[Senate Prints 111-47]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


111th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
  2d Session              COMMITTEE PRINT                        111-47
_______________________________________________________________________
 
                     COMMON ENEMY, COMMON STRUGGLE: 

                    PROGRESS IN U.S.-MEXICAN EFFORTS 

                       TO DEFEAT ORGANIZED CRIME 

                          AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 

                               __________

                                A REPORT

                             TO THE MEMBERS

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                             Second Session

                              MAY 18, 2010

                                     
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman        
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California            JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
              Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director        
        Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director        

                              (ii)        














                            C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v


Introduction.....................................................     1


Background.......................................................     3


Observations.....................................................     6


Recommendations..................................................    12


Conclusion.......................................................    14


                               Appendixes

Appendix I.......................................................    17


Appendix II......................................................    18


Appendix III.....................................................    19





                             (iii)        
?

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                      Washington, DC, May 18, 2010.
    Dear colleague: From April 28 to May 1, 2010, I directed my 
senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member 
for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to visit Mexico City to assess 
the Obama Administration's recent 2011 budget request of $310 
million for the Merida Initiative.
    The Merida Initiative, proposed to the U.S. Congress by 
former President George W. Bush in the fall of 2007, is a 
multi-year and multi-country effort (involving Mexico, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and the nations of Central America) 
to provide equipment, training, and technical assistance for 
long-term reform and oversight of security agencies. The 
Initiative has allocated more than $1.3 billion for Mexico from 
2008 to 2010, nearly a 10-fold increase above 2007 levels of 
assistance to that country. As a result, Mexico is now the top 
recipient of U.S. assistance in the Western Hemisphere.
    The Merida Initiative was put forward to support the 
Mexican Government's stepped-up efforts against organized crime 
and drug trafficking, which pose a serious threat to public 
security and economic well-being. Because of the Merida 
Initiative, relevant security agencies on opposite sides have 
strengthened cooperation, establishing regular, secure 
communications and routinely exchanging information at an 
operational level. This leap forward in collaboration along the 
border has resulted in dramatic progress in drug seizures and 
extraditions. But most importantly, our assistance and 
collaboration has helped Mexico develop stronger institutions 
to fight organized crime and drug trafficking.
    The Mexican Government is continuing to seek ways to 
improve its capacity to combat these threats. Chief among its 
efforts is the reform and consolidation of police forces 
nation-wide. With U.S. collaboration, the reform of the federal 
police force, numbering more than 30,000 officers, is moving 
forward. But little progress has been made on a framework for 
organizing the 2,022 state and local police forces spread among 
31 states and the Federal District. Reform of these state and 
local units is essential to the success of Mexico's anti-crime 
initiatives, because they constitute more than 90 percent of 
Mexico's police strength.
    This report highlights the need to deepen the partnership 
between the United States and Mexico in a way that respects our 
mutual sovereignty and yet addresses the shared problems caused 
by criminal organizations operating on both sides of the 
border. By history, by geography, and by family ties, the 
United States and Mexico are natural partners. Our policies 
toward Mexico should reflect our common interests and 
objectives.
    In the run-up to Mexican President Felipe Calderon's state 
visit on May 19-20, I hope this report will help stimulate 
broader debate on the importance of building a closer 
partnership that will improve our capacity to address shared 
challenges.
    Though we still have a long way to go, it is clear that 
efforts to fight the common threat posed to our societies by 
drug traffickers and organized crime are showing positive 
results and should be bolstered. I look forward to continuing 
to work with you on these issues, and welcome any comments you 
may have.


        Sincerely,
                                          Richard G. Lugar,
                                                    Ranking Member.






                              (v)        


                     COMMON ENEMY, COMMON STRUGGLE:
                    PROGRESS IN U.S.-MEXICAN EFFORTS
                       TO DEFEAT ORGANIZED CRIME
                          AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

                              ----------                              


                              Introduction

          The basis of U.S.-Mexico ties is a strategic relationship 
        that goes far beyond the problems of drugs and violence. Our 
        nation is inextricably intertwined with Mexico historically, 
        culturally, and commercially. The flow of goods and people 
        across our borders helps drive our economy and strengthen our 
        culture. But our land borders also serve as a conduit for 
        illicit activity. This is a problem that bears shared 
        responsibility and requires cooperative action.--Senator 
        Richard Lugar\1\
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    \1\ Statement by Senator Lugar for field hearing on ``U.S.-Mexico 
Border Violence,'' March 30, 2009.


