[Senate Prints 111-7] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] 111th Congress S. Prt. 1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 111-7 _______________________________________________________________________ FAR FROM HOME: DEFICIENCIES IN FEDERAL DISASTER HOUSING ASSISTANCE AFTER HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT ---------- SPECIAL REPORT prepared by the AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY of the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] FEBRUARY 2009 Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 111th Congress 1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt. 111-7 _______________________________________________________________________ FAR FROM HOME: DEFICIENCIES IN FEDERAL DISASTER HOUSING ASSISTANCE AFTER HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT __________ SPECIAL REPORT prepared by the AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY of the COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] FEBRUARY 2009 Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 47-251 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2009 --------------------------------------------------------------------- For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina JON TESTER, Montana ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk ------ AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois Donny R. Williams, Jr., Staff Director Charlie Martel, Chief Investigative Counsel Alan Kahn, Investigator and Senior Counsel Amanda Fox, Professional Staff Member Evan Glaberson, Legal Clerk Aprille C. Raabe, Minority Staff Director Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk ------ COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DURING THE 110TH CONGRESS JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma BARACK OBAMA, Illinois PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN WARNER, Virginia JON TESTER, Montana JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk ------ AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY DURING THE 110TH CONGRESS MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware TED STEVENS, Alaska MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico Donny R. Williams, Jr., Staff Director Aprille C. Raabe, Minority Staff Director Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ------ Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................ 1 I. Subcommittee Investigation.......................................1 II. FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Response.............................5 III. HUD's Post-Katrina Housing Role.................................12 IV. FEMA's Strategy and Planning Before, During, and After Katrina..19 Chapter One--The History of Federal Disaster Response............ 25 I. Disaster Response and Recovery Prior to 1950....................25 II. 1950 to 1979....................................................27 III. Creation of FEMA and Review of Pre-Katrina Disaster Responses...28 A. FEMA................................................... 28 B. Stafford Act of 1988................................... 30 C. Hurricane Hugo......................................... 30 D. The Loma Prieta Earthquake............................. 30 E. Hurricane Andrew....................................... 32 F. The Northridge Earthquake.............................. 33 G. Transition From the Clinton to the Bush Administration. 34 IV. September 11, 2001, Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and FEMA's Incorporation Into DHS.....................35 Chapter Two--The Stafford Act.................................... 37 I. Presidential Declaration and FEMA's Authority to Direct Disaster Assistance......................................................37 II. GThe Two Major Housing Programs--Emergency Shelter and Individual Assistance......................................................38 A. GEmergency Shelter Under Section 403.................... 39 B. GAssistance to Individuals and Households Under Section 408........................................................ 39 C. GConditions and Restrictions for Section 408 Housing Assistance................................................. 42 III. Flexibility and Discretion in the Stafford Act Was Not Exercised43 IV. Public Assistance for State and Local Infrastructure and Services--Cost Shares...........................................45 V. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management and Reform Act (PKEMRA)...47 Chapter Three--FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Assistance Programs... 49 I. Introduction: FEMA Housing Programs and FEMA's Overall Post- Katrina Housing Assistance......................................49 A. FEMA's Housing Programs Summarized..................... 51 B. The Positive Side of FEMA's Response: The Volume of FEMA Assistance............................................ 53 II. The Immediate Response to Katrina: FEMA's Early Decisions Define and Limit Housing Options.......................................55 A. Seven Factors That Limited FEMA's Housing Options...... 57 B. Consequences of FEMA's Limited Options................. 68 III. FEMA's Section 403 Shelter Assistance...........................75 A. Section 403 Assistance Generally....................... 75 B. Operation and Termination of Section 403 Programs...... 75 C. Criticism of FEMA's Flawed Administration of its Section 403 Programs....................................... 86 IV. The Post-Section 403 ``Housing Gap'' and FEMA's Unsuccessful Attempt to Launch a Rental Repair Program.......................88 V. FEMA's Section 408 Housing Assistance...........................93 A. The Section 408 Eligibility Process.................... 94 B. The Section 408 Rental Assistance Program.............. 96 C. Trailers and Mobile Homes.............................. 105 D. The Alternative Housing Pilot Program (AHPP)........... 119 E. Recoupment............................................. 120 VI. The Relationship of FEMA Public Assistance to Individual Housin121 VII. FEMA's Internal After-Action Report Confirms Problems With Post- Katrina Housing Response.......................................123 A. Housing Programs, Procedures and Organization Were Insufficient for a Large Scale Catastrophic Disaster....... 124 B. There Was No Catastrophic Disaster Operational Plan.... 125 C. Policies Were Unclear and Inconsistently Applied....... 125 D. Delay and Exclusion.................................... 126 E. Inadequate Staff, Poor Training and Insensitive Conduct 126 VIII.Summary of Findings............................................126 Chapter Four--The Role of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Post-Katrina Housing............................ 131 I. HUD's Role in FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Response.............136 A. The Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP) 137 B. The Disaster Voucher Program (DVP)..................... 141 C. The Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP)......... 142 D. Additional HUD Support................................. 151 II. The Decision Not to Utilize HUD in Lead Housing Role After Hurricane Katrina..............................................156 A. HUD's Losing Battle With The White House and DHS....... 158 B. FEMA's Conflict Over HUD's Role........................ 161 C. Alternate FEMA Planning Decisions During First Three Weeks of Response.......................................... 163 D. Attempts to Convey HUD's Capabilities.................. 164 E. Ultimate Decision and Responsibility................... 166 III. Calls to Expand HUD's Role in the Future.......................167 A. Demands Since 2005 and FEMA's Response in 2009......... 168 B. Formalization of DHAP.................................. 169 C. DHAP-IKE............................................... 170 IV. Unanswered Questions...........................................171 A. Recognition, But Inaction, Regarding Housing Stock..... 172 B. Ability to Provide Housing Stock: Half of the Equation. 173 C. Translating HUD's Housing Capabilities to a Catastrophic Setting....................................... 178 D. Remaining Questions: Funding, the Other Half of the Equation................................................... 181 V. Summary of Findings............................................183 Chapter Five--The Effects of Federal Assistance After Katrina For State and Local Government..................................... 186 I. Mississippi....................................................188 A. State Government....................................... 188 B. Local Governments...................................... 191 II. Louisiana......................................................193 A. The Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA)................. 193 B. City of New Orleans.................................... 195 C. Housing Statistics..................................... 199 III. Texas..........................................................201 A. Harris County.......................................... 201 B. City of Houston, Mayor Bill White...................... 203 IV. Summary of Findings............................................209 Chapter Six--Legal Action as a Consequence of FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Response............................................... 211 I. Class Action Litigation........................................211 A. McWaters, et al. v. FEMA............................... 212 B. ACORN, et al. v. FEMA.................................. 217 C. Ridgely, et al. v. FEMA................................ 218 II. Individual Claims--Public Interest Law Organizations...........220 A. Need for Legal Assistance With Trailers, Section 408 Assistance, Access, Eviction, and Delay Resulting From Housing Response........................................... 220 B. Additional Housing Assistance Resulting From Legal Efforts.................................................... 223 C. Continued Problems..................................... 223 Chapter Seven--FEMA's Inability to Implement a Disaster Housing Strategy....................................................... 225 I. Introduction: FEMA Acknowledged the Need For Catastrophic Housing Plan Prior to Katrina, But Failed to Prepare and Implement Such a Plan...........................................................225 II. The 2002 Plan..................................................227 III. February 2004 Catastrophic Disaster Housing Strategy...........229 IV. The 2005 Plan--The ``Hurricane Pam'' Exercise..................230 A. The Hurricane Pam Exercise............................. 230 B. The 2005 Plan and Its Housing Provisions............... 231 V. The 2002, 2004 and 2005 Plans Were Not Implemented or Operational Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita...........................234 VI. FEMA's Unsuccessful Housing Planning Immediately After Hurricane Katrina........................................................237 A. FEMA Did Not Use Pre-Katrina Housing Plans............. 237 B. FEMA Attempts to Draft a New Strategic Housing Plan Immediately After Hurricane Katrina........................ 238 VII. The 2004 National Response Plan and 2008 National Response Framework......................................................241 VIII.FEMA's Initial National Disaster Housing Strategy: Noncompliance With PKEMRA....................................................242 A. Congress Required FEMA to Prepare and Submit a National Disaster Housing Strategy.................................. 242 B. FEMA Submitted an Initial Strategy a Year After the Statutory Deadline, Following Congressional Pressure and Senate Investigation....................................... 244 C. The Initial Strategy Failed to Comply With FEMA's Legal Requirements Under PKEMRA and Lacked Operational Housing Plans...................................................... 245 IX. FEMA's Final National Disaster Housing Strategy: An Improved Foundation For Policy Reform, But More Planning and Development is Needed.........................................................248 A. The Final NDHS--Text of the Strategy and Ten Key Components................................................. 249 B. Annexes to the Final Strategy Address the PKEMRA Requirements............................................... 258 X. Summary of Findings............................................270 RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................. 274 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]