[Senate Prints 111-37]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress S. Prt.
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 111-37
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STRIKING THE BALANCE:
U.S. POLICY AND STABILITY IN GEORGIA
__________
A R E P O R T
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
First Session
DECEMBER 22, 2009
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
53-985 WASHINGTON : 2009
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Introduction..................................................... 1
Background....................................................... 2
Analysis......................................................... 4
Security Assistance.......................................... 4
Breakaway Regions............................................ 6
Early Warning and Maritime Security.......................... 8
Recommendations.................................................. 8
Conclusion....................................................... 9
Appendixes
Appendix I.--Meetings With Individuals in Georgia and Washington,
DC............................................................. 11
Appendix II.--U.S. Assistance to Georgia, 1992-2009.............. 12
Appendix III.--U.S. Security Assistance and Training in Georgia.. 14
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, December 22, 2009.
Dear colleague: From October 26 to November 1, 2009, I
directed my Senate Foreign Relations Committee professional
staff member for European Affairs, Marik String, to travel to
Georgia to evaluate U.S. security assistance and policies to
promote regional stability. During the trip, staff met with
U.S. embassy and senior Georgian national security officials,
as well as with monitors from the European Union and other
international donors.
In the aftermath of the August 2008 conflict between
Georgia and Russia, the United States pledged $1 billion in
assistance to Georgia to alleviate the humanitarian suffering
of the Georgian people and assist in rebuilding the Georgian
economy. As this infusion of post-conflict assistance is
concluded, the United States must develop a long-term policy
for moving Georgia towards Euro-Atlantic institutions, while
averting a renewal of armed conflict. Even as the Obama
administration pursues a more productive relationship with
Russia on arms control, nuclear security, Iran, Afghanistan,
and other issues, we must raise the profile of diplomatic
efforts to mitigate deep tensions that remain between Georgia
and Russia.
Russia's 2008 foray into Georgia seriously damaged
Georgia's military capacity, and Russian threats to sanction
entities engaging in arms deals with Georgia have left it
unable to procure many defense articles, even as some NATO
allies explore unprecedented military sales to Russia. The
United States, too, has not provided lethal defense articles to
Georgia since the 2008 war but has focused instead on the
intellectual aspects of defense reform such as doctrine and
training. As Georgia continues reforms in the direction of
Euro-Atlantic institutions, the United States and NATO allies
must reconcile a policy that leaves a dedicated NATO partner
unable to provide for its basic defense requirements. These
efforts will be most effective if they are undertaken on a
multilateral basis. The Alliance must come to grips with the
reality that Georgia will require coordinated security support
from America and European nations for some years to come.
This staff report examines how the United States can enlist
greater diplomatic support among NATO partners for a
coordinated strategy on Georgia, which includes regional arms
sales, non-use of force agreements, and confidence building
measures in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It also explores how
addressing these interrelated sources of insecurity on a
multilateral basis could benefit the Russian Federation.
Given the role of Congress in reviewing assistance
proposals for Georgia, I am hopeful that this report can
provide useful background and advance policy avenues in support
of stability and political progress in Georgia and the entire
region.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
STRIKING THE BALANCE:
U.S. POLICY AND STABILITY IN GEORGIA
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From October 26 to November 1, 2009, minority professional
staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee travelled to
Georgia to assess the security situation and U.S. foreign
assistance provided since the August 2008 conflict with Russia.
Staff met with U.S. embassy officials as well as senior defense
and national security officials from the Georgian Government,
opposition leaders, international donors, members of the NGO
community, think-tank representatives, and international
monitoring officials. At the direction of Senator Richard
Lugar, the purpose of the visit was to:
Assess the $1 billion assistance package pledged to Georgia
following the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict;
Investigate the mix of security assistance provided to
Georgia prior and subsequent to the 2008 conflict;
Examine the security situation with regard to the breakaway
enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and
Generate policy recommendations for advancing stability in
Georgia and the region.
