[Senate Prints 111-51]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


111th Congress 
 2d Session                 COMMITTEE PRINT                     S. Prt.
                                                                 111-51
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
                         HAITI AT A CROSSROADS

                               __________

                                A REPORT


                             TO THE MEMBERS


                                 OF THE


                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                             Second Session

                              JUNE 22, 2010

                                     





                  U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                 JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California            JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
                  Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
            Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director

                                  (ii)
?



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v
Executive Summary................................................     1
Ten Critical Issues for Haiti's Rebuilding.......................     2
Discussion.......................................................     4
Conclusion.......................................................     8
Appendix.........................................................     9

                                 (iii)
?

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                     Washington, DC, June 22, 2010.

    Dear Colleagues: This report by the committee majority 
staff is part of an ongoing examination of the effectiveness of 
the relief and recovery effort in Haiti in response to the 
January 12, 2010, earthquake.
    On May 25, 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
passed the Kerry-Corker Haiti Empowerment, Assistance and 
Rebuilding Act of 2010, S. 3317. This bill authorizes $2 
billion over 2 years to support the sustainable recovery and 
long-term rebuilding of Haiti. The legislation establishes a 
policy framework that emphasizes just, democratic and competent 
governance and investments in people, particularly women and 
children. It tasks the U.S. Agency for International 
Development to put together a comprehensive rebuilding and 
development strategy for Haiti. And it establishes a senior 
Haiti policy coordinator responsible for advising and 
coordinating U.S. policy toward Haiti.
    The committee takes seriously its responsibility to oversee 
the expenditure of the funds that the U.S. Government has 
pledged and spent in Haiti, and to ensure that the 
administration has the policy, personnel, and processes in 
place for effective use of funds within the strategy. While any 
sustainable strategy for rebuilding Haiti must be Haitian-led, 
given the dire circumstances in Haiti and the decimation of 
Haiti's civil service, the United States and other donors must 
take an active role in guiding the reconstruction process. This 
report highlights 10 critical issues for Haiti's rebuilding 
that require urgent attention by the Government of Haiti and 
the Obama administration.
    The report is based on extensive staff interviews with 
State Department, USAID, Haitian civil society and NGOs, U.N. 
officials, Haitian Government ministries, as well as site 
visits to hospitals, health clinics, schools, temporary 
settlement camps and emergency relocation camps.
    Five months after the earthquake, Haiti is at a crossroads. 
The Haitian Government is faced with daunting challenges in 
many areas--infrastructure, resettlement, job creation, 
education, health, justice and security--and it must confront 
these challenges with reduced capacity. It is essential that 
the United States and the international donor community improve 
their coordination and help an under-resourced Haitian 
Government make important policy decisions and address key 
rebuilding challenges before any more time passes.
            Sincerely,
                                             John F. Kerry,
                                                          Chairman.

                                  (v)



