[JPRT, 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
                             ANNUAL REPORT
                                  2010

=======================================================================

                     ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 10, 2010

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


         Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov

 
              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
                             ANNUAL REPORT
                                  2010

=======================================================================

                     ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 10, 2010

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


         Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov


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              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

Senate

                                     House

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota,          SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Cochairman
Chairman                             MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
MAX BAUCUS, Montana                  MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         DAVID WU, Oregon
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio                  CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BOB CORKER, Tennessee                DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
GEORGE LeMIEUX, Florida

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                  Department of State, To Be Appointed
                  Department of Labor, To Be Appointed
                Department of Commerce, To Be Appointed
                       At-Large, To Be Appointed
                       At-Large, To Be Appointed

                 Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director

             Douglas Grob, Cochairman's Senior Staff Member

                                  (ii)







                             CO N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Preface..........................................................     1

General Overview.................................................     2

I. Executive Summary.............................................    11

    Findings and Recommendations.................................    11
    Political Prisoner Database..................................    53

II. Human Rights.................................................    57

    Freedom of Expression........................................    57
    Worker Rights................................................    71
    Criminal Justice.............................................    86
    Freedom of Religion..........................................    99
    Ethnic Minority Rights.......................................   113
    Population Planning..........................................   116
    Freedom of Residence and Movement............................   123
    Status of Women..............................................   129
    Human Trafficking............................................   135
    North Korean Refugees in China...............................   140
    Public Health................................................   144
    Climate Change and the Environment...........................   150

III. Development of the Rule of Law..............................   160

    Civil Society................................................   160
    Institutions of Democratic Governance........................   166
    Commercial Rule of Law.......................................   178
    Access to Justice............................................   190

IV. Xinjiang.....................................................   200

V. Tibet.........................................................   215

VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau..........................   231

VII. Endnotes....................................................   239
          CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                       2010 ANNUAL REPORT

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, established by 
the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 as China prepared to enter 
the World Trade Organization, is mandated by law to monitor 
human rights, including worker rights, and the development of 
the rule of law in China. The Commission by mandate also 
maintains a database of information on political prisoners in 
China--individuals who have been imprisoned by the Chinese 
government for exercising their civil and political rights 
under China's Constitution and laws or under China's 
international human rights obligations. All of the Commission's 
reporting and its Political Prisoner Database are available to 
the public online via the Commission's Web site, www.cecc.gov.

                                Preface

    The findings of this Annual Report make clear that human 
rights conditions in China over the last year have 
deteriorated. This has occurred against the backdrop of China's 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and 
the Chinese government's years of preparation for accession, 
which provided the impetus for many changes to Chinese law. 
Those changes, some of which have been significant, have yet to 
produce legal institutions in China that are consistently and 
reliably transparent, accessible, and predictable. This has had 
far-reaching implications for the protection of human rights 
and the development of the rule of law in China.
    The Chinese people have achieved success on many fronts, 
for example in health, education, and in improved living 
standards for large segments of the population, and they are 
justifiably proud of their many successes. But the Chinese 
government now must lead in protecting fundamental freedoms and 
human rights, including the rights of workers, and in defending 
the integrity of China's legal institutions with no less skill 
and commitment than it displayed in implementing economic 
reforms that allowed the industriousness of the Chinese people 
to lift millions out of poverty.
    Most importantly, the Chinese government must free its 
political prisoners, who include some of the country's most 
capable and socially committed citizens--scholar and writer Liu 
Xiaobo, HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia, prominent attorney Gao 
Zhisheng, journalist Gheyret Niyaz, Tibetan environmentalist 
Karma Samdrub, and many others named in this Annual Report and 
in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database. By engaging 
rather than repressing human rights advocates, the Chinese 
government would unleash constructive forces in Chinese society 
that are poised to address the very social problems with which 
the government and Party now find themselves overburdened: 
corruption, poor working conditions, occupational safety and 
health, environmental degradation, and police abuse among them.
    Stability in China is in the national interest of the 
United States. The Chinese government's full and firm 
commitment to openness, transparency, the rule of law, and the 
protection of human rights, including worker rights, marks a 
stability-preserving path forward for China. Anything less than 
the government's full and firm commitment to protect and 
enforce these rights undermines stability in China.

                                Overview

    Over the Commission's 2010 reporting year, across the areas 
the Commission monitors, the following general themes emerged:

    1. New trends in political imprisonment include an 
increasingly harsh crackdown on lawyers and those who have a 
track record of human rights advocacy, particularly those who 
make use of the Internet and those from areas of the country 
the government deems to be politically sensitive (e.g., Tibetan 
areas and Xinjiang).
    2. Nexus between human rights and commercial rule of law, 
has become more evident particularly in connection with laws on 
state secrets, the Internet, and worker rights.
    3. Communist Party's intolerance of independent sources of 
influence extends broadly across Chinese civil society, 
including with respect to organized labor.
    4. Chinese government's new rhetoric on compliance with 
international human rights norms creates new challenges for 
U.S.-China dialogue and exchange.
    5. Global economic conditions have prompted the Chinese 
government to expand state economic and social control in a 
manner that impedes the development of the rule of law.
    6. Misapplication of law as a means of control has become 
more evident as the Communist Party has expanded and 
strengthened the capacity of law and regulation to serve as a 
means for the Party to control an increasing number of facets 
of daily life.
    7. Prospects for human rights and the rule of law in China 
depend on decisions taken at the highest levels of the 
Communist Party.

                  New Trends in Political Imprisonment

    The Chinese government appears to be engaged in an 
increasingly harsh crackdown on lawyers and human rights 
defenders. The tightening of control over criminal lawyers, 
human rights lawyers, and the legal profession more generally 
has led some of China's leading legal experts to state that the 
rule of law is in ``full retreat'' in China. Over the last two 
years, several lawyers involved in human rights advocacy work--
including in legal cases involving house church members, public 
health advocates, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, and 
others deemed by the government to threaten ``social 
stability''--have been harassed and abused by the government 
based on who their clients are and the causes those clients 
represent.
    The Internet appears to have given rise to a new category 
of 
political prisoners in China. Many citizens who criticize the 
government on blogs and comment boards face no severe 
repercussions--at most their comments may be deleted. But 
individuals who have a track record of human rights advocacy, 
political activism, grassroots organizing, or opposition to the 
Communist Party, and some from areas of the country the 
government deems to be politically sensitive (e.g., Tibetan 
areas and Xinjiang), have been targeted systematically. Among 
the most common charges against these citizens are the crimes 
of ``subverting state power'' or ``splittism,'' which carry a 
sentence of up to life imprisonment, and inciting subversion or 
``splittism,'' which carry a sentence of up to 15 years. 
Individuals, including lawyers, writers, scholars, and 
businesspeople, have been imprisoned on these charges for 
posting online essays critical of the government, for exposing 
corruption or environmental problems, or for trying to organize 
political opposition online, without advocating violence.
    In the past year, government officials moved more 
aggressively to diminish or end the public influence of Tibetan 
civic and intellectual leaders, writers, and artists. Officials 
imprisoned such Tibetans in past years, but the frequency of 
using courts and the misapplication of criminal charges to 
remove such figures from society has increased. As of early 
September 2010, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
had recorded more than 840 cases of political detention of 
Tibetans on or after March 10, 2008, when Tibetan protests 
began in Lhasa and then swept across the Tibetan plateau. The 
true number of political detentions during the period is 
certain to be far higher.
    In the year since the government suppression of a 
demonstration by Uyghurs and multi-ethnic riots in Xinjiang 
starting July 5, 2009, human rights conditions in this far 
western region of China have worsened, and cases of political 
imprisonment remain of critical concern. At the same time that 
authorities have punished people for violent crimes committed 
in July 2009, they also have continued to conflate the right to 
demonstrate peacefully or to express criticism over government 
policy with criminal activity. In the past year, authorities 
imprisoned Uyghur Webmasters and a Uyghur journalist in 
connection with articles critical of conditions in Xinjiang and 
in connection with Internet postings calling for the July 2009 
demonstrations. In the aftermath of the July 2009 events, 
authorities also carried out broad security sweeps resulting in 
mass detentions of Uyghur men and boys, some of whom appear to 
have had no connection to events in July 2009. The whereabouts 
of many people detained since July 2009 remain unknown.

         Nexus Between Human Rights and Commercial Rule of Law

    Developments over the past year have shown how business 
disputes and commercial issues can have real human rights 
implications when the Communist Party perceives its interests 
to be threatened. Under Chinese law, information relating to 
``national economic development'' may be deemed a ``state 
secret.'' Furthermore, officials sometimes deem information a 
state secret ex post facto, that is, after an alleged ``crime'' 
of unauthorized disclosure, trafficking, or possession of a 
``state secret'' has occurred. Many Chinese companies dealing 
with foreign businesses are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with 
close links to the government, heightening the possibility that 
such SOEs will press the government to classify commercial 
information as a state secret or that the government will use 
the charge of violating laws on state secrets to advantage 
Chinese commercial interests.
    The crime of supplying a state secret to a foreign 
``organization'' (a category that includes corporations) is 
punishable by up to life in prison. While it remains unclear 
whether this risk to foreign businesses has increased, high-
profile cases in the last year illustrate that the risk remains 
real. Among such cases is that of Xue Feng, a geologist and 
U.S. citizen who helped his employer, an American firm, 
purchase commercially available information on oil wells and 
prospecting sites in China. The information was classified as a 
state secret after the purchase took place. A Chinese court 
then sentenced the geologist to eight years in prison. The case 
shows that the risk of being charged with violating laws on 
state secrets complicates the normal, legitimate gathering of 
commercial information. The imposition of such a risk whenever 
state ownership of industry is involved is contrary to standard 
international business practice and undermines the rule of law.
    The controversy between the Chinese government and Google, 
Inc., over the last year highlighted the potential for Chinese 
censorship practices to interfere with the free flow of 
information among Chinese citizens and businesses, and between 
people and organizations in China and the rest of the world. 
The government appeared to single out Google in June 2009 
during an anti-pornography campaign, saying Google was not 
doing enough to filter banned content (much of which is 
politically sensitive, not ``pornographic''). In January 2010, 
Google announced that it had ``detected a highly sophisticated 
and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating 
from China'' that it said had ``resulted in the theft of 
intellectual property from Google.'' Google also said it had 
``evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was 
accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights 
activists.'' Google said that ``[t]hese attacks and the 
surveillance they have uncovered--combined with attempts over 
the past year to further limit free speech on the web'' led the 
company ``to conclude that we should review the feasibility of 
our business operations in China.'' The Google controversy 
underscored what some business leaders have noted as the 
Chinese government's long-growing impatience with private 
companies that it perceives to have grown too large or become 
too successful, or whose branding attracts too much loyalty 
outside of government-approved parameters.
    The nexus between human rights and commercial rule of law 
also has been evident in the area of worker rights. High-
profile worker actions during this reporting year included 
strikes calling for better wages and formal channels to submit 
grievances. In a number of strikes at prominent foreign 
manufacturing facilities in China, workers called for existing 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)-affiliated unions 
to behave more independently within the confines of Chinese 
law. Striking workers' demands for higher wages revealed that 
they may have been emboldened not only by protections for 
workers codified in labor laws that took effect in 2008, but 
also by a tighter labor market. However, they stopped short of 
calling for the formation of independent trade unions. The 
limited demands of workers reflected in part the political 
constraints imposed on the labor movement in China. Workers in 
China still are not guaranteed, either by law or in practice, 
full worker rights in accordance with international standards, 
including the right to organize into independent unions. The 
ACFTU, the official union under the direction of the Party, is 
the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower 
level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU and must align 
with its overarching political concerns of maintaining ``social 
stability'' and economic growth.

   Communist Party's Intolerance of Independent Sources of Influence

    The Communist Party's determination to rein in independent 
sources of influence remained evident across Chinese society 
during this reporting year. For example, the Chinese government 
denies workers the right to organize into independent unions in 
part because the Party continues to regard organized labor as 
it does citizen activism in other spheres of public concern: as 
a threat to the Party's hold on power and a potentially 
powerful competitor for allegiance. While legislative 
developments over the last three years now make collective 
bargaining a legal possibility in China, and efforts to develop 
collective labor contracting in some locales have progressed in 
limited respects (e.g., in Guangzhou and Shanghai), China's 
leaders have made clear they will not tolerate an independent 
trade union movement. They do not see such a development as 
potentially helping to relieve the government of the burden of 
social pressures.
    Chinese citizens who sought to establish and operate civil 
society organizations that focused on other issues deemed by 
officials to be ``sensitive,'' including public health 
advocacy, housing rights advocacy, and advocacy on behalf of 
petitioners, ethnic minorities, or adherents of religious and 
spiritual groups, faced intimidation, harassment, and 
punishment. The government continued to tighten its control 
over civil society groups through selective enforcement of 
regulations and through new regulations that make it difficult 
for some civil society organizations to accept tax deductible 
contributions or contributions from overseas donors.
    The government also punished citizens who waged independent 
campaigns seeking greater government accountability. Activists 
who criticized the government for not doing enough to 
investigate the causes of school collapses in the May 2008 
earthquake in Sichuan have been imprisoned. Tibetans engaged in 
environmental protection activities with Party and government 
encouragement found themselves facing imprisonment when their 
popularity soared and they criticized local officials for 
breaking laws that protect endangered animal species. 
Petitioners in many areas of China were mistreated, harassed, 
and detained for their involvement in advocating for housing 
rights and for organizing to protest forced evictions and 
relocations in which the government failed to meet its 
obligations to compensate residents fairly and in accordance 
with the law. Mistreatment of those advocating on behalf of 
individuals who suffered abuse at the hands of population 
planning officials continued.
    Authorities also sought to tighten control over the 
Internet, the influence of which continues to grow, with more 
than 420 million users in China. Officials stepped up 
monitoring and control of blogging, news, video, and social 
networking sites; issued legal measures that could increase 
pressure on Internet companies to censor political content; and 
sought to impose greater legal requirements on those wishing to 
post or host content on the Internet that could lead to self-
censorship of political content for fear of government 
retribution. The government also continued to quash 
attempts by Chinese media to test the boundaries of media 
independence, as illustrated, for example, when an editorial 
calling for reform of China's household registration system 
jointly published in 13 newspapers was removed from the 
Internet, and one of its co-authors was forced to resign his 
position as editor of one of the papers.
    A further example of the Chinese leadership's determination 
to rein in independent sources of influence is the continuing 
ban on Falun Gong. Falun Gong is a spiritual movement 
established in China in the early 1990s based on Chinese 
meditative exercises called qigong. By 1999, the Falun Gong 
movement reportedly had grown to include an estimated 70 to 100 
million followers (also called ``practitioners''). The group 
flourished during the decade following the suppression of the 
Tiananmen democracy movement in June 1989, which many viewed as 
a hopeful development, showing that it was possible, even in 
the wake of the events of June 1989, to build a non-state-
affiliated popular organization in China on a massive scale 
without state support. In 1999, however, the Party announced a 
total ban on Falun Gong, the implementation of which has 
resulted in the harassment, detention, and mental and physical 
abuse of large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners in official 
custody, and in some cases torture and death. The ban remains 
in force today, and authorities regularly intensify crackdowns 
on the Falun Gong movement around events the government deems 
to be sensitive, such as the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.

  Chinese Government's New Rhetoric on Compliance With International 
                           Human Rights Norms

    Chinese officials appear to have adopted a new rhetorical 
strategy with respect to China's compliance with international 
norms. In the past, Chinese officials often argued that it was 
necessary to carve out exceptions and waivers to the 
application of international norms to China. While stating 
their embrace of international norms in the abstract, for 
example, on free expression and the environment, they sought to 
make the case that, in practice, China deserved to be treated 
as an exception, due, for instance, to its status as a 
developing country. Now, however, official statements 
increasingly tend to declare the Chinese government's 
compliance with international norms, even in the face of 
documented noncompliance. For example, in June 2010, the State 
Council Information Office released a white paper presenting 
``the true situation of the development and regulation of the 
Internet in China'' to Chinese citizens and the international 
community. The white paper claims the government ``guarantees 
citizens' freedom of speech on the Internet'' and that its 
model for regulating the Internet is ``consistent with 
international practices.'' One implication of this new 
rhetorical tactic is that it seemingly relieves Chinese 
officials of the burden of arguing from the outset for 
exceptions and waivers to the application of international 
norms to China. Simply declaring compliance shifts the burden 
of persuasion to those who point out the Chinese government's 
noncompliance, placing them in the position of critics of 
China, subject to accusations by Chinese officials of ``finger-
pointing,'' ``China bashing,'' and ``poisoning the atmosphere'' 
for good relations with China. By adopting this new rhetorical 
approach, Chinese officials make respectful, open, and frank 
dialogue with China more difficult, and the approach itself 
underscores how important it is that Members of the U.S. 
Congress and Administration officials not uncritically accept 
Chinese officials' declarations of compliance.
    Chinese officials in the last year also increasingly have 
sought to portray the ``Chinese model'' (zhongguo moshi) as 
consistent with international human rights standards. In an 
April 2010 speech before the National People's Congress 
Standing Committee, for example, State Council Information 
Office Director Wang Chen said the government is campaigning to 
gain global acceptance for its model of Internet control, 
having ``engaged in dialogue and exchanges with more than 70 
countries and international organizations,'' ``countered 
Western enemy forces' smears against us, and enhanced the 
international community's acceptance and understanding of our 
model of managing the Internet.'' This new approach seeks to 
redefine the substance of international human rights standards 
in a manner that legitimizes the Chinese government's 
noncompliance. This new approach appears to be connected with 
debates going on now within China over whether China should 
sign on to, or try to change, the rules of the international 
system.

     Global Economic Conditions and the Expansion of State Control

    The Communist Party is motivated to deliver employment and 
prosperity to inland and rural areas, and not just to coastal 
regions that already have benefited disproportionately from 
economic development, in part in order to demonstrate the 
Party's ability to govern. The global economic downturn has 
dampened demand for Chinese exports, and that has made the 
delivery of employment and prosperity to inland and rural areas 
more challenging for the Party. In these areas, grievances over 
lax enforcement of health and safety standards and of 
environmental and worker rights protections have fueled 
discontent. The corruption and collusion 
between local businesses and local regulatory authorities that 
are associated with lax enforcement have undermined the 
reputation of the Party in these areas. In response, the 
leadership has resorted to expanded state economic and social 
control.
    In the economic sphere, state-owned companies acquired 
private companies at a faster clip in the past year than 
previously. Flush with capital from an economic stimulus 
program of unprecedented magnitude and favored in the awarding 
of infrastructure projects, China's state-owned enterprises 
have expanded easily and squeezed out private firms in some 
sectors. The need to address corruption and collusion between 
private firms and local regulatory officials, however, has 
allowed officials to cast expansion of state control as a 
method for improving accountability and the rule of law. In 
part because corruption and lax enforcement of health and 
safety standards and environmental and worker rights 
protections are the problems that fuel local discontent, 
Chinese citizens have not widely contested the Party's 
justification of expanded state control in these terms.
    At the same time, many Chinese firms, especially state-
owned enterprises, continue to benefit from the Chinese 
government's industrial policies that provide government 
subsidies, preferences, and other benefits. The government also 
has promoted ``indigenous innovation,'' a massive government 
campaign to decrease reliance on foreign technology through 
industrial policies and to enhance China's economy and national 
security, with the stated purpose of enabling China to become a 
global leader in technology by mid-century. Such policies have 
further facilitated the expansion of state control of the 
economy.
    In the social sphere, China's leaders over the last year 
sought to expand control by establishing or strengthening 
existing Party ``branches'' in non-governmental organizations, 
academic institutions, and residential communities. Local 
governments, charged with ``maintaining social stability,'' 
established or strengthened existing ``stability preservation 
offices'' and established new ``stability preservation funds'' 
(weiwen jijin) from which they make payments to people with 
grievances in order to preempt their escalating disputes. Large 
numbers of petitioners availing themselves of China's xinfang 
(``letters and visits'') system for filing grievances against 
the government were harassed, abused, detained illegally, and 
involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospitals or sent to 
``reeducation through labor'' facilities. Officials continued 
to use license suspension and disbarment as methods to control 
human rights lawyers who sought to represent clients in cases 
deemed by authorities to be politically sensitive.

              Misapplication of Law as a Means of Control

    The Communist Party and Chinese government are expanding 
and strengthening the capacity of law and regulation to serve 
as a means to control an increasing number of facets of life in 
China. Officials this past year sought to increase monitoring 
of communication technologies--the Internet and cell phones--
that play a significant role in the daily lives of large 
numbers of Chinese citizens. Officials sought to make it easier 
for the government to identify the source of online content, by 
barring anonymous 
commenting, for example, and passed legal measures that add 
pressure on Internet companies to police the Internet for state 
secrets and for content that authorities allege may ``infringe 
on the rights of others.'' While such moves may be aimed partly 
at legitimate targets of concern, including spam and defamatory 
content, in the Chinese context they also provide opportunities 
and incentives for officials and private companies to censor 
politically sensitive content.
    Authorities increasingly have used the Law on the Control 
of the Exit and Entry of Citizens to manage dissent. Article 8 
of the law allows the government to ban ``persons whose exit 
from the country, in the opinion of the competent department . 
. . [would] be harmful to state security or cause a major loss 
to national interest.'' During this reporting year, authorities 
increasingly cited this provision to prevent rights defenders 
and advocates who are critical of the government from leaving 
China.
    The Party and government also continued to use law to 
entrench a policy framework of state control over religion, as 
well as to exclude some religious communities from the limited 
but important protections afforded to state-sanctioned 
religious groups. In the past year, authorities made use of 
laws concerning property and financial assets to restrict the 
religious freedom of unregistered religious groups. President 
Hu Jintao used the powerful Fifth Tibet Work Forum platform to 
emphasize the Party's role in controlling Tibetan Buddhism and 
the important role of law as a tool to enforce what the Party 
deems to be the ``normal order'' for the religion. The 
government and Party created increasing restraints on the 
exercise of freedom of religion for Tibetan Buddhists by 
strengthening the push to use policy and legal measures to 
shape and control the ``normal order'' for Tibetan Buddhism.
    During this reporting year, China's security and judicial 
institutions' use of laws on ``endangering state security''--a 
category of crimes that includes ``subversion,'' ``splittism,'' 
``leaking state 
secrets,'' and ``inciting'' subversion or splittism--infringed 
upon Chinese citizens' constitutionally protected freedoms of 
speech, religious belief, association, and assembly. For 
example, the government has used the law on splittism to punish 
Tibetans who criticized or peacefully protested government 
policies and then used the law on ``leaking state secrets'' to 
punish Tibetans who attempted to share with other Tibetans 
information about incidents of repression and punishment. 
Authorities also issued regulations in the past year in 
Xinjiang to impose state-defined notions of ``ethnic unity'' 
and to tighten controls over online speech. The imprisonment of 
Uyghur Webmasters and a Uyghur journalist on charges of 
endangering state security, in connection with online postings 
and articles critical of conditions in Xinjiang, underscored 
authorities' use of the Criminal Law to quell free expression. 
The imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo and other activists on inciting 
subversion and leaking state secrets charges after they 
peacefully criticized officials and the Party further 
underscored authorities' use of the Criminal Law to quell free 
expression.

                 Prospects for the Rule of Law in China

    Prospects for human rights and the rule of law in China 
depend not only on decisions taken by officials responsible for 
implementing law and protecting rights at the grassroots, but 
also on decisions taken at the highest levels of the Communist 
Party. The Party, with over 75 million members (roughly 5.7 
percent of China's total population), strives to maintain 
unchallenged rule over a country of more than 1.3 billion 
people. The Party stakes the legitimacy of its claim to rule 
China on its ability to provide both 
stability and prosperity to the Chinese people, and to ``unify 
the country'' (tongyi guojia). The Party leadership regards 
developments that could adversely affect China's one-party 
system as potential threats to stability, prosperity, or unity. 
The rule of law, if implemented faithfully and fairly, should 
benefit not just those the Party favors. Some of China's 
leaders, therefore, regard implementation of the rule of law as 
potentially diminishing the capacity of the Party to maintain 
control.
    Three decades ago, the challenge that reformers within the 
Party faced was to find a way to advance market-oriented 
reforms while ensuring that economic development still bore the 
imprimatur of the Party. They succeeded. The economy boomed, 
and the Party received enough of the credit to enable it to 
maintain its hold on power. The challenge that reformers within 
the Party perceive today is in finding a way to advance the 
rule of law in a manner that results in the law still bearing 
the imprimatur of the Party. Over the last year, senior leaders 
have reiterated positions emphasizing the leading role of the 
Party, the need to adhere to the Party's formulation of 
``socialist democracy,'' and the impossibility of implementing 
``Western-style'' legal and political institutions.
    Motivated by China's dependence on foreign investment, 
China's leaders have appeared to be more nimble in the 
commercial context to accept concepts and practices associated 
with so-called Western-style rule of law. Whether a decrease in 
China's reliance on foreign investment ultimately will be 
associated with change or continuity in this regard remains to 
be seen. The findings of this Annual 
Report suggest, however, as the Commission reported in its last 
Annual Report, that the Party still ``rejects the notion that 
the imperative to uphold the rule of law should preempt the 
Party's role in guiding the functions of the state.'' Chinese 
leaders' actions over the coming months will shed light on 
whether their stated commitment to the rule of law is real. The 
Commission and those who pay close attention to these issues in 
China will watch developments carefully.
    In 2009, the Chinese government issued the 2009-2010 
National Human Rights Action Plan that uses the language of 
human rights to cast an ambitious program for promoting the 
rights of Chinese citizens. The Action Plan has been described 
by some human rights advocates as signifying ``remarkable 
progress'' because in it the Chinese government articulates a 
clearly defined time period (2009-2010) for implementing a 
number of commitments to civil and political rights. The 
findings of this Annual Report document how the Party thus far 
has prioritized strengthening its grip on society over the 
implementation of the commitments to human rights and the rule 
of law set forth in the Chinese government's own Action Plan. 
The Commission urges Members of the U.S. Congress and 
Administration officials to continue to inquire about the 
Chinese government's progress in translating words into action 
and in securing for its citizens the improvements it has set 
forth in its Action Plan. To that end, this Annual Report and 
the information available on the Commission's Web site may 
serve as useful resources.

                          I. Executive Summary

                      Findings and Recommendations

    A summary of specific findings follows below for each 
section of this Annual Report, covering each area that the 
Commission monitors. In each area, the Commission has 
identified a set of issues that merit attention over the next 
year, and, in accordance with the Commission's legislative 
mandate, submits for each a set of recommendations to the 
President and the Congress for legislative or executive action.

                         Freedom of Expression

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, 
        Chinese authorities continued to maintain a wide range 
        of restrictions that deny Chinese citizens their right 
        to freedom of speech as guaranteed under China's 
        Constitution. Chinese officials continued to justify 
        such restrictions on grounds such as protecting state 
        security, minors, or public order. They also 
        asserted that freedom of expression is protected in 
        China, and that restrictions on free expression imposed 
        by the Chinese government meet international standards. 
        In practice, however, authorities continued to misuse 
        vague criminal laws intended to protect state security 
        to instead target peaceful speech critical of the 
        Communist Party or Chinese government. In December 
        2009, a Beijing court sentenced prominent intellectual 
        Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison for ``inciting 
        subversion of state power,'' the longest known sentence 
        for this crime. Liu's offenses were to publish essays 
        online critical of the Communist Party and to help 
        draft and circulate Charter 08, a treatise advocating 
        political reform and human rights circulated online for 
        signatures. Following demonstrations and riots in 
        Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in 
        2009, authorities this past year used state security 
        crimes to imprison a journalist and Web site 
        administrators for expressing or failing to censor 
        views critical of government policies in the region.
         While Chinese citizens now have unprecedented 
        opportunities to express themselves through the 
        Internet and other communication technologies, Chinese 
        officials and private companies, as required by law, 
        continued arbitrarily to remove or block political and 
        religious content. They did so nontransparently and 
        without clearly articulated standards. During the 
        reporting year, Internet users and foreign media in 
        China frequently found that politically sensitive news 
        articles and discussions, including a domestic 
        editorial cartoon that referred to the 1989 Tiananmen 
        protests, had been removed or blocked from the 
        Internet. Despite its noncompliance with international 
        human rights standards, the Chinese government is 
        waging a campaign to gain global acceptance for its 
        model of Internet control.
         This past year, the controversy between the 
        Chinese government and the U.S. company Google 
        highlighted the potential for China's censorship 
        requirements to serve as a trade barrier and to cause 
        companies to stop providing services to Chinese 
        citizens, further limiting the free flow of 
        information.
         In the XUAR, China's maintenance of broad 
        restrictions on the Internet, text messages, and 
        international phone calls, put in place following the 
        July 2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi and only 
        gradually lifted starting in December 2009, illustrated 
        the overbroad scope of China's restrictions on free 
        expression.
         The Communist Party continued to view the news 
        media as a tool to serve the Party's interests, in 
        practice denying citizens their right to freedom of the 
        press as guaranteed under China's Constitution. 
        Throughout the reporting year, the Commission observed 
        numerous instances of officials reportedly prohibiting 
        news media from publishing certain stories, such as a 
        local media interview with U.S. President Barack Obama 
        during his November 2009 trip to China, or punishing 
        news media for publishing certain stories, such as a 
        Chinese domestic joint media editorial criticizing and 
        calling for reform of China's household registration 
        system.
         The government further strengthened its system 
        of ``prior restraints,'' by which the government may 
        deny a person or group the use of a forum for 
        expression in advance of the actual expression. Under 
        this system, any person or group who wishes to publish 
        a newspaper, host a Web site, or work as a journalist 
        must receive permission from the government in the form 
        of license or registration, and may also be required to 
        meet other conditions, including political loyalty or 
        financial requirements. In March 2010, an official 
        announced the government would be tightening entry 
        requirements for journalists by requiring them to pass 
        a qualification exam for which knowledge of ``Chinese 
        Communist Party journalism'' and ``Marxist views'' of 
        news will be required.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Raise concerns over the Chinese government's 
        efforts to gain global acceptance for its model of 
        Internet control and the Chinese government's blanket 
        defense of restrictions on freedom of expression as 
        being in line with international practice, without 
        differentiating between restrictions for legitimate 
        purposes, such as to protect minors, and restrictions 
        for impermissible purposes, such as to silence dissent. 
        Emphasize that such arguments undermine international 
        human rights standards for free expression, 
        particularly those contained in Article 19 of the 
        International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
        and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
        Rights.
         Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese 
        officials on the question of how governments can best 
        ensure that restrictions on freedom of expression are 
        not abused and do not exceed the scope necessary to 
        protect state security, minors, and public order. 
        Emphasize the importance of procedural protections such 
        as public participation in formulation of restrictions 
        on free expression, transparency regarding 
        implementation of such restrictions, and independent 
        judicial review of such restrictions. Reiterate Chinese 
        officials' own calls for greater transparency and 
        public participation in lawmaking. Such discussions may 
        be part of a broader discussion on how both the U.S. 
        and Chinese governments can work together to ensure the 
        protection of common interests, including protecting 
        minors, computer security, and privacy with regard to 
        the Internet.
         Support the research and development of 
        technologies that enable Chinese citizens to access and 
        share political and religious content that they are 
        entitled to access and share under international human 
        rights standards but that is blocked by Chinese 
        officials. Support tools and practices that enable 
        Chinese citizens to access and share such content in a 
        way that ensures their security and privacy.
         Call for the release of Liu Xiaobo and other 
        political prisoners imprisoned on charges of 
        endangering state security and other crimes but whose 
        only offenses were to peacefully express support for 
        political reform or criticism of government policies, 
        including: Tan Zuoren (sentenced in February 2010 to 
        five years in prison after using the Internet to 
        organize an independent investigation into school 
        collapses in an earthquake) and Huang Qi (sentenced in 
        November 2009 to three years in prison for using his 
        human rights Web site to advocate for parents of 
        earthquake victims).

                             Worker Rights

                                Findings

         Workers in China still are not guaranteed, 
        either by law or in practice, full worker rights in 
        accordance with international standards, including the 
        right to organize into independent unions. The All-
        China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the official 
        union under the direction of the Communist Party, is 
        the only legal trade union organization in China. All 
        lower level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU 
        and must align with its overarching political concerns 
        of maintaining ``social stability'' and economic 
        growth.
         Labor disputes and officials' concern with 
        maintaining ``social stability'' intensified over this 
        reporting year as layoffs, wage arrears, and poor and 
        unsafe working conditions persisted. Growing concern on 
        the part of local governments to maintain economic 
        growth and employment continued to prompt some 
        localities to respond to labor laws that took effect in 
        2008 (the Labor Contract Law, Employment Promotion Law, 
        and Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law) with 
        local opinions and regulations of their own that 
        weakened some employee-friendly aspects of these laws. 
        Interpretation of these laws across localities has not 
        been consistent, leading to their ``regionalization'' 
        and ``loopholization.''
         During the spring and summer of 2010, Chinese 
        and international media and non-governmental 
        organizations reported on a spate of worker actions--
        from a succession of strikes to suicides at a factory 
        compound--at various enterprises in China, mostly 
        foreign invested, that garnered attention in China and 
        around the world. Unofficial reports suggest that the 
        striking workers' primary demand was higher wages. In a 
        number of strikes workers called for existing All-China 
        Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)-affiliated unions to 
        behave more independently within the confines of 
        Chinese law. Some of the strikes and demands for higher 
        wages during 2010 may not be a sign of continued 
        weakness on the part of workers vis-a-vis management. 
        Rather, they may reveal that workers in some cases have 
        been emboldened not only by worker rights codified in 
        labor laws that took effect in 2008, but also by a 
        tighter labor market.
         In response to collective labor action that 
        was organized and large-scale, the Chinese government 
        continued to redirect labor disputes away from the 
        formal channels of arbitration and litigation toward 
        more ``flexible'' and ``grassroots-level'' negotiation 
        and mediation. These forms of dispute resolution often 
        relied on coordination among levels of local government 
        (e.g., provincial, city, town, etc.), involving local 
        government and Party units, the official trade union, 
        and the police and security apparatus.
         Backlogs in the handling of labor dispute 
        cases continued to exceed time limits mandated by law. 
        In addition to large increases in arbitrated cases, 
        labor dispute cases also continued to deluge Chinese 
        courts. In some cases, these disputes were the result 
        of strong dissatisfaction with arbitration proceedings, 
        as most arbitrated cases can be reviewed in a court if 
        either side is dissatisfied. In other cases, the 
        increase reflected the strong and growing rights 
        consciousness of Chinese workers who turned to new 
        protections offered in labor laws that took effect in 
        2008.
         Migrant workers continued to face 
        discrimination in urban areas, and their children still 
        faced difficulties accessing city schools. Employment 
        discrimination more generally continued to be a serious 
        problem, and plaintiffs brought a growing number of 
        anti-discrimination suits under China's Employment 
        Promotion Law.
         During the 2010 reporting year, enforcement of 
        China's Labor Contract Law continued to be uneven or 
        selective. Even as reported statistics show increases 
        in the number of labor contracts signed, formal 
        employment in China continues to erode, especially for 
        unskilled urban workers and rural 
        migrants. There have been reports of employers 
        concluding multiple contracts per worker in order to 
        avoid payment of overtime; replacing older workers with 
        younger workers to avoid longer-term contracts; using 
        contract expiration as a method for laying off formal 
        employees during economic slowdowns; and refusing to 
        hire employees who insist on exercising their right to 
        conclude a labor contract. Studies by Chinese 
        researchers suggest that substantial numbers of Chinese 
        workers report that their actual work hours are 
        different from the hours specified in their labor 
        contracts.
         The ACFTU during the reporting year has 
        appeared to be more willing to address the issue of 
        worker representation. One ACFTU official stated that, 
        ``in mitigating labour disputes, the fundamental issue 
        is to establish a collective bargaining system that 
        would allow labour disputes to be managed and resolved 
        within the enterprise.'' Following worker strikes at a 
        number of foreign-invested manufacturing facilities 
        during this reporting year, officials in the southern 
        Chinese province of Guangdong accelerated action on 
        draft Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management. 
        In September, the Guangdong People's Congress Standing 
        Committee reportedly delayed further deliberation of 
        the draft. Heavy lobbying by members of the Hong Kong 
        industrial community, many of whom own and operate 
        factories in Southern China, reportedly played a role 
        in the Standing Committee's decision. However, 
        Guangdong's draft regulations are particularly 
        noteworthy in that they specifically grant workers the 
        right to demand the initiation of collective wage 
        consultations--a right that typically has been reserved 
        for unions. Guangdong and other localities, including 
        Beijing, Hainan, and Tianjin, also have issued guidance 
        notices and regulations specifying the legal rights of 
        parties involved in collective consultations.
         The Chinese government's complicated and time-
        consuming work-related injury compensation procedure 
        continued to be a major problem for China's injured 
        workers. The process is further complicated for migrant 
        workers who may already have left their jobs and moved 
        to another location by the time clinical symptoms 
        surface. Workers more generally also continued to face 
        persistent occupational safety issues. Collusion 
        between mine operators and local government officials 
        reportedly remains widespread, leading to lax 
        enforcement of health and safety standards. 
        Prohibitions on independent organizing limit workers' 
        ability to promote safer working conditions.
         China's new generation of migrant workers, 
        unlike their parents, have higher expectations with 
        regard to wages and labor rights. Younger workers, born 
        in the 1980s and 1990s, reportedly were at the 
        forefront of worker strikes that took place this past 
        year across China. Together, they make up about 100 
        million of China's total pool of migrant workers. In an 
        essay describing the characteristics of the new 
        generation of migrant workers, China's Agricultural 
        Minister Han Changfu pointed out that many of these 
        young workers have never laid down roots, are better 
        educated, are the only child in the family, and are 
        more likely to ``demand, like their urban peers, equal 
        employment, equal access to social services, and even 
        the obtainment of equal political rights.''
         In 2010, the Commission followed several 
        reports alleging that Chinese state-owned enterprises 
        utilized prison labor sent from China at their overseas 
        worksites. Chinese prisoners reportedly have worked on 
        housing and other infrastructure projects such as ports 
        and railroads outside of China. One report indicated 
        that transporting workers from China is standard 
        practice for some Chinese companies operating outside 
        of China and sometimes includes prisoners and those who 
        are on parole. China's Law on the Control of the Exit 
        and Entry of Citizens states that ``approval to exit 
        from the country shall not be granted to . . . 
        convicted persons serving their sentences.''

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support projects promoting legal reform intended 
        to ensure that labor laws and regulations reflect 
        internationally recognized labor principles. Prioritize 
        projects that do not focus only on legislative drafting 
        and regulatory development, but that analyze 
        implementation and measure progress in terms of 
        compliance with internationally recognized labor 
        principles at the grassroots.
         Support multi-year pilot projects that showcase 
        the experience of collective bargaining in action for 
        both Chinese workers and trade union officials; and 
        identify local trade union offices found to be more 
        open to collective bargaining and focus pilot projects 
        in their locales. Where possible, prioritize programs 
        that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective 
        bargaining pilot projects even in factories that do not 
        have an official union presence. Encourage the 
        expansion of exchanges between Chinese labor rights 
        advocates in NGOs, the bar, academia, and the official 
        trade union, and U.S. collective bargaining 
        practitioners. Prioritize exchanges that emphasize 
        face-to-face meetings with hands-on practitioners and 
        trainers.
         Encourage research that identifies factors 
        underlying inconsistency in enforcement of labor laws 
        and regulations. This includes projects that prioritize 
        the large-scale compilation and analysis of Chinese 
        labor dispute litigation and arbitration cases, and 
        guidance documents issued by and to courts at the 
        provincial level and below, leading ultimately to the 
        publication and dissemination of Chinese language 
        casebooks that may be used as a common reference 
        resource by workers, arbitrators, judges, lawyers, 
        employers, union officials, and law schools in China.
         Support capacity-building programs to strengthen 
        Chinese labor and legal aid organizations involved in 
        defending the rights of workers. Encourage Chinese 
        officials at local levels to develop, maintain, and 
        deepen relationships with labor organizations based in 
        Hong Kong and elsewhere, and to invite these groups to 
        increase the number of training programs on the 
        mainland. Support programs that train workers in ways 
        to identify problems at the factory floor level, 
        equipping them with skills and problem-solving training 
        so they can relate their concerns to employers 
        effectively.
         Where appropriate, share the United States' 
        ongoing experience and efforts in protecting worker 
        rights--via legal, regulatory, or non-governmental 
        means--with Chinese officials. Facilitate site visits 
        and other exchanges for Chinese officials to observe 
        and share ideas with U.S. labor rights groups, lawyers, 
        the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and other 
        regulatory agencies at all levels of government that 
        work on labor issues. Encourage discussion on the value 
        of constructive interactions among labor non-
        governmental organizations, workers, employers, and 
        government agencies; encourage exchanges that emphasize 
        the importance of government transparency in developing 
        stable labor relations and in ensuring full and fair 
        enforcement of labor laws. Support USDOL's exchanges 
        with China's Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
        Security (MOHRSS) regarding setting and enforcing 
        minimum wage standards, strengthening social insurance, 
        improving employment statistics, and promoting social 
        dialogue. Support the annual labor dialogue with China 
        that USDOL started this year and plans for further 
        progress in bilateral labor relations.

                            Criminal Justice

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, 
        the Chinese government took steps to limit the 
        prevalence of coerced confessions and illegally 
        obtained evidence within the judicial system. In May 
        2010, five Chinese law enforcement agencies 
        announced two new regulations that intend to limit the 
        use of torture by police and prosecutors in criminal, 
        particularly death penalty, cases. Over the 2010 
        reporting year, police torture and coerced confessions 
        continued to be widely reported by international and 
        domestic organizations.
         Citing concerns over social tensions, Chinese 
        authorities have promoted local and nationwide anti-
        crime campaigns to stem reported rising crime rates. In 
        June 2010, China launched the fourth round of its 
        national ``strike hard'' campaign in a massive seven-
        month crackdown on violent crimes and escalating social 
        conflicts. ``Strike hard'' campaigns and anti-crime 
        crackdowns have been tied to unusually harsh law 
        enforcement tactics, quick trials, and violations of 
        China's own criminal procedure laws and regulations.
         During this reporting year, Chinese judicial 
        officials contravened provisions in China's Criminal 
        Procedure Law that require courts to provide access to 
        criminal trials for any observer, regardless of 
        citizenship, except where the law specifically 
        prohibits an open trial.
         Harassment and intimidation of human rights 
        advocates by Chinese government officials continued 
        during this reporting year. Public security authorities 
        and unofficial personnel unlawfully monitored rights 
        defenders, petitioners, religious adherents, human 
        rights lawyers, and their family members, and subjected 
        them to periodic illegal home confinement. Such 
        mistreatment and abuse was evident particularly in the 
        leadup to sensitive dates and events, such as U.S. 
        President Barack Obama's visit in November 2009 and the 
        Shanghai 2010 World Expo.
         Chinese officials continued to use various 
        forms of extralegal detention against Chinese citizens, 
        including petitioners, peaceful protesters, and other 
        individuals considered to be ``involved in issues 
        deemed sensitive by authorities.'' Some of those 
        arbitrarily detained were held in psychiatric hospitals 
        or extralegal detention facilities, such as ``black 
        jails,'' and subjected to treatment inconsistent with 
        international standards and protections found under 
        China's Constitution and Criminal Procedure Law.
         Chinese criminal defense lawyers continue to 
        confront obstacles to practicing law without judicial 
        interference or fear of prosecution. In politically 
        sensitive cases throughout China, criminal defense 
        attorneys routinely faced harassment and abuse. Some 
        suspects and defendants in sensitive cases were not 
        able to have counsel of their own choosing; some were 
        compelled to accept government-appointed defense 
        counsel. Abuses of Article 306 of the Criminal Law, 
        which assigns criminal liability to lawyers that force 
        or induce a witness to change his or her testimony or 
        falsify evidence, continue to hamper the effectiveness 
        of criminal defense.
         In August 2010, the National People's Congress 
        reviewed the first draft of the proposed eighth 
        amendment to China's Criminal Law, which reportedly 
        calls for reducing the current 68 crimes punishable by 
        death to 55 crimes. The reduction would signal the 
        first time the Chinese government has reduced the 
        number of crimes punishable by capital punishment since 
        the Criminal Law was enacted in 1979.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Press the Chinese government to adopt the 
        recommendation of the UN Committee against Torture to 
        investigate and disclose the existence of black jails 
        and other secret detention 
        facilities, as a first step toward abolishing such 
        forms of extralegal detention. Ask the Chinese 
        government to extend an invitation to the UN Working 
        Group on Arbitrary Detention to visit China.
         Call on the Chinese government to guarantee the 
        rights of criminal suspects and defendants in 
        accordance with international human rights standards 
        and provide the international community with a specific 
        timetable for its ratification of the International 
        Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the 
        Chinese government signed in 1998, but has not 
        ratified. Press the Chinese government to adhere to 
        protections for criminal suspects and defendants 
        asserted in its 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action 
        Plan, and encourage the publication and broad 
        dissemination of fully detailed reports and updates on 
        local government implementation of the Action Plan.
         Urge the Chinese government to amend its Criminal 
        Procedure Law to reflect the enhanced protections and 
        rights for lawyers and detained suspects contained in 
        the 2008 revision of the Lawyers Law. Encourage Chinese 
        officials to commit to a specific timetable for 
        revision and implementation of the revised Criminal 
        Procedure Law.
         Make clear that the international community 
        regards as laudable the commitments to fair trial 
        rights and detainee rights the Chinese government made 
        in its 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan. 
        Request information on the formalization of those 
        commitments into laws and regulations and on what 
        further steps it will take to ensure their successful 
        implementation, and support bilateral and multilateral 
        cooperation and dialogue to support such efforts.

                          Freedom of Religion

                                Findings

         China's Constitution guarantees ``freedom of 
        religious belief'' but protects only ``normal religious 
        activities,'' and the government's restrictive 
        framework toward religion continued in the past year to 
        prevent Chinese citizens from exercising their right to 
        freedom of religion in line with international human 
        rights standards.
         Some Chinese citizens had space to practice 
        their religion, but the Chinese government continued to 
        exert tight control over the affairs of state-
        sanctioned religious communities and to repress 
        religious and spiritual activities falling outside the 
        scope of Communist Party-sanctioned practice. The 
        government maintained requirements that religious 
        organizations register with the government and submit 
        to the leadership of ``patriotic religious 
        associations'' created by the Party to lead China's 
        five recognized religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, 
        Taoism, Islam, and Protestantism.
         Unregistered groups risked harassment, 
        detention, imprisonment, and other abuses, as did 
        members of registered groups deemed to deviate from 
        state-sanctioned activities. Variations in 
        implementation allowed some unregistered groups to 
        function in China, but such tolerance was arbitrary and 
        did not amount to the full protection of these groups' 
        rights.
         As leadership in the State Administration for 
        Religious Affairs changed in the past year, authorities 
        continued to affirm policies of control over religion. 
        Despite articulating a ``positive role'' for religious 
        communities in China, officials did not then use the 
        notion of this ``positive role'' to promote religious 
        freedom, but rather used the sentiment to bolster 
        support for state economic and social goals.
         The government continued to use law to control 
        religious practice rather than protect the religious 
        freedom of all Chinese citizens. The government 
        continued to pass legal measures that provide some 
        legal protections for registered religious communities, 
        but condition many activities on government oversight 
        or approval and exclude unregistered groups from 
        limited state protections.
         China's diverse religious communities faced 
        various state controls over their affairs, and in some 
        cases, harassment, detention, and other abuses. 
        Authorities continued to control Buddhist institutions 
        and practices and take steps to curb ``unauthorized'' 
        Buddhist temples. The government and Party placed 
        increasing restraints on the exercise of freedom of 
        religion for Tibetan Buddhists and continued to punish 
        Tibetan Buddhists for openly expressing their devotion 
        to the Dalai Lama. The government and Party continued 
        to deny members of the registered Catholic church the 
        freedom to recognize the authority of the Holy See to 
        select Chinese bishops, while authorities continued to 
        harass and hold some unregistered priests and bishops 
        under surveillance or in detention. Authorities across 
        the country used the specter of ``extremism'' to 
        bolster state interference in how Muslims interpreted 
        and practiced their religion. Conditions for religious 
        freedom for Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region continued to worsen as authorities integrated 
        controls over Muslims' religious freedom into far-
        reaching security crackdowns. Chinese authorities 
        continued to impose state-defined interpretations of 
        theology on registered Protestant communities and to 
        harass and, in some cases, detain and imprison members 
        of unregistered Protestant churches, while also razing 
        church property. Authorities maintained controls over 
        Taoist activities and took steps to curb ``feudal 
        superstitious activities.''
         During this reporting year, the Chinese 
        government maintained a ``strike hard'' campaign that 
        it has carried out against Falun Gong practitioners for 
        more than a decade, continuing its harassment and 
        intimidation of Falun Gong practitioners and lawyers 
        who defend Falun Gong clients. Local governments 
        throughout the Shanghai municipal area and surrounding 
        provinces reported mobilizing security forces to target 
        Falun Gong practitioners in preparation for the 
        Shanghai 2010 World Expo, and the 6-10 Office, whose 
        activities continued to expand during this reporting 
        year, spearheaded the Shanghai Expo crackdown.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to 
        all citizens freedom of religion in accordance with 
        Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
        and to remove its framework for recognizing only select 
        religious communities for 
        limited state protections. Stress to Chinese 
        authorities that all citizens are entitled to enjoy 
        freedom of religion as a fundamental human right, 
        regardless of whether they practice religion in a way 
        deemed to contribute to state economic and social 
        goals.
         Call for the release of Chinese citizens 
        confined, detained, or imprisoned in retaliation for 
        pursuing their right to freedom of religion (including 
        the right to hold and exercise spiritual beliefs). Such 
        prisoners include: Sonam Lhatso (Tibetan Buddhist nun 
        sentenced in 2009 to 10 years' imprisonment after she 
        and other nuns staged a protest calling for Tibetan 
        independence and the Dalai Lama's long life and return 
        to Tibet); Su Zhimin (an unregistered Catholic bishop 
        who ``disappeared'' after being taken into police 
        custody in 1996); Wang Zhiwen (Falun Gong practitioner 
        serving a 16-year sentence for organizing peaceful 
        protests by Falun Gong practitioners in 1999); Yusufjan 
        and Memetjan (university students who are members of a 
        Muslim religious group and were detained in May 2009 
        when members of the group met on a university campus); 
        Yang Rongli and Wang Xiaoguang (house church pastors 
        sentenced to 7 and 3 years, respectively, in 2009 in 
        connection to their activities leading an unregistered 
        congregation), as well as other prisoners mentioned in 
        this report and in the Commission's Political Prisoner 
        Database.
         Call on the Chinese government to end 
        interference in the internal affairs of religious 
        communities and stress to the Chinese government that 
        freedom of religion includes: the freedom of Buddhists 
        to carry out activities in temples independent of state 
        controls over religion, and the freedom of Tibetan 
        Buddhists to express openly their respect or devotion 
        to Tibetan Buddhist teachers, including the Dalai Lama; 
        the freedom of Catholics to recognize the authority of 
        the Pope to make bishop appointments; the freedom of 
        Taoists to interpret their faith free from state 
        efforts to ban practices deemed as ``feudal 
        superstitions''; the right of Falun Gong practitioners 
        to freely practice Falun Gong inside China; the right 
        of Muslims to interpret theology free from state 
        interference and not face curbs on their 
        internationally protected right to freedom of religion 
        in the name of upholding ``stability''; and the right 
        of Protestants to worship free from state controls over 
        doctrine and to worship in unregistered house churches, 
        free from harassment, detention, and other abuses.
         Support initiatives to provide technical 
        assistance to the Chinese government in drafting legal 
        provisions that protect, rather than restrain, freedom 
        of religion for all Chinese citizens. Support training 
        classes for Chinese officials on international human 
        rights standards for the protection of freedom of 
        religion.
         Support non-governmental organizations that 
        collect information on conditions for religious freedom 
        in China and that inform Chinese citizens of how to 
        defend their right to freedom of religion against 
        Chinese government abuses.

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

                                Findings

         Chinese law provides for a system of 
        ``regional ethnic autonomy'' in designated areas with 
        ethnic minority populations, but shortcomings in the 
        substance and implementation of this system have 
        prevented ethnic minorities from enjoying meaningful 
        autonomy in practice. The Chinese government maintained 
        policies in the past year that prevented ethnic 
        minorities from ``administering their internal 
        affairs'' as guaranteed in Chinese law and from 
        enjoying their rights in line with international human 
        rights standards. While the Chinese government 
        maintained some protections in law and practice for 
        ethnic minority rights, it continued to impose the 
        fundamental terms upon which Chinese citizens could 
        express their ethnicity and to prevent ethnic 
        minorities from enjoying their cultures, religions, and 
        languages free from state interference, in violation of 
        international human rights standards.
         Among the 55 groups the Chinese government 
        designates as minority ethnic groups, state repression 
        was harshest toward groups deemed to challenge state 
        authority, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
        Region, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Tibet 
        Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous areas.
         The Chinese government continued in the past 
        year to assert the effectiveness of state laws and 
        policies in upholding the rights of ethnic minorities, 
        following domestic protests and international criticism 
        of the government's treatment of ethnic minorities. The 
        Chinese government and Communist Party strengthened 
        ``ethnic unity'' campaigns as a vehicle for spreading 
        state policy on ethnic issues throughout Chinese 
        society and for imposing state-defined interpretations 
        of the history, relations, and current conditions of 
        ethnic groups in China.
         Chinese leaders pledged to refine and improve 
        conditions for ethnic minorities, within the parameters 
        of existing Party policy, issuing some policy documents 
        in the past year which may bring mixed results in the 
        protection of ethnic minorities' rights. The Chinese 
        government's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action 
        Plan issued in April 2009 outlined measures to support 
        ethnic minority populations in China.
         The Chinese government maintained economic 
        development policies that prioritize state economic 
        goals over the protection of ethnic minorities' rights. 
        Despite bringing some benefits to ethnic minority areas 
        and residents, such policies also have conflicted with 
        ethnic minorities' rights to maintain traditional 
        livelihoods, spurred migration to ethnic minority 
        regions, promoted unequal allocation of resources 
        favoring Han Chinese, intensified linguistic and 
        assimilation pressures on local communities, and 
        resulted in environmental damage.
         Authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
        Region continued in the past year to restrict 
        independent expressions of ethnic identity among 
        Mongols and to interfere with their preservation of 
        traditional livelihoods, while enforcing campaigns to 
        promote stability and ethnic unity.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Fund rule-of-law programs and exchange programs 
        that raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different 
        models for governance that protect ethnic minorities' 
        rights and allow them to exercise meaningful autonomy 
        over their affairs, in line with both domestic Chinese 
        law and international human rights standards. Fund 
        programs that promote models for sustainable 
        development that draw on participation from ethnic 
        minority communities.
         Support non-governmental organizations that 
        address human rights conditions for ethnic minorities 
        in China to enable them to continue their research and 
        develop programs to help ethnic minorities increase 
        their capacity to protect their rights. Encourage such 
        organizations to develop training programs to promote 
        sustainable development among ethnic minorities, 
        programs to protect ethnic minority languages and 
        cultures, and programs that research rights abuses in 
        the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Encourage broader 
        human rights and rule-of-law programs that operate in 
        China to develop programs to address issues affecting 
        ethnic minorities in China.
         Call on the Chinese government to release people 
        detained or imprisoned for advocating for the rights of 
        ethnic minority citizens, including Mongol rights 
        advocate Hada (serving a 15-year sentence after 
        pursuing activities to promote Mongols' rights and 
        democracy) and other prisoners mentioned in this report 
        and in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
         Support organizations that can monitor the 
        Chinese government's compliance with stated commitments 
        to protect ethnic minorities' rights, including as 
        articulated in the government's 2009-2010 National 
        Human Rights Action Plan and in international law that 
        the Chinese government is bound to uphold. Provide 
        support for organizations that can provide assistance 
        in implementing programs in a manner that draws on 
        participation from communities involved and ensures the 
        protection of their rights.

                          Population Planning

                                Findings

         Chinese authorities continued to implement 
        population planning policies that interfere with and 
        control the reproductive lives of women, employing 
        various methods including fines, cancellation of state 
        benefits and permits, forced sterilization, forced 
        abortion, arbitrary detention, and other abuses.
         Human rights abuses by officials charged with 
        implementing population planning policies continue 
        despite provisions in Chinese law that prohibit such 
        abuses. China's 2002 Population and Family Planning Law 
        (PFPL) states in Article 4 that officials ``shall 
        perform their administrative duties strictly in 
        accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil 
        manner, and they may not infringe upon the legitimate 
        rights and interests of citizens.'' The PFPL also 
        states in Article 39 that ``any functionary of a State 
        organ who commits one of the following acts in the work 
        of family planning, if the act constitutes a crime, 
        shall be investigated for criminal liability in 
        accordance with the law; if it does not constitute a 
        crime, he shall be given an administrative sanction 
        with law; his unlawful gains, if any, shall be 
        confiscated: (1) infringing on a citizen's personal 
        rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and 
        interests; (2) abusing his power, neglecting his duty, 
        or engaging in malpractices for personal gain . . . .''
         The Commission observed in 2010 a greater 
        number of reports confirming its 2009 finding that some 
        local governments are specifically targeting migrant 
        workers for forced abortions.
         The Commission noted that increased public 
        awareness of the demographic and social consequences of 
        the Chinese government's population planning policy in 
        the 2010 reporting year led to public debate among 
        Chinese experts and government officials regarding the 
        need for policy reform. However, top Communist Party 
        and government leaders continue to publicly defend the 
        policy and rule out reform in the near term.
         The Chinese government's population planning 
        policies continue to exacerbate the country's highly 
        skewed sex ratio. Reports in the last year, however, 
        emphasized how population planning policies exacerbate 
        other demographic challenges as well, including a 
        rapidly aging population and a decline in working age 
        population.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Urge the Chinese government to vigorously enforce 
        provisions under Chinese law that provide for 
        punishments of officials and other individuals who 
        violate the rights of citizens when implementing 
        population planning policies. Urge the Chinese 
        government to establish penalties, including specific 
        criminal and financial penalties, for officials and 
        individuals found to commit abuses such as coercive 
        abortion and coercive sterilization, which continue in 
        China despite provisions under existing laws and 
        regulations intended to prohibit them.
         Urge Chinese officials to cease coercive methods 
        of enforcing birth control quotas. Urge the Chinese 
        government to dismantle coercive population controls 
        and provide greater reproductive freedom and privacy 
        for women.
         Call on Chinese officials to permit greater 
        public discussion and debate concerning population 
        planning policies and to demonstrate greater 
        responsiveness to public concerns. Support the 
        development of programs and international cooperation 
        on legal aid and training programs that help citizens 
        pursue compensation under China's newly amended State 
        Compensation Law, and other remedies against the state 
        for injury suffered as a result of official abuse 
        related to China's population planning policies.

                   Freedom of Residence and Movement

                                Findings

         The Chinese government's household 
        registration (hukou) system, first implemented in the 
        1950s, continues to limit the right of Chinese citizens 
        formally to establish their permanent place of 
        residence. Implementation and enforcement of some hukou 
        measures resulted in discrimination against rural hukou 
        holders who migrate to urban areas. Most frequently, 
        hukou is used to deny social benefits such as education 
        and subsidized healthcare to migrant workers in cities. 
        The discriminatory effects are especially prominent in 
        the area of education.
         Authorities continued during the Commission's 
        2010 reporting period to relax some hukou restrictions 
        consistent with earlier reforms. Guangzhou municipality 
        instituted reforms to unify rural and urban hukou into 
        a single residential hukou. Chongqing municipality 
        initiated gradual voluntary hukou 
        reforms aimed at increasing the percentage of urban 
        hukou holders. The effects of these reforms are unclear 
        pending ongoing implementation.
         The Chinese government and Communist Party 
        exercised strict control over public debate on hukou 
        reforms during the 2010 reporting year. Authorities 
        removed from the Internet a joint editorial published 
        by 13 newspapers that decried the hukou system as 
        corrupt and in need of speedy reform. A coauthor of the 
        piece was forced to resign his position as deputy 
        editor of a major newspaper.
         The Chinese government continued to impose 
        restrictions on Chinese citizens' right to travel in a 
        manner that is inconsistent with international human 
        rights standards. During the Commission's 2010 
        reporting year, Chinese government authorities 
        arbitrarily barred rights defenders, advocates, and 
        critics from entering and leaving China. Officials 
        refused to renew passports to rights advocates and 
        subsequently cited invalid passports as grounds to 
        prevent entry. In some instances, no reasons for the 
        travel ban were provided.
         The Chinese government continued to use 
        coercive measures to restrict Chinese advocates', 
        rights defenders', and dissidents' liberty of movement 
        within China, especially during politically sensitive 
        periods, including the months leading up to the 
        Shanghai 2010 World Expo. Authorities used measures 
        such as surveillance, police presence outside of one's 
        home, ``invitations'' to tea with police, forced trips, 
        detention, removal from one's home, reeducation through 
        labor, and imprisonment.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support programs, organizations, and exchanges 
        with Chinese policymakers and academic institutions 
        engaged in research and outreach to migrant workers 
        that provide legal 
        assistance to migrant workers and encourage policy 
        debates on the hukou system.
         Encourage U.S. academic and public policy 
        institutions and experts to consult with the Commission 
        on avenues for outreach to Chinese academic and public 
        policy figures engaged in policy debates on reform of 
        the hukou system.
         Stress to Chinese government officials that the 
        Chinese government's noncompliance with international 
        standards regarding freedom of movement inside China 
        negatively impacts confidence outside China in the 
        Chinese government's commitment to international 
        standards more generally.
         Raise specifically Chinese authorities' 
        restriction on the liberty of movement of rights 
        defenders, advocates, and critics including writer Liao 
        Yiwu, advocate Feng Zhenghu, economist Ilham Tohti, 
        professor Cui Weiping, writer Liu Xia (wife of 
        imprisoned intellectual Liu Xiaobo), and democracy 
        advocates Ding Zilin, Qi Zhiyong, and Li Hai.

                            Status of Women

                                Findings

         Chinese officials continued to promote 
        existing laws that aim to protect women's rights, 
        including the amended Law on the Protection of Women's 
        Rights and Interests and the amended Marriage Law; 
        however, inconsistent interpretation, selective 
        implementation, and selective enforcement of these laws 
        across localities limit progress on concrete 
        protections of women's rights.
         Recent statistics show increases in women 
        holding positions at the central, provincial, and 
        municipal levels of government.
         Female political representation at the village 
        level remains low, due in part to the traditional 
        patriarchal system still in play in parts of rural 
        China. Villages typically have a high rate of ``self-
        governance'' with regard to issues such as land 
        contracts, profit distribution from collectives, and 
        land requisition compensation, and with limited 
        decisionmaking power in village committees, women's 
        interests are less likely to be represented in village 
        rules and regulations, as well as in land disputes.
         The Chinese government is committed under 
        Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
        Social and Cultural Rights and Article 11 of the 
        Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
        Discrimination Against Women to ensuring gender 
        equality in employment. While China's existing laws 
        such as the Labor Law, amended Law on the Protection of 
        Women's Rights and Interests, and Employment Promotion 
        Law prohibit gender discrimination, they lack clear 
        definitions and enforcement mechanisms, which weakens 
        their effectiveness. Women continue to experience 
        widespread discrimination in areas including 
        recruitment, wages, and retirement. The Shenzhen 
        Municipal Women's Federation announced draft 
        regulations during the Commission's 2010 reporting year 
        to promote gender equality in employment in the 
        Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.
         Sexual harassment remains prevalent in China, 
        and victims of sexual harassment face several 
        legislative, cultural, and social obstacles in 
        protecting their rights. China's amended Law on the 
        Protection of Women's Rights and Interests (LPWRI) 
        prohibits sexual harassment and provides an avenue of 
        recourse for victims through either administrative 
        punishment for offenders or civil action in the 
        people's court system; however, the LPWRI does not 
        provide a clear definition of sexual harassment or 
        specific standards and procedures for prevention and 
        punishment.
         Domestic violence remains pervasive, affecting 
        nearly one-third of China's 270 million families. 
        Advocates continue to call for comprehensive national-
        level legislation that clearly defines domestic 
        violence, assigns responsibilities to government and 
        civil society organizations to address it, and outlines 
        punishments for offenders. The All-China Women's 
        Federation proposed draft national legislation this 
        year, but it remains to be seen whether this or other 
        such drafts are entered into the legislative agenda.
         China's increasingly skewed sex ratio, which 
        some researchers attribute to government-imposed birth 
        limits and a traditional cultural bias for sons, may 
        lead to continued or 
        increased forced prostitution, forced marriages, and 
        human trafficking.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support programs in China that increase awareness 
        of judicial and law enforcement personnel regarding 
        domestic violence and sexual harassment and increase 
        women's leadership training through U.S.-China 
        exchanges and international conferences.
         Support legal programs that promote women's land 
        rights, especially in rural areas, and urge higher 
        levels of government to increase supervision over 
        village committees to ensure that village rules and 
        regulations are in accordance with national-level laws 
        and policies and to ensure adequate protection of 
        women's rights and interests.
         Urge the Chinese government to further revise the 
        Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests 
        or enact new comprehensive national-level legislation 
        to provide a clear definition of sexual harassment and 
        specific standards and procedures for prevention and 
        punishment. Inquire into whether 
        officials in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone have 
        placed gender equality regulations on the legislative 
        plan, whether they intend to make drafts available for 
        public comment, and if so, how long the public comment 
        period will be and to whom will they make drafts 
        available for comment.
         Urge the Chinese government to enact 
        comprehensive national-level legislation that clearly 
        defines domestic violence, assigns responsibilities of 
        government and civil society organizations in 
        addressing it, and outlines punishments for offenders. 
        Call for the release of such legislation in draft form 
        for public comment.
         Urge the Chinese government to establish an 
        enforcement mechanism for implementation of provisions 
        in China's Labor Law, amended Law on the Protection of 
        Women's Rights and Interests, and Employment Promotion 
        Law that prohibit 
        gender discrimination. Urge Chinese officials to 
        specifically address gender discrimination in 
        recruitment, wages, and retirement.

                           Human Trafficking

                                Findings

         The Chinese government voted to accede to the 
        UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
        in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP 
        Protocol) in December 2009, after several years of 
        stating its intent to do so.
         The legal definition of trafficking under 
        Chinese law does not conform to international 
        standards. Article 240 of China's Criminal Law defines 
        the trafficking of persons as ``abducting, kidnapping, 
        buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or 
        transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of 
        selling the victim.'' Because this definition is 
        narrower in scope than the definition provided in 
        Article 3 of the UN TIP Protocol, it imposes limits on 
        the Chinese government's prosecution of traffickers, 
        protection of victims, and funding of anti-trafficking 
        programs.
         China remains a country of origin, transit, 
        and destination for human trafficking and abductions. 
        The majority of trafficking cases are domestic and 
        involve trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced 
        labor, and forced marriage.
         The Chinese government continues to deport 
        North Korean refugees under the classification of 
        ``economic migrants,'' without legal alternatives for 
        victims of trafficking.
         The Chinese government made some efforts to 
        eliminate trafficking and comply with trafficking-
        related international human rights standards during the 
        Commission's 2010 reporting period. Authorities 
        investigated, prosecuted, and prevented some 
        trafficking crimes, especially domestic trafficking 
        cases, and those involving the abduction of women for 
        forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation.
         In April 2010, the Supreme People's Court, the 
        Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of 
        Justice, and the Ministry of Public Security jointly 
        issued the Opinion on Lawful Punishment for the Crime 
        of Abducting and Selling Women and Children. The 
        guideline may improve investigation and filing of cases 
        involving the trafficking of women under 18 years of 
        age.
         Officials continued to take steps to increase 
        collaboration with other countries, regions, and 
        international organizations on victim identification, 
        repatriation, and criminal prosecution. For example, 
        some local governments in Yunnan province and Guangxi 
        Zhuang Autonomous Region set up liaison offices with 
        the governments of bordering countries including Laos, 
        Vietnam, and Cambodia to cooperate on anti-trafficking 
        efforts.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Urge the Chinese government to abide by its 
        commitment under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
        and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
        Children, revise the government's definition of 
        trafficking, and enact comprehensive anti-trafficking 
        legislation to align with international standards.
         Call on the Chinese government to provide more 
        services for trafficking victims, particularly for 
        Chinese citizens trafficked for labor exploitation and 
        trafficked abroad.
         Urge the Chinese government to abide by its 
        international obligations with regard to North Korean 
        trafficking victims who are deported without legal 
        alternatives to repatriation.
         Support international and cross-border mechanisms 
        that can help enhance the Chinese government's 
        collaboration with other countries, regions, and 
        international organizations on victim identification, 
        repatriation, and criminal prosecution.
         Support legal assistance programs that advocate 
        on behalf of both foreign and Chinese trafficking 
        victims.

                     North Korean Refugees in China

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, 
        central and local authorities sustained efforts to 
        locate and forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees in 
        China. The 1951 Convention and its Protocol obligates 
        the Chinese government to refrain from repatriating 
        North Koreans in China who left the DPRK for fear of 
        persecution, or who fear persecution upon return to the 
        DPRK.
         North Korean women along the Chinese border 
        continue to be trafficked into forced marriage and the 
        sex industry. The Chinese government's repatriation of 
        trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951 
        Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 
        Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (Protocol), as well 
        as Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
        and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
        Children (UN TIP Protocol). The government's failure to 
        take adequate measures to prevent North Korean women 
        from being trafficked contravenes its obligations under 
        Article 9 of the UN TIP Protocol and Article 6 of the 
        Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
        Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
         Chinese local authorities near the border with 
        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
        continued to deny household registration (hukou) to the 
        children of North Korean women married to Chinese 
        citizens. Without household registration, these 
        children live in a stateless limbo and cannot access 
        education and other social benefits.
         Famine conditions in the DPRK have worsened 
        since late 2009, and food shortages during the 
        Commission's 2010 reporting year have been compared to 
        the food crisis of the 1990s.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Establish a task force to examine and support the 
        efforts of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
        (UNHCR) to gain unfettered access to North Korean 
        refugees in China, beginning with North Korean minors, 
        and to recommend a strategy for creating incentives for 
        China to honor its obligations under the 1951 
        Convention and its Protocol to immediately cease 
        detaining and repatriating North Koreans in China.
         Urge central and local Chinese government 
        officials to abide by their obligations under the UN 
        TIP Protocol (Article 9) to prosecute human traffickers 
        in northeastern China and along the border with the 
        DPRK.
         Urge Chinese officials to grant residency status 
        and related social benefits to North Korean women 
        married to Chinese 
        citizens and their children. In particular, urge local 
        Chinese officials to allow these children to receive an 
        education in accordance with the PRC Nationality Law 
        (Article 4) and the PRC Compulsory Education Law 
        (Article 5).

                             Public Health

                                Findings

         Authorities are beginning to implement goals 
        outlined in the January 2009 10-year medical reform 
        plan--such as initiating a pilot public hospital reform 
        project in 16 cities and establishing a basic medicine 
        system with an official list of approved 
        pharmaceuticals--however, challenges remain in 
        implementation.
         Rural areas continue to lack adequate 
        healthcare resources with which to serve local 
        residents.
         Residents of urban areas tend to have greater 
        access to healthcare benefits; however, the growing 
        population of migrant workers and their families who 
        live in these areas but do not possess an urban hukou 
        (household registration) still face difficulties in 
        accessing basic health services.
         Some children may go without household 
        registration (hukou) in China because they are born 
        ``out of plan,'' that is, not in compliance with birth 
        limits imposed by population planning policies, and 
        their parents do not pay the required fines. Lack of a 
        valid hukou raises barriers to access to social 
        benefits typically linked to the hukou, including 
        subsidized healthcare and public education.
         Discrimination and social stigma against 
        people living with medical conditions such as 
        infectious disease, physical disability, and mental 
        illness remain commonplace.
         Chinese non-governmental organizations and 
        individual advocates continue to play a significant 
        role in raising awareness about health concerns; 
        however, Chinese authorities continue to suppress some 
        forms of public health advocacy.
         The Chinese government has committed to take 
        steps to prevent, treat, and control infectious 
        disease, but reports indicate that curtailing the 
        spread of infectious diseases, especially in rural 
        areas, has continued to present a significant 
        challenge.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Urge the Chinese central government to work with 
        local governments to ensure effective implementation of 
        the healthcare reform plan. Local government 
        cooperation is critical in achieving the projected goal 
        of healthcare access for the entire population by the 
        year 2020.
         Urge the Chinese government to encourage local 
        governments to adopt and enforce measures and 
        regulations that prohibit discrimination against 
        migrant workers and provide equal access to social 
        services.
         Call on the Chinese government to ease repression 
        of public health advocates and provide more support to 
        U.S. organizations that address public health issues in 
        China.
         Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on 
        effective implementation of China's Employment 
        Promotion Law and related regulations that prohibit 
        discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS, 
        Hepatitis B virus, and other illnesses in hiring and in 
        the workplace.

                   Climate Change and the Environment

                                Findings

         Chinese leaders signed the United Nations 
        Copenhagen 
        Accord, ``with provisions for international 
        consultations and analysis under clearly defined 
        guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty 
        is respected,'' and then in a separate action, they 
        agreed to voluntarily ``endeavor to lower its carbon 
        dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45 percent by 
        2020 compared to the 2005 level . . .'' among other 
        actions. China emphasized that its ``autonomous 
        domestic mitigation actions are voluntary in nature.'' 
        However, top Chinese leaders explained that they would 
        include related binding targets in China's 12th Five-
        Year Plan (2010-2015).
         Chinese leaders continued to emphasize China's 
        reliance on domestic monitoring, reporting, and 
        verification of its greenhouse gas emissions and 
        reductions; nevertheless, Chinese leaders have signaled 
        a willingness to discuss greater transparency.
         China has made domestic regulatory and 
        institutional efforts, as well as engaged in bilateral 
        and multilateral cooperative programs to improve the 
        measurement, collection, analysis, and reporting of 
        energy and greenhouse gas data. However, the 
        reliability and transparency of China's energy and 
        greenhouse gas emission data are still in question.
         Without adequate procedural protections, 
        implementation of climate change mitigation policy may 
        place the rights of vulnerable groups, including the 
        rural poor and ethnic minorities, especially resettled 
        citizens, at risk. Hydroelectric dam construction has 
        been accompanied by lack of attention to environmental 
        impact assessment processes mandated by law, and by 
        reports of the infringement upon the fundamental rights 
        of local populations. Planned rapid acceleration of the 
        pace of development of nuclear and hydroelectric 
        projects heightens these concerns going forward.
         China incorporated language related to climate 
        change and the environment in its 2009-2010 National 
        Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP), including one 
        overarching principle touching upon the broad themes of 
        sustainable development and guaranteeing the ``public's 
        environmental rights.'' The HRAP does not detail the 
        nature of these rights. In addition, the HRAP contains 
        several specific pollution and climate change action 
        objectives that are similar to some of the goals 
        stipulated in China's previous national economic 
        development, renewable energy, and climate change 
        plans.
         A report released by the Ministry of 
        Environmental Protection (MEP) in February 2010 on a 
        national pollution source census conducted in China, 
        which for the first time included data from 
        agricultural and other sources of pollution, revealed 
        some discrepancies with past official figures for 
        several pollutants. The census figure for Chemical 
        Oxygen Demand, for example, was nearly double the 
        amount that was previously reported.
         Limitations on citizen access to information, 
        including pollution and related data, hinder efforts to 
        raise environmental awareness, promote public 
        participation, and develop incentives for compliance. 
        Limits on access to remedies for environmental harms 
        and selective or arbitrary enforcement weaken 
        environmental compliance efforts.
         Limited public participation in decisionmaking 
        processes and selective suppression of citizen demands 
        for a cleaner environment also weaken compliance 
        efforts and contribute to citizen dissatisfaction. In 
        several incidents, authorities harassed, detained, or 
        sentenced citizens for their environmental activism, 
        for allegedly organizing antipollution demonstrations, 
        or for ``illegally'' gathering environmental 
        information. In one notable case, officials ordered 
        Jigme Namgyal, a citizen living in the Tibet Autonomous 
        Region, to serve one year and nine months' reeducation 
        through labor for ``harming national security'' by 
        illegally gathering information and video material on 
        the local environment, by collecting ``propaganda'' 
        material ``from the Dalai Clique,'' and for allegedly 
        organizing local residents to conduct ``irregular 
        petitioning'' of authorities, among other charges.
         Numerous other factors, including the priority 
        attached to economic development, have led to 
        compliance challenges that hinder the realization of 
        some of the government's environmental protection 
        goals. Lack of accountability, corruption, local 
        governmental protectionism, and malfeasance impede 
        implementation and enforcement.
         During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, a 
        quasi-non-governmental organization overseen by the MEP 
        brought the first environmental administrative public 
        interest lawsuit by such a group to a special 
        environmental court, opening the door to the 
        possibility that other non-governmental groups could 
        bring such lawsuits in an effort to improve compliance 
        with environmental laws.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support U.S. Government cooperation with the 
        Chinese 
        government and other educational programs geared toward 
        raising awareness among Chinese officials of how to 
        implement climate change mitigation and adaptation 
        strategies and environmental protection policies 
        effectively without transgressing on fundamental 
        rights.
         Support U.S. Government engagement with relevant 
        ministries in developing China's capacity to reliably 
        measure, report, publicize, and verify emission 
        reduction strategies and techniques. Encourage Chinese 
        officials to make government and expert research 
        reports regarding climate change and its impacts in 
        China public and easily accessible.
          Call upon the Chinese government to cease 
        punishing citizens, such as Jigme Namgyal, Wu Lihong, 
        and Sun Xiaodi, for their grassroots environmental 
        activism, or for utilizing official and 
        institutionalized channels to voice their environmental 
        grievances or to protect their rights.
         Support efforts in China by those working to 
        strengthen environmental complaint and dispute 
        resolution mechanisms and support bilateral cooperation 
        in this area. Strengthen cooperation regarding 
        environmental health. Include environmental issues in 
        the Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue and expand 
        cooperation on rule of law education with specific 
        focus on issues pertaining to the environment.
         Invite U.S. domestic environmental civil society 
        organizations and urge the Chinese government to invite 
        Chinese environmental civil society organizations as 
        participants or observers in bilateral climate change 
        and environmental protection projects and dialogues. 
        Invite Chinese local-level leaders, including those 
        from counties, townships, and villages, to the United 
        States to observe U.S. public policy practices and 
        approaches to problem solving.
         Engage local leaders in their efforts to 
        reconcile development and environmental protection 
        goals. Call upon U.S. cities with sister-city 
        relationships in China to incorporate environmental 
        awareness and advocacy, environmental protection, and 
        climate change components into their programs. When 
        making arrangements for travel to China, request 
        meetings with officials from central and local levels 
        of the Chinese government to discuss environmental 
        governance and best practices.
         Support multilateral exchanges regarding 
        environmental 
        enforcement and compliance tools including 
        environmental insurance, market mechanisms, criminal 
        prosecution of serious environmental infringements, and 
        public interest litigation mechanisms. Encourage 
        Chinese leaders to strengthen environmental impact 
        assessment processes and citizen participation in those 
        processes. Engage Chinese officials in devising a 
        realistic and fair compensation system for people 
        harmed by pollution.
         Establish a Working Group on Climate Change 
        Policy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in accordance 
        with Section II(B) of the Memorandum of Understanding 
        to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and 
        Environment between the Government of the United States 
        of America and the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China (the MOU) signed during the U.S.-China 
        Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July 2009. 
        (Section II(B) of the MOU states that, ``[t]he 
        Participants may establish working groups or task 
        forces involving relevant ministries as necessary to 
        support the objectives of the Climate Change Policy 
        Dialogue and Cooperation.'')

                             Civil Society

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, 
        the number of civil society organizations (CSOs)--
        including organizational forms that most nearly 
        correspond to the Western concept of non-governmental 
        organizations (NGOs)--participating in legal and 
        policymaking activities in areas that are not 
        politically sensitive continued to increase gradually. 
        At the same time, organizations and individuals who 
        worked on politically sensitive issues continued to 
        face challenges.
         NGOs continued to face challenges fulfilling 
        complicated and cumbersome registration requirements. 
        In order to operate legally, an organization is 
        required to obtain sponsorship agreement from a public 
        administration department in a relevant ``trade, 
        scientific or other professional area'' at the 
        appropriate level of government before registering with 
        the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA). Sponsorship 
        agreements are sometimes difficult to obtain because 
        local sponsors are sometimes reluctant to take on the 
        burdens of supervisory responsibilities. NGOs that do 
        not fulfill these ``dual management'' requirements are 
        not protected under the law and are prohibited from 
        receiving outside donations. In part to circumvent the 
        burdens of fulfilling dual management requirements, 
        some NGOs opt to register as commercial entities, 
        though such actions could also subject them to targeted 
        or selective oversight from the government as well as 
        higher tax rates.
         Some Chinese citizens who sought to establish 
        and operate NGOs that focus on issues deemed by 
        officials to be sensitive faced intimidation, 
        harassment, and punishment from government authorities. 
        During this reporting year, for example, Chinese 
        officials repeatedly harassed and interfered with the 
        operations of Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, 
        a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization 
        that Wan Yanhai--a public health researcher and 
        advocate--founded in 1994. Authorities reportedly 
        canceled the group's seminar marking the International 
        Sex Worker Rights Day, conducted an unannounced 
        investigation into the group's tax records, and sent 
        fire department officials to carry out random and 
        unannounced safety inspections. Wan ultimately left 
        China for the United States in May 2010, saying that he 
        had concerns for his personal safety.
         During this reporting year, the Chinese 
        government continued to tighten its control over 
        ``sensitive'' civil society groups through selective 
        enforcement of regulations. In March 2010, China's 
        State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) put 
        into effect a circular concerning ``foreign exchange 
        donated to or by domestic institutions,'' which made it 
        difficult for some Chinese organizations, including 
        NGOs, to accept overseas donations. The circular 
        required organizations, when applying to receive 
        foreign donations through SAFE, to also submit their 
        business licenses, notarized donation agreements, and 
        certificates of registration of the overseas donating 
        organizations. One member of the Chinese NGO community 
        explained that the problem is not primarily a matter of 
        how social groups actually collect their funding, but 
        rather the authorities' selective enforcement of the 
        rules, depending on what the group does.
         Despite an overall trend of tighter control, 
        at least one case of limited localized reform took 
        place: In Shenzhen, the MCA signed an agreement with 
        the local government to explore the establishment of a 
        system allowing CSOs to apply and register directly 
        with the MCA. The reforms could potentially lead to a 
        system where the MCA will supervise and regulate 
        organizations alone, without sponsoring organizations, 
        making it possible for future individuals wishing to 
        form organizations, including NGOs, to have a 
        relatively less complicated one-stop shop process 
        rather than the existing ``dual management'' setup.
         The Chinese government in July 2009 issued 
        ``working guidelines'' for social organizations (shehui 
        tuanti) seeking eligibility to receive tax-deductible 
        donations. Social organizations are one of the three 
        main types of CSOs in China. The other two primary 
        types of CSOs in China are foundations (jijinhui) and 
        private nonenterprise organizations (minban fei qiye 
        danwei). The working guidelines issued last July 
        further clarified the standards for determining the 
        eligibility of social organizations for tax-deductible 
        donations. At the same time, they continued to limit 
        the number of eligible social organizations. The 
        working guidelines also did not alter existing 
        regulations requiring all CSOs to register with the 
        government.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Encourage the Chinese government to broaden the 
        recent 
        reforms relating to registration of non-governmental 
        organizations (NGOs) and other aspects of civil affairs 
        in Guangdong province and to make them applicable to 
        other parts of the country through national legislation 
        and regulatory development.
         Ask the Chinese government to refrain from 
        applying uneven or selective enforcement of regulations 
        to intimidate groups that they consider to be handling 
        sensitive work. Request the Chinese government revisit 
        the recently issued State Administration of Foreign 
        Exchange circular concerning overseas donations to 
        Chinese organizations. Emphasize that NGOs are actually 
        a way for citizens to channel their grievances and find 
        redress, and in turn contribute to the maintenance of a 
        stable society. Conversely, stricter controls over 
        civil society organizations could remove a potentially 
        useful social ``safety valve,'' thereby increasing the 
        sources of instability. During discussions with Chinese 
        officials, mention the Tsinghua University report that 
        made the same findings: that even as the government 
        increased spending on public security and tightened its 
        control over civil society, social conflicts are 
        happening with greater regularity.
         Take measures to facilitate the participation of 
        Chinese citizens who work in the NGO sector in relevant 
        international conferences and forums, and support 
        training opportunities in the United States to build 
        their leadership capacity in nonprofit management, 
        public policy advocacy, strategic planning, and media 
        relations.

                 Institutions of Democratic Governance

                                Findings

         The Communist Party exercises control over 
        political affairs, government, and society through 
        networks of Party committees or branches that exist at 
        all administrative levels within governmental, 
        legislative, judicial, and security organizations; 
        major social groups (including unions); enterprises 
        (both domestic and foreign-invested); most residential 
        communities; and the People's Liberation Army. During 
        the Commission's 2010 reporting year, Chinese leaders 
        emphasized expanding and strengthening the Party, 
        focusing in part on establishing or strengthening Party 
        branches at the local level and in non-government 
        organizations, the military, and academic institutions.
         During the 2010 reporting year, isolated 
        experiments with intraparty democracy took place around 
        the country. In some of these experiments, Party 
        officials used the ``open recommendation, direct 
        election'' method, whereby Party officials elicit 
        comments from the public on specific candidates, but 
        only Party members, not the general public, cast 
        ballots for the Party committee, Party branch, and 
        residents' committee members and leaders already 
        approved by Party officials at the next highest 
        administrative level. Party authorities in various 
        locations experimented with election monitoring systems 
        during intraparty elections for residents' committee 
        members and leaders.
         During this reporting year, Party and central 
        government leaders continued activities to strengthen 
        some controls over society and to ``safeguard 
        stability.'' Local governments charged with the work of 
        ``maintaining social stability'' continued to establish 
        specialized institutions including ``stability 
        preservation offices'' and ``comprehensive governance 
        offices.'' Officials reportedly continued to expand 
        networks of informants to pinpoint potential ``social 
        instability'' and to establish ``stability preservation 
        funds'' (weiwen jijin) from which they make payments to 
        people with grievances ostensibly in order to preempt 
        their escalating disputes.
         Chinese leaders made public statements 
        emphasizing the leading role of the Party, the need to 
        adhere to China's unique style of ``socialist 
        democracy,'' and the impossibility of implementing 
        ``Western-style'' democracy with a separation of powers 
        and competing political parties. Direct elections for 
        local people's congress representatives are held only 
        at the county level and direct elections for ``village 
        committees'' are held only at the village level, and 
        leaders emphasized that direct elections would not be 
        held at higher administrative levels.
         Some citizens and social groups demanded that 
        the Party and government undertake democratic reforms 
        and human rights protections. Some of these requests 
        were met with official reprisal, including harassment, 
        detention, and, in some cases, harsh prison sentences. 
        Chinese authorities continued to have no tolerance for, 
        arrested, and imposed sentences on individuals involved 
        in political parties not sanctioned by the Communist 
        Party. For example, a court in Jiangsu province 
        sentenced Guo Quan, formerly a university professor, to 
        10 years in prison for ``subversion of state power.'' 
        The court found that Guo used the Internet to organize 
        an ``illegal'' political party called the ``China New 
        Democracy Party,'' among other charges.
         The National People's Congress (NPC) Standing 
        Committee conducted two reviews of proposed draft 
        revisions to China's Organic Law on Villagers' 
        Committees. Proposed amendments could potentially 
        resolve the difficulties villagers have in removing 
        village committee members, make it easier to convene 
        villager meetings, and strengthen villager oversight of 
        village affairs. In addition, they could also 
        strengthen Party control at the village level.
         Local areas continued to experiment with 
        village committee election procedures, although 
        implementation problems with village elections 
        persisted. During this reporting year, Chinese 
        authorities developed plans to improve governance in 
        ``difficult villages,'' which are villages where, among 
        other problems, leaders do not support or have delayed 
        holding village committee elections for a long time, 
        where there have been long-standing tensions between 
        leaders and villagers, or where 
        citizens have taken their grievances to higher level 
        officials.
         The Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Wu 
        Bangguo, mentioned that the NPC and NPC Standing 
        Committee would increase supervision over governmental 
        affairs through ``inquiry and question'' procedures, 
        which, though in the past have been used rarely, 
        focused this year on ``issues of broad concern to NPC 
        delegates'' and the oversight of economic policy. The 
        NPC and NPC Standing Committee ``will invite 
        responsible cadres from the State Council and related 
        departments to attend meetings and listen to 
        suggestions, respond to inquiries, and answer 
        questions.'' The NPC Standing Committee passed the 
        revised Electoral Law in March 2010, which now awards 
        the same proportion of NPC deputies per population to 
        both rural and urban areas. In the past, urban 
        residents enjoyed greater representation. One county in 
        Sichuan province piloted experiments with full-time 
        professional local people's congress deputies.
         Chinese officials describe China's political 
        system as a ``socialist democracy'' with ``multi-party 
        cooperation'' and ``political consultation'' under the 
        leadership of the Communist Party. Consultation 
        reportedly takes place at both the national and the 
        local levels. During this reporting year, authorities 
        in Guangzhou municipality issued new rules that provide 
        for political consultation between the municipal Party 
        committee and members of the local people's political 
        consultative conference and local branches of the eight 
        ``approved'' political parties regarding laws, 
        regulations, and some policies of broad public 
        interest.
         During this reporting year, authorities 
        pledged in the 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action 
        Plan (HRAP) to more stringently implement 
        anticorruption measures. Central and local Party and 
        government entities also issued new or revised 
        corruption prevention measures, some focusing on 
        strengthening and expanding the system of reporting 
        officials' personal finances. Chinese authorities have 
        taken additional steps to encourage reporting of 
        corruption. Whistleblower protections, however, remain 
        inadequate.
         Citizens and groups are increasingly able to 
        access various channels such as public hearings, expert 
        meetings, roundtables, and the Internet to express 
        opinions regarding proposed policies and regulatory 
        instruments. Authorities reportedly have made 67 
        administrative legal measures available for public 
        comment since 2004. However, citizens still have little 
        direct access to political decisionmaking processes 
        above the village level (village elections) and the 
        county level (people's congress representative 
        elections).
         During this reporting year, at least some 
        cities implemented a national directive issued in 2008 
        stipulating that cities and counties expand the scope 
        of public hearings to solicit citizen opinions 
        regarding laws, regulations, provisions, and major 
        government administrative policies that are relevant to 
        the interests of citizens. Citizens and the media 
        continue to express concerns regarding the 
        implementation and impact of public hearings. Questions 
        remain regarding the depth and breadth of 
        participation, and the processes for compiling, 
        assessing, and incorporating public suggestions are 
        still not transparent.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support programs that aim to reduce corruption in 
        people's congress and village committee elections, 
        including expansion of domestic election monitoring 
        systems and training of domestic election monitors.
         Support exchanges between Members of the U.S. 
        Congress and members of the National People's Congress 
        and the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
        Conference, especially in relation to Congressional 
        oversight processes.
         Support projects that seek to work with local 
        governments in their efforts to improve transparency 
        and accountability, especially efforts to expand and 
        improve China's open government information 
        initiatives. Such projects might include joint efforts 
        to better publicize the Open Government Information 
        (OGI) Regulations at local levels and train citizens 
        and groups in how to submit OGI requests.
         Support projects that assist local governments, 
        academics, and the nonprofit sector in expanding and 
        making more transparent the use of public hearings and 
        other channels for citizens to incorporate their input 
        in the policymaking process. Such projects might 
        include an exchange program component, whereby Chinese 
        local government officials and non-governmental 
        organization representatives would travel together to 
        the United States to attend town hall or public 
        meetings that address significant issues. Such projects 
        might also include pilot projects in China that make 
        the processes through which citizens submit suggestions 
        to authorities about draft laws, regulations, or 
        policies more transparent, by making the suggestions 
        submitted to authorities available to the public.
         Call on the Chinese government to release people 
        detained or imprisoned for exercising their right to 
        call for political reform within China, including Liu 
        Xiaobo (signer of Charter 08 who was sentenced to 11 
        years in prison in December 2009 for ``inciting 
        subversion of state power''), Guo Quan, and other 
        people mentioned in this report and in the Commission's 
        Political Prisoner Database.

                         Commercial Rule of Law

                                Findings

         The Chinese government has increasingly relied 
        on industrial policies rather than the market to direct 
        economic growth. These industrial policies are 
        comprehensive frameworks for development in key sectors 
        of the Chinese economy, providing for subsidies and 
        other benefits, plans for restructuring the state-owned 
        companies in the relevant sector, and export goals. 
        Benefits outlined under the policies may discriminate 
        against 
        foreign-invested companies to the benefit of China's 
        state-owned enterprises. In some cases, provisions of 
        the policies have been found not to comply with World 
        Trade Organization (WTO) requirements, such as 
        provisions in the auto industrial plan concerning 
        import of auto parts, which a WTO dispute panel found 
        to violate the WTO rules in a case decided in 2008. The 
        Chinese government revised the policy, effective 
        September 2009. China's use of industrial policies has 
        been coupled with increasing protectionism by the 
        Chinese government.
         The Chinese government has promoted 
        ``indigenous innovation'' as a massive government 
        campaign utilizing industrial policies and government 
        procurement to decrease reliance on foreign technology, 
        and to enhance China's economy and national security, 
        with the stated purpose of enabling China to become a 
        global leader in technology by mid-century. In November 
        2009, three government departments issued the Circular 
        on Launching 2009 National Indigenous Innovation 
        Accreditation Work. Products that satisfy the standards 
        set forth in the circular may be entitled to certain 
        preferences in government procurement. The initial 
        draft of the circular provided that, in order to 
        qualify for these preferences, products (1) must be 
        produced by an enterprise in China that owns the 
        intellectual property; (2) must be covered by a 
        trademark that was first registered in China by a 
        Chinese company; (3) must be innovative and 
        internationally competitive; and (4) must meet Chinese 
        technical standards. In April 2010, the Ministry of 
        Science and Technology issued a revised version of the 
        circular relaxing the requirements for Chinese 
        ownership of 
        intellectual property rights, and allowing products 
        based on technology and trademarks licensed to a 
        licensee in China to qualify. Questions remain 
        concerning the implementation of the revised circular, 
        however, including the resolution of conflicts between 
        national- and local-level decisions on indigenous 
        innovation.
         The Chinese government has encouraged 
        indigenous innovation for several years. Indigenous 
        innovation is one of the ``guiding principles'' of 
        China's National Medium- and Long-Term Program for 
        Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), and 
        China explicitly called for indigenous innovation in 
        government procurement in the 2007 Administrative 
        Measures for Government Procurement of Imported Parts, 
        which provide that procurement of imported parts should 
        facilitate indigenous innovation by bringing into China 
        technologies that China then can assimilate. In some 
        cases, industrial policies call for indigenous 
        innovation, such as the 2004 Auto Industrial Policy, 
        which calls for indigenous innovation in the auto 
        sector.
         Chinese government departments in charge of 
        implementing China's Antimonopoly Law (AML), which took 
        effect in August 2008, have continued to flesh out the 
        regulatory regime. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
        passed two sets of measures on mergers, which came into 
        effect in January 2010. In May 2010, the State 
        Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) issued 
        for comment three drafts concerning (1) monopoly 
        agreements, or uncompetitive agreements, (2) abuse of 
        dominance, and (3) administrative monopoly, or 
        anticompetitive behavior by government authorities. The 
        MOFCOM measures cover reporting of proposed 
        concentrations, and investigations. The drafts issued 
        by the SAIC expand on provisions of the AML and provide 
        guidance on the regulators' methodology.
         Although one of the purposes of the AML is to 
        protect fair competition in the Chinese market, this 
        may conflict with 
        China's industrial policies encouraging the mergers of 
        large state-owned enterprises into larger enterprise 
        groups and the protection of state-owned enterprises in 
        general. For example, the Auto Industrial Policy calls 
        for the development of large auto enterprise groups, 
        and the 2009 Program for the Adjustment and 
        Rejuvenation of the Auto Industry calls for the 
        formation of two to three large auto groups and four to 
        five smaller ones, through a process of takeovers and 
        reorganization. In the period since the AML came into 
        effect in August 2008 to the end of 2009, MOFCOM has 
        completed 60 merger reviews, 6 of which MOFCOM approved 
        with conditions, and 1 of which MOFCOM blocked. MOFCOM 
        only publishes rulings on mergers that it rejects or 
        approves with conditions, so it is difficult to tell 
        whether the parties to unconditionally approved mergers 
        are state-owned enterprises or non-Chinese companies. 
        Of the published cases, however, six involved mergers 
        between non-Chinese parties.
         During the Commission's last (2009) reporting 
        year, China passed the Food Safety Law and implementing 
        legislation. The law called for the creation of a 
        National Food Safety Commission to coordinate the work 
        of government departments with responsibility for food 
        safety. During this reporting year, in February 2010, 
        the State Council established this commission, with 
        Vice Premier Li Keqiang as chairman and high-level 
        members of relevant departments as commission members. 
        The government also continued to issue regulations on 
        food safety, including regulations on food additives 
        and catering. China passed a Tort Liability Law in 
        December 2009, which came into effect in July 2010. The 
        Tort Liability Law covers product liability and product 
        recalls, and, if implemented faithfully and 
        effectively, may provide tools for victims of food 
        safety violations to seek redress.
         China's economic development has led to 
        increased need for land, and income from land sales has 
        been an important source of revenue for local 
        governments. In some cases, these factors have been 
        associated with abuse by local governments and property 
        developers, including widespread demolitions and forced 
        evictions. Forced evictions are contrary to Article 
        11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
        and Cultural Rights, which covenant China has ratified. 
        Some property owners who refuse to leave their homes 
        have been beaten, harassed, or illegally detained.
         In some cases, property rights owners receive 
        poor procedural protection and inadequate compensation 
        when their land is expropriated. There is evidence of 
        collusion in some cases between property developers and 
        local governments, which may receive as much as 60 
        percent of their revenue from land sales, to seize land 
        from its occupants for sale to the developers. 
        Furthermore, though China's 2007 Property Law and 
        China's 2004 Law on Administration of Urban Real 
        Property both provide that local governments should 
        only expropriate land in the ``public interest,'' this 
        term is not defined in law. Currently, the 2001 
        Regulations on Government Housing Demolition in Urban 
        Areas, which govern land requisitions, do not include 
        any requirement that expropriations of land be in the 
        public interest, and lack sufficient procedural 
        protections for property rights owners. In December 
        2009, five Peking University law professors sent an 
        open letter to the National People's Congress calling 
        for the repeal or amendment of the 2001 regulations, 
        which the professors said violated China's Constitution 
        and Property Law. In January 2010, the State Council 
        Legal Affairs Office published for public comment draft 
        Regulations for Expropriation and Compensation of 
        Residential Buildings on State-Owned Land, which 
        require that, in most cases, 
        expropriation must be in the public interest, and offer 
        some guidance as to what constitutes ``public 
        interest.'' The draft regulations, which have not yet 
        been finalized, fall short in that they allow some 
        expropriations that are not in the public interest, and 
        do not offer any protection to rural land dwellers.
         Rural land is owned by collectives, and 
        farmers legally can enter into 30-year contracts with 
        their collectives for use of collectively owned land. 
        However, there is little protection for farmers. In 
        some cases, the collectives take back land and ``re-
        allocate'' it to others. In other cases, village 
        leaders, developers, and local governments conspire to 
        take the land and change it into what is characterized 
        as ``urban land,'' which the local government can then 
        sell. Although the farmers are legally entitled to 
        compensation, procedures are not clearly spelled out; 
        in some cases, very little of the compensation may 
        reach them and they are left destitute. The draft 
        Regulations for Expropriation and Compensation of 
        Residential Buildings on State-Owned Land do not cover 
        collectively owned land, and at least one of the Peking 
        University professors who called for repeal or 
        amendment of the 2001 regulations has warned that this 
        is a problem. Nonetheless, Chinese authorities have not 
        proposed similar legislation to protect rural land 
        dwellers.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Develop and support a project surveying the role 
        of China's industrial policies in the Chinese economy 
        from the perspective of WTO requirements, including how 
        the development of these policies and the role they 
        play in directing China's economy, impact the 
        development of transparency and rule of law and China's 
        compliance with its international legal commitments.
         Make a formal request to the Chinese government 
        through bilateral meetings such as the Joint Commission 
        on Commerce and Trade or the Strategic and Economic 
        Dialogue, or through the inquiry points of the Chinese 
        government departments responsible for indigenous 
        innovation policy, for details of plans, policies, 
        regulations, measures, and other legislation relating 
        to indigenous innovation, and explanations as to how 
        these have been or will be implemented. This 
        information will facilitate understanding of the full 
        impact of China's indigenous innovation policy on 
        China's legal system and government procurement 
        practices.
         Request through the Open Government Information 
        office at the Ministry of Commerce, or through 
        bilateral dialogues 
        between the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal 
        Trade Commission and their Chinese counterparts, 
        details on merger applications reviewed since the 
        Antimonopoly Law came into effect, including the number 
        of applications involving non-Chinese companies, the 
        number involving state-owned enterprises, and the 
        results of each of the merger reviews.
         Arrange meetings under the auspices of legal 
        exchanges such as the U.S. Legal Exchange under the 
        Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, or through the 
        American Bar Association, between U.S. tort lawyers and 
        Chinese lawyers on consumer rights and compensation for 
        victims of substandard food products, and the U.S. 
        system of redress through the courts and government 
        departments in cases of food quality problems.
         Urge the Chinese government in meetings and 
        correspondence to (1) revise the draft Regulations for 
        Expropriation and Compensation of Residential Buildings 
        on State-Owned Land to clarify that expropriation is 
        allowed only in the public interest, (2) issue the 
        final version and put it into effect immediately, and 
        (3) ensure that the draft regulations are amended to 
        provide comparable protection for rural land dwellers, 
        or draft equivalent legislation to protect the rights 
        of rural land dwellers. Property owners whose land was 
        expropriated in the period between the date the draft 
        was published and the effective date of the regulations 
        and any comparable legislation for rural land should be 
        given an opportunity to challenge the expropriation.
         Arrange and support a program of technical 
        assistance for Chinese government departments 
        responsible for land management, concerning U.S. 
        procedures and standards for taking property by eminent 
        domain. Such assistance would highlight the meaning 
        under U.S. law of takings in the ``public interest,'' 
        and could be organized by U.S. municipal governments 
        working with their sister cities in China.
         Urge the Chinese government to put in place 
        comprehensive legislation to clarify rural land titles 
        and to provide legal assistance at the grassroots or 
        through pro bono programs at law firms, to rural land 
        dwellers to help them protect their rights to 
        collectively owned land. Working through organizations 
        such as the American Bar Association, encourage the All 
        China Lawyers Association to develop a comprehensive 
        and independent legal aid program to address rural land 
        issues.
         Help the Chinese government address issues with 
        rural land rights and land transfer by developing and 
        supporting a program under which U.S. local or state 
        governments responsible for land titles participate in 
        face-to-face meetings and exchanges with local 
        authorities in China. This training would cover title 
        registration, transfer, and dispute settlement.

                           Access to Justice

                                Findings

         Public security officials and those working 
        under their direction used abductions, physical 
        violence, or threats of physical violence to harass and 
        intimidate human rights lawyers during the Commission's 
        2010 reporting year. Chinese government officials 
        continued to use license suspension and disbarment as a 
        means to control and repress human rights lawyers who 
        work on politically sensitive issues.
         Amendments to the State Compensation Law, if 
        implemented faithfully, may expand channels whereby 
        individuals who have been subjected to the abuse of 
        administrative authority may obtain compensation. 
        Amendments to the Administrative Supervision Law, if 
        implemented faithfully, may improve protections for 
        whistleblowers. Other proposed administrative law 
        reforms may, if passed and implemented faithfully, 
        provide greater oversight of state agencies, improved 
        protection of citizen interests, and enhanced 
        supervision of government employees.
         During the 2010 reporting year, large numbers 
        of petitioners, i.e., individuals availing themselves 
        of China's xinfang (``letters and visits'') system--an 
        alternative to courts whereby citizens may seek redress 
        for grievances by submitting petitions to government 
        authorities were harassed, abused, put in illegal 
        ``black jails,'' locked up in psychiatric hospitals, or 
        sent to reeducation through labor centers.
         Chinese officials limited Chinese citizens' 
        and foreign visitors' lawful access to justice in 
        sensitive cases. In July 2010, a Beijing court 
        sentenced American geologist Xue Feng to eight years in 
        prison for helping the American company he worked for 
        purchase commercial information on oil wells in China. 
        Although the court claimed the information constituted 
        a state secret and endangered national security, 
        officials reportedly did not declare the information a 
        state secret until after the transaction had occurred. 
        During the more than two-year period of Xue's 
        detention, Chinese officials attempted to coerce him 
        into confessing to the crime by allegedly torturing him 
        and committed several violations of China's Criminal 
        Procedure Law.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Object to the continued harassment of human 
        rights lawyers and defenders. Call for the release of 
        lawyers, activists, and others who are incarcerated, 
        subject to unlawful home confinement, or who have 
        disappeared for their activities to defend and promote 
        the rights of Chinese citizens, including Gao Zhisheng, 
        Hu Jia, and Zheng Enchong, as well as other prisoners 
        mentioned in this report and in the Commission's 
        Political Prisoner Database.
         Support the U.S. State Department's International 
        Visitors Leadership Program and other similar bilateral 
        exchange programs that bring Chinese human rights 
        lawyers, advocates, and scholars to the United States 
        for study and dialogue. Support similar programs in the 
        non-governmental organization (NGO) and academic 
        sectors that partner with China's human rights lawyers 
        and nonprofit legal organizations.
         Support research and technical exchange programs 
        designed to improve implementation of administrative 
        law reforms, prioritizing those that will provide 
        greater oversight of government agencies and grant more 
        protections to Chinese citizens. Support NGOs with 
        programming to build capacity among 
        petitioners. Support research and exchanges that 
        examine incentive structures that can lead to the 
        punishment of whistleblowers and the stifling of 
        citizen expressions of legitimate grievances.
         Communicate concerns about possible official 
        political abuse of psychiatric treatment and 
        politically motivated commitment of petitioners to 
        psychiatric hospitals in China to the American 
        Psychiatric Association, the Geneva Initiative on 
        Psychiatry, and the World Medical Association. Urge 
        Chinese officials to adopt a national mental health law 
        that will specifically clarify the process of 
        involuntary commitment and protect individuals from 
        being hospitalized by public security officials.
         Call on the Chinese government to release Xue 
        Feng and permit him to return to the United States. 
        Call on the Chinese government, in the interim, to 
        ensure that U.S. officials are permitted to meet with 
        him on a regular basis.

                                Xinjiang

                                Findings

         Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
        Autonomous Region (XUAR) worsened during the 
        Commission's 2010 reporting year. Following government 
        suppression of a demonstration by Uyghurs and riots in 
        the XUAR in July 2009, authorities instituted 
        unprecedented levels of control over the free flow of 
        information, denying XUAR residents and the outside 
        world news about conditions in the region and 
        increasing the government's capacity to manipulate 
        information. Amid this information blackout, 
        authorities strengthened security measures and 
        campaigns to promote ``ethnic unity,'' using them to 
        quell free speech, curb independent religious activity, 
        and impose intrusive controls over the lives of XUAR 
        residents.
         Authorities singled out Uyghurs in particular 
        in security campaigns, and the whereabouts of some 
        Uyghurs detained in the aftermath of the July 2009 
        demonstrations and riots remain unknown. Trials 
        connected to events in July have been marked by a lack 
        of transparency and violations of due process. 
        Authorities detained, and in some cases, imprisoned, 
        Uyghur Web site workers and a journalist in connection 
        to free speech about the events and about broader 
        conditions in the XUAR.
         Central government and Communist Party 
        authorities inaugurated a ``central work forum'' on the 
        XUAR in May 2010 that sets central government and Party 
        objectives for the region's economic and political 
        development, intensifying a trend of top-down 
        initiatives that prioritize state economic and 
        political goals over the promotion of regional autonomy 
        and broader protections of XUAR residents' rights.
         The government enforced other policies and 
        measures that also fueled worsening human rights 
        conditions in the region, including measures aimed at 
        quelling dissent, promoting assimilation, and 
        repressing independent expressions of ethnic and 
        religious identity, especially among the Uyghurs. The 
        XUAR government intensified steps to promote Mandarin 
        Chinese and marginalize the use of the Uyghur language 
        in XUAR schools, in violation of Chinese law. As in 
        past years, some population planning policies in the 
        region singled out non-Han ethnic groups. The 
        government continued work to transfer Uyghur and other 
        non-Han workers to jobs in the interior of China, 
        through programs reportedly marked, in some cases, by 
        coercion and abusive practices. Uyghurs and other 
        groups within the XUAR remained subject to hiring 
        practices that have allowed widespread discrimination 
        against non-Han groups. Ongoing work to ``reconstruct'' 
        the historic Old City section of Kashgar continued to 
        undermine Uyghurs' right to preserve their cultural 
        heritage. Repression of Islam in the XUAR worsened. 
        [For more information on conditions for religious 
        freedom in the XUAR, see Findings and Recommendations 
        on Freedom of Religion in this section.]
         Uyghurs seeking asylum outside China continued 
        to face barriers to accessing asylum proceedings and 
        risk of refoulement under the sway of China's influence 
        in neighboring countries and its disregard for 
        international law, as illustrated by the Cambodian 
        government's deportation of 20 Uyghur asylum seekers to 
        China in December 2009, following Chinese government 
        intervention.
         Repressive government controls throughout the 
        region, especially those targeting Uyghurs, illustrated 
        the status of the XUAR as a government-designated 
        ethnic autonomous region that lacks true autonomy, 
        particularly for the group in whose name it was 
        established. Despite guarantees in Chinese law for 
        measures of autonomy in governance and protections for 
        ethnic minority rights, central and local government 
        authorities exert control at a level antithetical to 
        local residents' meaningful control over their own 
        affairs and to the protection of their rights. Chinese 
        government actions violate not only Chinese law but 
        also international human rights law that the Chinese 
        government is bound to uphold.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Support legislation that expands U.S. Government 
        resources for raising awareness of human rights 
        conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR), for protecting Uyghur culture, and for 
        increasing avenues for Uyghurs to protect their human 
        rights.
         Raise concern about human rights conditions in 
        the XUAR to Chinese officials and condemn the use of 
        information blackouts and security campaigns to 
        suppress human rights. Call on the Chinese government 
        to release people imprisoned for advocating for their 
        rights or for their personal connection to rights 
        advocates, including Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 
        to 10 years in prison for allegedly ``inciting racial 
        hatred or discrimination'' or ``inciting splittism'' 
        after writing a short story); Alim and Ablikim 
        Abdureyim (adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, 
        sentenced in 2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, 
        respectively, for alleged economic and ``splittist'' 
        crimes); and other prisoners mentioned in this report 
        and in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database.
         Call on the Chinese government to provide details 
        about each person detained, charged, tried, or 
        sentenced in connection with demonstrations and riots 
        in the XUAR in July 2009, including each person's name, 
        the charges (if any) against each person, the name and 
        location of the prosecuting office (i.e., 
        procuratorate), the court handling each case, and the 
        name of each facility where a person is detained or 
        imprisoned. Encourage people who have been wrongfully 
        detained to file for compensation. Call on the Chinese 
        government to ensure people suspected of crimes in 
        connection to events in July 2009 are able to hire a 
        lawyer and exercise their right to employ legal defense 
        in accordance with Articles 33 and 96 of China's 
        Criminal Procedure Law, and to ensure suspects can 
        employ legal defense of their own choosing. Call on the 
        Chinese government to announce the judgments in all 
        trials connected to events in July 2009, as required 
        under Article 163 of China's Criminal Procedure Law. 
        Call on the government to allow independent experts to 
        conduct independent examinations into the 
        demonstrations and riots and to allow them access to 
        the trials connected to these events.
         Support U.S. government funding for non-
        governmental organizations that address human rights 
        issues in the XUAR to enable them to continue to gather 
        information on conditions in the region and develop 
        programs to help Uyghurs increase their capacity to 
        preserve their rights and protect their culture, 
        language, and heritage. Support funding for media 
        outlets devoted to broadcasting news to the XUAR and 
        gathering news from the region to expand their capacity 
        to report on the region and provide uncensored 
        information to XUAR residents.
         Call on the Chinese government to support 
        development policies in the XUAR that promote the broad 
        protection of XUAR residents' rights and allow the XUAR 
        government to exercise its powers of regional autonomy 
        in making development decisions. Call on central and 
        XUAR authorities to ensure equitable development that 
        not only promotes economic growth but also respects the 
        broad civil and political rights of XUAR residents and 
        engages these communities in participatory 
        decisionmaking. Ensure development projects take into 
        account the particular needs and input of non-Han 
        ethnic groups, who have faced unique challenges 
        protecting their rights in the face of top-down 
        development policies and who have not been full 
        beneficiaries of economic growth in the region.
         Raise the issue of Uyghur refugees with Chinese 
        officials and with officials from international refugee 
        agencies and from transit or destination countries for 
        Uyghur refugees. Call on Chinese officials and 
        officials from transit or destination countries to 
        respect the asylum seeker and refugee designations of 
        the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the refugee 
        and citizenship designations of other countries. Call 
        on transit and destination countries to abide by 
        requirements in the 1951 Convention on the Status of 
        Refugees and the Convention against Torture on 
        refoulement.

