[Senate Prints 111-51]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
111-51
_______________________________________________________________________
HAITI AT A CROSSROADS
__________
A REPORT
TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
Second Session
JUNE 22, 2010
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-959 WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Ten Critical Issues for Haiti's Rebuilding....................... 2
Discussion....................................................... 4
Conclusion....................................................... 8
Appendix......................................................... 9
(iii)
?
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, June 22, 2010.
Dear Colleagues: This report by the committee majority
staff is part of an ongoing examination of the effectiveness of
the relief and recovery effort in Haiti in response to the
January 12, 2010, earthquake.
On May 25, 2010, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
passed the Kerry-Corker Haiti Empowerment, Assistance and
Rebuilding Act of 2010, S. 3317. This bill authorizes $2
billion over 2 years to support the sustainable recovery and
long-term rebuilding of Haiti. The legislation establishes a
policy framework that emphasizes just, democratic and competent
governance and investments in people, particularly women and
children. It tasks the U.S. Agency for International
Development to put together a comprehensive rebuilding and
development strategy for Haiti. And it establishes a senior
Haiti policy coordinator responsible for advising and
coordinating U.S. policy toward Haiti.
The committee takes seriously its responsibility to oversee
the expenditure of the funds that the U.S. Government has
pledged and spent in Haiti, and to ensure that the
administration has the policy, personnel, and processes in
place for effective use of funds within the strategy. While any
sustainable strategy for rebuilding Haiti must be Haitian-led,
given the dire circumstances in Haiti and the decimation of
Haiti's civil service, the United States and other donors must
take an active role in guiding the reconstruction process. This
report highlights 10 critical issues for Haiti's rebuilding
that require urgent attention by the Government of Haiti and
the Obama administration.
The report is based on extensive staff interviews with
State Department, USAID, Haitian civil society and NGOs, U.N.
officials, Haitian Government ministries, as well as site
visits to hospitals, health clinics, schools, temporary
settlement camps and emergency relocation camps.
Five months after the earthquake, Haiti is at a crossroads.
The Haitian Government is faced with daunting challenges in
many areas--infrastructure, resettlement, job creation,
education, health, justice and security--and it must confront
these challenges with reduced capacity. It is essential that
the United States and the international donor community improve
their coordination and help an under-resourced Haitian
Government make important policy decisions and address key
rebuilding challenges before any more time passes.
Sincerely,
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.
(v)
HAITI AT A CROSSROADS
----------
Executive Summary
Haiti needs to be rebuilt in a sustainable way that
considers the long-term future of the country and the people.
This needs to be a Haitian-owned process, led by the Government
of Haiti, but circumstances demand strong and strategic support
from the donor community.
Five months after a devastating earthquake struck Haiti on
January 12, 2010, leading to the deaths of approximately
230,000 people and the displacement of millions, there are
worrisome signs that the rebuilding process in Haiti has
stalled. Haiti is at a significant crossroads, with limited
time to enact key policies and programs that will allow the
country to build a more sustainable and prosperous future. As
the sense of immediate crisis has subsided, so has the sense of
urgency to undertake bold action--the ``reimagination'' of
Haiti hoped for months ago--and the commitment to prevent a
return to the dysfunctional, unsustainable ways of life past.
The donor community, working with a devastated and often
overwhelmed Government, has done a remarkable job in the relief
phase, forestalling potentially disastrous humanitarian
consequences, and providing consistent access to food, water,
medical supplies, shelter and other basic services. The U.S.
Government response in particular has contributed to the
overall success of international humanitarian efforts--it is
important to acknowledge the tremendous time, effort, and
energy expended getting people into safer conditions in the
immediate aftermath of the earthquake.
However, the reconstruction remains uncertain. Rubble is
still strewn all over the streets, the majority of buildings
are damaged if not collapsed, and informal tent settlements--in
penurious conditions--have sprouted everywhere. Emblematic of
the stalled rebuilding effort is the Presidential Palace, which
remains conspicuously in ruins, without any signs of
scaffolding or construction.
Plans for moving the displaced population out of tent
cities and into more durable shelter, not to mention permanent
housing, remain in early draft form. This is particularly
alarming given the onset of the hurricane season. Even a modest
hurricane could kill many thousands. The current rainy season
also threatens lives by increasing the spread of communicable
diseases, particularly in the squalor of the camps.
