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111th Congress } { S. Prt.
2d Session } COMMITTEE PRINT { 111-42 _______________________________________________________________________
MULTILATERALISM IN THE AMERICAS:
LET'S START BY FIXING THE OAS
__________
A REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
Second Session
JANUARY 26, 2010
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Introduction..................................................... 1
Background....................................................... 2
Observations..................................................... 4
Unfunded Mandates and Finances in Dire Condition............. 4
Selective Intervention in Defense of Democracy............... 6
Recommendations.................................................. 9
Improving the OAS's Financial Sustainability................. 10
Making the OAS an Effective Defender of Regional Democracy... 12
Conclusion....................................................... 15
Appendixes
Appendix I....................................................... 17
Appendix II...................................................... 19
Appendix III..................................................... 21
Appendix IV...................................................... 23
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, January 26, 2010.
Dear colleague: United States interests are served in
strengthening multilateral institutions on behalf of effective
democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere. As the primary
institution of the inter-American system, the Organization of
American States (OAS) is crucial to such an effort. Yet the
organization faces serious financial and political challenges
that demand the attention and leadership of its member-states.
I directed my senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(SFRC) staff member for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to examine
these challenges in light of recent events. The OAS faces two
primary challenges. First, in 2009, the OAS's abortive attempt
to resolve the political crisis in Honduras exemplified its
difficulty in addressing threats to democracy in their early
stages, as previously observed in countries such as Venezuela
and Nicaragua, where elected presidents have undermined
democratic institutions. Second, following years of chronic
budget difficulties, the OAS approved a 2010 budget that
effectively depletes the organization's reserve funds, leading
to an unsustainable financing shortfall. At the same time, the
OAS is expected to address hundreds of new mandates generated
at the Summits of the Americas and by the General Assembly.
This report, by Mr. Meacham with significant contributions
from Kezia McKeague, is particularly timely given the upcoming
election of the OAS Secretary General. It provides
recommendations for the United States Government, which remains
the organization's top donor. Yet I hope it will help stimulate
a broader debate on the critical situation confronting the OAS,
for multilateral institutions are only as strong as the
commitment of their member-states. The OAS requires a renewed
effort to make it effective and financially solvent in the
coming decade.
(v)
I also wish to commend the OAS and the OAS-affiliated non-
profit organization, the Pan American Development Foundation
(PADF), for their important work in providing emergency
humanitarian relief to the people of Haiti in the wake of the
January 12 earthquake.
I hope you find this report helpful as the U.S. Congress
considers how to advance U.S. interests in hemispheric affairs.
I look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues,
and I welcome any comments you may have.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
MULTILATERALISM IN THE AMERICAS:
LET'S START BY FIXING THE OAS
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Introduction
What is at stake with Honduras is nothing less than
the credibility of the OAS and its members in living up
to the call for the collective defense of democracy
enshrined in the Charter.--Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs\1\
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\1\ Remarks at Closed Meeting of the Permanent Council of the
Organization of American States by Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Washington, DC,
November 23, 2009.
The ongoing political challenges in Honduras continue to
raise questions about the appropriate role of the Organization
of American States (OAS) in U.S. foreign policy and in
hemispheric affairs. As Assistant Secretary Valenzuela made
clear in remarks to the Permanent Council of the OAS, the
organization's credibility largely depends on how it responds
to threats to democratic governance in the region. Despite the
advances made since the end of the Cold War, including the
Inter-American Democratic Charter, the Honduras case highlights
the limitations of the OAS's capacity for preventing and
responding to both coups d'etat and the gradual erosion of
democratic institutions by elected leaders.
Meanwhile, the OAS is facing a crisis much less understood
by the media or the public: a financial shortfall coupled with
a proliferation of mandates, which now total over 1,700.\2\
With an operating budget that has stagnated for more than a
decade, the organization is overstretched. Yet its member-
states have failed to prioritize among competing programs,
choosing instead to exhaust the organization's reserve funds.
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\2\ A compendium of mandates from the last 3 years is available at
http://lugar.senate.gov.
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Many of these limitations are inherent to a multilateral
institution of 35 sovereign states. ``The OAS is neither a
self-contained nor self-executing entity,'' noted a former U.S.
diplomat interviewed for this study. Instead, its various
collective decision-making organs operate based on consensus in
a diplomatic environment increasingly marked by ideological
division. Moreover, the increased importance of sub regional
bodies, such as the Rio Group and the newly established UNASUR,
has sidelined the organization in the policy formulations of
many of the region's most influential governments.\3\
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\3\ The Rio Group is an organization of Latin American and some
Caribbean states that was created in 1986. It does not have a
secretariat or permanent body, and instead consists of annual summits
of heads of state. Spearheaded by Brazil, the Union of South American
States (UNASUR) is a more recent initiative, whose founding treaty was
signed in 2008 by all twelve South American nations. Both the Rio Group
and UNASUR exclude the United States.
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Nevertheless, the OAS continues to play an essential role
more than 60 years after its creation. It is the only regional
institution that encompasses all the democracies in the Western
Hemisphere, and it provides a multilateral forum for the United
States to engage with Latin America and the Caribbean on issues
of mutual concern. The organization's commonly acknowledged
strengths include election monitoring, cooperation on counter-
narcotics and counter-terrorism, and the protection of human
rights through its two autonomous bodies, the Inter-American
Commission and Court on Human Rights.
At the direction of Senator Lugar, this study examines the
converging financial and political challenges now facing the
OAS. Although it is beyond the scope of this report to consider
the OAS's work in other core issue areas, the focus on
financial stability and defense of democracy reflects the most
pressing concerns for both the future of the organization and
U.S. interests. In Washington, DC, staff met with the Secretary
General of the OAS, Jose Miguel Insulza, and other senior OAS
officials, the U.S. Mission to the OAS, current and former
permanent representatives to the OAS, diplomats, and regional
analysts (see Appendix I for complete list of meetings).
The first section of this report provides background on the
structure and activities of the organization, while the
observations section analyzes the OAS's dire financial
situation and the challenges that face the OAS in defending
democracy in the region. The final section develops policy
recommendations for the United States Government (USG).
Background
The OAS evolved from a series of Inter-American conferences
that began in the 1820s and led to the creation of its
predecessor, the Pan American Union, in 1910. In 1948, the
United States and 20 Latin American nations signed the Charter
of the Organization of American States in Bogota, Colombia. The
OAS has since expanded to include Canada and the Caribbean
countries. According to the Charter, the essential purposes of
the OAS are to strengthen the peace and security of the
continent; promote and consolidate representative democracy;
ensure the pacific settlement of disputes; and promote
economic, social, and cultural development.
