[JPRT, 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
                 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA


                                     


                                     


                             ANNUAL REPORT

                                     


                                  2011

=======================================================================



                      ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 10, 2011

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


         Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
                           2011 ANNUAL REPORT





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              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA


                                     

                                     

                             ANNUAL REPORT


                                     

                                  2011

=======================================================================

                      ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 10, 2011

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


         Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov


              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS


House

                                     Senate

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,    SHERROD BROWN, Ohio, Cochairman
Chairman                             MAX BAUCUS, Montana
                                     CARL LEVIN, Michigan
                                     DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
                                     JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
                                     SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
                                     JAMES RISCH, Idaho

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                  SETH D. HARRIS, Department of Labor
                    MARIA OTERO, Department of State
              FRANCISCO J. SANCHEZ, Department of Commerce
                 KURT M. CAMPBELL, Department of State
     NISHA DESAI BISWAL, U.S. Agency for International Development

                     Paul B. Protic, Staff Director

                 Lawrence T. Liu, Deputy Staff Director

                                  (ii)


                             C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                               
-
                                                                   Page
I. Executive Summary.............................................     1

    Introduction.................................................     1
    Overview.....................................................     3
    Specific Findings and Recommendations........................    10
    Political Prisoner Database..................................    52

II. Human Rights.................................................    55

    Freedom of Expression........................................    55
    Worker Rights................................................    67
    Criminal Justice.............................................    80
    Freedom of Religion..........................................    94
    Ethnic Minority Rights.......................................   107
    Population Planning..........................................   110
    Freedom of Residence and Movement............................   117
    Status of Women..............................................   121
    Human Trafficking............................................   126
    North Korean Refugees in China...............................   131
    Public Health................................................   135
    The Environment..............................................   139

III. Development of the Rule of Law..............................   150

    Civil Society................................................   150
    Institutions of Democratic Governance........................   158
    Commercial Rule of Law.......................................   170
    Access to Justice............................................   182
    Property.....................................................   191

IV. Xinjiang.....................................................   194

V. Tibet.........................................................   207

VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau..........................   221

VII. Endnotes....................................................   226

      Political Prisoner Database................................   226
      Freedom of Expression......................................   227
      Worker Rights..............................................   234
      Criminal Justice...........................................   240
      Freedom of Religion........................................   247
      Ethnic Minority Rights.....................................   259
      Population Planning........................................   261
      Freedom of Residence and Movement..........................   267
      Status of Women............................................   269
      Human Trafficking..........................................   273
      North Korean Refugees in China.............................   277
      Public Health..............................................   279
      The Environment............................................   282
      Civil Society..............................................   290
      Institutions of Democratic Governance......................   293
      Commercial Rule of Law.....................................   303
      Access to Justice..........................................   312
      Property...................................................   316
      Xinjiang...................................................   318
      Tibet......................................................   328
      Developments in Hong Kong and Macau........................   343
                          I. Executive Summary

                              Introduction

    The China of today is vastly different from that of 30 
years ago, when major economic reforms began, and even 10 years 
ago, when China acceded to the World Trade Organization. More 
people in today's China enjoy an improved quality of life, 
economic freedoms, and greater access to information via the 
Internet and other communication technologies. But economic and 
technological progress has not led to commensurate gains in 
China's human rights and rule of law record.
    In the areas of human rights and rule of law this year, 
China's leaders have grown more assertive in their violation of 
rights, disregarding the very laws and international standards 
that they claim to uphold and tightening their grip on Chinese 
society. China's leaders have done this while confidently 
touting their own human rights and rule of law record. This 
year, officials declared that China had reached a ``major 
milestone'' in its legal system and made ``remarkable 
achievements'' in carrying out its 2009-2010 National Human 
Rights Action Plan, asserting that ``civil and political rights 
have been effectively protected.'' China's leaders no longer 
respond to criticism by simply denying that rights have been 
abused. Rather, they increasingly use the language of 
international law to defend their actions. According to China's 
leaders, today's China is strong and moving forward on human 
rights and rule of law.
    Official rhetoric notwithstanding, China's human rights and 
rule of law record has not improved. Indeed, as this year's 
Annual Report indicates, it appears to be worsening in some 
areas. A troubling trend is officials' increased willingness to 
disregard the law when it suits them, particularly to silence 
dissent. Beginning in February 2011, Chinese police took the 
unusual step of ``disappearing'' numerous lawyers and activists 
in one of the harshest crackdowns in recent memory. It was no 
surprise, then, that in sensitive issue areas such as China's 
population planning policy, local government officials 
demonstrated little restraint in turning to illegal measures, 
including violence, to coerce compliance with a policy that 
itself violates international human rights standards. Lack of 
respect for the rule of law extended into the international 
arena, where China pursued domestic subsidies and industrial 
policies inconsistent with China's commitments as a member of 
the World Trade Organization.
    The Chinese government's misuse of the law to violate 
fundamental human rights continued. The Commission observed 
officials citing the ``law'' as a basis to crack down on 
peaceful protests; to prevent Buddhists, Catholics, Falun Gong 
practitioners, Muslims, Protestants, and Taoists from freely 
practicing their beliefs; to prevent Tibetans, Uyghurs, and 
other ethnic minorities from exercising autonomy despite 
guarantees in Chinese law; to prevent workers from 
independently organizing; and to clamp down on civil society 
organizations. The Communist Party tightened its grip at all 
levels of society, stepping up monitoring of citizens and 
social groups and stifling attempts at independent political 
participation and advocacy for democracy.
    Along with negative developments, there have been some 
hopeful signs, notably at the grassroots level. The Commission 
observed the courage of citizens calling for justice, as when 
daring journalists and millions of Internet users outmaneuvered 
censors to raise questions about the government's response to a 
high-speed rail crash, or when members of the Shouwang Church 
openly defied the government to hold outdoor worship services 
in Beijing. The Commission also continued to observe well-
intentioned officials and individuals seeking to bring about 
positive changes within the system. Such actions testify to the 
Chinese people's desire for a just society and their 
willingness to be productive partners in pursuit of that aim.
    Human rights and rule of law developments in China are 
important to the rest of the world. The rights to freedom of 
expression, association, and religion are universal and 
transcend borders. These rights are provided for in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, two documents that 
China has publicly supported. When the Chinese government and 
Communist Party deny these rights, as when they censor the 
press and Internet and restrict access to courts, citizens 
worldwide--not just in China--know less about issues such as 
poisoned food, unsafe products, natural and man-made disasters, 
and infectious disease, and have less recourse to hold 
officials accountable. Moreover, the Chinese government's 
respect for human rights and rule of law domestically serves as 
an important barometer for China's compliance and cooperation 
internationally, from trade agreements to issues of common 
global concern. Finally, as recent years have shown, China's 
increasing confidence in and defense of its human rights record 
risk setting negative precedents for other countries and 
reshaping international human rights standards to allow for 
China's abuses. China's strident justification this past year 
of its imprisonment of the Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, 
and the refusal of some governments to send representatives to 
the Nobel ceremony, exemplify this trend.
    This is the Commission's 10th Annual Report on China's 
human rights and rule of law developments. As in the past, the 
Commission has assessed the Chinese government's record on the 
basis of China's own Constitution and laws and international 
human rights standards, relying on research based in large part 
on reports and articles published in China. As Commission 
research has shown this past year, Chinese officials continue 
to deny Chinese citizens their rights in order to preserve the 
Communist Party's notion of political stability and harmony. 
China's stability is in the United States' best interest, but 
the Commission believes that stability will not result from 
repressing rights for perceived short-term gain, but only by 
ensuring and protecting the rights of all Chinese citizens.

                                Overview

    Below is a discussion of the major trends that the 
Commission observed during the 2011 reporting year, covering 
the period from fall 2010 to fall 2011.


                         disregard for the law


    The Commission observed Chinese officials disregarding the 
law to deny Chinese citizens the freedoms of speech, 
association, and religion, and the right to be free from 
arbitrary detention, as well as Chinese officials refusing to 
abide by international commitments:

         Disappearance of Human Rights Lawyers and 
        Activists. In the first half of 2011, authorities 
        reportedly ``disappeared'' numerous lawyers and rights 
        activists known for criticizing the Communist Party and 
        for advocating on behalf of politically sensitive 
        causes and groups. The ``disappearances,'' in which 
        persons went missing with little or no word of their 
        whereabouts or the charges against them, violated the 
        limited procedural protections provided under Chinese 
        law and drew the criticism of the UN Working Group on 
        Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and of the 
        international community. The missing included the well-
        known artist and public advocate Ai Weiwei, who was 
        kept at a secret location for 81 days before being 
        released on bail on the condition that he not grant 
        interviews or send Twitter messages. Following the 
        crackdown, the Chinese government announced a draft 
        revision to its Criminal Procedure Law that would 
        legalize such disappearances.
         Population Planning. Although Chinese law 
        prohibits officials from infringing on the rights and 
        interests of citizens when promoting compliance with 
        population planning policies, the Commission noted 
        reports of official campaigns, as well as numerous 
        individual cases in which officials used violent 
        methods to coerce citizens to undergo sterilizations or 
        abortions or pay heavy fines for having ``out-of-plan'' 
        children. In one such example, in October 2010, local 
        family planning officials in Xiamen city, Fujian 
        province, reportedly kidnapped a woman who was eight 
        months pregnant with her second child and detained her 
        for 40 hours. They then forcibly injected her with a 
        substance that caused the fetus to be aborted. During 
        this time, the woman's husband reportedly was not 
        permitted to see her.
         Worker Rights. China's Constitution and 
        international human rights standards provide for 
        freedom of association, but workers in China are still 
        denied their fundamental right to organize independent 
        unions, despite some potentially positive but limited 
        developments this past year (see below). Instead, 
        workers must rely on a Party-controlled union to 
        represent them. Without genuine labor representation, 
        Chinese workers continue to face poor working 
        conditions and harassment when they seek to advocate 
        independently for their rights. Worker safety issues, 
        especially among miners, and child labor remained 
        serious problems.
         Extralegal Confinement of Released Activists, 
        Petitioners. Hu Jia, a human rights and environmental 
        advocate, and Chen Guangcheng, a self-trained legal 
        advocate who publicized population planning abuses, 
        were released from prison this year only to face, along 
        with their families, onerous conditions of detention 
        and abuse with little or no basis in Chinese law. In 
        Chen's case, authorities kept him and his wife under 
        extralegal house arrest and allegedly beat them after 
        video footage of their conditions was smuggled out of 
        the house and released on an overseas Web site. In 
        addition, officials continued to hold Mongol rights 
        advocate Hada after completion of his prison sentence 
        in December 2010. The legal basis under Chinese law, if 
        any, for his continued custody is unclear. Chinese and 
        international media also reported on the ongoing 
        problem of ``black jails,'' which are extralegal 
        detention facilities used to house and abuse citizens 
        who persistently petition the government about their 
        grievances.
         Commercial Rule of Law. China continued to 
        implement policies that are inconsistent with its 
        commitments as a member of the World Trade Organization 
        (WTO) and are incompatible with the rule of law. 
        Industrial policies limit market access for non-Chinese 
        companies and in some cases violate the core WTO 
        principle of national treatment; state-owned 
        enterprises enjoy direct and indirect subsidies, 
        including land and regulatory protection, which is 
        contrary to China's WTO commitments. Favoring state-
        owned enterprises has implications for human rights, 
        including the taking of land to subsidize production 
        and the use of the state secrets law to protect 
        information in the state-owned sector. WTO cases this 
        past year addressed the impact of China's policies on 
        its trading partners in industries ranging from tires 
        to wind energy. These cases highlight Chinese support 
        of its domestic industry, China's use of quotas and 
        subsidies, the lack of transparency, and the fear of 
        retaliation against foreign companies that speak up. 
        China continued to control its currency, which many 
        economists and the International Monetary Fund consider 
        to be undervalued.
         Ethnic Minority Language and Culture. In 
        Tibetan autonomous areas of China, the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
        Region, and other minority areas, the government 
        continued to promote policies threatening the viability 
        of the language and culture of Tibetans, Uyghurs, 
        Mongols, and other groups, in contravention of China's 
        Constitution and law providing autonomy to ethnic 
        minorities. These policies included the imposition of 
        Mandarin Chinese language in schools at the expense of 
        other languages, the compulsory resettlement of large 
        numbers of nomads, tight curbs over religious practice, 
        and economic development projects that threatened 
        livelihoods and sacred sites.


           misapplication of the law as a tool for repression


    The Commission also noted the continuance of Chinese 
officials abusing and strengthening laws as a tool for 
repression and to deny citizens the basic freedoms of speech, 
association, and religion, and the right to be free from 
arbitrary detention.

         Criminal and Administrative Law. Official 
        abuse of Chinese criminal law and administrative 
        provisions prohibiting ``subversion,'' ``splittism,'' 
        and ``disrupting social order'' remained a significant 
        concern this reporting year. Chinese officials used 
        these provisions to imprison labor advocates, writers, 
        Internet essayists, democracy advocates, and Tibetan 
        and Uyghur writers and journalists who engaged in 
        peaceful expression and assembly. These included labor 
        lawyer and advocate Zhao Dongmin, three Tibetans--
        Buddha (pen name), Jangtse, and Kalsang Jinpa--
        democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, Uyghur journalist 
        Memetjan Abdulla, and numerous other advocates swept up 
        in the domestic crackdown that followed protests in the 
        Middle East and North Africa and the calls for 
        ``Jasmine'' protests in China. In August, China's top 
        legislature reviewed a draft amendment of the Criminal 
        Procedure Law that would legalize the current practice 
        of forcibly ``disappearing'' rights advocates in 
        violation of international standards.
         Internet Regulation. The Chinese government 
        sought to tighten its supervision of Internet 
        activities, establishing in May 2011 a State Internet 
        Information Office to ``strengthen [the state's] 
        supervision of online content.'' Reports indicated that 
        officials also stepped up measures to monitor Internet 
        use in public places. The total number of Web sites in 
        China reportedly decreased dramatically as a result of 
        greater state intervention.
         Religious Regulation. The Chinese government 
        continued to formally recognize only five religions and 
        to require groups belonging to these religions to 
        register with the government and submit to ongoing 
        state control. Unregistered worshippers and those 
        practicing unrecognized beliefs continued to face 
        harassment.

                 Buddhists and Taoists. Authorities 
                maintained a restrictive framework for 
                controlling Buddhist and Taoist doctrines, 
                practices, worship sites, and religious 
                personnel.
                 Catholics. Authorities continued to 
                harass and detain Catholics who worshipped 
                outside state-controlled parameters. The state-
                controlled church forced some bishops to attend 
                the ordination ceremonies of two bishops 
                ordained without Holy See approval--the first 
                such ordinations since late 2006--as well as a 
                December 2010 state-controlled church 
                conference.
                 Falun Gong. Officials continued to carry 
                out a campaign--lasting more than a decade--of 
                extensive, systematic, and in some cases 
                violent efforts to pressure Falun Gong 
                practitioners to renounce their beliefs. This 
                year, officials were in the second year of a 
                three-year campaign that included greater 
                funding and government measures to achieve 
                these goals.
                 Protestants. Officials took into custody 
                or confined to their homes hundreds of members 
                of unregistered Protestant congregations who 
                assembled into large groups or across 
                congregations. These included members of the 
                Shouwang Church, which had not registered with 
                the authorities, after they attempted to hold 
                large-scale outdoor services in Beijing.

         Regulations in Ethnic Minority Regions.

                 Tibetans. Governments at prefecture 
                levels or above issued or drafted a series of 
                regulations to tighten state control over 
                Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, nunneries, monks, 
                and nuns.
                 Uyghurs. Following demonstrations and 
                riots in the Xinjiang region in 2009, 
                authorities there maintained repressive 
                security policies that targeted peaceful 
                dissent, human rights advocacy, and expressions 
                of cultural and religious identity, especially 
                among Uyghurs.


                 tightening party control over society


    The Commission observed the Communist Party's attempts to 
strengthen control over many aspects of society in ways that 
threatened basic human rights of freedom of expression, 
association, and religion. Authorities created new institutions 
and stepped up monitoring of citizens and groups in the name of 
``comprehensive management of public security'' and 
``safeguarding social stability.'' In some cities, Party 
monitoring was extended into commercial buildings and local 
officials packaged ``social management'' tasks with government 
service delivery in expanded monitoring of neighborhoods. Party 
wariness of the formation of independent networks, whether 
among Chinese citizens or between Chinese citizens and foreign 
groups, remained a prominent feature in many policies.

         Democratic Governance and Political 
        Participation. Top officials continued to insist that 
        there would be no multiparty elections or separation of 
        powers and that the goal of any political reform--
        whether it is of the political system or of the media--
        must be to strengthen, not weaken, the Party's 
        leadership. The use of the Internet by independent 
        candidates running in local people's congress elections 
        emerged as a hopeful sign for grassroots attempts at 
        democracy, but the Party discouraged such candidates, 
        and local officials took repressive measures to stop 
        them. The Party sought to monopolize village leadership 
        positions. Authorities continued to have no tolerance 
        for certain democracy advocates, for example 
        restricting the freedom of movement of elections expert 
        Yao Lifa.
         Media and Internet. Party officials maintained 
        heavy censorship of the Internet, media, and 
        publishing, including limiting coverage of public 
        disasters and health emergencies, and silencing well-
        known journalists such as Chang Ping. Repression of 
        foreign journalists peaked after they attempted to 
        cover the calls for ``Jasmine'' protests.
         Negotiations With the Dalai Lama. Regarding 
        the status of negotiations between Chinese officials 
        and the Dalai Lama or his representatives, no formal 
        dialogue between the two sides took place this past 
        year, the longest break since dialogue resumed in 2002. 
        Officials continued their campaign to discredit the 
        Dalai Lama as a religious leader. For his part, the 
        Dalai Lama renounced an official role in exiled Tibetan 
        governance, a move that could alter the dialogue 
        dynamics by making it more difficult for officials to 
        characterize him as a ``political'' figure.


                    progress claimed; impact unclear


    This past year, the Chinese government announced new 
measures related to human rights and the rule of law, but the 
actual impact was unclear or negative.

         Civil Society. Beijing and Shanghai reportedly 
        conducted limited reforms to potentially make it easier 
        for certain types of civil society organizations to 
        register with the government, but some experts argued 
        that the moves could solidify the government's already 
        tight control over which types of civil society 
        organizations are allowed to operate in China.
         Death Penalty Reform. In order to limit 
        application of the death penalty, for which statistics 
        remain a state secret, authorities amended the PRC 
        Criminal Law to reduce the number of crimes punishable 
        by death from 68 to 55. In practice authorities rarely, 
        if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 
        reclassified crimes.
         Access to Justice. Officials promoted a new 
        mediation law, effective in January 2011, as the 
        preferred method of resolving disputes and maintaining 
        social stability. While mediation may be effective in 
        some cases, the courts' emphasis on this form of 
        dispute resolution raised questions about denying 
        access to courts, increasing pressure on courts and 
        parties to mediate cases, and weakening the rule of 
        law.
         Village Governance. Local authorities 
        continued to implement pilot projects in villages to 
        reduce corruption, maintain ``social stability,'' 
        improve budget transparency, and promote ``democratic'' 
        public participation, but the sustainability and impact 
        of these projects are unclear.
         Environment. Some central-level authorities 
        continued to state their support for public 
        participation and took steps to improve environmental 
        information disclosure. An administrative provision 
        limiting the disclosure of basic pollution information, 
        however, appeared to remain in effect, and local 
        environmental authorities continued to be reluctant to 
        disclose information, especially in relation to 
        polluting industries. In addition, central-level 
        environmental officials issued a measure that states 
        support for social organizations and encourages closer 
        cooperation between government officials and 
        environmental groups, but also stipulates strengthening 
        ``guidance'' of and ``political thought'' work for 
        environmental groups.


                         potential for progress


    In a few areas, the Commission observed developments that 
could bring about positive change in human rights and the rule 
of law in China depending on implementation and other factors.

         Mental Health. After decades of preparation, 
        officials released a draft national mental health law 
        in June 2011 that could curb abuse of the diagnosis of 
        mental illness to detain in psychiatric institutions 
        persons who voice dissent.
         Government Transparency. Officials continued 
        to state their support for open government information 
        initiatives, and the number of government agencies 
        publicly disclosing general information about their 
        budgets reportedly increased. However, a number of 
        fundamental obstacles to transparency remained in 
        place, including China's state secrets laws, lack of a 
        free press and independent judiciary, and policies 
        requiring government approvals of investments through a 
        non-transparent process.
         Worker Rights. Faced in part with the demands 
        of a younger, more assertive workforce and pressure to 
        maintain social stability, Chinese officials introduced 
        limited steps that could improve conditions for 
        workers. A law on social insurance took effect that 
        deals with work-related injury insurance, and 
        authorities reportedly continued to consider a draft 
        national wage regulation. It remains unclear whether 
        such measures will help address unequal wealth 
        distribution and streamline worker compensation 
        procedures.
         Citizen Participation on the Internet. 
        Government initiatives to expand access to the 
        Internet, including access among rural residents, have 
        contributed to creating an online space that Chinese 
        citizens have utilized to express concern over human 
        rights and government policies. The government and 
        Party, however, continued to heavily censor the 
        Internet and to promote its use for economic 
        development and propaganda.
         Anticorruption. The government continued 
        limited anti-corruption measures, including steps to 
        prevent corruption at the grassroots level, to curb 
        judicial corruption, and to criminalize bribery of 
        foreign officials by Chinese companies operating 
        overseas. Officials issued provisions calling for the 
        promotion of an ``honest'' Party and a ``clean'' 
        government. Despite some new regulatory language, 
        protections for whistleblowers remain inadequate.
         Access to Justice. Chinese officials 
        reportedly took some steps to expand legal aid and to 
        promote administrative law reforms that seek to provide 
        greater oversight of state agencies and government 
        employees and to protect citizens' interests.
         Property Rights. Regulations covering 
        expropriation of urban housing came into effect in 
        January 2011. If fully implemented, the regulations 
        could offer greater protection for urban homeowners. 
        Rural landowners, however, lack equivalent protection.
         Criminal Procedure Reforms. In August, China's 
        top legislature reviewed a draft amendment to the 
        Criminal Procedure Law, which includes revisions that 
        aim to prohibit forced self-incrimination, bar the use 
        of evidence obtained through torture, and permit 
        Chinese criminal defense attorneys to meet criminal 
        defendants in custody without being monitored.

The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated in 
and supported the work of the Commission. The content of this 
Annual Report, including its findings, views, and 
recommendations, does not necessarily reflect the views of 
individual Executive Branch members or the policies of the 
Administration.

                 Specific Findings and Recommendations

     A summary of specific findings follows below for each 
section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the 
Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has 
identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next 
year, and, in accordance with the Commission's legislative 
mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the 
President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.

                         Freedom of Expression

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, 
        Chinese officials continued to maintain a broad range 
        of restrictions on free expression that do not comply 
        with international human rights standards, including 
        Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
        Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the 
        Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While such 
        standards permit states in limited circumstances to 
        restrict expression to protect interests such as 
        national security and public order, Chinese 
        restrictions covered a much broader range of activity, 
        including expression critical of the Communist Party 
        and peaceful dissent. Despite this, Chinese officials 
        continue to point to Internet development in China as 
        proof of freedom of expression and to argue that 
        Chinese restrictions comply with international law, 
        including in the case of imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize 
        winner Liu Xiaobo.
         This past year was marked by a major crackdown 
        on Internet and press freedom that exemplified the 
        range of tools officials can use to restrict the free 
        flow of information. The crackdown began in mid-
        February following protests in the Middle East and 
        North Africa and the appearance of online calls for 
        ``Jasmine'' protests in China.
         While international and domestic observers 
        continued to note the vibrancy of Internet and cell 
        phone use in China, government and Party officials 
        showed little sign of loosening political control. Top 
        leaders, including President Hu Jintao, called for 
        ``strengthening'' the Party's guidance of online public 
        opinion, as well as the Party's leadership over the 
        Internet. Officials established a central-level agency 
        to tighten supervision of the Internet and issued 
        regulations to increase monitoring of Internet use in 
        public places. Censors continued to block the sharing 
        of online information that officials deemed to be 
        politically sensitive, including news of the Nobel 
        Peace Prize award to imprisoned intellectual and reform 
        advocate Liu Xiaobo, the calls for ``Jasmine'' 
        protests, and words such as ``human rights'' and 
        ``democracy.'' At times, citizen expression on China's 
        microblogs overwhelmed censors, including following the 
        Wenzhou high-speed train accident in July 2011.
         Officials insisted that any reform of the 
        media industry would result in ``no change in the 
        Party's control over the media.'' Officials continued 
        to issue broad guidance, such as telling the media it 
        was their ``common responsibility'' to promote the 90th 
        anniversary of the Party's founding. Officials also 
        continued to issue specific directives, such as how to 
        cover the protests in the Middle East and North Africa 
        and the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. 
        Harassment of foreign journalists reached a new height 
        this past year, including beatings and threats of 
        expulsion of journalists who attempted to report on the 
        ``Jasmine'' protest strolls.
         Officials continued to arbitrarily restrict 
        expression by abusing vague criminal law provisions and 
        abusing broad regulations and registration requirements 
        applicable to journalists, publishers, news media, and 
        the Internet. Citizens who criticized the government 
        were charged with national security crimes such as 
        ``subversion.'' Official campaigns to train and 
        supervise journalists conducted in the name of 
        combating corruption continued to be heavily imbued 
        with political indoctrination. Officials continued to 
        use campaigns they described as intended to enforce the 
        law to instead target ``illegal'' political and 
        religious publications. Such publications included ones 
        that ``defame the Party and state leaders'' or 
        ``contain political rumors that create ideological 
        confusion.''

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Raise concerns over and draw enhanced 
        international attention to the Chinese government's 
        continued insistence that its restrictions on freedom 
        of expression are consistent with international 
        standards. Chinese officials assert that such measures 
        are taken to protect national security or public order 
        when available information indicates that many measures 
        are aimed at silencing opposition to the Party or 
        blocking the free flow of information on politically 
        sensitive topics. Emphasize that the Chinese 
        government's position undermines international human 
        rights standards for free expression, particularly 
        those contained in Article 19 of the International 
        Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19 
        and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
        Emphasize to Chinese officials that Communist Party and 
        government censorship of the Internet and the press can 
        lead to instability by eroding public faith in the 
        media and government.
         Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese 
        officials on the issue of how governments can best 
        ensure that restrictions on freedom of expression are 
        not abused and do not exceed the scope necessary to 
        protect national security, minors, and public order. 
        Emphasize the importance of procedural protections such 
        as public participation in formulation of restrictions 
        on free expression, transparency regarding 
        implementation of such restrictions, and independent 
        review of such restrictions. Reiterate Chinese 
        officials' own calls for greater transparency and 
        public participation in lawmaking. Such discussions may 
        be part of a broader discussion on how both the U.S. 
        and Chinese governments can work together to ensure the 
        protection of common interests on the Internet, 
        including protecting minors, computer security, and 
        privacy.
         Acknowledge the Chinese government's efforts to 
        expand access to the Internet and cell phones, 
        especially in rural areas, while continuing to press 
        officials to comply with international standards. 
        Support the research and development of technologies 
        that enable Chinese citizens to access and share 
        political and religious content that they are entitled 
        to access and share under international human rights 
        standards. Support practices and Chinese-language tools 
        and training materials that enable Chinese citizens to 
        access and share content in a way that ensures their 
        security and privacy. Support the dissemination of 
        online Chinese-language information on the Internet, 
        especially popular Chinese social media sites, that 
        discusses the rights and freedoms to which Chinese 
        citizens are entitled under international standards.
         Raise concerns regarding Chinese officials' 
        instrumental use of the law, including vague national 
        security charges, as a tool to suppress citizens' 
        rights to freedom of expression, and question whether 
        such actions are in keeping with the spirit of the 
        ``rule of law.''
         Elevate concern over the increased harassment of 
        foreign journalists, who this past year have been 
        beaten and threatened with expulsion for attempting to 
        report on events of public concern. Emphasize that such 
        treatment is not in keeping with regulations issued for 
        the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games in which Chinese 
        officials promised greater freedoms for foreign 
        journalists, and is not in keeping with the treatment 
        Chinese journalists are afforded when reporting on 
        events in the United States.
         Call for the release of Liu Xiaobo and other 
        political prisoners imprisoned for allegedly committing 
        crimes of endangering state security and other crimes 
        but whose only offense was to peacefully express 
        support for political reform or criticism of government 
        policies, including Tan Zuoren (sentenced in February 
        2010 to five years in prison after using the Internet 
        to organize an independent investigation into school 
        collapses in an earthquake).

                             Worker Rights

                                Findings

         Workers in China still are not guaranteed, 
        either by law or in practice, full worker rights in 
        accordance with international standards, including the 
        right to organize into independent unions. The All-
        China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official 
        union under the direction of the Communist Party, is 
        the only legal trade union organization in China. All 
        lower level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU.
         The Commission continues to note the lack of 
        genuine labor representation in China. ACFTU officials 
        continue to state that it is their goal to develop 
        stronger representation for workers. In January 2011, 
        for example, the ACFTU announced its plan to establish 
        a system of electing worker representatives in 80 
        percent of unionized public enterprises and 70 percent 
        of unionized non-public enterprises in 2011. In March 
        2011, Zhang Mingqi, the vice chairman of the ACFTU, 
        acknowledged that an increase in worker actions was due 
        to enterprises having ``neglected the legal rights and 
        benefits of workers'' for many years. Multiple 
        localities in China also announced plans to establish 
        collective wage consultation systems in coming years, 
        including Qingdao, Changde, Rizhao, Qinhuangdao, and 
        Shenzhen.
         At the same time, advocates for worker rights 
        in China continue to be subjected to harassment and 
        abuse. In particular, officials appear to target 
        advocates who have the ability to organize and mobilize 
        large groups of workers. For example, in October 2010, 
        a Xi'an court sentenced labor lawyer and advocate Zhao 
        Dongmin to three years in prison for organizing workers 
        at state-owned enterprises. Authorities charged him 
        with ``mobilizing the masses to disrupt social order.'' 
        Authorities continue to detain Yang Huanqing for 
        organizing teachers in fall 2010 to petition against 
        social insurance policies they alleged to be unfair.
         As the Commission found in 2010, Chinese 
        authorities continue to face the challenge of 
        accommodating a younger, more educated, and rights-
        conscious workforce. In February 2011, the ACFTU 
        released a set of policy recommendations intended to 
        better address the demands of these young workers. 
        Younger workers, born in the 1980s and 1990s, continue 
        to be at the forefront of worker actions in China this 
        year, including large-scale street protests in southern 
        China in June 2011. These young workers also make up 
        about 100 million of China's 160 million migrant 
        workers, and compared to their parents, have higher 
        expectations regarding wages and labor rights. China's 
        Minister of Agriculture Han Changfu has pointed out 
        that many of these young workers have never laid down 
        roots, are better educated, are the only child in the 
        family, and are more likely to ``demand, like their 
        urban peers, equal employment, equal access to social 
        services, and even the obtainment of equal political 
        rights.''
         With Chinese officials charged with preserving 
        ``social stability,'' the extent to which they will 
        allow workers to bargain for higher wages and genuine 
        representation remains unclear. In part to address 
        official concern over the unequal distribution of 
        wealth across China and its potential effects on 
        ``social unrest,'' the government reportedly is 
        considering a national regulation on wages. Chinese 
        media in the past year reported that the draft 
        regulation includes provisions creating a ``normal 
        increase mechanism'' for wages, defining a set of 
        standards to calculate overtime pay, and requiring the 
        management of certain ``monopolized industries'' 
        (longduan qiye) to disclose to the government and the 
        public the salary levels of their senior employees.
         The Commission continued to monitor the 
        progress of Guangdong province's draft Regulations on 
        Democratic Management of Enterprises, which reportedly 
        would extend to workers the right to ask for collective 
        wage consultations and allow worker members to sit on 
        the enterprise's board of directors and board of 
        supervisors, represent worker interests in the boards' 
        meetings, and take part in the enterprise's 
        decisionmaking processes. In September 2010, the 
        Standing Committee of the Guangdong People's Congress 
        reportedly withdrew the draft from further 
        consideration due to heavy opposition from industry. 
        During this reporting year, a major Hong Kong media 
        source reported that Guangdong authorities would 
        approve the draft in January 2011. However, no such 
        action has been observed.
         Chinese workers, especially miners, continued 
        to face persistent occupational safety issues. In 
        November 2010, the ACFTU released figures showing a 32 
        percent increase in occupational illnesses in 2009, of 
        which the vast majority involved lung disease. 
        Officials took some efforts to close some mines and 
        promote safety, and fatalities have been consistently 
        reduced over the past few years, but uneven enforcement 
        reportedly continued to hinder such efforts. Collusion 
        between mine operators and local officials reportedly 
        remains widespread.
         In January 2011, revisions to the Regulations 
        on Work-Related Injury Insurance became effective. The 
        changes include requiring officials to respond more 
        quickly to worker injury claims, but the effectiveness 
        of the changes is unclear. As the Commission reported 
        last year, the claims process may last for more than a 
        decade. The process is further complicated for migrant 
        workers who may already have left their jobs and moved 
        to another location by the time clinical symptoms 
        surface.
         The extent of child labor in China is unclear 
        in part because the government does not release data on 
        child labor despite frequent requests by the U.S. 
        Government, other countries' governments, and 
        international organizations. While a national legal 
        framework exists to address the issue, systemic 
        problems in enforcement have dulled the effects of 
        these legal measures. Reports of child labor continued 
        to surface this past year. As an example, in March 
        2011, Shenzhen authorities reportedly found 40 children 
        working at an electronics factory.
         The National People's Congress Standing 
        Committee passed the PRC Social Insurance Law in 
        October 2010, and it became effective on July 1, 2011. 
        The law specifies that workers may transfer their 
        insurance from one region to another and discusses five 
        major types of insurance: Old-age pension, medical, 
        unemployment, work-related injury, and maternity. No 
        implementing guidelines have been released and some 
        critics have said the law is too broad to be 
        implemented effectively. In addition, the extent to 
        which the law will enable a greater number of migrant 
        workers to obtain social insurance remains unclear. At 
        the same time, migrant workers continued to face 
        discrimination in urban areas, and their children still 
        faced difficulties accessing city schools. Employment 
        discrimination more generally continued to be a serious 
        problem, especially for workers without urban household 
        registration status.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support projects promoting reform of Chinese 
        labor laws and regulations to reflect internationally 
        recognized labor principles. Prioritize projects that 
        not only focus on legislative drafting and regulatory 
        development, but also analyze implementation and 
        measure progress in terms of compliance with 
        internationally recognized labor principles at the 
        shop-floor level.
         Support multi-year pilot projects that showcase 
        the experience of collective bargaining in action for 
        both Chinese workers and trade union officials; 
        identify local trade union offices found to be more 
        open to collective bargaining; and focus pilot projects 
        in those locales. Where possible, prioritize programs 
        that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective 
        bargaining pilot projects even in factories that do not 
        have an official union presence. Encourage the 
        expansion of exchanges between Chinese labor rights 
        advocates in non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
        bar, academia, the official trade union, and U.S. 
        collective bargaining practitioners. Prioritize 
        exchanges that emphasize face-to-face meetings with 
        hands-on practitioners and trainers.
         Encourage research that identifies factors 
        underlying inconsistency in enforcement of labor laws 
        and regulations. This includes projects that prioritize 
        the large-scale compilation and analysis of Chinese 
        labor dispute litigation and arbitration cases and 
        guidance documents issued by, and to, courts at the 
        provincial level and below, leading ultimately to the 
        publication and dissemination of Chinese language 
        casebooks that may be used as a common reference 
        resource by workers, arbitrators, judges, lawyers, 
        employers, union officials, and law schools in China.
         Support capacity-building programs to strengthen 
        Chinese labor and legal aid organizations involved in 
        defending the rights of workers. Encourage Chinese 
        officials at local levels to develop, maintain, and 
        deepen relationships with labor organizations inside 
        and outside of China and to invite these groups to 
        increase the number of training programs in mainland 
        China. Support programs that train workers in ways to 
        identify problems at the factory-floor level, equipping 
        them with skills and problem-solving training so they 
        can relate their concerns to employers effectively.
         Where appropriate, share the United States' 
        ongoing experience and efforts in protecting worker 
        rights--through legal, regulatory, or non-governmental 
        means--with Chinese officials. Expand site visits and 
        other exchanges for Chinese officials to observe and 
        share ideas with U.S. labor rights groups, lawyers, the 
        U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and other regulatory 
        agencies at all levels of U.S. Government that work on 
        labor issues.
         Support USDOL's exchange with China's Ministry of 
        Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) regarding 
        setting and enforcing minimum wage standards; 
        strengthening social insurance; improving employment 
        statistics; and promoting social dialogue and exchanges 
        with China's State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) 
        regarding improving workplace safety and health. 
        Support the annual labor dialogue with China that USDOL 
        started in 2010 and its plan for the establishment of a 
        safety dialogue. Encourage discussion on the value of 
        constructive interactions among labor NGOs, workers, 
        employers, and government agencies. Encourage exchanges 
        that emphasize the importance of government 
        transparency in developing stable labor relations and 
        in ensuring full and fair enforcement of labor laws.

                            Criminal Justice

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, 
        the Chinese government waged a broad-scale crackdown on 
        human rights advocates, lawyers, bloggers, writers, and 
        democracy activists. In early 2011, Chinese public 
        security officials detained more than 200 advocates in 
        a campaign that appeared related to official 
        sensitivity over recent protests in the Middle East and 
        North Africa and to an anonymous online call for so-
        called ``Jasmine'' protests within China.
         Harassment and intimidation of human rights 
        advocates and their families by Chinese government 
        officials continued during this reporting year. Public 
        security authorities and unofficial personnel illegally 
        monitored and subjected to periodic illegal home 
        confinement human rights defenders, petitioners, 
        religious adherents, human rights lawyers, and their 
        family members. Such mistreatment and abuse were 
        evident particularly in the leadup to sensitive dates 
        and events, such as the Nobel Peace Prize award 
        ceremony in December 2010 and the ``Jasmine'' protests 
        of early 2011.
         Chinese officials continued to use various 
        forms of extralegal detention against Chinese citizens, 
        including human rights advocates, petitioners, and 
        peaceful protesters. Those arbitrarily detained were 
        often held in psychiatric hospitals or extralegal 
        detention facilities and subjected to treatment 
        inconsistent with international standards and 
        protections found in China's Constitution and the PRC 
        Criminal Procedure Law.
         Chinese criminal defense lawyers continue to 
        confront obstacles to practicing law without judicial 
        interference or fear of prosecution. In cases that 
        officials deemed ``politically sensitive,'' criminal 
        defense attorneys routinely faced harassment and abuse. 
        Some suspects and defendants in sensitive cases were 
        not able to have counsel of their own choosing and some 
        were compelled to accept government-appointed defense 
        counsel. Abuses of Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law, 
        which prescribes criminal liability to lawyers who 
        force or induce a witness to change his or her 
        testimony or falsify evidence, continue to hinder 
        effective criminal defense.
         In February 2011, the National People's 
        Congress Standing Committee reviewed and passed the 
        eighth amendment to the PRC Criminal Law, which reduced 
        the number of crimes punishable by the death penalty to 
        55 crimes. The reduction signaled the first time the 
        Chinese government has reduced the number of crimes 
        punishable by capital punishment since the PRC Criminal 
        Law was enacted in 1979. International organizations 
        and the state-run media pointed out that courts rarely, 
        if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 crimes no 
        longer eligible for capital punishment.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Press the Chinese government to release 
        immediately advocates who are in prison or detention 
        and to adhere to fair trial standards and ensure 
        procedural protections for the approximately 40 human 
        rights advocates in cases that have already gone to 
        trial.
         Support the establishment of exchanges between 
        Chinese provincial law enforcement agencies and U.S. 
        state law enforcement agencies to study policing, 
        evidence collection, inmate rights, and other criminal 
        justice reforms currently underway in China.
         Press the Chinese government to adopt the 
        recommendation of the United Nations (UN) Committee 
        against Torture to investigate and disclose the 
        existence of ``black jails'' and other secret detention 
        facilities as a first step toward abolishing such forms 
        of extralegal detention. Ask the Chinese government to 
        extend an invitation to the UN Working Group on 
        Arbitrary Detention to visit China.
         Call on the Chinese government to commit publicly 
        to a specific timetable for its ratification of the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
        which the Chinese government signed in 1998 but has not 
        yet ratified. Press the Chinese government to implement 
        the principles asserted in its 2009-2010 National Human 
        Rights Action Plan, and request that the Chinese 
        government implement additional plans to advance human 
        rights and the rule of law.
         Urge the Chinese government to amend the PRC 
        Criminal Procedure Law to reflect the enhanced rights 
        and protections for lawyers and detained suspects 
        contained in the 2008 revision of the PRC Lawyers Law. 
        Encourage Chinese officials to commit to a specific 
        timetable for revision and implementation of the 
        revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law.

                          Freedom of Religion

                                Findings

         The Chinese government continued in the past 
        reporting year to restrict Chinese citizens' freedom of 
        religion. China's Constitution guarantees freedom of 
        religious belief but limits protections for religious 
        practice to ``normal religious activities,'' a term 
        applied in a manner that falls short of international 
        human rights protections for freedom of religion. The 
        government continued to recognize only five religions--
        Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and 
        Taoism--and required groups belonging to these 
        religions to register with the government. Registered 
        groups received some legal protection for their 
        religious activities but remained subject to ongoing 
        state controls. Members of both unregistered and 
        registered groups deemed to run afoul of state-set 
        parameters for religion faced risk of harassment, 
        detention, and other abuses. Some unregistered groups 
        had space to practice their religions, but this limited 
        tolerance did not amount to official recognition of 
        these groups' rights. Authorities also shut down the 
        activities of some unregistered groups and maintained 
        bans on other religious or spiritual communities, 
        including Falun Gong.
         The government continued to use law to control 
        religious practice in China rather than protect the 
        religious freedom of all Chinese citizens, accelerating 
        efforts in the past reporting year to revise or pass 
        new legal measures. Planned legal measures, like others 
        passed in recent years, build on provisions contained 
        in the 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA). 
        Recent legal measures have added more clarity to 
        ambiguous provisions in the RRA but also have 
        articulated more detailed levels of control.
         Authorities continued to control Buddhist 
        institutions and practices and take steps to curb 
        ``unauthorized'' Buddhist temples. As of August 2011, 
        the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan autonomous 
        prefectural governments issued or drafted regulatory 
        measures that increase substantially state infringement 
        on freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries 
        and nunneries.
         Authorities continued to deny Catholics the 
        freedom to recognize the authority of the Holy See in 
        matters relating to the practice of their faith, 
        including selecting Chinese bishops. Authorities 
        continued to harass, detain, and place under 
        surveillance some unregistered priests and bishops, as 
        well as forced some bishops to attend what the Holy See 
        considers illegitimate state-controlled church events 
        against their will.
         Local governments across China continued to 
        prohibit Muslims from engaging in religious outreach 
        and preaching activities independent of state-set 
        parameters. In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 
        officials integrated curbs over Islam into security 
        campaigns and monitored mosques, placed restrictions on 
        the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, continued 
        campaigns to prevent Muslim men from wearing beards and 
        women from wearing veils, and targeted ``illegal'' 
        religious materials in censorship campaigns.
         Cases of harassment and detention of 
        Protestants since late 2010 suggest that authorities' 
        sensitivities have intensified toward Protestants who 
        organize into large groups or across congregations, or 
        who have contact with foreign individuals or 
        organizations. This past year, the government also 
        called for ``guiding'' members of unregistered 
        Protestant groups to worship at registered sites.
         Authorities maintained controls over Taoist 
        activities and took steps to curb ``feudal 
        superstitious activities.''
         Authorities are currently in the second year 
        of a three-year campaign to increase efforts to 
        pressure Falun Gong practitioners to renounce their 
        belief in and practice of Falun Gong. This campaign is 
        part of a broader campaign--lasting more than a 
        decade--that reportedly has been extensive, systematic, 
        and in some cases violent. Local authorities in 
        Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, took measures to 
        restrict the freedom of Falun Gong practitioners during 
        the November 2010 Asian Games in Guangzhou, including 
        detaining Falun Gong practitioners on suspicion of 
        ``cult''-related activity.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to 
        all citizens freedom of religion in accordance with 
        Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
        and to remove the government's framework for 
        recognizing only select religious communities for 
        limited state protections. Stress to Chinese 
        authorities that freedom of religion includes the right 
        to practice a religion, as well as the right to hold 
        religious beliefs, and that China's limited protections 
        for ``normal religious activities'' do not meet 
        protections for freedom of religion as defined by 
        international human rights standards. Call on officials 
        to integrate steps to protect freedom of religion into 
        initiatives to improve human rights in China. Stress to 
        the Chinese government that the right to freedom of 
        religion includes: The right of Buddhists to carry out 
        activities in temples independent of state controls 
        over religion, and the right of Tibetan Buddhists to 
        express openly their respect or devotion to Tibetan 
        Buddhist teachers, including the Dalai Lama; the right 
        of Catholics to recognize the authority of the Holy See 
        in matters relating to the practice of their faith, 
        including to make bishop appointments; the right of 
        Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice Falun Gong 
        inside China; the right of Muslims to engage in 
        religious outreach and preaching activities independent 
        of state-set parameters and not face curbs on their 
        internationally protected right to freedom of religion 
        in the name of upholding ``stability''; the right of 
        Protestants to worship free from state controls over 
        doctrine and to worship in unregistered house churches, 
        free from harassment, detention, and other abuses; and 
        the right of Taoists to interpret their faith free from 
        state efforts to ban practices deemed as ``feudal 
        superstitions.''
         Call for the release of Chinese citizens 
        confined, detained, or imprisoned in retaliation for 
        pursuing their right to freedom of religion (including 
        the right to hold and exercise spiritual beliefs). Such 
        prisoners include: Sonam Lhatso (Tibetan Buddhist nun 
        sentenced in 2009 to 10 years' imprisonment after she 
        and other nuns staged a protest calling for Tibetan 
        independence and the Dalai Lama's long life and return 
        to Tibet); Su Zhimin (an unregistered Catholic bishop 
        who disappeared after being taken into police custody 
        in 1996); Wang Zhiwen (Falun Gong practitioner serving 
        a 16-year sentence for organizing peaceful protests by 
        Falun Gong practitioners in 1999); Nurtay Memet (Muslim 
        man sentenced to five years' imprisonment for a 
        ``superstition''-related activity connected to his 
        religion); Fan Yafeng (a legal scholar, religious 
        freedom advocate, and house church leader kept under 
        home confinement since November 2010 in connection with 
        his advocacy for unregistered Protestant communities 
        and coinciding with a broader crackdown on rights 
        advocates), as well as other prisoners mentioned in 
        this report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner 
        Database.
         Call for officials to eliminate criminal and 
        administrative penalties that target religion and 
        spiritual movements and have been used to punish 
        Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom 
        of religion. Specifically, call for officials to 
        eliminate Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law (which 
        criminalizes using a ``cult'' to undermine 
        implementation of state laws) and Article 27 of the PRC 
        Public Security Administration Punishment Law (which 
        stipulates detention or fines for organizing or 
        inciting others to engage in ``cult'' activities and 
        for using cults or the ``guise of religion'' to disturb 
        social order or to harm others' health).
         Support initiatives to provide technical 
        assistance to the Chinese government in drafting legal 
        provisions that protect, rather than restrain, freedom 
        of religion for all Chinese citizens. Promote exchanges 
        to bring experts on religious freedom to China and 
        support training classes for Chinese officials on 
        international human rights standards for the protection 
        of freedom of religion. Promote dialogue on religious 
        freedom, including information on protecting the rights 
        of the range of religious communities and 
        organizations, including faith-based groups that carry 
        out social welfare activities.
         Support non-governmental organizations that 
        collect information on conditions for religious freedom 
        in China and that inform Chinese citizens of how to 
        defend their right to freedom of religion against 
        Chinese government abuses. Support organizations that 
        help religious practitioners to appeal prisoners' 
        sentences and orders to serve reeducation through labor 
        stemming from citizens' exercise of freedom of 
        religion; to challenge government seizure of property; 
        and to challenge job discrimination based on religion.

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

                                Findings

         In the past reporting year, ethnic minorities 
        in China continued to face unique challenges in 
        upholding their rights, as defined in both Chinese and 
        international law. The International Covenant on Civil 
        and Political Rights stipulates that ethnic, religious, 
        and linguistic minorities within a state ``shall not be 
        denied the right, in community with the other members 
        of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
        and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
        language.'' The PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law 
        stipulates some protections for minority rights and 
        provides for a system of regional autonomy in 
        designated areas. Limits in the substance and 
        implementation of state laws and policies, however, 
        prevented minorities from fully enjoying their rights 
        in line with international standards and from 
        exercising meaningful autonomy in practice.
         The government continued to recognize 55 
        groups as minority ``nationalities'' or ``ethnicities'' 
        (shaoshu minzu) and exerted tightest control over 
        groups deemed to challenge state authority, especially 
        in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet 
        Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous areas, 
        and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See separate 
        findings and recommendations on Xinjiang and Tibet 
        within this section.] Government authorities continued 
        to punish ethnic Mongols perceived to challenge state 
        power or who attempted to promote their rights. In the 
        past year, authorities detained, sentenced to prison, 
        or appeared to hold in extralegal detention a number of 
        Mongols who aimed to protect their rights or preserve 
        Mongol culture. Those detained included Mongols who 
        held demonstrations in May 2011 to protest government 
        policy toward grasslands use and curbs on Mongol 
        culture.
         Government steps to address ethnic minorities' 
        grievances remained limited in the past year. The State 
        Ethnic Affairs Commission reported in December 2010 on 
        exploring and ``perfecting'' ``new mechanisms and 
        forms'' for improving the state's regional ethnic 
        autonomy system, but also affirmed the basic parameters 
        of the state's minority policies. The Chinese 
        government's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action 
        Plan pledged support for some aspects of ethnic 
        minority rights, but appeared to have limited impact, 
        especially in the areas of civil and political rights.
         The Chinese government continued to implement 
        top-down development policies that have undercut the 
        promotion of regional autonomy and limited the rights 
        of ethnic minorities to maintain their unique cultures, 
        languages, and livelihoods, while bringing a degree of 
        economic improvements to minority areas. The government 
        bolstered longstanding grasslands policies that have 
        imposed grazing bans and required some herders to 
        resettle from grasslands and abandon pastoral 
        livelihoods, a development that affects Mongols, 
        Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other minority groups in China. 
        Mongols protested grasslands policies during a series 
        of demonstrations in May.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support rule of law programs and exchange 
        programs that raise awareness among Chinese leaders of 
        different models for governance that protect ethnic 
        minorities' rights and allow them to exercise 
        meaningful autonomy over their affairs, in line with 
        both domestic Chinese law and international human 
        rights standards. Following the expiration of the 2009-
        2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, call on Chinese 
        authorities to continue to include attention to 
        minority rights in subsequent human rights initiatives 
        and issue concrete plans for implementation and 
        assessment in line with international standards.
         Support programs that promote models for economic 
        development in China that include participatory 
        decisionmaking from ethnic minority communities. Call 
        on the Chinese government to examine the efficacy of 
        existing grasslands policies in ameliorating 
        environmental degradation and to take steps to ensure 
        that the rights of herders are protected in the process 
        of promoting environmental policies.
         Support non-governmental organizations that 
        address human rights conditions for ethnic minorities 
        in China to enable them to continue their research and 
        develop programs to help ethnic minorities increase 
        their capacity to protect their rights. Encourage such 
        organizations to develop training programs on promoting 
        economic development that includes participatory 
        decisionmaking from ethnic minority communities; 
        programs to protect ethnic minority languages, 
        cultures, and livelihoods; and programs that document 
        conditions and research rights abuses in the Inner 
        Mongolia Autonomous Region. Encourage broader human 
        rights and rule of law programs that operate in China 
        to develop projects that address issues affecting 
        ethnic minorities in China.
         Call on the Chinese government to release people 
        detained, imprisoned, or otherwise held in custody for 
        advocating for the rights of ethnic minority citizens, 
        including Mongol rights advocate Hada (who remains in 
        custody despite the expiration of his 15-year sentence 
        in December 2010), his wife Xinna and son Uiles 
        (detained in advance of Hada's scheduled release and 
        later formally arrested), and other prisoners mentioned 
        in this report and in the Commission's Political 
        Prisoner Database.

                          Population Planning

                                Findings

         Chinese government officials continued to 
        implement population planning policies that interfere 
        with and control the reproductive lives of its 
        citizens, especially women, employing various methods 
        including fines, withholding of state benefits and 
        permits, forced sterilization, forced abortion, and 
        arbitrary detention to punish policy violations.
         The Commission observed in 2011 the continued 
        practice by local governments of specifically targeting 
        migrant workers for coercive implementation of family 
        planning policies.
         The PRC Population and Family Planning Law is 
        not consistent with the standards set by the 1995 
        Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of 
        the Cairo International Conference on Population and 
        Development. Controls imposed on Chinese women and 
        their families and additional abuses engendered by the 
        system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies 
        against ``out-of-plan'' children, also violate 
        standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All 
        Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention 
        on the Rights of the Child, and the International 
        Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. China 
        is a state party to these treaties and is bound to 
        uphold their terms.
         The Chinese government does not consistently 
        implement provisions in the PRC Population and Family 
        Planning Law (PFPL) that prohibit and provide 
        punishment for abuses in the implementation of 
        population planning policies. Article 4 of the PFPL 
        states that officials shall ``enforce the law in a 
        civil manner, and they may not infringe upon the 
        legitimate rights and interests of citizens.'' Under 
        Article 39, an official is subject to criminal or 
        administrative punishment if, in the implementation of 
        population planning policies, the official ``infringes 
        on a citizen's personal rights, property rights, or 
        other legitimate rights and interests'' or ``abuses his 
        power, neglects his duty, or engages in malpractices 
        for personal gain . . . .''
         September 2010 marked the 30th anniversary of 
        the beginning of China's current family planning 
        efforts, and following this anniversary, the Commission 
        observed increased public discussion of the prospects 
        for family planning policy reform. Top Communist Party 
        and government leaders continue to publicly defend the 
        policy and rule out its cancellation in the near-term.
         The Chinese government's population planning 
        policies continue to exacerbate the country's 
        demographic challenges, including a severely imbalanced 
        sex ratio--the highest in the world--an aging 
        population, and a decline in the working age 
        population.
         Authorities released Chen Guangcheng, a self-
        trained legal advocate who publicized population 
        planning abuses, from prison after he had completed his 
        full sentence on September 9, 2010. Following his 
        release, however, authorities have kept Chen and his 
        family under ``soft detention,'' or home confinement, 
        and continued to subject them to abuse and restrictive 
        control.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Urge Chinese government officials to cease 
        coercive methods of enforcing family planning policies. 
        Urge the Chinese government to dismantle coercive 
        population controls and provide greater reproductive 
        freedom and privacy for women.
         Urge the Chinese government to reevaluate the PRC 
        Population and Family Planning Law and bring it into 
        conformance with international standards set forth in 
        the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of 
        Action of the Cairo International Conference on 
        Population and Development, as well as the Convention 
        on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
        against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the 
        Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, 
        Social and Cultural Rights.
         Urge China's central and local governments to 
        enforce vigorously provisions under Chinese law that 
        provide for punishments of officials and other 
        individuals who violate the rights of citizens when 
        implementing population planning policies. Urge the 
        Chinese government to establish penalties, including 
        specific criminal and financial penalties, for 
        officials and individuals found to commit abuses such 
        as coercive abortion and coercive sterilization--
        practices that continue in China despite provisions 
        under existing laws and regulations intended to 
        prohibit them. Urge the Chinese government to delink 
        material and financial incentives for officials from 
        their performance in implementing family planning 
        policies and thereby reduce or remove the impetus for 
        unlawful practices.
         Support the development of programs and 
        international cooperation on legal aid and training 
        programs that help citizens pursue compensation under 
        the PRC State Compensation Law and that help citizens 
        pursue other remedies against the state for injury 
        suffered as a result of official abuse related to 
        China's population planning policies.
         Call on the Chinese government to release Chen 
        Guangcheng and his family from extralegal detention and 
        to permit them to enjoy the freedoms of movement, 
        expression, and association, as provided under Chinese 
        law and international standards to which the Chinese 
        government has committed.

                   Freedom of Residence and Movement

                                Findings

         During the Commission's reporting year, the 
        Chinese government continued to relax some household 
        registration (hukou) restrictions consistent with 
        earlier efforts. The system, first implemented in the 
        1950s, continues to limit the right of Chinese citizens 
        to establish formally their permanent place of 
        residence.
         The Chinese government implemented several 
        pilot hukou reform projects in several municipalities, 
        aimed to bring all residents who already hold a local 
        hukou under a unified registration system. The 
        ramifications of the latest hukou reforms remain 
        unclear. The Chinese media have praised the latest 
        reforms as an important step toward true equality 
        between urban and rural Chinese citizens. However, 
        potential problems include the possibility of forced 
        relocation of rural residents, inadequate compensation, 
        and rural residents' ability to adjust to urban life 
        after relocation.
         The Chinese government continued to impose 
        restrictions on Chinese citizens' right to travel in a 
        manner that is inconsistent with international human 
        rights standards. During the past year, authorities 
        increasingly used various legal pretexts to prevent 
        rights defenders, advocates, and critics from leaving 
        China. Officials often cited the PRC Law on the Control 
        of the Exit and Entry of Citizens as justification for 
        preventing rights defenders from traveling.
         The Chinese government continued to place 
        restrictions on liberty of movement to punish and 
        control political dissidents and human rights 
        advocates. Restrictions on liberty of movement within 
        China were especially harsh during this reporting 
        period. Authorities employed a spectrum of measures 
        including stationing police to monitor the homes of 
        rights defenders, taking rights defenders to remote 
        areas, inviting them to meetings to ``drink tea'' with 
        security personnel, and imprisonment.
         Chinese authorities used forceful efforts to 
        intimidate and control human rights advocates and their 
        family members during this reporting period. The 
        Chinese government appears to have intensified efforts 
        to crack down on human rights advocates after the 
        awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to prominent Chinese 
        writer and democracy activist Liu Xiaobo and an 
        anonymous online call for ``Jasmine Revolution'' 
        protests within China.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support programs, organizations, and exchanges 
        with Chinese policymakers and academic institutions 
        engaged in research and outreach to migrant workers 
        that provide legal assistance to migrant workers, and 
        encourage policy debates on the hukou system.
         Call on U.S. academic and public policy 
        institutions and experts to consult with the Commission 
        on avenues for outreach to Chinese academic and public 
        policy figures engaged in policy debates on reform of 
        the hukou system.
         Stress to Chinese government officials that the 
        Chinese government's non-compliance with international 
        standards regarding freedom of movement inside China 
        negatively impacts confidence outside China in the 
        Chinese government's commitment to international 
        standards more generally.
         Call on the Chinese government to revise the PRC 
        Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens so 
        that the meaning and parameter of ``harmful to state 
        security,'' and ``cause a major loss to national 
        interests'' under Article 8(5) are more clear.
         Call on the Chinese government to revise the PRC 
        Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens so 
        that those who are detained can appeal the decision or 
        seek other remedies.
         Raise specifically Chinese government 
        authorities' restriction on liberty of movement of 
        rights defenders, advocates, and critics including 
        writer Liu Xia, wife of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu 
        Xiaobo, and human rights activist Chen Guangcheng and 
        his family.

                            Status of Women

                                Findings

         Chinese officials continue to promote existing 
        laws that aim to protect women's rights, including the 
        amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and 
        Interests and the amended PRC Marriage Law; however, 
        ambiguity and lack of clearly outlined responsibilities 
        in China's national-level legislation, in addition to 
        selective implementation and selective enforcement of 
        this legislation across localities, limit progress on 
        concrete protections of women's rights.
         In its domestic laws and policy initiatives 
        and through its ratification of the Convention on the 
        Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
        Women (CEDAW), the Chinese government has committed to 
        ensuring female representation in government. However, 
        female representation at all levels of government 
        appears to have made little significant progress in the 
        2011 reporting year.
         The National People's Congress Standing 
        Committee passed the revised PRC Organic Law of the 
        Villagers' Committees in October 2010, revising the 
        language stating that there should be ``an appropriate 
        number of women'' in village committees to language 
        that states village committees ``should have female 
        members.'' The revised law also includes a stipulation 
        that women should hold one-third of positions in 
        village representative assemblies. The impact these 
        revisions will have on female representation at the 
        village level in the future is unclear, but some 
        domestic observers have hailed them as a positive step. 
        An increase in women's decisionmaking power at the 
        village level may lead to greater protection of women's 
        property rights in rural areas.
         China has committed under CEDAW to take ``all 
        appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
        against women in the field of employment.'' Women 
        continue to experience widespread discrimination in 
        areas including recruitment, wages, and retirement 
        despite the fact that the Chinese government has 
        committed under Article 7 of the International Covenant 
        of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Article 11 
        of CEDAW to ensuring gender equality in employment. 
        While China's existing laws such as the PRC Labor Law, 
        amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and 
        Interests (LPWRI), and PRC Employment Promotion Law 
        prohibit gender discrimination, they lack clear 
        definitions and enforcement mechanisms, which weakens 
        their effectiveness.
         The amended LPWRI and amended PRC Marriage Law 
        prohibit domestic violence, and individuals charged 
        with the crime of domestic violence are punishable 
        under the PRC Criminal Law. These national legal 
        provisions leave many who encounter domestic violence 
        unprotected, however, as they do not define domestic 
        violence or outline specific responsibilities of 
        government departments in prevention, punishment, and 
        treatment. Officials reportedly completed draft 
        national-level legislation that clarifies the 
        definition and distribution of government 
        responsibilities. Domestic violence reportedly remains 
        pervasive, affecting nearly one-third of families in 
        China. China's amended LPWRI also prohibits sexual 
        harassment and provides an avenue of recourse for 
        victims. The LPWRI does not, however, provide a clear 
        definition of sexual harassment or specific standards 
        and procedures for prevention and punishment, 
        presenting challenges for victims in protecting their 
        rights. Sexual harassment reportedly remains prevalent 
        in China.
         Statistics and analysis from studies published 
        in 2008, 2009, and 2010 regarding China's skewed sex 
        ratio suggest that sex-selective abortion remains 
        widespread, especially in rural areas, despite the 
        government's legislative efforts to deter the practice. 
        Some observers, including Chinese state-run media, have 
        linked China's increasingly skewed sex ratio with an 
        increase in forced prostitution, forced marriages, and 
        other forms of human trafficking.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support programs in China that increase women's 
        leadership training through U.S.-China exchanges and 
        international conferences. Support legal programs that 
        promote women's land rights, especially in rural areas, 
        and urge that steps be taken to ensure that village 
        rules and regulations are in accordance with national-
        level laws and policies and to ensure adequate 
        protection of women's rights and interests.
         Urge the Chinese government to strengthen 
        enforcement mechanisms for implementation of provisions 
        in the PRC Labor Law, the amended PRC Law on the 
        Protection of Women's Rights and Interests (LPWRI), and 
        the PRC Employment Promotion Law that prohibit gender 
        discrimination. Urge Chinese officials to address 
        specifically gender discrimination in recruitment, 
        wages, and retirement.
         Urge the Chinese government to enact 
        comprehensive national-level legislation that clearly 
        defines domestic violence, assigns responsibilities to 
        government and civil society organizations in 
        addressing it, and outlines punishments for offenders. 
        Inquire whether officials will release such legislation 
        for public comment and, if so, how long the public 
        comment period will be and to whom it will be made 
        available. Urge the Chinese government to further 
        revise the LPWRI or enact new comprehensive national-
        level legislation to provide a clear definition of 
        sexual harassment and specific standards and procedures 
        for prevention and punishment. Support training 
        programs that increase awareness of domestic violence 
        and sexual harassment issues among judicial and law 
        enforcement personnel.

                           Human Trafficking

                                Findings

         China remains a country of origin, transit, 
        and destination for the trafficking of men, women, and 
        children. The majority of human trafficking cases are 
        domestic and involve trafficking for sexual 
        exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage.
         The Chinese government acceded to the UN 
        Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
        Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo 
        Protocol) in December 2009. To date, the Chinese 
        government has revised some, but not all, of its 
        legislation to conform to the Palermo Protocol. For 
        example, the Chinese government issued an amendment to 
        the PRC Criminal Law, which included revisions that 
        broaden the scope of prosecutable offenses for forced 
        labor and increase penalties, but do not clearly define 
        forced labor. The Chinese government's legal definition 
        of trafficking does not conform to international 
        standards.
         Using the definition of human trafficking 
        under Chinese law--which conflates human smuggling, 
        child abduction, and illegal adoption with human 
        trafficking--the Supreme People's Court reportedly 
        convicted 3,138 defendants in trafficking cases in 
        2010, up from 2,413 in 2009. Of these, courts 
        reportedly handed down 2,216 prison sentences of five 
        years or more. In addition, the Supreme People's 
        Procuratorate reportedly convicted 4,422 individuals on 
        trafficking-related crimes in 2010. In cooperation with 
        non-governmental organizations and international 
        organizations, Chinese authorities took steps to 
        improve protection, services, and care for victims of 
        trafficking but continued to focus efforts on women and 
        children.
         The Chinese government does not offer legal 
        alternatives to deportation for identified foreign 
        victims of trafficking, and continues to deport North 
        Korean refugees under the classification of ``economic 
        migrants,'' regardless of whether or not they are 
        victims of trafficking.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Urge the Chinese government to abide by its 
        commitments under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
        and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
        Children; continue to revise the government's 
        definition of trafficking; and enact comprehensive 
        anti-trafficking legislation to align with 
        international standards.
         Call on the Chinese government to provide more 
        services for trafficking victims. Support expanding 
        training programs for law enforcement personnel and 
        shelter managers that help raise awareness and improve 
        processes for identifying, protecting, and assisting 
        trafficking victims. Support legal assistance programs 
        that advocate on behalf of both foreign and Chinese 
        trafficking victims.
         Object to the continued deportation of North 
        Korean trafficking victims as ``economic migrants.'' 
        Urge the Chinese government to abide by its 
        international obligations with regard to North Korean 
        trafficking victims and provide legal alternatives to 
        repatriation.

                     North Korean Refugees in China

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, 
        central and local authorities continued policies of 
        classifying all North Koreans in China as ``illegal'' 
        economic migrants and repatriating North Korean 
        refugees in China, amid rising concerns over 
        humanitarian crises and political instability in the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In 2011, 
        the Chinese government reportedly increased the 
        presence of public security officials in northeastern 
        China and erected new barricades along the Chinese-
        North Korean border.
         The Chinese government continued to deny the 
        UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to the 
        Chinese-North Korean border and to North Korean 
        refugees in northeast China. The inability of the UNHCR 
        to access North Koreans seeking asylum in China makes 
        it difficult for the UNHCR and human rights 
        organizations to obtain accurate information on the 
        number of North Korean refugees, the reasons behind the 
        North Korean defections, and the concerns of North 
        Korean refugees over forced repatriation.
         Chinese security authorities reportedly 
        cooperated with North Korean police officials to 
        repatriate North Korean refugees in reported 
        ``manhunts'' throughout China, including remote areas 
        within Yunnan province and the Guangxi Zhuang 
        Autonomous Region. Chinese law enforcement agencies 
        have deployed hundreds of officials to locate and 
        forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees.
         North Korean women in China continue to be 
        trafficked into forced marriage and commercial sexual 
        exploitation. The Chinese government's repatriation of 
        trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951 
        Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 
        Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (Protocol), as well 
        as Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
        and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
        Children (Palermo Protocol). The government's failure 
        to take adequate measures to prevent North Korean women 
        from being trafficked and to protect North Korean 
        victims of trafficking contravenes its obligations 
        under Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol and Article 6 
        of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
        Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
         Chinese local authorities near the border with 
        the DPRK continued to deny household registration 
        (hukou) to the children of North Korean women married 
        to Chinese citizens. Without household registration, 
        these children live in a stateless limbo and cannot 
        access education and other social benefits.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support the efforts of the UNHCR to gain 
        unfettered access to North Korean refugees in China, 
        beginning with children born to a North Korean parent 
        in China, and encourage the Chinese government to work 
        with the UNHCR in enacting and implementing national 
        asylum legislation that conforms with China's 
        obligations under the 1951 Convention and its Protocol 
        and to immediately cease detaining and repatriating 
        North Koreans in China.
         Urge central and local Chinese government 
        officials to abide by their obligations under the 
        Palermo Protocol (Article 9) and CEDAW (Article 6) to 
        prosecute human traffickers in northeastern China and 
        along the border with the DPRK.
         Urge Chinese officials to grant residency status 
        and related social benefits to North Korean women 
        married to Chinese citizens and grant the same to their 
        children. In particular, urge local Chinese officials 
        to allow these children to receive an education in 
        accordance with the PRC Nationality Law (Article 4) and 
        the PRC Compulsory Education Law (Article 5). Urge the 
        Chinese government to allow greater numbers of North 
        Korean defectors to have safe haven and secure transit 
        until they reach third countries.

                             Public Health

                                Findings

         The Chinese government's domestic legislation 
        explicitly forbids discriminatory practices in 
        employment, and as a State Party to the International 
        Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
        Chinese government has committed to eliminate 
        discrimination in employment and education against 
        persons with disability or infectious diseases. 
        Discrimination against people living with medical 
        conditions such as infectious diseases and mental 
        illness remains commonplace, and those who experience 
        discrimination face challenges in seeking legal 
        recourse.
         Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
        and individual advocates continue to play a positive 
        role in raising awareness about health concerns; 
        however, Chinese officials continue to harass some 
        public health advocates and monitor and control the 
        activities of NGOs through restrictions on registration 
        and funding.
         The burden that cases of mental illness place 
        on the country's under-resourced mental healthcare 
        system is significant. Officials reportedly continue to 
        abuse their power over psychiatric institutions and 
        medical professionals by using them as ``tools for 
        detaining people deemed a threat to social stability.'' 
        In June 2011, the Chinese government released for 
        public comment the draft Mental Health Law, which 
        generated vibrant discussion among individuals and 
        organizations across civil society sectors. Officials 
        announced plans to enact the Mental Health Law by the 
        end of 2011.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Call on the Chinese government to stop repression 
        of public health advocates and provide more support to 
        U.S. organizations that address public health issues in 
        China.
         Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on 
        effective implementation of the PRC Employment 
        Promotion Law and related regulations that prohibit 
        discrimination in hiring and in the workplace against 
        persons living with HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B virus, and 
        other illnesses. Support programs that raise rights 
        awareness among individuals living with infectious 
        disease, disability, or mental illness.
         Urge the Chinese government to address concerns 
        that individuals and NGOs raised during the public 
        comment period for the draft Mental Health Law. Urge 
        Chinese officials to accomplish their stated goal of 
        enacting the Mental Health Law by the end of 2011. Urge 
        officials to then ensure implementation of the law 
        across localities.

                            The Environment

                                Findings

         China's environmental problems remain serious. 
        This year's report highlights heavy metal and growing 
        rural pollution problems. Citizens continued to express 
        their environmental grievances and sometimes protested 
        in the streets, including at a protest against a 
        chemical plant in Dalian city, Liaoning province, 
        involving over 10,000 citizens who ``took a walk'' in 
        front of government and Communist Party buildings. In 
        some cases, officials suppressed demands for a cleaner 
        environment. Local authorities detained, harassed, or 
        threatened people including parents of children 
        affected by lead poisoning in several provinces who 
        raised grievances or sought redress; citizens 
        demonstrating or complaining about landfill operations 
        in Fujian province; citizens protesting operations of a 
        waste incinerator in Jiangsu province; and citizens 
        protesting expanded mining operations in the Inner 
        Mongolia Autonomous Region and Tibetan autonomous 
        areas.
         Corruption, noncompliance with and uneven 
        implementation and enforcement of environmental laws 
        and regulations, and the lack of legal recourse, remain 
        significant challenges for China in managing its 
        environmental problems. Sometimes environmental 
        protection authorities do not take enforcement actions 
        as required by law, and at times courts refuse to 
        accept lawsuits because of concerns over ``social 
        stability.'' Environmental protection was among the 
        areas to have the highest levels of bribery and 
        corruption in the first six months of 2010.
         Central and some local Chinese environmental 
        protection officials have taken steps to improve 
        information disclosure. Yet, efforts to implement 
        disclosure measures remain underdeveloped. Some 
        citizens have been proactive in requesting information; 
        however, several challenges to accessing information 
        remain, including administrative provisions that limit 
        the scope of information that environmental authorities 
        can disclose. The most difficult type of information to 
        obtain in some cases is that related to polluting 
        enterprises, which has potential implications for 
        citizen health. Chinese citizens and experts have 
        expressed concern over the speed and lack of 
        transparency of developing hydroelectric and nuclear 
        power projects. The nuclear power plant disaster in 
        Japan in March 2011 appeared to embolden Chinese 
        citizens and experts to speak out about safety 
        concerns, and prompted Chinese officials to conduct a 
        safety review and consider new legislation that could 
        improve the transparency of China's nuclear industry.
         Environmental protection remains a sector in 
        which public participation is somewhat encouraged, yet 
        officials also continue to seek to ``guide'' or manage 
        participation. A new national-level official guiding 
        opinion requires environmental groups to report on 
        their international cooperative projects with foreign 
        non-governmental entities for ``examination and 
        approval.'' The opinion also calls for the further 
        strengthening of relations and cooperation between the 
        government and social organizations, as well as greater 
        political indoctrination of environmental groups by 
        relevant authorities.
         Top Chinese authorities reportedly consider 
        China to be vulnerable to the impacts of climate change 
        and have taken steps to mitigate and adapt to climate 
        change. Chinese leaders plan to voluntarily reduce 
        carbon dioxide intensity (i.e., emissions per unit of 
        GDP) by 17 percent by 2015. While non-governmental 
        organizations continue some activities to address 
        climate change, public participation in climate change 
        policy processes is minimal. Chinese leaders stated 
        they would improve data reliability and transparency in 
        relation to energy and climate change; however, Chinese 
        leaders face significant challenges in these areas. 
        Official Chinese measures to address climate change, as 
        well as their implementation, could place the rights of 
        citizens at risk without sufficient procedural and 
        safety protections.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Call upon the Chinese government to cease 
        punishing citizens for their grassroots environmental 
        activism or for utilizing official and 
        institutionalized channels to voice their environmental 
        grievances or to protect their rights. Support efforts 
        by Chinese and U.S. groups working in China to expand 
        awareness of citizens' environmental rights and to 
        promote the protection of those rights. Projects might 
        include supporting U.S.-China discussions about 
        complaint resolution mechanisms and strengthening U.S.-
        China cooperation regarding researching and addressing 
        environmental health problems. Include environmental 
        law issues in the bilateral human rights and legal 
        expert dialogues.
         Support multilateral exchanges regarding 
        environmental enforcement and compliance tools, 
        including environmental insurance, market mechanisms, 
        criminal prosecution of serious environmental 
        infringements, and public interest litigation 
        mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen 
        environmental impact assessment processes and citizen 
        participation in those processes. Engage Chinese 
        officials and others who seek to devise a realistic and 
        fair compensation system for people harmed by pollution 
        in China that could aid enforcement efforts.
         Support continued expansion of environmental 
        information disclosure in China. Share U.S. Government 
        experiences with the Toxics Release Inventory Program 
        and other U.S. programs that seek to provide more 
        environmental transparency. Support programs that 
        educate Chinese citizens about China's system of open 
        government information. Encourage Chinese officials to 
        make government and expert research reports regarding 
        climate change and its impacts in China public and 
        easily accessible. In addition, continue U.S. 
        Government engagement with relevant ministries, 
        academic institutions, experts, and non-governmental 
        organizations (NGOs) in developing China's capacity to 
        measure, report, publicize, and verify emissions 
        reduction strategies and techniques reliably.
         Encourage the development of environmental NGOs 
        in China, including incorporating joint non-
        governmental participation in bilateral projects. 
        Support efforts to raise the technical and operational 
        capacity of Chinese environmental NGOs.
         Engage local Chinese leaders in their efforts to 
        reconcile development and environmental protection 
        goals. Call upon U.S. cities with sister-city 
        relationships in China to incorporate environmental 
        rights awareness, environmental protection, and climate 
        change components into their sister-city programs. When 
        making arrangements for travel to China, request 
        meetings with officials from central and local levels 
        of the Chinese government to discuss environmental 
        governance and best practices. Invite Chinese local-
        level leaders, including those from counties, 
        townships, and villages, to the United States to 
        observe U.S. public policy practices and approaches to 
        environmental problem-solving.

                             Civil Society

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, 
        the number of civil society organizations (CSOs)--
        including organizational forms that most nearly 
        correspond to the Western concept of non-governmental 
        organizations (NGOs)--participating in legal and 
        policymaking activities in areas that are not 
        politically sensitive continued to increase gradually. 
        At the same time, organizations and individuals who 
        worked on politically sensitive issues continued to 
        face challenges.
         NGOs continued to face challenges fulfilling 
        complicated and cumbersome registration requirements. 
        In order to operate legally, an organization is 
        required to obtain a sponsorship agreement from a 
        public administration department in a relevant ``trade, 
        scientific or other professional area'' at the 
        appropriate level of government before registering with 
        the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA). Sponsorship 
        agreements are sometimes difficult to obtain because 
        local sponsors are at times reluctant to take on the 
        burdens of supervisory responsibilities. NGOs that do 
        not fulfill these ``dual management'' requirements are 
        not protected under the law and are prohibited from 
        receiving outside donations. Some NGOs opt to register 
        as commercial entities, in part to circumvent the 
        burdens of fulfilling dual management requirements, 
        though such actions could also subject them to targeted 
        or selective oversight from the government as well as 
        higher tax rates.
         The Commission observed in this reporting year 
        that ``private'' foundations (fei gongmu jijin hui), 
        which are not permitted to solicit donations through 
        public fundraising activities, reportedly continued to 
        face operational hardships. ``Private'' foundations may 
        apply to become ``public'' foundations (gongmu jijin 
        hui), which are permitted to solicit donations through 
        public fundraising activities, only if they can find 
        government department sponsors and meet other required 
        criteria. The Chinese government reportedly is 
        considering revisions to the 2004 PRC Regulations on 
        the Management of Foundations and is drafting the PRC 
        Charities Law. Nevertheless, because draft language 
        does not appear to have been widely circulated, it 
        remains unclear what the proposed revisions and the new 
        law will entail or how proposed regulatory changes will 
        create room for private foundations to operate and 
        grow.
         Some Chinese citizens who sought to establish 
        and operate NGOs that focus on issues officials deem to 
        be sensitive faced intimidation, harassment, and 
        punishment from government authorities. During this 
        reporting year, for example, Chinese authorities 
        continued to repeatedly harass and interfere with the 
        operations of Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, 
        a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization 
        founded in 1994 by Wan Yanhai, a public health 
        researcher. Authorities reportedly visited Aizhixing's 
        office where they confiscated documents, warned Wan--
        who had left China for the United States in May 2010 
        over concerns for his personal safety--not to attend 
        the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Norway honoring Liu 
        Xiaobo, and shut down the organization's Web site for 
        posting a letter that officials found objectionable.
         Some localities are following efforts in 
        Shenzhen to simplify the registration process for 
        certain types of service-oriented NGOs, and two other 
        localities are among those considering changes to 
        current regulations. Authorities in Beijing, for 
        example, may extend to the entire city a current pilot 
        project in one district that ``opens up'' the 
        registration process for four types of social 
        organizations, including the types of organizations 
        that provide ``social benefits'' (shehui fuli) and 
        ``social services'' (shehui fuwu). Officials in 
        Shanghai city reportedly signed a ``cooperative 
        agreement'' with the Ministry of Civil Affairs to 
        ``create new models for the development of social 
        organizations.'' The extent to which these reform 
        efforts will create space for civil society 
        organizations to grow remains unclear, as civil society 
        advocates remain under tight scrutiny, and some were 
        subjected to harassment, detention, and other abuses. 
        Moreover, some experts on Chinese civil society both in 
        China and abroad have cautioned that the latest reform 
        efforts, while helpful to many grassroots organizations 
        providing various kinds of social services, could also 
        solidify the government's ability to control such 
        groups by forcing them to follow ``government 
        leadership'' as a condition to operate.
         During this reporting year, Chinese officials 
        have continued to emphasize efforts to ``guide'' 
        developments in civil society. Zhou Yongkang, the 
        Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee 
        Political and Legal Affairs Commission, said that ``in 
        fostering comprehensive social organizations, we must 
        work hard to integrate various types of social 
        organizations into a social organization system led by 
        the Party Committee and the government . . . in the 
        management of social organizations, we must establish a 
        system of separate development and separate management 
        to promote the healthy and orderly development of 
        social organizations . . . in the management of foreign 
        non-governmental organizations working in China, we 
        must establish a joint management mechanism to protect 
        legitimate exchanges and cooperation and strengthen 
        management according to the law.''

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Ask Chinese officials for updates on recent 
        reforms at the local level relating to registration of 
        non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other aspects 
        of civil affairs. Encourage these officials to broaden 
        the reform efforts that relax constraints on NGOs and 
        to make them applicable to other parts of the country 
        through national legislation and regulatory 
        development.
         Ask the Chinese government to refrain from 
        applying uneven or selective enforcement of regulations 
        to intimidate groups that they consider to be handling 
        sensitive work. Request the Chinese government to 
        revisit the recently issued State Administration of 
        Foreign Exchange circular concerning overseas donations 
        to Chinese organizations. Emphasize that NGOs, both 
        domestic and international, are outlets for citizens to 
        channel their grievances and find redress, and in turn 
        contribute to the maintenance of a stable society. 
        Conversely, point out that stricter controls over civil 
        society organizations could remove a potentially useful 
        social ``safety valve,'' thereby increasing the sources 
        of instability. During discussions with Chinese 
        officials, mention the Tsinghua University report which 
        found that even as the government increased spending on 
        public security and tightened its control over civil 
        society, social conflicts are happening with greater 
        regularity.
         Take measures to facilitate the participation of 
        Chinese citizens who work in the NGO sector in relevant 
        international conferences and forums, and support 
        training opportunities in the United States to build 
        their leadership capacity in nonprofit management, 
        public policy advocacy, strategic planning, and media 
        relations.

                 Institutions of Democratic Governance

                                Findings

         The Communist Party exercises control over 
        political affairs, government, and society through 
        networks of Party committees or branches that exist at 
        all levels in government, legislative, and judicial 
        agencies, as well as in businesses, major social groups 
        (including unions), the military, and most residential 
        communities. During the 2011 reporting year, Communist 
        Party leaders reiterated Party dominance and 
        accelerated efforts to build or revitalize Party 
        organizations, especially focusing on Party branches in 
        commercial buildings, urban neighborhoods, academic 
        institutions, and law firms.
         China's political institutions do not comply 
        with the standards defined in Article 25 of the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
        which Chinese leaders have signed and declared an 
        intention to ratify. Nor do China's political 
        institutions comply with the standards outlined in the 
        Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While central-
        level Chinese leaders continued to issue measures meant 
        to improve the efficiency of bureaucratic governance 
        and to bolster trust in the Party, news reports did not 
        indicate any major forthcoming political reforms. 
        Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the need for political 
        reforms; however, some of his remarks were censored in 
        the Chinese domestic news. Other top leaders appeared 
        to criticize ideological pluralism and to emphasize the 
        impossibility of implementing ``Western-style'' 
        democracy with its separation of powers and competing 
        political parties.
         During this reporting year, Chinese 
        authorities expanded social controls under the banner 
        of strengthening ``comprehensive management of public 
        security'' and ``safeguarding social stability.'' 
        Officials engaged in a largely preemptive crackdown 
        affecting hundreds of people, apparently disregarding 
        their constitutional right to freedom of assembly and 
        preventing them from gathering peacefully in so-called 
        ``Jasmine Revolution'' rallies, with the purpose of 
        advocating for democratic reforms, among other issues. 
        In addition, authorities continued to detain, sentence, 
        and demonstrate little tolerance for those individuals 
        involved in political parties not sanctioned by the 
        Communist Party. For example, authorities handed down a 
        harsh sentence to Liu Xianbin for his democracy 
        advocacy activities and arrested Li Tie for posting 
        writings advocating for democracy on the Internet.
         Direct elections for local people's congress 
        representatives are held only at the county level. 
        Authorities appeared to discourage ``independent 
        candidates'' who utilized online resources to campaign 
        in the latest round of local people's congress 
        elections, and news stories reported harassment of 
        ``independent candidates'' and their families. At least 
        100 ``independent candidates'' announced via microblog 
        their intention to run.
         Chinese leaders continued to voice support for 
        village autonomy with the Party as the leading core. 
        While village committee elections have spread across 
        most of China, they continue to be plagued by official 
        interference and corruption. Major revisions to the law 
        governing village committee elections are likely to 
        alter the balance of authority in village-governing 
        organizations, partially because the law mandates 
        establishment of a new ``supervisory committee'' or 
        equivalent in every village. The revisions also clarify 
        election and recall procedures. The supervisory 
        committees may help to reduce village corruption, but 
        they may also act to ``maintain social stability'' by 
        stifling critical voices. Central-level officials 
        continued a survey of outstanding governance problems 
        at the grassroots level, and authorities in numerous 
        localities reported that they instituted a variety of 
        ``democratic management'' projects to improve relations 
        between village leaders and rural residents, to reduce 
        corruption, to improve information disclosure, and to 
        promote ``democratic'' public participation. The 
        Commission has not observed news media reports 
        containing details on the implementation and 
        sustainability of these pilot projects.
         Authorities continued to express support for 
        government information disclosure and expanding the 
        transparency of Party affairs. In addition, the State 
        Council released the Opinion Regarding Strengthening 
        Construction of a Government That Rules by Law in 
        November 2010, which emphasizes enhancing government 
        information disclosure, with a focus on budgets, 
        allocation of public resources, approval and 
        implementation of major construction projects, and 
        nonprofit social causes. Beijing municipality issued a 
        measure that reportedly will, for the first time, 
        include Party leaders within the ``scope of 
        accountability.''
         The Chinese government and Communist Party 
        reportedly sought to improve governance accountability, 
        and at the same time improve ``social management.'' The 
        government reportedly took limited steps to combat 
        corruption, which remains a significant problem. In the 
        2011 reporting year, the Chinese government issued 
        China's first white paper on corruption as well as 
        other measures to subject officials to financial 
        audits, encourage reporting of corruption, and protect 
        whistleblowers. Chinese government authorities revised 
        official evaluation models that could lead to greater 
        accountability, relieving pressure on officials to 
        falsify data in order to be promoted. Authorities 
        issued a major economic and social development plan for 
        the next five years (the 12th Five-Year Plan), which 
        notes that authorities will ``establish a community 
        management and service platform,'' linking service 
        provision and social management.
         Citizens and groups in China have little 
        direct access to political decisionmaking processes; 
        however, they are increasingly able to use various 
        channels to express opinions regarding proposed 
        policies and regulatory instruments. New measures 
        stipulate that ``major'' policy decisionmaking 
        processes should include public participation, expert 
        argumentation, risk assessment, legal review, and group 
        discussions. The measures also stipulate that 
        authorities should track how their decisions are being 
        implemented.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Call on the Chinese government to release people 
        detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to 
        call for political reform within China--including 
        democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, who was sentenced to 10 
        years in prison in March 2011 for ``inciting subversion 
        of state power''; the people detained for mentioning 
        the protests in the Middle East and North Africa or 
        calls for ``Jasmine'' protests in personal 
        communications or in Internet postings; and other 
        prisoners of conscience mentioned in this report and in 
        the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
         Support research programs for U.S. citizens to 
        study political and social developments at the 
        grassroots level in China and expand the number of U.S. 
        consulates throughout the country.
         Support programs that aim to reduce corruption in 
        local people's congress and village committee 
        elections, including expansion of domestic election 
        monitoring systems, training of Chinese domestic 
        election monitors, and joint U.S.-Chinese election 
        monitoring activities.
         Support continued substantive exchanges between 
        Members of the U.S. Congress and members of the 
        National People's Congress and the Chinese People's 
        Political Consultative Conference, especially in 
        relation to Congressional oversight processes and 
        budgetary matters.
         Support projects of U.S. or Chinese organizations 
        that seek to work with local Chinese governments in 
        their efforts to improve transparency and 
        accountability, especially efforts to expand and 
        improve China's government information disclosure 
        initiatives. Such projects might include training in 
        the U.S. Freedom of Information system for Chinese 
        officials, joint efforts to better publicize the Open 
        Government Information (OGI) Regulations at local 
        levels, and citizen and group training about how to 
        submit OGI requests.
         Support projects that assist local governments, 
        academics, and the nonprofit sector in expanding 
        transparent public hearings and other channels for 
        citizens to incorporate their input in the policymaking 
        process. Such projects might include an exchange 
        program component, whereby Chinese local government 
        officials and non-governmental organization 
        representatives would travel together to the United 
        States to attend town hall or public meetings that 
        address significant issues. Such projects might also 
        include pilot projects in China in which citizens' 
        suggestions to authorities about draft laws, 
        regulations, or policies are made available to the 
        public.

                         Commercial Rule of Law

                                Findings

         Industrial policy continues to play an 
        important role in the Chinese economy, guiding 
        important sectors such as automotive, software, and 
        ``cultural industry.'' These industrial policies are 
        comprehensive frameworks for development in key sectors 
        of the Chinese economy, providing for subsidies and 
        other benefits, plans for restructuring the state-owned 
        companies in the relevant sector, and export goals. The 
        use of industrial policies, especially in key sectors, 
        was supplemented by China's 12th Five-Year Plan, which 
        sets out certain ``strategic emerging industries'' for 
        support, including energy conservation, new-generation 
        information technology (IT), biotechnology, high-end 
        equipment manufacturing, new energies, new materials, 
        and new-energy vehicles. Further, the Ministry of 
        Industry and Information Technology and other 
        government departments have issued sector-specific 
        plans.
         China's state-owned sector enjoys preferential 
        treatment, crowding out private companies in certain 
        key sectors. This can act as a barrier to legal 
        development and the rule of law, as the state controls 
        the companies, the courts, the legislatures, and 
        administrative departments. China's industrial policies 
        encourage the transfer of technology to the state-owned 
        enterprises (SOEs), and their consolidation into 
        ``domestic champions.'' SOEs also enjoy various direct 
        and indirect subsidies.
         Chinese legislation is vague as to whether 
        information concerning the SOEs falls under China's 
        rules on commercial secrets or the PRC State Secrets 
        Law. This was highlighted in the case of Xue Feng, a 
        U.S. citizen who was arrested in China for helping his 
        U.S.-based employer purchase a commercial database in 
        China. The database was not classified as a state 
        secret at the time of the transaction. Xue was 
        sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in China for 
        violating China's state secrets law, and his sentence 
        was upheld on appeal in February 2011.
         China has been a party to several World Trade 
        Organization (WTO) cases since acceding to the WTO in 
        December 2001, and there were six active disputes 
        against China in 2010. The WTO found against China in a 
        case it brought challenging the United States' 
        imposition of tariffs on certain auto and truck tires 
        under the transitional product-specific safeguard 
        provision in China's Protocol of Accession. The United 
        States brought a case against China concerning its 
        provision of subsidies to the domestic wind energy 
        industry, which is pending. China appealed a WTO 
        decision that China's restraints of exports of bauxite, 
        coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, 
        silicon metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc are not 
        consistent with China's obligations under the WTO.
         The value of the Chinese yuan continues to be 
        a subject of concern to policymakers inside and outside 
        China.
         Chinese government departments closely 
        regulate foreign investment in China and use the 
        approval process to ensure that foreign investment is 
        in keeping with government policy. During the 
        Commission's 2011 reporting year, Chinese authorities 
        issued a revised draft of the Foreign Investment 
        Guidance Catalogue, which lists industries in which 
        foreign investment is encouraged, restricted, or 
        forbidden. The revised catalogue includes provisions 
        listing as ``encouraged'' the strategic emerging 
        industries covered in the 12th Five-Year Plan.
         Chinese outbound investment has grown, with 
        much of the growth concentrated in investments in 
        energy and minerals needed for Chinese manufacturing. 
        Outbound investment is regulated by the Ministry of 
        Commerce (MOFCOM) and the National Development and 
        Reform Commission (NDRC). The State-Owned Assets 
        Supervision and Administration Commission issued new 
        measures regulating offshore financial activities by 
        the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Outbound 
        investments are financed by loans from China's state-
        owned banks, outbound investment funds, and use of 
        renminbi reserves.
         Two of the three Chinese government 
        departments in charge of implementing the PRC 
        Antimonopoly Law (AML) issued new AML regulations 
        during the 2011 reporting year. The State 
        Administration for Industry and Commerce passed three 
        sets of regulations on monopoly agreements, abuse of 
        dominance, and abuse of administrative power, and the 
        NDRC issued two sets of regulations on price monopoly. 
        The five sets of regulations became effective on 
        February 1, 2011.
         MOFCOM, which handles AML merger reviews, has 
        held up approval of mergers of non-Chinese entities 
        outside China during this reporting year, including 
        Nokia's purchase of certain of Motorola's network 
        assets, and the merger of two Russian potash companies. 
        There have been no reports of MOFCOM not approving, or 
        giving only conditional approval to, mergers between 
        Chinese companies; however, the State-Owned Assets 
        Supervision and Administration Commission has been 
        encouraging the consolidation of the SOEs in China, a 
        process which some industrial policies, such as that 
        for the auto industry, mandate.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Develop and support a project surveying the role 
        of China's industrial policies in the Chinese economy 
        from the perspective of WTO requirements, including how 
        the development of these policies, and the role they 
        play in directing China's economy, impact the 
        development of transparency, rule of law, and China's 
        compliance with its international legal commitments.
         Request through the Open Government Information 
        office at the Ministry of Commerce, or through 
        bilateral dialogues between the U.S. Department of 
        Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and their 
        Chinese counterparts, details on merger applications 
        reviewed since the PRC Antimonopoly Law came into 
        effect, including the number of applications involving 
        non-Chinese companies, the number of applications 
        involving state-owned enterprises, and the results of 
        each of the merger reviews.
         Through bilateral dialogues between (1) the U.S. 
        Trade Representative and U.S. Department of Commerce 
        and (2) China's Ministry of Commerce, National 
        Development and Reform Commission, and State-Owned 
        Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 
        obtain details on the amount of Chinese investment 
        (other than in financial instruments) in the United 
        States, the criteria Chinese authorities use in making 
        approval decisions concerning such investment, and how 
        such investment is financed.
         Arrange for Chinese authorities to clarify the 
        approval procedure applicable to foreign investment in 
        China, including how the security review procedure 
        relates to the regular review procedure applicable to 
        all foreign investment in China under the auspices of 
        legal exchanges such as the U.S. Legal Exchange under 
        the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.

                           Access to Justice

                                Findings

         Chinese citizens' ability to redress perceived 
        wrongs continued to face significant challenges during 
        the Commission's 2011 reporting year. Authorities 
        continued to promote a ``harmonious'' socialist society 
        with Chinese characteristics. Key policies and 
        regulations during the past year reflect the Party's 
        ongoing concern with ``maintaining social stability.''
         The courts encouraged the use of mediation 
        over trials as means to resolve disputes in civil 
        cases. Critics point out that mediation could lead to 
        curtailed access to courts for Chinese citizens. In 
        addition, it remains unclear whether the new PRC 
        People's Mediation Law can adequately resolve disputes 
        without coercion, and whether it can provide for 
        effective enforcement of mediated agreements.
         Citizen petitioners seeking to address their 
        grievances continued to face official reprisals, 
        harassment, violence, and detention, especially by 
        local governments due to incentive structures linked to 
        citizen petitioning.
         Officials at various levels of government 
        continued to discourage, intimidate, and detain human 
        rights lawyers and defenders who take on issues, cases, 
        and clients that officials deem to be ``sensitive.'' 
        Officials employed a spectrum of measures including 
        stationing police to monitor the homes of rights 
        defenders, forcing rights defenders to travel to 
        unknown areas or to attend meetings to ``drink tea'' 
        with security personnel, and imprisonment.
         The Supreme People's Court announced in May 
        2011 that it would issue uniform guidelines for some 
        types of cases. The guiding cases are meant to provide 
        uniformity in decisionmaking for the public security 
        apparatus, procuratoracy, and the courts. One of the 
        key questions that remains unanswered is the degree to 
        which the guiding cases are binding on lower courts.
         The Chinese government continued to promote 
        administrative law reforms that seek to provide greater 
        oversight of state agencies and government employees 
        and to protect citizen interests if they are faithfully 
        implemented and executed. The amended PRC 
        Administrative Supervision Law became effective in June 
        2011. Its key provisions provide some protection for 
        whistleblowers. The amended PRC State Compensation Law 
        became effective in December 2010. Its key provisions 
        expand the scope of the law by allowing negligence as a 
        cause of action against the government under some 
        circumstances. In addition, the amended law eliminates 
        certain procedural loopholes making it easier to 
        establish a valid claim.
         Chinese citizens remained reluctant to bring 
        cases against government officials utilizing 
        administrative law provisions. Cases brought against 
        the government based on administrative law provisions 
        reportedly accounted on average for very low 
        percentages of local courts' total workloads.
         The government increased funding for the legal 
        aid system during the 2011 reporting year. 
        Nevertheless, China faces a systemic shortage of 
        defense lawyers. In underdeveloped regions, some 
        criminal defendants may have no access to legal 
        representation.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support the U.S. State Department's International 
        Visitor's Leadership Program and other bilateral 
        exchange programs that bring Chinese human rights 
        lawyers, advocates, and scholars to the United States 
        for study and dialogue. Support similar programs in the 
        non-governmental organization and academic sectors that 
        partner with China's human rights lawyers and nonprofit 
        legal organizations.
         Continue to monitor the policy of mediation as 
        the Chinese government's preferred way to resolve 
        disputes. Achieve a clear understanding of the 
        implications on Chinese citizens' access to justice and 
        the Chinese government's compliance with international 
        standards.
         Continue to monitor the anticipated issuance of 
        the guiding cases by the Supreme People's Court for the 
        public security apparatus, procuratoracy, and the 
        courts. Pay particular attention to their effect, if 
        any, on lower level courts.
         Express concern to Chinese authorities over 
        treatment of petitioners and encourage Chinese leaders 
        to examine the incentive structures at the local level 
        that lead to abuse of petitioners who seek to express 
        their grievances.
         Object to the continued harassment of human 
        rights lawyers and advocates. Call for the release of 
        lawyers and activists who have been subject to unlawful 
        home confinement, ``disappearance,'' or harassment by 
        officials for their activities to defend and promote 
        the rights of Chinese citizens.
         Support exchange, education, and training in 
        legal aid expertise with Chinese defense lawyers and 
        law schools.

                                Property

                                Findings

         Over the past year, there have been numerous 
        cases of expropriation and abuses by local governments 
        and property developers, including forced evictions. 
        Forced evictions are contrary to the General Comments 
        to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
        Cultural Rights, which China has ratified. Some 
        property owners who refuse to leave their homes have 
        been beaten, harassed, or illegally detained. China's 
        economic development has led to increased need for 
        land, and income from land sales has been an important 
        source of revenue for local governments.
         In January 2011, the Regulations on 
        Expropriation and Compensation for Housing on State-
        Owned Land came into effect. The regulations define 
        ``public interest'' in the context of land takings and 
        set out some procedural protection for urban land 
        rights owners. Though the 2007 PRC Property Law and the 
        2004 PRC Law on Administration of Urban Real Property 
        both provide that local government should only 
        expropriate land in the ``public interest,'' neither 
        include a definition of the term. While the new 
        regulations provide greater clarity and better 
        protection, their effectiveness will depend on 
        implementation.
         The Regulations on Expropriation and 
        Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land apply only 
        to urban land, leaving China's rural residents with a 
        lower level of protection. Rural land is owned by 
        collectives, and farmers legally can enter into 30-year 
        contracts with their collectives for use of 
        collectively owned land. However, there is little 
        protection for farmers, and there have been 
        recommendations that protection from expropriation be 
        extended to rural residents.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Urge the Chinese government in meetings and 
        correspondence to prepare and pass legislation 
        concerning expropriations that provides protection for 
        rural land dwellers comparable to that enjoyed by urban 
        dwellers under the Regulations on Expropriation and 
        Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land.
         Arrange and support a program of technical 
        assistance for Chinese government departments 
        responsible for land management concerning U.S. 
        procedures and standards for taking property by eminent 
        domain. Such assistance would highlight the meaning 
        under U.S. law of takings in the ``public interest,'' 
        and could be organized by U.S. municipal governments 
        working with their sister cities in China.
         Urge the Chinese government to put in place 
        comprehensive legislation to clarify rural land titles 
        and to provide legal assistance to rural land dwellers 
        to help them protect their rights to collectively owned 
        land. Working through U.S.-China dialogues, such as the 
        Legal Exchange under the Joint Commission on Commerce 
        and Trade, engage in technical exchanges with China 
        concerning pro bono programs at law firms, or provision 
        of other legal services for the poor in the United 
        States.

                                Xinjiang

                                Findings

         Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained poor in the 
        Commission's 2011 reporting year. Following 
        demonstrations and riots in the region in July 2009, 
        authorities maintained repressive security policies 
        that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy, 
        and independent expressions of cultural and religious 
        identity, especially among Uyghurs, as threats to the 
        region's stability. Authorities bolstered security in 
        the region in summer 2011, following incidents they 
        described as terrorist attacks and in advance of an 
        expanded trade expo.
         The Chinese government continued to obscure 
        information about people tried in connection to the 
        July 2009 demonstrations and riots, while overseas 
        media reported on cases of people imprisoned for 
        peaceful speech and assembly during that time. The 
        number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes of 
        endangering state security--a category of criminal 
        offenses that authorities in China have used to punish 
        citizen activism and dissent--decreased in 2010 
        compared to 2009 figures but remained higher than in 
        years before 2009.
         Implementation of a series of central 
        government-led development initiatives, first announced 
        at a May 2010 meeting known as the Xinjiang Work Forum, 
        spurred an intensification of longstanding policies--
        including Mandarin-language schooling, herder 
        resettlement, and urban development projects--that have 
        undermined the rights of Uyghurs and other non-Han 
        groups to maintain their cultures, languages, and 
        livelihoods.
         Authorities in the XUAR enforced tight 
        controls over religion, especially Islam, and 
        maintained restrictions on religious practice that are 
        harsher than curbs articulated in national regulations. 
        Officials integrated curbs over Islam into security 
        campaigns and monitored mosques, placed restrictions on 
        the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, continued 
        campaigns to prevent Muslim men from wearing beards and 
        women from wearing veils, and targeted ``illegal'' 
        religious materials in censorship campaigns.
         Discriminatory job hiring practices against 
        Uyghurs and other non-Han groups continued in both the 
        government and private sectors. Authorities also 
        continued to send rural non-Han men and women to jobs 
        elsewhere in China, through programs reportedly marked, 
        in some cases, by coercion to participate and 
        exploitative working conditions. Education authorities 
        in the XUAR continued to require students to pick 
        cotton and engage in other forms of labor in work-study 
        programs that exceeded permitted parameters for student 
        labor under Chinese law and international standards for 
        worker rights.
         National and XUAR government officials 
        continued to implement projects that have undermined 
        Uyghurs' ability to protect their cultural heritage. 
        Authorities continued steps to demolish and 
        ``reconstruct'' the Old City section of Kashgar and 
        relocate residents, a five-year project launched in 
        2009 that has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents 
        and other observers for requiring the resettlement of 
        residents and for undermining cultural heritage 
        protection. The Chinese government also continued to 
        politicize the protection of Uyghurs' intangible 
        cultural heritage, nominating a Uyghur social and 
        artistic gathering for increased state and 
        international protection, but defining this form of 
        intangible heritage narrowly to exclude variations that 
        contain religious elements and social activism.
         Information remained limited on the status of 
        asylum seekers forcibly returned to China from Cambodia 
        in December 2009, before the UN High Commissioner for 
        Refugees (UNHCR) could make a determination of the 
        asylum seekers' refugee status. In May 2011, Chinese 
        security officials, in cooperation with authorities in 
        Kazakhstan, forcibly returned a Uyghur man--initially 
        recognized as a refugee, though the UNHCR later revoked 
        this status--from Kazakhstan to China. In August, 
        authorities in Thailand turned over a Uyghur man to 
        Chinese authorities--who are presumed to have returned 
        him to China--while authorities in Pakistan and 
        Malaysia forcibly returned Uyghurs to China in the same 
        month. The forced returns are among several documented 
        cases of forced deportation in recent years, 
        highlighting the ongoing risks of ``refoulement'' and 
        torture that Uyghur refugees, asylum seekers, and 
        migrants have faced in neighboring countries under the 
        sway of China's influence and its disregard for 
        international law.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support legislation that expands U.S. Government 
        resources for raising awareness of human rights 
        conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR), for protecting Uyghur culture, and for 
        increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human 
        rights.
         Raise concern about human rights conditions in 
        the XUAR to Chinese officials and condemn the use of 
        security campaigns to suppress human rights. Call on 
        the Chinese government to release people imprisoned for 
        advocating for their rights or for their personal 
        connection to rights advocates, including: Gheyret 
        Niyaz (sentenced in 2010 to 15 years in prison for 
        ``leaking state secrets'' after giving interviews to 
        foreign media); Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 
        years in prison for allegedly ``inciting racial hatred 
        or discrimination'' or ``inciting separatism'' after 
        writing a short story); Alim and Ablikim Abdureyim 
        (adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, sentenced in 
        2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respectively, 
        for alleged economic and ``separatist'' crimes), as 
        well as other prisoners mentioned in this report and in 
        the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
         Call on the Chinese government to provide details 
        about each person detained, charged, tried, or 
        sentenced in connection to demonstrations and riots in 
        the XUAR in July 2009, including each person's name, 
        the charges (if any) against each person, the name and 
        location of the prosecuting office (i.e., 
        procuratorate), the court handling each case, and the 
        name of each facility where a person is detained or 
        imprisoned. Call on the Chinese government to encourage 
        people who have been wrongfully detained to file for 
        compensation. Call on the Chinese government to ensure 
        people suspected of crimes in connection to events in 
        July 2009 are able to hire a lawyer and exercise their 
        right to employ legal defense in accordance with 
        Articles 33 and 96 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law 
        and to ensure suspects can employ legal defense of 
        their own choosing. Call on the Chinese government to 
        announce the judgments in all trials connected to 
        events in July 2009, as required under Article 163 of 
        the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. Call on the government 
        to allow independent experts to conduct independent 
        examinations into the demonstrations and riots and to 
        allow them access to the trials connected to these 
        events.
         Support non-governmental organizations that 
        address human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them 
        to continue to gather information on conditions in the 
        region and develop programs to help Uyghurs increase 
        their capacity to preserve their rights and protect 
        their culture, language, and heritage. Provide support 
        for media outlets devoted to broadcasting news to the 
        XUAR and gathering news from the region to expand their 
        capacity to report on the region and provide uncensored 
        information to XUAR residents. Provide support for 
        libraries that hold Uyghur-language collections to 
        increase their capacity to collect and preserve books 
        and journals from the XUAR. Support organizations that 
        can research and take steps to safeguard tangible and 
        intangible cultural heritage in the XUAR.
         Call on the Chinese government to support 
        development policies in the XUAR that promote the broad 
        protection of XUAR residents' rights and allow the XUAR 
        government to exercise its powers of regional autonomy 
        in making development decisions. Call on central and 
        XUAR authorities to ensure equitable development that 
        promotes not only economic growth but also respects the 
        broad civil and political rights of XUAR residents and 
        engages these communities in participatory 
        decisionmaking. Ensure development projects take into 
        account the particular needs and input of non-Han 
        ethnic groups, who have faced unique challenges 
        protecting their rights in the face of top-down 
        development policies and who have not been full 
        beneficiaries of economic growth in the region. Call on 
        authorities to ensure that residents have input into 
        resettlement initiatives and receive adequate 
        compensation. Call on authorities to take measures to 
        safeguard the rights of herders to preserve their 
        cultures and livelihoods.
         Call on the Chinese government to ensure 
        government and private employers abide by legal 
        provisions barring discrimination based on ethnicity 
        and cease job recruiting practices that reserve 
        positions exclusively for Han Chinese. Call on 
        authorities to monitor compliance with local directives 
        promoting job opportunities for non-Han groups, who 
        continue to face discrimination in the job market. 
        Support organizations that can provide technical 
        assistance in monitoring compliance with labor laws and 
        in bringing suits challenging discriminatory practices, 
        as provided for under Article 62 of the PRC Employment 
        Promotion Law. Call on Chinese authorities to 
        investigate reports of coercion and exploitative 
        working conditions within labor transfer programs that 
        send rural non-Han men and women to jobs in the 
        interior of China. Call on Chinese authorities to 
        investigate work-study programs within the XUAR and 
        ensure they do not exceed permitted parameters for 
        student labor under Chinese law and international 
        standards for worker rights.
         Call on the Chinese government to provide 
        information on the whereabouts and current legal status 
        of Uyghur asylum seekers forcibly returned from 
        Cambodia in December 2009 and Uyghurs forcibly returned 
        to China from Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, and 
        Malaysia in 2011. Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees 
        and asylum seekers with Chinese officials and with 
        officials from international refugee agencies and from 
        transit or destination countries for Uyghur refugees. 
        Call on Chinese officials and officials from transit or 
        destination countries to respect the asylum seeker and 
        refugee designations of the UN High Commissioner for 
        Refugees and the refugee and citizenship designations 
        of other countries. Call on transit and destination 
        countries for Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees, and 
        migrants to abide by requirements in the 1951 
        Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
        Convention against Torture on ``refoulement.''

                                 Tibet

                                Findings

         Expanding Chinese government and Communist 
        Party use of legal and policy measures to increase 
        pressure on Tibetan culture--especially on religion and 
        language--are resulting in consequences that Tibetans 
        believe threaten the viability of their culture. 
        Declining well-being of Tibetan culture contrasts with 
        increases in government-provided statistical measures 
        on economic development and social services, such as 
        education. Tibetans who peacefully express disapproval 
        of government and Party policy on Tibetan affairs are 
        at increased risk of punishment as the central and 
        local governments expand the use of legal measures to 
        safeguard ``social stability'' by criminalizing such 
        expression.
         No formal dialogue took place between the 
        Dalai Lama's representatives and Chinese government and 
        Party officials during the Commission's 2011 reporting 
        year. The environment for dialogue deteriorated as the 
        government pressed forward with implementation of legal 
        measures and policies that many Tibetans--including the 
        Dalai Lama--believe threaten the Tibetan culture, 
        language, religion, heritage, and environment. In 2011, 
        the Dalai Lama took steps to end the official role of a 
        Dalai Lama in the India-based organization that is 
        commonly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-
        exile. The change has the potential to alter dialogue 
        dynamics by eliminating the basis for the Party and 
        government to characterize the Dalai Lama as a 
        ``political'' figure.
         The government and Party continued the 
        campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious 
        leader and expanded government and Party control over 
        Tibetan Buddhism to impose what officials describe as 
        the ``normal order'' of the religion. As of August 
        2011, the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan 
        autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted 
        regulatory measures that increase substantially state 
        infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist 
        monasteries and nunneries. The measures impose closer 
        monitoring and supervision of each monastery's 
        Democratic Management Committee--a monastic group 
        legally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and 
        teachers obey government laws, regulations, and 
        policies. The measures expand significantly township-
        level government authority over monasteries and 
        nunneries and provide a monitoring, supervisory, and 
        reporting role to village-level committees.
         Government security and judicial officials 
        used China's legal system as a means to detain and 
        imprison Tibetan writers, artists, intellectuals, and 
        cultural advocates who turned to veiled language to 
        lament the status of Tibetan culture or criticize 
        government policies toward the Tibetan people and 
        culture. Examples during the 2011 reporting year 
        included writer-publishers, a conference organizer, a 
        singer, and persons who downloaded ``prohibited'' 
        songs. The government seeks to prevent such Tibetans 
        from influencing other Tibetans by punishing peaceful 
        expression as a ``crime'' and using imprisonment to 
        remove them from society.
         Events this past year highlighted the 
        importance Tibetans attribute to the status and 
        preservation of the Tibetan language and the increased 
        threat that some Tibetans believe will result from 
        ``reform'' of the ``bilingual education'' system. 
        Tibetan students in one province led protests against 
        plans to reduce the status and level of use of Tibetan 
        language during the period 2010 to 2020. A Party 
        official characterized ``unity of spoken and written 
        language'' as essential for ``a unified country'' and 
        implied that protesting students put national unity at 
        risk. Retired Tibetan educators submitted to 
        authorities a petition analyzing what they deemed to be 
        violations of China's Constitution and Regional Ethnic 
        Autonomy Law that result in the infringement of ethnic 
        minorities' rights.
         Rural Tibetans protested against what they 
        consider to be adverse effects of government and Party 
        economic development policies--especially mining--that 
        prioritize government objectives above respecting or 
        protecting the Tibetan culture and environment. The 
        value of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) mineral 
        resources is approximately double the 2001 to 2010 
        subsidies the central government provided to the TAR, 
        based on official reports. The TAR government has 
        completed the compulsory settlement or resettlement of 
        nearly two-thirds of the TAR rural population. 
        Officials provided updates on construction of the 
        railway network that will crisscross the Tibetan 
        plateau: one link will traverse quake-struck Yushu, 
        which the government renamed and will make into a 
        ``city'' with a substantial population, economy, and 
        well-developed infrastructure. Tibetans in Yushu 
        protested after authorities either sold or expropriated 
        their property without providing adequate compensation.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Urge the Chinese government to engage in 
        substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his 
        representatives on protecting the Tibetan culture, 
        language, religion, and heritage within the Tibet 
        Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous 
        prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, 
        and Yunnan provinces. The Dalai Lama's withdrawal from 
        exiled Tibetan administrative affairs has the potential 
        to alter dialogue dynamics by eliminating the basis for 
        the government and Party to characterize him as a 
        ``political'' figure. As tensions rise in Tibetan 
        areas, a Chinese government decision to engage in 
        dialogue can result in a durable and mutually 
        beneficial outcome for the Chinese government and 
        Tibetans and improve the outlook for local and regional 
        security in coming decades.
         Convey to the Chinese government the urgent 
        importance of refraining from expanding the use of 
        legal measures to infringe upon and repress Tibetan 
        Buddhists' right to the freedom of religion. Point out 
        to Chinese officials that the anti-Dalai Lama campaign, 
        aggressive programs of ``patriotic education,'' and 
        recent prefectural-level legal measures seeking to 
        control Tibetan Buddhist monastic affairs could promote 
        social discord, not ``social stability.'' Urge the 
        government to respect the right of Tibetan Buddhists to 
        identify and educate religious teachers in a manner 
        consistent with Tibetan preferences and traditions.
         Request that the Chinese government follow up on 
        a 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR government 
        that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the 
        Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as 
        an ``ordinary citizen'' along with his family. Urge the 
        government to invite a representative of an 
        international organization to meet with Gedun Choekyi 
        Nyima so that Gedun Choekyi Nyima can express to the 
        representative his wishes with respect to privacy; 
        photograph the international representative and Gedun 
        Choekyi Nyima together; and publish Gedun Choekyi 
        Nyima's statement and the photograph.
         Convey to the Chinese government the importance 
        of respecting and protecting the Tibetan culture and 
        language. Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant 
        Tibetan culture by honoring China's Constitution's 
        reference to the freedoms of speech, association, 
        assembly, and religion, and refraining from using the 
        security establishment, courts, and law to infringe 
        upon and repress Tibetans' exercise of such rights. 
        Urge officials to respect Tibetan wishes to maintain 
        the role of both the Tibetan and Chinese languages in 
        teaching modern subjects and not to consign Tibetan 
        language to inferior status by discontinuing its use in 
        teaching modern subjects.
         Encourage the Chinese government to take fully 
        into account the views and preferences of Tibetans when 
        the government plans infrastructure, natural resource 
        development, and resettlement projects in the Tibetan 
        areas of China. Encourage the Chinese government to 
        engage appropriate experts in assessing the impact of 
        such projects and in advising the government on the 
        implementation and progress of such projects. Request 
        the Chinese government to compensate fully, fairly, and 
        promptly all Tibetans who suffer the loss of property 
        or property rights as a result of the April 2010 Yushu 
        earthquake and the government's decision to redevelop 
        Yushu as a new ``city.''
         Increase support for U.S. non-governmental 
        organizations to develop programs that can assist 
        Tibetans to increase their capacity to peacefully 
        protect and develop their culture, language, and 
        heritage; that can help to improve education, economic, 
        health, and environmental conservation conditions of 
        ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and 
        that create sustainable benefits for Tibetans without 
        encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas.
         Continue to convey to the Chinese government the 
        importance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan 
        protesters and rioters; condemn the use of security 
        campaigns to suppress human rights; and request the 
        Chinese government to provide complete details about 
        Tibetans detained, charged, or sentenced for protest-
        related crimes. Continue to raise in meetings and 
        correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of 
        Tibetans who are imprisoned as punishment for the 
        peaceful exercise of human rights. Representative 
        examples include: Former Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now 
        serving an extended 18-year sentence for printing 
        leaflets, distributing posters, and later shouting pro-
        Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying Khedrub 
        (sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); 
        Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a 
        reincarnated lama, serving a sentence of 18 years 
        commuted from life imprisonment for ``inciting 
        splittism''); and nomad Ronggyal Adrag (sentenced to 8 
        years' imprisonment for shouting political slogans at a 
        public festival).

                  Developments in Hong Kong and Macau

                                Findings

         Though the Hong Kong Basic Law states that the 
        ``ultimate aim'' is the selection of the chief 
        executive and the election of all members of the 
        Legislative Council (Legco) by universal suffrage, 
        reforms passed in 2011 fell short of these aims. The 
        reforms cover the election of Legco members and the 
        selection of the chief executive in Hong Kong's 2012 
        elections. Under the reforms, the number of members of 
        the selection committee that chooses the chief 
        executive will be increased from 800 to 1,200, and the 
        number of Legco members will be increased from 60 to 
        70, with 5 of the additional 10 members elected 
        directly and the other 5 elected under a newly created 
        territory-wide District Council functional 
        constituency. According to a report in an independent 
        Hong Kong newspaper, the mainland Chinese government 
        has been ``coordinating'' election strategies behind 
        the scenes.
         The Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and Hong 
        Kong's Basic Law provide that Hong Kong shall enjoy a 
        high degree of autonomy. In the past year Hong Kong's 
        immigration authorities refused to grant visas to two 
        exiled leaders of the Tiananmen protests, Wu'er Kaixi 
        and Wang Dan, to attend the funeral of Hong Kong 
        democracy activist Szeto Wah in January 2011. Hong Kong 
        controls its own immigration policies under the Basic 
        Law, and at least one Hong Kong commentator viewed the 
        immigration department's refusal to issue visas as Hong 
        Kong deferring to the wishes of the mainland 
        authorities.
         Corruption in Macau is a major and growing 
        problem, with Macau's ranking on the Transparency 
        International Corruption Perception Index dropping from 
        43rd in 2009 to 46th in 2010. The growth of gambling in 
        Macau, fueled by money from mainland Chinese gamblers 
        and the growth of U.S.-owned casinos, has been 
        accompanied by widespread corruption, organized crime, 
        and money laundering.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Continue to make every effort to visit Hong Kong 
        when traveling to mainland China. U.S. Government 
        delegations' meetings in Hong Kong should include 
        meetings with members of the Hong Kong Legislative 
        Council, officials with the Hong Kong government 
        administration, and members of the judiciary. Such 
        meetings show U.S. support for a high degree of 
        autonomy in Hong Kong under the system of ``one 
        country, two systems'' and for rule of law.
         In meetings with Chinese government officials, 
        urge them to allow the people of Hong Kong to enjoy the 
        high degree of autonomy articulated in the Basic Law 
        and the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration, especially in 
        matters concerning elections and immigration, and to 
        allow the introduction of universal suffrage with ``one 
        man, one vote,'' if this is the wish of the people of 
        Hong Kong.
         Arrange for regulatory experts from states with 
        gaming industries, such as Nevada, to provide technical 
        training and assistance to Macau authorities on how to 
        control criminal activity, and ensure that U.S. casino 
        owners and operators in Macau are adhering to the 
        highest standards for the gaming industry.

    The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 13 to 
0.

                      Political Prisoner Database

                            Recommendations

    When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a 
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official 
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration 
officials are encouraged to:

         Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) 
        (http://ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date 
        information on a prisoner or groups of prisoners. 
        Consult a prisoner's database record for more detailed 
        information about the prisoner's case, including his or 
        her alleged crime; specific human rights that officials 
        have violated; stage in the legal process; and location 
        of detention or imprisonment, if known.
         Advise official and private delegations traveling 
        to China to present Chinese officials with lists of 
        political and religious prisoners compiled from 
        database records.
         Urge U.S. state and local officials and private 
        citizens involved in sister-state and sister-city 
        relationships with China to explore the database and to 
        advocate for the release of political and religious 
        prisoners in China.


                    a powerful resource for advocacy


    The Commission's 2011 Annual Report provides information 
about Chinese political and religious prisoners\1\ in the 
context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many 
of the abuses result from the Communist Party's and 
government's application of policies and laws. The Commission 
relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly 
available online database maintained by the Commission, for its 
own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of 
the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare 
summaries of information about political and religious 
prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials. 
The Commission invites the public to read about issue-specific 
Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this Annual 
Report and to access and make use of the upgraded PPD at http:/
/ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is available 
at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.)
    PPD use has increased substantially following the July 2010 
PPD upgrade. The PPD received approximately 90,900 online 
requests for prisoner information during the 12-month period 
ending August 31, 2011, an increase of approximately 164 
percent over the 34,400 requests during the 12-month period 
ending in August 2010. During the 12-month period ending in 
August 2011, the United States was the country of origin of the 
largest share of requests for information (approximately 46 
percent), followed by China (24 percent), Germany (8 percent), 
France (3.5 percent), and Great Britain (3.2 percent). 
Approximately 13 percent of the requests originated from U.S. 
Government (.gov) Internet domains, 13 percent from worldwide 
commercial (.com) domains, 13 percent from worldwide network 
(.net) domains, 1.5 percent from U.S. education (.edu) domains, 
and 0.8 percent from worldwide nonprofit organization (.org) 
domains. Approximately 16 percent of the requests for 
information were from numerical Internet addresses that do not 
provide information about the name of the registrant or the 
type of domain.


                          political prisoners


    The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information 
that is reliable and up-to-date. Commission staff members work 
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on the 
staff member's area of expertise. The staff seek to provide 
objective analysis of information about individual prisoners 
and about events and trends that drive political and religious 
imprisonment in China.
    As of September 1, 2011, the PPD contained information on 
6,623 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of 
those, 1,451 are cases of political or religious prisoners 
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 
5,172 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have 
been released, or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon 
after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there 
are considerably more than 1,451 cases of current political and 
religious imprisonment in China. The Commission staff works on 
an ongoing basis to add cases of political and religious 
imprisonment to the PPD.
    The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the 
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their 
extensive experience and data on political and religious 
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the 
database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The 
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner 
information, as well as on information provided by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize 
in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious 
imprisonment, and other public sources of information.


                   more powerful database technology


    The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a 
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and 
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational 
institutions, and individuals who research political and 
religious imprisonment in China or who advocate on behalf of 
such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly 
leveraged the capacity of the Commission's information and 
technology resources to support such research, reporting, and 
advocacy.
    The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power 
to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment 
in China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is 
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query 
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human 
rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her 
detention. These types include violations of the right to 
peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, 
and free expression, including the freedom to advocate for 
peaceful social or political change and to criticize government 
policy or government officials.
    The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the 
Internet to query the database and download prisoner data 
without providing personal information to the Commission and 
without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a 
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user 
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries, 
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal 
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not 
download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as the 
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not 
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be 
a nickname) and password are the only information required to 
set up a user account.

                            II. Human Rights

                         Freedom of Expression

                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, Chinese 
officials maintained a broad range of restrictions on free 
expression that do not comply with international human rights 
standards. While such standards permit states in limited 
circumstances to restrict expression to protect interests such 
as national security and public order, Chinese restrictions 
covered a much broader range of activity, including peaceful 
expression critical of the Communist Party. Chinese officials 
showed little sign of loosening political control over the 
Internet and cell phones. They called for strengthening the 
Party's guidance of online opinion and censored politically 
sensitive information, including searches for ``human rights'' 
or ``democracy.'' At times, citizen expression on China's 
popular microblogs overwhelmed censors, including following a 
high-speed train accident in July. A top official said there 
would be ``no change in the Party's control over the media,'' 
amidst censorship of events such as the Nobel Peace Prize award 
to imprisoned Chinese intellectual and reform advocate Liu 
Xiaobo and intensified harassment of foreign journalists. 
Officials continued to abuse vague criminal charges, including 
subversion, to target peaceful speech critical of the Party. 
Officials maintained broad regulations and registration 
requirements applicable to journalists, publishers, news media, 
and the Internet.

              International Standards for Free Expression

    Many Chinese restrictions on free expression do not comply 
with international human rights standards. Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights permit officials to restrict expression so long as it is 
(1) for the purpose of respecting the rights or reputations of 
others or protecting national security, public order, public 
health or morals, or the general welfare; (2) set forth in law; 
and (3) necessary and the least restrictive means to achieve 
the purported aim.\1\ Regarding the purpose requirement, the UN 
Human Rights Council has said restrictions on ``discussion of 
government policies and political debate,'' ``peaceful 
demonstrations or political activities, including for peace and 
democracy,'' and ``expression of dissent,'' are inconsistent 
with Article 19 of the ICCPR.\2\ As outlined in this section, 
Chinese officials continued to restrict expression on the 
Internet and in the media for impermissible purposes, such as 
to stifle peaceful criticism of the Communist Party. As to 
restrictions clearly set forth in law, Chinese officials this 
past year abused vaguely worded criminal law provisions and 
resorted to extralegal measures to arbitrarily restrict free 
expression. As to the narrowness requirement, as documented in 
this section, Chinese restrictions continued to be overly broad 
and disproportionate to protecting the stated interest. In May 
2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression noted that 
restrictions on expression should be applied by an independent 
body and include the possibility of remedy against abuse.\3\ As 
noted in this section, in China there remained no independent 
checks on government abuse.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Official Response to Overseas Protests and Calls for Domestic
                          ``Jasmine'' Protests
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  This past year was marked by a crackdown on free expression in China
 in early 2011 that followed protests in the Middle East and North
 Africa and the appearance of online calls for ``Jasmine'' protests
 domestically. Protests in the Middle East began in Tunisia in December
 2010 and soon spread to Egypt, Libya, and other countries in the
 region. In February 2011, the ``Jasmine'' calls began circulating
 online in China.\4\ They called for weekly non-violent protest strolls
 in select cities to demand an end to corruption and to promote issues
 such as judicial independence, free expression, and political
 reform.\5\

media and internet censorship

  Officials reportedly censored Chinese media coverage of the Middle
 East and North Africa protests. According to leaked censorship
 instructions, officials allegedly ordered Chinese media to use only
 stories issued by the central government news agency, Xinhua, and
 banned reporting on demands for democracy in the Middle East or drawing
 comparisons to China's political system.\6\ Western media observed
 Chinese media relying heavily on Xinhua stories and observed one-sided
 coverage emphasizing the dangers of democracy for countries not ready
 for it.\7\ At the time, online censors reportedly blocked searches of
 the words ``Egypt,'' ``Libya,'' ``Jasmine,'' and ``democracy.'' \8\ The
 duration and effectiveness of the censorship was unclear. Foreign media
 attempting to report on the ``Jasmine'' protests encountered intense
 harassment. [See Foreign Journalists below for more information.]

harassment, detentions of chinese citizens

  Starting in mid-February 2011, Chinese authorities also targeted large
 numbers of writers, artists, Internet bloggers, lawyers, and reform
 advocates. Many were outspoken critics of the government; some tried to
 share information about the ``Jasmine'' protest calls, while the
 connection of others, if any, to the calls was unclear.\9\ Officials
 detained numerous citizens on national security and public disturbance
 charges.\10\ [For information on these and other individual cases in
 the crackdown, see Internet and Other Electronic Media, and Abuse of
 Criminal Laws To Punish Free Expression in this section.] The UN
 Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and other
 international groups noted reports of numerous Chinese citizens having
 gone missing or disappearing into official custody with little or no
 information about their charges or whereabouts.\11\ [For more
 information on the apparent disregard of criminal procedural
 protections in connection with the disappearances, see Enforced
 Disappearances in Section II--Criminal Justice.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  Internet and Other Electronic Media


                blocking and filtering political content


    In China, officials are not transparent about the content 
that is blocked or why it is blocked,\12\ and they continue to 
arbitrarily block content for purposes impermissible under 
international standards. Chinese authorities expressed anger 
over the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned 
prominent intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo in 
October 2010, for example, and blocked online searches for 
``Nobel Peace Prize'' or ``Liu Xiaobo'' and text messages 
containing Liu's name.\13\ In January 2011, authorities 
reportedly banned hundreds of words, including ``democracy'' 
and ``human rights'' from cell phone text messages.\14\ 
Politically sensitive Web sites continued to be blocked, 
including a popular Tibetan culture site, an anticorruption 
site, and a public health advocacy Web site.\15\ Officials also 
continued to block information in a disproportionate manner 
that did not appear necessary to achieve a legitimate aim. For 
example, access to overseas sites such as Facebook, Twitter, 
and YouTube remained completely blocked.\16\ In late May 2011, 
officials reportedly imposed broad blocks on Internet and cell 
phone access in the northern part of the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region following a series of mostly peaceful 
protests sparked by the death of a herder.\17\
    Officials continued to detain and harass Chinese citizens 
who sought to share politically sensitive content online. In 
each case, the activity appeared to pose little threat to 
national security or public order, or the punishment appeared 
disproportionate to the alleged offense. For example, rights 
defender Cheng Jianping (who uses the pseudonym Wang Yi) sent a 
satirical Twitter message urging anti-Japanese protesters to 
converge on the Japanese pavilion at the Shanghai 2010 World 
Expo.\18\ The Xinxiang City Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) 
Committee in Henan province ordered her to serve one year of 
RTL in November 2010.\19\ In April 2011, authorities in 
Chongqing municipality ordered a citizen to serve RTL for 
posting scatological humor in a critique of the policies of 
Chongqing's Party Secretary Bo Xilai.\20\ In November 2010, 
Shanghai police interrogated the writer Xia Shang after he 
offered to buy flowers for victims of a Shanghai fire in an 
Internet post.\21\ Officials treated citizens who sought to 
share information about the calls for domestic ``Jasmine'' 
protests, which appeared to be a non-violent call for political 
reform, as threats to the state. The detained included Hua 
Chunhui, an insurance company manager and activist who 
reportedly sent Twitter messages about the ``Jasmine'' protest 
calls and was charged with endangering state security.\22\ In 
April 2011, officials in Jiangsu province ordered Hua to serve 
18 months of RTL.\23\ In February, police in Harbin city, 
Heilongjiang province, detained Internet blogger Liang Haiyi on 
suspicion of the crime of ``subversion of state power.'' Police 
accused her of posting information about the ``Jasmine'' 
protests on the popular QQ microblogging site.\24\
    The types of content prohibited online in China are not 
clearly defined in law, and thus conflict with international 
standards. Chinese Internet regulations contain vague and broad 
prohibitions on content that, for example, ``harms the honor or 
interests of the nation,'' ``spreads rumors,'' or ``disrupts 
national policies on religion.'' \25\ Chinese law does not 
define these concepts.\26\ In China, the government places the 
burden on Internet service and content providers to monitor and 
remove content based on these vague standards and to maintain 
records of such activity and report it to the government.\27\ 
In February 2011, a manager at Renren, a major social media 
company similar to Facebook, said that the company censored 
sensitive content using a staff of 500 and a keyword filtering 
system, and that the ``CEO would have to have a coffee with the 
government'' for any misstep.\28\ The Party's influence over 
the technology sector was evident in June, when more than 60 
representatives from top Chinese Internet companies, including 
Sina and Baidu, gathered in Shanghai to commemorate the Party's 
90th anniversary.\29\ Also in June, Sina announced plans to 
launch an English microblog site in the United States, which 
could have the effect of exporting Chinese censorship to 
overseas markets.\30\ The U.S.-based company Google, which has 
operations in China and which in early 2010 challenged Chinese 
censorship requirements, reportedly continued to face problems 
in China. In March 2011, Google reported that the Chinese 
government appeared to be interfering with its email service in 
China and making it look like a technical problem.\31\ The 
government denied the charge.\32\ In June, Google reported that 
an attack on hundreds of personal Gmail accounts, including 
those of Chinese political activists, senior U.S. officials, 
and journalists, had originated from China.\33\ The Party's 
official newspaper rejected the allegation.\34\


                    prior restraints on the internet


    In addition to blocking certain types of content, officials 
in China control the Internet by determining who gains access 
to the medium through numerous licensing requirements (i.e., 
prior restraints). All Web sites hosted in China are required 
either to be licensed by or registered with the government, and 
sites providing news content or audio and video services 
require an additional license or registration.\35\ In a 2011 
report, the UN Special Rapporteur for Free Expression said that 
licensing requirements ``cannot be justified in the case of the 
Internet, as it can accommodate an unlimited number of points 
of entry and an essentially unlimited number of users.'' \36\ 
In October 2010, Chinese media reported that as of the end of 
September 2010 Chinese Internet companies had inspected nearly 
1.8 million Web sites and shut down 3,000 for failing to 
register.\37\ In July 2011, the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) reported a 41 percent decrease in the number of 
Web sites in China in 2010 to 1.91 million sites.\38\ The 
report's editor cited government campaigns targeting 
``obscene'' sites and the economic downturn as reasons for the 
decrease, and said in recent years few sites had been closed 
``purely to control speech.'' \39\ Other observers in China, 
however, attributed the decrease to the chilling effect of 
expanding government control.\40\ The CASS study also claimed 
that the United States was using new media, including the Voice 
of America, to threaten China's ``ideological safety.'' \41\


          expanding overall access, while maintaining control


    The government has pledged to expand access to the Internet 
and cell phones.\42\ Official statistics indicate that by the 
end of 2010, there were 457 million Internet users in China, 
including a growing number in rural areas, and by April 2011, 
900 million mobile phone accounts.\43\ Officials have sought to 
expand the Internet to promote economic development and 
government propaganda.\44\ Still, international observers and 
Western media continue to note the difficulties officials have 
in controlling this emerging and vibrant space for expression, 
including expression of criticism of the government and 
discussion of some politically sensitive topics.\45\ In July 
2011, for example, users on China's two most popular Twitter-
type microblogs posted some 26 million messages after a high-
speed train crash near Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province.\46\ 
Officials reportedly censored some messages, but a large number 
of messages either were allowed through or appeared too quickly 
for censors to react.\47\
    Official statements and actions continue to emphasize 
control rather than freedom on the Internet. The importance of 
maintaining official control was reinforced in May 2011, when 
officials established a State Internet Information Office to 
``supervise and urge relevant departments to strengthen their 
supervision of online content, and to be responsible for 
approvals for online news services and other related services 
as well as day-to-day oversight.'' \48\ In China, the Communist 
Party exercises tight control over government agencies that 
manage the media and Internet.\49\ This relationship gives the 
Party discretion to use government restrictions not just for 
the purpose of regulating pornography, intellectual property 
violations, and protecting minors--permissible purposes under 
international standards--but also to serve the Party's 
interests. In February 2011, President Hu Jintao called for 
``strengthening the mechanisms for guiding online public 
opinion.'' \50\ The practice of authorities paying Chinese 
citizens to post comments favorable to the government and Party 
on the Internet reportedly continued.\51\ In February, 
Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou 
Yongkang said authorities should ``coalesce a comprehensive'' 
structure for managing the Internet ``under the Party 
committee's unified leadership.'' \52\ In Beijing, authorities 
reportedly issued regulations requiring bars, hotels, and other 
public places to purchase and install costly software to 
monitor the identities of people using wireless services at 
those locations.\53\

            Abuse of Criminal Law To Punish Free Expression

    Officials continued to use the criminal charges of 
``subversion'' and ``inciting subversion'' (Article 105 of the 
PRC Criminal Law) this past year, in part in connection with 
the crackdown that followed protests in the Middle East and 
North Africa and the calls for ``Jasmine'' protests 
domestically.\54\ According to the non-governmental 
organization (NGO) Chinese Human Rights Defenders, out of a 
total of 48 individuals detained since mid-February 2011, 
officials had charged at least 17 with ``subversion'' or 
``inciting subversion.'' \55\ Ran Yunfei, a prolific writer, 
blogger, and activist, was arrested in March for ``inciting 
subversion.'' \56\ Authorities released him in August but 
placed him under ``residential restriction'' for six months, 
restricting his movements and ability to write and speak.\57\ 
In March, police in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, detained 
prominent blogger Guo Weidong on suspicion of ``inciting 
subversion of state power'' after alleging he had forwarded 
information online about the protests.\58\
    Officials also charged numerous persons with ``creating 
disturbances,'' a crime under Article 293 of the PRC Criminal 
Law.\59\ Officials detained the human rights activist Wei Qiang 
on the charge of ``creating a disturbance'' in March 2011, 
before releasing him on bail to await trial in April.\60\ In 
February, Wei was at the site of one of the ``Jasmine'' protest 
strolls in Beijing and reported on the scene using his Twitter 
account. Amid the broader crackdown, authorities in March 2011 
also detained the Beijing-based rights advocate Wang Lihong on 
the charge of creating a disturbance, but in connection with 
activities stemming from almost a year earlier.\61\ They 
alleged that Wang had used the Internet to organize protests 
outside a court in support of three bloggers accused of 
defamation for helping a woman call on officials to 
reinvestigate her daughter's death.\62\ In September, after a 
trial reportedly marked by procedural irregularities,\63\ a 
Beijing court sentenced Wang to nine months in prison for 
creating a disturbance.\64\
    In the case of the well-known artist Ai Weiwei, officials 
charged him with economic crimes, alleging that his company had 
evaded ``a huge amount of tax.'' \65\ Ai had become an 
outspoken critic of government policies and had been keeping 
track of the lawyers, bloggers, and activists swept up in the 
crackdown, when officials detained him in April.\66\ 
Authorities had refused to notify his family of the charges 
against him or his whereabouts and kept him at a secret 
location, purportedly under ``residential surveillance.'' \67\ 
During his 81 days in custody, Ai was reportedly kept in a cell 
without windows and was accompanied by two guards.\68\ 
Authorities released Ai on bail in June on the condition that 
he not give interviews or use Twitter.\69\ In August, Ai 
resumed his Twitter messages and told a Western newspaper, ``I 
can't be alive and not express my feelings.'' \70\
    The actual threat these citizens posed to state security 
and public order or whether the underlying crime was the actual 
motivation for official action is unclear, as details regarding 
many of these cases remain limited. Available information 
suggests that officials targeted the citizens to stifle 
political expression and dissent. Many of the citizens targeted 
had track records of criticizing the government and Communist 
Party and advocating for democracy and human rights.\71\ As the 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders have noted in recent years, the vagueness of 
Chinese crimes of endangering state security, including 
subversion, lends itself to official abuse of freedom of 
speech, and Chinese courts make little assessment of whether 
the speech in question poses a threat to state security.\72\ 
There were other cases of alleged subversion or splittism this 
past year. In October 2010, officials in Wuhan city, Hubei 
province, arrested the prolific blogger Li Tie on charges of 
subversion; Li had written numerous essays in support of 
democracy.\73\ In November, Beijing authorities detained 
activist Bai Dongping on inciting subversion charges after he 
posted online a photo of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\74\ In 
December, three Tibetan writers, Kalsang Jinpa, Jangtse Donkho, 
and Buddha were sentenced to prison terms of three to four 
years for inciting splittism after articles they had written 
about the 2008 Tibetan protests appeared in a magazine.\75\ In 
March 2011, authorities in Suining city, Sichuan province, 
sentenced democracy advocate Liu Xianbin to 10 years in prison 
for seeking to incite subversion by writing essays advocating 
for, among other things, democracy, and posting them on Web 
sites outside of China.\76\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Authorities Defend Liu Xiaobo Case on Grounds of International Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  After imprisoned prominent intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo
 was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010, Chinese authorities
 sought to defend their handling of his case as consistent with
 international law. After the award was announced, China's central
 government news agency, Xinhua, issued an analysis of the case based on
 the findings of a Chinese criminal law scholar, Gao Mingxuan.\77\ The
 analysis noted that international treaties and nearly every country's
 laws criminalize some speech, and that Liu's speech had sought to
 incite the overthrow of the Chinese government.\78\ Xinhua failed to
 note that the essays and activities cited as evidence against Liu, who
 was sentenced to 11 years in prison, did not advocate violence and
 instead called for nonviolence and gradual political reform.\79\ A May
 2011 opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded
 that Chinese authorities' handling of Liu's case violated both his
 right to fair trial and his right to political free speech as provided
 under international law.\80\ Chinese officials responded to the Nobel
 announcement by detaining citizens who distributed leaflets and posted
 online messages in support of Liu.\81\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         Extralegal Harassment

    Chinese officials continued to physically harm, restrict 
the travel of, and otherwise extralegally harass citizens to 
punish and stifle expression. Under illegal home confinement 
after his release, self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng 
and his wife Yuan Weijing recorded video of themselves 
describing the round-the-clock surveillance and harassment they 
faced.\82\ After the video was smuggled out and posted online 
in February 2011, security officials reportedly beat Chen and 
Yuan on two occasions.\83\ After the Nobel announcement in 
October 2010, authorities confined Liu Xia, the wife of Liu 
Xiaobo, to her home in Beijing and cut off her communications 
to the outside world.\84\ A May 2011 opinion of the UN Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Liu Xia's house 
arrest violates international standards.\85\ After his release 
from prison in December, China Democracy Party co-founder Qin 
Yongmin was harassed by police in Wuhan city, Hubei province, 
who accused him of speaking to reporters.\86\ Officials refused 
to allow the noted writer Liao Yiwu to attend the March 2011 
PEN World Writers Festival in New York and a literary festival 
in Australia in May.\87\ In July, Liao escaped China at the 
Vietnam border. He fled to Berlin in anticipation of the 
publication of a memoir on the four years he spent in a Chinese 
prison for writing a poem on the 1989 Tiananmen protests.\88\ 
The Buddhist leader Wu Zeheng reportedly has been beaten, 
harassed, and prevented from participating in a Buddhist 
celebration by authorities in Guangdong province following his 
release from prison in February 2010.\89\ Wu previously served 
11 years for alleged economic crimes, although reports connect 
that imprisonment to his issuance of letters to China's 
leadership calling for reforms and an end to corruption.\90\

                          Freedom of the Press

    Chinese government and Communist Party control over the 
press continued to violate international standards. 
International experts identify media serving ``as government 
mouthpieces instead of as independent bodies operating in the 
public interest'' as a major challenge to free expression.\91\ 
In China, officials expect the media to serve as the Party and 
government's mouthpiece. In a November 2010 speech on political 
reform, Liu Binjie, director of the government agency 
responsible for regulating the press, the General 
Administration on Press and Publication, said any reform must 
be ``beneficial to strengthening and improving the Party's 
leadership over press and publishing work. . . . From beginning 
to end we must insist on . . . no change to the nature of press 
and publishing serving as mouthpiece of the Party and the 
people, no change in the Party's control over the media.'' \92\ 
In January 2011, a spokesperson for the State Administration 
for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) said officials had 
ruled out any moves to commercialize radio and television 
stations. ``Radio and television stations are the Party's 
important news media and battleground for propagandizing 
ideology and culture . . . and propaganda must remain its 
focus,'' he said.\93\ In November 2010, the Party's official 
journal, Seeking Truth, cited the experience of the former 
Soviet Union to argue against any liberalization of China's 
press.\94\
    Authorities have allowed reporters some room to exercise 
``public supervision'' duties over local officials and local 
matters, but in recent years have sought to rein in this space. 
In the summer of 2010, for example, the Central Propaganda 
Department reportedly barred more commercially oriented 
``metropolitan'' (dushi) newspapers from publishing 
``negative'' stories about incidents in other geographic areas 
within China or carrying stories published by newspapers based 
in other areas, a practice known as ``outside area 
supervision.'' \95\ Rhetorically, officials continue to claim 
that the rights of legally recognized journalists should be 
protected, although the content of such rights remains 
unclear.\96\ Emboldened by official claims that journalists 
deserve protection, Chinese journalists protested a series of 
incidents during the summer of 2010 in which local officials 
and commercial interests had targeted a number of journalists, 
including threatening them with charges of criminal 
defamation.\97\ Despite such protests, a deputy editor at 
Caijing, a Chinese financial magazine known for its 
investigative reporting, noted the ``core problem: our police 
and judiciary are not independent and there is widespread 
collusion between officials and enterprises.'' \98\ In July, 
the Party issued an order censoring news coverage of a high-
speed train accident in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province, 
forcing newspapers to discard pages containing coverage of the 
incident.\99\ The order came after Chinese citizens flooded the 
Internet with messages questioning officials' response and 
openness following the crash.\100\ A number of Chinese 
journalists expressed outrage at the propaganda order on their 
blogs, and at least one news weekly appeared to ignore the 
order.\101\


          political control of media through party directives


    This past year, officials continued to publicly issue broad 
directives on what China's domestic media should report, 
reminding journalists of their duty to ``correctly'' (zhengque) 
guide public opinion. On Journalists' Day in China in November 
2010, Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, said 
that ``a correct public opinion orientation benefits the Party 
and the people.'' \102\ He called on the news media to 
``propagandize the Party's positions.'' \103\ To prepare for 
the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist 
Party in July 2011, Central Propaganda Department director Liu 
Yunshan said in April that covering the anniversary was the 
``common responsibility of media organizations at various 
levels.'' \104\ He called on evening and metropolitan 
newspapers to ``use vivid stories and inspiring topics to 
illustrate the glorious history of our Party's struggle'' and 
urged online media to ``help the large numbers of netizens 
understand the Party's great historical course by publishing 
special postings, background links, and online interviews.'' 
\105\ In May 2011, an official at SARFT confirmed that 
television stations had been verbally ordered not to air 
detective and time travel shows during the anniversary 
period.\106\
    The Party, through its Central Propaganda Department, lower 
level propaganda departments, and other government agencies, 
also issues more specific directives to the media on what they 
can and cannot report on. These directives are considered state 
secrets, but their contents continue to be leaked to the public 
and reported on by foreign and Hong Kong media and non-
governmental organizations. In an April 2011 Washington Post 
story, unnamed Chinese editors and journalists confirmed the 
substance of a series of directives issued in March that 
appeared to reflect official nervousness over the North Africa 
and Middle East protests.\107\ In January 2011, the 
International Federation of Journalists released a report 
documenting more than 80 censorship orders in 2010.\108\ The 
orders reportedly blocked information on ``public health, 
disasters, corruption and civil unrest.'' \109\ A virtual news 
blackout, including the blacking out of Western stations 
broadcast in China, followed the Nobel Peace Prize announcement 
in October 2010.\110\ The only news stories were from state-run 
media outlets such as Xinhua and Global Times, which reported 
on Chinese displeasure with the award.\111\ In January 2011, 
the Central Propaganda Department reportedly ordered media not 
to use the phrase ``civil society'' in their reports.\112\


                       punishment of journalists


    Journalists and news media who issued news reports that 
authorities did not approve of continued to face punishment. In 
December 2010, a reporter at Southern Weekend said that the 
paper had been ordered to cease publication of an annual media 
award.\113\ In January 2011, the outspoken journalist Chang 
Ping, who worked for the Southern Daily Group, reported that he 
had been dismissed from his job under pressure from 
authorities.\114\ That same month, Time Weekly placed one of 
its editors, Peng Xiaoyun, on what appeared to be involuntary 
leave after the paper ran a story mentioning prominent 
activists and several signers of Charter 08.\115\ Titled the 
``100 Most Influential People of Our Time'' and published in 
mid-December, the list included Zhao Lianhai, the advocate for 
victims of tainted milk.\116\ After the story's publication, 
copies reportedly were recalled and Peng and another editor 
were required to write self-criticisms.\117\ In March 2011, 
Peng reported that she had been dismissed.\118\ The publishers 
of another Guangzhou-based publication, South Wind Window, 
reportedly demoted its president and suspended another 
journalist after officials criticized a story they deemed 
``anti-government and anti-Communist Party.'' \119\ Following 
the Wenzhou train crash, China's central television network 
suspended Wang Qinglei after the host of a program he produced 
questioned the Railway Ministry's response to the incident, and 
removed another program after it criticized the ministry's 
spokesman.\120\


     political control of media through regulation of editors and 
                              journalists


    All news media are subject to an extensive licensing system 
and continual government oversight. In order to legally report 
the news, domestic newspapers, magazines, and Web sites, as 
well as individual journalists, must obtain a license or 
accreditation from the government.\121\ Radio and television 
broadcast journalists must pass a government-sponsored exam 
that tests them on basic knowledge of Marxist views of news and 
Communist Party principles.\122\ In the 2010 Annual Report, the 
Commission reported that government officials were planning to 
require all journalists to pass a similar exam, but it is 
unclear whether this exam has been implemented.\123\ Ongoing 
training initiatives for journalists continued to be heavily 
imbued with political indoctrination. In November, 
teleconferences with journalists across China were held in 
connection with a new campaign to ``Stop False Reporting, 
Strengthen Social Responsibility, and Strengthen Construction 
of News Profession Ethics.'' \124\ The campaign sought to 
``guide editors and journalists to grasp the basics of Marxist 
views of news . . . in order to strengthen the feeling of glory 
and mission in doing the Party's news work well.'' \125\ 
According to an April 2011 article on the China Journalists 
Association Web site on 14 newspaper units that carried out 
``self-education,'' journalists at one Beijing newspaper were 
reminded that ``news media are the mouthpiece of the Party and 
people . . . and not simply a commercial activity.'' \126\
    International experts have criticized a general licensing 
requirement for journalists.\127\ In a 2010 joint declaration 
on challenges to free expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression and his international 
counterparts identified as challenges ``registration 
requirements for print media'' and government rules against 
``publishing false news.'' \128\ Chinese officials continue to 
exercise their discretion to shut down unlicensed media. In 
March 2011, China's main press regulator, the General 
Administration on Press and Publication, announced a 100-day 
campaign to, among other objectives, shut down ``illegal'' 
reporting offices.\129\


                          foreign journalists


    This past year the Commission observed a spike in the 
intensity and level of harassment against foreign journalists 
as they attempted to report on events considered sensitive by 
Chinese officials. In February 2011, foreign journalists who 
traveled to Linyi city, Shandong province, to report on the 
home confinement of self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng 
encountered violent groups of men who roughed them up, 
threatened them with bricks, and destroyed equipment.\130\ The 
journalists contacted local police but received no 
assistance.\131\ In late February and early March 2011, Chinese 
authorities harassed foreign journalists attempting to cover 
the ``Jasmine'' protest strolls at sites in Beijing and other 
parts of China.\132\ On February 27, reporters covering the 
Wangfujing site in Beijing met rough treatment from officials, 
and one journalist was reportedly beaten and later sought 
treatment at a hospital.\133\ Chinese Foreign Minister Yang 
Jiechi denied that any foreign journalists had been beaten, and 
foreign ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said the journalists had 
disrupted ``normal order'' and violated unspecified rules.\134\ 
Harassment continued in the days that followed, with officials 
asking a journalist to sign a pledge promising never to report 
on the ``Jasmine'' protests and officials threatening to expel 
journalists or revoke their press credentials.\135\ In April, 
plainclothes police detained, and in at least one case roughed 
up, foreign reporters attempting to cover an outdoor Christian 
religious gathering.\136\ In May 2011, the professional 
association of international journalists in China, the Foreign 
Correspondents' Club of China, said 94 percent of survey 
respondents believed reporting conditions in China had 
deteriorated, with 70 percent saying they faced interference, 
violence, or other harassment during the past year, and 40 
percent saying their sources had encountered official 
harassment.\137\


  restrictions on ``illegal'' publishing and political and religious 
                              publications


    The Chinese government continued to engage in campaigns to 
root out unlicensed publications and publications containing 
what officials deemed to be ``illegal'' political and religious 
content. In China, no one may publish, print, copy, or 
distribute a publication without government approval, and 
publishers must submit to ongoing government supervision.\138\ 
To obtain government approval, a publisher must meet minimum 
capital requirements, obtain a government-approved sponsor, and 
accord with the state's own plans for the publishing 
industry.\139\ Once approved, publishers must submit written 
reports of their publishing activities to the government and 
seek advance approval to publish on matters that involve 
``state security'' or ``social stability.'' \140\ In March 
2011, the State Council amended the Regulations of the 
Administration of Publications, leaving these general 
requirements intact and adding new provisions requiring those 
who distribute publications over the Internet or information 
networks to obtain a license and requiring specialized 
personnel to take a state exam to show compliance with state-
imposed qualifications.\141\
    Those who ``illegally'' engage in business activities, 
including publishing without a license, remain subject to 
criminal penalties under Article 225 of the PRC Criminal Law, 
and officials continue to use this charge to target political 
speech.\142\ In August 2010, authorities in Shaanxi province 
detained author and journalist Xie Chaoping on this charge 
after he published a book on the relocation of citizens 
affected by a hydroelectric dam.\143\ Prosecutors refused to 
approve Xie's arrest for insufficient evidence.\144\ In 
December 2010, authorities took Mongol writer Erden-uul into 
custody in apparent connection to a new book he authored that 
reportedly addressed Inner Mongolian independence from China, 
saying the writer had engaged in ``illegal publishing.'' \145\ 
The Chinese government reported in September 2010 that Mongol 
rights advocate Sodmongol was being tried in connection to 
``counterfeiting book registration numbers and illegally 
publishing and selling books.'' \146\ In April 2010 authorities 
detained Sodmongol while he was en route to attend the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.\147\
    Government agencies police content based on vague and 
sweeping prohibitions on content deemed by officials to 
``destroy ethnic unity, or infringe upon ethnic customs and 
habits,'' ``propagate evil cults or superstition,'' or ``harm 
the honor or interests of the nation.'' \148\ Provincial and 
local authorities continued to target ``illegal'' political and 
religious publications. In March 2011, a Chinese news report 
said authorities in Heilongjiang province would ``strictly 
confiscate political illegal publications and publications that 
defame the Party and state leaders, along with illegal 
publications that incite ethnic division.'' \149\ It also said 
authorities would emphasize blocking and confiscating ``illegal 
political publications'' that ``hostile foreign forces cook 
up,'' or that ``domestic lawless persons illegally print or 
copy to disseminate political rumors,'' or that ``create 
ideological confusion.'' \150\ In April, authorities in Jiangxi 
province seized some 632 publications that constituted 
``illegal religious propaganda.'' \151\ Also in April, 
authorities in Guang'an city, Sichuan province, reportedly 
destroyed some 30 items that were ``illegal political 
publications, [related to the] Falun Gong cult organization, 
and illegal religious propaganda,'' as well as 1,141 ``illegal 
newspapers and journals.'' \152\

                             Worker Rights

                              Introduction

    Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or 
in practice, full worker rights in accordance with 
international standards, including the right to organize into 
independent unions. Advocates for worker rights in China 
continued to be subjected to harassment and abuse. The All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official union 
under the direction of the Communist Party, is the only legal 
trade union organization in China. All lower level unions must 
be affiliated with the ACFTU.
    During the 2011 reporting year, Chinese authorities have 
faced the dual challenges of accommodating a younger, more 
educated, and rights-conscious workforce and addressing changes 
in economic development patterns (including inland growth, 
fewer workers migrating to coastal areas, rising wages, and 
labor shortages in some locales). Due in part to shifting 
labor, economic, and demographic conditions, official and 
unofficial reports have indicated that workers appeared to have 
gained increased leverage in the relationship between labor and 
capital. In recent years, Chinese workers have become more 
assertive in securing their rights, higher wages, more genuine 
representation, and better protection under China's labor laws. 
In some cases during this reporting year, workers continued to 
channel their grievances through, and to seek guidance, advice, 
and legal aid from, labor lawyers and advocates. At the same 
time, authorities have harassed, detained, and sent to prison 
labor advocates who attempted to organize workers for 
``disrupting social order.'' Some local officials reportedly 
beat and kicked striking workers and labor petitioners, and 
reports of attacks on migrant workers seeking back pay 
continued to surface.
    With Chinese officials charged with preserving ``social 
stability,'' the extent to which they will allow workers to 
bargain for higher wages and genuine representation remains 
unclear. Principles and different aspects of collective 
bargaining rights have been mentioned in multiple drafts of 
local and national regulations during this reporting year, 
including the draft Regulation on Wages--proposed in part to 
address official concern over the unequal distribution of 
wealth across China and its potential effects on ``social 
unrest''--as well as trials and measures for collective wage 
negotiations in different localities. Some critics, however, 
have questioned the lack of specifics in some of these 
proposals and, thus, their eventual effectiveness.