Introduction
Despite extraordinary economic commitments by the United
States and international community, comprising over $4.5
billion since the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict,
Georgians convey an acute sense of insecurity. No international
observers or non-governmental organizations have been granted
access to South Ossetia, only a 45 minute drive from Tbilisi.
Russian troops, instead of withdrawing to pre-war positions and
reducing troop strength to pre-war levels as the French-
brokered 2008 ceasefire requires, are constructing permanent
bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
As a result of Russian diplomatic pressure and threats to
restrict commercial ties with entities selling defense articles
to Georgia,\1\ the Georgian military has been unable to
replenish much of its military capacity that was eviscerated in
the war. While U.S. instruction in military doctrine and advice
on institutional reform continues apace, even the United
States, under substantial Russian diplomatic pressure, has
paused the transfer of lethal military articles to Georgia, and
no U.S. assistance since the war has been directly provided to
the Georgian Ministry of Defense. Consequently, Georgia lacks
basic capacity for territorial defense, and stability along the
administrative line with South Ossetia has been achieved
largely through a delicate political balance facilitated by
unarmed monitors from the European Union Monitoring Mission
(EUMM).
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\1\ In January 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev asked his
government to ``restrict or cut military-technical and military-
economic cooperation'' with entities providing weapons to Georgia.
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The current state of affairs in Georgia has left the United
States and allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in a tenuous situation. The Obama Administration,\2\ the
United States Congress,\3\ and NATO Heads of State\4\ have
expressed support for Georgia's integration within NATO.
Nonetheless, Georgia has lacked the influence to acquire many
capabilities that form the basis of territorial defense
planning. Meanwhile, certain NATO allies are exploring
unprecedented military agreements with the Russian
Federation.\5\
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\2\ See testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs Philip H. Gordon, ``Georgia: One Year After the August
War,'' hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 4,
2009.
\3\ See NATO Freedom and Consolidation Act of 2007, which became
law (P.L. 110-17) on April 9, 2007.
\4\ See Declaration of Heads of State and Government, Summit of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bucharest, Romania, April 3, 2008.
\5\ For example, France has approved the sale of a Mistral-class
amphibious assault ship to Russia, reportedly one of the largest
military sales ever from a NATO country to Russia. Mistral-class ships
can carry landing barges, tanks, and helicopters, providing littoral
combat capability. Russian Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy has boasted that
in the 2008 conflict with Georgia, ``a ship like that would have
allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its mission in 40 minutes,
not 26 hours, which is how long it took us.''
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Failing a coordinated, NATO-led strategy for security
assistance in the region, allies run the risk of disturbing an
already fragile political balance and engendering an excessive
nationalization of Georgian defense policy. In the longer-term,
a continuation of the status quo appears to ensure that Georgia
will not only have difficulty providing for its own territorial
defense needs but remain susceptible to the internal strife and
external manipulation that often accompany such national
insecurity.
This report assesses the role the United States has played
in stabilizing the situation in Georgia since the 2008 conflict
and offers policy recommendations on how the United States and
international community can avert renewed violence in the
region.
Background
Spanning the political fault lines of Europe and Asia,
Georgia and the nations of the Caucasus have prospered and
suffered for centuries as a result of imperial rivalry. The
United States has developed a close partnership with Georgia
since its independence in 1991 and has provided $1.67 billion
in foreign assistance dollars from 1992 to 2009, the largest
amount to any country in the South Caucasus (see Appendix II).
After President Mikheil Saakashvili and a cadre of Western-
oriented officials came to power in 2004, Georgia has sought to
burnish its position not simply as a strategic ally but as a
reform-minded, democratic one.
Within the former Soviet Union, nearly all armed conflict
that has occurred since 1991 has been in the Caucasus. Georgia,
in particular, has struggled with separatist movements and
irredentist claims of outside powers. Following conflict with
separatist regions in the early 1990s, tensions escalated again
during the tenure of President Saakashvili, whose overtures for
new negotiation frameworks were rebuffed by de facto separatist
authorities. War was again sparked in August 2008 between
Georgia and Russia, constituting the first extra-territorial
use of force by Russia since the demise of the Soviet Union.
