[Senate Prints 111-47]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress S. Prt.
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 111-47
_______________________________________________________________________
COMMON ENEMY, COMMON STRUGGLE:
PROGRESS IN U.S.-MEXICAN EFFORTS
TO DEFEAT ORGANIZED CRIME
AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
__________
A REPORT
TO THE MEMBERS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
Second Session
MAY 18, 2010
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Introduction..................................................... 1
Background....................................................... 3
Observations..................................................... 6
Recommendations.................................................. 12
Conclusion....................................................... 14
Appendixes
Appendix I....................................................... 17
Appendix II...................................................... 18
Appendix III..................................................... 19
(iii)
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, May 18, 2010.
Dear colleague: From April 28 to May 1, 2010, I directed my
senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member
for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to visit Mexico City to assess
the Obama Administration's recent 2011 budget request of $310
million for the Merida Initiative.
The Merida Initiative, proposed to the U.S. Congress by
former President George W. Bush in the fall of 2007, is a
multi-year and multi-country effort (involving Mexico, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and the nations of Central America)
to provide equipment, training, and technical assistance for
long-term reform and oversight of security agencies. The
Initiative has allocated more than $1.3 billion for Mexico from
2008 to 2010, nearly a 10-fold increase above 2007 levels of
assistance to that country. As a result, Mexico is now the top
recipient of U.S. assistance in the Western Hemisphere.
The Merida Initiative was put forward to support the
Mexican Government's stepped-up efforts against organized crime
and drug trafficking, which pose a serious threat to public
security and economic well-being. Because of the Merida
Initiative, relevant security agencies on opposite sides have
strengthened cooperation, establishing regular, secure
communications and routinely exchanging information at an
operational level. This leap forward in collaboration along the
border has resulted in dramatic progress in drug seizures and
extraditions. But most importantly, our assistance and
collaboration has helped Mexico develop stronger institutions
to fight organized crime and drug trafficking.
The Mexican Government is continuing to seek ways to
improve its capacity to combat these threats. Chief among its
efforts is the reform and consolidation of police forces
nation-wide. With U.S. collaboration, the reform of the federal
police force, numbering more than 30,000 officers, is moving
forward. But little progress has been made on a framework for
organizing the 2,022 state and local police forces spread among
31 states and the Federal District. Reform of these state and
local units is essential to the success of Mexico's anti-crime
initiatives, because they constitute more than 90 percent of
Mexico's police strength.
This report highlights the need to deepen the partnership
between the United States and Mexico in a way that respects our
mutual sovereignty and yet addresses the shared problems caused
by criminal organizations operating on both sides of the
border. By history, by geography, and by family ties, the
United States and Mexico are natural partners. Our policies
toward Mexico should reflect our common interests and
objectives.
In the run-up to Mexican President Felipe Calderon's state
visit on May 19-20, I hope this report will help stimulate
broader debate on the importance of building a closer
partnership that will improve our capacity to address shared
challenges.
Though we still have a long way to go, it is clear that
efforts to fight the common threat posed to our societies by
drug traffickers and organized crime are showing positive
results and should be bolstered. I look forward to continuing
to work with you on these issues, and welcome any comments you
may have.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
(v)
COMMON ENEMY, COMMON STRUGGLE:
PROGRESS IN U.S.-MEXICAN EFFORTS
TO DEFEAT ORGANIZED CRIME
AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
----------
Introduction
The basis of U.S.-Mexico ties is a strategic relationship
that goes far beyond the problems of drugs and violence. Our
nation is inextricably intertwined with Mexico historically,
culturally, and commercially. The flow of goods and people
across our borders helps drive our economy and strengthen our
culture. But our land borders also serve as a conduit for
illicit activity. This is a problem that bears shared
responsibility and requires cooperative action.--Senator
Richard Lugar\1\
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\1\ Statement by Senator Lugar for field hearing on ``U.S.-Mexico
Border Violence,'' March 30, 2009.
Since 2007, the Merida Initiative has deepened U.S.-Mexican
cooperation to jointly tackle the transnational threat posed by
drug traffickers and organized crime. In 2010, the urgency of
this task is heightened by the dramatic growth in drug-related
violence. By conservative estimates, more than 6,500 people
died last year in drug-related homicides, while January 2010
marked ``the bloodiest month on record,'' with nearly 800
homicides country-wide.\2\ According to press reports using
Mexican Government data, more than 3,000 drug-related homicides
occurred in the first four months of 2010 alone.\3\
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\2\ Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and
Analysis from 2001-2009, January 2010.
\3\ William Booth, ``A deadly new front in Mexico's drug war:
Nation's northeast is seized by terror as cartels' feud escalates,''
Washington Post, April 21, 2010.
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This escalation of violence is fueled in large part by
competition for the profits generated by illegal drug
consumption in the United States and by the illicit flow of
weapons and money to cartel operations. According to the
Government of Mexico (GOM), which has defined organized crime
as the country's greatest threat, the current surge of violence
reflects the success of the government's offensive against drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs), a perception shared by
relevant U.S. agencies. As rival organizations battle each
other for control of lucrative trafficking routes into the
United States, most of the violence occurs between and among
DTO members. Nevertheless, police officers, journalists, and
politicians have become more frequent targets, while the
January 2010 massacre of 15 teenagers in Ciudad Juarez
highlighted the victimization of innocent civilians.
