[Senate Prints 111-46]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session 111-46
_______________________________________________________________________
CUBA: IMMEDIATE ACTION IS NEEDED
TO ENSURE THE SURVIVABILITY
OF RADIO AND TV MARTI
__________
A REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
Second Session
APRIL 29, 2010
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-157 WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
1. Introduction.................................................. 3
2. Background.................................................... 3
3. Opposition in Congress Persists............................... 4
4. Problems Began Almost Immediately After Creation.............. 5
Adhering to Journalistic Standards........................... 5
Audience Size................................................ 7
Cuban Government Jamming..................................... 10
5. OCB Management Also Dealing with Other Problems............... 11
6. Recommendations............................................... 12
How Radio and TV Marti Broadcast................................. 14
Appendix: Broadcasting Board of Governors Organizational Chart... 15
?
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, April 19, 2010.
Dear colleague: This report by the committee majority staff
is part of our ongoing examination into the efficacy of Radio
and TV Marti. Radio Marti was created in 1983 to support the
Cuban people in their quest for ``accurate, unbiased, and
consistently reliable'' news and entertainment; TV Marti
followed in 1990. Unfortunately, listeners and viewers never
received the kind of high quality programming that was
originally intended. Problems with adherence to traditional
journalistic standards, miniscule audience size, Cuban
Government jamming, and allegations of cronyism have dogged the
program since its creation. As a result, Congress has reduced
TV Marti's funding and has strongly encouraged Radio Marti to
ensure that its broadcasts adhere to journalistic standards
practiced by the Voice of America. Indeed, this report goes
further, and recommends that the Office of Cuba Broadcasting be
incorporated into the Voice of America.
This report is based on extensive staff interviews with
Radio and TV Marti officials, as well as officials of the
International Broadcasting Bureau and the Broadcasting Board of
Governors. It also relies on comprehensive investigative
reports published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
John F. Kerry,
Chairman.
(v)
CUBA: IMMEDIATE ACTION IS NEEDED
TO ENSURE THE SURVIVABILITY OF
RADIO AND TV MARTI
----------
Executive Summary
Radio and TV Marti, the U.S. Government's broadcasters to
Cuba, continue to fail in their efforts to influence Cuban
society, politics, and policy.
Radio Marti was created in 1983 as a U.S. program to
support the right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas; to further the open communication
of information and ideas to Cuba; to serve as a consistently
reliable and authoritative source of news to Cuba; and to
provide news and commentary about events inside Cuba. TV Marti,
created in 1990, sought to expand those goals with television
programming related to Cuba. Both outlets are located in Miami.
Radio and TV Marti have failed to make any discernable
inroads into Cuban society or to influence the Cuban
Government. This failure has led to recent congressional action
to reduce funding for TV Marti. In the FY 2010 Consolidated
Appropriations Bill, the Senate approved a measure to strip TV
Marti of approximately $4 million in funding, in addition to a
reduction requested by the President, and it ordered the Office
of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), the entity that runs Radio and TV
Marti, to spend not more than $5.5 million for items other than
salaries and benefits, a move that would effectively end
funding for the airplane that TV Marti uses for much of its
broadcasting. This is not the first congressional attempt to
strip Radio and TV Marti of funding. Previous attempts have
been for reasons that have remained consistent over time. They
include:
The most commonly heard complaint is that OCB has
failed to adhere to generally accepted journalistic
standards. Both internal and external investigations
have criticized OCB for broadcasting unsubstantiated
reports from Cuba as legitimate news stories, for using
offensive and incendiary language in news broadcasts,
and for a lack of timeliness in news reporting.
While there are no nationally representative data,
most available research indicates that Radio and TV
Marti's audiences are miniscule. U.S. Government-
sponsored research groups indicate that Radio Marti has
a listenership of less than 2 percent of Cubans, and
claims that TV Marti has any stable viewership are
suspect. Most observers attribute these low levels to
pervasive Cuban Government jamming of Radio and TV
Marti broadcasts. But interviews with recently arrived
Cuban immigrants show that among those who were
familiar with the broadcasts, only a small minority
thought they were ``objective."
The Cuban Government employs an extensive jamming
system against Radio Marti transmissions on both
shortwave and medium wave. OCB officials concede that
the jamming is largely successful, with only areas
outside metropolitan Havana able to receive Radio
Marti's signal. TV Marti's ``over the air'' broadcasts
are similarly jammed.