                         HAITI AT A CROSSROADS

                              ----------                              


                           Executive Summary

    Haiti needs to be rebuilt in a sustainable way that 
considers the long-term future of the country and the people. 
This needs to be a Haitian-owned process, led by the Government 
of Haiti, but circumstances demand strong and strategic support 
from the donor community.
    Five months after a devastating earthquake struck Haiti on 
January 12, 2010, leading to the deaths of approximately 
230,000 people and the displacement of millions, there are 
worrisome signs that the rebuilding process in Haiti has 
stalled. Haiti is at a significant crossroads, with limited 
time to enact key policies and programs that will allow the 
country to build a more sustainable and prosperous future. As 
the sense of immediate crisis has subsided, so has the sense of 
urgency to undertake bold action--the ``reimagination'' of 
Haiti hoped for months ago--and the commitment to prevent a 
return to the dysfunctional, unsustainable ways of life past.
    The donor community, working with a devastated and often 
overwhelmed Government, has done a remarkable job in the relief 
phase, forestalling potentially disastrous humanitarian 
consequences, and providing consistent access to food, water, 
medical supplies, shelter and other basic services. The U.S. 
Government response in particular has contributed to the 
overall success of international humanitarian efforts--it is 
important to acknowledge the tremendous time, effort, and 
energy expended getting people into safer conditions in the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake.
    However, the reconstruction remains uncertain. Rubble is 
still strewn all over the streets, the majority of buildings 
are damaged if not collapsed, and informal tent settlements--in 
penurious conditions--have sprouted everywhere. Emblematic of 
the stalled rebuilding effort is the Presidential Palace, which 
remains conspicuously in ruins, without any signs of 
scaffolding or construction.
    Plans for moving the displaced population out of tent 
cities and into more durable shelter, not to mention permanent 
housing, remain in early draft form. This is particularly 
alarming given the onset of the hurricane season. Even a modest 
hurricane could kill many thousands. The current rainy season 
also threatens lives by increasing the spread of communicable 
diseases, particularly in the squalor of the camps.
    Even before the earthquake, Haiti faced significant 
developmental challenges. Fewer than 30 percent of Haitians had 
access to electricity, with roughly half of users tapping into 
the national grid illegally. There were longstanding problems 
with garbage and solid waste removal. Clogged canals presented 
serious and recurring risks of flooding. As one official noted, 
it is hard to separate what is due to the poverty levels that 
predated the earthquake and what is due to the earthquake 
itself, in a country where approximately 80 percent of the 
country lived on less than $2 a day, even before the 
earthquake.
    The enormous difficulties that confronted Haiti for decades 
have only been compounded by the devastation of the earthquake, 
adding urgency to the critical issues that have the potential 
to derail the effort to rebuild the country if they are not 
adequately addressed in the coming weeks.


