[Senate Prints 111-27]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


111th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
                            COMMITTEE PRINT                     
 1st Session                                                     111-27
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


 
                        MILESTONE OR MILLSTONE:
                       SETTING THE BAR TO PROMOTE
                     DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE

                               __________

                                A REPORT

                                 TO THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                             First Session

                            August 13, 2009

                                     


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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman        
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California            JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
                  David McKean, Staff Director        
        Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director        

                              (ii)        
?



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................     v

Background.......................................................     1


Legislative History..............................................     3


Transition to What?..............................................     4

      Financial Sector...........................................     5

      Rule of Law................................................     5

      Humanitarian Crisis........................................     6

      Capacity...................................................     7


Analysis and Recommendations for U.S. Policy.....................     7

      Objectives.................................................     7

      Means of Assistance........................................     9


Conclusions......................................................    11




Appendix I--Correspondence Between Senator John F. Kerry and the 
  Department of State............................................    13

                                 (iii)

                                     

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                              United States Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                   Washington, DC, August 13, 2009.
    Dear colleague: From April 5 to April 11, 2009, I directed 
my senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff 
member for Africa, Shannon Smith, to visit Zimbabwe to assess 
progress made by the transitional government in order to 
develop policy recommendations for the Committee.
    On February 11, 2009, opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai 
was sworn in as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe as part of a 
coalition government in which Robert Mugabe remained president 
and head of state. In the months since then, Prime Minister 
Tsvangirai, Finance Minister Tendai Biti, and other members of 
the Movement for Democratic Change have made measurable 
progress in some areas, particularly in corralling runaway 
hyper-inflation, establishing some government services, and 
imposing certain checks on the corruption that has so long 
characterized the Mugabe regime. Much remains to be done, but 
this outpost of tyranny has at least been breached.
    For U.S. policymakers, the fundamental questions revolve 
around how best to help the people of Zimbabwe achieve 
peaceful, democratic change; regain economic stability and 
agricultural productivity; address the ongoing health crisis; 
and restore the rule of law. Current policy is shaped both by 
law, the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 
and other measures, and by approach. The crux of the issue for 
many is how to promote the changes that we seek without aiding 
and abetting the architects of Zimbabwe's destruction.
    Dr. Smith's report explores these questions by examining 
the transitional government's progress and shortcomings and by 
offering recommendations on possible steps forward. I hope you 
find the report helpful as the U.S. Congress considers how to 
advance U.S. interests and those of the people of Zimbabwe.
            Sincerely,
                                             John F. Kerry,
                                                          Chairman.


                        MILESTONE OR MILLSTONE:
                       SETTING THE BAR TO PROMOTE
                     DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE

