[House Prints 112-B]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
112th Congress 1st
Session | COMMITTEE PRINT | Committee
Print 112-B
_______________________________________________________________________
BOKO HARAM
Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
December 2011
FIRST SESSION
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-725 WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director & Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
BOKO HARAM
Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland
I. Introduction.................................................. 1
II. Findings..................................................... 3
III. Recommendations............................................. 3
IV. Origins and History.......................................... 5
Uprising....................................................... 5
Radical Reemergence............................................ 5
V. From ``Aspiration'' to the U.S. Homeland...................... 6
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)....................... 7
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)................................ 9
VI. Evolution and Collaboration.................................. 11
Changing Tactics and Targets: Suicide Bombers and Western
Targets...................................................... 11
Collaboration with AQIM and al Shabaab......................... 12
A General's Warning............................................ 14
Potential Future Targets: Energy and Aviation Sectors.......... 15
VII. Communications and Media.................................... 17
Martyrdom Videos............................................... 17
Internet Forums................................................ 18
VIII. Options for U.S. Engagement................................ 20
Military and Intelligence Support.............................. 20
Diplomatic Engagement.......................................... 22
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Designation............... 23
IX. Conclusion................................................... 24
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 26, 2011, a suicide bomber drove a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device (VBIED) into the United Nations
(U.N.) headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, killing 23 people and
injuring more than 80 others.\1\ Responsibility for the
bombing, one of the deadliest in the United Nations' history,
was claimed by Boko Haram, an Islamist religious sect turned
insurgent group based in the predominantly Muslim northern
Nigeria. While this attack occurred inside Nigerian borders, it
was the first time Boko Haram had targeted an international,
non-Nigerian entity.
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\1\ ``Nigeria UN bomb: Video of `Boko Haram' bomber released,'' BBC
News, September 18, 2011. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-14964554.
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The attack marked a significant shift in the targeting and
goals of the group, largely unknown to the U.S. Intelligence
Community, and capped off an evolution in the capabilities of
Boko Haram, beginning in the mid-2000s, from attacks with
poisoned arrows and machetes to sophisticated car bombings.\2\
In a video that surfaced in Nigeria in the weeks following the
U.N. bombing, the perpetrator of the attack described the
United Nations as a forum for ``all global evil'' and stated
the attacks were designed to ``send a message to the U.S.
President and `other infidels.' ''\3\
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\2\ ``Islamist attacks in Nigeria: A taste of the Taliban,'' The
Economist, July 31, 2009. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/
14156107?story_id=14156107.
\3\ BBC News, supra note 1.
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According to Ambassador Anthony Holmes, Deputy to the
Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) of United States
Africa Command (AFRICOM), members of Boko Haram are being
trained by Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM).\4\ They are also believed to have ties to the Somalian
militant group al Shabaab.\5\ This cooperation, combined with
the increased sophistication of attacks executed by Boko Haram,
have led to concerns from the U.S. Intelligence Community over
the sect's intent and capability to strike Western targets in
Nigeria, throughout Africa, and most importantly, the U.S.
homeland.
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\4\ Al Qaeda-linked group finds fertile territory in Nigeria as
killings escalate,'' Paul Cruickshank and Tom Lister, CNN, November 18,
2011, pg. 2. Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-18/africa/
world_africa_nigeria-militants_1_boko-haram-maiduguri-nigerian-state/
2?_s=PM:AFRICA.
\5\ Ibid., 3.
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Historically, Boko Haram has been focused on Nigerian
government targets. Until recently, Western intelligence
services did not widely view Boko Haram as a potential threat.
Even after the U.N. attack, Nigerian experts remain skeptical
about Boko Haram's intent and capability to strike U.S.
interests and the homeland.
However, in the recent past, the U.S. Intelligence
Community has underestimated the intent and capability of other
terrorist groups to launch attacks against the U.S. homeland.
The most notable recent examples include al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
also known as the Pakistani Taliban. The U.S. Intelligence
Community and outside counterterrorism and intelligence experts
assessed that AQAP and TTP were regionally-based groups with a
target set limited to Western supported governments or, at
worst, American interests in the Middle East and South Asia.
These assessments and general assumptions nearly proved fatal
when a series of attempted attacks planned, directed, and
executed by these two groups were thwarted on Christmas Day
2009 on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 over Detroit, and in May
2010 in New York City's Times Square. Given the ability of
these other groups to become operational with apparently meager
resources, it would be prudent for the U.S. Government to
thoroughly and carefully examine the extent of the threat from
Boko Haram to the U.S. homeland.
As Chairman and Ranking Member of the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, it is our duty to examine
all threats to the U.S. homeland. Boko Haram's recent
escalation has prompted us to examine the group's potential,
intent, and capability to attack United States interests and
the U.S. homeland. This report will discuss the evolution of
Boko Haram, its goals, and potential to commit acts of
terrorism against U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland. This
report will further discuss Nigerian counterterrorism
capabilities, current U.S. diplomatic efforts, and future U.S.
engagement and assistance options to assist the Nigerian
government in countering the threat posed by Boko Haram. It is
our hope that the conclusions in this report will raise
awareness about the emerging threat posed by Boko Haram.
This report is based on open source information and
extensive unclassified briefings from Government and non-
Government entities. However, it should be noted that because
of the speed with which Boko Haram has evolved as a terrorist
group, little is known about the sect. Information is murky and
academic research is limited. This report attempts to shed
light on Boko Haram and the emerging threat it poses to U.S.
interests and the homeland. To the extent this report spurs
additional scholarship and intelligence collection, the U.S.
Government will benefit and the American people will be safer.
Patrick Meehan
Chairman Jackie Speier
Ranking Member
II. FINDINGS
1. Boko Haram has quickly evolved and poses an emerging threat
to U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland.
2. Boko Haram has the intent and may be developing capability
to coordinate on a rhetorical and operational level
with al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and al Shabaab.
3. Boko Haram's evolution in targeting and tactics closely
tracks that of other al-Qaeda affiliates that have
targeted the U.S. homeland, most notably Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP).
4. The U.S. Intelligence Community largely underestimated the
potential for al-Qaeda affiliate groups to target the
U.S. homeland, wrongly assessing they had only regional
ambitions and threats against the U.S. homeland were
merely ``aspirational.''
5. The United States should work with the Government of
Nigeria to build counterterrorism and intelligence
capability to effectively counter Boko Haram.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Do Not Underestimate Boko Haram's Intent and Capability
to Attack the U.S. Homeland.--As this report makes clear, the
U.S. Intelligence Community has recently underestimated the
intent and capability of terrorist groups to strike the
homeland, most notably Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). These underestimations had
near-deadly consequences on Christmas Day 2009 over Detroit and
in May 2010 in Times Square.
3. Determine Whether Boko Haram Should be Designated a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).--The Secretary of State
should conduct an investigation into whether Boko Haram should
be designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization, in accordance
with Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
as amended. Following the Boko Haram attack on the United
Nations (U.N.) headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, we wrote to
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling for an investigation
to determine whether FTO designation was necessary. In light of
Boko Haram's continued escalation, FTO designation may be
required to provide our intelligence and law enforcement
communities the tools necessary to ensure Boko Haram does not
attack U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland.
3. Increase U.S. Intelligence Community Collection on Boko
Haram.--The U.S. Intelligence Community must increase its
intelligence collection on Boko Haram, including human
intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). It
must also enhance its liaison relationship with Nigerian
security services and help build their capacity to combat the
threat posed by Boko Haram to Nigerian and U.S. interests.
4. Conduct Outreach with Nigerian Diaspora Communities in
the United States.--The U.S. Government should develop
relationships with Nigerian diaspora communities in the United
States to learn more about Boko Haram and the factors driving
its evolution, intent, capability, and targeting. Through
familial and personal relationships, diaspora communities in
the United States provide a unique and invaluable perspective
on their home country.
5. Increase U.S. Government Support for Nigerian
Counterterrorism and Intelligence Programs.--The U.S.
Government should increase its support for programs that
enhance the ability of Nigerian security forces to more
effectively target Boko Haram and counter its evolution. The
U.S. and Nigerian governments should also work more closely to
increase intelligence collection.