     Rights Consciousness, Worker Actions, and ``Social Stability''

    During this reporting year, Chinese officials have 
continued to assess the characteristics of the new generation 
of migrant workers as well as their significance on the 
shifting labor landscape, public safety, and ``social 
stability.'' \1\ Chinese government statistics suggest that 
these young workers constitute 61.6 percent of all migrant 
workers.\2\ In February 2011, the ACFTU released a study 
identifying the characteristics unique to current young migrant 
workers. The document also provided several policy 
recommendations for ``resolving the problems facing the new 
generation of migrant workers in realizing their rights and 
interests.'' \3\ The report notes that over half of young 
migrant workers are unmarried and that 74.1 percent of them had 
``studied in school'' prior to leaving home. By contrast, only 
35.4 percent of the ``traditional migrants,'' those born before 
1980, had studied in school.\4\ These young migrant workers 
also are mostly concentrated in secondary and tertiary 
industries and are overwhelmingly employed by private 
enterprises (84.3 percent) as opposed to state-owned 
enterprises (12.5 percent).\5\ On average, they receive lower 
wages (167.27 yuan (US$26) lower than ``traditional 
migrants''); are more likely to sign labor contracts that lack 
specific provisions detailing minimum pay in line with local 
regulations; have less employment stability; face ``relatively 
more hidden dangers'' in terms of workplace safety; and are 
less likely to join labor unions (44.6 percent of young migrant 
workers are union members, versus 56 percent of ``traditional 
migrants'').\6\
    The ACFTU report provides several recommendations on ways 
in which the government may more effectively accommodate 
younger workers' unique life experiences and characteristics. 
Some of the suggestions include strengthening efforts to tackle 
wage disparities, advance social insurance programs, provide 
technical training to increase young migrant workers' 
competitiveness and ability to adjust to changing 
circumstances, encourage localities to explore methods to 
reform the household registration system, and organize young 
migrant workers into unions and facilitate channels for them to 
address their grievances.\7\ These suggestions appear to 
reflect the Chinese government's initial ideas to grapple with 
the aforementioned generational changes, a generation of 
migrant workers who, as one senior Chinese official observed, 
have never put down roots, are better educated, are only 
children, and are more likely to demand equal access to 
employment and social services--and even equal political 
rights--in the cities.\8\
    Official and unofficial reports indicate that, for the most 
part, the young migrant workers described above have been at 
the forefront of recent worker actions.\9\ Worker actions have 
been common in China in recent years, and that continues to be 
the case during the 2011 reporting year. China Strikes, a Web 
site dedicated to ``track[ing] strikes, protests and other 
collective actions taken by Chinese workers to defend their 
rights and interests,'' recorded at least 32 such actions by 
workers from October 2010 to May 2011.\10\
    As with the spate of worker actions that took place in the 
spring and summer of 2010 that garnered international 
attention, workers during this reporting year took action to 
recover back wages, protest the non-payment of wages, call for 
higher pay, and, for some older workers, demand due 
compensation in the cases of restructuring at certain 
enterprises. Social inequality and the lack of rule of law 
reportedly played a role in driving low-paid migrant workers to 
participate in a series of riots and protests in southern China 
in June 2011.\11\ In April 2011, workers reportedly blocked the 
front gate of a liquor factory protesting the compensation 
terms during restructuring.\12\ In the same month, more than 
1,000 truck drivers in Shanghai municipality, reacting to 
rising fuel costs, protested for higher pay. In March 2011, 
about 80 sanitation workers in Guangzhou city, Guangdong 
province, took part in work stoppages to protest non-payment of 
wages, claiming that management owed each worker from 3,000 to 
4,000 yuan (US$464 to US$618) for overtime and other 
allowances.\13\ In November 2010, an ``entire street'' in 
Foshan city, Guangdong province, was reportedly ``filled with 
workers,'' perhaps up to 7,000, as management at Foxconn, a 
Taiwanese-owned company that produces electronics, allegedly 
forced workers to sign contracts with terms that many workers 
found unsatisfactory.\14\ Starting in October 2010, about 70 
workers at a Japanese-owned factory took part in strikes to 
demand that the company comply with China's labor laws, 
including the right to sign contracts and to be compensated 
with overtime payments.\15\
    Chinese authorities during this reporting year continued to 
harass, detain, and imprison labor advocates and lawyers whom 
officials deemed to be threats to ``social stability.'' For 
example, authorities ordered Yang Huanqing, a teacher in 
Jingzhou city, Hubei province, to serve one year of reeducation 
through labor in March 2011 for ``disrupting work unit order'' 
when he supposedly organized 22 and 33 dismissed teachers in 
October and November 2010, respectively, to petition in 
Beijing. Yang reportedly led the teachers to petition against 
social insurance policies they alleged were unfair.\16\
    In another case that reflects authorities' concern with 
labor advocates' and lawyers' ability to organize and mobilize 
large groups of workers, the Xincheng District People's Court 
in Xi'an city, Shaanxi province, sentenced labor lawyer and 
advocate Zhao Dongmin to three years' imprisonment on October 
2010 for ``gathering a crowd to disrupt social order.'' \17\ 
Zhao had allegedly organized workers at state-owned enterprises 
in Xi'an in April 2009 to establish the Shaanxi Union Rights 
Defense Representative Congress, an organization that, 
according to China Labor News Translations, a Web site 
dedicated to analyzing developments in China labor relations, 
was ``critical of the Chinese [state-run] trade union's failure 
to represent the interests of state sector employees in 
restructured and/or privatized enterprises.'' \18\ Prior to 
Zhao's arrest, Shaanxi authorities had warned that Zhao and 
others had:

        seriously disrupted the normal workings of Party and 
        government organs and have become a huge potential 
        danger to social stability. They have made use of 
        problems in society, including using old and frail 
        enterprise retirees as cannon fodder to pressure the 
        government. They have stirred up extreme delusions and 
        fanned the flames in an extremely outrageous manner. If 
        resolute measures are not adopted, they will grow into 
        a threatening force and are very likely to wreak even 
        greater havoc to social stability.\19\

            Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining

    The Chinese government prevents workers in China from 
exercising their constitutional right to freedom of 
association.\20\ Trade union activity in China is organized 
under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a 
quasi-governmental organization under the direction of the 
Communist Party.\21\ Leading trade union officials hold 
concurrent high-ranking positions in the Party. The ACFTU 
Constitution and the Trade Union Law of 1992 both highlight the 
dual nature of the ACFTU to protect the legal rights and 
interests of workers while supporting the leadership of the 
Party and the broader goals and interests of the Chinese 
government.\22\ The ACFTU monopolizes many worker rights issues 
in China, such as shop-floor organizing and formalistic 
collective contract negotiations, but it does not consistently 
or uniformly advance the rights of workers.\23\
    At the shop-floor level, the ACFTU's unions remain weak and 
marginalized. While the ACFTU and its affiliated unions at 
lower administrative levels sometimes may play an important 
role in legislative and regulatory development, this role is 
not matched with power at the enterprise level. Generally 
speaking, firm-level union branches are weak, non-democratic, 
and subordinate to management.\24\ Despite an increase in 
legislation and administrative regulations that grants the 
ACFTU more power at the firm level to resolve disputes, the 
structural weaknesses of the trade union branches make 
improvements in trade union autonomy and worker advocacy 
difficult and slow.\25\


                         collective contracting


    Collective contracts and some process of collective 
consultation and negotiation have been part of Chinese labor 
relations since the 1990s, when state enterprise reform 
deepened and labor conflict began to increase rapidly, 
especially in the private sector. The ACFTU has championed 
collective contracts and collective negotiations as important 
foundations for trade union work at the enterprise level. In 
recent years, the collective contract system has received more 
Chinese government and Communist Party support as part of an 
attempt to institutionalize a tripartite system of labor 
relations at the local level between the government, the ACFTU, 
and the employer associations.\26\ Moreover, some Chinese 
officials have stated in public that collective consultation--
and, in the process, fostering more genuine representation for 
workers--could be an effective way to defuse labor disputes and 
develop ``harmonious labor relations.'' \27\
    In January 2011, the ACFTU published a set of ``work 
objectives'' for the new year, stating the organization's goal 
to ``set up trade union organizations according to law to 
unionize the vast majority of workers[.]'' \28\ More 
specifically, some of the benchmarks that the ACFTU document 
provided include the boosting of national unionization rates at 
``businesses with corporate capacity to 65 [percent],'' and an 
increase in ``the number of union memberships to make up more 
than 80 [percent] by the end of 2011'' and ``over 90 [percent] 
by the end of 2013.'' \29\ Even as the ACFTU supplied 
quantifiable benchmarks, however, it is not clear how these 
goals will be implemented in practice. It remains to be seen 
whether such goals will facilitate the approval of local and 
national regulations with specific implementation and follow-
through directives and measures, as well as the necessary 
reforms to make unions more representative of workers' 
interests.\30\
     During this past year, the Commission continued to follow 
developments concerning the Guangdong province draft 
Regulations on Democratic Management of Enterprises 
(Regulations). As the Commission reported last year,\31\ the 
draft Regulations would extend to workers the right to ask for 
collective wage consultations \32\ and allow worker members to 
sit on the enterprise's board of directors and board of 
supervisors,\33\ represent worker interests in the boards' 
meetings,\34\ and take part in the enterprise's decisionmaking 
processes.\35\ In September 2010, reportedly under heavy 
lobbying by members of the Hong Kong industrial community, many 
of whom operate factories in southern China and are concerned 
with rising production costs, the Guangdong People's Congress 
Standing Committee decided to suspend further deliberation of 
the draft Regulations.\36\ In January 2011, a source in the 
Hong Kong industrial community who had met with officials in 
Guangdong province reported to the South China Morning Post 
that the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress would ``very 
likely'' approve the draft Regulations later that month.\37\ 
Other unofficial sources, however, suggest that the approval 
process of the draft Regulations seemed to have stalled 
indefinitely.\38\
    Other localities in China also announced plans to establish 
collective wage consultation systems in the coming years. In 
Qingdao city, Shandong province, for example, the Qingdao City 
Health Bureau announced in March 2011 goals to establish a 
system of ``equal collective wage consultation'' for all 
contract workers within three years.\39\ In a city with more 
than 40,000 medical workers, the health bureau's plan 
reportedly will only cover contracted workers, who number 
around 5,000.\40\ At medical organizations where unions do not 
yet exist, a government document suggests that workers may 
choose their own representatives.\41\ This past year, other 
cities that reported plans for collective wage consultation 
initiatives included Changde city, Hunan province; \42\ Rizhao 
city, Shandong province; \43\ Qinhuangdao city, Hebei province; 
\44\ and Guanghaiwei city, Zhejiang province.\45\ The Shenzhen 
Municipal Trade Union reportedly plans to sign collective wage 
contracts at 550 enterprises in the next year.\46\
    The extent to which the ACFTU's stated goals, if 
materialized, and other local experiments with collective 
consultation will expand the space for greater and more genuine 
worker representation remains unclear. At present, the 
collective contract and consultation system remains weak and 
formalistic in many cases because enterprise-level trade union 
leaders are not positioned to serve the interests of their 
workers. Many collective contracts reportedly solely reflect 
the basic legal standards in the locality and often are the 
result of concerted government or Party work to encourage the 
enterprise to enter into formalistic contracts rather than the 
result of genuine bargaining between management and the 
enterprise trade union.\47\ Finally, none of the aforementioned 
actions taken by different localities and the ACFTU have 
changed the fact that freedom of association does not exist in 
China.

                            Migrant Workers

    Migrants are generally characterized as rural residents who 
have left their place of residence to seek non-agricultural 
jobs in Chinese cities, sometimes in the same province and 
sometimes far from home. Official Chinese government statistics 
break down the total number of migrants into those who spent 
less than half the year as migrants, i.e., those who spent less 
than six months during the year away from their place of legal 
residence (61 million in 2010), and those who spent more than 
half the year as migrants (160 million in 2010).\48\ The 
government estimates that over the next three decades, about 
300 million people are expected to relocate to urban areas.\49\ 
As a marginalized urban group, migrant workers are often 
abused, exploited, or placed in unsafe work conditions by 
employers who take advantage of their insecure social position 
and lower levels of education.\50\ Persistent discrimination 
reportedly continues to adversely affect the social, civil, and 
political rights of migrant workers.\51\
    In 2011, migrant workers continued to face serious 
challenges in the workplace, such as wage arrears and non-
payment of wages.\52\ They also lacked access to reliable 
social insurance, specifically payments covering occupational 
injuries and diseases.\53\ Many localities have expanded 
efforts to provide migrants with social insurance coverage. 
Figures from the Chinese Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security indicated that, by mid-2011, 838 counties in 27 
provinces and autonomous regions, as well as the four directly 
administered municipalities, had launched what the State 
Council has called the ``new-type rural social old-age 
insurance pilots,'' covering 24 percent of the population in 
these areas.\54\ A 2009 State Council document also provided 
details on ways to make social insurance accounts transferable 
as migrants move around the country.\55\ There still appear to 
be significant problems in terms of participation (for both 
employers and employees), coverage, and portability between 
rural and urban areas.\56\ Migrant workers generally are able 
to withdraw funds only from their individual accounts, losing 
the larger percentage of their pensions that is paid by their 
employers. With migrant workers facing uncertainty about 
whether they will return to the same locale from one year to 
the next to look for new work, and with the portability of 
pension accounts highly restricted, some have chosen to 
withdraw their pensions.\57\

                        Law on Social Insurance

    The National People's Congress approved the PRC Law on 
Social Insurance in October 2010, and it went into effect on 
July 1, 2011.\58\ The law states that the Chinese government 
will establish \59\ a system of basic old-age insurance,\60\ 
medical insurance,\61\ work-related injury insurance,\62\ 
unemployment insurance,\63\ and maternity insurance.\64\ It 
specifies the respective responsibilities of employees and 
employers to fund contributions for different insurance 
programs. Under the law, both the employee and the employer, 
for example, are required to contribute toward the basic 
insurance funds for old-age pensions, medical care, and 
unemployment benefits.\65\ For work-related injury and 
maternity insurance, however, only the employer is responsible 
for the contributions.\66\ The law also requires employers to 
register employees with social insurance agencies within 30 
days of hire,\67\ delineates the legal penalties for an 
employer who fails to contribute the required funds within the 
specified time limit,\68\ and grants social insurance agencies 
the right to seek help from government administrative units--at 
the county level or above--to request the transfer of funds 
equal to the amount of missed payments from the appropriate 
banking and financial institutions.\69\
    One of the law's stated aims is to make social insurance 
coverage ``sustainable,'' \70\ and the law specifies that 
workers may transfer their accounts as they move from one 
region to another. It explicitly states that ``rural residents 
entering cities to work may participate in social insurance.'' 
\71\ In the cases of old-age and medical insurance, the law 
seeks to enable their portability by stating that, for an 
individual who travels from one region to another for work, his 
or her basic old-age and medical insurance records ``will 
transfer along with the individual,'' and the calculation of 
his or her contributions will be ``cumulative.'' \72\ Once the 
individual reaches retirement age, basic old-age insurance 
benefits will be calculated by taking into account work 
performed in all localities, but payments will be made in a 
``unified'' way (i.e., no distinction between work done in 
rural and urban areas).\73\ The law, however, states only that 
``national coordination'' of old-age insurance pools and 
``provincial coordination'' of the other four insurance pools 
will be ``gradually implemented,'' leaving the ``specific time 
frame [and] steps'' for the State Council to decide.\74\ 
Moreover, one foreign law firm pointed out that since the law 
does not provide ``national united social insurance 
contribution rates . . . employers would still need to refer to 
the local regulations for contribution rates of the social 
insurance schemes.'' \75\ At this point, the law's 
effectiveness and ability to standardize and expand China's 
social safety net remain unclear and implementation regulations 
have yet to be issued.\76\

                                 Wages

    By the end of 2010, 30 provinces had reportedly raised 
minimum wage levels by an average of 22.8 percent.\77\ Some 
localities continued to establish higher levels of increases 
thereafter.\78\ On March 1, 2011, Guangdong province announced 
a four-tier minimum wage level chart, categorizing minimum wage 
levels by region within the province.\79\ Authorities assigned 
Guangzhou city, the provincial capital, a level of 1,300 yuan 
(US$200) per month. Dongguan city, where many foreign-invested 
factories are located, fell into the second category, with a 
new minimum wage level of 1,100 yuan (US$170) per month. In 
Shenzhen, effective April 1, 2011, the government raised the 
minimum wage level by 20 percent, to 1,320 yuan (US$204) per 
month, the highest in China.\80\ Other localities, such as 
Shanghai municipality and Shandong province, also established 
further increases.\81\ Reports indicate that some cities 
proceeded to raise minimum wages because they struggled to 
attract workers.\82\ Despite rising minimum wage levels, 
however, reports also indicate that inflationary pressure 
continued: Inflation stood at 5.4 percent in March 2011 \83\ 
and 5.5 percent in May 2011, with food prices rising by 11.7 
percent.\84\

    The PRC 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for workers 
and requires local governments to set wage standards for each 
region.\85\ The PRC Labor Contract Law improves formal 
monitoring requirements by tasking local labor bureaus to 
monitor labor practices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage 
standards.\86\ The law also imposes legal liability on 
employers who pay rates below minimum wage.\87\ In addition, 
the law guarantees minimum hourly wages for part-time 
workers.\88\
    Illegal labor practices, however, continue to undermine 
minimum wage guarantees. Wage arrears remain a serious problem, 
especially for migrant workers.\89\ Subcontracting practices 
within industry reportedly also exacerbate the problem of wage 
arrearages. When investors and developers default on their 
payments to construction companies, workers at the end of the 
chain of labor subcontractors may lack the means to recover 
wages from the original defaulters. Some subcontractors neglect 
their own duties to pay laborers and leave workers without any 
direct avenue to demand their salaries.\90\ The Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security, in conjunction with other 
government agencies--including the Ministry of Public Security 
and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission--reportedly formed a ``united investigative group'' 
and examined wage arrears problems in provincial-level areas 
such as Tianjin, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Zhejiang, 
Jiangxi, Liaoning, Guangxi, Qinghai, and Xinjiang.\91\


                       draft regulation on wages


    In part to address official concern over the unequal 
distribution of wealth across China and its potential effects 
on ``social unrest,'' Chinese media sources indicated that the 
Chinese government reportedly has assembled a ``basic 
framework'' for a national regulation on wages.\92\ The 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) began 
formulating the regulation in 2007, and officials reportedly 
started soliciting comments and suggestions for a completed 
draft in early 2009.\93\ Some media reports indicated that the 
regulation would be approved sometime in 2010, though one 
MOHRSS official later said that was never the case.\94\ It 
appears that deliberations surrounding the pending regulation 
likely will continue throughout 2011.\95\
    Based on media reporting, the draft contains 10 sections, 
including provisions that delineate the ``parameters for 
collective contracts, collective consultations, and minimum 
wages.'' \96\ In addition, the draft reportedly lays out 
standards to determine minimum wage level increases, and 
mandates certain enterprises to ``periodically and publicly 
release average wage levels, increases, and bonuses''; \97\ 
requires that overtime compensation, time off given on days 
with extreme temperatures, as well as various kinds of state 
subsidies may not be factored into the calculation of wage 
levels; \98\ calls upon provinces to consider local consumer 
price indexes in setting minimum wage levels; \99\ and 
establishes a ``normal increase mechanism'' to ``create a 
system'' of collective wage consultations and ``open a 
scientifically logical space for wage increases.'' \100\
    Labor experts cited in Chinese media reports also commented 
that the draft lacks clarity on certain points. For example, it 
reportedly does not delineate whether or not employers will be 
required to answer workers' demands for collective wage 
negotiations, nor does it lay out the consequences for failing 
to do so.\101\ One labor expert also supported the idea to 
``link wage increases to the growth of enterprises,'' which 
apparently was introduced in an earlier version of the 
draft.\102\
    Reportedly, the draft regulation attempts to bridge the 
wealth gap with additional provisions such as requiring the 
disclosure to both the government and the public of plans to 
adjust salary levels and benefits within what one state-run 
publication called ``monopolized industries.'' \103\ These so-
called ``monopolized industries'' (longduan qiye) refer to 
state-owned enterprises in industries such as electricity, 
telecommunications, insurance, and finance.\104\ Another 
provision reportedly also would require these enterprises to 
seek approval from three different government departments 
before issuing bonuses or raises.\105\ One media report 
suggested that these provisions have contributed to the delay 
in the regulation's approval.\106\ One academic cited in the 
same report stated that the draft's proposed ``interference 
with or even control of wages through administrative methods 
are not compatible with the trends of market economics.'' \107\


                   pressure to examine wage policies


    In 2011, three developments continued to exert pressure on 
Chinese officials at all levels to examine their policies on 
wages: Labor shortages in certain areas, growing income 
inequality, and the central government's acknowledgement of the 
need to rebalance China's economy. During this reporting year, 
the Commission monitored reports of labor shortages surfacing 
in China's manufacturing centers, particularly in the south and 
coastal areas.\108\ As early as 2006, the PRC State Council 
Development Research Center found that 75 percent of the 2,749 
villages surveyed in China ``no longer have young laborers to 
move'' outward,\109\ and other reports also suggest that more 
migrant workers are opting to pursue opportunities in their 
home provinces.\110\ Such developments reportedly have 
contributed to the upward pressure on wage levels and, combined 
with other factors, have made some factory owners consider 
moving their operations further inland or to Southeast Asian 
countries in order to keep production costs competitive.\111\ 
At the same time, it has been pointed out that ``improved 
productivity can pay for more than half of these wage 
increases, while the other half can be passed in the form of 
higher customer prices.'' \112\ Moreover, despite moderate 
increases, wages actually have fallen for 22 straight years in 
proportion to China's gross domestic product.\113\
    The unequal distribution of wealth received much attention 
in recent years. The National People's Congress and the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference featured this issue 
prominently during their March 2010 meetings.\114\ In 2011, the 
Chinese media continued to report on the growing gap between 
the rich and the poor.\115\ The current ``income ratio among 
China's eastern, central, and western regions'' is roughly 
1.52:1:0.68.\116\ Moreover, the distribution has grown more 
unequal over time, with rural areas lagging far behind the 
urban regions.\117\ According to a November 2010 Chinese 
report, the ratio of ``urban to rural income'' was 2.9:1 in 
2001, 3.22:1 in 2005, and 3.31:1 in 2008.\118\ The difference 
between the top and bottom 10 percent of China's income earners 
has increased from a multiple of 7.3 in 1988 to 23 in 
2009.\119\
    Chinese officials have appeared more willing to openly 
acknowledge that a higher consumption rate within China is an 
important part of the government's efforts to rebalance the 
country's economic development. The PRC Outline of the 12th 
Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development, for 
example, noted that Chinese officials ``must be soberly aware 
of the fact that the problems of lack of balance, lack of 
coordination, and lack of sustainability in China's development 
remain prominent'' and that the imbalance in the ``investment 
and consumption relationship'' poses a challenge to the 
country's future growth.\120\ More pointedly, Premier Wen 
Jiabao has also described China's current growth model as 
``unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.'' 
\121\ Although some experts have said that reforms can be done 
in the short term via ``administrative fiat,'' such as 
``mandatory wage hikes,'' any rebalancing efforts will be 
difficult, as ``state-backed and private corporate sectors are 
likely to protest reforms that threaten their margins, as will 
these sectors' support bases associated with their interests, 
such as the commerce ministry and the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology.'' \122\

                Occupational Safety and Work Conditions


                    legal framework and developments


    The PRC Law on Safe Production, which took effect in 2002, 
delineates a set of guidelines to prevent workplace accidents 
and to keep ``their occurrence at a lower level, ensuring the 
safety of people's lives and property and promoting the 
development of the economy.'' \123\ Specifically, the law 
charges principal leading members of production and business 
units to educate workers on safety issues and formulate rules 
of operation; \124\ protects workers' right to have knowledge 
of, speak up about, and address work safety issues; \125\ sets 
forth trade unions' rights to pursue workers' complaints over 
safety issues; \126\ tasks local governments at the county 
level or above to inspect and handle violations and potential 
dangers in a timely manner; \127\ and lays out the consequences 
for non-compliance.\128\
    Workers in China, however, continued to face persistent 
occupational safety issues, especially those working in the 
mining industry. On November 9, 2010, Zhang Mingqi, the Vice 
Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, spoke to 
reporters at the National Mining Industry Health and Safety 
Experience Exchange Conference and stated that China had 18,128 
reported cases of occupational-related illnesses in 2009, which 
represented a 32 percent increase from the previous year.\129\ 
Of the 2009 cases, 14,495--about 80 percent--involved the lung 
disease pneumoconiosis.\130\ The People's Daily has reported 
that a total of 57,000 Chinese coal miners suffer from 
pneumoconiosis annually, and more than 6,000 of them die from 
the disease each year.\131\ Reportedly, ``pneumoconiosis is now 
responsible for nearly three times as many deaths each year as 
mine accidents.'' \132\
    Miners are limited in their ability to promote safer 
working conditions in part due to legal obstacles to 
independent organizing. Collusion between mine operators and 
local government officials reportedly remains widespread.\133\ 
Chinese authorities reportedly closed 1,600 small coal mines 
with ``outdated facilities'' during the first 10 months of 
2010.\134\ The State Administration of Work Safety issued a 
directive in September 2010 requiring mine managers to spend 
time in the shafts with workers in an effort to focus their 
attention on safety issues; the directive also laid out 
specific fines for managers who refused to do so.\135\ The 
China Daily, however, reported that some managers skirted the 
new requirements by handpicking ``people to be promoted to 
`assistants to managers' and to accompany the miners'' in their 
place.\136\


                           working conditions


    Workplace abuses and poor working conditions remained a 
persistent problem this reporting year. Allegations of unsafe 
working environments, for example, continued to surface at 
factories operated by Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned company that 
manufactures electronic products. In July, a worker died after 
falling from his dormitory at one of Foxconn's factory 
complexes in southern China.\137\ The Commission reported last 
year that more than 10 employees committed suicide in 2010, 
reportedly as a result of the harsh working conditions at the 
company's production plants.\138\ Workers often cited low 
wages, forced overtime, military-style management, and social 
isolation as some of the major problems that they face.\139\ 
Reports also indicated that some workers are also exposed to 
chemicals known to be harmful.\140\ In May 2011, a blast at 
Foxconn's factory in Chengdu city killed 3 people and injured 
16 others; the families of the factory's workers complained at 
the time that Foxconn management ``turned down'' their demand 
for ``a list of dead and injured.'' \141\ Poor conditions and 
other workplace abuses also surfaced at other factories, 
including ``routine excessive overtime'' that averaged 120 
hours per month, use of harmful chemicals, poor ventilation, 
arbitrary calculation of wages, and mistreatment by 
management.\142\ The Commission also observed one recently 
published report detailing a past case involving Chinese 
prisoners who, in addition to doing hard labor during the day, 
were ``forced to play online games'' at night ``to build up 
credits that prison guards would then trade for real money.'' 
\143\


                          workers compensation


    One major problem facing injured workers or their family 
members seeking to receive timely compensation is China's 
``complicated and incredibly time consuming'' work-related 
injury compensation procedure.\144\ Some cases reportedly can 
last for decades.\145\ It is difficult to determine the total 
number of cases in part because many cases never are reported 
due to the complicated nature of the compensation process.\146\ 
Moreover, Chinese courts and doctors do not routinely recognize 
some occupational diseases. While traumatic work injuries and 
deaths have been widely recognized and reported, experts on 
workers compensation litigation in China report failure to 
diagnose diseases like silicosis and failure to recognize that 
the condition may be caused by exposure to chemicals at 
work.\147\ As a result, the extent of work-related diseases 
like silicosis remains difficult to measure and report on and, 
therefore, in many cases goes largely unrecognized.\148\
    In January 2011, the State Council's revisions to the 
Regulations on Work-Related Injury Insurance (Work Injury 
Regulations) became effective.\149\ The revisions made 24 
changes to the old Regulations, clarifying the definitions of 
what constituted ``occupational injuries''; \150\ adding law 
firms and accounting firms, among others, to the list of 
contributors to the occupational injury insurance fund; \151\ 
and stating that in applications where ``the facts are clear'' 
and ``rights and obligations are apparent,'' the social 
insurance administrative department shall render a decision 
within 15 days of accepting the applications.\152\
    In addition to the aforementioned Work Injury Regulations, 
the PRC Law on Social Insurance, which went into effect in July 
2011, also addressed the topic of work-related injury 
insurance.\153\ It clarifies that the ``employing unit,'' not 
the worker, is responsible for contributing to the work-related 
injury insurance fund.\154\ The law states that the 
contribution rates will be determined by the ``risk level'' of 
each industry, as well as the number of workplace injury cases 
that occur in that industry, and leaves the task of setting the 
specific rate figures to the State Council.\155\ Though the 
law's language maintains that workers are entitled to receive 
work-related injury insurance benefits if their injuries or 
illnesses are certified as work related and that certification 
of such injuries should be ``straight-forward [and] 
convenient,'' it does not provide a specific time requirement 
for the certification process.\156\ The law does, however, 
detail the types of expenses that may be paid with money from 
the insurance fund. These may include, for example, a worker's 
medical treatment and rehabilitation fees as well as food and 
travel allowances if the worker obtains treatment outside of 
the area where the injury took place.\157\
    At this point, it is not clear to what extent the revisions 
to the Work Injury Regulations or the new PRC Law on Social 
Insurance will streamline the complicated and time-consuming 
compensation processes for injured workers. Central government 
directives have, in previous years, encouraged local 
governments to pressure bereaved families into signing 
compensation agreements and to condition out-of-court 
compensation settlements on forfeiture by bereaved families of 
their rights to seek further compensation through the court 
system.\158\ Moreover, there have been reports of local 
officials preempting class actions by prohibiting contact among 
members of bereaved families in order to forestall 
coordination.\159\

                              Child Labor

    Child labor remained a problem in China during this 
reporting year.\160\ As a member of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), China has ratified the two core conventions 
on the elimination of child labor.\161\ The PRC Labor Law and 
related legislation prohibit the employment of minors under 16 
years old.\162\ Both national and local legal provisions 
prohibiting child labor stipulate fines for employing 
children.\163\ Under the PRC Criminal Law, employers and 
supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years for 
forcing children to work under conditions of extreme 
danger.\164\ Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have 
dulled the effects of these legal measures. The extent of child 
labor in China is unclear in part because the government does 
not release data on child labor despite frequent requests by 
the U.S. Government, other foreign governments, and 
international organizations. One recent report by a global 
risks advisory firm, however, suggests that China is rated as 
``amongst those with the most widespread abuses of child 
workers'' and estimates that there are ``between 10 to 20 
million underage workers.'' \165\
    Child laborers reportedly work in low-skill service sectors 
as well as small workshops and businesses, including textile, 
toy, and shoe manufacturing enterprises.\166\ Many underage 
laborers reportedly are in their teens, typically ranging from 
13 to 15 years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the 
education system and labor shortages of adult workers.\167\ In 
March 2011, a Hong Kong newspaper reported that authorities in 
Longgang district, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, rescued 40 
children who were found working at a factory that manufactured 
electronics.\168\ The children were reportedly between the ages 
of 12 and 14, holders of ``fake identity cards'' that 
apparently demonstrated that they were of legal working age, 
and had worked there for at least three months for about five 
yuan (US$0.77) an hour.\169\ In another case reflective of the 
child labor problem, Apple acknowledged in February 2011 that, 
in 2010, it had discovered 91 children under 16 years old 
working in 10 ``Chinese factories owned by its suppliers''; in 
contrast, in 2009, the company discovered only 11 such 
cases.\170\ In the case of one factory that reportedly hired 42 
of the children, Apple learned that the ``vocational school 
involved in hiring the underage workers had falsified student 
IDs and threatened retaliation against students who revealed 
their ages during [Apple's] audits.'' \171\
    The Chinese government, which has condemned the use of 
child labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat 
it,\172\ permits ``work-study'' programs and activities that in 
practical terms perpetuate the practice of child labor and are 
tantamount to official endorsement of it.\173\ National 
provisions prohibiting child labor provide that ``education 
practice labor'' and vocational skills training labor organized 
by schools and other educational and vocational institutes do 
not constitute use of child labor when such activities do not 
adversely affect the safety and health of the students.\174\ 
The PRC Education Law supports schools that establish work-
study and other programs, provided that the programs do not 
negatively affect normal studies.\175\ These provisions 
contravene China's obligations as a Member State to ILO 
conventions prohibiting child labor.\176\ In 2006, the ILO's 
Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions and 
Recommendations ``expresse[d] . . . concern at the situation of 
children under 18 years performing forced labor not only in the 
framework of re-educational and reformative measures, but also 
in regular work programs at school.'' \177\

                            Criminal Justice

                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government's failure to uphold legal protections for criminal 
suspects and defendants, promote transparency of the judicial 
process, and implement legal reforms highlighted ongoing 
problems within the criminal justice system. Chinese public 
security officials continue to contravene international 
standards by detaining, interrogating, and investigating 
criminal suspects without adequate due process protections. 
Closed trial proceedings and unfair trial procedures continue 
to contravene Chinese and international legal protections and 
demonstrate the lack of an independent judiciary.
    During the year, the Chinese government signaled its 
resolve to protect what it deemed to be ``social stability'' 
through targeted crackdowns on rights advocates and continued 
reliance on an array of arbitrary and extrajudicial detention 
measures. In early 2011, Chinese public security officials 
implemented a harsh crackdown on government critics and rights 
advocates, including lawyers, bloggers, writers, and democracy 
activists. In the months that followed, Chinese authorities 
employed a range of illegal and arbitrary detention measures--
including home confinement and enforced disappearances--to 
``maintain stability'' and silence rights advocates. 
International human rights groups have called the 2011 
crackdown one of the most severe in years.

             Abuse of Police Powers: Suppression of Dissent

    During this past year, the Commission observed reports of 
Chinese law enforcement personnel engaged in a range of abuses 
targeting human rights advocates, lawyers, writers, and their 
families.\1\ These abuses included harassment, assault, 
detention, kidnappings, and illegal surveillance.\2\ Reported 
incidents of abuse increased during periods of heightened 
official sensitivity. Beginning in February 2011, public 
security officials and plainclothes security personnel 
detained, harassed, ``disappeared,'' and placed under illegal 
surveillance prominent rights defenders. The campaign appeared 
related to official concern over protests in the Middle East 
and North Africa and to an anonymous online call for so-called 
``Jasmine'' protests within China.\3\ By April 18, the non-
governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
reported that public security officials had criminally detained 
39 rights advocates and that more than 20 individuals remained 
``disappeared.'' \4\ For example, Chinese police detained 
Beijing-based lawyer Tang Jitian on February 16 after he 
attended a meeting to discuss the ongoing ``soft detention'' of 
the self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng.\5\ Beijing 
police summoned and detained human rights lawyer and university 
lecturer Teng Biao on February 19 before searching his 
residence and confiscating property, including two computers, 
politically themed books, and documentaries.\6\ In February, 
the Guardian reported that five domestic security protection 
officers allegedly beat human rights lawyer Liu Shihui after he 
attempted to attend a planned protest in Guangzhou city, 
Guangdong province.\7\ The Commission also noted increased 
police abuses against rights defenders and advocates 
surrounding other politically sensitive events, such as the 
Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony in December 2010 and the annual 
meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference in March 2011.\8\ Such 
arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association 
contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well 
as China's Constitution and domestic laws.\9\

      Pretrial Detention and Prisons: Torture and Abuse in Custody

    Although the Chinese government formally outlawed torture 
in 1996 with amendments to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and 
the PRC Criminal Law,\10\ torture and abuse by law enforcement 
officers remain widespread. In November 2008, the UN Committee 
against Torture (UNCAT) stated it ``remains deeply concerned 
about the continued allegations . . . of routine and widespread 
use of torture and ill-treatment of suspects in police custody, 
especially to extract confessions or information to be used in 
criminal proceedings.'' \11\ Although China objected to the 
UNCAT report's findings in its November 2009 followup report, 
in October 2010, UNCAT submitted a letter to the Chinese 
government requesting clarification on issues including the 
legal safeguards to prevent torture, the harassment of lawyers 
and rights defenders, and the lack of statistical information 
related to torture.\12\
    During this reporting year, the Commission observed 
multiple reports in which public security officials allegedly 
employed various torture measures, including beatings, electric 
shock, cigarette burnings, and sleep deprivation.\13\ In 
January 2011, the Guardian reported on the December 2010 death 
of local police chief Xie Zhigang in Benxi city, Liaoning 
province, who reportedly died from a heart attack within a day 
of his detention. Xie's wife disputed the police account and 
claimed Xie died as a result of torture, stating, ``There were 
bruises all over [Xie's] body, and deep scars on his wrist and 
ankles. Five of his ribs were broken.'' \14\ In March 2011, 
human rights lawyer Zhang Kai released a video of Qian Chengyu, 
a witness to the murder of village leader and petitioner Qian 
Yunhui. In the February 2011 video, Qian Chengyu described how 
public security officials beat him for five hours and deprived 
him of sleep for thirty hours and explained that the injuries 
prevented him from standing for a month.\15\
    In response to a spate of high-profile suspicious deaths 
and increased public scrutiny since 2009, Chinese law 
enforcement agencies reportedly have ordered an overhaul of 
prisons and detention centers. In 2009 and 2011, Chinese 
agencies released various guidelines intended to improve 
oversight responsibilities and enhance supervision of detainees 
in detention centers.\16\ In early 2011, the Ministry of Public 
Security reportedly delivered a draft revision of the Detention 
Regulations, the first revision since the Detention Regulations 
were enacted in 1990.\17\ In February 2011, Xinhua reported 
that in a nationwide campaign to improve oversight of detention 
centers, prosecutors found 2,207 detention center ``bullies'' 
and prosecuted 123 suspected crimes.\18\ In a March 2011 China 
News Weekly interview, Sun Qian, Deputy Procurator-General of 
the Supreme People's Procuratorate, said that abnormal deaths 
in recent years had ``exposed problems in prison administration 
law enforcement'' and had resulted in reportedly ``thorough'' 
official investigations into prisons and detention centers.\19\

                   Arrest and Trial Procedure Issues


                           access to counsel


    The right to legal counsel in criminal trials is not a 
guaranteed legal right for all defendants in China, even though 
the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and the PRC Lawyers Law 
provide guidelines for legal representation in criminal 
trials.\20\ Chinese law grants all criminal defendants the 
right to hire an attorney, but only guarantees legal defense if 
the defendant is a minor, faces a possible death sentence, or 
is blind, deaf, or mute. Although the Chinese government has 
increased funding for legal assistance in recent years, most 
criminal defendants approach the legal system without access to 
legal assistance. [For more information on developments in 
China's legal aid system, see Section III--Access to Justice.] 
This remains counter to provisions under Article 14(3)(d) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
grant the right to defend oneself in person or through legal 
assistance.\21\
    Chinese criminal defendants face two primary obstacles--
referred to on occasion as the ``two lows'' (liang di)--in 
securing criminal defense counsel: The low rate of active 
representation by lawyers in criminal cases and the low quality 
of criminal defense.\22\ Most Chinese defendants confront the 
criminal process without the assistance of an attorney.\23\ 
According to a February 2011 Beijing Review article, a 
professor at China University of Political Science and Law 
noted that 80 to 90 percent of criminal defendants in China are 
unable to hire a lawyer.\24\ In addition, the higher proportion 
of risks associated with criminal defense work--as compared 
with those of civil and commercial work--continues to impact 
the quality of criminal representation.\25\ In recent years, 
lawyers have been illegally detained, criminally punished, 
beaten, summoned, and disbarred for performing their legal 
responsibilities.\26\
    Chinese lawyers also remain vulnerable to prosecution under 
Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law (commonly referred to as 
the ``lawyer-perjury'' statute), a legal provision on evidence 
fabrication that specifically targets criminal defense 
attorneys.\27\ While harassment of lawyers takes many forms in 
China, from prosecution for corruption to threats and physical 
violence, a disproportionately high number of such cases 
involve charges of evidence fabrication.\28\ Many evidence 
fabrication cases are brought under Article 306, which makes it 
a crime for defense attorneys or other defense agents to 
``destroy or forge evidence, help any parties destroy or forge 
evidence, or coerce or entice witnesses into changing their 
testimony in defiance of the facts or giving false testimony.'' 
\29\ Because of the risks presented by Article 306, most 
defense attorneys reportedly engage in passive defense: they 
focus on finding flaws and weaknesses in the prosecutors' 
evidence rather than actively collecting evidence or conducting 
their own investigations.\30\ Chinese criminal defense lawyers 
acknowledge that the threat of Article 306 of the PRC Criminal 
Law--also commonly referred to as ``Big Stick 306''--gives 
prosecutors ``unlimited power'' to intimidate lawyers and 
derail criminal defense work.\31\
    Specific cases involving Article 306 of the PRC Criminal 
Law continued to be featured prominently in national Chinese 
news and in ongoing debates over Article 306. In June 2011, for 
instance, leading Chinese scholars and lawyers criticized the 
high profile case against four criminal defense lawyers--Yang 
Zaixin, Yang Zhonghan, Luo Sifang, and Liang Wucheng--in Beihai 
city, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.\32\ The four criminal 
defense attorneys were representing criminal suspect Pei Jinde, 
accused in a murder trial, when the testimonies of three 
defense witnesses challenged the prosecution's case.\33\ 
Authorities later detained the four attorneys on suspicion of 
committing ``witness tampering'' under Article 306 and arrested 
the defense witnesses, who were indicted on perjury charges. On 
June 28, 2011, public security officials formally arrested 
rights lawyer Yang Zaixin on suspicion of violating Article 
306.\34\ The three remaining criminal defense lawyers were 
reportedly released on bail pending trial on suspicion of 
similar charges.\35\ In July 2011, China University of 
Political Science and Law Professor Chen Guangzhong told 
Oriental Outlook Magazine that the formal arrest of Yang Zaixin 
was ``wrongful'' and that, based on disclosed information, the 
four lawyers were fulfilling their professional 
obligations.\36\ In July 2011, the Global Times, which operates 
under the official People's Daily, reported that more than 30 
unidentified persons attacked lawyers from Beijing municipality 
and Shandong and Yunnan provinces who had travelled to Beihai 
to represent lawyer Yang Zaixin.\37\ According to the Global 
Times article, the assailants reportedly demanded the lawyers 
not represent client Yang and that they leave immediately.\38\
    Chinese legal scholars this past year continued to urge 
revision of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, which is reportedly 
on the National People's Congress agenda, to address the 
problem of Article 306 and other longstanding issues related to 
criminal defense counsel. Such longstanding issues include the 
commonly referred to ``three difficulties'' (san nan) of 
criminal defense: Gaining access to detained clients, reviewing 
the prosecutors' case files, and collecting evidence.\39\ 
Although authorities amended the 2008 PRC Lawyers Law to 
address these issues, inconsistencies between the PRC Lawyers 
Law and the 1997 PRC Criminal Procedure Law remain. In January 
2011, several criminal defense lawyers, interviewed by the 
Legal Weekly, expressed growing frustrations over limitations 
within criminal defense work. In addition to the widely 
discussed ``three difficulties,'' prominent Beijing criminal 
defense lawyer Xu Lantang raised ``ten difficulties''--
including the difficulty of getting witnesses to appear in 
court, the difficulty of getting a hearing for trial on appeal, 
and the difficulty of participating in the death penalty review 
process.\40\ According to the article, criminal defense 
lawyers' primary obstacle is having innocence claims accepted 
by people's courts.\41\ A January 2011 Legal Daily article said 
that the challenges to successfully representing criminal 
defendants have led to a decline in the rate of legal 
representation of criminal defendants in China.\42\


                      fairness of criminal trials


    Chinese lawyers and criminal defendants continue to face 
numerous obstacles in ensuring the application of the right to 
a fair trial. Although judicial independence is enshrined in 
the 1997 PRC Criminal Procedure Law, Chinese judges regularly 
receive political guidance on pending cases, including 
instructions on how to rule, from both the government and the 
Communist Party.\43\ Closed trials, undue political influence, 
and a lack of transparency in judicial decisionmaking remain 
commonplace within the justice system. For criminal suspects 
that reach the trial stage, the likelihood of a guilty verdict 
is great. According to 2010 official statistics from the 
Supreme People's Court, the conviction rate for criminal cases 
was 98.12 percent.\44\ Chinese officials routinely sentence 
defendants in trials that fall far short of fair trial 
standards set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.\45\
    During this reporting year, the Commission has observed 
several notable cases in which Chinese judicial authorities 
failed to provide transparency and uphold defendants' fair 
trial rights in accordance with domestic and international law. 
In March 2011, for instance, the Suining Intermediate People's 
Court in Sichuan province sentenced democracy advocate Liu 
Xianbin, a signatory to Charter 08 (a treatise advocating 
political reform and human rights), to 10 years' imprisonment 
for ``inciting subversion of state power.'' \46\ Authorities 
reportedly denied Liu access to a lawyer for months, which 
appeared to contravene protections in the PRC Lawyers Law.\47\ 
[For more information about Liu Xianbin, see Section III--
Institutions of Democratic Governance.] In August 2011, the 
Chaoyang District People's Court in Beijing city tried rights 
advocate Wang Lihong for ``creating a disturbance'' in 
connection with her role in organizing a protest outside of a 
Fujian province courthouse on April 16, 2010.\48\ It was not 
until March 2011, nearly 12 months after the protest, that 
Chinese authorities criminally detained Wang.\49\ At Wang's own 
trial in August, Wang's criminal defense lawyer, Han Yicun, 
maintained that the trial was ``unfair,'' since the judge 
interrupted Wang's final statement and did not permit defense 
attorney Han to finish his defense statement.\50\ In addition, 
the criminal defense attorneys were unable to photocopy court 
documents or present arguments before the indictment.\51\ In 
September, the court sentenced Wang to nine months in prison 
for ``creating a disturbance.'' \52\ Additionally, in the past 
year, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention released 
Opinion No. 15/2011, which found that the December 2009 
criminal case against prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo ``was 
organized in [a] way which constitutes a breach of fairness.'' 
\53\
    In June 2010, two regulations took effect that prohibit 
convictions based on illegally obtained evidence.\54\ According 
to a November 2010 Oriental Outlook Weekly article, however, 
fewer than 20 percent of lawyers surveyed had used the 
regulations, and many alleged that the regulations lacked 
enforceability.\55\ In January 2011, a Procuratorial Daily 
article addressed the reasons behind enforcement obstacles and 
why the implemented guidelines lack force.\56\ The article 
noted that the evidence regulations ``possess their own 
inherent flaws,'' ``easily result in different 
interpretations,'' and suffer from the prejudices of judicial 
officials.\57\

                   Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders

    Amid a broad crackdown against human rights advocates that 
began in February 2011, authorities in Beijing municipality and 
Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, detained at least five 
prominent human rights lawyers in late February or early March 
2011, including Teng Biao, Tang Jitian, Jiang Tianyong, and 
Tang Jingling.\58\ Chinese officials detained other human 
rights lawyers, such as Li Fangping and Li Xiongbing, for 
briefer periods in April and May 2011.\59\ In at least some 
instances, authorities required those released to sign 
``letters of guarantee.'' \60\ According to one unnamed human 
rights lawyer, the ``letters'' required that those released 
guarantee not to commit certain acts, including criticizing the 
Communist Party, participating in training by overseas 
organizations, and communicating with overseas 
organizations.\61\ As a result, released human rights lawyers 
declined to speak to the media about their detentions.\62\
    The following are examples from the past year of official 
mistreatment of Chinese human rights lawyers and defenders.

         In February 2011, security officials in 
        Shandong province reportedly beat self-trained legal 
        advocate Chen Guangcheng and his wife Yuan Weijing. The 
        reported beatings followed the couple's covert 
        recording of video footage in which they described the 
        official surveillance, intimidation, harassment, and 
        abuse their family has endured since Chen's release 
        from prison after serving his full sentence on 
        September 9, 2010.\63\
         In April 2011, Beijing-based human rights 
        lawyer Jin Guanghong disappeared amid a number of 
        apparently politically motivated disappearances.\64\ 
        After a Beijing psychiatric hospital reportedly 
        released Jin 10 days later, he was in an ``extremely 
        weak physical and mental state.'' \65\ Jin alleged he 
        was beaten and vaguely recalled receiving injections 
        while tied to a bed.\66\ He was unable to fully recall 
        the circumstances surrounding his detention.\67\ In 
        recent years, Jin had defended a member of the banned 
        Falun Gong spiritual movement in Guangzhou city, 
        Guangdong province, and had participated on the legal 
        defense team in a high-profile 2010 criminal defamation 
        case in Fujian province.\68\ [For more information on 
        conditions for Falun Gong practitioners, see Section 
        II--Freedom of Religion--Falun Gong.]
         In April 2011, public security officials in 
        Beijing detained housing rights advocate and former 
        lawyer Ni Yulan on suspicion of ``creating a 
        disturbance.'' \69\ The criminal detention of Ni and 
        the disappearance of her husband followed months of 
        police harassment, which included surveillance and 
        disruptions in their electricity, water, and Internet 
        services.\70\ Ni is confined to a wheelchair reportedly 
        due to chronic medical conditions and alleged official 
        torture suffered over the past decade.\71\

    In 2011, Chinese authorities have continued to pressure 
human rights lawyers who take on sensitive cases by denying 
annual professional license renewals during the ``annual 
inspection and assessment process'' (niandu jiancha kaohe), 
which justice departments throughout the country completed in 
July 2011.\72\ Lawyers that participate in politically 
``sensitive'' cases--including those involving workers' rights, 
religious freedom, and political reform--frequently fail to 
have their professional licenses renewed during the annual 
assessment.\73\ As of mid-July 2011, justice departments failed 
to renew the professional licenses of at least four human 
rights lawyers, including Liu Xiaoyuan, Cheng Hai, Li Jinglin, 
and Li Baiguang.\74\ In July 2011, a Caijing article reported 
that some lawyers viewed the annual assessment system as a 
``tool to suppress disobedient lawyers.'' \75\ The article 
claimed that prominent rights lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan failed to 
pass the 2011 ``annual inspection and assessment process'' as a 
result of offending officials.\76\ In a subsequent posting on 
his personal blog, however, Liu denied offending any 
individuals prior to failing to have his professional license 
renewed.\77\
    The whereabouts and condition of prominent human rights 
lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who angered Chinese authorities by 
exposing human rights abuses and representing marginalized 
citizens and religious practitioners, remain unknown. Weeks 
after reportedly reappearing publicly in late March 2010, Gao 
``disappeared'' again in mid-April 2010.\78\ In January 2011, 
the Associated Press released information from an April 2010 
interview with Gao in which he confirmed being tortured 
extensively during detention.\79\ In February 2011, Freedom 
Now, a U.S.-based non-governmental organization that represents 
individual prisoners of conscience, publicly released a 
November 2010 statement from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention in which the UN agency demanded the Chinese 
government ``proceed to an immediate release of [Gao] and 
provide for reparation of the harm caused as a result of his 
situation.'' \80\

                          Arbitrary Detention

    Arbitrary detention in China takes many forms and continues 
to be widely used by Chinese authorities to quell local 
petitioners, government critics, and rights advocates. Among 
the forms of arbitrary extralegal and illegal detention are:

         ``enforced disappearances'';
         ``soft detention'' (ruanjin), a range of 
        extralegal controls under which individuals may be 
        subjected to home confinement, surveillance, restricted 
        movement, and limitations on contact with others;
         reeducation through labor, an administrative 
        detention of up to four years for minor offenses;
         ``black jail'' (hei jianyu) detentions; and
         forcible detention in psychiatric hospitals 
        for non-medical reasons.

``Shuanggui,'' another form of extralegal detention, is used by 
the Communist Party for investigation of Party members, most 
often in cases of suspected corruption. The UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) defines the deprivation of 
personal liberty to be ``arbitrary'' if it meets one of the 
following criteria: (1) There is no clear legal basis for the 
deprivation of liberty; (2) an individual is deprived of his 
liberty for having exercised rights guaranteed under the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); 
or (3) there is grave non-compliance with fair trial standards 
set forth in the UDHR and other international human rights 
instruments.\81\ In addition, many forms of arbitrary detention 
also appear to contravene protections within China's 
Constitution and domestic laws.\82\ In this past year, for 
example, UNWGAD issued two opinions declaring that the Chinese 
government's imprisonment of prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo 
and house arrest of his wife Liu Xia contravene the UDHR and 
amount to arbitrary detentions. The opinions call on Chinese 
officials to immediately release Liu Xiaobo, immediately end 
Liu Xia's house arrest, and provide reparations to both 
persons.\83\


                        enforced disappearances


    During the 2011 reporting year, the Commission observed 
numerous reported cases of Chinese citizens who went 
``missing'' or ``disappeared'' into official custody with 
little or no information about their whereabouts or potential 
charges against them. In an April 8, 2011, press release, the 
UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 
(UNWGEID) expressed ``serious concern at the recent wave of 
enforced disappearances that allegedly took place in China over 
the last few months,'' adding that it had received ``multiple 
reports of a number of persons having [been] subject to 
enforced disappearance . . . .'' \84\ Article 2 of the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance defines ``enforced disappearance'' as 
follows: ``the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form 
of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons 
or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or 
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge 
the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or 
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a 
person outside the protection of the law.'' \85\ In late May, 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that at least 22 
prominent Chinese rights advocates--including well-known artist 
and public advocate Ai Weiwei, petitioner Zhou Li, and writer 
Gu Chuan--had been subjected to enforced disappearances, some 
for as long as 70 days.\86\ In June, UNWGEID issued a press 
release expressing ``serious concern'' over all persons 
subjected to enforced disappearance in China, including the 300 
Tibetan monks whom security personnel allegedly removed from 
Kirti Monastery, Aba county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 
Prefecture, Sichuan province, on April 21, 2011.\87\


------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Draft Amendment to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In August 2011, the National People's Congress Standing Committee
 (NPCSC) reviewed a draft amendment to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law
 (CPL), which includes 99 amendments to the current CPL.\88\ Chinese
 state-run media has reported that any revised draft amendment approved
 by the NPCSC will likely be deliberated upon and passed by the plenary
 session of the National People's Congress in March 2012.\89\
  According to state-run media reports, legal scholars have said the CPL
 draft revisions ``will help improve the protection of criminal
 suspects' human rights'' \90\ and have said the draft amendment
 complies with international standards.\91\ The CPL draft amendment
 includes revisions that would aim to prohibit forced self-
 incrimination,\92\ and bar collecting evidence obtained through
 torture.\93\ The draft amendment explicitly states that Chinese
 criminal defense attorneys are not to be monitored when meeting
 criminal defendants in custody.\94\
  International organizations and news media outlets have raised
 concerns that specific amendment revisions, however, would legalize the
 current practice of forcibly ``disappearing'' rights advocates in
 violation of international standards.\95\ The revisions allow Chinese
 police, in cases involving national security, terrorism, or major
 instances of bribery, to keep criminal suspects under residential
 surveillance at a fixed location outside of their homes, with approval
 from an upper level procuratorate or security organ, for up to six
 months, if keeping them at their homes would likely ``hinder an
 investigation.'' \96\ The revisions also would permit Chinese police to
 withhold information about this form of ``house arrest'' in the case of
 suspected state security or terrorism cases, if they believed that
 notifying relatives, as normally required, could ``hinder the
 investigation.'' \97\ Under the International Convention for the
 Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, a state commits
 a crime of enforced disappearance when its agents arrest, detain,
 abduct, or otherwise deprive a person of liberty and then deny holding
 the person or conceal the fate or whereabouts of the person.\98\
 Chinese lawyers and media organizations have also criticized these
 provisions for having the potential to undermine human rights
 protections.\99\ In September 2011, for instance, an editorial in the
 official newspaper China Daily acknowledged potential loopholes: ``For
 one thing, the crime of endangering state security is a vague and
 sprawling conception. Without proper definition and limitations, it is
 highly vulnerable to abuse. The impossibility of notification and the
 possibility of impeding investigations are even harder to define and
 clarify.'' \100\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     ``soft detention'' and control


    During this reporting year, the Commission noted various 
reports of law enforcement authorities continuing to use ``soft 
detention'' (ruanjin) to control and intimidate Chinese 
citizens.\101\ Those under ``soft detention'' may be subject to 
various forms of harassment, including home confinement, 
surveillance, restricted movement, and limited contact with 
others.\102\ The ``soft detention'' that numerous human rights 
defenders, advocates, and their family members are subjected to 
has no basis in Chinese law and constitutes arbitrary detention 
under international human rights standards.
    In the period surrounding the Nobel Peace Prize award 
ceremony in late 2010, Chinese authorities used ``soft 
detention'' measures on more than 100 prominent human rights 
advocates and associates of 2010 Nobel Peace Prize award 
recipient Liu Xiaobo.\103\ The Commission also noted that in 
2011, authorities placed many rights defenders under ``soft 
detention'' after releasing them from official custody. The 
following are some notable ``soft detention'' cases from the 
past year:

         From October 2010 to December 2010, state 
        security officials in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, and 
        Beijing municipality held Ding Zilin, a representative 
        of the Tiananmen Mothers (an advocacy organization of 
        1989 Tiananmen protest victims' relatives), and her 
        husband Jiang Peikun under ``soft detention'' for a 
        period of 74 days. The couple was unable to access all 
        forms of communication and unable to contact relatives, 
        friends, and fellow rights advocates.\104\
         In February 2011, a publicly released homemade 
        video of legal advocate Chen Guangcheng showed Chen and 
        his family under ``soft detention'' in Dongshigu 
        village, Linyi city, Shandong province.\105\ Chen and 
        his family have been under ``soft detention'' since 
        September 2010, when he completed a 51-month sentence 
        for disturbing public order and destroying public 
        property.\106\
         In April 2011, public security officers 
        reportedly placed Jin Tianming, a Protestant pastor, 
        and 500 members of the Shouwang Church in Beijing under 
        ``soft detention'' after several outdoor worship 
        services organized by the Shouwang Church.\107\


                    reeducation through labor (rtl)


    Public security officers continued to use the reeducation 
through labor (RTL) system to silence critics and to circumvent 
the criminal procedure process. RTL is an administrative 
measure that allows Chinese law enforcement officials to order 
Chinese citizens, without legal proceedings or due process, to 
serve a period of administrative detention of up to three 
years, with the possibility of up to one year extension.\108\ 
While the Bureau of Reeducation Through Labor Administration 
maintains that the RTL system has been established ``to 
maintain public order, to prevent and reduce crime, and to 
provide compulsory educational reform to minor offenders,'' 
\109\ authorities frequently use RTL to punish, among others, 
dissidents, drug addicts, petitioners, Falun Gong adherents, 
and religious practitioners who belong to religious groups not 
approved by the government.\110\
    During this reporting year, the Commission observed 
numerous accounts of RTL orders violating the legal rights of 
Chinese citizens, specifically their right to a fair trial and 
right to be protected from arbitrary detention. In November 
2010, an RTL committee in Henan province ordered rights 
defender Cheng Jianping (who uses the pseudonym Wang Yi) to 
serve one year of RTL. Authorities alleged that Cheng 
``disturbed social order'' when, in October 2010, she re-
tweeted a Twitter message from her fiance regarding anti-
Japanese protests following a fishing incident between China 
and Japan in disputed waters.\111\ The tweet was reportedly 
satirical in tone and urged demonstrators to protest at the 
Japanese pavilion at the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.\112\ In 
March 2011, Chinese authorities ordered rights advocate Yang 
Qiuyu to serve two years of RTL for ``creating a disturbance.'' 
\113\ The RTL order claimed that Yang had ``incited'' 
petitioners to go to Tiananmen Square, Wangfujing Street, and 
other locations in Beijing to cause ``trouble.'' \114\ In July 
2011, Shanghai authorities released Shanghai petitioner Mao 
Hengfeng after she served 18 months of RTL for ``disturbing the 
social order.'' \115\ According to her husband Wu Xuewei, Mao 
was subjected to physical and mental torture while serving her 
RTL order.\116\ After her release, Wu said that Mao, who 
arrived home in a wheelchair, was unable to speak and did ``not 
have the strength to walk.'' \117\ Mao was initially released 
on medical parole in February 2011, but officials detained Mao 
again two days later for unspecified ``illegal activities.'' 
\118\
    Human rights advocates and legal experts in China have been 
calling for an end to RTL for decades. In August 2010, on the 
eve of the 53rd anniversary of the establishment of China's RTL 
system, a number of Chinese scholars, lawyers, and advocates 
publicly released a ``civil rights advocacy letter'' calling on 
the government to immediately abolish the ``Decision of the 
State Council Regarding the Question of Reeducation Through 
Labor'' and other administrative regulations that form the 
legal basis for RTL.\119\ The letter stated that current RTL 
provisions that permit detention without a judicial trial are 
unconstitutional and violate Chinese domestic laws and 
regulations, including the PRC Legislation Law and the PRC 
Administrative Punishment Law.\120\ In February 2011, the 
advocates reportedly planned to send the signed letter, with 
over 1,000 signatures, to the National People's Congress 
Standing Committee.\121\


              ``black jails'': secret detention facilities


    Chinese authorities continued to use ``black jails'' (hei 
jianyu)--secret detention sites established by local 
officials--to detain and punish petitioners who travel to 
Beijing and provincial capitals to voice complaints and seek 
redress for injustices.\122\ Those detained are denied access 
to legal counsel and often denied contact with family members 
or associates.\123\ A December 2010 Human Rights Watch report 
detailed conditions for prisoners in ``black jails'': ``Once 
detained, petitioners are subjected to abuses including 
physical and sexual violence, food and sleep deprivation, 
denial of medical care, and intimidation.'' \124\ [For more 
information about China's petitioning, or xinfang (letters and 
visits), system, see Section III--Access to Justice.]
    In recent years, the Commission has observed reports by 
international and domestic Chinese media organizations on 
``black jails,'' as well as on the network of personnel that 
intercept and abuse petitioners.\125\ In one prominent example 
of domestic reporting, in September 2010, the Southern 
Metropolitan Daily reported on a private security company, 
Anyuanding, which was accused of assisting local governments in 
abducting and detaining petitioners in ``black jails.'' \126\ 
The New York Times reported in late September 2010 that the 
``system of interceptors and black jails has flourished in 
recent years,'' as Chinese petitioners have sought official 
redress in the face of illegal land grabs, official misconduct, 
and other injustices.\127\ In April 2011, the Southern 
Metropolitan Daily reported on the experiences of Sun Yinxia 
and two individuals forcibly detained in a ``black jail'' in 
Sihong county, Jiangsu province, after refusing to sign an 
agreement allowing the local government to demolish their 
houses without adequate compensation.\128\ Village and township 
leaders reportedly watched as unidentified guards forcibly 
detained the ``nail household'' \129\ residents, who reportedly 
were later ``beaten,'' ``sexually harassed,'' and tortured 
during their 12 days of detention.\130\ According to the 
article, local residents said that local officials had detained 
nearly 200 people in the ``black jail'' since it opened in 
2006.\131\ In August 2011, Chinese media reported on a ``black 
jail'' in Changping district, Beijing municipality, after a 
petitioner surnamed Zhou revealed information about her four-
day detention.\132\ According to the Beijing News, several 
``black jail'' ``retrievers'' forcibly detained Zhou after she 
visited a local government office in Beijing.\133\ The ``black 
jail'' personnel reportedly held Zhou and more than 50 
detainees in tight quarters without beds, depriving the 
detainees of their mobile phones and beating some who resisted 
the detention center management. Zhou said that the detainees, 
from several provinces, had been forcibly detained or lured 
into detention.\134\


   shuanggui: extralegal investigatory detention of communist party 
                                members


    During this reporting year, the Commission continued to 
observe Chinese media reporting on the Communist Party's use of 
shuanggui (often translated as ``double regulation'' or 
``double designation''), a form of extralegal detention that 
involves summoning Party members under investigation to appear 
at a designated place at a designated time.\135\ Notable cases 
of high-ranking officials placed under shuanggui included: Liu 
Xiquan, a deputy head of Beijing's Chaoyang district; \136\ 
Zhang Wanqing, Shandong Provincial People's Government 
Secretary-General; \137\ and Zhang Rui, a deputy director at 
the Department of Exchequer in the Ministry of Finance.\138\ 
Shuanggui investigations often precede formal Party 
disciplinary sanctions or the transfer of suspects to law 
enforcement agencies if there has been a violation of the 
criminal law.\139\ The investigations at undisclosed locations 
usually last several months, and officials may extend the 
investigations for over a year.\140\ Those under investigation 
are ``generally held incommunicado and denied some of the 
protections to which criminal suspects are entitled at least in 
principle.'' \141\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Legal Scholar Questions Anti-Crime Campaign's Excesses
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  This past year, authorities in Chongqing municipality, Sichuan
 province, continued a massive, public ``anti-crime'' sweep (known in
 Chinese as ``striking organized crime and uprooting evil'' [dahei
 chu'e]) of criminal syndicates and corrupt officials that netted
 thousands of arrests and raised various concerns about judicial
 independence and procedural rights.\142\ In an April 2011 public
 letter, circulated widely, Beijing-based human rights advocate and
 university professor He Weifang compared the ``movement-style''
 campaign to the turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution.\143\ Of
 the campaign, He writes, ``the Cultural Revolution is being replayed,
 and the ideal of rule of law is right now being lost.'' \144\ He
 publicly questioned the lack of independent adjudicative and
 prosecutorial powers and criticized the public security agencies'
 emphasis on order above all.\145\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             Medical Parole

    During this reporting year, Chinese authorities denied 
medical parole and adequate medical treatment to prisoners, 
particularly human rights advocates. The U.S. State Department 
observed in its report on China's human rights situation for 
2010 that ``[a]dequate, timely medical care for prisoners 
remained a serious problem, despite official assurances that 
prisoners have the right to prompt medical treatment.'' \146\ 
In January 2011, Zeng Jinyan, a rights advocate and the wife of 
human rights defender Hu Jia, applied for medical parole on 
behalf of Hu, who suffers from hepatitis and 
cholelithiasis.\147\ As was the case with previous requests, 
authorities denied the appeal for medical parole, despite Hu's 
deteriorating condition.\148\ The Commission noted at least one 
case where untimely medical parole release had likely 
contributed to a decline in a prisoner's medical condition. In 
December 2010, rights advocate Zhang Jianhong, who wrote under 
the pen name Li Hong, died after being released on medical 
parole on June 5, 2010.\149\ Authorities had repeatedly denied 
Zhang medical parole, which resulted in an apparent worsening 
of his condition.\150\
    In addition, authorities appeared to use medical parole as 
a measure to silence rights advocates and defenders. In 
December 2010, authorities released rights advocate Zhao 
Lianhai, the head of an advocacy group for parents of children 
sickened by melamine-tainted milk, on medical parole.\151\ Some 
supporters, however, feared that Zhao's release was intended to 
keep him silent.\152\ In April 2010, Zhao reportedly broke this 
public silence to comment on the broad crackdown on rights 
advocates and to detail the intense pressure he and his family 
were living under.\153\ Police reportedly then threatened to 
rescind Zhao's medical parole if he continued to comment on the 
treatment of human rights advocates.\154\ In February 2011, 
Shanghai authorities terminated the medical parole release of 
Shanghai petitioner Mao Hengfeng, two days after her release 
from a reeducation through labor (RTL) center.\155\ Although 
authorities cited ``illegal activities inconsistent with [the 
stipulations of] medical parole'' as the rationale, they 
reportedly did not specify the alleged ``illegal activities.'' 
\156\ Mao reportedly suffered torture and ill treatment 
throughout her RTL detention.\157\

                           Capital Punishment

    During this reporting year, the Chinese government 
maintained its policy of not releasing details on the thousands 
of prisoners reportedly executed annually and continued to keep 
information on the death penalty a state secret. Chinese 
officials also maintained the stated goal of limiting the 
number of executions. In March 2011, for instance, Supreme 
People's Court (SPC) President Wang Shengjun emphasized the 
state policy of ``strictly controlling and carefully applying 
the death penalty'' and urged ``improving the death penalty 
review process'' in his report to the annual session of the 
National People's Congress.\158\ In May 2011, the SPC stated in 
its annual 2010 work report that courts should suspend death 
sentences for two years, if the criminal circumstances do not 
require an ``immediate execution.'' \159\ On February 25, 2011, 
the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) 
passed the eighth amendment to the PRC Criminal Law, which 
reduced the number of crimes punishable by the death penalty 
from 68 to 55.\160\ As the revision was the first time the 
Chinese legislature reduced the number of crimes subject to 
capital punishment since enacting the PRC Criminal Law in 1979, 
the country's official media heralded the reform as a step ``to 
restructure its penalty system and better protect human 
rights.'' \161\ In an August 2010 Southern Weekend article on 
the then proposed amendment, a member of the National People's 
Congress Legal Committee pointed out that authorities rarely, 
if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 crimes under 
consideration for reclassification as non-capital 
offenses.\162\

                          Freedom of Religion

                              Introduction

    The Chinese government continued in the Commission's 2011 
reporting year to restrict Chinese citizens' freedom of 
religion. China's Constitution guarantees freedom of religious 
belief but limits protections for religious practice to 
``normal religious activities,'' \1\ a term applied in a manner 
that falls short of international human rights protections for 
freedom of religion.\2\ The government continued to recognize 
only five religions--Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, 
Protestantism, and Taoism--and required groups belonging to 
these religions to register with the government. Registered 
groups received some legal protection for their religious 
activities but remained subject to ongoing state controls. 
Members of both unregistered groups and registered groups 
deemed to run afoul of state-set parameters for religion faced 
risk of harassment, detention, and other abuses. Some 
unregistered groups had space to practice their religions, but 
this limited tolerance did not amount to official recognition 
of these groups' rights. Authorities also shut down the 
activities of some unregistered groups and maintained bans on 
other religious or spiritual communities, including Falun Gong.
    Despite the Chinese government's stated commitment to 
promoting internationally recognized human rights, it has not 
committed to promoting religious freedom in line with 
international human rights standards. The Chinese government's 
2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan, which was ``framed 
. . . in pursuit of . . . the essentials of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights,'' affirmed the government's existing 
framework of control over religion.\3\ A September 2010 State 
Council Information Office white paper, which described China's 
human rights progress in the previous year, addressed a range 
of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, but 
made no reference to religion.\4\ The State Administration for 
Religious Affairs' goals for 2011 called for further 
institutionalizing existing controls and mobilizing religious 
communities to promote doctrine that advances state-defined 
notions of ``social harmony.'' \5\
    The government continued to use law to control religious 
practice in China rather than protect the religious freedom of 
all Chinese citizens, accelerating efforts in the past year to 
revise or pass new legal measures. The State Administration for 
Religious Affairs (SARA) issued measures for the management of 
Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in September 2010, effective in 
November 2010, that stipulate more extensive controls over 
these religious venues.\6\ [See Section V--Tibet for more 
information.] In January 2011, SARA announced it would issue 
new legal measures (banfa) and provisions (guiding) during the 
year on managing the ``collective religious activities'' of 
foreigners in China; on certifying teacher qualifications; on 
granting degrees at religious schools; and on managing 
religion-related foreign affairs.\7\ It also described plans to 
begin drafting measures for the management of religious schools 
and of Muslims' pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj).\8\ The planned 
measures, like others passed in recent years, build on 
provisions in the Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA), which 
took effect in March 2005.\9\ Recent legal measures have added 
more clarity to ambiguous provisions in the RRA but also have 
articulated more detailed levels of control. In addition, while 
such legal measures, along with the RRA, have provided limited 
protections for the activities of registered religious 
communities--such as establishing venues for worship and 
holding property--they exclude unregistered groups from these 
benefits, leaving their activities and possessions vulnerable 
to official abuses.\10\

                         Buddhism (Non-Tibetan)

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government and Communist Party maintained a restrictive 
framework for controlling the doctrine, practices, worship 
sites, and religious personnel of Buddhists in non-Tibetan 
areas.\11\ [For more information on conditions for Tibetan 
Buddhists, see Section V--Tibet.] State-controlled ``patriotic 
religious organizations'' \12\ monitor and control the 
doctrine, practices, property, and personnel of each of China's 
five recognized religions, and the Buddhist Association of 
China (BAC) continued to monitor, control, and restrict the 
religious activities of Buddhists.


              controls over buddhist doctrine and practice


    This past reporting year, the government and Party 
continued to control Buddhist doctrine and practices to conform 
them to government and Party goals. Local governments and 
Buddhist associations throughout China continued to call for 
government and Party controls over Buddhists.\13\ For example, 
the Shanxi Provincial Buddhist Association reportedly called on 
Buddhists to recognize Communist Party doctrine, implement the 
Party's basic policy on religion, and demonstrate allegiance to 
China and to socialism, among other goals.\14\ China's State 
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) called for 
authorities to ``lead'' Buddhists to hold Buddhist scripture 
reading events based on the government-dictated theme of 
``purity and harmony,'' \15\ and local authorities and Buddhist 
associations held events that echoed this theme.\16\ Local 
governments continued to restrict Buddhist practices by calling 
for the removal of practices that authorities deemed to be 
``superstitious'' or ``feudal.'' \17\ Chinese law does not 
provide clear definitions for these terms,\18\ giving 
authorities the flexibility to arbitrarily restrict the 
religious practices of Buddhists.


    controls over buddhist sites of worship and religious personnel


    The government and Party continued to impose political 
goals on the management of Buddhist sites of worship and 
personnel. Government sources continued to call for the 
construction of ``harmonious temples, mosques, and churches,'' 
\19\ and during a March 2011 interview with the central 
government news agency Xinhua, BAC head Master Chuanyin said a 
December 2010 event that focused on this theme ``aroused the 
positive nature of making contributions to economic and social 
development'' for Buddhists.\20\ The Regulations on Religious 
Affairs conditions the construction of sites of worship on 
government oversight,\21\ and local authorities throughout 
China continued to call for restrictions on what authorities 
often refer to as the ``indiscriminate construction of temples 
and excessive construction of open-air religious statues.'' 
\22\ In addition, local Buddhist associations throughout China 
continued to exercise control over the appointment of Buddhist 
monks and nuns.\23\ For example, the Mount Putuo Buddhist 
Association, in Zhoushan prefecture, Zhejiang province, 
convened a meeting in late 2010 in which an official from the 
Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee 
``required'' the Mount Putuo Buddhist Association to confirm 
and put on file the qualifications of Buddhist monks and nuns 
according to guidance from SARA.\24\

                              Catholicism

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government and Communist Party continued to interfere in the 
religious activities of China's estimated 4 to 12 million 
Catholics.\25\ The state-controlled church continued to deny 
Catholics in China the freedom to accept the authority of the 
Holy See to select bishops, and authorities continued to detain 
and harass some Catholics who practiced their faith outside of 
state-approved parameters. In addition, authorities forced some 
bishops to attend a December 2010 national conference of state-
controlled church leadership, as well as the ordination 
ceremonies of two bishops ordained without Holy See approval.


          interference with religious personnel and activities


    The government and Party continued to implement a 
restrictive framework of control over the selection and 
activities of Catholic religious personnel. Since the 1950s, 
the government and Party have denied Catholics in China the 
freedom to accept the authority of the Holy See to select 
bishops, and the state-controlled church asserts that it has 
the authority to approve the ordination of bishops in 
China.\26\ Officials have cited the principles of 
``independence'' for Catholics in China and the ``autonomous'' 
selection and ordination of bishops as a basis for rejecting 
the authority of foreign entities (including the Holy See) over 
the state-controlled church,\27\ and China's State 
Administration for Religious Affairs continued to call for the 
promotion of these principles in 2011.\28\ In some cases, the 
state-controlled church has allowed discreet Holy See approval 
of bishops who have also received state-controlled church 
approval, and this practice continued during this reporting 
year.\29\ Nevertheless, on November 20, 2010, state-controlled 
church authorities ordained Guo Jincai of Chengde diocese,\30\ 
Hebei province, the first ordination of a Catholic bishop in 
China without Holy See approval since November 2006. 
Authorities reportedly forced some bishops to attend the 
ordination, including Li Liangui of the Cangzhou diocese, 
Hebei.\31\ In July 2011, authorities in Shantou city, Guangdong 
province, took bishops Liang Jiansen, Liao Hongqing, Su Yongda, 
and Gan Junqiu into custody \32\ and reportedly forced them to 
attend the ordination ceremony of Huang Bingzhang, another 
bishop ordained without Holy See approval.\33\
    The government continued to interfere in the affairs of 
some unregistered bishops and their congregations this past 
year. For example, authorities in Gonghui town, Zhangbei 
county, Zhangjiakou city, Hebei province, reportedly restricted 
access to the town after the March 9, 2011, death of 
unregistered bishop Hao Jinli \34\ in order to prevent large 
numbers of Catholics from traveling there to pay their respects 
to the bishop.\35\
    Authorities also continued efforts to incorporate political 
themes into Catholic doctrine and education. In November 2010, 
the Hebei Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 
appointed one of its own officials, Tang Zhaojun, to join the 
leadership of the Hebei Seminary and teach classes on ideology 
and politics.\36\ Students at the seminary demonstrated soon 
thereafter,\37\ and the seminary appointed new leadership in 
January 2011.\38\ Honorary chairman Liu Bainian \39\ of both 
the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA)--which manages the 
state-controlled church on behalf of the government and Party 
\40\--and the Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church in 
China (BCCCC)--which approves the selection of bishops in China 
\41\--said in a March 2011 interview that ``[w]hat the church 
needs is talent who love the country and love religion: 
politically, they should respect the Constitution, respect the 
law, and fervently love the socialist motherland.'' \42\


                        harassment and detention


    The government and Party continued to harass and detain 
unregistered Catholics who practiced their faith outside of 
state-approved parameters. At least 40 unregistered Chinese 
bishops are in detention, home confinement, or surveillance; 
are in hiding; or have disappeared under suspicious 
circumstances.\43\ Some have been missing for years, such as 
unregistered (or ``underground'') bishops Su Zhimin and Shi 
Enxiang, whom public security officials took into custody in 
1996 and 2001, respectively.\44\ Authorities targeted other 
Catholics more recently. For example, on April 8, 2011, public 
security officials in Beijing municipality reportedly took into 
custody Beijing-based unregistered priest Chen Hailong in 
connection with his religious activities.\45\ Authorities 
reportedly took him to a guest house in Yanqing county, 
Beijing, and then took him to an unknown location on April 
9.\46\ Authorities reportedly questioned Chen about the 
location of unregistered bishop Zhao Kexun and then released 
Chen on July 23, 2011.\47\


         bishops forced to attend national catholic conference


    From December 7 to 9, 2010, the state-controlled Catholic 
church convened the eighth National Conference of Chinese 
Catholic Representatives (NCCCR) in Beijing to choose new 
state-controlled church leaders. Throughout the NCCCR, 
government and Party leaders emphasized that Catholics in China 
should practice their religion in conformity with government 
and Party policies. For example, Jia Qinglin--a member of the 
Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist 
Party Central Committee \48\--described to CPA and BCCCC 
representatives the Party's efforts to prevent Catholics in 
China from practicing their faith independent of Party 
policies: ``Religious work is an important component of the 
work of the Party and the country . . . . [The Party Central 
Committee] continuously consolidates and develops a patriotic 
united front between the Party and the religious community.'' 
\49\
    During the time surrounding the NCCCR, the government 
denied some bishops the choice to abstain from religious 
activities that contravene the Holy See's policies. Both the 
Holy See and some delegates at the NCCCR reportedly alleged 
that authorities forced some bishops to take part in the 
NCCCR,\50\ following reports that authorities instructed local 
United Front Work Departments and Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Bureaus throughout China to ensure that enough delegates 
attend.\51\ For example, on December 6, 2010, public security 
officials in Hengshui city, Hebei province, reportedly used 
force to remove registered bishop Feng Xinmao from the Jing 
county cathedral in Hengshui to take him to the NCCCR.\52\ 
Shortly before the NCCCR, public security authorities attempted 
to force bishop Li Liangui to participate, but they could not 
locate him,\53\ and they reportedly told members of his 
diocese, the Cangzhou diocese, that they would attempt to find 
him.\54\ After Li returned to his diocese on December 17, 2010, 
authorities reportedly took him to attend a political study 
session and ordered him to write a letter of apology for his 
absence.\55\ As of January 20, 2011, he reportedly was back at 
the Cangzhou diocese.\56\

                               Falun Gong

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Communist 
Party and Chinese government continued to carry out a 
campaign--lasting more than a decade \57\--of extensive, 
systematic, and in some cases violent efforts to pressure Falun 
Gong practitioners to renounce their belief in and practice of 
Falun Gong. The government and Party refer to this process as 
``transformation through reeducation,'' or simply 
``transformation,'' and they are currently in the second year 
of a three-year, national campaign to increase efforts to 
``transform'' Falun Gong practitioners. In addition, 
authorities in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, targeted 
Falun Gong practitioners during the November 2010 Asian Games, 
held in Guangzhou. Falun Gong is a spiritual movement based on 
Chinese meditative exercises called qigong and the teachings of 
its founder, Li Hongzhi.\58\ It is difficult to ascertain the 
number of practitioners in China today, because the movement 
has been forced underground, but official Chinese sources and 
Falun Gong sources estimate that tens of millions of Chinese 
citizens practiced Falun Gong in the 1990s.\59\ The Commission 
tracks information on Falun Gong practitioners detained in 
connection to their practice of Falun Gong based on public 
information, which is incomplete, and reports that information 
in its Political Prisoner Database (PPD). As of September 20, 
2011, the PPD contained records of 486 Falun Gong practitioners 
currently detained, serving prison sentences, or serving 
reeducation through labor (RTL) terms.\60\ Of the 376 serving 
prison sentences and for whom sentence information is 
available, the average sentence was approximately 7 years and 7 
months.\61\


             harassment, detention, and ``transformation''


    This past reporting year, government authorities and the 6-
10 Office--an extralegal, Party-run security apparatus created 
in June 1999 to implement the ban against Falun Gong \62\--
continued to take measures to ``transform'' Falun Gong 
practitioners in China,\63\ primarily through prisons, RTL 
centers, and specialized facilities known as ``transformation 
through reeducation centers.'' \64\ For example, in September 
2010, public security officials detained 11 Falun Gong 
practitioners \65\ in Laishui county, Baoding municipality, 
Hebei province, under orders from a 6-10 Office in Baoding and 
reportedly forced them to participate in ``transformation'' at 
a ``transformation through reeducation center.'' \66\
    The government and Party also continued to harass and 
detain people who attempted to assist Falun Gong practitioners, 
such as family members and lawyers. For example, on February 
24, 2011, public security officials in Shijiazhuang city, Hebei 
province, took into custody Hu Mingliang after he sought legal 
redress against the Hebei Women's RTL Center.\67\ Public 
security officials there reportedly had sexually assaulted his 
daughter Hu Miaomiao, a Falun Gong practitioner.\68\ The 
Commission has not observed reports that provide further 
information on Hu Mingliang's whereabouts. On February 16, 
2011, public security officials in Xuanwu district, Beijing 
municipality, detained human rights lawyer Tang Jitian,\69\ 
whose lawyer's license had been revoked by the Beijing 
Municipal Justice Bureau in 2010 in connection with his 
representation of a Falun Gong practitioner in 2009.\70\ 
Authorities reportedly placed Tang under a state described as 
``house arrest'' in March 2011, as of which time he reportedly 
was suffering from tuberculosis.\71\ [For more information on 
the detention and disappearance of human rights lawyers, see 
Section II--Criminal Justice.]


 party spearheads campaign to increase efforts to ``transform'' falun 
                           gong practitioners


    The government and Party are in the second year of a three-
year, national campaign to increase efforts to ``transform'' 
Falun Gong practitioners. Documents from local governments, 
Party organizations, and other sources describe a ``2010-2012 
Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation 
Overall Battle Work Plan,'' a campaign that calls on 
governments, Party organizations, businesses, and individuals 
to increase efforts to ``transform'' Falun Gong 
practitioners,\72\ including allocating more funding to 
``transformation'' work.\73\ The campaign is divided into three 
stages, with themes that include the following: \74\

                       ageh1T2Selected Themesj
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Stage                           Selected Themes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stage 1: 2010                                   Establishing
                                                targets for the campaign
                                                Signing
                                                ``responsibility
                                                agreements'' to
                                                implement
                                                ``transformation through
                                                reeducation''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stage 2: 2011                                   Training a
                                                professional cadre corps
                                                and a civil, volunteer
                                                ``help and education''
                                                corps to participate in
                                                ``transformation'' work
                                                ``Deeply
                                                launching the work of a
                                                transformation-through-
                                                reeducation assault and
                                                consolidation''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stage 3: 2012                                   Developing a
                                                long-term mechanism for
                                                work to ``return to
                                                society'' Falun Gong
                                                practitioners who have
                                                renounced their belief
                                                in and practice of Falun
                                                Gong
                                                Drawing lessons
                                                from the experience of
                                                the campaign and
                                                ``establish[ing] and
                                                perfect[ing] long-
                                                lasting mechanisms for
                                                transformation through
                                                reeducation work''
                                                Proposing new
                                                ``transformation through
                                                reeducation'' duties
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The documents indicate that the Party has taken the lead 
role in initiating and overseeing the campaign. Some cite the 
October 2007 17th Party Congress as a basis for the 
campaign,\75\ and one states specifically that the 17th Party 
Congress ``put forward a new, higher requirement'' in ``the 
work of dealing with cults, including transformation through 
reeducation.'' \76\ Some note that 6-10 Office authorities at 
the central, provincial, municipal, and county levels have 
required local government authorities to participate in the 
campaign,\77\ and one describes ``transformation'' work as 
``led by the Party committees, with the cooperation of relevant 
[government] departments . . . .'' \78\ That document also 
refers to ``transformation'' work as a ``test of [the] Party's 
ability to govern.'' \79\
    The documents also call for the establishment of mechanisms 
to place greater responsibility for ``transformation'' work on 
actors at the local level, such as governments, Party 
organizations, businesses, and individuals. For example, one 
document calls on 6-10 Office authorities to sign 
``responsibility agreements'' with various businesses and to 
assess the ``transformation'' work of those businesses on a 
regular basis.\80\ In some cases, local governments have 
established specific, numerical targets. For example, the 
General Office of the Ruichang Municipal People's Government 
established the following targets: To reduce by 50 percent the 
number of people who had not been ``transformed'' by the end of 
2009, and to keep the proportion of ``recidivists'' and 
``unstable people'' within 10 percent of ``transformed'' Falun 
Gong practitioners.\81\
    The mechanisms to place greater responsibility at the local 
level include personalized and, in some cases, invasive 
measures that reach into the workplaces and homes of Falun Gong 
practitioners. For example, one document calls on authorities 
to ``mobilize and organize basic-level Party organizations and 
mass organizations, form responsibility help and education 
small groups, and enter the villages and homes [of Falun Gong 
practitioners] to conduct an educational assault.'' \82\ One 
document calls on local authorities to require local businesses 
to establish ``transformation-through-reeducation assault work 
small groups'' and develop an individual plan to ``transform'' 
each employee who has not been ``transformed.'' \83\ Three of 
the documents call on authorities to establish databases of 
information on Falun Gong practitioners.\84\


                              asian games


    Under the theme of ``oppose cults, promote harmony, welcome 
the Asian Games,'' \85\ authorities used the 2010 Asian Games 
as a justification to increase security measures targeted at 
Falun Gong practitioners (the Asian Games were held in 
Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, from November 12 to 27, 
2010). For example, on August 18, 2010, public security 
officials in Haizhu district, Guangzhou, criminally detained 
lawyer and Falun Gong practitioner Zhu Yubiao on suspicion of 
``using a cult to undermine the implementation of the law,'' 
\86\ a crime under Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law \87\ and 
a charge commonly used against Falun Gong practitioners. The 
charges reportedly were related to Falun Gong materials that 
authorities found in Zhu's home during a sweep of Falun Gong 
practitioners and supporters ahead of the Asian Games.\88\ Zhu 
was last reported to be held at the Haizhu District Public 
Security Bureau Detention Center.\89\ In addition, a November 
10, 2010, directive from the Guangzhou Municipal People's 
Government instructed local authorities to ``prevent cult 
organizations and law breakers, including `Falun Gong,' from 
using wireless communications to initiate activities of 
interference and destruction.'' \90\

                                 Islam

    Chinese authorities maintained tight controls over the 
affairs of Muslim communities. The state-controlled Islamic 
Association of China (IAC) continued to regulate the 
confirmation of religious leaders, content of sermons, and 
overseas pilgrimages to accord with the Chinese government and 
Communist Party objectives. In 2011, the IAC marked the 10th 
anniversary of the establishment of a steering committee to 
interpret scripture and compile sermons in line with state 
goals. In an April 2011 speech on the anniversary, Wang Zuo'an, 
Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs 
(SARA), praised the scripture interpretation work for raising 
the ``political caliber'' of religious leaders and for 
promoting ``positive positions within Islam that suit social 
progress.'' He also described the work as beneficial for 
``rallying the Muslim masses even more tightly around the Party 
and government'' and called for future work to ``even better 
conform to the needs of our country's social development.'' 
\91\ In its work plan for 2011, SARA said it would ``help'' the 
IAC in its scripture interpretation work and change of 
leadership.\92\
    SARA announced plans in 2011 to draft legal measures on 
``the management of Hajj work,'' \93\ building on existing 
requirements in the national Regulations on Religious Affairs 
and other documents that regulate pilgrimages.\94\ The 
government requires all pilgrimages to take place under the 
auspices of the IAC.\95\ Participants are subject to 
``patriotic education'' prior to departure and to restrictions 
on activities within Mecca in a stated effort to guard against 
contact with ``East Turkistan forces'' (groups, according to 
the Chinese government, that seek Xinjiang's independence) and 
other ``enemy forces.'' \96\ An official from SARA reported in 
October 2010 that authorities had strengthened ``education and 
guidance'' toward Muslims and ``investigated, prosecuted, and 
curbed'' the activities of ``illegal organizations'' as part of 
efforts to stop pilgrimages organized independently of state 
control.\97\
    Local governments maintained bans on Islamic religious 
activities outside of state-sanctioned parameters. Authorities 
in multiple localities continued to call for banning ``dawa 
preaching activities''--a term apparently used by officials to 
refer to religious outreach to fellow Muslims, including by 
foreign groups--and to stop religious ``infiltration.'' \98\ 
Authorities in a neighborhood in Shizuishan municipality, 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, for example, reported in 
September 2010 on an ``implementation plan'' to address 
``dawa'' activities and on ``educating and leading'' cadres and 
religious believers to distance themselves from and stop 
``dawa'' activities and organizations.\99\ In Taojiang county, 
Yiyang municipality, Hunan province, local Islamic association 
officials reported taking steps to stop ``infiltration'' by 
outside missionaries, whose sermons were deemed to ``violate'' 
the Quran and state policy, and they reported carrying out 
``ideological work'' toward local Muslims after ordering ``dawa 
preachers'' to leave the province.\100\ In Changde 
municipality, Hunan province, authorities called for 
``vigorously performing anti-infiltration stability work'' 
following ``illegal proselytizing and infiltration activities'' 
by ``backbone members'' of ``Muslim extremist `dawa preaching 
groups' '' and foreign Christian missionaries and reported 
``appropriately handling'' three ``infiltration'' incidents 
connected to ``dawa'' groups.\101\ In Huangpu district, 
Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, authorities singled 
out for scrutiny the activities of ``Muslims, Tibetan 
Buddhists, and members of non-mainstream sects'' who came to 
the locality, as part of steps to guard against ``foreign 
infiltration.'' \102\


             islam in the xinjiang uyghur autonomous region


    See Section IV--Xinjiang for information on conditions in 
the Muslim-majority Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

                             Protestantism

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government and Communist Party continued to implement a 
restrictive framework for control of the doctrine and practices 
of China's estimated 20 million or more registered 
Protestants,\103\ who worship in state-sanctioned churches. 
Unregistered Protestants worship outside state-sanctioned 
churches; reliable data on the number of unregistered 
Protestants is difficult to obtain, and estimates vary widely. 
Many sources estimate that there are between 50 and 70 million 
unregistered Protestants,\104\ while other estimates range from 
approximately 45 million to over 100 million.\105\ The 
government and Party continued to harass, detain, and imprison 
some members of both the registered and unregistered 
communities who ran afoul of government or Party policy. In 
addition, cases of harassment and detention since late 2010 
suggest that authorities' sensitivities intensified toward 
Protestants who assemble into large groups or across 
congregations, or who have contact with foreign individuals or 
organizations.


 government and party seek to control protestant doctrine and practices


    This past year, the government, Party, and state-controlled 
Protestant church continued to dictate the terms by which 
Protestants in China must interpret doctrine and theology. 
China's Constitution guarantees ``freedom of religious 
belief,'' \106\ but the government and Party continued to 
promote ``theological reconstruction,'' the process by which 
the state-controlled church attempts to eliminate elements of 
the Christian faith that do not conform to Party goals and 
ideology.\107\ The Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and the 
China Christian Council (CCC) are the official organizations 
that manage registered Protestants on behalf of the government 
and Party,\108\ and TSPM Secretary General Xu Xiaohong linked 
Protestant doctrine to political goals when he reportedly said 
in September 2010 that ``[t]here are many Bible teachings that 
are complementary to the government policy of social harmony. 
These ethics, if carried out, are a great help to society and, 
in a way, help consolidate the regime.'' \109\ Officials also 
continued to link theological reconstruction to economic 
development \110\ and describe it as a ``requirement'' for the 
``mutual adaptation'' of Protestantism and socialism.\111\


     harassment, detention, and interference with places of worship


    The government and Party continued to harass, detain, 
imprison, and interfere with the religious activities of some 
Protestants who worship outside of state-approved parameters. 
In particular, cases since late 2010 suggest that authorities' 
sensitivities intensified toward members of unregistered 
Protestant congregations (``house churches'') who assembled 
into large groups or across congregations, or who had contact 
with foreign individuals or organizations. The Commission has 
not observed official statements that acknowledge a concerted 
effort to target house church congregations during this period, 
but a January 2011 document from China's State Administration 
for Religious Affairs (SARA) that outlines SARA's policies in 
2011 called on authorities to ``guide'' Protestants who 
``participate in activities at unauthorized gathering places'' 
(house churches) to worship in state-controlled churches.\112\ 
In addition, two April 2011 editorials from the Global Times 
warned unregistered Protestant congregations not to overstep 
state-approved parameters in their religious activities.\113\ 
The Global Times operates under the People's Daily,\114\ the 
official news media of the Communist Party. During this period, 
authorities throughout China stopped house church gatherings; 
took participants into custody; placed unregistered Protestants 
under ``soft detention'' (ruanjin), a form of unlawful home 
confinement; and blocked access to sites of worship. Such 
measures violate provisions in international law that protect 
religious practice and peaceful assembly, such as Articles 18 
and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights \115\ and 
Articles 18 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.\116\ China's Regulations on Religious Affairs 
excludes unregistered religious groups from the limited state 
protections that it offers,\117\ leaving members of house 
church congregations at risk of harassment, detention, and 
imprisonment by authorities. Selected cases follow: \118\

         Beginning on April 9, 2011, public security 
        authorities in Beijing repeatedly took into custody and 
        placed under ``soft detention'' members and leaders of 
        the unregistered Beijing Shouwang Church as they 
        attempted to worship outdoors in Beijing.\119\ Shouwang 
        reportedly has approximately 1,000 members, one of the 
        largest unregistered congregations in Beijing.\120\ 
        Shouwang began to organize outdoor worship gatherings 
        every Sunday from April 10 onward after authorities 
        reportedly pressured its landlords to deny it access to 
        indoor sites where it had previously met or planned to 
        meet.\121\ In one instance, officials reportedly took 
        into custody over 160 church members.\122\ In total, 
        officials reportedly placed approximately 500 church 
        members and leaders under ``soft detention,'' \123\ 
        including pastors Jin Tianming, Yuan Ling, Zhang 
        Xiaofeng, and Li Xiaobai, and lay leaders Sun Yi, You 
        Guanhui, and Liu Guan.\124\ As of April 29, all seven 
        remained confined to their homes.\125\
         On May 10, 2011, public security officials in 
        Zhengzhou city, Henan province, interrupted a Bible 
        study gathering of members of the Chinese House Church 
        Alliance (CHCA)--which associates with unregistered 
        Protestant congregations in multiple provinces--and 
        took into custody 49 people.\126\ The 49 included 3 
        persons who were previously detained in April after 
        having contact with CHCA leaders,\127\ as well as 
        Korean pastor Jin Yongzhe (pinyin name), and Jin's wife 
        Li Sha.\128\ All but Jin and Li were released by the 
        following day; \129\ Jin and Li were released on May 
        15.\130\ Since late 2010, authorities in various 
        locations have harassed and detained CHCA leadership, 
        including president Zhang Mingxuan \131\ and vice 
        president Shi Enhao.\132\ On June 21, public security 
        officials in Suqian city, Jiangsu province, reportedly 
        detained Shi on suspicion of ``using superstition to 
        undermine the implementation of the law,'' \133\ and 
        authorities later ordered him to serve two years of 
        reeducation through labor.\134\
         In December 2010, authorities harassed, 
        detained, or prevented from leaving the country 
        approximately 200 Protestants who received invitations 
        to attend the Third Lausanne Congress on World 
        Evangelization, held in South Africa,\135\ despite the 
        fact that a January 2011 SARA report lists 
        ``proactively launching foreign religious exchanges'' 
        as an achievement of SARA in 2010.\136\ Authorities 
        reportedly warned members of unregistered church 
        communities not to attend because their attendance 
        would ``endanger state security,'' \137\ an explanation 
        that, according to Fan Yafeng, anecdotal evidence 
        suggests has been broadly applied to rights defenders 
        and other citizens.\138\ Fan is a prominent legal 
        scholar, religious freedom advocate, and house church 
        leader.\139\ [See Section II--Freedom of Residence and 
        Movement for more information.]
         Between October and December 2010, authorities 
        in Beijing took Fan Yafeng into custody at least six 
        times in connection with his legal advocacy for 
        unregistered Protestant communities \140\ and his 
        contact with foreign media.\141\ Since November 1, 
        2010, public security officials have prevented him from 
        leaving his home.\142\

    Other members of unregistered Protestant communities remain 
in detention or in prison for practicing their religion. For 
example, Uyghur Protestant Alimjan Yimit remains in the 
Xinjiang No. 3 Prison in Urumqi city, Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region,\143\ after the Kashgar Intermediate People's 
Court sentenced him to 15 years in prison in 2009 for ``leaking 
state secrets.'' \144\ He previously told a U.S. citizen about 
an interview between himself and local authorities about his 
own preaching activities; the interview's contents were later 
classified as a state secret.\145\
    In a May 2011 letter submitted to the National People's 
Congress (NPC),\146\ 22 house church leaders and members called 
on the NPC to investigate and resolve the Beijing Shouwang 
Church's conflict with authorities, examine the 
constitutionality of the Regulations on Religious Affairs, and 
pass a law that protects freedom of religious belief.\147\ 
Drawing on Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the letter argued that freedom of religion includes 
assembly, association, expression, education, and 
evangelization.\148\
    Authorities also continued to interfere in the religious 
practices and worship sites of registered Protestants. For 
example, in December 2010, public security officials in Bengbu 
city, Anhui province, pressured three congregations--two 
unregistered and one registered--to cancel a Christmas service 
that all three had planned to hold together.\149\ On November 
19, 2010, the registered Chengnan Church, in Tinghu district, 
Yancheng city, Jiangsu province, was demolished \150\ after 
government officials and real estate developers had 
unsuccessfully sought to purchase the church's property to 
build commercial residential buildings.\151\

                                 Taoism

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government and Communist Party continued to exercise control 
over Taoist \152\ religious activities in much the same way 
that they do for other religious communities in China, 
restricting doctrine, personnel, activities, and sites of 
worship.


                         controls over doctrine


    The state-controlled Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) 
continued to dictate the terms by which Taoists must interpret 
doctrine and continued to call on Taoists to accept government 
and Party goals. For example, a November 23, 2010, CTA 
announcement seeking students for a Taoist scripture reading 
class required candidates to ``fervently love the socialist 
motherland [and] uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party.'' \153\ Authorities continued to link Taoist doctrine to 
patriotism and economic development,\154\ and in March 2011, 
China's State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) urged 
the CTA to hold an international event on Taoism because it 
would be significant in ``increasing the influence of Taoism, 
spreading traditional Chinese culture, increasing the country's 
soft power, and the great revival of the Chinese nation.'' 
\155\


       controls over personnel, activities, and sites of worship


    The government requires Taoist groups and religious 
personnel to register with the CTA to legally perform ritual 
services and hold Taoist ceremonies.\156\ Local governments 
continued to restrict Taoist practices by calling for the 
removal of practices that authorities deem to be 
``superstitious'' or ``feudal.'' \157\ China's Regulations on 
Religious Affairs conditions the construction of sites of 
worship on government oversight,\158\ and local governments 
continued to call on officials to monitor and control the 
``indiscriminate'' construction of Taoist temples and 
statues.\159\ Central and local authorities also used the 
November 2010 Asian Games as a justification for imposing 
political goals on Taoist practices.\160\ For example, SARA 
Vice Director Jiang Jianyong told participants at a November 
2010 Taoist cultural festival in Huizhou city, Guangdong 
province, that the festival would be ``advantageous for 
`constructing harmonious religion and serving the Asian Games.' 
'' \161\

                      Other Religious Communities

    The Chinese government did not recognize additional 
religious groups in the past year or remove its framework of 
recognizing only selected religious communities. In January 
2011, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) 
implemented a technical revision to implementing rules that 
regulate the activities of foreigners in China.\162\ The 
revised rules retain broad restrictions on foreigners' 
religious activities in China and interaction with Chinese 
citizens, barring them from leading religious activities with 
Chinese citizens in attendance, ``cultivating followers from 
among Chinese citizens,'' distributing ``religious propaganda 
materials,'' and carrying out ``other missionary activities.'' 
\163\ Leaders of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints reported in August 2010 on holding meetings with a high-
level Chinese official and said church leaders ``established a 
relationship'' that they ``expect will lead to regularizing the 
activities of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
in China.'' \164\ No new developments appeared to take place in 
this area in the past reporting year. SARA has engaged in talks 
with officials from the Orthodox Church in recent years,\165\ 
but the Orthodox Church continues to lack national-level 
recognition. A limited number of localities in China recognize 
the Orthodox church within local legislation.\166\

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

                              Introduction

    In the past reporting year, ethnic minorities in China 
continued to face unique challenges in upholding their rights, 
as defined in both Chinese and international law. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates 
that ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities within a 
state ``shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language.'' \1\ China's Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law stipulates 
some protections for minority rights and provides for a system 
of regional autonomy in designated areas.\2\ Limits in the 
substance and implementation of state laws and policies, 
however, prevented minorities from fully enjoying their rights 
in line with international standards and from exercising 
meaningful autonomy in practice. The government continued to 
recognize 55 groups as minority ``nationalities'' or 
``ethnicities'' (shaoshu minzu \3\) and exerted tightest 
control over groups deemed to challenge state authority, 
especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Tibet 
Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous areas, and the 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See Section IV--Xinjiang and 
Section V--Tibet for more information on these areas. See text 
below for information on broader government policies toward 
ethnic minorities and on conditions in the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region.]

                         State Minority Policy

    Government steps to address ethnic minorities' grievances 
remained limited in the 2011 reporting year. The State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission (SEAC) reported in December 2010 on 
exploring and ``perfecting'' ``new mechanisms and forms'' for 
improving the regional ethnic autonomy system, but throughout 
the year SEAC also affirmed the basic parameters of the state's 
minority policies.\4\ In a June 2011 report, SEAC called for 
``persisting on the correct path of [using] Chinese 
characteristics [zhongguo tese] to solve ethnic problems.'' \5\ 
In August, SEAC issued a five-year plan on the construction of 
an ``ethnic legal system,'' outlining measures to promote 
continued legislation and research related to ethnic issues.\6\ 
The plan perpetuates the state's existing legal framework for 
ethnic minorities, though it also calls for research on ethnic 
minority-related legislation in other countries and on 
protections for ethnic minorities in international human rights 
conventions.\7\ The Chinese government's 2009-2010 National 
Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) outlined measures to promote 
legislation on regional autonomy and on some aspects of ethnic 
minority rights,\8\ but the HRAP appeared to have limited 
impact in spurring improvements, especially for civil and 
political rights.\9\ The Chinese government continued to 
implement top-down development policies that have undercut the 
promotion of regional autonomy and limited the rights of ethnic 
minorities to maintain their unique cultures, languages, and 
livelihoods, while bringing a degree of economic improvement to 
minority areas.\10\ During the past reporting year authorities 
promoted a second 10-year phase of the Great Western 
Development Project, which has accelerated development efforts 
in a number of provinces and regions with large populations of 
non-Han ethnic groups.\11\ The PRC Outline of the 12th Five-
Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development called 
for expanding aid for development efforts in ethnic minority 
areas.\12\

            Grasslands Policy and Protests in Inner Mongolia

    The government bolstered longstanding grasslands policies 
that have imposed grazing bans and required some herders to 
resettle from grasslands and to abandon pastoral livelihoods, a 
development that affects Mongols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other 
minority groups in China.\13\ At a State Council meeting in 
April 2011, authorities called for ``more forceful policy 
measures'' for ``speeding up development of pastoral areas, 
ensuring the state's ecological security, and promoting ethnic 
unity and border stability,'' along with ``a more vigorous 
employment policy'' for ``encouraging herders to change [modes 
of] production and occupations.'' \14\ In August, the 
government publicized a State Council opinion issued in June on 
the development of grasslands.\15\ The opinion reinforces 
grazing bans, calls for resettling nomadic pastoralists by 
2015, and promotes herders' change of occupation.\16\ Scholars 
have questioned the efficacy of state grasslands policies in 
meeting the declared goal of ameliorating grasslands 
degradation,\17\ while communities affected have reported 
forced resettlement, inadequate compensation, minimal recourse 
for grievances, and poor living conditions, along with 
challenges in upholding traditional pastoral livelihoods and 
preserving their cultures.\18\
    Mongols in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) held 
a series of protests in May 2011, after mining workers in 
Xilingol League, IMAR, killed a Mongol herder protesting mining 
operations on grasslands and, in a separate incident, a mining 
worker killed a resident protesting other mining 
operations.\19\ Demonstrators called for authorities to address 
the case of the murdered herder and protested government policy 
toward grasslands use and curbs on Mongol culture.\20\ 
Authorities reportedly took some protesters into detention, as 
well as others believed to be connected to the protests.\21\ In 
the aftermath, security in the region reportedly remained 
tight, with curbs on the Internet and other communication 
tools.\22\ Authorities and official media acknowledged some of 
the protesters' concerns but did not address broader grievances 
over official curbs on Mongol culture, and cast blame on groups 
with alleged ``ulterior motives'' for organizing the 
protests.\23\ In June, the Xilingol Intermediate People's Court 
sentenced two people to death for the murders in May.\24\ 
Mongols in the IMAR also held other protests connected to 
grasslands use and mining later in the summer.\25\

                          Political Prisoners

    In addition to detentions associated with the May protests 
in the IMAR, officials punished other ethnic Mongols who aimed 
to protect their rights or preserve Mongol culture. New 
developments occurred in the following cases:

         Hada. The 15-year prison sentence of Mongol 
        rights advocate Hada expired on December 10, 2010, but 
        authorities have continued to hold him in custody.\26\ 
        Hada's prison sentence stemmed from charges of 
        ``splittism'' and ``espionage'' after he organized a 
        peaceful protest for Mongol rights in Hohhot, the IMAR 
        capital, in 1995.\27\ Before Hada's scheduled release, 
        authorities also detained Hada's wife and son, Xinna 
        and Uiles--later formally arresting them both \28\--and 
        placed under home confinement people who had planned to 
        mark Hada's homecoming, including rights advocate 
        Govruud Huuchinhuu, whose whereabouts later became 
        unknown.\29\
         Batzangaa. On January 15, 2011, the Dongsheng 
        District People's Court, Ordos municipality, IMAR, 
        tried Batzangaa, the head of a traditional Mongolian 
        medicine school, on charges connected to ``diverting a 
        special fund'' and sentenced him on January 27, 2011, 
        to three years' imprisonment with a four-year 
        reprieve.\30\ Batzangaa had come under official 
        scrutiny earlier because of his school's activities 
        promoting cooperation between Mongols and Tibetans and 
        because of a land dispute with local authorities.\31\ 
        Chinese security officials initially detained Batzangaa 
        and his family in October 2009 outside the UN High 
        Commissioner for Refugees office in Ulaanbaatar, 
        Mongolia, where Batzangaa had applied for asylum.\32\
         Erden-uul (pen name Unaga). In December 2010, 
        authorities took Mongol writer Erden-uul into custody 
        in apparent connection to a book he authored that 
        reportedly addressed Inner Mongolian independence from 
        China. Authorities described the book's publication as 
        ``illegal publishing'' and ``illegal operation of a 
        business.'' The most recent report on his status from 
        mid-January 2011 indicated that he remained in 
        detention.\33\
         Sodmongol. Following the April 2010 detention 
        of Mongol rights advocate Sodmongol while he was in 
        Beijing, en route to the UN Permanent Forum on 
        Indigenous Issues in New York, the Chinese government 
        reported in September 2010 that he was being tried in 
        connection to ``counterfeiting book registration 
        numbers and illegally publishing and selling books.'' 
        \34\ [See Section II--Freedom of Expression for more 
        information about government controls over the 
        publishing industry.]

                          Population Planning

                              Introduction

    China's population planning policies in both their nature 
and implementation violate international standards. During the 
Commission's 2011 reporting year, central and local authorities 
continued to implement population planning policies in a manner 
that interferes with and controls the reproductive lives of 
Chinese citizens, especially women. Population planning 
policies limit most women in urban areas to bearing one child, 
while permitting slightly more than half of Chinese women--
located in many rural areas--to bear a second child if their 
first child is female.\1\ The Commission notes continued debate 
in the Chinese media about possible reform of these policies, 
but has not observed government action to introduce national 
reform measures.
    Local officials continue to monitor the reproductive cycles 
of Chinese women in order to prevent unauthorized births. The 
Chinese government requires married couples to obtain a birth 
permit before they can lawfully bear a child and forces them to 
employ contraceptive methods at other times. Although Chinese 
law prohibits officials from infringing upon the rights and 
interests of citizens while promoting compliance with 
population planning policies, reports during this reporting 
year indicate that abuses continue. Mandatory abortion, which 
is often referred to as a ``remedial measure'' (bujiu cuoshi) 
in government reports, is endorsed explicitly as an official 
policy instrument in the regulations of at least 18 of China's 
31 provincial-level jurisdictions.\2\ This past year, the 
Commission found that local officials continued to coerce women 
with unauthorized pregnancies to undergo abortions in both 
urban and rural areas across China.

                        International Standards

    China's population planning policies in both their nature 
and implementation constitute human rights violations according 
to international standards. The 1995 Beijing Declaration and 
the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International 
Conference on Population and Development provide for the 
freedom to make reproductive decisions.\3\ The PRC Population 
and Family Planning Law and provincial implementing guidelines, 
however, limit couples' freedom of reproductive choice by 
stipulating if, when, and how often they may bear children.\4\ 
Other domestic policies coerce compliance with population 
planning targets through heavy fines.\5\ Controls imposed on 
Chinese women and their families and additional abuses 
engendered by the system, from forced abortion to 
discriminatory policies against ``out-of-plan'' children, 
violate standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women,\6\ the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,\7\ and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.\8\ China is a state party 
to these treaties and is bound to uphold their terms.

                        Coercive Implementation

    Chinese law prohibits certain types of official behavior in 
the implementation of population planning policies. For 
example, Article 4 of the PRC Population and Family Planning 
Law (PFPL) states that officials ``shall perform their 
administrative duties strictly in accordance with the law, and 
enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe 
upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.'' \9\ 
Article 39 states that an official is subject to criminal or 
administrative punishment if he ``infringes on a citizen's 
personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights 
and interests'' or ``abuses his power, neglects his duty, or 
engages in malpractices for personal gain'' in the 
implementation of population planning policies.\10\ Despite 
these provisions, the Commission has noted continued abuses in 
the 2011 reporting year, as illustrated by the examples of 
official campaigns and individual cases of abuse below.


                           official campaigns


    During the 2011 reporting year, authorities in some areas 
implemented population planning enforcement campaigns--in some 
cases dubbed ``spring family planning service activities'' 
(chunji jisheng fuwu xingdong)--that employed coercive measures 
to prevent or terminate ``out-of-plan'' pregnancies.\11\ For 
example, in March 2011, the Yangchun city government in 
Guangdong province reported that one such campaign had 
commenced and that the ``focal points'' of the campaign were 
the sterilization of mothers with two daughters and the 
implementation of ``remedial measures'' for out-of-plan 
pregnancies.\12\ Yangchun family planning officials were 
directed to adopt ``man-on-man military tactics,'' ``launch 
meticulous ideological work,'' and ``storm the fortifications 
of `nail households' (dingzi hu) \13\ and `flight households' 
(waitao hu) \14\ in a targeted manner.'' \15\
    The Commission noted that this year, in official speeches 
and government reports from a wide range of localities, 
authorities also used the phrase ``spare no efforts'' (quanli 
yifu) to signify intensified enforcement measures and less 
restraint on officials who oversee coercive population planning 
implementation measures. Between November 2010 and June 2011, 
county and township governments in at least eight provincial-
level jurisdictions (Shandong,\16\ Anhui,\17\ Gansu,\18\ 
Guangdong,\19\ Hunan,\20\ Guangxi,\21\ Hubei,\22\ and Jiangxi 
\23\) urged officials to ``spare no efforts'' in implementing 
family planning campaigns including, in some cases, the ``two 
inspections and four procedures'' (liangjian sishu)--or 
intrauterine device (IUD) inspections and pregnancy inspections 
(the two inspections), IUD implants, first-trimester abortions, 
mid- to late-term abortions, and sterilization (the four 
procedures).\24\
    Reports surfaced in May 2011 regarding official 
implementation of population planning policies which resulted 
in the illegal abduction and sale of children by local 
officials. From 2000 to 2005 in Hunan province,\25\ family 
planning officials reportedly took at least 16 children--
allegedly born in violation of population planning policies--
from their families and sold them to local orphanages.\26\ In 
many of the reported cases, officials took the children because 
their families could not pay the steep fines levied against 
them for violating population planning regulations.\27\


                  individual cases of violent coercion


    Numerous reports emerged this past year illustrating family 
planning officials' use from 2009 to 2011 of violence to coerce 
sterilizations, abortions, or payment of fines. The following 
are representative cases that occurred in eight different 
provinces.

         Hunan. In February 2009, local family planning 
        officials reportedly kidnapped Liu Dan, 39 weeks 
        pregnant with her first child, and forced her to 
        undergo an abortion because she had not yet reached the 
        age at which she could be legally married to the 
        child's father. Liu and the child reportedly died 
        during the procedure.\28\

         Anhui. In July 2010, local family planning 
        officials reportedly kidnapped 23-year-old Li Hongmei 
        and forced her to undergo a sterilization procedure. 
        She later filed a lawsuit, which the local county 
        people's court did not accept on the grounds that the 
        case was ``unclear.'' \29\

         Yunnan. In September 2010, officials 
        reportedly destroyed a man's home, harassed his family, 
        and reportedly beat his 67-year-old mother because the 
        man did not return home to pay family planning fines 
        and undergo a mandatory sterilization procedure.\30\

         Shandong. In September 2010, local family 
        planning officials reportedly forced a woman surnamed 
        Xie to undergo an abortion when she was six months 
        pregnant because her husband had been three months 
        younger than the legal marriage age at the time the 
        child was conceived.\31\

         Fujian. In October 2010, local family planning 
        officials reportedly kidnapped a woman who was eight 
        months pregnant and detained her for 40 hours. They 
        then forcibly injected her with a substance which 
        aborted the fetus. During this time, the woman's 
        husband was reportedly not permitted to see her.\32\

         Henan. In November 2010, local family planning 
        officials reportedly kidnapped a man in order to force 
        him to pay the remainder of a fine for having a second 
        child. The same day, the village head notified his 
        family that he was in the hospital. When the family 
        went to see him, they reportedly found him dead under 
        unknown circumstances.\33\

         Guizhou. In May 2011, local family planning 
        officials reportedly beat Zhang Xuequn and her husband 
        and forced her to undergo surgical implantation of an 
        intrauterine device, despite the fact that she showed 
        them her valid marriage license and birth permits and 
        that she was technically accountable to the government 
        in her home province of Zhejiang.\34\

         Jiangxi. In May 2011, local officials 
        reportedly beat Zhang Julan and forced her to undergo 
        tubal ligation surgery after she and 10 other villagers 
        went to the town government to discuss officials' 
        illegal requisition of land. Zhang remained in the 
        hospital for at least one month following the procedure 
        due to injuries she sustained while in official 
        custody.\35\

                        Punishments and Rewards

    Chinese authorities continued to use various methods of 
punishment and reward to manage citizens' compliance with 
population planning policies. For example, in accordance with 
national policy,\36\ local governments continued to direct 
officials to levy fines, termed ``social compensation fees'' 
(shehui fuyang fei), against couples who give birth to an 
unauthorized child.\37\ These fines force many couples to 
choose between undergoing an unwanted abortion and incurring 
financial hardship.\38\ Often with court approval, family 
planning officials are permitted to take ``forcible'' action 
against families who are unwilling or unable to pay the 
fines.\39\ These ``forcible'' actions are in violation of the 
PRC Population and Family Planning Law and include the 
confiscation of family belongings and the destruction of 
violators' homes.\40\
    In some cases officials not only levy fines against 
violators but also threaten or impose other punitive measures, 
including job loss, demotion, denial of promotion, expulsion 
from the Communist Party, destruction of personal property, 
arbitrary detention, and, in some cases, violence.\41\ Some 
children may go without household registration (hukou) in China 
because they are born ``out-of-plan'' and their parents do not 
pay the necessary fines.\42\ According to sources cited in a 
December 2010 Chinese Human Rights Defenders report, family 
planning officials in some cases also reportedly withhold a 
hukou from an otherwise eligible child whose mother refuses to 
undergo sterilization or IUD insertion after the child's 
birth.\43\ Lack of a valid hukou raises barriers to access to 
social benefits typically linked to the hukou, including 
government-subsidized healthcare and public education.\44\ [For 
additional discussion of China's hukou system, see Section II--
Freedom of Residence and Movement.]
    Some local governments offer rewards to informants who 
report population planning violations. Local government reports 
during the 2011 reporting year mentioned rewards for informants 
in amounts ranging from 100 yuan (US$15) to 6,000 yuan (US$926) 
per case for verified information on violations by either 
citizens or officials, including concealment of out-of-plan 
births, false reports of medical procedures, and falsified 
family planning documents.\45\ Conversely, authorities in one 
neighborhood in Chifeng city, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, 
offered a reward of up to 20,000 yuan (US$3,085) for 
information regarding non-medically necessary prenatal sex 
determination examinations or performance of a sex-selective 
abortion.\46\
    Local governments similarly incentivized family planning 
officials to ensure strict implementation of population 
planning policies. For example, in March 2011, the Maojing 
township government in Qingyang city, Gansu province, issued a 
report on the ``outstanding results'' of the government's 
``rectification activities.'' \47\ The report calls for 
officials to ``spare no efforts'' (quanli yifu) in implementing 
population policies and notes that village cadres face a 
penalty of 1,500 yuan (US$230) for each woman with two 
daughters whom they fail to sterilize. Conversely, they are 
promised a reward of 500 yuan (US$77) for each tubal ligation 
that they see through to completion.\48\ A March 2011 directive 
from the Yangchun city government in Guangdong province 
indicated a goal of fostering ``friendly one-upmanship'' and 
``keen competition'' among family planning cadres, calling for 
daily progress reports and participation in ``information 
sharing meetings'' in which they are publicly praised or 
criticized based on their reports.\49\ [See Official Campaigns 
above.]

                       Targeting Migrant Workers

    As in prior years, the Commission observed during its 2011 
reporting year a number of reports indicating that some local 
governments continue to target migrant workers specifically for 
implementation, in some cases coercively, of family planning 
policies. For example, in April 2011, the Sucheng township 
government in Zuoquan county, Jinzhong municipality, Shanxi 
province, called for a one-month ``superior services, superior 
management'' campaign targeting migrant worker women ``who had 
given birth, were pregnant, or may become pregnant again.'' As 
part of the ``superior management'' efforts, Sucheng officials 
were directed to ``adopt remedial measures''--a term often used 
to refer to mandatory abortion--for out-of-plan pregnancies and 
``levy social compensation fees in accordance with the law'' 
for out-of-plan births.\50\ In November 2010, the Tangshan city 
government in Hebei province reprinted a China Population 
Report article on the ``Six Rights and Six Obligations of the 
Migrant Population.'' Obligations 5 and 6 directed that migrant 
workers whose contraceptive measures ``fail'' should ``promptly 
adopt remedial measures'' and that migrant workers who violate 
family planning laws and regulations should pay the appropriate 
``social compensation fees.'' \51\ The Commission also noted 
directives from local governments in several provinces, 
including Jiangsu,\52\ Guangdong,\53\ Shandong,\54\ and 
Zhejiang,\55\ instructing local officials to take advantage of 
the spring festival timeframe--a period when many migrant 
workers return home to be with family--to target the migrant 
population for family planning policy implementation and 
services. [For additional information on official treatment of 
migrant workers, see Section II--Freedom of Residence and 
Movement and Section II--Worker Rights.]

                      Prospects for Policy Reform

    September 2010 marked the 30th anniversary of the beginning 
of China's current family planning policies,\56\ and following 
this anniversary, the Commission observed increased public 
discussion of the prospects for family planning policy 
reform.\57\ According to a March 2011 Xinhua report, officials 
in five provinces will introduce relaxed population planning 
trial measures in 2011, allowing a second child for some 
couples in which both persons are only children.\58\ The same 
``loosened'' measures are already in effect in major 
municipalities including Shanghai,\59\ Beijing,\60\ and 
Tianjin.\61\ While census data released in 2011 may have also 
sparked new debate among Chinese leaders regarding family 
planning policies,\62\ top Communist Party and government 
leaders continue to publicly defend the policy and rule out its 
cancellation in the near term.\63\

                        Demographic Consequences

    The Chinese government's population planning policies 
continue to exacerbate the country's demographic challenges, 
including an aging population, diminishing workforce, and 
skewed sex ratio. Affected in recent decades by government 
restrictions on the number of births per couple, China's total 
fertility rate has dropped from 6.1 births per woman in 1949 
\64\ to an estimated 1.5 births per woman in 2011,\65\ 
resulting in the rapid growth of China's aging population and 
decline in the working-age population. In the 2011 reporting 
year, officials continued to express concern about China's 
aging population and its present and anticipated strain on the 
country's social services.\66\ Several reports also have 
emerged projecting that the recent decline in China's working-
age population may result in significant labor shortages by as 
soon as 2013.\67\ [For additional information on China's 
projected labor shortage, see Section II--Worker Rights.]
    In response to government-imposed birth limits and in 
keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons, Chinese 
parents continue the practice of sex-selective abortion,\68\ 
contributing to a severely skewed sex ratio--the highest sex 
ratio in the world.\69\ In August 2011, Chinese state media 
noted that China's sex ratio at birth ``is increasing,'' citing 
the remarks of a senior Chinese health official at a press 
conference.\70\ Some social and political scientists argue that 
large numbers of ``surplus males'' could create social 
conditions that the Chinese government may choose to address by 
expanding military enlistment.\71\ Reports in the 2011 
reporting year have also suggested a possible linkage between 
China's large number of ``surplus males'' and an increase in 
the trafficking of women and children for forced marriage or 
commercial sexual exploitation.\72\ In August 2011, the State 
Council issued the PRC Outline for the Development of Children 
(2011-2020), which urged officials to ``step up efforts against 
the use of ultrasound and other [forms of technology] to engage 
in non-medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective 
abortion.'' \73\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Case Update: Chen Guangcheng
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Public security officials continue to hold prominent rights advocate
 Chen Guangcheng and his family under ``soft detention,'' or home
 confinement, following his release from prison on September 9, 2010,
 after serving his full sentence.\74\ Authorities reportedly beat Chen
 Guangcheng and his wife Yuan Weijing in their home on February 8 \75\
 and February 18, 2011.\76\ The beatings are believed to be in
 connection with the couple's recording of video footage, released on
 ChinaAid's Web site on February 9, in which Chen and Yuan spoke of the
 official abuse and restrictive control the family has faced since
 Chen's release.\77\ Officials reportedly did not permit Chen and Yuan
 to seek medical care for their injuries sustained in the beatings.\78\
 Foreign journalists and a ``netizen'' who attempted to visit Chen's
 village following the release of this video reported encountering
 ``groups of violent, plainclothes thugs.'' \79\ Police also reportedly
 detained several lawyers and rights defenders in Beijing in February
 after they met to discuss Chen's case.\80\
  Chen is a self-trained legal advocate who drew international news
 media attention to population planning abuses, particularly forced
 abortions and forced sterilizations, in Linyi city, Shandong province,
 in 2005.\81\ The Yinan County People's Court tried and sentenced Chen
 in August 2006 to four years and three months in prison for
 ``intentional destruction of property'' and ``organizing a group of
 people to disturb traffic order.'' \82\ Chen's trial, retrial, and
 treatment in prison prompted repeated criticism for criminal procedure
 violations and infringement of the rights of Chen and his family.\83\
 Chen reportedly remains under ``soft detention'' with his family, and
 his six-year-old daughter reportedly has not been permitted to leave
 the house to attend school.\84\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Freedom of Residence and Movement

                          Freedom of Residence

    The Chinese government continued to enforce the household 
registration (hukou) system it first established in the 
1950s.\1\ Hukou regulations place limitations on the right of 
Chinese citizens to formally establish their permanent place of 
residence. Initially used to control migration of the rural 
population to China's cities, the hukou system today has 
developed into ``one of the most important mechanisms 
determining entitlement to public welfare, urban services and, 
more broadly, full citizenship.'' \2\ The hukou regulations 
classify Chinese citizens as either rural or urban hukou 
holders, and local governments restrict access to some social 
services based on the classification. The implementation of 
these regulations discriminates against rural hukou holders who 
migrate to urban areas by imposing significant constraints on 
rural hukou holders' ability to obtain healthcare benefits, 
education, and other social services in urban locations where 
they reside but lack legal residency status. The hukou 
regulations appear to contravene the freedoms guaranteed in 
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
Articles 12 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which include ``the right to liberty of 
movement and freedom to choose [one's] residence.'' \3\
    During this reporting period, many local governments have 
continued to relax certain hukou restrictions, consistent with 
earlier reform efforts. While details vary by location, the key 
provisions of these reforms allow some rural residents to 
transfer their hukou status from rural to urban status based on 
certain criteria, which usually include income, education, and 
specialized skill sets. For example, the coastal province of 
Guangdong implemented a point-based system that allowed some 
rural hukou holders to become urban hukou holders. However, 
only a relatively small number of migrant workers, 60,000 \4\ 
out of 23 million \5\ according to data available in October 
2010, had been affected by the reform.
    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, authorities 
implemented new experimental hukou reform policies. Unlike 
earlier hukou reforms that have allowed some rural residents to 
obtain urban hukou based on criteria such as income and 
education, the latest reforms seek to include all residents who 
already hold a local hukou irrespective of other criteria such 
as income and education. For example, Chengdu municipality 
initiated hukou reforms that allowed all local hukou holders to 
register under a unified registration system for purposes of 
concentrated community relocation, marriage and population 
control, employment taxes, creditworthiness, and social 
benefits.\6\ The implications of the latest hukou reforms are 
unclear.
    It has become increasingly apparent that one of the driving 
forces behind the latest hukou reforms is the need for more 
land for urbanization. According to Global Times, which 
operates under the official People's Daily, ``the ultimate goal 
of reform, is to engineer a smooth and advanced urbanization 
process''--meaning more rural land must be made available for 
economic and industrial development.\7\ At the same time, 
authorities have provided some safeguards for rural residents 
against potential adverse consequences resulting from the 
reforms. For example, a key feature of the latest hukou reform 
allows local rural hukou holders to temporarily retain their 
contracted land.\8\ According to official government 
statements, the land retention provision is meant to ease the 
rural-to-urban transition: ``It is clear that the current hukou 
reform does not call for rural residents to give up their land 
and rural property. As soon as they settle down into urban 
areas, their land and properties will need to be dealt with 
sooner or later.'' \9\ The long-term implications for rural 
residents, especially after the land seizure, remain unclear.
    Under the rubric of hukou reform, there appears to be 
increasing tension between some local governments and rural 
residents. The tension results from the clash between some 
rural residents' desire to remain on rural land and some local 
authorities' inclination to convert rural land to urban 
land.\10\ The conversion allows the local government to sell 
some of the rural land rights to developers after relocating 
rural residents to urban areas. According to one Chinese 
source, ``officials are eager to move farmers off the land, 
because land sales make up about half of local government 
revenue and, in some areas, as much as 80 percent. The 
governments earn huge profits by compensating farmers very 
little . . . . [T]his scheme has become a new source of land 
supply for many local governments.'' \11\ [For a discussion of 
the requisition and conversion of rural land, see Section III--
Property--Urban Land and Collectively Owned--or Rural--Land.]
    In connection with the latest hukou and land reforms, 
corruption at the local level and mistreatment of rural 
residents emerged as prominent issues during this reporting 
period. Some local governments forcibly seized rural land and 
relocated rural residents to urban areas, often at a 
compensation level that is deemed unfair based on market 
values.\12\ For example, in one case, authorities withheld 70 
percent of the money owed to rural residents after the 
residents moved into apartments.\13\ In another example, the 
local government removed 11,000 villagers from rural lands 
located outside of Wuxi city, Jiangxi province, and sold the 
underlying land to developers for 30 times the amount it paid 
in compensation to the rural residents.\14\
    The current hukou reforms face many challenges. In addition 
to local-level corruption and abuse, it is unclear how rural 
residents will adapt after relocation to urban areas, or to 
what extent their host municipalities can bear the cost of 
providing social benefits equivalent to those available to the 
existing urban residents. In addition, the issue of how to deal 
with rural residents who insist on staying on rural land 
remains a key concern to the Commission.

                          Freedom of Movement

    The majority of Chinese citizens enjoy increasing freedom 
of movement to travel within China and internationally. 
However, authorities restrict freedom of movement to penalize 
citizens who express views that authorities deem objectionable. 
During this reporting period, the Chinese government placed 
restrictions on freedom of movement that are inconsistent with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\15\
    Chinese authorities increasingly prevented rights 
defenders, advocates, and critics from leaving China under the 
color of law. Officials often cited the PRC Law on the Control 
of the Exit and Entry of Citizens as justification for 
preventing rights defenders from traveling (see examples 
below). To the extent the authorities provided an explanation 
for the prohibition on travel, they frequently cited Article 
8(5) of the Law, which prohibits the departure from China of 
``persons whose exit from the country . . . in the opinion of 
the competent department of the State Council, [would] be 
harmful to state security or cause a major loss to national 
interests.'' \16\ However, the meaning and scope of ``harmful 
to state security'' and ``cause a major loss to national 
interests'' are undefined. In addition, there appear to be no 
effective remedial provisions for appealing a decision 
preventing one's freedom to travel.
    The Commission particularly notes official efforts to block 
some human rights advocates' ability to travel internationally, 
especially during the period close to the Nobel Prize award 
ceremony. To the extent the authorities gave any justification 
at all, they predominantly cited the activists' travel as 
harmful to ``national security.'' Examples include the 
following:

          Authorities prevented Nobel Prize Laureate 
        Liu Xiaobo's lawyer, Mo Shaoping, and his colleague, He 
        Weifang, from traveling to London to attend a legal 
        conference hosted by the International Bar Association 
        on November 9, 2010; \17\ prevented economist Mao Yushi 
        from traveling to Singapore on December 1, citing 
        concerns for ``national security''; \18\ prevented 
        artist Ai Weiwei from boarding a flight to Seoul on 
        December 2, also citing concerns for ``national 
        security'' at the boarding gate; \19\ prevented human 
        rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong from boarding flights to 
        the United States on October 30, 2010, again citing 
        concerns for ``national security''; \20\ and prevented 
        professor and religious scholar He Guanghu from 
        boarding a plane to Singapore to attend a conference on 
        November 20, 2010, explaining that his trip ``would 
        pose a threat to national security.'' \21\ Authorities 
        also turned down retired professor Sun Wenguang's 
        passport application after he openly stated his desire 
        to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony.\22\
          Chinese authorities prevented poet, writer, 
        and musician Liao Yiwu from traveling to the United 
        States in March to promote his books,\23\ from 
        attending the PEN World Voices Festival of 
        International Literature in New York City in April,\24\ 
        and from attending a literary festival in Australia in 
        May.\25\ Liao had been imprisoned for four years for 
        reciting his poem ``Massacre'' about the Tiananmen 
        protests.\26\ In July 2011, with help from his friends, 
        Liao fled to Germany through Vietnam and Poland so that 
        he could ``speak freely and publish freely.'' \27\


   home confinement, surveillance, and harassment of chinese citizens


    The Chinese government placed restrictions on liberty of 
movement to punish and control political dissidents and human 
rights advocates in contravention of international legal 
standards \28\ and Article 37 of China's Constitution, which 
prohibits unlawful detention, and deprivation or restriction of 
personal freedom of citizens by unlawful means.
    As in previous years, authorities continued to employ a 
range of measures to restrict liberty of movement, including 
stationing police to monitor the homes of rights defenders,\29\ 
forcing rights defenders to take so-called ``vacations'' to 
remote areas \30\ or to ``drink tea'' with security 
personnel,\31\ removing them to unknown locations,\32\ and 
imprisoning them.\33\ In apparent sensitivity to recent 
protests in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as an 
online call for ``Jasmine'' protests within China, authorities 
detained, ``forcibly disappeared,'' or put under extralegal 
home confinement several dozen human rights defenders, 
including human rights lawyers Jiang Tianyong, Li Tiantian, Liu 
Anjun, and Teng Biao, among others.\34\
     In October 2010, in apparent connection with the awarding 
of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, authorities restricted 
approximately three dozen human rights defenders' freedom of 
movement. For example, authorities stationed police personnel, 
sometimes around-the-clock, outside of the homes of writer Yu 
Jie and democracy advocate Hu Shigen,\35\ lawyer Li Fangping 
and activist Li Zhiying,\36\ and Christian house church leader 
Xu Yonghai.\37\ Authorities also placed Ding Zilin, the 
organizer of the Tiananmen Mothers, under extralegal house 
arrest for 74 days; \38\ and close associates of Liu Xia, wife 
of the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo, have not been 
able to reach her.\39\
    The Commission notes that, during this reporting period, 
authorities employed particularly forceful techniques to 
intimidate and control the family members of human rights 
defenders and activists. For example, authorities continued to 
confine, harass, and abuse legal advocate Chen Guangcheng and 
his family after his official prison release date in September 
2010.\40\ [See Case Update: Chen Guangcheng in Section II--
Population Planning.] Officials have also kept Liu Xia under 
extralegal house arrest since October 2010.\41\ In addition, 
authorities detained Xinna and Uiles, the wife and son of 
Mongol rights advocate Hada, on apparent charges of ``illegal 
business operations'' and ``drug possession.'' \42\

                            Status of Women

                              Introduction

    Chinese officials continue to actively promote the 
protection of women's rights and interests in accordance with 
international human rights norms; however, due in part to 
ambiguity and a lack of clearly outlined responsibilities in 
China's national-level legislation, women still encounter 
gender inequality, discrimination, and other abuses in the 
community, in the workplace, and at home. Women's 
representation in leadership positions at all levels of 
government still falls short of international norms and, 
according to the most recent available statistics, appears to 
have made little significant progress for at least four 
decades. Chinese women continued to face gender-based 
employment discrimination during the Commission's 2011 
reporting year, including lower average wages than their male 
counterparts, gender bias in recruitment, and compulsory 
retirement at an age set 5 to 10 years younger than that of 
men. Domestic violence and sexual harassment reportedly affect 
a majority of Chinese women, yet ambiguity in China's existing 
national-level legislation on these issues limits preventative 
measures and makes it difficult for women to seek recourse when 
they encounter abusive treatment. Officials reportedly 
completed draft domestic violence legislation that addresses 
longstanding concerns regarding issues such as domestic 
violence among cohabitating couples, psychological abuse, and 
physical violence, but it is unclear when and if such 
legislation will be placed on the legislative agenda. Sex-
selective abortion continues, despite Chinese government 
regulations prohibiting the practice, and exacerbates China's 
severely imbalanced sex ratio. Observers have raised concerns 
this year that China's skewed sex ratio may lead to an uptick 
in the trafficking of women for forced marriage or commercial 
sexual exploitation.

                            Gender Equality

    In its domestic laws \1\ and policy initiatives \2\ and 
through its ratification of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),\3\ the 
Chinese government has committed to ensuring female 
representation in government. However, at the highest levels of 
the central government, as well as in the Communist Party, 
female representation remains low. Only one woman currently 
holds a position in the Party's top-ranking 25-person Political 
Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee,\4\ and women 
hold only four positions in China's 35-person State Council.\5\ 
Official statistics on female political participation in the 
country's legislature do not appear to be available for years 
more recent than 2008,\6\ at which time China's National Bureau 
of Statistics reported that women made up approximately 21 
percent of delegates to the National People's Congress. This 
figure has shown little growth since the early 1970s \7\ and 
remains short of the 30 percent standard set by the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women in 1990.\8\ Song Xiuyan, Vice 
Chair of the National Working Committee on Children and Women 
under the State Council, reported in August 2011 that female 
leadership has increased in the provincial, municipal, and 
county levels of government since 2000. When asked about the 
lack of women's political participation at higher levels, she 
stated, ``[W]e still have a lot of work to do to raise social 
awareness and guarantee gender equality through legal means.'' 
\9\ In August 2011, the State Council issued the PRC Outline 
for the Development of Women (2011-2020), which, among other 
goals, calls for ``local governments at the county level and 
above to have at least one female leader'' by the end of 
2020.\10\
    Against a backdrop of reportedly limited female 
representation at the village level,\11\ authorities revised 
national-level legislation this year, changing the language on 
female quotas in village committees and village representative 
assemblies. With limited decisionmaking power in village 
committees, women face challenges in protecting their rights 
and interests.\12\ The National People's Congress Standing 
Committee passed the revised PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' 
Committees in October 2010, changing the stipulation that 
village committees should have ``an appropriate number of 
women'' \13\ to the stipulation that village committees 
``should have female members.'' \14\ The revised law also 
includes a new stipulation requiring that ``female village 
representatives should make up one-third or more of the village 
representative assembly,'' a separate decisionmaking body made 
up of village committee members and village 
representatives.\15\ According to one Peking University law 
professor, ``The Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees is 
not directly aimed at furthering women's rights, however, it is 
of great significance in protecting women's rights, for it is 
related to women's right to vote, which is vital in upholding 
and furthering women's rights and gender equality.'' \16\ The 
impact that these revisions will have on female representation 
at the village level in the future is unclear, but some 
domestic observers have hailed them as a positive step.\17\ An 
increase in women's decisionmaking power at the village level 
may lead to greater protection of women's property rights,\18\ 
an issue that plagues rural women who lose their land when they 
marry out of their village.\19\ [For additional information on 
the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees, see Section 
III--Institutions of Democratic Governance.]