                              ----------                              


                               Background

    In 1980, when Robert Mugabe came to power in Zimbabwe, many 
hailed him as a liberator. In the decades since, he has helped 
transform his country into an economic basket case, public 
health disaster, and political dictatorship. Violence, 
political oppression, and corruption have increased over the 
years as tools to maintain power for Mugabe and the Zimbabwean 
African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Currency 
denominated in the trillions and still virtually worthless; an 
exodus of teachers, healthcare workers, and other 
professionals; and a raging cholera epidemic all symbolized an 
economy and social system in a state of collapse by 2008.
    In March of last year, Zimbabweans dared to vote for 
change, clearly catching the regime off guard with both their 
courage and their level of discontent. In addition to 
opposition victories at the parliamentary level, after much 
delay, official results for the presidential elections awarded 
Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), 47.9 percent of the vote and Mugabe 43.2 percent, thus 
requiring a runoff. Careful not to allow a repeat performance 
of this exercise in democracy, Mugabe, his allies in the 
security sector, and other ZANU-PF leaders launched a campaign 
of violence and intimidation against opposition leaders, 
potential MDC supporters, journalists, human rights advocates, 
and others, especially in rural areas. Tsvangirai, as a result 
of massive violence against his supporters and his own 
detention, was forced to withdraw from the runoff, leaving 
Mugabe to claim 85 percent of the official vote and a hollow 
triumph.
    After the election, politically motivated violence by the 
security forces, so-called ``war veterans,'' and other youth 
and militia groups escalated even further; dozens of MDC 
supporters were reportedly killed after the election, raising 
the death toll still higher, and Human Rights Watch reported 
that over 5000 people were beaten and tortured.\1\ Zimbabweans 
continued to flee their country's economic crisis and political 
violence by crossing the border, but some also faced attacks of 
xenophobic violence in South Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\  Human Rights Watch, `` `They Beat Me like a Dog': Political 
Persecution of Opposition Activists and Supporters in Zimbabwe,'' 
August 2008. Groups of ``war veterans'' in Zimbabwe are government-
financed militias associated with land invasions and other attacks; 
their ranks often include large numbers of individuals too young to 
have fought in the struggle for liberation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prodded by international pressure, including the mediation 
efforts of Southern African Development Community (SADC) leader 
Thabo Mbeki, on September 15, 2008, Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and 
Arthur Mutambara (leader of the opposition faction known as 
MDC-M), signed a Global Political Agreement (GPA). This power-
sharing arrangement named Mugabe as president and head of state 
and Tsvangirai as prime minister within a unity government in 
which cabinet ministries would be divided among the parties.\2\ 
The GPA prioritized the restoration of economic stability and 
growth, mandated a constitutional drafting process, referendum, 
and time frame, and affirmed political freedoms and adherence 
to the rule of law. Significantly, it did not designate control 
of the security sector, which has remained in the hands of 
ZANU-PF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Under the GPA, ZANU-PF would nominate 15 ministers and MDC 
would name 16 (13 for MDC-Tsvangirai or MDC-T and 3 for MDC-M). The 
text of the agreement is available online at [http://www.nimd.org/
document/807/zimbabwe-agreement].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The signing of this accord did not lead to the immediate 
formation of a unified government. Rather, it was followed by a 
renewed campaign of arrests and harassment of MDC members and 
other activists and accelerated economic decline. On January 
31, 2009, Tsvangirai announced that he would indeed join a 
transitional coalition government. On February 11, 2009, he was 
sworn in as prime minister. The MDC assumed control (although 
often with few resources) of important ministries including 
Finance, Health, Education, Commerce and State Enterprises, and 
Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs.
    Given the history of violence that has marked relations 
between the parties, it is worth asking what their motivations 
were in joining a coalition government. For Mugabe, joint 
government--however protracted and limited--does represent a 
significant concession in power. His tyranny is definitely 
somewhat diluted, although continued ZANU-PF control over the 
security apparatus tempers the impact of this power-sharing. 
While much international attention has focused on Mugabe, ZANU-
PF is larger than its president, and other members of the old 
guard are at risk of losing the wealth, privileges, and 
protection that the regime has brought them if the GPA is 
ultimately fulfilled. Zimbabwe's utter economic crisis (with 
inflation early in the year measured in percentage points in 
the hundreds of millions) had to be one driver behind Mugabe's 
decision.\3\ Moreover, the 85-year old Mugabe ultimately may 
have concluded that he could win either way: if the MDC is able 
to restore economic progress and perhaps get international 
sanctions lifted, he may prosper in the transition. And if the 
MDC fails at this task or the arrangement itself falls apart, 
he and ZANU-PF will in all likelihood remain, perhaps in an 
even stronger position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\  Economist Steve Hanke captured the mind-numbing statistics 
this way: ``In the absence of good official numbers, I've developed my 
own hyperinflation index for Zimbabwe. I derive it from market-based 
price data starting in January 2007. The index tells us that Zimbabwe's 
inflation rate recently peaked at 80 billion percent a month. That 
means around 6.5 quindecillion novemdecillion percent a year--or 65 
followed by 107 zeros. To get a handle on it, realize that it's 
equivalent to inflation of 98% a day. Prices double every 24.7 hours.'' 
Hanke, ``The Printing Press,'' Forbes Magazine (December 22, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When he announced he was joining the government on January 
30, 2008, Morgan Tsvangirai stated that since the party had 
been forced by ZANU-PF's campaign of violence to abandon the 
polling booth as the mechanism for change, the MDC now saw 
``the negotiating table as the new front line in our quest for 
a democratic Zimbabwe'' and the GPA as the means to advance 
this cause. ZANU-PF's continued obstruction had blocked 
progress, but ultimately, Tsvangirai said, the MDC National 
Council had asked itself two questions: what would allow the 
party to continue to pursue its goal of achieving a free, 
democratic Zimbabwe and what was ``the best way of alleviating 
the suffering of the Zimbabwean people, stabilizing the economy 
and restoring and retaining some semblance of a normal 
society?'' The answers, he concluded, led him and his 
colleagues to the decision to join the inclusive government.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Statement by Morgan Tsvangirai, January 30, 2009, printed in 
http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/tsvangiraistatement_300109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When he heard the news, MDC Secretary-General (and now 
Finance Minister) Tendai Biti wept, according to his own 
account, heartbroken that the MDC had joined forces with the 
regime that had tortured opposition members, stolen their 
electoral victory, and run their country into the ground. But 
for Tsvangirai, and subsequently for the even more skeptical 
Biti, coalition had become the only alternative to the complete 
collapse of the economy and a worsening in the suffering of 
Zimbabwe's people, despite the obvious flaws in the coalition 
agreement and despite their lack of trust in their new partners 
in government.

