[Senate Prints 111-7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress S. Prt.
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 111-7
_______________________________________________________________________
FAR FROM HOME:
DEFICIENCIES IN FEDERAL DISASTER
HOUSING ASSISTANCE AFTER
HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
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SPECIAL REPORT
prepared by the
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
FEBRUARY 2009
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
111th Congress
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
111-7
_______________________________________________________________________
FAR FROM HOME:
DEFICIENCIES IN FEDERAL DISASTER
HOUSING ASSISTANCE AFTER
HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
__________
SPECIAL REPORT
prepared by the
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
FEBRUARY 2009
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
47-251 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2009
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
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AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
Donny R. Williams, Jr., Staff Director
Charlie Martel, Chief Investigative Counsel
Alan Kahn, Investigator and Senior Counsel
Amanda Fox, Professional Staff Member
Evan Glaberson, Legal Clerk
Aprille C. Raabe, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DURING THE
110TH CONGRESS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
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AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY
DURING THE 110TH CONGRESS
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware TED STEVENS, Alaska
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
Donny R. Williams, Jr., Staff Director
Aprille C. Raabe, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................ 1
I. Subcommittee Investigation.......................................1
II. FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Response.............................5
III. HUD's Post-Katrina Housing Role.................................12
IV. FEMA's Strategy and Planning Before, During, and After Katrina..19
Chapter One--The History of Federal Disaster Response............ 25
I. Disaster Response and Recovery Prior to 1950....................25
II. 1950 to 1979....................................................27
III. Creation of FEMA and Review of Pre-Katrina Disaster Responses...28
A. FEMA................................................... 28
B. Stafford Act of 1988................................... 30
C. Hurricane Hugo......................................... 30
D. The Loma Prieta Earthquake............................. 30
E. Hurricane Andrew....................................... 32
F. The Northridge Earthquake.............................. 33
G. Transition From the Clinton to the Bush Administration. 34
IV. September 11, 2001, Creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, and FEMA's Incorporation Into DHS.....................35
Chapter Two--The Stafford Act.................................... 37
I. Presidential Declaration and FEMA's Authority to Direct Disaster
Assistance......................................................37
II. GThe Two Major Housing Programs--Emergency Shelter and Individual
Assistance......................................................38
A. GEmergency Shelter Under Section 403.................... 39
B. GAssistance to Individuals and Households Under Section
408........................................................ 39
C. GConditions and Restrictions for Section 408 Housing
Assistance................................................. 42
III. Flexibility and Discretion in the Stafford Act Was Not Exercised43
IV. Public Assistance for State and Local Infrastructure and
Services--Cost Shares...........................................45
V. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management and Reform Act (PKEMRA)...47
Chapter Three--FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Assistance Programs... 49
I. Introduction: FEMA Housing Programs and FEMA's Overall Post-
Katrina Housing Assistance......................................49
A. FEMA's Housing Programs Summarized..................... 51
B. The Positive Side of FEMA's Response: The Volume of
FEMA Assistance............................................ 53
II. The Immediate Response to Katrina: FEMA's Early Decisions Define
and Limit Housing Options.......................................55
A. Seven Factors That Limited FEMA's Housing Options...... 57
B. Consequences of FEMA's Limited Options................. 68
III. FEMA's Section 403 Shelter Assistance...........................75
A. Section 403 Assistance Generally....................... 75
B. Operation and Termination of Section 403 Programs...... 75
C. Criticism of FEMA's Flawed Administration of its
Section 403 Programs....................................... 86
IV. The Post-Section 403 ``Housing Gap'' and FEMA's Unsuccessful
Attempt to Launch a Rental Repair Program.......................88
V. FEMA's Section 408 Housing Assistance...........................93
A. The Section 408 Eligibility Process.................... 94
B. The Section 408 Rental Assistance Program.............. 96
C. Trailers and Mobile Homes.............................. 105
D. The Alternative Housing Pilot Program (AHPP)........... 119
E. Recoupment............................................. 120
VI. The Relationship of FEMA Public Assistance to Individual Housin121
VII. FEMA's Internal After-Action Report Confirms Problems With Post-
Katrina Housing Response.......................................123
A. Housing Programs, Procedures and Organization Were
Insufficient for a Large Scale Catastrophic Disaster....... 124
B. There Was No Catastrophic Disaster Operational Plan.... 125
C. Policies Were Unclear and Inconsistently Applied....... 125
D. Delay and Exclusion.................................... 126