                       Employment Discrimination

    Gender-based employment discrimination with respect to 
issues such as wages, recruitment, and retirement age remains 
widespread in China, despite government efforts to eliminate it 
and promote women's employment. The Chinese government has 
signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and has committed under Article 7 to 
ensuring ``the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and 
favourable conditions of work,'' including ``equal pay for 
equal work,'' and ``equal opportunity for everyone to be 
promoted in his employment to an appropriate higher level, 
subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and 
competence.'' \20\ Several domestic laws also prohibit gender 
discrimination and promote gender equality in the 
workplace,\21\ but according to an analysis in a February 2010 
Women's Watch-China report, these laws do not provide guidance 
for an enforcement mechanism. For example, if a female 
encounters discrimination in recruitment or on the job, she has 
no legal basis for filing a lawsuit against the discriminatory 
behavior; she can only request labor arbitration.\22\
    A number of domestic reports and surveys from the 2011 
reporting year highlighted challenges that women continue to 
face in employment due to their gender:

          Difficulty securing employment. According to 
        a January 2011 Shaanxi Provincial Women's Federation 
        survey, 70 percent of those surveyed believed that 
        males have an easier time finding a job than females. 
        In addition, 44 percent of females surveyed reported 
        that they had encountered discrimination based on their 
        marital or childbearing status, compared to 13.9 
        percent of their male counterparts. In addition, 19 
        percent of females surveyed reported that their height 
        and physical appearance were obstacles in their job 
        search, compared to 10.9 percent of their male 
        counterparts.\23\

          Wage disparity. A survey released in February 
        2011 by the educational consulting firm MyCOS reported 
        that the income gap between male and female graduates 
        increased with their level of education. For example, 
        on a monthly basis, males with vocational school 
        degrees reportedly earned an average of 169 yuan 
        (US$26) more than females, males with undergraduate 
        degrees reportedly earned an average of 330 yuan 
        (US$51) more than females, and males with graduate 
        degrees earned an average of 815 yuan (US$126) more 
        than females.\24\

          Unequal treatment. A study released in March 
        2011 by the non-profit research group Center for Work-
        Life Policy reported that, in a survey on the female 
        talent pool in China, 35 percent of those surveyed 
        believed that women faced unfair treatment at work. The 
        study also found that 48 percent of women choose to 
        ``disengage, scale back their ambitions or consider 
        quitting [their jobs]'' due to ``problems of bias.'' 
        \25\

          Forced early retirement. Mandatory retirement 
        ages for women in China continue to be five years 
        earlier than those for men.\26\ Public discussion on 
        retirement age burgeoned in the 2011 reporting year 
        surrounding the publication of a white paper on the 
        state of China's human resources in September 2010,\27\ 
        the issuance of new social security regulations in 
        Shanghai municipality in September 2010,\28\ passage of 
        the PRC Law on Social Insurance in October 2010,\29\ 
        proposals at the annual sessions of the National 
        People's Congress in March 2011,\30\ and the release of 
        the 2010 Census results in April.\31\ The gender 
        discrepancy in retirement age may obstruct some women's 
        career advancement and impact their economic rights and 
        interests.\32\ In the past, the lower retirement age 
        for women has also reportedly contributed to hiring 
        discrimination, as employers in some cases preferred to 
        hire women younger than 40 years of age.\33\

    In May 2011, the Shenzhen Municipal Women's Federation 
passed draft regulations on gender equality.\34\ If adopted, 
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Gender Equality Promotion 
Regulations would be the first legislation of their kind in 
China to specifically focus on gender equality.\35\ The draft 
has reportedly been placed on the 2011 legislative agenda.\36\

                         Violence Against Women


                           domestic violence


    The amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and 
Interests (LPWRI) and amended PRC Marriage Law prohibit 
domestic violence,\37\ and the crime of domestic violence is 
punishable under the PRC Criminal Law.\38\ The problem of 
domestic violence remains widespread, reportedly affecting more 
than one-third of Chinese families.\39\ Current national-level 
legal provisions regarding domestic violence leave many victims 
unprotected, as they simply prohibit domestic violence without 
defining the term or clarifying specific responsibilities of 
government departments in prevention, punishment, and 
treatment.\40\ During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, 
Chinese advocates continued to express concern regarding the 
nationwide problem of domestic violence and called for clear 
national-level legislation on domestic violence.\41\ According 
to state-run media sources, officials announced in March 2011 
the completion of draft domestic violence legislation.\42\ 
Highlights reportedly include attention given to cohabitating 
couples, as well as to cases that involve ``psychological 
violence.'' \43\


                           sexual harassment


    Sexual harassment remains prevalent in China, yet those who 
encounter sexual harassment remain largely unprotected under 
Chinese law and face difficulties in defending their rights. An 
April 2011 article published by a Chinese business 
investigation group reported that 84 percent of women in China 
had experienced some form of sexual harassment and that 50 
percent of this harassment had occurred in the workplace.\44\ A 
Women's Watch-China (WWC) survey released in May 2011 
interviewed both men and women and found that 19.8 percent of 
those surveyed had experienced sexual harassment, and of those, 
55.1 percent were women.\45\ The Chinese government has 
committed under Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to taking ``all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in the field of employment,'' \46\ and it introduced the 
concept of sexual harassment into legislation with the 2005 
amendment to the LPWRI.\47\ The amended LPWRI prohibits sexual 
harassment and provides an avenue of recourse for victims 
through either administrative punishment for offenders or civil 
action in the court system, but it does not provide a clear 
definition of sexual harassment or specific standards and 
procedures for prevention and punishment.\48\ While most people 
who face sexual harassment choose to remain silent about 
it,\49\ those who decide to take legal action risk losing their 
lawsuits due to the challenge of supplying adequate 
evidence.\50\
    As reported in the Commission's 2009 and 2010 Annual 
Reports, in February 2009, a study group led by three Chinese 
researchers submitted a draft proposal to the National People's 
Congress for a law aimed at preventing sexual harassment in the 
workplace.\51\ The proposed law would hold the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security responsible for prevention 
and punishment of sexual harassment in the workplace, while 
also holding the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the 
Communist Youth League, and the All-China Women's Federation 
responsible for providing aid to those who experience sexual 
harassment.\52\ The Commission has not found indicators of 
progress on this or similar national-level legislation during 
the 2011 reporting year.

                Population Planning and Gender Equality

    According to reports during the Commission's 2011 reporting 
year, sex-selective abortion continues, despite the 
government's legislative and policy efforts to deter such 
practices. In response to government-imposed birth limits and 
in keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons, some 
Chinese parents choose to engage in sex-selective abortion, 
especially rural couples whose first child is a girl.\53\ The 
Chinese government issued national regulations in 2003 banning 
prenatal gender determination and sex-selective abortion.\54\ 
Statistics and analysis from studies published in 2008,\55\ 
2009,\56\ and 2010 \57\ regarding China's significantly skewed 
sex ratio show that sex-selective abortion remains prevalent, 
especially in rural areas, suggesting that implementation of 
the ban on sex-selective abortion remains uneven. In August 
2011, the State Council issued the PRC Outline for the 
Development of Children (2011-2020), which urged officials to 
``step up efforts against the use of ultrasound and other 
[forms of technology] to engage in non-medically necessary sex 
determination and sex-selective abortion.'' \58\ Some 
observers, including Chinese state media, have linked China's 
increasingly skewed sex ratio with an increase in forced 
prostitution, forced marriages, and other forms of human 
trafficking.\59\ [For more information regarding China's skewed 
sex ratio, see Section II--Population Planning.]

                           Human Trafficking

                              Introduction

    The Chinese government took steps to combat human 
trafficking during the Commission's 2011 reporting year, but 
challenges remain. Multiple factors shape the context of the 
ongoing human trafficking problem in China, including the 
government's population planning policies and their 
exacerbation of China's skewed sex ratio; migrant mobility; 
uneven enforcement of anti-trafficking laws; lack of anti-
trafficking training, education, and resources; and government 
corruption. In addition, officials in the past year continued 
to focus on the abduction and sale of women and children,\1\ 
while giving proportionally less attention to other forms of 
trafficking. The government's limited capacity restricts the 
number of trafficking victims that can access official 
protection, services, and care. The National People's Congress 
Standing Committee passed amendments to the PRC Criminal Law in 
February 2011, including new language which, if implemented, 
may strengthen prosecution and punishment of forced labor 
cases. Authorities reported taking action to combat trafficking 
in the 2011 reporting year. Gaps between domestic legislation 
and international standards remain and continue to limit the 
scope and effectiveness of anti-trafficking efforts.

                      Anti-Trafficking Challenges

    The Chinese government acceded to the UN Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) in December 2009,\2\ but 
it has not revised current domestic legislation to come into 
full compliance. The PRC Criminal Law prohibits the trafficking 
of persons, which it defines as ``abducting, kidnapping, 
buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or transferring a 
woman or child, for the purpose of selling the victim.'' \3\ 
The law does not provide definitions for these concepts. The 
PRC Criminal Law separately prohibits forced prostitution,\4\ 
but it does not make clear whether minors under 18 years of age 
who are engaged in prostitution may be considered victims of 
trafficking, regardless of the use of force. Chinese law does 
not clearly prohibit non-physical forms of coercion-including 
debt bondage and threats-or the recruitment, provision, or 
attainment of persons for forced prostitution,\5\ which are 
covered under Article 3 of the Palermo Protocol.\6\ The Chinese 
government's differing definition of human trafficking has 
negative implications for anti-trafficking work in China, 
including limiting the Chinese government's prosecution 
efforts, protection of victims, and victim services.\7\ It is 
unclear whether the Chinese government's definition of human 
trafficking also has negative implications for program funding, 
as fiscal information on programs is not publicly available.
    Chinese officials continue to conflate human trafficking 
with human smuggling and therefore treat some victims of 
trafficking as criminals, although recent law enforcement 
efforts have sought to reduce this.\8\ According to the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime, the main international body 
responsible for implementing the Palermo Protocol, human 
trafficking and migrant smuggling differ with respect to 
consent, exploitation, transnationality, and source of 
profit.\9\ Commonly, human trafficking involves the 
exploitation of an individual (either domestically or across 
borders) for forced labor or prostitution without the 
individual's consent, whereas migrant smuggling involves the 
cross-border transport of an individual with the individual's 
consent and for direct or indirect profit resulting from the 
transport.\10\ In conflating the two, Chinese officials may 
consider an individual's illegal entry into China to be a crime 
of ``human smuggling'' and punish the individual accordingly, 
while giving less consideration to the role exploitation may 
have played in the border crossing.\11\ The Chinese government 
continues to deport all undocumented North Koreans as illegal 
``economic migrants'' and does not provide legal alternatives 
to repatriation for identified foreign victims of 
trafficking.\12\ [For more information, see Section II--North 
Korean Refugees in China.] Reports from the 2011 reporting year 
indicate that official corruption and lack of resources in some 
areas also continue to deter or limit anti-trafficking efforts 
and exacerbate the trafficking problem.\13\

                               Prevalence

    China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination 
for the trafficking of men, women, and children.\14\ The 
majority of trafficking cases are domestic; \15\ however, human 
traffickers continue to traffic Chinese women and children from 
China to countries around the world.\16\ Women and girls from 
countries across Asia, as well as some countries in Europe and 
Africa, are also trafficked into China and forced into 
marriages, employment, and sexual exploitation.\17\ Forced 
labor continues, and certain cases gained widespread media 
attention during this reporting year; \18\ however, the full 
extent of the forced labor problem in China is unclear.\19\ 
[See Section II--Worker Rights for more information on child 
labor.] According to the Palermo Protocol, forced labor of any 
person under 18 years of age constitutes ``trafficking in 
persons.'' \20\

                            Driving Factors

    Experts link the reported growth \21\ of the trafficking 
market in China to several political, demographic, economic, 
and social factors. Reports indicate that China's skewed sex 
ratio,\22\ which is increasing against the backdrop of China's 
population planning policies and Chinese families' preference 
for sons,\23\ has increased the demand for trafficking for 
forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation.\24\ In 
recent years, domestic and international observers have also 
linked the growing trafficking market with the lack of 
awareness and education on trafficking prevention for 
vulnerable women and parents \25\ and conditions in bordering 
countries such as instability in Burma and poverty in the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.\26\ [For additional 
information on China's skewed sex ratio, see Section II--
Population Planning.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Representative Human Trafficking Cases  From the 2011 Reporting Year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In December 2010, authorities detained an official from a
 government-funded homeless shelter for his alleged involvement in a
 forced labor scheme.\27\ The official allegedly sold 11 workers, 8 of
 whom reportedly had disabilities, to a building materials factory in
 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where they were held and
 forced to work for at least three years without pay or protective
 gear.\28\

  Also in December, authorities detained a brick kiln employer
 in Shaanxi province on charges of forced labor after he brought people
 in who were mentally ill, deaf, mute, disabled, or otherwise vulnerable
 to exploitation.\29\ Authorities reportedly rescued 18 workers from the
 brick kiln.\30\

  Despite a 2008 XUAR Department of Education circular stating
 that students enrolled in elementary and junior high school would no
 longer participate in work-study activities to pick cotton, a number of
 Chinese media and government reports from the 2011 reporting year
 indicate that authorities in the XUAR continued to implement work-study
 programs in 2009 and 2010 that required school-age students to pick
 cotton and engage in other forms of labor.\31\ [See Section IV--
 Xinjiang for more information on these programs.]

  Individuals continued to force children to work in
 exploitative conditions as child beggars.\32\ In one incident reported
 in February 2011, a man in Henan province ``rented out'' his daughter
 for 5,000 yuan (US$774) to an ``acrobatic troupe'' and discovered three
 years later that the eight-year-old had been made to beg and was
 physically abused.\33\ In another incident reported in August, a man in
 the XUAR sold his 12-year-old daughter to a group who trained her to
 pickpocket. When she was ``rescued and sent back home,'' the man
 reportedly sold her again to a different pickpocketing group.\34\

  Authorities in the XUAR announced plans in April 2011 for a
 nationwide campaign to locate and retrieve children from the XUAR who
 are ``strays'' and in some cases ``steal or beg for a living.'' \35\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Anti-Trafficking Efforts

    The Chinese government, non-governmental organizations, and 
individuals continued efforts to combat human trafficking 
during the Commission's 2011 reporting year. As reported in the 
Commission's 2010 Annual Report, in December 2009, the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) approved China's 
accession to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo 
Protocol).\36\ On February 25, 2011, the NPCSC revised the PRC 
Criminal Law, making amendments to provisions on forced labor 
\37\--a crime that constitutes human trafficking under the 
Palermo Protocol.\38\ The revised legislation broadens the 
scope of activity considered punishable for forced labor and 
strengthens punishments for ``serious'' crimes of forced labor; 
however, the legislation still does not clearly define what 
constitutes forced labor.\39\ [See box titled Strengthened 
Legislation on Forced Labor below.] The Commission did not 
observe changes to other areas in which China's domestic 
legislation does not comply with the Palermo Protocol during 
the 2011 reporting year.\40\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Strengthened Legislation on Forced Labor
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The National People's Congress Standing Committee passed amendments to
 the PRC Criminal Law in February 2011, which included additions to
 provisions on trafficking in Article 244.\41\ The revised provisions,
 if properly implemented, may strengthen prosecution and punishment of
 forced labor cases:  Widened scope of punishable persons. The new provision expands
 the scope of responsibility from ``employer'' to ``whoever forces
 another to work . . . .'' In addition, the new provision adds language
 that provides a basis for punishing anyone who is ``aware of a person
 committing the crime . . . and recruits or transports personnel for
 him, or otherwise aids forced labor.'' \42\ This added language, if
 implemented, may strengthen prosecution and punishment of middlemen,
 transporters, and recruiters.  Lengthened prison sentences. The revised provision provides
 for a maximum three-year imprisonment for forced labor situations that
 are not considered ``serious.'' This period of time was unclear prior
 to revisions. The new provision also provides for longer prison
 sentences (three to seven years, an increase from the former maximum of
 three years) for forced labor crimes that are considered ``serious.''
 \43\ While the term ``serious'' is not clearly defined, this revised
 language, if implemented, may result in harsher punishments for those
 convicted of forced labor crimes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Chinese authorities, in cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations and international organizations, took steps to 
improve protection, services, and care for victims of 
trafficking but continued to focus such efforts only on women 
and children identified as victims through the government's 
definition of trafficking. The International Organization on 
Migration and the Ministry of Civil Affairs conducted two 
training sessions during the Commission's 2011 reporting year 
that reportedly addressed issues including victim 
identification, protection, and assistance.\44\ According to 
the U.S. State Department, the All-China Women's Federation 
(ACWF) is in the process of starting a network of shelters for 
women. At these shelters, women reportedly may access referrals 
for legal aid, report human trafficking violations, and seek 
assistance from social workers.\45\ In addition, in September 
2010, Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu and Vietnamese 
Minister of Public Security Le Hong Anh signed a cooperative 
agreement to work together on trafficking prevention and 
control.\46\
    The Chinese government continued outreach and education 
campaigns in concert with the ACWF and international 
organizations. The government continued trafficking education 
campaigns in areas with high numbers of migrant workers, 
including train and bus stations, and through television, cell 
phones, and the Internet, informing workers of their 
rights.\47\ Chinese authorities established nationwide and 
local hotlines for reporting suspected trafficking cases,\48\ 
although there appears to be limited public data on their use.
    As the Chinese government continues to conflate human 
smuggling, illegal adoption, and child abduction with human 
trafficking, accurate statistics on the number of trafficking 
cases the government investigated and prosecuted during the 
past reporting year are not available.\49\ Using the definition 
of human trafficking under Chinese law, the Supreme People's 
Court reportedly convicted 3,138 defendants in trafficking 
cases in 2010,\50\ up from 2,413 in 2009,\51\ and of those 
convicted, authorities reportedly handed down 2,216 prison 
sentences for terms of five years or more.\52\ In addition, the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate prosecuted 4,422 individuals for 
trafficking offenses,\53\ up from 4,017 in 2009.\54\
    The U.S. State Department placed China on its Tier 2 Watch 
List for the seventh consecutive year in 2011,\55\ listing 
several areas in which anti-trafficking efforts were 
insufficient, including that the Chinese government ``does not 
fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking'' and ``did not demonstrate evidence of significant 
efforts to address all forms of trafficking or effectively 
protect victims.'' \56\


                         civil society efforts


    Individual citizens have also been active in the effort to 
combat human trafficking. One individual's anti-trafficking 
efforts on an Internet blog launched during the 2011 reporting 
year have received widespread attention.\57\ While the combined 
efforts of the individual, the blog's photograph contributors, 
and a number of government agencies have resulted in the 
``rescue'' of at least six abducted children,\58\ the online 
campaign has also raised concerns regarding the privacy of the 
children being photographed,\59\ potential for publicly 
misidentifying children as abducted,\60\ and the risk that 
traffickers might inflict further harm on their victims if they 
find pictures of them posted publicly.\61\

                     North Korean Refugees in China

                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government persisted in detaining and repatriating North Korean 
refugees to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), 
despite the harsh punishments refugees face once they have 
returned to the DPRK.\1\ In 2011, the Chinese government 
reportedly increased the presence of public security officials 
in northeastern China and erected new border barricades along 
the China-DPRK border. The Chinese government classifies all 
North Korean refugees in China as ``illegal'' economic migrants 
and not refugees (nanmin) and continues its policy of 
repatriating them.\2\ China's repatriation of North Korean 
refugees, including those who leave the DPRK for fear of 
persecution, contravenes obligations under the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 
1967 Protocol (1967 Protocol), to which China has acceded.\3\ 
In addition, the North Korean government's imprisonment and 
torture of repatriated North Koreans renders North Koreans in 
China refugees ``sur place,'' or those who fear persecution 
upon return to their country of origin.\4\ Under the 1951 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the Chinese government is 
obligated to refrain from repatriating refugees ``sur place.'' 
\5\

                         Unlawful Repatriation

    During the 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government 
appeared to take new measures to stem streams of North Korean 
refugees.\6\ In September 2010, one overseas news organization 
reported that Chinese public security authorities were 
cooperating with North Korean police agents to repatriate North 
Korean refugees throughout China--including in regions such as 
Yunnan province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region--in 
organized ``manhunts.'' \7\ Chinese officials reportedly have 
deployed hundreds of People's Armed Police and law enforcement 
officials to work with 100 North Korean state security 
officials throughout China. In some instances, North Korean 
agents reportedly pose as North Korean defectors to target 
refugees in migrant communities.\8\
    Media reports indicated that Chinese officials continue to 
enforce a system of rewards to facilitate the capture of North 
Korean refugees and members of their support network. Chinese 
authorities offer bounties to Chinese citizens who turn in 
North Koreans and fine,\9\ detain,\10\ or imprison \11\ those 
who provide the refugees with humanitarian assistance. Chinese 
authorities reportedly offer rewards of up to 3,000 yuan 
(US$456) to Chinese nationals and Chinese nationals of Korean 
descent (Sino-Koreans, or chaoxianzu) who provide information 
on North Koreans.\12\ As a result, many North Koreans living 
throughout China are now settling farther from the China-DPRK 
border.\13\
    China's public security bureau agencies hold all detained 
North Korean refugees in detention centers that are not subject 
to independent monitoring.\14\ Refugees cannot challenge their 
detention in court.\15\ The Chinese government continued to 
deny the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) permission 
to operate along its northeastern border with the DPRK.\16\

                         Punishment in the DPRK

    During the 2011 reporting year, the DPRK appeared to 
increase surveillance camera systems and reinforce barbed wire 
in areas along the Chinese-North Korean border in order to 
crack down on North Korean refugees to China.\17\ North Koreans 
repatriated by the Chinese government face the threat of 
imprisonment, torture, and capital punishment in the DPRK.\18\ 
Under the 2004 revised North Korean Penal Code, border crossers 
can receive sentences of up to two years' imprisonment in a 
``labor-training center.'' \19\ North Korean authorities assign 
harsher punishment, including long sentences and public 
execution, to repatriated North Koreans deemed to have 
committed ``political'' crimes, which include attempted 
defection; conversion to Christianity; and having had extensive 
contact with religious groups, South Koreans, or Americans.\20\ 
A significant number of the non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and humanitarian workers assisting North Koreans in 
China and helping them seek asylum are Christian, South Korean, 
or American.\21\
    In May 2011, Amnesty International (AI) released new 
information demonstrating that North Korean political prison 
camps, which hold an estimated 200,000 people, have ``expanded 
significantly.'' \22\ It is unclear, based on the reports, how 
many of those detained were forcibly repatriated from China. 
Based on AI interviews with former detainees at one political 
prison camp, prisoners in some cases are reportedly forced to 
work in inhumane conditions and ``are frequently subjected to 
torture and other cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.'' 
\23\ The North Korean Human Rights Archives organization claims 
that there are at least 480 prisons and detention facilities 
throughout the DPRK.\24\

             Trafficking and Denial of Access to Education

    The Chinese government's policy of repatriating North 
Korean refugees and denying them legal status increases their 
vulnerability to trafficking, mistreatment, and exploitation in 
China. North Korean women, in particular, often fall victim to 
inhumane treatment and indentured servitude.\25\ NGOs and 
researchers estimate that as many as 70 percent of the tens of 
thousands of North Korean refugees in China are women.\26\ In 
March 2011, an NGO worker estimated that 9 out of every 10 
North Korean women in China are trafficked.\27\ Traffickers, 
many of whom operate in organized networks, use false promises 
to lure North Korean women into China and abduct those entering 
China on their own.\28\ Traffickers reportedly blackmail North 
Korean women in China by warning them that if they do not obey, 
they will be reported to Chinese authorities who will forcibly 
repatriate them.\29\ Chinese authorities reportedly took steps 
to investigate and crack down on criminal syndicates 
trafficking North Korean women. In June 2011, for instance, 
public security officials in Hailun city, Heilongjiang 
province, detained traffickers but also detained three 
trafficked North Korean women with them.\30\
    The trafficking of North Korean women has created a black 
market in which refugees are ``moved and traded like 
merchandise, with many sold as `brides,' kept in confinement, 
and sexually assaulted.'' \31\ In a March 2011 Radio Free Asia 
article, a North Korean defector living in Yanji city, Yanbian 
Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jilin province, described how 
Chinese middlemen ``appraise'' and sell trafficked women based 
on certain criteria.\32\ He said, ``North Korean women in their 
40s are sold for 3,000 yuan (US$457), those in their 30s for 
5,000 yuan (US$761), and those in their 20s for about 7,000 
yuan (US$1,066).'' \33\ There is a high demand for wives in 
northeastern China where severe sex ratio imbalances have 
spurred the Chinese market for trafficked North Korean brides, 
and where poor, disabled, or elderly men have difficulty 
finding wives.\34\ [See Section II--Population Planning for 
more information on sex ratio imbalance in China.] In other 
cases, North Korean women have been trafficked into commercial 
sexual exploitation and forced to work as prostitutes or in 
Internet sex operations.\35\ Some women reportedly have been 
sold and resold multiple times,\36\ and trafficked North Korean 
women have testified to beatings, sexual abuse, and being 
locked up to prevent escape.\37\
    The Chinese government's repatriation of trafficked North 
Korean women contravenes the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, 
and the Chinese government is obligated under Article 7 of the 
UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) to 
``consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures 
that permit victims of trafficking to remain in its territory, 
temporarily or permanently . . . giving appropriate 
consideration to humanitarian and compassionate factors.'' \38\ 
The Chinese government's failure to prevent trafficking of 
North Korean women and protect them from revictimization also 
contravenes its obligations under Article 9 of the Palermo 
Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women.\39\ Although the 
central government has taken limited steps to combat 
trafficking and protect trafficking victims,\40\ traffickers 
continue to traffic an estimated 90 percent of the North Korean 
women in China,\41\ and the Chinese government refuses to 
provide these victims with legal alternatives to 
repatriation.\42\ [For more information on the central 
government's efforts to combat trafficking, see Section II--
Human Trafficking.]
    Another problem that reportedly stems from China's unlawful 
repatriation policy is the denial of education and other public 
goods for the children of North Korean women married to Chinese 
citizens. The scope of this problem, however, is unclear based 
on limited public information. The PRC Nationality Law 
guarantees citizenship and, by extension, household 
registration (hukou) to all children born in China to at least 
one parent of Chinese nationality.\43\ The PRC Compulsory 
Education Law, moreover, provides that all children age six 
years and older with Chinese citizenship shall receive nine 
years of free and compulsory education, regardless of race or 
ethnicity.\44\ Some local governments refuse to register 
Chinese-North Korean children without seeing documentation that 
the mother is a citizen, has been repatriated, or has run 
away.\45\ Local authorities contravene the PRC Nationality Law, 
the PRC Compulsory Education Law, and the Chinese government's 
commitments under international conventions when they refuse 
these children the hukou required to access public education 
and obtain healthcare.\46\ Denial of hukou forces these 
children to live in a stateless limbo. Estimates for the number 
of such stateless children in China range from several thousand 
to several tens of thousands.\47\ Moreover, when their North 
Korean mothers are repatriated, a significant number of these 
children also are abandoned, as their fathers are unwilling or 
unable to take care of them.\48\ According to one non-
governmental organization, China may have as many as 100,000 of 
these ``orphans.'' \49\ [See Section II--Freedom of Residence 
and Movement.]

                             Public Health

                         Public Health Advocacy

    Despite official recognition of the positive role non-
governmental actors have played in raising awareness about 
health concerns, combating stigma, and promoting prevention of 
diseases,\1\ many Chinese citizens involved in public health 
advocacy continued to face government harassment and 
interference in the past year. In addition to restrictions on 
registration and funding of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) that remain in effect and have been used to monitor and 
control NGO activities,\2\ government pressure on some public 
health advocates continued during this reporting year, as 
illustrated by the following cases.

          Tian Xi. On February 11, 2011, the Xincai 
        County People's Court in Zhumadian municipality, Henan 
        province, sentenced public health advocate Tian Xi to 
        one year's imprisonment for ``intentional destruction 
        of property.'' \3\ Tian Xi reportedly was infected with 
        HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C through a hospital 
        blood transfusion in 1996.\4\ Since learning of his 
        diseases, he has persistently petitioned for resolution 
        of his case and the cases of others who have been 
        infected through transfusions.\5\ Although Tian Xi's 
        sentence was reportedly related to his destruction of 
        office supplies during a dispute with a hospital 
        official over his case,\6\ government and Communist 
        Party official documents from Gulu township, Xincai 
        county, indicate that officials had planned to take 
        action against Tian Xi before the hospital dispute.\7\ 
        Issued prior to the hospital dispute, the documents 
        called for public security officials to take ``security 
        and stability control measures against Tian Xi'' and to 
        ``intervene, prepare documentation, [and] strike.'' \8\ 
        Tian Xi's family, as well as international observers, 
        expressed concern regarding his health while in 
        prison.\9\ Authorities released Tian Xi on August 18, 
        2011, upon the completion of his sentence.\10\
          Aizhixing. Authorities continued to harass 
        and interfere with the operations of Aizhixing 
        Institute of Health Education, a Beijing-based public 
        health advocacy NGO. In December 2010, Beijing tax 
        officials and public security personnel entered the 
        organization's office and confiscated documents as part 
        of an investigation into Aizhixing's compliance with 
        tax regulations.\11\ On March 11, 2011, Beijing 
        officials demanded that Aizhixing remove from its Web 
        site an open letter alleging that two central 
        government officials were involved in a blood 
        transfusion scandal which led to an HIV/AIDS epidemic 
        in Henan province in the 1990s.\12\ The letter noted 
        that former Henan provincial officials (not named in 
        the letter, but later identified as Li Changchun and Li 
        Keqiang) \13\ never faced legal action and instead were 
        appointed to positions in China's top policymaking 
        organ.\14\ On March 15, without providing a reason, 
        Beijing municipal press and publications officials 
        notified Aizhixing that the organization's Web site had 
        been shut down.\15\
          Chang Kun. On April 4, 2011, authorities in 
        Linquan county, Fuyang municipality, Anhui province, 
        physically injured public health advocate Chang Kun as 
        he presided over an annual meeting of the AIBO Youth 
        Center, a public health education NGO that he 
        founded.\16\ Unidentified ``thugs'' reportedly entered 
        the room while Chang was speaking and ``beat him 
        severely,'' leaving Chang unconscious for several 
        hours.\17\ That morning, authorities had also destroyed 
        his video camera.\18\ The same local authorities who 
        injured Chang reportedly had visited his organization a 
        few days before the conference and destroyed several 
        signs outside his office.\19\
          Hu Jia and Zeng Jinyan. Authorities released 
        prominent HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia from prison on June 
        26, 2011, upon completion of his three-and-a-half-year 
        sentence for ``inciting subversion.'' On her Twitter 
        page, Hu's wife, Zeng Jinyan, reported that the couple 
        would not be able to receive visitors,\20\ indicating 
        that numerous security vehicles were stationed outside 
        their home in Beijing.\21\ Zeng said that she had 
        returned to Beijing on June 19 \22\ after her landlord, 
        citing unidentified pressure, served her a notice of 
        eviction from her apartment in the Shenzhen Special 
        Economic Zone.\23\ According to Zeng, eight security 
        officers escorted her from the airport upon her arrival 
        in Beijing.\24\

                      Health-Based Discrimination


                      discrimination in employment


    China's domestic legislation explicitly forbids 
discriminatory practices in employment.\25\ Nevertheless, 
health-based discrimination, including ``mandatory testing of 
workers [including for infectious diseases], denial of job 
opportunities, forced resignations[,] and restricted access to 
health insurance,'' reportedly remains widespread.\26\ Those 
who experience such discrimination also continue to face 
challenges in seeking legal recourse,\27\ as highlighted by 
health-based discrimination lawsuits this past year in 
Hebei,\28\ Anhui,\29\ and Sichuan \30\ provinces.


                      discrimination in healthcare


    Individuals living with infectious diseases such as HIV/
AIDS continue to face difficulties accessing medical care. 
Reports emerged during this past year indicating that people 
living with HIV/AIDS are, in some cases, refused medical 
treatment at ``mainstream hospitals'' \31\ and instead forced 
to seek treatment at separate infectious disease facilities 
referred to as ``HIV/AIDS hospitals.'' \32\ A joint study 
published in May 2011 by the International Labour Organization 
and the STD and AIDS Prevention and Control Center of the 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention found that 
underlying reasons for the denial of treatment included 
perceived risks to other patients, lack of resources, potential 
loss of profit, and ``poor feasibility of policies and 
mechanisms.'' \33\

                             Mental Health

    In 2001, China ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in doing so committed 
itself to ensuring ``the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.'' \34\ As the Commission reported in its 2010 Annual 
Report, cases of mental illness are prevalent in China, and the 
burden these cases place on the country's under-resourced 
mental healthcare system is significant.\35\ The rate of 
treatment is low,\36\ and officials reportedly continue to 
abuse their power over psychiatric institutions and medical 
professionals by using them as ``tools for detaining people 
deemed a threat to social stability.'' \37\ Against the 
backdrop of these concerns, in October 2010, a court in 
Shandong province ordered compensation for the plaintiff in 
China's first case of misdiagnosed mental illness and 
compulsory psychiatric treatment,\38\ and in June 2011, the 
central government took steps that could improve the 
legislative framework for regulating the mental healthcare 
system.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Draft Mental Health Law Released for Public Comment
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  On June 10, 2011, the State Council Legislative Affairs Office
 announced the release of a draft Mental Health Law for public
 comment.\39\ Officials and experts have reportedly been working on the
 draft for 26 years.\40\ Individuals and organizations across a range of
 civil society sectors reportedly participated in the 30-day public
 comment period, including some individuals \41\ who have experienced
 being ``misidentified as mentally ill'' (bei jingshenbing)--a strategy
 that Chinese officials often use to extralegally detain
 ``troublemakers'' in psychiatric institutions.\42\ In March 2011, top
 government officials announced plans to enact the Mental Health Law by
 the end of the year.\43\ A list of selected highlights from the draft,
 as well as observers' expressed concerns regarding the draft, follows.  Highlights:  Article 3 provides for an integrated approach to prevention,
 treatment, and recovery of those who live with mental illness, placing
 ``prevention as the priority.'' It also provides for the establishment
 of a mechanism for implementing this approach, calling for the
 participation of both government and civil society actors.\44\  Article 4 prohibits infringement on a mentally ill
 individual's human dignity and personal safety and calls for the legal
 protection of the individual's rights to education, work, medical
 treatment, privacy, and help from the state and society.\45\  The legislation outlines procedures for diagnosis and
 admittance for psychiatric treatment, including requirements that
 standards for diagnosis and treatment be determined by the State
 Council health administration department (Article 22); \46\ that
 diagnosis be performed by a practicing psychiatrist (Article 25); \47\
 and that, in cases of involuntary admittance, two or more psychiatrists
 should diagnose the individual, provide a written copy of the diagnosis
 within 72 hours, and notify the individual and the party who brought
 the individual in for diagnosis, which in some cases may include public
 security personnel (Article 26).\48\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Draft Mental Health Law Released for Public Comment-- Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Article 27 requires that admittance for psychiatric treatment
 be voluntary, but includes exceptions for cases in which the individual
 is incapable of recognizing or controlling his own conduct or is in
 danger of harming himself, endangering public safety or the safety of
 others, or disrupting public order.\49\
  Concerns:Aizhixing, a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization, raised
 the following concerns regarding the draft Mental Health Law.\50\  The draft does not clearly state protections for certain basic
 rights of individuals who live with mental illness, particularly the
 rights to legally marry, pursue a divorce, and raise children.
 Reporting and supervision requirements in Articles 12 and 63 also may
 conflict with the protection of an individual's privacy and human
 dignity.\51\  There are remaining questions regarding the protections
 provided for persons involuntarily committed to a mental institution.
 For example, there does not appear to be an upper limit for the amount
 of time a person may be involuntarily institutionalized.\52\  There are remaining questions regarding how an individual or
 guardian can seek legal recourse against a judicial determination of a
 medical diagnosis. The draft also does not make clear whether an
 individual may obtain legal representation to dispute a diagnosis in
 court.\53\  The draft calls for increased surveillance as part of a
 ``mental health monitoring network'' and reporting system (Article 20)
 to prevent major violent outbreaks by persons with mental illness.
 However, the draft does not appear to protect citizens from
 infringement on citizens' rights to privacy and human dignity.\54\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            The Environment

                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government continued to strengthen regulatory efforts to 
address China's serious environmental problems. Inadequate 
access to information, unreliable access to legal remedies, an 
underdeveloped compensation system for individuals and groups 
harmed by pollution, uneven enforcement and lax compliance, 
corruption, and other issues, however, have contributed to the 
continuation of these serious environmental problems and to the 
potential for the infringement of citizens' rights. Chinese 
authorities have taken some steps to improve collection of 
environmental data and to expand ``open environmental 
information,'' but significant challenges remain, especially in 
relation to obtaining information on industrial pollution 
sources. Access to legal remedies also remains a challenge, and 
channels available to citizens to express environmental 
grievances are not always open, contributing to the rise of 
citizen anti-pollution demonstrations. Chinese authorities 
continued to selectively stifle environmental activism and 
environmental grievances or suppress people who were involved 
in or organized collective action to halt perceived 
environmental harms. During this reporting year, citizen 
grievances regarding hydroelectric dam construction, lead 
pollution, chemical plants, and waste incinerator and landfill 
operations were prominently covered in Chinese and foreign 
media.

   Serious Environmental Challenges: Focus on Rural and Heavy Metal 
                               Pollution

    China's environmental problems reportedly remain severe, 
despite some regulatory advances and isolated reductions in a 
limited number of pollutants.\1\ Examples highlight the 
seriousness of these problems and the legal challenges they 
pose. In October 2010, a Chinese research institute completed a 
``Green GDP'' report on the economic impacts of environmental 
pollution in China, which asserts that the economic costs of 
environmental pollution and ecological damage have risen 74.8 
percent over a five-year period from 2004 to 2008, equaling 
about 3 percent of GDP.\2\ In February 2011, a Chinese 
scholarly report revealed that 10 percent of the rice in 
markets in many cities contained cadmium levels above standard; 
soil pollution is seen as the culprit.\3\ In August, it came to 
light that the Luliang Chemicals Company dumped over 140 
truckloads, totaling over 5,200 tons, of hexavalent chromium 
slag in Yunnan province, where it could wash into the Pearl 
River via its tributaries.\4\ The chromium reportedly killed 
fish and livestock and threatens drinking water sources.\5\ The 
dumping case underscores the lack of official transparency and 
reportedly may have involved official complicity, highlighting 
governance problems.\6\ An employee of the plant reportedly 
admitted that the company had dumped or buried over 288 
thousand tons of chromium dregs between 1989 and 2003.\7\ 
Across 12 provinces, there reportedly may be 1 to 1.3 million 
tons of chromium waste (from a variety of sources) not disposed 
of properly, with some dumped in water sources and densely 
populated areas.\8\
    During this reporting year, authorities continued to 
develop regulatory instruments to manage these pollution 
problems. Chinese officials currently have reduction targets 
for only two pollutants but have announced plans to expand this 
to four in the next five-year period (2011-2015).\9\ 
Environmental officials reportedly discussed revisions to the 
Environmental Protection Law, circulated a draft for comment of 
a technical guideline for public participation in environmental 
impact assessment processes, issued the Opinions Regarding 
Initiation of Environmental Pollution Damage Assessment Work, 
which outlines the initial steps toward an environmental 
compensation system, and issued several other relevant laws, 
policies, and measures on environmental issues.\10\
    Over the past year, officials focused on growing rural 
pollution problems, which highlight ongoing challenges in 
applying the laws evenly and in protecting citizens' health, 
especially the health of children and the rural poor. 
Authorities reportedly acknowledged environmental conditions in 
many villages are still severe, partially due to the increasing 
movement of polluting enterprises from urban to village 
areas.\11\ In June 2011, a top environmental official stated 
that environmental protection efforts in rural areas lag far 
behind those in urban areas, the foundation for rural 
environmental management is weak, regulatory standards are 
incomplete, and the ability to monitor problems is 
insufficient.\12\ These problems put the health of rural 
populations at risk. In January 2011, central government 
officials announced long-term plans to address rural pollution 
challenges, primarily relying on the policy of ``using rewards 
to promote control.'' \13\ In June 2011, Chinese news reports 
further described the steps officials said they would take 
during the next five-year period.\14\ The Minister of 
Environmental Protection stated that China would ``work hard'' 
to make initial improvements in rural village environmental 
quality by 2015 and to control prominent environmental problems 
in key villages and townships across the country by 2020.\15\
    Environmental protection officials also prioritized heavy 
metal pollution problems, including lead pollution that is 
linked to cases of lead poisoning involving thousands of 
children in several provinces in 2009 and 2010.\16\ Some of 
these cases involve the violation of citizens' rights.\17\ [See 
Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a 
Cleaner Environment in this section for more information on 
these cases.] In response to the series of lead poisoning 
cases, authorities reportedly released a circular in May 2011 
that outlined steps to address heavy metal pollution, including 
better management and disposal of pollutants, punishment of 
violators, and enhanced transparency.\18\ However, the circular 
does not have the power of a legally binding regulation.\19\ In 
June 2011, environmental authorities launched a special 
campaign to try to reduce heavy metal pollution and asserted 
that they would use their authority to suspend approval of new 
projects in areas where heavy metal pollution cases have 
occurred.\20\ In August, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection reportedly suspended production at 1,015 lead 
battery manufacturing, assembly, and recycling plants and made 
public the names of these plants. Authorities shut down 583 of 
the plants, but the news agency reporting the story did not 
indicate how many of the plants moved production facilities to 
other locations.\21\

  Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a Cleaner 
                              Environment

    Environmental problems, including heavy metal pollution, 
continued to trigger citizen grievances and demands for better 
environmental quality. In June 2011, nearly 1,000 citizens 
blocked a road protesting pollution from a battery plant in 
Heyan city, Guangdong province; one citizen reported that 10 
people were injured in the ensuing conflict between citizens 
and police and that police killed one person.\22\ In August, 
more than 10,000 citizens peacefully protested a chemical plant 
that manufactures paraxylene (PX) in Dalian city, Liaoning 
province, by ``taking a stroll,'' after a typhoon damaged an 
ocean wall protecting the plant, triggering citizen concerns 
about a chemical leak.\23\ Prior to the storm, factory workers, 
reportedly ordered by plant bosses, stopped and beat reporters 
who wanted to investigate possible impacts of a storm on 
chemical storage tanks.\24\ The story of this event reportedly 
was pulled from TV coverage.\25\ Local Communist Party and 
government leaders quickly responded to the protest and 
reportedly put the ``relocation of the plant on the government 
work agenda.'' \26\ One international press report noted that 
the government was considering closing down the plant prior to 
the protests. It also noted that the plant had been approved 
during the term of a previous Party Secretary, speculating that 
the current cohort of authorities may have had political 
motives for allowing such a large demonstration.\27\ 
Nevertheless, the Global Times, which operates under the 
official People's Daily, stated that citizens taking to the 
streets to express their views ``should not be advocated in 
China'' and that ``Chinese society objected'' to the street 
protests as evidenced by the fact that ``[r]eports on this 
incident have not gained much ground in China's mainstream 
media . . . .'' \28\
    Access to legal remedies remains unreliable, contributing 
to citizen protests, despite a growing number of specialized 
environmental courts. In 2010, regular Chinese courts completed 
12,018 environmental pollution compensation cases, an increase 
of 2.83 percent over the previous year.\29\ However, notably, a 
study by a Peking University professor reportedly found that 
courts often refuse to take cases in the name of ``social 
stability.'' \30\ One expert with an international 
environmental organization noted that Chinese lawyers said they 
believe it is more difficult to have an environmental damages 
case accepted by the courts now than in the past.\31\ The same 
expert noted that public supervision via the courts has been 
constrained in recent years, emphasizing that while litigation 
in some cases has driven legal reform or compelled a local 
government to act, it has not been as effective in stopping 
pollution problems or for compelling pollution cleanup.\32\ In 
some cases, the expert noted, litigation has led to 
compensation for citizens, but he pointed out that compensation 
is sometimes difficult to obtain due to evidentiary burdens and 
problems in proving causality.\33\ In some cases, it can be 
difficult to obtain compensation even when a party has been 
ordered to pay it.\34\ One former environmental protection 
official told a reporter that ``[w]ith limited fines and low 
compensation, breaking the law is often cheaper than following 
it . . . .'' \35\ Specialized environmental courts may still 
benefit environmental litigation, although critics reportedly 
believe they have not resolved the challenges of local 
protectionism or judicial independence.\36\ Some of these 
courts, which are growing in number, set local rules providing 
for public interest litigation cases brought by procuratorates, 
environmental agencies, non-government organizations, and 
individuals.\37\ In January 2011, the Kunming Intermediate 
People's Court in Yunnan province awarded approximately 4 
million yuan (US$626,300) compensation for citizens whose 
drinking water had been contaminated in a public interest case 
brought by the Kunming City Environmental Protection Bureau and 
supported by the city procuratorate.\38\ The Commission's 2010 
Annual Report noted a couple of these courts have accepted a 
few cases brought by the All-China Environment Federation 
(ACEF), an environmental group that is overseen by the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection; \39\ the ACEF demonstration cases 
appear to have been the only quasi-NGO or NGO public interest 
cases accepted by the courts.
    In some cases, officials suppressed citizen demands for a 
cleaner environment. The study by the Peking University 
professor reportedly found that criminal liability for 
pollution is rarely enforced and that in many cases, citizens 
exposed to environmental harms have little access to legal 
remedies and may resort to violence to pressure the polluter to 
act.\40\ Further, the study pointed out that those who use 
violence to protest pollution are often prosecuted.\41\ Some 
recent incidents of official suppression of largely peaceful 
citizen demands for a cleaner environment include the 
following:

          According to a June 2011 Human Rights Watch 
        Report, local officials in four provinces--Henan, 
        Hunan, Shaanxi, and Yunnan--in recent years ``imposed 
        arbitrary limits on access to blood lead testing; 
        refused appropriate treatment to children and adults 
        with critically high lead levels; withheld and failed 
        to explain test results showing unaccountable 
        improvements in lead levels; and denied the scope and 
        severity of lead poisoning.'' \42\ Other sources 
        provide additional information on cases in Hunan and 
        Shaanxi.\43\ Parents reportedly stated that local 
        police threatened some people who tried to obtain 
        information and detained or arrested individuals 
        protesting against polluting factories or seeking help 
        for their sick children.\44\ In addition, journalists, 
        including one foreign reporter, indicated they had been 
        harassed when they tried to report on some of the lead 
        poisoning cases.\45\
          In October 2010, over 1,000 citizens in 
        Pingnan county, Ningde city, Fujian province, signed a 
        collective petition complaining about pollution from a 
        local landfill facility \46\ following a protest that 
        resulted in the detention of four citizens.\47\ After 
        receiving no response from local government officials, 
        five village representatives took the collective 
        petition to the provincial government office of letters 
        and visits.\48\ County officials intercepted and 
        detained the representatives on suspicion of 
        ``disrupting social order.'' \49\ Their detention 
        triggered a protest by village residents.\50\ News 
        reports do not provide additional information on those 
        detained.
          In late 2010, authorities allegedly beat and 
        detained 17 persons who participated in protests or who 
        petitioned against proposed mining operations in Rikaze 
        (Shigatse) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region 
        (TAR).\51\ Also in late 2010, authorities detained over 
        20 Tibetans, some briefly, for their protest or 
        petitioning activities against a construction team said 
        to have a mining permit.\52\ In August 2010, officials 
        reportedly fired upon a group of 100 Tibetans and 
        possibly killed one to four citizens. They were 
        protesting gold-mining operations in Ganzi (Kardze) 
        Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, 
        because of the harmful environmental effects. 
        Authorities also reportedly detained 35 Tibetans in 
        this case.\53\ In July 2011, authorities in Zuogong 
        (Dzogang) county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, 
        reportedly detained about 50 Tibetans because they 
        protested mining activities.\54\ Authorities reportedly 
        warned citizens that protest activities would be 
        considered ``politically motivated.'' Officials 
        detained the ``village officials'' who traveled to 
        Lhasa, the TAR capital, to ``protest'' the mining and 
        the other detentions, as well as the alleged protest 
        ``ringleaders.'' \55\ [See Section V--Tibet for more 
        information on these incidents.]
          In May 2011, citizens and police clashed in a 
        large-scale conflict involving as many as 10,000 \56\ 
        residents in a village in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, 
        after residents gathered to protest the operation of a 
        waste incinerator that they have opposed since 2007 
        because they claim to have been tricked into accepting 
        it.\57\ Authorities reportedly injured several citizens 
        and took a few residents into custody,\58\ although 
        reports do not provide further information on those 
        detained.
          In June 2011, Mongol herders in Bayannuur 
        city, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, shut down the 
        water pump to a lead mine, which had expanded into 
        grazing land, after ``repeatedly petitioning the 
        government.'' \59\ Some protesters set up traditional 
        tents outside of government offices for nearly two 
        weeks.\60\ The herders believed the mine was polluting 
        the environment and endangering their health.\61\ The 
        local government sent more than 50 riot police to the 
        scene, and they reportedly beat and detained many of 
        the protesters.\62\ A group of 600 herders reportedly 
        sought compensation for pollution linked to the 
        mine.\63\ The mine reportedly agreed to compensate the 
        group with 1.2 million yuan (US$188,000), and the 
        herders ended their protest.\64\ News stories do not 
        provide further details regarding the herders detained 
        by police. The demonstration followed herder protests 
        in May linked to the death of a herder at the hands of 
        a mine worker.\65\ [See Section II--Ethnic Minority 
        Rights for more information on the May protests.]

  Hydroelectric Dam and Water Project Construction: Rights and Safety 
                             Controversies

    Increasing reliance on renewable energy and reducing 
China's carbon dioxide and other air pollutant emissions are 
among the reasons Chinese authorities cite for escalating the 
construction of hydroelectric dams.\66\ Some of these projects 
reportedly continue to raise safety concerns and include 
forcible relocation practices. To date, China has constructed 
25,800 large dams, and the associated land requisition projects 
reportedly have led to the relocation of more than 10 million 
people.\67\ Central-level authorities announced in early 2011 
that development of hydropower, including the controversial 
series of dams along the Nu River (Salween River), is a 
``must.'' \68\ Local officials rapidly built many smaller 
hydroelectric projects along the Nu River that did not need 
State Council approval over the past two years, some of which 
are in areas of relative geological instability, leading to 
heightened concerns among experts and citizens.\69\ In May 
2011, Xinhua reported that the State Council had recognized 
``urgent'' problems associated with the Three Gorges Dam.\70\ 
During the same month, the State Council Standing Committee 
passed a plan to address these issues.\71\ Estimates of the 
number of people resettled because of the Three Gorges Dam so 
far range from 1.4 million to 4 million.\72\ There have been 
numerous reports of infringements on the rights of populations 
affected by the Three Gorges Dam, including an attack on 
activist Fu Xiancai that left him paralyzed.\73\ Additional 
areas with reports of forced resettlement practices include 
Fujian, Hunan, and Yunnan provinces.\74\ In some cases, these 
resettlement practices triggered citizen protests. For example, 
in March 2011, as many as 2,000 to 3,000 citizens reportedly 
blocked roads to protest compensation levels for their homes 
and farmland in Suijiang county, Zhaotong prefecture, Yunnan 
province, to make way for the Xiangjiaba Dam along the Yangtze 
River.\75\ Authorities reportedly administratively detained 
several men for two weeks in what appeared to be punishment for 
participating in the demonstrations.\76\ Central authorities 
acknowledged problems with compensation schemes, and the PRC 
Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and 
Social Development (12th Five-Year Plan) notes intended reforms 
to the land requisition system, including shrinking ``the scope 
of requisitioned land, and increas[ing] the compensation 
standard for requisitioned land.'' \77\
    The relocation of some of the 330,000 people relocated in 
Hubei and Henan provinces to make way for the central route of 
the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, which is slated for 
completion in 2014 and will divert water from China's southern 
regions to dryer northern regions,\78\ so far reportedly has 
involved less forcible practices. The relocation projects, 
however, have already triggered a protest and citizen 
grievances. According to an international non-governmental 
organization report released in August 2010, authorities 
utilized persuasion rather than physical force in some citizen 
relocation projects in Danjiangkou city, Hubei province, which 
the report described as an improvement from the practices 
employed in Three Gorges Dam relocations. The government 
employees who were responsible for persuading people to 
relocate, however, reportedly were required to live among the 
villagers and were not permitted to return home until the 
villagers all agreed to relocate.\79\ News reports indicate the 
project has already triggered a multi-day villager protest in 
Qianjiang city, Hubei province; \80\ led to complaints by 
relocated farmers about inadequate compensation,\81\ poor job 
prospects, and unprofitable land; \82\ and triggered at least 
one instance in which officials threatened citizens who took 
their grievances to higher levels.\83\ In addition, the central 
route of the relocation project reportedly generated claims of 
dishonest officials and corruption, as well as additional 
citizen hardships.\84\

          Environmental Transparency and Public Participation

    Central and some local Chinese environmental protection 
officials have taken steps to improve environmental 
transparency, but regular disclosure of information remains a 
problem. Central authorities took a positive step when they 
reportedly acknowledged the link between pollution in the Huai 
River basin and the high number of cancerous tumors found in 
residents along the river.\85\ According to its 2010 annual 
work report, the Ministry of Environmental Protection received 
226 requests for information in 2010, an increase of 205 
percent.\86\ The report does not indicate how many requests 
were granted or denied, only that the ministry responded to 
every request, except one which was still in process.\87\ The 
ministry received 25 requests for administrative 
reconsideration.\88\ A joint Chinese-international study 
released in December 2010 found that there had been some 
improvement in awareness of the need for transparency on the 
part of government officials but that more efforts are 
necessary to translate this awareness into regular disclosure 
of information.\89\ The study also found that the types of 
information hardest for researchers to obtain included 
``list(s) of polluting enterprises whose pollutant discharge 
exceeds national or local standards, list(s) of enterprises 
with major or serious environmental pollution accidents or 
incidents, and list(s) of enterprises refusing to carry out 
effective environmental administrative penalties.'' \90\ The 
results of a second joint study by Chinese and international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on open environmental 
information in 113 cities released in December 2010 noted 
overall improvement in information disclosure from 2009 to 2010 
but also noted that some cities' disclosure performance 
declined.\91\ Eleven cities (9.73 percent) earned ``passing'' 
scores of 60 or above in 2009-2010, an increase from four 
cities (3.54 percent) in 2008.\92\ The study noted that ``many 
facilities in violation of emissions and clean production 
standards failed to publicly disclose emissions data as 
required by law.'' \93\
    During this reporting period, environmental groups have 
utilized environmental open government information procedures 
to obtain information, although barriers to transparency 
continue. A December 2010 article by a Chinese author noted 
that at least 35 organizations joined an ongoing campaign 
promoting green consumption and that these NGOs had requested 
information on polluting factories.\94\ Over 300 enterprises 
reportedly responded to the requests by explaining the reasons 
for the pollution problems, and 50 of those companies consented 
to ``third-party audits'' by NGOs.\95\ Administrative 
provisions, however, remain a major obstacle to transparency as 
environmental protection authorities use them as the basis for 
restricting information disclosure.\96\ Authorities refused to 
grant information in two recent environmental information 
disclosure cases discussed in the Chinese media. In the first 
case, the Ministry of Agriculture refused a 2011 request for 
information about the downsizing of a national nature reserve 
along the Yangtze River because it involved ``procedural 
information.'' \97\ In the second case, local environmental 
officials in Hai'an county, Nantong prefecture, Jiangsu 
province, denied a 2011 request regarding a waste incinerator, 
reportedly responding that they had ``already approved an 
environmental impact assessment'' for the project. The lawyer 
who submitted the request on behalf of an environmental group 
reportedly noted that ``this answer was unrelated to the 
information requested.'' \98\ In May, the lawyer filed an 
administrative reconsideration request to the environmental 
protection bureau at the next highest level.\99\
    Chinese citizens and experts have expressed concern over 
the perceived lack of transparency and the potential risks 
associated with the rapid development of nuclear power 
projects. The nuclear disaster in Japan in March 2011 appeared 
to embolden Chinese citizens and experts to speak out about 
safety concerns.\100\ For example, a noted Chinese scientist 
stated that China is ``seriously unprepared, especially on the 
safety front,'' for speedy development of nuclear plants.\101\ 
The disaster also prompted Chinese officials to conduct a 
safety review of currently operating and planned nuclear power 
plants.\102\ In June, a Ministry of Environmental Protection 
vice minister announced that officials had found all of China's 
13 operating nuclear reactors were safe.\103\ The Chinese 
government reportedly will adhere to its current medium- and 
long-term plans for nuclear power development.\104\ Chinese 
authorities are reportedly considering a new nuclear energy law 
\105\ that one researcher notes could spur transparency in 
China's nuclear power industry.\106\


            public participation and environmental outcomes


    Environmental protection remains a sector in which central 
authorities state a need for greater public participation but 
within the confines of state control. In December 2010, the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection passed a guiding opinion, 
which states that China needs to further expand efforts to 
cultivate and guide environmental social organizations, as well 
as further strengthen relations and cooperation between the 
government and social organizations.\107\ The opinion requires 
environmental social organizations that want to engage in 
cooperative projects with foreign non-governmental entities to 
report to foreign affairs departments for ``examination and 
approval.'' \108\ In addition, the opinion also stipulates that 
various levels of environmental departments must ``strengthen 
political thought construction'' (sixiang zhengzhi jianshe) of 
environmental social organizations.\109\
    This past year, authorities' responsiveness to citizen 
environmental grievances varied across the country. One case 
that highlights the influence of environmental groups involves 
the shuttering and relocation of a polluting chemical plant in 
Qiugang village, Bengbu municipality, Anhui province.\110\ 
Residents unsuccessfully utilized the court system over a 
period of years to find relief from pollution associated with 
nearby chemical plants but then worked with an environmental 
group to utilize alternative ways to bring pressure on 
officials to act.\111\ Local officials relocated one of the 
main polluting plants, although the site still requires a large 
cleanup effort.\112\ Another case involves a waste incineration 
plant in Beijing municipality. A Chinese newspaper reported in 
February 2011 that authorities in Haidian district, Beijing, 
cancelled construction of the incinerator reportedly because of 
its environmental impacts, citizen protests, and its close 
proximity to ``high-end residential complexes.'' \113\ In 
addition, authorities in Dalian municipality, Liaoning 
province, responded quickly to the more than 10,000 people who 
protested a paraxylene (PX) plant in the city.\114\ In 
contrast, in May, in Panyu district, Guangzhou municipality, 
Guangdong province, 5,000 citizens signed a petition to voice 
opposition to five incinerators. Authorities, however, counted 
the petition only as ``one opposition vote'' because the 
citizens did not provide their addresses and phone numbers on 
the petition.\115\ [See Access to Justice and Suppression of 
Citizen Demands for a Cleaner Environment in this section for 
more examples of less responsive authorities in pollution 
cases.]

     Challenges of Enforcement, Compliance, and Official Corruption

    Uneven implementation and enforcement of environmental laws 
and regulations, along with non-compliance and corruption, 
remain significant challenges for the development of rule of 
law in the environmental sector, including in relation to 
environmental impact assessments. In September 2010, a study 
done by a Peking University professor reportedly noted that 
officials face difficulties in enforcing legal sanctions, that 
environmental criminal law remains weak, and that often a law's 
overall objectives contradict the articles within the law.\116\ 
In addition, news reports indicated high levels of bribery and 
corruption among officials in ecological and environmental 
protection during the first six months of 2010.\117\ A 2010 
international study found that enforcement of pollution 
standards varied across time and location in China for a 
variety of reasons, including the level of support from central 
authorities, public pressure, the level of commitment of local 
government officials, enforcement capacity, the characteristics 
of businesses, and the economic context.\118\ In August 2011, 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) announced at 
least two special programs to ``supervise'' seven sewage plants 
across China because they turned off their systems ``without 
good reason'' and eight power plants across China for 
fabricating emissions monitoring data.\119\ In June, five non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) sent a letter to the MEP 
noting that the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences 
(CAMS) had given a ``grade A environmental impact assessment'' 
to a waste incineration plant and reportedly had ``falsified 
public feedback.'' The letter urged officials to reject the 
environmental impact assessment (EIA), investigate and fine 
CAMS, and reform the EIA system.\120\ The Hebei Provincial 
Environmental Protection Bureau had previously revoked a 
different CAMS EIA in May for ``fabricated public feedback.'' 
\121\ One report suggests that of the 68 hydropower projects 
approved by local authorities in Zhouqu (Drugchu) county, 
Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, 
67 had not undergone an EIA or geological assessment.\122\ In 
August, one Chinese newspaper article outlined several alleged 
problems with the current EIA system, including low penalties 
for construction companies that break the law, EIA 
organizations' lack of integrity, difficulties in getting 
public information on EIAs, and the symbolic nature of public 
participation.\123\ One Chinese expert notes that ``it is more 
common in China for the public wish to participate in 
environmental impact assessments to be thwarted.'' \124\ An 
international NGO noted that a Chinese scholar reported that 
there are times when local government officials will protect 
polluting businesses.\125\ A December 2010 joint Chinese and 
international report noted that from 2009 to 2010, ``[l]ocal 
environmental protection bureaus often failed to impose any 
fines or take other actions in response as required by law.'' 
\126\ For example, in Shaanxi province, local environmental 
protection bureau personnel on several occasions reportedly 
agreed to an electric power company's requests for a delay in 
execution of penalties for commencing regular operations 
without first gaining environmental approvals.\127\

          Climate Change: Rule of Law and Public Participation

    China's efforts to address climate change relate to the 
development of the rule of law in China, the incorporation of 
public participation in policy processes, and cases of rights 
infringement. China surpassed the United States to become the 
world's top emitter of carbon dioxide in 2007 \128\ and 
reportedly may become responsible for one-third to one-half of 
the world's carbon dioxide emissions by 2030.\129\ Top 
officials reportedly consider China to be vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change \130\ and during this reporting year 
undertook a variety of actions \131\ and laid out plans \132\ 
to address the issue, including engaging in cooperative 
programs with the United States.\133\ Chinese leaders signed 
the UN Cancun Agreements in December 2010,\134\ but as a 
developing country, China is not bound to reduce greenhouse 
gases under relevant international climate change 
agreements.\135\ Nevertheless, domestically, Chinese leaders 
included a carbon dioxide intensity reduction target of 17 
percent in the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on 
National Economic and Social Development.\136\ In addition, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) reportedly 
established a working group to draft a climate change law,\137\ 
for which officials sought public comments between March and 
September 2011.\138\ Despite the call for public input, the 
lack of transparency hinders public participation in climate 
change policy processes.\139\ While in general, participation 
in policy processes is minimal,\140\ citizens do engage in some 
activities addressing climate change. For example, 60 NGOs 
reportedly organized 20 events surrounding the NGO side event 
at the UN Climate Change Conference in Tianjin municipality and 
published a position paper on Chinese NGOs' response to climate 
change, among other projects.\141\ In recent years, citizen 
protests reportedly took place in Shanxi and Liaoning 
provinces, as well as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 
because of the lack of public input and the land requisition 
practices associated with experimental carbon capture projects 
to help mitigate carbon dioxide emissions in industrial 
processes.\142\ [For additional cases of policies to promote 
use of renewable energy sources to address climate change that 
can be linked to cases of rights infringement, see 
Hydroelectric Dam and Water Project Construction: Rights and 
Safety Controversies in this section.]

           Data Reliability and Transparency: Climate Change

    Chinese leaders have pledged to improve data reliability 
and transparency related to energy and climate change. 
Nevertheless, they reportedly face significant challenges, such 
as obtaining from provinces comprehensive statistics on coal, 
transportation energy, coal-bed methane, biomass, and clean 
energy sectors.\143\ China is reportedly still developing the 
institutions and capacity to evaluate energy figures provided 
by provincial governments, some of which may have incentives to 
provide false information.\144\ Authorities specified in the 
PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and 
Social Development the intention to establish a greenhouse gas 
emissions statistical accounting system,\145\ which could 
improve data collection if implemented. In October 2010, a 
high-level NDRC official stated that China would begin 
greenhouse gas inventory pilot projects in provinces and cities 
and develop a publicly available greenhouse gas inventory 
database.\146\ Chinese leaders have indicated they would 
continue to rely on domestic monitoring, reporting, and 
verification of China's greenhouse gas emissions and reduction 
data in relation to projects using domestic financing and 
technology.\147\ They reportedly stated their willingness to 
share this information with the international community \148\ 
and to do their utmost to improve transparency.\149\

                  III. Development of the Rule of Law

                             Civil Society

                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government continued to tighten control over civil society 
organizations (CSOs) in part because of concern over ``social 
stability'' in the midst of international attention surrounding 
Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and the political upheavals 
in the Middle East. Authorities harassed and, in many cases, 
detained individuals that officials deemed to be threats to 
``social stability''; raided the offices and shut down the Web 
site of at least one organization that conducted activities and 
projects that officials considered to be politically sensitive; 
continued to impose controls over the receipt of foreign 
funding; and held ``consultations'' with ``troublesome'' 
students. Though several localities, including Beijing, have 
introduced reform experiments aimed at simplifying the legal 
registration process for some CSOs,\1\ something that the 
southern Chinese city of Shenzhen, a special economic zone, had 
initiated during the previous reporting year, it is too early 
to assess whether such reforms will succeed in broadening the 
space for the development of civil society. Some experts on 
Chinese civil society, however, have noted that the latest 
reforms could strengthen government control over which types of 
CSOs are allowed to operate in the country as part of an 
official effort to ``manage'' and ``guide'' the development of 
civil society.

                               Background

    As the number of CSOs in China grows, their impact 
continues to be evident. Official government statistics 
indicate that the number of registered groups increased from 
288,000 in 2004 to approximately 447,000 in the first quarter 
of 2011.\2\ Nevertheless, unofficial estimates for the total 
number of groups, including unregistered grassroots 
organizations, range from 2 to 8 million.\3\ CSOs in China 
address a wide array of social issues, such as HIV/AIDS, 
women's rights, worker rights, and environmental concerns. For 
example, one CSO that focuses on labor issues has reportedly 
worked with an enterprise to help prepare migrants to adjust to 
life as factory workers in urban areas.\4\ Some organizations 
focus primarily on women's rights issues, such as providing 
practical skills training for migrant women and legal aid to 
those in need.\5\ In October 2010, a few Chinese CSOs jointly 
organized events to highlight environmental concerns and 
published a position paper addressing ``the civil society 
response to climate change.'' \6\ In November 2010, four CSOs 
released a joint statement warning that a new regulation on the 
management of persons with mental illness in Zhejiang province 
could lead to serious human rights abuses.\7\ In addition, at 
present, there are reportedly at least 100 CSOs in China 
dedicated to providing support to people living with HIV/AIDS; 
some of these organizations distribute educational pamphlets 
and promote the use of condoms.\8\
    Still, many Chinese officials hold conflicting views of 
civil society organizations (CSOs). While acknowledging that 
CSOs serve a necessary and helpful function as mediating 
mechanisms between the government and society, Chinese 
authorities also look upon many groups with suspicion, fearing 
that ``Western countries have used non-governmental 
organizations extensively . . . to intervene in the internal 
affairs of other countries, create turmoil, and even subvert 
the regimes of the host countries.'' \9\ China, one Chinese 
scholar warned, ``has to be vigilant about [Western 
intervention].'' \10\ As such, Chinese authorities allowed many 
CSOs that focus on providing basic social services to operate 
freely, and forcibly closed some that tried to form networks or 
carry out projects that the government considers to be 
``politically sensitive.'' A former editor of the China 
Development Brief, an online newsletter which focuses on 
Chinese civil society, explained, one never knows ``where the 
line is, and it does shift''--for it is ``civil society with 
Chinese characteristics,'' where groups are ``light, not 
antagonistic and not pushing the envelope too far.'' \11\
    The Chinese government's actions to harass and tighten 
control over CSOs operating in China contravene Chinese law and 
international conventions. China's Constitution states that 
``citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of 
speech . . . of assembly, of association . . . .'' \12\ Article 
22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides that:

          Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
        association with others . . . no restrictions may be 
        placed on the exercise of this right other than those 
        which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in 
        a democratic society in the interests of national 
        security or public safety . . . .\13\

                Legal Framework and Government Controls

    The Chinese government imposes strict registration 
requirements for civil society organizations (CSOs). Under the 
1998 Regulations for Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations, an individual who wishes to organize a CSO in 
China must first obtain a sponsorship agreement from a 
government administration department in a relevant ``trade, 
scientific or other professional area'' at the appropriate 
level of government, at the county level or above, before 
registering with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA).\14\ 
Groups that wish to operate locally must register with the 
corresponding local government administrative departments and 
local MCA units and those that wish to operate nationally must 
register with national departments and the MCA. In their role 
as sponsoring agencies, the public administration departments 
are charged with supervising the CSOs that they register, 
including ``record keeping with respect to establishment, 
modification, and closure of social organizations,'' completing 
annual reviews of the organizations, and ``applying 
disciplinary sanctions to organizations which fail to comply'' 
with MCA regulations.\15\
    Such a dual management process has presented problems for 
various groups, as permission to organize is difficult to 
obtain from local sponsors who are sometimes reluctant to take 
on the burdens of supervisory responsibilities.\16\ Groups that 
fail to obtain permission to organize are not protected under 
the law, and often face difficulties gaining trust among the 
general public.\17\ Many experts conclude that the cumbersome 
dual management requirement has had a chilling effect on 
Chinese civil society.\18\ During the 2011 reporting year, the 
Commission monitored the continued difficulties that CSOs face 
as they operate without official registration status. Some 
unregistered CSOs perform their services under dangerous 
circumstances, occasionally in the aftermath of natural 
disasters, and volunteers working under these organizations 
have reportedly been injured or even killed.\19\ In these 
instances, as one Chinese grassroots CSO worker explained, many 
CSOs working in difficult situations are unable to receive help 
from local governments since, without registration papers, 
local officials ``cannot identify which groups are genuinely 
providing compassionate [services] and which groups are using 
compassionate [services] as a pretext for illicit activities.'' 
\20\
    In other cases, some CSOs conducting services that the 
Chinese government considers to be politically sensitive 
attempt to avoid official government registration requirements 
by registering as ``commercial entities'' rather than as CSOs 
subject to the Chinese government's targeted oversight, even 
though registering as ``commercial entities'' means that these 
groups are subject to different tax schemes than government-
registered CSOs.\21\ These groups risk becoming targets for 
harassment, as in the case of the Beijing Aizhixing Institute 
(Aizhixing), a public health advocacy organization founded by 
public health researcher Wan Yanhai in 1994, or even closure, 
as the Open Constitution Initiative, or Gongmeng, experienced 
in 2009.\22\
    In Aizhixing's case, authorities from the domestic security 
unit of the Beijing Public Security Bureau and the local 
taxation bureau entered the organization's offices in December 
2010 and took with them ``three large suitcases full of 
documents'' as part of an inspection into Aizhixing's 
compliance with tax regulations.\23\ Authorities took materials 
with financial and project information, some dating back to 
2002, including funding agreements (with attachments and 
financial and donor work reports), account books and vouchers, 
financial and audit reports, documents related to Aizhixing's 
property and taxes, and bank statements.\24\ On March 11, 2011, 
Beijing officials demanded that Aizhixing remove from its Web 
site a letter addressed to President Hu Jintao from Chen 
Bingzhong, a former senior Chinese health official. In the 
letter, Chen called on the government to reveal information and 
hold accountable the officials who were reportedly responsible 
for the blood transfusion scandal that took place in Henan 
province in the 1990s, in which tens of thousands of people 
were reportedly infected with HIV.\25\ The letter specifically 
pointed out that two former high-ranking Henan provincial 
officials, Li Changchun and Li Keqiang, never faced any legal 
actions, and later received appointments to the highest 
policymaking institution in China, the Communist Party 
Political Bureau Standing Committee.\26\ In response to the 
request to remove the letter, Aizhixing asked the Beijing 
officials to demonstrate the legal basis for their demand. On 
March 15, 2011, without providing a reason, the Beijing 
municipal news department notified Aizhixing that Aizhixing's 
Web site had been shut down.\27\
    On April 4, 2011, authorities in Linquan county, Anhui 
province, physically injured public health advocate Chang Kun, 
as he presided over an annual meeting of the AIBO Youth Center, 
an organization that he founded in May 2010 to ``provide a 
place for students to gather and also act as a venue for 
carrying out health, human rights, policy, and internet freedom 
education projects,'' according to Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders.\28\ One of Chang's contacts in the United States 
recounted that ``thugs broke into the room where Chang was 
speaking, knocked him from the podium and beat him severely.'' 
\29\ Chang reportedly was unconscious for a few hours after the 
beating.\30\ The same local authorities who injured Chang 
reportedly visited his organization a few days before the 
conference and destroyed several signs outside of his office as 
well as his video camera.\31\
    During this reporting year, a number of Chinese media 
organizations reportedly received a ``propaganda directive'' 
from the Communist Party Central Propaganda Department 
instructing them to avoid using the term ``civil society'' 
(gongmin shehui).\32\ Media outlets that received the notice 
reportedly included the Southern Metropolitan Daily, Southern 
Weekend, and the 21st Century Business Herald.\33\ Though some 
Chinese officials hold a generally suspicious view of civil 
society groups and their potential to challenge the 
government's authority,\34\ the specific reasons, rationale, 
and geographic reach of such a reported ban remain unclear in 
this instance, and it is difficult to ascertain the 
effectiveness of such a ban if propaganda authorities did, 
indeed, pursue its implementation fully.\35\ The China Media 
Project, an organization based at the University of Hong Kong 
that analyzes media trends in China, noted in a January 2011 
analysis that the term ``civil society'' continued to appear in 
various publications after the reported release of the ban, but 
the People's Daily has apparently made no reference to it since 
April 2009.\36\ Some Chinese publications, according to the 
China Media Project's analysis, attempted to circumvent the 
reported ban by using the term ``public society'' (gonggong 
shehui) instead of ``civil society'' (gongmin shehui).\37\

          Funding Difficulties and Proposed Regulatory Changes

    During this reporting year, Chinese academics, 
representatives of NGOs and foundations, and media reports 
continued to emphasize the need to expand the space for 
charitable foundations to develop in China.\38\ At present, 
there are 2,243 foundations in China,\39\ and they are 
classified as either ``private'' (fei gongmu jijin hui) or 
``public'' (gongmu jijin hui) foundations. ``Private'' 
foundations are not permitted to solicit donations through 
public fundraising activities, and media sources indicate that 
they continue to face operational hardships.\40\ ``Private'' 
foundations may become ``public'' foundations, which are 
permitted to solicit donations through public fundraising 
activities, only if they can find government department 
sponsors and meet other required criteria, including specific 
levels of operating funds--reportedly 8 million yuan 
(US$1,236,000) for foundations to operate at the national level 
and 4 million (US$618,000) at the municipal level.\41\ 
Practically speaking, however, as one China Daily article 
reported, many foundations find it difficult to find sponsors 
``willing to take responsibility for them,'' and, for overseas 
charities operating in China, ``99 percent of [them] . . . do 
not have legal identity because no government department wants 
to be affiliated with them.'' \42\ The lack of transparency 
reportedly has also posed problems in the charity sector, as 
donors have complained that, at times, not enough information 
is available on how the funds were appropriated.\43\
    In part as a response to concerns over the difficulties 
that foundations face in raising funds and questions over their 
operational transparency, among others, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (MCA) has reportedly drafted revisions to the 2004 
Regulation on the Management of Foundations (Foundations 
Regulations).\44\ No information is available on when these 
revisions will be issued, but one Chinese media source reported 
that it would be sometime before the end of 2011.\45\ 
Additional Chinese media reports indicate that the proposed 
regulations would:

          Abolish the ``dual management'' system 
        governing foundations and allow private foundations to 
        register directly with local MCA departments; \46\
          Require foundations to submit to audits by 
        the MCA; \47\
          Make clear that both donors and the public 
        share the same right to be able to ``inquire'' about a 
        foundation's use of donations; \48\
          Forbid foundations from increasing their 
        total investments by more than 10 percent of the 
        foundation's total assets from the end of the previous 
        year (Article 40); \49\
          Require private foundations to derive at 
        least 70 percent of a given year's total donations from 
        the foundation's ``primary benefactor'' (Article 37); 
        \50\ and
          Prohibit foundations from ``providing 
        financial aid to unregistered NGOs, cooperating with 
        unregistered NGOs on development programs, and 
        absorbing new members'' (Article 47).\51\

    Some private foundations and scholars have reportedly 
expressed concerns about the revisions. In particular, they 
believe that Article 37 would restrict their ability to develop 
and tie them down to the primary benefactor, thereby 
restricting their independence.\52\ Others have pointed out 
that Article 40 would compel the top 100 foundations in China 
to cut their investments by at least half.\53\ In addition, 
some foundations argue that the restrictions delineated in 
Article 47 would ``cut off the artery of support'' for the 
estimated 1 to 8 million CSOs operating in ``gray zones''--many 
of which depend on foundations for funding.\54\
    The Legislative Affairs Office (LAO) of the State Council 
is also reportedly reviewing a draft of a national charities 
law.\55\ While a complete draft does not appear to be available 
publicly--thus making it difficult to assess its scope and 
potential effectiveness--the China Daily has described several 
elements of the pending law's content.\56\ In July 2010, the 
LAO reportedly released a ``structure'' of the draft, revealing 
that the proposed legislation, which reportedly has three main 
goals, would: \57\

          Adjust the tax deduction and registration 
        systems to give charities a more open and ``regular'' 
        operating space; \58\
          ``Confine the power and responsibility of the 
        government'' in order to maintain the ``voluntary and 
        civil positions in the charity sector''; \59\ and
          ``Request'' that charities are managed in a 
        more ``public and transparent way'' in order to enhance 
        their credibility.'' \60\

    Director Zhu Weiguo of the LAO revealed that defining the 
concept of charity is difficult, and that a number of issues 
must be researched regarding ``charity organizations, charity 
fundraising, charity volunteer services, charity trusts, 
charity taxation systems, and the credibility and transparency 
of charities.'' \61\ Zhu also asserted that the primary actors 
in charities should be civilians and not government officials, 
and stipulated that the draft law on charities must clearly 
distinguish the roles of government, industry, and society in 
philanthropic work.\62\

                  Limited Reform in Several Localities

    During this reporting year, the Commission monitored 
official statements and media reports indicating that Beijing 
and Shanghai municipalities have introduced measures to 
``create a new model of development'' for civil society 
organizations (CSOs) and to ease registration difficulties.\63\ 
The regulatory changes appear to reflect elements in the PRC 
Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and 
Social Development (12th Five-Year Plan).\64\ In particular, 
Chapter 39 of the 12th Five-Year Plan delineates the 
government's goal to ``improve social organization 
management,'' and establish a sound social organization 
management system featuring unified registration\65\ and to 
``give priority to developing economic [organizations], public 
interest charity [organizations], civilian-run non-enterprise 
units, and urban and rural community social organizations.'' 
\66\ One media report stated that, beginning in February 2011, 
four types of CSOs in Beijing would be allowed to ``register 
directly with the MCA.'' \67\ The four types include groups 
that carry out commercial, charity, social welfare, and social 
services activities.\68\ The report also mentioned the MCA's 
goal to establish and improve the registration and management 
systems, enhance its supervision over the daily activities and 
management of CSOs, and perfect the CSOs' practices on 
information disclosure as well as their public commitment.\69\
    In addition, Shanghai municipal government officials signed 
the Cooperative Agreement To Formally Initiate the Building of 
a National Model Civil Administration (Shanghai-MCA Agreement) 
in July 2010,\70\ an agreement that, according to one scholar 
on Chinese civil society, may ``establish a friendlier 
environment for registration of CSOs'' in Shanghai.\71\ The MCA 
document addressing the changes in Shanghai stated that, as the 
foreground of China's reform and opening up, the city has a 
responsibility and the capacity to be the ``front guard of 
civil affairs reform and innovation.'' \72\ As such, the 
document indicated that the city will ``launch a new `one-stop 
shop' method of government service'' and ``construct a system 
for the government to purchase services from social 
organizations.'' \73\ Another government document, released by 
the Shanghai municipal government on July 5, 2011, described 
eight general areas of cooperation between Shanghai and the MCA 
as delineated in the Shanghai-MCA Agreement.\74\ The document 
stated that the Shanghai government would establish a 
``scientific mechanism'' for social assistance; promote 
``general benefit-type social welfare and charity 
undertakings''; reform the community management system and 
service mechanism; create innovative models for the development 
of CSOs; advance the building of a modern system of social 
work; enhance the management of social affairs and standard of 
social services; strengthen modern technology and its standard 
applications; and refine mechanisms to ensure advances in 
modern civil administration.\75\
    The changes in Beijing and Shanghai appear to mirror 
developments in the Shenzhen special economic zone, where in 
July 2009 the Shenzhen government and the MCA signed the 
Cooperative Agreement on Pushing Forward With Integrated 
Reforms to Civil Affairs Undertakings (Shenzhen-MCA Agreement). 
As the Commission detailed in its 2010 annual report, the 
Shenzhen-MCA Agreement delineates a deepening of reforms 
concerning the registration and management of social 
organizations.\76\ It calls for Shenzhen to ``take the lead in 
experimenting with some of the MCA's major reform projects and 
measures,'' and to ``explore establishing a system whereby 
civil society organizations apply and register directly with 
the [MCA].'' \77\ According to one study, of the 81 CSOs 
registered in Shenzhen from January to September 2010, 42 
reportedly registered directly with the MCA.\78\

                 ``Guiding'' Civil Society Development

    Some experts on Chinese civil society in China and abroad 
have cautioned that the latest reform efforts, while helpful to 
many grassroots organizations providing various kinds of social 
services, could also strengthen government control over which 
types of CSOs are allowed to operate in the country. An editor 
of a domestic Chinese magazine that focuses on civil society 
told a Hong Kong newspaper that ``while there will be more 
social areas available for non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to take part in, these NGOs must also have a better 
relationship with the government and follow government 
leadership.'' \79\ Another Chinese expert added that ``the NGOs 
dealing with rights advocacy will certainly face more 
regulations.'' \80\ Even as reform efforts move forward in 
different localities in China, a People's Daily article 
described the new guiding principle as ``wide approval, strict 
control.'' \81\ During a speech addressing the topic of 
``social management,'' Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing 
Committee member and the Secretary of the Communist Party's 
Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission, 
stated:

          . . . in fostering comprehensive social 
        organizations, we must work hard to integrate various 
        types of social organizations into a social 
        organization system led by the Party Committee and the 
        government . . . in the management of social 
        organizations, [we must] establish a system of separate 
        development and separate management to promote the 
        healthy and orderly development of social organizations 
        . . . in the management of foreign non-governmental 
        organizations engaged in activities in China, we must 
        establish a unified management mechanism to ensure 
        legitimate exchanges and cooperation and strengthen 
        management according to the law.\82\

                 Institutions of Democratic Governance

                              Introduction

    China's political system is dominated by the Communist 
Party, and Party organizations extend into and influence every 
sector of society. There is limited participation by non-Party 
members in political decisions. During the Commission's 2011 
reporting year, Chinese authorities intensified Party-building 
efforts and efforts to strengthen controls over society in the 
name of improving ``comprehensive management of public 
security'' and ``safeguarding stability.'' Leaders launched a 
widespread crackdown to thwart citizens' attempts to gather for 
peaceful demonstrations around the country, dubbed ``Jasmine'' 
protests by the organizers, which included advocating for 
democratic reforms. Leaders continued to have little tolerance 
for outspoken democracy advocates. Authorities continued to 
voice support for enhanced accountability, ``open government 
affairs,'' and greater public participation, although 
implementation of various measures was sporadic. The central 
government encouraged pilot grassroots-level ``democratic 
management'' programs, partially to reduce corruption, improve 
relations between officials and citizens, promote transparency, 
and encourage ``democratic'' public participation. While 
village elections for ``village committees'' have spread 
throughout China, their implementation remains problematic. 
Corruption remained a serious problem at all levels, and the 
central government issued the first ``white paper'' on 
corruption and reportedly strengthened anticorruption efforts.

             China's One-Party State and Political Control

    During this reporting year, Communist Party leaders 
accelerated efforts to reinvigorate the Party's dominance and 
involvement in all sectors of society. July 1, 2011, marked the 
90th anniversary of the founding of the Party, which reportedly 
had nearly 80.3 million members by the end of 2010 \1\ and has 
established more than 3.79 million committees and branches 
throughout the country.\2\ These organizations exert influence 
over every sector of society, including villages and urban 
neighborhoods,\3\ as well as most enterprises,\4\ public 
service organizations (including hospitals, schools, and 
research institutes),\5\ government departments, and quasi-
governmental and non-governmental organizations.\6\ Chinese 
leaders continued to insist upon the leading role of the Party 
and the infusion of Party principles in various sectors 
including ``managing talent'' (human resources), education, and 
the media.\7\ This reporting year, Party officials focused 
Party-building efforts on urban residents' committees,\8\ law 
firms, schools,\9\ and rural residents.\10\

    Increasing Social Controls in the Name of ``Safeguarding Social 
                              Stability''

    Chinese government and Party officials expanded social 
controls, especially mechanisms to monitor citizens and groups, 
in the name of strengthening ``comprehensive management of 
public security'' \11\ and ``safeguarding social stability.'' 
Authorities also appeared to link social control strategies 
with service provision, whereby outreach to citizens would 
involve both service provision and ``management'' tasks.\12\ In 
July 2011, the Information Office of the State Council noted 
that officials across China had opened 2,842 government affairs 
service centers at the provincial, autonomous prefectural, and 
municipal levels, and 25,000 (rural) township and (urban) 
street service centers.\13\ In November 2010, central 
government and Party officials issued an opinion about 
strengthening urban Party-affiliated resident committees that 
noted the growing role for the committees in ``safeguarding 
social stability.'' \14\ In addition, local and sector-specific 
officials implemented measures expanding controls over society:

          In Beijing, authorities appear to be 
        encouraging volunteers to monitor their fellow 
        citizens; they are expected to play a ``leading'' role 
        in ``comprehensive management'' by providing 
        information and reports related to ``stability,'' 
        sometimes for a monetary reward.\15\
          In March 2011, authorities in Shanghai 
        reportedly began to establish Party organizations in 
        some commercial buildings to monitor activities, as a 
        part of implementing local regulations on 
        ``comprehensive management.'' \16\ The regulations are 
        also the first to incorporate directives monitoring the 
        Internet into the city's ``comprehensive management'' 
        system.\17\
          Zhejiang provincial \18\ and Shenzhen 
        municipality \19\ authorities initiated measures to 
        control the movements of ``critical personnel'' 
        (zhongdian renshi). Zhejiang includes in this category 
        persons involved in ``rights defense'' activities, 
        petitioners who take their grievances to higher 
        administrative levels, and those suspected of 
        ``creating instability.'' \20\
          Education authorities strengthened the 
        ``student security informant'' system, which reportedly 
        operates covertly on campuses to safeguard stability, 
        and the ``student informant system,'' \21\ which 
        authorities use to monitor the political expression and 
        behavior of students and teachers.\22\ One school 
        bulletin board posting reportedly disclosed that 
        students who celebrated Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize 
        award would not be eligible for scholarships.\23\ 
        Peking University reportedly banned students from 
        copying sensitive materials including those critical of 
        the Party,\24\ and announced plans to arrange 
        consultations for ``troublesome students,'' including 
        students with ``radical thoughts'' who hold critical 
        views of the university's management or who complained 
        about policy changes.\25\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
         2011 Crackdown: From Reform Advocates to Flower Vendors
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Authorities conducted a largely preventative crackdown amid calls for
 nonviolent, ``Jasmine'' protests in various cities in China.
 Authorities prevented some citizens from exercising their
 constitutional right \26\ to freedom of assembly, association, and
 speech, as well as to advocate for change including democratic reforms.
 [For more information on the 2011 crackdown, see Section II--Freedom of
 Expression and Section II--Criminal Justice.] Beginning in mid-February
 after the protests in the Middle East and North Africa, weekly calls
 for peaceful ``Jasmine'' protests in China to take place each Sunday
 appeared online, urging citizens to ``stroll'' around designated areas
 at designated times, in a gradually increasing number of cities.\27\
 The original anonymous statement circulated in China, also sent to and
 posted by an international Web site, Boxun, urged Chinese citizens to
 demonstrate for democratic reforms and against alleged corruption in
 China among other issues.\28\ On February 19, 2011, a few days after
 the appearance of the first online call for protests, and amid
 commemoration of 20 years of ``comprehensive management of social
 order'' work launched in 1991,\29\ top Chinese officials held a seminar
 for key provincial and ministry-level leaders. At the meeting,
 President Hu Jintao outlined eight main tasks for leaders to strengthen
 ``social management.'' \30\ According to the South China Morning Post,
 government-controlled newspapers including the Beijing Daily, the
 Jiefang Daily, and the Shanghai Morning Post issued front page articles
 warning against mass gatherings \31\ and emphasizing the need to
 strengthen ``social management'' and ``safeguard social harmony and
 stability.'' \32\
  Authorities have reportedly arrested, detained, ``disappeared,'' put
 under ``soft detention,'' or otherwise harassed over 200 citizens,
 writers, scholars, and political reform advocates since mid-
 February.\33\ Those arrested included Chen Wei,\34\ Ding Mao,\35\ and
 Ran Yunfei.\36\ Relevant central or local authorities also reportedly:    Censored words and phrases related to the unrest in the
   Middle East and North Africa, and related to the word ``Jasmine'';
   \37\
    Declared jasmine flowers to be contraband and instructed at
   least one flower vendor in Beijing municipality to report on people
   seeking to purchase the flowers; \38\
    Urged some church followers not to join mass gatherings;
   \39\
    Detained two students in Chongqing municipality for posting
   news of the ``Jasmine'' protest strolls online, prevented some
   students from leaving certain campuses at specific times, issued
   notices asking students to stay away from sensitive areas, and warned
   students not to hold any collective gathering in order to avoid a
   misunderstanding; \40\
    Presented a strong showing of security personnel and
   equipment at locations in municipalities designated as ``Jasmine''
   rally sites \41\ and used water trucks to flood streets and sidewalks
   at those sites; \42\
    Closed some subway entrances and businesses near rally
   sites; \43\
    Assaulted at least 2 foreign journalists, detained more than
   12 international reporters in Shanghai and Beijing, and warned
   journalists in Beijing not to carry out interviews without
   permission; \44\ and
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
   2011 Crackdown: From Reform Advocates to Flower Vendors--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Disrupted mobile phone services.\45\  Chinese authorities reportedly pressured European missions and
 interfered in at least 60 activities organized by the U.S. Embassy in
 Beijing between February and April leading to their cancellation,
 including ``cultural forums, school programs, [and] ambassadorial
 visits.'' \46\ The Ministry of Education reportedly warned Chinese
 academics not to cooperate with groups that promote democracy while
 they are abroad and have stepped up scrutiny of nonprofit groups,
 especially those that receive funding from the United States or the
 European Union.\47\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

              Official Actions Against Democracy Advocates

    Authorities continued to detain, arrest, and impose 
sentences on democracy advocates who exercised their right to 
freedom of assembly, speech, movement, and association 
guaranteed in China's Constitution and under international 
human rights standards. Authorities imposed a 10-year sentence 
on Liu Xianbin for ``inciting subversion of state power'' for 
writing and posting overseas articles that advocated for 
democratization, criticized Party rule, and supported the 
development of a ``strong opposition organization.'' \48\ In 
October 2010, officials in Wuhan city, Hubei province, arrested 
the prolific blogger Li Tie on charges of subversion.\49\ As of 
September 2011, news stories have not provided information 
regarding his sentence. Authorities in Qianjiang city, Hubei 
province, also detained, held incommunicado, illegally confined 
to his home, or denied basic utilities to former local people's 
congress delegate and elections expert Yao Lifa on at least 
seven occasions over the past reporting year, sometimes for a 
few days and other times for months.\50\ Amid the appearance of 
numerous ``independent candidates'' for local people's congress 
elections, authorities took Yao into custody on June 20 without 
charging him, and had not released him as of early August 
2011.\51\

      Intraparty Democracy and High-Level Debate Regarding Reform

    China's political institutions do not comply with the 
standards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,\52\ which China has signed and 
declared an intention to ratify.\53\ Nor do China's political 
institutions comply with the standards outlined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.\54\ These standards 
provide universal rights to freely choose accountable 
representatives through free and monitored elections, as well 
as protection for freedom of expression, assembly, and 
association. In China, however, the Communist Party continues 
to dominate government and allows only limited independent 
political participation. Chinese leaders maintain that 
intraparty democracy should come before democracy in society 
more widely.\55\ The notion of intraparty democracy has been a 
part of the Communist Party's basic institutional design since 
1956.\56\
    During the reporting period, official documents and 
statements continued to include vague support for undefined 
``democratic'' processes and reforms. At the same time, in 
September 2011, officials issued a white paper titled ``China's 
Peaceful Development'' that states, ``China is firm in 
upholding its core interests which include . . . China's 
political system established by the Constitution and overall 
social stability. . . .'' \57\ This is the first time officials 
have designated the current political system as a ``core 
interest.'' \58\ A Communist Party communique issued in October 
2010 emphasized that ``[g]reat impetus should be given to 
economic system reform, while vigorous yet steady efforts 
should be made to promote political restructuring.'' \59\ The 
PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and 
Social Development (12th Five-Year Plan) describes plans to 
``develop democracy and promote socialist political culture 
development,'' without providing specifics.\60\ Premier Wen 
Jiabao continued to assert the need for undefined political 
reforms including in an August 2010 statement declaring that 
``[w]ithout political reform, China may lose what it has 
already achieved through economic restructuring and the targets 
of its modernization drive might not be reached.'' \61\ State 
press reports, however, criticized calls for rapid democratic 
reforms in an apparent refutation of some of Wen's remarks.\62\ 
Other officials appeared to criticize ideological pluralism and 
emphasize the need for China to maintain a ``correct political 
orientation.'' \63\ At the March 2011 National People's 
Congress (NPC) annual meeting, Wu Bangguo, the Chairman of the 
NPC Standing Committee, said China would not ``copy'' western-
style political systems.\64\ An October 2010 People's Daily 
editorial reiterated that political development should proceed 
along a ``correct political direction . . . . [P]olitical 
structural reform is not to weaken, but to strengthen and 
improve the Party's leadership . . . .'' \65\

   Local People's Congress Elections and Criticism of ``Independent 
                              Candidates''

    Communist Party members continue to dominate local people's 
congress elections, but the congresses reportedly are no longer 
the ``rubber stamps'' they were in the past. Only township and 
county congress delegates are elected by the public, so higher 
level congresses are not elected by ordinary citizens. In May 
2009, an international researcher noted that Party members make 
up approximately 65 percent of township congresses and 
approximately 70 percent of congresses above this level.\66\ In 
October 2010, the NPC Standing Committee passed revisions to 
the 1992 Deputies Law of the National People's Congress and 
Various Levels of Local People's Congresses of the People's 
Republic of China.\67\ According to an official news source, 
the revisions will help to better protect delegates' rights to 
information and more clearly define their rights and 
duties.\68\
     Central officials appeared to discourage and prevent 
``independent candidates'' from running in local people's 
congress elections. While 10 or more citizens may nominate a 
candidate, sometimes resulting in a large number of ``voter-
nominated candidates,'' i.e., ``independent candidates,'' in 
the early stages of election activities, by the time election 
day arrives, most such candidates reportedly are winnowed 
out.\69\ Several articles in Party-affiliated newspapers warned 
of the dangers of including ``independent candidates'' in 
elections after blogger and writer Li Chengping, from Chengdu 
city, Sichuan province, gained more than 2.9 million followers 
on the Internet when he declared his candidacy.\70\ 
Subsequently, more than 100 such candidates reportedly declared 
their candidacy online.\71\ In May 2011, in Xinyu city, Jiangxi 
province, security personnel from an enterprise reportedly held 
local ``independent candidates'' Liu Ping, Wei Zhongping, and 
Li Sihua to prevent them from campaigning or participating in a 
district-level election.\72\ The three were released shortly 
after the election took place.\73\ Officials also reportedly 
detained Du Quanbing, who traveled to Xinyu to observe the 
election proceedings.\74\ In late June, news stories reported 
additional harassment of ``independent candidates'' and their 
families.\75\ A May article in the Party-affiliated Global 
Times noted that ``independent candidates'' could play a 
positive role, but also asserted that it was not suitable to 
allow candidates who held opinions different from those of the 
current political system to run; and that such candidates would 
bring ``even more turbulence, threatening the cohesion of the 
nation.'' \76\

        Village Elections and ``Democratic Management'' Projects

    TRENDS IN VILLAGE ELECTIONS AND RELATED LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

    While village elections have spread to all provinces and 
most villages in China, they reportedly continue to be plagued 
by official interference, corruption,\77\ and, in at least one 
case, violence.\78\ Corruption problems reportedly include such 
things as election bribery \79\ and gift-giving in exchange for 
votes.\80\ One example of official interference occurred in 
July 2010 in a village in Fangshan, a suburban district in 
Beijing; officials there reportedly interfered with vote 
counting, allegedly upon orders of the incumbent village 
leader, leading to a standoff with villagers.\81\ Fangshan 
officials called in 200 police, who then detained several 
villagers, some for reportedly ``obstructing traffic.'' \82\
    In October 2010, the NPC Standing Committee passed 
revisions to the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' 
Committees,\83\ which clarified election and recall 
procedures.\84\ The revisions stipulate that every village must 
establish a ``supervisory committee'' or similar 
organization,\85\ which may permanently alter the distribution 
of power among village-governing organizations, possibly 
reining in the power of village committees. The ``supervisory 
committees'' are intended to promote a more ``harmonious 
society,'' prevent corruption, and deepen ``open village 
affairs'' and ``democratic management.'' \86\ The deputy 
minister of the Ministry of Civil Affairs noted in November 
2010 that 85 percent of the country's villages had already 
established supervisory committees or their equivalent.\87\ 
Some news articles note that villages are now governed by 
``three committees'' (Party, village, and supervisory 
committees).\88\ In general, it appears that the Party 
committee makes decisions, the village committee implements 
those decisions, and the supervisory committee oversees the 
decisions.\89\ However, relative authority among the three 
committees, as well as other village organizations, may vary 
from village to village. The revisions also appear to provide a 
stronger legal foundation for the authority of ``villager 
representative assemblies.'' \90\ Provincial-level authorities 
in at least three provinces (Guangdong, Hubei, and Qinghai) 
revised regulations governing village committee and/or urban 
resident committee elections, which for the first time 
stipulate the establishment of official Party- and government-
sponsored election observer systems.\91\ It is unclear whether 
officials will tolerate non-governmental monitoring activities.
    Major trends in grassroots governance highlight the efforts 
of the Party to strengthen control at the grassroots level and 
central authorities' efforts to improve the competence of 
village officials. Higher level authorities continued to 
encourage the same person to serve as village Party secretary 
and village committee head, reversing the trend started in the 
late 1980s to separate Party and government positions.\92\ 
While this development may reduce perceived conflict over power 
in villages,\93\ it strengthens Party control and may also 
decrease competition for and oversight of authority. This 
development highlights the importance of the order in which 
Party and village committee elections take place. Authorities 
reportedly sought to enhance village-level accountability and 
improve the competence \94\ of local officials in a variety of 
ways, including increasing salary levels,\95\ using college 
graduates \96\ and ``extra-payroll'' officials,\97\ and 
incorporating Party members ``without a post'' or ``old'' Party 
members as ``senators'' into village governing processes to 
promote more ``harmonious'' relations and to improve 
decisionmaking processes.\98\ In some localities, by the end of 
2010, a greater percentage of elected village and Party leaders 
reportedly had higher educational and professional skill levels 
than in the past.\99\

     ``DIFFICULT VILLAGES'' AND ``DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT'' PROJECTS

    Likely in response to growing discontent and erosion of 
Communist Party legitimacy at the grassroots level, central and 
local authorities continued programs to ``transform'' so-called 
``difficult villages'' and to implement ``democratic 
management'' projects. Programs to rectify ``difficult 
villages'' \100\ (i.e., villages where tensions between 
citizens and officials are present, where people's aspirations 
and demands have not been met, or where there are unresolved 
economic or social problems, among other problems) \101\ 
reportedly are basically complete.\102\ During this reporting 
year, ``democratic management'' pilot projects in some 
localities focused on strengthening the role of the Party at 
the grassroots level, promoting economic development, and 
improving participation and transparency while ``safeguarding 
stability.'' \103\ Hebei, Guangdong, Hunan, Shaanxi, and other 
provinces issued ``open village affairs'' or similar 
regulations to accomplish these goals.\104\ Some villages also 
established ``villager financial management groups,'' \105\ 
``transparent account book systems,'' \106\ or ``Sunshine 
Village Affairs Projects.'' \107\ The effects of most of these 
pilot projects remain unclear, and one Chinese researcher 
believes most to be transitory.\108\

     Accountability and Transparency: Party and Government Reforms

  BUILDING A ``RULE BY LAW GOVERNMENT,'' ACCOUNTABILITY, AND OFFICIAL 
                        EVALUATION SYSTEM REFORM

    The State Council and the National People's Congress (NPC) 
continued or initiated policy measures to enhance government 
accountability. At the annual meetings of the NPC and the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March 
2011, Wu Bangguo reportedly promised that the NPC would enhance 
accountability through its work on supervision of the 
government, especially in the areas of ``low-income housing, 
government budgets, education reform, and strengthening 
primary-level courts and procura
torates.'' \109\ In November 2010, the State Council issued the 
Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction of a Government 
That Rules by Law. The Opinion points out several problems that 
need to be addressed, including increasing ``social 
contradictions'' in some localities and fields, ``mass 
incidents'' occurring with some frequency, ``corruption in some 
fields,'' ``unjust law enforcement,'' and ``negligible or 
arbitrary administration.'' \110\ The Opinion calls for deeper 
reforms, stronger institutions, enhanced government 
supervision, restriction of administrative powers, and ``a 
government ruled by law.'' \111\ On June 30, the NPC Standing 
Committee adopted the PRC Law on Administrative Coercion, which 
will come into force on January 1, 2012, after a 12-year 
drafting process. The law is meant to resolve the problems of 
official infringement of citizens' legal rights and weak 
enforcement of regulatory instruments by government agencies, 
according to an official with the NPC Standing Committee 
Legislative Affairs Commission as reported by the Beijing 
Review.\112\ In July, news reports indicated that the revisions 
of the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law had advanced to 
the legislative planning phase and that it is possible the 
revisions will expand the scope of administrative 
reconsideration cases to be accepted in the future.\113\ The 
revised PRC State Compensation Law, which came into effect on 
December 1, 2010, could, if implemented, provide citizens more 
opportunities to obtain compensation when government officials 
violate their rights.\114\
    There have been both potentially encouraging and seemingly 
unconstructive developments in official evaluation system 
reforms. Authorities plan to revise official professional 
evaluation standards based on a new system that takes regional 
economic, geographical, and social differences into 
account.\115\ The new standards could lead to greater 
accountability because they could reduce incentives for 
falsifying information given to higher level officials to 
improve promotion chances. Official responsibility and 
evaluation systems sometimes provide incentives to suppress 
citizens who want to take their grievances to higher level 
authorities.\116\ One Chinese editorial pointed out the dangers 
of incorporating ``stability preservation'' into cadre 
evaluation systems, because officials may put ``safeguarding 
stability'' above everything else or seek to ``control 
petitions'' and, as a result, cover up problems.\117\ One 
document indicates officials in one county can be marked down 
for collective petitions received at higher levels of 
government and for the number of ``unsafe political incidents 
that affect national security.'' \118\ In one case, authorities 
said they would withhold grain subsidies if citizens made 
complaints to higher level officials.\119\

                     Accountability and Corruption

                               CORRUPTION

    Corruption reportedly remains high, and Premier Wen Jiabao 
recently emphasized that corruption poses a significant danger 
to Communist Party rule.\120\ Corruption also reportedly 
continues to be one of the top concerns of Chinese 
citizens.\121\ During this reporting year, official discipline 
inspection and supervision entities reported receiving over 1 
million accusations and complaints against officials from 
citizens between January and December 2010.\122\ Authorities 
reportedly opened 7,349 malfeasance and rights infringement 
cases perpetrated by 10,227 government officials in 2010; 3,508 
of these cases were considered major or serious.\123\

         MEASURES TO CURB CORRUPTION AND PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY

    Chinese authorities took regulatory steps to address 
corruption,\124\ and in December 2010 the State Council issued 
China's first white paper on corruption titled ``China's 
Efforts To Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government.'' 
\125\ Prior to that, on December 8, 2010, top Party and 
government authorities jointly issued the Provisions on 
Economic Responsibility Audits for Chief Leading Cadres of the 
Party and the Government and Executives of State-Owned 
Enterprises, which seek to strengthen supervision and 
management of cadres.\126\ In addition, on December 15, 2010, 
authorities issued the Provisions Regarding Implementation of 
the Responsibility System for Construction of an Honest Party 
and a Clean Government.\127\ In February 2011, the NPC Standing 
Committee amended the PRC Criminal Law to criminalize the 
giving of items of value to an official of a foreign government 
or international organization in order to obtain an improper 
commercial benefit. The amendment went into effect on May 1, 
2011.\128\ Authorities issued a new anti-bribery law that went 
into effect in May and will apply to state-owned enterprises 
and private companies.\129\ In July, top Party and government 
officials issued the Provisions Regarding Rural Village 
Grassroots Officials' Honest Performance of Duties (Trial 
Implementation), which prohibit 41 specific types of behavior 
of grassroots officials, including ``participating in, 
coddling, or supporting criminal syndicates or evil forces'' 
and ``violating stipulations by seizing and taking citizens' 
money or property, or by penalizing citizens.'' \130\
    Authorities also took limited steps to encourage reporting 
of corruption and to protect whistleblowers. Protections for 
whistleblowers, however, are insufficient and authorities have 
discouraged independent anticorruption Web sites. The Supreme 
People's Court and provincial courts reportedly established 
corruption reporting Web sites.\131\ Revisions to the PRC Law 
on Administrative Supervision require authorities to inform a 
person who files a ``real-name'' report about the results of 
the corresponding inquiry. A new section stipulates that 
officials must keep confidential the information they collect 
about citizens who provide tips.\132\ According to the Legal 
Daily, 70 percent or more of the cases of work-related offenses 
filed with procuratorate offices initially involved a tip from 
a citizen.\133\ According to material from the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate reported by the Legal Daily, 70 percent of the 
people who filed tips with procuratorate offices were subject 
to some form of retribution.\134\ In July, court officials in 
Tengzhou city, Shandong province, rejected an appeal by 
journalist Qi Chonghuai, known for his official corruption 
exposes, sending him to prison for eight years on the charge of 
embezzlement.\135\ This follows the four-year sentence he had 
already completed after being convicted of extortion and 
blackmail following his posting of stories online about alleged 
corrupt practices of municipal government officials.\136\ While 
authorities have established official tip sites, some have 
blocked non-governmental whistleblower Web sites.\137\ In the 
summer of 2011, new sites based on ``confess-a-bribe'' Web 
sites in India began to appear in China.\138\ As of mid-June 
2011, there were at least eight Chinese independent platforms 
for reporting bribes, reportedly receiving tens to hundreds of 
thousands of hits.\139\ The sites were unregistered, leaving 
them vulnerable to closure.\140\ Authorities began blocking 
access to the sites and warning some of the webmasters to close 
their sites by mid-June.\141\ At least two of these sites were 
targets of cyber attacks.\142\

           TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

    Authorities reportedly strengthened policies favoring 
government information disclosure, although the State Council 
has implemented transparency commitments inconsistently, and 
citizens continued to face challenges in accessing information 
and bringing cases to court. An April 2011 report by the US-
China Business Council noted that China has pledged to publicly 
release drafts of all economic laws and regulations for 30 
days.\143\ The report found, however, that over a recent 11-
month period the State Council had posted no more than half of 
its rules and regulations for public comment, with only a few 
being posting for the full 30 days.\144\ In contrast, the 
report found that the National People's Congress had posted 
drafts of most laws for the full 30 days.\145\ At the May 2011 
U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue, China pledged to 
issue a measure in 2011 requiring that all proposed trade- and 
economic-related administrative regulations and departmental 
rules (with certain exceptions) be published on the State 
Council Legislative Affairs Office Web site for at least 30 
days.\146\
    In November 2010, the State Council Opinion Regarding 
Strengthening Construction of a Government That Rules by Law 
(the Opinion) reiterated that ``making government information 
public is the principle, while a few exceptions are allowed.'' 
\147\ Authorities reportedly also sought to strengthen 
information disclosure at the grassroots level.\148\ In 
December 2010, the Supreme People's Court passed a provision 
that stipulates courts shall accept five types of 
administrative cases brought by citizens suing government 
departments for failing to provide information that legally 
should be open to the public. The provision also stipulates 
that courts are not authorized to accept cases under four types 
of vaguely defined conditions,\149\ leaving significant leeway 
for courts not to accept cases. The 12th Five-Year Plan, issued 
in March 2011, specifies that China will establish and improve 
``open information'' to advance digitalization of government 
affairs.\150\ In August, just after Chinese citizens flooded 
the Internet with inquiries regarding the lack of transparency 
about a high-speed train accident in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang 
province,\151\ central Party and government officials issued 
the Opinion Regarding Deepening Open Government Affairs and 
Strengthening Government Services, which includes an item 
stating that officials should ``take great efforts to make 
transparent information about major sudden incidents and issues 
of concern to citizens . . . and correctly guide public 
opinion.'' \152\ [For more information on media coverage of the 
train incident and ``guiding public opinion,'' see Section II--
Freedom of Expression.]
    Nevertheless, officials continued to deny open government 
information requests for reasons that appear to contradict the 
spirit of the law. One study of open government information 
annual reports submitted by national, provincial, and some city 
government organizations conducted by researchers in China 
reportedly found that officials continue to refuse to grant 
information disclosure requests because officials claimed the 
``information is not available,'' the information would 
``influence social stability,'' and the information ``involves 
state secrets.'' \153\
    Voluntary disclosure of government budgetary information 
remained an area of progress, although challenges remain. The 
State Council Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction of a 
Government That Rules by Law stipulates that officials should 
more actively make government information public and focus on 
``financial budgets, allocation of public resources, approval 
and implementation of major construction projects, and non-
profit social causes.'' \154\ In early July 2011, government 
departments under the State Council began to make public 
information on expenditures for overseas trips, public 
relations, and vehicles, otherwise known as the ``Three 
Publics.'' By late July, 86 of the 98 departments under the 
State Council had made their expenditures public.\155\ Central 
officials also have required central government departments 
that have their budgets approved by the National People's 
Congress to make their annual budgets public. As of the end of 
May, 88 of the 98 departments reportedly had disclosed their 
budgets to the public.\156\ In July, the State Council Standing 
Committee reportedly said it was necessary to ``vigorously 
advance'' budget transparency, to expand the scope of 
transparency, and refine disclosed content.\157\ According to 
one survey, the Ministry of Finance expanded the number of 
items it made public in the national budget.\158\ Although 
central-level ministries, the governments of Shaanxi province 
and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and other areas have 
opened their 2011 budgets to the public, many citizens 
reportedly believe that the information provided is incomplete 
and that the budget category of ``other expenses'' hides 
information.\159\
    Central Party leaders continued to make policy 
announcements regarding their intent to expand the transparency 
of Party affairs, and the Beijing municipal government took 
policy steps to enhance Party accountability. In October 2010, 
a top Party organization issued a policy document that outlined 
the ``guiding thought'' and basic principles for putting into 
practice ``open Party affairs'' at the lowest administrative 
levels, as well as the content to be made public.\160\ The 
Beijing municipal government issued the Beijing Municipal 
Implementation Measure in January 2011, which for the first 
time includes Party leaders in the ``scope of accountability.'' 
\161\ Authorities announced that 13 central Party departments, 
31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, and 
nearly half of China's prefectural-level cities have already 
established Party press spokesperson systems.\162\

   Public Input in Decisionmaking, Interest Articulation, and Public 
                                Hearings

    Citizens and groups in China have little direct access to 
political decisionmaking processes; however, they are 
increasingly able to utilize various channels to express 
opinions regarding proposed policies and regulatory 
instruments. The 12th Five-Year Plan stipulates that ``it is 
necessary to give full play'' to ``people's organizations, 
trade associations, and mass media to express social 
interests'' and that authorities will expand the ``degree of 
public participation'' in decisionmaking.\163\ The Opinion 
Regarding Strengthening Construction of a Government That Rules 
by Law (Opinion), issued in November, stipulates that ``before 
major decisions are made [authorities] should widely solicit 
and adequately assimilate opinions from all sides.'' \164\ It 
requires that ``public opinion . . . be solicited'' with 
respect to ``administrative laws and regulations . . . that 
have direct influence on rights and obligations of citizens, 
legal person [sic] or other organizations.'' In addition, the 
Opinion stipulates that ``what opinions are adopted, and why, 
should be made public in appropriate formats.'' \165\

                         Commercial Rule of Law

                              Introduction

    As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), China is 
bound by commitments outlined in both the WTO agreements and 
China's accession documents.\1\ China must abide by obligations 
that prohibit it from discriminating among WTO members or from 
discriminating between foreign and Chinese goods, services, and 
intellectual property rights. China must adhere to WTO 
obligations to publish promptly all laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions, and administrative rulings related to trade in 
goods, services, trade-related intellectual property rights, or 
control of foreign exchange. While China has taken many steps 
to open its economy and reform its legal system since acceding 
to the WTO in December 2001, it has not fully met its 
commitments.\2\ According to the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), ``in some areas, it appears that China 
has yet to fully implement important commitments, and in other 
areas, significant questions have arisen regarding China's 
adherence to ongoing WTO obligations, including core WTO 
principles.'' \3\ For example, China has failed to adhere to 
the WTO's transparency principle, and this in itself has made 
it difficult for other WTO members, including the United 
States, to monitor China's overall WTO compliance.\4\ China 
agreed when it acceded to the WTO to begin negotiations to join 
the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) ``as soon as 
possible.'' \5\ It has not yet done so. USTR notes that China 
is moving slowly toward joining the GPA, while ``maintaining 
and adopting government procurement measures that give domestic 
preferences.'' \6\
    The USTR has indicated that problems in China's WTO 
compliance can be traced to China's use of industrial policies 
and ``government intervention intended to promote or protect 
China's domestic industries and state-owned enterprises.'' \7\ 
The Chinese government's use of industrial policies to direct 
economic growth, rather than relying on market-based 
principles, both hinders development of the rule of law \8\ and 
limits the access of non-Chinese companies, including those 
from other WTO members, to the Chinese market,\9\ thereby 
violating the core WTO principle of national treatment.\10\
    Chinese government departments' use of industrial policies 
has been accompanied by, and in some cases provides for, the 
growth of the state sector in the Chinese economy,\11\ a trend 
called ``the state advances, the private sector retreats.'' 
\12\ It is not clear that a large state-owned sector is 
compatible with rule of law. The state, as the main 
shareholder, controls the courts, the police, and the 
legislature, which renders equal treatment before the law and 
an independent judiciary impossible.\13\

                              Transparency

    In its Protocol of Accession to the WTO, China committed to 
publish all laws, regulations, or other measures affecting 
trade (with certain exceptions), to allow a reasonable comment 
period before implementation, and to establish or designate an 
official journal for this purpose.\14\ USTR notes in its 2010 
report on China's WTO compliance that China's implementation of 
its WTO transparency obligations has been uneven.\15\ In its 
April 2011 PRC Transparency Tracking report, the US-China 
Business Council reported that regulatory transparency remains 
one of the top concerns of the council's member companies.\16\ 
This was raised at the May 2011 meeting of the U.S.-China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), and China agreed to 
issue a measure in 2011 requiring publication in most cases of 
all proposed measures related to trade and economics on the Web 
site of the State Council Legislative Affairs Office for a 30-
day comment period.\17\ At the S&ED, China and the United 
States broadened discussions of transparency to encompass 
provision of export credits and arrangements for export 
financing.\18\ China has two official export credit agencies 
(ECAs), China Eximbank and Sinosure, and the state-owned policy 
bank, China Development Bank, performs a function similar to 
that of an ECA.\19\ As China is not a member of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
China's ECAs are not required to adhere to the standards set 
out in the OECD Arrangement on Export Credits, which includes 
provisions for consultation and exchange of information on 
export credit offers.\20\ (Eximbank's Export Seller Credit 
program typically supports ``exports of `national champion' 
companies that are oftentimes State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as 
well.'') \21\ At the S&ED, China also committed to ``steadily 
increase its solicitation of public opinions on regulatory 
documents with a direct influence on the rights and obligations 
of citizens, legal persons, or other organizations.'' \22\

            State-Owned Enterprises and the Communist Party

    China's state-owned sector continues to enjoy preferential 
treatment, crowding out private companies in certain key 
sectors.\23\ State-owned enterprises (SOEs) enjoy a number of 
direct and indirect subsidies, some of which violate China's 
WTO commitments. [For a discussion of the WTO case against 
China concerning its subsidies in the wind energy industry, see 
China and the World Trade Organization in this section.] 
According to an American economist, ``SOEs operate within 
markets but they operate primarily within state-controlled 
markets. This regulatory protection is the most powerful 
subsidy many SOEs receive.'' \24\ Further, the government plays 
a key role in allocating inputs to production, such as land, 
financing, resources, and corporate management.\25\ Through 
ownership of land \26\ and the SOEs, the state held 76 percent 
of productive wealth in China at the end of 2006.\27\ According 
to a Yale University expert, this is a ``[b]arrier to legal 
development and the rule of law.'' \28\

               SOES AND COMMERCIAL SECRETS/STATE SECRETS

    One area in which SOEs may receive extra protection is the 
application of state secrets rules. Chinese legislation on 
state secrets is vague as to whether information concerning the 
SOEs falls under China's rules on commercial secrets \29\ or 
the PRC State Secrets Law.\30\ This creates potential risks for 
individuals and companies competing or contracting with the 
SOEs or trying to obtain information on sectors controlled by 
the SOEs.\31\ Under Chinese law, a commercial secret can be 
elevated to a state secret when the information is not publicly 
available and if ``state interests are involved.'' \32\ 
Further, the use of such legislation to protect secrets in a 
way to benefit the SOEs may raise trade issues.\33\
    The importance of this lack of clarity was highlighted in 
the 2010 case of Xue Feng, a U.S. citizen who was charged with 
violating the State Secrets Law when he helped his U.S.-based 
employer purchase a commercial database in China. The database 
was not classified as a state secret at the time of the 
transaction.\34\ In February 2011, a Chinese court upheld Xue's 
sentence of eight years' imprisonment.\35\ The New York Times 
noted, ``Some analysts have viewed Xue's prosecution as a 
reflection of China's sensitivity to matters regarding natural 
resources.'' \36\

                           SOES AND THE PARTY

    As government-owned entities, SOEs are closely linked to 
the Communist Party. State Council regulations provide for 
building primary Party organizations in the SOEs pursuant to 
the Party constitution.\37\ Further, the Party is active in 
management of the SOEs, including through appointment of senior 
management by the Party's Central Organization Department, 
which appoints personnel for all important jobs in China.\38\ 
There are also reports of Party organizations in the overseas 
operations of SOEs.\39\ According to one Chinese article, ``Any 
major Party activity happening in the mainland shall be 
executed simultaneously overseas.'' \40\

                           Industrial Policy

    Industrial policy continues to play an important role in 
the Chinese economy, guiding important sectors such as the 
automotive, software, and ``cultural'' industries.\41\ China's 
industrial policies encourage the transfer of technology to, 
and consolidation of, the SOEs, and creation of ``domestic 
champions.'' \42\ In March 2011, the National People's Congress 
passed the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National 
Economic and Social Development (12th Five-Year Plan), which 
supplements current industrial policies by prioritizing seven 
``strategic emerging industries'' for development over the 
coming five years. These industries--energy conservation, new 
generation information technology (IT), biotechnology, high-end 
equipment manufacturing, new energies, new materials, and new 
energy vehicles--will enjoy preferential tax and financial 
policies.\43\ Since issuance of the 12th Five-Year Plan, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other 
government departments have issued sector-specific plans.\44\
    To promote the development of the information technology 
(IT) industry, in January 2011, the State Council issued a 
circular on encouraging the development of the software and 
integrated circuit (IC) industries, providing for various 
incentives to improve the environment for these industries.\45\ 
The circular is a supplement to a document the State Council 
passed in 2000,\46\ which subsequently was revised to settle a 
WTO dispute the United States brought against China.\47\ ICs 
and software are included as ``encouraged investments'' in both 
the 2007 and the draft 2011 Foreign Investment Guidance 
Catalogue,\48\ with an additional entry in the 2011 draft for 
next-generation Internet.\49\

                      Intellectual Property Rights

    Chinese authorities' enforcement of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) continues to be poor, notwithstanding government 
campaigns, crackdowns, and commitments.\50\ Poor enforcement is 
combined with government policies to compel foreign companies 
to transfer technology to entities in China in exchange for 
market access. Further, U.S. businesses have continued to 
express concerns that Chinese authorities are using technical 
standards \51\ and the PRC Antimonopoly Law as tools to acquire 
foreign technology and other forms of intellectual 
property.\52\
    During the 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government took 
some actions to improve enforcement of IPR. The State Council 
launched a six-month campaign starting in October 2010 to 
combat the manufacture and sale of counterfeit and shoddy 
goods.\53\ In March 2011, the government extended the campaign 
an additional three months.\54\ In December 2010, nine central-
level government departments issued a notice on stopping the 
sale of such goods online.\55\ In March 2011, the Chinese 
search engine Baidu announced plans to address copyright 
infringement through its Web site.\56\ There have been reports 
of greater IPR protection in certain industries subject to 
industrial policy, including a campaign to enforce IPR in 
Shanghai's cultural markets \57\ and protection of IPR in 
software and integrated circuits under the policies for 
development of the software and integrated circuit industries. 
[See Industrial Policy in this section.] \58\ However, 
infringement of IPR continues to be a major challenge for 
Chinese consumers \59\ and for U.S. companies operating in 
China.\60\
    The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative kept China on 
the Priority Watch List in its 2011 Special 301 Report because 
of ``ongoing concerns about the prevalence of piracy and 
counterfeiting in China, and China's implementation of 
`indigenous innovation' and other industrial policies that 
discriminate against or otherwise disadvantage U.S. exports and 
U.S. investors.'' \61\ During the 2010 meeting of the Joint 
Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), China agreed to carry 
out special campaigns on IPR enforcement and to ``actively work 
to advance software legalization,'' and to address certain 
other issues in IPR protection.\62\ President Hu Jintao made 
additional commitments on IPR protection during his visit to 
Washington in January 2011, including an agreement for funding 
and auditing the use of licensed software by the Chinese 
government and for promoting the use of licensed software by 
private companies and state-owned enterprises.\63\ In February, 
according to Chinese press and government reports, the Chinese 
government agreed that by the end of May 2011, all central 
government departments would use legitimate software, and local 
governments would implement the same plan by the end of 
October.\64\

                         INDIGENOUS INNOVATION

    During this reporting year, foreign investors continued to 
raise concerns that China's indigenous innovation policy \65\ 
for Chinese domestic development and ownership of technology is 
a means to force foreign companies to transfer their technology 
to China and a trade barrier, disadvantaging certain types of 
companies seeking to access some of China's markets, 
particularly China's large government procurement market, 
including through discriminatory use of technical 
standards.\66\ The U.S. Government raised these concerns at the 
December 2010 meeting of the JCCT, at which China made 
commitments concerning IPR and non-discrimination in its 
indigenous innovation policies.\67\ At a meeting in January 
2011 between U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President 
Hu Jintao, President Hu agreed that China would eliminate 
certain discriminatory innovation policies,\68\ and at the 
third meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
in May 2011, China committed to ``eliminate all of its 
government procurement indigenous innovation products 
catalogues . . . .'' \69\ The Ministry of Finance announced 
revocation of three discriminatory measures on government 
procurement effective July 1, 2011.\70\ One commentator noted 
that the change does not ``by its terms extend to sub-central 
agencies.'' \71\ Several provincial and municipal authorities, 
however, posted the Ministry of Finance announcement on their 
Web sites, or posted notices revoking related legislation.\72\
    Indigenous innovation has continued to play an important 
role in China's economic planning. In October 2010, the State 
Council issued the Decision on Accelerating Cultivation and 
Development of Strategic Emerging Industries,\73\ presaging the 
strategic industries outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan. The 
decision calls for cooperation with foreign companies and 
research centers, including encouraging them to set up research 
centers in China.\74\ The American Chamber of Commerce in the 
People's Republic of China considers the decision as ``an 
extension of the indigenous innovation drive and a complement 
to the 2006 [Medium- and Long-Range Plan for Development of 
Science and Technology].'' \75\ Further, Chapter 27 of the 12th 
Five-Year Plan, titled ``Increase Science and Technical 
Innovation Capabilities,'' calls for continuation of indigenous 
innovation.\76\ Article 3 of the chapter discusses 
``surrounding the enhancement of the capabilities of original 
innovation, integrated innovation, and of absorbing and re-
innovating imported technologies . . . .'' \77\

                 China and the World Trade Organization

    China is an active member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). In the period since becoming a member in December 2001 
through July 2011, China has been a respondent in 21 cases, 
complainant in 8, and a third-party participant in 78.\78\ 
According to the 2010 U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Report 
to Congress on China's WTO Compliance, there were six active 
disputes against China in 2010.\79\
    In September 2010, the United Steelworkers filed a Section 
301 petition with USTR concerning China's support for its 
domestic wind energy industry, citing five areas.\80\ In 
January 2011, the U.S. requested consultations with China at 
the WTO concerning China's provision of subsidies to Chinese 
wind turbine manufacturers through a ``Special Fund for 
Industrialization of Wind Power Equipment.'' \81\ This was much 
narrower than the areas covered in the United Steelworkers' 
petition. In March, USTR indicated its preference to settle the 
dispute, and in June, USTR announced that China had ended the 
challenged subsidies.\82\ USTR noted difficulties uncovering 
subsidies given China's lack of transparency.\83\ China is 
required to notify the WTO of subsidies on a regular basis, 
which it has failed to do.\84\ Further, while USTR depends on 
companies to gather the information necessary for a trade case, 
companies often hesitate to do so, ``fearing Chinese officials' 
reputation for retaliating against joint ventures in the 
country and potentially denying market access to any company 
that takes sides against China.'' \85\ [See Investment 
Regulation--Foreign Investment in China in this section, 
concerning China's discretionary foreign investment approval 
procedures and annual inspection requirements.]
    In September 2009, the United States imposed tariffs on 
certain passenger vehicle and truck tires from China in 
accordance with Article 16 of China's Protocol of Accession, 
which provides for a transitional product-specific safeguard 
mechanism to give temporary relief from ``market disruption'' 
to a domestic industry caused by a surge in imports from 
China.\86\ Within days, China initiated proceedings at the WTO 
against the U.S. action, and in December 2010, the WTO panel 
decided against China.\87\ China appealed the panel's decision, 
and in September 2011 the WTO Appellate Body upheld the panel's 
decision, once again finding against China.\88\ The provision 
for the transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism will 
terminate 12 years after the date of China's WTO accession, in 
December 2013.\89\
    In a case concerning market access for certain publications 
and audiovisual products, including films for theatrical 
release, audiovisual home entertainment products, sound 
recordings, and publications, and foreign service providers 
that distribute publications and certain audiovisual home 
entertainment products, the WTO Appellate Body decided against 
China. China had until March 2011 to comply with the WTO 
decision, but failed to do so.\90\ A USTR spokesman stated that 
the U.S. Government had ``communicated its concerns to China, 
and is working to ensure that China promptly brings its 
measures into full compliance.'' \91\ In an August 2011 status 
report to the WTO, China noted that it had ``made tremendous 
efforts'' to implement the rulings, listing completed 
amendments to legislation and a draft amendment to the foreign 
investment guidance catalogue.\92\ [Concerning the amendment to 
the catalogue, see Investment Regulation--Foreign Investment in 
China, in this section.] The decision is complicated for China 
to implement, because it conflicts directly with China's 
restrictions on media. As one U.S. lawyer in China noted, 
``China's current policy is to strengthen control over domestic 
media and further restrict foreign access. Thus the WTO ruling 
is 180 degrees contrary to very strong current movements in 
Chinese policy.'' \93\ [See Section II--Freedom of Expression 
for more information on Chinese government restrictions on 
media.]
    In its report of October 2010, a WTO dispute panel rejected 
China's claims against the United States in a case China 
brought in 2008 concerning the United States' imposition of 
both anti-dumping and countervailing duties on four products 
from China (circular welded carbon quality steel pipe, certain 
new pneumatic off-the-road tires, light-walled rectangular pipe 
and tube, and laminated woven sacks) and certain other 
issues.\94\ China appealed, contesting several of the panel's 
findings, including those concerning the concurrent application 
of both duties (i.e., ``double remedy'') and its standard as to 
when state-owned enterprises are ``public bodies'' for purposes 
of determining whether the government is providing 
subsidies.\95\ In March 2011, the Appellate Body reversed in 
part the panel's decision, including its findings on double 
remedy, its standard for when SOEs are ``public bodies,'' and 
certain other issues.\96\ The U.S. Trade Representative, Ron 
Kirk, said that he was ``deeply troubled'' by the reversal, 
which, he said, ``appears to be a clear case of overreaching by 
the Appellate Body,'' \97\ and the United States raised these 
concerns at the March 2011 meeting of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body.\98\
    In July 2011, the WTO decided against China in a case the 
United States initiated in 2009 concerning China's restraints 
on the export of various forms of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, 
magnesium, manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow 
phosphorus, and zinc.\99\ The export restraints at issue 
included ``export quotas, export licensing requirements, and 
minimum export price requirements.'' \100\ The WTO panel 
rejected China's defense that various restraints were permitted 
if needed to address a critical shortage, to conserve natural 
resources, and for environmental protection.\101\ China's 
central news agency, Xinhua, called the ruling ``regrettable,'' 
\102\ and in August 2011, China notified the WTO of its 
decision to appeal the ruling.\103\

                              RARE EARTHS

    The WTO case decided in July 2011 on China's export 
restraints did not cover exports of rare earths, minerals 
essential in a range of important industries, such as 
``advanced technology, renewable energy, electronics, and 
defense.'' \104\ China has a number of measures in place to 
restrict exports of rare earths, under the rationale that 
restrictions are necessary for environmental reasons and to 
protect exhaustible resources.\105\ The WTO panel rejected this 
argument in July's decision in the export restraints case \106\ 
and, according to a spokesperson for the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR), USTR is ``deeply troubled by 
China's use of market distorting export restrictions on raw 
materials including rare earths,'' especially in light of the 
WTO decision.\107\ Within days of the WTO decision, China's 
Ministry of Commerce announced rare earth export quotas that 
restore 2011 levels to those of the 2010 quotas, but 
incorporate a new category, thereby effectively tightening the 
quota.\108\
     A five-year plan for the sector, announced in February 
2011, includes ``increased state oversight, raising 
environmental standards, a crackdown on smuggling, the closure 
of illegal mines and consolidation of rare earth producers.'' 
\109\ Furthermore, Chinese authorities are instituting greater 
control by consolidating rare earth assets under state-owned 
companies.\110\

                                Currency

    The value of the Chinese yuan continues to be of concern to 
policymakers inside and outside China. Since 2005, China has 
maintained an exchange rate system under which the value of the 
yuan is tied to a basket of currencies.\111\ Under this system, 
China's regulators allow the yuan to float against the U.S. 
dollar within a narrow band.\112\ Chinese authorities control 
the value of the yuan in part because a revalued yuan would 
increase the cost of Chinese exports.\113\ This arguably raises 
trade issues. Article XV(4) of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) provides that WTO members ``shall not, by 
exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of [the 
GATT], nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of 
the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.'' 
\114\ The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) state that ``each member shall . . . avoid 
manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary 
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments 
adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over 
other members[.]'' \115\
    One U.S. economist notes several reasons it is in China's 
interests to revalue the yuan: Revaluation would help China 
manage its rising inflation rate and help ease an asset bubble 
in real estate; \116\ revaluation would be in keeping with 
China's goal to shift from reliance on exports to reliance on 
consumption, as outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan; \117\ and 
revaluation would benefit China's trading partners.\118\ 
Furthermore, in order to artificially keep the value of the 
yuan low, China must accumulate large reserves of foreign 
currency, which leads to market distortions.\119\
    Against the backdrop of discussions concerning revaluation, 
some Chinese government departments have been urging 
liberalization of the exchange rate mechanism, including 
allowing wider use of the yuan internationally, or 
``internationalization.'' \120\ An article in the Communist 
Party School newspaper, Study Times, in April 2011 called for 
making the yuan a reserve currency,\121\ suggesting five 
actions: Accelerating China's outbound investments, entering 
into currency exchange agreements, encouraging the use of yuan 
in trade, issuing yuan-based bonds, and making better use of 
finance centers such as Hong Kong.\122\ However, as China takes 
these steps to internationalize the yuan, analysts note the 
contradiction between internationalizing the yuan and not 
making it fully convertible.\123\ Nonetheless, during this 
reporting year, Chinese authorities have made several moves on 
the internationalization of the yuan.\124\

                         Investment Regulation

                      FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA

    Foreign investment in China is highly regulated, and the 
Chinese government uses the approval process to ensure that 
foreign investment in China is in keeping with government 
policy. The two government departments with primary 
responsibility are the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), which formulates industrial policy and 
economic strategy, and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which 
is responsible for approval of foreign investment in China. 
NDRC and MOFCOM in certain cases delegate authority to their 
counterparts at lower levels of government.\125\ Approval is 
discretionary on the part of the approving authority. Most 
foreign investment in China must undergo a government approval 
process, with larger investments, or investments in certain 
sectors, requiring approval at a higher level of 
government.\126\ In February 2011, MOFCOM issued a Circular on 
Issues in the Administration of Foreign Investment, delegating 
some approvals to provincial-level departments and eliminating 
or simplifying other administrative requirements.\127\ The 
Foreign Investment Guidance Catalogue, which is updated 
periodically, lists industries in which foreign investment is 
encouraged, restricted, or forbidden, including, in some cases, 
provisions concerning the structure, shareholding, or 
management of the investment.\128\ (In addition to the foreign 
investment approval process, enterprises in China must undergo 
a governmental annual review process to maintain their business 
licenses.) \129\
    In April 2010, the State Council issued opinions that 
called for revising the catalogue to encourage foreign 
investment in ``high-end manufacturing, `high-tech' industries, 
modern services, new energy sources, and energy conservation 
and environmental protection sectors.'' \130\ The opinions' 
introduction notes, ``Utilizing foreign investment has always 
been an important part of China's basic state policy of opening 
up,'' and underscores the important role of foreign investment 
in scientific and technological innovation.\131\ The State 
Council issued a draft revision to the current 2007 catalogue 
in April 2011 which includes provisions adding the strategic 
industries listed in the 12th Five-Year Plan to the 
``encouraged'' category.\132\
    In February 2011, the State Council issued the Circular on 
Establishing a Security Review System for Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, with the goal of 
guiding such acquisitions and protecting national 
security.\133\ The security review applies to transactions 
involving foreign investors and domestic military industries, 
or military industry parts, or important enterprises near 
military facilities; or acquisitions through which foreign 
investors may acquire a controlling share in other entities 
relevant to national security, as well as entities providing 
important agricultural products, energy and natural resources, 
infrastructure, transportation services, key technologies, and 
major equipment manufacturers.\134\ The security review will 
evaluate the effects of an acquisition on national security, 
the national economy, and society, and the research and design 
capabilities of important domestic technologies relevant to 
national security.\135\ A panel to carry out security reviews 
will be established under the State Council, with the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and MOFCOM in the 
lead.\136\ Under the review procedure, a foreign investor must 
file an application with MOFCOM.\137\ If MOFCOM finds that the 
acquisition should be subject to security review, MOFCOM will 
file a request with the panel.\138\ Even if a foreign investor 
does not file for a review, the relevant Chinese industry 
association or government department can file for a 
review.\139\ In March 2011, MOFCOM issued provisions, effective 
from March 5, 2011 to August 31, 2011, which provide procedural 
rules for a security review.\140\

                      CHINA'S OUTBOUND INVESTMENT

    Like foreign investment into China, China's outbound 
investment is subject to a government approval process, with 
approval authority under MOFCOM and the NDRC. MOFCOM measures 
issued in 2009 set out the approval process for outbound 
investment,\141\ generally requiring approval at higher 
government levels for larger investments. Relatively larger 
investments in the energy or mineral sectors can be approved at 
the provincial level, which expedites these transactions.\142\ 
In addition, certain large investments require the approval of 
the NDRC.\143\ Outbound investments by central-level state-
owned enterprises must make a filing with the NDRC.\144\
    As China encourages its companies to ``go global'' under 
the 12th Five-Year Plan,\145\ Chinese government departments 
are revising regulation of outbound investments. MOFCOM and 
other departments are preparing draft regulations on outbound 
investment and foreign labor service cooperation, and there are 
discussions concerning regulations on foreign contracted 
projects.\146\ In February, the National People's Congress 
amended the Criminal Law to criminalize the giving of items of 
value to foreign governments or international organizations for 
purposes of obtaining improper commercial benefits.\147\ The 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
issued two sets of interim measures on monitoring and 
supervising financial activities of the central-level state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) offshore.\148\
    There are a number of avenues for SOEs to obtain financing 
for outbound investment, including loans by China's state-owned 
banks, outbound investment funds, and use of yuan. According to 
a report in People's Daily, the head of the China Nonferrous 
Metals Industry Association indicated that the government will 
certify enterprises that meet standards for mine exploration 
and development, which will be given priority when applying for 
loans.\149\ According to a 2011 report by the Heritage 
Foundation, most funding for outbound investment has gone into 
energy and power, and at the end of 2010, there was a ``rush of 
energy acquisition and plant construction deals. Metals draw 
the second-most investment, followed by finance and real 
estate.'' \150\ Though there have been allegations of subsidies 
for overseas investments, a MOFCOM official called the 
allegations ``entirely groundless.'' \151\ [For information on 
China's liberalization of the yuan in outbound investment, see 
Currency in this section.]

                            Antimonopoly Law

    In December 2010, two of the three Chinese government 
departments charged with enforcing the PRC Antimonopoly Law 
(AML) issued new regulations.\152\ The State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC), which is responsible for 
regulating monopoly agreements and abuse of dominance not 
involving pricing, issued provisions prohibiting monopoly 
agreements,\153\ provisions on abuse of dominance,\154\ and 
provisions covering abuse of administrative power to restrict 
competition.\155\ The NDRC, which covers monopoly agreements 
and abuse of dominance involving pricing, issued provisions on 
monopolies involving pricing \156\ and enforcement 
procedures.\157\ While four of these measures address business 
conduct, the SAIC provisions on abuse of administrative power 
could, if fully implemented, constrain abuse by local officials 
and allow freer movement of goods within China, both of which 
would benefit Chinese consumers.\158\ These regulations all 
took effect on February 1, 2011.
    After issuing the new regulations, but before the effective 
date, SAIC imposed its first fine for a violation of the AML, 
in a case concerning a concrete cartel in Jiangsu 
province.\159\ The cartel was organized by a trade association 
and resulted in concrete producers dividing the market.\160\ In 
another case, Hudong, an online encyclopedia in China, filed a 
complaint with SAIC against Chinese search engine Baidu, 
alleging that Baidu abused its dominant position by ranking 
Hudong's Web site lower on search results. According to a 
report in China Daily, however, there have been at least three 
complaints against Baidu that Chinese regulators declined to 
pursue.\161\
    In January 2011, the NDRC announced that the Zhejiang 
Provincial Price Bureau fined the Zhejiang Fuyang Paper 
Industry Association for price fixing.\162\ According to the 
announcement, the case was to be used as an example to educate 
other industry associations.\163\ In one of the first 
administrative monopoly cases, in June 2011 the Guangdong 
provincial government found that the Heyuan Municipal People's 
Government violated the AML's provisions on administrative 
monopoly by restricting the promotion and sale of global 
positioning systems.\164\ The administrative monopoly 
provisions of the AML forbid conduct by administrative 
departments to restrict competition or protect local 
businesses.\165\
    The U.S. business community in China has expressed concern 
that the AML may be used in ways that do not support consumer 
interests and market efficiency but may be ``selectively or 
discriminatorily enforced to promote industrial policy and 
other ends.'' \166\ This is of greatest concern in the context 
of merger reviews, which MOFCOM, the third government 
department charged with responsibility under the AML, handles. 
MOFCOM held up approval of an offshore transaction for the sale 
of Motorola's network assets to Nokia. Antitrust authorities in 
other jurisdictions, including the United States and European 
Union, had approved the deal.\167\ One management consultant 
noted that the Chinese government may have been using the 
approval process as leverage because of controversy over 
Chinese telecommunications equipment suppliers that were not 
allowed access to the U.S. market.\168\ In June, MOFCOM gave 
only a conditional approval to the merger of two Russian potash 
producers in a decision that made clear that MOFCOM would 
evaluate the effect of the merger on national economic 
development.\169\
    There have been no reports of MOFCOM not approving, or 
giving conditional approval to, mergers between Chinese 
companies. The State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) has encouraged the 
consolidation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China (a 
process some industrial policies mandate, such as that for 
automobiles). For example, SASAC is consolidating China's two 
largest train manufacturers so that they do not compete with 
each other, especially in international markets.\170\ SASAC is 
also consolidating the crucial rare earth industry so that 
there will be three companies with 80 percent of the rare earth 
market in southern China.\171\ Furthermore, the NDRC has 
formulated a plan to adjust nine major industries in China to 
improve their efficiency.\172\

                              Food Safety

    During the 2011 reporting year, food safety problems 
persisted in China, with incidents ranging from exploding 
watermelons to toxic bean sprouts ``soaked in banned 
additives'' and poisonous pepper in Chongqing hotpots.\173\ To 
address reporting of these incidents, the Ministry of Health 
(MOH) will create a media platform to provide public 
notifications of food safety issues.\174\ In addition, however, 
MOH also said they will ``blacklist'' reporters who ``mislead 
the public,'' according to a Chinese media report.\175\ The 
Chinese government has continued to develop its food safety 
system, as established under the 2009 PRC Food Safety Law, and 
the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social 
Development devotes a section to food and drug safety, 
including the need for a tracing system, risk monitoring, and 
supervision.\176\ In September 2010, the MOH passed the 
National Food Safety Standards, which took effect in 
December,\177\ and in November, six government departments 
issued measures on disclosure of food safety information.\178\ 
The central government is investing in improvements to local-
level food inspection.\179\ The State Council issued a 
comprehensive document on food safety work for 2011, which 
addresses cracking down on illegal behavior, improving 
supervision of food safety, and strengthening education.\180\ 
In June, MOH banned the use of bisphenol-A (BPA) in infants' 
milk bottles.\181\

                           Access to Justice

                              Introduction

    Chinese citizens' ability to seek redress against 
government actions that violate their legal rights has changed 
significantly over the past 30 years. More than 200 laws have 
been enacted,\1\ but citizens continue to face significant 
obstacles to accessing justice. Article 8 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states that ``[e]veryone has the 
right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him 
by the constitution or by law.'' \2\ Article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
requires states to ensure that persons whose rights or freedoms 
are violated ``have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity.'' \3\
    During the Commission's 2011 reporting period, key policies 
and regulations relating to access to justice reflected the 
Communist Party's ongoing concern with maintaining stability. 
Authorities emphasized the use of mediation over trials in 
civil cases and promoted mediation as the solution to social 
unrest. At the same time, authorities sought to enact measures 
that could curb corruption and lead to greater professionalism 
within the courts. Authorities' concern with maintaining 
stability extended to citizen petitioning, an area beset with 
well-documented human rights violations such as arbitrary 
detention. During this reporting year, Chinese media exposed a 
``stability maintenance'' organization tasked by some local 
governments with retrieving petitioners from Beijing, a 
practice that often led to abuse of petitioners. In addition, 
petitioner cases involving land disputes continued as a trend 
as officials sought to develop more rural land.
    Against the backdrop of the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded 
to China's prominent imprisoned intellectual and writer Liu 
Xiaobo in October 2010, and amidst the online ``Jasmine'' call 
for reform domestically, the government enforced measures that 
further restricted human rights lawyers' advocacy efforts. 
Officials at various levels of the government continued to take 
steps to discourage, intimidate, and detain human rights 
lawyers and defenders who take on issues, cases, and clients 
that officials deem to be ``sensitive.'' In spite of apparent 
efforts to train more legal aid representatives, measurable 
positive effects in citizens' access to justice remain elusive.