The annual General Assembly is the supreme policy-making
organ of the OAS. It is composed of the delegations of each
member-state, with each state having the right to one vote. It
adopts its own rules of procedure, determines the structures
and functions of the other OAS bodies, deliberates on current
issues, sets the member-state contribution quota, approves the
program-budget, and sets the standards that govern the General
Secretariat. While the General Assembly tends to operate by
consensus, it is empowered to adopt most decisions with the
affirmative vote of an absolute majority of member-states. A
two-thirds vote is necessary for certain decisions, such as the
adoption of the agenda and the approval of budgetary
matters.\4\
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\4\ Meyer, Peter. Congressional Research Service Memo on Background
on the Organization of American States. Requested by minority staff of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 31 August 2009.
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The Permanent Council meets regularly throughout the year
at OAS headquarters in Washington, DC to conduct the day-to-day
business of the organization. Like the General Assembly, the
Permanent Council is composed of one representative of each
member-state, with each state having one vote. A two-thirds
vote is necessary for most Permanent Council decisions, though
the Council tends to operate by consensus.\5\
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\5\ Ibid.
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While the General Assembly and Permanent Council set the
policies of the OAS, the General Secretariat is the permanent
body charged with implementing them. The General Secretariat is
directed by the Secretary General and Assistant Secretary
General, who are elected to five-year terms--with the
possibility of one reelection-by the General Assembly. Under
Chapter XVI of the OAS Charter, the Secretary General's formal
powers include serving as legal representative of the
organization, participating in all OAS meetings with a voice
but without a vote, and establishing the offices and hiring the
personnel necessary to implement the mandates given to the
General Secretariat. Additionally, a 1988 amendment to the OAS
Charter empowered the Secretary General to bring any matter
that may threaten the peace and security of the hemisphere to
the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent
Council.\6\ The current Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza
of Chile, was elected in 2005.
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\6\ Article 110, Chapter XVI.
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While the OAS dealt primarily with border disputes and
collective security issues in its first years, it has steadily
expanded its activities into a variety of other areas. The
organization has identified four ``pillars'': democracy, human
rights, security, and development.\7\ On democracy promotion,
in particular, the OAS has taken a much more active role since
the end of the Cold War and the return to democratic governance
in much of the hemisphere. In 1990, the organization created
the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, a specialized
department for fostering democratic practices in the
Americas.\8\ In 1991, the General Assembly adopted Resolution
1080, which instructed the Secretary General to convoke the
Permanent Council or the General Assembly in the event of an
interruption of democratic governance among one of the OAS
member-states. The following year, the Washington Protocol
allowed the suspension of a member-state for the forceful
overthrow of a democratically constituted government. The
fourth and most important instrument, the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, was adopted on September 11, 2001.
Affirming the universal right to democratic governance, it
provided a set of definitional criteria for representative
democracy to be used as benchmarks in the collective defense of
democracy in the Americas.
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\7\ Organization of American States website: ``What We Do.'' http:/
/www.oas.org/en/about/what--we--do.asp
\8\ The Unit for the Promotion of Democracy has since been merged
into the Secretariat for Political Affairs, which is composed of three
departments: State Modernization and Governance; Electoral Cooperation
and Observation; and Democratic Sustainability and Special Missions.
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The OAS budget consists of three separate funds. The
Regular Fund supports the General Secretariat and is primarily
financed through member-state quotas, which are calculated
based on gross national income, with adjustments for debt
burden and low per capita income. The Regular Fund is divided
into two Subfunds: the Operations Subfund and the Reserve
Subfund. Another large portion of the OAS budget comes from
specific funds, voluntary contributions that are directed to
specific projects or programs. The OAS has collected specific
funds since 1997 in order to supplement shortages in the
Regular Fund. The final portion of the OAS budget is the
Special Multilateral Fund of the Inter-American Council for
Integral Development (FEMCIDI or Voluntary Fund), through which
countries can contribute to the financing of national and
multilateral development programs. The 2010 program-budget
appropriated $178 million, of which $90.1 million come from the
Regular Fund and $88 million from voluntary funds and
contributions to specific projects. As the top source of
funding, the USG is responsible for 59.47 percent of the
member-state quota, totaling $47 million in FY2009. The USG
also contributes an average of $20 million annually to specific
and voluntary funds.\9\
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\9\ According to OAS officials, the U.S. contribution to the
overall OAS budget, including all specific funds, amounts to
approximately 37.64 percent.
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Observations
Unfunded Mandates and Finances in Dire Condition
The OAS continues to face persistent budget difficulties.
Until a modest increase in 2006, the regular fund had been
straight-lined for over 10 years with no adjustment for
inflation. Increases in non-discretionary costs have made it
more difficult to carry out programs and made the OAS more
reliant on voluntary contributions. Yet the organization's
financial situation is even more dire today, according to
information provided by OAS officials. For the past two years,
the General Secretariat has increased expenditures by relying
on the organization's Reserve Subfund without the expectation
of member-states increasing their quotas. With the Reserve
Subfund now depleted, the projected financing shortfall for
2011 is $9.6 million, leading to what one OAS official called
``a cliffhanger.''
At the same time, the OAS has been given an increasing
number of mandates as the organization approved new documents
like the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the Summits of
the Americas Declarations and Plans of Action. For instance,
the first four Summits alone produced almost 650 mandates
addressing nearly every issue facing the nations of the
hemisphere, while other mandates have originated from General
Assembly resolutions. The U.S.-chaired Board of External
Auditors, which is charged with examining the accounts of the
General Secretariat, has identified approximately 1,700
existing mandates. Although some mandates do not require
funding, many others have not been properly funded or
fulfilled. Some analysts have suggested that the OAS's
financial situation is partially a consequence of this
broadened agenda, which led to a proliferation of committees,
directorates, and consultants that are largely unaccountable
and only tangentially related to the organization's core
mission.
As a result of financial difficulties in the region and a
reluctance to adjust the country quotas, the OAS is unlikely to
receive adequate financial support to either resolve its budget
shortfall or to implement ever increasing mandates. According
to some analysts, the organization's recurring budgetary crisis
is ``a demoralizing institutional weakness . . . [that]
constrains the OAS's ability to establish priorities and plan
ahead, to recruit and retain top level staff, conduct high
quality programs, and initiate urgently needed activities.''
\10\ Moreover, the OAS has deferred maintenance on its property
and other tangible assets to the point that engineers have
identified serious deficiencies in need of urgent repairs.
These deficiencies endanger the health and safety of employees
as well as the preservation of properties of historical
significance.
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\10\ Inter-American Dialogue, Responding to the Hemisphere's
Political Challenges: Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force
on the Organization of American States, June 2006.
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In 2009, the Board of External Auditors advocated ``the
need for member-states to seriously challenge and reduce the
number of mandates to a mutually agreed core of important work
commensurate with the organization's founding principles and
purposes.'' The task of prioritization, however, is complicated
by the political nature of the OAS and the divergent interests
of its member-states. Security challenges, for example, mean
``crime in the street for Mexico and climate change for the
Caribbean,'' as one permanent representative put it. Moreover,
for some member-states the OAS is primarily a political
organization that should focus on democracy and human rights,
while others, including the Caribbean countries, many of which
are not members of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),
insist that development must remain an integral part of the OAS
agenda. As a follow-up to their meeting with staff regarding
this study, the Caribbean diplomatic delegations to the OAS
sent a letter to Senator Lugar emphasizing the significance of
OAS development programs to their interest in the OAS (letter
attached in Appendix II).