               ten critical issues for haiti's rebuilding


   Establish a feasible, comprehensive rebuilding 
        strategy. While the Haitian Government's Action Plan 
        for National Recovery and Development in Haiti 
        represented a good start, much more work is needed to 
        translate broad concepts into implementable programs 
        that will catalyze and guide the rebuilding process. 
        Haitians are waiting for more concrete guidance on 
        everything from where displaced persons can resettle 
        and how the education system will be rebuilt to plans 
        for economic decentralization and private sector 
        investment. Fundamentally, Haitians want to know how 
        they are going to be able to earn a living and send 
        their children to school. Right now these questions 
        remain unanswered. The lack of a plan and the failure 
        to build political support for one makes even small 
        obstacles seem difficult.
   Build leadership and capacity in the Government of 
        Haiti. The Government of Haiti was decimated by the 
        earthquake, losing civil servants, senior leaders, the 
        Presidential Palace and most of the ministry buildings. 
        Haiti and its leaders remain in shock and mourning, and 
        there is a sense of national exhaustion and frustration 
        caused by the fact that the earthquake hit just as 
        certain positive trends were developing. It is 
        understandable that having lost so many of its own 
        personnel in the earthquake, the Government of Haiti 
        has limited capacity, but Haitians need to be reassured 
        that their Government is resolutely leading the 
        rebuilding process and is executing a well-thought-out 
        plan. Likewise, the donor community needs a viable 
        partner who will lay out priorities, appropriately 
        guide reconstruction activities, and make the political 
        commitment necessary for success.
   Empower the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission. While 
        many details still need to be sorted out about how the 
        IHRC will function, this should not be an excuse for 
        delaying its full establishment and allowing it to 
        become fully operational. The IHRC represents perhaps 
        the country's best near-term prospect for driving 
        rebuilding. While an acting executive director has been 
        designated for the short term, a search is ongoing for 
        a permanent executive director, and the Commission 
        needs to be staffed up as soon as possible with 
        technical and administrative experts. Further, donors 
        need to line up behind the IHRC and quickly achieve 
        consensus on how it will operate. The Commission 
        represents an opportunity to change the way of doing 
        business in Haiti--an expertise-based approach that 
        builds political consensus--and it is essential that it 
        operate with focus, discipline, and decisiveness.
   Address the resettlement issue. Addressing the 
        hundreds of thousands of Haitians trapped in temporary 
        or informal settlements is the major recovery issue. 
        This already is an emergency situation, and it 
        threatens to get much worse. Everyone recognizes that 
        the status quo is unacceptable and unsustainable, yet 
        key land-policy decisions have been inexplicably 
        delayed. Solutions need to be offered for moving 
        displaced people out of the dozens of tent cities that 
        have cropped up. There is land available, but land 
        tenure issues must be resolved. The longer Haitians 
        continue to live in makeshift camps, the harder it will 
        be to reintegrate them into communities and take down 
        the camps. Security challenges in the camps have been 
        manageable because people have hope for a better 
        future, but risks will increase if a sense of 
        desperation sets in.
   Hold elections expeditiously. It is imperative that 
        Haiti's fragile democracy is not imperiled further by 
        the January earthquake, or by the necessary 
        postponement of parliamentary elections originally 
        scheduled for last February. A Presidential decree 
        formally initiating a process for Presidential and 
        parliamentary elections in November is apparently 
        imminent, but the tasks ahead are immense, including 
        registering voters in a country where so many 
        government records were lost. A legitimate and 
        democratically elected government is an essential 
        precondition for laying a strong, sustainable 
        foundation for Haiti's future.
   Donors need to speak with one voice and improve 
        coordination. There is too much fragmentation in the 
        donor community and too much disagreement. Conflicting 
        messages are going to President Preval and the 
        Government, leading to confusion and mixed signals on 
        important issues. The donor community needs a unified 
        and consistent voice to represent its interests with 
        the authority to make necessary decisions to push the 
        process forward. Many agree that the U.N. Special 
        Envoy, former President Bill Clinton, may be in the 
        best position to assume this role. The donor community 
        also needs to confront significant coordination 
        problems and determine the best way to align its 
        priorities within an overall rebuilding framework. 
        Current donor efforts are marked by excessive 
        fragmentation and a proliferation of approaches and 
        strategies that are undercutting recovery and 
        rebuilding.
   Coordinate U.S. assistance efforts with the 
        Government of Haiti and other donors. As the U.S. 
        Government puts together its development strategy and 
        begins to program money for different rebuilding 
        priorities, it is important that our efforts complement 
        other donors and support the Government of Haiti's 
        development framework. In other contexts, there has 
        been a tendency to operate outside the main development 
        framework, leading to redundancies and overlap. Because 
        the United States is such a big player in Haiti's 
        rebuilding, it is important that U.S. efforts are well-
        coordinated internally (this includes imminently naming 
        an overall coordinator for assistance to Haiti), and 
        that we continue to provide vital leadership to the 
        donor community and support to the Government of Haiti.
   Rebuild Haiti's decimated civil service. Haiti's 
        bureaucracy and civil service suffered a triple blow 
        from the earthquake. Almost all the ministry buildings 
        were damaged or destroyed due to their proximity to the 
        epicenter of the quake, immediately killing a huge 
        number of civil servants and shattering the backbone of 
        Haiti's Government. As of today, most ministries are 
        operating out of makeshift offices, including basic 
        tents. Computer systems are not functioning, 
        electricity is threadbare, and basic supplies are hard 
        to come by. Moreover, most civil servants have yet to 
        receive any salaries since the earthquake struck. There 
        is a significant risk that many will begin leaving the 
        government and searching for alternate sources of 
        income if salaries are not restored soon, further 
        diluting the government's capacity. Stabilizing Haiti's 
        public sector must be a top priority, and donors should 
        work with the Government of Haiti to get payments 
        flowing again to the civil service, including to 
        critical personnel such as doctors, nurses, and 
        teachers, many of whom have not been paid since before 
        the earthquake.
   Maintain security gains. The successes of the U.N. 
        security mission and police training programs have been 
        widely recognized. Right before the earthquake struck, 
        security was one of the success stories in the country, 
        with neighborhoods such as Cite Soleil having gained 
        significant stability. The challenge of maintaining 
        security has become more difficult and an increase in 
        gang violence has been noted in recent months. It is 
        vital that the Government and international community 
        continue to build the capacity of the Haitian National 
        Police and that key justice sector reforms are pushed 
        forward. These include addressing indefinite pretrial 
        detentions and confronting alleged prison and human 
        rights abuses. Continued international support for the 
        U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is 
        essential, though the international community must 
        ensure that MINUSTAH's mandate is not stretched beyond 
        an achievable and definable set of objectives.
   Bring the broader Haitian community into the 
        rebuilding process. While many look to the Government 
        of Haiti to provide guidance and leadership for 
        rebuilding, it is equally important that Haitian civil 
        society and others outside the government participate 
        in the reconstruction. Rebuilding the country should 
        not be politicized, but should be an inclusive process 
        that attempts to build a functional, equal, and 
        responsible society. The Government of Haiti must 
        embrace civil society, Haitian nongovernmental 
        organizations, and the private sector as it rebuilds; 
        without broader inclusion of Haitian stakeholders, the 
        formation of a ``reimagined'' Haiti will be difficult 
        to achieve.


