[Senate Prints 112-5]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
112th Congress
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
112-5
_______________________________________________________________________
WILL RUSSIA END EASTERN EUROPE'S
LAST FROZEN CONFLICT?
__________
A REPORT
TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
First Session
February 8, 2011
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-345 WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal.......................................... v
Introduction................................................... 1
Background..................................................... 2
U.S. Interests................................................. 3
Transnistria and Russia...................................... 3
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.......................... 4
Trafficking in Uranium, Arms, and Persons.................... 5
5 + 2 Status Talks........................................... 6
Supporting Moldova's Pro-Western Government.................. 7
Recommendations................................................ 7
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, February 8, 2011.
Dear Colleagues: In August 2010, I directed my Senate
Foreign Relations Committee professional staff member for
European Affairs, Marik String, to conduct a review of U.S.
policy in Moldova and, in particular, Transnistria, a disputed
territory within the Republic of Moldova controlled by Russian-
supported separatists.
Among the frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union,
Transnistria is unique in having experienced no significant
political violence since a brief separatist war with Moldovan
forces in 1992. Since then, Russian forces have served in
Transnistria, ostensibly as peacekeepers and protectors of an
estimated 20,000 tons of arms and ammunition left behind by the
Soviet 14th Army, despite Russia's 1999 pledge to remove all
equipment by 2002 and Moldova's strong advocacy for a
transition of the current Russian-led military peacekeeping
force into an international civilian mission.
Recent events should provide the United States with an
opportunity to renew high-level engagement in support of
forging a solution to this conflict. In 2009, a reform-minded,
Western-oriented government was swept to power in Moldova.
However, its efforts at reform and European integration
continue to be saddled by the unresolved status of
Transnistria. While status negotiations under the auspices of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
have dragged on since 1993, senior European Union officials,
including the German Chancellor and French President, have
publicly pressed the Russian Federation over the last year to
cooperate constructively in resolving the conflict as a
condition for deeper EU-Russian security dialogue.
The United States should strongly support European efforts
to resolve the conflict and thereby assist Moldova in advancing
its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. A resolute U.S. commitment to
this cause will ensure that we do not cede influence in a
region of paramount importance to U.S. foreign policy.
A solution would also bring greater pressure against
reported human rights and trafficking abuses in Transnistria.
It would strengthen export controls that have enabled illicit
trade, which threatens U.S. and allied interests, including
illegal trafficking of proliferation-sensitive conventional and
nuclear items. For instance, $11 million worth of uranium-238,
which could be used in a dirty bomb or in a nuclear weapon
program, was seized in Moldova in 2010.
(v)
Given the lack of military tensions and relatively amicable
relations between the residents of Transnistria and Moldova
proper, the outlines of a civilian-led peacekeeping mission in
Moldova under the OSCE or European Union are readily
envisioned. A past U.S. proposal to broker a solution under the
auspices of the NATO-Russia Council may also deserve
reconsideration and could demonstrate that recent developments
in NATO's relationship with Russia can redound to Eastern
Europe's security.
In the United States Congress, we have an opportunity to
provide important support for Moldova's Western ambitions by
graduating Moldova from Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions.
This staff report presents the background of the dispute in
Transnistria and tangible recommendations for advancing U.S.
foreign policy objectives in this important region. I welcome
any comments you may have.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
WILL RUSSIA END EASTERN EUROPE'S
LAST FROZEN CONFLICT?
----------
At the direction of Senator Richard Lugar, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee minority staff undertook a review of U.S.
and international efforts to broker a settlement for the
protracted conflict in Transnistria, a separatist region of
Moldova. In addition to briefings in Washington, staff
travelled to Moldova and to the Secretariat of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna,
Austria.\1\ The purpose of this study was to:
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\1\ Based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the
OSCE is a European security organization with 56 participating states
stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The OSCE maintains a
Secretariat in Vienna and a network of field missions throughout Europe
and Eurasia. Its work focuses on early warning, conflict prevention,
post-conflict rehabilitation, conventional arms control and military
transparency, human rights, democratization, and other issues.
Evaluate international efforts to resolve the status of
Transnistria through the ``Five plus Two'' talks held
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under the auspices of the OSCE;
Assess U.S., European, and OSCE confidence- and security-
building measures (CSBMs) between residents of
Transnistria and Moldova proper;
Recommend to members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and United States Government steps to advance
U.S. foreign policy objectives in Moldova.