IV. ORIGINS AND HISTORY
Uprising
``Boko Haram,'' which in the local Hausa language means
``Western education is forbidden,'' officially calls itself
``Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad,'' which means
``people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's
teachings and jihad.''\6\ Though the origins of Boko Haram are
murky, the group was not founded as a violent insurgency bent
on overthrowing the Nigerian government. Founded in the mid-
1990s as a religious study group, Boko Haram did not begin to
transform into the insurgent group it is today until a young
and charismatic Nigerian civil service employee named Mohammed
Yusuf assumed control. Calling themselves the Nigerian Taliban,
Boko Haram adopted a ``live-off-the land'' lifestyle and
established a camp in a remote area of northeast Nigeria, which
the group dubbed ``Afghanistan.''\7\
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\6\ ``Boko Haram,'' Toni Johnson, Council on Foreign Relations,
November 7, 2011. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/africa/boko-haram/
p25739.
\7\ ``Boko Haram: History, ideas, and revolt [2].'' Shehu Sani, The
Guardian, July 8, 2011. Available at: http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&- id=53730:boko-haramhistory-
ideas-and-revolt-2&catid=72:focus&Itemid=598.
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From 2002-2009, Boko Haram engaged in low-level conflict
with local police forces and non-compliant villagers. In 2009,
a crackdown on Boko Haram members from Nigerian police forces
in Borno state erupted into fighting. On July 26, 2009, sect
members launched an attack against a police station in Bauchi
state, resulting in the death of 39 Boko Haram members, two
police officers, and one soldier.\8\ This ignited a 5-day
stand-off between Boko Haram and security personnel that saw
violent attacks and battles spread across four northern
Nigerian states: Bauchi, Kano, and Yobe, culminating in a final
battle in the city of Maiduguri in Borno state.
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\8\ ``Boko Haram: History, ideas, and revolt [4].'' Shehu Sani,
Vanguard, July 8, 2011. Available at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/
07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-4/.
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On July 30, 2009, the battle of Maiduguri ended when
Nigerian security forces captured and killed Boko Haram's
leader, Mohammed Yusuf, in what human rights groups have deemed
an extrajudicial killing. Yusuf's execution was videotaped by
soldiers and later broadcast on television.\9\ In total, nearly
700 people were killed in the uprising. The death of Yusuf
marked a turning point for the Boko Haram. It was forced
underground and many of its leaders reportedly fled to other
parts of Nigeria, including Bauchi state, as well as
neighboring countries.\10\
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\9\ ``Boko Haram: History, ideas, and revolt [5].'' Shehu Sani,
Vanguard, July 7, 2011. Available at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/
07/boko-haram-history-ideas-and-revolt-5/.
\10\ ``Nigeria Conflict Assessment,'' USAID, August 2011, pg. 39.
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Radical Reemergence
In 2010, Boko Haram re-emerged radically more violent and
determined to seek vengeance against the Nigerian state for
executing its leader. Under the leadership of Imam Abubakar
Shekau, who claimed to have assumed control of the sect
following the death of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram militants
carried out violent operations against government targets in
the north. The most notable include an assault on a Maiduguri
prison that resulted in the release of 700 prisoners, including
Boko Haram members, and a bombing in the city of Jos that
killed more than 80 people. Significantly, the targeting of the
Nigerian capital city of Abuja represented an evolving target
set outside of Northern Nigeria. In June 2011, Boko Haram
militants bombed the police headquarters in Abuja, and finally,
carried out the suicide attack against the Abuja U.N.
headquarters 2 months later.
A number of factors have been attributed to fueling Boko
Haram's violence and fanaticism, including a feeling of
alienation from the wealthier, Christian, oil-producing,
southern Nigeria, pervasive poverty, rampant government
corruption, heavy-handed security measures, and the belief that
relations with the West are a corrupting influence. These
grievances have led to sympathy among the local Muslim
population despite Boko Haram's violent tactics.\11\
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\11\ ``In Nigeria's northeast, some sympathy for Islamists,'' Joe
Brock, Reuters, November 14, 2011. Available at: http://in.reuters.com/
article/2011/11/14/idINIndia-60515120111114.
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Residents in northern Nigeria live in extreme poverty. In
Maiduguri, most residents live on less than $2 a day.\12\
Shettima Khalifa Dikwa, chairman of the Voters Forum at the
University of Maiduguri, blamed the government and heavy
security practices for the growing public sympathy toward Boko
Haram. ``If it escalates it is the fault of the government and
JTF (Joint Task Force). You can't have JTF searching your
house, invading your privacy, mistreating people without you
having sympathy for Boko Haram.''\13\ These grievances and the
failure of the government to effectively address them serve as
a key recruiting tool for Boko Haram.
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\12\ Ibid.
\13\ Ibid.
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Boko Haram's desire to rid northern Nigeria of these
problems serves as the primary motives behind their stated
ambition to implement Sharia Law and establish an Islamic
state.\14\ Sharia Law currently exists in 12 out of 36 Nigerian
states as the result of a grassroots movement that coincided
with Nigeria's transition to democracy in 1999.\15\
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\14\ Johnson, supra note 6.
\15\ Ibid.
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A consistent lack of reliable reporting on Boko Haram has
contributed to the difficulty in assessing its size, makeup,
and goals. Boko Haram operates out of Maiduguri, the capital
city of Borno state in northeast Nigeria bordered by Chad,
Cameroon, and Niger. The group's membership is elusive. Some
describe the ``core Boko Haram'' as the immediate followers of
the late sect leader Mohammed Yusuf. However, others consider
Boko Haram to be more of a ``grassroots insurrection,'' or an
``amorphous cloud'' that has emerged from the larger context of
Muslim grievances and frustration with the government.
V. FROM ``ASPIRATION'' TO THE U.S. HOMELAND
Boko Haram's activities over the last 2 years mark an
escalation in the frequency and violence of its attacks. On
February 10, 2011, Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
James Clapper delivered the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the
U.S. Intelligence Community and stated that Boko Haram was
``focused on local issues. [and] may be pursuing interests it
shares with AQIM.''\16\ Boko Haram's activities since then mark
an escalation in the frequency and violence of its attacks and
an emboldened Boko Haram should warrant enhanced scrutiny from
the U.S. Intelligence Community.
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\16\ ``Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment
for the U.S. Intelligence Community,'' James R. Clapper, Director of
National Intelligence, February 10, 2011, pg. 18. Available at: http://
www.dni.gov/testimonies/20110210_testimony_clapper.pdf.
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In order to properly gauge the true threat Boko Haram will
pose to U.S. interests and potentially the U.S. homeland in the
future, it may be useful to examine two other groups whose
rapid expansion in capabilities and apparent evolution in
targeting and goals took the United States by surprise. Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP), both newly formed groups, were viewed by the
U.S. Intelligence Community and outside experts as regionally
focused and content to launch strikes against their home
governments and Western interests in the region. In both cases,
the Intelligence Community--and the country--were caught off
guard when attacks were launched by AQAP and TTP against the
U.S. homeland. The rapid evolution of Boko Haram as a threat
shares certain characteristics with AQAP and TTP; an
examination of the rise of these two groups may be useful in
projecting the future threat of Boko Haram.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
In January 2009, the al-Qaeda branches in Saudi Arabia and
Yemen merged into Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.\17\ The
creation of AQAP concerned U.S. intelligence officials, but the
widely-held assessment was that AQAP intended to target the
Saudi Arabian monarchy, the Yemeni government, and U.S.
interests in the Gulf region. Twice in the months prior to the
merger that created AQAP, the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a was
attacked. Still, the U.S. Intelligence Community did not assess
there was serious intent nor capability to launch attacks on
American soil.
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\17\ ``Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula,'' National
Counterterrorism Center website. Available at: http://www.nctc.gov/
site/groups/aqap.html.
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In August 2009, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive
device hidden inside his body in an attempt to assassinate the
Saudi Arabian Assistant Interior Minister Muhammad bin Nayef.
It was a brazen plot that came close to killing a top U.S.
terrorism ally, and represented AQAP's boldest terrorist
attempt since the merger. It also signaled a quick evolution in
sophistication of targeting and bomb-making.