On August 26, 2008, Russia formally recognized the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, breaching core
principles of the Helsinki Final Act; \6\ only Nauru,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela have followed suit. Notably, Russian
attempts to secure broader recognition at meetings of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (comprised of Russia, China
and Central Asian nations) and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization have been unsuccessful.
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\6\ Helsinki Final Act, Questions Relating to the Security of
Europe, 1(a)III states that parties ``shall regard as inviolable all
one another's frontiers . . . and therefore they will refrain now and
in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will
also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of
part or all of the territory of any participating State.'' Questions
Relating to the Security of Europe, 1(a)IV states that ``participating
States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the
object of military occupation . . . or the object of acquisition by
means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or
acquisition will be recognized as legal.''
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The conflict left Russian relations with the West at a
post-Cold War nadir. Ambassadorial and ministerial contacts at
the NATO-Russia Council were suspended for the remainder of
2008; then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also asserted
that Russia was ``more and more becoming the outlaw in this
conflict.'' In September 2008, the Bush administration withdrew
from Congressional consideration the U.S.-Russia Agreement for
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.
In response to hostilities that decimated the Georgian
economy and military,\7\ the United States pledged $1 billion
in aid over a two-year period. The assistance package has
addressed the acute humanitarian needs of internally-displaced
persons; sorely-needed projects focusing on economic growth;
and the building and reform of public institutions. The
Congressional Notification for the last tranche of $242 million
was transmitted on December 7, 2009. In order to mollify
Russian concerns and target pressing humanitarian needs, no
lethal defense items have been provided to Georgia since the
2008 conflict.
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\7\ According to the World Bank's Joint Needs Assessment, the
conflict caused $394.5 million in damage in Georgia and reduced its
economic growth for 2008 from 9 percent to 3.5 percent.
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Several months after the war, Georgia was buffeted by
another political force: the Obama administration's
announcement of a ``reset'' in U.S. relations with the Russian
Federation. Given the deteriorated state of Russian-Georgian
relations that has taken on extremely personal dimensions, this
change in U.S. policy has had the potential to drastically
affect the direction of U.S. policy towards Georgia.
In outlining the mutual U.S.-Russian interests that will be
pursued as part of its new policy towards Russia, senior
administration officials have mentioned the fight against the
Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and the opening of an
alternate supply distribution network through Russia; nuclear
security and non-proliferation; and Iran. While administration
officials have repeated that U.S.-Georgian relations will not
suffer as a result of a ``reset'' in policy, statements reflect
the sentiment that the administration expects disagreements
over the situation in Georgia to persist.\8\
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\8\ Vice President Joseph Biden noted at the Munich Security
Conference in February 2009 that ``We will not agree with Russia on
everything. For example, the United States will not recognize Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as independent states. But the United States and
Russia can disagree and still work together where our interests
coincide.''
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After meetings in Moscow in October, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton asserted that the United States ``will help the
Georgian people to feel like they can protect themselves.'' The
focus of U.S. assistance has been on intellectual issues like
doctrine and personnel management, as well as ongoing training
of Georgian troops to deploy in Afghanistan. The situation in
Georgia is being addressed in Geneva through Status Conference
Meetings with delegations from Georgia, Russia, the United
States and representatives from de facto Abkhaz and South
Ossetian authorities.
Analysis
Georgian national security officials remain deeply wary of
the Obama administration's recalibration of U.S.-Russian
relations and still view Russian troops as an existential
threat to the Georgian state. As one senior Georgian defense
official noted, ``we hear the same words [from the Obama and
George W. Bush administrations], but how deep in practical
terms the U.S.-Georgian relationship will be is still vague.''
Other Georgian officials expressed the view that the current
administration appears unsure as to what shape U.S. policy in
Georgia will take. When pressed on this point, however,
Georgian officials conceded that they have seen only modest
tangible changes in the United States commitment to Georgia.
Security Assistance
One such tangible change has been in the realm of security
assistance. Staff met with U.S. and Georgian security
assistance officials in Washington, D.C. and Tbilisi to assess
past and current U.S. security assistance programs in Georgia.