Introduction
Situated between the European Union's easternmost border
and Ukraine, Moldova represents a frontier of the West.
Throughout much of its independence, gained from the Soviet
Union in 1991, Moldova's European prospects were dimmed by
ineffectual public institutions dominated for many years by
Communist Party officials, a moribund economy, constraints on
civil society, and a series of separatist movements, including
in Moldova's eastern region of Transnistria.
Transnistrian separatists, armed and financed by Moscow and
remnants of the Soviet 14th Army, fought a brief war with
Moldovan forces in 1992, and a contingent of approximately
1,500 Russian soldiers continues to serve in Transnistria,
ostensibly as peacekeepers and guardians of an estimated 20,000
tons of Soviet-era weapons and ammunition. In 1999, Russia
pledged to remove this equipment, but withdrawals ceased in
2004. Although tensions remain, little political violence has
ensued since the conflict, and residents of Transnistria and
Moldova proper experience relative ethnic homogeneity and
regularized contact compared to other Eurasian frozen
conflicts. Nonetheless, Transnistria overtly seeks integration
with Russia, and formal status negotiations (the ``Five plus
Two'' talks) held under the auspices of the OSCE have been
stalled since 2006.
In 2009, Moldovan voters dismissed the Communist Party from
office amid unrest known as the ``Twitter revolution,'' which
swept to power the Alliance for European Integration (AEI), a
coalition of reform-minded, Europe-oriented politicians. This
is a notable development in light of the flagging democratic
reform movements within other post-Soviet states. Although AEI
has pushed through important economic, rule-of-law, and civil
society reforms, its lack of the requisite supermajority in
parliament to elect a President has resulted in political
uncertainty (Moldova has experienced eight national elections
or referenda since April 2009), which is routinely cited by
Transnistrian and Russian officials as a pretext for spurning
status talks.
Given the European Union's strict border control and visa
regime requirements, the lack of uniform Moldovan control over
the Transnistrian region hampers Moldova's Western aspirations.
Moreover, the current situation in Transnistria has allowed its
leadership to escape sustained pressure for shortcomings in the
realm of civil, political, and media freedoms and has left its
residents isolated from their European peers.
Despite important border control assistance provided by the
European Union, the status quo has also enabled illicit
commerce that could threaten U.S. interests, including
trafficking in persons, drugs, weapons (past sales of anti-tank
grenade launchers without serial numbers have been reported),
and sensitive materials with applications for nuclear weapons.
In 2010, Moldovan authorities seized $11 million worth of
uranium-238, which could be converted to plutonium-239 (fissile
material for nuclear weapons) or a dirty bomb, from a criminal
enterprise with reported links to Transnistria.
Since June 2010, senior European leaders, including German
Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy,
have brought high-level visibility to the situation in
Transnistria by personally raising with Russian President
Medvedev the need for Russia to fulfill its 1999 pledge to
withdraw its military equipment from Moldova and to coax its
partners in Transnistria back to the negotiating table as a
test case for broader EU-Russia security cooperation. The
United States should seize this opportunity to bring similar
attention to recommencing negotiations over Transnistria and
building support for Moldova's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Background
Located within historical Bessarabia, Moldova has spent the
last centuries under the tutelage of the Mongols, Ottomans,
Romanians, and Soviets. Transnistria, present day Moldova's
easternmost region on the east bank of the Dniestr River, has
experienced considerable autonomy since 1924, when it
constituted part of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic (MASSR) within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic. After the dislocations of World War II, the
Transnistrian part of the MASSR was ceded to the Moldovan
Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) and its capital of Chisinau, a
political entity approximating the borders of present day
Moldova.
Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the MSSR
was succeeded by the independent Republic of Moldova. However,
Transnistria, emboldened by Russian nationalists and those
fearing annexation by Romania,\2\ declared itself the
``Transniester Moldovan Republic,'' a move that led to a 4-
month conflict between Moldovan forces and separatists backed
by the Soviet 14th Army that claimed an estimated 1,000 lives.
The 1992 ceasefire agreement created the Joint Control
Commission (JCC), under which 1,500 Russian, de facto
Transnistrian, and Moldovan forces continue to serve ostensibly
as peacekeepers in Transnistria in roughly equal proportion.
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\2\ Due to ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, elements in both
Romania and Moldova have historically sought integration of the two
countries.