OCB also must deal with competition from domestic
Cuban radio and television stations. In recent surveys,
more than 90 percent of Cuban respondents said they
listened to Cuban radio stations and watched Cuban
television stations. OCB officials concede that the
quality of Cuban programming has improved recently,
with local television carrying U.S. programs like
``Grey's Anatomy,'' ``Friends,'' and ``The Sopranos.''
Cuban TV also carries CNN en Espanol, which many Cubans
watch for world news.
Finally, allegations of cronyism and malfeasance
continue to haunt OCB. Critics maintain that many
senior-level OCB officials were granted their positions
because of their personal connections within OCB,
rather than because of specific qualifications for the
job. For example, the director of the Voice of
America's Latin American service is a nephew of the OCB
director and is himself a former OCB official.
Furthermore, in 2007, the former director of
programming for TV Marti pleaded guilty to receiving
nearly $112,000 in kickbacks from a vendor contracted
by OCB. These allegations of nepotism and corruption
have harmed morale and led to questions about
management's transparency.
There are several things that OCB can do to improve
programming, operations, and morale. OCB's parent organization
already has mandated closer cooperation between OCB and the
Voice of America. This cooperation brings OCB and VOA
broadcasters together to coproduce news programs and a regular
half-hour radio show called ``A Fondo,'' or ``In Depth,'' which
provides news and analysis. Unfortunately, however, the moves
have been from VOA to OCB, rather than vice versa.
OCB's parent organization should consider moving OCB to
Washington and subordinating it into the Voice of America. This
could help ensure that programming is up to VOA standards. In
the meantime, OCB should ``return to basics'' to clean up its
operation. It must attract quality talent from outside Miami,
implement quality editorial standards, and attract quality
management. Hiring and training must be overhauled to ensure a
de-politicized and professional workforce.
OCB should focus on quality programming, which will cause
interested Cubans to seek out available broadcasts, whether
over the air, or, if their access to technology permits, via
satellite and the internet.
OCB's parent organization should enhance guidance,
training, and oversight for analysts performing OCB program
reviews, and provide regular, ongoing, and comprehensive
training to OCB staff regarding journalistic standards.
To address chronic management issues, it is important to
have processes in place to enable the efficient and effective
operation of OCB. Finally, to improve morale within the
organization, OCB management should take steps to address
persistent concerns with its communication and interaction with
OCB staff.
1. Introduction
The U.S. Government began broadcasting Radio Marti to Cuba
in 1985 and added television broadcasts with TV Marti in 1990.
The goals of Radio and TV Marti are, according to the
International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB),\1\ to 1) support the
right of the Cuban people to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers; 2) to be effective in furthering the open
communication of information and ideas through the use of radio
and television broadcasting to Cuba; 3) to serve as a
consistently reliable and authoritative source of accurate,
objective, and comprehensive news; and 4) to provide news,
commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and
elsewhere to promote the cause of freedom in Cuba.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The International Broadcasting Bureau oversees VOA and OCB and
provides transmission services, administration, and marketing for all
broadcasters that fall under the jurisdiction of the Broadcasting Board
of Governors. These include Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Marti, TV Marti, Radio Sawa, and
Alhurra Television. See the Appendix for an organizational chart of the
IBB structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Background
In 1983, Congress passed the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act
to provide the people of Cuba, through Radio Marti, with
information they ordinarily would not receive due to the
censorship practices of the Cuban Government. Subsequently, in
1990, TV Marti began television broadcasts to Cuba.
Until October 1999, U.S. Government-funded international
broadcasting programs had been a primary function of the United
States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished and
its public diplomacy functions were merged with the Department
of State at the beginning of FY 2000, the Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG) became an independent agency to oversee such
entities as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti. OCB is
headquartered in Miami. Legislation in the 104th Congress
required the relocation of OCB from Washington to south Florida
so that Radio and TV Marti could be more easily immersed in
Miami's Cuban community. The move began in 1996 and was
completed in 1998.
In October 2003, President George W. Bush established the
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) to identify
measures to accelerate an end to the Castro government and to
support U.S. programs that could assist in an ensuing
transition. This commission published two interagency policy
frameworks which identified measures to 1) empower Cuban civil
society; 2) break the Cuban Government's ``information
blockade''; 3) deny resources to the Cuban Government; 4)
``illuminate the reality of Castro's Cuba''; 5) encourage
international efforts to support Cuban civil society; and 6)
undermine the regime's ``succession strategy.'' In addition,
State Department and OCB officials indicated that Radio and TV
Marti could be important platforms for providing information to
Cubans during any future government transition.
