AVOIDING WATER WARS: WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA'S GROWING IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

[Senate Prints 112-10]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

112th Congress
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
112-10
_______________________________________________________________________

AVOIDING WATER WARS:
WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA'S
GROWING IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY
IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

__________

A MAJORITY STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

One Hundred Twelfth Congress

First Session

February 22, 2011

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director

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C O N T E N T S

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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Section 1: Water Management in Central and South Asia............ 3
Section 2: Agriculture as a Driver of Water Demand and Tensions
in Region...................................................... 7
Section 3: Growing Concern Over Using Water to Create Energy..... 8
Section 4: Climate Change Exacerbates Water Scarcity............. 9
Section 5: Current and Future Water Scarcity is a National
Security Issue................................................. 10
Section 6: United States Foreign Policy on Water................. 12
Section 7: Recommendations for Action............................ 13
Conclusion....................................................... 21

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, February 22, 2011.
Dear Colleagues: This report by the committee majority
staff examines United States policy with respect to water
scarcity and water management in Central and South Asia. Water
plays an increasingly important role in our diplomatic and
national security interests in the region, and we must ensure
that our approach is carefully considered and coordinated
across the interagency. President Obama's administration
deserves credit for recognizing the critical role water plays
in achieving our foreign policy objectives. As water demand for
food production and electricity generation increases, in part
as a result of the quickening pace of climate change, so too
must our efforts to provide water security. While much of our
focus currently rests on Afghanistan and Pakistan,
we must also consider the interests in the shared waters by
India
and the neighboring five Central Asian countries--Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. This
report draws on staff travel to the region and the work of
experts in government, academia, and international
institutions. It provides significant insight and several key
recommendations to advance U.S. policy in Central and South
Asia with respect to this vital transboundary resource.
Sincerely,
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.

(v)
AVOIDING WATER WARS: WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA'S GROWING
IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

----------

Executive Summary

Water scarcity is often overlooked, underfunded, and
undervalued within foreign policy. Yet a government's ability
to provide and manage access to water is critical for ensuring
political, economic, and social stability.
In Central and South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, the impacts of water scarcity are fueling dangerous
tensions that will have repercussions for regional stability
and U.S. foreign policy objectives. The national security
implications of this looming water shortage--directly caused or
aggravated by agriculture demands, hydroelectric power
generation, and climate instability--will be felt all over the
world.
To its credit, the Obama administration has recognized the
critical role water plays in achieving our foreign policy goals
and in protecting our national security interests. For the
first time, the United States has elevated water-related issues
in its bilateral relationships with priority countries, such as
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Accordingly, the U.S. strategy and
foreign assistance budgets now include significant investments
allocated toward activities that promote water security through
high-visibility projects, such as expanding water storage
capabilities and irrigation.
However, the U.S. approach walks a fine line with respect
to water issues and must be tailored to reflect the realities
of water politics in Central and South Asia. While the focus of
the United States is appropriately directed toward Afghanistan
and Pakistan, it is important to recognize that our water-
related activities in the region are almost exclusively
confined within the borders of these two countries. We pay too
little attention to the waters shared by their Indian and
Central Asian neighbors--Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. For example, in 2009 the United
States provided approximately $46.8 million in assistance for
water-related activities to Afghanistan and Pakistan compared
with $3.7 million shared among all five Central Asian countries
for these efforts.
Providing the right support can have a tremendous
stabilizing influence, but providing the wrong support can
spell disaster by agitating neighboring countries. By
neglecting the interconnectivity of water issues between
Central and South Asia, the U.S. approach could exacerbate
regional tensions. Our activities should be carefully
calibrated to address a broad range of needs and encourage
reluctant state actors to come to the negotiating table. The
United States must be cautious and recognize that, while
regional stability will not be determined solely by our efforts
to support water cooperation, regional stability can be
strongly undermined by misguided support.
The United States has a historic opportunity to address
these issues properly and intelligently. Congress has
authorized $1.5 billion annually in foreign assistance to
Pakistan, through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of
2009, better known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. The Obama
administration still faces critical decisions on how it will
spend these resources. This report will detail several aspects
of a coordinated regional strategy for allocating those
resources.
This report analyzes how the United States can be more
strategic in delivering water-related assistance in Central and
South Asia to maximize its peacekeeping and humanitarian
benefits. It also makes the following four recommendations to
the administration with respect to water issues in the region
that capture opportunities for enhanced cooperation and
coordination:

2. Focus on Water Demand Management
The United States can help create space for regional and
bilateral negotiations on water by reducing pressure on shared
water resources. Countries in the region cannot simply engineer
their way out of growing water scarcity; they must begin by
improving management of their existing supply. In fact, many
experts agree that these countries must start shifting their
focus from increasing the supply of water to decreasing their
demand for it. The United States should couple its support for
activities that reduce demand for water with those that
increase water use efficiency. Specifically, the United States
can utilize its expertise in demand management and help
countries reduce the amount of water consumed by the
agriculture sector and regulate groundwater withdrawals.

3. Recognize International Dimensions of Water Issues and Deliver
Holistic Solutions
The impact of the United States approach to address water
in Afghanistan and Pakistan can extend far beyond each
country's border, as water ignores political boundaries.
Moreover, regional water management can be an important type of
conflict management. U.S. assistance should encompass
comprehensive activities, such as strengthening river basin
dialogues and establishing community-level water management
projects on shared watersheds.

4. Safeguard Institutions Against Shocks to Water Supply and Demand
Long-term stability requires strong institutions capable of
responding to sudden shocks to critical natural resources, such
as water. When weak institutions are confronted with natural
disasters or human interventions that suddenly disrupt water
flow, tensions can flare. With decades of experience on water
sharing agreements, the United States is well-positioned to
support programs that build the institutional capacity of
government agencies and universities in areas such as
international water law, dispute resolution, mediation, and
arbitration. The United States should also invest in
institutions that support developing transboundary water
sharing agreements.

This report is organized into seven sections. Section 1
provides an overview of water management in Central and South
Asia. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the demand for water from the
agriculture and energy sectors. Section 4 describes climate
change's effect on water and how this can exacerbate local and
regional tensions. Section 5 highlights how, in the aggregate,
the demand for a diminishing supply of water portends a
significant threat to national security. Section 6 outlines the
U.S. foreign policy approach to water in the region and Section
7 provides policy recommendations for improving water
management in conjunction with promoting stability in the
region.

