[Senate Prints 111-39]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress } { S. Prt.
2d Session } COMMITTEE PRINT { 111-39 _______________________________________________________________________
U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE,
COPENHAGEN, DENMARK,
DECEMBER 2009
__________
A REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
Second Session
JANUARY 15, 2010
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Background....................................................... 1
Formal Negotiations at the Conference............................ 2
Copenhagen as Catalyst for Climate Commitments................... 3
The Copenhagen Accord............................................ 3
Analysis of the Accord........................................... 4
Implications for the United States............................... 5
Further Observations on the Negotiation Process.................. 7
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, January 15, 2010.
Dear colleague: In December 2009, I directed two senior
members of my Foreign Relations Committee staff, Mark Helmke
and Minority Chief Counsel Michael Mattler, to observe the 15th
meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen, Denmark.
The Copenhagen conference was originally envisioned as the end
point of a two-year negotiating process toward a new
international agreement addressing climate change, and was
attended by over 100 heads of state. Following the Conference
they prepared the attached trip report.
The Foreign Relations Committee role in overseeing
international climate change negotiations is longstanding.
Beginning in 2007, former Chairman Biden and I directed members
of the majority and minority staffs of the committee to attend
significant UNFCCC negotiations. Their role was to help inform
the committee on the progress of these negotiations, and to
help the committee address issues within its jurisdiction--
including relating to consideration of treaties and foreign
assistance--that might emerge from the negotiations. This
arrangement continued in Copenhagen with members of both the
majority and the minority staff attending the conference.
I look forward to continuing to work with you on these
issues and welcome any comments you may have on this report.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Minority Member.
U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE, COPENHAGEN, DENMARK,
DECEMBER 2009
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Background
The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference was originally
envisioned as the end point of a two-year negotiating process
to address climate change in the period beyond 2012. (2012 is
the end of the period in which parties to the Kyoto Protocol--
which do not include the United States--made commitments for
actions to address climate change.) The parties to the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed in 2007
to launch negotiations to address issues for the post-2012
period including:
Actions by developed and developing states to mitigate
climate change,
Actions to help states adapt to the effects of climate
change,
Actions to develop and deploy technology to help states
mitigate and adapt to climate change, and
Actions to mobilize financial resources and investment to
support actions to mitigate and adapt to climate
change.
The negotiating mandate called for an agreed outcome and
the adoption of a decision addressing these issues at the
Copenhagen Conference.
Negotiators from states parties to the UNFCCC held a series
of meetings during 2008 and 2009 designed to produce a legally
binding treaty addressing these issues. These discussions made
little progress in producing agreement on the most significant
issues in the negotiation, including:
What steps developed and developing countries would commit
to take to reduce their emissions of carbon, including
what targets they would adopt for medium- and long-term
emissions reductions;
How much money (and from what sources) developed countries
would commit to providing developing countries to
assist them in mitigating and adapting to climate
change;
What mechanisms would be used to allocate and oversee such
financial flows; and
What mechanisms would be used to monitor and verify that
countries were implementing their obligations?
On the eve of the Copenhagen Conference, the main
negotiating document addressing these issues was more than 160
pages long and reflected numerous competing proposals. In spite
of the pressure created by the planned presence at the
conference of over 100 heads of state, it was clear to most
observers that there were too many unresolved issues to permit
the conclusion of a comprehensive legally binding instrument at
Copenhagen as had originally been envisioned. Focus instead
turned to the possibility of concluding a more general
political agreement addressing broad principles for responding
to climate change, but leaving details of implementation to a
legally binding agreement to be concluded in the future.
Formal Negotiations at the Conference
The formal track of negotiations at the conference produced
little progress even toward this scaled back goal of a general
political agreement. Discussions were characterized by
significant acrimony between the so-called G-77 group of
developing countries (including China) and the Danish
presidency of the Conference. While there were a number of
underlying sources of these tensions, they manifested
themselves at the conference in heated debate over two
procedural issues.
First, the G-77 took a firm line that the Kyoto Protocol
should be preserved as the framework for post-2012 actions to
address climate change. Many developed countries believed that
the Kyoto Protocol was ill suited for this function because the
United States is not (and is not likely to become) a party to
it and because it contains significant obligations only for
developed countries, but not for developing countries,
including major emitters such as China and India. As an
alternative, many developed countries preferred to pursue a new
agreement delinked from the Kyoto structure. The G-77 opposed
such efforts, in large part in order to preserve the structure
in which developing countries have no mitigation obligations.