On November 5, 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan
opened fire on fellow soldiers at the Fort Hood Army base in
Texas, killing 13 and wounding more than 30.\18\ In the
subsequent investigation, it was revealed that before the
attack, Major Hasan corresponded via email with the future
operational leader of AQAP, American-born cleric Anwar al-
Awlaki.\19\ Major Hasan's contact with al-Awlaki served as an
inspiration for the Fort Hood terrorist attack. This became the
first incident in which an AQAP and al-Awlaki inspired attack
took place on U.S. soil.
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\18\ ``Fort Hood Suspect Yells Nidal Hasan's Name in Court,''
Pierre Thomas, Martha Raddatz, Rhonda Scwartz, Jason Ryan, ABC News,
July 29, 2011. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fort-
hoodsuspect-nabbed-al-qaeda-inspire-magazine/
story?id=14187568#.TtS7YLJFuso.
\19\ Ibid. Anwar al-Awlaki was an American-born Muslim cleric of
Yemeni descent. He was an imam at mosques in San Diego, CA and Falls
Church, VA where it was suspected that he had ties to three of the 9/11
hijackers. After 9/11, he denounced the attacks and emerged as a voice
of moderation within the Muslim community. This changed in 2002 when he
left the United States for London and eventually Yemen, where he became
a proponent of militant Islam and encouraged attacks against Americans.
He came to be viewed by many in the U.S. Intelligence Community as a
greater threat to the United States than Osama bin Laden. On September
30, 2011, al-Awlaki was killed by a CIA drone strike in Yemen, after a
2-year manhunt.
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A little over 1 month later, on Christmas Day 2009, Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian Muslim and the son of a
prominent Nigerian government official, attempted to detonate a
bomb on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 destined for Detroit. As
the Airbus A330 with 289 people on board approached Detroit,
Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb hidden in his
underwear. When he failed to successfully detonate the
explosive, passengers and flight crew quickly subdued him.\20\
AQAP quickly claimed responsibility for the attack and promised
that more attacks would follow.\21\
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\20\ ``The Radicalization of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.'' Mark
Hosenball, Newsweek, January 1, 2010. Available at: http://
www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/01/the-radicalization-of-umar-
faroukabdulmutallab.html.
\21\ ``Al-Qaeda link investigated as clues emerge in foiled terror
attack,'' CNN, December 28, 2009, pg. 2. Available at: http://
articles.cnn.com/2009-12-28/justice/airline.terror.attempt_1_al-qaeda-
explosive-deviceyemeni/2?_s=PM:CRIME.
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Similar to the Fort Hood case, the subsequent investigation
revealed that Abdulmutallab had direct ties to AQAP, travelling
to Yemen for instruction and deployment at a terrorist training
camp.\22\ The attack caught the U.S. Intelligence Community off
guard as they did not believe AQAP had neither the intent nor
capability to deploy militants to the United States to strike
the U.S. homeland. During a press conference following the
Flight 253 bombing attempt, John O. Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism stated:
``The fact that they [AQAP] had moved forward to try to execute
this attack against the homeland I think demonstrated to us--
and this is what the review sort of uncovered--that we had a
strategic sense of sort of where they were going, but we didn't
know they had progressed to the point of actually launching
individuals here.''\23\
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\22\ ``Underwear Bomber: New video of Training, Martyrdom
Statements,'' Matthew Cole, Brian Ross, and Nasser Atta, April 26,
2010. Available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/underwear-bomber-
videotraining-martyrdom-statements/story?id=10479470#.TtS9K7JFuso.
\23\ ``Press Briefing by Napolitano, Brennan, and Gibbs on the
attempted December 25, 2009 terrorist attack,'' Council on Foreign
Relations, January 7, 2010. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/
pressbriefing-napolitano-brennan-gibbs-december-25-2009-attempted-
terrorist-attack/p21154.
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When Mr. Brennan was asked when it had become known that AQAP
intended to attack the United States, he explained:
``In the intelligence that we have acquired, over the
past several years it's been rather aspirational. It
has said things, it has promoted a certain view as far
as bringing the fight to us, but all of their
activities, at least that we were focused on, were
happening in Yemen. They carried attacks against Prince
Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia, against Saudi
targets, inside of Yemen, against Yemeni as well as
against U.S. targets. So it was aspirational. We saw
that there was this mounting sort of drumbeat of
interest in trying to get individuals to carry out
attacks. That was the fragmentary information.
``And so in hindsight now--and 20/20 hindsight always
gives you much better opportunity to see it--we saw the
plot was developing, but at the time we did not know in
fact that they were talking about sending Mr.
Abdulmutallab to the United States.
``Now, remember, Mr. Abdulmutallab was a much different
story in terms of a Nigerian who traveled to Yemen and
then came over here. But what it clearly indicates is
that there is a seriousness of purpose on the part of
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to carry out attacks
here in the United States--whether they're reaching
people through the Internet, or whether or not, in
fact, they are sending people abroad.''\24\
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\24\ Ibid.
On January 19, 2010, 3 weeks after the Christmas Day attempted
attack, the Department of State officially declared AQAP as a
foreign terrorist organization (FTO).\25\
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\25\ ``Designations of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
and Senior Leaders,'' Philip J. Crowley, U.S. Department of State Press
Release, January 19, 2010.
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Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, more commonly referred to as TTP
or the Pakistani Taliban, was formed in 2007 as an alliance of
militant groups dedicated to waging jihad against the Pakistani
military and government and fighting to expel U.S. and NATO
forces from Afghanistan.\26\ They carried out numerous large-
scale attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and are reportedly
tied to the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto in December 2007.\27\ The TTP actively targets U.S.
interests in Pakistan, including NATO supply lines, and has
conducted multiple assaults on the U.S. consulate in Peshawar,
among other American targets.
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\26\ ``Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).'' National Counterterrorism
Center profile. Available at: http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ttp.html.
\27\ Ibid.
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Despite their aggressive targeting of U.S. and NATO troops
and facilities, the U.S. Intelligence Community assessed that
TTP was a regional--and not a homeland--threat. \28\ While the
evolution of tactics by TTP did evoke concern among U.S.
counterterrorism officials, the notion that the TTP would
strike the homeland was dismissed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). Even after TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud
made threats against the White House in 2009, the FBI said in
an emailed statement:
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\28\ See footnotes 29 and 30. ``The Taliban's Threats,'' and ``From
Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-Pakistan
Relationship.'' Available at: Available at: http://
foreignaffairs.house.gov/111/49547.pdf.
``The FBI is aware of the claims made by Baitullah
Mehsud. He has made similar threats to the U.S. in the
past and we deem these new statements as aspirational .
. . ''\29\
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\29\ ``The Taliban's Threats,'' Mark Hosenball, The Daily Beast,
March 31, 2009. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/
2009/03/31/the-taliban-s-threats.html.
On May 5, 2009, the State Department Special Representative
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the late Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke, reiterated this belief in response to a question
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during testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs:
``In regard to al Qaeda, I think it is very well-
described in an article in this morning's New York
Times where a Taliban spokesman said we do the local
war against the Americans, al Qaeda does the global
war.''\30\
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\30\ ``From Strategy to Implementation: The Future of the U.S.-
Pakistan Relationship,'' U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Foreign Affairs hearing, May 5, 2009.
On May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistan-born naturalized
U.S. citizen, drove a 1993 Nissan Pathfinder 4x4 loaded with
propane, gasoline, and fertilizer into New York City's Times
Square.\31\ Shahzad failed to successfully detonate the
explosives before a street vendor alerted the New York Police
Department (NYPD) about the abandoned, smoking vehicle.
Following an intense manhunt by Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies, Shahzad was caught 2 days later
attempting to flee at John F. Kennedy International Airport
onboard a departing flight to Dubai.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ ``Profile: Faisal Shahzad,'' BBC News, October 5, 2010.
