[Senate Prints 112-3]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
112th Congress
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
112-3
_______________________________________________________________________
IRAQ: THE TRANSITION FROM
A MILITARY MISSION TO
A CIVILIAN-LED EFFORT
__________
A REPORT
TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
First Session
January 31, 2011
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-954 WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS \1\
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JIM WEBB, Virginia JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
VACANT JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
VACANT
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
\1\ Committee membership for the 112th Congress had not
been set when this report was sent to press.
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal.......................................... v
Part One: Executive Summary and Recommendations................ 1
Part Two: Current Conditions in Iraq........................... 4
Part Three: An Ambitious Transition............................ 7
Regional Engagement.......................................... 9
U.S. Military Presence....................................... 13
Budgeting and Authorities.................................... 16
Conclusion..................................................... 19
Appendixes
Appendix I: Iraqi Security Forces ``Minimum Essential
Capabilities''................................................. 21
Appendix II: Congressional Funding of the War in Iraq.......... 22
Appendix III: Security Incident Trends: January 2004 to May
2010........................................................... 23
(iii)
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, January 31, 2011.
Dear Colleagues: This will be a year of unprecedented
transition for the United States in Iraq as we move from a
military-led mission to a civilian-led effort. The diplomatic
mission that results will be of extraordinary size and
complexity and it will assume security responsibilities in a
still-dangerous environment. The stakes are high, not just for
our civilian personnel, but for American foreign policy in the
Middle East. While Iraq has made dramatic progress in recent
years, the situation remains fragile and potentially
reversible. The success of our diplomatic mission there will be
an important factor in whether Iraq emerges from years of
turmoil as a strategic partner or turns toward Iran. This
report by the majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee sheds new light on this important topic and offers a
number of policy recommendations. The report's central
message--that our government needs to make sure our objectives
in Iraq are aligned with both our civilian capacities and a
financial commitment to succeed--will be vital as we face a
similar transition in Afghanistan in the years to come.
Sincerely,
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.
(v)
IRAQ: THE TRANSITION FROM
A MILITARY MISSION TO
A CIVILIAN-LED EFFORT
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Part One: Executive Summary and Recommendations
As the U.S. military presence is withdrawn from Iraq,
civilians, rather than soldiers, are likely to write the last
chapter of the American war effort there. There is much
encouraging news: There has been a remarkable transformation
since sectarian war threatened state collapse in 2006 and 2007.
A permanent government is finally in place. While the
negotiations to form this government spanned most of 2010, the
Iraqi leaders' commitment to the political process over
violence has helped sustain hard fought security gains.
But these advances remain fragile, uneven, and potentially
reversible. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist groups
continue their efforts to foment violence and sectarian strife.
The nine months it took to form the new government is evidence
that Iraq's political processes are not yet self-sustaining.
Fundamental political issues remain unresolved, from the
hydrocarbon laws, to Kirkuk and other disputed internal
boundaries, to the nature of Iraqi federalism. While Iraq has
the potential to become a wealthy country, it faces a difficult
fiscal environment until at least 2014 when increased oil
production is projected to begin coming online.
The transition in the coming year from a military to a
civilian mission will be critical to the United States' broader
interests in the Middle East. It will test the sustainability
of the progress made in recent years. It will be an indicator
of United States' commitment to the bilateral partnership. And
it will have a significant bearing on Iraq's place in the
regional security architecture.
By December 2011, in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq
security agreement, the American military is scheduled to
withdraw its remaining 50,000 troops.\1\ The diplomatic mission
that remains will be an initiative of unprecedented size and
complexity, currently projected to consist of some 17,000
individuals on 15 different sites, including 3 air hubs, 3
police training centers, 2 consulates, 2 embassy branch
offices, and 5 Office of Security Cooperation sites.
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\1\ The U.S. military effort peaked in November 2007 with some
170,000 troops. Today, there are about 50,000 troops present, in
addition to 75,000 contractors, most of them third country nationals.
But even though the new mission must attain full
operational capability by October 2011 to facilitate a smooth
transition, fundamental questions remain unanswered. The State
Department is scheduled to assume full security
responsibilities in a still dangerous and unpredictable
environment and must strike a difficult balance between
maintaining a robust presence and providing a sufficient level
of security. In almost any scenario, the United States will
continue to have military personnel stationed at the American
embassy in a non-combat role under the Office of Security
Cooperation. As in many countries around the world, these
troops will be responsible for enhancing the bilateral defense
relationship by facilitating security assistance. But the size,
scope, and structure of this presence remain undetermined, even
at this late date. Perhaps most significantly, it is unclear
what kind of security relationship the incoming Iraqi
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Government would like with the United States.
In the wake of such uncertainties, a complicated diplomatic
plan has emerged that highlights a dilemma that will likely
confront the nation for as long as counterinsurgency warfare
and state-building are central components of American foreign
policy: How can the State Department effectively operate in
difficult security environments without the support of the
American military?
The U.S. Government should ensure that the scope of the
mission in Iraq is compatible with the resources available,
including State Department capacity, the financial commitment
from Congress, a degree of U.S. military support and the
backing of the Iraqi Government. If these elements are not
fully in place, the administration may be forced to choose
between scaling back the diplomatic mission or accepting a
degree of physical risk familiar to military personnel, but
normally unacceptable for diplomats. Because this is a
difficult and unappealing choice, this report will examine how
elements of the transition can be aligned with U.S. diplomatic
goals to increase the likelihood of success. Two Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff members visited Iraq to examine the
military-to-civilian transition in detail. These are their
principle findings:
First, it is unclear whether the State Department has the
capacity to maintain and protect the currently planned
diplomatic presence without U.S. military support. Among the
planned satellite offices are consulates in Basra and Irbil and
smaller branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul. There is no doubt
about these cities' strategic importance. But given the ongoing
security challenges in Iraq and the immense manpower the
military brings to bear, maintaining an American diplomatic
presence without military support will cost hundreds of
millions of dollars to set up, cost even more to operate, and
have large ``tooth-to-tail'' ratios. The consulates will
require a combined security and life support staff of roughly
1,400 to sustain about 120 functional personnel, whereas the
branch offices will require more than 600 staff to support 30
functional personnel--a ratio of 20 to 1.\2\
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\2\ According to State Department officials, the branch offices are
projected to cost about $350 million apiece to set up. The embassy
branch office in Kirkuk is also scheduled to house an Office of
Security Cooperation site which will include about 100 functional
staff, as well as about 300 additional security and life support
personnel.
