russia.
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The United States has dedicated significant resources to
non-proliferation and border security priorities in Ukraine
since its independence. In 1992, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program began work to dismantle Ukraine's
entire nuclear weapons arsenal, allowing it to enter the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.
Subsequently, Nunn-Lugar has established deep relationships
with many Ukrainian ministries in the areas of biothreat
reduction, strategic delivery system disassembly, border
security, and others.
One continuous threat of WMD material diversion has been
stocks of HEU still held at many military and civilian sites in
the former Soviet Union. In Ukraine, the U.S. Department of
Energy has been implementing a preliminary agreement to pay for
the removal of all Ukrainian stocks of HEU and replace the fuel
with low enriched uranium. Ukraine has begun removal of HEU
stocks from the Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research, the
Sevastopol National University for Nuclear Energy and Industry,
and the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technologies.
Separately, the United States has committed $20 million for the
construction of a neutron source facility near Kharkiv, Ukraine
to be completed in 2014, which has medical, scientific
research, and energy applications. A memorandum of
understanding on the project was scheduled for signature in
Vilnius in July 2011 between the U.S. Secretary of State and
her Ukrainian counterpart. According to officials familiar with
the situation, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister was unable to
sign the MOU because its language did not reflect a previous
decision of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC),
which called for the removal of the HEU upon the completion of
the neutron source facility in 2014. However, the original
agreement called for final HEU removal in time for the spring
2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, and the Government of
Ukraine is seeking to modify the previous NSDC decision, as
well as a U.S. guarantee that the neutron source facility will
subsequently be completed.
Today, several U.S. border security and WMD material
interdiction programs are active in Ukraine. The Export Control
and Related Border Security (EXBS) program has an approximately
$1 million budget for Ukraine that focuses on building human
capital through training and imparting best practices expertise
to the Ukrainian border security and customs services, as well
as modest equipment procurements such as x-ray scanners,
spectrometers, and dosimeters. EXBS has also assisted Ukrainian
agencies to investigate and prosecute trade in illegal WMD-
related and dual-use items. The Department of Energy's Second
Line of Defense program has provided portal monitors at key
points of entry to detect radioactive material (including items
contaminated by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster), one ton of
which was interdicted in 2010.
With by far the largest budget for border security, the
Nunn-Lugar WMD Proliferation Prevention Program (WMD-PPP)
provides equipment for the Ukrainian border service, focusing
on four geographical zones: the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (CEZ),
major ports on the Black Sea coast, the Russian Federation
border, and the vulnerable border with Moldova.
Staff visited the CEZ boundary area, which forms an
approximately 14 mile ring around the stricken reactor at
Pripyat and abuts the Ukrainian-Belarusian border. In light of
the heavily restricted access to the CEZ itself, the Ukrainian
border guard service patrols the boundary as if it were an
international boundary and must contend with elevated radiation
levels. With U.S. assistance, the Ukrainian border guard
service interdicts smugglers of radioactive material, such as
scrap metal, and serves as a line of defense against illicit
trafficking of other toxic elements. In particular, the Nunn-
Lugar WMD-PPP program has provided personal radiation detection
equipment, all-terrain vehicles, shelters, patrol boats, and
mobile infrared cameras to build night and all-season patrol
capability.
At the major maritime ports of Odessa and at the Kerch
Strait where the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea adjoin, the WMD-
PPP program has provided training and equipment to customs
units, as well as maritime radars and ship refurbishment to
assist with detection and vessel boarding.
In light of the recent seizures of uranium in Moldova, the
Ukrainian-Moldovan border has been identified as an acute
proliferation challenge, particularly in the border regions
controlled by de facto separatist authorities in Moldova's
region of Transnistria, who heavily profit from illicit trade
and kickbacks.\8\ Nunn-Lugar efforts have augmented the
Ukrainian border service capacity in command and control,
communications and surveillance at the most heavily trafficked
point of entry as a test bed that can be expanded to other
border areas. Assistance has included radars, ground sensors,
and an infrared camera package to cover the ``green'' border
between official points of entry, as well as Department of
Energy portal radioactivity detectors. Since 2005, 10
interdictions of radioactive material have occurred and 587
illicit weapons shipments have been interrupted at the
Ukrainian-Moldovan border. Although several border disputes
between Moldova and Ukraine have hampered cooperation for a
number of years, the most serious dispute over the Palanca
border crossing was recently solved; two additional disputes
will require diplomatic attention to enhance future Moldovan-
Ukrainian cooperation.
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\8\ Notably, the son of Transnistria's ``president'' Igor Smirnov
heads the enclave's customs service.
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moldova
The U.S.-Moldovan non-proliferation relationship dates back
to the mid-1990s, when Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
funds were used to purchase 21 Moldovan MiG fighter jets, 14 of
which were nuclear capable MiG-29Cs, reportedly in order to
preempt a sale of the jets to Iran,\9\ which was seeking an
air-based WMD delivery system. The agreement also led to the
purchase of 500 air-to-air missiles.
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\9\ Arms Control Today, ``U.S. Buys Moldovan Aircraft to Prevent
Acquisition by Iran," October 1997.
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For much of the past decade, U.S. cooperation on border
security with Moldova has been limited due to its relatively
small size and competing budget priorities. The U.S. EXBS
program had no budget for Moldova in 2008 and 2009 but
reengaged in 2010 to focus on export control and investigation
training. In fact, three Moldovan law enforcement officials who
participated in the June 2011 HEU interdiction received U.S.
counter-proliferation training in the United States in April
2011.