As detailed below (see Appendix III), U.S. train-and-equip
programs have undergone several iterations in Georgia, but
since the 2008 conflict, senior Department of Defense and
security assistance officials have reported that no lethal
assistance has been provided through Section 1206, Foreign
Military Financing, or Foreign Military Sales.\9\
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\9\ According to staff interviews and testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. See testimony of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow,
``Georgia: One Year After the August War,'' hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, August 4, 2009.
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The United States has developed close military-to-military
cooperation with Georgia since its independence in 1991.\10\
U.S.-Georgian security cooperation has been an especially sore
point in Russia's relationship with Georgia, even though
enhanced cooperation began during the term of former Georgian
President (and former Soviet Foreign Minister) Eduard
Shevardnadze and was initially focused on addressing threats of
terrorism raised by Russia.
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\10\ The United States has not been the only NATO country to
develop enhanced security cooperation with Georgia. For example, France
has funded a military training center in the mountainous area of
northern Georgia, which France reportedly pressured Russian forces not
to destroy during the 2008 conflict.
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After the 2008 conflict, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin asserted that the United States had been ``arming
Georgians to the teeth.'' More recently, Russian officials have
alleged that renewed military assistance has been ``under the
guise of humanitarian aid'' \11\ and that Georgia's ``military
potential is much higher today than last August.'' \12\ While
some senior Russian Government sources assert that the United
States is in the midst of replenishing Georgia's military
potential, other officials single out only third countries.
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\11\ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin.
\12\ Russian Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces,
General Nikolai Makarov.
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Given this fusillade of accusations, the United States must
move forward in a highly transparent manner, in coordination
with our European and NATO allies, in order to dispel
misinformation and to lessen any risk of miscalculation. If the
United States does alter the mix of assistance being provided
to Georgia, a multilateral and transparent strategy will assure
others that regional stability is the ultimate concern.
U.S. defense officials were quick to point out how U.S.
security assistance programs had been crafted to avoid
augmenting Georgia's force-on-force or territorial defense
capacity due to Russian concerns. Although equipment and
training provided nominally for one mission cannot be
completely walled off from potential utility in other types of
missions, the bulk of U.S. security assistance has been focused
on efforts to train agile, counter-terror personnel to deploy
away from Georgian soil. These programs have been focused on
preparing Georgian troops to deploy in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and NATO's International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.\13\
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\13\ Georgia has been one of the highest per capita contributors of
troops to coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, having deployed
over 7,500 troops to OIF and 800 troops to ISAF.
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Enhanced cooperation began in 2002 with the initiation of
the Georgian Train-and-Equip Program (GTEP) to enhance Georgian
counter-terrorism capacity to address the threat posed by
Chechen rebels, who had taken refuge in Georgia's Pankisi
Gorge. Prior to GTEP, the Russian military had reportedly
pressured Georgia to allow Russian troops to pursue these
rebels into Georgia. GTEP foreclosed this possibility, allowing
Georgia to subdue the rebels with its own military capacity.
This program consisted of an 18-month, $64 million investment
to train around 2,000 light infantry soldiers and a small
number of police and border guards and equip them with small
arms and communications gear.
GTEP was used as a basis for the Georgian Sustainment and
Stability Operations Program (GSSOP), which provided another
$159 million from 2005-2008 to continue to train three brigades
of 2,000 soldiers to deploy to OIF in support of coalition
activities. Apart from training, items provided included anti-
IED devices, radios, and other equipment. Troops deployed
gained skills in counter-insurgency, traffic and entry-point
control and base camp security. According to Department of
Defense officials, regular briefings on GTEP and GSSOP were
offered to the Russian military.
In total, four brigades were trained under GTEP and GSSOP.
At the time hostilities broke out between Georgia and Russian
forces in South Ossetia on August 7, 2008, one brigade was in
Iraq, two were in Georgia, and a fourth Georgian brigade was
being trained for deployment to Iraq by approximately 80 U.S.
servicemen. Pursuant to a prior agreement for the United States
to provide transport for Georgian troops to and from Iraq, the
United States airlifted the 1,800 Georgian soldiers back from
Iraq on August 10 and 11. Thus, during the peak of hostilities
with Russia, Georgia's most capable forces, constituting over
one-fifth of Georgia's active armed forces, were not present in
Georgia.