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11475789.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the subsequent Federal investigation, it was discovered
that Shahzad had purchased the car and explosive materials
through funding provided to him by the TTP. He received a total
of $12,000 in two separate cash payments through hawalas in
Massachusetts and New York, which was sent from a TTP militant
in Pakistan to carry out the attack. During questioning
following his arrest, Shahzad confessed to traveling to
Waziristan, Pakistan in December 2009 to receive explosives
training from members of the TTP at a terrorist training camp,
after which he received an additional $4,000.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ ``Pakistani Taliban helped Faisal Shahzad, it's not on U.S.
list of terrorists?'' Liam Stack, The Christian Science Monitor, June
23, 2010. Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-
security/2010/0623/Pakistani-Taliban-helped-Faisal-Shahzad-it-s-not-on-
US-list-of-terrorists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notably, the State Department did not designate the TTP as
a FTO until September 2010, 4 months after the attempted Times
Square attack.\33\ In summarizing the explanation given by an
unnamed senior counterterrorism official as to why the TTP was
not labeled a FTO sooner, Newsweek magazine wrote: ``Until
relatively recently, the TTP was thought to be targeting the
Pakistani government exclusively--not the United States--and
State Department officials were reluctant to intrude on what
was largely regarded as an internal Pakistani problem.''\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ ``Pakistan Taliban given FTO designation,'' UPI.com Special
Reports, September 2, 2010. Available at: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/
Special/2010/09/02/Pakistani-Taliban-given-FTO-designation/UPI-
22681283446480/.
\34\ ``U.S. Weighs Official `Terrorist Organization' Status for the
Pakistani Taliban,'' Michael Isikoff, The Daily Beast, Newsweek, May
11, 2010. Available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/
declassified/2010/05/11/u-s-weighs-official-terrorist-organization-
status-for-the-pakistani-taliban.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the aftermath of the AQAP and TTP attempted attacks, the
U.S. Intelligence Community admitted to underestimating the
potential of these two groups to launch attacks against the
homeland. The United States cannot afford to miscalculate Boko
Haram's intent and capability to strike the homeland. The
evolution of Boko Haram clearly illustrates it is a group with
fast-growing ambitions. It is important for the U.S.
Intelligence Community to stay ahead of Boko Haram in an effort
to thwart a potential attack against the homeland.
VI. EVOLUTION AND COLLABORATION
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the rise of Boko Haram
in Nigeria is the reports of increasing collaboration between
the group and al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and al Shabaab. The rapid evolution of Boko Haram may
point to the sharing of weapons and expertise among various
terrorist organizations across the African continent.
Changing Tactics and Targets: Suicide Bombers and Western Targets
There has been a significant shift in Boko Haram's targets,
tactics, and geographic reach, particularly in the last year.
The use of a suicide VBIED on the Abuja police barracks in June
2011 marked the first time on record a suicide attack was
carried out in Nigeria. The bomb used was large enough to
destroy 40 other vehicles in the parking lot, and it
demonstrated the sect's ability to launch attacks outside of
its traditional area of operations in the north, proving that
they were now capable of targeting the capital.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ ``The Rising Threat from Nigeria's Boko Haram Militant
Group,'' Scott Stewart, STRATFOR Global Intelligence, November 10,
2011. Available at: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111109-rising-
threatnigerias-boko-haram-militant-group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boko Haram's traditional targets had been those affiliated
with the Nigerian state. Past targets include police stations,
army barracks, banks, churches, markets, teachers, and
universities. Boko Haram has also attacked beer drinkers, card
players, and those engaging in activities that they deem as un-
Islamic.\36\ The sect has also conducted targeted
assassinations against religious and political leaders,
particularly those individuals who have challenged or spoken
out against the group or allied themselves with the government
of Christian President Goodluck Jonathan. Before their recent
bombing campaign, Boko Haram's signature tactic was drive-by
shootings and bombings from motorbikes.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ ``The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria,'' David Cook, CTC
Sentinel, September 2011, pg. 4.
\37\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The suicide attack launched against the U.N. headquarters
in Abuja appears to be Boko Haram's first non-Nigerian,
international target. The driver rammed the car into an exit
gate and then drove into a parking garage before detonating the
VBIED.\38\ This is significant because `` . . . the U.N.
compound was located in the diplomatic district of Abuja, where
numerous high-profile facilities are located, demonstrating
that Boko Haram possessed the ability to spot a soft target
amid harder targets like foreign embassies and government
buildings.''\39\ The group also managed to successfully find
and exploit the security gap at the exit gate. This indicates
that some type of surveillance may have been conducted before
the attack was launched.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Stewart, supra note 35.
\39\ Ibid.
\40\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some have described the attack on the U.N. headquarters as
an attack driven against an entity that cooperates with the
Nigerian government, and is by extension only targeting the
Nigerian state. However, suicide attacks against Western
targets working with the host government have in many instances
marked the beginning of a new and advanced stage of insurgency.
According to David Cook, writing for the West Point Combating
Terrorism Center's CTC Sentinel, ``While the attack on the
police General Headquarters can be seen as a continuation of
Boko Haram's fixation upon the Nigerian police and army, the
United Nations attack is much more in line with other [global
terrorist] organizations, and is strongly reminiscent of the
suicide attack in Baghdad against the United Nations in August
2003, which was one of the opening blows of the Iraqi
insurgency.''\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Cook, supra note 36, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Collaboration with AQIM and al Shabaab
Boko Haram's evolving tactics and targeting may be the
result of ties between AQIM in North Africa and al Shabaab in
Somalia. Such cross-pollination of weapons, tactics, and bomb-
making expertise can quickly increase the capabilities of
terrorist groups, as seen in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas of Pakistan, and may have been a contributing factor to
Boko Haram's advances. The Boko Haram leadership exile from
Nigeria following the 2009 security forces crackdown may have
also contributed. Members of Boko Haram appear to have
connections in Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Sudan, and it is
believed that the sect has also purchased weapons in some of
these countries.\42\ These connections highlight the mobility
and transnational nature of Boko Haram's operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ USAID, supra note 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda militants operating in Nigeria is not
unprecedented. In 2004, the Nigerian government charged
Mohammed Ashafa, a Nigerian national claiming to be operating
an al-Qaeda cell.\43\ These charges included receiving money
from al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan for the purposes of
recruiting and training terrorists to attack Americans in
Nigeria.\44\ In 2008, former police inspector-general, Mike
Okiro, claimed that he had recovered evidence revealing a plot
by bin Laden to conduct a bombing within Nigeria.\45\ The rise
of Boko Haram as a terrorist group in Nigeria may serve as a
means by which al-Qaeda can infiltrate Nigeria. Moreover, a
recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Center's Global
Attitudes Projects on Muslim favorability toward bin Laden
showed Nigerian Muslims as uniquely favorable to bin Laden and
al-Qaeda. Throughout the past decade, Muslim populations have
discredited bin Laden and al-Qaeda. However, unlike their
counterparts elsewhere in the world, just under half--49
percent--of all Nigerian Muslims polled expressed more
favorable views toward bin Laden and al-Qaeda in 2010.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ ``Bin Laden and Nigeria,'' Paul Ohia, This Day Live, May 3,
2011. Available at: http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/bin-laden-and-
nigeria/90683/.
\44\ Ibid.
\45\ Ibid.
\46\ ``Osama bin Laden Largely Discredited Among Muslim Publics in
Recent Years,'' Pew Global Attitudes Project, May 2, 2011. Available
at: http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1977/poll-osama-bin-laden-death-
confidence-muslim-publics-al-qaeda-favorability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the past year, in response to successful
counterterrorism crackdowns by North African governments, AQIM
has reportedly been extending its operations into Mauritania,
Mali, and Niger, among other places. Evidence has surfaced
suggesting that AQIM is making a focused attempt to extend its
area of operations and sphere of influence into the Sahel and
sub-Saharan Africa. In August 2011, a video surfaced showing
two Westerners who were kidnapped for ransom in Nigeria by
AQIM. While kidnappings for ransom are not a new strategy for
AQIM, extending their reach into Nigeria represents a marked
expansion of geographic reach in kidnapping operations.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ ``Al-Qaeda's North African Franchise Moves South,'' Dr. J.