If the OAS is to maintain the support of all member-states,
it should examine its agenda ``topic by topic, program by
program, mandate by mandate'' to determine which contribute to
the viability of the organization as a whole, a permanent
representative told staff. As Secretary General Insulza
acknowledged in his inaugural speech, the OAS requires a
``targeted agenda'' and a greater linkage between mandates and
the budget in order to become more effective. A positive step
in this direction is the creation of a working group to
determine member-states' priorities for the 2011 budget.\11\
Moreover, according to OAS senior officials, the General
Secretariat plans to move towards a results-based budget over
the next two years that will emphasize outputs and outcomes. In
December 2009, the Permanent Council adopted a resolution
establishing a formal linkage between the annual formulation
and adoption of resolutions by the General Assembly and the
budget and funding process of the OAS. The result should be a
clear definition of the expected outcomes for each resolution
adopted at the annual session of the General Assembly, an
assessment of the cost of implementing the resolution, its
formal incorporation into the budget process, and an
identification of the funding source.
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\11\ The chair of the working group, Canadian Deputy Chief of
Mission Pierre Giroux, has developed a mechanism for assigning points
to the 35 different groupings that he has made of the voluminous number
of OAS mandates. Delegations submitted their rankings in January 2010.
The working group will deliberate over the member-states' submissions
during the month of February and will present its report to the
Permanent Council's Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Affairs
(CAAP) during the first week of March. The report will serve as an
input to draft the budget.
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Despite these positive steps, the OAS will face a battle
over budget cuts in 2010. With the Reserve Subfund exhausted,
one permanent representative predicted ``a train wreck,'' while
another interviewee described ``bloodletting'' from an already
lean budget. Clearly, the OAS can no longer postpone difficult
decisions on the unsustainable gap between funding and
mandates.
Selective Intervention in Defense of Democracy
As related in the background section, the OAS has
strengthened its legal norms and procedures for the defense of
democracy in the post-Cold War era. In practice, however, the
OAS has not demonstrated consistency in its treatment of
threats to democracy in the region. The OAS tends to act
decisively in response to the illegal seizure of power through
unconstitutional means, such as the clear-cut situation of a
military coup. A distinct threat arises when democracy is
eroded gradually through the abuse of constitutional powers by
those who hold them; in these instances, the OAS has proven
reluctant to act.
On paper, the Inter-American Democratic Charter
differentiates between unconstitutional interruption and
alteration.\12\ Although these situations are not clearly
defined, they are usually interpreted to denote traditional
military coups (interruption) and the undermining of democratic
institutions by elected officials (alteration). In the case of
the latter threat, any member-state may request a meeting of
the Permanent Council to assess the situation collectively and,
if necessary, send a diplomatic mission ``to foster the
restoration of democracy'' (Article 20 of the Democratic
Charter). In the case of an unconstitutional interruption and
the failure of diplomatic initiatives, a special session of the
General Assembly may suspend the member-state from the OAS
(Article 21 of the Democratic Charter). The impetus for these
provisions stemmed from the OAS's experience in Peru, where
President Alberto Fujimori's erosion of democratic
institutions, culminating in electoral manipulation in his run
for a third term in 2000, provided grounds for developing a
capacity to address not only coup but also non-coup
scenarios.\13\
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\12\ Perina, Ruben. ``The Role of the Organization of American
States.'' Protecting Democracy: International Responses. Eds. Morton H.
Halperin and Mirna Galic. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005. 127-171.
\13\ Piccone, Theodore J. ``International Mechanisms for Protecting
Democracy.'' Protecting Democracy: International Responses. Eds. Morton
H. Halperin and Mirna Galic. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005. 101-6.
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The Democratic Charter also strengthened the preventive
capacities of the organization by allowing the government of a
member-state to request assistance of the Secretary General or
Permanent Council when it ``considers that its democratic
institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power is at
risk'' (Article 17 of the Democratic Charter). In addition,
``the Secretary General or the Permanent Council may, with the
consent of the government concerned, arrange for visits or
other actions to analyze the situation,'' and ``adopt decisions
for the preservation and strengthening of the democratic
system'' (Article 18 of the Democratic Charter). Up to and
including the Peruvian political crisis in 2000, the OAS had
been criticized for a ``firefighter approach,'' focusing on
extinguishing full-blown crises when they ignited rather than
preventing them before they flared up.\14\
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\14\ Cooper, Andrew F. and Thomas Legler. Intervention Without
Intervening: The OAS Defense and Promotion of Democracy in the
Americas? New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
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Since the implementation of the Democratic Charter in 2001,
a special session of the General Assembly has convened only
twice, in response to military overthrows in Venezuela in 2002
and Honduras in 2009. These crises revealed the shortcomings of
the OAS's defense of democracy. In both cases, the OAS reacted
forcefully to the democratic interruption, yet it had
demonstrably failed to respond to the erosion of democratic
institutions by elected presidents that preceded the coups.
In Venezuela, multiple signs of democratic weakening and
political tension preceded the ouster of President Hugo Chavez
on April 11, 2002. Yet the OAS did not take any preventive
measures that might have encouraged the Venezuelan Government
to foment dialogue rather than confrontation with its many
powerful internal critics. Instead, domestic political turmoil
continued to build, and following the violent breakup of a
massive march on the presidential palace the military sided
with a diverse coalition of political, civil society, and
business leaders to seek the removal of President Chavez from
power. The formula chosen to replace President Chavez clearly
violated the Venezuelan constitution. Invoking the Democratic
Charter, the Permanent Council condemned the coup, dispatched
Secretary General Cesar Gaviria to Caracas to investigate the
situation and begin diplomatic efforts, and convoked a special
session of the General Assembly.\15\ By the time the General
Assembly met, President Hugo Chavez had already been restored
to power. In the wake of the crisis, the OAS was unable to
obtain consent from the Venezuelan Government to maintain its
presence on the ground until the political situation once again
deteriorated in the last quarter of 2002.
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\15\ Former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria served as Secretary
General of the OAS from 1994 to 2004.
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As Secretary General Insulza wrote in a report to the
Permanent Council in 2007, the Democratic Charter proved
``ineffective in Venezuela in April 2002, when the OAS was
unable to prevent the coup against the constitutional
President, or to produce any resolution on the rupture of
democracy before the country returned to normal.'' \16\ The
Venezuelan case illustrated the difficulties in sustaining
preventive or follow-up diplomacy because of the Democratic
Charter's requirement of ``by invitation only.'' It also
underscored the OAS's reliance on executive sovereignty; no
branch of government other than the executive has invoked the
Democratic Charter to prevent a breakdown of democracy. In many
cases, however, the executive branch itself threatens
democratic institutions.