GSSOP was augmented by $6.5 million in Section 1206 funds
for FY 2007 to conduct ``combined military operations with the
U.S. Armed Forces.'' \14\ Funds provided for Harris Falcon II
radios and spare parts, Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement
Systems (MILES) for tactical engagement simulation, and
training by U.S. contractors. These programs supported the
deployment of 850 soldiers to support OIF. In FY 2008, an
additional $11.5 million in Section 1206 funding was authorized
to train and equip Georgian special forces. HF/VHF
communications equipment, ground sensor systems, Humvees, and
training teams were provided with these funds.
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\14\ Inspectors General, U.S. Department of Defense and U.S.
Department of State, ``Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206
Global Train and Equip Program,'' August 31, 2009.
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Since the 2008 conflict, the profile of U.S. assistance has
changed dramatically. Of the $1 billion package, no funding has
been provided to the Ministry of Defense. No lethal defense
equipment has been provided, either through Section 1206,
Foreign Military Sales, or Foreign Military Financing. U.S.
defense officials noted that training of Georgian special
forces has also ceased. While Georgian defense officials have
requested information on the availability and prices for anti-
tank and air defense articles, they have been told that those
sales will not go forward at this time. In fact, Georgian
officials argue that they are under a de facto arms embargo and
are having great difficulty procuring any lethal defense items,
which they attribute to Russia's threat of sanctions against
any entities participating in such sales. Assistant Secretary
of Defense Alexander Vershbow has explained this policy as a
``phased approach'' that is meant to ensure that assistance is
not ``counterproductive to our goals of promoting peace and
stability in the region.'' \15\
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\15\ Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow, ``Georgia: One Year After the
August War,'' hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August
4, 2009.
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On August 31, 2009, United States forces began training 730
Georgian soldiers for deployment to NATO's ISAF mission in
Afghanistan using $24 million in Coalition Readiness Support
Program (CRSP) funds. The first deployment departed on November
16, 2009. According to senior U.S. defense officials, any
equipment used for training must be taken out of Georgia after
training is completed, and a Section 1206 proposal has been
submitted so that non-lethal training equipment can remain in
country.
Breakaway Regions
While Abkhazia has enjoyed relative autonomy and greater
economic prospects due to its Black Sea coastline, South
Ossetia has had close ethnic and political links to the Russian
district of North Ossetia with fewer opportunities for economic
development. Georgian troops fought to suppress movements for
greater autonomy in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1990-1992 and
1992-1993, respectively, after which cease-fires were
concluded. In Abkhazia, the United Nations Observer Mission in
Georgia (UNOMIG) was given a mandate to observe cease-fire
implementation, as well as the peacekeeping force comprised of
soldiers from the Commonwealth of Independent States. In South
Ossetia, the OSCE Mission in Georgia was provided a mandate for
monitoring joint peacekeeping forces. Due to Russian
opposition, both missions were ended following the 2008
conflict.
On August 26, 2008, Russia formally recognized the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and international
telephone access codes have reportedly been changed from
Georgian to Russian. Only Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have
followed suit in recognizing the independence of the enclaves.
While several humanitarian organizations and NGOs have
received access to Abkhazia, staff was informed that none have
been active in South Ossetia at the time of the visit. South
Ossetia's de facto authorities demand that any aid groups enter
the enclave from the north through Russia, but doing so would
jeopardize the organization's relationship with Tbilisi.
International donors, NGO representatives, and U.S. assistance
officials noted that Tbilisi is still struggling to formulate
policies towards the breakaway enclaves with regard to access
of multinational and humanitarian organizations. The United
States and international donors should continue to dedicate
expertise to assist Georgian authorities in the development of
a policy reintegration, while continuing to emphasize that any
attempt to solve the situation militarily would be disastrous.