Peter Pham, The Atlantic Council, August 5, 2011. Available at: http://
www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-north-african-
franchise-moves-south.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As AQIM has moved south, it has reportedly become involved
in drug trafficking and cultivated alliances with criminal
organizations in the Sahel to expand its reach and enhance its
operational capacity. According to Dr. J. Peter Pham, this
strategy is, in effect, the ``subcontracting'' of operations to
local militant groups.\48\ As Mohammed Mokaddem, an Algerian
journalist and author of a recent book about AQIM stated:
``[AQIM] has never hidden its ambition to bring in the
Islamists of Nigeria in particular at the very moment when
sectarian strife and conflict between Muslims and Christians is
on the rise.''\49\ U.S. intelligence officials have also
suspected that AQIM operatives were extending their reach
southward. Three years ago, in the 2008 Annual Threat
Assessment from the U.S. Intelligence Community, AQIM's reach
into Nigeria was clear: ``AQIM traditionally has operated in
Algeria and northern Mali and has recruited and trained an
unknown, but probably small, number of extremists from Tunisia,
Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, and other countries.''\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Ibid.
\49\ Ibid.
\50\ ``Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for
the Senate Armed Services Committee,'' J. Michael McConnell, Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, February 27, 2008, pg. 6.
Available at: http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080227_testimony.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
African governments have been open about their concerns
regarding Boko Haram and AQIM collaboration. In November 2011,
the Algerian Deputy Foreign Minister, Abdelkader Messahel,
issued a public warning that Algerian intelligence found
evidence of cooperation between Boko Haram and AQIM. ``We have
no doubts that coordination exists between Boko Haram and al-
Qaeda. The way both groups operate and intelligence reports
show there is cooperation.''\51\ Algeria's public
acknowledgement of cooperation between Boko Haram and AQIM is
significant. Algeria currently serves as AQIM's base of
operations and the Algerian government conducts the largest
intelligence-gathering operation on AQIM of any country in
Africa.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ ``Algeria says Nigeria's Boko Haram tied to al Qaeda,''
Reuters, MSNBC, November 13, 2011. Available at: http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45277821/ns/world_news-africa/#.
\52\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boko Haram has also been reportedly collaborating with al
Shabaab, an al-Qaeda linked militant Islamist group in Somalia
and a U.S. State Department designated FTO. It has been
reported that some members of Boko Haram have trained in
Somalia as al Shabaab has made an effort in recent years to
recruit outsiders in both Africa and the United States. Despite
being involved in a civil war, al Shabaab has launched attacks
outside of Somalia, most notably twin suicide nightclub
bombings during the World Cup in Kampala, Uganda on July 11,
2010.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ ``Al-Shabaab,'' National Counterterrorism Center profile.
Available at: http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Skeptics of Boko Haram's ties to al Shabaab cite the fact
that both groups are concerned mainly with their respective
countries. Somalia and Nigeria are on opposite ends of the
continent, making the long distance between them a hindrance to
cooperation. However, members of Boko Haram's leadership have
studied in Saudi Arabia and desire to build relationships with
other extremists outside Nigeria. \54\ Most importantly,
however, Boko Haram has admitted to establishing links in
Somalia. A statement allegedly released by the sect read,
``Very soon, we will wage jihad . . . We want to make it known
that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where
they received real training on warfare from our brethren who
made that country ungovernable . . . This time round, our
attacks will be fiercer and wider than they have been.''\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ USAID, supra note 10.
\55\ ``From Somalia to Nigeria: Jihad,'' Katherine Zimmerman, The
Weekly Standard, June 18, 2011. Available at: http://
www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/somalia-nigeria-jihad_574838.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A General's Warning
On August 17, 2011, U.S. Army General Carter F. Ham,
Commander of AFRICOM called attention to Boko Haram's expanding
ambitions, telling the Associated Press that intelligence
indicated Boko Haram had made contact with operatives from both
AQIM and al Shabaab:
``What is most worrying at present is, at least in my
view, a clearly stated intent by Boko Haram and by al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to coordinate and
synchronize their efforts. I'm not so sure they're able
to do that just yet, but it's clear to me they have the
desire and intent to do that.''\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ ``Nigeria's Boko Haram: Al-Qaeda's New Friend in Africa?''
Karen Leigh, TIME Magazine. August 17, 2011. Available at: http://
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2091137,00.html.
On June 14, 2010, AQIM leader Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud, also
known as Abdelmalik Droukdel, told al-Jazeera that his group
would provide Boko Haram with weapons, support, and
training.\57\ Since those comments, there have been public
reports that Boko Haram fighters have been seen training in
AQIM camps.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Stewart, supra note 35.
\58\ Stewart, supra note 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In August 2011, one week before the U.N. bombing in August,
Nigerian authorities arrested two Boko Haram militants. The
detainees, who were still in custody after the U.N. bombing,
allegedly told Nigerian investigators that another Boko Haram
member, Mamman Nur, had led the attack. Nur reportedly has
links to al-Qaeda and had recently returned from Somalia.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ ``Nigeria says Boko Haram, al Qaeda link behind U.N. attack,''
Camillus Eboh, Reuters, August 31, 2011. Available at: http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/31/us-nigeria-bomb-
investigationidUSTRE77U3BM20110831.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2011, European Union Counterterrorism
Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove warned of collaboration between
the two groups: ``There is still nothing structural. There are
efforts at contacts, and small transfers of money. It seems
that some members of Boko Haram and al Shabaab were trained by
AQIM.''\60\ The increasing sophistication of the attacks seems
to support Mr. de Kerchove's belief that Boko Haram militants
have received training and weapons from AQIM. Moreover,
purported leaders of the sect have publically praised Osama bin
Laden and al-Qaeda. Some reports suggest the bombing may have
been a message from Boko Haram to AQIM signaling its desire to
cooperate in terrorist operations.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ ``EU official warns of spreading al-Qaida offshoot,'' Jorge
Benitez, NATO Source Alliance News Blog, The Atlantic Council,
September 9, 2011. Available at: http://www.acus.org/natosource/eu-
official-warnsspreading-al-qaida-offshoot.
\61\ Leigh, supra note 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than the threat of any two of these groups
collaborating would be the threat of all three collaborating
together. AFRICOM Commander General Ham warned that while he
doubts the ability of Boko Haram, AQIM, and al Shabaab to carry
out attacks against the United States directly at the moment,
he does not doubt their intent to do so. General Ham has warned
about the potential for a transnational terrorist network to
develop in Africa if the rising threat potential of these three
groups is left unchecked:
``Each of those three independently, I think, presents
a significant threat not only in the nations in which
they primarily operate but regionally and . . . to the
United States. Those three organizations have very
explicitly and publicly voiced an intent to target
Westerners and the U.S. specifically. . . . If left
unaddressed, then you could have a network that ranges
from East Africa through the center and into the Sahel
and Maghreb, and I think that would be very, very
worrying.''\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ ``African Islamist group seen as U.S. threat--general,'' David
Alexander, Reuters, September 15, 2011. Available at: http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/us-usa-defense-africa-
idUSTRE78E13920110915.
Recently, a statement from a purported spokesman for Boko
Haram, Abul Qaqa, appeared to validate the concerns of General
Ham and others. On November 24, 2011, Abul Qaqa admitted that
the sect does receive assistance from al-Qaeda, presumably
AQIM, stating: ``It is true that we have links with al Qaeda.
They assist us and we assist them.''\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ ``Boko Haram claims al-Qaeda links,'' News24, November 24,
2011. Available at: http://m.news24.com/news24/Africa/News/Boko-Haram-
claims-al-Qaeda-links-20111124.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potential Future Targets: Energy and Aviation Sector
Nigeria has proven reserves of up to 36 billion barrels of
oil, the 10th largest in the world.\64\ It is the largest oil
producer in Africa and the fourth-largest supplier of oil to
the United States. As of August 2011, the United States was
importing 854,000 barrels of oil per day from Nigeria.\65\ In
2010, this amounted to 43 percent of Nigeria's total petroleum
exports and 8 percent of total U.S. petroleum imports.\66\
Nigeria also exports a mostly sulfur-free sweet crude, which
U.S. refineries prefer to the heavier oil imported from Persian
Gulf and Caribbean sources.\67\ As a member of the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Nigeria has proven
that it can flex its economic muscle and impact global oil
production. In short, disruptions to Nigerian oil production
can impact domestic refining in the United States and affect
global oil markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ ``Why Nigeria Matters,'' Dr. J. Peter Pham, New Atlanticist
Blog, The Atlantic Council, April 4, 2011. Available at: http://
www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/why-nigeria-matters-0.