Section 1: Water Management in Central and South Asia

Accessible Freshwater is Scarce and Must Be Well-Managed
Water is a fundamental human need; and yet, it is also one
of the most overlooked aspects in our daily lives. Water is
more than just what people drink or use to clean or create
power; it is also embedded in our food and environment. As a
result, global water use has been growing at a rate more than
double that of the world population in the last century.
Even though the majority of our planet is water, most of it
is too salty or deep to be reached. As little as 0.75 percent
of the total water available on Earth is accessible fresh
water. Given such constraints, the real threat to this limited
resource is poor management.
Poor water management has rendered water unusable and
subject to exploitation at a rate faster than it is
replenished, directly contributing to the growing water
scarcity crisis. In 2006, the United Nations reported that many
of the world's water problems come not from the physical
absence of freshwater, but from poor governance and lack of
investment in basic activities like sewage treatment and water
efficiency programs.
Effective water management is difficult because precious
freshwater is often not controlled or undisputedly owned by any
one nation. In fact, more than 260 major rivers basins are
shared by two or more countries. Human dependency on these
transboundary freshwater basins exacerbates this delicate
balance; approximately 40 percent of the world's population
relies on them. This report focuses on two such primary water
basins: the Amu Darya and Indus.
Weakened Water Management Systems in Central Asia
There are two main rivers in Central Asia: the Amu Darya
and the Syr Darya. The Amu Darya is the largest river with a
basin shared by Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The river is formed by the
confluence of the Vakhsh and Pyanj rivers. The most important
river, the Pyanj, begins near Pakistan's Northern Territories
and forms the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan (see
Figure 1). There are also several rivers within northern
Afghanistan contributing to the Amu Darya flow, mainly the
Wakhan and Pamir rivers and, to a lesser extent, the
Badakhshan, Kokcha, and Kunduz.

Figure 1: Map of Amu Darya and Syr Darya River Basins

Source: CRS produced using U.S. Department of State,
International Land Boundaries,https://www.intelink.gov/
basestate/landBHome.asp; U.S. Geological Survey, HydroSHEDS,
http://hydrosheds.cr.usgs.gov; World Resources Institute,
Watersheds of the World, http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-
resources/maps.html; ESRI Data and Maps 9.3.1; DeLorme World
Vector Data, 1:250,000; IHS World Data, December 2008.

Notes: Place names and boundary representation are not
necessarily authoritative. River basin boundaries are
approximate and adapted from WRI Watersheds of the World and
USGS HydroSHEDS databases.

During the Soviet era, the central government in Moscow
controlled the entire network of rivers shared among its
republics through water-use quotas. This approach meant that
the borders between the Central Asian republics had little, if
any, effect on basin management. The Soviet system involved
integrated water policies where in the summer, the two upstream
republics (present day Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) released
water from their lakes to the downstream ones (present day
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) for irrigation and
hydroelectric power generation. In return, during the winter
when it was not practical to release water, the downstream
republics provided those upstream with gas and coal to generate
electricity.
The collapse of the Soviet Union drastically weakened water
management in the region. The previous controls broke down and
national self-interests took hold. The former Soviet republics
began to function independently, seeking to increase national
control over water often at the expense of their neighbors. As
Kai Wegerich, an expert in water policy put it, ``[w]hen
administrational boundaries became national boundaries in 1991,
the Central Asian states were left with inequitable water
allocation limits and a high level of water provision
structures interdependences.'' \1\ Recognizing the destabilized
system, all five Central Asian countries agreed to keep the
water quotas from the Soviet era in place and signed the Almaty
Agreement in 1992.
In addition, agreements reached over water allocations
during the Soviet era largely ignored non-Soviet interests,
especially those of Afghanistan, a weaker neighbor. As a
significant outlier in the process of developing regional water
sharing agreements, Afghanistan's interests in the waters of
the Amu Darya basin have only recently gained prominence. This
renewed focus on Afghanistan derives in part from international
reinvestment in the country's agriculture sector following the
ouster of the Taliban government. However, sparse water data,
limited access to collect it, and combat conditions have
rendered challenging discussions on water between Afghanistan
and its neighbors. Looking ahead, experts question whether and
how this region will incorporate growing water consumption and
its implications for regional stability.
Decentralized Water Management in South Asia
The Indus River Basin hosts a major network of rivers
flowing between India and Pakistan. It is comprised of six
shared rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej
(see Figure 2). The Indus is one of the world's longest rivers
(1,800 miles long), originating in the Tibetan Himalayas,
flowing west through Kashmir, then through Pakistan until
eventually reaching the Arabian Sea. The upper portion of the
Indus is fed by snow and glacial meltwaters and converges in
the Punjab region of Pakistan with the five other rivers in the
system.

Figure 2: Map of Indus River Basin

Source: CRS produced using U.S. Department of State,
International Land Boundaries, https://www.intelink.gov/
basestate/landBHome.asp; U.S. Geological Survey, HydroSHEDS,
http://hydrosheds.cr.usgs.gov;World Resources Institute,
Watersheds of the World, http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/water-
resources/maps.html; ESRI
Data and Maps 9.3.1; DeLorme World Vector Data, 1:250,000;
IHS World Data, December 2008.

Notes: Place names and boundary representation are not
necessarily authoritative. River basin boundary is approximate
and adapted from WRI Watersheds of the World and USGS
HydroSHEDS databases.