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\16\ The Inter-American Democratic Charter. Report of the Secretary
General pursuant to resolutions AG/RES. 2154 and AG/RES. 2251.
Presented to the Permanent Council. 4 April 2007.
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In Honduras, a coup ousted President Manuel Zelaya on June
28, 2009, following months of escalating tension between the
executive branch and the rest of the Honduran Government. In
March 2009, President Zelaya announced that he would conduct a
referendum in June regarding the convocation of a
constitutional assembly, provoking fears that he aimed to
remove limits on presidential election and perpetuate himself
in power. Nearly all Honduran political institutions reacted
negatively to the proposed referendum, and the Honduran
judiciary declared the proposal to be unconstitutional in late
May 2009. Nonetheless, President Zelaya proceeded with the
referendum, even after losing an appeal on June 16, 2009. As
the political situation deteriorated, the OAS's response was
limited. Secretary General Insulza sent a special envoy to
Honduras on June 17, Raul Alconada, and the Permanent Council
issued a resolution on June 26 calling on all actors to ``avoid
a disruption of the constitutional order'' and directing a
Special Commission to visit Honduras. Public statements made by
the Secretary General's envoy aggravated the situation as he
appeared to endorse the ballot. The Commission, which was
formed on June 27 and was scheduled to arrive on June 29, was
canceled after the June 28 ouster.
Following President Zelaya's removal from office and the
country, the Permanent Council adopted a resolution that
condemned the ``coup d'etat''; demanded the immediate, safe,
and unconditional return of President Zelaya to the presidency;
declared that no government arising from the coup will be
recognized; condemned all acts of violence; and called a
special session of the OAS General Assembly. On July 1, the OAS
General Assembly adopted a resolution that threatened to
suspend Honduras from the organization if the de facto
authorities of the country failed to allow President Zelaya to
return to power within three days. On July 4, Secretary General
Insulza briefed the OAS General Assembly on his consultations
in Honduras, and the General Assembly unanimously voted to
suspend Honduras in accordance with its previous resolution and
Article 21 of the Democratic Charter. After the suspension, and
in light of the OAS's inability to engage both sides, Costa
Rican President Oscar Arias, with the support of the U.S. State
Department, took the lead in negotiating an agreement between
President Zelaya and de facto President Roberto Micheletti. Due
to the breakdown of the subsequent accord, the OAS did not
monitor the Honduran presidential election on November 29,
though it continued to call for adherence to the accord.\17\
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\17\ The so-called Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord called for the
formation of a national unity and reconciliation government, a
congressional vote on President Zelaya's restitution to the presidency,
and the creation of a verification commission to ensure the accord's
implementation, among other provisions. Although a verification
commission was created according to schedule, the government of
national unity could not be formed due to President Zelaya's insistence
that he should head it and then his refusal to present candidates to
complement the list presented by de facto President Micheletti. The
Honduran Congress, moreover, delayed for several weeks before finally
announcing that it would consider Zelaya's reinstatement on December 2,
three days after the presidential election on November 28. As a result,
Zelaya declared the pact dead and urged his supporters to boycott the
election.
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The swift and principled response to the coup highlighted
unity among OAS member-states on the defense of democracy. As
Assistant Secretary of State Valenzuela responded in his
Questions for the Record submitted by Senator Lugar, ``the
unanimous condemnation of the disruption of the constitutional
order in Honduras reaffirms the collective defense of democracy
as a core principle and responsibility for all the nations of
the Western Hemisphere.'' Yet some analysts criticized the
organization's punitive stance towards the de facto government
for hardening positions on all sides and failing to foster
dialogue between the relevant parties. ``Speed trumped
deliberation,'' one senior OAS official told staff.
Furthermore, the association of the Secretary General with
President Zelaya's abortive attempt to return to Honduras on
July 5 damaged the image of the OAS as an honest broker.
Regarding the 72-hour ultimatum for the restoration of
President Zelaya, one permanent representative to the OAS
argued to staff that ``it was absurd to set those kinds of
conditions 24 hours after the coup'' and ``the lesson is that
the OAS should not rush to judgment.'' While other permanent
representatives maintained that the OAS did everything it could
with the tools provided by the Democratic Charter, they
lamented that the OAS was left to only a supporting, rather
than leading, role in attempting to resolve the crisis.
As in Venezuela, the Honduran crisis also highlighted the
limitations of the OAS's capacity to prevent institutional
ruptures. While political polarization and fragile institutions
were among the long-term conditions that contributed to the
crisis, even its immediate causes were evident well before the
OAS became involved. Admittedly, as one OAS permanent
representative described to staff, the OAS does not always
receive proper credit for its ``underground work, for
preventative diplomacy is silent and very hard to sell.''
Nevertheless, the OAS has demonstrated decisive responses to
traditional coups but relative passivity towards the gradual
erosion of democracy, despite the relationship between these
two threats, as illustrated by recent crises. In both Venezuela
and Honduras, executive defiance of other government
institutions provoked the breakdown of democratic rule.
A number of comparable situations exist in the region,
including the persecution of the media in Venezuela and recent
electoral fraud in Nicaragua. Because military coups have been
relatively rare since the democratic wave of the 1980s and 90s,
the greatest danger to democracy lies with elected officials
who abuse their constitutional powers. Although the Democratic
Charter provided a variety of tools for the OAS to address this
threat, including authority for the Secretary General to engage
a government directly, in practice, neither the Secretary
General nor member-state governments have been willing to take
any serious steps toward developing an effective early warning
mechanism that does not depend on the invitation of a member-
state.
Recommendations
Staff developed the following recommendations for the USG
to ensure that the United States plays a constructive role in
addressing the issues reviewed. If hemispheric democracy
remains a long-term strategic benefit, then the USG should
continue to advance its interest in improving the democracy
promotion capacities and financial stability of the
organization.
U.S. ideas and support are critical to this endeavor. The
State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs should
consult closely with the U.S. Mission to the OAS on policy
formulation towards the hemisphere. The USG should also
consider high-level consultations with regional governments to
obtain their views on improving OAS performance, establishing
priorities for the organization, and expanding application of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Without a conscious
effort to formulate a systematic policy, the OAS could remain
an afterthought for policymakers. Quiet diplomacy, however,
should allow the USG to build coalitions on individual issues
with like-minded governments.
Staff also cautions against two commonly-proposed reforms.
First, the USG should not recommend abandoning the practice of
consensus, despite its limitations, for the United States would
wield less influence if the Permanent Council and General
Assembly conducted a vote on every issue. Second, the
Democratic Charter should not be reopened for negotiation.
While subject to improvement, it provides important mechanisms
to assess and directly respond to threats to democracy.