OCB's stated mission is to broadcast to Cuba the sorts of
Spanish-language programming available in an open society. In
2004, Radio Marti changed its programming from entertainment
and news to an all-news format, and currently broadcasts news
and information programming 6 days a week, 24 hours per day,
and for 18 hours on Sunday. Radio Marti's daily programming
consists of 70 percent live news broadcasts and 30 percent
recorded programming. TV Marti broadcasts 2 live newscasts,
sports and entertainment, and special programming 24 hours per
day.
In October 2006, OCB launched AeroMarti to expand
availability of TV Marti broadcasts in Cuba. AeroMarti consists
of two Gulfstream propeller airplanes that OCB leases to
broadcast television signals to Cuba from U.S. airspace off the
coast of Florida. In December 2006, IBB leased airtime on TV
Azteca, a commercial television station in Miami that is
carried on the DirecTV satellite system, which is available to
Cubans with a satellite card, although this is illegal in Cuba.
Due in large part to the launch of AeroMarti, much of OCB's
FY 2008 $15.158 million budget for transmission costs is spent
on TV Marti. In FY 2008, OCB spent over $6 million on
AeroMarti, which included about $5 million for fuel, operation,
and maintenance of the airplanes and about $1 million to equip
one airplane with the ability to broadcast on VHF channel 13.
3. Opposition in Congress Persists
Radio and TV Marti have received negligible support from
among the Cuban people and have had almost no impact on Cuban
Government behavior and policy. As a result, Congress has made
several attempts over the years to cut funding for the
programs, especially for TV Marti. In addition to the programs'
ineffectiveness, in December 2006, press reports alleged
significant problems in OCB's operations, with claims of
cronyism, patronage, and bias in its coverage, issues that
attracted further attention in Congress.
Concerns about TV Marti continue to run so deep that in
July 2009 the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a
provision by Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) in the FY 2010 State,
Foreign Operations and Related Programs Appropriations bill to
further tighten funding for TV Marti. In its final version, the
amendment cut approximately $4 million in funding in addition
to the reduced appropriation requested by the President, and it
ordered OCB to spend not more than $5.5 million for items other
than salaries and benefits. The intent was to end funding for
AeroMarti. OCB officials maintain that the budget reduction
will be devastating to both TV Marti and Radio Marti because
many OCB employees are ``dual-hatted'' and would have to be let
go in the absence of adequate funding for AeroMarti.
OCB officials maintain that total FY 2010 costs for TV
Marti are $12,025,910. They complain that they already must
eliminate 35 positions and $4.2 million as mandated in the FY
2010 budget request; a further $4 million cut, as called for by
the Dorgan Amendment, would require deep cuts beyond TV Marti.
OCB officials argue that even if all of TV Marti's 32 remaining
employees are eliminated, this would achieve an additional
savings of only about $1.3 million.
4. Problems Began Almost Immediately After Creation
From their inception, Radio and TV Marti have had several
difficult problems, including a lax adherence to generally
accepted journalistic standards, reports of small audience
size, and Cuban Government jamming of broadcast signals.
Adhering to Journalistic Standards
OCB's failure over many years to adhere to generally
accepted journalistic standards remains its most significant
problem, and the grounds for most criticism leveled against it.
These failures have been documented in the press, in a January
2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and
in IBB's own internal evaluations.
The 2009 GAO report--the most recent of several--criticized
OCB for failing to maintain appropriate journalistic standards.
In response, IBB and OCB took several steps to improve
operations and to help ensure that U.S. broadcasting to Cuba
adheres to domestic and international broadcasting laws,
agreements, and standards. It is too soon to assess whether
these moves will have a significant impact over time. OCB has
attempted a succession of such initiatives over the past 20
years with mixed results.