Of all the rivers flowing into Pakistan, the Indus is the
most essential because of its importance to the agricultural
sector. Pakistan's agriculture relies on the world's largest
contiguous irrigation system fed by the Indus waters; in fact,
water withdrawals for agricultural irrigation represent almost
97 percent of all withdrawals in Pakistan. This irrigation
network covers an estimated 83 percent of cultivated land in
the country and contributes to nearly a quarter of its gross
domestic product. Unfortunately, Pakistan has almost fully
exploited the surface and groundwater that is crucial for its
irrigation, so improvements in management and efficiency are
vital.
Although the headwaters for the Indus originate in China,
from a long-term planning perspective, it is India's water
management of the Indus that merits scrutiny. With a population
already exceeding 1.1 billion people and forecasts indicating
continued growth to over 1.5 billion by 2035, India's demand
for water is rising at unprecedented rates. However, water
management in India is extremely decentralized and virtually
unregulated. Multiple government ministries have established
water-use guidelines at the national level, but, they have
little effect. Water management is constitutionally delegated
to India's constituent states, which have limited capacity to
coordinate among themselves. This has led rapidly to
diminishing available surface and groundwater.
Waters flowing between India and Pakistan, unlike those in
Central Asia, are managed within the framework of the Indus
Waters Treaty (IWT), a long-standing agreement negotiated by
the governments of India and Pakistan and the World Bank.
Signed in 1960, the IWT is considered the world's most
successful water treaty, having remained relatively intact for
50 years and having withstood four Indo-Pakistani wars.
The treaty gives control of the ``western rivers'' (Indus,
Jelum, and Chenab) to Pakistan and gives India the ``eastern
rivers'' (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) up to the Pakistani border.
The treaty quantifies the amount of water both countries will
receive from these rivers and serves an important function by
managing the use of the rivers for hydroelectric power
projects. It lays out guidelines for hydropower on the eastern
rivers, allows Pakistan to object to projects, and specifies
mechanisms for conflict resolution.
While the IWT has maintained stability in the region over
water, experts question the treaty's long-term effectiveness in
light of chronic tensions between India and Pakistan over the
Kashmir region, where a significant portion of the Indus
River's headwaters originate. In addition, others question
whether the IWT can address India's growing use of the shared
waters and Pakistan's increasing demand for these waters for
agricultural purposes.

Section 2: Agriculture as a Driver of Water Demand
and Tensions in Region

Globally, the agriculture sector is the single largest
consumer of freshwater, accounting for about 70 percent of the
total volume of freshwater withdrawals from lakes, rivers, and
aquifers. As a primary driver of water scarcity and source of
tension within and among countries, agriculture policies
produce water insecurity when they promote water-intensive
crops and require unsustainable irrigation.
Agriculture is one of the chief factors that exacerbate
water-related tensions in Central and South Asia.
First, local government policies continue to pursue cotton
production in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, adding further stress to limited water resources
and driving water scarcity. The demise of the Aral Sea in
Central Asia remains one of the most iconic global images of
mismanaged agriculture policies and highlights the
interconnectivity between such policies and water scarcity. The
Aral Sea was once the world's fourth largest lake. It has
shrunk by 90 percent since the rivers that fed the sea were
diverted for Soviet projects aimed at boosting cotton
production, a water-intensive crop.
Second, the loss of production and farm-level knowledge is
exacerbating water scarcity. After the collapse of the Soviet
Union, large collective farms became individualized. This meant
that many peasant farmers, who only had a single task to
perform as part of the larger farming process, quickly became
responsible for the entire production chain. These farmers
lacked knowledge in maximizing productivity, so yields
declined, irrigation canals became silted, and inefficiencies
in water use increased.
Finally, government policies, including U.S. policies, have
increased agricultural productivity by expanding irrigated land
area without regard for the down-river impacts of those
policies. For example, Afghanistan's 2007 Water Sector Strategy
focuses on improving, rehabilitating, and reestablishing
irrigated areas. In addition, the United States is investing in
increasing Afghanistan's agricultural productivity by
rehabilitating and constructing irrigation systems and
providing seeds. However, little is known about the impacts
that expanded irrigation could have on already sensitive
rivers, such as the Amu Darya, which flows into Central Asia
from Afghanistan. Without investments in managing the demand
for water from irrigation, this solution can create conflicts
among its users.
Similarly, proposals to expand irrigated land in India and
Pakistan have exacerbated tensions between these neighbors.
Water mismanagement and increased inefficiencies in the
existing irrigation systems, requiring more water for less
agricultural returns, compound the problem. As the existing
agriculture system becomes more water-intensive and, in some
areas, more inefficient, water may prove to be a source of
instability in South Asia.

Section 3: Growing Concern Over Using Water
to Create Energy

A second driver of growing frictions in the region is
hydropower development. Lacking a coordinated management
system, each nation is trying to meet its own energy needs
without consideration of its neighbors. As many experts note,
``transboundary water conflicts arise not over natural supplies
but over human interventions to manage them. Dams, irrigation
diversions, and other infrastructure alter hydrological
relations, affecting the quantity, quality, and timing of
downriver flows, but also relations between upstream and
downstream riparians.'' \2\
As of late 2010, three dam projects are under consideration
or construction in Kyrgyzstan (Kambaratinsk Dam) and Tajikistan
(Rogun Dam, Sangtuda I and II Dam). The energy produced from
hydroelectric power constitutes 27 percent of the total energy
in Central Asia and is expected to grow to 3.5 percent if the
proposed projects are built. The Rogun and Kambaratinsk dams
are the two largest dams under consideration and would serve to
store water in large reservoirs and generate electricity by
releasing this water.
The proposed Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh River in southern
Tajikistan is relevant because of its potential effects on
energy security for Tajikistan and on water availability for
Uzbekistan. This dam was first proposed in 1959 and
construction began in 1976. However, the project stalled after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. In recent years, the Tajik
Government restarted the construction process. If completed,
this dam would likely be the highest in the world and generate
power not only for Tajikistan but enough to export to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. These plans have raised serious
concerns across the border in Uzbekistan, as the Vakhsh River
contributes approximately 25 percent of the water flows in the
Amu Darya. In discussions with staff, Uzbek officials argue
that because it could take up to 18 years to fill, the Rogun
project will severely reduce the amount of water flowing into
Uzbekistan.
The drive to meet energy demand through hydropower
development is also occurring in India and Pakistan, two
countries that lack sufficient access to energy. This is
particularly true with respect to India, which faces a rapidly
expanding population, growing economy, and soaring energy
needs. To meet growing demand and cope with increasing
electricity shortages, the government has developed plans to
expand power generation through the construction of
multipurpose dams. India has 33 projects at various stages of
completion on the rivers that affect this region.
The number of dams under construction and their management
is a source of significant bilateral tension. Currently, the
most controversial dam project is the proposed 330-megawatt dam
on the Kishenganga River, a tributary of the Indus. While
studies show that no single dam along the waters controlled by
the Indus Waters Treaty will affect Pakistan's access to water,
the cumulative effect of these projects could give India the
ability to store enough water to limit the supply to Pakistan
at crucial moments in the growing season. In the difficult 60-
plus year bilateral relationship, water has not yet been used
in this way. However, staff met with some experts that argue
the treaty's long-term stability is threatened by a lack of
trust between these two countries. Any perceived reduction in
water flows magnifies this distrust, whether caused by India's
activities in the Indus Basin or climate change.