Furthermore, the hemispheric unity on democracy that produced
the document would be more difficult to attain today. Reforms
to the Democratic Charter should be explored in the area of
implementation only.
improving the oas's financial sustainability
Resolve the Financial Shortfall
Member-states confront the following options to address the
$9.6 million shortfall in the 2011 budget: increase the
assessed contributions by 12 percent, increase the
contributions by a smaller percentage and cut lower priority
activities and personnel, or, if assessed contributions are not
increased, cut expenditures by a larger amount. The majority of
member-states have stated that they will be unable to increase
their assessed contributions by the 12 percent that would be
required to meet the shortfall. Budget cuts therefore appear
inevitable, at least in the short-term. Based on conversations
with a wide group, staff concluded that several areas should be
evaluated for possible cost-cutting measures.
Most importantly, the OAS needs to streamline services and
merge programs wherever possible in order to achieve savings.
For example, the Inter-American Children's Institute, located
in Montevideo, Uruguay, creates the need for an administrative
infrastructure and office space that could be accommodated at
headquarters at a much lower cost. The Institute's current
budget of approximately $1.2 million could therefore be reduced
substantially.
Similarly, a considerable portion of the budget is
allocated to field offices. A review should be made of the
costs that could be reduced if the offices were abolished in
those large countries that have not expressed an interest in
keeping them. This would be a potential reduction of over $2.1
million of the overall $7.6 million allocated to the offices,
even while maintaining the 21 offices in the Caribbean and
Central American countries that have specifically requested
preserving these offices for the provision of much-needed
services.
Regarding the subsidies for non-profit organizations
affiliated with the OAS, similar dependencies should receive
equal treatment. For example, the Pan American Development
Foundation (PADF) receives a subsidy of $131,000 but pays rent
($457,456) for the space it uses at the OAS building located on
F Street in Washington, DC. The Trust for the Americas,
however, receives $199,800 but does not pay rent. Both
organizations should pay rent and receive the same subsidy
currently provided to the PADF.
Regarding operations at headquarters, the Department of
Special Legal Programs is located in the already bloated
Secretariat for Legal Affairs and is tasked with responsibility
for consumer protection and follow-up to the Inter-American
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Persons with Disabilities. According to several
missions to the OAS, the Department has not produced
significant accomplishments in either area and could be
eliminated in order to save $511,500. Moreover, the Secretariat
for Multidimensional Security has three distinct departments
responsible for programming as well as an office of the
Executive Secretary, which does not conduct any programs and
could be reduced to the Executive Secretary's salary, allowing
for savings of $517,100.
Finally, a review of the OAS personnel roster reveals that
there are 53 non-career positions of trust financed by the
Regular Fund. Any reduction of personnel due to the financial
shortfall should focus on this category, particularly from the
ranks of advisers, rather than line authority positions, such
as Department directors.
Support a Comprehensive Review of Mandates
The recommendations detailed above represent examples of
viable reductions to address the deficit forecast for 2011. An
informed decision on budget cuts, however, must rely on a
comprehensive evaluation of all the mandates given to the
organization. This assessment is currently being undertaken by
member-state delegations, and the results should guide the
General Secretariat in its drafting of the 2011 budget to be
approved at the 2010 General Assembly.
Staff recommends that the USG strongly support this
priority-setting process, assessing which mandates should
continue to receive funding as well as establishing its own
criteria to allocate the specific funds it provides to the OAS.
As the Chair of the Working Group on the Review of OAS Programs
wrote to the Permanent Council, OAS member-states must
prioritize among ``competing goals, competing objectives,
competing outputs'' in the face of limited resources.\18\ This
process will not eliminate the need for a political negotiation
on allocations, but it should assist the organization in making
informed choices. The ultimate objective should be to focus the
OAS on its core mandates and strengths.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Priority Setting Process. Presented by the Chair of the
Working Group on the Review of OAS Programs. Permanent Council of the
Organization of American States. CAAP/GT/RVPP-3/09 rev. 1 add. 1. 16
October 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the review of mandates should contribute to
decisions on the OAS's long-term financial stability. Member-
states will need to choose between reducing the number of
mandates or increasing funding in order to place the
organization on sound financial footing as well as enhance its
credibility, which has been damaged by the large number of
mandates that remain unfulfilled. The USG should not propose
any funding increases until the OAS successfully defines
priorities and makes better use of results-based budgeting to
link strategic objectives with expected results and indicators.
In the medium-term, the USG could also assess the viability of
capping its quota contribution at 49 percent of the Regular
Fund in order to encourage other countries to take a greater
financial responsibility and thus become more vested in the
future of the organization.
Promote Responsible Use and Replenishment of Reserve Subfund
Regarding future budget decisions, the USG should advocate
adherence to Article 72(b) of the General Standards to Govern
the Operations of the General Secretariat, which regulates the
use of the Reserve Subfund (see Appendix III). According to
these standards, ``the amount of this Subfund shall be 30
percent of the total of the annual quotas of the Member
States'' and it ``may be used only on a temporary basis'' to
cover liquidity shortages, ``pending full receipt of the
anticipated income,'' or financing shortages (italics added).
In the latter case, Article 72(b) requires the restoration of
funds by way of an equivalent appropriation in the following
year's program-budget. In recent years, however, the General
Secretariat and the member-states have failed to abide by this
payback provision, instead continually relying on the Reserve
Subfund to resolve financing shortages while postponing
difficult prioritizing decisions.
Without a Reserve Subfund, the OAS will be unprepared for
any period of illiquidity in the Regular Fund, which it has
faced in the past when quota payments have not been received as
scheduled. The USG should press for replenishment of the
Reserve Subfund as well as for its responsible future use.
Promote a Fundraising Strategy for Maintenance of OAS Buildings
According to reports commissioned by the General
Secretariat in the past two years, six specific and urgent
problems in the Main Building and the General Secretariat
Building represent an imminent threat to health and safety and
require immediate repair. The latest report concludes that
immediate repairs will cost approximately $6 million, while the
overall cost of renovating the 100-year-old headquarters
building and other properties is an estimated $40 million. As a
result, the OAS Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Reform authorized $1,034,000 from existing resources in
September 2009 to undertake urgent structural repairs in OAS
buildings. The 2010 program-budget also instructed ``the
General Secretariat to prepare a fundraising strategy for
facility of building issues including urgent repairs and
preservation of historic buildings.'' The USG should assist the
General Secretariat in implementing a fundraising campaign for
this purpose.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Program-Budget of the Regular Fund of the Organization for
2010, Quota Assessments and Contributions to FEMCIDI for 2010. AG/RES.
