[Senate Prints 112-10]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



112th Congress 
 1st Session                COMMITTEE PRINT                     S. Prt.
                                                                 112-10
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
                          AVOIDING WATER WARS:
                   WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA'S
                    GROWING IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY
                      IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

                               __________

                        A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT

                      PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      One Hundred Twelfth Congress

                             First Session

                           February 22, 2011

                                     




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                COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS          

            JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman          
BARBARA BOXER, California            RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois          JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico                MIKE LEE, Utah
             Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director          
       Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director          

                             (ii)          
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                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v
Executive Summary................................................     1
Section 1: Water Management in Central and South Asia............     3
Section 2: Agriculture as a Driver of Water Demand and Tensions 
  in Region......................................................     7
Section 3: Growing Concern Over Using Water to Create Energy.....     8
Section 4: Climate Change Exacerbates Water Scarcity.............     9
Section 5: Current and Future Water Scarcity is a National 
  Security Issue.................................................    10
Section 6: United States Foreign Policy on Water.................    12
Section 7: Recommendations for Action............................    13
Conclusion.......................................................    21

                                 (iii)
?

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                 Washington, DC, February 22, 2011.
    Dear Colleagues: This report by the committee majority 
staff examines United States policy with respect to water 
scarcity and water management in Central and South Asia. Water 
plays an increasingly important role in our diplomatic and 
national security interests in the region, and we must ensure 
that our approach is carefully considered and coordinated 
across the interagency. President Obama's administration 
deserves credit for recognizing the critical role water plays 
in achieving our foreign policy objectives. As water demand for 
food production and electricity generation increases, in part 
as a result of the quickening pace of climate change, so too 
must our efforts to provide water security. While much of our 
focus currently rests on Afghanistan and Pakistan,
we must also consider the interests in the shared waters by 
India
and the neighboring five Central Asian countries--Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. This 
report draws on staff travel to the region and the work of 
experts in government, academia, and international 
institutions. It provides significant insight and several key 
recommendations to advance U.S. policy in Central and South 
Asia with respect to this vital transboundary resource.
            Sincerely,
                                             John F. Kerry,
                                                          Chairman.

                                  (v)
    AVOIDING WATER WARS: WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA'S GROWING 
          IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

                              ----------                              


                           Executive Summary

    Water scarcity is often overlooked, underfunded, and 
undervalued within foreign policy. Yet a government's ability 
to provide and manage access to water is critical for ensuring 
political, economic, and social stability.
    In Central and South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, the impacts of water scarcity are fueling dangerous 
tensions that will have repercussions for regional stability 
and U.S. foreign policy objectives. The national security 
implications of this looming water shortage--directly caused or 
aggravated by agriculture demands, hydroelectric power 
generation, and climate instability--will be felt all over the 
world.
    To its credit, the Obama administration has recognized the 
critical role water plays in achieving our foreign policy goals 
and in protecting our national security interests. For the 
first time, the United States has elevated water-related issues 
in its bilateral relationships with priority countries, such as 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Accordingly, the U.S. strategy and 
foreign assistance budgets now include significant investments 
allocated toward activities that promote water security through 
high-visibility projects, such as expanding water storage 
capabilities and irrigation.
    However, the U.S. approach walks a fine line with respect 
to water issues and must be tailored to reflect the realities 
of water politics in Central and South Asia. While the focus of 
the United States is appropriately directed toward Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, it is important to recognize that our water-
related activities in the region are almost exclusively 
confined within the borders of these two countries. We pay too 
little attention to the waters shared by their Indian and 
Central Asian neighbors--Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. For example, in 2009 the United 
States provided approximately $46.8 million in assistance for 
water-related activities to Afghanistan and Pakistan compared 
with $3.7 million shared among all five Central Asian countries 
for these efforts.
    Providing the right support can have a tremendous 
stabilizing influence, but providing the wrong support can 
spell disaster by agitating neighboring countries. By 
neglecting the interconnectivity of water issues between 
Central and South Asia, the U.S. approach could exacerbate 
regional tensions. Our activities should be carefully 
calibrated to address a broad range of needs and encourage 
reluctant state actors to come to the negotiating table. The 
United States must be cautious and recognize that, while 
regional stability will not be determined solely by our efforts 
to support water cooperation, regional stability can be 
strongly undermined by misguided support.
    The United States has a historic opportunity to address 
these issues properly and intelligently. Congress has 
authorized $1.5 billion annually in foreign assistance to 
Pakistan, through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 
2009, better known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. The Obama 
administration still faces critical decisions on how it will 
spend these resources. This report will detail several aspects 
of a coordinated regional strategy for allocating those 
resources.
     This report analyzes how the United States can be more 
strategic in delivering water-related assistance in Central and 
South Asia to maximize its peacekeeping and humanitarian 
benefits. It also makes the following four recommendations to 
the administration with respect to water issues in the region 
that capture opportunities for enhanced cooperation and 
coordination:

1. Provide Benchmark Data to Improve Water Management
    The countries in Central and South Asia, regardless of 
their level of development, lack publicly available access to 
consistent and comparable data on water supply, flow, and 
usage. This creates tension over the management of water by 
both upstream and downstream countries. Providing basic 
technical information to all countries is a constructive way 
for the United States to help create a foundation for bona fide 
discussion and debate over water management. The United States 
should support data-related activities specific to measuring 
and monitoring water flow and volume for key rivers and river 
basins. We should also promote technical partnerships in the 
region to monitor glaciers, track shifts in monsoons, and model 
climatic changes across a range of water flow scenarios.

2. Focus on Water Demand Management
    The United States can help create space for regional and 
bilateral negotiations on water by reducing pressure on shared 
water resources. Countries in the region cannot simply engineer 
their way out of growing water scarcity; they must begin by 
improving management of their existing supply. In fact, many 
experts agree that these countries must start shifting their 
focus from increasing the supply of water to decreasing their 
demand for it. The United States should couple its support for 
activities that reduce demand for water with those that 
increase water use efficiency. Specifically, the United States 
can utilize its expertise in demand management and help 
countries reduce the amount of water consumed by the 
agriculture sector and regulate groundwater withdrawals.

3. Recognize International Dimensions of Water Issues and Deliver 
        Holistic Solutions
    The impact of the United States approach to address water 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan can extend far beyond each 
country's border, as water ignores political boundaries. 
Moreover, regional water management can be an important type of 
conflict management. U.S. assistance should encompass 
comprehensive activities, such as strengthening river basin 
dialogues and establishing community-level water management 
projects on shared watersheds.

4. Safeguard Institutions Against Shocks to Water Supply and Demand
    Long-term stability requires strong institutions capable of 
responding to sudden shocks to critical natural resources, such 
as water. When weak institutions are confronted with natural 
disasters or human interventions that suddenly disrupt water 
flow, tensions can flare. With decades of experience on water 
sharing agreements, the United States is well-positioned to 
support programs that build the institutional capacity of 
government agencies and universities in areas such as 
international water law, dispute resolution, mediation, and 
arbitration. The United States should also invest in 
institutions that support developing transboundary water 
sharing agreements.