Section 4: Climate Change Exacerbates Water Scarcity

As demand for water from agriculture and hydroelectric
power generation grows in Central and South Asia, climate
change is expected to increase water scarcity. Current
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projections of
rising temperatures and sea levels and increased intensity of
droughts and storms suggest that substantial displacements will
take place within the next 30-50 years, particularly in coastal
zones. As our planet's climate becomes increasingly unstable,
our relationship with water is changing in dangerous and
potentially catastrophic ways (see Figure 3).
Warmer temperatures threaten the cyclical changes to
glaciers that provide essential water to the rivers in Central
and South Asia. Glacier melt water is estimated to comprise 30
percent or more of the Indus River's flow, with snow and ice
providing up to two-thirds more. In Central Asia, a report
commissioned by the United Nations Development Program's Water
Governance Facility noted that in the 20th century, the
glaciers of Tajikistan decreased on average by 20-30 percent.
In Afghanistan, this decrease is as much as 50-70 percent.
While shrinking glaciers increase the run off in the short
term, the long-term effect is a decrease in available water.
As the rate of melting increases, flooding could become
more frequent and severe, particularly from ``glacial lake
outburst floods.'' These floods occur when runoff from glaciers
builds up to form lakes that can burst and inundate neighboring
regions. According to a report by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), Changing Glaciers and
Hydrology in Asia: Addressing Vulnerabilities to Glacier Melt
Impacts, there is ``a history of outburst floods from Karakoram
glaciers involving much larger impoundments by short-lived,
unstable ice dams that blocked tributaries of the upper Indus .
. . causing outburst floods of exceptional size and
destructiveness.'' Changes in runoff to river basins can
significantly exacerbate already tense relations over water-
dependent sectors, such as agriculture and hydropower.
Finally, climate change is expected to influence monsoon
dynamics that are vital for river systems dependent on their
seasonal rains. The summer monsoon season is particularly
crucial to the agriculture, water supply, economics,
ecosystems, and human health of Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and
Pakistan. A 2009 Purdue University study predicted an eastern
shift in monsoon circulation caused by the changing climate,
which today causes more rainfall over the Indian Ocean,
Bangladesh, and Burma and less rainfall over India, Nepal, and
Pakistan. This shift raises serious concerns for the countries
expecting decreased rainfall. For example, summer monsoon
rainfall provides 90 percent of India's total water supply. As
the effects of climate change become more pronounced, agrarian
populations in India and Pakistan dependent on monsoons and
glacial melt for irrigation will be profoundly affected.

Figure 3. Illustrative Pathway of How Climate Change May Affect
Security

Source: CRS
Notes: First two boxes were adapted from S. Smith and J.
Vivekananda, A Climate of Conflict (International Alert, Nov.
2007), pp. 10-11, available at http://www.international-
alert.org/pdf/A--Climate--Of--Conflict.pdf.

Section 5: Current and Future Water Scarcity
is a National Security Issue

The national security implications of this looming water
shortage--exacerbated and directly caused by agriculture
demands, hydroelectric power generation, and climate
instability--will be felt all over the world. The defense and
intelligence specialists focused on the region have recognized
the threat of conflict stemming from ineffective water
management within these countries. General Anthony Zinni
(Ret.), former commander of U.S. Central Command, recently
said, ``[w]e have seen fuel wars; we're about to see water
wars.'' It is imperative that the foreign policy community heed
the warnings from top defense and intelligence experts. The
United States should not only elevate water issues in foreign
policy dialogues, but tackle them with a comprehensive
approach.
The danger posed by water scarcity is that it triggers
human insecurity, which can intensify potentially explosive
tensions among neighboring countries or regions. As Dr. Peter
H. Gleick, cofounder and president of the Pacific Institute for
Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, wrote,
``[w]here water is scarce, competition for limited supplies can
lead nations to see access to water as a matter of national
security. History is replete with examples of competition and
disputes over shared fresh water resources.''
As the defense and intelligence community increasingly
acknowledge the links between natural resource degradation and
national security, their views on the sources of future
conflict are also evolving. The 2007 Center for Naval Analysis
report, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,
found that ``environmental crises such as water scarcity, soil
depletion, and natural disasters can intensify conflict or
stress within a country and potentially contribute to national
security issues.'' When the Central Intelligence Agency
inaugurated its Environmental Indications and Warnings program,
whose mission is to ``provide intelligence analysts with
indications of where societies may experience environmental
stress that exceeds local capacity to manage and adapt,'' the
first environmental stressor they identified was freshwater
availability. The Navigating Peace Initiative's Water Conflict
and Cooperation Working Group correctly summarized the current
state of water use by saying,

. . . water use is shifting to less-traditional
sources such as deep fossil aquifers and wastewater
reclamation. Conflict, too, is becoming less
traditional, driven increasingly by internal or local
pressures or, more subtly, by poverty and instability.
These changes suggest that tomorrow's water disputes
may look very different from today's.\3\

Water conflicts can occur both within and across state
lines. Since 1994, the Pacific Institute has maintained a Water
Conflict Chronology summarizing historical disputes over water
resources. The most recent update to this chronology was
released in December 2009. It indicates that local and
subnational conflicts are increasing in severity and intensity
relative to international conflicts, noting that ``[a] growing
number of disputes over allocations of water across local
borders, ethnic boundaries, or between economic groups have
also led to conflict.'' \4\ The National Intelligence Council
echoed these concerns in their Global Trends 2025: A
Transformed World, finding that with ``water becoming more
scarce in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage
changing water resources is likely to become more difficult
within and between states.'' \5\
Given the important role water plays in Central and South
Asia as a primary driver of human insecurity, it is important
to recognize that for the most part, the looming threat of so-
called ``water wars'' has not yet come to fruition. Instead,
many regions threatened by water scarcity have avoided violent
clashes through discussion, compromise, and agreements. This is
because ``[w]ater--being international, indispensable, and
emotional--can serve as a cornerstone for confidence building
and a potential entry point for peace.'' \6\
However, the United States cannot expect this region to
continue to avoid ``water wars'' in perpetuity. In South Asia,
the Indus Waters Treaty has been the primary vehicle for
resolving conflicts over the shared waters between India and
Pakistan. It is a prescriptive agreement that has recently been
criticized for its inflexibility to adjust to changes in water
levels. Experts are now questioning whether the IWT can adapt
to these changes, especially when new demands for the use of
the river flows from irrigation and hydroelectric power are
fueling tensions between India and Pakistan. A breakdown in the
treaty's utility in resolving water conflicts could have
serious ramifications for regional stability.