If a vigorous regional presence is necessary to support
Iraq's stability, a mechanism for a continued but restricted
follow-on military presence should be considered to help secure
American diplomats. But it is not yet clear that the Iraqi
Government desires such an arrangement on terms compatible with
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American interests.
Second, uncertainty about the nature of the U.S. military
presence in Iraq after 2012 is complicating all other aspects
of transition planning. The transition's most important element
also remains its biggest unknown. Although the new Iraqi
Government is publicly signaling that it will not seek to
renegotiate the terms of the security agreement, the door is
still open for a limited follow-on U.S. military presence.
Clarity is needed on what this presence will look like and how
it will integrate into the larger diplomatic mission. The
authors have identified three distinct possibilities for the
U.S.-Iraq security relationship beyond 2011. Each involves
significant tradeoffs, but only the first two may be
politically palatable to the new Iraqi Government.
Total drawdown of U.S. troops: A full military withdrawal
in 2011, except for a limited Office of Security
Cooperation housed within the embassy, would confirm
the United States as true to its word (an essential
message to deliver throughout the region) and it would
force Iraq to take full responsibility for its own
affairs. However, security and political gains could be
jeopardized with the full exit of American forces. In
this scenario, given the prohibitive costs of security
and the capacity limitations of the State Department,
the United States should consider a less ambitious
diplomatic presence in Iraq.
Expanded Office of Security Cooperation: The United States
maintains, on a temporary basis, an expanded Office of
Security Cooperation that includes a limited number of
non-combat military forces functioning in a reduced
capacity under the State Department's purview. They
provide logistical support for the Iraqi army, shore up
administrative gaps within the Ministry of Defense, and
provide ``behind the wire'' capabilities to better
enable the State Department to sustain its proposed
mission. Although new funding authorities would need to
be negotiated between the State and Defense Departments
and approved by Congress, the limited military presence
would augment the State Department's ability to execute
its current plan in Iraq.
New security agreement: The United States negotiates a new
security agreement to allow a limited and temporary
U.S. troop presence to include the support described
above as well as a continuing partnership with the
Iraqi military to conduct select counterterrorism
operations, and to sustain the nascent security
cooperation between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish
peshmerga throughout the disputed internal boundaries.
This approach should only be considered if it comes at
Iraq's request within parameters consistent with
American interests, which may be unlikely given the
current posture of the newly formed government. It
risks reinforcing the notion of the United States as an
occupying power and would elicit political and popular
opposition in both the United States and Iraq. In this
scenario, the State Department, although still
responsible for significant facets of diplomatic
security, would be substantially aided by the continued
but limited presence of the U.S. military.
Third, bureaucratic integration between the Departments of
Defense and State remains incomplete, and the unity of effort
in Baghdad has not yet been matched in Washington. Under the
direction of Ambassador Jim Jeffrey and General Lloyd Austin,
an effective partnership has been fostered between the embassy
leadership team and the senior officers on the ground. But the
supporting bureaucracy has not matched that cohesiveness. For
example, according to military and civilian personnel in Iraq,
it is easier to transfer critical ``non-excess'' equipment from
the military to a third country than it is to the State
Department. While the U.S. military has a pressing need for
helicopters, including in Afghanistan, it is not in the
taxpayers' interest for the State Department to purchase new
helicopters and ship them to Iraq if more suitable ones are
already in country. There appear to be tensions within the
State Department between those bureaus responsible for
conducting the ambitious diplomatic strategy and those
responsible for securing and supporting them. Embassy security
personnel need to be empowered to face risks rationally and
creatively, and protected from second-guessing from Washington
that produces risk-aversion.
Fourth, a creative and sustainable funding mechanism is
needed to pay for the diplomatic mission in Iraq.
Congressional support has been undermined by a constrained
fiscal environment and war fatigue. Yes, there are significant
unanswered questions about what kind of presence the United
States will have in Iraq post-2011. But regardless of whether
the U.S. military withdraws as scheduled or a smaller successor
force is agreed upon, the State Department will take on the
bulk of responsibility for their own security. Therefore,
Congress must provide the financial resources necessary to
complete the diplomatic mission. Consideration should be given
to a multiple-year funding authorization for Iraq programs,
including operational costs (differentiated from the State
Department's broader operational budget), security assistance,
and economic assistance programs. The price tag will not be
cheap--perhaps $25-30 billion over 5 years--but would
constitute a small fraction of the $750 billion the war has
cost to this point.
Part Two: Current Conditions in Iraq
The situation in Iraq is at a critical juncture. Terrorist
and insurgent groups are less active but still adept; the Iraqi
army continues to develop but is not yet capable of deterring
regional actors; and strong ethnic tensions remain along Iraq's
disputed internal boundaries. Although a government has finally
been formed, it remains to be seen how cohesive and stable it
will be.
Threat assessment: Violence has been reduced by more than
90% since peaking in early 2007.\3\ After an upward spike in
the third quarter of 2010--and notwithstanding horrific
episodes such as the October 31st Al-Qaeda in Iraq attack
against a Catholic church in Baghdad in which dozens of
hostages were killed--the number of Iraqi civilians killed in
violent attacks declined every month between the formal end of
the U.S. combat mission on August 31 and December. \4\ American
combat fatalities are down from an average of 75 a month
between 2004 and 2007 to an average of five a month in 2010. A
number of insurgent and terrorist groups in Iraq are still
capable of violent attacks, but they are generally diminished
in strength and many have begun the process of political
assimilation.\5\
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\3\ See Appendix III.
\4\ According to the Iraqi Health, Defense and Interior Ministries,
the violent death totals for the last five months are: December: 89
civilians + 62 Iraqi security forces (ISF); November: 105 civilians +
66 ISF; October: 120 civilians + 65 ISF; September: 185 civilians + 88
ISF; August: 295 civilians + 131 ISF. Source: multiple Reuters and
Associated Press stories. By way of comparison, during the worst spasms
of sectarian violence in late 2006 and early 2007, Iraqi civilians died
at a rate of more than 100 per day.
\5\ In addition to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, notable Sunni insurgent groups
include Jaysh al-Islami, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigade, Ansar al-
Sunna, Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al Naqshabandia, Hamas al-Iraq, and the
Mujahidin Army. Active Shi'a groups include the Promised Day Brigade,
Muqtada al-Sadr's movement, and Kata'ib Hizbollah. Department of
Defense, ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,'' June 2010, p 28.
Despite the encouraging trend, the U.S. embassy and certain
satellite sites, such as the forward operating base outside
Mosul, are under daily threat from mortar and rocket fire.