                                 Tibet

                                Findings

         During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, 
        the Chinese government and Communist Party pressed the 
        ``core interest'' policy that seeks to isolate the 
        Dalai Lama internationally and diminish or end his 
        international influence. The policy is based on Chinese 
        assertions that ``Tibet'' is one of China's two ``core 
        interests'' (``Taiwan'' is the other); the Dalai Lama 
        is a separatist; and other governments therefore should 
        not permit the Dalai Lama to enter their countries and 
        thereby threaten China's ``territorial integrity.'' The 
        policy operates in tandem with the Party's domestic 
        campaign to isolate Tibetans in China from the Dalai 
        Lama. The results of such government policies could 
        include further increases of human rights abuses of 
        Tibetans concurrent with a decrease in the ability of 
        the international community to detect, document, and 
        respond to such abuses.
         The 25-member Party Political Bureau 
        (Politburo) met in January to formulate a ``new general 
        strategy for governing Tibet'' based on the notion of 
        ``four adherences'' that emphasizes the high degree of 
        subordination imposed on local ethnic autonomous 
        governments established under China's Constitution and 
        Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law. One ``adherence'' 
        reaffirms the Party's intention to continue the policy 
        of creating a Tibet where the fundamental objectives 
        are Chinese but where some ``Tibetan traits'' will 
        remain. Formulation of a ``new'' Tibetan governance 
        strategy by a body made up of the highest ranking 
        representatives of central Party and government power, 
        and lacking Tibetan representation, demonstrates the 
        poor implementation of ``ethnic autonomy'' in the 
        Tibetan autonomous areas of China.
         The Politburo Standing Committee presided in 
        January over the Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum), 
        applying the highest imprimatur of political power to 
        achieving sweeping economic, social, and cultural 
        policy objectives for the Tibetan areas of China by 
        2020. The Fifth Forum expanded the Party's Tibet policy 
        purview beyond the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to 
        include the Tibetan autonomous areas in Qinghai, Gansu, 
        Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. The policy change more 
        than doubles the number of Tibetans who live within the 
        forum's contiguous target area, and nearly doubles the 
        area subject to central-level policy coordination. 
        Party General Secretary and President of China Hu 
        Jintao outlined goals that prioritize changes to rural 
        Tibetan areas, where most Tibetans live. Heightened 
        emphasis on the link between rural development and 
        regional stability follows Tibetan farmers' and 
        herders' participation in the wave of protests (and 
        some rioting) that began in March 2008.
         The Dalai Lama's envoys arrived in China for 
        the ninth round of formal dialogue with Party officials 
        in January 2010, less than one week after the Fifth 
        Forum concluded. The 15-month interval between the 
        eighth and ninth rounds of dialogue was the longest 
        since such contacts resumed in 2002. Neither side 
        reported substantive progress, both sides reiterated 
        key positions, and the Party added more preconditions 
        on the Dalai Lama, but dialogue participants referred 
        to certain developments in a positive manner. A senior 
        Party official praised the ``better attitude'' of the 
        Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, and the Special Envoy 
        referred favorably to the Fifth Forum decision to 
        consider development issues throughout all Tibetan 
        autonomous areas.
         The Dalai Lama expressed deepening alarm about 
        the outlook for Tibetan Buddhism in China, saying in 
        March that ``monasteries function more like museums and 
        are intended to deliberately annihilate [Tibetan] 
        Buddhism.'' A senior TAR official said in March that 
        Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the then-five-year-old boy who 
        disappeared after the Dalai Lama recognized him as the 
        Panchen Lama in 1995, is in the TAR living a ``very 
        good life'' as ``an ordinary citizen'' with his family, 
        and that he and his family are ``reluctant to be 
        disturbed.'' The Karmapa, the spiritual head of the 
        Kagyu tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, stated publicly in 
        January that he fled his religious seat in the TAR at 
        the end of 1999 and escaped to India because he feared 
        the government would have assigned him ``political 
        duties'' when he was older.
         The government and Party created increasing 
        restraints on the exercise of freedom of religion for 
        Tibetan Buddhists by strengthening the push to use 
        policy and legal measures to shape and control what 
        officials refer to as the ``normal order'' for Tibetan 
        Buddhism. At the Fifth Forum, Party General Secretary 
        and President Hu Jintao used the Marxist premise of 
        ``special contradiction'' to reinforce the Party 
        campaign against the Dalai Lama and seek to end his 
        influence among Tibetans in China. Legal measures 
        requiring nationwide re-registration of ``professional 
        religious personnel,'' underway during 2010, could 
        result in substantial losses to the Tibetan monastic 
        community if authorities apply re-registration in a 
        manner intended to weed out monks and nuns whom 
        authorities suspect of holding religious views that the 
        government does not deem to be ``legal.'' Such views 
        include religious devotion toward the Dalai Lama and 
        support of the Dalai Lama's recognition in 1995 of 
        Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama.
         Government and Party economic development 
        objectives for 2010 to 2020 principally focus on 
        accelerating and strengthening a development model that 
        subordinates respecting and protecting Tibetan culture 
        to Party and government priorities. Party General 
        Secretary and President Hu Jintao outlined Fifth Forum 
        objectives that included building major infrastructure 
        projects, increasing natural resource exploitation, and 
        continuing to push forward the construction of a 
        ``socialist new countryside'' (compulsory settlement of 
        nomadic herders and resettlement of farmers). China's 
        state-run media provided information showing that, by 
        the end of 2009, more than 1.33 million TAR nomadic 
        herders and farmers (a figure equal to about half the 
        TAR Tibetan population) will have been settled in new 
        housing, and that by 2020 officials plan for the mining 
        industry share of TAR GDP to increase from about 3 
        percent currently to between 30 percent and 50 percent. 
        Reports during this reporting year disclosed limited 
        progress on Tibetan railway construction.
         Government security and judicial institutions' 
        use of laws on ``splittism'' and ``leaking state 
        secrets'' during this reporting year infringed upon 
        China's constitutionally protected freedoms of speech, 
        religion, association, and assembly--first by using the 
        law on ``splittism'' to punish Tibetans who criticize 
        or peacefully protest against government policies, and 
        then by using the law on ``leaking state secrets'' to 
        punish Tibetans who attempt to share with other 
        Tibetans information about incidents of repression and 
        punishment. Reports of Tibetan political protest and 
        detention declined during this reporting year based on 
        Commission monitoring as of September 2010. The 
        apparent decline may suggest that Tibetans generally 
        are not risking the consequences of political protest 
        in the presence of the ongoing security crackdown. 
        Courts sentenced Tibetans to imprisonment for using 
        cultural or entertainment media to articulate their 
        views.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Urge the Chinese government to engage in 
        substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his 
        representatives on protecting the Tibetan culture, 
        language, religion, and heritage within the Tibet 
        Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous 
        prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, 
        and Yunnan provinces--a geographic area that both sides 
        identify as the focus of their Tibet policies. A 
        Chinese government decision to engage in such dialogue 
        can result in a durable and mutually beneficial outcome 
        for Chinese and Tibetans, and improve the outlook for 
        local and regional security in coming decades.
         Convey to the Chinese government the urgent 
        importance of refraining from using legal measures to 
        infringe upon and repress Tibetan Buddhists' right to 
        the freedom of religion. Such measures include: 
        aggressive campaigns of ``patriotic education'' that 
        compel Tibetans to endorse state antagonism 
        toward the Dalai Lama; preventing Tibetan Buddhists 
        from identifying and educating religious teachers in a 
        manner consistent with Tibetan preferences and 
        traditions; and enacting laws and issuing regulations 
        that remold Tibetan Buddhism to suit the state.
         Request that the Chinese government follow up on 
        the March 2010 statement by the Chairman of the TAR 
        government that Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama 
        whom the Dalai Lama recognized in 1995, is living in 
        the TAR as an ``ordinary citizen'' along with his 
        family. Urge the government to invite a representative 
        of an international organization to meet with Gedun 
        Choekyi Nyima so that he can express his wishes with 
        respect to privacy, photograph the international 
        representative and Gedun Choekyi Nyima together, and 
        publish Gedun Choekyi Nyima's statement and the 
        photograph.
         Encourage the Chinese government to maximize 
        benefits to Tibetans resulting from the Fifth Tibet 
        Work Forum by fully taking into account the views and 
        preferences of Tibetans when planning infrastructure 
        and natural resource development projects in Tibetan 
        areas of China. Encourage the Chinese government to 
        engage appropriate experts in assessing the impact of 
        infrastructure and natural resource development 
        projects, and in advising the government on the 
        implementation, progress, and impact of such projects.
         Increase support for U.S. non-governmental 
        organizations to develop programs that can assist 
        Tibetans to increase their 
        capacity to peacefully protect and develop their 
        culture, language, and heritage; that can help to 
        improve education, economic, health, and environmental 
        conservation conditions of ethnic Tibetans living in 
        Tibetan areas of China; and that create sustainable 
        benefits without encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans 
        into these areas.
         Continue to convey to the Chinese government the 
        importance of honoring reference to the freedoms of 
        speech, religion, association, and assembly in China's 
        Constitution, and refraining from using the security 
        establishment, courts, and law to infringe upon and 
        repress Tibetans' exercise of such rights. Continue to 
        convey to the Chinese government the importance of 
        distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters and 
        rioters, and request the Chinese government to provide 
        complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or 
        sentenced with protest-related crimes.
         Continue to raise in meetings and correspondence 
        with 
        Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are 
        imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of 
        human rights. Representative examples include: former 
        Tibetan monk Jigme Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-
        year sentence for printing leaflets, distributing 
        posters, and later shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in 
        prison); monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life 
        imprisonment for printing leaflets); Bangri Chogtrul 
        (regarded by Tibetans as a reincarnated teacher; 
        serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life 
        imprisonment for ``inciting splittism''); and nomad 
        Ronggye Adrag (sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment for 
        shouting political slogans at a public festival).

                  Developments in Hong Kong and Macau

                                Findings

         In November 2009, the Hong Kong government 
        issued a consultation document on election of the 
        Legislative Council (Legco) and of the chief executive 
        in Hong Kong's 2012 elections, and in April 2010, 
        submitted its final proposals on elections. The 
        document and proposals increased from 800 to 1200 the 
        number of members of an election committee that chooses 
        the chief executive, and increased the number of Legco 
        members from 60 to 70, but otherwise did not increase 
        the proportion of Legco seats returned by direct 
        election. A 2007 decision of China's National People's 
        Congress Standing Committee, which prohibited the 
        people of Hong Kong from directly electing both the 
        chief executive and all members of the Legislative 
        Council by universal suffrage in the 2012 elections, 
        had limited the scope and form of the Hong Kong 
        government's proposal.
         In July 2009, the election committee in Macau 
        selected a new chief executive in an uncontested 
        election, and 29 members of the Legislative Assembly, 
        with 12 selected by direct election.

                            Recommendations

    Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials 
are encouraged to:

         Make every effort to visit Hong Kong when 
        traveling to mainland China. Members of the U.S. 
        Congress and Administration officials should meet with 
        their counterparts in the Hong Kong Legislative 
        Council, and with members of the Hong Kong government 
        administration. Such meetings would show U.S. support 
        for a high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong under the 
        system of ``one country, two systems.''
         Urge Chinese government officials to allow the 
        people of Hong Kong to make their own determination as 
        to constitutional reform, without interference from the 
        central government either through decisions of the 
        National People's 
        Congress or informally, and to allow the introduction 
        of universal suffrage with one person, one vote, if 
        this is the wish of the people of Hong Kong.

    The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 17 to 0 
with one abstention.

                      Political Prisoner Database


                            Recommendations

    When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a 
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official 
travel to China, Members of Congress and Administration 
officials are encouraged to:

         Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) 
        (http://ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date 
        information on a prisoner or groups of prisoners. 
        Consult a prisoner's database record for more detailed 
        information about the prisoner's case, including his or 
        her alleged crime, specific human rights that officials 
        have violated, stage in the legal process, and location 
        of detention or imprisonment, if known.
         Advise official and private delegations 
        traveling to China to present Chinese officials with 
        lists of political and religious prisoners compiled 
        from database records.
         Urge U.S. state and local officials and 
        private citizens involved in sister-state and sister-
        city relationships with China to explore the database, 
        and to advocate for the release of political and 
        religious prisoners in China.

                 A MORE POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY

    The Commission's 2010 Annual Report provides information 
about Chinese political and religious prisoners\1\ in the 
context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many 
of the abuses result from the Communist Party's and 
government's application of policies and laws. The Commission 
relies on the Political Prisoner Database (PPD), a publicly 
available online database maintained by the Commission, for its 
own advocacy and research work, including the preparation of 
the Annual Report, and routinely uses the database to prepare 
summaries of information about political and religious 
prisoners for Members of Congress and Administration officials.
    On July 29, 2010, the Commission announced the availability 
of a PPD upgrade that doubles the number of types of 
information available to the public and enables faster and 
easier methods of finding and downloading information about 
political and religious prisoners. The Commission invites the 
public to read about issue-specific Chinese political 
imprisonment in sections of this Annual Report, and to access 
and make use of the upgraded PPD at http://ppd.cecc.gov. 
(Information on how to use the PPD is available at: http://
www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.)
    The PPD received approximately 34,400 online requests for 
prisoner information during the 12-month period ending August 
31, 2010. During the entire period of PPD operation beginning 
in late 2004, approximately 29 percent of the requests for 
information have originated from U.S. Government (.gov) 
Internet domains, 15 percent from commercial (.com) domains, 15 
percent from network (.net) domains, 12 percent from 
international (e.g., .fr, .de, .ca) domains, 3 percent from 
nonprofit organization (.org) domains, 2 percent from education 
(.edu) domains, 2 percent from Arpanet (.arpa) domains, and 1 
percent from international treaty organization (.int) domains. 
Approximately 19 percent of the requests have been from 
numerical Internet addresses that do not provide information 
about the name of the registrant or the type of domain.

                          POLITICAL PRISONERS

    The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information 
that is reliable and up to date. Commission staff members work 
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on 
their areas of expertise. The staff seeks to provide objective 
analysis of information about individual prisoners and about 
events and trends that drive political and religious 
imprisonment in China.
    As of September 3, 2010, the PPD contained information on 
5,608 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of 
those, 1,426 are cases of political and religious prisoners 
currently known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 
4,182 are cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have 
been released or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon 
after release, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there 
are considerably more than 1,426 cases of current political and 
religious imprisonment in China. The Commission staff works on 
an ongoing basis to add cases of political and religious 
imprisonment to the PPD.
    The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the 
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their 
extensive experience and data on political and religious 
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the 
database. The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The 
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner 
information, as well as on information provided by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), other groups that specialize 
in promoting human rights and opposing political and religious 
imprisonment, and other public sources of information.

                   MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY

    The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a 
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and 
Administration, other governments, NGOs, educational 
institutions, and individuals who research political and 
religious imprisonment in China or who advocate on behalf of 
such prisoners. The July 2010 PPD upgrade significantly 
leverages the capacity of the Commission's information and 
technology resources to support such research, reporting, and 
advocacy. [See New Political Prisoner Database Features in this 
section.]
    The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power 
to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment 
in China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is 
structured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query 
engine. Each prisoner's record describes the type of human 
rights violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her 
detention. These types include violations of the right to 
peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, 
and free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful 
social or political change and to criticize government policy 
or government officials. Users may search for a prisoner by 
name, using either the Latin alphabet or Chinese characters. 
The PPD allows users to construct queries that include one or 
more types of information. [For a list of types of information, 
see box titled Congressional-Executive Commission on China 
Political Prisoner Database: Previous and Additional Data 
Fields in this section.]
    The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the 
Internet to query the database and download prisoner data 
without providing personal information to the Commission, and 
without the PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a 
user's computer. Users have the option to create a user 
account, which allows them to save, edit, and reuse queries, 
but the PPD does not require a user to provide any personal 
information to set up such an account. The PPD does not 
download software or a Web cookie to a user's computer as a 
result of setting up such an account. Saved queries are not 
stored on a user's computer. A user-specified ID (which can be 
a nickname) and password are the only information required to 
set up a user account.

New Political Prisoner Database Features

    Some of the new PPD features that will strengthen reporting 
on political and religious imprisonment in China and advocacy 
on behalf of Chinese political prisoners are listed below.

         An easy-to-use Welcome Page search box for a 
        prisoner's name.
         An increase in the number of types of 
        information (fields) from 19 to 40. Several of the 
        additional fields are on the judicial process--for 
        example, court names and dates and articles of China's 
        Criminal Law. All 40 of the PPD fields may be queried 
        separately or in any combination.
         A full-text search that applies to all 40 
        fields in a PPD record.
         A one-click download of all of the field data 
        for all of the records in the PPD as a Microsoft Excel 
        spreadsheet.
         An Excel spreadsheet download of the data for 
        every PPD record that satisfies a query or a full-text 
        search that a user creates.
         Opening a PPD record from another Web site, 
        blog, document, or email by using the PPD record's Web 
        link. The link will open the current state of the 
        database record, not a stored Web page.
         Opening reports, articles, and texts of 
        Chinese laws that are available on the Commission's Web 
        site or on another Web site by clicking links in a PPD 
        record's short summary. (Many PPD records contain a 
        short summary of the case that includes basic details 
        about the political or religious imprisonment and the 
        legal process leading to imprisonment.)
         Exporting a PPD record to a single-page Adobe 
        PDF document that contains all of the available record 
        data, including the short summary.

Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database:
                   Previous and Additional Data Fields
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  PPD Fields Added in the  July 2010 Upgrade      PPD Fields Available
                     (21)                        Prior to Upgrade (19)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affiliation                                    CECC record number
Residence (province)                           Detention status
Residence (prefecture)                         Issue category
Residence (county)                             Main name
Formal arrest date                             Chinese characters (main
                                                name)
Trial date                                     Other (or lay) name
Trial court                                    Alternate name(s)
Sentence date                                  Pinyin name (for non-Han)
Sentence court                                 Ethnic group
Appeal date                                    Sex
Appeal court                                   Age at detention
Appeal ruling date                             Religion
Appeal ruling court                            Occupation
Sentence ends per PRC                          Date of detention
Actual date released                           Province where imprisoned
Charge (statute)                               Current prison
Sentence length (months)                       Sentence length (years)
Sentence length (weeks)                        Legal process
Sentence length (days)                         Short summary
Prefecture where imprisoned
County where imprisoned
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            II. Human Rights


                         Freedom of Expression


                              Introduction

    The Chinese government and Communist Party's system of 
restrictions on free expression consists of two core 
components: content prohibitions and prior restraints. Content 
prohibitions are based on vague and broadly worded criminal and 
administrative provisions covering a wide range of media. These 
provisions prohibit Chinese citizens from expressing or 
accessing content the Party or government deems to ``incite 
subversion of state power,'' ``spread rumors,'' or ``attack the 
Chinese Communist Party,'' among other things.\1\ Such 
provisions continued to serve as the basis for punishing 
peaceful critics of the Party this past year. The Commission's 
2009 Annual Report noted the arrest of prominent intellectual 
Liu Xiaobo as part of a crackdown on citizens who supported 
Charter 08, a treatise advocating political reform and human 
rights circulated online.\2\ In December 2009, a Beijing court 
sentenced Liu to 11 years in prison for inciting subversion, 
the longest known sentence for that crime.\3\ Officials also 
moved forward with cases against Tan Zuoren and Huang Qi, the 
activists who criticized authorities for not doing enough to 
investigate school collapses in the May 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake.\4\ Courts in Sichuan province sentenced Tan to five 
years' imprisonment for inciting subversion and Huang to three 
years' imprisonment for leaking state secrets. These cases 
reflect officials' heightened concern about the Internet, as 
Liu, Tan, and Huang had peacefully used that medium for rights 
advocacy and political expression. Officials continued to 
censor political expression across a wide range of media, from 
the Internet to print publications. In March 2010, after 13 
Chinese newspapers published a joint editorial criticizing and 
calling for reform of China's household registration system, 
officials disciplined editors at the Economic Observer and 
ordered the editorial removed from Web sites.\5\
    The second core component of China's system of 
restrictions, prior restraints, refers to a system by which the 
government controls, through a licensing requirement for 
example, who may use a forum for expression. In China, prior 
restraints are extensive. Any person or group wishing to 
publish a newspaper, magazine, or book; \6\ host a Web site; 
\7\ or work as a journalist \8\ must first obtain a license 
from or register with the government. Reflecting heightened 
concern over the Internet, the government during the 
Commission's 2010 reporting year sought to tighten prior 
restraints on those applying for domain names for Web sites, to 
curb anonymity on the Internet, and to crack down on unlicensed 
video Web sites. In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the 
government shut down Internet, text messaging, and 
international phone call service altogether following 
demonstrations and riots in July 2009, and only gradually began 
lifting restrictions in December. Officials also sought to 
tighten control over the news industry nationwide, announcing 
in March 2010 a qualification exam for journalists that would 
require knowledge of ``Chinese Communist Party journalism'' and 
warning against unlicensed citizen journalists sharing news on 
the Internet.

              INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FREE EXPRESSION

    The Chinese government's content restrictions and prior 
restraints aimed at controlling political and religious content 
are inconsistent with international human rights standards and 
also with the rights to free speech and the press enumerated in 
China's Constitution.\9\ Chinese officials, however, continue 
to insist that these rights are protected.\10\ Under 
international human rights standards, a restriction on free 
expression is permitted so long as it is (1) for the purpose of 
respecting the rights or reputations of others or protecting 
national security, public order, public health or morals, or 
the general welfare; (2) set forth in law; and (3) narrowly 
tailored.\11\ The vagueness of the Chinese government's content 
prohibitions provides Chinese officials with broad discretion 
to apply prohibitions for purposes impermissible under 
international human rights standards, such as to target 
criticism of the Communist Party.\12\ The vagueness with which 
prohibitions are set forth in law also leaves citizens with no 
clear guidance on the boundaries of free speech.\13\ The 
government's prior restraints on various speech activities also 
are not narrowly tailored, allowing officials the discretion to 
suppress unlicensed expression that they find politically 
disagreeable.\14\ Moreover, officials apply restrictions on 
expression with little transparency \15\ and without sufficient 
judicial oversight.\16\

                 Abuse of Vague Criminal Law Provisions


                          CRIME OF SUBVERSION

    During this reporting year, Chinese officials continued to 
label peacefully expressed criticism of the government or the 
Party as a threat to state security, relying in some cases on 
Article 105 of China's Criminal Law. Article 105 provides for 
sentences of up to life imprisonment for attempts to subvert 
state power or up to 15 years for inciting such subversion.\17\ 
Chinese courts make little assessment of whether the speech in 
question poses an actual threat to state security.\18\ Chinese 
lawyers have noted that courts can apply Article 105 
arbitrarily because no legislative or judicial interpretation 
defines the specific boundaries between free expression and 
state security.\19\ In June 2010, Joshua Rosenzweig of the Dui 
Hua Foundation, a human rights organization, said, ``There's 
little doubt that . . . the intent of the law against inciting 
subversion is the silencing of political speech.'' \20\
    This past year, courts continued to punish alleged 
subversion in trials marred by procedural abuses and in which 
the defendants' online activity figured prominently. The 
Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court levied what is 
reportedly the longest known sentence for inciting subversion, 
11 years, against the prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo in 
December 2009.\21\ [See box titled Liu Xiaobo below.] In 
February 2010, a court in Chengdu city sentenced the activist 
Tan Zuoren to five years in prison for inciting subversion.\22\ 
The court cited online essays Tan wrote criticizing the 
government's handling of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Tan's 
efforts to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the protests, 
and interviews he gave to foreign media in which he criticized 
the government's response to the May 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake.\23\ Tan was detained while conducting an 
investigation into school collapses in the quake. During Tan's 
trial, the judge refused to allow Tan's lawyers to call 
witnesses or to show evidence, frequently cut his lawyers off, 
and barred reporters from the courtroom.\24\ In October 2009, a 
court in Jiangsu province sentenced former professor Guo Quan 
to 10 years in prison for subversion for using the Internet to 
organize an ``illegal'' political party and publishing 
``reactionary'' articles online.\25\ [See Section III--
Institutions of Democratic Governance.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Liu Xiaobo
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  On December 25, 2009, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court
 sentenced the prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison
 for inciting subversion.\26\ The court cited six essays Liu had written
 and posted on the Internet as well as his work on Charter 08, a
 treatise advocating political reform and human rights circulated online
 for signatures.\27\ The essays, with titles such as ``The Chinese
 Communist Party's Dictatorial Patriotism'' and ``Can It Be That the
 Chinese People Are Only Suited To Accepting `Party-Ruled Democracy'?
 '', criticize the Communist Party's governance of China but do not
 advocate violence.\28\ The court noted how Liu had taken advantage of
 the Internet's ``rapid transmission of information, broad reach, great
 social influence, and high degree of public attention.'' \29\ Liu's
 case was marred by official abuses. When police first took Liu into
 custody in December 2008, they kept him under residential surveillance
 at a secret location instead of his home in Beijing and did so beyond
 the legal six-month limit.\30\ At trial, the judge limited Liu's
 defense lawyers to less than 20 minutes to present their arguments and
 prevented Liu from finishing his remarks.\31\ In February 2010, the
 Beijing High People's Court affirmed the lower court judgment and
 rejected Liu's argument that his residential surveillance amounted to
 de facto detention and should be counted toward time served.\32\ In
 March, officials in Shanghai municipality ordered Shanghai petitioner
 Mao Hengfeng to serve 18 months of reeducation through labor for
 shouting slogans outside Liu's trial in December 2009.\33\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

          OTHER CRIMES: SPLITTISM, STATE SECRETS, AND SLANDER

    This past year authorities used legal provisions 
criminalizing slander and acts of endangering state security--
``splittism'' (separatism) and possessing or trafficking state 
secrets--to punish persons who criticized officials or who 
dealt with commercial information.

         Gheyret Niyaz. In July 2010, a court in 
        Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), 
        sentenced Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist and Web 
        editor, to 15 years' imprisonment for ``leaking state 
        secrets.'' Prosecutors cited essays by Gheyret Niyaz 
        addressing economic and social problems affecting 
        Uyghurs; sources also connected the prison sentence to 
        interviews Gheyret Niyaz gave to foreign media that 
        criticized aspects of government policy in the 
        XUAR.\34\ [For information on other Uyghur cases, see 
        box titled Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang in 
        Section IV--Xinjiang.]
         Xue Feng. In July 2010, a Beijing court 
        sentenced Xue Feng, a naturalized American citizen and 
        geologist, to eight years in prison for trafficking 
        state secrets.\35\ Xue had helped an American company 
        purchase information on oil wells in China.\36\ 
        Officials reportedly did not declare the information a 
        state secret until after the purchase took place and 
        allegedly tortured Xue.\37\ Xue's lengthy detention and 
        trial violated China's Criminal Procedure Law, while 
        officials violated China's consular treaty with the 
        United States by delaying notification of the case and 
        access to Xue by U.S. officials.\38\
         Tagyal (Shogdung). In May 2010, authorities in 
        Qinghai province arrested the Tibetan writer known as 
        Shogdung, whose real name is Tagyal, on the charge of 
        inciting splittism.\39\ The writer had signed an open 
        letter suggesting that people avoid sending donations 
        for the April 2010 Yushu earthquake in Qinghai through 
        official channels, citing corruption concerns, and had 
        written a book about the March 2008 Tibetan 
        protests.\40\ [For information on other Tibetan cases, 
        see box titled Imprisonment for Sharing Information, 
        Cultural Expression in Section V--Tibet.]
         Fan Yanqiong, Wu Huaying, and You Jingyou. In 
        April, a court in Fujian province sentenced Fan 
        Yanqiong to two years in prison and Wu Huaying and You 
        Jingyou each to one year in prison for the crime of 
        slander (Article 246 of China's Criminal Law) after 
        they wrote essays and created a video documenting a 
        mother's claim that her daughter was gang-raped and 
        murdered by people with ties to local police.\41\ The 
        court claimed the allegations were fabricated and had 
        caused a stir on the Internet.\42\ Authorities 
        reportedly suspended the license of Wu's lawyer before 
        the trial.\43\ The Commission's 2009 Annual Report 
        noted rising official abuse of Article 246 to retaliate 
        against Internet whistleblowers.\44\
         Huang Qi. In November 2009, a court in Chengdu 
        city, Sichuan province, sentenced the rights activist 
        Huang Qi to three years in prison for illegal 
        possession of state secrets.\45\ Huang's human rights 
        Web site advocated on behalf of grieving parents after 
        the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Authorities have 
        considerable discretion to declare almost any matter of 
        public concern a state secret. [See box titled Open 
        Government Information and the Amended State Secrets 
        Law below.] Huang's lawyer said the ``state secrets'' 
        were rules for government agencies on dealing with 
        citizen petitions.\46\

[For information on authorities' use of extralegal tactics and 
restrictions on freedom of movement to punish free expression, 
see Section II--Criminal Justice--Abuse of Police Powers: 
Suppression of Dissent and Section II--Freedom of Residence and 
Movement.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Open Government Information and the Amended State Secrets Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  China's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan emphasizes
 citizens' ``right to be informed'' and says the ``Chinese government
 will make more efforts to keep the public informed of government
 affairs, and improve relevant laws and regulations, so as to guarantee
 citizens' right of information.'' \47\ Effective in May 2008, the
 Regulations on Open Government Information require governments to
 disclose information  involving the vital interests of citizens and
 give citizens the right to request information.\48\ One barrier to
 transparency, however, is a state secrets framework that gives
 officials wide latitude to declare almost any matter of public concern
 a state secret, from death penalty statistics to the state's
 reeducation through labor policy, and to deny requests for
 information.\49\ The Commission's 2009 Annual Report noted that Chinese
 officials were considering proposed changes to the state secrets law in
 effect since 1989,\50\ and in April 2010, the National People's
 Congress Standing Committee passed the amended Law on the Protection of
 State Secrets, which took effect on October 1, 2010.\51\ The definition
 of ``state secrets'' in the 2010 law, however, remains vague and broad.
 According to Article 9, a state secret may relate to major policy
 decisions on state affairs, national economic and social development,
 and science and technology, or other matters as determined by
 officials.\52\ Like the previous law, the amended law does not provide
 for any judicial review of a state agency's determination that
 information is a state secret. It remains to be seen whether other
 provisions in the amended law, including one that places time limits on
 state secrets, reduce the number of state secrets.\53\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  Internet and Other Electronic Media


                        CHINA'S INTERNET POLICY

    As the Commission has documented in recent annual 
reports,\54\ the Chinese government continued to encourage the 
Internet for economic development while maintaining political 
control over the medium. According to a white paper on the 
Internet released by the State Council Information Office 
(SCIO) in June 2010, the government plans to increase the 
percentage of Internet users from 28.9 percent of the 
population to 45 percent in five years.\55\ According to 
official statistics, there were 420 million Internet users in 
China as of the end of June 2010, an increase of 82 million 
over the previous year.\56\ The white paper noted the 
government's investments in Internet infrastructure and the 
role the Internet has played in driving China's economy.\57\ 
The white paper also repeated the government's argument that 
increased access to the Internet, as evidenced by the large 
number of blogs in China and the presence of lively exchanges 
on China's Internet, shows that China ``guarantees citizens' 
freedom of speech on the Internet.'' \58\ This past year, 
Chinese citizens continued to use communication technologies to 
advocate for rights and to criticize government policies. In 
early summer 2010, for example, workers in China used the 
Internet and cell phones to organize and document strikes.\59\ 
Such phenomena, however, are insufficient evidence that China 
guarantees free speech, in light of the continued political 
censorship documented below.
    While greater Internet access has afforded Chinese citizens 
unprecedented opportunities for expression, it has not 
signified Chinese officials' willingness to loosen political 
control. In an April 2010 speech before the National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, SCIO Director Wang Chen said the 
government is using the Internet to promote ``positive 
propaganda''; ``guide public opinion'' (citing guidance of the 
Internet following unrest in Tibetan and Uyghur areas of China 
in 2008 and 2009); enhance China's ``soft power''; and 
``balance the hegemony of the Western media.'' \60\ Wang also 
said the government is campaigning to gain global acceptance 
for its model of Internet control:

        Our nation has successively engaged in dialogue and 
        exchanges with more than 70 countries and international 
        organizations. We have explained our Internet 
        management policy, introduced the achievements of our 
        Internet construction . . . countered Western enemy 
        forces' smears against us, and enhanced the 
        international community's acceptance and understanding 
        of our model of managing the Internet.\61\

Officials remained concerned about citizens' use of the 
Internet to network socially and post commentary. In mid-July 
2010, Chinese and foreign media reported that officials were 
behind service disruptions at major microblogging sites, the 
removal of the blogs of well-known activists and lawyers, and 
increased monitoring of journalists' blogs.\62\ In April 2010, 
the New York Times reported that the SCIO had established a new 
bureau to monitor social networking sites, which have grown in 
popularity in China.\63\ The Chinese government continued to 
employ paid agents to issue pro-government comments online.\64\ 
In his April speech, Wang said officials would ``strengthen the 
blocking of harmful information from outside [China's] 
borders.'' \65\ In December 2009, Minister of Public Security 
Meng Jianzhu published an essay saying the Internet had become 
an important tool for ``anti-China forces'' and ``a new 
challenge for public security forces safeguarding state 
security and social stability.'' \66\

                    CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL CONTENT

Scope of Censorship

    Censorship of political content on the Internet remained 
pervasive this reporting year. The Chinese government readily 
acknowledges the blocking of some online content, such as 
content it considers to be pornographic,\67\ but it provides 
few details about how it determines other content to block, 
including what political content it censors.\68\ The scope of 
content the Chinese government requires authorities and private 
actors to censor remains ill-defined, and therefore allows 
officials to target political and religious content 
arbitrarily.\69\ OpenNet Initiative, an Internet research 
organization, noted in a 2009 report that censors primarily 
target Chinese-language content, including content dealing with 
the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Tibetan rights, and Falun Gong, as 
well as ``human rights, political reform, sovereignty issues, 
and circumvention tools.'' \70\ The following are select 
examples of censored political content from the past year, as 
reported by Chinese Internet users and foreign media in China.

         News items were removed from Web sites, 
        including an article examining the role of the Internet 
        in mass incidents in China; \71\ a transcript of U.S. 
        President Barack Obama's November 2009 town hall 
        meeting in Shanghai, where he called for a free 
        Internet; \72\ and a Chinese editorial cartoon that 
        appeared to refer to the government suppression of the 
        1989 Tiananmen protests.\73\
         In October 2009, the organizers of an overseas 
        Web site inviting visitors to comment on the fall of 
        the Berlin Wall reported the site was blocked in 
        China.\74\
         In March 2010, the Chinese government 
        reportedly instructed Web sites to limit online 
        discussion of the controversy between the U.S. 
        technology company, Google, and the Chinese 
        government.\75\
         In April 2010, Internet users reportedly were 
        unable to search the word ``carrot'' on the Internet 
        because it shares the same Chinese character as ``Hu'' 
        in President Hu Jintao's name.\76\
         In May 2010, several popular Uyghur Web sites 
        remained shut down after authorities restored Internet 
        access to the XUAR.\77\

China's Internet Censors and the Rule of Law

    Both Chinese officials and Internet companies in China have 
a responsibility under China's laws and regulations to censor 
content. Chinese officials block or filter access to foreign 
Web sites through control of the gateway connection between 
China and the global Internet.\78\ Chinese authorities continue 
to block social media sites based overseas, such as Facebook, 
YouTube, Twitter, and Flickr.\79\ According to Xiao Qiang, an 
expert on China's Internet based at the University of 
California at Berkeley, ``There is an Internet monitoring and 
surveillance unit in every city, wherever you have an Internet 
connection.'' \80\ Chinese Internet regulations provide lists 
of prohibited categories of content including content that 
``harms the honor or interests of the nation,'' ``destroys 
ethnic unity,'' ``spreads rumors,'' or ``disrupts national 
policies on religion.'' \81\ These vague and broadly worded 
categories provide little guidance to Internet users or 
Internet companies in China,\82\ the latter of which are 
required by Chinese regulations to censor content and to 
monitor and report customer activity to authorities.\83\ [See 
box titled Chinese Media Article Exposes Problems With China's 
Internet Censorship below.] In January 2010, Chinese cell phone 
users complained about unclear standards during a crackdown on 
text messages containing pornography or ``unhealthy'' 
information.\84\ Vague content prohibitions also apply to other 
electronic media, such as television.\85\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Chinese Media Article Exposes Problems With China's Internet Censorship
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The Global Times, which operates under the official People's Daily,
 issued a rare article in February 2010 on the subject of Internet
 censorship in China that highlighted a number of problems, including
 lack of transparency and clear standards and the absence of adequate
 procedural protections.\86\ According to a professor of Internet
 politics at Nanjing University cited in the article, the 14 regulations
 dealing with online content in China are all vague and lack detailed
 provisions.\87\ The professor also noted that content bans were
 becoming increasingly unpredictable and that affected Internet users
 receive no explanation or opportunity to appeal.\88\ The article noted
 how these factors led Internet users to practice self-censorship and
 placed pressure on Internet companies, especially those without
 government connections, who feared being closed down for any
 misstep.\89\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This past year, the government introduced measures that 
could increase the pressure on Internet companies to censor 
politically sensitive content. In April 2010, the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee passed an amended state 
secrets law, effective October 1, 2010.\90\ [For more 
information, see the box titled Open Government Information and 
the Amended State Secrets Law above.] The law retains the vague 
definition of state secrets that allows officials to declare 
almost any matter of public concern a state secret.\91\ In 
addition, the amended law adds a new provision, Article 28, 
which requires Internet and other telecommunication companies 
to cooperate with authorities' investigation of state secret 
leaks and, upon discovering a leak, to stop transmission of the 
secret, preserve any relevant records, and notify 
officials.\92\ This provision further codifies in law a 
requirement that appears in existing administrative 
regulations.\93\ Internet companies that violate Article 28 
will face punishment from police, state security officers, or 
government officials.\94\ In December 2009, the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee issued the Tort Liability 
Law, effective July 1, 2010, which includes a provision 
(Article 36) exposing Internet service providers (ISPs) to 
liability for failing to remove content that infringes upon the 
rights of others, to the extent the ISP is aware of or is 
informed of such content.\95\ A state-controlled media article 
noted that the liability provision could pressure ISPs to be 
overzealous in removing content, including politically 
sensitive content.\96\ Furthermore, the article said it is 
unclear to what extent the ``aware'' clause requires ISPs to 
actively search the Internet for prohibited content.\97\
    The pressure to censor politically sensitive content 
affects foreign companies in China in ways that may have an 
impact on trade and may further limit the free flow of 
information, as the controversy between the Chinese government 
and the U.S. company Google this past year clearly illustrated. 
In January 2010, Google announced that partly because of 
``attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on 
the web'' in China, the company was ``no longer willing to 
continue censoring'' search results on Google.cn, its search 
engine for China.\98\ In explaining the problems Google faced 
in China, a Google representative told the Commission at a 
March 2010 hearing that Chinese government censorship requests 
put Google in a ``terribly difficult position'' because 
``there's not very much transparency at all about what's being 
requested, and whether it's being requested of everybody.'' 
\99\ Google's stated refusal to censor the search engine it 
created for the Chinese market raised the possibility that it 
would be forced to shut down this service. Some Chinese 
citizens supported Google's position but worried about losing 
access to a source of information that censored less than 
domestic alternatives.\100\ In February, Nature magazine 
released a survey of 784 Chinese scientists, 84 percent of whom 
said that blocked access to Google would ``somewhat or 
significantly'' hinder their research.\101\ Google announced in 
March that it would automatically redirect mainland users to 
its less censored Hong Kong site, but in June modified this 
practice out of fear that the Chinese government would not 
renew Google's Internet content license.\102\

       PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND BROAD RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNET ACCESS

    This past year, officials sought to tighten broad prior 
restraints on citizens' ability to post content on the 
Internet. All Web sites hosted in China are required either to 
be licensed by or registered with the government, and sites 
providing news content or audio and video services require an 
additional license or registration.\103\ In December 2009, the 
state-run domain name registrar announced rules barring 
individuals from registering for the Chinese domain name 
``.cn'' for their Web sites, limiting registrations to only 
entities with business licenses.\104\ Although officials and 
domestic and foreign media cited pornography and online fraud 
concerns with ``.cn'' sites, some in China questioned the 
reasonableness of 
banning all individual registrations.\105\ In February 2010, 
the government rescinded the ban, but added a new requirement 
that applicants must submit a photo and meet in person with the 
Internet service provider assisting people with Web site 
registration, which could have a chilling effect given China's 
restrictions on political content.\106\ In its 2009 Annual 
Report, the Commission also reported that the government had 
issued a secret directive requiring Internet users in China to 
provide their real name and identification number before 
posting a comment on major news Web sites.\107\ This past year, 
Wang Chen, the State Council Information Office Director, 
confirmed the existence of the requirement and said the 
government was exploring a real name identification system for 
comment services generally.\108\
    The government continued its periodic crackdown on illegal 
Web sites, often couched as anti-pornography campaigns. A 
February 2010 report by the government news agency Xinhua 
indicated, however, that only 12 percent of the 136,000 Web 
sites targeted in a government crackdown were shut down for 
having pornography, while most had failed to register.\109\ 
Officials continued to target sites devoted to posting news or 
videos. In November 2009, officials shut down Yeeyan, a site 
that published translations of English and Chinese articles, 
for failing to have a license to provide news.\110\ To obtain a 
license to provide online news in China, an applicant must have 
at least five full-time news editors with at least three years 
of experience in journalism, as well as registered capital of 
no less than 10 million yuan (US$1.48 million).\111\ Yeeyan 
reportedly came back online 39 days later, after removing all 
``political news'' from the site.\112\ As the Commission 
reported in its 2008 Annual Report, a 2008 regulation requires 
audio and video Web sites to be wholly state-owned or state-
controlled in order to obtain a license.\113\ In December 2009, 
officials in a crackdown on unlicensed audio and video sites 
shut down BTChina, a popular video-sharing site, which they 
also accused of hosting pornography.\114\ The owner denied the 
pornography charge and said that government regulations 
prevented him from obtaining a license.\115\ A September 2009 
government notice stated that beginning in March 2010, 
officials nationwide would need to inspect their jurisdictions 
for audio and video Web sites operating without a license.\116\
    In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), 
authorities maintained blanket restrictions on the Internet, 
international phone calls, and text messages, put in place 
following demonstrations and riots in Urumqi starting July 
2009, and gradually began lifting them only after almost half a 
year had passed.\117\ It was not until May 2010 that officials 
restored more complete Internet access.\118\ Authorities 
claimed that overseas elements had directed the violence \119\ 
and that restrictions were imposed to prevent further 
violence.\120\ The actual role the communication devices played 
in violent rioting (as opposed to demonstrations) was 
unclear,\121\ however, and the wide-reaching restrictions--
affecting all Internet, SMS, and international phone content 
and lasting for months after the July 2009 events--exceeded 
permissible boundaries allowable under international human 
rights standards. [See International Standards for Free 
Expression in this section.] The press freedom organization 
Reporters Without Borders noted in October 2009 that the 
restrictions were overbroad and prevented XUAR residents from 
sharing information about the ensuing government 
crackdown.\122\ [For more information, see Section IV--
Xinjiang--Controls Over Free Expression.]

                          Freedom of the Press


                              STATE POLICY

    While China's Constitution guarantees freedom of the press, 
in practice Communist Party and government control and 
regulation of Chinese news media and publishing continued to 
violate international standards. [See International Standards 
for Free Expression in this section.] International standards 
prohibit restrictions on free expression for political control, 
but in China the official policy is that the media is 
subordinate to the Party's interests. In a November 2009 
speech, top Party official Li Changchun marked Journalists' Day 
in China by telling journalists to ``persist in strengthening 
and improving the Party's leadership over news propaganda 
work.'' \123\ This policy continued to be reflected in media 
coverage of major events. Following the April 2010 Yushu 
earthquake in Qinghai province, Li said that propaganda 
reporting had been effectively utilized to ``create a good 
public opinion atmosphere'' for disaster relief work and told 
Chinese media to reflect the ``good(ness)'' of the Communist 
Party and ethnic groups ``uniting'' in disaster relief.\124\ 
The government also continued with state-led expansion of the 
media industry in order to spread China's influence globally. 
In July 2010, the central government's news agency Xinhua 
launched a global English-language television channel.\125\

                               NEWS MEDIA

Censorship and Guidance of News

    This past year, the Commission observed numerous reports of 
officials continuing to direct media coverage of topics they 
deemed politically sensitive. The Party, primarily through the 
Central Propaganda Department, issues frequent directives to 
Chinese news media informing them about the stories they can 
and cannot cover or how to cover a story, including requiring 
them to run only Xinhua reports.\126\ The following table 
indicates some of the publicly known directives over the past 
year, as well as other instances where officials sought to 
control news coverage:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Restricted Topic                       Restriction
------------------------------------------------------------------------
November 2009--Southern Weekend's    Ban on reprinting of interview and
 interview with U.S. President        posting on the Internet.\127\
 Barack Obama.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2010--Lunar New Year         CCTV (national television station)
 Holiday in February.                 ordered to avoid negative
                                      news.\128\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2010--Dispute between Google   News Web sites ordered not to
 and Chinese government over          report information released by
 Internet censorship.                 Google, to play down Chinese
                                      citizens' displays of support for
                                      Google, and to publish only
                                      stories by central government
                                      media.\129\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
March 2010--Annual meetings of       Ban on negative news on front pages
 National People's Congress and       and in headlines.\131\
 Chinese People's Political
 Consultative Conference.\130\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2010--Coal mine disaster in    Local officials reportedly ordered
 Shanxi province.                     journalists to leave the area and
                                      reduce coverage.\132\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2010--Yushu earthquake in      Officials attempted to ban non-
 Qinghai province.                    local journalists from covering
                                      quake. Media later ordered to
                                      reduce coverage and focus on
                                      Shanghai 2010 World Expo.\133\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 2010--Shanghai 2010 World      Officials ordered news media to
 Expo.                                adhere to only central media
                                      reports when activities of central
                                      officials are concerned.\134\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Political Loyalty and Prior Restraints

    The Chinese government claims that government licensing and 
supervision of journalists is needed to prevent corruption and 
protect journalists.\135\ Journalists continue to be subject, 
however, to political requirements unrelated to corruption or 
protecting journalists. In March 2010, a high-level official at 
the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), the 
Chinese government's main regulator of the press, said that 
journalists in China would be required to pass a new 
qualification exam that will test them on their knowledge of 
``Chinese Communist Party journalism'' and Marxist views of 
news.\136\ In November, the All-China Journalists Association 
issued a revised ethics code that maintains political 
requirements, including to ``be loyal to the Party,'' ``persist 
in correct guidance of public opinion . . . giving first place 
to positive propaganda,'' and ``abide by the Party's discipline 
for news workers.'' \137\ Government warnings against 
unlicensed journalistic activity also appear intended to ensure 
centralized control over the news. In a February 2010 People's 
Daily interview, a GAPP official noted that commercial Web 
sites and unlicensed ``Internet journalists'' are not allowed 
to independently report news on the Internet.\138\ The official 
said that the only news Web sites that are allowed to conduct 
their own reporting are ``traditional media'' already licensed 
by the government, naming as examples People.com.cn (of the 
Party's flagship newspaper People's Daily) and Xinhuanet.com 
(of the central government's news agency).\139\ The close ties 
between some media and the state may exacerbate corruption 
among journalists. According to one foreign news organization, 
``[w]hen journalists from China's top news agencies approach a 
bureaucrat or businessmen, they have not only market power 
behind them but something even more formidable, the power of 
the state.'' \140\

Punishment of Journalists and Newspapers

    Chinese journalists and newspapers continued to face 
official pressure and punishment for reporting on issues 
authorities deemed to be sensitive. In November 2009, General 
Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) officials 
``severely punished'' four newspapers for publishing what they 
deemed to be ``false'' reports claiming that much of China's 
wealth is held by a small percentage of the population.\141\ In 
May 2010, GAPP officials ordered Business Watch to halt 
publication for one month because it had published an article 
on a major state power company's alleged monopolistic 
activities.\142\ The story was published during the annual 
meetings of the National People's Congress and Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference in March 2010 and prompted 
some delegates to criticize the power company.\143\ Authorities 
reportedly cited Business Watch for ``violating propaganda 
discipline'' and creating a ``negative influence.'' \144\ In 
early March, the Central Propaganda Department reportedly 
issued a warning to top editors at the Economic Observer, after 
it and 12 other newspapers jointly published an editorial 
criticizing and calling for reform of China's household 
registration system.\145\ Zhang Hong, an editor and co-author 
of the editorial, reportedly was removed from his position. 
[For more information, see Section II--Freedom of Residence and 
Movement--Significant Household Registration (Hukou) Policies 
and Regulatory Developments in 2010--The Joint Editorial on 
Hukou Reform]. In May 2010, an editor of the China Economic 
Times was reportedly removed from his position after the paper 
reported that poorly handled vaccinations in Shanxi province 
led to deaths and sickening of children.\146\ [For more 
information, see Section II--Public Health.]

Foreign and Hong Kong Journalists

    Credentialed journalists reporting for foreign news 
organizations in China are subject to fewer restrictions than 
their domestic counterparts but continued to face harassment. 
As a result of China hosting the Olympics in 2008, since 
January 2007, foreign journalists allowed into China 
technically may report without additional government 
permission, with the notable exception of permission being 
required to enter restricted areas such as the Tibet Autonomous 
Region.\147\ At the World Media Summit held in Beijing in 
October 2009, President Hu Jintao promised that the government 
would ``guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of 
foreign news organizations and reporters, and facilitate 
coverage and reporting by foreign media in China according to 
relevant laws and regulations.'' \148\ The Foreign 
Correspondents' Club of China, however, reported several cases 
of harassment this past year when reporters tried to cover 
sensitive events or geographic areas. In November 2009, police 
and local foreign affairs officers in Kashgar city, Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), reportedly 
harassed Italian and American journalists after finding out 
their occupation.\149\ In February 2010, police in Chengdu 
city, Sichuan province, forced nine Hong Kong reporters into a 
holding room under the pretext that they wanted to check the 
journalists' credentials.\150\ The reporters were attempting to 
cover the trial of activist Tan Zuoren. The police released the 
reporters only after the verdict was announced. The reporters 
encountered further harassment outside the court as they tried 
to interview Tan's lawyer.\151\
    Chinese authorities continued to harass Chinese citizens 
working with foreign journalists and to prevent citizens from 
speaking to foreign journalists. In late April 2010, 
authorities threatened a Chinese employee with loss of work 
after he helped a German journalist film video of a migrant 
school slated for demolition in Beijing.\152\ Police accused 
the assistant of conducting ``independent'' 
reporting.\153\ In June 2010, public security officials in the 
XUAR reportedly ordered people not to speak to foreign 
journalists without authorization in the wake of the one-year 
anniversary of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in 
Urumqi.\154\

                              PUBLICATIONS

Prior Restraints and Political Publications Considered Illegal

    The Chinese government continued to engage in campaigns to 
root out unlicensed publications and publications containing 
what officials deemed to be ``illegal'' political content. All 
newspapers and publications must be licensed by the government, 
have a government sponsor, and meet certain financial 
requirements.\155\ Chinese regulations include vague and 
sweeping prohibitions on the publication of materials that 
``destroy ethnic unity, or infringe upon ethnic customs and 
habits,'' ``propagate evil cults or superstition,'' or ``harm 
the honor or interests of the nation.'' \156\ The non-
governmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
reported in March 2010 that the government Web site of Jilin 
city, Jilin province, posted an article on how the city's local 
press and publications bureau was targeting 38 different kinds 
of ``illegal political publications,'' including those 
``attacking the Party and the country's leaders,'' ``attacking 
the Party's policies,'' and ``inciting ethnic splittism.'' 
Banned publications included those about China's present and 
former leaders, Charter 08 (a political reform and human rights 
treatise), the XUAR and Tibetan protests and riots of the last 
two years, and the Dalai Lama.\157\ In July 2010, the writer Yu 
Jie said police threatened him with imprisonment if he 
published a book critical of China's Premier Wen Jiabao.\158\
    Officials waged campaigns against ``illegal'' publications 
around politically sensitive events or areas. Following the 
April 2010 Yushu earthquake in Qinghai province, the Qinghai 
``Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications'' 
Office issued a notice calling on officials to strengthen 
supervision of the ``cultural market'' to ensure it ``remains 
stable and orderly.'' \159\ The Ministry of Culture, from April 
to June 2010, waged a campaign against ``illegal'' political 
publications and cultural products centered on major tourist 
sites, ethnic minority areas, and Shanghai, host of the 2010 
World Expo.\160\ In May, the official newspaper China Daily 
reported that local authorities in Lhasa city, Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR), passed a rule requiring anyone wishing to make 
photocopies to supply their ID and have their ID numbers 
registered. The article cited a police official's claim that 
``separatists'' hand out banners and pamphlets with illegal 
content in the TAR.\161\

                             Worker Rights


                              Introduction

    Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or 
in practice, full worker rights in accordance with 
international standards, including the right to organize into 
independent unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the 
Communist Party, is the only legal trade union organization in 
China. All lower level unions must be affiliated with the 
ACFTU, and must align with its overarching political concerns 
of maintaining ``social stability'' and economic growth.
    Labor disputes and officials' concern with maintaining 
``social stability'' intensified over this reporting year as 
layoffs, wage arrears, and poor and unsafe working conditions 
persisted. Growing concern on the part of local governments to 
maintain economic growth and employment continued to prompt 
some localities to respond to labor laws that took effect in 
2008 (the Labor Contract Law, Employment Promotion Law, and 
Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law) with local 
opinions and regulations of their own that weakened some 
employee-friendly aspects of these laws. In response to 
collective labor action that was organized and large scale, the 
Chinese government continued to redirect labor disputes away 
from the formal channels of arbitration and litigation toward 
more ``flexible'' and ``grassroots-level'' negotiation and 
mediation. Strikes and demands for higher wages during 2010 
revealed that workers, in some cases, have been emboldened not 
only by protections for workers codified in labor laws that 
took effect in 2008, but also by a tighter labor market. 
Backlogs in the handling of labor dispute cases continued to 
exceed time limits mandated by law. Migrant workers continued 
to face discrimination in urban areas, and their children still 
faced difficulties accessing city schools.\1\ Employment 
discrimination more generally continued to be a serious 
problem, and plaintiffs brought a growing number of 
antidiscrimination suits under China's Employment Promotion 
Law.

                        Labor Dispute Settlement

    China's Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law (LDMAL) 
provides a specific timeframe within which disputes must be 
resolved, requiring arbitral tribunals to rule on cases 
``within 45 days of the acceptance of the arbitration 
application by the labor dispute arbitration commission.'' \2\ 
If an extension is necessary for complex cases, it must be 
approved by the dispute commission and, in any case, may not 
exceed 15 days.\3\ If no decision is made within the timeframe 
set forth in the LDMAL, then parties may pursue litigation in 
courts.\4\ An ACFTU report indicated that, by the first half of 
2010, some localities saw dramatic increases in the number of 
labor dispute cases.\5\ The hearing of labor disputes in many 
cases now takes far longer than the stipulated 45- to 60-day 
legal requirement.\6\
    To adjust to the pressure of a rapidly rising caseload and 
address dissatisfaction with long delays between case filings 
and hearings, some local governments pushed disputes down to 
lower levels for resolution, encouraging, even coercing, 
disputants to resolve 
disputes through negotiation or grassroots mediation, often led 
by low-level officials.\7\ This emphasis on mediation and 
extrajudicial resolution has not been limited to local 
governments, but also has been reflected in national- and 
provincial-level regulations and circulars.\8\
    In addition to large increases in arbitrated cases, labor 
dispute cases also continued to deluge Chinese courts. In some 
cases, these disputes were the result of strong dissatisfaction 
with arbitration proceedings, as most arbitrated cases can be 
reviewed in a court if either side is dissatisfied.\9\ In other 
cases, the increase reflected the strong and growing rights 
consciousness of Chinese workers who turned to new protections 
offered in labor laws that took effect in 2008. The Supreme 
People's Court reported that civil courts throughout China 
accepted 280,000 cases in 2008 (a 94 percent increase from the 
previous year) and 319,000 in 2009; during the first eight 
months of 2010, the number of cases totaled 207,400.\10\ As 
workers turn to strikes and protests, some officials believe 
that the government has an incentive to proactively address 
disagreements at worksites before they add to the case backlog 
or threaten ``social stability.'' \11\ In Guangzhou city, 
Guangdong province, for example, a new rule allows the 
government to fine employers up to 20,000 yuan (US$2,968) if 
they refuse to conduct collective negotiations with workers to 
resolve wage arrears issues.\12\
    While employment discrimination continued to be a serious 
problem during this reporting year, legal scholars noted that 
there appeared to be a growing number of cases brought by 
plaintiffs under China's Employment Promotion Law alleging 
discrimination in hiring. The law, which took effect in 2008, 
prohibits discrimination based on ethnicity, race, sex, 
religion, residency, infectious disease, and disability.\13\ 
One study indicated that civil society organizations have 
contributed to a greater awareness of employment discrimination 
and have helped bring cases to the courts.\14\ In some widely 
reported cases, plaintiffs have prevailed, suggesting that 
``courts have taken a favorable view of the law'' and that the 
``long-discussed implementation deficit of Chinese law is 
shrinking, slightly.'' \15\
    China's Labor Contract Law, which also took effect in 2008, 
continues to be subject to interpretation at the local level. 
Interpretations over this reporting year have been inconsistent 
across some localities. For example, Article 14 of the law 
states that if a ``worker has worked for an uninterrupted term 
of 10 years for the employer'' and if the worker ``proposes or 
agrees to renew or conclude a labor contract,'' then the worker 
is entitled to an open-ended contract, that is, ``a labor 
contract without a fixed period.'' \16\ Addressing this 
provision, the Jiangsu High Court's Guiding Opinion on the 
Handling of Employment Disputes ruled in December 2009 that an 
employee may be entitled to an open-ended contract even if the 
employee's 10 years include leave from work due to pregnancy or 
other conditions allowed by the statute.\17\ A March 2010 
opinion by the Shanghai High People's Court, however, construes 
the law more strictly, indicating that judges should deny 
employees' requests for open-ended contracts in such 
situations.\18\ Such variance in interpretation across locales 
potentially lays the groundwork for disputes leading ultimately 
to calls for further national-level clarification of ambiguity 
in the law's provisions.

                         Recent Worker Actions

    Widespread reports of strikes and demonstrations continued 
during this reporting year, especially in manufacturing centers 
in southern China. Strikes were often prompted by factory 
slowdowns, closures, and nonpayment of wages or overtime.\19\ 
In these cases, trade unions often appeared during the period 
of negotiation and settlement of the strike as subordinate to 
the government.\20\ During the spring and summer of 2010, 
Chinese and international media and non-governmental 
organizations reported on a spate of worker actions--from a 
succession of strikes to suicides at a factory compound--at 
various enterprises in China, mostly foreign-owned, that 
garnered attention in China and around the world.\21\ 
Unofficial reports suggest that the striking workers' primary 
demand was higher wages. These reports also indicate that many 
of the workers decided to participate in the strikes after 
hearing coworkers who had worked at other factories recount 
similar situations at their previous places of employment--
namely, low wage levels and subsequent successful attempts to 
force employers to raise wages through work stoppages. In other 
words, the spread of the strikes seemed to have resulted from a 
``copy-cat chain'' of events inspired by previous successes 
rather than an organized labor movement.\22\ Journalists, 
commentators, and academics in China and abroad have also 
pointed to changing attitudes of a new generation of workers, 
migrant workers' difficulties in adjusting to urban factory 
life, and the denial of the right to free association as 
factors contributing to worker actions.\23\

            Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining

    The Chinese government prevents workers in China from 
exercising the constitutionally protected freedom of 
association.\24\ Trade union activity in China is organized 
under the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a 
quasi-governmental organization under the direction of the 
Communist Party.\25\ Leading trade union officials hold 
concurrent high-ranking positions in the Party. The ACFTU 
Constitution and the Trade Union Law of 1992 both highlight the 
dual nature of the ACFTU to protect the legal rights and 
interests of workers while supporting the leadership of the 
Party and the broader goals and interests of the Chinese 
government.\26\ The ACFTU monopolizes many worker rights issues 
in China, such as shopfloor organizing and ``formalistic'' 
collective contract negotiations, but it does not consistently 
or uniformly advance the rights of workers.\27\
    In recent years, the central government has shown support 
for an enlarged trade union role in collective contracting, and 
in union organizing in private firms in China, including 
multinational companies.\28\ These changes are less a sign of 
opening up and liberalization than they are a collection of 
strategies to improve the standing and legitimacy of the ACFTU 
in workers' eyes. The government's strategy appears to be based 
on its expectation that a more vibrant and engaged ACFTU may 
limit demands for independent union organization and 
spontaneous collective action by aggrieved workers.
    At the shopfloor level, the ACFTU's unions remain weak and 
marginalized. While the ACFTU and its affiliated unions at 
lower administrative levels sometimes may play an important 
role in legislative and regulatory development, this role is 
not matched with power at the enterprise level. Generally 
speaking, firm-level union branches are weak, nondemocratic, 
and subordinate to management.\29\ Despite an increase in 
legislation and administrative regulations that gives the ACFTU 
more power at the firm level to 
resolve disputes, the structural weaknesses of the trade union 
branches make improvements in trade union autonomy and worker 
advocacy difficult and slow.\30\
    In its last Annual Report, the Commission noted that during 
2009, with the impact of the global economic crisis and 
increased government fear of social instability related to 
rising unemployment, the trade union's role focused on 
assisting the government in resolving labor disputes and 
conflicts. This was reflected in the renewed emphasis on 
mediation and local-level dispute resolution contained in local 
regulations and measures. During 2010 it was no longer clear 
that the global economic crisis still was the main driver of 
the increase in labor disputes, as it appeared to be during 
2009. The Chinese economy showed some signs of recovery, and 
the migrant labor shortage first reported in 2004 began to 
reappear.\31\ Some of the strikes and demands for higher wages 
during 2010 may not be a sign of continued weakness on the part 
of workers vis-a-vis management.\32\ Rather, they may reveal 
that workers in some cases have been emboldened not only by 
protections for workers codified in labor laws that took effect 
in 2008, but also by a tighter labor market.\33\
    Most workers who participated in recent strikes reportedly 
were not calling for the formation of independent trade unions 
per se, but rather were calling for unions to act more 
independently and democratically within the confines of Chinese 
law. A June 18, 2010, China Daily commentary noted that Chinese 
workers' demands for genuine union representation was not the 
same as a push for alternative unions.\34\ While acknowledging 
that the government-run ACFTU ``has a herculean task ahead if 
it wants to fulfill its assigned role of representing 
workers,'' the article, written by a prominent Australia-based 
expert on Chinese labor, states that Chinese workers ``are 
willing to become members of the ACFTU,'' but that the ACFTU 
should: \35\

        Do away with the ``fake unions'' . . . [the ones] 
        assigned by the local governments, whose paramount 
        interest is to attract foreign investment . . . . These 
        governments now rent out land to companies and appoint 
        a few local union-ignorant people to run the trade 
        union offices . . . . The local trade union offices 
        should be put under the jurisdiction of the upper-level 
        union instead of local governments. The ACFTU should 
        allow workers to elect their representatives to their 
        workplace union committees, too, as has happened in a 
        very modest number of firms. Only then can the union 
        branches demonstrably represent workers' interests 
        rather [than] . . . employers' or governments' 
        [interests].\36\

    The lack of genuine labor representation is well 
documented. A representative of the Hong Kong-based labor 
organization China Labour Bulletin told the Toronto Star in a 
June 8 article that China's state-run labor unions ``will 
rarely, if ever, stand four-square with workers.'' \37\ In the 
past reporting year, however, Chinese officials have appeared 
to be more willing to address the issue of more genuine worker 
representation. As the global economic crisis deepened and the 
number of labor disputes continued to increase at an alarming 
rate, there has been greater emphasis on encouraging mutual 
cooperation and agreement between employers and workers. A key 
notion in recent regulatory development was that protection of 
both workers' rights and employers' lawful rights and interests 
was essential to maintain stable labor relations and to 
continue with industrial and economic development.\38\
    China's Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, which 
went into effect in 2008, underlined the requirement first to 
exhaust all consultation, negotiation, and mediation avenues to 

resolve labor disputes. The law suggests that arbitration and 
litigation should be used only when the other alternatives 
failed.\39\ It also indicates the importance of the tripartite 
system of coordination between labor bureaus, trade unions, and 
enterprise representatives to solve labor dispute cases 
together.\40\ Earlier local interpretations echoed and 
encouraged the use of this structure,\41\ and in some 
instances, they also suggested major collaboration and 
involvement from local governments and other relevant 
departments and organizations.\42\
    With the explosion of labor conflict cases in arbitration 
committees and courts, however, the central government has been 
trying to redirect these labor conflicts to other channels at 
lower levels, and to encourage more mediation in general and 
negotiation within enterprises.\43\ Local governments are 
encouraged to strengthen and provide better guidance to improve 
the competence of labor dispute mediation organizations,\44\ 
and there is emphasis on the communication and exchange of 
information between the relevant bodies.\45\ Thus, the 
government continues to seek inter-organizational 
collaboration, where arbitration committees, courts, mediation 
committees, trade unions, and enterprises research and work 
together to resolve labor disputes.\46\ In Jiangsu province, 
for example, the Human Resources and Social Security Office 
issued a circular calling for the establishment of a ``Five in 
One'' mechanism to resolve labor disputes, outlining the 
respective responsibilities of judicial administrative 
departments, the human resources and social security 
department, the people's courts, arbitration committees, and 
trade unions to first utilize mediation before proceeding to 
the arbitration and judicial stages.\47\ A Chongqing 
municipality notice also highlights the primary 
responsibilities of mediation committees, while delineating the 
rights of disputants and the procedures for all parties to 
follow in dispute cases.\48\
    The Supreme People's Court issued a judicial interpretation 
in September 2010--its third since 2008--in an attempt to 
clarify the courts' responsibilities to ``properly [hear] labor 
dispute cases,'' the vast majority of which had failed to 
result in satisfactory outcomes during the mediation and 
arbitration stages.\49\ The interpretation specifies the types 
of dispute cases deemed to be acceptable by the courts, noting 
that people's courts shall accept, among others, cases 
concerning disputes arising out of the restructuring of 
enterprises,\50\ the failure of employers to pay wages as 
stipulated in labor contracts,\51\ and when employees are 
unable to obtain insurance benefits due to their employers' 
failure to properly handle the required social insurance 
application procedures.\52\

                         COLLECTIVE CONTRACTING

    Collective contracts and some process of collective 
consultation and negotiation have been part of Chinese labor 
relations since the 1990s when state enterprise reform deepened 
and labor conflict began to increase rapidly, especially in the 
private sector. The ACFTU has championed collective contracts 
and collective negotiations as important foundations for trade 
union work at the enterprise level. In recent years, the 
collective contract system has 
received more Chinese government and Communist Party support as 
part of an attempt to institutionalize a tripartite system of 
labor relations at the local level between the government, the 
ACFTU, and the employer associations.\53\ Nonetheless, the 
collective contract and consultation system remains weak and 
formalistic because enterprise-level trade union leaders are 
not positioned to serve the interests of their workers. Many 
collective contracts merely reflect the basic legal standards 
in the locality and often are the result of concerted 
government or Party work to encourage the enterprise to enter 
into formalistic contracts rather than the result of genuine 
bargaining between management and the enterprise trade 
union.\54\
    In December 2009, Zhang Jianguo, Director of the ACFTU's 
Collective Contracts Department, stated that ``in mitigating 
labour disputes, the fundamental issue is to establish a 
collective bargaining system that would allow labour disputes 
to be managed and 
resolved within the enterprise. From this point of view, 
collective bargaining is the route we must take in defusing 
conflict and developing harmonious labour relations.'' \55\ Han 
Dongfang, a well-known Chinese labor activist and founder of 
the China Labour Bulletin, made this point in a more succinct 
way:

        The long-term trend is clear. The only way the 
        government can prevent greater social conflict is by 
        giving more power to the workers not less. If workers 
        have the right to negotiate as equals with the boss the 
        chances of disputes turning violent will be greatly 
        reduced. If on the other hand, the government ignores 
        workers' rights and gives the boss free rein, the 
        consequences will be very serious.\56\

    In July 2010, Chinese media reports indicated that drafters 
of Guangdong province's Regulations on the Democratic 
Management of Enterprises (Regulations) began seeking opinions 
from relevant government departments, workers, state-owned and 
non-state-owned enterprises.\57\ One labor advocacy group 
argued that these ``regulations . . . could, if implemented, 
finally open the door to genuine worker participation in 
collective bargaining in China.'' \58\ Article 38 of the draft 
Regulations states that if less than one-third of workers 
request wage consultations with management, they must notify 
the enterprise union, and the union may consult with management 
on the workers' behalf, and report the results to workers.\59\ 
However, if one-third or more of workers demand collective 
consultations, the union must demand collective consultations 
with the enterprise's management.\60\
    The Guangdong government's decision to advance and demand 
faster action on the drafting process appeared to be a response 
to the recent worker actions in the spring and summer of 
2010.\61\ The original draft of the Regulations initially was 
submitted to the Guangdong Province People's Congress Standing 
Committee in July 2008. However, with the onset of the global 
financial crisis in the fall of 2008, officials reportedly 
delayed further action on the draft.\62\ In July 2010, when 
worker actions revealed a ``sharpened concern over [the] 
problem of representation,'' officials recognized that, given 
that the ``changes in labor supply and demand'' have enabled 
workers to gradually gain more leverage in their relationships 
with management, the absence of genuine representation can 
easily turn common labor strife into a ``hard landing'' with 
``intensified contradictions.'' \63\ Thus, by focusing on the 
right of workers to carry out collective actions as well as the 
representativeness and trustworthiness of unions, the draft 
Regulations reportedly reflects an attempt to defuse potential 
collective labor disputes by preemptively bringing workers into 
formal legal and regulatory channels.\64\
    While some labor activists appeared to be optimistic about 
the draft's potential impact, an expert on Chinese labor 
relations at the University of Michigan cautioned that 
``without significant institutional reforms to the trade union 
itself, including the system of leadership selection, 
compensation and job security of trade union leaders within the 
enterprise, and better support and training from higher level 
unions, these reforms are unlikely to succeed.'' \65\ Still, in 
recent years at least eight other provincial, city, and 
autonomous regional governments have also enacted or put forth 
for consideration their own regulations on enterprise 
democratic management and collective consultations, including 
the provinces of Guizhou,\66\ Hubei,\67\ Jiangsu,\68\ 
Shanxi,\69\ and Zhejiang,\70\ as well as the cities of Jinan 
\71\ and Tianjin.\72\ Shanghai reportedly is advancing similar 
regulations as well.\73\ However, Guandong's draft Regulations 
are particularly noteworthy in that they specifically grant 
workers the right to demand the initiation of collective wage 
consultations--a right that typically has been reserved for 
unions. In addition, some localities, including Beijing,\74\ 
Guangdong,\75\ Hainan,\76\ and Tianjin,\77\ also have issued 
guidance notices and regulations highlighting collective 
consultations' potential in fostering ``harmonious'' labor 
relations and specifying the legal rights of parties involved 
in collective consultations. In mid-September 2010, however, 
media reports indicated that the Guangdong Province People's 
Congress Standing Committee delayed further deliberation of 
Guangdong's draft Regulations. Heavy lobbying by some members 
of the Hong Kong industrial community, many of whom operate 
factories in southern China, reportedly played a role in the 
Standing Committee's decision.\78\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Migrant Workers
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The Chinese government characterizes as migrants rural residents who
 have left their place of residence to seek non-agricultural jobs in
 Chinese cities, sometimes in the same province and sometimes far from
 home. China had more than 229 million migrant workers at the end of
 2009, an increase of almost 2 percent from the year before.\79\
 Official Chinese government statistics break down the total number of
 migrants into those who spent less than half the year as migrants,
 i.e., those who spent less than six months during the year away from
 their place of legal residence (85 million in 2009), and those who
 spent more than half the year as migrants (144 million in 2009).\80\
 The Chinese household registration (hukou) system places restrictions
 on migration between rural and urban areas in China. Therefore, migrant
 workers may work in a city for many years but remain unable to qualify
 for city residency. Without city residency, authorities may deny them
 many basic public benefits, such as inclusion in social insurance
 programs, education for their children, and healthcare.\81\ As a
 marginalized urban group, migrant workers are often abused or exploited
 by employers who take advantage of their insecure social position and
 lower levels of education.\82\ While the central government has allowed
 the hukou system to relax over time, this system of institutionalized
 discrimination continues to affect adversely the social, civil, and
 political rights of migrants.\83\
  During the global economic crisis, wage arrears problems increased
 dramatically as factories shut their doors.\84\ Moreover, even though
 wages for migrant workers have been on the rise, they continued to work
 longer hours for less pay than local residents.\85\ Many localities
 have expanded efforts to include migrants in social insurance coverage.
 However, there are still significant problems in terms of participation
 (for both employers and employees), coverage, and portability between
 rural and urban areas and even within urban areas. Migrant workers
 generally are able to withdraw monies only from their individual
 accounts, losing the larger percentage of their pensions that is paid
 by their employers. With migrant workers facing uncertainty about
 whether they would return to the same locale to look for new work, and
 with the portability of pension accounts highly restricted, they chose
 to withdraw their pensions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Migrant Workers--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  A Beijing Federation of Trade Unions survey of workers in Beijing
 reportedly found that the percentage of migrant workers surveyed who
 had signed formal employment contracts with their employers was
 significantly lower than the percentage of workers with a Beijing urban
 hukou who had done so.\86\ In February 2010, over 10,000 children of
 migrant workers reportedly were unable to resume classes after the
 Chinese New Year's holiday in some districts within Beijing as dozens
 of schools faced forced demolitions.\87\ These students have few
 alternatives--in Beijing, for example, state-run and legal private
 schools can accommodate only half of all admissions demand.\88\ Adding
 to the problem, many parents prefer to enroll their children in state-
 run schools, since these institutions are cheaper and safer and have a
 lower turnover of teachers.\89\ In an attempt to curb rising crime
 rates, officials in Daxing, a Beijing suburb, are planning to carry out
 a ``sealed management'' system (fengbi guanli) and build fences around
 16 migrant communities, putting migrants behind ``tall metal fences and
 high walls'' while ``newly-installed closed-circuit cameras sweep the
 area for suspicious activity.'' \90\
  A recent ACFTU study found that China's new generation of migrant
 workers, unlike their parents, have higher expectations with regard to
 wages and labor rights as they struggle to transition into urban
 life.\91\ China's Minister of Agriculture, Han Changfu, observes the
 several characteristics that set post-1990s workers apart from the
 previous generations, pointing out that many of them have never put
 down roots, are better educated, are the only child in the family, and
 are more likely to demand equal access to employment and social
 services--and even equal political rights--in the cities.\92\ Some
 reports indicate that the so-called ``post-1980s'' and ``post-1990s''
 new generation of migrant workers is at the forefront of the recent
 strikes; in all, there are about 100 million young workers in China's
 total pool of migrant workers.\93\ As a Chinese demographer explained,
 the young workers have ``the greatest intention to become urban
 residents and their problems can only be solved by making them such.''
 \94\ The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced in
 March 2010 that it would provide job training to about 600,000 migrant
 workers each year,\95\ and high-level central government officials have
 called for reforming the household registration system.\96\ [See also
 Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Working Conditions

    There is increasing evidence of deteriorating working 
conditions for many Chinese workers and increasing bifurcation 
of the workforce as highly skilled workers still are in high 
demand while lower level workers bear the brunt of the global 
economic downturn. The trend of informalization also 
disadvantages the lower rungs of the labor market more severely 
as employers seek to retain highly sought technical workers and 
managers while reducing the size of the less skilled labor 
force.\97\ Academic experts define informal employment as 
employment that is not stable or secure, that lacks a written 
agreement or contract, and that does not provide social 
insurance or benefits.\98\ Since the mid-1990s, when China's 
economic reforms quickened, there has been a ``rapid and 
unprecedented rise'' in informal employment.\99\ Economists 
estimate that 45 percent of urban employment in China is now 
informal. Of workers in the state or collective sectors, 22 
percent are employed informally, while the percentage rises to 
84 percent for workers in the private sector. Informal 
employment is also more likely for women, for the very young 
and the very old, and among less educated workers.\100\
    Workplace abuses also contributed to poor working 
conditions. During the first five months of 2010, 10 workers 
committed suicide at a Shenzhen factory compound owned by the 
Taipei-based Foxconn Technology Group, which manufactures 
electronic products for several foreign companies. Yang 
Jianchang, a member of the Shenzhen People's Congress, blamed 
authorities for failing to intervene, saying that ``the union 
and officials . . . actually understand little about what the 
youths really want and their sufferings.'' \101\ Nine labor 
advocates embedded themselves in the factory as workers and 
later published a report detailing that Foxconn ``uses military 
style management,'' that its ``managers always scold workers,'' 
and that the company sometimes forces workers to sign contracts 
against their will.\102\ In response to the worker suicides and 
criticism from Chinese and foreign media as well as non-
governmental labor organizations that Foxconn's factory 
``remains a typical sweatshop . . . that overlook[s] the basic 
needs of their workers for the sake of profit,'' the company in 
late May 2010 agreed to double workers' wages to 2,000 yuan 
(US$294) per month.\103\

                                 Wages

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, minimum wages 
rose in 11 provincial-level areas across China. Shanghai, 
Guangdong, and Zhejiang have monthly minimum wage levels above 
the 1,000 yuan mark (US$148).\104\ Reports indicate that some 
cities proceeded to raise minimum wages because they struggled 
to compete for workers.\105\ A labor non-governmental 
organization also attributed the rise in wages to the sudden 
jump in prices at the end of 2009, when China's consumer price 
index increased 1.9 percent, year on year, in December.\106\
    China's 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for workers 
and requires local governments to set wage standards for each 
region.\107\ China's Labor Contract Law (LCL) improves formal 
monitoring requirements by tasking local labor bureaus to 
monitor labor practices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage 
standards.\108\ The law also imposes legal liability on 
employers who pay rates below minimum wage.\109\ In addition, 
the law guarantees minimum hourly wages for part-time 
workers.\110\
    Illegal labor practices, however, continue to undermine 
minimum wage guarantees. Wage arrears remain a serious problem, 
especially for migrant workers. Subcontracting practices within 
industry exacerbate the problem of wage arrearages. When 
investors and developers default on their payments to 
construction companies, workers at the end of the chain of 
labor subcontractors lack the means to recover wages from the 
original defaulters. Some subcontractors neglect their own 
duties to pay laborers and leave workers without any direct 
avenue to demand their salaries.
    Kang Houming, a delegate representing migrants at the 
National People's Congress from Chongqing municipality, told a 
Hong Kong magazine that, as of March 2010, there has yet to be 
a ``fundamental solution to the wage arrears problems.'' \111\ 
The key concern is not only whether governments will raise 
minimum wages, but also whether local governments will enforce 
new wage levels even as enterprises complain that the increased 
costs make them less competitive, and as some local interests 
take abusive action against migrant workers who demand back 
wages.\112\ In February 2010, in a case reflective of the 
general problem, a group of migrant workers at a power plant in 
Chongqing municipality's Wuxi county went to the Sinohydro 
Foundation Engineering Company, which oversaw the operations at 
the Wuxi plant, to demand their back wages after their 
supervisor ``went missing'' during the Spring Festival.\113\ 
The workers, who staffed two 12-hour shifts daily without 
written contracts, reportedly were later beaten by a gang of 
people wielding knives and sticks.\114\

                             Working Hours

    China's Labor Law mandates a maximum 8-hour workday and 44-
hour average workweek.\115\ Forced overtime and workdays much 
longer than the legally mandated maximum are not uncommon, 
especially in export sectors, where some employers avoid paying 
overtime rates by compensating workers on a piece-rate basis 
with quotas high enough to avoid requirements to pay overtime 
wages.\116\ According to a report, suppliers in China avoid 
exposing themselves to claims of requiring illegal long hours 
by hiring firms that help them set up double booking systems 
for foreign importers who aim to adhere to Chinese rules and 
regulations. Such firms not only help suppliers prepare books 
to pass audits, but also coach managers and employees on how to 
respond to auditors' questions.\117\
    Disputes over working hour abuses continued to be a major 
reason for labor disputes, especially disputes involving 
overtime or wage arrears related to past abuses and to 
struggling enterprises avoiding legal responsibilities to cut 
costs.\118\ China's Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law 
lengthened the time allowed to file a dispute and also put more 
evidentiary responsibility on the employer to demonstrate that 
overtime abuses had not occurred, which also resulted in an 
increase in the number of workers seeking compensation.\119\ 
Many workplaces reduced hours and salaries in the wake of the 
global economic crisis, which led to workers' complaints over 
minimum wage violations.\120\

                          Occupational Safety


                    LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENTS

    China's Law on Safe Production, which took effect in 2002, 
delineates a set of guidelines to prevent ``accidents due to 
lack of work safety'' and to keep ``their occurrence at a lower 
level, ensuring the safety of people's lives and property and 
promoting the development of the economy.'' \121\ Specifically, 
the law charges principal leading members of production and 
business units to educate workers on safety issues and 
formulate rules of operation; \122\ protects workers' right to 
speak up and address work safety issues; \123\ sets forth trade 
unions' right to pursue workers' complaints over safety issues; 
\124\ tasks local governments to inspect, examine, and handle 
violations and potential dangers in a timely manner; \125\ and 
lays out the consequences for noncompliance.\126\
    In 2009, there were 2,631 reported deaths in Chinese mines, 
representing a decrease from a high of 6,995 in 2002.\127\ 
Workers in China, however, continued to face persistent 
occupational safety issues during this reporting year. Miners 
are limited in their ability to promote safer working 
conditions in part due to legal obstacles to independent 
organizing. Collusion between mine operators and local 
government officials reportedly remains widespread. As one Hong 
Kong-based labor advocacy group explained to Time Magazine, 
``[T]he people who are tasked with doing the investigations [of 
mine accidents] are the same people who have financial 
interests in the mines themselves.'' \128\ The China Daily 
reported that even though the ``heaviest fine specified by the 
national safety laws amounts to 2 million yuan (US$294,117) . . 
. not a single coal mine in China has ever incurred such a 
heavy fine for safety violations,'' and ``fines of 1 million 
yuan (US$147,058), which have been seen in some areas, are 
regarded as harsh enough.'' \129\ During this reporting year, 
the Chinese government continued to control media coverage of 
workplace accidents.

                          WORKERS COMPENSATION

    One major problem facing injured workers or their family 
members pushing to receive timely compensation is China's 
``complicated and incredibly time consuming'' work-related 
injury compensation procedure; in some instances, cases can 
last for decades.\130\ It is difficult to determine the total 
number of cases in part because many cases never are reported 
due to the convoluted nature of the compensation process.\131\ 
Moreover, Chinese courts and doctors do not routinely recognize 
some occupational diseases; while traumatic work injuries and 
deaths have been widely recognized and reported, experts on 
workers compensation litigation in China report failures to 
diagnose diseases like silicosis, and failure to recognize that 
the condition may be caused by exposure at work.\132\ As a 
result, the extent of work-related diseases like silicosis 
remains difficult to measure and report and, therefore, in many 
cases goes largely unrecognized.
    A Chinese worker stricken with an occupational illness or 
injury must undergo a ``diagnosis . . . conducted by medical 
and health institutions approved by the public health 
administration departments of the people's governments at or 
above the provincial level.'' \133\ The worker, or a close 
relative, must then apply to the local human resources and 
social security bureau within one year after the issuance of 
the diagnosis in order to receive an official certification of 
work-related injury/disability.\134\ This certification, the 
``key document'' that enables ``official classification of 
incapacity,'' allows the worker to apply for benefits, which is 
also a complicated process.\135\ If the worker's application is 
rejected, he or she must appeal to the labor dispute 
arbitration committee, though its rulings are nonbinding. Only 
if the committee makes a decision that is unfavorable can the 
worker proceed with civil litigation.\136\ The process becomes 
even more problematic given the reality ``faced by migrant 
workers, most of whom will have already left their jobs and 
moved back home by the time clinical symptoms of the disease 
become apparent.'' \137\
    Central government directives encourage local governments 
to pressure bereaved families into signing compensation 
agreements and to condition out-of-court compensation 
settlements on forfeiture by bereaved families of their rights 
to seek further compensation through the court system.\138\ 
There have been reports of local officials preempting class 
actions by prohibiting contact among members of bereaved 
families in order to forestall coordination.\139\ In December 
2009, Li Liang, a 26-year-old engineer, collapsed on a factory 
bus and died in Suzhou city ``amid a spate of workers falling 
seriously ill from chemical poisoning.'' \140\ The factory, 
which produces electronic touch screens for several foreign 
companies, reportedly assigned workers to clean the screens 
with the toxic solvent n-hexane ``in violation of local codes 
and without proper safety equipment.'' \141\ After Li's death, 
2,000 workers went on strike to demonstrate their concerns over 
prolonged exposure to the chemical. Officially, management told 
other employees that Li had died of a heart attack. Authorities 
were never able to determine Li's cause of death, since 
management persuaded the victim's father to have the body 
cremated before the family received medical expenses and 
humanitarian aid from the company, some of which came from Li's 
coworkers.\142\

                              Child Labor

    Child labor remained a persistent problem during this 
reporting year.\143\ As a member of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), China has ratified the two core conventions 
on the elimination of child labor.\144\ China's Labor Law and 
related legislation prohibit the employment of minors under 16 
years old,\145\ and both national and local legal provisions 
prohibiting child labor stipulate a series of fines for 
employing children.\146\ Under China's Criminal Law, employers 
and supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years for 
forcing children to work under conditions of extreme 
danger.\147\ Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have 
dulled the effects of these legal measures. The overall extent 
of child labor in China is unclear in part because the 
government classifies data on the matter as ``highly secret.'' 
\148\
    Child laborers reportedly work in low-skill service sectors 
as well as small workshops and businesses, including textile, 
toy, and shoe manufacturing enterprises.\149\ Many underage 
laborers reportedly are in their teens, typically ranging from 
13 to 15 years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the 
education system and labor shortages of adult workers.\150\ In 
April 2010, the National Labor Committee, a New York-based 
nonprofit that focuses on U.S. companies' treatment of foreign 
workers, alleged that two factories in Dongguan city, Guangdong 
province that manufacture products for Microsoft recruited 
``hundreds--even up to 1,000--`work study students' 16 and 17 
years of age, who work 15-hour shifts, six and seven days a 
week.'' \151\ They were required to produce 2,000 computer mice 
per shift and are ``prohibited from talking, listening to music 
or using the bathroom during working hours.'' \152\ The report 
also found that:

        These hours and conditions are blatantly illegal. Under 
        China's laws, 14- and 15-year-olds may not work, while 
        16- and 17-year-olds are classified as ``non-adult'' 
        workers, who cannot work more than eight hours a 
        day.\153\

    Investigators working for Dongguan's Human Resources Bureau 
told the Associated Press that factories are allowed to hire 
workers between 16 and 18 years of age as long as management 
registers them with the authorities.\154\ However, KYE 
factories reportedly hired 385 such workers, of which 326 were 
not ``properly registered.'' \155\ A company representative 
reportedly acknowledged management's failure to register these 
workers, and reportedly said they ``would now fix the 
problem.'' \156\
    The Chinese government, which has condemned the use of 
child labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat 
it,\157\ permits ``work-study'' programs and activities that in 
practical terms perpetuate the practice of child labor, and are 
tantamount to official endorsement of it.\158\ National 
provisions prohibiting child labor provide that ``education 
practice labor'' and vocational skills training labor organized 
by schools and other educational and vocational institutes do 
not constitute use of child labor when such 
activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of the 

students.\159\ The Education Law supports schools that 
establish work-study and other programs, provided that the 
programs do not negatively affect normal studies.\160\ These 
provisions contravene China's obligations as a Member State to 
ILO conventions prohibiting child labor.\161\ In 2006, the 
ILO's Committee of Experts on the Applications of Conventions 
and Recommendations ``expresse[d] . . . concern at the 
situation of children under 18 years performing forced labor 
not only in the framework of re-educational and reformative 
measures, but also in regular work programs at school.'' \162\

                              Prison Labor

    During this reporting year, the Commission monitored 
reports on prison labor in China.\163\ The export of prison 
products from China reportedly continues despite China's 
Provisions Reiterating the Prohibition on the Export of 
Products Made by Prisoners Undergoing Reeducation Through 
Labor, which prohibit the export of such products.\164\ Media 
reports during the reporting year also have described the 
alleged export of prison labor from China to worksites in other 
countries operated by Chinese state-owned enterprises. Chinese 
prisoners reportedly have worked on housing and other 
infrastructure projects such as ports and railroads in Sri 
Lanka and the Maldives, among other places.\165\ China's Law on 
the Control of Exit and Entry of Citizens states that 
``approval to exit from the country shall not be granted to . . 
. convicted persons serving their sentences.'' \166\ Despite 
the existing law, however, and despite Chinese officials' 
encouragement for companies to increase the number of local 
residents that they hire and train in foreign countries, one 
academic who follows the issue wrote that it is the operating 
practice of some Chinese companies on overseas projects to 
``keep the number of local workers to a bare minimum and to 
bring in much of the work force from China, including convicts 
`freed' on parole . . . .'' \167\ A Ministry of Commerce 
official dismissed such allegations made in media reports, 
telling People's Daily that, based on China's own laws and 
regulations, ``enterprises engaged in foreign contracted 
projects . . . must . . . assign employees who . . . have no 
misconduct record or criminal record to work overseas.'' \168\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           China's International Commitments to Worker Rights
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  As a member of the International Labour Organization (ILO), China is
 obligated to respect a basic set of internationally recognized labor
 rights for workers, including freedom of association and the
 ``effective recognition'' of the right to collective bargaining.\169\
 China is also a permanent member of the ILO's governing body.\170\ The
 ILO's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
 (1998 Declaration) commits ILO members ``to respect, to promote and to
 realize'' these fundamental rights based on ``the very fact of [ILO]
 membership.'' \171\
  The ILO's eight core conventions articulate the scope of worker rights
 and principles enumerated in the 1998 Declaration. Each member is
 committed to respect the fundamental right or principle addressed in
 each core convention, even if that member state has not ratified the
 convention. China has ratified four of the eight ILO core conventions,
 including two core conventions on the abolition of child labor (No. 138
 and No. 182) and two on non-discrimination in employment and occupation
 (No. 100 and No. 111).\172\ The ILO has reported that the Chinese
 government is preparing to ratify the two core conventions on forced
 labor (No. 29 and No. 105).\173\ On its face, Chinese labor law appears
 to incorporate some of the basic obligations of the ILO's eight core
 conventions, but, in practice, many of these obligations remain
 unfulfilled.\174\ Importantly, Chinese labor law does not incorporate
 basic obligations of the ILO's provisions relating to the freedom of
 association and the right to collective bargaining.
  The Chinese government is a state party to the International Covenant
 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which guarantees the
 right of workers to strike, the right of workers to organize
 independent unions, the right of trade unions to function freely, the
 right of trade unions to establish national federations or
 confederations, and the right of the latter to form or join
 international trade union organizations.\175\ In ratifying the ICESCR,
 the Chinese government made a reservation to Article 8(1)(a), which
 guarantees workers the right to form free trade unions. The government
 asserts that application of the article should be consistent with
 Chinese law, which does not allow for the creation of independent trade
 unions.\176\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            Criminal Justice


                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, international 
and Chinese domestic media have documented a range of new as 
well as ongoing problems within China's justice system, 
including detention abuses, coerced confessions, and police 
torture. Closed trial proceedings and trial procedures that 
unfairly disadvantage criminal suspects and defendants continue 
to contravene protections in both Chinese and international 
law. Public security administrative powers remain unchecked 
despite growing media coverage and public controversy.
    Chinese and international media reported on various 
criminal justice policy developments during this reporting 
year, including reforms to stem the use of coerced confessions, 
to limit the number of executions, and to address public 
dissatisfaction with public security authorities.\1\ While 
there were some potentially positive 
developments, the Chinese criminal justice system in practice 
consistently contravened domestic legal protections and 
continued to fall short of upholding international human rights 
standards. The Chinese government adopted legislation and 
regulations that signal new challenges for human rights 
advocates and reformers within the justice system. The National 
People's Congress, for instance, passed new amendments to 
tighten controls over communications under its state secrets 
law and increased restrictions on lawyers and law firms that 
work on politically sensitive cases or cases involving mass 
incidents.\2\ The rights of criminal suspects and defendants 
continued to fall far short of the rights guaranteed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as rights 
provided for under China's Criminal Procedure Law and 
Constitution.\3\ Although China's 2009-2010 National Human 
Rights Action Plan (HRAP), released in April 2009, signaled the 
Chinese government's commitment to improving the ``process of 
law enforcement and judicial work,'' Chinese authorities have 
not implemented criminal justice provisions in the HRAP 
consistently.\4\

             Abuse of Police Powers: Suppression of Dissent

    Chinese authorities' targeting of human rights advocates 
and defenders in the leadup to sensitive dates and events in 
2009 continued through the 2010 reporting year. In the period 
surrounding sensitive events, such as the 60th anniversary of 
the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 2009, 
U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to China in November 2009, 
the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Two 
Sessions) in March 2010, the 21st anniversary of the 1989 
Tiananmen protests, and the Shanghai 2010 World Expo, public 
security officers and unidentified personnel continued to use 
detention measures against human rights advocates, petitioners, 
and their families.
    Public security officers continued to engage in extralegal 
tactics such as harassment, assault, kidnappings, and illegal 
detention in order to punish Chinese citizens who expressed 
dissent or sought to defend their rights and the rights of 
others. Such arbitrary restrictions on personal liberty, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association contravene the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, as well as China's Constitution.\5\ In September 2009, 
for example, prominent activist Qi Zhiyong said Chinese 
authorities placed him under home confinement and told him to 
leave Beijing prior to China's National Day parade.\6\ In the 
leadup to President Obama's visit to China in November 2009, 
Chinese law enforcement officials reportedly detained dozens of 
rights defenders and reform advocates.\7\ On November 13, 2009, 
public security officers took away Zhao Lianhai, the head of an 
advocacy group for parents of children sickened by melamine-
tainted milk, searched his house, and confiscated personal 
property. When Zhao refused to comply with the public security 
officers because the summons did not specify a charge, the 
police officers added ``provoking an incident'' to the 
summons.\8\ In February 2010, before the Two Sessions, Beijing 
and Shanghai police forcefully removed Mao Hengfeng, a longtime 
Shanghai petitioner, from her Beijing hotel room; subsequently, 
the Shanghai Municipal Reeducation Through Labor Committee 
ordered her to serve 18 months of reeducation through labor for 
her involvement in a protest that occurred outside a Beijing 
court in December 2009.\9\ [See box titled Liu Xiaobo in 
Section II--Freedom of Expression.] During the Two Sessions in 
early March 2010, the non-governmental organization Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders reported that public security officers 
detained more than 20 petitioners.\10\ Chinese police similarly 
acted to limit free speech and activism in the period before 
and during the Shanghai Expo. Shanghai public security officers 
reportedly detained, threatened, and placed under surveillance 
housing petitioners that sought to exercise their 
constitutional right to petition. [For more information on the 
Shanghai Expo, see Section III--Access to Justice--Abuse of 
Petitioners.] In early April 2010, Shanghai police sent human 
rights advocates notices warning them not to go near the 
Shanghai Expo.\11\ In June 2010, Human Rights in China, a U.S.-
based 
non-governmental organization, reported that police authorities 
detained and abused members of the Guizhou Human Rights 
Symposium for planning to commemorate the 21st anniversary of 
the Tiananmen protests.\12\ Later in June 2010, state security 
officers reportedly abducted Beijing-based human rights 
advocate Liu Dejun and took him to the outskirts of Beijing, 
where he was beaten and threatened before being left on the 
side of the road.\13\
    Lawyers and rights defenders who took on ``sensitive'' 
cases or who became involved with ``sensitive'' issues during 
the past year were harassed, abducted, or beaten by public 
security officers or unidentified personnel working under the 
direction of, or with the knowledge of, the public security 
bureau. In November 2009, public security officers detained 
Jiang Tianyong, a prominent human rights lawyer, for more than 
13 hours, after he and other activists gathered outside the 
U.S. Embassy for a possible meeting with President Obama.\14\ 
In January 2010, Chinese lawyers met with imprisoned human 
rights lawyer Wang Yonghang who defended Falun Gong prisoners 
and verified reports that authorities beat Wang on three 
occasions following his kidnapping by plainclothes police 
officers.\15\ Prominent human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng 
resurfaced in late March after ``disappearing'' into what 
experts on the case describe as official custody for more than 
a year, but news outlets reported that Gao once again 
``disappeared'' in late April.\16\ [For more information, see 
Section III--Access to Justice--Human Rights Lawyers and 
Defenders.]

      Pretrial Detention and Prisons: Torture and Abuse in Custody

    Although China officially claims to have outlawed torture 
in 1996 with amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law and the 
Criminal Law, torture and abuse by law enforcement officers 
remain widespread. In November 2008, the UN Committee against 
Torture (UNCAT) stated it ``remains deeply concerned about the 
continued allegations . . . of routine and widespread use of 
torture and ill-treatment of suspects in police custody, 
especially to extract confessions or information to be used in 
criminal proceedings.'' \17\ While the Chinese government 
objected to the UNCAT report's findings in its November 2009 
followup report, over this reporting year, the Commission 
observed cases of alleged torture during pretrial detention and 
the continued reporting of suspicious deaths in detention 
centers.\18\
    Despite the government's public efforts to combat the 
practice of torture, international media, domestic news sites, 
and non-governmental organizations have documented ongoing 
problems of police torture and other forms of police 
mistreatment. Public security officers have allegedly employed 
various torture measures, including beatings, electric shock, 
cigarette burnings, and sleep deprivation.\19\ In December 
2009, the Yancheng Evening News reported that 19 out of 26 
suspects in Chongqing municipality's ``anticrime'' crackdown 
alleged that police used torture to extract confessions.\20\ In 
February 2010, a Dahe Net article (reprinted in the Global 
Times, which operates under the official People's Daily) 
reported that the Mengzhou Municipal People's Court sentenced 
three police officers to varying periods of fixed-term 
imprisonment or to suspended sentences for using torture to 
extract a confession after the officers ruptured a suspect's 
bladder with tear gas canisters.\21\ In May 2010, environmental 
activist Wu Lihong described his mistreatment in prison to 
international reporters: ``They used tree branches to whip my 
head, burned my hands with cigarettes and kicked and beat me 
until my arms and legs were swollen and my head was spinning.'' 
\22\ [For more information, see Section II--Climate Change and 
the Environment.] In a related case, Zhu Mingyong, a lawyer for 
alleged Chongqing criminal syndicate boss Fan Qihang, made 
public secret recordings of his client detailing numerous forms 
of torture in July 2010, after submitting recordings and 
pictures documenting Fan's torture to the Supreme People's 
Court for review.\23\
    During this reporting year, an earlier case of torture 
emerged, sparking national interest in the justice system's 
overreliance on confessions in criminal trials. In May, the 
China Daily reported that officials in Shangqiu city, Henan 
province, admitted police officers had tortured criminal 
suspect Zhao Zuohai into confessing to a murder.\24\ Zhao, who 
spent 11 years in prison before being released after the 
supposed victim reappeared in late April, was reportedly beaten 
and forced ``to stay awake for more than 30 days'' during the 
interrogation process.\25\ Days after his release, the Henan 
High People's Court acquitted Zhao in a retrial, and the 
Shangqiu Intermediate People's Court awarded Zhao 650,000 yuan 
(US$96,000) in compensation. In June, the Procuratorial Daily 
reported that the ``wrongful case of Zhao Zuohai'' had sparked 
a ``great amount of public concern,'' particularly over the 
causes behind such an injustice.\26\ A May 2010 China Daily 
editorial advocated for greater oversight to prevent future 
abuses, stating, ``The police ought to police themselves to rid 
its [sic] reputation of such taints.'' \27\
    Chinese print and online media outlets have continued 
reporting on several instances of ``bizarre'' or ``unnatural'' 
detention deaths over the year, which, according to the China 
Daily, have reportedly ``sparked nationwide discussion about 
inmates' human rights and the proper management of detention 
houses.'' \28\ In news reports and online forums, the detention 
deaths received high-profile monikers, following the widely 
reported ``hide-and-seek'' death of detainee Li Qiaoming in 
February 2009.\29\ During this reporting year, the Chinese 
media reported on unnatural death cases and official 
explanations that reportedly captured public attention, 
including deaths linked to ``taking a shower,'' ``drinking hot 
water,'' ``falling in the bathroom,'' ``hanging by shoelaces,'' 
and ``having a nightmare.'' \30\ According to a June Zhejiang 
Daily report, ``the naming convention[s]'' related to these 
official explanations that have emerged are a ``glib poke at 
the official line that time and again accompanies these 
tragedies, a line that clumsily obfuscates the most commonly 
suspected cause of the deaths, which is abuse at the hands of 
detention center personnel.'' The reports of unnatural deaths 
have shaken public confidence in China's judicial system, 
according to various media reports.\31\ In March 2010, Minister 
of Public Security Meng Jianzhu addressed the controversy, 
urging reform and stating that the unnatural deaths have 
``seriously harmed the public's confidence in law enforcement 
by police authorities.'' \32\
    During this reporting year, Chinese authorities announced 
new measures intended to limit inmate abuse and police torture 
by improving the criminal justice system. At the end of May, 
the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, 
and the Ministries of Public Security, State Security, and 
Justice released two evidence guidelines that prohibit the use 
of illegally obtained evidence to convict defendants.\33\ In 
May, the Ministries of Public Security, Supervision, and Human 
Resources and Social Security jointly issued the first police 
discipline regulation, which went into effect in June 2010 and 
details punishments for 76 types of misconduct including 
sanctioning inmates to mistreat suspects.\34\ The amended State 
Compensation Law, which enters into effect in December 2010, 
stipulates that when a detainee dies or is incapacitated, the 
authorities shall be required to provide evidence proving they 
are not responsible.\35\

                   Arrest and Trial Procedure Issues


                           ACCESS TO COUNSEL

    The right to legal counsel in criminal trials is not a 
guaranteed legal right for all defendants in China, even though 
China's Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and Lawyers Law provide 
guidelines for legal representation in criminal trials.\36\ 
Many criminal defendants reportedly do not have access to legal 
assistance. This is counter to provisions under Article 
14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which China signed in 1998 but has not yet 
ratified.\37\
    Most Chinese defendants confront the criminal process 
without the assistance of an attorney.\38\ According to a 
survey reported on Qianlong Web, lawyers participated in 
criminal defense in approximately 30 percent of criminal cases 
nationally, and in Beijing, the rate of legal representation 
was less than 10 percent.\39\ In March 2010, All China Lawyers 
Association (ACLA) President Yu Ning told China Newsweek that 
criminal defense may be in decline since many Chinese lawyers 
seek more profitable legal fields and hope to avoid the risks 
associated with criminal law.\40\
    Chinese criminal lawyers continue to confront obstacles in 
handling cases, most notably in managing the ``three 
difficulties'' (san nan) of criminal defense--gaining access to 
detained clients, reviewing the prosecutors' case files, and 
collecting evidence.\41\ Although authorities amended the 2008 
Lawyers Law to address these longstanding issues, ACLA Vice 
President Wang Junfeng said in December 2009 that, based on 
national ACLA surveys conducted in late 2009, the amended 
Lawyers Law had not ``fundamentally resolved'' the ``three 
difficulties'' and that some lawyers expressed concerns that 
the amended Lawyers Law posed new difficulties for the legal 
profession.\42\ Many lawyers in the survey expressed 
frustration with justice officials for failing to honor new 
rights under the Lawyers Law, due to incongruence between the 
CPL and the revised Lawyers Law.\43\ A senior lawyer with the 
ACLA, Li Guifang, told the China Daily in June 2010 that it is 
``almost impossible'' for criminal defense attorneys to meet 
with their clients within the first 48 hours of detention--a 
period he characterized as ``a crucial time in getting to grips 
with a case and vital for warning a suspect of his legal rights 
and responsibilities.'' \44\
    Chinese lawyers also remain vulnerable to prosecution under 
controversial Article 306 of China's Criminal Law (commonly 
referred to as the ``lawyer-perjury'' statute), a legal 
provision on evidence fabrication that specifically targets 
defense attorneys.\45\ 
Because of the risks presented by Article 306, most defense 
attorneys reportedly engage in passive defense: they focus on 
finding flaws and weaknesses in the prosecutors' evidence 
rather than actively conducting their own investigations.\46\ 
Human rights groups and Chinese legal experts estimate that 
more than 100 defense attorneys have been charged with evidence 
fabrication under Article 306 and suspect the statute has had a 
``chilling effect for defense lawyers, who may decide to defend 
clients less forcefully than they otherwise would for fear of 
displeasing the prosecution.'' \47\ According to a March Legal 
Daily article, Article 306 may be responsible for declining 
rates of criminal representation: ``Because of Article 306, an 
increasing number of lawyers are leaning toward noncriminal 
procedure professions, which has led to an increasing decline 
in the rate of criminal defense.'' \48\
    In late 2009 and early 2010, the case against prominent 
Beijing-based lawyer Li Zhuang and its handling figured 
prominently in national Chinese news and in ongoing debates 
over Article 306.\49\ In early February 2010, the Chongqing No. 
1 Intermediate People's Court sentenced Li to a prison term of 
one year and six months for falsifying evidence and inciting 
others to bear false witness (under Article 306) in what 
reportedly was widely regarded as political targeting.\50\

                      FAIRNESS OF CRIMINAL TRIALS

    Chinese lawyers and criminal defendants continue to face 
numerous obstacles in defending the right to a fair trial. 
Closed trials, political influence, and a lack of transparency 
in judicial decisionmaking remain commonplace within the 
justice system. Although China has signed and committed to 
ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), Chinese officials routinely sentence defendants in 
trials that fall far short of fair trial standards set forth in 
the ICCPR.
    During this reporting year, the Commission has observed 
several notable cases in which Chinese judicial authorities 
failed to uphold defendants' right to a fair trial in 
accordance with domestic and international law.

         In November 2009, the Wuhou District People's 
        Court in Chengdu city, Sichuan province, sentenced 
        veteran activist Huang Qi, whose human rights Web site 
        advocated on behalf of grieving parents after the May 
        12 Sichuan earthquake, to three years' imprisonment for 
        violating China's broad and vague ``state secrets'' 
        legal framework.\51\ Throughout the legal process, 
        owing to the broad definition of state secrets, 
        authorities granted Huang's lawyers, witnesses, and 
        associates limited access to evidence.\52\ [For more 
        information see Section II--Freedom of Expression--
        Abuse of Vague Criminal Law Provisions--Other Crimes: 
        Splittism, State Secrets, and Slander.]
         On December 25, 2009, a Beijing court 
        sentenced prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo to 11 years 
        in prison for ``inciting subversion of state power'' 
        for his role in organizing Charter 08, a treatise 
        advocating political reform and human rights, and 
        publishing six articles online.\53\ Among various 
        procedural violations, Liu was denied the right to hire 
        the attorney of his choice. Liu's defense attorneys 
        were also denied the right to present their opinions, 
        as required by law, to prosecutors before the 
        indictment was issued and were not given adequate time 
        to prepare for trial.\54\ [For more information see box 
        titled Liu Xiaobo in Section II--Freedom of 
        Expression.]
         In June 2010, the Yanqi County People's Court, 
        located in Bayinguoleng (Bayangol) Mongol Autonomous 
        Prefecture, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 
        sentenced Karma Samdrub, a Tibetan environmentalist, to 
        15 years' imprisonment for ``illegally excavating and 
        robbing cultural sites or ancient tombs,'' charges that 
        were initially dropped in 1998.\55\ Karma Samdrub's 
        lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, called the trial a ``miscarriage 
        of justice'' due to a number of procedural 
        irregularities: ``evidence was tampered with, 
        inadequate translation was provided and the judge 
        refused to look into [Karma Samdrub's] claims of 
        beatings and sleep deprivation while in custody.'' \56\ 
        [For more information see Section V--Tibet--Political 
        Imprisonment of Tibetans: Law as a Tool of Repression.]

                           Arbitrary Detention

    Arbitrary detention in China takes many forms and continues 
to be used widely by Chinese authorities to quell local 
petitioners, government critics, and rights advocates. 
Arbitrary detention includes various forms of extralegal 
detention, such as ``black jails'' (hei jianyu); ``soft 
detention'' (ruanjin), a form of unlawful home confinement; 
reeducation through labor, an administrative detention of up to 
four years for minor crimes; and forcible detention in 
psychiatric hospitals for nonmedical reasons. Another form of 
extralegal detention--shuanggui (often translated as ``double 
regulation'' or ``double designation'')--is used by the 
Communist Party for investigation of Party members, most often 
officials in cases of suspected corruption.
    The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention defines the 
deprivation of personal liberty to be ``arbitrary'' if it meets 
one of the following criteria: (1) there is clearly no legal 
basis for the deprivation of liberty; (2) an individual is 
deprived of his liberty for having exercised rights guaranteed 
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); 
or (3) there is grave noncompliance with fair trial standards 
set forth in the UDHR and other international human rights 
instruments.\57\ In addition, many forms of arbitrary detention 
also violate China's own laws.\58\

                     ``SOFT DETENTION'' AND CONTROL

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Commission 
noted various reports of law enforcement authorities using 
``soft 
detention'' and surveillance measures to control and intimidate 
Chinese citizens. The ``soft detention'' that numerous human 
rights defenders, advocates, and their family members are 
subjected to has no basis in Chinese law and constitutes 
arbitrary detention under international human rights standards. 
In late April 2010, for example, public security officers held 
housing rights advocates and victims of forced evictions under 
``soft detention'' at their homes in order to prevent them from 
drawing attention away from the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.\59\ 
In June, the South China Morning Post reported on New York 
University Law School Professor Jerome Cohen's visit with 
criminal lawyer Zheng Enchong, who has remained under ``soft 
detention'' since June 2006.\60\ In Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen's 
South China Morning Post editorial on the meeting, the authors 
described the circumstances behind Zheng's house arrest:

        Around the clock, 12 guards, including uniformed 
        police, plain-clothes public security officials and 
        their hired hands, take turns manning the outer gate, 
        building entrance and hallway outside Zheng's 
        apartment. Strategically posted surveillance cameras 
        ensure that no one in the vicinity can escape police 
        eyes. Zheng, who is 60, only leaves when summoned by 
        police and has been summoned at least 77 times since 
        2006 for interrogations that are intimidating and 
        occasionally physically abusive. His home has been 
        searched 11 times, and five computers have been 
        confiscated. He generally has no Internet access, and 
        his phone is monitored when not disconnected.\61\

    Petitioners and activists across China continue to face the 
threat of police surveillance and home confinement for 
criticizing government policies, challenging officials, and 
advocating for human rights. Huang Yuqin, a Shanghai resident 
whose home was demolished on March 2, 2010, was placed under 
``soft detention'' and prevented from leaving her home on at 
least one occasion.\62\ Public 
security officers placed Beijing activists Cha Jianguo and Gao 
Hongming, founders of the China Democracy Party, under ``soft 
detention'' in late January 2010. Although police stationed at 
Cha and Gao's apartment blocks did permit them to leave their 
homes, the police directed Cha and Gao to travel in police 
vehicles.\63\ In July 2010, authorities placed a number of 
civil society activists under ``soft detention'' during German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel's visit to Beijing. Those who 
reportedly faced harassment or restrictions on movement 
included Yang Jing, Qi Zhiyong, Wang Debang, and Xu 
Yonghai.\64\

                       REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR

    Public security officers continue to use the reeducation 
through labor (RTL) system to silence critics and to circumvent 
the criminal procedure process. RTL is an administrative 
measure that allows Chinese law enforcement officials to order 
Chinese citizens, without legal proceedings or due process, to 
serve a period of administrative detention of up to three 
years, with the possibility of up to one-year extension.\65\ 
While Chinese sources maintain that the RTL system has been 
established ``to maintain public order, to prevent and reduce 
crime, and to provide compulsory educational reform to minor 
offenders,'' RTL is used frequently to punish, among others, 
dissidents, drug addicts, petitioners, Falun Gong adherents, 
and religious practitioners who belong to religious groups not 
approved by the government.\66\
    During this reporting year, the Commission observed 
numerous accounts of RTL orders violating the legal rights of 
Chinese citizens, specifically their rights to a fair trial and 
to be protected from arbitrary detention.\67\ In October 2009, 
the non-governmental organization Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders reported that the Shenyang RTL Committee ordered 
democracy advocate Sun Fuquan to serve one year and nine months 
of RTL in February 2009 for ``inciting subversion of state 
power'' and ``splittist speech'' by posting information online 
about the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen 
protests.\68\ In March 2010, the Shanghai RTL Committee ordered 
Shanghai petitioner Mao Hengfeng to serve one year and six 
months of RTL for ``disturbing social order'' after she shouted 
slogans outside a Beijing court on December 25, 2009. On April 
13, 2010, the Shanghai RTL Committee ordered Shanghai 
petitioner Chen Jianfang to serve one year and three months of 
RTL for committing ``acts disruptive to social order,'' after 
he participated in a peaceful protest outside of Peking 
University on April 17, 2009.\69\
    Human rights advocates and legal experts within China have 
been calling for an end to RTL for decades. In 2008, another 
public call to end RTL came in the treatise Charter 08, which 
was signed initially by 303 Chinese intellectuals, human rights 
advocates, and others. The Charter states: ``All persons should 
be free from unlawful arrest, detention, summons, 
interrogation, and punishment. The system of reeducation 
through labor should be abolished.'' \70\ In March 2010, the 
Chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, 
Wu Bangguo, announced that the Illegal Behavior Correction Law, 
which in recent years has been discussed as possibly replacing 
the RTL regulations, had been included in the 2010 legislative 
agenda.\71\ In 2010, two prominent Chinese legal scholars 
publicly debated abolishing and reforming the reeducation 
through labor system in a series of public opinion 
editorials.\72\

                ``BLACK JAILS'': SECRET DETENTION SITES

    During this reporting year, Chinese authorities continued 
to use ``black jails'' (hei jianyu), secret detention sites 
established by local officials, to detain and punish 
petitioners who travel to Beijing and provincial capitals to 
voice complaints and seek redress for injustices. Inside the 
black jails, detainees are denied access to legal counsel and 
in most cases, contact with family and friends. A 
November 2009 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report detailed 
conditions at the black jails: ``Detainees are kept under 
constant surveillance, and subject to often arbitrary physical 
and psychological abuse including beatings, sexual violence, 
threats and intimidation.'' \73\
    The Chinese government continues to deny the existence of 
black jails. In November 2009, Foreign Ministry spokesperson 
Qin Gang told reporters: ``I can assure you there are no so-
called black jails in China. We put people first, and we are an 
administration for the people.'' \74\ Still, the existence of 
black jails of various forms throughout China is well 
documented by international organizations and, increasingly, 
domestic media. Black jails arose as a substitute for the 
dismantled ``custody and repatriation'' (shourong qiansong) 
centers that had been used to detain petitioners and 
undocumented migrants until the centers were abolished in 
2003.\75\ Law professor and human rights defender Xu Zhiyong 
defines black jails as:

        places used by provincial governments to illegally 
        imprison petitioners; we call them black jails because, 
        first, they are just like prisons--established by the 
        government to restrict people's freedom--and, second, 
        they are ``black'' because they have no basis in any 
        laws or regulations and are totally illegal.\76\

    According to the HRW report on black jails, guards at the 
detention centers ``routinely subject [the] detainees to abuses 
including physical violence, theft, extortion, threats, 
intimidation, and deprivation of food, sleep, and medical 
care.'' \77\
    During this reporting year, the Commission observed reports 
by international and domestic Chinese media organizations on 
black jails, as well as on the network of personnel that 
intercept and abuse petitioners.\78\ In one prominent example 
of domestic reporting, a Southern Weekly article reported in 
August 2009 on the case of 21-year-old Li Ruirui from Anhui 
province.\79\ According to the report, a black jail security 
guard publicly raped Li after she had been detained for several 
days in a black jail in the Juyuan Hotel in Beijing. In 
December, a court in Beijing ordered the guard Xu Jian to serve 
eight years in prison and pay 2,300 yuan (US$337) in 
compensation.\80\ In late November, China's Oriental Outlook 
Magazine, published by the official Xinhua news agency, 
provided an investigative report on the network of black jails, 
stating that they ``seriously damage the government's image.'' 
\81\ The report noted that, at certain times of the year, local 
governments employ over 10,000 black jail ``retrievers'' to 
abduct citizens and pay fees from 100 to 200 yuan (between 
US$15 and US$30) per person per day of detention. The Oriental 
Outlook report stated there were at least 73 black jails in 
Beijing alone. Chinese human rights observers stated that this 
was the first time an official, high-level magazine 
acknowledged the existence of black jails; however, the article 
did not appear to influence official statements on the 
existence of black jails or prompt official calls to abolish 
the detention centers.\82\

     SHUANGGUI: EXTRALEGAL INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF PARTY MEMBERS

    During this reporting year, the Chinese media reported on 
the Communist Party's use of shuanggui (often translated as 
``double regulation'' or ``double designation''), a form of 
extralegal detention that involves summoning Communist Party 
members under investigation to appear at a designated place at 
a designated time. Shuanggui investigations often precede 
formal Party disciplinary sanctions or the transfer of suspects 
to law enforcement agencies, if there has been a violation of 
the criminal law. Although those under investigation are 
reportedly held under conditions preferable to police 
detention, in 2006, Professor Jerome Cohen pointed out that the 
suspects are ``generally held incommunicado and denied some of 
the protections to which criminal suspects are entitled at 
least in principle.'' \83\ Shuanggui has no basis in Chinese 
law and violates protections found in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.\84\
    Communist Party discipline inspection commissions continued 
to use shuanggui during the past year to detain high-ranking 
officials in the Communist Party's ongoing battle against 
corruption. In October 2009, for example, Ou Shaoxuan, a former 
top-level official of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region High 
People's Court, was put under shuanggui for alleged corruption 
in a property dispute.\85\ The China Daily reported in late 
April 2009 that Chinese authorities had placed six officials 
from the State Food and Drug Administration, the agency 
responsible for issuing production licenses for biological 
products and supervising drug safety, under shuanggui for 
allegedly accepting bribes from drug companies.\86\

              ``Strike Hard'' and ``Anticrime'' Campaigns

    With official sources reporting an increase in violent 
crime and escalating social tensions with high-profile school 
attacks, Chinese officials launched anticrime campaigns across 
China during the reporting year.\87\ In June 2010, the Ministry 
of Public Security announced the launch of the fourth round of 
its national ``strike hard'' campaign (to take place between 
July 2010 and February 2011) aimed at violent crime.\88\ In 
June, the Vice Minister of Public Security Zhang Xinfeng told a 
national meeting that ``China, during a process of social and 
economic transformation, is facing emerging social conflicts 
and new problems in social security.'' \89\ Traditionally, 
``strike hard'' campaigns have been intense national crackdowns 
of fixed duration associated with unusually harsh law 
enforcement tactics, quick trials, and violations of criminal 
procedure. In addition to the national ``strike hard'' 
campaign, provincial, municipal, and lower level governments 
also undertook anticrime and anticorruption campaigns. In the 
most high-profile example, the southwestern municipality of 
Chongqing continued a massive, public ``anticrime'' sweep 
(known in Chinese as ``striking organized crime and uprooting 
evil'' [dahei chu'e]) of criminal syndicates and corrupt 
officials that resulted in thousands of arrests and raised 
various concerns about judicial independence and procedural 
rights.
    Launched in June 2009, the Chongqing anticrime campaign 
continued to capture national publicity and lead to numerous 
high-profile trials and arrests. By April 2010, Chongqing 
authorities had arrested 14 high-ranking officials and more 
than 3,000 others in the crackdown.\90\ In February 2010, in 
one of the more publicized cases, the Chongqing No. 1 
Intermediate People's Court sentenced Li Zhuang, a prominent 
Beijing lawyer who represented alleged Chongqing organized 
crime figure Gong Gangmo, to one year and six months in prison 
for fabricating evidence and interfering with witness 
testimony. While officials alleged that Li urged his client to 
make false claims of torture by police and directed a lawyer to 
make claims in support of the allegations, various Chinese 
lawyers have asserted ``that the prosecution of Li is a 
political vendetta because he, unlike most of the other defense 
lawyers, fought hard for his client.'' \91\ In May 2010, the 
Chongqing High People's Court upheld an April death sentence 
for former Director of the Chongqing Municipal Judicial Bureau 
Wen Qiang for his role in ``accepting bribes, shielding 
criminal gangs, rape, and failing to account for his cash and 
assets.'' \92\ In his May appeal, Wen confessed to ``85 
percent'' of the charges, but maintained that the first trial 
``inaccurately'' determined certain established crimes, which 
had led to a ``more severe penalty.'' \93\
    At the same time, however, Chinese scholars and lawyers 
have expressed concern that efforts to satisfy public 
resentment and meet anticrime targets have led to procedural 
inconsistencies and wrongful convictions. Jiang Ping, former 
President of the China University of Politics and Law, strongly 
criticized the handling of the Li Zhuang case in an essay 
widely circulated online, stating ``[n]o matter what you think 
about it, from the most basic level, procedural justice was 
violated.'' \94\ According to the July 1, 2010, Oriental 
Outlook article, some Chinese legal scholars have criticized 
the ``strike hard'' campaigns, whose ``severity and speed'' 
have led to criminal procedure violations. The article states 
``the procedural rights of criminal suspects and defendants to 
a certain extent are deprived--which is not consistent with the 
spirit of the rule of law.'' \95\

                             Medical Parole

    During this reporting year, Chinese authorities denied 
medical parole and adequate medical treatment to those within 
the prison system, particularly human rights advocates. The 
U.S. State Department observed in its report on China's human 
rights situation for 2009 that ``adequate, timely medical care 
for prisoners remained a serious problem, despite official 
assurances that prisoners have the right to prompt medical 
treatment.'' \96\ Chinese authorities reportedly denied legal 
advocate and rights defender Chen Guangcheng adequate medical 
treatment while he was imprisoned.\97\ [For additional 
discussion on Chen Guangcheng, see box titled Case Update: Chen 
Guangcheng--Human Rights Defender in Section II--Population 
Planning.] In April 2010, imprisoned activist Hu Jia, who had 
been sentenced to three years and six months in April 2008, was 
denied early release from prison despite a reportedly rapidly 
deteriorating medical condition and possible liver cancer.\98\ 
In June 2010, Chinese authorities released Zhang Jianhong, also 
known by his pen name Li Hong, who had been serving a six-year 
sentence and suffers from advanced-stage Amyotrophic Lateral 
Sclerosis, or Lou Gehrig's disease. Authorities first diagnosed 
Zhang with advanced-stage muscular dystrophy in 2007, after 
determining that he was ``suffering from muscle contractions 
and spasms of the hands and feet, and gradual weakening of his 
entire body.'' \99\ Despite the 2007 diagnosis, which qualified 
him for medical parole, prison authorities rejected ``requests 
from Zhang's family and lawyers for medical parole.'' \100\

                           Capital Punishment

    In March 2010, Supreme People's Court President Wang 
Shengjun emphasized the state policy of ``strictly controlling 
and carefully applying the death penalty'' in his annual report 
to the National People's Congress.\101\ Despite claims that 
fewer executions occur, however, the Chinese government 
maintained its policy of not releasing details on the thousands 
reportedly executed annually and continues to keep information 
on the death penalty a ``closely guarded state secret,'' 
according to a March 2010 Amnesty International report.\102\ In 
August 2010, the National People's Congress reviewed the first 
draft of the proposed eighth amendment to the Criminal Law, 
which reportedly calls for reducing the current 68 crimes 
punishable by death to 55 crimes.\103\ The reduction would 
signal the first time the Chinese government has reduced the 
number of crimes subject to the death penalty since the 
Criminal Law was enacted in 1979.
    In December 2009, China gained international attention for 
executing British defendant Akmal Shaikh, the first EU national 
to be executed in China since 1951, after refusing to allow 
Shaikh to be examined by a doctor.\104\ Despite multiple 
appeals by the British government based on Shaikh's ``serious 
mental health problems,'' China executed Shaikh on December 29, 
2009.\105\ According to an international media report, Chinese 
authorities maintained that evidence of Shaikh's mental illness 
was ``insufficient,'' and that the case was handled according 
to Chinese law.\106\ China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson 
Jiang Yu defended the execution, stating, ``The Chinese 
judiciary's right to treat cases according to the rule of law 
should be respected and there's nobody who has the right to 
make improper comments on China's judicial sovereignty.'' \107\ 
International organizations and critics have claimed the 
execution contravened the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of 
the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, adopted in 1984 
by the UN Economic and Social Council, which states that 
executions shall not be carried out on persons who suffer from 
mental illness.\108\
    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, China moved to 
adopt lethal injection as the primary form of execution. Lethal 
injection was legalized in China as an alternative to execution 
by firing squad in the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law. In December 
2009, Liaoning province became the first province to adopt 
lethal injections as the sole form of execution.\109\ In 2010, 
Beijing municipality also moved to implement lethal injections 
for all executions.\110\

                          Freedom of Religion


                              Introduction

    China's Constitution guarantees ``freedom of religious 
belief'' but protects only ``normal religious activities,'' and 
the government's restrictive framework toward religion 
continued in the past year to prevent Chinese citizens from 
exercising their right to freedom of religion in line with 
international human rights standards.\1\ Some Chinese citizens 
had space to practice their religion, but the Chinese 
government continued to exert tight control over the affairs of 
state-sanctioned religious communities and to repress religious 
and spiritual activities falling outside the scope of Communist 
Party-sanctioned practice. During the Commission's 2010 
reporting year, the government maintained requirements that 
religious organizations register with the government and submit 
to the leadership of ``patriotic religious associations'' 
created by the Party to lead China's five recognized religions: 
Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism. 
Unregistered groups risked harassment, detention, imprisonment, 
and other abuses, as did members of registered groups deemed to 
deviate from state-sanctioned activities. Variations in 
implementation allowed some unregistered groups to function in 
China,\2\ but such toleration was arbitrary and did not amount 
to the full protection of these groups' rights.
    As leadership in the State Administration for Religious 
Affairs (SARA) changed in the past year,\3\ authorities 
continued to affirm policies of control over religion. Despite 
articulating a ``positive role'' for religious communities in 
China, officials did not then use the notion of this ``positive 
role'' to promote religious freedom, but rather used the 
sentiment to bolster support for state economic and social 
goals.\4\ According to Wang Zuo'an, the new head of SARA, ``The 
starting point and stopping point of work on religion is to 
unite and mobilize, to the greatest degree, the religious 
masses' zeal, to build socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.'' \5\
    The government continued to use law to control religious 
practice rather than protect the religious freedom of all 
Chinese citizens. In April 2010, authorities marked the fifth-
year anniversary of implementation of the State Council 
Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA), which codifies the 
government's and Party's restrictive framework for religion.\6\ 
While the RRA also provides some legal protections for 
registered religious communities, it conditions many activities 
on government oversight or approval.\7\ The RRA excludes 
unregistered groups from limited state protections, leaving 
them especially vulnerable to official harassment.\8\ In late 
2009, Hubei and Hainan provinces each implemented new 
provincial-level legislation that, compared to older 
legislation they replace, provides more explicit protections 
for registered religious communities, in line with the RRA, but 
that also articulates more detailed state oversight of 
religious activities. Both include, for example, limits on the 
activities of clergy and other religious workers that were 
absent from the earlier provincial legal measures they 
replace.\9\ In January, SARA issued new trial measures on the 
financial affairs of venues for religious activities,\10\ 
subjecting the venues to more clearly specified state 
oversight, as well as specifying some protection for their 
property and income.\11\ The new measures apply only to 
registered religious venues, leaving unregistered venues both 
outside this system of oversight and outside the limited 
protections afforded by the measures.\12\ The State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange issued a circular, effective 
March 1, 2010, concerning foreign exchange donated to or by 
domestic institutions that imposes unique requirements on 
religious organizations to receive approval to accept one-time 
donations over 1 million yuan (US$147,000).\13\ [See Section 
III--Civil Society for more information.]