\65\ ``Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports Top 15 Countries,''
U.S. Energy Information Administration, August 2011 data. Available at:
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/
company_level_imports/current/import.html.
\66\ U.S. Energy Information Administration Nigeria Analysis.
Available at: http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI.
\67\ Pham, supra note 64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Niger Delta, where most Nigerian oil production takes
place, has a long history of instability and violence.
Kidnappings, bombings, and attacks on oil facilities are
routinely carried out by militant groups who feel
disenfranchised and left out of the wealth that oil production
generates. While these groups have been hesitant to inflict
truly crippling damage against these facilities because they
have some economic stake in them, Boko Haram, which is believed
to have no financial interest in the plants, has no such
reservations.\68\ Niger Delta militants have in the past cut
Nigerian oil production significantly through sustained attacks
on oil facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ In the past, Boko Haram has carried out armed bank robberies
and has distributed whatever money it has stolen to the general
population rather than keeping it. While Niger Delta militants may rely
on the theft of oil for their primary means of financing, Boko Haram's
financing comes from different sources and would be less inclined to be
concerned with the affects of production being completely shut down.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2007, protestors from the Ogoni tribe in the Niger
Delta overran an oil pipeline, cutting Nigerian oil production
by 30 percent.\69\ That same month, militants from the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), bombed three
pipelines, decreasing oil production by 100,000 barrels a day
for the Italian oil company Eni. This disruption caused oil
prices to rise by 71 cents a barrel in New York.\70\ A well-
coordinated attack by Boko Haram could result in far worse
damage, completely cutting off Nigerian oil production in a
worst-case scenario. If that occurred, 8 percent of U.S. oil
imports would be cut off, which could result in a spike in oil
prices worldwide and soaring domestic gas prices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ ``Nigerian Oil Production Falls After a Pipeline Hub is
Overrun,'' Lydia Polgreen, The New York Times, May 16, 2007. Available
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/16/business/worldbusiness/
16oil.html.
\70\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Boko Haram is based in the north, recent reports
indicate that Nigerian security services were searching for
Boko Haram members who had allegedly infiltrated southern
territory.\71\ Niger Delta militants also released a statement
warning Boko Haram against any incursions into the Delta
territory, vowing to join with security forces to drive them
out if necessary.\72\ Given the vulnerability of Niger Delta
oil facilities, and the potential powder keg of multiple
militant factions squaring off against each other, Boko Haram's
infiltration into this area should be closely monitored by the
United States and allies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ ``Boko Haram in the Niger Delta,'' John Campbell, Africa in
Transition blog, September 19, 2011. Available at: http://
blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2011/09/19/boko-haram-in-the-niger-delta/.
\72\ ``Boko Haram: N-Delta militants volunteer to join forces with
army,'' Emma Amaize, Sweet Crude Reports, September 20, 2011. Available
at: http://sweetcrudereports.com/2011/09/21/boko-haram-n-
deltamilitants-volunteer-to-join-forces-with-army/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed previously, Boko Haram has already adopted
many of al-Qaeda's targeting tactics. If Boko Haram continues
this trend, Nigerian oil facilities will be in thecrosshairs.
In 2006, al-Qaeda struck the Abqaiq oil facility in eastern
Saudi Arabia. Abqaiq is one of the largest oil fields in the
world with a capacity of 7 million barrels per day.\73\
According to open source intelligence, on February 24, 2006,
two suicide bombers attempted to drive two cars loaded with
explosives into the compound. This operation--and many others--
mirror recently adopted Boko Haram tactics, including the use
of suicide bombers and multiple VBIED attacks.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ ``The Impact of the Abqaiq Attack on Saudi Energy Security,''
Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), February 27, 2006, pg. 2. Available at: http://csis.org/files/
media/csis/pubs/060227_abqaiqattack.pdf.
\74\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In September 2011, threats made by Boko Haram to bomb Lagos
Airport prompted security officials to search all vehicles
approaching the airport, causing major disruptions.\75\
Although aviation has not yet been a Boko Haram target, it is
worth noting that Nigeria is a major destination for Western
travelers. On August 26, 2000, the United States and Nigeria
signed an open skies agreement to expand commercial aviation
between them. This agreement established a direct flight from
Lagos to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York
City, easing air travel to and from Nigeria\76\ It is
conceivable that Boko Haram may seek to take advantage of the
tremendous volume of Western passenger traffic coming through
Nigeria and the security vulnerabilities that volume creates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ ``Bomb scare disrupts Lagos airport road activities,''
Emmanuel Chidiogo, DailyTimesNG, September 24, 2011. Available at:
http://dailytimes.com.ng/article/bomb-scare-disrupt-lagos-airport-road-
activities.
\76\ ``Nigeria,'' Encyclopedia of the Nations. Available at: http:/
/www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria.html. The full
text of the agreement, formally titled ``Air Transport Agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,'' can be accessed on the
Department of State's website: http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ata/
n/ni/114137.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the attempted Christmas Day attack in 2009,
investigations revealed that four full-body scanners given to
Nigeria by the United States in 2008 had gone unused; top
officials were found to have been unaware of their placement in
Nigeria's four main airports.\77\ Nigerian airports began to
use body scanners actively in 2010. The United States can
assist Nigeria in improving security at its major airports
through efforts such as providing full-body scanners and
security training. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) can train Nigerian
immigration officials in how to more effectively identify
individuals who can pose a threat to homeland security, process
and admit foreign travelers, and share passenger name record
information (PNR) to prevent another incident similar to 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ ``U.S. scanners went unused at Nigeria airport,'' Associated
Press, MSNBC, December 31, 2009. Available at: http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34645445/ns/us_news-airliner_security/t/us-
scanners-went-unused-nigeria-airport/#.TsQzi1ZBU8k.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. COMMUNICATIONS AND MEDIA
Martyrdom Videos
On September 18, 2011, BBC News reported that Agence France
Presse (AFP) news agency obtained two videos, each 25 minutes
in length, of the Boko Haram U.N. bomber that had surfaced in
Nigeria. Pictured holding an AK-47 rifle with two other people
standing against a wall, the suicide bomber asked his family to
understand his decision and explained that the bombing was
designed to send a message to the ``U.S. President and `other
infidels.' ''\78\ The man, whom an alleged Boko Haram spokesman
identified as Mohammed Abul Barra from Maiduguri, also referred
to the United Nations as a ``forum for all global evil'' and
praised Osama bin Laden.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ BBC News, supra note 1.
\79\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A BBC correspondent, Jonah Fischer, based in Nigeria, wrote
in a brief analysis that the existence of these videos signals
an elevation in the sophistication of Boko Haram's methods of
communication. ``They show an organization which is far
different from the local group fighting a tit-for-tat battle
with the army and police in northern Nigeria,'' said Fischer.