January 2011 was a relatively bad month, with as many as 159
Iraqis killed in a single week, but it remains to be seen
whether this level of violence will be sustained. Al-Qaeda in
Iraq remains the country's most dangerous terrorist
organization, although the pace of its high-profile attacks has
slowed considerably. Joint engagements by Iraqi and U.S.
Special Operations Forces killed at least 34 of its 42 top
leaders in 2010. But its remaining fighters, estimated to be
95% Iraqi, are well-trained and dedicated insurgents. Al-Qaeda
in Iraq and other extremist groups do not currently constitute
an existential threat to Iraq's political order. But continued
political instability could provide them the opportunity to
rejuvenate, especially in the absence of constant pressure and
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an integrated intelligence effort.
Iraqi security capacity: The withdrawal of the U.S.
military from population centers in June 2009 left the Iraqi
forces in control of all eighteen provinces. To their credit,
they have withstood significant security tests, from the
drawdown of over 100,000 U.S. forces to the March 2010
parliamentary elections and the ongoing government formation
process that followed.
As a result of an earlier American focus on force
generation, the Iraqi army has been the fastest growing
professional military in the world over the past several
years.\6\ More recently, efforts have shifted towards
developing specialization, professionalism, and the
administrative capability throughout the military and police.
Despite great strides, the ability of the Iraqi forces to
operate without the support of a robust U.S. presence remains
unknown.
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\6\ As of October 2010, the Iraqi security forces stood at
approximately 645,000, of which 247,000 are Ministry of Defense forces
and 398,000 Ministry of Interior forces.
Complicating matters, Iraq's political leadership may not
fully appreciate how integral U.S. military support is to
buttressing the Iraqi army's basic capabilities. In large part
operating behind the scenes, American troops still provide
critical administrative and logistical functions, skills the
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Iraqi forces have yet to master.
The U.S. military has developed metrics known as ``minimal
essential capabilities'' to measure the Iraqi security forces'
foundational effectiveness at independently providing internal
security and defending against external threats. Alarming
deficiencies are projected beyond 2011, which will have a
serious impact on the State Department's ability to provide its
own force-protection: \7\
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\7\ Based on discussions in Baghdad with U.S. military and embassy
officials and Iraqi military officials. See also Appendix II.
The Ministry of Defense is deficient in its ability to
maintain and support the armed forces. Although the
Iraqi military has developed into a competent
counterinsurgency force, the logistics, training, and
maintenance requirements that contribute to its
sustainment will potentially go unfulfilled without
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U.S. military assistance.
The army and air force lack the full conventional ability
to defend Iraq's borders against external threats.
Although Iraq does not currently face a conventional
threat, it cannot yet deter its neighbors from
interfering in domestic politics.
Iraq's skillful counterterrorism force is likely to become
less capable because it still relies on the United
States to integrate intelligence.
The U.S. military presence is the glue that holds together
nascent cooperation between the Iraqi army and Kurdish
peshmerga. Without U.S. troops to resolve disputes and
foster relations, the situation could deteriorate,
leaving the country with two separate heavily armed
security forces at odds over contentious political
issues.
Arab/Kurdish security: Unresolved political tensions
between Baghdad and the Kurdish regional government remain a
threat to Iraq's long-term stability. In an effort to manage
these tensions, the U.S. military established Combined Security
Mechanisms beginning in 2009, in which Arabs, Kurds, and
Americans operate checkpoints and conduct joint patrols in four
provinces along the Arab-Kurd trigger line (Ninewa, Salah ad-
Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala). The effort has reduced tensions and
put in place lines of communication in case of a breakdown.
However, it remains to be seen if this architecture can be
sustained after the U.S. military withdrawal, absent progress
towards resolving the underlying political disputes between
Irbil and Baghdad.
The United States has also pushed for the integration of
the Kurdish peshmerga into the Iraqi security forces. Prime
Minister Maliki announced in April 2010 the formation of four
unified peshmerga regional guard brigades which theoretically
will report to Baghdad, and laid out plans to train and equip
eight additional units in hopes of forming two Iraqi army
divisions within Kurdish provinces.
Politics: All of Iraq's major constituencies participate,
at least grudgingly, in the Iraqi political order. But
fundamental questions remain about the make-up of the Iraqi
state, including the nature of Iraqi federalism, the final
disposition of the disputed internal boundaries, the
organization of Iraq's energy sector, and the political
reintegration of the Sunni Arabs. The contentious nine-month
period of government formation indicates that Iraq's political
processes are not yet self-sustaining.
Mistrust between political factions remains high, sectarian
wounds have not fully healed, and decisions to forgo violence
in favor of the political process may still be reversible. The
integration of the Sons of Iraq--comprised mostly of former
Sunni insurgents--into the army and local governments remains
uneven. Should the new government break down along sectarian
lines, Sunni extremist groups may have an opening to lure back
former fighters into the insurgency.
Bilateral agreements: The U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relationship
is delineated in two accords that were negotiated in tandem and
signed by the Bush administration in November 2008: the
strategic framework agreement and the security agreement.
The strategic framework agreement is an aspirational
document intended to broaden the U.S. partnership with Iraq
beyond security. Although short on detail and non-binding, the
agreement provides a template for normalizing the bilateral
relationship in areas such as economic, cultural, diplomatic,
and security cooperation. The security agreement is the legal
framework that dictates the terms of the U.S. military presence
in Iraq. It contains two significant milestones. First, it
required U.S. combat troops to withdraw from Iraqi population
centers by June 30, 2009. Second, it obligates all U.S. forces
to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. Any changes to the
agreement would require the consent of the Iraqi Government and
parliamentary ratification.
On August 31, the U.S. military formally ended Operation
Iraqi Freedom and began Operation New Dawn, dedicated to three
distinct functions: train, equip, and advise the Iraqi
military; continue counterterrorism operations; and protect
U.S. diplomatic initiatives.\8\
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\8\ The August 31 transition is not included in the security
agreement, but was outlined by President Obama in his February 27, 2009
speech on Iraq at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
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Part Three: An Ambitious Transition
Already the largest in the world, the American diplomatic
mission in Iraq will expand further as the State Department
takes on full responsibility for its own security. But time for
planning is short, as the new mission must attain full
operational capability by October 2011.
The embassy compound will continue to be the center of
American diplomatic gravity. But it will be supported by a
planned 15 satellite sites across the country: three air hubs,
three police training centers, two consulates, two embassy
branch offices, and five Office of Security Cooperation sites.
Roughly 17,000 individuals are expected to be under ``chief of
mission authority,'' mostly third-country nationals working as
life-support and security contractors. The number of American
diplomats in Iraq is projected to remain at roughly 650, with
an additional several hundred functional staff posted at the
embassy from a variety of other government agencies, including
USAID and the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and
Agriculture.