                                Buddhism

    The Chinese government and Communist Party exercise control 
over the doctrine and religious practices of Han Buddhists in 
non-Tibetan areas in much the same manner as they do for other 
religious communities.\14\ During the Commission's 2010 
reporting year, the government and Party continued to control 
Buddhist doctrine, as well as monitor and control unregistered 
Buddhist groups and activities. [For more information on 
conditions for Tibetan Buddhists, see Section V--Tibet.]

                    CONTROLS OVER BUDDHIST DOCTRINE

    During this reporting year, the government continued to 
control the institutions and religious practices of Buddhists 
in an effort to bring them into conformity with Party goals and 
policies. The government requires Buddhist groups and religious 
personnel to register with the Buddhist Association of China 
(BAC) \15\ in order to practice their religion and hold 
religious services legally,\16\ and authorities tend to allow a 
wider scope of activities for Buddhist groups that work more 
closely with them.\17\ During this reporting year, authorities 
continued to emphasize the BAC's role in promoting the 
government's and Party's goals. For example, Wang Zuo'an--
Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs 
(SARA)--said in a February 2010 speech that the BAC ``received 
the Party and government's approval'' \18\ for, among other 
things, ``raising high the banner of loving the country and 
loving religion, as well as the banner of solidarity and 
progress . . ., spurring economic development, social harmony, 
ethnic solidarity, [and] unification of the motherland . . . 
.'' \19\

 MONITORING AND CONTROL OF UNREGISTERED BUDDHIST GROUPS AND ACTIVITIES

    Local authorities continued to monitor and control 
unregistered Buddhist groups and activities during this 
reporting year, labeling certain groups ``cult organizations'' 
and characterizing unapproved religious practices as 
inconsistent with legal measures. For example, the government 
continued to enforce a ban against at least one Buddhist group 
that it has designated a ``cult organization'': a Taiwan-based 
sect known as the Quan Yin Method (Guanyin Famen).\20\ A 2000 
circular from the Ministry of Public Security that explains the 
background of the Party's ban of the Quan Yin Method cites 
criticism of the Party by the sect's founder, Supreme Master 
Ching Hai.\21\ In addition, reports from local governments 
throughout China in late 2009 and early 2010 focused on the 
construction of unregistered Buddhist temples or statues,\22\ 
often characterizing these practices as ``illegal'' \23\ or 
``indiscriminate.'' \24\ Echoing the language from these 
reports, a September 2009 article from the People's Daily cited 
the ``indiscriminate construction'' of temples and religious 
statues as a problem.\25\ Some of these government reports 
claimed that local authorities stopped a ``resurgence of the 
indiscriminate construction'' of temples during this reporting 
year.\26\ An October 19, 2009, manual posted on the Web site of 
the Wuxi City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Jiangsu 
province offered four methods of dealing with unauthorized 
temples: ``transform,'' ``demolish,'' ``change,'' or ``co-
opt''; demolition and transformation are identified as the 
primary two methods.\27\

                              Catholicism

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 
government continued to interfere in the religious activities 
of Chinese Catholics who did not accept the full authority of 
the state-controlled church, including members of the state-
controlled church community and the unregistered, or 
``underground,'' Catholic community. In addition, the 
government continued to harass or detain some members of both 
communities, which are estimated to equal between 4 million and 
12 million believers.\28\ Authorities also placed restrictions 
on pilgrimages to the Sheshan Marian shrine during the period 
surrounding the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.

 RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE AND INTERFERENCE WITH RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

    Chinese authorities continued to restrict the scope of 
religious 
activities of some Chinese Catholics, both registered and 
underground, who did not accept the full authority of China's 
state-
controlled church. For example, since the 1950s, the Chinese 
Government has denied members of the Chinese official church 
the freedom to recognize the authority of the Holy See to 
select 
Chinese bishops.\29\ The Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA)--
a state-controlled entity that monitors and controls Catholic 
doctrine, practices, property, and personnel--exercises 
influence over the ordination of bishops for the registered 
church in China, including through coercion of bishops to 
officiate ordinations.\30\ In some cases, the CPA has allowed 
discreet Holy See approval of some bishops also approved by the 
CPA,\31\ and the CPA continued this practice during this 
reporting year.\32\ However, the government continued to insist 
that the Chinese Catholic church be independent, and the 
government interfered in the religious activities of Chinese 
Catholics who did not accept the full authority of the state-
controlled church. In January 2010, CPA Vice Chair Liu Bainian 
called on Chinese Catholics to ``continue to raise high the 
banner of loving the country and loving religion, [and] insist 
that the independent, autonomous, self-managing church be 
unwavering. . . .'' \33\ Various local government reports 
carried similar language,\34\ while some instructed officials 
to monitor ``infiltration by'' or ``contact with'' foreign 
religious groups with reference to Catholics.\35\ In April 
2010, the CPA insisted that Bishop Du Jiang of the Bameng 
diocese in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) attend 
his official installation ceremony together with Ma Yinglin, 
whom the state-controlled church ordained in 2006 without 
approval from the Holy See.\36\ Du stated publicly that he was 
forced to attend the ceremony with Ma, and authorities 
subsequently placed Du under home confinement.\37\ During the 
January 2010 funeral of underground bishop Yao Liang--an 
octogenarian released from detention less than a year before 
his death \38\--authorities prevented displays of official 
bishop's insignia, prohibited the publication of obituaries, 
and only allowed three bishops to attend.\39\ Authorities had 
implemented similar restrictions during the October 2009 
funeral of underground bishop Lin Xili.\40\

                        HARASSMENT AND DETENTION

    During the past year, the government continued to harass 
and detain arbitrarily Catholics who were not registered with 
the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA), as well as those who 
were registered but ran afoul of the Party's policies. At least 
40 unregistered Chinese bishops are in detention, home 
confinement, or surveillance, are in hiding, or have 
disappeared under suspicious 
circumstances.\41\ Some have been missing for years, such as 
underground bishops Su Zhimin and Shi Enxiang, whom public 
security officials took into custody in 1996 and 2001, 
respectively, and whose whereabouts are unknown.\42\ 
Authorities targeted other 
underground bishops more recently, as government and Party 
documents from late 2009 and early 2010 called on authorities 
to ``educate and transform'' \43\ underground Catholic 
communities to maintain ``stability'' \44\ and stop ``illegal 
religious activities,'' \45\ as well as to ``insist on 
maintaining secrecy . . . especially with regard to underground 
Catholic forces . . . .'' \46\ In March 2010, authorities 
detained underground priests Luo Wen and Liu Maochun after they 
organized youth camps for university students.\47\ Authorities 
released Luo on March 18.\48\ The Commission has observed no 
reports that Liu has been released. After public security 
officials held underground bishop An Shuxin in custody for 10 
years, he joined the CPA in July 2009.\49\ He asserted that he 
made the decision ``for the good of the diocese and the urgent 
need to evangelize,'' \50\ despite facing resentment from some 
members of the underground Catholic church.\51\ Even after An 
joined the CPA, however, public security officials placed him 
under surveillance.\52\ Authorities officially installed An on 
August 7, 2010.\53\ In July 2010, authorities in Hebei province 
released unregistered Catholic bishop Jia Zhiguo after 
detaining him in an unknown location for one year and three 
months.\54\ Jia's detention was reportedly linked to his 
cooperation with officially recognized bishop Jiang Taoran; 
local authorities told Jia that the ``unity'' between Jia and 
Jiang is ``bad because it is desired by a foreign power like 
the Vatican. If there must be unity, it must come through the 
government and the [CPA].'' \55\ On June 8, 2010, over 100 
public security officials and unidentified persons demolished 
the only Catholic church in Ordos municipality, Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region and detained two priests for over 20 
hours.\56\ The church was registered,\57\ but according to 
media reports, the local government intended to build a new 
road on the land where the church was located.\58\

        RESTRICTIONS ON PILGRIMAGES TO THE SHESHAN MARIAN SHRINE

    Authorities restricted the freedom of Catholics to visit 
the Sheshan Marian shrine, in Shanghai municipality, during the 
period surrounding the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.\59\ Large 
numbers of Catholic pilgrims travel to Marian shrines around 
the world in the month of May, and the Sheshan Marian shrine 
has special significance to Catholics in China.\60\ A 2007 
letter from Pope Benedict XVI mentions the shrine specifically: 
``[May 24] is dedicated to the liturgical memory of Our Lady, 
Help of Christians, who is venerated with great devotion at the 
Marian Shrine of Sheshan in Shanghai.'' \61\ In 2010, May 24 
fell during the Shanghai Expo, and local governments in the 
Shanghai municipal area and other localities ordered security 
forces to ensure ``stability'' in anticipation of Catholic 
pilgrims traveling to the shrine.\62\ According to media 
reports, the CPA issued directives during this reporting year 
instructing Catholics not to travel from other localities to 
visit the shrine,\63\ and some Catholics in China reported 
being prevented from traveling to the shrine during the 
Shanghai Expo.\64\

                               Falun Gong

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Communist 
Party and Chinese government maintained the ``strike hard'' 
campaign that they have carried out against Falun Gong 
practitioners for more than a decade.\65\ Falun Gong is a 
spiritual movement based on the teachings of its founder, Li 
Hongzhi, and Chinese meditative exercises called qigong.\66\ 
The Party designated Falun Gong an illegal ``cult 
organization'' in 1999 following a peaceful demonstration held 
by its practitioners near the Communist Party leadership 
compound in Beijing.\67\ It is difficult to ascertain the 
number of practitioners in China today because the movement has 
been forced underground, but official Chinese sources and Falun 
Gong sources estimate that tens of millions of Chinese citizens 
practiced Falun Gong in the 1990s.\68\
    The Shanghai 2010 World Expo, held from May to October 
2010, became the latest in a series of events that the Chinese 
government has seized upon as justification for ongoing 
``security'' crackdowns that aim to ferret out and punish Falun 
Gong practitioners. In the lead up to and during the Shanghai 
Expo, authorities conducted propaganda campaigns deriding Falun 
Gong, carried out strict surveillance of practitioners, 
detained and imprisoned large numbers of practitioners, and 
subjected some who refused to disavow Falun Gong to torture and 
other abuses in prison and reeducation through labor 
facilities.\69\ In May 2010, Falun Gong sources based in the 
United States published information on 127 documented cases of 
Chinese authorities detaining practitioners in the Shanghai 
area in connection with the pre-Shanghai Expo crackdown; 26 of 
the 127 are known to be serving sentences in prison or 
reeducation through labor facilities.\70\
    Authorities also continued to arbitrarily imprison Falun 
Gong practitioners in cases unrelated to the Shanghai Expo. In 
January 2010, after Zhang Binglan had reportedly given Falun 
Gong fliers to her daughter, the Tancheng County People's Court 
in Linyi city, Shandong province sentenced Zhang and her 
husband Sun Dejian to eight years and six months in prison and 
three years in prison, respectively, for ``using a cult 
organization to undermine the implementation of the law.'' \71\ 
Other Falun Gong political prisoners remain in prison on 
similar charges, such as artist Xu Na, whom the Beijing 
Chongwen District People's Court sentenced to three years in 
prison in 2008.\72\
    The government has not ceased its harassment and 
intimidation of lawyers who defend Falun Gong clients in the 
Chinese judicial system, which the Commission first reported in 
its 2009 report.\73\ In November 2009, the Shahekou District 
People's Court in Dalian city, Liaoning province, sentenced 
human rights lawyer Wang Yonghang, who had defended several 
Falun Gong clients over a three-year period, to seven years in 
prison on the charge that is most commonly leveled against 
Falun Gong practitioners: ``using a cult organization to 
undermine the implementation of the law.'' \74\ In May 2010, 
the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Justice permanently revoked the 
licenses of attorneys Tang Jitian and Liu Wei, which Tang 
believed was retaliation for their defense of Yang Ming, a 
Falun Gong practitioner in Sichuan province.\75\ Chinese 
security forces continue to detain Gao Zhisheng, a prominent 
human rights lawyer whom the government targeted in part 
because of his work on behalf of Falun Gong practitioners.\76\ 
Gao was forcibly ``disappeared'' from February 2009 until late 
March 2010, at which time he briefly reappeared before 
vanishing again at the end of April.\77\

                        SHANGHAI 2010 WORLD EXPO

    Local governments throughout the Shanghai municipal area 
reported mobilizing security forces to target Falun Gong 
practitioners in preparation for the Shanghai 2010 World Expo. 
In January 2010, residential committees in Shanghai's Pudong 
district conducted ``one-by-one inspections of unstable 
elements'' in which officials were told to report swiftly Falun 
Gong ``reactionary posters and other activities'' to higher 
authorities and warned that they ``absolutely must not allow 
Falun Gong to take root, germinate, and spread.'' \78\ In 
February, Xu Lin, the Pudong Party Secretary, warned security 
forces that they must ``adopt necessary management and control 
measures'' and ``must absolutely never lose 
control [of Falun Gong].'' \79\ Shanghai Expo-related 
propaganda campaigns in the greater Shanghai area portrayed 
``cults'' like Falun Gong as ``dangers'' to society that 
``wreck families'' and ``poison the minds of youth'' and 
stressed the need to ``transform'' practitioners.\80\ Party 
authorities made clear that participation in ``anti-cult'' 
propaganda campaigns was mandatory, and insisted that local 
officials utilize these campaigns to organize residents to 
``vigorously struggle'' and ``win the tough battle against 
cults.'' \81\ At least four Shanghai Expo-related government 
reports stressed the importance of ``transformation through 
reeducation,'' a coercive process carried out during detention 
that has been used to force Falun Gong practitioners to 
renounce their beliefs.\82\
    The crackdown against Falun Gong carried out in the name of 
providing security for the Shanghai Expo extended well beyond 
the Shanghai municipal area into surrounding provinces hundreds 
of miles away from the Expo site. In April 2010, officials in 
Fuzhou city, the capital of Fujian province, announced a 
``large dragnet investigation'' during the period of the 
Shanghai Expo that would ``strengthen monitoring and control of 
Falun Gong practitioners'' and ``ensure that they do not have 
contact with people from the outside.'' \83\ In March 2010, 
Shicheng county authorities in Jiangxi province--approximately 
700 miles from Shanghai--announced measures to ``guard 
against'' possible ``interference and sabotage'' of the 
Shanghai Expo by Falun Gong.\84\

                            THE 6-10 OFFICE

    The 6-10 Office--an extralegal, Party-run security 
apparatus created in June 1999 to implement the ban against 
Falun Gong--spearheaded the Shanghai Expo crackdown against 
Falun Gong.\85\ In February 2010, 6-10 Office agents visited 
village and residential committees in Shanghai's Minhang 
district to persuade community leaders to sign ``special 610 
work responsibility agreements.'' \86\ In its 2010 work plan 
for ``comprehensive management of social order,'' a township in 
Pudong district designated ``perfecting the 610 prevention and 
control system'' as a priority for its security services and 
required specific measures to be taken such as ``24-hour 
monitoring and control'' of Falun Gong practitioners during 
``sensitive periods'' to ``ensure that there is no danger of 
anything going wrong.'' \87\
    Beyond the Shanghai Expo crackdown, government reports from 
elsewhere in China indicate that the 6-10 Office continues to 
expand its activities to punish Falun Gong practitioners, whom 
authorities sometimes describe as ``diehard'' \88\ or 
``obsessed,'' \89\ and close potential openings for the 
movement to grow. The Ministry of Commerce reported in November 
2009 that a county-level commerce bureau in Hunan province had 
established an internal ``610 work leading group'' that feeds 
intelligence reports to the 6-10 Office and ``stability 
maintenance office'' (weiwenban).\90\ Assessing the results of 
10 years of the ``strike hard'' campaign against Falun Gong, a 
December 2009 report from the director of a district-level 6-10 
Office in Beijing listed the decline in ``registered'' Falun 
Gong practitioners living in the district from a number in the 
thousands (the actual number was removed) in 1999 to a number 
in the hundreds in 2009 as a factor in the office's 
``significant victory'' over Falun Gong.\91\

                                 Islam

    Chinese authorities maintained tight controls over Islam in 
China. Authorities across the country used the specter of 
``extremism'' to bolster state interference in how Muslims 
interpreted and practiced their religion. The state-controlled 
Islamic Association of China (IAC) continued to align aspects 
of Islamic practice with government and Party policy through 
its work to train religious leaders, interpret theology, draft 
sermons, and lead overseas pilgrimages. During the Commission's 
2010 reporting year, the IAC published its fourth collection of 
sermons as part of an ongoing project that one government 
official described as putting forth ``authentic 
interpretations'' of Islam that placed Muslims on the ``road to 
adapting to socialism'' and led them to uphold the state-
defined goals of ``unification of the country, ethnic unity, 
and social stability.'' \92\ One sermon published in the past 
year called on Muslims to ``unite love of country with love of 
Islam'' and ``believe in the Communist Party and government'' 
instead of ``rumors'' deemed to spark unrest.\93\
    Throughout the year, government officials in some 
localities reported strengthening oversight of Muslim 
communities and blocking religious activities, groups, and 
venues they deemed ``illegal.'' Various government sources 
described steps to stop religious ``infiltration'' and 
``illegal'' outreach and preaching activities.\94\ A report 
from the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region also described 
``improving and rectifying'' Arabic schools and scripture 
classes, as part of steps to ``resist religious infiltration.'' 
A Communist Party report from Wulan county in Qinghai province 
noted the county had strengthened steps to deal with illegal 
sites of worship in recent years and had banned two privately 
established mosques.\95\

             ISLAM IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

    Conditions for religious freedom for Muslims in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) continued to worsen. 
XUAR authorities increased repressive security campaigns in the 
region in the aftermath of demonstrations and riots in July 
2009 and continued to identify ``religious extremism'' as one 
source of the unrest, as well as an ongoing threat to the 
region's stability.\96\ As in the past, authorities singled out 
aspects of Islam in particular in campaigns targeting 
``religious extremism'' and ``illegal religious activities.'' 
They defined such terms to encompass religious practices, group 
affiliations, and viewpoints protected under international 
human rights guarantees for freedom of religion, expression, 
and association that the Chinese government is bound to 
uphold.\97\ In the aftermath of the demonstrations and riots, 
XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri called for strengthening 
management of religion and ``bringing into full play the 
special role of patriotic religious figures in maintaining 
ethnic unity.'' \98\ Authorities carried out a new cycle of 
training for religious leaders in the past year, calling on 
them to raise their ``consciousness and firmness'' in the 
``battle against extremism.'' \99\ The region's 2009 work 
report called for strengthening management of religion through 
measures including preventing ``religious forces'' from 
``infiltrating schools,'' punishing underground religious 
schools, and increasing management of pilgrimages.\100\
    Authorities in the XUAR implemented various campaigns in 
the past year to restrict religious practice, singling out 
aspects of Islam and tightening controls in some cases. The 
Party-controlled XUAR Women's Federation carried out a wide-
scale campaign in 2009 to ``weaken religious consciousness'' 
among women \101\ and campaigns to dissuade Muslim women from 
wearing veils.\102\ One Women's Federation report described 
veiling as a form of ``extreme religion'' and ``an expression 
of a type of ignorant and backward way of thinking.'' \103\ 
Following a proposal in early 2009 to draw Muslim women 
religious specialists known as buwi under government and Party 
management,\104\ the XUAR Women's Federation also reported 
increasing oversight of these women.\105\ The XUAR government 
targeted ``illegal religious materials'' in 2009 censorship 
campaigns and reportedly issued multiple directives singling 
out ``illegal'' religious and political materials.\106\ In 
March 2010, state media reported confiscating 13 tons of 
``illegally printed religious books'' and detaining a Uyghur 
man who had received the shipment of books from another 
province.\107\
    Local governments at the prefectural level and below 
reported taking a range of steps to restrict religious freedom. 
The Aqsu municipal government, Aqsu district, reported in 
January on strengthening implementation of and refining its 
``two systems'' program of maintaining regular government 
contact with mosques and religious figures. Steps taken include 
formulating measures to preexamine sermons and monitoring 
conditions at religious venues daily.\108\ The Ili Kazakh 
Autonomous Prefecture government formulated a set of measures 
to manage Muslim women religious specialists (buwi).\109\ A 
Communist Party office in Kashgar district 
reported it would increase oversight of groups including buwi, 
people who have gone on unauthorized pilgrimages, and people 
dismissed from their posts as religious personnel, as part of 
work to ``safeguard stability.'' \110\ In line with XUAR 
government direction, various local authorities pledged to 
continue curbing unauthorized religious pilgrimages.\111\ 
Government offices in Turpan district and Shule (Qeshqer 
Yengisheher) county, Kashgar district, posted job 
advertisements that required that candidates ``not believe in a 
religion'' or ``participate in religious activities.'' \112\
    Government authorities in the XUAR continued to restrict 
children's freedom of religion. Authorities adopted a new 
regulation on the protection of minors, effective December 
2009, that restricts children's religious activities.\113\ 
While the regulation excludes a previously codified ban (now 
void) on parents ``permitting children to engage in religious 
activities,'' \114\ it broadens an earlier provision to 
prohibit people from ``luring or forcing minors to participate 
in religious activities.'' \115\ The regulation lacks criteria 
for determining what acts constitute ``luring'' or ``forcing,'' 
leaving wide latitude to interpret the terms in a manner that 
constrains children's exercise of freedom of religion and 
parents' right to impart a religious education. The provisions 
on children's religious activities appear to remain the most 
detailed in China and to lack a clear basis in Chinese 
law.\116\ Authorities in Nilka county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous 
Prefecture, launched a campaign in March to spread government 
policies including the ``six forbiddens'': forbidding students 
from believing in religion, participating in religious 
activities, fasting, wearing clothes with a ``religious hue,'' 
viewing or listening to audio-video products with ``reactionary 
content,'' and disseminating ``separatist thought.'' \117\
    Amid government calls to curb ``illegal'' religious 
activities, overseas media reported in the past year on cases 
of Muslims detained for practicing their religion. Radio Free 
Asia reported in May on a series of religion-related detentions 
in July 2009 in one township in Yining (Ghulja) county, Ili 
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, involving 10 people in two sets 
of cases. According to sources cited in the RFA reports, the 
people were detained for teaching unauthorized classes on 
religion and reading certain religious publications.\118\ Most 
of those detained reportedly remained in detention, with 
details of charges against them unknown.\119\ Authorities 
reportedly detained 32 women in a Quran study group in Bachu 
(Maralbeshi) county, Kashgar district, around early June. 
Authorities said the women were engaged in illegal religious 
activities and formally detained two of them, releasing the 
others after levying fines.\120\

                             Protestantism

    The Chinese government and Communist Party continued to 
restrict the religious activities and doctrine of Chinese 
Protestants who worship in the state-controlled church, a 
network of at least 20 million citizens and 50,000 
churches.\121\ In addition, they continued to arbitrarily 
harass, intimidate, detain, or imprison some of the estimated 
50 to 70 million Chinese Protestants who worship in China's 
unregistered congregations (house churches),\122\ communities 
that have been growing larger and more conspicuous over the 
past few decades.\123\ The government made strong efforts to 
interfere with the internal affairs of some unregistered 
congregations through such means as the arbitrary detention of 
religious leaders, violent raids, destruction of worship sites, 
attempts to prevent members from gathering, and the labeling of 
some Protestant organizations as ``cults.''

    PATRIOTIC RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION

    China's state-controlled Protestant church continued to 
dictate the terms by which it allowed Protestants to interpret 
doctrine and theology, in an effort to eliminate elements of 
the Christian faith that the Party regards as incompatible with 
its goals and ideology. The government and Party call this 
process ``theological reconstruction.'' \124\ The Three-Self 
Patriotic Movement (TSPM) and the China Christian Council (CCC) 
are the official organizations that manage registered 
Protestants,\125\ and government and Party officials continued 
to emphasize the role of those organizations in promoting Party 
policies. For example, during an early February 2010 meeting 
with the TSPM and CCC, top Party and government leaders 
commended the two organizations for their ``positive function 
in safeguarding social harmony and stability while maintaining 
smooth, relatively rapid economic development''; \126\ for 
``resolutely resisting various forms of foreign religious 
infiltration activities''; \127\ and for ``achieving positive 
results through continuing to promote theological 
reconstruction, strengthening the building of their 
organizations, and vigorously launching trainings [for 
pastors].'' \128\ In February 2010, Jia Qinglin, the fourth-
highest ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee, 
called on the patriotic religious organizations to ``diligently 
train a corps of qualified religious personnel who are 
politically reliable . . . .'' \129\ In line with these 
sentiments, government entities from localities across the 
country stressed the importance of theological reconstruction 
and political training for pastors in various government 
meetings and work reports.\130\

 MAJOR CASES OF HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND INTERFERENCE WITH PLACES OF 
                                WORSHIP

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, authorities 
continued to harass and detain arbitrarily members of house 
churches throughout China and interfere with their places of 
worship.\131\ Local government reports throughout China called 
on authorities to monitor and control house churches,\132\ and 
authorities targeted several prominent house church leaders and 
large house church congregations that had already lost their 
indoor meeting spaces, which some reports suggest may have been 
a result of government pressure on their landlords.\133\ For 
example, on November 8, 2009, authorities prevented pastor Jin 
Tianming of the Shouwang Church in Beijing from leaving his 
home to attend worship and then prevented the congregation from 
gathering in a park to worship.\134\ On November 22, 2009, 
authorities detained four members of the clergy and two other 
members of the Wanbang Church in Shanghai \135\ as members of 
the congregation were planning to meet outdoors to 
worship.\136\ Wanbang pastor Cui Quan said that police accused 
the church of being ``illegal,'' questioned those detained 
about its operations, and then released all six later that 
day.\137\ On May 8, 2010, authorities put pastor Wang Dao--a 
participant in the 1989 Tiananmen protests and leader of the 
Liangren Church in Guangzhou--under criminal detention and 
dispersed the congregation as they attempted to worship in a 
park.\138\ Wang was released on bail on June 13 to await his 
trial.\139\ On August 13, authorities in Guangzhou summoned him 
to a police station in Panyu district in Guangzhou, attempted 
to pressure him to join the state-controlled church, and 
released him on the same day.\140\ On June 13, authorities 
detained pastor Zhang Mingxuan and his wife in a hotel in 
Zhengzhou city, Henan province for two days. Authorities 
questioned them about their connection with a U.S. citizen who 
is a Christian in Beijing and a church in Yancheng city, 
Jiangsu province that local authorities had scheduled for 
demolition.\141\
    In some cases, authorities levied criminal penalties or 
used violence against members of house churches. In the early 
morning hours of September 13, 2009, over 400 public security 
officers conducted a violent raid against the Linfen-Fushan 
Church, an unregistered Protestant church in Fushan county, 
Linfen municipality, Shanxi province.\142\ Two bulldozers 
reduced the building to rubble,\143\ and public security 
officers wounded at least 100 church members,\144\ striking 
some with blunt objects such as bricks, iron bars, and garden 
hoes.\145\ The congregation site was located inside a shoe and 
clothing factory,\146\ and Linfen municipal officials 
characterized the raid as an effort to ``ban illegal 
buildings.'' \147\ Two official reports posted in August 2009 
on the Web site of the Linfen Municipal People's Government 
foreshadowed the crackdown against unregistered churches, as 
the reports featured statements from top Communist Party 
leaders calling for tighter control of religious activities. 
According to one of the reports, dated August 18, Ding Wenlu, 
the local head of the Party's United Front Work Department, 
inspected the municipality's religious affairs work on June 16 
and urged officials to recognize the ``high degree of political 
sensitivity'' surrounding their work.\148\ Ding issued a 
``clear demand'' that officials must ``pay close attention to . 
. . and promptly dispose of . . . illegal religious activities 
according to the law.'' \149\ At a government meeting on 
``safeguarding stability'' held in Linfen on June 25, reported 
in an August 18 article, Xie Hai, the Secretary of the 
Municipal Party Committee, emphasized the need to ``strengthen 
management of religious and ethnic affairs work,'' which he 
characterized as ``having extraordinarily important 
significance for safeguarding the overall stability of the 
entire city.'' \150\ Xie called for officials to ``go a step 
further to strengthen punishment of illegal religious 
activities and strike hard against those who wear the cloak of 
religion and use religion to conduct various divisive sabotage 
activities.'' \151\
    On September 25, 2009, authorities detained Linfen pastors 
Wang Xiaoguang and Yang Rongli, along with three other church 
leaders, as they attempted to petition central government 
authorities for redress.\152\ On October 11, public security 
officials also detained an additional 10 Linfen-Fushan Church 
members \153\ and, on November 30, ordered five church members 
to serve two years of reeducation through labor.\154\ On 
November 25, the Yaodu District People's Court variously 
convicted the five church leaders of 
``illegally occupying farm land'' and ``gathering a crowd to 
disturb transportation order'' \155\ in a trial that was 
reportedly marked by procedural irregularities that restricted 
the defense counsel's access to evidence.\156\ Yang received 
the longest prison sentence: seven years.\157\ Authorities also 
interfered with the efforts of Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) researcher Fan Yafeng and Beijing lawyer Zhang 
Kai to provide legal assistance to members of the church. In 
November 2009, after Fan attempted to provide legal assistance 
to the church, the Party Secretary at CASS reportedly told Fan 
that he would not be permitted to continue working at 
CASS.\158\ In July 2010, police barred Zhang from entering a 
Linfen court as he attempted to file an administrative lawsuit 
on behalf of the convicted church leaders.\159\ [See Section 
III--Access to Justice for more information.]
    Alimjan Yimit (Himit)--a Protestant house church leader in 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) whom the Kashgar 
Intermediate People's Court convicted of ``leaking state 
secrets to overseas organizations'' in October 2009 \160\--was 
moved from the Kashgar Municipal Detention Center to a prison 
in Urumqi after the XUAR People's High Court upheld his 15-year 
sentence on appeal on March 16, 2010.\161\ According to his 
lawyer, Li Baiguang, the charges against Alimjan Yimit stemmed 
from his talking with visiting Christians from the United 
States,\162\ and Li reported that, in his view, the court's 
decision did not successfully prove that Alimjan Yimit supplied 
state secrets to people overseas.\163\ Alimjan Yimit had 
previously worked for a foreign-owned company that was shut 
down for ``illegal religious infiltration activities'' \164\ 
after public security officials accused the company of 
preaching Christianity to Uyghurs in 2007.\165\

  BANNED PROTESTANT GROUPS AND THE DESIGNATION OF GROUPS AS ``CULTS''

    The government and Party continued to prohibit 
categorically some Protestant groups from exercising religious 
freedom by criminalizing their communities as ``cult 
organizations.'' \166\ The government has banned at least 18 
Protestant groups with adherents in multiple provinces, as well 
as many more congregations and movements that are active in 
only one province.\167\ Examples of groups that have been 
banned in previous years include the South China Church (SCC); 
\168\ the Local Church, a group that officials refer to as the 
``Shouters''; \169\ and the Disciples Association.\170\ Two 
weeks after the September 13, 2009, raid on the Shanxi Linfen-
Fushan Christian Church,\171\ officials met to discuss whether 
or not to classify the Linfen-Fushan Church as a ``cult'' 
organization.\172\ According to a ChinaAid report, the 
officials decided not to label the church a ``cult'' 
organization but resolved not to allow what they characterized 
as the ``abuses and legal violations of Pastor Yang Rongli and 
her `foolish and misguided followers.' '' \173\ In another 
case, after a November 18, 2009, raid on a Protestant house 
church congregation in Shuozhou city, Shanxi province, 
authorities detained six church members,\174\ five of whom were 
formally arrested on charges of ``cult'' involvement.\175\ On 
August 2, 2010, the Weidu District Court of Xuchang city, Henan 
province reportedly refused to hear an administrative lawsuit 
filed by Gao Jianli and Liu Yunhua, two members of a Henan 
house church that authorities in Shangqiu municipality had 
deemed a ``cult'' on the basis of an internal document, thereby 
effectively upholding an administrative punishment of one year 
of reeducation through labor (RTL) for each of the two 
men.\176\ The court had previously upheld the RTL order in July 
on the basis of a prior administrative lawsuit that Gao and Liu 
filed against the Shangqiu Municipal Reeducation Through Labor 
Committee.\177\

                                 Taoism

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 
government and Communist Party continued to exercise control 
over the scope of Taoist \178\ religious activities in much the 
same way that they do for other religious communities in China. 
The government requires Taoist groups and religious personnel 
to register with the state-controlled Chinese Taoist 
Association (CTA) in order to legally perform ritual services 
and hold Taoist ceremonies,\179\ and authorities tend to allow 
a wider scope of activities for Taoist groups that work more 
closely with them.\180\ Authorities also continued to exercise 
control over the scope of religious freedom for Taoists by 
emphasizing the role of the CTA in promoting government and 
Party policy. For example, the CTA's official Web site 
described the theme of the June 21, 2010, Eighth National 
Conference of the CTA in the following way:

        [R]aising high the banner of loving the country and 
        loving religion, as well as the banner of solidarity 
        and progress, deeply implementing the scientific 
        development concept, implementing the Party's basic 
        policy on religious work, vigorously strengthening 
        self-construction, [and] making efforts to play a 
        positive role in advancing social harmony and economic 
        and social development . . . .\181\

    In addition, various government reports throughout China 
called on local officials to monitor and control the 
``indiscriminate'' construction of temples and statues,\182\ as 
well as ``feudal, superstitious'' Taoist activities.\183\ One 
April 2010 report from the Wuxi Municipal Park Administration 
specifically called on local authorities to strengthen the 
management of Taoist sites and prevent Taoists from engaging in 
various forms of fortunetelling and other ``feudal, 
superstitious'' activities during the Shanghai 2010 World 
Expo.\184\

                      Other Religious Communities

    The Chinese government maintained its framework for 
recognizing only select religious communities and did not 
enlarge this framework to recognize additional groups. Legal 
regulations allowed foreign religious communities, including 
communities not recognized as domestic religions by the 
government, to hold services for expatriates, but forbade 
Chinese citizens from participating.\185\ In August, leaders of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints reported 
holding meetings with a high-level Chinese official and said 
church leaders ``established a relationship'' that they 
``expect will lead to regularizing the activities of The Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in China.'' \186\ Some 
local governments recognized the Orthodox church within local 
legislation.\187\ Chinese citizens reportedly were unable to 
attend Orthodox services in Beijing, however, because the 
services were set up for foreigners, and seminary graduates 
reportedly have been unable to work as religious leaders.\188\ 
The State Administration for Religious Affairs has engaged in 
talks with officials from the Orthodox church in recent years 
and met with Russian Orthodox Church officials in November 
2009.\189\ In recent years, some local governments have issued 
measures to register venues for folk belief activities.\190\ No 
national legal measures govern folk belief activities in China.

                         Ethnic Minority Rights

    Chinese law provides for a system of ``regional ethnic 
autonomy'' in designated areas with ethnic minority 
populations,\1\ but shortcomings in the substance and 
implementation of this system have prevented these groups from 
enjoying meaningful autonomy in practice. The Chinese 
government maintained policies during the Commission's 2010 
reporting year that prevented ethnic minorities from 
``administering their internal affairs'' as guaranteed in 
Chinese law \2\ and from enjoying their rights in line with 
international human rights standards.\3\ International human 
rights standards stipulate that ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic minorities within a state ``shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language.'' \4\ While the 
government maintained some protections in law and practice for 
minority rights, it continued to impose the fundamental terms 
upon which Chinese citizens could express their ethnicity and 
to prevent ethnic minorities from enjoying their cultures, 
religions, and languages free from state interference.\5\ Among 
the 55 groups designated as minority ``nationalities'' or 
``ethnicities'' (shaoshu minzu \6\), state repression was 
harshest toward groups deemed to challenge state authority, 
especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region, and Tibet Autonomous Region and 
other Tibetan autonomous areas.

               State Policies and Ethnic Unity Campaigns

    The Chinese government continued in the past year to assert 
the effectiveness of state laws and policies in upholding the 
rights of ethnic minorities, following domestic protests and 
international criticism of the government's treatment of ethnic 
minorities. A September 2009 State Council Information Office 
white paper on the topic described state policy as the 
``correct'' approach ``in keeping with . . . the common 
interests of all ethnic groups'' and guiding Chinese citizens 
to ``[safeguard] national unification, social stability and 
ethnic unity.'' \7\ Authorities defended state policy in the 
aftermath of demonstrations and riots in Tibetan areas in 2008 
and in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 2009 that 
highlighted deep tensions in ethnic minority areas and citizen 
grievances toward government policy. Authorities denied the 
events had domestic political roots and instead attributed 
conflict to factors such as interference from outside forces 
and ``contradictions'' among the people.\8\ Some academics 
affiliated with state universities or think tanks, along with 
some lower level officials, openly criticized government policy 
toward ethnic issues in the past year.\9\ Although the ultimate 
impact of such criticism is unknown, it may signal growing room 
for debate and reconsideration of aspects of government policy 
in this area.
    The government and Communist Party strengthened ``ethnic 
unity'' campaigns as a vehicle for spreading state ethnic 
policy throughout Chinese society and for imposing state-
defined interpretations of the history, relations, and current 
conditions of ethnic groups in China. The State Council 
Information Office white paper stressed the importance of 
ethnic unity in meeting state political goals such as social 
stability and development, and described ``ethnic unity 
education'' as part of ``the whole process of socialist 
cultural and ideological construction.'' \10\ Following steps 
in 2008 and 2009 to strengthen ethnic unity education,\11\ 
central government and Party offices issued plans in the past 
year to expand the reach of ethnic unity education.\12\ 
Provincial and local governments also reported strengthening 
ethnic unity campaigns.\13\

              2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan

    Chinese leaders pledged to refine laws and improve 
conditions for ethnic minorities, within the parameters of 
existing Party policy, issuing some policy documents in the 
past year which may bring mixed results in the protection of 
ethnic minorities' rights. The government's 2009-2010 National 
Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) issued in April 2009 outlined 
measures to support legislation, governance, education, 
personnel training and employment, language use, and cultural 
and economic development among ethnic minorities.\14\ The 
government's December 2009 review of the HRAP provided limited 
information on the plan's progress, noting work in the areas of 
cultural and economic development.\15\ Following that date, 
government offices issued an opinion in May and a plan in July 
that state more support for ethnic minority languages and for 
education among ethnic minorities, respectively, including 
support in both documents for ``bilingual education.'' \16\ The 
two documents also state support for ethnic minorities' right 
to use their own languages,\17\ but ``bilingual education'' as 
implemented in some parts of China has marginalized the role of 
ethnic minority languages, in contravention of Chinese law.\18\

                          Economic Development

    The government maintained economic development policies 
that prioritize state economic goals over the protection of 
ethnic minorities' rights. Despite bringing some benefits to 
ethnic minority areas and residents, such policies also have 
conflicted with ethnic minorities' rights to maintain 
traditional livelihoods, spurred migration to ethnic minority 
regions, promoted unequal allocation of resources favoring Han 
Chinese, intensified linguistic and assimilation 
pressures on local communities, and resulted in environmental 
damage.\19\ In the past year, the government marked the 10th 
anniversary of the Great Western Development project--which is 
directed at a number of provinces and regions with large 
populations of non-Han ethnic groups--and announced plans to 
continue western development in the coming decade.\20\ 
Authorities also stressed enhancing development work in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas of China, 
where development initiatives have been closely tied to central 
government-led political controls and campaigns to ``uphold 
stability'' and suppress dissent. [See Section IV--Xinjiang and 
Section V--Tibet.]

          Human Rights in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

    Authorities in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) 
continued in the past year to restrict independent expressions 
of ethnic identity among Mongols and to interfere with 
traditional livelihoods, while enforcing campaigns to promote 
stability and ethnic unity. In a December 2009 interview, the 
head of the IMAR Public Security Department likened the 
region's public security situation to that in the autonomous 
Tibetan areas of China and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 
stating ``enemy forces'' from Western countries aimed to split 
the region.\21\ In September 2009, the IMAR Department of 
Education issued a detailed plan for strengthening ethnic unity 
education in IMAR schools.\22\ Authorities strengthened 
``ecological migration'' policies that have required herders to 
resettle from pasture land and abandon traditional 
livelihoods,\23\ while outside observers and some domestic 
scholars have questioned the effectiveness of these government 
policies in ameliorating environmental degradation.\24\ Mongols 
continued to face the risk of repercussions for peacefully 
defending their rights or aiming to preserve their culture. In 
a case also illustrating China's influence outside its borders 
and contravention of protections for asylum seekers, on October 
3, 2009, Chinese security officials inside the country of 
Mongolia reportedly joined Mongolian security officials in 
detaining Batzangaa, an ethnic Mongol from China. The detention 
occurred outside the UN High Commissioner for Refugees office 
in Ulaanbaatar, where Batzangaa had applied for refugee status. 
Authorities returned him to China and held him in detention. 
Batzangaa ran a traditional Mongolian medicine school in Ordos 
municipality, IMAR, that reportedly had come under official 
scrutiny for its popularity and activities with Mongols and 
Tibetans, and he was also involved in a land dispute with local 
authorities.\25\ On April 18, 2010, officials at the Beijing 
Capital International Airport detained rights advocate 
Sodmongol as he was waiting to board a flight to the United 
States to attend the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. 
Sodmongol had organized events and led two Web sites--now shut 
down--that promoted the protection of Mongols' rights. His 
current whereabouts remain unknown.\26\

                          Population Planning


                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, central and 
local authorities continued to interfere with and control the 
reproductive lives of Chinese women through an all-encompassing 
system of population planning regulations. Population planning 
policies limit most women in urban areas to bearing one child, 
while permitting slightly more than half of Chinese women--
located in many rural areas--to bear a second child if their 
first child is female.\1\ The Commission notes the emergence of 
a growing debate in the Chinese media about possible reform of 
these policies, but has not yet seen government action to 
introduce national reform measures.\2\
    Local officials continue to monitor the reproductive cycles 
of Chinese women in order to prevent unauthorized births.\3\ 
The Chinese government requires married couples to obtain a 
birth permit before they can lawfully bear a child and forces 
them to employ contraceptive methods at other times.\4\ 
Although Chinese law prohibits officials from infringing upon 
the rights and interests of citizens while promoting compliance 
with population planning policies,\5\ reports from recent years 
indicate that abuses continue. Violators of the policy are 
routinely punished with fines, and in some cases, subjected to 
forced sterilization, forced abortion, arbitrary detention, and 
torture.\6\ In some cases surgical sterilization may be 
required of Chinese women following the birth of their second 
child.\7\ Mandatory abortion, which is often referred to as 
``remedial measures'' (bujiu cuoshi) in government reports, is 
endorsed explicitly as an official policy instrument in the 
regulations of 18 of China's 31 provincial-level 
jurisdictions.\8\ In 2010, the Commission found that local 
officials continued to coerce women with unauthorized 
pregnancies to undergo abortions in both urban and rural areas 
across China's major regions.\9\
    China's population planning policies in both their nature 
and 
implementation violate international human rights standards. 
Although implementation tends to vary across localities, the 
government's population planning law and regulations contravene 
international human rights standards by limiting the number of 
children that women may bear and by coercing compliance with 
population targets through heavy fines.\10\ For example, 
China's Population and Family Planning Law is not consistent 
with the standards set by the 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 
1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference 
on Population and Development.\11\ Controls imposed on Chinese 
women and their families and additional abuses engendered by 
the system, from forced abortion to discriminatory policies 
against ``out-of-plan'' children, also violate standards in the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women,\12\ the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,\13\ and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights.\14\ China is a state party to these treaties and is 
bound to uphold their terms.

                      Coercive Abortion and Fines

    China's 2002 Population and Family Planning Law (PFPL) 
states in Article 4 that officials ``shall perform their 
administrative duties strictly in accordance with the law, and 
enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe 
upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.'' \15\ 
The PFPL also states in Article 39 that ``any functionary of a 
State organ who commits one of the following acts in the work 
of family planning, if the act constitutes a crime, shall be 
investigated for criminal liability in accordance with the law; 
if it does not constitute a crime, he shall be given an 
administrative sanction with law; his unlawful gains, if any, 
shall be confiscated: (1) infringing on a citizen's personal 
rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and 
interests; (2) abusing his power, neglecting his duty, or 
engaging in malpractices for personal gain . . . .'' \16\ 
Despite these provisions, abuses continue. The Commission has 
reported on a number of cases of violence against women in 
connection with officials' enforcement of population planning 
policies.\17\ During this reporting year, the use of violence 
to coerce compliance with the PFPL was illustrated by family 
planning officials in Changfeng county, Anhui province. 
According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD), on July 15, 
2010, Changfeng family planning officials kidnapped 23-year-old 
Li Hongmei and her three-week-old daughter and took them to a 
local hospital where they reportedly held Li's baby hostage 
until she signed her consent to undergo sterilization. 
According to CHRD, Li remained hospitalized for at least a 
month after the procedure due to illness.\18\
    In 2010, authorities across a wide range of Chinese 
localities launched population planning enforcement campaigns--
often dubbed ``spring family planning service activities'' 
(chunji jisheng fuwu xingdong) \19\--that employed coercive 
measures to terminate ``out-of-plan'' pregnancies. In February, 
the Jiangxi provincial government reported that one such 
campaign had commenced in Anyi county where officials vowed to 
engage in a ``100-day battle'' in which they would ``insist 
without wavering on the principle of IUD [intrauterine device] 
insertion after the first child, surgical sterilization after 
the second child, and abortion of out-of-plan pregnancies.'' 
\20\ In March 2010, a local official in Ezhou city, Hubei 
province, instructed cadres preparing for a spring campaign to 
``immediately adopt remedial measures against those with out-
of-plan pregnancies, follow procedures to terminate the 
pregnancy . . . and forcefully ensure implementation in order 
to reduce the birth rate.'' \21\ Regulations published in 2009 
in Zhanjiang city in Guangdong province spell out penalties for 
violators of the policy and explicitly call for officials to 
``force'' (qiangxing) abortion of ``extra births'':

        Strictly prohibit out-of-plan second births or multiple 
        births; those who have out-of-plan pregnancies must 
        adopt abortion measures, force those who exceed birth 
        limits to have an abortion. Out-of-plan children will 
        not be allowed to enjoy benefits for villagers; for a 
        period of 15 years, parents of out-of-plan children 
        will not be allowed to enjoy benefits for villagers, 
        gain employment at a village-run enterprise, or be 
        granted documents.\22\

    In 2010, the Commission analyzed government reports from 
nine provinces that used the phrase ``by all means necessary'' 
(qian fang bai ji) to signify intensified enforcement measures 
and less restraint on officials who oversee coerced 
abortions.\23\ Between January and March 2010, city and county 
governments in at least four provinces (Henan, Hubei, 
Guangdong, and Jiangsu) and at least one provincial-level 
government (Jiangxi) vowed to ``by all means necessary, 
stabilize the low birth level.'' \24\ In March, Panjin 
municipal authorities in Liaoning province expressed their 
resolve to crack down on population planning violations ``in 
order to stabilize a low birth rate . . . continuously 
strengthen measures . . . [and] by all means necessary, drive 
population and family planning work into the `fast lane.' '' 
\25\ In addition to mandating abortion of pregnancies that 
exceed fertility limits, all pregnancies that occur without an 
official permit, including first pregnancies, are regarded by 
the government as ``out-of-plan'' and subject to ``remedial 
measures.'' In Jiangxi province, a Xingzi county official 
highlighted this point in responding to an anonymous citizen's 
online inquiry in March 2010. Noting that there are 10 
circumstances in which a couple may apply for a permit to have 
a second child in Jiangxi, the official told the citizen that 
``even if you conform to some of the stipulated conditions, you 
must first obtain a `repeat birth permit,' then you may remove 
the IUD and become pregnant; otherwise, it would be considered 
an out-of-plan pregnancy.'' \26\ For women who give birth to an 
out-of-plan child before authorities discover the pregnancy, 
the government imposes penalties known as ``social compensation 
fees'' (shehui fuyang fei). For certain couples, these fines 
pose a dilemma between undergoing an unwanted abortion and 
incurring potentially overwhelming financial costs.\27\ In some 
cases, authorities not only levy fines against violators, but 
also punish them through job dismissal and other penalties.\28\ 
Some children may go without household registration (hukou) in 
China because they are born out of plan and their parents do 
not pay the necessary fines.\29\ Lack of a valid hukou raises 
barriers to access to social benefits typically linked to the 
hukou, including subsidized healthcare and public 
education.\30\ [For additional discussion of China's hukou 
system, see Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement.]
    The U.S. State Department, reporting on China's ``high 
female suicide rate'' in its 2009 Human Rights Report noted 
that ``(m)any observers believed that violence against women 
and girls, discrimination in education and employment, the 
traditional preference for male children, birth-limitation 
policies, and other societal factors contributed to the high 
female suicide rate. Women in rural areas, where the suicide 
rate for women was three to four times higher than for men, 
were especially vulnerable.'' \31\

                       Targeting Migrant Workers

    The Commission observed during its 2010 reporting year a 
greater number of reports confirming its 2009 finding that some 
local governments are specifically targeting migrant workers 
for forced abortions.\32\ [For more information on 
discrimination against migrant workers, see Section II--Freedom 
of Residence and Movement.] In April 2010, the National 
Population and Family Planning Commission released an 
``implementation plan'' for enforcing population planning 
regulations for migrant workers within a 10-province region 
called the Bohai Rim.\33\ This plan calls for governments where 
migrant workers reside to ``persuade and educate'' those with 
out-of-plan pregnancies to ``promptly adopt remedial 
measures.'' If a migrant worker refuses, local authorities are 
instructed to coordinate with the migrant's home government 
(place of household registration) to ``launch unified 
enforcement work.'' \34\ Strengthening family planning 
enforcement through coordination between governments where 
migrants work and where their households are registered, as 
described in the Bohai plan, was also the chief goal behind a 
cooperation agreement that 10 district and county-level 
governments in Shanghai and Fuzhou municipalities signed in 
March 2010.\35\ In the migrant-rich factory city of Kunshan on 
the outskirts of Shanghai, the government launched a ``special 
rectification operation'' for the ``floating population'' in 
December 2009 that set ``raising the implementation rate of 
remedial measures for out-of-plan pregnancies'' as one of its 
primary objectives.\36\ Anhui provincial family planning 
measures for migrant workers require officials to ``mobilize 
pregnant migrant workers without a birth permit to adopt 
remedial measures.'' \37\ Those who initially refuse are fined 
repeatedly until they terminate the pregnancy, or if they fail 
to abort within a designated period of time, officials are 
required to ``order them to adopt remedial measures on the 
spot.'' \38\

                         Coercive Sterilization

    When women reach the state-imposed limit on number of 
births, local authorities often mandate surgical sterilization 
to prevent ``out-of-plan'' pregnancies. In February 2010, the 
Qiaojia county government in Yunnan province issued a directive 
that urged officials to ``by all means necessary, raise the 
rate of surgical sterilization after the second birth and IUD 
insertion after the first birth.'' \39\ The directive also 
warns that the government will ``stop salary payments without 
exception'' for government workers who fail to adopt 
contraception measures within a specified time period.\40\ In 
March 2010, the Qianxi county government in Guizhou province 
issued a similar directive authorizing ``special rectification 
activities'' to sterilize women with two children.\41\ Qianxi 
officials face a penalty of 1,000 yuan (US$147) for each woman 
with two children that they fail to sterilize, and conversely, 
they are promised a reward of the same amount for each tubal 
ligation that they see through to completion.\42\
    In some areas, coerced sterilization is accomplished 
through punitive action taken against the family members of 
targeted women, which can include extended periods of 
detention. In April 2010, the Puning city government in 
Guangdong province launched a ``special operation to sterilize 
women with two children'' in which officials were authorized to 
``adopt measures that exceed conventional practices.'' \43\ The 
impetus for the operation came from Guangdong provincial 
authorities who identified Puning as a problematic area that 
``lagged behind'' other localities in meeting population 
planning goals.\44\ Puning authorities indicated that the 
operation's initial sweep, conducted from April 7 to April 26, 
resulted in 5,601 surgical sterilizations.\45\ The government 
reportedly set 9,559 tubal ligations as its target to achieve 
before the end of April.\46\ As of April 12, Puning authorities 
had detained 1,377 people--many of whom were elderly relatives 
of unsterilized women--in extralegal ``study classes'' in order 
to force women who had left Puning for work purposes to return 
and undergo sterilization.\47\ In addition to detentions, 
Puning authorities employed a series of other ``measures that 
exceed conventional practice'' such as nullification of 
household registration (hukou) for unsterilized women, refusal 
to grant household registration to their children, and punitive 
actions taken against their relatives such as cancellation of 
state benefits and permits.\48\ As of April 12, 63 officials 
who failed to adopt these measures were reportedly subjected to 
disciplinary action, including one township Communist Party 
secretary who was suspended.\49\ Puning is not exceptional in 
its use of coercive ``measures that exceed conventional 
practices,'' as the Commission analyzed official government 
reports containing the same phrase in provinces such as 
Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, Gansu, and the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region.\50\

                      Prospects for Policy Reform

    Growing awareness of the demographic and social 
consequences of China's population planning policy is giving 
rise to public discussion of the need for policy reform. In 
2010, Chinese experts and officials engaged in a relatively 
open exchange in the state-run media about how to address 
demographic trends that are expected to detrimentally impact 
China's future development.\51\ The Beijing News reported in 
January that the municipal government would soon allow all 
couples to have two children, but within hours, the Beijing 
Population and Family Planning Commission denied the 
earlier report.\52\ The central government reportedly 
commissioned feasibility studies in 2009 to assess the possible 
effects of a change in policy.\53\ Top Party and government 
leaders, however, continue to publicly defend the policy and 
rule out reform in the near-term.\54\

                        Demographic Consequences

    Chinese society is aging at a rapid pace and is expected to 
undergo a challenging demographic transformation in the next 
two decades. In 2008, China had 169 million citizens over the 
age of 60, constituting 13 percent of the total population and 
surpassing the UN's threshold for classification as an ``aging 
society.'' \55\ By 2030, some Western demographers estimate 
that the number of elderly Chinese could soar to as high as 350 
million and account for 25 percent of the population.\56\ An 
economist with the Asian Development Bank projects that one in 
five urban Chinese will be over 65 years of age by 2025.\57\
    China's total fertility rate has dropped from 6.1 births 
per woman in 1949 to an estimated 1.5 births per woman in 
2010.\58\ Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Li Keqiang called 
on separate occasions in 2010 for officials to maintain China's 
low birth rate for the foreseeable future.\59\ Cai Fang, the 
Director of the Institute of Population and Labor Economics at 
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), characterizes 
this decline in the working-age population as the ``greatest 
threat to China's economic prosperity'' and predicts labor 
shortages in China as soon as 2013.\60\
    An imbalanced sex ratio remains one of China's major 
demographic challenges and recent data indicate that it is 
worsening. In response to government-imposed birth limits and 
in keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons, Chinese 
parents often engage in sex-selective abortion, especially 
rural couples whose first child is a girl.\61\ In January 2010, 
CASS published a comprehensive study that placed the male-to-
female sex ratio for the infant-to-four-year-old age group in 
China at 123.26 males for every 100 females.\62\ Some provinces 
have ratios exceeding 130.\63\ This is far above the global 
norm of roughly 103 to 105 males for every 100 females and 
represents growth of nearly two and a half points from the 2000 
census ratio.\64\ CASS estimates that, by 2020, the number of 
Chinese males of marriageable age will exceed the number of 
Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 to 40 million.\65\ 
[For additional discussion of China's imbalanced sex ratio, see 
Section II--Status of Women.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Case Update: Chen Guangcheng--Human Rights Defender
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Authorities in Linyi city, Shandong province, released rights defender
 Chen Guangcheng from prison on September 9, 2010, after he completed a
 four-year, three-month sentence for exposing widespread abuses by local
 officials responsible for implementing China's one-child policy.\66\
 During the period of his imprisonment, authorities reportedly denied
 Chen Guangcheng, who is blind, adequate medical treatment despite his
 reported deteriorating health.\67\ Authorities also repeatedly denied
 requests filed by both Chen and his wife, Yuan Weijing, on his behalf
 for his medical parole.\68\
  According to several media and non-governmental organization reports,
 Chen returned home under police escort on the morning of September 9,
 2010, to heightened police surveillance, including a number of
 plainclothes and uniformed guards around Chen's home and at the
 entrance to his village,\69\ disconnection of the family's telephone
 and cell phone service,\70\ and newly installed 24-hour closed-circuit
 surveillance cameras by which security agents monitor his and his
 family's activities.\71\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Case Update: Chen Guangcheng--Human Rights Defender-- Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In 1996, Mr. Chen began defending the rights of disabled peasants and
 providing legal advice as a self-trained legal advocate focusing on
 antidiscrimination.\72\ Over the next decade, his legal advocacy was
 recognized in China and internationally.\73\ In 2005, Mr. Chen's rights
  defense work drew international news media attention to population
 planning abuses in Linyi city, Shandong province.\74\ Local authorities
 placed Chen under house arrest in September 2005 and formally arrested
 him on June 21, 2006.\75\ On the eve of his August 18, 2006, trial,
 three of his defense lawyers were taken into custody.\76\ The Yinan
 County People's Court first tried and sentenced Chen on August 24,
 2006, to four years and three months in prison for ``intentional
 destruction of property'' and ``organizing a group of people to disturb
 traffic order.'' \77\ Li Jinsong, lead counsel on Chen's criminal
 defense team, filed an appeal in September 2006 arguing that at trial,
 the court had illegally deprived Chen of the right to be represented by
 criminal defense lawyers of his own choosing.\78\ On October 31, 2006,
 the Linyi Intermediate People's Court vacated the original trial court
 judgment and remanded the case for a retrial.\79\ The retrial took
 place on November 27, 2006,\80\ and on December 1, 2006, the Yinan
 court handed down the same judgment as before,\81\ which the appeals
 court affirmed on January 12, 2007.\82\ Chen's retrial prompted
 repeated criticism for its criminal procedure violations.\83\ In June
 2007, Chen reportedly informed his wife and brother that he had been
 beaten by fellow inmates.\84\
  In August 2007, Chen received the Ramon Magsaysay Award for ``his
 irrepressible passion for justice in leading ordinary Chinese citizens
 to assert their legitimate rights under the law.'' \85\ His wife, Yuan
 Weijing, attempted to travel to the Philippines to accept the award on
 behalf of Chen, but Chinese authorities intercepted her before leaving
 the country and reportedly forcibly returned her to her village.\86\ At
 other times during Chen's imprisonment, authorities also repeatedly
 subjected Yuan and their two children to harassment, home confinement,
 surveillance, and other abuses,\87\ including reportedly preventing the
 children from enrolling in school.\88\ The Commission will continue to
 monitor and report on the conditions surrounding Chen Guangcheng and
 his family in the coming year.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Freedom of Residence and Movement


                          Freedom of Residence

    The Chinese government continued to enforce the household 
registration (hukou) system it first established in the 
1950s.\1\ Hukou regulations limit the right of Chinese citizens 
formally to establish their permanent place of residence. 
Initially used to control migration of the rural population to 
China's cities, ``[t]oday it is one of the most important 
mechanisms determining entitlement to public welfare, urban 
services and, more broadly, full citizenship.'' \2\ The hukou 
regulations classify Chinese citizens as either rural or urban 
hukou holders and local governments restrict access to some 
social services based on the classification. The implementation 
of these regulations discriminates against rural hukou holders 
who migrate to urban areas by imposing significant constraints 
on rural hukou holders' ability to obtain healthcare benefits, 
education, and other social services in urban locations where 
they reside but lack legal residency status. The hukou 
regulations appear to contradict the freedoms guaranteed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which include ``the 
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
residence.'' \3\
    The discriminatory effect is especially prominent in the 
area of education. In many cases, migrant children, who live in 
urban areas but lack urban hukous, cannot attend local public 
schools. The estimated number of migrant children affected by 
hukou regulations ranges from 14 million to 19 million.\4\ 
Chinese law and regulations call for nine years of compulsory 
education and equal treatment of all children.\5\ In practice, 
however, many migrant children are systematically excluded from 
urban public schools, where resources are more abundant than in 
urban private schools or rural schools.\6\ Many resort to 
substandard, often unlicensed but relatively affordable urban 
private schools, those with more means offer a special 
``donation'' to public schools in order to gain access, and 
some send their children back to their place of rural hukou, 
relying on relatives to raise their children.\7\ Some migrant 
children who have gained access to urban public school systems 
report unequal treatment. According to a 16-year-old middle 
school graduate, migrant and local students ``from the two 
sides of the school never communicate . . . . Class starting 
time, lunch time and dismissal time are different for students 
of the two parts. The eastern part's [local] students are going 
to visit the expo site, but the western part [migrant students] 
doesn't have the chance.'' \8\ Most migrant students are 
``housed in a separate school building, wear an alternative 
uniform and have different teachers and textbooks.'' \9\ School 
teachers tell the local children to ``stay clear of the migrant 
children'' because they are ``wild, lacking in manners and 
poor.'' \10\ In addition, migrant children cannot attend high 
school or sit for the crucial college entrance exam in the 
cities where they reside, but in which they do not possess a 
valid hukou.\11\ Instead, they generally are required to return 
to their hukou locations where they may experience significant 
alienation or have little knowledge of the local academic 
culture.\12\
    In recent years, local governments have instituted a series 
of policies intended to reform the hukou system. While details 
vary by location, the key provisions of these reforms allow 
people to transfer hukou from rural to urban status based on 
certain criteria.\13\ These criteria usually include income, 
education, and special skills aimed at attracting elite rural 
hukou holders with wealth and education.\14\ The vast majority 
of China's over 200 million migrant workers fall outside the 
scope of these reforms.\15\
     Because the problems the hukou system creates are complex, 
any large-scale reform likely will carry sweeping 
implications.\16\ Hukou transfer is managed at the local level, 
and typically each local government sets its own standard of 
admission for rural-to-urban hukou transfers.\17\ Furthermore, 
rural hukou holders confront disparate interests. For example, 
those with easy access to urban centers may actually prefer 
rural hukous over urban hukous due to benefits tied to land 
ownership and a higher birth allowance rate.\18\ In addition, 
hukou reforms often lack support from the urban hukou class as 
the current status quo tips in its favor.\19\
    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, authorities 
continued to relax certain hukou restrictions consistent with 
earlier 
reform efforts.\20\ Several high-level officials acknowledged 
and publicized the need for hukou reforms.\21\ The Development 
Research Center of the State Council published an essay that 
advocated for a more inclusive approach to hukou reform in 
order to achieve ``substantive equality of rights.'' \22\ The 
efficacy of these policies remains unclear.\23\
    The government and the Communist Party exercised strict 
control over public debate on hukou reforms during this 
reporting year. Authorities retracted a joint editorial 
published by 13 newspapers that decried the hukou system as 
corrupt and in need of speedy reforms. One of the editorial's 
co-authors, a deputy editor at one of the newspapers, was 
forced to resign.\24\

  Significant Household Registration (Hukou) Policies and Regulatory 
                          Developments in 2010


                         GUANGZHOU MUNICIPALITY

    In May 2010, the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau in 
Guangdong province directed district- and county-level Party 
committees and governments to gradually transform its hukou 
system into one that will identify residents as holders of 
Guangzhou's residential hukou.\25\ The impact of the reform 
remains unclear. One key issue associated with the reform is 
the interpretation of its language. A noted hukou scholar 
interpreting similar reforms has 
argued that the impact of a unified residential hukou system is 
negligible on migrant workers. This is because the reform can 
be interpreted to include only a small percentage of rural 
hukou holders who are already eligible for social benefits,\26\ 
rendering the reform efforts pro forma at best. According to 
one source, the Guangzhou experiment is likely to have a 
limited impact on its large migrant population.\27\

                         CHONGQING MUNICIPALITY

    In July 2010, Chongqing municipality initiated gradual 
voluntary hukou reforms aimed at increasing the percentage of 
urban hukou holders in the municipality.\28\ By 2020, the 
reform efforts are intended to gradually turn at least 10 
million rural hukou holders into urban hukou holders, thus 
potentially allowing them greater access to social services in 
exchange for their land allocations.\29\ An unusual feature of 
the reform allows rural hukou holders to retain their land 
contracting and use rights (cheng bao), among other provisions, 
for up to three years after transitioning to urban hukou 
status.\30\ It is unclear whether rural hukou holders can 
choose to retain their land rights and their rural hukou status 
at the end of the three-year transition period should they wish 
to do so. If successful, the Chongqing hukou reforms could 
significantly remedy a shortage of urban land for construction 
and development in the municipality.\31\

                  THE JOINT EDITORIAL ON HUKOU REFORM

    On March 1, 2010, 13 mainland newspapers published a joint 
editorial four days before the annual meetings of the National 
People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference convened in Beijing.\32\ The joint 
editorial demanded a clear timetable for hukou reforms, stating 
that freedom of movement is ``an inseparable part of human 
rights and personal freedom.'' \33\ Furthermore, it decried the 
hukou system as a breeding ground for corruption and urged the 
delegates to abolish the system.\34\ Just one day after its 
publication, the editorial was removed from many Web sites and 
the deputy editor of one of the newspapers was forced to 
resign.\35\

                          Freedom of Movement

    There can be little doubt that there is greater freedom of 
movement for those Chinese citizens who shun political 
engagement outside of government-approved parameters. Unlike 30 
years ago, there are many opportunities for travel. Yet, 
Chinese rights defenders and advocates who venture beyond 
government-sanctioned parameters face frequent restrictions on 
their liberty of movement. The Chinese government continues to 
impose restrictions on Chinese citizens' liberty of movement 
that contravene international standards.\36\

    CHINESE CITIZENS BARRED FROM ENTERING AND LEAVING MAINLAND CHINA

    Chinese authorities arbitrarily barred rights defenders, 
advocates, and critics from entering and leaving China. China's 
Passport Law delineates the legal framework for regulating 
travel abroad. While providing some procedural safeguards, the 
law provides no mechanism for redress. Article 2 of the 
Passport Law requires Chinese citizens to have a valid passport 
to enter China while Article 13 gives officials the discretion 
to refuse the issuance of a passport where ``the competent 
organs of the State Council believe that [the applicant's] 
leaving China will do harm to the state security or result in 
serious losses to the benefits of the state.'' \37\ With 
respect to entering China, authorities refuse to renew the 
passports of rights advocates and subsequently cite passport 
expiration as grounds to prevent entry. Such arbitrary 
practices appear to contravene the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.\38\
    There are numerous cases of concern. The following is a 
representative sample:

         Between June 7, 2009, and February 12, 2010, 
        on at least eight separate occasions, the Chinese 
        government prevented Feng Zhenghu, a Shanghai-based 
        human rights advocate and Chinese citizen, from 
        returning to China after a temporary visit to Japan. He 
        spent at least 90 days at Narita Airport, Tokyo's main 
        airport, before he was allowed to reenter mainland 
        China.\39\ Since Feng's return to Shanghai in mid-
        February, the Chinese government has subjected him to 
        an array of control measures including surveillance, 
        confiscation of property, detention, and home 
        confinement due to his intended publication of 12 
        instances of injustice to coincide with the Shanghai 
        2010 World Expo.\40\
         During the week of March 22, 2010, Chinese 
        professor Cui Weiping was banned from leaving China to 
        travel to the United States, where she planned to 
        attend an academic conference hosted by the Association 
        for Asian Studies in Philadelphia and to give lectures 
        at Harvard University and other schools.\41\ Cui's 
        travel ban is likely related to a series of Twitter 
        messages she posted about Liu Xiaobo's 11-year prison 
        sentence and to her comments commemorating the 1989 
        Tiananmen protests.\42\
         On at least two separate occasions, Chinese 
        authorities prevented poet, writer, and musician Liao 
        Yiwu from leaving China. Liao was imprisoned for four 
        years for reciting his poem ``Massacre'' about the 
        Tiananmen protests.\43\ In October 2009, authorities 
        banned Liao from going to the Frankfurt Book Fair, 
        where China was the ``honored guest.'' \44\ On March 2, 
        2010, Liao was again banned from attending Germany's 
        largest literary festival, Lit.Cologne. Authorities 
        removed him from a plane en route to Germany and placed 
        him under house confinement.\45\
         In April 2010, the Chinese government banned 
        Ilham Tohti, a prominent Uyghur economist, from 
        traveling to Turkey to attend an academic 
        conference.\46\ Ilham Tohti is a professor at Minzu 
        University of China who also writes an online blog 
        addressing Uyghur social issues.\47\ Chinese 
        authorities warned Ilham Tohti against attending the 
        conference and took him on a ``vacation'' days before 
        the event.\48\ The ban is one of eight instances where 
        Ilham Tohti was prevented from traveling abroad since 
        the July 2009 demonstrations and riots in Urumqi, 
        Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.\49\ At the time of 
        the April travel ban, Ilham Tohti held a valid Chinese 
        passport and had already received a Turkish visa to 
        attend the conference.\50\
         Macau customs officials banned ``Long Hair'' 
        Leung Kwok-hung, a member of the Legislative Council of 
        Hong Kong, from entering Macau in December 2009.\51\ 
        ``Long Hair'' Leung, along with other democracy 
        activists, had planned to press President Hu Jintao on 
        the issue of universal suffrage in Hong Kong while Hu 
        was in Macau to attend commemorative ceremonies of 
        Macau's return to China.\52\ Macau customs authorities 
        cited Macau's Internal Security Law as grounds for 
        Leung's ban.\53\ An outspoken lawmaker, ``Long Hair'' 
        Leung had been prevented from entering Macau on 
        previous occasions.\54\

     HOME CONFINEMENT AND SURVEILLANCE OF CHINESE CITIZENS DURING 
                     POLITICALLY SENSITIVE PERIODS

    The Chinese government continued to detain, harass, and 
restrict the movement of political dissidents and rights 
defenders inside China. Restrictions on liberty of movement 
within China were especially prominent during politically 
sensitive periods. The Commission's 2010 reporting year 
coincided with several anniversaries and events: the Shanghai 
2010 World Expo, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's 
Republic of China (National Day), and the 21st anniversary of 
the 1989 Tiananmen protests.
    The Chinese government employs a spectrum of measures to 
restrict the movement of dissidents, advocates, and rights 
defenders who act outside of approved parameters. During this 
reporting year, authorities used methods including 
surveillance, police presence outside of one's home, 
``invitation'' to tea with police, forced trips during 
politically sensitive periods, detention, removal from one's 
home, reeducation through labor, and imprisonment.
    There are numerous cases of concern. Representative 
examples follow.

         In connection with October 1, 2009 (National 
        Day), several dozen activists, dissidents, and rights 
        defenders saw 
        increased state intrusion in connection with the 60th 
        anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of 
        China. Examples include the following incidents:

                  Li Hai, a former Tiananmen protest student 
                leader, disappeared from Beijing for 22 days in 
                mid-September 2009 after having been 
                ``invited'' by the police to go on a trip. Li's 
                whereabouts remained unknown as of October 9, 
                2009.\55\
                  Domestic security protection personnel forced 
                Qi Zhiyong to travel to an area outside of 
                Beijing. Qi is a Beijing activist who is 
                disabled from the 1989 Tiananmen protest.\56\ 
                He was allowed to return to Beijing to attend 
                to his daughter but was placed under 
                residential surveillance and denied access to 
                foreign media.\57\
                  Ding Zilin, the leader of the Tiananmen 
                Mothers, and Liu Xia, wife of imprisoned 
                intellectual Liu Xiaobo, received orders to 
                leave Beijing.\58\

         In connection with the 21st anniversary of the 
        1989 Tiananmen protests in June 2010, activists, 
        dissidents, and rights defenders saw heightened 
        official intrusion during this period. The following 
        list highlights the extent and methods employed:

                  On May 28, 2010, Guiyang Public Security 
                Bureau personnel in Guizhou province surveyed, 
                intercepted, and detained a gathering of 
                Guiyang Human Rights members discussing the 
                commemoration of the 21st anniversary of the 
                Tiananmen protests.\59\
                  On May 24, 2010, domestic security protection 
                personnel warned Beijing lawyer Li Xiongbing 
                ``not to leave his home in the coming days,'' 
                \60\ and stationed police outside of his 
                home.\61\
                  On May 26 and 28, 2010, in Xi'an city, 
                Shaanxi province, domestic security protection 
                personnel summoned rights defenders Yang Hai 
                and Zhang Jiankang to ``tea'' and told them 
                that they would be forced to travel during the 
                Tiananmen protest anniversary period.\62\
                  Several supporters of Internet writer Chen 
                Yang went missing. Their whereabouts remained 
                unknown as of June 7. In 2009, Chen was ordered 
                to serve reeducation through labor for his 
                Twitter messages mobilizing others to 
                commemorate the anniversary of the Tiananmen 
                protests.\63\

                            Status of Women


                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, Chinese 
officials continued to promote existing laws and policies that 
aim to protect women's rights in accordance with international 
human rights norms. Inconsistent interpretation, 
implementation, and enforcement of these laws across 
localities, however, limit progress on 
concrete protections of women's rights. Recent statistics on 
female representation in government show increases in women 
holding positions at the central, provincial, and municipal 
levels of government; however, female political representation 
at the village level remains low and may contribute to 
continued violations of women's land rights in rural areas. 
Domestic violence remained widespread, highlighting a need for 
national-level legislation that provides a clear definition of 
domestic violence and standards for prevention and punishment. 
Like many countries, China lacks national legislation that 
clearly defines sexual harassment and gives guidance on 
appropriate measures for prevention and punishment of offenses. 
Sex-selective abortion and infanticide continue, despite 
Chinese government regulations which aim to deter such 
practices, and have contributed to a severely imbalanced gender 
ratio, according to a 2010 UN Development Programme report. 
Gender discrimination with respect to wages, recruitment, and 
retirement age continues; however, authorities promoted women's 
employment and took concrete steps to eliminate gender 
discrimination in the workplace.

                            Gender Equality

    In its domestic laws and policy initiatives \1\ and through 
its ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women \2\ (CEDAW), the Chinese 
government has committed to ensuring female representation in 
government on equal terms with men. According to a March 2010 
Southern Daily report, factors including the costs of giving 
birth, family conflict, and even a woman's clothing and makeup 
prevent many Chinese women from breaking through the ``glass 
ceiling.'' \3\ Official statistics reported in March 2010 show 
that female representation in official positions has increased 
at central, provincial, and municipal levels of government,\4\ 
but according to the Southern Daily report, ``compared with 
women's political participation internationally, China's 
progress in this area is very limited.'' \5\ The report notes 
that China's international ranking with regard to female 
political participation dropped from 12th place in 1994 to 52nd 
in 2009,\6\ and that although women now make up 21.3 percent of 
National People's Congress representatives, this is still far 
short of the 30 percent standard set by the UN Commission on 
the Status of Women in 1990.\7\
    Female political representation at the village level also 
remains low and may contribute to continued violations of 
women's land rights in rural areas. Chen Zhili, Chair of the 
All-China Women's Federation, reported in March 2010 that women 
make up over 60 percent of the rural workforce, but only just 
over 10 percent of village committee members.\8\ In most rural 
areas of China, villages have a high rate of ``self-
governance'' with regard to issues such as land contracts, 
profit distribution from collectives, and land requisition 
compensation.\9\ With limited decisionmaking power in village 
committees, women's interests are less likely to be represented 
in village rules and regulations.\10\ According to a 2008 
report by the non-governmental organization Women's Watch-
China, ``villages deny land rights of women who married . . . 
in other villages and the women's sons and daughters in a 
variety of ways. Yet, the grassroots government often holds an 
equivocal attitude towards land rights disputes.'' \11\

                 Gender-Based Employment Discrimination

    Gender-based employment discrimination with respect to 
issues such as wages, recruitment, and retirement age remains 
widespread in China, despite government efforts to eliminate it 
and promote women's employment. The Chinese government is 
committed under Article 7 of the International Covenant of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to ensuring ``the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of 
work,'' including ``equal pay for equal work,'' and ``equal 
opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an 
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other 
than those of seniority and competence.'' \12\ Several domestic 
laws also prohibit gender discrimination and promote gender 
equality in the workplace, but lack an enforcement mechanism, 
thus providing limited protection and support for those facing 
discrimination.\13\ Examples of reports and surveys on gender 
discrimination in employment from the 2010 reporting year 
include:

         According to a September 2009 All-China 
        Women's Federation survey, over 90 percent of the 
        female college students interviewed felt they had 
        experienced gender discrimination in their job 
        searches.\14\
         According to a survey cited in a February 2010 
        Women's Watch-China report, 15 percent of the companies 
        surveyed pay higher wages to male employees than to 
        their female counterparts for the same work.\15\ 
        Another survey released in March 2010 by an educational 
        consulting firm reportedly revealed that, of the 
        students who found jobs, males earned an average of 361 
        yuan (US$53) per month more than females.\16\
         According to a China University of Political 
        Science and Law survey report released in July 2010, 
        employment discrimination occurs at a high frequency in 
        60.7 percent of state-operated enterprises, 43.44 
        percent of government agencies, and 38.61 percent of 
        public institutions.\17\
         Several job postings mentioned in a May 2010 
        investigative report on employment discrimination in 
        the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone revealed trends in 
        the differences between 
        recruitment of male and female employees. Job postings 
        specifically recruiting women often were for lower 
        level, administrative, or auxiliary positions, or 
        positions that required ``a woman's meticulous and 
        patient nature'' (for example a teacher or an 
        accountant).\18\ Meanwhile, job postings recruiting men 
        often were for positions at one of two extremes: either 
        low-level positions such as security personnel, 
        drivers, or warehouse staff, or high-level positions 
        such as managers, engineers, and supervisors.\19\ Some 
        job descriptions listed in the report also demonstrated 
        an interest in female applicants' marital status, proof 
        of birth control, and childbearing history.\20\
         Mandatory retirement ages for women in China 
        continue to be five years earlier than those for 
        men.\21\ In June 2010, the Enforcement Investigation 
        Group of the National People's Congress Standing 
        Committee issued a report on its investigation of the 
        implementation of China's Law on the Protection of 
        Women's Rights and Interests.\22\ According to a China 
        Youth Daily report on the group's findings, retirement 
        policies for female senior intellectuals and some 
        female cadre have not been well executed in certain 
        central and local state organs and institutions, 
        leading women to retire too early, and impacting their 
        economic rights and interests as well as their 
        opportunities for promotion and development.\23\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Shenzhen Women's Federation Proposes Draft Gender Equality Regulations
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In December 2009, the Shenzhen Municipal Women's Federation announced
 draft regulations to promote gender equality in the workplace.\24\ If
 adopted, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Gender Equality Promotion
 Regulations (Shenzhen regulations) would be the first legislation of
 its kind in China to specifically focus on gender equality.\25\
 According to a January report by the non-governmental organization
 Women's Watch-China (WWC), Shenzhen authorities have integrated the
 draft into the Shenzhen Municipal People's Congress 2010 legislative
 plan.\26\ While domestic and international reports revealed some
 details of the Shenzhen regulations in late January 2010,\27\ the draft
 is still under review and not yet publicly available.\28\

  Highlights of the draft include:

   Definition of gender discrimination. Currently, China's
   legislative framework for gender equality--namely the Law on the
   Protection of Women's Rights and Interests and the Employment
   Promotion Law--does not provide a definition for gender
   discrimination. According to the WWC report, the Shenzhen regulations
   would clearly define both direct and indirect gender
   discrimination.\29\
   Compensation for pension disparity between men and women.
   Chinese law currently requires women to retire at age 55 and men at
   60. Because women retire earlier, they typically have smaller
   pensions than men.\30\
   Establishment of a gender budgeting system, regular gender
   audits, and statistical reviews. With these mechanisms in place,
   governments will be able to ensure that public finances are allocated
   more fairly based on gender,\31\ develop appropriate gender-specific
   facilities (such as restrooms),\32\ and analyze the status of gender
   equality in education and employment.\33\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shenzhen Women's Federation Proposes Draft Gender Equality Regulations--
                                Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Establishment of a protection order system. Under the draft
   Shenzhen regulations, an individual would be able to apply for a
   protection order from the court following abuse or the threat of
   abuse. In addition, if an individual reports abuse to the police,
   police have the right to detain and charge the offender.\34\
   Paternity leave. The Shenzhen regulations would provide a
   legislative basis for paternity leave of 30 days ``on-demand'' for
   fathers of newborns.\35\ If implemented, this would provide greater
   protection for males' rights and interests \36\ and could encourage a
   larger male role in the care of the newborn and mother, according to
   some assessments.\37\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[For more information on legal developments related to 
workplace discrimination, see Section II--Worker Rights.]

                         Violence Against Women


                           DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

    The amended Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and 
Interests (LPWRI) and the amended Marriage Law prohibit 
domestic violence,\38\ and individuals charged with the crime 
of domestic violence are punishable under China's Criminal 
Law.\39\ The problem of domestic violence remains widespread, 
affecting nearly one-third of China's 270 million families, 
according to a November 2009 People's Daily report.\40\ Current 
national-level legal provisions regarding domestic violence 
leave many victims unprotected as they do not clearly define 
domestic violence, assign clear and concrete legal 
responsibilities, or outline the roles of government 
departments and social organizations in prevention, punishment, 
and treatment.\41\
    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, Chinese 
advocates expressed concern regarding the growing problem of 
domestic violence and called for national legislation on 
domestic violence that clarifies the aforementioned 
shortcomings.\42\ The Communist Party-controlled All-China 
Women's Federation announced on November 25, 2009, that it had 
drafted proposed legislation on preventing and curbing domestic 
violence.\43\ The proposal reportedly attempts to provide a 
clear definition of domestic violence, a clear assignment of 
government responsibility in domestic violence prevention and 
treatment, and ``breakthroughs in legal responsibility,'' among 
other improvements, according to another November 2009 People's 
Daily report.\44\ It remains to be seen whether this or other 
such drafts are entered into the legislative agenda.

                           SEXUAL HARASSMENT

    Victims of sexual harassment in China face several 
legislative, cultural, and social obstacles in protecting their 
rights, despite China's international commitments and domestic 
legislation on this subject. The Chinese government is 
committed under Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to taking ``all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in the field of employment,'' \45\ and introduced the concept 
of sexual harassment into legislation with the 2005 amendment 
to the LPWRI.\46\ The amended LPWRI prohibits sexual harassment 
and provides an avenue of recourse for victims through either 
administrative punishment for offenders or civil action in the 
people's court system, but it does not provide a clear 
definition of sexual harassment or specific standards and 
procedures for prevention and punishment.\47\ In addition, 
public awareness regarding sexual harassment in the workplace 
is generally lacking, and traditional views toward gender roles 
in society continue to limit momentum toward progress.\48\
    Sexual harassment remains prevalent in China, and those who 
choose to pursue sexual harassment claims face potential social 
and economic risks. According to a May 2010 survey published by 
the Qian Qian law firm, 17.2 percent of the women surveyed 
reported experiencing sexual harassment from their bosses, 28.7 
percent reported experiencing sexual harassment from their 
colleagues, and 54.1 percent expressed that they had 
experienced sexual harassment from people other than their 
bosses or colleagues, such as clients, patients, and others 
with whom they must interact for work purposes.\49\ According 
to one expert on women's rights protection in China, ``those 
who take action against sexual harassment offenders simply risk 
losing more than they will gain.'' \50\ In one such example in 
March 2009, a woman sued her company and the specific employer 
who sexually harassed her, seeking damages of 400,000 yuan 
(US$58,573) and a written apology. She ``won'' the lawsuit in 
November (the court granted her 3,000 yuan, or US$439, for 
psychological recovery),\51\ but the corporation had already 
dismissed her from her job.\52\ Observers note that she may 
face difficulty seeking employment elsewhere due to the 
significant media exposure of her case.\53\
    As reported in the Commission's 2009 Annual Report, in 
February 2009 a study group led by three Chinese researchers 
submitted a draft proposal to the National People's Congress 
for a law aimed at preventing sexual harassment in the 
workplace.\54\ The proposed law would hold both the government 
and employers responsible for the prevention and punishment of 
sexual harassment offenses. The Commission has not found 
indicators of progress on this or similar national-level 
legislation during the 2010 reporting year.

                       SEX-SELECTIVE ELIMINATION

    Violence and bias against women and girls continues in the 
form of sex-selective abortion,\55\ as well as infanticide, 
neglect, and abandonment of female babies and children, despite 
the government's legislative efforts to deter such 
practices.\56\ According to a UN Development Programme report 
released on International Women's Day 2010, Asia is currently 
``missing'' nearly 100 million women due to ``discriminatory 
treatment in health care, nutrition access or pure neglect--or 
because they were never born in the first place.'' \57\ China's 
``missing'' women constitute over 40 percent of that 
figure.\58\ In response to government-imposed birth limits and 
in keeping with a traditional cultural bias for sons, Chinese 
parents often engage in sex-selective abortion, especially 
rural couples whose first child is a girl.\59\ The government 
issued national regulations in 2003 banning prenatal gender 
determination and sex-selective abortion.\60\ According to 
experts cited in an April 2010 Xinhua report, however, ``more 
effective action'' may be needed to address China's skewed sex 
ratio.\61\ The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 
published a comprehensive study in January 2010 that placed the 
male-female sex ratio for the infant-to-four-year-old age group 
in China at 123.26 males for every 100 females.\62\ Some 
provinces have ratios exceeding 130.\63\ The 123.26 figure is 
far above the global norm of roughly 103 to 105 males for every 
100 females and represents growth of more than two boys per 100 
girls from the 2000 census ratio.\64\ CASS estimates that, by 
2020, the number of Chinese males of marriageable age will 
exceed the number of Chinese females of marriageable age by 30 
to 40 million.\65\ According to an April 2009 British Medical 
Journal study, China's sex ratio has steadily increased since 
ultrasound technology--through which pregnant parents can 
determine the sex of the fetus--became available in the 1980s. 
The study suggests that sex-selective abortion contributes 
largely to the country's significantly skewed sex ratio.\66\ A 
March 2010 SOS Children's Village report alleged that in 
addition to sex-selective abortion, ``China suffers high rates 
of female infanticide . . . as well as widespread abandonment 
and human trafficking of the girl-child.'' \67\ Some scholars 
have expressed concern that the continued devaluation of women 
and the resulting skewed sex ratio may lead to continued or 
increased forced prostitution, forced marriages, and human 
trafficking.\68\ [For more information regarding China's 
increasingly skewed sex ratio, see Section II--Population 
Planning.]

                           Human Trafficking


                              Introduction

    The Chinese government took steps to combat human 
trafficking during the Commission's 2010 reporting year, but 
longstanding challenges remain. Officials in the past year 
continued to focus on the abduction and sale of women and 
children.\1\ Other pervasive forms of trafficking--including 
labor trafficking and trafficking for commercial sexual 
exploitation--did not receive as much attention from 
authorities. The trafficking situation in China appears to be 
uniquely affected by the government's one-child policy, the 
resulting gender imbalance, the current economic crisis, and 
migrant mobility, among other factors. After years of stating 
its intent to do so,\2\ the Chinese government voted to accede 
to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol) in 
December 2009,\3\ but has not yet enacted legislation to 
implement it fully.\4\ The UN TIP Protocol contains the first 
global definition of trafficking and obligates state parties to 
criminalize conduct described in the protocol. China's Criminal 
Law defines the trafficking of persons as ``abducting, 
kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, sending, or 
transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of selling the 
victim.'' \5\ This definition is narrower than that provided in 
the UN TIP Protocol in that it does not automatically prohibit 
forms of trafficking such as forced adult and child labor, 
commercial sex trade of minors over 14 years old, or 
trafficking of men.\6\ From 2008 to 2010, a number of 
provincial governments, central government agencies, and 
Communist Party organizations issued regulations, plans, or 
opinions to implement the Chinese government's National Plan of 
Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-
2012).\7\ In addition, some local governments established 
liaison 
offices with governments of bordering countries to facilitate 
cooperation in combating cross-border human trafficking. 
Individuals and organizations not associated with the 
government have also been active in the effort to combat human 
trafficking, but some have reported government pressure in 
response to their actions.

                               Prevalence

    China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination 
for the trafficking of men, women, and children.\8\ The 
majority of trafficking cases are domestic; \9\ however, human 
traffickers continue to traffic Chinese women and children from 
China to other regions, such as Africa, other parts of Asia, 
Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and North America.\10\ 
Women and girls from countries including North Korea, Russia, 
Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma are also 
trafficked into China and forced into marriages, employment, 
and sexual exploitation.\11\ One May 2010 news article notes 
that women may currently make up approximately 80 percent of an 
estimated 50,000 to 100,000 North Korean refugees in China, and 
of these women, an estimated 90 percent become victims of 
trafficking.\12\ As the U.S. State Department 2010 Trafficking 
in Persons Report (2010 TIP Report) notes, however, a lack of 
reliable statistics makes it difficult to assess how many of 
the North Korean women in China have been trafficked.\13\ [For 
more information on North Korean refugees in China, see Section 
II--North Korean Refugees in China.] Forced labor, especially 
forced child labor, reportedly continues to be a pressing 
problem.\14\ [For more information on child labor, see Section 
II--Worker Rights.] According to the UN TIP Protocol, forced 
labor of any person under 18 years of age constitutes 
``trafficking in persons.'' \15\

                      Factors Driving Trafficking

    Experts link the reported growth \16\ of trafficking in 
China to several political, demographic, economic, and social 
factors. Against the backdrop of the Chinese government's one-
child policy, Chinese families' preference for sons, and the 
growing gender imbalance, increasing numbers of male children 
are trafficked for adoption,\17\ and women and girls are 
trafficked for forced marriages and commercial sexual 
exploitation.\18\ In addition, parents who cannot keep their 
``out-of-plan'' children--those children born in violation of 
population planning policies and requirements--are vulnerable 
to persuasion or coercion to relinquish or sell them.\19\ 
Domestic and international observers link the growing 
trafficking market to the economic crisis,\20\ the lack of 
awareness and education on trafficking prevention for 
vulnerable women and parents,\21\ poverty and instability in 
bordering countries such as North Korea and Burma,\22\ a 
thriving international adoption market,\23\ and the growing 
number of migrant workers whose children experts identify as an 
``at-risk'' population for abduction.\24\ Using the narrower 
definition of human trafficking under Chinese law, authorities 
reportedly convicted 2,413 defendants in trafficking cases and 
resolved more than 7,000 trafficking cases involving over 7,300 
women and 3,400 children in 2009.\25\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Representative Human Trafficking and Abduction Cases This Year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 According to the 2010 TIP Report, in November 2009, Macau
 officials convicted a Macanese man of trafficking two local women to
 Japan in 2008 and sentenced him to over seven years in prison. This
 reportedly was the Macau government's first trafficking conviction
 under its anti-trafficking law.\26\
 Also in November 2009, 12 children were injured and 1 was
 killed as a result of an explosion that occurred while they were making
 fireworks in a workshop in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region,
 according to a Southern Metropolitan Daily report. The children ranged
 in age from 7 to 15 years old.\27\ According to a Xinhua report on the
 same incident, the children were all ``left behind children,'' or
 children whose parents worked as migrant workers away from home.\28\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Representative Human Trafficking and Abduction Cases This Year--
                                Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 According to a January 2010 China Peace Net report, officials
 exposed a trafficking ring in Harbin city, Heilongjiang province, in
 which one suspect was a doctor and the chair of the obstetrics and
 gynecology department at a local hospital. According to the report, the
 doctor ``exploited the convenience of her position'' and worked with
 her daughter and son-in-law to arrange the purchase of a newborn for
 10,000 yuan (US$1,476) from parents at the hospital. Officials
 criminally detained the three suspects and, as of January 7, were still
 investigating the case.\29\
 On March 4, 2010, Hong Kong's Wanchai District Court convicted
 \30\ a Filipino club owner and an employee of human trafficking.\31\
 According to a report by the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, they had
 forced two Filipina women to work as entertainers and prostitutes in
 their club after a relative of the women initially lured them with the
 promise of waitressing positions in Macau.\32\
 Domestic news sources reported at least two cases this year of
 parents selling their children in order to reap material benefit. In
 one case, an unemployed couple sold their healthy six-day-old infant
 son for 2,500 yuan (US$368) and then reportedly used the money to
 purchase a cell phone, among other items.\33\ In another case, a couple
 reportedly fond of gambling sold their two children for 9,000 yuan
 (US$1,328) and 25,800 yuan (US$3,807).\34\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Anti-Trafficking Efforts

    The Chinese government and civil society continued with 
efforts to combat human trafficking during the Commission's 
2010 reporting year. In December 2009, the National People's 
Congress Standing Committee voted to accede to the UN Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children.\35\ The Ministry of Public 
Security conducted a nine-month campaign to combat the 
abduction and sale of women and children beginning in April 
2009, using a national DNA database for matching children with 
parents and a Web site for increased publicity regarding the 
children's plight.\36\ As of September 2010, at least 6 of the 
60 posted rescued children were successfully matched with their 
parents through these resources.\37\
    In April 2010, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme 
People's Procuratorate, the Ministry of Justice, and the 
Ministry of Public Security jointly issued the Opinion on 
Lawful Punishment for the Crime of Abducting and Selling Women 
and Children.\38\ According to the China Daily, ``[T]he 
guideline will speed up the investigation and filing of cases 
involving girls between 14 and 18 [years of age],'' a 
demographic that has historically fallen through the cracks in 
authorities' anti-trafficking efforts under current Chinese 
legislation.\39\
    From 2008 to 2010, a number of provincial governments, 
central government agencies, and Communist Party organizations 
issued regulations, plans, or opinions to implement the Chinese 
government's National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking 
in Women and Children (2008-2012) (National Plan of 
Action).\40\ In addition, some local governments in Yunnan 
province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region set up 
liaison offices with the governments of bordering countries 
including Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia to facilitate cooperation 
in the effort to combat human 
trafficking across borders.\41\
    Local authorities, in cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and international organizations, took 
steps to improve trafficking victim protection services and 
care, but continued to focus such efforts only on women and 
children identified as victims through the government's limited 
definition of trafficking.\42\ According to the U.S. State 
Department 2010 Trafficking in Persons Report (2010 TIP 
Report), China has an estimated 1,400 shelters nationwide, with 
5 specifically devoted to assisting ``trafficking victims.'' 
Shelters nationwide aided 12,000 trafficking victims in 
2009.\43\ Individuals and organizations not associated with the 

government have also been active in the effort to combat human 
trafficking. While some NGOs have successfully cooperated with 
officials to raise public awareness and provide training and 
victim assistance,\44\ several media reports indicate that 
individuals, especially parents of trafficked children seeking 
to informally organize and raise awareness about trafficking 
cases, face government pressure including silencing of protests 
and petitions,\45\ official threats, home confinement,\46\ and 
police surveillance.\47\

                      Anti-Trafficking Challenges

    Several hurdles remain in the Chinese government's fight 
against human trafficking. Although the Chinese government 
voted to accede to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children 
(UN TIP Protocol) in December 2009,\48\ it has not revised 
current domestic legislation or the National Plan of Action to 
bring them into compliance with the UN TIP Protocol. Article 
240 of China's Criminal Law defines the trafficking of persons 
as ``abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetching, 
sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of 
selling the victim.'' \49\ This definition does not 
automatically prohibit forms of trafficking such as forced 
adult and child labor, commercial sex trade of minors over 14 
years old, or trafficking of men, which are covered under 
Article 3 of the UN TIP Protocol.\50\ The Chinese government's 
narrower definition of human trafficking has negative 
implications for anti-trafficking work in China, including 
imposing limits on the Chinese government's prosecution 
efforts, protection of victims, funding of programs, and victim 
services.\51\ Officials continue to conflate human trafficking 
with human smuggling and therefore treat some victims of 
trafficking as criminals.\52\ This is because, as noted in the 
2010 TIP Report, officials consider that a victim's crossing of 
the border without documentation constitutes involvement in 
``human smuggling,'' which, unlike human trafficking, gives 
less consideration to the role exploitation may have played in 
the border crossing. As the 2010 TIP Report noted, officials 
continue to fine or criminally penalize some victims of 
trafficking for crossing borders illegally.\53\ In addition, 
the Chinese government continues to deport all undocumented 
North Koreans as illegal ``economic migrants,'' without 
providing legal alternatives to repatriation for identified 
victims of trafficking.\54\ The U.S. State Department placed 
China on its Tier 2 Watch List for the sixth consecutive year 
in 2010,\55\ saying that, among other areas needing 
improvement, the Chinese government ``did not make significant 
efforts to investigate and prosecute labor trafficking offenses 
and convict offenders of labor trafficking'' and ``did not 
sufficiently address corruption in trafficking by government 
officials.'' \56\

                     North Korean Refugees in China


                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 
government persisted in repatriating North Korean refugees to 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), especially in 
the months before October 1, 2009, the 60th anniversary of the 
founding of the People's Republic of China.\1\ Beginning in 
July 2009, the Chinese government reportedly increased the 
presence of public security officials in northeastern China and 
repatriated more North Koreans than it had in the earlier part 
of 2009.\2\ The Chinese government's repatriation of North 
Korean refugees, or those who leave the DPRK for fear of 
persecution, contravenes its obligations under the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) 
and its 1967 Protocol (Protocol).\3\ The Chinese government 
maintains that North Korean refugees in China are illegal 
economic migrants and not refugees.\4\ The North Korean 
government's imprisonment and torture of repatriated North 
Koreans, however, renders those North Koreans in China who did 
not leave the DPRK for fear of persecution ``refugees sur 
place'' under international law, or those who fear persecution 
upon return.\5\ Under the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, the 
Chinese government is also obligated to refrain from 
repatriating refugees sur place.\6\

                         Unlawful Repatriation

    In 2009, the Chinese government continued to repatriate 
North Korean refugees to the DPRK and stepped up its 
repatriation of North Korean refugees before October 1, 
2009.\7\ In October 2009, one overseas news organization 
reported that Chinese authorities were conducting weekly visits 
to every house along the Chinese-North Korean border to locate 
North Koreans in hiding.\8\ In July 2009, Chinese authorities 
detained a North Korean woman who had lived in China for over 
10 years while her 10-year-old son looked on, according to 
Radio Free Asia.\9\ In September 2009, Chinese authorities 
detained five North Korean defectors attempting to travel to 
Vietnam to seek asylum.\10\ Their current status remains 
unknown. In late 2009, 20 women from the same county in the 
DPRK were repatriated and subsequently imprisoned.\11\ In 
January 2010, Chinese authorities repatriated one North Korean 
woman two days after she entered China. Upon return to the 
DPRK, North Korean authorities punished her together with more 
than 40 repatriated refugees from the same town.\12\ In March 
2010, one overseas media source reported that 50 North Korean 
defectors had taken refuge in South Korean diplomatic missions 
in China, which they were unwilling to leave for fear of being 
detained and repatriated to the DPRK by Chinese authorities. 
About 30 of the refugees had been confined to the diplomatic 
missions for more than one year, as the Chinese government had 
intentionally delayed negotiations with South Korea for their 
departure.\13\ The Chinese government continues to deny the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to North Koreans 
seeking asylum.\14\
    Chinese authorities offer bounties to Chinese citizens who 
turn in North Koreans \15\ and fine,\16\ detain,\17\ or 
imprison those who provide the refugees with humanitarian 
assistance. In August 2009, the Erlianhaote City People's Court 
in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region sentenced Zhang Yonghu 
and Li Mingshun to 7 and 10 years' imprisonment, respectively, 
for crimes of ``human smuggling.'' Zhang and Li were assisting 
61 North Korean refugees to cross the Chinese border into 
Mongolia to seek asylum.\18\ While the Chinese government 
prosecutes those who assist North Korean refugees in seeking 
asylum, traffickers traffic an estimated 90 percent of the 
North Korean women in China.\19\ [See Trafficking and Denial of 
Education in this section.]

                       Punishment in North Korea

    North Koreans repatriated by the Chinese government face 
the threat of imprisonment, torture, and capital punishment in 
the DPRK.\20\ Under the DPRK's Penal Code, border crossers can 
receive sentences of up to two years' imprisonment in a labor 
training center.\21\ North Korean authorities assign harsher 
punishment, including long sentences and public execution, to 
repatriated North Koreans deemed to have committed 
``political'' crimes, which include attempted defection, 
conversion to Christianity, and having had extensive contact 
with religious groups, South Koreans, or Americans.\22\ Many 
repatriated North Koreans are vulnerable to severe punishment 
on one of these ``political'' grounds. A significant number of 
the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian 
workers assisting North Koreans in China and helping them seek 
asylum are Christians, South Koreans, or Americans.\23\ In 
March 2008, the Peterson Institute for International Economics 
(PIIE) published a large-scale survey of North Koreans in China 
in which 99 percent of those interviewed stated that they did 
not want to return to the DPRK, but wanted to permanently 
resettle in another country.\24\ Also in March 2008, the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom reported that 
after Chinese authorities repatriated a group of North Koreans 
to the DPRK, North Korean authorities executed all 60 of them 
for trying to defect to South Korea.\25\ According to the PIIE 
survey, 67 percent of North Koreans in China suffering from 
severe psychological distress named ``arrest'' as the primary 
cause of their anxiety.\26\ Conditions in North Korean 
detention facilities are harsh, and torture, beatings, and 
inhumane treatment are common.\27\ NGOs and the UNHCR report 
that North Korean security officials have assaulted repatriated 
women carrying babies of mixed Chinese-Korean ancestry to force 
them to have abortions.\28\

             Trafficking and Denial of Access to Education

    The Chinese government's policy of repatriating North 
Korean refugees and denying them legal status increases their 
vulnerability to trafficking, mistreatment, and exploitation in 
China. North Korean women, in particular, often fall victim to 
inhumane treatment and indentured servitude.\29\ One February 
2009 National Geographic report estimates 75 percent of North 
Koreans in China are women.\30\ According to an NGO, 
approximately 90 percent of these North Korean women are 
trafficked into China.\31\ Traffickers, many of whom operate in 
organized networks, use false promises to lure North Korean 
women into China and abduct those entering China on their 
own.\32\ In many cases, traffickers reportedly sell the women 
into forced ``marriages'' with Chinese nationals for amounts 
ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 yuan (US$294 to US$2,934).\33\ 
There is a high demand for ``brides'' in northeastern China 
where men outnumber women in some areas by as much as 14 to 
1,\34\ and where poor, disabled, or elderly men have difficulty 
finding wives.\35\ In other cases, North Korean women are 
trafficked into the sex industry, where they are forced to work 
as prostitutes in brothels or in Internet sex operations.\36\ 
Some women reportedly have been sold and resold up to seven or 
eight times,\37\ and trafficked North Korean women have 
testified to being beaten, sexually abused, and locked up to 
prevent escape.\38\ The Chinese government's repatriation of 
trafficked North Korean women contravenes the 1951 Convention 
and its Protocol, and the Chinese government is obligated under 
Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (TIP 
Protocol) to ``consider adopting legislative or other 
appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking to 
remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently . . . 
giving appropriate consideration to humanitarian and 
compassionate factors.'' \39\ The Chinese government's failure 
to prevent trafficking of North Korean women and protect them 
from revictimization also contravenes its obligations under 
Article 9 of the TIP Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women.\40\ Although the central government has taken some minor 
steps to combat trafficking and protect trafficking victims 
along its borders with Vietnam and Burma \41\ [see Section II--
Human Trafficking], traffickers continue to traffic an 
estimated 90 percent of the North Korean women living in 
China,\42\ and the Chinese government refuses to provide these 
victims with legal alternatives to repatriation.\43\
    Another problem that stems from China's unlawful 
repatriation policy is the denial of education and other public 
benefits for the children of North Korean women married to 
Chinese citizens. There are anywhere from several thousand to 
several tens of thousands of these stateless children in 
China,\44\ and their numbers continue to rise.\45\ China's 
Nationality Law guarantees citizenship and, by extension, 
household registration (hukou) to all children born in China to 
at least one parent of Chinese nationality.\46\ China's 
Compulsory Education Law, moreover, provides that all children 
age six years and older shall receive nine years of free and 
compulsory education, regardless of race or nationality.\47\ 
Some local governments refuse to register Chinese-North Korean 
children without seeing documentation that the mother is a 
citizen, has been repatriated, or has run away.\48\ Local 
authorities contravene Chinese law and the Chinese government's 
commitments under international law when they refuse these 
children the hukou they need to attend school and obtain 
healthcare.\49\ Denial of hukou forces these children to live 
in a stateless limbo. Moreover, when their North Korean mothers 
are repatriated, a significant number of these children also 
become orphaned, as the fathers are unwilling or unable to take 
care of them.\50\

                    Reemergence of Famine Conditions

    The Chinese government's repatriation of North Korean 
refugees continued as famine conditions in the DPRK have 
worsened since late 2009. In April and June 2010, international 
NGO and overseas media reports compared food shortages in the 
DPRK to the food crisis of the 1990s,\51\ which killed an 
estimated 1 million North Koreans.\52\ Existing food shortages 
in late 2009 were exacerbated by a failed DPRK government 
devaluation of the North Korean currency in November 2009.\53\ 
In June 2010, the New York Times interviewed eight North 
Koreans who had left the DPRK not long before and reported that 
half of them planned on defecting to South Korea.\54\ While 
many North Koreans may enter China in pursuit of food and basic 
necessities for survival,\55\ the Chinese government 
contravenes its commitments under international law when it 
makes the blanket assertion that North Korean refugees in China 
are illegal economic migrants and not refugees.\56\ The North 
Korean government's imprisonment and torture of repatriated 
North Koreans renders those North Koreans in China who did not 
leave the DPRK for fear of persecution ``refugees sur place'' 
under international law, or those who fear persecution upon 
return.\57\ Thus, whether North Koreans in China left the DPRK 
for fear of persecution or fear persecution upon return to the 
DPRK, the 1951 Convention and its Protocol obligate the Chinese 
government to refrain from repatriating them.\58\ In 2009 and 
2010, however, the Chinese government continued to repatriate 
North Korean refugees and reportedly stepped up its efforts to 
do so before the 60th anniversary of the founding of the 
People's Republic of China.\59\

                             Public Health


                              Introduction

    China has committed to ensuring all its citizens the right 
to ``the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health'' \1\ and has taken steps toward this goal. The rising 
cost of healthcare and limited access to quality services, 
however, remain top concerns for many living in both urban and 
rural areas of China.\2\ Authorities at the central \3\ and 
local \4\ levels took steps to launch initiatives in 2009 to 
address healthcare challenges, but distribution of medical 
services continued to vary widely by location.\5\ During the 
Commission's 2010 reporting year, the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange issued new regulations on foreign funding that 
have led to increased restrictions on the activities of public 
health non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Authorities also 
have heightened targeted harassment of certain public health 
NGOs and individual 
advocates in the past year. Official corruption and lack of 
transparency continued to hinder the prevention of infectious 
disease outbreaks, posing the potential risk of further spread 
of infectious disease domestically as well as globally. A 
government circular issued in December 2009 improved the 
outlook for Hepatitis B virus carriers to enjoy equal treatment 
in employment and education, but specific cases this year 
continued to highlight a need for consistent enforcement of 
existing laws and regulations prohibiting health-based 
discrimination.