         Mediation as a Vehicle To Maintaining Social Stability

    During the 2011 reporting year, government and party 
officials continued to use courts as a tool in their efforts to 
maintain social stability. In particular, the Supreme People's 
Court encouraged the use of mediation over trials as means to 
resolve disputes in civil cases.\4\ The PRC People's Mediation 
Law became effective in January 2011,\5\ and stresses the need 
to resolve civil disputes through mediation and to maintain 
social harmony and stability.\6\ It encourages disagreeing 
parties to reach a voluntary resolution through people's 
mediation committees.\7\ Furthermore, the mediation services 
are free of charge and legally binding on the parties.\8\ To 
further strengthen enforcement efforts, in July 2010, 
authorities issued a joint opinion involving multiple agencies 
in an effort to improve enforcement of legally binding 
decrees.\9\ The joint opinion establishes general policy 
provisions for each agency and allows the courts to coordinate 
among agencies.\10\ Since passage of the PRC People's Mediation 
Law, authorities have actively promoted it as the ``first line 
of defence [sic]'' \11\ against mass conflicts. In January 
2011, the Supreme People's Court further emphasized the 
importance of mediation to all basic-level people's courts by 
stressing the need to uphold the principle of ``mediation 
first, then integrate mediation and adjudication.'' \12\
    Authorities also praised the national model judge for 2010, 
who resolved more than 3,100 cases in 14 years ``all without a 
single mistake, appeal, or citizen petitioning [against her 
decisions].'' \13\ Judge Chen explained that one of her key 
work principles is to prioritize mediation over litigation, 
especially in cases involving neighborhood disputes and marital 
discord.\14\
    In spite of the push for mediation, the broader 
implications of the law remain unclear. While mediation is an 
effective tool in some types of cases, concerns about mediation 
center on three main issues: Curtailed access to courts for 
Chinese citizens, adequate resolution of disputes without 
coercion, and effective enforcement.\15\ A particular concern 
is the potential use of the PRC People's Mediation Law to 
pressure and silence human rights activists. For example, in 
June 2011, public security officials reportedly approached 
members of the Tiananmen Mothers, a non-governmental 
organization that seeks public discussion and accountability 
for people killed during the 1989 Tiananmen protests. The 
officials reportedly offered to pay compensation to settle 
individual cases.\16\ The terms of the settlement, however, did 
not include public discussions about the 1989 Tiananmen 
protests, investigations, or accountability--objectives that 
the Tiananmen Mothers aim to achieve.\17\ To further promote 
mediating disputes over trial work, the government and the 
Party reportedly have mandatory mediation quotas, offer 
financial rewards and career advancements to judges who have 
high rates of mediation, and punish judges who issue decisions 
that result in citizen petitioning.\18\ This approach can lead 
some judges to engage in unfair settlement tactics that could 
``detract from the substantive fairness of the process and 
undermines the legitimacy of the court system.'' \19\ Survey 
data also suggests that the enforcement of mediated agreements 
remains weak.\20\

                 Efforts To Professionalize the Courts

    During this reporting year, the Supreme People's Court 
sought to professionalize courts by issuing codes of conduct, 
recusal regulations, and guiding cases. In December 2010, the 
Supreme People's Court issued two documents concerning judges' 
conduct: The Model Judicial Behavior Code \21\ and the Basic 
Code of Professional Conduct for Judges.\22\ The two documents 
seek to guide judges in their judicial work and conduct outside 
of work,\23\ set forth five principles of loyalties for 
judges,\24\ and stress allegiance and loyalty to the Party.\25\ 
In early 2011, the Supreme People's Court issued two 
regulations intended to limit improper influence on the courts. 
The Trial Implementation of the Provisions Regarding 
Professional Avoidance of Trial Judges and Court Leadership 
When a Spouse or Child Practices as a Lawyer \26\ (``Trial 
Implementation Provisions'') requires the court officials and 
some trial judges to recuse themselves in some professional 
settings when a spouse or child practices as a lawyer in the 
jurisdiction they oversee. The Provisions Regarding the 
Prevention of Interference With Casework by Internal Court 
Personnel \27\ prohibit current and retired court personnel 
from conducting private meetings with parties, as well as their 
relatives and legal representatives, whose cases are being 
adjudicated by the court. The provisions also prohibit current 
and retired court personnel from forwarding documents, 
inquiring, or interceding on behalf of the parties.\28\ The 
efficacy of these regulations remains unclear. For example, the 
Trial Implementation Provisions do not include limitations on 
the procuratorate, public security personnel, or anyone else 
who shares a close relationship with the parties or the court.
    Authorities also sought to limit the lower courts' ability 
to request instructions from higher level courts when 
adjudicating cases. This practice occurs when lower level 
courts seek to avoid responsibility or are unwilling to decide 
a case based on the facts and law as presented. The Opinion 
Concerning the Standardization of Trial Work Between Higher 
Level and Lower Level Courts,\29\ issued in December 2010, is 
the latest in a series of efforts by the central government to 
address this practice. Key provisions in the opinion limit the 
types of cases where instructions can be sought and prohibits 
``in principle'' the court of second instance from remanding a 
case based on unclear facts and insufficient evidence, when the 
court of first instance has fully investigated the facts.\30\
    The Supreme People's Court issued the long-awaited 
Regulations Regarding Guiding Cases in November 2010, which 
could lead to greater uniformity in the handling of cases.\31\ 
The regulations announced that the Supreme People's Court will 
publish uniform guidelines for some cases that have generated 
broad societal interest; where the regulation is general; where 
cases are representative of other cases similarly situated; or 
where cases are particularly complex, difficult or novel, or 
otherwise have guiding value.\32\ The Supreme People's Court 
(SPC) reportedly was selecting its first series of guiding 
cases in May 2011.\33\ In addition, according to the director 
of the SPC research department, the guiding cases will 
eventually include three series covering public security, the 
procuratorate, and the courts.\34\ One of the key questions 
that remains unanswered is the degree to which the guiding 
cases are binding on lower courts.\35\
    In September 2010, the Supreme People's Court issued 
sentencing guidelines on a trial basis that could improve 
transparency, uniformity, and fairness in sentencing criminal 
defendants.\36\ The key provisions of the guidelines provide 
baseline sentences for 15 of the most commonly encountered 
crimes such as traffic offenses, battery, rape, robbery, 
larceny, fraud, and drug offenses, among others, and establish 
sentencing factors in aggravation and in mitigation.\37\ If 
implemented at the local level, the guidelines could 
potentially promote greater transparency and consistency in 
sentencing by limiting individual discretion of judges.

                    Corruption Within the Judiciary

    Corruption within the judiciary has been a longstanding 
problem.\38\ The extent and scope of corruption are unclear due 
to a lack of independent data. According to official sources, 
from January to November 2010, the government ``investigated 
119,000 graft cases, resulting in 113,000 people being 
punished, of whom 4,332 were prosecuted . . . .'' \39\ In 
addition, a report published by the Supreme People's Court in 
February 2011 singled out 187 people within the judicial system 
for improper conduct, ranging from private use of public 
property to charging inflated fees in 2010.\40\ Anecdotal but 
numerous incidents of corruption reported in the media involved 
judges extorting money from litigants,\41\ engaging in 
collusion,\42\ and accepting bribes.\43\
    During this reporting year, key policies continued to 
reflect the authorities' ongoing efforts to root out corruption 
within the judiciary,\44\ and within the confines of the 
existing political structure where the courts are subject to 
the control of the Party.\45\ The current approach to combat 
judicial corruption appears to particularly emphasize the role 
of state supervision.\46\ In October 2010, the Supreme People's 
Court announced it would gradually undertake tours of 
inspection of local-level courts where one of the main purposes 
is to investigate the lower level courts' ability to handle 
matters diligently and free from corruption.\47\ In addition, 
the authorities continued to promote the policy of ``Five 
Prohibitions'' first promulgated in 2009.\48\ The ``Five 
Prohibitions'' policy proscribes judges from engaging in 
improper conduct such as accepting gifts, interceding on behalf 
of another party, divulging work secrets, and engaging in 
favoritism.\49\ The courts have also instituted an online forum 
where citizens can report on corrupt judges and monitor the 
progress of whistleblowing tips.\50\ The efficacy of the online 
forum remains unclear.

                           Administrative Law

    Administrative law provides channels for citizens to seek 
limited remedy when they believe the government has violated 
their rights. Because Chinese courts do not have the power 
either to apply constitutional provisions or to strike down 
laws or regulations that are inconsistent with China's 
Constitution,\51\ administrative laws serve as a tool to allow 
citizens to express grievances, challenge alleged official 
wrongdoing, and impose constraints on official misconduct. 
Overall, Chinese citizens today have more options for redress 
against government violations than they did 20 years ago, when 
the field of administrative law first began to develop. In 
spite of these developments, the administrative law system 
still faces fundamental institutional challenges. For example, 
Chinese citizens cannot challenge administrative regulations 
that violate constitutional or legal rights. Article 12 of the 
PRC Administrative Procedure Law forbids courts from accepting 
citizen challenges of administrative rules and regulations that 
have ``general binding force.'' \52\ In addition, the PRC 
Administrative Reconsideration Law does not allow adjudication 
of State Council rules or regulations.\53\ During this 
reporting period, the Chinese government continued to promote 
administrative law reforms that seek to provide greater 
oversight of state agencies and government employees and to 
protect citizens' interests. In June 2010, the amended PRC 
Administrative Supervision Law became effective.\54\ The key 
amendments provide some protection for whistleblowers.\55\ For 
example, Article 6 stipulates that administrative agencies 
shall keep whistleblowers' information confidential, and 
Articles 46 and 47 provide that individuals [should] be 
punished or prosecuted for revealing information about 
whistleblowers or bringing retaliatory charges against 
reporting parties.\56\ In December 2010, the amended PRC State 
Compensation Law became effective.\57\ The amended compensation 
law expands the scope of the existing law by allowing 
negligence to go forward as a cause of action against the 
government under some circumstances.\58\ In addition, the 
amended law eliminates certain procedural loopholes making it 
easier to establish a valid claim \59\ and allows compensation 
for ``psychological injury.'' \60\
    The Commission notes that overall, Chinese citizens remain 
reluctant to bring cases against government officials using 
administrative law provisions. According to the Supreme 
People's Court's work report, the courts handled 135,679 
administrative cases, or approximately 1 percent of the 11.7 
million cases handled by local courts at various levels.\61\ 
The key reasons include a lack of confidence in the judicial 
system, historical context, and the belief that the xinfang 
system is a more appropriate channel for citizens' 
grievances.\62\

                     Citizen Petitioning (Xinfang)

    The petitioning, or xinfang (letters and visits), system 
exists to provide a channel, outside court challenges, for 
citizens to appeal government, court, and Communist Party 
decisions and present their grievances. Due to institutional 
weaknesses in the judiciary and limits on citizens' ability to 
air grievances, citizens often use petitioning as a means to 
seek redress for perceived wrongs. Common citizen petitioning 
cases involve reports of official corruption causing perceived 
injustice, alleged abuse of power, and unfair land 
compensation.
    China's Constitution and the 2005 PRC National Regulations 
on Letters and Visits provide that Chinese citizens have the 
right to petition without retribution. Xinfang bureaus are 
found throughout the Chinese bureaucracy, including offices of 
the Party, police, government, procuratorates, courts, and 
people's congresses. Individual petitioning may take the form 
of one dissatisfied citizen going to multiple xinfang bureaus 
repeatedly over the course of several months or years. 
Collective or mass petitioning may involve attempts to organize 
demonstrations, speeches, or marches of people seeking to 
present their grievances. The capital city, Beijing, where the 
central government and high-level officials are located, is an 
especially prominent destination for petitioners from all over 
China. According to a 2007 research study conducted by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, there were ``more than 
10,000 petitioners that have set up temporary residence'' in 
Beijing.\63\ However, only approximately 0.2 percent of the 
petitioners reportedly achieve resolution through 
petitioning.\64\
    Based on official information from Xinhua in March 2011, 
the xinfang system ``ferreted out a total of 2,076,000 cases of 
varying kinds of conflicts since April 2010, of which 1,643,000 
cases,'' or 79.1 percent, have been resolved.\65\ According to 
the latest Supreme People's Court's annual report, the number 
of citizen-petitioning cases in 2010 declined by 22 percent at 
local levels.\66\ The declining figures could mean, however, 
that the local officials, whose career advancement is often 
correlated with lower instances of citizen petitioning,\67\ are 
becoming more skilled at preventing petitioners from reaching 
higher level xinfang bureaus.
    In spite of Premier Wen Jiabao's show of support for 
petitioners' problems during a visit to Beijing's top 
petitioning bureau,\68\ Chinese citizens continued to face 
official reprisals, harassment, and violence. During this 
reporting year, the central government, and its extensive 
network of ``social stability preservation'' organizations 
under the leadership of the Communist Party Central Committee, 
continued to assess local government in part based on the 
number of ``abnormal petitions.'' \69\ To cope with the 
assessment, local governments continued to employ private 
security companies that sometimes resorted to extralegal 
measures to prevent petitioners from reaching the central 
government.\70\ In October 2010, Southern Metropolitan Daily 
exposed a private security company, Anyuanding, under contract 
by local governments to ``retrieve'' petitioners who attempted 
to petition in Beijing, where the central government is 
located.\71\ Anyuanding employed a variety of methods to 
prevent petitioners from making their grievances heard at the 
central level. The methods reportedly included coaxing, 
threats, abduction, detention in ``black jails'' for extended 
periods of time, and beatings.\72\ Official mistreatment of 
petitioners was especially harsh during national holidays, 
meetings held by the Party, and ``politically sensitive 
periods.'' \73\
    Maintaining social stability and containing the petitioning 
system remained a priority for central and local authorities. 
In May 2011, the Supreme People's Court issued a series of 
documents for lower level courts on how to handle petitioning. 
The documents outlined ``four musts and five systems.'' The 
four ``musts'' include: Strengthening the ideology of the 
masses, finding the problem at the source, building long-term 
capacity, and focusing on the masses. The five systems focus on 
risk assessment, notification, reception of petitioners, multi-
faceted solutions, and establishing a system of finality in 
petitioning.\74\ Key elements of the documents echoed the push 
for mediation and social stability observed throughout the 
court system during this reporting period. [See Mediation as a 
Vehicle To Maintaining Social Stability in this section.]
    During this reporting year, local governments continued to 
misapply legal regulations to punish petitioners for the sake 
of maintaining social stability. Public security officers on 
occasion detained petitioners under Article 23 of the PRC 
Public Security Administration Punishment Law.\75\ The 
provision proscribes conduct that ``disturbs social order.'' 
Specifically, Subsection 1 prohibits ``disturbing order of 
organizations, groups, enterprises, institutions, causing 
interference in their routine operations in work production, 
operation, medical care, education and research, but not yet 
causing serious harm.'' \76\ Subsection 2 prohibits 
``disturbing order in bus stations, ports, wharfs, airports, 
shopping facilities, parks, exhibition centers, and other 
public places.'' \77\ The punishment for ``disturbing social 
order'' under Article 23 ranges from warning to 15 days of 
detention. For example, public security officers from the 
Beijing Public Security Bureau's Haidian district took 
petitioner Cai Fuxian into custody for 10 days under Article 23 
on October 17, 2010, for distributing leaflets near the meeting 
place of the fifth plenum of the Communist Party's Central 
Committee. Cai was seeking redress for the alleged wrongful 
death of her father, a veteran cadre of the Party, and claimed 
that a current Central Committee member was involved.\78\
    Authorities and rural petitioners who petitioned about 
demolition of or eviction from their land and residences 
continued to confront each other, often violently.\79\ Under 
the rubric of land and hukou reform, there appeared to be 
increasing tension between some local governments' plans to 
develop rural land for urbanization and some rural residents' 
desire to stay put. According to data made available by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in December 2010, 
petitioning related to land makes up 73 percent of all 
petitioning cases.\80\ Presently, there are approximately 50 
million farmers who have lost their farmland due to urban 
development, a number projected to double in 10 years' 
time.\81\ Against this backdrop, the National People's Congress 
Standing Committee passed the PRC Administrative Coercion Law 
on June 30, 2011, to become effective on January 1, 2012.\82\ 
The law aims to establish a framework for regulating coercive 
measures government authorities can use against citizens.\83\ 
Key chapters in the law define government actions that fall 
within the scope the law,\84\ set out a standardized process by 
which forcible measures may be imposed against citizens,\85\ 
and allow citizens to sue for damages under certain 
circumstances.\86\
    Citizen petitioning and its abuses reflect two 
contradictory goals of the system: Stability preservation--
embodied by the need for conflicts to remain at the local 
level--and the central government's use of citizen petitioning 
as a check on local governments.\87\ Furthermore, the existing 
system partially reflects the limited options available to 
Chinese citizens seeking redress through the rule of law.

                   Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders

    The Commission observed increasing efforts by Chinese 
authorities to discourage, intimidate, and physically harm 
human rights lawyers and defenders who took on ``sensitive'' 
causes.\88\ Authorities continued to employ a spectrum of harsh 
measures such as stationing police personnel to monitor the 
whereabouts of rights defenders,\89\ forcing rights defenders 
to ``travel'' to remote or unknown locations,\90\ inviting them 
to ``drink tea'' with security personnel,\91\ and imprisoning 
them.\92\ In addition, the Chinese government appears to 
increasingly target human rights defenders under the color of 
law. For example, throughout this reporting year, the 
government denied annual license renewals for human rights 
lawyers,\93\ charged some human rights defenders and activists 
with crimes such as ``disturbing social order,'' \94\ and 
prohibited others from leaving the country, citing national 
security concerns under the PRC Law on the Control of the Exit 
and Entry of Citizens.\95\ [See Section II--Criminal Justice 
and Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement for 
additional information on human rights lawyers and defenders.]

                               Legal Aid

    Chinese law grants criminal defendants the right to hire an 
attorney but guarantees pro bono legal defense only if the 
defendant is a minor, faces a possible death sentence, or is 
blind, deaf, or mute.\96\ In other cases in which defendants 
cannot afford legal representation, courts may appoint defense 
counsel or defendants may apply for legal aid, in theory, as 
early as the investigative stage of their cases.\97\
    During the 2011 reporting year, the Commission observed 
numerous reports of legal aid initiatives aimed at serving 
disadvantaged regions and improving access to justice for 
citizens. In early February 2011, the Ministry of Justice 
announced that legal aid funds nationwide increased to more 
than 1 billion yuan (US$153 million) in 2010, as the central 
government and provincial governments allocated more funds to 
establish legal aid programs in rural localities.\98\ In 
addition, the China Legal Aid Foundation--a government agency 
established to raise, manage, and allocate funding for the 
legal aid system--increased legal assistance funding with 
allocations from the public welfare lottery.\99\ The increase 
in legal aid funding comes as officials report that legal aid 
organizations across China handled record numbers of cases on 
behalf of disadvantaged applicants.\100\
    According to a February 9, 2011, China Daily article, a 
senior official with the Ministry of Justice announced that the 
government would send lawyers to assist disadvantaged groups in 
213 destitute counties in central and western China.\101\ On 
February 14, 2011, the China Daily reported that the Beijing 
Legal Aid Center announced free legal aid consultations and 
services for families of trafficked children seeking to sue 
child traffickers, in response to a high-profile government 
crackdown on child abductions.\102\ On February 25, 2011, China 
Tibet News reported that the Ministry of Finance allocated a 
special legal aid fund of 700,000 yuan (US$107,200) to assist 
migrant workers, minors, the elderly, women, and persons with 
disabilities in the Tibet Autonomous Region.\103\ In a March 1, 
2011, China Daily article, the Beijing Municipal Bureau of 
Justice announced its Legal Services in the Community project 
would place lawyers in all 2,600 communities and 3,900 villages 
within the Beijing municipality.\104\
    Despite the expansion of the legal aid system, China's 
legal aid structure faces systemic challenges in meeting the 
demands of its disadvantaged citizens and rural localities. 
According to a February 2010 article in Zhengyi Net (a Web site 
under the authority of the Supreme People's Procuratorate), a 
large number of citizens are in need of legal assistance--
including 40 million poor rural residents and 82 million 
persons with disabilities.\105\ The article notes that ``the 
staffs of legal aid agencies in China are far from meeting 
these needs.'' \106\ In February 2011, China Daily reported 
that China continues to face an imbalance in legal 
professionals, as only 5,000 of China's 200,000 lawyers work in 
the relatively poorer central and western regions.\107\ In some 
of China's underdeveloped regions, courts may have no defense 
attorneys.\108\ Furthermore, even in areas with a higher 
proportion of lawyers, citizens are often unable to manage the 
high costs associated with legal representation. According to 
one estimate, 80 to 90 percent of criminal defendants in China 
are unable to hire a lawyer.\109\ Despite increases to legal 
aid funding by the China Legal Aid Foundation, the legal aid 
system needs substantially more financial support to expand 
legal aid resources nationwide and to improve training for 
lawyers handling the challenges of legal aid cases.\110\