                               discussion


    The following provides a longer discussion of the issues 
raised above, based on a series of meetings, interviews, and 
several committee staff visits to Haiti, both before and after 
the January earthquake.
    What is the rebuilding strategy for Haiti? At the March 
2010 donors conference, the Government presented its ``Action 
Plan for National Recovery and Development in Haiti'' (http://
www.haiti
conference.org/Haiti_Action_Plan_ENG.pdf), which delineated 
four broad areas of priority for rebuilding: territorial 
(roads, watershed, infrastructure, urban redevelopment), 
economic (agriculture, private sector investment, electricity), 
social (housing, education, health), and institutional 
(democratic governance, justice and security, public 
administration). This represented an important step forward at 
the time and provided a good blueprint for guiding 
implementation and more specific programming. Unfortunately, 
progress on planning seems to have stalled since then, and 
specific plans to move forward on implementation of these four 
priority areas have not yet been issued. As a result, key 
decisions remain in flux and critical humanitarian issues 
related to shelter and resettlement are not resolved. Even if 
longer term rebuilding issues require additional time and 
deliberation, short-term imperatives should be acted upon with 
greater urgency. We advise the following:

   Work from the Government of Haiti's Action Plan to 
        flesh out specific implementation details. There is an 
        agreed upon development framework for Haiti rebuilding. 
        The Government of Haiti, donors, and NGOs now need to 
        come together and determine specific details of this 
        plan in order to begin implementing key priorities. 
        While most agree on broader principles of rebuilding, 
        the success or failure of rebuilding ultimately rests 
        on specific programs, activities and projects.
   Agree upon a timetable and hold stakeholders 
        accountable. Key stakeholders need to come together and 
        decide on an implementation timetable--i.e., by a 
        certain date a full resettlement strategy will be 
        agreed upon and by a subsequent date, the Government 
        will promulgate necessary land policy regulations to 
        allow camp inhabitants to transition back to permanent 
        housing and permanent communities.
   Come up with a short-term priority list and enforce 
        a rigid implementation schedule. Even while longer term 
        issues require further thought and deliberation, there 
        is consensus on some key issues that need to move 
        forward in the next 3-6 months, especially with regard 
        to resettlement. These issues need to be expedited and 
        resolved as soon as possible.

    Capacity of the Government of Haiti. The ability of the 
Haitian Government to lead an effective, credible and 
legitimate rebuilding process has been debated extensively. 
Some interlocutors believe that Haiti's national leaders lack 
the political will to lead, but all observers readily concede 
that the Government lacks the human, financial, and technical 
resources to take a decisive role in shaping recovery and 
development efforts--and it clearly needs international help. 
There are many factors behind this:

   Presidential leadership. The effort to rebuild Haiti 
        must be led by Haiti's Government, starting with 
        President Preval. To date, the Government has not done 
        an effective job of communicating to Haitians that it 
        is in charge and ready to lead the rebuilding effort. 
        President Preval should take a more visible and active 
        role, despite the difficulties confronting his 
        government. One of the President's main priorities has 
        been to remove the informal Champs de Mars settlement, 
        which sits in front of the ruined Presidential Palace 
        and sprang up after the earthquake. His leadership and 
        commitment to tackle a broader array of priorities in 
        the near future is crucial.
   Key Government deputies are not empowered. President 
        Preval can help enormously by providing vital support 
        to deputies assigned to lead the Government rebuilding 
        efforts. It is important that the President empower his 
        lieutenants to make key development decisions about 
        where to permanently house displaced citizens, where to 
        allocate resources, and how to prioritize rebuilding. 
        As a result of the current consolidation of 
        decisionmaking power, many parts of the process have 
        been beset by paralysis because donors do not have the 
        green light to move forward on critical issues and 
        their government counterparts do not feel empowered by 
        President Preval to sign off on important tasks and 
        decisions.

    Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC). The IHRC is 
touted by many in Haiti as the best near-term solution for 
galvanizing the rebuilding process and moving things forward. 
The idea behind IHRC is to create an efficient mechanism 
separate from the bureaucracy of Haiti's line ministries that 
will sit key donors together with government officials and 
allow for swift decisions and implementation of development 
priorities. As the President's top economic advisor indicated, 
an executive director of the IHRC would work with a technical 
team of 60 people (including Haitian, expatriate and 
international experts and advisors) to vet donor and NGO 
proposals as they come in, as well as to fill in the specifics 
behind the Government's rebuilding framework. The executive 
director would be the first screen for approving projects 
forward or declining to advance them. The executive director's 
recommendations would then be forwarded to either the full IHRC 
board (which is chaired by Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive 
and U.N. Special Envoy Bill Clinton, and comprised of an even 
balance of donor representatives and Haitian representatives 
from the government, parliament, and civil society) or to a 
partial board for projects requiring less money. If the 
projects were independently funded, then the process would 
conclude. If the projects required funding from the multidonor 
trust fund, then they would be screened by its board before 
funds were finally released and the project approved. There are 
several concerns with this setup and the general evolution of 
the IHRC:

   Is it overly bureaucratic? Multiple checks are 
        essential for transparency and accountability, but this 
        must also be balanced with efficiency. The outlined 
        process has the potential to dramatically slow things 
        down through cumbersome bureaucratic obstacles at a 
        time when Haiti cannot afford to delay its rebuilding. 
        At a certain point, one questions if the added value of 
        yet another board signoff is worth the delay in time. 
        It is strongly recommended that key stakeholders 
        involved in the IHRC, particularly the Government of 
        Haiti and donors, consider streamlining and 
        consolidating boards into a single approval process, 
        and that specific fast-track authority for smaller 
        projects be given to the executive director and a core 
        ``advisory board'' to speed up the process. This is an 
        area in which breaking with past Haitian practice is 
        absolutely essential.
   Who is in charge? Since the March donors conference, 
        which established the IHRC structure, it is still 
        unclear what resources the IHRC has at its disposal to 
        start moving resources in support of key development 
        priorities, and who is empowered to make the necessary 
        leadership decisions. While President Preval and former 
        President Clinton have supported Gabriel Verret as the 
        acting executive director of the IHRC, a formal search 
        process is underway to find a more permanent executive 
        director. Until an executive director is officially 
        named, the acting executive director has very little 
        authority to actually implement critical time-sensitive 
        decisions.
   Donor disagreements. There are clear disagreements 
        among donors about how the IHRC approval structure 
        should work, which entity has ultimate sign-off for 
        disbursement of funds from the multidonor trust fund, 
        and how much discretion should be given to the IHRC 
        secretariat. If not resolved, these disagreements 
        threaten to slow funding. It is difficult to pressure 
        the Government of Haiti to move expeditiously when 
        donors themselves lack consensus about the structure of 
        the IHRC.