                          Legislative History

    The United States has imposed a ban on the transfers of 
defense items and services to Zimbabwe since 2003 and targeted 
sanctions against over 250 individuals and entities, as well. 
U.S. policy has also prohibited non-humanitarian aid, and other 
sanctions are required under the Brooke Amendment. At the same 
time, the United States has led the world in the provision of 
life-saving assistance to the people of Zimbabwe, supplying an 
estimated $1 billion in aid since 2002.\5\ The Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-99) 
specifically addressed debt relief and restricted U.S. voting 
regarding Zimbabwe through international financial 
institutions. More broadly, it laid out a framework for U.S. 
relations with the country. The Act, often referred to as 
ZDERA, states that ``It is the policy of the United States to 
support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect 
peaceful, democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable 
economic growth, and restore the rule of law.'' It also 
requires presidential certification of the achievement of 
certain conditions as a requirement for the extension of debt 
relief or other financial assistance to the government. These 
benchmarks, which may be waived by the President if it is in 
the national interest to do so, include the restoration of the 
rule of law; the conduct of a free and fair presidential 
election or the creation of conditions necessary for such an 
occurrence; the commitment to equitable, legal, and transparent 
land reform; fulfillment of agreements to end the war in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo; and the subordination of military 
and national police forces to civilian government. The Act also 
authorized assistance to support the establishment of 
democratic institutions, a free press and the media, and the 
rule of law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Lauren, ``Zimbabwe,'' Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress RL32723, (May 19, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In April 2008, the Senate passed S. Res. 533, offered by 
Senators John Kerry and Norm Coleman, which detailed the 
violence and fraud that characterized the elections and called 
for a cessation of violence by Zimbabwean security forces and 
militias, a timely and peaceful democratic transition, and 
international cooperation to prepare a comprehensive economic 
and political recovery package for Zimbabwe in the event a 
democratic government is formed and commits to key reforms. The 
events of 2008 were also the subject of substantial 
correspondence between members of Congress and the 
administration.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See, for example, correspondence between Senator John Kerry and 
the Department of State in Appendix 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In recent years, appropriations measures have expanded 
these restrictions and Section 7070(e) of the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 (P.L. 111-8) 
further stated that ``none of the funds appropriated by this 
Act shall be made available for assistance for the central 
government of Zimbabwe'' unless the Secretary of State 
determines that ``the rule of law has been restored in 
Zimbabwe, including respect for ownership and title to 
property, freedom of speech and association, and a transitional 
government has been established that reflects the will of the 
people as they voted in the March 2008 elections.'' The FY 2009 
Supplemental Appropriations request from the President included 
$45 million for Zimbabwe to re-establish and strengthen 
democratic institutions, provide social safety nets, ensure 
critical health interventions and support economic 
revitalization in the wake of contentious national elections 
and sought targeted relief from the limitation on assistance to 
the central government imposed by P.L. 111-8. The bill as 
passed by Congress, provided relief from section 7070(e) of 
P.L. 111-8 for ``macroeconomic growth assistance to Zimbabwe.'' 
It also authorized $40 million in Economic Support Fund 
assistance (the House bill had included $28 million while the 
Senate bill had included the President's full request).

                          Transition to What?

