[Senate Prints 111-7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



111th Congress                                          S. Prt.
1st  Session                 COMMITTEE PRINT            111-7
_______________________________________________________________________




 
                             FAR FROM HOME:
                    DEFICIENCIES IN FEDERAL DISASTER
                        HOUSING ASSISTANCE AFTER
                    HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA AND
                    RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

                               ----------                              

                             SPECIAL REPORT

                            prepared by the

                AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY

                                 of the

                              COMMITTEE ON
                         HOMELAND SECURITY AND
                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                             FEBRUARY 2009

       Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html









111th Congress 
 1st Session                COMMITTEE PRINT                     S. Prt.
                                                                  111-7
_______________________________________________________________________





                             FAR FROM HOME:

                    DEFICIENCIES IN FEDERAL DISASTER

                        HOUSING ASSISTANCE AFTER

                    HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA AND

                    RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

                               __________

                             SPECIAL REPORT

                            prepared by the

                AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY

                                 of the

                              COMMITTEE ON

                         HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                             FEBRUARY 2009

       Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html



                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL BENNET, Colorado
                  Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
     Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                  Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

                AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY

                 MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
                 Donny R. Williams, Jr., Staff Director
              Charlie Martel, Chief Investigative Counsel
               Alan Kahn, Investigator and Senior Counsel
                 Amanda Fox, Professional Staff Member
                      Evan Glaberson, Legal Clerk
               Aprille C. Raabe, Minority Staff Director
                       Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

  COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DURING THE 
                             110TH CONGRESS

               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois               PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           JOHN WARNER, Virginia
JON TESTER, Montana                  JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
                  Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
     Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                  Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

                AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY
                       DURING THE 110TH CONGRESS

                 MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           TED STEVENS, Alaska
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
                 Donny R. Williams, Jr., Staff Director
               Aprille C. Raabe, Minority Staff Director
                       Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk


                            C O N T E N T S

                                 ------                                
                                                                   Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................     1

  I. Subcommittee Investigation.......................................1

 II. FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Response.............................5

III. HUD's Post-Katrina Housing Role.................................12

 IV. FEMA's Strategy and Planning Before, During, and After Katrina..19

Chapter One--The History of Federal Disaster Response............    25

  I. Disaster Response and Recovery Prior to 1950....................25

 II. 1950 to 1979....................................................27

III. Creation of FEMA and Review of Pre-Katrina Disaster Responses...28
      A. FEMA...................................................    28
      B. Stafford Act of 1988...................................    30
      C. Hurricane Hugo.........................................    30
      D. The Loma Prieta Earthquake.............................    30
      E. Hurricane Andrew.......................................    32
      F. The Northridge Earthquake..............................    33
      G. Transition From the Clinton to the Bush Administration.    34

 IV. September 11, 2001, Creation of the Department of Homeland 
     Security, and FEMA's Incorporation Into DHS.....................35

Chapter Two--The Stafford Act....................................    37

  I. Presidential Declaration and FEMA's Authority to Direct Disaster 
     Assistance......................................................37

 II. GThe Two Major Housing Programs--Emergency Shelter and Individual 
     Assistance......................................................38
      A. GEmergency Shelter Under Section 403....................    39
      B. GAssistance to Individuals and Households Under Section 
      408........................................................    39
      C. GConditions and Restrictions for Section 408 Housing 
      Assistance.................................................    42

III. Flexibility and Discretion in the Stafford Act Was Not Exercised43

 IV. Public Assistance for State and Local Infrastructure and 
     Services--Cost Shares...........................................45

  V. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management and Reform Act (PKEMRA)...47

Chapter Three--FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Assistance Programs...    49

  I. Introduction: FEMA Housing Programs and FEMA's Overall Post-
     Katrina Housing Assistance......................................49
      A. FEMA's Housing Programs Summarized.....................    51
      B. The Positive Side of FEMA's Response: The Volume of 
      FEMA Assistance............................................    53

 II. The Immediate Response to Katrina: FEMA's Early Decisions Define 
     and Limit Housing Options.......................................55
      A. Seven Factors That Limited FEMA's Housing Options......    57
      B. Consequences of FEMA's Limited Options.................    68

III. FEMA's Section 403 Shelter Assistance...........................75
      A. Section 403 Assistance Generally.......................    75
      B. Operation and Termination of Section 403 Programs......    75
      C. Criticism of FEMA's Flawed Administration of its 
      Section 403 Programs.......................................    86
 IV. The Post-Section 403 ``Housing Gap'' and FEMA's Unsuccessful 
     Attempt to Launch a Rental Repair Program.......................88

  V. FEMA's Section 408 Housing Assistance...........................93
      A. The Section 408 Eligibility Process....................    94
      B. The Section 408 Rental Assistance Program..............    96
      C. Trailers and Mobile Homes..............................   105
      D. The Alternative Housing Pilot Program (AHPP)...........   119
      E. Recoupment.............................................   120