    This report is organized into seven sections. Section 1 
provides an overview of water management in Central and South 
Asia. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the demand for water from the 
agriculture and energy sectors. Section 4 describes climate 
change's effect on water and how this can exacerbate local and 
regional tensions. Section 5 highlights how, in the aggregate, 
the demand for a diminishing supply of water portends a 
significant threat to national security. Section 6 outlines the 
U.S. foreign policy approach to water in the region and Section 
7 provides policy recommendations for improving water 
management in conjunction with promoting stability in the 
region.

         Section 1: Water Management in Central and South Asia

Accessible Freshwater is Scarce and Must Be Well-Managed
    Water is a fundamental human need; and yet, it is also one 
of the most overlooked aspects in our daily lives. Water is 
more than just what people drink or use to clean or create 
power; it is also embedded in our food and environment. As a 
result, global water use has been growing at a rate more than 
double that of the world population in the last century.
    Even though the majority of our planet is water, most of it 
is too salty or deep to be reached. As little as 0.75 percent 
of the total water available on Earth is accessible fresh 
water. Given such constraints, the real threat to this limited 
resource is poor management.
    Poor water management has rendered water unusable and 
subject to exploitation at a rate faster than it is 
replenished, directly contributing to the growing water 
scarcity crisis. In 2006, the United Nations reported that many 
of the world's water problems come not from the physical 
absence of freshwater, but from poor governance and lack of 
investment in basic activities like sewage treatment and water 
efficiency programs.
    Effective water management is difficult because precious 
freshwater is often not controlled or undisputedly owned by any 
one nation. In fact, more than 260 major rivers basins are 
shared by two or more countries. Human dependency on these 
transboundary freshwater basins exacerbates this delicate 
balance; approximately 40 percent of the world's population 
relies on them. This report focuses on two such primary water 
basins: the Amu Darya and Indus.
Weakened Water Management Systems in Central Asia
    There are two main rivers in Central Asia: the Amu Darya 
and the Syr Darya. The Amu Darya is the largest river with a 
basin shared by Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The river is formed by the 
confluence of the Vakhsh and Pyanj rivers. The most important 
river, the Pyanj, begins near Pakistan's Northern Territories 
and forms the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan (see 
Figure 1). There are also several rivers within northern 
Afghanistan contributing to the Amu Darya flow, mainly the 
Wakhan and Pamir rivers and, to a lesser extent, the 
Badakhshan, Kokcha, and Kunduz.




         Figure 1: Map of Amu Darya and Syr Darya River Basins

    Source: CRS produced using U.S. Department of State, 
International Land Boundaries,https://www.intelink.gov/
basestate/landBHome.asp; U.S. Geological Survey, HydroSHEDS, 
http://hydrosheds.cr.usgs.gov; World Resources Institute, 
Watersheds of the World, http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-
resources/maps.html; ESRI Data and Maps 9.3.1; DeLorme World 
Vector Data, 1:250,000; IHS World Data, December 2008.

    Notes: Place names and boundary representation are not 
necessarily authoritative. River basin boundaries are 
approximate and adapted from WRI Watersheds of the World and 
USGS HydroSHEDS databases.


    During the Soviet era, the central government in Moscow 
controlled the entire network of rivers shared among its 
republics through water-use quotas. This approach meant that 
the borders between the Central Asian republics had little, if 
any, effect on basin management. The Soviet system involved 
integrated water policies where in the summer, the two upstream 
republics (present day Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) released 
water from their lakes to the downstream ones (present day 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) for irrigation and 
hydroelectric power generation. In return, during the winter 
when it was not practical to release water, the downstream 
republics provided those upstream with gas and coal to generate 
electricity.
    The collapse of the Soviet Union drastically weakened water 
management in the region. The previous controls broke down and 
national self-interests took hold. The former Soviet republics 
began to function independently, seeking to increase national 
control over water often at the expense of their neighbors. As 
Kai Wegerich, an expert in water policy put it, ``[w]hen 
administrational boundaries became national boundaries in 1991, 
the Central Asian states were left with inequitable water 
allocation limits and a high level of water provision 
structures interdependences.'' \1\ Recognizing the destabilized 
system, all five Central Asian countries agreed to keep the 
water quotas from the Soviet era in place and signed the Almaty 
Agreement in 1992.
    In addition, agreements reached over water allocations 
during the Soviet era largely ignored non-Soviet interests, 
especially those of Afghanistan, a weaker neighbor. As a 
significant outlier in the process of developing regional water 
sharing agreements, Afghanistan's interests in the waters of 
the Amu Darya basin have only recently gained prominence. This 
renewed focus on Afghanistan derives in part from international 
reinvestment in the country's agriculture sector following the 
ouster of the Taliban government. However, sparse water data, 
limited access to collect it, and combat conditions have 
rendered challenging discussions on water between Afghanistan 
and its neighbors. Looking ahead, experts question whether and 
how this region will incorporate growing water consumption and 
its implications for regional stability.
Decentralized Water Management in South Asia
    The Indus River Basin hosts a major network of rivers 
flowing between India and Pakistan. It is comprised of six 
shared rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej 
(see Figure 2). The Indus is one of the world's longest rivers 
(1,800 miles long), originating in the Tibetan Himalayas, 
flowing west through Kashmir, then through Pakistan until 
eventually reaching the Arabian Sea. The upper portion of the 
Indus is fed by snow and glacial meltwaters and converges in 
the Punjab region of Pakistan with the five other rivers in the 
system.




                   Figure 2: Map of Indus River Basin

    Source: CRS produced using U.S. Department of State, 
International Land Boundaries, https://www.intelink.gov/
basestate/landBHome.asp; U.S. Geological Survey, HydroSHEDS, 
http://hydrosheds.cr.usgs.gov;World Resources Institute, 
Watersheds of the World, http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-
resources/maps.html; ESRI
    Data and Maps 9.3.1; DeLorme World Vector Data, 1:250,000; 
IHS World Data, December 2008.

    Notes: Place names and boundary representation are not 
necessarily authoritative. River basin boundary is approximate 
and adapted from WRI Watersheds of the World and USGS 
HydroSHEDS databases.