As of December, land use agreements had not been signed and
construction had not begun at the satellite sites. The size and
character of the Office of Security Cooperation has not been
determined. The transfer from the military to the embassy of
sensitive materiel has not been completed. Thousands of
critical life-support and security personnel contractors need
to be vetted and hired.
In an April 7, 2010 letter sent to his counterpart at the
Department of Defense, Undersecretary of State for Management
Patrick Kennedy highlighted the magnitude of the challenge:
Secure ground and air movements within Iraq,
essential to DOS' current and proposed provincial
presence, are now possible only because of U.S.
military capabilities and availability of support.
Without such support in the future, DOS will be forced
to redirect its resources towards obtaining and
supporting less-appropriate vehicles and airframes to
allow the [branch offices and consulates] to function
in an insecure environment. We will continue to have a
critical need for logistical and life support of a
magnitude and scale of complexity that is unprecedented
in the history of the Department of State. [State] does
not have within its Foreign Service cadre sufficient
experience and expertise to perform necessary contract
oversight.
Connecting the satellite sites will be a contractor-
operated air wing, operated by the State Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.\9\ A
fixed-wing component of four turboprop aircraft, which seat
roughly fifty passengers, will transport officials across
international borders and between Baghdad, Basrah, and Irbil.
Unlike diplomats from some other nations, U.S. Government
personnel are generally prohibited from arriving via commercial
aircraft at Baghdad International Airport, significantly
increasing transportation costs. Instead, they are flown in on
military aircraft, landing within the commercial terminal's
sight line. Beginning this year, they will enter the country on
the embassy's air-wing.
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\9\ Although both run by Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL), the police training program and air wing
will be operationally separate. INL developed its air transportation
capacity during its Latin America training and drug interdiction
programs in the 1990s, and now has a worldwide fleet of about 230 fixed
and rotary wing aircraft. But this will be its most complex operation.
The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs plans to augment its current
rotary-wing fleet of 14 UH-1N Twin Huey helicopters, with 20
Sikorsky S-61 helicopters and four more UH-1Ns, operating out
of the three air hubs.\10\ State Department requested in
writing 24 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters from the Defense
Department, which are faster, carry more passengers and were
already in theater. The Defense Department never formally
responded. The rotary-wing fleet is theoretically capable of
moving several hundred passengers a day, though this tempo may
be hard to sustain in practice.
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\10\ INL also operates a small number of MD-530 helicopters in
Baghdad for surveillance and ground movement air support.
As reported by the Commission on Wartime Contracting, an
independent legislative commission created by Congress, the
State Department has identified fourteen military functions
that will be lost once the U.S. military is gone from Iraq.\11\
The State Department is looking to reproduce limited versions
of many of these functions through security contractors. But
there are roles that a diplomatic mission is not capable of
replacing. The U.S. military's strategic over-watch function in
Iraq provides a deterrent to armed militia groups, demonstrates
American resolve, and bolsters the political order.
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\11\ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Special Report 3, July 12, 2010: ``Better planning for Defense-to-State
transition in Iraq needed to avoid mistakes and waste.'' http://
www.wartimecontracting.gov/index.php/reports. The fourteen lost
military functions are:
Recovering killed and wounded personnel
Recovering damaged vehicles
Recovering downed aircraft
Clearing travel routes
Operations center monitoring of private security contractors
Private security contractor inspection and accountability
services
Convoy security
Explosive-ordnance disposal
Counter rocket, artillery and mortar notification
Counter-battery neutralization response
Communications support
Tactical-operations center dispatch of armed response teams
Policing Baghdad's international zone
Maintaining electronic counter-measures, threat intelligence,
and technology capabilities.
The capacity of the diplomatic effort depends in large part
on the short-term U.S. military footprint and the budget and
bureaucratic support the embassy receives from Washington. The
administration must be willing to make tough choices to ensure
strategic goals are in line with realities on the ground and
available resources.
REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT
By October, the Embassy will transition from 16 provincial
reconstructions teams down to four regional posts--permanent
consulates in Basrah and Irbil and shorter-term embassy branch
offices in Kirkuk and Mosul.
The provincial reconstruction teams have been a cost-
effective enterprise, with the military providing security,
logistics and transportation support. Peaking at 31 teams in
2008, the teams have interacted with provincial and sub-
provincial political leaders, and been a focal point of such
diplomatic initiatives as outreach to the Sons of Iraq, efforts
to manage Arab-Kurdish tensions, and interactions with the
Shiite religious establishment. While the State Department
originally contemplated five to seven provincial sites, the
rapidly rising cost estimates have reduced the number to four,
leaving engagement outposts in Najaf, Ramadi, and Baquba
unfilled.
In comparison to the provincial reconstruction teams, the
successor sites will have reduced functional staffs, smaller
operational radii, and no funding for discretionary projects.
Three of the four--Basrah, Kirkuk and Mosul--will be located in
dangerous locales. As the U.S. military withdraws from these
locations, it will take much of its local situational awareness
with it, the product of relationships cultivated over seven
years.\12\ Similarly, the branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul
will have little capacity for sustaining the Combined Security
Mechanisms, a key element of the current strategy to manage
Arab-Kurdish tensions in disputed areas, which are currently
supported by several thousand American troops.
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\12\ The observations in this section are based upon discussions
with civilian and military officials in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Washington.
The authors visited Kirkuk in November 2010, and visited Kirkuk and
Mosul in November 2009.
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs will take over the police-training program from the
U.S. military, based on a hub-and-spoke system. Approximately
190 police trainers will be based at Baghdad, Basrah and Irbil,
from which they can deploy to approximately 25 field
locations.\13\ Iraq now runs its own police training academies.
So rather than classroom training, the program will focus on
advising and mentoring the local and national police
leadership, as well as supporting the Ministry of Interior and
focusing on specialized disciplines such as forensics and
prosecution.
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\13\ The Baghdad hub will hold roughly 110 trainers at Forward
Operating Base Shield east of the Tigris River, near a large Iraqi
Government complex which houses the Ministry of Interior and several
other important government ministries. The Basrah and Irbil hubs will
be contained on the same compounds that house the consulates and will
be home to roughly 45 and 25 trainers, respectively.
While the U.S. military has begun reconfiguring existing
sites as part of the military withdrawal, real estate
agreements could not be formally negotiated until the new
government was in place. With the consulates and branch offices
becoming fully operational by October 2011, the Bureau of
Overseas Building Operations has been left with precious little
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margin for error.