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U.S. Interests
transnistria and russia
The destination for an estimated 300,000 ethnic Russians
under Soviet resettlement policies and host of key Soviet-era
military-industrial enterprises, Transnistria still enjoys
privileged relations with and access to Moscow. The main
thoroughfare of Tiraspol, Transnistria's ``capital,'' is
adorned with placards of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, and
polls indicate that the most popular politician among
Transnistrians is Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Although Transnistria is wedged between Moldova proper and
Ukraine, both of which openly seek European Union accession,
Transnistrian authorities look east, seeking assimilation with
Russia; with the nearest Russian border over 350 miles away,
Transnistria would become another Russian exclave similar to
Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast. In addition to 500 Russian
peacekeepers under the JCC who guard Transnistria's boundaries,
bridges, and strategic assets, 700-1,000 additional Russian
forces guard ammunition depots left behind by the Soviet 14th
Army. After U.S. missile defense plans were unveiled for
Romania in 2010, Transnistrian ``President'' Igor Smirnov
offered to host an emplacement of Russian Iskander missiles;
Russia declined.
Transnistrian politics and economics remain heavily
influenced by Russia. Its parallel administrative structures
include a ``parliament'' called the Supreme Soviet; its
currency, along with only Belarus and Russia, is called the
ruble; and its citizens and industry rely on substantial energy
and economic subsidies (and passports) \3\ from Moscow.
Russian-owned Gazprom possesses a controlling stake in
Moldovagaz, which offers Transnistria subsidized energy
purchases, while holding the Moldovan Government in Chisinau
responsible for Transnistria's mounting energy debt, now over
$2.1 billion. Moreover, Transnistria has marginalized the
Moldovan/Romanian language in Latin script that is used in the
rest of Moldova in favor of Russian in Cyrillic script. Civil
society and free media have also been heavily restricted, and
human rights abuses, including torture and arbitrary detention,
are regularly reported. Still, no nation, including Russia, has
recognized Transnistria's independence.
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\3\ An estimated 120,000 of the 555,000 residents of Transnistria
are reportedly Russian citizens.
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Transnistrian and Russian authorities contend that the
Russian-led peacekeeping force has been a nearly unqualified
success, pointing to the lack of political violence since 1992.
However, relative tranquility between Transnistria and Moldova
proper has benefited equally from relative ethnic homogeneity;
\4\ sustained people-to-people contacts; and the near complete
lack of any offensive military capacity in Moldova.\5\
Moreover, Transnistria's status has allowed its leadership to
escape sustained pressure for its significant shortcomings in
the realm of civil and political freedoms and has left its
residents isolated from their European peers.
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\4\ Despite Transnistrian fealty towards Moscow, the dispute is not
based predominantly on ethnicity, unlike other frozen conflicts in the
former Soviet Union. The ethnic composition of Transnistria is
comprised of ethnic Moldovans/Romanians (40 percent), Ukrainians (28
percent), and Russians (23 percent). The ethnic composition of the rest
of Moldova consists of Moldovans/Romanians (83 percent), Ukrainians (7
percent), and Russians (1.7 percent).
\5\ In addition to Russian troops and equipment, Transnistria
itself maintains an estimated 2,000-4,000 indigenous troops under arms
consisting of a T-34 tank battalion, an anti-aircraft regiment, and
motorized rifle brigades; Transnistrian authorities also maintain an
internal security contingent of an estimated 2,000 troops and Black Sea
Cossack militiamen. Analysts view this force capacity to far surpass
Moldova's own: Moldova maintains only 5,000 troops, no tanks, and a
deteriorating air force consisting of 8-10 MIG jets.
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Moldovan officials remain hopeful that the Russian-led
peacekeeping forces can be transitioned into a truly
international civilian force but remain prepared to consider a
continued Russian civilian role in any future mission.
Transnistrian ``President'' Igor Smirnov, however, has warned
that replacement of Russian peacekeepers with an international
contingent will lead to ``new bloodshed.''
conventional armed forces in europe
For the past decade, U.S. policy in Moldova has focused
largely on issues relating to the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty. The CFE Treaty was signed in 1990 among 22
states and placed limits on five categories of treaty-limited
equipment (TLE)\6\ between two Groups of States, 16 NATO
members and
6 former Warsaw Pact countries.\7\ Moldova was not an original
signatory to the Treaty but acceded in 1992 following the
Tashkent Agreement that divided erstwhile Soviet TLE among its
successor republics. During this process, Transnistria became a
repository for over 40,000 tons of weapons and ammunition left
by the Soviet 14th Army at the Colbasna depot and Tiraspol
airfield. Since 1992, Russia has also reportedly transferred
approximately 18 T-64 tanks to Transnistrian authorities, as
well as BM-21 GRAD rocket systems.