    Of all the rivers flowing into Pakistan, the Indus is the 
most essential because of its importance to the agricultural 
sector. Pakistan's agriculture relies on the world's largest 
contiguous irrigation system fed by the Indus waters; in fact, 
water withdrawals for agricultural irrigation represent almost 
97 percent of all withdrawals in Pakistan. This irrigation 
network covers an estimated 83 percent of cultivated land in 
the country and contributes to nearly a quarter of its gross 
domestic product. Unfortunately, Pakistan has almost fully 
exploited the surface and groundwater that is crucial for its 
irrigation, so improvements in management and efficiency are 
vital.
    Although the headwaters for the Indus originate in China, 
from a long-term planning perspective, it is India's water 
management of the Indus that merits scrutiny. With a population 
already exceeding 1.1 billion people and forecasts indicating 
continued growth to over 1.5 billion by 2035, India's demand 
for water is rising at unprecedented rates. However, water 
management in India is extremely decentralized and virtually 
unregulated. Multiple government ministries have established 
water-use guidelines at the national level, but, they have 
little effect. Water management is constitutionally delegated 
to India's constituent states, which have limited capacity to 
coordinate among themselves. This has led rapidly to 
diminishing available surface and groundwater.
    Waters flowing between India and Pakistan, unlike those in 
Central Asia, are managed within the framework of the Indus 
Waters Treaty (IWT), a long-standing agreement negotiated by 
the governments of India and Pakistan and the World Bank. 
Signed in 1960, the IWT is considered the world's most 
successful water treaty, having remained relatively intact for 
50 years and having withstood four Indo-Pakistani wars.
    The treaty gives control of the ``western rivers'' (Indus, 
Jelum, and Chenab) to Pakistan and gives India the ``eastern 
rivers'' (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) up to the Pakistani border. 
The treaty quantifies the amount of water both countries will 
receive from these rivers and serves an important function by 
managing the use of the rivers for hydroelectric power 
projects. It lays out guidelines for hydropower on the eastern 
rivers, allows Pakistan to object to projects, and specifies 
mechanisms for conflict resolution.
    While the IWT has maintained stability in the region over 
water, experts question the treaty's long-term effectiveness in 
light of chronic tensions between India and Pakistan over the 
Kashmir region, where a significant portion of the Indus 
River's headwaters originate. In addition, others question 
whether the IWT can address India's growing use of the shared 
waters and Pakistan's increasing demand for these waters for 
agricultural purposes.

          Section 2: Agriculture as a Driver of Water Demand 
                         and Tensions in Region

    Globally, the agriculture sector is the single largest 
consumer of freshwater, accounting for about 70 percent of the 
total volume of freshwater withdrawals from lakes, rivers, and 
aquifers. As a primary driver of water scarcity and source of 
tension within and among countries, agriculture policies 
produce water insecurity when they promote water-intensive 
crops and require unsustainable irrigation.
    Agriculture is one of the chief factors that exacerbate 
water-related tensions in Central and South Asia.
    First, local government policies continue to pursue cotton 
production in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, adding further stress to limited water resources 
and driving water scarcity. The demise of the Aral Sea in 
Central Asia remains one of the most iconic global images of 
mismanaged agriculture policies and highlights the 
interconnectivity between such policies and water scarcity. The 
Aral Sea was once the world's fourth largest lake. It has 
shrunk by 90 percent since the rivers that fed the sea were 
diverted for Soviet projects aimed at boosting cotton 
production, a water-intensive crop.
    Second, the loss of production and farm-level knowledge is 
exacerbating water scarcity. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, large collective farms became individualized. This meant 
that many peasant farmers, who only had a single task to 
perform as part of the larger farming process, quickly became 
responsible for the entire production chain. These farmers 
lacked knowledge in maximizing productivity, so yields 
declined, irrigation canals became silted, and inefficiencies 
in water use increased.
    Finally, government policies, including U.S. policies, have 
increased agricultural productivity by expanding irrigated land 
area without regard for the down-river impacts of those 
policies. For example, Afghanistan's 2007 Water Sector Strategy 
focuses on improving, rehabilitating, and reestablishing 
irrigated areas. In addition, the United States is investing in 
increasing Afghanistan's agricultural productivity by 
rehabilitating and constructing irrigation systems and 
providing seeds. However, little is known about the impacts 
that expanded irrigation could have on already sensitive 
rivers, such as the Amu Darya, which flows into Central Asia 
from Afghanistan. Without investments in managing the demand 
for water from irrigation, this solution can create conflicts 
among its users.
    Similarly, proposals to expand irrigated land in India and 
Pakistan have exacerbated tensions between these neighbors. 
Water mismanagement and increased inefficiencies in the 
existing irrigation systems, requiring more water for less 
agricultural returns, compound the problem. As the existing 
agriculture system becomes more water-intensive and, in some 
areas, more inefficient, water may prove to be a source of 
instability in South Asia.

              Section 3: Growing Concern Over Using Water 
                            to Create Energy

    A second driver of growing frictions in the region is 
hydropower development. Lacking a coordinated management 
system, each nation is trying to meet its own energy needs 
without consideration of its neighbors. As many experts note, 
``transboundary water conflicts arise not over natural supplies 
but over human interventions to manage them. Dams, irrigation 
diversions, and other infrastructure alter hydrological 
relations, affecting the quantity, quality, and timing of 
downriver flows, but also relations between upstream and 
downstream riparians.'' \2\
    As of late 2010, three dam projects are under consideration 
or construction in Kyrgyzstan (Kambaratinsk Dam) and Tajikistan 
(Rogun Dam, Sangtuda I and II Dam). The energy produced from 
hydroelectric power constitutes 27 percent of the total energy 
in Central Asia and is expected to grow to 3.5 percent if the 
proposed projects are built. The Rogun and Kambaratinsk dams 
are the two largest dams under consideration and would serve to 
store water in large reservoirs and generate electricity by 
releasing this water.
    The proposed Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh River in southern 
Tajikistan is relevant because of its potential effects on 
energy security for Tajikistan and on water availability for 
Uzbekistan. This dam was first proposed in 1959 and 
construction began in 1976. However, the project stalled after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. In recent years, the Tajik 
Government restarted the construction process. If completed, 
this dam would likely be the highest in the world and generate 
power not only for Tajikistan but enough to export to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. These plans have raised serious 
concerns across the border in Uzbekistan, as the Vakhsh River 
contributes approximately 25 percent of the water flows in the 
Amu Darya. In discussions with staff, Uzbek officials argue 
that because it could take up to 18 years to fill, the Rogun 
project will severely reduce the amount of water flowing into 
Uzbekistan.
    The drive to meet energy demand through hydropower 
development is also occurring in India and Pakistan, two 
countries that lack sufficient access to energy. This is 
particularly true with respect to India, which faces a rapidly 
expanding population, growing economy, and soaring energy 
needs. To meet growing demand and cope with increasing 
electricity shortages, the government has developed plans to 
expand power generation through the construction of 
multipurpose dams. India has 33 projects at various stages of 
completion on the rivers that affect this region.
    The number of dams under construction and their management 
is a source of significant bilateral tension. Currently, the 
most controversial dam project is the proposed 330-megawatt dam 
on the Kishenganga River, a tributary of the Indus. While 
studies show that no single dam along the waters controlled by 
the Indus Waters Treaty will affect Pakistan's access to water, 
the cumulative effect of these projects could give India the 
ability to store enough water to limit the supply to Pakistan 
at crucial moments in the growing season. In the difficult 60-
plus year bilateral relationship, water has not yet been used 
in this way. However, staff met with some experts that argue 
the treaty's long-term stability is threatened by a lack of 
trust between these two countries. Any perceived reduction in 
water flows magnifies this distrust, whether caused by India's 
activities in the Indus Basin or climate change.