                           Healthcare Reform

    The Chinese government considers unrestricted access to 
basic healthcare a universal right,\6\ and in the 2010 
reporting year, officials echoed calls for its realization \7\ 
and took steps to implement related policies. In an effort to 
close the wide gap in access to basic healthcare as well as 
deal with issues of corruption within the healthcare system, 
the State Council passed a large-scale medical reform plan in 
January 2009 and a corresponding three-year implementation plan 
in April 2009.\8\ Central and local authorities have begun to 
implement some goals outlined in the plan, such as initiating a 
pilot public hospital reform project in 16 cities,\9\ 
establishing a basic medicine system with a national official 
list of 
approved pharmaceuticals,\10\ initiating a plan to train 60,000 
general practitioners in the next three years and 300,000 by 
2020,\11\ and increasing aid for children suffering from 
serious illnesses.\12\
    Despite these initial steps toward healthcare reform, 
health inequities persist between urban and rural regions in 
China. According to an April 2010 study on urban/rural 
differences in China's public health sector, ``[p]eople living 
in urban areas have an advantage in life and health compared 
with those in rural areas, and there is no exception to this 
pattern in all the 31 provincial-level administrative units.'' 
\13\ While the majority of urban residents tend to enjoy 
greater healthcare benefits, including more widespread medical 
insurance coverage \14\ and higher quality of facilities and 
care,\15\ the growing population of migrant workers and their 
families who live in urban areas but do not possess an urban 
hukou (household registration) still faces difficulties in 
accessing basic health services.\16\ In addition, some children 
may not have a hukou in China because they are born ``out of 
plan,'' that is, not in compliance with birth limits imposed by 
population planning policies, and their parents do not pay the 
required fines.\17\ [For additional discussion of China's 
population planning policies, see Section II--Population 
Planning.] Lack of a valid hukou raises barriers to access to 
social benefits typically linked to the hukou, including 
subsidized healthcare and public education.\18\ [For additional 
discussion of China's hukou system see, Section II--Freedom of 
Residence and Movement.]
    Rural areas continue to lack the necessary resources to 
provide adequate healthcare to local residents.\19\ As noted in 
the Commission's 2009 Annual Report, access to healthcare in 
these areas 
remains dependent on local authorities' interpretation, 
implementation, and management of healthcare initiatives.\20\ 
The Rural Cooperative Medical System--a cooperative medical 
care program in which farmers are reimbursed for their medical 
expenses from a fund to which farmers and local and central 
government entities contribute \21\--reportedly expanded in 
certain areas.\22\ Nevertheless, reports in previous years have 
pointed to problems with this system, including forced 
participation in some areas,\23\ as well as a significant 
fiscal burden on local governments \24\ and an insufficient 
number of administrative personnel.\25\

                           Infectious Disease

    The Chinese government has committed to taking steps to 
prevent, treat, and control infectious diseases,\26\ but 
curtailing the spread of infectious disease remained a 
challenge this year.\27\ Infectious diseases highlighted in 
domestic and international news reports this reporting year 
included hand-foot-mouth disease,\28\ syphilis,\29\ viral 
hepatitis,\30\ HIV/AIDS,\31\ and tuberculosis.\32\ Resources in 
many rural areas are insufficient to prevent and control the 
spread of infectious disease effectively,\33\ and problems with 
government transparency continue to hinder the effectiveness of 
existing measures.\34\ For example, in March 2010, China Daily 
reported that tainted vaccines in Shanxi province led to the 
deaths of four children and sickened dozens more between 2006 
and 2008.\35\ According to the report, whistleblower Chen 
Tao'an, who had worked for the provincial center for disease 
control and prevention, attributed the deaths and sickening of 
children to ``abuse of power and corruption by local health 
authorities.'' \36\ A May 2010 Human Rights Watch article 
reported that local health officials did not investigate the 
case but rather denied the story as ``basically untrue.'' \37\ 
Chen Tao'an was also demoted, according to the report.\38\ 
According to an October 2009 study in the Lancet, an 
international medical journal, China's domestic vulnerability 
to the spread of infectious disease has a significant impact on 
global public health.\39\

                             Mental Health

    In 2001, China ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights \40\ and in doing so 
committed itself to ensuring ``the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.'' \41\ Mental illness continues to increase in 
prevalence, however, and the rate of treatment remains low, 
incubating what one report calls ``a quiet crisis in China.'' 
\42\ The World Health Organization now considers mental illness 
the greatest burden on the country's healthcare system, over 
heart disease and cancer, according to an April 2010 Telegraph 
report.\43\ According to a July 2010 study in the Lancet, 
``mental ill-health'' affects more than 100 million people in 
China, of which ``serious [mental] illnesses'' affect 16 
million.\44\ Several news articles attribute China's increase 
in cases of mental illness to recent social changes and 
resulting social problems.\45\ Against the backdrop of a low 
number of qualified psychiatrists, few hospitals equipped with 
mental health facilities, and widespread stigma regarding 
mental disorders, most individuals have never been treated for 
their mental disorders, according to the Lancet study.\46\
    Following a series of violent attacks on adults and 
children in spring 2010 by individuals who allegedly suffered 
from mental illness, which reportedly raised public concerns 
about those who fall through the cracks of the system and their 
potential harm to society, Chinese officials at the central and 
local levels took steps to address the country's deficient 
mental healthcare system.\47\ News media sources inside and 
outside China reported widely on a sudden wave of violent 
attacks--mostly targeting school children--that took place from 
March to May 2010.\48\ The perpetrators in at least three of 
the attacks reportedly suffered from mental illness.\49\ In May 
2010, the China Daily reported official plans in Hubei province 
to initiate a mental health screening program that would 
include free treatment for those perceived as a potential 
threat to ``public safety.'' \50\ According to the same report, 
authorities in Fujian province ordered a similar screening of 
``serious patients with an inclination to violence.'' \51\ It 
is unclear what standards are used to evaluate patients or what 
safeguards exist to prevent misuse. In June, Vice Minister of 
Health Yin Li announced that the country would ``increase the 
rate of treatment for those with serious mental illness and 
reduce [the occurrence of] disturbances and trouble that bring 
harm on society,'' and in the next two years renovate and 
expand 550 mental health facilities.\52\ As noted in a July 
Lancet report, however, ``such hospitals have been used as a 
means to silence individuals exercising their freedom of 
expression. Protestors and dissenters have been put in 
institutions against their will by local authorities, diagnosed 
with mental disorders they do not have, and given drugs and 
electroshock treatments they do not need.'' \53\
    Official news media reported in 2009 that authorities had 
circulated a draft of China's first national mental health law 
for expert review.\54\ According to one Shenzhen lawyer quoted 
in the 
report, ``The draft has made some progress after 25 years of 
construction and amendments but it may still be difficult to 
get public support as several loopholes have been left 
unfilled.'' \55\ While the report indicated that authorities 
would put the law into effect as early as the end of 2009,\56\ 
the Commission has not observed reports of further developments 
on the legislation during this reporting year.

                         Public Health Advocacy

    Despite official recognition this year of the valuable role 
non-governmental actors have played in raising awareness about 
health concerns, combating stigma, and promoting prevention of 
diseases,\57\ some involved in public health advocacy continued 
to face government harassment and opposition in the past 
year.\58\ The Chinese government continued to exert control 
over advocates' right to freedom of association through strict 
registration requirements that limit some organizations' 
ability to legally function independently of the 
government.\59\ In addition, in December 2009, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange issued a circular that 
tightens restrictions on organizations that receive foreign 
funding.\60\ Some in China's non-governmental organization 
(NGO) community have expressed concern that the new circular 
may be used to specifically target NGOs.\61\ [See Section III--
Civil Society for more information on the December 2009 
circular.] Additional examples of government pressure on public 
health advocates in the past year include:

         According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
        (CHRD), officials from Xincai county, Henan province, 
        detained HIV/AIDS advocate Tian Xi on August 6, 2010, 
        after he had broken office supplies the previous day 
        when the director of Xincai County No. 1 People's 
        Hospital refused to hear his request for resolution of 
        his case.\62\ Officials initially placed Tian under 
        administrative detention, but on August 17, they took 
        him to the Xincai County No. 2 People's Hospital for 
        medical treatment.\63\ On August 21, officials notified 
        Tian's family of his transfer into criminal detention 
        at the Shangcai County Public Security Bureau (PSB) 
        Detention Center, and on August 23 he was formally 
        arrested for ``intentional destruction of property.'' 
        \64\ According to Tian's father, in 1996, Tian was 
        infected with HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C through 
        a blood transfusion he received at Xincai County No. 1 
        People's Hospital after sustaining a mild concussion. 
        Since learning of his illnesses in 2004, Tian has 
        persistently petitioned for resolution of his case as 
        well as those of others similarly infected.\65\ Beijing 
        officials detained Tian in December 2009 and July 2010 
        reportedly in connection with his petitioning 
        activities. He is currently held at the Shangcai County 
        PSB Detention Center and, without access to his regular 
        medications, he is reportedly in poor health.\66\
         HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia continues to serve a 
        three-and-a-half year prison sentence for allegedly 
        ``inciting subversion of state power.'' He is expected 
        to be released in June 2011.\67\ In April 2010, 
        authorities denied family members' requests for his 
        medical parole, despite recent indications that Hu's 
        health has deteriorated.\68\
         Due to ``increasing government harassment,'' 
        Wan Yanhai, a prominent AIDS activist and founder of 
        the NGO Beijing Aizhixing Institute, left China for the 
        United States with his family in early May 2010.\69\ 
        Recent restrictions on foreign 
        donations as well as recent run-ins with officials--
        including 
        police interruption of a Guangzhou event at which he 
        was speaking in March and harassment by the municipal 
        fire department in April--reportedly factored into his 
        decision to leave China.\70\ Beijing tax bureau 
        officials also launched an investigation into 
        Aizhixing's tax records in March 2010 \71\ in a move 
        that was reminiscent of developments that led to the 
        shutdown of the Open Constitution Initiative in July 
        2009.\72\ [For more details regarding official pressure 
        on Aizhixing and other NGOs, see Section III--Civil 
        Society--Legal Framework and Government Controls.]
         According to a CHRD report, on June 13, the 
        hotel scheduled to host a legal training organized by 
        the Beijing Yirenping Center (Yirenping)--an NGO that 
        works to raise awareness about public health risks and 
        eliminate discrimination against those carrying certain 
        diseases--notified the center's director, Lu Jun, that 
        it had cancelled the reservation due to official 
        pressure.\73\ On the same day, the antivirus software 
        on Lu's personal computer revealed attempts by a remote 
        computer to make changes to his computer and copy 
        documents from his hard drive.\74\ The attacks followed 
        six previous hotel cancellations of Yirenping's planned 
        legal training workshops, one of which was reportedly 
        due to looting and vandalizing of the host hotel.\75\

                      Health-Based Discrimination

    Despite provisions in China's domestic laws and regulations 
and commitments under international conventions that explicitly 
forbid discriminatory practices in employment and education 
against 
persons with disability or infectious disease,\76\ regulation 
and punishment of such discrimination reportedly continue to be 
a challenge.\77\ The Chinese government took steps this year to 
combat discrimination against Hepatitis B carriers,\78\ but at 
least two reports involving discrimination against Hepatitis B 
carriers this year highlight the need for continued progress. 
According to a March 2010 report by the Hong Kong-based labor 
rights organization China Labour Bulletin, a university 
graduate with Hepatitis B won a lawsuit in October 2009 against 
Xiasha Hospital in Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, for 
violating his right to privacy when it revealed his test 
results to a potential employer. Despite the success of this 
suit, many hospitals continue with such practices, according to 
the report.\79\ [For additional information on employment 
discrimination, see Section II--Worker Rights.] According to a 
report by the Beijing Yirenping Center, some kindergartens in 
Haikou city, Hainan province, reportedly continued to refuse 
enrollment to children with Hepatitis B in March 2010.\80\ July 
2009 draft regulations on the management of health practices in 
nurseries and kindergartens contain provisions that prohibit 
such action.\81\ On August 30, 2010, the Yingjiang District 
People's Court in Anqing city, Anhui province, accepted what 
may be China's first case of employment discrimination based on 
HIV status.\82\ University graduate Xiao Wu (alias) brought a 
lawsuit against the Anqing Department of Education (DOE) for 
refusing to hire him as an 
instructor after he passed the written tests and interviews for 
the position but then tested positive for HIV in a subsequent 
medical examination.\83\ According to China Labour Bulletin, 
Xiao is not seeking monetary compensation beyond legal expenses 
but rather acknowledgment from the court that the DOE's refusal 
to hire him constituted an ``illegal act'' and must be 
corrected with ``concrete action.'' \84\ Although HIV cannot be 
spread through daily contact, one DOE employee told the China 
Daily, ``Our decision not to hire [Xiao] is to protect the 
students.'' \85\ According to the report, Xiao Wu also 
expressed concern that the publicity of the case may negatively 
impact his future.\86\

                   Climate Change and the Environment


                              Introduction

    The Chinese government continued to strengthen regulatory 
structures and institutions to address climate change and 
environmental pollution and degradation. However, major 
implementation, enforcement, and compliance difficulties 
remain. Despite challenges, data reliability, access to 
information, and transparency in the climate change and 
environmental protection sectors have improved in some areas. 
Chinese leaders have emphasized their intent to rely on 
domestic monitoring, reporting, and verification of China's 
greenhouse gas emissions and reductions data, but at the same 
time, they have signaled some willingness to discuss 
transparency issues with international actors, and are working 
to improve data reliability. The Ministry of Environmental 
Protection and some local environmental protection bureaus have 
expanded ``open government affairs'' efforts, which, in the 
Chinese context, often refer to open government information 
systems and E-government, among other initiatives, but 
implementation has been uneven. Chinese officials remained 
willing to engage in cooperative programs with international 
actors related to climate change and environmental protection. 
Some policies and projects intended to address climate change, 
especially in relation to hydroelectric dam construction and 
other energy projects, could be linked to infringements upon 
citizens' rights. Citizen environmental complaints continued to 
increase in number as citizens increasingly voiced concerns 
about potentially polluting projects. However, channels 
available to citizens to express environmental concerns and 
grievances were not always open, contributing to the rise of 
antipollution demonstrations. Chinese authorities continued to 
stifle selectively environmental activism and suppress citizens 
who were involved in or organized collective action to halt 
perceived environmental harms.

                             Climate Change


     CHINA'S COMMITMENTS, GOVERNMENTAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS

    Chinese leaders signed the United Nations Copenhagen Accord 
\1\ in 2010, and took additional steps to address climate 
change. The Chinese government agreed to voluntarily ``endeavor 
to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 
45 percent by 2020 compared to the 2005 level,'' among other 
actions.\2\ In a communication to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change Secretariat, Chinese authorities 
emphasized that China's ``autonomous domestic mitigation 
actions are voluntary in nature.'' \3\ In November 2009, Xie 
Zhenhua, the Vice Chairman of the National Development and 
Reform Commission, explained to the press that China will 
incorporate related targets in its next domestic five-year plan 
that will go into effect in 2011.\4\ The Chinese government has 
not agreed to carbon emission caps, only to carbon intensity 
reductions. According to Chinese officials, China's carbon 
emissions are likely to continue to rise for decades, peaking 
between 2030 and 2040 according to some officials, and prior to 
2050 according to others.\5\
    The Chinese government included climate change-related 
language in China's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan 
(HRAP) and initiated related institutional and regulatory 
changes; in addition, non-governmental actors are taking steps 
to address climate change. The HRAP contains several specific 
goals \6\ connected to energy and climate change that reiterate 
goals outlined in preexisting national climate change, energy, 
and environmental plans.\7\ Energy reportedly accounts for 85 
percent of China's carbon emissions.\8\ Several Chinese energy-
related institutional and regulatory developments have the 
potential to impact China's capacity to meet its voluntary 
carbon intensity targets, if adequately managed or implemented, 
including passage of new amendments to China's revised 
Renewable Energy Law in December 2009,\9\ the establishment of 
the National Energy Commission in January 2010,\10\ and the 
ongoing development of climate change programs in provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions.\11\ Citizen groups and 
networks have been active during this reporting year,\12\ 
publishing reports,\13\ issuing a public statement urging more 
proactive steps to address climate change,\14\ and engaging in 
activities to educate the public about a low carbon 
economy.\15\

                   DATA RELIABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

    While challenges remain, the Chinese government has taken 
steps to improve the reliability of its energy data. However, 
China has had less experience collecting and reporting 
greenhouse gas emission data than it has had with energy 
data.\16\ The State Council, the National Bureau of Statistics, 
and the National Development and Reform Commission are 
reportedly responsible for collecting and verifying China's 
energy data.\17\ The National People's Congress Standing 
Committee passed a revision to China's Law on Statistics in 
June 2009, which came into effect on January 1, 2010, that 
imposes penalties on officials who ``intervene in government 
statistical work and manipulate or fabricate data.'' \18\ In 
previous years, China reportedly has acknowledged problems with 
energy figures \19\ and the Chinese government states it has 
taken regulatory and institutional steps to improve the 
reliability of its energy data.\20\ Current opinions regarding 
the reliability of China's energy data are mixed.\21\
    Chinese leaders have emphasized their intent to rely on 
domestic monitoring, reporting, and verification of China's 
greenhouse gas emissions and reductions data.\22\ At the same 
time, they have signaled some willingness to discuss 
transparency issues with international actors.\23\ Chinese 
leaders signed the Copenhagen Accord and accepted an undefined 
role for the international community in ``consultations'' 
regarding information on the implementation of China's emission 
reductions.\24\ Premier Wen Jiabao further signaled the Chinese 
government's intent to improve transparency of China's climate 
change-related data in his speech at the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Summit.\25\ China already is engaged in cooperative 
programs with international actors regarding energy and carbon 
emission reduction data, including projects with the 
International Energy Agency \26\ and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency.\27\ During U.S. President Barack Obama's 
trip to China in November 2009, both sides agreed to ``provide 
for full transparency with respect to the implementation of 
mitigation measures and provision of financial, technology and 
capacity building support.'' \28\

          CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES: CONSEQUENCES AND CHALLENGES

    To mitigate China's carbon dioxide emissions, Chinese 
authorities intend to increase China's reliance on renewable 
energy sources, especially hydroelectric power.\29\ 
Hydroelectric dam construction requires the relocation of 
citizens from construction zones,\30\ which, without adequate 
procedural protections, could place the rights of relocated 
citizens at risk. There have been 
numerous reports of infringements on the rights of populations 
affected by the Three Gorges Dam hydroelectric project. These 
reports have uncovered forced evictions, below-standard 
compensation, suppression of advocates, and government 
corruption during resettlement processes, as well as the 
documented threat of severe hardships that may be faced by 
relocated citizens, including homelessness, unemployment, 
conflicts between resettled citizens and existing populations, 
and poverty among resettled migrants.\31\ Authorities 
reportedly intend to address problems relating to early 
resettlement by implementing a ``post-Three Gorges plan'' 
starting in 2010.\32\ China Daily reported in January 2010 that 
China has ``basically'' completed the first phase of the Three 
Gorges Dam resettlement, which involved, in part, relocating 
1.3 million people and 1,500 enterprises from Chongqing 
municipality and Hubei province.\33\
    The Three Gorges hydroelectric dam project is not the only 
one plagued by problems with citizen resettlement schemes. Over 
the years, the construction of the Pubugou Hydropower Station 
along the Dadu River, partially in Hanyuan county, Sichuan 
province, reportedly has been delayed repeatedly because of 
disputes over resettlement issues.\34\ During this reporting 
year, a dozen families in Hanyuan county reportedly resisted 
officials' efforts to compel them to move to make way for 
additional construction on the dam.\35\ Hanyuan county 
officials reportedly arrested six people in June who repeatedly 
petitioned against alleged unfair resettlement terms.\36\ Lei 
Keqiao and five other women reportedly travelled to the 
township government to petition in May and police arrested 
them, accusing them of trying to injure a township 
official.\37\ In another hydroelectric dam case, one 2010 
research paper published by the Social Science Research 
Network, based on survey data, asserts that some resettlement 
practices in three villages affected by the construction of the 
Liuku Dam in the Nu River (Salween River) watershed may not be 
in accordance with national laws, including the cost and size 
of replacement housing, lack of access to agricultural land, 
lack of long-term economic support programs, and paucity of 
citizen input into decisionmaking processes.\38\
    In August 2010, public security officials from Linwei 
district, Weinan city, Shaanxi province, and Beijing reportedly 
detained, but did not formally arrest, Xie Chaoping, an author 
and a journalist with a magazine under the Procuratorate Daily, 
in Beijing on suspicion of ``illegal business activities.'' 
\39\ Xie's lawyer reportedly has said the charge is linked to 
publication of Xie's documentary book ``The Great Migration,'' 
which documents the historical impact of relocation programs 
related to the Sanmenxia hydroelectric dam.\40\ The migrants 
residing in Weinan reportedly are the primary subjects of the 
book.\41\ Spark Magazine published the book as a 
supplement.\42\ Xie reportedly used his own money to print the 
supplement, and agreed not to include advertisements or to sell 
it.\43\ Xie reportedly alleges that Weinan authorities detained 
him because his writings provide details about corruption, land 
disputes, and hardship suffered by migrants associated with the 
Sanmenxia relocation programs.\44\ Xie's lawyer and Chinese 
news stories raised questions about the charge against Xie, and 
noted procedural irregularities in the handling of his 
case.\45\ On September 17, the Linwei District People's 
Procuratorate announced it had rejected the public security 
bureau's request to arrest Xie on the grounds that there was 
insufficient evidence.\46\ Linwei public security officials 
released Xie on bail after holding him 29 days; however, they 
did not withdraw the case and will continue to investigate.\47\ 
In addition, in mid-September, Linwei public security officers 
detained Zhao Shun, the manager of the print shop that printed 
``The Great Migration,'' although they reportedly have not 
provided the reason for the detention.\48\
    During this reporting year, China's population planning 
officials sought to justify China's one-child policy by linking 
it to climate change,\49\ saying the policy was ``among the 
most cost-effective tools to reduce carbon emissions.'' \50\ 
However, as the findings of this 
report show, China's population planning policies in both their 

nature and implementation violate international human rights 
standards.\51\ [For more information, see Section II--
Population Planning.]

                        Environmental Governance


               CHINA'S POLLUTION PROBLEMS UNDERESTIMATED

    Pollution remains a serious problem in China, and a report 
released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in 
February 2010 on the first national pollution source survey 
\52\ revealed that the levels of some pollutants are higher 
than previously reported. This is largely because authorities 
incorporated data from additional pollution sources in the 
survey,\53\ including agricultural sources, leachate from waste 
management facilities, and household waste from all ``cities 
and towns'' (except city-level county seats).\54\ The newspaper 
Caixin reported a high-level environmental protection official, 
Wang Yuqing, as saying that the MEP would compile and release 
most of the survey data by the end of 2010,\55\ but as of 
August 17, only an executive summary of the survey report was 
available.\56\ Beyond the pollution source survey, other 
research by Western and Chinese scholars is beginning to reveal 
the depth of China's ``cancer village'' problem.\57\ ``Cancer 
villages'' are, according to one study by U.S.-based scholar 
Lee Liu, farming villages that have a cancer cluster, i.e., an 
area ``where cancer is more prevalent as a result of cancer-
causing pollutants.'' \58\ During his research, Lee found 241 
``officially'' reported and about as many ``unofficially'' 
reported ``cancer villages'' in China.\59\

       ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES, OFFICIAL CORRUPTION

    China's 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan (HRAP) 
includes themes of sustainable development and ``environmental 
rights.'' \60\ The HRAP also states that China will improve 
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.\61\ The HRAP 
includes the stated goal of ``strengthening the rule of law in 
the sphere of environmental protection to safeguard the 
public's environmental rights and interests,'' \62\ but does 
not clearly outline the nature of these rights.
    Uneven implementation and enforcement of environmental laws 
and regulations, along with noncompliance, remain significant 
challenges. In October 2009, the National Audit Office released 
an audit report regarding spending for a major project to 
reduce water pollution between 2001 and 2007 in China's ``three 
rivers and three lakes'' (which span 13 provinces, autonomous 
regions, and municipalities).\63\ In some locations, auditors 
found inadequate environmental law enforcement, inaccurate 
environmental statistical data, work units that transmitted 
automated monitoring systems data on an irregular basis, and 
work units that did not have their monitoring equipment in 
proper working order.\64\ Selective official 
enforcement and enterprise noncompliance with China's 
environmental impact assessment regulations continue to blunt 
their effectiveness. For example, in Jiahe county, Hunan 
province, a site that had been plagued by lead poisoning 
incidents, 309 of 541 enterprises in the county reportedly had 
not undergone an environmental impact assessment process.\65\ 
Compliance problems in less developed areas of China are 
exacerbated because polluting enterprises with prohibited, 
antiquated equipment have been known to move to poorer areas 
within provinces or across provinces after being shut down in 
more developed areas.\66\
    Official misconduct and corruption continued to be problems 
in the environmental sector during this reporting year. 
Discipline 
inspection and supervision entities around the country helped 
to investigate and manage over 10,000 cases involving 
government departments and Party cadres who violated major laws 
or regulations during the course of their administrative duties 
between January and November 2009.\67\ In addition, the 
official National Audit report released in 2010 revealed 
corruption; a significant amount of project funding had been 
misappropriated or was ``held back,'' according to China 
Daily.\68\

               ENVIRONMENTAL OPEN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

    The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and some 
local environmental protection bureaus have continued to 
implement ``open government affairs'' policies, but obstacles 
to accessing environmental information remain. In her remarks 
at an April 2010 Commission roundtable, an expert in Chinese 
energy and environmental issues noted the significant progress 
environmental protection organs have made in information 
disclosure in recent years, but also highlighted obstacles to 
better compliance with environmental open government 
information (OGI) measures, including the lack of capacity of 
local-level environmental bureaus, the vagueness of the 
measures, and inconsistency in making local officials 
accountable for failing to comply with the measures.\69\ During 
this reporting year, Chinese citizens continued to request 
environmental data and other information from environmental 
protection bureaus and offices. One joint Chinese/Western study 
of 113 cities also noted progress in the growth of the 
environmental OGI system, highlighting the good performances by 
some cities. It also noted overall low average performance on 
transparency, a little over 30 points out of 100.\70\
    According to the MEP 2009 OGI report, the ministry received 
72 requests for information, up from 68 last year, and had 
processed 71 of those requests by the time authorities 
published the report in March 2010.\71\ The MEP did not grant 
information in four cases.\72\ The MEP received nine 
administrative reconsideration requests.\73\ While the MEP did 
not reveal the nature of the information it decided not to 
grant or explain its refusal in the report, it acknowledged 
some of the shortcomings of its implementation of the 
Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI Regulations), 
including an incomplete catalog, nonstandardized procedures, 
and an insufficiently wide range of information open to the 
public.\74\
    In October 2009, Beijing resident Ren Xinghui filed open 
government information requests with the Ministry of Finance, 
the Three Gorges Project Construction Committee under the State 
Council, and the China Yangtze Three Gorges Project Development 
Corporation requesting information on the budget and financing 
of the Three Gorges hydroelectric dam project.\75\ The Ministry 
of Finance refused Ren's request on November 16 and based the 
refusal on Article 14 of an official interpretation of the OGI 
Regulation, saying Ren's request had no direct relationship to 
his ``production, livelihood, and scientific and technological 
research.'' \76\ In January 2010, Ren sued the Ministry of 
Finance for refusing to fulfill his information request.\77\ On 
April 19, the court informed Ren that it would not accept his 
case.\78\ Two days later, Ren filed an appeal with the Beijing 
High People's Court.\79\
    Media reports on incidents of pollution during the 
reporting period highlighted the lack of transparency in both 
the government's and industry's handling of information related 
to environmental disasters. Associated Press reporters covering 
a major oil spill after the explosion of a pipeline at a Dalian 
port quoted a Greenpeace statement as saying Greenpeace was 
``surprised to see that the beaches have not been closed to 
visitors and lack any warning signs . . . . [a]s a result, 
locals and visitors unaware of the extent of the oil spill were 
playing in the water with their kids, risking exposure to 
petroleum.'' \80\ The New York Times reported that an American 
marine conservationist, who said he has seen ``spills all over 
the world,'' asserted that the magnitude of the spill was ``far 
more extensive than the official figures.'' \81\ Media reports 
on a July 3 wastewater pollution incident involving a copper 
mine in Fujian province owned by the Zijin Mining Group that 
reportedly led to the death of at least 2,000 tons of fish, 
include allegations by local residents of collusion between 
polluting enterprises and local authorities.\82\ According to a 
July 12, 2010, article by the Agence France-Presse, the Fujian 
province environmental protection bureau issued a statement 
saying it first detected the leak on July 3 and gave the order 
to begin monitoring it.\83\ The company, however, did not make 
a public announcement regarding the acid pollution until nine 
days after the incident occurred.\84\ The South China Morning 
Post reported that residents accused local authorities of 
covering up for the copper mining company after the July 
incident, and also after a similar smaller incident in June 
2010.\85\

          PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

    During this reporting year, several developments occurred 
that are likely to impact decisions about who has standing to 
bring environmental public interest litigation cases in Chinese 
courts. For the first time, an environmental group initiated 
environmental administrative public interest lawsuits, and 
another group initiated an environmental administrative 
reconsideration case. The All-China Environment Federation 
(ACEF), a group that is ``overseen by the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection,'' brought two cases to China's 
special environmental courts, one against a local branch of a 
governmental ministry \86\ and the other against a private 
entity.\87\ Both ended in negotiated settlements. The cases 
mark an important development because these are the first 
instances in which courts accepted cases initiated by a group 
registered as a social organization. In another development, 
the Chinese citizen environmental organization Chongqing City 
League of Green Volunteers, headed by Wu Dengming, filed an 
administrative reconsideration request because Wu questioned 
the legality of low fines levied by environmental protection 
authorities against hydroelectric dam companies that 
disregarded a June 2009 order to stop construction of two dams 
along the Jinsha River and because the water below the dam site 
was affected by the construction.\88\ The group withdrew the 
request in August 2009 after representatives from the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection, the Chongqing City Environmental 
Protection Bureau, and the ACEF consulted with Wu.\89\

         SUPPRESSION OF CITIZEN DEMANDS FOR A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT

    During this reporting year, citizen environmental 
complaints increased, highlighting mounting citizen demand for 
a cleaner environment. Environmental complaints increased in 
2009, according to a report about MEP Vice Director Zhou Jian's 
speech during an April national environmental petition work 
videoconference.\90\ There was a greater number of ``petitions 
to higher authorities'' and ``a trend of mass petitions'' in 
2009 according to a separate news report on the conference.\91\ 
The report noted eight focal points for 2010 petitioning work, 
including ``further unblocking petitioning channels'' and 
``strengthening petitioning mediation work.'' \92\
    Major lead poisoning incidents across China during this 
reporting year led citizens to file petitions and engage in 
protests. Some of these incidents involved citizen detentions 
and draw attention to issues of government accountability. 
After the series of lead poisoning incidents, central 
authorities promised to take regulatory action to address heavy 
metal pollution problems on a national scale \93\ and ``placed 
importance on petitions about heavy metal pollution.'' \94\ 
Select lead poisoning incidents in late 2009 and 2010 include:

         In August 2009, in Wugang city, Hunan 
        province, approximately 1,000 residents clashed with 
        police after as many as 1,354 children living nearby 
        tested positive for various levels of lead 
        poisoning.\95\ The plant linked to the pollution that 
        caused the lead poisoning reportedly did not have 
        approval to operate from local environmental 
        authorities. Local officials reportedly briefly 
        detained 15 of the ill children's parents who 
        participated in the protest, accusing them of being 
        Falun Gong practitioners and reportedly intimidating 
        and warning other parents not to talk to the media 
        about the case.\96\
         Also in August 2009, lead pollution in 
        Fengxiang county, Shaanxi province, led to elevated 
        blood lead levels in 851 children and protests by 
        hundreds of citizens. The case highlighted ongoing 
        compliance problems related to environmental laws and 
        policies, gaps in government accountability, and 
        insufficient protection for citizens' rights, including 
        that of access to information.\97\
         In September 2009, in Jiahe county, Hunan 
        province, authorities stopped a bus carrying 53 Jiahe 
        residents who were taking their children to obtain 
        blood tests to determine if they had lead poisoning and 
        subsequently detained 3 of the residents, accusing them 
        of ``disrupting traffic.'' They released one citizen 
        later because of a medical condition. As of mid-March 
        2010, a second citizen remained in detention, while the 
        fate of the third citizen was unknown.\98\

    Chinese citizens are becoming increasingly vocal about 
concerns over potentially polluting enterprises prior to their 
construction. In some cases, citizens report they were not 
given opportunities to utilize institutionalized channels to 
voice their grievances. In some cases, authorities have 
arrested organizers of subsequent anti-pollution 
demonstrations. During this reporting year, ``not-in-my-
backyard'' protests broke out against planned landfill 
facilities in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and in Anhui 
province, where authorities shelved project plans due to public 
discontent.\99\ In Fuxing village, Guanyang county, Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region, village officials reportedly did not 
consult with the village committee, nor did they convene a 
village representative meeting before moving forward with a 
landfill project. Only the village Communist Party committee 
approved of the construction.\100\ In July, public security 
officers formally arrested six citizens who along with other 
villagers had repeatedly demonstrated and petitioned against 
construction of the nearby planned landfill since mid-
2009.\101\ Authorities arrested Liu Zhengjiao, Mo Jian, Wang 
Zhaosheng, He Nianfa, Wang Shuangfa, and Wang Qiwen.\102\ 
Irregularities in the handling of these cases were 
apparent.\103\ Guanyang public security officers detained Liu 
Zhengjiao on June 15 but reportedly did not inform his family 
or charge him until July 11, at which time they arrested and 
charged him on ``suspicion of disturbing public order.'' \104\ 
A China Economic Times report noted irregularities with the 
detention orders or arrest warrants for Mo Jian, Wang Qiwen, 
and Wang Shuangfa.\105\
    Large-scale not-in-my-backyard protests also broke out 
during this reporting year in several areas, including Jiangsu 
province and Guangzhou municipality, over the planned 
construction of trash incinerators and cogeneration plants. The 
protests involved detentions of demonstration organizers, but 
also appeared to impact the construction schedule of a plant in 
at least one area. From October 21 to 23, 2009, thousands of 
citizens reportedly protested plans to build a cogeneration 
plant in Pingwang town, Wujiang city, Jiangsu province, and 
police detained 16 people when citizens and police 
clashed.\106\ Early in 2010, Beijing authorities announced they 
will move forward with plans to build more incinerators in the 
city despite city residents' protests and community campaigns 
to look at other options.\107\ Citizens in Panyu district, 
Guangzhou municipality, protested plans to build an 
incinerator, and on November 23, 2009, over 1,000 residents 
held a ``sit-in in the city.'' \108\ Authorities reportedly 
ordered a media blackout on November 5 \109\ and detained 
several people, four on ``suspicion of organizing and 
instigating an illegal gathering.'' \110\ As of July 2010, the 
fate of those detained was unknown. However, also in response 
to these protests, local officials eventually suspended, but 
did not cancel, the incinerator project.\111\
    Citizens also engaged in demonstrations protesting 
pollution problems after the fact, following unsuccessful 
attempts to utilize the petitioning (xinfang) system and other 
institutionalized channels to resolve their grievances. 
Specific cases also highlight possible ill-treatment of 
citizens, the lack of public involvement in 
environmental decisionmaking, and the non-transparency of the 
media.

         In Tibetan areas in Gansu province, citizens 
        reportedly petitioned, among other things, for tighter 
        controls over air pollutants emitted by a cement plant 
        in Madang township, Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan 
        (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, after attempts 
        to resolve the problem through talks with the cement 
        company were unsuccessful.\112\ A crowd of 200 to 300 
        people gathered at the cement factory to protest, and 
        some were reportedly detained and others injured by 
        police.\113\
         In May and June, ``thousands'' of Tibetans in 
        the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) protested against 
        mining activities.\114\ One citizen said that Tibetans 
        had repeatedly appealed for an end to the mining 
        activities; authorities brought in armed police to 
        quell dissent.\115\ [For more information on mining and 
        a June 2009 negotiated agreement to cease the mining in 
        parts of the TAR, see Section V--Tibet.]
         In July 2010, in Jingxi county, Guangxi Zhuang 
        Autonomous Region, thousands of villagers participated 
        in demonstrations over the course of three days 
        beginning on July 11, against a long-term water 
        pollution problem reportedly caused by an aluminum 
        plant.\116\ One article notes that villagers said the 
        local media had been barred from reporting on the 
        case.\117\ Authorities reportedly detained the 
        ``troublemakers,'' i.e., the people who allegedly acted 
        illegally to ``instigate the incident.'' \118\ One 
        account noted that authorities had detained 17 people 
        involved in leading the demonstrations.\119\ As of 
        August, more information about those detained was 
        unavailable.

    During this reporting year, there were other cases where 
authorities detained or harassed citizens for their 
environmental activism. In March 2010, authorities in Guangzhou 
detained Xiao Qingshan, a longtime labor rights advocate, for 
seven days for ``disturbing public order,'' for standing 
outside the Nanfang News Group office educating people about 
the alleged linkages between official corruption and 
environmental pollution.\120\ In April, Beijing police 
prevented the ``Environmental Protection and Citizen 
Responsibility Discussion Forum'' from taking place \121\ and 
raided the home of forum participant and rights defender Gu 
Chuan.\122\
    Authorities also arrested and imprisoned citizens, in part 
for their environmental activism. In August 2009, public 
security officers in the Tibet Autonomous Region detained 
brothers Rinchen Samdrub and Jigme Namgyal reportedly after a 
local environmental protection group they founded accused local 
police of hunting protected wildlife species.\123\ On July 3, a 
Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture court sentenced Rinchen Samdrub to 
five years' imprisonment and deprivation of political rights 
for three years on the charge of ``inciting splittism.'' The 
court accused him of posting a pro-Dalai Lama article on his 
Web site.\124\ On November 13, the Changdu Reeducation Through 
Labor (RTL) Committee ordered Jigme Namgyal to serve 21 months' 
RTL for ``harming national security'' by illegally gathering 
information and video material on the local environment, 
collecting propaganda material ``from the Dalai Clique,'' and 
``severely interfering with state power organizations'' and 
``harming social stability'' by organizing local residents to 
conduct ``irregular petitioning'' of authorities.\125\
    In April 2010, authorities released Wu Lihong, an 
environmental advocate, after he served a three-year prison 
sentence for alleged extortion and fraud. Wu had documented 
pollution in the Lake Tai region, Jiangsu province, for many 
years.\126\ Upon his release, Wu reported mistreatment by 
officials while in detention and in prison.\127\

                  III. Development of the Rule of Law


                             Civil Society


                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 
government continued to tighten control over what it considered 
to be politically sensitive individuals and organizations 
through harassment, closing of offices, and new regulations 
that could make it more difficult for groups to receive foreign 
sources of funding. Though localized experiments aimed at 
simplifying the legal registration process for civil society 
organizations (CSOs) \1\ are currently taking place in the 
southern Chinese city of Shenzhen, a special economic zone, it 
is too early to conclude whether such reforms will succeed or 
be replicated in other parts of China.
    The number of CSOs in China continues to grow, and their 
impact continues to be evident. Official government statistics 
indicate that the number of registered groups increased from 
288,000 in 2004 to 430,000 in the first quarter of 2010.\2\ 
However, unofficial estimates for the total number of groups, 
including unregistered grassroots organizations, range from two 
to eight million.\3\ CSOs in China address a wide array of 
social issues, such as HIV/AIDS, women's rights, worker rights, 
religious charity work, and environmental concerns.\4\ In the 
aftermath of recent earthquakes in Qinghai and Sichuan 
provinces, for example, CSOs played an instrumental role in 
organizing a national humanitarian response as part of the 
rescue effort.\5\ The Beijing Yirenping Center, a public health 
advocacy organization, pressured the government to introduce 
measures aimed at eliminating discrimination against Hepatitis 
B virus carriers.\6\ As severe drought affected southwest China 
in early 2010, Oxfam Hong Kong allocated funds for relief 
efforts and worked with local officials to provide drinking 
water and other supplies for residents.\7\
    Still, many Chinese officials hold conflicting views of 
civil society organizations. While acknowledging that CSOs 
serve a necessary and even helpful function as mediating 
mechanisms between the government and society, Chinese 
authorities also look upon many groups with suspicion, fearing 
that ``Western countries have used non-governmental 
organizations extensively . . . to intervene in the internal 
affairs of other countries, create turmoil, and even subvert 
the regimes of the host countries.'' \8\ China, one Chinese 
scholar warned, ``has to be vigilant about [Western 
intervention].'' \9\ As such, Chinese authorities allowed many 
CSOs that focus on providing basic social services to operate 
freely, and forcibly closed some that tried to form networks or 
carry out projects that the government considers to be 
``politically sensitive.'' As a former editor of the China 
Development Brief, an online newsletter dedicated to news about 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), explained, one never 
knows ``where the line is, and it does shift''--for it is 
``civil society with Chinese characteristics,'' where groups 
are ``light, not antagonistic and not pushing the envelope too 
far.'' \10\
    The Chinese government's actions to harass and tighten its 
control over CSOs operating in China contravene both Chinese 
law and international conventions. China's Constitution states 
that ``citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom 
of speech . . . of assembly, of association . . . .'' \11\ 
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights provides that:

        Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association 
        with others . . . no restrictions may be placed on the 
        exercise of this right other than those which are 
        prescribed by law and which are necessary in a 
        democratic society in the interests of national 
        security or public safety . . . .\12\

                Legal Framework and Government Controls

    The Chinese government imposes strict registration 
requirements for civil society organizations (CSOs). Under the 
1998 Regulations for Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations, an individual who wishes to organize an NGO \13\ 
in China must first obtain a sponsorship agreement from a 
government administrative department in a relevant ``trade, 
scientific or other professional area'' at the appropriate 
level of government before registering with the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs (MCA).\14\ In other words, groups that wish to 
operate locally must register with the corresponding local 
government administrative departments and local MCA units; 
those that wish to operate nationally must do so with national 
departments and the MCA. In their role as sponsoring agencies, 
the local government administrative departments are charged 
with the duty to supervise the NGOs that they register, 
including ``record keeping with respect to establishment, 
modification, and closure of social organizations,'' completing 
annual reviews on the organizations, and ``applying 
disciplinary sanctions to organizations which fail to comply'' 
with MCA regulations.\15\
    Such a dual management process has presented problems for 
various groups, as permission to organize is difficult to 
obtain from local sponsors who are sometimes reluctant to take 
on the burdens of supervisory responsibilities.\16\ Groups that 
fail to obtain permission to organize are not protected under 
the law and are also barred from receiving outside 
donations.\17\ Many experts conclude that the cumbersome dual 
management requirement has had a chilling effect on Chinese 
civil society.
    In part to avoid government interference, some groups in 
China register as ``commercial entities'' rather than as NGOs 
subject to the Chinese government's targeted oversight, even 
though registering as ``commercial entities'' means that these 
groups are subject to different tax schemes than government-
registered NGOs.\18\ At the same time, because such groups are 
neither NGOs nor legally recognized commercial enterprises, 
they risk becoming targets for closure. As the Commission 
reported in 2009, the Open Constitution Initiative (OCI), or 
Gongmeng, provides one prominent example. Founded in 2003, OCI 
attracted authorities' attention by challenging China's ``black 
jails,'' campaigning for migrant workers' rights, and helping 
parents of babies hurt in the tainted milk incident of 2008 to 
seek legal redress.\19\ Authorities ultimately fined the 
organization 1.42 million yuan (US$208,823) for allegedly 
evading 250,000 yuan (US$36,764) in taxes \20\ before shutting 
it down, apparently because OCI did not register as an NGO.\21\ 
In any case, OCI's experience sent, in the words of a Human 
Rights Watch researcher, ``a chilling effect across China's 
nascent civil society,'' since ``most NGOs are much more 
fragile than [OCI].'' \22\
    During this reporting year, Chinese officials repeatedly 
harassed and interfered with the operations of the Beijing 
Aizhixing Institute (Aizhixing), a Beijing-based public health 
advocacy organization that activist Wan Yanhai founded in 1994. 
Having already been questioned or detained by authorities 
several times in the past 12 years, Wan was familiar with 
official harassment and interference, as some of his most 
significant and politically sensitive work involved publicizing 
the spread of HIV resulting from blood contamination cases in 
the 1990s among villagers in Henan province.\23\ In March 2010, 
when the annual meetings of the National People's Congress and 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference convened in 
Beijing, authorities ordered Wan to cancel a seminar marking 
International Sex Worker Rights Day.\24\ On March 25, local 
taxation bureau officials in Beijing went to Wan's offices to 
conduct an unannounced investigation into his organization's 
tax records from the previous year. A month later, fire 
officials showed up for a safety inspection.\25\ Tax officials 
had investigated Aizhixing before, in September 2008, but they 
did not find any problems with the group's accounting.\26\ Wan 
ultimately left China for the United States in May, saying that 
``the attacks from the government had become very serious for 
my organization and for me personally'' and that, already 
``under a lot of stress,'' he had concerns for his personal 
safety.\27\
    Peking University released a notice on March 25, 2010, 
announcing that it was canceling ties with four university-
affiliated organizations, including the Center for Women's Law 
and Legal Services (Center).\28\ The Center was China's first 
NGO dedicated to women's rights issues, and over its 15-year 
history it had provided free legal counseling to more than 
70,000 people, handled over 2,000 cases, and proposed more than 
70 pieces of legislation.\29\ Although the university's dean of 
social sciences told the South China Morning Post that the 
cancellations were part of a routine restructuring aimed at 
eliminating ``some institutes that no longer suit the current 
trend,'' Guo Jianmei, who founded the Center, confirmed to Asia 
Week that the Ministry of Education had made the cancellation 
decision, adding that ``higher-up'' authorities had told 
university officials that, because the Center accepted overseas 
funding, and because it was creating a public interest lawyer 
network, the political risks were relatively high.\30\
    At least one international NGO, like its domestic 
counterparts, also faced politically motivated harassment from 
Chinese authorities during this reporting year. On February 4, 
2010, the Ministry of Education (MOE) issued a notice warning 
Chinese students to ``sever all ties'' with the British relief 
agency Oxfam, accusing the organization of being an ``[NGO] 
seeking to infiltrate our interior.'' \31\ Although Oxfam's 
Hong Kong Director Howard Liu insisted that his agency had 
never challenged the government's policies or laws and was only 
interested in alleviating poverty, the MOE notice referred to 
Oxfam Hong Kong Chairman Lo Chi-kin--also a member of Hong 
Kong's Democratic Party who has spoken in support of direct 
elections and political reforms in Hong Kong--as a ``stalwart 
of the opposition faction.'' \32\

                    Continued Regulatory Tightening

    A new circular that tightens rules concerning foreign 
donations to domestic organizations provides another example of 
the Chinese government's further strengthening of its control 
over civil society. On December 25, 2009, the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued a circular 
concerning ``foreign exchange donated to or by domestic 
institutions,'' which went into effect on March 1.\33\ Stating 
that foreign donations shall ``comply with the laws and 
regulations . . . of China and shall not go against social 
morality or damage public interests,'' \34\ the SAFE circular 
requires all NGOs seeking to receive foreign donations to 
present the following information:

        1. An application stating that the ``donation is not 
        against national prohibitive regulations . . . that the 
        overseas institution is a non-profit institution, [and] 
        that the domestic enterprise shall strictly follow the 
        agreement in making use of the donation and bear the 
        legal responsibility thus caused.'' \35\
        2. A copy of the receiving organization's business 
        license.\36\
        3. A notarized donation agreement stating the purpose 
        of the donation.\37\
        4. The registration certificate of the overseas non-
        profit organization (with Chinese translation 
        attached).\38\

    One particularly problematic element of the new SAFE 
circular is the requirement that the donation agreement be 
notarized.\39\ The Global Times, which operates under the 
official People's Daily, reported that two months after the 
rules became effective, ``banks, notary service providers and 
non-profit outfits are in the dark about how to get a donation 
agreement `notarized.' '' \40\ Moreover, some notaries 
reportedly will also require some donors to be present in China 
for the notarization.\41\
    The new circular will also require all foreign donations to 
go into special foreign exchange bank accounts, allowing SAFE 
to ``improve the administration of donated foreign exchange and 
facilitate the donated foreign exchange receipts and 
payments.'' \42\ The circular also provides the central and 
provincial governments additional control over religious 
organizations by requiring an additional level of approval to 
accept one-time donations of more than one million yuan 
(US$147,000).\43\ While it is unclear whether authorities 
established the SAFE rule to specifically target NGOs, some 
NGOs fear that the rule can be used as such.\44\ As the 
organization Asia Catalyst put it succinctly, the new SAFE rule 
completes the government's goal to create ``a chill that shuts 
some NGOs down, allows others . . . to survive but limits the 
overall growth of the sector--and without sparking an 
international outcry . . . .'' \45\

                       Limited Reform in Shenzhen

    Despite an overall trend of tighter controls, at least one 
case of limited localized reform took place in the past year. 
In July 2009, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) and the city 
of Shenzhen signed the Cooperation Agreement on Pushing Forward 
With Integrated Reforms to Civil Affairs Undertakings 
(Agreement), which delineates a deepening of systemic reforms 
concerning the registration and management of social 
organizations. The Agreement calls for Shenzhen to ``take the 
lead in experimenting with some of the MCA's major reform 
projects and measures,'' \46\ and to ``explore establishing a 
system whereby civil society organizations apply and register 
directly with the [MCA].'' \47\ The reforms, if successful, 
could potentially lead to a system, at least in Shenzhen, where 
the MCA will supervise and regulate CSOs alone, without a 
sponsor organization, making it possible for future individuals 
wishing to form organizations--including NGOs--to have a 
relatively less complicated one-stop shop process.\48\ The 
Agreement is also being used by certain civil society 
organizations, such as ones that provide services to the poor 
and migrant workers, to forgo registrations altogether and to 
be recognized by local authorities provided that organizations 
file the required papers properly.\49\

              2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan

    At the national level, the 2009-2010 National Human Rights 
Action Plan (HRAP), issued by the State Council Information 
Office in April 2009, also referenced the need to broaden the 
channel to ``support mass organizations to participate in 
social management and public services, so as to protect the 
people's legitimate rights and interests.'' \50\ The plan 
pledges to strengthen the ``construction and management of 
social organizations'' in order to ``enhance their functions in 
serving society'' and that ``revisions will be made'' to the 
Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations, Provisional Regulations for the Registration and 
Management of Non-Commercial Institutions, and Regulations for 
the Management of Foundations ``to ensure social organizations 
conduct activities in accordance with the law and their 
respective charters.'' \51\ Moreover, as stated in the HRAP, 
the government encouraged social organizations to ``participate 
in social management and public services'' and to establish 
``private non-enterprise entities in the fields of education, 
science and technology, culture, health care, sports and public 
welfare.'' \52\ The plan also aims to develop and standardize 
``all kinds of foundations to promote programs for the public 
good.'' \53\
    Notwithstanding the goals stated in the HRAP, however, the 
findings in this section suggest otherwise: that the overall 
trend is one in which the government continues to tighten its 
control over civil society, intimidates individuals that it 
deems threatening to ``social stability,'' and shuts down 
organizations that conduct activities and projects that it 
considers to be politically sensitive.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Three Major Regulations That Govern NGO Operations in China
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations
 (1998)

  This set of regulations defines ``social organizations'' as ``non-
 profit  organizations voluntarily created by citizens in order to
 achieve the collective desires of members, and conduct activities
 according to their charters.'' \54\ It sets forth the administrative,
 registration, supervision, and management requirements that NGOs must
 follow in order to operate in China.\55\ It also requires that social
 organizations not ``harm the unification, security, and ethnic unity of
 the state; damage state interests, the public interests of society, and
 the lawful rights and interests of other organizations and citizens; or
 violate prevailing social morals.'' \56\Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Management of Non-
 Commercial Institutions (1998)  This set of regulations addresses institutions that ``engage in such
 activities as education, science and technology, culture, or public
 health, that the state, with an objective of social welfare, runs
 through state organs or other organizations using state assets.'' \57\Regulations for the Management of Foundations (2004)  This set of regulations places ``foundations'' into two categories:
 groups ``aimed at fundraising from the general public . . . and those
 that are not'' and lays out specific and different rules for both
 categories of groups.\58\ It sets forth the administrative,
 registration, supervision, and management requirements that Chinese and
 foreign foundations must follow in order to operate in China.\59\ It
 requires foundations to have charters and boards of directors, and
 specifies expenditure requirements.\60\ Under the regulations, local
 sponsoring agencies are obligated to supervise these foundations, and
 to ensure that they follow all applicable laws and regulations.\61\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 Institutions of Democratic Governance


                              Introduction

    China's political system is dominated by the Communist 
Party, with limited participation by non-Party members in 
decisionmaking that affects China's political affairs. During 
the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Party and the central 
government continued actions to strengthen controls over 
society and to ``safeguard stability.'' Chinese authorities 
continued to have little tolerance for those involved in 
political activities not sanctioned by the Party. The Party 
continued to support isolated experiments with intraparty 
democracy and ``democratic management'' in localities around 
the country, and high-level leaders stated that the National 
People's Congress (NPC) and the NPC Standing Committee would 
strengthen supervision of governmental affairs and departments. 
While village elections for ``village committees'' have spread 
throughout China, their implementation remains problematic. 
Authorities plan to continue to strengthen open government 
affairs and various forms of ``democratic management'' in so-
called ``difficult villages.'' Corruption remained high and of 
serious concern to citizens. To bolster the legitimacy of the 
Party, in part in response to citizen concerns about corruption 
and official accountability, Party organs and government 
agencies initiated measures to strengthen anticorruption 
efforts and improve local accountability and transparency. 
Authorities at central and local levels signaled that China's 
budget processes could become more open to public scrutiny. 
There is variation in the willingness of local government 
agencies to make their budgets public. During this reporting 
year, authorities continued to signal that they would expand 
public participation in government policymaking on issues of 
``vital public interest'' through a variety of public forums, 
and would establish a public hearing system to gather citizen 
input on draft regulatory instruments.

             China's One-Party State and Political Control

    Although China voted as a member of the UN General Assembly 
in favor of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) in 1948, China's political institutions do not 
comply with the standards outlined therein. Article 21 of the 
UDHR, for example, provides that, ``everyone has the right to 
take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives . . . . [T]he will of the people 
shall be the basis of the authority of government, this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which 
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.''\1\ 
China's political institutions also do not comply with the 
standards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has signed 
and committed to ratify.\2\ Article 25 of the ICCPR requires 
that citizens be allowed to ``take part in the conduct of 
political affairs'' and ``to vote and to be elected at genuine 
periodic elections.'' Under General Comment 25 to the ICCPR, 
this language requires that: ``Where citizens participate in 
the conduct of public affairs through freely chosen 
representatives, it is implicit in article 25 that those 
representatives do in fact exercise governmental power and that 
they are accountable through the electoral process for their 
exercise of that power.'' (para. 7); ``The right to vote at 
elections and referenda must be established by law and may be 
subject only to reasonable restrictions . . . . [P]arty 
membership should not be a condition of eligibility to vote, 
nor a ground of disqualification.'' (para. 10); ``Freedom of 
expression, assembly and association are essential conditions 
for the effective exercise of the right to vote and must be 
fully protected.'' (para. 12); ``The right of persons to stand 
for election should not be limited unreasonably by requiring 
candidates to be members of parties or of specific parties.'' 
(para. 17); ``An independent electoral authority should be 
established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure 
that it is conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with 
established laws which are compatible with the Covenant.'' 
(para. 20).\3\
    During this reporting year, the Communist Party emphasized 
Party building \4\ and increased Party membership. At the end 
of 2009, the Party had nearly 78 million members, an increase 
of approximately 2 million members from the previous year.\5\ 
The Party has established more than 3.79 million committees and 
branches throughout the country.\6\ These organizations reach 
down into and influence every sector of society, including 
villages and urban neighborhoods,\7\ as well as many 
enterprises,\8\ public service organizations (hospitals, 
schools, research institutes, etc.),\9\ government departments, 
and social organizations \10\ (shehui tuanti: foundations, 
nonprofit enterprises, and non-governmental organizations). The 
Party organizations in urban neighborhoods and residents 
committees (jumin weiyuanhui) \11\ play a role in citizens' 
political, social, and economic lives.\12\ During this 
reporting year, top Party leaders directed cadres to focus on 
Party construction at the most basic administrative levels,\13\ 
in military organizations,\14\ in academic institutions,\15\ 
and in social organizations.\16\

             Social Controls, Maintaining Social Stability

    The Communist Party and the central government continued to 
focus on ``safeguarding social stability'' and strengthened 
controls over society. A March 2010 Southern Weekend article 
described the ``quiet'' changes to China's ``system of 
safeguarding stability,'' which the article argues began to 
take shape in preparation for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic 
Games and are now becoming standard practice.\17\ The story 
quotes an article by Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Politburo 
Standing Committee and Secretary of the Politics and Law 
Commission of the Party Central Committee, in which Zhou 
stated, ``We should apply the successful experience of security 
at Beijing Olympic Games in developing a public order 
prevention and control system, deeply promote socialization, 
network formation, and informatization in developing the public 
order prevention and control system . . . .'' \18\ In the name 
of ``maintaining social stability,'' the Party and the 
government make extensive use of informant networks.\19\ 
Informant networks reportedly reach down into social 
institutions, such as schools.\20\ In December 2009, high-level 
official Yang Huanning reportedly said that collecting 
information (through informants) was important for ensuring 
``social stability.'' He promised ``preemptive attacks'' 
against people that Party and government officials characterize 
as threats to social stability.\21\ In the spring of 2010, the 
Politics and Law Commission of the Party Central Committee 
reportedly launched a crackdown on groups for the protection of 
military personnel rights, underground labor unions, and groups 
of farmers petitioning higher level officials, labeling them 
the ``internal three forces'' and calling them ``threats to 
social stability.'' \22\ An April 2010 Tsinghua University 
Social Development Research Group report asserted that 
``safeguarding stability'' has become one of the ``most 
important duties'' of local officials.\23\ The report also 
states that ``maintaining social stability'' has begun to 
influence the normal work of governments in some locations.\24\ 
Local officials reportedly have made serious investments in 
personnel to ``maintain stability'' and over the years 
increasingly have established specialized institutions, 
including ``stability preservation offices'' (weiwenban) or 
``comprehensive governance offices'' (zongzhiban).\25\ China's 
public security expenditures for 2009 reportedly increased by 
16 percent, and the budget for such expenditures is expected to 
increase by another 8.9 percent for 2010.\26\ Authorities at 
all administrative levels reportedly have established 
``stability preservation funds'' from which they try to ``buy 
security'' by making payments to individuals with grievances in 
order to resolve conflicts before they escalate.\27\ The 
Tsinghua University group report noted several downsides to the 
use of these funds for the development of rule of law in China, 
including the potential that these funds will be used 
arbitrarily without any legal basis.\28\

              Official Actions Against Democracy Advocates

    During this reporting year, Chinese authorities continued 
to show little tolerance for select individuals who advocated 
for greater democracy, who organized political parties, or who 
expressed political views not sanctioned by the Communist 
Party; for example:

         Liu Xianbin. On July 5, 2010, security 
        officials in Suining city, Sichuan province, arrested 
        Liu, a 1989 democracy movement participant and member 
        of the banned Chinese Democracy Party, on charges of 
        ``inciting subversion of state power.'' \29\ Liu was 
        reportedly arrested because of his support for 
        activists and human rights defenders and because 
        articles penned by Liu had been posted outside of 
        China.\30\ As of August 2010, Liu was still awaiting 
        trial.
         Guo Quan. The Suqian Intermediate People's 
        Court in Jiangsu province sentenced Guo, formerly a 
        university professor, to 10 years in prison on October 
        16, 2009, for ``subversion of state power.'' \31\ The 
        court found that Guo used the Internet to organize an 
        ``illegal'' political party called the ``China New 
        Democracy Party,'' among other charges.\32\
         Xue Mingkai. The Shenzhen Intermediate 
        People's Court sentenced Xue to 18 months in prison on 
        charges of ``subverting state power'' on February 10, 
        2010, despite pleas by his mother to consider medical 
        records showing that Xue had a mental illness.\33\ 
        Authorities claimed Xue had contacted and joined the 
        overseas China Democracy Party (CDP) in 2009 and 
        planned to organize a ``China Democratic Workers' 
        Party'' online in the summer of 2006.\34\
         Luo Yongquan. In the summer of 2009, 
        authorities in Shaoguan city, Guangdong province, 
        ordered Luo, a member of the CDP and a poet, to serve 
        two years of reeducation through labor. Authorities 
        said that Luo publicly attacked the Communist Party and 
        Chinese government in his poems.\35\

                          Intraparty Democracy

    Isolated experiments with intraparty democracy (also 
translated as ``inner-Party democracy'') are taking place 
around the country with high-level Communist Party support. 
Chinese writers on the subject maintain that intraparty 
democracy should come before democracy in society as a 
whole.\36\ The notion of intraparty democracy has been a part 
of the Party's basic institutional design since 1956.\37\ The 
decision drafted by Party leaders during the Fourth Plenary 
Session of the 17th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
meeting in September 2009 called for expanding intraparty 
democracy and called it the ``lifeblood of the Party.'' \38\ 
During this reporting year, Party authorities in various 
locations experimented with election monitoring systems (xuanju 
guanchayuan zhidu or minyi guanchayuan zhidu) during intraparty 
elections for residents' committee members and leaders.\39\ 
Election monitors typically were retired officials, people's 
congress and people's political consultative congress deputies, 
and Party committee members; but in some areas, people from 
other professions took on the role.\40\

The People's Congresses and the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
                               Conference

    Chinese officials describe China's political system as a 
``socialist democracy'' with ``multi-party cooperation'' and 
``political consultation'' under the leadership of the 
Communist Party.\41\ The 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action 
Plan (HRAP), issued by 
Chinese authorities in April 2009, referenced the supervisory 
roles of the National People's Congress (NPC) \42\ and the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).\43\ 
However, an 
official speech by Wang Chen, the Director of the State Council 
Information Office, on the comprehensive summary of the mid-
term evaluation of the HRAP released in December 2009, included 
scant reference to civil and political rights developments 
related to the NPC and the CPPCC,\44\ except for noting the 
deliberations regarding the proposed revisions to China's 
Electoral Law.\45\ The NPC Standing Committee passed the 
revised Electoral Law in March 2010, which now awards the same 
proportion of NPC deputies per population to both rural and 
urban areas. (In the past, urban residents enjoyed greater 
representation.\46\) In summer 2010, Luojiang county, Sichuan 
province, reportedly began an experiment that established the 
country's first full-time, professional local people's congress 
deputies. While China's Constitution and other relevant laws do 
not prohibit professional deputies, there currently is not a 
specific legal foundation for them.\47\

 ANNUAL MEETINGS: NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S 
                   POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

    At the annual meetings of the National People's Congress 
(NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) in March 2010 (Two Sessions), the Chairman 
of the NPC Standing Committee, Wu Bangguo, discussed the plan 
to increase NPC and NPC Standing Committee supervision over 
governmental affairs, and NPC delegates expressed displeasure 
regarding some government work. Increasing NPC supervision of 
governmental affairs is one of the goals outlined in the 
HRAP.\48\ Wu said the NPC and the NPC Standing Committee would 
launch special topic ``inquiry and questioning'' work by 
inviting cadres from the State Council departments to sit in on 
meetings, listen to suggestions, and ``respond to inquiries, 
and answer questions'' regarding ``issues of broad concern to 
NPC delegates'' and the supervision of economic work.\49\ 
During the Two Sessions, NPC delegates expressed their 
displeasure about some government work: 479 delegates opposed 
the Supreme People's Court report and 411 delegates opposed the 
report on the work of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.\50\ 
The 2009 Finance and 2010 Budget Report and the Government Work 
Report fared better with 317 and 36 opposing votes, 
respectively.\51\ In March, newspapers in two regions of China 
published editorials criticizing authorities for restricting 
lawmakers and political advisors' freedom of speech after a 
city government advisor admitted officials had pressured him 
during the Two Sessions to be cautious about discussing 
divisive policies.\52\

  LOCAL PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCES: POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN 
                               GUANGZHOU

    ``Multi-party cooperation and political consultation'' 
purportedly take place among the Party, the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference, and eight ``approved'' minor 
political parties.\53\ During this reporting year, the 
Guangzhou Municipal Central Party Committee issued a notice 
which provides for political consultation to be brought into 
the city's policy processes.\54\ Specifically, it provides for 
political consultation between the municipal Party committee 
and each of the eight ``approved'' political parties at the 
municipal level or between the municipal Party committee and 
the municipal-level people's political consultative conference 
regarding a variety of documents including important local laws 
and regulations, long-term municipal economic and social plans, 
and leadership choices.\55\ The notice outlines several 
consultative meeting types at which political consultation 
purportedly takes place.\56\ A Wei Wen Po article reported that 
this is the first instance of such an experiment in China, and 
if the experiment goes smoothly, officials reportedly will 
promote it throughout Guangdong province in the second half of 
2010.\57\

       Village Autonomy, Elections, and ``Democratic Management''

    Authorities have established ``grassroots autonomy'' or 
village elections for village committees,\58\ and while village 
elections have spread throughout China, their implementation 
remains problematic. In a December 2009 interview with the 
People's Daily, a spokesperson for a department within the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) noted that in a small number of 
villages, there are several problems with the operations of 
village organizations.\59\ During this reporting year, Chinese 
authorities continued to implement plans to put in order open 
government affairs and ``democratic management'' in so-called 
``difficult villages.'' Authorities in different regions label 
villages ``difficult'' for a variety of reasons. In Guizhou 
province, which reported that 3.13 percent of its villages were 
``difficult villages,'' \60\ the category included villages 
that have not had successful village elections, had long-term 
problems with tensions between villagers and leaders, had 
longstanding issues with citizens taking grievances to higher 
authorities, or had problems with transparency of village 
affairs, among others.\61\ At a video conference in February 
2009, authorities pointed out that 6 percent of the villages 
across the country are ``difficult villages'' and that local 
officials had been underreporting their numbers.\62\ In 
December 2009, authorities held a national meeting to share 
local authorities' experiences regarding open village affairs 
and ``democratic management'' in ``difficult villages'' across 
the country.\63\ The conference followed a plan issued by the 
MCA in July 2009 to resolve problems in ``difficult villages'' 
between 2009 and 2011 and a joint opinion issued in February 
2009 by high-level authorities outlining the guiding ideology, 
principles, goals, responsibilities, and methods authorities 
link to transforming ``difficult villages.'' \64\
    The National People's Congress Standing Committee reviewed 
draft amendments to the Organic Law of Villagers' Committees 
(Organic Law) in January and again in June \65\ in part to 
potentially strengthen Party control over villages and remedy 
problems with village elections and village governance. 
Proposed changes to the law, if passed, reportedly could 
mandate that villagers establish village affairs supervision 
mechanisms, make it easier for rural residents to remove 
village committee members, and make it simpler to convene 
village meetings to decide on village issues.\66\ In addition, 
there has been debate regarding a proposed change that would 
strengthen Party leadership over the running of village 
affairs.\67\ Authorities collected public comments on the draft 
law from the end of December 2009 to the end of January 
2010.\68\ In February, authorities in Beijing attempted to 
prevent village leaders, who were attending a meeting in 
Beijing on February 25 to discuss the proposed amendments to 
the Organic Law, from holding a press conference. Police 
threatened one of the eight village leaders who planned to 
speak and prohibited the tea shop where the conference was to 
be held from opening. Two of the leaders found an alternate 
site and held the press conference there.\69\

          Party and Government Accountability and Transparency


                     ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION

    Corruption reportedly remains high and continues to be one 
of the top three concerns of Chinese citizens, according to a 
survey conducted since 2006 by the People's Daily Online.\70\ 
Transparency International gave China a score of 3.6 (out of a 
possible 10, which signifies ``highly clean'') on the 
organization's 2009 Corruption Perception Index, which is a 
measurement of the perceived levels of public sector 
corruption.\71\ During this reporting year, official discipline 
inspection and supervision entities from around the country 
reported receiving nearly 1.32 million complaints and 
information tips from citizens between January and November 
2009, according to information from an official joint press 
conference.\72\ Prosecution entities reportedly investigated 
2,687 government officials who were allegedly involved in three 
categories of cases in 2009: infringement of people's rights, 
graft, and malfeasance.\73\ In May 2010, the Vice Minister of 
the Ministry of Supervision announced that 3,058 officials had 
received punishments ranging up to life imprisonment in cases 
concluded over a six-month period beginning in October 2009 for 
wrongdoings related to China's economic stimulus funds or 
construction projects.\74\ In addition, the Communist Party 
reportedly punished 5,241 individuals for issues relating to 
corruption involving economic stimulus funds.\75\ It is unclear 
how many officials were subject to both Party and government 
punishment.

         MEASURES TO CURB CORRUPTION AND PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY

    Authorities pledged in the 2009-2010 National Human Rights 
Action Plan to stringently implement corruption prevention 
measures.\76\ Central and local Communist Party and Chinese 
government entities also issued new or revised corruption 
prevention measures related to the disclosure of assets,\77\ 
the closure of ``liaison offices'' in Beijing associated with 
local government lobbying efforts,\78\ and a revised ethics 
code.\79\
    Chinese authorities have taken additional steps to 
encourage reporting of corruption. Whistleblower protections, 
however, remain insufficiently developed at this time. [For 
more information on whistleblower protections, see Section 
III--Access to Justice--Administrative Law Developments.] In 
October 2009, the Party Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection and the Ministry of 
Supervision established a new hotline to accept citizen tips 
and complaints about corruption.\80\ According to the Legal 
Daily, 70 percent or more of the cases of work-related offenses 
filed with procuratorate offices initially involved a tip from 
a citizen.\81\ Citizens who make allegations risk retribution. 
According to material from the Supreme People's Procuratorate 
reported by the Legal Daily, 70 percent of the people who filed 
tips with procuratorate offices were subject to various forms 
of retribution.\82\ According to the South China Morning Post, 
however, a procuratorate official said that fewer than 200 
cases of retaliation were reported each year.\83\ The Legal 
Daily report indicated that some experts believe the law 
inadequately protects whistleblowers and that many forms of 
retribution technically are ``legal'' or are ``hidden.'' \84\ 
In one case of retribution in March 2010, police in Hubei 
province held Chen Yonggang for seven days of an eight-day 
detention on suspicion of ``defamation,'' after Chen used the 
Internet to question government budget choices that he believed 
were extravagant.\85\ Chen said he would not make such Internet 
postings again. County police reportedly will give Chen 
compensation for detaining him illegally.\86\ In June, Chinese 
lawmakers discussed a second draft of the revised 
Administrative Supervision Law proposal, which included a draft 
provision designed to provide legal protection for informants 
who report suspected official corruption.\87\
    Chinese lawmakers and officials are considering 
institutional changes and measures to resolve other ongoing 
problems with official infringement of citizens' rights and to 
improve government accountability. Experts believe that a new 
round of training for county officials signals a continuing 
restructuring of county-level governance; the former system of 
``accountability upwards'' will be modified to one of 
``accountability downward.'' \88\ One official from the Party 
Construction Department of the Party Central Committee Party 
School noted that most mass incidents and frictions occur at 
the county level and stated that ``the capability of the county 
government to deal with such events is closely related to the 
stability of the whole country.'' \89\ During this reporting 
year, central officials urged local governments to eliminate 
local policies that could impinge on the rights of citizens. In 
May 2010, a Supreme People's Court vice president requested 
that local governments rapidly eliminate ``local policies'' 
that work to limit acceptance of administrative court 
suits.\90\ A May China News article pointed out that for years, 
administrative behavior has been a ``blind spot'' for judicial 
supervision, including local administrative policy documents or 
so-called ``red (letter) head documents'' issued by 
administrative organs at every level of government.\91\ The 
article noted that ``red (letter) head documents'' repeatedly 
have been found to be illegal, giving rise to numerous problems 
in administrative law; without examination for their legality, 
these documents could ``deprive citizens of their rights.'' 
\92\ During this reporting year, Guangdong province officials 
released for public comment a draft provision that would, if 
passed, limit the applicability of these ``red (letter) head 
documents'' to five years and restrict their scope in three 
areas.\93\

                          BUDGET TRANSPARENCY

    Chinese authorities at the central level urged local 
officials to share information about official budgets with the 
public, and citizens put pressure on government agencies to 
reveal their budgets. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests 
there is some variation in the willingness on the part of local 
government agencies to make their budgets public. In March 
2010, the Ministry of Finance made public national budget 
figures for the second time since early 2009, and included more 
budget categories, which increased the length of the material 
issued publicly from 4 to 12 pages.\94\ Also in March, the 
National People's Congress (NPC) reportedly requested that all 
budgets approved by the NPC be made public, including the State 
Council's budget.\95\ During this reporting year, 45 Beijing 
municipal government agencies were to make public their 
budgets, and by a May deadline, most of those agencies 
reportedly did make information available on the Internet.\96\ 
Nevertheless, a news report suggested some experts and Beijing 
residents thought that the figures made public were not 
detailed enough nor presented clearly.\97\ In October 2009, Li 
Detao, a Shenzhen resident working with Public Budget Watch, a 
volunteer group, submitted open government information requests 
to government agencies in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Nanjing.\98\ The Bureau of Finance in 
Shanghai responded to Li Detao's requests but refused to 
provide him with the information he requested, declaring it a 
``state secret.'' \99\ Officials at the Bureau of Finance in 
Guangzhou, however, called Li and informed him that the 2009 
financial budgets for 114 agencies would be placed on the 
Internet.\100\ The report said Li believes that this is among 
the first times he has seen government agencies in a first-
level (provincial-level) city make their budgets widely 
available to the public.\101\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Open Government Information
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In May 2008, the Regulations on Open Government Information (OGI
 Regulations) took effect.\102\ The OGI Regulations are part of China's
 anticorruption efforts and are intended to increase public access to
 information and expand public oversight and participation.\103\ The OGI
 Regulations require proactive disclosure of certain types of
 information by government agencies, allow for citizen requests for
 access to government information, and provide legal remedies for
 violations of the regulations. During the Commission's 2010 reporting
 year, the State Council General Office issued an opinion and the
 Supreme People's Court (SPC) issued two opinions (one proposed)
 relating to the OGI Regulations. The State Council General Office's
 opinion was issued in January 2010. That opinion affirmed guidance
 found in a 2008 opinion \104\ allowing agencies to limit who may make
 an information request. Specifically, agencies may deny requests that
 do not relate to a requester's ``special needs'' in their ``production,
 livelihood, or scientific and technological research.'' \105\ The 2010
 opinion also encourages agencies to release more information up front
 to reduce requests and to strengthen systems for determining whether
 information should be withheld on the grounds of state secrets or
 national, public, or economic security.\106\ In November 2009, the SPC
 released for public comment proposed measures concerning the hearing of
 administrative cases involving open government information (OGI).\107\
 Within the month-long consultation period, the court collected 411
 comments.\108\ Internet users and a Chinese professor expressed concern
 that the draft gives courts too much discretion to deny the release of
 information for reasons such as ``state secrets'' or so as not to
 disrupt ``normal administrative activities.'' \109\ That same month,
 the SPC issued an opinion dealing with administration litigation that
 calls on courts to ``vigorously accept'' new categories of cases,
 including OGI cases.\110\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Open Government Information--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Chinese citizens reportedly have responded to the OGI Regulations with
 ``dynamism'' amidst ongoing challenges to their ``right to know.''
 \111\ The latest annual work reports on OGI requests in some of China's
 larger cities reported numbers of requests received that ranged from
 thousands to hundreds of thousands.\112\ The level of detail provided
 on the disposition of requests varied. Shanghai, for example, provided
 information on why certain requests were denied, disclosing that 152
 requests were denied because they involved ``state secrets.'' The
 efforts of one Shenzhen resident, Li Detao, to file OGI requests for
 budget information from the governments in different locales
 illustrates some lack of uniformity regarding the handling of OGI
 requests. Shanghai officials denied Li's request for budget information
 on state secret grounds while Guangzhou officials granted his
 request.\113\ Media stories reported that officials denied or had yet
 to respond to notable OGI requests, including one Shanghai resident's
 request for information about compensation for demolished homes,\114\
 one regarding the death toll in and the costs associated with the May
 2008 Sichuan earthquake,\115\ and one regarding Shanghai lawyer Yan
 Yiming's request on China's economic stimulus spending.\116\
  Chinese and Western researchers have conducted studies assessing
 implementation of the OGI Regulations, with varying results.\117\
 Results of at least one Chinese study and one joint Chinese-Western
 study showed variation in the effectiveness of government agencies in
 implementing the OGI Regulations.\118\ Studies highlighted the need to
 strengthen OGI mechanisms within government agencies and indicated that
 Chinese citizens' awareness and use of OGI mechanisms may be relatively
 low in some areas.\119\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Open Government Information--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  According to the 2009 annual work reports from Beijing, Shanghai,
 Guangzhou, and Chongqing municipalities, the number of OGI lawsuits
 heard by courts in these jurisdictions numbered 147, 199, 3, and 1,
 respectively.\120\ Since Shanghai has had a local OGI regulation since
 2004, there is some comparative data that shows that OGI-related
 lawsuits increased from 35 cases in 2006 to a high of 258 cases in
 2008.\121\ Details regarding the disposition of the OGI court cases
 also varied.\122\ One Western expert on China's OGI noted that
 ``Chinese courts have frequently refused to accept lawsuits over
 information disclosure or have found in favor of the government.''
 \123\ Chinese media reported on notable lawsuits. A June 2010 Democracy
 and Law article reported that Shanghai lawyer Li Honghua filed lawsuits
 against 80 provincial and city governments after he was dissatisfied
 with responses he received to his requests for information on
 government spending of a 4 trillion yuan (US$588 billion) stimulus
 package. Seven courts reportedly agreed to hear his case.\124\ In
 January 2010, a court in Wuhan concluded the city's first OGI case,
 ruling that an agency had violated the law by not responding to an
 information request within the legal time limit.\125\ In May, the
 Haidian District People's Court in Beijing ruled against a plaintiff
 who had requested information about the local environmental protection
 bureau's approval of a nearby medical waste incinerator, on the grounds
 that the plaintiff did not live close enough to the waste
 facility.\126\ [For more information on implementation of the OGI
 initiative in the environmental protection sector, see Section II--
 Climate Change and the Environment.]
  Taken together, developments relating to the OGI regulations over the
 past year suggest that officials are seeking to provide greater clarity
 regarding how the regulations should be implemented, while citizen
 interest in requesting government information and seeking legal
 remedies for government inaction continues to grow.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Public Input on Draft Regulatory Instruments, Public Hearings

    Citizens and groups in China have little direct access to 
political decisionmaking processes; however, they are 
increasingly able to utilize various channels to express 
opinions regarding proposed policies and regulatory 
instruments. During this reporting year, authorities continued 
to signal they would expand public participation in 
policymaking related to issues involving the public interest. A 
March 2010 Legal Daily article outlined some of the channels 
through which experts and citizens can express their opinions 
about draft regulatory instruments including expert meetings, 
the Internet, and public participation in roundtables, 
discussion meetings, and public hearings.\127\ According to the 
article, authorities granted citizens the opportunity to submit 
suggestions on 67 administrative legal measures over a six-year 
period beginning in 2004.\128\ According to the same article, a 
spokesperson from the State Council Legislative Affairs Office 
(SCLAO) said that since June 2007, authorities have made all 
administrative regulations, excluding those involving state 
secrets and national security, available in principle on the 
Internet and open for public comment.\129\ The U.S.-China 
Business Council released in April 2010 its annual review of 
China's compliance with its policies and its bilateral 
agreements that relate to transparency. The report noted that 
the NPC had complied with regulations stipulating it must allow 
a 30-day comment period on all draft laws at least once during 
the NPC's three-reading review process.\130\ It also noted, 
however, that the SCLAO had been inconsistent in publishing 
``trade and economic-related administrative regulations and 
department rules'' for the 30-day public comment period.\131\ 
The SCLAO posted on its Web site only approximately 25 percent 
of the regulations and rules issued or posted for comment 
during the Council's report period, which represents a decline 
from the previous year.\132\
    Citizens and the media continue to express concern 
regarding the implementation and impact of public hearings. 
Public hearings in China have expanded across the country since 
1996 with the promulgation of China's Law on Administrative 
Punishment and offer limited opportunities for public 
engagement regarding various policy topics.\133\ During this 
reporting year, at least a few cities have issued local 
measures \134\ in order to implement a 2008 State Council 
decision directing cities and counties to expand the scope of 
public hearings and to establish a hearing system to solicit 
citizen opinions regarding laws, regulations, provisions, and 
major government administrative policies that are relevant to 
the interests of citizens.\135\ During this reporting year, 
several news articles reported that citizens were concerned 
about the implementation of water price hearings because of 
problems reported in several cases around the country.\136\ In 
some of these cases, relevant authorities tried to prevent 
critics from attending hearings or excluded certain groups of 
citizens that may be adversely affected by the proposed policy, 
leaving them with no opportunity to speak out, among several 
other issues.\137\ A Chinese university professor argued in a 
December 2009 China Daily commentary that the impact of public 
hearings on policy is limited.\138\

                         Commercial Rule of Law


                              Introduction

    As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), China is 
bound by commitments outlined under both the WTO agreements and 
China's accession documents.\1\ During the Commission's 2010 
reporting year, foreign investors in China have found an 
increasingly uneven playing field and lack of progress in 
China's compliance with WTO principles of transparency and 
national treatment, i.e., treating foreign and domestic 
companies equally with respect to goods, services, and 
intellectual property rights.\2\ The Chinese government's 
implementation of its WTO commitments, including those 
regarding transparency and non-discrimination, is a measure of 
the overall development of rule of law in China and of the 
Chinese government's willingness to abide by its international 
commitments.
    The Chinese government's record in meeting WTO commitments 
is mixed. When China joined the WTO, the Chinese government 
agreed to adhere to WTO transparency standards, under which all 
laws, regulations, and other measures relating to trade shall 
be published in a timely manner.\3\ According to China's two 
largest trading partners, the United States and the European 
Union, the Chinese government's current record in transparency 
is poor.\4\ Further, when joining the WTO in 2001, the Chinese 
government 
committed to ensuring that all trade-related measures would be 
administered in a non-discriminatory manner and that, under the 
principle of national treatment, foreign and domestically owned 
companies would be treated the same. However, the government 
has become increasingly protectionist in the period since 
2008.\5\ One June 2010 report quoted the head of the U.S. 
delegation to the WTO as saying, ``China has become much more 
focused on developing industrial policy initiatives aimed at 
helping Chinese enterprises move up the value chain in key 
industries, and China has demonstrated a highly selective 
interest in continuing to open its market more fully and fairly 
to foreign participation.'' \6\
    The foreign business community has found increased problems 
in the Chinese government's regulatory system and its 
application to business operations in China. The AmCham-China 
2010 Business Climate Survey for the first time found 
``inconsistent interpretation and implementation of laws'' to 
be the top challenge for the 318 members that responded to the 
survey.\7\ The survey also found increased concern over 
``obtaining required licenses and national protectionism, 
coupled with consistent concern about bureaucracy in China . . 
. .'' \8\
    The Chinese government has increasingly made use of 
industrial policies, which favor state-owned companies at the 
expense of foreign-owned companies,\9\ and in some cases, such 
as the auto parts import provisions of the 2004 Auto Industrial 
Policy, which are not in keeping with WTO requirements on non-
discrimination.\10\ This jeopardizes equality before the law 
and neutral legal enforcement. Such use of industrial policies 
also negatively impacts transparency.

          Industrial Policies and Commercial Law Developments

    The Chinese government's use of industrial policies to 
direct economic growth, rather than strictly relying on market-
based principles, hinders development of rule of law.\11\ 
Industrial policies lay out comprehensive frameworks for the 
government's direction of relevant sectors, providing, for 
example, details on subsidies and other benefits, restructuring 
of key industrial entities, financing, technological 
development, and export goals. Industrial policies are 
implemented through various measures, including laws and 
regulations, which in some instances do not comply with WTO 
requirements, as in the WTO case on the Chinese government's 
imposition of measures affecting the import of auto parts. In 
that case, the WTO dispute settlement body found in 2008 that 
certain provisions of China's Policy on Development of the 
Automotive Industry, together with implementing legislation, 
violated WTO rules.\12\ Under China's Protocol of Accession, 
the government agreed to provide comment periods for new 
legislation when possible.\13\ However, as industrial policies 
spell out the scope and direction of legislation, comments on 
the legislation may carry less weight, rendering the comment 
period less meaningful.
    Discussions of two industrial policies, cultural industrial 
policy and automotive policy, follow below.

                  Industrial Policy--Cultural Industry

    During this reporting year, the Chinese government moved 
forward with a plan for promoting the so-called cultural 
industry through subsidies and other forms of support and 
guidance, passing legislation, and arranging financing in the 
sector. In July 2009, China Daily reported that the State 
Council had adopted a plan for the industry's development in 
light of the financial crisis,\14\ and on September 26, 2009, 
the central government published the Plan to Vigorously Promote 
the Cultural Industry (Plan).\15\ The Plan covers filmmaking, 
publishing, printing and reproduction, advertising, the 
performing arts and entertainment, animation, cultural 
exhibitions, and digitalization,\16\ and lists a number of 
policy measures for the Chinese government to take to further 
develop the industry, including, for example, financing, 
reforming the state-owned cultural entities, preferential land 
use and tax policies, development of creative industry parks, 
assistance with exporting, provision of subsidies, and 
investment.\17\
    The Plan was issued within two months after the panel 
established by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body reported its 
findings in a case concerning Chinese regulation of importation 
and distribution of certain foreign cultural products.\18\ In 
that case, the WTO panel found Chinese regulations restricting 
the ability of 
foreign companies and Chinese-foreign joint ventures to import 
or distribute reading materials, audiovisual home entertainment 
products, and sound recordings, or to import films for 
theatrical performances, violated WTO rules.\19\
    Though an industrial plan lays out the framework for the 
development of the sector, it is implemented through 
legislation and other similar measures by responsible 
government departments. During the period since the issuance of 
the Plan, government departments have issued a number of 
implementation measures. In September 2009, the Ministry of 
Culture--the ministry with overall supervisory responsibility 
for the industry--published its Guiding Opinion Concerning 
Speeding Up Development of the Cultural 
Industry (Guiding Opinion).\20\ The Guiding Opinion was dated 
September 10, but was not published until after the State 
Council 
announced the Plan, and sets out additional details on the 
covered industries and on the means to accelerate development 
of the industry.

    Financing. The Plan to Vigorously Promote the Cultural 
Industry (Plan) calls for financing of the industry.\21\ In 
September 2009, a report indicated that the central government 
would establish a fund to invest in the cultural industry and 
that China Film would be recommended for listing on China's 
stock exchange.\22\ The China Securities Journal reported on 
March 30, 2010, six months after the issuance of the Plan, that 
the domestic entertainment and media industry would grow 9.5 
percent annually but noted that cultural enterprises in China 
still had trouble obtaining financing.\23\ On April 8, the 
central bank and nine other government 
departments issued the Guidance on Financial Support To 
Reinvigorate and Develop the Culture Industry, which related to 
providing financing to support the cultural industry.\24\
    Exports. The Plan calls for expanding trade in Chinese 
cultural products and for Chinese cultural products to have 
greater influence on international markets.\25\ In 2010, 6 
government departments accredited 211 printing and reproduction 
companies as Major Culture Export Enterprises and 255 printing 
and reproduction projects as Major Culture Export Projects, 
which the Ministry of Commerce would support to become more 
competitive on export markets.\26\
    Sectoral policies. During this reporting year, government 
departments in charge of particular cultural sectors issued 
measures implementing the Plan. For example, in January 2010, 
the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) 
issued a guiding opinion for the development of printed 
materials, digital and 
non-paper media, animation and electronic games, and press and 
publications distribution and logistics; \27\ the Ministry of 
Culture accredited 100 enterprises as Animation Enterprises, 
eligible for preferential tax policies; \28\ and the State 
Council issued Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Development of 
a Flourishing Movie Industry.\29\ In March, GAPP worked out a 
plan for international best sellers.\30\
    Regulation of markets. The Chinese government regulates the 
cultural industry strictly, as evidenced by the strict 
censorship prevalent in China.\31\ In December 2009, the 
Ministry of Commerce issued a notice on special management of 
the cultural markets during the New Year and the weeklong 
Spring Festival, including supervising online games and 
Internet cafes, online music and cell phone music, and lip-
syncing and unlawful performances.\32\ [For information on 
censorship in China, see Section II--Freedom of Expression.]

                     Industrial Policy--Automotive

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 
government revised its 2004 Auto Industrial Policy, and 
implemented its Auto Stimulus Program, which it had issued in 
March 2009.\33\ The dramatic development of China's auto sector 
has been guided by China's 2004 Auto Industrial Policy.\34\ The 
policy sets out comprehensive guidelines for China's auto 
industry, including the development and acquisition of 
technology, structural adjustment of the auto sector through 
the formation of large corporate groups, foreign investment in 
the sector, growth in the domestic auto market, and automobile 
exports.\35\
    In 2006, the United States, European Union, and Canada 
challenged certain provisions of China's auto policy concerning 
tariff rates applicable to the import of auto parts and 
assemblies, and the legislation implementing these provisions, 
at the WTO.\36\ The WTO dispute panel found that the provisions 
discriminated against imported auto parts and thus were 
inconsistent with WTO requirements.\37\ The Chinese government 
appealed the panel's ruling, which subsequently was upheld by 
the WTO Appellate Body. Accordingly, the panel requested that 
the government bring the auto parts import provisions of the 
policy, as well as its implementing legislation, into 
conformity with WTO obligations by September 1, 2009.\38\ The 
government did so in August 2009, effective September 1, 
2009.\39\ In the five years from the issuance of the policy 
till the import provisions were revised, foreign automakers 
with factories in China started buying parts produced in China, 
in part because of the discriminatory measures.\40\
    Both the auto policy and the Program for the Adjustment and 
Rejuvenation of the Auto Industry call for development of 
automotive technology through a combination of imported 
technology and independent research and development, or 
indigenous innovation.\41\ Chinese companies' overseas 
acquisitions, including state-owned Beijing Automotive's 
acquisition of rights to certain Saab technology from General 
Motors in December 2009 \42\ and Zhejiang Geely's purchase of 
Volvo from Ford in March 2010 (financed in large part by 
Chinese state-owned banks), have provided access to foreign 
technology.\43\

                              Transparency

    The Chinese government's implementation of its WTO 
transparency commitments has been uneven. In its Protocol of 
Accession to the WTO, the government committed to publish all 
laws, regulations, or other measures affecting trade, to allow 
a reasonable comment period before implementation, and to 
establish or designate an official journal for this 
purpose.\44\ The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in a 2010 
report notes that while the State Council issued regulations in 
2001 requiring comment periods and hearings, ``only a small 
proportion of new or revised laws and regulations have been 
issued after a period for public comment, and even in these 
cases the amount of time provided for public comment generally 
has been short.'' \45\ According to the USTR report, a 2006 
State Council notice directed all government authorities to 
send trade-related rules to the Ministry of Commerce for 
publication in its gazette, but compliance with this 
requirement is ``far from complete.'' \46\ The USTR's finding 
is similar to the April 2010 analysis conducted by the US-China 
Business Council on transparency in China.\47\
    China's transparency obligations have been the subject of 
several dialogues between the U.S. and Chinese governments.\48\ 
Most recently, at a meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce 
and Trade in October 2009, both governments agreed to continue 
to cooperate and to develop a workplan on transparency for 
2009-2010.\49\ [For more information on transparency, see box 
titled Open Government Information in Section III--Institutions 
of Democratic Governance.]

                         Government Procurement

    In 2009, Chinese government procurement exceeded 700 
billion yuan (US$147 billion).\50\ This is an area of 
importance to Chinese citizens and to non-Chinese companies 
alike. As noted in a WTO overview, ``Procurement systems have a 
significant impact on the efficiency of the use of public funds 
and, more generally, on public confidence in government and on 
good governance.'' \51\ When China joined the WTO, the Chinese 
government made several commitments related to government 
procurement, including that it would begin negotiations to join 
the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) under the WTO ``as 
soon as possible.'' \52\ While there has been some minimal 
progress toward this end, it is still subject to 
negotiation.\53\
    During this reporting year, the Chinese government 
continued to develop legislation to improve its procurement 
system for domestic companies. In January 2010, the government 
issued for comment draft Implementation Rules for the 2003 
Government Procurement Law,\54\ which clarify certain open 
issues in the law. According to a China Daily report, the draft 
``is aimed at specifying the law, including details over 
domestic goods in government procurement, to further fight any 
corruption in the purchasing process.'' \55\ The draft rules 
specify when the procuring party should withdraw from a 
procurement proceeding because of a relationship to the 
supplier, and provide details on the definition of domestic 
goods, projects, and services. On May 21, 2010, four Chinese 
government departments issued the Notice on Collecting Public 
Comments on Administrative Measures for Government Procurement 
of Domestically Made Products.\56\ The draft clarifies that 
domestic goods and services include products of foreign-
invested companies in China.\57\

                         Indigenous Innovation

    The Chinese government's use of industrial policy 
intersects with government procurement in the area of 
indigenous innovation. China's industrial policies have called 
for Chinese domestic development and ownership of 
technology.\58\ The government's policy on indigenous 
innovation is directed toward encouraging technological 
development in certain key sectors of the economy, with final 
consideration the development of potential exports, as well as 
substitution of products using Chinese technology for imported 
products using non-Chinese technology. Although indigenous 
innovation policy only applies to government procurement at the 
central level, there are concerns with the policy's application 
at the provincial and local levels.\59\
    Although the Chinese government has encouraged indigenous 
innovation since at least 2007,\60\ there has been significant 
regulatory activity during this reporting year, which has led 
to widespread concern from the international business community 
and to high-level United States and China discussions of 
indigenous innovation. In November 2009, three Chinese 
government departments issued the Circular on Launching 2009 
National Indigenous Innovation Accreditation Work,\61\ 
requiring companies to apply by December 2009 for their 
products to be ``accredited'' as qualifying for government 
procurement. The circular, which covers six broad categories of 
products in high technology, or new energy or energy efficient 
areas, provided that only products using intellectual property 
initially registered in China would be eligible for 
accreditation.\62\ In December 2009, four government 
departments issued the Catalogue Guiding Domestic Innovation in 
Major Technology Equipment, which listed products that could be 
certified as indigenous innovation products, eligible for 
certain procurement preferences.\63\ Although China is not a 
member of the WTO GPA, the policies potentially raise market 
access or intellectual property issues under the WTO.\64\
    Foreign government response to the December documents was 
negative,\65\ and perhaps in response, on April 10, 2010, the 
Chinese government issued a draft notice without the 
requirement that intellectual property first be registered in 
China.\66\ Other issues remain, including the resolution of 
conflicts between national policies and local-level government 
decisions on indigenous innovation,\67\ and a group of large 
American, Canadian, and European business associations 
submitted a letter to the Chinese government commenting on the 
draft, urging China to join the GPA, and urging the Chinese 
government ``not to publish the indigenous innovation product 
list and not to carry forward this program.'' \68\

                      Intellectual Property Rights

    China's record on protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) remained poor during this reporting year. China is 
on the U.S. Government's Priority Watch List for 2010, and 
named in the Special 301 Report of April 30, 2010, which notes, 
``China's IPR enforcement regime remains largely ineffective 
and non-deterrent.'' \69\ According to the report, ``IPR 
enforcement at the local level is hampered by poor coordination 
among Chinese ministries and agencies, local protectionism and 
corruption, high thresholds for initiating investigations and 
prosecuting criminal cases, lack of training, and inadequate 
and non-transparent processes.'' \70\
    In October 2009, revisions to China's Patent Law went into 
effect, and in February 2010, revisions to the Patent Law's 
implementing rules went into effect.\71\ While the revisions 
provide some clarification, the Special 301 Report notes some 
concerns, ``including the effect of disclosure of origin 
requirements on patent validity, inventor remuneration, and the 
scope of and procedures relating to compulsory licensing, among 
other matters.'' \72\ The National People's Congress revised 
the Copyright Law, effective April 1, 2010, to close a loophole 
on the scope of protection and to add an article concerning 
registration of pledges of copyright.\73\ To implement the 
law's language on pledges of copyright, the National Copyright 
Administration issued for comments a draft Measure for 
Registration of Copyright Pledge on April 26, 2010.\74\
    According to the Supreme People's Court (SPC) 2009 Annual 
Report on Intellectual Property Cases, there were 440 IPR cases 
pending before the SPC in 2009, an increase of 33.7 percent 
over 2008.\75\ The SPC concluded 390 IPR cases in 2009, an 
increase of 111.96 percent over 2008.\76\ A Chinese court ruled 
that Microsoft had infringed the rights of Chinese software 
maker Zhongyi Electronics in November 2009.\77\ However, in 
April 2010, Microsoft won a major case against a Chinese 
insurance company, Dazhong Insurance, which was using pirated 
copies of Microsoft software.\78\ Dazhong indicated it would 
appeal the ruling, accusing Microsoft of acting 
monopolistically.\79\

                            Antimonopoly Law

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, two of the 
three government departments charged with enforcing China's 
2008 Antimonopoly Law (AML) issued implementing legislation. To 
clarify the merger control procedures, the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) issued two sets of measures on concentrations of 
businesses, both of which came into effect on January 1, 
2010.\80\ The State Administration for Industry and Commerce on 
May 25, 2010, issued three draft rules for comment, covering 
monopoly agreements, abuse of dominance, and administrative 
monopolies.\81\ If promulgated, the draft rules will provide 
greater clarity on the types of conduct forbidden by the AML.
    The AML has the potential to enhance competition in the 
Chinese economy and to benefit Chinese consumers, but may 
conflict with Chinese industrial policies encouraging the 
development of large domestic companies and protecting state-
owned enterprises. A comparison of MOFCOM's merger rulings in 
cases involving non-Chinese companies with MOFCOM's lack of 
review of mergers of large Chinese state-owned companies 
highlights this conflict. During this reporting year, MOFCOM 
has blocked or given conditional approvals to a number of deals 
involving foreign companies, in some cases forcing global 
companies to divest assets outside of China.\82\ In the period 
since the AML came into effect in August 2008 to the end of 
2009, MOFCOM has completed 60 merger reviews, 6 of which MOFCOM 
approved with conditions, and 1 of which MOFCOM blocked. MOFCOM 
only publishes rulings on mergers that it rejects or approves 
with conditions, so it is difficult to tell whether the parties 
to unconditionally approved mergers are state-owned enterprises 
or non-Chinese companies. The six that were conditionally 
approved involved mergers between non-Chinese parties.\83\ This 
has led some multinationals to believe the AML ``is being used 
as a tool to protect domestic rivals from competition and 
suspect that--unlike in the US, EU and Japan--merger reviews 
are open to industrial policy considerations.'' \84\ However, 
as a matter of industrial policy, the Chinese government 
intends to create large ``national champions,'' for example, in 
automobiles and steel.\85\ Indeed, the 2008 merger of two large 
state-owned enterprises, China Unicom and China Netcom, was 
large enough to trigger a merger filing with MOFCOM but, 
reportedly, none was filed.\86\

                    Food Safety and Product Quality


                              FOOD SAFETY

    Following the passage of China's Food Safety Law in March 
2009 and implementing legislation \87\ during this reporting 
year, the Chinese government continued to develop its food 
safety regime, though problems remain. The Chinese government 
issued regulations on food additives and on monitoring food 
safety and a 
rectification plan for the catering industry, and established a 
high-level Food Safety Commission headed by Vice Premier Li 
Keqiang to coordinate the work of government departments 
involved in food safety.\88\ Nonetheless, there still are risks 
in the food supply, according to a report by Radio Free Asia, 
as indicated by recent cases of poisoned chives and dyed 
beans.\89\ The report notes that analysts point to several 
problems, including poor government supervision, lack of 
coordination among departments, and lack of compensation.\90\ 
Parents of the children sickened by the contaminated Sanlu milk 
in 2008 continue to seek redress.\91\ Zhao Lianhai, who 
organized a group representing the parents and is a parent of a 
sickened child, was tried in March for ``inciting social 
disorder,'' according to his lawyer.\92\ Four parents, unable 
to obtain redress in China, sued in small claims court in Hong 
Kong in April 2010.\93\ However, the Hong Kong court refused 
the case on jurisdictional grounds.\94\

                            PRODUCT QUALITY

    Problems with the quality of Chinese products are well 
known outside China, with recent cases of toxic sofas exported 
to England, reported cadmium in children's jewelry imported 
into the United States, and toxic drywall imported into the 
United States.\95\ The General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine has taken some steps, 
including setting up a blacklist system in January 2010 for 
companies with illegal quality problems, and announced plans to 
establish a recall system for home appliances this year.\96\

                           Tort Liability Law

    The National People's Congress Standing Committee passed 
the Tort Liability Law in December 2009.\97\ The law took 
effect July 1, 2010, and covers product liability and product 
recalls.\98\ The law provides for punitive damages where a 
producer or seller of a defective product has knowledge of the 
defect, but still produces or sells the product, and it causes 
serious injury or death.\99\

               Exchange Rate Policy and Export Restraints

    The value of the Chinese yuan continues to be the subject 
of criticism and concern among policymakers and the general 
public in the United States and around the world. Article XV(4) 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides 
that contracting parties ``shall not, by exchange action, 
frustrate the intent of the provisions of [the GATT], nor, by 
trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.'' \100\ The 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
state that ``each member shall . . . avoid manipulating 
exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to 
prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an 
unfair competitive advantage over other members[.]'' \101\
    From July 2008 till June 2010, China maintained a yuan-
dollar exchange rate of about 6.83 yuan to the dollar.\102\ 
According to one economist, this has given Chinese 
manufacturing ``a large cost advantage over its rivals, leading 
to huge trade surpluses.'' \103\ On June 19, 2010, just before 
a G-20 meeting, Chinese officials made statements concerning 
greater exchange rate flexibility for the yuan.\104\ As of the 
end of August 2010, however, there has been no real change. 
According to a July 8 Treasury Department report, ``China's 
continued foreign reserve accumulation, the limited 
appreciation of China's real effective exchange rate relative 
to rapid productivity growth in the traded goods sector, and 
the persistence of current account surpluses even during a 
period when China's trading partners were in deep recession 
together suggest that the renminbi remains undervalued.'' \105\
    During this reporting year, the United States challenged 
China's restraints on exports of certain key input materials at 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). According to the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR), these restraints tilt the playing field 
in favor of Chinese manufacturers by lowering prices of inputs 
to manufacturers in China, giving them a competitive price 
advantage.\106\ When it joined the WTO, China committed to 
eliminate export restraints, with certain exceptions enumerated 
in China's WTO accession documents.\107\ However, according to 
a 2010 USTR report on foreign trade barriers, ``China has 
increased the artificial advantages afforded to its downstream 
producers by making the export quotas more restrictive and by 
imposing or increasing export duties on many raw materials at 
issue.'' \108\ The United States brought a WTO challenge 
against China over export restraints on nine materials used in 
the manufacture of steel and chemicals, joined by the European 
Union and other third parties.\109\ In March 2010, the 
Director-General of the WTO composed a panel to hear the 
case,\110\ and in May, the panel made certain preliminary 
rulings in response to a request by China.\111\
    There are reports that USTR is considering a separate WTO 
case against China concerning its restraints on exports of rare 
earth metals, which are essential for production of certain 
high technology products,\112\ and are the found in many 
products, including, for example, ``iPads, BlackBerries, plasma 
TVs, lasers, wind turbines, hybrid engines, and smart bombs.'' 
\113\ USTR cited the policies on rare earths during China's 
2009 Transitional Review Mechanism.\114\ In 2009, China 
supplied about 97 percent of the global demand for rare 
earths.\115\ However, China has cut its export quotas, 
decreasing its rare earth shipments for the second half of 2010 
by 72 percent,\116\ and is planning to consolidate domestic 
production in a few Chinese companies.\117\ Foreign companies 
are not allowed to engage in rare earth prospecting or mining 
in China,\118\ but can enter into rare earth smelting or 
refining joint ventures with Chinese partners.\119\

                                Property

    Under China's Constitution and system of property law, land 
is categorized into ``urban land'' and rural, or 
``collectively-owned land.'' \120\ Urban land is owned by the 
state.\121\ Urban land cannot be sold, but the state can grant 
the right to use urban land for a term of years upon payment of 
a land grant premium. The period of the grant is 70 years for 
land classified as residential, 50 years for industrial, and 40 
years for recreational/tourism/commercial.\122\ While only the 
state can grant urban land use rights, a grantee can transfer 
such rights. The parties cannot, however, change the type of 
usage, i.e., residential, industrial, or recreational/tourism/
commercial. Collectively owned land can be used only for 
agricultural purposes, or for residences or services for 
farmers, who can enter into land use contracts with the 
collective for a period of 30 years.\123\
    China's real property system raises both commercial rule of 
law and human rights issues. During the Commission's 2010 
reporting year, there were many cases of expropriation and 
abuses by local governments and property developers, including 
forced evictions.\124\ The International Federation for Human 
Rights notes that there are no statistics on the number of 
evictions in China but states that, according to the Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions, ``at least 1,25 million 
households were demolished and nearly 3,7 million people were 
evicted'' in the period from 1997 to 2007.\125\ Land disputes, 
especially forced evictions, are a major cause of social unrest 
in China.\126\ As a commercial matter, the supply of land, 
including through conversion of collectively owned land into 
urban land for industrial use, is necessary for China's 
economic development and the land sales provide revenue for the 
government.\127\ According to one ``semiofficial'' estimate, 
revenue from land sales makes up as much as 60 percent of local 
government revenue.\128\ Further, according to at least one 
expert, the Chinese government subsidizes production by its 
state-owned enterprises in part by providing them with free or 
undervalued land.\129\ This brings down costs, making Chinese 
exports more competitive internationally.

         EXPROPRIATION OF URBAN AND RURAL LAND, COMPENSATION, 
                               AND ABUSES

    The dramatic changes in Chinese land law since the 
country's founding in 1949 have resulted in conflicting 
regulations, and in many cases, unclear title, which coupled 
with the rapid rise in property values, has led to widespread 
demolitions and evictions.\130\ In some cases, there is 
collusion between local officials and property developers, for 
example, through officials' ownership interests in the property 
developers, or through family relationships.\131\ Article 11 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which the Chinese government has ratified, provides for 
the right to housing, and General Comment 4, paragraph 18, 
adopted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in 1991, provides that ``instances of forced evictions 
are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the 
Covenant and can only be justified in the most exceptional 
circumstances.'' \132\

Urban Land Expropriation

    Expropriation of urban land for redevelopment is governed 
by China's Constitution and legislation including the 2007 
Property Law, the 2004 Law on Administration of Urban Real 
Property, and the 2001 Regulations on Government Housing 
Demolition in Urban Areas (2001 Demolition Regulations).\133\ 
The Property Law allows expropriation of urban land in the 
``public interest,'' subject to compensation for demolition and 
resettlement.\134\ After the Property Law came into effect, the 
Law on Administration of Urban Real Property was revised to add 
a new Article 6, providing that the state may expropriate urban 
land in the ``public interest,'' subject to granting 
compensation to the rights holder. Neither law defines the term 
``public interest,'' which allows abuse of expropriation.\135\ 
Article 6 further provides that when an individual's residence 
is expropriated, that individual's living conditions should be 
protected.\136\
    There has been widespread abuse in the process of 
expropriation of urban land, with forced evictions, lack of 
adequate compensation, and poor procedural protection.\137\ 
Owners who refuse to leave their homes in some cases have been 
harassed, beaten, or illegally detained.\138\ There have been 
countless cases of forced eviction reported in the press,\139\ 
including the case of a Sichuan woman who set herself on fire 
in November 2009 to protest the demolition of her home.\140\ 
This case triggered a debate among Chinese Internet users 
concerning forced demolitions.\141\
    In December 2009, five law professors from Peking 
University sent an open letter to the National People's 
Congress calling for the repeal or amendment of the 2001 
Demolition Regulations, which they said violate the 
Constitution and the Property Law.\142\ In January 2010, the 
government issued for public comment draft Regulations for 
Expropriation and Compensation of Residential Buildings on 
State Owned Land.\143\ The draft provides that evictions must 
be in the ``public interest'' and sets out seven categories of 
public interest, such as national defense installations.\144\ 
However, the draft allows expropriation other than in the 
public interest in certain circumstances where the developers 
get permission from the relevant government departments.\145\ 
The draft contains procedures for expropriation with greater 
protection for evicted residents, including public comment 
periods and better terms of compensation payment and 
calculation. At least two of the law professors who had called 
for the amendment considered the draft an improvement, though 
it allows certain demolitions that do not meet the public 
interest requirement and it does not cover expropriation of 
collectively owned land.\146\ As of July 2010 the draft had not 
been passed. One of the five professors, Jiang Ming'an, told 
the South China Morning Post that, ``if the draft regulation 
goes into effect, the western provinces would barely be able to 
attract investment, as real estate developers would find it 
difficult to acquire land under the new rules.'' Noting the 
reliance of local governments on income from land sales, Jiang 
said that ``less government revenue could affect the 
implementation of projects that aim to improve people's 
livelihoods.'' \147\ The government has issued other documents 
since the publication of the draft in January 2010 to address 
problems with forced evictions, including a State Council 
directive issued in May to stop forced demolition and a 
Ministry of Land and Resources notice issued in July to local 
governments concerning compensation to homeowners.\148\ In May, 
China Daily reported that the State Council had ordered 
localities to put in place land compensation standards before 
July.\149\

Expropriation of Collectively Owned Land

    The draft Regulations for Expropriation and Compensation of 
Residential Buildings on State Owned Land apply to urban land 
only, leaving rural residents with a lower level of protection 
than that provided by the draft.\150\ Many of the disputes 
leading to mass protests involve collectively owned land around 
major cities.\151\ Though farmers can enter into 30-year 
contracts with their collectives for use of collectively owned 
land,\152\ in some cases, the village committee takes the land 
back to ``reallocate'' it.\153\ In other cases, the village 
committee, local government, and developer conspire to convert 
land into urban land, which the local government can then sell 
to the developer.\154\ Finally, the Property Law mandates 
payment of compensation for the land, fixtures, and crops; 
subsidies for resettlement; and premiums for the farmers' 
social security.\155\ Often, these amounts are paid to the 
village committee, and in some cases, very little reaches the 
original inhabitants.\156\

                 COOLING AN OVERHEATING PROPERTY MARKET

    During the reporting year, the Chinese government took a 
number of measures at the national and local levels to cool the 
property market and curb speculation, and the Communist Party 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection issued rules to 
stop officials from ``meddling in the real estate industry,'' 
in a nod to corruption in the construction sector.\157\ These 
efforts were against the backdrop of a surge in property prices 
of 23.6 percent in 2009.\158\ In January 2010, the State 
Council issued a notice ordering local governments to curb 
speculation and provide affordable housing for residents.\159\ 
In April, the State Council issued the Circular on Determined 
Suppression of the Exceedingly Rapid Rise of Certain Urban 
Housing Prices.\160\ The Bank of China announced that, in 
principle, it would stop issuing home loans to purchasers who 
already owned two or more homes,\161\ and reportedly the 
Chinese government planned to put a moratorium on real estate 
firms raising capital.\162\ The Ministry of Land and Resources 
issued the 
Circular on Issues Relevant To Strengthening the Supply and 
Regulation of Land Use for Real Property in March 2010.\163\ A 
number of localities, including Hainan, Chongqing, Beijing, and 
Shanghai, introduced measures as well.\164\

                           Access to Justice


                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Commission 
observed instances in which Chinese officials failed to meet 
international and domestic standards in upholding and 
protecting citizens' access to justice. International human 
rights standards require effective remedies for official 
violations of citizen rights. Article 8 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provides: ``Everyone has the right 
to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law.'' \1\ Article 2 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China has 
signed but not yet ratified, requires that all parties to the 
ICCPR ensure that persons whose rights or freedoms are violated 
``have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.'' 
\2\ China's Constitution similarly provides protections, under 
Article 41, for citizens seeking to petition or criticize the 
Chinese government for ``violation of the law or dereliction of 
duty by any state organ or functionary.'' \3\
    Chinese citizens, particularly disadvantaged groups--such 
as ethnic minorities, religious adherents, and laid-off 
workers--however, continue to face substantial obstacles in 
seeking remedies for violations of their legal rights by 
government entities and officials. During this reporting year, 
international media and domestic news sources widely reported 
on a range of systemic obstacles to justice, from the official 
targeting of human rights advocates to the unlawful detention 
of petitioners.
    The National People's Congress Standing Committee issued 
laws and regulations--including a revision to the State 
Compensation Law and a new Mediation Law--which, if faithfully 
and effectively enforced, may improve access to justice for 
Chinese citizens in the future. However, the Chinese 
government's policy of targeting Chinese human rights defenders 
and lawyers that handle ``sensitive'' case work continued 
unabated, jeopardizing the potential of these reforms to 
produce positive results.\4\ Systemic abuses within China's 
xinfang (letters and visits), or petitioning, system continue 
to reflect official unwillingness to protect the legal rights 
of Chinese citizens.\5\

                    Administrative Law Developments

    During this reporting year, the Chinese government 
continued to promote administrative law reforms that reportedly 
aim to provide greater oversight of state agencies, protect 
citizen interests, and enhance supervision of government 
employees. The administrative law system in China, however, 
remains beset with fundamental institutional challenges. For 
instance, although the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) 
gives Chinese citizens the right to file lawsuits to challenge 
``concrete'' administrative acts that violate their lawful 
rights and interests, Chinese media sources have 
consistently criticized difficulties within the legal system 
that undermine the effectiveness of the ALL.\6\ In November 
2009, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) addressed concerns over 
administrative litigation by issuing an opinion on the 
protection of administrative litigants, which aims to 
strengthen the system for accepting administrative cases and to 
resolve ``complainant difficulties.'' \7\ In May 2010, however, 
the Legal Daily criticized the ``chronic [justice] problems'' 
that exist in administrative lawsuits (commonly referred to as 
``citizens sue officials''), due in part to the problem of 
lower level courts creating policies to restrict citizens from 
exercising administrative litigation rights.\8\ According to a 
May 2010 article in the Southern Metropolis Daily, the low 
success rate of administrative lawsuits not only reflects the 
reality of ``citizen-official'' power dynamics, but also 
demonstrates the ``awkwardness'' of the ALL.\9\ The article 
notes that even when plaintiffs win their cases, the 
``difficulty of implementing'' the decisions remains.\10\
    In addition, in June 2010, Chinese officials announced that 
revisions to the Administrative Reconsideration Law (ARL) would 
be included in the 2010 annual legislative agenda of the State 
Council.\11\ The ARL allows Chinese citizens to submit an 
application to State Council departments for administrative 
review of specific government actions that violate the 
applicant's legal rights and interests.\12\ In July, a China 
University of Politics and Law professor said the scope of the 
ARL should be expanded: ``the scope of administrative 
reconsideration cases should be broader than the scope of 
administrative litigation--except where otherwise provided by 
law, any administrative influence over the rights of citizens 
should be included within the scope of reconsideration.'' \13\ 
In July, Gao Fengtao, Deputy Director of the State Council's 
Legislative Affairs Office, told official news media: 
``Although administrative reconsideration has made significant 
progress and achieved significant 
results, the functional role of the administrative 
reconsideration system has yet to be effectively developed.'' 
\14\
    In April 2010, the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee (NPCSC) adopted the first revision to the 1994 State 
Compensation Law (SCL) in more than 15 years.\15\ The 
amendments to the SCL reportedly will expand the scope of state 
liability and grant citizens greater ability to obtain 
compensation.\16\ The revised SCL, which will go into effect in 
December 2010, includes amendments that will allow citizens to 
claim compensation for psychological injury, will enhance 
detainees' protections by allowing 
compensation when authorities sanction the mistreatment of 
criminal suspects in detention centers, and will shift the 
burden of proof to authorities when a detainee dies or is 
incapacitated, so that officials will now be required to 
provide evidence demonstrating they were not responsible.\17\ 
Under the revised SCL, victims will be 
allowed to apply directly for compensation; the current SCL 
stipulates ``victims should first apply for state compensation 
at the department which caused the loss, and . . . in some 
cases, the citizen must first obtain written acknowledgement of 
violation from the department before applying for 
compensation.'' \18\ The April amendments come after years of 
criticism over the SCL's effectiveness. The law, which had been 
dubbed the ``Non-Compensation Law'' by many due to its 
complicated procedures, underwent one draft amendment in 2008 
and two in 2009.\19\ In 2009, Chinese courts tried a total of 
1,531 cases in which citizens applied for state 
compensation.\20\ Only one-third of the complainants, however, 
received compensation, according to the Southern Metropolis 
Daily.\21\ The recently revised SCL received some public 
criticism for not including earlier draft recommendations on 
prolonged detention, which would have allowed for state 
compensation in cases where criminal suspects were detained 
wrongly within the period stipulated by the Criminal Procedure 
Law (up to a total of 37 days).\22\
    In June 2010, the NPCSC endorsed amendments to the 
Administrative Supervision Law (ASL), which entered into effect 
on October 1, 2010.\23\ The ASL fulfills an important function 
in China's 
national legal system, stipulating measures that bolster 
administrative control, cover government oversight, and boost 
agency efficiency. The revised ASL aims to expand the scope of 
supervision from administrative agencies to those more broadly 
involved in public management activities. In addition, if 
properly implemented, the ASL will improve the monitoring of 
agencies by strengthening the responsibility to protect 
whistleblowers and by stipulating that individuals who reveal 
an informant's personal information may be punished according 
to the law.\24\ The issue of retaliation against whistleblowers 
has become a serious problem for the law's implementation--the 
Supreme People's Procuratorate revealed in late June that 
``approximately 70 percent of informants suffered varying 
degrees of retaliation or covert retaliation.'' \25\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Mediation Reform: The People's Mediation Law
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Over the 2010 reporting year, the Commission observed ongoing
 government efforts to advance and expand China's system of dispute
 settlement through mediation.\26\ China's official state media claim
 that local-level mediation of civil disputes has existed in China for
 ``thousands of years.'' \27\ In recent years, however, the Chinese
 government has promoted an official ``great mediation'' (da tiaojie)
 campaign nationally in part to relieve pressure on courts amid what has
 been deemed a ``litigation explosion.'' \28\ According to a Ministry of
 Justice official, by the end of 2009, the country had 4.94 million
 mediators (renmin tiaojie yuan) and 824,000 mediation organizations
 (renmin tiaojie zuzhi).\29\ In June 2010, Xinhua reported that these
 organizations handled 7.67 million cases in 2009 and that less than one
 percent of mediated cases went on to litigation.\30\ In 2009, Sichuan
 Province mediated 527,000 disputes, which the government claimed
 contributed to a 23.5 percent drop in ``mass incidents'' and a 47.3
 percent decline in grievances filed through the petition (xinfang)
 system.\31\ In January, Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou
 Yongkang affirmed the Sichuan model on mediation and called on
 officials to do more to eliminate and resolve disputes at the
 grassroots level.\32\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Mediation Reform: The People's Mediation Law--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  During the reporting year, the Chinese government moved to streamline
 mediation procedures.\33\ Most notably, on August 28, 2010, the
 National People's Congress Standing Committee passed the first People's
 Mediation Law (PML), which will take effect on January 1, 2011.\34\ In
 presenting the draft law for approval in June, Minister of Justice Wu
 Aiying told the Standing Committee that ``Mediation should be the first
 line of defence to maintain social stability and promote harmony.''
 \35\ The PML stipulates the legal basis for establishing mediation
 committees as the organizations charged with resolving disputes.\36\
 The PML stipulates, for instance, procedures on the creation of
 mediation committees within village committees (cunmin weiyuanhui) and
 neighborhood committees (jumin weiyuanhui).\37\ The PML also requires
 local-level governments to provide financial support for mediation
 work.\38\ Some observers, however, have pointed out possible
 shortcomings in the new People's Mediation Law. Article 14, for
 instance, stipulates that mediation committees must select mediators
 that are ``impartially upright and enthusiastic in carrying out the
 people's mediation work.'' \39\ It further states that the mediators
 must possess the ``certain level of education, policy and legal
 knowledge of adult citizens.'' \40\ The PML, however, does not specify
 professional qualifications or procedures for how committees will
 determine impartiality.\41\ Critics of the PML have expressed concern
 with how the new law will ensure mediation outcomes are enforced.\42\
 In July 2010, a Beijing Youth Daily article pointed out that ``the
 courts are strongly pushing mediated settlements, but the rate of
 voluntary execution for mediated settlements is far less than that for
 litigated settlements.'' \43\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders

    During its 2010 reporting year, the Commission noted 
ongoing official efforts to discourage, intimidate, and 
physically harm human rights lawyers and defenders who took on 
issues officials deemed ``sensitive.'' In what activists have 
said is a ``widespread official clampdown'' on human rights 
defenders, Chinese authorities 
targeted human rights lawyers with extralegal detention, 
administrative punishments, and harassment. In April 2010, 
Chinese officials announced even greater restrictive measures 
on the legal profession.\44\
    The whereabouts and condition of prominent human rights 
lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who gained international attention for 
representing marginalized citizens and religious practitioners, 
remain unknown. On March 28, 2010, Gao reportedly resurfaced at 
Wutai Mountain, a sacred Buddhist landmark in Shanxi province, 
after ``disappearing'' into the custody of public security 
officers in February 2009.\45\ In early April 2010, Gao gave 
several interviews to foreign reporters, claiming he had been 
``released'' months earlier and planned to end his human rights 
campaigning in hopes of reuniting with his family.\46\ Weeks 
later, however, Gao ``vanished'' again, after visiting with 
family in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.\47\ The 
disappearance of Gao has raised concerns internationally about 
the Chinese government's willingness to silence critics. In a 
May 2010 Wall Street Journal op-ed, Professor Jerome Cohen of 
New York University Law School and Beth Schwanke, Legislative 
Counsel for Freedom Now, stated that ``[i]f the government can 
act with impunity toward a lawyer as prominent as Gao Zhisheng 
. . . other dissidents will continue to be `disappeared,' as 
have many protesters unknown to the outside world.'' \48\
    As noted in the Commission's 2009 Annual Report, law firms 
and legal advocacy organizations faced similar challenges in 
advocating on behalf of their clients and human rights topics. 
The Beijing Yitong Law Firm, a firm well known for taking on 
``matters deemed sensitive by the authorities,'' remained 
inactive after Chinese authorities shut down the law firm for 
six months in March 2009.\49\ In March 2010, Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders reported that Beijing's Anhui Law Firm, a 
human rights law firm that failed its annual examination and 
evaluation in May 2009, was forced to move from its Chongwen 
district offices after Bureau of Justice and Public Security 
Bureau officials pressured the firm's landlord not to renew its 
lease.\50\ The Chinese government has also continued its 
crackdown on non-governmental organizations representing 
disadvantaged groups. In late March, Peking University severed 
ties with its Center for Women's Law Studies and Legal 
Services, a high-profile women's rights advocacy group that has 
been involved with sensitive legal work in recent years.\51\ 
[For more information, see Section III--Civil Society.] In May 
2010, prominent Chinese AIDS rights advocate Wan Yanhai, 
founder of the Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, fled 
China for the United States after facing increasing pressure 
and harassment from government sources.\52\ [For more 
information, see Section III--Civil Society.]
    The following examples illustrate the mistreatment that 
Chinese human rights lawyers suffered during this reporting 
year under public security measures and government policies.