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\6\ Limits are included for Tanks (20,000 units), Armored Carrier
Vehicles (30,000), Artillery (20,000), Combat Aircraft (6,800), and
Attack Helicopters (2,000).
\7\ The CFE Treaty also includes limits on individual state TLE
holdings; geographical limits to prevent a destabilizing concentration
of conventional forces along the primary military approaches through
Central Europe, where a Soviet-led attack was seen most likely; and
``flank'' limits in northern Europe, southern Europe, and the Caucasus,
where NATO was adjacent to the Warsaw Pact.
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In Moldova, the CFE Treaty has served predominantly as a
vehicle for advancing the notion of ``host nation consent,''
the modest but fundamental concept that military forces should
not be stationed on an independent nation's soil without that
nation's consent. In 1999, simultaneous to revisions to the CFE
Treaty,\8\ Moscow made a series of agreements, known today as
the ``Istanbul Commitments,'' pledging to remove CFE TLE from
within Moldova's internationally recognized borders by 2001 and
all equipment by 2002.\9\
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\8\ These revisions resulted in the Adapted CFE Treaty, which was
ratified by Russia in 2004 but has not been ratified by any member of
NATO.
\9\ Specifically, Russia committed ``to complete withdrawal of
[all] Russian forces from the territory of Moldova by the end of
2002.'' Moldova also renounced ``the right to receive a temporary
deployment on its territory due to its Constitutional provisions which
control and prohibit any presence of foreign military forces on the
territory of Moldova.''
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The 2001 TLE deadline was met by Russia, but its pledge to
fully withdraw has not been fulfilled. Half of the arms at
Colbasna had been removed or destroyed under OSCE monitoring by
2004, but since then, removal has ceased. In response to
Russian claims that it could not afford further removal, the
OSCE continues to make available a $5.5 million voluntary fund
to fully finance the destruction of the remaining armaments.
Consistent with the U.S. Senate's Resolution of Advice and
Consent to the CFE Flank Document in 1997,\10\ the United
States and NATO allies have insisted since 2002 that
ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty would not be sought
until the Russian Federation fulfilled its commitment to
withdraw remaining forces from Georgia and Moldova.
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\10\ The United States Senate's 1997 Resolution of Advice and
Consent to the CFE Flank Document included a condition for ratification
that ``Nothing in the CFE Flank Document shall be construed as altering
the policy of the United States to achieve the immediate and complete
withdrawal of any armed forces and military equipment under the control
of the Russian Federation that are deployed on the territories of the
independent states of the former Soviet Union . . . without the full
and complete agreement of those states.''
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Moldovan and international officials do not view the
equipment as a military threat as such but report that the
ammunition is held under dangerous conditions, posing a threat
to civilians.\11\ Although Transnistrian authorities claim
inheritance of the equipment under the Tashkent Agreement,
international officials do
not believe that Moscow would agree to this reasoning but
suggest that it acquiesces because it serves Russia's interest
in maintaining sway with Transnistrian authorities and
preserving a cordon sani-
taire against NATO expansion.
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\11\ Some international officials suggest that Russia impedes
greater international access partly because it would be embarrassed by
the condition of the equipment.
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Amid growing distrust in NATO-Russia relations and Russia's
revisionist posture towards a raft of agreements, Russia
announced ``suspension'' of its implementation of the CFE
Treaty on July 14, 2007, an action of dubious legality under
the terms of the treaty and under customary international law.
Russia specifically cited its frustration with NATO's
reluctance to ratify the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty until Russia
fulfilled its pledges to Moldova and Georgia, to which a
similar commitment was made. CFE Treaty discussions remain at
an impasse, and Russia appears disinclined to fulfill its 1999
pledge.
trafficking in uranium, arms, and persons
Corruption within Transnistria's law enforcement
institutions and its absence of civil society watchdog groups
have allowed Transnistria to fester as a source of trafficking
in persons, arms, and other illicit goods. In 2010, Moldovan
authorities broke up a criminal ring in Chisinau with reported
ties to Transnistria that attempted to sell four pounds of
uranium-238, reportedly worth $11 million on the black market,
that could be converted to plutonium-239 (fissile material for
nuclear weapons) or a dirty bomb. In the past, authorities have
seized weapons, including anti-tank grenade launchers without
serial numbers (ideal for trafficking) that were reportedly
manufactured in Transnistria.