In light of the recent HEU seizure, as well as other WMD
material seizures over the past decade having transited
Moldova, this limited U.S. assistance does not appear to have
matched the threat. The chief vulnerability remains the
breakaway enclave of Transnistria, which is renowned as an
organizing base for smuggling illicit materials, including the
June 2011 HEU sale that included several residents of the
enclave. International assistance to Moldovan authorities has
been centered on the European Union Border Assistance Mission
(EUBAM), which provides EU best practices training and limited
equipment to Ukrainian border officials to control goods
exiting and entering Transnistria. Nonetheless, as explained
further below, this assistance package inevitably leaves major
border control gaps given that flights into Transnistria cannot
be monitored (one theory behind the June 2011 HEU interdiction
is that it arrived in Transnistria by air) and that Moldovan
authorities, for conflict resolution purposes, are constrained
in controlling for persons and goods entering Moldova proper
from the breakaway region.
However, the United States is poised to increase non-
proliferation assistance to Moldova following the July 2011
signature of the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI),
which serves as the umbrella agreement for enhanced non-
proliferation cooperation and will result in a full assessment
of Moldovan border security and customs needs.\10\ The
Department of Energy has also signed a Second Line of Defense
agreement, which may lead to radioactivity-related equipment
and training.
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\10\ The United States has NSOI agreements with 30 countries
worldwide based on nuclear smuggling threat assessments established
through interagency processes.
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A principal challenge will be developing controls for
Moldova's internal boundary line with Transnistria. Moldova is
unlikely to be granted an EU visa-free regime without such
controls over the flow of goods and persons from the
Transnistrian enclave. On the other hand, establishment of more
permanent controls for persons and goods creates greater
political separation between Transnistria and Moldova proper,
advancing the separatists' aims and hindering reintegration. In
light of the recent HEU seizure, creative solutions may have to
be explored.
The separatist issue has also complicated Moldova's control
over much of its easternmost international border with Ukraine,
which coincides with the Transnistrian-controlled boundary.
Early last decade, a joint Ukrainian-Moldovan border post
arrangement was devised on the Ukrainian side of the border so
that Moldovan border guards and customs could control goods and
persons entering and exiting sovereign Moldovan territory
without being present on Transnistrian-administered territory.
However, this arrangement faltered reportedly due to Ukrainian
sovereignty concerns and, instead, EUBAM was initiated to
ensure an international, as opposed to Moldovan, presence co-
located with Ukrainian border guards (even though EUBAM plays
an advisory role and does not participate in any monitoring
itself). In light of the recent Ukrainian-Moldovan agreement
over the most tense border dispute at Palanca, a co-located
Moldovan presence with Ukrainian border and customs officials
could be revisited.
In expanding U.S. non-proliferation assistance with
Moldova, many lessons can be learned from similar programs that
have been underway in Ukraine for several years. First, initial
assistance should be focused on assessing human capital in the
customs and border security services to ensure that local
officials have the absorptive capacity to operate and sustain
higher technology assistance. Second, once baseline training
and absorptive capacity is determined, modest technological
solutions, including mobile surveillance assets at test bed
locations, could be pursued at high vulnerability areas. Third,
training capacity built by EXBS and Nunn-Lugar programs in
Ukraine at Cherkasy, Khmelnitsky, and Kharkiv could become
regional centers used to train Moldovan officials and avoid
duplicating assistance.
Recommendations
The United States should:
Work with the Russian Federation in apprehending those
persons reportedly involved in the recent HEU sale in
Moldova who are suspected of having fled to Russia; and
to redouble efforts in identifying security shortfalls
at Russian nuclear facilities.
Immediately provide tasking to the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency to utilize the Nunn-Lugar WMD Proliferation
Prevention Program to conduct a border walk in Moldova
to identify customs and border security needs and
vulnerabilities while the Office of the Secretary of
Defense simultaneously pursues the necessary assistance
agreements.
Apply lessons learned from non-proliferation cooperation in
Ukraine over the past years to Moldova, including focus
on test bed projects and provision of technology only
to the extent that it can be absorbed and maintained by
local officials.
Ensure sufficient funding for the U.S. International
Counterproliferation Program (ICP) and EXBS training
programs, the latter of which several Moldovan
officials involved in the June 2011 HEU interdiction
attended in April 2011.
Ukraine should:
Arrange for the memorandum of understanding on HEU removal
to be promptly signed with the United States on the
margins of the United Nations General Assembly meeting
in September 2011 so that removal of the HEU can
promptly occur.
Continue to dedicate resources towards sustainment and
maintenance of the technology provided through Nunn-
Lugar WMD-PPP border security programs.
Revisit the arrangement attempted a decade ago to allow
Moldovan customs and border officials to co-locate with
Ukrainian officials at Ukrainian border posts near
Transnistrian-administered territory to foster Moldovan
sovereignty over its international borders.
Reject an agreement sought by de facto Transnistrian
officials that would allow rail traffic to enter
Ukraine without being checked by Moldovan customs
officials, as currently required.
Offer to Moldova the possibility of turning Ukrainian
border security training centers at Cherkasy,
Khmelnitsky, and Kharkiv into regional training
centers, where Moldovan officials can receive training.
Dedicate attention to solving the two outstanding border
disputes with Moldova to ensure that border security
cooperation is not hampered.
Moldova should:
Prioritize the creation of a counter-smuggling team with
international assistance, similar to those created in
other nations such as Georgia.
Consider creative solutions for the Ministry of Internal
Affairs to patrol high vulnerability zones, such as use
of mobile surveillance assets and checkpoints. This
system can be augmented with all terrain vehicles,
watercraft, and night vision.
Dedicate attention to solving the two outstanding border
disputes with Ukraine to ensure that border security
cooperation is not hampered.
Pursue high-level criminal cases against corruption given
that not a single corruption prosecution has recently
taken place in Moldova.