         On November 20, 2009, Chinese security 
        officials placed ``dozens'' of Chinese human rights 
        lawyers and defenders, including prominent human rights 
        lawyer Jiang Tianyong, ``under house arrest or under 
        surveillance'' during U.S. President Barack Obama's 
        visit to China.\53\ [For more information about house 
        arrests and ``soft detention,'' see Section II--
        Criminal Justice--Arbitrary Detention.] Chinese 
        authorities held Jiang for more than 13 hours at a 
        Beijing police station, without any documentation 
        authorizing the detention, the day after Jiang 
        requested to meet with President Obama.\54\ While 
        public security officials detained Jiang in a police 
        car, a public security officer reportedly used 
        excessive force in constraining Jiang's wife in front 
        of his seven-year-old daughter. Public security 
        officials reportedly later questioned the daughter at 
        school while he was in custody. During President 
        Obama's visit, Chinese authorities also placed other 
        human rights lawyers, including Li Xiongbing, Li 
        Heping, and Mo Shaoping, under police surveillance, 
        with three or four police officers stationed in front 
        of their homes.\55\
         In December 2009, officials from the Fuzhou 
        Municipal Justice Bureau, in Fujian province, suspended 
        the legal license of Fuzhou-based criminal defense 
        lawyer Lin Hongnan for one year, and in April 2010, 
        justice officials reportedly notified Lin that his law 
        firm would be dissolved for ``holding unlawful 
        statutory conditions of establishment.'' \56\ The 70-
        year-old criminal defense lawyer represented one of 
        three defendants accused of posting articles and video 
        on the Internet calling on officials to investigate 
        allegations of rape and murder in the death of a young 
        woman in a highly publicized slander case.\57\ The 
        three Internet users reportedly repeated claims by the 
        woman's mother that her daughter was gang-raped and 
        murdered by people with ties to local police. [For more 
        information on the ``Case of the Fujian Netizens,'' see 
        Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
         In late 2009, the Shahekou District People's 
        Court, located in Dalian city, Liaoning province, 
        sentenced human rights lawyer Wang Yonghang, in a 
        closed court hearing without a lawyer, to seven years' 
        imprisonment for defending Falun Gong practitioners and 
        publishing articles on Internet sites outside of China. 
        According to the non-governmental organization Chinese 
        Human Rights Defenders, Wang met with his lawyers for 
        the first time in January 2010, six months after 
        domestic security protection officers kidnapped him on 
        July 4, 2009. During the meeting, the lawyers verified 
        reports that he had been ``violently beaten on three 
        occasions, and that he suffered a severe ankle injury, 
        which required surgery. . . .'' \58\
         On July 12, 2010, after reportedly receiving 
        orders from their superiors,\59\ police barred Beijing 
        lawyer Zhang Kai from entering a court in Linfen 
        municipality, Shanxi province.\60\ A prominent lawyer 
        who has defended Christians in several sensitive cases 
        over the past year,\61\ Zhang was attempting to file an 
        administrative lawsuit on behalf of five Linfen church 
        leaders sentenced to imprisonment in November 2009 
        following a violent raid on the Linfen-Fushan Church in 
        September 2009.\62\ One officer reportedly referred to 
        the issue as a matter of national security.\63\ [For 
        more information on the Linfen-Fushan Church raid, see 
        Section II--Freedom of Religion.]
         In June 2010, officials from the Beijing 
        Justice Bureau's Lawyer's Management Office warned 
        prominent human rights lawyers Li Heping and Li 
        Xiongbing not to participate in the formation of the 
        ``Rights Defense Lawyers' Association,'' and indicated 
        that the Association would not be registered.

    In 2010, Chinese authorities continued to pressure human 
rights lawyers who took on sensitive cases by denying annual 
license renewals. In order to continue practicing law, lawyers 
in China must have their license to practice law renewed 
annually by passing the ``assessment and registration'' 
process, which is conducted by government-controlled lawyers 
associations.\64\ Some rights lawyers have stated that this 
process has become a political tool to silence human rights 
lawyers and intimidate other attorneys from joining their 
ranks.\65\ In July, the China Human Rights Lawyer Concern Group 
reported it had received information that six human rights 
lawyers--Jiang Tianyong, Wen Haibo, Zhang Lihui, Tong Chaoping, 
Yang Huiwen, and Li Jinsong--failed to pass the ``annual 
assessment and registration'' by the extended July 15 
deadline.\66\ Some human rights lawyers passed the assessment 
only after accepting supplementary conditions, such as 
guaranteeing that they will avoid certain sensitive cases or 
decline interviews.\67\ After the deadline, prominent human 
rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong described the pressures placed on 
lawyers and law firms: ``They put a lot of requirements on law 
firms, even making lawyers make strict promises, and at the 
same time making them pay guarantee deposits. But as soon as 
they say they are going to do a certain case, this insurance 
money disappears.'' \68\
    In April 2010, the Beijing Municipal Justice Bureau 
permanently revoked the lawyer's licenses of Tang Jitian and 
Liu Wei, two Beijing human rights lawyers who represented a 
Falun Gong practitioner in an April 2009 trial in Sichuan 
province.\69\ The justice 
bureau officials accused Tang and Liu of ``disrupting the order 
of the court and interfering with the regular litigation 
process.'' According to the organization Human Rights in China, 
however, the two lawyers claimed that authorities illegally 
videotaped the trial, that the trial judge interrupted the 
proceedings repeatedly, and that unidentified men ordered the 
lawyers out of the courtroom.\70\ Although lawyers in China are 
usually permanently disbarred only if convicted of a crime, the 
New York Times quoted a law professor at the Chinese University 
of Hong Kong who stated the permanent revocation of Tang and 
Liu's practicing licenses could be the first of its kind for a 
``disruption-of-court'' charge.\71\
    In early April 2010, Chinese authorities issued two new 
administrative regulations on the legal profession that Chinese 
media outlets claimed will ``strengthen the supervision and 
management of lawyers and law firms.'' \72\ The Ministry of 
Justice publicly stated the measures aim to standardize 
practices nationally, provide consistency across regulations, 
and ensure conformity with the 2008 Lawyers Law.\73\ The 
organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders, however, 
criticized the regulations, writing: ``it is clear that these 
regulations were designed to protect the interests of the 
government, rather than lawyers or the law.'' \74\ According to 
an April 2010 Associated Press article, lawyers and human 
rights groups in China warned that the new legal measures 
``will allow authorities to punish lawyers . . . for actions 
such as talking to the media or even causing `traffic 
troubles.' '' \75\

                         Petitioning (Xinfang)

    The xinfang (letters and visits), or petitioning, system 
exists to provide a channel, outside court challenges, for 
citizens to appeal government, court, and Party decisions and 
present their grievances.\76\ China's Constitution and the 2005 
National Regulations on Letters and Visits provide that Chinese 
citizens have the right to petition without retribution.\77\ 
Because of ``institutional weaknesses of the Chinese judiciary 
and government limitations on citizen political 
participation,'' citizen petitions are a ``popular channel'' 
for wronged Chinese citizens seeking accountability.\78\ 
Xinfang offices are found throughout the Chinese bureaucracy, 
including offices of the Communist Party, police, government, 
procuratorates, courts, and people's congresses.\79\ Citizen 
petitions cover a range of issues, from ``minor business 
disputes'' to the most egregious alleged abuses and accusations 
of ``murder, torture, and rape inflicted at the hands of 
government and police officials.'' \80\ Despite legal rights to 
petition and prohibitions against retribution, citizens may 
face official reprisals, harassment, violence, or detention in 
reeducation through labor centers, psychiatric hospitals 
(ankang), and extralegal ``black jails'' (hei jianyu).\81\
    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, central 
authorities continued to urge officials to handle petitions 
locally to prevent grievances reaching higher administrative 
offices, as authorities have noted increasing xinfang trends 
and labeled some petitioning activities as threats to ``social 
stability.'' In March 2010, Zhou Yongkang, member of the 
Politburo Standing Committee and secretary of the Politics and 
Law Commission of the Party Central Committee, wrote that 
``much of what is reflected behind petitions and mass incidents 
are contradictions among the people that are triggered by 
interest-related complaints . . . [w]ith regard to the large 
number of contradictions and problems which have not yet risen 
to the level of petitions, they should also be resolved as 
quickly as possible in order to keep them from building up and 
intensifying.'' \82\ Zhou urged improving the mediation system 
and resolving ``social contradictions at the grassroots 
level.'' \83\ In November 2009, a Supreme People's Court 
official announced that the people's county system received 
8.25 percent more complaints during the first six months of 
2009 than it received in 2008, and he estimated that the number 
of complaints for the whole year could surpass 12 million 
cases.\84\ In March 2010, the Party's Central Political-Legal 
Committee for the first time named groups of farmers 
petitioning higher level officials as one of the ``internal 
three forces'' that threatened ``social stability.'' \85\
    With growing concerns over xinfang trends, central and 
local authorities intensified restrictions on ``abnormal 
petitioning.'' \86\ In November 2009, Shenzhen municipal 
authorities reportedly issued the Circular Regarding the Lawful 
Handling of Abnormal Petitioning Behavior.\87\ The Circular 
identified 14 types of ``abnormal'' petitioning behavior, such 
as ``shouting slogans'' and ``wearing grievances,'' that would 
be subject to administrative disciplinary action, including 
reeducation through labor (RTL).\88\ Various provinces and 
cities have passed circulars similar to Shenzhen's.\89\ In 
April, Shenzhen authorities announced a new ``policy'' that 
would restrict those with a history of ``abnormal'' petitioning 
behavior from obtaining residence permits.\90\ Some authorities 
have already detained \91\ or sent to RTL centers citizens for 
exhibiting ``abnormal petitioning'' behavior, including repeat 
petitioners from Guangxi province who traveled to Beijing to 
air their grievances with higher level authorities.\92\

                          Abuse of Petitioners

    Regulations and evaluation systems dictate that local-level 
leaders bear responsibility if a large number of petitioners 
take their grievances to higher levels; in some instances, 
petitions may contribute to poor performance evaluations.\93\ 
These responsibility 
systems give local authorities an interest in suppressing group 
petitions and preventing petitioners from taking their 
grievances to higher administrative levels.\94\
    During the 2010 reporting year, some collective petitioning 
activities resulted in police abuses. On June 24, 2010, 
approximately 200 relatives of children killed in the May 2008 
Sichuan earthquake reportedly stormed the Mianzhu city 
government, but were prevented from entering the building by 
300 special police.\95\ On June 21, nearly 80 Dongjiangyan 
county parents of children killed in the Sichuan earthquake 
petitioned the provincial government in Chengdu for 
compensation, but 40 were detained and 3 appeared to still be 
in detention as of June 25.\96\ On April 27, 314 teachers from 
Gong'an county, Hubei province, knelt before the county 
government building and public security bureau to protest being 
illegally fired. Police administratively detained three of the 
organizers and sought two more associated with the kneeling 
protest.\97\ After a previous protest in 2009 by teachers in 
Gong'an county, authorities sent at least one organizer to a 
reeducation through labor center for one year.\98\
    In 2010, Chinese authorities detained, threatened or placed 
under surveillance petitioners across China to ensure that 
their complaints regarding access to justice would not 
interfere with the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.\99\ Chinese 
authorities targeted a number of housing activists, including 
petitioners from Shanghai that sought to exercise their rights 
to petition against the relocation of 18,000 households in 
preparation for the Shanghai Expo site.\100\ International 
human rights organizations and media widely reported on 
official abuses and detentions related to the forced evictions 
and demolitions.\101\ In one such instance, Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders reported that Shanghai public security 
officials ordered Cao Yibao to serve one year of reeducation 
through labor in late May for ``disrupting public order,'' 
after being detained in April during an identification check on 
the Expo grounds. Cao, who is 60 years old and suffers from 
diabetes and high blood pressure, has petitioned for years 
since her home was demolished in preparation for the Shanghai 
Expo event.\102\

                PETITIONERS IN ``BLACK JAIL'' DETENTIONS

    Chinese authorities continued to use ``black jails'' (hei 
jianyu), secret detention sites established by local officials, 
to detain and punish petitioners that travel to Beijing and 
other provincial capitals to voice complaints and seek redress 
for injustices. [For more information, see Section II--Criminal 
Justice--``Black Jails'': Secret 
Detention Sites.] During this reporting year, the Commission 
observed several examples of black jail detentions that 
violated international and domestic laws.\103\

         In June 2010, Xu Lingjun, a disabled People's 
        Liberation Army (PLA) retiree from Shaanxi province, 
        died in a black jail after suffering from starvation in 
        detention. Xu and other petitioners were held after 
        pursuing complaints against local officials. A former 
        inmate from the black jail told Radio Free Asia that Xu 
        ``had been detained for 10 months, and his family had 
        been placed under very tight surveillance.'' According 
        to the report, authorities at the black jail, 
        established by the Communist Party's Politics and Law 
        Committee of Shaanxi's Chenggu county, regularly beat 
        detainees and failed to provide sufficient food.\104\
         On May 7, 2010, black jail authorities 
        released Beijing-based human rights advocate Li Jinping 
        after domestic security protection officers abducted 
        him on April 28 in Beijing. The guards refused to let 
        Li leave the ``closely guarded room'' throughout the 
        duration of his detention, and individuals beat and 
        verbally abused Li. According to Chinese Human Rights 
        Defenders, authorities detained Li for seeking to 
        demonstrate for ``an official re-evaluation of the 
        legacy of Zhao Ziyang'' and for ``encouraging 
        petitioners to join him to commemorate [Zhao,] the 
        former [Communist Party General Secretary] known for 
        his sympathy with demonstrators during the 1989 
        Tiananmen protests.'' \105\

       FORCIBLE DETENTION OF PETITIONERS IN PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS

    During this reporting year, authorities continued to 
forcibly 
confine Chinese citizens--including petitioners--to psychiatric 
hospitals, because of outspoken petitioning activities. Chinese 
and foreign media outlets reported on petitioners committed to 
mental 
institutions for periods ranging from days (particularly around 
sensitive dates) to years.\106\ In late April, a China Youth 
Daily article exposed the case of Xu Lindong, a Henan 
petitioner held in psychiatric hospitals for more than six 
years despite his pleas of sanity. Authorities released Xu, a 
villager from Luohe city, Henan province, after he spent six 
and one-half years in forcible confinement for filing a 
petition, on behalf of a disabled friend, over a land dispute 
with local officials.\107\ During his detention, psychiatric 
officials shackled Xu 48 times, applied electric shocks on 54 
occasions, and forced Xu to take psychiatric drugs. In late 
April 2010, China Youth Daily reporters, posing as relatives, 
revealed the wrongful detention, sparking widespread criticism 
of compulsory psychiatric commitments. In response to the case, 
more than 100 lawyers around the country reportedly signed a 
recommendation urging China's procuratorates to end the 
practice of falsely labeling citizens as ``mentally ill.'' 
\108\ In February 2010, Radio Free Asia 
reported that one Chinese non-governmental organization had 
collected the names of over 300 people who had been forcibly 
committed to psychiatric hospitals, including petitioners and 
Falun Gong practitioners.\109\

                              IV. Xinjiang


                              Introduction

    Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) worsened during the Commission's 2010 reporting 
year. Following government suppression of a demonstration by 
Uyghurs and riots in the XUAR in July 2009, authorities 
instituted unprecedented levels of control over the free flow 
of information, denying XUAR residents and the outside world 
news about conditions in the region and increasing the 
government's capacity to manipulate information. Amid this 
information blackout, authorities strengthened security 
measures and campaigns to promote ``ethnic unity,'' using them 
to quell free speech, curb independent religious activity, and 
impose intrusive controls over the lives of XUAR residents. 
Authorities singled out Uyghurs in particular in security 
campaigns, and the whereabouts of some Uyghurs detained in the 
aftermath of the July demonstrations and riots remain unknown. 
Trials connected to events in July 2009 have been marked by a 
lack of transparency and violations of due process. Authorities 
detained, and in some cases, imprisoned, Uyghur Web site 
workers and a journalist in connection to free speech about the 
events and about broader conditions in the XUAR. Amid these 
developments, central government and Communist Party 
authorities inaugurated a ``central work forum'' on the topic 
of the XUAR in May 2010 that set central government and Party 
objectives for the region's economic and political development, 
intensifying a trend of top-down initiatives that prioritize 
state economic and political goals over the promotion of 
regional autonomy and broader protections of XUAR residents' 
rights.
    Against this backdrop, the government enforced other 
policies and measures that also fueled worsening human rights 
conditions in the region, including measures aimed at quelling 
dissent, promoting assimilation, and repressing independent 
expressions of ethnic and religious identity, especially among 
the Uyghurs. The XUAR government intensified steps to promote 
Mandarin Chinese and marginalize the use of the Uyghur language 
in XUAR schools, in violation of Chinese law. As in past years, 
some population planning policies in the region singled out 
non-Han ethnic groups. The government continued work to 
transfer Uyghur and other non-Han workers to jobs in the 
interior of China, through programs reportedly marked, in some 
cases, by coercion and abusive practices. Uyghurs and other 
groups within the XUAR remained subject to hiring practices 
that have allowed widespread discrimination against non-Han 
groups. Ongoing work to ``reconstruct'' the historic Old City 
section of Kashgar continued to undermine Uyghurs' right to 
preserve their cultural heritage. Repression of Islam in the 
XUAR worsened. [For more information on conditions for 
religious freedom in the XUAR, see Section II--Freedom of 
Religion--Islam.] Uyghurs seeking asylum outside of China 
continued to face barriers to accessing asylum proceedings and 
risk of refoulement to China under the sway of China's 
influence in neighboring countries and its disregard for 
international law, as illustrated by the Cambodian government's 
deportation of 20 Uyghur asylum seekers to China in December 
2009, following Chinese government intervention.
    Repressive government controls throughout the region, 
especially those targeting Uyghurs, illustrated the status of 
the XUAR as a government-designated ethnic autonomous region 
that lacks true autonomy, particularly for the group in whose 
name it was established. Despite guarantees in Chinese law for 
measures of autonomy in governance and protections for ethnic 
minority rights,\1\ central and local government authorities 
exert control at a level antithetical to local residents' 
meaningful control over their own affairs and to the protection 
of their rights. Chinese government actions violate not only 
Chinese law but also international human rights law that the 
Chinese government is bound to uphold.\2\

              Security Measures and Ideological Campaigns

    Top leaders from the central and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) governments and Communist Party pledged 
throughout the year to make ``upholding stability'' a top 
priority for the region.\3\ Zhang Chunxian, who replaced Wang 
Lequan as Party Secretary of the XUAR in April 2010,\4\ 
reiterated official calls to promote the ideology of 
``stability above all else'' and to ``strike hard with maximum 
pressure'' against the ``three forces'' of terrorism, 
separatism, and religious extremism.\5\ Authorities continued 
to politicize security concerns, targeting peaceful human 
rights activity, political dissent, and free expression as 
threats to the region's security.\6\ The XUAR government took 
several steps in the past year to enhance the region's security 
capacity. The XUAR government increased spending for public 
security by 87.9 percent over the previous year in its 2010 
budget, raising the total to 2.89 billion yuan (US$423 
million).\7\ In December 2009, the XUAR government made 
revisions to its Regulation for the Comprehensive Management of 
Social Order, effective February 1, 2010, that redefine the 
region's priorities in maintaining social order, placing new 
prominence on ``striking hard'' against crimes of endangering 
state security (ESS).\8\ Authorities in China have used ESS 
charges to punish political dissent,\9\ and the new emphasis on 
such crimes in the XUAR regulation is unseen in most other 
social order regulations in China.\10\ The XUAR government also 
increased the number of ``special 
police'' in the region, with plans to recruit a total of 5,000 
new officers.\11\ In the XUAR capital of Urumqi, where the July 
2009 demonstrations and riots took place, authorities reported 
they would 
increase the number of 24-hour surveillance cameras in the city 
to 60,000 by the end of 2010.\12\ Urumqi authorities also 
described plans to hire 10,000 new officers to expand the ranks 
of ``patrol teams'' to monitor the city.\13\ Urumqi authorities 
launched a one-month stability operation in late June in the 
lead-up to the one-year anniversary of the July 2009 
demonstrations and riots.\14\
    In the aftermath of events in July 2009, the XUAR 
government also increased measures to promote ``ethnic unity'' 
in the region, using them as a vehicle for promoting 
longstanding government and Party policy and as a tool for 
restricting free speech. Authorities dispatched ``stability 
work teams'' to over 160 neighborhoods in Urumqi following 
events in July, to ``stress the truth about the incident, 
stress ethnic unity, and stress policy and law.'' \15\ In 
December, the XUAR People's Congress Standing Committee passed 
a regulation on promoting education on ethnic unity--apparently 
the first of its kind in China \16\--that aims to publicize 
Party policy toward ethnic minorities and that imposes tight 
controls on freedom of expression, with implications in areas 
such as academic freedom, educational curricula, and commercial 
decisions.\17\ The regulation includes administrative penalties 
and states the possibility of punishment under China's Criminal 
Law for spreading information deemed ``not beneficial'' to 
ethnic unity.\18\ In January and February 2010, XUAR 
authorities used administrative and criminal measures to punish 
people for spreading ``harmful'' information by telephone and 
text message, including information that ``influenced'' or 
``destroyed'' ethnic unity.\19\ [For additional information, 
see Controls Over Free Expression in this section.] Authorities 
also bolstered ethnic unity education in XUAR schools and 
universities.\20\

                   Criminal Law and Access to Justice

    The criminal justice system in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) remained marked by rights abuses, 
overt politicization, and a lack of transparency. In the 
aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots, government 
reports provided inconsistent statistics on the number of 
people detained in connection to the events,\21\ while overseas 
media cited sources in the XUAR that described widespread 
security sweeps and mass detentions--including mass roundups of 
Uyghur men--indicating detention numbers that would exceed 
those reported at different times by the Chinese government and 
media.\22\ Some of the people reported to have been detained 
appeared to have no involvement in either acts of protest or 
violent activity in July.\23\ An October 2009 report from Human 
Rights Watch documented 43 cases of enforced disappearances 
after July 2009, while the report estimated that the true 
number of people in such situations was ``likely significantly 
higher than the number of cases documented'' in the report.\24\ 
In addition, Chinese authorities have not reported 
investigating accounts of state abuses committed during the 
events in July. In July 2010, the Uyghur Human Rights Project 
published a report, based on interviews with people present in 
Urumqi on July 5, 2009, that described the use of deadly police 
force against Uyghur protestors and Uyghur crowds that day.\25\
    Trials held in connection to alleged crimes committed 
during the July 2009 demonstrations and riots were marred by 
violations of Chinese law and international standards for due 
process, including politicized judge selections and curbs on 
independent legal defense. Rozi Ismail, head of the XUAR High 
People's Court, reported in July 2009 that the court had 
selected judges for the trials who were ``politically 
reliable,'' \26\ and he reported in January 2010 that the XUAR 
High People's Court had issued ``guiding opinions'' to the 
trial court and strengthened ``supervision and guidance'' 
toward the court to ``guarantee'' the trials ``took place in an 
orderly way in accordance with law.'' \27\ Although defendants 
reportedly had legal defense at the trials, in advance of the 
court hearings, authorities in Beijing and the XUAR issued 
orders dictating the terms upon which lawyers could be involved 
in cases.\28\ Authorities also reportedly warned lawyers active 
in human rights defense work against taking the cases.\29\ In 
at least one set of trials, authorities reportedly violated 
Article 151(5) of China's Criminal Procedure Law (stipulating 
that courts shall announce trials involving public prosecutions 
three days in advance) by failing to provide adequate public 
notice of the hearings.\30\ Authorities also warned the media 
against independent reporting on the events.\31\ Trials were 
also marked by a lack of transparency and apparent failure to 
publicize many of the judgments, in violation of Article 163 of 
the Criminal Procedure Law (stipulating that ``[i]n all cases, 
judgments shall be pronounced publicly'').\32\ XUAR government 
chairperson Nur Bekri said in March that 198 people involved in 
97 cases had been sentenced in the XUAR for crimes committed in 
July 2009, a figure that appeared to far exceed the number of 
cases reported as of March 2010 by Chinese media.\33\ [See 
table below titled Xinjiang Trials for Crimes Committed During 
the July 2009 Demonstrations and Riots for detailed 
information.]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Sentencing    Ethnic Group
                   Number of       Date of                         Details      (Conjectured
  Trial Date     People/Cases   Alleged Crime      Charges        (Number of    based on name       Appeals
                                                                   people)     of  defendant)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
October 12,     7 people/       July 5         Intentional      6: death       7 Uyghur        October 30, 2009:
 2009           3 cases                         homicide;        (executed)                     All judgments
                                                arson; robbery  1: life in                      upheld.
                                                                 prison
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
October 14,     14 people/3     July 5 and     Intentional      3: death       12 Uyghur       October 30, 2009:
 2009            cases           July 7         homicide;        (executed)    2 Han            All judgments
 (sentence                                      arson;          3: death + 2-                   upheld.
 October 15)                                    robbery;         yr reprieve
                                                intentional     3: life in
                                                injury;          prison
                                                intentional     5: 5-18 yrs
                                                destruction of
                                                property
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 3,     13 people/5     July 5         Intentional      5: death       11 Uyghur, of   December 19,
 2009            cases                          homicide;       2: life in      names           2009: Some cases
                                                robbery;         prison         provided        appealed.
                                                arson;          6: 10-20 yrs                    Judgments
                                                intentional                                     upheld.
                                                injury
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 4,     7 people/5      July 5-7       Intentional      3: death       5 Uyghur        December 19,
 2009            cases                          homicide;       1: life in     2 Han            2009: Some cases
                                                intentional      prison                         appealed.
                                                injury; arson;  3: 10-18 yrs                    Judgments
                                                carrying out                                    upheld.
                                                explosions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 22     22 people/5     July 5         Intentional      5: death       22 Uyghur       N/A
 and 23, 2009    cases                          homicide;       5: death + 2-
                                                robbery          yr reprieve
                                                                8: life in
                                                                 prison
                                                                4: 12-15 yrs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 25,     13 people/5     N/A            N/A              4: death       6 Uyghur, of    N/A
 2010            cases                                          1: death + 2-   names
                                                                 yr reprieve    provided
                                                                8: prison
                                                                 terms
                                                                 including
                                                                 life in
                                                                 prison
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total           76 people/ 26                  Where reported:  26: death      63 Uyghur
                 cases                         Intentional      9: death + 2-  4 Han, of
                                                homicide;        yr reprieve    names
                                                arson;          15: life in     provided
                                                robbery;         prison
                                                intentional     18: 5-20 yrs
                                                injury;         8: prison
                                                intentional      terms,
                                                destruction of   including
                                                property;        life in
                                                carrying out     prison
                                                explosions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The number of trials for crimes of endangering state 
security (ESS)--a category of criminal offenses that 
authorities in China have used to punish citizen activism and 
dissent--surged in the XUAR in 2009. Courts in the XUAR 
completed trials in 437 ESS cases in 2009, an increase of 169 
cases over the previous year.\35\ The 2008 figure from the 
XUAR, 268 cases, appeared in turn to represent a sharp increase 
over previous years.\36\ As of December 2009, no trials 
directly related to events in July 2009 were reported to 
involve ESS crimes,\37\ suggesting the increase in 2009 may 
have come partly or fully from other sources, though detailed 
information on the ESS crimes committed in 2009 is not 
available.\38\ XUAR authorities had previously heightened 
politicized security campaigns in the region in advance of the 
2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games and into 2009.\39\

                     Controls Over Free Expression

    The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government and 
Communist Party imposed widespread controls over the free flow 
of information in 2009 and 2010. Following demonstrations and 
riots in Urumqi starting July 5, 2009, the Urumqi Party 
Secretary announced on July 7 that authorities had cut Internet 
access in the city to ``quench the riot quickly and prevent 
violence from spreading to other places.'' \40\ Authorities 
also instituted Internet restrictions across the XUAR and 
imposed curbs on text messaging and international phone 
calls.\41\ The actual role the communication devices played in 
the violence (as opposed to demonstrations), however, was 
unclear,\42\ and the wide-reaching restrictions--affecting all 
Internet, SMS, and international phone content and lasting for 
months after the July 2009 events--exceeded permissible 
boundaries for limiting the right to free expression as defined 
in international human rights standards.\43\ [See Section II--
Freedom of Expression for details.] Authorities allowed XUAR 
residents more access to the technologies starting in late 
December and January \44\ but did not restore more complete 
Internet access until May 14.\45\ At the same time, after that 
date, a number of popular Uyghur-language Web sites remained 
shut down, with some of their staff held in detention [see box 
titled Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang below], and 
longstanding curbs throughout China over some human rights Web 
sites remained in place.\46\ Throughout the past year, and 
especially in advance of the one-year anniversary of events in 
July 2009, authorities also maintained restrictions on Internet 
discussions and reporting about the events and reportedly 
ordered people not to speak to foreign journalists without 
authorization.\47\
    Authorities in the XUAR bolstered legal measures to repress 
free speech following events in July 2009. The XUAR People's 
Congress Standing Committee passed a new regulation on 
information promotion in September 25, 2009, effective December 
1, 2009, that bans use of the Internet to ``endanger state 
security,'' ``incite ethnic separatism,'' ``destroy ethnic 
unity,'' or publish ``harmful'' information, among other 
acts.\48\ Though similar in certain respects to some Internet 
regulations elsewhere in China,\49\ one official described the 
new prohibitions as addressing the role the Internet played in 
allowing the ``three forces'' (terrorism, separatism, and 
religious extremism) to ``spread rumors, incite ethnic 
separatism, and provoke disturbances'' before events in Urumqi 
on July 5.\50\ The regulation stipulates the possibility of 
criminal penalties for acts such as ``destroying ethnic unity'' 
and ``inciting ethnic separatism'' (splittism).\51\ An 
announcement issued by three Kashgar district government 
offices in March 2010 reiterated the possibility of criminal 
punishment and other penalties for using the Internet and other 
communications technology to commit the crime of ``inciting 
separatism.'' The announcement defined the crime to include 
using technology to carry out, with the aim of splitting the 
country, acts including: spreading materials on separatism, 
``inciting'' people to participate in demonstrations, 
distributing literary works ``with separatist content,'' and 
``slandering and assaulting the Party and government.'' \52\ 
Additional regulations implemented or revised in the past year 
in the XUAR further expanded curbs over free expression. In 
addition to the new regulation on ethnic unity, discussed 
above,\53\ which curbs speech deemed ``not beneficial'' to 
ethnic unity, a regulation on social order, revised on December 
29, 2009, and effective February 1, 2010, calls for government 
offices to punish those who create, publish, sell, or 
distribute materials perceived to touch on issues including 
threats to state security, ``illegal religion,'' and 
superstition.\54\
    The XUAR government and Party also continued to enforce 
wide-scale censorship campaigns. A XUAR media report said the 
XUAR government and Party have made ``striking hard'' against 
``reactionary'' materials and other ``illegal'' political and 
religious publications distributed by the ``three forces'' as 
the focus of the region's censorship campaign since 2009.\55\ 
The article also described strengthening controls over 
``illegal'' materials especially after events in July 2009.\56\ 
Authorities initiated a special multi-province operation in 
2009, headed by a XUAR government and Party group, aimed at 
stopping ``three forces'' materials.\57\ Zhou Huilin, Deputy 
Director of the National ``Sweep Away Pornography and Strike 
Down Illegal Publications'' Office, said that the operation 
held significance in staving off the threats of 
``Westernization'' and ``division'' from ``Western countries 
led by the United States.'' \58\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Information emerged throughout this reporting year on people in the
 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) detained for exercising their
 right to freedom of expression. Limited information from XUAR
 government and media sources indicates authorities have detained people
 of various ethnic groups for speech deemed to ``threaten stability,''
 while several indepth reports detail detentions targeting Uyghurs in
 particular for speaking out about the demonstrations and riots in July
 2009 or otherwise deemed to have a connection to the events.   Haji Memet and Abdusalam Nasir, two Uyghur men from Huocheng
   (Qorghas) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, were detained on
   September 23, 2009, for their role in sharing information with U.S.-
   based Radio Free Asia on the death in custody of Shohret Tursun, a
   man from Huocheng who reportedly had been detained in Urumqi on July
   6 and died in police custody under suspicious circumstances.\59\
   Authorities reportedly suspected Haji Memet and Abdusalam Nasir of
   leaking state secrets.\60\ Authorities also reportedly detained
   several other people in connection to Shohret Tursun's case, and as
   of June 2010, reportedly continued to hold at least one of them in
   detention, along with Abdusalam Nasir.\61\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Gheyret Niyaz, a Uyghur journalist and Web editor in Urumqi,
   was sentenced by the the Urumqi Intermediate People's Court on July
   23, 2010, to 15 years' imprisonment for ``leaking state secrets.''
   Prosecutors in court cited essays by Gheyret Niyaz addressing
   economic and social problems affecting Uyghurs; sources also
   connected the prison sentence to interviews Gheyret Niyaz gave to
   foreign media after the July 2009 demonstrations and riots that were
   critical of aspects of government policy in the XUAR.\62\
   Nijat Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli, Web site
   administrators, received prison sentences of 10, 5, and 3 years,
   respectively, in July 2010 for ``endangering state security.'' \63\
   Sources connected the cases to their Web sites not deleting postings
   about hardships in the XUAR and, in one instance, permitting the
   posting of announcements for the July 2009 demonstration.\64\ All
   three are believed to have been taken into detention in the aftermath
   of the July 2009 events,\65\ and other people involved with Uyghur
   Web sites also were detained during the same period.\66\ In July
   2009, XUAR government chairperson Nur Bekri accused some Uyghur Web
   sites of contributing to incitement of the events on July 5.\67\
   Gulmira (Gulmire) Imin, a Uyghur Web site administrator and
   government employee, was sentenced by the Urumqi Intermediate
   People's Court on April 1, 2010, to life in prison for ``splittism,
   leaking state secrets, and organizing an illegal demonstration.''
   Authorities alleged she was involved in organizing the July 5, 2009,
   demonstration.\68\
   Following the partial restoration of text messaging in the
   XUAR in January 2010, the XUAR Public Security Department penalized
   over 100 people in January and February for using text messages and
   telephone calls to ``spread harmful information,'' including
   information deemed to ``harm ethnic unity'' or pertain to ``splitting
   the country.'' While authorities levied administrative penalties on
   most people, they took at least five people into criminal
   detention.\69\ Authorities reported in May on penalizing others for
   similar acts.\70\ The penalties and detentions--about which
   authorities provided limited details--come amid a track record of
   authorities in China using overbroad and vague legal provisions to
   punish peaceful expression. [See Section II--Freedom of Expression
   for more information.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          Xinjiang Work Forum

    Central government and Communist Party authorities 
inaugurated a ``central work forum'' on the topic of the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in May 2010 that set 
central government and Party objectives for the region's 
economic and political development, intensifying a trend of 
top-down initiatives that prioritize state economic and 
political goals over the promotion of regional autonomy and 
broader protections of XUAR residents' rights.\71\ Speaking at 
the forum, President and Party General 
Secretary Hu Jintao described upholding long-term stability and 
promoting ``fast-track development'' as the dual priorities for 
the region.\72\ The forum did not address citizen grievances 
over longstanding political and religious controls in the XUAR 
and affirmed existing government policy toward ethnic and 
religious issues.\73\ Initiatives and goals addressed at the 
forum--some of which represent a continuation or 
intensification of older policies--included increased 
infrastructure construction; greater market access in some 
sectors; wider job creation and pension coverage; tax reforms 
aimed at keeping resource revenue in the region (a reform 
scheduled to be implemented throughout China \74\); and renewed 
programs to promote ``ethnic unity,'' ``social stability,'' and 
security of border areas.\75\ Authorities said development 
efforts will focus on the southern XUAR, an area with a 
predominantly Uyghur population that has lagged economically 
behind areas of the XUAR with larger Han populations.\76\ 
Authorities also will channel development assistance to the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, areas within the 
XUAR with a separate administrative structure and with 
predominantly Han residents that have adopted agricultural, 
manufacturing, and security functions.\77\
    Taken as a whole, while some initiatives from the forum may 
bring some economic benefits to the region, the program appears 
to poise the XUAR to undergo greater demographic and cultural 
shifts in coming decades that further undercut the ability of 
Uyghurs and other non-Han groups to protect their culture, 
language, and livelihoods. Following the forum, XUAR Party 
Secretary Zhang Chunxian detailed development initiatives 
including plans to resettle 100,000 herders, resettle 700,000 
urban residents, and intensify Mandarin-focused ``bilingual'' 
education, a program that has marginalized the use of Uyghur 
and other non-Han languages in XUAR schools.\78\ He also said 
that work would focus on strengthening the promotion of state 
ideologies, ``ethnic unity'' campaigns, and ``Party 
construction,'' a program to strengthen Party discipline, 
governance, and legitimacy.\79\

                Language Policy and Bilingual Education

    The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government 
intensified steps to promote Mandarin Chinese in XUAR schools 
and to largely phase out instruction in other languages, a 
development that in the future could permanently marginalize 
the role of the Uyghur language within broad segments of 
society in the XUAR. Authorities announced in May 2010 that by 
2015, they would aim to universalize ``bilingual education''--a 
policy that, within the XUAR, has come to promote class 
instruction almost exclusively in Mandarin \80\--with the goal 
of making all ethnic minority children proficient in Mandarin 
by 2020.\81\ The efforts to make Mandarin the dominant language 
of instruction in XUAR schools contravene protections for 
ethnic minority languages in Chinese law \82\ and underscore 
state failures to safeguard and promote local languages as one 
component of regional ethnic autonomy. Prior to the May 
announcement, XUAR authorities had already increased promotion 
of ``bilingual education.'' In 2009, 31.79 percent of the total 
ethnic minority student population in the XUAR--753,300 ethnic 
minority preschool, primary, and secondary school students--
received ``bilingual education,'' an increase of over 25 
percent from 2008, according to official statistics.\83\ 
Another 240,900 ethnic minority students (minkaohan students) 
received education solely in Mandarin through longstanding 
programs that track ethnic minority students directly into 
Mandarin Chinese schooling.\84\ The central and XUAR 
governments also continued to promote ``bilingual education'' 
at the preschool level. XUAR authorities reported in 2010 that 
the central and XUAR governments would build over 2,200 new 
``bilingual'' kindergartens by 2012 and universalize two years 
of ``bilingual'' preschool education by that time.\85\
    Authorities also continued to bolster plans to train more 
teachers for bilingual programs,\86\ a policy which has had a 
detrimental effect on older teachers who do not know Mandarin 
or teachers who do not meet certain political requirements, 
such as holding appropriate viewpoints toward religion, 
ethnicity, and the Marxist state.\87\ New developments in the 
past year also affected the career prospects of current 
students. In the past year, authorities announced plans to 
recruit 6,000 students each year from 2010 to 2013 for free 
teacher training, with a focus on students who have received 
``bilingual education'' or education in Mandarin. The program 
will include students training to teach in bilingual 
programs.\88\ In addition, in announcing college recruitment 
priorities for the coming year, XUAR authorities said they 
would ``readjust'' preferential recruitment policies for ethnic 
minority students educated in ethnic minority languages and 
increase the number of students educated in Mandarin, in order 
to ``adapt to the needs of speeding up the promotion of 
`bilingual' education.'' \89\
    In a measure that, depending on effectiveness of 
implementation, could promote the use of Uyghur in some 
capacity among government officials, a XUAR Communist Party 
office and a government department issued a circular in April 
to require all candidates for state jobs and some current state 
employees to pass a language proficiency test in a second 
language spoken in the XUAR.\90\ The degree of proficiency 
required and overall scope of implementation remains unclear, 
although authorities reported in 2010 on carrying out a 
separate language-training program to promote second-language 
skills for grassroots cadres.\91\

                      Population Planning Policies

    In the past reporting year, government authorities 
continued to enforce some population planning measures that 
target non-Han ethnic groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR), at the same time it enforced broader population 
planning measures across the region. In October 2009, the 
National Population and Family Planning Commission signed an 
agreement with the XUAR government to launch a series of 
initiatives in the region to strengthen the region's population 
control work, including through ``special rewards'' (teshu 
jiangli) for families in 26 poor and border counties who have 
fewer children than permitted.\92\ Official media reported that 
the new reward policy mainly targets rural ethnic minority 
households that already have two children and have ``been 
certified'' as voluntarily forgoing a third birth.\93\ Under 
Article 15 of the XUAR's Regulation on Population and Family 
Planning, rural ethnic minority families are permitted to have 
a maximum of three children.\94\ In March 2009, a XUAR Party 
official called on ethnic and religious affairs departments to 
train religious leaders to ``bring their relatively greater 
prestige and influence among the religious masses into play 
[and] actively propagandize the importance of family 
planning[.]'' \95\ The steps build on earlier measures to 
target population planning in predominantly non-Han areas 
within the XUAR.\96\
    Citizens who expose abuses in official implementation of 
population planning policies have faced repercussions,\97\ and 
information became available in the past reporting year on a 
Uyghur man from the XUAR detained for speaking to media about a 
case involving official abuses against his daughter. According 
to October 2009 reports from Radio Free Asia, authorities in 
Yining (Ghulja) county, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, 
detained 67-year-old Tursunjan Hesen on July 2, 2009, and 
reportedly accused him of revealing state secrets and 
endangering state security. Tursunjan Hesen earlier had given 
interviews to overseas media about a case involving his 
daughter, Arzigul Tursun, whom authorities had planned to 
subject to a forced abortion.\98\ Prior to his detention, 
Tursunjan Hesen reported that police had interrogated him 
repeatedly about Arzigul's case, asking him who had alerted 
international media about the situation.\99\

                          Freedom of Residence

    In the aftermath of demonstrations and riots in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in July 2009, 
authorities increased oversight of migrants. Some of the steps 
appeared to target Uyghur migrants to Urumqi from other parts 
of the XUAR. Authorities alleged that Uyghur migrants who were 
involved in events in July had stayed in unregulated rental 
housing.\100\ According to official media, in August, Urumqi 
authorities launched a ``clean-up and reorganize'' campaign 
targeting ``disorderly'' migration and ``chaotic'' rental 
managements, after events in July ``exposed bottlenecks'' in 
the management of rentals and migrant 
populations.\101\ As areas of Urumqi implemented directives to 
regulate rentals, one district in Urumqi reported ``screening 
out and striking hard'' against ``itinerant society'' and 
``illegal activities such as concealing the `three forces' 
[terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism] in rental 
housing.'' \102\ In April 2010, Urumqi authorities adopted a 
formal regulation, effective July, that institutes registration 
and other requirements on rentals,\103\ a step one official 
connected to the presence of migrants in the city and the use 
of rental housing by the ``three forces.'' \104\ The region's 
Regulation for the Comprehensive Management of Social Order, 
revised in December 2009, added new provisions to strengthen 
controls over migrants and over rental housing.\105\ In July, 
authorities demolished what they described as a shantytown in 
the Heijiashan area of Urumqi,\106\ where authorities had 
already increased oversight of migrants earlier in the 
year.\107\ An official in charge of the demolition--part of 
broader stated efforts to eliminate ``shantytowns''--said that 
migrants in the area ``often disrupted social order'' and 
because of ``poor management'' were ``easily incited by 
rioters'' during events in July 2009.\108\

                                 Labor


                             DISCRIMINATION

    Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
reported taking some steps in the past year to promote 
employment among non-Han ethnic groups, but did not indicate 
that the government had taken broader measures to eliminate 
longstanding systemic discrimination in job hiring. The XUAR 
government and Party Committee implemented an opinion on 
employment promotion in October 2009 that calls for enterprises 
registered in the XUAR and enterprises working there to recruit 
no fewer than 50 percent of workers from among local XUAR 
residents.\109\ The opinion also calls for ``recruiting more 
ethnic minorities to the extent possible.'' \110\ In addition, 
employers are to pledge a fixed proportion of positions for 
ethnic minorities as part of work to increase recruitment of 
college graduates and prioritize graduates from the XUAR.\111\ 
(Within the XUAR, groups designated as ethnic minorities 
comprise about 60 percent of the population and Han Chinese 40 
percent, according to official Chinese statistics.\112\) The 
opinion does not appear to clarify if the stipulations apply to 
government agencies.\113\ Information on adherence to the 
opinion and steps to promote the hiring of non-Han groups 
remains limited.\114\ Job hiring practices that discriminated 
against ethnic minorities continued. The Commission has tracked 
government and other employment announcements in recent years, 
including in the past reporting year, that reserved positions 
for Han, in violation of Chinese law.\115\ The Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps reserved 78 percent of 1,131 
open positions for Han during job recruitment in the past 
year.\116\

                            LABOR TRANSFERS

    Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
continued to send young non-Han men and women to work in 
factory jobs in the interior of China through programs that, in 
some cases, reportedly have involved coercion and have placed 
participants in exploitative working conditions.\117\ XUAR 
government chairperson Nur Bekri has denied that workers are 
coerced into participating in the government-led labor transfer 
programs--versions of which exist elsewhere in China \118\--and 
has described the programs as a means for XUAR residents to 
earn income and gain job training.\119\ Uyghurs demonstrating 
in Urumqi on July 5, 2009, were protesting government handling 
of a reported assault on Uyghur laborers sent to a Guangdong 
factory through the government-sponsored program.\120\ In the 
aftermath of the events, 
authorities affirmed that the labor transfer programs would 
continue.\121\ The XUAR Labor and Social Security Department 
reportedly planned to transfer 300,000 rural workers in 
2010,\122\ an 
increase of approximately 60,000 people over the number of 
workers who went to jobs in the interior of China in 2008.\123\
    Authorities continued to tie the labor transfers to broader 
efforts to promote state political ideology. According to a 
XUAR Human Resources and Social Security Department 
official,\124\ labor transfers not only have allowed 
participants to earn money but, ``more significantly,'' have 
enabled ethnic minorities in border areas to ``transform their 
ideas, liberate themselves from old thinking, and experience 
the huge achievements gained from the state's reform and 
opening.'' \125\ An article on labor transfers in Qaba (Habahe) 
county in Altay, Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, reported 
that under county government leadership, numerous rural women 
changed ``traditional concepts'' and ``vigorously threw 
themselves into various kinds of economic construction.'' \126\ 
Another article reported that authorities in Jiashi (Peyziwat) 
county, Kashgar district, strengthened services to protect the 
rights of transferred workers, but also carried out work in 
``ideology education'' and ``persuasion for morale.'' \127\

                    Protection of Cultural Heritage

    Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
reported on continued steps to demolish and ``reconstruct'' the 
Old City section of Kashgar and relocate residents, a project 
which has drawn opposition from Uyghur residents and other 
observers for requiring the resettlement of residents and for 
undermining cultural heritage protection.\128\ Authorities in 
Kashgar implemented a ``zero-tolerance system'' (lingkongzhi) 
in the past year to curb citizen petitioning to higher 
authorities over grievances connected to the demolition and 
resettlement project.\129\ They incorporated incentives for 
officials to curb petitioning to higher level authorities in 
official performance evaluations.\130\ Authorities reported 
spreading information on the ``necessity, urgency, and 
significance'' of the demolition project and visiting local 
households to ``coordinate and solve'' existing problems.\131\ 
A Xinhua article reported that a three-month project was 
launched in October to survey cultural heritage in the Old 
City, but the article did not explain why the preservation 
effort began almost a year after beginning demolition work in 
the Old City.\132\ In the runup to the launch of the demolition 
project in 2009, authorities said that ``few'' buildings in the 
Old City had real preservation value and that most structures 
would be demolished.\133\ The statements on the number of 
buildings with preservation value were at odds, however, with 
outside assessments and earlier official evaluations of the 
area's cultural heritage, while subsequent reports indicated 
that historic buildings had been razed.\134\ Although Chinese 
authorities stated in the past year that an official from the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) supported the project,\135\ the UNESCO 
official said the organization's statements were taken out of 
context and described the Kashgar project as ``a whole cultural 
heritage that's being destroyed.'' \136\

                      Uyghur Refugees and Migrants

    Uyghurs seeking asylum outside of China continued to face 
barriers to accessing asylum proceedings and risk of 
refoulement under the sway of China's influence in neighboring 
countries and its disregard for international protections for 
asylum seekers. While a number of previously reported cases of 
refoulement and extradition involved refugees, asylum seekers, 
and migrants in central and south Asian countries near the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR),\137\ a case from the 
past year illustrated the barriers to asylum procedures that a 
group of Uyghurs faced in a southeast Asian country. On 
December 19, 2009, Cambodian authorities deported a group of 20 
Uyghur asylum seekers to China, including 2 infants,\138\ in 
violation of international law.\139\ Most of the group, along 
with two others, had arrived in the country in November, and 
sought asylum from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) office in Phnom Penh.\140\ A Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson alleged the asylum seekers 
were ``involved in crimes,'' and the Chinese government sent 
the Cambodian government a diplomatic note on the case.\141\ 
Cambodian authorities then deported the 20 people before the 
UNHCR made a determination of their refugee status.\142\ Two 
days after the deportation, China's Vice President Xi Jinping 
signed an agreement to provide a reported US$1.2 billion in aid 
to Cambodia.\143\ The Chinese MFA spokesperson denied a 
connection between the two events and said that authorities 
would deal with the Uyghur group's ``illegal criminal 
activities in accordance with the law.'' \144\ Chinese 
authorities reported in June that 3 of the 20 people returned 
to China were terrorist suspects,\145\ a charge that, even if 
made at the time of extradition, would not have precluded an 
assessment of the asylum cases by UN officers.\146\ Earlier in 
the reporting year, authorities in China also reportedly 
detained Uyghurs in Chinese cities outside the XUAR who had 
tried to leave China or who had helped others attempting to 
leave.\147\

                                V. Tibet


                              Introduction

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 
government and Communist Party continued to press the ``core 
interest'' policy that seeks to isolate the Dalai Lama 
internationally and diminish or end his international 
influence. The Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum) applied the 
highest imprimatur of political power to achieving sweeping 
economic, social, and cultural policy objectives throughout the 
Tibetan autonomous areas of China by 2020--the same year that 
the government intends to have completed the ``redesign'' of 
Lhasa city and the construction of a network of railways 
crisscrossing the Tibetan plateau.\1\ The forum 
expanded the Party's Tibet policy purview beyond the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR) to include the Tibetan autonomous 
prefectures and counties located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, 
and Yunnan provinces. The forum set out economic development 
objectives that principally focus on accelerating and 
strengthening a development model that subordinates respecting 
and protecting Tibetan culture to Party and government 
priorities.
    During this reporting year, the dialogue between the Dalai 
Lama's representatives and Chinese government and Party 
officials resumed as the government increased pressure on 
Tibetan Buddhism, a principal element of Tibetan culture. The 
China-Dalai Lama dialogue resumed days after the Fifth Forum 
when the Dalai Lama's envoys arrived in China for the ninth 
round of formal dialogue since 2002 with Party officials. 
Neither side reported substantive progress and both sides 
reiterated key positions, but senior figures on both sides 
referred to certain developments in a positive manner. The 
Chinese government and Party strengthened the push to use 
policy and legal measures to shape and control what Chinese 
officials refer to as the ``normal order'' for Tibetan 
Buddhism. Legal measures requiring a nationwide re-registration 
of ``professional religious personnel,'' underway in the TAR 
during 2010, could result in substantial losses to the Tibetan 
monastic community if authorities apply re-registration in a 
manner intended to weed out monks and nuns whom authorities 
suspect of holding religious views that the government does not 
deem to be ``legal.'' Such views include religious devotion 
toward the Dalai Lama and support of the Dalai Lama's 
recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the Panchen Lama.
    Reports of Tibetan political protest and detention declined 
during the Commission's 2010 reporting year based on Commission 
monitoring as of early September. The apparent decline may 
suggest that Tibetans generally are less willing to risk the 
consequences of political protest in the presence of the 
ongoing security crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries, 
nunneries, schools, and workplaces. Courts sentenced Tibetans 
to imprisonment for seeking to make information and views about 
the Tibetan protests available to other Tibetans (inside and 
outside of China) and for using cultural or entertainment media 
to articulate their views.

Internationally, Government Presses ``Core Interest'' Policy To Isolate 
                               Dalai Lama

    The Chinese government and Communist Party during the 
Commission's 2010 reporting year pressed the ``core interest'' 
policy that seeks to isolate the Dalai Lama internationally and 
diminish or end his international influence.\2\ The policy is 
based on Chinese officials' assertions that ``Tibet'' is one of 
China's two ``core interests'' (``Taiwan'' is the other); \3\ 
the Dalai Lama is a ``splittist''; \4\ and that other 
governments, therefore, should not permit the Dalai Lama to 
enter their countries and thereby threaten China's 
``territorial integrity.'' \5\
    During the period preceding U.S. President Barack Obama's 
February 18, 2010, meeting with the Dalai Lama,\6\ China's 
state-run media published demands that the United States 
``respect China's core interests'' by not allowing the meeting 
to occur.\7\ During the period between the October 6, 2009, 
White House statement \8\ confirming that the meeting would 
take place at a time following the President's November 15 to 
18 China visit,\9\ and the February 11, 2010, White House 
announcement that the meeting would take place on February 
18,\10\ some Chinese media reports expressed exuberance based 
on the incorrect conclusion that President Obama's decision to 
travel to China before meeting with the Dalai Lama signaled 
that Chinese government pressure had caused him to decide to 
forego meeting the Dalai Lama.\11\
    The ``core interest'' policy that aims to isolate the Dalai 
Lama internationally operates in tandem with the Party's 
domestic campaign to isolate Tibetans in China from the Dalai 
Lama. [See, e.g., Hu Jintao Invokes Marxist Theory To Reinforce 
Struggle Against the Dalai Lama's Influence in this section.] 
At the same time, the Chinese government seeks to isolate 
Tibetans in China from the international community with respect 
to issues such as human rights by asserting that Tibetan 
affairs are China's ``internal affairs'' and ``brook no 
interference'' from other countries.\12\ The 
results of such Chinese government policies could include 
further increases of human rights abuses of Tibetans concurrent 
with a decrease in the ability of the international community 
to detect, document, and respond to such abuses.

  Domestically, Fifth Forum Sets Far-Reaching Objectives for 2010-2020


  PRIOR TO FORUM, POLITBURO SETS ``NEW'' STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING TIBET

    On January 8, 2010, 10 days prior to the Fifth Tibet Work 
Forum (Fifth Forum),\13\ the Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Communist Party met to 
formulate a ``new general strategy for governing Tibet.'' \14\ 
At the meeting, Politburo members planned the Party's ``work on 
Tibet'' for the period ahead, namely ``the advancement of work 
on Tibet's development by leaps and bounds and long-term order 
and stability in the new situation.'' \15\ China's state-run 
media reported that the Politburo's ``new general strategy'' 
for Tibetan governance would be based on the notion of ``four 
adherences'': \16\

         ``Insist on adherence to the [Party's] 
        leadership'';
         ``Insist on adherence to the socialist 
        system'';
         ``Insist on adherence to the system of 
        regional autonomy for minority nationalities''; and
         ``Insist on adherence to a development path 
        with Chinese characteristics and Tibetan traits.''

    The fourth ``adherence'' reaffirms the Party's intention to 
continue the policy of creating a Tibet where the fundamental 
objectives (the ``development path'') are Chinese, but where 
some 
``Tibetan traits'' will remain.\17\ As a governing 
``strategy,'' the ``adherences'' emphasize the high degree of 
subordination imposed on local ethnic autonomous governments 
established under China's Constitution and Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law.\18\ None of the 25 members of the Politburo--the 
highest ranking bureau within the Party's Central Committee--
are Tibetans.\19\ Formulation of a ``new'' Tibetan governance 
strategy by a body made up of the highest ranking 
representatives of central Party and government power, and 
lacking Tibetan representation, demonstrates the poor 
implementation of ``ethnic autonomy'' in the Tibetan autonomous 
areas of China.

          THE FORUM: HIGHEST LEVEL OF PARTY AND STATE SUPPORT

    The nine-member Politburo Standing Committee presided at 
the January 18-20 Fifth Forum, signifying the highest level of 
Party and state support for policy objectives across the 
Tibetan autonomous areas of China.\20\ Party General Secretary 
and President of China Hu Jintao and Premier of the State 
Council Wen Jiabao delivered key addresses.\21\ The Fourth 
Tibet Work Forum took place in June 2001.\22\

Maintaining the Rural Priority: Boost Income, Provide Services, Build 
        Infrastructure

    Hu Jintao outlined at the Fifth Forum a series of 
development goals for 2015 and 2020 that prioritize changes to 
rural Tibetan areas--where 87 percent of Tibetans lived in 
2000, according to official Chinese census data \23\--and that 
will have the capacity to increase pressure on Tibetan culture 
in rural areas. The Party and government's heightened emphasis 
on the link between rural development and regional stability 
follows Tibetan farmers' and herders' participation in the wave 
of protests (and some rioting) that began in Lhasa in March 
2008 and spread to locations across the Tibetan plateau.\24\ By 
2015, the gap between the income level of farmers and herders 
in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the national average 
\25\ must be ``markedly narrowed'' and by 2020, the gap must be 
nearly closed, Hu told forum attendees.\26\ The government's 
ability to provide basic public services in rural areas must be 
``markedly increased'' by 2015 and must be near the national 
level by 2020.\27\ Hu said that infrastructure construction 
must make ``great progress'' by 2015, and by 2020 
infrastructure must be ``comprehensively improved.'' \28\
    As of September 2010, the Commission had observed few 
published reports containing details about specific projects 
that the Fifth Forum would promote in the Tibetan autonomous 
areas of China. Pema Choling (Baima Chilin), Chairman of the 
TAR government as of January 15, 2010,\29\ said in March that 
the Fifth Forum adopted ``unprecedented new measures'' and the 
TAR government would ``initiate some major projects,'' but he 
named only one: the ``Qinghai-Tibet direct current transmission 
line.'' \30\ In terms of potential economic, demographic, 
environmental, and cultural impact, however, the most important 
infrastructure projects that the central government has 
announced for completion by 2020 are several new railways that 
will crisscross the Tibetan plateau.\31\

New Development: Policy Coordination Across an Expanded Tibetan Area

    The Fifth Forum for the first time expanded and coordinated 
the Party's Tibetan policy purview beyond the administrative 
boundaries of the TAR to include the Tibetan autonomous 
prefectures and counties located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, 
and Yunnan provinces.\32\ China's state-run media reported that 
the Fifth Forum ``made comprehensive arrangements for speeding 
up the economic and social development'' of the Tibetan areas 
of those four provinces at both central and provincial 
government levels.\33\ Echoing the principal policy 
declarations of the January Politburo meeting [see Prior to 
Forum, Politburo Sets ``New'' Strategy for Governing Tibet in 
this section], the Fifth Forum identified four priorities as 
``the main direction of attack'' for resolving ``the most 
conspicuous and most urgent issues restraining economic and 
social development'' (listed in the order reported): \34\

         ``Improvement in the people's livelihood'';
         ``Development of social undertakings'';
         ``Protection for the ecological environment''; 
        and
         ``Construction of the infrastructure.''

    The policy change more than doubles the number of Tibetans 
who live within the Fifth Forum's contiguous target area and 
nearly doubles the area subject to central-level policy 
coordination. According to official Chinese 2000 census data, 
of approximately 5.42 million Tibetans in China, approximately 
2.43 million lived in the TAR and approximately 2.57 million 
lived in the Tibetan autonomous areas of Qinghai, Gansu, 
Sichuan, and Yunnan.\35\ The expanded Tibetan policy area, with 
an area of approximately 2.24 million square kilometers, is 
nearly double the size of the 1.2-million-square-kilometer 
TAR.\36\
    The Party's decision to expand the Tibetan policy area and 
coordinate policy implementation has resulted in an 
unprecedented political consequence: Chinese government and 
Party officials, as well as the Dalai Lama and his 
representatives, have focused their respective recent policy 
statements on the same area of administrative geography--all of 
the Tibetan autonomous areas of China. The Dalai Lama's envoys' 
November 2008 ``Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan 
People'' \37\ identifies the Tibetan area that the Memorandum 
seeks to address as ``comprising all the areas currently 
designated by the PRC as Tibetan autonomous areas.'' \38\ The 
Chinese and Tibetan parties engaged in the China-Dalai Lama 
dialogue continue, however, to maintain different policy 
approaches toward the Tibetan autonomous areas.\39\

Hu Jintao Invokes Marxist Theory To Reinforce Struggle Against the 
        Dalai Lama's Influence

    Party General Secretary and President of China Hu Jintao 
may have used the Fifth Forum to seek to improve the Party's 
reputation as ``Communist'' by using an esoteric Marxist 
premise to reinforce the Party campaign against the Dalai Lama 
and end the Dalai Lama's influence among Tibetans in China.\40\ 
Hu applied the Marxist theoretical concept of ``special 
contradiction'' to what the Party claims is a threat to China's 
ethnic unity and stability that the Dalai Lama and 
organizations and individuals that the Party associates with 
him (``the Dalai Clique'') create.\41\ Marxism posits that a 
``special contradiction'' may exist when an entity such as an 
ethnic minority group considers itself to be ``alienated'' from 
other ethnic groups, then makes the ``mistake'' of equating 
``alienation'' with ``differentiation'' and attributing 
alienation to ``historical categories.'' \42\ (That is, if 
ethnic Tibetans believe they are ``differentiated'' from ethnic 
Chinese, and that such a belief has a historical basis, then 
the Party blames ``the Dalai Clique'' for creating a ``special 
contradiction'' to Marxism.)
    Hu's prominent mention at the Fifth Forum of the Marxist 
notion of ``special contradiction'' may seek to serve Party 
interests by creating the semblance of a Communist ideological 
basis for the Party insistence that the Dalai Lama aims to 
``separate the motherland'' (seek independence).\43\ The Dalai 
Lama's recurrent assertions that he seeks ``genuine'' (or 
``meaningful'') autonomy for Tibetans, not independence, hinder 
the Party's campaign.

Increasing Pressure on Religion: The ``Normal Order'' for Tibetan 
        Buddhism

    Hu Jintao used the powerful Fifth Forum platform to 
emphasize the Communist Party's role in controlling Tibetan 
Buddhism and the important role of law as a tool to enforce 
what the Party deems to be the ``normal order'' for the 
religion. Hu instructed the forum: ``Comprehensively implement 
the Party's basic principles for religious work and laws and 
regulations on the government's administration of religious 
affairs, earnestly maintain the normal order of Tibetan 
Buddhism, and guide Tibetan Buddhism to keep in line with the 
socialist society.'' \44\
    The legal measures to which Hu Jintao referred at the Fifth 
Forum empower the Chinese government to reshape and control 
Tibetan Buddhism (and other religions) and had not yet been 
created when the Fourth Tibet Work Forum took place in 
2001.\45\ [See Religious Freedom: Tibetan Buddhists ``Can 
Believe Whatever They Want as Long as It's Legal'' in this 
section.]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Initial Fifth Forum Reports Do Not Address Some Key Issues
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
State-run media reports on the Fifth Forum seen by the Commission in the
 weeks following the forum are also noteworthy for what they do not
 include.   None of the reports provided details about infrastructure and
   aid projects from 2010 to 2020 or estimates of their cost. The total
   cost of building additional railways linking Tibetan autonomous areas
   with principal cities in Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces, and
   with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, could be several times
   greater than the 33 billion yuan (US$4.7 billion) cost of
   constructing the Qinghai-Tibet railway.\46\
   None of the Fifth Forum reports provided information about
   whether Party and government personnel canvassed Tibetans at the
   grassroots level on their preferences for economic and social
   development.
   None of the reports provided information on whether ``Tibet
   work'' over the coming decade aims to improve the human rights
   environment for Tibetans along with their standard of living, or
   whether  officials intend to address in a reconciliatory manner any
   of the complaints that Tibetans have raised in the series of protests
   that began in March 2008.\47\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese government and the Dalai 
                      Lama or His Representatives

    The China-Dalai Lama dialogue resumed less than one week 
after the Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum) concluded.\48\ 
The Dalai Lama's envoys arrived in China on January 26, 2010, 
for the ninth round of formal dialogue with Communist Party 
officials.\49\ The 15-month interval between the eighth and 
ninth rounds of dialogue was the longest since such contacts 
resumed in 2002.\50\ Du Qinglin, head of the Party's United 
Front Work Department (UFWD) and the most senior Chinese 
official engaged in discussions with the Dalai Lama's envoys, 
reportedly briefed the envoys on the Fifth Forum and claimed 
that the forum showed that ``[no] country or party in the world 
can match China and the [Communist Party] in using the 
resources of the whole country to support the development of an 
ethnic region.'' \51\
    Neither side reported substantive progress as a result of 
the ninth round of dialogue and both sides reiterated key 
positions,\52\ but senior figures referred to certain 
developments in a positive manner. For example, Chinese 
officials and the Dalai Lama's 
envoys both emphasized the important role of Fifth Forum 
developments.\53\ Zhu Weiqun, Deputy Head of the UFWD, praised 
the ``better attitude'' of the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi 
Gyari.\54\ In March 2010, Lodi Gyari referred favorably to the 
Party's Fifth Forum decision to consider development issues 
throughout all Tibetan autonomous areas:

        We welcome the fact that the Fifth Tibet Work Forum has 
        looked into the issues of development in all Tibetan 
        areas--the Tibet Autonomous Region as well as other 
        Tibetan areas. It is our strong belief that all the 
        Tibetan areas must be under a uniform policy and a 
        single administration. If we take away the political 
        slogans, many of the issues that have been prioritized 
        by the Forum are similar to the basic needs of the 
        Tibetan people outlined in our Memorandum.\55\

Other developments at the ninth round of dialogue included:

         Party adds more preconditions on the Dalai 
        Lama. Du Qinglin listed four types of expression (or 
        criticism) that the Dalai Lama must not ``indulge in'': 
        \56\
                 ``National interests brook no 
                infringement'';
                 ``The principles of the Constitution 
                brook no trampling on'';
                 ``National dignity brooks no 
                vilification''; and
                 ``The common wishes of the people of 
                all ethnic groups brook no deviation.''

         The Tibetan ``Note.'' The Dalai Lama's envoys 
        provided to UFWD officials a ``Note'' with additional 
        explanation of the eighth-round ``Memorandum on Genuine 
        Autonomy for the Tibetan People,'' which elaborated on 
        behalf of the Dalai Lama a more detailed explanation of 
        Tibetan aspirations for ``genuine autonomy'' than had 
        been available previously.\57\ The Note contained 
        ``constructive suggestions for a way forward'' and 
        addressed ``fundamental issues,'' according to a 
        February 10, 2010, Special Envoy statement.\58\
         Party rejection of the ``Note.'' At a February 
        2 press conference, Zhu Weiqun rejected the Note and 
        claimed that the envoys refused to ``revise a single 
        word'' of the Memorandum or ``make any concession.'' 
        \59\ Zhu repeated that the Party is willing to discuss 
        only the Dalai Lama's ``personal future and the future 
        of those around him.'' \60\

 Religious Freedom: Tibetan Buddhists ``Can Believe Whatever They Want 
                        as Long as It's Legal''

    The Chinese government and Communist Party's push to define 
and manage a ``normal order'' for Tibetan Buddhism, and 
transform the Tibetan Buddhist community into one that adheres 
to state-approved positions and practices, creates increasing 
restraints on the exercise of freedom of religion for Tibetan 
Buddhists. In March 2010, Lhasa's mayor summed up the limits on 
freedom of religion: ``In Tibet, people can believe whatever 
they want as long as it is legal.'' \61\

 STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF LAW IN SHAPING, CONTROLLING TIBETAN BUDDHISM

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 
government and Communist Party strengthened their push to use 
policy and legal measures to shape and control what Chinese 
officials, including President and Party General Secretary Hu 
Jintao, refer to as the ``normal order'' for Tibetan Buddhism. 
Hu directed senior Party leadership figures attending the Fifth 
Tibet Work Forum to guide Tibetan Buddhism ``to keep in line 
with socialist society'' and to rely on the Party's ``basic 
principles for religious work'' and the government's ``laws and 
regulations'' to achieve that end.\62\ [See Domestically, Fifth 
Forum Sets Far-Reaching Objectives for 2010-2020 in this 
section.] Some of the principal regulatory instruments to which 
Hu referred were not issued until recent years; the most recent 
measure went into effect days before the Fifth Tibet Work Forum 
commenced. In addition to China's principal regulatory measure 
on religion, the 2005 Regulation on Religious Affairs,\63\ the 
central and Tibet Autonomous Region governments have issued at 
least four regulatory measures since 2007 that provide 
increased state control of Tibetan Buddhism.\64\

         Effective January 1, 2007. The TAR People's 
        Government Standing Committee issued the TAR 
        Implementing Measures for the Regulation on Religious 
        Affairs (TAR Measures), imposing stricter and more 
        detailed controls on monks, nuns, monasteries, and 
        nunneries in the TAR than previous measures.\65\
         Effective March 1, 2007. The State 
        Administration for 
        Religious Affairs (SARA) issued the Measures for 
        Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record 
        (Record Measures), requiring nationwide re-registration 
        of ``professional religious personnel.'' \66\
         Effective September 1, 2007. SARA issued the 
        Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of 
        Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism. The measures could 
        transform Tibetan Buddhism in China by empowering the 
        Party and government to gradually reshape the religion 
        by controlling one of the religion's most unique and 
        important features--lineages of teachers that Tibetan 
        Buddhists believe are reincarnations (trulkus) and that 
        can span centuries.\67\
         Effective January 10, 2010. The Buddhist 
        Association of China \68\ issued the Measures for 
        Confirming the Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist 
        Professional Religious Personnel (Confirming 
        Measures).\69\ The measures provide that Tibetan 
        Buddhist ``religious personnel'' whose credentials were 
        ``confirmed'' prior to the measure's effective date 
        need not repeat the confirmation process, but that the 
        monastery or nunnery Democratic Management Committee 
        (DMC) \70\ must examine and verify the monk's, nun's, 
        or trulku's conformity with political, professional, 
        and personal criteria.\71\ After the DMC submits an 
        opinion on the applicant to the local Buddhist 
        Association for 
        approval, the association will issue a registration 
        certificate to the ``religious professional.'' \72\ The 
        TAR government reported on the date the Confirming 
        Measures took effect that it would complete re-
        registration by the end of 2010--including recording 
        the government's assessment of the ``qualifications'' 
        of Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and ``living 
        Buddhas,'' a Chinese term for trulkus.\73\

    The number of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns subject to 
re-registration under the Record Measures and Confirming 
Measures is substantial. The central government has reported 
the total number of monks and nuns in the Tibetan areas of 
China as approximately 120,000 as long ago as 1997 \74\ and as 
recently as June 2009, according to a U.S. State Department 
report.\75\ The impact of the measures could result in 
substantial losses to the monastic community if authorities 
apply re-registration in a manner intended to weed out monks 
and nuns whom authorities suspect of holding beliefs that the 
government does not deem to be ``legal.'' Such views include 
religious devotion toward the Dalai Lama and support of the 
Dalai Lama's recognition in 1995 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima as the 
Panchen Lama.\76\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Three Top-Ranking Lamas: Deepening Alarm; a Hint on Location;
                    Explanation of Escape From Tibet
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Dalai Lama expressed
 deepening alarm on the outlook for Tibetan Buddhism in China. A senior
 Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) official commented on the current status
 of Gedun Choekyi Nyima, who was five years old when he disappeared
 after the Dalai Lama recognized him as the 11th Panchen Lama in May
 1995.\77\ The Karmapa, the spiritual head of the Kagyu tradition of
 Tibetan Buddhism,\78\ explained publicly why he decided to escape from
 Tibet at the end of 1999.   The Dalai Lama spoke in his 2010 annual March 10 address \79\
   about the outlook for Tibetan Buddhism under current Chinese
   policies: ``Today, the Chinese authorities are conducting various
   political campaigns, including a campaign of patriotic re-education,
   in many monasteries in Tibet. They are putting the monks and nuns in
   prison-like conditions, depriving them [of] the opportunity to study
   and practice in peace. These conditions make the monasteries function
   more like museums and are intended to deliberately annihilate
   [Tibetan] Buddhism.'' \80\
   The Panchen Lama (Gedun Choekyi Nyima) and his family are
   ``living a very good life in Tibet,'' Chairman of the TAR government
   Pema Choling (Baima Chilin) told reporters on March 7.\81\ He said
   that Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his family ``are reluctant to be
   disturbed,'' \82\ and described Gedun Choekyi Nyima as a ``victim''
   [apparently of the Dalai Lama] who ``lives the life of an ordinary
   citizen like us.'' \83\ Also in March, Gyaltsen Norbu, the Panchen
   Lama that the Chinese government installed in December 1995,\84\
   entered the ``political arena'' as a member of the Chinese People's
   Political Consultative Conference.\85\
   The Karmapa, in a January 2010 interview, stated that he fled
   from Tibet to India because he feared that ``the Chinese government
   would have assigned me political duties as I became older.'' \86\
   Life in China might have been ``endurable'' if he had been able to
   focus only on his religious functions, he said. The Karmapa fled his
   religious seat at Tsurphu Monastery, located in Duilongdeqing
   (Toelung Dechen) county, Lhasa municipality, TAR, on December 28,
   1999, at the age of 14 and arrived in Dharamsala, India, the Dalai
   Lama's residence in exile, on January 5, 2000.\87\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Tibetan Development Initiatives: Party Claims National, International 
                     Stakes for Its ``Tibet Work''

    The January 2010 Fifth Tibet Work Forum (Fifth Forum) set 
out Communist Party and central government economic development 
objectives for 2010 to 2020. The objectives principally focus 
on 
accelerating and strengthening a development model that 
subordinates respecting and protecting Tibetan culture to Party 
and government priorities. President and Party General 
Secretary Hu Jintao claimed high stakes nationally and 
internationally for the success of such objectives, telling 
forum attendees that Party initiatives in Tibetan areas address 
``the urgent need in safeguarding ethnic solidarity, 
safeguarding social stability, and safeguarding national 
security,'' as well as ``the urgent need in creating a 
favorable international environment.'' \88\ Hu outlined Fifth 
Forum development objectives that included building major 
infrastructure projects,\89\ increasing natural resource 
exploitation,\90\ and continuing to push forward the 
construction of a ``socialist new countryside'' (compulsory 
settlement of nomadic herders and resettlement of farmers).\91\
    The Fifth Forum objectives build upon the Great Western 
Development campaign that the State Council launched in 
2000,\92\ and (because of the magnitude of forum objectives) 
will increase pressure on Tibetans to accept and adapt to a 
development model the fundamental properties of which the Party 
describes as ``Chinese characteristics,'' but that would retain 
``Tibetan traits.'' \93\ Tibetan resentment against Chinese 
policies--including poor implementation of the Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law \94\ and consequences of development initiatives 
\95\--helps to explain the wave of Tibetan protests that began 
in March 2008.\96\ Government and Party officials have not 
acknowledged publicly the unpopularity of their Tibetan 
development policies.

                   UPDATES ON KEY DEVELOPMENT TOPICS

    Railroad construction. Chinese government plans to complete 
a network of railways crisscrossing the Tibetan plateau by 2020 
have the potential to have a profound impact on the Tibetan 
culture and the ecological environment.\97\ During the 
Commission's 2010 reporting year, state-run media reports 
disclosed limited progress on Tibetan railway construction.

         Work on the first section of the Sichuan-Tibet 
        railway, between Chengdu city, the capital of Sichuan 
        province, and Kangding (Dartsedo), the capital of Ganzi 
        (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), will 
        start by the end of 2010, according to a January 2010 
        Sichuan government report.\98\ An April Chinese news 
        report, however, said that work would start ``next 
        year''(2011).\99\
         Construction of a railway segment from Lhasa 
        eastward to Linzhi (Kongpo) that both the Sichuan-Tibet 
        and Yunnan-Tibet railways will use will start in 2013 
        at the earliest, according to a state-run media 
        report.\100\ The government has not yet decided whether 
        to route the railway to the north of the Brahmaputra 
        River (Yarlung Tsangpo) or to the south of the 
        river.\101\ A southern route would position the 
        railroad much closer to a section of disputed, heavily 
        militarized border between the Indian state of 
        Arunachal Pradesh and Linzhi prefecture in the 
        TAR.\102\ Experts favor the southern route, the report 
        said.\103\
         Construction of the railway extension westward 
        from Lhasa to Rikaze (Shigatse) city, initially 
        ``expected to be completed in 2010,'' \104\ remained in 
        preparatory stages as of March 2010.\105\ Construction 
        work began on September 26, 2010, and will take four 
        years to complete, according to an official news media 
        report.\106\

    Expansion of mining. A TAR official said in March 2010 that 
the mining industry share of TAR gross domestic product would 
increase from the current level of about 3 percent to between 
30 percent and 50 percent by 2020.\107\ The TAR government has 
designated nine ``special zones for mineral industries,'' the 
official said.\108\ Tibetan protests against Chinese government 
mineral exploitation and resulting environmental damage 
continued during the Commission's 2010 reporting year and could 
increase further if the government expands mining without 
adequate protection for Tibetans and their environment. On May 
15, 2010, for example, People's Armed Police reportedly fired 
on 200 to 300 Tibetan villagers in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, 
Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, 
after they attempted to protest at the gate of a cement factory 
they held responsible for fouling the atmosphere, damaging a 
roadside Buddhist pagoda, and blocking access to their 
village.\109\ And according to a report in early May, 
``thousands'' of Tibetans renewed protests against mining on 
what Tibetans regard as a sacred mountain in Mangkang (Markham) 
county, Changdu (Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, after the companies 
involved disregarded a June 2009 negotiated agreement to cease 
the mining.\110\
    Forced settlement of nomadic herders, resettlement of 
farmers. Chairman of the TAR government Pema Choling (Baima 
Chilin) said in March 2010 that ``constantly deepening efforts 
to build a new socialist countryside'' was a priority following 
the Fifth Forum.\111\ China's state-run media reported in 
November 2009 that ``more than 1 million farmers and herdsmen'' 
in the TAR were already ``enjoying safe houses,'' and that by 
the end of 2009 an additional 330,000 nomadic herders and 
farmers would move into new houses.\112\ These figures total 
approximately 1.33 million, a figure equal to about half the 
TAR Tibetan population.\113\ A September 2009 State Council 
Information Office white paper listed ``building settlements 
for formerly nomadic people'' as a measure to ``relieve the 
poverty the ethnic minorities suffer,'' \114\ but an 
international advocacy organization said in 2010 the policy 
threatens Tibetan nomads' livelihoods and often results in 
``ghetto-like'' conditions.\115\
    Managing the ``floating population.'' Lhasa's mayor said in 
March 2010 that following the March 2008 Lhasa rioting, the 
city had implemented measures ``reinforcing the management [of] 
the floating population and communities.'' \116\ The mayor did 
not specify whether he referred to Tibetan or Han itinerant 
workers and 
traders.\117\ Chinese officials have acknowledged that Tibetan 
resentment against increasing numbers of non-Tibetan workers 
and traders \118\ traveling into the TAR was a factor in the 
March 14, 2008, Lhasa riots.\119\ Premier Wen Jiabao in his 
March 2010 National People's Congress work report called on the 
government to improve services and ``do a good job in 
employment and management work'' for the ethnic minority 
``floating population.'' \120\ State-run media reported that 
Wen's comments were the first time the issue has been raised in 
a national work report.\121\

    Political Imprisonment of Tibetans: Law as a Tool of Repression

    Reports of Tibetan political protest and detention declined 
during the Commission's 2010 reporting year based on Commission 
monitoring as of early September.\122\ The apparent decline may 
suggest that Tibetans generally are less willing to risk the 
consequences of political protest in the presence of the 
ongoing security crackdown on Tibetan communities, monasteries, 
nunneries, schools, and workplaces following the wave of 
Tibetan political protests that began in March 2008. The 
Commission, however, cannot determine the extent to which the 
apparent decrease may have resulted from heightened security 
measures that reduce the frequency of protests and detentions 
(thus reducing the number of reports of protest and detention), 
or the extent to which Chinese government suppression of 
information flow may have prevented reports of protest and 
detention from reaching international monitoring and reporting 
organizations (thus reducing such agencies' ability to report 
protests and detention).
    China's security and judicial institutions' use of laws on 
``splittism'' and ``leaking state secrets'' \123\ during this 
reporting year infringed upon Chinese citizens' 
constitutionally protected freedoms of speech, religion, 
association, and assembly \124\--first by using the law on 
``splittism'' to punish Tibetans who criticize or peacefully 
protest government policies, and then by using the law on 
``leaking state secrets'' to punish Tibetans who attempt to 
share with other Tibetans information about incidents of 
repression and punishment. For example, a Chinese court 
reportedly sentenced Dondrub Wangchen to imprisonment on the 
charge of ``splittism'' for using film media to disseminate 
Tibetan views on topics such as Tibetan freedom and the Dalai 
Lama.\125\ Prosecutors reportedly used the charge of ``leaking 
secrets'' to seek conviction of Konchog Tsephel and Kunga 
Tseyang for using their Web sites to share with other 
Tibetans--including Tibetans outside of China--information and 
views on Tibetan experiences of detention, imprisonment, and 
religious and cultural repression during the ongoing 
crackdown.\126\ [See box titled Imprisonment for Sharing 
Information, Cultural Expression below for more information on 
these cases.]
    Chinese government officials moved during the Commission's 
2010 reporting year to diminish or end the public influence of 
emergent Tibetan civic and intellectual leaders.\127\ Prior to 
this reporting year, the apparent misapplication of China's 
Criminal Law to imprison Tibetan leaders and remove them from 
society involved religious figures, e.g., Bangri Chogtrul 
(1999),\128\ Sonam Phuntsog (1999),\129\ Tenzin Deleg 
(2002),\130\ and Phurbu Tsering (2008).\131\ During this 
reporting year, officials misapplied the law in order to 
imprison environmentalist and art collector Karma Samdrub and 
charge secularist intellectual Tagyal--both of whom had 
developed cooperative relationships with the government and 
avoided ``political'' activity, according to reports.\132\ Some 
officials may suspect that such leaders could encourage in 
Tibetan citizens a commitment to civic values and 
responsibilities that the Party may regard as a potential 
obstacle to the Party's exclusive exercise of political 
power.\133\ Other officials may have sought retribution against 
the men for more parochial reasons.\134\

         In Karma Samdrub's case, a court in the 
        Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region sentenced him on June 
        24, 2010, to 15 years' imprisonment for ``tomb-
        robbing,'' a charge first brought against him in 1998 
        and dropped the same year.\135\ Officials revived 
        criminal proceedings against Karma Samdrub after he 
        attained national acclaim as an environmentalist,\136\ 
        and then sought the release of two of his brothers whom 
        public security officials detained in August 2009 after 
        an environmental protection organization they founded 
        accused local officials of hunting protected 
        wildlife.\137\
         In the case of Tagyal--an intellectual who 
        worked at a government publishing house and advocated 
        for a more secular Tibetan society \138\--officials in 
        Qinghai province charged him in May 2010 with 
        ``inciting splittism'' after he used veiled language 
        the previous month to urge Tibetans to avoid corrupt 
        official channels when donating money to aid victims of 
        the April 2010 Yushu earthquake in Qinghai.\139\ Other 
        accounts attribute his detention to the publication of 
        a book he wrote about the 2008 Tibetan protests.\140\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural Expression
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, Chinese courts sentenced
 Tibetans to imprisonment for seeking to make information and views
 about the Tibetan protests and their consequences available to other
 Tibetans (inside and outside of China). Some of the sentenced Tibetans
 used cultural or entertainment media to articulate their views. Five
 examples follow.   Dondrub Wangchen, film-maker. On December 28, 2009, the
   Xining Intermediate People's Court, located in Xining city, Qinghai
   province, reportedly sentenced Dondrub Wangchen to six years in
   prison on the charge of ``splittism'' for making a documentary film
   featuring Tibetans in Qinghai expressing on camera their views on the
   Dalai Lama, the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, and Chinese
   law.\141\
   Konchog Tsephel, civil servant and Web site operator. On
   November 12, 2009, the Gannan (Kanlho) Intermediate People's Court,
   located in Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Gansu
   province, reportedly sentenced Konchog Tsephel to 15 years'
   imprisonment for ``disclosing state secrets.'' \142\ The charge
   reportedly was linked to essays he published on his Tibetan-language
   Web site.\143\
   Kunga Tseyang, monk and Web site operator. On November 12,
   2009, the Gannan Intermediate People's Court reportedly sentenced
   Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery monk Kunga Tseyang to five years in
   prison on the charge of ``disclosing state secrets'' for publishing
   essays, photographs, and environmental information on his Tibetan-
   language Web site.\144\
   Ngagchung, monk. In January 2010, the Ganzi (Kardze)
   Intermediate People's Court, located in Ganzi TAP, Sichuan province,
   reportedly sentenced Serthar Buddhist Institute (Larung Gar) monk
   Ngagchung to seven years' imprisonment for ``leaking information'' on
   the Tibetan situation to ``separatist forces'' outside of China via
   telephone and other means.\145\
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Imprisonment for Sharing Information, Cultural Expression--Continued
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Tashi Dondrub, singer. On January 5, 2010, the Henan (Yulgan)
   Mongol Autonomous County Reeducation Through Labor (RTL) Committee,
   located in Huangnan (Malho) TAP, Qinghai province, ordered Tashi
   Dondrub, a member of the county performing arts troupe, to serve 15
   months' RTL for singing songs with ``provocative themes'' \146\ such
   as nostalgia for the Dalai Lama and sadness at the situation
   following the March 2008 protests.\147\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       UPDATES: PROTESTS, SENTENCING, POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE

    Although the number of published reports of Tibetan 
political protest and detention observed by the Commission 
declined during the 2010 reporting year, instances of protest 
continued to occur that suggest some Tibetan areas remain 
protest-prone even under heightened security measures. Two 
representative examples follow.

         Protesters demand release of Buddhist teacher 
        in Sichuan. Tenzin Deleg (A'an Zhaxi), recognized by 
        the Dalai Lama as a reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist 
        teacher, was convicted in a closed court in Sichuan 
        province in November 2002 of conspiring to cause 
        explosions and inciting splittism and is currently 
        serving a sentence of life imprisonment.\148\ In July 
        2009, Tibetans in Yajiang (Nyagchukha) county, Ganzi 
        (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (TAP), Sichuan 
        province, presented to officials a petition calling for 
        his release on the asserted basis that there was no 
        proof of his guilt, he had not confessed to the alleged 
        crimes, and officials had framed him.\149\ Beginning on 
        December 5, several hundred Nyagchukha Tibetans 
        participated in several days of protests calling for 
        Tenzin Deleg's release.\150\ Public security officials 
        and People's Armed Police reportedly beat and detained 
        dozens of protesters and later released most of 
        them.\151\
         Middle school students protest in Gansu, TAR. 
        On March 14, 2010, 20 to 30 Tibetan middle school 
        students joined by at least 100 other Tibetans in the 
        seat of Maqu (Machu) county, Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, 
        staged a political protest calling for Tibetan freedom 
        and the Dalai Lama's long life.\152\ Public security 
        officials and People's Armed Police reportedly detained 
        at least 40 protesters.\153\ On March 16, 30 to 40 
        Tibetan students from two middle schools in Hezuo 
        (Tsoe), the capital of Gannan TAP, staged a brief 
        protest and shouted slogans.\154\ Public security 
        officials reportedly detained at least 20 of the 
        students. On March 22, Tibetan primary school students 
        briefly staged a protest in Biru (Driru) county, Naqu 
        (Nagchu) prefecture, Tibet Autonomous Region.\155\ 
        During the protests, students in both locations 
        reportedly called for Tibetan freedom, the Dalai Lama's 
        long life, and his return to Tibet.\156\

    In a closely watched case,\157\ on December 23, 2009, the 
Ganzi TAP Intermediate People's Court, located in Kangding 
(Dartsedo), Ganzi TAP, reportedly sentenced Phurbu 
Tsering,\158\ whom Tibetan Buddhists regard as a reincarnated 
Tibetan Buddhist teacher, to eight years and six months' 
imprisonment.\159\ The same court had tried him on April 21, 
2009, on charges of illegally possessing weapons or ammunition 
(an offense under China's Criminal Law, Article 128) and 
``embezzlement'' (Criminal Law, Article 271), according to his 
lawyers, Jiang Tianyong and Li Fangping.\160\ The lawyers' 
defense statement to the court argued that insufficient 
evidence was available to support either charge and the 
government could not prove that Phurbu Tsering had not been 
framed by someone else.\161\ The court reportedly sentenced 
Phurbu Tsering to one year and six months' imprisonment for 
``illegal possession of ammunition'' and seven years' 
imprisonment for ``misappropriation of public assets.'' \162\
    The Commission has not observed during the 2010 reporting 
year any new developments in the cases of former monk Jigme 
Gyatso \163\ (detained in 1996 and serving an extended 18-year 
sentence for printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later 
shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying 
Khedrub \164\ (sentenced in 2000 to life imprisonment for 
printing leaflets); Bangri Chogtrul\165\ (regarded by Tibetan 
Buddhists as a reincarnated teacher; detained in 1999 and 
serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life imprisonment 
for ``inciting splittism''); or nomad Ronggye Adrag (sentenced 
in November 2007 to 8 years' imprisonment for shouting 
political slogans at a public festival).\166\

Summary Information: Tibetan Political Detention and 
        Imprisonment

    As of September 3, 2010, the Commission's Political 
Prisoner Database (PPD) contained records of 824 Tibetan 
political prisoners believed to be currently detained or 
imprisoned. Of those 824 records, 765 are records of Tibetans 
detained on or after March 10, 2008,\167\ and 59 are records of 
Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 2008. It is certain that 
PPD information is far from complete for the period after March 
10, 2008.
    Of the 765 Tibetan political prisoners believed to be 
currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or 
after March 10, 2008, according to PPD data:

         Slightly more than half (388) are detained or 
        imprisoned in Sichuan province; the rest are detained 
        or imprisoned in the Tibet Autonomous Region (183), 
        Gansu province (105), Qinghai province (87), Yunnan 
        province (1), and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (1).
         443 (approximately 58 percent) are Tibetan 
        Buddhist ``religious professionals'' (monks, nuns, and 
        trulkus).

    Sentencing information is available for 152 of the 824 
Tibetans the PPD records as currently imprisoned or detained, 
as of September 3, 2010. Of the 152 Tibetan political prisoners 
for whom sentencing information is available, 116 were detained 
on or after March 10, 2008. The 116 sentences range in length 
from one year to life imprisonment.\168\ The average length of 
the 116 sentences imposed on Tibetan political prisoners 
detained on or after March 10, 2008, is approximately five 
years and nine months.\169\ Of the 141 Tibetan political 
prisoners for whom sentencing information is available, 36 were 
detained prior to March 10, 2008. The 36 sentences range in 
length from three years to life imprisonment.\170\ The average 
length of the 36 sentences currently being served by Tibetan 
political prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, is 
approximately 13 years and 5 months.\171\


      

                VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau


                              Introduction

    The United States supports a stable, autonomous Hong Kong 
under the ``one country, two systems'' formula articulated in 
the Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China.\1\ The United States also supports the high degree of 
autonomy of Macau set forth in the Sino-Portuguese Joint 
Declaration on the Question of Macao and the Basic Law of the 
Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China.\2\ The people of Hong Kong and Macau enjoy an 
independent judiciary \3\ and an open society in which the 
freedoms of speech, movement, and assembly are largely 
respected.\4\
    According to the Hong Kong Basic Law, ``The ultimate aim is 
the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon 
nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in 
accordance with democratic procedures''; the Basic Law also 
provides that ``[t]he ultimate aim is the election of all the 
members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage''; 
furthermore, under the Basic Law, the mainland Chinese 
government authorizes Hong Kong to exercise ``a high degree of 
autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent 
judicial power. . . .'' \5\
    Macau introduced national security legislation provided by 
Article 23 of the Macau Basic Law in October 2008, 
criminalizing treason, secession, subversion, sedition, theft 
of state secrets, and association with foreign political 
organizations that harm state security.\6\ The Macau 
government's passage of the legislation in February 2009 was 
praised by Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the National People's 
Congress Standing Committee, at a celebration in December 2009 
commemorating Macau's handover, raising concerns among some in 
Hong Kong that China would try to reintroduce similar 
legislation in Hong Kong.\7\ When similar legislation was 
proposed for Hong Kong in 2003, public protest was strong, and 
the government withdrew the legislation.\8\

                               Hong Kong


                           UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE

    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, there has been 
limited progress toward universal suffrage in Hong Kong.\9\ A 
December 2007 decision of the National People's Congress 
Standing Committee (NPCSC) prohibited the people of Hong Kong 
from directly electing both the chief executive and all members 
of the Legislative Council (Legco) by universal suffrage in 
2012, or making other substantive changes to the electoral 
system.\10\ In light of the decision, the earliest possible 
dates for universal suffrage are 2017 for the chief executive 
and 2020 for Legco, though there is no guarantee of universal 
suffrage at those times. In line with the NPCSC decision, the 
Hong Kong government issued a consultation document on 
constitutional reform in November 2009, and on April 14, 2010, 
released its Package of Proposals for the Methods for Selecting 
the Chief Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 
2012.\11\
    The government's proposals cover the 2012 election only. 
Currently, an 800-member election committee selects the chief 
executive. Under the proposals, the number of members of the 
committee is enlarged to 1,200, but the makeup and procedure of 
appointment to the committee are not changed. According to a 
Financial Times article, the election committee is ``dominated 
by pro-Beijing businessmen and community leaders.'' \12\ 
Currently, Legco has 60 members, only half of whom are directly 
elected. The other half are 
selected by ``functional constituencies,'' which represent 
``key economic and social sectors.'' \13\ According to one 
commentator, ``By one estimate, this system allows 1% of the 
voters to fill half the Legco seats.'' \14\ The proposals add 
10 seats to Legco, 5 selected by functional constituencies and 
5 directly elected, thus not changing the proportion of Legco 
seats returned by direct election. The Basic Law provides that 
``passage of bills introduced by the government'' require only 
a simple majority vote, but requires that the ``passage of 
motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by 
individual members of the Legislative Council'' require a 
majority vote of each of the two groups in Legco, those 
directly elected through geographically-based elections, and 
those selected by the functional constituencies.\15\ The 
government proposals were criticized by some in Hong Kong.\16\ 
Legco approved the proposal package in June 2010, after it was 
amended to provide voters who do not belong to any functional 
constituency the right to elect Legco members from a list of 
candidates nominated by the district councilors to fill the 
five additional functional constituency seats.\17\ The vote for 
the package brought what the South China Morning Post described 
as an ``incremental boost to democracy--but not universal 
suffrage.'' \18\

                             ACTIVE DISSENT

    During this reporting year, Hong Kong citizens have 
continued to express their dissent, not only concerning the 
pace of progress toward universal suffrage,\19\ but also 
against other government actions, including plans to build a 
costly high-speed railway project.\20\ There were several 
large-scale protests during this reporting year, including a 
January 1, 2010, anti-government demonstration.\21\ According 
to a January 2010 article, ``The political system in Hong Kong 
is increasingly paralyzed, and street protests are growing more 
confrontational as public dissatisfaction on economic issues 
and a lack of democracy is rising.'' \22\ The Chinese 
government has expressed its concerns over Hong Kong protests 
with Peng Qinghua, the director of the mainland's Liaison 
Office in Hong Kong, saying that Hong Kong would not put up 
with what Peng characterized as radical demonstrations.\23\

                         FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

    For the most part, the people of Hong Kong continue to 
enjoy freedom of expression. For example, Hong Kong rose three 
rankings to 48th over the previous year in the 2009 Press 
Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders.\24\ (For 
comparison, the United States rose from 36th to 20th during the 
same period, and China ranked 168th.) \25\ According to the 
U.S. State Department 2009 Human Rights Report, however, 
``reports of self-censorship continued during the year.'' The 
report noted claims that businesses with interests in China 
owned most media outlets, making them ``vulnerable to self-
censorship.'' \26\ The Hong Kong Journalists Association 
``expressed regret'' concerning Esquire magazine's decision to 
pull a 16-page story on the June 1989 Tiananmen protests, and 
one of Hong Kong's free-to-air television stations was 
criticized at a public hearing for deliberately downplaying 
coverage of the annual Hong Kong commemoration of the Tiananmen 
protests.\27\ There were also concerns with the editorial 
independence of a new advisory board for the government-run 
Radio Television Hong Kong.\28\

                                 Macau


        ABILITY OF MACAU CITIZENS TO INFLUENCE THEIR GOVERNMENT

    The ability of the people of Macau to influence their 
government is restricted by Macau's constitutional system, 
under which the chief executive is selected by a 300-person 
committee, and only 12 of 29 seats in the Legislative Assembly 
are filled by direct election.\29\ In July 2009, the selection 
committee chose Fernando Chui Sai On as the chief executive in 
an uncontested election.\30\ In September, voters selected 12 
assembly members by direct election, the chief executive 
appointed 7, and an additional 10 were selected indirectly (in 
a manner similar to the system of functional constituencies in 
Hong Kong) in uncontested elections.\31\ The South China 
Morning Post reported that vote buying in the September 
legislative election was widespread, though reportedly not as 
widespread as in previous elections.\32\

                               CORRUPTION

    Corruption, and the belief that business and government are 
too close, are serious issues for the people of Macau, with 
corruption fueling discontent.\33\ Macau ranked 43rd in the 
2009 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 
which measures the perceived level of corruption in 180 
countries.\34\ (By comparison, Hong Kong ranked 12th, the 
United States ranked 19th, and mainland China ranked 79th.) 
Bloomberg reported in December 2009 that 66 percent of Macanese 
questioned in a survey said that getting rid of corruption 
should be a top priority of the new government.\35\

                   NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (ARTICLE 23)

    Macau enacted national security legislation in March 2009, 
a move that was highly praised by mainland authorities.\36\ The 
impact of the law is not clear at this stage. However, one 
media report commented on Chief Executive Chui's use of force 
to put down a May Day demonstration in 2010, writing, ``Since 
the passage of Article 23 antisubversion legislation last year, 
he [Chui] has a freer hand to legally suppress public 
protest.'' \37\

             China's International Human Rights Commitments

    The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enshrines 
a core set of rights and freedoms that individuals everywhere 
enjoy. Prior to the establishment of the People's Republic of 
China in October 1949, China voted as a member of the UN 
General Assembly in favor of the adoption of the UDHR in 1948. 
According to the Chinese government's 2009-2010 National Human 
Rights Action Plan (HRAP), issued in April 2009, ``China will 
continue to fulfill its obligations to the international human 
rights conventions to which it has acceded, and initiate and 
actively participate in exchanges and cooperation in the field 
of international human rights.'' \1\
    During the Commission's 2010 reporting year, the Chinese 
government reiterated its stated commitment to ratify the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
which China signed in 1998. In October 2009, Ambassador Liu 
Zhenmin, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, said at a UN meeting, ``At present, legislative, 
judicial and administrative reforms are under way in China with 
a view to aligning our domestic legislation with the provisions 
of the [ICCPR] and paving the way for its ratification.'' \2\ 
This statement followed similar expressions made during the 
Commission's 2009 reporting year. In the HRAP, for example, the 
Chinese government said it would ``continue legislative, 
judicial and administrative reforms to make domestic laws 
better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the ground for 
approval of the ICCPR.'' \3\ During the February 2009 session 
of the UN Human Right's Council's Universal Periodic Review of 
the Chinese government's human rights record, the Chinese 
government supported recommendations that it ratify the ICCPR 
and said it was in the process of amending domestic laws, 
including the criminal procedure law and laws relating to 
reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the 
ICCPR.\4\ The chart below lists what action China has taken on 
major human rights treaties and protocols to the treaties.\5\

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Declarations and
     Convention or  Protocol         Ratification        Reservations
                                        Status            (Excerpts)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Covenant on          Ratified March    The application of
 Economic, Social and Cultural      27, 2001.         article 8.1(a) of
 Rights                            The Covenant       the Covenant to
                                    also applies to   the People's
                                    Hong Kong and     Republic of China
                                    Macau.            shall be
                                                      consistent with
                                                      the relevant
                                                      provisions of the
                                                      Constitution of
                                                      the People's
                                                      Republic of China,
                                                      Trade Union Law of
                                                      the People's
                                                      Republic of China
                                                      and Labor Law of
                                                      the People's
                                                      Republic of China.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Covenant on Civil    Signed October
 and Political Rights               5, 1998; not
                                    yet ratified.
                                   The Covenant
                                    applies to Hong
                                    Kong and Macau
                                    as described in
                                    the notes
                                    accompanying
                                    the Covenant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the           Neither signed
 International Covenant on Civil    nor ratified.
 and Political Rights
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second Optional Protocol to the    Neither signed
 International Covenant on Civil    nor ratified.
 and Political Rights
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Convention on the    Acceded to        The People's
 Elimination of All Forms of        December 29,      Republic of China
 Racial Discrimination              1981.             has reservations
                                   The Convention     on the provisions
                                    with the          of article 22 of
                                    reservation       the Convention and
                                    made by China     will not be bound
                                    also applies to   by it.
                                    Hong Kong and
                                    Macau.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Elimination of   Ratified          The People's
 All Forms of Discrimination        November 4,       Republic of China
 against Women                      1980.             does not consider
                                   The Convention     itself bound by
                                    with the          paragraph 1 of
                                    reservation       article 29 of the
                                    made by China     Convention.
                                    also applies to
                                    Hong Kong and
                                    Macau.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the           Neither signed
 Convention on the Elimination of   nor ratified.
 All Forms of Discrimination
 against Women
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Rights of the    Ratified March    The People's
 Child                              2, 1992.          Republic of China
                                   The Convention     shall fulfill its
                                    with the          obligations
                                    reservation       provided by
                                    made by China     article 6 of the
                                    also applies to   Convention under
                                    Hong Kong and     the prerequisite
                                    Macau.            that the
                                                      Convention accords
                                                      with the
                                                      provisions of
                                                      article 25
                                                      concerning family
                                                      planning of the
                                                      Constitution of
                                                      the People's
                                                      Republic of China
                                                      and in conformity
                                                      with the
                                                      provisions of
                                                      article 2 of the
                                                      Law of Minor
                                                      Children of the
                                                      People's Republic
                                                      of China.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the           Ratified          1. The minimum age
 Convention on the Rights of the    February 20,      for citizens
 Child on the Involvement of        2008.             voluntarily
 Children in Armed Conflict        Ratification       entering the Armed
                                    also applies to   Forces of the
                                    Hong Kong and     People's Republic
                                    Macau.            of China is 17
                                                      years of age.
                                                     2. The Government
                                                      of the People's
                                                      Republic of China
                                                      is applying
                                                      [safeguard
                                                      measures] in
                                                      implementing the
                                                      foregoing
                                                      provision.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the           Ratified
 Convention on the Rights of the    December 3,
 Child on the Sale of Children,     2002.
 Child Prostitution and Child      The Protocol
 Pornography                        also applies to
                                    Macau. The
                                    application of
                                    the Protocol to
                                    Hong Kong
                                    requires prior
                                    domestic
                                    legislation by
                                    the Hong Kong
                                    government and
                                    the Protocol
                                    shall not apply
                                    to Hong Kong
                                    until the
                                    Chinese
                                    government
                                    notifies
                                    otherwise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention against Torture and     Ratified October  The Chinese
 Other Cruel, Inhuman or            4, 1988.          government does
 Degrading Treatment or            The Convention     not recognize the
 Punishment                         with the          competence of the
                                    reservation       Committee against
                                    made by China     Torture as
                                    also applies to   provided for in
                                    Hong Kong and     article 20 of the
                                    Macau.            Convention. The
                                                      Chinese government
                                                      does not consider
                                                      itself bound by
                                                      paragraph 1 of
                                                      article 30 of the
                                                      Convention.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the           Neither signed
 Convention against Torture and     nor ratified.
 Other Cruel, Inhuman or
 Degrading Treatment or
 Punishment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention relating to the Status  Acceded to        [Subject to]
 of Refugees                        September 24,     reservations on
                                    1982.             the following
                                   The Convention     articles: 1. The
                                    with the          latter half of
                                    reservation       article 14, which
                                    made by China     reads ``In the
                                    also applies to   territory of any
                                    Macau.            other Contracting
                                                      State, he shall be
                                                      accorded the same
                                                      protection as is
                                                      accorded in that
                                                      territory to
                                                      nationals of the
                                                      country in which
                                                      he has his
                                                      habitual
                                                      residence.'' 2.
                                                      Article 16(3).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protocol relating to the Status    Acceded to        With a reservation
 of Refugees                        September 24,     in respect of
                                    1982.             article 4.
                                   The Convention
                                    with the
                                    reservation
                                    made by China
                                    also applies to
                                    Macau.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Prevention and   Ratified April    The People's
 Punishment of the Crime of         18, 1983.         Republic of China
 Genocide                          The Convention     does not consider
                                    with the          itself bound by
                                    reservation       article IX of the
                                    made by China     said Convention.
                                    also applies to
                                    Hong Kong and
                                    Macau.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
United Nations Convention against  Ratified          The People's
 Transnational Organized Crime      September 23,     Republic of China
                                    2003.             makes a
                                   The Convention     reservation with
                                    also applies to   regard to Article
                                    Hong Kong and     35, paragraph 2 of
                                    Macau.            the Convention and
                                                      is not bound by
                                                      the provisions of
                                                      Article 35,
                                                      paragraph 2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and  Acceded to        The People's
 Punish Trafficking in Persons,     February 8,       Republic of China
 Especially Women and Children,     2010.             shall not be bound
 supplementing the UN Convention   The Protocol       by paragraph 2 of
 against Transnational Organized    also applies to   Article 15 of the
 Crime.                             Macau. The        Protocol.
                                    Protocol shall
                                    not apply to
                                    Hong Kong
                                    unless
                                    otherwise
                                    notified by the
                                    Chinese
                                    government.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protocol against the Smuggling of  Neither signed
 Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,     nor ratified.
 supplementing the UN Convention
 against Transnational Organized
 Crime
------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Convention on the    Neither signed
 Protection of the Rights of All    nor ratified.
 Migrant Workers and Members of
 Their Families
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convention on the Rights of        Ratified August
 Persons With Disabilities          1, 2008.
                                   The Convention
                                    also applies to
                                    Hong Kong and
                                    Macau.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optional Protocol to the           Neither signed
 Convention on the Rights of        nor ratified.
 Persons With Disabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                    Ratification of the International Labour Organization Fundamental Conventions \6\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Forced Labor                         Freedom of  Association               Discrimination                      Child Labor
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              C. 29                    C. 105          C. 87            C. 98            C. 100          C. 111          C. 138             C. 182
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Not ratified.                      Not ratified.  Not ratified.    Not ratified.    Ratified No-     Ratified        Ratified April  Ratified August 8,
                                                                                     vember 2,        January 12,     28, 1999.       2002.
                                                                                     1990.            2006.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             VII. Endnotes

    Voted to adopt: Senators Dorgan, Baucus, Levin, Feinstein, 
Brown, Corker, Barrasso, and LeMieux; and Representatives Levin, 
Kaptur, Honda, Walz, Wu, Smith, Manzullo, Royce, and Pitts.
    Not voting: Senator Brownback.

    Notes to Section I--Political Prisoner Database
    \1\ The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual 
detained or imprisoned for exercising his or her human rights under 
international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, 
freedom of association and free expression, including the freedom to 
advocate peaceful social or political change and to criticize 
government policy or government officials. (This list is illustrative, 
not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners listed in the Political 
Prisoner Database were detained or imprisoned for attempting to 
exercise rights guaranteed to them by China's Constitution and law, by 
international law, or both. Chinese security, prosecution, and judicial 
officials sometimes seek to distract attention from the political or 
religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de facto political or 
religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a generic 
crime. In such cases defendants typically deny guilt but officials may 
attempt to coerce confessions using torture and other forms of abuse, 
and standards of evidence are poor. If authorities permit a defendant 
to entrust someone to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as 
China's Criminal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may 
deny the counsel adequate access to the defendant, restrict or deny the 
counsel's access to evidence, and not provide the counsel adequate time 
to prepare a defense.