    Since 2007, the Merida Initiative has deepened U.S.-Mexican 
cooperation to jointly tackle the transnational threat posed by 
drug traffickers and organized crime. In 2010, the urgency of 
this task is heightened by the dramatic growth in drug-related 
violence. By conservative estimates, more than 6,500 people 
died last year in drug-related homicides, while January 2010 
marked ``the bloodiest month on record,'' with nearly 800 
homicides country-wide.\2\ According to press reports using 
Mexican Government data, more than 3,000 drug-related homicides 
occurred in the first four months of 2010 alone.\3\
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    \2\ Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and 
Analysis from 2001-2009, January 2010.
    \3\ William Booth, ``A deadly new front in Mexico's drug war: 
Nation's northeast is seized by terror as cartels' feud escalates,'' 
Washington Post, April 21, 2010.
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    This escalation of violence is fueled in large part by 
competition for the profits generated by illegal drug 
consumption in the United States and by the illicit flow of 
weapons and money to cartel operations. According to the 
Government of Mexico (GOM), which has defined organized crime 
as the country's greatest threat, the current surge of violence 
reflects the success of the government's offensive against drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs), a perception shared by 
relevant U.S. agencies. As rival organizations battle each 
other for control of lucrative trafficking routes into the 
United States, most of the violence occurs between and among 
DTO members. Nevertheless, police officers, journalists, and 
politicians have become more frequent targets, while the 
January 2010 massacre of 15 teenagers in Ciudad Juarez 
highlighted the victimization of innocent civilians. 
Criminality has also extended itself to extortion, robbery, and 
kidnapping, affecting innocent people throughout Mexico and 
making security the number one concern of Mexican citizens.
    Some significant government victories against the DTOs 
include the December 2009 killing of Arturo Beltran Leyva and 
January 2010 capture of Teodoro Garcia Simental, the 
extradition of 107 fugitives to the United States in 2009, and 
the GOM's seizure of 92 tons of cocaine between December 2006 
and March 2010.\4\ Yet drug-related violence continues to 
threaten public security throughout Mexico, particularly near 
the U.S.-Mexico border. The most afflicted Mexican states 
include Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guerrero, and Durango [see map in 
Appendix II], while the most violent cities are considered to 
be Ciudad Juarez (on the border between Chihuahua and Texas), 
Culiacan (the capital of Sinoloa), and Tijuana (on the border 
between Baja California and California).\5\
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    \4\ Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, ``United States-
Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact,'' March 23, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138929.htm.
    \5\  Based on the Trans-Border Institute (TBI), ``Drug Violence in 
Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009,'' January 2010, citing data 
gathered by Reforma newspaper.
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    Currently, U.S. Government (USG) officials deny that the 
increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has 
resulted in a significant spillover of violence into the United 
States, but they recognize that the prospect is a serious 
concern. Even without evidence of spillover violence, however, 
the United States has an important stake in Mexico's 
challenges. According to a 2010 assessment by the National Drug 
Intelligence Center, Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) represent the single greatest drug trafficking threat to 
the United States.\6\ Mexico is a major transit country for 
cocaine and a source country for heroin, marijuana, and 
methamphetamine.
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    \6\ U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center 
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, February 2010, http://
www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/index.htm .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Both the GOM and the USG acknowledge the gravity of the 
crisis and their shared interest in improving coordination of 
law enforcement, institution-building, and efforts to reduce 
demand for drugs. Mexico City has received a series of high-
level visits by Obama administration officials, testifying to 
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano's characterization 
of the current level of cooperation as ``unprecedented.'' \7\ 
Yet, as the record levels of violence demonstrate, many of the 
challenges undermining bilateral efforts are deep-rooted and 
difficult to change, from the lack of legal economic 
opportunities for Mexico's youth to corruption cases in both 
countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Testimony by Secretary Napolitano before Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary. April 27, 2010.
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    Moreover, as the violence increases, public criticisms of 
President Calderon's strategy and of the Merida Initiative grow 
in number and intensity. A poll conducted in March 2010 by 
Milenio newspaper found that 59 percent of Mexicans believe 
organized crime is winning the drug war, while only 21 percent 
believe the government is.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ El Milenio, ``Gana el narco guerra contra el gobierno federal, 
piensa 59 % de los mexicanos.'' March 22, 2010., http://
www.milenio.com/node/407205.
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    At the direction of Senator Lugar, this study examines the 
current state of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. Its focus 
is on efforts to improve border security and modernize Mexico's 
police forces, as these key areas will contribute to the 
success of the Merida Initiative. The chief conclusion is that 
the Merida Initiative is delivering results but must be 
bolstered in order to achieve its aims. While the dramatic 
surge in violence is an expected upshot of the aggressive 
campaign against DTOs, the risk is that political support for 
expanded cooperation may not survive daily news reports of 
brutal homicides and kidnappings. The Merida Initiative is thus 
entering a critical period, with important implications for the 
national security of both the United States and Mexico.

                             Background\9\

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    \9\ This section is adapted from a memo prepared by Clare Seelke of 
the Congressional Research Service, April 23, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the GOM's request for increased cooperation 
and assistance, in October 2007 the United States and Mexico 
proposed the Merida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug 
and anticrime cooperation to Mexico and Central America. The 
Merida Initiative was to provide some $1.4 billion in 
assistance, largely in the form of equipment and training, from 
FY 2008 through FY 2010. The four primary goals of the Merida 
Initiative, as originally conceived, were to (1) break the 
power and impunity of criminal organizations; (2) assist the 
Mexican and Central American Governments in strengthening 
border, air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the capacity of 
justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity in 
Mexico and Central America and diminish drug demand in the 
region.
    Congress has so far appropriated $1.3 billion of the 
original package, resulting in a significant increase in 
foreign assistance for Mexico. In FY 2007, total assistance to 
Mexico was $65.4 million, while in FY 2008, after the Merida 
Initiative was enacted, total assistance to Mexico (including 
Merida funds) was $405.9 million. There has been increasing 
concern, however, about the slow delivery of Merida assistance 
[see Appendix III for chart of delivered items]. U.S. officials 
reportedly attributed early delays in disbursal of FY 2008 
funds to USG contracting regulations, negotiations with Mexico 
and other countries about what equipment is actually needed, 
the time required to conduct competitive procurements, and the 
difficulty of delivering an aid package that involves so many 
agencies and offices.
    As part of the FY 2011 budget preparation process, U.S. and 
Mexican officials began to revise the strategic framework 
underpinning U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. After several 
months of consultations, the Obama and Calderon governments 
agreed to a new strategy, called ``Beyond Merida'' or ``Merida 
2.0,'' that broadens the scope of bilateral security efforts 
and focuses more on institution-building than on technology and 
equipment transfers. The Obama Administration outlined the 
strategy in its FY 2011 budget request, which includes $310 
million for Merida-related programs in Mexico: $292 million in 
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) 
funds, $10 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), and $8 
million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
    The Obama administration formally announced the new 
strategy at the Merida High-Level Consultative Group meeting in 
Mexico City on March 23, 2010. Its four pillars include:


  1. Disrupting the operational capacity of organized crime;

  2. Strengthening Mexican institutions to sustain the rule of 
        law (police and judicial reform);

  3. Creating a 21st century border; and

  4. Building strong and resilient communities.


    The Calderon government has focused its efforts on a 
comprehensive strategy, including dismantling the power of drug 
trafficking organizations. To that end, the government has 
conducted joint police-military operations to arrest DTO 
leaders, investigated and indicted public officials suspected 
of collusion, and begun to go after the DTOs' illicit 
assets.\10\ A significant percentage of U.S. assistance 
appropriated during the first phase of the Merida Initiative, 
including at least $421 million in FMF funding, was obligated 
to purchase equipment for those efforts. The Obama 
administration has asked for only $8 million in FMF for FY 
2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ An asset forfeiture law is currently under discussion in the 
Mexican Congress. ``Ley Debilitar  las Finanzas del Narcotr fico y 
Crimen Organizado en Mexico,'' EFE, April 13, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the GOM has increasingly begun to conceptualize the DTOs 
as corporations, its strategy, and U.S. efforts to support it, 
has begun to focus more attention on disrupting the illicit 
weapons and funding flowing to the traffickers from the United 
States. These efforts, as well as increased intelligence-
sharing and coordinated law enforcement operations, have been 
suggested as possible areas for increased cooperation under 
pillar one. As the DTOs increasingly evolve into poly-criminal 
organizations, perhaps as a partial result of drug interdiction 
efforts cutting into their profits, some analysts have also 
urged both governments to focus more on combating other types 
of organized crime, such as human trafficking and alien 
smuggling.
    Notwithstanding a comprehensive judicial reform underway in 
Mexico, many security experts also maintain that the GOM, with 
U.S. support, needs to focus more on addressing the country's 
weak law enforcement and judicial institutions than it has in 
the last three years (pillar two). Federal police reform is 
well underway. In Juarez, the federal police has assumed 
control over all police forces, with the military in a 
supporting role. But there are not sufficient federal police to 
replace dysfunctional local police with federal police across 
the country, which underscores the need for a Mexican strategy 
to reform its state and municipal police forces. Some FY 2009 
Merida funding is likely to be reprogrammed in order to extend 
U.S.-funded police training and corrections reform efforts to 
Tijuana and Juarez as part of a pilot project. Designed by a 
binational team for the areas of Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad 
Juarez-El Paso, the project is intended to support the GOM's 
plan for Juarez through training, equipment, professional 
exchanges, and targeted information-sharing.\11\ Security 
experts have also identified improving police-community 
relations, respect for human rights, and the prevention and 
punishment of street crime as important issues that need to be 
addressed in Juarez and elsewhere in Mexico.
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    \11\  For a description of U.S. programs planned for Ciudad Ju rez, 
see: U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, ``Confronting Border Violence in 
Ciudad Juarez,'' March 2010, available at: http://www.usembassy-
mexico.gov/eng/merida/pdf/emerida_factsheet_ViolenceCJ.pdf.
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    With impunity rates hovering around 98%, experts maintain 
that it is crucial for Mexico to implement the judicial reforms 
passed in the summer of 2008 and focus on fighting corruption 
at all levels of government.\12\ In order for Mexico to 
transition its criminal justice system to an accusatorial 
system with oral trials by 2016, some argue that U.S.-funded 
judicial training programs, some of which are just getting 
started, may have to be significantly expanded. They are 
encouraged that $207 million of the Obama administration's FY 
2011 request for Merida programs in Mexico are under the 
``Governing Justly and Democratically'' category.\13\ Others 
argue that, even with expanded U.S. assistance, it may be 
unrealistic to expect Mexico to implement such a major 
transformation in its judicial system in the midst of the 
current struggle against escalating drug trafficking-related 
crime and violence.
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    \12\ In other words, about 98% of perpetrators have not been 
brought to justice. This is figure is widely cited. See, for example, a 
recent report by the Center of Research for Development (CIDAC), 
``Indice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009,'' August 2009, p. 9.
    \13\ Eric L. Olson and Christopher E. Wilson, ``Beyond Merida,'' 
Woodrow Wilson Center, April 6, 2010.
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    The third pillar included in the State Department's 
proposal for the second phase of the Merida Initiative involves 
the creation of a ``21st Century border.'' The proposed 21st 
century border is based on:


   Enhancing public safety via increased information sharing, 
        screenings, and prosecutions;

   Securing the cross-border flow of goods and people;

   Expediting legitimate commerce and travel through 
        investments in personnel, technology, and 
        infrastructure;

   Engaging border communities in cross-border trade; and

   Setting bilateral policies for collaborative border 
        management.\14\
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    \14\ U.S. Department of State, United States-Mexico Partnership: A 
New Border Vision, Washington, DC, March 23, 2010, http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138926.htm.