          Section 4: Climate Change Exacerbates Water Scarcity

    As demand for water from agriculture and hydroelectric 
power generation grows in Central and South Asia, climate 
change is expected to increase water scarcity. Current 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projections of 
rising temperatures and sea levels and increased intensity of 
droughts and storms suggest that substantial displacements will 
take place within the next 30-50 years, particularly in coastal 
zones. As our planet's climate becomes increasingly unstable, 
our relationship with water is changing in dangerous and 
potentially catastrophic ways (see Figure 3).
    Warmer temperatures threaten the cyclical changes to 
glaciers that provide essential water to the rivers in Central 
and South Asia. Glacier melt water is estimated to comprise 30 
percent or more of the Indus River's flow, with snow and ice 
providing up to two-thirds more. In Central Asia, a report 
commissioned by the United Nations Development Program's Water 
Governance Facility noted that in the 20th century, the 
glaciers of Tajikistan decreased on average by 20-30 percent. 
In Afghanistan, this decrease is as much as 50-70 percent. 
While shrinking glaciers increase the run off in the short 
term, the long-term effect is a decrease in available water.
    As the rate of melting increases, flooding could become 
more frequent and severe, particularly from ``glacial lake 
outburst floods.'' These floods occur when runoff from glaciers 
builds up to form lakes that can burst and inundate neighboring 
regions. According to a report by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Changing Glaciers and 
Hydrology in Asia: Addressing Vulnerabilities to Glacier Melt 
Impacts, there is ``a history of outburst floods from Karakoram 
glaciers involving much larger impoundments by short-lived, 
unstable ice dams that blocked tributaries of the upper Indus . 
. . causing outburst floods of exceptional size and 
destructiveness.'' Changes in runoff to river basins can 
significantly exacerbate already tense relations over water-
dependent sectors, such as agriculture and hydropower.
    Finally, climate change is expected to influence monsoon 
dynamics that are vital for river systems dependent on their 
seasonal rains. The summer monsoon season is particularly 
crucial to the agriculture, water supply, economics, 
ecosystems, and human health of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and 
Pakistan. A 2009 Purdue University study predicted an eastern 
shift in monsoon circulation caused by the changing climate, 
which today causes more rainfall over the Indian Ocean, 
Bangladesh, and Burma and less rainfall over India, Nepal, and 
Pakistan. This shift raises serious concerns for the countries 
expecting decreased rainfall. For example, summer monsoon 
rainfall provides 90 percent of India's total water supply. As 
the effects of climate change become more pronounced, agrarian 
populations in India and Pakistan dependent on monsoons and 
glacial melt for irrigation will be profoundly affected.



    Figure 3. Illustrative Pathway of How Climate Change May Affect 
                                Security

    Source: CRS
    Notes: First two boxes were adapted from S. Smith and J. 
Vivekananda, A Climate of Conflict (International Alert, Nov. 
2007), pp. 10-11, available at http://www.international-
alert.org/pdf/A--Climate--Of--Conflict.pdf.

              Section 5: Current and Future Water Scarcity
                      is a National Security Issue

    The national security implications of this looming water 
shortage--exacerbated and directly caused by agriculture 
demands, hydroelectric power generation, and climate 
instability--will be felt all over the world. The defense and 
intelligence specialists focused on the region have recognized 
the threat of conflict stemming from ineffective water 
management within these countries. General Anthony Zinni 
(Ret.), former commander of U.S. Central Command, recently 
said, ``[w]e have seen fuel wars; we're about to see water 
wars.'' It is imperative that the foreign policy community heed 
the warnings from top defense and intelligence experts. The 
United States should not only elevate water issues in foreign 
policy dialogues, but tackle them with a comprehensive 
approach.
    The danger posed by water scarcity is that it triggers 
human insecurity, which can intensify potentially explosive 
tensions among neighboring countries or regions. As Dr. Peter 
H. Gleick, cofounder and president of the Pacific Institute for 
Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, wrote, 
``[w]here water is scarce, competition for limited supplies can 
lead nations to see access to water as a matter of national 
security. History is replete with examples of competition and 
disputes over shared fresh water resources.''
    As the defense and intelligence community increasingly 
acknowledge the links between natural resource degradation and 
national security, their views on the sources of future 
conflict are also evolving. The 2007 Center for Naval Analysis 
report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, 
found that ``environmental crises such as water scarcity, soil 
depletion, and natural disasters can intensify conflict or 
stress within a country and potentially contribute to national 
security issues.'' When the Central Intelligence Agency 
inaugurated its Environmental Indications and Warnings program, 
whose mission is to ``provide intelligence analysts with 
indications of where societies may experience environmental 
stress that exceeds local capacity to manage and adapt,'' the 
first environmental stressor they identified was freshwater 
availability. The Navigating Peace Initiative's Water Conflict 
and Cooperation Working Group correctly summarized the current 
state of water use by saying,

         . . . water use is shifting to less-traditional 
        sources such as deep fossil aquifers and wastewater 
        reclamation. Conflict, too, is becoming less 
        traditional, driven increasingly by internal or local 
        pressures or, more subtly, by poverty and instability. 
        These changes suggest that tomorrow's water disputes 
        may look very different from today's.\3\

    Water conflicts can occur both within and across state 
lines. Since 1994, the Pacific Institute has maintained a Water 
Conflict Chronology summarizing historical disputes over water 
resources. The most recent update to this chronology was 
released in December 2009. It indicates that local and 
subnational conflicts are increasing in severity and intensity 
relative to international conflicts, noting that ``[a] growing 
number of disputes over allocations of water across local 
borders, ethnic boundaries, or between economic groups have 
also led to conflict.'' \4\ The National Intelligence Council 
echoed these concerns in their Global Trends 2025: A 
Transformed World, finding that with ``water becoming more 
scarce in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage 
changing water resources is likely to become more difficult 
within and between states.'' \5\
    Given the important role water plays in Central and South 
Asia as a primary driver of human insecurity, it is important 
to recognize that for the most part, the looming threat of so-
called ``water wars'' has not yet come to fruition. Instead, 
many regions threatened by water scarcity have avoided violent 
clashes through discussion, compromise, and agreements. This is 
because ``[w]ater--being international, indispensable, and 
emotional--can serve as a cornerstone for confidence building 
and a potential entry point for peace.'' \6\
    However, the United States cannot expect this region to 
continue to avoid ``water wars'' in perpetuity. In South Asia, 
the Indus Waters Treaty has been the primary vehicle for 
resolving conflicts over the shared waters between India and 
Pakistan. It is a prescriptive agreement that has recently been 
criticized for its inflexibility to adjust to changes in water 
levels. Experts are now questioning whether the IWT can adapt 
to these changes, especially when new demands for the use of 
the river flows from irrigation and hydroelectric power are 
fueling tensions between India and Pakistan. A breakdown in the 
treaty's utility in resolving water conflicts could have 
serious ramifications for regional stability.