Even before the earthquake, Haiti faced significant
developmental challenges. Fewer than 30 percent of Haitians had
access to electricity, with roughly half of users tapping into
the national grid illegally. There were longstanding problems
with garbage and solid waste removal. Clogged canals presented
serious and recurring risks of flooding. As one official noted,
it is hard to separate what is due to the poverty levels that
predated the earthquake and what is due to the earthquake
itself, in a country where approximately 80 percent of the
country lived on less than $2 a day, even before the
earthquake.
The enormous difficulties that confronted Haiti for decades
have only been compounded by the devastation of the earthquake,
adding urgency to the critical issues that have the potential
to derail the effort to rebuild the country if they are not
adequately addressed in the coming weeks.
ten critical issues for haiti's rebuilding
Establish a feasible, comprehensive rebuilding
strategy. While the Haitian Government's Action Plan
for National Recovery and Development in Haiti
represented a good start, much more work is needed to
translate broad concepts into implementable programs
that will catalyze and guide the rebuilding process.
Haitians are waiting for more concrete guidance on
everything from where displaced persons can resettle
and how the education system will be rebuilt to plans
for economic decentralization and private sector
investment. Fundamentally, Haitians want to know how
they are going to be able to earn a living and send
their children to school. Right now these questions
remain unanswered. The lack of a plan and the failure
to build political support for one makes even small
obstacles seem difficult.
Build leadership and capacity in the Government of
Haiti. The Government of Haiti was decimated by the
earthquake, losing civil servants, senior leaders, the
Presidential Palace and most of the ministry buildings.
Haiti and its leaders remain in shock and mourning, and
there is a sense of national exhaustion and frustration
caused by the fact that the earthquake hit just as
certain positive trends were developing. It is
understandable that having lost so many of its own
personnel in the earthquake, the Government of Haiti
has limited capacity, but Haitians need to be reassured
that their Government is resolutely leading the
rebuilding process and is executing a well-thought-out
plan. Likewise, the donor community needs a viable
partner who will lay out priorities, appropriately
guide reconstruction activities, and make the political
commitment necessary for success.
Empower the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission. While
many details still need to be sorted out about how the
IHRC will function, this should not be an excuse for
delaying its full establishment and allowing it to
become fully operational. The IHRC represents perhaps
the country's best near-term prospect for driving
rebuilding. While an acting executive director has been
designated for the short term, a search is ongoing for
a permanent executive director, and the Commission
needs to be staffed up as soon as possible with
technical and administrative experts. Further, donors
need to line up behind the IHRC and quickly achieve
consensus on how it will operate. The Commission
represents an opportunity to change the way of doing
business in Haiti--an expertise-based approach that
builds political consensus--and it is essential that it
operate with focus, discipline, and decisiveness.
Address the resettlement issue. Addressing the
hundreds of thousands of Haitians trapped in temporary
or informal settlements is the major recovery issue.
This already is an emergency situation, and it
threatens to get much worse. Everyone recognizes that
the status quo is unacceptable and unsustainable, yet
key land-policy decisions have been inexplicably
delayed. Solutions need to be offered for moving
displaced people out of the dozens of tent cities that
have cropped up. There is land available, but land
tenure issues must be resolved. The longer Haitians
continue to live in makeshift camps, the harder it will
be to reintegrate them into communities and take down
the camps. Security challenges in the camps have been
manageable because people have hope for a better
future, but risks will increase if a sense of
desperation sets in.
Hold elections expeditiously. It is imperative that
Haiti's fragile democracy is not imperiled further by
the January earthquake, or by the necessary
postponement of parliamentary elections originally
scheduled for last February. A Presidential decree
formally initiating a process for Presidential and
parliamentary elections in November is apparently
imminent, but the tasks ahead are immense, including
registering voters in a country where so many
government records were lost. A legitimate and
democratically elected government is an essential
precondition for laying a strong, sustainable
foundation for Haiti's future.