In 2005, the European Union Border Assistance Mission
(EUBAM) partnered with the Governments of Ukraine and Moldova
to address border control challenges through seven offices in
Ukraine and Moldova. EUBAM does not monitor in Transnistria
itself but has built indigenous customs and border patrol
capacity along the border with Ukraine to intercept and deter
illicit trade.
EUBAM also facilitates enforcement of a common registration
system, whereby exporters of goods from Transnistria must
obtain Moldovan export certification. Although some exporters
continue to operate outside the system, this arrangement
promotes Moldovan sovereignty, prevents importers from
circumventing Moldovan customs and excise duties, and confers
to legitimate Transnistrian exporters the trade preferences
associated with Moldova's status as a member of the World Trade
Organization.
5 + 2 status talks
In talks over the past 17 years to reintegrate Transnistria
with the rest of Moldova, several federalist structures have
been explored, but none has received sufficient traction.\12\
Prompted by Transnistria's alleged failure to bargain in good
faith, the European Union and United States implemented travel
sanctions against senior officials in Tiraspol in 2003. The
international status of Transnistria is currently being
addressed through the ``Five plus Two'' talks under the
auspices of the OSCE, to which the United States is
observer.\13\ The last official ``Five plus Two'' meeting
occurred in 2006, but informal meetings occur four to six times
annually at the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, where 33 discrete
issues focused predominantly on access and confidence-building
measures with Transnistria are discussed.
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\12\ The Kiev Document of 2002 envisioned a federal state built on
a ``contractual basis''; Moldova rejected this plan, in part due to its
purported conferral to Transnistria of equal status under international
law. The 2003 Constitutional Initiative, presented by then Moldovan
President Vladimir Voronin, invited Transnistria to co-author a new
Constitution for the Republic of Moldova based on a federal structure
but faltered due to Transnistria's preference for a confederation or
contractual arrangement between two equal political units that would
lack a strong central authority. The Kozak Memorandum, negotiated
mostly in secret by Russian presidential advisor Dmitry Kozak with
Transnistrian and Moldovan authorities in 2003 without input from OSCE
mediators, envisioned an asymmetric federation granting Transnistria
expansive powers, which, analysts contend, would have nearly enshrined
the status quo. Upon discovery of the document, the OSCE, EU, and
United States intervened and noted that the arrangement would be
detrimental to Moldova's relationship with Europe, and Moldova
ultimately rejected the memorandum as unconstitutional.
\13\ The talks between Moldovan and de facto Transnistrian
authorities are mediated by Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE (the ``5''),
with the European Union and the United States serving as observers
since 2005 (the ``2''). In practice, however, officials report that the
roles of mediators and observers are indistinguishable.
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In June 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel provided
impetus for renewed settlement talks by challenging Russian
President Medvedev that Transnistria would be used as a test
case for deeper EU-Russia security cooperation. In exchange for
restarting the negotiations within the ``Five plus Two'' format
and for Russia's fulfillment of its 1999 pledge to withdraw its
troops and materiel from Moldova, Chancellor Merkel agreed to
explore the creation of an EU-Russia political and security
committee, a forum long coveted by Moscow.\14\ The proposal was
again tabled at the German-Russian-French Summit at Deauville
in October 2010.
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\14\ These elements were enshrined in the June 2010 Merkel-Medvedev
``Meseberg Memorandum,'' which envisaged a committee that could be
charged to cooperate ``towards a resolution of the Transnistria
conflict with a view to achieve tangible progress within the
established 5 + 2 format.''
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supporting moldova's pro-western government
Since independence, Moldova has struggled to implement
reforms due to ineffective public institutions, a moribund
economy, and political capital spent dealing with the
separatist conflict in Transnistria. From 2001 to 2009, Moldova
was governed by leaders from the Party of Communists, until
their plurality victory in April 2009 parliamentary elections
sparked civil unrest and a subsequent crackdown by government
forces. Known today as the ``Twitter revolution,'' the
Government's violence provoked a backlash in the subsequent
snap election as voters sent to power a coalition of reform-
minded politicians, the Alliance for European Integration, who
were strongly oriented towards the European Union. Its
parliamentary majority was re-affirmed in November 2010
elections, but AEI has lacked the supermajority required to
elect a President, a conundrum that could result in new
parliamentary elections and further political uncertainty
(Moldova has experienced three national parliamentary
elections, four unsuccessful parliamentary votes to elect a
president, and a nationwide referendum since April 2009).