                                Property

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the press, 
including Chinese media, have reported numerous cases of 
expropriation and abuses of citizens' land use rights by local 
governments and property developers, including forced 
evictions, and related protests by Chinese citizens.\1\ These 
cases reflect a failure of rule of law \2\ in the face of a 
```great' and `unrelenting' gap between available land and 
demand for construction sites,'' which likely will lead to 
continued illegal land seizures as the Chinese economy 
grows.\3\ In April 2011, a Ministry of Land and Resources 
official was paraphrased as warning of ``a growing number of 
illegal land seizures in the future.'' \4\ Currently, land 
disputes, especially forced evictions, are a major cause of 
social unrest in China.\5\ A March 2011 report by a Chinese 
research institute found that land confiscation and housing 
demolition were one of three problems that drew the most 
attention from Chinese Internet users.\6\ To address these 
problems, in January 2011, the State Council issued new 
regulations on expropriation of urban land.\7\ If fully 
implemented, these regulations should provide greater 
protection to urban land use rights holders. Nevertheless, the 
regulations only apply to confiscations of state-owned land--
which generally is urban land--and not to rural land 
confiscations.
    The Chinese government has tried to improve regulation of 
the real estate market, including reining in prices, boosting 
the supply of low-income housing, and protecting scarce arable 
land. In January 2011, the State Council issued a circular on 
regulating the property market, which included provisions on 
boosting the housing supply and on holding officials 
responsible for stabilizing the market.\8\ Property prices have 
been climbing sharply since mid-2009, making housing 
increasingly unaffordable for many urban dwellers, and the 
government has set a target of 10 million apartments in 2011 
for low-income families.\9\ Furthermore, the government has 
taken a number of measures to control prices, which have risen 
as much as 50 percent in the 18-month period ending April 2011. 
For example, Beijing municipality issued rules that impose 
restrictions on who can buy property.\10\ Finally, the 
government was conducting a pilot project as of April 2011 to 
establish a nationwide system of land registration, with the 
stated aim of improving regulation of the market and protecting 
farmland.\11\

           Urban Land and Collectively Owned--or Rural--Land

    In China, urban and rural land are regulated differently. 
Under China's Constitution and system of property law, land is 
categorized as ``urban land,'' or rural ``collectively owned 
land.'' \12\ Urban land is owned by the state.\13\ Urban land 
cannot be sold, but the state can grant the right to use it for 
a term of years, upon payment of a land grant premium. The term 
is 70 years for residential land, 50 years for industrial land, 
and 40 years for commercial land, including land used for 
tourism and recreation.\14\ While only the state can grant 
urban land use rights,\15\ a grantee can transfer such 
rights.\16\ Collectively owned land is owned by the rural 
collectives and can be used only for agricultural purposes or 
for residences or services for farmers.\17\ Rural residents can 
enter into land use contracts with the collective for a period 
of 30 years.\18\
    As discussed below, holders of urban land use rights enjoy 
greater protection against expropriation than holders of 
interests in collectively owned land. Under certain 
circumstances, collectively owned land use rights can be 
requisitioned and converted into urban--or state-owned--land, 
which the local government can then grant.\19\ The sales of 
such land grants provide revenue for local governments.\20\ 
Furthermore, according to at least one U.S. expert, China 
subsidizes production by its state-owned enterprises in part by 
providing them with free land.\21\ The provision of subsidized 
land allows the Chinese government to support certain 
industries or companies, including in clean energy.\22\ One 
official who spoke at a press conference in April 2011 about 
illegal land seizures stated that the ``supply of land will be 
unrelentingly tighter and the tension it causes will accompany 
the whole process of China's urbanization, industrialization 
and modernization.'' \23\ [For a discussion of rural land 
conversion and hukou reform, see Section II--Freedom of 
Residence and Movement--Freedom of Residence.]

    Expropriation of Urban and Rural Land, Compensation, and Abuses

    During this reporting year, the Chinese government and 
Communist Party have taken actions to try to address abuses in 
property expropriations. For example, the Ministry of Public 
Security Party Committee in March 2011 issued an opinion on 
Party work in building clean government and fighting 
corruption, which included a ``zero tolerance'' policy toward 
involvement of public security officers in illegal actions to 
expropriate land.\24\ The Supreme People's Court issued an 
opinion in February 2011 calling on local courts to handle 
expropriation cases cautiously.\25\ According to a report on a 
meeting of Chinese legal experts, the National People's 
Congress (NPC) is considering a draft Immovable Property 
Expropriation and Relocation Law, and one of the drafters 
commented China should have a law that creates a uniform system 
for expropriation of both urban and rural land.\26\ 
Furthermore, the NPC is considering a draft Law on 
Administrative Coercion which, according to some reports, would 
address the problem of abuse and violence in 
expropriations.\27\ According to a professor of administrative 
law at Peking University who was cited in official media, the 
draft is an attempt ``to restrain administrative coercive power 
on one hand, and to maintain [urban management officers'] 
ability to undertake social management on the other.'' \28\ 
Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, which China has ratified, provides for the 
right to housing.\29\ General Comment 4 to Article 11 provides 
that ``instances of forced evictions are prima facie 
incompatible with the requirements of the Covenant and can only 
be justified in the most exceptional circumstances . . . .'' 
\30\

                        URBAN LAND EXPROPRIATION

    The PRC Regulations on Expropriation and Compensation for 
Housing on State-Owned Land (Urban Expropriation Regulations) 
came into effect in January 2011 \31\ and, if fully 
implemented, should offer greater protection to urban land 
rights holders.\32\ The PRC Property Law and the PRC Law on 
Administration of Urban Real Property allow expropriation of 
urban land in the ``public interest,'' subject to compensation 
for demolition and resettlement,\33\ but neither law defines 
``public interest.'' Article 8 of the Urban Expropriation 
Regulations defines ``public interest'' in the context of land 
takings for purposes including, for example, national defense 
and government infrastructure construction. Unlike previous 
legislation, the Urban Expropriation Regulations also provide 
for payment of market value, grant rights holders some 
procedural protections, such as payment of the purchase price 
before the owner vacates the property, and include a process 
for administrative review of the compensation amount if 
desired.\34\

                EXPROPRIATION OF COLLECTIVELY OWNED LAND

    Chinese laws and regulations provide rural residents, who 
live on collectively owned land, a lower level of procedural 
protection and a lower standard of compensation during 
expropriations.\35\ Though widespread abuse continues in the 
countryside, there is no legislation covering rights similar to 
the Urban Expropriation Regulations. According to a survey 
conducted in mid-2010 by Landesa, a U.S.-based rural 
development institute, together with a U.S. university and a 
Chinese university, according to an official media report, 
``[a]bout 37 percent of the 1,564 villages in 17 provinces and 
autonomous regions that were covered by the survey have 
experienced land confiscation since the late 1990s.'' \36\ Of 
these, farmers in 60 percent of the villages felt compensation 
was insufficient, and 29 percent of the farmers had no prior 
notice before their land was taken forcibly.\37\ Farmers who 
try to protect their land may face beating and detention, 
according to Western media reports.\38\

                              IV. Xinjiang


                              Introduction

    Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) remained poor during the Commission's 2011 
reporting year. Following demonstrations and riots in the 
region in July 2009, authorities maintained repressive security 
policies that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy, 
and independent expressions of cultural and religious identity, 
especially among Uyghurs, as threats to the region's stability. 
Authorities bolstered security in the region in summer 2011 
following incidents they described as terrorist attacks and in 
advance of an expanded trade expo. The government continued to 
obscure information about people tried in connection to the 
July 2009 demonstrations and riots, while overseas media 
reported on cases of people imprisoned for peaceful speech and 
assembly during that time. Implementation of a series of 
central government-led development initiatives, first announced 
at a May 2010 meeting known as the Xinjiang Work Forum, spurred 
an intensification of longstanding policies--including 
Mandarin-language schooling, herder resettlement, and urban 
development projects--that have undermined the rights of 
Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to maintain their cultures, 
languages, and livelihoods. Authorities enforced tight controls 
over religion, especially Islam, and maintained restrictions on 
religious practice that are harsher than curbs articulated in 
national regulations. Discriminatory job hiring practices 
against Uyghurs and other non-Han groups, who comprise roughly 
60 percent of the XUAR population, continued in both the 
government and private sectors. The Chinese government 
maintained its disregard of international legal protections for 
refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, and information on the 
status of Uyghurs forcibly returned to China in recent years, 
including multiple cases in 2011, remained limited.

                           Security Measures

    Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
continued to use security measures to bolster political and 
social controls in the region. At the same time XUAR 
authorities reiterated the Xinjiang Work Forum's call for 
``developments by leaps and bounds'' and ``long-term 
stability'' in the XUAR, high-level officials also continued to 
emphasize ``placing stability above all else'' and ``striking 
hard'' against the ``three forces'' of terrorism, separatism, 
and religious extremism.\1\ Authorities continued to apply the 
term ``three forces'' to include peaceful dissent, human rights 
advocacy, and independent expressions of cultural and religious 
identity, especially among Uyghurs.\2\ XUAR Communist Party 
Secretary Zhang Chunxian emphasized in a December 2010 meeting 
that stability was the ``prerequisite'' and ``guarantee'' for 
the region's development.\3\ In addition, officials at the 
meeting affirmed, as the region's guiding principle for 
stability work, central authorities' ``correct assessment'' 
that ``ethnic separatism'' is the main threat to the region's 
stability.\4\ The government and media also reported that 
terrorist incidents took place in the region in the past year, 
including incidents in Hoten and Kashgar districts 
(prefectures) in July.\5\ As in the past, authorities provided 
limited information on the events and continued to enforce 
restrictions on reporting that hindered efforts to investigate 
the incidents.\6\ The government reported the July incident in 
Hoten municipality, Hoten district, as a premeditated terrorist 
attack on a police station.\7\ Some people in Hoten 
contradicted the government's account, and some sources 
reported that the incident involved authorities suppressing a 
protest that started at another location.\8\
    In line with directives to guard against stated terrorist 
threats and other stability concerns, the regional government 
and lower level governments within the XUAR reported 
implementing a range of security measures. The XUAR Public 
Security Department launched a 100-day ``strike hard'' campaign 
in December 2010 that focused on preventing ``serious violent 
crimes'' and ``large-scale mass incidents'' and called on 
localities to expand the scope of round-the-clock street 
patrols.\9\ In February, the regional government established a 
leading group on state security to ``mobilize'' society to 
``wage battle against various acts that harm state security and 
social and political stability.'' \10\ Authorities heightened 
security following reported terrorist attacks in July and 
surrounding an inaugural ``China-Eurasia Expo'' in 
September.\11\ The XUAR Public Security Department launched a 
two-month ``strike hard'' anti-terrorism campaign in August, 
pledging an increased security presence and including among its 
targets ``illegal religious activities,'' ``religious 
extremism,'' and ``illegal propaganda materials.'' \12\ In the 
XUAR capital of Urumqi (population approximately 2.6 
million),\13\ state-controlled media reported in January 2011 
that authorities had added almost 17,000 security cameras in 
the previous year to existing surveillance cameras in the 
city.\14\ Authorities had announced plans in early 2010 to 
increase the number of 24-hour surveillance cameras in the city 
to 60,000 by that year's end,\15\ and the 17,000-camera 
addition appeared to exceed this target.\16\ After Urumqi 
authorities strengthened controls over the rental housing 
market in late 2009--steps they connected to the alleged 
involvement of Uyghur migrants to the city in the July 2009 
demonstrations and riots \17\--authorities launched a three-
month campaign in late 2010 to strengthen controls over 
migrants and housing rentals.\18\ In Shuimogou district, Urumqi 
city, authorities used the campaign to ``strike hard'' against 
``illegal religious activities'' and other ``three forces'' 
crimes.\19\ Districts throughout Urumqi reportedly have used a 
range of technologies and methods to monitor migrants and 
rental housing, including computerized entry cards in rental 
housing keyed to data about the user, and sealed-off 
neighborhoods with security checkpoints for vehicles and 
pedestrians.\20\ XUAR residents reported that authorities have 
maintained restrictions on passport applications from Uyghurs 
and members of other non-Han groups since the July 2009 
demonstrations and riots.\21\
    Uyghurs from the XUAR also faced scrutiny elsewhere in 
China. As part of a campaign to promote a ``peaceful Asian 
Games'' launched in advance of the November 2010 event hosted 
in Guangdong province, authorities in Zhongshan city, 
Guangdong, called for continuing work to resolve 
``contradictions'' and disputes in areas where ``Xinjiang 
Uyghurs'' ``assemble, live, or are active.'' \22\ A December 
2010 directive on promoting stability from the Changde city, 
Hunan province, ethnic and religious affairs bureau called for 
``launching investigation and research into the situation for 
managing Xinjiang Uyghurs.'' \23\

                         Ideological Campaigns

    Authorities within the XUAR continued to promote 
ideological and ``ethnic unity'' campaigns throughout the 
region and maintained a regional regulation on promoting ethnic 
unity that entered into force in February 2010. Both the 
regulation and related campaigns have promoted state-defined 
notions of ethnic unity and ethnic relations and have sought to 
quell or punish forms of speech deemed ``not beneficial'' to 
government and Party objectives.\24\ Authorities continued a 
``patriotic education'' campaign, launched in June 2010, titled 
``Ardently Loving the Great Motherland, Building a Glorious 
Homeland.'' A description from the state-run Xinhua news agency 
described the campaign as ``a fundamental project for promoting 
Xinjiang's development by leaps and bounds and long-term 
stability.'' \25\ Authorities reportedly organized 13,300 teams 
made up of 57,600 staff and held 91,000 lectures for a total of 
11 million listeners, thereby ``conveying the voice of the 
Party and government to people at the grassroots level,'' 
according to the head of the Xinjiang Academy of Social 
Sciences.\26\ Venues for the campaign included mosques, 
schools, and individual households.\27\

                          Xinjiang Work Forum

    In the past reporting year, central and XUAR government and 
Communist Party offices continued to implement a series of 
initiatives first announced at the May 2010 Xinjiang Work 
Forum, convened in Beijing by top central government and Party 
leaders. The inaugural forum set government and Party 
objectives for the XUAR's economic and political development, 
intensifying a trend of top-down initiatives that prioritize 
state economic and political goals over the promotion of 
regional autonomy and broader protection of XUAR residents' 
rights.\28\ Throughout the year, authorities emphasized the 
political importance of fulfilling the work forum's aims of 
``developments by leaps and bounds'' and ``long-term 
stability.'' \29\ As authorities renewed ``counterpart 
support'' programs that bring personnel and funding to the XUAR 
from other provincial-level areas, they stressed dispatching 
``politically steadfast'' cadres to serve development projects 
in the XUAR.'' \30\
    Implementation of the initiatives announced at the May 2010 
forum and its immediate aftermath brought an intensification of 
longstanding policies that have challenged the ability of 
Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to protect their cultures, 
languages, and livelihoods. Authorities accelerated 
implementation of Mandarin-focused ``bilingual education,'' a 
program that has diminished the use of Uyghur and other non-
Mandarin languages in XUAR schools. [See Language Policy and 
Bilingual Education in this section for more information.] XUAR 
authorities bolstered steps to resettle farmers and resettle 
herders away from grasslands, as part of initiatives from the 
Xinjiang Work Forum and longstanding grasslands policies that 
have restricted grazing for the stated goal of combating 
grasslands degradation.\31\ The grasslands policies affect 
Mongols, Kazakhs, and other groups in the XUAR with cultural 
ties to pastoral livelihoods. [See Section II--Ethnic Minority 
Rights for more information on grasslands policies throughout 
China and its impact on non-Han groups.] An August 2011 report 
from official media cited animal excrement upsetting tourists 
and grasslands degradation as impetuses for a grazing ban 
imposed at a tourist site containing grasslands.\32\ August 
media reports also detailed plans to resettle herders from 
grasslands areas, including other tourist sites, and shift them 
to different occupations.\33\ The XUAR government reported in 
November 2010 on already resettling 669,000 farmers and herders 
and described plans to resettle a total of 106,000 nomadic 
herding households and 700,000 rural households by 2015.\34\
    Following the Xinjiang Work Forum, authorities also 
accelerated urban development, raising concerns about the 
resettlement of residents, equitable distribution of resources, 
and cultural preservation. Projects described as ``slum 
transformations'' took place in the past year in localities 
throughout the XUAR.\35\ A report from the state-run Xinhua 
news agency noted ``mostly ethnic Uyghurs'' made up the 250,000 
residents of Urumqi city's ``slum areas,'' which the report 
said ``are considered the breeding ground for the resentment 
which underpinned the deadly riots that rocked the city two 
years ago.'' \36\ In the past year XUAR authorities also 
detailed plans for developing part of Kashgar municipality and 
Korgas Port, along with part of Yining (Ghulja) municipality, 
Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, as two special economic zones 
reportedly ``modeled on Shenzhen'' and for developing Urumqi 
into a ``core city'' of western China and an ``international 
trade center,'' \37\ with reported plans to double or almost 
double the populations of Urumqi and Kashgar.\38\ Authorities 
expanded a longstanding trade fair in Urumqi into an inaugural 
``China-Eurasia Expo'' held in September, describing it as a 
``major strategic measure to achieve rapid development and the 
long-term stability of Xinjiang,'' with focus on ``making 
Xinjiang a bridgehead in the development of [the] western 
region.'' \39\ In addition, officials announced plans to 
construct a railway line between Golmud city, Qinghai province, 
and Korla city within the period of the 12th Five-Year Plan on 
National Economic and Social Development (2011-2015).\40\ Some 
Uyghurs and outside observers have expressed concern about the 
ability of Uyghur communities to maintain their culture amid 
top-down development projects and questioned whether Uyghurs 
would enjoy economic benefits on par with Han residents, 
against a backdrop of prior development projects that have 
brought disproportionate benefits to Han Chinese.\41\ The 
Kashgar plans come as authorities continue a five-year project 
to raze and rebuild the city's historic area. [See Preservation 
of Cultural Heritage in this section for more information.]

                   Criminal Law and Access to Justice

    Authorities in the XUAR continued to stress the role of the 
justice system in ``striking hard'' against the ``three 
forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. In 
2010, the Supreme People's Court issued an opinion on 
nationwide work to assist the XUAR court system. The opinion 
called for strengthening ``guidance'' for trying cases 
connected to endangering state security, including cases 
involving the ``three forces,'' as well as cases ``influencing 
ethnic unity'' and social ``harmony and stability.'' \42\ The 
opinion also called for dispatching ``politically steadfast'' 
judges to the XUAR.\43\ The Communist Party-controlled Xinjiang 
Lawyers Association held a training session for non-Han 
(``ethnic minority'') lawyers in December. In addition to 
providing professional training, the session's stated aim was 
strengthening ``ideological and political construction'' and 
cultivating ``politically steadfast'' lawyers.\44\ Speaking at 
the event, XUAR Justice Department head Abliz Hoshur noted 
ethnic minority lawyers' ``special role'' in dealing with 
sensitive cases, including those connected to events in July 
2009.\45\ He called on the lawyers to ``fully utilize the 
weapon of the law'' to battle the ``three forces.'' \46\
    Following a statement in March 2010 by XUAR government 
chairperson Nur Bekri that courts had tried 198 people in 97 
cases in connection to the July 2009 demonstrations and 
riots,\47\ Chinese government and media reports appeared to 
provide no additional details on trials connected to the July 
events. Nur Bekri said in his March 2010 remarks, however, that 
trials were ongoing.\48\ Later, in January 2011, Rozi Ismail, 
head of the XUAR High People's Court, also made a brief 
reference to ongoing cases connected to the events,\49\ but 
authorities did not provide specific information on the trials. 
Overseas media and a non-governmental organization reported on 
trials that took place in April and July 2010.\50\ A lawyer in 
the XUAR reported to overseas media in fall 2010 that she and 
other judges and lawyers had been sent to Urumqi, the XUAR 
capital, from other localities in the XUAR to handle July 2009-
related cases and that they were ordered to finish handling the 
cases by the end of 2010.\51\
    The number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes of 
endangering state security (ESS)--a category of criminal 
offenses that authorities in China have used to punish citizen 
activism and dissent--decreased in 2010 compared to 2009 
figures, but remained higher than in years before 2009.\52\ 
Courts in the XUAR completed trials in 376 ESS cases in 2010, a 
decrease of 61 cases over the previous year.\53\ The 2009 
figure of 437 was a sharp increase over the 268 ESS cases tried 
in the region in 2008, as well as cases tried earlier in the 
decade.\54\ Officials did not report the reason for the high 
number of cases in 2009 and 2010, although Rozi Ismail, 
President of the XUAR High People's Court, said the 2010 
figures included cases connected to ``violent terrorist 
crimes,'' including crimes reported to have taken place in 
2008.\55\ Rozi Ismail did not link the ESS cases from 2010 to 
trials connected to the July 2009 demonstrations and riots. To 
date, official reports have not clearly specified how many 
trials connected to the July events involved ESS cases.\56\ 
Unofficial sources have reported on a limited number of trials 
connected to the July 2009 events that involve ESS charges, 
including the cases of Gulmira Imin, Gheyret Niyaz, Nijat Azat, 
Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli.\57\ [See Section III--Access to 
Justice for information on legal aid initiatives in western 
China.]

                     Controls Over Free Expression

    The XUAR government continued to exert tight controls over 
free expression. The government maintained regulations passed 
in the aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots that 
repress free speech,\58\ while a series of reports from the 
past year underscored continuing government repression of 
people who exercised their right to free expression. Radio Free 
Asia (RFA) reported in December 2010 that Uyghur journalist and 
webmaster Memetjan Abdulla received a life sentence in April 
2010 in apparent connection to translating an announcement 
calling on Uyghurs to hold demonstrations in July 2009 and in 
connection to interviews he gave to foreign journalists.\59\ 
RFA reported in March 2011 on the seven-year sentence of Uyghur 
webmaster Tursunjan Hezim in July 2010, following his detention 
in the aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots.\60\ 
A number of other Uyghur writers, journalists, and Web site 
workers continued to serve prison sentences in connection to 
exercising their right to free expression about the 
demonstrations and riots in July 2009 or otherwise deemed to 
have a connection to the events. They include Dilshat Perhat, 
Gheyret Niyaz, Gulmira Imin, Nijat Azat, and Nureli.\61\ 
Kajikhumar (Qazhyghumar) Shabdan, an ethnic Kazakh writer in 
the XUAR, remained under home confinement until his death in 
February 2011. Authorities had held him under home confinement 
following a 15-year prison sentence in 1987 for ``espionage,'' 
in reported connection to allegations that he belonged to an 
illegal group with ties to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic 
and after he wrote a book critical of Chinese government policy 
toward Turkic groups.\62\ Outside the XUAR, Beijing authorities 
held Beijing-based Uyghur professor and webmaster Ilham Tohti 
and his family in custody at a resort in southern China for 
almost a week in December 2010 and placed additional 
restrictions on their activities and travel at other times.\63\
    The XUAR government continued to enforce censorship 
campaigns in the region, in line with both national campaigns 
and local directives to ``strike hard'' against the ``three 
forces'' of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. The 
XUAR Press and Publications Bureau said in July 2010 that the 
bureau would deepen its implementation of censorship work 
during the last half of 2010 and would focus on ``striking 
hard'' against ``reactionary propaganda materials'' and 
``illegal'' political and religious publications publicized and 
disseminated by the ``three forces.'' \64\ At a meeting in 
January 2011, an official called for strengthening inspection 
and prosecution connected to these publications and cited 
concerns about ``western enemy forces'' and the ``three 
forces'' ``importing western values and an ideological trend in 
`Xinjiang independence.' '' \65\ The official also called for 
strengthening oversight of transportation of published 
materials, and one locality reported finding ``suspicious 
items'' at a transportation inspection point that authorities 
later determined were ``illegal religious publications'' 
consisting of Uyghur- and Arabic-language items.\66\ Other 
localities within the XUAR also reported targeting or 
confiscating religious and political items.\67\ The World 
Uyghur Congress reported in December 2010 and February 2011 on 
people detained or charged for possessing religious materials 
and ``illegal'' DVDs and CDs with ``overseas enemy 
propaganda.'' \68\

                          Freedom of Religion

    Authorities in the XUAR continued to target ``illegal 
religious activities'' and ``religious extremism'' as threats 
to the region's stability, and they maintained curbs over 
religious activities independent of government control in the 
region's security campaigns, singling out Islamic practices in 
a number of cases. Authorities continued to define ``illegal 
religious activities'' and ``religious extremism'' to encompass 
religious practices, group affiliations, and viewpoints 
protected under international human rights guarantees for 
freedom of religion. A December meeting of the XUAR Party 
Committee Standing Committee called for ``resolutely preventing 
illegal religious activities and striking in accordance with 
law against religious extremist forces'' as part of work in the 
region to maintain stability.\69\ XUAR Communist Party 
Secretary Zhang Chunxian reiterated the pledge to curb illegal 
religious activities in August 2011, following attacks the 
previous month that officials labeled as terrorist.\70\ The 
region's two-month ``strike hard'' anti-terrorism campaign 
launched in August included ``illegal religious activities'' 
and ``religious extremism'' among its targets.\71\ Regional 
regulations and directives maintained restrictions on religious 
practice that are absent in national regulations or harsher 
than curbs articulated in national documents.\72\ Authorities 
continued to enforce a document of unclear legal status that 
defines ``23 kinds of illegal religious activity,'' including 
``letting students pray,'' conducting certain Islamic practices 
pertaining to marriage and divorce, holding private religious 
instruction classes, ``distorting religious doctrine,'' and 
advocating ``Pan-Islamism'' and ``Pan-Turkism.'' \73\ The 
region's 2009 regulation on the protection of minors stipulates 
penalties for people who ``lure or force minors to participate 
in religious activities'' and appears to provide the most 
extensive curbs in China on children's religious activities, 
while lacking a clear basis in Chinese law.\74\
    In line with regionwide directives restricting the scope of 
religious activity, local authorities in the XUAR reported on 
enforcing a range of controls over religion. Villages within 
Hoten district and a limited number of other localities 
continued to implement and expand a system of ``voluntary 
pledges'' to regulate villagers' behavior and to fine villagers 
for noncompliance, placing special emphasis on the pledges to 
curb ``illegal religious activity.'' \75\ In January 2011, 
authorities in a township in Chapchal Xibe Autonomous County, 
Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, described implementing a 
system for government religious affairs employees to set the 
schedule for Friday sermons at the township's mosques and for 
using ``religious information gatherers'' of ``high political 
consciousness'' to provide information on the sermon delivery 
and the ``ideological trends'' of mosque attendees.\76\ 
Authorities in a district in Urumqi described an emergence of 
``illegal religious sects'' that they deemed are ``contrary'' 
to the teachings of the Quran and they called on religious 
personnel to interpret religious doctrine in accordance with 
``social advancement.'' \77\ Local governments throughout the 
XUAR continued to place restrictions on the observance of the 
holiday of Ramadan, barring some people from fasting, ordering 
restaurants to stay open, and increasing oversight of religious 
venues.\78\ In April, a court in Shihezi municipality 
reportedly sentenced Muslim religious leaders Qahar Mensur and 
Muhemmed Tursun to three years' imprisonment in connection to 
storing and distributing ``illegal religious publications,'' 
which Shihezi residents reportedly described as retaliation 
after Qahar Mensur refused to comply with government demands 
such as bringing government documents into the mosque where he 
worked.\79\
    Authorities throughout the XUAR also continued campaigns 
targeting Muslim men who wear beards and women who wear veils 
or clothing deemed to carry religious connotations, practices 
authorities connect to ``religious extremism'' and 
``backwardness.'' \80\ Under the direction of the Party-
controlled women's federation in the XUAR, multiple localities 
reported continuing a campaign aimed at dissuading women from 
veiling their hair and faces.\81\ Management rules in force for 
the ``information corps'' in a residential district in Usu 
city, Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district, included requirements to 
immediately report scenarios such as the presence of ``people 
from outside [the district] abnormally wearing large beards or 
veiling their faces'' along with ``residents holding extremist 
religious thoughts.'' \82\ A township in Aqsu district included 
veiling and wearing large beards or ``bizarre clothes'' among 
targets of a campaign against ``illegal'' religious 
activities.\83\ Authorities also continued to increase 
oversight of Muslim women religious specialists known as 
buwi.\84\ [See Section II--Freedom of Religion for additional 
information on religion in China, including cases from the 
XUAR.]

                Language Policy and Bilingual Education

    The XUAR government accelerated implementation of 
``bilingual education,'' a policy that promotes the use of 
Mandarin Chinese in school instruction for non-Han students and 
increasingly has curtailed the opportunity for non-Han groups 
to choose to receive education in Uyghur and other languages. 
The policy has conflicted with legal protections for non-Han 
groups to maintain and use their own languages, as provided in 
both Chinese and international law,\85\ and underscores 
government failure to maintain the use of Uyghur and other 
languages as lingua franca within the XUAR in line with the 
promotion of regional autonomy. Following goals set after the 
May 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum to universalize ``bilingual 
education'' in the region's schools,\86\ the XUAR government 
and Party Committee issued a 10-year education reform plan in 
January 2011 that provides for ``basically universalizing'' 
elementary and secondary school ``bilingual education'' among 
non-Han students (designated as ``ethnic minorities'' by the 
Chinese government) to reach a coverage rate of 75 percent of 
such students by 2015 and over 90 percent by 2020.\87\ The plan 
adds that all ethnic minority high school graduates shall 
``basically have a skilled grasp and use'' of spoken and 
written Mandarin by 2020.\88\ The plan also calls for coverage 
of at least 85 percent of ethnic minority preschoolers by 2012, 
a target authorities appear to have articulated since 2008.\89\ 
The plan describes the promotion of ``bilingual education'' of 
``strategic significance'' for goals including ``building a new 
model of socialist ethnic relations'' and ``promoting cohesion 
and centripetal force toward the Chinese nation (zhonghua 
minzu).'' \90\ The plan also calls for protecting the right to 
instruction using minority languages and allows for preserving 
instruction using such languages in the process of implementing 
``bilingual education.'' \91\ The future role of non-Mandarin 
languages in XUAR schools and broader society, however, remains 
uncertain as the plan and accompanying measures bolster overall 
support for instruction in Mandarin. The implementation of 
Mandarin-focused ``bilingual'' programs and accompanying 
reduction in classes using minority languages reportedly has 
provoked dissatisfaction among some students, parents, and 
teachers, and a few localities reportedly reinstated some 
Uyghur-language instruction in the past year.\92\
    XUAR authorities also have accelerated steps to staff 
``bilingual'' classes and address a shortage of ``bilingual'' 
teachers. In 2010, the Xinjiang Education Department announced 
plans to recruit 5,109 elementary and secondary school 
``bilingual'' teachers, reportedly marking the largest scope of 
recruitment for ``specially appointed teachers'' as of that 
date.\93\ Authorities announced plans to recruit over 11,500 
teachers in 2011, of whom 9,200 would be ``bilingual'' 
teachers.\94\ Localities within the XUAR also reported 
increasing ``bilingual'' training among ethnic minority 
teachers.\95\ Authorities have dismissed or reassigned some 
Uyghur teachers deemed not to have adequate Mandarin skills--
with a minimum of 1,000 elementary school teachers dismissed 
since 2010, according to one report--and in some cases, 
authorities detained teachers for protesting ``bilingual'' 
policies or dismissals from their teaching posts.\96\
    Authorities also reported taking some steps to promote 
ethnic minority language arts classes within Mandarin-focused 
schools and to train Mandarin-speaking teachers in minority 
languages. A pilot project in two prefectural-level areas 
called for implementing language arts classes in minority 
languages for ethnic minority students (minkaohan students) in 
longstanding programs that provide schooling solely in 
Mandarin.\97\ A January 2011 plan called for providing 320 
class hours of instruction in basic ``ethnic minority 
languages'' for teachers at ``bilingual'' preschools who are 
native Mandarin speakers.\98\

                      Population Planning Policies

    XUAR authorities continued to expand a system of rewarding 
non-Han households (``ethnic minority'' households) that have 
been ``certified'' as having fewer children than the maximum 
allowed under the region's regulation on population and family 
planning.\99\ This step builds on similar reward systems 
present throughout China, while intensifying a regional focus 
on ethnic minority households. The XUAR Party Committee and 
government reported plans in the past year to expand the 
existing reward system in 2011 to any XUAR county or city where 
rural ethnic minorities comprise over 50 percent of the 
population.\100\ Authorities initially implemented the reward 
system for ethnic minorities in 3 southern XUAR prefectural-
level areas in 2007 \101\ and expanded the reward system in 
2009 to an additional 26 ``poor and border counties.'' \102\ 
Local governments reported enforcing the reward system in the 
past year.\103\

               Pledge System To Regulate Village Behavior

    Some villages within the XUAR continued to implement and 
expand a system of ``voluntary pledges'' to regulate villagers' 
behavior and to fine villagers for non-compliance, a practice 
that has no explicit basis in Chinese law and appears to exceed 
the scope of villages' authority to enforce penalties.\104\ 
Under the pledge system, first implemented in Hoten district in 
2006 \105\ and almost wholly unique to the XUAR,\106\ village 
residents and village officials enter into agreements (cungui 
shouyue chengnuoshu) with villagers' committees to abide by 
local village ``codes of conduct'' (cungui minyue).\107\ 
Villages throughout China use codes of conduct, which are 
stipulated under the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' 
Committees,\108\ to implement population planning requirements, 
regulate social order, and manage local production, among other 
tasks.\109\ In the XUAR, authorities have used the pledge 
system to bolster the efficacy of these codes of conduct, 
placing special emphasis on the pledges and codes of conduct to 
curb ``illegal religious activity.'' \110\ An official 
described the villagers' participation in the pledge system as 
voluntary,\111\ but a 2007 government and Party directive from 
one district called for achieving a participation rate of over 
98 percent within each village.\112\

                                 Labor


                             DISCRIMINATION

    Hiring practices that discriminate against non-Han groups 
continued in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in 
the past year. Some job recruitment announcements from the 
region continued to reserve positions exclusively for Han 
Chinese in civil servant posts and private-sector jobs, in 
contravention of provisions in Chinese law that forbid 
discrimination.\113\ A job announcement for a hospital in 
Urumqi city, for example, advertised in late 2010 for 28 
positions, all of which were reserved for Han.\114\ Civil 
servant recruitment in fall 2010 for county-level discipline 
inspection and supervision offices reserved 93 of 224 open 
positions for Han, leaving 93 of the remaining positions 
unrestricted by ethnicity and reserving 38 for members of non-
Han (``ethnic minority'') groups.\115\ In an apparent shift 
from previous years, however, 2011 annual recruiting for the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) left almost 
all positions unreserved by ethnicity--marking a change from 
past practice of formally reserving a majority of positions for 
Han--but the XPCC continued restrictions based on sex.\116\
    A XUAR government and Party committee opinion on employment 
promotion issued in October 2009 called for enterprises 
registered in the XUAR and enterprises working there to recruit 
no fewer than 50 percent of workers from among local XUAR 
residents and to ``recruit more ethnic minority workers to the 
extent possible,'' \117\ including an unspecified ``fixed 
proportion'' of positions for ethnic minority college 
graduates.\118\ The extent to which some enterprises adhered to 
the opinion's provisions on minority workers in the past year 
is unclear.\119\ In January 2011, several XUAR government and 
Party offices issued an opinion on sending ethnic minority 
university graduates to train in areas engaged in counterpart 
support relationships with the region. Citing concerns about 
employment pressures on the region's stability and economic 
development, the opinion outlines plans to train 22,000 
unemployed college graduates from the XUAR in the next two 
years,\120\ after which trainees reportedly may take up set 
posts within the XUAR or remain in areas elsewhere in China to 
find work.\121\ The opinion states the program's usefulness in 
``transforming ideas,'' promoting ``good sentiments'' among the 
ethnicities, strengthening a ``sense of identification toward 
the Chinese nation'' (zhonghua minzu), and promoting ``social 
stability'' and ``ethnic assimilation'' (minzu ronghe).\122\ 
The opinion does not address barriers to employment due to job 
recruiting practices that reserve positions for Han.

                            LABOR TRANSFERS

    Government programs to send rural non-Han men and women to 
jobs elsewhere in China continued in the past year. As 
documented by the Commission in recent years, some participants 
and their family members have reported coercion to participate 
in the programs, the use of underage workers, and exploitative 
working conditions.\123\ XUAR authorities have described the 
programs as a way for XUAR workers to gain income, build job 
skills, and transform participants' ``outmoded thinking.'' 
\124\ A XUAR Department of Agriculture official said in 
September 2010 that ``the state policy of encouraging 
relatively developed areas to recruit workers from Xinjiang 
will not change.'' \125\ Another official described 
``Xinjiang's organizing ethnic minority youth to go [elsewhere 
in China] to engage in manufacturing and construction 
activities'' as an ``inevitable large trend'' in professional 
resources exchange in a market economy.\126\ Official media 
reported in May 2011 that there have been 800,000 instances 
since 2005 of XUAR laborers going to work in other provinces 
under government auspices.\127\ The ongoing work to export the 
labor force comes amid a reported shortage of agricultural and 
factory workers within the XUAR, for which employers have 
recruited laborers from other provinces and used student 
labor.\128\

                               WORK STUDY

    Education authorities in the XUAR continued to require 
students to pick cotton and engage in other forms of labor in 
``work-study'' programs that have exceeded permitted parameters 
for student labor under Chinese law and international standards 
for worker rights.\129\ Under the programs, schools take 
students out of class for periods of one to two weeks during 
the academic year to engage in full-time labor; in some 
reported cases, students have worked for longer periods and 
under hazardous conditions.\130\ Although the XUAR Education 
Department issued a circular in 2008 stating that students in 
junior high and lower grades would no longer pick cotton in the 
work-study programs,\131\ reports from 2010 indicated that some 
localities continued to use these younger students to meet the 
shortage of cotton-pickers.\132\ Officials stressed the 
importance of using students to meet labor shortages following 
demonstrations and riots in the region in July 2009.\133\

                   Preservation of Cultural Heritage

    National and XUAR government officials continued to 
implement projects that have undermined Uyghurs' ability to 
protect their cultural heritage. Authorities continued steps to 
demolish and ``reconstruct'' the Old City section of Kashgar 
city and relocate residents. The five-year project, launched in 
2009, has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and other 
observers for requiring the resettlement of residents and for 
undermining cultural heritage protection.\134\ Official media 
reported in July 2011 that authorities revived the project in 
August 2010 after ``nearly falling into stagnation'' following 
the July 2009 demonstrations and riots and reported plans to 
complete restoration of 10,566 homes during the year.\135\ A 
Kashgar official reported in October 2010 that 9,378 houses had 
been ``removed'' to date, while 16,557 homes had been built or 
restored.\136\ The Chinese government also continued to 
politicize the preservation of Uyghur intangible cultural 
heritage. In November 2010, the UN Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) accepted China's nomination to 
place the meshrep, a Uyghur social and artistic gathering, on 
its List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent 
Safeguarding.\137\ While the designation obligates China to 
take measures to promote the practice's sustainability,\138\ 
the Chinese government defined the meshrep narrowly to exclude 
forms of the practice that have incorporated religious elements 
and social activism.\139\ In the mid-1990s, authorities in 
Yining (Ghulja) municipality, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, 
prohibited meshrep gatherings where participants sought to 
reduce alcohol and drug use and had become active in organizing 
a boycott of alcohol stores.\140\

          Forced Return of Uyghur Asylum Seekers and Migrants

    In the past year, information remained limited on the 
status of Uyghur asylum seekers forcibly returned to China from 
Cambodia in December 2009, before the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) could make a determination of the asylum 
seekers' refugee status.\141\ Following the forced deportation 
of the 20 asylum seekers and disappearance of another 2 who 
escaped forced return, the Chinese government reported in June 
2010 that 3 of the 20 people returned to China were suspected 
of terrorist crimes, and that all 17 who remained in custody 
were members of a terrorist group \142\--charges that, even if 
made at the time of extradition, would not have precluded an 
assessment of the asylum cases by UN officers.\143\ The 
government appeared to provide no additional information on the 
cases in the past reporting year. According to a March 2011 
Radio Free Asia article, the group was held in detention in 
Kashgar district, and their cases had not gone to trial.\144\ 
One of the asylum seekers who had escaped forced return from 
Cambodia and was deported from Laos to China in March 2010 
reportedly was held in detention in Kashgar with the group, 
where he reportedly was in poor health and was denied medical 
care for an arm infection.\145\
    In May 2011, Chinese security officials in cooperation with 
authorities in Kazakhstan forcibly returned Ershidin Israil, a 
Uyghur man from the XUAR, from Kazakhstan to China.\146\ 
Ershidin Israil left China in 2009 after Chinese authorities 
reportedly sought him for providing information to Radio Free 
Asia about the death of Shohret Tursun, a Uyghur man held in 
custody after the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in the 
XUAR.\147\ Ershidin Israil received refugee status from the 
UNHCR in March 2010 and had awaited resettlement to Sweden 
before authorities in Kazakhstan took him into custody and the 
UNHCR revoked his refugee status.\148\ Upon his return, Chinese 
authorities reportedly charged him for terrorist acts. A family 
member and advocates for Ershidin Israil said that the charges 
and bases for revoking his refugee status were based on false 
information.\149\ In August, authorities in Thailand detained 
Nur Muhammed, a Uyghur man from the XUAR, on grounds of illegal 
entry. Thai authorities bypassed a court appearance as provided 
by Thai law and turned him over to Chinese authorities, who are 
presumed to have returned him to China.\150\ The same month, 
authorities in Pakistan reportedly forcibly returned five 
Uyghurs, including two children, to China.\151\ Later in 
August, Malaysian authorities deported 11 Uyghur men from 
Malaysia to China, following the arrests of a group of 16 
Uyghurs earlier in the month.\152\
    The forced returns violate the Convention Against Torture, 
which provides, ``No State Party shall expel, return 
(`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.'' \153\ [See Section II--
Criminal Justice for additional information on the use of 
torture in China.] In addition, the return of Uyghur asylum 
seekers violates the principle of non-refoulement as stipulated 
in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.\154\ 
The forced returns from Cambodia, Laos, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, 
and Thailand are among several documented cases of forced 
deportation in recent years, highlighting the ongoing risks of 
refoulement and torture that Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees, 
and migrants have faced in neighboring countries under the sway 
of China's influence and its disregard for international 
law.\155\

                                V. Tibet


                              Introduction

    Developments during the Commission's 2011 reporting period 
show that expanding Chinese government and Communist Party use 
of legal and policy measures to increase pressure on Tibetan 
culture--especially religion and language--are resulting in 
consequences that Tibetans believe threaten the viability of 
their culture. Declining well-being of Tibetan culture 
contrasts with increases in economic development and social 
services such as education in government-provided statistics. 
Tibetans who peacefully express disapproval of Chinese 
government policy on Tibetan affairs are at increased risk of 
punishment as governments expand the use of legal measures to 
safeguard ``social stability'' by criminalizing such 
expression.

  Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the Dalai 
                      Lama or His Representatives

    No formal dialogue took place between the Dalai Lama's 
representatives and Chinese government and Communist Party 
officials during the Commission's 2011 reporting year. The 
environment for dialogue deteriorated as the Chinese government 
pressed forward with implementation of legal measures and 
policies that many Tibetans--including the Dalai Lama--believe 
threaten the Tibetan culture, language, religion, heritage, and 
environment. In his March 10 address to Tibetans,\1\ the Dalai 
Lama expressed disappointment with previous rounds of the 
dialogue. He noted the ``lack of any positive response'' to 
proposals set out in his Middle Way Approach \2\ and suggested 
that the Communist Party United Front Work Department officials 
who met with the Dalai Lama's envoys may not have accurately or 
completely informed higher ranking officials about the Tibetan 
proposals.\3\
    In March 2011, the Dalai Lama took steps to end the 
official role of a Dalai Lama in the India-based organization 
that is commonly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-
exile.\4\ The change, he said, would enable him to focus ``more 
effectively'' on spiritual matters.\5\ He explained in his 
March 10 address that he had reached a ``decision to devolve 
[his] formal authority to the elected leader'' \6\ and the next 
day outlined his decision to end the centuries old Tibetan 
government structure that positioned the Dalai Lama as the 
highest-ranking figure in both government and religious 
affairs.\7\ The Dalai Lama's renunciation of an official role 
in exiled Tibetans' governance has the potential to alter the 
dialogue's dynamics by eliminating an institutional basis for 
the Party and government to characterize the Dalai Lama as a 
``political'' figure.\8\
    In July 2011, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and 
Global Affairs Maria Otero reiterated U.S. Administration 
objectives to ``promote a substantive, results-oriented 
dialogue between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama or 
his representatives'' and ``to help sustain Tibet's unique 
religious, linguistic, and cultural heritages.'' \9\ She 
observed that it is in the Chinese government's interests to 
resolve problems and that counterproductive policies ``will 
exacerbate already existing tensions that could, in turn, 
undermine China's efforts to maintain its current social and 
economic development.'' \10\

                Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists

    During the past year, the Chinese government and Communist 
Party continued the campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a 
religious leader \11\ and expanded government and Party control 
over Tibetan Buddhism in order to impose what officials 
describe as the ``normal order'' of the religion.\12\ In April 
2011, Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the Party's United 
Front Work Department \13\ (and principal interlocutor for the 
Dalai Lama's envoys) summed up Party intentions toward the 
Tibetan Buddhist religion, monasteries, and nunneries during a 
working group ``investigation'' he led in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR).\14\ A Party-run newspaper described his remarks:

        He expressed his hopes that religious personages and 
        believers will always implement the line, principle, 
        and policies of the Party, unswervingly carry out 
        struggle against the Dalai clique, expose the 
        reactionary essence of Dalai, establish a sound and 
        permanent mechanism for the management of monasteries, 
        and ensure that all activities of monasteries will have 
        rules to follow. In addition, their interpretations of 
        religious doctrines and rules must be [in] line with 
        social development and progress and ensure that Tibetan 
        Buddhism will actively adapt itself to socialist 
        society.\15\

  OFFICIALS PRESS ATTACK ON DALAI LAMA, SET SIGHTS ON SELECTING NEXT 
                               DALAI LAMA

    Chinese government and Communist Party officials pressed 
their campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious 
leader. Zhang Qingli, Secretary of the TAR Party Committee, at 
a March 2011 meeting of TAR delegates to the National People's 
Congress, accused the Dalai Lama of being ``the boss of 
splittism'' and a ``double dealer'' who, ``under the signboard 
of religion,'' seeks to ``deceive religious believers' simple 
feelings.'' \16\ Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo), Chairman of 
the Standing Committee of the TAR People's Congress, said the 
same month during a visit to the United States that Tibetans 
``could have developed much better without the Dalai Lama and 
his followers,'' and that if the Dalai Lama ``is indeed a 
religious person'' he should ``not dabble in'' political 
issues.\17\ China's official media reported in August that as 
part of a ``major leadership reshuffle'' the Party Central 
Committee transferred Hebei province Deputy Party Secretary 
Chen Quanguo to the TAR to replace Zhang as Secretary, and 
posted Zhang to Hebei as Party Secretary.\18\
    During the past reporting year, senior officials continued 
to assert the Chinese government's intention to supervise the 
selection of the next Dalai Lama and to challenge the current 
Dalai Lama's views on the matter. Jampa Phuntsog, also 
Executive Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee,\19\ 
characterized the Dalai Lama's recent remarks as ``the biggest 
obstacle to the normal continuation of Tibetan Buddhism'' and 
objected to the Dalai Lama's remarks about his own 
reincarnation.\20\ He observed: ``The Dalai Lama's attitude on 
this question is that there is sometimes reincarnation and 
sometimes no reincarnation, and the living Buddha may return as 
a man, a woman or a foreigner. Recently he even talked about 
stopping the reincarnation.'' \21\ The comment refers to 
remarks attributed to the Dalai Lama as recently as October 
2010 stating that his reincarnation would take place ``in a 
free country,'' \22\ and that he may choose to identify and 
train his successor before he dies, or Tibetans might elect to 
discontinue the institution of the Dalai Lama.\23\ Pema Choling 
(Baima Chilin), Chairman of the TAR People's Government and 
Deputy Secretary of the TAR Party Committee, said the Dalai 
Lama's views on reincarnation are ``impossible.'' \24\ In July 
2011, the Dalai Lama rejected government and Party intrusion 
into the matter of Tibetan Buddhist reincarnation as a 
``disgrace'' and stated with respect to his own reincarnation, 
``[The] final authority is myself and no one else, and 
obviously not China's Communists.'' \25\

 PREFECTURAL REGULATORY MEASURES TIGHTEN CONTROL ON ``TIBETAN BUDDHIST 
                               AFFAIRS''

    The central government and 9 of the 10 Tibetan autonomous 
prefectural governments \26\ issued or drafted regulatory 
measures as of August 2011 that increase substantially the 
state's infringement of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist 
monasteries and nunneries. The measures increase curbs on 
protection of ``freedom of religious belief'' \27\ as provided 
under China's Constitution by imposing greater subordination of 
``Tibetan Buddhist affairs'' to government regulations that 
enforce Communist Party policy.
    In Qinghai province, for example, from July 2009 to 
September 2010, people's congresses in five of Qinghai's six 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures (TAPs) put into effect 
regulations on Tibetan Buddhist affairs to fulfill Party 
objectives.\28\ The regulations followed a provincial Party 
committee determination in May 2008 that Tibetan Buddhist 
monasteries in the province had ``drifted freely beyond the 
government's management by law and supervision by the public.'' 
\29\ As a result, the Qinghai government issued an ``opinion'' 
\30\ proposing that Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nunneries 
be required to implement a ``new system'' based on ``Party 
committee leadership, government responsibility, . . . and 
management in accordance with the law by religious affairs 
departments and other concerned departments.'' \31\
    As of April 2011, new regulatory measures on ``Tibetan 
Buddhist affairs'' were in effect in a total of seven TAPs 
located in three provinces: \32\ Huangnan (Malho) TAP,\33\ 
Hainan (Tsolho) TAP,\34\ Haibei (Tsojang) TAP,\35\ Guoluo 
(Golog) TAP,\36\ and Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP in 
Qinghai province; \37\ Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 
Prefecture (T&QAP) in Sichuan province; \38\ and Diqing 
(Dechen) TAP in Yunnan province.\39\ Prefectural regulations 
reportedly were in the legislative process in Yushu (Yulshul) 
TAP, Qinghai,\40\ and Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan.\41\ As of 
August 2011, the Commission had not observed information on 
whether Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, was preparing such 
a regulation. The 10 TAPs make up approximately half the area 
the Chinese government designates as ``Tibetan autonomous,'' 
and approximately half the Tibetan population of the Tibetan 
autonomous areas lives in the 10 TAPs.\42\ The central 
government issued national-level regulations effective November 
1, 2010,\43\ that along with the prefectural-level regulations 
tighten and expand existing means of government control and 
monitoring of Tibetan Buddhist institutions.\44\

      COMMON FEATURES AMONG NEW TIBETAN BUDDHIST AFFAIRS MEASURES

    A summary of the Commission's analysis of the points of 
similarity among the national regulations \45\ and four of the 
prefectural-level regulations (Huangnan TAP \46\ and Hainan TAP 
\47\ in Qinghai, Aba T&QAP \48\ in Sichuan, and Diqing TAP \49\ 
in Yunnan) follows.\50\
    Prioritizing Tibetan Buddhist obligation to support Chinese 
government policies. The regulatory measures build on existing 
government and Communist Party policies mandating that Tibetan 
Buddhist institutions (like other state-sanctioned religious 
institutions) must protect Chinese national and ethnic unity 
and ``social stability,'' \51\ promote patriotism toward China 
and adherence to socialism,\52\ and obey Chinese government 
laws and regulations.\53\
    ``Buddhist Associations'' (BAs): Greater authority over 
monastic institutions. BAs--institutional links between Tibetan 
Buddhist institutions and the Chinese government and Party that 
facilitate the exercise of government and Party authority over 
Tibetan Buddhist activity \54\--must, among other duties, 
approve or revoke the official status of monks and nuns as 
``religious personnel'' in accordance with government 
requirements; \55\ approve quotas on the number of monks or 
nuns who may reside at a monastery or nunnery; \56\ and conduct 
classes educating Tibetan Buddhist ``religious personnel'' on 
patriotism toward China, Chinese laws and regulations 
(including on religion), and adapting Tibetan Buddhism to 
socialism.\57\
    ``Democratic Management Committees'' (DMCs): Subject to 
greater scrutiny, subordination to government authority. The 
regulatory measures impose closer supervision of each 
monastery's Democratic Management Committee--a monastic group 
legally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and teachers obey 
government laws, regulations, and policies.\58\ The measures 
empower three types of agencies to supervise or monitor DMCs: 
BAs, government religious affairs bureaus (RABs), and village-
level ``peoples'' or ``masses'' committees.\59\ Provisions 
require DMCs (under BA supervision and in compliance with 
central government measures issued in 2007 \60\) to direct the 
process of identifying, seating, and educating trulkus \61\--
teachers whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are reincarnations. For 
the first time, DMCs must fulfill a central government 
requirement to apply for, justify, and receive approval for a 
fixed quota on the number of monks or nuns who may reside at a 
monastery or nunnery.\62\
    ``Religious personnel'': Subject to more detailed control 
over religious contact, travel, study. The measures strengthen 
external supervision of DMCs, Tibetan Buddhist teachers, 
trulkus, monks, and nuns by requiring their submission to 
administration and guidance by governments at the prefectural, 
county, and township levels, and by village-level residents 
committees.\63\ Most of the prefectural measures impose 
requirements on ``religious personnel'' who wish to travel to 
another county or prefecture to study or teach Buddhism.\64\ 
The national measures impose the most difficult requirements: 
First, ``religious personnel'' must apply for and receive 
approval from the prefectural-level BA where they live and from 
the prefectural-level BA where they hope to study or teach; 
then each BA granting approval must report the approval to the 
corresponding prefectural-level RAB.\65\
    Township-level governments: Expanded responsibility, 
authority over monasteries, nunneries. The prefectural 
regulatory measures expand significantly township-level 
government authority to implement regulations on Tibetan 
Buddhist activity at monasteries and nunneries. All five of the 
regulations for Qinghai TAPs for which text was available 
online as of August 2011 contained articles empowering 
township-level governments to monitor and supervise monastic 
activity.\66\ Regulations for four of the Qinghai TAPs state 
explicitly that township governments have the responsibility to 
``manage'' Tibetan Buddhist affairs within the township 
area.\67\ Enabling township governments to take on greater 
responsibility for regulating Tibetan Buddhist affairs is 
important because there are so many township-level governments. 
As of 2007, there were a total of 998 township-level 
governments subordinate to 75 county-level governments in the 
10 TAPs outside the TAR \68\--an average of 13 township 
governments under each county government.
    Village-level committees: Expanded role as grassroots 
monitors, supervisors. Most of the prefectural regulatory 
measures for which text was available online as of August 2011 
included a greater monitoring, supervisory, and reporting role 
for village-level committees than did previous measures.\69\ 
Measures effective in Aba T&QAP, Sichuan, for example, provide 
village committees a role in reviewing applications from 
persons who wish to become monks or nuns, and in supervising 
monks and nuns.\70\ The national regulations provide for the 
first time a legal basis for placing a village committee member 
on a DMC--and by doing so, empower the village committee member 
to participate directly in DMC decisionmaking.\71\

        DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PREFECTURAL REGULATORY MEASURES

    A summary of some principal areas of distinction between 
the seven prefectural-level regulatory measures for which text 
was available online as of August 2011 follows.
    Dedicated village-level committees monitor, supervise, 
report on monastic activity. All five of the Qinghai province 
TAP regulations include provisions that establish ``masses 
supervision and appraisal committees'' (MSACs, qunzhong jiandu 
pingyi weiyuanhui).\72\ MSACs are a new development with 
respect to their specific role in government management of 
Tibetan Buddhist affairs.\73\ Township governments guide 
selection of MSAC members from among village residents, 
herders, and monastery staff.\74\ Regulations mandate MSACs to 
fulfill specific duties in supervising, monitoring, and 
appraising monastic management (especially DMCs), 
administration (including financial affairs), and Buddhist 
teaching.\75\ MSACs must submit periodic reports to township- 
and county-level governments.\76\
    Extent of provisions for administrative and criminal 
punishment. The regulatory measures vary in the extensiveness 
and specificity of language describing activity that may result 
in administrative penalties (e.g., expulsion) or criminal 
punishment (e.g., imprisonment) of ``religious personnel.'' 
\77\ Three prefectural measures (Hainan, Guoluo, Aba) contain 
more extensive descriptions of punishable activity; \78\ three 
prefectural measures (Haibei, Haixi, Diqing) contain less 
extensive descriptions of punishable activity; \79\ and one 
prefectural measure (Huangnan) contains language that is mid-
range.\80\ Information available as of February 2011 in the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database demonstrated a 
positive correlation between the number of Buddhist monks, 
nuns, teachers, or trulkus detained in each TAP on or after 
March 10, 2008, and the extensiveness of regulatory measures' 
provisions on punishment.\81\
    Provision for potential redress against administrative 
punishment. Four of the prefectural regulations (Huangnan, 
Hainan, Guoluo, Diqing) for which text was available online as 
of August 2011 contain provisions allowing a person punished 
administratively under the regulations either to seek 
administrative reconsideration of the punishment or to file a 
lawsuit against the punishment.\82\ Three of the four 
regulations (Huangnan, Haibei, Guoluo) cite the PRC 
Administrative Reconsideration Law \83\ and PRC Administrative 
Litigation Law \84\ as the legal instruments for undertaking 
such action.\85\ The Hainan, Haixi, and Aba regulatory measures 
do not mention administrative reconsideration or filing an 
administrative lawsuit.

      Tibetan Cultural Expression: Increasing Pressure, Punishment

    Chinese government and Communist Party policies and their 
implementation increased pressure on and sometimes threatened 
Tibetan cultural expression during the Commission's 2011 
reporting year. Political detentions in 2011 increased compared 
to 2009 and 2010 but were lower than the high level of 
2008.\86\ Security and judicial officials used China's legal 
system to detain and imprison Tibetan writers, artists, 
intellectuals, and cultural advocates who turned to veiled 
language to lament the status of Tibetan culture or criticize 
government policies toward the Tibetan people and culture. The 
government seeks to prevent such Tibetans from influencing 
other Tibetans and uses imprisonment to remove them from 
society. Examples follow of developments this reporting year 
that involved imprisonment, detention, and a police manhunt. In 
two separate cases, monks committed self-immolation to protest 
China's handling of Tibetan issues.
    January 2011: Detention after publishing an article.\87\ 
Public security officials reportedly detained monk-writer 
Tsering Tenzin of Palyul Monastery, located in Ganzi (Kardze) 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), in connection with an 
essay he wrote that was published in 2010 in a collection of 
articles on ``the situation inside Tibet.'' \88\ In February 
2010, officials in Hongyuan (Marthang) county,\89\ Aba (Ngaba) 
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, detained monk Tsering 
Dondrub of Rongtha Monastery for assisting with 
publication.\90\
    Winter 2010: Detention for downloading banned songs.\91\ 
During a winter ``strike hard'' campaign in the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR), security officials punished Tibetans 
who had downloaded ``prohibited'' songs such as ``Voice of 
Unity,'' ``My Lama,'' and ``I Miss the Sun, Moon, and Stars,'' 
with 10 to 15 days of detention and a fine. Police allegedly 
beat some detainees.\92\
    December 2010: Imprisonment for writing articles about the 
2008 Tibetan protests.\93\ The Aba Intermediate People's Court 
sentenced three contributing editors of a Tibetan-language 
magazine to imprisonment for ``inciting splittism'' (PRC 
Criminal Law, Article 103(2)): Buddha (a pen name) and Jangtse 
Donkho, four years; and Kalsang Jinpa, three years.\94\
    December 2010: Redetention for making video appeal.\95\ 
Public security officials in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan 
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, reportedly redetained monk-writer 
Kalsang Tsultrim of Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery on December 
16, 2010.\96\ Officials released him on bail the previous 
October after detaining him in July 2010 for distributing a 
video CD of him speaking about concern for the Tibetan culture 
and religion.\97\
    December 2010: Detention after publishing articles, 
organizing conferences.\98\ Public security officials in Lhasa 
city reportedly detained monk-writer Tenpa Lodroe on December 
29, 2010, reportedly in connection with a December 20 
conference on ``the situation in Tibet'' arranged in Ganzi TAP, 
Sichuan province.\99\
    September 2010: Arrest warrant issued for singer after CD 
release.\100\ In the second half of September, public security 
officials in Lhasa city reportedly issued an arrest warrant for 
singer Pasang Tsering and banned his newly released CD.\101\ 
Officials allegedly suspected the lyrics of praising the Dalai 
Lama and ``inciting ethnic sentiments.'' \102\ As of late 
September 2010, relatives had lost contact with him.\103\
    March 2011: Self-immolation to mark anniversary of 2008 
protest.\104\ On March 16, 2011, monk Phuntsog of Kirti 
Monastery, located near the Aba county seat, Aba T&QAP, set 
himself on fire to protest the fatal shooting on the same date 
in 2008 of at least 10 Tibetan protesters.\105\ As he burned, 
Phuntsog reportedly shouted slogans calling for the Dalai 
Lama's long life.\106\ Phuntsog died in a hospital the next 
morning.\107\ Officials forced Kirti monks to submit to 
political education starting March 21; \108\ on April 21, 
People's Armed Police (PAP) removed at least 300 of the monks 
and took them to other counties to undergo ``legal education.'' 
\109\ PAP and other police allegedly beat severely Tibetans who 
attempted to block removal of the monks, resulting in serious 
injuries and the deaths of two elderly Tibetans.\110\ On August 
29 and 30, 2011, a county-level court in Aba T&QAP sentenced 
three Kirti monks to 10-, 11-, and 13-year prison terms for 
Phuntsog's ``intentional homicide,'' claiming that two monks 
``plotted, instigated and assisted'' in the self-immolation and 
one monk delayed medical treatment.\111\ International media 
and advocacy group reports described the convicted monks' 
intentions toward Phuntsog in terms of providing rescue, 
protection, and shelter.\112\
    August 2011: Self-immolation to protest Chinese policies. 
On August 15, monk Tsewang Norbu of Nyitso Monastery, located 
in the seat of Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi TAP, died after 
setting himself on fire as he shouted slogans calling for 
Tibetan freedom and the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet.\113\

  Education and Economic Development: Government Initiatives, Tibetan 
                                Protests

    Tibetan students and farmers protested government and 
Communist Party policies on education, the environment, and 
rural Tibetans' use of farming and grazing lands during the 
Commission's 2011 reporting year. Such protests indicate that 
Tibetans \114\ consider the policies a threat to the Tibetan 
culture, language, and environment, and the viability of 
farming and herding as a means of livelihood for rural 
Tibetans--who made up approximately 87 percent of Tibetans in 
China in 2000.\115\

     TIBETAN STUDENTS, TEACHERS PROTEST GOVERNMENT EDUCATION POLICY

    Events this past year, detailed below, highlighted the 
importance Tibetans attribute to the status of Tibetan 
language, its level of use in the education system,\116\ and 
the threat that government and Party policy pose to the status 
and use of Tibetan language.\117\ Senior Party and government 
officials issued a series of statements \118\ on plans to 
reduce the status and level of use of Tibetan language during 
the period from 2010 to 2020.\119\ Tibetan student-led 
protests, principally in Qinghai province,\120\ resulted in 
retired Tibetan cadres and educators submitting a petition (or 
``letter'') to Communist Party and government offices asserting 
that the Qinghai government was implementing reforms that 
contravene provisions in China's Constitution and the Regional 
Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL).\121\
    The speed with which protests spread suggests that Tibetan 
discontent with education policy may be widespread.\122\ 
Tibetan teachers' and students' views in Qinghai on the role of 
Tibetan language in education are unlikely to differ 
significantly from Tibetan views in other Tibetan autonomous 
areas.\123\ A chronology of principal events from October 15 to 
29, 2010, follows.
    October 15: Teachers sign letter criticizing bilingual 
education reform. As a ``Tibetan Language Course Reforms 
Training'' attended by more than 300 teachers employed at 
Qinghai province Tibetan-language primary and middle schools 
concluded,\124\ attendees reportedly signed a petition (or 
``letter'') on October 15 calling on Qinghai officials to 
continue to treat Tibetan language as the ``language of 
instruction'' in Tibetan schools.\125\ The teachers reportedly 
were responding to the ``Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term 
Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020)'' \126\ 
(the Plan).\127\ The petition reasoned that ``choice of 
language of instruction should depend entirely on those being 
taught.'' \128\
    October 19: Student protests begin. Students at schools in 
Tongren (Rebgong), the Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture (TAP) capital,\129\ reportedly protested on October 
19 in response to a report that Qinghai Party Secretary Qiang 
Wei ``ordered that the language used in textbooks should be 
changed to Chinese.'' \130\ Students carried banners demanding 
expanded use of Tibetan language \131\ and circulated a text 
message claiming the central government had decided to cancel 
``Tibetan-language centered'' education.\132\ Qiang had 
instructed educators in September to increase Chinese-language 
teaching and ``conquer the erroneous thinking that if minority 
nationality students undergo an education based on the state's 
common language [Mandarin] and script it will hurt the feelings 
of the minority nationality masses, or effect the development 
of the minority nationality culture, or impact social 
stability.'' \133\ Protests reportedly spread to Beijing and 
Hainan (Tsolho), Haibei (Tsojang), and Guoluo (Golog) TAPs in 
Qinghai.\134\
    October 22: Qinghai education head defends reform. Director 
Wang Yubo of the Qinghai Department of Education acknowledged 
on October 22 that students had ``expressed their 
dissatisfaction'' with the ``bilingual education reform plan,'' 
and attributed the incidents to students' ``misunderstanding.'' 
\135\ He referred to an ``outline'' of the Plan issued by the 
provincial government and Party on September 12, and confirmed 
that among the ``main goals'' was for instructors to ``adhere 
to mainly teaching with the state's standard spoken and written 
language [Mandarin].'' \136\
    October 24: Retired cadres and educators argue that 
education reforms are illegal. A petition signed on October 24 
by ``retired Tibetan cadres and veteran education workers'' in 
Qinghai's capital, Xining, analyzed perceived violations of 
China's Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law 
(REAL),\137\ and other laws that resulted in the infringement 
of ethnic minorities' rights.\138\ The educators submitted the 
letter to central-, provincial-, and prefectural-level Party, 
legislative, government, and consultative bodies.\139\ The 
petition ``proposed'' that the Qinghai Province Education 
Department ``immediately stop the enforcement of the illegal 
provision for using Chinese as the only language for teaching'' 
\140\ and cited the Constitution and REAL, Article 20, as the 
legal basis for non-implementation.\141\
     October 25: Officials describe diminished scope for 
Tibetan language use. At a forum convened on October 25 to 
``study and implement the spirit'' of the Plan,\142\ Gao 
Yunlong, Vice Chairman of the Qinghai People's Government, told 
government, academic, and other personnel that Mandarin is the 
appropriate language for use in ``public places'' and ethnic 
languages are suitable for ``one's home location.'' \143\ He 
justified the decision to exclude ethnic languages from 
teaching ``scientific'' subjects such as ``mathematics, 
physics, and chemistry'' and said that exclusion ``does no harm 
to carrying ethnic culture forward.'' \144\
    October 27: Party Secretary ties reforms to ``national 
unity,'' protests to ``plots.'' Qiang Wei on October 27 linked 
support of bilingual education reform to protecting ``national 
sovereignty'' and promoting ``national and ethnic unity.'' 
\145\ He described ``unity of spoken and written language'' as 
``a fundamental and essential condition for a unified 
country.'' \146\ He warned Qinghai Party members that 
``domestic and foreign hostile forces will seek to exploit our 
promotion of bilingual education reform as an opportunity to 
plot, orchestrate, incite, and provoke disturbances, . . . and 
to destroy our social situation of unity and stability.'' \147\

      RURAL TIBETANS PROTEST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MAINSTAY: MINING

    Rural Tibetans protested during the 2011 reporting year 
against what they consider to be adverse effects of Chinese 
government and Communist Party economic development policies--
especially mining--that prioritize government objectives above 
respecting or protecting the Tibetan culture and 
environment.\148\ Officials justify such policies in part by 
publicizing statistical indicators such as rising GDP \149\ and 
household income.\150\ At the same time, government officials 
emphasized the dependency of the Tibetan Autonomous Region 
(TAR) on central support: State Ethnic Affairs Commission 
Minister Yang Jing asserted that the central government 
provided in the form of subsidies 90 percent of the funds the 
TAR government spent from 2001 to 2010.\151\ Statistics are 
difficult to locate on central government revenue derived from 
natural resource extraction in Tibetan autonomous areas--
China's Constitution appropriates ownership of natural 
resources throughout China to the central government.\152\ The 
value of such resources in the TAR may be as high as 600 
billion yuan (US$93.8 billion), according to a December 2010 
official media report \153\--about double the total 2001 to 
2010 subsidies the central government provided to the TAR.\154\
    Examples of reported incidents of Tibetan protest against 
economic development initiatives follow.
    November-December 2010: Protest and detentions in Rikaze 
(Shigatse) prefecture, TAR. On December 18, People's Armed 
Police (PAP) ended a standoff that began on November 22 when 
Tibetans began to protest and petition against the start of 
mining activity near Lingka Monastery in Xietongmen 
(Shetongmon) county, Rikaze.\155\ PAP allegedly beat protesters 
and detained 17 persons, including the Lingka abbot (Kalsang) 
and four monks (Jamyang Rigsang, Jamyang Tsering, Rigzin Pema, 
and Tsewang Dorje).\156\
    September-October 2010: Protest and detentions in Naqu 
(Nagchu) prefecture, TAR. Tibetans in Biru (Driru) county 
reportedly attempted to block Chinese workers who arrived in 
August 2010 to begin construction of a dam near a mountain 
Tibetans regard as sacred.\157\ Villagers claimed workers 
intended to establish mines in the area, asserted that they had 
the right to protect the local environment, and refused to 
move.\158\ On September 26, the construction team claimed to 
have received a mining permit agreed to by the TAR Party 
secretary.\159\ Security officials reportedly detained protest 
leaders Dorje Dragtsal and Palden Choedrag and three other 
Tibetans, Buphel, Tsegon, and Samten, who presented a petition 
to Naqu authorities.\160\
    August 2010: Protest, shooting, detentions in Ganzi 
(Kardze) TAP, Sichuan. On August 18 security officials in the 
seat of Baiyu (Palyul) county, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture (TAP), opened fire on a group of about 100 Tibetans 
petitioning outside county government offices against a 
Shanghai-based mining company's expanded gold-mining 
operations.\161\ Villagers alleged that mining had damaged 
their farming and grazing lands.\162\ Gunfire reportedly killed 
``at least four'' Tibetans and wounded about 30 after a 
``scuffle'' broke out.\163\ China's official media reported 
that police fired warning shots after Tibetans attacked them 
and a ``stray bullet'' killed one Tibetan; police detained 35 
Tibetans.\164\
    May-July 2011: Protest and detentions in Changdu (Chamdo) 
prefecture, TAR. After Tibetans learned that Chinese laborers 
had been ``deployed'' in May 2011 to work at mining locations 
in Zuogong (Dzogang) county, Changdu, authorities warned 
residents that protests against mining activity ``would be 
construed as politically motivated,'' according to a media 
report's unidentified source.\165\ During June and July, 
security officials allegedly detained approximately 50 Tibetans 
(15 named) linked to protest activity.\166\ Detainees included 
``village officials'' Arsong, Tashi Namgyal, and Jamyang 
Trinle, who traveled to the TAR capital, Lhasa, to ``protest'' 
the mining and detentions, and alleged protest ``ringleaders'' 
Tenzin and Tashi.\167\

          SETTLING NOMADS, BUILDING RAILWAYS, REPLACING YUSHU

    Chinese officials continued to implement policies and 
announce projects over this past year that some Tibetans 
believe threaten the Tibetan culture and heritage. Pema Choling 
(Baima Chilin), Chairman of the TAR People's Government, said 
on January 10, 2011, that the government had settled or 
resettled ``1.43 million farmers and herdsmen of 275,000 
households'' into new housing \168\--one of the initiatives of 
a program the Party refers to as ``construction of a new 
socialist countryside'' \169\ and that Party General Secretary 
and President of China Hu Jintao named as a top development 
priority at the 2010 Fifth Forum on Work in Tibet.\170\ Based 
on a reported total TAR rural population of 2.21 million,\171\ 
the government has completed the compulsory settlement or 
resettlement of nearly two-thirds of the TAR rural 
population.\172\ The Commission has not observed statistics 
during the past year on compulsory settlement or resettlement 
in other Tibetan autonomous areas.
    The Chinese government provided updates this past year on 
construction of the railway network that will crisscross the 
Tibetan plateau and has the potential to impact profoundly the 
Tibetan culture and environment.\173\

          Lhasa-Rikaze (Shigatse) railway. In February 
        2011, state-run media reported that the 253-kilometer 
        westward link from Lhasa to Rikaze will be completed by 
        2015 (the end of the period of the TAR 12th Five-Year 
        Plan on Economic and Social Development).\174\ On 
        September 2, China Daily reported the railway will 
        begin operating in 2014 but did not cite the source of 
        the information.\175\ The estimated cost of building 
        the railway as of the September 2010 start of 
        construction was 13.3 billion yuan \176\ (US$2.1 
        billion)--approximately 20 percent greater than the 11 
        billion yuan (US$1.7 billion) estimate reported in 
        April 2009.\177\
          Lhasa-Linzhi (Nyingtri) railway. Construction 
        of the eastward link from Lhasa to Linzhi will begin 
        during the period of the TAR 12th Five-Year Plan.\178\ 
        The Commission has not observed information about 
        whether the railway will be built along the north or 
        the south side of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Yalung Zangbo, 
        Brahmaputra) River.\179\
          Sichuan-Tibet railway and Yunnan-Tibet 
        railway. The TAR will ``conduct a pre-construction 
        planning and study on the Sichuan-Tibet and Yunnan-
        Tibet railways'' during the TAR 12th Five-Year 
        Plan.\180\
          Ge'ermu (Golmud, Kermo)-Ku'erle (Korla) 
        railway. Construction of the railway linking Golmud 
        city in Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous 
        Prefecture, Qinghai province, with Ku'erle (Korla) 
        city, the capital of Bayingguoleng (Bayingolin) Mongol 
        Autonomous Prefecture in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region (XUAR), will begin in 2011 and be complete by 
        2015.\181\ The railway will reduce the journey between 
        Urumqi city, the XUAR capital, and Lhasa city by more 
        than 1,000 kilometers.\182\
          Chengdu-Ge'ermu railway. Construction of the 
        railway linking Chengdu city, the Sichuan capital, and 
        Ge'ermu city may start by 2015, the end of the PRC 12th 
        Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social 
        Development.\183\ The route traverses Ruo'ergai 
        (Dzoege) county in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang 
        Autonomous Prefecture, Yushu (Kyegudo) in Yushu TAP 
        (the site of an April 2010 earthquake \184\), and 
        Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai.\185\ Yushu and Guoluo are 
        the most ethnically Tibetan areas remaining outside the 
        TAR, based on official 2000 census data: Yushu TAP 
        (97.1 percent Tibetan), TAR (92.7 percent Tibetan), and 
        Guoluo TAP (91.6 percent Tibetan).\186\

    Tibetans protested in April 2011 against Chinese government 
plans for rebuilding Yushu (Kyegudo), the capital of Yushu 
(Yushul) TAP, Qinghai, severely damaged by an April 2010 
earthquake, and demanded that authorities ``fairly and 
legitimately'' resolve issues involving their residences and 
use of their land.\187\ Media reports between June 2010 and 
March 2011 revealed government plans to rename Yushu and 
transform it into an urban area traversed by a railway.\188\ 
Yushu's ``temporary'' name would be Sanjiangyuan \189\ (``three 
rivers source''), after a nearby nature reserve.\190\ The 
government will redesignate the administrative area as a 
``city,'' \191\ indicating that it will become the center of a 
substantial population and economy with a well-developed 
infrastructure.\192\ In June 2010, the Qinghai government 
announced the central government would provide most of 32 
billion yuan (US$4.68 billion) budgeted to rebuild the area 
\193\--a sum similar to the 33 billion yuan (then US$4.7 
billion) cost of constructing the Qinghai-Tibet railway.\194\ 
In March 2011, the Qinghai government announced that the 
Chengdu-Ge'ermu railway would pass through Yushu's 
location.\195\
    In January 2011, official media reports described Yushu as 
``flattened,'' \196\ but a June 2010 unofficial report noted 
that officials allegedly were expropriating Tibetan homes and 
businesses in sound condition so the government could redevelop 
the area.\197\ Tibetans have objected to government plans to 
move them from spacious homes to smaller apartment- or 
townhouse-style residences in other locations.\198\ On April 2, 
2011, approximately 300 Tibetans staged a sit-in protest in 
Yushu, claiming authorities either sold or expropriated their 
property without providing ``appropriate'' compensation.\199\ 
People's Armed Police allegedly ``attacked'' the protesters, 
detained about 40 of them, and cleared the area.\200\

   Summary Information: Tibetan Political Detention and Imprisonment


       POST-MARCH 10, 2008: LACK OF INFORMATION, UNCERTAIN STATUS

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government's failure to provide details about Tibetans 
detained, charged, or sentenced for peaceful, protest-related 
activity during the period since March 10, 2008, has resulted 
in prolonged uncertainty about the current status of hundreds 
of cases. As of September 1, 2011, the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 1,134 records of Tibetan 
political prisoners detained on or after March 10, 2008--a 
figure certain to be far from complete. No information is 
available, however, on the outcome of more than half (623) of 
the cases. More than half (348) of the 623 unresolved cases are 
presumed to have resulted in release based on the substantial 
period of time since detention--three years or more in hundreds 
of cases.
    Among the 1,134 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions 
reported since March 2008, post-detention information is 
available for only 307 cases. Included in those 307 cases are 
21 Tibetans whom officials ordered to serve reeducation through 
labor (16 are believed released upon completing their terms), 
and 197 Tibetans whom courts sentenced to periods of 
imprisonment ranging from six months to life (79 are believed 
released upon sentence completion). Of the 197 Tibetan 
political prisoners sentenced to imprisonment since March 2008, 
sentencing information is available for 186 prisoners: the 
average sentence length is five years and three months based on 
PPD data as of September 1, 2011.\201\

          CURRENT TIBETAN POLITICAL DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT

    As of September 1, 2011, the PPD contained records of 527 
Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed to be 
currently detained or imprisoned. Of those 527 records, 483 are 
records of Tibetans detained on or after March 10, 2008,\202\ 
and 44 are records of Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 
2008. PPD information for the period since March 10, 2008, is 
certain to be far from complete.
    Of the 483 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed 
to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on 
or after March 10, 2008, according to PPD data as of September 
1, 2011:

          More than half (264) are believed or presumed 
        to be detained or imprisoned in Sichuan province; the 
        rest are believed or presumed to be detained or 
        imprisoned in the Tibet Autonomous Region (160), Gansu 
        province (23), Qinghai province (34), the Xinjiang 
        Uyghur Autonomous Region (1), and Beijing (1).
          113 are serving sentences ranging in length 
        from one year and six months to life imprisonment; the 
        average sentence length is seven years and two 
        months.\203\ Sixty-two (55 percent) of the 113 
        prisoners with known sentences are monks, nuns, or 
        Tibetan Buddhist teachers or trulkus.
          240 (50 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks, 
        nuns, teachers, or trulkus.
          425 (88 percent) are male, 51 (11 percent) 
        are female, and 7 are of unknown gender.

    Sentencing information is available on 27 of the 44 Tibetan 
political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, and 
believed to remain imprisoned. Their sentences range in length 
from five years to life imprisonment; the average sentence 
length is 14 years and 3 months.\204\

 

                VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau


                              Introduction

    The United States supports a stable, autonomous Hong Kong 
under the ``one country, two systems'' formula articulated in 
the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China.\1\ The United States also supports the high degree of 
autonomy of Macau set forth in the Sino-Portuguese Joint 
Declaration on the Question of Macao and the Basic Law of the 
Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China.\2\ Furthermore, the United States supports the rights of 
the people of Hong Kong and Macau to enjoy an independent 
judiciary \3\ and an open society in which the freedoms of 
speech, movement, and assembly are largely respected.\4\

                               Hong Kong


                    UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE IN HONG KONG

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council (Legco) passed legislation broadening the 
electoral base somewhat for the 2012 election of Legco by 
adding 10 new members to the current 60 members \5\ and 
increasing the membership of the selection committee that 
chooses the chief executive from 800 to 1,200 members, changes 
which fell far short of universal suffrage.\6\ Of the 10 new 
Legco members, 5 will be elected by geographical 
constituencies, and 5 by a newly formed territory-wide District 
Council constituency.\7\ The Hong Kong Basic Law provides, 
``The ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive by 
universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative 
nominating committee in accordance with democratic 
procedures[;]'' and ``The ultimate aim is the election of all 
the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage.'' 
\8\ A December 2007 decision of the National People's Congress 
Standing Committee (NPCSC) that prohibited the people of Hong 
Kong from directly electing the chief executive or the Legco in 
2012, or making other substantive changes to the electoral 
system, circumscribed the electoral reforms that Legco could 
pass concerning the 2012 elections.\9\
    In January 2010, five Legco members resigned, forcing a by-
election to serve as an informal referendum on the pace of 
democratization. The by-election was held in May 2010, and the 
same five persons won back their seats.\10\ The mainland 
government was ``hostile'' to the by-election,\11\ and in June 
2011 the Hong Kong government introduced a bill providing that 
any Legco vacancy henceforth would be filled by the candidate 
with the next highest number of votes, thereby eliminating by-
elections in cases where there are other eligible candidates 
who received votes in the relevant election.\12\ The Hong Kong 
Bar Association argued that the proposed bill was not in 
conformity with the Basic Law,\13\ and the bill was considered 
one of the reasons that a large number of protesters joined the 
annual rally on the anniversary of Hong Kong's reunification 
with the mainland.\14\ In light of controversy surrounding the 
proposed bill, the government withdrew it in July.\15\
    Though the electoral base will broaden somewhat for the 
2012 elections, an increased number of political parties may 
make it unlikely that any party will present a challenge to 
mainland China's influence in the affairs of Hong Kong. The 
number of political parties or organizations has increased 
considerably, from 3 parties shortly after the handover in 1997 
to about 14 ``political parties, organizations or loose 
coalitions'' in 2011.\16\ According to one Democratic Party 
lawmaker, James To Kun-sun, from the perspective of the 
Communist Party, this is a positive development, since there is 
no single dominant political party that can pose a threat to 
China. He noted, however, that it does present problems for 
governance.\17\ At least one independent Hong Kong paper, Ming 
Pao, also conjectured that the mainland government is 
``coordinating'' the election strategies of the pro-mainland 
political parties in Hong Kong.\18\

                      ``ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS''

    During this reporting year, Hong Kong people continued to 
express concern over the mainland's role in Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong-based analyst Frank Ching has expressed concern that Hong 
Kong's autonomy is under threat.\19\ One of the examples Ching 
cited was the refusal of Hong Kong immigration officials to 
grant visas to two exiled leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen 
protests, Wu'er Kaixi and Wang Dan, to attend the funeral of 
political activist Szeto Wah. Ching wrote in the Hong Kong 
Journal, though Hong Kong controls its own immigration matters 
under the Basic Law, ``The impression, inescapably, is that the 
Chinese government withheld its blessings and Hong Kong was 
left to `decide' that it would not permit a visit by Wang 
Dan.'' \20\ During a visit by Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang 
in August, ``heavy-handed security'' raised concerns in Hong 
Kong that ``its autonomy is being eroded by a mainland 
government that does not value the territory's more 
freewheeling ways.'' \21\
    In June, Wang Guangya, the director of the Hong Kong and 
Macau Office of the PRC State Council, reportedly told a group 
of Hong Kong students that they should learn the basic elements 
of mainland national education,\22\ and in July the Hong Kong 
Education Bureau issued a Moral and National Education 
Curriculum Guide Consultation Draft.\23\ The proposals 
reportedly were condemned in an editorial in the independent 
Hong Kong newspaper, Apple Daily,\24\ and by the union that 
represents 90 percent of Hong Kong's teachers.\25\

                      ACTIVE DISSENT IN HONG KONG

    During this reporting year, Hong Kong citizens have 
continued to express their dissent. In some cases, 
demonstrations have not been peaceful, such as one in March 
2011 over the Hong Kong budget, at which 113 people were 
arrested, with activists vowing to continue to stage 
``confrontational'' rallies.\26\ After a protester assaulted 
Chief Executive Donald Tsang in March 2011, mainland Chinese 
officials expressed their disapproval, calling for punishment 
of the protester.\27\ This raised concerns that mainland China 
was not adhering to the principle of ``one country, two 
systems.'' \28\ Supporters of greater democracy in Hong Kong 
have criticized confrontational protests. Richard Tsoi Yiu-
cheong, a veteran democracy advocate, told the South China 
Morning Post that ``[i]ncreasingly radical protests may serve 
the purpose of embarrassing government officials, but they also 
risk diverting public attention from real policy debates.'' 
\29\

                         FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

    For the most part, the people of Hong Kong appear to 
continue to enjoy freedom of expression. Hong Kong rose from 
48th to 34th over the previous year in the 2010 Press Freedom 
Index of Reporters Without Borders.\30\ (For comparison, the 
United States, as in the previous year, remained 20th during 
the same period, and China's ranking dropped from 168 to 171 
out of 178 countries.) \31\ U.S.-based Freedom House in its 
2011 Global Press Freedom Rankings listed Hong Kong as ``partly 
free.'' \32\ According to the U.S. State Department's 2010 
Human Rights Report, ``reports of media self-censorship 
continued during the year.'' \33\ The report noted claims that 
businesses with interests in China owned most media outlets, 
making them ``vulnerable to self-censorship.'' \34\ This is 
reflected in a 2011 Chinascope report, which divides Hong Kong 
media into those funded by the Communist Party, and those that 
have just ``recently grown closer to the [Party].'' \35\ The 
latter, according to the report, are owned by businesses with 
close ties to mainland China.\36\
    This past year, Hong Kong people expressed support for 
imprisoned Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo. Bishop John Tong of the 
Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong praised Liu in a speech on 
Christmas Eve in 2010, for which mainland Chinese-owned 
newspaper, Ta Kung Pao, carried an article criticizing the 
bishop.\37\ In November 2010, pan-democratic Legco members 
introduced a motion of support for Liu, calling on the mainland 
government to release him. The motion was defeated.\38\

                               JUDICIARY

    During the Commission's 2011 reporting year, there were two 
prominent cases in Hong Kong courts of first instance which 
appear to be positive signs of an independent judiciary in Hong 
Kong. In one, the court rejected the Hong Kong government's 
environmental impact assessment report on the Hong Kong section 
of a bridge connecting Hong Kong to the mainland.\39\ The South 
China Morning Post in an editorial called the decision ``a 
victory for rule of law.'' \40\ In the other case, the Hong 
Kong court refused to enforce a mainland arbitration decision 
as contrary to Hong Kong public policy because the same person 
had acted both as mediator and arbitrator and there was a risk 
of bias.\41\
    In a groundbreaking June 2011 provisional judgment, Hong 
Kong's Court of Final Appeal (CFA) found that the mainland's 
rules on sovereign immunity should be applied to Hong Kong.\42\ 
The case raised issues as to whether the mainland's rules on 
sovereign immunity apply to Hong Kong, and whether the Hong 
Kong judiciary could rule on the issue.\43\ For the first time, 
the CFA referred the case to the National People's Congress 
Standing Committee (NPCSC) for interpretation.\44\ The NPCSC 
issued its interpretation in August, affirming the decisions of 
the CFA.\45\ The mainland government welcomed the CFA's 
decision to seek a judicial interpretation, though the CFA's 
move raised some concerns over Hong Kong's judicial 
independence.\46\ In addition, one commentator, the director of 
the Centre for Comparative and Public Law at the University of 
Hong Kong, observed that the decision could lead to Hong Kong 
providing sanctuary to leaders wanted for international 
crimes.\47\

                                 Macau


        ABILITY OF MACAU CITIZENS TO INFLUENCE THEIR GOVERNMENT

    The ability of the people of Macau to influence their 
government is restricted by Macau's constitutional system, 
under which the chief executive is selected by a 300-person 
committee, and only 12 of 29 seats in the Legislative Assembly 
are filled by direct election.\48\ In July 2009, the selection 
committee chose Fernando Chui Sai On as the chief executive in 
an uncontested election.\49\ In September 2009, voters selected 
12 assembly members by direct election, the chief executive 
appointed 7, and an additional 10 were selected indirectly in 
uncontested elections, similar to the system of functional 
constituencies in Hong Kong.\50\

                               CORRUPTION

    Corruption is a serious issue in Macau, which ranked 46th 
in the 2010 Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index, having dropped from 43rd in 2009. The index measures the 
perceived level of corruption in 178 countries.\51\ (By 
comparison, Hong Kong ranked 13th, the United States ranked 
22nd, and mainland China ranked 78th.) One local Macau scholar 
argues that corruption in Macau has not necessarily worsened. 
Rather, business people are simply more aware of the 
problem.\52\
    Gambling plays a major role in Macau's economy, with 
revenue increasing 58 percent in 2010.\53\ According to a 2011 
Reuters report, gambling is tied to widespread corruption, 
organized crime, money laundering, and movement of cash from 
mainland Chinese governments and state-owned companies into 
Macau.\54\ The movement of cash from the mainland to the 
gambling casinos of Macau is fueled by a ``junket'' system, 
which allows mainland ``high-rollers'' to bypass Chinese rules 
that limit how much cash an individual can take out of the 
mainland in a year. An article in the Washington Post cites a 
2009 study based on official PRC media reports, which found 
that ``57 percent of Chinese high-stakes gamblers in Macau are 
either government officials or senior managers in state-run 
companies, the main beneficiaries of easy credit from state-
owned banks. On average, these officials and managers each lost 
$3.3 million--nearly all of it public money.'' \55\

                            MACAU'S ECONOMY

    The mainland government has called for changes to the Macau 
economy. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called for Macau to improve 
regulation and diversify its economy beyond gambling.\56\ 
Further, the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National 
Economic and Social Development provides for Macau to develop 
its tourism and leisure industry and diversify its economy.\57\

                   NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (ARTICLE 23)

    Macau enacted national security legislation in 2009, 
criminalizing treason, secession, subversion, sedition, theft 
of state secrets, and association with foreign political 
organizations that harm state security.\58\ As of the end of 
2010, there had been no arrests under the legislation, and thus 
the impact of the law is not clear at this stage.\59\

                             VII. Endnotes

    Voted to adopt: Representative Smith; Senators Brown, 
Baucus, Levin, Feinstein, Merkley, Collins, and Risch; Deputy Secretary 
Harris, Under Secretary Otero, Under Secretary Sanchez, Assistant 
Secretary Campbell, and Assistant Administrator Biswal.

    Notes to Section I--Political Prisoner Database

    \1\ The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual 
detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under 
international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, 
freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to 
advocate peaceful social or political change, and to criticize 
government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative, 
not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were detained or 
imprisoned for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by 
China's Constitution and law, or by international law, or both. Chinese 
security, prosecution, and judicial officials sometimes seek to 
distract attention from the political or religious nature of 
imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or religious prisoner 
under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In such cases 
defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt to coerce 
confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of 
evidence are poor. If authorities permit a defendant to entrust someone 
to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as China's Criminal 
Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the counsel 
adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel's access 
to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time to prepare a 
defense.
    Notes to Section II--Freedom of Expression

    \1\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, art. 19(3); Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A 
(III) of 10 December 48, arts. 19, 29. The UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression has also used this three-factor test to describe the 
standard for determining when a restriction is permissible under 
Article 19, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR. UN Human Rights Council, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/
17/27, para. 24.
    \2\ UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 12th Sess., Promotion and Protection 
of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Including the Right to Development, adopted by Human Rights 
Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para. 
5(p)(i).
    \3\ In its May 2011 report, the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression stated 
that ``any legislation restricting the right to freedom of expression 
must be applied by a body which is independent of any political, 
commercial, or other unwarranted influences in a manner that is neither 
arbitrary nor discriminatory, and with adequate safeguards against 
abuse, including the possibility of challenge and remedy against its 
abusive application.'' UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/17/27, para. 24.
    \4\ Wu Yu, `` `Jasmine Revolution' Circulates Online, Chinese 
Authorities Take Precautions on All Fronts'' [Wangchuan ``molihua 
geming,'' zhongguo dangju quanxian jiebei], Deutsche Welle, 19 February 
11.&
    \5\ ``China's `Jasmine Revolution,' Assembly Sites in Each Major 
City'' [Zhongguo ``molihua geming'' geda chengshi jihui didian], Boxun, 
19 February 11; Wu Yu, `` `Jasmine Revolution' Circulates Online, 
Chinese Authorities Take Precautions on All Fronts'' [Wangchuan 
``molihua geming,'' zhongguo dangju quanxian jiebei], Deutsche Welle, 
19 February 11; Human Rights in China, ``Jasmine Organizers Call for 
Rallies Every Sunday,'' 22 February 11.
    \6\ ``Latest Directives From the Ministry of Truth, January 2-28, 
2011,'' China Digital Times, 8 February 11; ``Latest Directives From 
the Ministry of Truth, February 17-24, 2011,'' China Digital Times, 23 
February 11. For CECC analysis, see ``Authorities Censor Access to 
Information on Middle East and Chinese `Jasmine' Protests,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.
    \7\ Jeremy Page, ``Beijing Blocks Protest Reports,'' Wall Street 
Journal, 31 January 11; Edward Wong and David Barboza, ``Wary of Egypt 
Unrest, China Censors Web,'' New York Times, 31 January 11. See, e.g., 
``Color Revolutions Will Not Bring About Real Democracy,'' Global 
Times, 30 January 11.
    \8\ Michael Kan, ``China Microblogs Block Chinese Word for `Egypt,' 
'' IDG News, reprinted in PCWorld, 29 January 11; Jeremy Page, ``China 
Co-Opts Social Media To Head Off Unrest,'' Wall Street Journal, 22 
February 11. For CECC analysis, see ``Authorities Censor Access to 
Information on Middle East and Chinese `Jasmine' Protests,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.
    \9\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Escalating Crackdown 
Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution' in China,'' 31 March 11. For 
CECC analysis, see ``Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders, 
Lawyers, Artists, Bloggers,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 3 May 11.
    \10\ Ibid.
    \11\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: 
UN Expert Body Concerned About Recent Wave of Enforced 
Disappearances,'' 8 April 11; Human Rights Watch, ``China: Arrests, 
Disappearances Require International Response,'' 31 March 11; Amnesty 
International, ``China: New Generation of Internet Activists 
Targeted,'' 23 March 11.
    \12\ Barbara Demick, ``China Has Many `Dirty Words,' '' Los Angeles 
Times, 21 April 10; Loretta Chao and Jason Dean, ``China's Censors 
Thrive in Obscurity,'' Wall Street Journal, 31 March 10. Zhang Lei, 
``Publish and Be Deleted,'' Global Times, 25 February 10.
    \13\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China, Angered by Peace Prize, Blocks 
Celebration,'' New York Times, 9 October 10; ``PRC Blocks Web, Text 
Message Reports of Peace Prize for Liu Xiaobo,'' Agence France-Presse, 
8 October 10; Pascale Trouillaud, ``China Wages Propaganda War After 
Nobel,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 11 October 10.
    \14\ ``New Controls on Text Messages,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 January 
11.
    \15\ ``China, Tibet: The End of TibetCul.com? '' Global Voices, 19 
March 11; ``Graft-Busting Site Blocked,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 January 
11; ``China Closes AIDS Website,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 March 11.
    \16\ Sky Canaves, ``What Are You Allowed To Say on China's Social 
Networks? '' IEEE Spectrum, June 2011.
    \17\ Reporters Without Borders, ``Internet Is Collateral Victim of 
Crackdown on Inner Mongolia Protests,'' 31 May 11. For CECC analysis, 
see ``Mongols Protest in Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands 
Use, Mining Operations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
1 July 11.
    \18\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``News Flash: Rights Defender 
Wang Yi About To Be Sent to Reeducation Through Labor'' [Kuai xun: 
weiquan renshi wang yi zheng yao bei song qu laojiao], reprinted in 
Boxun, 15 November 10; Amnesty International, ``Chinese Woman Sentenced 
to a Year in Labour Camp Over Tweet,'' 17 November 10. For CECC 
analysis, see ``Henan Authorities Order One-Year Reeducation Through 
Labor Sentence for Activist's Satirical Tweet,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
    \19\ Ibid.
    \20\ ``Netizen `Re-educated' for Online Rant,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 
June 11.
    \21\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Caught in an `Authoritarian Moment,' '' 
New York Times, 25 November 10.
    \22\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet 
Likely the Harshest in Recent Years,'' 25 February 11.
    \23\ ``Guangzhou Lawyer Liu Zhengqing Arrested and House Searched, 
Zheng Chuangtian Seeks Defense and Hua Chunhui Receives Reeducation 
Through Labor'' [Guangzhou lushi liu zhengqing beibu chaojia, zheng 
chuangtian qubao hua chunhui chuan laojiao], Radio Free Asia, 1 April 
11.
    \24\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet 
Likely the Harshest in Recent Years,'' 25 February 11.
    \25\ Measures for the Administration of Internet Information 
Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, 
effective 25 September 00, art. 15.
    \26\ See, e.g., a November 2010 China Daily article that notes the 
concerns of one Chinese professor, who said there is a need for 
specific laws to determine when citizens have ``spread rumors.'' Li 
Xinzhu, ``Latest Batch of Rogue Netizens Exposed,'' China Daily, 3 
November 10.
    \27\ Measures for the Administration of Internet Information 
Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, 
effective 25 September 00, arts. 15-16; Provisions on the 
Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen 
xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 
September 05, arts. 19-21.
    \28\ Lana Lam, ``Social Media Finding Ways Around Censors,'' South 
China Morning Post, 13 February 11.
    \29\ Zhang Duo, et al., ``Online Media Visit `First Congress' 
Meeting Site in Nanhu, Li Yanhong Speaks on Behalf of Members'' 
[Wangluo meiti tanfang ``yi da'' huizhi nanhu li yanhong daibiao 
chengyuan fayan], Xinhua, 8 June 11.
    \30\ Melanie Lee, ``Sina To Launch English Microblog by Year-End,'' 
Reuters, 7 June 11.
    \31\ Loretta Chao, ``Google Objects to China's Acts,'' Wall Street 
Journal, 22 March 11.
    \32\ Chris Buckley, ``Ministry Spokeswoman Says Accusations 
`Unacceptable,' '' Reuters, 22 March 11.
    \33\ ``Ensuring Your Information Is Safe Online,'' The Official 
Google Blog, 1 June 11.
    \34\ Michael Wines, ``China Rejects Google's Hacking Charge,'' New 
York Times, 6 June 11.
    \35\ Measures for the Administration of Internet Information 
Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, 
effective 25 September 00, art. 4; Registration Administration Measures 
for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing 
hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei'an guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05, 
effective 20 March 05, art. 5; Provisions on the Administration of 
Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli 
guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 5, 
11, 12; Provisions on the Administration of Internet Video and Audio 
Programming Services [Hulianwang shiting jiemu fuwu guanli guiding], 
issued 20 December 07, effective 31 January 08, art. 7.
    \36\ The Special Rapporteur also noted that such licensing schemes 
should be distinguished from ``registration with a domain name 
authority for purely technical reasons or rules of general application 
which apply without distinction to any kind of commercial operation.'' 
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 11, A/HRC/17/27, para. 28. In China, 
because the registration system gives the government discretion to 
reject an application based on content (i.e., whether the Web site 
operator intends to post ``news,'' and if so, whether it is authorized 
to do so), it is qualitatively different from registration which all 
Web site operators must undertake with a domain registrar, and 
constitutes a de facto licensing scheme. Measures for the 
Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu 
guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, effective 25 September 00, art. 
4; Registration Administration Measures for Non-Commercial Internet 
Information Services [Fei jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei'an 
guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05, effective 20 March 05, art. 5.
    \37\ ``Nationwide 3000 Web Sites Closed for Failing To Register, 
636,000 Domain Names No Longer Resolving'' [Quanguo guanbi 3000 ge wei 
bei'an wangzhan, tingzhi jiexi 63.6 wan yuming], Sina, 28 October 10.
    \38\ Yin Yungong and Liu Ruisheng, ``The Indigenization and 
Socialization of China's New Media--Characteristics, Dissemination 
Influence, and Hot Topic Analysis in the Development of New Media in 
China in 2010'' [Zhongguo xin meiti de bentuhua yu shehuihua--2010 nian 
zhongguo xin meiti fazhan tezheng, chuanbo yingxiang yu redian jiexi], 
taken from the Chinese New Media Development Report (2011) [Zhongguo 
xin meiti fazhan baogao (2011)], Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Media and Communications Research Web, 12 July 11.
    \39\ Priscilla Jiao, ``41pc of Mainland Websites Close in Just One 
Year,'' South China Morning Post, 13 July 11.
    \40\ Ibid.
    \41\ Yin Yungong and Liu Ruisheng, ``The Indigenization and 
Socialization of China's New Media--Characteristics, Dissemination 
Influence, and Hot Topic Analysis in the Development of New Media in 
China in 2010'' [Zhongguo xin meiti de bentuhua yu shehuihua--2010 nian 
zhongguo xin meiti fazhan tezheng, chuanbo yingxiang yu redian jiexi], 
taken from the Chinese New Media Development Report (2011) [Zhongguo 
xin meiti fazhan baogao (2011)], Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Media and Communications Research Web, 12 July 11.
    \42\ State Council Information Office, ``White Paper on the State 
of the Internet in China'' [Zhongguo hulianwang zhuangkuang bai pi 
shu], 8 June 10, sec. I.
    \43\ China Internet Network Information Center, ``27th Statistical 
Report on Internet Development in China'' [Di 27 ci zhongguo 
hulianwangluo fazhan zhuangkuang diaocha tongji baogao], 19 January 11, 
12, 21; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, ``Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology Announces April 2011 
Telecommunications Industry Operating Situation'' [Gongye he xinxihua 
bu fabu 2011 nian 4 yue tongxinye yunxing zhuangkuang], 24 May 11.
    \44\ ``Wang Chen: Chinese Government Attaches Great Importance to 
and Actively Promotes the Development and Utilization of the Internet'' 
[Wang chen: zhongguo zhengfu gaodu zhongshi bing jiji cujin hulianwang 
fazhan yu yunyong], China.com, 30 December 10; ``Hu Jintao: Firmly 
Raise the Standard for Scientization of Social Management'' [Hu jintao: 
zhazhashishi tigao shehui guanli kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua, 19 
February 11.
    \45\ Guobin Yang, ``China's Gradual Revolution,'' New York Times, 
13 March 11; Keith B. Richburg, ``In China, Microblogging Sites Become 
Free-Speech Platform,'' Washington Post, 27 March 11; Michael Wines, 
``China's Censors Misfire in Abuse-of-Power Case,'' New York Times, 17 
November 10. One U.S.-based Chinese Internet expert tallied 60 major 
cases of online activism in 2009 and 2010, but noted that the protests 
were primarily local and directed at corrupt officials and specific 
instances of injustice and that government controls had prevented more 
``broad-based coalitions.'' Guobin Yang, ``China's Gradual 
Revolution,'' New York Times, 13 March 11.
    \46\ Michael Wines and Sharon LaFraniere, ``In Baring Facts of 
Train Crash, Blogs Erode China Censorship,'' New York Times, 28 July 
11.
    \47\ Ibid.
    \48\ ``State Internet Information Office Established'' [Guojia 
hulianwang xinxi bangongshi sheli], Xinhua, reprinted in State Council 
Information Office, 4 May 11.
    \49\ In an April 2011 Chinese news article, an official with the 
Beijing City Internet Propaganda Supervision Office noted that the 
``basic principle of the Communist Party managing the media'' had been 
legally enshrined in major Internet regulations and that the government 
body in charge of managing the media, the State Council Information 
Office, and the Central Party External Propaganda Office were simply 
``the same office under different names.'' Chen Hua, ``Looking Back on 
Ten Years of Internet News Publishing Work and the Avenues of 
Management by Law'' [Hulianwang zhan dengzai xinwen yewu shinian huigu 
yu fazhi guanli lujing], Qianlong Net, 29 April 11.
    \50\ ``Hu Jintao: Firmly Raise the Standard for Scientization of 
Social Management'' [Hu jintao: zhazhashishi tigao shehui guanli 
kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua, 19 February 11.
    \51\ Pascale Trouillaud, ``China's Web Spin Doctors Spread 
Beijing's Message,'' Sydney Morning Herald, 12 May 11.
    \52\ ``Zhou Yongkang: Adapt to New Economic and Social Development 
Conditions, Strengthen and Create Innovations in Social Management'' 
[Zhou yongkang: shiying jingji shehui fazhan xin xingshi, jiaqiang he 
chuangxin shehui guanli], Xinhua, 20 February 11.
    \53\ Andrew Jacobs, ``As China Steps Up Web Monitoring, Many Wi-Fi 
Users Stay Away,'' New York Times, 25 July 11; Xu Tianran, ``Is Wi-Fi 
Software Illegal? '' Global Times, 29 July 11.
    \54\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Official Data Show State Security 
Arrests, Prosecutions Remained at Historic Levels in 2010,'' 15 March 
11. Article 105 provides for sentences of up to life imprisonment for 
attempts to subvert state power or up to 15 years for inciting such 
subversion. PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 105.
    \55\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the 
Crackdown Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' updated 30 May 
11.
    \56\ Ibid.
    \57\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China Releases Dissident Blogger, With 
Conditions,'' New York Times, 10 August 11.
    \58\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Escalating Crackdown 
Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution' in China,'' 31 March 11.
    \59\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 293.
    \60\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the 
Crackdown Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' updated 30 May 
11.
    \61\ ``Chinese Activist on Trial Amid Crackdowns,'' Associated 
Press, reprinted in Time, 11 August 11.
    \62\ Tania Branigan, ``Chinese Internet Activist Wang Lihong Goes 
on Trial,'' Guardian, 12 August 11.
    \63\ Human Rights in China, ``Lawyers Report Procedural 
Irregularities at Trial of Rights Activist Wang Lihong,'' 13 August 11.
    \64\ Human Rights in China, ``Rights Defender Wang Lihong Sentenced 
to Nine Months,'' 9 September 11.
    \65\ ``Ai Weiwei's Company Evades `Huge Amount' of Tax: Police,'' 
Xinhua, 20 May 11.
    \66\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China Takes Dissident Artist Into Custody,'' 
New York Times, 3 April 11.
    \67\ ``Wife of Detained Chinese Artist Finds Him Tense During 
Visit; No Word on Why He Was Seized,'' Associated Press, 15 May 11.
    \68\ Jeremy Page, ``Ai Weiwei Resumes His Defiance of Beijing,'' 
Wall Street Journal, 12 August 11.
    \69\ Ibid.
    \70\ Ibid.
    \71\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the 
Crackdown Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' updated 30 May 
11.
    \72\ Following its 2005 visit to China, the UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention noted that the vague definition of crimes of 
endangering national security, splitting the state, subverting state 
power, and supplying state secrets ``leaves their application open to 
abuse particularly of the rights to freedom of religion, speech, and 
assembly.'' It recommended that political crimes ``that leave large 
discretion to law enforcement and prosecution authorities such as 
`endangering national security,' `subverting State power,' `undermining 
the unity of the country,' `supplying of State secrets to individuals 
abroad,' etc. should be abolished.'' Manfred Nowak, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Mission to China, 10 March 06, paras. 34, 
82(s). In a January 2008 report, Chinese Human Rights Defenders studied 
41 cases from 2000 to 2007 in which officials used the ``inciting 
subversion'' provision of the PRC Criminal Law (Article 105(2)) to 
punish Chinese citizens for exercising their right to freedom of 
expression. It found that in such cases ``[t]he `evidence' often 
consists of no more than the writings of an individual or simply shows 
that he/she circulated certain articles containing dissenting views, 
without any effort to show that the expression had any potential or 
real subversive effect. That is to say, speech in and of itself is 
interpreted as constituting incitement of subversion. . . .'' Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders, ``Inciting Subversion of State Power: A Legal 
Tool for Prosecuting Free Speech in China,'' 8 January 08. See, e.g., a 
Beijing court's December 2009 decision in the Liu Xiaobo case in which 
the court provided no evidence that Liu advocated violence in his 
works. Human Rights in China, ``Case Update: International Community 
Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Verdict,'' 30 December 09. For CECC analysis, 
see ``Liu Xiaobo Appeals Sentence; Official Abuses Mar Case From 
Outset,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 
February 10, 2.
    \73\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Wuhan Rights Defender Li Tie 
Arrested on Suspicion of `Subverting State Power' Crime'' [Wuhan 
weiquan renshi litie bei yi shexian ``dianfu guojia zhengquan zui'' 
daibu], 17 November 10.
    \74\ ``Chinese Activist Held Over Tiananmen Picture,'' Associated 
Press, reprinted in Guardian, 30 November 10.
    \75\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three More Tibetan Writers 
Sentenced to Prison,'' 21 January 11; ``Tibetan Writers Sentenced,'' 
Radio Free Asia, 31 December 10; International Campaign for Tibet, 
``Three Tibetan Writers on Trial Await Verdict,'' 5 November 10; 
``Tibetan Writers Tried as `Splittists,' '' Radio Free Asia, 5 November 
10.
    \76\ Human Rights in China, ``Activist Sentenced to Ten Years for 
Inciting Subversion; Essays Cited as Evidence,'' 25 March 11.
    \77\ ``So-Called `Punishment Because of Speech' Is a Misreading of 
the Judgment in the Liu Xiaobo Case'' [Suowei ``yinyan huozui'' shi dui 
liu xiaobo an panjue de wudu], Xinhua, 25 October 10. For CECC 
analysis, see ``Xinhua Article Claims Liu Xiaobo Case Meets 
International Standards,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 1-2.
    \78\ Ibid.
    \79\ Ibid.
    \80\ UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2011 
(People's Republic of China), 5 May 11, reprinted in Freedom Now, 1 
August 11. For CECC analysis, see ``UN Group Calls for Immediate 
Release of Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 12 August 11.
    \81\ Reporters Without Borders, ``Debate on Internet Censorship 
Censored,'' 30 November 10; ``Guizhou Poet `Still Missing,' '' Radio 
Free Asia, 16 December 10.
    \82\ ChinaAid, ``Urgent! Chen and Wife Beaten Severely, Chinese 
Citizens Appeal to America,'' 10 February 11; China Human Rights 
Lawyers Concern Group, ``Vehemently Condemn Beating and Taking Into 
Custody Rights Defense Lawyer'' [Qianglie qianze ouda ji jujin weiquan 
lushi], 21 February 11. For CECC analysis, see ``Chen Guangcheng, Wife 
Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing Official Abuse,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 March 11.
    \83\ Ibid.
    \84\ PEN American Center, ``PEN Sounds Alarm Over Treatment of 
Jailed Nobel Laureate's Wife in China,'' 22 February 11.
    \85\ UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 15/2011 
(People's Republic of China), 5 May 11, reprinted in Freedom Now, 1 
August 11. For CECC analysis, see ``UN Group Calls for Immediate 
Release of Liu Xiaobo and Wife Liu Xia,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 12 August 11.
    \86\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Qin Yongmin, Recently 
Released From Prison, Suffers High Blood Pressure After Being Abused by 
Police During Visit'' [Gang chuyu de qin yongmin yin jingcha shangmen 
manma, zhi xueya dou sheng chuxian yanzhong bushi], 1 December 10.
    \87\ Philip Gourevitch, ``Liao Yiwu: Grounded in China,'' New 
Yorker, 30 March 11; ``China Bans Writer From Traveling Abroad,'' 
Associated Press, 9 May 11. Earlier, officials had allowed Liao to 
attend a literary festival in Germany in September 2010.
    \88\ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Chinese Artists Drawn to Berlin, a 
Haven That Reveres History,'' New York Times, 10 August 11.
    \89\ Human Rights in China, ``Three Documents Related to the Case 
of Buddhist Leader Wu Zeheng,'' 22 September 11.
    \90\ Ibid.
    \91\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Tenth Anniversary Joint 
Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next 
Decade,'' Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 
Frank La Rue, 25 March 10, A/HRC/14/23/Add.2, art. 1(a).
    \92\ ``Liu Binjie: Political System Reform Must Insist on the 
Correct Orientation'' [Liu binjie: zhengzhi tizhi gaige bixu jianchi 
zhengque fangxiang], China Press and Publications Daily, 17 November 
10.
    \93\ ``SARFT Spokesperson: Radio and Televisions Not Allowed To 
Entirely Go on Market'' [Guangdian zongju xinwen fayan ren: diantai 
dianshitai buxu zhengti shangshi], China News Net, 14 January 11.
    \94\ Zhao Qiang, ``Loss of Control Over Public Opinion: Catalyst 
for Disintegration of Soviet Union'' [Yulun shikong: sulian jieti de 
cuihuaji], Seeking Truth, 1 November 10.
    \95\ ``Local Newspapers Prohibited From Swapping Reports, Freedom 
of Speech in the Mainland Again Put Under Pressure'' [Difang baozhang 
jin huhuan gaojian neidi yanlunziyou zai yu ya], Ming Pao, 15 July 10; 
Reporters Without Borders, ``New Regulations Pose Threat to Liberal 
Press,'' 21 July 10. For CECC analysis, see ``Communist Party Seeks To 
Restrict Already Limited Critical Media Reports,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 4.
    \96\ ``Does China's General Administration on Press and Publication 
Safeguard or Restrict Freedom of the Press? '' [Zhongguo xinwen chuban 
shu weihu hai shi xianzhi xinwen ziyou?], Radio Free Asia, 6 November 
10.
    \97\ Katherine Hille, ``Anger Over Attacks on Journalists in 
China,'' Financial Times, 8 August 10.
    \98\ Ibid.
    \99\ Sharon LaFraniere, ``Media Blackout in China After Wreck,'' 
New York Times, 31 July 11.
    \100\ Ibid.
    \101\ Ibid.
    \102\ ``Remarks at 11th China Journalists' Day and Presentation of 
Awards and Report Meeting'' [Zai di shiyi jie zhongguo jizhe jie ji 
banjiang baogao hui shang de jianghua], People's Daily, 8 November 10.
    \103\ Ibid.
    \104\ ``Liu Yunshan Presides Over Convening of Meeting on Topic of 
Starting Propaganda Reporting Work for 90th Anniversary of the Party's 
Founding'' [Liu yunshan zhuchi zhaokai jiandang 90 zhounian xuanchuan 
baodao gongzuo zhuanti huiyi], Xinhua, 22 April 11. For CECC analysis, 
see ``Top Official Directs Media To Promote July Anniversary of Party's 
Founding,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.
    \105\ Ibid.
    \106\ Damian Grammaticas, ``Chinese Regulators Suspend TV Crime and 
Spy Dramas,'' BBC, 6 May 11.
    \107\ Keith Richburg, ``Chinese Editors, and a Web Site, Detail 
Censors' Hidden Hand,'' Washington Post, 1 April 11.
    \108\ International Federation of Journalists, ``New IFJ Report 
Outlines Restrictions on Journalists in China in 2010,'' 30 January 11.
    \109\ Ibid.
    \110\ Pascale Trouillaud, ``China Wages Propaganda War After 
Nobel,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 11 October 10.
    \111\ Ibid.
    \112\ Wu Yu, ``Chinese Authorities Issue Media Restriction, Banning 
`Civil Society' '' [Zhongguo danggju xiada meiti jinling, pingbi 
``gongmin shehui''], Deutsche Welle, 6 January 11.
    \113\ Priscilla Jiao, ``Officials Put an End to Reporting Awards,'' 
South China Morning Post, 28 December 10.
    \114\ David Barboza, ``Chinese Journalist Who Defied the Censors 
and Wrote About Corruption Is Fired,'' New York Times, 27 January 11.
    \115\ `` `Time Weekly' Selection Crisis, Commentary Department Head 
`Forced To Resign' '' [``Shidai zhoubao'' pingxuan fengbo, pinglunbu 
zhuren ``bei cizhi''], Radio Free Asia, 10 January 11.
    \116\ Ibid.
    \117\ Ibid.
    \118\ Committee to Protect Journalists, ``Mainstream Journalists 
Also Targeted in China Crackdown,'' 30 March 11.
    \119\ Priscilla Jiao, ``High Price for Airing Sun Yat-sen 
Criticism,'' South China Morning Post, 19 August 11.
    \120\  International Federation of Journalists, ``IFJ Demands 
Reinstatement of Journalist Suspended Over China Disaster Reports,'' 2 
August 11.
    \121\ Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information 
Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 
September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 7, 8, 11; Regulations on 
the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 
December 01, effective 1 February 02, art. 15; Measures for 
Administration of News Reporter Cards [Xinwen jizhe zheng guanli 
banfa], issued 24 August 09, effective 15 October 09, arts. 11, 12, 16.
    \122\ Zhejiang Province Radio, Film and Television Bureau, ``2010 
Nationwide Radio and Television Editors and Reporters, Broadcasters, 
and Hosts Qualification Exam'' [2010 nian quanguo guangbo dianshi 
bianji jizhe, boyin yuan zhuchi ren zige kaoshi dagang], 30 July 10, 
chap. 2, art. 6.
    \123\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 68.
    \124\ ``Stop False Reporting, Strengthen Social Responsibility, 
Strengthen Construction of News Professional Ethics'' [Dujue xujia 
baodao, zengqiang shehui zeren, jiaqiang xinwen zhiye daode jianshe], 
Xinhua, 24 November 10.
    \125\ Ibid.
    \126\ ``14 News Units Conscientiously Launch Self-Education and 
Self-Examination, Self-Rectification'' [Shisi jia xinwen danwei renzhen 
kaizhan ziwo jiaoyu he zicha zijiu], Xinhua, 13 April 11.
    \127\ ``Individual journalists should not be required to be 
licensed or to register. There should be no legal restrictions on who 
may practice journalism.'' UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of 
American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 
``International Experts Condemn Curbs on Freedom of Expression and 
Control Over Media and Journalists,'' UN Press Release, 18 December 03.
    \128\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Tenth Anniversary Joint 
Declaration: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next 
Decade,'' Addendum to Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 
Frank La Rue, 25 March 10, A/HRC/14/23/Add.2, arts. 1(b), 1(g).
    \129\ ``GAPP's Special Campaign Against Newspaper and Magazine 
Journalist Stations'' [Xinwen chuban zongshu jiang dui baokan jizhe 
zhan kaizhan zhuanxiang zhili], Xinhua, 24 March 11.
    \130\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Warning: Reporting 
on Chen Guangcheng,'' 17 February 11. For CECC analysis, see ``Chen 
Guangcheng, Wife Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing 
Official Abuse,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 March 
11.
    \131\ Ibid.
    \132\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``New Details on 
Wangfujing Interference,'' 28 February 11. For CECC analysis, see 
``Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten Foreign Journalists 
Covering `Jasmine Revolution,' '' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 22 March 11.
    \133\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``New Details on 
Wangfujing Interference,'' 28 February 11; ``Bloomberg Journalist 
Assaulted as China Heightens Security,'' Bloomberg, 27 February 11. For 
CECC analysis, see ``Authorities Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten 
Foreign Journalists Covering `Jasmine Revolution,' '' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 22 March 11.
    \134\ ``Foreign Minister to Foreign Press: Don't Believe Your Lying 
Eyes,'' Wall Street Journal, 8 March 11; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on 
March 3, 2011,'' 5 March 11. The Commission and others reported on the 
existence of local regulations issued in late 2010 and early 2011 that 
require official approval to report in the Wangfujing area and near the 
designated Shanghai protest site. For CECC analysis, see ``Authorities 
Reportedly Beat, Detain, and Threaten Foreign Journalists Covering 
`Jasmine Revolution,' '' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
22 March 11. But national regulations put in place for the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics provide that foreign journalists may interview any individual 
or organization so long as they obtain their consent. At the time, 
officials touted the regulations as providing foreign journalists 
freedom to report on every aspect of Chinese society, from political 
matters to social issues. Regulations of the People's Republic of China 
on News Covering Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News 
Agencies and Foreign Journalists [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waiguo 
changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang tiaoli], issued 17 
October 08, art. 17; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry 
News Department Head Liu Jianchao Hosts Sino-Foreign Journalists Press 
Conference on State Council's Promulgation of the `Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent 
Offices of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists' '' [Waijiaobu 
xinwen si sizhang liu jianchao jiu guowuyuan banbu shishi ``zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo waiguo changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang 
tiaoli'' juxing zhongwai jizhe hui], 17 October 08.
    \135\ Sharon LaFraniere and Edward Wong, ``Even With Protests 
Averted, China Turns to Intimidation of Foreign Journalists,'' New York 
Times, 6 March 11; Alexa Olesen, ``China Warns Foreign Media Not To 
Cover Protests,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 3 
March 11.
    \136\ Louisa Lim, ``China Cracks Down on Christians at Outdoor 
Service,'' National Public Radio, 11 April 11; Bill Schiller, ``Star 
Reporter Detained, Interrogated by Chinese Police for Taking Photo,'' 
Toronto Star, 11 April 11.
    \137\ Ben Blanchard and Chris Buckley, ``Foreign Media in China 
Face Worsening Conditions--Survey,'' Reuters, 19 May 11.
    \138\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban 
guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended 
19 March 11, arts. 6, 7, 61; Provisions on the Administration of 
Newspaper Publishing [Baozhi chuban guanli guiding], issued 30 
September 05, effective 1 December 05, arts. 2, 4; Provisions on the 
Administration of Periodical Publishing [Qikan chuban guanli guiding], 
issued 30 September 05, effective 1 December 05, arts. 2, 5.
    \139\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban 
guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended 
19 March 11, art. 11.
    \140\ Provisions on the Administration of Periodical Publishing 
[Qikan chuban guanli guiding], issued 30 September 05, effective 1 
December 05, art. 45 (written reports); Regulations on the 
Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 
01, effective 1 February 02, amended 19 March 11, art. 20 (advance 
approval for special topics).
    \141\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban 
guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended 
19 March 11, arts. 36, 53.
    \142\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 225.
    \143\ ``Procuratorate Decides Not To Arrest Author Xie Chaoping in 
Sanmenxia Dam Relocation Program `Book Case,' '' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 10 December 10.
    \144\ Ibid.
    \145\ ``Inner Mongolia Writer Unaga Secretly Detained for 
Publishing New Book'' [Neimeng zuojia wunaga ni chuban xinshu zao mimi 
daibu], Radio Free Asia, 19 January 11; ``Mongol Writer Unaga Secretly 
Arrested in Inner Mongolia'' [Mongghul yazghuchisi unaga ichki 
mongghulda mexpiy tutuldi], Radio Free Asia, 18 January 11; Southern 
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Southern Mongolian 
Dissident Writer, Author of `Forefront of Independence' Arrested and 
Detained,'' 23 January 11.
    \146\ UN Human Rights Council, ``Cases Examined by the Special 
Rapporteur (June 2009-July 2010),'' Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Rights of Indigenous People, James Anaya, 15 September 10, A/HRC/
15/37/Add.1.
    \147\ Ibid.
    \148\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban 
guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, amended 
19 March 11, art. 25.
    \149\ ``Strongly Rectify and Standardize Culture Market Order'' 
[Zhongquan zhengdun guifan wenhua shichang zhixu], Heilongjiang 
Information Net, 11 March 11.
    \150\ Ibid.
    \151\ ``Jiangxi Province `Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down 
Illegal Publications' Publications Market Program Clean-Up Has 
Remarkable Results'' [Jiangxi sheng ``saohuang dafei'' chubanwu 
shichang zhuanxiang zhengzhi chengxiao xianzhu], People's Daily, 21 
April 11.
    \152\ Liu Xilin, ``Our City Has Destroyed More Than 60,000 Items of 
Rights--Violating, Pirated, and All Types of Illegal Publication'' [Wo 
shi jizhong xiaohui 6 wan yu jian qinquan daoban ji gelei feifa 
chubanwu], Guang'an City Radio and Television Station, 22 April 11.
    Notes to Section II--Worker Rights

    \1\ See, e.g., All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``The 
Conditions of New Generation Migrant Workers in Enterprises: A 2010 
Study and Policy Recommendations'' [2010 nian qiye xinshengdai 
nongmingong zhuangkuang diaocha ji duice jianyi], 21 February 11; Qian 
Yanfeng, ``Migrant Workers Can Earn Degrees,'' China Daily, 7 December 
10; ``Unhappy Rural Workers `Threaten Social Stability,' '' Reuters, 
reprinted in South China Morning Post, 15 June 11; ``Riots Highlight 
Migrant Rights,'' Radio Free Asia, 14 June 11; Jeremy Page, ``China 
Stamps Out Southern Unrest,'' Wall Street Journal, 15 June 11; 
Katherine Ryder, ``China's Labor Market: Valuable Asset or Economic 
Albatross? '' Fortune, reprinted in CNN Money, 17 December 10; Li Li, 
``Battling for Workers: China's Labor Pool Is Not Running Dry, but 
Migrant Workers Are Expecting More From Cities,'' Beijing Review, 8 
March 11; ``Crimes Committed by Young Migrant Workers Spark Public 
Concern,'' Xinhua, 25 February 11.
    \2\ All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``The Conditions of New 
Generation Migrant Workers in Enterprises: A 2010 Study and Policy 
Recommendations'' [2010 nian qiye xinshengdai nongmingong zhuangkuang 
diaocha ji duice jianyi], 21 February 11; Zhang Jieping and Zhu Yixin, 
``Labor Movement's Demand for the Establishment of Independent Unions 
Will Change the Country's Trajectory'' [Zhongguo gong yun yaoqiu 
chengli duli gonghui gaibian guoyun guiji], Asia Week, 13 June 10.
    \3\ All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``The Conditions of New 
Generation Migrant Workers in Enterprises: A 2010 Study and Policy 
Recommendations'' [2010 nian qiye xinshengdai nongmingong zhuangkuang 
diaocha ji duice jianyi], 21 February 11.
    \4\ Ibid.
    \5\ Ibid.
    \6\ Ibid.
    \7\ Ibid.
    \8\ ``Agricultural Minister Han Changfu Discusses `Post-1990s' 
Migrant Workers'' [Nongyebu buzhang han changfu tan ``90 hou'' 
nongmingong], China Review News, 1 February 10. See also ``Joint 
Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After 
Publication, Co-Author Fired,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 1-2.
    \9\ See, e.g., James Pomfret and Chris Buckley, ``Special Report: 
China Migrant Unrest Exposes Generation Faultline,'' Reuters, 28 June 
11; Zhang Jieping and Zhu Yixin, ``Labor Movement's Demand for the 
Establishment of Independent Unions Will Change the Country's 
Trajectory'' [Zhongguo gong yun yaoqiu chengli duli gonghui gaibian 
guoyun guiji], Asia Week, 13 June 10.
    \10\ For more information, see the Web site ``China Strikes: 
Mapping Labor Unrest Across China.'' According to the site's founder, 
Manfred Elfstrom, China Strikes is dedicated to tracking ``strikes, 
protests and other collective actions taken by Chinese workers to 
defend their rights and interests.'' News reports of worker actions are 
regularly uploaded onto the site, and they are classified into 
different categories, such as apparel and textile, bus and truck 
drivers, machinery and appliance, mines, etc. Data may also be viewed 
in a map format, showing the number of worker actions that took place 
in various regions across China. China Strikes, last visited June 2, 
2011.
    \11\ James Pomfret, ``Police Stem S. China Riots but Migrant 
Workers' Anger Runs Deep,'' Reuters, reprinted in Yahoo!, 14 June 11. 
See also ``Zengcheng Riot: China Forces Quell Migrant Unrest,'' BBC, 14 
June 11; Jeremy Page, ``China Stamps Out Southern Unrest,'' Wall Street 
Journal, 15 June 11; ``Security Reported Tight in Riot-Torn South China 
City as Unofficial Curfew Imposed,'' Associated Press, reprinted in 
Washington Post, 13 June 11.
    \12\ ``Workers Occupied Front Gate of Guizhou Liquor Factory; 
Restructuring Revealed Protests With Tears of Blood'' [Guizhou chunjiu 
chang damen bei gongren zhanling, gaizhi jiekai xuelei kangyi], Workers 
Forum, 27 April 11.
    \13\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Migrant Worker Union Negotiates Pay 
Deal for Tianjin Cleaners,'' 1 April 11.
    \14\ James Pomfret, ``More Problems for China's Foxconn Over 
Workers' Pay,'' Reuters, 19 November 10; China Labour Bulletin, 
``Foxconn Workers in Foshan Strike Over Low Pay,'' 19 November 10.
    \15\ China Labour Net, ``Workers of Guangzhou INPEX Metal Product 
Company Limited Call for Support From Japanese Trade Union,'' 13 
November 10.
    \16\ ``Assembly of Private Teachers in Ten-Some Counties and 
Municipalities in Hubei Province Calls for Release of Yang Huanqing, 
Who Was Sent to Reeducation Through Labor'' [Hubei shiyu xian shi 
minshi jihui yaoqiu jiefang bei laogai de yang huanqing], Boxun, 28 
March 11.
    \17\ ``Labor Lawyer Imprisoned in Xi'an for Organizing Against 
Corrupt Privatization of State Enterprises,'' China Labor News 
Translations, 10 January 11; ``Xi'an Rights Defender Zhao Dongmin 
Detained; Applied for the Establishment of `Workers Defense Congress' 
'' [Shenqing chengli ``gongwei hui'' xi'an weiquan renshi zhao dongmin 
bei xingju], Radio Free Asia, 27 August 09; ``No Trial for Labor 
Activist,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 September 10.
    \18\ ``Labor Lawyer Imprisoned in Xi'an for Organizing Against 
Corrupt Privatization of State Enterprises,'' China Labor News 
Translations, 10 January 11; China Study Group, ``Zhao Dongmin 
Sentenced to Three Years,'' 25 October 10. See also Utopia, ``A 
Discussion With the Compatriots Who Care for and Love Zhao Dongmin'' 
[Yu guanxin he aihu zhao dongmin de tongzhimen shangque], 23 October 
10.
    \19\ Utopia, ``Sunshine Is the Best Disinfectant and Antiseptic'' 
[Yangguang shi zuihao de shajun fangfuji], 26 October 10.
    \20\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
    \21\ Bill Taylor and Qi Li, ``Is the ACFTU a Union and Does It 
Matter? '' Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 49, No. 5 (2007), 701-
15.
    \22\ PRC Trade Union Law, enacted and effective 3 April 92, amended 
27 October 01; Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions, adopted 26 
September 03, amended 21 October 08.
    \23\ See, e.g., Qiu Liben, ``The Silent Lambs Are No Longer 
Silent'' [Chenmo de gaoyang buzai chenmo], Asiaweek, 13 June 10; Keith 
Bradsher, ``A Labor Movement Stirs in China,'' New York Times, 10 June 
10; Yu Jianrong, ``No Social Stability Without Labor Protection,'' 
China Media Project, 15 June 10; Mingwei Liu, ``Chinese Employment 
Relations and Trade Unions in Transition,'' Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell 
University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, January 2009; 
China Labour Bulletin, ``Protecting Workers' Rights or Serving the 
Party: The Way Forward for China's Trade Union,'' March 2009.
    \24\ Han Dongfang, ``China's Main Union Is Yet To Earn Its Job,'' 
Guardian, 26 June 11; Anita Chan, ``Labor Unrest and Role of Unions,'' 
China Daily, 18 June 10; China Labour Bulletin, ``Protecting Workers' 
Rights or Serving the Party: The Way Forward for China's Trade Union,'' 
March 2009.
    \25\ International Trade Union Confederation, ``China,'' in Asia 
and the Pacific, an Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 
(2009).
    \26\ Simon Clarke et al., ``Collective Consultation and Industrial 
Relations in China,'' British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 42, 
No. 2 (2004), 235, 240.
    \27\ Yang Lin, ``Grasp the Opportunity To Reevaluate the Structure 
of Labor and Management, Eliminate Contradictions and Hidden Dangers in 
Labor and Management, and Adjust Policy'' [Zhua zhu chongxin shenshi 
laozi geju, xiaochu laozi maodun yinhuan, tiaozheng laogong zhengce de 
jihui], Outlook, 16 December 09.
    \28\ All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``Chinese Trade Unions 
Make Progress in 2010,'' 31 January 11.
    \29\ Ibid.
    \30\ Ibid.
    \31\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 76-77.
    \32\ Guangdong Province People's Congress Standing Committee, 
``Opinions From the Public Openly Sought for `Guangdong Province's 
Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management (Third Draft for Public 
Comment)' '' [Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli cao'an xiugai 
(san gao zhengqiu yijian gao) xiang shehui gongkai zhengqiu yijian], 23 
August 10, art. 36.
    \33\ Ibid., art. 34.
    \34\ Ibid., art. 32.
    \35\ Ibid.
    \36\ ``Guangdong Decides To Delay `Regulations on Democratic 
Management of Enterprises' '' [Guangdong jue huan shen qiye minzhu 
guanli tiaoli], Wen Wei Po, 18 September 10.
    \37\ Denise Tsang, ``Collective Wage Bargaining Plan To Start Next 
Month,'' South China Morning Post, 15 January 11.
    \38\ CECC Staff Interview.
    \39\ Qingdao Public Health Bureau, ``The Wages of Contract Nurses 
in Qingdao Can Be Settled Through Collective Consultation'' [Qingdao 
hetongzhi hushi gongzi ke jiti xieshang], 18 April 11; China Labour 
Bulletin, ``The Wages of Health Contract Workers in Qingdao Can Be 
Settled Through Collective Consultation'' [Qingdao weisheng hetonggong 
gongzi ke jiti xieshang], 22 March 11.
    \40\ Ibid.
    \41\ Qingdao Public Health Bureau, ``The Wages of Contract Nurses 
in Qingdao Can Be Settled Through Collective Consultation'' [Qingdao 
hetongzhi hushi gongzi ke jiti xieshang], 18 April 11.
    \42\ ``Changde City, Hunan Province's `Spring Contract Action' on 
Collective Wage Consultation Commences'' [Hunan sheng changde gongzi 
jiti xieshang chunji yaoyue xingdong qidong], Changde Evening News, 29 
March 11; China Labour Bulletin, ``Cities Across China Roll Out 
Collective Wage Initiatives,'' 25 March 11.
    \43\ Rizhao City People's Government, `` `Rizhao City Worker 
Collective Wage Consultation Trial Methods' Is Released'' [``Rizhao shi 
zhigong gongzi jiti xieshang shixing banfa'' chutai], 9 March 11; China 
Labour Bulletin, ``Cities Across China Roll Out Collective Wage 
Initiatives,'' 25 March 11.
    \44\ ``Qinhuangdao Year of Collective Wage Consultations Hundred-
Day Action Commences'' [Qinhuangdao gongzi jiti xieshang tuijin nian 
huodong qidong], Hebei News Net, reprinted in China Worker Net, 12 
April 11; China Labour Bulletin, ``Cities Across China Roll Out 
Collective Wage Initiatives,'' 25 March 11.
    \45\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Lighter Enterprise in Guanhaiwei Town 
in Cixi Experiments With Collective Consultation'' [Cixi guanhaiwei 
zhen huo ji hangye shixing gongzi jiti xieshang], 24 March 11.
    \46\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Shenzhen Trade Union Announces Major 
Push for Collective Wage Negotiations,'' 24 March 11.
    \47\ Stanley Lubman, ``Are Strikes the Beginning of a New 
Challenge? '' Wall Street Journal, 25 June 10; Simon Clarke et al., 
``Collective Consultation and Industrial Relations in China,'' British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2004), 235, 240.
    \48\ ``China's `Floating Population' Exceeds 221 Million,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Daily, 28 February 11.
    \49\ ``Migrant Population To Grow to 350 Million: Report,'' China 
Daily, 31 May 11; ``China's `Floating Population' Exceeds 221 
Million,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 28 February 11.
    \50\ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Topic Paper: 
China's Household Registration System: Sustained Reform Needed To 
Protect China's Rural Migrants, 7 October 05. See also China Labour 
Bulletin, ``17 Migrant Workers Die in Fire at Illegally-Built 
Workshop,'' 26 April 11; Zhang Yan and Li Jiabao, ``17 Perish as 
Inferno Razes Illegal Plant,'' China Daily, 26 April 11; Shenzhen 
Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Centre, ``New Ongoing Violations After the 
Implementation of Labor Contract Law in China,'' 12 June 09; Jeffrey 
Becker and Manfred Elfstrom, International Labor Rights Forum, ``The 
Impact of China's Labor Contract Law on Workers,'' 23 February 10, 7-
10, 18.
    \51\ For additional information, see, e.g., Kam Wing Chan, ``The 
Chinese Hukou System at 50,'' Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 
50, No. 2 (2009), 197-221.
    \52\ Zhou Pingxiang, ``Ten Thugs Brandishing Steel Pipes Beat 100 
Migrant Workers Over Wage Dispute; Eight People Were Injured and 
Hospitalized'' [Nongmin gong shangmen taoxin zaojin bairen weiou 8 ren 
shoushang jin yiyuan], Yunnan Net, 1 February 11.
    \53\ ``Migrants `Losing Out on Benefits,' '' Shanghai Daily, 28 
March 11; Wang Wen, ``The Woes of Injury at Work,'' China Daily, 14 
March 11.
    \54\ Liu Conglong, Department of Rural Social Insurances, Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Security, ``Latest Developments of the 
Old-Age Insurance System for Urban and Rural Residents in China,'' 11 
May 11; State Council, Guiding Opinion Regarding the Initiation of New-
Type Rural Social Old-Age Insurance Pilots [Guowuyuan guanyu kaizhan 
xinxing nongcun shehui yanglao baoxian shidian de zhidao yijian], 
issued 1 September 09, art. 1.
    \55\ State Council Circular Regarding the Interim Method To 
Transfer and Continue the Old-Age Insurance Relationship of Urban 
Enterprise Workers [Chengzhen qiye zhigong jiben yanglao baoxian guanxi 
zhuanyi jiexu zanxing banfa de tongzhi], 28 December 09.
    \56\ ``NPC Standing Committee Passes Social Insurance Law by Wide 
Margin'' [Renda changweihui gaopiao tongguo shehui baoxian fa], Xinhua, 
28 October 10.
    \57\ Ibid.
    \58\ PRC Social Insurance Law, enacted 28 October 10, effective 1 
July 11; Hong Kong Trade Development Council, ``China Enacts Social 
Insurance Law,'' 3 May 11; ``NPC Standing Committee Passes Social 
Insurance Law by Wide Margin'' [Renda changweihui gaopiao tongguo 
shehui baoxian fa], Xinhua, 28 October 10; ``Social Insurance Law 
Becomes Effective Next July; May Receive Retirement Benefits in Less 
Than 15 Years'' [Shebao fa mingnian 7 yue shixing buman 15 nian ke bu 
jiao lingqu yanglao jin], Guangzhou Daily, reprinted in Sina, 29 
October 10; ``Social Insurance Law Clearly States That Retirement 
Insurance and Benefits Will Be Gradually Coordinated Nationwide'' 
[Shebao fa mingque yanglao xian zhubu shixing quanguo tongchou], 
Beijing News, 29 October 10.
    \59\ PRC Social Insurance Law, issued 28 October 10, effective 1 
July 11, art. 2.
    \60\ Ibid., arts. 10-22.
    \61\ Ibid., arts. 23-32.
    \62\ Ibid., arts. 33-43.
    \63\ Ibid., arts. 44-52.
    \64\ Ibid., arts. 53-56.
    \65\ Ibid., arts. 10, 23, 44.
    \66\ Ibid., arts. 33, 53.
    \67\ Ibid., art. 58.
    \68\ Ibid., art. 62.
    \69\ Ibid., art. 63.
    \70\ Ibid., art. 3.
    \71\ Ibid., art. 95. For more information, see ``China's Top 
Legislature Adopts Social Insurance Law To Safeguard Social Security 
Funds,'' Xinhua, 28 October 10; ``NPC Standing Committee Passes Social 
Insurance Law by Wide Margin'' [Renda changweihui gaopiao tongguo 
shehui baoxian fa], Xinhua, 28 October 10.
    \72\ PRC Social Insurance Law, issued 28 October 10, effective 1 
July 11, art. 19.
    \73\ Ibid.
    \74\ PRC Social Insurance Law, issued 28 October 10, effective 1 
July 11, art. 64; Laney Zhang, ``China: Law on Social Insurance 
Passed,'' Library of Congress, 4 November 10; ``Social Insurance Law 
Clearly States That Retirement Insurance and Benefits Will Be Gradually 
Coordinated at the National Level'' [Shebao fa mingque yanglao xian 
zhubu shixing quanguo tongchou], Beijing News, 29 October 10.
    \75\ Susan Deng, ``Changes Introduced by the New PRC Social 
Insurance Law,'' Mayer Brown JSM Legal Update, 1 December 10.
    \76\ Laney Zhang, ``China: Law on Social Insurance Passed,'' 
Library of Congress, 4 November 10.
    \77\ ``Another Round of Minimum Wage Adjustment; Shenzhen Is Moved 
to Highest in the Nation'' [Zuidi gongzi biaozhun xin yi lun tiaozheng 
shenzhen tiao zhi quanguo zuigao], China Business Network, reprinted in 
Hexun, 4 March 11.
    \78\ Ibid.
    \79\ Guangdong Province People's Government, Circular Regarding the 
Adjustment of Minimum Wage Standards for Guangdong Province's 
Enterprise Workers [Guanyu tiaozheng wo sheng qiye zhigong zuidi gongzi 
biaozhun de tongzhi], 18 January 11; ``Another Round of Minimum Wage 
Adjustment; Shenzhen Is Moved to Highest in the Nation'' [Zuidi gongzi 
biaozhun xin yi lun tiaozheng shenzhen diao zhi quanguo zuigao], China 
Business Network, 4 March 11; Fang Zhenbin, ``Pearl River Delta Region 
Faces Difficulties in Finding and Retaining Workers'' [Zhu sanjiao diqu 
mianlin zhaogong nan he liu gong nan kunrao], Southern Daily, reprinted 
in CNFOL.com, 23 February 11.
    \80\ ``Another Round of Minimum Wage Adjustment; Shenzhen Is Moved 
to Highest in the Nation'' [Zuidi gongzi biaozhun xin yi lun tiaozheng 
shenzhen diao zhi quanguo zuigao], China Business Network, 4 March 11.
    \81\ Ibid.
    \82\ Denise Tang, ``Guangdong Pay Pledge To Drive Out HK 
Factories,'' South China Morning Post, 18 January 11; China Labour 
Bulletin, ``Minimum Wage Set To Increase in Cities Across China,'' 5 
February 10.
    \83\ Zheng Lifei et al., ``Zhou Pledges More Tightening as China 
Raises Reserve Ratios,'' Bloomberg, 17 April 11; China Labour Bulletin, 
``Guangdong Raises Minimum Wage as Inflation Hurts Workers,'' 28 
February 11.
    \84\ National Bureau of Statistics of China, ``China's Major 
Economic Indicators in May,'' 14 June 11.
    \85\ PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 
48.
    \86\ PRC Labor Contract Law, issued 29 June 07, effective 1 January 
08, art. 74(5).
    \87\ Ibid., art. 85.
    \88\ Ibid., art. 72.
    \89\ ``Over 100 Migrant Workers Kneel in Front of the Zunhua City, 
Hubei Province, Government Building To Talk Wages'' [Bai yu nongmin 
gong zai hebei zun hua shi zhengfu menkou xia gui tao xin], Sichuan 
Daily, 13 January 11; Su Dake, ``If I Were the Boss I'd Fail To Pay 
Wages Too'' [Ruguo wo shi laoban ye hui qian xin, you qian cai shi ye 
mei laingxin suan ge sha], Southern Daily, 5 January 11; Zhou 
Pingxiang, ``Ten Thugs Brandishing Steel Pipes Beat 100 Migrant Workers 
Over Wage Dispute; Eight People Were Injured and Hospitalized'' 
[Nongmin gong shangmen tao xin zao jin bairen wei ou 8 ren shoushang 
jin yuyuan], Yunnan Net, 1 February 11.
    \90\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 80.
    \91\ ``Over 100 Migrant Workers Kneel in Front of the Zunhua City, 
Hubei Province, Government Building To Talk Wages'' [Bai yu nongmin 
gong zai hebei zun hua shi zhengfu menkou xia gui tao xin], Sichuan 
Daily, 13 January 11.
    \92\ Suo Han, `` `Wage Regulations' Framework Basically Solidified, 
but Difficult To Roll Out by Year's End'' [``Gongzi tiaoli'' kuangjia 
chu ding niannei nan chutai], China Business Network, 19 November 10.
    \93\ ``Draft of Wage Regulation Faces Pressure From Ministry 
Committees; Accused of Interfering With Internal Management of 
Monopolized Industries'' [Gongzi tiaoli cao'an zaoyu buwei yali bei zhi 
ganshe longduan qi ye neibu guanli], First Financial, reprinted in 
People's Daily, 1 September 10.
    \94\ Ibid.
    \95\ Ibid.
    \96\ Suo Han, `` `Wage Regulations' Framework Basically Solidified, 
but Difficult To Roll Out by Year's End'' [``Gongzi tiaoli'' kuangjia 
chu ding niannei nan chutai], China Business Network, 19 November 10.
    \97\ Zhao Peng, ``Draft of Wage Regulation To Be Reported to State 
Council; Intended To Publicize Wages of Monopolized Industries'' 
[Gongzi tiaoli cao'an jiang bao guowuyuan ni gongbu longduan hangye 
gongzi], Beijing Times, reprinted in Sina, 29 July 10.
    \98\ Ibid.
    \99\ Ibid.
    \100\ `` `Enterprise Wage Regulations' Draft Revisions Near End; 
Industry Insiders Reveal Draft's Brightest Spot'' [``Qiye gongzi 
tiaoli'' cao'an xiugai jiejin weisheng yenei renshi toulu gai cao'an 
zuida liang], Lanzhou Morning Post, reprinted in Sina, 5 August 10.
    \101\ Ibid.
    \102\ Ibid.
    \103\ Lai Fang, ``Will Publicizing Monopolized Industries' Salaries 
Bring More Equal Wage Distribution? '' [Gongshi longduan hangye gongzi 
neng fou dailai gongzi de gongping fenpei?], Southern Weekend, 23 
November 10; ``Draft of Wage Regulation Faces Pressure From Ministry 
Committees; Accused of Interfering With Internal Management of 
Monopolized Industries'' [Gongzi tiaoli cao'an zaoyu buwei yali pi zhi 
ganshe longduan qi ye neibu guanli], First Financial, reprinted in 
People's Daily, 1 September 10; Chen Chen, China Internet Information 
Center, ``Social Status, Industrial Monopolies Cause Widening Income 
Gap,'' 26 May 10; `` `Enterprise Wage Regulations' Draft Revisions Near 
End; Industry Insiders Reveal Draft's Brightest Spot'' [``Qiye gongzi 
tiaoli'' cao'an xiugai jiejin weisheng yenei renshi toulu gai cao'an 
zuida liangdian], Lanzhou Morning Post, reprinted in Sina, 5 August 10.
    \104\ Chen Chen, China Internet Information Center, ``Social 
Status, Industrial Monopolies Cause Widening Income Gap,'' 26 May 10.
    \105\ `` `Enterprise Wage Regulations' Draft Revisions Near End; 
Industry Insiders Reveal Draft's Brightest Spot'' [``Qiye gongzi 
tiaoli'' cao'an xiugai jiejin weisheng yenei renshi toulu gai cao'an 
zuida liangdian], Lanzhou Morning Post, reprinted in Sina, 5 August 10.
    \106\ Lai Fang, ``Will Publicizing Monopolized Industries' Salaries 
Bring More Equal Wage Distribution? '' [Gongshi longduan hangye gongzi 
neng fou dai lai gongzi de gongping fenpei?] Southern Weekend, 23 
November 10.
    \107\ Ibid.
    \108\ Willy Lam, Jamestown Foundation, ``2010 Census Exposes Fault 
Lines in China's Demographic Shifts,'' 6 May 11; Olivia Chung, ``China 
Labor Shortage Spreads,'' Asia Times, 29 January 11; Jui-te Shih, 
``Labor Shortages Spread to More Regions, Industries in China,'' Want 
China Times, 17 June 11; Edward Wong, ``Chinese Export Regions Face 
Labor Shortages,'' New York Times, 29 November 10; Jianmin Li, 
Jamestown Foundation, ``China's Looming Labor Supply Challenge? '' 8 
April 11; Ma Jiantang, ``National Labor Shortage Looms on Horizon,'' 
Global Times, 3 May 11; Mark MacKinnon and Carolynne Wheeler, ``China's 
Future: Growing Old Before It Grows Rich,'' Globe and Mail, 28 April 
11. For a long-range perspective on wages in China, see Dennis Tao 
Yang, Vivian Chen, and Ryan Monarch, Institute for the Study of Labor, 
``Rising Wages: Has China Lost Its Global Labor Advantage? '' 
Discussion Paper No. 5008, June 2010.
    \109\ ``2010 First Quarter Analysis on Economic Conditions and 
Yearly Outlook'' [2010 nian yi jidu jingji xingshi fenshi yu quannian 
zhanwang], China Economic Net, 28 April 10.
    \110\ Kathrin Hille, ``China's Inner Landscape Changes,'' Financial 
Times, 3 March 11.
    \111\ Federation of Hong Kong Industries, ``Survey Report on Labour 
Issues Faced by HK Manufacturing Companies in the PRD,'' 28 July 10. 
See also Dennis Tao Yang, Vivian Chen, and Ryan Monarch, The Institute 
for the Study of Labor, ``Rising Wages: Has China Lost Its Global Labor 
Advantage? '' Discussion Paper No. 5008, June 2010.
    \112\ Andy Xie, ``Sweet Spot for China's Blue-Collar Revolution,'' 
Caixin Net, reprinted in Market Watch, 28 June 10.
    \113\ Hou Lei, ``Official: Wage Share Decreases 22 Years in a 
Row,'' China Daily, 12 May 10.
    \114\ Suo Han, `` `Wage Regulations' Framework Basically 
Solidified, Difficult To Roll Out by Year's End'' [``Gongzi tiaoli'' 
kuangjia chu ding niannei nan chutai], China Business Network, 19 
November 10; ``Draft of Wage Regulation Faces Pressure From Ministry 
Committees; Accused of Interfering With Internal Management of 
Monopolized Industries'' [Gongzi tiaoli cao'an zaoyu buwei yali bei zhi 
ganshe longduan qiye neibu guanli], First Financial, reprinted in 
People's Daily, 1 September 10.
    \115\ Suo Han, `` `Wage Regulations' Framework Basically 
Solidified, but Difficult To Roll Out by Year's End'' [``Gongzi 
tiaoli'' kuangjia chu ding niannei nan chutai], China Business Network, 
19 November 10.
    \116\ Ibid.
    \117\ Ibid.
    \118\ Ibid.
    \119\ Ibid.
    \120\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 1.
    \121\ Ray Kwong, ``What China's 12th Five-Year Plan Means to the 
Average Zhou,'' 31 August 11.
    \122\ Nicholas Consonery et al., Eurasia Group, ``China's Great 
Rebalancing,'' 18 August 11. See also, Ray Kwong ``What China's 12th 
Five-Year Plan Means to the Average Zhou,'' 31 August 11.
    \123\ PRC Safe Production Law, issued 29 June 02, effective 1 
November 02, arts. 1, 2.
    \124\ Ibid., arts. 17, 21.
    \125\ Ibid., art. 45.
    \126\ Ibid., art. 52.
    \127\ Ibid., art. 53.
    \128\ Ibid., art. 82.
    \129\ Yuan Junbao, ``Great Progress in Preventing Pneumoconiosis in 
China's Coal Mines; Situation Is Still Grim'' [Woguo meikuang chenfei 
bing fangzhi qude jiao da jinzhan xingshi yiran yanjun], Xinhua, 
reprinted in PRC People's Central Government, 9 November 10.
    \130\ Ibid. See also China Labour Bulletin, ``Time To Overhaul Coal 
Mine Safety in China,'' 19 November 10.
    \131\ ``57,000 Chinese Coal Miners Suffer From Lung Disease 
Annually,'' People's Daily, 11 November 10.
    \132\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Time To Overhaul Coal Mine Safety in 
China,'' 19 November 10.
    \133\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Injured Coal Miner Struggles for 
Compensation,'' 24 February 11.
    \134\ ``Mainland Closes 1,600 Illegal Coal Mines,'' Associated 
Press, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 15 October 10.
    \135\ ``Bosses Who Don't Enter China's Mines May Be Fined,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 7 October 10.
    \136\ Wang Huazhong, ``Mine Leaders To Send Substitutes 
Underground,'' China Daily, 21 September 10.
    \137\ ``Another Foxconn Worker `Falls to Death,' '' South China 
Morning Post, 20 July 11.
    \138\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 80; Cary Huang, 
``Foxconn Worker in Chengdu Suicide,'' South China Morning Post, 27 May 
11. See also ``Military-Style Management,'' Global Times, 24 May 11.
    \139\ Chloe Albanesius, ``Foxconn Factories: How Bad Is It? '' PC 
Magazine, 6 May 11; ``Military-Style Management,'' Global Times, 24 May 
11.
    \140\ Chloe Albanesius, ``Foxconn Factories: How Bad Is It? '' PC 
Magazine, 6 May 11.
    \141\ Liu Linlin, ``Families Say Foxconn Not Cooperating,'' Global 
Times, 23 May 11; Tim Culpan and Joshua Fellman, ``Foxconn's Plant in 
China Has Fire, Killing Two,'' Bloomberg, 20 May 11.
    \142\ Gethin Chamberlain, ``Disney Factory Faces Probe Into 
Sweatshop Suicide Claims,'' Guardian, 27 August 11. See also China 
Labour Bulletin, ``Waking From a Ten-Year Dream,'' 21 February 11; 
Chloe Albanesius, ``Foxconn Factories: How Bad Is It? '' PC Magazine, 6 
May 11.
    \143\ Danny Vincent, ``China Used Prisoners in Lucrative Internet 
Gaming Work,'' Guardian, 25 May 11.
    \144\ Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ``Silicon Sweatshops: What's a Worker 
Worth? The Cold Calculus of Supply Chain Economics,'' Global Post, 17 
March 10.
    \145\ Ibid.
    \146\ Ibid.
    \147\ CECC Staff Interview.
    \148\ Ibid.
    \149\ State Council Decision Regarding Amendments to ``Regulations 
on Occupational Injury Insurance'' [Guowuyuan guanyu xiupai ``gongshang 
baoxian tiaoli'' de jueding], 20 December 10, effective 1 January 11.
    \150\ Ibid., art. 8.
    \151\ State Council Decision Regarding Amendments to ``Regulations 
on Occupational Injury Insurance [Guowuyuan guanyu xiupai ``gongshang 
baoxian tiaoli'' de jueding], 20 December 10, effective 1 January 11; 
PRC State Council, ``PRC State Council Notice 586 `State Council 
Decision Regarding Amendments to Regulations on Occupational Injury 
Insurance' '' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan ling di 586 hao 
``guowuyuan guanyu xiugai `gongshang baoxian tiaoli' de jueding''],'' 
20 December 10, art. 1.
    \152\ State Council Decision Regarding Amendments to ``Regulation 
on Occupational Injury Insurance [Guowuyuan guanyu xiupai ``gongshang 
baoxian tiaoli'' de jueding], 20 December 10, effective 1 January 11, 
art. 9.
    \153\ PRC Social Insurance Law, issued 28 October 10, effective 1 
July 11, arts. 33-43.
    \154\ Ibid., art. 33.
    \155\ Ibid., art. 34.
    \156\ Ibid., art. 36.
    \157\ Ibid., arts. 38(1)-38(9).
    \158\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 52; China Labour 
Bulletin, ``Bone and Blood: The Price of Coal in China,'' 17 March 08.
    \159\ Ibid.
    \160\ See, e.g., He Huifeng, ``40 Children Rescued From Shenzhen 
Plant,'' South China Morning Post, 26 March 11; Malcolm Moore, 
``Apple's Child Labour Issues Worsen,'' Telegraph, 15 February 11; 
William Foreman, ``China Factories Break Labor Rules,'' Associated 
Press, 20 April 10; National Labor Committee, ``China's Youth Meet 
Microsoft: KYE Factory in China Produces for Microsoft and Other U.S. 
Companies,'' 13 April 10.
    \161\ ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission 
to Employment, 26 June 73, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297; ILO Convention (No. 182) 
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161.
    \162\ PRC Labor Law, issued 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, 
amended 10 October 01, art. 15. See also PRC Law on the Protection of 
Minors, issued 4 September 91, effective 1 January 92, art. 28. See 
generally Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi 
shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 
02.
    \163\ Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi 
shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 
02, art. 6. See also ``Legal Announcement--Zhejiang Determines Four 
Circumstances That Define Use of Child Labor'' [Fazhi bobao: zhejiang 
jieding shiyong tonggong si zhong qingxing], China Woman, 26 July 08.
    \164\ This provision was added into the fourth amendment to the 
Criminal Law in 2002. Fourth Amendment to the PRC Criminal Law 
[Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingfa xiuzheng an (si)], issued 28 
December 02. See also PRC Criminal Law, issued 1 July 79, amended 14 
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 244.
    \165\ Maplecroft, ``Child Labour Most Widespread in the Key 
Emerging Economies; Climate Change Will Push More Children Into Work,'' 
12 January 10.
    \166\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Small Hands: A Survey Report on 
Child Labor in China,'' September 2007, 7, 8; He Huifeng, ``40 Children 
Rescued From Shenzhen Plant,'' South China Morning Post, 26 March 11.
    \167\ ``Disney Factory Faces Probe Into Sweatshop Suicide Claims,'' 
Guardian, 27 August 11; China Labour Bulletin, ``Small Hands: A Survey 
Report on Child Labor in China,'' September 2007, 15, 22, 25-32.
    \168\ He Huifeng, ``40 Children Rescued From Shenzhen Plant,'' 
South China Morning Post, 26 March 11.
    \169\ Ibid.
    \170\ Malcolm Moore, ``Apple's Child Labour Issues Worsen,'' 
Telegraph, 15 February 11.
    \171\ Apple, ``Apple Supplier Responsibility 2011 Progress 
Report,'' 15 February 11, 9.
    \172\ For the government response to forced labor in brick kilns, 
including child labor, see, e.g., Zhang Pinghui, ``Crackdown on Slave 
Labor Nationwide--State Council Vows To End Enslavement,'' South China 
Morning Post, 21 June 07.
    \173\ Ji Beibei, ``Students Say Schools Require Them To Do 
Internships at Foxconn Factory,'' Global Times, 12 October 10; Ben 
Blanchard, ``China Urged To End `Child Labor' in Schools,'' Reuters, 3 
December 07; Human Rights Watch, ``China: End Child Labor in State 
Schools,'' 3 December 07.
    \174\ Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi 
shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 
02, art. 13.
    \175\ PRC Education Law, issued 18 March 95, effective 1 September 
95, amended 27 August 09, art. 58.
    \176\ ILO Convention 138 permits vocational education for underage 
minors only where it is an ``integral part'' of a course of study or 
training course. ILO Convention 182 obligates Member States to 
eliminate the ``worst forms of child labor,'' including ``forced or 
compulsory labor.'' ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for 
Admission to Employment, 26 June 73, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297; ILO Convention 
(No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99, 2133 
U.N.T.S. 161.
    \177\ ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention, 1999 (No. 182) China (ratification: 2002) Observation, 
CEACR 2006/77th Session, International Labour Organization, 2006.
    Notes to Section II--Criminal Justice

    \1\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Twenty-Two Years After 
Tiananmen Massacre, Worst Repression in a Generation,'' 2 June 11; 
Tania Branigan, ``Crackdown in China Spreads Terror Among Dissidents,'' 
Guardian, 31 March 11.
    \2\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``U.S. Must Voice Concerns Over 
China's Assault on Human Rights Lawyers During the Upcoming Legal 
Experts Dialogue With China,'' 7 June 11; ``China Cracking Down on 
Rights Lawyers: Amnesty,'' Agence France-Presse, 29 June 11; Andrew 
Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, ``China's Intimidation of Dissidents Said 
To Persist After Prison,'' New York Times, 17 February 11.
    \3\ ``Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders, Lawyers, Artists, 
Bloggers,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 May 11.
    \4\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the 
Crackdown Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' 18 April 11.
    \5\ Tania Branigan, ``Fears Grow After Chinese Human Rights Lawyer 
Detained,'' Guardian, 18 February 11.
    \6\ Human Rights in China, ``Lawyers and Activists Detained, 
Summoned, and Harassed in `Jasmine Rallies' Crackdown,'' 23 February 
11; ``China Releases Detained Activist,'' New York Times, 29 April 11.
    \7\ Tania Branigan, ``Chinese Lawyer Beaten Ahead of Jasmine 
Revolution Protests,'' Guardian, 21 February 11.
    \8\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chinese Reactions to Liu 
Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize--From Both Sides,'' 3 January 11; Human 
Rights in China, ``Lawyers and Activists Detained, Summoned, and 
Harassed in `Jasmine Rallies' Crackdown,'' 23 February 11.
    \9\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 
3, 5, 9, 19, 20 [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 7, 9(1), 19(1), 
19(2), 21, 22(1) [hereinafter ICCPR]; PRC Constitution, enacted and 
effective 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 
14 March 04, arts. 35 (freedom of speech, press, assembly), 37 (freedom 
of person), 41 (right to criticize state organ or functionary).
    \10\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 247, 248; PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], 
enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 
43.
    \11\ UN Committee against Torture, 41st Session, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: 
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture--China, CAT/C/
CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 11.
    \12\ UN Committee against Torture, ``Request for Further 
Clarification,'' 29 October 10.
    \13\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Dissident Writer, Freed After 5 Years in 
Jail, Says Treatment Was `Beyond Imagination,' '' Associated Press, 
reprinted in Washington Post, 14 September 11; Peter Foster, ``Chinese 
Dissidents Describe Physical and Mental Torture at Hands of Regime,'' 
Telegraph, 14 September 11; ``Missing China Dissident Recounted 
Abuse,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Taipei Times, 12 January 
11; Tania Branigan, ``Chief's Widow Alleges Torture After He Dies in 
Custody,'' Guardian, 14 January 11; ``Benxi City `Xie Zhigang Incident' 
Interview With the Joint Investigation Team Leader'' [Benxi shi 
``xiezhigang shijian'' lianhe diaocha zu fuze ren jieshou jizhe 
caifang], Northeast News, 13 January 11; Tania Branigan, ``Chinese 
Activists Seized in Human Rights Crackdown Accuse Authorities of 
Torture,'' Guardian, 13 September 11; Jiang Li, ``State Tax Cadre 
`Commits Suicide' in Prison; Prison Refuses to Accept Responsibility'' 
[Guoshui ganbu jianyu zhong ``bei zisha,'' jianyu ju bu chengdan 
zeren], Boxun, 25 January 11.
    \14\ Tania Branigan, ``Chief's Widow Alleges Torture After He Dies 
in Custody,'' Guardian, 14 January 11; ``Benxi City `Xie Zhigang 
Incident' Interview With the Joint Investigation Team Leader'' [Benxi 
shi ``xie zhigang shijian'' lianhe diaocha zu fuze ren jieshou jizhe 
caifang], Northeast News, 13 January 11.
    \15\ Yan Jianbiao, `` `Yueqing Case' Witness Suffers Torture To 
Extract Confession'' [``Yueqing an'' zhengren zhi zao xingxun bigong], 
Caijing, 24 March 11.
    \16\ Wang Quanbao, ``SPP Sun Qian, Deputy Procurator General: Do 
Not Allow Unexpected Deaths in the Detention Centers'' [Zuigao jian fu 
jiancha zhang sun qian: bu yunxu kanshousuo chuxian yiwai siwang], 
China News Weekly, reprinted in Sina, 10 March 11.
    \17\ Wang Lina, `` `Detention Regulations' Draft Revision 
Submitted: To Respect Prisoners as Human'' [``Kanshousuo tiaoli'' 
xiuding cao'an yi shangbao: ba fanren dang ren lai zunzhong], China 
Youth On line, 9 March 11.
    \18\ ``China Pushes Forward Judicial Reform by Enhancing 
Supervision, Person-Centered Care,'' Xinhua, 20 February 11.
    \19\ Wang Quanbao, ``SPP Sun Qian, Deputy Procurator General: Do 
Not Allow Unexpected Deaths in the Detention Centers'' [Zuigao jian fu 
jiancha zhang sun qian: bu yunxu kanshousuo chuxian yiwai siwang], 
China News Weekly, reprinted in Sina, 10 March 11.
    \20\ According to Article 34 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, the 
court ``shall designate a lawyer that is obligated to provide legal aid 
to serve as a defender'' if the defendant does not have a lawyer and is 
blind, deaf, mute, a minor, or facing the possibility of a death 
sentence. In cases in which the criminal defendant ``has not entrusted 
anyone to be his defender due to financial difficulties or other 
reasons, the People's Court may designate a lawyer that is obligated to 
provide legal aid to serve as a defender.'' Article 42 of the PRC Law 
on Lawyers states that lawyers must fulfill their obligations to 
provide legal aid services. For more information see the texts: PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong fa], 
enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 
34; PRC Lawyers Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lushi fa], enacted 15 
May 96, amended 29 December 01, revised 28 October 07, effective 1 June 
08, art. 42.
    \21\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76.
    \22\ Zhang Youyi, ``High Risks Result in Low Defense Rates, 
Criminal Defense Lawyers Face Six Problems'' [Gao fengxian zhishi 
bianhu lu di xingshi bianhu lushi mianlin liu nanti], Legal Daily, 
reprinted in Xinhua, 6 January 08.
    \23\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2009, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.
    \24\ Yuan Yuan, ``Aiding in Defense,'' Beijing Review, 6 February 
11.
    \25\ Zhang Youyi, ``High Risks Result in Low Defense Rates, 
Criminal Defense Lawyers Face Six Problems'' [Gao fengxian zhishi 
bianhu lu di xingshi bianhu lushi mianlin liu nanti], Legal Daily, 
reprinted in Xinhua, 6 January 08.
    \26\ Amnesty International, ``Against the Law: Crackdown on China's 
Human Rights Lawyers Deepens,'' June 2011, 3, 24-27, 45-50; Paul 
Mooney, ``Silence of the Chinese Dissidents,'' South China Morning 
Post, 4 July 11; Zhang Youyi, ``High Risks Result in Low Defense Rates, 
Criminal Defense Lawyers Face Six Problems'' [Gao fengxian zhishi 
bianhu lu di xingshi bianhu lushi mianlin liu nanti], Legal Daily, 
reprinted in Xinhua, 6 January 08.
    \27\ Patrick Kar-wai Poon, China Human Rights Lawyers Concern 
Group, ``Rights Defense Lawyers and the Rule of Law in China,'' 18 May 
11. For CECC analysis on Article 306, see, e.g., ``Defense Lawyers 
Turned Defendants: Zhang Jianzhong and the Criminal Prosecution of 
Defense Lawyers in China,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 27 May 03.
    \28\ Yanfei Ran, ``When Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers Become the 
Criminals,'' Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 32, Issue 3 
(2008), 988, 1023; `` `Big Stick 306' and China's Contempt for the 
Law,'' New York Times, 5 May 11.
    \29\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 306.
    \30\ ``Ignoring Facts and Law as a Concession to Popular Will 
Actually Contravenes the Will of the People'' [``Weile qianjiu minyi 
bugu shishi he falu cai shi zhenzheng weibei minyi''], China Youth 
Daily, 18 June 09. For more information about Article 306, see CECC, 
2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 90.
    \31\ `` `Big Stick 306' and China's Contempt for the Law,'' New 
York Times, 5 May 11.
    \32\ Human Rights in China, ``Guangxi Rights Defense Lawyer Yang 
Zaixin Formally Arrested,'' 5 July 11.
    \33\ Ibid.; Li Jiayu, ``Mob Storms Into Hotel, Beats Up Two Defense 
Lawyers,'' Global Times, 20 July 11.
    \34\ Human Rights in China, ``Guangxi Rights Defense Lawyer Yang 
Zaixin Formally Arrested,'' 5 July 11.
    \35\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing 
June 29-July 6, 2011,'' 6 July 11; Human Rights in China, ``Guangxi 
Rights Defense Lawyer Yang Zaixin Formally Arrested,'' 5 July 11.
    \36\ Chen Guangzhong, ``I Think Arresting These Four Lawyers Is 
Wrong'' [``Wo renwei zhua zhe si ming lushi shi cuowu de''], Oriental 
Outlook, July 2011.
    \37\ Li Jiayu, ``Mob Storms Into Hotel, Beats Up Two Defense 
Lawyers,'' Global Times, 20 July 11. For more information on the 
assault, see ``Lawyers Group Representing Yang Zaixin Attacked and 
Unable To Work'' [Yang zaixin daibiao lushi tuan zao weigong wufa 
gongzuo], Radio Free Asia, 19 July 11.
    \38\ Li Jiayu, ``Mob Storms Into Hotel, Beats Up Two Defense 
Lawyers,'' Global Times, 20 July 11.
    \39\ Sun Jibin, ``How `Three Difficulties' of Criminal Defense 
Became `10 Difficulties' '' [Xingshi bianhu ``san nan'' weihe bian 
``shi nan''], Legal Weekly, 20 January 11; `` `Big Stick 306' and 
China's Contempt for the Law,'' New York Times, 5 May 11.
    \40\ Sun Jibin, ``How `Three Difficulties' of Criminal Defense 
Became `10 Difficulties' '' [Xingshi bianhu ``san nan'' weihe bian 
``shi nan''], Legal Weekly, 20 January 11; Dui Hua Foundation 
``Translation: How `Three Difficulties' of Criminal Defense Became `10 
Difficulties,' '' 2 February 11.
    \41\ Sun Jibin, ``How `Three Difficulties' of Criminal Defense 
Became `10 Difficulties' '' [Xingshi bianhu ``san nan'' weihe bian 
``shi nan''], Legal Weekly, 20 January 11.
    \42\ Ibid.
    \43\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2010 Human Rights 
Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 8 April 11.
    \44\ Supreme People's Court,``Table on Circumstances for Accused in 
2010 China Court Criminal Case Judgments'' [2010 Nian quanguo fayuan 
shenli xingshi anjian beigao ren panjue shengxiao qingkuang biao], 24 
March 11. According to official 2010 criminal adjudication statistics, 
Chinese authorities approved 999 individual acquittals and 17,957 
exemptions from criminal punishment. Chinese authorities imposed 
criminal penalties on 1,007,419 criminal defendants.
    \45\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76.
    \46\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Democracy Advocate Is Sentenced to 10 
Years,'' New York Times, 25 March 11; Human Rights in China, ``Activist 
Sentenced to Ten Years for Inciting Subversion; Essays Cited as 
Evidence,'' 25 March 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Liu Xianbin 
Case Trial Oral Judgment Announcement of 10 Years, Family and Lawyers 
Cannot Visit'' [Liu xianbin an fating koutou xuanpan shi nian xingqi, 
jiaren lushi wufa huijian], 25 March 11; Gillian Wong, ``China 
Sentences Democracy Activist to 10 Years,'' Associated Press, reprinted 
in Yahoo!, 25 March 11.
    \47\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Democracy Advocate Is Sentenced to 10 
Years,'' New York Times, 25 March 11.
    \48\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing 
August 10-15, 2011,'' 16 August 11; Human Rights in China, ``Lawyers 
Report Procedural Irregularities at Trial of Rights Activist Wang 
Lihong,'' 13 August 11.
    \49\ Peter Foster, ``Chinese Internet-Activist on Trial,'' 
Telegraph, 12 August 11; ``Chinese Citizens Support Jailed Activist 
Wang Lihong,'' New Tang Dynasty Television, 9 August 11.
    \50\ Human Rights in China, ``Rights Defender Wang Lihong Sentenced 
to Nine Months,'' 9 September 11; Peter Foster, ``Chinese Internet-
Activist on Trial,'' Telegraph, 12 August 11; Human Rights in China, 
``Lawyers Report Procedural Irregularities at Trial of Rights Activist 
Wang Lihong,'' 13 August 11; ``Wang Lihong's `Creating a Disturbance' 
Lawyer Denounces Unfair Trial'' [Wang lihong ``zishi an'' lushi chi 
tingshen bugong], BBC, 12 August 11.
    \51\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing 
August 10-15, 2011,'' 16 August 11; Peter Foster, ``Chinese Internet-
Activist on Trial,'' Telegraph, 12 August 11; ``Wang Lihong's `Creating 
a Disturbance' Lawyer Denounces Unfair Trial'' [Wang lihong ``zishi 
an'' lushi chi tingshen bugong], BBC, 12 August 11.
    \52\ Human Rights in China, ``Lawyers Report Procedural 
Irregularities at Trial of Rights Activist Wang Lihong,'' 13 August 11; 
Human Rights in China, ``Rights Defender Wang Lihong Sentenced to Nine 
Months,'' 9 September 11.
    \53\ Freedom Now, ``UN Declares Detention of Imprisoned Nobel Peace 
Prize Laureate and Wife Illegal; Calls for Immediate Release,'' 1 
August 11.
    \54\ Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, 
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry 
of Justice Circular Regarding the Issue of ``Provisions Concerning 
Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases'' 
and ``Provisions Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal 
Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao 
renmin jiancha yuan gongan bu guojia anquan bu sifa bu yinfa ``guanyu 
banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding'' 
he ``guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de 
guiding'' de tongzhi], issued 13 June 10; Provisions Concerning 
Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal 
Cases [Guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de 
guiding], effective 1 July 10, arts. 1, 7; Provisions Concerning 
Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases 
[Guanyu banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan wenti de 
guiding], effective 1 July 10, arts. 18(4), 19, 34; Yang Ming and Zhang 
Hailin, ``Staggered Start to `Illegal Evidence Exclusion' '' [Feifa 
``zhengju paichu'' panshan qibu], Oriental Outlook Weekly, November 
2011.
    \55\ Yang Ming and Zhang Hailin, ``Staggered Start to `Illegal 
Evidence Exclusion' '' [Feifa ``zhengju paichu'' panshan qibu], 
Oriental Outlook Weekly, November 2011.
    \56\ Li Guomin, ``Why the Illegal Evidence Exclusionary Regulations 
Cannot Be Strictly Enforced'' [Feifa zhengju paichu guize weihe buneng 
yange zhixing], Procuratorial Daily, 10 January 11.
    \57\ Ibid.
    \58\ Edward Wong, ``Human Rights Advocates Vanish as China 
Intensifies Crackdown,'' New York Times, 11 March 11.
    \59\ ``China Frees Rights Lawyer but Another Disappears,'' Agence 
France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 5 May 11.
    \60\ ``Human Rights Lawyers Suppressed in Different Ways'' [Weiquan 
lushi shou butong xingshi daya], Radio Free Asia, 26 May 11; ``Friend 
Says Chinese Civil Rights Lawyer Resurfaces,'' Associated Press, 
reprinted in Google, 4 May 11; Chris Buckley, ``China Dissident 
Released After U.S. Official's Visit,'' Reuters, 29 April 11.
    \61\ ``Human Rights Lawyers Suppressed in Different Ways'' [Weiquan 
lushi shou butong xingshi daya], Radio Free Asia, 26 May 11.
    \62\ Ibid.; ``Friend Says Chinese Civil Rights Lawyer Resurfaces,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Google, 4 May 11; Chris Buckley, ``China 
Dissident Released After U.S. Official's Visit,'' Reuters, 29 April 11.
    \63\ ChinaAid, ``Urgent! Chen and Wife Beaten Severely, Chinese 
Citizens Appeal to America,'' 10 February 11; Ding Xiao, ``Blind 
Activist, Wife Beaten,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 February 11; ChinaAid, 
``Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng's Wife Reveals Details of 
Torture,'' 16 June 11. For CECC analysis, see ``Chen Guangcheng, Wife 
Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing Official Abuse,'' 11 
March 11.
    \64\ John Zhang, ``The Silencing of China's Human Rights Lawyers,'' 
Epoch Times, 3 March 11.
    \65\ Rona Rui, ``Beijing Rights Lawyer Suffers Memory Loss After 
Ten-Day Detention,'' Epoch Times, 27 April 11; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``Lawyer Jin Guanghong Tortured, Cannot Remember the Facts 
Surrounding His Disappearance,'' 23 April 11.
    \66\ Clear Harmony, ``Lawyer Jin Guanghong Persecuted and Now 
Suffering From Partial Amnesia,'' 21 May 11.
    \67\ Rona Rui, ``Beijing Rights Lawyer Suffers Memory Loss After 
Ten-Day Detention,'' Epoch Times, 27 April 11; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``Lawyer Jin Guanghong Tortured, Cannot Remember the Facts 
Surrounding His Disappearance,'' 23 April 11.
    \68\ ``Concern Over Rights Lawyer,'' Radio Free Asia, 13 April 11.