    MDC ministers and other supporters of the attempt to enter 
into the government with ZANU-PF frequently employ the term 
``inclusive government'' to describe the arrangement. 
Ambassador James D. McGee and staff of the U.S. Embassy in 
Harare generally referred to the enterprise as the 
``transitional government,'' emphasizing the need to move 
forward through a constitutional process to new free and fair 
elections. It has also been described as ``an unholy marriage 
of contradicting interests'' \7\ and is at best a fragile 
coalition of perceived necessity of two competing and often 
antagonistic parties, each seeking a new election in which it 
can prevail--which for the MDC would require a fair playing 
field, international observers and other protections, 
conditions which by their very nature would imperil ZANU-PF's 
hold on power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Lorne Craner, President, International Republican Institute, 
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Hearing, 
``Zimbabwe: Opportunities for a New Way Forward,'' May 7, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the contradictions inherent in this unsteady 
coalition, the MDC, joined at times by reform-minded elements 
in the other party, has managed to make more progress than may 
be readily recognized from news stories about Zimbabwe. There 
are major hurdles still to be overcome--notably including the 
continued presence of Gideon Gono as Reserve Bank Director and 
Johannes Tomana as Attorney General; ongoing farm invasions and 
disruptions; recurrent arrests of human rights activists, MDC 
members, and others; and delays in fulfilling other commitments 
of the GPA. Nonetheless, it is worth examining sector by 
sector, incremental advances and setbacks or obstacles to 
reform and thus, ultimately, to fundamental change.
Financial Sector
    In terms of the economy and governance, Finance Minister 
Tendai Biti has managed to make notable strides forward. His 
abandonment of Zimbabwean currency in favor of a combination of 
U.S. dollars and South African rand helped bring to a halt the 
rampaging hyper-inflation that had ravaged the Zimbabwean 
economy, and goods have again begun to line store shelves. In a 
country with an estimated 90 percent unemployment rate in the 
formal economy, however, the ability to purchase food supplies 
and other products remains limited. Thanks largely to Biti's 
success in capturing revenues formerly lost to the corrupt 
machinations of Gono and others, the government has initiated 
monthly allowances of $100 for civil servants, teachers, and 
other government employees. Cutting off many of their funding 
sources and instituting ``dollarization'' also reduces the 
ability of Gono and Mugabe to continue to buy the support of 
their cronies through the largesse of purloined revenue and the 
vehicle of the printing press. Gono remains in office but he 
appears to have been marginalized.
    Biti's Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) 
offers an attempt to provide a roadmap to stabilize the economy 
and promote investment and growth; advance political reforms; 
uphold the rule of law and fulfill the tenets of the GPA 
including the drafting of a constitution; and restore the 
provision of social services and protections. The STERP, like 
the GPA, calls for the abolition of international sanctions and 
the repeal of ZDERA ``in order to facilitate a sustainable 
solution to the challenges that are currently facing the 
country,'' arguing that measures limiting access to credit, for 
example, hinder the inclusive government's chances of 
resuscitating the economy. The ambitious document depends both 
on the will of the government to carry out its provisions and 
the eventual availability of billions of dollars in 
international assistance and private investment to reverse the 
enormous economic and structural damage of the past decade and 
more.
Rule of Law
    One sees far less progress in the judicial and security 
sectors, which remain largely in the hands of ZANU-PF through 
the office of the Attorney General and the larger bureaucracy 
of the ``securocrats''--Zimbabwe's service chiefs, police, 
colleagues at the Ministries of Defense and Justice, and their 
network of spies and henchmen. Human rights advocates who have 
suffered previous arrests, detention, and torture, have been 
re-arrested in recent weeks, and farm invasions against 
Zimbabwe's few remaining white farmers and their black 
associates and employees have continued, as have additional 
land invasions of conservation areas. These actions fly in the 
face of the promises made in the GPA and elsewhere, but may 
also demonstrate the efforts of hardliners within ZANU-PF to 
assert their authority or to sabotage the inclusive government. 
The role of Mugabe himself is not always precisely clear; some 
MDC reformers and other activists have argued that he has 
actually at times played a constructive role in the process by 
keeping some of the other extremists at bay. Certainly, though, 
he appears to remain at the center of his party and of its 
machinations to remain in power. At the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee members' coffee on June 11, 2009, Prime 
Minister Tsvangirai stated that Mugabe remains in full control 
of the institutions that he manages, but also asserted that the 
aging Mugabe may be searching for an exit from the political 