The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act and the TV Broadcasting
to Cuba Act require Radio and TV Marti to adhere to VOA
journalistic standards to ensure that their programming is
accurate, balanced, and objective. While IBB officials report
that the quality of OCB programming has ``improved slightly''
in recent years, IBB's internal, as well as external, reviews
identified continuing problems with OCB broadcasters' adherence
to journalistic standards, particularly in the area of balance
and objectivity. IBB program analysts' reviews from 2003
through 2008 repeatedly cite specific problems with the
broadcasts, such as the presentation of individual views as
news, editorializing, and the use of inappropriate guests whose
viewpoints represented a narrow segment of opinion. IBB reviews
of Radio and TV Marti's content identified other problems,
including placement of unsubstantiated reports coming from Cuba
with news stories that had been verified by at least two
reputable sources; the use of offensive and incendiary language
in broadcasts, which is explicitly prohibited by OCB's
editorial guidelines; and a lack of timeliness in news and
current affairs reporting.
External reviews of Radio and TV Marti's broadcast content
also identified problems regarding balance and objectivity. For
example, the results of IBB monitoring panels from 2003 through
2007 showed that the majority (9 of 13) of expert control
listeners and viewers expressed concerns about the broadcasts'
balance and objectivity. In addition, an OCB-commissioned
survey of recent Cuban arrivals in 2007 showed that only 38
percent felt that TV Marti programming was ``objective,'' and
only 29 percent of respondents believed that Radio Marti's news
was ``objective.''
To help improve adherence to journalistic standards, in
2007, the director of OCB issued a memorandum to managers
requiring them to certify that they have provided employees and
contractors with a copy of both OCB's editorial guidelines and
the VOA Charter. In interviews with committee staff, OCB
management did not identify any follow-up. If this
``certification'' has occurred, evidence that it has improved
performance still is unavailable.
OCB says it has taken recent steps to improve training for
its employees. OCB selected a staff person to serve as a
training coordinator and established a designated space for
training classes. However, BBG's Manual of Administration
establishes additional responsibilities for providing training
that OCB has not yet fulfilled. For example, while the manual
requires managers to review employees' training needs annually,
OCB officials reported that they have made no recent efforts to
do so, citing budget limitations. In FY 2009, however, OCB
received funding for training in journalistic standards.
OCB also has failed to implement some IBB program review
recommendations. For example, IBB action plans from 2003
through 2008 recommended that OCB: 1) separate news from
opinion in broadcasts; 2) ensure balanced and comprehensive
selection of viewpoints; 3) avoid sweeping generalizations and
editorializing; 4) use guests who are informed on program
topics; and 5) separate unsubstantiated reports from Cuba from
newscasts.
Rather than move OCB under VOA, the two organizations have
implemented a modest co-location plan, whereby VOA Latin
America broadcasters have begun working from a dedicated studio
in OCB. This arrangement enables--but does not require--them to
work with and advise OCB broadcasters, and has created an optic
of main VOA dependence on, and implicit subordination to, a
surrogate radio with serious quality control issues. It is
unclear at this stage what the overall mission of the co-
located group will be, who will work for whom, and what
authority, if any, VOA will have over Radio and TV Marti
broadcasts. So far, OCB and VOA have begun co-producing a half-
hour program called ``A Fondo,'' or ``In Depth,'' which
provides news and analysis on the Western hemisphere.
Unfortunately, however, the fact that OCB will remain in Miami
undercuts efforts to broaden the organization's political scope
outside southern Florida and to ensure that programming is up
to worldwide VOA standards.
IBB's efforts to oversee OCB take three main forms, but all
have been largely unsuccessful. First, OCB participates in a
daily editorial meeting at the manager level with VOA and IBB
staff to discuss what news stories each entity will be covering
that day. According to IBB's deputy director, participation in
such meetings is supposed to help coordinate entities' coverage
of stories and ensure that each entity is covering all relevant
news events. Second, as previously noted, IBB performs annual
program reviews of Radio and TV Marti. IBB's deputy director
said that the program review process is intended to provide
quality control by objectively evaluating OCB's broadcasting
services once a year and recommending improvements in their
broadcasting. But this is only once a year, and it has little
effect on Radio and TV Marti's day-to-day programming. Third,
IBB participates in and oversees OCB's handling of strategic
issues, such as using an aircraft to broadcast TV Marti's
programming.
Audience Size
Radio and TV Marti have struggled with reports of small
audience size since their creation. While there are no
nationally representative data, and some surveys indicate a
larger potential audience, most available research suggests
that Radio and TV Marti's audience is small, due in large part
to signal jamming by the Cuban Government.