    Pillar four will be a new focus for U.S.-Mexican 
cooperation and may include targeted efforts to assist at-risk 
youth and curb unemployment and other social problems in 
communities plagued by drug trafficking and violence. Experts 
have lauded the inclusion of social development and crime 
prevention programs in the new Merida framework but have 
expressed concern about the limited funds the programs are 
likely to receive from the United States. \15\ While U.S. 
assistance in this area includes promising new projects in 
support of local funding by municipalities through bond 
issuance, additional support for advice and consultative 
partnering between our two governments could help expand in a 
dramatic way our cooperation in this area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Testimony of Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fellow, the Brookings 
Institution, before the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the House 
Oversight and Government Reform Committee, April 14, 2010.
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    Bilateral efforts under pillar four are focusing for now on 
pilot projects in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua but may also be 
expanded to Tijuana and the state of Baja California. These 
efforts involve the continuation and expansion of some existing 
Merida-funded initiatives, such as school-based ``culture of 
lawfulness'' programs and demand reduction and treatment 
services. They may also involve USAID or other agencies 
providing technical expertise in how to re-zone neighborhoods 
to prevent crime, issue municipal bonds to fund infrastructure 
projects, and/or launch public-private partnerships. It is also 
still possible that the GOM may request additional U.S. support 
to carry out President Calderon's ``We Are All Juarez'' plan, 
which includes 160 different initiatives that the federal 
government has begun to implement in the city, in some cases 
with the help of state and local officials.
    At this point, it appears that the funding and 
implementation of pillar four will primarily be the 
responsibility of the GOM, possibly with support from 
multilateral institutions like the Inter-American Development 
Bank. Still, staff believes that U.S, assistance can helpfully 
create models to be replicated and can leverage hundreds of 
millions of dollars in investments from other sources. For 
example, a USAID technical assistance program helped introduce 
a legal framework to issue state and municipal bonds, which 
have now raised over $1 billion in about five years. Such bond 
issues can be linked with socioeconomic investment programs, 
public-private partnerships, and development bank financing. 
Hence, USAID contributions even in the range of $30 million can 
still have a major impact through the resources such 
investments can leverage.

                              Observations

    The central goal of border security is to prevent dangerous 
goods and people from causing harm to our country and our 
people. In the context of economic globalization and widespread 
international travel, as our Ambassador in Mexico City stated 
to staff, ``We cannot simply attempt to `hold the line' at the 
border itself rather, we must work with the appropriate Mexican 
officials to deter, identify and intercept threats as early as 
possible, developing effective channels to share with each 
other the information necessary to do so.''
    Cross-border criminal organizations--including Mexican 
based DTOs and gangs--are responsible for most of the traffic 
in people, drugs, arms, money, and other contraband across the 
land border. They are also responsible for the dramatic surge 
of violence occurring in parts of Mexico.
    According to senior government officials on both sides of 
the border, we should respond to cross-border crime with 
binationally coordinated law enforcement operations, both at 
the border and in the interior of both countries. The 
administration is taking some key steps to enhance public 
safety and security:


   Increased sharing of mutually useful information to permit 
        integrated, intelligence-driven operations along the 
        border.

   Common approaches and standards for vetting officials and 
        purging those found to be compromised, including 
        sharing of information on corrupt officials in both 
        countries.

   Development and implementation of joint strategies for key 
        smuggling and trafficking corridors, including the 
        Ciudad Juarez-El Paso, Tijuana-San Diego, Sonora-
        Arizona, and Tamaulipas-Rio Grande Valley corridors, 
        among others.

   Strengthening of a Mexican enforcement presence between the 
        ports of entry, extending efforts in the Sonora-Arizona 
        corridor to Ciudad Juarez-El Paso and other locations 
        along the border.

   Regular, secure communications and exchange of information 
        at an operational level between enforcement agencies on 
        opposite sides of the border.

   Flexibility, discretion, and initiative at the operational 
        level to reach out to counterparts on the other side of 
        the border.

   Design and implementation of an integrated strategy to 
        prevent arms trafficking, significantly extending and 
        deepening Operation Armas Cruzadas and other efforts.

   Acceleration of current efforts to seize cash proceeds from 
        criminal activities by (among other ways) continuing 
        investigations and southbound inspections in the United 
        States.

   Progressive increasing of alignment and coordination among 
        law enforcement and military assets, building on 
        successes to date.

   Regular sharing of information from investigations and 
        prosecutions, building on the success of recent efforts 
        related to Operation Coronado.\16\
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    \16\ Operation Coronado was a joint law enforcement operation 
conducted in October 2009 across the United States. It resulted in the 
arrests of 303 individuals, many of them associated with the Mexican 
drug trafficking organization ``La Familia Michoacana.'' This 
investigation relied heavily on coordination between the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, Department of 
Homeland Security, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, and state and local law enforcement authorities, and was 
supported by information and cooperation from Mexican authorities.

   Application of the Controlled Substance Project, extending 
        the current pilot program in Nogales to the areas 
        around Ciudad Juarez and elsewhere along the 
        border.\17\
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    \17\ The Nogales Controlled Substances Program is aimed at reducing 
narcotics smuggling along Arizona's border with Mexico. Since its 
inception in October 2009, 24 suspects have been referred to Mexican 
authorities for prosecution (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/1003/100315nogales.htm).