stage.
    The GPA calls for the drafting of a new people-driven 
constitution to replace the original document, which was 
written at Lancaster House, London in 1979, with a referendum 
to be held within 18 months; the initial phases of this process 
are underway. A number of civil society activists have charged 
that the process is insufficiently inclusive, and consultations 
are becoming increasingly contentious. Tensions over public 
input are in part a product of the strain between a people-
driven process and the drafting of an actual document. They may 
also reflect differing priorities. At the same time, civil 
society actors emphasize the importance of creating and living 
up to a clear timeline for elections, which is not established 
in the GPA. Establishing an environment in which future 
elections can be held without the intimidation and violence 
that has characterized previous campaigns and balloting will be 
critical to achieving an outcome that reflects the will of the 
people.
    In addition to a new constitution, basic legal reforms are 
needed in a number of areas. The Mugabe government has used the 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) to 
stifle the media in the country, while the Public Order and 
Security Act (POSA), the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) 
Act, and the Miscellaneous Offences Act (MOA) have together 
provided a legal veil over massive opposition arrests and the 
broader suppression of freedoms of speech, assembly, and 
expression.\8\ These laws persist on the books and represent a 
fundamental stumbling block in the transitional government's 
attempt to convince human rights champions within Zimbabwe and 
critics outside the country that it is moving forward in the 
reform process. ZANU-PF control of critical ministries may 
impede immediate repeal of these laws, but even introduction of 
progressive legislation by MDC parliamentarians could signal 
progress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ For a fuller discussion of the legal restrictions, see 
``Zimbabwe.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Humanitarian Crisis
    Zimbabwe's humanitarian crisis has fully unfolded over the 
last year, as the repercussions of a wide range of past policy 
decisions and resulting economic catastrophe have collided. In 
Africa's ``bread basket,'' an estimated 9 million people--or 
three out of four Zimbabweans--relied upon food assistance in 
the past year. Zimbabwe also has the highest proportion of 
orphans in the world, and these 1.5 million children are 
extremely vulnerable. Once home to the continent's premier 
education system, schools are emptying out as teachers have 
left the country, parents have been unable to pay school fees, 
and classrooms lack the most basic materials or structures. A 
threatened teachers' strike, which would have been disastrous 
for the MDC-led ministry of education and perhaps the coalition 
itself, was averted through negotiations. Agricultural 
productivity--already slashed by farm invasions and the 
corruption-ridden redistribution of land to ZANU-PF loyalists--
has further declined, leaving millions in need of food 
assistance. The cholera epidemic, which has stricken some 
100,000 people in the past year, has substantially slowed, as a 
result of a combination of treatment efforts funded by the 
international community and changing weather conditions. 
However, without infrastructural improvements in water and 
sanitation and in the country's health system, the epidemic is 
almost certain to resurge. A January 2009 report from 
Physicians for Human Rights, ``Health in Ruins: A Man-Made 
Disaster in Zimbabwe,'' offered a scathing indictment of how 
the Mugabe regime's politicization of healthcare, abrogation of 
basic government services, and corruption had together created 
the health crisis manifested by but hardly limited to the 
cholera outbreak.\9\ The MDC now holds the reins at the 
Ministry of Health, but the damage wrought to the system and 
the exodus of health workers constitute formidable obstacles to 
restoring care without a major infusion of additional 
assistance from abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Physicians for Human Rights, ``Health in Ruins: A Man-Made 
Disaster in Zimbabwe,'' (January 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capacity
    MDC and other members of the government who may be willing 
to undertake reforms are handicapped not only by the Mugabe 
machine but also by a fundamental lack of capacity. Opposition 
members who had never been allowed near government positions 
now command ministries, and while many of these individuals are 
quite capable, experience levels within the ministries can 
quickly run thin. The agencies themselves--and this clearly is 
a function of ZANU-PF obstruction--are breathtakingly bare: a 
ministry may, for example, possess a single computer. Minister 
of Education David Coltart has described coming to work to find 
a cadre of women preparing to carry buckets of water up 18 
flights of stairs because his ministry lacked both water and 
working elevators. Another disturbing sign is that one of the 
first acts of Reserve Bank chief Gono after the formation of 
the inclusive government was to provide each of the newly named 
ministers with his or her own official Mercedes Benz; 
reportedly only Coltart rejected the car.