    \69\ Feng Weimin, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Beijing Human 
Rights Lawyer Ni Yulan Criminally Detained'' [Beijing weiquan lushi ni 
yulan bei xingshi juliu], 14 April 11.
    \70\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Activist Ni Yulan Becomes 
Latest Victim of `Jasmine' Crackdown,'' 14 April 11.
    \71\ Ibid.
    \72\ For CECC analysis, see ``Authorities Deny Human Rights Lawyers 
Professional License Renewals,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 10 December 10.
    \73\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Four Human Rights 
Lawyers Barred From Passing the Annual Assessment,'' 19 July 11; 
Aizhixing, ``Aizhixing Strongly Concerned That Many Lawyers Still Have 
Not Passed Annual Assessment for Professional Lawyers'' [Ai zhi xing 
qianglie guanzhu duo ming lushi shangwei tongguo lushi zhiye niandu 
kaohe], reprinted in Boxun, 28 June 11.
    \74\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, ``Four Human Rights 
Lawyers Barred From Passing the Annual Assessment,'' 19 July 11.
    \75\ Xu Kai, `` `Chinese Characteristics' of Lawyers Association'' 
[``Zhongguo tese'' de luxie], Caijing Magazine, 18 July 11.
    \76\ Ibid.
    \77\ Liu Xiaoyuan, `` `Chinese Characteristics' of Lawyers 
Association'' [``Zhongguo tese'' de luxie], Liu Xiaoyuan's Blog, 
reprinted in Sina, 19 July 11.
    \78\ ``Chinese Human Rights Defender Gao Zhisheng Disappears 
Again,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 
10, 2.
    \79\ Charles Hutzler, ``AP Exclusive: Missing Chinese Lawyer Told 
of Abuse,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Bloomberg, 10 January 11.
    \80\ Edward Wong, ``U.N. Rights Group Calls on China To Release 
Lawyer,'' New York Times, 28 March 11; Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Opinion No. 26/2010 (People's Republic of China), reprinted in Freedom 
Now, 6 July 10.
    \81\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. IV; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, and 27; 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN 
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 7, 10, 
13, 14, 18, 19, and 21. The ICCPR provides that the deprivation of an 
individual's liberty is permissible only ``on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law,'' and that an 
individual must be promptly informed of the reasons for his detention 
and any charges against him or her. See ICCPR, arts. 9(1), 9(2).
    \82\ See, e.g., PRC Constitution, enacted and effective 4 December 
82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 
35, 37, 41; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
xingshi susong fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 
January 97, art. 3; PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhian guanli chufa fa], enacted 28 August 
05, effective 1 March 06, arts. 3, 9, 10, 16; PRC Legislation Law 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifa fa], enacted 15 March 00, effective 1 
July 00, art. 8(v).
    \83\ Freedom Now, ``UN Declares Detention of Imprisoned Nobel Peace 
Prize Laureate and Wife Illegal; Calls for Immediate Release,'' 1 
August 11; ``UN Group Calls for Immediate Release of Liu Xiaobo and 
Wife Liu Xia,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 12 August 
11.
    \84\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: 
UN Expert Body Concerned About Recent Wave of Enforced 
Disappearances,'' 8 April 11.
    \85\ International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
From Enforced Disappearance, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/61/177 of 20 December 06, entry into force 23 December 10, art. 
2.
    \86\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the 
Crackdown Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' 30 May 11.
    \87\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``China: 
UN Expert Body Seriously Concerned About Tibetan Monks Reportedly 
Subjected to Enforced Disappearance,'' 8 June 11. For more information, 
see ``After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and `Education' for Monks; 
Possible Murder Charges,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
17 August 11.
    \88\ ``China To Amend Criminal Procedural Law,'' Xinhua, reprinted 
in China Daily, 24 August 11; National People's Congress, ``Criminal 
Procedure Law Amendments (Draft): Explanation of Provisions and Draft'' 
[Xingshi susongfa xiuzheng'an (cao'an) tiaowen ji cao'an shuoming], 30 
August 11; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
xingshi susongfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 
January 97. For more information on reviews of draft laws, see Article 
27 of the PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifafa], 
issued 15 March 00, effective 1 July 00, art. 27.
    \89\ ``Procedural Justice,'' China Daily, 25 August 11.
    \90\ ``China To Amend Criminal Procedural Law To Prevent Forced 
Confessions,'' Xinhua, 24 August 11.
    \91\ ``China's Draft Law Amendment in Conformity With International 
Conventions: Experts,'' Xinhua, 30 August 11.
    \92\ National People's Congress, ``Criminal Procedure Law 
Amendments (Draft): Explanation of Provisions and Draft'' [Xingshi 
susongfa xiuzheng'an (cao'an) tiaowen ji cao'an shuoming], 30 August 
11, item 14; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
xingshi susongfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 
January 97, art. 43.
    \93\ National People's Congress, ``Criminal Procedure Law 
Amendments (Draft): Explanation of Provisions and Draft'' [Xingshi 
susongfa xiuzheng'an (cao'an) tiaowen ji cao'an shuoming], 30 August 
11, item 17.
    \94\ Ibid., item 7; PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo xingshi susongfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 
effective 1 January 97, art. 36.
    \95\ For more information on the international organizations and 
experts' criticism of the draft amendment's treatment of residential 
surveillance, see, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ``China: Don't Legalize 
Secret Detention,'' 1 September 11; Michael Wines, ``More Chinese 
Dissidents Appear to Disappear,'' New York Times, 2 September 11; Jaime 
FlorCruz, ``Proposed Legal Changes in China Cause Jitters,'' CNN, 3 
September 11.
    \96\ National People's Congress, ``Criminal Procedure Law 
Amendments (Draft): Explanation of Provisions and Draft'' [Xingshi 
susongfa xiuzheng'an (cao'an) tiaowen ji cao'an shuoming], 30 August 
11, item 30.
    \97\ Ibid.
    \98\ International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
From Enforced Disappearance, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/61/177 of 12 January 07, entry in force 23 December 10, item 2.
    \99\ See, e.g., Michael Wines, ``More Chinese Dissidents Appear To 
Disappear,'' New York Times, 2 September 11; Jaime FlorCruz, ``Proposed 
Legal Changes in China Cause Jitters,'' CNN, 3 September 11; ``Amend 
Legal Procedures,'' China Daily, 1 September 11.
    \100\ ``Amend Legal Procedures,'' China Daily, 1 September 11.
    \101\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Free Unlawfully Detained Legal 
Activists, Relatives,'' 22 February 11; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Out of 
Jail in China, but Not Free,'' New York Times, 9 March 11; Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders, ``Elections Expert Yao Lifa Abused and Beaten 
During Soft Detention Period,'' reprinted in Boxun, 13 December 10.
    \102\ Human Rights Watch, ``China: Free Unlawfully Detained Legal 
Activists, Relatives,'' 22 February 11; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, ``Out of 
Jail in China, but Not Free,'' New York Times, 9 March 11; ``China 
Nobel Laureate Wife Fears Going `Crazy': Activists,'' Agence France-
Presse, reprinted in Google, 26 February 11.
    \103\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chinese Reactions to Liu 
Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize--From Both Sides,'' 3 January 11.
    \104\ Human Rights in China, ``Prominent Rights Activists Detail 
Life in 74-Day House Arrest,'' 30 December 10.
    \105\ Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, ``China's Intimidation 
of Dissidents Said To Persist After Prison,'' New York Times, 17 
February 11.
    \106\ Michael Wines, ``A Chinese Advocate Is Freed, but Stays Under 
Surveillance,'' New York Times, 9 September 10; Ian Johnson and 
Jonathan Ansfield, ``Chinese Officials Beat Activist and His Wife, 
Group Says,'' New York Times, 17 June 11.
    \107\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China Detains Church Members at Easter 
Services,'' New York Times, 24 April 11.
    \108\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 39-41; Dui Hua 
Foundation, ``Reference Materials on China's Criminal Justice System, 
Vol. 2 (June 2009), iv; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 36-37; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Re-Education Through Labor Abuses 
Continue Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue,'' 4 February 09, 4.
    \109\ Bureau of Reeducation Through Labor Administration, ``A Brief 
Description of China's Reeducation Through Labor System'' [Zhongguo 
laodong jiaoyang zhidu jianjie], accessed 14 July 11.
    \110\ Xiaobing Li, Civil Liberties in China, (Santa Barbara, 
California: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 118; Human Rights in China, ``Reeducation 
Through Labor: A Summary of Regulatory Issues and Concerns,'' 1 
February 01; Jim Yardley, ``Issue in China: Many in Jails Without 
Trial,'' New York Times, 9 May 05; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 
``Re-Education Through Labor Abuses Continue Unabated: Overhaul Long 
Overdue,'' 4 February 09, 3.
    \111\ ``News Update: Rights Advocate Wang Yi (Cheng Jianping) 
Ordered To Serve One Year of Reeducation Through Labor'' [Kuaixun: 
Weiquan renshi wang yi (cheng jianping) bei laojiao yi nian], Boxun, 15 
November 10; Human Rights in China, ``Lawyers Appeal to Twitter CEO for 
Help,'' 9 January 11.
    \112\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Update: Human Rights 
Defender Wang Yi Sent to RTL'' [Kuaixun: weiquan renshi wang yi zheng 
yao bei song qu laojiao], reprinted in Boxun, 15 November 10.
    \113\ Human Rights in China, ``Two Years of Reeducation-Through-
Labor for Rights Activist Yang Qiuyu,'' 14 April 11.
    \114\ Ibid.
    \115\ ``China: Mao Hengfeng Released From Prison in a Wheelchair,'' 
Asia News, reprinted in Spero News, 30 July 11.
    \116\ Ibid.
    \117\ Human Rights in China, ``Petitioner Mao Hengfeng Released 
From Reeducation-Through-Labor in Serious Condition,'' 28 July 11.
    \118\ ``China: Mao Hengfeng Released From Prison in a Wheelchair,'' 
Asia News, reprinted in Spero News, 30 July 11; Human Rights in China, 
``Petitioner Mao Hengfeng Released From Reeducation-Through-Labor in 
Serious Condition,'' 28 July 11.
    \119\ Hai Yan, ``Thousands of Chinese Citizens Jointly Sign Letter 
To Abolish Reeducation Through Labor System'' [Zhongguo qian gongmin 
lian shu yaoqiu feichu laojiao zhidu], Voice of America, 16 February 
11.
    \120\ Ibid.
    \121\ Ibid.
    \122\ Liu Chang, ``Controversy Over `Black Jails' Continues,'' 
Global Times, 4 May 11; ``Campaigner Detained in Beijing,'' Radio Free 
Asia, 2 February 11; Chris Buckley, ``China's Wen Meets Petitioners in 
Show of Worry Over Discontent,'' Reuters, 25 January 11.
    \123\ Human Rights Watch, ``An Alleyway in Hell: China's Abusive 
`Black Jails,' '' 12 November 09.
    \124\ Human Rights Watch, ``Closing China's Network of Secret 
Jails,'' 9 December 10.
    \125\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Jilin Petitioner 
Qu Yanjiang Is Tricked Back Into Black Jail Custody by Retrievers'' 
[Jilin fang min qu yanjiang bei jie fang ren pian hui guan hei jianyu], 
reprinted in Boxun, 24 October 10; Gan Hao, ``Petitioner Reports to 
Police That He Was `Detained and Beaten' '' [Fangmin baojing cheng zao 
``guanya ouda''], Beijing News, 12 January 11; ``Black Jails, 
Petitioners on Eve of Spring Festival: 13 Big Stories of Beijing 
Petitioning in 2010'' [Hei jianyu, fang min chunwan: 2010 nian zaijing 
fang min 13 da xinwen], Boxun, 3 January 11; Liu Chang, ``Controversy 
Over `Black Jails' Continues,'' Global Times, 4 May 11; ``After All, 
Where Is Jiangsu Sihong County's `Petitioner Study Class'? '' [Jiangsu 
si hong xian de ``xinfang xuexi ban'' jiujing shige shenme difang?], 
Southern Metropolitan Daily, 28 April 11; Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan 
Ansfield, ``Well-Oiled Security Apparatus in China Stifles Calls for 
Change,'' New York Times, 28 February 11; Melinda Liu and Isaac Stone 
Fish, ``Portrait of the Gulag,'' Newsweek, 26 June 11; ``Veterans 
Protest Over Welfare,'' Radio Free Asia, 29 June 11.
    \126\ Long Zhi, ``Anyuanding: Investigation Into Beijing's `Black 
Jails' To Stop Petitioners'' [Anyuanding: beijing jie fang ``hei 
jianyu'' diaocha], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 24 September 10; 
``China Police Investigate `Black Jails' for Protesters,'' BBC, 27 
September 10.
    \127\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China Investigates Extralegal Petitioner 
Detentions,'' New York Times, 27 September 10; Susan Stumme, ``China PM 
First To Meet Petitioners in 60 Years,'' Agence France-Presse, 
reprinted in Google, 25 January 11.
    \128\ Zhan Caiqiang, `` `Study Sessions' Nightmare'' [``Xuexi ban'' 
mengyan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 27 April 11. See also Liu Chang, 
``Controversy Over `Black Jails' Continues,'' Global Times, 4 May 11.
    \129\ The term ``nail household'' (dingzi hu) is commonly used to 
refer to tenants who refuse to leave their households despite the 
demolition of structures around them.
    \130\ Zhan Caiqiang, `` `Study Sessions' Nightmare'' [``Xuexi ban'' 
mengyan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 27 April 11. See also Liu Chang, 
``Controversy Over `Black Jails' Continues,'' Global Times, 4 May 11.
    \131\ Zhan Caiqiang, `` `Study Sessions' Nightmare'' [``Xuexi ban'' 
mengyan], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 27 April 11; Zhang Xuanchen, 
``Officials Accused of Opening Illegal `Jail,' '' Shanghai Daily, 28 
April 11.
    \132\ An Ying and Yi Fangxing, ``Woman Detained in Black Jail After 
Coming to Beijing To Handle Affairs'' [Laijing banshi nu bei guan 
heijianyu], Beijing News, 2 August 11; Wang Huazhong, ``Former Inmate 
Reveals Existence of `Black Jail,`'' China Daily, 3 August 11.
    \133\ Ibid.
    \134\ Ibid.
    \135\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Official Fear: Inside a Shuanggui 
Investigation Facility,'' 5 July 11.
    \136\ Li Yanhui, ``Chaoyang Deputy Director Allegedly Detained for 
Bribery,'' Global Times, 2 June 11; Zhang Lu, ``Beijing's Chaoyang 
District Deputy Mayor Liu Xiquan Investigated,'' Caijing, 1 June 11.
    \137\ ``Shandong Provincial Government Secretary-General Zhang 
Wanqing Dismissed, Had Been Detained Under Shuanggui'' [Shandong sheng 
zhengfu mishu zhang zhang wanqing bei ti qing chezhi ci qian bei 
shuanggui], People's Daily, 26 May 11.
    \138\ Zhang Yuzhe, ``High-Ranking Ministry of Finance Official 
Detained,'' Caixin Net, 18 January 11.
    \139\ ``Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China,'' CECC Hearing, 
20 September 06, Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law, New 
York University Law School, Co-Director of U.S.-Asia Law Institute.
    \140\ Dui Hua Foundation, ``Official Fear: Inside a Shuanggui 
Investigation Facility,'' 5 July 11.
    \141\ ``Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China,'' CECC Hearing, 
20 September 06, Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law, New 
York University Law School, Co-Director of U.S.-Asia Law Institute.
    \142\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 96.
    \143\ He Weifang, ``For the Rule of Law, for the Ideal in Our 
Hearts--A Letter to Chongqing Colleagues'' [Weile fazhi, weile women 
xinzhongde di na yi fen lixiang--zhi chongqing falu jie de yifeng 
gongkaixin], China Media Project, 12 April 11.
    \144\ Ibid.
    \145\ Ibid.
    \146\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2010 Human Rights 
Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 8 April 11.
    \147\ ``Jailed Activist's Health Failing,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 
January 11.
    \148\ Ibid.; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Zeng Jinyan Once 
Again Applies for Medical Parole for Hu Jia's Condition in Prison,'' 17 
January 11.
    \149\ PEN International, ``CHINA: Death Announced of Prominent 
Writer Zhang Jianhong (aka Li Hong),'' 12 January 11.
    \150\ Ibid.
    \151\ ``China Frees Father Zhao Lianhai Jailed for Milk Protest,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Australian, 29 December 10.
    \152\ Ibid.
    \153\ Will Clem and Choi Chi-yuk, ``Beijing's Silence an Ominous 
Signal,'' South China Morning Post, 6 April 11; ``Milk Activist Told 
`Be Quiet or Go Back to Jail,' '' South China Morning Post, 8 April 11.
    \154\ ``Milk Activist Told `Be Quiet or Go Back to Jail,' '' South 
China Morning Post, 8 April 11.
    \155\ Human Rights in China, ``Petitioner Recounts Abuses During 
RTL; Medical Parole Rescinded,'' 24 February 11.
    \156\ Ibid.
    \157\ ``Mao Hengfeng: Amnesty Urgent Action,'' Guardian, 25 June 
11.
    \158\ ``Supreme People's Court Work Report'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan 
gongzuo baogao], Xinhua, reprinted in National People's Congress of the 
People's Republic of China, 19 March 11.
    \159\ Supreme People's Court, ``2010 Annual Work Report on the 
People's Courts'' [Renminfayuan gongzuo niandu baogao (2010 nian)], 25 
May 11. For more information on the death penalty in the 2010 Annual 
Work Report, see, e.g., Michael Bristow, ``China Orders Suspension of 
Death Sentences,'' BBC News, 25 May 11; Wang Qiushi, ``SPC Requests 
Uniform Suitable Standards for the Death Penalty; Try Utmost To Not 
Immediately Implement the Death Penalty'' [Zuigao fa yaoqiu tongyi 
sixing shiyong biaozhun jinliang bu pan sixing liji zhixing], People's 
Daily, 25 May 11.
    \160\ Zhao Yinan, ``13 Crimes Removed From Death Penalty List,'' 
China Daily, 26 February 11; Robert Saiget, ``China Scraps Death 
Penalty for Some Crimes,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 
26 February 11.
    \161\ Zhao Yinan, ``13 Crimes Removed From Death Penalty List,'' 
China Daily, 26 February 11; ``China Mulls Lessening Number of Crimes 
Punishable by Death,'' Xinhua, 23 August 10.
    \162\ Zhao Lei, ``Greater Steps Can Be Taken To Reduce the Death 
Penalty'' [Jianshao sizui, buzi keyi zai da yixie], Southern Weekend, 
26 August 10. For more information, see ``Chinese Government Considers 
Reducing Number of Crimes Punishable by Death,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 23 February 11.
    Notes to Section II--Freedom of Religion

    \1\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.
    \2\ For protections in international law, see, e.g., the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by UN 
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 18; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, art. 18; International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 
76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to ``ensure the religious and 
moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents'] own 
convictions''); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted 
and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General 
Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 
September 90, art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. See General 
Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official 
interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. UN 
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of 
Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 30 
July 93, para. 1. China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC and a 
signatory to the ICCPR. The Chinese government has committed itself to 
ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, the ICCPR 
and reaffirmed its commitment on April 13, 2006, in its application for 
membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China's top leaders have 
also stated on other occasions that they are preparing for ratification 
of the ICCPR, including in March 18, 2008, press conference remarks by 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao; in a September 6, 2005, statement by 
Politburo member and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd World Congress 
on Law; in statements by Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe tour; 
and in a January 27, 2004, speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao before 
the French National Assembly. China affirmed this commitment during the 
Universal Periodic Review of China's human rights record before the UN 
Human Rights Council. UN GAOR, Hum Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of 
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/11/25, 
3 March 09, para. 114(1). In addition, China's National Human Rights 
Action Plan affirms the principles in the ICCPR. State Council 
Information Office, ``National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-
2010),'' reprinted in Xinhua, 13 April 09, Introduction. The ``White 
Paper on Progress in China's Human Rights in 2009,'' issued in 2010, 
also states that the government is ``vigorously creating conditions'' 
for ratifying the ICCPR. State Council Information Office, ``White 
Paper on Progress in China's Human Rights in 2009'' [2009 nian zhongguo 
renquan shiye de jinzhan], reprinted in Xinhua, 26 September 10, sec. 
VII.
    \3\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights 
Action Plan of China (2009-2010),'' reprinted in Xinhua, 13 April 09, 
Introduction, sec. II(4).
    \4\ State Council Information Office, ``White Paper on Progress in 
China's Human Rights in 2009'' [2009 nian zhongguo renquan shiye de 
jinzhan], reprinted in Xinhua, 26 September 10.
    \5\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Main Points of 
State Administration for Religious Affairs' 2011 Work'' [Guojia 
zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11. See 
analysis in ``State Administration for Religious Affairs Outlines 
Restrictive Religious Practices for 2011,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 12 April 11.
    \6\ Measures on the Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries 
[Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], issued 30 September 10, 
effective 1 November 10. The measures come as most Tibetan autonomous 
prefectures in China have drafted or implemented their own legal 
measures to regulate ``Tibetan Buddhist Affairs.'' See Section V--Tibet 
for additional information.
    \7\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Our Country To 
Further Draft and Revise Accompanying Measures to `Regulations on 
Religious Affairs' '' [Woguo jiang jinyibu zhiding he xiuding 
``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' peitao banfa], 10 January 11.
    \8\ Ibid.
    \9\ Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05.
    \10\ For information and analysis on previous legal measures, see 
CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 73-75; ``New Measures Regulate 
Financial Affairs of Venues for Religious Activities,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 3; and ``Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefectures,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 
11. The Regulations on Religious Affairs condition protections on 
religious groups registering as organizations and registering their 
venues with the government. Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao 
shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 6, 
12-15.
    \11\ This section pertains to what official sources refer to as 
``Buddhism in the Han tradition,'' an inaccurate umbrella term that 
encompasses all schools of Buddhism in China, aside from the Tibetan 
tradition. ``Buddhism in the Han tradition'' (hanchuan fojiao) is 
inaccurate in religious terms. Buddhists divide themselves according to 
a number of traditions, ritual practices, and schools of thought, but 
not in purely ethnic terms. It is also worth noting that with the 
possible exception of the Chan school of Buddhism, there is arguably no 
true ``Han tradition'' of Buddhism. All non-Chan schools of Buddhism in 
China can be clearly traced to Indian sources. In addition, there are 
Chinese citizens belonging to officially recognized ``ethnic minority'' 
groups, such as the Dai, that practice Theravada Buddhism--a branch of 
Buddhism completely outside of what Chinese officials mean by the ``Han 
tradition'' (non-esoteric Mahayana Buddhism as practiced by non-
Tibetans).
    \12\ See, e.g., ``Top Leaders Praise the Work of China's `Patriotic 
Religious Organizations,' '' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 3.
    \13\ See, e.g., ``Jiangsu Provincial Buddhist Association 
Conference Celebrating the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the 
Party and Second Leadership Meeting Convenes'' [Jiangsu sheng foxie 
qingzhu jian dang 90 zhounian zuotan hui ji di er ci huizhang bangong 
hui zhaokai], Buddhism Online, 27 June 11; ``Jincheng Municipal 
Buddhist Association, Shanxi, Holds Art Exhibition for the 90th 
Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party'' [Shanxi jincheng 
shi fojiao xiehui juxing jian dang 90 zhounian wenyi huiyan], Buddhism 
Online, 20 June 11; ``Nationwide Religious Communities Hold Conference 
To Celebrate the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese 
Communist Party'' [Quanguo zongjiao jie qingzhu zhongguo gongchan dang 
chengli 90 zhounian zuotan hui juxing], Buddhism Online, 25 June 11; 
``Shanxi Provincial Buddhist Association Confirms 2011 Work Points'' 
[Shanxi sheng fojiao xiehui queding 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 
Buddhism Online, 25 January 11; Yi Ming, Buddhist Academy of China, 
``Welcoming the 90th Anniversary of the Founding of the Chinese 
Communist Party, Buddhist Academy of China Holds Party Knowledge 
Conference'' [Yingjie zhongguo gongchan dang chengli 90 zhounian, wo 
yuan juxing dang de zhishi jiangzuo], 20 May 11; ``Xingtai City, Hebei, 
Convenes Religious Words and Harmony Conference'' [Hebei xingtai shi 
zhaokai zongjiao jie hua hexie yantao hui], China Religion, reprinted 
in Buddhism Online, 31 May 11; Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Bureau, ``Second Jiangsu Province Buddhist Temple Abbots 
(Persons in Charge) Training Session Held'' [Di er qi jiangsu sheng 
fojiao siyuan zhuchi (fuze ren) peixun ban juban], reprinted in 
Buddhism Online, 15 March 11; ``Gaotang Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Bureau Firmly Grasps `Three Educations' To Raise the Quality of 
Religious Personnel'' [Gaotang minzong ju henzhua `san ge jiaoyu' 
tisheng zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan suzhi], Buddhism Online, 11 April 11.
    \14\ ``Shanxi Provincial Buddhist Association Confirms 2011 Work 
Points'' [Shanxi sheng fojiao xiehui queding 2011 nian gongzuo 
yaodian], Buddhism Online, 25 January 11.
    \15\ State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), ``Main 
Points of State Administration for Religious Affairs' 2011 Work'' 
[Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11. A 
SARA document summarizing SARA's work in 2010 reported that authorities 
``supported'' Buddhist scripture reading events; it did not use the 
word ``lead.'' State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Report on 
the Situation of State Administration for Religious Affairs' 2010 
Work'' [Guojia zongjiao shiwu ju 2010 nian gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 
24 January 11.
    \16\ See, e.g., ``Han Buddhist Scripture Reading Conference 
Scripture Reading Monk Representatives Touring Event Held in Shaanxi'' 
[Hanchuan fojiao jiangjing jiaoliu hui jiangjing fashi daibiao xunjiang 
huodong zai shaanxi juxing], Shaanxi Buddhism Net, reprinted in 
Buddhism Online, 2 April 11; Zhenjiang Municipal Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Bureau, ``Purity, Harmony--Jiangsu Provincial Buddhist 
Association Scripture Reading Group Does Scripture Reading Tour in 
Zhenjiang'' [Qingjing hexie--jiangsu sheng fojiao xiehui jiangjing tuan 
zai zhenjiang xunhui jiangjing], 6 April 11.
    \17\ See, e.g., Gongan County Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 
``Proactively Lead, Manage According to Law'' [Jiji yindao, yi fa 
guanli], 11 May 11; Xu Yun, Suzhou Municipal Local Records Office, 
``The Situation of I-Kuan Tao in Suzhou'' [Yidaoguan zai suzhou de 
qingkuang], 6 December 10.
    \18\ The Commission has not observed official definitions of the 
terms ``feudal'' or ``superstitious'' in reference to Buddhist 
religious practices. For example, the 1993 Measures for the Management 
of Nationwide Han Buddhist Temples uses the term ``superstitious 
activities'' but does not elaborate on the meaning of the term. 
Buddhist Association of China, Measures for the Management of Han 
Buddhist Temples Nationwide [Quanguo hanchuan fojiao siyuan guanli 
banfa], adopted 21 October 93, art. 8. In addition, in at least some 
cases, authorities have asserted a link between what they deem to be 
``feudal'' or ``superstitious'' religious activities and what they deem 
to be ``cult'' activities. See, e.g., State Administration for 
Religious Affairs, ``The Genesis of and Defense Against Cults'' 
[Xiejiao de chansheng yu fangfan], 28 October 05. Authorities have 
invoked the term ``cult'' as a basis for restrictions on the freedom of 
religion of members of a variety of religious groups in China, 
including Falun Gong, groups of Protestant origin, and groups of 
Buddhist and Taoist origin. See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Henan Police 
Unlawfully Fine, Sentence Believers to Labor Camps,'' 9 April 10; 
Ministry of Public Security, ``The Situation of Organizations Already 
Recognized as Cults'' [Xianyi rending de xiejiao zuzhi qingkuang], 
reprinted in Zhengqi Net, 5 February 07; Verna Yu, ``Christians Held To 
Extort Cash, Say Wife, Lawyer,'' South China Morning Post, 29 June 10; 
``Members of Henan House Church Ordered To Serve Reeducation Through 
Labor,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 
November 10, 3; ``National Conferences Highlight Restrictions on 
Buddhist and Taoist Doctrine,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 4.
    \19\ See, e.g., ``Exclusive Interview With Buddhist Association of 
China Head Master Chuanyin: Religious Figures Should Improve Self-
Construction'' [Zhuanfang zhongfoxie huizhang chuanyin zhanglao: 
zongjiao jie yao jiaqiang zishen jianshe], Xinhua, reprinted in 
Buddhism Online, 2 March 11; State Administration for Religious 
Affairs, ``Serve the General Situation and Write Brilliant Works--
Review of Religious Work at the Time of the 11th Five-Year Plan'' [Fuwu 
daju xie huazhang--``shi yi wu'' shiqi zongjiao gongzuo saomiao], 29 
October 10.
    \20\ ``Exclusive Interview With Buddhist Association of China Head 
Master Chuanyin: Religious Figures Should Improve Self-Construction'' 
[Zhuanfang zhongfoxie huizhang chuanyin zhanglao: zongjiao jie yao 
jiaqiang zishen jianshe], Xinhua, reprinted in Buddhism Online, 2 March 
11.
    \21\ Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 13-14, 24-25, 44.
    \22\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
``Summary of the Fifth Five-Year Plan Awareness Promotion Work of the 
Nationwide Religious Work System'' [Quanguo zongjiao gongzuo xitong 
``wu wu'' pufa gongzuo zongjie], 22 March 11. For other examples, see 
Ding Cai'an, Hunan Provincial Religious Affairs Bureau, ``Humble 
Remarks on the Current Situation of the Management of Folk Beliefs and 
Methods of Improvement'' [Minjian xinyang guanli xianzhuang yu gaijin 
fangfa de chuyi], 4 January 11; Guang'an Municipal Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Bureau, ``Guangan, Sichuan, Improves Work of Governing and 
Inspecting the Indiscriminate Construction of Temples and Excessive 
Construction of Open-Air Religious Statues'' [Sichuan guang'an jiaqiang 
luan jian miaoyu lan su lutian zongjiao zaoxiang zhili diaoyan 
gongzuo], reprinted in Buddhism Online, 7 April 11; Tongan County Party 
Committee, ``Tongan District Convenes Special Work Meeting on Stopping 
the Indiscriminate Construction of Temples and Open-Air Religious 
Statues'' [Tongan qu zhaokai zhizhi luan jian simiao he lutian zongjiao 
zaoxiang zhuanxiang gongzuo huiyi], 11 April 11.
    \23\ See, e.g., ``Nanjing City Convenes Meeting for `Confirming and 
Putting Religious Personnel on File' Pilot Work'' [Nanjing shi 
``zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan rending ji bei'an'' shidian gongzuo huiyi 
zhaokai], Buddhism Online, 28 August 10; Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and 
Religious Affairs Committee, ``Putuoshan Buddhist Association Convenes 
Work Mobilization Meeting for Confirming and Putting on File 
Qualifications of Religious Personnel'' [Putuoshan foxie zhaokai 
jiaozhi renyuan zige rending bei'an gongzuo dongyuan hui], reprinted in 
Buddhism Online, 30 November 10; Guangdong Provincial Buddhist 
Association, ``Special Meeting on the Work of Confirming and Verifying 
the Credentials of Guangdong Provincial Buddhist Religious Personnel 
Convenes'' [Guangdong sheng fojiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending shenhe 
gongzuo zhuanxiang huiyi zhaokai], 30 March 11.
    \24\ Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee, 
``Putuoshan Buddhist Association Convenes Work Mobilization Meeting for 
Confirming and Putting on File Qualifications of Religious Personnel'' 
[Putuoshan foxie zhaokai jiaozhi renyuan zige rending bei'an gongzuo 
dongyuan hui], reprinted in Buddhism Online, 30 November 10.
    \25\ Estimates of the size of China's Catholic community vary 
widely, and there are large discrepancies between Chinese government 
estimates and international media estimates. For example, senior 
Communist Party leader Jia Qinglin has estimated the Catholic 
population at 4 million, although it is unclear whether or not his 
estimate applies to both registered and unregistered Catholics. Bao 
Daozu, ``Religion `Can Promote Harmony,' '' China Daily, 4 March 08. 
International media estimates range from 8 to over 12 million. See, 
e.g., Ambrose Leung, ``Tsang Had Audience With Pope but Cancelled,'' 
South China Morning Post, 26 March 10; ``Cardinal for China,'' Wall 
Street Journal, 16 April 09; James Pomfret, ``New Hong Kong Bishop 
Pressures China on Religious Freedom,'' Reuters, 17 April 09.
    \26\ According to the Charter of the Bishops' Conference of the 
Catholic Church in China (BCCCC), the BCCCC has the authority to 
approve the ordination of bishops in China. Bishops' Conference of the 
Catholic Church in China, Charter of the Bishops' Conference of the 
Catholic Church in China [Zhongguo tianzhujiao zhujiaotuan zhangcheng], 
adopted 9 July 04, art. 6(2).
    \27\ See, e.g., ``State Administration for Religious Affairs Issues 
Statement Regarding Vatican's Criticism of National Conference of 
Chinese Catholic Representatives'' [Guojia zongjiao ju jiu fandigang 
zhize zhongguo tianzhujiao daibiao huiyi fabiao tanhua], Xinhua, 22 
December 10.
    \28\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Main Points of 
State Administration for Religious Affairs' 2011 Work'' [Guojia 
zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11.
    \29\ See, e.g., ``China Appoints New Bishop With Vatican Approval 
Following Souring of Relations Last Year,'' Associated Press, 11 April 
11; Jian Mei, ``New Bishop of Yanzhou Ordained With Holy See 
Approval,'' AsiaNews, 20 May 11.
    \30\ The Chinese government established the Chengde diocese in May 
2010, and the Holy See does not recognize it. See, e.g., Zhen Yuan, 
``Chengde: Illicit Episcopal Ordination, the First in Four Years,'' 
AsiaNews, 19 November 10.
    \31\ Bernardo Cervellera, ``The Return of the Cultural Revolution: 
Chinese Bishops Imprisoned or Hunted Like Criminals,'' AsiaNews, 6 
December 10; W. Zhicheng and Z. Yuan, ``Chinese Bishops Deported To 
Attend Patriotic Assembly,'' AsiaNews, 7 December 10; Zhen Yuan, 
``Chengde: Illicit Episcopal Ordination, the First in Four Years,'' 
AsiaNews, 19 November 10.
    \32\ Jian Mei and W. Zhicheng, ``Officials Kidnap Bishops of 
Guangdong To Force Them To Take Part in Illicit Shantou Ordination,'' 
AsiaNews, 11 July 11.
    \33\ Jian Mei, ``Eight Bishops in Communion With the Pope Forced To 
Take Part in Illegitimate Ordination in Shantou,'' AsiaNews, 14 July 
11; ``Bishops Attend Unapproved Ordination,'' Union of Catholic Asian 
News, 14 July 11.
    \34\ `` `Underground' Xiwanzi Bishop Dies,'' Union of Catholic 
Asian News, 10 March 11; ``Police Isolate Hebei Village After Death of 
an Underground Bishop,'' AsiaNews, 12 March 11.
    \35\ ``Police Isolate Hebei Village After Death of an Underground 
Bishop,'' AsiaNews, 12 March 11. Yao Liang, the auxiliary bishop of the 
same diocese, died in 2009, and authorities implemented restrictions on 
his funeral. For more information, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 
October 10, 102.
    \36\ Ambrose Leung, ``Catholic Seminarians Mount Rare Protest,'' 
South China Morning Post, 3 December 10; ``China's Hebei Seminary 
Strikes, Demands Revocation of Political Appointment'' [Zhongguo hebei 
xiuyuan ba ke yaoqiu chehui zhengzhi renming], CathNews China, 24 
November 10; Hebei Seminary, ``Provincial Department Leaders Come to 
Our Seminary To Express Greetings'' [Sheng ting lingdao lai wo yuan 
weiwen], 11 November 10.
    \37\ Ambrose Leung, ``Catholic Seminarians Mount Rare Protest,'' 
South China Morning Post, 3 December 10; ``China's Hebei Seminary 
Strikes, Demands Revocation of Political Appointment'' [Zhongguo hebei 
xiuyuan ba ke yaoqiu chehui zhengzhi renming], CathNews China, 24 
November 10.
    \38\ ``Shijiazhuang: Hebei Catholic Seminary Board of Directors 
Convenes Meeting'' [Shijiazhuang: hebei tianzhujiao shenzhexue yuan 
dongshi hui zhaokai huiyi], Faith Press, 14 January 11; Zhen Yuan, 
``Hebei Seminarians Welcome New Rector,'' AsiaNews, 15 January 11.
    \39\ Liu Bainian was previously the vice chairman of the Catholic 
Patriotic Association (CPA). At the Eighth National Conference of 
Chinese Catholic Representatives, he was chosen to be honorary chairman 
of the CPA and Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China. 
See, e.g., ``Exclusive Interview With Catholic Patriotic Association 
and Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China Honorary 
Chairman Liu Bainian'' [Zhuanfang zhongguo tianzhujiao ``yi hui yi 
tuan'' mingyu zhuxi liu bainian], China Religion, 30 March 11.
    \40\ The charter of the Catholic Patriotic Association lists among 
its duties: ``Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and 
the People's government, to fervently love socialism and the 
motherland; to unite all the country's Catholic clergy and church 
members; to respect the country's constitution, laws, regulations, and 
policies; to exhibit Catholicism's own strengths; to contribute 
strength to comprehensively establishing a prosperous society; to be 
the light and the salt, the glory of God.'' Catholic Patriotic 
Association, Charter of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association 
[Zhongguo tianzhujiao aiguo hui zhangcheng], adopted 9 July 04, art. 6.
    \41\ The charter of the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church 
in China (BCCCC) does not explicitly formalize the BCCCC's relationship 
with the government or the Party. It does, however, formalize its 
relationship with the CPA. Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church 
in China, Charter of the Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in 
China [Zhongguo tianzhujiao zhujiaotuan zhangcheng], adopted 9 July 04, 
art. 1.
    \42\ ``Exclusive Interview With Catholic Patriotic Association and 
Bishops' Conference of the Catholic Church in China Honorary Chairman 
Liu Bainian'' [Zhuanfang zhongguo tianzhujiao ``yi hui yi tuan'' mingyu 
zhuxi liu bainian], China Religion, 30 March 11.
    \43\ U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, ``2010 
Annual Report,'' May 2010, 110.
    \44\ Bernardo Cervellera, ``In Hebei, Underground Bishop Joins 
Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association,'' AsiaNews, 29 October 09.
    \45\ ``Priests Not Spared in China's Crackdown,'' Union of Catholic 
Asian News, 13 April 11; ``Three Priests in Hebei Province Detained or 
Whereabouts Unknown'' [Hebei sheng san ming shenfu bei juliu huo xialuo 
bu ming], CathNews China, 13 April 11.
    \46\ Ibid.
    \47\ ``Officials Free `Underground' Priest,'' Union of Catholic 
Asian News, 4 August 11.
    \48\ Jia is also head of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The CPPCC Web site lists among the 
functions of the CPPCC ``political consultation,'' ``democratic 
oversight,'' and ``participation in the deliberation and administration 
of state affairs,'' and it contains representatives from religious 
communities. Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, ``The 
Main Functions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference'' [Zhongguo zhengxie de zhuyao zhineng], 29 June 10.
    \49\ ``Jia Qinglin Meets With Representatives From Eighth National 
Conference of Chinese Catholic Representatives'' [Jia qinglin huijian 
zhongguo tianzhu jiao di ba ci daibiao huiyi daibiao], Xinhua, 9 
December 10.
    \50\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Catholics Mull Post-Congress Future,'' 
Union of Catholic Asian News, 17 December 10. In a communique from the 
Press Office of the Holy See, the Holy See alleged that ``many Bishops 
and priests were forced to take part in the [National Conference of 
Chinese Catholic Representatives].'' The full text of the communique is 
reprinted in ``Vatican `Sorrow' Over China Catholic Congress,'' Union 
of Catholic Asian News, 17 December 10.
    \51\ ``Three Days in China's Catholic Congress,'' Union of Catholic 
Asian News, 16 December 10.
    \52\ Keith B. Richburg, ``China Defies Vatican on Bishop 
Conclave,'' Washington Post, 8 December 10.
    \53\ Bernardo Cervellera, ``The Return of the Cultural Revolution: 
Chinese Bishops Imprisoned or Hunted Like Criminals,'' AsiaNews, 6 
December 10; W. Zhicheng and Z. Yuan, ``Chinese Bishops Deported To 
Attend Patriotic Assembly,'' AsiaNews, 7 December 10.
    \54\ Ibid.
    \55\ ``Bishop Voted Chinese Catholic of 2010,'' Union of Catholic 
Asian News, 20 January 11.
    \56\ Ibid.
    \57\ The campaign began after the Communist Party designated Falun 
Gong an illegal ``cult organization'' in 1999, following a peaceful 
demonstration held by its practitioners near the Party leadership 
compound in Beijing.
    \58\ For more information on the teachings and practices of Falun 
Gong, see David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008).
    \59\ Official estimates placed the number of adherents inside China 
at 30 million prior to the crackdown. Falun Gong sources estimate that 
there was twice that number. Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of 
Days (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 2. In April 2009, Han 
Zhiguang, a Chinese attorney who has defended Falun Gong clients, 
reported that there remain ``huge numbers'' of practitioners in China 
and that the movement is ``expanding.'' Malcolm Moore, ``Falun Gong 
`Growing' in China Despite 10-Year Ban,'' Telegraph, 24 April 09.
    \60\ Based on data in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
as of September 20, 2011.
    \61\ Ibid.
    \62\ For more information on the background and activities of the 
6-10 Office, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 105; CECC, 
2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 121-23.
    \63\ ``Transformation through reeducation'' can also apply to non-
Falun Gong groups that authorities have designated as ``cult'' 
organizations. For example, a government document from a town in 
Weng'an county, Qiannan Buyi and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, Guizhou 
province, calls on authorities to ``transform'' followers of the 
Disciples Sect (Mentuhui), an indigenous Chinese sect that appears on a 
list of Chinese government and Party-designated ``cults'' issued by the 
Ministry of Public Security in 2000. Ministry of Public Security, ``The 
Situation of Organizations Already Recognized as Cults'' [Xianyi 
rending de xiejiao zuzhi qingkuang], reprinted in Zhengqi Net, 5 
February 07; Tianwen Town People's Government, ``Tianwen Town 2010-2012 
Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall 
Battle Work Plan,'' reprinted in Weng'an County People's Government, 5 
May 10. For a recent example of the ``cult'' designation applied to 
non-Falun Gong practitioners, see ChinaAid, ``Henan Police Unlawfully 
Fine, Sentence Believers to Labor Camps,'' 9 April 10; Verna Yu, 
``Christians Held To Extort Cash, Say Wife, Lawyer,'' South China 
Morning Post, 29 June 10; ChinaAid, ``Christians in Shangqiu, Henan, 
Including Gao Jianli, Bring Suit Against RTL Committee, Rejected'' 
[Henan shangqiu jidu tu gao jianli deng su laojiao wei bei bohui], 3 
August 10; ``Members of Henan House Church Ordered To Serve Reeducation 
Through Labor,'' CECC Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 
November 2010, 3.
    \64\ The China Anti-Cult Association has identified these three 
kinds of facilities as the ``main front'' in the effort to 
``transform'' Falun Gong practitioners. Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult 
Association, ``Prepare Basic Thinking on Transformation-Through-
Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle'' [Dahao jiaoyu 
zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10.
    \65\ The 11 Falun Gong practitioners detained are Xin Xiumin, Ning 
Shumei, Gao Shuxian, Wang Xiling, Bao Zhenjiang, Luo Lingmei, Zhu 
Fengqi, Zhang Yulan, Shen Hai, Gao Cun, and Fang Xiuying.
    \66\ ``Twenty-Four Falun Gong Practitioners From Laishui County, 
Hebei Province, Have Been Taken to CCP Brainwashing Centers'' [Hebei 
laishui xian 24 ming falungong xueyuan bei bangru dangxiao xinao], 
Clear Wisdom, 24 September 10; ``Twenty-Four Falun Gong Practitioners 
From Laishui County, Hebei Province, Have Been Taken to CCP 
Brainwashing Centers,'' Clear Wisdom, 30 September 10. Some sources use 
the term ``brainwashing'' to refer to ``transformation through 
reeducation.''
    \67\ ``Having Accused Those Responsible for Violating His Daughter, 
the Father of Hu Miaomiao Is Kidnapped'' [Konggao qinhai nu'er de 
zuifan, hu miaomiao fuqin bei jiechi], Clear Wisdom, 1 March 11; ``Mr. 
Hu Mingliang Arrested After Suing the Labor Camp Where His Daughter Ms. 
Hu Miaomiao Was Sexually Abused,'' Clear Wisdom, 4 March 11; ``Seeking 
Justice for His Daughter, Hu Miaomiao's Father Is Illegally Detained'' 
[Wei nu'er tao gongdao, hu miaomiao fuqin bei feifa guanya], Clear 
Wisdom, 14 March 11.
    \68\ ``Having Suffered Sexual Assault in Reeducation Through Labor 
Center, Girl Cannot Stand Upright or Walk'' [Zao laojiao suo xing 
cuican, nuhai bu neng zhili xingzou], Clear Wisdom, 4 November 10; 
Falun Dafa Information Center, ``Urgent Appeal: 25-Year-Old Woman 
Unable To Walk From Sexual Abuse in Hebei Labor Camp,'' 14 November 10.
    \69\ Tania Branigan, ``Fears Grow After Chinese Human Rights Lawyer 
Detained,'' Guardian, 18 February 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 
``CHRD Condemns Preemptive Strikes Against Protests,'' 21 February 11.
    \70\ ``Human Rights Lawyers Threatened and Jailed,'' AsiaNews, 31 
December 10; Ye Bing, ``Beijing Rights Defense Lawyers Tang Jitian and 
Liu Wei Faced With Losing Their Licenses'' [Weiquan lushi tang jitian 
liu wei mianlin diaoxiao zhizhao chufa], Voice of America, 14 April 10.
    \71\ ``Concern Over Rights Lawyer,'' Radio Free Asia, 13 April 11; 
Verna Yu, ``Rights Lawyers Free After Being Held in Crackdown,'' South 
China Morning Post, 21 April 11.
    \72\ General Office of the Ningdu County People's Government, 
``Ningdu County Sanitation System 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-
Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' 
[Ningdu xian weisheng xitong 2010-2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu 
gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], reprinted in Ningdu County 
People's Government, 18 March 10; ``Yang Sisong Attends City-Wide 
Mobilization and Deployment Meeting on Work To Defend Against and 
Handle Cults and the Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle'' [Yang sisong canjia quanshi fangfan he 
chuli xiejiao gongzuo ji jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti 
zhang dongyuan bushu dahui], Hefei Daily, reprinted in Hefei Municipal 
People's Government, 1 April 10; Longbu Town Party Committee, ``Longbu 
Town 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' [Longbu zhen 2010-2012 nian 
jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], 
reprinted in Anyuan County People's Government, 2 April 10; Jiyuan 
Municipal Bureau of Industry and Information Technology, ``Regarding 
Launching the 2010-2012 Jiyuan City Transformation-Through-Reeducation 
Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work'' [Quansheng laojiao 
xitong jiaoyu zhuanhua ``xin san nian gongjian gonggu zhengti zhang'' 
dongyuan bushu hui zai sheng nu suo zhaokai], reprinted in Jiyuan 
Municipal People's Government, 6 April 10; Binhu Township Party and 
Government General Office, ``Binhu Township 2010-2012 Transformation-
Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work 
Plan'' [Binhu xiang 2010-2012 jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu 
zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], reprinted in Changji Municipal People's 
Government, 13 April 10; Chengxi Town Party Committee, ``Chengxi Town 
2010-2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation 
Plan'' [Chengxi zhen 2010 zhi 2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu 
gonggu fang'an], reprinted in Guoyang County People's Government, 13 
April 10; General Office of the Ruichang Municipal People's Government, 
``Hongxia Township 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault 
and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' [Hongxia xiang 2010-2012 
nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], 
reprinted in Ruichang Municipal People's Government, 26 April 10; 
Tianwen Town People's Government, ``Tianwen Town 2010-2012 
Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall 
Battle Work Plan'' [Tianwen zhen 2010-2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua 
gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], reprinted in Weng'an 
County People's Government, 5 May 10; Jiangxi Provincial Reeducation 
Through Labor Administration Bureau, ``Provincial Reeducation Through 
Labor System Mobilization and Deployment Meeting on Transformation-
Through-Reeducation `New Three-Year Assault and Consolidation Overall 
Battle' Convenes at Provincial Women's Reeducation Through Labor 
Center'' [Quansheng laojiao xitong jiaoyu zhuanhua ``xin san nian 
gongjian gonggu zhengti zhang'' dongyuan bushu hui zai sheng nu suo 
zhaokai], 13 June 10; Gulou District People's Government, ``Kaiyuan 
Community 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle Work Implementation Plan'' [Kaiyuan shequ 
2010-2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo 
shishi fang'an], 27 June 10; Longnan County Bureau of Industry and 
Information Technology, ``County Industry and Information Bureau 
Establishing, Synthesizing, and Maintaining Stability Work Summary for 
the First Half of 2010'' [Xian gongxin ju 2010 nian shang ban nian 
chuangjian, zongzhi, weiwen gongzuo zongjie], reprinted in Longnan 
County People's Government, 30 June 10; Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult 
Association, ``Prepare Basic Thinking on Transformation-Through-
Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle'' [Dahao jiaoyu 
zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10; 
China Anti-Cult Association, ``Suxian District, Chenzhou City, Hunan 
Province, Implements Shingle-Hanging Transformation as Shining Tactic 
in Three-Year Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle'' [Hunan sheng 
chenzhou shi suxian qu shishi guapai zhuanhua wei san nian gongjian yu 
gonggu zhengti zhang liang shizhao], 6 August 10; Hepu County Water 
Bureau, ``Hepu County Water Bureau Party Committee's 2010-2012 
Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall 
Battle Work Plan'' [Zhonggong hepu xian shuili ju weiyuan hui 2010-2012 
nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], 
last visited 23 November 10. For more information on the campaign, see 
``Communist Party Calls for Increased Efforts To `Transform' Falun Gong 
Practitioners as Part of Three-Year Campaign,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 22 March 11.
    \73\ Jiyuan Municipal Bureau of Industry and Information 
Technology, ``Implementation Plan Regarding Launching the 2010-2012 
Jiyuan City Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle Work'' [Guanyu kaizhan 2010-2012 nian 
jiyuan shi jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo 
shishi fang'an], reprinted in Jiyuan Municipal People's Government, 6 
April 10; Binhu Township Party and Government General Office, ``Binhu 
Township 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' [Binhu xiang 2010-2012 jiaoyu 
zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], reprinted 
in Changji Municipal People's Government, 13 April 10; Chengxi Town 
Party Committee, ``Chengxi Town 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-
Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Plan'' [Chengxi zhen 2010 zhi 
2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu fang'an], reprinted in 
Guoyang County People's Government, 13 April 10; Hepu County Water 
Bureau, ``Hepu County Water Bureau Party Committee's 2010-2012 
Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall 
Battle Work Plan'' [Zhonggong hepu xian shuili ju weiyuan hui 2010-2012 
nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], 
last visited 23 November 10.
    \74\ See, e.g., Chengxi Town Party Committee, ``Chengxi Town 2010-
2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation 
Plan'' [Chengxi zhen 2010 zhi 2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu 
gonggu fang'an], reprinted in Guoyang County People's Government, 13 
April 10; General Office of the Ruichang Municipal People's Government, 
``Hongxia Township 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault 
and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' [Hongxia xiang 2010-2012 
nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], 
reprinted in Ruichang Municipal People's Government, 26 April 10.
    \75\ Longnan County Bureau of Industry and Information Technology, 
``County Industry and Information Bureau Establishing, Synthesizing, 
and Maintaining Stability Work Summary for the First Half of 2010'' 
[Xian gongxin ju 2010 nian shang ban nian chuangjian, zongzhi, weiwen 
gongzuo zongjie], reprinted in Longnan County People's Government, 30 
June 10; Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult Association, ``Prepare Basic 
Thinking on Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle'' [Dahao jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu 
gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10; Hepu County Water 
Bureau, ``Hepu County Water Bureau Party Committee's 2010-2012 
Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall 
Battle Work Plan'' [Zhonggong hepu xian shuili ju weiyuan hui 2010-2012 
nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], 
last visited 23 November 10.
    \76\ Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult Association, ``Prepare Basic 
Thinking on Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle'' [Dahao jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu 
gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10.
    \77\ General Office of the Ningdu County People's Government, 
``Ningdu County Sanitation System 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-
Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' 
[Ningdu xian weisheng xitong 2010-2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu 
gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], reprinted in Ningdu County 
People's Government, 18 March 10; Longbu Town Party Committee, ``Longbu 
Town 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' [Longbu zhen 2010-2012 nian 
jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an de 
tongzhi], reprinted in Anyuan County People's Government, 2 April 10; 
Chengxi Town Party Committee, ``Chengxi Town 2010-2012 Transformation-
Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Plan'' [Chengxi zhen 2010 
zhi 2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu fang'an], reprinted in 
Guoyang County People's Government, 13 April 10.
    \78\ Xiang Yang, China Anti-Cult Association, ``Prepare Basic 
Thinking on Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle'' [Dahao jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu 
gonggu zhengti zhang de jiben sikao], 5 August 10.
    \79\ Ibid.
    \80\ Jiyuan Municipal Bureau of Industry and Information 
Technology, ``Implementation Plan Regarding Launching the 2010-2012 
Jiyuan City Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle Work'' [Guanyu kaizhan 2010-2012 nian 
jiyuan shi jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo 
shishi fang'an], reprinted in Jiyuan Municipal People's Government, 6 
April 10.
    \81\ General Office of the Ruichang Municipal People's Government, 
``Hongxia Township 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault 
and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' [Hongxia xiang 2010-2012 
nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], 
reprinted in Ruichang Municipal People's Government, 26 April 10.
    \82\ Tianwen Town People's Government, ``Tianwen Town 2010-2012 
Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall 
Battle Work Plan'' [Tianwen zhen 2010-2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua 
gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], reprinted in Weng'an 
County People's Government, 5 May 10.
    \83\ Jiyuan Municipal Bureau of Industry and Information 
Technology, ``Implementation Plan Regarding Launching the 2010-2012 
Jiyuan City Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle Work'' [Guanyu kaizhan 2010-2012 nian 
jiyuan shi jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo 
shishi fang'an], reprinted in Jiyuan Municipal People's Government, 6 
April 10.
    \84\ General Office of the Ningdu County People's Government, 
``Ningdu County Sanitation System 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-
Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' 
[Ningdu xian weisheng xitong 2010-2012 nian jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu 
gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], reprinted in Ningdu County 
People's Government, 18 March 10; Longbu Town Party Committee, ``Longbu 
Town 2010-2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and 
Consolidation Overall Battle Work Plan'' [Longbu zhen 2010-2012 nian 
jiaoyu zhuanhua gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], 
reprinted in Anyuan County People's Government, 2 April 10; Binhu 
Township Party and Government General Office, ``Binhu Township 2010-
2012 Transformation-Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation 
Overall Battle Work Plan'' [Binhu xiang 2010-2012 jiaoyu zhuanhua 
gongjian yu gonggu zhengti zhang gongzuo fang'an], reprinted in Changji 
Municipal People's Government, 13 April 10.
    \85\ See, e.g., Panyu District Judicial Bureau, ``Donghuan Street 
Law Promulgation Office Holds `Oppose Cults, Promote Harmony, Welcome 
the Asian Games, Prohibit Drugs, Protect Minors' Knowledge 
Competition'' [Donghuan jie pufa ban juxing `fan xiejiao, cu hexie, 
ying yayun, jin du, baohu weichengnian ren' zhishi jingsai], 1 November 
10; Tianshan District Bureau of Science and Technology, `` `Oppose 
Cults, Promote Harmony, Welcome the Asian Games' Propaganda Education, 
Propaganda Education Topic Number One: What Is a Cult? '' [``Fan 
xiejiao, cu hexie, ying yayun'' xuanchuan jiaoyu xuanchuan jiaoyu 
zhuanti zhi yi: shenme shi xiejiao?], 28 September 10.
    \86\ ``Guangzhou Lawyer Zhu Yubiao Framed for Using Cult To 
Undermine Implementation of the Law'' [Guangzhou zhu yubiao lushi bei 
gouxian liyong xiejiao pohuai falu shishi], Canyu, reprinted in Boxun, 
10 September 10; ``Defense Lawyer for Falun Gong Jailed for Second 
Offense, Raids Performed in Anticipation of Guangzhou's Asian Games'' 
[Wei falun gong bianhu lushi er jin gong, guangzhou yayun qingchang 
shangmen soubu], Radio Free Asia, 5 October 10.
    \87\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 300.
    \88\ ``Defense Lawyer for Falun Gong Jailed for Second Offense, 
Raids Performed in Anticipation of Guangzhou's Asian Games'' [Wei falun 
gong bianhu lushi er jin gong, guangzhou yayun qingchang shangmen 
soubu], Radio Free Asia, 5 October 10.
    \89\ ``Materials Framing [Zhu] Having Been Rejected, Zhu Yubiao Is 
Still Kidnapped'' [Gouxian cailiao bei tuihui, zhu yubiao lushi reng 
bei jiechi], Clear Wisdom, 7 March 11.
    \90\ Guangzhou Municipal People's Government, ``Proactively Launch 
Management of the Electromagnetic Environment, Ensure Free Flow and 
Safety for Information During Asian Games'' [Jiji kaizhan dianci 
huanjing zhili, quebao yayun xinxi changtong he anquan], 10 November 
10.
    \91\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Bureau Head Wang 
Zuo'an Attends Summary Meeting for 10th-Year Anniversary of Islamic 
Scripture Interpretation Work and Gives Speech'' [Wang zuo'an juzhang 
chuxi yisilanjiao jiejing gongzuo shi zhou nian zongjie dahui bing 
jianghua], 4 May 11.
    \92\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Main Points of 
State Administration for Religious Affairs' 2011 Work'' [Guojia 
zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11.
    \93\ ``Our Country To Further Draft and Revise Accompanying 
Measures to `Regulations on Religious Affairs' '' [Woguo jiang jinyibu 
zhiding he xiuding ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' peitao banfa], Xinhua, 
reprinted in State Administration for Religious Affairs, 10 January 11.
    \94\ Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 11, 43; Measures 
Regarding Chinese Muslims Signing Up To Go Abroad on Pilgrimages (Trial 
Measures) [Zhongguo musilin chuguo chaojin baoming paidui banfa 
(shixing)], issued 16 June 05; Islamic Association of China, ed., 
Practical Pilgrimage Handbook for Chinese Muslims [Zhongguo musilin 
chaojin shiyong shouce], (Ningxia: Ningxia People's Press, 2005).
    \95\ Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 11.
    \96\ Islamic Association of China, ed., Practical Pilgrimage 
Handbook for Chinese Muslims [Zhongguo musilin chaojin shiyong shouce], 
(Ningxia: Ningxia People's Press, 2005), 106-7, 120-21.
    \97\ Islamic Association of China, ``2010 Training Class for Hajj 
Leader Personnel and Imams Opens in Lanzhou'' [2010 niandu chaojin 
daidui renyuan, daidui yimamu peixunban zai lanzhou juxing], 10 October 
10.
    \98\ See examples that follow as well as, e.g., Lan Congshan, 
Shaoyang City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission, ``Discussion on 
Problems and Countermeasures in Extant Problems in Managing Religious 
Affairs in Accordance With Law'' [Qianlun yifa guanli zongjiao shiwu 
zhong cunzai de wenti yu duice], reprinted in Hunan Religious Affairs 
Bureau, 22 October 10; Tongxin County People's Political Consultative 
Conference Office, ``People's Political Consultative Conference Work 
Report'' [Zhengxie gongzuo baogao], reprinted in Tongxin County 
People's Government, 6 January 11.
    \99\ Xiao Hong, Dawukou District People's Government, ``Changcheng 
Neighborhood Committee Office News on Ethnicity and Religion'' 
[Changcheng jiedao banshichu minzu zongjiao xinxi], 19 September 10.
    \100\ Taojiang County Islamic Association, ``Carry Out Activities 
in Accordance With Laws and Stipulations, Strive To Create Harmonious 
Model Mosques'' [Yifa yigui kaizhan huodong nuli chuangjian hexie mofan 
qingzhensi], reprinted in Hunan Religious Affairs Bureau, 11 November 
10.
    \101\ Changde City People's Government, ``City Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Bureau: Create Satisfied Mechanisms, Adhere to Service, Promote 
Development, Demand Stability'' [Shi minzu zongjiao shiwuju: chuang 
manyi jiguan yi fuwu cu fazhan qiu wending], 22 December 10.
    \102\ Huangpu District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 
``Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau Summary of 2010 Emergency Work 
and 2011 Work Plan'' [Minzongju 2010 nian yingji gongzuo zongjie 2011 
nian gongzuo jihua], reprinted in Huangpu District People's Government, 
25 November 10.
    \103\ The 2010 Blue Book of Religions, published by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, estimates that there are over 23 million 
Protestants in China and 55,000 sites of worship, including 
approximately 24,000 churches and 31,000 ``gathering sites'' (juhui 
dian). `` `Annual Report on China's Religiions (2010),' Report on 
China's Census of Protestants'' [``Zhongguo zongjiao baogao 2010'' 
zhongguo jidu jiao ruhu wenjuan diaocha baogao], in Blue Book of 
Religions: Annual Report on China's Religions (2010), Institute of 
World Religions, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (August 2010), 
article reprinted in State Administration for Religious Affairs, 18 
August 10; Li Guang, ``Religion White Paper Announces Over 55,000 
Churches'' [Zongjiao baipishu gongbu you 55000 yu tangdian], Phoenix 
Weekly, 15 October 10, 50. Estimates from official Chinese sources 
often do not include Protestants who worship outside of the state-
controlled church, and the 23 million figure likely does not reflect 
the size of China's unregistered Protestant community. In an interview 
with the BBC, Wang Zuo'an, director of China's State Administration for 
Religious Affairs, reportedly told a journalist that at least 20 
million Protestants worship in China's state-controlled church. 
Christopher Landau, ``China Invests in Confident Christians,'' BBC, 23 
August 10.
    \104\ Many of the estimates that fall in the 50-70 million range 
appear to stem from numbers published by the Pew Research Center. See, 
e.g., Brian Grim, Pew Research Center, ``Religion in China on the Eve 
of the 2008 Beijing Olympics,'' 7 May 08; Michael Gerson, ``A Founding 
Document for a New China,'' Washington Post, 12 May 11; Stephanie 
Samuel, ``Chinese House Churches Petition for Religious Freedom,'' 
Christian Post, 9 May 11. Some other sources appear to have arrived at 
these numbers independently. See, e.g., Rodney Stark et al., ``Counting 
China's Christians,'' First Things, 1 May 11; Verna Yu, ``Test of 
Faith,'' South China Morning Post, 8 May 11.
    \105\ For example, Yu Jianrong of the Rural Development Institute 
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimates that there are 
between 45 and 60 million unregistered Protestants in China. Yu 
Jianrong, China Institute of Strategy and Management, ``Yu Jianrong: 
Research on the Legalization of China's Protestant House Churches'' [Yu 
jianrong: zhongguo jidu jiao jiating jiaohui hefahua yanjiu], 2010. 
Based on information collected among Christians in China, a 2010 study 
by Asia Harvest--an inter-denominational Christian ministry that works 
in various countries throughout Asia--estimates that there are 
approximately 103 million Christians in China, although this figure 
likely includes both Protestants and Catholics. [See Catholicism in 
this section for more information on the size of China's Catholic 
community.] Paul Hattaway and Joy Hattaway, Asia Harvest, ``Answering 
the Question: How Many Christians Are in China Today? '' Asia Harvest 
Newsletter, No. 106, October 2010. The South China Morning Post 
estimates that the number of unregistered Protestants could be as high 
as 120 million. Nicola Davidson, ``Suspension of Disbelief,'' South 
China Morning Post, 7 November 10.
    \106\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36.
    \107\ The term in Chinese is shenxue sixiang jianshe. See, e.g., Du 
Qinglin, ``Du Qinglin: Remarks at the Chinese Protestant Three-Self 
Patriotic Movement's 60th Anniversary Celebration'' [Du qinglin: zai 
zhongguo jidu jiao sanzi aiguo yundong 60 zhounian qingzhu dahui shang 
de jiang hua], China Religion, 8 November 10; State Administration for 
Religious Affairs, ``Vice Director Jiang Jianyong Attends Amity 
Foundation's 25th Anniversary and Speaks at the Ceremony To Celebrate 
the Printing of 80 Million Bibles'' [Jiang jiangyong fu juzhang chuxi 
aide jijinhui chengli ershiwu zhounian qingdian bing zai yinshua 
shengjing baqianwan ce qingdian yishi shang zhici], 10 November 10; 
Yang Xuelian, China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic 
Movement, ``Hebei Provincial China Christian Council and Three-Self 
Patriotic Movement Hold `Harmonious Outlook' Theological Reconstruction 
Conference'' [Hebei sheng jidu jiao liang hui juban ``hexie guan'' 
shenxue sixiang jianshe yantaohui], 9 December 10; Qingdao Municipal 
Three-Self Patriotic Movement and Qingdao Municipal China Christian 
Council, ``Qingdao Municipal Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic 
Movement Hold Theological Reconstruction Conference'' [Qingdao shi jidu 
jiao liang hui juxing shenxue sixiang jianshe yantaohui], reprinted in 
China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic Movement, 15 December 
10. For more information on theological reconstruction, see CECC, 2009 
Annual Report, 10 October 09, 132-35; ``Official Protestant Church 
Politicizes Pastoral Training, `Reconstructs' Theology,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \108\ The charters of the TSPM and CCC list among each 
organization's duties: ``Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the People's Government, to unite all the country's 
Protestants; to fervently love socialism and the motherland; to respect 
the country's Constitution, laws, regulations, and policies; [and] to 
proactively participate in the construction of a socialist society with 
Chinese characteristics.'' Three-Self Patriotic Movement, Charter of 
the National Committee of Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the 
Protestant Churches in China [Zhongguo jidu jiao sanzi aiguo yundong 
weiyuanhui zhangcheng], passed 12 January 08, art. 6(1); China 
Christian Council, Charter of the China Christian Council [Zhongguo 
jidu jiao xiehui zhangcheng], passed 12 January 08, art. 7(1).
    \109\ Nicola Davison, ``Suspension of Disbelief,'' South China 
Morning Post, 7 November 10.
    \110\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Vice 
Director Jiang Jianyong Attends Amity Foundation's 25th Anniversary and 
Speaks at the Ceremony To Celebrate the Printing of 80 Million Bibles'' 
[Jiang jianyong fu juzhang chuxi aide jijinhui chengli ershiwu zhounian 
qingdian bing zai yinshua shengjing baqianwan ce qingdian yishi shang 
zhici], 10 November 10.
    \111\ See, e.g., Du Qinglin, ``Du Qinglin: Remarks at the Chinese 
Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement's 60th Anniversary 
Celebration'' [Du qinglin: zai zhongguo jidu jiao sanzi aiguo yundong 
60 zhounian qingzhu dahui shang de jiang hua], China Religion, 8 
November 10. The phrase that Du used is ``jidu jiao jin yi bu yu 
shehuizhuyi shehui xiang shiying.''
    \112\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Main Points of 
State Administration for Religious Affairs' 2011 Work'' [Guojia 
zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11. A 2010 
article in China Religion, an official SARA publication, that 
summarizes the content of a meeting to discuss SARA's work in 2010 did 
not mention this policy, although a January 24, 2011, SARA report 
states that authorities did make efforts to ``guide'' unregistered 
Protestants to worship in state-controlled churches in 2010. ``Meeting 
on National Religious Work Held in Beijing'' [Quanguo zongjiao gongzuo 
huiyi zai jing juxing], China Religion, Issue 1, No. 122, 2010; State 
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Report on the Situation of the 
State Administration for Religious Affairs' 2010 Work'' [Guojia 
zongjiao shiwu ju 2010 nian gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 24 January 11.
    \113\ ``House Churches Cannot Politicize Religion,'' Global Times, 
11 April 11; ``Editorial: Individual Churches Should Avoid Letting 
Themselves [Become] Politicized'' [Sheping: gebie jiaohui yao bimian 
rang ziji zhengzhihua], Global Times, 26 April 11.
    \114\ ``English Edition of Global Times Launched,'' China Daily, 20 
April 09.
    \115\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 
18, 20.
    \116\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, arts. 18, 21.
    \117\ See the RRA generally for provisions defining the scope of 
state control over various internal affairs of religious groups. For 
detailed analysis of specific articles, see, e.g., ``Zhejiang and Other 
Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9-10.
    \118\ For other examples, see ``Beijing Police Oppress 
Congregation, Targeted at He Depu'' [Zhendui he depu beijing jingfang 
daya jiaoyou juhui], Radio Free Asia, 31 January 11; ChinaAid, ``Anhui 
and Shandong Oppress House Church and Three-Self Patriotic Movement 
Church'' [Anhui shandong shengdan qijian bipo jiating jiaohui he sanzi 
jiaohui], 29 December 10; ChinaAid, ``Beijing Church Blocked by Police, 
Christians Taken Away'' [Beijing yi jiaohui bei jingcha zuzhi jidu tu 
bei daizou], 30 January 11; ChinaAid, ``More Reports of Christmas 
Persecutions of House Church Christians,'' 30 December 10; ChinaAid, 
``Police Detain Two House Church Pastors; Pastor Bike and Wife Under 
Informal House Arrest,'' 23 April 11; ``Jiangsu Pastor Placed Under 
Soft Detention, Money Stolen, Beaten; Head of House Church Forced To 
Travel'' [Jiangsu mushi zao ruanjin qiang qian ji ouda, jiating jiaohui 
huizhang bei qiangzhi luyou], 10 March 11; ``Yancheng Church, Jiangsu, 
Attacked While Worshiping, Officials Close Off Church'' [Jiangsu 
yancheng jiaohui chongbai zao chongji, guanfang fengsuo jiaotang], 
Radio Free Asia, 1 February 11; ``Government Interferes With Activities 
of House Church Networks in Late 2010 and 2011,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.
    \119\ See, e.g., ``Persecution Mounts Against the Church of 
Shouwang,'' AsiaNews, 16 May 11; ``Beijing Police Disperse House Church 
Easter Gathering'' [Beijing jingfang qusan shouwang jiaohui fuhuojie 
juhui], BBC, 24 April 11; Alexa Olesen, ``Beijing Police Halt 
Unapproved Church Service,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 10 
April 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Announcement of Beijing Shouwang 
Church Regarding the May 29 Outdoor Worship Service,'' reprinted in 
ChinaAid, 1 June 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Beijing Shouwang Church 
Announcement on May 15th Outdoor Worship Service,'' reprinted in 
ChinaAid, 18 May 11; Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Beijing Shouwang Church 
May 22 Outdoor Worship Bulletin'' [Beijing shouwang jiaohui 5 yue 22 ri 
huwai jingbai tongbao], reprinted in ChinaAid, 24 May 11; Beijing 
Shouwang Church, ``Beijing Shouwang Church May 29 Outdoor Worship 
Bulletin'' [Beijing shouwang jiaohui 5 yue 29 ri huwai jingbai 
tongbao], reprinted in ChinaAid, 30 May 11; ChinaAid, ``500 Shouwang 
Church Christians Under House Arrest in Beijing on Easter Sunday, More 
Than 30 in Police Custody,'' 24 April 11; ChinaAid, ``At Least 31 
Members of Shouwang Church Taken Away This Morning'' [Jintian zaochen 
zhishao 31 ming shouwang jiaohui chengyuan bei zhuazou], 1 May 11; 
ChinaAid, ``Beijing Police Release Nearly All Shouwang Church 
Detainees, Pastor and Two Others Still in Custody,'' 11 April 11; 
ChinaAid, ``Latest Update--3: Beijing Shouwang Church May 8, 2011, 
Outdoor Worship Gathering Continues To Suffer Oppression'' [Zuixin 
dongtai--3: beijing shouwang jiaohui 2011 nian 5 yue 8 ri de huwai 
juhui jixu zaoshou bipo], 10 May 11; ChinaAid, ``Persecution of 
Shouwang Church Members Continues for Fifth Sunday,'' 8 May 11; 
ChinaAid, ``Week 6: Police Detain 20 Shouwang Church Members, Put 100 
Under House Arrest,'' 15 May 11; ``China Detains Protestant Shouwang 
Devotees,'' BBC, 24 April 11; Alexa Olesen, ``Underground Beijing 
Church Members Detained,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 17 
April 11; ``Fears of New Crackdown as 160 Christians Held,'' South 
China Morning Post, 11 April 11; Jo Ling Kent, ``Church Officials: 
Chinese Authorities Block Easter Service in Beijing,'' CNN, 24 April 
11; Li Ya, ``Under Pressure, Beijing Shouwang Church Faces a Crisis'' 
[Zhong ya zhi xia, beijing shouwang jiaohui mianlin xin weiji], Voice 
of America, 6 June 11; Louisa Lim, ``China Cracks Down on Christians at 
Outdoor Service,'' National Public Radio, 11 April 11; Nicola Davidson, 
``Chinese Christianity Will Not Be Crushed,'' Guardian, 24 May 11; P. 
Simpson, ``Several Hundred Chinese Protestants Under Home Confinement 
on Easter, 40 People Detained'' [Shu bai zhongguo jidu tu fuhuojie zao 
ruanjin 40 ren bei ju], Voice of America, 24 April 11; Verna Yu, ``Four 
Leaders Go in Church Split,'' South China Morning Post, 6 June 11; 
Verna Yu, ``Police Round Up 27 Christians,'' South China Morning Post, 
23 May 11; Verna Yu, ``Police Round Up Pastors, Christians for a Second 
Time,'' South China Morning Post, 18 April 11; Yan Yan, ``Beijing 
Police Take Away Over 100 Underground Church Believers'' [Beijing 
jingfang daizou 100 duo ming dixia jiaohui xintu], Deutsche Welle, 11 
April 11; Wang Zhicheng, ``More Arrests, More Persecution for Shouwang 
Underground Christians,'' AsiaNews, 9 May 11; Zhang Nan, ``Beijing 
Shouwang Church Members Detained Again'' [Beijing shouwang jiaohui 
chengyuan zai zao kouya], Voice of America, 1 May 11; ``Beijing 
Authorities Harass, Detain, and Restrict the Freedom of Movement of 
Shouwang Church Members,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
1 July 11.
    \120\ Chris Buckley and Sui-Lee Wee, ``Beijing Church Faces 
Eviction in Tense Times,'' Reuters, 3 April 11.
    \121\ Beijing Shouwang Church, ``An Explanation of the Issue of 
Worshiping Outside'' [Huwai jingbai wenti jieda], 4 April 11; Beijing 
Shouwang Church, ``Beijing Shouwang Church March 2011 Open Letter to 
Congregation'' [Beijing shouwang jiaohui 11 nian 3 yue gao huizhong 
shu], 27 March 11; Chris Buckley and Sui-Lee Wee, ``Beijing Church 
Faces Eviction in Tense Times,'' Reuters, 3 April 11; Verna Yu, ``Fears 
of More Pressure on Underground Churches,'' South China Morning Post, 1 
April 11.
    \122\ ``Beijing Police Halt Unapproved Church Service,'' Associated 
Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 10 April 11; ChinaAid, ``Beijing Police 
Release Nearly All Shouwang Church Detainees, Pastor and Two Others 
Still in Custody,'' 11 April 11; ``Fears of New Crackdown as 160 
Christians Held,'' South China Morning Post, 11 April 11; Louisa Lim, 
``China Cracks Down on Christians at Outdoor Service,'' National Public 
Radio, 11 April 11; Yan Yan, ``Beijing Police Take Away Over 100 
Underground Church Believers'' [Beijing jingfang daizou 100 duo ming 
dixia jiaohui xintu], Deutsche Welle, 11 April 11.
    \123\ ``36 Detained at Shouwang Church Outdoor Worship'' [Shouwang 
jiaohui huwai jingbai 36 ren bei bu], Radio Free Asia, 25 April 11; 
Brian Spegele, ``Beijing Police Detain Group of Christians,'' Wall 
Street Journal, 25 April 11; Jo Ling Kent, ``Church Officials: Chinese 
Authorities Block Easter Service in Beijing,'' CNN, 24 April 11; 
Michael Foust, ``4th Week: China Arrests 30 Church Members,'' Baptist 
Press, 2 May 11; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 
``Easter Detentions Show Need for Religious Freedom Priority in U.S.-
China Relations,'' 27 April 11.
    \124\ Alexa Olesen, ``Beijing Police Halt Unapproved Church 
Service,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 10 April 11; Beijing 
Shouwang Church, ``Beijing Shouwang Church April 24 Easter Outdoor 
Worship Bulletin'' [Beijing shouwang jiaohui 4 yue 24 ri fuhuo jie 
huwai jingbai tongbao], 25 April 11; Liu Jianghe, ``Pastor Li Xiaobai 
of the Beijing Shouwang Church and His Wife Released, Still No Place To 
Go for Worship'' [Shouwang jiaohui li xiaobai mushi shifang, jingbai 
changsuo yiran wu zhuoluo], China Free Press, 13 April 11.
    \125\ Beijing Shouwang Church, ``Beijing Pastors' Joint Prayer 
Meeting Prays for Beijing Shouwang Church (4)'' [Beijing jiaomu liandao 
hui wei beijing shouwang jiao hui daidao (4)], reprinted in ChinaAid, 
29 April 11.
    \126\ ``49 Detained in Raid on China Underground Church,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 11 May 11; ChinaAid, ``During 
the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Chinese House Church 
Alliance Bible Study Attacked, 49 Detained'' [Zhongmei jingji zhanlue 
duihua qijian, zhonguo jiating jiaohui lianhe hui de shengjing peixun 
zao chongji, 49 bei zhuabu], 11 May 11; ``Korean Bible Instructor Held 
Following Raid on Underground Chinese Church Gathering,'' Associated 
Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 11 May 11; ``Multiple Members of 
Underground Church in Henan Detained at Once'' [Henan duo ming dixia 
jiaohui chengyuan yidu bei jubu], Deutsche Welle, 11 May 11; 
``Zhengzhou Public Security Attacks Church, Detains 49, Three Korean 
Pastors and Two People Pursued and Detained'' [Zhengzhou gong'an 
chongji jiaohui ju 49 ren, hanguo san mushi liang ren zao zhuyi juliu], 
Radio Free Asia, 11 May 11.
    \127\ ChinaAid, ``Police Detain Two House Church Pastors; Pastor 
Bike and Wife Under Informal House Arrest,'' 23 April 11; ChinaAid, 
``Police Surround a Shandong House Church, Detain Seven,'' 17 April 11; 
ChinaAid, ``Zaozhuang, Shandong House Church Leader Taken Into 
Custody'' [Shandong zaozhuang jiating jiaohui lingxiu bei zhua], 16 
April 11; ChinaAid, ``Zaozhuang, Shandong Province, House Church 
Oppressed (Update), Cangshan County Also Detaining Believers'' 
[Shandong sheng zaozhuang jiating jiaohui zaoshou bipo (gengxin), 
cangshan xian ye zai zhua xintu], 17 April 11; ``Seven Followers in 
Shandong, Even Car, Are Detained, Shaanxi Police Block Medical 
Treatment for Pastor After Beating Him'' [Shandong jiaotu qi ren lian 
che zao kouya, shaan jing da mushi hou geng zu jiuzhi], Radio Free 
Asia, 21 April 11.
    \128\ ``49 Detained in Raid on China Underground Church,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo!, 11 May 11; ChinaAid, ``During 
the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Chinese House Church 
Alliance Bible Study Attacked, 49 Detained'' [Zhongmei jingji zhanlue 
duihua qijian, zhonguo jiating jiaohui lianhe hui de shengjing peixun 
zao chongji, 49 bei zhuabu], 11 May 11; ``Korean Bible Instructor Held 
Following Raid on Underground Chinese Church Gathering,'' Associated 
Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 11 May 11; ``Multiple Members of 
Underground Church in Henan Detained at Once'' [Henan duo ming dixia 
jiaohui chengyuan yidu bei jubu], Deutsche Welle, 11 May 11; 
``Zhengzhou Public Security Attacks Church, Detains 49, Three Korean 
Pastors and Two People Pursued and Detained'' [Zhengzhou gong'an 
chongji jiaohui ju 49 ren, hanguo san jiaoshi liang ren zao zhuyi 
juliu], Radio Free Asia, 11 May 11.
    \129\ ChinaAid, ``Update: 49 House Church Leaders Released,'' 11 
May 11.
    \130\ ChinaAid, ``All Believers Detained in the May 10 Zhengzhou 
Church Incident and May 22 Hubei Oppression Incident Released'' [5-10 
zhengzhou jiao an he 5-22 hubei bipo an bei guanya xintu quanbu 
huoshi], 26 May 11.
    \131\ ChinaAid, ``Police Detain Two House Church Pastors; Pastor 
Bike and Wife Under Informal House Arrest,'' 23 April 11; ``Jiangsu 
Pastor Placed Under Home Confinement, Money Stolen, Beaten; Head of 
House Church Forced To Travel'' [Jiangsu mushi zao ruanjin qiang qian 
ji ouda, jiating jiaohui huizhang bei qiangzhi luyou], Radio Free Asia, 
10 March 11.
    \132\ ChinaAid, ``Christians Persecuted in Henan and Jiangsu,'' 7 
March 11; ``Jiangsu Pastor Placed Under Home Confinement, Money Stolen, 
Beaten; Head of House Church Forced To Travel'' [Jiangsu mushi zao 
ruanjin qiang qian ji ouda, jiating jiaohui huizhang bei qiangzhi 
luyou], Radio Free Asia, 10 March 11.
    \133\ ChinaAid, ``Persecution of House Churches Continues, Pastor 
Shi Enhao Criminally Detained'' [Bipo jiating jiaohui jixu jinxing, shi 
enhao mushi zao xingshi juliu], 5 July 11. ``Using superstition to 
undermine the implementation of the law'' is similar to the language of 
Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law. Article 300 also contains language 
about ``using a cult to undermine the implementation of the law,'' a 
charge commonly used against Falun Gong practitioners. PRC Criminal Law 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, 25 February 11, art. 300.
    \134\ ``Pastor Sent to Labor Camp,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 July 11.
    \135\ ChinaAid, ``ChinaAid Pays Attention to the Chinese 
Representatives to the Lausanne Congress Being Oppressed'' [Duihua 
yuanzhu xiehui guanzhu luosang huiyi zhongguo jiaohui daibiao shoudao 
daya], 11 October 10; ``Underground Churches Banned From Attending 
Overseas Gospel Conference, Authorities Allege Conference Is Anti-
China, Five Taken Into Custody at Beijing Airport'' [Dixia jiaohui jin 
fu haiwai fuyin hui, dangju zhi dahui she fanhua, beijing jichang kou 5 
ren], Ming Pao, 11 October 10. For more information, see also ``Chinese 
Authorities Prevent Protestants From Attending International 
Evangelization Conference,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 2.
    \136\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Main Points of 
State Administration for Religious Affairs' 2011 Work'' [Guojia 
zongjiao shiwu ju 2011 nian gongzuo yaodian], 24 January 11.
    \137\ Louisa Lim, ``Beijing Blocks Travelers to Christian 
Conference,'' National Public Radio, 14 October 10.
    \138\ ``Chinese Authorities Prohibit Many Human Rights Defenders 
From Leaving Country'' [Duo ming weiquan gongmin bei zhongguo dangju 
jinzhi chujing], Radio Free Asia, 3 August 10; ``Travel Bans for 
Activists,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 August 10.
    \139\ Fan is also a former researcher at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS). In November 2009, the Party secretary at CASS 
reportedly told Fan he would not be permitted to continue working at 
CASS after Fan attempted to provide legal aid to the Linfen-Fushan 
Church. See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Prominent Chinese Legal Researcher 
Abruptly Dismissed for `Political Reasons,' '' 3 November 09; CECC, 
2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 109-110.
    \140\ ChinaAid, ``Beijing Police Zero In on Holy Mountain 
Institute,'' 15 December 10; ``Chinese Authorities' Suppression of 
Civil Rights Activists Continues To Increase'' [Zhongguo dangju dui 
weiquan renshi daya buduan shengji], Radio Free Asia, 12 October 10. 
Fan reportedly has played an important role in promoting legal activism 
among members of house church congregations throughout China. See, 
e.g., ChinaAid, ``2010 Annual Report,'' 31 March 11, 3.
    \141\ ``Chinese Authorities' Suppression of Civil Rights Activists 
Continues To Increase'' [Zhongguo dangju dui weiquan renshi daya buduan 
shengji], Radio Free Asia, 12 October 10.
    \142\ ``Fan Yafeng, a Christian, Is Arrested, He Signed Charter 
08,'' AsiaNews, 26 November 10; ChinaAid, ``Detained Human Rights 
Lawyer Fan Yafeng Returns Home! '' 18 December 10; Verna Yu, ``Police 
Take Christian Leader, Family From Home,'' South China Morning Post, 26 
November 11.
    \143\ ChinaAid, ``Decision of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
High People's Court: Rejects Christian Alimjan's Request for 
Reconsideration'' [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhi qu gaoji renmin fayuan de 
caiding shu: bohui jidu tu alimujiang de shensu], 3 March 11.
    \144\ ChinaAid, ``Seminar on Alimujiang's Case and Governance of 
the Law on Guarding State Secrets,'' 18 November 10.
    \145\ Ibid.
    \146\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Christians Rally Around Underground 
Church,'' New York Times, 12 May 11.
    \147\ Xie Moshan and Li Tianen, ``We Are [Doing This] for Faith: A 
Citizen Petition Letter to the National People's Congress With Respect 
to the Political Conflict'' [Women shi weile xinyang: wei zhengzhi 
chongtu zhi quanguo renda de gongmin qingyuan shu], reprinted in 
ChinaAid, 12 May 11.
    \148\ Ibid.
    \149\ ChinaAid, ``More Reports of Christmas Persecutions of House 
Church Christians,'' 30 December 10.
    \150\ ChinaAid, ``Even Government Churches Face Official 
Persecution: Local Authorities Demolish TSPM Church,'' 22 November 10.
    \151\ ChinaAid, ``Registered Church in Jiangsu Province Demolished, 
Christians Beaten,'' 22 December 08. For more information, see ``State-
Sanctioned Church in Jiangsu Province Demolished,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 20 January 11.
    \152\ The word ``Taoism'' and its derivatives are also often 
spelled with a ``D'' instead of a ``T,'' e.g., ``Daoism'' or 
``Daoist.''
    \153\ Chinese Taoist Association, ``Basic Rules on First Chinese 
Taoist College Scripture Study Class Seeking Students'' [Zhongguo 
daojiao xueyuan shou jie jingdian jiangxi ban zhao sheng jianzhang], 23 
November 10. The document lists this requirement first, ahead of 
``upholding the standards of Taoism.''
    \154\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
``Congratulatory Letter to All Taoists in the Country'' [Zhi quanguo 
daojiao jie de hexin], 19 March 11.
    \155\ Chinese Taoist Association, ``Chinese Taoist Association 
Leadership Meeting Convenes in Beijing'' [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui 
huizhang huiyi zai jing zhaokai], 14 March 11.
    \156\ Article 4 of the Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) 
Constitution says that the State Administration for Religious Affairs 
is the ``administrative unit in charge of'' the CTA. Constitution of 
the Chinese Taoist Association [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui zhangcheng], 
passed 22 June 10, art. 4.
    \157\ See, e.g., Gongan County Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 
``Proactively Lead, Manage According to Law'' [Jiji yindao, yi fa 
guanli], 11 May 11; Xu Yun, Suzhou Municipal Local Records Office, 
``The Situation of I-Kuan Tao in Suzhou'' [Yidaoguan zai suzhou de 
qingkuang], 6 December 10. The Commission has not observed official 
definitions of the terms ``feudal'' or ``superstitious'' in reference 
to Taoist religious practices. For example, the 1998 Measures Regarding 
the Management of Taoist Temples uses the term ``feudal, superstitious 
activities'' but does not elaborate on the meaning of the term. Chinese 
Taoist Association, Measures Regarding the Management of Taoist Temples 
[Guanyu daojiao gongguan guanli banfa], adopted 24 August 98, effective 
September 98, arts. 6(6), 7(3). In addition, in at least some cases, 
authorities have asserted a link between what they deem to be 
``feudal'' or ``superstitious'' religious activities and what they deem 
to be ``cult'' activities. See, e.g., State Administration for 
Religious Affairs, ``The Genesis of and Defense Against Cults'' 
[Xiejiao de chansheng yu fangfan], 28 October 05. Authorities have 
invoked the term ``cult'' as a basis for restrictions on the freedom of 
religion of members of a variety of religious groups in China, 
including Falun Gong, groups of Protestant origin, and groups of 
Buddhist and Taoist origin. See, e.g., ChinaAid, ``Henan Police 
Unlawfully Fine, Sentence Believers to Labor Camps,'' 9 April 10; 
Ministry of Public Security, ``The Situation of Organizations Currently 
Recognized as Cults'' [Xian yi rending de xiejiao zuzhi qingkuang], 
reprinted in Zhengqi Net, 5 February 07; Verna Yu, ``Christians Held To 
Extort Cash, Say Wife, Lawyer,'' South China Morning Post, 29 June 10; 
``Members of Henan House Church Ordered To Serve Reeducation Through 
Labor,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 
November 10, 3; ``National Conferences Highlight Restrictions on 
Buddhist and Taoist Doctrine,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 4.
    \158\ Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 13-14, 24-25, 44.
    \159\ See, e.g., Ding Cai'an, Hunan Provincial Religious Affairs 
Bureau, ``Humble Remarks on the Current Situation of the Management of 
Folk Beliefs and Methods of Improvement'' [Minjian xinyang guanli 
xianzhuang yu gaijin fangfa de chuyi], 4 January 11; State 
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Summary of the Fifth Five-Year 
Plan Awareness Promotion Work of the Nationwide Religious Work System'' 
[Quanguo zongjiao gongzuo xitong ``wu wu'' pufa gongzuo zongjie], 22 
March 11; Tongan County Party Committee, ``Tongan District Convenes 
Special Work Meeting on Stopping the Indiscriminate Construction of 
Temples and Open-Air Religious Statues'' [Tongan qu zhaokai zhizhi luan 
jian simiao he lutian zongjiao zaoxiang zhuanxiang gongzuo huiyi], 11 
April 11.
    \160\ See, e.g., Chinese Taoist Association, ``Luofushan, Guangdong 
To Hold Taoist Cutlural Festival, Pray for a Prosperous Asian Games in 
Guangzhou'' [Guangdong luofushan jiang juban daojiao wenhua jie, qifu 
guangzhou yayun], 17 October 10; Chinese Taoist Association, ``Three 
Hundred Volunteers To Serve at 2010 Guangdong Inaugural Taoist 
Festival'' [300 zhiyuanzhe jiang fuwu 2010 guangdong shou jie daojiao 
wenhua jie], 29 October 10; Chinese Taoist Association, ``Guangdong 
Taoist Cultural Festival Opens on November 2 in Luofushan, Huizhou 
City'' [Guangdong daojiao wenhua jie 11 yue 2 ri zai huizhou shi 
luofushan kaimu], 2 November 10; State Administration for Religious 
Affairs, ``Vice Director Jiang Jianyong Attends 2010 Guangdong Taoist 
Festival Opening Ceremony and Religious Assembly for Praying for 
Fortune for the Asian Games'' [Jiang jianyong fu juzhang chuxi 2010 
guangdong daojiao wenhua jie kaimushi ji qifu yayun da fahui], 4 
November 10.
    \161\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Vice Director 
Jiang Jianyong Attends 2010 Guangdong Taoist Festival Opening Ceremony 
and Religious Assembly for Praying for Fortune for the Asian Games'' 
[Jiang jianyong fu juzhang chuxi 2010 guangdong daojiao wenhua jie 
kaimushi ji qifu yayun da fahui], 4 November 10.
    \162\ The revision removes a layer of approval and reporting 
previously required for religious schools to host foreign exchange 
students, bringing the regulation up to date with a 2004 directive that 
reduced administrative oversight in a variety of regulatory documents. 
State Administration for Religious Affairs Decree No. 9 [Guojia 
zongjiao shiwu ju ling di 9 hao], issued 29 November 10, effective 1 
January 11, citing State Council Decision Concerning Third Group of 
Items for Abolishing and Adjusting Administrative Examination and 
Approval [Guowuyuan guanyu di san pi quxiao he tiaozheng xingzheng 
shenpi xiangmu de jueding], issued 19 May 04; Detailed Implementing 
Rules for the Provisions on the Management of the Religious Activities 
of Foreigners Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei 
waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli guiding shishi xize], issued 11 
August 00, art. 14.
    \163\ Detailed Implementing Rules for the Provisions on the 
Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli 
guiding shishi xize], issued 11 August 00, art. 17(2), (5), (7), (8).
    \164\ The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, ``Statement 
From the First Presidency,'' 30 August 10; The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, ``Church in Talks To `Regularize' Activities in 
China,'' 30 August 10.
    \165\ See, e.g., Department for External Church Relations of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, ``Talks on Russian-Chinese Relations in 
Religious Sphere Held in Beijing,'' 17 November 09; State 
Administration for Religious Affairs, ``Vice-Director Jiang Jianyong 
Sees Delegation From the Presidential Council for Cooperation With 
Religious Organization'' [Jiang jianyong fujuzhang huijian eluosi 
zongtong zhishu de zongjiao tuanti hezuo weiyuanhui daibiaotuan 
yixing], 18 November 09; ``Beijing Visit of Moscow Patriarch May Revive 
Russian Orthodox Church in PRC,'' South China Morning Post, 7 July 06 
(Open Source Center, 7 July 06).
    \166\ At the provincial level, see Heilongjiang Regulation on the 
Management of Religious Affairs [Heilongjiang sheng zongjiao shiwu 
guanli tiaoli], issued 12 June 97, effective 1 July 97, art. 2; Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the Management of 
Venues for Religious Activity [Nei menggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong 
changsuo guanli shishi banfa], issued 23 January 96, art. 2.
    Notes to Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights

    \1\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, art. 27.
    \2\ See generally Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL) [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 
October 84, amended 28 February 01.
    \3\ Some scholars writing in English choose to leave the term minzu 
untranslated. See, e.g., Gardner Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han 
Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,'' East-West Center 
Washington 2004, Policy Studies 11, 49 (endnote 4); Jonathan N. Lipman, 
Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China, (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1997), xx-xxv. This section uses 
``ethnic minorities'' both to refer to the status of such groups as 
defined in international human rights instruments and in reference to 
PRC categorizations of shaoshu minzu. While recognizing the problems 
associated with rendering the term minzu into English, this paper 
follows the PRC government's and media's current use of ``ethnicity'' 
when referring to minzu in English-language publications and in the 
official name of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (guojia minzu 
shiwu weiyuanhui).
    \4\ See, e.g., State Ethnic Affairs Commission, ``Ethnic Policies, 
Laws, and Regulations Continuously Gain New Developments'' [Minzu 
zhengce fagui gongzuo buduan qude xin fazhan], 28 December 10; State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission, ``Do Well in Summing Up, Persisting in, and 
Developing the 90 Years of Successful Experiences of Our Party's Ethnic 
Work'' [Zongjie hao, jianchi hao, fazhan hao women dang minzu gongzuo 
90 nian de chenggong jingyan], Seeking Truth, 16 June 11.
    \5\ State Ethnic Affairs Commission, ``Do Well in Summing Up, 
Persisting in, and Developing the 90 Years of Successful Experiences of 
Our Party's Ethnic Work'' [Zongjie hao, jianchi hao, fazhan hao women 
dang minzu gongzuo 90 nian de chenggong jingyan], Seeking Truth, 16 
June 11.
    \6\ State Ethnic Affairs Commission, ``Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
(2011-2015) on the Construction of a System of Ethnic Legal 
Institutions'' [Minzu fazhi tixi jianshe shi er wu guihua (2011-2015 
nian)], 11 August 11.
    \7\ Ibid., item 2(5).
    \8\ State Council Information Office, ``National Human Rights 
Action Plan of China (2009-2010),'' reprinted in Xinhua, 13 April 09, 
III(1).
    \9\ For reviews of developments in the area of ethnic minority 
rights during periods that the National Human Rights Action Plan was 
applicable, see, e.g., Yu Xiaojie, ``Uphold a People-Centered Approach 
and Revel in the Light of Human Rights--Roundup at the Midpoint of the 
`National Human Rights Action Plan (2009-2010),' '' Xinhua, 4 December 
09 (Open Source Center, 13 December 09); State Council Information 
Office, ``White Paper on Progress in China's Human Rights in 2009'' 
[2009 nian zhongguo renquan shiye de jinzhan], reprinted in Xinhua, 26 
September 10, sec. V; State Council Information Office, ``Assessment 
Report on the National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010),'' 
Xinhua, 14 July 11, IV(1); Human Rights Watch, ``Promises Unfulfilled: 
An Assessment of China's National Human Rights Action Plan,'' January 
2011, 47-50.
    \10\ For more information on development projects in past years, 
see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263-64, 282-88; 
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 207-208, 222-24.
    \11\ See, e.g., ``Published Excerpts of Main Points of `Central 
Committee of the Communist Party and State Council Opinions on 
Deepening Implementation of the Great Western Development Strategy' '' 
[``Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenru shishi xibu da kaifa 
zhanlue de ruogan yijian'' yaodian zhaideng], Zhongwei Daily, reprinted 
in Zhongwei People's Government, 23 August 10; ``Chinese Leaders Call 
for More Efforts To Develop West,'' Xinhua, 6 July 10; ``China's 
Western Region Development Plan a Dual Strategy,'' Xinhua, 8 July 10.
    \12\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 18, sec. 5.
    \13\ For information on grasslands policy in earlier years, see, 
e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 148-149, 194. See this 
section for information on the impact of these policies on minority 
groups that practice pastoralism.
    \14\ ``State Council Researches and Deploys Policies and Measures 
To Promote Sound and Fast Development of Pastoral Areas'' [Guowuyuan 
yanjiu bushu cujin muqu you hao you kuai fazhan de zhengce cuoshi], 
Xinhua, 6 April 11.
    \15\ State Council Opinions on Promoting Sound and Fast Development 
of Pastoral Areas [Guowuyuan guanyu cujin muqu you hao you kuai fazhan 
de ruogan yijian], issued 1 June 11. For additional information, see 
also ``National Conference on Work Regarding Pastoral Areas Is Convened 
in Hulunbuir'' [Quanguo muqu gongzuo huiyi zai hulunbei'er zhaokai], 
Inner Mongolia Daily, reprinted in Inner Mongolia News Net, 13 August 
11.
    \16\ State Council Opinions on Promoting Sound and Fast Development 
of Pastoral Areas [Guowuyuan guanyu cujin muqu you hao you kuai fazhan 
de ruogan yijian], issued 1 June 11, items 6, 7, 11, 19, 21.
    \17\ Gregory Veeck and Charles Emerson, ``Develop the West 
Assessed: Economic and Environmental Change in Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China 2000-2005,'' Asian 
Geographer, Vol. 25, Nos. 1 and 2 (2006), 61 (based on information on 
page 13 of pre-publication article on file with the Commission); 
China's Ethnic Regional Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights? 
Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 
April 05, Testimony of Christopher P. Atwood, Associate Professor, 
Department of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University; Dee Mack 
Williams, Beyond Great Walls (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2002), 40-60; Qiu Lin, ``Scholars Urge Improving Grassland Policies,'' 
Xinhua, 31 July 09.
    \18\ See generally Human Rights Watch, `` `No One Has the Liberty 
to Refuse': Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, 
Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region,'' June 2007; Human Rights in 
China, ``China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising 
Tensions,'' 2007, 14; Henry Sanderson, ``Traditions Fade as China 
Settles Nomads in Towns,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Seattle 
Times, 4 October 09.
    \19\ See information that follows and, e.g., Southern Mongolian 
Human Rights Information Center, ``Herders Take to the Streets, Four 
Arrested,'' 23 May 11; Andrew Jacobs, ``Anger Over Protesters' Deaths 
Leads to Intensified Demonstrations by Mongolians,'' New York Times, 30 
May 11; ``Clampdown in Inner Mongolia,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 May 11; 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Public Security Department, ``Public 
Security Department Holds News Conference, Shares Information on 
Situations Regarding Xilingol `5.11' and `5.15' Incidents and Public 
Security Organs Cracking the Cases'' [Gonganting juxing xinwen fabuhui 
tongbao xilingguolei meng ``5.11,'' ``5.15'' anjian qingkuang he gongan 
jiguan zhenpo qingkuang], 29 May 11. See analysis in ``Mongols Protest 
in Inner Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands Use, Mining 
Operations,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.
    \20\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 
``Protests Spread in Southern Mongolia, Thousands More Take to the 
Streets,'' 26 May 11; Andrew Jacobs, ``Anger Over Protesters' Deaths 
Leads to Intensified Demonstrations by Mongolians,'' New York Times, 30 
May 11.
    \21\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 
``Many Detained, Some Fled After Protests in Southern Mongolia,'' 17 
June 11; ``Clampdown in Inner Mongolia,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 May 11.
    \22\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 
``Many Detained, Some Fled After Protests in Southern Mongolia,'' 17 
June 11; Christopher Bodeen, ``China's Response to Latest Unrest 
Follows Pattern,'' Associated Press, reprinted in ABC News, 1 June 11.
    \23\ See, e.g., ``China Says Foreigners Stir Inner Mongolia 
Unrest,'' BBC, 31 May 11; Dan Martin, ``China Clamps Down on Inner 
Mongolia To Quash Demos,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Yahoo!, 
30 May 11; ``Putting Mongolian Protests Into Context,'' Global Times, 
31 May 11. See additional information in ``Mongols Protest in Inner 
Mongolia After Clashes Over Grasslands Use, Mining Operations,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 July 11.
    \24\ ``Driver Sentenced to Death for Killing Mongol Herder,'' 
Xinhua, reprinted in China Internet Information Center, 8 June 11; 
``Forklift Driver Sentenced to Death Over Murder,'' Xinhua, reprinted 
in China Internet Information Center, 21 June 11.
    \25\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``New 
Round of Herders' Protest Erupts in Southern (Inner) Mongolia,'' 29 
June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Fresh 
Protest by Mongolian Herders, Dozens Hospitalized,'' 23 July 11.
    \26\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 
``Hada Is Still Held in a Secret Prison, Wife and Son Formally 
Arrested,'' 5 May 11; Amnesty International, ``China: Fear of 
Disappearance of Activist and Family: Hada,'' 7 January 11; Southern 
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Detention of Mongolian 
Dissident Hada and Family Reaches New Level of Human Rights 
Violation,'' 27 December 10; Southern Mongolian Human Rights 
Information Center, ``Official Met with Relative, but Dissident's 
Whereabouts Undisclosed,'' 14 December 10; Southern Mongolian Human 
Rights Information Center, ``Release Date Passed and Ethnic Mongolian 
Political Prisoner's Status Unclear While Wife and Son Remain Under 
Detention,'' 11 December 10.
    \27\ See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for 
additional information.
    \28\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Hada Is 
Still Held in a Secret Prison, Wife and Son Formally Arrested,'' 5 May 
11.
    \29\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 
``Mongolian Dissident Writer Huuchinhuu Gone Missing,'' 8 February 11; 
Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Hada's Wife and 
Son Detained as Scheduled Release Approaches,'' 4 December 10; Southern 
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Southern Mongolian 
Dissident Detained and Put under House Arrest,'' 16 November 10.
    \30\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Deported 
United Nations Refugee Applicant Batzangaa Tried in China,'' 17 January 
11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Batzangaa, a 
UN Refugee Status Applicant, Sentenced to 3-Year Jail Term in China,'' 
30 January 11.
    \31\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 
``Principal of Mongol-Tibetan Medical School Arrested in Mongolia by 
Chinese Police,'' 19 October 09; Southern Mongolian Human Rights 
Information Center, ``Interview With Batzangaa: Striking Details on How 
Mongolia and China Cooperate to Deport a Southern (Inner) Mongolian 
Exile Back to China,'' 30 January 11.
    \32\ Ibid.
    \33\ ``Inner Mongolia Writer Unaga Secretly Detained for Publishing 
New Book'' [Neimeng zuojia wunaga ni chuban xinshu zao mimi daibu], 
Radio Free Asia, 19 January 11; ``Mongol Writer Unaga Secretly Arrested 
in Inner Mongolia'' [Mongghul yazghuchisi unaga ichki mongghulda mexpiy 
tutuldi], Radio Free Asia, 18 January 11; Southern Mongolian Human 
Rights Information Center, ``Southern Mongolian Dissident Writer, 
Author of `Forefront of Independence' Arrested and Detained,'' 23 
January 11.
    \34\ James Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
People, ``Cases Examined by the Special Rapporteur (June 2009-July 
2010),'' A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, 15 September 10.
    Notes to Section II--Population Planning

    \1\ The population planning policy was first launched in 1979, 
canonized as a ``fundamental state policy'' in 1982, and codified as 
national law in 2002. As of 2007, 19 of China's 31 provincial-level 
jurisdictions--accounting for 53.6 percent of China's population--allow 
rural dwellers to have a second child if their first child is a girl. 
Gu Baochang et al, ``China's Local and National Fertility Policies at 
the End of the Twentieth Century,'' 33 Population and Development 
Review 133, 138 (2007). Other exceptions to the one-child rule vary by 
provincial-level jurisdiction, and include some exceptions for ethnic 
minorities. See ``The Origin of China's Current Birth Policy'' 
[Zhongguo xianxing shengyu zhengce youlai], China Net, 18 April 08; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My Own 
Body,'' 21 December 10, 6. According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 
``In 1984, the Central Committee issued a document outlining its 
`current family planning policy,' which stated that rural residents 
with one daughter could have a second child, while ethnic minorities 
could have between two and four children. Since then, even more 
exceptions to the original `one-child' rule have been added by local 
governments. These exceptions are numerous, detailed and differ across 
the country. For example, the Shandong Provincial Population and Family 
Planning Regulations lists 14 circumstances in which couples are 
permitted to have more than one child.''
    \2\ This number is based on Commission analysis of population 
planning measures. These jurisdictions include Tianjin, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, Shandong, Fujian, Hebei, Hubei, Chongqing, Shaanxi, 
Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Xinjiang, Henan, Qinghai, Jiangxi, Sichuan, 
Guangxi, Anhui, Gansu, Yunnan, and Guizhou. For two specific examples, 
see ``Revised `Guangdong Province Population and Family Planning 
Regulations' Published'' [Xiuding hou de ``guangdong sheng renkou yu 
jihua shengyu tiaoli'' gongbu], Guangzhou Beiyun District Zhongloutian 
Public Information Net, 29 June 09; ``Jiangxi Province Population and 
Family Planning Regulations'' [Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu 
tiaoli], Jiangxi News Net, 11 April 09; Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ``Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices--2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 
25 February 09, 6. The Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning 
Commission clearly draws the link between the term ``remedial 
measures'' and abortion: ``early term abortion refers to the use of 
surgery or pharmaceutics to terminate a pregnancy before the 12th week 
of gestation, it is a remedial measure taken after the failure of 
contraception.'' See Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning 
Commission, ``Early Term Abortion'' [Zaoqi rengong liuchan], 10 April 
09.
    \3\ Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), para. 17. 
The Beijing declaration states, ``The explicit recognition and 
reaffirmation of the right of all women to control all aspects of their 
health, in particular their own fertility, is basic to their 
empowerment.'' Cairo International Conference on Population and 
Development, para. 7.2. The Cairo International Conference on 
Population and Development states, ``Reproductive health . . . implies 
. . . that people are able to have . . . the capability to reproduce 
and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so. Implicit in 
this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed and 
to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of 
family planning of their choice . . . .'' On the concept of ``illegal 
pregnancy'' and its use in practice, see Elina Hemminki et al., 
``Illegal Births and Legal Abortions--The Case of China,'' Reproductive 
Health, Vol. 2, No. 5 (2005).
    \4\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, 
effective 1 September 02, art. 18. According to Article 18, ``The State 
maintains its current policy for reproduction, encouraging late 
marriage and childbearing and advocating one child per couple. Where 
the requirements specified by laws and regulations are met, plans for a 
second child, if requested, may be made.'' Implementing regulations in 
different provinces vary on the ages at which couples may give birth 
and the number of children they are permitted to have. See Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My Own Body,'' 21 
December 10, 6-7.
    \5\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My 
Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 18-19. See, e.g., Pan Lihua, Qingdao 
Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, ``Shinan District: 
Spare No Efforts in Completing Population Planning, Welcome Inspection 
Work'' [Shinanqu: quanli yifu zuohao jisheng ying jian gongzuo], 16 
November 10; Zhu Xiulin, Xiushui County Government, ``[Xiushui] County 
Plans To Deploy 2011 New Year Spring Family Planning Service 
Activities'' [Wo xian anpai bushu 2011 nian yuandan chunjie qijian 
jihua shengyu fuwu huodong], 15 January 11; Wu Yapeng, Songyang County 
Government, ``Fengping Town Strengthens Family Planning Work'' 
[Fengping xiang jiaqiang jisheng gongzuo lidu], 5 May 11; Taihe County 
Open Government Information Platform, ``Chengjiang Township Launches 
Population Planning Concentrated Fortification Campaign'' [Chengjiang 
zhen kaizhan jihua shengyu jizhong gongjian huodong], 14 April 11.
    \6\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, 
entry into force 2 September 81, China signed 17 July 80, ratified 4 
November 80, arts. 2-3, 16(1)(e).
    \7\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly 
resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, 
China signed 29 August 90, ratified 2 March 92, arts. 2-4, 6, 26.
    \8\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, China signed 27 October 97, 
ratified 27 March 01, art. 10(3).
    \9\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], enacted 29 December 01, 
effective 1 September 02, art. 4.
    \10\ Ibid., art. 39.
    \11\ See, for example, Maonan District Population and Family 
Planning Bureau, ``Leaders Pay Attention, Responsibilities Fulfilled, 
Real Action Taken, Maonan District Spring Family Planning Concentrated 
Services Campaign [Achieves] Outstanding Results'' [Lingdao zhongshi, 
zeren luoshi, zhenzhua shigan, maonanqu chunji jisheng jizhong fuwu 
huodong chengxiao xianzhu], 13 May 11; Chenzhou City People's 
Government, ``(Shijiao Town) Early Planning, Early Activities To 
Soundly Launch Spring Family Planning Centralized Services Campaign'' 
[(Shijia xiang) zao mouhua, zao xingdong zhashi kaizhan chunji jisheng 
jizhong fuwu huodong], 21 February 11; Yangchun City People's 
Government, ``Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Family Planning Services 
Activities Off to a Good Start'' [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu 
huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11.
    \12\ Yangchun City People's Government, ``Chuncheng Neighborhood 
Spring Family Planning Services Activities Off to a Good Start'' 
[Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11.
    \13\ ``Nail households'' is used in this context to refer to 
families who resist government population planning efforts.
    \14\ ``Flight households'' is used in this context to refer to 
families who have left their homes to evade official reprisal for 
noncompliance with population planning policies.
    \15\ Yangchun City People's Government, ``Chuncheng Neighborhood 
Spring Family Planning Services Activities Off to a Good Start'' 
[Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11.
    \16\ Pan Lihua, Qingdao Municipal Population and Family Planning 
Commission, ``Shinan District: Spare No Efforts in Completing 
Population Planning, Welcome Inspection Work'' [Shinanqu: quanli yifu 
zuohao jisheng ying jian gongzuo], 16 November 10.
    \17\ Population and Family Planning Commission of Huoqiu County, 
``[Huoqiu] County Convenes County-wide Second Quarter Family Planning 
Focused Services Work Meeting'' [Woxian zhaokai quanxian di'er jidu 
jihua shengyu jizhong fuwu gongzuohui], 25 January 11; Mingguang City 
Open Government Information Net, ``Longshan Community Spares No Efforts 
in Carrying Out Family Planning Special Clean-Up Work'' [Longshan shequ 
quanli yifu zuohao jihua shengyu zhuanxiang qingli gongzuo], 1 April 
11.
    \18\ Shandan County Population and Family Planning Commission, 
``Weiqi Town 2011 Population and Family Planning Work Plan'' [Weiqi 
zhen 2011 nian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo anpai], 28 February 11; 
Population and Family Planning Commission of Gansu, ``Shenchuan Town 
Proposes Four Measures and Launches Spring Family Planning Superior 
Services Activity'' [Shenchuan xiang sicuo bingju kaizhan chunji jihua 
shengyu youzhi fuwu huodong], 28 March 11.
    \19\ Su Xianchao, Yangchun City People's Government, ``Chuncheng 
Neighborhood Spring Family Planning Services Activities Off to a Good 
Start'' [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju hao], 4 
March 11.
    \20\ Tang Zhenghai and Gong Ren, ``Luxi Spares No Efforts in 
Contending To Become the Province-wide Model County in Population and 
Family Planning Work'' [Luxi quanli yifu zheng chuang quansheng renkou 
jisheng gongzuo mofan xian], Unity Newspaper, reprinted in Xiangxi 
Tujia Autonomous Prefecture Official Web site, 21 March 11.
    \21\ People's Government of Tengxian Guangxi, ``Pingfu Town 
Proposes Many Measures and Launches Spring Family Planning Superior 
Services Activities'' [Pingfu xiang duo cuo bingju kaizhan chunji jihua 
shengyu youzhi fuwu huodong], 12 April 11.
    \22\ Population and Family Planning Commission of Gong'an County, 
``Maojiagang Town 2011 Annual First-Half-of-the-Year Population and 
Family Planning Work Situation'' [Maojianggang zhen 2011 niandu 
shangbannian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang], 25 May 11.
    \23\ Fengcheng City People's Government, ``Hutang Town Population 
and Family Planning Action Month-Long Exercise Achieves Three Clear 
Results'' [Hutang xiang jihua shengyu xingdong yue huodong qude sange 
mingxian chengxiao], 2 June 11.
    \24\ For one such example in which the two examinations and four 
procedures are clearly enumerated, see Population and Family Planning 
Commission of Gong'an County, ``Maojiagang Town 2011 Annual First-Half-
of-the-Year Population and Family Planning Work Situation'' 
[Maojianggang zhen 2011 niandu shangbannian renkou he jihua shengyu 
gongzuo qingkuang], 25 May 11. Some government reports refer to ``three 
examinations,'' instead of two. The third examination in these 
references is an examination for the presence of a gynecological 
disease or illness. Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have 
Control Over My Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 10.
    \25\ The original source, Caixin, reported that the abductions 
happened between 2000 and 2005. The New York Times reported that the 
abductions occurred between 1999 and 2006. Shangguan Jiaoming, ``In 
Hunan, Family Planning Turns to Plunder,'' Caixin Net, 10 May 11; 
Sharon LaFraniere, ``Chinese Officials Seized and Sold Babies, Parents 
Say,'' New York Times, 4 August 11.
    \26\ Shangguan Jiaoming, ``In Hunan, Family Planning Turns to 
Plunder,'' Caixin Net, 10 May 11; Sharon LaFraniere, ``Chinese 
Officials Seized and Sold Babies, Parents Say,'' New York Times, 4 
August 11; Zhao Hejuan, ``Hunan Officials Launch Inquiry Over Sale of 
Children,'' Caixin Net, 16 May 11.
    \27\ Shangguan Jiaoming, ``In Hunan, Family Planning Turns to 
Plunder,'' Caixin Net, 10 May 11; Sharon LaFraniere, ``Chinese 
Officials Seized and Sold Babies, Parents Say,'' New York Times, 4 
August 11.
    \28\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My 
Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 12.
    \29\ ``Anhui Young Married Woman Undergoes Forced Sterilization, 
Lawsuit Rejected by Courts'' [Anhui shaofu bei qiangzhi jueyu, xiang 
fayuan ti qisu zaoju], Radio Free Asia, 17 November 10.
    \30\ ``Zhaotong, Yunnan Villagers Accused of Exceeding Birth 
Limits, Town Officials Destroy New House and Accuse Entire Family'' 
[Yunnan zhaotong cunmin bei zhi chaosheng, zao xiangguan daohui xinfang 
zhulian quanjia], Radio Free Asia, 29 October 10.
    \31\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My 
Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 12. For another example of violence during 
family planning implementation in Shandong, see Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``Another Bloody Family Planning Case Erupts in Chen 
Guangcheng's Hometown Linyi, 22 Year Old Youth Cruelly Killed'' [Chen 
guangcheng laojia linyi zai bao jisheng xue'an, 22 sui qingnian canzao 
shahai], 27 March 11. According to this report, in March 2011, local 
family planning officials and hired personnel entered the home of Xu 
Shuaishuai in order to take away his sister for an unnamed birth 
control surgery. In an argument that ensued between his father and the 
personnel, Xu came to his father's defense and reportedly was fatally 
stabbed by one of the personnel.
    \32\ ``Xiamen Woman Eight Months Pregnant Forced To Abort, Also 
Kidnapped and Beaten'' [Xiamen huaiyun bageyue funu bei qiangzhi 
yinchan, bing ceng canzao bangjia ji ouda], Radio Free Asia, 13 October 
10. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control 
Over My Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 10.
    \33\ ``Henan Villager Beaten to Death for Exceeding Birth Limit, 
Thousand People Carry Coffin and Protest at Town Government'' [Henan 
cunmin yin chaosheng bei dasi, qianren tai guancai zhenzhengfu kangyi], 
Radio Free Asia, 19 November 10.
    \34\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Hangzhou Woman Forcibly 
Subjected to Birth Control Surgery in Guizhou Province'' [Hangzhou nuzi 
zai guizhou bei qiangxing zuo jieyu shoushu], 22 May 11. For an 
additional case of coercive implementation in Guizhou, see Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders, ``Another Violent Family Planning Incident 
Outside of Guiyang'' [Guiyang chengjiao zaici fasheng baoli jihua 
shengyu shijian], 30 May 11.
    \35\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Xinyu Village, Jiangxi Woman 
Undergoes Forced Tubal Ligation for Exposing Illegal Land Requisition'' 
[Jiangxi xinyu cunfu yin jielu weigui zhengdi bei qiangzhi jieza], 19 
June 11.
    \36\ PRC Measures for Collection of Social Compensation Fees 
[Shehui fuyang fei zhengshou guanli banfa], issued 2 August 02, 
effective 1 September 02, arts. 3, 7.
    \37\ See, e.g., Pan Lihua, Qingdao Municipal Population and Family 
Planning Commission, ``Shinan District: Spare No Efforts in Completing 
Population Planning, Welcome Inspection Work'' [Shinanqu: quanli yifu 
zuohao jisheng ying jian gongzuo], 16 November 10; Zhu Xiulin, Xiushui 
County Government, ``[Xiushui] County Plans To Deploy 2011 New Year 
Spring Festival Family Planning Service Activities'' [Wo xian anpai 
bushu 2011 nian yuandan chunjie qijian jihua shengyu fuwu huodong], 15 
January 11; Wu Yapeng, Songyang County People's Government, ``Fengping 
Town Strengthens Family Planning Work'' [Fengping xiang jiaqiang 
jisheng gongzuo lidu], 5 May 11; Taihe County Open Government 
Information Platform, ``Chengjiang Township Launches Population 
Planning Campaign Focused on Storming the Fortifications'' [Chengjiang 
zhen kaizhan jihua shengyu jizhong gongjian huodong], 24 December 10.
    \38\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My 
Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 18.
    \39\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2010, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 8 April 11, 54. For more 
information on the role of courts in family planning implementation, 
see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My Own 
Body,'' 21 December 10, 27.
    \40\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, 
effective 1 September 02, art. 39. According to Article 39, officials 
are to be punished either criminally or administratively for the 
following acts: ``(1) infringing on a citizen's personal rights, 
property rights or other legitimate rights and interests; (2) abusing 
his power, neglecting his duty or engaging in malpractices for personal 
gain; (3) demanding or accepting bribes; (4) withholding, reducing, 
misappropriating or embezzling funds for family planning or social 
maintenance fees; or (5) making false or deceptive statistic data on 
population or family planning, or fabricating, tampering with, or 
refusing to provide such data.''
    \41\ See, e.g., Pingdu Government Affairs Net, ``Are Village 
Officials Relieved From Their Post if They Violate Population Planning 
Policies During Their Term of Office? '' [Cunguan renqinei weifan jihua 
shengyu falu fagui zhongzhi zhiwu ma?], 16 February 11; ``Hunan 
Officials Launch Inquiry Over Sale of Children,'' Caixin Net, 16 May 
11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My Own 
Body,'' 21 December 10, 19-23. See also CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 
October 08, 97.
    \42\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My 
Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 13, 26. According to the report, ``The 
management of the hukou system is the domain of the Ministry of Public 
Security and it refuses to issue hukous to children without birth 
permits, children of unmarried parents, and children whose parents for 
some reason have not completed the required procedures. Without a 
hukou, a child cannot apply for an ID card and thus does not have a 
legal identity, is not a citizen and consequently is deprived of the 
rights accorded to other Chinese citizens.'' Zhang Hui, ``City Cuts 
Fines on Second Child,'' Global Times, 23 August 10. According to one 
expert quoted in this report, ``Children born outside State scrutiny 
will enjoy equal rights as the first child only after the family pays 
the fine and registers them.''
    \43\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I Don't Have Control Over My 
Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 15-16.
    \44\ Yan Hao and Li Yanan, ``Urban Hukou, or Rural Land? Migrant 
Workers Face Dilemma,'' Xinhua, 10 March 10; Tao Ran, ``Where There's a 
Will, There's a Way To Reform,'' China Daily, 22 March 10.
    \45\ See, e.g., Jishan County People's Government, ``Jishan County 
Population and Family Planning Report Reward System and Report 
Telephone Number'' [Jishan xian renkou yu jihua shengyu youjiang jubao 
zhidu he jubao dianhua], 27 April 11; Tai'an City People's Government, 
``Family Planning Report Reward Measures'' [Jihua shengyu youjiang 
jubao banfa], 20 November 04; Chengguan Town People's Government, 
``Fengtai County Chengguan Town Family Planning Report Reward 
Implementation Program'' [Fengtai xian chengguan zhen jihua shengyu 
youjiang jubao shishi fang'an], 17 March 11; Yulong Neighborhood Web 
site, ``Family Planning Report Reward System'' [Jihua shengyu youjiang 
jubao zhidu], 12 June 11. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``I 
Don't Have Control Over My Own Body,'' 21 December 10, 15-16.
    \46\ Yulong Neighborhood Web site, ``Family Planning Report Reward 
System'' [Jihua shengyu youjiang jubao zhidu], 12 June 11.
    \47\ Li Haixi, Population and Family Planning Commission of 
Qingyang, ``Effectiveness of Maojing Township Family Planning 
Concentrated Remediation Activities Significant'' [Maojing xiang jihua 
shengyu jizhong zhengzhi huodong chengxiao xianzhu], 28 March 11.
    \48\ Ibid.
    \49\ Yangchun City People's Government, ``Chuncheng Neighborhood 
Spring Family Planning Services Activities Off to a Good Start'' 
[Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11.
    \50\ ``Zuoquan County Sucheng Township Launches `Two Superiors' 
Family Planning Activities for Migrant Worker Population'' [Zuoquan 
xian sucheng xiang kaizhan liudong renkou jihua shengyu `shuang you' 
huodong], China Net Focus on Shanxi, 4 April 11.
    \51\ ``The Six Rights and Six Obligations of the Migrant 
Population'' [Liudong renkou de liuxiang quanli he liuxiang yiwu], 
China Population Report, reprinted in Tangshan City People's 
Government, 23 November 10.
    \52\ Qidong City People's Government, ``Circular Regarding Soundly 
Completing 2011 Springtime Population and Family Planning Services 
Management Work for Migrant Populations'' [Guanyu zhashi zuohao 2011 
nian chunjie qijian liudong renkou jihua shengyu fuwu guanli gongzuo de 
tongzhi], 19 January 11.
    \53\ Fengyang Neighborhood Web site, ``Fengyang Street Actively 
Launches Migrant Population Investigation, Cleanup and Services 
Management Work'' [Fengyang jie jiji kaizhan liudong renkou qingcha 
qingli he fuwu guanli gongzuo], 10 March 11.
    \54\ Dongying City People's Government, ``Circular Regarding 
Completing Migrant Population Family Planning Management Services Work 
During the Spring Festival'' [Guanyu zuohao chunjie qijian liudong 
renkou jihua shengyu guanli fuwu gongzuo de tongzhi], 25 January 11.
    \55\ Shaoxing City Yuecheng District People's Government, ``Jishan 
Street Launches Spring Festival Migrant Population Services Promotion 
Event'' [Jishan jiedao kaizhan chunjie qijian liudong renkou xuanchuan 
fuwu huodong], 26 January 11.
    \56\ Feng Wang and Cai Yong, The Brookings Institution, ``China's 
One Child Policy at 30,'' 24 September 10.
    \57\ The Commission observed an increase in reports from domestic 
academic observers as well as state-controlled media outlets discussing 
family planning policy reform in late 2010 and surrounding the 2011 
annual meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference. Several reports highlighted debate 
among officials and experts. See, for example, Zuo Xuejin, ``Time To 
Drop the One-Child Policy,'' Chinadialogue, 15 September 10; 
``Guangdong Province Population and Family Planning Committee Director 
Zhang Feng: There Is Hope for Two Child Policy in 2033'' [Guangdong 
sheng jishengwei zhuren zhang feng: 2033 nian you wang fangkai sheng er 
tai], Sina, 24 September 10; ``China May Expand Two-Child Policy to 
Urban Areas,'' People's Daily, 7 March 11; Jeremy Page, ``On Beijing 
Topic List: One-Child Policy's Future,'' Wall Street Journal, 9 March 
11; ``Li Yining Discusses Adjusting Family Planning Policy: Relaxation 
Is Not Unrestricted'' [Li yining tan tiaozheng jihua shengyu zhengce: 
fangkai bushi wu xianzhi], People's Daily, reprinted in Phoenix Net, 10 
March 11; ``Delegates Debate Easing of China's One-Child Policy,'' 
Xinhua, 12 March 11; Mu Guangzong, ``Debate: Family Planning,'' China 
Daily, 21 March 11; Josh Noble, ``End of the One-Child Policy Coming? 
'' Financial Times, 8 March 11.
    \58\ ``Two-Child Policy May Be Tried in Some Areas, Difficult To 
Implement Nationwide in the Short-Term'' [Fangkai sheng ertai zhengce 
keneng shidian duanqi nanyi quanmian shishi], Xinhua, 12 October 10. 
See also Mimi Lau, ``Get Ready for an Easing of the One-Child Policy in 
2033,'' South China Morning Post, 26 September 10.
    \59\ Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 
``Shanghai Municipality Population and Family Planning Commission: 
Urban Residents Who Meet One of 12 Criteria May Have a Second Child'' 
[Shanghai shi renkou jisheng wei: shimin fu 12 zhong tiaojian zhiyi ke 
sheng ertai], 28 July 09.
    \60\ Beijing Municipal Commission of Population and Family 
Planning, ``Beijing Municipal Commission of Population and Family 
Planning Publishes Circular on the Provisions on Examination and 
Approval for the Birth of a Second Child'' [Beijing shi renkou he jihua 
shengyu weiyuanhui yinfa ``guanyu shenpi shengyu di'er ge zinu de 
guiding'' de tongzhi], reprinted in Beijing Language and Culture 
University, 14 April 04.
    \61\ Tianjin Beichen District Commission on Population and Family 
Planning, ``Tianjin Municipality Current Policy on Giving Birth to a 
Second Child'' [Tianjin shi xianxing shengyu ertai zhengce], 15 July 
10.
    \62\ ``China Census Shows Population Aging Rapidly,'' Associated 
Press, reprinted in USA Today, 28 April 11; ``Population Census Data 
Shows That It Is Appropriate To Do a Pragmatic Readjustment of 
Population Policy'' [Renkou pucha shuju xianshi dui renkou zhengce yi 
zuo wushi tiaozheng], Study Times, reprinted in Hexun, 17 May 11; 
``Challenges and Countermeasures,'' Beijing Review, 26 May 11.
    \63\ ``President Hu Pledges To Keep China's Birth Rate Low To 
Ensure Economic Growth,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington 
Post, 27 April 11. In a March 5 work report, Premier Wen Jiabao stated, 
``We will adhere to the basic state policy on family planning and 
progressively improve it.'' Wen Jiabao, ``Full Text: Report on the Work 
of the Government,'' Xinhua, 15 March 11.
    \64\ ``Total Population, CBR, CDR, NIR and TFR in China (1949-
2000),'' China Daily, 20 August 10.
    \65\ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ``The World Factbook,'' 
accessed 14 June 11. While China's National Bureau of Statistics 
estimated China's fertility rate at 1.8 in 2007, in May 2011 a group of 
Chinese academics publicly refuted the number, stating that it had been 
``grossly overestimated.'' These academics estimate that China's total 
fertility rate more accurately stands anywhere from 1.63 to below 1.5. 
See ``China's Total Fertility Rate Grossly Overestimated: Academic,'' 
Caijing, 17 May 11.
    \66\ ``China's Aging Population Big Challenge to Pension System: 
Minister,'' Xinhua, 8 March 11; ``Vast `Empty Nests,' Disabled Aging 
Population Challenging China's Social Network,'' Xinhua, 2 March 11. Of 
particular concern are China's pension and healthcare systems. For more 
information on China's limited capacity to support its aging 
population, see Nicholas Eberstadt, Swiss Re Center for Global 
Dialogue, ``The Demographic Risks to China's Long-Term Economic 
Outlook,'' 24 January 11, 7.
    \67\ ``National Labor Shortage Looms on Horizon,'' Global Times, 3 
May 11; Jui-te Shih and Staff Reporter, ``Labor Shortages Spread to 
More Regions, Industries in China,'' Want China Times, 17 June 11; 
Jianmin Li, Jamestown Foundation, ``China's Looming Labor Supply 
Challenge? '' 8 April 11; Nicholas Eberstadt, Swiss Re Center for 
Global Dialogue, ``The Demographic Risks to China's Long-Term Economic 
Outlook,'' 24 January 11, 3.
    \68\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, 
effective 1 September 02, art. 22. According to Article 22, 
``Discrimination against, maltreatment, and abandonment of baby girls 
are prohibited.'' State Commission for Population and Family Planning, 
Ministry of Health, State Food and Drug Administration, Regulations 
Regarding the Prohibition of Non-medically Necessary Gender 
Determination Examinations and Sex-Selective Termination of Pregnancy'' 
[Guanyu jinzhi fei yixue xuyao de tai'er xingbie jianding he xuanze 
xingbie de rengong zhongzhi renshen de guiding], issued 29 November 02, 
effective 1 January 03. For discussion of these regulations, see 
``China Bans Sex-Selection Abortion,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Net, 
22 March 03.
    \69\ According to United Nations Population Division statistics, 
China's sex ratio at birth (SRB) in 2010 was the highest in the world 
at 120 males per females born. The next highest was Azerbaijan at 117, 
followed by Armenia at 115, Federated States of Micronesia at 111, and 
the Republic of Korea at 110. Population Division of the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, ``World 
Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,'' 31 August 11. According to 
one demographer's analysis, ``ordinary human populations regularly and 
predictably report [SRBs of] 103 to 105.'' Nicholas Eberstadt, Swiss Re 
Center for Global Dialogue, ``The Demographic Risks to China's Long-
Term Economic Outlook,'' 24 January 11, 7. For recent statistics 
regarding sex-selective abortion in China see, Wei Xing Zhu, Li Lu, and 
Therese Hesketh, ``China's Excess Males, Sex Selective Abortion and One 
Child Policy: Analysis of Data From 2005 National Intercensus Survey,'' 
British Medical Journal, 9 April 09, 4-5. For one observer's analysis 
of these statistics, see ``A Study of Sex-Selective Abortion,'' China 
YouRen blog, 13 May 10.
    \70\ ``China Faces Increasing Gender Ratio,'' Xinhua, reprinted in 
China Daily, 9 August 11.
    \71\ See Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer, Bare Branches: 
Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2004).
    \72\ See ``China Gender Gap Fuelling Human Trafficking: Report,'' 
Agence France-Presse, reprinted in China Post, 22 September 10. See 
also, World Health Organization, Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Children's 
Fund, and United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment 
of Women, ``Preventing Gender-Biased Sex Selection,'' 14 June 11, 5; 
Susan W. Tiefenbrun and Christie J. Edwards, ``Gendercide and the 
Cultural Context of Sex Trafficking in China,'' 32 Fordham 
International Law Journal 731, 752 (2009); Therese Hesketh et al., 
``The Effect of China's One-Child Policy After 25 Years,'' New England 
Journal of Medicine, Volume 353, No. 11 (2005), 1173; Nicholas 
Eberstadt, ``A Global War Against Baby Girls: Sex-Selective Abortion 
Becomes a Worldwide Practice,'' Handbook of Gender Medicine, reprinted 
in All Girls Allowed, 1 May 11. According to this report, ``Some 
economists have hypothesized that mass feticide, in making women 
scarce, will only increase their `value'--but in settings where the 
legal and personal rights of the individual are not secure and 
inviolable, the `rising value of women' can have perverse and 
unexpected consequences, including increased demand for prostitution 
and an upsurge in the kidnapping and trafficking of women (as is now 
reportedly being witnessed in some women-scarce areas in Asia)[.]''
    \73\ PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Women 
[Zhongguo funu fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11; PRC State Council, 
PRC Outline for the Development of Children [Zhongguo ertong fazhan 
gangyao], issued 30 July 11.
    \74\ ChinaAid, ``Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng's Wife 
Reveals Details of Torture,'' 17 June 11; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``Activist Chen Guangcheng Released After Serving Full 
Sentence,'' 9 September 10.
    \75\ ChinaAid, ``Urgent! Chen and Wife Beaten Severely, Chinese 
Citizens Appeal to America,'' 10 February 11.
    \76\ ChinaAid, ``Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng's Wife 
Reveals Details of Torture,'' 17 June 11. See also, ``Chen Guangcheng, 
Wife Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing Official 
Abuse,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 March 11.
    \77\ ChinaAid, ``Exclusive Video Shows Ill Treatment & Illegal 
Detention of Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng,'' 9 February 11.
    \78\ ChinaAid, ``Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng's Wife 
Reveals Details of Torture,'' 17 June 11.
    \79\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China, ``Warning: Reporting on 
Chen Guangcheng,'' 17 February 11; ChinaAid, ``Government Retaliation 
Continues, Foreign Journalists Mistreated in Wake of Smuggled Video by 
Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng,'' 15 February 11.
    \80\ Human Rights in China, ``Lawyers Beaten, Detained After 
Meeting Regarding Chen Guangcheng,'' 16 February 11. See also, ``Chen 
Guangcheng, Wife Reportedly Beaten After Release of Video Detailing 
Official Abuse,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 March 
11.
    \81\ Philip P. Pan, ``Who Controls the Family? '' Washington Post, 
27 August 05; Hannah Beech, ``Enemies of the State? '' Time, 12 
September 05; Michael Sheridan, ``China Shamed by Forced Abortions,'' 
Times of London, 18 September 05. See also, ``Population Planning 
Official Confirms Abuses in Linyi City, Shandong Province,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 October 05.
    \82\ ``Blind Mob Organizer Sentenced to Imprisonment,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Daily, 25 August 06. In April 2008, Chen filed a 
lawsuit alleging that Linyi officials had ``trumped up charges'' 
against him in retaliation for his efforts to expose their misdeeds. 
Chen also wrote a detailed letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
People's Court and the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate to protest his imprisonment and petition for release. Li 
Jinsong, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chen Guangcheng Sues Li Qun, 
Liu Jie, and Other Officials for Trumped Up Charges and Retaliation'' 
[Chen guangcheng konggao li qun liu jie deng shexian fanyou baofu 
xianhai zui zhi, gongmin bao'an konggao han], 5 April 08. See also 
``Authorities Sentence Chen Guangcheng After Taking His Defense Team 
Into Custody,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 November 
06.
    \83\ ``Authorities Sentence Chen Guangcheng After Taking His 
Defense Team Into Custody,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 1 November 06; ``Chen Guangcheng Remains in Prison Following 
Flawed Retrial,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 
December 06; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``CRD Protests Ill-
Treatment of Chen Guangcheng in Prison,'' 21 June 07.
    \84\ ChinaAid, ``Detained Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng's Wife 
Reveals Details of Torture,'' 16 June 11; Chi-chi Zhang, ``Activist: 
Child of Chinese Lawyer Denied Education,'' Associated Press, reprinted 
in Google, 5 September 11. According to He Peirong, a human rights 
advocate quoted in the Associated Press report, ``I was told by local 
officials . . . that the girl has a right to an education and they 
would give us an answer by Sept. 1 as to whether she will go to school. 
. . . Now that school has started, it is obvious she has not been able 
to attend.''
    Notes to Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement

    \1\ PRC Regulations on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo hukou dengji tiaoli], issued and effective 9 January 58.
    \2\ Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, ``Is China Abolishing the 
Hukou System? '' China Quarterly, Vol. 195 (2008), 582, 587.
    \3\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 
2, 13(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 26.
    \4\ Ke Xuedong, ``Sixty Thousand Migrant Workers Settle in 
Guangdong'' [Yu 6 wan yue wailaigong jifen ruhu], Guangzhou Daily, 17 
November 10.
    \5\ Jiang Yuefei et al., ``11.4 Million Migrant Workers in 
Guangzhou Will Enjoy Low-Threshold Health Insurance'' [Guangzhou 1140 
wan nongmingong jiang xiangshou dimenkan yibao], Guangzhou Daily, 21 
January 08.
    \6\ Chengdu Municipal Party Committee and Chengdu Municipal 
People's Government, Opinion Regarding the Unification of Chengdu Urban 
and Rural Hukou To Achieve Freedom of Movement [Quanyu chengdu 
chengxiang tongyi huji shixian ziyou qianxi yijian], issued 9 November 
10, art. 1.
    \7\ Shen Weihuang, ``Cautious Steps to Land Reform,'' Global Times, 
16 February 11.
    \8\ Zhang Tingting et al., ``Municipal Party Committee and 
Municipal Government Announce Opinion Regarding the Unification of 
Hukou by 2012'' [Shiwei shizhengfu chutai yijian 2012 nian tongyi 
chengxiang huji], Chengdu Daily, reprinted in Chengdu Municipal 
People's Government, 17 November 10.
    \9\ Xie Liangbing, ``Turn Freedom of Movement Into a Real 
Possibility: Central Government Investigates Chengdu Hukou Reform'' 
[Dang ziyou qianxi chengwei keneng: buwei diaoyan chengdu hugai], 
Economic Observer, 3 December 10.
    \10\ Gillian Wong, ``Chinese Farmers Moved Into Apartments in Land 
Grab,'' Associated Press, 8 March 11; Sherry Tao Kong, ``China's 
Migrant Problem: The Need for Hukou Reform,'' East Asia Forum, 29 
January 10.
    \11\ Gillian Wong, ``Chinese Farmers Moved Into Apartments in Land 
Grab,'' Associated Press, 8 March 11.
    \12\ Ibid.; Wang Junxiu and Zhang Lei, ``Government Cannot Only 
Think About Taking Land From the Rural Residents'' [Zhengfu buneng 
zhixiangzhe na nongminde tudi], China Youth Daily, 13 January 11; Mitch 
Moxley, ``China's City Workers Prefer Rural Roots,'' Asia Times, 1 
December 10; Rob Schmitz, ``A Land Grab in the Chinese Countryside,'' 
Market Place, 13 December 10.
    \13\ Gillian Wong, ``Chinese Farmers Moved Into Apartments in Land 
Grab,'' Associated Press, 8 March 11.
    \14\ Rob Schmitz, ``A Land Grab in the Chinese Countryside,'' 
Market Place, 13 December 10. In one instance, the city scheduled one 
resident's house for demolition and offered her an apartment in the 
city, if the resident paid the equivalent of US$15,000, an amount far 
beyond her means. When she traveled to Beijing to appeal her case, 
authorities detained her for 26 days after her return.
    \15\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 
13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and 
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 12.
    \16\ PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo gongmin chujing rujing guanli fa], issued 22 
November 85, effective 1 February 86.
    \17\ Peter Simpson, ``China Bans Rights Lawyers From Travel China 
[sic],'' Voice of America, 9 November 10; Dan Martin, ``Nobel Winner's 
Lawyer Says Barred From Leaving China,'' Agence France-Presse, 
reprinted in France 24, 9 November 10.
    \18\ Cara Anna, ``China Blocks Famous Artist, Economist From 
Flights,'' Associated Press, 3 December 10.
    \19\ Ibid.; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Prominent Artist and 
Activist Ai Weiwei Prevented From Leaving Country En Route to South 
Korea,'' 2 December 10.
    \20\ Cara Anna, ``Lawyers: China Blocked US Visit, Citing 
`Security,' '' Associated Press, 30 October 10.
    \21\ ChinaAid, ``China Blocks Well-Known Religion Scholar From 
Leaving Country To Attend Conference,'' 20 November 10.
    \22\ ``Anger Over Nobel Exit Ban,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 December 10.
    \23\ ``Sichuan Advocate Liao Yiwu Again Barred From Leaving the 
Country'' [Sichuan yiyi renshi liao yiwu zaici bei jinzhi chuguo], 
Radio Free Asia, 7 April 11.
    \24\ Philip Gourevitch, ``Liao Yiwu: Grounded in China,'' New 
Yorker, 30 March 11.
    \25\ Keith Bradsher, ``China Bars Prominent Writer From Overseas 
Travel,'' New York Times, 9 May 11.
    \26\ Philip Gourevitch, ``Liao Yiwu's Persistent Voice,'' New 
Yorker, 2 March 10.
    \27\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Dissident Chinese Writer Flees to Germany,'' 
New York Times, 12 July 11; Gillian Wong, ``Writer Liao Yiwu Threatened 
by Chinese Government, Leaves for Germany,'' Associated Press, 8 July 
11. For an extended interview with Liao Yiwu since he fled to Germany, 
see Ian Johnson, `` `I'm Not Interested in Them; I Wish They Weren't 
Interested in Me': An Interview With Liao Yiwu,'' New York Review of 
Books, 15 August 11.
    \28\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 9; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN 
General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into 
force 23 March 76, art. 9(1).
    \29\ ``Tang Jitian Sent Home to House Arrest, Suspected To 
Encounter Disaster, What's the Crime in a Happy Reunion? '' [Tang 
jitian qian xiang ruanjin yi ceng zao nue, weixiao juhui he zui xu hui 
bei zhua], Radio Free Asia, 17 March 11; Minnie Chan, ``Security Even 
Tighter After `Jasmine' Call,'' South China Morning Post, 2 March 11; 
``Human Rights Defenders Assail Xu Shuiliang, Beijing, for Vilifying 
Liu Xiaobo,'' Boxun, 9 November 10.
    \30\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing 
Weekly December 8-13, 2010,'' 15 December 10; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``As Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony Nears, Chinese 
Government Increases Surveillance, Restrictions on Dissidents,'' 8 
December 10.
    \31\ ``Mainland Student in Hong Kong Asked To `Drink Tea' by 
Mainland Liaison Office After Participating in Rights Defense 
Activities'' [Zai gang neidisheng weiquan zhong lianban ``qing 
yincha''], Sina, 1 June 11; ``Caijing Magazine Journalist Zhang Jialong 
Missing After Being Asked To `Have Tea,' May Be Related to Ai Weiwei 
Case'' [Caijing zazhi jizhe zhang jialong bei ``hecha'' shizong huo yu 
ai weiwei an you guan], Radio France Internationale, 2 May 11; ``The 
Chinese Government Charges Three Internet Dissidents With the Crime of 
`Incitement To Subvert State Authority' '' [Zhongguo zhengfu dui 
sanming wanluo yiyirenshi kong yi `shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan' 
zuiming], Radio Free Asia, 3 April 11.
    \32\ John Yang, ``The Silencing of China's Human Rights Lawyers,'' 
Epoch Times, 2 May 11; Gillian Wong, ``China Cracks Down, Many 
Activists Missing,'' Associated Press, 21 March 11.
    \33\ ``China Charges Two Amid `Jasmine' Crackdown,'' Agence France-
Presse, 29 March 11; Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Democracy Advocate Is 
Sentenced to 10 Years,'' New York Times, 25 March 11.
    \34\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Escalating Crackdown 
Following Call for Jasmine Revolution in China,'' 31 March 11.
    \35\ Human Rights in China, ``Dozens Put Under House Arrest as 
Chinese Authorities Intensify Crackdown Following Nobel Peace Prize 
Announcement,'' 28 October 10; Chris Buckley, ``China Dissidents Under 
Lockdown as Nobel Tensions Linger,'' Reuters, 29 October 10.
    \36\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Beijing Activists Li 
Fangping, Li Zhiying Placed Under Soft Detention'' [Beijing weiquan 
renshi li fangping, li zhiying zao ruanjin], 26 October 10.
    \37\ Human Rights in China, ``Clampdown on Individuals Following 
Nobel Announcement,'' 12 October 10.
    \38\ Tania Branigan, ``Chinese Activists Praise Liu Xiaobo's Nobel 
Prize Despite Crackdown,'' 12 January 11.
    \39\ Human Rights in China, ``Dozens Put Under House Arrest as 
Chinese Authorities Intensify Crackdown Following Nobel Peace Prize 
Announcement,'' 28 October 10.
    \40\ ChinaAid, ``A Video Shows Blind Christian Activist Perseveres 
Under House Arrest,'' 9 February 11; Rachel Beitarie, ``Guilty by 
Association,'' Foreign Policy, 19 May 11; ``Activist Lawyer Beaten Over 
Leaked Video,'' Associated Press, 1 February 11.
    \41\ Christopher Bodeen, ``Wife of Chinese Nobel Prize Winner Still 
Under House Arrest, Brother Denied Prison Visit,'' Canadian Press, 19 
October 10; ``US Urges China To Let Nobel Winner's Wife Move Freely,'' 
Reuters, 12 October 10; Human Rights in China, ``Dozens Put Under House 
Arrest as Chinese Authorities Intensify Crackdown Following Nobel Peace 
Prize Announcement,'' 28 October 10; Rachel Beitarie, ``Gulty by 
Assocation,'' Foreign Policy, 17 May 11.
    \42\ Southern Mongolia Human Rights Information Center, ``Hada Is 
Still Held in a Secret Prison, Wife and Son Formally Arrested,'' 5 May 
11.
    Notes to Section II--Status of Women

    \1\ The PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests 
and the PRC Electoral Law of the National People's Congress and Local 
People's Congresses stipulate that an ``appropriate number'' of female 
deputies should serve at all levels of people's congresses. PRC Law on 
the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 
October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 11; PRC Electoral Law of the 
National People's Congress and Local People's Congresses [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui he difang geji renmin 
daibiao dahui xuanju fa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 10 December 82, 2 
December 86, 28 February 95, 27 October 04, 14 March 10, art. 6.
    \2\ PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Women 
[Zhongguo funu fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11; PRC State Council, 
PRC Outline for the Development of Children [Zhongguo ertong fazhan 
gangyao], issued 30 July 11.
    \3\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 
accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, 
entry into force 3 September 81, art. 7. China signed the convention on 
17 July 80 and ratified it on 4 November 80.
    \4\ State Councilor Liu Yandong is reportedly the only woman who 
holds a position in the Politburo. Jen-Kai Liu, ``The Main National 
Leadership of the PRC,'' China Data Supplement, Journal of Current 
Chinese Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2011), 3; ``Liu Yandong,'' China 
Vitae, accessed 13 April 11.
    \5\ Jen-Kai Liu, ``The Main National Leadership of the PRC,'' China 
Data Supplement, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 3 
(2011), 3; Michael Forsythe and Yidi Zhao, ``Women Knowing China Men 
Rule Prove Mao's Half the Sky Remains Unfulfilled,'' Bloomberg News, 23 
June 11.
    \6\ ``Number of Deputies to All Previous National People's 
Congresses'' [Lijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui daibiao renshu], China 
Statistical Yearbook 2010, 26 September 10, Table 22-1.
    \7\ Ibid.
    \8\ The target of 30 percent female representation in leadership 
positions by 1995 was set by the UN Commission on the Status of Women 
at its 34th session in 1990. ``Target: 30 Percent of Leadership 
Positions to Women by 1995--United Nations Commission on the Status of 
Women,'' United Nations Publications, reprinted in Bnet, June 1990.
    \9\ ``87.1 Pct of China's Provincial Regions Have Female Vice 
Governors,'' Xinhua, 9 August 11.
    \10\ PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Women 
[Zhongguo funu fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11; PRC State Council, 
PRC Outline for the Development of Children [Zhongguo ertong fazhan 
gangyao], issued 30 July 11; He Dan and Cang Wei, ``Women Seek Larger 
Role,'' China Daily, 10 August 11.
    \11\ According to All-China Women's Federation Deputy Chair Hong 
Tianhui, cited in a November 2010 People's Daily report, women hold 
approximately 3 percent of village committee director positions. 
``Official: China's Sex Ratio Lacks Proportion,'' People's Daily, 17 
November 10. For statistics on village representation from the 2010 
reporting year, see ``Chen Zhili: All-China Women's Federation Actively 
Promotes Female Political Participation'' [Chen zhili biaoshi fulian 
jiang jiji tuidong funu canzheng yizheng], China Radio International, 6 
March 10.
    \12\ Women's Watch-China, ``Annual Report 2008,'' 23 October 09, 
19. According to this report, ``Women's participation in grassroots 
decision-making bodies is comparatively low. They have a disadvantaged 
position in political affairs. Moreover, as women had been kept away 
from the decision-making power of the village, they had low awareness 
of or enthusiasm for getting involved in village self-governance and 
safeguarding their rights and interests. Consequently, they were not 
able to unite themselves into a powerful interest group and to fight 
for their own rights and interests. As a result, they could not 
challenge the powerful and dominant male decision-making groups.''
    \13\ PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa], enacted 4 November 98, art. 9.
    \14\ PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa], enacted 4 November 98, amended 
28 October 10, art. 6.
    \15\ Ibid., art. 25.
    \16\ Wang Lei, Women's Watch-China, ``A Perspective on the 
Amendment of the Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees Concerning 
the Protection of Women's Rights,'' 15 March 10.
    \17\ Women's Watch-China, ``Women's Organizations Discuss Draft of 
Revised Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees, Each Anticipate 
Increased Level of Village Female Political Participation'' [Funu jie 
tan cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhi fa xiuding cao'an-yiyi qidai nongcun funu 
canzheng shuiping jinyibu tigao], 2 February 10.
    \18\ Women's Watch-China, ``Annual Report 2008,'' 23 October 09, 
19-20, 27.
    \19\ Women's Watch-China, ``20 Percent of Rural-to-Urban Female 
Migrant Workers Lose Land'' [20% jincheng wugong nongcun nuxing shiqu 
tudi], 12 February 11; Women's Watch-China, ``The E-Newsletter 69 of 
WW-China,'' 16 June 11, 4-8. For information on one city's revision of 
village rules and regulations to safeguard women's rights and 
interests, see ``Revision of Village Regulations Is a Starting Point 
Opportunity for Village Women's Rights Defense'' [Cungui minyue xiuding 
shi jihui cun tun funu weiquan you zhuashou], Heilongjiang Daily, 4 
November 10.
    \20\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 7. China signed the 
covenant on 27 October 97 and ratified it on 27 March 01. See also PRC 
Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin fa], 
enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 3.
    \21\ PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong fa], enacted 
5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 10 October 01, arts. 12, 13. 
PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April 92, 
effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, arts. 22-27; PRC 
Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye cujin fa], 
enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 3.
    \22\ Women's Watch-China, ``The E-Newsletter 54 of WW-China,'' 
February 2010, 10.
    \23\ ``19 Percent of Women Face Discrimination Based on Appearance 
When Seeking Jobs, 44 Percent of Women Have Faced Discrimination Based 
on Childbearing Status'' [19% nuxing qiuzhi cunzai rongmao qishi, 44% 
nuxing zao hunyun qishi], Xi'an Evening News, 13 January 11.
    \24\ ``Analysis of October Results From the `2011 University 
Graduate Follow-Up Survey Monthly Report,' '' MyCOS HR Digital 
Information Co., Ltd., 2011; Women's Watch-China, ``Income Gap Is Large 
Between Male and Female University Students'' [Nannu daxuesheng shouru 
chaju da], 3 March 11.
    \25\ Center for Work-Life Policy, ``New Study Finds the Solution to 
China's Talent Crunch Is in the Hidden Talent Pool of Educated Chinese 
Women,'' 22 March 11.
    \26\ Currently, retirement ages for male and female government and 
Party officials are 60 and 55, respectively, while retirement ages for 
male and female workers in general are 60 and 50, respectively. 
``China's Compulsory Retirement Age for Males and Females Challenged 
for Violating Constitution'' [Woguo nannu tuixiu nianling guiding 
beitiqing weixian shencha], China Law Education, 16 March 06. For 
information on the current debate about raising the retirement age, see 
``Retirement Age Will Be Pushed Back: Minister,'' China Daily, 
reprinted in Sina, 22 March 10.
    \27\ PRC State Council Information Office, ``China's Human 
Resources Situation'' [Zhongguo de renli ziyuan zhuangkuang], reprinted 
in PRC Central Government Web Portal, 10 September 10. For discussion 
following this white paper on retirement age, see, e.g., Kit Gillet, 
``White Paper on Retirement Age Prompts Fresh Debate,'' South China 
Morning Post, 22 September 10.
    \28\ Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Human Resources and Social 
Security, Municipal Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security Trial 
Opinion Regarding [Shanghai's] Enterprise Talent Pool of All Kinds and 
Flexible Deferment of the Pension Application Process [Shi renli ziyuan 
shehui baozhang ju guanyu benshi qiye gelei rencai rouxing yanchi banli 
shenling jiben yanglaojin shouxu de shixing yijian], issued 6 September 
10, effective 1 October 10; Huang Anqi, ``Relevant Person in Charge at 
Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security 
Analyzes Shanghai's `Trial Opinions' To Defer Application for Pension'' 
[Shanghai shi renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang ju youguan fuzeren jiedu 
shanghai yanchi shenling yanglaojin ``shixing yijian''], Xinhua, 5 
October 10; Duan Yan, ``Age-Old Problem Looms for Families,'' China 
Daily, 14 October 10.
    \29\ PRC Social Insurance Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shehui 
baoxian fa], enacted 28 October 10, effective 1 July 11. For examples 
of reports discussing the possibility of and need for raising the 
retirement age, see Chen Xin, ``Experts Warn Pension Fund Under 
Pressure,'' China Daily, 30 October 10.
    \30\ Li Dong et al., ``Respect Women's Choice'' [Zunzhong nuxing 
ziji xuanze], Guangzhou Daily, 8 March 11; Zhao Yinan, ``Women's 
Retirement May Be Delayed,'' China Daily, 1 March 11; Wang Chunxia, 
All-China Women's Federation, ``Gender Equal Retirement Age Imminent 
but Gradual,'' 15 March 11.
    \31\ National Bureau of Statistics, ``Report on the Main Data From 
the 2010 Sixth National Population Census (No. 1)'' [2010 nian diliuci 
quanguo renkou pucha zhuyao shuju gongbao (di 1 hao)], 28 April 11; 
National Bureau of Statistics, ``Report on the Main Data From the 2010 
Sixth National Population Census (No. 2)'' [2010 nian diliuci quanguo 
renkou pucha zhuyao shuju gongbao (di 2 hao)], 29 April 11; Feng Han, 
``Flexible Retirement System Under Discussion in China,'' Global Times, 
25 May 11.
    \32\ Gao Zhuyuan, ``Same Retirement Age for All,'' China Daily, 24 
March 11. According to one observer cited in this report, the earlier 
compulsory retirement age for women is ``outdated, causes huge 
financial loss to women and blocks their career path.''
    \33\ ``China's Compulsory Retirement Age for Males and Females 
Challenged for Violating Constitution'' [Woguo nannu tuixiu nianling 
guiding bei tiqing weixian shencha], China Law Education, 16 March 06; 
CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 170.
    \34\ All-China Women's Federation, ``Shenzhen First To Enforce 
Rules on Gender Equality,'' 1 June 11.
    \35\ For a brief analysis of highlights in the draft regulations, 
see Women's Watch-China, ``Preparing To Draft Gender Equality Promotion 
Regulations, Shenzhen Leads the Way'' [Yunniang zhiding xingbie 
pingdeng cujin tiaoli, shenzhen xianxing], 3 March 11. See also CECC, 
2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 131-132.
    \36\ All-China Women's Federation, ``Shenzhen First To Enforce 
Rules on Gender Equality,'' 1 June 11; `` `Gender Equality Promotion 
Regulations' on Shenzhen's Legislative Agenda This Year'' [``Xingbie 
pingdeng cujin tiaoli'' lieru shenzhen jinnian lifa xiangmu], China 
Women's News, reprinted in All-China Women's Federation, 22 March 11.
    \37\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April 
92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 46; PRC Marriage 
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa], enacted 10 September 80, 
effective 1 January 81, amended 28 April 01, art. 3.
    \38\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], enacted 
1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, arts. 234, 236, 260.
    \39\ Cheng Yingqi, ``Call for Legislation To Curb Domestic 
Violence,'' China Daily, 26 November 10.
    \40\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April 
92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 46; PRC Marriage 
Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa], enacted 10 September 80, 
effective 1 January 81, amended 28 April 01, art. 3. For Chinese 
experts' discussion of the shortcomings of current national-level 
legislation, see ``All-China Women's Federation Strongly Promotes Anti-
Domestic Violence Law'' [Quanguo fulian litui fan jiating baoli fa], 
People's Representative News, 31 December 09; Women's Watch-China, 
``Proposal for Law on Prevention and Curbing of Domestic Violence Comes 
Out'' [Yufang he zhizhi jiating baoli fa jianyi gao chulu], 28 November 
09; He Ping, ``China Scholars Call for Attention on `Anti-Domestic 
Violence Legislation' '' [Zhongguo xuezhe huyu guanzhu ``fan jiating 
baoli'' lifa], Radio Free Asia, 13 January 10. See also ``All-China 
Women's Federation Proposes, Highlights Need for Draft Anti-Domestic 
Violence Legislation,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2 
February 10.
    \41\ ``All-China Women's Federation Vice-Chair: Anti-Domestic 
Violence Should Be Entered Into Legislative Agenda'' [Quanguo fulian fu 
zhuxi: fan jiating baoli ying lieru lifa], Jinghua Times, reprinted in 
Huanqiu Net, 8 March 11; Cheng Yingqi, ``Call for Legislation To Curb 
Domestic Violence,'' China Daily, 26 November 10.
    \42\ Chen Bin, ``Draft of First Anti-Domestic Violence Law 
Reportedly Already Complete'' [Jucheng shoubu fan jiating baoli fa 
cao'an yi qicao wancheng], Legal Weekly, reprinted in Sina, 18 March 
11; ``Draft of `Anti-Domestic Violence Law' Complete'' [``Fan jiating 
baoli fa'' cao'an qicao wancheng], Xinhua, 20 March 11.
    \43\ ``Draft of `Anti-Domestic Violence Law' Complete'' [``Fan 
jiating baoli fa'' cao'an qicao wancheng], Xinhua, 20 March 11.
    \44\ Guangdong Bonthe Business Investigation Co., ``Female 
University Graduate Survey'' [Nu daxuesheng diaocha], 21 April 11.
    \45\ Women's Watch-China, ``Survey Report on Sexual Harassment in 
the Workplace'' [Zhichang xing saorao diaocha baogao], 16 May 11, 3.
    \46\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 
accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, 
entry into force 2 September 81, art. 11. China signed the convention 
on 17 July 80 and ratified it on 4 November 80.
    \47\ Women's Watch-China, ``Annual Report 2008,'' 23 October 09, 
30; PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo funu quanyi baozhang fa], enacted 3 April 92, 
effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, arts. 40, 58.
    \48\ Ibid.
    \49\ Tang Yu, ``Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, What 
Difficulties Exist in Defending One's Rights'' [Zhichang xing saorao 
weiquan heqi nan], China Worker Net, 7 January 11; Women's Watch-China, 
``Survey Report on Sexual Harassment in the Workplace'' [Zhichang xing 
saorao diaocha baogao], 16 May 11, 5.
    \50\ Tang Yu, ``Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, What 
Difficulties Exist in Defending One's Rights'' [Zhichang xing saorao 
weiquan heqi nan], China Worker Net, 7 January 11; Gao Zhuyuan, ``The 
Evil of Sexual Harassment,'' China Daily, 2 June 11.
    \51\ Maple Women's Psychological Counseling Center Beijing, ``Law 
on Prevention of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Submitted to the 
National People's Congress (Draft Proposal)'' [Xiang quanguo renda 
tijiao ``gongzuo changsuo xing saorao fangzhifa'' (jianyi gao) yi an], 
17 March 09; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 133.
    \52\ Maple Women's Psychological Counseling Center Beijing, ``Law 
on Prevention of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Submitted to the 
National People's Congress (Draft Proposal)'' [Xiang quanguo renda 
tijiao ``gongzuo changsuo xing saorao fangzhifa'' (jianyi gao) yi an], 
17 March 09.
    \53\ See, e.g., Therese Hesketh, Li Lu, and Zhu Wei Xing, ``The 
Consequences of Son Preference and Sex-Selective Abortion in China and 
Other Asian Countries,'' Canadian Medical Journal, 14 March 11, 1-2; 
Mikhail Lipatov, Shuzhuo Li, and Marcus W. Feldman, ``Economics, 
Cultural Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in 
China,'' Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, Vol. 105, No. 49 (2008), 19171. According to this 
study, ``The root of the [sex ratio] problem lies in a 2,500-year-old 
culture of son preference.'' See also Chu Junhong, ``Prenatal Sex 
Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural Central China,'' 
Population and Development Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2001), 260; Joseph 
Chamie, ``The Global Abortion Bind: A Woman's Right To Choose Gives Way 
to Sex-Selection Abortions and Dangerous Gender Imbalances,'' Yale 
Global, 29 May 08.
    \54\ State Commission for Population and Family Planning, Ministry 
of Health, State Food and Drug Administration, PRC Regulations 
Regarding the Prohibition of Non-Medically Necessary Gender 
Determination Examinations and Sex-Selective Termination of Pregnancy 
[Guanyu jinzhi fei yixue xuyao de tai'er xingbie jianding he xuanze 
xingbie de rengong zhongzhi renshen de guiding], issued 29 November 02, 
effective 1 January 03. For a discussion of these regulations, see 
``China Bans Sex-Selection Abortion,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Net, 
22 March 03.
    \55\ Mikhail Lipatov et al., ``Economics, Cultural Transmission, 
and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in China,'' Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 
105, No. 49 (2008), 19171. According to this study, ``The root of the 
[sex ratio] problem lies in a 2,500-year-old culture of son 
preference.''
    \56\ Wei Xing Zhu et al., ``China's Excess Males, Sex Selective 
Abortion and One Child Policy: Analysis of Data From 2005 National 
Intercensus Survey,'' British Medical Journal, 9 April 09, 4-5.
    \57\ Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ``Difficulty Finding a 
Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch'' [10 nian 
zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 January 
10. According to the January 2010 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
study, by 2020, the number of Chinese males of marriageable age may 
exceed the number of Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 
million.
    \58\ PRC State Council, PRC Outline for the Development of Women 
[Zhongguo funu fazhan gangyao], issued 30 July 11; PRC State Council, 
PRC Outline for the Development of Children [Zhongguo ertong fazhan 
gangyao], issued 30 July 11.
    \59\ ``China Gender Gap Fuelling Human Trafficking: Report,'' 
Agence France-Presse, reprinted in China Post, 22 September 10. See 
also World Health Organization, Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Children's 
Fund, and United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment 
of Women, ``Preventing Gender-Biased Sex Selection,'' 14 June 11, 5; 
Susan W. Tiefenbrun and Christie J. Edwards, ``Gendercide and the 
Cultural Context of Sex Trafficking in China,'' Fordham International 
Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), 752; Therese Hesketh et al., ``The 
Effect of China's One-Child Policy After 25 Years,'' New England 
Journal of Medicine, Vol. 353, No. 11 (2005), 1173; Nicholas Eberstadt, 
``A Global War Against Baby Girls: Sex-Selective Abortion Becomes A 
Worldwide Practice,'' Handbook of Gender Medicine, reprinted in All 
Girls Allowed, 1 May 11. According to Eberstadt's report, ``Some 
economists have hypothesized that mass feticide, in making women 
scarce, will only increase their `value'--but in settings where the 
legal and personal rights of the individual are not secure and 
inviolable, the `rising value of women' can have perverse and 
unexpected consequences, including increased demand for prostitution 
and an upsurge in the kidnapping and trafficking of women (as is now 
reportedly being witnessed in some women-scarce areas in Asia)[.]''
    Notes to Section II--Human Trafficking

    \1\ The specific phrase used to describe the concept of trafficking 
in Chinese government documents, including the National Plan of Action 
on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012), as well as 
related regulations, circulars, and opinions, is guaimai funu ertong, 
which literally means ``the abduction and sale of women and children.'' 
See, for example, State Council General Office, ``Circular on the State 
Council General Office's Issuance of China's National Plan of Action on 
Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012)'' [Guowuyuan 
bangongting guanyu yinfa zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong 
jihua (2008-2012 nian) de tongzhi], 13 December 07; See also Ministry 
of Public Security, ``Qinghai Province Implementing Rules and 
Regulations for the Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women 
and Children (2008-2012)'' [Qinghai sheng fandui guaimai funu ertong 
xingdong jihua shishi xize (2008-2012 nian)], 22 December 09; Ministry 
of Public Security, Zhuzhou Municipal People's Government, ``Zhuzhou 
Municipal People's Government Office Circular Regarding the Issuance of 
Zhuzhou Municipality's Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women 
and Children'' [Zhuzhou shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu yinfa 
zhuzhou shi fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua de tongzhi], 31 
December 09; Bazhong Municipal People's Government, ``Opinion of 
Bazhong Municipal People's Government Office Regarding the 
Implementation of the China National Action Plan on Combating 
Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012)'' [Bazhong shi renmin 
zhengfu bangongshi guanyu guanche guowuyuan ``zhongguo fandui guaimai 
funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)'' de shishi yijian], 30 
September 09.
    \2\ ``China's Top Legislature Ends Bimonthly Session, Adopts Tort 
Law,'' Xinhua, 26 December 09; UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, adopted 15 November 00, entered into force 25 December 
03. This protocol is commonly referred to as the Palermo Protocol 
because it was adopted in Palermo, Italy, in 2000.
    \3\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 
July 79, effective 1 October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 
31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 
06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 240.
    \4\ Ibid., art. 358.
    \5\ See also Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 
U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--
China,'' 27 June 11, 122.
    \6\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Protocol), adopted 15 
November 00, entered into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). Article 3(a) 
of the Palermo Protocol states: `` `Trafficking in persons' shall mean 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power 
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation 
shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of 
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or 
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs.''
    \7\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 
June 11, 122. According to this report, ``Male victims of trafficking 
and victims of forced labor--either male or female--did not receive 
regular protection services, but some were sent to hospitals for 
treatment of their medical needs and at least two victims received 
legal aid to gain financial compensation.'' CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 
10 October 09, 175.
    \8\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 175; Office To Monitor 
and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, 
``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 June 11, 124. 
According to this report, ``The Ministry of Public Security issued 
orders to police departments to treat all women arrested for 
prostitution as victims of trafficking. It was not clear during the 
reporting period to what extent local police units complied with the 
order.''
    \9\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Human Trafficking 
FAQs,'' last visited 28 June 11.
    \10\ Ibid.
    \11\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 
June 11, 122.
    \12\ Ibid., 124. Human Rights Watch, ``World Report 2011--North 
Korea,'' 24 January 11.
    \13\ ``Supreme People's Court Procuratorate Requests In-Depth 
Investigation of the Abduction and Sale of Children and Corruption'' 
[Zuigaojian yaoqiu shenjiu she guaimai ertong duzhi fubai], China Net, 
reprinted in China Daily, 4 June 11; Zhang Yan and He Dan, 
``Trafficking of Chinese Women on the Rise,'' China Daily, 24 January 
11. An official cited in this article reported that insufficient 
finances and manpower restrict police capacity to fight trafficking. 
For specific examples of official corruption reported during the 
Commission's 2011 reporting year, see ``Official Detained in `Slavery' 
Scandal,'' Shanghai Daily, reprinted in China Information Center, 23 
December 10; ``Ringleaders in Anhui Ordered To Surrender,'' South China 
Morning Post, 10 February 11.
    \14\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 118. As documented 
and defined internationally, major forms of human trafficking include 
forced labor, bonded labor, involuntary domestic servitude, child 
soldiers, forced prostitution, children exploited for commercial sex, 
child sex tourism, and debt bondage and involuntary servitude among 
migrant laborers. Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 
U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2008--Major 
Forms of Trafficking in Persons,'' 4 June 08, 19-25.
    \15\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 
June 11, 121.
    \16\ Zhang Yan and He Dan, ``Trafficking of Chinese Women on the 
Rise,'' China Daily, 24 January 11; Office To Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in 
Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 June 11, 121. See also, for example, 
Mandy Zuo, ``Gang Busted for Trafficking Women to Congo,'' South China 
Morning Post, 4 December 10; U.S. Department of Justice, ``California 
Woman Sentenced to More Than Three Years in Prison for Human 
Trafficking Charges,'' 17 November 10.
    \17\ See, e.g., Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 
2011--China,'' 27 June 11, 121. See also, for example, ``Women Tricked, 
Trafficked Into China,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 March 11; Palaung Women's 
Organization, ``Stolen Lives: Human Trafficking From Palaung Areas of 
Burma to China,'' 9 June 11.
    \18\ See, e.g., ``Mentally Disabled Individuals Sold by Orphanage 
as `Indentured Laborers,' Ate From the Same Bowls as Dogs'' 
[Zhizhangzhe bei shouyangsuo maiwei ``baoshengong'' yu gou tong shi 
yiguo mian], China Economic Net, reprinted in QQ News, 13 December 10; 
Zhang Xuanchen, ``Former Homeless Shelter Official Detained on Human 
Trafficking Allegations,'' Shanghai Daily, 22 December 10; Du Guangli, 
``Mentally Disabled Workers in Shaanxi Illicit Brick Kiln Face Aid 
Puzzle'' [Shanxi hei zhuanyao zhizhang gong mianlin jiuzhu miju], 
Phoenix Net, 28 January 11.
    \19\ See, e.g., Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 
2011--China,'' 27 June 11, 123. According to this report, ``[T]he 
Chinese government did not release statistics related to forced labor 
of men.''
    \20\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 15 November 00, entered 
into force 25 December 03, art. 3.
    \21\ Zhang Yan and He Dan, ``Trafficking of Chinese Women on the 
Rise,'' China Daily, 24 January 11.
    \22\ Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ``Difficulty Finding a 
Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch'' [10 nian 
zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 January 
10. According to the January 2010 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
study, by 2020, the number of Chinese males of marriageable age may 
exceed the number of Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 
million.
    \23\ Mikhail Lipatov et al., ``Economics, Cultural Transmission, 
and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in China,'' Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 
105, No. 49 (December 2008), 19171. According to this study, ``The root 
of the [sex ratio] problem lies in a 2,500-year-old culture of son 
preference.'' Wei Xing Zhu et al., ``China's Excess Males, Sex 
Selective Abortion and One Child Policy: Analysis of Data From 2005 
National Intercensus Survey,'' British Medical Journal, 9 April 09, 4-
5.
    \24\ Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ``Borderland: Sex Trafficking on the 
China-Myanmar Border,'' Global Post, 26 October 10; ``China's Gender 
Imbalance,'' World Press, 11 January 11; ``China Gender Gap Fuelling 
Human Trafficking: Report,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in China 
Post, 22 September 10; Elizabeth Lee, ``Rights Activists Say China's 
Gender Ratio Contributes to Human Trafficking,'' Voice of America, 24 
January 11; ``Police Rescue Hundreds of Women, Children Kidnapped in SW 
China,'' People's Daily, 22 December 10.
    \25\ ``Chinese Women Taught To Avoid People-Traffickers,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Daily, 8 March 10.
    \26\ Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ``Borderland: Sex Trafficking on the 
China-Myanmar Border,'' Global Post, 26 October 10; ``Women Tricked, 
Trafficked Into China,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 March 11.
    \27\ Zhang Xuanchen, ``Former Homeless Shelter Official Detained on 
Human Trafficking Allegations,'' Shanghai Daily, 22 December 10.
    \28\ ``Sweatshop Allegedly Abuses Mentally Ill,'' Global Times, 14 
December 10. ``Mentally Disabled Individuals Sold by Orphanage as 
Indentured Laborers'' [Zhizhangzhe bei shouyangsuo maiwei 
``baoshengong'' yu gou tong shi yiguo mian], China Economic Net, 13 
December 10.
    \29\ Du Guangli, ``Mentally Disabled Workers in Shaanxi Illicit 
Brick Kiln Face Aid Puzzle'' [Shanxi hei zhuanyao zhizhang gong mianlin 
jiuzhu miju], Phoenix Net, 28 January 11.
    \30\ Ibid.
    \31\ ``Response to: `Students With 9 Years of Compulsory Education 
Still Pick Cotton? ' '' [Huifu neirong: ``jiunian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng 
hai zai shi mianhua ma? ''], Xinhe (Toqsu) County Message Board, 
reprinted in Xinhe (Toqsu) County People's Government, 18 September 10; 
``Second Agricultural Division 29th Regiment's Legal Office Strengthens 
Legal and Safety Education During Period Students Pick Cotton'' [Nong 
er shi ershijiu tuan sifasuo jiaqiang xuesheng shi mian qijian fazhi 
anquan jiaoyu], Xinjiang Agricultural Information Portal, 4 October 10; 
Xu Jiang, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government, ``Wusu, 
Xinjiang No. 5 Central School Students Help Pick Cotton at 134 
Regiment'' [Wusushi wu zhong xuesheng dao yisansi tuan zhiyuan shi 
hua], 2 October 10. For recent Commission analyses on Xinjiang's work-
study programs, see ``Underage Students Continue To Pick Cotton in 
Xinjiang Work-Study Program,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 8 December 10.
    \32\ Cui Jia et al., ``Saving Kidnapped Kids From Streets of 
Crime,'' China Daily, 26 May 11; ``Parents Blamed for Begging, 
Performing,'' Asia One News, 15 February 11; China Internet Information 
Center, ``Gov't Campaign Against Child Begging,'' 9 March 11; ``Blog 
Fights Child Trafficking,'' Xinhua, 9 February 11.
    \33\ ``Child Rented Out by Parents To Beg Was Forced To Eat 
Faeces,'' Asia One News, 27 February 11; Hu Zhanfen and Yang Jiang, 
``The Real Situation of China's Child Beggars: 10,000 Yuan To Resolve 
Unforeseen Circumstances'' [Zhongguo tonggai zhenxiang: chu shenme 
yiwai dou 1 wan yuan jiejue], Xinmin Weekly, reprinted in QQ News, 23 
February 11.
    \34\ ``Region Sentences Eight for Felonies,'' Xinhua, reprinted in 
China Daily, 17 August 11.
    \35\ Shao Wei, ``China's Xinjiang Region Aims To Get Stray Kids 
Back Home,'' China Daily, 23 April 11.
    \36\ ``China's Top Legislature Ends Bimonthly Session, Adopts Tort 
Law,'' Xinhua, 26 December 09; UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
adopted 15 November 00, entered into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a).
    \37\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 
July 79, effective 1 October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 
31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 
06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 244; Eighth Amendment to the 
Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo xingfa xiuzheng'an (ba)], issued 25 February 11, provision 
38.
    \38\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 15 November 00, entered 
into force 25 December 03, art. 3(a).
    \39\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 
July 79, effective 1 October 97, art. 244; PRC Criminal Law, passed 1 
July 79, effective 1 October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 
31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 
06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11, art. 244.
    \40\ Topics that need to be addressed in domestic legislation to 
bring it into compliance with the Palermo Protocol, include protection 
and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking (see Palermo Protocol art. 
6.3), non-physical forms of coercion into the legal definition of 
trafficking (see Palermo Protocol art. 3(a)), commercial sexual 
exploitation of minors (see Palermo Protocol art. 3(c and d)), and 
trafficking of men (see Palermo Protocol art. 3(a)). See UN Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime (Palermo Protocol), adopted 15 November 00, entered 
into force 25 December 03; Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons, U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 
2011--China,'' 27 June 11, 122.
    \41\ PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xing fa], passed 1 
July 79, effective 1 October 97, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 
31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 
06, 28 February 09, 25 February 11. The previous language for Article 
244 appeared in the 2002 amendment and stated, ``Where an employer, in 
violation of the laws and regulations on labour administration, compels 
its employees to work by restricting their personal freedom, if the 
circumstances are serious, the persons who are directly responsible for 
the offence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more 
than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, 
be fined.'' The revised language of Art. 244 states, ``Whoever forces 
another to work by violence, threats or restriction of personal freedom 
shall be sentenced to not more than three years fixed-term imprisonment 
or criminal detention, and shall also, or shall only, be fined. If the 
circumstances are serious, he shall be sentenced to not less than three 
years and not more than seven years fixed-term imprisonment and shall 
also be fined. Whoever is aware of a person committing the crime in the 
previous paragraph and recruits or transports personnel for him, or 
otherwise aids forced labour shall be punished according to the 
preceding paragraph. Where a unit commits the crimes in the two 
preceding paragraphs, it shall be fined, and the persons who are 
directly responsible for the crime shall be punished according to 
provisions in paragraph one.''
    \42\ Ibid., art. 240.
    \43\ Ibid., art 244.
    \44\ International Organization for Migration, ``IOM, China Improve 
Support to Victims of Human Trafficking,'' 10 December 10; 
International Organization for Migration, ``IOM and China Work To 
Protect, Assist Victims of Trafficking,'' 15 March 11.
    \45\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 
June 11, 124.
    \46\ ``Vietnam and China Sign Pack [sic] on Human Trafficking,'' 
Viet Nam News, 16 September 10.
    \47\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 
June 11, 125.
    \48\ Ibid., 121,124.
    \49\ Ibid., 122.
    \50\ Ibid.
    \51\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China,'' 14 
June 10, 113.
    \52\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 
June 11, 122.
    \53\ ``Highlights of Work Report of China's Supreme People's 
Procuratorate,'' Xinhua, 11 March 11.
    \54\ ``Highlights of Work Report of China's Supreme People's 
Procuratorate,'' Xinhua, 11 March 10.
    \55\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 
June 11, 121. For information on the significance of the tier 
placements see, Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 
U.S. Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--Tier 
Placements,'' 27 June 11. According to the U.S. Department of State, 
countries placed on the Tier 2 Watch List are ``countries whose 
governments do not fully comply with the [Trafficking Victim Protection 
Act's] minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring 
themselves into compliance with those standards AND: a) The absolute 
number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or 
is significantly increasing; b)There is a failure to provide evidence 
of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons 
from the previous year; or c) The determination that a country is 
making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with minimum 
standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional 
future steps over the next year.''
    \56\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report 2011--China,'' 27 
June 11, 121.
    \57\ Huang Jingjing, ``Blog Fights Child Trafficking,'' Global 
Times, 9 February 11.
    \58\ Xu Chi, ``Six Children Rescued in Beggar Campaign,'' Shanghai 
Daily, 10 February 11; ``Microblogs Save Abducted Children,'' China 
Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 15 February 11. According to the China 
Daily report, ``Various government agencies have gotten involved. The 
police went on the micro blog, followed the campaign and rescued the 
six children. Civil affairs authorities arranged children's DNA tests 
to aid in identification. Several non-governmental organizations have 
also launched projects to help begging children.''
    \59\ Ng Tze-wei, ``Beggar Children Rescued in Net Drive, Online 
Campaign Raises Privacy Issues,'' South China Morning Post, 10 February 
11; ``Yu Jianrong's Anti-trafficking Stirs Debate--The People Call for 
Public Clarification'' [Yu jianrong daguai yin zhengyi, minzhong yuqing 
gongkai chengqing], Radio Free Asia, 9 February 11.
    \60\ ``Child Beggar Raid Raises Doubts About Campaign,'' Shanghai 
Daily, 8 February 11.
    \61\ Ibid.; ``Online Effort To Save China's Kidnapped Children Is 
Flawed,'' CNN, 14 February 11; ``Six Children Rescued in Beggar 
Campaign,'' Shanghai Daily, 10 February 11.
    Notes to Section II--North Korean Refugees in China

    \1\ ``Chinese Crackdown Spurs N.Korean Defectors' Move to South,'' 
Chosun Daily, 5 July 11; ``N.Korea, China Intensify Crackdown on 
Defectors,'' Arirang News, reprinted in Chosun Daily, 17 June 11.
    \2\ The Commission observed numerous reports describing China's 
longstanding policy position that North Korean refugees are illegal 
economic migrants. See, e.g., Tania Branigan, ``South Korea Reports 
Huge Rise in Defectors From the North,'' Guardian, 15 November 10; Kim 
Young-jin, ``Problem of Forgotten NK Children in China Grows,'' Korea 
Times, 12 June 11.
    \3\ UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 
Convention), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 
December 50, arts. 1, 33; UN Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/2198 of 16 
December 66, entry into force 4 October 67. Article 1 of the 1951 
Convention defines a refugee as someone who, ``owing to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country . 
. . .'' Article 33 of the 1951 Convention mandates that ``[n]o 
Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.'' The Chinese government acceded to the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol in September 1982, but has not adopted legislation to 
implement the treaties.
    \4\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea,'' 21 February 11, para. 65.
    \5\ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Handbook 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees,'' January 1992, sec. (b), paras. 94-105; UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, ``Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea,'' 21 February 11, para. 65.
    \6\ Carla Freeman and Drew Thompson, Center for the National 
Interest, ``China on the Edge: China's Border Provinces and Chinese 
Security Policy,'' 8 April 11.
    \7\ Daisuke Nishimura, ``China Working With N. Korea To Hunt Down 
People Fleeing,'' Asahi Shimbun, 28 September 10.
    \8\ Ibid.
    \9\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, ``Lives for Sale: 
Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China,'' March 2009, 
18-19.
    \10\ Lee Sung Jin, ``Current Situation on Refugees in China,'' 
Daily NK, 10 May 09.
    \11\ ``Korean-Chinese Who Helped North Defectors Granted Refugee 
Status,'' Yonhap, 20 February 11.
    \12\ ``North Korean Defectors Would Return,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 
March 11.
    \13\ Ibid.
    \14\ U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, ``World Refugee 
Survey 2009: China,'' 2010.
    \15\ Ibid.
    \16\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2010, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 8 April 11.
    \17\ ``N.Korea in New Crackdown on Refugees: Report,'' Agence 
France-Presse, 16 August 11.
    \18\ Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, ``Survival 
Under Torture: Briefing Report on the Situation of Torture in the 
DPRK,'' September 2009, 24-31; UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, ``Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,'' 21 
February 11, para. 65; Yoonok Chang et al., Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, ``Migration Experiences of North Korean 