   Expansion of Operation No Refuge, denying visas, adjustment 
        of status, admission into the United States and other 
        benefits to known drug traffickers and close family 
        members or associates who knowingly assist, aid, abet, 
        conspire, or collude in drug trafficking, and closer 
        coordination between Mexican and U.S. law enforcement 
        authorities when suspected criminals are denied entry 
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        into one country.

   Enhanced coordination on the repatriation process of 
        criminal aliens.


    Many of the steps mentioned take place through the Border 
Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) Initiative and the 
Operation Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on 
Safety and Security (OASISS).
    BEST is a multi-agency initiative, led by the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS, wherein 
task forces seek to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal 
organizations posing significant threats to border 
security.\18\ Through the BEST Initiative, ICE partners with 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Attorneys' Offices, as well 
as local, state, and international law enforcement agencies. In 
particular, the Mexican Secretariat for Public Security (SSP) 
is a partner along the Southwest border. There are currently 17 
BEST teams around the country, 10 of which are along the 
Southwest border and one in Mexico City.
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    \18\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security Task Forces, November 3, 2009, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm. 
Besides BEST, there is a variety of interagency collaborative efforts, 
such as the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Forces and the El 
Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), both led by the Drug Enforcement 
Agency but with Department of Homeland Security and other agency 
participation.
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    BEST teams provide the platform for Operation Armas 
Cruzadas, an ICE-led operation to disrupt and dismantle weapons 
smuggling networks.\19\ Operation Armas Cruzadas involves 
several components such as training stakeholders in database 
management, laws, resources, and methods to combat organized 
crime. It also is the umbrella for the Vetted Arms Trafficking 
Group, the Weapons Virtual Task Force, and the ICE Border 
Liaison Program.
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    \19\ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Armas Cruzadas, 
November 2, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/
armas_cruzadas.htm.
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    CBP and the Mexican Government have also partnered through 
OASISS, a bi-lateral program aimed at enhancing both countries' 
abilities to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers 
along the Southwest border.\20\ Through OASISS, the GOM is able 
to prosecute alien smugglers apprehended in the United States. 
From the time of its inception in 2005 through the end of FY 
2009, OASISS generated 1,579 cases.\21\ This program is 
supported by the Border Patrol International Liaison Unit, 
which is responsible for establishing and maintaining working 
relationships with foreign counterparts in order to enhance 
border security.
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    \20\  See testimony by Audrey Adams, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, 
Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Relations, 109th Cong., April 26, 2006.
    \21\ Data provided to CRS by DHS Congressional Affairs.
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    Staff strongly believes that additional funding for U.S. 
law enforcement agencies along the border, coupled with 
increased technology and the building of additional barriers, 
where necessary, would help with these efforts. Additional 
trained personnel for CBP would be far more effective than only 
pursuing an increased National Guard presence on the border, 
which could complicate Mexico's willingness to cooperate. As 
one senior Mexican official commented, ``Finding the political 
will for closer collaboration may be compromised if the Mexican 
public perceives that the border is being militarized.''
    The cross-border investigation between Ciudad Juarez and El 
Paso of the murders of three individuals associated with the 
U.S. consulate in Juarez has provided a model that is 
demonstrating wider results and should be replicated. Over 200 
law enforcement personnel have worked on the case on the El 
Paso side of the border, and about 40 on the Juarez side. This 
intensive effort has generated massive information on previous 
crimes and on the gangs and cartels working in the area, 
possibly facilitating legal actions targeting these entities as 
organizations. Cooperation with Mexican law enforcement has 
been excellent on this case. Staff believes that this kind of 
intensive law enforcement increases prospects to damage drug 
trafficking organizations as corporate entities.
    At the ports of entry, dangerous goods and other contraband 
are concealed within the vast amount of legal cargo that 
crosses the border each day; dangerous people (including those 
who constitute a threat to national security, public safety, or 
simply use false documents) likewise attempt to blend into the 
much larger number of legal travelers. As Mexican and U.S. 
officials stated to staff, ``The central challenge in managing 
flows of people and goods is to separate travelers and cargo by 
level of risk and threat.'' Such risk segmentation allows 
governments to enhance security by focusing more attention on 
stopping illegitimate trade, while at the same time 
facilitating legal travel and commerce.
    Equally essential to securing flows is closer collaboration 
in managing land ports of entry, building on the Port Security 
Committees framework. Staff believes that we should continue 
and expand efforts to facilitate trade and enhance security at 
the ports of entry begun under the Binational Strategic Plan
    Ultimately, customs and immigration on both sides should 
have access to the information they need to do their jobs 
effectively and be able to communicate with each other in real 
time. The administration is taking some key steps to enhance 
the smooth movement of legal goods and people, including :


   Complementary risk management strategies on both sides of 
        the border, and the replacement of comprehensive 
        customs inspections in Mexico with a risk-based 
        approach.

   Greater reciprocal sharing of information on potentially 
        dangerous or illegal goods to permit more accurate 
        targeting.

   The establishment of a binational ``model port'' with 
        comparable infrastructure, state-of-the-art inspection 
        technologies, harmonized operation standards, and real-
        time information sharing.

   Integrated, interoperable systems for collecting, 
        analyzing, and sharing information on passengers 
        entering our countries from outside North America, 
        building on the work to date on advanced passenger 
        information system (APIS).

   Shared watch lists and common screening protocols for 
        dealing with aliens from special interest countries 
        (ASICs), building on the Joint Security Program in 
        Mexico City.

   Coordinated efforts to secure key shipping centers in our 
        countries.