Russian and Transnistrian authorities have used this
uncertainty as a pretext for spurning formal status
discussions.
Nonetheless, the AEI coalition has expressed an unequivocal
ambition for Moldova to join the European Union, which would be
a milestone as the first member of the post-Soviet Commonwealth
of Independent States to achieve such status. AEI has pushed
through important institutional and market-oriented reforms and
has exhibited a respect for civil society and media freedoms
that its Communist predecessors lacked, although execution of
such reforms remains a substantial challenge.
Boundary and access issues with Transnistria continue to
saddle Moldova's path towards Western institutions, especially
with regard to visa policy. While firmer boundary controls with
Transnistria could propel Moldova's EU ambitions, such an
eventuality would also favor separatists by creating greater
political separation between Transnistria and Moldova proper.
Consequently, broader progress on Transnistrian status issues
will be essential for moving Moldova and the entire region
closer to Western institutions.
Recommendations
The recent political developments in Moldova and the high-
level attention paid by allied leaders to the situation in
Transnistria offer the United States an opportunity to enlist
similar attention to resume negotiations over Transnistria and
build support for Moldova's Western aspirations. Specifically,
the United States Government should:
Devote high-level diplomatic attention to restarting status
talks over Transnistria to build on similar efforts
launched by the German and French Governments. Decades
of experience suggest that U.S. leadership on issues of
European security remains indispensible. A durable
settlement would advance political stability and
economic growth in all of Moldova; assist in moving the
region towards Western institutions; curtail
trafficking in illicit goods and persons and
marginalize those who prosper from such trade; and
enhance the protections of individual rights and
freedoms in Transnistria.
Advocate transitioning the Russia-led peacekeeping
arrangement into an international civilian force.
Military tensions between the parties to the 1992
conflict have been all but eliminated, and the
remaining arms depots and military peacekeeping forces
have become anachronistic. A past U.S. proposal that
merits reconsideration is the deployment of an
international fact-finding mission to establish
baseline transparency, which could serve as an initial
step towards the deployment of a truly international
civilian or police mission under the aegis of the EU,
OSCE, or NATO-Russia Council.
Emphasize to the Russian Federation that its assistance in
brokering a settlement in Transnistria, and other
conflict regions in Eurasia, would serve as an
illustration that developments in NATO-Russia relations
can tangibly advance Eastern European security and that
relationships in the post-Soviet sphere are not ``zero
sum.''
Consider utilizing, if an arrangement is reached for the
complete withdrawal of Russian military equipment from
Moldova, authority under the Conventional Arms
Disarmament Act (Section 11 of Public Law 109-472) to
provide additional funding to safeguard and eliminate
small arms, light weapons, stockpiled munitions,
abandoned ordnance, and other conventional weapons
systems left in the region.
Continue to affirm that discussions concerning conventional
arms control in Europe will be guided by the need for
progress on the principle of host nation consent for
the stationing of foreign military forces, reflected in
the Senate's 1997 Resolution of Advice and Consent to
the CFE Flank Document, which stated that ``Nothing . .
. shall be construed as altering the policy of the
United States to achieve the immediate and complete
withdrawal of any armed forces and military equipment
under the control of the Russian Federation that are
deployed on the territories of the independent states
of the former Soviet Union . . . without the full and
complete agreement of those states.''
Work to repeal Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions on Moldova,
which would serve as a basis for improving bilateral
trade relations between the United States and Moldova.
Moldova has been found to be in compliance with
Jackson-Vanik-related concerns and is already a member
of the World Trade Organization. A bill to extend
permanent normal trade relations treatment to the
products of Moldova (S. 334) was introduced by Senator
Lugar in the 111th Congress and will be reintroduced in
the 112th Congress.
Explore the development of a U.S.-Moldovan partnership
charter to institutionalize cooperation across the
bilateral agenda.
Provide technical assistance to the Government of Moldova
in the realm of institutional reform and economic
growth, which will enable more foreign investment to
Moldova. Although the World Bank placed Moldova among
the top 10 Most Improved Business Reformers in 2010, it
still ranks 19th out of 25 countries in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia in its 2011 Ease of Doing Business
report, behind many of its peers in Eastern Europe,
including Romania, Belarus, and Bulgaria.
Offer regular briefings to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on the status of negotiations over
Transnistria and other protracted conflicts.