    Notes to Section II--Freedom of Expression
    \1\ See, e.g., PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 
March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 
29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 105; Provisions on the Administration of Internet News 
Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], 
issued and effective 25 September 05, art. 19(6); PRC Measures for 
Overseeing the Import and Export of Printed Materials and Audio-Visual 
Materials Through Customs [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo haiguan jinchu 
jing yinshuapin ji yinxiang zhipin jianguan banfa], issued 18 April 07, 
effective 1 June 07, art. 4(4).
    \2\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 48.
    \3\ Michael Wines, ``Dissident Chinese Writer Appeals Sentence,'' 
New York Times (Online), 4 January 10; Political Prisoners in China: 
Trends and Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearing of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 3 August 10, Written Statement Submitted 
by Joshua Rosenzweig, Senior Manager, Research and Hong Kong 
Operations, The Dui Hua Foundation.
    \4\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 47-48.
    \5\ Ng Tze-wei, `` `End Hukou System' Call Earns Rebuke,'' South 
China Morning Post (Online), 6 March 10; For CECC analysis, see ``Joint 
Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After 
Publication, Co-Author Fired,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 1-2.
    \6\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli 
tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, art. 15.
    \7\ Measures for the Administration of Internet Information 
Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, 
effective 25 September 00, art. 4; Registration Administration Measures 
for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing 
hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei'an guanli banfa], issued 8 February 05, 
effective 20 March 05, art. 5.
    \8\ Measures for Administration of News Reporter Cards [Xinwen 
jizhe zheng guanli banfa], issued 24 August 09, effective 15 October 
09, arts. 11, 12, 16.
    \9\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35. Article 41 also 
provides the right to criticize officials free from retaliation. PRC 
Constitution, art. 41.
    \10\ For example, the State Council Information Office released a 
white paper on the Internet in June 2010 which stated that the 
government ``guarantees the citizens' freedom of speech on the 
Internet.'' State Council Information Office, White Paper on the State 
of the Internet in China [Zhongguo hulianwang zhuangkuang], 8 June 10.
    \11\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 
10 December 48, arts. 19, 29. The UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression has also used this three-factor test to describe the 
standard for determining when a restriction is permissible under 
Article 19, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 14th 
Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, A/HRC/14/23, 20 
April 10, para. 74. China signed the ICCPR in 1998. The Chinese 
government has committed to ratifying the ICCPR and says it is taking 
concrete steps to prepare for ratification. In November 2009, a Joint 
Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit said, ``The EU welcomed China's 
commitment to ratifying the [ICCPR] as soon as possible.'' Joint 
Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, reprinted in China Internet 
Information Center (Online), 30 November 09. In October 2009, 
Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, said, ``At present, legislative, judicial and 
administrative reforms are under way in China with a view to aligning 
our domestic legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and paving 
the way for its ratification.'' Permanent Mission of the People's 
Republic of China to the UN (Online), ``Statement by H.E. Ambassador 
Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United 
Nations, at the Third Committee of the 64th Session of the General 
Assembly on the Implementation of Human Rights Instruments (Item 
69A),'' 20 October 09. In its 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action 
Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese government stated that the ICCPR 
was one of the ``fundamental principles'' on which the plan was framed, 
and that the government ``will continue legislative, judicial and 
administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this 
Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.'' State 
Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China 
(2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In 
February 2009, during the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic 
Review of the Chinese government's human rights record, the Chinese 
government supported recommendations made by Member States that China 
ratify the ICCPR. Chinese officials said China was in the process of 
amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws 
relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the 
ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, 
paras. 63, 114(1).
    \12\ In October 2009, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a 
resolution that identified a number of restrictions that are 
inconsistent with the freedom of expression provision in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (i.e., Article 
19), including restrictions on ``[d]iscussion of government policies 
and political debate,'' ``reporting on human rights,'' and ``expression 
of opinion and dissent.'' UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 12th Sess., 
Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development, adopted by Human Rights Council resolution 12/16, A/HRC/
RES/12/16, 12 October 09, para. 5(p)(i).
    \13\ See, e.g., Zhang Lei, ``Publish and Be Deleted,'' Global Times 
(Online), 25 February 10.
    \14\ International experts on freedom of expression have declared 
licensing schemes for print media unnecessary and subject to abuse and 
have found press accreditation appropriate only where necessary to 
provide access to certain places and events. UN Press Release, UN 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Representative on 
Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of American States Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, ``International Experts Condemn 
Curbs on Freedom of Expression and Control Over Media and 
Journalists,'' 18 December 03.
    \15\ Zhang Lei, ``Publish and Be Deleted,'' Global Times (Online), 
25 February 10.
    \16\ Committee to Protect Journalists (Online), ``Falling Short: 
Olympic Promises Go Unfulfilled as China Falters on Press Freedom,'' 
2008, 36.
    \17\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 105.
    \18\ See, e.g., a Beijing court's December 2009 decision in the Liu 
Xiaobo case in which the court provided no evidence that Liu advocated 
violence in his works. Human Rights in China (Online), ``Case Update: 
International Community Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Verdict,'' 30 December 
09. For CECC analysis, see ``Liu Xiaobo Appeals Sentence; Official 
Abuses Mar Case From Outset,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 2.
    \19\ ``Lawyer Shang Baojun Speaks About Liu Xiaobo's Appeal'' 
[Shang baojun lushi tan liu xiaobo shangshu], Radio France 
Internationale (Online), 5 January 10; Maggie Chen, ``Freedom of Speech 
Defence Bound To Fail,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 7 June 10.
    \20\ Maggie Chen, ``Freedom of Speech Defence Bound To Fail,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 7 June 10.
    \21\ Michael Wines, ``Dissident Chinese Writer Appeals Sentence,'' 
New York Times (Online), 4 January 10; Political Prisoners in China: 
Trends and Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearing of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 3 August 10, Written Statement Submitted 
by Joshua Rosenzweig, Senior Manager, Research and Hong Kong 
Operations, The Dui Hua Foundation.
    \22\ ``Chengdu Intermediate People's Court Criminal Judgment,'' 
Canyu (Online), 9 February 10. For CECC analysis, see ``Chengdu Court 
Sentences Tan Zuoren to Five Years and Upholds Huang Qi's Sentence,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 1.
    \23\ Ibid.
    \24\ Bao Daozu, ``Activist on Trial for Subversion,'' China Daily 
(Online), 13 August 09.
    \25\ ``Suqian Intermediate People's Court of Jiangsu Province 
Criminal Verdict [in case of Guo Quan],'' Dui Hua Foundation (Online), 
16 October 09. For CECC analysis, see ``Jiangsu Court Affirms 10-Year 
Sentence of Guo Quan for Organizing Political Party Online,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 2.
    \26\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Case Update: International 
Community Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Verdict--Beijing Municipal No. 1 
Intermediate People's Court Criminal Verdict,'' 30 December 09. For 
CECC analysis, see ``Beijing High People's Court Affirms Liu Xiaobo's 
11-Year Sentence,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 
3, 16 March 10, 3.
    \27\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Case Update: International 
Community Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Verdict--Beijing Municipal No. 1 
Intermediate People's Court Criminal Verdict,'' 30 December 09. For 
CECC analysis, see ``Beijing Court Sentences Liu Xiaobo to 11 Years,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 1.
    \28\ For a complete English translation of each of these essays, 
see Human Rights in China, ``Freedom of Expression on Trial in China,'' 
China Rights Forum No. 1, 2010, 17-67. For a CECC analysis and summary 
of the essays, see ``Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial To Take Place 
December 23,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 
January 10, 1.
    \29\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Case Update: International 
Community Speaks Out on Liu Xiaobo Verdict--Beijing Municipal No. 1 
Intermediate People's Court Criminal Verdict,'' 30 December 09.
    \30\ ``China Extends Detention of Leading Dissident,'' Agence 
France-Presse (Online), 9 June 09.
    \31\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Liu Xiaobo 
Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison,'' 25 December 09.
    \32\ ``Final Decision on Liu Xiaobo's Appeal of Inciting Subversion 
Case'' [Liu xiaobo shexian shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan shangshu yi 
an zhongshen caiding shu], Boxun (Online), 9 February 10.
    \33\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Shanghai Petitioner To Serve 
18 Months of Reeducation-Through-Labor After Shouting Slogans,'' 9 
March 10.
    \34\ See, e.g., Alexa Olesen, ``China Sentences Uighur Writer to 15 
Years in Jail,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post 
(Online), 23 July 10; ``Uyghur Journalist Gets 15 Years,'' Radio Free 
Asia (Online), 22 July 10. For information on the charge against him, 
see ``Many Scholars Make Appeal: Release Xinjiang Reporter, Respect 
Freedom of Speech'' [Zhong xuezhe huyu: shifang xinjiang jizhe zunzhong 
yanlun ziyou], Chinese Human Rights Defenders, reprinted in Boxun 
(Online), 30 July 10.
    \35\ James T. Areddy, ``Geologist Sought Oil-Industry Data,'' Wall 
Street Journal (Online), 6 July 10.
    \36\ Ibid.
    \37\ Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ``China Sentences American 
Geologist on State Secrets Charge,'' 4 July 10; Charles Hutzler, ``Xue 
Feng, American Geologist, Held and Mistreated by China,'' Associated 
Press, reprinted in Huffington Post (Online), 19 November 09.
    \38\ Jerome A. Cohen, ``Justice Denied,'' South China Morning Post 
(Online), 21 July 10.
    \39\ ``Quake Critic Arrested,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 June 
10.
    \40\ Ibid.; International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``A `Raging 
Storm': The Crackdown on Tibetan Writers and Artists After Tibet's 
Spring 2008 Protests,'' 18 May 10.
    \41\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Three Fujian 
Digital Activists Convicted as Thousands Gather in Landmark Protest,'' 
16 April 10; ``Criminal Judgment [of Fujian Province Fuzhou City Mawei 
District People's Court]'' [Xingshi panjue shu], reprinted in Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders (Online), 16 April 10, 25-26.
    \42\ ``Criminal Judgment [of Fujian Province Fuzhou City Mawei 
District People's Court]'' [Xingshi panjue shu], reprinted in Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders (Online), 16 April 10, 25-26.
    \43\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Fujian 
Lawyer Lin Hongnan and His Law Firm Punished--Retaliation for Taking Up 
the `Three Fuzhou Netizens' Case'' [Fujian lin hongnan lushi yu lushi 
shiwusuo jieban ``san wangmin'' an zao baofu], 3 May 10.
    \44\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 50.
    \45\ Sharon LaFraniere, ``School Construction Critic Gets Prison 
Term in China,'' New York Times (Online), 23 November 09. For CECC 
analysis, see ``Authorities Sentence Rights Activist Huang Qi to Three 
Years in Prison,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 
1, 8 January 10, 2.
    \46\ Keith Richburg, ``China Sentences Quake Activist to 3 Years in 
Prison,'' Washington Post (Online), 23 November 09.
    \47\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. II(5).
    \48\ Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open 
Government Information [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai 
tiaoli], issued 5 April 07, effective 1 May 08, arts. 9, 13.
    \49\ Article 8 of the previous state secrets law defines state 
secrets as, among other things, secrets relating to ``major policy 
decisions on state affairs'' (clause 1), ``national economic and social 
development'' (clause 4), ``science and technology'' (clause 5), as 
well as ``other matters that are classified as state secrets by the 
state secret-guarding department'' (clause 7). PRC Law on Guarding 
State Secrets, issued 5 September 88, effective 1 May 89, art. 8. Minzu 
University Professor Xiong Wenzhao has said that, under clause 7 of 
Article 8, ``all information can be brought within the scope of a 
secret to be guarded.'' ``Guarding State Secrets Law Implemented for 20 
Years, Scholars Suggest the Procedures for Determining a Secret Be Made 
Clear'' [Baoshou guojia mimi fa shishi 20 nian, xuezhe jianyi mingxi 
dingmi chengxu], China Ningbo Net (Online), 20 April 09. A June 2009 
China Daily editorial said: ``In theory, government institutions, 
should they choose to do so, have the authority to label everything as 
State secrets.'' ``Redefine State Secrets,'' China Daily (Online), 23 
June 09. See also, Dui Hua Human Rights Journal (Online), ``Lawyer's 
Request for RTL Information Disclosure Rebuffed by Chinese Ministry of 
Justice,'' 18 June 09.
    \50\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 66.
    \51\ PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 
10, effective 1 October 10. For CECC analysis, see ``National People's 
Congress Standing Committee Issues Revised State Secrets Law,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \52\ PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 
10, effective 1 October 10, art. 9.
    \53\ Ibid., arts. 15, 19.
    \54\ See, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 81.
    \55\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on the State of 
the Internet in China [Zhongguo hulianwang zhuangkuang], 8 June 10.
    \56\ China Internet Network Information Center (Online), ``26th 
Statistical Report on Internet Development in China'' [Di 26 ci 
zhongguo hulianwangluo fazhan zhuangkuang diaocha tongji baogao], 15 
July 10, 10.
    \57\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on the State of 
the Internet in China [Zhongguo hulianwang zhuangkuang], 8 June 10.
    \58\ Ibid.
    \59\ Ariana Lindquist, ``In China, Labor Movement Enabled by 
Technology,'' New York Times (Online), 17 June 10.
    \60\ Wang Chen, ``Regarding Our Nation's Internet Development and 
Supervision'' [Guanyu wo guo hulianwang fazhan he guanli], National 
People's Congress (Online), 29 April 10.
    \61\ Ibid.
    \62\ Cao Minjie, ``Four Major Microblog Sites `Fall Back' to 
Testing Mode'' [Si da menhu weibo ``tuihua'' cheng ceshi ban], Oriental 
Morning Post (Online), 15 July 10; Jonathan Ansfield, ``China Tests New 
Controls on Twitter-Style Services,'' New York Times (Online), 16 July 
10; Cara Anna, ``Dozens of Outspoken, Popular Blogs Shut in China,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 15 July 10; 
Priscilla Jiao, ``Bloggers Attract Censors' Sights as Internet 
Crackdown Continues,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 17 July 10. 
For CECC analysis, see ``Government Appears To Crack Down on Microblogs 
and Blogs,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 7, 19 
August 10, 4.
    \63\ Jonathan Ansfield, ``China Starts New Bureau To Curb Web,'' 
New York Times (Online), 16 April 10.
    \64\ Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield, 
``China's Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet,'' New York Times 
(Online), 7 April 10.
    \65\ Wang Chen, ``Regarding Our Nation's Internet Development and 
Supervision'' [Guanyu wo guo hulianwang fazhan he guanli], National 
People's Congress (Online), 29 April 10.
    \66\ Meng Jianzhu, ``Endeavor To Strengthen the Construction of the 
Five Capabilities, Comprehensively Raise the Standard for Safeguarding 
Stability'' [Zhuoli qianghua wu ge nengli jianshe quanmian tisheng 
weihu wending shuiping], Seeking Truth (Online), 1 December 09. For 
CECC analysis, see ``Top Chinese Security Officials Urge Continued 
Crackdown in 2010,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
No. 3, 16 March 10, 3.
    \67\ See, e.g., ``China Purges Porn Works on Internet,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 27 October 09.
    \68\ Barbara Demick, ``China Has Many `Dirty Words,' '' Los Angeles 
Times (Online), 21 April 10; Loretta Chao and Jason Dean, ``China's 
Censors Thrive in Obscurity,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 31 March 
10.
    \69\ Zhang Lei, ``Publish and Be Deleted,'' Global Times (Online), 
25 February 10.
    \70\ OpenNet Initiative (Online), ``Internet Filtering in China,'' 
15 June 09, 17.
    \71\ `` `Nanfang Chuang' Web Site Suddenly Suspends Operations'' 
[``Nanfang chuang'' wangzhan turan tingzhi yunzuo], Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 26 October 09.
    \72\ ``Chinese Censors Block Obama's Call To Free the Web,'' 
Associated Press (Online), 16 November 09.
    \73\ Michael Bristow, ``Chinese Paper Prints `Tiananmen Cartoon,' 
'' BBC (Online) 3 June 10.
    \74\ ``China Blocks `Berlin Wall' Twitter Page: Organisers,'' 
Agence France-Presse (Online), 29 October 09.
    \75\ ``China's Instructions on Reporting on Google,'' Washington 
Post (Online), 25 March 10.
    \76\ Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield, 
``China's Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet,'' New York Times 
(Online), 7 April 10.
    \77\ ``Xinjiang Online, Controls Remain,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 19 May 10. For CECC analysis, see ``Internet Available in 
Xinjiang, But Controls Over Information Remain,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 7, 19 August 10, 4.
    \78\ OpenNet Initiative (Online), ``Internet Filtering in China,'' 
15 June 09, 5; Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield, 
``China's Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet,'' New York Times 
(Online), 7 April 10.
    \79\ Farah Master, ``China's Web `Firewall' Should Be WTO Issue: 
EU's Kroes,'' Reuters (Online), 17 May 10.
    \80\ Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield, 
``China's Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet,'' New York Times 
(Online), 7 April 10.
    \81\ Measures for the Administration of Internet Information 
Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, 
effective 25 September 00, art. 15.
    \82\ Zhang Lei, ``Publish and Be Deleted,'' Global Times (Online), 
25 February 10.
    \83\ Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information 
Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 
September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 19-21.
    \84\ Li Xinzhu and Cui Xiaohuo, ``Text Message Service Cut Off for 
`Bad' Words,'' China Daily (Online), 19 January 10.
    \85\ Regulations on the Supervision of Television Drama Content 
[Dianshi ju neirong guanli guiding], issued 19 May 10, effective 1 July 
10, art. 5. Article 5 provides for the common litany of prohibited 
content found in other media regulations, including content that 
``harms national unity,'' ``harms the honor or interests of the 
nation,'' and ``disrupts national policies on religion,'' among other 
things.
    \86\ Zhang Lei, ``Publish and Be Deleted,'' Global Times (Online), 
25 February 10.
    \87\ Ibid.
    \88\ Ibid.
    \89\ Ibid.
    \90\ PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 
10, effective 1 October 10. For CECC analysis, see ``National People's 
Congress Standing Committee Issues Revised State Secrets Law,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \91\ PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 
10, effective 1 October 10, art. 9.
    \92\ Ibid., art. 28. For CECC analysis, see ``National People's 
Congress Standing Committee Issues Revised State Secrets Law,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \93\ Jonathan Ansfield, ``China Passes Tighter Information Law,'' 
New York Times (Online), 29 April 10.
    \94\ PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets, issued 29 April 
10, effective 1 October 10, art. 50.
    \95\ PRC Tort Liability Law, enacted 26 December 09, effective 1 
July 10.
    \96\ Wang Jun, ``What Are the Implications of the `Special Internet 
Provision'/ '' [``Hulianwang zhuantiao'' yiweizhe shenme?], Internet 
Communication Magazine, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 2 April 
10.
    \97\ Ibid.
    \98\ David Drummond, ``A New Approach to China,'' Google Blog 
(Online), 12 January 10.
    \99\ Google and Internet Control in China: A Nexus Between Human 
Rights and Trade? Hearing of Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 24 March 10, Testimony of Alan Davidson, Director of U.S. Public 
Policy, Americas, Google, Inc.
    \100\ Laura Farrar, ``Google-China Move Hurts Businesses, 
Academics,'' CNN (Online), 23 March 10; John Pomfret, ``For Chinese 
People, Loss of Google Would Mean `Nothing But Darkness,' '' Washington 
Post (Online), 19 March 10.
    \101\ Jane Qiu, ``A Land Without Google/ '' Nature (Online), 24 
February 10.
    \102\ David Drummond, ``A New Approach to China: an Update,'' 
Google Blog (Online), 22 March 10; David Drummond, ``An Update on 
China,'' Google Blog (Online), 28 June 10.
    \103\ Measures for the Administration of Internet Information 
Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00, 
effective 25 September 00, art. 4 ; Registration Administration 
Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei 
jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi fuwu bei'an guanli banfa], issued 28 
January 05, effective 20 March 05, art. 5; Provisions on the 
Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen 
xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05, effective 25 
September 05, arts. 5, 11, 12; Provisions on the Administration of 
Internet Video and Audio Programming Services [Hulianwang shiting jiemu 
fuwu guanli guiding], issued 20 December 07, effective 31 January 08, 
art. 7.
    \104\ China Internet Network Information Center (Online), 
``Announcement on Further Strengthening the Examination of Domain Name 
Registration Information'' [Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang yuming zhuce xinxi 
shenhe gongzuo de gonggao], 11 December 09.
    \105\ Xu Shenglan, ``All .cn Websites Require Business License,'' 
Global Times (Online), 14 December 09; Austin Ramzy, ``China's Domain-
Name Limits: Web Censorship/ '' Time (Online), 18 December 09.
    \106\ Owen Fletcher, ``China Further Tightens Rules for Domain Name 
Owners,'' IDG News Service, reprinted in PCWorld (Online), 23 February 
10; Michael Wines, Sharon LaFraniere, and Jonathan Ansfield, ``China's 
Censors Tackle and Trip Over the Internet,'' New York Times (Online), 7 
April 10.
    \107\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 60.
    \108\ Wang Chen, ``Regarding Our Nation's Internet Development and 
Supervision'' [Guanyu wo guo hulianwang fazhan he guanli], National 
People's Congress (Online), 29 April 10; ``State Council Information 
Office for First Time Confirms Promotion of Real Name Online System'' 
[Guoxinban shouci queren tuidong wangluo shimingzhi], Southern 
Metropolitan Daily (Online), 4 May 10.
    \109\ Stephen Chen, ``Innocent Websites Suffer in Beijing's Anti-
Porn Push,'' South Chinese Morning Post (Online), 12 February 10; 
``Cleaning up Online Environment in Accordance With Law Has Clear 
Impact'' [Yifa zhengzhi wangluo huanjing qude mingxian chengxiao], 
Xinhua (Online), 10 February 10.
    \110\ Zhang Lei, ``Publish and Be Deleted,'' Global Times (Online), 
25 February 10.
    \111\ Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information 
Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 
September 05, effective 25 September 05, arts. 7, 8.
    \112\ Zhang Lei, ``Publish and Be Deleted,'' Global Times (Online), 
25 February 10.
    \113\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 61; Provisions on 
the Administration of Internet Video and Audio Programming Services 
[Hulianwang shiting jiemu fuwu guanli guiding], issued 20 December 07, 
effective 31 January 08, art. 8.
    \114\ ``SARFT Intensely Checks Permits for Online Audio and Video, 
Three Major BT Web Sites Eliminated From Match'' [Guangdian zongju 
yancha hulianwang shiting xuke sanda BT wangzhan xishu luoma], China 
Business News, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 7 December 09.
    \115\ Stephen Chen, ``Online Communities Shut Down for Hosting 
Porn, `Sensitive' Content,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 8 
December 09.
    \116\ Circular on Related Questions on Administration of Audio/
Visual Program Transmission Licenses [Shiting jiemu fuwu xukezheng 
guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 15 September 09.
    \117\ In late December 2009, Xinjiang officials began to allow 
limited browsing on two Web sites, those for the Communist Party's 
flagship newspaper People's Daily and the site for the central 
government's news agency, Xinhua. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
People's Government News Office, Announcement Concerning Progressive 
Opening of Related Communications Service [Guanyu zhubu kaifang 
xiangguan tongxin yewu de gonggao], 28 December 09, reprinted in Xinhua 
Bingtuan Net (Online), 29 December 09. In January 2010, officials 
restored domestic text messaging services, but limited messages to 20 
per day. Cui Jia, ``SMS Returns to Xinjiang,'' China Daily (Online), 18 
January 10. That same month, officials also lifted the ban on 
international phone calls. ``China Lifts Ban on International Calls in 
Xinjiang,'' Agence France-Presse, 20 January 10 (Open Source Center, 20 
January 10).
    \118\ Xinjiang News Office, ``Xinjiang Internet Services Completely 
Resumed on the 14th'' [Xinjiang hulianwang yewu 14 ri quanmian huifu], 
reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 14 May 10.
    \119\ ``Police Have Evidence of World Uyghur Congress Masterminding 
Xinjiang Riot,'' Xinhua (Online), 6 July 09.
    \120\ ``Official: Internet Cut in Xinjiang To Prevent Riot From 
Spreading,'' Xinhua (Online), 7 July 09.
    \121\ The events of July 5, 2009, began as a protest against 
authorities' handling of a reported attack on Uyghur factory workers by 
Han factory workers in Guangdong province and against the government's 
general policies toward Uyghurs. Organizers reportedly used the 
Internet to mobilize support for a peaceful demonstration. Clashes with 
police followed, as did attacks between Uyghurs and Han Chinese that 
left 197 dead and 1,700 injured, according to official reports. Chinese 
officials claimed that Rebiya Kadeer, an exiled Uyghur living in the 
United States, had orchestrated the violence through a phone call to 
China, a charge she denied. During the July 2009 events, Chinese 
officials conflated peaceful attempts to demonstrate with criminal and 
violent activity. See, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 
249; ``Urumqi Tense, Quiet After Violence,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
5 July 09; ``More Web Sites Back Online in Xinjiang,'' China Daily 
(Online), 8 February 10. For a CECC analysis of July 5 and its 
aftermath, see ``Xinjiang Authorities Forcefully Suppress 
Demonstration, Restrict Free Flow of Information,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2.
    \122\ Reporters without Borders (Online), ``Survey of Blocked 
Uyghur Websites Shows Xinjiang Still Cut Off From the World,'' 29 
October 09.
    \123\ Li Changchun, ``Speech at the 10th Journalists' Day and 
Awards Presentation Public Lecture'' [Zai dishijie zhongguo jizhe jie 
ji banjiang baogao hui shang de jianghua], People's Daily (Online), 8 
November 09. For CECC analysis, see ``Top Official Emphasizes Party's 
Dominance Over Media on Journalists' Day,'' CECC China Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 4.
    \124\ ``Li Changchun: Solidly Perform Propaganda Reporting Work for 
the Yushu Earthquake Disaster Relief'' [Li Changchun: zhashi zuohao 
yushu kangzhen jiuzai xuanchuan baodao gongzuo], Xinhua (Online), 18 
April 10.
    \125\ Chi-Chi Zhang, ``China Launches Global 24-Hour English TV 
News,'' Associated Press (Online), 1 July 10.
    \126\ Committee to Protect Journalists (Online), ``Falling Short: 
Olympic Promises Go Unfulfilled as China Falters on Press Freedom,'' 
2008, 23-25.
    \127\ ``Summary: PRC Propaganda Restricts Media Coverage of Obama's 
Interview With Nanfang Zhoumo,'' Open Source Center, 20 November 09.
    \128\ ``Next Up on CCTV, Yet More Propaganda,'' South China Morning 
Post (Online), 7 January 10.
    \129\ ``China's Instructions on Reporting on Google,'' Washington 
Post (Online), 25 March 10.
    \130\ Ibid.
    \131\ Ibid.
    \132\ Fiona Tam and Choi Chi-yuk, ``Media Told To Cut Rescue 
Coverage,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 10 April 10.
    \133\ Reporters without Borders (Online), ``Propaganda Department 
Sets Rule for Covering Shanghai Expo and Qinghai Earthquake,'' 29 April 
10. For CECC analysis, see ``Communist Party Controls Media Coverage of 
Yushu Earthquake,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 
5, 4 June 10, 3.
    \134\ Reporters without Borders (Online), ``What You Cannot Read in 
the Chinese Press,'' 4 May 10.
    \135\ ``Liu Binjie: Focal Point for GAPP This Year Is Striking 
Against Fake Journalists'' [Liu binjie: xinwen chuban zongshu jinnian 
zhongdian daji jia jizhe], Jinghua Times (Online), 4 March 09; Circular 
Regarding 2009 Exchange and Issuance of Press Cards [Guanyu 2009 nian 
huanfa xinwen jizhe zheng de tongzhi], issued 3 February 09, preamble.
    \136\ Raymond Li, ``Journalists Must Face New Exam,'' South China 
Morning Post (Online), 11 March 10. For CECC analysis, see ``Chinese 
Government To Introduce Qualification Exam for Journalists in 2010,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2.
    \137\ China News Workers' Code of Professional Ethics [Zhongguo 
xinwen gongzuozhe zhiye daode zhunze], amended 9 November 09, preamble, 
arts. 1, 6.
    \138\ ``News Reporter Card Exchange To End Soon, Commercial Web 
Sites Have No Right To Report News--General Administration of Press and 
Publication News Publication Department Responsible Person Answers 
Journalists' Questions'' [Xinwen jizhe zheng huanfa jijiang jieshu 
shangye wangzhan meiyou xinwen caifangquan--xinwen chuban zongshu 
xinwen baokan si fuze ren da jizhe wen], People's Daily (Online), 22 
February 10.
    \139\ Ibid.
    \140\ Gady Epstein, ``Dark Journalism,'' Forbes (Online), 21 July 
08.
    \141\ Will Clem, ``4 Dailies `Severely Punished for Lying,' '' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 26 November 09.
    \142\ Xu Kai, `` `Business Watch' Ordered To Halt Publication for 
One Month Because of Story on China State Grid Corp.'' [``Shangwu 
zhoukan'' yin guojia dianwang gongsi baodao beize tingkan yi yue], 
Caijing (Online), 8 May 10.
    \143\ Ibid.
    \144\ Ibid.
    \145\ Sky Canaves, ``Editorial Writer Punished in China,'' Wall 
Street Journal (Online), 10 March 10.
    \146\ John Garnaut, ``Beijing Sacks Editor for Expose,'' Age 
(Online), 13 May 10; ``Making Themselves Heard,'' Sydney Morning Herald 
(Online), 15 May 10.
    \147\ Regulations of the People's Republic of China on News 
Covering Activities of the Permanent Offices of Foreign News Agencies 
and Foreign Journalists [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waiguo changzhu 
xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang tiaoli], issued 17 October 08, 
art. 17; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Foreign Ministry News 
Department Head Liu Jianchao Hosts Sino-Foreign Journalists Press 
Conference on State Council's Promulgation of the Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China on News Covering Activities of the Permanent 
Offices of Foreign News Agencies and Foreign Journalists'' [Waijiaobu 
xinwen si sizhang liu jianchao jiu guowuyuan banbu shishi ``zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo waiguo changzhu xinwen jigou he waiguo jizhe caifang 
tiaoli'' juxing zhongwai jizhe hui], 17 October 08.
    \148\ ``Hu Jintao's Address at the Opening Ceremony of the World 
Media Summit'' [Hu jintao zai shijie meiti fenghui kaimushi shang de 
zhici], Xinhua (Online), 9 October 09.
    \149\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (Online), ``Kashgar 
Police Follow, Harass Journalists,'' 27 November 09.
    \150\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (Online), ``Chengdu 
Police Rough Up Reporters Covering Trial,'' 11 February 10.
    \151\ Ibid.
    \152\ Foreign Correspondents' Club of China (Online), ``Beijing 
Police Question, Threaten News Assistant (Update May 26),'' 26 May 10.
    \153\ Ibid.
    \154\ ``Xinjiang Authorities Prohibit the Public From Interviewing 
With Foreign Media Without Authorization'' [Xinjiang dangju jinzhi 
minzhong shanzi jieshou waimei caifang], Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 
June 10.
    \155\ Provisions on the Administration of Newspaper Publishing 
[Baozhi chuban guanli guiding], issued 30 September 05, effective 1 
December 05, 2; Provisions on the Administration of Periodical 
Publishing [Qikan chuban guanli guiding], issued 30 September 05, 
effective 1 December 05, 2; Regulations on the Administration of 
Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 
February 02, art. 11.
    \156\ Regulations on the Administration of Publishing [Chuban 
guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, effective 1 February 02, art. 
26.
    \157\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China's `Sweep 
Pornography Strike Illegal Publications' Focuses on Shutting Off 38 
Kinds of Political Publications?!'' [Zhongguo ``dahuang saofei'' jiushi 
zhongdian fengdu 38 zhong zhengzhixing chubanwu?!], 1 March 10. CECC 
staff attempted to access the link to the original article on the Jilin 
Municipal Government Web site on May 17, 2010, and was able to access a 
search result of the article using Google but not the link to the full 
article itself.
    \158\ Michael Wines, ``China Seeks To Halt Book That Faults Its 
Prime Minister,'' New York Times (Online), 6 July 10.
    \159\ Wang Kunning et al., ``News Publication System All Out 
Support for Earthquake Relief'' [Xinwen chuban xitong quanli zhiyuan 
kangzhen jiuzai], China News Publication Net (Online), 20 April 10.
    \160\ Xi Fengyu, ``Ministry of Culture Official: Protecting 
Intellectual Property and Nation's Cultural Safety Are Major Focus'' 
[Wenhuabu guanyuan: baohu zhishi chanquan weihu guojia wenhua anquan 
cheng zhongdian], Legal Daily, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 26 
March 10.
    \161\ ``Copying Services in Lhasa Tightened,'' China Daily 
(Online), 19 May 10.

    Notes to Section II--Worker Rights
    \1\ ``Migrant Workers' Children Face Barriers to Education, 
Activists Call for Fair Treatment,'' Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China (Online), 8 March 10.
    \2\ PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law enacted 29 
December 07, effective 1 May 08, art. 43.
    \3\ Ibid., art. 43.
    \4\ Ibid., art. 43.
    \5\ ``All-China Federation of Trade Unions: A Rising Trend in the 
Number of Local Labor Dispute Cases in 2010'' [Quanzong: 2010 nian 
difang laodong zhengyi anjian shuliang shangsheng qushi], People's 
Daily (Online), 2 September 10.
    \6\ Yang Lin, ``Grasp the Opportunity To Reevaluate Labor 
Relations, Eliminate Potential Problems, and Reformulate Policy'' [Zhua 
zhu chongxin shenshi laozi geju, xiaochu laozi maodun yinhuan, 
tiaozheng laogong zhengce de jihui], Outlook, 16 December 09.
    \7\ See, e.g., Jiangsu Province Human Resources and Social Security 
Office, Opinion Relating To Establishing the ``Five in One'' Mediation 
System for Labor Disputes [Guanyu jianli laodong zhengyi ``wu wei 
yiti'' tiaojie jizhi de yijian], issued 27 November 09; Chongqing 
Municipality People's Government, Chongqing Municipality Labor Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Measures [Chongqing shi laodong zhengyi 
tiaojie zhongcai banfa], issued 19 July 10, effective 1 September 10; 
Yuhang District Government (Online), ``Analysis of Our District's 
Resolution of Labor Disputes in the First Quarter of 2009'' [Woqu 2009 
nian yijidu laodong zhengyi chuli qingkuang fenxi], 2 April 09; Taizhou 
City Government (Online), ``Analysis of Labor Disputes in the First 
Quarter of 2009'' [2009 nian yiji laodong zhengyi anjian qingkuang 
fenxi], 28 April 09; ``Employers Lose Over 90 Percent of Labor 
Disputes'' [Laodong zhengyi anjian yongren danwei baisu yuanhe 90% 
yishang], Eastern Legal Eye (Online), 14 May 09; Beijing Municipal 
Labor and Social Security Bureau (Online), ``According to Law, Justly 
and Efficiently Resolve Labor Disputes, Promote the Scientific 
Development of the City's Arbitration Profession--Commemorating the 
First Anniversary of the Implementation of the `PRC Labor Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Law' '' [Yifa gongzheng gaoxiao chuli laodong 
zhengyi, tuijin benshi zhongcai shiye kexue fazhan, jinian ``zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai fa'' shishi yi 
zhounian], 15 May 09; Shanghai Bureau of Justice (Online), ``Xuhui 
District Establishes People's Mediation Committees for Labor Disputes'' 
[Xuhuiqu chengli laodong zhengyi renmin tiaojie weiyuanhui], 11 
November 08; Wuxi Municipal Bureau of Labor and Social Security, 2009 
Opinion on the Resolution of Labor Disputes [2009 nian laodongzhengyi 
chuli gongzuo yijian], issued 13 March 09.
    \8\ Fujian Provincial Bureau of Labor and Social Security, 2009 
Main Points of Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration [2009 nian 
laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai gongzuo yaodian], issued 6 February 
09.
    \9\ Ningbo Municipal Labor and Social Security Bureau (Online), 
``Jiangbei District's January-May Labor Disputes Exhibit Five 
Characteristics'' [1-5 yue jiangbeiqu laodong zhengyi anjian chengxian 
wu tedian], 1 June 09.
    \10\ Wang Jingqiong, ``Courts Struggling To Handle Labor 
Disputes,'' China Daily (Online), 15 September 10; ``All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions: A Rising Trend in the Number of Local Labor 
Dispute Cases in 2010'' [Quanzhong: 2010 nian difang laodong zhengyi 
anjian shuliang cheng shangsheng qushi], People's Daily (Online), 2 
September 10; Edward Wong, ``Global Crisis Adds to Surge of Labor 
Disputes in Chinese Courts,'' New York Times (Online), 15 September 10; 
China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``China's Labour Dispute Court Cases 
Increased by Over Ten Percent in 2009,'' 22 March 10; Yang Lin, ``Grasp 
the Opportunity To Reevaluate Labour Relations, Eliminate Potential 
Problems, and Reformulate Policy'' [Zhua zhu chongxin shenshi laozi 
geju, xiaochu laozi maodun yinhuan, tiaozheng laogong zhengce de 
jihui], Outlook, 16 December 09.
    \11\ ``Dongguan Workers Collectively Strike, Force Factory To Make 
Up Back Pay'' [Dongguan gongren jiti bagong poshi chang fang bu hai 
qian xin], Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 October 09; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (Online), ``Guangzhou Again Detains Worker, Detainee 
Dies in Detention Center Again, Family Members Suspect Deaths Due to 
Beatings'' [Guangzhou zaiya renyuan zai bao kanshousuo siwang shi jian, 
qinshu yi zao ouda zhisi], 19 March 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(Online), ``Xi'an Police Brutally Beat and Detain Worker Petitioner'' 
[Xi'an jingcha yeman ouda zhua bu shangfang gongren], 19 March 10; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Chongqing Migrant Worker 
Severely Beaten While Discussing Wages'' [Nongmin gong tao gongzi bei 
da zhi shengming chuiwei], 12 February 10; ``Shanxi Workers Petition 
Provincial Government En Masse'' [Shanxi tongchuan gongchang zhigong 
dao sheng zhengfu shangfang weiquan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 20 
April 10; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Will the New Year See a 
Resumption of Collective Bargaining in China? '' 5 January 10.
    \12\ ``Enterprises That Refuse To Negotiate Can Be Fined 20,000 
RMB'' [Zhigong yu zhang xin qiye bu tanpan huo jiang fa 2 wan yuan], 
Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 18 March 10.
    \13\ PRC Employment Promotion Law, enacted 30 August 07, effective 
1 January 08, arts. 3, 29, 30.
    \14\ Timothy J. Webster, ``Ambivalence and Activism: Employment 
Discrimination in China,'' Lecturer and Other Affiliate Scholarship 
Series, Paper 1, 2010, 66.
    \15\ Ibid. Plaintiffs who prevailed in employment discrimination 
cases during this reporting year included: Chen Ling in Shenzhen, whose 
verdict was issued on March 5, 2010; and Wang Li in Tianhe, Guangzhou, 
whose verdict was issued on March 11, 2010. For a more detailed summary 
of cases, see Appendix on page 66 of ``Ambivalence and Activism: 
Employment Discrimination in China.''
    \16\ PRC Labor Contract Law, enacted 29 June 07, effective 1 
January 08, art. 14.
    \17\ Jiangsu Province High Court and Jiangsu Provincial Labour 
Dispute Arbitration Commission, Guiding Opinion on the Handling of 
Employment Disputes [Guanyu shenli laodong zhengyi anjian de zhidao 
yijian], issued 14 December 09, art. 9.
    \18\ Shanghai Municipality High People's Court, Opinion on Several 
Issues Concerning the Application of Labour Contract Law [Shiyong 
laodong hetong fa ruogan wenti de yijian], issued 3 March 09, art. 4.
    \19\ Shai Oster, ``China Faces Unrest as Economy Falters,'' Wall 
Street Journal (Online), 22 December 08; ``Wenzhou Taxi Drivers Pay 
Tens of Thousands per Month, City Government Proposes Six Points of 
Action'' [Wenzhou chuzuche siji yue bei choucheng shangwan shi zhengfu 
ti liudian fangan], Daily Economic News, reprinted in Fenghuang Wang 
(Online), 30 July 09.
    \20\ Stanley Lubman, ``Are Strikes the Beginning of a New 
Challenge? '' Wall Street Journal (Online), 25 June 10; CECC Staff 
Interview.
    \21\ Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch (Online), ``Hundreds of 
Cotton Workers Striking in Suizhou, Hubei, for the Second Day'' [Hubei 
suizhou shu bai mianfang gongren du lu kangyi jinru di ertian], 6 June 
10; ``More Than 900 Workers From a Japanese Plant in Xi'an Strike in 
Demand of Higher Wages'' [Xi'an ri zi chang 900 duo ming gongren bagong 
yaoqiu jia xin], Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 June 10; Keith Bradsher 
and David Barboza, ``Strike in China Highlights Gap in Workers' Pay,'' 
New York Times (Online), 28 May 10; China Labour Bulletin (Online), 
``Police Reportedly Detain Striking Workers at Henan Cotton Mill,'' 4 
June 10; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Two Days, Two Strikes in the 
Pearl River Delta,'' 8 June 10; Norihiko Shirouzu, ``Honda Hit by 
Second Strike in Southern China,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 8 June 
10; ``Series of Strikes at Toyota Plants Highlight Chinese Government's 
Difficult Position'' [Bentian xilie bagong shijian tuxian zhongguo 
zhengfu liangnan jumian], Wall Street Journal (Online), 14 June 10; 
``Recent Worker Actions in China,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, No. 6, 12 July 10, 3. See also Keith Bradsher and David 
Barboza, ``Strike in China Highlights Gap in Workers' Pay,'' New York 
Times, 28 May 10.
    \22\ Chris Buckley et al., ``Q+A--What Does China's Labour Unrest 
Mean for Foreign Companies? '' Reuters (Online), 1 July 10.
    \23\ Zhang Jieping and Zhu Yixin, ``Labor Movement's Demand for the 
Establishment of Independent Unions Will Change the Country's 
Trajectory'' [Zhongguo gong yun yaoqiu chengli duli gonghui gaibian 
guoyun guiji], Asiaweek (Online), 7 June 10; Anita Chan, ``Labor Unrest 
and Role of Unions,'' China Daily, 23 June 10; Bill Schiller, ``Labour 
Strife Rolls Across China,'' Toronto Star (Online), 8 June 10; Han 
Dongfang, ``China's Workers Are Stirring,'' International Herald 
Tribune (Online), 17 June 10.
    \24\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
    \25\ Bill Taylor and Qi Li, ``Is the ACFTU a Union and Does It 
Matter? '' 49(5) Journal of Industrial Relations, 701, 701-715 (2007).
    \26\ PRC Trade Union Law, enacted and effective 3 April 92, amended 
27 October 01; Constitution of the Chinese Trade Unions, adopted 26 
September 03, amended 21 October 08.
    \27\ Qiu Liben, ``The Silent Lambs Are No Longer Silent'' [Chenmo 
de gaoyang bu zai chenmo], Asiaweek (Online), 7 June 10; Keith 
Bradsher, ``A Labor Movement Stirs in China,'' New York Times (Online), 
10 June 10; Yu Jianrong, ``No Social Stability Without Labor 
Protection,'' China Media Project (Online), 15 June 10; Mingwei Liu, 
``Chinese Employment Relations and Trade Unions in Transition,'' Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations, January 2009; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Protecting 
Workers' Rights or Serving the Party: The Way Forward for China's Trade 
Union,'' March 2009.
    \28\ He Dan and Li Wenfang, ``Draft Law Aims To Ease Labor Tension 
in Guangdong,'' China Daily (Online), 6 August 10; Qian Yanfeng, 
``Collective Contracts Sought,'' China Daily (Online), 9 July 10; 
``Unionization Campaign Against Fortune 500 Companies Intensifies,'' 
China Employment Law Update, Baker & McKenzie (Online), August 2008; 
Mingwei Liu, ``Chinese Employment Relations and Trade Unions in 
Transition,'' Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations, January 2009.
    \29\ Anita Chan, ``Labor Unrest and Role of Unions,'' China Daily, 
23 June 10; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Protecting Workers' 
Rights or Serving the Party: The Way Forward for China's Trade Union,'' 
March 2009.
    \30\ International Trade Union Confederation (Online), ``China,'' 
in Asia and the Pacific, an Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union 
Rights (2009).
    \31\ ``China's `Labor Shortage': Scholar Analyzes Labor's Supply 
and Demand Deadlock'' [Zhongguo ``mingong huang'' manyan xuezhe xi 
laodongli gongqiu jiangju], Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 February 10; 
``Labor Shortage Leads to Illegal Child Labor'' [Jingti yonggong huang 
youfa feifa shiyong tonggong], Xinhua (Online), 17 July 10; ``Worker 
Shortage Presses China's Economic `Turbulence' '' [Mingong huang poshi 
zhongguo jingji ``bianju''], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 March 10.
    \32\ `` `Guangdong Province Regulations on the Democratic 
Management of Enterprises': Labor Union's Opportunity and Challenge'' 
[``Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli'': gonghui de jiyu he 
tiaozhan], China Economic Times, reprinted in Sannong Market (Online), 
26 July 10; Mary E. Gallagher, `` `We Are Not Machines': Teen Spirit on 
China's Shopfloor,'' China Beat (Online), 23 August 10.
    \33\ Qiu Liben, ``The Silent Lambs Are No Longer Silent'' [Chenmo 
de gaoyang bu zai chenmo], Asiaweek (Online), 7 June 10; ``Strikes in 
Foreign-Funded Plants Spread to Other Provinces; Strikers Demand They 
Follow Example of Foxconn and Increase Salaries'' [Waizi chang bagong 
chao manyan duo sheng yaoqiu fangxiao fushi kang jia xin], Ming Pao 
(Online), 11 June 10; David Barboza and Hiroko Tabuchi, ``With Strikes, 
China's Workers Seem To Gain Power,'' New York Times (Online), 8 June 
10; Andy Xie, ``Dismantling Factories in a Dreamweaver Nation,'' Caixin 
(Online), 7 June 10; ``The Next China: As the Supply of Migrant Labour 
Dwindles, the Workshop of the World Is Embarking on a Migration of Its 
Own,'' Economist (Online), 29 June 10; `` `Guangdong Province 
Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises': Labor Union's 
Opportunity and Challenge'' [``Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli 
tiaoli'': gonghui de jiyu he tiaozhan], China Economic Times, reprinted 
in Sannong Market (Online), 26 July 10; Mary E. Gallagher, `` `We Are 
Not Machines': Teen Spirit on China's Shopfloor,'' China Beat (Online), 
23 August 10.
    \34\ Anita Chan, ``Labor Unrest and Role of Unions,'' China Daily, 
23 June 10.
    \35\ Ibid.
    \36\ Ibid.
    \37\ Bill Schiller, ``Labour Strife Rolls Across China: Textile 
Workers Toiling for Pennies Say They've Had Enough,'' Toronto Star 
(Online), 8 June 10.
    \38\ Highlighted in Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and China Enterprise 
Directors Association, Guiding Opinion on How To Maintain Stable Labor 
Reltaions in the Current Economic Situation [Guanyu yingdui dangqian 
jingjixingshi wending laodong guanxi de zhidao yijian], issued 23 
January 09, and in Jiangsu High People's Court, Guiding Opinion on the 
Handling of Labor Dispute Cases in the Current Macroscopic Economic 
Situation [Guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia tuoshan 
shenli laodong zhengyi anjian de zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09.
    \39\ PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, enacted 29 
December 07, effective 1 May 08, arts. 4, 5 (on negotiation and the 
application for mediation and arbitration), and 10 (on organizations 
that provide mediation).
    \40\ Ibid., art. 8.
    \41\ Local interpretations with explicit articles and sections 
addressing this include, e.g., Regulations To Promote Harmonious Labor 
Relations in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone [Shenzhen jingji tequ 
hexie laodong guanxi cujin tiaoli], issued 23 September 08, effective 1 
November 08, arts. 4 (on collaboration between local governments and 
other bodies handling labor relations), 13 (on negotiation between 
employers and workers), 34 (on the tripartite system), and 47 (on 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration), and Jiangsu High People's 
Court and Labor Arbitration Committee, Opinion on Questions Regarding 
the Use of the ``PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law'' 
[Guanyu shiyong ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong zhengyi tiaojie 
zhongcai fa'' ruogan wenti de yijian], issued and effective 10 October 
08, arts. 6-10 (on cases and application for mediation, arbitration, 
and litigation).
    \42\ See, e.g., Regulations To Promote Harmonious Labor Relations 
in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone [Shenzhen jingji tequ hexie 
laodong guanxi cujin tiaoli], issued 23 September 08, effective 1 
November 08, arts. 4, 35, 36 (on services by the labor commission and 
the city and region's labor department), 45 (on the establishment of 
organizations to promote and carry out labor laws and regulations), 30, 
34, 50, 47, 48 (on ``group'' labor disputes), 49 (on the improvement of 
mediation), 50 (on the involvement of the regional labor relations 
committee), and 54 (on the involvement of trade unions).
    \43\ See, e.g., Jiangsu High People's Court, Guiding Opinion on the 
Handling of Labor Dispute Cases in the Current Macroscopic Economic 
Situation [Guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia tuoshan 
shenli laodong zhengyi anjian de zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09, 
sec. 3. See also ``Cases Soar as Workers Seek Redress,'' China Daily 
(Online), 22 April 09, which suggests that experts encourage the use of 
``more out-of-court mediation'' with ``extensive participation of 
government departments, labor unions, residents' or villagers' 
committees as well as mediators.'' Moreover, as reported in the 
article, Qiu Baochang, head of the Huijia Law Firm in Beijing was 
quoted as saying that ``workers should not rely solely on the courts 
and arbitration committees. Fair labor treatment can also be achieved 
through negotiations between workers and enterprises.''
    \44\ Jiangsu High People's Court, Guiding Opinion on the Handling 
of Labor Dispute Cases in the Current Macroscopic Economic Situation 
[Guanyu zai dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia tuoshan shenli laodong 
zhengyi anjian de zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09, sec. 3(2). For 
a discussion on handling labor-related cases in people's mediation 
committees, see also Aaron Halegua, ``Getting Paid: Processing the 
Labor Disputes of China's Migrant Workers,'' 26(1) Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, 254, 292 (2008).
    \45\ Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions, and China Enterprise Directors Association, 
Guiding Opinion on How To Maintain Stable Labor Relations in the 
Current Economic Situation [Guanyu yingdui dangqian jingji xingshi 
wending laodong guanxi de zhidao yijian], issued 23 January 09, sec. 6; 
Jiangsu High People's Court Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Labor 
Dispute Cases in the Current Macroscopic Economic Situation [Guanyu zai 
dangqian hongguan jingji xingshi xia tuoshan shenli laodong zhengyi 
anjian de zhidao yijian], issued 27 February 09, sec. 3.
    \46\ Guangdong Province People's Congress Standing Committee 
(Online), ``Opinions From the Public Openly Sought for `Guangdong 
Province's Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management (Third Draft 
for Public Comment)' '' [Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli 
cao'an xiugai san gao zhengqiu yijian gao xiang shehui gongkai zhengqiu 
yijian], 23 August 10. Note that in section 3(4) of the Jiangsu High 
People's Court Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Labor Dispute Cases 
in the Current Macroscopic Economic Situation on guidance to lower 
level courts, higher level courts are advised to supervise and guide 
grassroots courts in handling labor dispute cases, especially when 
there is a large number of them. Further, these courts should 
investigate or research the reasons and causes. Jiangsu High People's 
Court, Guiding Opinion on the Handling of Labor Dispute Cases in the 
Current Macroscopic Economic Situation [Guanyu zai dangqian hongguan 
jingji xingshi xia tuoshan shenli laodong zhengyi anjian de zhidao 
yijian], issued 27 February 09, sec. 3(4).
    \47\ Jiangsu Province Human Resources and Social Security Office, 
Opinion Relating To Establishing the ``Five in One'' Mediation System 
for Labor Disputes [Guanyu jianli laodong zhengyi ``wu wei yiti'' 
tiaojie jizhi de yijian], issued 27 November 09, arts. 6-7.
    \48\ Chongqing Municipality People's Government, Chongqing 
Municipality Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Measures 
[Chongqing shi laodong zhengyi tiaojie zhongcai banfa], issued 19 July 
10, effective 1 September 10, arts. 2, 3, 6, 7.
    \49\ Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Disputes (III) 
[Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli laodong zhengyi anjian shiyong falu 
ruogan wenti de jieshi (san)], issued 13 September 10; Yang Weihan, 
``Supreme People's Court Issues Judicial Interpretation on Standardized 
Measure on Labor Dispute Rulings'' [Zuigao fa fabu sifa jieshi tongyi 
laodong zhengyi caipan chidu], Xinhua (Online), 14 September 10; Edward 
Wong, ``Global Crisis Adds to Surge of Labor Disputes in Chinese 
Courts,'' New York Times (Online), 15 September 10.
    \50\ Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Disputes (III) 
[Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli laodong zhengyi anjian shiyong falu 
ruogan wenti de jieshi (san)], issued 13 September 10, art. 2.
    \51\ Ibid., art. 3.
    \52\ Ibid., art 1.
    \53\ Simon Clarke et al., ``Collective Consultation and Industrial 
Relations in China,'' 42(2) British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
235, 240, 2004.
    \54\ Stanley Lubman, ``Are Strikes the Beginning of a New 
Challenge? '' Wall Street Journal (Online), 25 June 10; Simon Clarke et 
al., ``Collective Consultation and Industrial Relations in China,'' 
42(2) British Journal of Industrial Relations, 235, 240, 2004.
    \55\ Yang Lin, ``Grasp the Opportunity To Reevaluate Labour 
Relations, Eliminate Potential Problems, and Reformulate Policy'' [Zhua 
zhu chongxin shenshi laozi geju, xiaochu laozi maodun yinhuan, 
tiaozheng laogong zhengce de jihui], Outlook, 16 December 09.
    \56\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Will the New Year See a 
Resumption of Collective Bargaining in China? '' 5 January 10.
    \57\ ``Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises 
Could Be Revealed Next Month; Emphasizes Equal Rights Among the Three 
Sides of Labor Relations'' [Qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli youwang xia yue 
chutai qiangdiao laozi sanfang pingdeng quanli], Southern Daily 
(Online), 5 August 10.
    \58\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Guangdong's New Labour 
Regulations Open the Door to Worker Participation in Collective 
Bargaining,'' 26 July 10.
    \59\ Guangdong Province People's Congress Standing Committee 
(Online), ``Opinions From the Public Openly Sought for `Guangdong 
Province's Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management (Third Draft 
for Public Comment)' '' [Guangdong sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli 
cao'an xiugai san gao zhengqiu yijian gao xiang shehui gongkai zhengqiu 
yijian], 23 August 10.
    \60\ Ibid.
    \61\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Guangdong's New Labour 
Regulations Open the Door to Worker Participation in Collective 
Bargaining,'' 26 July 10.
    \62\ ``Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises 
Could Be Revealed Next Month; Emphasizes Equal Rights Among the Three 
Sides of Labor Relations'' [Qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli youwang xia yue 
chutai qiangdiao laozi sanfang pingdeng quanli], Southern Daily 
(Online), 5 August 10.
    \63\ ``Guangdong Province Regulations on the Democratic Management 
of Enterprises: Labor Unions' Opportunities and Challenges'' [Guangdong 
sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli: gonghui de jiyu he tiaozhan], Sannong 
Express (Online), 26 July 10.
    \64\ ``Legislation on Wage Negotiations Is an Opportunity for 
Unions and Workers'' [Gongzi tanpan lifa shi gonghui ji gongren de 
jiyu], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 23 July 10.
    \65\ Mary E. Gallagher, `` `We Are Not Machines': Teen Spirit on 
China's Shopfloor,'' China Beat (Online), 23 August 10.
    \66\ Guizhou Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic 
Management [Guizhou sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli], issued 26 
November 08, effective 1 January 09.
    \67\ Hubei Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management 
[Hubei sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli], issued 6 December 07, 
effective 1 February 08.
    \68\ Jiangsu Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic 
Management [Jiangsu sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli], issued 27 
September 07, effective 1 January 08.
    \69\ Shanxi Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic 
Management [Shanxi sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli], adopted 31 May 05, 
effective 1 July 05.
    \70\ Zhejiang Province Regulations on Enterprise Democratic 
Management [Zhejiang sheng qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli], adopted 30 March 
10, effective 1 October 10.
    \71\ Jinan City Regulations on Enterprise Democratic Management 
[Jinan shi qiye minzhu guanli tiaoli], issued 20 November 09, effective 
1 May 10.
    \72\ Tianjin City Regulations on Enterprise Workers Democratic 
Management [Tianjin shi qiye zhigong minzhu guanli tiaoli], issued 15 
November 07, effective 1 March 08.
    \73\ Mary E. Gallagher, `` `We Are Not Machines': Teen Spirit on 
China's Shopfloor,'' China Beat (Online), 23 August 10.
    \74\ Beijing Federation of Trade Unions, Circular Regarding the 
Speeding-Up of the Work of Advancing Collective Wage Consultations 
[Guanyu jin yi bu jiakuai tuijin gongzi jiti xieshang gongzuo de 
tongzhi], issued 25 August 10, effective 25 August 10.
    \75\ Federation of Hong Kong Industries (Online), ``Guidance Notes 
Issued by Guangdong Government on Collective Wage Consultations'' 
[Guangdong sheng qiye gongzi jiti xieshang zhiyin], 10 August 10.
    \76\ Hainan Province Regulations on Collective Contracts [Hainan 
sheng jiti hetong tiaoli], enacted 27 November 09, issued 1 January 10.
    \77\ Tianjin City Regulations on Enterprise Collective Wage 
Consultations [Tianjin shi qiye gongzi jiti xieshang tiaoli], adopted 
22 July 10, effective 1 September 10.
    \78\ Li Yongqing, ``Guangdong Decides To Delay `Regulations on 
Democratic Management of Enterprises' '' [Guangdong jue huan shen 
``qiye minzhu guangli tiaoli''], Wen Wei Po (Online), 18 September 10; 
Xu Bo, ``Guangdong Province Sets Aside Labor Legislation'' [Guangdong 
sheng gezhi laogong lifa], Voice of America (Online), 22 September 10; 
Han Dongfang, China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``China Labour Bulletin 
Supports Guangdong's Efforts To Establish a Collective Wage Negotiation 
System,'' 22 September 10.
    \79\ ``China Rural Migrant Workers Number Nearly 230 Million,'' 
People's Daily (Online), 24 March 10.
    \80\ Ibid.
    \81\ Tammy Chia, ``Schools for Migrant Children in Beijing Face 
Demolition,'' Kyodo News (Online), 29 January 10; China Labour Bulletin 
(Online), ``Call for Fairer Treatment for Migrant Children in Beijing 
Goes Unheeded,'' 2 February 10; Meng Jing, ``Blaze at Unlicensed 
Kindergarten Kills Infant,'' China Daily (Online), 19 January 10; Lian 
Weiliang, ``Allow All Infants To Easily Enter Nurseries; Beijing 
People's Political Consultative Conference Calls To Resolve `Barriers 
Against Entering Nurseries' '' [Rang suoyou baobao dou qingsong rutuo 
beijing zhengxie huyu jiejue rutuo nan], Xinhua (Online), 30 June 09; 
``Scholars Call on the People's Congress To Enact Legislation To Treat 
Children Without Hukou Registration Equally'' [Xuezhe huyu renda lifa 
pingdeng duidai fei huji ertong], Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 January 
10; CECC, Special Topic Paper: China's Household Registration System: 
Sustained Reform Needed to Protect China's Rural Migrants, 7 October 
05.
    \82\ Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Centre, ``New Ongoing Violations 
After the Implementation of Labor Contract Law in China,'' 12 June 09; 
Jeffrey Becker and Manfred Elfstrom, International Labor Rights Forum 
(Online), ``The Impact of China's Labor Contract Law on Workers,'' 23 
February 10, 7-10, 18.
    \83\ Kam Wing Chan, ``The Chinese Hukou System at 50,'' 50(2) 
Eurasian Geography and Economics, 197, 197-221, 2009.
    \84\ ``Cases Soar as Workers Seek Redress,'' China Daily (Online), 
22 April 09.
    \85\ Albert Park et al., ``Shock and Recovery in China's Labour 
Market: Flexibility in the Face of a Global Financial Crisis,'' 
PowerPoint Presentation given at the Chinese Economic Association 
Conference on Global Economic Recovery: The Role of China and Other 
Emerging Economies, University of Oxford, July 12-13, 2010.
    \86\ Jeffrey Becker and Manfred Elfstrom, International Labor 
Rights Forum (Online), ``The Impact of China's Labor Contract Law on 
Workers,'' 23 February 10, 9.
    \87\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``New Semester Begins 
in Beijing, Over 10,000 Migrant Workers' Children Unable To Attend 
School'' [Beijing xin xueqi kai xue shang wan nongmin gong zinu mei xue 
shang], 23 February 10.
    \88\ ``Scholars Call on the People's Congress To Enact Legislation 
To Treat Children Without Hukou Registration Equally'' [Xuezhe huyu 
renda li fa pingdeng duidai fei huji ertong], Radio Free Asia (Online), 
29 January 10.
    \89\ Ibid.
    \90\ He Na, ``Migrants Put Behind Fences,'' China Daily (Online), 6 
May 10.
    \91\ All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ``All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions: Research Report Regarding Issues Facing the New 
Generation of Migrant Workers'' [Quanguo zong gonghui: guanyu xinsheng 
dai nongmin gong wenti de yan jiu baogao], 21 June 10. See also He Na, 
``Unlike Parents, Young Migrants Will Not Take Their Fate Lying Down,'' 
China Daily (Online), 23 March 10.
    \92\ ``Agricultural Minister Han Changfu Discusses `Post-1990s' 
Migrant Workers'' [Nongye bu buzhang han changfu tan ``90 hou'' nongmin 
gong], China Review News, 3 March 10. See also ``Joint Editorial 
Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After Publication, 
Co-Author Fired,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 
4, 21 April 10, 1-2.
    \93\ Zhang Jieping and Zhu Yixin, ``Labor Movements Demand for the 
Establishment of Independent Unions Will Change the Country's 
Trajectory'' [Zhongguo gong yun yaoqiu chengli duli gonghui gaibian 
guoyun guiji], Asia Week (Online), 13 June 10.
    \94\ He Na, ``Unlike Parents, Young Migrants Will Not Take Their 
Fate Lying Down,'' China Daily (Online), 23 March 10.
    \95\ ``China To Train Six Million Migrant Workers Each Year'' 
[Zhongguo jiang meinian peixun nongmin gong 600 wan], Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 5 March 10.
    \96\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Politburo Officials Calls 
for Hukou Reform,'' 4 March 10. See also ``Joint Editorial Calling for 
Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After Publication, Co-Author 
Fired,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 
April 10, 1-2.
    \97\ CECC Staff Interview; Zhou Jing, ``Dongguan Labor Disputes 
Suddenly Increase'' [Dongguan laodong zhengyi zhousheng], Caijing 
(Online), 14 January 09; Albert Park and Fang Cai, ``The 
Informalization of the Chinese Labour Market,'' Paper presented at 
Breaking Down Chinese Walls Conference, Cornell University, September 
2008.
    \98\ Albert Park and Fang Cai, ``The Informalization of the Chinese 
Labour Market,'' Paper presented at Breaking Down Chinese Walls 
Conference, Cornell University, September 2008.
    \99\ Ibid.
    \100\ Ibid.
    \101\ He Huifeng, ``Official Blames Shenzhen Authorities,'' South 
China Morning Post (Online), 27 May 10.
    \102\ ``Military-Style Management,'' Global Times (Online), 24 May 
10.
    \103\ Tim Culpan, ``Hon Hai Falls on Plan To Double Wages at China 
Plants (Update2),'' Bloomberg Businessweek (Online), 7 June 10.
    \104\ ``Minimum Wages Rise in 11 Provinces,'' China Daily (Online), 
18 May 10.
    \105\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Minimum Wage Set To 
Increase in Cities Across China,'' 5 February 10.
    \106\ Ibid.
    \107\ PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 08, 
art. 48
    \108\ PRC Labor Contract Law, enacted 29 June 07, effective 1 
January 08, art. 74.
    \109\ Ibid., art. 85.
    \110\ Ibid., art. 72.
    \111\ ``Migrant Worker Representative Proposes Double Compensation 
for Arrears'' [Mingong ren dai tian qian xin pei shuang bei], Ming Pao 
(Online), 10 March 10.
    \112\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Minimum Wage Set To 
Increase in Cities Across China,'' 5 February 10.
    \113\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Migrant Worker 
Nearly Beaten to Death While Discussing Wages'' [Nongmin gong tao 
gongzi bei da zhi shengming chuiwei], 12 February 10.
    \114\ Ibid.
    \115\ PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, 
amended 10 October 01, art. 36.
    \116\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Falling Through the Floor: 
Migrant Women Workers' Quest for Decent Work in Dongguan, China,'' 
September 2006, 6, 10, 15; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 51.
    \117\ Dexter Roberts and Pete Engardio, ``Secrets, Lies, and 
Sweatshops,'' Business Week (Online), 27 November 06.
    \118\ ``All-China Federation of Trade Unions: A Rising Trend in the 
Number of Local Labor Dispute Cases in 2010'' [Quanzong: 2010 nian 
difang laodong zhengyi anjian shuliang cheng shangsheng qushi], 
People's Daily (Online), 2 September 10; ``In the First Half of the 
Year, Labor Dispute Cases in China Explode'' [Shangban nian zhongguo 
laodong zhengyi anjian cheng jingpen taishi], Caijing (Online), 13 July 
09.
    \119\ PRC Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, enacted 29 
December 07, effective 1 May 08, arts. 6, 27, 39.
    \120\ ``Wages Tumble as Chinese Workers Hunt Factory Jobs,'' 
Reuters (Online), 20 February 09.
    \121\ PRC Safe Production Law, enacted 29 June 02, effective 1 
November 02, arts. 1-2.
    \122\ Ibid., arts. 17, 21.
    \123\ Ibid., art. 45.
    \124\ Ibid., art. 52.
    \125\ Ibid., art. 53.
    \126\ Ibid., art. 82.
    \127\ Austin Ramzy, ``China and West Virginia: A Tale of Two Mine 
Disasters,'' Time (Online), 23 April 10.
    \128\ Ibid.
    \129\ Yan Jie, ``Lax Law, Lack of Funds Make China's Mines 
Deadliest,'' China Daily (Online), 10 May 10.
    \130\ Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ``Silicon Sweatshops: What's a Worker 
Worth? The Cold Calculus of Supply Chain Economics,'' Global Post 
(Online), 17 March 10.
    \131\ Ibid.
    \132\ CECC Staff Interview.
    \133\ PRC Law on Prevention and Control of Occupational Diseases, 
enacted 27 October 01, effective 1 May 02, art. 39; Regulations on 
Work-Related Injury Insurance [Gongshang baoxian tiaoli], issued 27 
April 03, effective 1 January 04, art 18; China Labour Bulletin 
(Online), ``Suffocated by the System,'' 16 April 10.
    \134\ Regulations on Work-Related Injury Insurance [Gongshang 
baoxian tiaoli], issued 27 April 03, effective 1 January 04, arts. 17-
18.
    \135\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Suffocated by the System,'' 
16 April 10.
    \136\ For additional analysis of China's workplace-related injury 
and illness compensation process, see China Labour Bulletin (Online), 
``Suffocated by the System,'' 16 April 10.
    \137\ Tan Ee Lyn, ``Few China Workers With Lung Disease Get 
Redress--Rights Group,'' Reuters (Online), 26 April 10.
    \138\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 52.
    \139\ Ibid.
    \140\ Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ``Silicon Sweatshops: The Strange 
Death of Li Liang. What Killed a Chinese Technology Worker at the 
Center of a Supply Chain Firestorm? '' Global Post (Online), 17 March 
10.
    \141\ Ibid.
    \142\ Ibid.
    \143\ See, e.g., William Foreman, ``China Factories Break Labor 
Rules,'' Associated Press (Online), 20 April 10; National Labor 
Committee (Online), ``China's Youth Meet Microsoft: KYE Factory in 
China Produces for Microsoft and Other U.S. Companies,'' 13 April 10.
    \144\ ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission 
to Employment, 26 June 73; ILO Convention (No. 182) Concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms 
of Child Labour, 17 June 99.
    \145\ PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, 
amended 10 October 01, art. 15. See also PRC Law on the Protection of 
Minors, enacted 4 September 91, effective 1 January 92, art. 28. See 
generally Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi 
shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 
02.
    \146\ Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi 
shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 
02, art. 6. See also ``Legal Announcement--Zhejiang Determines Four 
Circumstances That Define Use of Child Labor'' [Fazhi bobao: zhejiang 
jieding shiyong tonggong si zhong qingxing], China Woman (Online), 26 
July 08.
    \147\ This provision was added into the fourth amendment to the 
Criminal Law in 2002. Fourth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the 
People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingfa xiuzheng 
an (si)], issued 28 December 02. See also PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 
July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 244.
    \148\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Small Hands: A Survey 
Report on Child Labor in China,'' September 2007, 3.
    \149\ Ibid., 7-8.
    \150\ Ibid., 15, 22, 25-32.
    \151\ National Labor Committee (Online), ``China's Youth Meet 
Microsoft: KYE Factory in China Produces for Microsoft and Other U.S. 
Companies,'' 13 April 10, 3.
    \152\ Ibid.
    \153\ Ibid., 15.
    \154\  William Foreman, ``China Factories Break Labor Rules,'' 
Associated Press (Online), 20 April 10.
    \155\ Ibid.
    \156\ Ibid.
    \157\ For the government response to forced labor in brick kilns, 
including child labor, see, e.g., Zhang Pinghui, ``Crackdown on Slave 
Labor Nationwide--State Council Vows To End Enslavement,'' South China 
Morning Post (Online), 21 June 07.
    \158\ Ben Blanchard, ``China Urged To End `Child Labor' in 
Schools,'' Reuters (Online), 3 December 07; Human Rights Watch 
(Online), ``China: End Child Labor in State Schools,'' 3 December 07.
    \159\ Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi 
shiyong tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02, effective 1 December 
02, art. 13.
    \160\ PRC Education Law, enacted 18 March 95, effective 1 September 
95, amended 27 August 09, art. 58.
    \161\ ILO Convention 138 permits vocational education for underage 
minors only where it is an ``integral part'' of a course of study or 
training course. ILO Convention 182 obligates Member States to 
eliminate the ``worst forms of child labor,'' including ``forced or 
compulsory labor.'' ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for 
Admission to Employment, 26 June 73; ILO Convention (No. 182) 
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 17 June 99.
    \162\ Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention, 1999 (No. 182) China (ratification: 2002) Observation, 
CEACR 2006/77th Session, International Labour Organization, 2006.
    \163\ Laogai Research Foundation, Report on Laogai Enterprise 
Advertisements and Listings in English, February 2010, 5; Laogai 
Research Foundation (Online), ``Laogai Forced Labor Camps: Listed in 
Dun & Bradstreet Databases,'' 19 June 08, Introduction; U.S.-China 
Security Review Commission (Online), Policy Paper on Prison Labor and 
Forced Labor in China, modified 17 February 10.
    \164\ State Council, Provisions Reiterating the Prohibition on the 
Export of Products Made by Prisoners Undergoing Reeducation Through 
Labor [Guanyu chongshen jinzhi laogai chanpin chukou de guiding], 
enacted and effective 5 October 91, art. 4; U.S.-China Security Review 
Commission (Online), Policy Paper on Prison Labor and Forced Labor in 
China, modified 17 February 10; Laogai Research Foundation, Report on 
Laogai Enterprise Advertisements and Listings in English, February 
2010, 6.
    \165\ Brahma Chellaney, ``Exporting Convicts Stains China's 
Reputation,'' Globe and Mail (Online), 16 August 10.
    \166\ PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens, 
enacted 22 November 85, effective 1 February 86, art. 8.
    \167\ Brahma Chellaney, ``Exporting Convicts Stains China's 
Reputation,'' Globe and Mail (Online), 16 August 10. For more 
information, see Lan Lan, ``Overseas Projects Fuel Big Dreams for 
Workers,'' China Daily (Online), 20 July 10; PRC Law on the Control of 
the Exit and Entry of Citizens, enacted 22 November 85, effective 1 
February 86, art. 8.
    \168\ People's Daily (Online), ``Commerce Ministry Denies China 
Exports Prison Labor,'' 10 August 10.
    \169\ These other rights are ``(b) the elimination of all forms of 
forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child 
labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation.'' ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, 18 June 98, International Labour Organization 
(Online), art. 2.
    \170\ See International Labour Organization (Online), ``ILO 
Tripartite Constituents in China,'' last visited 27 September 07.
    \171\ ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
18 June 98, International Labour Organization (Online), art. 2. China 
has been a member of the ILO since its founding in 1919. For more 
information, see the country profile on China in the ILO database of 
national labor, social security, and human rights legislation (NATLEX) 
(Online).
    \172\ International Labour Organization (Online), ``Ratifications 
of the Fundamental Human Rights Conventions by Country,'' 11 September 
07.
    \173\ International Labour Organization (Online), ``China: Forced 
Labor and Trafficking: The Role of Labour Institution in Law 
Enforcement and International Cooperation,'' August 2005.
    \174\ See generally PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 
January 95, amended 10 October 01, art. 12.
    \175\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.
    \176\ United Nations Treaty Collection (Online), Declarations and 
Reservations, 5 February 02. Article 10 of China's Trade Union Law 
establishes the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) as the 
``unified national trade union federation,'' and Article 11 mandates 
that all unions must be approved by the next higher level union body, 
giving the ACFTU an absolute veto over the establishment of any local 
union and the legal authority to block independent labor associations. 
PRC Trade Union Law, enacted and effective 3 April 92, amended 27 
October 01, arts. 10, 11.

    Notes to Section II--Criminal Justice
    \1\ For information on reforms related to limiting the use of 
coerced confessions and executions, see Provisions Concerning Questions 
About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases [Guanyu 
banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding], 
effective 1 July 10, and Provisions Concerning Questions About 
Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases [Guanyu banli 
xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding], effective 
1 July 10. After several reports on the handling of suspicious 
detention center deaths, the Ministry of Public Security released new 
guidelines on management and education in detention centers. For more 
information, see ``China Issues Detention Center Guideline,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 26 February 10.
    \2\ ``National People's Congress Standing Committee Issues Revised 
State Secrets Law,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
No. 5, 4 June 10, 2; ``Lawyers' Licenses Withheld,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 18 July 10; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group 
(Online), ``Concern Over Human Rights Lawyers Snatched of Their Legal 
Practice Qualification, Demand Scrapping the Annual Inspection and 
Annual Registration System,'' 15 July 10.
    \3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, art. 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 
10 December 48, art. 29.
    \4\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. II(1), 
art. 22; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2009, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.
    \5\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 
3, 5, 9, 19, and 20; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 7, 9(1), 19(1), 19(2), 
21, and 22(1); PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 
April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 35 (freedom of 
speech, press, assembly), 37 (freedom of person), and 41 (right to 
criticize state organ or functionary).
    \6\ Henry Sanderson, ``China Activist Told To Leave City for 
National Day,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Taiwan News (Online), 18 
September 09.
    \7\ ``China Arrests Activists Before Obama Visit,'' United Press 
International (Online), 14 November 09.
    \8\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Organizer of Families of 
Tainted Milk Powder Victims Detained,'' 13 November 09.
    \9\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Shanghai Petitioner To Serve 
18 Months of Reeducation-through-Labor After Shouting Slogans,'' 9 
March 10.
    \10\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``During Two 
Sessions, More Than 20 Petitioners From Every Region Arrested and 
Detained'' [Lianghui zhi shi you you 20 duo wei gedi fang min bei soubu 
guanya], 7 March 10.
    \11\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``On the Eve of the 
World Expo, Shanghai Citizens Receive Public Security Authorities' 
Notice'' [Shibohui qianxi, shanghai shimin shou dao gongan jiguan de 
shibo gaozhi shu], 13 April 10.
    \12\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Guizhou Authorities Suppress 
Activities To Commemorate June Fourth,'' 2 June 10.
    \13\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Human Rights 
Activist Liu Dejun Beaten and Taken to a Remote Location by Police in 
the Middle of the Night'' [Weiquan renshi liu dejun shenye bei jingcha 
ouda bing pao shenshan], 16 June 10; ``Liu Dejun, Civil Rights 
Activist, Kidnapped by Police and Left in Mountains,'' Boxun (Online), 
15 June 10.
    \14\ Ng Tze-wei, ``Police Detain Lawyers Who Sought To Meet 
Obama,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 21 November 09.
    \15\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Lawyers Meet With 
Wang Yonghang; Family Calls for End to Persecution'' [Lushi huijian 
wangyonghang jiashu xu tingzhi pohai], 18 January 10; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights Briefing January 14-22, 
2010,'' 27 January 10.
    \16\ ``Gao Zhisheng Missing Again for 3 Months,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 8 July 10; ``Chinese Dissident Disappears for Second Time,'' 
Voice of America (Online), 1 May 10; Michael Wines, ``Chinese Rights 
Lawyer Disappears Again,'' Associated Press (Online), 30 April 10; 
``Chinese Human Rights Defender Gao Zhisheng Disappears Again,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \17\ UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: 
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: China, CAT/C/
CHN/CO/4, 12 December 08, para. 11.
    \18\ China objected to the quoted UN Committee against Torture 
statement by stating, ``The Government of China contends that this 
statement seriously distorts the truth.'' UN Committee against Torture, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of 
the Convention: Comments by the Government of the People's Republic of 
China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 9 December 09, 2. For examples of police 
torture, see Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: Investigate Torture 
Allegations in Tibet Philanthropist Trial,'' 23 June 10; ``Extorting 
Confessions by Torture Is an Illness of the Chinese Detention System; 
Call for Separation of Detention and Investigation Powers'' [Xingxun 
bigong cheng zhongguo jiya tizhi chenke huyu shixian ji zhen fenli], 
People's Daily (Online), 17 March 10. For examples of detention center 
deaths, see ``Ensure the Rights of Suspects and Unnatural Deaths Will 
Be Avoided'' [Baozheng she'an renyuan quanli caineng bimian fei 
zhengchang siwang], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 16 April 10; 
Chen Wenxiang, ``Face-Washing? How Many More Ways To Die Can Detention 
Centers `Invent'/ '' [Xilian si, kanshousuo jiujing hai yao ``faming'' 
duoshao zhong si fa?], People's Daily (Online), 10 April 10; `` 
`Bizarre' Inmate Death Sparks Investigation,'' China Daily (Online), 12 
April 10.
    \19\ For descriptions of police abuse and torture, see Geng He's 
opinion-editorial on her husband Gao Zhisheng's disappearance and 
coverage of the high-profile Zhao Zuohai case: Geng He, ``The U.S. Must 
Speak Out Against China's Offenses,'' Washington Post (Online), 4 
February 10; Clifford Coonan, ``Zhao Zuohai: Beaten, Framed and Jailed 
for a Murder That Never Happened,'' Independent (Online), 14 May 10.
    \20\ ``19 Defendants Claim Confessions Extracted Through Torture'' 
[19 ming beigao cheng zao xingxun bigong], Yancheng Evening News 
(Online), 4 December 09.
    \21\ On November 30, 2009, the Mengzhou Municipal Court sentenced 
Zhang Jiabin to three years' imprisonment, Xu Libin to two years' 
imprisonment, suspended for three years, and Dong Dongli to one year's 
imprisonment, suspended for two years. ``Police Torture Suspect and 
Induce Bladder Rupture; Use Tear Gas Canister'' [Minjing xingxun bigong 
zhi xianfan pangguang polie yong cuilei pensheqi], Dahe Net, reprinted 
in Global Times (Online), 26 February 10.
    \22\ Robert Saiget, ``China Environmentalist Alleges Brutal Jail 
Treatment,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 11 May 10; ``Environmental 
Activist Wu Lihong Released, Alleges Abuse,'' CECC Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \23\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China's Highest 
Court Must Overturn Death Sentence Based on Confession Extracted by 
Torture,'' 3 August 10; Ng Tze-wei, ``Lawyer Reveals Grim Details of 
Client's Torture,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 29 July 10.
    \24\ Wang Jingqiong and Shi Baoyin, `` `Murderer' Says He Was 
Tortured To Confess,'' China Daily (Online), 12 May 10.
    \25\ ``Wrongly Jailed Man Gets State Compensation,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 13 May 10.
    \26\ ``A Major Initiative To Protect the Quality of Death Penalty 
Cases'' [Baozhang sixing anjian zhiliang de yige zhongda jucuo], 
Procuratorial Daily (Online), 7 June 10.
    \27\ ``Policing the Police,'' China Daily (Online), 13 May 10.
    \28\ ``Inmate Death Sparks Investigation,'' China Daily (Online), 
12 April 10; ``Ensure the Rights of Suspects and Unnatural Deaths Will 
Be Avoided'' [Baozheng she'an renyuab guanli caineng bimian 
feizhengchang], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 31 March 10.
    \29\ Kent Ewing, ``Chinese Prisons: Horror and Reform,'' Asia Times 
(Online), 24 March 09. The first case that came to light in 2009 
involved the death in February of 24-year-old Li Qiaoming at a 
detention center in Yunnan province, which was initially explained by 
officials to have resulted from fatal injuries sustained during a game 
of ``hide-and-seek'' (duo maomao) with other inmates. The media and 
blogosphere spread news of the case. Internet users expressed anger 
over the death and the unconvincing explanation given by the officials, 
and called for an investigation.
    \30\ ``Urgently Awaiting the End of Unnatural Deaths in Detention 
Centers'' [Feizhengchang siwang jidai ezhi], Zhejiang Daily (Online), 
24 June 10; Chen Wenxiang, ``Face-Washing? How Many More Ways To Die 
Can Detention Centers `Invent'/ '' [Xilian si, kanshousuo jiujing hai 
yao ``faming'' duoshao zhong sifa?], People's Daily (Online), 10 April 
10.
    \31\ See, e.g., Deng Wei, ``Why Do `Detention Stories' Continue 
Without End/ '' [``Kanshousuo de gushi'' heyi xuji buduan], Xi'an 
Evening News, reprinted in New People Network (Online), 17 March 10; 
Wang Jingqiong, ``Officers Suspended After Inmate Death,'' China Daily 
(Online), 19 April 10; Wang Huazhong, ``Inmate Death Sparks 
Investigation,'' China Daily (Online), 12 April 10; ``What Should We 
Call the Next Detention Center Death/ '' [Kanshousuo li xia yili siwang 
gai jiao shenme], Dalian Evening News, 13 August 09.
    \32\ Wang Jingqiong, ``Officers Suspended After Inmate Death,'' 
China Daily (Online), 19 April 10; ``Meng Jianzhu: Successive Unnatural 
Deaths Severely Damage the Credibility of the Public Security'' [Meng 
jianzhu: jielian fasheng fei zhengchang siwang shijian yanzhong sunhai 
gongan jiguan zhifa gongxinli], Legal Daily (Online), 27 March 10.
    \33\ Circular From Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's 
Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, 
and Ministry of Justice Regarding the Issue of ``Provisions Concerning 
Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases'' 
and ``Provisions Concerning Questions About Exclusion of Illegal 
Evidence in Handling Criminal Cases'' [Zuigao renmin fayuan zuigao 
renmin jiancha yuan gong'an bu guojia anquan bu sifa bu yinfa ``guanyu 
banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan wenti de guiding'' 
he ``guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de 
guiding'' de tongzhi], issued 13 June 10; Provisions Concerning 
Questions About Exclusion of Illegal Evidence in Handling Criminal 
Cases [Guanyu banli xingshi anjian paichu feifa zhengju ruogan wenti de 
guiding], effective 1 July 10, arts. 1, 7; Provisions Concerning 
Questions About Examining and Judging Evidence in Death Penalty Cases 
[Guanyu banli sixing anjian shencha panduan zhengju ruogan wenti de 
guiding], effective 1 July 10, arts. 18(4), 19, 34.
    \34\ Regulations on the Discipline of Policemen [Gong'an jiguan 
renmin jingcha jilu tiaoling], issued 21 April 10, effective 1 June 10; 
Wang Huazhong, ``Regulation Details Disciplines for Police,'' China 
Daily (Online), 6 May 10; ``Regulations on `Discipline of Policemen' 
Will Go Into Effect June 1'' [``Gong'an jiguan renmin jingcha jilu 
tiaoling'' jiang yu liu yue yi ri qi shixing], People's Daily (Online), 
4 May 10.
    \35\ PRC State Compensation Law, enacted 12 May 94, amended 29 
April 10, effective 1 December 10, art. 26. Cheng Zhuo and Li Huizi, 
``China Adopts Amended State Compensation Law To Better Protect Human 
Rights,'' Xinhua (Online), 30 April 10.
    \36\ According to Article 34 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the 
court ``shall designate a lawyer that is obligated to provide legal aid 
to serve as a defender,'' if the defendant does not have a lawyer and 
is blind, deaf, mute, a minor, or facing the possibility of a death 
sentence. Article 42 of the Law on Lawyers states that lawyers must 
fulfill their obligations to provide legal aid services. For more 
information see PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 
17 March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 34; PRC Law on Lawyers, 
enacted 15 May 96, amended 29 December 01, amended 28 October 07, 
effective 1 June 08, art. 42.
    \37\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 102.
    \38\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2009, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.
    \39\ `` `Lawyers Falsification-Gate' and `Law of Perjury' '' 
[``Lushi zaojiamen'' yu ``lushi weizhengzui''], Qianlong Web (Online), 
15 December 09.
    \40\ ``President of All China Lawyers Association Discusses Article 
306 of Criminal Law'' [Quanguo luxiehui zhang shou tan ``bu zuowei'' 
cheng ziji bingfei kuilei], China Newsweek, reprinted in Xinhua 
(Online), 25 March 10.
    \41\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 38.
    \42\ PRC Law on Lawyers, enacted 15 May 96, amended 29 December 01, 
amended 28 October 07, effective 1 June 08; PRC Criminal Procedure Law, 
enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, effective 1 January 97; Zhang 
Liang, ``ACLA Survey Shows Lack of Optimism in Professional Lawyer 
Field'' [Quanguo lushi xiehui diaoyan xianshi lushi zhiye huanjing 
burong leguan], Legal Daily (Online), 30 December 09.
    \43\ Zhang Liang, ``ACLA Survey Shows Lack of Optimism in 
Professional Lawyer Field'' [Quanguo luxie diaoyan xianshi lushi zhiye 
huanjing burong leguan], Legal Daily (Online), 30 December 09.
    \44\ Zhang Yan, ``Lawyers Plagued With Red Tape,'' China Daily 
(Online), 25 June 10.
    \45\ ``ACLA President Talks About `Omission' for the First Time; 
States He Wasn't a Puppet'' [Quanguo luxiehuizhang shoutan ``bu 
zuowei'' cheng ziji bingfei kuilei], China Newsweek, reprinted in 
Xinhua (Online), 25 March 10.
    \46\ ``Ignoring Facts and Law as a Concession to Popular Will 
Actually Contravenes the Will of the People'' [Weile qianjiu minyi bugu 
shishi he falu cai shi zhenzheng weibei minyi], China Youth Daily 
(Online), 18 June 09. For more information about Article 306, see CECC, 
2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 106.
    \47\ ``Chinese Article Claims That Research on the Difficulties 
Faced by Criminal Defense Lawyers Restricted After Revealing `Shocking' 
Initial Results,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China 
(Online), 13 January 05; Tom Kellogg, Human Rights in China (Online), 
``A Case for the Defense,'' China Rights Forum, No. 2, 31-34; Human 
Rights Watch (Online), ``Walking on Thin Ice,'' 28 April 08.
    \48\ ``ACLA President Talks About `Omission' for the First Time; 
States He Wasn't a Puppet'' [Quanguo luxiehuizhang shoutan ``bu 
zuowei'' cheng ziji bingfei kuilei], China Newsweek, reprinted in 
Xinhua (Online), 25 March 10.
    \49\ Xunjun Eberlein, ``Lawyer's Trial Rivets Public and Tests 
Chinese Courts,'' New America Media (Online), 5 January 10.
    \50\ Lu Fei, ``Li Zhuang Retracts Admission of Guilt Following 
Reduced Sentence,'' Economic Observer (Online), 9 February 10; 
``Beijing Lawyer Given Lighter Punishment on Appeal in Mob Trial,'' 
Xinhua (Online), 9 February 10; Austin Ramzy, ``China's Dark City: 
Behind Chongqing's Crime Crackdown,'' Time (Online), 15 March 10.
    \51\ Amnesty International (Online), ``China Must Free Activist Who 
Defended Earthquake Victims,'' 23 November 09.
    \52\ ``Huang Qi,'' New York Times (Online), 8 February 09. For more 
information on Huang Qi's advocacy and the Tianwang Human Rights 
Center, see Human Rights in China (Online), ``HRIC Condemns Three-Year 
Sentence for Earthquake Activist,'' 23 November 09.
    \53\ ``International Outcry After Chinese Dissident Liu Xiaobo 
Sentenced to 11 Years,'' Times of London (Online), 26 December 09.
    \54\ ``Liu Xiaobo Appeals Sentence; Official Abuses Mar Case From 
Outset,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 
February 10, 2.
    \55\ The charge of ``illegally excavating and robbing cultural 
sites or ancient tombs'' is listed under 328 of the PRC Criminal Law. 
PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 
October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 
December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 328. 
``Tibetan Gets 15 Years,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 24 June 10; 
``Tibetan Karma Samdrup Sentenced to 15 Years; Will Appeal'' [Zangzu 
gama sangzhu bei pan 15 jiang shangsu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 24 
June 10.
    \56\ Jonathan Watts, ``China Jails Tibetan Environmentalist for 15 
Years,'' Guardian (Online), 25 June 10.
    \57\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Online), 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Fact Sheet No. 26, May 2000, sec. 
IV; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 27; 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN 
General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 7, 10, 
13, 14, 18, 19, and 21. The ICCPR provides that the deprivation of an 
individual's liberty is permissible only ``on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law'' and that an 
individual must be promptly informed of the reasons for his detention 
and any charges against him or her.
    \58\ See, e.g., PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 
April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 35, 37, 41; PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 
effective 1 January 97, art. 3; PRC Public Security Administration 
Punishment Law, enacted 28 August 05, effective 1 March 06, arts. 3, 9, 
10, 16; PRC Legislation Law, enacted 15 March 00, effective 1 July 00, 
art. 8(v).
    \59\ Shao Jiang, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Chinese 
Government Silences Activists Ahead of Shanghai World Expo,'' 29 April 
10.
    \60\ Jerome A. Cohen and Yu-Jie Chen, ``Prisoner in His Own Home: 
The Plight of a `Rights Lawyer' Under Illegal House Arrest Reflects 
Beijing's Fear of Dissent,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 10 June 
10.
    \61\ Ibid.
    \62\ Shao Jiang, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Chinese 
Government Silences Activists Ahead of Shanghai World Expo,'' 29 April 
10.
    \63\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Beijing Dissidents 
Cha Jianguo and Gao Hongming's Movement Restricted'' [Beijing yiyi 
renshi cha jianguo, gaohongming bei xianzhi ziyou], 31 January 10.
    \64\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing Weekly July 14-19, 2010,'' 20 July 10.
    \65\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 39; Dui Hua 
Foundation, Reference Materials on China's Criminal Justice System, 
Vol. 2, June 09, iv; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 36-37; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Re-Education through Labor 
Abuses Continue Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue,'' 4 February 09, 4.
    \66\ Bureau of Reeducation Through Labor Administration, ``A Brief 
Description of the Reeducation through Labor System'' [Laodong jiaoyang 
zhidu jianjie], Legal Info (Online), 18 May 10.
    \67\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Re-Education 
through Labor Abuses Continue Unabated: Overhaul Long Overdue,'' 4 
February 09.
    \68\ ``Sun Fuquan Sent to Reeducation though Labor for 
Disseminating Truth About June 4'' [Sun fuquan yin chuanbo ``liu si'' 
zhenxiang bei laojiao], 23 October 09.
    \69\ Ou Yangqing, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Shanghai Activist Jian-Fang Chen's RTL Decision,'' 2 May 10.
    \70\ Xiaorong Li and Zhang Zuhua, Charter 08 (Hong Kong: Open 
Books, 2009), 319.
    \71\ ``China To Speed Up Legislation on Reforming Reeducation 
through Labor System,'' Xinhua (Online), 10 March 10.
    \72\ In April and May 2010, prominent Chinese legal scholars Jiang 
Ming'an, a professor at Peking University Law School, and Yu Jianrong, 
Chairman of the Social Issues Research Center of the Rural Development 
Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, exchanged opinion 
editorials debating the function of the reeducation through labor 
system. For more information, see Dui Hua Foundation (Online), 
``Professors Yu Jianrong and Jiang Ming'an Spar Over Future of Re-
education Through Labor,'' 9 July 10.
    \73\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``An Alleyway in Hell: China's 
Abusive `Black Jails,' '' 12 November 09, 8.
    \74\ ``China Accused of Human Rights Abuses in Secret `Black 
Jails,' '' Mail (Online), 12 November 09.
    \75\ Jamil Anderlini, ``Punished Supplicants,'' Financial Times 
(Online), 5 March 09.
    \76\ Xu Zhiyong, ``A Visit to One of Beijing's `Black Jails,' '' 
Black and White Cat Blog (Online), 13 October 08.
    \77\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``An Alleyway in Hell: China's 
Abusive `Black Jails,' '' 12 November 09.
    \78\ See, e.g., Human Rights Watch (Online), ``An Alleyway in Hell: 
China's Abusive `Black Jails,' '' 12 November 09; Gordon Ross, 
``China's Secret `Black Jails' Hold Sordid Tales of Injustice,'' Inter 
Press Service (Online), 9 July 10; John M. Glionna, ``China's `Black 
Jails' Shove Complaints Into the Dark,'' Los Angeles Times (Online), 11 
January 10; Austin Ramzy, ``New Report Released on China's `Black 
Jails,' '' Time (Online), 12 November 09; Cara Anna, ``Activist Speaks 
Out From Inside `Black Jail,' '' Associated Press, reprinted in Sydney 
Morning Herald (Online), 5 December 09; ``China Accused of Human Rights 
Abuses in Secret `Black Jails,' '' Mail Foreign Service (Online), 12 
November 09.
    \79\ ``Authorities Close Doors on Trial of Case of Li Ruirui Who 
Was Detained and Sexually Assaulted'' [Dangju bi men shenli li ruirui 
zao guanya renyuan qiangjian an], Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 November 
10.
    \80\ Wang Yan, ``Settlement Upsets `Black Jail' Victim,'' China 
Daily (Online), 12 December 09.
    \81\ ``Receivers' `Gray Industrial Chain' Achieves Scale; Seriously 
Undermines the Government's Image,'' People's Daily (Online), 24 
November 09.
    \82\ Tini Tran, ``State-Run Magazine Reports on Black Jails in 
China,'' Associated Press (Online), 23 November 09; Andrew Jacobs, ``A 
Rare Chinese Look at Secret Detentions,'' New York Times (Online), 26 
November 09; Tini Tran, ``Liaowang, State-Run Magazine, Exposes State-
Run `Black Jails' in China,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Huffington 
Post (Online), 25 November 09.
    \83\ Human Rights and the Rule of Law in China, Hearing of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 20 September 06, Testimony 
of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor of Law, New York University Law School, 
Co-Director of U.S.-Asia Law Institute.
    \84\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76.
    \85\ ``Guangxi High Court Vice-President Ou Shaoxuan Put Under 
`Shuanggui' '' [Guangxi gaoji fayuan fu yuan zhang ou shao xuan bei 
``shuanggui''], Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 October 09.
    \86\ ``Drug Officials Arrested on Bribery Charges,'' China Daily 
(Online), 19 April 10.
    \87\  Ministry of Public Security (Online), ``Ministry of Public 
Security Holds Video Conference Call To Deploy `2010 Strike Hard 
Campaign' '' [Gonganbu zhaokai dianshi dianhua huiyi bushu ``2010 yanda 
zhengzhi xingdong''], 13 June 10; Yu Lan, ``CASS: China's Violent 
Crimes Rise for the 1st Time in a Decade,'' People's Daily (Online), 25 
February 10; Alexa Olesen, ``Spiraling Violent Crime Triggers Concern 
in China,'' Associated Press (Online), 3 June 10.
    \88\ Jin Zhu, `` `Strike Hard' Campaign Targets Violent Crimes,'' 
China Daily (Online), 15 June 10.
    \89\ Ibid.
    \90\ Cara Anna, ``Former China Police Chief Gets Death in Gang 
Case,'' Associated Press (Online), 14 April 10.
    \91\ Austin Ramzy, ``China's Dark City: Behind Chongqing's Crime 
Crackdown,'' Time (Online), 15 March 10.
    \92\ ``Justice Official Loses Death Sentence Appeal in Chongqing,'' 
China Daily (Online), 21 May 10.
    \93\ Wang Huazhong and Ma Wei, ``Convicted Ex-Top Cop Asks for 
Leniency,'' China Daily (Online), 14 May 10.
    \94\ Chinese Law Prof Blog (Online), ``Jiang Ping: `China's Rule of 
Law Is in Full Retreat,' '' 21 February 10.
    \95\ Yang Ming, ``Strike Hard Returns'' [Youjian yanda], Oriental 
Outlook (Online), 1 July 10.
    \96\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2009, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.
    \97\ ``Health of Chen Guangcheng, Imprisoned Blind Activist, in 
Danger,'' AsiaNews (Online), 16 October 09.
    \98\ ``Ill but No Medical Parole, Government Controls Fate of 
Defenders'' [You bing bu bao wai wu bing po zhuyuan zhengfu zuoyou 
weiquan zhe mingyun], Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 May 10; ``China and 
US To Discuss Human Rights as Beijing Cracks Down on Jailed 
Dissidents,'' AsiaNews (Online), 17 May 10; Human Rights in China 
(Online), ``Liver Cancer Suspected, Activist Hu Jia Seeks Medical 
Parole,'' 9 April 10.
    \99\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Writer Zhang Jianhong, 
Gravely Ill, Is Released on Medical Parole; Family Struggles To Pay for 
Treatment,'' 8 June 10.
    \100\ Measures for Carrying Out Medical Parole for Prisoners 
[Zuifan baowai jiuyi zhixing banfa], issued 31 December 90, art. 2(2); 
Human Rights in China (Online), ``Writer Zhang Jianhong, Gravely Ill, 
Is Released on Medical Parole; Family Struggles To Pay for Treatment,'' 
8 June 10.
    \101\ ``Wang Shengjun: Strictly Apply the Relevant Facts, Evidence 
and Laws in Capital Cases So as To Ensure the Quality of Trials'' [Wang 
shengjun: yan ba sixing anjian shishi guan zhengju guan falu guan 
quebao shenpan zhiliang], Xinhua (Online), 11 March 10.
    \102\ ``China Executes Thousands: Amnesty,'' Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (Online), 30 March 10.
    \103\ Bao Daozu, ``China May Drop Death Penalty for 13 Economic 
Crimes,'' China Daily (Online), 24 August 10; ``Criminal Law Draft 
Revision (8) Removes 13 Economic Crimes From Death Penalty'' [Xingfa 
xiuzheng an (ba) ni quxiao 13 ge jingji xing fei baoli fanzui sixing], 
People's Daily Network (Online), 23 August 10.
    \104\ Peter Simpson and David Williams, ``Gordon Brown Leads 
Furious Outcry as China Executes British Drugs Mule by Lethal 
Injection,'' Daily Mail (Online), 30 December 09.
    \105\ Rosa Prince, ``Akmal Shaikh Execution Leaves Sino-British 
Relations at a Low Point,'' Telegraph (Online), 30 December 09.
    \106\ ``British Citizen Akmal Shaikh Executed in China,'' Telegraph 
(Online), 29 December 09.
    \107\ ``China Calls for Steady Development of Sino-British Ties,'' 
Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times (Online), 5 January 10.
    \108\ Amnesty International (Online), ``China: British Man Facing 
Imminent Execution,'' 21 October 09.
    \109\ Cristian Segura, ``China Injects `Humanity' Into Death 
Sentence,'' Asia Times (Online), 16 December 09; Liu Ligang, ``Liaoning 
Completely Implements Death by Injection, Becomes the First Province To 
Say Goodbye to Executions by Firing Squad'' [Liao quanmian shixing 
zhushe sixing cheng quanguo shou ge gaobie ``qiangjue'' shengfen], 
Xinhua (Online), 10 December 09.
    \110\ ``Next Year Beijing Will Fully Implement Lethal Injections'' 
[Beijing ni mingnian qi quanmian shixing zhushe sixing], Global Times 
(Online), 5 November 09.