    Constructively addressing the resettlement issue. 
Adequately addressing the hundreds of thousands of Haitians 
residing in temporary or informal settlements has arisen as the 
major recovery issue for the country, and the paralysis in 
decision-making bodes poorly for speedy resolution. Moreover, 
the longer Haitians continue to reside in makeshift camps, the 
harder it will be to reintegrate citizens into communities and 
take down the camps. Experts estimate that 200,000 Haitians 
could move back into homes labeled ``green'' (deemed to be safe 
from collapse) right away, and that another 125,000 could be 
housed in semi-permanent transitional shelters (``T-shelters'') 
in the next month. Unfortunately, this resettlement is delayed 
because of several factors, including lack of clarity on land 
policy (i.e., whether displaced persons owe full back rent to 
landlords despite not living in leased houses for the last 5 
months), as well as significant customs delays for getting 
essential construction and building material into the country. 
Meanwhile, in the camps, there is a reluctance to improve 
services--to provide more latrines, better security, food 
assistance, and access to schools--due to the concern that more 
Haitians will be drawn from their communities and move into the 
camps in order to get these services (however unpleasant and 
dangerous conditions may be). The land policy stalemate must be 
overcome as soon as possible to encourage Haitians to move out 
of the camps en masse and rebuild their lives in regular 
communities. In the longer term, the Government needs to 
consider more permanent solutions to the problems that plague 
Port-au-Prince, including land scarcity, overcrowding, and an 
unsustainable strain on services. In particular, this means 
seriously considering the concept of ``decentralization,'' and 
whether to invest significant resources into developing 
alternate economic centers away from the Port-au-Prince.


                               conclusion


    Haiti is at a critical crossroads five months after the 
earthquake. The United States and the international community 
are faced with tough choices about how best to support the 
Haitian Government to rebuild the country and provide 
desperately needed services to the Haitian people. While many 
immediate humanitarian relief priorities appear to have been 
met, there are troubling signs that the recovery and longer 
term rebuilding activities are flagging. With the rainy season 
well underway and the hurricane season rapidly approaching, 
time is running short on a host of critical policy decisions, 
ranging from resettlement to infrastructure rehabilitation.
    The Government of Haiti, led by President Preval and Prime 
Minister Bellerive, faced difficult odds even before the 
earthquake, and restoring government capacity will be a long-
term effort. Operational capabilities aside, however, the 
Haitian nation desperately needs the leadership and vision that 
the President and Prime Minister were elected to provide. The 
government needs to assertively guide the next phase of Haiti's 
rebuilding, implement a viable development strategy, and take 
decisive steps to move Haiti onto a more sustainable 
reconstruction path.
    Likewise, international donors have an important role to 
play in supporting the rebuilding effort and helping to stand 
up the IHRC by providing critical technical and administrative 
capabilities. The donor community must minimize fragmentation 
and speak in a more cohesive and unified fashion. The last 
thing Haiti can afford is a donor community beset by 
disagreements and cacophony of approaches.
    Key decisions must not be delayed while the Haitian 
Government reorganizes itself; time is of the essence, and 
getting the IHRC up and running should be an immediate 
priority.
    Ultimately, this must be a Haitian-owned process, and the 
success or failure of rebuilding lies with the citizens of the 
country, from the community level up through the national 
government. But, given the circumstances, donors will have to 
play an essential role in assisting Haitians with picking up 
the pieces of their country and building a more sustainable, 
responsible, and just future.