Section 6: United States Foreign Policy on Water

U.S. Policies Beginning to Recognize Water's Strategic Importance
To its credit, the Obama administration has recognized the
critical role water plays in achieving our foreign policy goals
and in protecting our national security interests. The United
States is now addressing water from a political, economic, and
diplomatic perspective.
Politically, senior officials in the administration are
integrating water considerations into our efforts overseas.
U.S. embassies and missions have elevated the importance of
water in our diplomacy and an interagency process has been
established to coordinate and advance a U.S. policy on water.
In a speech delivered on World Water Day 2010, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton laid out a new ``five streams'' approach
to U.S. international water engagement.
``Five streams'' refers to five different focus areas that
together form a comprehensive strategy. The first stream is
capacity-building at local, national, and regional levels. This
effort seeks to empower key actors at all levels of water
management, both nationally and internationally. The second
focus is coordination between U.N. agencies, international
financial institutions, government entities, and other
stakeholders. The third element is financial support, whether
from the United States through USAID, the World Bank, or other
international institutions. Science and technology form the
fourth stream. While it is important to remember that
technology alone will not be able to solve the world's water
problems, scientific advancements can make enormous differences
in the developing world. The final input is private sector
engagement. Public-private partnerships allow the United States
to leverage private sector skills and capital to better respond
to challenges in the water sector.
Economically, the portion of the U.S. foreign assistance
budget dedicated to address water issues has slowly increased
since 2005. The budgets for high-priority countries, such as
Afghanistan and Pakistan, now include significant funds for
water-related assistance, receiving approximately $46.8 million
in 2009. The majority of this is targeted at efforts in
Pakistan, particularly in the aftermath of this summer's
devastating floods.
Diplomatically, the United States has identified water as a
central foreign policy concern with far-reaching effects. For
example, the U.S. Government's 2010 Inter-Agency Water Strategy
for Afghanistan is focused on improving access to safe drinking
water and sanitation, agricultural irrigation, and water-sector
management. A significant portion of U.S. assistance is aimed
at rehabilitating the Kajaki dam to provide much needed
electric power for the country and potentially for future
irrigation purposes. Similarly, in November, President Obama
and Prime Minister Singh agreed to work together on food
security cooperation as part of the ``Evergreen Revolution''
where water figures in nearly all the components of this
effort.
The United States also elevated water activities in
Pakistan by launching a multiyear Signature Water Program and
establishing a water working group within the U.S.-Pakistan
Strategic Dialogue. The Signature Water Program aims to improve
Pakistan's ability to manage its water resources and improve
water distribution. The first phase of the program focuses on
building high efficiency irrigation systems, water storage
dams, municipal water and services delivery, and dams for
irrigation. In the aftermath of the floods, these programs are
still going forward but with adjustments to reflect new needs
given that the floods destroyed 30 percent of arable land.
Need to Improve Integrating Water with U.S. National Security Interests
While the United States has appropriately begun to elevate
its interest in supporting water through ``signature'' projects
in these regions, our efforts still lack strategic clarity,
unity of purpose, and a long-term vision to support our
national security interests. The next section describes four
recommendations focused on encouraging a U.S. foreign policy
that strengthens our support in the region and promotes efforts
to increase transboundary water cooperation and stability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Section 7: Recommendations for Action

1. Provide Benchmark Data to Improve Water Management
The countries in Central and South Asia, regardless of
their level of development, lack publicly available access to
consistent and comparable data on water supply, its flow, and
use. This paucity of data causes friction over the management
of water by upstream and downstream countries. Providing basic
technical information to all countries is a constructive way to
create a foundation for bona fide debate over water management.
Specifically, the United States should build on its comparative
advantages to support the following four data-related
activities.
First, the United States should provide technical trainings
on how to gather water flow and volume information using remote
sensing or other related technologies. Scientists in Central
and South Asia can capitalize on the expertise of U.S.
agencies, such as the United States Geologic Service,
Environmental Protection Agency, and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, to learn how to access and collect
such data. This type of data-sharing is contemplated in the
inaugural strategic dialogues launched this year with India and
Pakistan, but for Central Asia more work is needed.
For example, the Amu Darya river basin countries do not
know how much of the river's flow originates in Afghanistan.
Similarly, little is known about aquifer recharge rates due to
limited data on water quality and security issues with
collecting on the ground data. The United States should support
expert exchange programs with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan. These programs should include support for the
development of local and remote monitoring capacity through the
use of new technologies, such as NASA's Gravity Recovery and
Climate Experiment. With such assistance, the United States can
provide the tools necessary to develop baseline data on water.
When staff traveled to Central Asia, they observed that key
water-dependent neighbors, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
lack a common baseline from which to begin discussions over
water use. In both countries, government officials agreed that
climate change and water use for energy or agriculture could
have a significant effect on water supply, but they lacked
sufficient resources to meet their research needs. In addition,
tensions between these two countries continue to escalate as
plans to build the Rogun Dam move forward without any common
baseline for what the impacts of the dam are on water flow.
Although the Tajik Government claims that the dam will have
only a minimal impact on river flows into Uzbekistan, the Uzbek
Government disagrees. According to the facts, as both countries
see them, they each have compelling reasons to support or
oppose this dam.
Second, the United States should support increased
technical capacity to monitor changes to glaciers because these
changes can significantly affect river flows and the
livelihoods that depend on them. Central Asia and India face
critical challenges in monitoring glaciers and tracking
changes, particularly differences from year to year. As USAID's
report Changing Glaciers and Hydrology in Asia: Addressing
Vulnerabilities to Glacier Melt Impacts noted, ``[t]he review
of scientific information about glacier melt in High Asia
revealed, first and foremost, a lack of data and information, a
lack that hampers attempts to project likely impacts and take
action to adapt to changed conditions.'' \7\ The United States
should engage in collaborative glacier monitoring programs and
those that develop local or sub-national water monitoring
capacity. In the case of Central Asia, the United States could
support bringing back the expertise and data collection that
fell into disrepair after the end of the Soviet era. For
example, Tajikistan has lost almost 38 percent of its glacier
monitoring stations since 1985.\8\
Third, the United States should support scientific studies
to monitor, track, and analyze changes in monsoon rains that
play an important role in food security. Studies on climate
change have traditionally focused on temperature increases,
sea-level rise, and droughts; but for a region like South Asia,
it is changes to the monsoons that will be felt the hardest.
Early climatic trends show that monsoon rains will become more
erratic and intense, leading to more flooding, less soil
absorption, and lower agricultural productivity. The more we
understand the changes to the monsoon, the better positioned we
will be to partner in our efforts to promote sustainable
agricultural programs. This type of collaboration has already
begun with the recent signing of the ``Monsoon Agreement''
between the United States and India, which seeks to improve
long-range monsoon prediction through collaboration between the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association and India's
Ministry of Earth Sciences.
Fourth, the United States should support efforts in Central
and South Asia to model changes to water flow and volume for
entire river basins across a range of scenarios, from the
impacts of climate change to the construction of dams.
Understanding these impacts, which generally take the form of
reduced or irregular water flow, will help governments make
more informed decisions on water management. Today, most of
these basins only have studies on the outcomes of individual
projects, rather than the cumulative impact of multiple
projects. Without complete river basin analysis for the Amu
Darya, Syr Darya, and Indus, countries in Central and South
Asia are left to negotiate water allocations and usage based on
either the status quo or their own assumptions, neither of
which lends itself to finding synergies. The United States
should support the development of basin-level water modeling
and scenario analysis through technical exchanges and
partnerships with Central Asian and Indian universities.
Basin-wide modeling is also useful for addressing tensions
over hydroelectric dam proposals that continue to agitate
countries sharing rivers. Dams are often the easiest target for
public scrutiny, blame, and anger when water flow changes,
regardless of whether they are the culprit. For the major dam
proposals in the region, such as Rogun and Kishenganga, there
is still no independent analysis of the cumulative impact these
projects will have on water flow, especially during the low
flow season. Providing water flow models for a range of
construction scenarios to all interested countries can form the
basis for discussions on the utility of these projects.