            Section 6: United States Foreign Policy on Water

U.S. Policies Beginning to Recognize Water's Strategic Importance
    To its credit, the Obama administration has recognized the 
critical role water plays in achieving our foreign policy goals 
and in protecting our national security interests. The United 
States is now addressing water from a political, economic, and 
diplomatic perspective.
    Politically, senior officials in the administration are 
integrating water considerations into our efforts overseas. 
U.S. embassies and missions have elevated the importance of 
water in our diplomacy and an interagency process has been 
established to coordinate and advance a U.S. policy on water. 
In a speech delivered on World Water Day 2010, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton laid out a new ``five streams'' approach 
to U.S. international water engagement.
    ``Five streams'' refers to five different focus areas that 
together form a comprehensive strategy. The first stream is 
capacity-building at local, national, and regional levels. This 
effort seeks to empower key actors at all levels of water 
management, both nationally and internationally. The second 
focus is coordination between U.N. agencies, international 
financial institutions, government entities, and other 
stakeholders. The third element is financial support, whether 
from the United States through USAID, the World Bank, or other 
international institutions. Science and technology form the 
fourth stream. While it is important to remember that 
technology alone will not be able to solve the world's water 
problems, scientific advancements can make enormous differences 
in the developing world. The final input is private sector 
engagement. Public-private partnerships allow the United States 
to leverage private sector skills and capital to better respond 
to challenges in the water sector.
    Economically, the portion of the U.S. foreign assistance 
budget dedicated to address water issues has slowly increased 
since 2005. The budgets for high-priority countries, such as 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, now include significant funds for 
water-related assistance, receiving approximately $46.8 million 
in 2009. The majority of this is targeted at efforts in 
Pakistan, particularly in the aftermath of this summer's 
devastating floods.
    Diplomatically, the United States has identified water as a 
central foreign policy concern with far-reaching effects. For 
example, the U.S. Government's 2010 Inter-Agency Water Strategy 
for Afghanistan is focused on improving access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation, agricultural irrigation, and water-sector 
management. A significant portion of U.S. assistance is aimed 
at rehabilitating the Kajaki dam to provide much needed 
electric power for the country and potentially for future 
irrigation purposes. Similarly, in November, President Obama 
and Prime Minister Singh agreed to work together on food 
security cooperation as part of the ``Evergreen Revolution'' 
where water figures in nearly all the components of this 
effort.
    The United States also elevated water activities in 
Pakistan by launching a multiyear Signature Water Program and 
establishing a water working group within the U.S.-Pakistan 
Strategic Dialogue. The Signature Water Program aims to improve 
Pakistan's ability to manage its water resources and improve 
water distribution. The first phase of the program focuses on 
building high efficiency irrigation systems, water storage 
dams, municipal water and services delivery, and dams for 
irrigation. In the aftermath of the floods, these programs are 
still going forward but with adjustments to reflect new needs 
given that the floods destroyed 30 percent of arable land.
Need to Improve Integrating Water with U.S. National Security Interests
    While the United States has appropriately begun to elevate 
its interest in supporting water through ``signature'' projects 
in these regions, our efforts still lack strategic clarity, 
unity of purpose, and a long-term vision to support our 
national security interests. The next section describes four 
recommendations focused on encouraging a U.S. foreign policy 
that strengthens our support in the region and promotes efforts 
to increase transboundary water cooperation and stability in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.

                 Section 7: Recommendations for Action

1. Provide Benchmark Data to Improve Water Management
    The countries in Central and South Asia, regardless of 
their level of development, lack publicly available access to 
consistent and comparable data on water supply, its flow, and 
use. This paucity of data causes friction over the management 
of water by upstream and downstream countries. Providing basic 
technical information to all countries is a constructive way to 
create a foundation for bona fide debate over water management. 
Specifically, the United States should build on its comparative 
advantages to support the following four data-related 
activities.
    First, the United States should provide technical trainings 
on how to gather water flow and volume information using remote 
sensing or other related technologies. Scientists in Central 
and South Asia can capitalize on the expertise of U.S. 
agencies, such as the United States Geologic Service, 
Environmental Protection Agency, and National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, to learn how to access and collect 
such data. This type of data-sharing is contemplated in the 
inaugural strategic dialogues launched this year with India and 
Pakistan, but for Central Asia more work is needed.
    For example, the Amu Darya river basin countries do not 
know how much of the river's flow originates in Afghanistan. 
Similarly, little is known about aquifer recharge rates due to 
limited data on water quality and security issues with 
collecting on the ground data. The United States should support 
expert exchange programs with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan. These programs should include support for the 
development of local and remote monitoring capacity through the 
use of new technologies, such as NASA's Gravity Recovery and 
Climate Experiment. With such assistance, the United States can 
provide the tools necessary to develop baseline data on water.
    When staff traveled to Central Asia, they observed that key 
water-dependent neighbors, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 
lack a common baseline from which to begin discussions over 
water use. In both countries, government officials agreed that 
climate change and water use for energy or agriculture could 
have a significant effect on water supply, but they lacked 
sufficient resources to meet their research needs. In addition, 
tensions between these two countries continue to escalate as 
plans to build the Rogun Dam move forward without any common 
baseline for what the impacts of the dam are on water flow. 
Although the Tajik Government claims that the dam will have 
only a minimal impact on river flows into Uzbekistan, the Uzbek 
Government disagrees. According to the facts, as both countries 
see them, they each have compelling reasons to support or 
oppose this dam.
    Second, the United States should support increased 
technical capacity to monitor changes to glaciers because these 
changes can significantly affect river flows and the 
livelihoods that depend on them. Central Asia and India face 
critical challenges in monitoring glaciers and tracking 
changes, particularly differences from year to year. As USAID's 
report Changing Glaciers and Hydrology in Asia: Addressing 
Vulnerabilities to Glacier Melt Impacts noted, ``[t]he review 
of scientific information about glacier melt in High Asia 
revealed, first and foremost, a lack of data and information, a 
lack that hampers attempts to project likely impacts and take 
action to adapt to changed conditions.'' \7\ The United States 
should engage in collaborative glacier monitoring programs and 
those that develop local or sub-national water monitoring 
capacity. In the case of Central Asia, the United States could 
support bringing back the expertise and data collection that 
fell into disrepair after the end of the Soviet era. For 
example, Tajikistan has lost almost 38 percent of its glacier 
monitoring stations since 1985.\8\
    Third, the United States should support scientific studies 
to monitor, track, and analyze changes in monsoon rains that 
play an important role in food security. Studies on climate 
change have traditionally focused on temperature increases, 
sea-level rise, and droughts; but for a region like South Asia, 
it is changes to the monsoons that will be felt the hardest. 
Early climatic trends show that monsoon rains will become more 
erratic and intense, leading to more flooding, less soil 
absorption, and lower agricultural productivity. The more we 
understand the changes to the monsoon, the better positioned we 
will be to partner in our efforts to promote sustainable 
agricultural programs. This type of collaboration has already 
begun with the recent signing of the ``Monsoon Agreement'' 
between the United States and India, which seeks to improve 
long-range monsoon prediction through collaboration between the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association and India's 
Ministry of Earth Sciences.
    Fourth, the United States should support efforts in Central 
and South Asia to model changes to water flow and volume for 
entire river basins across a range of scenarios, from the 
impacts of climate change to the construction of dams. 
Understanding these impacts, which generally take the form of 
reduced or irregular water flow, will help governments make 
more informed decisions on water management. Today, most of 
these basins only have studies on the outcomes of individual 
projects, rather than the cumulative impact of multiple 
projects. Without complete river basin analysis for the Amu 
Darya, Syr Darya, and Indus, countries in Central and South 
Asia are left to negotiate water allocations and usage based on 
either the status quo or their own assumptions, neither of 
which lends itself to finding synergies. The United States 
should support the development of basin-level water modeling 
and scenario analysis through technical exchanges and 
partnerships with Central Asian and Indian universities.
    Basin-wide modeling is also useful for addressing tensions 
over hydroelectric dam proposals that continue to agitate 
countries sharing rivers. Dams are often the easiest target for 
public scrutiny, blame, and anger when water flow changes, 
regardless of whether they are the culprit. For the major dam 
proposals in the region, such as Rogun and Kishenganga, there 
is still no independent analysis of the cumulative impact these 
projects will have on water flow, especially during the low 
flow season. Providing water flow models for a range of 
construction scenarios to all interested countries can form the 
basis for discussions on the utility of these projects.