To measure audience size, IBB periodically commissions
international telephone surveys, conducted primarily from Costa
Rica. IBB also empanels focus groups in Miami made up of recent
Cuban arrivals to the United States to solicit their feedback
on the content and production quality of OCB programming and to
obtain information about their radio and television use,
preferences, and experiences in Cuba. These panels appear to be
duplicative, in that OCB also contracts with a local Miami
market research firm that conducts monitoring panels once a
month and conducts surveys twice a year to solicit recent Cuban
arrivals' feedback on the quality of TV Marti programming and
to obtain information about their media habits and perceptions
of programming. Many Cuba watchers doubt the reliability of
recent arrivals from Cuba, fearing that they tell interviewers
what they want to hear. In addition, many recent arrivals
report having watched TV Marti, only to clarify that they saw
it in the U.S. Interests Section in Havana while awaiting a
visa.
Fewer than 2 percent of respondents to telephone surveys
since 2003 reported tuning in to Radio or TV Marti during the
past week, but some observers claim the telephone interview
methodology is flawed. In a recent interview, the pollster said
that telephone interviewers almost immediately were confronted
with hostile respondents, who thought that the interviewers
were working on behalf of the Cuban Government and were trying
to trick them into admitting that they listened to Radio and TV
Marti, which would incriminate citizens as government
opponents. Many respondents answered the pollsters' questions
by saying that, of course they did not listen to Radio Marti or
watch TV Marti, and to tell Cuban authorities that their
utilities were in need of repair, there was not enough food
available in the marketplace, or that the local hospital lacked
supplies.
Despite the problems associated with telephone surveys
conducted from outside Cuba, they still are among the only
cost-effective methods of estimating audience size for Radio
and TV Marti.\2\ The surveys indicate that fewer than 2 percent
of respondents in 2003, 2005, and 2006 said they listened to
Radio Marti during the previous week. In 2008, fewer than 1
percent of respondents said they listened to Radio Marti during
the previous week.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ It is possible to place signal strength meters on U.S. Coast
Guard ships circling Cuba in international waters to determine if the
signal is getting through, but this would cost more than $100,000--
money that is not included in OCB's budget, according to IBB and OCB
officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional IBB audience research indicates that TV Marti's
audience size also is minute. All of IBB's telephone surveys
since 2003 show that fewer than 1 percent of respondents said
they watched TV Marti during the previous week. Notably,
results from the 2006 and 2008 telephone surveys show no
increase in reported TV Marti viewership following the launch
of AeroMarti and DirecTV broadcasting in 2006.
OCB officials maintain that other information suggests that
Radio and TV Marti may have a larger audience in Cuba. For
example, a 2007 survey that OCB commissioned to obtain
information on programming preferences and media habits also
contained data on Radio and TV Marti's audience size. This
nonrandom survey of 382 Cubans who had recently arrived in the
United States found that 45 percent of respondents reported
listening to Radio Marti and that 21 percent reported watching
TV Marti within the last six months before leaving Cuba.
However, these results may not represent the actual size of
Radio and TV Marti's audience because 1) according to BBG
officials, higher viewing and listening rates are expected
among recent arrivals, and 2) the demographic characteristics
of the respondents to this survey did not reflect the broader
Cuban population.
Anecdotal reports confirm that Radio Marti broadcasts have
reached significant audiences over the years in response to
specific events. OCB claimed that Radio Marti's coverage of
Hurricane Ike, which struck Cuba in September 2008, was widely
heard there, with callers from all over the island providing
updated information on the situation to OCB. And in interviews
with the Associated Press, more than two dozen Cuban immigrants
to Florida contended that Radio Marti could be heard throughout
Cuba in the days following the hurricane.
In June 2009, OCB commissioned Spanish Radio Productions
(SRP) of Coral Gables, FL to carry out a study among recently
arrived Cuban immigrants to determine their radio listening and
television viewing habits during their last six months in
Cuba.\3\ SRP found that among 390 people interviewed, when
asked what ``foreign radio stations'' they listened to, 32
percent volunteered that they had listened to Radio Marti.
Slightly more than half of those added that they stopped
listening to Radio Marti because Cuban Government jamming made
reception difficult. When asked what ``foreign television
stations'' they had watched during their last six months in
Cuba, 4 percent said they had watched TV Marti. Of those who
reported viewing TV Marti, 75 percent had seen it on VHF
Channel 13, 41.7 percent said they had seen it on DVD or video
cassette, and 8.3 percent said they had seen it via DirecTV.