``This is another indication that this is now another beast,
more international in its ambitions.''\80\ The correspondent
also suggested that the sophistication of the U.N. attack and
the use of more advanced communication methods may signal the
support of outside help.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ ``Analysis--Nigeria UN bomb: Video of `Boko Haram' bomber
released,'' Jonah Fisher, BBC News, September 18, 2011. Available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14964554.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Forums
Even more indicative of the growing sophistication and
threat potential of Boko Haram is the group's increased use of
internet forums. In July 2010, the alleged leader of Boko
Haram, Imam Abubakar Shekau, issued an online statement
praising al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and offered condolences for
the recent killing of AQI members. In this statement, Shekau
warned the United States, ``Don't think jihad is over. Rather,
jihad has just begun. O America, die with your fury.''\81\ This
statement coincided with an online presence the group developed
in 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ ``Suicide bomber hits UN office in Nigerian capital,'' Bill
Roggio, The Long War Journal, August 26, 2011. Available at: http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/11/boko_haram_kills_sco.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to a September 28, 2011 report published by the
SITE Intelligence Group, Boko Haram had developed an increased
online presence that ``seems to have contributed to the rapid
increase in their strength.''\82\ According to the report, a
representative of Boko Haram who went by the name ``Abu
Sabaya'' began posting requests for help on the prominent
jihadi forum Ansar al-Mijahideen English Forum (AMEF) in March
2010. He has solicited advice on fundraising and Arabic
translation programs and has sought information on how to
hinder the operations of security services monitoring the sect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ ``Boko Haram Representative Solicits Guidance and Assistance
on Jihadist Forums,'' Rita Katz and Margaret Foster, SITE Intelligence
Group, September 28, 2011, pg 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The forums have provided fertile ground for raising
interest in Boko Haram's cause, and providing possible
fundraising and recruitment opportunities. One member,
``Aydan,'' predicted that Nigeria would become a new front in
the global jihad, writing, ``I guess a new front is about to
open.''\83\ Abu Sabaya continued to post calls for help with
the development of Boko Haram. In one post, he described the
sect's efforts to build its propaganda and media capacity,
stating: ``As for the media productions . . . we are rigorously
working on them . . . we lack vibrant media experts in video
production.''\84\ AMEF member Abu Hafs al-Gharib replied,
suggesting that Boko Haram build links with an official jihadi
media center, such as the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) or
the al-Fajr Media Center. Linking with one or both of these
centers would provide Boko Haram with much needed technical
assistance and would also increase its legitimacy among the
jihadi community. Linking with the official media centers was
also the strategy al Shabaab adopted before it became a
mainstream terror organization. In other posts written on 6
October and 27 October, Abu Sabaya requested fundraising advice
and sought guidance on enhancing organizational structure and
management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Ibid., 2 & 3.
\84\ Ibid., 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Encouraged by Abu Sabaya's posts, other AMEF members began
calling for jihad in Nigeria. In response to one post, a member
who goes by ``TheRealTruth'' stressed the need for fighters to
travel to Nigeria now, because security services have not yet
been effective in securing borders, writing: ``Sounds like a
call! Where are the jealous sons of Islam to answer it! Right
now its east [sic] to go to Nigeria, but may not be in the
future . . . and another opportunity may slip us by!''\85\
Echoing warnings by General Ham, forum member Abu Hafs al-
Gharib responded by outlining a regional insurgency, stating:
``Inshallah (Allah willing), Mujahideen from West Africa would
be join with the brothers in Nigeria . . . jihad [will] spread
out from North Africa, East Africa, West Africa and soon
Central Africa . . . ''.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ Ibid., 5.
\86\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not only is Boko Haram soliciting advice from AMEF members,
but its posts appear to verify growing links between the sect
and AQIM. One member, ``Ansar AQIM,'' is an administrator and
highly-regarded member of the forum. His posting history
indicates that he has ties to AQIM. In an October 2010 post, he
described links between Boko Haram and AQIM, claiming that AQIM
commanders had arrived in Nigeria to train Boko Haram fighters.
His full post read:
``The assistance from the commanders of Al-Qaida in the
Islamic Maghreb has reached Nigeria. I can't give any
numbers of how many brothers from the Sahel region
moved back to Nigeria to train the youth of the
tawheed.''\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ Ibid., 6.
According to the report, Abu Sabaya's updates during the
spring and summer of 2011 ``described a much-emboldened
group.''\88\ On July 25, 2011, he announced in a post that the
sect had successfully recruited defectors from the Nigerian
security forces after they were sent to subdue Boko Haram
fighters. The frequency of Abu Sabaya's statements also
increased, as he began to claim responsibility for attacks,
showcasing the sect's increased activity and capabilities
during the summer of 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIII. OPTIONS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT
The rise of the potential threat of Boko Haram poses a new
challenge to United States interests in a region where
significant threats to U.S. National security already exist.
However, the United States has also been presented with a
unique window of opportunity. If the United States acts quickly
on the military, intelligence, and diplomatic fronts, it can
ensure the relative protection of U.S. interests while
assisting the Nigerian government in containing Boko Haram.
Nigeria has a population of over 150 million people, making
it Africa's most populous country. Nigeria also enjoys the
continent's second-largest economy and has become a major
regional player since transitioning from military to democratic
rule in 1999. Nigeria's contributions to regional stability
have not gone unnoticed in the United States. Speaking at an
event in October 2011, General Ham noted, ``Nigeria is the
leading country for most activities in West Africa, in the Gulf
of Guinea. They lead a number of other missions in a variety of
places.''\89\ Nigeria's capital, Abuja, has played a major role
in resolving regional disputes. It is the fourth-largest troop
contributor to U.N. peacekeeping missions in the world.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ ``General Carter F. Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa Command,''
Center for Strategic and International Studies Military Strategy Forum,
October 4, 2011. Available at: http://csis.org/event/military-strategy-
forum-general-carter-f-ham-commander-us-africa-command.
\90\ ``Nigeria: Elections and Issues for Congress,'' Lauren Ploch,
Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2011, pg. 1. Available at:
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33964_20110401.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, the deteriorating security situation in
Nigeria is a cause for concern, especially as Boko Haram's
attacks become more sophisticated, coordinated, and deadly.
Boko Haram and other terrorist groups such as AQIM--which is
looking to expand its reach across Africa--would likely feel
encouraged to exploit a destabilized Nigeria. Moreover, further
instability could force Nigeria to pull out of various
peacekeeping missions in order to increase manpower at home. If
Nigeria were to collapse and become a failed state or descend
into civil war, it could have negative implications for the
United States and its allies.
In short, the rising threat of Boko Haram presents the
United States with an opportunity to expand diplomatic and
military engagement with both Abuja and Nigerian Muslims in the
north.
Military and Intelligence Support
U.S. security assistance to Nigeria was suspended briefly
from 2003-2006 while the State Department restarted its
International Military Education and Training Program.\91\
Since then, U.S. security assistance to Nigeria has steadily
increased. According to General Ham, the U.S. military
currently enjoys ``a very longstanding, and very helpful, very
useful naval and air military relationship [with
Nigeria].''\92\ In 2007, the U.S. Navy started the African
Partnership Station as part of a larger effort to enhance
security in the Gulf of Guinea. This program has included
visits to Nigerian ports and regional naval exercises with
Nigerian and European counterparts. The United States also
provides military training with an emphasis on respect for
human rights and civilian authority. The State Department,
which has also engaged Nigeria through its African Coastal and
Border Security (ACBS) program, has focused its assistance on
peacekeeping support, training, border and maritime security,
and increasing military professionalization.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Ploch, supra note 90, at 30.
\92\ Center for Strategic and International Studies, supra note 89.
\93\ Ploch, supra note 90, at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cooperation exists to a lesser extent between the U.S. and
Nigerian armies. Nigeria is a participant in the National Guard
State Partnership Program and coordinates activities
specifically with the California National Guard. The Nigerian
Army has also received counterterrorism funding from the
Department of Defense: $2.2 million for the development of a
counterterrorism infantry unit, and another $6.2 million
designated to the tactical communications and interoperability
within its counterterrorism unit.\94\ General Ham has reported
that cooperation between the two armies is steadily increasing
and has noted that the U.S.-Nigerian military relationship is
in part being shaped by the rise of Boko Haram:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ Ibid., 31.
`` . . . in my visit to Abuja I had a great meeting
with the chief of the army staff following President
Jonathan's visit here with President Obama. And I
think, we're now starting to find ways in which we can
cooperate more closely. Very clearly Boko Haram has
altered that relationship somewhat. And so we're
looking for ways in which we can help, ways that
Nigeria would like us to give help in developing their
counterterrorist capabilities . . . ''\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Center for Strategic and International Studies, supra note 89.
General Ham proposed that the development of Nigeria's
counterterrorism capabilities could include providing non-
lethal equipment and training, and helping security forces to
be more precise in their use of force.
Despite General Ham's positive reviews of U.S.-Nigerian
military cooperation, Nigerian capacity to combat Boko Haram in
the north is limited. According to sources following the
attacks, soldiers deployed in northern Nigeria have been
deserting due to a lack of pay. Morale has been reported to be
generally low among security forces based in the north.