              Analysis and Recommendations for U.S. Policy

Objectives
    In thinking about U.S. policy, two closely related sets of 
guidelines are worth bearing in mind. The first comes from the 
statement of policy of the 2001 ZDERA legislation: ``to support 
the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to effect peaceful, 
democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic 
growth, and restore the rule of law.'' The second derives from 
the questions Morgan Tsvangirai said he wrestled with earlier 
this year in making the decision to join the government: 
wherein lies the best chance for achieving a free, democratic 
Zimbabwe and ``alleviating the suffering of the Zimbabwean 
people, stabilizing the economy and restoring and retaining 
some semblance of a normal society?'' These objectives are 
broadly shared by policy makers in Washington and activists, 
human rights advocates, humanitarian workers, and others 
striving for change in Zimbabwe. Differences emerge on tactics 
and timing, particularly the question of when and how to 
strengthen reform efforts within the government.
    On the one hand, the MDC has achieved gains that seemed 
impossible last year. MDC members control a majority in 
parliament, hold the prime minister's office, have succeeded in 
sidelining Gono to a surprising degree, and have been able to 
make a difference in people's lives by steps such as halting 
the death spiral of inflation and providing $100 allowances to 
teachers, healthcare workers, and other civil servants. While 
divided and fragile, the coalition government is a reality.
    On the other hand, Mugabe and his allies maintain control 
over the security apparatus, and farm invasions, arrests, and 
other abuses of individuals and of the rule of law persist. For 
each step forward, the hardliners often manage to pull the 
government another step back, in a deliberate strategy to 
sabotage the progress of the MDC and the coalition itself. At 
the same time, though, ZANU-PF is beginning to show some 
cracks, as other factions within the party perhaps see the 
writing on the wall that the balance may be shifting in the 
country and look to ensure their own political survival.
    The agenda for change that the United States hopes to see 
in Zimbabwe includes a legitimate constitutional process, free 
and fair elections within a 2 to 3 year timeframe, and 
increased productivity within the economy. Benchmarks set in 
the ZDERA legislation in 2001 were written for a Mugabe 
government. Today we confront a government in which Mugabe 
remains in the presidency but joined by the opposition leaders 
who have for years fought for change in Zimbabwe, often at 
extreme personal risk. The MDC and perhaps their likeminded 
reformers in ZANU-PF positions cannot achieve these benchmarks; 
ensuring equitable and transparent land reform, for example, is 
out of their hands at this time. Are these markers, then, the 
appropriate standard to which to hold the transitional 
government or are there alternative metrics that may increase 
U.S. flexibility to work with agents of change and strengthen 
their efforts?
    Considering options to move forward does not require the 
broad removal of sanctions, travels bans, or frozen assets on 
individuals or parastatals that are on the Office of Foreign 
Assets (OFAC) lists. In the latter category there are one or 
two entities (such as Agribank, discussed further in this 
report) for which it may be worth considering revision in the 
near term, but the wider lifting of the sanctions as a whole 
appears both premature and exceedingly unlikely, despite the 
requests of the MDC that the United States do so. Within these 
existing structures, however, it is worth exploring other 
opportunities to strengthen the chances of success for 
Zimbabwe's achieving the fundamental objectives of a 
constitution, meaningful elections, and economic growth and 
asking if amendments in U.S. law are needed to improve these 
odds.
    The tension is how to move forward with assistance without 
rewarding tyrants and thieves. Potential expanded assistance is 
a gamble: the coalition could simply crumble or the MDC could 
be forced out by the machinations of the ZANU-PF security 
establishment. Some analysts emphasize caution. For example, in 
an April 29, 2009 statement, Georgette Gagnon, Africa director 
at Human Rights Watch, affirmed that ``donor governments . . . 
should not release development aid until there are irreversible 
changes on human rights, the rule of law, and accountability.'' 
\10\ If one waits for irreversible changes, however, the 
opportunity to try to create the conditions that could lead to 
them may pass us by. A recent statement by the Elders, a group 
of global leaders brought together by Nelson Mandela, reflects 
this urgency: ``The risks of inaction by donors outweigh the 
challenges of delivering increased aid.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Human Rights Watch, ``Zimbabwe: Donors Should Focus First on 
Reform,'' (April 29, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/29/
zimbabwe_donors_should_focus_first_on_reforms.
    \11\ The Elders, ``The Elders call for more aid to help stabilise 
Zimbabwe,'' May 7, 2009, http://theelders-news.blogspot.com/search/
label/Zimbabwe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Means of Assistance
    The Supplemental Appropriations Act recently signed into 
law includes $40 million in assistance for Zimbabwe and 
modifies the restriction from the Omnibus Appropriations Act 
for FY2009 on certain forms of assistance to the central 
government. This assistance provides more than simply some 
flexibility for the Secretary of State down the road if 
conditions improve. It offers the opportunity to develop and 
begin to act on a phased strategy to seek to enhance the 
chances for macroeconomic growth and with it reform and 
democracy in Zimbabwe. Following his visit with Prime Minister 