The European Union Monitoring Mission for Georgia, present
in Georgia since October 1, 2008, has approximately 225 unarmed
monitors in country, which is slightly fewer than the number of
military and police monitors present under UNOMIG and the OSCE
prior to the 2008 conflict. The EUMM was created through a
memorandum of understanding with the Georgian Government.
While the EUMM's mandate is to monitor the ``withdrawal of
Russian and Georgian armed forces to the positions held prior
to the outbreak of hostilities,'' EUMM, in practice, monitors
solely the Tbilisi-side of the administrative boundary line
with South Ossetia and has no access, apart from satellite
imagery, to the Russian-controlled enclave. Although Russia has
no formal agreement with EUMM, monitoring officials noted that
EUMM's presence has been welcomed by Russia as EUMM conducts
inspections of Georgian police and military installations; EUMM
has been effective in dispelling Russian assertions of Georgian
troop build-ups near the administrative boundary line.
Before the war, approximately 2,000 Russian
``peacekeeping'' troops were stationed in Abkhazia and 1,000 in
South Ossetia. Although the French-brokered peace plan requires
Russian troop strength to return to pre-war levels, monitoring
officials note that Russia maintains troops well above those
levels. Despite its role in conferring Russian citizenship to
ethnic Ossetians in Georgia by distributing passports before
the war and its heavily armed forces serving without UN or
multilateral mandates, Russia continues to insist that its role
in South Ossetia is one of dispassionate peacekeeper,
tantamount to the EUMM. Russia has relied in part on the
argument that Russian agreements for Friendship, Cooperation,
and Mutual Assistance with Abkhazia and South Ossetia trump
other international obligations and allow de facto authorities
to request the number of Russian troops they see fit. Hence,
there is no international group present in South Ossetia at
this time apart from the Russian Federation.
EUMM not only lacks physical access to South Ossetia but
has no direct line of communication with de facto authorities;
its only hotline is directly to Moscow. In October 2009, over a
dozen wood collectors were arrested by de facto authorities for
straying across the administrative boundary from the Tbilisi-
administered side. This and similar incidents have been
attributed to unclear boundary markings and disparate maps. In
this case, the hotline was used, and escalation was avoided,
but EUMM officials noted that they do not have high confidence
that more time-sensitive crises can be handled efficiently
without direct lines of communication to de facto authorities.
Early Warning and Maritime Security
Senior Georgian national security officials reported that
the Russian military destroyed all military and civilian radars
in the 2008 conflict. While some radars have been replaced,
these are allegedly designed for civilian use and ill-suited
for early warning. Hence, Georgia reportedly still cannot
monitor all of its airspace, and even the airspace that is
covered by radar lacks early warning capabilities.
Through the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement
(GBLSE) and Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS)
programs, the United States has provided direct assistance to
the Georgian Coast Guard for capacity building (the Coast Guard
and Navy have been merged into one service since the 2008 war),
focusing on radars and other infrastructure. Funds totaling
$850,000 have been dedicated to repairing the fleet, dredging
the Poti Coast Guard base, and overhauling two U.S. donated
patrol boats. GBSLE has also built maritime radar stations in
five locations to detect and interdict illicit traffic and
materials, provide search and rescue capacity, and monitor
maritime activities. The stations allow monitoring of the full
coast from Turkey to Russia.
Recommendations
It has been one year since the first tranche of the $1
billion pledge arrived in Georgia to alleviate the most
pressing humanitarian needs of the Georgian population. As the
situation in Georgia transitions from post-conflict, the United
States Government must grapple with the challenge of charting a
long-term policy. This policy must be closely informed by the
territorial and defense challenges that Georgia is facing
today.
The United States Government should:
Work with NATO allies in crafting a comprehensive,
transparent approach to security assistance and
military sales in the region. While Georgia has
encountered great difficulty in procuring equipment
from NATO countries to provide for its basic
territorial defense needs, some allies have pursued
significant military deals with Russia that could upset
the military balance. A transparent and multilateral
approach to security assistance would aid in dispelling
conspiracies in Russian media and preclude an excessive
nationalization of Georgian defense policy.