Residents feel that the security situation will continue to
deteriorate, in part due to the fact that senior commanders
still do not appear to take the threat posed by Boko Haram
seriously. The inability of the government to pay its soldiers
and the lack of urgency among senior commanders regarding the
increasingly violent attacks waged by Boko Haram underscore the
challenges the Nigerian state faces in to confronting this
problem.
It is critical that the United States work more closely
with Nigerian security forces to develop greater domestic
intelligence collection and sharing with the U.S. Intelligence
Community. Military cooperation is vital to a successful
counterterrorism strategy. A possible model includes Yemen,
with whom the United States built an effective intelligence
sharing partnership following the Christmas Day 2009 attempted
attack to hunt suspected militants. While this relationship
continues to pose challenges, it has had notable success,
highlighted by the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki.
In a recent display of growing international concern
surrounding the rise of Boko Haram, France has offered military
support to Nigeria. Meeting in Abuja with his Nigerian
counterpart, Olugbenga Ashira, French Foreign Minister Alain
Juppe stated: ``We shall fight against this phenomenon. We are
ready to share any information. We are ready to coordinate our
intelligence services. We are ready also to give our help in
training cooperation . . . France is directly concerned with
the question of terrorism. It goes against our interest in the
region and so we are in complete solidarity with the countries
of the region around the sub Sahara and around the Sahel . . .
''\96\ Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika, the Nigerian Army
Chief of Staff, said that in addition to the United States and
France, Pakistan and Britain have also offered to assist with
counterterrorism training.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ ``France to help Nigeria with Boko Haram militants,''
defenceWeb, November 14, 2011. Available at: http://
www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=-
21097:france-to-helpnigeria-with-boko-haram-
militants&catid=56:diplomacy-a-peace&-Itemid=- 111.
\97\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diplomatic Engagement
The United States has begun to engage Nigerian Muslims,
primarily through two U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) programs in the northern states of Bauchi and
Sokoto.\98\ Moreover, Nigeria serves as a minor partner in the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a State
Department initiative aimed at helping a number of African
countries in the Trans-Sahara and Sahel regions combat
terrorist organizations.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ Ploch, supra note 90, at 30.
\99\ ``The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,'' U.S. Africa
Command website, http://www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp. TSCTP partners
include Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
and Senegal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Active public outreach to Nigerian Muslims plays a critical
role in containing Boko Haram. Boko Haram has so far rejected
negotiations with the Nigerian government, and has attacked and
killed Muslim leaders who supported the election of President
Jonathan. The United States has begun to take steps to promote
government action on the numerous grievances that plague the
north and hinder the prospect of talks between Boko Haram and
the Nigerian government.
The United States is one of the largest providers of non-
military aid to Nigeria.\100\ In 2010, Abuja received roughly
$614 million in aid from the United States. This aid is focused
on programs in democratic governance, economic reform, security
service reform and professionalization, and education and
health care services. However, the majority of the aid goes to
HIV/AIDS programs.\101\ In 2010, the Obama Administration
established the U.S.-Nigeria Bilateral Commission to encourage
dialogue on issues ranging from security and energy to anti-
corruption as requested by Congress in H.R. 2410, the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011. The
Commission is composed of four working groups that meet on a
regular basis: Good Governance, Transparency and Integrity;
Food Security and Agriculture; Energy and Investment; and Niger
Delta and Security Cooperation.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Ploch, supra note 90, at 29.
\101\ Ibid.
\102\ Ibid., 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States has begun to publicly pressure the
government to tackle corruption, encourage greater investment
in the north, address poverty and joblessness, and promote
government accountability and transparency. Recent statements
by U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Terence P. McCulley pressuring
the government to address these problems are a significant
starting point, and such pressure should continue.
Additionally, a USAID program called Leadership, Empowerment,
Advocacy, and Development (LEAD), is assisting northern
governments build partnerships between state and local
governments and the private sector. The goal of this program is
to improve accountability, governance, and the delivery of
essential services.\103\ Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria,
John Campbell, suggests the United States could also support
efforts to ``make modern education more palatable to an Islamic
population.''\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Ibid., 30.
\104\ ``To Battle Nigeria's Boko Haram, Put Down Your Guns,'' John
Campbell, Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2011. Available at: http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68249/john-campbell/to-battle-nigerias-
boko-haram-put-down-your-guns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to increasing government transparency and
accountability, concerns regarding airport security, the
economy, and education must also be addressed. The Nigerian
government has taken steps to improve airport security after
the attempted Christmas Day airline bombing over Detroit, but
the government has been less effective in addressing the
economic and educational issues that plague the north. In these
areas, the United States has begun to implement programs to
assist local and state governments.
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Designation
According to the U.S. State Department, ``the Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department (S/CT)
continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active
around the world to identify potential targets for designation.
When reviewing targets of specific groups, S/CT looks not only
at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out,
but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and
preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains
the capability and intent to carry out such acts.''\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Complete information regarding legal criteria for FTO
designation can be found at the website of the U.S. Department of
State, Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Available at: http:/
/www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The legal criteria for FTO designation includes the
following:
1. LIt must be a foreign organization.
2. LThe organization must engage in terrorist
activity, as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA
(8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined
in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22
U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and
intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. LThe organization's terrorist activity or terrorism
must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the
national security (national defense, foreign relations,
or the economic interests) of the United States.
Based on Boko Haram's evolution and recent public warnings
by the U.S. State Department to U.S. citizens in Nigeria, Boko
Haram may meet the legal criteria for State Department FTO
designation.\106\ Such designations are subject to a rigorous
statutory process and through investigation, which the State
Department needs to initiate. If Boko Haram were to be
designated an FTO, it would support U.S. Intelligence Community
efforts to curb the group's financing, stigmatize and isolate
it internationally, heighten public awareness and knowledge,
and signal to other governments the United States takes the
threat from Boko Haram seriously.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ ``Emergency Message for American Citizens,'' United States
Diplomatic Mission to Nigeria, November 5, 2011. Available at: http://
nigeria.usembassy.gov/emac_2011.html.
\107\ U.S. Department of State, supra note 105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IX. CONCLUSION
Boko Haram's attacks are occurring at their greatest
frequency since the sect emerged from hiding in 2010. The
sophistication of its tactics, use of the internet, and its
recent attack on the U.N. headquarters in Abuja all point to a
dangerously evolving organization.
Debate exists regarding Boko Haram. Some believe it is
little more than a grassroots insurrection with no defined
leader or structure. Others believe that core Boko Haram, as it
is understood, is a very small group of individuals who simply
consider themselves to be the followers of their slain leader
Mohammed Yusuf. Despite our lack of understanding of Boko
Haram, the movement appears to have significant sympathy among
many Nigerian Muslims. Coupled with the grievances that plague
the north, the environment is ripe for recruitment. Recent
evidence alludes to the sect's potential desire to join the
ranks of international jihadist organizations. American,
Nigerian, other African, and European officials have all
expressed concern over the sect's communication with AQIM and
al Shabaab. An alliance, or at the very least cooperation
between the groups, can prove costly for the stability of
Africa, the Sahel, and American interests.
Perhaps most striking is how little is known about Boko
Haram. The sect remained relatively off the radar screen of the
U.S. Intelligence Community until the U.N. headquarters attack,
its first non-Nigerian, international target. Similar attacks
have signaled the beginning of new phases for other extremist
groups such as AQIM in the past.
The U.S. Intelligence Community has underestimated the
threat potential of terrorist organizations in the recent past,
most notably AQAP in Yemen and TTP, the Pakistani Taliban. Both
of these groups were believed to be focusing on regional
targets in the Arabian Peninsula and South Asia. The attempted
bombing of a U.S. passenger jet over Detroit on Christmas Day
2009 by a Nigerian Muslim trained by AQAP, and the attempted
bombing of New York's Times Square by a Pakistani American
trained by TTP left many in the Intelligence Community caught
off guard. This report seeks to avoid another intelligence
lapse by calling attention to the potential threat Boko Haram
can pose to U.S. interests abroad and in the homeland. At this
time, the risk of an attack by Boko Haram on the U.S. homeland
may be low, but it is advisable to take the threat seriously
and prepare accordingly.