1 (XXXVIII-E/09). 30 September 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
making the oas an effective defender
of regional democracy
Encourage the Secretary General to Make Full Use of the Powers of the
Office
As described in the observations section, the Democratic
Charter has given the Secretary General new and broader
diplomatic responsibilities, allowing him to act with greater
autonomy in the defense and promotion of democracy. Although he
remains accountable to member-states, the Secretary General may
convoke OAS meetings on critical topics, use his ``bully
pulpit'' and access to the region's leaders, and offer his good
offices to resolve crises. According to Assistant Secretary of
State Valenzuela, ``as the elected leader and spokesman for the
OAS, he [the Secretary General] does have certain autonomy and
ability to shape the agenda.'' \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Questions for the Record Submitted to Assistant Secretary--
Designate Arturo Valenzuela by Senator Richard Lugar (#19), Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, July 8, 2009
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USG should continue to encourage the Secretary General
to make full use of both his formal and informal powers to
exercise consistent leadership in protecting democracy in the
region. ``If an able diplomat, the Secretary General can play
an effective `soft power' role even without the permission of
the country in question,'' one think tank analyst commented to
staff. One permanent representative interviewed for this study
called for greater communication and shared leadership between
the General Secretariat and the Permanent Council, although he
recognized that the Secretary General should not be absolutely
bound by the commands of the Permanent Council representatives.
Indeed, the General Assembly elects the Secretary General with
the clear expectation of leadership based on experience and
access to member-state governments. Full use of the Secretary-
General's powers could ameliorate crisis situations as well as
call attention to cases of democratic erosion in the region.
Support A Strengthened Role for the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is an
autonomous organ of the OAS and one of the two bodies charged
with the promotion and protection of human rights in the
hemisphere. Composed of seven members who are elected by the
OAS General Assembly, the IACHR receives, analyzes, and
investigates alleged human rights abuses. It also publishes
reports on the human rights situations in individual countries
and submits cases to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.
According to the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR, the
Commission may create rapporteurships to assist in the
promotion and protection of human rights in relation to certain
thematic issues. The rapporteurships may be assigned to members
of the Commission, or to outside individuals, in which case
they are designated special rapporteurs. The rapporteurs report
their findings to the Commission on at least an annual
basis.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ There are currently six thematic rapporteurships and one
special rapporteurship: the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Women; the
Rapporteurship on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families; the
Rapporteurship on the Rights of the Child; the Unit for Human Rights
Defenders; the Rapporteurship on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; the
Rapporteurship on the Rights of Persons Deprived of Liberty; the
Rapporteurship on the Rights of Afro-Descendants and Against Racial
Discrimination; and the Special Rapporteurship for Freedom of
Expression.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USG should assess the viability of individually
presenting the reports prepared by the rapporteurs to the OAS
Permanent Council and General Assembly. The IACHR already
provides annual reports to both bodies, noting which countries'
human rights situations deserve special attention, follow-up,
and monitoring. By permitting the timely submission of
individual reports to the political bodies, the OAS would
strengthen the role of the rapporteurs in protecting essential
elements of representative democracy. All too often the
findings of the IACHR and the agenda of the Permanent Council
diverge to the detriment of both democracy and the respect of
human rights in the hemisphere.
The USG should also encourage the IACHR to develop cross-
country comparisons that could be used to create a
comprehensive index on democratic indicators in each country of
the hemisphere. Similar to the UN Human Development Index, such
an index could serve as a warning mechanism with respect to
democratic erosion by elected leaders. Although several member-
states have indicated the need for periodic evaluation of the
quality of democracy in the region, many other member-states
would likely oppose a monitoring mechanism conducted by the
General Secretariat as counter to the principle of
nonintervention. An expansion of existing monitoring mechanisms
by the well-respected IACHR would be a more effective
alternative.
Maintain and Strengthen the Role of the OAS as the Principal Agency of
Electoral Observation in the Americas
The OAS is widely regarded as the leading election
observation organization in the hemisphere. Since 1962 and
particularly following the creation of the Unit for Democracy
Promotion in 1990 (followed by the Secretariat for Political
Affairs in 2006), the OAS has successfully observed
presidential, legislative, and special elections throughout the
region. As representatives of a multilateral institution, OAS
observers are often able to establish closer relationships with
and gain greater access to political and electoral institutions
than other observer groups. In addition, the OAS has the
institutional capacity to organize larger electoral missions
and maintain observers on the ground longer than other
organizations.\22\ Nevertheless, this cornerstone of the
organization's democracy-promoting operations is funded
precariously by voluntary contributions instead of a permanent
fund.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ United States Permanent Mission to the Organization of
American States, http://www.usoas.usmission.gov/democracy.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USG should explore the viability of supporting
electoral observations with a standing fund adequate to finance
the full range of activities required for electoral monitoring.
Such a fund would permit the advance planning required for
election observers to start their work in early phases of the
electoral process, such as registration and campaigning, which
often prove vital for deterring or exposing fraud.\23\ In
addition, the USG should encourage the OAS's Department for
State Modernization and Good Governance to formulate a results-
based and comprehensive work-plan to strengthen the role of the
OAS on decentralization, transparency, and institution-
building, among other governance issues. This effort could
provide a means to help strengthen the capacity of the OAS to
be proactive, rather than reactive, in defense of democracy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Inter-American Dialogue, Responding to the Hemisphere's
Political Challenges: Report of the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force
on the Organization of American States, June 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Promote Consultation With All Branches of Government and With Civil
Society
The Democratic Charter allows ``the government concerned''
to invoke the Democratic Charter to prevent a breakdown of
democracy. In practice, however, no branch of government other
than the executive has turned to the OAS to denounce the
disruption or erosion of democracy. If the executive branch
itself is threatening democratic institutions, then the
Permanent Council only takes action after the rupture has
occurred. As Secretary General Insulza wrote in a report to the
Permanent Council, the effectiveness of the Democratic Charter
is ``seriously limited when only the executive can use it to
defend a democracy.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ The Inter-American Democratic Charter. Report of the Secretary
General pursuant to resolutions AG/RES. 2154 and AG/RES. 2251.
Presented to the Permanent Council. 4 April 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The USG should encourage other branches of government to
request action by the Permanent Council. It will be up to the
Permanent Council to determine whether the complaint is valid,
but the term ``government'' should not be restricted to the
executive branch. The OAS would be further strengthened if the
Democratic Charter is invoked before an institutional
breakdown, in cases in which there is a clear erosion of the
democratic process. Until now, Resolution 1080 and the
Democratic Charter have been invoked only after an
institutional breakdown, reducing their preventive value. In
part, their invocation has been hindered by the traditional
reliance on consensus, which allows the affected country or its
allies to block a decision. Although staff recommends
maintaining the practice of consensus decision making, the OAS
could explore the possibility of creating an exceptional
mechanism for voting on application of the Democratic Charter.
In addition, the USG should continue to support and
strengthen the participation of civil society organizations in
OAS activities. Civil society participation has already
increased in the past ten years; attendance at the General
Assembly and the Summits of the Americas is significant, and
many human rights groups work with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. Nevertheless, according to an NGO
representative, ``the vast majority of groups in the region
remain disengaged from OAS initiatives,'' in part due to the
obstacles posed by the complexities of the OAS system for small
or emerging organizations, as well as to the effective ``veto''
power wielded by certain OAS member-states over applications
submitted by civil society organizations to the Committee on
Inter-American Summits Management and Civil Society
Participation in OAS Activities (CISC). The USG should
encourage programs that promote better understanding between
the OAS and civil society. It should also assess the viability
of creating a permanent and institutionalized mechanism for
civil society consultations that could guarantee the right to a
voice for non-governmental actors.