Tsvangirai, President Obama announced that the United States 
would provide $73 million in new assistance aimed primarily at 
strengthening good governance and addressing Zimbabwe's HIV/
AIDS crisis.
    Enhanced humanitarian assistance or ``Humanitarian Plus'' 
or even ``Humanitarian Plus Plus'' is one avenue to promote 
change. The donor community in Zimbabwe, known locally as the 
Fishmongers Group (named after a local restaurant that was long 
the site of coordination meetings), is looking at ways to 
expand the range of support and to avoid duplication of 
efforts. Donors are wrestling with questions of progress and 
timing: namely, at what point should the international 
community cross the threshold from humanitarian aid to 
development work and how clear a line is there between these 
approaches? The U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) is exploring programs in the health and democracy and 
governance sectors, for example, which might be expanded under 
such an approach. Other donors are examining areas such as 
education. Either the U.S. or other partners should also 
closely examine opportunities to boost agricultural 
productivity, especially since rainy season cycles are such 
that lost plantings may cost Zimbabwe another year of hunger.
    Direct budget support is clearly a non-starter for the 
United States, but South Africa has offered some assistance, 
and others might follow if sufficient progress is made. 
Differing policies and approaches underscore the importance of 
coordination for both the bilateral and multilateral donors.
    Zimbabwe's crisis has had a significant destabilizing 
impact on the surrounding region. While the massive migration 
from Zimbabwe has fueled xenophobic tensions, the exodus of so 
many members of Zimbabwe's talented work force has also 
provided some genuine advantages to these neighbors. The 
regional context is significant, both for its strategic 
implications and for the positive economic and political 
influence that partners in SADC could play in Zimbabwe's 
future, although countries in Southern Africa have been hard 
hit by the global financial crisis. Countries such as South 
Africa can and should do more to promote democratic change in 
Zimbabwe, along with economic growth; recent statements in this 
regard are promising.
    There is generally broad support for expanded humanitarian 
efforts, and they represent an important element of any broader 
U.S. strategy towards Zimbabwe. Flexibility and creativity are 
critical. In Zimbabwe, the situation is in many ways more a 
matter of the restoration of capabilities and infrastructure 
that have been laid waste by the regime and the return of 
talented expatriates who have fled in droves, rather than the 
creation of new skills. It is in some respects comparable to a 
post-conflict situation. Additionally, the direct effects of 
Operation Murambatsvina (translated variously as ``Clean Out 
the Filth'' or ``Drive Out the Trash''), the massive demolition 
of much of the housing and informal economy of the country's 
urban poor in 2005, in apparent retaliation for their support 
of the MDC in parliamentary elections, continue to be visible. 
Increased international support in the humanitarian sector will 
also free up resources within the Zimbabwean government to make 
its payroll for civil servants and the military and to 
undertake other projects.
    Economic growth is essential to alleviating suffering and 
to the country's prospects for democracy. There has to be a 
tangible ``coalition dividend'' for the population in terms of 
jobs and economic security, as well as the ability of the 
government to deliver basic services, if the reform effort is 
to offer a credible distinction from the misrule of Mugabe's 
reign.
    Agricultural productivity will be critical to economic 
recovery. The international community has responded to 
Zimbabwe's crisis with life-saving food aid, but additional 
agricultural inputs are needed to help restore food security. 
The MDC has also emphasized the need for the restoration of 
lines of credit and has specifically called for sanctions to be 
eased on Agribank, which is primarily government-owned, in 
order to help restart food production by communal and small-
scale farmers. Such a step would require careful scrutiny but 
should be explored as a possibility.
    Local and provincial governments are another target of 
opportunity for U.S. and other assistance in this democratic 
push, as is civil society, including business associations, 
farmers' unions, women's groups, and human rights and legal 
advocates among others. Parliament is in need of capacity 
building as well, if it is to serve as a check on and balance 
to the executive.
    The Ministry of Finance has made a start at tackling 
financial reforms, revenue enhancement, tax collection, and 
other fiscal management issues, but will need support to 
overturn decades of misrule. The World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) are repositories of expertise in these 
areas, and in May the IMF, with U.S. support, voted to resume 
technical assistance, in spite of Zimbabwe's continued arrears. 
While it is obviously logical to take advantage of these 
institutions' capabilities and unwise to duplicate their 
efforts, additional technical assistance from the Department of 
Treasury or other U.S. agencies could be of symbolic 
significance and concrete help, as well as a source of welcome 
additional oversight for policy makers in Washington.
    The transitional government, including the Parliament, must 
also do more. Laws such as the Access to Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and 
Security Act (POSA) that have stifled basic freedoms for years 
are still on the books and still in use. Introduction and 
passage of legislation to repeal these laws is one benchmark to 
measure Parliament's determination to re-write Zimbabwe's 
punitive laws and uphold human rights and liberties.