These survey figures, if true, are deceptive. Extrapolated to
the whole Cuban population, 3 percent have seen TV Marti on
Channel 13, 1.7 percent have seen it on DVD or video, and only
0.3 percent on DirecTV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Survey Conducted for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting Among
Recently Arrived Cubans: Preliminary Report, Requisition Number IQ
1088-09-IQ 005, Solicitation Number QS-BBG50-R-09-0001, June 12, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The problems with this survey are twofold. First, the
methodology is not a scientific, random sample, but a group of
recently arrived immigrants, who likely are, by definition,
anti-regime. Second, there is no accounting for where these
immigrants listened to Radio Marti or viewed TV Marti. For
example, both are offered in the U.S. Interests Section, where
the immigrants had to go to acquire visas for their travel to
the United States.
Higher listenership and viewership numbers are plausible,
as evidenced by Lockheed Martin, a TV Marti contractor, and by
the Cuban Government itself, both of which have offered
evidence that TV Marti is potentially available across wide
swaths of the country as a ``Grade A'' broadcast signal.
At OCB's request, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics' Advanced
Development Programs developed analytical models of the
AeroMarti UHF Channel 20 and VHF Channel 13 broadcast systems,
Cuban local TV transmitters operating on Channels 20 and 13,
and Cuban jamming transmitters based in Havana.\4\ These
computer models were employed in an advanced broadcast
simulation environment and used to develop an engineering
assessment of the effectiveness of the AeroMarti airborne
broadcast system. Broadcast performance was evaluated both in
an environment of co-channel interference from neighboring
Cuban TV stations and when Havana-based jamming is active.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Modeling of the AeroMarti UHF Channel 20 and VHF Channel 13
broadcast system performance was developed using Analytical Graphics,
Inc.'s Satellite Tool Kit analytic software package, which enables the
user to model the dynamic link performance of a communications system,
as well as the intervisibility among objects in a 3-D geometric model.
The STK/Communication module was used to model the desired (TV Marti)
and undesired (jamming and noise) signal levels at the receiver and the
effects of atmospheric propagation on signal strengths.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Lockheed Martin's model, TV Marti's Channel 20
broadcast signal potentially extends over 21.1 percent of the
main island of Cuba (outside Havana) during jamming while
broadcasting along the Matanzas flight profile.\5\ The
AeroMarti Channel 13 broadcast model indicates potential
coverage over 22.7 percent of the island from the same flight
profile, an increase of 322 sq km from the UHF model's
coverage.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The Matanzas flight profile is the practice of pointing the
aircraft's broadcast antenna toward the city of Matanzas, Cuba. OCB
technicians say that this allows broader potential viewership coverage,
and less jamming interference, than would directing the signal at
Havana.
\6\ AeroMarti Broadcast Effectiveness Analysis, Contract Number
BBG45-P-08-0008, Data Item Number A002, Document Number PMF-01382, 27
August 2008, by Lockheed Martin Corporation, Lockheed Martin
Aeronautics Company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lockheed Martin's simulations suggest high TV Marti signal
levels are greater than jamming noise and noise from co-channel
broadcasts. That is, in the simulations, viewers could see TV
Marti broadcast signals even with jamming. Clear broadcast
reception is projected over wide areas during these events with
significant signal coverage over a portion of the Cuban
mainland along the northern coastal regions and outside of
Havana. The studies do not explain, however, why all eyewitness
accounts and polls show much lower TV Marti viewership.
In June 2007, the Cuban Government claimed a similar
theoretical signal strength (i.e., when not jamming) when it
filed a formal complaint with the International
Telecommunications Union.\7\ In its complaint, the Cuban
Government specified the on-ground measured signal strength of
the AeroMarti broadcast to be within the range of 64dBm-74dBm.
This measured performance by the Cuban Government corroborates
test measurements performed by Lockheed Martin on the AeroMarti
aircraft in 2006 and 2007, prior to formal acceptance of the
airborne broadcast systems by OCB. It is also consistent with
the ``FCC Grade A'' signal strength specified in the Lockheed
Martin model and in its contract with OCB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Complaint filed with the FCC and the ITU on June 25, 2007 by
the Cuban ``Agencia de Control y Supervision-MIC.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cuban Government Jamming
IBB and OCB have studied the extent and impact of jamming,
but they still lack data on the number, type, and overall
effectiveness of the jammers. Nonetheless, IBB, OCB, and
Lockheed Martin feel confident with their conclusions on Cuba's
jamming practices.