Criminality has also extended itself to extortion, robbery, and
kidnapping, affecting innocent people throughout Mexico and
making security the number one concern of Mexican citizens.
Some significant government victories against the DTOs
include the December 2009 killing of Arturo Beltran Leyva and
January 2010 capture of Teodoro Garcia Simental, the
extradition of 107 fugitives to the United States in 2009, and
the GOM's seizure of 92 tons of cocaine between December 2006
and March 2010.\4\ Yet drug-related violence continues to
threaten public security throughout Mexico, particularly near
the U.S.-Mexico border. The most afflicted Mexican states
include Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guerrero, and Durango [see map in
Appendix II], while the most violent cities are considered to
be Ciudad Juarez (on the border between Chihuahua and Texas),
Culiacan (the capital of Sinoloa), and Tijuana (on the border
between Baja California and California).\5\
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\4\ Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, ``United States-
Mexico Security Partnership: Progress and Impact,'' March 23, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138929.htm.
\5\ Based on the Trans-Border Institute (TBI), ``Drug Violence in
Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009,'' January 2010, citing data
gathered by Reforma newspaper.
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Currently, U.S. Government (USG) officials deny that the
increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has
resulted in a significant spillover of violence into the United
States, but they recognize that the prospect is a serious
concern. Even without evidence of spillover violence, however,
the United States has an important stake in Mexico's
challenges. According to a 2010 assessment by the National Drug
Intelligence Center, Mexican drug trafficking organizations
(DTOs) represent the single greatest drug trafficking threat to
the United States.\6\ Mexico is a major transit country for
cocaine and a source country for heroin, marijuana, and
methamphetamine.
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\6\ U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center
National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, February 2010, http://
www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/index.htm .
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Both the GOM and the USG acknowledge the gravity of the
crisis and their shared interest in improving coordination of
law enforcement, institution-building, and efforts to reduce
demand for drugs. Mexico City has received a series of high-
level visits by Obama administration officials, testifying to
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano's characterization
of the current level of cooperation as ``unprecedented.'' \7\
Yet, as the record levels of violence demonstrate, many of the
challenges undermining bilateral efforts are deep-rooted and
difficult to change, from the lack of legal economic
opportunities for Mexico's youth to corruption cases in both
countries.
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\7\ Testimony by Secretary Napolitano before Senate Committee on
the Judiciary. April 27, 2010.
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Moreover, as the violence increases, public criticisms of
President Calderon's strategy and of the Merida Initiative grow
in number and intensity. A poll conducted in March 2010 by
Milenio newspaper found that 59 percent of Mexicans believe
organized crime is winning the drug war, while only 21 percent
believe the government is.\8\
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\8\ El Milenio, ``Gana el narco guerra contra el gobierno federal,
piensa 59 % de los mexicanos.'' March 22, 2010., http://
www.milenio.com/node/407205.
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At the direction of Senator Lugar, this study examines the
current state of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. Its focus
is on efforts to improve border security and modernize Mexico's
police forces, as these key areas will contribute to the
success of the Merida Initiative. The chief conclusion is that
the Merida Initiative is delivering results but must be
bolstered in order to achieve its aims. While the dramatic
surge in violence is an expected upshot of the aggressive
campaign against DTOs, the risk is that political support for
expanded cooperation may not survive daily news reports of
brutal homicides and kidnappings. The Merida Initiative is thus
entering a critical period, with important implications for the
national security of both the United States and Mexico.
Background\9\
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\9\ This section is adapted from a memo prepared by Clare Seelke of
the Congressional Research Service, April 23, 2010.
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In response to the GOM's request for increased cooperation
and assistance, in October 2007 the United States and Mexico
proposed the Merida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug
and anticrime cooperation to Mexico and Central America. The
Merida Initiative was to provide some $1.4 billion in
assistance, largely in the form of equipment and training, from
FY 2008 through FY 2010. The four primary goals of the Merida
Initiative, as originally conceived, were to (1) break the
power and impunity of criminal organizations; (2) assist the
Mexican and Central American Governments in strengthening
border, air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the capacity of
justice systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity in
Mexico and Central America and diminish drug demand in the
region.
Congress has so far appropriated $1.3 billion of the
original package, resulting in a significant increase in
foreign assistance for Mexico. In FY 2007, total assistance to
Mexico was $65.4 million, while in FY 2008, after the Merida
Initiative was enacted, total assistance to Mexico (including
Merida funds) was $405.9 million. There has been increasing
concern, however, about the slow delivery of Merida assistance
[see Appendix III for chart of delivered items]. U.S. officials
reportedly attributed early delays in disbursal of FY 2008
funds to USG contracting regulations, negotiations with Mexico
and other countries about what equipment is actually needed,
the time required to conduct competitive procurements, and the
difficulty of delivering an aid package that involves so many
agencies and offices.