Refugees: Survey Evidence From China,'' March 2008, 10.
    \19\ Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, East-West Center, 
``Repression and Punishment in North Korea: Survey Evidence of Prison 
Camp Experiences,'' 5 October 09, 11-12.
    \20\ Yoonok Chang et al., Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, ``Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey 
Evidence From China,'' March 2008, 6; Tom O'Neill, ``Escape From North 
Korea,'' National Geographic, 1 February 09; U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, ``A Prison Without Bars: Refugee and 
Defector Testimonies of Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or 
Belief in North Korea,'' March 2008, 28.
    \21\ Tom O'Neill, ``Escape From North Korea,'' National Geographic, 
1 February 09; John M. Glionna, ``Aiding North Korea Defectors: A High-
Stakes Spy Mission,'' Los Angeles Times, 25 November 09.
    \22\ ``Political Prison Camps Expand,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 May 11.
    \23\  Amnesty International, ``Images Reveal Scale of North Korean 
Political Prison Camps,'' 3 May 11.
    \24\  ``N.Korea `Has Far More Prisons Than Previously Believed,' '' 
Chosun Daily, 27 April 11.
    \25\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, ``Lives for Sale: 
Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China,'' March 2009, 
46-49; Yoonok Chang et al., Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, ``Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey 
Evidence From China,'' March 2008, 13.
    \26\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--Korea, Democratic 
People's Republic of,'' 27 June 11.
    \27\ ``Women Tricked, Trafficked Into China,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 
March 11.
    \28\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, ``Lives for Sale: 
Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China,'' March 2009, 
28-33; ``North Korean Trafficked Brides,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 April 
09.
    \29\ Escaping North Korea: The Plight of the Defectors, Hearing of 
the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, 
23 September 10, Testimony of Su Jin Kang.
    \30\ ``Hailun Police Break Up a Human Trafficking Criminal Group,'' 
Suihua Evening News, 13 June 11.
    \31\ ``Women Tricked, Trafficked Into China,'' Radio Free Asia, 4 
March 11.
    \32\ Ibid.
    \33\ Ibid.
    \34\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, ``Lives for Sale: 
Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China,'' March 2009, 
20-21; Lee Tae-hoon, ``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at 
$1,500,'' Korea Times, 5 May 10.
    \35\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--Korea, Democratic 
People's Republic of,'' 27 June 11, 198-199; Jason Strother, 
``Christian Missionaries Go Online To Help North Korean Refugees in 
China,'' Voice of America, 27 December 10.
    \36\ Nam You-Sun, ``N.Korean Women Up for Sale in China: 
Activist,'' Agence France-Presse, 12 May 10; The Rising Stakes of 
Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, 
President, Defense Forum Foundation.
    \37\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, ``Lives for Sale: 
Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China,'' March 2009, 
33-36; The Rising Stakes of Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable 
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony 
of Suzanne Scholte, President, Defense Forum Foundation.
    \38\ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 29 September 
03, art. 7.
    \39\ Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol provides that ``State 
Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other 
measures: (a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons; and (b) To 
protect victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and 
children, from revictimization.'' Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 
accession by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 
2000, entry into force 29 September 03, art. 9. Article 6 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women provides that ``States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in 
women and exploitation of prostitution of women.'' Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General 
Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, entry into force 3 
September 81, art. 6.
    \40\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--China,'' 27 June 
11.
    \41\ Lee Tae-hoon, ``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at 
$1,500,'' Korea Times, 5 May 10.
    \42\ Office To Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, ``Trafficking in Persons Report--China,'' 27 June 
11.
    \43\ PRC Nationality Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guoji fa], 
effective 10 September 80, art. 4; Every citizen in China is registered 
under the household registration (hukou) system. See also Human Rights 
Watch, ``Denied Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean 
Women in China,'' April 2008, 3.
    \44\ PRC Compulsory Education Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu 
jiaoyu fa], issued 12 April 86, amended 29 June 06, effective 1 
September 06, arts. 4, 5, 9, 11.
    \45\ Human Rights Watch, ``Denied Status, Denied Education: 
Children of North Korean Women in China,'' April 2008, 3, 9-12; Lina 
Yoon, ``Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China,'' Christian 
Science Monitor, 4 September 09; ``Korean Children Left in China,'' 
Radio Free Asia, 12 February 10.
    \46\ UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by 
UN General Assembly resolution 49 (V) of 14 December 50, art. 22; PRC 
Nationality Law, [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yiwu jiaoyu fa] effective 
10 September 80, art. 4; PRC Compulsory Education Law [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo yiwu jiaoyu fa], issued 12 April 86, amended 29 June 06, 
effective 1 September 06, art. 5; Lina Yoon, ``Stateless Children: 
North Korean Refugees in China,'' Christian Science Monitor, 4 
September 09.
    \47\ Lina Yoon, ``Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in 
China,'' Christian Science Monitor, 4 September 09.
    \48\ Human Rights Watch, ``Denied Status, Denied Education: 
Children of North Korean Women in China,'' April 2008, 8; Lee Tae-hoon, 
``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,'' Korea Times, 5 May 
10; Lina Yoon, ``Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China,'' 
Christian Science Monitor, 4 September 09; ``Korean Children Left in 
China,'' Radio Free Asia, 12 February 10.
    \49\  Kirsty Taylor, ``Helping Hands Needed for N.K. Kids,'' Korea 
Herald, 15 June 11.
    Notes to Section II--Public Health

    \1\ ``Worldview: NGOs a Paradox in Today's China,'' Philadelphia 
Inquirer, 23 May 10. According to Minister of Health Chen Zhu, quoted 
in this article, ``NGOs have an indispensable role in health care . . . 
[t]he participation of NGOs has played an active role in raising social 
awareness and ending stigma and in prevention measures.''
    \2\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 147; State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange Circular on Issues Concerning the 
Management of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions 
[Guojia waihui guanli ju guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng waihui guanli 
youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10. 
See also Verna Yu, ``Beijing Tightens Rules on Foreign Funding of 
NGOs,'' South China Morning Post, 15 March 10; Cara Anna, ``NGOs in 
China Say Threatened by New Donor Rules,'' Associated Press, reprinted 
in Google, 12 March 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Prominent NGO 
Raise [sic] Concern Over New Regulations on Receiving Foreign 
Funding,'' 16 March 10.
    \3\ ``AIDS Activist Tian Xi Sentenced to One Year in Prison'' 
[Aizibing weiquan renshi tian xi bei panxing yi nian], Boxun, 12 
February 11.
    \4\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Henan Rights Defender Living 
With HIV Tian Xi Criminally Detained'' [Henan aizibing ganran weiquan 
renshi tian xi bei xingshi juliu], reprinted in Boxun, 23 August 10.
    \5\ Ibid.
    \6\ Ibid.
    \7\ ``Government Documents Make Clear, Capture of AIDS Transfusion 
Victim Tian Xi Was Premeditated'' [Zhengfu wenjian xianshi, zhua shuxue 
ran aizi de tian xi zao you yumou], Boxun, 18 August 10.
    \8\ Ibid.
    \9\ ``AIDS Sufferer Tian Xi's Health Worthy of Concern, Rights 
Defender Denied Visit to Wang Yi'' [Aizibing huanzhe tian xi jiankang 
kanyou weiquan renshi tanwang wangyi zaoju], Radio Free Asia, 18 March 
11; Asia Catalyst, ``120 International Groups and Experts Call for Tian 
Xi's Release,'' 9 March 11.
    \10\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing 
August 16-18, 2011,'' 19 August 11.
    \11\ ``Public Security and Tax Officials Forcibly Removed Documents 
From Beijing-Based Aizhixing'' [Beijing aizhixing ziliao zao gongan ji 
shuiwu guanyuan qiangzhi dai li], Radio Free Asia, 22 December 10.
    \12\ Chen Bingzhong, ``An Open Letter to General Secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party and President Hu Jintao'' [Zhi zhonggong 
zhongyang zong shuji guojia zhuxi hu jintao de gongkaixin], reprinted 
in Aizhixing, 28 November 10; ``Aizhixing Web Site Shut Down on March 
15 for Publishing Retired Health Official's Letter to Hu Jintao 
Exposing Henan AIDS and Blood Transfusion Incident'' [Yin fabu tuixiu 
weisheng guanyuan chen bingzhong zhixin hu jintao jielu henan aizibing 
xue huo zeren guanyuan, aizhixing wangzhan 3 yue 15 ri bei guanbi], 
Aizhixing Google Buzz site, 16 March 11.
    \13\ Marianne Barriaux, ``Ex-Official Implicates China Leaders in 
AIDS,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 30 November 10.
    \14\ Chen Bingzhong, ``An Open Letter to General Secretary of the 
Chinese Communist Party and President Hu Jintao'' [Zhi zhonggong 
zhongyang zong shuji guojia zhuxi hu jintao de gongkaixin], reprinted 
in Aizhixing, 28 November 10; ``China Closes AIDS Website,'' Radio Free 
Asia, 16 March 11.
    \15\ ``China Closes AIDS Website,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 March 11; 
Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch, ``Beijing Aizhixing Research 
Institute Web Site Closed'' [Beijing aizhixing yanjiu suo wangzhan bei 
guanbi], 16 March 11.
    \16\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing 
March 31-April 5, 2011,'' 5 April 11; Kate Krauss, ``China's Brutal 
Repression,'' Washington Post, 27 April 11.
    \17\ Kate Krauss, ``China's Brutal Repression,'' Washington Post, 
27 April 11; Beijing Yirenping Center, ``Beijing Yirenping Center 
Strongly Condemns and Reports to the Public Security Bureau the Violent 
Acts Against Chang Kun'' [Beijing yirenping zhongxin qianglie qianze 
dui chang kun de baoli qinhai xingwei bing xiang gongan bumen jubao], 
reprinted in China AIDS Group, 5 April 11.
    \18\ Beijing Yirenping Center, ``Beijing Yirenping Center Strongly 
Condemns and Reports to the Public Security Bureau the Violent Acts 
Against Chang Kun'' [Beijing yirenping zhongxin qianglie qianze dui 
chang kun de baoli qinhai xingwei bing xiang gongan bumen jubao], 
reprinted in China AIDS Group, 5 April 11.
    \19\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing, 
March 31-April 5, 2011,'' 5 April 11; Beijing Yirenping Center, 
``Beijing Yirenping Center Strongly Condemns and Reports to the Public 
Security Bureau the Violent Acts Against Chang Kun'' [Beijing yirenping 
zhongxin qianglie qianze dui chang kun de baoli qinhai xingwei bing 
xiang gongan bumen jubao], reprinted in China AIDS Group, 5 April 11.
    \20\ @zengjinyan, Web log post, Twitter.com, 27 June 11.
    \21\ Ibid., 28 June 11.
    \22\ Ibid., 20 June 11.
    \23\ Ibid., 7 June 11.
    \24\ Ibid., 20 June 11.
    \25\ PRC Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiuye 
cujin fa], issued 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, arts. 29, 30; 
PRC Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons [Zhonghua renmin 
gongeheguo canjiren baozhang fa], issued 28 December 90, amended 24 
April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts. 3, 25, 30--40; PRC Law on the 
Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo chuanranbing fangzhi fa], issued 21 February 1989, amended 28 
August 04, art. 16. See also Ministry of Education, ``Circular 
Regarding Further Standardizing Physical Examinations [Prior to] School 
Enrollment or Employment To Protect the Rights of Hepatitis B Surface 
Antigen Carriers to School Enrollment or Employment'' [Guanyu jinyibu 
guifan ruxue he jiuye tijian xiangmu weihu yigan biaomian kangyuan 
xiedaizhe ruxue he jiuye quanli de tongzhi], 10 February 10.
    \26\ Shan Juan and Cang Wei, ``HIV-Positive Still Face Job 
Discrimination,'' China Daily, 2 December 10. See also Yirenping, 
``2010 State-Owned Enterprise Hepatitis B Discrimination Investigative 
Report'' [2010 guoqi yigan qishi diaocha baogao], February 2011. For an 
example of one such case in Guangdong province, see Claire Wang, ``Hep 
B Testing Exposed in Guangzhou,'' Shanghai Daily, reprinted in Life of 
Guangzhou, 26 January 11.
    \27\ ``New Hepatitis B Employment Discrimination Case'' [Yigan 
jiuye qishi puxin anli], Radio Free Asia, 26 May 11. According to Lu 
Jun, public health advocate and founder of anti-discrimination non-
governmental organization Yirenping, ``A root reason for [the 
difficulty of implementing anti-discrimination policies] is that the 
cost for an enterprise to violate the law is too low, and the cost for 
a worker to protect [his or her] rights is too high. Research has found 
that after these organizations have behaved in violation of the law, 
the legal penalty is next to nothing. [An organization] need not pay a 
price for behaving in violation of the law, while a worker must first 
hire a lawyer to defend [his or her] rights; in addition, [he or she] 
must spend the time. In the end, the worker may not necessarily win the 
lawsuit.''
    \28\ ``New Hepatitis B Employment Discrimination Case'' [Yigan 
jiuye qishi puxin anli], Radio Free Asia, 26 May 11.
    \29\ ``HIV-Infected Man Appeals Ruling,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 April 
11; ``Courts Hear China's First HIV/AIDS Employment Discrimination 
Cases,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 31 March 11.
    \30\ ``Experts Call for Amendments to Civil Servant Physical 
Examination Standards, Do Away With AIDS Employment Discrimination'' 
[Zhuanjia huyu xiugai gongwuyuan tijian biaozhun xiaochu aizi jiuye 
qishi], Worker Daily, reprinted in Sichuan Online, 6 July 11.
    \31\ Shan Juan and Li Yao, ``HIV/AIDS Sufferers Rejected by 
Hospitals,'' China Daily, 18 May 11.
    \32\ Zhang Hailin, ``People Living With HIV/AIDS Go `Underground' 
for Medical Treatment'' [Aizibing ren ``dixia'' jiuzhen xianzhuang], 
Outlook Weekly, 15 March 11.
    \33\ STD and AIDS Prevention and Control Center of the Chinese 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention and International Labour 
Organization, ``Discrimination Against People Living With HIV Within 
Healthcare Settings in China,'' 17 May 11.
    \34\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXII) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 12(1). China signed 
the ICESCR on October 27, 1997, and ratified it on March 27, 2001.
    \35\ Malcolm Moore, ``China Has 100 Million People With Mental 
Illness,'' Telegraph, 28 April 10; ``Psychiatric Institutions in 
China,'' Lancet, Vol. 376, No. 9734 (2010), 2; According to this study, 
``The average number of qualified psychiatrists worldwide is four per 
100 000 individuals: in China, it is about 1.26.'' See also CECC, 2010 
Annual Report, 10 October 10, 146.
    \36\ Mitch Moxley, ``China Tackles Mental Health Woes,'' Inter 
Press Service, reprinted in Asia Times, 9 July 10.
    \37\ Dai Lian et al., ``Touch of Insanity Sullies Mental Health 
Care,'' Caixin, 22 July 11.
    \38\ ``China's First Case of `Being Misidentified as Mentally Ill' 
Obtains Compensation'' [Zhongguo shoulie ``bei jingshenbing'' huo 
peichang], Radio Free Asia, 18 October 10.
    \39\ ``State Council Legislative Affairs Office Publishes `Mental 
Health Law (Draft)' Full Text,'' China News Net, reprinted in NetEase, 
10 June 11; Li Qiumeng, ``Public Comment [Period] on Mental Health Law 
Ends, Raises Concerns Over Misuse'' [Jingshen weisheng fa zheng yijian 
jieshu yinfa lanyong danyou], Jinghua Times, reprinted in QQ News, 11 
July 11; Li Zezhao, ``Let the Light of the Judiciary Look After the 
Spirits in the Dim Corners'' [Rang sifa zhi guang guanzhao you'an 
jiaoluo li de linghun], ChinaRights2 Blog, 10 July 11.
    \40\ Li Qiumeng, ``Public Comment [Period] on Mental Health Law 
Ends, Raises Concerns Over Misuse'' [Jingshen weisheng fa zheng yijian 
jieshu yinfa lanyong danyou], Jinghua Times, reprinted in QQ News, 11 
July 11;
    \41\ Li Zezhao, ``Let the Light of the Judiciary Look After the 
Spirits in the Dim Corners'' [Rang sifa zhi guang guanzhao you'an 
jiaoluo li de linghun], ChinaRights2 Blog, 10 July 11.
    \42\ See, e.g., Dai Lian et al., ``Touch of Insanity Sullies Mental 
Health Care,'' Caixin, 22 July 11; ``Xinhua Review: What's Behind the 
Frequent Cases of `Being Mentally-Illed' '' [Xinhua zongheng: ``bei 
jingshenbing'' shijian pinfa beihou], Xinhua, 12 June 11; Chen Yong and 
Zhu Changjun, ``Lao He Is Sick: A Side Note on `Being Mentally-Illed' 
'' [Lao he bing le: ``bei jingshenbing'' pangzhu], Economic Observer, 
reprinted in Phoenix Net, 22 July 11; Yang Jianshun et al., ``Need a 
Combination of Law and Relief To Put a Stop to `Being Misdiagnosed as 
Mentally Ill' '' [Dujue ``bei jingshenbing'' xu falu yu jiuji jiehe], 
Legal Daily, 13 June 11.
    \43\ ``Chen Zhu: Mental Health Law Expected To Come Out Within the 
Year'' [Chen zhu: jingshen weisheng fa niannei youwang chutai], Number 
One Caijing Daily, reprinted in QQ News, 11 March 11.
    \44\ ``State Council Legislative Affairs Office Publishes `Mental 
Health Law (Draft)' Full Text,'' China News Net, reprinted in NetEase, 
10 June 11, art. 3; Yang Jianshun et al., ``Need a Combination of Law 
and Relief To Put a Stop to `Being Misdiagnosed as Mentally Ill' '' 
[Dujue ``bei jingshenbing'' xu falu yu jiuji jiehe], Legal Daily, 13 
June 11.
    \45\ ``State Council Legislative Affairs Office Publishes `Mental 
Health Law (Draft)' Full Text,'' China News Net, reprinted in NetEase, 
10 June 11, art. 4.
    \46\ Ibid., art. 22.
    \47\ Ibid., art. 4.
    \48\ Ibid., art. 26.
    \49\ Ibid., art. 27.
    \50\ Aizhixing, ``Letter of Recommendations Addressed to the State 
Council Legislative Affairs Office Regarding the Draft Mental Health 
Law'' [Jiu ``jingshen weisheng fa (cao'an)'' zhi guowuyuan fazhi 
bangongshi de jianyi xin], reprinted in China Rights Google group, 24 
June 11.
    \51\ ``State Council Legislative Affairs Office Publishes `Mental 
Health Law (Draft)' Full Text,'' China News Net, reprinted in NetEase, 
10 June 11, arts. 12, 63; Aizhixing, ``Letter of Recommendations 
Addressed to the State Council Legislative Affairs Office Regarding the 
Draft Mental Health Law'' [Jiu ``jingshen weisheng fa (cao'an)'' zhi 
guowuyuan fazhi bangongshi de jianyi xin], reprinted in China Rights 
Google group, 24 June 11, arts. 12, 63.
    \52\ Aizhixing, ``Letter of Recommendations Addressed to the State 
Council Legislative Affairs Office Regarding the Draft Mental Health 
Law'' [Jiu ``jingshen weisheng fa (cao'an)'' zhi guowuyuan fazhi 
bangongshi de jianyi xin], reprinted in China Rights Google group, 24 
June 11, question 5.
    \53\ Ibid., question 6.
    \54\ Ibid., question 4.
    Notes to Section II--The Environment

    \1\ Wu Jingjing, ``Vigorously Explore New Paths for Environmental 
Protection in China--Interview With Ministry of Environmental 
Protection Minister Zhou Shengxian'' [Jiji tansuo zhongguo huanjing 
baohu xin daolu-huanjing baohubu buzhang zhou shengxian fangtan], 
Xinhua, 25 December 10. Zhou describes regulatory and institutional 
improvements and notes that carbon oxygen demand dropped 9.66 percent 
and sulfur dioxide emissions dropped 13.4 percent between 2006 and 
2009. He also notes that pollution problems remain severe. Ian Johnson, 
``China Faces `Very Grave' Environmental Situation, Officials Say,'' 
New York Times, 3 June 11.
    \2\ Guangdong Municipal Environmental Protection Science Research 
Institute, ``Five Years of Economic Development in China Gives Rise to 
Environmental Pollution Costs Nearing One Trillion Yuan'' [Woguo 5 nian 
jingji fazhan zaocheng de huanjing wuran chengben jin wanyi], reprinted 
in Greenlaw, 14 January 11. The original report title is: ``Zhongguo 
Huanjing Jingji Hesuan Yanjiu Baogao'' and it asserts that economic 
losses due to pollution and ecological damage total nearly a trillion 
yuan (US$157 million) for the five-year period.
    \3\ Gong Jing, ``Cadmium Rice Killing Machine'' [Gemi shaji], New 
Century, reprinted in Caixin Net, 14 February 11.
    \4\ Yu Dawei, ``Yunnan Circulates Notice Chromium Dregs Reason for 
Pearl River Pollution, for the Moment, Water Quality Has Not Appeared 
Abnormal'' [Yunnan tongbao gezha wuran yuanyin zhujiang shuizhi zhan 
weijian yichang], Caixin Net, 15 August 11; Meng Si, Chinadialogue, 
``On Yunnan's Chromium Trail,'' 30 August 11.
    \5\ Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``On Yunnan's Chromium Trail,'' 30 
August 11; ``Experts To Probe Toxic Dumping,'' South China Morning 
Post, 15 August 11.
    \6\ Zhang Yanling, ``Scholar Urges Third Party Institution 
Investigate Yunnan Chromium Pollution'' [Xuezhe huyu disanfang jigou 
diaocha yunnan gezha wuran], Caixin, 16 August 11; An Baijie, 
``Watchdog Suspected Over Toxic Waste,'' China Daily, 25 August 11; 
Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``On Yunnan's Chromium Trail,'' 30 August 11. 
Yunnan officials reportedly did not inform downstream provinces of the 
problem in a timely manner.
    \7\ Fiona Tam, ``Yunnan Plant Dumped Toxins for 20 Years,'' South 
China Morning Post, 17 August 11.
    \8\ Zhou Wenting, ``Huge Stockpile of Toxic Waste in 12 
Provinces,'' China Daily, 31 August 11.
    \9\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 3(5). 
Authorities plan to reduce carbon oxygen demand (COD) and sulfur 
dioxide by 8 percent by 2015, as well as reduce by 10 percent the 
amounts of two new pollutants, ammonia nitrogen and nitrogen oxide.
    \10\ ``Scholar Calls the Content of the Environmental Protection 
Law Out of Touch With Reality'' [Xuezhe cheng ``huanjing baohu fa'' 
neirong yu xianshi tuojie], Radio Free Asia, 16 June 10; Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, ``Circular Letter Regarding Soliciting 
Comments on Environmental Protection Standard (Environmental Impact 
Assessment Technical Guidelines Public Participation) (Draft for 
Comment)'' [Guanyu zhengqiu guojia huanjing baohu biaozhun ``huanjing 
yingxiang pingjia jishu daoze gongzhong canyu'' (zhengqiu yijiangao) 
yijian de han], 30 January 11; State Council Standing Committee, 
Hazardous Chemicals Safety Management Regulations, issued 26 January 
02, amended 16 February 11; Yang Zhanghuai, ``Hubei Dazhi Formally 
Establishes `Environmental Police' '' [Hubei dazhi zujian ``huanbao 
jingcha''], Southern Metropolis Weekend, 13 May 11; ``Legal Aid in 
Environmental Pollution Cases Just in Time'' [Falu yuanzhu huanjing 
wuran an zhengdang qishi], Beijing News, 8 October 10. According to the 
above Beijing News article, Beijing included air pollution cases among 
the cases eligible for legal aid in the city. ``China Will Write 
Legislation Regarding Genetically Modified Organisms Safety, Ministry 
of Environmental Protection To Draft Bill'' [Zhongguo jiang dui zhuan 
jiyin shengwu anquan lifa huanbaobu qicao fa'an], People's Daily, 7 
January 11; National People's Congress Standing Committee, PRC Water 
and Soil Conservation Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo shuitu baochifa], 
issued 29 June 91, amended 25 December 10; ``Our Suggestions for Air 
Pollution Law Revision'' [Wo wei daqifa xiuding jianyan], China 
Environment News, 9 December 10; Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``Seeking 
Damages,'' 21 July 11.
    \11\ ``Ministry of Environmental Protection: Rural Pollution 
Emissions Account for Half of the Country's Pollution'' [Huanbaobu: 
nongcun wuran paifang yi zhan zhongguo ``banbi jiangshan''], China 
Youth Daily, 3 June 11. According to the above China Youth Daily 
article, environmental protection Vice Minister Li Ganjie stated that 
environmental pollution in rural areas is serious. Liu Yu, Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, ``Zhou Shengxian Chairs Opening of the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection Standing Committee Meeting'' [Zhou 
shengxian zhuchi zhaokai huanjing baohubu changwu huiyi], 31 December 
10; Ian Johnson, ``China Faces `Very Grave' Environmental Situation, 
Officials Say,'' New York Times, 03 June 11.
    \12\ ``Ministry of Environmental Protection: Rural Pollution 
Emissions Account for Half of the Country's Pollution'' [Huanbaobu: 
nongcun wuran paifang yi zhan zhongguo ``banbi jiangshan''], China 
Youth Daily, 3 June 11.
    \13\ Liu Yu, Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Zhou Shengxian 
Chairs Opening of the Ministry of Environmental Protection Standing 
Committee Meeting'' [Zhou shengxian zhuchi zhaokai huanjing baohubu 
changwu huiyi], 31 December 10. In conjunction with the basic policy 
approach, authorities plan to strengthen planning leadership, expand 
financial investment, strengthen the evaluation of targets, spread 
technology, and promote ``coordinated action.''
    \14\ ``Ministry of Environmental Protection: Rural Pollution 
Emissions Account for Half of the Country's Pollution'' [Huanbaobu: 
nongcun wuran paifang yi zhan zhongguo ``banbi jiangshan''], China 
Youth Daily, 3 June 11. According to the above China Youth Daily 
article, at a press conference, environmental protection Vice Minister 
Li Ganjie noted the steps in the strategy to tackle rural pollution. 
The first step is to design environmental protection plans; the second 
step is to pass livestock and poultry waste and soil pollution 
prevention legislation; the third step is to organize environmental 
monitoring, enforcement, and education activities in villages and 
establish environmental teams to extend supervision coverage to 
villages; the fourth step includes using ``rewards to promote control'' 
demonstration projects and official environmental comprehensive control 
target responsibility system assessments; the fifth step concentrates 
on making advances in drinking water safety, trash management, and soil 
protection, as well as preventing and controlling livestock, poultry, 
and farm pollution. National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th 
Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian 
guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11. The plan also 
notes efforts will be made to protect drinking water, control 
fertilizer and pesticide pollution, speed up the handling of solid 
waste management, and strictly prohibit urban and industrial pollution 
from spreading to rural areas, among other goals.
    \15\ Liu Yu, Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Zhou Shengxian 
Chairs Opening of the Ministry of Environmental Protection Standing 
Committee Meeting'' [Zhou shengxian zhuchi zhaokai huanjing baohubu 
changwu huiyi], 31 December 10.
    \16\ Elaine Kurtenbach, ``Arrests and Closures in Lead Poison 
Crackdown,'' Shanghai Daily, 31 May 11; ``Ministry Allocates Fund To 
Inspect Environmental Emergencies,'' Xinhua, 13 June 11. In 2010, 14 
major pollution cases involving heavy metals occurred and there had 
already been 7 cases in 2011 as of the end of May.
    \17\ ``Ministry Allocates Fund To Inspect Environmental 
Emergencies,'' Xinhua, 13 June 11.
    \18\ ``China Intensifies Regulation on Battery Industries After 
Lead Poisoning Case,'' Xinhua, 19 May 11.
    \19\ Mimi Lau, ``Crackdown on Cities With Major Lead Pollution,'' 
South China Morning Post, 20 May 11.
    \20\ ``Chinese Environment Minister Warns of Project Approval 
Suspension Amid Crackdown on Heavy Metal Pollution,'' Xinhua, 1 June 
11.
    \21\ ``China Shuts Down 583 Plants in Lead Battery Plant 
Overhaul,'' Xinhua, 2 August 11.
    \22\ ``Heyuan Conflict Erupts, Villager Says Police Beat Someone to 
Death'' [Heyuan bao chongtu, cunmin cheng jingcha dasi ren], Bingbao, 
reprinted in Sina, 20 June 11.
    \23\ ``Dalian PX Project Triggers Concerns, Thousands of Citizens 
Gather in Protest'' [Dalian PX xiangmu yinqi danyou shuwan minzong shi 
zhizheng jihui kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 14 August 11.
    \24\ Christina Larson, ``The New Epicenter of China's Discontent,'' 
Foreign Policy, 23 August 11.
    \25\ Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``PX Factory in Typhoon,'' 11 August 
11.
    \26\ ``Dalian PX Project Stopped and Will Be Moved'' [Dalian PX 
xiangmu tingchan daiban], Southern Metropolis Daily, 15 August 11.
    \27\ ``Dalian's People--and Power,'' Wall Street Journal, 15 August 
11.
    \28\ ``Dalian Incident Shows More Adaptable Government,'' Global 
Times, 15 August 11.
    \29\ ``Highlights of Work Report of Supreme People's Court,'' 
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 11 March 11.
    \30\ Wang Jin, Chinadialogue, ``China's Green Laws Are Useless,'' 
23 September 10. A survey of 12,000 judicial employees revealed that 50 
percent of them believed environmental lawsuits were regularly being 
refused by courts.
    \31\ Alex Wang, Chinadialogue, ``Green Litigation in China Today,'' 
18 July 11.
    \32\ Ibid.
    \33\ Ibid.
    \34\ Ibid.
    \35\ Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``Seeking Damages,'' 21 July 11.
    \36\ Alex Wang, Chinadialogue, ``Green Litigation in China Today,'' 
18 July 11.
    \37\ Ibid. The author counts 39 environmental courts, which is an 
increase from a handful of courts noted in the CECC 2009 Annual Report. 
CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 191, 195. CECC staff 
interviews found that other estimates of the number of environmental 
courts run from 50 to 100.
    \38\ ``Kunming's First Environmental Public Interest Case Announces 
Judgment, 4 Million in Compensation'' [Kunming shouli huanjing gongyi 
susong anjian xuanpan peichang 400 wan], Jinghua News, reprinted in 
NetEase, 30 January 11.
    \39\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 156. Also see Alex 
Wang, Chinadialogue, ``Green Litigation in China Today,'' 18 July 11.
    \40\ Wang Jin, Chinadialogue, ``China's Green Laws Are Useless,'' 
23 September 10.
    \41\ Ibid.
    \42\ Human Rights Watch, `` `My Children Have Been Poisoned': A 
Public Health Crisis in Four Chinese Provinces,'' 15 June 11, 25-31.
    \43\ For more information about one of the cases in Hunan (Wugang 
city), see Michael Wines, ``Lead Sickens 1,300 Children in China,'' New 
York Times, 20 August 09; ``Lead Poisoning in Children in Hunan 
Triggers Protests by Parents and Raises Questions About Governmental 
Accountability,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 
1, 8 January 10, 2. For more information about the Shaanxi (Fengxiang 
county) lead poisoning case, see Tu Chonghang, ``Shaanxi Lead Poisoning 
Incident From Start to Finish'' [Shaanxi fengxiang qian zhongdu 
shijianshiwei], Beijing News, reprinted in China Law Information Net, 
21 August 09; ``Lead Poisoning Incident in Shaanxi Leads to Protests, 
Rights Infringements Reported,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 8.
    \44\ Human Rights Watch, `` `My Children Have Been Poisoned': A 
Public Health Crisis in Four Chinese Provinces,'' 15 June 11. Police in 
Shaanxi detained citizens demonstrating in front of a lead-processing 
facility and police in Hunan reportedly arrested seven people seeking 
assistance with their sick children.
    \45\ Ibid. Authorities in Shaanxi forced a journalist who tried to 
report on the lead poisoning cases to leave the area.
    \46\ ``Six Environmental Protection Villagers Detained for 
Petitioning on Behalf of Over One Thousand Villagers in Pingnan, Fujian 
Province,'' [Fujian pingnan liuwei huanbao cunmin wei yuqian cunmin 
shangfang bei juliu], Radio Free Asia, 25 October 10.
    \47\ ``Pingnan County, Fujian Province: Nearly 100 Villagers Kneel 
in Supplication for Detained Villagers' Release'' [Fujian pingnan jin 
bai cunmin guiqiu shifang bei bu cunmin], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 10.
    \48\ ``Six Environmental Protection Villagers Detained for 
Petitioning on Behalf of Over One Thousand Villagers in Pingnan, Fujian 
Province'' [Fujian pingnan liuwei huanbao cunmin wei yuqian cunmin 
shangfang bei juliu], Radio Free Asia, 25 October 10.
    \49\ Ibid.; ``Pingnan County, Fujian Province: Nearly 100 Villagers 
Kneel in Supplication for Detained Villagers' Release'' [Fujian pingnan 
jin bai cunmin guiqiu shifang bei bu cunmin], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 
10.
    \50\ ``Pingnan County, Fujian Province: Nearly 100 Villagers Kneel 
in Supplication for Detained Villagers' Release'' [Fujian pingnan jin 
bai cunmin guiqiu shifang bei bu cunmin], Radio Free Asia, 10 May 10.
    \51\ Voice of Tibet, ``Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Detained by 
Authorities for Opposing Mine'' [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang 
zao zhonggong duda he jubu], reprinted in Boxun, 11 February 11 
(protests and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and detention 
on December 18); ``15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-mining 
Protests in Shigatse,'' Phayul, 14 February 11. See the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database for more information on the cases.
    \52\ ``Tibetan Dam Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 
October 10. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for more 
information on the cases. ``Villagers Block Work on Dam,'' Radio Free 
Asia, 30 September 10 (the mountain's name is Lhachen Naglha Dzamba). 
According to the news report, workers claimed ``their permit to mine in 
the area had been approved by the Communist Party secretary of the 
TAR.'' The TAR government would issue such a permit, but a TAR Party 
official may have signified agreement.
    \53\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans 
in Palyul County,'' Phayul, 24 August 10; ``Police Fire on Mine 
Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 August 10; Phurbu Thinley, ``China 
Says Only One Tibetan Shot Dead in Palyul Mine Protest,'' Phayul, 1 
September 10; ``Tibetan Accidentally Shot Dead in Dispute With 
Police,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Internet Information Center, 30 
August 10.
    \54\ ``Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 
August 11.
    \55\ Ibid.
    \56\ ``Wuxi Huangtutang Trash Incinerator Mass Incident, More Than 
10,000 Gather'' [Wuxi huangtutang laji ranxiao qunti shijian yiwan duo 
ren juji], Boxun, 9 April 11.
    \57\ ``Wuxi Police and Citizens Tangle in Protest Against Operation 
of Incinerator'' [Kangyi fenhualu touchan wuxi jingmin hunzhan], 
Mingpao, reprinted in Sina, 29 May 11; Feng Yongfeng, ``Jiangsu, Wuxi 
`Grandfather Gallery' Morphs Into `Waste Incinerator' '' [Jiangsu, wuxi 
``huangtutang'' bianshen ``laji fenshaochang''], Wohua Media Net, 
reprinted in QQ News, 31 May 11. The village secretary reportedly 
convinced 77 percent of the villagers in the area to sign over their 
land to build a ``Grandfather Gallery,'' but then proceeded to build an 
incinerator instead.
    \58\ ``Wuxi Police and Citizens Tangle in Protest Against Operation 
of Incinerator'' [Kangyi fenhualu touchan wuxi jingmin hunzhan], 
Mingpao, reprinted in Sina, 29 May 11.
    \59\ ``Chinese Mongolians Protest Again, Herders Beaten: Rights 
Group,'' Reuters, 30 June 11; ``Herders in China's Inner Mongolia 
Protest Over Lead Mine in Latest Unrest, Some Reported Hurt,'' 
Washington Post, 30 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights 
Information Center, ``New Round of Herders' Protest Erupts in Southern 
(Inner) Mongolia,'' 29 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights 
Information Center, ``Fresh Protest by Mongolian Herders, Dozens 
Hospitalized,'' 23 July 11.
    \60\ ``Herders in China's Inner Mongolia Protest Over Lead Mine in 
Latest Unrest, Some Reported Hurt,'' Washington Post, 30 June 11.
    \61\ ``Chinese Mongolians Protest Again, Herders Beaten: Rights 
Group,'' Reuters, 30 June 11.
    \62\ Ibid.; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 
``New Round of Herders' Protest Erupts in Southern (Inner) Mongolia,'' 
29 June 11; Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, ``Fresh 
Protest by Mongolian Herders, Dozens Hospitalized,'' 23 July 11.
    \63\ ``Herders in China's Inner Mongolia Protest Over Lead Mine in 
Latest Unrest, Some Reported Hurt,'' Washington Post, 30 June 11.
    \64\ Ibid.
    \65\ See, e.g., Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center, 
``Protests Spread in Southern Mongolia, Thousands More Take to the 
Streets,'' 26 May 11; Andrew Jacobs, ``Anger Over Protesters' Deaths 
Leads to Intensified Demonstrations by Mongolians,'' New York Times, 30 
May 11.
    \66\ Wenran Jiang and Zining Liu, Jamestown Foundation, ``Energy 
Security in China's 12th Five-Year Plan,'' China Brief, Vol. 11, No. 
11, 17 June 11; National Human Rights Action Plan and China National 
Development and Reform Commission, ``Medium and Long-Term Development 
Plan for Renewable Energy in China (Abbreviated Version),'' China Net, 
September 2007, secs. 3.2, 4, 4.1. See the following articles for 
examples of reasons given by Chinese officials as to why dams are 
built, which include increasing reliance on renewable energy, flood 
control, transportation, establishing a reliable reservoir of water for 
irrigation or drinking, stimulating economic development, and 
generating local government revenues. ``Massive Chinese Hydro Project 
Moves Ahead,'' Breakbulk Online, 27 January 11; Fu Wen and Teddy Ng, 
``Experts Cast Doubt Over Benefits of Hydropower,'' Global Times, 24 
November 11; ``China Daily: China Pledges Water Will Still Flow,'' 
China Daily, 19 November 11; S. Anuradha, International Rivers Network, 
``China's Sinohydro Says Hydropower Growth Likely To Fall in Asia on 
Growing Resistance,'' 11 November 10; Christina Larson, ``Where the 
River Ends,'' Foreign Policy, 2 June 11; ``Lessons To Be Learned,'' 
China Daily, 8 August 11.
    \67\ Xu Donghuan, ``Ecologists Dread New Dam Boom,'' Global Times, 
10 February 11.
    \68\ ``Is Hydropower Exploitation of the Nu River in China a Must? 
'' Guardian blog, 10 February 11; Jonathan Watts, ``China's Big Hydro 
Wins Permission for 21.3GW Dam in World Heritage Site,'' Guardian, 1 
February 11; ``National Energy Bureau Responsible Person Declares for 
First Time: Nujiang Will Be Developed'' [Guojia nengyuanju fuzeren 
shouci biaotai: nujiang yiding hui kaifa], China National Radio, 
reprinted in People's Daily, 31 January 11; Fu Wen and Teddy Ng, 
``Experts Cast Doubt Over Benefits of Hydropower,'' Global Times, 24 
November 10.
    \69\ Xu Donghuan, ``Ecologists Dread New Dam Boom,'' Global Times, 
10 February 11. According to the Global Times report, a Beijing-based 
river expert stated that ``[t]hese sub-standard small hydroelectric 
stations can trigger landslides and are a great threat to the local 
ecological system.'' Authorities have dammed 60 tributaries to the Nu 
River, with 42 projects completed and 88 slated to be completed. A top 
official noted that a number of national studies show the Nu River 
valley in Yunnan province is subject to geological and seismological 
disasters, and she prepared a proposal calling on the central 
government to ``pay attention to the special and complex geological and 
seismological conditions in the Nu River valley and take caution in 
making decisions about hydraulic power development there.'' Li Xing and 
Wang Huazhong, ``Earthquake Casts Doubt on Hydropower,'' China Daily, 
12 March 11; ``Lessons To Be Learned,'' China Daily, 8 August 11.
    \70\ ``Wen Jiabao Opens State Council Meeting, Discusses and Passes 
`Three Gorges Follow-Up Work Plan' '' [Wen jiabao kai guowuyuan hui 
taolun tongguo ``sanxia houxu gongzuo guihua'' deng], Xinhua, 18 May 
11. These problems include the ``stability'' and livelihood of 
resettled populations and the prevention of geological disasters. 
Leaders also acknowledged that the dam had affected the 
``transportation in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, 
irrigation, and the supply of water,'' among other problems.
    \71\ Ibid. The plans include the ``Three Gorges Follow-Up Work 
Plan'' and the ``Yangtze Middle and Lower Reaches Watershed Water 
Pollution Prevention and Control Plan.'' According to Xinhua, the Three 
Gorges Follow-Up Work Plan's objectives include bringing the standard 
of living of those relocated because of the dam up to a level equal to 
that of residents in Hubei province and Chongqing municipality.
    \72\ Dai Qing, Probe International, ``On the Completion of the 
Three Gorges Project,'' 22 January 11. Some estimates are higher 
because they include people who the government said were resettled for 
``urbanization'' or ``employment'' programs. Dai Qing reports the 
official number of people relocated to make way for the Three Gorges 
dam to be 1.4 million. Probe International estimates that 3.7 million 
people have been relocated and Dai Qing estimates the number is higher 
at 4 million.
    \73\ These reports have uncovered forced evictions, below-standard 
compensation, suppression of advocates, and government corruption 
during resettlement processes, as well as documented the threat of 
severe hardships that may be faced by relocated citizens, including 
homelessness, unemployment, conflicts between resettled citizens and 
existing populations, and poverty among resettled migrants. See, e.g., 
Peter H. Gleick, ``Three Gorges Dam Project, Yangtze River, China,'' in 
Water Brief 3, The World's Water 2008-2009 (Oakland, CA: Pacific 
Institute, 2009), 145-46; Jim Yardley, ``Chinese Dam Projects 
Criticized for Their Human Costs, Choking on Growth, Part IV,'' New 
York Times, 19 November 07. For information on activist Xie Fulin, see 
CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 103; ``Three Gorges 
Resettlement Activist Paralyzed After Assault,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 10-11; Stacy Mosher, Human 
Rights in China, ``The Case of Fu Xiancai,'' China Rights Forum, No. 3, 
2006, 48-51. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for more 
information on Fu Xiancai.
    \74\ International Rivers, ``Resettlement in Action,'' 25 August 
10.
    \75\ Choi Chi-yu, ``2,000 Battle Police in Yunnan,'' South China 
Morning Post, 31 March 11.
    \76\ Rachel Beitarie, ``Burst of New Dams in Southwest China 
Produces Power and Public Ire,'' Circle of Blue, 22 March 11.
    \77\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 8(2).
    \78\ International Rivers, ``Resettlement in Action,'' 25 August 
10, 1; ``More Resettled for S-N Water Diversion Project,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Daily, 20 September 10.
    \79\ International Rivers, ``Resettlement in Action,'' 25 August 
10, 8.
    \80\ ``Migrants Hold Large Protest at Median Line of South-to-North 
Water Diversion Project, Vice Governor Assumes Command, Moves Armed 
Police To Disperse With Force'' [Nanshui beidiao zhongxian yimin da 
kangyi fushengzhang zuozhen tiao wujing qiang qusan], Radio Free Asia, 
26 November 10; Carla Freeman, China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, ``Quenching the Dragon's Thirst, the 
South-North Water Transfer Project--Old Plumbing for New China? '' last 
visited 9 February 11, 6.
    \81\ Jamil Anderlini, ``China: A Blast From the Past,'' Financial 
Times, 14 December 09.
    \82\ Chris Buckley, ``China To Move Tens of Thousands for Huge 
Water Scheme,'' Reuters, 29 June 10. According to Reuters, some farmers 
relocated for the Danjiangkou Dam have complained they are being 
relocated to less arable land and have sparse job prospects. The dam's 
reservoir will provide water for the diversion project. Carla Freeman, 
China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, ``Quenching the Dragon's Thirst, the South-North Water 
Transfer Project--Old Plumbing for New China? '' last visited 9 
February 11, 6. In 2009, villagers near the Danjiangkou Dam 
construction site ``verbally attacked village officials and threatened 
resistance over plans to resettle them elsewhere in central China.'' 
Wang Dazhong, Nanyang City Party Committee, Mass Work Department, and 
Nanyang City Petition Bureau, ``Several Points To Ponder in Addressing 
South-to-North Water Diversion Central Route Project Danjiangkou 
Reservoir Migrant Petitions'' [Dui nanshui beidiao zhongxian gongcheng 
danjiangkou kuqu yimin xinfang de jidian sikao], 13 October 10; Michael 
Bristow, ``China Villagers Moved To Quench the Urban Thirst,'' BBC, 3 
March 10. The above report provides some information about the nature 
of citizen complaints related to the Danjiangkou Dam relocation 
project.
    \83\ ``Officials Lure Villagers, Force Them To Accept Place To 
Settle, Threaten Petitioners'' [Ganbu youdao cunmin qiangzhi jieshou 
anzhidian konghe shangfang zhe], China Journalist Survey Net, reprinted 
in Bangkaow.com, 3 September 10.
    \84\ Wang Dazhong, Nanyang City Party Committee, Mass Work 
Department, and Nanyang City Petition Bureau, ``Several Points To 
Ponder in Addressing South-to-North Water Diversion Central Route 
Project Danjiangkou Reservoir Migrant Petitions'' [Dui nanshui beidiao 
zhongxian gongcheng danjiangkou kuqu yimin xinfang de jidian sikao], 13 
October 10; Michael Bristow, ``China Villagers Moved To Quench the 
Urban Thirst,'' BBC, 3 March 10.
    \85\ Xu Chao, ``The Relationship Between Huai River Basin Pollution 
and Cancer Basically Established'' [Huaihe liuyu wuran yu aizheng 
guanxi jiben zhengshi], Caijing, 27 December 10.
    \86\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, ``Ministry of 
Environmental Protection Open Government Information Work 2010 Annual 
Report'' [Huanjing baohubu zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo 2010 niandu 
baogao], 14 March 11.
    \87\ Ibid.
    \88\ Ibid.
    \89\ Article 19 and Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution 
Victims, ``Access to Environmental Information in China: Evaluation of 
Local Compliance,'' December 2010.
    \90\ Ibid.
    \91\ Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute of Public & 
Environmental Affairs, ``Environmental Open Information: Between 
Advance & Retreat--The 2009-2010 Pollution Information Transparency 
Index (PITI) Second Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in 
113 Chinese Cities,'' 28 December 10, 3. According to the study's 
results, out of 100 possible points, the average score of the cities 
examined increased from 31 points in 2008 to 36 points in 2009-2010 (p. 
3).
    \92\ Ibid.
    \93\ Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute of Public & 
Environmental Affairs, ``Environmental Open Information: Between 
Advance & Retreat--The 2009-2010 Pollution Information Transparency 
Index (PITI) Second Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in 
113 Chinese Cities,'' 28 December 10, 4.
    \94\ Ma Jun, Chinadialogue, ``Advancing Energy Conservation and 
Reducing Pollution With Environmental Open Information'' [Yi huanjing 
xinxi gongkai cujin jieneng jianpai], 13 December 10.
    \95\ Ibid.
    \96\ For example, one online response to an open environmental 
information request on the Anhui Government Open Government Information 
Net Web site listed a provision and its appendix as the basis for not 
releasing some of the information requested. Anhui Province People's 
Government Open Government Information Net, ``Description of Needed 
Information Contents, Yangtze River, Anchuang Section, Wuwei Section 
and Chaohu Lake Region Related Water Quality Raw Data from 2007-2010'' 
[Suo xu xinxi de neirong miaoshu, changjiang anqing duan, wuwei duan he 
chaohu huqu zi 2007-2010 de xiangguan shuizhi yuanshi shuju], 20 
October 10. According to the response posted on the Anhui Province 
government Web site, the response to the environmental information 
request cites provisions that environmental protection authorities 
apparently issued in 2004, i.e., ``Provisions on the Scope of State 
Secrets in Environmental Protection Work'' (Provisions). Based on the 
response to the open environmental information request cited above, the 
Provisions appear to have an appendix that stipulates environmental 
protection work secrets, i.e., the ``Environmental Protection Work 
State Secrets Catalog'' [Huanjing baohu gongzuo guoji mimi mulu]. Based 
on a review of the Catalog of National Environmental Departmental 
Normative Documents Remaining in Force cited below, the Provisions were 
in force as of September 2010, but Commission staff could not locate a 
copy of them on the Internet. Hubei Environmental Protection Portal, 
``Appendix: Catalog of National Environmental Departmental Normative 
Documents Remaining in Force'' [Fujian: jixu youxiao de guojia huanbao 
bumen guifanxing wenjian mulu], 30 September 10.
    \97\ Xi Jianrong, ``Environmental Protection Organization Seeks 
Investigation Into Legality of `Procedural Information' '' [Huanbao 
zuzhi tiqing ``guochengxing xinxi'' hefaxing shencha], Legal Daily, 25 
March 11; Zhang Ke, ``Environmental NGO Petitions State Council To 
Question Whether Fish Reserve Restructuring Serves Power Station'' 
[Huanbao zuzhi shangshu guowuyuan zhiyi yulei baohuqu wei dianzhan 
tiaozheng], Number One Caijing Daily, reprinted in China Transparency, 
8 June 11. For more complete information about the case, see Xi 
Jianrong, ``NGO Requests Publication of Information on Nature Reserve 
Restructuring'' [Minjian zuzhi jiu ziran baohuqu tiaozheng shenqing 
xinxi gongkai], Legal Daily, 20 January 11; Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, ``Ministry of Environmental Protection: Announcement on 
Applications for Promotion and Restructuring of National Level Nature 
Reserves'' [Huanjing baohubu gonggao: dui shenqing jinsheng he 
tiaozheng de guojia ji ziranbaohuqu jinxing gong shi], 4 January 11; Xi 
Jianrong, ``Scholars Request Hearing on National Level Nature Reserve 
Restructuring'' [Xuezhe qingqiu jiu changjiang shangyou guojia ji 
ziranbaohuqu tiaozheng tingzheng], Legal Daily, 1 March 11; Beijing 
Impact Law Firm, ``Upper Yangtze National Level Rare Fish Nature 
Reserve To Be Downsized'' [Changjiang shangyou zhenxi teyou yulei 
guojia ji ziranbaohuqu mianji bei suojian], 24 March 11.
    \98\ Han Lewu, ``Application for Publication of Environmental 
Information on Waste Incineration Plant Rejected, Environmental NGO 
Seeks Administrative Review'' [Shenqing gongkai laji fenshaochang 
huanjing xinxi beiju huanbao zuzhi tiqi xingzheng fuyi], Legal Daily, 8 
June 11. According to the Legal Daily article, the Darwin Nature 
Knowledge Society submitted open government information requests to the 
Hai'an County Environmental Protection Bureau among other environmental 
departments asking for the environmental impact assessment reports for 
a waste incineration power plant and related waste management projects, 
as well as requesting information about the power plant's emissions 
data. Xi Jianrong, ``Environmental Organization Requests Environmental 
Impact Assessment of Beijing Sujiatuo Incineration Plant'' [Huanbao 
zuzhi shenqing gongkai beijing sujiatuo fenshaochang huanping xinxi], 
Legal Daily, reprinted in China Transparency, 16 June 11.
    \99\ Han Lewu, ``Application for Publication of Environmental 
Information on Waste Incineration Plant Rejected, Environmental 
Protection NGO Seeks Administrative Review'' [Shenqing gongkai laji 
fenshaochang huanjing xinxi beiju huanbao zuzhi tiqi xingzheng fuyi], 
Legal Daily, 8 June 11.
    \100\ Malcolm Moore, ``Leading Physicist Calls China's Nuclear 
Programme `Rash and Unsafe,' '' Telegraph, 1 June 11; ``Minister 
Recommends China Have Independent Nuclear Safety Regulator in Wake of 
Japan Crisis,'' Associated Press, 3 June 11. Other Chinese experts and 
top international nuclear authorities also expressed the need to 
increase oversight of nuclear power plants. Keith Bradsher, ``Nuclear 
Power Expansion in China Stirs Concerns,'' New York Times, 15 December 
09. An International Atomic Energy Agency official noted there was some 
concern that China might not have enough nuclear inspectors with 
sufficient training to manage the rapid growth of nuclear power. Choi 
Chi-yuk, ``Nuclear Threat From Mountain of Spent Fuel,'' South China 
Morning Post, 1 April 11. One Chinese nuclear engineer was quoted as 
saying ``. . . previously produced waste has yet to be properly dealt 
with, . . .'' ``It will pose a tremendous safety threat to the public 
as a result of the piling up of more and more nuclear fuel, year after 
year.''
    \101\ Malcolm Moore, ``Leading Physicist Calls China's Nuclear 
Programme `Rash and Unsafe,' '' Telegraph, 1 June 11.
    \102\ Liu Yiyu, ``New Nuclear Power Plants `Set To Be Approved,' '' 
China Daily, 22 April 11. Chinese authorities reportedly suspended 
approvals for new nuclear power projects and inspected plants in 
operation and under construction.
    \103\ Brian Spegele, ``Beijing Says Its Reactors Are Safe,'' Wall 
Street Journal, 16 June 11.
    \104\ Liu Yiyu, ``New Nuclear Power Plants `Set To Be Approved,' '' 
China Daily, 22 April 11; ``China Says Its Nuclear Reactors Passed 
Inspections,'' Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times, 15 June 
11. China reportedly plans to have more than 100 plants in operation by 
2020.
    \105\ Wang Huazhong, ``Japan Nuclear Crisis Prompts `Urgent' 
Drafting of New Law,'' China Daily, 26 April 11. China currently does 
not have an overarching nuclear energy law and two previous attempts to 
pass one in 1984 and 2008 were not successful. The law would reportedly 
include stipulations related to uranium mining, nuclear material 
management, nuclear power plant operation, nuclear waste, emergency 
management, and compensation.
    \106\ Ibid.
    \107\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, Guiding Opinion on 
Cultivating and Guiding Orderly Development of Environmental Non-
Governmental Organizations [Peiyu yindao huanbao shehui zuzhi youxu 
fazhan de zhidao yijian], issued 10 December 10, arts. 2, 10.
    \108\ Ibid., art. 10.
    \109\ Ibid. This may indicate efforts to strengthen Party control 
over environmental groups.
    \110\ Alex Wang, ``The Warriors of Qiugang--A New Documentary on 
the Struggle To Save China's Environment,'' Natural Resources Defense 
Council Switchboard Blog, 11 January 11 (has a link to the video).
    \111\ Ibid.
    \112\ Ibid.
    \113\ Wang Qingchu, ``Pollution Fear Cancels Beijing Power Plant 
Plan,'' Shanghai Daily, 10 February 11.
    \114\ ``Dalian PX Project Stopped and Will Be Moved'' [Dalian PX 
xiangmu tingchan daiban], Xinhua, reprinted in Southern Metropolis 
Daily, 15 August 11; ``Dalian PX Project Triggers Concerns, Thousands 
of Citizens Gather in Protest'' [Dalian PX xiangmu yinqi danyou shuwan 
minzong shi zhizheng jihui kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 14 August 11.
    \115\ Tao Dapin, ``5,000 People Press Thumbprints To Oppose Panyu 
Waste Incinerator, Only Counted as One Opposition Vote? '' [5 qian ren 
an shouyin fandui panyu laji fenshaochang zhi suan yizhang 
fanduipiao?], Asia News, 24 May 11.
    \116\ Wang Jin, Chinadialogue, ``China's Green Laws Are Useless,'' 
23 September 10. For example, the government of Guzhen county, Anhui 
province, removed six local environmental protection officials, 
including the head of the local environmental protection bureau (EPB), 
because local government officials claimed the EPB's strict enforcement 
actions hurt efforts to attract business investment. Anhui province 
requires environmental authorities to obtain governmental approval 
prior to conducting a check.
    \117\ Zhao Yang, ``Ecology, Environmental Protection, Land 
Requisition, and Demolition, High Levels of Corruption'' [Shengtai 
huanbao zhengdi chaiqian fubai gaofa], Legal Daily, 12 August 10.
    \118\ Benjamin Van Rooij and Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, ``Fragile 
Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China's 
Industrial Pollution Law,'' Law & Policy, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2010), 16-17.
    \119\ ``China Launches Special Supervision in 15 Companies for 
Pollution Control Violations,'' Xinhua, 29 August 11.
    \120\ Chinadialogue, ``NGOs Challenge Environment Authorities,'' 21 
June 11.
    \121\ Ibid.
    \122\ ``Lessons To Be Learned,'' China Daily, 8 August 11.
    \123\ ``The Fabricated Environmental Impact Assessment System'' 
[Bei jiakong de huanping zhidu], China Reform Net, reprinted in Caixin, 
1 August 11. For one review of the role of public participation in 
environmental EIA processes and beyond since 2004, see Zhang Jingjing, 
Chinadialogue, ``The Plight of the Public (1),'' 19 July 11.
    \124\ Zhang Jingjing, Chinadialogue, ``The Plight of the Public 
(2),'' 19 July 11. Zhang notes that while the 2006 measure ``Temporary 
Method for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessments'' 
provides for public participation, there is no legal recourse for 
infringement of that right.
    \125\ Wang Jin, ``China's Green Laws Are Useless,'' China Dialogue, 
23 September 10. For example, the government of Guzhen county, Anhui 
province, removed six local environmental protection officials, 
including the head of the local environmental protection bureau (EPB), 
because local government officials claimed the EPB's strict enforcement 
actions hurt efforts to attract business investment. Anhui province 
requires environmental authorities to obtain governmental approval 
prior to conducting a check.
    \126\ Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute of Public & 
Environmental Affairs, ``Environmental Open Information: Between 
Advance & Retreat--The 2009-2010 Pollution Information Transparency 
Index (PITI) Second Annual Assessment of Environmental Transparency in 
113 Chinese Cities,'' 28 December 10, 4.
    \127\ Qie Jianrong, ``Delay in Administering Penalty for 
Illegalities Raises Doubts Among Experts'' [Weifa chufa huanqi zhixing 
yin zhuanjia zhiyi], Legal Daily, 13 December 10. The power plant 
authorities claimed that stopping power generation and paying a fine 
would adversely affect regional power supply.
    \128\ John Vidal and David Adam, ``China Overtakes U.S. as World's 
Largest CO2 Emitter,'' Guardian, 19 June 07; Jane A. Leggett, Jeffrey 
Logan, and Anna Mackey, Congressional Research Service, ``China's 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies,'' 10 September 08; 
Todd White and Jeremy Van Loon, ``China Exports Made It World's Largest 
Greenhouse-Gas Factory,'' Bloomberg News, 25 February 09.
    \129\ Bruce Gilley, ``Authoritarian Environmentalism and China's 
Response to Climate Change,'' Environmental Politics (forthcoming 
2012), draft version online, 22 April 11, 6-8.
    \130\ State Council Information Office, ``White Paper: China's 
Policies and Actions on Climate Change,'' 29 October 08. According to 
the white paper, authorities state they take ``economic development as 
the core objective''; and they have also stated that they place 
emphasis on energy conservation policies, strive to mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions, and prioritize policies to adapt to climate change. 
Renmin University, ``China Human Development Report 2009/10, China and 
a Sustainable Future: Towards a Low Carbon Economy and Society,'' 
commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme, April 2010; 
Joint Global Change Research Institute and Battelle Memorial Institute, 
Pacific Northwest Division, ``China: Impact of Climate Change to 2030--
A Commissioned Research Report,'' prepared for the National 
Intelligence Council, April 2009. The above paper lists several 
specific impacts, states China has lower resilience (adaptive capacity) 
to climate change than some other counties, and argues climate change 
will exacerbate existing social and resource stresses. United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, ``Climate Change: Impacts, 
Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries,'' 2007; 
Germanwatch, ``Global Climate Risk Index 2011, Who Suffers Most From 
Extreme Weather Events/Weather-Related Loss Events in 2009 and 1990 to 
2009,'' 16 December 10. This research ranked China 35th compared with 
other countries for the occurrence of extreme weather events in 2009.
    \131\ Barbara Finamore, ``Taking Action To Meet Its Climate 
Pledge--China Enacts National Energy Efficiency DSM Regulations To 
Dramatically Scale Up Investment in Energy Efficiency,'' Natural 
Resources Defense Council Switchboard Blog, 29 November 10; ``China To 
Set Up Funds for Development of Green Energy Counties,'' Xinhua, 28 
April 11; ``National Development and Reform Commission Issues `China's 
Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change--2010 Annual Report' 
'' [Fagaiwei gongbu ``zhongguo yingdui qihou bianhua zhengce yu 
xingdong--2010 niandu baogao''], China Government Net, reprinted in 
Xinhua, 23 November 10.
    \132\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 21. Chinese 
leaders plan to speed up research and development of low carbon 
technologies, to develop a greenhouse gas statistical accounting 
system, to gradually establish an emission trading market, and to 
promote ``low carbon demonstration projects,'' among other plans.
    \133\ Joanna Lewis, ``The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate 
Change: Examining the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship,'' China 
Environment Series, No. 11, 2010/2011, 7-39 (especially pp. 26-34).
    \134\ ``Cancun Climate Conference Passes Resolution on Response to 
Climate Change'' [Kankun qihou dahui tongguo yingdui qihou bianhua 
jueyi], Caixin Net, 11 December 10.
    \135\ Because China signed and ratified the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyoto Protocol as a 
``developing'' country and is not on the list of Annex B countries with 
binding emission reduction targets, China currently has no formal 
obligation under the Protocol to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. 
For China's ratification information, see United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, ``Kyoto Protocol Status of 
Ratification,'' 10 July 06. For listings of countries on Annexes A and 
B of the Kyoto Protocol, see United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, art. 3, Annexes A and B. See also 
Letter from Su Wei, Director-General, Department of Climate Change, 
National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Mr. Yvo de 
Boer, Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat [Letter Regarding 
Autonomous Domestic Mitigation Actions], reprinted in ChinaFAQs, 28 
January 10. Internationally, top officials emphasize the voluntary 
nature of the country's efforts to lower carbon dioxide emissions per 
unit of GDP (carbon intensity) by 40-45 percent by 2020 compared to 
2005 levels. The Chinese government has not agreed to carbon emission 
caps, only voluntary carbon intensity reductions.
    \136\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 3. According to 
the 12th Five-Year Plan, China also pledged to increase the forest 
coverage rate to 21.66 percent and its forest stock volume by 600 
million cubic meters. Chapter 10(1) of the 12th Five-Year Plan 
indicates that officials also included ``energy conservation and 
environment'' and ``new energy'' among a list of at least seven 
priority ``strategic new and developing industries.'' Xie Zhenhua, 
``China's Challenges Limit Control of Emissions (Authority Forum)'' 
[Zhongguo tiaozhan kongzhi paifang jixian (quanwei luntan)], People's 
Daily, 6 January 10.
    \137\ ``China Drafting Special Law on Climate Change,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Daily, 27 April 11. ``China Will Consider Climate 
Change Legislation at an Appropriate Time'' [Zhongguo jiang zai shidang 
shiji kaolu qihou bianhua lifa], Caixin Net, 9 December 10.
    \138\ Wang Qian, ``People Invited To Share Their Climate Change 
Ideas,'' China Daily, 22 March 11.
    \139\ Renmin University, ``China Human Development Report 2009/10, 
China and a Sustainable Future: Towards a Low Carbon Economy and 
Society,'' Commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme, 
April 2010, 86. ``Where public participation does exist, it is often on 
inequitable terms or does not provide adequate opportunity for public 
inputs. Little information on procedures and timing for public 
participation is available.''
    \140\ Bruce Gilley, ``Authoritarian Environmentalism and China's 
Response to Climate Change,'' Environmental Politics (forthcoming 
2012), draft version online, 22 April 11, 6-8.
    \141\ Meng Si, Chinadialogue, ``Turning Point in Tianjin,'' 25 
October 10.
    \142\ Bruce Gilley, ``Authoritarian Environmentalism and China's 
Response to Climate Change,'' Environmental Politics (forthcoming 
2012), draft version online, 22 April 11, 14.
    \143\ Barbara Finamore, ``Transparency of Climate Change Actions: 
Sitting Down With Minister Xie,'' National Resources Defense Council 
Switchboard Blog, 20 October 10. Finamore paraphrases remarks by Teng 
Fei of Tsinghua University, who outlined some of the difficulties in 
obtaining statistics relevant to evaluating energy usage and carbon 
dioxide emissions.
    \144\ Ibid.
    \145\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 21(1).
    \146\ Barbara Finamore, ``China's Domestic Climate Commitments 
Reach a Global Audience in Tianjin,'' Natural Resources Defense Council 
Switchboard Blog, 7 October 10.
    \147\ ``China Does Not Oppose MRV, Should Find a Good Reason for 
Transferring Responsibility'' [Zhongguo bu fandui MRV, zhuanyi zeren 
yao zhaohao liyou], China Net, 12 October 10.
    \148\ Ibid. Su Wei, Director-General, Office of National Leading 
Group on Climate Change, stated the Chinese government was ``not 
opposed to monitoring, reporting, and verification'' in projects using 
international financing and technology and that China would make the 
results of its domestic MRV known to the international community and 
``can accept international discussions, consultations, dialogue, and 
clarifications.''
    \149\ Barbara Finamore, ``China's Domestic Climate Commitments 
Reach a Global Audience in Tianjin,'' Natural Resources Defense Council 
Switchboard Blog, 7 October 10. Vice Chair of the National Development 
and Reform Commission Xie Zhenhua reportedly said that China would do 
its utmost to ``increase the transparency of its actions in terms of 
tackling climate change and integrating our measure into global 
efforts.''
    Notes to Section III--Civil Society

    \1\ Civil society organizations in China include a range of groups, 
such as national mass organizations that Party authorities create and 
fund, smaller citizen associations registered under national 
regulations, and loose networks of unregistered grassroots 
organizations. The Chinese organizational forms that most nearly 
correspond to the Western concept of a non-governmental organization 
are social organizations (SOs) [shehui tuanti], non-governmental and 
non-commercial enterprises (NGNCEs) [minban feiqiye danwei], and 
foundations [jijinhui]. For the purposes of this section of the CECC 
Annual Report, the term ``CSO'' refers to these three types of 
organizations. SOs are voluntary organizations; they include academic, 
professional, or trade organizations, as well as voluntary associations 
of individuals with a common interest. NGNCEs are non-governmental 
service providers, including schools, hospitals, sports organizations, 
or employment service organizations. Foundations are non-profit and 
non-governmental organizations managed through the use of funds 
voluntarily donated by foreign and domestic social organizations. 
Foundations often promote the development of scientific research, 
culture, education, social welfare, and social services. The State 
Council issued the current national regulations governing SOs and 
NGNCEs in 1998, and those regulating foundations in 2004. For more 
information, see CECC Topic Paper: Chinese Civil Society Organizations, 
12 August 05.
    \2\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Civil Affairs Quarterly Statistics 
Report (First Quarter, 2011) [Minzheng shiye tongji jibao (2011 nian 1 
jidu)], 28 April 11; CECC, Topic Paper: Chinese Civil Society 
Organizations, 12 August 05. The quarterly report breaks down the 
447,243 figure as follows: 246,000 SOs, 199,000 NGNCEs, and 2,243 
foundations. See also CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 120.
    \3\ Gao Bingzhong and Yuan Ruijun, eds., Blue Book on Civil Society 
Development in China [Zhongguo gongmin shehui fazhan lanpishu] 
(Beijing: Peking University Press, 2008), 18; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 
10 October 09, 204.
    \4\ Rahul Jacob and Lydia Guo, ``Far from Home and Lonely,'' 
Financial Times, 31 May 11.
    \5\ See, e.g., Women's Watch-China and Rural Women.
    \6\ Meng Si, ``Turning Point in Tianjin,'' Chinadialogue, 25 
October 10.
    \7\ ``Four NGOs Call on Zhejiang To Cancel New Regulations on 
Management of the Mentally Ill'' [Si minjian jigou yu zhejiang quxiao 
chuzhi jingshen bingren xin gui], Radio Free Asia, 30 November 10.
    \8\ ``NGOs Important in Fighting Spread of AIDS,'' Xinhua, 30 
October 10.
    \9\ Keith B. Richburg, ``China's Crackdown on Non-Profit Groups 
Prompts New Fears Among Activists,'' Washington Post, 11 May 10; Chen 
Xiangyang, ``The Current State and Challenges of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in China'' [Fei zhengfu zuzhi zai zhongguo de xianzhuang 
ji tiaozhan], China Economic Times, 26 May 05.
    \10\ Chen Xiangyang, ``The Current State and Challenges of Non-
Governmental Organizations in China'' [Fei zhengfu zuzhi zai zhongguo 
de xianzhang ji tiaojian], China Economic Times, 26 May 05.
    \11\ Keith B. Richburg, ``China's Crackdown on Nonprofit Groups 
Prompts New Fears Among Activists,'' Washington Post, 11 May 10.
    \12\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
    \13\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art 22.
    \14\ Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and 
effective 25 October 98, art. 6; Yu Fangqiang, ``Challenges for NGOs in 
China,'' Asia Catalyst, 2 June 09.
    \15\ Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and 
effective 25 October 98, art. 27.
    \16\ Wang Di, ``Numerous Domestic Public Interest Organizations 
Cannot Register, Making Compassionate Activities Illegal'' [Woguo 
zhongduo gongyi zuzhi wufa zhuce zhi aixin huodong bu hefa], China 
Youth Daily, reprinted in East Day, 14 December 10; Human Rights Watch, 
``Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,'' 14 June 05, sec. VI, 42-
49.
    \17\ Wang Di, ``Numerous Domestic Public Interest Organizations 
Cannot Register, Making Compassionate Activities Illegal'' [Woguo 
zhongduo gongyi zuzhi wufa zhuce zhi aixin huodong bu hefa], China 
Youth Daily, reprinted in East Day, 14 December 10; Yu Fangqiang, 
``Challenges for NGOs in China,'' Asia Catalyst, 2 June 09.
    \18\ Russell Leigh Moses, ``Shut-Out, Shut-Down, Shut-Up,'' Wall 
Street Journal, 10 August 10.
    \19\ Wang Di, ``Numerous Domestic Public Interest Organizations 
Cannot Register, Making Compassionate Activities Illegal'' [Woguo 
zhongduo gongyi zuzhi wufa zhuce zhi aixin huodong bu hefa], China 
Youth Daily, 14 December 10.
    \20\ Ibid.
    \21\ Asia Catalyst, ``Restrictions on AIDS NGOs in Asia,'' 1 
December 09, 10.
    \22\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 161-62.
    \23\ ``Public Security and Tax Officials Forcibly Removed Documents 
From Beijing-Based Aizhixing'' [Beijing aizhixing ziliao zao gongan ji 
shuiwu guanyuan qiangzhi dai li], Radio Free Asia, 22 December 10.
    \24\ Ibid.
    \25\ Chen Bingzhong, Aizhixing. ``An Open Letter to General 
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President Hu Jintao'' [Zhi 
zhonggong zhongyang zong shuji guojia zhuxi hu jintao de gongkaixin], 
reprinted in Boxun, 28 November 10.
    \26\ Ibid.
    \27\ ``China Closes AIDS Website,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 March 11.
    \28\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Officials Disrupt Annual 
Meeting of Anhui Province Youth Center Run by AIDS Activist,'' China 
Human Rights Briefing March 31-April 5, 2011, 5 April 11.
    \29\ Kate Krauss, ``China's Brutal Repression,'' Washington Post, 
27 April 11; ``Beijing Yirenping Center Strongly Condemns and Reports 
to the Public Security Bureau the Violent Acts Against Chang Kun'' 
[Beijing yirenping zhongxin qianglie qianze dui chang kun de baoli 
qinhai xingwei bing xiang gongan bumen jubao], China AIDS Group, 
reprinted in Blogspot, 5 April 11.
    \30\ ``Beijing Yirenping Center Strongly Condemns the Violent 
Behavior Infringing on the Rights of Chang Kun and Reports Incident to 
Public Security Agencies'' [Beijing yirenping zhongxin qianglie qianze 
dui chang kun de baoli qinhai xingwei bing xiang gongan bumen jubao], 
China AIDS Group, reprinted in Blogspot, 5 April 11.
    \31\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Freedom of Assembly: 
Officials Disrupt Annual Meeting of Anhui Province Youth Center Run by 
AIDS Activist,'' China Human Rights Briefing March 31-April 5, 2011, 5 
April 11; ``Beijing Yirenping Center Strongly Condemns and Reports to 
the Public Security Bureau the Violent Acts Against Chang Kun'' 
[Beijing yirenping zhongxin qianglie qianze dui chang kun de baoli 
qinhai xingwei bing xiang gongan bumen jubao], China AIDS Group, 
reprinted in Blogspot, 5 April 11.
    \32\ David Bandurski, ``China Bans `Civil Society,' '' China Media 
Project, 11 January 11.
    \33\ ``The Central Propaganda Department Prohibits the Media from 
Mentioning `Civil Society' '' [Zhongxuanbu jinzhi meiti tiji ``gongmin 
shehui''], Canyu, reprinted in China Digital Times, 4 January 11.
    \34\ ``Advocating for `Civil Society' Touches Communist Party's 
Nerves, Wang Yang Admonishes Others `Not To Talk Politics' '' [Chang 
``gongmin shehui'' chudong zhonggong shenjing, wang yang hen pi ``bu 
jiang zhengzhi''], Apple Daily, reprinted in Boxun, 15 December 2010; 
Borje Ljunggren, ``China's Growing Online Civil Society May Pose the 
Biggest Challenge to the Party's Hold on Power,'' South China Morning 
Post, 15 February 11; Zhang Yuchen, ``NGOs Nest in Never-Never Land,'' 
Global Times, 20 August 09; ``Chinese NGO Space is Still Narrow'' 
[Zhongguo NGO kongjian rengran xiaxiao], Radio Free Asia, 6 October 10.
    \35\ Wu Yu, ``Chinese Authorities Pass Down an Order to the Media, 
Blocking `Civil Society' '' [Zhongguo dangju xiada meiti jinling, 
pingbi `gongmin shehui'], Deutsche Welle Chinese, 6 January 11.
    \36\ David Bandurski, ``China Bans `Civil Society','' China Media 
Project, 11 January 11.
    \37\ ``The Central Propaganda Department Prohibits the Media from 
Mentioning `Civil Society' '' [Zhongxuanbu jinzhi meiti tiji `gongmin 
shehui'], Canyu, reprinted in China Digital Times, 4 January 11; David 
Bandurski, ``China Bans `Civil Society','' China Media Project, 11 
January 11.
    \38\ See, e.g., Yuan Qi, ``In the Coming Five Years, the Government 
Will Give Civil Society Charities More Room To Develop'' [Weilai wunian 
guojia yao gei minjian cishan geng da de fazhan kongjian], China Radio 
International, reprinted in Sina, 2 March 11; Wu Chen, ``A New Approach 
for Philanthropy in China? '' Xinhua, 6 February 11; Zheng Li, ``China 
Enters `Big Public Interest Era'; Fraud and Other Ills Impact 
Charitable Donations'' [Zhongguo taru ``dagongyi shidai'' zha juan deng 
yingxiang cishan shiye fazhan], Workers Daily, 28 March 11; Li Mengkun, 
``Three Questions on Donations in China'' [Zhongguo juanzeng sanwen], 
Southern Weekend, 30 September 10.
    \39\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, ``Civil Affairs Quarterly 
Statistics Report'' (First Quarter, 2011) [Minzheng shiye tongji jibao 
(2011 nian 1 jidu)], 28 April 11.
    \40\ See, e.g., Jing Wei, ``Legal Constraints Hurt Charities,'' 
China Daily, 11 October 10; Liang Chen, ``Grey Charity,'' Global Times, 
29 September 10; ``The Dilemmas Facing One Foundation,'' China Policy 
Institute, School of Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of 
Nottingham, 30 September 10.
    \41\ Lian Mo, ``China's Charities Among the Needy,'' China Daily, 3 
November 10.
    \42\ Ibid.
    \43\ Zheng Li, ``China Enters `Big Public Interest Era'; Fraud and 
Other Ills Impact Charitable Donations'' [Zhongguo taru ``dagongyi 
shidai'' zha juan deng yingxiang cishan shiye fazhan], Workers Daily, 
28 March 11.
    \44\ Zuo Lin and Zhu Yuchen, ``New Management Regulations May Be 
Announced This Year'' [Jijin hui xin jinguzhou: xin guanli tiaoli huo 
jiang niannei banbu], Caijing, reprinted in Sina, 15 March 11.
    \45\ Ibid.
    \46\ Ibid.
    \47\ Ibid.
    \48\ Ibid.
    \49\ Ibid.
    \50\ Ding Jun, ``Regulations on the Management of Foundations Face 
Revision, Restrictions on Investment and Donations Incite Controversy'' 
[Jijin hui guanli tiaoli mianlin xiugai touzi he juanzeng shouxian yin 
zhengyi], 21st Century Business Herald, 24 February 11.
    \51\ Wang Yingnan, ``Ministry of Civil Affairs Revised Supervisory 
Regulations, Unapproved Grassroots NGOs May Not Be Able To Receive 
Funding From Foundations'' [Minzhengbu xiuding guanli tiaoli wei huopi 
caogen NGO huo wuyuan jijinhui zizhu], Beijing Times, 28 March 11. See 
also Zuo Lin and Zhu Yuchen, ``New Management Regulations May Be 
Announced This Year'' [Jijin hui xin jinguzhou: xin guanli tiaoli huo 
jiang niannei banbu], Caijing, reprinted in Sina, 15 March 11.
    \52\ Zuo Lin and Zhu Yuchen, ``New Management Regulations May Be 
Announced This Year'' [Jijin hui xin jinguzhou: xin guanli tiaoli huo 
jiang niannei banbu], Caijing, reprinted in Sina, 15 March 11; Wang 
Yingnan, ``Ministry of Civil Affairs Revised Supervisory Regulations, 
Unapproved Grassroots NGOs May Not Be Able To Receive Funding From 
Foundations'' [Minzhengbu xiuding guanli tiaoli wei huopi caogen NGO 
huo wuyuan jijinhui zizhu], Beijing Times, 28 March 11.
    \53\ Ibid.
    \54\ Ibid.
    \55\ Lian Mo, ``Beijing Looks at Laws on Philanthropy,'' China 
Daily, 3 November 10.
    \56\ Ibid.
    \57\ Ibid.
    \58\ Ibid.
    \59\ Ibid.
    \60\ Ibid.
    \61\ Chen Qiao, ``Chen Guangbiao Responds to Failure of Charities: 
I Take the Initiative To Request Not To Participate and Select By 
Vote'' [Cheng guangbiao huiying luobang cishan bang: wo zhudong yaoqiu 
bu canyu pingxuan], Qianhong Evening Post, reprinted in Xinhua, 28 
April 11.
    \62\ Ibid.
    \63\ Changde City, Hunan Province, Department of Civil Affairs, 
``Civil Affairs Ministry and Shanghai City Signed Cooperative Agreement 
to Formally Initiate the Building of a National Model Modern Civil 
Administration'' [Minzhengbu yu shanghai shi qianshu hezuo xieyi 
zhengshi qidong guojia xiandai minzheng shifan qu jianshe], 5 July 10; 
Tong Shuquan, ``Four Major Types of Social Organizations Registration 
About To Be Completely Open'' [Si dalei shehui zuzhi dengji shenpi 
jiang quanbu fangkai], Beijing Daily, 26 February 11.
    \64\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 39 (1)(2).
    \65\ Ibid., chap. 39 (1).
    \66\ Ibid.
    \67\ Tong Shuquan, ``Four Major Types of Social Organizations 
Registration About To Be Completely Open'' [Si dalei shehui zuzhi 
dengji shenpi jiang quanbu fangkai], Beijing Daily, 26 February 11.
    \68\ Ibid.
    \69\ Ibid.
    \70\ Changde City, Hunan Province, Department of Civil Affairs, 
``Civil Affairs Ministry and Shanghai City Signed Cooperative Agreement 
to Formally Initiate the Building of a National Model Modern Civil 
Administration'' [Minzhengbu yu shanghai shi qianshu hezuo xieyi 
zhengshi qidong guojia xiandai minzheng shifan qu jianshe], 5 July 10.
    \71\ Karla W. Simon, ``The Regulation of Civil Society 
Organizations in China,'' International Journal of Civil Society Law, 
Vol. 9, No. 1 (2011), 11.
    \72\ Changde City, Hunan Province, Department of Civil Affairs, 
``Civil Affairs Ministry and Shanghai City Signed Cooperative Agreement 
to Formally Initiate the Building of a National Model Modern Civil 
Administration'' [Minzhengbu yu shanghai shi qianshu hezuo xieyi 
zhengshi qidong guojia xiandai minzheng shifan qu jianshe], 5 July 10.
    \73\ Ibid.
    \74\ People's Government of Shanghai, ``Civil Affairs Ministry and 
Shanghai City Signed Cooperative Agreement to Formally Initiate a 
National Model to Demonstrate the Building of Modern Civil 
Administration'' [Minzheng bu yu shanghai shi qianshu hezuo xieyi 
zhengshi qidong guojia xiandai minzheng shifan qu jianshe], 5 July 10.
    \75\ Ibid.
    \76\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 163-64.
    \77\ Ibid.
    \78\ Karla W. Simon, ``The Regulation of Civil Society 
Organizations in China,'' International Journal of Civil Society Law, 
Vol. 9, No. 1 (2011), 9.
    \79\ Ng Tze-wei, ``Will Stronger Social Governance Give NGOs More 
Leeway? '' South China Morning Post, 10 March 11.
    \80\ Ibid.
    \81\ ``Beijing Develops New Management of NGOs: The Threshold Is 
Lowered While Supervision Is More Strict'' [Beijing chuangxin shehui 
zuzhi guanli: menkan geng di le jianguan geng yan le], People's Daily, 
1 March 11.
    \82\ ``Zhou Yongkang: Adapt to the New Conditions of Socio-Economic 
Development, Strengthen and Renew Social Management'' [Zhou yongkang: 
shiying jingji shehui fazhan xin xingshi jiaqiang he chuangxin shehui 
guanli], Xinhua, 20 February 11.
    Notes to Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance

    \1\ ``Central Organization Department: By the End of 2010, the 
Chinese Communist Party Reached 80.269 Million Members'' [Zhongzubu: 
jiezhi 2010 niandi zhonggang dangyuan zongshu 80.269 wan ming], China 
News, 24 June 11.
    \2\ ``At the End of 2009 Total Number of Party Members Reaches 
77,995,000 Nationally'' [Jiezhi 2009 niandi quanguo dangyuan zongshu da 
7799.5 wan ming], Chinese Communist Party News Net, 28 June 10.
    \3\ Ibid. There are 6,629 urban street Communist Party 
organizations, 34,224 town organizations, 80,000 residential 
committees, and 598,000 village committees.
    \4\ Ibid. Over 99 percent of the various types of eligible 
enterprises have Party organizations.
    \5\ Ibid. Of the country's 570,000 public service organizations, 
471,000 have Party organizations.
    \6\ Ibid. The numbers here include eligible 13,000 ``social 
organizations'' (shehui tuanti), of which 12,000 have Party 
organizations, and 16,000 eligible ``nonprofit enterprises'' (minban 
feiqiye), of which 15,000 have Party organizations.
    \7\ National People's Congress, Outline of the Economic and Social 
Development 12th Five-Year Plan of the People's Republic of China'' 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge 
wunian guihua gangyao], issued 14 March 11. In relation to assigning 
government posts, authorities must ``uphold the principle of the Party 
managing talent'' (chap. 29 (3)); in relation to the education system, 
authorities will ``comprehensively implement the Party's educational 
principles. . . .'' (chap. 28). ``Remarks at 11th China Journalists' 
Day and Presentation of Awards and Report Meeting'' [Zai di shiyi jie 
zhongguo jizhe jieji banjiang baogaohui shang de jianghua], People's 
Daily, 9 November 11. With regards to the media, ``Party principles 
should be taken as basic principles in news propaganda work.'' ``Liu 
Binjie: Political System Reform Must Insist on the Correct 
Orientation'' [Liu binjie: zhengzhi tizhi gaige bixu jianchi zhengque 
fangxiang], China Press and Publications Daily, 17 November 10. In 
addition, ``the Party is in charge of the media, which cannot change.''
    \8\ Central Committee of the Communist Party General Office and 
State Council General Office, ``Opinion Regarding Strengthening and 
Improving Development of Urban Residence Committees'' [Guanyu jiaqiang 
he gaijin chengshi shechu jumin weiyuanhui jianshe de yijian], issued 9 
November 10.
    \9\ ``China's Justice Minister Calls for Better Party Building in 
Law Firms,'' Xinhua, 23 November 10.
    \10\ ``CPC Seeks Closer Ties With China's Grassroots To Consolidate 
Ruling Status,'' Xinhua, 6 June 11. This reporting year, Party 
officials took measures to ``consolidate [the Party's] ruling status'' 
in a campaign aimed at rural residents. For instance, the Ganzhou 
municipal government, Jiangxi province, sent 20,000 Party members to 
3,751 villages at the end of 2010.
    \11\ Central Committee of the Communist Party and State Council, 
Decision Concerning Strengthening Comprehensive Management of Social 
Order, issued 19 February 91; ``Authorities Crack Down on Rights 
Defenders, Lawyers, Artists, Bloggers,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 3 May 11.
    \12\ ``Social Management Innovations Take People's Livelihood as 
the Main Line, 35 Pilot Project Communities Nationally Give Impetus for 
Innovation'' [Shehui guanli chuangxin yi minsheng wei zhuxian quanguo 
35 ge shidian diqu fali chuangxin], Legal Daily, reprinted in People's 
Daily, 13 June 11. Outreach activities allow officials to monitor and 
gauge if citizens are a threat to ``stability,'' while simultaneously 
taking care of social welfare issues. ``Focus on Social Management's 
Difficult Problems, Really Resolving Contradictions Requires Putting 
People First'' [Jujiao shehui guanli nanti yiren weiben caineng 
zhenzheng huajie maodun], Xinhua, 19 February 11. In an economic 
development zone in Hefei city, Anhui province, 119 responsible 
personnel would ``learn about the affairs of 100 households'' in the 
city's 21 communities, engaging in ``face-to-face'' service provision 
and coordinating social management work. In Dongcheng district, 
Beijing, ``network management'' personnel work to set up a database 
with information on ``people, land, property, matters, and 
sentiments.''
    \13\ ``Assessment Report on the National Human Rights Action Plan 
of China (2009-2010)'' [Guojia renquan xingdong jihua (2009-2010 nian) 
pinggu baogao], Xinhua, 14 July 11, sec. 3(5).
    \14\ Opinion Regarding Strengthening and Improving Development of 
Urban Residence Committees [Guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin chengshi shechu 
jumin weiyuanhui jianshe de yijian], issued 9 November 10. The preface 
of this Opinion emphasized the ``more prominent [resident committee] 
function of safeguarding social stability, the increasing importance of 
community residence committees to take on social management tasks, and 
the more urgent service demands of community resident committees by 
citizens.''
    \15\ ``Beijing Addresses New Challenges in Social Management, Makes 
Innovations in Comprehensive Management Work Mechanisms'' [Beijing 
yingdui shehui guanli xin tiaozhan chuangxin zongzhi gongzuo xin 
tizhi], Xinhua, 18 June 10.
    \16\ ``Building Comprehensive Management and Internet Management 
Included for First Time'' [Luoyu zongzhi wangluo guanli bei shouci 
naru], Liberation Daily, 2 March 11.
    \17\ Ibid.
    \18\ ``Zhejiang Police's Internal Document: Controlling the 
Movements of Critical Persons,'' China Digital Times, 2 March 10.
    \19\ ``Shenzhen Evicts More Than 80,000 `Security High-Risk 
Personnel,' Including People With Mental Illnesses'' [Shenzhen qingchu 
8 wanyu ``zhi'an gaowei renyuan'' baokuo jingshenbingren], Chongqing 
Evening News, reprinted in Phoenix Net, 12 April 11; ``Shenzhen Plans 
Comprehensive Investigation of `High-Risk Personnel' To Create a Stable 
Situation'' [Shenzhen jihua quanmian paicha ``gaowei renyuan'' zhizao 
wending jumian], Radio Free Asia, 20 November 10. The Shenzhen 
municipal Party Committee and the municipal government passed measures, 
called ``Certain Opinions Regarding Strengthening Social Management 
Structures, Public Security, and Solid Prevention and Control 
Systems,'' which stipulate the establishment of an ``intelligence 
information network,'' a ``basic prevention network,'' a ``surveillance 
and control network,'' and an ``Internet management and control 
network,'' among others, in order to maintain ``stability.''
    \20\ ``Zhejiang Police's Internal Document: Controlling the 
Movements of Critical Persons,'' China Digital Times, 2 March 10.
    \21\ ``China: Student Informant System To Expand, Limiting School 
Autonomy, Free Expression,'' CIA Directorate of Intelligence (Open 
Source Works), 23 November 10. The ``student informant system'' 
reportedly is more open, includes one student informant in each class 
to monitor teachers' and students' political attitudes, and employs 
denunciation techniques.
    \22\ Ibid. Education officials reportedly started to strengthen the 
student informant system in 2005, which then reportedly was extended to 
lower-tier universities and middle and high schools in some parts of 
the country. Public debate about the ``student informant centers'' 
reportedly focuses on the risk of propagating a ``culture of 
denunciation,'' of deterring freedom of speech, and potentially harming 
the development of gifted students.
    \23\ Ibid.
    \24\ Huang Shaojie, ``PKU Copy Rooms Censor Materials,'' Global 
Times, 19 January 11.
    \25\ He Dan, ``Peking University's Plan Stirs Questions,'' China 
Daily, 26 March 11.
    \26\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
    \27\ Gillian Wong, ``AP Exclusive: Internet-Savvy Network of 20 Is 
Behind Protest Calls That Have Rattled China,'' Associated Press, 
reprinted in Yahoo!, 6 April 11; ``Red Armbands Go Into Battle While 
Authorities Monitor Those Passing by, Communications Are Monitored as 
Personnel Assemble in the Capital'' [Hongxiuzhang shangzhen jianshi lu 
ren tongxun jianting renyuan ju jingcheng], Radio Free Asia, 25 
February 11; ``Organizer of Chinese Jasmine Rallies Extends an Open 
Letter to the Whole Nation'' [Zhongguo molihua jihui zuzhizhe zhi 
quanguo renmin gongkaixin], Boxun, 21 February 11.
    \28\ ``Organizer of Chinese Jasmine Rallies Extends an Open Letter 
to the Whole Nation'' [Zhongguo molihua jihui zuzhizhe zhi quanguo 
renmin gongkaixin], Boxun, 21 February 11. The statement appeared to 
say that the organizers were willing to give the Communist Party time 
to resolve problems, but that if it could not eliminate corruption and 
accept citizen ``supervision,'' then it should ``retreat from the stage 
of history.'' The statement said, ``We do not support violent 
revolution; we persist in non-violent non-cooperation.'' Further, the 
statement indicated that the organizers did not care if China had a 
one-, two-, or three-party system, but that government officials must 
accept citizen ``supervision,'' and that China must have judicial 
independence.
    \29\ ``Peaceful Road With Chinese Characteristics Out of 20 Years 
of Comprehensive Management'' [Zongzhi 20 nian zouchu yitiao zhongguo 
tese pingan zhilu], Legal Daily, 1 March 11. 2011 marks the 20th 
anniversary of the establishment of the Central Committee on 
Comprehensive Management of Social Order that was put in place in 1991, 
as well as the two official decisions that were issued in 1991 that 
contain the ``guiding principles'' related to ``social order,'' 
``maintaining social stability,'' and ensuring ``lasting stability and 
durable peace.''
    \30\ ``Hu Jintao: Firmly Raise the Standard for Scientification of 
Social Management'' [Hu jintao: zhazha shishi tigao shehui guanli 
kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua, 19 February 11.
    \31\ Ren Siwen, ``Be Conscious of Upholding Social Harmony and 
Stability'' [Zijue weihu shehui hexie wending], Beijing Daily, 5 March 
11; Ren Siwen, ``Upholding Stability Begins With Each Individual'' 
[Weihu wending cong mei geren zuoqi], Beijing Daily, 6 March 11; 
``Police Out in Force Again To Stop `Jasmine' Rallies Flowering,'' 
South China Morning Post, 7 March 11.
    \32\ Li Liyan, ``People's Editorial: Why the Communist Party 
Central Committee Attaches Great Importance To Strengthening of and 
Innovation in Social Management'' [Renmin shiping: zhongyang weihe 
gaodu zhongshi jiaqiang he chuangxin shehui guanli], People's Daily, 23 
February 11; Ren Siwen, ``Be Conscious of Upholding Social Harmony and 
Stability'' [Zijue weihu shehui hexie wending], Beijing Daily, 5 March 
11; ``Chinese Official Press Attack `Jasmine' Gatherings'' [Zhongguo 
guanmei pingji ``molihua'' jihui huodong], Radio Free Asia, 5 March 11.
    \33\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Escalating Crackdown 
Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution' in China,'' 31 March 11. 
According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``The Chinese government 
has criminally detained a total of 26 individuals, disappeared more 
than 30, and put more than 200 under soft detention.'' For Commission 
analysis, see ``Authorities Crack Down on Rights Defenders, Lawyers, 
Artists, Bloggers,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 May 
11.
    \34\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Suining City Public Security 
Bureau Notice of Criminal Detention to Chen Wei'' [Suiningshi gonganju 
dui chen wei de xingshi juliu tongzhishu], reprinted in Boxun, 22 
February 11; Democratic China, ``Chen Wei: Me and the `92 Democracy 
Movement' '' [Chen wei: wo yu jiuer minzhu yundong], 11 September 10.
    \35\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Escalating Crackdown 
Following Call for `Jasmine Revolution' in China,'' 31 March 11; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet Likely the 
Harshest in Recent Years,'' 25 February 11.''
    \36\ Human Rights in China, ``Independent Intellectual Ran Yunfei 
Arrested on ``Inciting Subversion of State Power'' Charge'' [Zheming 
duli zhishi fenzi ran yunfei bei yi shexian `shandongzui' daibu], 28 
March 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet 
Likely the Harshest in Recent Years,'' 25 February 11; ``Ran Yunfei 
Detained for the Crime of Subversion, All Circles Are Shocked and Decry 
[Detention]'' [Ran yunfei bei yi dianfu zuiming xingju, gejie zhenjing 
qianze], Radio Free Asia, 24 February 11.
    \37\ Jeremy Page, ``Beijing Blocks Protest Reports,'' Wall Street 
Journal, 31 January 11; Edward Wong and David Barboza, ``Wary of Egypt 
Unrest, China Censors Web,'' New York Times, 31 January 11. For 
Commission analysis, see ``Authorities Censor Access to Information on 
Middle East and Chinese `Jasmine' Protests,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 22 March 11.
    \38\ Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, ``A Revolution's Namesake 
Is Contraband in China,'' New York Times, 10 May 11.
    \39\ ``Chinese Church Leaders Urge Followers Not To Join Street 
Gatherings,'' Xinhua, 4 March 11 (Open Source Center, 4 March 11).
    \40\ ``Jasmine Open for Third Time, Beijing Subway Closed, Hong 
Kong Residents Expressing Support Taken Into Custody'' [Molihua kai 
sandu beijing ditie beifeng gangmin shengyuan beizhua], Epoch Times, 7 
March 11; ``Universities Targeted in `Jasmine' Crackdown,'' Radio Free 
Asia, 7 March 11. Chinese Government Takes Strict Precautions for 
Fourth Jasmine Exercise, Plainclothes Police Outnumber Pedestrians'' 
[Zhongguo zhengfu yanfang disi bo molihua huodong, jingcha bianyi 
chaoguo sanbuzhe renshu], Radio Free Asia, 13 March 11; ``Two Chongqing 
Students Detained for Transmitting News of `Jasmine Revolution' '' 
[Chongqing liang xuesheng yin shangwang zhuanfa ``molihua geming'' 
xinxi beiju], Radio Free Asia, 2 March 11; ``Beijing High School 
Students Admonished: Do Not Organize Collective Activities'' [Beijing 
gaoxiao quanjie xuesheng: jinqi wu zuzhi jiti huodong], Radio Free 
Asia, 2 March 11.
    \41\ ``Police Out in Force Again To Stop `Jasmine' Rallies 
Flowering,'' South China Morning Post, 7 March 11; Ian Johnson, ``Call 
for Protests in China Draws More Police Than Protesters,'' New York 
Times, 27 February 11; Malcolm Moore, ``Heavy-Handed Reaction to 
China's `Jasmine' Protests,'' Telegraph, 27 February 11.
    \42\ Ian Johnson, ``Call for Protests in China Draws More Police 
Than Protesters,'' New York Times, 27 February 11; Malcolm Moore, 
``Heavy-Handed Reaction to China's `Jasmine' Protests,'' Telegraph, 27 
February 11.
    \43\ ``Jasmine Open for Third Time, Beijing Subway Closed, Hong 
Kong Residents Expressing Support Taken Into Custody'' [Molihua kai 
sandu beijing ditie beifeng gangmin shengyuan beizhua], Epoch Times, 7 
March 11; Malcolm Moore, ``Heavy-Handed Reaction to China's `Jasmine' 
Protests,'' Telegraph, 27 February 11.
    \44\ Ian Johnson, ``Call for Protests in China Draws More Police 
Than Protesters,'' New York Times, 27 February 11; Malcolm Moore, 
``Heavy-Handed Reaction to China's `Jasmine' Protests,'' Telegraph, 27 
February 11; ``Police Out in Force Again To Stop `Jasmine' Rallies 
Flowering,'' South China Morning Post, 7 March 11.
    \45\ Frank Ching, ``Don't Look for Jasmine Revolution or Tea in 
China,'' Yale Global Online, 7 March 11.
    \46\ Edward Wong and Jonathan Ansfield, ``Beijing Blames Foreigners 
For Its Fears of Unrest,'' New York Times, 8 May 11.
    \47\ Ibid.
    \48\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Liu Xianbin Case Trial Oral 
Judgment Announcement of 10 Years, Family and Lawyers Cannot Visit'' 
[Liu xianbin an fating koutou pan shi nian xingqi, jiaren lushi wufa 
huijian], 25 March 11; Human Rights in China, ``Activist Sentenced to 
Ten Years for Inciting Subversion; Essays Cited as Evidence,'' 25 March 
11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Liu Xianbin Already Formally 
Indicted'' [Liu xianbin yijing bei zhengshi qisu], 17 November 10; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Sichuan Activist Liu Xianbin's 
Criminal Sentencing Document'' [Sichuan yiyi renshi liu xianbin xingshi 
panjueshu], 17 May 11. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
for more information about Liu Xianbin's case.
    \49\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Wuhan Rights Defender Li Tie 
Arrested on Suspicion of `Subverting State Power' Crime'' [Wuhan 
weiquan renshi litie bei yi shexian ``dianfu guojia zhengquan zui'' 
daibu], 17 November 10.
    \50\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``After Being Missing for 12 
Days, Elections Expert Yao Lifa Free'' [Xuanju zhuanjia yao lifa 
shizong 12 tianhou huode ziyou], 30 October 10. This instance was 
reportedly related to authorities' perception that Yao was trying to 
organize a celebration of Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize. Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders, ``Special Alert: Elections Expert Yao Lifa Once Again 
Kidnapped, Taken Away'' [Tebie guanzhu: xuanju zhuanjia yao lifa zaici 
bei bangjia dao waidi], reprinted in Boxun, 19 November 10. This 
instance was reportedly to impede his investigation of a case in which 
a petitioner was allegedly killed by an official. Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders, ``Elections Expert Yao Lifa Abused and Beaten During Soft 
Detention Period'' [Xuanju zhuanjia yao lifa bei ruanjin qijian shoudao 
ruma ouda], 13 December 10. This instance was reportedly to stop him 
from meeting Qin Yongmin, a democracy advocate. Human Rights in China, 
``Rights Lawyer Missing More Than 48 Hours; Former Local People's 
Congress Deputy Detained Seven Days,'' 18 February 11. This instance 
was reportedly to prevent him from training independent candidates for 
local elections. ``Police Question Foreigners in Seventh Jasmine Wave, 
Ai Weiwei and Assistant Prevented from Leaving the Country and Summoned 
by the Police'' [Di qibo molihua jingfang pancha waijiren ai weiwei ji 
zhushou bei jin chujing ji chuanhuan], Radio Free Asia, 3 April 11. 
This instance reportedly was related to the ``Jasmine Revolution'' 
rallies. Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``As June 4th Approaches, 
Strict Control and Suppression Intensifies (Continuation)'' [Liusi 
jiangling, quanguo yankong daya shengji (xu)], 3 June 11. In February, 
authorities placed Yao under 24-hour observation, which intensified as 
the anniversary of the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen 
protests approached in early June. ``Elections Expert Yao Lifa's 
Movements Restricted After Receiving a Call From the US Embassy'' 
[Xuanju zhuanjia yao lifa jie meiguo shiguan dianhua hou bei xianzhi 
renshen ziyou], 12 June 11; ``Scholar Held Amid Election Bid,'' Radio 
Free Asia, 21 June 11. Yao Lifa disappeared again after receiving calls 
from the U.S. Embassy and a reporter. Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 
``Yao Lifa Missing for Twenty Days, Home Searched Twice in One Day'' 
[Yao lifa shizong 20 tian shi, jiazhong yitian nei bei chachao 
liangci], 7 July 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human 
Rights Briefing August 3-9, 2011,'' 9 August 11.
    \51\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing 
August 3-9, 2011,'' 9 August 11; ``Scholar Held Amid Election Bid,'' 
Radio Free Asia, 21 June 11.
    \52\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 25; UN Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 25: The Right To Participate in Public Affairs, 
Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service, CCPR/C/
21/Rev.1/Add.7, 7 December 96. Under General Comment 25 to the ICCPR, 
this language requires that: ``Where citizens participate in the 
conduct of public affairs through freely chosen representatives, it is 
implicit in article 25 that those representatives do in fact exercise 
governmental power and that they are accountable through the electoral 
process for their exercise of that power'' (Item 7); ``The right to 
vote at elections and referenda must be established by law and may be 
subject only to reasonable restrictions . . . [p]arty membership should 
not be a condition of eligibility to vote, nor a ground of 
disqualification'' (Item 10); ``Freedom of expression, assembly and 
association are essential conditions for the effective exercise of the 
right to vote and must be fully protected . . .'' (Item 12); ``The 
right of persons to stand for election should not be limited 
unreasonably by requiring candidates to be members of parties or of 
specific parties . . .'' (Item 17); An ``independent electoral 
authority should be established to supervise the electoral process and 
to ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance 
with established laws which are compatible with the Covenant . . . .'' 
(Item 20).
    \53\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76. China has signed, but has not yet 
ratified, the ICCPR. In the 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan 
issued by the Chinese government in April 2009, officials stated that 
the ICCPR was one of the ``fundamental principles'' on which the plan 
was framed, and that the government ``will continue legislative, 
judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked 
with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.'' 
State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of 
China (2009-2010), reprinted in Xinhua, 13 April 09, Introduction, sec. 
V(1).
    \54\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48, art. 21. 
``Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives . . . . The will of 
the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by 
equivalent free voting procedures.''
    \55\ ``How To Look at New Trends in Rural Grassroots Elections'' 
[Ruhe kandai nongcun jiceng xuanju de xin chaoshi], Beijing Daily, 
reprinted in Seeking Truth, 27 September 10; Xu Dongmei, Research on 
Chinese Communist Party Intra-Party Democracy [Zhongguo gongchandang 
dangnei minzhu yanjiu], (Beijing: Party Construction Reading Materials 
Press, 2004), 7.
    \56\ Deng Xiaoping, ``Report on the Revision of the Constitution of 
the Communist Party of China,'' People's Daily, 16 September 56. 
According to Deng, ``The measures taken for the development of inner-
Party democracy are not meant to weaken necessary centralization in the 
Party, but to supply it with a powerful and vigorous base.'' 
Constitution of the Communist Party of China, as amended 21 October 07. 
According to the Party Constitution, ``Democratic centralism is a 
combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under 
centralized guidance. It is the fundamental organizational principle of 
the Party and is also the mass line applied in the Party's political 
activities. The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy, 
safeguard the democratic rights of its members, and give play to the 
initiative and creativity of Party organizations at all levels as well 
as its members.'' Xu Dongmei, Research on Chinese Communist Party 
Intra-Party Democracy [Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei minzhu yanjiu], 
(Beijing: Party Construction Reading Materials Press, 2004), 3. 
Development of inner-Party democracy was all but abandoned during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976), but was revived after 1978 when the 
concept of ``collective leadership'' once again became a guiding 
principle of the Party.
    \57\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on China's 
Peaceful Development (English), reprinted in Xinhua (Open Source 
Center, 6 September 11), issued 6 September 11, sec. III; State Council 
Information Office, White Paper on China's Peaceful Development 
(Chinese), reprinted in China Net, 6 September 11, sec. III. A 
subsequent article in Xinhua notes Chinese authorities' resolve to 
never permit ``external forces to interfere in China's internal 
affairs.'' ``China Will Never Allow External Interference, Says White 
Paper,'' Xinhua, 6 September 11. See also ``Editorial: Political System 
Included in China's `Core Interests' '' [Shelun: zhengzhi zhidu jinru 
zhongguo ``kexin liyichuan''], Global Times, 7 September 11.
    \58\ ``Editorial: Political System Included in China's `Core 
Interests' '' [Shelun: zhengzhi zhidu jinru zhongguo ``kexin 
liyichuan''], Global Times, 7 September 11.
    \59\ Full Text of Communique of the Fifth Plenum of the 17th CPC 
Central Committee, reprinted in Xinhua, 18 October 10.
    \60\ National People's Congress, Outline of the Economic and Social 
Development 12th Five-Year Plan of the People's Republic of China 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge 
wunian guihua gangyao], issued 14 March 11, chap. 54. It states that 
China will ``strengthen democratic systems, enrich democratic forms, 
broaden democratic channels, implement democratic elections according 
to law; promote democratic policies, democratic management, and 
democratic supervision; protect people's right to know, right to 
participate, and right to supervise.''
    \61\ An Baijie, ``Premier Wen Calls for Major Political Reform,'' 
Global Times, 23 August 10. Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly made a 
statement in August 2010 declaring that ``[w]ithout the political 
reform, China may lose what it has already achieved through economic 
restructuring and the targets of its modernization drive might not be 
reached.''
    \62\ Gary Huang, ``Editorial Aims To Silence Calls for Political 
Reform: Western-Style Democracy Rejected,'' South China Morning Post, 
28 October 10.
    \63\ Shi Jiangtao, ``Beijing Slams Door on Political Reform,'' 
South China Morning Post, 11 March 11; `` `Zheng Qingyuan' Says 
Political Reform Is To `Strengthen' Party Leadership,'' People's Daily, 
26 October 10 (Open Source Center, 26 October 10).
    \64\ Wang Yuting, ``Wu Bangguo: Do Not Apply Mechanically Certain 
Western Legal Systems'' [Wu bangguo: bu taoyong xifang moxie guojia 
falu tixi], Eastday, 10 March 11; ``China Vows No Western-Style 
Political Reforms,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 9 
March 11. He also stated China would not carry out formal 
privatization.
    \65\ `` `Zheng Qingyuan' Says Political Reform Is To `Strengthen' 
Party Leadership,'' People's Daily, 26 October 10 (Open Source Center, 
26 October 10).
    \66\ What ``Democracy'' Means in China After Thirty Years of 
Reform, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 22 May 09, Testimony of Melanie Manion, Professor of Public 
Affairs and Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
    \67\ National People's Congress, ``Delegates' Law Revision (Draft) 
Articles and Draft Explanation'' [Daibiaofa xiuzheng'an (cao'an) 
tiaowen ji cao'an shuoming], 28 August 10; Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress, Decisions Regarding Revising Delegates Law 
of the National People's Congress and Various Levels of Local People's 
Congresses of the People's Republic of China, issued 28 October 10.
    \68\ Ibid.
    \69\ What ``Democracy'' Means in China After Thirty Years of 
Reform, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 22 May 09, Testimony of Melanie Manion, Professor of Public 
Affairs and Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
According to Manion, one development is that, despite official voter 
turnout figures of 90 percent, survey evidence indicates that ``very 
high proportions of ordinary Chinese know little or nothing about local 
congress candidates on election day, didn't vote in the most recent 
congress election, and can recall nothing their congress representative 
have done in the past term.''
    \70\ ``New Faces Should Go Back to Reality,'' Global Times, 31 May 
11; ``Editorial: Independent Candidates Should Revert From Micro Blogs 
Back to Reality,'' Global Times, 30 May 11; Zhu Shanshan, ``Grass-roots 
Candidates Rally Online,'' Global Times, 30 May 11.
    \71\ Peter Foster, ``Chinese Activists Harness Twitter To Campaign 
in Elections,'' Telegraph, 19 June 11.
    \72\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Jiangxi Independent 
Candidate Liu Ping Released After Four-Day Illegal Detention'' [Jiangxi 
duli houxuanren liu ping bei feifa guanya 4 tian hou houshi], 17 May 
11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Jiangxi Independent Candidate Liu 
Ping and Others Lose Contact With Outside World'' [Jiangxi duli 
houxuanren liu ping dengren yu waijie shiqu lianxi], 12 May 11; ``The 
True Story of a Local Female Independent Election Candidate in Xinyu, 
China,'' China Elections Blog, 20 May 11. Police told Liu, who 
reportedly had over 30,000 followers on her microblog, that she was not 
qualified to run because she traveled to Beijing to petition about a 
land issue and because some of her nominators were not eligible. Prior 
to this, police officials reportedly interrupted Liu's public speeches, 
accused her of being in league with ``hostile foreign political 
forces,'' and confiscated fliers and numerous items from her home. 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Jiangxi Independent Candidate Liu 
Ping Released After Four-Day Illegal Detention'' [Jiangxi duli 
houxuanren liu ping bei feifa guanya 4 tian hou houshi], 17 May 1. 
Officials called her in for questioning for ``disrupting public 
order.''
    \73\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Xinyu City, Jiangxi, 
Independent Candidates Wei Zhongping and Others Regain Their Freedom,'' 
20 May 11.
    \74\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Chinese Civic Elections 
Monitor Du Quanbing Kidnapped by Police'' [Zhongguo minjian xuanju 
guanchayuan du quanbin bei jingfang bangjia], 30 April 11.
    \75\ ``Independent Poll Candidates Harassed,'' South China Morning 
Post, 23 June 11. Authorities warned Li Sihua, of Jiangxi province, 
that he may face charges of ``sabotaging elections,'' accusing him of 
falsifying signatures on his nomination form. Xie Runliang, of Jiangsu 
province, pulled out of a local election in May one day after police 
called him in for a ``chat.'' A ``mysterious department'' allegedly 
pressured a company to withhold a tennis sponsorship for the son of 
candidate Li Chengpeng.
    \76\ ``New Faces Should Go Back to Reality,'' Global Times, 31 May 
11; ``Editorial: Independent Candidates Should Revert From Micro Blogs 
Back to Reality,'' Global Times, 30 May 11.
    \77\ Lin Wei and Chen Anyu, ``Longhua District in Haikou 
Effectively Bans Anomalies Involved in Village-Level Election 
Canvassing'' [Longhuachu cunji huanjie shunli tuijin], 23 July 10; Chen 
Anning and Bai Bin, ``Treating and Sending Gifts To Win Village Cadre 
Election'' [Wei jingxuan cun ganbu qingke songli], Hainan Daily, 12 
August 10. This article discusses election canvassing bribery in one 
district.
    \78\ ``Party Committee Twists Guangdong Village Committee 
Elections, New Shandong Village Chief Stabbed 20 Times'' [Guangdong 
cunwei huanjie dangwei caopan shandong cunzhang xin shangren bei kan 20 
dao], Radio Free Asia, 18 April 11.
    \79\ Chen Anning and Bai Bin, ``Treating and Sending Gifts To Win 
Village Cadre Election'' [Wei jingxuan cun ganbu qingke songli], Hainan 
Daily, 12 August 10; ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil 
Affairs Deputy Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the 
Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang Jiang 
Li jiu shenru guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 
10.
    \80\ Chen Anning and Bai Bin, ``Treating and Sending Gifts To Win 
Village Cadre Election'' [Wei jingxuan cun ganbu qingke songli], Hainan 
Daily, 12 August 10; Zhao Lei, ``Bribery Being Bred in Grassroots 
Elections,'' China Daily, 22 July 10.
    \81\ Yan Faming, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Fangshan Village 
Election Ballot Box Snatched 8 Villagers Detained'' [Fangshan cunmin 
xuanju quan piaoxiang bei qiang 8 cunmin bei zhua], reprinted in Boxun, 
17 August 10; Paul Mooney, ``Village Seethes Over `Stolen' Election,'' 
South China Morning Post, reprinted in Web site of Paul Mooney, 29 
August 10.
    \82\ Yan Faming, Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Fangshan Village 
Election Ballot Box Snatched 8 Villagers Detained'' [Fangshan cunmin 
xuanju quan piaoxiang bei qiang 8 cunmin bei zhua], reprinted in Boxun, 
17 August 10. Those detained include Qiu Lina, Zhao Yun, Ma Zhizheng, 
Zhao Zhenghai, and Zhao Daqing. Paul Mooney, ``Village Seethes Over 
`Stolen' Election,'' South China Morning Post, reprinted in Web site of 
Paul Mooney, 29 August 10. ``Four More Detained in the Beijing Suburban 
Village Raoyuefu Election Scandal, 13 Arrested Including the Election 
Committee Director'' [Jingjiao raoyuefu xuanjumen zai zhua siren 
xuanweihui zhuren deng shisanren beizhua], Civil Rights and Livelihood, 
24 August 10. Officials later detained four other villagers including 
Liu Jinfu, a former village leader and director of the village election 
commission, on charges not specified in news reports.
    \83\ PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa], issued 4 November 98, amended and 
effective 28 October 10.
    \84\ ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil Affairs Deputy 
Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the Organic Law of the 
Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang Jiangli jiu shenru 
guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 10.
    \85\ PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa], issued 4 November 98, amended and 
effective 28 October 10, art. 32.
    \86\ ``Closely Watching the `Executive Power' of 7,000,000 
Government Officials'' [Dingjin 700 wan cunguan de ``xingzhengquan''], 
Xinhua, 7 December 10. For example, in Henan province, supervisory-
related organizations reportedly are mechanisms to supervise the 
exercise of official power, prevent corruption, and according to one 
official, have ``become a buffer safeguarding social stability in rural 
areas.'' Li Bo, ``Yijun County Sets Up Villager Supervisory Committees 
in Every Village'' [Yijun sheli cunmin jiandu weiyuanhui cujin nongcun 
hexie], Shaanxi Daily, 12 August 10. One village in Shaanxi province 
reported that after the village established the supervisory committee, 
petitioning cases decreased by 40 percent. ``Guo Yongping at 
Guanzhongwu City First District Open Village Affairs, Democratic 
Management, and Democratic Supervision Work Symposium Requires 
Deepening Open Village Affairs and Democracy for Tangible Advances in 
Managing `Difficult Villages' '' [Guo yongping zai guanzhongwushi yiqu 
cunwu gongkai minzhu guanli minzhu jiandu gongzuo zuotanhuishang yaoqiu 
shenhua cunwu gongkai he minzhu queshi tuijin ``nandiancun'' zhili], 
Shaanxi Daily, 27 July 10.
    \87\ ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil Affairs Deputy 
Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the Organic Law of the 
Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang Jiangli jiu shenru 
guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 10.
    \88\ ``Panlong District: `Three Types of Committees' Jointly 
Oversee Management of Community Affairs'' [Panlongqu: ``sanwei'' 
xieshou guifan shequ shiwu guanli], Yunnan Daily, 5 July 10.
    \89\ Qian Qilu, ``To Hammer Out a Base, Promote Grassroots 
Democratic Political Construction in Village Pastoral Areas'' [Hanshi 
jichu tuijin nongcun muqu jiceng minzhu zhengzhi jianshe], Inner 
Mongolia Daily, 13 August 10. According to this news story, the 
``villager party branch is to exercise the power of conducting the 
decision-making process, the villager representative conference is to 
exercise the power to vote to approve the decision, the villager 
committee is to exercise the power to execute the decision, and the 
villager supervisory committee is to exercise the power of supervising 
the implementation of the decision.'' ``Promote Innovations in the 
Construction of Village Grassroots Party Organization--Briefing on 
Construction of Village Grassroots Organizations' `Three-Three System' 
High-Level Forum'' [Tuaijin nongcun jiceng dang zuzhi jianshe tizhi 
chuangxin--``nongcun jiceng zuzhi jianshe `sansanzhi' gaozeng luntan'' 
suyao], People's Daily, 20 October 10. In another village, the Party 
branch reportedly ``organizes a meeting to discuss major village 
issues'' and the villager representative assembly ``makes decisions 
happen,'' while the ``supervisory committee'' ``directs.''
    \90\ The 2010 revision contains an entire section on the ``villager 
representative assemblies,'' while the 1998 version only mentions the 
body once. PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa], issued 4 November 98, 
amended and effective 28 October 10, sec. 4. PRC Organic Law of the 
Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui 
zuzhifa], issued and effective 4 November 98, art. 21.
    \91\ ``Qinghai Province Establishes Village (Resident) Committee 
Election Observer System'' [Wosheng jianli cun (ju) min weiyuanhui 
xuanju guanchayuan zhidu], Qinghai News Net, 1 February 11. According 
to this article, provincial, autonomous prefecture, and county election 
leading agencies chose Party members, people's congress, and people's 
political consultative conference delegates, experts, scholars, and 
retired Party and government cadres, among others, with ``definite 
political qualities and knowledge of village/residents committee self-
governance and law'' to observe elections. Guangdong Province People's 
Congress Standing Committee, Guangdong Province Village Committee 
Election Measure [Guangdong sheng cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju banfa], 
issued 1 December 10. Hubei Province People's Congress Standing 
Committee, Hubei Province Village Committee Election Measures [Hubei 
sheng cunmin weiyuanhui xuanju banfa], issued 26 May 11.
    \92\ Wang Zhiyong and Sun Chunyan, ``Promote the Healthy 
Development of Democracy'' [Cujin minzhu zhengzhi jiankang fazhan], 
Jilin Daily, 17 March 10; ``For the 306 Villages of Xiji County `Two 
Committee' Elections, the Overall Quality of the Candidates Improves'' 
[Xiji 306 ge cun ``liangwei'' shunli huanjie dangxuanzhe zhengti suzhi 
tigao], Ningxia Daily, summarized in Open Source Center, 22 December 
10; Zhang Zhongbao, ``Village-Level Organization Elections Complete, 
All Achieved `One Shoulder To Carry' [Responsibilities of] Secretary 
and Leader, Five Village Committees in Qiongshan Held Successful `Open 
Direct Nomination' [Elections]'' [Wancheng cunji zuzhi huanjie xuanju, 
quanmian shixian shuji, zhuren ``yijantiao'' qiongshan 5 cunweihui 
``gongkai zhixuan'' chenggong], Hainan Daily, 26 September 10; Ji 
Chuanpai, ``Researching the `Two Committees' Village Elections and the 
Work of Party Leaders'' [Yanjiu cun ``liangwei'' huanjie xuanju he 
dangzheng lingdao ganbu wenze gongzuo], Beijing Daily, 9 December 10; 
Wu Zongyi and Han Xijiang, ``Grassroots Democracy Will Become Deeper if 
Citizens Have More Rights To Speak'' [Jiceng minzhu jiangxiang zongshen 
tuijin minzhong you gengduo huayuquan], Dazhong Net, 6 December 10. See 
the Commission's 2006 Annual Report for more information regarding the 
trend of recentralizing Party and government authority, which appears 
to be based on a September 2004 Party ``Decision on Strengthening the 
Party's Ruling Capacity.'' CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 
Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance and Legislative 
Reform, 124-31.
    \93\ Zhang Zhongbao, ``Village-Level Organization Elections 
Complete, All Achieved `One Shoulder To Carry' [Responsibilities of] 
Secretary and Leader, Five Village Committees in Qiongshan Held 
Successful `Open Direct Nomination' [Elections]'' [Wancheng cunji zuzhi 
huanjie xuanju, quanmian shixian shuji, zhuren ``yijantiao'' qiongshan 
5 cunweihui ``gongkai zhixuan'' chenggong], Hainan Daily, 26 September 
10.
    \94\ Huang Yong et al., ``Rudong County Accepts Applications From 
Whole County for Positions of Village Party Branch Secretaries'' 
[Rudong mianxiang quanxian gongkai xuanbo cun zhishu], China Jiangsu 
Net, 17 July 10. In Rudong county, Nantong municipality, Jiangsu 
province, to improve the professional skill level of leaders, county 
authorities allowed almost 20 percent (40 out of 235) of the county's 
villages to choose their Party branch secretaries from among candidates 
anywhere in the county, not just in the village where the election was 
being held.
    \95\ ``Dafang's Open Nomination System for Cadres Increases the 
Village's Vigor'' [Dafang gongkai xuanba cunji ganbu zeng huoli], 
Guizhou Daily, 28 December 10. One county in Guizhou province raised 
salaries for village heads and deputy heads to attract candidates with 
better qualifications.
    \96\ Zhang Xinyu, ``Gongliu Village Establishes Innovative 
Organization Combining `Three Officials in One System' '' [Gongliu 
chuangxin ``sanguan yiti'' cunji zuzhi jianshe], Yunnan Daily, 4 May 
10; Lian Xiaofang, ``Research To Intensify the Work of Open and 
Democratic Supervision of Village Affairs'' [Yanjiu shenhua cunwu 
gongkai he minzhu guanli deng gongzuo], Ningxia Daily, 30 December 10. 
To reduce the reported ``dishonest ethos'' among officials in so-called 
``difficult villages,'' Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region officials plan to 
use ``skilled and moral university students'' as village officials and 
appoint officials from outside the borders of villages.
    \97\ Zhang Xinyu, ``Gongliu Village Establishes Innovative 
Organization Combining `Three Officials in One System' '' [Gongliu 
chuangxin ``sanguan yiti'' cunji zuzhi jianshe], Yunnan Daily, 4 May 
10. One county in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region combined using 
local village officials, college-graduate officials, and ``extra-
payroll'' officials in local organizations to resolve problems of 
governance.
    \98\ Mao Guanghui, ``Party Members First Discuss Major Issues in 
the Village'' [Cunli dashi dangyuan xianyi], Zhejiang Daily, 18 March 
10. Party officials described in this article developed a ``Party-
Member Preliminary Consultation System'' for Party members without a 
post. Guo Limin, ``Yutai Creates Village-Level Affairs Scientific 
Policy Making Platform'' [Yutai dazao cunji shiwu kexue jueci pingtai], 
Dazhong Daily, 6 August 10. According to this article, authorities 
reportedly established a ``senator'' affiliate system. The village 
Party committees in all 392 villages reportedly appointed ``senators'' 
from among ``old'' Party and government cadres and businessmen or 
workers who now work outside the village. These ``senators'' reportedly 
not only make suggestions, help with work, and even provide financing 
for a variety of projects, they also have assisted in smoothing out 
interactions between Hui and Han citizens, improved ``harmonious 
relations,'' and resolved hundreds of disputes.
    \99\ ``For the 306 Villages of Xiji County `Two Committee' 
Elections, the Overall Quality of the Candidates Improves'' [Xiji 306 
ge cun ``liangwei'' shunli huanjie dangxuanzhe zhengti suzhi tigao], 
Ningxia Daily, summarized in Open Source Center, 22 December 10; Zhang 
Xuefei, ``In Choosing Well the ``Lead Goose'' Villagers Go Straight to 
the Lead'' [Xuanhao ``lingtouya'' cunmin you bentou], Yunnan Daily, 2 
September 10; Zhang Xinyu, ``Gongliu Village Establishes Innovative 
Organization Combining `Three Officials in One System' '' [Gongliu 
chuangxin ``sanguan yiti'' cunji zuzhi jianshe], Yunnan Daily, 4 May 
10.
    \100\ Yang Yueqing, ``Provincial Conference on Deepening Open 
Village Affairs and Democratic Management Opens'' [Quansheng shenhu 
cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli gongzuo xianchang hui zhaokai], Shaanxi 
Daily, 2 November 10. Shaanxi province reportedly had 314 ``difficult 
villages'' and 2,900 ``weak villages.'' One hundred and fifty-six 
villages now reportedly meet ``management standards.''
    \101\ The list in the text contains representative types of 
``difficult villages'' as defined by authorities in a variety of 
locations. The sources below provide more details regarding the types 
of ``difficult villages'' found in a variety of locations. Lian 
Xiaofang, ``Research To Intensify the Work of Open and Democratic 
Supervision of Village Affairs'' [Yanjiu shenhua cunwu gongkai he 
minzhu guanli deng gongzuo], Ningxia Daily, 30 December 10. In the 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, ``difficult villages'' include those 
villages with ``relatively backward economic development,'' where 
``citizen aspirations and demands have not met with a response'' and 
where ``contradictions have accumulated and citizens' complaints are 
relatively large.'' Hui Ji, Zhejiang Normal University Village Research 
Center, ``Research Report on Guizhou Province Open Government Affairs 
and Democratic Management `Difficult Villages' Governance Work'' [Dui 
guizhousheng cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli ``nandiancun'' zhili 
gongzuo de diaoyan baogao], 11 December 09. In Guizhou province, the 
category included villages that have not had successful village 
elections, had long-term problems with tensions between villagers and 
leaders, had longstanding issues with citizens taking grievances to 
higher authorities, or had problems with transparency of village 
affairs, among others. He Linping, ``Huizhou `Four-Democracy Working 
Method' To Realize `Villager Management' of Village Affairs'' [Huizhou 
``si minzhu gongzuofa'' shixian cunli de shiqing ``cunmin'guan''], 
People's Daily, 4 August 10. In a village in Guangdong province, the 
relationship between officials and villagers became ``complicated,'' 
and there was a high number of citizen complaints because ``a few 
village cadres had the final say over everything'' and ``villagers had 
no knowledge of the things they should know about, much less have the 
right to participate.'' The village was known as one where there were 
lots of complaints to higher levels, one that was ``ruled by men,'' and 
one that was poor and underdeveloped.
    \102\ See, e.g., Jiang Qiu, ``Perfecting the Systems of Open 
Village Affairs and Democratic Management To Promote Social Harmony and 
Stability in Rural Areas'' [Wanshan cunwu gongkai minzhu guanli zhidu, 
cujin nongcun shehui hexie wending], Guangxi Daily, 27 January 11; 
Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010 National Civil Affairs Work Report 
(Summary of Contents) [2010 nian quanguo minzheng gongzuo baogao 
(neirong tiyao)], reprinted in Hebei Province Department of Civil 
Affairs, 28 December 10. Following are some news articles illustrating 
the various programs to resolve problems in villages. Lian Xiaofang, 
``Research To Intensify the Work of Open and Democratic Supervision of 
Village Affairs'' [Yanjiu shenhua cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli deng 
gongzuo], Ningxia Daily, 30 December 10; Zhang Xuefei et al., ``Carry 
Out Duties as Promised, Let Real Achievements Speak, Malang County 
Introduces `Four Double' Commitment System to Break Bottlenecks in 
Supervision of Village Cadres'' [An chengnuo luzhi yong shiji shuohua - 
malongxian tuixing ``si shuang'' mubiao chengnuozhi pojie cunganbu 
jianguan nan pingtou], Yunnan Daily, 22 July 10; He Linping, ``Huizhou 
`Four-Democracy Working Method' To Realize `Villager Management' of 
Village Affairs'' [Huizhou ``si minzhu gongzuofa'' shixian cunli de 
shiqing ``cunmin guan''], People's Daily, 4 August 10.
    \103\ Zhou Qianjin, ``Prevent the Minority From Calling the Shots 
in Village Affairs'' [Cunli de shi fangzhi xiaoshuren shuole suan], 
Sichuan Daily, 18 March 10; ``Li Yuanchao: It Is Necessary To Develop 
and Perfect Party Leadership Over Mechanisms of Village-Level 
Autonomy'' [Li Yuanchao: yao fazhan he wanshan dang lingdao de cunji 
minzhu zizhi jizhi], Chinese Communist Party Information Net, 27 August 
2009; ``Liaoning Provincial Departments Strengthen Construction of 
Village Grassroots Organizations'' [Liaoning sheng bushu jiaqiang 
nongcun jiceng zuzhi jianshe], Dongbei News Net, 15 October 10.
    \104\ ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil Affairs Deputy 
Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the Organic Law of the 
Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang jiang li jiu shenru 
guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 10.
    \105\ He Xuefeng, `` `Villagers Managing Expenditures, Financial 
Affairs Are Square'' [Kaizhi cunmin dangjia caiwu yiben qingzhang], 
Anhui Daily, 9 August 10; ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil 
Affairs Deputy Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the 
Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang jiang 
li jiu shenru guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 
10.
    \106\ Yu Qin, ``Villagers Need To Show Respect for `Transparent 
Account Books' '' [``Luozhang,'' xu cunmin maizhang], Zhejiang Daily, 
25 March 10.
    \107\ Xu Jian, ``Village Affairs, Under the Sunshine Moving Towards 
Transparency'' [Cunwu, zai yangguangxia zouxiang touming], Anhui Daily 
News, 1 September 10.
    \108\ The World and China Institute, Chinese Democratization Index 
2.0 [Zhongguo Minzhuhua Zhibiao Yanjiu Baogao 2009], (Beijing: The 
World and China Institute, 2011), 26.
    \109\ ``China's Top Legislature To Step Up Oversight Work Through 
Special Inquires,'' Xinhua, 10 March 11.
    \110\ State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction 
of a Government That Rules by Law [Guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu 
jianshe de yijian], 8 November 10, sec. 1(1).
    \111\ Ibid.
    \112\ ``Reining in Coercive Power,'' Beijing Review, 4 August 11. 
PRC Law on Administrative Coercion [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng 
qiangzhi fa], issued 30 June 11, effective 1 January 12.
    \113\ ``Six Highlights of the Draft Amendments to the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law'' [Xingzheng fuyifa xiuding ni 
shixian mingaoguan an liu da tupo], Legal Education Net, 20 July 11; 
``State Council Legislative Affairs Office: Appropriately Expand the 
Scope of Acceptance of Administrative Reconsideration Cases'' 
[Guowuyuan fazhiban: shidu kuoda xingzheng fuyi shouan fanwei], Legal 
Education Net, 17 July 11.
    \114\ PRC State Compensation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia 
peichangfa], issued 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, effective 1 
December 10, arts. 7, 35; ``New Compensation Law Brings More 
Fairness,'' Global Times, 2 December 10.
    \115\ Zhang Xiangdong and Zheng Yi, ``NDRC To Revise System for 
Evaluating Performance of Local Officials,'' Economic Observer, 28 
March 11. The National Development and Reform Commission reportedly 
plans to divide regions into four categories to take differences into 
consideration: ``areas optimal for development,'' ``areas for key 
development,'' ``areas where development is restricted,'' and areas 
where ``development is prohibited.''
    \116\ Carl F. Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese 
Legal Institutions,'' Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 42 
(2006), 154-55.
    \117\ Pan Hongqi, ``Need To Avoid Negative Effects of Including 
Stability Preservation in Officials' Performance Evaluations'' [Yi 
``weiwen'' kaohe guanyuan zhengji xu bimian fumian xiaoying], Beijing 
Youth Daily, 16 October 10. The author of this article argues that it 
would be better to evaluate the ``process'' of stability preservation 
rather than evaluating just the results of stability preservation.
    \118\ Ningyuan County People's Government, Detailed Rules and 
Regulations for Assessing Comprehensive Order and Stability Maintenance 
Marks in Villages and Towns [Du xiangzhen zongzhi weiwen kaohe pingfen 
xize], last visited 25 May 11 (estimated date 2009). For more 
information about the incentives for local officials to suppress 
petitioners, see Carl F. Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal 
Chinese Legal Institutions,'' Stanford Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 42 (2006), 154.
    \119\ ``The Most Idiotic Villager Rules Ever'': Petitioners Must 
Get Permission To Take Their Complaints to Higher Levels, Offenders 
Grain Rations Deducted'' [``Shishang zuiniu cunmin shouze'': shangfang 
xu jing xuke weizhe kou kouliang qian], Worker's Daily, reprinted in 
Xinhua, 9 December 10. In Xiaobanqiao village, Jiaojiang district, 
Taizhou city, Zhejiang province, local officials reportedly issued 
``villager behavioral guidelines'' (cunmin shouze) that included the 
following rule: ``Anyone who visits an administration office at a 
higher level to lodge complaints without a justifiable reason and 
without the permission of his respective village Party branch and 
villager committee is liable to be punished by having his grain 
subsidies withheld for a period ranging from one to 10 years.'' 
Worker's Daily reported that the villagers said a ``grain subsidy'' is 
a form of cash compensation paid to villagers on a regular basis by 
officials for rent or lease payments for land used by businesses. 
Worker's Daily reported that ``legal experts'' advised village cadres 
that the ``guidelines'' were in violation of state laws, but did not 
specify which laws.
    \120\ ``Wen Jiabao: The Party's Largest Danger Is Corruption'' [Wen 
jiabao: zhizheng dang de zuida weixian shi fubai], China Review News, 
27 August 10.
    \121\ ``Graft Remains Top Public Concern Prior to Annual 
Parliamentary Session: Survey,'' Xinhua, 24 February 11.
    \122\ ``2010 Discipline Inspection and Supervision Agencies Case 
Investigation and Management Work Situation Press Conference'' 
[Zhongjiwei jianchabu zhaokai 2010 nian chaban anjian gongzuo qingkuang 
xinwen tongqihui], Xinhua, 6 January 11.
    \123\ ``Supreme People's Procuratorate Work Report March 11, 2011, 
at the 4th Plenum of the 11th National People's Congress'' [Zuigao 
renmin jianchayuan gongzuo baogao, 2011 nian sanyue shiyi ri zai di 
shiyi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di xici huiyishang], People's 
Daily, 20 March 11.
    \124\ See ``Anti-Corruption Policies and Laws,'' People's Daily, 18 
August 11, for a list of recent anti-corruption regulatory instruments.
    \125\ State Council Information Office, ``White Paper on China's 
Efforts To Combat Corruption and Build a Clean Government,'' reprinted 
in PRC Central People's Government, 29 December 10.
    \126\ Central Committee of the Communist Party of China General 
Office, State Council General Office, Provisions on Economic 
Responsibility Audits for Chief Leading Cadres of the Party and the 
Government and Executives of State-Owned Enterprises [Dangzheng zhuyao 
lingdao ganbu he guoyouqiye lingdaoren yuan jingji zeren shenji 
guiding], issued 08 December 10.
    \127\ Party Central Committee and State Council, Provisions on 
Implementation of the Responsibility System for Construction of an 
Honest Party and a Clean Government [Guanyu shixing dangfeng lianzheng 
jianshe zerenzhi de guiding], issued 15 December 10.
    \128\ National People's Congress, ``PRC Criminal Law Amendment 
(8)'' [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa xiuzhengan (8)], 25 February 
11, art. 164; ``China Amends Criminal Law To Cover Foreign Bribery, 
Bribery of Non-PRC Government Officials Criminalized,'' E-Alert from 
Covington & Burling LLP, 1 March 11.
    \129\ ``China Is Promoting Anti-Bribery Law, but Enforcement 
Details Are Sparse,'' China Trade Extra, 9 August 11.
    \130\ ``Central Discipline Inspection: `41 Prohibitions' 
Standardize Township, Village-Level Grassroots Cadre Behavior,'' 
Xinhua, 15 July 11. Provisions on Rural Village Grassroots Officials' 
Honest Performance of Duties (Trial Implementation) [Nongcun jiceng 
ganbu lianjie luxing zhize ruogan guiding (shixing)], issued 14 July 
11, arts. 8(1), 1(5).
    \131\ ``Tip-Off Websites Launched To Curb Corruption,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Daily, 9 February 11.
    \132\ Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress Regarding the Changes to the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Administrative Supervision'' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui 
changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng 
jianchafa'' de jueding], issued 25 June 10, arts. 3, 6.
    \133\ Zhao Yang, ``Supreme People's Procuratorate: More Than 70 
Percent of the Cases of Work-Related Offenses Originate From Citizen 
Reports'' [Zuigaojian: qicheng yishang zhiwu fanzui anjian yuanyu 
qunzhong jubao], Legal Daily, 21 June 10.
    \134\ Du Meng, ``70 Percent of Whistleblowers Subject to 
Retribution Trend Toward Concealed Methods, Difficult To Establish 
Scope'' [70% jubaozhe zaoyu daji baofu shouduan riqu yingbi nanyu 
jieding], Legal Daily, 17 June 10.
    \135\ Human Rights in China, ``Anti-Corruption Journalist Who 
Served 4 Year Sentence To Serve Eight More Years'' [Fuxing 4 nian de 
fanfu jizhe bei caiding zai fuxing 8 nian], 28 July 11.
    \136\ Ibid.
    \137\ ``Graft-Busting Site Blocked,'' Radio Free Asia, 11 January 
11.
    \138\ Chris Buckley, ``China Confess-a-Kickback Web Sites Draw 
Inspiration From India,'' Reuters, 13 June 11.
    \139\ ``China's Illegal Anti-Corruption Websites Face Closure,'' 
China Times News Group, 18 June 11; ``Anonymous Websites To Report 
Bribery Prove Wildly Popular in China Until the Censors Arrive,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post, 22 June 11.
    \140\ ``China's Illegal Anti-Corruption Websites Face Closure,'' 
China Times News Group, 18 June 11.
    \141\ ``Anonymous Websites To Report Bribery Prove Wildly Popular 
in China Until the Censors Arrive,'' Associated Press, reprinted in 
Washington Post, 22 June 11.
    \142\ ``Internet Users Set Up Site To Report Bribery,'' South China 
Morning Post, 14 June 11. An administrator of the site 
``woxinghuiliao'' said that hackers had attacked the Web site.
    \143\ US-China Business Council, "PRC Transparency Tracking," 
updated April 2011, 1.
    \144\ Ibid.
    \145\ Ibid.
    \146\ U.S. Department of Treasury, "Third Meeting of the U.S.-China 
Strategic & Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact 
Sheet," 10 May 11.
    \147\ State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction 
of a Government That Rules by Law [Guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu 
jianshe de yijian], issued 8 November 10, chap. 17.
    \148\ Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party General 
Office, Opinion Regarding Implementation of Open Party Affairs by 
Grassroots-Level Party Organizations [Guanyu dang de jiceng zuzhi 
shixing dangwu gongkai de yijian], issued 8 October 10; Xu Jian, 
``Village Affairs, Under the Sunshine Moving Towards Transparency'' 
[Cunwu, zai yangguangxia zouxiang touming], Anhui Daily News, 1 
September 10; ``Questions and Answers by Ministry of Civil Affairs 
Deputy Minister Jiang Li on Deepening Implementation of the Organic Law 
of the Villagers' Committees'' [Minzhengbu fubuzhang jiang li jiu 
shenru guanche cunweihui zuzhifa dawen], China Net, 3 November 10.
    \149\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions Regarding Several Issues 
in Trying Open Government Information Administrative Cases, issued 13 
December 10, arts. 1-2. The provisions clarify which government 
organization can be sued under certain circumstances if more than one 
is involved in an open government information case (art. 4). It also 
stipulates that the defendant in a case must explain why the 
information request was denied (art. 5). In cases involving state 
secrets, commercial secrets, or personal privacy issues, the court 
shall determine if the information falls within the scope of 
information that should be disclosed (art. 8). It also stipulates 
situations under which the court will make a determination regarding 
the reasons given by the defendant for not providing the information 
requested (art. 12). Zhao Yinan, ``Chinese Gain Right To Sue Govt for 
Public Records,'' China Daily, 16 August 11.
    \150\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11.
    \151\ Sharon LaFraniere, ``Media Blackout in China After Wreck,'' 
New York Times, 31 July 11.
    \152\ Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party General 
Office, State Council General Office, Opinion Regarding Deepening Open 
Government Affairs and Strengthening Government Services [Guanyu 
shenhua zhengwu gongkai jiaqiang zhengwu fuwu de yijian], issued 2 
August 11, item 7. See also ``Analysis of the `Opinion Regarding 
Deepening Open Government Affairs and Strengthening Government 
Services' '' [Jiedu ``guanyu shenhua zhengwu gongkai jiaqiang zhengwu 
fuwu de yijian''], Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central People's 
Government, 3 August 11; David Bandurski, China Media Project, ``The 
CCP Pushes for Openness, Again,'' 3 August 11. In addition, the Opinion 
urges officials to ``make innovations in information disclosure 
methods,'' ``to move ahead with openness in administrative decision-
making,'' ``to move forward with open and transparent operation of 
administrative authority,'' ``to expand openness in administrative 
examination and approval processes,'' ``to deepen implementation of 
Open Government Information Regulations,'' ``to make an effort to 
deepen open government affairs at the grassroots level,'' and ``to 
strengthen openness of administrative agency internal affairs.''
    \153\ Peking University, Center for Public Participation Studies 
and Support, ``Some of the Open Government Information Annual Reports 
Are Just a Formality'' [Bufen zhengfu xinxi gongkai nianbao zou 
xingshi], 20 May 11; Beijing University Center for Public Participation 
Studies and Support, ``Summary of the 2009 Annual Report on China's 
Administrative Transparency,'' translated by the China Law Center, Yale 
Law School, 28 September 10. The 2009 annual report assesses the 
administrative transparency of 43 agencies of the State Council, 30 
provinces, and 97 administrative units based on five indicators: 
information disclosure on request, disclosure on own initiative, 
institution building, system building, and supervision and remedy. The 
report determined that, on average, provinces received higher scores 
than the prefectures or cities. Further, the south-central China region 
scored the highest on average, suggesting that the level of economic 
development is not ``strictly proportional'' to the level of 
information disclosure.
    \154\ State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction 
of a Government That Rules by Law [Guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu 
jianshe de yijian], issued 8 November 10, chap. 17. It specifically 
stipulates some of the categories within a budget that should be made 
transparent.
    \155\ ``Reluctant Transparency,'' Economic Observer, 26 July 11.
    \156\ Chen Yannan, ``Finance Ministry: 88 Central Government 
Departments Have Already Published 2011 Departmental Budgets'' 
[Caizhengbu: yiyou 88 jia zhongyang bumen gongkai 2011 nian bumen 
yusuan], Administrative Transparency Watch Net, 24 May 11.
    \157\ ``News on Three Public Expenses Made Public, a Good Beginning 
Needs a Good End'' [Sangong xiaofei xinxi gongkai hao de kaitou hai 
xuyao yige hao jieguo], Huasheng Online, 14 June 11; The ``three public 
expenses'' are expenses for cars and transportation, travel overseas, 
and public relations. ``Premier Wen Jiabao Convenes State Council 
Standing Committee Meeting'' [Wen jiabao zhuchi zhaokai guowuyuan 
changwu huiyi], Xinhua, 6 July 11. The Standing Committee especially 
called for the release of more detailed information related to the 
``three public expenses'' and other matters of concern to citizens.
    \158\ ``Central Authorities' Budget Is Made Open to the Public for 
the First Time'' [Zhongyang bumen yusuan shouci xiang shehui gongkai], 
Southern Weekend, 1 March 11; Chen Yannan, ``Finance Ministry: 88 
Central Government Departments Have Already Published 2011 Departmental 
Budgets'' [Caizhengbu: yiyou 88 jia zhongyang bumen gongkai 2011 nian 
bumen yusuan], Administrative Transparency Watch Net, 24 May 11.
    \159\ ``Governmental Financial Budgets: How Far Till Open and 
Transparent'' [Zhengfu caizheng yusuan: li gongkai touming haiyou 
duoyuan], Zhengzhou Evening News, reprinted in Xinhua, 12 April 11.
    \160\ Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party General 
Office, Opinion Regarding Implementation of Open Party Affairs by 
Grassroots-Level Party Organizations [Guanyu dang de jiceng zuzhi 
shixing dangwu gongkai de yijian], issued 8 October 10.
    \161\ Zhou Xian, ``New Beijing Measures Hold Party Leaders 
Accountable,'' Beijing Daily, 22 March 11.
    \162\ ``Chinese Communist Party Comprehensively Promotes Open Party 
Affairs, Welcomes the 90th Birthday of Party Establishment'' [Zhonggong 
quanmian tuijin dangwu gongkai yingjie jiandang 90 huadan], China News 
Service, reprinted in Democracy and Law Times, 30 December 10; 
``Nationally 31 Provinces, Municipalities, Autonomous Regions, Party 
Committees, Organizations, and Departments Establish New Spokesperson 
Systems'' [Quanguo 31 ge sheng qu shi dangwei zuzhi bumen jianli xinwen 
fayanren zhidu], Xinhua, 30 June 10.
    \163\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11.
    \164\ State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction 
of a Government That Rules by Law [Guanyu jiaqiang fazhi zhengfu 
jianshe de yijian], issued 8 November 10, chap. 4. Authorities plan to 
improve the public hearing process for major policy decisions, to 
expand the scope of hearings, and to standardize hearing procedures. 
The Opinion stipulates that hearing participants should have wide-
ranging representativeness, and their opinions should be used as 
important references in making decisions.
    \165\ Ibid.
    Notes to Section III--Commercial Rule of Law

    \1\ A complete and up-to-date compilation of information on China's 
participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), including 
principal accession documents (Working Party Report, Protocol of 
Accession, General Counsel decision), schedules, trade policy reviews, 
and dispute case documents can be found on the WTO Web site.
    \2\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2010 Report to 
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2010, 2.
    \3\ Ibid.
    \4\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``China Ends Wind 
Power Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO 
Dispute,'' 7 June 11. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Glossary 
defines transparency as the ``[d]egree to which trade policies and 
practices, and the process by which they are established, are open and 
transparent. For a discussion of the principles of the WTO, including 
transparency, see World Trade Organization, ``What Is the World Trade 
Organization,'' on the WTO Web site.
    \5\ World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 01, paras. 337-41.
    \6\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2010 Report to 
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2010, 63. For a 
discussion of the process of China's accession to the Government 
Procurement Agreement, and of China's government procurement regime, 
see p. 63-67 of the report.
    \7\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2010 Report to 
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2010, 2.
    \8\ Chen Zhiwu, Presentation on ``Difficulty in Finding 
Compatibility Between State Ownership and Constitutionalism'' 
[Guoyouzhi yu xianzheng fazhi nanyi jianrong], China University of 
Politics and Law, 22 May 09, reprinted in the Chenzhiwu blog, on Sohu, 
5 June 09. For discussions of industrial policies in China, see 
Alexandra Harney, ``Where's the Chinese Toyota? '' Foreign Policy, 8 
December 09; China's Industrial Policy and Its Impact on U.S. 
Companies, Workers, and the American Economy, Hearing of the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 24 March 09, Testimony of Alan 
Wm. Wolff, Partner, Dewey & LeBoeuf, Washington, DC.
    \9\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China, 
``DC Outreach 2011: Market Access Challenges,'' 28 April 11.
    \10\ World Trade Organization, ``Understanding the WTO: Principles 
of the Trade System,'' last visited 15 July 11. See also World Trade 
Organization, ``Glossary,'' last visited 12 September 11, which defines 
``national treatment'' as follows: ``The principle of giving others the 
same treatment as one's own nationals. GATT Article 3 requires that 
imports be treated no less favorably than the same or similar 
domestically-produced goods once they have passed customs. GATS Article 
17 and TRIPS Article 3 also deal with national treatment for services 
and intellectual property protection.''
    \11\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2010 Report to 
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2010, 7.
    \12\ The term in Chinese is guo jin min tui. See ``Wen Jiabao: 
Currently, the Problem of the So-Called `the State Advances, the 
Private [Sector] Retreats' Does Not Exist in China'' [Wen jiabao: 
muqian zhongguo bu cunzai suowei ``guo jin min tui'' wenti], China News 
Service, 14 March 11, which reports on Wen Jiabao refuting the belief 
that the state-owned sector is growing and squeezing out the private 
sector in China. See also Wang Xiaotian, ``New Regulations To Encourage 
Private Sector,'' China Daily, 15 March 11.
    \13\ For more information, see Chen Zhiwu, Presentation on 
``Difficulty in Finding Compatibility Between State Ownership and 
Constitutionalism'' [Guoyou zhi yu xianzheng fazhi nanyi jianrong], 
China University of Politics and Law, 22 May 09, reprinted in the 
Chenzhiwu blog, on Sohu, 5 June 09.
    \14\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the 
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(C).
    \15\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2010 Report to 
Congress on China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2010, 8-9, 58-59.
    \16\ US-China Business Council, ``PRC Transparency Tracking,'' 
updated April 2011, 1.
    \17\ U.S. Department of Treasury, ``The 2011 U.S.-China Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue U.S. Fact Sheet--Economic Track,'' 10 May 11.
    \18\ Ibid.
    \19\ Export-Import Bank of the United States, ``Report to the U.S. 
Congress on Export Credit Competition and The Export-Import Bank of the 
United States,'' June 2011, 108.
    \20\ OECD, Trade and Agriculture Directorate, Arrangement on Export 
Credits, last visited on 27 September 11. According to p. 108 of the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States' June 2011 ``Report to the U.S. 
Congress on Export Credit Competition and The Export-Import Bank of the 
United States'': ``as China is not a member of any part of the OECD, 
none of China's ECAs are under any obligation to follow the OECD 
Arrangement on Export Credits, which sets the guidelines for official 
export credits.'' For a discussion of the operations of China's ECAs, 
see p. 108-13 of the report.
    \21\ Export-Import Bank of the United States, ``Report to the U.S. 
Congress on Export Credit Competition and The Export-Import Bank of the 
United States,'' June 2011, 109.
    \22\ U.S. Department of Treasury, ``Third Meeting of the U.S.-China 
Strategic & Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact 
Sheet,'' 10 May 11.
    \23\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2010 Report to 
Congress On China's WTO Compliance,'' December 10, 59-60.
    \24\ Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and U.S.-China Bilateral 
Investment, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 30 March 11, Testimony of Derek Scissors, Research Fellow, 
Heritage Foundation.
    \25\ Ibid.
    \26\ Article 10 of the PRC Constitution provides that land in the 
cities is owned by the state, and land in the rural and suburban areas 
is owned by the collectives, except for those portions which belong to 
the state. PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 
88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 10.
    \27\ Zhiwu Chen, Presentation on ``Economic Consequences of State 
Capitalism,'' Brookings Institution, 1 March 11.
    \28\ Ibid.
    \29\ State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 
Provisional Regulations on Protection of Commercial Secrets of Central-
Level State-Owned Enterprises [Zhongyang qiye shangye mimi baohu 
zanxing guiding], issued and effective 26 April 10.
    \30\ PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo baoshou guojia mimi fa], issued 5 September 88, revised 29 
April 10, effective 1 October 10.
    \31\ For a discussion on state secrets and commercial secrets, see 
Baker & McKenzie, ``Client Alert: Latest Developments on China's State 
Secrets and Trade Secrets Regime,'' August 2010. For additional 
information on China's commercial secrets regulations, see ``SASAC 
Issues New Commercial Secrets Regulations,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 2. For information on 
state secrets legislation, see ``National People's Congress Standing 
Committee Issues Revised State Secrets Law,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \32\ Baker & McKenzie, ``Client Alert: Latest Developments on 
China's State Secrets and Trade Secrets Regime,'' August 2010; ``SASAC 
Issues New Commercial Secrets Regulations,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 2. Article 11 of the 
Interim Provisions on the Protection of Commercial Secrets of Central 
Enterprises provides that commercial secrets should be changed to state 
secrets when the scope of state secrets has been adjusted. State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, Interim Provisions on 
the Protection of Commercial Secrets of Central Enterprises, issued and 
effective 26 April 10, art. 11.
    \33\ Sigrid Ursula Jernudd, ``China, State Secrets, and the Case of 
Xue Feng: the Implication for International Trade,'' Chicago Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2011), 309-39.
    \34\ ``Beijing Court Sentences American Geologist to Eight Years 
for State Secrets,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
No. 7, 19 August 10, 2.
    \35\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China Upholds Conviction of American 
Geologist,'' New York Times, 18 February 11. See also ``Beijing Court 
Upholds Eight-Year Sentence for American Geologist Xue Feng,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 23 February 11.
    \36\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China Upholds Conviction of American 
Geologist,'' New York Times, 18 February 11. According to Article 9 of 
the PRC Constitution, mineral resources and other natural resources are 
owned by the state. PRC Constitution, issued and effective 4 December 
82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 9.
    \37\ State Council, Interim Regulations on Supervision and 
Management of State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, issued and effective 
27 May 03, art. 43.
    \38\ A 2007 study by Chinascope found that the SOEs are held by a 
three-tier ownership structure, with the Communist Party appointing 
senior management at each tier. ``Piercing the Corporate Veil,'' 
Chinascope, 29 December 07. For information on the role of the 
Communist Party Central Organization Department in appointing 
management of China's state-owned enterprises, see Richard McGregor, 
``The Party Organiser,'' Financial Times, 30 September 09. According to 
McGregor, an equivalent imaginary department in the United States 
``would oversee the appointments of U.S. state governors and their 
deputies; the mayors of big cities; heads of federal regulatory 
agencies; the chief executives of General Electric, ExxonMobil, Walmart 
and 50-odd of the remaining largest companies; justices on the Supreme 
Court; the editors of The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and 
The Washington Post, the bosses of the television networks and cable 
stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities 
and the heads of think-tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the 
Heritage Foundation.'' The role of the Party in decisionmaking in the 
state-owned enterprises was delineated in the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee General Office and State Council General Office 
Opinions Concerning Promoting Further Implementation of the ``Three 
Major One Large'' Decisionmaking System in the State-Owned Enterprises 
[Guanyu jinyibu tuijin guoyou qiye guancheluoshi ``sanchong yi da'' 
juece zhidu de yijian], 15 July 10. The opinions provide procedures 
that must be followed in making important decisions, important 
appointments, and usage of large amounts of government funds.
    \39\ For examples, see ``China Civil Engineering Corporation's 
Practice and Exploring Party Building Overseas'' [Zhongtu jituan haiwai 
dangjian de shijian yu tansuo], Fujian Net, 28 December 10; ``Study 
Times: Overseas Expansion of the Party,'' Study Times, summarized by 
Chinascope, 27 December 10; ``Research Group for the (Group) Company's 
Party Building Efforts in Overseas Programs'' [Jituan gongsi haiwai 
gongcheng xiangmu dang jian gongzuo diaoyanzu dao gongsi diaoyan], 
CR17BG [China Railway 17 Group] No. 3 Engineering Co., Ltd. [Zhong tie 
shiqi ju jituan di san gongcheng youxian gongsi], 13 May 11. Commission 
staff have found references to a Party document entitled ``Leading 
Opinion on Strengthening Work on Party Building in Overseas 
Organizations [Guanyu jiaqiang haiwai jigou dangjian gongzuo de zhidao 
yijian], but have not found the original document. See, e.g., ``China 
Water Resources Construction Group: Forging a 'Go Outward' 
Hydroelectric Power Leading Enterprise'' [Zhongguo shuidian: dazao 
``zou chuqu'' de shuidian ling jun qiye], People's Daily, reprinted in 
Ministry of Commerce, Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, 22 
October 09.
    \40\ ``Shandong International Economic and Technical Cooperation 
Company: Strengthening the Work of Party-Building in Projects 
Overseas'' [Zhongguo shandong guoji jingji jishu hezuo gongsi jiaqiang 
haiwai xiangmu dangjian gongzuo], State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, 29 September 10.
    \41\ State Council, Relevant Policies for Further Encouraging 
Development of the Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry 
[Jinyibu guli ruanjian chanye he jicheng dianlu chanye fazhan ruogan 
zhengce de tongzhi], issued 28 January 11; National Development and 
Reform Commission, Automotive Industry Development Policy [Qiche chanye 
fazhan zhengce], issued 21 May 04, revised 15 August 09, effective 1 
September 09. ``Cultural industry'' covers a range of sectors, from 
filmmaking to printing. For the range of covered sectors, see Central 
People's Government, ``Plan To Invigorate the Cultural Industry'' 
[Wenhua chanye zhenxing guihua], issued 26 September 09, art. 3, para. 
1.
    \42\ See, e.g., National Development and Reform Commission, 
Automotive Industry Development Policy [Qiche chanye fazhan zhengce], 
issued 21 May 04, revised 15 August 09, effective 1 September 09, art. 
7. Article 7 states in part, ``The principle of combining imported 
technology and independent research and development shall be pursued. 
[The industry] shall follow and study advanced international 
technologies, actively engage in international cooperation, and develop 
appropriate and advanced technologies that shall be eligible for 
intellectual property rights. Products using imported technologies 
shall be competitive internationally and meet the compulsive 
requirements of international automotive technical standards.'' Article 
4 provides in part for the formation by 2010 of a few large auto 
manufacturers, which would rank among the top 500 companies. See also 
American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China, 
Business in China 2011 White Paper, (2011), 64; Under Secretary Robert 
D. Hormats, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at Amcham-China's Annual 
DC Dialogue, Washington, DC, 3 May 11.
    \43\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 10, secs. 1, 3.
    \44\ See, e.g., ``MIIT Drafts 12th Five-Year Plan for New Chemical 
Materials'' [Gongxin bu zhiding huagong xin cailiao ``shier wu'' 
guihua], Caijing, 22 April 11; ``12th Five-Year Plan for Civil Aviation 
Development Released,'' Shanghai Securities News, 12 April 11.
    \45\ State Council, Relevant Policies for Further Encouraging 
Development of the Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry 
[Jinyibu guli ruanjian chanye he jicheng dianlu chanye fazhan ruogan 
zhengce de tongzhi], issued 28 January 11. For a discussion of the 
policies and their background, see DLA Piper, ``China Offers New 
Incentives To Further Boost Software and Semiconductor Industries,'' 
International Tax Newsletter, 22 March 11.
    \46\ State Council, Relevant Policies for Further Encouraging 
Development of the Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry 
[Jinyibu guli ruanjian chanye he jichengdianlu chanye fazhan ruogan 
zhengce], issued 28 January 11, preamble.
    \47\ See CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 5 October 04, 86; World Trade 
Organization, DS309, China-Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, 
Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Doc. No. 05-4494, 6 October 
05.
    \48\ National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of 
Commerce, Foreign Investment Industry Guidance Catalogue (Revised 2007) 
[Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu (2007 nian xiuding)], issued 31 
October 07, effective 1 December 07, Catalogue of Industries in Which 
Foreign Investment Is Encouraged, arts. 3(21)(vi) and 3(21)(xiv); State 
Council Legislative Affairs Office, Circular Concerning Publicly 
Soliciting Opinions on Foreign Investment Industry Guidance Catalogue 
(Revised Draft for Comments)'' [Guanyu ``waishang touzi chanye zhidao 
mulu (xiuding zhengqiu yijian gao)'' gongkai zhengqiu yijian de 
tongzhi], 1 April 11, Catalogue of Industries in Which Foreign 
Investment Is Encouraged, arts. 3(21)(iv), 3(21)(xi).
    \49\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Circular Concerning 
Publicly Soliciting Opinions on ``Foreign Investment Industry Guidance 
Catalogue (Revised Draft for Comments)'' [Guanyu ``waishang touzi 
chanye zhidao mulu (xiuding zhengqiu yijian gao)'' gongkai zhengqiu 
yijian de tongzhi], issued 1 April 11, Catalogue of Industries in Which 
Foreign Investment Is Encouraged, art. 3(21)(xxviii).
    \50\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of 
China, American Business in China 2011 White Paper, (2011), 72-82.
    \51\ See, e.g., Chapter 27 of the 12th Five-Year Plan, which states 
in Article 4 that, ``There will be encouragement for the adoption and 
promotion of technological standards with indigenous innovation 
intellectual property right.'' National People's Congress, PRC Outline 
of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge 
wu nian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 
27.
    \52\ On intellectual property (IP) issues in standards setting, and 
on IP issues in the Antimonopoly Law, see American Chamber of Commerce 
in the People's Republic of China, American Business in China 2011 
White Paper, (2011), 86-88, and 48-50, respectively.
    \53\ State Council General Office Circular Concerning the Program 
for Special Campaign on Combating Intellectual Property Rights 
Infringement and Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeiting and Shoddy 
Commodities [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu daji qinfan zhishi chanquan 
he zhishou jiamaoweilie shangpin zhuanxiang xingdong fang'an de 
tongzhi], issued 27 October 10; ``China Cracks Down on Online Copyright 
Infringements and Counterfeits,'' People's Daily, 7 April 11.
    \54\ State Council General Office Circular Concerning Adjusting the 
Ending Date of the Special Campaign on Combating Intellectual Property 
Rights Infringement and Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeit and Shoddy 
Commodities [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu tiaozheng daji qinfan zhishi 
chanquan he zhishou jiamaoweilie shangpin zhuanxiang xingdong jieshu 
shijian de tongzhi], issued 10 March 11.
    \55\ Ministry of Commerce, ``Nine Government Departments Together 
Attack Illegal Acts of Intellectual Property Rights Infringement and 
Shoddy Goods Online'' [Jiu bumen lianshou daji wangluo gouwu lingyu 
qinfan zhishi chanquan he jiamaoweilie shangpin weifa fanzui xingwei], 
31 December 10.
    \56\ ``Baidu To Introduce Anti-Piracy Technology for Books 
Product,'' Reuters, 24 March 11. See also Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, ``2011 Special 301 Report,'' April 2011, 20-21. 
Concerning Baidu and copyright infringement, see ``Baidu Accused Over 
Copyright Infringement,'' CNTV, reprinted in China Internet Information 
Center, 28 March 11; ``Shame on Baidu,'' Han Han Digest, 25 March 11.
    \57\ Intellectual Property Protection in China, ``Shanghai Focused 
on Combating Intellectual Property Infringement in Cultural Markets,'' 
18 March 11. For information on China's support of its cultural 
industry in general, see CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 179-
80.
    \58\ Intellectual Property Protection in China, ``The State Council 
To Encourage the Development of Software Industry and Stress IPR 
Protection,'' 15 February 11.
    \59\ State Council, General Office Circular Concerning the Program 
for Special Campaign on Combating Intellectual Property Rights 
Infringement and Manufacture and Sales of Counterfeiting and Shoddy 
Commodities [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu daji qinfan zhishi chanquan 
he zhishou jiamaoweilie shangping zhuanxiang xingdong fang'an de 
tongzhi], issued 27 October 10; ``New Rules To Fight Online Pirates,'' 
China Daily, reprinted in Intellectual Property Protection in China, 17 
March 11.
    \60\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of 
China, American Business in China 2011 White Paper, (2011), 5. The 
white paper reports that in the 2011 Amcham-China Business Climate 
Survey, infringement of intellectual property rights was reported as 
one of the top five business challenges by 24 percent of respondents.
    \61\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``USTR Releases 
Annual Special 301 Report on Intellectual Property Rights,'' May 2011. 
For a detailed discussion of intellectual property enforcement 
campaigns and of legislative developments in China, see Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative, ``2011 Special 301 Report,'' April 2011, 19-
23.
    \62\ ``Key Excerpt From Vice Premier Wang Qishan's Dec. 15 
Statement at Conclusion of 21st JCCT,'' China Trade Extra, 15 December 
10. For additional details, see Ministry of Commerce, ``21st JCCT 
Successfully Held in Washington'' [Di ershiyi jie zhong mei shang mao 
lian wei hui zai meiguo huashengdun chenggong juxing], 16 December 10; 
U.S. Department of Commerce, ``21st U.S.-China Joint Commission on 
Commerce and Trade Fact Sheet,'' 20 December 10.
    \63\ Office of the Press Secretary, White House, ``Fact Sheet: 
U.S.-China Economic Issues,'' 19 January 11.
    \64\ ``Central-Level Departments Already Spent 1.3 Billion Yuan To 
Buy Genuine Software'' [Zhongyang guojia jiguan yi huafei yue 13 yi 
yuan yongyu goumai zhengban ruanjian], Global Times, 22 February 11; 
``Govt Ban on Illegal Software Gains Pace,'' China Daily, reprinted in 
Intellectual Property Protection in China, 18 January 11. For a 
discussion of a pilot program on software legalization, see the China 
Daily article.
    \65\ For a discussion of China's indigenous innovation policy, see 
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 182-83.
    \66\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of 
China, American Business in China 2011 White Paper, (2011), 64-70. See 
also chapter 27, article 4 of the 12th Five-Year Plan, which provides, 
``There will be encouragement for the adoption and promotion of 
technological standards with indigenous innovation intellectual 
property right.'' National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th 
Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian 
guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11. In his January 
2011 visit to the United States, President Hu Jintao committed that 
China would not ``link its innovation policies to the provision of 
government procurement preferences.'' Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, ``2011 Special 301 Report,'' April 2011, 24.
    \67\ U.S. Department of Commerce, ``21st U.S.-China Joint 
Commission on Commerce and Trade Fact Sheet,'' 15 December 10.
    \68\ Office of the Press Secretary, White House, ``Fact Sheet: 
U.S.-China Economic Issues,'' 19 January 11.
    \69\ U.S. Department of Treasury, ``Third Meeting of the U.S.-China 
Strategic & Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact 
Sheet,'' 10 May 11.
    \70\ Ministry of Finance, Circular on Ceasing Implementation of 
Three Documents, Including ``Measures on Handling the Budget for 
Government Procurement of Indigenous Innovation Products'' [Guanyu 
tingzhi zhixing ``zizhu chuangxin chanpin zhengfu caigou yusuan guanli 
banfa'' deng san ge wenjian de tongzhi], announced 23 June 11, 
effective 1 July 11. For a discussion of the three documents, see 
``China Announces Revocation of Three Measures Favoring the Procurement 
of `Indigenous Innovation' Products,'' Mayer Brown Legal Update, 6 July 
11.
    \71\ Stanley Lubman, ``Changes to China's `Indigenous Innovation' 
Policy: Don't Get Too Excited,'' Wall Street Journal, 22 July 11.
    \72\ For provinces or localities that posted the Ministry of 
Finance circular on their Web sites, see, e.g., Fujian Provincial 
Department of Finance Transmission of Ministry of Finance Circular on 
Ceasing Implementation of Three Documents, Including ``Measures on 
Handling the Budget for Government Procurement of Indigenous Innovation 
Products'' [Fujian sheng caizheng ting zhuanfa caizheng bu guanyu 
tingzhi zhixing ``zizhu chuangxin chanpin zhengfu caigou yusuan guanli 
banfa'' deng san ge wenjian de tongzhi], issued 6 July 11; Shenzhen 
Municipal Department of Finance, Circular on Ceasing Implementation of 
Three Documents, Including ``Measures on Handling the Budget for 
Government Procurement of Indigenous Innovation Products [Guanyu 
tingzhi zhixing ``zizhu chuangxin chanpin zhengfu caigou yusuan guanli 
banfa'' deng san ge wenjian de tongzhi], issued 15 July 11; Liaoning 
Provincial People's Government, Circular on Ceasing Implementation of 
Three Documents, Including ``Measures on Handling the Budget for 
Government Procurement of Indigenous Innovation Products'' [Guanyu 
tingzhi zhixing ``zizhu chuangxin chanpin zhengfu caigou yusuan guanli 
banfa'' deng san ge wenjian de tongzhi], issued 30 June 11; Zhejiang 
Provincial Government Procurement Office, Circular on Ceasing 
Implementation of Three Documents, Including ``Measures on Handling the 
Budget for Government Procurement of Indigenous Innovation Products'' 
[Guanyu tingzhi zhixing ``zizhu chuangxin chanpin zhengfu caigou yusuan 
guanli banfa'' deng san ge wenjian de tongzhi], issued 23 June 11; 
Jiangxi Provincial Department of Finance Regarding Transmission of the 
``Ministry of Finance Circular on Ceasing Implementation of Three 
Documents, Including `Measures on Handling the Budget for Government 
Procurement of Indigenous Innovation Products' '' [Jiangxi sheng 
caizheng ting guanyu zhuanfa ``caizheng bu guanyu tingzhi zhixing 
`zizhu chuangxin chanpin zhengfu caigou yusuan guanli banfa' deng san 
ge wenjian de tongzhi''], issued 4 July 11. For provinces or 
municipalities that posted circulars revoking related legislation, see, 
e.g., Shanghai Municipal Finance Bureau, Circular on Ceasing 
Implementation of the ``Shanghai Municipality 2009 Catalogue for 
Government Procurement of Indigenous Innovation Products'' [Guanyu 
tingzhi zhixing ``shanghai shi 2009 nian zhengfu caigou zizhu chuangxin 
chanpin mulu'' de tongzhi], issued 1 July 11; Chongqing Municipal 
Finance Bureau Circular Regarding Transmission of the ``Ministry of 
Finance Circular on Ceasing Implementation of the Three Documents, 
Including `Measures on Handling the Budget for Government Procurement 
of Indigenous Innovation Products' '' [Chongqing shi caizheng ju guanyu 
zhuanfu ``caizheng bu guanyu tingzhi zhixing `zizhu chuangxin chanpin 
zhengfu caigou yusuan guanli banfa' deng san ge wenjian de tongzhi'' de 
tongzhi], 14 July 11, which both reprints the Ministry of Finance 
notice and revokes a related Chongqing circular.
    \73\ State Council Decision on Accelerating the Cultivation and 
Development of Strategic Emerging Industries [Guowuyuan guanyu jiakuai 
peiyu he fazhan zhanluexing xinxing chanye de jueding], issued 10 
October 10.
    \74\ Ibid., art. 6(1).
    \75\ American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of 
China, American Business in China 2011 White Paper, (2011), 66. For 
additional information on indigenous innovation, see CECC, 2010 Annual 
Report, 10 October 10, 182-183.
    \76\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 27, preamble.
    \77\ Ibid., chap. 27, art. 3.
    \78\ World Trade Organization, Disputes by Country/Territory, last 
visited 12 July 11.
    \79\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``2010 Report to 
Congress On China's WTO Compliance,'' December 2010, 21. For 
information on the cases concerning antidumping and countervailing 
duties imposed on grain-oriented flat-rolled steel imported from the 
United States, see U.S. Trade Representative, ``USTR Requests WTO 
Dispute Settlement Panels in Two Cases Against China,'' February 11.
    \80\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``United States 
Launches Section 301 Investigation Into China's Policies Affecting 
Trade and Investment in Green Technologies,'' 15 October 10. The 
petition addressed ``restrictions on access to critical materials . . . 
performance requirements for investors . . . discrimination against 
foreign firms and goods . . . prohibited export subsidies and 
prohibited domestic content subsidies . . . and trade distorting 
domestic subsidies.'' United Steelworkers, ``Steelworkers Applaud Obama 
Administration Acceptance of Trade Case,'' 15 October 10.
    \81\ World Trade Organization, DS 419, China--Measures Concerning 
Wind Power Equipment, Request for Consultations by the United States, 
Doc. No. 11-0019, 6 January 11.
    \82\ ``USTR Signals Clear Preference for Settling China Wind 
Subsidies Case,'' China Trade Extra, 1 April 11; Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, ``China Ends Wind Power Equipment Subsidies 
Challenged by the United States in WTO Dispute,'' 8 June 11.
    \83\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``China Ends Wind 
Power Equipment Subsidies Challenged by the United States in WTO 
Dispute,'' 8 June 11.
    \84\ Ibid. Article 25 of the World Trade Organization's Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures requires WTO members to notify 
their subsidies by 30 June of each year. World Trade Organization, 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, date of signature 
15 April 94, entry into force 1 January 95, art. 25.
    \85\ Keith Bradsher, ``Union Accuses China of Illegal Clean Energy 
Subsidies,'' New York Times, 9 September 10.
    \86\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``Information 
Regarding Application of Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard 
Measure to Chinese Tyres,'' 11 September 09; World Trade Organization, 
Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 
10 November 01, Part I, 16; World Trade Organization, DS 399, United 
States-Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and 
Light Truck Tyres From China, Request for Consultations by China, Doc. 
No. 09-4361, 16 September 09; World Trade Organization, Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by China, Doc. No. 09-6454, 11 December 09. 
For a discussion of the case, see Terence Poon et al., ``China Seeks 
Talks at WTO Over Tire-Import Tariff,'' Wall Street Journal, 15 
September 09; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 228-29.
    \87\ World Trade Organization, DS 399, United States--Measures 
Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres 
From China, Request for Consultations by China, Doc. No. 09-4361, 16 
September 09; World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Doc. No. 
10-6582, 13 December 10.
    \88\ World Trade Organization, DS 399, United States--Measures 
Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres 
From China, Communication From the Appellate Body, Doc. No. 11-3821, 27 
July 11; World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Doc. 
11-4323, 5 September 11.
    \89\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the 
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 16(9).
    \90\ World Trade Organization, DS 363, China--Measures Affecting 
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, Request for Consultations, Doc. No. 
07-1499, 16 April 07; World Trade Organization, Panel Report, Doc. No. 
09-3798, 12 August 09; World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, 
Doc. No. 09-6642, 21 December 09; Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of 
the DSU, Doc. No. 10-3817, 13 July 10; World Trade Organization, Status 
Report by China, Doc. No. 11-2444, 13 May 11; World Trade Organization, 
Status Report by China, Doc. No. 11-4466, 16 September 11. For a 
discussion of the case, see ``WTO Rules Against Chinese Trade 
Restrictions on Books, DVDs, Music, and Films,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10.
    \91\ David Pierson, ``China Still Restricting Foreign Media, U.S. 
Complains,'' Los Angeles Times, 22 March 11.
    \92\ World Trade Organization, DS 363, China--Measures Affecting 
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, Status Report by China, Doc. 11-
4187, 23 August 11.
    \93\ David Pierson, ``China Still Restricting Foreign Media, U.S. 
Complains,'' Los Angeles Times, 22 March 11.
    \94\ World Trade Organization, DS 379, United States--Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
Request for Consultations by China, Doc. No. 08-4427, 22 September 08; 
World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Doc. No. 10-5262, 22 
October 10.
    \95\ World Trade Organization, DS 379, United States--Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
Notification of an Appeal by China, Doc. No. 10-6557, 6 December 10.
    \96\ World Trade Organization, DS 379, United States--Definitive 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
Report of the Appellate Body, Doc. No. 11-1239, 11 March 11. See also 
``U.S. Hints WTO Decision Could Hamper Ability To Apply CVDs To 
China,'' China Trade Extra, 29 March 11.
    \97\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``USTR Statement 
Regarding WTO Appellate Body Report in Countervailing Duty Dispute With 
China,'' 11 March 11.
    \98\ World Trade Organization, WT/DSB/M/294, Dispute Settlement 
Body, Minutes of Meeting, Doc. No. 11-2851, 25 March 11, paras. 92-102.
    \99\ For the panel's decision, see World Trade Organization, DS 
394, China--Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, Report of the Panel, Doc. No. 11-3179, 5 July 11. The ``Key 
Facts'' of the case list Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, 
Ecuador, European Union, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, 
Norway, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as 
third parties.
    \100\ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ``WTO Panel Finds 
Against China's Export Restraints on Raw Materials,'' 5 July 11.
    \101\ Ibid.
    \102\ ``A Regrettable Ruling'' [Lingren yihan de caiding], Xinhua, 
6 July 11; ``China's Measures on Raw Material Export in Line With WTO 
Objective: Statement,'' Xinhua, 5 July 11.
    \103\ World Trade Organization, ``China Appeals Raw Material 
Dispute Panel Reports,'' 31 August 11.
    \104\ Terence P. Stewart, ``China Intensifies Dominance of Global 
Rare Earths as Industry and Policymakers Debate Course of Action,'' 
China Trade Extra, 9 June 11.
    \105\ Central People's Government, ``Ministry of Commerce Discusses 
Questions on Bringing Rare Earth Ferroalloys Into Rare Earth Export 
Quotas'' [Shangwubu tan xitu tiehejin naru, xitu chukou pei e guanli 
wenti], 20 May 11; ``China Will Continue To Improve Regulation of Rare 
Earth Exports,'' Xinhua, 6 July 11; Liu Linlin, ``WTO Rules Against 
China,'' Global Times, 7 July 11; ``China's Measures on Raw Material 
Export in Line With WTO Objective: Statement,'' Xinhua, 6 July 11.
    \106\ ``Paper Says China Has Legal, Moral Right To Curb Rare 
Earth,'' Reuters, 6 July 11.
    \107\ ``U.S., EU Denounce New China Rare Earths Export Quota as Too 
Restrictive,'' China Trade Extra, 14 July 11. See also ``China's Fresh 
Rare Earths Export Quotas Restore Cuts,'' Reuters, reprinted in New 
York Times, 14 July 11.
    \108\ ``U.S., EU Denounce New China Rare Earths Export Quota as Too 
Restrictive,'' China Trade Extra, 14 July 11.
    \109\ Leslie Hook, ``Chinese Rare Earth Metals Prices Soar,'' 
Financial Times, 26 May 11; State Council Opinion on Speeding Up the 
Healthy Development of the Rare Earth Sector [Guowuyuan guanyu cujin 
xitu hangye chixu jiankang fazhan de ruogan yijian], issued 10 May 11.
    \110\ Zhou Yu, ``MIIT: Speed Up Rare Earth Sector Consolidation'' 
[Gongxinbu: jiakuai zujian daxing xitu jituan], Securities Times, 
reprinted in Xinhua, 14 June 11; ``China Plans To Consolidate State-
Owned Rare Earth Assets,'' 21st Century Business Herald, 4 January 11; 
Yin Mingzhe, ``Top 3 Rare Earth Firms To Be Named,'' China Daily, 13 
June 11; ``China Minmetals Head Backs Beijing Rare Earths Plan,'' Wall 
Street Journal, 6 March 11.
    \111\ Hu Xiaolian, People's Bank of China, ``A Managed Exchange 
Rate Is an Established Policy,'' 15 July 10. For a detailed discussion 
of the exchange rate mechanism, see Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin 
Wei, ``Assessing China's Exchange Rate Regime,'' Harvard University, 1 
March 07.
    \112\ Laura D'Andrea Tyson, ``The Outlook for China's Currency,'' 
New York Times, 6 May 11.
    \113\ Jason Dean and Tom Orlik, ``China Signals Yuan May Be 
Inflation Tool,'' Wall Street Journal, 22 April 11.
    \114\ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 47, 61 
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XV(4).
    \115\ International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, 22 July 44, entry into force 27 December 
45, art. IV--Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements, Section 1--
General Obligations of Members, subsection (111).
    \116\ See Laura D'Andrea Tyson, ``The Outlook for China's 
Currency,'' New York Times, 6 May 11.
    \117\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11.
    \118\ Laura D'Andrea Tyson, ``The Outlook for China's Currency,'' 
New York Times, 6 May 11.
    \119\ David Barboza, ``In China, Tentative Steps Toward Global 
Currency,'' New York Times, 10 February 11.
    \120\ Charles W. Freeman III and Wen Jin Yuan, Center for Strategic 
& International Studies, ``China's Exchange Rate Politics: Decoding the 
Cleavage Between the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the People's Bank 
of China,'' June 2011.
    \121\ Chinascope, ``Study Times: Strategic Thinking on RMB 
Internationalization,'' 20 April 11.
    \122\ Ibid.
    \123\ Aaron Back, ``Yuan's Role in China Trade Grows Quickly,'' 
Wall Street Journal, 19 April 11; David Barboza, ``In China, Tentative 
Steps Toward Global Currency,'' New York Times, 10 February 11. 
According to European Central Bank president, Jean-Claude Trichet, as 
quoted by the South China Morning Post, the yuan must be free-floating 
and fully convertible in order to enter the International Monetary 
Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDR), though a deputy governor of the 
People's Bank of China reportedly indicated that ``there was no link 
between yuan convertibility and its inclusion in the basket that forms 
SDRs.'' Will Clem, ``G20 Finance Chiefs Want Yuan in IMF's Basket of 
Top Currencies,'' South China Morning Post, 1 April 11.
    \124\ These moves have included the following: (1) A pilot program 
on renminbi settlement of foreign direct investment, People's Bank of 
China, Interim Administrative Measures on Renminbi Settlement of Direct 
Outbound Investment [Jingwai zhijie touzi renminbi jiesuan shidian 
guanli banfa], issued and effective 6 January 11; ``Central Bank: 
Cross-Border Renminbi Settlement Project To Expand This Year'' 
[Zhonghang: kuajing maoyi renminbi jiesuan shidian jinnian niannei 
kuoda zhi quanguo], China Securities Journal, reprinted in Sohu, 27 
April 11; (2) Allowing renminbi-denominated IPOs in Hong Kong. 
``Renminbi Initial Public Offering To Be Launched in Hong Kong'' 
[Renminbi IPO xianggang shibu], Caijing, 4 April 11; (3) Allowing 
exporters to deposit proceeds offshore, rather than having to remit 
them to China, State Administration for Foreign Exchange Circular on 
Administration of Income From the Export of Goods, Deposited Outside 
China [Guojia waihui guanliju guanyu shishi huowu maoyi chukou shouru 
cunfang jingwai guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 31 December 
10; (4) Allowing the use of yuan in foreign currency options trading. 
Li Dandan, ``Renminbi Foreign Exchange Options Trading Launched'' 
[Renminbi dui waihui qi quan jiaoyi zhengshi tuichu], Yifeng, 17 
February 11; O'Melveny & Myers, ``Notice of the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange on Issues Relating to RMB-Foreign Exchange Options 
Trading,'' China Law & Policy, Edition 4 (2011); (5) Adding Singapore 
as a second yuan-trading hub (after Hong Kong), Li Dandan, ``Renminbi 
Foreign Exchange Options Trading Launched'' [Renminbi dui waihui qi 
quan jiaoyi zhengshi tuichu], Yifeng, 17 February 11; O'Melveny & 
Myers, ``Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on 
Issues Relating to RMB-Foreign Exchange Options Trading,'' China Law & 
Policy, Edition 4 (2011).
    \125\ See Ministry of Commerce, ``Mission,'' 7 December 10; 
National Development and Reform Commission, ``Main Functions of the 
NDRC,'' last visited 9 September 11.
    \126\ For a discussion of foreign investment and the approval 
process, see James M. Zimmerman, China Law Deskbook (Chicago: American 
Bar Association, 2010), Vol. I, chap. 4.
    \127\ Ministry of Commerce, Circular on Issues in the 
Administration of Foreign Investment [Shangwubu guanyu waishang touzi 
guanli gongzuo youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 25 February 11.
    \128\ National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of 
Commerce, Foreign Investment Industry Guidance Catalogue (Revised 2007) 
[Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu (2007 nian xiuding)], issued 31 
October 07, effective 1 December 07. For a discussion of the catalogue, 
and of foreign investment in general, see Lester Ross, ``Choosing a 
China Investment Vehicle,'' China Business Review, September-October 
2010.
    \129\ State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Enterprise 
Annual Inspection Measures [Qiye niandu jianyan banfa], issued 24 
February 06, effective 1 March 06. For a discussion of the annual 
inspection process, see James M. Zimmerman, China Law Deskbook 
(Chicago: American Bar Association, 2010), Vol. I, 525-527.
    \130\ Several Opinions of the State Council on Further Improving 
the Work of Using Foreign Investment [Guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu zuohao 
liyong waizi gongzuo de ruogan yijian], issued 6 April 10, art. 1(1).
    \131\ Ibid., preamble.
    \132\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 10; Zhang 
Muxia, ``China Formulates Strategy for Encouraging Foreign Investment 
in Strategic Emerging Industries'' [Zhongguo guli waishang touzi 
zhanlue xinxing chanye xiangmu niding], Shanghai Negotiable Securities 
Paper, reprinted in Xinhua, 7 April 11; Ding Qingfen, ``China `Opening 
Wider' for Foreign Investment,'' China Daily, 8 April 11.
    \133\ State Council General Office Circular on Establishing a 
Security Review System for Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors [Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jianli waiguo touzizhe 
bing gou jingnei qiye anquan shencha zhidu de tongzhi], 3 February 11, 
preamble.
    \134\ Ibid., art. 1(1).
    \135\ Ibid., art. 2.
    \136\ Ibid., art. 3(2).
    \137\ Ibid., art. 4(1).
    \138\ Ibid.
    \139\ Ibid., art. 4(2).
    \140\ Ministry of Commerce Interim Provisions on Matters Relating 
to the Security Review System for Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises 
by Foreign Investors [Shangwubu shishi waiguo touzizhe bing gou jingnei 
qiye anquan shencha zhidu youguan shixiang de zanxing guiding], issued 
4 March 11, effective from 5 March 11 to 31 August 11.
    \141\ Ministry of Commerce Measures on Management of Outbound 
Investment [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shangwubu jingwai touzi guanli 
banfa], issued 16 March 09.
    \142\ Charles Comey and Zhu Zhu, ``MOFCOM Streamlines Regulatory 
Approvals for Outbound Investments,'' Morrison Foerster Client Alert, 
23 April 09.
    \143\ According to a February 2011 National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) circular, outbound investment in resource development 
projects with a value over US$300 million and other investments with a 
value over US$100 million require NDRC approval, and such investments 
under these amounts must be approved by provincial-level authorities 
under NDRC. National Development and Reform Commission Circular on 
Delegating Approval Rights for Overseas Investment Projects to Lower 
Level Authorities [Guojia fazhan gaige wei guanyu zuohao jingwai touzi 
xiangmu xiafang hezhun quanxian gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 14 February 
11.
    \144\ National Development and Reform Commission Circular on 
Delegating Approval Rights for Overseas Investment Projects to Lower 
Level Authorities [Guojia fazhan gaige wei guanyu zuohao jingwai touzi 
xiangmu xiafang hezhun quanxian gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 14 February 
11.
    \145\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 52.
    \146\ ``Ministries Prepare Improvements to Overseas Investment 
Policy'' [Duo buwei yunniang wanshan haiwai touzi zhengce], 21st 
Century Business Herald, 5 January 11.
    \147\ National People's Congress, PRC Criminal Law Amendment (8) 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa xiuzhengan (8)], issued 25 February 
11, effective 1 May 11, art. 29; ``China Amends Criminal Law To Cover 
Foreign Bribery, Bribery of Non-PRC Government Officials 
Criminalized,'' E-Alert from Covington & Burling LLP, 1 March 11.
    \148\ State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 
Provisional Measures on Monitoring the Overseas Assets of Central-Level 
Enterprises [Zhongyang qiye jingwai guoyou zichan jiandu guanli zanxing 
banfa], issued 14 June 11, effective 1 July 11; State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, Provisional Measures on 
Administering Overseas State-Owned Assets of Central-Level Enterprises 
[Zhongyang qiye jingwai guoyou chanquan guanli zanxing banfa], issued 
14 June 11, effective 1 July 11. See also ``Central-Level State-Owned 
Enterprises Lost 4 Trillion Yuan Worth of Overseas Assets, the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Increases 
Supervision'' [Yang qi siwanyi haiwai zichan pinfan xian ju kui 
guoziwei huoxian du lou], Sohu, 8 December 10. In December 2010, there 
was a report that at of the end of 2009, central SOEs have lost 4 
trillion yuan worth of state assets in outbound investments.
    \149\ ``China To Raise Standard for Companies' Overseas Resources 
M&A,'' People's Daily, 8 December 10.
    \150\ Derek Scissors, Heritage Foundation, ``China's Investment 
Overseas in 2010,'' 3 February 11.
    \151\ Wang Yanlin, ``SOEs Get No Special Treatment, Says 
Official,'' Shanghai Daily, 2 November 10.
    \152\ For details on the Antimonopoly Law, and the Chinese 
government departments charged with implementation, see Nathan Bush and 
Zhaofeng Zhou, ``Chinese Antitrust--Act II, Scene 1,'' The Antitrust 
Source, October 2008, 1-11.
    \153\ State Administration for Industry and Commerce Provisions on 
Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements [Gongshang xingzheng guanli jiguan 
jinzhi longduan xieyi xingwei de guiding], issued 31 December 10, 
effective 1 February 11.
    \154\ State Administration for Industry and Commerce Provisions on 
Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominance [Gongshang xingzheng guanli 
jiguan jinzhi lanyong shichang zhipei diwei xingwei de guiding], issued 
31 December 10, effective 1 February 11.
    \155\ State Administration for Industry and Commerce Provisions on 
Prohibiting the Misuse of Administrative Power To Exclude or Restrict 
Competition [Gongshang xingzheng guanli jiguan zhizhi lanyong xingzheng 
quanli paichu, xianzhi jingzheng xingwei de guiding], issued 31 
December 10, effective 1 February 11.
    \156\ National Development and Reform Commission, Provisions on 
Anti-Price Monopoly [Fan jiage longduan guiding], issued 29 December 
10, effective 1 February 11.
    \157\ National Development and Reform Commission, Administrative 
Enforcement Procedures on Antimonopoly Provisions [Fan jiage longduan 
xingzheng zhifa chengxu guiding], issued 29 December 10, effective 1 
February 11.
    \158\ For a discussion of these regulations, see Adrian Emch, ``The 
Antitrust Enforcers' New Year Resolutions,'' China Law & Practice, 
February 2011. For a discussion on the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce provisions, see State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce, ``Responsible Official of the SAIC General Office 
Competition Law Enforcement Bureau Responds to Questions on Three New 
Supporting Regulations on the `Antimonopoly Law' '' [Guojia gongshang 
zongju jingzheng zhifa ju fuzeren jiu ``fan longduan fa'' sange peitao 
guizhang chutai da jizhe wen], 7 January 11.
    \159\ ``First Cartel Fines in China Following New Regulations,'' 
Caixin Net, 26 February 11.
    \160\ Adrian Emch, ``The Antitrust Enforcers' New Year 
Resolutions,'' China Law & Practice, February 2011.
    \161\ Wang Xing, ``Baidu Accused of Abusing Dominant Position,'' 
China Daily, 23 February 11.
    \162\ National Development and Reform Commission, ``Zhejiang Fuyang 
Paper Industry Association Receives Severe Punishment for Price 
Monopoly Behavior'' [Zhejiang sheng fuyang shi zaozhi hangye xiehui 
zuzhi shishi jiage longduan xingwei shoudao yanli chufa], 1 September 
11.
    \163\ Ibid.
    \164\ ``Chinese Municipal Government Held in Breach of Anti-
Monopoly Law,'' Mayer Brown JSM Legal Update, 23 August 11.
    \165\ PRC Antimonopoly Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan longduan 
fa], issued 30 August 07, effective 1 August 08, chap. V.
    \166\ American Chamber of Commerce People's Republic of China, 
American Business in China 2011 White Paper, (2011), 40.
    \167\ Nick Wood, ``Huawei-Motorola Settlement Paves Way for Closure 
of Nokia-Siemens Deal,'' Total Telecom, 13 April 11.
    \168\ Diana ben-Aaron, ``Nokia Siemens Postpones $1.2 Billion 
Motorola Deal Again,'' Bloomberg, 9 March 11.
    \169\ Ministry of Commerce, Announcement Concerning the Conditional 
Approval in the Antimonopoly Investigation of the Merger of Ulralkali 
and Silvinet [Guanyu futiaojian pizhun wula'er kaifangxing gufen gongsi 
xishou hebing xie'erweinite kaifangxing gufen gongsi fanlongduan 
shencha jueding de gonggao], issued 2 June 11. In Article 27(5) of the 
2008 Antimonopoly Law, the impact of the concentration on national 
economic development is listed as an element that the Ministry of 
Commerce should consider in reviewing a proposed merger. PRC 
Antimonopoly Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fan longduan fa], issued 30 
April 07, effective 1 August 08. For a discussion of the case, see 
Jones Day, ``China Approves Merger Between Russian Potash Producers but 
Requires They Continue To Supply the Chinese Market,'' Antitrust Alert, 
13 June 11.
    \170\ Zhang Qi, ``Train Merger Stays on Track,'' China Daily, 6 
January 11.
    \171\ ``Ministry of Industry and Information Technology: Speed Up 
Organization of Large-Size Rare Earth Group'' [Gongxinbu: jiakuai 
zujian daxing xitu jituan], Securities Times, reprinted in Xinhua, 14 
June 11; Yin Mingzhe, ``Top 3 Rare Earth Firms To Be Named,'' China 
Daily, 13 June 11. For a discussion of reorganization of the rare earth 
sector in China, see ``Gradual Reorganization of the Rare Earth 
[Sector], Mining Rights To Be Returned to the State-Owned Enterprises'' 
[Xitu zhengdun da mu jianci kaiqi caikuang quan keneng gui guoqi], 21st 
Century Economic Times, reprinted in State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council, 3 June 10.
    \172\ Zhang Qi, ``Train Merger Stays on Track,'' China Daily, 6 
January 11.
    \173\ He Dan, ``Food Safety a Work in Progress,'' China Daily, 7 
May 11; Joshua Fellman, ``Chinese Watermelons `Explode,' Maybe From 
Chemical, Xinhua Says,'' Bloomberg, reprinted in Washington Post, 18 
May 11; ``Chongqing Seizes Over 10,000 Jin Poisonous Pepper: A Portion 
Is Already in the Hotpots'' [Chongqing chahuo shangwan jin du huajiao 
bufen yi zhicheng huoguodi liao], Sina, 25 March 11. See also, ``Two 
Years After the Issuance of the Food Safety Law It Is Still Difficult 
To Constrain Food Safety Incidents'' [Shipin anquan fa banbu liang nian 
reng nan ezhi shipin anquan shijian], Global Times, 28 February 11.
    \174\ ``Ministry of Health Official: Will Establish a Blacklist of 
Reporters Who Mislead the Public About Food Safety Issues'' [Weishengbu 
guanyuan: jiang dui shipin anquan baodao wudao gongzhong de jizhe jian 
heimingdan], Caijing, 14 June 11.
    \175\ Ibid.
    \176\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shi'er ge wu nian guihua 
gang yao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 41, sec. 1.
    \177\ Ministry of Health, Management of National Food Safety 
Standards [Shipin anquan guojia biaozhun guanli banfa], issued 20 
October 10, effective 1 December 10.
    \178\ Administrative Measures on Food Safety Information Disclosure 
[Shipin anquan xinxi gongbu guanli banfa], issued 3 November 10.
    \179\ Qiu Bo, ``County Focus To Ensure Food Safety,'' China Daily, 
3 January 11.
    \180\ ``State Council Arranges Key Works on Food Safety in 2011'' 
[Guowuyuan anpai 2011 nian shipin anquan zhongdian gongzuo], Caijing, 
25 March 11.
    \181\ Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology, Ministry of Commerce, State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce, General Administration of Quality Supervision and Quarantine, 
State Food and Drug Administration, Announcement of Six Agencies 
Including the Ministry of Health Concerning Banning the Use of 
Bisphenol A in Infant Milk Bottles [Weishengbu deng 6 bumen guanyu 
jinzhi shuangfen A yongyu ying you'er naiping de gonggao], issued 23 
May 11, effective for manufacturing 1 June 11, effective for import and 
sale 1 September 11. See also ``Ministry of Health Issues Draft Ban on 
the Use of BPA in Infant Food Containers (Update)'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 24 May 11, updated 9 June 11.
    Notes to Section III--Access to Justice

    \1\ ``By the End of 2010, Our Country Will Have Drawn Up 236 Active 
Laws and Over 690 Administrative Regulations'' [Dao 2010 niandi, woguo 
yi zhiding xianxing youxiao falu 236 jian, xingzheng fagui 690 
duojian], Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily, 10 March 10.
    \2\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and 
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 
48, art. 8.
    \3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 2.
    \4\ ``Chinese Chief Justice Stresses Priority of Mediation Over 
Court,'' Xinhua, 30 May 11; ``China Issues Guidelines for Resolving 
Social Conflicts,'' Xinhua, 4 May 11.
    \5\ PRC People's Mediation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin 
tiaojie fa], issued 28 August 10, effective 1 January 11; Supreme 
People's Court, Several Provisions Regarding Judicial Affirmation 
Procedures for People's Mediation Agreements [Zuigao renmin fayuan 
guanyu renmin tiaojie xieyi sifa queren chengxude ruogan guiding], 
issued 23 March 11; ``New People's Mediation Law Takes Effect,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 February 11.
    \6\ PRC People's Mediation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renmin 
tiaojie fa], issued 28 August 10, effective 1 January 11, art. 1.
    \7\ Ibid., arts. 1, 7-12.
    \8\ Ibid., arts. 4, 33.
    \9\ Opinion on Questions Regarding Establishing and Improving 
Enforcement [of Judicial Decisions) by Multiple Organizations [Guanyu 
jianli he wanshan zhixing liandong jizhi ruogan wentide yijian], issued 
7 July 10.
    \10\ Ibid. For example, Chapter 8 calls on the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs to give special consideration to those seeking enforcement who 
are in dire conditions.
    \11\ Zhu Zhe and Lan Tian, ``Mediation Draft Law Could Ease 
Tension,'' China Daily, 23 June 10. According to the article, Minister 
of Justice Wu Aiying told the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee that the ``mediation should be the fire line of defence to 
maintain social stability and promote harmony.''
    \12\ Several Opinions Regarding Further Strengthening the Basic 
People's Courts Under New Circumstances [Guanyu xinxingshi xia jinyibu 
jiaqiang renmin fayuan jiceng jichu jianshede ruogan yijian], issued 28 
January 11, secs. 13, 14.
    \13\ Zhu Xudong, ``Basic-Level Court Judge Chen Yanping's Work 
Method Is Worth Spreading Throughout the Country'' [Jiceng faguan chen 
yanping gongzuofa zai quanguo huo tuiguang], News of the Communist 
Party of China, 23 February 11; Carl F. Minzner, ``China's Turn Against 
the Law,'' Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research 
Paper, No. 11-03-01 (2011), 24.
    \14\ Ma Shoumin, ``Prioritizing Mediation Promotes Societal Harmony 
and Stability'' [Tiaojie youxian licu shehui hexie wending], People's 
Court Daily, 15 March 11.
    \15\ Carl F. Minzner, ``China's Turn Against the Law,'' Washington 
University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 11-03-01 
(2011); Stanley Lubman, ``Civil Litigation Being Quietly `Harmonized,' 
'' Wall Street Journal, 31 May 11; Willy Lam, ``Beijing Tightens 
Control Over Courts,'' Asia Times, 25 June 11.
    \16\ ``Open Letter From the Tiananmen Mothers,'' reprinted in Human 
Rights in China, 30 May 11; Willy Lam, ``Beijing Tightens Control Over 
Courts,'' Asia Times, 25 June 11.
    \17\ Ibid.
    \18\ Carl F. Minzner, ``China's Turn Against the Law,'' Washington 
University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 11-03-01 
(2011), 31-37.
    \19\ Ibid., 38-39.
    \20\ Li Gang, ``Court Supervised `Mediation' Is Easy, Enforcement 
Is Hard'' [Fayuan ``tiaojie'' rongyi zhixing nan], Beijing Youth Daily, 
7 July 10. According to this article, based on data released by a court 
in Beijing, agreements in nearly half of the disputes settled through 
mediation are not honored by the parties, contributing to what the 
paper characterized as the ``strange phenomenon'' of too much mediation 
and too little enforcement. ``We Ought To Pay Attention to Both 
Mediation and Enforcement'' [Tiaojielu yu tiaojie zidong luxinglu 
yingdang bingzhong], People's Court Daily, reprinted in Legal Daily, 14 
April 11; Carl F. Minzner, ``China's Turn Against the Law,'' Washington 
University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 11-03-01 
(2011), 42-43. Minzner postulates that as courts began to aggressively 
pressure parties to settle, parties increasingly had second thoughts 
after settlement, further eroding voluntary enforcement rates for 
mediated agreements.
    \21\ Supreme People's Court, Model Judicial Behavior Code [Faguan 
xingwei guifan], issued 6 December 11.
    \22\ Supreme People's Court, Basic Code of Professional Conduct for 
Judges [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo faguan zhiye daode jiben zhunze], 
issued 6 December 11.
    \23\ Supreme People's Court, Model Judicial Behavior Code [Faguan 
xingwei guifan], issued 6 December 11, arts. 81, 82, 83-activities 
outside of work; 84-interaction with media; 85-interpersonal conflict 
with others; 89-overseas travel.
    \24\ Supreme People's Court, Basic Code of Professional Conduct for 
Judges [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo faguan zhiye daode jiben zhunze], 
issued 6 December 11. The five principles are: Guaranteeing loyalty to 
the administration of justice, ensuring judicial fairness, ensuring 
judicial honesty, striving to achieve justice for the people, and 
defending the image of the judiciary.
    \25\ Supreme People's Court, Model Judicial Behavior Code [Faguan 
xingwei guifan], issued 6 December 11, art. 1. Specifically, Article 1 
requires judges to be loyal to the Party and contains new language on 
``maintaining the same line of thought and action as the Party's 
Central Committee,'' and ``to not go against the core policies of the 
Party and the country, in words and deeds''; Supreme People's Court, 
Basic Code of Professional Conduct for Judges [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo faguan zhiye daode jiben zhunze], issued 6 December 11, arts. 
4-7. Specifically, these articles contain new references requiring 
``loyalty to the Party, loyalty to country, and loyalty to the people 
in order to build and defend a socialist system with Chinese 
characteristics,'' ``abide by political discipline, guard the country's 
secrets and trial work secrets, and not engage in activities that are 
detrimental to the country's interests and judicial authority, and not 
speak or publish speeches that are detrimental to the country's 
interests and judicial authority.''
    \26\ Supreme People's Court, Trial Implementation of Provisions 
Regarding Professional Avoidance of Trial Judges and Court Leadership 
When a Spouse or Child Practices as a Lawyer [Guanyu dui peiou zinu 
congshi lushi zhiyede fayuan lingdao ganbu he shenpan zhixing gangwei 
faguan shixing renzhi huibi de guiding (shixing)], issued 10 February 
11.
    \27\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions Regarding the Prevention of 
Interference With Casework by Internal Court Personnel [Guanyu zai 
shenpan gongzuozhong fangzhi fayuan neibu renyuan ganrao banande ruogan 
guiding], 15 February 11.
    \28\ Ibid., arts. 1-5.
    \29\ Supreme People's Court, Opinion Concerning the Standardization 
of Trial Work Between Higher Level and Lower Level Courts [Guanyu 
guifan shangxiaji renmin fayuan shenpan yewu guanxide ruogan yijian], 
issued 28 December 10. For a summary of the Opinion, also see ``Recent 
Developments in Judicial Reform,'' Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China, 31 March 11.
    \30\ Supreme People's Court, Opinion Concerning the Standardization 
of Trial Work Between Higher Level and Lower Level Courts [Guanyu 
guifan shangxiaji renmin fayuan shenpan yewu guanxide ruogan yijian], 
issued 28 December 10, art. 6.
    \31\ Supreme People's Court, Regulations Regarding Guiding Cases 
[Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu anli zhidao gongzuode guiding], issued 26 
November 10.
    \32\ Ibid., arts. 1, 2.
    \33\ ``Supreme People's Court Steadily Pushes Forward Guiding Cases 
With Chinese Characteristics'' [Zuigaofa wenbu tuijin zhongguo tese 
anli zhidao zhidu], Legal Daily, 17 May 11.
    \34\ An Jie, ``Hu Yunteng Explains the Regulations Regarding 
Guiding Cases'' [Hu yunteng jiedu guanyu anli zhidao gongzuode 
guiding], Dongfang Fayan, 11 January 11.
    \35\ Ibid. In the same article, the director of the research 
department of the Supreme People's Court suggests that the lower courts 
should abide by the guiding cases when adjudicating cases that are 
similarly situated. If the judge does not follow the guiding cases, he 
should articulate a compelling reason.
    \36\ Supreme People's Court, Guiding Opinion on Sentencing in 
Peoples' Courts (Trial Version) [Renmin fayuan liangxing zhidao yijian 
(shixing)], issued 13 September 10, effective 1 October 10.
    \37\ Ibid., chap. 4.
    \38\ See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule 
of Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002), 295-98. 
Peerenboom discusses corruption in the context of judges' technical 
competence and judicial independence. See also Ling Li, ``The 
`Production of Corruption' in China's Courts,'' U.S.-Asia Law Institute 
Working Paper Series, 5 July 2011. Li postulates that corruption within 
the judiciary is a systemic problem.
    \39\ ``Corrupt Chinese Judges To Face Harsh Punishments: SPC Vice 
President,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Human Rights, 29 December 10. 
Details about graft cases are not known.
    \40\ ``Making Fundamental Improvements, Guaranteeing a Fair and 
Just Judiciary'' [Zhuazhu genben qianghua cuoshi, baozhang gongzheng 
lianjie sifa], People's Court Daily, reprinted in Legal Daily, 28 
February 11. The article is a summary of Supreme People's Court's anti-
corruption efforts in 2010.
    \41\ Mimi Lau, ``Bribing Judges Is Almost a Sure Thing,'' South 
China Morning Post, 21 May 11.
    \42\ Chen Xianfeng and Wang Kailei, ``Following the Trail of a 
Corrupt Court in Guangdong Province, Nine Judges Conspired With Others 
for Profit'' [Guangdong zhanjiang fayuan fubai wo'an zhuizong: jiuming 
faguan yuren hemou huoli], Communist Party of China News, 2 May 11.
    \43\ Shao Ming, ``Foshan Intermediate People's Court Responds to 
Judges Accepting Bribes, `Sentences to Three, Postpones for Four' '' 
[Foshan zhongyuan huiying faguan shouhui ``pansan huansi''], Southern 
Metropolis Daily, 17 June 11.
    \44\ Supreme People's Court, ``Work Report of the Supreme People's 
Court'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao], reprinted in People's 
Daily, 20 March 11, subsection 5; Supreme People's Court, ``Wang 
shengjun: The Work of the People's Courts Still Has Five Problem 
Areas'' [Wang shengjun: renmin fayuan gongzuozhong haicunzai wuge 
fangmiande wenti he kunnan], 11 March 11.
    \45\ Ling Li, ``The `Production of Corruption' in China's Courts,'' 
U.S.-Asia Law Institute Working Paper Series, 5 July 2011, 36. Li 
argues reform efforts ``have seldom touched upon the decision-making 
mechanism, through which corruption in the judiciary has become 
institutionalized.''
    \46\ State Council Information Office, ``China's Efforts To Combat 
Corruption and Build a Clean Government,'' 29 December 10.
    \47\ ``Strengthen Internal Supervision of the Courts, SPC Promotes 
Judicial Inspection Tour'' [Jiaqiang fayuan neibu jiandu, zuigao fayuan 
quanmian tuixing sifa xuncha zhidu], People's Court Daily, reprinted in 
Xinhua, 21 October 10. The other goals include implementing Party 
ideology, shaping ideas regarding a clean government, and resolving 
conflicts.
    \48\ Supreme People's Court, Provisions Regarding the ``Five 
Prohibitions'' [Guanyu wuge yanjinde guiding], issued 8 January 09.
    \49\ Ibid.
    \50\ ``Tip-Off Websites Launched To Root Out Corruption in China's 
Legal System,'' Xinhua, 9 February 11.
    \51\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 62, 67,128.
    \52\ PRC Administrative Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
xingzheng susong fa], issued 4 April 89, effective 1 October 90, art. 
12. The law is also known as the Administrative Litigation Law.
    \53\ National People's Congress, Explanation Regarding the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng 
fuyi fa shiyi], 18 October 00.
    \54\ PRC Administrative Supervision Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
xingzheng jiancha fa], issued 9 May 97, amended 25 June 10.
    \55\ Ibid., arts. 6, 46, 47.
    \56\ Ibid.
    \57\ PRC State Compensation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia 
peichang fa], issued 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, effective 1 
December 10.
    \58\ Ibid., art. 2. Article 2 states, ``If a state organization or 
a member of its personnel, when exercising functions and powers in 
violation of the law, infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of 
a citizen., and causes damages-the aggrieved person shall have the 
right to recover damages from the state in accordance with the law.'' 
For a further discussion about the implication of the amended State 
Compensation Law, including negligence, see Stanley Lubman, ``A Step 
Forward: New Law Expands Government Liability,'' Wall Street Journal, 
13 January 11.
    \59\ PRC State Compensation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia 
peichang fa], issued 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, effective 1 
December 10, art. 35. For a further discussion about the implication of 
the amended State Compensation Law, including efforts to eliminate 
procedural loopholes, see Stanley Lubman, ``A Step Forward: New Law 
Expands Government Liability,'' Wall Street Journal, 13 January 11.
    \60\ PRC State Compensation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia 
peichang fa], issued 12 May 94, amended 29 April 10, effective 1 
December 10, arts. 9-12. For a further discussion about the implication 
of the amended State Compensation Law, including the inclusion of 
psychological injuries, see Stanley Lubman, ``A Step Forward: New Law 
Expands Government Liability,'' Wall Street Journal, 13 January 11.
    \61\ ``Highlights of Work Report of Supreme People's Court,'' 
Xinhua, 11 March 11.
    \62\ See Carl F. Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal 
Chinese Legal Institutions,'' Stanford Journal of International Law, 
No. 42 (2006), 118-20.
    \63\ Zhang Han, ``Pressuring Petitioners,'' Global Times, 27 
October 10.
    \64\ Ibid.
    \65\ ``Our Country's Petition System Is Full of Innovation and 
Shows Good Results, Achieving a Positive Outcome'' [Woguo xinfang 
xitong chuangxian zhengyou huodong yijing qude jieduanxing chengguo], 
Xinhua, reprinted in Legal Daily, 29 March 11.
    \66\ Supreme People's Court, ``Annual Work Report (2010)'' [Renmin 
fayuan gongzuo niandu baogao (2010)], May 2011, 33.
    \67\ Human Rights Watch, ``An Alleyway in Hell,'' November 2009, 3, 
7-19; Xu Kai and Li Wei'ao, ``The Machinery of Maintaining Social 
Stability'' [Weiwen jiqi], Caijing, 6 June 11.
    \68\ Tania Branigan, ``Wen Jiabao Visits China's Central Complaints 
Department,'' Guardian, 26 January 11.
    \69\ Xu Kai and Li Wei'ao, ``The Machinery of Maintaining Social 
Stability'' [Weiwen jiqi], Caijing, 6 June 11.
    \70\ Ibid.; Long Zhi, ``Anyuanding: Investigation Into Beijing 
`Black Jail' Retrievers (Part I)'' [Anyuanding: beijing jiefang ``hei 
jianyu'' diaocha (shang pian)], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 24 
September 10; See also Zhan Han, ``Pressuring Petitioners,'' Global 
Times, 27 October 10; Liu Chang, ``Controversy Over `Black Jails' 
Continues,'' Global Times, 4 May 11; ``Woman Detained in a Black Jail 
After Coming to Beijing To Handle Affairs'' [Laijing banshi nu beiguan 
heijianyu], Beijing News, 2 August 11.
    \71\ Long Zhi, ``Anyuanding: Investigation Into Beijing `Black 
Jail' Retrievers (Part I)'' [Anyuanding: beijing jiefang ``hei jianyu'' 
diaocha], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 24 September 10. See also Zhan 
Han, ``Pressuring Petitioners,'' Global Times, 27 October 10.
    \72\ Zhan Han, ``Pressuring Petitioners,'' Global Times, 27 October 
10.
    \73\ Ibid.; Xu Kai and Li Wei'ao, ``The Machinery of Maintaining 
Social Stability'' [Weiwen jiqi], Caijing, 6 June 11.
    \74\ ``Supreme People's Court Issues the Following Documents 
Regarding Petitioning Work'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan jiushe su xinfang 
gongzuo xiafa xilie wenjian], People's Court Daily, 16 May 11.
    \75\ PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo zhi'an guanli chufa fa], issued 5 September 86, 
amended 12 May 94, 28 August 05, effective 1 March 06, art. 23.
    \76\ Ibid.
    \77\ Ibid.
    \78\ ``Female Petitioner Cai Fuxian From Guizhou Is Detained for 
Leafletting and Later Released'' [Guizhou lupanshui nufangmin cai 
fuxian sa chuandan bei zhuahou shifang], Boxun, 29 October 10.
    \79\ ``Land Disputes Worst Problem in Rural Areas,'' Agence France-
Presse, 16 December 10; Choi Chi-yu, ``2,000 Battle Police in Yunna,'' 
South China Morning Post, 31 March 11; ``Six Hundred Policemen in 
Fuzhou Used Tear Gas To Force Expropriation of Property, Violent 
Conflict Results in Many Villagers Beaten and Detained'' [Fuzhou liubai 
jingshi cuileidan qiangzhengdi-bao chongtu duowei cunmin beida 
beizhua], Radio Free Asia, 8 April 11; ``Petitioners Attacked and 
Beaten,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 March 11; Alice Yan, ``Demolition 
Violence Stirs Fury on the Mainland,'' South China Morning Post, 6 
November 10; ``Police Detain Land Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 
October 10.
    \80\ Zhang Huailei, ``The Urgency of Building a Social Benefit Net 
for Farmers Who Have Lost Land'' [Wei shidi nongmin jianli shehui 
baozhang tixide jinpoxing], Social Sciences in China Press, Vol. 148, 
16 December 10.
    \81\ Ibid.
    \82\ PRC Administrative Coercion Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo 
xingzheng qiangzhi fa], enacted 30 June 11, effective 1 January 12.
    \83\ Ibid., especially chaps. 2-4.
    \84\ Ibid., chap. 2.
    \85\ Ibid., chaps. 3, 4.
    \86\ Ibid., art. 8.
    \87\ Xu Kai and Li Wei'ao, ``The Machinery of Maintaining Social 
Stability'' [Weiwen jiqi], Caijing, 6 June 11.
    \88\ Edward Wong, ``Human Rights Advocates Vanish as China 
Intensifies Crackdown,'' New York Times, 11 March 11; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders, ``A Quiet Crackdown, Yet Likely the Harshest in 
Recent Years,'' 25 February 11; Human Rights in China, ``Heavy Charges 
for Chinese Activists; HRIC Urges Support From International 
Community,'' 25 February 11; Andrew Quinn, ``U.S. Urges China To Halt 
Detention of Activists,'' Reuters, 8 March 11.
    \89\ See, e.g., Minnie Chan, ``Security Even Tighter After 
`Jasmine' Call,'' South China Morning Post, 2 March 11; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders, ``Individuals Affected by the Crackdown Following 
Call for `Jasmine Revolution,' '' 30 May 11; Human Rights in China, 
``Dozens Put Under House Arrest as Chinese Authorities Intensify 
Crackdown Following Nobel Peace Prize Announcement,'' 28 October 10; 
Chris Buckley, ``China Dissidents Under Lockdown as Nobel Tensions 
Linger,'' Reuters, 29 October 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, 
``Beijing Activists Li Fangping, Li Zhiying Placed Under Soft 
Detention'' [Beijing weiquan renshi li fangping, li zhiying zao 
ruanjin], 26 October 10.
    \90\ See, e.g., Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human 
Rights Briefing Weekly December 8-13, 2010'' 15 December 10; Gillian 
Wong, ``China Cracks Down, Many Activists Missing,'' Associated Press, 
21 March 11.
    \91\ See, e.g., ``Mainland Student in Hong Kong Asked To `Drink 
Tea' by Mainland Liaison Office After Participating in Rights Defense 
Activities'' [Zai gang neidisheng weiquan zhong lianban ``qing 
yincha''], Sina, 1 June 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China 
Human Rights Briefing Weekly December 8-13, 2010'' 15 December 10; 
``Caijing Magazine Journalist Zhang Jialong Missing After Being Asked 
to `Have Tea,' May Be Related to Ai Weiwei Case'' [Caijing zazhi jizhe 
zhang jialong bei ``hecha'' shizong huo yu ai weiwei an you guan], 
Radio France Internationale, 2 May 11; ``The Chinese Government Charges 
Three Internet Dissidents With the Crime of `Incitement To Subvert 
State Authority' '' [Zhongguo zhengfu dui sanming wanluo yiyirenshi 
kong yi `biandong dianfu guojia zhengquan' zuiming], Radio Free Asia, 3 
April 11.
    \92\ See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Democracy Advocate Is 
Sentenced to 10 Years,'' New York Times, 25 March 11.
    \93\ ``Lawyers' Licenses Withheld,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 July 10; 
``Authorities Deny Human Rights Lawyers Professional License 
Renewals,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 December 
10.
    \94\ Jonathan Shieber, ``A Joke on Twitter, a Year in Labor Camp? 
'' Wall Street Journal, 19 November 10; Stanley Lubman, ``China's War 
on Dissent and Activism,'' Wall Street Journal, 24 December 10; ``China 
Court Jails Tainted-Milk Activist, Amnesty Says,'' Bloomberg News, 10 
November 10.
    \95\ Peter Simpson, ``China Bans Rights Lawyers From Travel China 
[sic],'' Voice of America, 9 November 10; Cara Anna, ``Lawyers: China 
Blocked US Visit, Citing `Security,' '' Associated Press, reprinted in 
Yahoo!, 30 October 10.
    \96\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 
March 96, effective 1 January 97, arts. 33, 34.
    \97\ Provisions on Criminal Litigation [Guanyu xinggshi susong falu 
yuanzhu gongzuode guiding], issued 28 September 05, effective 1 
December 05, art. 4.
    \98\ ``China's Legal Aid Funds Surge in 2010,'' Xinhua, 2 February 
11; Cui Qingxin, ``China Surpasses One Billion Yuan in Legal Aid 
Support Last Year'' [Qunian woguo falu yuanzhu jingfei zonge chaoguo 10 
yi], Xinhua, 3 February 11.
    \99\ Ibid.
    \100\ Cui Qingxin, ``Last Year, More Than 70 Million Legal Aid 
Cases Handled; 40 Percent on Behalf of Migrant Workers'' [Qunian 
gongban 70 duo wanjian falu yuanzhu anjian jin sicheng wei nongmingong 
banli], Xinhua, 4 February 11.
    \101\ Zhang Yan and Wang Yan, ``213 Counties Will Receive Free 
Legal Aid,'' China Daily, 9 February 11.
    \102\ Li Jiabao, ``Parents of Child Beggars Offered Legal Aid,'' 
China Daily, 14 February 11.
    \103\ ``700,000 Yuan Earmarked for Tibet's Legal Aid,'' China Tibet 
News, reprinted in China Daily, 25 February 11.
    \104\ Liu Yujie, ``China Daily: Communities Get Free Legal Aid,'' 
China Daily, 1 March 11.
    \105\ Cao Hongbing, ``Requirements and Ideas for Improving Legal 
Aid'' [Wanshan woguo falu yuanzhu de biyaoxing he silu], People's 
Daily, 12 February 10.
    \106\ Ibid.
    \107\ Zhang Yan and Wang Yan, ``213 Counties Will Receive Free 
Legal Aid,'' China Daily, 9 February 11.
    \108\ Yuan Yuan, ``Aiding in Defense,'' Beijing Review, 6 February 
11.
    \109\ Ibid.
    \110\ Ibid.
    Notes to Section III--Property

    \1\ See, e.g., Qian Yanfeng, ``Shanghai Residents Fight Forced 
Demolitions,'' China Daily, 26 February 10; ``Security Clampdown in 
Taizhou,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 June 11; ``Anhui Farmer Arrested for 
Self-Immolation'' [Anhui zifen nongmin bei daibu], Radio Free Asia, 13 
June 11; ``Fifteen Yunnan Villagers Who Smashed Cars Because They Were 
Unhappy With Land Requisition Receive Punishment'' [Dui zhengdi buman 
daza cheliang Yunnan 15 cunmin huode], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 25 
May 11; Fiona Tam, ``At Least Two Killed, Six Hurt in Jiangxi Blasts,'' 
South China Morning Post, 27 May 11; ``Over 300 Forcibly Evicted in 
Wuxi Protest Court's Inaction'' [Wuxi sanbai duo qiangchai kangyi 
fayuan buzuowei], Radio Free Asia, 24 May 11; ``Skirmish Over 
Farmland,'' Radio Free Asia, 12 April 11; Yan Jie, ``Mass Disturbance 
Over Yunnan Dam,'' China Daily, 1 April 11; Civil Rights & Livelihood 
Watch, ``Land Requisition in Dongxishan Village, Yantai, Shandong, Many 
Residents Continuously Arrested, Sentenced'' [Shandong yantai 
dongxishan cun zhengdi lianxu zhuopu panxing duowei nongmin], 30 March 
11; Wang Jingqiong, ``List of Forced Demolition Cases Grows Longer,'' 
China Daily, 2 November 10. For a comprehensive report on land 
seizures, see China Human Rights Defenders, ``Thrown Out: Human Rights 
Abuses in China's Breakneck Real Estate Development,'' 9 February 10.
    \2\ This view is reflected in the Chinese press. See, e.g., Zhao 
Jicheng, ``Rule of Law Is Not Apparent, Violent Demolitions Difficult 
To Stop'' [Fazhi buzhang xie chai nan zu], Southern Weekend, 12 May 11.
    \3\ Wang Huazhong, ``Illegal Land Grabs a Growing Problem,'' China 
Daily, 20 April 11. For information on land rights and social 
stability, see He Qinglian, Human Rights in China, ``The Relationship 
Between Chinese Peasants' Right to Subsistence and China's Social 
Stability,'' 1 April 09, and He Qinglian, Human Rights in China, ``Why 
Have China's Peasants Become the Major Force in Social Resistance,'' 4 
June 09.
    \4\ Wang Huazhong, ``Illegal Land Grabs a Growing Problem,'' China 
Daily, 20 April 11.
    \5\ For general information, see Zhu Keliang and Roy Prosterman, 
Cato Institute, Center for Global Liberty & Prosperity, Development 
Policy Analysis, ``Securing Land Use Rights for Chinese Farmers: A Leap 
Forward for Stability and Growth,'' 15 October 07, No. 3; China Urgent 
Action Working Group, ``Papering Over the Cracks: Reform of the Forced 
Eviction Regime in China,'' 29 March 10, 6.
    \6\ ``Report Issued on Index of Public Sentiment on the Chinese 
Internet: Demolitions, Anti-Corruption Followed to a Great Extent'' 
[Zhonghua wangluo yuqing zhishu baogao fabu: chaiqian, fanfu guanzhu du 
gao], Xinhua, 24 March 11.
    \7\ State Council Standing Committee, Regulations on Expropriation 
and Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land [Guoyou tudishang 
fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli], issued and effective 19 January 
11.
    \8\ ``State Council General Office Circular Concerning Problems in 
Advancing Regulation and Control of the Property Market'' [Guowuyuan 
bangongting guanyu jinyibu zuohao fangdichan shichang tiaokong gongzuo 
youguan wenti de tongzhi], 26 January 11, arts. 1, 5; ``Wen Jiabao 
Directs State Council Standing Committee Meeting Researches and Deploys 
Eight Measures To Strengthen Regulation and Control of the Housing 
Market'' [Wen jiabao zhuchi guowuyuan changwuhui yanjiu bushu 8 xiang 
cuoshi qianghua fangdichan shichang tiaokong], People's Daily, 27 
January 11.
    \9\ Aaron Back and Esther Fung, ``China To Ramp Up Cheap-Housing 
Push,'' Wall Street Journal, 10 March 11; ``China To Build 10 Million 
Low-Cost Homes,'' Agence France-Press, reprinted in South China Morning 
Post, 9 March 11.
    \10\ Howard Schneider, ``China Looks To Tame Real Estate Tiger,'' 
Washington Post, 18 April 11. See also ``Beijing Aims To Stabilize New 
Home Prices, Joining Other Cities in Curbs,'' Bloomberg, 1 April 11; 
Cary Huang, ``Analysts Skeptical Over Property Price Plan,'' South 
China Morning Post, 2 April 11.
    \11\ Zhao Yinan, ``Land ID System To Identify Misuse,'' China 
Daily, 18 April 11; ``1.8 Billion Mu of Farmland Faces Severe 
Challenge'' [Zhongguo 18 yi mu gengdi hong xian mianlin yanjun 
tiaozhan], China Review News, summarized by Chinascope, 25 February 11. 
According to a China Review News article, as summarized by Chinascope, 
``The Agricultural and Rural Affairs Committee of the National People's 
Congress revealed that the total amount of farmland in China is 
approaching the `red line' of 1.8 billion Chinese acres, which is 
considered the minimum required acreage to sustain China's 
population.''
    \12\ PRC Constitution, issued December 4, 1982, amended 12 April 
88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, and 14 March 04, art. 10.
    \13\ PRC Property Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo wuquan fa], 
issued 16 March 07, effective 1 October 07, art. 47; PRC Constitution, 
issued December 4, 1982, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 
and 14 March 04, art. 10.
    \14\ PRC Granting and Assigning Leaseholds in State-Owned Urban 
Land Tentative Regulations [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo chengzhen guoyou 
tudi shiyongquan churang he zhuanrang zanxing tiaoli], issued and 
effective 19 May 90, art. 12.
    \15\ Ibid., art. 11. According to Article 11, the government land 
administrative departments at the municipal or county level can enter 
into contracts granting leaseholds to land users.
    \16\ Ibid., chap. III.
    \17\ Steve Dickinson, ``China Real Estate Laws, Part I,'' China Law 
Blog, 1 May 07.
    \18\ PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, and 14 March 04, art. 10; PRC Property Law 
[Zhonghua renmin gonghe quo wuquan fa], issued 16 March 07, effective 1 
October 07, arts. 61-64; PRC Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo nongcun tudi chengbao fa], issued 29 August 
02, effective 1 March 03, arts. 5, 12, 20; Steve Dickinson, ``China 
Real Estate Laws, Part I,'' China Law Blog, 1 May 07.
    \19\ PRC Administration of Urban Real Property Law [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo chengshi fangdichan guanli fa], issued 5 July 94, effective 1 
January 95, amended 30 August 07, art 9.
    \20\ See, e.g., Michael Vines and Jonathan Ansfield, ``Trampled in 
a Land Rush, Chinese Resist,'' New York Times, 26 May 10.
    \21\ William Ide, ``Analysts: US-China Debate Over Currency Misses 
Larger Issues,'' Voice of America, 15 April 10; Derek Scissors, The 
Heritage Foundation, ``10 China Myths for the New Decade,'' 
Backgrounder 2366, 28 January 10.
    \22\ Keith Bradsher, ``Government Aid Puts China Ahead in Clean 
Energy,'' New York Times, 8 September 10.
    \23\ Wang Huazhong, ``Illegal Land Grabs a Growing Problem,'' China 
Daily, 20 April 11.
    \24\ Ministry of Public Security Party Committee, 2011 Public 
Security Organs Opinion on Party Work-style, Construction of Honest and 
Clean Government, and Anti-Corruption Work [2011 nian gongan jiguan 
dangfeng lianzheng jianshe he fan fubai gongzuo yijian], 3 March 11. 
See also ``Ministry of Public Security Strictly Prohibits Public 
Security People's Police From Participating in Land Requisition, 
Demolition, and Other Non-Police-Related Activities'' [Gonganbu yanjin 
gongan minjing canyu zhengdi chaiqian deng fei jingwu huodong], Radio 
Free Asia, 3 March 11.
    \25\ Supreme People's Court, Opinions Concerning Further 
Strengthening the Basic Development of the Lower People's Courts Under 
New Circumstances [Guanyu xin xingshi xia jinyibu jiaqiang renmin 
fayuan jiceng jichu jianshe de ruogan yijian], issued 28 January 11, 
art. II(6). See also ``Supreme People's Court Requests Local Courts To 
Handle Expropriation Cases Cautiously'' [Zuigao fayuan yaoqiu jiceng 
fayuan shenshen chuli zheng di chaiqian an], Beijing News, reprinted in 
Xinhua, 16 February 11.
    \26\ ``Legislation on Immovable Property Expropriation Included on 
Agenda of the National People's Congress'' [Budongchan zhengshou lifa 
quanguo renda yi lie zhengshi yi'an], People's Daily, National People's 
Congress News, 28 March 11.
    \27\ ``China's Draft Law To Stop Administrative Power Abuse Under 
Fourth Review,'' Xinhua, reprinted in National People's Congress, 21 
April 11; Zhao Yinna, ``Door About To Close on Forced Home 
Demolitions,'' China Daily, 21 April 11.
    \28\ Zhao Yinna, ``Door About To Close on Forced Home 
Demolitions,'' China Daily, 21 April 11.
    \29\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, Art. 11(1).
    \30\ United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comments, Comment 4 to 
Article 11, paragraph 18: The right to adequate housing (art. 11(1) of 
the Covenant) (Sixth session 1991), para. 18.
    \31\ State Council, Regulations on Expropriation and Compensation 
for Housing on State-Owned Land [Guoyou tudishang fangwu zhengshou yu 
buchang tiaoli], issued and effective 21 January 11.
    \32\ Ibid.; ``Will Law Reforms Reduce Forced Home Demolitions? '' 
Wall Street Journal, 29 January 11; ``Explanation of Expropriation and 
Compensation for Houses: Standards for Demolition and Safeguarding 
Personal Rights'' [Fanwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli jiedu: guifan 
chaiqian baozhang siquan], People's Daily, 24 January 11. For 
background information see China Urgent Action Working Group, 
``Papering over the Cracks: Reform of the Forced Eviction Regime in 
China,'' 29 March 10, 14-19.
    \33\ PRC Property Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo wuquan fa], 
issued 16 March 07, effective 1 October 07, art. 42; PRC Administration 
of Urban Real Property Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengshi 
fangdichan guanli fa], passed 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, 
amended 30 August 07, art. 19.
    \34\ PRC Property Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo wuquan fa], 
issued 16 March 07, effective 1 October 07, art. 42. This law provides 
that the holder of expropriated urban land is entitled to compensation 
for demolition and relocation. PRC Administration of Urban Real 
Property Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengshi fangdichan guanli fa], 
passed 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 30 August 07, art. 
20. This law provides for compensation which is appropriate to the 
length of time the holder used the land and the state of its 
development. State Council, Regulations on Expropriation and 
Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land [Guoyou tudishang fangwu 
zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli], issued and effective 21 January 11, arts. 
19, 26, and 27.
    \35\ PRC Property Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo wuquan fa], 
issued 16 March 07, effective 1 October 07, art 42. This law provides 
for payment of land compensation fees, resettlement subsidies, and 
compensation for attachments to the land and young crops in the event 
of expropriation, and includes general language on safeguarding the 
residents' lawful rights and interests. For a report on expropriations 
see Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, ``Papering Over the Cracks: 
Reform of the Forced Eviction Regime in China,'' 29 March 10.
    \36\ ``Land Seizures Threaten To Disrupt Countryside Calm,'' China 
Daily, 2 March 11.
    \37\ Ibid.
    \38\ See, e.g., Radio Free Asia, ``Skirmish Over Farmland, 12 April 
11; Radio Free Asia, ``Guilin Forced Expropriation for `Reserve Land,' 
Farmers Protecting Their Land Beaten'' [Guilin qiangzheng tudi zuo 
``chubei'' nongmin hu tian zao ouda], 21 April 11; Radio Free Asia, 
``Anhui `Development' Is Forced Expropriation and Unending Violent 
Protest, Land Official Disappears After Charges of Corruption'' [Anhui 
``fazhan'' wei ming qiangzheng bao chai buduan tudi guanyuan zishou 
jubao ``wo tan'' hou shizong], 15 April 11; Radio Free Asia, ``600 
Fuzhou Policemen Use Tear Gas To Forcibly Expropriate Property, 
Resulting in Violent Conflict, Many Villagers Beaten and Detained'' 
[Fuzhou liubai jing shi cuileidan qiangzheng di bao chongtu duo wei 
cunmin beida beizhua], 8 April 11.
    Notes to Section IV--Xinjiang

    \1\ See, e.g., Cheng Lixin and Sui Yunyan, ``Persist in the 
Normalization of Work To Safeguard Stability, Guarantee the Stability 
of Overall Society'' [Jianchi weiwen gongzuo changtaihua quebao shehui 
daju wending], Xinjiang Daily, 25 December 10; ``Autonomous Region 
Chair Nur Bekri Issues 2011 New Year's Speech, Grab Opportunities, Try 
Hard and Fight to the Fullest, Wholeheartedly Drive Ahead With 
Xinjiang's Development by Leaps and Bounds and Long-Term Stability'' 
[Zizhiqu zhuxi nu'er baikeli fabiao 2011 nian xinnian zhici qiangzhua 
jiyu fenli pinbo quanli tuijin xinjiang kuayueshi fazhan he 
changzhijiu'an], Xinjiang Daily, 1 January 11; ``Government Work 
Report'' [Zhengfu gongzuo baogao], Xinjiang Daily, 20 January 11; Cao 
Huijuan et al., ``Fu Qiang: Strengthen Sense of Responsibility, 
Urgency, and Mission in Work To Safeguard Stability'' [Fu qiang: 
zengqiang weiwen gongzuo zerengan jinpogan shiminggan], Xinjiang Peace 
Net, 13 December 10.
    \2\ See examples that follow within this section, as well as, e.g., 
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 200-13.
    \3\ Cheng Lixin and Sui Yunyan, ``Persist in the Normalization of 
Work To Safeguard Stability, Guarantee the Stability of Overall 
Society'' [Jianchi weiwen gongzuo changtaihua quebao shehui daju 
wending], Xinjiang Daily, 25 December 10.
    \4\ Ibid.
    \5\ See, e.g., Kashgar Municipal People's Government, ``Kashgar 
Municipal People's Government Announcement'' [Kashi shi renmin zhengfu 
gonggao], 1 August 11; Kashgar Municipal People's Government, ``Our 
Municipality Resolutely Deals With Violent Terrorism Case'' [Wo shi 
guodan chuzhi yiqi baoli kongbu anjian], 1 August 11; ``Chinese State 
Councilor Vows To Crack Down on Terrorists,'' Xinhua, 4 August 11; 
``Fourteen Gangsters Shot Dead in Terrorist Acts of Violence in Hotan, 
Xinjiang,'' China News Service, 20 July 11 (Open Source Center, 20 July 
11); ``3 Cases of Serious Violent Terrorist Crimes From Kashgar Are 
Concluded'' [Kashi sanqi yanzhong baoli kongbu fanzui anjian shenjie], 
Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua, 23 March 11; Kashgar District 
People's Government, ``Resolutely Uphold the Dignity of the Law'' 
[Jianjue weihu falu zunyan], 23 March 11. In some cases, the incidents 
appear to have been described as terrorist crimes months after they 
were initially reported. See, e.g., Sui Yunyan, ``Hami Armed Murder 
Case Cracked'' [Hami shi chiqiang sharen an gaopo], Xinjiang Daily, 3 
December 10 (reporting on September 29 and November 3 murder cases as 
ordinary crimes); Aksu District Administration News Office, 
``Explosives Attack Occurs in Aksu City, Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang akesu shi 
fasheng yiqi baozha xiji an], reprinted in Aksu District People's 
Government, 19 August 10 (describing August 19 attack as ordinary 
crime); ``Judgment Made Public in Three Cases of Terrorist Crime'' 
[Gongkai xuanpan sanqi baoli kongbu fanzui anjian], Xinjiang Daily, 23 
February 11 (state-controlled media reporting of crimes in Aksu and 
Hami as terrorist); ``Severely Punishing Terrorist Crimes Shows Respect 
for Law'' [Yancheng baoli kongbu fanzui zhangxian falu zunyan], 
Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (editorial in state-controlled media 
describing crimes as terrorist).
    \6\ Based on CECC assessment of the reports. See, e.g., Kashgar 
Municipal People's Government, ``Kashgar Municipal People's Government 
Announcement'' [Kashi shi renmin zhengfu gonggao], 1 August 11; Kashgar 
Municipal People's Government, ``Our Municipality Resolutely Deals With 
Violent Terrorism Case'' [Wo shi guodan chuzhi yiqi baoli kongbu 
anjian], 1 August 11; ``Chinese State Councilor Vows To Crack Down on 
Terrorists,'' Xinhua, 4 August 11; ``Fourteen Gangsters Shot Dead in 
Terrorist Acts of Violence in Hotan, Xinjiang,'' China News Service, 20 
July 11 (Open Source Center, 20 July 11); ``3 Cases of Serious Violent 
Terrorist Crimes From Kashgar Are Concluded'' [Kashi sanqi yanzhong 
baoli kongbu fanzui anjian shenjie], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in 
Xinhua, 23 March 11; Kashgar District People's Government, ``Resolutely 
Uphold the Dignity of the Law'' [Jianjue weihu falu zunyan], 23 March 
11. In some cases, the incidents appear to have been described as 
terrorist crimes months after they were initially reported. See, e.g., 
Sui Yunyan, ``Hami Armed Murder Case Cracked'' [Hami shi chiqiang 
sharen an gaopo], Xinjiang Daily 3 December 10 (reporting on September 
29 and November 3 murder cases as ordinary crimes); Aksu District 
Administration News Office, ``Explosives Attack Occurs in Aksu City, 
Xinjiang'' [Xinjiang akesu shi fasheng yiqi baozha xiji an], reprinted 
in Aksu District People's Government, 19 August 10 (describing August 
19 attack as ordinary crime); ``Judgment Made Public in Three Cases of 
Terrorist Crime'' [Gongkai xuanpan sanqi baoli kongbu fanzui anjian], 
Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (state-controlled media reporting of 
crimes in Aksu and Hami as terrorist); ``Severely Punishing Terrorist 
Crimes Shows Respect for Law'' [Yancheng baoli kongbu fanzui zhangxian 
falu zunyan], Xinjiang Daily, 23 February 11 (editorial in state-
controlled media describing crimes as terrorist). For background 
information on Chinese government reporting on terrorist cases, see 
``Uighurs Face Extreme Security Measures; Official Statements on 
Terrorism Conflict,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
May 2006, 12. For information on restrictions on free press, see 
Section II--Freedom of Expression.
    \7\ ``Fourteen Gangsters Shot Dead in Terrorist Acts of Violence in 
Hotan, Xinjiang,'' China News Service, 20 July 11 (Open Source Center, 
20 July 11).
    \8\ See, e.g., ``Clashes in Silk Road Town,'' Radio Free Asia, 18 
July 11; World Uyghur Congress, ``World Uyghur Congress (WUC) Troubled 
by Witness Accounts on Hotan Incident,'' 19 July 11.
    \9\ Sui Yunyan and Zhang Min, ``Autonomous Region Public Security 
Organs Launch Special 100-Day Operation for Taking Strict Precautions 
Against and Striking Hard Against Serious Violent Crimes'' [Zizhiqu 
gongan jiguan kaizhan bairi yanfang yanda yanzhong baoli fanzui 
zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Daily, 24 December 10.
    \10\ Cheng Lixin, ``Autonomous Region Leading Group on State 
Security Work Is Established'' [Zizhiqu guojia anquan gongzuo lingdao 
xiaozu chengli], Xinjiang Daily, 1 March 11.
    \11\ See, e.g., Chen Zehua, ``Our Region Launches Special Operation 
To `Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorist Crimes' '' [Wo qu kaizhan 
``yanli daji baoli kongbu fanzui'' zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Legal 
Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang Peace Net, 15 August 11; Ji Jun, Aksu 
Municipal People's Government, ``District Convenes Meeting on Upholding 
Stability, Huang Sanping Makes Important Speech'' [Diqu zhaokai wei wen 
gongzuo huiyi huang sanping zuo zhongyao jianghua], 25 July 11; 
``Security Tightened as Urumqi Gears Up for China-Eurasia Expo,'' 
Xinhua, 30 August 11; ``Tensions Amid Xinjiang Clampdown,'' Radio Free 
Asia, 19 August 11.
    \12\ Chen Zehua, ``Our Region Launches Special Operation To `Strike 
Hard Against Violent Terrorist Crimes' '' [Wo qu kaizhan ``yanli daji 
baoli kongbu fanzui'' zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Legal Daily, 
reprinted in Xinjiang Peace Net, 15 August 11.
    \13\ Yang Yuanyuan and Zhang Xuemin, ``Total Population of Urumqi 
Surmounts 2.6 Million, Birthrate Maintains Low Growth'' [Wulumuqi 
zongrenkou tupo 260 wan chushenglu baochi di zengzhang], Tianshan Net, 
2 November 10.
    \14\ ``Surveilance [sic] Cameras To Keep Northwest China's Riot-
Rocked City Under Watch,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 26 
January 11.
    \15\ ``At End of This Year Video Cameras in Urumqi Proper To Reach 
60,000'' [Jinnianmo wulumuqi chengqu shipin shexiang tou jiang dadao 6 
wan zhi], China News Service, 15 January 10.
    \16\ The city had 46,953 cameras by November 2009 and added 
``nearly 17,000'' in 2010. ``At End of This Year Video Cameras in 
Urumqi Proper To Reach 60,000'' [Jinnianmo wulumuqi chengqu shipin 
shexiang tou jiang dadao 6 wan zhi], China News Service, 15 January 10; 
``Surveilance [sic] Cameras To Keep Northwest China's Riot-Rocked City 
Under Watch,'' Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times, 26 January 11.
    \17\ CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 210.
    \18\ Ge Youjun and Tan Yanbin, ``Urumqi Launches 100-Day 
Rectification Campaign for Floating Population and Room Rentals'' [Wu 
shi kaizhan liudong renkou he chuzu fangwu bairi zhuanxiang zhengzhi], 
Xinjiang Peace Net, 2 December 10. See also Yi Changchun, ``Shuimogou 
District Launches 100-Day Special Rectification Work Mobilization 
Meeting'' [Shuiqu zhaokai bairi zhuanxiang zhengzhi gongzuo dongyuan 
dahui], Xinjiang Peace Net, 16 December 10; Zhao Yuhong, ``North 
Jiefang Road Residential Area Organizes and Launches 100-Day Special 
Rectification Work Meeting'' [Jiefang bei lu jiedao zuzhi zhaokai bairi 
zhuanxiang zhengzhi gongzuohui], Xinjiang Peace Net, 17 December 10.
    \19\ Yi Changchun, ``Shuimogou District Launches 100-Day Special 
Rectification Work Mobilization Meeting'' [Shuiqu zhaokai bairi 
zhuanxiang zhengzhi gongzuo dongyuan dahui], Xinjiang Peace Net, 16 
December 10.
    \20\ ``One Good Plan After the Other for Management of Urumqi 
Floating Population'' [Wulumuqi shi liudong renkou guanli haozhao 
lianlian], Tianshan Net, 23 May 11.
    \21\ `` `No Passports' for Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 September 
10; ``Uyghurs Targeted Amidst Reform Call,'' Radio Free Asia, 28 
February 11.
    \22\ Zhongshan City Judicial Bureau, ``Zhongshan City Judicial 
Bureau Launches People's Mediation Activity for `100-Day Campaign for 
Peaceful Asian Games' '' [Zhongshan shi sifaju kaizhan renmin tiaojie 
``pingan yayun bairi dahuizhan'' huodong], 31 August 10.
    \23\ Changde City People's Government, ``City Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Bureau: Create Satisfaction Mechanisms, Use Service To Promote 
Development and Seek Stability'' [Shi minzu zongjiao shiwuju: chuang 
manyi jiguan yi fuwu cu fazhan qiu wending], 22 December 10. For an 
example from elsewhere in Hunan province, see Yongxing County United 
Front Work Department, ``Yongxing County Uses Strengthening Functions 
and Stimulating United Front Work To Magnify New Bright Spots'' 
[Yongxing xian yi qianghua zhineng jifa tongzhan gongzuo tuxian xin 
liangdian], Chenzhou City United Front News Net, 15 December 10.
    \24\ See generally Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on 
Ethnic Unity Education [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jiaoyu 
tiaoli], effective 1 February 10. For detailed analysis of the 
regulation and broader ``ethnic unity'' campaigns in the region, see `` 
`Xinjiang Ethnic Unity' Regulation Imposes Party Policy, Restricts Free 
Expression,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 
March 10, 2; CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 201-2.
    \25\ ``Summary of Educational Activities on Theme of `Ardently 
Loving the Great Motherland, Building a Glorious Homeland' '' [Re'ai 
weida zuguo jianshe meihao jiayuan zhuti jiaoyu huodong zongshu], 
Xinhua, 23 March 11.
    \26\ Ibid.
    \27\ Ibid.
    \28\ For more information on the forum, see CECC, 2010 Annual 
Report, 10 October 10, 207-8, and ``Central Leaders Hold Forum on 
Xinjiang, Stress Development and Stability as Dual Goals,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 12 July 10, 3. For 
comprehensive reporting on the forum from Chinese media, see, e.g., Zou 
Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ``The CPC Central Committee and State Council 
Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important 
Speeches; Zhou Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia 
Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and He Guoqiang Attend 
the Conference,'' Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 23 May 10). 
For information on past development efforts, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 
Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263-64.
    \29\ See, e.g., ``Grasp Key Points, Grasp the Breakthrough Point, 
Comprehensively Implement the Spirit of the Central Work Forum on 
Xinjiang'' [Zhuazhu guanjian dian zhuahao tupokou quanmian luoshi 
zhongyang xinjiang gongzuo zuotanhui jingshen], People's Daily, 26 
September 10; Cheng Lixin, ``Go a Step Further To Emancipate the Mind 
and Maintain and Expand the First Stages of a Good Situation'' [Jinyibu 
jiefang sixiang baochi he kuoda chubu xingcheng de hao xingshi], 
Xinjiang Daily, 10 October 10; ``Government Work Report'' [Zhengfu 
gongzuo baogao], Xinjiang Daily, 20 January 11.
    \30\ See, e.g., ``National Conference for Aid-Xinjiang Work Opens, 
Li Keqiang and Zhou Yongkang Give Speeches'' [Quanguo duikou zhiyuan 
xinjiang gongzuohui zhaokai li keqiang zhou yongkang jianghua], Xinhua, 
30 March 10; Supreme People's Court Guiding Opinion Concerning Aiding 
Xinjiang Court Work [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu duikou zhiyuan 
xinjiang fayuan gongzuo de zhidao yijian], undated (estimated date 
October 2010), item 3(5). For more information on counterpart support, 
see ``Central Leaders Hold Forum on Xinjiang, Stress Development and 
Stability as Dual Goals,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 6, 12 July 10, 3.
    \31\ See Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights in this report and 
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 207-8, for more information on 
grasslands policy and on initiatives announced at the forums.
    \32\ ``Scenic Area of Tianshan Heavenly Lake, Xinjiang, Continues 
`Grazing Ban,' Will Enlarge Strength in Future'' [Xinjiang tianshan 
tianchi jingqu chixu ``jinmu'' weilai jiang jiada lidu], Xinhua, 
reprinted in Sohu, 2 August 11.
    \33\ Ibid.; Shao Wei, ``Herders Face Five Year Ban on Grazing,'' 
China Daily, 1 August 2011.
    \34\ ``Xinjiang Wealthy Folks Affordable Housing Project Makes 
Smooth Progress, 670,000 Farmers and Herders Move Into New Homes'' 
[Xinjiang fumin anju gongcheng jinzhan shunli 67 wan nongmumin ruzhu 
xinfang], Xinhua, 8 November 10. For information on earlier reported 
plans to resettle herders, see Cui Jia, ``New Measures To Boost 
Xinjiang Livelihoods,'' China Daily, 28 May 10.
    \35\ See, e.g., Yang Yonghua, ``Bortala Slum Transformation 
Embodies Putting People at the Center'' [Bole shi penghuqu gaizao 
tixian yiren weiben], China Xinjiang, 8 November 10; Zhao Guangping, 
``Fukang City Slum District Transformation Enables Residents' Dreams of 
Peaceful Life'' [Fukang shi penghuqu gaizao yuanle jumin anju meng], 
Tianshan Net, 13 December 10; Tao Tao, Chen Zhe, ``Entering the Slum 
Districts: Urumqi Slum Transformation, Sunshine To Benefit the People'' 
[Zoujin penghuqu: wulumuqi shi penghu gaizao yangguang huimin], 
Xinjiang News Net, 5 February 11.
    \36\ ``Urumqi's Sweeping Slum Makeover Gathers Steam,'' Xinhua, 16 
May 11.
    \37\ For detailed information on the special economic zones (SEZs), 
including background on initial planning in 2009 to create the SEZs and 
their formation in mid-2010, see Wang Rengui et al., ``Xinjiang 
`Special Economic Zones' Unveiled,'' Liaowang, 30 May 11-05 Jun 11 
(Open Source Center, 27 July 11). See also ``Xinjiang To Set Up Two 
Special Economic Zones in 2011,'' People's Daily, 14 February 11; 
``China Aims To Build Xinjiang's Capital Into Int'l Trade Center,'' 
Xinhua, 30 March 11.
    \38\ ``China Aims To Build Xinjiang's Capital Into Int'l Trade 
Center,'' Xinhua, 30 March 11; ``Xinjiang To Set Up Two Special 
Economic Zones in 2011,'' People's Daily, 14 February 11 (describing 
plans to increase Kashgar's population to 1 million); Kashgar Municipal 
People's Government, ``Brief Introduction to Kashgar Municipality'' 
[Kashi shi jianjie], 9 November 10 (describing current population as 
600,000, including a floating population of 150,000).
    \39\ ``China-Eurasia Expo,'' China-Eurasia Expo Web site, last 
visited 26 August 11.
    \40\ ``New Railway To Cut Short Trip Between Capital Cities of 
Tibet, Xinjiang,'' Xinhua, 6 March 11.
    \41\ See, e.g., ``Development Could Widen Ethnic Divide,'' Radio 
Free Asia, 31 March 11; ``Plan To Build `Guangzhou New City' in Kashgar 
Gives People Deep Grief'' [Qeshqerde ``guangju yengi shehri'' ning 
qurulush pilani kishini chongqur qayghugha salidu], Radio Free Asia, 18 
April 11; ``Has the Economic Development Region in Korla Only Been Open 
to Han? '' [Korlidiki iqtisadiy tereqqiyat rayoni peqet xitaylarghila 
echiwetilgenmu?], Radio Free Asia, 19 April 11. For additional 
information on past development projects, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 
10 October 09, 263-64.
    \42\ Supreme People's Court Guiding Opinion Concerning Aiding 
Xinjiang Court Work [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu duikou zhiyuan 
xinjiang fayuan gongzuo de zhidao yijian], undated (estimated date 
October 2010), item 4(8).
    \43\ Ibid., item 3(5).
    \44\ Xinjiang Lawyers Association, ``2010 Regionwide Ethnic 
Minority Lawyers' Training Class Begins Soon, Publicity Underway During 
Organization and Preparatory Work'' [2010 nian quanqu shaoshu minzu 
lushi peixunban kaike zaiji zuzhi zhunbei gongzuo jinluo migu], 1 
December 10. For more information on the training, see ``Xinjiang's 
First Large-Scale Training Class for Ethnic Minority Lawyers Stresses 
Meeting Political Goals,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
19 January 11.
    \45\ Xinjiang Lawyers Association, ``2010 Regionwide Training Class 
for Ethnic Minority Lawyers Opens in Urumqi, Justice Department Head 
Abliz Hoshur Attends Opening Ceremony and Makes Important Speech'' 
[2010 nian quanqu shaoshu minzu lushi peixunban zai wu kaike sifating 
tingchang abulizi wushou'er chuxi kaike yishi bing zuo zhongyao 
jianghua], 5 December 10.
    \46\ Ibid.
    \47\ ``Xinjiang Official Stresses Fighting Separatism, Says 198 
Sentenced for Deadly Riot,'' Xinhua, 7 March 10; ``198 People in 97 
Cases Already Tried and Sentenced in Urumqi `7-5' Incident'' [Wulumuqi 
``7-5'' shijian yi shenli xuanpan 97 an 198 ren], Xinhua, 7 March 10. 
See analysis in ``198 People in Xinjiang Reportedly Sentenced in Trials 
Marked by Lack of Transparency,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2.
    \48\ ``Xinjiang Official Stresses Fighting Separatism, Says 198 
Sentenced for Deadly Riot,'' Xinhua, 7 March 10.
    \49\ Han Xiaoyi, ``Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases 
of Crimes of Endangering State Security'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie 
weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People's Daily, 16 
January 11.
    \50\ ``Uyghur Journalist Handed Life Term,'' Radio Free Asia, 21 
December 10; ``Uyghur Student Sentenced to Death,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 
December 10; ``Uyghur Historian Given 7 Years,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 
March 11; Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``A City Ruled by Fear and 
Silence: Urumchi, Two Years On,'' 5 July 11, 8.
    \51\ ``China Handling July 5 Cases in Urgent Manner Within Court 
System'' [Xitay, sot mehkimisi saheside 5-iyul delolirini jiddiy bir 
terep qilmaqta], Radio Free Asia, 22 September 10.
    \52\ Han Xiaoyi, ``Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases 
of Endangering State Security Crimes'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai 
guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People's Daily, 16 January 11. 
For analysis and comparison with figures from previous years, see 
information that follows within text as well as ``Number of State 
Security Cases Tried in Xinjiang Decreases in 2010; Number of Longer 
Prison Sentences Increases,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 3 February 11.
    \53\ Han Xiaoyi, ``Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases 
of Endangering State Security Crimes'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai 
guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People's Daily, 16 January 11; 
Cao Zhiheng and Wang Dalin, ``Xinjiang Completed Trials Last Year in 
437 Cases of Endangering State Security'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie 
weihai guojia anquan fanzui anjian 437 qi], Xinhua, 15 January 10.
    \54\ In 2008, courts completed 268 cases of endangering state 
security. ``Xinjiang Courts in Total Complete Investigation of 268 
Endangering State Security Cases'' [Xinjiang fayuan gong shenjie weihai 
guojia anquan fanzui anjian 268 qi], Xinhua, 10 January 09. Between 
2003 and 2007, the XUAR court system had accepted an average of roughly 
150 ESS cases per year. The figure refers to cases accepted (shouli) 
rather than trials completed (shenjie), but suggests a lower number of 
completed ESS trials before 2008 and subsequent years. Tian Yu, ``Work 
Regarding Courts Nationwide Assisting Xinjiang Courts Is Launched'' 
[Quanguo fayuan duikou zhiyuan xinjiang fayuan gongzuo qidong], Xinhua, 
14 August 07. See also analysis in ``State Security Cases From Xinjiang 
Appear To Surge in 2008,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 1, 2009, 3.
    \55\ Han Xiaoyi, ``Xinjiang Last Year Completed Trials in 376 Cases 
of Endangering State Security Crimes'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai 
guojia anquan fanzui anjian 376 jian], People's Daily, 16 January 11.
    \56\ See further analysis in ``Number of State Security Cases Tried 
in Xinjiang Decreases in 2010; Number of Longer Prison Sentences 
Increases,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 February 
11.
    \57\ See CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 206-7, and the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2009-00448, 2009-
00449, 2010-00106, 2010-00238, and 2010-00253, for more information on 
these cases.
    \58\ For information on the regulations, see CECC, 2010 Annual 
Report, 10 October 10, 205, citing Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
Informatization Promotion Regulation [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu 
xinxihua cujin tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 
09, art. 40; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Ethnic 
Unity Education [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jiaoyu 
tiaoli], issued 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10; Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Comprehensive Management of 
Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili 
tiaoli], issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97, revised 29 
December 09, effective 1 February 10, art. 25.
    \59\ ``Uyghur Journalist Handed Life Term,'' Radio Free Asia, 21 
December 10; ``Translator and Reporter Muhemmetjan Abdulla Known To 
Have Been Sentenced to Life in Prison'' [Terjiman we muxbir muhemmetjan 
abdullaning muddetsiz qamaqqa hokum qilinghanliqi melum bolmaqta], 
Radio Free Asia, 20 December 10.
    \60\ ``Uyghur Historian Given 7 Years,'' Radio Free Asia, 6 March 
11; World Uyghur Congress, ``World Uyghur Congress Condemns 15-Year 
Sentence Handed Down to Uyghur Journalist and Web site Editor Gheyret 
Niyaz,'' 24 July 10.
    \61\ See CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 206-7, and the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database, records 2009-00448, 2009-
00449, 2010-00106, 2010-00238, and 2010-00253, for more information on 
these cases.
    \62\ ``Dissident Kazakh Writer Dies in Western China,'' Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 February 11; See also the Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database, record 2011-00173, on Kajikhumar Shabdan 
(citing Dui Hua Foundation information based on official Chinese 
sources).
    \63\ ``Travel Ban Extends to Family,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 February 
11; ``Uyghur Scholar, Family Held,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 December 10.
    \64\ Xinjiang Press and Publication Bureau, ``Raising `Eight Points 
of Work' for Making Focused Efforts in Latter Half of Year'' [Tichu 
xiabannian zhongdian zhuahao ``ba xiang gongzuo''], 5 July 10.
    \65\ Shi Qiaomei et al., ``Our Region Convenes `Sweep Away 
Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications' Work Video 
Teleconference'' [Wo qu zhaokai ``saohuang dafei'' gongzuo dianshi 
dianhuahui], Xinjiang Daily, 15 January 11.
    \66\ Yang Chen, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Transportation 
Department, `` `Turfan Transportation Management Bureau' Tracks Down 87 
Illegal Religious Publications'' [``Tulufan yunguanju'' chahuo 87 ben 
feifa zongjiao chubanwu], 22 February 11; Shi Qiaomei et al., ``Our 
Region Convenes `Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal 
Publications' Work Video Teleconference'' [Wo qu zhaokai ``saohuang 
dafei'' gongzuo dianshi dianhuahui], Xinjiang Daily, 15 January 11.
    \67\ See, e.g., ``Urumqi Announces `10 Big Sweep Away Pornography, 
Strike Down Illegal Publications Cases' '' [Wulumuqi gongbu 2010 nian 
``saohuang dafei shida anjian''], Tianshan Net, 10 February 11; 
``Directly Administered Areas in Ili Prefecture Stress Strengthening 
`Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications' and Cultural 
Market Supervision Work During `New Year' and `Chinese New Year' 
Period'' [Yili zhouzhi zhuzhong jiaqiang ``yuandan'' ``chunjie'' qijian 
``saohuang dafei'' he wenhua shichang jianguan gongzuo], Xinjiang 
Culture Net, 11 February 11; Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture 
People's Government, ``Bortala Prefecture Enlarges Strength of 
Inspections, Ensures `Big Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal 
Publications' Work Gets Down to the Substance'' [Bo zhou jiada jiancha 
lidu quebao ``saohuang dafei'' gongzuo luo dao shichu], 17 February 11; 
Fuyun County People's Government, ``Turaxun Township, Fuyun County, 
Vigorously Launches Activity To Investigate Illegal Religious 
Publications'' [Fuyun xian tu'erhong xiang dali kaizhan qingcha feifa 
zongjiao chubanwu huodong], reprinted in E'erqisi Net, 14 January 11. 
See analysis of these items in ``Xinjiang Authorities Target Religious 
and Political Publications in Censorship Campaigns,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 31 March 11.
    \68\ ``Crackdown Launched in Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 
December 10; ``Uyghurs Targeted Amidst Reform Call,'' Radio Free Asia, 
28 February 11.
    \69\ Cheng Lixin, ``Autonomous Regional Party Committee Standing 
Committee (Enlarged) Meeting Stresses Raising Recognition, Synthesizing 
Measures and Policies, and Ensuring Stability'' [Zizhiqu dangwei 
changwei (kuoda) huiyi qiangdiao tigao renshi zonghe shice quebao 
wending], Xinjiang Daily, 8 December 10.
    \70\ ``Zhang Chunxian: Use `5 Resolutes' To Propel Development and 
Stability'' [Zhang chunxian: yi ``wuge jiandingbuyi'' tuijin fazhan he 
wending], Tianshan Net, 7 August 11.
    \71\ Chen Zehua, ``Our Region Launches Special Operation To `Strike 
Hard Against Violent Terrorist Crimes' '' [Wo qu kaizhan ``yanli daji 
baoli kongbu fanzui'' zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Legal Daily, 
reprinted in Xinjiang Peace Net, 15 August 11.
    \72\ See examples that follow, as well as analysis in ``Authorities 
in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over Village Life,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 
3.
    \73\ Autonomous Region Definitions Concerning 23 Kinds of Illegal 
Religious Activity [Zizhiqu guanyu 23 zhong feifa zongjiao huodong de 
jieding] (undated, reprinted in, e.g., Chinggil County People's 
Government, 25 February 08), Nos. 3, 4, 5, 20. For mention of the 
document from the past year, see, e.g., Yengisar Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Bureau, ``Penetrate the Countryside for Grand Propaganda and 
Explanations, Ethnic Unity Enters People's Hearts, Yengisar County 
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau Launches `Grand Propagandizing and 
Explanation' Activity'' [Shenru xiangcun da xuanjiang minzu tuanjie jin 
minxin, yingjisha xian minzongju kaizhan ``da xuanjiang'' huodong], 
reprinted in Yengisar County People's Government, 21 March 11; Qaramay 
Dushanzi District Number 1 Middle School, ``2011 Plan for Launching 
`Year of Studying Law' Activity'' [2011 nian kaizhan ``xuefa nian'' 
huodong jihua], 11 March 11.
    \74\ See Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the 
Protection of Minors [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu weichengnianren baohu 
tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 09, arts. 34, 53, 
and analysis in ``New Regulation in Xinjiang Appears To Expand Controls 
Over Children's Religious Freedom (Includes Update),'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2 and ``Draft 
Regulation in Xinjiang Could Strengthen Legal Prohibitions Over 
Children's Freedom of Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 3.
    \75\ See Village Pledge System in this section for more information 
and ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over 
Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 
10 December 10, 3.
    \76\ Qiongbola Township People's Government, ``Qiongbola Township 
Blazes Trails in Model for Religious Management, Drives Ahead With New 
Ideas in Social Management'' [Qiongbola xiang chuangxin zongjiao guanli 
moshi, tuijin shehui guanli chuangxin], reprinted in Qapqal Xibe 
Autonomous County People's Government, 7 January 11.
    \77\ Toutunhe District People's Political Consultative Office, 
``Inspection Report Concerning Toutunhe District's Religious 
Personnel's Lifestyle Situation and Conditions for Playing a Positive 
Role in Strengthening Ethnic Unity and Safeguarding Stability'' [Guanyu 
dui toutunhe qu zongjiao renshi zai jiaqiang minzu tuanjie, weihu 
wending fangmian fahui zuoyong qingkuang ji shenghuo zhuangkuang de 
shicha baogao], reprinted in Toutunhe District People's Government, 2 
September 10.
    \78\ See, e.g., Jiashi County People's Government, ``Jiashi County 
Launches Food Hygiene and Safety Education and Training Work During the 
`Two Holidays' Period'' [Jiashi xian kaizhan ``liang jie'' qijian 
shipin weisheng anquan jiaoyu peixun gongzuo], 28 July 11; Bortala 
Mongol Autonomous Prefecture People's Government, ``Bortala 
Municipality Takes Four Measures To Soundly Launch Work on Management 
of Religious Affairs'' [Bole shi si cuo bingju zhashi kaizhan zongjiao 
shiwu guanli gongzuo], 20 July 11; Ruoqiang County People's Government, 
``Washsheri Township Convenes Forum Regarding Stability Work During 
Ramadan'' [Washixia xiang zhaokai guanyu zhaiyue qijian weiwen gongzuo 
zuotanhui], 29 July 11; Qiemo County People's Government, ``Tatirang 
Township Adopts Forum Method To Do Good Job of Religion Work'' 
[Tatirang xiang caiqu zuotanhui fangshi zuohao zongjiao gongzuo], 5 
August 11; ``Situation All-Around Tense in Uyghur Area During Ramadan 
Period'' [Ramzan mezgilide uyghur eli weziyiti omumyulu jiddiyleshken], 
Radio Free Asia, 28 July 11. For additional information on controls 
over Ramadan in recent years, see, e.g., ``Authorities Continue To 
Restrict Ramadan Observance in Xinjiang,'' CECC China Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 November 10, 3, and ``Religious Repression 
in Xinjiang Continues During Ramadan,'' CECC China Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 3.
    \79\ ``Father and Son Religious Personages Detained on Suspicion in 
Shihezi Are Given 3-Year Sentences'' [Shixenzide guman bilen tutqun 
qilinghan dada-bala diniy zatlargha 3 yilliqtin qamaq jazasi berilgen], 
Radio Free Asia, 22 April 11.
    \80\ For information on earlier campaigns, see ``Xinjiang 
Authorities Target Beards, Veils in Campaigns To Tighten Control Over 
Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 9 
November 10, 4-5, and ``Xinjiang Authorities Tighten Controls Over 
Muslim Women,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 
4 June 10, 2.
    \81\ See, e.g., All-China Women's Federation, ``10 Measures From 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Women's Federation Let Women of 
All Ethnicities All Reap Benefits'' [Xinjiang zizhiqu fulian shi xiang 
jucuo rang gezu funu pu shouhui], 7 March 11; Hoten District Women's 
Federation, ``Hoten District Women's Federation 2011 Work 
Arrangements'' [Hetian diqu fulian 2011 nian gongzuo anpai], reprinted 
in Hoten District People's Government, 27 January 11; Luntai County 
Women's Federation, ``Implementation Plan for Luntai County Women's 
Federation System's Launching of `Creating Advancement, Striving for 
Excellence' Activities'' [Guanyu zai luntai xian fulian xitong zhong 
kaizhan chuangxian zhengyou huodong de shishi fang'an], reprinted in 
Luntai County People's Government, 7 September 10; Turpan Municipality 
Leading Group Office for Creating Advancement, Striving for Excellence 
Activities, ``Implementation Plan for Turpan City Women's Federation 
System and Women of All Ethnicities' Deeply Launching of Creating 
Advancement, Striving for Excellence Activities'' [Guanyu zai tulufan 
shi fulian xitong he gezu funu zhong shenru kaizhan chuangxian zhengyou 
huodong de shishi fang'an], Turpan Party Construction Net, 6 January 
11.
    \82\ Hongqiao Residential District Office, ``Hongqiao Residential 
District Work System Two'' [Hongqiao jiedao gongzuo zhidu er], 
reprinted in Usu Municipal People's Government, 18 September 10.
    \83\ Paixianbaibazha Township People's Government, ``Implementation 
Plan for Paixianbaibazha Township's Launching of Special Rectification 
Operation To Attack Illegal Religious Activities'' 
[Paixianbaibazhaxiang kaizhan daji feifa zongjiao huodong zhuanxiang 
zhengzhi xingdong shishi fang'an], reprinted in Xinhe County People's 
Government, 27 November 10.
    \84\ Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Women's Federation, 
``Circular Concerning Printing and Distributing the `Autonomous 
Prefecture 2011 Women's Federation Propaganda Work Points' '' [Guanyu 
yinfa ``zizhizhou fulian 2011 nian xuanchuan gongzuo yaodian'' de 
tongzhi], 30 March 11; Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Women's 
Federation, ``Circular Concerning Printing and Distributing the 
`Autonomous Prefecture 2011 Women's Federation Propaganda Work Points' 
'' [Guanyu yinfa ``zizhizhou fulian 2011 nian xuanchuan gongzuo 
yaodian'' de tong zhi], 2 February 11; Paixianbaibazha Township 
People's Government, ``Implementation Plan for Paixianbaibazha 
Township's Launching of Special Rectification Operation To Attack 
Illegal Religious Activities'' [Paixianbaibazhaxiang kaizhan daji feifa 
zongjiao huodong zhuanxiang zhengzhi xingdong shishi fang'an], 
reprinted in Xinhe County People's Government, 27 November 10. For more 
information on oversight in recent years, see ``Xinjiang Authorities 
Train, Seek To Regulate Muslim Women Religious Figures,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2, and ``Xinjiang 
Authorities Tighten Controls Over Muslim Women,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \85\ In Chinese law, see, e.g., PRC Constitution, arts. 4, 121, and 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), issued 31 May 84, effective 1 
October 84, amended 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37. 2005 Implementing 
Provisions for the REAL affirm the freedom to use and develop minority 
languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting 
``bilingual'' education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council 
Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law 
[Guowuyuan shishi ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa'' 
ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art. 22. In 
international law, see, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 26, 
27.
    \86\ For more information on goals set following the forum, see 
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 208.
    \87\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Mid- to Long-Term 
Education Reform and Development Plan (2010-2020)'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er 
zizhiqu zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020 
nian)], issued 21 January 11, item 14; Jing Bo, ``Xinjiang Promulgates 
`Outline of Education Plan' '' [Xinjiang gongbu ``jiaoyu guihua 
gangyao''], Tianshan Net, 22 January 11 (noting date of issue of the 
reform plan). For more information, see analysis in ``Xinjiang 
Authorities Accelerate Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual 
Education,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.
    \88\ Ibid.
    \89\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Mid- to Long-Term 
Education Reform and Development Plan (2010-2020)'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er 
zizhiqu zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020 
nian)], issued 21 January 11, item 14; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 
October 08, 178-79.
    \90\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Mid- to Long-Term 
Education Reform and Development Plan (2010-2020)'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er 
zizhiqu zhongchangqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020 
nian)], issued 21 January 11, item 8.
    \91\ Ibid., item 15.
    \92\ ``Uyghur-Language Classes Preserved at Middle School in 
Dadamtu Township, Ghulja'' [Ghulja dadamtu yeziliq ottura mektipide 
uyghur tilidiki siniplar saqlinip qaldi], Radio Free Asia, 1 December 
10. For additional information on dissatisfaction over bilingual 
education in recent years, see Uyghur Human Rights Project, ``Uyghur 
Language Under Attack: The Myth of `Bilingual' Education in the 
People's Republic of China,'' 24 July 07.
    \93\ Jing Bo, ``Xinjiang Publicly Recruits 5109 Elementary and 
Secondary School Bilingual Teachers'' [Xinjiang gongkai zhaopin 5109 
ming zhongxiaoxue shuangyu jiaoshi], Tianshan Net, 10 October 10. For 
more information, see analysis in ``Xinjiang Authorities Accelerate 
Promotion of Mandarin-Focused Bilingual Education,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 10 May 11.
    \94\ Li Min, ``Xinjiang Publicly Recruits Over 10,000 Elementary 
and Secondary School Teachers'' [Xinjiang 2011 nian mianxiang shehui 
zhaopin 1 wan yu ming zhongxiaoxue jiaoshi], Tianshan Net, 30 May 11; 
``Xinjiang To Recruit 9,200 Bilingual Teachers,'' Xinhua, 31 May 11.
    \95\ See, e.g., Fan Yingli and Aynur, ``Zhejiang Aid to Xinjiang 
Will Train Over 5000 Ethnic Minority `Bilingual' Teachers Within 5 
Years'' [Zhejiang yuanjiang wunian nei jiang peixun 5000 yu ming 
shaoshu minzu ``shuangyu'' jiaoshi], Xinhua, reprinted in Tianshan Net, 
16 November 10; Xinjiang Education Department, ``The Four Provinces and 
Municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Jiangsu Hold 
Cooperation Meeting in Nanjing on Work for Training Backbone Ethnic 
Minority Bilingual Teachers'' [Jing jin hu su si shengshi zai nanjing 
zhaokai xinjiang shaoshu minzu shuangyu gugan jiaoshi peixun gongzuo 
xiezuo hui], 9 December 10.
    \96\ ``Laid Off Profs Reject Deal,'' Radio Free Asia, 27 September 
11; ``Teachers Fired Over Mandarin Ability,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 
September 11; ``Two Female Teachers in Qaghliq Spent 35 Days in Prison 
for Petitioning to Higher Levels'' [Qaghiliqta ikki neper ayal 
oqutquchi yuqirigha erz qilghanliqi uchun 35 kun qamaqta yatqan], Radio 
Free Asia, 4 April 11. See also ``Cuts Expected for Uyghur Teachers,'' 
Radio Free Asia, 16 November 10; ``Uyghur Teachers in Toqsun Again 
Under Harsh Pressure'' [Toqsundiki uyghur oqutquchilar yenimu qattiq 
besim astida], Radio Free Asia, 9 December 10.
    \97\ Xinjiang Education Department, Circular Concerning Completing 
Pilot Work To Offer Ethnic Minority Language Arts Classes in Compulsory 
Education-Level Schools Teaching in Mandarin [Guanyu zuohao hanyu 
shouke yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuexiao kaishe minzu yuwen kecheng shidian 
gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 30 August 10.
    \98\ Xinjiang Education Department, Guiding Opinion on Autonomous 
Region's Work To Strengthen Training in Minority Languages for Newly 
Hired Preschool Teachers Who Are Native Mandarin Speakers [Zizhiqu 
xinpin muyu wei hanyu de xueqian shuangyu jiaoshi min yuyan qianghua 
peixun gongzuo zhidao yijian], issued 30 August 10.
    \99\ See CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 209-10, for 
information on reward programs in earlier years.
    \100\ ``Rural Special Award System in 3 Southern Xinjiang Districts 
and Prefecture Is Again Enlarged'' [Xinjiang nanjiang san dizhou 
nongcun teshu jiangli zhengce zaidu kuomian], Tianshan Net, 17 March 
11.
    \101\ Zepu County Population and Family Planning Committee, ``Rural 
Family Planning Household Special Award System for 3 Xinjiang Districts 
and Prefecture'' [Nanjiang san dizhou nongcun jihua shengyu jiating 
teshu jiangli zhidu], reprinted in Zepu Net, 4 September 08.
    \102\ ``National Population and Family Planning Commission Starts 
Series of Operations To Support Xinjiang'' [Guojia renkou jishengwei 
qidong zhiyuan xinjiang xilie xingdong], China Population News, 
reprinted in National Population and Family Planning Commission, 3 
November 09. For additional analysis, see ``Authorities Begin New 
Incentive Initiative To Continue Population Control in Xinjiang,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2.
    \103\ See, e.g., Li Yanmin, ``3.21 Million From State Goes to 2252 
Ethnic Minority Households in Xinjiang's Altay'' [Guojia 321 wan huiji 
xinjiang aletai 2252 hu shaoshu minzu jiating], Xinhua, 19 November 10; 
Zhang Yanhong and Wang Yizhi, ``Nileke County Townships and Towns 
Launch Family Planning Special Awards-Granting Ceremony'' [Nileke xian 
xiangzhen fafang jihua shengyu jiating teshu jiangjin fafang yishi], 
Xinjiang News Net, 1 December 10; ``Seman Towsnhip, Kashgar, Convenes 
[Meeting] for Farmers and Herders To Receive Family Planning 
`Certificates of Honor' '' [Kashi shi seman xiang zhaokai nongmumin 
lingqu jihua shengyu ``guangrongzheng''], Kashgar Today, 8 April 11.
    \104\ For a broad overview and analysis of the program, see 
``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To Exert Control Over 
Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 
10 December 10, 3.
    \105\ ``Seek Realistic Results, Blaze Trails, Form Great 
Achievements, and Cure and Exhibit New Look'' [Qiushi chuangxin jie 
shuoguo puzhi bingju zhan xinmao], Fazhi Xinjiang, 25 August 10.
    \106\ See analysis in ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System 
To Exert Control Over Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
    \107\ For general information, see, e.g., ``Seek Realistic Results, 
Blaze Trails, Form Great Achievements, and Cure and Exhibit New Look'' 
[Qiushi chuangxin jie shuoguo puzhi bingju zhan xinmao], Fazhi 
Xinjiang, 25 August 10; Du Jianxi, ``Take Implementing `Village Rules' 
as the Handhold, Promote Firm Progress for Work To Have `Rule of Law' 
Enter the Countryside'' [Yi luoshi ``cungui minyue'' wei ``zhuashou'' 
tuidong ``fazhi jin xiangcun'' gongzuo zhashi jinzhan], Fazhi Xinjiang, 
6 April 08. For analysis see ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge 
System To Exert Control Over Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update; No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
    \108\ PRC Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa], issued and effective 4 November 
98, amended 28 October 10, art. 27.
    \109\ See, e.g., analysis in ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge 
System To Exert Control Over Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
    \110\ See Du Jianxi, ``Take Implementing `Village Rules' as the 
Handhold, Promote Firm Progress for Work To Have `Rule of Law' Enter 
the Countryside'' [Yi luoshi ``cungui minyue'' wei ``zhuashou'' tuidong 
``fazhi jin xiangcun'' gongzuo zhashi jinzhan], Fazhi Xinjiang, 6 April 
08. For analysis see ``Authorities in Xinjiang Use Pledge System To 
Exert Control Over Village Life,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 3.
    \111\ ``Promises To Respect the Rules in Hoten District, Xinjiang: 
Villagers Manage Themselves (1)'' [Xinjiang hetian diqu shouyue 
chengnuo: cunmin ziji guan ziji (1)], Legal Daily, reprinted in China 
Finance Net, 8 April 08.
    \112\ Hoten District Leading Group on Governing District in 
Accordance to Law et al., Opinion Concerning Implementation of 
Promotion of Village ``Codes of Conduct'' in Rural Areas in 2007, To 
Govern Villages in Accordance With Law'' [Guanyu 2007 nian zai nongcun 
tuixing ``cungui minyue'' yifa zhicun de shishi yijian], 22 January 07, 
Item 1(1).
    \113\ See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 4; PRC Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa], issued 31 
May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01, art. 9; PRC 
Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodongfa], issued 5 July 94, 
effective 1 January 95, art. 12; PRC Employment Promotion Law [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo jiuye cujinfa], issued 30 August 07, effective 1 
January 08, art. 28. See also legal analysis in ``Governments in 
Xinjiang Continue To Sponsor, Sanction Job Recruitment That 
Discriminates Against Ethnic Minorities,'' CECC China Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 11 March 09, 3.
    \114\ ``Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Occupational Disease 
Hospital Recruiting Information'' [Xinjiang wewu'er zizhiqu zhiyebing 
yiyuan zhaopin xinxi], reprinted in Graduate School of Lanzhou 
University, 26 November 10. See also ``Job Discrimination Against 
Ethnic Minorities Continues in Xinjiang,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 31 March 11.
    \115\ ``List of Civil Servant and Staff Positions for 2010 Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region Public Recruiting Through Exam for County-
Level Discipline Inspection and Supervision Organs'' [2010 nian 
xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu mianxiang shehui gongkai kaolu xianji jijian 
jiancha jiguan gongwuyuan, gongzuo renyuan zhiweibiao], reprinted in 
Xinjiang Human Resources Testing Center, 16 September 10.
    \116\ Bingtuan Personnel Bureau, ``Summary of Posts for 2011 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Public Recruiting of 
Functionaries'' [2011 xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan mianxiang 
shehui zhaolu gongwuyuan zhiwei huizongbiao], reprinted in Bingtuan 
Personnel Testing Authority, 6 August 11. For information on hiring in 
previous years, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2010 
Annual Report, 10 October 10, 211; Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 264; Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 107.
    \117\ Autonomous Region Party Committee and Autonomous Region 
People's Government Opinion Concerning Employment Promotion Work 
[Zizhiqu dangwei, zizhiqu renmin zhengfu guanyu cujin jiuye gongzuo de 
yijian], issued 11 September 09, art. 2(2).
    \118\ Ibid., art. 1(5).
    \119\ Congressional-Executive Commission on China searches for 
information did not find specific reports from the past year on 
localities taking steps to adhere to the opinion and promote the hiring 
of ethnic minorities.
    \120\ Opinion of Five Departments Including Autonomous Region 
Organization Department Concerning Organizing and Implementing ``Plan 
for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang 
Provinces and Municipalities for Training'' [Zizhiqu dangwei zuzhibu 
deng wu bumen guanyu zuzhi shishi ``shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao 
biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua'' de yijian], 9 
January 11, items 1, 2. See analysis in ``Job Discrimination Against 
Ethnic Minorities Continues in Xinjiang,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 31 March 11.
    \121\ Opinion of Five Departments Including Autonomous Region 
Organization Department Concerning Organizing and Implementing ``Plan 
for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang 
Provinces and Municipalities for Training'' [Zizhiqu dangwei zuzhibu 
deng wu bumen guanyu zuzhi shishi ``shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao 
biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua'' de yijian], 9 
January 11, item 5(2) (referring to trainees taking up set posts); He 
Jun and Mao Yong, ``Xinjiang Starts `Plan for Ethnic Minority Standard 
College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang Provinces and Municipalities 
for Training' '' [Xinjiang qidong ``shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao 
biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua''], Xinhua, 25 
March 11.
    \122\ Opinion of Five Departments Including Autonomous Region 
Organization Department Concerning Organizing and Implementing ``Plan 
for Ethnic Minority Standard College Graduates To Go to Aid-Xinjiang 
Provinces and Municipalities for Training'' [Zizhiqu dangwei zuzhibu 
deng wu bumen guanyu zuzhi shishi ``shaoshu minzu putong gaoxiao 
biyesheng fu duikou yuanjiang shengshi peiyang jihua'' de yijian], 9 
January 11, item 1.
    \123\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 179; CECC, 2009 
Annual Report, 10 October 09, 264-66; CECC 2010 Annual Report, 10 
October 10, 211-12.
    \124\ See, e.g., ``Nuer Bekri Refutes the Allegation That Women of 
Uyghur Ethnic Group `Are Forced To Work in the Interior of the 
Country,' '' Xinhua, 18 July 09 (Open Source Center, 20 July 09); Zhang 
Jie, ``Fifth: Realm for Labor Export Is Broad'' [Zhi wu: laowu shuchu 
tiandi kuan], Xinjiang Daily, 21 September 10; Kashgar District 
People's Government, ``Earned Income in Jiashi From 7 Years of Labor 
Export Exceeds 1 Billion'' [Jiashi 7 nian laowu shuchu chuangshou chao 
10 yi], 13 May 11; Mao Yong and Zhao Chunhui, ``Isolated Xinjiang 
Ethnic Minority Rural Workers March Toward Openness'' [Xinjiang shaoshu 
minzu nongmingong cong fengbi maixiang kaifang], Xinhua, reprinted in 
China Ethnicities News, 25 January 10.
    \125\ Zhang Jie, ``Fifth: Realm for Labor Export Is Broad'' [Zhi 
wu: laowu shuchu tiandi kuan], Xinjiang Daily, 21 September 10.
    \126\ Ibid.
    \127\ ``Strive To Stand on One's Feet, Establish Good Image for 
People From Xinjiang-Third Sidelight in Autonomous Region Party and 
Government Representatives Delegation Visit to Aid-Xinjiang Provinces 
and Municipalities'' [Ziqiang zili shuli xinjiangren lianghao xingxiang 
zizhiqu dangzheng daibiaotuan zoufang duikou yuanjiang shengshi ceji 
san], Xinjiang TV, reprinted in Xinhua, 4 May 11.
    \128\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Lacks Workers, Provinces [Elsewhere in 
China] With Large Labor Export Suffer Hardships'' [Xinjiang quegong 
neidi laowu shuchu da sheng fannan], Yaxin, reprinted in Sina, 18 
February 11; ``Will Students in Nine Years of Compulsory Education 
Still Pick Cotton? '' [Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng hai zai shi mianhua 
ma?], reprinted in Xinhe County People's Government, 18 September 10; 
``Second Agricultural Division 19th Regiment's Legal Office Strengthens 
Legal and Safety Education During Period Students Pick Cotton'' [Nong 
er shi ershijiu tuan sifasuo jiaqiang xuesheng shi mian qijian fazhi 
anquan jiaoyu], Xinjiang Agricultural Information Portal, 4 October 10.
    \129\ The International Labor Organization's Convention 138, which 
China has ratified, sets the minimum age for child labor at 15, with 
limited exceptions. Although the Convention excludes work done as part 
of general, vocational, or technical education, such work must be an 
``integral part'' of a course of study or training course. Article 15 
of China's Labor Law forbids the employment of minors under 16. Within 
this legal framework prohibiting child labor, Article 13 of the 
Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor and Article 58 of the 
Education Law together allow for ``education practice labor'' and work-
study programs for children under the age of 16, but such programs must 
not harm children's health or safety or adversely affect their normal 
studies. A nationwide regulation on work-study programs for elementary 
and secondary school students outlines the general terms of such 
programs, which it says are meant to cultivate morals, contribute to 
production outputs, and improve conditions for schools. ILO Convention 
(No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 26 June 
73, arts. 2, 6; PRC Labor Law [Zhonghua renmin heguo laodongfa], issued 
5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, art. 15; Provisions on Prohibiting 
the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 
October 02, effective 1 December 02, art. 13; PRC Education Law 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiaoyufa], issued 18 March 95, effective 1 
September 95, art. 58. Also see generally Regulation Regarding 
Temporary Work on Work-Study Labor for Secondary and Elementary Schools 
[Quanguo zhongxiaoxue qingongjianxue zanxing gongzuo tiaoli], issued 
and effective 20 February 83, arts. 1, 3.
    \130\ See Opinion on Strengthening the Management of Secondary and 
Elementary School Students' Work-Study Service Activities [Guanyu 
jiaqiang zhongxiaoxue qingongjianxue laowu huodong guanli de yijian], 
issued 8 May 06, art. 3, and ``Xinjiang Government Continues 
Controversial `Work-Study' Program,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, November 2006, 11.
    \131\ He Ping, ``Starting This Fall, Xinjiang Students Attending 
Compulsory Education Will Not Pick Cotton Again'' [Jin qiu qi xinjiang 
jiu nian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng buzai shi mianhua], Tianshan Net, 19 
September 08. See also analysis in ``Xinjiang Work-Study Programs 
Continue; Cotton-Picking Activities Limited,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, December 2008, 4.
    \132\ See, e.g., ``Will Students in Nine Years of Compulsory 
Education Still Pick Cotton? '' [Jiunian yiwu jiaoyu xuesheng hai zai 
shi mianhua ma?], reprinted in Xinhe County People's Government, 18 
September 10; and ``Second Agricultural Division 19th Regiment's Legal 
Office Strengthens Legal and Safety Education During Period Students 
Pick Cotton'' [Nong er shi ershijiu tuan sifasuo jiaqiang xuesheng shi 
mian qijian fazhi anquan jiaoyu], Xinjiang Agricultural Information 
Portal, 4 October 10, cited in ``Underage Students Continue To Pick 
Cotton in Xinjiang Work-Study Program,'' CECC China Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, No. 9, 10 December 10, 4.
    \133\ Ibid.
    \134\ For general background on the project, see ``Demolition of 
Kashgar's Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, 
Population Resettlement,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 3, 2009, 2.
    \135\ Pan Ying, ``Old City Transformation Project in Kashgar, 
Xinjiang, Steadily Moves Ahead, City Culture Is Inherited'' [Xinjiang 
kashi laocheng gaizao xiangmu pingwen tuijin chengshi wenhua deyi 
chuancheng], Xinhua, 9 July 11.
    \136\ Cai Muyuan, ``Restoring Old Kashgar for a Safer Future,'' 
China Daily, 26 October 10.
    \137\ Ben Ochieng and Wang Yanan, ``Interview: Inscribed Chinese 
Intangible Elements Have Viability: UNESCO Official,'' Xinhua, 17 
November 10; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, ``Intangible Heritage Lists,'' last visited 20 June 11.
    \138\ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, ``Songs, Dances and Traditional Know-How From 29 
Countries Proposed for Inscription on UNESCO Lists of Intangible 
Heritage,'' 11 September 10.
    \139\ See information on the Chinese government description of the 
meshrep in Rachel Harris, UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization, ``Report on the Examination of Nomination Files No. 00304 
for Inscription on the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of 
Urgent Safeguarding in 2010,'' November 2010, and Cultural Department 
of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, ``Clarification to the Report on 
the Examination of Nomination Files No. 00304 for Inscription on the 
List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding in 
2010,'' last visited 20 June 11. See also analysis in ``Draft of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage Law Limits Research Activities; Xinjiang 
Case Study Shows Politicization of Heritage (Updated),'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 16 February 11.
    \140\ Jay Dautcher, ``Public Health and Social Pathologies in 
Xinjiang,'' in Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick 
Starr (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 285-86.
    \141\ For more information on the cases, see CECC, 2010 Annual 
Report, 10 October 10, 212-13.
    \142\ Zhou Yingfeng and Cui Qingxin, ``Our Country Busts Major 
Terrorist Group Case, Details on Public Security Bureau Announcement'' 
[Woguo pohuo zhongda kongbu zuzhi an gong'anbu gongbu xiangqing], 
Xinhua, 24 June 10.
    \143\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ``The 
Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on Their Application,'' December 1996, 
II(i)(10). See also Monette Zard, ``Exclusion, Terrorism and the 
Refugee Convention,'' Forced Migration Review, June 2002.
    \144\ ``Uyghur Prisoner Denied Medical Care,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 
March 11.
    \145\ Ibid.; ``Laos Deports Seven Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 
December 10; ``Health Status of Prisoner Memtili Rozi, Returned From 
Cambodia, Worries Family'' [Kambodzhadin qayturulghan tutqun memtili 
rozining salametlik ehwali ailisidikilerni jiddiy endishige salmaqta], 
Radio Free Asia, 13 December 10.
    \146\ ``Kazakhstan Deports Uyghur Teacher,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 
June 11; Uyghur American Association, ``The World Must Demand 
Accountability for Deported Uyghur Refugee Ershidin Israel,'' 8 June 
11.
    \147\ ``Uyghur in Chinese Custody? '' Radio Free Asia, 31 May 11; 
Amnesty International, ``Document-China: Forcibly Returned Asylum 
Seeker at Risk,'' 16 June 11.
    \148\ ``Fabricated Evidence Used in Deportation,'' Radio Free Asia, 
15 June 11; ``Kazakhstan Deports Uyghur Teacher,'' Radio Free Asia, 2 
June 11; ``Uyghur in Chinese Custody? '' Radio Free Asia, 31 May 11.
    \149\ ``Fabricated Evidence Used in Deportation,'' Radio Free Asia, 
15 June 11.
    \150\ Human Rights Watch, ``China/Thailand: Account for Uighur Man 
Turned Over to Chinese Officials,'' 10 August 11; ``Uyghur Held in 
Thailand,'' Radio Free Asia, 8 August 08.
    \151\ ``Pakistan Deports Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 10 August 11.
    \152\ See, e.g., Sean Yoong, ``5 Uighur Chinese Held in Malaysia 
Risk Deportation,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Google, 22 August 
11; ``Malaysia Deports Uyghurs,'' Radio Free Asia, 23 August 11.
    \153\ UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, art. 3(1).
    \154\ UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by 
the UN General Assembly resolution 429(V) of 14 December 50, art. 
33(1). For a UNHCR statement noting that the principle of refoulement 
applies to asylum seekers as well as refugees and stating that the 
return of the Uyghur asylum seekers from Cambodia violates this 
principle, see ``UN Refugee Agency Deplores Forced Return of Uighur 
Asylum-Seekers From Cambodia,'' UN News Centre, 21 December 09.
    \155\ For more information, see CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 
October 08, 176-77; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 261-62; 
CECC, 2010 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 212-13.
    Notes to Section V--Tibet

    \1\ The Dalai Lama has made a statement on the anniversary of the 
March 10, 1959, Lhasa uprising every year that he has lived in exile, 
beginning in 1960. The statements for the years 1961 to 2011 are 
available on the Web site of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
    \2\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Statement of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 52nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National 
Uprising Day,'' 10 March 11. For information about the Middle Way 
Approach, see Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``His Holiness's 
Middle Way Approach for Resolving the Issue of Tibet,'' last visited 3 
June 08.
    \3\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Statement of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 52nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National 
Uprising Day,'' 10 March 11.
    \4\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Message of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Fourteenth Assembly of the Tibetan 
People's Deputies,'' 11 March 11. (The U.S. Government does not 
recognize the ``Central Tibetan Administration'' (Tibetan ``government-
in-exile'') as a government. See, e.g., ``Report on Tibet Negotiations, 
March 2009-February 2010,'' reprinted in International Campaign for 
Tibet, last visited 21 March 11. The copy posted on the ICT Web site 
does not include the name of the issuing authority. The Report is 
mandated by Sections 611 (Tibetan Policy Act of 2002) and 613(b) of the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003, which direct the President 
to submit such a report annually to Congress. The Department of State 
customarily prepares the report. The report states, ``Since the U.S. 
Government does not recognize Tibet as an independent state, the United 
States does not conduct official diplomatic relations with the Tibetan 
`government-in-exile' in Dharamsala, India.'')
    \5\ Phurbu Thinley, ``Dalai Lama Asks Tibetans To Embrace 
Democratic Change, Rejects Parliament's Resolution,'' Phayul, 19 March 
11. The Dalai Lama reportedly said, ``If [relinquishing political 
power] happens, like the first, second, third and fourth Dalai Lamas I 
can concentrate more effectively on [the] spiritual role.''
    \6\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Statement of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 52nd Anniversary of the Tibetan National 
Uprising Day,'' 10 March 11.
    \7\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``Message of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Fourteenth Assembly of the Tibetan 
People's Deputies,'' 11 March 11. The Dalai Lama stated in his prepared 
remarks, ``Since the Fifth Dalai Lama's founding of the Ganden Phodrang 
[Gaden Phodrang] Government of Tibet in 1642, successive Dalai Lamas 
have been both the spiritual and temporal leaders of Tibet. . . . The 
essence of a democratic system is, in short, the assumption of 
political responsibility by elected leaders for the popular good. In 
order for our process of democratization to be complete, the time has 
come for me to devolve my formal authority to such an elected 
leadership.'' Phurbu Thinley, ``Dalai Lama Asks Tibetans To Embrace 
Democratic Change, Rejects Parliament's Resolution,'' Phayul, 19 March 
11. According to the article, the Dalai Lama said, ``So as the 14th 
Dalai Lama of Tibet, I take pride and freedom to voluntarily relinquish 
the political power wielded by the institution of the Dalai Lama (Gaden 
Phodrang).''
    \8\ ``Press Conference on Central Govt's Contacts With Dalai Lama 
(Text),'' China Daily, 11 February 10. According to the interview 
transcript, United Front Work Department Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun said, 
``[The Dalai Lama] is not a religious figure; instead he is the head of 
a separatist political group, who leads a government-in-exile with an 
illegal constitution, a constitution which describes that the 14th 
Dalai Lama is the supreme head both politically and relationally of 
this political group.''
    \9\ The Dalai Lama: What He Means for Tibetans Today, Roundtable of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 13 July 11, Written 
Statement Submitted by Maria Otero, Under Secretary of State for 
Democracy and Global Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and Member, 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
    \10\ Ibid.
    \11\ ``Zhang Qingli: Overall Situation in Tibet Stable,'' Xinhua, 7 
March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 March 11); ``Qiangba 
Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should Apply Himself to the 
Study of Buddhism and Stand Aloof From Worldly Affairs,'' China News 
Agency, 16 March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 16 March 11).
    \12\ See, e.g., ``Government Work Report-Delivered by Tibet 
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the 
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011 
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). Chairman of the TAR 
Government Pema Choling (Baima Chilin) urged the TAR People's Congress 
to ``speed up the establishment of a long-standing mechanism on 
monastery management, to protect the normal order of religion.'' Huang 
Zhiwu, ``Zhu Weiqun Leads a Working Group To Conduct an Investigation 
in Our Region'' [Zhu weiqun lu gongzuozu zai wo qu diaoyan], Tibet 
Daily, 7 April 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 11 April 11). 
According to the report, Zhu Weiqun, Executive Deputy Head of the 
Communist Party's United Front Work Department, said that it is 
``necessary to extensively and thoroughly conduct legal publicity and 
education as well as management and safeguard the normal order of 
religious activities.''
    \13\ China Directory 2010, ed. Radiopress (Kawasaki: RP Printing, 
2009), 17.
    \14\ Huang Zhiwu, ``Zhu Weiqun Leads a Working Group To Conduct an 
Investigation in Our Region'' [Zhu weiqun lu gongzuozu zai wo qu 
diaoyan], Tibet Daily, 7 April 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 11 
April 11).
    \15\ Ibid.
    \16\ ``Zhang Qingli: Overall Situation in Tibet Stable,'' Xinhua, 7 
March 11 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 March 11).
    \17\ ``Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should 
Apply Himself to the Study of Buddhism and Stand Aloof From Worldly 
Affairs,'' China News Agency, 16 March 11 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 16 March 11).
    \18\ Zhao Yinan, ``Govt Leadership Changes Continue,'' China Daily, 
30 August 11 (includes chart titled ``Major Leadership Reshuffle: 
Eleven Officials Have Changed Positions in Recent Weeks''); ``Chen 
Quanguo Becomes New Party Chief of Tibet,'' Xinhua, 25 August 11, 
reprinted in China Daily; ``Chen Quanguo, New Secretary of the Tibet 
Autonomous Region Party Committee, Says He Will Take Root in Tibet and 
Dedicate His Wisdom and Efforts,'' China News Agency, 25 August 11 
(translated in Open Source Center, 28 August 11).
    \19\ ``[Tibetan Autonomous] Region Party Committee Holds Special 
Report Meeting on Maintaining the Advanced Nature of Party Members, 
Emphasizes Insisting on Unwaveringly Grasping Development, Taking a 
Clear-Cut Stand on Grasping Stability, and Working Hard To Establish a 
Harmonious Tibet'' [Qu dangwei juxing baochi gongchan dang yuan 
xianjinxing zhuanti baogao hui qiangdiao jianding buyi de zhua fazhan, 
qizhi xianming de zhua wending, nuli jianshe hexie xizang], Tibet 
Daily, 7 April 05 (translated in Open Source Center, 12 May 05); 
``Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo],'' China Vitae, last visited 12 
April 11 (Executive Deputy Secretary of TAR Party Committee since 
2003).
    \20\ ``Qiangba Puncog [Xiangba Pingcuo]: The Dalai Lama Should 
Apply Himself to the Study of Buddhism and Stand Aloof From Worldly 
Affairs,'' China News Agency, 16 March 11 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 16 March 11).
    \21\ Ibid.
    \22\ Amitabh Pal, ``The Dalai Lama Interview,'' Progressive, 
January 2006. The Dalai Lama said, ``If the Tibetan people want another 
reincarnation, then logically while we're outside, the successor should 
be someone who can carry out this task, which has not yet been 
accomplished by the previous Dalai Lama. That means that he must come 
in a free country.''
    \23\ Evan Osnos, ``The Next Incarnation,'' New Yorker, 4 October 
10. ``[The Dalai Lama] has taken to musing aloud that he might be 
reincarnated as a woman, or that Tibetans might vote on whether the 
institution of the Dalai Lama should continue at all. Or, he says, he 
might select his own reincarnation while he is still alive . . . which 
would give him the chance to train a successor . . . . Only one thing 
is certain, he says: his successor will be found outside Tibet.''
    \24\ Sui-Lee Wee and Ben Blanchard, ``China Says Dalai Lama Has To 
Reincarnate,'' Reuters, 7 March 11.
    \25\ Ravi Nessman, ``Dalai Lama Calls Chinese Insistence on Picking 
His Religious Successor `a Disgrace,' '' Associated Press, 1 July 11, 
reprinted in Yahoo!.
    \26\ There are a total of 10 prefectural-level areas of ethnic 
Tibetan autonomy located in a total of four provinces in China: Qinghai 
province (Haibei [Tsojang] Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Hainan 
[Tsolho] TAP, Haixi [Tsonub] Mongol and Tibetan AP, Huangnan [Malho] 
TAP, Guoluo [Golog] TAP, and Yushu [Yulshul] TAP); Gansu province 
(Gannan [Kanlho] TAP); Sichuan province (Ganzi [Kardze] TAP and Aba 
[Ngaba] Tibetan and Qiang AP); and Yunnan province (Diqing [Dechen] 
TAP). For additional information on the Tibetan autonomous prefectures, 
see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 22-24.
    \27\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36 (``Citizens of the 
People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. . . .'').
    \28\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09; 
Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09; Haibei Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei 
zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, 
approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10; Guoluo Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo 
zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, 
issued and effective 30 September 10; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi 
mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 
March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10.
    \29\ Ma Yong, ``New Changes at Qinghai's Tibetan Buddhist 
Temples,'' Outlook Weekly, 29 November 10 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 11 December 10).
    \30\ Ibid. In or after May 2008 (the report does not provide a 
date), ``[t]he province therefore drew up and distributed `Opinions on 
Guiding the Strengthening and Improving of the Social Management of 
Temples in Accordance With the Law.''
    \31\ Ibid.
    \32\ Based on Commission monitoring, as of August 2011, the first 
regulatory measures known to take effect were in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan 
and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan province, reported and 
effective on July 24, 2009; the most recent regulatory measures known 
to take effect were in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province, effective 
September 30, 2010, and posted publicly on November 19, 2010. Aba 
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Circular on Temporary Measures 
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zhou renmin zhengfu 
guanyu yinfa aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli 
zanxing banfa de tongzhi], Find Law Net, 24 July 09; ``Qinghai Province 
`Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations' Approved'' [Qinghai sheng ``guoluo zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwi tiaoli'' huo pi], China Tibet News, 19 November 
10.
    \33\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09.
    \34\ Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09.
    \35\ Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 
March 10.
    \36\ Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10.
    \37\ Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and 
effective 3 June 10.
    \38\ Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures 
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09. All of the regulatory measures listed are ``regulations'' 
(tiaoli) except for the Aba ``measures'' (banfa).
    \39\ Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management 
of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, 
issued and effective 1 September 09.
    \40\ ``Qinghai People's Congress Standing Committee 2010 
Legislation Program'' [Qinghai sheng renda changweihui 2010 nian lifa 
jihua], 14 December 09, reprinted in Qinghai Province People's Congress 
Standing Committee, 3 March 10. According to the legislation plan, the 
Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Yushu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwi tiaoli] had 
been reported for approval.
    \41\ Sichuan Province People's Congress Standing Committee 2011 
Legislation Plan [Sichuan sheng renda changweihui 2011 nian lifa 
jihua], 21 February 11, reprinted in Sichuan Province People's Congress 
Standing Committee, 31 March 11. According to the legislation plan, the 
Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Ganzi zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwi tiaoli] had 
been reported for approval.
    \42\ The area of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (approximately 
1.2 million square kilometers), the 10 TAPs (approximately 1.02 million 
square kilometers), and 2 Tibetan autonomous counties (TACs) 
(approximately 0.019 million square kilometers) totals approximately 
2.24 million square kilometers. The 10 TAPs make up approximately 46 
percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total area. According to China's 2000 census 
data, the Tibetan population of the TAR (approximately 2.43 million 
persons), the 10 TAPs (approximately 2.47 million persons), and the 2 
TACs (approximately 0.11 million persons) totaled approximately 5.01 
million Tibetans. The Tibetan population of the 10 TAPs made up 
approximately 49 percent of the TAR/TAP/TAC total Tibetan population as 
of 2000. Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology 
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics et al., Tabulation on 
Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Ethnic 
Publishing House, 2003), Tables 10-1, 10-4; Steven Marshall and Susette 
Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: 
Development With Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: Self-
published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, citing multiple Chinese sources. 
Table 7 provides the following information. Tibet Autonomous Region 
(1.2 million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai 
province: Haibei [Tsojang] TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077 
square miles); Hainan [Tsolho] TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075 
square miles); Haixi [Tsonub] Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square 
kilometers, or 125,786 square miles); Huangnan [Malho] TAP (17,901 
square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles; Guoluo [Golog] TAP (78,444 
square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles); and Yushu [Yulshul] TAP 
(197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province: 
Gannan [Kanlho] TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles) 
and Tianzhu [Pari] TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square 
miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi [Kardze] TAP (153,870 square 
kilometers, or 59,409 square miles); Aba [Ngaba] Tibetan and Qiang AP 
(86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square miles); and Muli [Mili] TAC 
(11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square miles). Yunnan province: 
Diqing [Dechen] TAP (23,870 square kilometers, or 9,216 square miles). 
The Table provides areas in square kilometers; conversion to square 
miles uses the formula provided on the Web site of the U.S. Geological 
Survey: 1 square kilometer = 0.3861 square miles. For more information 
on the Tibetan autonomous areas of China, see CECC, Special Topic 
Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 22-24.
    \43\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management 
Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao 
guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10.
    \44\ For detailed information on the regulations and the articles 
under which various controls are imposed, see ``Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11.
    \45\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management 
Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao 
guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10.
    \46\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09.
    \47\ Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09.
    \48\ Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures 
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09.
    \49\ Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management 
of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, 
issued and effective 1 September 09.
    \50\ For more detailed information on provisions of the regulatory 
measures, see ``Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 10 March 11, Table 2 titled Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulatory 
Measures: Selected Areas of Requirement, Prohibition, Control.
    \51\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
art. 4; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 4, 
20(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 4, 16(2); Aba 
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on 
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09, arts. 3, 8; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on 
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 3.
    \52\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
arts. 4, 10; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
arts. 4, 20(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 16(1) 
(no reference to socialism); Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 
Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
[Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing 
banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, art. 17; Diqing Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist 
Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli 
tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 
1 September 09, art. 3 (no reference to socialism).
    \53\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
arts. 4, 10(1); Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
arts. 4, 11(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 4, 
11(1); Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures 
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09, arts. 17, 21; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation 
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 3.
    \54\ ``Deepen the Struggle Against Separatist Activities and Make 
Further Efforts To Do Our Religious Work Well,'' Tibet Daily, 15 
February 96 (translated in Open Source Center, 15 February 96). The 
article states, ``The Buddhist association organizations formed in 
accordance with the constitution of the Buddhist Association of China 
are mass religious organizations composed of patriotic religious people 
which serve as a bridge and tie between the government and the broad 
masses of religious believers.'' Tibet Autonomous Region Temporary 
Measures on the Management of Religious Affairs [Xizangzizhiqu zongjiao 
shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued 9 December 91, effective 20 
December 91, art. 15. The measures state, ``The Buddhist Association is 
a . . . bridge for the Party and government to unite and educate 
personages from religious circles and the believing masses. Its 
effectiveness shall be vigorously brought into play under the 
administrative leadership of the government's religious affairs 
department.''
    \55\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
art. 16; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
arts. 26-27; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 26-
27; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on 
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09, arts. 19-20.
    \56\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
art. 16; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures 
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09, art. 10; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on 
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 10.
    \57\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
art. 4; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 
11(1); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 11(1); Aba 
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on 
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09, arts. 16, 17 (responsibility over DMC).
    \58\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
arts. 8, 10, 11; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 
September 09, arts. 10, 19-20; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 
09, arts. 12-16; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary 
Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and 
effective 24 July 09, arts. 16-18; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, 
approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, arts. 7-9.
    \59\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
arts. 35-36 (implied); Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 
September 09, arts. 7, 10(3), 20(7), 22; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and 
effective 31 July 09, arts. 6-8, 10(4), 18; Aba Tibetan and Qiang 
Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 4, 16, 18 
(no mention of village committee supervision of DMC); Diqing Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist 
Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli 
tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 
1 September 09, arts. 5, 7.
    \60\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the 
Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism 
[Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], passed 13 July 07, 
issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07. For more information on 
the measures, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV--Tibet: Special 
Focus for 2007, 196-197; ``New Legal Measures Assert Unprecedented 
Control Over Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 22 August 07.
    \61\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
art. 20; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
art. 10(4); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 7(6); 
Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on 
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09, art. 26; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulations on 
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 18.
    \62\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
arts. 15-17; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary 
Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and 
effective 24 July 09, art. 10; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, 
approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 10.
    \63\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
arts. 9, 16-18, 21, 22, 25, 28-30, 33, 35, 40, 42; Huangnan Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan 
zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, 
issued and effective 24 September 09, art. 7; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and 
effective 31 July 09, arts. 3, 8; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 
Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
[Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing 
banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 4, 6; Diqing Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist 
Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli 
tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 
1 September 09, arts. 5-6.
    \64\ See, e.g., State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
arts. 22, 28-29; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 
September 09, art. 31; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture 
Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba 
zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], 
issued and effective 24 July 09, art. 23; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries 
[Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 
14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, 
art. 14.
    \65\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management 
Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao 
guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, arts. 
22, 28-29. For more information on monastic travel requirements under 
previous regulatory measures, see Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing 
Measures for the ``Regulations on Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures) 
[Xizang zizhiqu shishi ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)], 
issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07, arts. 41, 43; Tibet 
Autonomous Region Temporary Measures on the Management of Religious 
Affairs, issued by the Standing Committee of the Tibet Autonomous 
Region People's Government on December 9, 1991, art. 9; CECC, 2007 
Annual Report, 10 October 10, 194-195.
    \66\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
arts. 7(2), 22(1-3), 23(6), 37; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 
09, arts. 8(1), 9, 13, 19, 21(3), 24(1,3); Haibei Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, 
approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 11(1), 
12, 26, 39, 43, 45(3); Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao 
shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 
10, arts. 6, 7, 12(3), 15, 16, 18-19, 31; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi 
mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 
March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, arts. 8, 
9, 13(2), 15, 17(2), 22, 25.
    \67\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
art. 7(2); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 8(1); 
Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 
March 10, art. 11(1); Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, 
issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 8.
    \68\ The statement is based on information obtained on the Web site 
of Harry's World Atlas in January 2011 and represented as current in 
early 2007.
    \69\ Five of the seven measures for which text was available online 
as of August 2011 provide for a greater role for village committees 
than the TAR Implementing Measures for the Regulations on Religious 
Affairs issued in September 2006; two prefectural measures (Diqing and 
Haixi) contain language similar to the TAR measures. See, e.g., Tibet 
Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ``Regulations on 
Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu shishi ``zongjiao 
shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 
January 07, art. 7; State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao 
simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, 
arts. 8, 11(2-3), 36; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 
September 09, arts. 19, 22-23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 
09, arts. 19-21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and 
effective 22 March 10, arts. 12, 43-45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued 
and effective 30 September 10, arts. 18, 31; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi 
mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 
March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 9; 
Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on 
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09, arts. 20, 21(2); Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, 
approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 5(2).
    \70\ Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures 
on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 
July 09, arts. 20, 21(2).
    \71\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management 
Measures for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao 
guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 November 10, art. 8,
    \72\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
arts. 22-23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 18-
21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 
March 10, arts. 11(3), 35, 42(9), 43-45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued 
and effective 30 September 10, arts. 7(5), 17-19; Haixi Mongol and 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 
8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 
17.
    \73\ CECC Staff Analysis.
    \74\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
art. 22; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 19; Haibei 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 
January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, 
art. 43; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 18; 
Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 
June 10, art. 17.
    \75\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
art. 23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 20-21; Haibei 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 
January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, 
arts. 44-45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, 
arts. 17, 19 (do not list specific responsibilities); Haixi Mongol and 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 
8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17 
(does not list specific responsibilities).
    \76\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
art. 23(6); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 21(3); 
Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 
March 10, art. 44(5); Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao 
shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 
10, art. 19; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and 
effective 3 June 10, art. 17 (does not detail reporting requirements).
    \77\ Commission Staff Analysis. For more detailed information on 
provisions that provide criminal or administrative punishment in the 
prefectural regulatory measures, see ``Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11, Table 2 
titled Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulatory Measures: Selected Areas of 
Requirement, Prohibition, Control. According to the table, ``DMC 
members, teachers, trulkus, monks and nuns may face administrative or 
criminal punishment for activity characterized as . . . .''
    \78\ Commission Staff Analysis. See Hainan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, issued and 
effective 31 July 09, arts. 39-45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 
September 10, arts. 45-50; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture 
Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba 
zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], 
issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 34-41.
    \79\ Commission Staff Analysis. See Haibei Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, 
approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 46-50; 
Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 
June 10, art. 27 (no chapter on ``legal liability'' (falu zeren)); 
Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of 
Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao 
siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued 
and effective 1 September 09, arts. 24-26, 28 (no chapter on ``legal 
liability'' (falu zeren)).
    \80\ Commission Staff Analysis. See Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued 
and effective 24 September 09, arts. 43-47.
    \81\ The Commission's Political Prisoner Database (PPD) data on 
Tibetan political detention and imprisonment during the period 
beginning on March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete. 
``Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefectures,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
10 March 11, Table 3. Based on PPD information as of February 11, 2011, 
the following numbers of Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and teachers 
were detained on or after March 10, 2008, in prefectures with more 
extensive descriptions of punishable offenses--Hainan TAP (12), Guoluo 
TAP (18), and Aba T&QAP (57); in a prefecture with mid-range 
extensiveness of descriptions of punishable offenses--Huangnan TAP (3); 
and in prefectures with less extensive descriptions of punishable 
offenses--Haibei TAP (0), Haixi M&TAP (0), and Diqing TAP (0).
    \82\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
art. 48; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 
March 10, art. 51; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao 
shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 
10, art. 51; Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on 
Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 
July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 27.
    \83\ PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe 
guo xingzheng fuyi fa], issued 29 April 99, effective 1 October 99.
    \84\ PRC Administrative Litigation Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo 
xingzheng sufa fa], issued 4 April 89, effective 1 October 90.
    \85\ Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, 
art. 48; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 
March 10, art. 51; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao 
shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 
10, art. 51.
    \86\ As of September 1, 2011, the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database (PPD) contained 576 records of political or religious 
detention of Tibetans in 2008; 220 records in 2009; 113 records in 
2010; and 225 records in 2011. PPD information on Tibetan political 
detentions in and after March 2008 is certain to be far from complete. 
The increase in 2011 is due mainly to the coerced removal of monks from 
Kirti Monastery in April 2011 for de facto detention at undisclosed 
sites for ``legal education.'' For additional information on the Kirti 
detentions, see ``After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and `Education' 
for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 17 August 11.
    \87\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``4 Tibetans Arrested Over 2 Books in Ngaba, 
Author Escapes,'' Phayul, 6 March 11.
    \88\ Ibid.
    \89\ Hongyuan county is also known by the Tibetan names Kakhog, 
Khyungchu, and Mewa.
    \90\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``4 Tibetans Arrested Over 2 Books in Ngaba, 
Author Escapes,'' Phayul, 6 March 11; Cornelius Lundsgaard and Pema 
Tso, ``China Arrests Four Tibetans Including Two Writers Over 2 
Books,'' Tibet Post, 19 March 11.
    \91\ ``Police Crack Down on Banned Songs,'' Radio Free Asia, 25 
February 11.
    \92\ Ibid. The RFA report did not identify the location(s) in the 
TAR where the detentions took place or identify any of the Tibetans 
detained.
    \93\ ``Tibetan Writers Sentenced,'' Radio Free Asia, 31 December 
10.
    \94\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Three More Tibetan Writers 
Sentenced to Prison,'' 21 January 11; ``Tibetan Writers Sentenced,'' 
Radio Free Asia, 31 December 10; International Campaign for Tibet, 
``Three Tibetan Writers on Trial Await Verdict,'' 5 November 10; 
``Tibetan Writers Tried as `Splittists,' '' Radio Free Asia, 5 November 
10.
    \95\ ``Tibetan Author of Banned Video Released, Slapped 
Conditions,'' Phayul, 18 October 10 (released on October 15, 2010, on 
conditions described in a manner that indicates bail following 
detention on July 27, 2010); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, ``Takmig Arrested Again,'' 4 February 11 (redetention on 
December 16, 2010).
    \96\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``Takmig 
Arrested Again,'' 4 February 11 (redetention on December 16, 2010).
    \97\ ``Tibetan Author of Banned Video Released, Slapped 
Conditions,'' Phayul, 18 October 10 (release October 15, 2010, on 
conditions described in a manner that indicate bail following detention 
on July 27, 2010); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ``One 
More Tibetan Intellectual Arrested'' 22 August 10 (2,500 VCDs); 
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Monk Makes Video Appeal for 
Return of Dalai Lama and End to Repression in Tibet,'' 28 August 09 
(translation of VCD statement).
    \98\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Tibetan Monk Writer From Palbar Arrested in 
Lhasa,'' Phayul, 11 January 11 (refers to events as ``debates''); Y.C. 
Dhardhowa, ``China Detains a Tibetan Writer in Lhasa, Capital of 
Tibet,'' Tibet Post, 11 January 11 (refers to events as 
``conferences'').
    \99\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Tibetan Monk Writer From Palbar Arrested in 
Lhasa,'' Phayul, 11 January 11.
    \100\ ``A Lhasa Singer's Newly Published CD Accused of Political 
Problems, Arrest Warrant Issued'' [Yi lasa geshou chuban xin guangdie 
beikong she zheng zao tongji], Boxun, 24 September 10. The Boxun report 
cites a Voice of Tibet broadcast (likely the same date or one day 
earlier) that describes the police activity, including the issue of the 
arrest warrant (jubu ling) and banning of the CD as taking place ``in 
recent days.''
    \101\ Ibid.
    \102\ Ibid.
    \103\ Ibid.
    \104\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years 
Since Bloody Crackdown,'' Phayul, 16 March 11.
    \105\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Monk Immolates Himself; 
Major Protests at Tibetan Monastery Violently Suppressed,'' 16 March 
11; Kalsang Rinchen, ``Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years Since 
Bloody Crackdown,'' Phayul, 16 March 11; ``After Monk's Suicide: 
Coerced Removal and `Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.
    \106\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Chinese Authorities 
Confirm Death of Monk After Self-Immolation; Military Crackdown at 
Kirti,'' 17 March 11.
    \107\ Ibid.; ``Protest Monk Dies,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 March 11; 
Kalsang Rinchen, ``Monk Who Set Ablaze Self Dead, 7 Kirti Monks 
Released, Several Still Held,'' 17 March 11.
    \108\ ``Monks Face New Restrictions,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 March 11 
(``On [March 21] . . . a program of political reeducation called 
`Patriotic Religion' was launched . . .''); Kalsang Rinchen, ``3 Youth 
Among Arrested as China Goes on Arrest Drive in Ngaba County,'' Phayul, 
24 March 11 (``the patriotic reeducation campaign at Ngaba Kirti 
monastery that started on Monday [March 21] is underway . . .''); 
International Campaign for Tibet, ``Protests, Tensions Escalate in 
Ngaba Following Self-Immolation of Monk: Kirti Monastery Under 
Lockdown,'' 11 April 11 (``a rigorous `patriotic education' campaign is 
being enforced''); ``After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and 
`Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.
    \109\ ``Kirti Monks Forcibly Removed,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 April 
11 (``Local Tibetans . . . heard that the detained monks were then 
taken to [Wenchuan (Lunggu), Mao (Maowun), and Li (Tashiling) counties 
in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture]''); Kalsang 
Rinchen, ``2 Beaten to Death in Ngaba, 300 Kirti Monks Arrested,'' 
Phayul, 22 April 11; International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Elderly 
Tibetans Killed as Hundreds of Monks Detained From Kirti; Crackdown 
Deepens,'' 22 April 11; ``After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and 
`Education' for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,'' Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11.
    \110\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Two Elderly Tibetans 
Killed as Hundreds of Monks Detained From Kirti; Crackdown Deepens,'' 
22 April 11 (``[people] had their arms and legs broken''; ``The two 
people who died . . . were Dongko (male) . . . aged 60, and 65-year old 
Sherkyi (female).''); ``Kirti Monks Forcibly Removed,'' Radio Free 
Asia, 22 April 11 (``Chinese armed police then attacked the crowd, 
beating some and gagging others . . .; A 60-year-old man named Donkho . 
. . and a 65-year-old woman named Sherkyi . . . were killed, and others 
suffered broken arms and legs in the attack.''); International Campaign 
for Tibet, ``Ngaba Students Protest Crackdown, Authorities Respond; New 
Information on Deaths of Tibetans Who Tried To Protect Monks,'' 9 May 
11; ``After Monk's Suicide: Coerced Removal and `Education' for Monks; 
Possible Murder Charges,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 
17 August 11.
    \111\ ``1st Ld-Writethru: Tibetan Monk Jailed 11 Years For Murder 
in Self-Immolation Case,'' Xinhua, 29 August 11, reprinted in China 
Daily. According to the report, on August 29, 2011, the Ma'erkang 
[Barkham] County People's Court sentenced Kirti monk ``Drongdru'' to 11 
years' imprisonment ``because he hid the injured monk and prevented 
emergency treatment.'' ``Two Tibetan Monks Sentenced in Murder Case,'' 
Xinhua, 31 August 11, reprinted in China Daily. According to the 
report, on August 30, 2011, the Ma'erkang [Barkham] County People's 
Court sentenced Kirti monks ``Tsering Tenzin'' and ``Tenchum'' to 13 
years' and 10 years' imprisonment respectively. PRC Criminal Law 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 
97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 232: ``Whoever intentionally commits homicide shall be 
sentenced to death, life imprisonment or fixed-term imprisonment of not 
less than 10 years; if the circumstances are relatively minor, he shall 
be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years 
but not more than 10 years.''
    \112\ ``Tibet Protest March Attacked,'' Radio Free Asia, 16 March 
11. According to an RFA source, ``Chinese police and security people 
present in the area immediately came to the scene and kicked and beat 
him as they extinguished the flames. Local Tibetans and Kirti monks 
came to his rescue and took Phuntsog back to the monastery.'' ``Ngaba 
Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years Since Bloody Crackdown,'' Phayul, 
16 March 11. According to the report, ``As the police were trying to 
take him away in a waiting police van scores of Tibetans rushed to the 
scene and protected Phuntsok.'' International Campaign for Tibet, 
``Protests, Tensions Escalate in Ngaba Following Self-Immolation of 
Monk: Kirti Monastery Under Lockdown,'' 11 April 11. According to the 
ICT report, ``At that point, Kirti monks intervened and sheltered him 
at the monastery before ensuring he received medical treatment at 
hospital, . . . .''
    \113\ Free Tibet Campaign, ``Monk Dies After Setting Himself on 
Fire in Protest in Tibet,'' 15 August 11 (``Nyitso Monastery''); 
``Tibetan Monk Sets Himself Ablaze,'' Radio Free Asia, 15 August 11 
(``Nyatso Monastery''); ``Monk Sets Himself on Fire in SW China,'' 
Xinhua, 15 August 11, reprinted in China Internet Information Center.
    \114\ Accurate, comprehensive, and independently verified 
information on the views of Tibetans living in China is not available.
    \115\ Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology 
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics et al., Tabulation on 
Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Ethnic 
Publishing House, 2003). Based on 2000 census data, 87.2 percent of 
Tibetans were classified as ``rural'' population: Table 1-2 shows the 
total Tibetan population in 2000 as 5,416,021; Table 1-2a shows the 
``city'' population of Tibetans in 2000 as 221,355; Table 1-2b shows 
the ``town'' population of Tibetans in 2000 as 473,467; Table 1-2c 
shows the ``rural'' population of Tibetans in 2000 as 4,721,199. Based 
on information in Table 1-5, the percentage of rural Tibetans could be 
even higher: Of the total 5,416,021 Tibetan population, 5,373,339 
Tibetans were classified as either ``agricultural'' (4,792,676) or 
``non-agricultural'' (580,663). Based on those figures, the 4,792,676 
Tibetans classified as ``agricultural'' made up 88.5 percent of the 
5,416,021 total Tibetan population.
    \116\ For previous Commission reporting addressing the issues of 
Tibetan literacy and the status of the Tibetan language, see, e.g., 
CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 202; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 
11 October 05, 108-9; Teaching and Learning Tibetan: The Role of the 
Tibetan Language in Tibet's Future, Staff Roundtable of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 7 April 03, Testimony of 
Nicolas Tournadre, Associate Professor of Linguistics, University of 
Paris 8, Paris; Testimony of David Germano, Professor of Tibetan and 
Buddhist Studies, University of Virginia; Testimony of Losang Rabgey, 
Commonwealth Scholar and Ph.D. Candidate, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London.
    \117\ China's Constitution and the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law 
provide nominal protection for the use of minority languages. See, 
e.g., PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 
March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 4, 121; PRC Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law (REAL) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa], 
issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 
February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37. The State Council Provisions on 
Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law affirm the freedom to 
use and develop minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use 
of Mandarin by promoting ``bilingual'' education and bilingual teaching 
staff. State Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law [Guowuyuan shishi ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu 
zizhifa'' ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art. 
22.
    \118\ ``It Is in the Fundamental Interests of the Tibetan People in 
Our Province To Strengthen and Reform `Bilingual' Education,'' Qinghai 
Daily, 29 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 3 November 10); 
``NW China Province Clarifies Purpose of Bilingual Education Reform,'' 
Xinhua, 23 October 10; Xue Jun, ``Provincial Party Committee Convenes 
Telephone and Videoconference of Leading Cadres Province Wide, Qiang 
Wei Delivers Important Speech'' [Sheng wei zhaokai quansheng lingdao 
ganbu dianshi dianhua huiyi qiangwei zuo zhongyao jianghua], Qinghai 
Daily, 28 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 November 10); 
Zhi Zhenpu, ``Qinghai Province Party Secretary Qiang Wei: Make `Bi-
lingual' Education a Livelihood Project'' [Qinghai sheng wei shuji 
qiang wei: ba ``shuang yu'' jiaoyu zuowei minsheng gongcheng], People's 
Daily, 30 September 10, reprinted in Phoenix Net.
    \119\ ``Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the 
Spirit of the Province-Wide Conference on Education'' [Lingdao ganbu 
xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen zuotanhui zhaokai], 
Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 
November 10) (ethnic languages are for use in ``one's home location'' 
and in ``courses of study to carry ethnic culture forward''; Chinese 
language is for use in ``public places''; non-ethnic languages (e.g., 
Chinese, English) are for ``scientific learning such as mathematics, 
physics, and chemistry''); ``Qinghai Provincial Department of Education 
Leader Explains `Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for 
Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020)' '' [Qinghai sheng 
jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu ``qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he 
fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020)''], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 
10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10) (the role of 
Chinese language: ``adhere to mainly teaching with the state's standard 
spoken and written language [Mandarin]''; role of ethnic language is 
not identified: ``learn spoken and written ethnic languages'').
    \120\ ``Students Protest Language Change,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 
October 10 (October 19 protest in Tongren (Rebgong), capital of 
Huangnan (Malho) TAP, involved students from six secondary- and 
tertiary-level schools; estimates ranged from 1,000 to 7,000 students); 
``Tibet Students Protests Spread,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 October 10 
(October 20 protests included ``more than 2,000'' middle school 
students in Zeku (Tsekhog), Huangnan TAP, and a total of about 6,000 
secondary- and tertiary-level students in Gonghe (Chabcha), capital of 
Hainan (Tsolho) TAP); Barbara Demick, ``Tibetan Student Protests Reach 
Beijing,'' Los Angeles Times, 23 October 10 (200 to 300 students 
protested on October 22 at the Central University for Minorities in 
Beijing); ``Language Protests Spread to Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 
October 10 (``some 400'' Tibetan students protested on October 22 at 
the National Minorities University in Beijing); ``20 Tibetan Students 
Detained, Protests Over Language Continue in Tibet,'' Phayul, 25 
October 10 (``thousands'' of students reportedly protested on Sunday, 
October 24, in the seat of Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan TAP; the 
report also mentions student protest in the days prior to the report in 
Guide (Trika) county, Hainan TAP, and in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai 
province).
    \121\ ``Opinions on Mid- and Long-Term Reform of the Use of 
Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language in Qinghai Province'' [Guanyu 
qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige wenti de yijian], 
Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November 
10). ``The Qinghai Education Department and [Director] Wang Yubo openly 
restricted the freedom of study, use, and development of ethnic 
minority languages in schools, which totally violates the Constitution, 
the [REAL], . . . the Education Law, and the Law for the State's 
Commonly Used Language.'' See also PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law 
[Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, 
effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01.
    \122\ CECC Staff Analysis. Official reports acknowledged the 
protests but did not allege planning or organization. Participation of 
large numbers of students across a wide area in the protests without 
planning or organization would depend on widespread student 
predisposition to join protests. Such predisposition would depend on a 
significant level of dissatisfaction.
    \123\ CECC Staff Analysis. Based on the relative consistency of 
government and Party policy on Tibetan education as well as on the 
relative consistency of the Tibetan people's wish to maintain their 
language and culture, teachers' and students' views in Qinghai province 
are likely to be similar to such views in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
and Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces.
    \124\ In Qinghai province, Tibetan-language primary and middle 
schools are located in five Tibetan autonomous prefectures (Haibei 
(Tsojang), Hainan (Tsolho), Huangnan (Malho), Guoluo (Golog), and Yushu 
(Yulshul)), and in one Mongol and Tibetan autonomous prefecture (Haixi 
(Tsonub)).
    \125\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Teachers Write 
Petition in Support of Tibetan Language; Fears for Students After 
Detentions,'' 26 October 10. According to the article, the training 
took place in Tongren (Rebgong), the capital of Huangnan (Malho) 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture.
    \126\ See Jia Xiaoyun, ``Qinghai Provincial Department of Education 
Leader Explains `Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for 
Educational Reform and Development (2010-2020)' '' [Qinghai sheng 
jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu ``Qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he 
fazhan guihua gangyao (2010-2020)''], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 
10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10).
    \127\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Tibetan Teachers Write 
Petition in Support of Tibetan Language; Fears for Students After 
Detentions,'' 26 October 10.
    \128\ Ibid.
    \129\ ``Students Protest Language Change,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 
October 10 (the six schools in Tongren were the First Nationalities 
Middle School, the Tongren County Yifu Nationalities Middle School, the 
Tongren District Residential School, the Tongren Modern Medicine 
College, the Huangnan National Teacher Training Institute, and the 
Huangnan Nationalities Middle School); Free Tibet Campaign, ``Students 
Protest for Language Rights,'' 22 October 10.
    \130\ ``Students Protest Language Change,'' Radio Free Asia, 19 
October 10.
    \131\ Ibid.
    \132\ Free Tibet Campaign, ``Students Protest for Language 
Rights,'' 22 October 10. The article provided a translation of the 
apparently Chinese-language text message: ``Yesterday, the Ministry of 
Education decided that, Tibetan language centered education system 
should be canceled [in] all the schools in Tibetan areas. The Tibetan 
language above primary school is set as an optional subject. Tibetan 
students are protesting for their mother-tongue in the Tibetan areas in 
Qinghai and others. For the sake of saving the Tibetan mother-tongue, 
please pass the message to each other.''
    \133\ Zhi Zhenpu, ``Qinghai Province Party Secretary Qiang Wei: 
Make `Bi-lingual' Education a Livelihood Project'' [Qinghai sheng wei 
shuji qiang wei: ba ``shuang yu'' jiaoyu zuowei minsheng gongcheng], 
People's Daily, 30 September 10, reprinted in Phoenix Net.
    \134\ ``Tibet Student Protests Spread,'' Radio Free Asia, 20 
October 10 (October 20 protests included ``more than 2,000'' middle 
school students in Zeku (Tsekhog), Huangnan TAP; a total of about 6,000 
secondary- and tertiary-level students in Gonghe (Chabcha), capital of 
Hainan (Tsolho) TAP); Barbara Demick, ``Tibetan Student Protests Reach 
Beijing,'' Los Angeles Times, 23 October 10 (200 to 300 students 
protested at Beijing's Central University for Minorities); ``Language 
Protests Spread to Beijing,'' Radio Free Asia, 22 October 10 (``some 
400'' Tibetan students protested at the Beijing National Minorities 
University); ``20 Tibetan Students Detained, Protests Over Language 
Continue in Tibet,'' Phayul, 25 October 10 (``thousands'' of students 
reportedly protested on Sunday, October 24, in the seat of Jianza 
(Chentsa) county, Huangnan TAP; the report also mentions student 
protest in the days prior to the report in Guide (Trika) county, Hainan 
TAP, and in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province); ``Opinions on Mid- 
and Long-Term Reform of the Use of Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language 
in Qinghai Province'' [Guanyu qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong 
changqi gaige wenti de yijian], Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in 
Open Source Center, 7 November 10) (``demonstrations staged by the 
primary and secondary schools of the four autonomous prefectures of 
Huangnan, Hainan, Guoluo, and Haibei since 19 October'').
    \135\ ``NW China Province Clarifies Purpose of Bilingual Education 
Reform,'' Xinhua, 22 October 10.
    \136\ ``Qinghai Provincial Department of Education Leader Explains 
`Qinghai Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Educational Reform and 
Development (2010-2020)' '' [Qinghai sheng jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu 
``Qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao 
(2010-2020)''], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 10 (translated in Open 
Source Center, 6 November 10).
    \137\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo 
minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 
and effective 28 February 01.
    \138\ ``Opinions on Mid- and Long-Term Reform of the Use of 
Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language in Qinghai Province'' [Guanyu 
qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige wenti de yijian], 
Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November 
10). The letter raised issues including: ``[Director Wang Yubo of the 
Qinghai Province Department of Education] bypassed the setting up of 
the Chinese language course and also altered the meaning of `the right 
to receive education in their own ethnic minority language' proposed in 
the Outline for National Education Plan''; ``The Qinghai Education 
Department and Wang Yubo openly restricted the freedom of study, use, 
and development of ethnic minority languages in schools, which totally 
violates the Constitution, the [REAL], the Education Law, and the Law 
for the State's Commonly Used Language''; ``[Furthermore, since the 
[REAL] is still in effect in the PRC, the change in use of language in 
the schools practicing regional autonomy made by an administrative 
department without authorization constitutes a deliberate challenge and 
infringement of the state's basic laws and a serious contempt for the 
authority of state laws''; and, ``Unless the National People's Congress 
[NPC] adopts any amendment to the [REAL], an administrative department, 
which is actually a provincial level administrative organ, has no right 
whatsoever to go beyond the principles of the basic law and make a 
decision in violation of the law.''
    \139\ Ibid. The letter states that the authors ``submitted'' it to 
national-, provincial-, and prefectural-level Communist Party, 
legislative, government, and consultative entities including the 
following: Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD), 
National People's Congress Religious Committee, State Ethnic Affairs 
Commission, Ministry of Education, Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Ethnic Affairs Committee, Qinghai 
Communist Party Standing Committee, Qinghai People's Congress, Qinghai 
People's Government, Qinghai CPPCC, Qinghai UFWD, Qinghai Religious 
Affairs Department, and Party committees, people's governments, 
people's congresses, CPPCCs, and education departments in each of 
Qinghai's six autonomous prefectures.
    \140\ Ibid. The letter stated, ``Under the current situation and 
conditions, a government functional department, without approval of a 
higher level state organ, has gone so far as to make a decision and 
reform in violation of the Constitution and law. We would like to 
appeal.''
    \141\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo 
minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended 
and effective 28 February 01, art. 20: ``If a resolution, decision, 
order, or instruction of a state agency at a higher level does not suit 
the actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area, an autonomous 
agency of the area may report for the approval of that higher level 
state agency to either implement it with certain alterations or cease 
implementing it altogether. That higher level state agency must give 
its decision within sixty days of receiving the report.'' For 
information on implementation of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, 
see, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 
25-28; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV--Tibet: Special Focus for 
2007, 10 October 07, 187-91; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, Section III--
Monitoring Compliance With Human Rights--Special Focus for 2005: 
China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law, 11 October 05, 13-23.
    \142\ ``Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the 
Spirit of the Province-Wide Conference on Education'' [Lingdao ganbu 
xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen zuotanhui zhaokai], 
Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 
November 10). The article listed Qinghai province institutional 
participants: ``Education Department, Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Commission, Civil Affairs Department, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry 
Department, Poverty Eradication Bureau, Cultural Federation, Academy of 
Social Sciences, Science Association, Red Cross, and Qinghai University 
for Nationalities.'' For information on a similar conference on October 
23, 2010, see ``The Party and the Government Will Never Force Any 
Student To Abandon Their Mother Tongue'' [Dang he zhengfu juebu hui 
qiangpo renhe xuesheng fangqi muyu], Qinghai News Agency, 25 October 10 
(translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 10).
    \143\ ``Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the 
Spirit of the Province-Wide Conference on Education'' [Lingdao ganbu 
xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen zuotanhui zhaokai], 
Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 
November 10). According to Gao, ``The realm of language learning is to 
be able to speak the common language of one's home location, to be able 
to speak the national language in public places, and to be able to 
speak an international language on international occasions.''
    \144\ Ibid.
    \145\ Xue Jun, ``Provincial Party Committee Convenes Telephone and 
Videoconference of Leading Cadres Province Wide, Qiang Wei Delivers 
Important Speech'' [Sheng wei zhaokai quansheng lingdao ganbu dianshi 
dianhua huiyi qiangwei zuo zhongyao jianghua], Qinghai Daily, 28 
October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 November 10).
    \146\ Ibid.
    \147\ Ibid. The videoconference was convened by the Qinghai 
Communist Party Committee and included ``leading cadres throughout the 
province.''
    \148\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet 
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the 
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011 
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). The report 
emphasizes adherence to policy as the basis for success: ``In face of 
constant disruptions and sabotages by the Dalai clique, all kinds of 
frequent natural disasters, retrenchment of the macroeconomic 
environment, and other challenges, under the leadership of the party 
Central Committee and the State Council, the people of various ethnic 
groups across the autonomous region have united as strongly as a 
fortress, overcome difficulties, and accumulated valuable experience in 
expanding demand, promoting growth, creating welfare for the masses, 
and maintaining stability.''
    \149\ Hu Yongqi and Dachiog, ``Tibet's Achievements Celebrated,'' 
China Daily, 28 March 11. According to the report, the Tibet Autonomous 
Region increased an average of 12.4 percent per year from 2005 to 2010.
    \150\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet 
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the 
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011 
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). ``The farmers and 
herdsmen'[s] per capita net income has remained at a two-digit increase 
for eight consecutive years and topped 4,000 yuan in 2010, to stand at 
4,138.7 yuan, up by 99.2 percent over 2005. The city and town 
residents' per capita disposable income has reached 14,980 yuan, an 
increase of 78.1 percent over 2005.''
    \151\ Zhao Yinan, ``Minister Prepares To Solve Ethnic Challenges,'' 
China Daily, 18 November 10. ``From 2001 to 2010, the central 
government allocated more than 310 billion yuan (US$46.7 billion) to 
the Tibet autonomous region, . . . . Of every 100 yuan the Tibet 
regional government spends, 90 yuan comes from the central 
government.''
    \152\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 9. ``Mineral resources, 
waters, forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches and 
other natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole 
people, with the exception of the forests, mountains, grassland, 
unreclaimed land and beaches that are owned by collectives in 
accordance with the law.''
    \153\ ``Tibet Autonomous Region Reserves Most Chromium and Cuprum 
in China,'' China Tibet Information Center, reprinted in China Tibet 
Online, 6 December 10.
    \154\ Ibid.; Zhao Yinan, ``Minister Prepares To Solve Ethnic 
Challenges,'' China Daily, 18 November 10 (``[from] 2001 to 2010, the 
central government allocated more than 310 billion yuan (US$46.7 
billion) to the Tibet autonomous region'').
    \155\ Reports did not provide information about the type of mining. 
``Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Arrested by Authorities for Opposing 
Mine'' [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang zao zhonggong duda he 
jubu], Voice of Tibet, 11 February 11, reprinted in Boxun, 11 February 
11 (protests and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and 
detention on December 18); ``15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-
mining Protests in Shigatse,'' Phayul, 14 February 11.
    \156\ ``Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Arrested by Authorities for 
Opposing Mine'' [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang zao zhonggong duda 
he jubu], Voice of Tibet, reprinted in Boxun, 11 February 11 (protests 
and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and detention on 
December 18); ``15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-mining Protests 
in Shigatse,'' Phayul, 14 February 11. See the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database for more information on the cases.
    \157\ ``Villagers Block Work on Dam,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 
September 10 (the mountain's name is Lhachen Naglha Dzamba); ``Tibetan 
Dam Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 October 10 (the mountain 
is ``a traditional site of worship and offerings'').
    \158\ ``Villagers Block Work on Dam,'' Radio Free Asia, 30 
September 10.
    \159\ Ibid. According to the report, workers claimed ``their permit 
to mine in the area had been approved by the Communist Party secretary 
of the TAR.'' The TAR government would issue such a permit, but a TAR 
Party official may have signified agreement.
    \160\ ``Tibetan Dam Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 7 
October 10. See the Commission's Political Prisoner Database for more 
information on the cases.
    \161\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans 
in Palyul County,'' Phayul, 24 August 10 (``100 Tibetans from the 
village had camped outside the government headquarters waiting for a 
response from the authorities to their plea.''); ``Police Fire on Mine 
Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 August 10.
    \162\ ``Police Fire on Mine Protesters,'' Radio Free Asia, 26 
August 10 (``gold mining operations by the Chinese-owned Kartin Company 
had led to an overcrowded population, severely degraded the fertility 
of their farmland, and adversely affected the local grassland 
habitat'').
    \163\ Kalsang Rinchen, ``Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans 
in Palyul County,'' Phayul, 24 August 10 (``[three] Tibetans have been 
killed and 30 others severely wounded''); Phurbu Thinley, ``China Says 
Only One Tibetan Shot Dead in Palyul Mine Protest,'' Phayul, 1 
September 10 (``Subsequent reports by overseas Tibetan news services 
said at least four Tibetans were killed, . . .'').
    \164\ ``Tibetan Accidentally Shot Dead in Dispute With Police,'' 
Xinhua, 30 August 10, reprinted in China Internet Information Center.
    \165\ ``Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 
August 11.
    \166\ Ibid. The Radio Free Asia report named three persons (the 
``village officials'') detained on July 2, nine persons detained on 
July 6 and 7, one person detained on July 14, and two persons (the 
alleged protest ``ringleaders'') detained ``around July 20.''
    \167\ Ibid.
    \168\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet 
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the 
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011 
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). ``Around 1.43 
million farmers and herdsmen of 275,000 households whose housing 
conditions were comparatively bad have moved into safe and affordable 
homes.''
    \169\ Laba Cier and Gama Douji, ``Secretary Zhang Qingli of the 
Tibet Autonomous Regional CPC Committee Says That It Is Necessary To 
Adhere to the Scientific Development Concept and Maintain a Leapfrog 
Development'' [Xizang zizhiqu dangwei shuji zhang qingli: jianchi kexue 
fazhan guan baochi kuayueshi fazhan], Xinhua, 6 January 11 (translated 
in Open Source Center, 9 January 11).
    \170\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10).
    \171\ ``Rural Pension System Extended to 2 Mln Tibetan Farmers, 
Herdsmen,'' Xinhua, 10 January 11. ``[The Tibet Autonomous Region] has 
a rural population of 2.21 million, of whom more than 235,000 are aged 
60 or over.'' (The January 2011 report likely refers to a 2010 
statistic.)
    \172\ Based on official Chinese media reports, the government has 
settled or resettled into new housing 1.43 million ``farmers and 
herdsmen'' among the Tibet Autonomous Region's 2.21 million rural 
population. Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet 
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the 
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011 
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11) (``Around 1.43 
million farmers and herdsmen . . . moved into safe and affordable 
homes.''); ``Rural Pension System Extended to 2 Mln Tibetan Farmers, 
Herdsmen,'' Xinhua, 10 January 11 (``[The Tibet Autonomous Region] has 
a rural population of 2.21 million.''). For information on the 
compulsory nature of the program, see Human Rights Watch, `` `No One 
Has the Liberty To Refuse'--Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in 
Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region,'' 11 June 07.
    \173\ For more information on the network of railways the Chinese 
government plans to build on the Tibetan plateau, see CECC, Special 
Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 46-53; CECC, 2009 Annual 
Report, 10 October 10, 285-86. For information on the completion of the 
Qinghai-Tibet railway in July 2006 and passenger traffic during the 
first year of operation, see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 
166-68; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 203-4.
    \174\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet 
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the 
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011 
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11); ``Lhasa-Xigaze 
Railway To Be Completed by 2015,'' Xinhua, 16 February 11.
    \175\ ``Tibet's New Railway To Open in 2014,'' China Daily, 2 
September 11.
    \176\ ``Lhasa-Xigaze Railway To Be Completed by 2015,'' Xinhua, 16 
February 11.
    \177\ ``Tibet Starts Building 5th Civil Airport,'' Xinhua, 29 April 
09.
    \178\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet 
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the 
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011 
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11); ``Lhasa-Xigaze 
Railway To Be Completed by 2015,'' Xinhua, 16 February 11.
    \179\ CECC Staff Analysis. The decision on whether to route the 
railway along the northern or southern bank of the river has economic 
and security implications. Most of the forestry and mineral resources, 
as well as most of the population, are on the north side of the river, 
but a section of the China-India border that China disputes is on the 
south side of the river.
    \180\ Dan Zengshe, ``Government Work Report--Delivered by Tibet 
Autonomous Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the 
Ninth Autonomous Regional People's Congress on 10 January 2011'' [2011 
nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 
(translated in Open Source Center, 25 February 11). For more 
information on the Sichuan-Tibet railway between Chengdu city and 
Lhasa, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 
49-53.
    \181\ ``New Railway To Cut Short Trip Between Capital Cities of 
Tibet, Xinjiang,'' Xinhua, 6 March 11. (China Daily reported in August 
2008 that the line would be constructed. Xin Dingding, ``Qinghai-Tibet 
Railway To Get Six New Lines,'' China Daily, 17 August 08.)
    \182\ ``New Railway To Cut Short Trip Between Capital Cities of 
Tibet, Xinjiang,'' Xinhua, 6 March 11.
    \183\ Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, ``During the 12th Five-Year Plan a 
Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang'' [Shier wu 
qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang], 
Xinhua, 6 March 11, reprinted in People's Daily, 7 March 11. According 
to the report, Luo Yulin, Vice Chairman of the Qinghai government, 
``hopes that work will start on the Golmud to Chengdu line during the 
period of the 12th Five-Year Plan.''
    \184\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Chinese Authorities 
Rename and Rebuild Quake-Struck Tibetan Area; Tibetans Excluded From 
Planning,'' 25 January 11; ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County 
Into Tourist City,'' Xinhua, 18 January 11.
    \185\ Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, ``During the 12th Five-Year Plan a 
Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang'' [Shier wu 
qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang], 
Xinhua, 6 March 11, reprinted in People's Daily, 7 March 11.
    \186\ Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology 
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics et al., Tabulation on 
Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Ethnic 
Publishing House, 2003), Table 10-4. According to the table: Of Yushu 
TAP's 262,661 total population, 255,167 were Tibetan; of the TAR's 
2,616,329 total population, 2,427,168 were Tibetan; of Guoluo TAP's 
137,940 total population, 126,395 were Tibetan.
    \187\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``Reconstruction of 
Earthquake-Hit Area Excludes Tibetan Participation, Ignores Local 
Concerns: One Year on From Earthquake,'' 15 April 11. According to the 
report, on April 1 to 3, 2011, several hundred Tibetan protesters in 
the damaged city displayed banners with messages such as, ``Fairly and 
legitimately resolve this issue,'' ``Our land belongs to us,'' ``Help 
for the Yushu disaster area should put ordinary people's benefits 
first,'' and ``Reasonably plan the land of our lives.''
    \188\ ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,'' 
Xinhua, 18 January 11 (renamed and designated a ``city''); Zhou Zhou 
and Ma Yong, ``During the 12th Five-Year Plan a Strategic Rail Network 
To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang'' [Shier wu qijian jiang jiancheng 
guantong xizang xinjang zhanlue tielu wang], Xinhua, 6 March 11, 
reprinted in People's Daily, 7 March 11 (railway ``will pass through 
Jiegu [Kyegudo] town in Yushu prefecture.'').
    \189\ ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,'' 
Xinhua, 18 January 11.
    \190\ Emily T. Yeh, ``Green Governmentality and Pastoralism in 
Western China: `Converting Pastures to Grasslands,' '' Nomadic Peoples, 
Vol. 9, No. 1 (2005), 23. According to the paper: ``Officially the 
largest nature reserve in China (at 31.8 million ha), it was 
established in 2000 to protect the sources of the Yangtze, Yellow and 
Lancangjiang (Mekong) Rivers. As such, the reserve covers most of 
Golog, Yushu and Haixi prefectures, which constitute about 44 percent 
of the total land area of the province.''
    \191\ ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,'' 
Xinhua, 18 January 11. Luo Huining, Chairman of the Qinghai People's 
Government, announced the change.
    \192\ Ibid. According to the Chairman of the Qinghai People's 
Government, ``We will strive to build [Kyegudo] into a commerce and 
logistics center and a tourist city featuring ethnic traditional 
Tibetan culture and ecological preservation.''
    \193\ ``China Plans 32 Billion Yuan on Qinghai Quake 
Reconstruction,'' Xinhua, 13 June 10. ``The money would mainly came 
[sic] from the central budget, supplemented by funds from the Qinghai 
government, donations and corporate funding, according to a circular 
published on the government's website.''
    \194\ Cao Deshung, ``Tibet Rail Construction Completed,'' China 
Daily, 15 October 05.
    \195\ Zhou Zhou and Ma Yong, ``During the 12th Five-Year Plan a 
Strategic Rail Network To Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang'' [Shier wu 
qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang zhanlue tielu wang], 
Xinhua, 6 March 11, reprinted in People's Daily, 7 March 11.
    \196\ ``China To Rebuild Quake-Levelled County Into Tourist City,'' 
Xinhua, 18 January 11. ``The entire town of [Kyegudo], the seat of 
Yushu prefectural government, was flattened, leaving more than 100,000 
residents homeless.''
    \197\ ``Tibetans Protest Over Land,'' Radio Free Asia, 3 June 10. 
``Some properties claimed by the authorities suffered no damage in the 
April earthquake, . . . . [His] family . . . complained that the `local 
government selected the best sites for the construction of government 
offices, schools, and public parks.' ''
    \198\ International Campaign for Tibet, ``The Kyegu Earthquake: Six 
Months On,'' 18 October 10 (``main concern of Tibetans is over losing 
their land and being moved into the government-built permanent housing, 
which will be in apartment or townhouse-type complexes''); ``Tensions 
Rise in Quake Town,'' Radio Free Asia, 17 June 10 (``the government has 
allocated 80 square meters (860 square feet) of living space per 
household . . . the people to be displaced are also unhappy with the 
location . . . . It's definitely much farther away than the place we 
were in before the earthquake struck.'').
    \199\ ``Tibetans Protest Land Grab,'' Radio Free Asia, 5 April 11. 
According to an RFA source, Tibetan property owners had been ``assured 
of compensation, but so far they have not been compensated 
appropriately.''
    \200\ Ibid.
    \201\ For the purpose of calculating average sentences, the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database provides 20 years as a nominal 
length of a life sentence. Official Chinese information about the 
actual average time served by prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment 
is not available.
    \202\ In addition to the 483 Tibetan political prisoners believed 
or presumed to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were 
detained on or after March 10, 2008, the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database recorded as of September 1, 2011, an additional 651 
Tibetan political prisoners detained or imprisoned on or after March 
10, 2008, who are known or presumed to have been released, or who 
reportedly escaped or died.
    \203\ For the purpose of calculating average sentences, the 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database provides 20 years as a nominal 
length of a life sentence. Official Chinese information about the 
actual average time served by prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment 
is not available.
    \204\ Ibid.
    Notes to Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong and Macau

    \1\ U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Public Law No. 102-383, 
enacted 5 October 92; Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People's Republic of China, enacted by the National 
People's Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97; Joint Declaration of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong 
Kong, adopted 19 December 84.
    \2\ U.S.-Macau Policy Act of 2000, Public Law No. 106-570, enacted 
27 December 2000; Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Portugal on the 
Question of Macau, adopted 13 April 87, art. 2; Basic Law of the Macau 
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 
enacted by the National People's Congress 31 March 93, effective 20 
December 99, art. 2.
    \3\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's Congress 
31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, art. 83; Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 
enacted by the National People's Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 
97, art. 85.
    \4\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's Congress 
31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, arts. 27, 33, 34; Basic Law of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China, enacted by the National People's Congress 4 April 90, effective 
1 July 97, arts. 27, 31, 32.
    \5\ Hong Kong Legislative Council, Legislative Council (Amendment) 
Bill 2010, introduced 10 December 10, passed 5 March 11; Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, Legislative Council (Amendment) Ordinance 2011, 
issued 11 March 11. The legislation adds 10 seats to the Legislative 
Council, 5 of which to be returned by existing geographical 
constituencies and 5 from a new District Council functional 
constituency.
    \6\ Hong Kong Legislative Council, Chief Executive (Amendment) Bill 
2010, introduced 10 December 10, passed 3 March 11, and Chief Executive 
Election (Amendment) Ordinance 2011, issued 11 March 11. The bill 
amends the Chief Executive Bill by increasing the number of members of 
the election committee to 1,200.
    \7\ Hong Kong Legislative Council, Legislative Council (Amendment) 
Bill 2010, introduced 10 December 10, passed 5 March 11; Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, Legislative Council (Amendment) Ordinance 2011, 
issued 11 March 11.
    \8\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's Congress 4 
April 90, effective 1 July 97, chap. IV, art. 45 (selection of the 
chief executive), art. 68 (selection of Legislative Council); chap. 1, 
art. 2 (``high degree of autonomy'').
    \9\ Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Decision 
of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues 
Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative 
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 
and on Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage, issued 29 December 07.
    \10\ Anne-Marie Evans, ``Hong Kong Activists Win Back Seats in By-
Election,'' BBC, 17 May 10.
    \11\ Keith Bradsher, ``Hong Kong Voting Light,'' New York Times, 16 
May 10.
    \12\ Hong Kong Legislative Council, Legislative Council (Amendment) 
Bill 2011, introduced 3 June 11.
    \13\ Hong Kong Bar Association's Submission on the Proposed 
Replacement Arrangement in the Legislative Council (Amendment) Bill 
2011, Press Release, 17 June 11; Hong Kong Bar Association's Further 
Press Release on the Government's Proposals Regarding Replacement 
Arrangements in the Event of a Vacancy, Press Release, 21 June 11. For 
the response of the Hong Kong Government Constitutional and Mainland 
Affairs Bureau, see LC Paper No. CB(2)2214/10-11(01), June 2011. See 
also, Lai Ying-kit, ``Pan-Democrats Stage Walk-Out at Legco,'' South 
China Morning Post, 22 June 11.
    \14\ ``Thousands March in Hong Kong,'' Radio Free Asia, 1 July 11; 
``Tens of Thousands Vent Anger at Hong Kong Rally Over Wealth Gap, 
Gov't Policies,'' Washington Post, 1 July 11.
    \15\ Gary Cheung and Tanna Chong, ``By-Election Bid Put on Hold in 
Latest U-Turn,'' South China Morning Post, 5 July 11.
    \16\ Fanny W.Y. Fung and Lo Wei, ``Voters Spoilt for Choice on 
Crowded Campaign Trail,'' South China Morning Post, 29 March 11.
    \17\ Ibid.
    \18\ ``State Council Official `Coordinates' HK Election Strategy,'' 
Ming Pao, 23 February 11 (summarized in Open Source Center).
    \19\ See, e.g., Frank Ching, ``Hong Kong's Autonomy Slips Away,'' 
Hong Kong Journal, April 2011.
    \20\ Ibid.
    \21\ Kelvin Chan, ``Hong Kong Worries About China's Tightening 
Grip,'' Associated Press, 1 September 11.
    \22\ ``Beijing Wants Socialist Patriotism Taught to Hong Kong 
Students,'' AsiaNews, 14 June 11.
    \23\ Government of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region 
Education Bureau, Moral and National Education Curriculum Guide 
(Primary 1 to Secondary 6) Consultation Draft, issued 29 July 11.
    \24\ Xiao He, ``What Is Behind Li Yi's Vicious Attack on 
`Patriotism' '' [Li yi e du gongji ``aiguo zhuyi'' suowei heshi], Wen 
Wei Po, 20 July 11.
    \25\ ``HK Teachers Lash Out at China Patriotism Lessons,'' Agence 
France-Presse, reprinted in Google, 10 August 11.
    \26\ Phyllis Tsang and Simpson Cheung, ``Budget Activists Vow To 
Maintain Protests in City,'' South China Morning Post, 8 March 2011.
    \27\ Phyllis Tsang and Peter So, ``Beijing Wants Punishment After 
Attack on Tsang,'' South China Morning Post, 3 March 11.
    \28\ Ibid.
    \29\ Gary Cheung and Tanna Chong, ``Radicals Will Harm Cause in 
Long Run, Says Veteran Activist,'' South China Morning Post, 13 April 
11.
    \30\ Reporters Without Borders, Press Freedom Index 2010.
    \31\ Ibid.
    \32\ Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2011, Global Press Freedom 
Rankings, 2011.
    \33\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2010, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 8 April 11, 106.
    \34\ Ibid.
    \35\ ``He Qinglian: The Political Face of Several Hong Kong Media 
Owners,'' Chinascope, last visited 14 September 11.
    \36\ Ibid.
    \37\ ``Summary: TKP Blasts Bishop John Tong for Praising Liu 
Xiaobo,'' Ta Kung Bao, 28 December 10 (summarized in Open Source 
Center).
    \38\ ``Legco Rejects Call for Release of Nobel Laureate,'' South 
China Morning Post, 3 November 10.
    \39\ Maggie Ng and Cheung Chi-fai, ``Court Backs Tung Chung Woman's 
Challenge to Infrastructure Project,'' South China Morning Post, 19 
April 11; Cheung Chi-fai, ``MTR Pulls Report on Impact Around Rail 
Link,'' South China Morning Post, 29 April 11.
    \40\ ``Judgment on Bridge a Victory for Rule of Law,'' South China 
Morning Post, 21 April 11.
    \41\ SNR Denton, ``Enforcement of Mainland Chinese Arbitration 
Award Refused on Public Policy Grounds in Hong Kong Amid Warnings on 
the Dangers of Arb-Med,'' 9 May 11.
    \42\ ``Filling the State Immunity Lacuna in Hong Kong: The Congo 
Case,'' Jones Day, July 2011; Democratic Republic of the Congo v FG 
Hemisphere Associates LLC (FACV Nos., 5, 6, and 7 of 2010).
    \43\ PRC National People's Congress, ``Explanation Concerning the 
National People's Congress Standing Committee (Draft) Interpretation of 
Article 13 (1) and Article 19 of the `Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region' '' [Guanyu ``quanguo renmin daibiao 
dahui changwuweiyuanhui guanyu `zhonghua remnin gongheguo xianggang 
tebie xingzhengqu jibenfa' di shisan tiao di yi kuan he di shijiu tiao 
de jieshi (cao an)'' de shuoming], reprinted in Xinhua, 24 August 11; 
Hogan Lovells, ``International Arbitration Newslash: Beijing Hands Down 
Its Decision on Sovereign Immunity,'' 26 August 11.
    \44\ ``Filling the State Immunity Lacuna in Hong Kong: The Congo 
Case,'' Jones Day, July 2011; Hogan Lovells, ``International 
Arbitration Newslash: Beijing Hands Down Its Decision on Sovereign 
Immunity,'' 26 August 11. See also ``National People's Congress 
Standing Committee Group Considers Draft Interpretation of Article 13 
(1) and Article 19 of the Hong Kong Basic Law'' [Quanguo renda 
changweihui fenzu shenyi guanyu xianggang jibenfa di shisan tiao di yi 
kuan he di shijui tiao de jieshi cao'an], People's Daily, reprinted in 
National People's Congress, 25 August 11; ``China's Legislature Reviews 
Draft Interpretation of Articles of HK's Constitution,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in National People's Congress, 25 August 11.
    \45\ PRC National People's Congress Standing Committee Legislative 
Working Group, ``Explanation Concerning the National People's Congress 
Standing Committee Interpretation (Draft) of Article 13 (1) and Article 
19 of the `Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People's Republic of China' '' [Guanyu ``quanguo renmin daibiao 
dahui changwuwei yuanhui guanyu `zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianggang 
tebie xingzhengqu jibenfa' di shi san tiao di yi kuan he di shijiu tiao 
de jieshi (cao'an)'' de shuoming], reprinted in Xinhua, 26 August 11; 
Constance Johnson, ``China/Hong Kong: Congo Assets Case Tests Sovereign 
Immunity,'' Library of Congress, 1 September 11.
    \46\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Foreign Ministry Spokesperson 
Hong Lei's Remarks on FG Hemisphere Associates LLC's Lawsuit Against 
the Democratic Republic of Congo in HK,'' 8 June 11; Chris Ip, 
``Highest Court Seeks Ruling From Beijing,'' South China Morning Post, 
9 June 11.
    \47\ Simon Young, ``HK's State Immunity Law Open to Abuse,'' South 
China Morning Post, 2 August 11.
    \48\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's Congress 
31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, Annexes I, II.
    \49\ Jonathan Cheng, ``Macau Picks Chief in Time of Transition,'' 
Wall Street Journal, 27 July 09; Chia-Peck Wong, ``China's Hu Says 
Macau Should Diversify Its Economy (Update 1),'' Bloomberg, 20 December 
09.
    \50\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2010, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 8 April 11, 139.
    \51\ Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, 
2010.
    \52\ Natalie Leung and Alexandra Lages, ``Corruption Not 
Necessarily `Getting Worse,' '' Macau Daily Times, 28 October 10.
    \53\ ``Macau Gaming Revenue Soars 58pc to Record US$23.5b,'' 
Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning Post, 3 January 11.
    \54\ Matt Isaacs, ``Special Report: The Macau Connection,'' 
Reuters, 11 March 11.
    \55\ Andrew Higgins, ``Macau's Casinos Rake in Cash From Chinese 
Who See Gambling as an Investment,'' Washington Post, 13 February 11.
    \56\ ``Wen Jiabao Hopes for Macau SAR To Promote Moderate Economic 
Pluralism'' [Wen jiabao xiwang aomen tequ cujin jingji shidu duoyuan 
fazhan], People's Daily, 14 November 10; ``Macau Gaming Revenue Soars 
58pc to Record US$23.5b,'' Reuters, reprinted in South China Morning 
Post, 3 January 11. For more information on official economic policy 
toward Macau's gaming industry, see also National People's Congress, 
PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social 
Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan 
di shier ge wunian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 
11, chap. 57(2).
    \57\ National People's Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier ge wunian guihua 
gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 57.
    \58\ Macau Special Administrative Region Law No. 2/2009, Law on 
Safeguarding National Security, passed 25 February 09, effective 2 
March 09, art. 1 (treason), art. 2 (secession), art. 3 (subversion), 
art. 4 (sedition), art. 5 (theft of state secrets), art. 6 (association 
with foreign political organizations that harm state security). See 
also PRC Central People's Government, ``Macau SAR Formally Issues 
National Security Law, Effective March 3,'' 2 March 09; Fanny W.Y. Fung 
and Gary Cheung, ``Macau Security Law Praised at Handover Event,'' 
South China Morning Post, 5 December 09. For detailed information on 
the law and its passage, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 
302-304.
    \59\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, ``Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2010, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),'' 8 April 11, 135.

                                 
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