2. Focus on Water Demand Management
    The United States can help create space for regional and 
bilateral negotiations on water by reducing the pressure on 
shared water resources. This means recognizing that countries 
in this region cannot simply engineer their way out of growing 
water scarcity, but should begin managing water resources more 
effectively. In fact, many experts agree that these countries 
must start shifting their focus from increasing the supply of 
water to decreasing the demand for it. Supporting improved 
demand management is at its core a type of conflict management. 
The two critical areas for U.S. engagement are in addressing 
the agriculture sector's demand for water and in establishing 
better groundwater management.
    The agriculture sector is the primary user of water 
globally. Agriculture policies create water security issues 
when these policies promote water-intensive crops, such as 
cotton and rice. The United States can encourage the shift away 
from water intensive farming that drives many of the countries 
in the region to exhaust their water supply by incorporating 
water-saving projects in its international agricultural 
activities.
    For example, there are advancements taking place in 
developing integrated and environmentally sound alternative 
approaches to water-intensive crops, such as rice. While it is 
still being demonstrated on a small scale, the system of rice 
intensification (SRI) is a promising new model of agricultural 
production centered on four components: planting method, water 
(irrigation) management, soil fertility management, and pest/
weed control. SRI introduces simple changes to specific 
practices, though the fundamental procedures of rice production 
remain the same as in conventional systems. Implementing SRI on 
a broad scale would result in considerable water savings. Water 
use in SRI is typically 25-50 percent lower than conventional 
paddy systems because fields are not flooded throughout the 
entire production cycle.
    The United States should also continue to focus on 
activities that result in significant water savings, such as 
increasing the efficiency of irrigation systems in Central and 
South Asia. While it is important that the United States help 
ensure Pakistani farmers have the ability to replant after last 
year's devastating floods, the current spend plan for our 
assistance lacks a comprehensive solution to addressing 
agriculture needs and water demands. For example, the current 
spend plan for fiscal year 2010 includes providing seeds and 
fertilizer and supporting agricultural extension and 
cooperatives. However, we must also incorporate, in tandem, 
repairs and improvements to the irrigation systems, efforts to 
strengthen dykes and embankment protections, and water storage 
through the construction of small to mid-size water storage 
units and rainwater harvesting.
    Staff recently met with representatives from 
nongovernmental organizations in arid regions in Tajikistan, 
such as the Konibodom District in Khujand, Tajikistan, a town 
near the border of Uzbekistan. Staff learned that after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the water supply system fell into 
disrepair and the irrigation canals became heavily polluted. 
Nongovernmental groups are now working to rehabilitate the 
water distribution systems. Interestingly, because water 
remains a scarce resource, these groups are establishing water 
associations to manage and fund water use. For this district, 
once completed, the system will supply 50,000 villagers with 
40-50 liters per person per day.
    Second, the United States should focus on the 
sustainability of access to water, not just access. As we have 
learned from past efforts to address water crises, the 
solutions of today can create the problems of tomorrow. For 
instance, to address India's growing drought crisis, the 
international community in conjunction with the Indian 
Government has significantly increased the distribution of 
individual tube wells to access groundwater. As Steve Solomon 
notes, ``in 1975, before groundwater pumping became 
significant, India had about 800,000 wells . . . only a quarter 
century later, the nation had an estimated 22 million wells . . 
. and continuing to increase phenomenally, by about 1 million a 
year.'' \9\ At the same time, the Indian Government provided 
electricity subsidies that allowed individuals to run these 
pumps for several hours a day. As a result of this unfettered 
and exploited access, India is now the world leader in 
groundwater withdrawals, pumping out roughly 230 cubic 
kilometers annually, more than a quarter of the world total.
    Going forward, the United States should consider 
integrating management of groundwater withdrawals with our 
efforts to promote access to water. This integration can be 
done through demand driven solutions, such as installing water 
gauges, collecting groundwater use and recharge, promoting 
water reuse, improving efficiencies in water delivery, and 
trainings on how to budget water among users.
    Moreover, the United States can share its domestic 
expertise in groundwater management, from monitoring to mapping 
groundwater resources. For example, the U.S. Geological Survey 
collects data on domestic groundwater, including the Ground 
Water Atlas of the United States, which gives a summary of each 
principal aquifer in each of the 50 States, Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands. Specifically for this region, the 
United States can follow the model set forth in the 
Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act with Mexico, which 
authorizes the United States to cooperate with the Mexican 
Government and other organizations to conduct hydrogeologic 
studies and modeling of transboundary aquifers.
    While the United States should continue to focus on 
improving the efficiencies of water delivery, we must also 
support the development of plans to ensure the long-term 
maintenance of these systems. If we fail to do so, we may find 
ourselves with a more formidable challenge in the years ahead 
caused by water shortages and its destabilizing derivative 
effects.