Place the internationalization of the situation in South
Ossetia high on its agenda with the Russian Federation
and within the United Nations (UN) and the OSCE, two
venues where Russia has wielded its veto to prevent an
international presence in Georgia. Currently, neither
humanitarian aid organizations nor EUMM monitors have
physical access to South Ossetia. Greater transparency
must be brought to both the activities of the Russian
Federation in South Ossetia and the plight of South
Ossetian citizens affected by the 2008 conflict.
Encourage the opening of direct lines of communication
between EUMM authorities and de facto authorities
within South Ossetia. Russia has insisted that all such
communications are channeled through Moscow. Following
a number of border incidents in recent months, such a
step would build confidence, while reducing the risk of
miscalculation in an administrative boundary area where
tensions remain high.
Work towards facilitating a non-aggression pact between
Georgia and Russia. The French-brokered peace plan
contains a clause on the non-use of force, but Russia
has insisted that this clause was binding only between
Georgia and the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and that Russia, like France, was a mere
mediator to the conflict.
Continue to explore avenues for confidence-building
measures between the parties to the conflict, including
in the energy and water sectors, where mutual reliance
on both sides of the administrative boundaries could be
furthered, as well as youth and business exchange
programs.
Assist the Georgian Government in setting forth a
reintegration strategy for the breakaway enclaves,
including issues of access to multinational
corporations, humanitarian aid organizations, etc. Such
efforts should include finding workable definitions of
humanitarian assistance so that ostensible humanitarian
aid is not used in other sectors like institution
building. U.S. and international officials must
continue to emphasize that attempts to solve the
situation militarily would be disastrous.
Conclusion
Even as the Obama administration seeks to develop more
productive ties with the Russian Federation on other national
security challenges, tensions in Georgia remain high, and
mutual suspicion risks tipping the balance towards renewed
conflict. The United States must garner greater support among
NATO and EU partners for crafting a long-term strategy towards
the region that aims to reassure all parties to the conflict.
Particularly in the realm of security assistance, such
coordination is critical. While Georgia finds itself under a de
facto arms embargo, other NATO allies are pursuing record
military deals with the Russian Federation. Georgia has become
an exceptional contributor to international security through
its contributions to missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A
strategy to enable Georgia to similarly provide for its own
territorial defense will require close cooperation with NATO
allies to preserve stability in the region.
An internationalization of monitoring and humanitarian
activities in these enclaves would bring transparency to a
situation where miscommunication and extremist appeals threaten
to reignite armed conflict. Given that Russian arguments
concerning its role in Georgia have relied heavily on
international law, the United States and our partners must also
not be reluctant to continue to highlight Russia's own failures
to meet its international legal obligations.
Addressing these interrelated sources of insecurity on a
multilateral basis would also benefit Russia by reducing the
risk of miscalculation, preventing Georgia from excessively
nationalizing its defense policy, and reconditioning Russia's
international image. Even the development of niche military
capacity in countries like Georgia can promote shared interests
with the Russian Federation in combating terrorism that has
spilled from the North Caucasus, promoting stability in United
Nations-mandated missions, and interdicting hazardous weapons
and material.
The United States must continue to emphasize that economic
and political development in the former Soviet sphere is not a
zero-sum endeavor and that the development of confident,
prosperous nations on Russia's periphery can create more
effective partners for Russia as well as the West. A
coordinated strategy with European allies will assist in
maintaining a peaceful balance and forging more productive
relationships throughout the South Caucasus.