    Notes to Section II--Freedom of Religion
    \1\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 36. This section of the 
Commission's Annual Report primarily uses the expression ``freedom of 
religion'' but encompasses within this term reference to the more 
broadly articulated freedom of ``thought, conscience, and religion'' 
(see, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted 
and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 
December 48, art. 18). For protections in international law, see, e.g., 
UDHR, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by 
UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to 
``ensure the religious and moral education of . . . children in 
conformity with [the parents'] own convictions''); Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 
20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 14; Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 
November 81. See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for 
an official interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the 
ICCPR. General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, 
Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), 30 July 93, para. 1. China is a 
party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a signatory to the ICCPR. China 
signed the ICCPR in 1998. The Chinese Government has committed to 
ratifying the ICCPR and says it is taking concrete steps to prepare for 
ratification. In November 2009, a Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China 
Summit said, ``The EU welcomed China's commitment to ratifying the 
[ICCPR] as soon as possible.'' Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China 
Summit, reprinted in China Internet Information Center (Online), 30 
November 09. In October 2009, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, China's Deputy 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, said, ``At present, 
legislative, judicial and administrative reforms are under way in China 
with a view to aligning our domestic legislation with the provisions of 
the [ICCPR] and paving the way for its ratification.'' Permanent 
Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN (Online), 
``Statement by H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent 
Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Third Committee 
of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on the Implementation of 
Human Rights Instruments (Item 69A),'' 20 October 09. In its 2009-2010 
National Human Rights Action Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese 
Government stated that the ICCPR was one of the ``fundamental 
principles'' on which the plan was framed, and that the government 
``will continue legislative, judicial and administrative reforms to 
make domestic laws better linked with this Covenant, and prepare the 
ground for approval of the ICCPR.'' State Council Information Office, 
National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua 
(Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In February 2009, 
during the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review of the 
Chinese Government's human rights record, the Chinese Government 
supported recommendations made by Member States that China ratify the 
ICCPR. Chinese officials said China was in the process of amending 
domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws relating 
to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the ICCPR. 
UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working Group on 
the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, paras. 
63, 114(1).
    \2\ For more on unregistered groups in China, see, e.g., Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
International Religious Freedom Report--2009, China (includes Tibet, 
Hong Kong, and Macau), 26 October 09.
    \3\ State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ``Central 
Authorities' Decision Restructures Main Leadership Posts at State 
Administration for Religious Affairs'' [Zhongyang jueding guojia 
shiwuju zhuyao lingdao zhiwu tiaozheng], 21 September 09.
    \4\ See, e.g., ``Religious Harmony: New Frontiers in Religion 
Work'' [Zongjiao hexie: zongjiao gongzuo de xin jingjie], People's 
Daily (Online), 13 January 10; ``Senior Leader Urges Religious 
Believers To Help Promote Development, Stability,'' Xinhua (Online), 9 
February 10. For an overview of past efforts to articulate a ``positive 
role'' for religion, see ``Politburo Study Session Calls for Uniting 
Religious Communities Around Party,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, January 2008, 3.
    \5\ Wang Zuo'an, ``Strengthen Ability To Do Work on Religion'' 
[Zengqiang zuohao zongjiao gongzuo de nengli], Qiushi (Online), 1 
February 10.
    \6\ ``Forum Convenes on 5th-Year Anniversary of Implementation of 
`Regulation on Religious Affairs,' Hui Liangyu Attends and Makes 
Important Speech'' [``Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' shishi 5 zhounian 
zuotanhui zhaokai hui liangyu chuxi bing zuo zhongyao jianghua], China 
Religions (Online), 12 April 10; Regulation on Religious Affairs 
[Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05.
    \7\ See the RRA generally for provisions defining the scope of 
state control over various internal affairs of religious groups. For 
detailed analysis of specific articles, see, e.g., ``Zhejiang and Other 
Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9-10.
    \8\ The RRA conditions protections on religious groups registering 
as official organizations and registering venues with the government. 
Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 
November 04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 6, 12-15. For information on 
harassment of unregistered groups, see subsections on specific 
religious communities within this section. See also Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 
International Religious Freedom Report--2009, China (includes Tibet, 
Hong Kong, and Macau), 26 October 09.
    \9\ Hubei Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Hubei sheng 
zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 31 July 09, effective 1 October 09, 
arts. 30-35; Hainan Province Provisions on the Management of Religious 
Affairs [Hainan sheng zongjiao shiwu guanli ruogan guiding], issued 25 
September 09, effective 1 December 09, art. 10. Compare these 
provisions with those in the older regulations they replace. Hubei 
Province Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs [Hubei sheng 
zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], issued 14 January 01, effective 1 April 
01, art. 7; Hainan Province Regulation on the Management of Religious 
Affairs [Hainan sheng zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], issued 26 
September 97, effective 22 October 97 (lacking a provision on cross-
provincial movement of religious personnel that is present in the 2009 
measures that replace them). For analysis of the new regulation and 
provisions, see ``Three Provinces Issue New or Amended Regulations on 
Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 9 
December 09, 4. In addition, in 2010, the Guangdong province People's 
Congress Standing Committee amended its 2000 regulation on religious 
affairs. Guangdong Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Guangdong 
sheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 June 00 as the Guangdong 
Province Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs [Guangdong 
sheng zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], amended and name changed on 22 
January 10, effective 1 March 10.
    \10\ Measures on the Supervision and Management of Financial 
Affairs of Venues for Religious Activities (Trial) [Zongjiao huodong 
changsuo caiwu jiandu guanli banfa (shixing)], issued 11 January 10, 
effective 1 March 10.
    \11\ See analysis in ``New Measures Regulate Financial Affairs of 
Venues for Religious Activities,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 3. For provisions articulating broad 
oversight of venues and as well as protection for the sites, see 
Measures on the Supervision and Management of Financial Affairs of 
Venues for Religious Activities (Trial) [Zongjiao huodong changsuo 
caiwu jiandu guanli banfa (shixing)], issued 11 January 10, effective 1 
March 10, arts. 6, 7.
    \12\ Measures on the Supervision and Management of Financial 
Affairs of Venues for Religious Activities (Trial) [Zongjiao huodong 
changsuo caiwu jiandu guanli banfa (shixing)], issued 11 January 10, 
effective 1 March 10, art. 2.
    \13\ State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues 
Concerning the Management of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic 
Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng waihui guanli youguan wenti 
de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10, art. 8(3).
    \14\ This section pertains to what official sources refer to as 
``Buddhism in the Han tradition,'' an inaccurate umbrella term that 
encompasses all schools of Buddhism in China, aside from the Tibetan 
tradition. ``Buddhism in the Han tradition'' (hanchuan fojiao) is 
inaccurate in religious terms. Buddhists divide themselves according to 
a number of traditions, ritual practices, and schools of thought, but 
not in purely ethnic terms. It is also worth noting that with the 
possible exception of the Chan school of Buddhism, there is arguably no 
true ``Han tradition'' of Buddhism. All non-Chan schools of Buddhism in 
China can be clearly traced to Indian sources. In addition, there are 
Chinese citizens belonging to officially recognized ``ethnic minority'' 
groups, such as the Dai, that practice Theravada Buddhism--a branch of 
Buddhism completely outside of what Chinese officials mean by the ``Han 
tradition'' (non-esoteric Mahayana Buddhism--a branch of Buddhism of 
Indian origin as practiced by non-Tibetans).
    \15\ Constitution of the Buddhist Association of China [Zhongguo 
fojiao xiehui zhangcheng], enacted 18 September 02, art. 3; Regulation 
on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, 
effective 1 March 05, arts. 6, 27-29.
    \16\ See the discussion of the legal framework for religion in 
China in the Introduction of this section for more information.
    \17\ See, e.g., case studies from ``China--Taoist, Buddhist 
Associations' Websites Suggest Constraints,'' Open Source Center, 23 
November 09.
    \18\ Buddhism Online (Online), ``Director Wang Zuo'an's Remarks at 
the Eighth National Conference of the Buddhist Association of China'' 
[Wang zuo'an ju zhang zai zhongguo fojiao xiehui di ba ci quanguo 
daibiao huiyi shang de jiang hua], 2 February 10.
    \19\ Ibid.
    \20\ See, e.g., Mashang Party Committee and Mashang People's 
Government, Mashang Work Summary for First Half of 2009 and Work Plan 
for Second Half of 2009 [Mashang zhen 2009 nian shangbannian gongzuo 
zongjie ji xiabannian gongzuo dasuan], 25 December 09; Qidong Municipal 
Anti-Cult Association (Online), ``Introduction to Anti-Cult Knowledge 
in 2010'' [2010 nian fanxiejiao zhishi jieshao], 4 June 10.
    \21\ Ministry of Public Security, Circular on Several Issues With 
Designating and Banning Cult Organizations [Guanyu rending he qudi 
xiejiao zuzhi ruogan wenti de tongzhi], issued 30 April 00.
    \22\ See, e.g., Changsha Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Bureau, Circular Regarding the Breakdown of the Changsha Municipal 
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau's Official Law Enforcement Powers 
[Guanyu changsha shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju zhifa zhiquan fenjie de 
tongzhi], issued 1 December 09; Changshu Municipal Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Bureau, 2009 Work Summary and Focal Points of 2010 Work [2009 
niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo zhongdian], 17 November 09; 
Wuxi Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Wuxi City 
Propaganda Manual for Governance of Unapproved Sites (Temples) [Wuxi 
shi weijing pizhun changsuo (simiao) zhili gongzuo xuanchuan shouce], 
19 October 09; Wuzhong District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 
District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work Summary and 2010 
Work Plans [Qu minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu 
gongzuo dasuan], 22 December 09; Yangzhou Religious Affairs Bureau, 
``Jiangdu Television Station Special Exposes Tricks of Fake Monks and 
Fake Daoist Priests'' [Jiangdu dianshitai zhuanti jiechuan jia seng jia 
dao de pianshu], reprinted in Yangzhou Municipal People's Government 
(Online), 2 June 10; Zetan Township Communist Party Committee, Circular 
Regarding Investigation Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, 
Taoists, Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, 
yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], 
issued 15 September 09.
    \23\ See, e.g., Wuxi Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, 
Wuxi City Propaganda Manual for Governance of Unapproved Sites 
(Temples) [Wuxi shi weijing pizhun changsuo (simiao) zhili gongzuo 
xuanchuan shouce], 19 October 09; Wuzhong District Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Bureau, District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work 
Summary and 2010 Work Plans [Qu minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie 
ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 22 December 09.
    \24\ See, e.g., Changsha Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Bureau, Circular Regarding the Breakdown of the Changsha Municipal 
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau's Official Law Enforcement Powers 
[Guanyu changsha shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju zhifa zhiquan fenjie de 
tongzhi], issued 1 December 09; Changshu Municipal Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Bureau, 2009 Work Summary and Focal Points of 2010 Work [2009 
niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo zhongdian], 17 November 09; 
Wuzhong District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, District Ethnic 
and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Plans [Qu 
minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 
22 December 09; Zetan Township Communist Party Committee, Circular 
Regarding Investigation Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, 
Taoists, Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, 
yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], 
issued 15 September 09.
    \25\ ``The Flower of Ethnic Unity Is in Full Bloom, Religion Has 
Stepped Onto the Harmonious Path'' [Minzu shengkai tuanjie hua, 
zongjiao tashang hexie lu], People's Daily (Online), 1 September 09.
    \26\ See, e.g., Changshu Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Bureau, 2009 Work Summary and Focal Points of 2010 Work [2009 niandu 
gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo zhongdian], 17 November 09; 
Wuzhong District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, District Ethnic 
and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Plans [Qu 
minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 
22 December 09.
    \27\ Wuxi Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, Wuxi City 
Propaganda Manual for Governance of Unapproved Sites (Temples) [Wuxi 
shi weijing pizhun changsuo (simiao) zhili gongzuo xuanchuan shouce], 
19 October 09.
    \28\ Estimates of the size of China's Catholic community vary 
widely, and there are large discrepancies between Chinese Government 
estimates and foreign media estimates. For example, senior Party leader 
Jia Qinglin has estimated the Catholic population at 4 million, 
although it is unclear whether or not his estimate applies to both 
registered and unregistered Catholics. Bao Daozu, ``Religion `Can 
Promote Harmony,' '' China Daily (Online), 4 March 08. Foreign media 
estimates range from 6 to over 12 million. See, e.g., Ambrose Leung, 
``Tsang Had Audience With Pope but Cancelled,'' South China Morning 
Post (Online), 26 March 10; ``Cardinal for China,'' Wall Street Journal 
(Online), 16 April 09; James Pomfret, ``New Hong Kong Bishop Pressures 
China on Religious Freedom,'' Reuters (Online), 16 April 09.
    \29\ For information on the history of this policy, see CECC, 2006 
Annual Report, 20 September 06, 87.
    \30\ See CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 96-97, for 
information on coercion to participate in bishop appointments in 
previous years.
    \31\ Ambrose Leung, ``Beijing and Vatican Focus on Long-Term 
Future,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 1 November 09; U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2010 Annual Report, May 
2010, 109.
    \32\ Examples of bishops approved by both the CPA and the Holy See 
this year include Bishop Cai Bingrui of the Xiamen diocese in Fujian 
province, Bishop Meng Qinglu of the Hohhot diocese in the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR), Bishop Shen Bin of the Haimen 
diocese in Jiangsu province, Bishop Du Jiang of the Bameng diocese in 
the IMAR, and Bishop Han Yingjin of the Sanyuan diocese in Shaanxi 
province. ``Church Communities Welcome Xiamen Bishop,'' Union of 
Catholic Asian News (Online), 10 May 10; Tom Mitchell, ``China Ordains 
Bishops Backed by the Vatican,'' Financial Times (Online), 10 May 10; 
``Haimen Bishop Ordained With Papal Mandate,'' Union of Catholic Asian 
News (Online), 21 April 10; Wang Zhicheng, ``Bishop Placed Under House 
Arrest for Refusing To Co-Celebrate Mass With Excommunicated Bishop,'' 
AsiaNews (Online), 8 April 10; ``Fourth China Bishop Ordained This 
Year,'' Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 24 June 10.
    \33\ Ankang Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs (Online), ``Liu 
Bainian, Vice-Chair of the China Catholic Patriotic Association, Visits 
Ankang To Inspect and Guide Catholic Work'' [Zhongguo tianzhujiao aiguo 
hui fu zhuxi liu bainian lai an jiancha zhidao tianzhujiao gongzuo], 20 
January 10.
    \34\ See, e.g., ``Study Deeply and Implement the Spirit of the 2010 
National Meeting for Work on Religion'' [Shenru xuexi guanche 2010 nian 
quanguo zongjiao gongzuo huiyi jingshen], China Religion (Online), 3 
March 10; Guangdong Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (Online), 
``Zhongshan Municipal Catholic Patriotic Association Convenes Second 
Representative Assembly'' [Zhongshan shi tianzhujiao aiguo hui zhaokai 
di er jie daibiao da hui], 20 January 10; Li Yi, Songjiang District 
Religious and Ethnic Affairs Bureau, ``Our District's Third 
Representative Assembly of Catholics Convenes'' [Wo qu tianzhujiao di 
san ci daibiao huiyi zhaokai], reprinted in Songjiang District United 
Front Work Department (Online), 18 January 10.
    \35\ See, e.g., Qujiang People's Government, Program Regarding the 
Implementation of Investigations into the Basic Situation for 
Buddhists, Taoists, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, 
tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha shishi fang'an], 8 January 10; 
Taijiang District People's Government, Taijiang District Ethnic and 
Religious Affairs Bureau's 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Ideas 
[Taijiang qu minzongju 2009 nian gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo 
silu], 15 January 10; Zetan Township Communist Party Committee, 
Circular Regarding Investigation Into the Basic Situation for 
Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, 
daojiao, yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de 
tongzhi], issued 15 September 09.
    \36\ Wang Zhicheng, ``Bishop Placed Under House Arrest for Refusing 
To Co-Celebrate Mass With Excommunicated Bishop,'' AsiaNews (Online), 8 
April 10.
    \37\ Ibid.
    \38\ Michael Wines, ``Bishop Yao Liang, 87, Imprisoned in China for 
Loyalty to the Vatican, Dies,'' New York Times (Online), 6 January 10.
    \39\ Zhen Yuan, ``Underground Bishop of Xiwanzi Dies, Security 
Tightened for Funeral,'' AsiaNews (Online), 4 January 10.
    \40\ ``Over 20 Thousand Official and Underground Catholics at the 
Funeral of the Bishop of Wenzhou,'' AsiaNews (Online), 15 October 09.
    \41\ U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2010 
Annual Report, May 2010, 110.
    \42\ Bernardo Cervellera, ``In Hebei, Underground Bishop Joins 
Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association,'' AsiaNews (Online), 29 October 
09.
    \43\ See, e.g., Hebei Province Bureau of Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs, ``Hebei Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau Bulletin 
No. 16: the `Year of Cadre Work-Style Building' Activities'' [Sheng 
minzongting `ganbu zuofeng jianshe nian' huodong di 16 qi jianbao], 28 
December 09; Shandan County United Front Work Department, ``Regarding 
Thoughts on Accelerating the Socioeconomic Development of Ethnic and 
Religious Neighborhoods'' [Guanyu jiakuai minzu zongjiao qunzhong 
jujuqu jingji shehui fazhan de sikao], reprinted in Shandan County 
People's Government (Online), 20 November 09; Wuxi City Bureau of 
Ethnic and Religious Affairs, Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Report Regarding 2009 Work To Promote Administration According 
to the Law [Wuxi shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu 2009 niandu tuijin 
yifa xingzheng gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 29 December 09.
    \44\ See, e.g., Qujiang People's Government, Program Regarding the 
Implementation of Investigations Into the Basic Situation for 
Buddhists, Taoists, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, 
tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha shishi fang'an], 8 January 10; 
Shandan County United Front Work Department, ``Regarding Thoughts on 
Accelerating the Socioeconomic Development of Ethnic and Religious 
Neighborhoods'' [Guanyu jiakuai minzu zongjiao qunzhong jujuqu jingji 
shehui fazhan de sikao], reprinted in Shandan County People's 
Government (Online), 20 November 09; Taijiang District People's 
Government, Taijiang District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau's 
2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Ideas [Taijiang qu minzongju 2009 nian 
gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo silu], 15 January 10; Wuxi City 
Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and 
Religious Affairs Report Regarding 2009 Work To Promote Administration 
According to the Law [Wuxi shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu 2009 
niandu tuijin yifa xingzheng gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 29 December 09; 
Zetan Township Communist Party Committee, Circular Regarding 
Investigation Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, 
and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao 
jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 15 September 09.
    \45\ See, e.g., Qujiang People's Government, Program Regarding the 
Implementation of Investigations into the Basic Situation for 
Buddhists, Taoists, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, 
tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha shishi fang'an], 8 January 10; 
Taijiang District People's Government, Taijiang District Ethnic and 
Religious Affairs Bureau's 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Ideas 
[Taijiang qu minzongju 2009 nian gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo 
silu], 15 January 10; Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs, 
Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs Report Regarding 2009 
Work To Promote Administration According to the Law [Wuxi shi minzu 
zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu 2009 niandu tuijin yifa xingzheng gongzuo 
qingkuang baogao], 29 December 09; Zetan Township Communist Party 
Committee, Circular Regarding Investigation Into the Basic Situation 
for Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, 
daojiao, yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de 
tongzhi], issued 15 September 09.
    \46\ See, e.g., Qujiang People's Government, Program Regarding the 
Implementation of Investigations Into the Basic Situation for 
Buddhists, Taoists, and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, 
tianzhujiao jiben qingkuang diaocha shishi fang'an], 8 January 10; 
Zetan Township Communist Party Committee, Circular Regarding 
Investigation Into the Basic Situation for Buddhists, Taoists, Muslims, 
and Catholics [Guanyu kaizhan fojiao, daojiao, yisilanjiao, tianzhujiao 
jiben qingkuang diaocha gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 15 September 09.
    \47\ ``Fujian Priest Detained Over Youth Camp,'' Union of Catholic 
Asian News (Online), 11 March 10.
    \48\ ``CHINA--Another `Underground' Priest Detained,'' Union of 
Catholic Asian News (Online), 23 March 10.
    \49\ ``Baoding Bishop Explains Departure From `Underground' 
Church,'' Union of Catholic Asian News (Online), 12 November 09.
    \50\ Zhen Yuan, ``Underground Bishop: I Joined the Patriotic 
Association for the Good of the Church,'' AsiaNews (Online), 11 
November 09.
    \51\ Bernardo Cervellera, ``In Hebei, Underground Bishop Joins 
Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association,'' AsiaNews (Online), 29 October 
09.
    \52\ Ibid.
    \53\ ``Bishop Francis An Shuxin Openly Installed,'' Union of 
Catholic Asian News (Online), 9 August 10; Wang Zhicheng, ``Bishop An 
Shuxin, Former Underground Bishop Installed as Ordinary of Baoding,'' 
AsiaNews (Online), 7 August 10.
    \54\ ``Bishop Jia Zhiguo of China's Zhengding Diocese Released'' 
[Zhongguo zhengding jiaoqu jia zhiguo zhujiao huoshi], CathNews China 
(Online), 8 July 10; ``Chinese Underground Bishop Released,'' Union of 
Catholic Asian News (Online), 8 July 10; Wang Zhicheng, ``Mgr. Jia 
Zhiguo, Underground Bishop, Released After 15 Months,'' AsiaNews 
(Online), 8 July 10.
    \55\ Bernardo Cervellera, ``Police Arrest Underground Zhengding 
Bishop Jia Zhiguo,'' AsiaNews (Online), 31 March 09.
    \56\ ``Inner Mongolia, the Only Catholic Church in Ordos Demolished 
To Build a New Road,'' AsiaNews (Online), 10 June 10; ``Only Catholic 
Church in Ordos Demolished'' [E'erduosi shi weiyi de tianzhu jiaotang 
bei chai], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 June 10.
    \57\ Ibid.
    \58\ Ibid.
    \59\ For more information on the Shanghai 2010 World Expo, see 
Falun Gong in this section for more information.
    \60\ For more information, see ``China's Marian Shrines,'' AsiaNews 
(Online), 27 May 04.
    \61\ Holy See, Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI to the 
Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons, and Lay Faithful of the Catholic 
Church in the People's Republic of China, 27 May 07.
    \62\ See, e.g., Taijiang District People's Government, Taijiang 
District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau's 2009 Work Summary and 
2010 Work Ideas [Taijiang qu minzong ju 2009 nian gongzuo zongjie ji 
2010 nian gongzuo silu], 15 January 10; Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and 
Religious Affairs, Wuxi City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Report Regarding 2009 Work To Promote Administration According to the 
Law [Wuxi shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu 2009 niandu tuijin yifa 
xingzheng gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 29 December 09.
    \63\ See, e.g., ``Believers From Various Locations in the Mainland 
Answer Pope's Call To Pray for the Chinese Church'' [Dalu ge di 
xinzhong xiangying jiaozong wei zhongguo jiaohui qidao], CathNews 
China, reprinted in Catholic Online (Online), 25 May 10; ``Mainland 
Catholics Pray for China Church,'' Union of Catholic Asian News 
(Online), 24 May 10.
    \64\ See, e.g., ``Mainland Catholics Pray for China Church,'' Union 
of Catholic Asian News (Online), 24 May 10; Wang Zhicheng, ``Even in 
Persecution We Pray to Our Lady of Sheshan,'' AsiaNews (Online), 24 May 
10.
    \65\ For more information about the history of the ``strike hard'' 
campaign against Falun Gong, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 
09, 120-26.
    \66\ For more information on the teachings and practices of Falun 
Gong, see David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008).
    \67\ For more information on the events leading to the crackdown on 
Falun Gong, see Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Meditation: China's 
Campaign Against Falun Gong, January 2002, 17-43.
    \68\ Official estimates placed the number of adherents inside China 
at 30 million prior to the crackdown. Falun Gong sources estimate that 
there was twice that number. Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: the End of 
Days (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 2. In April 2009, Han 
Zhiguang, a Chinese attorney who has defended Falun Gong clients, 
reported that there remain ``huge numbers'' of practitioners in China 
and that the movement is ``expanding.'' See Malcolm Moore, ``Falun Gong 
`Growing' in China Despite 10-Year Ban,'' Telegraph (Online), 24 April 
09.
    \69\ Dafa Information Center (Online), ``Shanghai Expo Fuels Falun 
Gong Crackdown, Over 120 Abductions,'' 5 May 10; Pudong District 
People's Government (Online), ``Comrade Xu Lin's Speech to the New 
District Political-Legal Comprehensive Management Work Meeting'' [Xu 
lin tongzhi zai xinqu zhengfa zongzhi gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 
1 February 10; Pudong District People's Government (Online), ``Hangtou 
Residential Committees Launch Anti-Cult Propaganda and Education 
Activities To Welcome the World Expo'' [Hangtou juwei kaizhan ying 
shibo fan xiejiao xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong], 31 March 10; Pudong 
District People's Government (Online), ``Residential Committee Work 
Meeting on Sorting Through Unstable Factors'' [Juwei bu wending yinsu 
paimo gongzuo huiyi], 21 January 10; Shanghai Municipal People's 
Government (Online), ``Chongming County Bureau of Civil Affairs 
Launches `Welcome World Expo, Speak in a Civilized Way, Oppose Cults' 
Week of Propaganda Education Activities'' [Chongming xian minzhengju 
kaizhan `ying shibo, jiang wenming, fan xiejiao' xuanchuan jiaoyu zhou 
huodong], 2 April 10.
    \70\ Falun Dafa Information Center (Online), ``Shanghai Expo Fuels 
Falun Gong Crackdown, Over 120 Abductions,'' 5 May 10.
    \71\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 300; ClearWisdom (Online), ``Husband and Wife Sentenced to 
Prison for Practicing Falun Gong'' [Fuqi er ren tong bei panxing, 
meiman jiating lizi san], 20 January 10.
    \72\ Xu was sentenced to three years in prison in 2008, and there 
have been no reports indicating that she has been released early. For 
more information on Xu's case, see, e.g., Amnesty International 
(Online), ``China: Fear of Torture and Other Ill-Treatment/Prisoner of 
Conscience,'' 28 November 08; ``Artist Xu Na Is Sentenced to Three 
Years in Prison'' [Huajia xu na bei pan san nian tuxing], 25 November 
08; Christopher Bodeen, ``China Falun Gong Follower Receives 3-Year 
Sentence,'' Associated Press, reprinted in International Herald Tribune 
(Online), 25 November 08.
    \73\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 124-26.
    \74\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 300; ``Sentenced to Seven Years for Defending Falun Gong, 
Attorney Wang Yonghang's Family Calls for Support'' [Wei falun gong 
bianhu huoxing qi nian, lushi wang yonghang jiashu huyu guanzhu], Radio 
Free Asia (Online), 19 January 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(Online), ``Dalian Human Rights Lawyer Wang Yonghang Sentenced to Seven 
Years in Prison'' [Dalian weiquan lushi wang yonghang bei panxing 7 
nian], 5 December 09; Lucy Hornby, ``China Disbars Two Rights Defense 
Lawyers,'' Reuters (Online), 9 May 10.
    \75\ Tang Jitian said that the disbarment was ``revenge for what we 
have done. It's to scare our friends who are doing the same things. It 
has a chilling effect on them.'' Edward Wong and Xiyun Yang, ``China 
Bans Two Rights Lawyers for Life,'' New York Times (Online), 10 May 
2010. See also Lucy Hornby, ``China Disbars Two Rights Defense 
Lawyers,'' Reuters (Online), 9 May 10. The Beijing Municipal Bureau of 
Justice alleged that the two attorneys had ``disrupted the order of the 
court and interfered with the regular litigation process.'' The lawyers 
dispute the charges, and experts note that it is very unusual for 
lawyers to be disbarred in China on such charges.
    \76\ Michael Wines, ``Chinese Rights Lawyers Disappears Again,'' 
New York Times (Online), 30 April 10. For more information on Gao 
Zhisheng and the torture that he has suffered in custody, see CECC, 
2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 97-98, 125. See Section III--Access 
to Justice--Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders for more information.
    \77\ Michael Wines, ``Chinese Rights Lawyer Disappears Again,'' New 
York Times (Online), 30 April 10; Gordon Fairclough, ``Missing 
Dissident Found in Northern China,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 29 
March 10; Austin Ramzy, ``A Chinese Dissident's Mysterious 
Reappearance,'' Time Magazine (Online), 29 March 10; ``Crusading 
Chinese Lawyer Gives Up Activism,'' Associated Press (Online), 7 April 
10.
    \78\ Pudong District People's Government (Online), ``Residential 
Committee Work Meeting on Sorting Through Unstable Factors'' [Juwei bu 
wending yinsu paimo gongzuo huiyi], 21 January 10.
    \79\ Pudong District People's Government (Online), ``Comrade Xu 
Lin's Speech to the New District Political-Legal Comprehensive 
Management Work Meeting'' [Xu lin tongzhi zai xinqu zhengfa zongzhi 
gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua], 1 February 10.
    \80\ Pudong District People's Government (Online), ``Hangtou 
Residential Committees Launch Anti-Cult Propaganda and Education 
Activities To Welcome the World Expo'' [Hangtou juwei kaizhan ying 
shibo fan xiejiao xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong], 31 March 10; Shanghai 
Municipal People's Government (Online), ``Chongming County Bureau of 
Civil Affairs Launches `Welcome World Expo, Speak in a Civilized Way, 
Oppose Cults' Week of Propaganda Education Activities'' [Chongming xian 
minzhengju kaizhan ``ying shibo, jiang wenming, fan xiejiao'' xuanchuan 
jiaoyu zhou huodong], 2 April 10.
    \81\ A ``concrete demand'' is the exact phrase used by officials to 
indicate that the propaganda campaign was mandatory. Pudong District 
People's Government (Online), ``Hangtou Residential Committees Launch 
Anti-Cult Propaganda and Education Activities To Welcome the World 
Expo'' [Hangtou juwei kaizhan ying shibo fan xiejiao xuanchuan jiaoyu 
huodong], 31 March 10.
    \82\ Pudong District People's Government (Online), ``Hangtou 
Residential Committees Launch Anti-Cult Propaganda and Education 
Activities To Welcome the World Expo'' [Hangtou juwei kaizhan ying 
shibo fan xiejiao xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong], 31 March 10; Pudong 
District People's Government (Online), ``Nanmatou Road Subdistrict 
Implementation Opinion Regarding Security Defense and Mass Prevention 
Work To Welcome the World Expo'' [Nanmatou lu jiedao guanyu ying shibo 
anquan baowei qunfangqunzhi gongzuo de shishi yijian], 13 September 09; 
Tang Township People's Government (Online), 2009 Tang Township 
Comprehensive Management of Social Order Work Summary and 2010 Work 
Plan [2009 nian tang zhen shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili gongzuo zongjie ji 
2010 nian gongzuo jihua], 14 December 09; Xuhui District People's 
Government (Online), Fenglin Subdistrict 2009 Work Summary and 2010 
Work Plan [Fenglin jiedao 2009 nian gongzuo zongjie he 2010 nian 
gongzuo jihua], 19 January 10.
    \83\ Gulou District People's Government (Online), ``Wushan 
Community: Community Stability Work During the Period of the Shanghai 
World Expo'' [Wushan shequ: shanghai shibohui qijian shequ weiwen 
gongzuo], 26 April 10.
    \84\ Huang Yanwen, Shicheng County People's Government (Online), 
``Mulan Township Launches Propaganda Activities To Guard Against `Falun 
Gong' Cult Organization's Interference and Sabotage of the Shanghai 
World Expo'' [Mulan xiang kaizhan fangfan ``falun gong'' xiejiao zuzhi 
ganrao pohuai shanghai shibohui xuanjiang huodong], 22 April 10.
    \85\ For more detailed information on the 6-10 Office, see CECC, 
2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 88-90, and CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 
10 October 09, 121-123.
    \86\ Qibao Township People's Government (Online), ``Qibao Township 
Political-Legal Committee and Village and Residential Committees Sign 
Special 610 Work Responsibility Agreement'' [Qibao zhen zhengfawei yu 
cunjuwei qianding 610 zhuanxiang gongzuo zerenshu], 9 February 10.
    \87\ Tang Township People's Government (Online), 2009 Tang Township 
Comprehensive Management of Social Order Work Summary and 2010 Work 
Plan [2009 nian tang zhen shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili gongzuo zongjie ji 
2010 nian gongzuo jihua], 14 December 09.
    \88\ See, e.g., Jing'an County People's Government (Online), 
``Gaohu Launches Warning and Education Plan To Prevent `Falun Gong' 
Cult Organization From Using RMB To Carry Out Reactionary Propaganda'' 
[Gaohu zhen kaizhan fangfan ``falungong'' xiejiao zuzhi liyong renminbi 
jinxing fandong xuanchuan de jingshi jiaoyu xuanjiang huodong fang'an], 
8 January 10; Mentougou District People's Government and Party 
Committee (Online), ``Deeply Carry Out the Scientific Development 
Concept, Strongly Push Forward With Anti-Cult Work'' [Shenru guanche 
luoshi kexue fazhanguan zhashi tuijin fan xiejiao gongzuo], 8 December 
09.
    \89\ See, e.g., Jing'an County People's Government (Online), 
``Gaohu Launches Warning and Education Plan To Prevent `Falun Gong' 
Cult Organization From Using RMB To Carry Out Reactionary Propaganda'' 
[Gaohu zhen kaizhan fangfan ``falungong'' xiejiao zuzhi liyong renminbi 
jinxing fandong xuanchuan de jingshi jiaoyu xuanjiang huodong fang'an], 
8 January 10; Lishui County Office of the Leading Group for 
Administering the County by Law and Lishui County Bureau of Justice 
(Online), ``Lishui County 6-10 Office Organizes Special Study Session 
for Transformed `Falun Gong' Practitioners'' [Lishui xian 610 
bangongshi zuzhi ``falungong'' zhuanhua renyuan zhuanti xuexi], 21 
January 10; Mentougou District People's Government and Party Committee 
(Online), ``Deeply Carry Out the Scientific Development Concept, 
Strongly Push Forward With Anti-Cult Work'' [Shenru guanche luoshi 
kexue fazhanguan zhashi tuijin fan xiejiao gongzuo], 8 December 09; 
Pudong District People's Government (Online), ``Comrade Xu Lin's Speech 
to the New District Political-Legal Comprehensive Management Work 
Meeting'' [Xu lin tongzhi zai xinqu zhengfa zongzhi gongzuo huiyi shang 
de jianghua], 1 February 10.
    \90\ Ministry of Commerce, Pingjiang County Bureau of Commerce 610 
Work Report [Pingjiang xian shangwuju 610 gongzuo huibao], 27 November 
09.
    \91\ Mentougou District People's Government and Party Committee 
(Online), ``Deeply Carry Out the Scientific Development Concept, 
Strongly Push Forward With Anti-Cult Work'' [Shenru guanche luoshi 
kexue fazhanguan zhashi tuijin fan xiejiao gongzuo], 8 December 09.
    \92\ ``Wang Zuo'an: `Interpreting Scripture' and New `Wa'z' '' 
[Wang zuo'an: ``jiejing'' yu xin ``wo'erzi''], China Religions 
(Online), 7 April 10.
    \93\ ``Never Believe Vicious Language, Safeguard Ethnic Unity'' 
[Juebu qingxin eyan weihu minzu tuanjie], 4 China Muslim 33 (2009). For 
additional information on the sermon, see ``Wang Zuo'an: `Interpreting 
Scripture' and New `Wa'z' '' [Wang zuo'an: ``jiejing'' yu xin 
``wo'erzi''], China Religions (Online), 7 April 10.
    \94\ See, e.g., Lingwu Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Bureau, Concerning Summary of Work in 2009 and Main Points of Work in 
2010 [Guanyu 2009 nian gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 nian gongzuo yaodian], 
28 October 09, reprinted in Lingwu People's Government (Online), 30 
December 09; Yiyang Municipal United Front Work Department (Online), 
``Municipal Islamic Association Convenes Second Representative Assembly 
and Smoothly Changes Leadership'' [Shi yisilanjiao xiehui zhaokai di er 
ci daibiao dahui bing shunli huanjie], 21 December 09; Chengde 
Municipal United Front Work Department (Online), ``Put in Heart and 
Consolidate Strength, Advance Bravely Hand in Hand Launching New 
Dimensions in United Front Work'' [Ning xin ju li xieshou fenjin 
kaichuang tongzhan gongzuo xin jumian], 18 March 10; Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region People's Congress Standing Committee, Report 
Concerning Circumstances of Whole Region's Work on the Management of 
Religious Affairs [Guanyu quanqu zongjiao shiwu guanli gongzuo 
qingkuang de baogao], 7 April 10.
    \95\ Wulan County Communist Party Committee Organization 
Department, Report on Investigation Into Current Conditions for Venues 
for Islamic Activities in Wulan County [Wulan xian yisilanjiao huodong 
changsuo xianzhuang diaocha baogao], 18 November 09.
    \96\ See Section IV--Xinjiang for information on security 
campaigns.
    \97\ See examples in this section as well as a document defining 
``23 types of illegal religious activities,'' such as ``letting 
students pray,'' conducting certain religious practices pertaining to 
marriage and divorce, holding private religious instruction classes, 
``distorting religious doctrine,'' ``fabricating history,'' ``inciting 
religious fanaticism,'' and advocating ``Pan-Islamism'' and ``Pan-
Turkism.'' Autonomous Region Definitions Concerning 23 Kinds of Illegal 
Religious Activity [Zizhiqu guanyu 23 zhong feifa zongjiao huodong de 
jieding], 2008, arts. 3, 4, 5, 20. For information on human rights 
standards, see, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 
and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 
December 48, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 18; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 
January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to ``ensure the 
religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the 
parents'] own convictions''); Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN 
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 
September 90, art. 14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. 
See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official 
interpretation of freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. 
General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, 
and Religion (Art. 18), 30 July 93, para. 1.
    \98\ Yuan Lei, ``Nur Bekri Investigates Conditions in Hotan, Kashi, 
and Aksu,'' Xinjiang Daily, 18 August 09 (Open Source Center, 11 
September 09).
    \99\ Xiaokaiti Imin, ``Patriotic Religious Personages Should Bring 
Into Play Role of Non-Party Grassroots Cadres'' [Aiguo zongjiao renshi 
yao fahui feidang jiceng ganbu zuoyong], Tianshan Net (Online), 16 
December 09.
    \100\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government, 2009 Government 
Work Report [2009 nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao], 18 January 10.
    \101\ ``Women's Federation Undertakes Important Tasks in Promoting 
Unity and Safeguarding Stability'' [Fulian zuzhi zai cujin minzu 
tuanjie, weihu shehui wending zhong dandang zhongren], People's Daily 
(Online), 12 January 10.
    \102\ ``Xinjiang Women's Federation: Bring Into Play Role of `Half 
the Sky' in Promoting Ethnic Unity and Safeguarding Social Stability'' 
[Xinjiang fulian: zai cujin minzu tuanjie he weihu shehui wending zhong 
fahui ``banbiantian'' zuoyong], People's Daily (Online), 20 November 
09; ``Women's Federation Undertakes Important Tasks in Promoting Unity 
and Safeguarding Stability'' [Fulian zuzhi zai cujin minzu tuanjie, 
weihu shehui wending zhong dandang zhongren], People's Daily (Online), 
12 January 10. See additional analysis in ``Xinjiang Authorities 
Tighten Controls Over Muslim Women,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \103\ ``Xinjiang Women's Federation: Bring Into Play Role of `Half 
the Sky' in Promoting Ethnic Unity and Safeguarding Social Stability'' 
[Xinjiang fulian: zai cujin minzu tuanjie he weihu shehui wending zhong 
fahui ``banbiantian'' zuoyong], People's Daily (Online), 20 November 
09.
    \104\ For background on previous proposals to regulate buwi and for 
more information on these religious specialists, see ``Xinjiang 
Authorities Train, Seek To Regulate Muslim Women Religious Figures,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2.
    \105\ ``Xinjiang Women's Federation: Bring Into Play Role of `Half 
the Sky' in Promoting Ethnic Unity and Safeguarding Social Stability'' 
[Xinjiang fulian: zai cujin minzu tuanjie he weihu shehui wending zhong 
fahui ``banbiantian'' zuoyong], People's Daily (Online), 20 November 
09; ``Women's Federation Undertakes Important Tasks in Promoting Unity 
and Safeguarding Stability'' [Fulian zuzhi zai cujin minzu tuanjie, 
weihu shehui wending zhong dandang zhongren], People's Daily (Online), 
12 January 10. See additional analysis in ``Xinjiang Authorities 
Tighten Controls Over Muslim Women,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \106\ ``Firmly Capture the Cultural Battlefield for Socialist 
Thought--Summary of Autonomous Region's 2009 `Sweep Away Pornography 
and Strike Down Illegal Publications' Work'' [Laolao zhanling 
shehuizhuyi sixiang wenhua zhendi zizhiqu 2009 nian ``saohuang dafei'' 
gongzuo zongshu], Tianshan Net (Online), 19 January 10.
    \107\ Liu Qingxia, ``Urumqi Municipal Public Security Organs Track 
Down 13 Tons of Illegal Religious Books'' [Wulumuqi shi gongan jiguan 
chahuo 13 dun feifa zongjiao shuji], Xinhua (Online), 10 February 10.
    \108\ Aqsu Municipal People's Government (Online), ``Implement Six 
Big Projects To Build New Pattern in Community Work'' [Shishi liu da 
gongcheng goujian shequ gongzuo xin geju], 26 January 10.
    \109\ Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture Government, Bulletin 
Regarding Effective Construction Work [Jiguan xiaoneng jianshe gongzuo 
jianbao], 6 April 10.
    \110\ Study and Practice Activities Office, ``Kashgar District 
Deepens Study and Practice Activities for Scientific Development 
Concept'' [Kashi diqu shenru xuexi shijian kexue fazhan guan huodong], 
13 October 09.
    \111\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Government, 2009 Government 
Work Report [2009 nian zhengfu gongzuo baogao], 18 January 10. For 
reports from lower level governments, see, e.g., Hami District 
Government, Hami District 2010 Work Arrangements [Hami diqu xingshu 
2010 nian gongzuo anpai], 4 January 10; Turpan District Government, 
Turpan District Implements 2009 Notice Number 112: Notice Concerning 
Printing and Distributing ``District Administrative Office Party 
Leading Group Implementation Plan on Rectifying and Reforming Study and 
Practice Activities for Scientific Development Concept'' [Tudi xing 
2009 112 hao: guanyu yinfa ``diqu xingshu dangzu xuexi shijian kexue 
fazhan guan huodong zhenggai luoshi fang'an'' de tongzhi], 24 August 
09; Fuyun County Government (Online), ``Four Measures From Fuyun County 
Simultaneously Do Good Job of Work To Curb Scattered Pilgrimages'' 
[Fuyun xian si cuo bingju zhuahao zhizhi lingsan chaojin gongzuo], 7 
April 10; Hoboksar Mongol Autonomous County Government (Online), 
``District Convenes United Work Front Department, Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Commission Meeting on Work To Curb Scattered Pilgrimages'' 
[Diqu zhaokai tongzhan, minzong ji zhizhi lingsan chaojin gongzuo 
huiyi], 7 April 10.
    \112\ Kashgar District Personnel Bureau, 2010 Shule County 
Announcement on Publicly Recruiting Song and Dance Ensemble Performers 
[Er ling yi ling nian shule xian mianxiang shehui gongkai zhaopin 
wengongtuan biaoyan renyuan gonggao], 5 March 10; Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region Education Department, 2009 Turpan District 
Experimental Middle School Announcement on Recruiting Teachers [2009 
nian tulufan diqu shiyan zhongxue mianxiang shehui zhaopin jiaoshi 
gonggao], 11 September 09.
    \113\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the 
Protection of Minors [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu weichengnianren baohu 
tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 09.
    \114\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for 
the ``Law on the Protection of Minors'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu 
shishi ``weichengnianren baohufa'' banfa], issued 25 September 93, 
effective 25 September 93, art. 14.
    \115\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the 
Protection of Minors [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu weichengnianren baohu 
tiaoli], issued 25 September 09, effective 1 December 09, art. 34.
    \116\ See analysis in ``New Regulation in Xinjiang Appears To 
Expand Controls Over Children's Religious Freedom (Includes Update),'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2, 
and ``Draft Regulation in Xinjiang Could Strengthen Legal Prohibitions 
Over Children's Freedom of Religion,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 3.
    \117\ Ili Party Committee Organization Department (Online), 
``Strengthen Ethnic Unity Education, Uphold Harmony and Stability on 
School Campuses'' [Jiaqiang minzu tuanjie jiaoyu weihu xiaoyuan hexie 
wending], 20 May 10. For detailed information on the ``six 
forbiddens,'' see Chapchal County Government (Online), ``Compilation of 
Questions for Knowledge Contest on `Promoting Unity, Opposing 
Separatism, Upholding Stability' '' [``Zengjin tuanjie, fandui fenlie, 
weihu wending'' zhishi jingsai ti huibian], 31 August 09.
    \118\ ``New Details on Arrests,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 26 May 
10; ``4 Kids of Turghan Polat, Bulaqdadamtu Village, Are Detained'' 
[Bulaqdadamtu kentidiki turghan polatning 4 perzenti tutqun qilinghan], 
Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 May 10.
    \119\ Ibid.
    \120\ ``Police Raid Quran Group,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 June 
10; ``Police in Maralbeshi County Punished Uyghur Women'' [Maralbeshi 
nahiyisi saqchiliri uyghur ayallirini jazalidi], Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 7 June 10.
    \121\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, International Religious Freedom Report--2009, China (includes 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 26 October 09.
    \122\ Ibid.
    \123\ Christopher Bodeen, ``Fast-Growing Christian Churches Crushed 
in China,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian (Online), 10 
December 09.
    \124\ The term in Chinese is shenxue sixiang jianshe. For more 
information on theological reconstruction, see CECC, 2009 Annual 
Report, 10 October 09, 132-35, and ``Official Protestant Church 
Politicizes Pastoral Training, `Reconstructs' Theology,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \125\ In Chinese, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and the China 
Christian Council are commonly referred to as the lianghui (two 
organizations), which reflects the fact that the top leadership and 
general functions of the two often overlap.
    \126\ ``Jia Qinglin Holds New Year's Chat With Leaders of National 
Religious Organizations'' [Jia qinglin yu quanguoxing zongjiao tuanti 
fuzeren juxing yingchun zuotan], Xinhua (Online), 8 February 10.
    \127\ Ibid.
    \128\ State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ``2010 
Welcoming Spring Tea Party for Religious Figures Is Held in Beijing'' 
[2010 nian zongjiaojie renshi yingchun cha hua hui zai jing juxing], 10 
February 10.
    \129\ ``Jia Qinglin Holds New Year's Chat With Leaders of National 
Religious Organizations'' [Jia qinglin yu quanguoxing zongjiao tuanti 
fuzeren juxing yingchun zuotan], Xinhua (Online), 8 February 10.
    \130\ See, e.g., Guangdong Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission 
(Online), ``Jieyang Municipal Committee of the Three-Self Movement of 
Protestant Churches and China Christian Council Propose Activities To 
Push Forward With the Building of Harmonious Churches'' [Jieyangshi 
jidujiao lianghui changyi tuidong hexie jiaotang chuangjian huodong], 
23 December 09; Hubei Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (Online), 
``Huangshi Municipal Committee of the Three-Self Movement of Protestant 
Churches and China Christian Council Push Ahead With the Study of 
Theological Reconstruction'' [Huangshi shi jidujiao ``lianghui'' tuijin 
shenxue sixiang jianshe yantao], 1 December 09; Jiangsu Ethnic and 
Religious Affairs Commission (Online), ``Huai'an Municipal Committee of 
the Three-Self Movement of Protestant Churches and China Christian 
Council Along With County (District) TSPM Committees Conduct 2009 Work 
Assessment'' [Huai'anshi jidujiao lianghui he xian (qu) sanzijinxing 
2009 niandu gongzuo kaoping], 2 February 10; Suzhou Municipal Ethnic 
and Religious Affairs Bureau (Online), ``Suzhou Municipal Committee of 
the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Protestant Churches and China 
Christian Council Convene 2009 Summary Work and Report Meeting'' 
[Suzhoushi jidujiao lianghui zhaokai 09 niandu zongjie gongzuo ji 
shuzhi huiyi], 27 January 10. For more information, see also ``Official 
Protestant Church Politicizes Pastoral Training, `Reconstructs' 
Theology,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 
March 10, 2.
    \131\ See, e.g., ChinaAid (Online), ``Handan Officials Disrupt 
Worship Concert and Beat Christians,'' 9 January 10; ChinaAid (Online), 
``Korla Police and Farm Leaders Burn Bibles and Persecute Elderly 
Christians,'' 8 January 10; ChinaAid (Online), ``Shuozhou Pastor's Home 
Destroyed; 6 Christian Leaders Detained,'' 28 January 10; ``Fate of 
Church Members Unknown,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 January 10; 
``Nanyang Authorities Bust Theology Class, Disperse Over 30 Christian 
Students'' [Nanyang dangju chachao shenxue ban, qusan sanshi duo jidu 
tu xueyuan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 March 10; ``Suining House 
Church: Eight People Detained, Two Beaten'' [Suining jiating jiaohui ba 
ren bei kou liang ren bei da], Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 May 2010; 
Verna Yu, ``Christians' Detention Sparks Concern,'' South China Morning 
Post (Online), 11 January 10.
    \132\ See, e.g., Qian Xinan Prefectural People's Government, Qian 
Xinan Prefectural Government Report Concerning Circumstances of 
Religious Work [Qian xinan zhou renmin zhengfu guanyu zongjiao gongzuo 
qingkuang de baogao], 11 March 10; Wuxi Municipal Bureau of Ethnic and 
Religious Affairs, ``Wuxi Municipal Bureau of Ethnic and Religious 
Affairs Report Regarding 2009 Moving Forward With Administrative Work'' 
[Wuxi shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju guanyu 2009 niandu tuijin yifa 
xingzheng gongzuo qingkuang baogao], 8 April 10.
    \133\ See, e.g., Cara Anna, ``China Blocks Unregistered Church 
Service Again,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post 
(Online), 15 November 09; ``Gathering of 700 Shouwang Church Members 
Blocked'' [Shouwang jiaohui 700 jiaotu juhui shouzu], Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 9 November 09; ``Protestant Clergyman Arrested in 
Guangzhou,'' AsiaNews (Online), 11 May 10; Verna Yu, ``Police Detained 
Clergymen To Disrupt Service, Church Says,'' South China Morning Post 
(Online), 23 November 09; ``Wang Dao of Liangren Church Detained, Home 
Searched; Believers Meet for First Time at Park, Dispersed'' [Liangren 
jiaohui wang dao bei chaojia ji juliu; xintu shouci gongyuan juhui bei 
qusan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 May 10.
    \134\ Cara Anna, ``China Blocks Unregistered Church Service 
Again,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 15 
November 09; ``Gathering of 700 Shouwang Church Members Blocked'' 
[Shouwang jiaohui 700 jiaotu juhui shouzu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 
November 09.
    \135\ Verna Yu, ``Police Detained Clergymen To Disrupt Service, 
Church Says,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 23 November 09.
    \136\ Ibid.
    \137\ Ibid.
    \138\ ``Protestant Clergyman Arrested in Guangzhou,'' AsiaNews 
(Online), 11 May 10; ``Wang Dao of Liangren Church Detained, Home 
Searched; Believers Meet for First Time at Park, Dispersed'' [Liangren 
jiaohui wang dao bei chaojia ji juliu; xintu shouci gongyuan juhui bei 
qusan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 May 10.
    \139\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Wang Dao Released on Bail, Awaiting 
Trial,'' 14 June 10; ChinaAid (Online), ``Pastor Bike Visits Wang 
Dao,'' 22 June 10.
    \140\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Guangzhou Pastor Wang Dao Calls for 
Continuing Prayer To Fight'' [Guangzhou wang dao mushi huyu jixu daogao 
zhengzhan], 18 August 10; ChinaAid (Online), ``News Flash: Pastor Wang 
Dao Taken Away by Public Security Personnel Again, Released After Brief 
Detention'' [Kuai xun: wang dao mushi zai ci bei guo'an dai zou, 
duanzan kouya hou shifang], 13 August 10.
    \141\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Pastor Zhang Mingxuan and Wife 
Released'' [Zhang mingxuan mushi fufu huoshi], 15 June 10.
    \142\ ChinaAid (Online), ``By Dawn's Early Light: 400 Launch 
Violent Attack on Fushan House Church,'' 15 September 09; ``Shanxi 
Linfen Household Church Endures an Escalation in Government Pressure'' 
[Shanxi linfen jiating jiaohui shou zhengfu daya shengji], Radio Free 
Asia (Online), 21 September 09; ``Protestant Church Destroyed by Police 
in Shanxi, Dozens of Faithful Wounded,'' AsiaNews (Online), 17 
September 09.
    \143\ ChinaAid (Online), ``By Dawn's Early Light: 400 Launch 
Violent Attack on Fushan House Church,'' 15 September 09; ``Protestant 
Church Destroyed by Police in Shanxi, Dozens of Faithful Wounded,'' 
AsiaNews (Online), 17 September 09.
    \144\ Ibid.
    \145\ ChinaAid (Online), ``By Dawn's Early Light: 400 Launch 
Violent Attack on Fushan House Church,'' 15 September 09; ChinaAid 
(Online), ``Linfen Fushan Church Leaders Rushed to Trial Without 
Notice,'' 13 November 09.
    \146\ ``Protestant Church Destroyed by Police in Shanxi, Dozens of 
Faithful Wounded,'' AsiaNews (Online), 17 September 09.
    \147\ ``Shanxi Linfen Household Church Endures an Escalation in 
Government Pressure'' [Shanxi linfen jiating jiaohui shou zhengfu daya 
shengji], Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 September 09.
    \148\ Linfen City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, ``Ding 
Wenlu, Linfen Municipal Party Committee Standing Committee Member and 
Head of United Front Work Department, Inspects the City's Ethnic and 
Religious Work'' [Linfen shi wei changwei, tongzhanbu zhang ding wenlu 
diaoyan shi minzu zongjiao gongzuo], reprinted in Linfen Municipal 
People's Government (Online), 18 November 09.
    \149\ Ibid.
    \150\ Linfen City Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, ``Linfen 
Municipal Party Committee Secretary Xie Hai Stresses the Strengthening 
of Ethnic and Religious Work in Practical Ways'' [Linfen shi wei shuji 
xie hai qiangdiao yao qieshi jiaqiang minzu zongjiao gongzuo], 
reprinted in Linfen Municipal People's Government (Online), 18 November 
09.
    \151\ Ibid.
    \152\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Fushan House Church Christian Sentenced 
to 7-Years in Prison,'' 25 November 09.
    \153\ ChinaAid (Online), ``10 More Arrested After Detainees Refuse 
To Leave Without Fellow Linfen Pastor,'' 18 October 09.
    \154\ ``China Sentences 5 Church Leaders to Labor Camp,'' 
Associated Press (Online), reprinted in Washington Post, 2 December 09.
    \155\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Fushan House Church Christian Sentenced 
to 7-Years in Prison,'' 25 November 09.
    \156\ Ibid.
    \157\ Ibid.; ``Linfen Golden Lamp Church To Be Demolished After Two 
Sessions'' [Linfen jindengtang jiaotang ``lianghui'' hou jiang bei 
dangju qiangchai], Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 March 10.
    \158\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Prominent Chinese Legal Researcher 
Abruptly Dismissed for `Political Reasons,' '' 3 November 09.
    \159\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Human Rights Lawyer Banned From Entering 
Linfen Court, Barred From Travel,'' 13 July 10; ``Christians Come Under 
Attack in China,'' Toronto Star (Online), 7 August 10.
    \160\ ``China Moves Uyghur Christian Prisoner, Allows Family 
Visit,'' Compass Direct News (Online), 29 April 10.
    \161\ Ibid.; ``Second Trial for Alimjan Affirms First Ruling of 15 
Year Prison Sentence'' [Alimujiang an ershen caiding weichi yuanpan 
shiwu nian tuxing], Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 April 10.
    \162\ ``China Moves Uyghur Christian Prisoner, Allows Family 
Visit,'' Compass Direct News (Online), 29 April 10.
    \163\ Ibid.
    \164\ U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 
``Countries of Particular Concern: People's Republic of China,'' Annual 
Report 2010, May 2010, 112.
    \165\ ``Religious Rights Abuses Cited,'' Compass Direct News 
(Online), 7 May 09; ``Tortured Christian Lawyer Arrested as Officials 
Deny Abuses,'' Compass Direct News (Online), 11 February 09.
    \166\ The Chinese term is xiejiao zuzhi. In 1995, the State Council 
and the Communist Party Central Committee formally outlawed a number of 
``heretical'' or ``cult'' groups with Protestant roots. ``Selection of 
Cases From the Criminal Law: Banned Protestant Groups,'' Occasional 
Publications of the Dui Hua Foundation, No. 12, February 2003, iii. 
Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law outlaws ``using cult organizations 
to undermine the implementation of the law.'' PRC Criminal Law, enacted 
1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 
December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 
05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 300.
    \167\ Fengang Yang, ``The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion 
in China,'' 47 Sociological Quarterly 93, 106-108 (2006). It is unknown 
how many members of these groups have been arrested or detained in 
recent years, but the total has likely risen on account of the 
extensive ``anti-cult'' crackdown of the last decade. For more 
information on the scale of the anti-cult crackdown, see CECC, 2008 
Annual Report, 31 October 08, 87-93. In the 17 months prior to the July 
1999 commencement of the anti-cult crackdown, the Ministry of Public 
Security reported over 20,000 arrests of ``cult'' members from mostly 
Protestant groups. ``Selection of Cases From the Criminal Law: Banned 
Protestant Groups,'' Occasional Publications of the Dui Hua Foundation, 
No. 12, February 2003, iv.
    \168\ Ministry of Public Security, Circular on Several Issues With 
Designating and Banning Cult Organizations [Gong'an bu guanyu rending 
he qudi xiejiao zuzhi ruogan wenti de tongzhi], 30 April 00.
    \169\ The government labeled the church a ``counterrevolutionary 
group'' in 1983 and designated it a ``cult organization'' in 1995. 
``Selection of Cases From the Criminal Law: Banned Protestant Groups,'' 
Occasional Publications of the Dui Hua Foundation, No. 12, February 
2003, vii; Ministry of Public Security, Circular on Several Issues With 
Designating and Banning Cult Organizations [Gong'an bu guanyu rending 
he qudi xiejiao zuzhi ruogan wenti de tongzhi], 30 April 00.
    \170\ Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee of the Protestant 
Churches of Beijing's Fengtai District (Online), ``Promoting Harmony, 
Everyone Has a Duty'' [Cujin hexie, renren youze], 11 July 08.
    \171\ ChinaAid (Online), ``The Oppression of Linfen-Fushan Church 
Continues,'' 7 October 09. See Major Cases of Harassment, Detention, 
and Interference With Places of Worship in this section for more 
information.
    \172\ Ibid.
    \173\ ChinaAid (Online), ``10 More Arrested After Detainees Refuse 
To Leave Without Fellow Linfen Pastor,'' 18 November 09.
    \174\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Shuozhou Pastor's Home Destroyed; 6 
Christian Leaders Detained,'' 28 January 10.
    \175\ ``Five Members of House Church in Shuozhou, Shanxi Formally 
Arrested'' [Shanxi shuozhou wu ming jiating jiaohui jiaoyou bei 
zhengshi daibu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 2 February 10.
    \176\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Christians in Shangqiu, Henan Including 
Gao Jianli Bring Suit Against RTL Committee, Rejected'' [Henan shangqiu 
jidutu gao jianli deng su laojiao wei bei bohui], 3 August 10; ChinaAid 
(Online), ``Court Upholds Decision Sentencing Two Henan Christians,'' 3 
August 10.
    \177\ Ibid.
    \178\ The word ``Taoism'' and its derivatives are also often 
spelled with a ``D'' instead of a ``T,'' e.g., ``Daoism'' or 
``Daoist.''
    \179\ Article 3 of the Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) 
Constitution says that the State Administration for Religious Affairs 
is the ``administrative unit in charge of'' the CTA. Constitution of 
the Chinese Taoist Association [Zhongguo daojiao xiehui zhangcheng], 
enacted 24 June 05, art. 3.
    \180\ See, e.g., case studies from ``China-Taoist, Buddhist 
Associations' Websites Suggest Constraints,'' Open Source Center, 23 
November 09.
    \181\ Chinese Taoist Association (Online), ``Chinese Taoist 
Association's Eighth National Conference Convenes in Beijing'' 
[Zhongguo daojiao xiehui di ba ci quanguo daibiao huiyi zai jing 
kaimu], 22 June 10.
    \182\ See, e.g., Changsha Municipal Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Bureau, Circular Regarding the Breakdown of the Changsha Municipal 
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau's Official Law Enforcement Powers 
[Guanyu changsha shi minzu zongjiao shiwu ju zhifa zhiquan fenjie de 
tongzhi], 1 December 09; Wuzhong District Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Bureau (Online), District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work 
Summary and 2010 Work Plans [Qu minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie 
ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 22 December 09.
    \183\ See, e.g., Wuxi Municipal Park Administration Center, 
Opinions Regarding Doing Religious Safety and Stability Work Well 
During the Shanghai 2010 World Expo [Guanyu zuohao shibo qijian 
zongjiao anquan wending gongzuo de yijian], 17 April 10; Wuzhong 
District Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, District Ethnic and 
Religious Affairs Bureau 2009 Work Summary and 2010 Work Plans [Qu 
minzong ju 2009 niandu gongzuo zongjie ji 2010 niandu gongzuo dasuan], 
22 December 09.
    \184\ Wuxi Municipal Park Administration Center, Opinions Regarding 
Doing Religious Safety and Stability Work Well During the Shanghai 2010 
World Expo [Guanyu zuohao shibo qijian zongjiao anquan wending gongzuo 
de yijian], 17 April 10.
    \185\ Provisions on the Management of the Religious Activities of 
Foreigners Within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren 
zongjiao huodong guanli guiding], issued 31 January 94, effective 31 
January 94, art. 4; Detailed Implementing Rules for the Provisions on 
the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners Within the PRC 
[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao huodong guanli 
guiding shishi xize], issued 26 September 00, effective 26 September 
00, arts. 7, 17(5).
    \186\ The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Online), 
``Statement From the First Presidency,'' 30 August 10; The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Online), ``Church in Talks To 
`Regularize' Activities in China,'' 30 August 10.
    \187\ Heilongjiang Regulation on the Management of Religious 
Affairs [Heilongjiangsheng zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], issued 12 
June 97, effective 1 July 97, art. 2; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
Implementing Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious 
Activity [Nei menggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli shishi 
banfa], issued 23 January 96, effective 23 January 96, art. 2.
    \188\ ``An Orthodox View,'' Global Times (Online), 4 January 10.
    \189\ Department for External Church Relations of the Russian 
Orthodox Church (Online), ``Talks on Russian-Chinese Relations in 
Religious Sphere Held in Beijing,'' 17 November 09; State 
Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ``Vice-Director Jiang 
Jianyong Sees Delegation From the Presidential Council for Cooperation 
With Religious Organizations'' [Jiang jianyong fujuzhang huijian eluosi 
zongtong zhishu de zongjiao tuanti hezuo weiyuanhui daibiaotuan 
yixing], 18 November 09.
    \190\ For detailed information, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 
October 09, 141.

    Notes to Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights
    \1\ See generally PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, enacted 31 May 
84, effective 1 October 84, amended 28 February 01.
    \2\ Ibid., preamble.
    \3\ See discussion within for more information on restrictions on 
ethnic minority rights in China. For a detailed discussion of the 
relevant domestic legal framework, see Special Focus for 2005: China's 
Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law in CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 13-23. 
Regarding international human rights standards, see, e.g., the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by UN 
General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2, 7; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 26, 27; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 
January 76, art. 2(2); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN 
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 
September 90, arts. 2(1), 30. See generally International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), adopted 
and opened for signature and ratification by UN General Assembly 
resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 65, entry into force 4 January 69. 
Article 1(1) of CERD defines racial discrimination to mean ``any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of 
public life.'' China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a 
signatory to the ICCPR. China signed the ICCPR in 1998. The Chinese 
Government has committed to ratifying the ICCPR and says it is taking 
concrete steps to prepare for ratification. In November 2009, a Joint 
Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit said, ``The EU welcomed China's 
commitment to ratifying the [ICCPR] as soon as possible.'' Joint 
Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, reprinted in China Internet 
Information Center (Online), 30 November 09. In October 2009, 
Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, said, ``At present, legislative, judicial and 
administrative reforms are under way in China with a view to aligning 
our domestic legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and paving 
the way for its ratification.'' Permanent Mission of the People's 
Republic of China to the UN (Online), ``Statement by H.E. Ambassador 
Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United 
Nations, at the Third Committee of the 64th Session of the General 
Assembly on the Implementation of Human Rights Instruments (Item 
69A),'' 20 October 09. In its 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action 
Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese Government stated that the ICCPR 
was one of the ``fundamental principles'' on which the plan was framed, 
and that the government ``will continue legislative, judicial and 
administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this 
Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.'' State 
Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China 
(2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In 
February 2009, during the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic 
Review of the Chinese Government's human rights record, the Chinese 
Government supported recommendations made by Member States that China 
ratify the ICCPR. Chinese officials said China was in the process of 
amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws 
relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the 
ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, 
paras. 63, 114(1).
    \4\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, art. 27.
    \5\ For a discussion of longstanding controls over how ethnic 
groups may express their ethnicity, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 
October 09, 147.
    \6\ Due to imprecision that can be engendered in the translation 
process, some scholars writing in English choose to leave the term 
minzu untranslated. See, e.g., Gardner Bovingdon, ``Autonomy in 
Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent,'' East-
West Center Washington 2004, Policy Studies 11, 49 (endnote 4); 
Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in 
Northwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), xx-
xxv. This section uses ``ethnic minorities'' both to refer to the 
status of such groups as defined in international human rights 
instruments and in reference to China's categorizations of shaoshu 
minzu. While recognizing the challenges of translating the term, this 
section follows the Chinese Government's and media's current use of 
``ethnicity'' when referring to minzu in English-language publications 
and in the official name of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission (guojia 
minzu shiwu weiyuanhui).
    \7\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on Ethnic Policy, 
China Daily (Online), 27 September 09. For other examples defending 
state policy, see, e.g., Choi Chi-Yuk, ``Policies Not To Blame for 
Rioting, Official Says,'' South China Morning Post, 22 July 09 (Open 
Source Center, 22 July 09); ``FYI--CCTV-4 Live Coverage of PRC State 
Council Press Conference on Ethnic Policy,'' Open Source Center, 21 
July 09; ``Chinese Vice Premier Stresses Ethnic Unity,'' China Daily, 
22 December 09 (Open Source Center, 22 December 09); ``Sita: Our 
Country's Regional Ethnic Autonomy System Is a Success'' [Sita: woguo 
de minzu quyu zishi zhidu shi chenggong de], People's Daily, reprinted 
in United Front Work Department (Online), 8 March 10; ``Hui Liangyu 
Stresses at Plenary Session of State Ethnic Affairs Commission Going a 
Step Further To Ramp Up the Foundation of Ethnic Work and Promote Great 
Unity for All Ethnic Groups and Accelerated Development in Ethnic 
Areas'' [Hui liangyu zai guojia minwei weiyuan quanti huiyi shang 
qiangdiao jinyibu hangshi minzu gongzuo de jichu cujin ge minzu 
datuanjie he minzu diqu jiakuai fazhan], Xinhua, reprinted in State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), 21 December 10.
    \8\ For general statements, see, e.g., ``Absolute Equality for All 
Ethnicities Is the Cornerstone of China's Ethnic Policy'' [Ge minzu 
yilu pingdeng shi zhongguo minzu zhengce de jishi], Seeking Truth 
(Online), 16 November 09; Central Propaganda Bureau and State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission, Outline Concerning Propaganda and Education on the 
Party and State's Ethnic Policy [Dang he guojia minzu zhengce xuanchuan 
jiaoyu tigang], 5 February 09 (estimated date). For more information on 
official statements blaming events in Tibet in 2008 and in the XUAR in 
2009 on overseas ``hostile forces,'' see, e.g., CECC, 2008 Annual 
Report, 31 October 08, 185-186; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 
09, 249.
    \9\ See, e.g., ``Views of Beijing Experts on `Xinjiang' Ethnic 
Relations Issue'' [Bengdiki mutexessislerning `shinjang'diki milletler 
munasiwiti mesilisi heqqidiki qarashliri], Radio Free Asia (Online), 17 
November 09; ``Prominent Tibetan Communist Yangling Dorje's Critique of 
China's Ethnic and Religious Affairs Policy,'' Tibetan Culture Net, 31 
December 09 (Open Source Center, 7 January 10); Raymond Li, ``Delegate 
Dares To Challenge Official Policy on Xinjiang,'' South China Morning 
Post, 9 March 10 (Open Source Center, 9 March 10).
    \10\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on Ethnic 
Policy, China Daily (Online), 27 September 09.
    \11\ See the following documents issued in 2008 and 2009: Central 
Propaganda Bureau and State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Outline 
Concerning Propaganda and Education on the Party and State's Ethnic 
Policy [Dang he guojia minzu zhengce xuanchuan jiaoyu tigang], 5 
February 09 (estimated date); Ministry of Education and State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission, Guiding Program on Ethnic Unity Education in 
Schools (Trial) [Xuexiao minzu tuanjie jiaoyu zhidao gangyao 
(shixing)], issued 26 November 08. For analysis, see CECC, 2009 Annual 
Report, 10 October 09, 145-146.
    \12\ ``CPC Vows To Crack Down on `Ethnic Separatist Activities,' '' 
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 18 September 09; Jia Nan, 
``State Ethnic Affairs Commission: Stress Great Efforts in 2010 in 
Implementation of Ethnic Policy and Blazing Trails'' [Guojia minwei: 
2010 nian tuchu zhuahao minzu zhengce luoshi he chuangxin deng], 
Xinhua, reprinted in PRC Central People's Government (Online), 24 
December 09; State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), ``Central 
Propaganda Bureau, United Front Work Department, and State Ethnic 
Affairs Commission Put Forth `Opinion on Further Launching Activities 
To Establish Ethnic Unity and Progress' '' [Zhongyang xuanchuanbu, 
zhongyang tongzhanbu, guojia minwei chutai ``guanyu jinyibu kaizhan 
minzu tuanjie jinbu chuangjian huodong de yijian''], 4 March 10; 
Central Propaganda Bureau, United Front Work Department, and State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission, Opinion on Further Launching Activities To 
Establish Ethnic Unity and Progress [Guanyu jinyibu kaizhan minzu 
tuanjie jinbu chuangjian huodong de yijian], issued 1 February 10.
    \13\ See, e.g., Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Education 
Department Opinion on Further Strengthening Implementation of Ethnic 
Unity Propaganda and Education Activities in All Levels and Types of 
Schools Throughout the Region [Neimenggu zizhiqu jiaoyuting guanyu zai 
quanqu geji gelei xuexiao jinyibu jiaqiang minzu tuanjie xuanchuan 
jiaoyu huodong de shishi yijian], issued 9 September 09; ``Beijing To 
Drive Ahead Wholeheartedly With `Five Enters' Project for Ethnic Unity 
Education [Beijing jiang quanli tuijin minzu tuanjie jiaoyu ``wu jin'' 
gongcheng], China Ethnicities News (Online), 19 January 10; Qingdao 
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau, ``Qingdao Drafts `Opinion on 
Carrying Out in Deep-Going Way Ethnic Unity Propaganda and Education 
Activities' '' [Qingdao shi zhiding ``guanyu shenru kaizhan minzu 
tuanjie xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong de yijian''], reprinted in State 
Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), 18 January 10; ``Highlights: 
Reports on Ethnic Stability Issues in PRC Provinces 1 Dec 09-28 Feb 
10,'' Open Source Center, 30 March 10.
    \14\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. III(1).
    \15\ Yu Xiaojie, ``Uphold a People-Centered Approach and Revel in 
the Light of Human Rights--Roundup at the Midpoint of the `National 
Human Rights Action Plan (2009-2010),' '' Xinhua, 4 December 09 (Open 
Source Center, 13 December 09).
    \16\ State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Opinion on Improving Work on 
the Management of Ethnic Minority Languages [Guojia minwei guanyu zuo 
hao shaoshu minzu yuyan wenzi guanli gongzuo de yijian], issued 14 May 
10; Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, Outline of 
National Plan for Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and Development 
(2010-2020) [Guojia zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua 
gangyao], issued 29 July 10. For a summary of aspects of the July plan, 
see ``China Vows Stronger Support for Education for Ethnic Minority 
Groups,'' Xinhua (Online), 30 July 10.
    \17\ State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Opinion on Improving Work on 
the Management of Ethnic Minority Languages [Guojia minwei guanyu zuo 
hao shaoshu minzu yuyan wenzi guanli gongzuo de yijian], issued 14 May 
10, art. 2(5); Communist Party Central Committee and State Council, 
Outline of National Plan for Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and 
Development (2010-2020) [Guojia zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan 
guihua gangyao], issued 29 July 10, art. 27.
    \18\ See Section IV--Xinjiang for more information as well as, 
e.g., Ben Blanchard, ``Tibetans' Mother Tongue Faces Tide of Chinese,'' 
Reuters, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 13 July 10.
    \19\ See, e.g., Human Rights in China (Online), ``China: Minority 
Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tensions,'' 2007, 22-24; Keith B. 
Richburg, ``China's Push To Develop Its West Hasn't Closed Income Gap 
With East, Critics Say,'' Washington Post (Online), 29 June 10. See 
also CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263-64, 282-88.
    \20\ See, e.g., ``Premier Wen Says China Will Continue Developing 
Western Region,'' Xinhua (Online), 16 October 09; ``Chinese Leaders 
Call for More Efforts To Develop West,'' Xinhua (Online), 6 July 10; 
``100 Billion To Go to Poorer West China,'' China Daily (Online), 7 
July 10; Lan Xinzhen, ``What's Best for the West,'' Beijing Review, 19 
July 10 (Open Source Center, 20 July 10).
    \21\ ``Transcript of Interview With Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region Assistant Chairman, Public Security Department Head Zhao 
Liping'' [Neimeng zizhiqu zhuxi zhuli, gongan tingzhang zhao liping 
fangtan wenzi shilu], People's Daily, reprinted in Police Net (Online), 
4 December 09.
    \22\ Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Education Department, Opinion 
on Further Strengthening Implementation of Ethnic Unity Propaganda and 
Education Activities in All Levels and Types of Schools Throughout the 
Region [Neimenggu zizhiqu jiaoyuting guanyu zai quanqu geji gelei 
xuexiao jinyibu jiaqiang minzu tuanjie xuanchuan jiaoyu huodong de 
shishi yijian], issued 9 September 09.
    \23\ For general information, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 
10 October 09, 149. For reports from the past year, see, e.g., Emma 
Graham-Harrison, ``China To Speed Up Clearing Nomads From Grasslands,'' 
Reuters (Online), 8 July 10; Etuokeqian Banner People's Government 
(Online), ``Etuokeqian Banner's Smooth Headway on Major Projects and 
Key Projects Pushed Forward in One Quarter'' [Eqian qi yi jidu 
zhongdian tuijin de zhongyao xiangmu ji zhongdian xiangmu jinzhan 
shunli], 19 April 10; ``Ordos City Prohibits Wholesale Transfer of 
Population in Development Zone, Transfer Carried Out in Orderly [Way]'' 
[E'erduosi shi jinzhi kaifaqu renkou zhengti banqian zhuanyi youxu 
tuijin], Xinhua (Online), 13 October 09; ``China Spends 6.5 Bln Yuan 
Protecting Northern Grasslands,'' Xinhua (Online), 7 December 09.
    \24\ Gregory Veeck and Charles Emerson, ``Develop the West 
Assessed: Economic and Environmental Change in Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China 2000-2005,'' 25 (Nos. 1 
and 2) Asian Geographer 61 (2006) (based on information on page 13 of 
prepublication article on file with the Commission); China's Ethnic 
Regional Autonomy Law: Does It Protect Minority Rights? Staff 
Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 11 April 
05, Testimony of Christopher P. Atwood, Associate Professor, Department 
of Central Eurasian Studies, Indiana University; Dee Mack Williams, 
Beyond Great Walls (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 40-60; 
Qiu Lin, ``Scholars Urge Improving Grassland Policies,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 31 July 09.
    \25\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), 
``Principal of Mongol-Tibetan Medical School Arrested in Mongolia by 
Chinese Police,'' 19 October 09. For an account of the incident in a 
Mongolian newspaper, see ``General D. Murun Says Mongolian Police 
Helped Chinese,'' Zuunii Medee, 28 October 09, translated in Southern 
Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online).
    \26\ Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center (Online), 
``Southern Mongolian Representative to United Nations Conference 
Arrested at Beijing Airport,'' 23 April 10. Sources cited in a July 
2010 Amnesty International report conjectured that Sodmongol was held 
in detention in Chaoyang city, Liaoning province, and that the 
procuratorate was investigating the case, but officials have not 
confirmed his whereabouts, according to the report. Amnesty 
International (Online), ``Document--China: Ethnic Mongolian Activist 
Detained in China: Sodmongol,'' 15 July 10.

    Notes to Section II--Population Planning
    \1\ The population planning policy was first launched in 1979, 
canonized as a ``fundamental state policy'' in 1982, and codified as 
national law in 2002. As of 2007, 19 of China's 31 provinces--
accounting for 53.6 percent of China's population--allow rural dwellers 
to have a second child if their first child is a girl. Gu Baochang et 
al., ``China's Local and National Fertility Policies at the End of the 
Twentieth Century,'' 33 Population and Development Review 133, 138 
(2007).
    \2\ See, e.g., ``Time For Families To Have Two Children Each,'' 
China Daily (Online), 1 February 10; Liu Ming, ``Ease One-Child Policy 
and Invite Disaster,'' China Daily (Online), 1 February 10; ``Most 
People Want Two Children, Survey Says,'' China Daily (Online), 27 March 
10; Yao Yijiang, ``30 Years of Family Planning, To Change or Not To 
Change to a Two Child Policy: At a Historical Juncture, Undergoing 
Heated Debate'' [Jihua shengyu 30 nian, bian haishi bubian ertai 
zhengce: lishi guankou, zhengzai jibian], Southern Metropolitan Daily 
(Online), 17 March 10.
    \3\ For example, officials in Huanggang township (Xiushui county, 
Jiangxi province) described a family planning campaign in July 2009 
that focused on the ``two inspections and four procedures,'' (liangjian 
sishu) which refers to IUD inspections, pregnancy examinations (the two 
inspections), IUD implants, first-trimester abortions, mid-to-late term 
abortions, and sterilization (the four procedures). See Xiushui County 
Population and Family Planning Committee (Online), ``Huanggang 
Township's Statement at the Xiushui County 2009 Population and Family 
Planning Work Dispatch Meeting'' [Huanggangzhen zai 2009 nian quanxian 
renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo diaoduhui fayan], 18 June 09.
    \4\ See, e.g., in Fujian's Sha county, family planning officials 
are required to insert an IUD in women within three months of the birth 
of a first child. Sha County Zhenghu Township People's Government 
(Online), ``Recommendations Regarding Zhenghu Township's Population and 
Family Planning Work for 2009'' [Guanyu zuohao 2009 niandu zhenghu 
xiang renkou yu jihua shengyu gongzuo de yijian], 18 February 09.
    \5\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law, adopted 29 December 01, 
effective 1 September 02, art. 4. According to Article 4, officials 
``shall perform their administrative duties strictly in accordance with 
the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not 
infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.''
    \6\ CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 109; Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country 
Report on Human Rights Practices--2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong 
Kong, and Macau), 25 February 09; UN Committee against Torture, 41st 
Session, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee 
against Torture--China, CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 3-21 November 08, 12.
    \7\ For examples of the sterilization requirements, see Qiaojia 
County People's Government Circular on the Completion of 2010 
Population and Family Planning Work [Qiaojia xian renmin zhengfu guanyu 
zuohao 2010 nian renkou yu jihua shengyu gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 29 
January 10; Guangzhou Municipal Population and Family Planning Bureau 
(Online), ``Seeking Advice Regarding the Issue of Tubal Ligation'' 
[Zixun biaoti: guanyu jieza wenti], 6 July 09.
    \8\  Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2008, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 09, 6. The Beijing 
Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission clearly draws the 
link between the term remedial measures and abortion: ``early term 
abortion refers to the use of surgery or pharmaceutics to terminate a 
pregnancy before the 12th week of gestation, it is a remedial measure 
taken after the failure of contraception.'' See Beijing Municipal 
Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ``Early Term 
Abortion'' [Zaoqi rengong liuchan], 10 April 09.
    \9\ For a recent example from an urban area, see Xincun Village 
Committee's Self-Governing Regulations for Family Planning [Xincun 
cunweihui jihua shengyu zizhi zhangcheng], issued 16 January 09. For a 
recent example from a rural area, see Jiangxi Provincial Population and 
Family Planning Commission (Online), ``Anyi County Unleashes an Upsurge 
of Population and Family Planning Activities To `Welcome Three 
Festivals, Battle for 100 Days, Achieve Three Breakthroughs' '' [Anyi 
xian xianqi ``ying sanjie, zhan baitian, san tupo'' renkou jisheng 
huodong gaochao], 24 February 10.
    \10\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 108.
    \11\ The PRC Population and Family Planning Law became effective in 
2002. PRC Population and Family Planning Law, adopted 29 December 01, 
effective 1 September 02; United Nations, Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, 
Beijing, 4-15 September 95, para. 17; United Nations, Programme of 
Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, 
adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development, 
Cairo, 5-13 September 94, para. 7.2. On the concept of ``illegal 
pregnancy'' and its use in practice, see Elina Hemminki et al., 
``Illegal Births and Legal Abortions--The Case of China,'' Reproductive 
Health (Online), Vol. 2, No. 5, 11 August 05.
    \12\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 
accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, 
entry into force 2 September 81, arts. 2, 3, 16(1)(e).
    \13\ Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification, and accession by UN General Assembly 
resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, 
arts. 2, 3, 4, 6, 26.
    \14\ International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) 
of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 10(3).
    \15\ PRC Population and Family Planning Law, adopted 29 December 
01, effective 1 September 02, art. 4.
    \16\ Ibid., art. 39.
    \17\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 153-156; CECC, 2008 
Annual Report, 31 October 08, 98-99; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 
October 07, 110.
    \18\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing August 25, 2010,'' 25 August 10.
    \19\ Puning City People's Government (Online), ``Our City Starts a 
Special Operation To Sterilize Women With Two Children'' [Woshi xianqi 
erhai jieza zhuanxiang xingdong], 12 April 10; Yifeng County Circular 
Regarding the Earnest Launch of Family Planning Technical Services for 
the 2010 Spring Festival [Guanyu renzhen kaizhan 2010 nian chunji jihua 
shengyu jishu fuwu huodong de tongzhi], issued 18 March 10.
    \20\ Jiangxi Provincial Population and Family Planning Commission 
(Online), ``Anyi County Unleashes an Upsurge of Population and Family 
Planning Activities To `Welcome Three Festivals, Battle for 100 Days, 
Achieve Three Breakthroughs' '' [Anyi xian xianqi ``ying sanjie, zhan 
baitian, san tupo'' renkou jisheng huodong gaochao], 24 February 10.
    \21\ Gulou Subdistrict Office of the Echeng District People's 
Government (Online), ``Comrade Ke Yanmin's Speech to the Subdistrict 
Plenary Work Meeting for the Large-Scale Family Planning Operation for 
Spring 2010'' [Ke yanmin tongzhi zai quanjie 2010 nian jihua shengyu 
chunji daxingdong gongzuo dahui shang de jianghua], 3 March 10.
    \22\ Xincun Village Committee's Self-Governing Rules for Family 
Planning [Xincun cunweihui jihua shengyu zizhi zhangcheng], issued 16 
January 09.
    \23\ The nine provinces in which local governments produced these 
reports were, as detailed later in the paragraph: Henan, Hubei, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Anhui, Zhejiang, and Yunnan.
    \24\ For a Henan province example, see Jiyuan City Population and 
Family Planning Commission (Online), ``Our City Convenes 2010 
Population and Family Planning Work Conference on Spring Service 
Activities'' [Woshi zhaokai 2010 nian renkou he jihua shengyu ji chunji 
fuwu huodong gongzuo huiyi], 4 March 10; for a Hubei province example, 
see Yingshan County Population and Family Planning Bureau (Online), 
``Xiao Ang: By Any Means, Stabilize Low Birth Level'' [Xiao ang: 
qianfangbaiji wending di shengyu shuiping], 17 March 10; for a 
Guangdong province example, see Lechang City People's Government, 
Lechang City Circular on the Launch of Family Planning Concentrated 
Service Activities in Spring 2010 [Guanyu kaizhan 2010 nian jihua 
shengyu chunji jizhong fuwu huodong de tongzhi], issued 11 March 10; 
for a Jiangsu province example, see Suqian Municipal People's 
Government (Online), ``Stand at a New Starting Point, Seek New 
Breakthroughs, Achieve New Strides'' [Lizu xin qidian mouqiu xin tupo 
shixian xin kuayue], 18 January 10; for a Jiangxi province source, see 
PRC National Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), 
``Jiangxi: All-Province Population and Family Planning Work Conference 
Convenes in Nanchang'' [Jiangxi: quansheng renkou jisheng gongzuo huiyi 
zai nanchang zhaokai], 24 March 10.
    \25\ Panjin Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission 
(Online), ``By Any Means, Xinglongtai District Drives Population and 
Family Planning Work Into the Fast Lane'' [Xinglongtai qu qianfangbaiji 
yindao renkou jisheng gongzuo shiru `kuai chedao'], 31 March 10.
    \26\ Xingzi County People's Government (Online), ``Regarding the 
Policy on the Planned Birth of a Second Child'' [Guanyu jihua shengyu 
ertai zhengce], 1 March 10.
    \27\ ``City Cuts Fines On Second Child,'' Global Times (Online), 23 
August 10. According to the report, ``The fine for an extra child is 
based on the official measure of average annual income: 26,738 yuan 
($3,937) for an urban Beijinger and 11,986 yuan ($1,765) for a rural 
resident. Parents are fined six to 10 times that figure for a second 
baby or six to 20 times for a third or more.'' See also An Evaluation 
of 30 Years of the One-Child Policy, Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human 
Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, 10 November 09, 
Testimony of Toy Reid, Senior Research Associate, Congressional-
Executive Commission on China; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 
151-152.
    \28\ ``Famous Scholar Yang Zhizhu Fired for Challenging Family 
Planning Regulations'' [Zhuming xuezhe yang zhizhu yin tiaozhan jihua 
shengyu zhengce bei jiepin], Chinese Human Rights Defenders, reprinted 
in Boxun (Online), 6 April 10; ``Beijing Professor Yang Zhizhu Fired 
for Exceeding One-Child Policy Limit'' [Beijing jiaoshou yang zhizhu 
yin chaosheng bei jiepin], Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 April 10; ``City 
Cuts Fines On Second Child,'' Global Times (Online), 23 August 10.
    \29\ ``City Cuts Fines on Second Child,'' Global Times (Online), 23 
August 10. According to one expert quoted in this report, ``Children 
born outside State scrutiny will enjoy equal rights as the first child 
only after the family pays the fine and registers them.''
    \30\ Yan Hao and Li Yanan, ``Urban Hukou, or Rural Land? Migrant 
Workers Face Dilemma,'' China Daily (Online), 10 March 10; Tao Ran, 
``Where There's a Will, There's a Way To Reform,'' China Daily 
(Online), 22 March 10.
    \31\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2009, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.
    \32\ See CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 155. The 
Commission analyzed local government reports which show targeting of 
migrant workers in Zhejiang and Yunnan provinces. As this section 
details, the Commission has examined such reports in the 2010 reporting 
year issued by local governments in Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, 
Shandong, and Fujian provinces as well as a central-level directive 
that applies to all governments within the following provincial-level 
jurisdictions: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Liaoning, 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Henan, Shandong, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region.
    \33\ The implementation plan defines the Bohai Region as 
encompassing the following provincial-level jurisdictions: Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Henan, 
Shandong, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. PRC National 
Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), ``Bohai Rim 
Floating Population Family Planning Region's `Chess Board' Work 
Implementation Plan'' [Huan bohai liudong renkou jihua shengyu quyu `yi 
pan qi' gongzuo shishi fang'an], 11 April 10.
    \34\ PRC National Population and Family Planning Commission 
(Online), ``Bohai Rim Floating Population Family Planning Region's 
`Chess Board' Work Implementation Plan'' [Huan bohai liudong renkou 
jihua shengyu quyu `yi pan qi' gongzuo shishi fang'an], 11 April 10.
    \35\ Fuzhou Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission 
(Online), ``Ten Floating Population Family Planning Regions at the 
District and County Levels in Fuzhou Municipality and Shanghai 
Municipality Hold a Signing Ceremony for a Cooperation Agreement in 
Shanghai'' [Fuzhou shi yu shanghai shi shi quxian liudong renkou jihua 
shengyu quyu xiezuo qianyue yishi zai shanghai juxing], 16 March 10.
    \36\ Zhoushi Town Opinion on the Implementation of a Special Family 
Planning Rectification Operation for the Floating Population [Zhoushi 
zhen liudong renkou jihua shengyu zhuanxiang zhengzhi xingdong shishi 
yijian], issued 3 June 09.
    \37\ The text of the measures specifies Anhui province as the area 
of jurisdiction, but the regulations were found by Commission staff on 
the official Web site of a municipal government in neighboring Shandong 
province. Binzhou Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, 
``Family Planning Management Measures for the Floating Population'' 
[Liudong renkou jihua shengyu guanli banfa], issued 24 December 09.
    \38\ Ibid.
    \39\ Qiaojia County People's Government Circular on the Completion 
of 2010 Population and Family Planning Work [Qiaojia xian renmin 
zhengfu guanyu zuohao 2010 nian renkou yu jihua shengyu gongzuo de 
tongzhi], issued 29 January 10.
    \40\ Ibid.
    \41\ Qianxi County Population and Family Planning Bureau, Circular 
Regarding the Launch of Special Rectification Activities for Population 
and Family Planning Work [Guanyu kaizhan renkou jisheng gongzuo 
zhuanxiang zhengzhi huodong de tongzhi], issued 4 March 10.
    \42\ Ibid.
    \43\ Puning City People's Government (Online), ``Our City Starts a 
Special Operation To Sterilize Women With Two Children'' [Wo shi xianqi 
erhai jieza zhuanxiang xingdong], 12 April 10.
    \44\ ``Puning Exceeds Conventional Measures To Break Through Family 
Planning Difficulties'' [Puning chao changgui cuoshi tupo jisheng 
nandian], Southern Rural News (Online), 14 April 10.
    \45\ Puning City People's Government (Online), ``Our City Starts a 
Special Operation To Sterilize Women With Two Children'' [Wo shi xianqi 
erhai jieza zhuanxiang xingdong], 12 April 10.
    \46\ ``Puning Exceeds Conventional Measures To Break Through Family 
Planning Difficulties'' [Puning chao changgui cuoshi tupo jisheng 
nandian], Southern Rural News (Online), 14 April 10.
    \47\ A local Chinese journalist from the Southern Rural News 
conducted extensive undercover interviews with locals and witnessed 
detentions firsthand in four townships in Puning (Hongyang, Daba, 
Liaoyuan, and Chiwei). ``Puning Exceeds Conventional Measures To Break 
Through Family Planning Difficulties'' [Puning chao changgui cuoshi 
tupo jisheng nandian], Southern Rural News (Online), 14 April 10.
    \48\ ``Puning Exceeds Conventional Measures To Break Through Family 
Planning Difficulties'' [Puning chao changgui cuoshi tupo jisheng 
nandian], Southern Rural News (Online), 14 April 10.
    \49\ Ibid.
    \50\ For examples from Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Gansu 
provinces, and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (GZAR), see Yongxiu 
County People's Government (Online), ``Yongfeng Reclaimed Land Site 
Pushes Strongly Ahead With Tubal Ligations of Households With Two 
Female Children'' [Yongfeng kenzhi chang zhashi tuijin liangnu hu jieza 
gongzuo], 26 April 10 (Jiangxi); Jiangsu Provincial Population and 
Family Planning Commission (Online), ``Tongzhou District Convenes All-
District Meeting To Push Forward With Establishing a `15th' Provincial 
Population Coordinated Development Advanced District'' [Tongzhou qu 
zhaokai quanqu chuangjian ``shiyiwu'' sheng renkou xietiao fazhan 
xianjin qu tuijin hui], 21 April 10 (Jiangsu); Huangshan Municipal 
People's Government (Online), ``Xiuning County Party Secretary Lu Qun 
Raises `Four Demands' for Population and Family Planning Work Across 
the County'' [Xiuning xianwei shuji lu qun dui quanxian renkou jisheng 
gongzuo tichu ``sidian yaoqiu''], 26 March 10 (Anhui); Huan County 
People's Government (Online), ``Huan County Vice-Magistrate Li 
Yuanqing's Report to the County Population and Family Planning 
Meeting'' [Zhengfu fuxianzhang li yuanqing zai quanxian renkou he jihua 
shengyu gongzuo huiyi shang baogao], 3 March 10 (Gansu); Hezhou 
Municipal People's Government (Online), ``Vice-Mayor Liu Xueping's 
Speech to the All-City Population and Family Planning Work Conference'' 
[Fu shizhang liu xueping zai quanshi renkou jisheng gongzuo huiyi shang 
de jianghua], 24 March 10 (GZAR).
    \51\ For examples, see ``Time for Families To Have Two Children 
Each,'' China Daily (Online), 1 February 10; Liu Ming, ``Ease One-Child 
Policy and Invite Disaster,'' China Daily (Online), 1 February 10; 
``Most People Want Two Children, Survey Says,'' China Daily (Online), 
27 March 10; Yao Yijiang, ``30 Years of Family Planning, To Change or 
Not To Change to a Two Child Policy: At a Historical Juncture, 
Undergoing Heated Debate'' [Jihua shengyu 30 nian, bian haishi bubian 
ertai zhengce: lishi guankou, zhengzai jibian], Southern Metropolitan 
Daily (Online), 17 March 10.
    \52\ Zhao Chunzhe, ``Beijing To Loosen Control on One-Child 
Policy,'' China Daily (Online), 25 January 10; ``Beijing Municipal 
Population and Family Planning Commission: `Preparing To Relax 
Conditions for Having a Second Child' Report Strays From the Truth'' 
[Beijing shi renkou jishengwei: ``yunniang fangkuan shengyu ertai 
tiaojian'' baodao shishi], Xinhua, reprinted in Legal Daily (Online), 
25 January 10.
    \53\ ``Long-Hated One-Child Rule May Be Eased in China,'' 
Associated Press (Online), 25 April 10.
    \54\ ``China To Maintain Low Birth Rate: Vice Premier,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 20 January 10; ``Wen Jiabao: Do a Good Job With Population 
and Family Planning Work, Continue To Stabilize Low Birth Level'' [Wen 
jiabao: zuohao renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo, jixu wending dishengyu 
shuiping], Xinhua, reprinted in National Population and Family Planning 
Commission (Online), 5 March 10.
    \55\ The UN sets the threshold for classification as an aging 
society at 10 percent of the total population. Shan Juan, ``Aging 
Seniors Facing Life Without Proper Care,'' China Daily (Online), 30 
December 09.
    \56\ John Gordon, et al., Domestic Trends in the United States, 
China, and Iran: Implications for U.S. Navy Strategic Planning (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 60.
    \57\ Cary Huang, ``Leadership Wakes to Grey Storm of Ageing 
Population,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 2 November 09.
    \58\ John Gordon, et al., Domestic Trends in the United States, 
China, and Iran: Implications for U.S. Navy Strategic Planning (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 61; U.S. Census Bureau (Online), 
``International Data Base--China,'' last visited 31 March 10.
    \59\ ``China To Maintain Low Birth Rate: Vice Premier,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 20 January 10; ``Wen Jiabao: Do a Good Job With Population 
and Family Planning Work, Continue To Stabilize Low Birth Level'' [Wen 
jiabao: zuohao renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo, jixu wending dishengyu 
shuiping], Xinhua, reprinted in National Population and Family Planning 
Commission (Online), 5 March 10.
    \60\ Cary Huang, ``Leadership Wakes to Grey Storm of Ageing 
Population,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 2 November 09.
    \61\ See Mikhail Lipatov et al., ``Economics, Cultural 
Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio at Birth in China,'' 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Social Sciences of the United 
States of America, 9 December 08, vol. 105 (49), 19171. According to 
this study, ``The root of the [gender imbalance] problem lies in a 
2,500-year-old culture of son preference.'' See also Chu Junhong, 
``Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural 
Central China,'' 27 Population and Development Review 2 (2001), 259; 
Joseph Chamie, ``The Global Abortion Bind: A Woman's Right To Choose 
Gives Way to Sex-Selection Abortions and Dangerous Gender Imbalances,'' 
Yale Global (Online), 29 May 08.
    \62\ Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Online), ``Difficulty 
Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch'' 
[10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 
January 10.
    \63\ ``China To Be Short 24 Million Wives, Study Says,'' Associated 
Press (Online), 12 January 10.
    \64\ For 2000 PRC census data and information on global norms for 
sex ratio at birth, see Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: 
Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 171-172. 
According to this study, ``In the 2000 census, the relative number of 
boys per 100 girls in the 0-4 age group was 120.8, clearly outside the 
normal range.''
    \65\ Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Online), ``Difficulty 
Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch'' 
[10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 
January 10.
    \66\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: For Blind Activist, 
Prison Release May Not Mean Freedom,'' 9 September 10; Michael Wines, 
``Chinese Advocate Released From Prison, but Confinement Continues,'' 
New York Times (Online), 9 September 10; William Wan, ``Release of 
Chinese Activist Brings Crackdown to His Village,'' Washington Post 
(Online), 9 September 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Activist Chen Guangcheng Released After Serving Full Sentence,'' 9 
September 10; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 98; Li Jinsong, 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Chen Guangcheng Sues Li Qun, 
Liu Jie, and Other Officials for Trumped Up Charges and Retaliation'' 
[Chen guangcheng konggao li qun liu jie deng shexian fanyou baofu 
xianhai zui zhi, gongmin bao'an konggao han], 5 April 08.
    \67\ ``Chen Guangcheng Not in Good Health and Yuan Weijing Beaten, 
Hong Kong's China Human Rights Watch Lends Support'' [Chen guangcheng 
shenti qianjia ji yuan weijing bei ou, xianggang zhongguo weiquan lushi 
guanzhu zu shengyuan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 April 09.
    \68\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Blind 
`Barefoot Lawyer' Chen Guangcheng's Wife Yuan Weijing's Family 
Letter,'' 17 September 09; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Several Activists and Dissidents Languish in Detention Despite 
Serious Illnesses,'' 5 November 09.
    \69\ Anita Chang, ``Blind Activist Lawyer Set To Be Released in 
China,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Google (Online), 8 September 
10; William Wan, ``Release of Chinese Activist Brings Crackdown to His 
Village,'' Washington Post (Online), 9 September 10.
    \70\ William Wan, ``Release of Chinese Activist Brings Crackdown to 
His Village,'' Washington Post (Online), 9 September 10.
    \71\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: For Blind Activist, 
Prison Release May Not Mean Freedom,'' 9 September 10; Michael Wines, 
``Chinese Advocate Released From Prison, but Confinement Continues,'' 
New York Times (Online), 9 September 10.
    \72\ ``Profiles of Prominent Chinese Rights Defence Lawyers--Chen 
Chuangcheng,'' in A Sword and a Shield, eds. Stacy Mosher and Patrick 
Poon (Hong Kong: China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, 2009), 14.
    \73\ Melinda Liu, ``Barefoot Lawyers,'' Newsweek (Online), 4 March 
02; Jerome A. Cohen, ``Breaking Point? The Persecution of `Barefoot 
Lawyer' Chen Guangcheng Adds to China's Miserable Record,'' South China 
Morning Post (Online), 14 September 10.
    \74\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 157; Li Jinsong, 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Chen Guangcheng Sues Li Qun, 
Liu Jie, and Other Officials for Trumped Up Charges and Retaliation'' 
[Chen guangcheng konggao li qun liu jie deng shexian fanyou baofu 
xianhai zui zhi, gongmin bao'an konggao han], 5 April 08.
    \75\ Philip P. Pan, ``Rural Activist Seized in Beijing,'' 
Washington Post (Online), 7 September 05; ``Authorities Formally Arrest 
Legal Advocate Chen Guangcheng,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China (Online), 30 August 06, citing ``Yuan Weijing Receives 
Notification From Yinan County Public Security Office of the Formal 
Arrest of Chen Guangcheng'' [Yuan weijing shoudao yinan xian gong'an ju 
daibu chen guangcheng tongzhishu (tu)], Boxun (Online), 25 June 06.
    \76\ ``Authorities Sentence Chen Guangcheng After Taking His 
Defense Team Into Custody,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, September 2006, 4-5, citing Maureen Fan, ``Chinese Rights 
Activist Stands Trial After Police Detain Defense Team,'' Washington 
Post (Online), 19 August 06.
    \77\ ``Authorities Sentence Chen Guangcheng After Taking His 
Defense Team Into Custody,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, September 2006, 4-5, citing ``Blind Mob Organizer Sentenced to 
Imprisonment,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 25 August 
06.
    \78\ ``Appellate Court Orders Retrial of Chen Guangcheng Case,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 5, 
citing ``Chen Guangcheng Appeals Decision, Zhao Yan Has Misgivings 
About Own Appeal'' [Cheng guangcheng bufu panjue tichu shangsu, zhao 
yan dui shangsu baoyou gulu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 2 September 06; 
``Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng Appeals First Judgment'' [Mangren 
weiquan renshi chen guangcheng dui yishen ti shangsu], Voice of America 
(Online), 3 September 06.
    \79\ ``Appellate Court Orders Retrial of Chen Guangcheng Case,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 5, 
citing ``Chen Guangcheng's Trial Judgment Made Invalid, Sent Back for 
Retrial'' [Chen guangcheng an yishen panjue zuofei fahui chongshen], 
Radio Free Asia (Online), 31 October 06; ``Appeals Court Overturns 
Blind Chinese Activist's Guilty Verdict,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 31 
October 06.
    \80\ ``Chen Guangcheng Remains in Prison Following Flawed 
Retrial,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 
2006, 1-3, citing ``Shandong Court Upholds Jail Sentence for Blind Mob 
Organizer,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China.org.cn (Online), 1 December 06.
    \81\ ``Chen Guangcheng Remains in Prison Following Flawed 
Retrial,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 
2006, 1-3.
    \82\ ``Final Judgment Affirms Original Sentence in Chen Guangcheng 
Case, Lawyers Plans To Apply for Serving Sentence Outside Prison, 
Continue Appeals'' [Chen guangcheng an zhongshen weichi yuanpan lushi 
ni shenqing jianwaizhixing ji jixu shensu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 
12 January 07.
    \83\ ``Chen Guangcheng Remains in Prison Following Flawed 
Retrial,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 
2006, 1-3.
    \84\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Rights Defender 
Receives Malreatment in Prison: Examination of Government's 
International Commitment Against Torture'' [Weiquan renshi yuzhong shou 
nuedai: dui zhengfu fan kuxing guji chengruo de jianyan], 21 June 07; 
``Chinese Activist Beaten in Jail,'' BBC (Online), 22 June 07.
    \85\ Maureen Fan, ``Wife of Activist Detained at Beijing Airport, 
Authorities Forcibly Return Her to Home Village,'' Washington Post 
(Online), 25 August 07.
    \86\ Ibid.
    \87\ See, e.g., ``Reflections on a Visit to Chen Guangcheng's 
Family, We Were Beaten Out of the Village,'' Wang Keqin's Blog 
(Online), 14 March 09; ``Chen Guangcheng Not in Good Health and Yuan 
Weijing Beaten, Hong Kong's China Human Rights Watch Lends Support'' 
[Chen guangcheng shenti qianjia ji yuan weijing bei ou, xianggang 
zhongguo weiquan lushi guanzhu zu shengyuan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 
22 April 09; Amnesty International (Online), ``China: Wife of Human 
Rights Activist Beaten,'' 20 April 09.
    \88\ Political Prisoners in China: Trends and Implications for U.S. 
Policy, Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3 
August 10, Testimony of Jerome A. Cohen, Professor, New York University 
School of Law; Co-director, U.S.-Asia Law Institute; and Adjunct Senior 
Fellow for Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. See also 
``Reflections on a Visit to Chen Guangcheng's Family, We Were Beaten 
Out of the Village,'' Wang Keqin's Blog (Online), 14 March 09; Amnesty 
International (Online), ``China: Wife of Human Rights Activist 
Beaten,'' 20 April 09.

    Notes to Section II--Freedom of Residence and Movement
    \1\ PRC Regulations on Household Registration [Zhonghua renmin 
gonheguo hukou dengji tiaoli], issued and effective 9 January 58.
    \2\ Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, ``Is China Abolishing the 
Hukou System/ '' 195 China Quarterly 582, 587 (2008).
    \3\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 2 
and 13(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), and 26.
    \4\ ``China Loosens Student Hukou Controls,'' Xinhua, reprinted in 
City of Kunming's Web Site, 19 May 10; Tania Branigan, ``Millions of 
Chinese Rural Migrants Denied Education for Their Children,'' Guardian 
(Online), 15 March 10.
    \5\ PRC Compulsory Education Law, enacted 12 April 86, effective 1 
July 86, amended 29 June 06, art. 2; State Council Decision Regarding 
Grassroots Education Reform and Development [Guowuyuan guanyu jichu 
jiaoyu gaige yu fazhan de jueding], issued 29 May 01; Ministry of 
Education, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Finance, et al., 
Guiding Opinion on Improving Compulsory Education of Migrant Workers' 
Children [Guanyu jinyibu zuo hao jincheng wugong jiuye nongmin zinu 
yiwu jiaoyu gongzuo de yijian], issued 17 September 03. For more 
information on government education policies regarding migrant workers, 
see Wu Xinhui and Liu Chengxian, ``A Way Out and Guarantee--State 
Policy for the Education of Migrant Workers' Children'' [Chulu yu 
baozhang--nongmingong zinu jiaoyu de guojia zhengce], China Youth 
Research Net (Online), 28 September 07.
    \6\ Tania Branigan, ``Millions of Chinese Rural Migrants Denied 
Education for Their Children,'' Guardian (Online), 15 March 10; 
``Migrant Children Denied School,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 2 March 
10; Qian Yanfeng, ``Migrant Children Face Education Divide,'' China 
Daily (Online), 14 July 10; Ren Zhongxi, ``School Closures Highlight 
Migrant Education Issue,'' China.org.cn (Online), 8 March 10.
    \7\ Sky Canaves and Sue Feng, ``The Trials of Migrant Schools in 
Beijing,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 5 March 10; Ren Zhongxi, 
``School Closures Highlight Migrant Education Issue,'' China.org.cn 
(Online), 8 March 10.
    \8\ Alice Yan, ``Condemned by Hukou to Education Apartheid,'' South 
China Morning Post (Online), 2 July 10.
    \9\ Qian Yanfeng, ``Migrant Children Face Education Divide,'' China 
Daily (Online), 14 July 10.
    \10\ Ibid.
    \11\ Alice Yan, ``Condemned by Hukou to Education Apartheid,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 2 July 10; ``Beijing Student Commits 
Suicide for Hukou,'' Xinhua (Online), 23 July 10; ``Migrant Children 
Face Education Divide,'' China Daily (Online), 14 July 10.
    \12\ Alice Yan, ``Condemned by Hukou to Education Aparthied,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 2 July 10; ``Migrant Children Face 
Education Divide,'' China Daily (Online), 14 July 10.
    \13\ For an article discussing representative hukou legislation, 
see Fiona Tam, ``Migrant Workers Get Chance for Urban Residency,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 9 June 10.
    \14\ For a review of hukou reforms since 2005, see CECC, 2008 
Annual Report, 31 October 08, 103-112; ``Invisible and Heavy 
Shackles,'' Economist (Online), 6 May 10.
    \15\ ``China's Floating Population Exceeds 210m,'' Xinhua (Online), 
27 June 10; Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, ``Is China Abolishing 
the Hukou System/ '' 195 China Quarterly 582, 596-599 (2008).
    \16\ ``Invisible and Heavy Shackles,'' Economist (Online), 6 May 
10.
    \17\ Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, ``Is China Abolishing the 
Hukou System/ '' 195 China Quarterly 582, 594-596 (2008).
    \18\ Ibid., 582, 597.
    \19\ ``Invisible and Heavy Shackles,'' Economist (Online), 6 May 
10.
    \20\ For a review of hukou reforms since 2005, see CECC, 2008 
Annual Report, 31 October 08, 103-112.
    \21\ Han Changfu, ``Agriculture Minister Han Changfu Discusses 
Post-1990s Migrant Workers'' [Nongyebu buzhang han changfu tan 
jiushihou nongmingong], People's Daily, reprinted in China Review News 
(Online), 1 February 10. Agricultural Minister Han Changfu wrote an 
essay in People's Daily calling on the central government to make the 
necessary policy and administrative preparations as more migrants 
became urban residents; Zhou Yongkang, ``Promote the In-Depth 
Resolution of Social Contradictions, Be Innovative in Social 
Management, and Enforce the Law Fairly and Honestly, Providing Even 
More Powerful Rule-of-Law Support for Both Good and Rapid Economic and 
Social Development'' [Shenru tuijin shehui maodun huajie, shehui guanli 
chuangxin, gongzheng lianjie zhifa, wei jingji shehui youhao youkua 
fazhan tigong gengjia youli de fazhi baozhang], Seeking Truth, No. 4., 
16 February 10, reprinted in Xinhua (Online). Zhou Yongkang, a ranking 
member of the Politburo Standing Committee, referenced the need to 
accelerate hukou reform and efforts to resolve the challenges facing 
migrant workers. ``Premier Wen Jiabao Chats With Online Users'' [Wen 
jiabao zongli yu wangyou zaixian jiaoliu], Xinhua (Online), 28 February 
10. Premier Wen said that China would advance reforms of the hukou 
system for the new generation of migrant workers.
    \22\ Development Research Center of the State Council, ``Gradually 
Advancing Hukou Reform, Achieving Substantive Equality of Rights'' 
[Tidu tuijin huji gaige shixian quanli shizhi pingdeng], China Economic 
Times, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 9 June 10.
    \23\ ``Invisible and Heavy Shackles,'' Economist (Online), 6 May 
10.
    \24\ For a detailed account of the joint editorial and 
circumstances surrounding its depublication, see ``Joint Editorial 
Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From Internet Hours After Publication, 
Co-Author Fired,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 
4, 21 April 10, 1-2.
    \25\ Guangzhou Development and Reform Commission, Implementing 
Opinion Regarding the Advancing of Urban-Rural Hukou System Reforms 
[Guanyu tuijin chengxiang huji zhidu gaige de shishi yijian], issued 31 
August 09. For a summary of the Guangzhou hukou reform in English, see 
``Hukou Reform Experiment Begins in Guangzhou,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2-3.
    \26\ Kam Wing Chan and Will Buckingham, ``Is China Abolishing the 
Hukou System/ '' 195 China Quarterly 582, 596-599 (2008).
    \27\ ``Invisible and Heavy Shackles,'' Economist (Online), 6 May 
10.
    \28\ Chongqing Municipal Government, Opinion on Systematically 
Reforming Urban-Rural Household Registration [Guanyu tongchou 
chengxiang huji zhidu gaigede yijian], issued 25 July 10.
    \29\ Ibid., arts. 3, 6(1)-(10).
    \30\ Ibid., art. 6(1).
    \31\ Wu Hongying and Huang Haiyang, ``Ten Million Migrant Workers 
Will Move Into Urban Area in Ten Years, Chongqing Initiates Household 
Registration Reform on a Trial Basis'' [Shinian qianwan nongmin 
jincheng chongqing shi shui huji gaige], 21st Century Business Herald, 
14 July 10.
    \32\  For English translation of the editorial, see Chinese Law 
Prof Blog (Online), ``The Famous Hukou Editorial,'' 26 March 10, last 
visited 21 June 10; ``Joint Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed 
From Internet Hours After Publication, Co-Author Fired,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 1-2.
    \33\ ``Joint Editorial From 13 Newspapers Urges Speedy Household 
Registration Reform'' [Quanguo 13 jia baozhi fabiao gongtong shelun 
duncu jiasu huji gaige], Sina Hong Kong (Online), 1 March 10.
    \34\ Ibid.
    \35\ ``Hukou Editorial Gone From Some Sites,'' China Realtime 
Report (Online), 3 March 10; Sharon Lafraniere, ``Editor Is Fired After 
Criticizing Chinese Registration System,'' New York Times (Online), 9 
March 10. For a detailed account of facts surrounding the joint hukou 
editorial, see ``Joint Editorial Calling for Hukou Reform Removed From 
Internet Hours After Publication, Co-Author Fired,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 1-2.
    \36\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 
13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN 
General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into 
force 23 March 76, art. 12.
    \37\ PRC Passport Law, enacted 29 April 06, effective 1 January 07, 
art. 13(7).
    \38\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, arts. 
2, 13(1), 13(2); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 2(1), 12(1), 12(3), 12(4), and 
26.
    \39\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 164; Justin McCurry, 
``Chinese Dissident Stranded at Tokyo Airport Set To Return Home,'' 
Guardian (Online), 1 February 10.
    \40\ Louisa Lim, ``In Shanghai, Alternatives to the World Expo,'' 
National Public Radio (Online), 4 May 10; Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights Briefing Weekly,'' 31 May 10.
    \41\ Charles Hutzler, ``China Bans Poet From Traveling to US 
Conference,'' Associated Press (Online), 25 March 10.
    \42\ Ibid.
    \43\ Philip Gourevitch, ``Liao Yiwu's Persistent Voice,'' New 
Yorker (Online), 2 March 10; Steven Erlanger and Jonathan Ansfield, 
``Uneasy Engagement: at Book Fair, a Subplot About Chinese Rights,'' 
New York Times (Online), 18 October 09.
    \44\ Steven Erlanger and Jonathan Ansfield, ``Uneasy Engagement: at 
Book Fair, a Subplot About Chinese Rights,'' New York Times (Online), 
18 October 09.
    \45\ Sapa-dpa, ``Chinese Author Put Under House Arrest,'' (South 
Africa) Sunday Times Live (Online), 1 March 10; Letter from Liao Yiwu, 
to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, translated from Chinese by Human 
Rights in China (Online), 5 February 10.
    \46\ ``Uyghur Scholar Slams Exit Ban,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
28 April 10.
    \47\ ``Travel Ban for Uyghur Scholar,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
20 May 10.
    \48\ ``Uyghur Scholar Slams Exit Ban,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
28 April 10; ``Uyghur Barred from Travel,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
19 April 10.
    \49\ ``Travel Ban for Uyghur Scholar,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
20 May 10.
    \50\ Ibid.
    \51\ ``Hong Kong Activists Denied Entry to Macao,'' Agence France-
Presse (Online), 19 December 09.
    \52\ Ibid.
    \53\ Du Yali, ``Leung Kwok-Hung Denied Entry to Macao; Has Returned 
to Hong Kong'' [Liang guoxiong bei jurujing aomen yi fandi xiang gang], 
Radio Television Hong Kong (Online), 19 December 09.
    \54\ ``Macao Bans HK Activists After May Day Rally,'' Reuters 
(Online), reprinted in Epoch Times, 13 May 07.
    \55\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Chinese Government 
Tightens the Screws Ahead of National Day,'' 1 October 10; 
``Restrictions on Dissidents and Human Rights Defenders Have Still Not 
Been Lifted as of October 9'' [Yijian renshi yu weiquanzhe 10 yue 9 ri 
rengwei jiejin], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 October 09.
    \56\ ``Restrictions on Dissidents and Human Rights Defenders Have 
Still Not Been Lifted as of October 9'' [Yijian renshi yu weiquanzhe 10 
yue 9 ri rengwei jiejin], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 October 09.
    \57\ Ibid.
    \58\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Chinese Government 
Tightens the Screws Ahead of National Day,'' 1 October 10.
    \59\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing May 25-31,'' 31 May 10.
    \60\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing May 25-31,'' 31 May 10; ``Tang Jitian Meets With U.S. 
Officials To Talk About Human Rights and Religion: Lawyer Li Xiongbing 
Not Allowed To Leave Home'' [Tang jitian tan jian meiguanyuan tan 
renquan zongjiao li xiongbing lushi bei jinzhi chumen], Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 25 May 10.
    \61\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing May 25-31,'' 31 May 10.
    \62\ Ibid.
    \63\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing June 1-7, 2010,'' 7 June 10.

    Notes to Section II--Status of Women
    \1\ The 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan states that 
women should occupy 50 percent of government leadership positions in 
central government ministries, provincial governments, and city 
governments. State Council Information Office, National Human Rights 
Action Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 
III(2). The Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests and 
the Electoral Law of the National People's Congress and local people's 
congresses stipulate that an ``appropriate number'' of female deputies 
should serve at all levels of people's congresses. PRC Law on the 
Protection of Women's Rights and Interests, enacted 3 April 92, 
effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 11; PRC Electoral 
Law of the National People's Congress and local people's congresses, 
enacted 1 July 79, amended 27 October 04, art. 6.
    \2\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 
accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, 
entry into force 2 September 81, art. 7.
    \3\ `` `She' Officials'' [``Ta'' guanyuan], Southern Daily 
(Online), 8 March 10.
    \4\ Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN 
(Online), ``Statement by Mme. Meng Xiaosi, Head of Chinese Delegation 
to 54th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women, Vice-
Chairperson of the National Working Committee on Women and Children 
Under the State Council of China,'' 1 March 10. According to Meng, ``At 
present, there are 8 women among the state leaders, 230 ministerial and 
vice-ministerial/provincial level women leaders, and 670 mayors and 
deputy mayors of the over 600 cities of China. Women account for over 
40% of government officials compared with less than 1/3 of 1995.'' See 
also `` `She' Officials'' [``Ta'' guanyuan], Southern Daily (Online), 8 
March 10. According to this report, of the eight women in Party and 
central government leadership positions mentioned by Meng Xiaosi above, 
some are in deputy positions. The report also notes that, currently, 3 
of the 28 departments under the State Council are headed by women.
    \5\ `` `She' Officials'' [``Ta'' guanyuan], Southern Daily 
(Online), 8 March 10.
    \6\ 2010 data provided by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, however, 
now ranks China 53rd out of 186 countries with regard to women's 
representation in national parliaments. Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(Online), ``Women in Parliaments: World Classification,'' 31 May 10.
    \7\ `` `She' Officials'' [``Ta'' guanyuan], Southern Daily 
(Online), 8 March 10. The target of 30 percent female representation in 
leadership positions was set by the UN Commission on the Status of 
Women at its 34th session in 1990. United Nations Publications, 
reprinted in Bnet (Online), ``Target: 30 Percent of Leadership 
Positions to Women by 1995--United Nations Commission on the Status of 
Women,'' June 1990.
    \8\ ``Chen Zhili: ACWF Actively Promotes Female Political 
Participation'' [Chen zhili biaoshi fulian jiang jiji tuidong funu 
canzheng yizheng], China Radio International (Online), 6 March 10.
    \9\ Women's Watch-China (Online), Annual Report 2008, 2009, 17.
    \10\ Ibid., 18. According to this report, ``[s]ome scholars have 
pointed out that village rules and regulations are much more important 
than other similar customary laws, mainly because they have greater 
force than even national laws in most villages, and are regarded as the 
supreme principle in handling the village's daily affairs.''
    \11\ Ibid., 20.
    \12\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 7; PRC Employment 
Promotion Law, enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 3.
    \13\ PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, effective 1 January 95, 
amended 10 October 01, arts. 12, 13. PRC Law on the Protection of 
Women's Rights and Interests, enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 
92, amended 28 August 05, arts. 22-27; PRC Employment Promotion Law, 
enacted 30 August 07, effective 1 January 08, art. 3. See also Women's 
Watch-China (Online), ``The E-Newsletter 54 of WW-China,'' February 
2010, 10. According to this analysis, Chinese laws on employment 
discrimination are ``riddled with flaws and loopholes by virtue of 
having no enforcement mechanism. Should an employer refuse to recruit a 
female applicant, she has little recourse other than to appeal to the 
local women's federation. As there is no law in force through which to 
file a lawsuit against the prejudice itself, the only option at present 
is to file for labor arbitration.''
    \14\ ``Survey Reveals Over Ninety Percent of Female College 
Students Experience the Trouble of Gender Discrimination in 
Employment'' [Diaocha xianshi: yu jiucheng nu daxuesheng jiuye shou 
xingbie qishi kunrao], CCTV, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 16 September 
09.
    \15\ Women's Watch-China (Online), ``The E-Newsletter 54 of WW-
China,'' February 2010, 10.
    \16\ Jia Feishang, ``Male Students Have Edge in Jobs,'' Shanghai 
Daily (Online), 3 March 10.
    \17\ Women's Studies Institute of China, reprinted in All-China 
Women's Federation (Online), ``Gender Tops List of University Graduate 
Employment Discriminations,'' 30 July 10. The report does not specify 
how many state-operated enterprises, government agencies, or public 
institutes were surveyed.
    \18\ Shenzhen Hengping Jigou (Online), An Investigative Report on 
the Shenzhen Employment Discrimination Situation [Shenzhen jiuye qishe 
zhuangkuang diaocha baogao], May 2010, 18.
    \19\ Ibid.
    \20\ Ibid.
    \21\ Currently, retirement ages for male and female government and 
Party officials are 60 and 55, respectively, while retirement ages for 
male and female workers in general are 60 and 50, respectively. 
``China's Compulsory Retirement Age for Males and Females Challenged 
for Violating Constitution'' [Woguo nannu tuixiu nianling guiding 
beitiqing weixian shencha], China Law Education (Online), 16 March 06.
    \22\ Wang Yijun and Cui Li, ``National People's Congress Standing 
Committee Enforcement Investigation Reveals Covert Gender 
Discrimination Still Exists in Employment'' [Renda changweihui zhifa 
jiancha faxian jiuye reng cun yinxing xingbie qishi], China Youth 
Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 24 June 10.
    \23\ Ibid. See also ``Centennial of Women's Day,'' China Daily 
(Online), 8 March 10. According to this report, women are sometimes 
``pushed into early retirement'' and many are ``passed over for 
promotion'' as they near retirement age.
    \24\ Women's Watch-China (Online), ``Shenzhen Promises To Launch 
First Gender Equality Promotion Regulation'' [Shenzhen youwang chutai 
shoubu xingbie pingdeng cujin tiaoli], 28 December 09.
    \25\ Ibid.
    \26\ Liu Minghui, Women's Watch-China (Online), ``The E-Newsletter 
53 of WW-China,'' February 2010, 3. See also ``Shenzhen Gender Equality 
Regulations Soon To Be Made Public, Men To Enjoy 30 Days Paternity 
Leave'' [Shenzhen jiang chutai xingbie pingdeng tiaoli, nanshi kewang 
xiang 30 tian yuyingjia], Chongqing Evening Post (Online), 21 January 
10.
    \27\ See, e.g., Women's Watch-China (Online), ``Shenzhen Promises 
to Launch First Gender Equality Promotion Regulation'' [Shenzhen 
youwang chutai shoubu xingbie pingdeng cujin tiaoli], 28 December 09; 
``Shenzhen Gender Equality Regulations Soon To Be Made Public, Men To 
Enjoy 30 Days Paternity Leave'' [Shenzhen jiang chutai xingbie pingdeng 
tiaoli, nanshi kewang xiang 30 tian yuyingjia], Chongqing Evening Post 
(Online), 21 January 10; Liu Minghui, Women's Watch-China (Online), 
``The E-Newsletter 53 of WW-China,'' February 2010, 3.
    \28\ He Huifeng, ``Draft Sex Equality Law Proposes Leave for 
Dads,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 22 January 10.
    \29\ Liu Minghui, Women's Watch-China (Online), ``The E-Newsletter 
53 of WW-China,'' February 2010, 4. According to this report, in the 
draft Shenzhen Regulation, ``direct gender discrimination is defined as 
any gender-based exclusion or restriction with the result and purpose 
to damage or impede a citizen to enjoy or exercise their political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other rights and freedoms on 
the basis of gender equality. Indirect gender discrimination is defined 
as a considerable degree of more adverse impacts on a particular gender 
though there is no difference in treatment based on gender, marital 
status, pregnancy and childbirth.''
    \30\ He Huifeng, ``Draft Sex Equality Law Proposes Leave for 
Dads,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 22 January 10.
    \31\ Liu Minghui, Women's Watch-China (Online), ``The E-Newsletter 
53 of WW-China,'' February 2010, 9.
    \32\ ``Shenzhen Gender Equality Regulations Soon To Be Made Public, 
Men To Enjoy 30 Days Paternity Leave'' [Shenzhen jiang chutai xingbie 
pingdeng tiaoli, nanshi kewang xiang 30 tian yuyingjia], Chongqing 
Evening Post (Online), 21 January 10.
    \33\ Liu Minghui, Women's Watch-China (Online), ``The E-Newsletter 
53 of WW-China,'' February 10, 10.
    \34\ Ibid., 14-15.
    \35\ Ibid., 10.
    \36\ He Huifeng, ``Draft Sex Equality Law Proposes Leave for 
Dads,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 22 January 10.
    \37\ ``Shenzhen Gender Equality Regulations Soon To Be Made Public, 
Men To Enjoy 30 Days Paternity Leave'' [Shenzhen jiang chutai xingbie 
pingdeng tiaoli, nanshi kewang xiang 30 tian yuyingjia], Chongqing 
Evening Post (Online), 21 January 10.
    \38\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests, 
enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 
46; PRC Marriage Law, enacted 10 September 80, effective 1 January 81, 
amended 28 April 01, art. 3.
    \39\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, arts. 234, 236, 260.
    \40\ ``Domestic Violence Occurs in Nearly 30 Percent of Chinese 
Families, Experts Call for Legislation To Protect Victims'' [Zhongguo 
jin 30% de jiating cunzai jiating baoli, zhuanjia huyu wei fan jiabao 
lifa], People's Daily (Online), 27 November 09.
    \41\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests, 
enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, art. 
46; PRC Marriage Law, enacted 10 September 80, effective 1 January 81, 
amended 28 April 01, art. 3. For Chinese scholars' discussion of the 
shortcomings of current national-level legislation, see ``All-China 
Women's Federation Strongly Promotes Anti-Domestic Violence Law'' 
[Quanguo fulian litui fan jiating baoli fa], People's Representative 
News (Online), 31 December 09; Women's Watch-China (Online), ``Proposal 
for Law on Prevention and Curbing of Domestic Violence Comes Out'' 
[Yufang he zhizhi jiating baoli fa jianyi gao chulu], 28 November 09; 
``China Scholars Call for Attention on `Anti-Domestic Violence' 
Legislation'' [Zhongguo xuezhe huyu guanzhu ``fan jiating baoli'' 
lifa], Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 January 10. See also ``All-China 
Women's Federation Proposes, Highlights Need for Draft Anti-Domestic 
Violence Legislation,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
No. 2, 5 February 10, 3.
    \42\ ``All-China Women's Federation Proposes, Highlights Need for 
Draft Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation,'' CECC China Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3; ``Domestic Violence Occurs 
in Nearly 30 Percent of Chinese Families, Experts Call for Legislation 
To Protect Victims'' [Zhongguo jin 30% de jiating cunzai jiating baoli, 
zhuanjia huyu wei fan jiating baoli fa], People's Daily (Online), 27 
November 09; ``Experts Discuss Anti-Domestic Violence Legislation: 
`Cohabitants Who Encounter Domestic Violence' Can Also Apply for 
Protection Orders'' [Zhuanjia tan fan jiabao lifa: tongju zao 
``jiabao'' ye ke shenqing baohuling], People's Daily (Online), 12 
January 10.
    \43\ Women's Watch-China (Online), ``Proposal for Law on Prevention 
and Curbing of Domestic Violence Comes Out'' [Yufang he zhizhi jiating 
baoli fa jianyi gao chulu], 28 November 09.
    \44\ ``Current Situation and Characteristics of China Anti-Domestic 
Violence Legislation'' [Zhongguo fan jiating baoli lifa de xianzhuang 
yu tedian], People's Daily (Online), 26 November 09.
    \45\ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 
accession by UN General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, 
entry into force 2 September 81, art. 11.
    \46\ PRC Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests, 
enacted 3 April 92, effective 1 October 92, amended 28 August 05, arts. 
40, 58.
    \47\ Ibid. For discussion on the shortcomings of the LPWRI in 
addressing sexual harassment, see Women's Watch-China (Online), Annual 
Report 2008, 2009, 30.
    \48\ Women's Watch-China (Online), Annual Report 2008, 2009, 30.
    \49\ ``Defending Rights of Women Who Face Workplace Sexual 
Harassment Difficult, Related Regulations Have a Ways To Go'' [Zhichang 
nuxing yu xing saorao hou weiquan kunnan xiangguan guiding dai 
wanshan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 11 May 10.
    \50\ CECC Staff Interview. See also ``Defending Rights of Women Who 
Face Workplace Sexual Harassment Difficult; Related Regulations Have a 
Ways To Go'' [Zhichang nuxing yu xing saorao hou weiquan kunnan 
xiangguan guiding dai wanshan], Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua 
(Online), 11 May 10. According to this report, women who encounter 
sexual harassment typically do not report offenses due to worries that 
it might harm their own reputation, have a negative impact on their 
families, or even cause them to lose their jobs.
    \51\ Women's Watch-China (Online), ``The E-Newsletter 52 of WW-
China,'' December 2009, 3, 10.
    \52\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Trade Union Recommended 
Sacking Sexual Harassment Victim,'' 22 December 09.
    \53\ CECC Staff Interview.
    \54\ Maple Women's Psychological Counseling Center Beijing 
(Online), `` `Law on Prevention of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace,' 
Submitted to the National People's Congress (Draft Proposal)'' [Xiang 
quanguo renda tijiao ``gongzuo changsuo xingsaorao fangzhifa'' (jianyi 
gao) yi an], 17 March 09.
    \55\ China Best Practices--Infanticide, What if the Infant Is Still 
Alive After Induced Labor? Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights 
Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, 10 November 09, Report 
Submitted by ChinaAid and Women's Rights Without Frontiers; China's 
One-Child Policy, Hearing of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, 
U.S. House of Representatives, 10 November 09, Testimony of Reggie 
Littlejohn, President, Women's Rights Without Frontiers.
    \56\ SOS Children's Villages, Canada (Online), ``Chinese Child 
Traffickers Detained,'' 29 March 10. According to this report, ``The 
combination of these factors [China's one child policy and a 
traditional preference for male heirs] has meant that China suffers 
high rates of female infanticide, sex-selective abortion, as well as 
widespread abandonment and human trafficking of the girl-child.''
    \57\ United Nations Development Programme (Online), Power, Voice 
and Rights: A Turning Point for Gender Equality in Asia and the 
Pacific, 8 March 10.
    \58\ According to statistics quoted in the report, China is 
``missing'' 42.6 million women, 44 percent of Asia's 96.2 million 
``missing'' women. United Nations Development Programme (Online), 
Power, Voice and Rights: A Turning Point for Gender Equality in Asia 
and the Pacific, 8 March 10, 34.
    \59\ See Mikhail Lipatov, Shuzhuo Li, and Marcus W. Feldman, 
``Economics, Cultural Transmission, and the Dynamics of the Sex Ratio 
at Birth in China,'' 105 (49) Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Social Sciences of the United States of America, 19171 (2003). 
According to this study, ``The root of the [sex ratio] problem lies in 
a 2,500-year-old culture of son preference.'' See also Chu Junhong, 
``Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion in Rural 
Central China,'' 27 Population and Development Review 259 (2001); 
Joseph Chamie, ``The Global Abortion Bind: A Woman's Right To Choose 
Gives Way to Sex-Selection Abortions and Dangerous Gender Imbalances,'' 
Yale Global (Online), 29 May 08.
    \60\ State Commission for Population and Family Planning, Ministry 
of Health, State Food and Drug Administration, Regulations Regarding 
the Prohibition of Non-Medically Necessary Gender Determination 
Examinations and Sex-Selective Termination of Pregnancy [Guanyu jinzhi 
fei yixue xuyao de tai'er xingbie jianding he xuanze xingbie de rengong 
zhongzhi renshen de guiding], issued 29 November 02, effective 1 
January 03. For a discussion of these regulations, see ``China Bans 
Sex-Selection Abortion,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Net (Online), 22 
March 03.
    \61\ ``Experts: Gender Discrimination Creates China's Sex Ratio 
Imbalance,'' Xinhua (Online), 3 April 10.
    \62\ Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Online), ``Difficulty 
Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch'' 
[10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 
January 10.
    \63\ ``China To Be Short 24 Million Wives, Study Says,'' Associated 
Press (Online), 12 January 10.
    \64\ For China's 2000 census data and information on global norms 
for sex ratio at birth, see Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: 
Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 171-172.
    \65\ Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Online), ``Difficulty 
Finding a Wife in 10 Years: 1 Out of Every 5 Men To Be a Bare Branch'' 
[10 nian zhihou quqi nan, 5 ge nanren zhong jiuyou 1 ge guanggun], 27 
January 10.
    \66\ Wei Xing Zhu, Li Lu, and Therese Hesketh, ``China's Excess 
Males, Sex Selective Abortion and One Child Policy: Analysis of Data 
From 2005 National Intercensus Survey,'' British Medical Journal 
(Online), 9 April 09, 4-5.
    \67\ SOS Children's Villages, Canada (Online), ``Chinese Child 
Traffickers Detained,'' 28 March 10.
    \68\ Susan W. Tiefenbrun and Christie J. Edwards, ``Gendercide and 
the Cultural Context of Sex Trafficking in China,'' 32 Fordham 
International Law Journal 731, 752 (2009); Women in a Changing China, 
Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 
March 10, Testimony of Mark Lagon, Former Ambassador-at-Large and 
Director, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State.