There is cause for concern that the Defense Department has
not yet finalized planning on the structure of the Office of
Security Cooperation and how its activities will integrate into
the larger diplomatic mission, including decisions on its size,
locations, lines of funding, and force protection. Current
plans call for a central hub in Baghdad; four fully staffed
auxiliary posts; and an undetermined number of ``spokes''
throughout the country. Each site will serve as a base for
distinct training, maintenance, and logistical missions to
improve Iraqi defense capabilities.\14\ More than 200 permanent
military and civilian staff will be augmented by a still
undetermined, but steadily increasing number of skilled
contractors (currently estimated somewhere in the range of
800), supplemented by perhaps 3,000 or more life-support and
security contractors. But it is unclear whether the Office will
use the embassy's air wing or contract its own helicopters,
which could have significant consequences for the larger
diplomatic mission.
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\14\ As of November 2010, USF-I planned posts in Balad, Taji,
Besmaya, and Umm Qasr with additional ``spokes'' in Tikrit, Taji, Ali
Air Base, and Kirkuk. At these locations, training, maintenance, and
operations will occur on equipment including F-16 Aircraft, M1A1 Tanks,
T-6A Training Aircraft, UH-1H Huey Helicopters, Armored Vehicles, M113
Armored Personnel Carriers, and OH-58 Helicopters.
The period immediately after the military withdrawal may be
especially sensitive, as extremist groups test the new defenses
and attempt to demonstrate their own relevance. Current
planning calls for 5,500 security contractors to be employed by
the State Department in Iraq, roughly double the current number
and not including the Office of Security Cooperation.\15\
Roughly four thousand of these will be third-country nationals
serving as static perimeter security for the various
installations, a continuation of current practice at both
civilian and military sites.
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\15\ Though the numbers remain in flux, current plans call for
about 600 guards in Irbil, 575 in Baghdad, 335 each in Kirkuk and
Mosul, and about 3,650 in Baghdad. Most of State's security
contractors, both perimeter and movement, will be hired through the
Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract, the successor to the
current Worldwide Personal Protective Security (WPPS II) contract.
However, some of the specialized security functions described in this
section will be contracted separately. For more information, see http:/
/www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rm/143420.htm.
Despite the continuing threat of indirect fire,\16\ the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security's ability to provide security on
American compounds after 2011 is encouraging. The State
Department already coordinates perimeter security and external
movements through an impressive high-tech tactical operations
center inside the embassy. More limited operations centers will
be set up in satellite facilities located on Iraqi Government
compounds or military bases, thus providing for an additional
layer of local security. However, security contractors will
have to take over highly specialized functions, such as
explosive-ordnance disposal; counter rocket, artillery and
mortar notification; and aerial surveillance, raising important
questions about both the desirability and capacity of military
functions in the hands of private security contractors.
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\16\ While mortar and rocket attacks against the embassy and other
American facilities usually do little damage, three Triple Canopy
perimeter guards were killed in July by indirect fire.
The more difficult challenge will be maintaining the
ability to make frequent secure ground movements. That the
State Department will have considerably less firepower at its
disposal ``outside the wire'' is obvious, but arguably
desirable for a diplomatic mission. The State Department has
been coordinating movements in Baghdad and other locations for
some time. What the civilian mission will lose, though, is the
military's over-watch capabilities. Functions like
surveillance, intelligence, liaising with the Iraqi military,
rapid response, and the like are less visible, but they cannot
easily be replaced. The embassy's central location in the
``Green Zone'' provides relatively good security and easy
access to key Iraqi leaders in Baghdad. But the satellite sites
will only be as effective as their inhabitants' ability to get
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off their compounds.
The branch offices are designed to support the movements of
personnel to two different local destinations simultaneously.
(For the sake of comparison, the current provincial
reconstruction team in Kirkuk averages three movements per
day.) However, given current conditions and security standards,
we believe this projection may be overly optimistic and that
functional personnel will be greatly restricted in comparison
with the existing construct.\17\
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\17\ Two other factors could reduce the branch offices' engagement
tempo. First, the U.S. military moves more personnel per movement than
Diplomatic Security is able to support. Second, provincial
reconstruction team Kirkuk personnel currently maintain virtual offices
in the main Kirkuk Government building, allowing them to coordinate
multiple meetings per movement. It is not clear that the branch offices
will be able to maintain this virtual presence.
There is a built-in tension between a diplomat's desire to
energetically engage local actors and the Regional Security
Officers' prerogative to keep those diplomats safe.\18\ This is
nowhere truer than in Iraq and Afghanistan, where strategically
critical diplomatic objectives are paired with formidable
security threats. Unlike their military counterparts, diplomats
are unarmed, and every protection must be taken to ensure their
safety. On the other hand, there is also a risk of compromising
the mission with excessive or inflexible security requirements.
The question is whether the benefits at these diplomatic
missions will justify their enormous costs if the functional
staff's ability to move off compound is constrained. Effective
risk management and clear strategic guidance from Washington
will be essential.
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\18\ Regional Security Officers, special agents with the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, coordinate all aspects of a diplomatic mission's
security. The Embassy has used private security contractors to conduct
``red zone'' movements in Baghdad for some time, though it will soon
lose the military's quick response capacity. Since the tragic shooting
incident in Nisour Square in 2007, at least one Diplomatic Security
agent now participates in every movement outside the Green Zone.
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Recommendations
1. The State Department should reconsider whether the embassy
branch offices will have sufficient freedom of movement
to justify their considerable expense. If a vigorous
regional presence is necessary to support Iraq's
stability, a mechanism for a continued but restricted
follow-on military presence should be considered to
help secure American diplomats. But it is not yet clear
that the Iraqi Government desires such an arrangement
on terms compatible with American interests.
2. The size and scope of the Office of Security Cooperation
must be determined as soon as possible and integrated
into the diplomatic mission. In Afghanistan, it will be
important to stand up a similar office sooner. Within
the organization, the administration should develop an
integrated team consisting of State, Defense, and
specialized contracting personnel adept at dealing with
the intricacies of U.S. security assistance. Compared
to the current ad hoc arrangements in Iraq and
Afghanistan, these offices will be capable of carefully
assessing the needs of the host nation, aligning those
desires with national interests, gauging the
requirements to sustain continued support (both in
terms of potential training sites and required
contractors), and assessing the regional impact of arms
sales.