E. Inadequate Staff, Poor Training and Insensitive Conduct 126
VIII.Summary of Findings............................................126
Chapter Four--The Role of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in Post-Katrina Housing............................ 131
I. HUD's Role in FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Response.............136
A. The Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP) 137
B. The Disaster Voucher Program (DVP)..................... 141
C. The Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP)......... 142
D. Additional HUD Support................................. 151
II. The Decision Not to Utilize HUD in Lead Housing Role After
Hurricane Katrina..............................................156
A. HUD's Losing Battle With The White House and DHS....... 158
B. FEMA's Conflict Over HUD's Role........................ 161
C. Alternate FEMA Planning Decisions During First Three
Weeks of Response.......................................... 163
D. Attempts to Convey HUD's Capabilities.................. 164
E. Ultimate Decision and Responsibility................... 166
III. Calls to Expand HUD's Role in the Future.......................167
A. Demands Since 2005 and FEMA's Response in 2009......... 168
B. Formalization of DHAP.................................. 169
C. DHAP-IKE............................................... 170
IV. Unanswered Questions...........................................171
A. Recognition, But Inaction, Regarding Housing Stock..... 172
B. Ability to Provide Housing Stock: Half of the Equation. 173
C. Translating HUD's Housing Capabilities to a
Catastrophic Setting....................................... 178
D. Remaining Questions: Funding, the Other Half of the
Equation................................................... 181
V. Summary of Findings............................................183
Chapter Five--The Effects of Federal Assistance After Katrina For
State and Local Government..................................... 186
I. Mississippi....................................................188
A. State Government....................................... 188
B. Local Governments...................................... 191
II. Louisiana......................................................193
A. The Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA)................. 193
B. City of New Orleans.................................... 195
C. Housing Statistics..................................... 199
III. Texas..........................................................201
A. Harris County.......................................... 201
B. City of Houston, Mayor Bill White...................... 203
IV. Summary of Findings............................................209
Chapter Six--Legal Action as a Consequence of FEMA's Post-Katrina
Housing Response............................................... 211
I. Class Action Litigation........................................211
A. McWaters, et al. v. FEMA............................... 212
B. ACORN, et al. v. FEMA.................................. 217
C. Ridgely, et al. v. FEMA................................ 218
II. Individual Claims--Public Interest Law Organizations...........220
A. Need for Legal Assistance With Trailers, Section 408
Assistance, Access, Eviction, and Delay Resulting From
Housing Response........................................... 220
B. Additional Housing Assistance Resulting From Legal
Efforts.................................................... 223
C. Continued Problems..................................... 223
Chapter Seven--FEMA's Inability to Implement a Disaster Housing
Strategy....................................................... 225
I. Introduction: FEMA Acknowledged the Need For Catastrophic Housing
Plan Prior to Katrina, But Failed to Prepare and Implement Such a
Plan...........................................................225
II. The 2002 Plan..................................................227
III. February 2004 Catastrophic Disaster Housing Strategy...........229
IV. The 2005 Plan--The ``Hurricane Pam'' Exercise..................230
A. The Hurricane Pam Exercise............................. 230
B. The 2005 Plan and Its Housing Provisions............... 231
V. The 2002, 2004 and 2005 Plans Were Not Implemented or Operational
Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita...........................234
VI. FEMA's Unsuccessful Housing Planning Immediately After Hurricane
Katrina........................................................237
A. FEMA Did Not Use Pre-Katrina Housing Plans............. 237
B. FEMA Attempts to Draft a New Strategic Housing Plan
Immediately After Hurricane Katrina........................ 238
VII. The 2004 National Response Plan and 2008 National Response
Framework......................................................241
VIII.FEMA's Initial National Disaster Housing Strategy: Noncompliance
With PKEMRA....................................................242
A. Congress Required FEMA to Prepare and Submit a National
Disaster Housing Strategy.................................. 242
B. FEMA Submitted an Initial Strategy a Year After the
Statutory Deadline, Following Congressional Pressure and
Senate Investigation....................................... 244
C. The Initial Strategy Failed to Comply With FEMA's Legal
Requirements Under PKEMRA and Lacked Operational Housing
Plans...................................................... 245
IX. FEMA's Final National Disaster Housing Strategy: An Improved
Foundation For Policy Reform, But More Planning and Development is
Needed.........................................................248
A. The Final NDHS--Text of the Strategy and Ten Key
Components................................................. 249
B. Annexes to the Final Strategy Address the PKEMRA
Requirements............................................... 258
X. Summary of Findings............................................270
RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................. 274
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