3. Recognize International Dimensions of Water Issues and Deliver 
        Holistic Solutions
    The impact of our actions to address water extends far 
beyond a country's border, as water transcends political 
boundaries. This means U.S. actions centered on only one part 
of a river can have unintended consequences either upstream or 
downstream. For example, water projects are a priority for U.S. 
assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, if our 
assistance is managed or implemented poorly, it may increase 
tensions over water in the greater region. Our assistance 
should target comprehensive activities, such as strengthening 
river basin dialogues and establishing community-level water 
management projects on shared watersheds.
    U.S. investment in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is 
twelve times greater than what is invested in Central Asia, 
could have significant unintended consequences. Although it is 
strategically important for the United States to keep a laser-
like focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially on high-
visibility water projects that can reduce internal tensions, 
the United States should also consider activities that promote 
regional cooperation over these shared river systems. As noted 
in the United States Government Accountability Office's report 
on U.S. efforts to support the Afghan water sector (GAO-11-
138), ``[f]our of Afghanistan's five major river basins flow 
into the territory or boundary waters of five of its six 
neighbors--Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Iran. The construction of large water storage or diversion 
facilities could affect these countries. The ability of the 
Government of Afghanistan to achieve sustainable and 
multipurpose use of its abundant water resources will depend on 
its capacity to engage in dialogue, negotiate, and establish 
relationships and agreements with its neighbors.'' The United 
States should evaluate how it distributes regional assistance 
and consider supporting transboundary capacity-building on 
water issues.
    In Afghanistan, the United States should support mechanisms 
that integrate U.S. expertise on water management and resource 
allocation within the Afghan Government. This would enable 
Afghanistan's interests over shared waters to be represented at 
regional dialogues. It will also foster a process that engages 
Afghanistan and Pakistan on the management of the Kabul River 
Basin. This basin is important to both countries because it has 
the potential to provide vital hydroelectric power to energy-
poor Afghanistan and predictable water flows to key 
agricultural areas in Pakistan. Limited technical capacity 
within the Afghan Government to negotiate transboundary 
agreements has meant that no such water and energy sharing 
arrangement exists. However, the United States is already on 
the right track to get these negotiations started.
    For example, U.S. expertise was recently used to improve 
water management data for the Kabul Basin drawing on the United 
States Geographical Survey in collaboration with the 
Afghanistan Geological Survey and the Afghanistan Ministry of 
Energy and Water. This project, supported by the United States 
Agency for International Development, included results from a 
multidisciplinary water-resource assessment that analyzed how a 
growing population and the potential effects of climate change 
affect water.\10\ In addition, the United States has supported 
ground water assessments and a hydropower feasibility study in 
the Kabul Basin. With this information, U.S. assistance plans 
for Afghanistan should lay out concrete options for supporting 
regional activities, including those that encourage 
collaboration among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.
    The United States needs a concrete vision and plan to help 
the region tackle its water challenges. Through the U.S.-
Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, Under Secretary of State for 
Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero has seized the 
initiative by cochairing a water working group to examine how 
to respond to Pakistan's needs and improve U.S. assistance. 
This working group should now consider beginning a process to 
engage across country borders and supports basin-wide efforts. 
For example, the United States could facilitate basin-wide 
scenario planning, modeling, regional technical workshops, or 
direct interventions on water around basin-specific dialogues.
    To support confidence building in basin-wide planning, the 
United States should also look for opportunities that create 
transboundary cooperation on smaller rivers. Successful pilot 
efforts on these rivers can be scaled-up to encompass larger 
rivers and even basins. Specifically, the United States should 
support local, community-based cooperation over shared rivers 
and watersheds. Staff heard in meetings with nongovernmental 
organizations in Central Asia and India that the closer the 
solution moves toward the community, the more sustainable the 
solution. By helping create local control over water, the 
United States will be supporting a trust-building conflict 
management tool that can pay dividends in future.
    For example, the United States has successfully engaged 
with water user associations (WUAs). These community-driven 
water management organizations often negotiate water supply 
agreements between farmers and management administrations and 
resolve disputes in a transparent and democratic manner. While 
in Tajikistan, staff visited a water user association formed 
with support from USAID and learned that farms that had 
previously paid collective water fees during the Soviet-era 
were forced individually to attempt to fill their quota on 
independence. WUAs were created to bring all farmers together 
and reduce conflicts, while also increasing land productivity 
because everyone received reliable water access. This 
particular WUA collected fees and was responsible for 
maintaining, rehabilitating, and improving the irrigation 
system. The WUA also created a tractor rental program to help 
increase farmers yields, generating revenues for the 
association to rehabilitate additional canals. Although WUAs 
typically have been limited to domestic portions of rivers, it 
is worth considering piloting these cooperative arrangements on 
transboundary segments of rivers.
    Another successful water management mechanism has been 
piloted in Andhra Pradesh, India. This area relies entirely on 
the monsoons to replenish its groundwater resources and the 
area's particular geological characteristics limit underground 
storage. Those factors force farmers to focus on demand rather 
than increased exploitation of the groundwater. To accomplish 
this task, they come together to monitor rainfall, calculate 
available water, and decide which crops should be planted. 
Those meetings culminate in a water budget that is displayed on 
a wall in the village and updated as new information becomes 
available. Participation is voluntary but nearly 1 million 
people in 650 villages have joined, resulting in widespread 
changes in the variety of local diets and a move toward organic 
fertilizer. In essence, the program turns the people most 
invested in local water management, literally and figuratively, 
into ``barefoot hydrogeologists.'' \11\