Conclusion
The OAS has a significant role to play in the Americas,
especially regarding the strengthening of democracy, respect
for human rights, and promotion of human development. In the
final analysis, the OAS will be judged by its ability to act
effectively in line with its doctrinal commitment to the
defense of democracy. As a former U.S. Permanent Representative
to the OAS stated, ``Let's face it, when people think of the
OAS, they don't think of all of the services it provides around
the region, they assess its value based on whether the
organization promotes democracy effectively, nothing more,
nothing less.'' Unfortunately, the OAS is faltering in this
endeavor. If more governments in the hemisphere become less
democratic, the OAS will be even less capable of collectively
enforcing the procedures for defending democracy.
Exacerbating these challenges is the dire financial
condition of the organization. In part, this is the result of
years of financial mismanagement and a proliferation of
unfunded mandates, dating back to the organization's inception,
which has undermined the OAS's ability to realize its core
mission and strengthen its organizational integrity. This issue
can no longer be ignored.
Finally, the organization must address the crucial issue of
leadership. Upon taking office in May 2005, Secretary General
Insulza pledged to ``make the OAS a more effective institution
with a targeted agenda.'' He also aimed to strengthen the
organization's political relevance and its capacity for action.
After initial high hopes, these challenges have not been met.
Instead, Insulza has been repeatedly accused of
demonstrating more interest in his political fortunes in his
native Chile. Further complicating the political environment
for Insulza were statements made by President-elect of Chile,
Sebastian Pinera, who, during the later stages of his campaign
in January 2010, said he was unsure whether he would support
Insulza as continuing head of the OAS when the diplomat faces
reelection later this year. Insulza returned to Chile several
times during the presidential campaign to speak publicly in
favor of Pinera's opponent, Eduardo Frei, and participate in
political rallies in his support.
Most recently, Secretary General Insulza has called for a
special session of the General Assembly to conduct his
reelection in March 2010, thus allowing for a transition period
before his term expires in May. Although no set date exists for
elections, this is an appropriate time to regularize the
process, so that, except in extraordinary circumstances,
elections take place at the annual General Assembly. A special
session would incur significant costs for the organization and
prevent the return to a normal election cycle.
Furthermore, any reelection should involve a deliberative
evaluation of the incumbent's first term in office. As
suggested by a General Assembly resolution proposed by
Argentina and passed in June 2005, an opportunity should be
provided for candidates to give a public presentation to the
Permanent Council on their proposals and initiatives prior to
the election (see Appendix IV).
For the sake of the organization, it is essential for
member governments to appreciate the importance of this
leadership position and the qualities an aspirant must possess.
Given the challenges described in this report, no reelection
should be rushed or rubber stamped.
A P P E N D I X E S
Appendix I
----------
MEETINGS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN WASHINGTON, DC
Organization of American States
Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General
Albert Ramdin, Assistant Secretary General
Frank Amalguer, Secretary for Administration and Finance
Adam Blackwell, Secretary for External Relations
Linda Eddleman, Senior Advisor to the Secretary General
Dale Crowell, Specialist, Secretariat for External Relations
Alfonso Quinonez, Executive Secretary for Integral
Development
United States Mission to the Organization of American States
Carmen Lomellin, U.S. Permanent Representative
W. Lewis Amselem, former Acting U.S. Permanent Representative
John Maisto, former U.S. Permanent Representative
Hector Morales, former U.S. Permanent Representative
Other Permanent Representatives to the Organization of American States
Gustavo Albin, Mexico
CARICOM Caucus
Graeme Clark, Canada
Guillermo Cochez, Panama
Marca Maro Da Silva, Minister-Counselor, Brazil
Pedro Oyarce, Chile
Francisco Proano, Ecuador
Jorge Skinner-Klee, Guatemala
Think Tanks and NGOs
Jaime Daremblum, Hudson Institute
Viviana Giacaman, Freedom House
Peter Hakim, Inter-American Dialogue
Ted Piccone, Brookings Institution
Mark Schneider, International Crisis Group
Correspondence via e-mail
Fernando Cepeda, former Colombian Permanent Representative to
the OAS
Luigi Einaudi, former Acting Secretary General and Assistant
Secretary General of the OAS
John Graham, Canadian Foundation for the Americas
Viron Vaky, former U.S. diplomat
Appendix II
----------
Embassy of the Republic of Guyana
December 22, 2009.
Hon. Richard Lugar,
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lugar: In keeping with the process which you
had initiated through the Secretary-General of the OAS, Mr.
Jose Miguel Insulza, to study the current challenges being
faced by the Organization including its budget, its core
mandates and its record in responding to threats to democratic
governance, CARICOM Permanent Missions to the OAS were pleased
to have shared our views with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. We trust that when we held discussions with the
Committee's appointee, Mr. Carl Meacham, on November 12th, our
perspectives on the issues were informative and productive.
Our countries subscribe to the fact that the Organization
of American States is the primary instrument for political
dialogue and consultation within the hemisphere--the most vital
edifice in the hemispheric architecture of the establishment
and maintenance of peace and democracy in our region. All
member states recognize that the process of multilateralism has
a bearing on the potency of the Organization's decisions, but
none would dispute the validity of the OAS and its
accomplishments in the maintenance of security and stability
and in the promotion of democracy and human rights in the
Americas. That the purpose of the OAS is to serve the interests
of all its members equally, be they large or small, developed
or underdeveloped, is a matter of fundamental interest to
CARICOM. Our countries have furthered their commitment to
integration, democracy, security and stability in the
hemisphere individually and collectively over the years through
the OAS. CARICOM is convinced that a strong and effective OAS
is in the collective interest of all its members.
As the Foreign Relations Committee is aware, the OAS has
been assigned by our Heads of Government to implement the
mandates of the Summit of the Americas. The Organization is
also vested with responsibilities to foster Integral
Development among its member states. The instruments of the
Organization address the barriers which poverty,
underdevelopment and insecurity pose in the attainment of
democracy, stability, human rights and good governance in the
region. Consequently, the development agenda of the OAS is a
matter of great importance in the countries of CARICOM who are
Small Island Development States in the thralls of
Multidimensional Threats ot Security.
Vulnerable states in the region run the risk of their
democratic foundations being undermined through social and
economic underdevelopment. Addressing this situation ought to
be a matter of priority for the region so that serious problems
including crime, insecurity and instability being faced by most
of our countries can be tackled effectively. Given the
prevailing limitations with funding for development we believe
that at this time the OAS requires the solidarity and support
of all of its members. We are certain that other member states
and sub-regions of the Organization recognize that it is within
our collective interests and responsibilities not to diminish
the effectiveness of the OAS as an agency for development.