Donors need to speak with one voice and improve
coordination. There is too much fragmentation in the
donor community and too much disagreement. Conflicting
messages are going to President Preval and the
Government, leading to confusion and mixed signals on
important issues. The donor community needs a unified
and consistent voice to represent its interests with
the authority to make necessary decisions to push the
process forward. Many agree that the U.N. Special
Envoy, former President Bill Clinton, may be in the
best position to assume this role. The donor community
also needs to confront significant coordination
problems and determine the best way to align its
priorities within an overall rebuilding framework.
Current donor efforts are marked by excessive
fragmentation and a proliferation of approaches and
strategies that are undercutting recovery and
rebuilding.
Coordinate U.S. assistance efforts with the
Government of Haiti and other donors. As the U.S.
Government puts together its development strategy and
begins to program money for different rebuilding
priorities, it is important that our efforts complement
other donors and support the Government of Haiti's
development framework. In other contexts, there has
been a tendency to operate outside the main development
framework, leading to redundancies and overlap. Because
the United States is such a big player in Haiti's
rebuilding, it is important that U.S. efforts are well-
coordinated internally (this includes imminently naming
an overall coordinator for assistance to Haiti), and
that we continue to provide vital leadership to the
donor community and support to the Government of Haiti.
Rebuild Haiti's decimated civil service. Haiti's
bureaucracy and civil service suffered a triple blow
from the earthquake. Almost all the ministry buildings
were damaged or destroyed due to their proximity to the
epicenter of the quake, immediately killing a huge
number of civil servants and shattering the backbone of
Haiti's Government. As of today, most ministries are
operating out of makeshift offices, including basic
tents. Computer systems are not functioning,
electricity is threadbare, and basic supplies are hard
to come by. Moreover, most civil servants have yet to
receive any salaries since the earthquake struck. There
is a significant risk that many will begin leaving the
government and searching for alternate sources of
income if salaries are not restored soon, further
diluting the government's capacity. Stabilizing Haiti's
public sector must be a top priority, and donors should
work with the Government of Haiti to get payments
flowing again to the civil service, including to
critical personnel such as doctors, nurses, and
teachers, many of whom have not been paid since before
the earthquake.
Maintain security gains. The successes of the U.N.
security mission and police training programs have been
widely recognized. Right before the earthquake struck,
security was one of the success stories in the country,
with neighborhoods such as Cite Soleil having gained
significant stability. The challenge of maintaining
security has become more difficult and an increase in
gang violence has been noted in recent months. It is
vital that the Government and international community
continue to build the capacity of the Haitian National
Police and that key justice sector reforms are pushed
forward. These include addressing indefinite pretrial
detentions and confronting alleged prison and human
rights abuses. Continued international support for the
U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is
essential, though the international community must
ensure that MINUSTAH's mandate is not stretched beyond
an achievable and definable set of objectives.
Bring the broader Haitian community into the
rebuilding process. While many look to the Government
of Haiti to provide guidance and leadership for
rebuilding, it is equally important that Haitian civil
society and others outside the government participate
in the reconstruction. Rebuilding the country should
not be politicized, but should be an inclusive process
that attempts to build a functional, equal, and
responsible society. The Government of Haiti must
embrace civil society, Haitian nongovernmental
organizations, and the private sector as it rebuilds;
without broader inclusion of Haitian stakeholders, the
formation of a ``reimagined'' Haiti will be difficult
to achieve.
discussion
The following provides a longer discussion of the issues
raised above, based on a series of meetings, interviews, and
several committee staff visits to Haiti, both before and after
the January earthquake.
What is the rebuilding strategy for Haiti? At the March
2010 donors conference, the Government presented its ``Action
Plan for National Recovery and Development in Haiti'' (http://
www.haiti
conference.org/Haiti_Action_Plan_ENG.pdf), which delineated
four broad areas of priority for rebuilding: territorial
(roads, watershed, infrastructure, urban redevelopment),
economic (agriculture, private sector investment, electricity),
social (housing, education, health), and institutional
(democratic governance, justice and security, public
administration). This represented an important step forward at
the time and provided a good blueprint for guiding
implementation and more specific programming. Unfortunately,
progress on planning seems to have stalled since then, and
specific plans to move forward on implementation of these four
priority areas have not yet been issued. As a result, key
decisions remain in flux and critical humanitarian issues
related to shelter and resettlement are not resolved. Even if
longer term rebuilding issues require additional time and
deliberation, short-term imperatives should be acted upon with
greater urgency. We advise the following:
Work from the Government of Haiti's Action Plan to
flesh out specific implementation details. There is an
agreed upon development framework for Haiti rebuilding.
The Government of Haiti, donors, and NGOs now need to
come together and determine specific details of this
plan in order to begin implementing key priorities.
While most agree on broader principles of rebuilding,
the success or failure of rebuilding ultimately rests
on specific programs, activities and projects.
Agree upon a timetable and hold stakeholders
accountable. Key stakeholders need to come together and
decide on an implementation timetable--i.e., by a
certain date a full resettlement strategy will be
agreed upon and by a subsequent date, the Government
will promulgate necessary land policy regulations to
allow camp inhabitants to transition back to permanent
housing and permanent communities.
Come up with a short-term priority list and enforce
a rigid implementation schedule. Even while longer term
issues require further thought and deliberation, there
is consensus on some key issues that need to move
forward in the next 3-6 months, especially with regard
to resettlement. These issues need to be expedited and
resolved as soon as possible.
Capacity of the Government of Haiti. The ability of the
Haitian Government to lead an effective, credible and
legitimate rebuilding process has been debated extensively.
Some interlocutors believe that Haiti's national leaders lack
the political will to lead, but all observers readily concede
that the Government lacks the human, financial, and technical
resources to take a decisive role in shaping recovery and
development efforts--and it clearly needs international help.
There are many factors behind this:
Presidential leadership. The effort to rebuild Haiti
must be led by Haiti's Government, starting with
President Preval. To date, the Government has not done
an effective job of communicating to Haitians that it
is in charge and ready to lead the rebuilding effort.
President Preval should take a more visible and active
role, despite the difficulties confronting his
government. One of the President's main priorities has
been to remove the informal Champs de Mars settlement,
which sits in front of the ruined Presidential Palace
and sprang up after the earthquake. His leadership and
commitment to tackle a broader array of priorities in
the near future is crucial.
Key Government deputies are not empowered. President
Preval can help enormously by providing vital support
to deputies assigned to lead the Government rebuilding
efforts. It is important that the President empower his
lieutenants to make key development decisions about
where to permanently house displaced citizens, where to
allocate resources, and how to prioritize rebuilding.
As a result of the current consolidation of
decisionmaking power, many parts of the process have
been beset by paralysis because donors do not have the
green light to move forward on critical issues and
their government counterparts do not feel empowered by
President Preval to sign off on important tasks and
decisions.
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC). The IHRC is
touted by many in Haiti as the best near-term solution for
galvanizing the rebuilding process and moving things forward.
The idea behind IHRC is to create an efficient mechanism
separate from the bureaucracy of Haiti's line ministries that
will sit key donors together with government officials and
allow for swift decisions and implementation of development
priorities. As the President's top economic advisor indicated,
an executive director of the IHRC would work with a technical
team of 60 people (including Haitian, expatriate and
international experts and advisors) to vet donor and NGO
proposals as they come in, as well as to fill in the specifics
behind the Government's rebuilding framework. The executive
director would be the first screen for approving projects
forward or declining to advance them. The executive director's
recommendations would then be forwarded to either the full IHRC
board (which is chaired by Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive
and U.N. Special Envoy Bill Clinton, and comprised of an even
balance of donor representatives and Haitian representatives
from the government, parliament, and civil society) or to a
partial board for projects requiring less money. If the
projects were independently funded, then the process would
conclude. If the projects required funding from the multidonor
trust fund, then they would be screened by its board before
funds were finally released and the project approved. There are
several concerns with this setup and the general evolution of
the IHRC:
Is it overly bureaucratic? Multiple checks are
essential for transparency and accountability, but this
must also be balanced with efficiency. The outlined
process has the potential to dramatically slow things
down through cumbersome bureaucratic obstacles at a
time when Haiti cannot afford to delay its rebuilding.
At a certain point, one questions if the added value of
yet another board signoff is worth the delay in time.
It is strongly recommended that key stakeholders
involved in the IHRC, particularly the Government of
Haiti and donors, consider streamlining and
consolidating boards into a single approval process,
and that specific fast-track authority for smaller
projects be given to the executive director and a core
``advisory board'' to speed up the process. This is an
area in which breaking with past Haitian practice is
absolutely essential.
Who is in charge? Since the March donors conference,
which established the IHRC structure, it is still
unclear what resources the IHRC has at its disposal to
start moving resources in support of key development
priorities, and who is empowered to make the necessary
leadership decisions. While President Preval and former
President Clinton have supported Gabriel Verret as the
acting executive director of the IHRC, a formal search
process is underway to find a more permanent executive
director. Until an executive director is officially
named, the acting executive director has very little
authority to actually implement critical time-sensitive
decisions.
Donor disagreements. There are clear disagreements
among donors about how the IHRC approval structure
should work, which entity has ultimate sign-off for
disbursement of funds from the multidonor trust fund,
and how much discretion should be given to the IHRC
secretariat. If not resolved, these disagreements
threaten to slow funding. It is difficult to pressure
the Government of Haiti to move expeditiously when
donors themselves lack consensus about the structure of
the IHRC.
Constructively addressing the resettlement issue.
Adequately addressing the hundreds of thousands of Haitians
residing in temporary or informal settlements has arisen as the
major recovery issue for the country, and the paralysis in
decision-making bodes poorly for speedy resolution. Moreover,
the longer Haitians continue to reside in makeshift camps, the
harder it will be to reintegrate citizens into communities and
take down the camps. Experts estimate that 200,000 Haitians
could move back into homes labeled ``green'' (deemed to be safe
from collapse) right away, and that another 125,000 could be
housed in semi-permanent transitional shelters (``T-shelters'')
in the next month. Unfortunately, this resettlement is delayed
because of several factors, including lack of clarity on land
policy (i.e., whether displaced persons owe full back rent to
landlords despite not living in leased houses for the last 5
months), as well as significant customs delays for getting
essential construction and building material into the country.
Meanwhile, in the camps, there is a reluctance to improve
services--to provide more latrines, better security, food
assistance, and access to schools--due to the concern that more
Haitians will be drawn from their communities and move into the
camps in order to get these services (however unpleasant and
dangerous conditions may be). The land policy stalemate must be
overcome as soon as possible to encourage Haitians to move out
of the camps en masse and rebuild their lives in regular
communities. In the longer term, the Government needs to
consider more permanent solutions to the problems that plague
Port-au-Prince, including land scarcity, overcrowding, and an
unsustainable strain on services. In particular, this means
seriously considering the concept of ``decentralization,'' and
whether to invest significant resources into developing
alternate economic centers away from the Port-au-Prince.
conclusion
Haiti is at a critical crossroads five months after the
earthquake. The United States and the international community
are faced with tough choices about how best to support the
Haitian Government to rebuild the country and provide
desperately needed services to the Haitian people. While many
immediate humanitarian relief priorities appear to have been
met, there are troubling signs that the recovery and longer
term rebuilding activities are flagging. With the rainy season
well underway and the hurricane season rapidly approaching,
time is running short on a host of critical policy decisions,
ranging from resettlement to infrastructure rehabilitation.
The Government of Haiti, led by President Preval and Prime
Minister Bellerive, faced difficult odds even before the
earthquake, and restoring government capacity will be a long-
term effort. Operational capabilities aside, however, the
Haitian nation desperately needs the leadership and vision that
the President and Prime Minister were elected to provide. The
government needs to assertively guide the next phase of Haiti's
rebuilding, implement a viable development strategy, and take
decisive steps to move Haiti onto a more sustainable
reconstruction path.
Likewise, international donors have an important role to
play in supporting the rebuilding effort and helping to stand
up the IHRC by providing critical technical and administrative
capabilities. The donor community must minimize fragmentation
and speak in a more cohesive and unified fashion. The last
thing Haiti can afford is a donor community beset by
disagreements and cacophony of approaches.
Key decisions must not be delayed while the Haitian
Government reorganizes itself; time is of the essence, and
getting the IHRC up and running should be an immediate
priority.
Ultimately, this must be a Haitian-owned process, and the
success or failure of rebuilding lies with the citizens of the
country, from the community level up through the national
government. But, given the circumstances, donors will have to
play an essential role in assisting Haitians with picking up
the pieces of their country and building a more sustainable,
responsible, and just future.
A P P E N D I X
----------
HAITI AT A CROSSROADS
Fig. 1: The Presidential Palace in Haiti remains in ruins,
and there are no signs of demolition or reconstruction
underway. Several containers and makeshift buildings are being
used as temporary meeting spaces on the grounds of the
Presidential Palace. June 8, 2010
Fig. 2: Tents and primitive structures in the Ancien
Aeroport Militaire Camp house approximately 50,000 residents.
Sites are becoming increasingly permanent, with slabs of
corrugated metal reinforcing flimsy walls and tarps. June 7,
2010
Fig. 3: Adolescent boys play in the Ancien Aeroport
Militaire Camp. The boys in the foreground are standing on a
set of showers that were installed several weeks prior by an
international NGO. The night before staff's visit, criminal
gangs had torn down the showers, leaving just the concrete
slab. Gang violence and criminality are on the upswing at the
camp. In addition to harassing the camp population, gangs have
targeted the water delivery, latrines, showers, and sanitation
facilities provided by NGOs. Crumbling buildings affected by
the earthquake are in the background. June 7, 2010
Fig. 4: Women stand in line with their children at a
medical clinic run by an international NGO at the Ancien
Aeroport Militaire Camp. Disease remains a big problem in
Haiti, but health care has actually improved since the
earthquake due to the influx of outside aid money. While
minimal, the services provided in the camp are often better
than services Haitians can access outside of the camp, creating
an incentive for people to remain in camps for the longer term
and presenting a serious challenge for reintegrating people
back into their communities. June 7, 2010
Fig. 5: Tabarre Issa Emergency Relocation Camp is one of
the few planned relocation sites for people who were displaced
by the earthquake. This photograph illustrates the impressive
organization of the camp, with adequate space between tents,
sufficient sanitation facilities, and lighting around the
roads. While the emergency relocation camp concept has been
successful when implemented, the system as a whole lacks the
resources to sufficiently address the overwhelming needs of
Haiti's population. More land needs to be identified for
resettlement and relocation of displaced people, but until
thorny land tenure issues are resolved, Haitians will continue
living in the squalor of makeshift tent camps, such as the
Ancien Aeroport Militaire Camp. June 8, 2010
Fig. 6: ``T-shelters,'' semi-permanent transitional
shelters, are being constructed at many relocation sites,
including at the Tabarre Issa Emergency Relocation Camp. While
durable, the T-shelters have been more expensive than budgeted,
and their construction has been delayed due to supplies being
held up by Haitian Customs officials. It has been estimated
that 125,000 T-shelters have been donated (which could house up
to 600,000 people), but the land upon which to build and place
them has yet to be identified by the Government of Haiti. June
8, 2010
Fig. 7: School children in Port-au-Prince walk amidst the
rubble to get to their classrooms. Education remains a huge
challenge in Haiti. The earthquake destroyed an estimated 4,228
schools as well as the Ministry of Education building itself,
leading to the deaths of around 38,000 students, 1,347
teachers, and 180 education personnel. One of the principal
challenges in the education sector in Haiti is that 85% of the
schools are private and unregulated, with little or no
oversight by the Government of Haiti. The vast majority of
schools are ineffective, have no money to pay for teachers, few
teaching materials and an unstructured curriculum.
Approximately 80-90% of university facilities in Haiti were
demolished by the earthquake. The lack of higher education,
vocational, and professional training is a huge and widening
gap for Haiti. June 8, 2010
Fig. 8: Piles of files from the Ministry of Education
rescued from their collapsed building are stacked outside in a
semi-protected area, not sheltered sufficiently to be protected
from the rain. Many important records, such as international
exam scores, matriculation records and qualification tests for
teachers were lost in the earthquake and many of the files that
did survive are strewn across rooms and piled in corners. The
destruction of so many records creates enormous challenges for
teachers and students in Haiti's educational system. June 8,
2010
Fig. 9: Even five months after the earthquake, rubble
blocks and slows travel on roads in many parts of Port-au-
Prince, leading to horrific traffic congestion and continuing
to make sections of the city impassable. Rubble removal is the
first critical step towards reconstruction; it is a precursor
to accessible roads, ports, airports, as well as improved
infrastructure such as water, sewage and electrical systems.
Until the rubble is removed, Haitians will not be able to
return to their pre-earthquake communities. June 8, 2010