4. Safeguard Institutions Against Shocks to Water Supply and Demand
    Transboundary waters by their very definition require 
international cooperation to avoid conflict. The formation of 
international institutions is an important way to solidify 
countries' commitment to sharing rivers equitably and when 
needed, resolve disputes. Long-term stability requires strong 
institutions capable of adapting and responding to immediate 
shocks to critical natural resources, such as water. When weak 
institutions are confronted with natural disasters or human 
interventions that suddenly disrupt water flow, tensions can 
flare.
    The United States can play an important role by building or 
strengthening institutions to facilitate multilateral 
discussions in regions experiencing water scarcity. As a first 
step, the United States should build on the water data called 
for in the first recommendation of this report and support 
regional institutions capable of bringing together key 
stakeholders to discuss water sharing. Shared access to 
accurate data is critical in creating a foundation for 
negotiations. Having water baselines can help these 
institutions integrate the necessary flexibility to adjust to 
changing water patterns from climate change, hydropower 
development, and other possible changes.
    A small grant by the United States to the United Nations 
Regional Center for Preventative Diplomacy for Central Asia 
(UNRCCA) is a step in the right direction. In a meeting with 
UNRCCA representatives, staff learned that they are elevating 
water cooperation through seminars, which include 
representatives from the Afghan Government as observers. The 
success of this institution will turn on its ability to 
continue to bring together all the Central Asian countries, 
including Afghanistan.
    The United States should also invest in local or regional 
institutions that can support the development of agreements or 
treaties to address water management. These institutions are 
critical for managing the problems that arise when a dam is 
proposed or unseasonably low levels of rainfall leave countries 
searching for someone to blame. Studies found that 
``[s]tatistically, the likelihood of conflictual interactions 
over water appears slightly higher in areas of high dam 
density. But this propensity disappears where institutional 
arrangements such as treaties or river commissions exist to 
mitigate those pressures.'' \12\ Once formed, institutions 
remain in place after disputes are resolved and can transform 
into tools for cooperation that address the needs and concerns 
of all interested states.\13\
    Specifically, if tensions between India and Pakistan 
related to the treaty continue to grow, the United States 
should back relevant supporting institutions that both 
countries believe can help mitigate conflicts. In conversations 
with staff, experts expressed concern that over time the volume 
of water managed by the IWT is likely to change due to 
unsustainable water withdrawals, increased population growth, 
and climate change. The Pakistan Government has already alleged 
misappropriation of water from the Indus by India, which the 
latter denies. India has not made data on water volume in the 
Indus widely available, impeding efforts to build trust. 
Efforts described in the previous recommendations, such as 
improving monitoring of the Indus basin, decreasing water 
demand through efficiencies, and creating flexibility to 
respond to changes in water volume, are possible ways forward 
to address these concerns. The continued peace, stability, and 
success of the IWT are in the national security interests of 
all stakeholders, including the United States.
    Staff was pleased to learn that the United States has begun 
to support regional discussions. For example, staff learned 
that the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea invited 
Afghanistan to participate in discussions as an observer, with 
the possibility of joining in the future. The United States has 
provided the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea with a 
small grant to the support the institution's technical capacity 
as well as offering the expertise of the United States Geologic 
Services to its executive committee. Similarly, local groups 
informed staff that they are working to establish an Amu Darya 
river basin dialogue that would include Afghanistan. It is 
precisely these types of inclusive, intraregion dialogues to 
which the United States should continue to offer our expertise 
or other resources.
    Finally, the United States can build stronger institutions 
and lasting agreements by investing in the people who are, and 
will be, responsible for water management, including government 
officials, youth, and farmers. This is already being done 
through technical exchanges between the United States and 
Central and South Asia, but such activities should be expanded 
to require the development of tools needed to reach agreement 
on water sharing. For example, the future water managers in 
Central Asia could be taught international water law, dispute 
resolution, or mediation at local universities. Given U.S. 
expertise in these areas, the United States should work to 
develop more informed water managers, which in turn can lead to 
more sustainable water agreements.

                               Conclusion

    Water scarcity, coupled with how governments address these 
challenges, can exacerbate conflict or promote cooperation. 
Although it is still too early to determine the impacts of our 
efforts in the broader region, now is the time to begin 
evaluating water-related trends.
    The Obama administration should be commended for 
recognizing the importance of water issues in its unprecedented 
commitment of assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. For the 
first time, senior government officials are recognizing the 
critical role that sound water management must play in 
achieving our foreign policy goals and in protecting our 
national security. Providing the right support can have a 
tremendous stabilizing influence in the region.
    The four recommendations laid out in this report focus on 
encouraging U.S. policies that promote efforts to increase 
transboundary cooperation and stability. These recommendations 
call for targeted assistance that addresses water concerns by 
considering a broader range of needs and diplomatic 
consequences. Water security is not unique to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, but successes there could be replicated in other 
regions facing similar threats. The lessons learned in water 
management and development in Central and South Asia can help 
the United States contribute further to diminishing tensions in 
other volatile and vulnerable regions of the world.

                                 Notes

    1. Kai Wegerich, ``Hydro-hegemony in the Amu Darya Basin,'' 
Water Policy, Vol. 10 No. 2 (IWA Publishing, 2008), 71-88 at 
71.
    2. ``Fresh Water Futures: Imagining Responses to Demand 
Growth, Climate Change, and the Politics of Water Resource 
Management by 2040,'' Conference Report prepared by The Stimson 
Center (May 2010) at 4.
    3. Aaron T. Wolf, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and 
Geoffrey D. Dabelko, ``Water can be a pathway to peace, not 
war,'' Environmental Change and Security Program Special 
Report, Issue 13 (2008-2009), 66-70 at 70.
    4. Heather Cooley, Juliet Christian-Smith, Peter H. Gleick, 
Lucy Allen, and Michael Cohen, ``Understanding and Reducing the 
Risks of Climate Change for Transboundary Waters,'' Pacific 
Institute (December 2009) at 2.
    5. National Intelligence Council, ``Global Trends 2025: A 
Transformed World,'' (November 2008) at x.
    6 Aaron T. Wolf, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and 
Geoffrey D. Dabelko, ``Water can be a pathway to peace, not 
war,'' Environmental Change and Security Program Special 
Report, Issue 13 (2008-2009), 66-70 at 70.
    7. United States Agency for International Development, 
``Changing Glaciers and Hydrology in Asia: Addressing 
Vulnerabilities to Glacier Melt Impacts,'' (November 2010) at 
5.
    8. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery, ``Improving Weather, Climate and 
Hydrological Services Delivery in Central Asia (Kyrgyz 
Republic, Republic of Tajikistan and Turkenistan),'' at 14, 
available at: http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/
publication/GFDRR--ECA--Hydromet--Study.pdf.
    9. Steve Solomon, ``Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, 
Power, and Civilization,'' New York: Harper Collins, 2010 at 
423.
    10. Mack, T.J., Akbari, M.A., Ashoor, M.H., Chornack, M.P., 
Coplen, T.B., Emerson, D.G., Hubbard, B.E., Litke, D.W., 
Michel, R.L., Plummer, L.N., Rezai, M.T., Senay, G.B., Verdin, 
J.P., and Verstraeten, I.M., 2010, Conceptual model of water 
resources in the Kabul Basin, Afghanistan: U.S. Geological 
Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2009-5262, 240, also 
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2009/5262.
    11. ``Making farmers matter: And monitor, budget, manage--
and prosper,'' The Economist (22 May 2010), Special Section at 
12.
    12. ``Fresh Water Futures: Imagining Responses to Demand 
Growth, Climate Change, and the Politics of Water Resource 
Management by 2040,'' Conference Report prepared by The Stimson 
Center (May 2010) at 17.
    13. Jerome Delli Priscoli and Aaron T. Wolf, ``Managing and 
Transforming Water Conflicts,'' International Hydrology Series, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 at 119.

                                  
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