2. Focus on Water Demand Management
The United States can help create space for regional and
bilateral negotiations on water by reducing the pressure on
shared water resources. This means recognizing that countries
in this region cannot simply engineer their way out of growing
water scarcity, but should begin managing water resources more
effectively. In fact, many experts agree that these countries
must start shifting their focus from increasing the supply of
water to decreasing the demand for it. Supporting improved
demand management is at its core a type of conflict management.
The two critical areas for U.S. engagement are in addressing
the agriculture sector's demand for water and in establishing
better groundwater management.
The agriculture sector is the primary user of water
globally. Agriculture policies create water security issues
when these policies promote water-intensive crops, such as
cotton and rice. The United States can encourage the shift away
from water intensive farming that drives many of the countries
in the region to exhaust their water supply by incorporating
water-saving projects in its international agricultural
activities.
For example, there are advancements taking place in
developing integrated and environmentally sound alternative
approaches to water-intensive crops, such as rice. While it is
still being demonstrated on a small scale, the system of rice
intensification (SRI) is a promising new model of agricultural
production centered on four components: planting method, water
(irrigation) management, soil fertility management, and pest/
weed control. SRI introduces simple changes to specific
practices, though the fundamental procedures of rice production
remain the same as in conventional systems. Implementing SRI on
a broad scale would result in considerable water savings. Water
use in SRI is typically 25-50 percent lower than conventional
paddy systems because fields are not flooded throughout the
entire production cycle.
The United States should also continue to focus on
activities that result in significant water savings, such as
increasing the efficiency of irrigation systems in Central and
South Asia. While it is important that the United States help
ensure Pakistani farmers have the ability to replant after last
year's devastating floods, the current spend plan for our
assistance lacks a comprehensive solution to addressing
agriculture needs and water demands. For example, the current
spend plan for fiscal year 2010 includes providing seeds and
fertilizer and supporting agricultural extension and
cooperatives. However, we must also incorporate, in tandem,
repairs and improvements to the irrigation systems, efforts to
strengthen dykes and embankment protections, and water storage
through the construction of small to mid-size water storage
units and rainwater harvesting.
Staff recently met with representatives from
nongovernmental organizations in arid regions in Tajikistan,
such as the Konibodom District in Khujand, Tajikistan, a town
near the border of Uzbekistan. Staff learned that after the
collapse of the Soviet Union the water supply system fell into
disrepair and the irrigation canals became heavily polluted.
Nongovernmental groups are now working to rehabilitate the
water distribution systems. Interestingly, because water
remains a scarce resource, these groups are establishing water
associations to manage and fund water use. For this district,
once completed, the system will supply 50,000 villagers with
40-50 liters per person per day.
Second, the United States should focus on the
sustainability of access to water, not just access. As we have
learned from past efforts to address water crises, the
solutions of today can create the problems of tomorrow. For
instance, to address India's growing drought crisis, the
international community in conjunction with the Indian
Government has significantly increased the distribution of
individual tube wells to access groundwater. As Steve Solomon
notes, ``in 1975, before groundwater pumping became
significant, India had about 800,000 wells . . . only a quarter
century later, the nation had an estimated 22 million wells . .
. and continuing to increase phenomenally, by about 1 million a
year.'' \9\ At the same time, the Indian Government provided
electricity subsidies that allowed individuals to run these
pumps for several hours a day. As a result of this unfettered
and exploited access, India is now the world leader in
groundwater withdrawals, pumping out roughly 230 cubic
kilometers annually, more than a quarter of the world total.
Going forward, the United States should consider
integrating management of groundwater withdrawals with our
efforts to promote access to water. This integration can be
done through demand driven solutions, such as installing water
gauges, collecting groundwater use and recharge, promoting
water reuse, improving efficiencies in water delivery, and
trainings on how to budget water among users.
Moreover, the United States can share its domestic
expertise in groundwater management, from monitoring to mapping
groundwater resources. For example, the U.S. Geological Survey
collects data on domestic groundwater, including the Ground
Water Atlas of the United States, which gives a summary of each
principal aquifer in each of the 50 States, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands. Specifically for this region, the
United States can follow the model set forth in the
Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act with Mexico, which
authorizes the United States to cooperate with the Mexican
Government and other organizations to conduct hydrogeologic
studies and modeling of transboundary aquifers.
While the United States should continue to focus on
improving the efficiencies of water delivery, we must also
support the development of plans to ensure the long-term
maintenance of these systems. If we fail to do so, we may find
ourselves with a more formidable challenge in the years ahead
caused by water shortages and its destabilizing derivative
effects.