   An environment of greater compliance and legality in flows 
        across Mexico's southern border.

   Purging of corrupt officials from agencies in both 
        countries with responsibility for border management and 
        inclusion of information from other agencies on 
        prospective employees in the vetting process.

   Substantial investments in capacity building (training and 
        vetting personnel, enhancing professionalism, 
        constructing or refurbishing facilities, deploying new 
        technology, etc.).

   A legal, orderly, and secure system for managing the 
        movement of people across the border (including, in the 
        case of illegal migration, close coordination on 
        deportations).

Public Security and Law Enforcement Reform

    The corruption of law enforcement and government officials 
in both countries has made the campaign against drug 
trafficking organizations more difficult. In October 2008, an 
elite unit within the federal Attorney General's office for 
Special Investigations of Organized Crime (SIEDO) was 
implicated in a scandal involving payoffs for sensitive 
information about antidrug activities, with at least 35 
officials fired or arrested.\22\ In November 2008, the former 
head of SIEDO was arrested and accused of accepting bribes from 
a drug cartel. The former investigative agency within the PGR, 
the Federal Agency of Investigations (AFI), which was created 
in 2001, was also widely criticized for corruption by 2005 and 
partially disbanded in June 2009.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Tracy Wilkinson, ``Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by 
Drug Gang,'' Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008.
    \23\ Robert E. Donnelly and David A. Shirk, eds., Police and Public 
Security in Mexico, San Diego, CA: University Readers, 2010, p. 228.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Corruption has also plagued federal, state, and municipal 
police forces. The Calderon administration had launched a 
concerted effort to improve training, root out corruption via a 
comprehensive vetting program and a network of control centers, 
and establish a workable model for professionalizing the 4,000+ 
new members of the national police, these officials stated.
    Mexican officials stated that police corruption has been a 
major problem at all levels of the Mexican policing system and 
that reform was necessary. Officials told staff that ``reforms 
of Mexico's federal, state and municipal police force could 
strengthen border security, and that, in particular, reforms 
under consideration to have state-level forces absorb the 
municipal police could bring increased effectiveness, 
efficiency, standardization, and better trained and equipped 
police to municipalities, particularly those in rural areas 
that have lacked human and financial capital.'' As one senior 
official mentioned, ``In Mexico the police are looked down 
upon, hated, and feared.'' Mexican officials believe that 
police reform will help strengthen confidence in the police, as 
well.
    An important legal step was the passage of an implementing 
law on reform of the constitution in January 2009 that set the 
parameters for a three-tiered model of police: a reaction 
element, a prevention element, and an investigatory element. 
This effort was ongoing and channeled through various 
Secretariat of Public Security (SSP or Federal Police) offices 
responsible for implementing standardized training and other 
requirements necessary to build a professional force. SSP state 
offices were providing some minimal support to state and local 
authorities, but this cooperation was contingent on the 
interest of local authorities. As of March 2010, 4,300 
university-educated SSP officers had graduated from a newly-
established basic investigative training course at the 
refurbished federal police institute.
    Mexican law enforcement officials acknowledged that the 
larger challenge was to address local and state police forces, 
which comprised over 90 percent of the police forces nationwide 
and which suffered from corruption, mismanagement, and low 
levels of professionalism. There are 2,022 separate police 
forces, and a reform law that would consolidate them under 
state control has been stalled in the Congress because of 
disagreements at the state and local levels, where reform was 
seen as a competition for resources.
    The reform law that was proposed on September 24, 2009, 
intends to reform article 115 of the Mexican Constitution in 
order to dissolve the country's municipal police forces and put 
them under the authority of state police entities. In order to 
take effect, the measure has to be approved by the Mexican 
Congress and then a majority of the state legislatures, a 
process which could take several months to a year or more. In 
April 2010, the National Governor's Conference (CONAGO), with 
the unanimous support of all governors from all parties, 
presented to the Senate a proposal for a ``unified force'' 
within each state, perhaps because it would likely increase the 
power of the governor's office.
    But there are serious political challenges that revolve 
around entrenched interests. Most senators from the opposition 
PRI and Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) parties are in 
support of the reform measure, while some National Action Party 
(PAN) senators have dismissed it as a ploy by the governors to 
concentrate power in their offices and undermine municipal 
governments.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ ``Mexico Mulls Plan to Eliminate Municipal Police,'' EFE, 
March 24, 2010. Office of Senator Ramon Galindo Noriega, ``Con 
Liquidacion de Policias Municipales, Gobernadores Buscan Ratificar 
Virreinatos,'' March 29, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Staff met with PAN Senator Felipe Gonzalez, head of the 
Public Security Committee, and his PRI counterpart, Eloy Cantu, 
a strong supporter of the U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship 
who hails from Nuevo Leon. Gonzalez observed that not all the 
parties were on board with the reform law. While some governors 
were pushing CONAGO, there were still concerns at the municipal 
level that the shift in resources to the state would undermine 
local efforts and have an unfair political impact by rewarding 
some state governments that had done very little in the past to 
support a professional police force. Cantu noted his 
frustration with the slow pace of reform and the ``same old 
politics'' that are complicating Mexico's ability to confront 
organized crime. ``The recent violence in Nuevo Leon did not 
start yesterday. The inability of local authorities to confront 
rising violence in recent months reflected deeper and 
longstanding problems with an ever-pervasive corruption that 
was undermining state and local officials,'' Cantu observed.
    Staff believes that some PAN leaders may be concerned about 
giving more power to the governors at a time when 19 of the 
country's 32 governorships are controlled by the PRI. Beyond 
the political implications of the proposed reform, a debate in 
Mexico has ensued concerning whether the proposed reform would 
help or hinder broader police reform efforts. Proponents of the 
reform maintain that it would improve coordination with the 
SSP. They assert that the reform would bring efficiency, 
standardization, and better trained and equipped police to 
municipalities, particularly those in rural areas that have 
lacked human and financial capital. They say that corruption 
has been particularly rife among local police in Mexico, and 
that previous reform efforts have been insufficient to address 
the deep problems that exist at that level of the policing 
structure. SSP Secretary Garcia Luna has publicly advocated 
this reform as a critical step to create an effective state and 
local capacity to complement SSP's federal role.
    Skeptics argue that police corruption has been a major 
problem at all levels of the Mexican policing system, including 
the state and federal police.\25\ They challenge the assertion 
that the Calderon government's restructuring of the police will 
be more effective than past restructuring efforts. Critics also 
argue that there is a role for municipal police who are 
acclimated to local conditions and concerns and are trained to 
deal with household and community issues, as opposed to federal 
concerns like the fight against organized crime. They urge the 
GOM to concentrate its resources and attention on implementing 
the vetting and certification procedures for state and local 
police that were codified in the public security law passed in 
2009, and on strengthening the National System of Public 
Security, which is responsible for overseeing those efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Phone Interview with Daniel Sabet, Visiting Professor at 
Georgetown University, April 15, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Calderon government has also cracked down on existing 
corruption within the police and other government institutions. 
Critics maintain, however, that a large percentage of those who 
have been arrested on charges of colluding with organized crime 
have been subsequently released for lack of evidence. In May 
2009, for example, federal agents arrested ten mayors and 
seventeen other officials from Michoacan for allegedly 
colluding with DTOs, but a majority of those individuals have 
since been released.\26\ Most recently, the wife of a fugitive 
trafficker, Joaquin ``El Chapo'' Guzman, was captured but then 
released on May 13, 2010.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ ``Casting Too Wide a Net For Cartels,'' Newsweek 
International, March 8, 2010.
    \27\ Associated Press, ``Mexican Policy Question, Release Drug 
Lord's Wife,'' May 14, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is a difficult issue that will not be resolved quickly 
or easily. It should not come as a surprise that there was no 
agreement on the police reform law in the last session of 
Congress that ended on April 30. The law will likely be taken 
up in September when Congress resumes.