As part of the FY 2011 budget preparation process, U.S. and
Mexican officials began to revise the strategic framework
underpinning U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. After several
months of consultations, the Obama and Calderon governments
agreed to a new strategy, called ``Beyond Merida'' or ``Merida
2.0,'' that broadens the scope of bilateral security efforts
and focuses more on institution-building than on technology and
equipment transfers. The Obama Administration outlined the
strategy in its FY 2011 budget request, which includes $310
million for Merida-related programs in Mexico: $292 million in
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
funds, $10 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF), and $8
million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
The Obama administration formally announced the new
strategy at the Merida High-Level Consultative Group meeting in
Mexico City on March 23, 2010. Its four pillars include:
1. Disrupting the operational capacity of organized crime;
2. Strengthening Mexican institutions to sustain the rule of
law (police and judicial reform);
3. Creating a 21st century border; and
4. Building strong and resilient communities.
The Calderon government has focused its efforts on a
comprehensive strategy, including dismantling the power of drug
trafficking organizations. To that end, the government has
conducted joint police-military operations to arrest DTO
leaders, investigated and indicted public officials suspected
of collusion, and begun to go after the DTOs' illicit
assets.\10\ A significant percentage of U.S. assistance
appropriated during the first phase of the Merida Initiative,
including at least $421 million in FMF funding, was obligated
to purchase equipment for those efforts. The Obama
administration has asked for only $8 million in FMF for FY
2011.
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\10\ An asset forfeiture law is currently under discussion in the
Mexican Congress. ``Ley Debilitar las Finanzas del Narcotr fico y
Crimen Organizado en Mexico,'' EFE, April 13, 2010.
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As the GOM has increasingly begun to conceptualize the DTOs
as corporations, its strategy, and U.S. efforts to support it,
has begun to focus more attention on disrupting the illicit
weapons and funding flowing to the traffickers from the United
States. These efforts, as well as increased intelligence-
sharing and coordinated law enforcement operations, have been
suggested as possible areas for increased cooperation under
pillar one. As the DTOs increasingly evolve into poly-criminal
organizations, perhaps as a partial result of drug interdiction
efforts cutting into their profits, some analysts have also
urged both governments to focus more on combating other types
of organized crime, such as human trafficking and alien
smuggling.
Notwithstanding a comprehensive judicial reform underway in
Mexico, many security experts also maintain that the GOM, with
U.S. support, needs to focus more on addressing the country's
weak law enforcement and judicial institutions than it has in
the last three years (pillar two). Federal police reform is
well underway. In Juarez, the federal police has assumed
control over all police forces, with the military in a
supporting role. But there are not sufficient federal police to
replace dysfunctional local police with federal police across
the country, which underscores the need for a Mexican strategy
to reform its state and municipal police forces. Some FY 2009
Merida funding is likely to be reprogrammed in order to extend
U.S.-funded police training and corrections reform efforts to
Tijuana and Juarez as part of a pilot project. Designed by a
binational team for the areas of Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad
Juarez-El Paso, the project is intended to support the GOM's
plan for Juarez through training, equipment, professional
exchanges, and targeted information-sharing.\11\ Security
experts have also identified improving police-community
relations, respect for human rights, and the prevention and
punishment of street crime as important issues that need to be
addressed in Juarez and elsewhere in Mexico.
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\11\ For a description of U.S. programs planned for Ciudad Ju rez,
see: U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, ``Confronting Border Violence in
Ciudad Juarez,'' March 2010, available at: http://www.usembassy-
mexico.gov/eng/merida/pdf/emerida_factsheet_ViolenceCJ.pdf.
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With impunity rates hovering around 98%, experts maintain
that it is crucial for Mexico to implement the judicial reforms
passed in the summer of 2008 and focus on fighting corruption
at all levels of government.\12\ In order for Mexico to
transition its criminal justice system to an accusatorial
system with oral trials by 2016, some argue that U.S.-funded
judicial training programs, some of which are just getting
started, may have to be significantly expanded. They are
encouraged that $207 million of the Obama administration's FY
2011 request for Merida programs in Mexico are under the
``Governing Justly and Democratically'' category.\13\ Others
argue that, even with expanded U.S. assistance, it may be
unrealistic to expect Mexico to implement such a major
transformation in its judicial system in the midst of the
current struggle against escalating drug trafficking-related
crime and violence.
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\12\ In other words, about 98% of perpetrators have not been
brought to justice. This is figure is widely cited. See, for example, a
recent report by the Center of Research for Development (CIDAC),
``Indice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009,'' August 2009, p. 9.
\13\ Eric L. Olson and Christopher E. Wilson, ``Beyond Merida,''
Woodrow Wilson Center, April 6, 2010.
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The third pillar included in the State Department's
proposal for the second phase of the Merida Initiative involves
the creation of a ``21st Century border.'' The proposed 21st
century border is based on:
Enhancing public safety via increased information sharing,
screenings, and prosecutions;
Securing the cross-border flow of goods and people;
Expediting legitimate commerce and travel through
investments in personnel, technology, and
infrastructure;
Engaging border communities in cross-border trade; and
Setting bilateral policies for collaborative border
management.\14\
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\14\ U.S. Department of State, United States-Mexico Partnership: A
New Border Vision, Washington, DC, March 23, 2010, http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/03/138926.htm.
Pillar four will be a new focus for U.S.-Mexican
cooperation and may include targeted efforts to assist at-risk
youth and curb unemployment and other social problems in
communities plagued by drug trafficking and violence. Experts
have lauded the inclusion of social development and crime
prevention programs in the new Merida framework but have
expressed concern about the limited funds the programs are
likely to receive from the United States. \15\ While U.S.
assistance in this area includes promising new projects in
support of local funding by municipalities through bond
issuance, additional support for advice and consultative
partnering between our two governments could help expand in a
dramatic way our cooperation in this area.
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\15\ Testimony of Vanda Felbab-Brown, Fellow, the Brookings
Institution, before the Domestic Policy Subcommittee of the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee, April 14, 2010.
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Bilateral efforts under pillar four are focusing for now on
pilot projects in Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua but may also be
expanded to Tijuana and the state of Baja California. These
efforts involve the continuation and expansion of some existing
Merida-funded initiatives, such as school-based ``culture of
lawfulness'' programs and demand reduction and treatment
services. They may also involve USAID or other agencies
providing technical expertise in how to re-zone neighborhoods
to prevent crime, issue municipal bonds to fund infrastructure
projects, and/or launch public-private partnerships. It is also
still possible that the GOM may request additional U.S. support
to carry out President Calderon's ``We Are All Juarez'' plan,
which includes 160 different initiatives that the federal
government has begun to implement in the city, in some cases
with the help of state and local officials.
At this point, it appears that the funding and
implementation of pillar four will primarily be the
responsibility of the GOM, possibly with support from
multilateral institutions like the Inter-American Development
Bank. Still, staff believes that U.S, assistance can helpfully
create models to be replicated and can leverage hundreds of
millions of dollars in investments from other sources. For
example, a USAID technical assistance program helped introduce
a legal framework to issue state and municipal bonds, which
have now raised over $1 billion in about five years. Such bond
issues can be linked with socioeconomic investment programs,
public-private partnerships, and development bank financing.
Hence, USAID contributions even in the range of $30 million can
still have a major impact through the resources such
investments can leverage.
Observations
The central goal of border security is to prevent dangerous
goods and people from causing harm to our country and our
people. In the context of economic globalization and widespread
international travel, as our Ambassador in Mexico City stated
to staff, ``We cannot simply attempt to `hold the line' at the
border itself rather, we must work with the appropriate Mexican
officials to deter, identify and intercept threats as early as
possible, developing effective channels to share with each
other the information necessary to do so.''
Cross-border criminal organizations--including Mexican
based DTOs and gangs--are responsible for most of the traffic
in people, drugs, arms, money, and other contraband across the
land border. They are also responsible for the dramatic surge
of violence occurring in parts of Mexico.
According to senior government officials on both sides of
the border, we should respond to cross-border crime with
binationally coordinated law enforcement operations, both at
the border and in the interior of both countries. The
administration is taking some key steps to enhance public
safety and security:
Increased sharing of mutually useful information to permit
integrated, intelligence-driven operations along the
border.
Common approaches and standards for vetting officials and
purging those found to be compromised, including
sharing of information on corrupt officials in both
countries.
Development and implementation of joint strategies for key
smuggling and trafficking corridors, including the
Ciudad Juarez-El Paso, Tijuana-San Diego, Sonora-
Arizona, and Tamaulipas-Rio Grande Valley corridors,
among others.
Strengthening of a Mexican enforcement presence between the
ports of entry, extending efforts in the Sonora-Arizona
corridor to Ciudad Juarez-El Paso and other locations
along the border.
Regular, secure communications and exchange of information
at an operational level between enforcement agencies on
opposite sides of the border.
Flexibility, discretion, and initiative at the operational
level to reach out to counterparts on the other side of
the border.
Design and implementation of an integrated strategy to
prevent arms trafficking, significantly extending and
deepening Operation Armas Cruzadas and other efforts.
Acceleration of current efforts to seize cash proceeds from
criminal activities by (among other ways) continuing
investigations and southbound inspections in the United
States.
Progressive increasing of alignment and coordination among
law enforcement and military assets, building on
successes to date.
Regular sharing of information from investigations and
prosecutions, building on the success of recent efforts
related to Operation Coronado.\16\
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\16\ Operation Coronado was a joint law enforcement operation
conducted in October 2009 across the United States. It resulted in the
arrests of 303 individuals, many of them associated with the Mexican
drug trafficking organization ``La Familia Michoacana.'' This
investigation relied heavily on coordination between the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, Department of
Homeland Security, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, and state and local law enforcement authorities, and was
supported by information and cooperation from Mexican authorities.
Application of the Controlled Substance Project, extending
the current pilot program in Nogales to the areas
around Ciudad Juarez and elsewhere along the
border.\17\
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\17\ The Nogales Controlled Substances Program is aimed at reducing
narcotics smuggling along Arizona's border with Mexico. Since its
inception in October 2009, 24 suspects have been referred to Mexican
authorities for prosecution (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/1003/100315nogales.htm).
Expansion of Operation No Refuge, denying visas, adjustment
of status, admission into the United States and other
benefits to known drug traffickers and close family
members or associates who knowingly assist, aid, abet,
conspire, or collude in drug trafficking, and closer
coordination between Mexican and U.S. law enforcement
authorities when suspected criminals are denied entry
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into one country.
Enhanced coordination on the repatriation process of
criminal aliens.
Many of the steps mentioned take place through the Border
Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) Initiative and the
Operation Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on
Safety and Security (OASISS).
BEST is a multi-agency initiative, led by the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS, wherein
task forces seek to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal
organizations posing significant threats to border
security.\18\ Through the BEST Initiative, ICE partners with
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Attorneys' Offices, as well
as local, state, and international law enforcement agencies. In
particular, the Mexican Secretariat for Public Security (SSP)
is a partner along the Southwest border. There are currently 17
BEST teams around the country, 10 of which are along the
Southwest border and one in Mexico City.
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\18\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security Task Forces, November 3, 2009,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm.
Besides BEST, there is a variety of interagency collaborative efforts,
such as the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Forces and the El
Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), both led by the Drug Enforcement
Agency but with Department of Homeland Security and other agency
participation.
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BEST teams provide the platform for Operation Armas
Cruzadas, an ICE-led operation to disrupt and dismantle weapons
smuggling networks.\19\ Operation Armas Cruzadas involves
several components such as training stakeholders in database
management, laws, resources, and methods to combat organized
crime. It also is the umbrella for the Vetted Arms Trafficking
Group, the Weapons Virtual Task Force, and the ICE Border
Liaison Program.
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\19\ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Armas Cruzadas,
November 2, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/
armas_cruzadas.htm.
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CBP and the Mexican Government have also partnered through
OASISS, a bi-lateral program aimed at enhancing both countries'
abilities to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers
along the Southwest border.\20\ Through OASISS, the GOM is able
to prosecute alien smugglers apprehended in the United States.
From the time of its inception in 2005 through the end of FY
2009, OASISS generated 1,579 cases.\21\ This program is
supported by the Border Patrol International Liaison Unit,
which is responsible for establishing and maintaining working
relationships with foreign counterparts in order to enhance
border security.
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\20\ See testimony by Audrey Adams, Deputy Assistant Commissioner,
Office of International Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security before the U.S. Congress, House
Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, U.S.-Mexico Relations, 109th Cong., April 26, 2006.
\21\ Data provided to CRS by DHS Congressional Affairs.
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Staff strongly believes that additional funding for U.S.
law enforcement agencies along the border, coupled with
increased technology and the building of additional barriers,
where necessary, would help with these efforts. Additional
trained personnel for CBP would be far more effective than only
pursuing an increased National Guard presence on the border,
which could complicate Mexico's willingness to cooperate. As
one senior Mexican official commented, ``Finding the political
will for closer collaboration may be compromised if the Mexican
public perceives that the border is being militarized.''
The cross-border investigation between Ciudad Juarez and El
Paso of the murders of three individuals associated with the
U.S. consulate in Juarez has provided a model that is
demonstrating wider results and should be replicated. Over 200
law enforcement personnel have worked on the case on the El
Paso side of the border, and about 40 on the Juarez side. This
intensive effort has generated massive information on previous
crimes and on the gangs and cartels working in the area,
possibly facilitating legal actions targeting these entities as
organizations. Cooperation with Mexican law enforcement has
been excellent on this case. Staff believes that this kind of
intensive law enforcement increases prospects to damage drug
trafficking organizations as corporate entities.
At the ports of entry, dangerous goods and other contraband
are concealed within the vast amount of legal cargo that
crosses the border each day; dangerous people (including those
who constitute a threat to national security, public safety, or
simply use false documents) likewise attempt to blend into the
much larger number of legal travelers. As Mexican and U.S.
officials stated to staff, ``The central challenge in managing
flows of people and goods is to separate travelers and cargo by
level of risk and threat.'' Such risk segmentation allows
governments to enhance security by focusing more attention on
stopping illegitimate trade, while at the same time
facilitating legal travel and commerce.
Equally essential to securing flows is closer collaboration
in managing land ports of entry, building on the Port Security
Committees framework. Staff believes that we should continue
and expand efforts to facilitate trade and enhance security at
the ports of entry begun under the Binational Strategic Plan
Ultimately, customs and immigration on both sides should
have access to the information they need to do their jobs
effectively and be able to communicate with each other in real
time. The administration is taking some key steps to enhance
the smooth movement of legal goods and people, including :
Complementary risk management strategies on both sides of
the border, and the replacement of comprehensive
customs inspections in Mexico with a risk-based
approach.
Greater reciprocal sharing of information on potentially
dangerous or illegal goods to permit more accurate
targeting.
The establishment of a binational ``model port'' with
comparable infrastructure, state-of-the-art inspection
technologies, harmonized operation standards, and real-
time information sharing.
Integrated, interoperable systems for collecting,
analyzing, and sharing information on passengers
entering our countries from outside North America,
building on the work to date on advanced passenger
information system (APIS).
Shared watch lists and common screening protocols for
dealing with aliens from special interest countries
(ASICs), building on the Joint Security Program in
Mexico City.
Coordinated efforts to secure key shipping centers in our
countries.
An environment of greater compliance and legality in flows
across Mexico's southern border.
Purging of corrupt officials from agencies in both
countries with responsibility for border management and
inclusion of information from other agencies on
prospective employees in the vetting process.
Substantial investments in capacity building (training and
vetting personnel, enhancing professionalism,
constructing or refurbishing facilities, deploying new
technology, etc.).
A legal, orderly, and secure system for managing the
movement of people across the border (including, in the
case of illegal migration, close coordination on
deportations).
Public Security and Law Enforcement Reform
The corruption of law enforcement and government officials
in both countries has made the campaign against drug
trafficking organizations more difficult. In October 2008, an
elite unit within the federal Attorney General's office for
Special Investigations of Organized Crime (SIEDO) was
implicated in a scandal involving payoffs for sensitive
information about antidrug activities, with at least 35
officials fired or arrested.\22\ In November 2008, the former
head of SIEDO was arrested and accused of accepting bribes from
a drug cartel. The former investigative agency within the PGR,
the Federal Agency of Investigations (AFI), which was created
in 2001, was also widely criticized for corruption by 2005 and
partially disbanded in June 2009.\23\
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\22\ Tracy Wilkinson, ``Mexico Under Siege: Elite Police Tainted by
Drug Gang,'' Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2008.
\23\ Robert E. Donnelly and David A. Shirk, eds., Police and Public
Security in Mexico, San Diego, CA: University Readers, 2010, p. 228.
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Corruption has also plagued federal, state, and municipal
police forces. The Calderon administration had launched a
concerted effort to improve training, root out corruption via a
comprehensive vetting program and a network of control centers,
and establish a workable model for professionalizing the 4,000+
new members of the national police, these officials stated.
Mexican officials stated that police corruption has been a
major problem at all levels of the Mexican policing system and
that reform was necessary. Officials told staff that ``reforms
of Mexico's federal, state and municipal police force could
strengthen border security, and that, in particular, reforms
under consideration to have state-level forces absorb the
municipal police could bring increased effectiveness,
efficiency, standardization, and better trained and equipped
police to municipalities, particularly those in rural areas
that have lacked human and financial capital.'' As one senior
official mentioned, ``In Mexico the police are looked down
upon, hated, and feared.'' Mexican officials believe that
police reform will help strengthen confidence in the police, as
well.
An important legal step was the passage of an implementing
law on reform of the constitution in January 2009 that set the
parameters for a three-tiered model of police: a reaction
element, a prevention element, and an investigatory element.
This effort was ongoing and channeled through various
Secretariat of Public Security (SSP or Federal Police) offices
responsible for implementing standardized training and other
requirements necessary to build a professional force. SSP state
offices were providing some minimal support to state and local
authorities, but this cooperation was contingent on the
interest of local authorities. As of March 2010, 4,300
university-educated SSP officers had graduated from a newly-
established basic investigative training course at the
refurbished federal police institute.
Mexican law enforcement officials acknowledged that the
larger challenge was to address local and state police forces,
which comprised over 90 percent of the police forces nationwide
and which suffered from corruption, mismanagement, and low
levels of professionalism. There are 2,022 separate police
forces, and a reform law that would consolidate them under
state control has been stalled in the Congress because of
disagreements at the state and local levels, where reform was
seen as a competition for resources.
The reform law that was proposed on September 24, 2009,
intends to reform article 115 of the Mexican Constitution in
order to dissolve the country's municipal police forces and put
them under the authority of state police entities. In order to
take effect, the measure has to be approved by the Mexican
Congress and then a majority of the state legislatures, a
process which could take several months to a year or more. In
April 2010, the National Governor's Conference (CONAGO), with
the unanimous support of all governors from all parties,
presented to the Senate a proposal for a ``unified force''
within each state, perhaps because it would likely increase the
power of the governor's office.
But there are serious political challenges that revolve
around entrenched interests. Most senators from the opposition
PRI and Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) parties are in
support of the reform measure, while some National Action Party
(PAN) senators have dismissed it as a ploy by the governors to
concentrate power in their offices and undermine municipal
governments.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ ``Mexico Mulls Plan to Eliminate Municipal Police,'' EFE,
March 24, 2010. Office of Senator Ramon Galindo Noriega, ``Con
Liquidacion de Policias Municipales, Gobernadores Buscan Ratificar
Virreinatos,'' March 29, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Staff met with PAN Senator Felipe Gonzalez, head of the
Public Security Committee, and his PRI counterpart, Eloy Cantu,
a strong supporter of the U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship
who hails from Nuevo Leon. Gonzalez observed that not all the
parties were on board with the reform law. While some governors
were pushing CONAGO, there were still concerns at the municipal
level that the shift in resources to the state would undermine
local efforts and have an unfair political impact by rewarding
some state governments that had done very little in the past to
support a professional police force. Cantu noted his
frustration with the slow pace of reform and the ``same old
politics'' that are complicating Mexico's ability to confront
organized crime. ``The recent violence in Nuevo Leon did not
start yesterday. The inability of local authorities to confront
rising violence in recent months reflected deeper and
longstanding problems with an ever-pervasive corruption that
was undermining state and local officials,'' Cantu observed.
Staff believes that some PAN leaders may be concerned about
giving more power to the governors at a time when 19 of the
country's 32 governorships are controlled by the PRI. Beyond
the political implications of the proposed reform, a debate in
Mexico has ensued concerning whether the proposed reform would
help or hinder broader police reform efforts. Proponents of the
reform maintain that it would improve coordination with the
SSP. They assert that the reform would bring efficiency,
standardization, and better trained and equipped police to
municipalities, particularly those in rural areas that have
lacked human and financial capital. They say that corruption
has been particularly rife among local police in Mexico, and
that previous reform efforts have been insufficient to address
the deep problems that exist at that level of the policing
structure. SSP Secretary Garcia Luna has publicly advocated
this reform as a critical step to create an effective state and
local capacity to complement SSP's federal role.
Skeptics argue that police corruption has been a major
problem at all levels of the Mexican policing system, including
the state and federal police.\25\ They challenge the assertion
that the Calderon government's restructuring of the police will
be more effective than past restructuring efforts. Critics also
argue that there is a role for municipal police who are
acclimated to local conditions and concerns and are trained to
deal with household and community issues, as opposed to federal
concerns like the fight against organized crime. They urge the
GOM to concentrate its resources and attention on implementing
the vetting and certification procedures for state and local
police that were codified in the public security law passed in
2009, and on strengthening the National System of Public
Security, which is responsible for overseeing those efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Phone Interview with Daniel Sabet, Visiting Professor at
Georgetown University, April 15, 2010.
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The Calderon government has also cracked down on existing
corruption within the police and other government institutions.
Critics maintain, however, that a large percentage of those who
have been arrested on charges of colluding with organized crime
have been subsequently released for lack of evidence. In May
2009, for example, federal agents arrested ten mayors and
seventeen other officials from Michoacan for allegedly
colluding with DTOs, but a majority of those individuals have
since been released.\26\ Most recently, the wife of a fugitive
trafficker, Joaquin ``El Chapo'' Guzman, was captured but then
released on May 13, 2010.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``Casting Too Wide a Net For Cartels,'' Newsweek
International, March 8, 2010.
\27\ Associated Press, ``Mexican Policy Question, Release Drug
Lord's Wife,'' May 14, 2010.
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This is a difficult issue that will not be resolved quickly
or easily. It should not come as a surprise that there was no
agreement on the police reform law in the last session of
Congress that ended on April 30. The law will likely be taken
up in September when Congress resumes.
Recommendations
As demonstrated in the current stalemate on police reform
in Mexico, new approaches to strengthening law enforcement and
modernizing border security will face obstacles and require
policy change, but also a change in attitude. Staff believes
that assistance must be reconceived in a way that reflects the
collaborative efforts between our countries. Cooperation must
be based on jointly-funded programs in which both countries
determine priorities, with clear objectives and transparent
funding mechanisms.
On the police front, it is clear we will not achieve the
security we are both looking for unless there is an organized,
well-trained, and professional police force throughout the
country. The details of such a reform are for the Mexicans to
decide, but the USG could expand on the collaborative funding
mechanism that was used to establish and sustain the federal
police academy at San Luis Potosi. Staff would suggest building
on the following ideas:
As a foundational point, the GOM would establish clear
legal parameters for the creation of modern state/local
police.
Develop a framework for perhaps 6-8 regional police
academies that could have national coverage and achieve
economies of scale, drawing on lessons and courses from
the San Luis Potosi SSP academy.
Begin with 1-2 states that could provide a base for
developing an effective regional model and provide
Merida funding, through established channels, to build
a modern police training program.
As with San Luis Potosi, the GOM would provide the bulk of
funding for facilities and salaries. The United States
would focus on course development and training. Both
should work together to leverage other donor
contributions. Both U.S. and Mexican monies would have
agreed benchmarks with reporting and auditing
requirements.
The GOM would develop a federal-state cost-sharing plan to
sustain these regional academies respect professional
standards, and uphold promotion and retention policies
in the future. The USG should also support judicial
sector reform.
On the border, though much progress has been made, more is
necessary.
Both governments are yet to establish agile processes to
permit rapid policy-making and binational policy coordination.
Key ingredients include:
The establishment of inter-agency policy-making processes
that meet these specifications.
Regular binational meetings of these committees.
Coordination of this new policy-making structure with
existing inter-agency and binational mechanisms.
Integration of Canada into the process, on issues or topics
that affect all three countries.
Developing a new vision for border security will not be an
easy task; both governments will have to address a number of
obstacles and challenges along the way--cultural, political,
bureaucratic, regulatory, statutory, and possibly even
constitutional. Staff strongly encourages relevant United
States government officials to advance the following:
Improve infrastructure and increased staffing of ports of
entry.
Demonstrate that the benefits of preclearance and related
activities more than offset their costs.
Re-prioritize border infrastructure projects, adjudicating
competing funding requests and financing necessary
infrastructure in the interior of each country.
Develop the concept of ``corridor security,'' aimed at
integrating intelligence, interdiction, and
investigation across the border.
Create a regulatory framework for sharing intelligence and
information with counterpart Mexican officials,
including addressing the challenges involved in sharing
third-party information, access to databases, and real-
time data feeds.
Create strict vetting procedures for border enforcement
personnel.
Ensure safety of law enforcement personnel, including those
stationed abroad.
Establish the appropriate diplomatic arrangements and
staffing models necessary for expanded exchange of
personnel and their assignment abroad.
Ensure that law enforcement personnel operating outside
their home country have the necessary authorities to do
their jobs effectively.
Address the issue of access to airspace, roads, and
waterways where that access is necessary for certain
law enforcement operations.
Devise the optimal mechanisms for coordinating policy-
making binationally and within each country.
Coordinate investment in technology to ensure system
compatibility.
Engage Canadian partners in efforts to create a secure
North American economic space.
Secure permission from foreign partners to conduct joint
preclearance operations abroad.
The challenge for both governments will be to not let these
all-too-familiar barriers deter them from pursuing the larger
goal of collaborative border management.
Conclusion
Collaboration across the border has grown at an impressive
rate. First, under President Bush and now under President
Obama, unsurpassed cooperation has yielded dramatic progress.
This close relationship is evidence that both sides of the
border understand that we are bound in a common struggle to rid
Mexico and the United States of DTOs and organized crime, and
that when we work together positive results follow.
Though much remains to be done, it is clear that we are
witnessing the clear strengthening of institutional capacity
building in Mexico--police, intelligence, courts, an inter-
agency process--that could allow in the future for drug
trafficking and organized crime to move from a national
security concern to a local law enforcement concern. Though it
may not be possible to eliminate drug trafficking entirely, it
is vital that we support the strengthening of Mexican
institutions so that the transnational DTOs cannot threaten the
security of both U.S. and Mexican states. Because of our shared
border, any national security threat to Mexico represents a
security threat to the United States.
Staff believes that the establishment of the current
institutional frameworks is progress in itself. Still, efforts
by the Mexican Government will not succeed if state and local
authorities are not involved and held accountable for
implementing and providing effective oversight of law
enforcement and legal institutions at the state and local
level. If the Mexican authorities succeed in building this
nation-wide capacity across key areas, especially in the reform
of local and state police, we will see more progress in the
coming years.
In this regard, the most dramatic change is the contention
by many Mexican officials that police reform would allow the
country to shift from the overuse of the military against drugs
to the targeted use of the military in support of law
enforcement operations. This would be an important development.
Most Mexicans currently favor the military over the police
because of their distrust of the police, despite the common
view that the military's involvement involves questionable
methods. As one senior Mexican official stated, ``The
military's objective is to do away with an enemy. The military
is the sword.''
In the United States, many fear developments in Mexico
because of spillover violence in border cities, though it has
been sporadic. For many Americans, the problem is
``elsewhere.'' But as one U.S. Embassy official remarked,
``There is no doubt that Mexican organized crime would not be
as successful in moving drugs into the United States without
distribution networks, safe houses, and ways to launder money
in the United States.'' In other words, the problem is already
in the interior of the United States--it is not simply a border
issue.
In the short term, strengthening and institutionalizing
cooperation on border security issues, intelligence sharing,
and the support of Mexican efforts to reform law enforcement
are the best ways to protect U.S. security from the threats
posed by organized criminals in Mexico and by those who work
with them in the United States.
Strong U.S.-Mexico cooperation is vital to our common aim
of defeating the drug trafficking organizations. President
Calderon's May 19 visit is an ideal opportunity both to raise
the public's understanding of the common challenge facing both
countries and of the vital need for continued cooperation.
Today, transnational cooperation has become more vital, both to
confronting the drug cartels and to handling broader challenges
in the bilateral relationship. President Calderon's visit will
provide an opportunity for both governments to reaffirm and
express our shared commitment to meeting those challenges head-
on, in a spirit of mutual friendship, trust, and cooperation.
A P P E N D I X E S
----------
Appendix I
Contributor
Kezia McKeague, Legislative Assistant, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate
Meetings with Individuals in Mexico
U.S. Diplomats
Carlos Pascual, Ambassador to Mexico
Representatives from NAS, DEA, FBI, DOJ, CBP, OPAD
Mexican Government Officials
Margarita Gomez, Secretaria de Seguridad Publica
Yessica de la Madrid, Procuraduria General de la Republica
Jorge Medina, Penitentiary System
Jose Juan Bravo Moises, Customs Administrator
Alejandro Poire, Secretaria de Gobernacion
Marco Tulio, Secretaria de Seguridad Publica
Julian Ventura, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores
Gonzalo Villareal, Penitentiary System
Antonio Vivanco, Presidencia
Rafael Fernandez de Castro, Presidencia
Mexican Legislative Branch
Senator Felipe Gonzalez, Public Security Committee
Senator Eloy Cantu, Foreign Affairs Committee
Mexican Civil Society
Representatives from Mexico Unido contra la Delicuencia
Appendix II. Rates of Drug Trafficking-Related Killings in Mexico by
State
(per 100,000 people)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: Congressional Research Service, April 2010.
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Appendix III--Merida Deliverables as of May 2010
SOURCE: DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MAY 11, 2010
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]