Accordingly, they insisted that work toward extending the
existing Kyoto Protocol by adding new post-2012 commitments for
developed countries should be the principal focus of the
Conference's efforts.
Second, the G-77 resisted suggestions by the Danish
presidency to delegate to small drafting committees the task of
developing proposals to bridge the significant differences in
the 160 page negotiating text. Because the unresolved issues in
the text were large in number and highly detailed, it was
difficult to make progress toward solving them in discussions
that included all 192 countries present at the conference. The
G-77, including China, however, argued that any such smaller
group efforts would unfairly exclude countries and would be
illegitimate, even if they were composed in representative
fashion and if their proposals would remain subject to further
discussion, amendment, and approval by the entire conference.
Differences on these procedural issues were likely proxies
for larger substantive disputes, including disputes about the
relative responsibilities of developed and developing states
for taking actions to mitigate climate change and on amounts of
money developed states should provide developing states as part
of such an agreement. But discussion of these procedural issues
dominated the formal negotiating sessions of the conference.
Hours were spent debating the form in which substantive
discussions should take place, and comparatively little time
was spent on substantive discussions themselves. Because of the
limited time for substantive discussions and the G-77's
insistence that they be conducted in formal sessions open to
all parties, these sessions made little progress and mostly
involved repetition of previously articulated positions. At the
end of the conference, the formal negotiating sessions had made
no significant progress toward addressing the major issues in
the conference's mandate.
Copenhagen as Catalyst for Climate Commitments
While the formal track of negotiations made little progress
toward a comprehensive international agreement, the conference
did serve as a catalyst for a number of states to announce
steps they intend to take to address climate change.
In the case of the United States, the Obama administration
announced on the eve of the conference that it was prepared to
offer a target of a 17 percent reduction in U.S. emissions from
2005 levels by 2020 as part of an overall climate agreement. It
also endorsed the goal of mobilizing $10 billion per year by
2012 to assist developing countries in addressing climate
change needs, and said that the United States ``will pay its
fair share'' of such a fund. At the conference itself,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that that the
United States was prepared to work with other countries toward
a longer term goal of jointly mobilizing from a variety of
public and private sources $100 billion per year by 2020 to
assist developing countries in addressing their climate change
needs.
Other countries also made such pledges:
China announced in advance of the conference that it would
reduce the carbon intensity of its economic output
(rather than the absolute volume of its emissions) by
40-45 percent by 2020 compared with 2005 levels.
India pledged to reduce its carbon intensity by 20-25
percent by 2020 compared with 2005 levels.
The European Union announced that it would reduce its
emissions by between 20 and 30 percent from 1990 levels
by 2020, and provide $10.6 billion over the next three
years to finance climate change assistance for
developing countries.
These and other similar pledges began to define the
parameters of actions major actors were prepared to take to
address climate change. In some cases these pledges were
contingent on steps other actors were prepared to take in
parallel or subject to other conditions. For example, the Obama
administration said that its announced mitigation target
applied ``in the context of an overall deal in Copenhagen that
includes robust mitigation contributions from China and the
other emerging economies.''
The Copenhagen Accord
In the absence of progress through the conference's formal
negotiating process, the final hours of the conference centered
on discussions among heads of state from a handful of major
countries, including both developed and developing countries.
These discussions ultimately produced a document agreed among
the United States, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa
entitled ``Copenhagen Accord.'' The accord represents a
statement of political intentions, but is not legally binding.
Key elements of the accord included:
A general agreement to take action to produce deep cuts in
global emissions with a view to holding the increase in
global temperature below 2 Celsius.
An agreement that developed countries will submit and
implement quantified economy-wide emissions targets,
and that compliance with these targets will be
measured, reported and verified according to UNFCCC
guidelines. The accord calls for emissions targets to
be submitted to the UNFCCC by January 31, 2010.
An agreement that developing countries will report to the
UNFCCC every two years on actions they have taken and
intend to take to mitigate climate change. These
reports will be subject to international consultations
under guidelines to be established by the UNFCCC. The
accord calls for initial submissions of intended steps
to mitigate climate change to be submitted to the
UNFCCC by January 31, 2010.
A commitment by developed countries to provide new and
additional resources approaching $30 billion for the
period 2010-2012 to assist developing countries in
mitigating and adapting to climate change.
A commitment by developed countries to a goal by 2020 of
mobilizing jointly $100 billion per year, from a
variety of public, private, bilateral, and multilateral
sources, to assist developing countries in mitigating
and adapting to climate change.
While the accord was supported by the vast majority of
countries, several developing countries, led by Sudan and
Venezuela, objected to the Conference endorsing the accord,
arguing that they had been excluded from the process of
negotiating the text and that the accord was therefore
illegitimate. As a result, formal conference action on the
accord was limited to a decision to ``take note'' of the
accord. In the absence of formal UNFCCC endorsement of the
accord, the Obama administration is encouraging individual
states to express their support for the accord through
individual national statements or communications.
Analysis of the Accord
The accord falls far short of the original objectives of
the UNFCCC negotiating process. It addresses the key issues in
the negotiating mandate--emissions reductions by developed and
developing countries, climate change assistance for developing
countries, and mechanisms for monitoring and verifying
commitments--but only in the most general terms. In particular:
The accord establishes a general goal of limiting the rise
in global temperature below 2 Celsius, but it does not
contain commitments regarding specific emissions
reductions to be made by individual states. (Specific
commitments are to be made by January 31, 2010.) The
accord does not address what steps should be taken in
the event that mitigation commitments made by
individual states prove insufficient to limit the
global temperature increase to 2 Celsius.
While the accord establishes goals for aggregate levels of
assistance to developing countries from developed
countries, it is silent on the amount of money to be
contributed by individual states toward the medium and
long-term funding commitments included in the accord.
It is also silent on the precise sources of such
funding and the conditions for distributing it.
While the accord establishes the important principle that
developing states will be responsible for reporting on
the climate mitigation actions they plan to take and
have taken, the details of the guidelines for these
reports and the process for international review of
them remain subject to further negotiation.
Thus, rather than resolving the key questions in the
negotiating mandate, the accord is largely limited to
establishing broad parameters for future decisions on these
issues.
The accord is also vague about the future process for
reaching such decisions. At its most specific, it calls for
states to make submissions relating to mitigation actions by
January 31, 2010. On other operational issues, including
financing assistance for developing countries, and the process
for reporting, monitoring, and verifying states' climate
commitments, the accord makes only general reference to future
discussions among, and decisions to be made by, the parties to
the UNFCCC. The accord is silent on whether further efforts
will be made to conclude a legally binding treaty on future
climate change actions, or whether future efforts will be
addressed through less formal means.
Implications for the United States
The accord contains a number of elements that advance
important U.S. negotiating objectives. It also creates
significant expectations about future U.S. actions with respect
to climate change at a time when important aspects of future
U.S. climate policy remain uncertain.
1. Elements of Flexibility for the United States
The accord preserves important flexibility for the United
States with respect to U.S. actions to address climate change.
While the accord provides for the United States to commit to
implement an economy-wide emissions target for 2020, it does
not prescribe what that target will be, nor the actions the
United States will take to meet it. Accordingly, the United
States retains discretion to decide both on its own target and
on the policies it will adopt in an effort to meet the target.
Similarly, while the accord identifies aggregate goals for
assistance from developed countries to developing countries, it
does not prescribe how much money each country will contribute
toward such goals, or the mechanisms for marshalling such
funds. As a result, the United States retains significant
discretion to decide how and to what extent it will provide
such assistance. Because the accord is not a legally binding
agreement, there are no formal legal consequences should the
United States fail to carry out even the general undertakings
applicable to it under the accord.
2. Commitments for Developing Countries
The accord also contains provisions aimed at expanding the
role of developing countries, including major emitters such as
China and India, in addressing climate change. Though such
countries would not have the same obligations as developed
states to commit to implementing economy-wide emissions
targets, they would be required to report regularly on the
actions they intend to take and have taken to address climate
change. The reports will be subject to international review, an
element China resisted during the negotiations. While the
nature and scope of this review remains to be decided, in
principle it should provide the United States the opportunity
both to better understand the actions being taken and to
identify areas where failure by developing countries to
implement their commitments may have an adverse effect on U.S.
interests or economic competitiveness.
3. Raised Expectations for Future U.S. Action
The accord also raises significant expectations for U.S.
action on climate change in areas that remain under intense
debate within the Congress. It is unclear whether future
Congressional action on climate change issues will satisfy
these expectations.
First, the accord calls for the United States to submit by
January 31, 2010 an economy-wide emissions target for 2020. The
Obama administration has indicated that it will pledge under
the accord that the United States will reduce its emissions by
17 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. The administration has
indicated that this position is based, in part, on its
assumptions about Congress's willingness to pass climate change
legislation mandating such reductions, and is informed by
relevant provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill that passed the
House in 2009 and the Boxer-Kerry bill that passed the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works in 2009.
Similarly, the accord establishes goals for financial
assistance to developing countries toward which the United
States will be expected to contribute. The size of these
goals--$30 billion for the period 2010-2012 and $100 billion
per year by 2020--suggests that the expected U.S. contributions
would far exceed current U.S. funding levels. The FY2010 budget
contains around $1.2 billion in climate change related
assistance. Based on past practice, the United States may be
expected to contribute as much as $3 billion per year between
2010 and 2012, and as much as $30 billion per year by 2020. In
supporting the aggregate funding goals contained in the accord,
the administration appears to be assuming both that Congress
will support increased U.S. Government foreign assistance for
climate change related goals, and that carbon markets created
by passage of a cap and trade bill will help marshal
significant private sector resources for such assistance.
The uncertainty about the prospects for Congressional
passage of climate change legislation creates similar
uncertainty about whether the United States will fulfill the
expectations the accord creates on these issues. Congress may
ultimately prove unwilling to endorse emissions targets as
ambitious as those the Obama administration will pledge, and
indeed may be unwilling to adopt any specific economy-wide
emissions reduction target for 2020 regardless of its level.
Similarly, Congress may be unwilling to support significantly
increased foreign assistance for climate change in the current
budget constrained environment, and may not opt for a cap and
trade system that would facilitate the creation of large
private carbon markets. While the accord's provisions may be
expected to inform Congressional debate on climate change
policy, they will not be the only factors members will consider
in developing climate change legislation, and other factors
could lead to Congress to pursue different policies than those
envisioned by the accord.
In the event that Congress does not pass legislation
consistent with the expectations for U.S. actions created by
the accord and the Obama administration's statements, the
United States may have a more difficult time urging other
countries, in particular China and India, to follow through on
their commitments, and overall global efforts to address
climate change may be less effective. The United States would
also risk diplomatic criticism from European countries and
those particularly vulnerable to climate change who are leading
advocates for more robust actions.
Further Observations on the Negotiation Process
In addition to these issues specific to the outcome at
Copenhagen, several other developments at the Conference may be
of interest to the Foreign Relations Committee and to the
Senate more generally:
China's increased assertiveness: China played a more
assertive and visible role at the Copenhagen conference
than it traditionally does in similar multilateral
fora. China aggressively defended its position that
steps to address climate change should not come at the
expense of its development objectives for its economy.
It also made a number of statements aligning itself
with G-77 critiques of the negotiating process. This
could reflect an increased willingness on China's part
to play an active leadership role in international
institutions generally, or could simply suggest that
the Chinese attached particular significance to the
shape of a future climate change regime.
Leading role played by emerging economies: The final deal
at Copenhagen was agreed among the United States,
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. The engagement
of these major emerging economies, and their
willingness to negotiate based on their own interests,
rather than on behalf of the developing world as a
whole, was critical to the ability to reach a final
deal. The significant role played by these countries,
and the less central role played by the European Union,
also may suggest and broader shift in power and
influence in the international system. Such a shift is
consistent with the emergence of the G-20, which
encompasses emerging economies, and the corresponding
displacement of the narrower G-8 as a forum for
coordinating action on major economic issues.
Positive reactions to U.S. engagement: The United States
was largely seen as playing a constructive role at the
conference, both in making concrete commitments for
U.S. actions on climate change, and in trying to broker
differences among countries to produce an agreement.
The United States shouldered little if any of the blame
for the conference's failure to produce more
substantial results. This contrasts with the frequent
perception in the post-Kyoto era of the United States
as a principal obstacle on climate change, and thus
Copenhagen may be seen as a diplomatic victory for the
United States. Some of these benefits could prove short
lived if future U.S. action on climate change does not
fulfill expectations raised by the U.S. positions
announced in connection with Copenhagen.
Questions about the future of the UNFCCC process: The
inability of the UNFCCC process to deliver more
substantial success toward meeting its negotiating
mandate raises questions as to its future viability as
the principal forum for international climate efforts.
Given the difficulty of reaching agreement among 192
countries in an increasingly polarized UNFCCC forum,
countries may look to other options for coordinating
international efforts on climate change. These could
include less formal climate specific institutions like
the Major Economies Forum, or broader existing
institutions like the G-20.
Developing world disaffection: The G-77's positions placed
great emphasis on procedural issues and on the need for
all states to participate at every stage of the
negotiation in order for it to be legitimate. The
resonance of these issues among developing countries
suggests a broader dissatisfaction with their role in
international institutions more generally. If these
arguments continue to characterize G-77 positions in
multilateral bodies, they could make it more difficult
for such bodies to work effectively and reach practical
decisions.