                            Recommendations

    As demonstrated in the current stalemate on police reform 
in Mexico, new approaches to strengthening law enforcement and 
modernizing border security will face obstacles and require 
policy change, but also a change in attitude. Staff believes 
that assistance must be reconceived in a way that reflects the 
collaborative efforts between our countries. Cooperation must 
be based on jointly-funded programs in which both countries 
determine priorities, with clear objectives and transparent 
funding mechanisms.
    On the police front, it is clear we will not achieve the 
security we are both looking for unless there is an organized, 
well-trained, and professional police force throughout the 
country. The details of such a reform are for the Mexicans to 
decide, but the USG could expand on the collaborative funding 
mechanism that was used to establish and sustain the federal 
police academy at San Luis Potosi. Staff would suggest building 
on the following ideas:


   As a foundational point, the GOM would establish clear 
        legal parameters for the creation of modern state/local 
        police.

   Develop a framework for perhaps 6-8 regional police 
        academies that could have national coverage and achieve 
        economies of scale, drawing on lessons and courses from 
        the San Luis Potosi SSP academy.

   Begin with 1-2 states that could provide a base for 
        developing an effective regional model and provide 
        Merida funding, through established channels, to build 
        a modern police training program.

   As with San Luis Potosi, the GOM would provide the bulk of 
        funding for facilities and salaries. The United States 
        would focus on course development and training. Both 
        should work together to leverage other donor 
        contributions. Both U.S. and Mexican monies would have 
        agreed benchmarks with reporting and auditing 
        requirements.

   The GOM would develop a federal-state cost-sharing plan to 
        sustain these regional academies respect professional 
        standards, and uphold promotion and retention policies 
        in the future. The USG should also support judicial 
        sector reform.


    On the border, though much progress has been made, more is 
necessary.
    Both governments are yet to establish agile processes to 
permit rapid policy-making and binational policy coordination. 
Key ingredients include:


   The establishment of inter-agency policy-making processes 
        that meet these specifications.

   Regular binational meetings of these committees.

   Coordination of this new policy-making structure with 
        existing inter-agency and binational mechanisms.

   Integration of Canada into the process, on issues or topics 
        that affect all three countries.


    Developing a new vision for border security will not be an 
easy task; both governments will have to address a number of 
obstacles and challenges along the way--cultural, political, 
bureaucratic, regulatory, statutory, and possibly even 
constitutional. Staff strongly encourages relevant United 
States government officials to advance the following:

   Improve infrastructure and increased staffing of ports of 
        entry.

   Demonstrate that the benefits of preclearance and related 
        activities more than offset their costs.

   Re-prioritize border infrastructure projects, adjudicating 
        competing funding requests and financing necessary 
        infrastructure in the interior of each country.

   Develop the concept of ``corridor security,'' aimed at 
        integrating intelligence, interdiction, and 
        investigation across the border.

   Create a regulatory framework for sharing intelligence and 
        information with counterpart Mexican officials, 
        including addressing the challenges involved in sharing 
        third-party information, access to databases, and real-
        time data feeds.