                              Conclusions

    The July/August 2009 ``Failed States Index'' ranked 
Zimbabwe as the second most fragile state in the world, behind 
only Somalia, based on the events of 2008. As that report 
noted, however, the power-sharing agreement, abating inflation, 
and improving personal security offer hope.\12\ Zimbabwe now 
has a government in a genuine if uncertain transition, with 
hyperinflation slowed, a new sense of optimism among the 
public, some government ministries delivering services, and at 
least partial checks on the corruption and oppression of the 
Mugabe regime. This outpost of tyranny has been breached, 
though it has not fallen. The coalition government--while 
fragile and imperfect--is a reality. And that progress could 
come to a screeching halt, either because of internal 
weaknesses or a lack of external support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ ``The Failed States Index,'' a collaboration of Foreign Policy 
and Fund for Peace: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/
2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In dealing with this new reality, U.S. policy must be 
adaptable without sacrificing basic principles. While 
individual sanctions aimed at the architects of Zimbabwe's 
destruction are appropriately unlikely to be on the agenda for 
revision, benchmarks by which to measure change should be 
milestones rather than millstones. Without developmental 
assistance that helps the transitional government demonstrate a 
tangible difference from its previous years, reform may fail. A 
phased approach is needed, and careful monitoring is required. 
The international community should be careful, but excessive 
caution that paralyzes implementation may undermine U.S. 
objectives and Zimbabwean progress.
    Specific policy options for the United States to help boost 
change include:


   increased support for food security (beyond food 
        assistance) and mechanisms to foster the extension of 
        agricultural credit, especially for small-scale and 
        communal farmers;

   expanded technical assistance and on-site mentoring for the 
        Ministry of Finance and other reform agencies;

   continued assistance in the health sector, especially to 
        maintain HIV/AIDS and TB treatment programs and to 
        begin to rebuild the health system and restore the lost 
        workforce;

   continued support in the areas of democracy and governance 
        at the local, provincial, and national levels, 
        particularly to promote parliamentary action and to 
        strengthen the constitutional drafting process;

   close coordination with other regional and international 
        actors to maximize the positive impact of donor 
        activity, including efforts to revive Zimbabwe's 
        economy; and

   an approach predicated on U.S. objectives rather than 
        fears.


    Rethinking benchmarks to measure forward progress is 
necessary to measure the impact of reformers seeking to move 
Zimbabwe toward democracy and to restart its economy.
    Zimbabwe's agents of change must also do more. Efforts to 
repeal Zimbabwe's repressive legal framework and adherence to 
additional safeguards against corruption are important 
parliamentary and ministerial steps. Furthermore, for 
international assistance to even begin to approach the billions 
called for in the STERP and other plans, the coalition 
government must make substantially greater headway politically, 
economically, and in terms of the rule of law. A graduated but 
flexible approach to increasing support and easing constraints 
by the United States and others that adapts to these changes on 
the ground will boost the prospects for lasting change.
    Over-arching U.S. goals for Zimbabwe have been laid out 
clearly since 2001: ``to support the people of Zimbabwe in 
their struggle to effect peaceful, democratic change, achieve 
broad-based and equitable economic growth, and restore the rule 
of law.'' The realization of those objectives will require 
concrete progress on the ground in the coming months in order 
to begin to fulfill the promise of the Global Political 
Agreement including measures to create a new constitution; 
reinvigorate the economy; restore Zimbabwe's ability to feed 
its people and resuscitate its health and education systems; 
and create the conditions for free and fair elections. Robert 
Mugabe and the larger apparatus of ZANU-PF have run Zimbabwe 
into the ground but if they remain the dominant and unyielding 
focus of U.S. foreign policy, the chances for reform efforts to 
succeed are diminished. And, if these attempts to create a 
democracy fail, Mugabe and the hard-liners will be the greatest 
beneficiaries.
   Appendix I--Correspondence Between Senator John F. Kerry and the 
                          Department of State








                                    

      
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