A P P E N D I X E S
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Appendix I.--Meetings With Individuals in Georgia
and Washington, DC
U.S. Officials
Ambassador John Bass, United States Ambassador to Georgia
Jock Conly, Mission Director, United States Agency for
International Development
Other Country Team members
Ambassador John Tefft, former United States Ambassador to
Georgia
Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, Department of State
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense
Millennium Challenge Corporation
Office of the Coordinator of Assistance to Europe and Eurasia
Georgian Officials
Ekaterine Zguladze, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs
Irakli Porchkhidze, Deputy Secretary, National Security
Council
Vasil Sikharulidze, Foreign Policy Advisor to the President,
former Minister of Defense
Nikoloz Vashakidze, Deputy Defense Minister
Dimitri Gvindadze, Deputy Minister of Finance
Other Individuals
Ambassador David Smith, Director, Georgian Security Analysis
Center
Irakli Alasania, Chairman, Our Georgia-Free Democrats Party
Representatives from local and international NGOs
Representatives from the European Union Monitoring Mission
Representatives from the European Commission
Representatives from the International Monetary Fund
Representatives from the World Bank
Representatives from the United Nations Development Programme
Representatives from the International Organization for
Migration
Appendix II.--U.S. Assistance to Georgia, 1992-2000 (Part I)
($ millions, by fiscal year)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
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GEORGIA
Economic Growth.................. 0.94 1.79 11.94 7.81 10.14 10.12 33.85 32.61 35.26
Governing Justly & Democratically 0.21 2.04 4.11 3.08 4.28 5.37 16.66 15.68 20.50
Humanitarian Assistance.......... 0.53 22.95 32.60 34.98 6.35 8.52 24.23 14.47 21.04
Investing in People.............. 0.15 0.44 0.95 0.80 0.60 1.00 3.75 5.30 4.04
Peace & Security................. 0.00 2.80 0.00 0.10 0.60 0.79 19.47 21.39 28.30
GEORGIA TOTAL.................. 1.83 30.02 49.60 46.77 21.97 25.79 97.95 89.45 109.13
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*Does not include $315 million supplemental Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriation for Georgia under the Disaster Relief and Recovery Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2008 (Division B, P.L. 110-329)
**Does not include $242 million supplemental AEECA appropriation for Georgia under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32)
Appendix II.--U.S. Assistance to Georgia, 2001-2009 & FY 92-09 (Part II)
($ millions, by fiscal year)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 FY 92-09
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GEORGIA
Economic Growth............ 41.17 33.45 32.09 26.84 35.26 27.54 23.39 18.54 20.69 403.41
Governing Justly & 12.89 21.75 19.79 12.57 13.79 13.92 12.59 13.73 15.40 208.36
Democratically............
Humanitarian Assistance.... 12.30 14.18 11.05 2.00 1.90 2.12 1.84 1.84 2.46 215.37
Investing in People........ 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.88 11.90 7.98 7.16 8.24 7.88 71.05
Peace & Security........... 29.00 21.93 24.24 20.15 23.38 15.94 13.25 7.71 5.56 234.60
GEORGIA TOTAL............ 95.36 91.31 87.17 72.43 86.23 67.49 58.23 50.06* 52.00** 1,132.79
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Does not include $315 million supplemental Economic Support Fund (ESF) appropriation for Georgia under the Disaster Relief and Recovery Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2008 (Division B, P.L. 110-329)
**Does not include $242 million supplemental AEECA appropriation for Georgia under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32)
Appendix III.--U.S. Security Assistance and Training in Georgia
($ millions)
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Georgia International
Foreign Georgia Train Sustainment and Coalition Foreign Military
Military Section 1206 and Equip Stability Readiness Military Sales Education and Total
Financing (FMF) (GTEP) Operations Support Program Deliveries Training
Program (GSSOP) (CRSP) Program (IMET)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2002................................................. 55.5 -- 64.5 -- -- 3.6 .889 124.5
FY 2003................................................. 6.9 -- -- -- -- 9.8 1.18 17.88
FY 2004................................................. 12 -- -- -- -- 7.3 1 20.3
FY 2005................................................. 11.9 -- -- -- -- 11.5 1.4 24.8
FY 2006................................................. 11.8 -- -- 60 -- 10.5 1.26 83.56
FY 2007................................................. 9.7 6.5 -- 28 -- 25 1.15 70.35
FY 2008................................................. 9 11.5 -- 71 -- 72.3 .799 164.6
FY 2009................................................. 11 -- -- -- -- -- 1.15 12.15
Total FY 2002-2009.................................... 127.8 18 64.5 159 -- 140 8.9 518
FY 2010 (request)..................................... 16 -- -- -- 24 -- 2 43
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Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense