[Senate Prints 111-50]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
111-50
_______________________________________________________________________
HAITI: NO LEADERSHIP--NO ELECTIONS
__________
A REPORT
TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
Second Session
JUNE 10, 2010
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-884 WASHINGTON : 2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Introduction..................................................... 1
Background....................................................... 2
Observations..................................................... 3
Procedural Actions........................................... 3
Political Actions............................................ 4
Recommendations.................................................. 4
In Haiti..................................................... 5
Within the International Donor Community..................... 5
Conclusion....................................................... 5
Meetings With Individuals in Preparation for or during Visit to
Haiti.......................................................... 6
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, June 10, 2010.
Dear Colleagues: On May 26, 2010, I directed two of my
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff members, Carl
Meacham and Garrett Johnson, to assess the viability of
contesting credible Presidential and parliamentary elections
slated for this fall in Haiti. They consulted with Haitian
officials, senior United Nations officials, international
electoral technicians, and senior members of our Embassy in
Port-au-Prince. Staff found that even under perfect conditions,
contesting elections in 2010 will be challenging for Haiti. At
a time when leadership is needed, whether Haiti will have an
elected government to succeed President Preval and continue the
rebuilding effort is currently uncertain.
The lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate
that the greatest constraint to rebuilding devastated
countries, war-torn or otherwise, is the absence of strong and
transparent leadership. A free and timely election strengthens
legitimacy and public support enjoyed by any government, and
this is especially important in Haiti as it contends with a
natural disaster and a long legacy of troubled governance.
Though President Preval has informally announced his
commitment to holding elections on November 28 of this year, he
has yet to issue an official decree authorizing the Provisional
Electoral Council to begin preparations. This is an important
step, as budgetary arrangements and formulation of the
electoral calendar cannot move forward without the decree.
I encourage President Preval to issue the appropriate
decree establishing an official date for Presidential and
parliamentary elections, without delay. Preparations for
elections should begin with dispatch because the term of
Haiti's President and the majority of its Parliament will have
expired by early 2011. The absence of democratically elected
successors could potentially plunge the country into chaos,
adding a political crisis to the death and destruction caused
by the January 12 earthquake.
Our Government is sympathetic to the plight of Haitians, as
demonstrated by the assistance our military, diplomats, and
development experts provided in the wake of the disaster. More
importantly, the American people, including many Hoosiers like
the parishioners of St. Luke's United Methodist Church in
Indianapolis and the faculty of Notre Dame University, remain
committed to helping the people of Haiti. But the positive
effect of assistance programs will be limited if Haiti lacks a
responsible, popularly elected government.
(v)
This report and its recommendations are particularly timely
given that arrangements for the November elections are stalled.
I look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues,
and I welcome any comments you have.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
HAITI: NO LEADERSHIP--NO ELECTIONS
Introduction
The devastation caused by the earthquake and ongoing
aftershocks in Haiti since January 12, 2010, represent one of
the worst natural disasters to confront the Western Hemisphere.
Pre-earthquake, the country was considered the poorest in the
region, with over 70 percent of the population living on less
than $2 per day and roughly 50 percent of children having no
access to basic education.\1\ Nearly 3 million people were
directly affected by the disaster and casualties exceeded
300,000 according to the Government of Haiti. An estimated 1.5
million people are currently living under tarps, tents, or
transitional houses, which increases the likelihood of
additional casualties and human suffering during hurricane
season.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ J.F. Hornbeck, ``The Haitian Economy and the Hope Act,''
Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2010.
\2\ Ezequil A. Lopez, ``U.N. Rep: Haiti Democracy Depends on
Reconstruction,'' Associated Press, June 2, 2010. Available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/02/
AR2010060204271.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The earthquake's damage amounted to 117 percent of Haiti's
annual economic output, according to the Inter-American
Development Bank and the country's GDP was reduced by an
estimated 50 percent. Monthly apparel sector exports, which the
recently passed HELP Act seeks to strengthen because of the
sector's importance to the country's economy, declined 43
percent from $58.2 million in February 2009 to $33.1 million in
February 2010.\3\ The loss of a significant number of jobs
resulting from the disaster, across many sectors including
apparel, has increased the severity of a chronically high
unemployment rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ J.F. Hornbeck, ``The Haitian Economy and the Hope Act,''
Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Up to 40 percent of the civil service perished and 28 out
of 29 government ministries collapsed, which has significantly
reduced Haiti's already limited capacity to offer basic
services.\4\ Six months later, the lack of visible improvements
in conditions on the ground or official communication regarding
reconstruction plans is reported to have exacerbated a
lingering crisis of confidence in the government among many
Haitians. President Preval's extension of his term beyond the
constitutionally mandated departure of February 7, 2011, while
failing to issue a decree calling for and funding elections, is
said to have raised political tensions in the country and
deepened concerns among the international community.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ U.S. Department of State, Hill Briefing Notes, published in
March 2010.
\5\ Damien Cave, ``Rubble of a Broken City Strains Haitians'
Patience,'' New York Times, May 29, 2010. Available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/world/americas/30haiti.html?scp=1&
sq=Preval&st=cse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background \6\
On December 16, 1990, the provisional government of
President Ertha Pascal-Trouillot held what is believed to be
the first free and fair elections in Haiti's history, which saw
Jean-Bertrand Aristide elected President with 67 percent of the
vote.\7\ In September 1991 he was overthrown by a military coup
and did not return to power until October 1994, under the
protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ This section is adapted from a January 25, 2008, report
prepared by Maureen Taft-Morales and Clare Ribando Seelke of the
Congressional Research Service entitled ``Haiti: Developments and U.S.
Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns.''
\7\ National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. ``The
1990 General Elections in Haiti,'' December 16, 1990. Available at
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/electionreports/democracy/
FinalReportHaiti1990.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Presidential elections of December 1995 saw Aristide
succeeded by Preval, in the first transfer of power between two
democratically elected Presidents in Haiti's history, and a
return of Aristide during Presidential elections of December
2000. All of the elections held under Aristide and Rene Preval,
however, were marred by alleged irregularities, low voter
turnout, and opposition boycotts.
On February 29, 2004, Aristide was forced to resign before
finishing his Presidential term. After his departure, a
``council of the wise'' was appointed to serve as the interim
assembly and they chose Mr. Gerard Latortue as Prime Minister.
In the absence of an elected head of state, the President of
Haiti's Supreme Court was named President of Haiti, as
delineated in article 149 of the Constitution of Haiti.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The current structure of Haiti's political system was
established under the Constitution of Haiti on March 29, 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite efforts by the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), established in April 2004 by the U.N Security
Council, conditions remained unstable and natural disasters
caused by hurricanes inflamed the instability. After several
postponements, Presidential elections were contested on
February 7, 2006, and runoff legislative elections were held in
April. Following days of protests in the streets and a
controversial calculation process, Preval was declared the
winner, although he did not initially receive 51 percent of the
vote as required by Haitian electoral law. Because the
elections were delayed from November 2005 to February 2006,
Preval was not sworn in on February 7, 2006, as stipulated by
the Haitian Constitution, but on May 14, 2006.
President Preval's term ends, as mandated by the
constitution, on February 7, 2011. But because of concerns
regarding the ability of the Haitian Government to organize
Presidential and parliamentary elections in the face of the
devastation caused by the January 12 earthquake, Haiti's
National Assembly, before the majority of their terms expired
on May 8, 2010, granted President Preval an extension of his
Presidential mandate until May 14, 2011--unless a successor is
elected and prepared to assume office by February 7, 2011.
As was explained to staff by the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti,
if elections are not held before President Preval's extended
mandate expires, Haiti may be confronted by a vacuum of power
at every level of its government. If this occurs, a government
of transition would need to be established, which would be
difficult to form and likely lack popular support.
Observations
During meetings with senior officials from the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the
Government of Canada, staff was informed that convening
credible elections is feasible in November if key procedural
and political decisions are made without delay. However, a
senior member of Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)--
the entity constitutionally empowered to oversee all
elections--clearly stated, ``The required schedule in order to
prepare for elections is not compressible. We have already
counted that staff must work weekends and holidays to meet our
deadline.'' Yet, to date, staff learned that because of
procedural and political squabbles, President Preval has
neglected to take official action and all election-related
efforts remain at a standstill.
Procedural Actions
The baseline procedural action that must be initiated if
elections are to be held in 2010 is the issue of a Presidential
decree by Preval, establishing a date and granting the CEP a
mandate to prepare for Presidential and parliamentary
elections. Staff learned from senior United Nations officials
that Preval's reluctance to call officially for elections is
largely motivated by a ``chicken and egg'' scenario.
Essentially, the CEP cannot initiate its work without the
Presidential decree and an estimated $38 million in funding,
but Preval has stated that donor countries must make firm
financial commitments before he will set a date. International
donors, however, are conditioning their commitments on
receiving a detailed budget and electoral calendar from the
CEP, which they are incapable of producing absent a
Presidential decree.
Following the issuance of a Presidential decree, other
daunting procedural hurdles would then be confronted in the
buildup to elections:
The electoral list must be updated, to reflect
population changes since the last time it was revised
in 2005, which includes accounting for the nearly
300,000 who perished and many more displaced to the
hinterlands due to the earthquake. This process must
begin no later than July, a broad swath of electoral
experts told staff, if elections are to be held in
2010.
National identification cards must be produced for
new registrants, as well as for those whose cards were
lost or destroyed as a result of the earthquake.
Haiti's National Identification Office (ONI), whose
capacity has proven to be limited during past elections
according to senior IFES officials, estimates that it
can generate approximately 100,000 cards per month.
However, the IFES assessment points out that ONI only
has one machine in all of Haiti and a breakdown or even
delay in production could prove catastrophic for the
entire operation.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ International Foundation for Electoral Systems. ``Post-Disaster
Assessment on the Feasibility of Organizing Free and Fair Elections in
Haiti'' May 13, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Political Actions
Staff was told in most meetings that the main challenges to
having elections in Haiti were political. The IFES assessment
noted that the operational arm of the CEP was technically
capable of organizing elections but argued that ``giving the
mandate of organizing the upcoming elections to the current CEP
would mean that the electoral process will be considered flawed
and questionable from the beginning.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Staff was informed by U.S. Embassy staff that the week
before our arrival a CEP member was forced to resign after
being accused by one of his consultants of having taken his
salary. Other CEP members allegedly wanted to keep the internal
conflict concealed and asked the member to resign quietly but
he refused. The president and director general of the CEP were
also recently accused publicly by a Haitian senator of awarding
a significant contract to the relative of a CEP official. Each
of these incidents has garnered media attention and further
undermines the CEP's credibility.
Senior members of the CEP consulted while in Haiti agreed
that their current membership was problematic, but warned that
sweeping changes could compromise the ability to contest
elections in 2010. Nonetheless, one member noted, ``Regardless
of if the President changes all of the members and the director
general or just a few of the members, he has to do something.''
Calls for President Preval to exercise his executive powers
and reform the CEP have been ongoing since controversial
decisions made by the CEP to ban candidates representing Fanmi
Lavalas (FL) from participating in the senatorial elections of
2009. FL is the political party of Aristide who continues to
exert control even while exiled in South Africa. The CEP barred
FL from standing for election, according to senior officials
from the United Nations, on the grounds that FL's list of
candidates lacked Aristide's signature.
Appeals by the United Nations, the Organization of American
States, and other international partners for the CEP to reverse
its decision--in order to buttress the legitimacy of the
elections--went unheeded. Consequentially, many allegedly pro-
Preval candidates prevailed in an election that saw less than
20 percent of eligible voters participate, according to senior
U.S. Embassy staff.
Recommendations
Strong leadership is required by the Government of Haiti if
elections are to be contested in 2010. The current stalemate
may prove to be a significant obstacle to the reconstruction
effort and Haiti's struggle to institutionalize essential
democratic traditions. The path toward elections in Haiti
contains many formidable procedural and political obstacles.
The following recommendations constitute critical steps that,
if taken without delay, will increase the country's chances of
realizing economic and political development. Staff strongly
encourages appropriate officials at the Department of State to
ask,
In Haiti
President Preval to issue a decree in earnest
establishing a date for Presidential and parliamentary
elections. This will empower the technical arm of the
CEP with the mandate and funding to initiate
preparation of electoral lists and identifications
cards, as well as voter education campaigns in
anticipation of elections.
President Preval to undertake the appropriate
restructuring of CEP's membership, in consultation with
international partners, in a way that causes minimal
interruption to procedural preparations, but
demonstrates a clear political commitment to contesting
credible elections.
Within the International Donor Community
The international donor community to seek an
agreement with the CEP and all political parties,
including the factions of Famni Lavalas, to ensure that
the parties meet the CEP's legal requirements and are
not excluded from the elections because of perceived
technicalities.
The international donor community, immediately upon
issue of the decree by President Preval, to make a
portion of election funds available so that the
daunting task of updating electoral lists, generating
identification cards, and reallocating displaced
persons to the appropriate polling center can begin
before July 2010.
Conclusion
The people of Haiti are confronted with a unique
opportunity to fundamentally alter the trajectory of their
economic, social, and political future. Rebuilding the country
is already proving to be a slow and daunting challenge, which
will demand extraordinary leadership and unity of purpose if it
is to be successful. The United States and the international
community have demonstrated their desire to support the people
of Haiti as they attempt to realize this objective. But this
commitment should not be taken for granted.
President Preval and his administration should view the
elections of 2010 as a moment to signal clearly their
commitment to a democratic framework and good governance, which
then must be visible in day-to-day actions. The outpouring of
goodwill and resources by the United States and the
international community should be leveraged by Haiti's leaders
to catalyze compromises on contentious issues so that all sides
can go forward and rebuild Haiti together.
Meetings With Individuals in Preparation For or During
Visit to Haiti
U.S. Diplomats
Kenneth Merten, Ambassador to Haiti
David Lindwall, Deputy Chief of Mission
Kara McDonald, Political Counselor
Greg Groth, Economic Counselor
Haitian Government Officials
Gaillot Dorsinvil, Provisional Electoral Council, President
Jacques Belzin, Provisional Electoral Council, Treasurer
Pierre-Louis Opont, Provisional Electoral Council, Director
General
United Nations Officials
Kevin Kennedy, United Nations, Special Representative of the
Secretary General
David Le Notre, United Nations, OIC Electoral Assistance
Section
Organization of American States Official
Albert Ramdin, Organization of American States, Assistant
Secretary General
International Elections Experts
Sophie Lagueny, International Foundation for Electoral System,
Chief of Party
Rachna Mishra, Embassy of Canada, Political Counselor