3. Recognize International Dimensions of Water Issues and Deliver
Holistic Solutions
The impact of our actions to address water extends far
beyond a country's border, as water transcends political
boundaries. This means U.S. actions centered on only one part
of a river can have unintended consequences either upstream or
downstream. For example, water projects are a priority for U.S.
assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, if our
assistance is managed or implemented poorly, it may increase
tensions over water in the greater region. Our assistance
should target comprehensive activities, such as strengthening
river basin dialogues and establishing community-level water
management projects on shared watersheds.
U.S. investment in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is
twelve times greater than what is invested in Central Asia,
could have significant unintended consequences. Although it is
strategically important for the United States to keep a laser-
like focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially on high-
visibility water projects that can reduce internal tensions,
the United States should also consider activities that promote
regional cooperation over these shared river systems. As noted
in the United States Government Accountability Office's report
on U.S. efforts to support the Afghan water sector (GAO-11-
138), ``[f]our of Afghanistan's five major river basins flow
into the territory or boundary waters of five of its six
neighbors--Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and
Iran. The construction of large water storage or diversion
facilities could affect these countries. The ability of the
Government of Afghanistan to achieve sustainable and
multipurpose use of its abundant water resources will depend on
its capacity to engage in dialogue, negotiate, and establish
relationships and agreements with its neighbors.'' The United
States should evaluate how it distributes regional assistance
and consider supporting transboundary capacity-building on
water issues.
In Afghanistan, the United States should support mechanisms
that integrate U.S. expertise on water management and resource
allocation within the Afghan Government. This would enable
Afghanistan's interests over shared waters to be represented at
regional dialogues. It will also foster a process that engages
Afghanistan and Pakistan on the management of the Kabul River
Basin. This basin is important to both countries because it has
the potential to provide vital hydroelectric power to energy-
poor Afghanistan and predictable water flows to key
agricultural areas in Pakistan. Limited technical capacity
within the Afghan Government to negotiate transboundary
agreements has meant that no such water and energy sharing
arrangement exists. However, the United States is already on
the right track to get these negotiations started.
For example, U.S. expertise was recently used to improve
water management data for the Kabul Basin drawing on the United
States Geographical Survey in collaboration with the
Afghanistan Geological Survey and the Afghanistan Ministry of
Energy and Water. This project, supported by the United States
Agency for International Development, included results from a
multidisciplinary water-resource assessment that analyzed how a
growing population and the potential effects of climate change
affect water.\10\ In addition, the United States has supported
ground water assessments and a hydropower feasibility study in
the Kabul Basin. With this information, U.S. assistance plans
for Afghanistan should lay out concrete options for supporting
regional activities, including those that encourage
collaboration among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.
The United States needs a concrete vision and plan to help
the region tackle its water challenges. Through the U.S.-
Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, Under Secretary of State for
Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero has seized the
initiative by cochairing a water working group to examine how
to respond to Pakistan's needs and improve U.S. assistance.
This working group should now consider beginning a process to
engage across country borders and supports basin-wide efforts.
For example, the United States could facilitate basin-wide
scenario planning, modeling, regional technical workshops, or
direct interventions on water around basin-specific dialogues.
To support confidence building in basin-wide planning, the
United States should also look for opportunities that create
transboundary cooperation on smaller rivers. Successful pilot
efforts on these rivers can be scaled-up to encompass larger
rivers and even basins. Specifically, the United States should
support local, community-based cooperation over shared rivers
and watersheds. Staff heard in meetings with nongovernmental
organizations in Central Asia and India that the closer the
solution moves toward the community, the more sustainable the
solution. By helping create local control over water, the
United States will be supporting a trust-building conflict
management tool that can pay dividends in future.
For example, the United States has successfully engaged
with water user associations (WUAs). These community-driven
water management organizations often negotiate water supply
agreements between farmers and management administrations and
resolve disputes in a transparent and democratic manner. While
in Tajikistan, staff visited a water user association formed
with support from USAID and learned that farms that had
previously paid collective water fees during the Soviet-era
were forced individually to attempt to fill their quota on
independence. WUAs were created to bring all farmers together
and reduce conflicts, while also increasing land productivity
because everyone received reliable water access. This
particular WUA collected fees and was responsible for
maintaining, rehabilitating, and improving the irrigation
system. The WUA also created a tractor rental program to help
increase farmers yields, generating revenues for the
association to rehabilitate additional canals. Although WUAs
typically have been limited to domestic portions of rivers, it
is worth considering piloting these cooperative arrangements on
transboundary segments of rivers.
Another successful water management mechanism has been
piloted in Andhra Pradesh, India. This area relies entirely on
the monsoons to replenish its groundwater resources and the
area's particular geological characteristics limit underground
storage. Those factors force farmers to focus on demand rather
than increased exploitation of the groundwater. To accomplish
this task, they come together to monitor rainfall, calculate
available water, and decide which crops should be planted.
Those meetings culminate in a water budget that is displayed on
a wall in the village and updated as new information becomes
available. Participation is voluntary but nearly 1 million
people in 650 villages have joined, resulting in widespread
changes in the variety of local diets and a move toward organic
fertilizer. In essence, the program turns the people most
invested in local water management, literally and figuratively,
into ``barefoot hydrogeologists.'' \11\

4. Safeguard Institutions Against Shocks to Water Supply and Demand
Transboundary waters by their very definition require
international cooperation to avoid conflict. The formation of
international institutions is an important way to solidify
countries' commitment to sharing rivers equitably and when
needed, resolve disputes. Long-term stability requires strong
institutions capable of adapting and responding to immediate
shocks to critical natural resources, such as water. When weak
institutions are confronted with natural disasters or human
interventions that suddenly disrupt water flow, tensions can
flare.
The United States can play an important role by building or
strengthening institutions to facilitate multilateral
discussions in regions experiencing water scarcity. As a first
step, the United States should build on the water data called
for in the first recommendation of this report and support
regional institutions capable of bringing together key
stakeholders to discuss water sharing. Shared access to
accurate data is critical in creating a foundation for
negotiations. Having water baselines can help these
institutions integrate the necessary flexibility to adjust to
changing water patterns from climate change, hydropower
development, and other possible changes.
A small grant by the United States to the United Nations
Regional Center for Preventative Diplomacy for Central Asia
(UNRCCA) is a step in the right direction. In a meeting with
UNRCCA representatives, staff learned that they are elevating
water cooperation through seminars, which include
representatives from the Afghan Government as observers. The
success of this institution will turn on its ability to
continue to bring together all the Central Asian countries,
including Afghanistan.
The United States should also invest in local or regional
institutions that can support the development of agreements or
treaties to address water management. These institutions are
critical for managing the problems that arise when a dam is
proposed or unseasonably low levels of rainfall leave countries
searching for someone to blame. Studies found that
``[s]tatistically, the likelihood of conflictual interactions
over water appears slightly higher in areas of high dam
density. But this propensity disappears where institutional
arrangements such as treaties or river commissions exist to
mitigate those pressures.'' \12\ Once formed, institutions
remain in place after disputes are resolved and can transform
into tools for cooperation that address the needs and concerns
of all interested states.\13\
Specifically, if tensions between India and Pakistan
related to the treaty continue to grow, the United States
should back relevant supporting institutions that both
countries believe can help mitigate conflicts. In conversations
with staff, experts expressed concern that over time the volume
of water managed by the IWT is likely to change due to
unsustainable water withdrawals, increased population growth,
and climate change. The Pakistan Government has already alleged
misappropriation of water from the Indus by India, which the
latter denies. India has not made data on water volume in the
Indus widely available, impeding efforts to build trust.
Efforts described in the previous recommendations, such as
improving monitoring of the Indus basin, decreasing water
demand through efficiencies, and creating flexibility to
respond to changes in water volume, are possible ways forward
to address these concerns. The continued peace, stability, and
success of the IWT are in the national security interests of
all stakeholders, including the United States.
Staff was pleased to learn that the United States has begun
to support regional discussions. For example, staff learned
that the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea invited
Afghanistan to participate in discussions as an observer, with
the possibility of joining in the future. The United States has
provided the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea with a
small grant to the support the institution's technical capacity
as well as offering the expertise of the United States Geologic
Services to its executive committee. Similarly, local groups
informed staff that they are working to establish an Amu Darya
river basin dialogue that would include Afghanistan. It is
precisely these types of inclusive, intraregion dialogues to
which the United States should continue to offer our expertise
or other resources.
Finally, the United States can build stronger institutions
and lasting agreements by investing in the people who are, and
will be, responsible for water management, including government
officials, youth, and farmers. This is already being done
through technical exchanges between the United States and
Central and South Asia, but such activities should be expanded
to require the development of tools needed to reach agreement
on water sharing. For example, the future water managers in
Central Asia could be taught international water law, dispute
resolution, or mediation at local universities. Given U.S.
expertise in these areas, the United States should work to
develop more informed water managers, which in turn can lead to
more sustainable water agreements.

Conclusion

Water scarcity, coupled with how governments address these
challenges, can exacerbate conflict or promote cooperation.
Although it is still too early to determine the impacts of our
efforts in the broader region, now is the time to begin
evaluating water-related trends.
The Obama administration should be commended for
recognizing the importance of water issues in its unprecedented
commitment of assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. For the
first time, senior government officials are recognizing the
critical role that sound water management must play in
achieving our foreign policy goals and in protecting our
national security. Providing the right support can have a
tremendous stabilizing influence in the region.
The four recommendations laid out in this report focus on
encouraging U.S. policies that promote efforts to increase
transboundary cooperation and stability. These recommendations
call for targeted assistance that addresses water concerns by
considering a broader range of needs and diplomatic
consequences. Water security is not unique to Afghanistan and
Pakistan, but successes there could be replicated in other
regions facing similar threats. The lessons learned in water
management and development in Central and South Asia can help
the United States contribute further to diminishing tensions in
other volatile and vulnerable regions of the world.

Notes

1. Kai Wegerich, ``Hydro-hegemony in the Amu Darya Basin,''
Water Policy, Vol. 10 No. 2 (IWA Publishing, 2008), 71-88 at
71.
2. ``Fresh Water Futures: Imagining Responses to Demand
Growth, Climate Change, and the Politics of Water Resource
Management by 2040,'' Conference Report prepared by The Stimson
Center (May 2010) at 4.
3. Aaron T. Wolf, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and
Geoffrey D. Dabelko, ``Water can be a pathway to peace, not
war,'' Environmental Change and Security Program Special
Report, Issue 13 (2008-2009), 66-70 at 70.
4. Heather Cooley, Juliet Christian-Smith, Peter H. Gleick,
Lucy Allen, and Michael Cohen, ``Understanding and Reducing the
Risks of Climate Change for Transboundary Waters,'' Pacific
Institute (December 2009) at 2.
5. National Intelligence Council, ``Global Trends 2025: A
Transformed World,'' (November 2008) at x.
6 Aaron T. Wolf, Annika Kramer, Alexander Carius, and
Geoffrey D. Dabelko, ``Water can be a pathway to peace, not
war,'' Environmental Change and Security Program Special
Report, Issue 13 (2008-2009), 66-70 at 70.
7. United States Agency for International Development,
``Changing Glaciers and Hydrology in Asia: Addressing
Vulnerabilities to Glacier Melt Impacts,'' (November 2010) at
5.
8. The World Bank and Global Facility for Disaster
Reduction and Recovery, ``Improving Weather, Climate and
Hydrological Services Delivery in Central Asia (Kyrgyz
Republic, Republic of Tajikistan and Turkenistan),'' at 14,
available at: http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/
publication/GFDRR--ECA--Hydromet--Study.pdf.
9. Steve Solomon, ``Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth,
Power, and Civilization,'' New York: Harper Collins, 2010 at
423.
10. Mack, T.J., Akbari, M.A., Ashoor, M.H., Chornack, M.P.,
Coplen, T.B., Emerson, D.G., Hubbard, B.E., Litke, D.W.,
Michel, R.L., Plummer, L.N., Rezai, M.T., Senay, G.B., Verdin,
J.P., and Verstraeten, I.M., 2010, Conceptual model of water
resources in the Kabul Basin, Afghanistan: U.S. Geological
Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2009-5262, 240, also
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2009/5262.
11. ``Making farmers matter: And monitor, budget, manage--
and prosper,'' The Economist (22 May 2010), Special Section at
12.
12. ``Fresh Water Futures: Imagining Responses to Demand
Growth, Climate Change, and the Politics of Water Resource
Management by 2040,'' Conference Report prepared by The Stimson
Center (May 2010) at 17.
13. Jerome Delli Priscoli and Aaron T. Wolf, ``Managing and
Transforming Water Conflicts,'' International Hydrology Series,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009 at 119.