3. Regional security officers need to be empowered to face
risks rationally and creatively. They have an
incredibly difficult balancing act to perform and must
be protected from second-guessing from Washington that
produces risk-aversion. While all prudent security
measures should be taken, allowances need to be made
for the nature of the diplomatic mission in Iraq. In
the authors' experience, American diplomats in are
courageous, committed and cognizant of the dangers, but
often chafe at what they see as excessive security
requirements. Examples of possible security measures
include:
Reconsider security in the Kurdish Regional Government.
Not a single American has died in Iraqi Kurdistan
since 2003, and until recently, American diplomats
in Irbil received a higher level of movement
security than in Sanaa, Yemen. Excessive security
requirements in the north drain resources that
could be better used elsewhere and constrain our
diplomats' ability to function.
Consider the use of Baghdad International Airport. If
there are systemic security gaps at the airport,
the United States should forcefully engage the
Iraqi Government to address these gaps. It is
enormously expensive, inefficient for smaller
groups and undiplomatic not to use a country's
international airport.
Explore the feasibility of ``Iraqizing'' security. Local
security guards are more affordable, understand the
local language and culture, and have a superior
situational awareness. As Ambassador Ryan Crocker
has pointed out, highly trained and vetted Lebanese
guards were used during the worst years of the
Lebanese civil war without a single ``friendly
fire'' instance.
4. A joint State and Defense Department task force should be
set up to explore options for sustaining the Combined
Security Mechanisms. The Iraqi Government should be
consulted on the feasibility and desirability of
maintaining a smaller presence of U.S. military liaison
or training teams that would not require the
renegotiation of a new security agreement.
U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
Even after the expiration of the 2008 security agreement,
the United States will have military personnel stationed at the
American embassy in a non-combat role, as it has in most
countries in the world, as affirmed by the strategic framework
agreement. But the size, scope, structure and role of this
presence remain undetermined, even at this late date. Perhaps
most significantly, it is unclear what kind of security
relationship the incoming Iraqi Government would like with the
United States. The outcome will shape the nature of the
bilateral relationship, and have a profound effect on the State
Department's diplomatic posture.
Assuming no renegotiation of the security agreement, the
U.S. military will transfer the vestiges of its mission to the
Office of Security Cooperation--Iraq under embassy authority by
October 2011. Similar offices throughout the region assist host
nations with sustainment, training, acquisition, and the
conduct of joint exercises, but the office in Iraq--the largest
U.S.-funded organization of its kind--will face unique
challenges based on the security environment.\19\ The Office's
responsibilities will include the provision of training and
logistical support for current and future arms sale to Iraq.
This is not an insignificant task given that some $13 billion
in U.S. arms sales are currently pending.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Based on discussions in Baghdad with U.S. military and embassy
officials and Iraqi military officials.
The authors suspect that many U.S. and Iraqi senior
military commanders, along with some senior diplomats, would
like an augmented residual U.S. military presence in Iraq after
2011 not only to bolster the Iraqi army, but also to support
the Combined Security Mechanisms, protect hard fought gains in
security, and provide a counter to Iran. But the new Iraqi
Government has not yet signaled a public desire to renegotiate
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the 2008 security agreement.
And a continued military presence poses significant risks,
as well: that it validates our status as occupiers in the eyes
of the local population and the larger Muslim community, that
it exacerbates Iraqi dependencies and thereby retards rather
than accelerates Iraqi political accommodation, and that an
opportunity is missed to finalize the American military exit
from Iraq. It remains to be seen whether the Iraqi Government
will request a continued U.S. military presence or how the
Obama administration would respond.
Although several variations exist, the authors see three
broad options for the U.S. military posture going forward. A
long-term U.S. military presence in Iraq is both unsustainable
and undesirable. Thus, each option is a temporary solution to
help manage the evolving security situation while Iraq's
political class evolves and its armed forces continue to
develop. Each involves significant tradeoffs, but only the
first two may be politically palatable to the new Iraqi
Government.
Total drawdown of U.S. troops: In this scenario, the
U.S. military departs as scheduled by the end of 2011,
though presumably still leaving behind the Office of
Security Cooperation described above. The United States
will be viewed as upholding its end of the security
agreement, delivering a critical message throughout the
region: it is not in the business of occupying foreign
countries.
But this option is not without significant risks. The
Iraqi military will be forced to sustain itself with
only limited American support. This could lead to
outside political interference and a deteriorated
security environment allowing Al-Qaeda in Iraq and
other insurgent groups to reenergize and potentially
destabilize Iraq, with significant negative
consequences for the region. In this scenario, the
diplomatic mission will not have the capacity to
support the Combined Security Mechanisms set up to
foster communication and coordination between the Iraqi
army and Kurdish peshmerga along Iraq's disputed
internal boundaries, potentially leaving two heavily
armed forces at odds over unresolved politically
contentious issues.
Forced to operate without the security blanket of the
military, American diplomats would be exposed to
additional danger without adequate protection from the
host nation. Unless the Iraqi security forces can
demonstrate the capability to provide a more permissive
security environment, the State Department should
reconsider whether it has the capacity to undertake the
ambitious regional posture described in this paper.
Expanded Office of Security Cooperation: In this
scenario, U.S. combat forces depart in accordance with
the security agreement, but the Office of Security
Cooperation would be expanded, to include additional
military personnel under the ambassador's chief of
mission authority. Though these personnel would serve
in a strictly advisory capacity, they could continue to
perform critical functions such as sustaining
logistics, administrative duties, and training--roles
that many in the Iraqi military and political classes
seem keen for the United States to maintain. While not
directly participating in force protection or combat
operations, these troops could provide critical
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support,
as well as a coordination function with the Iraqi
security forces, to better enable the State Department
to carry out its engagement.
This arrangement would require the consent of the
Iraqi Government, though perhaps not parliamentary
approval. This creates its own problems: the presence
of troops, even in a limited fashion, could come to be
politicized and seen as allied with ruling parties
against the opposition. Such a footprint might not be
capable of supporting the Combined Security Mechanisms
in the north. And it would lack a quick reaction
capacity or any kind of force projection except in
self-defense. Though such a force would have little
interaction with the Iraqi public, it might also be
cited as evidence that the United States has no
intention of leaving Iraq.
New security agreement: Under this scenario, the
Obama administration would renegotiate, at Iraq's
public request, a new security agreement to allow a
continued U.S. military presence--a lean force capable
of partnering in support of counterterrorism operations
and maintaining the Combined Security Mechanisms in the
north. This residual presence would address the
projected shortfalls in the Iraqi security forces by
providing sustained logistics, intelligence, and
maintenance support and be positioned to help the Iraqi
counterterrorism forces exert maximum pressure against
Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other extremist groups. A larger
troop presence could reinforce Iraqi border security
and air sovereignty, and would probably retain a
robust, if little used, rapid reaction capability.
But this scenario does not seem compatible with the
public statements of the new Iraqi Government.
Furthermore, the Obama administration has committed to
abide by the terms of the current security agreement,
negotiated by the Bush administration, and withdraw all
troops by December 2011. The presence of American
troops is a contentious issue in Iraqi politics. Even
if the Iraqi Government signaled a desire to
renegotiate the security agreement, there is likely to
be significant parliamentary opposition, especially
among the large Sadrist bloc. Rather than building
Iraqi capacity, a continued U.S. military presence
could instead foster Iraqi dependency.
If Iraq were to request a new security agreement, the
United States should carefully consider the appeal, but
only agree if the terms are favorable to American
interests. The U.S. military presence would be
purposefully limited and only present to facilitate
highly selective missions.
Recommendations
1. The administration should ensure that its resources,
capacities and policy objectives are in balance. Each
of the security options described above leads to
separate conclusions about how best to structure the
diplomatic presence in Iraq. But there is a clear
relationship between the U.S. military support in place
and the capacity of the State Department, which the
authors are concerned, is not adequately incorporated
into the current transition planning.
2. The administration should clarify to lawmakers in
Washington what the military presence in Iraq, if any,
will look like beyond 2012.
BUDGETING AND AUTHORITIES
The total request for Congressional appropriations in Iraq
in FY12, after the transition is completed, could reach $6
billion. Of that, diplomatic operations will cost at least $3
billion, roughly double the FY11 request and encompassing more
than a quarter of the State Department's global operational
budget.\20\ This does not include other State Department
programs in Iraq such as economic and security assistance, or
the Office of Security Cooperation. While these are
indisputably expensive programs, their cost constitute a mere
fraction of what was spent on earlier military operations. And
if Iraq emerges from the chaos of the last years as an
important regional partner it will have been money well
spent.\21\
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\20\ Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides wrote in response to
questions for the record from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
received November 17: ``The current average monthly obligation rate for
ongoing Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP)-funded operations of
the embassy and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) is approximately
$120 million per month. As the transition of DOD-supported activities
to State accelerates over the coming year, average monthly obligations
will grow by $275 million, peaking at approximately $395 million per
month around the end of the third quarter before dropping to lower
obligation rates by year end. This includes significant security and
construction contracts related to the two Embassy Branch Offices, two
consulates, and Sather Air Base-funded by the FY 2010 supplemental--to
be awarded during January-March. The Department foresees total FY 2011
obligations for D&CP of nearly $3.2 billion.''
\21\ Appropriations for the war in Iraq peaked in FY08 at $142
billion and declined in FY10 to $51 billion. See Appendix II.
Given this enormous cost disparity between military and
diplomatic operations, it is notable that Congress cut the
State Department's requests for Iraq operations twice in
2010.\22\ With the nation deeply involved in a second war in
Afghanistan and recovering from a severe recession, Iraq
receives less attention in a difficult fiscal environment.
Security costs in Iraq are enormous compared to most diplomatic
postings, and thus disruptive to the budgeting cycle.
Nonetheless, the cuts have raised serious concerns that the
current funding baselines might limit the scope of future
operations. A more stable funding mechanism must be found that
contains both clarity for operational planners at the State
Department and mechanisms for effective Congressional
oversight.
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\22\ The FY2010 supplemental appropriations act, passed in July
2010, included a $540 million cut from the administration's D&CP
(Diplomatic and Consular Programs account) request. FY11 appropriations
have not yet been resolved with the Government operating on a
continuing resolution until March 2011, but the Senate and House
appropriations committee markups included cuts to administration's
$1.78 billion FY11 Iraq D&CP request, to $1.65 billion and $1.34
billion respectively.
Meanwhile, the unity of mission in Baghdad does not appear
to have been matched in Washington. Communication between
military personnel and civilian counterparts is much better in
the field than in Washington. This is hardly an unusual
phenomenon, but the ``stove-piping'' of information and
resources can have a particularly deleterious effect in such a
complex operation. Within the State Department there appear to
be tensions between the embassy and the Bureau of Near-East
Affairs, which are looking to maintain a vigorous provincial
profile, and operational bureaus such as the Bureaus of
Diplomatic Security and Overseas Building Operations
responsible for securing them. While an element of bureaucratic
tension can help refine strategic objectives, there is also a
danger that differing bureaucratic prerogatives lead to muddled
policy. Creative thinking is especially important to security.
Because this is a transition of such extraordinary importance
and complexity--and because time is so limited--the State
Department must articulate sharper strategic and operational
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
guidelines.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the State and Defense
Departments have all of the legal authorities they need. For
example, according to military and diplomatic personnel in
Baghdad, it is easier to transfer ``non-excess'' military
equipment in Iraq to a third country than it is to the State
Department.\23\ New authorities could conceivably be needed in
a number of different areas: flexibility between spending
accounts, operations and staffing of the Office for Security
Cooperation, the definition of ``chief of mission'' authority,
on the security standards employed, etc. Such legal questions
urgently need to be resolved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides, November 17: ``The
Department of Defense (DoD) does not currently have the authority to
transfer `non-excess' property. Therefore, for items identified as
`Non-excess' the Department of State (DOS) will either have to fund
those items or DoD may require exceptional, temporary authorities to
transfer them to the Department of State at no cost. Giving DoD such
authority would greatly facilitate such transfers.''
Adding to the uncertainty, Foreign Military Sales to Iraq
have sharply increased in recent months. In August 2010, the
U.S. military was tracking 170 Iraqi cases valued at almost $6
billion. But by November, the number had skyrocketed to
approximately 400 cases valued at nearly $13 billion, raising
serious questions about the Iraqi military's capacity to deal
with such an influx of highly technical equipment. This
dramatic increase--and the accompanying contractors necessary
to fulfill the orders--could result in an even larger footprint
likely to overwhelm the State Department's already lean
resources. Arms sales professionals, who typically broker such
deals, were not present in Iraq soon enough and political-
military specialists from the State Department were
insufficiently involved in the early stages of arms
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
negotiations with Iraqis.
The startup costs associated with the Office of Security
Cooperation, responsible for managing Foreign Military Sales,
are typically funded by the State Department. However, in Iraq
this is problematic for two reasons. First, the security
environment is such that the State Department may not be able
to afford the associated security costs. The Defense Department
however, has less restrictive requirements--which could reduce
site-protection costs by as much as $750 million--and a larger,
more flexible budget. Second, the State Department, if forced
to outfit the Office of Security Cooperation to its security
standards, will not achieve full operational capability by
October. Due to the expanding footprint, there would be too
much to do with not enough time.
Funding streams to support the Iraqi military are changing.
The Iraqi army must be properly resourced and adequately
equipped to deter future challenges from outside its borders.
From 2005-2012 this was accomplished through the Iraq Security
Forces Fund within the Defense budget.\24\ The fund has been a
discretionary spending vehicle for procurement, operations, and
maintenance. But in FY 2012, that funding line will be replaced
with a more restrictive and traditional form of security
assistance, Foreign Military Financing, granted through the
Department of State's budget to finance the purchase of U.S.
equipment, training, and services. The administration will
likely request approximately $1 billion annually through FY
2014 after which Iraq is forecast to be capable of financing
its own military.
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\24\ The administration request for FY 2011, through the defense
budget, was $2 billion dollars of which Congress is likely to
appropriate closer to $1.5 billion.
With the departure of combat troops, the security
assistance is the principal point of leverage the United States
has in promoting Kurdish integration and developing a
professional generation of soldiers and police. The sale of
military equipment gives us an edge in diplomacy, builds
relationships, and fosters interoperability. But perhaps most
importantly, it fills a void that other countries, including
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Iran, are more than willing to step into if left empty.
Although there are many unknowns still associated with the
transition to a diplomatic mission in Iraq, it will not serve
the United States to sit back and take a ``wait and see''
approach to funding our efforts there. A future presence of the
U.S. military, in any form, will not alleviate the
responsibilities of the State Department, but will only help
facilitate its effectiveness.
Recommendations
1. Congress must provide the financial resources necessary to
complete the diplomatic mission in Iraq. To this end,
senior administration officials in Washington should be
more vocal on the importance of full Congressional
funding for its budget requests for Iraq programs.
2. Consideration should be given to a multiple-year funding
authorization for Iraq programs, including operational
costs (differentiated from the State Department's
global operational budget account), security
assistance, and economic assistance programs. The State
Department would have to articulate a more
comprehensive three-to-five year strategy for Iraq, but
would receive assurances that critical programs would
not fall victim to the vagaries of the budgeting
process. Congress would demonstrate its commitment to
the bilateral relationship, but also be able to create
benchmarks for progress and establish sunsets to ensure
the transition period to normal diplomatic operations
is not open-ended.
3. State Department should appoint a senior coordinator for
Iraq, housed within the Bureau of Near East Affairs,
empowered to engage across bureaus. This office would
be responsible for ensuring a unity of effort within
the State Department, including on difficult security
matters and serve as the principle interlocutor with
the Defense Department on transition issues. It will
also serve as the model for transition in Afghanistan.
4. If the administration needs new authorities to execute the
new diplomatic mission in Iraq, these need to be
urgently communicated to the appropriate Congressional
committees.
5. Congress should approve an authority whereby the
Department of Defense funds the stand-up costs of the
Office of Security Cooperation inside Iraq. This would
alleviate a financial burden that the State Department
would not be able to bear. Consideration should also be
given to authorizing the Defense Department to
subsidize security costs associated with arms sales. In
the Iraqi security environment these costs are highly
inflated and if incorporated could have the dual
effects of pricing U.S. defense contractors out of a
competitive Iraqi market and offending our Iraqi
partners by calling their security measures into
question.
6. Congress should fully fund the current request for the
Iraqi Security Forces Fund and future requests for
Foreign Military Financing. This will ensure future
defense cooperation between the U.S. and Iraq. The
``total package'' approach associated with American
arms sales will establish an ongoing relationship where
the Iraqis will depend on specialized U.S. skills for
training and maintenance. An extensive security aid
package will also prohibit other regional actors from
inserting their undue influence on Iraq's fledgling
democracy.
Conclusion
The U.S. Government should ensure that the scope of the
mission in Iraq is compatible with the resources available,
including civilian capacity, the financial commitment from
Congress, a degree of U.S. military support and the backing of
the Iraqi Government. If these elements are not fully in place,
the administration may be forced to choose between scaling back
the diplomatic mission or accepting a degree of physical risk
familiar to military personnel, but normally unacceptable for
diplomats.
Debate over the balance between conventional and
unconventional military capacity is often heard through the
halls of the Pentagon. A similar discussion must take place
within the State Department regarding the role and capabilities
of our diplomatic corps. Although the State Department's budget
is a fraction of the Pentagon's, the distinctions between the
diplomatic and military missions in places like Iraq and
Afghanistan are quickly blurring. To adapt to the
counterinsurgency doctrine, U.S. troops are asked to put down
their weapons and converse over cups of tea. Conversely, in
Iraq the State Department is being asked to augment its
traditional diplomatic functions with a forceful, though
defensive, security capacity.
Reevaluating the role of diplomats is not about giving up
on Iraq. Quite the opposite, it is an acknowledgment of the
importance of getting the transition right. Some will argue
that the war's faulty pretext--that Iraq's supposed weapons of
mass destruction stocks constituted ``a grave and gathering
danger''--justify a quick American disengagement from Iraq once
our troops are withdrawn next year. While such an approach may
be ideologically fulfilling, it constitutes snatching ``defeat
from the jaws of victory.''
For all the challenges the diplomatic mission faces, its
success or failure has profound implications on the nature of
the American sacrifice in Iraq. It will be an important factor
in whether a more stable Iraq emerges from decades of turmoil
as a strategic partner of the United States, or, instead,
potentially turns towards Iran.
More than 4,400 American lives have been lost and $750
billion spent. But no figure can encapsulate the horrific loss
of life, treasure, and the associated sweat that was poured
into waging war, crafting a peace, and charting the transition.
Now is not the time to politically disengage. The transition
must be fostered through this critical stage, for the template
being created in Iraq now will serve as the model in
Afghanistan in years to come.
Appendix I: Iraqi Security Forces
``Minimum Essential Capabilities''
Appendix II: Congressional Funding of the War in Iraq
Congressional Funding of the War in Iraq, 2003-2011
(In billions of U.S. dollars by fiscal year)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 2011
Department 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2003-2010 Request
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense.................................................... 50 56 83 98 127 139 92 61 707 46
State (incl. USAID)........................................ 3 20 2 3 3 3 2 3 39 4
Veterans Affairs........................................... 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 5 1
Total: Iraq.............................................. 53 76 86 102 131 142 96 66 751 51
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Research Service
Appendix III: Security Incident Trends:
January 2004 to May 2010
Source: Department of Defense, ``Measuring Stability and Security
in Iraq,'' June 2010.