                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              


                         HAITI AT A CROSSROADS









    Fig. 1: The Presidential Palace in Haiti remains in ruins, 
and there are no signs of demolition or reconstruction 
underway. Several containers and makeshift buildings are being 
used as temporary meeting spaces on the grounds of the 
Presidential Palace. June 8, 2010





    Fig. 2: Tents and primitive structures in the Ancien 
Aeroport Militaire Camp house approximately 50,000 residents. 
Sites are becoming increasingly permanent, with slabs of 
corrugated metal reinforcing flimsy walls and tarps. June 7, 
2010





    Fig. 3: Adolescent boys play in the Ancien Aeroport 
Militaire Camp. The boys in the foreground are standing on a 
set of showers that were installed several weeks prior by an 
international NGO. The night before staff's visit, criminal 
gangs had torn down the showers, leaving just the concrete 
slab. Gang violence and criminality are on the upswing at the 
camp. In addition to harassing the camp population, gangs have 
targeted the water delivery, latrines, showers, and sanitation 
facilities provided by NGOs. Crumbling buildings affected by 
the earthquake are in the background. June 7, 2010





    Fig. 4:  Women stand in line with their children at a 
medical clinic run by an international NGO at the Ancien 
Aeroport Militaire Camp. Disease remains a big problem in 
Haiti, but health care has actually improved since the 
earthquake due to the influx of outside aid money. While 
minimal, the services provided in the camp are often better 
than services Haitians can access outside of the camp, creating 
an incentive for people to remain in camps for the longer term 
and presenting a serious challenge for reintegrating people 
back into their communities. June 7, 2010





    Fig. 5: Tabarre Issa Emergency Relocation Camp is one of 
the few planned relocation sites for people who were displaced 
by the earthquake. This photograph illustrates the impressive 
organization of the camp, with adequate space between tents, 
sufficient sanitation facilities, and lighting around the 
roads. While the emergency relocation camp concept has been 
successful when implemented, the system as a whole lacks the 
resources to sufficiently address the overwhelming needs of 
Haiti's population. More land needs to be identified for 
resettlement and relocation of displaced people, but until 
thorny land tenure issues are resolved, Haitians will continue 
living in the squalor of makeshift tent camps, such as the 
Ancien Aeroport Militaire Camp. June 8, 2010





    Fig. 6: ``T-shelters,'' semi-permanent transitional 
shelters, are being constructed at many relocation sites, 
including at the Tabarre Issa Emergency Relocation Camp. While 
durable, the T-shelters have been more expensive than budgeted, 
and their construction has been delayed due to supplies being 
held up by Haitian Customs officials. It has been estimated 
that 125,000 T-shelters have been donated (which could house up 
to 600,000 people), but the land upon which to build and place 
them has yet to be identified by the Government of Haiti. June 
8, 2010





    Fig. 7: School children in Port-au-Prince walk amidst the 
rubble to get to their classrooms. Education remains a huge 
challenge in Haiti. The earthquake destroyed an estimated 4,228 
schools as well as the Ministry of Education building itself, 
leading to the deaths of around 38,000 students, 1,347 
teachers, and 180 education personnel. One of the principal 
challenges in the education sector in Haiti is that 85% of the 
schools are private and unregulated, with little or no 
oversight by the Government of Haiti. The vast majority of 
schools are ineffective, have no money to pay for teachers, few 
teaching materials and an unstructured curriculum. 
Approximately 80-90% of university facilities in Haiti were 
demolished by the earthquake. The lack of higher education, 
vocational, and professional training is a huge and widening 
gap for Haiti. June 8, 2010





    Fig. 8: Piles of files from the Ministry of Education 
rescued from their collapsed building are stacked outside in a 
semi-protected area, not sheltered sufficiently to be protected 
from the rain. Many important records, such as international 
exam scores, matriculation records and qualification tests for 
teachers were lost in the earthquake and many of the files that 
did survive are strewn across rooms and piled in corners. The 
destruction of so many records creates enormous challenges for 
teachers and students in Haiti's educational system. June 8, 
2010





    Fig. 9: Even five months after the earthquake, rubble 
blocks and slows travel on roads in many parts of Port-au-
Prince, leading to horrific traffic congestion and continuing 
to make sections of the city impassable. Rubble removal is the 
first critical step towards reconstruction; it is a precursor 
to accessible roads, ports, airports, as well as improved 
infrastructure such as water, sewage and electrical systems. 
Until the rubble is removed, Haitians will not be able to 
return to their pre-earthquake communities. June 8, 2010

                                  
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