We appreciate the exercise upon which the Foreign Relations
Committee has embarked and we appreciate being able to bring
these matters to the Committee's attention. We take the
opportunity to acknowledge and express our appreciation for the
enormous contributions which the United States has made to the
Organization over the years and which have contributed in no
small measure to the pursuit of our common ideals and
aspirations. We trust that the Committee would continue to
value the role and performance of the Organization and would
continue to lend its support wherever necessary.
We congratulate the United States Senate for its interest
in strengthening the role of the Organization of American
States in hemispheric affairs. We would wish to reiterate the
will and the commitment of the countries of the CARICOM to work
with all partners to strengthen the Organization in order to
realize our common objectives so that, together, our peoples
may attain the benefits of greater peace, democracy, security
and development.
Yours faithfully,
Bayney R. Karran, Ambassador of Guyana
Deborah Mae-Lowell, Ambassador of Antigua and Barbuda
Rhoda M. Jackson, Ambassador to the Commonwealth of the Bahamas
John E. Beale, Ambassador of Barbados
Nestor Mendez, Ambassador of Belize
Ms. Judith-Anne Rolle, Charge d'Affairs of the Commonwealth of Dominica
Dennis Antoine, Ambassador of Grenada
Duly Brutus, Ambassador of Haiti
Anthony Johnson, Ambassador of Jamaica
Izben C. Williams, Ambassador of Saint Kitts and Nevis
Clenie Greer-Lacasde, Ambassador of Saint Lucia
La Celia A. Prince, Ambassador of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Jacques Kross, Ambassador of Suriname
Marina Valere, Ambassador of Trinidad and Tobago
Appendix III
----------
Excerpted from the General Standards to Govern the
Operations of the General Secretariat of the Organization of
American States:
Article 72. Regular Fund. This is made up mainly of the
quotas collected from the Member States and includes the
contributions from other funds for technical supervision and
administrative support provided by the General Secretariat.
Funds received for unspecified purposes shall be treated as
miscellaneous income under the Regular Fund. The purpose of
this Fund is to finance: the regular secretariat and general
support services provided by the Secretariat; technical
supervision and administrative support to the programs; and
multilateral integral development programs, as established in
Article 32 of the Charter and as specified in the approved
program-budget. The Career Service may be financed only by the
Regular Fund of the Organization.
The Regular Fund includes the following sub funds:
a. Operations Subfund to which shall be credited all
income of the Regular Fund, and against which shall be
charged all obligations and expenditures in accordance
with the Regular Fund program-budget.
At the end of each year, any excess in income over
obligations and expenditures shall be transferred from
the Operations Subfund to the Reserve Subfund, or any
excess in obligations and expenditures over income
shall be transferred from the Reserve Subfund to the
Operations Subfund. The General Secretariat shall
report on these actions to the Permanent Council within
thirty days of the date the transfer was made.
b. Reserve Subfund, the purpose of which is to ensure
the regular and continuous financial functioning of the
General Secretariat.
The amount of this Subfund shall be 30 percent of the
total of the annual quotas of the Member States. This
amount shall be reached through crediting to this
Subfund the annual income in excess of the obligations
and expenditures of the Operations Subfund. To the
extent that the Subfund exceeds 30 percent of the total
of the annual quotas of the Member States, the excess
shall be available for any purpose approved by the
General Assembly.
The Reserve Subfund may be used only on a temporary
basis to cover:
i. Expenditures under the program-budget
financed by the Regular Fund, pending full
receipt of the anticipated income; and
ii. Special expenditures not provided for in
the program-budget. Such expenditures must be
authorized by the General Assembly or, when it
is not in session, by the Permanent Council,
which shall first hear a report on the
condition of the Reserve Subfund and the
reasons for such expenditures from its
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Affairs (CAAP).
No withdrawals shall be made from the Reserve Subfund
for purposes other than to ensure the regular and
continuous financial functioning of the General
Secretariat until such time as the Reserve Subfund
shall have reached 10 percent of the annual quotas of
the Member States earmarked for the program-budget of
the Regular Fund approved by the General Assembly.
The amounts withdrawn for the purposes set forth in
this article shall be reimbursed to the Reserve Subfund
in the following manner: in the case covered by
subparagraph (i) above, as soon as the corresponding
income permits; and, in the case of subparagraph (ii),
by means of equivalent appropriations in the program-
budget for the next fiscal period or in such a manner
as may be determined by the General Assembly.
Appendix IV
----------
AG/RES. 2103 (XXXV-O/05)
PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF CANDIDATES PROPOSED FOR THE POSITIONS OF
SECRETARY GENERAL AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES
(Adopted at the fourth plenary session, held on June 7, 2005)
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
RECALLING the nature, purposes and principles established
in the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS);
BEARING IN MIND that the Inter-American Democratic Charter
stipulates that the OAS will continue to carry out programs and
activities designed to promote democratic principles and
practices and strengthen a democratic culture in the
Hemisphere;
CONSIDERING that the Organization fulfills its purposes
through the General Secretariat, as well as other organs;
UNDERSCORING the concern of member states that those who
serve as Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General of
the Organization should commit to fulfilling the purposes
proclaimed in the OAS Charter and diligently performing the
functions established in said Charter, in other inter-American
treaties and agreements, and by the General Assembly;
BEARING IN MIND that resolution CP/RES. 874 (1459/04)
recommended that, when sponsoring candidates for the positions
of Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General, member
states exercise due diligence, to ensure that the candidates
meet the highest standards of personal integrity, professional
ability, respect for democracy and democratic institutions, as
well as for the defense and promotion of human rights;
BEARING IN MIND ALSO that the same resolution also resolved
to continue examining this issue in order to develop proposals
or criteria for strengthening this selection process;
IT BEING PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, for the member states and
for civil society in general, to be familiar in advance with
the plans, projects, and programs proposed by the candidates to
the positions of Secretary General and Assistant Secretary
General, for the sake of greater transparency;
ACKNOWLEDGING the right of member states to present
candidates for the positions of Secretary General and Assistant
Secretary General up to the very day elections are held during
the General Assembly; and
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the duty of the Permanent Council under
Article 91 of the Charter of the OAS to watch over the
observance of the standards governing the operation of the
General Secretariat,
RESOLVES:
1. To instruct the Permanent Council to invite the
candidates put forward by member states for the positions of
Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General to give a
public presentation to this Organization prior to the
elections, in order to describe in greater detail their
proposals and the initiatives they would undertake should they
be elected.
2. The presentations will be made to the Permanent Council
on a date to be determined by it and, if possible, in the same
meeting of the Council, which would be disseminated as widely
as possible.
3. An opportunity shall also be provided for a separate
dialogue between the candidates and representatives of civil
society organizations duly accredited to the Organization; such
participation shall be governed by the guidelines for the
participation of civil society organizations in the OAS.
4. This resolution shall not impair the authority of member
states, established in Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of
Procedure of the General Assembly, to present candidates for
the positions of Secretary General and Assistant Secretary
General until the day of the corresponding election.