The Cuban Government jams Radio Marti's shortwave signals
and interferes with Radio Marti's AM signals by counter-
broadcasting at a higher power level on the same frequency. OCB
tries to overcome jamming of its shortwave signals by
alternating among 10 different frequencies throughout the
day.\8\ To overcome Cuban Government counter-broadcasting of
its AM broadcasts, OCB increases signal power during daylight
hours. According to OCB, the Cuban Government's counter-
broadcasting is largely effective in and around Havana and
several other large cities, but probably has little impact
outside those areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ We are unable to determine how the frequency changes affect
listeners' ability to tune in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OCB reports that jamming affects all Radio Marti shortwave
transmissions at all hours. It is more intense around Havana,
but shortwave reception in eastern parts of Cuba is often
strong. There are significant areas of the island, outside
Havana, where medium wave jamming is not a significant obstacle
to listening.
Lockheed Martin believes, based on identification of high
points, that Cuba's fixed jammers are located on the four
tallest buildings in Havana. They are likely atop the FOCSA
Building (400 feet), the Bacardi Building (150 feet),
Revolution Tower (350 feet), and Capitolio (300 feet). OCB also
claims that mobile jammers are mounted on trucks and boats and
in airplanes so that they can be moved around the island as
necessary; we are unable to corroborate that assertion. All of
the fixed jammers were damaged by Hurricane Ike in September
2008, but were pressed back into duty a year later.
Cuban Government jamming of TV Marti transmissions from
AeroMarti is intense in metropolitan Havana, but OCB has no
evidence of jamming of either Radio or TV Marti transmissions
from the HISPASAT satellites. HISPASAT is a group of Spanish
communications satellites that carry Spanish and Latin American
television programming. It is available across northern Latin
America and throughout Cuba. There is no jamming of TV Marti
transmissions from DirecTV, which carries other Spanish-
language stations from Miami and covers the western portion of
Cuba.
Recently arrived Cubans who participated in an IBB-
commissioned focus group reported that signal jamming of TV
Marti's over-the-air broadcast via AeroMarti made it difficult
for them to view TV Marti. Officials of the U.S. Interests
Section in Havana also said that Cuban Government jamming of
AeroMarti usually prevented them from viewing over-the-air TV
Marti broadcasts.
Interestingly, OCB engineers claim that there is no Cuban
jamming at all during baseball games broadcast on TV Marti on
Friday and Sunday evenings during baseball season. In a
December 2007 SRP survey, which interviewed 382 recently
arrived Cuban immigrants, 21 percent reported watching TV Marti
in Cuba during the past six months, and 81 percent said that
baseball was a ``very important'' or ``important'' programming
feature.
5. OCB Management Also Dealing with Other Problems
Besides congressional opposition, journalistic standards,
audience size, and jamming, OCB management has had to deal with
several other serious problems in the recent past. Competition
from domestic Cuban radio and television stations, for example,
has forced OCB to continually update its format, an action that
can be confusing to some listeners and viewers. In interviews
with committee staff, OCB's director emphasized that the
competitive media environment in Cuba is a key challenge for
OCB in attracting and maintaining an audience for Radio and TV
Marti. Indeed, OCB management was concerned enough about its
``brand'' in Cuba that it changed the Radio Marti and TV Marti
logo in 2009.
Meanwhile, time, progress, and the internet may be doing
what Radio and TV Marti have not been able to do in Cuba. In
2008, more than 90 percent of telephone survey respondents said
they watched Cuba's national television broadcasts during the
past week. IBB and OCB officials said that the quality of Cuban
television programming has improved and now includes popular
U.S. programming, such as ``Grey's Anatomy,'' ``Friends,'' and
``The Sopranos.'' In addition, about 30 percent of respondents
in recent polls said they watched CNN en Espanol, which is
carried on Cuban television, during the past week. This clearly
is a challenge for TV Marti, which arguably has had limited
success in opening Cuban society to uncensored news from around
the world. The presence of CNN on Cuban television--and its
apparent popularity among Cubans--appears to undercut the need
for an alternative news source such as TV Marti.