 VI. The Relationship of FEMA Public Assistance to Individual Housin121

VII. FEMA's Internal After-Action Report Confirms Problems With Post-
     Katrina Housing Response.......................................123
      A. Housing Programs, Procedures and Organization Were 
      Insufficient for a Large Scale Catastrophic Disaster.......   124
      B. There Was No Catastrophic Disaster Operational Plan....   125
      C. Policies Were Unclear and Inconsistently Applied.......   125
      D. Delay and Exclusion....................................   126
      E. Inadequate Staff, Poor Training and Insensitive Conduct   126

VIII.Summary of Findings............................................126


Chapter Four--The Role of the Department of Housing and Urban 
  Development in Post-Katrina Housing............................   131

  I. HUD's Role in FEMA's Post-Katrina Housing Response.............136
      A. The Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP)   137
      B. The Disaster Voucher Program (DVP).....................   141
      C. The Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP).........   142
      D. Additional HUD Support.................................   151

 II. The Decision Not to Utilize HUD in Lead Housing Role After 
     Hurricane Katrina..............................................156
      A. HUD's Losing Battle With The White House and DHS.......   158
      B. FEMA's Conflict Over HUD's Role........................   161
      C. Alternate FEMA Planning Decisions During First Three 
      Weeks of Response..........................................   163
      D. Attempts to Convey HUD's Capabilities..................   164
      E. Ultimate Decision and Responsibility...................   166

III. Calls to Expand HUD's Role in the Future.......................167
      A. Demands Since 2005 and FEMA's Response in 2009.........   168
      B. Formalization of DHAP..................................   169
      C. DHAP-IKE...............................................   170

 IV. Unanswered Questions...........................................171
      A. Recognition, But Inaction, Regarding Housing Stock.....   172
      B. Ability to Provide Housing Stock: Half of the Equation.   173
      C. Translating HUD's Housing Capabilities to a 
      Catastrophic Setting.......................................   178
      D. Remaining Questions: Funding, the Other Half of the 
      Equation...................................................   181

  V. Summary of Findings............................................183

Chapter Five--The Effects of Federal Assistance After Katrina For 
  State and Local Government.....................................   186

  I. Mississippi....................................................188
      A. State Government.......................................   188
      B. Local Governments......................................   191

 II. Louisiana......................................................193
      A. The Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA).................   193
      B. City of New Orleans....................................   195
      C. Housing Statistics.....................................   199

III. Texas..........................................................201
      A. Harris County..........................................   201
      B. City of Houston, Mayor Bill White......................   203

 IV. Summary of Findings............................................209
Chapter Six--Legal Action as a Consequence of FEMA's Post-Katrina 
  Housing Response...............................................   211

  I. Class Action Litigation........................................211
      A. McWaters, et al. v. FEMA...............................   212
      B. ACORN, et al. v. FEMA..................................   217
      C. Ridgely, et al. v. FEMA................................   218

 II. Individual Claims--Public Interest Law Organizations...........220
      A. Need for Legal Assistance With Trailers, Section 408 
      Assistance, Access, Eviction, and Delay Resulting From 
      Housing Response...........................................   220
      B. Additional Housing Assistance Resulting From Legal 
      Efforts....................................................   223
      C. Continued Problems.....................................   223

Chapter Seven--FEMA's Inability to Implement a Disaster Housing 
  Strategy.......................................................   225

  I. Introduction: FEMA Acknowledged the Need For Catastrophic Housing 
     Plan Prior to Katrina, But Failed to Prepare and Implement Such a 
     Plan...........................................................225

 II. The 2002 Plan..................................................227

III. February 2004 Catastrophic Disaster Housing Strategy...........229

 IV. The 2005 Plan--The ``Hurricane Pam'' Exercise..................230
      A. The Hurricane Pam Exercise.............................   230
      B. The 2005 Plan and Its Housing Provisions...............   231

  V. The 2002, 2004 and 2005 Plans Were Not Implemented or Operational 
     Prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita...........................234

 VI. FEMA's Unsuccessful Housing Planning Immediately After Hurricane 
     Katrina........................................................237
      A. FEMA Did Not Use Pre-Katrina Housing Plans.............   237
      B. FEMA Attempts to Draft a New Strategic Housing Plan 
      Immediately After Hurricane Katrina........................   238

VII. The 2004 National Response Plan and 2008 National Response 
     Framework......................................................241

VIII.FEMA's Initial National Disaster Housing Strategy: Noncompliance 
     With PKEMRA....................................................242
      A. Congress Required FEMA to Prepare and Submit a National 
      Disaster Housing Strategy..................................   242
      B. FEMA Submitted an Initial Strategy a Year After the 
      Statutory Deadline, Following Congressional Pressure and 
      Senate Investigation.......................................   244
      C. The Initial Strategy Failed to Comply With FEMA's Legal 
      Requirements Under PKEMRA and Lacked Operational Housing 
      Plans......................................................   245

 IX. FEMA's Final National Disaster Housing Strategy: An Improved 
     Foundation For Policy Reform, But More Planning and Development is 
     Needed.........................................................248
      A. The Final NDHS--Text of the Strategy and Ten Key 
      Components.................................................   249
      B. Annexes to the Final Strategy Address the PKEMRA 
      Requirements...............................................   258

  X. Summary of Findings............................................270

RECOMMENDATIONS..................................................   274



[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



                                 
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