   Create strict vetting procedures for border enforcement 
        personnel.

   Ensure safety of law enforcement personnel, including those 
        stationed abroad.

   Establish the appropriate diplomatic arrangements and 
        staffing models necessary for expanded exchange of 
        personnel and their assignment abroad.

   Ensure that law enforcement personnel operating outside 
        their home country have the necessary authorities to do 
        their jobs effectively.

   Address the issue of access to airspace, roads, and 
        waterways where that access is necessary for certain 
        law enforcement operations.

   Devise the optimal mechanisms for coordinating policy-
        making binationally and within each country.

   Coordinate investment in technology to ensure system 
        compatibility.

   Engage Canadian partners in efforts to create a secure 
        North American economic space.

   Secure permission from foreign partners to conduct joint 
        preclearance operations abroad.


    The challenge for both governments will be to not let these 
all-too-familiar barriers deter them from pursuing the larger 
goal of collaborative border management.

                               Conclusion

    Collaboration across the border has grown at an impressive 
rate. First, under President Bush and now under President 
Obama, unsurpassed cooperation has yielded dramatic progress. 
This close relationship is evidence that both sides of the 
border understand that we are bound in a common struggle to rid 
Mexico and the United States of DTOs and organized crime, and 
that when we work together positive results follow.
    Though much remains to be done, it is clear that we are 
witnessing the clear strengthening of institutional capacity 
building in Mexico--police, intelligence, courts, an inter-
agency process--that could allow in the future for drug 
trafficking and organized crime to move from a national 
security concern to a local law enforcement concern. Though it 
may not be possible to eliminate drug trafficking entirely, it 
is vital that we support the strengthening of Mexican 
institutions so that the transnational DTOs cannot threaten the 
security of both U.S. and Mexican states. Because of our shared 
border, any national security threat to Mexico represents a 
security threat to the United States.
    Staff believes that the establishment of the current 
institutional frameworks is progress in itself. Still, efforts 
by the Mexican Government will not succeed if state and local 
authorities are not involved and held accountable for 
implementing and providing effective oversight of law 
enforcement and legal institutions at the state and local 
level. If the Mexican authorities succeed in building this 
nation-wide capacity across key areas, especially in the reform 
of local and state police, we will see more progress in the 
coming years.
    In this regard, the most dramatic change is the contention 
by many Mexican officials that police reform would allow the 
country to shift from the overuse of the military against drugs 
to the targeted use of the military in support of law 
enforcement operations. This would be an important development. 
Most Mexicans currently favor the military over the police 
because of their distrust of the police, despite the common 
view that the military's involvement involves questionable 
methods. As one senior Mexican official stated, ``The 
military's objective is to do away with an enemy. The military 
is the sword.''
    In the United States, many fear developments in Mexico 
because of spillover violence in border cities, though it has 
been sporadic. For many Americans, the problem is 
``elsewhere.'' But as one U.S. Embassy official remarked, 
``There is no doubt that Mexican organized crime would not be 
as successful in moving drugs into the United States without 
distribution networks, safe houses, and ways to launder money 
in the United States.'' In other words, the problem is already 
in the interior of the United States--it is not simply a border 
issue.
    In the short term, strengthening and institutionalizing 
cooperation on border security issues, intelligence sharing, 
and the support of Mexican efforts to reform law enforcement 
are the best ways to protect U.S. security from the threats 
posed by organized criminals in Mexico and by those who work 
with them in the United States.
    Strong U.S.-Mexico cooperation is vital to our common aim 
of defeating the drug trafficking organizations. President 
Calderon's May 19 visit is an ideal opportunity both to raise 
the public's understanding of the common challenge facing both 
countries and of the vital need for continued cooperation. 
Today, transnational cooperation has become more vital, both to 
confronting the drug cartels and to handling broader challenges 
in the bilateral relationship. President Calderon's visit will 
provide an opportunity for both governments to reaffirm and 
express our shared commitment to meeting those challenges head-
on, in a spirit of mutual friendship, trust, and cooperation.















                          A P P E N D I X E S

                              ----------                              




                               Appendix I

Contributor

    Kezia McKeague, Legislative Assistant, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate

                  Meetings with Individuals in Mexico


U.S. Diplomats

    Carlos Pascual, Ambassador to Mexico

    Representatives from NAS, DEA, FBI, DOJ, CBP, OPAD

Mexican Government Officials

    Margarita Gomez, Secretaria de Seguridad Publica

    Yessica de la Madrid, Procuraduria General de la Republica

    Jorge Medina, Penitentiary System

    Jose Juan Bravo Moises, Customs Administrator

    Alejandro Poire, Secretaria de Gobernacion

    Marco Tulio, Secretaria de Seguridad Publica

    Julian Ventura, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores

    Gonzalo Villareal, Penitentiary System

    Antonio Vivanco, Presidencia

    Rafael Fernandez de Castro, Presidencia

Mexican Legislative Branch

    Senator Felipe Gonzalez, Public Security Committee

    Senator Eloy Cantu, Foreign Affairs Committee

Mexican Civil Society

    Representatives from Mexico Unido contra la Delicuencia
 Appendix II. Rates of Drug Trafficking-Related Killings in Mexico by 
                                 State

                          (per 100,000 people)


            [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Congressional Research Service, April 2010.
      
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            Appendix III--Merida Deliverables as of May 2010


               SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MAY 11, 2010

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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