Accusations of cronyism also continue to dog OCB
management. Critics maintain that many senior-level OCB
employees were granted their positions because of their
personal connections within OCB, rather than because of any
specific qualifications they may have had for the job. For
example, the director of VOA Latin America is a nephew of OCB's
director and is also a former OCB official. These critics
assert that whether ``connected'' employees have succeeded in
their positions is irrelevant. The fact that they obtained
their jobs in a non-competitive manner is enough to harm morale
and to lead to questions about management's transparency.
OCB's presence in Miami also is another potential oversight
problem. BBG and IBB management, both in Washington, said that
OCB's Miami locale did not inhibit their efforts to oversee it.
They noted that they were in regular telephone and email
contact with OCB management. They also claimed that the monthly
BBG board meetings (one of which is held in Miami each year)
offered sufficient personal contact with OCB management. Some
OCB employees, however, expressed concern to GAO over what they
perceived as a lack of oversight by BBG and IBB. One employee
commented that OCB seemed to be ``out of sight and out of the
minds'' of BBG and IBB. Other employees told committee staff
that they did not feel like they were part of ``the BBG
family'' because of the physical distance between BBG and IBB
management and OCB.
Finally, OCB has even had to deal with criminal behavior in
the workplace. In February 2007, the former director of TV
Marti programming, along with a relative of a member of
Congress, pleaded guilty in U.S. federal court to receiving
nearly $112,000 in kickbacks over a three-year period from a
vendor receiving OCB contracts. The former OCB employee, Jose
Miranda, was sentenced to 27 months in prison and fined $5,000
after being found guilty of taking as much as 50 percent of all
monies paid by TV Marti for the production of television
programming by vendor Perfect Image. The court found that
Miranda personally accepted 73 separate checks from Perfect
Image from late 2001 through 2004. He also pleaded guilty to
income tax evasion in the scheme.
6. Recommendations
First and foremost, IBB should move OCB back to Washington
and integrate it fully into VOA. OCB cooperation with VOA in
Miami is fine for purposes of occasional joint programming and
editorial review, but OCB's problems are deeper than that and
require integration between the two organizations under tighter
IBB control. Creating a VOA-Marti service within VOA could
resolve several serious problems: It would help ensure that
programming, particularly news quality, meets VOA standards. It
would bring OCB, VOA, and IBB management teams together
permanently, allowing them to share best practices. And the
creation of a Cuba/Marti service within VOA would more firmly
establish the Marti brand in Cuba, and, by raising standards,
help build OCB's audience.
OCB must ``return to basics'' to clean up its operation. It
must attract quality talent from outside Miami, implement
quality editorial standards, and attract quality management.
Hiring and training must be overhauled to ensure a de-
politicized and professional workforce.
OCB should spend less on measuring audience size,
especially surveys by self-interested contractors, and focus
more on quality programming. It is that quality programming
that will cause interested Cubans to seek out available
broadcasts, whether over the air, or, if their access to
technology permits, via satellite and the internet.
IBB should take several immediate actions to comply with
recommendations raised by GAO's report. First, GAO recommended
that BBG take the following two steps: 1) to conduct an
analysis of the relative success and return on investment of
broadcasting to Cuba, showing the cost, nature of the audience,
and challenges--such as jamming and competition--related to
each of OCB's transmission methods. The analysis should also
include comprehensive information regarding the media
environment in Cuba to better understand the extent to which
OCB broadcasts are attractive to Cubans; and 2) to coordinate
the sharing of information among U.S. agencies and grantees
regarding the audience research relating to Radio and TV Marti.
We agree fully with these recommendations. OCB cannot fully
serve its intended audience without understanding its operating
environment, its competition, and its audience's wishes.
In addition, we believe that IBB must: 1) enhance guidance,
training, and oversight for analysts performing program
reviews; 2) provide regular, ongoing, and comprehensive
training to OCB staff regarding journalistic standards; and 3)
develop guidance and take steps to ensure that political and
other inappropriate advertisements are not shown during OCB
broadcasts.
To address chronic management issues, it is important to
have processes in place to enable the efficient and effective
operation of OCB. Finally, to improve morale within the
organization, OCB management should take steps to address
persistent concerns with its communication and interaction with
OCB staff.
A P P E N D I X
----------
Broadcasting Board of Governors
Organizational Chart