    Notes to Section II--Human Trafficking
    \1\ The specific phrase used to describe the concept of trafficking 
in Chinese government documents, including the National Plan of Action 
on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) as well as 
related regulations, circulars, and opinions, is guaimai funu ertong, 
which literally means ``the abduction and sale of women and children.'' 
See, e.g., State Council General Office, China's National Plan of 
Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) 
[Zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)], 
issued 13 December 07, effective 1 January 08. See also Qinghai 
Province Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Plan of Action on 
Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) [Qinghai sheng 
fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua shishi xize (2008-2012 
nian)], issued 22 December 09; Zhuzhou City Action Plan on Combating 
Trafficking in Women and Children [Zhuzhou shi fandui guaimai funu 
ertong xingdong jihua], issued 31 December 09; Opinion of Bazhong City 
People's Government Office Regarding the Implementation of ``China's 
National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children 
(2008-2012)'' [Bazhong shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu guanche 
guowuyuan ``zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-
2012 nian)'' de shishi yijian], issued 25 August 09.
    \2\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into 
force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). The Chinese government had been 
considering accession to the UN TIP Protocol for the past few years. 
China's laws and regulations already include more than 95 percent of 
the protocol's contents. CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 120-
21. See also Wang Zhuoqiong, ``China Set To Ratify UN Trafficking 
Protocol,'' China Daily (Online), 24 October 08.
    \3\ National People's Congress, National People's Congress Standing 
Committee Decision Regarding Acceding to the ``United Nations Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Supplementing the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime'' [Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu 
weiyuanhui guanyu jiaru ``lianheguo daji kuaguo youzuzhi fanzui gongyue 
guanyu yufang, jinzhi he chengzhi fanyun renkou tebie shi funu he 
ertong xingwei de buchong yidingshu'' de jueding], 26 December 09. For 
additional information regarding China's accession to the UN TIP 
Protocol, see Chen Jia, ``China Joins UN Fight Against Human 
Trafficking,'' China Daily (Online), 23 December 09.
    \4\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment--China, 
24 February 10. According to this report, ``Forced adult and forced 
child labor remained a problem throughout the country. Government 
efforts described as addressing human trafficking, however, continued 
to be aimed largely at the trafficking of women and children. The 
government did not take steps to enact legislation to prohibit all 
forms of trafficking, though it ratified the UN TIP Protocol in 
December 2009.''
    \5\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 240.
    \6\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking In 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into 
force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol 
states: `` `Trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, 
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.'' See also Office to 
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 10. According to 
this report, ``China's definition of trafficking does not prohibit non-
physical forms of coercion, fraud, debt bondage, involuntary servitude, 
forced labor, or offenses committed against men, although many aspects 
of these crimes are addressed in other articles of China's criminal 
law. China's legal definition of trafficking does not automatically 
regard children over the age of 14 who are subjected to the commercial 
sex trade as trafficking victims.''
    \7\ State Council General Office, China's National Plan of Action 
on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) [Zhongguo 
fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)], issued 13 
December 07, effective 1 January 08. See also Qinghai Province 
Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Plan of Action on Combating 
Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) [Qinghai sheng fandui 
guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua shishi xize (2008-2012 nian)], 
issued 22 December 09; Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Gansu 
Province Implementation of ``China's National Plan of Action on 
Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012)'' [Gansu sheng 
shishi ``zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 
nian)'' fang'an shishi xize], issued 29 April 10; Zhuzhou City Action 
Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children [Zhuzhou shi fandui 
guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua], issued 31 December 09; Opinion of 
Bazhong City People's Government Office Regarding the Implementation of 
``China's National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Women and 
Children (2008-2012)'' [Bazhong shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu 
guanche guowuyuan ``zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua 
(2008-2012 nian)'' de shishi yijian], issued 25 August 09.
    \8\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 118. As documented and 
defined internationally, major forms of human trafficking include 
forced labor, bonded labor, involuntary domestic servitude, child 
soldiers, forced prostitution, children exploited for commercial sex, 
child sex tourism, and debt bondage and involuntary servitude among 
migrant laborers. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking In Persons, 
U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2008, Major 
Forms of Trafficking in Persons, 4 June 08, 19-25.
    \9\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 
10; Juliet Shwe Gaung, ``Forced Marriages Driving Human Trafficking, UN 
Says,'' Myanmar Times (Online), 8 March 10.
    \10\  Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 
10; See also Women in a Changing China, Staff Roundtable of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 March 10, Testimony of 
Mark Lagon, Former Ambassador-At-Large and Director, Office to Monitor 
and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State.
    \11\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 121. Countries where 
women and children are trafficked into China include North Korea, 
Vietnam, and Burma. See, e.g., Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking 
in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 
2010--China, 14 June 10; Keith B. Richburg, ``Chinese Border Town 
Emerges as New Front Line in Fight Against Human Trafficking,'' 
Washington Post (Online), 26 December 09; ``Analyzing the Underlying 
Interest in Transnational Marriages: High Income Urban Males Visit 
Vietnam To Find a Mate'' [Jiexi liyi xia de kuaguo hunyin, gao shouru 
dushi nan fu yuenan qiu'ou], Southern Metropolis Weekly, reprinted in 
Sina (Online), 6 April 10. See also Women in a Changing China, Staff 
Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 March 
10, Testimony of Mark Lagon, Former Ambassador-At-Large and Director, 
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of 
State.
    \12\ Lee Tae-hoon, ``North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,'' 
Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10. See also CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 
October 08, 121.
    \13\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--Korea, 
Democratic People's Republic of, 14 June 10. According to the U.S. 
State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, ``NGOs and researchers 
estimate that tens of thousands of undocumented North Koreans currently 
live in northeast China, and as many as 70 percent of them are women. 
There is no reliable information on how many of these North Koreans are 
or have been trafficked, but their status in China as economic migrants 
who may be deported to North Korea makes them particularly vulnerable 
to trafficking.''
    \14\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment--China, 
24 February 10; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 
U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 
June 10. For information on allegations of child labor at one of 
Microsoft's supplier factories, see National Labor Committee (Online), 
``China's Youth Meet Microsoft,'' April 2010.
    \15\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into 
force 25 December 03.
    \16\ Man Guihua, All-China Women's Federation (Online), ``The Fight 
Against Human Trafficking,'' 14 December 09; ``China Faces Growing 
Gender Imbalance,'' BBC (Online), 11 January 10. Researchers quoted in 
this article reported that human trafficking in China has become 
``rampant.''
    \17\ Malcolm Moore, ``Chinese Police Rescue 2,000 Kidnapped 
Children,'' Telegraph (Online), 28 October 09; Mark Colvin, ``Chinese 
Authorities Crackdown on Child Trafficking,'' ABC (Online), 29 October 
10; Lucy Hornby, ``China Police Rescue Trafficked Children,'' Reuters 
(Online), 21 June 09.
    \18\ Juliet Shwe Gaung, ``Forced Marriages Driving Human 
Trafficking, UN Says,'' Myanmar Times (Online), 8 March 10; Virginie 
Mangin, ``Parents Left Bereft by Curse of China's Child Snatchers,'' 
National (Online), 12 March 10; ``The Reason Child Trafficking Crimes 
Are Unstoppable'' [Guaimai ertong fanzui weihe luda bujue], China 
Comment Magazine, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 24 March 09.
    \19\ ``The Reason Child Trafficking Crimes Are Unstoppable'' 
[Guaimai ertong fanzui weihe luda bujue], China Comment Magazine, 
reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 24 March 09; Lucy Hornby, ``China Police 
Rescue Trafficked Children,'' Reuters (Online), 21 June 09. For 
examples of cases in which parents sold their children this year, 
although not explicitly as a direct result of the one child policy, see 
Zhou Xuelian, ``21-Year-Old Youngster `Sells' 6-Day-Old Son To Buy Cell 
Phone To Play With'' [21 sui shuawa dang laohan ``mai'' 6 tian da de 
erzi mai bu shouji shua], Chongqing Times (Online), 9 December 09; 
``Child Trafficking Ring Cracked in Harbin, Suspect Is Chair of OB/GYN 
Department in Hospital'' [Harbin pohuai yiqi guaimai ertong an 
xianyiren shi yiyuan fuchanke zhuren], 7 January 10.
    \20\ ``US Envoy: Economic Crisis Drives Human Trafficking,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Google (Online), 4 December 09. See, 
e.g., Jane Chen, ``Parents Sold Baby and Bought a Phone,'' Shanghai 
Daily (Online), 9 December 09. See also Zhou Xuelian, ``21-Year-Old 
Youngster `Sells' 6-Day-Old Son To Buy Cell Phone To Play With'' [21 
sui shuawa dang laohan ``mai'' 6 tian da de erzi mai bu shouji shua], 
Chongqing Times (Online), 9 December 09.
    \21\ ``Chinese Women Taught To Avoid People-Traffickers,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 8 March 10.
    \22\ Pino Cazzaniga, ``Fleeing From North Korea To Be Sold in China 
as Brides or Prostitutes,'' AsiaNews.it (Online), 15 February 10; Bill 
Allan, ``They Fled From the Nightmare of North Korea--Only To Be Sold 
Into Slavery in China,'' Herald Scotland (Online), 20 June 10; Keith B. 
Richburg, ``Chinese Border Town Emerges as New Front Line in Fight 
Against Human Trafficking,'' Washington Post (Online), 26 December 09.
    \23\ Scott Tong, ``Take My Daughter: Confessions of a Chinese Baby 
Trafficker,'' Marketplace (Online), 5 May 10.
    \24\ Tania Branigan, ``The Chinese Toddler Chained Through Love and 
Fear,'' Guardian (Online), 4 February 10; ``Migrant Children Become At-
Risk Group for Trafficking'' [Liudong ertong chengwei bei guaimai de 
gaowei qunti], Peace Net, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 7 January 10; 
China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``The Children of Migrant Workers in 
China,'' 8 May 09; Damian Grammaticas, ``Chinese Children Snatched and 
Sold on to Couples,'' BBC (Online), 27 November 09.
    \25\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 
10, 113.
    \26\ Ibid., 217.
    \27\ ``Explosion in Fireworks Workshop Occurs in Hezhou City, 
Guangxi Province, 1 Child Killed, 12 Seriously Injured'' [Guangxi 
hezhou fasheng yiqi baozhu zuofang baozha an 13 ertong 1 si 12 
zhongshang], Southern Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in Zhu'ao Net 
(Online), 13 November 09.
    \28\ Jiang Guibin and Tang Xuping, `` `Child Workers' Injured and 
Killed in Hezhou Fireworks Factory Explosion Case Were All `Left Behind 
Children' '' [Hezhou baozhu zuofang baozha shijian zhong sishang 
`tonggong' junwei `liushou ertong'], Xinhua (Online), 14 November 09. 
See also Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 
10, 112.
    \29\ Liang Shubin, ``Child Trafficking Ring Cracked in Harbin, 
Suspect Is Chair of OB/GYN Department in Hospital'' [Harbin pohuai yiqi 
guaimai ertong an xianyiren shi yiyuan fuchanke zhuren], Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Peace Net (Online), 7 January 10.
    \30\ According to the Chinese government's second reservation in 
its written decision to accede to the UN TIP Protocol, Hong Kong is not 
a party to the UN TIP Protocol. Human trafficking cases in Hong Kong 
are treated separately under Hong Kong law. National People's Congress, 
National People's Congress Standing Committee Decision Regarding 
Acceding to the ``United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime'' 
[Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu jiaru 
``lianheguo daji kuaguo youzuzhi fanzui gongyue guanyu yufang, jinzhi 
he chengzhi fanyun renkou tebie shi funu he ertong xingwei de buchong 
yidingshu'' de jueding], 26 December 09.
    \31\ Office of the President of the Philippines, Commission on 
Filipinos Overseas (Online), ``Two Filipinos Convicted of Human 
Trafficking in Hong Kong,'' 15 March 10.
    \32\ Ibid. See also Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in 
Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--
Hong Kong, 14 June 10, 167. According to the State Department report, 
the two Filipina offenders lured three women.
    \33\ Jane Chen, ``Parents Sold Baby and Bought a Phone,'' Shanghai 
Daily (Online), 9 December 09; Zhou Xuelian, ``21-Year-Old Youngster 
`Sells' 6-Day-Old Son To Buy Cell Phone To Play With'' [21 sui shuawa 
dang laohan ``mai'' 6 tian da de erzi mai bu shouji shua], Chongqing 
Times (Online), 9 December 09.
    \34\ Chen Yong, ``Gambling Couple Gave Birth to Children and Sold 
Them for Money To Squander, Grandmother Contacted Buyer'' [Haodu fuqi 
sheng haizi maiqian huihuo nainai lianxi maijia], Northeast Net 
(Online), 5 July 10.
    \35\ ``China's Top Legislature Ends Bimonthly Session, Adopts Tort 
Law,'' Xinhua (Online), 26 December 09; UN Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 
3(a).
    \36\ ``Trafficking Crackdown: `Babies Looking for Home' Campaign 
Results in Another Two `Babies' Finding Their Homes'' [Daguai: ``baobei 
xunjia'' huodong you you liangming ``baobei'' zhaodao jia], Xinhua 
(Online), 24 December 09; Ministry of Public Security (Online), 
``National Anti-Trafficking DNA Database Set Up'' [Quanguo ``daguai'' 
DNA shujuku jiancheng], 30 April 09; Office to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in 
Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 10.
    \37\ Ministry of Public Security (Online), ``Information on 
Unidentified Trafficked Children'' [Wei chaqing shenyuan de bei guaimai 
ertong xinxi], accessed 23 September 10.
    \38\ Ministry of Public Security, Opinion on Lawful Punishment for 
the Crime of Abducting and Selling Women and Children [Guanyu yifa 
zhengzhi guaimai funu ertong fanzui de yijian], 2 April 10.
    \39\ Chen Jia, ``Parents of Missing Teenagers Win in New 
Trafficking Law,'' China Daily (Online), 11 March 10.
    \40\ State Council General Office, China's National Plan of Action 
on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012) [Zhongguo 
fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)], issued 13 
December 07, effective 1 January 08. See also CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 
10 October 09, 176; Qinghai Province Implementing Rules and Regulations 
for the Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children 
(2008-2012) [Qinghai sheng fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua 
shishi xize (2008-2012 nian)], issued 22 December 09; Implementing 
Rules and Regulations for the Gansu Province Implementation of 
``China's National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and 
Children (2008-2012)'' [Gansu sheng shishi ``zhongguo fandui guaimai 
funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)'' fang'an shishi xize], 
issued 29 April 10; Zhuzhou City Action Plan on Combating Trafficking 
in Women and Children [Zhuzhou shi fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong 
jihua], issued 31 December 09; Opinion of Bazhong City People's 
Government Office Regarding the Implementation of ``China's National 
Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-
2012)'' [Bazhong shi renmin zhengfu bangongshi guanyu guanche guowuyuan 
``zhongguo fandui guaimai funu ertong xingdong jihua (2008-2012 nian)'' 
de shishi yijian], issued 25 August 09.
    \41\ See, e.g., ``China, Laos Set Up Liaison Office To Fight Human 
Trafficking,'' Xinhua (Online), 17 October 09; Keith B. Richburg, 
``Chinese Border Town Emerges as New Front Line in Fight Against Human 
Trafficking,'' Washington Post (Online), 26 December 09; Ma Guihua, 
``China Joins Mekong Countries in Fighting Cross-Border Human 
Trafficking,'' 29 November 09.
    \42\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 
10.
    \43\ Ibid.
    \44\ Zhang Yuchen, ``A League of Their Own Out To Trace Missing 
Children,'' China Daily (Online), 28 April 10; Office to Monitor and 
Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in 
Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 10.
    \45\ Virginie Mangin, ``Parents Left Bereft by Curse of China's 
Child Snatchers,'' National (Online), 12 March 10; ``Parents of 
Abducted Children Protest in South China,'' Reuters, reprinted in Radio 
Nederland Wereldomroep (Online), 18 January 10; Peter Hitchens, 
``Gendercide: China's Shameful Massacre of Unborn Girls Means There 
Will Soon Be 30m More Men Than Women,'' Daily Mail (Online), 10 April 
10. According to this article, Chinese officials ``even chase after 
citizens who go to Peking to complain about their treatment, or to 
petition for help. Parents who had put up posters begging for news of 
their stolen children were shocked to find that officials immediately 
snatched them from walls.''
    \46\ Mark MacKinnon, ``The Search for China's Stolen Children,'' 
Globe and Mail (Online), 25 December 09; John Vause, ``Parents Seek 
Answers After Children Abducted,'' CNN (Online), 10 August 09. One 
parent of a missing child told CNN, ``During sensitive times, like 
Children's Day, the government forces me to leave town . . . they were 
afraid I would organize some activities like searching for kids.''
    \47\ Damian Grammaticas, ``Chinese Children Snatched and Sold on to 
Couples,'' BBC (Online), 27 November 09.
    \48\ ``China's Top Legislature Ends Bimonthly Session, Adopts Tort 
Law,'' Xinhua (Online), 26 December 09.
    \49\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 240.
    \50\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into 
force 25 December 03, art. 3(a). Article 3(a) of the UN TIP Protocol 
states: `` `Trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment, 
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of 
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for 
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, 
the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.'' See also Office to 
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State, 
Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 10. According to 
this report, ``China's definition of trafficking does not prohibit non-
physical forms of coercion, fraud, debt bondage, involuntary servitude, 
forced labor, or offenses committed against men, although many aspects 
of these crimes are addressed in other articles of China's criminal 
law. China's legal definition of trafficking does not automatically 
regard children over the age of 14 who are subjected to the commercial 
sex trade as trafficking victims.''
    \51\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 175.
    \52\ Ibid. For information concerning the distinction between human 
smuggling and trafficking, see U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(Online), ``Human Smuggling and Trafficking,'' 20 January 10.
    \53\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 
10.
    \54\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment--China, 
24 February 10; Human Rights Watch (Online), World Report 2010--North 
Korea, 20 January 10; Women in a Changing China, Staff Roundtable of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 8 March 10, Testimony 
of Mark Lagon, Former Ambassador-at-Large and Director, Office to 
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State.
    \55\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 
10.
    \56\ Ibid.

    Notes to Section II--North Korean Refugees in China
    \1\ ``Crackdown on North Koreans,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 
September 09.
    \2\ Ibid.
    \3\ The 1951 Convention and its Protocol define a refugee as 
someone who, ``owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country.'' They mandate that ``[n]o 
Contracting State shall expel or return (`refouler') a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.'' Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 51 by 
the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons convened under UN General Assembly resolution 429(V) 
of 14 December 50, arts. 1, 33. China acceded to the Convention on 
September 24, 1982.
    \4\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Jiang Yu Holds January 22, 2008, Press Conference'' [2008 
nian 1 yue 22 ri waijiaobu fayanren jiang yu juxing lixing jizhehui], 
22 January 08.
    \5\ UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
A/64/224, 4 August 09, 16-17.
    \6\ Ibid.
    \7\ ``Crackdown on North Koreans,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 
September 09.
    \8\ John Garnaut, ``Crackdown Reduces Flow of Fleeing North 
Koreans,'' Sydney Morning Herald (Online), 26 October 09.
    \9\ ``Crackdown on North Koreans,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 
September 09.
    \10\ John M. Glionna, ``Aiding North Korea Defectors: A High-Stakes 
Spy Mission,'' Los Angeles Times (Online), 25 November 09.
    \11\ Good Friends (Online), North Korea Today, No. 328, January 
2010.
    \12\ Good Friends (Online), North Korea Today, No. 332, February 
2010.
    \13\ ``Some 50 Refugees in S. Korea Diplomatic Missions,'' Agence 
France-Presse, reprinted in AsiaOne News (Online), 8 March 10.
    \14\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices--2009, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.
    \15\ Lee Tae-hoon, ``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at 
$1,500,'' Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10.
    \16\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for 
Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 
2009, 18-19.
    \17\ Lee Sung Jin, ``Current Situation on Refugees in China,'' 
Daily NK (Online), 10 May 09.
    \18\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Christian Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison 
for Aiding North Korean Refugees,'' 1 September 09.
    \19\ Lee Tae-hoon, ``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at 
$1,500,'' Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10.
    \20\ Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, Survival 
Under Torture: Briefing Report on the Situation of Torture in the DPRK, 
September 2009, 24-31; UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, A/64/224, 4 August 09, 17; Yoonok Chang, Stephan 
Haggard, and Marcus Noland, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, Migration Experiences of North Korean Refugees: Survey 
Evidence From China, March 2008, 10.
    \21\ Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, East-West Center (Online), 
``Repression and Punishment in North Korea: Survey Evidence of Prison 
Camp Experiences,'' October 2009, 11-12.
    \22\ Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Migration Experiences of North 
Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China, March 2008, 6; Tom 
O'Neill, ``Escape From North Korea,'' National Geographic (Online), 1 
February 09; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(Online), A Prison Without Bars: Refugee and Defector Testimonies of 
Severe Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea, 
March 2008, Preface, 28.
    \23\ Tom O'Neill, ``Escape From North Korea,'' National Geographic 
(Online), 1 February 09; John M. Glionna, ``Aiding North Korea 
Defectors: A High-Stakes Spy Mission,'' Los Angeles Times (Online), 25 
November 09.
    \24\ A total of 1,346 refugees were interviewed at 11 sites in 
northeastern China. Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Migration Experiences 
of North Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China, March 2008, 12-
13, 24.
    \25\ U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (Online), A 
Prison Without Bars: Refugee and Defector Testimonies of Severe 
Violations of Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea, March 2008, 
30.
    \26\ Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Migration Experiences of North 
Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China, March 2008, 9, 21.
    \27\ UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
A/64/224, 4 August 09, 17; Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human 
Rights, Survival Under Torture: Briefing Report on the Situation of 
Torture in the DPRK, September 2009, 23-33; The Rising Stakes of 
Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, 
President, Defense Forum Foundation.
    \28\ Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, Survival 
Under Torture: Briefing Report on the Situation of Torture in the DPRK, 
September 2009, 27; Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), 
Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to 
China, March 2009, 15; UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, A/64/224, 4 August 09, 17; The Rising Stakes of 
Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, 
President, Defense Forum Foundation.
    \29\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for 
Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 
2009, 46-49; Yoonok Chang, Stephan Haggard, and Marcus Noland, Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, Migration Experiences of North 
Korean Refugees: Survey Evidence From China, March 2008, 13.
    \30\ Tom O'Neill, ``Escape From North Korea,'' National Geographic 
(Online), 1 February 09.
    \31\ Lee Tae-hoon, ``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at 
$1,500,'' Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10.
    \32\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for 
Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 
2009, 28-33; ``North Korean Trafficked Brides,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 30 April 09.
    \33\ ``North Korean Women Sold in China,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 29 April 09.
    \34\ Joel R. Charny, et al., Refugees International, Acts of 
Betrayal: The Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China, April 
2005, 11.
    \35\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for 
Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 
2009, 20-21; Lee Tae-hoon, ``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at 
$1,500,'' Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10.
    \36\ Pino Cazzaniga, ``Fleeing From North Korea To Be Sold in China 
as Brides or Prostitutes,'' AsiaNews.it (Online), 15 February 10; Lee 
Tae-hoon, ``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,'' Korea 
Times (Online), 5 May 10.
    \37\ Nam You-Sun, ``N. Korean Women Up for Sale in China: 
Activist,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 12 May 10; The Rising Stakes 
of Refugee Issues in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 1 May 09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, 
President, Defense Forum Foundation.
    \38\ Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (Online), Lives for 
Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, March 
2009, 33-36; Norma Kang Muico, Anti-Slavery International, ``An Absence 
of Choice: The Sexual Exploitation of North Korean Women in China,'' 9 
November 05, 5; The Rising Stakes of Refugee Issues in China, Staff 
Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 1 May 
09, Testimony of Suzanne Scholte, President, Defense Forum Foundation.
    \39\ UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP Protocol), adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 00, entry into 
force 25 December 03, art. 7.
    \40\ Article 9 of the UN TIP Protocol provides that ``State Parties 
shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other measures: 
(a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons; and (b) To protect 
victims of trafficking in persons, especially women and children, from 
revictimization.'' UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UN TIP 
Protocol), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 
November 00, entry into force 25 December 03, art. 9. Article 6 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women provides that ``States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in 
women and exploitation of prostitution of women.'' Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification, and accession by UN General 
Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 79, entry into force 2 
September 81, art. 6.
    \41\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 
10, 107.
    \42\ Lee Tae-hoon, ``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at 
$1,500,'' Korea Times (Online), 5 May 10.
    \43\ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2010--China, 14 June 
10, 107.
    \44\ Lina Yoon, ``Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in 
China,'' Christian Science Monitor (Online), 4 September 09.
    \45\ Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (Online), ``Shadow 
Children Denied National ID,'' 6 July 09.
    \46\ PRC Nationality Law, enacted and effective 10 September 80, 
art. 4. Every citizen in China is registered under the household 
registration (hukou) system. Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Denied 
Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean Women in China,'' 
April 2008, 3.
    \47\ PRC Compulsory Education Law, enacted 12 April 86, effective 1 
July 86, amended 29 June 06, effective 1 September 06, arts. 5, 10.
    \48\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Denied Status, Denied 
Education: Children of North Korean Women in China,'' April 2008, 3, 9-
11; Lina Yoon, ``Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in China,'' 
Christian Science Monitor (Online), 4 September 09.
    \49\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 51 by 
the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons convened under UN General Assembly resolution 429(V) 
of 14 December 50, art. 22; PRC Nationality Law, enacted and effective 
10 September 80, art. 4; PRC Compulsory Education Law, enacted 12 April 
86, effective 1 July 86, amended 29 June 06, effective 1 September 06, 
art. 5; Lina Yoon, ``Stateless Children: North Korean Refugees in 
China,'' Christian Science Monitor (Online), 4 September 09.
    \50\ Human Rights Watch (Online), Denied Status, Denied Education: 
Children of North Korean Women in China, April 2008, 8; Lee Tae-hoon, 
``Female North Korean Defectors Priced at $1,500,'' Korea Times 
(Online), 5 May 10; Lina Yoon, ``Stateless Children: North Korean 
Refugees in China,'' Christian Science Monitor (Online), 4 September 
09; Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (Online), ``Shadow Children 
Denied National ID,'' 6 July 09.
    \51\ Life Funds for North Korean Refugees (Online), ``Food Prices 
Rocket in North Korea,'' 10 April 10; Chico Harlan, ``N. Korea Lifts 
Restrictions on Private Markets as Last Resort in Food Crisis,'' 
Washington Post (Online), 18 June 10.
    \52\ Chico Harlan, ``N. Korea Lifts Restrictions on Private Markets 
as Last Resort in Food Crisis,'' Washington Post (Online), 18 June 10.
    \53\ Blaine Harden, ``North Korea Revalues Currency, Destroying 
Private Savings,'' Washington Post (Online), 2 December 09; Life Funds 
for North Korean Refugees (Online), ``Food Prices Rocket in North 
Korea,'' 10 April 10; ``N. Korea Completely Cuts off State Rations: Aid 
Group,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 14 June 10; Chico Harlan, ``N. 
Korea Lifts Restrictions on Private Markets as Last Resort in Food 
Crisis,'' Washington Post (Online), 18 June 10.
    \54\ Sharon LaFraniere, ``Views Show How North Korea Policy Spread 
Misery,'' New York Times (Online), 9 June 10.
    \55\ A survey conducted from August 2004 to September 2005 found 
that most refugees crossed the border for ``economic'' reasons. Yoonok 
Chang, with Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, ``North Korean Refugees 
in China: Evidence From a Survey,'' in The North Korean Refugee Crisis: 
Human Rights and International Response, eds. Stephan Haggard and 
Marcus Noland (Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea, 2006), 19.
    \56\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ``Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Jiang Yu Holds January 22, 2008, Press Conference'' [2008 
nian 1 yue 22 ri waijiaobu fayanren jiang yu juxing lixing jizhehui], 
22 January 08.
    \57\ UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
A/64/224, 4 August 09, 16-17.
    \58\ Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 51 by 
the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons convened under UN General Assembly resolution 429(V) 
of 14 December 50, art. 33; UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, A/64/224, 4 August 09, 16-17.
    \59\ ``Crackdown on North Koreans,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 
September 09.

    Notes to Section II--Public Health
    \1\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 12.
    \2\ Ministry of Health (Online), ``Minister of Health Chen Zhu 
Attends Press Conference at Third Session of Eleventh NPC on `Ensuring 
and Improving the People's Livelihood' '' [Chen zhu buzhang chuxi shiyi 
jie quanguo renda sanci huiyi ``baozhang he gaishan minsheng'' zhuanti 
jizhehui], 8 March 10. At a March 8, 2010, press conference, Minister 
of Health Chen Zhu revealed that ``Eighty percent of China's quality 
medical resources flow to the urban areas when a majority of our 
populace still dwells in the countryside.'' See also ``Chinese Experts 
Stress Need for Basic Health Care,'' Washington Post (Online), 7 March 
10. According to this article, ``The high cost and poor availability of 
health services are among the biggest complaints of the Chinese 
public.''
    \3\ See, e.g., ``Basic Medicine System To Cover 30% of Grass-Roots 
Hospitals by February: Official,'' Xinhua (Online), 27 February 10; 
Ministry of Health (Online), ``Ministry of Health Issues `PRC National 
Formulary (Chemical Drugs and Biological Products Chapter) 2010 
Edition' '' [Weishengbu fabu ``Zhongguo guojia chufang ji (huaxue 
yaopin yu shengwu zhipin juan) 2010 nian ban''], 8 February 10; 
Ministry of Health (Online), ``Six Departments and Committees Jointly 
Print and Distribute `Plan for the Construction of a Basic Healthcare 
Team With General Practitioners as the Focal Point' '' [Liu buwei 
lianhe yinfa ``yi quanke yisheng wei zhongdian de jiceng yiliao 
weisheng duiwu jianshe guihua''], 1 April 10.
    \4\ See, e.g., Han Xue, ``42 Counties and Cities in Heilongjiang To 
Implement Basic Healthcare Reform Pilot Projects'' [Heilongjiang 42 ge 
xianshi jiang shishi jiceng yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige shidian], 
Dongbei Net (Online), 9 July 10; Song Qianyun, ``Guizhou Strengthens 
Measures, High Level Completion of Tasks in Deepening Healthcare 
Reform'' [Guizhou qianghua cuoshi gaoshuiping wancheng shenhua yiyao 
weisheng tizhi gaige renwu], Guizhou Daily News, reprinted in Xinhua 
(Online), 25 June 10; Wu Yueqiang, ``Jiangxi Province Announces This 
Year's Target Tasks for Deepening Healthcare Reform'' [Jiangxi sheng 
gongbu jinnian shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige mubiao renwu], Jinshi 
Net-Nanchang Evening News, reprinted in Jinshi.net (Online), 9 July 10; 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Development and Reform Commission, 
``Meeting on 2010 Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Work on Deepening 
Healthcare Reform Convenes Today'' [2010 nian ningxia huizu zizhi qu 
shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige gongzuo huiyi jinri zhaokai], 
reprinted in Sina (Online), 9 July 10.
    \5\ Gu Xin, ``Distribute Medical Service Evenly,'' China Daily 
(Online), 24 November 09. According to this report, ``In some rural, 
mountainous and outlying regions, people have no access to even basic 
medical services given the small number of public healthcare providers, 
let alone specialized care from the poorly-equipped hospitals. The 
underlying factor for this should be attributed to government efforts 
to maintain the dominant status of public hospitals in large cities. 
For a long time, big hospitals, especially in big cities, have enjoyed 
an absolute advantage over their counterparts in rural and outlying 
areas in being awarded public inputs. At the same time, medical workers 
in under-funded hospitals have tried to move to big cities and 
economically developed regions to get higher pay.''
    \6\ ``Govt' Promises Equitable Healthcare for All,'' China Daily, 
reprinted in PRC Central People's Government (Online), 8 January 08.
    \7\ See, e.g., Che Yuming, ``Li Keqiang: Hurry To Implement Five 
Focal Tasks of Healthcare Reform'' [Li keqiang: ba yigai wuxiang 
zhongdian renwu zhuajin luodao shichu], Xinhua (Online), 4 December 09; 
``Chinese President Calls for Universal Basic Health Care,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 29 May 10.
    \8\ Drew Thompson, ``China's Health Care Reform,'' Council on 
Foreign Relations (Online), 30 April 09 (``There is widespread 
insecurity about health care in the country, with more than 60 percent 
of Chinese citizens surveyed unsatisfied with the health services they 
receive.''). See also Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
``China's Capacity To Manage Infectious Diseases: Global 
Implications,'' March 2009, VII; State Council Information Office, 
State Council Opinion on Deepening Healthcare Reform [Zhonggong 
zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige de 
yijian], issued 17 March 09; State Council Information Office, State 
Council Circular Regarding the Printing and Distribution of the 2009-
2011 Healthcare Reform Implementation Plan [Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa 
yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige jinqi zhongdian shishi fang'an (2009-2011 
nian) de tongzhi], issued 18 March 09.
    \9\ Ministry of Health (Online), ``Ministry of Health and Five 
Other Ministries Deploy Public Hospital Reform Pilot Project'' 
[Weishengbu deng wu buwei bushu gongli yiyuan gaige shidian gongzuo], 
23 February 10; Ministry of Health (Online), ``Ministry of Health and 
Five Other Ministries Jointly Issue `Guiding Opinions on the Public 
Hospital Reform Pilot Project' '' [Weishengbu deng wu buwei lianhe fabu 
``guanyu gongli yiyuan gaige shidian de zhidao yijian''], 23 February 
10.
    \10\ ``Basic Medicine System To Cover 30% of Grass-Roots Hospitals 
by February: Official,'' Xinhua (Online), 27 February 10; Ministry of 
Health (Online), ``Ministry of Health Issues `PRC National Formulary 
(Chemical Drugs and Biological Products Chapter) 2010 Edition' '' 
[Weishengbu fabu ``Zhongguo guojia chufang ji (huaxue yaopin shengwu 
zhipin juan) 2010 nian ban''], 8 February 10.
    \11\ Ministry of Health (Online), ``Six Departments and Committees 
Jointly Print and Distribute `Plan for the Construction of a Basic 
Healthcare Team With General Practitioners as the Focal Point' '' [Liu 
buwei lianhe yinfa ``yi quanke yisheng wei zhongdian de jiceng yiliao 
weisheng duiwu jianshe guihua''], 1 April 10.
    \12\ Wu Yueqiang, ``Jiangxi Province Announces This Year's Target 
Tasks for Deepening Healthcare Reform'' [Jiangxi sheng gongbu jinnian 
shenhua yiyao weisheng tizhi gaige mubiao renwu], Jinshi Net-Nanchang 
Evening News, reprinted in Jinshi.net (Online), 9 July 10.
    \13\ Yuhui Li and Linda Dorsten, ``Regional and Urban/Rural 
Differences of Public Health in China,'' 2 Global Journal of Health 
Science 20, 21 (April 2010).
    \14\ ``Medical Insurance To Cover All Urban Residents This Year,'' 
Xinhua, reprinted in China Economic Net (Online), 23 February 09; Yuhui 
Li and Linda Dorsten, ``Regional and Urban/Rural Differences of Public 
Health in China,'' 2 Global Journal of Health Science, 20, 25 (April 
2010).
    \15\ Jingjing Yang, ``Imbalance Grows at Chinese Hospitals,'' New 
York Times (Online), 26 April 10; Gordon Fairclough, ``In China, Rx for 
Ailing Health System,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 15 October 09; Gu 
Xin, ``Distribute Medical Service Evenly,'' China Daily (Online), 24 
November 09. According to this report, ``For a long time, big 
hospitals, especially in big cities, have enjoyed an absolute advantage 
over their counterparts in rural and outlying areas in being awarded 
public inputs. At the same time, medical workers in under-funded 
hospitals have tried to move to big cities and economically developed 
regions to get higher pay.''
    \16\ See CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 183; ``Migrant 
Restrictions in China Stirs Outcry,'' CNN (Online), 12 March 10; Aris 
Chan, China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Paying the Price for Economic 
Development: The Children of Migrant Workers in China,'' November 2009, 
29-31, 45-48, 57; Carl Minzner, ``The System That Divides China,'' Los 
Angeles Times (Online), 16 March 10.
    \17\ ``City Cuts Fines on Second Child,'' Global Times (Online), 23 
August 10. According to one expert quoted in this report, ``Children 
born outside State scrutiny will enjoy equal rights as the first child 
only after the family pays the fine and registers them.''
    \18\ Yan Hao and Li Yanan, ``Urban Hukou, or Rural Land? Migrant 
Workers Face Dilemma,'' China Daily (Online), 10 March 10; Tao Ran, 
``Where There's a Will, There's a Way To Reform,'' China Daily 
(Online), 22 March 10.
    \19\ ``Resources Imbalance Challenges China's Health Care Reform: 
Minister,'' Xinhua (Online), 28 September 09; ``China Endeavors To 
Bring Affordable Medical Services to Farmers,'' Xinhua (Online), 2 
January 10; Gordon Fairclough, ``In China, Rx for Ailing Health 
System,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 15 October 09; Gu Xin, 
``Distribute Medical Service Evenly,'' China Daily (Online), 24 
November 09. According to this report, ``In some rural, mountainous and 
outlying regions, people have no access to even basic medical services 
given the small number of public healthcare providers, let alone 
specialized care from the poorly-equipped hospitals.''
    \20\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 183.
    \21\ Ibid.
    \22\ ``China Audits Rural Cooperative Medical Care System,'' 
Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 6 June 10. According to 
official statistics quoted in this report, 833 million farmers, or 94 
percent of the rural population, were participating in the rural 
cooperative medical system as of the end of 2009. This is an increase 
over the 85.9 percent coverage reported in the Commission's 2009 Annual 
Report. CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 183.
    \23\ ``Missing the Barefoot Doctors: Many a Problem Lies in the Way 
of a `New Socialist Countryside,' '' Economist (Online), 11 October 07.
    \24\ Shanlian Hu, Shenglan Tang, Yuanli Liu, Yuxin Zhao, Maria-
Luisa Escobar, and David de Ferranti, ``Reform of How Health Care Is 
Paid for in China: Challenges and Opportunities,'' 372 Lancet, 1846 (22 
November 08); ``Case Studies in Chinese Health Care Reform,'' Economic 
Observer (Online), 4 November 08.
    \25\ ``Case Studies in Chinese Health Care Reform,'' Economic 
Observer (Online), 4 November 08. See also CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 
October 09, 183.
    \26\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXII) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 12(2c). See also 
``China Pledges To Step Up Fight Against Infectious Diseases,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 29 June 10.
    \27\ See discussion below for more details.
    \28\ ``Hand-Foot-Mouth Disease Epidemic Spreads Early'' [Shouzukou 
bing yiqing tiqian gaofa], Beijing News (Online), 7 May 10; ``Hand-
Foot-Mouth Disease Claims 94 Lives in China,'' Xinhua (Online), 14 
April 10. See also Fang Xiao, ``Alarming Outbreak of Mutated Hand, 
Foot, and Mouth Disease in Guangxi,'' Epoch Times (Online), 5 May 10.
    \29\ Margie Mason, ``1 Chinese Baby Born With Syphilis Every 
Hour,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 5 May 
10. See also Joseph D. Tucker, et al., ``Syphilis and Social Upheaval 
in China,'' 362 New England Journal of Medicine, 1658, 1658-1661 (6 May 
10).
    \30\ Jane Chen, ``10 Patients Claim Hep C Infection From 
Dialysis,'' Shanghai Daily (Online), 16 April 10.
    \31\ ``Infectious Diseases Kill 1,269 in China in April; Over Half 
AIDS Cases,'' Xinhua (Online), 11 May 10; Yang Wanli, ``China's HIV/
AIDS Total To Hit 740,000,'' China Daily (Online), 23 December 09. See 
also ``Ministry of Health Ranks HIV/AIDS Deadliest Infectious Disease 
in China, Government Harassment of Advocates Continues,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2; ``China's 
Minister of Health Warns of HIV Spread,'' Xinhua (Online), 24 November 
09.
    \32\ Tan Ee Lyn, ``China Fights Growing Problem of Tuberculosis,'' 
Reuters (Online), 5 January 10.
    \33\ ``Resources Imbalance Challenges China's Health Care Reform: 
Minister,'' Xinhua (Online), 28 September 09; L.H. Chan, P.K. Lee, and 
G. Chan, ``China Engages Global Health Governance: Processes and 
Dilemmas,'' 4 Global Health 1, 5 (January 2009). For examples of some 
factors that contribute to greater risk of the spread of infectious 
disease in rural areas, see Yuhui Li and Linda Dorsten, ``Regional and 
Urban/Rural Differences of Public Health in China,'' 2 Global Journal 
of Health Science 20, 24 (April 2010).
    \34\ L.H. Chan, P.K. Lee, and G. Chan, ``China Engages Global 
Health Governance: Processes and Dilemmas,'' 4 Global Health 1, 5 
(January 2009). Joe Amon, Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Chinese 
Corruption Is Hazardous to Your Health,'' 13 May 10.
    \35\ Shan Juan, ``Probe Ordered Into Tainted Vaccines,'' China 
Daily (Online), 18 March 10.
    \36\ Ibid.
    \37\ Joe Amon, Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Chinese Corruption Is 
Hazardous to Your Health,'' 13 May 10.
    \38\ Ibid.
    \39\ Qide Han, et al., ``China and Global Health,'' 372 Lancet 
1439, 1439-1441 (October 2008). See also Peter Foster, ``China 
Threatens World Health by Unleashing Waves of Superbugs,'' Telegraph 
(Online), 5 February 10; Gordon Fairclough, ``In China, Rx for Ailing 
Health System,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 15 October 09.
    \40\ Human Rights in China, ``Take Action, Tiananmen: 2008 and 
Beyond,'' China Rights Forum, No. 2, 2008, 43.
    \41\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXII) of 16 
December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, art. 12(1).
    \42\ Mitch Moxley, ``China Tackles Mental Health Woes,'' Inter 
Press Service, reprinted in Asia Times (Online), 9 July 10.
    \43\ Malcolm Moore, ``China Has 100 Million People With Mental 
Illness,'' Telegraph (Online), 28 April 10.
    \44\ ``Psychiatric Institutions in China,'' 376 Lancet 2, 2 (3 July 
10). According to this editorial, ``The average number of qualified 
psychiatrists worldwide is four per 100 000 individuals: in China, it 
is about 1.26.''
    \45\ Kathrin Hille, ``School Killings Cast Spotlight on Social 
Stresses in China,'' Financial Times (Online), 15 May 10; Malcolm 
Moore, ``China To Build 550 Mental Hospitals in Response to School 
Stabbings,'' Telegraph (Online), 21 June 10; ``Psychiatric Institutions 
in China,'' 376 Lancet 2, 2 (3 July 10). According to this editorial, 
``The average number of qualified psychiatrists worldwide is four per 
100,000 individuals: in China, it is about 1.26.''
    \46\ ``Psychiatric Institutions in China,'' 376 Lancet 2, 2 (3 July 
10). According to this editorial, ``The average number of qualified 
psychiatrists worldwide is four per 100 000 individuals: in China, it 
is about 1.26.'' See also ``Prevalence, Treatment, and Associated 
Disability of Mental Disorders in Four Provinces in China During 2001-
05: An Epidemiological Survey,'' 373 Lancet 2041, 2049 (13 June 09). 
According to this study, an estimated 91 percent of the screened 
individuals who suffered from some form of mental illness in China 
never sought help.
    \47\ See, e.g., Shan Juan, ``After a Spate of Brutal Murders, 
Mental Health Gets a Closer Look,'' China Daily (Online), 25 May 10; 
Malcolm Moore, ``China To Build 550 Mental Hospitals in Response to 
School Stabbings,'' Telegraph (Online), 21 June 10.
    \48\ Shan Juan, Hu Meidong, and Zhu Xingxin, ``School Killings 
Reveal Mental Health Woes,'' China Daily (Online), 24 March 10; Joel 
Martinsen, ``School Violence: Does It Belong in the News/ '' Danwei 
(Online), 30 April 10; Shirley S. Wang, ``For China, Attacks Shine a 
Light on Its Treatment of the Mentally Ill,'' Wall Street Journal 
(Online), 3 May 10; Dan Martin, ``China School Attacks Expose Mental 
Health Dilemma,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 12 May 10; Shan Juan, 
``After a Spate of Brutal Murders, Mental Health Gets a Closer Look,'' 
China Daily (Online), 25 May 10; Deng Jingyin, ``Mental Health Gets a 
Boost,'' Global Times (Online), 22 June 10.
    \49\ Tini Tran, ``China School Attacks Highlight Mental Health,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Google (Online), 14 May 10. See also 
Shan Juan, Hu Meidong, and Zhu Xingxin, ``School Killings Reveal Mental 
Health Woes,'' China Daily (Online), 24 March 10. According to this 
report, Zheng Mingsheng, who stabbed eight children to death and 
injured five more in Fujian province in March, ``is said to have a 
history of mental illness.'' Deng Jingyin, ``Mental Health Gets a 
Boost,'' Global Times (Online), 22 June 10. According to this report, a 
man who killed his daughter and her classmate in Heilongjiang province 
in May suffered from a ``mental disorder.''
    \50\ Shan Juan, ``After a Spate of Brutal Murders, Mental Health 
Gets a Closer Look,'' China Daily (Online), 25 May 10.
    \51\ Ibid.
    \52\ Zhou Yingfeng, ``China To Renovate and Expand 550 Mental 
Hospitals, Prevent [Mentally] Ill From Creating Disturbances and 
Causing Trouble'' [Wo guo jiang gaikuangjian 550 suo jingshenbing yuan 
fangbingren zhaoshi zhaohuo], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily 
(Online), 21 June 10. See also Deng Jingyin, ``Mental Health Gets A 
Boost,'' Global Times (Online), 22 June 10.
    \53\ ``Psychiatric Institutions in China,'' 376 Lancet 2, 2 (3 July 
10).
    \54\ Huang Jingjing, ``Experts Consider Law on Mental Health,'' 
Global Times (Online), 17 June 09.
    \55\ Ibid.
    \56\ Huang Jingjing, ``Experts Consider Law on Mental Health,'' 
Global Times (Online), 17 June 09.
    \57\ ``Worldview: NGOs a Paradox in Today's China,'' Philadelphia 
Inquirer (Online), 23 May 10. According to Minister of Health Chen Zhu, 
quoted in this article, ``NGOs have an indispensable role in health 
care . . . [t]he participation of NGOs has played an active role in 
raising social awareness and ending stigma and in prevention 
measures.''
    \58\ See, e.g., ``Ministry of Health Ranks HIV/AIDS Deadliest 
Infectious Disease in China, Government Harassment of Advocates 
Continues,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 
January 10, 2.
    \59\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 203.
    \60\ State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues 
Concerning the Management of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic 
Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng waihui guanli youguan wenti 
de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10. See also 
Verna Yu, ``Beijing Tightens Rules on Foreign Funding of NGOs,'' South 
China Morning Post, 15 March 10; Cara Anna, ``NGOs in China Say 
Threatened by New Donor Rules,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Google 
(Online), 12 March 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``Prominent NGO 
Raise Concern Over New Regulations on Receiving Foreign Funding,'' 16 
March 10.
    \61\ Emma Graham-Harrison, ``New Finance Rules Add to Squeeze on 
China NGOs,'' Reuters (Online), 12 March 10.
    \62\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, reprinted in Boxun (Online), 
``Henan HIV/AIDS-Infected Rights Defender Tian Xi Criminally Detained'' 
[Henan aizibing ganran weiquan renshi tian xi bei xingshi juliu], 23 
August 10.
    \63\ Ibid.
    \64\ Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch, ``Henan HIV/AIDS Rights 
Defender Tian Xi Arrested'' [Henan aizibing weiquan renshi tian xi bei 
zhixing daibu], 24 August 10.
    \65\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, reprinted in Boxun (Online), 
``Henan HIV/AIDS-Infected Rights Defender Tian Xi Criminally Detained'' 
[Henan aizibing ganran weiquan renshi tian xi bei xingshi juliu], 23 
August 10.
    \66\ Ibid.
    \67\ ``Beijing Court Sentences Hu Jia to 3 Years 6 Months' 
Imprisonment,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March-
April 2008, 1. See also the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more 
information.
    \68\ ``Hu Jia Denied Medical Parole, Family Members Urge 
[Authorities] To Show Written Examination Report'' [Hu jia baowai jiuyi 
shenqing beiju, jia ren cu chushi shumian jiancha baogao], Radio Free 
Asia (Online), 12 April 10; ``Jailed China Activist Hu Jia May Have 
Cancer: Wife,'' Reuters (Online), 8 April 10.
    \69\ Gillian Wong, ``China AIDS Activist Flees to US After 
Harassment,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 
10 May 10.
    \70\ Ibid.
    \71\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Beijing's 
`Aizhixing' Has Tax Records Investigated After Delay'' [Beijing 
``aizhixing'' shuiwu jicha zanshiyan hou], 25 March 10; ``China's 
Crackdown on Nonprofit Groups Prompts New Fears Among Activists,'' 
Washington Post (Online), 11 May 10. According to this article, Wan 
Yanhai indicated concern that his organization may eventually be shut 
down.
    \72\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 204-05. In July 2009, 
Beijing officials fined and then shut down the organization for not 
being legally registered with the government as a non-governmental 
organization.
    \73\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing Weekly June 8-14, 2010,'' 15 June 10.
    \74\ Ibid.
    \75\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing Weekly April 27-May 3, 2010,'' 4 May 10.
    \76\ PRC Employment Promotion Law, enacted 30 August 07, effective 
1 January 08, arts. 29, 30; International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 
2200A (XXII) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, arts. 7, 
13; PRC Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons, issued 28 December 
90, amended 24 April 08, effective 1 July 08, arts. 3, 25, 30-40; 
Ministry of Education Circular Regarding Further Standardizing Physical 
Examinations [Prior to] School Enrollment or Employment To Protect the 
Rights of Hepatitis B Surface Antigen Carriers to School Enrollment or 
Employment [Guanyu jinyibu guifan ruxue he jiuye tijian xiangmu weihu 
yigan biaomian kangyuan xiedaizhe ruxue he jiuye quanli de tongzhi], 
issued 10 February 10.
    \77\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Hepatitis B Activists 
Publish Major New Research Report Highlighting Employment 
Discrimination in China,'' 13 January 10.
    \78\ Ministry of Education, Circular Regarding Further 
Standardizing Physical Examinations [Prior to] School Enrollment or 
Employment To Protect the Rights of Hepatitis B Surface Antigen 
Carriers to School Enrollment or Employment [Guanyu jinyibu guifan 
ruxue he jiuye tijian xiangmu weihu yigan biaomian kangyuan xiedaizhe 
ruxue he jiuye quanli de tongzhi], issued 10 February 10.
    \79\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Job Seeker Successfully Sues 
Hospital for Violation of Right to Privacy,'' 9 March 10.
    \80\ ``Many Kindergartens in Haikou Refuse Hepatitis B Children,'' 
Sina (Online), 2 March 10; Yirenping (Online), ``Infant in Haikou 
Barred From Entering Kindergarten, Ministry of Education, Ministry of 
Health Denounced'' [Haikou shi yigan baobao nan ruyuan, jiaoyuju, 
weishengju zao jubao], 4 March 10.
    \81\ ``Health Care Management Measures for Nurseries and 
Kindergartens (Draft),'' China News Services (Online), 30 July 09.
    \82\ Zhang Yue and Shan Juan, ``Job Seeker Files Case on HIV 
Discrimination,'' China Daily (Online), 31 August 10.
    \83\ Ibid.; China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Anhui Court Accepts 
HIV Discrimination Lawsuit,'' 31 August 10. See also Li Guangming, 
``Anhui University Student Sues Bureau of Education After Refused 
Employment Because of Positive HIV/AIDS Test Results in Physical 
Examination'' [Yin tijian aizi yangxing qiuzhi bei ju anhui yi daxue 
sheng qisu jiaoyuju], Legal Daily (Online), 26 August 10.
    \84\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Anhui Court Accepts HIV 
Discrimination Lawsuit,'' 31 August 10.
    \85\ Zhang Yue and Shan Juan, ``Job Seeker Files Case on HIV 
Discrimination,'' China Daily (Online), 31 August 10.
    \86\ Ibid.

    Notes to Section II--Climate Change and the Environment
    \1\ Letter from Su Wei, Director-General, Department of Climate 
Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Mr. Yvo 
de Boer, Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat, 9 March 10 (to 
include China in the list of Parties).
    \2\ Letter from Su Wei, Director-General, Department of Climate 
Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Mr. Yvo 
de Boer, Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat, reprinted in 
ChinaFAQs (Online), 28 January 10 (letter regarding autonomous domestic 
mitigation actions).
    \3\ Ibid.
    \4\ Xie Zhenhua, ``China's Challenges Limit Control of Emissions 
(Authority Forum)'' [Zhongguo tiaozhan kongzhi paifang jixian (quanwei 
luntan)], People's Daily (Online), 6 January 10.
    \5\ Kathrin Hille, ``China Sets Date for CO2 Cut,'' Financial Times 
(Online), 15 August 09. The above source notes that Su Wei, Director 
General of the Department of Climate Change, National Development and 
Reform Commission of China, reportedly told the Financial Times that 
``China's emissions will not continue to rise beyond 2050.'' On the 
other hand, the source below notes that Wan Gang, the Minister of 
Science and Technology, reportedly told the Guardian that carbon 
emissions in China would peak sometime between 2030 and 2040. Jonathan 
Watts, ``China's Carbon Emissions Will Peak Between 2030 and 2040, Says 
Minister,'' Guardian (Online), 6 December 09.
    \6\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 7. The 
Action Plan outlines numerous specific science-based goals related to 
energy and climate change. The plan calls for ``[i]mplementing China's 
National Plan for Coping with Climate Change by slowing down greenhouse 
gas emission. While enhancing energy utilization efficiency and 
developing renewable energy resources to reduce the emission of carbon 
dioxide, China will strive to maintain the discharge of nitrous oxide 
in the processes of industrial production at the 2005 level, to 
increase the forestry coverage to 20 percent, and increase the annual 
carbon sink by about 50 million tons of carbon dioxide over the level 
of 2005.'' Other actions include: ``[d]oing all we can to make the 
ratio of energy consumption per GDP unit in 2010 around 20 percent 
lower than that in 2005,'' and ``[d]eveloping renewable energy 
resources, and working toward the goal of increasing their consumption 
to 10 percent of the total energy consumption by 2010.''
    \7\ See, e.g., State Council Information Office, National Human 
Rights Action Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, 
sec. 7; Outline of the Economic and Social Development 11th Five-Year 
Plan of the People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shiyi ge wunian guihua gangyao], 
Xinhua, reprinted in China Net (Online), 16 March 06, chap. 3; National 
Development and Reform Commission, Medium and Long-Term Development 
Plan for Renewable Energy in China (Abbreviated Version), China 
Internet Information Center (Online), September 2007, sec. 3.2(1); 
``China's National Climate Change Programme,'' China Climate Change 
Info-Net (Online), June 2007.
    \8\ Shi Jiangtao, ``Carbon Pledge on Track With Past Performance,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 28 November 09.
    \9\ PRC Renewable Energy Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo kezaisheng 
nengyuan fa], enacted 28 February 05, effective 1 January 06, amended 
26 December 09, effective 1 April 10.
    \10\ ``National Energy Commission Established New Energy Sources 
Could Benefit First'' [Guojia nengyuanwei chengli xin nengyuan keneng 
xian shouyi], Daily Economic News, reprinted in China Energy Net 
(Online), 28 January 10. The establishment of the National Energy 
Commission was formally approved in 2008. State Council General Office, 
Circular Regarding Establishment of National Energy Commission 
[Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu chengli guojia nengyuanweiyuanhui de 
tongzhi], issued 22 January 10. The National Energy Commission will, 
among other tasks, participate in energy research projects, devise 
energy development strategies, and play a coordinating role on some 
major issues.
    \11\ ``Local Development and Reform Commissions Will Establish 
Climate Change Response Offices and Issue Emission Reduction Plans'' 
[Gedi fagaiwei jiang she yingdui qihou bianhuachu chu jianpai fangan], 
Dongfang Net, reprinted in Netease (Online), 3 January 10.
    \12\ See, e.g., Hui Qi, China Development Brief (Online), 
``Introducing Chinese Civil Society's Projects To Address Climate 
Change'' [Zhongguo gongmin shehui yingdui qihou bianhua xiangmu], 12 
March 10; Greenpeace China (Online), ``Greenpeace China, Oxfam Hong 
Kong, WWF Hong Kong and Twelve Other Community Organizations Ally 
Against Climate Change,'' 25 May 09; Huo Weiya, Chinadialogue (Online), 
``The New Face of Youth Activism in China,'' 6 December 07; Heinrich 
Boll Stiftung (Online), ``Environment and Climate,'' last visited 4 
October 10.
    \13\ Friends of Nature et al. (Online), ``A Warming China: Thoughts 
and Actions for the Chinese Civil Society'' [Biannuan de zhongguo: 
gongmin shehui de si yu xing], 20 December 07; Friends of Nature 
(Online), ``How Chinese Civil Society Can Participate in Responding to 
Climate Change Disasters'' [Zhongguo gongmin shehui zuzhi ruhe canyu 
yingdui qihou zaihai], February 2010. The source above notes that seven 
Chinese environmental groups issued a report regarding ways in which 
Chinese citizen groups could participate in climate disaster actions.
    \14\ Shai Oster, ``Not All in China Resist Carbon Caps,'' Wall 
Street Journal (Online), 9 December 09. This source discusses the 
incident in December 2009, where a group of 200 Chinese business 
leaders issued a statement in which they said they would promote 
absolute emissions reduction targets for Chinese enterprises.
    \15\ Jonathan Watts, ``Pants for Progress: Chinese Climate 
Protesters Strip Off on Train,'' Guardian (Online), 18 January 10.
    \16\ Transparency in Environmental Protection and Climate Change in 
China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 1 April 10, Testimony of Deborah Seligsohn, Senior Advisor, 
China Climate and Energy Program, World Resources Institute. Ms. 
Seligsohn stated that ``[i]n contrast to energy data, China has 
substantially less experience collecting and reporting greenhouse gas 
emissions data.''
    \17\ Teng Fei et al., World Resources Institute (Online), 
``Mitigation Actions in China: Measurement, Reporting and 
Verification,'' June 2009, 9.
    \18\ ``China Revises Statistics Law To Curb Data Falsification,'' 
Xinhua (Online), 27 June 09.
    \19\ ``China Agrees Energy Data Deal,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 3 
November 09.
    \20\ National Development and Reform Commission, China's Policies 
and Actions for Addressing Climate Change--The Progress Report 2009, 
reprinted in China Climate Net (Online), November 2009. These include 
the Circular of the State Council on Approving and Forwarding the Plan 
and Measures for Implementing the Statistics, Monitoring and Assessment 
of Energy Conservation and Pollution Reductions jointly issued in 2007 
by several ministries. The National Bureau of Statistics established a 
special department in 2008, the Department of Energy Statistics, which 
is tasked with organizing the survey, collection, compilation, and 
publication of energy data.
    \21\ ``China Agrees Energy Data Deal,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 3 
November 09. Radio Free Asia reported Professor Philip Andrews-Speed, 
an expert on Chinese energy issues at the University of Dundee in 
Scotland, as saying Chinese energy data has accuracy problems because 
of the large number of data sources and the alleged practice by 
officials of modifying data to meet government targets and advance 
their personal careers. Transparency in Environmental Protection and 
Climate Change in China, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 1 April 10, Testimony of Deborah 
Seligsohn, Senior Advisor, China Climate and Energy Program, World 
Resources Institute. Ms. Seligsohn stated that ``[t]here is no doubt 
data could be improved . . . [w]hile [the National Bureau of 
Statistics] has become much more willing to revise its data sets . . . 
Chinese revisions of recent-year data do not always include revisions 
of prior-year data, making time series analysis difficult.''
    \22\ Coral Davenport, ``Kerry's Reality Check in Copenhagen,'' CQ 
Today (Online), 17 December 09. In December 2009, Su Wei, China's 
primary climate change negotiator, said: ``It's not necessary for 
others to have worries about China's reductions commitment, because 
these have been approved by the National People's Congress . . . [t]he 
delegates in Congress have the role of supervision . . . .''
    \23\ Ibid. Su Wei also stated, ``[t]he channels of information are 
open . . . [i]nstitutions and countries who have questions about 
China's commitment will be answered.''
    \24\ Copenhagen Accord (Decision 2/CP.15), UNFCCC, Conference of 
Parties, 15th Sess., FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add. 1, 18 December 09, art. 5. 
Article 5 of the Copenhagen Accord states: ``. . . [m]itigation actions 
subsequently taken and envisaged by Non-Annex I Parties, including 
national inventory reports, shall be communicated through national 
communications consistent with Article 12.1(b) every two years on the 
basis of guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties. 
Those mitigation actions in national communications or otherwise 
communicated to the Secretariat will be added to the list in appendix 
II. Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to 
their domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of 
which will be reported through their national communications every two 
years. Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the 
implementation of their actions through National Communications, with 
provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly 
defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is 
respected. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking 
international support will be recorded in a registry along with 
relevant technology, finance and capacity building support . . . . 
These supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be 
subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in 
accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.''
    \25\ ``Build Consensus and Strengthen Cooperation To Advance the 
Historical Process of Combating Climate Change,'' Xinhua (Online), 18 
December 09. Wen said China ``. . . will further enhance the domestic-
statistical, monitoring and evaluation methods, improve the way for 
releasing emission reduction information, increase transparency and 
actively engage in international exchange, dialogue and cooperation.''
    \26\ International Energy Agency (Online), Joint Statement by the 
National Energy Administration of the People's Republic of China and 
the International Energy Agency, 14 October 09, para. 16. China and the 
IEA announced China would engage in several programs including one 
related to energy statistics: ``[a]ccurate, complete and timely energy 
statistics are essential in all countries to inform wise policy choices 
and foster market stability. Experts from China and of the IEA will 
continue to work together on capacity building to strengthen China's 
energy statistical system, and will co-operate in the development of 
internationally comparable statistics and indicators of energy 
efficiency in all sectors, to support energy policy making in China.''
    \27\ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Online), Memorandum of 
Cooperation Between the National Development and Reform Commission of 
the People's Republic of China and the Environmental Protection Agency 
of the United States of America To Build Capacity To Address Climate 
Change, 17 November 09, sec. 2. The memorandum states: ``[t]he 
cooperative activities undertaken pursuant to this Memorandum of 
Cooperation, hereinafter referred to as the `MOC,' may involve the 
following areas: 1. Capacity building for developing greenhouse gas 
inventories; 2. Education and public awareness of climate change; 3. 
The impacts of climate change to economic development, human health and 
ecological system, as well as research on corresponding 
countermeasures; and 4. Other areas as determined by the 
Participants.''
    \28\ U.S. White House (Online), U.S.-China Joint Statement, 17 
November 09.
    \29\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 7; 
National Development and Reform Commission, Medium and Long-Term 
Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China (Abbreviated Version), 
China Internet Information Center (Online), September 2007, secs. 3.2, 
4, and 4.1.
    \30\ Peter H. Gleick, ``Three Gorges Dam Project, Yangtze River, 
China'' in Peter H. Gleick et al., The World's Water 2008-2009 
(Washington: Island Press, 2009), 145-146.
    \31\ See, e.g., Peter H. Gleick, ``Three Gorges Dam Project, 
Yangtze River, China,'' in Peter H. Gleick et al., The World's Water 
2008-2009 (Washington: Island Press, 2009), 145-146; Jim Yardley, 
``Chinese Dam Projects Criticized for Their Human Costs, Choking on 
Growth, Part IV,'' New York Times (Online), 19 November 07; CECC, 2006 
Annual Report, 20 September 06, 103; ``Three Gorges Resettlement 
Activist Paralyzed After Assault,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, July 2006, 10-11; Stacy Mosher, ``The Case of Fu Xiancai,'' 
China Rights Forum, No. 3, 2006, 48-51.
    \32\ Wan Huazhong, ``Dam Forces Relocations of 300,000 More,'' 
China Daily (Online), 21 January 10; ``Three Gorges Relocated Migrants: 
Return to Emptiness and Wondering Ever Since'' [Sanxia waiqian yimin, 
guiqu lai xikong paihuai], Southern Daily (Online), 10 March 10.
    \33\ Wan Huazhong ``Dam Forces Relocations of 300,000 More,'' China 
Daily (Online), 21 January 10. The article noted that as of January 
2010, an additional 300,000 people living in the reservoir area still 
needed to be relocated to ensure people's safety from geographic 
hazards, such as landslides. ``Central China City Relocates 150,000 
People for Three Gorges Project in 17 Years,'' Xinhua (Online), 10 
January 10.
    \34\ Shi Jiangtao, ``Protest Over Dam Project Ends After 20-Hour 
Stand-Off,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 26 April 10; ``Sichuan 
Farmers Protest of Dadu Dam Seen To Have Little Impact,'' South China 
Morning Post, 4 January 05 (Open Source Center, 4 January 05); 
``100,000 Protesters Clash With Police Over Dam Project in Sichuan,'' 
Tai Yang Pao, 1 November 04 (Open Source Center, 1 November 04). The 
Pubugou Dam was the site of one of China's most serious outbreaks of 
rural unrest in 2004 when tens of thousands of citizens protested 
against the dam's construction.
    \35\ Shi Jiangtao, ``Protest Over Dam Project Ends After 20-Hour 
Stand-Off,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 26 April 10.
    \36\ Shi Jiangtao, ``Six Arrested for Defying Eviction Over Dam 
Work,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 24 June 10.
    \37\ Ibid.
    \38\ Philip Brown and Yilin Xu, Social Science Research Network 
(Online), ``Hydropower Development and Resettlement Policy on China's 
Nu River,'' 2010, 13-17.
    \39\ Qian Haoping, ``Shaanxi Weinan Police Go to Beijing To Detain 
Writer, Say His Book Publication Involves Illegal Business Operations'' 
[Shaanxi weinan jingfang jinjing zhuazou zuojia cheng qi chushu she 
feifa jingying], Beijing News, reprinted in Phoenix Net (Online), 1 
September 10.
    \40\ Ibid.
    \41\ Ibid.
    \42\ Ibid.
    \43\ He Xin, Liu Chang, Qin Xudong, and Tang Ying, ``Yellow River 
Reportage Lands Writer in Jail,'' Caixin (Online), 10 September 10.
    \44\ ``In Writer's Arrest, a New Cry for Rule of Law,'' Century 
Weekly, reprinted in Caixin (Online), 10 September 10.
    \45\ Zhou Ze, ``Doubts About Relevant Weinan Department's 
Notifications Regarding the Xie Chaoping Case Communicated by the 
News'' [Dui xie chaoping an xinwen tongji shang weinan youguan bumen 
tongbao qingkuang de zhiyi], Caijing (Online), 18 September 10; 
``Police Enter Beijing To Detain a Person, Xie Chaoping `Guilty of 
Speech' or `Illegal Business Activities?' '' [Jingcha jinjing zhuaren, 
xie chaoping ``yiyan huozui'' haishi ``feifa jingying''], Southern 
Daily (Online), 2 September 10; ``Please Let Us Believe Xie Chaoping Is 
Not `Guilty of Speech' '' [Qing rang women xiangxin xie chaoping bushi 
``yinyan huozui''], Zhengyi Net (Online), 3 September 10; ``Mistakes in 
the Xie Chaoping Case Should Be Rectified as Soon as Possible'' [Xie 
chaoping an ying jinkuai jiucuo], Century Weekly (Online), 4 September 
10; ``Regarding the Process of Publishing `The Great Migration' and 
Numerous Questions About Weinan Police Involvement'' [Guanyu 
``daqianxi'' chuban de jingguo ji dui weinan jingfang jieru de zhuduo 
bujie], Caixin (Online), 3 September 10.
    \46\ ``Weinan `Book Case' Procuratorate Rejects Arrest of Xie 
Chaoping'' [Weinan ``shu'an'' jianfang jubu xie chaoping], Caijing 
(Online), 17 September 10.
    \47\ Ibid.
    \48\ ``Weinan `Book Case' Worker at a Print Shop Detained Because 
of `The Great Migration' '' [Weinan ``shu'an'' yi yinshuachang zhigong 
yin ``daqianxi'' beizhua], Caijing (Online), 16 September 10; 
``Tracking Down `Great Migration' Printer Zhao Shun'' [Zhuixun 
``daqianxi'' yinshuaren zhaoshun], Voice of America (Online), 20 
September 10.
    \49\ National Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), 
``Deputy Director Zhao Baige and Other Leaders Give Lectures at an 
International Research Forum on Population and Climate Change'' [Zhao 
baige fuzhuren deng lingdao zai renkou yu qihou bianhua guoji yanxiu 
banshang zuo zhuanti yanjiang], 28 April 10; ``China Says Population 
Controls Help Fight Climate Change,'' Reuters (Online), 11 December 09.
    \50\ National Population and Family Planning Commission (Online), 
``Deputy Director Zhao Baige and Other Leaders Give Lectures at an 
International Research Forum on Population and Climate Change'' [Zhao 
baige fuzhuren deng lingdao zai renkou yu qihou bianhua guoji yanxiu 
banshang zuo zhuanti yanjiang], 28 April 10.
    \51\ See CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 151.
    \52\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, First National Pollution 
Source Survey Report [Diyi ci quanguo wuranyuan pucha gongbao], 6 
February 10. The ministry started the survey in December 2007 and 
incorporated data from 5.93 million sources.
    \53\ Ministry of Environmental Protection (Online), ``Ministry of 
Environmental Protection: Four Points From Results of First National 
Pollution Source Survey'' [Huanbaobu: diyi ci quanguo wuranyuan pucha 
gongzuo chengguo you si fangmian], 9 February 10; Shai Oster, ``China 
Sees Vast Pollution,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 10 February 10; 
Emma Graham-Harrison, ``China's Water Pollution Level Higher Than 
Estimated in 2007,'' Reuters (Online), 10 February 10.
    \54\ Ministry of Environmental Protection (Online), ``Ministry of 
Environmental Protection: Four Points From Results of First National 
Pollution Source Survey'' [Huanbaobu: diyi ci quanguo wuranyuan pucha 
gongzuo chengguo you si fangmian], 9 February 10.
    \55\ Zhang Ruidan, ``Widest Pollution Trail Leads to Farm Fields,'' 
Caixin (Online), 25 February 10.
    \56\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, First National Pollution 
Source Survey Report [Diyi ci quanguo wuranyuan pucha gongbao], 6 
February 10; Emma Graham-Harrison, ``China's Water Pollution Level 
Higher Than Estimated in 2007,'' Reuters (Online), 10 February 10. 
Greenpeace campaign director Sze Pang Cheung urged the government to 
give the public access to the survey data.
    \57\ Lee Liu, Environment Magazine (Online), ``Made in China: 
Cancer Villages,'' March/April 2010. See section of report titled ``How 
Real Is the Cancer-Village Phenomenon, and Who Is Spreading the Word/ 
'' for more information about the various Chinese research projects 
examining ``cancer villages.''
    \58\ Ibid.
    \59\ Ibid.
    \60\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 7. The 
action plan states: ``[u]pholding the principle of harmonious 
development between man and nature and the rational exploitation and 
utilization of natural resources, China will take an active part in 
international cooperation in an effort to create an environment 
favorable for human existence and sustainable development and build a 
resource-conserving and environment-friendly society to guarantee the 
public's environmental rights.''
    \61\ Ibid. It states ``[s]pecial actions will be taken to protect 
public health by intensifying monitoring over and punishing enterprises 
that discharge pollutants against the law, and by investigating and 
severely punishing acts and cases of violating laws and regulations on 
environmental protection.''
    \62\ Ibid.
    \63\ Cui Peng, ``National Audit Office: False Reports Divert 515 
Million Yuan for Water Pollution Prevention'' [Shenjishu: shui wuran 
fangzhi nuoyong xubao 5.15 yiyuan], People's Daily (Online), 29 October 
09.
    \64\ Ibid.
    \65\ ``Main Culprit Behind Jiahe's `Blood Lead Incident' (2)'' 
[Jiahe ``xieqian shijian'' beihou yuanxiong (2)], Beijing News 
(Online), 16 March 10. The news story reported that Jiahe County 
People's Congress Standing Committee member Luo Jiangbing said some of 
the new enterprises in the county would open for operations prior to 
conducting an environmental impact assessment (EIA), some would not 
even conduct an EIA, and others would open for business without meeting 
the requirements of an EIA.
    \66\ Wang Gang et al., ``Pollution in the Go: Mistakes During the 
Transfer of Industries'' [Wuran qianzou: chanye zhuanyizhong de fazhan 
wuqu], in Change: Chinese Environmental Journalists Survey Report 
[Gaibian: zhongguo huanjing jizhe diaocha baogao], ed. Wang Yongchen 
(Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2007), 198-200; ``Main Culprit 
Behind Jiahe's `Blood Lead Incident' (2)'' [Jiahe ``xieqian shijian'' 
beihou yuanxiong (2)], Beijing News (Online), 16 March 10. During the 
reporting year, Lei Xiangdong, the Director of the Jiahe Environmental 
Protection Bureau in Hunan province, commented that some enterprises 
using antiquated equipment had been shut down in neighboring Guangdong 
province, and then moved to the poorer county of Jiahe. He continued by 
saying ``everyone is developing the economy, Jiahe is backwards, it is 
not easy to get a few enterprises to move [here], it is not good to 
discipline them.''
    \67\ Ministry of Supervision (Online), ``2009 Discipline Inspection 
and Supervision Entities Case Investigation and Management Work 
Situation Press Conference,'' 7 January 10.
    \68\ Cui Peng, ``National Audit Office Announced `Three Rivers and 
Three Lakes' Water Pollution Prevention and Control Achievements Audit 
Investigation Results,'' People's Daily (Online), 29 October 09. The 
article noted that 515 million yuan in project funding had been 
misappropriated or appropriated using falsified reports; 214.3 million 
yuan in project funding had not been collected or was [on the books as 
being] in arrears (as waste management fees or pollution levies) in 
nine provinces, autonomous regions, or cities; and 151 million yuan in 
project funding had been misappropriated or held back (retained for 
one's own use) by enterprises in 13 provinces, autonomous regions, and 
cities.
    \69\ ``Transparency in China: Implications for the Environment and 
Climate Change,'' Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 1 April 10, Testimony of Barbara Finamore, Senior 
Attorney and Director, China Program, Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 7.
    \70\ Natural Resources Defense Council and Institute for Public and 
Environmental Affairs, ``Breaking the Ice on Open Environmental 
Information'' [Huanjing xinxi gongkai jiannan pobing], June 2010; Alex 
Wang, Switchboard (Online), ``Assessing the State of Environmental 
Transparency in China,'' 7 June 10.
    \71\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of 
Environmental Protection Open Government Information Work 2009 Annual 
Report [Huanjing baohubu zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo 2009 niandu 
baogao], 18 March 10. Citizens requested information primarily about 
environmental impact assessment reports, environmental monitoring data, 
and environmental laws and regulations among other items. CECC, 2009 
Annual Report, 10 October 10, 198; Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, Ministry of Environmental Protection 2008 Government Open 
Information Work Report [Huanjing baohubu zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo 
2008 niandu baogao], 20 March 09.
    \72\ Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of 
Environmental Protection Open Government Information Work 2009 Annual 
Report [Huanjing baohubu zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo 2009 niandu 
baogao], 18 March 10.
    \73\ Ibid. Six were submitted by the same person in connection with 
Ministry of Environmental Protection matters (the ministry upheld the 
original decision in all six) and three in connection with local 
environmental protection bureau matters.
    \74\ Ibid.
    \75\ Ren Xinghui, ``Explanation for the Circumstances of My Open 
Government Information Request Regarding Three Gorges Dam Construction 
Funding'' [Wo shenqing sanxia gongcheng jianshe zijin xiangguan zhengfu 
xinxi gongkai de qingkuang shuoming], reprinted in China Transparency 
(Online), 9 December 09. He sent requests to the Ministry of Finance, 
the Three Gorges Project Construction Committee under the State 
Council, and the China Yangtze Three Gorges Project Development 
Corporation.
    \76\ Ibid.; Opinions on Several Questions Regarding the People's 
Republic of China Regulations on Open Government Information [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli ruogan wenti de yijian], 
issued 29 April 08, art. 14.
    \77\ Shai Oster, ``Activists Test China's Openness Vows,'' Wall 
Street Journal (Online), 10 March 10.
    \78\ Three Gorges Watch (Online), ``Already Raised Appeal in Case 
Against Ministry of Finance for Non-Disclosure of Three Gorges 
Construction Funding Information'' [Su caizhengbu sanxia jianshe zijin 
xinxi bu gongkai an, yitiqi shangsu], 21 April 10.
    \79\ Ibid.
    \80\ Cara Anna, ``First Details on China Oil Spill's Cause 
Emerge,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Google (Online), 23 July 10.
    \81\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Group Says China's Official Oil Spill Figure 
May Be Too Low,'' New York Times (Online), 30 July 10.
    \82\ Shi Jiangtao, ``Sludge, Sludge, Wink, Wink: How Collusion 
Abets Pollution,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 27 July 10.
    \83\ ``Pollution From Copper Mine Kills Millions of Fish,'' Agence 
France-Presse (Online), 12 July 10.
    \84\ Alex Wang, ``Zijin Mining Group's Inadequate Disclosure of 
China Acid Spill, What Needs To Be Done/ '' Greenlaw (Online), 24 July 
10.
    \85\ Shi Jiangtao, ``Sludge, Sludge, Wink, Wink: How Collusion 
Abets Pollution,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 27 July 10. The 
South China Morning Post reported that because of the June pollution 
incident, approximately 200 fishermen from several nearby villages 
obstructed the gate of the county government building with two tons of 
dead fish on June 23, 2010, but as of the end of July, residents said 
top local authorities had not taken real action so far to address 
citizen complaints about the pollution problem.
    \86\ Alex Wang, ``The Real Significance of China's First 
Environmental Group-Led Lawsuit Against the Government,'' Switchboard 
(Online), 10 August 09; ``China's First Environmental Administrative 
Public Interest Litigation Case by a Social Organization Opens in 
Guiyang'' [Quanguo shouli shetuan zuzhi huanjing xingzheng gongyi 
susongan guiyang kaishen], 3 February 09. On September 1, 2009, one 
hour into the trial, the All-China Environment Federation agreed to 
withdraw the case against the Qingzhen City Ministry of Land and 
Resources in Guizhou province.
    \87\ Qin Xudong, ``China's First Environmental Civil Case Ends in 
Mediation,'' Caijing (Online), 30 September 09. The All-China 
Environment Federation accepted a mediated settlement in its case 
against the Jiangyin Port Container Company in July 2009 in Wuyi city, 
Jiangsu province.
    \88\ ``Follow-Up on Jinsha River Environmental Public Interest 
Rights Defense Incident'' [Jinshajiang huanjing gongyi weiquan shijian 
zhuizong], China Economic Times (Online), 27 August 09.
    \89\ Ibid. Prior to Wu dropping his request, the Chongqing City 
Environmental Protection Bureau and the All-China Environment 
Federation consulted with Wu.
    \90\ Zhangjiajie Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau 
(Online), ``National Environmental Petition Work: Videoconference 
Convenes'' [Quanguo huanjing xinfang gongzuo, shipin huiyi zhaokai], 14 
April 10.
    \91\ Jinhua Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (Online), 
``Ministry of Environmental Protection Convenes First National 
Environmental Petition Work Videoconference'' [Huanbaobu zhaokao di 
yici quanguo huanjing xinfang gongzuo shipin huiyi], 15 April 10.
    \92\ Ibid.
    \93\ Li Jing, ``Heavy Metal Pollution To Be Controlled,'' China 
Daily (Online), 27 January 10. In January 2010, the Minister of 
Environmental Protection said the ministry would issue a plan to manage 
and remediate heavy metal pollution by June 2010 after review by the 
State Council. Alex Wang, ``More Heavy Metal Mania: Another China 
Pollution Round-Up,'' Switchboard (Online), 2 November 09; Wang Qian, 
``China Cracks Down on Heavy Metal Pollution,'' China Daily (Online), 
10 April 10. The Ministry of Environmental Protection conducted a 
nationwide campaign to investigate enterprises that are sources of 
heavy metal pollution.
    \94\ Jinhua Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (Online), 
``Ministry of Environmental Protection First National Environmental 
Petition Work Videoconference'' [Huanbaobu zhaokai diyici quanguo 
huanjing xinfang gongzuo shipin huiyi], 15 April 10.
    \95\ For more information about the Wugang case, see ``Lead 
Poisoning in Children in Hunan Triggers Protests by Parents and Raises 
Questions About Governmental Accountability,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2; Michael Wines, ``Lead 
Sickens 1,300 Children in China,'' New York Times (Online), 20 August 
09.
    \96\ ``Lead Poisoning in Children in Hunan Triggers Protests by 
Parents and Raises Questions About Governmental Accountability,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2; 
``China Detains 15 Over Lead Protest,'' Associated Press, reprinted in 
Wall Street Journal (Online), 3 September 09; Song Shengxia, ``Police 
Deny Arresting Parents Over Lead Case,'' Global Times (Online), 4 
September 09; ``Parents of Poison Victims Say China Linking Them to 
Falun Gong,'' CNN (Online), 3 September 09.
    \97\ For more information about the Shaanxi lead poisoning case, 
see ``Lead Poisoning Incident in Shaanxi Leads to Protests, Rights 
Infringements Reported,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 8; Tu Chonghang, ``Shaanxi Lead Poisoning 
Incident From Start to Finish'' [Shaanxi fengxiang qian zhongdu 
shijianshiwei], Beijing News, reprinted in China Law Information Net 
(Online), 21 August 09.
    \98\ Jonathan Watts, ``China Defends Detention of Lead Poisoning 
Victims Who Sought Medical Help,'' Guardian (Online), 16 March 10; 
``Main Culprit Behind Jiahe's `Blood Lead Incident' (2)'' [Jiahe 
``xieqian shijian'' beihou yuanxiong (2)], Beijing News (Online), 16 
March 10.
    \99\ Choi Chi-yuk, ``Landfill at Water Source Stirs Up Unrest in 
Anhui,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 28 July 10; ``Popular 
Protest Against Landfill in Shucheng County Met With Police Force'' 
[Shucheng minzhong kangyi lajidui tianqu zaoyu jingcha baoli], Radio 
Free Asia (Online), 26 July 10; ``Shucheng County, Anhui Province 
Residents Protest Construction of Landfill, Clash Between Police and 
Citizens Shelves Project'' [Anhui shucheng baixing kangyi xingjian 
lajichang jingmin chongtu jihua gezhi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 27 
July 10.
    \100\ Liu Shuduo, ``Guangxi Villagers Resist Re-siting of Landfill, 
Six People Detained, Eight People's Whereabouts Unknown'' [Guangxi 
cunmin dizhi lajichang gaizhi, 6 ren beiju 8 ren xialuo buming], Global 
Times (Online), 25 July 10.
    \101\ ``Police Fire Teargas and Arrest Villagers Protesting Chosen 
Location for Landfill Site'' [Cunmin dizhi lajichang xuanzhi jiangfang 
fashe cuilei waci jincun zhuaren], China Economic Times (Online), 26 
July 10.
    \102\ Ibid.
    \103\ PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 
March 96, effective 1 January 97, art. 64. Public security officials 
are required to notify family members or employers of the reasons for 
and place of a person's detention within 24 hours.
    \104\ ``Police Fire Teargas and Arrest Villagers Protesting Chosen 
Location for Landfill Site'' [Cunmin dizhi lajichang xuanzhi jiangfang 
fashe cuilei wacijincun zhuaren], China Economic Times (Online), 26 
July 10.
    \105\ Ibid.
    \106\ Li Dewen, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``In 
Jiangsu Province, Wujiang City, Pingwang Town, Tens of Thousands Join 
Demonstration'' [Jiangsu wujiang pingwanzhen shuwan jumin lianxu juxing 
kangyi shiwei], 25 October 09; ``Wujiang, Jiangsu Waste Cogeneration 
Power Plant, a 300 Million Yuan Investment, Is Closed Because of 
Citizen Resistance'' [Jiangsu wujiang touzi 3yi laji fadianchang yin 
qunzhong dizhi beijiaoting], Southern Daily (Online), 2 November 09; 
``Tens of Thousands of People Continuously Protest in the Streets 
Against Putting Into Operation a Waste Incineration Cogeneration Plant 
in Wujiang, Jiangsu'' [Jiangsu wujiang laji ranshaochang touchan shuwan 
ren lianxu jietou kangyi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 October 09.
    \107\ ``Oppose Beijing Waste Incineration, Protect Rights: Bieshu 
District PK Asia's Largest Incineration Plant'' [Beijing fan laji 
ranshao weiquan: bieshuchu pk yazhou zuida ranshaochang], Southern 
Metropolitan Daily (Online), 3 March 10; Li Jing, ``Green NGO Drives 
Change at Grass Roots,'' China Daily (Online), 20 April 10; ``Officials 
State Beijing Already Has No Room To Put Garbage, Incineration Plant 
Construction Plan Will Not Change'' [Guanyuan cheng beijing yi wudi mai 
laji ranshaochang jianshe guihua bu hui gaibian], Beijing Times 
(Online), 11 May 10. One community of residents, known by the name 
Aobei, submitted a 25,000-word alternative proposal to authorities.
    \108\ Chloe Lai, ``Stealth Protest Over Waste Burning Takes Off,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 15 November 09; Fang Zilin, Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Panyu, Guangdong Residents Opposed 
to Garbage Incinerator Construction Stage Sit-In Protest'' [Guangdong 
panyu fandui jian laji fenshaochang de shimin kaishi jingzuo 
kangzheng], 23 November 09. Citizens also used other tactics such as 
producing t-shirts and bumper stickers and collecting thousands of 
signatures for a petition.
    \109\ Chloe Lai, ``Stealth Protest Over Waste Burning Takes Off,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 15 November 09.
    \110\ ``Guangzhou Proprietors Oppose Construction of Waste 
Incineration Plant in Their District'' [Guangzhou yezhu fandui qunei 
jian laji ranshaochang], Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 November 09.
    \111\ ``China's Guangzhou Suspends Incinerator Project Until 
Environmental Assessments OK,'' Xinhua (Online), 23 November 09; Ivan 
Zhai, ``Controversial Incinerator Project on Hold,'' South China 
Morning Post (Online), 12 December 09; ``Disputed Garbage Incinerator 
Project Suspended in South China,'' Xinhua (Online), 21 December 09.
    \112\ Kristine Kwok, ``Tibetans Beaten During Angry Protests,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 19 May 10; ``Enterprise Development 
Leads to Environmental Disaster Citizen Protest in Tibetan Areas 
Suppressed'' [Qiye kaifa zhi huanjing zainan zangqu minzhong kangyi zao 
zhenya], Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 May 10.
    \113\ Ibid.
    \114\ ``Villagers Renew Mine Protests,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
12 May 10; ``Tibetans Held After Protest,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
21 June 10.
    \115\ ``Tibetans Held After Protest,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 
June 10.
    \116\ ``Thousands of Guangxi Villagers Clash With Polluting 
Factory, Many Detained After Blocking Roads and Protesting'' [Guangxi 
qian cunmin chong wuranchang dulu kangyi duoren beiju], Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 14 July 10.
    \117\ Choi Chi-yuk, ``How Greed Turned River Into Pea Soup and Left 
Village in Despair,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 23 July 10.
    \118\ ``Thousands of Guangxi Villagers Clash With Polluting 
Factory, Many Detained After Blocking Roads and Protesting'' [Guangxi 
qian cunmin chong wuranchang dulu kangyi duoren beiju], Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 14 July 10.
    \119\ ``17 Jingxi County Rioters Arrested in Guangxi, Police Seal 
Village'' [Guangxi jingxi xian saoluan 17 ren beibu jingcha fengcun], 
Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 July 10.
    \120\ ``Rights Defender Xiao Qingshan Detained for Seven Days for 
Publicizing Environmental Protection'' [Weiquan renshi xiao qingshan 
yin xuanchuan huanbao bei juliu qiri], Radio Free Asia (Online), 07 
April 10.
    \121\ ``Beijing Non-Governmental Environmental Protection Forum 
Prevented, Some Participants Summoned, Houses Searched, and Some Put 
Under Soft Detention'' [Beijing minjian huanbao yantao bei jin zao 
chuanhuan chaojia ruanjin zhe zong], Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 April 
10. At the forum, participants were scheduled to discuss China's 
drought and the role of non-governmental groups in addressing the 
problem. Gu reported that the police who questioned him thought that 
the 30 people who were involved in organizing or were possibly going to 
attend the forum could be put under surveillance, warned not to go, 
interrogated, or put under soft detention.
    \122\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Police Raid Home 
of Beijing Activist Gu Chuan as Pressure on Human Rights Defenders 
Increases,'' 9 April 10. Authorities requested information about his 
bank account, confiscated his computers, notebooks, and other 
belongings, without producing a warrant, and interrogated him for seven 
hours.
    \123\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: Drop Charges Against 
Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,'' 10 June 10.
    \124\ ``Tibetan Environmentalist Jailed for 5 Years,'' Reuters 
(Online), 3 July 10.
    \125\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: Drop Charges Against 
Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,'' 10 June 10; Cara Anna, ``China 
Now Pressuring Tibetans Outside Politics,'' Associated Press, reprinted 
in Yahoo! (Online), 18 June 10.
    \126\ Robert Saiget, ``China Environmentalist Alleges Brutal Jail 
Treatment,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 11 May 10; ``Taihu Lake 
Defender Wu Lihong Released From Prison, Local Authorities Block People 
From Greeting Him'' [Taihu weishi wu lihong chuyu dangju zuzhi minzhong 
yingjie], Radio Free Asia (Online), 12 April 10; ``Environmental 
Activist Wu Lihong Released, Alleges Abuse,'' CECC Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 
October 07, 138.
    \127\ Robert Saiget, ``China Environmentalist Alleges Brutal Jail 
Treatment,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 11 May 10; ``Environmental 
Activist Wu Lihong Completes Sentence, Publicly Requests Authorities To 
Restore His Reputation'' [Huanbao renshi wulihong xingman huoshi 
gongkai yaoqiu dangju huifu mingyu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 May 
10.

    Notes to Section III--Civil Society
    \1\ Civil society organizations in China include a range of groups, 
such as national mass organizations that Party authorities created and 
fund, smaller citizen associations registered under national 
regulations, and loose networks of unregistered grassroots 
organizations. The Chinese organizational forms that most nearly 
correspond to the Western concept of a non-governmental organization 
are social organizations (SOs) [shehui tuanti], non-governmental and 
non-commercial enterprises (NGNCEs) [minban feiqiye danwei], and 
foundations [jijinhui]. SOs are voluntary organizations; they include 
academic, professional, or trade organizations, as well as voluntary 
associations of individuals with a common interest. NGNCEs are non-
governmental service providers, including schools, hospitals, sports 
organizations, or employment service organizations. Foundations are 
non-profit and non-governmental organizations managed through the use 
of funds voluntarily donated by foreign and domestic social 
organizations. Foundations often promote the development of scientific 
research, culture, education, social welfare, and social services. The 
State Council issued the current national regulations governing SOs and 
NGNCEs in 1998, and those regulating foundations in 2004. The 
proliferation of different organizational forms stems in part from the 
fact that China has only recently concentrated on creating a 
comprehensive system of governance for the large number of private 
voluntary organizations that have emerged in the wake of the enormous 
social changes of the 1980s and 1990s. It is also a result of strict 
registration regulations that drive many civil society organizations to 
operate without government registration.
    \2\ Ministry of Civil Affairs, Civil Affairs Statistics, Quarterly 
Report [Minzheng shiye tongji ji bao], 2010; see also CECC, 2006 Annual 
Report, 20 September 06, 120; CECC, Topic Paper: Chinese Civil Society 
Organizations, 12 August 05.
    \3\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 204.
    \4\ Ibid. For more detailed definitions of civil society 
organizations in China, see CECC, Topic Paper: Chinese Civil Society 
Organizations, 12 August 05.
    \5\ ``How China's NGOs Can Make a Difference,'' South China Morning 
Post (Online), 14 December 09; Keith B. Richburg, ``China's Crackdown 
on Non-Profit Groups Prompts New Fears Among Activists,'' Washington 
Post (Online), 11 May 10.
    \6\ China Labour Bulletin (Online), ``Beijing Gives Local 
Governments 30 Days To Implement Anti-HBV Discrimination Measures,'' 12 
February 10.
    \7\ John Carney, ``Vilified Oxfam Points to Good Works in China,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 21 March 10.
    \8\ Keith B. Richburg, ``China's Crackdown on Non-Profit Groups 
Prompts New Fears Among Activists,'' Washington Post (Online), 11 May 
10; Chen Xiangyang, ``The Current State and Challenges of Non-
Governmental Organizations in China'' [Fei zhengfu zuzhi zai zhongguo 
de xianzhang ji tiaojian], China Economic Times, 26 May 05.
    \9\ Chen Xiangyang, ``The Current State and Challenges of Non-
Governmental Organizations in China'' [Fei zhengfu zuzhi zai zhongguo 
de xianzhang ji tiaojian], China Economic Times, 26 May 05.
    \10\ Keith B. Richburg, ``China's Crackdown on Non-Profit Groups 
Prompts New Fears Among Activists,'' Washington Post (Online), 11 May 
10.
    \11\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 35.
    \12\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art 22.
    \13\ For the purposes of this section, the term ``NGO'' refers to 
NGOs recognized in Chinese law (of which the various types recognized 
under Chinese law are sometimes referred to collectively in English as 
civil society organizations or social organizations), as well as those 
not registered with the government, or those that operate as a legally 
recognized organization but are not considered an NGO according to 
Chinese law.
    \14\ Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and 
effective 25 October 98, art. 6; Yu Fangqiang, ``Challenges for NGOs in 
China,'' Asia Catalyst (Online), 2 June 09.
    \15\ Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and 
effective 25 October 98, art. 27.
    \16\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``Restrictions on AIDS Activists 
in China,'' 14 June 05, sec. VI, 42-49.
    \17\ Yu Fangqiang, ``Challenges for NGOs in China,'' Asia Catalyst 
(Online), 2 June 09.
    \18\ Asia Catalyst (Online), ``Restrictions on AIDS NGOs in Asia,'' 
1 December 09, 10.
    \19\ Verna Yu, ``China's NGOs Fear for the Worst,'' Asia Times 
(Online), 15 August 09.
    \20\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Deeply 
Concerned About Beijing Civil Organization `Gongmeng' Being 
Unreasonably Clamped Down,'' 17 July 09.
    \21\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Law Research Center Is Shut 
Down as Authorities Tighten Control on Civil Society Groups,'' 17 July 
09.
    \22\ Verna Yu, ``China's NGOs Fear for the Worst,'' Asia Times 
(Online), 15 August 09.
    \23\ Gillian Wong, ``China AIDS Activist Flees to US After 
Harassment,'' Associated Press (Online), 10 May 10.
    \24\ ``Beijing on Alert as Annual Political Session Opens,'' 
Associated Press (Online), 2 March 10.
    \25\ Gillian Wong, ``China AIDS Activist Flees to US After 
Harassment,'' Associated Press (Online), 10 May 10.
    \26\ Amnesty International (Online), ``China Human Rights Briefing 
23-30 March 2010,'' 1 April 10.
    \27\ Gillian Wong, ``China AIDS Activist Flees to US After 
Harassment,'' Associated Press (Online), 10 May 10.
    \28\ Peking University Department of Social Sciences (Online), 
``Public Announcement'' [Gong gao], 25 March 10; ``Rights Defense NGOs 
Affiliated With Peking University Suddenly Killed'' [Beida xia xia 
weiquan NGO tu bei sha], Ming Pao (Online), 30 March 10.
    \29\ ``RFA Exclusive: Guo Jianmei Says Peking University Should Not 
Have Removed the Center'' [RFA dujia: guo jianmei cheng beida che 
zhongxin bu ying gai], Radio Free Asia (Online), 29 March 10.
    \30\ ``NGOs Fear Tighter State Curbs After University Cuts Links,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 30 March 10; Zhang Jieping, ``Public 
Interest Lawyer Guo Jianmei's NGO Faces Pressure'' [Gongyi lushi guo 
jianmei NGO bei daya], Asia Week (Online), 11 April 10.
    \31\ Ministry of Education, Urgent Notice From the Party Committee 
of the Ministry of Education Regarding Preventing Oxfam International's 
Chinese Office in Hong Kong From Recruiting ``University Student 
Volunteers'' via the Internet [Guanyu fangzhi xianggang le shi hui 
zhongguo fen bu tongguo hulianwang zai wo gaoxiao zhaopin daxuesheng 
zhiyuan zhe de jinji tongzhi], issued 4 February 10; Christopher 
Bodeen, ``China Tells Schools To Shun Relief Agency Oxfam,'' Associated 
Press (Online), 23 February 10; He Bei, Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(Online), ``Ministry of Education Orders College Students Not To 
Participate in Hong Kong Oxfam'' [Zhongguo jiaoyu bu leling daxuesheng 
bude canyu xianggang le shi hui], 23 February 10.
    \32\ Christopher Bodeen, ``China Tells Schools To Shun Relief 
Agency Oxfam,'' Associated Press (Online), 23 February 10; ``Mainland 
Suddenly `Clamps Down,' Oxfam Will Cease Training Programs'' [Neidi tu 
fengsha le shi hui ting peixun], Sina (Online), 24 February 10.
    \33\ State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues 
Concerning the Management of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic 
Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng waihui guanli youguan wenti 
de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10.
    \34\ Ibid., art. 2.
    \35\ Ibid., art. 5(1).
    \36\ Ibid., art. 5(2).
    \37\ Ibid., art. 5(3).
    \38\ Ibid., art. 5(4).
    \39\ Ibid., art. 5(3).
    \40\ Zhang Han, ``NGOs Feel the Squeeze,'' Global Times (Online), 
19 May 10.
    \41\ ``Hot Topic: China Suppresses NGOs,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 17 May 10.
    \42\ State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues 
Concerning the Management of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic 
Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng waihui guanli youguan wenti 
de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10, Introduction; 
Emma Graham-Harrison, ``New Finance Rules Add to Squeeze on China 
NGOs,'' Reuters (Online), 12 March 10.
    \43\ State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Circular on Issues 
Concerning the Management of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic 
Institutions [Guanyu jingnei jigou juanzeng waihui guanli youguan wenti 
de tongzhi], issued 30 December 09, effective 1 March 10, art. 8; Emma 
Graham-Harrison, ``New Finance Rules Add to Squeeze on China NGOs,'' 
Reuters (Online), 12 March 10.
    \44\ Emma Graham-Harrison, ``New Finance Rules Add to Squeeze on 
China NGOs,'' Reuters (Online), 12 March 10.
    \45\ Meg Davis, ``China's New Nonprofit Regulations: Season of 
Instability,'' Asia Catalyst (Online), 14 June 10.
    \46\ ``Government Advances Civil Society-Related Reforms in 
Shenzhen,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 
February 10, 3.
    \47\ Ministry of Civil Affairs and Shenzhen Municipal Government, 
Cooperation Agreement on Pushing Forward With Integrated Reforms to 
Civil Affairs Undertakings [Tuijin minzheng shiye zonghe peitao gaige 
hezno xieyi], issued 20 July 09, item 11.
    \48\ Karla W. Simon, Professor, the Catholic University of America, 
at Lecture, ``Half a Century of Asian Law: A Celebration of Prof. 
Jerome Cohen,'' George Washington University, 20 February 10.
    \49\ Karla W. Simon, ``Two Steps Forward and One Step Back--
Developments in the Regulation of Civil Society Organization in 
China,'' PowerPoint Presentation, Available at International Center for 
Civil Society Law (Online), October 2009, slide 12.
    \50\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. II(6).
    \51\ Ibid.
    \52\ Ibid.
    \53\ Ibid.
    \54\ Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social 
Organizations [Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli], issued and 
effective 25 October 98, art. 2.
    \55\ Ibid., arts. 3-10.
    \56\ Ibid., art. 4.
    \57\ Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Management of 
Non-Commercial Institutions [Shiye danwei dengji guanli zhanxing 
tiaoli], issued and effective 25 October 98, amended 27 June 04, art. 
2.
    \58\ Regulations for the Management of Foundations [Jijinhui guanli 
tiaoli], issued 8 March 04, effective 1 June 04, art. 3.
    \59\ Ibid., arts. 6-10.
    \60\ Ibid., arts. 8(3), 20, 29.
    \61\ Ibid., art. 6.

    Notes to Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance
    \1\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48, art. 21.
    \2\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76. China signed the ICCPR in 1998. The 
Chinese government has committed to ratifying the ICCPR and says it is 
taking concrete steps to prepare for ratification. In November 2009, a 
Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit said, ``The EU welcomed 
China's commitment to ratifying the [ICCPR] as soon as possible.'' 
Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, reprinted in China 
Internet Information Center (Online), 30 November 09. In October 2009, 
Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, said, ``At present, legislative, judicial and 
administrative reforms are under way in China with a view to aligning 
our domestic legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and paving 
the way for its ratification.'' Permanent Mission of the People's 
Republic of China to the UN (Online), ``Statement by H.E. Ambassador 
Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United 
Nations, at the Third Committee of the 64th Session of the General 
Assembly on the Implementation of Human Rights Instruments (Item 
69A),'' 20 October 09. In its 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action 
Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese government stated that the ICCPR 
was one of the ``fundamental principles'' on which the plan was framed, 
and that the government ``will continue legislative, judicial and 
administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this 
Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.'' State 
Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China 
(2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In 
February 2009, during the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic 
Review of the Chinese government's human rights record, the Chinese 
government supported recommendations made by Member States that China 
ratify the ICCPR. Chinese officials said China was in the process of 
amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws 
relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the 
ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, 
paras. 63, 114(1).
    \3\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 25; General Comment No. 25: The 
Right To Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of 
Equal Access to Public Service, 12 July 96.
    \4\ Joseph Fewsmith, ``Inner-Party Democracy: Development and 
Limitations,'' China Leadership Monitor, No. 31, Winter 2010, 1, 9.
    \5\ ``At the End of 2009 Total Number of Party Members Reaches 
77,995,000 Nationally'' [Jiezhi 2009 niandi quanguo dangyuan zongshu da 
7799.5 wan ming], Chinese Communist Party News Net (Online), 28 June 
10.
    \6\ Ibid.
    \7\ ``At the End of 2009 Total Number of Party Members Reaches 
77,995,000 Nationally'' [Jiezhi 2009 niandi quanguo dangyuan zongshu da 
7799.5 wan ming], Chinese Communist Party News Net (Online), 28 June 
10. There are 6,629 urban street Party organizations, 34,224 town 
organizations, 80,000 residential committees, and 598,000 village 
committees.
    \8\ Ibid. Over 99 percent of the various types of eligible 
enterprises have party organizations.
    \9\ Ibid. Of the country's 570,000 public service organizations, 
471,000 have party organizations.
    \10\ Ibid. The numbers here include 13,000 eligible ``social 
organizations'' (shehui tuanti), of which 12,000 have Party 
organizations, and 16,000 eligible ``non-profit enterprises'' (minban 
feiqiyi), of which 15,000 have Party organizations.
    \11\ Benjamin Read, ``Revitalizing the State's Urban `Nerve Tips,' 
'' 163 China Quarterly 806, 815 (2000). During the Mao Zedong period 
(1949 to 1976), these committees were responsible for political 
campaigns, struggle sessions, and household registry checks, among 
other unpopular tasks.
    \12\ Ibid., 806-808 (2000). The residents' committees implement 
Party and government policies, such as birth control, and engage in a 
number of other tasks, including providing social services, collecting 
fees, and mediating disputes. They maintain close ties to police 
stations. Willy Lam, Jamestown Foundation (Online), ``CCPLA: Tightening 
the CCP's Rule Over Law,'' China Brief, Vol. IX, No. 7, 2 April 09. The 
residents' committees also help to organize citizens for security 
tasks, such as mobilizing residents in the runup to the 2008 Beijing 
Summer Olympic Games and during the annual meetings of the National 
People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference.
    \13\ ``During Workshop of the Political and Legislative Affairs 
Committee of the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Yongkang Stresses That We 
Should Earnestly Study and Carry Out the Spirit of the Fourth Plenum of 
the 17th CPC Central Committee and We Should Also Push Forward 
Political and Legal Work and Construction of Political and Legal Ranks 
With Party Construction,'' Xinhua, 10 October 09 (Open Source Center, 
10 October 09). In a speech during a workshop of the Political and 
Legislative Affairs Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee in October 2009, Zhou Yongkang emphasized that the Party 
``should focus on party construction'' and ``should focus on the 
grassroots level and steadily solve the fundamental problems in 
political and legal work.''
    \14\ ``Hu Jintao: Grasp Well Party Building Work in the Military, 
Raise the Scientific Standards of Party Building in the Military'' [Hu 
jintao: zhuahao jundui dang de jianshe gongzuo tigao jundui dang de 
jianshe kexuehua shuiping], Xinhua (Online), 24 July 10.
    \15\ Li Yajie, ``Xi Jinping: Under New Circumstances 
Comprehensively Strengthen and Improve Building the Party in 
Institutions of Higher Education'' [Xi jinping: quanmian jiaqiang he 
gaijin xinxingshixia gaoxiaodang de jianshe], Xinhua, reprinted in 
China Education News Net, 24 December 09; ``Summary of the First 
National Meeting Regarding Party Construction Work in Institutes of 
Higher Education'' [Di yici quanguo gaoxiao dang de jianshe gongzuo 
huiyi qingkuang gaishu], Xinhua, reprinted in Ministry of Education 
(Online), last visited 28 September 10. The Central Committee of the 
Communist Party increased efforts to strengthen Party construction in 
institutions of higher education in 1990, not long after the June 4, 
1989, student-led Tiananmen protests.
    \16\ ``Chinese VP Stresses Party Building in Social 
Organizations,'' Xinhua (Online), 29 January 10; Huang Xiaohua, ``My 
Province Puts Forward This Year's New Party Construction Goal; Every 
Social Organization Will Establish a Party Organization'' [Wo sheng 
tichu jinnian dangjian xin mubiao suoyou shehui zuzhi douyao jianli 
dang zuzhi], Hainan Daily (Online), 23 June 10. For example, the Hainan 
Provincial Social Organization Party Work Committee will require each 
social organization to establish some type of Party organization by the 
end of the year.
    \17\ Hu Bi, ``(Changes in Chinese `Way of Governance,' Central 
Authorities) `Safeguarding Stability': A System Quietly Takes Shape,'' 
Southern Weekend, 3 March 10 (Open Source Center, 17 March 10).
    \18\ Ibid.
    \19\ Ibid.; ``Interview With Comrade Liu Xingchen, Assistant to the 
Head of Kailu County, Party Committee Secretary of the Public Security 
Bureau and Director of the Public Security Bureau'' [Kailuxian 
xianzhang zhuli, gonganju dangwei shuji, juzhang liu xingchen tongzhi], 
Xinhua (Online), 28 August 09. Informants in these networks try to 
identify troublemakers and to pinpoint potential social instability 
problems before they erupt, including problems that may lead citizens 
to take grievances to higher levels of authority. According to this 
article, officials in Kailu county in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region reportedly established a network of over 12,000 informants for a 
population of 400,000 citizens. The assistant to the leader of Kailu 
county, Liu Xingchen, told Xinhua that ``[e]very policeman . . . no 
matter their division or particular police station, has to establish at 
least 20 informants in their community, village, [or] work unit . . . 
.''
    \20\ ``DSD Police Recruit and Maintain Informant Networks Among 
University Students,'' China Digital Times (Online), 11 April 10. 
Officials at Dezhou University recruited, managed, and rewarded student 
security informants for valuable information and directed them to 
assist in carrying out the university's security and stability work. 
Tania Branigan, ``China Recruits Classroom Snoops To Fight Violence and 
Pornography,'' Guardian (Online), 19 March 10. In Kunming, Yunnan 
province, police and education departments reportedly requested primary 
and secondary school teachers to choose students to be ``little 
security informants'' to collect information and report on a variety of 
student behaviors, amid concerns regarding school violence.
    \21\ ``Domestic Security To Remain a Challenge in 2010: Police,'' 
Global Times, 29 December 09 (Open Source Center, 29 December 09).
    \22\ ``Focus of Efforts To Maintain Stability Is Crackdown on 
`Internal Three Forces' Involving Workers, Farmers, Military 
Personnel,'' Ming Pao, 13 March 10 (Open Source Center, 16 March 10).
    \23\ Tsinghua University Sociology Department Social Development 
Research Group, ``New Thinking About `Stability,' Systematize Interest 
Articulation, Realize Lasting Stability and Durable Peace'' [``Weiwen'' 
xin silu: liyi biaoda zhiduhua, shixian changzhi jiuan], Southern 
Weekend (Online), 14 April 10.
    \24\ Ibid.
    \25\ Ibid.
    \26\ ``Public Security Expenditures Increase Surpass Military 
Spending'' [Gongan zhichu zeng fuchao junfei], Ming Pao, reprinted in 
Boxun (Online), 6 March 10.
    \27\ Tsinghua University Sociology Department Social Development 
Research Group, ``New Thinking About `Stability,' Systematize Interest 
Articulation, Realize Lasting Stability and Durable Peace'' [``Weiwen'' 
xin silu: liyi biaoda zhiduhua, shixian changzhi jiuan], Southern 
Weekend (Online), 14 April 10.
    \28\ Ibid. The study suggests that the use of the funds does not 
promote social equity and ``may undermine overall social values, 
including those of morality and justice.''
    \29\ Shi Zhifeng and Liu Meng, Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(Online), ``News Flash: Liu Xianbin Officially Arrested'' [Kuaixun: liu 
xianbin yi bei zhengshi daibu], 6 July 10; ``China Detains Democracy 
Advocate for New Activism,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington 
Post (Online), 30 June 10; Amnesty International (Online), ``Chinese 
Democracy Activist Detained: Liu Xianbin,'' 5 July 10.
    \30\ Amnesty International (Online), ``Chinese Democracy Activist 
Detained: Liu Xianbin,'' 5 July 10; ``China Detains Democracy Advocate 
for New Activism,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post 
(Online), 30 June 10.
    \31\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Democracy Activist Gets Ten 
Years for `Subversion of State Power,' '' 16 October 09. See also the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database 
for more information on Guo's case.
    \32\ ``Guo Quan Case: Jiangsu Provincial High People's Court 
Criminal Judgment'' [Guo quan an: jiangsu sheng gaoji renmin fayuan 
xingshi caidingshu], Boxun (Online), 4 January 10.
    \33\ ``Worker Is Jailed for Joining a Party,'' South China Morning 
Post (Online), 11 February 10; Dong Lei, Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(Online), ``Youth With Mental Disorder Is Tried on Suspicion of 
`Subverting State Power' '' [Jingshenbing qingnian beiyi shexian 
``dianfu guojia zhengquan'' shenpan], 15 December 09. See also the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database 
for more information on Xue's case.
    \34\ Dong Lei, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Youth 
With Mental Disorder Is Tried on Suspicion of `Subverting State Power' 
'' [Jingshenbing qingnian beiyi shexian ``dianfu guojia zhengquan'' 
panduan], 15 December 09; ``Worker Is Jailed for Joining a Party,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 11 February 10.
    \35\ Zhang Zequn, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Guangdong Shaoguan Democracy Activist Luo Yongquan Ordered To Serve 
Two Years Reeducation Through Labor'' [Guangdong shaoguan minzhu renshi 
lou yongquan beichu laojiao liangnian], 3 August 09. See also the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China Political Prisoner Database 
for more information on Luo's case.
    \36\ Xu Dongmei, Research on Chinese Communist Party Intra-Party 
Democracy [Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei minzhu yanjiu], (Beijing: 
Party Construction Reading Materials Press, 2004), 7.
    \37\ Deng Xiaoping, ``Report on the Revision of the Constitution of 
the Communist Party of China,'' People's Daily (Online), 16 September 
56. According to Deng, ``[t]he measures taken for the development of 
inner-Party democracy are not meant to weaken necessary centralization 
in the Party, but to supply it with a powerful and vigorous base.'' 
Constitution of the Communist Party of China, as amended 21 October 07. 
According to the Party constitution, ``Democratic centralism is a 
combination of centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under 
centralized guidance. It is the fundamental organizational principle of 
the Party and is also the mass line applied in the Party's political 
activities. The Party must fully expand intra-Party democracy, 
safeguard the democratic rights of its members, and give play to the 
initiative and creativity of Party organizations at all levels as well 
as its members.'' Xu Dongmei, Research on Chinese Communist Party 
Intra-Party Democracy [Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei minzhu yanjiu], 
(Beijing: Party Construction Reading Materials Press, 2004), 3. 
Development of inner-Party democracy was all but abandoned during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976), but was revived after 1978 when the 
concept of ``collective leadership'' once again became a guiding 
principle of the Party.
    \38\ Joseph Fewsmith, ``Inner-Party Democracy: Development and 
Limitations,'' China Leadership Monitor, No. 31, Winter 2010, 1, 9.
    \39\ Chen Xinyu, ``Yibin: Gong County Establishes Public Opinion 
Observer System, Raises Public Trust in Candidate Selection'' [Yibin: 
gongxian jianli minyi guanchayuan zhidu tigao xuanren yongren 
gongxindu], Sichuan News Net (Online), 9 June 10; Chen Xinyu, Shi 
Xisheng, and Liu Xiaofang, ``Suzhou Community Resident's Committees 
Commonly Elected Through Direct Elections'' [Suzhou shequ juweihui 
huanjie pubian caiyong zhixuan laiyuan], Suzhou Daily, reprinted in 
Suzhou Hotline (Online), 9 April 10.
    \40\ Ibid.; Hangzhou Municipality, Yuhang District, Bureau of Civil 
Affairs (Online), ``Speech at the 2010 Annual Community Organization 
Elections Conference'' [Zai 2010 nian shequ zuzhi huanjie xuanju 
dahuishang de jianghua], 26 April 10; Dai Candong et al., ``Binjiang 
District Smoothly Completes Community Party Organization Election 
Work'' [Bingjiangqu shunli wancheng shequ dang zuzhi huanjie xuanju 
gongzuo], Hangzhou Daily Net (Online), 2 June 10; Liu Wei, ``Gongshu 
Promotes First Citywide Community Election Observer System'' [Gongshu 
zai quanshi shoutui shequ huanjie xuanju guangchayuan zhidu], Hangzhou 
Daily (Online), 30 May 10. Other listed eligible professions included 
members of the eight ``approved'' democratic parties, students or 
teachers in law and politics departments at institutes of higher 
education, and members of law firms or social organizations. Guangdong 
Province Civil Affairs Department, Circular Regarding Further Efforts 
To Improve Village (Residents') Committee Election Monitor Systems 
[Guanyu jinyibu wanshan cun (ju) weihui xuanju guanchayuan zhidu de 
tongzhi], issued 13 March 08. Earlier domestic pilot projects with 
election monitoring systems took place in Guangdong.
    \41\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on China's 
Political Party System [Zhongguo de zhengdang zhidu baipishu], Xinhua 
(Online), 15 November 07, preface.
    \42\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 2(6), 
(8). The 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action Plan declared in 
relation to the National People's Congress among other items, that 
``[t]he people's congress system will be improved. Revisions will be 
made to the Election Law to improve the election system . . . and the 
close ties between the deputies and their constituencies will be 
maintained.'' In addition, the plan states that ``[t]he Law on the 
Supervision by the Standing Committees of People's Congresses at All 
Levels shall be implemented to strengthen supervision by the people's 
congresses over administrative, trial and procuratorial organs, 
focusing on conspicuous problems that have a bearing on the overall 
situation of reform, development and stability, affect social harmony 
or cause strong public resentment.''
    \43\ Ibid., sec. 2(6)-(8). The 2009-2010 National Human Rights 
Action Plan declared in relation to the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC), among other items, that ``[p]olitical 
consultation will be incorporated further in the decision-making 
procedures, and the effectiveness of the participation and deliberation 
of state affairs by personages from non-Communist parties and people 
with no political affiliation will be enhanced.'' The Action Plan also 
stated that ``[t]he proportions of deputies from social organizations 
to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference at all levels 
will be increased.'' In addition, the plan states that ``[t]he 
democratic supervision mechanism of the CPPCC will be improved, making 
institutional improvements in the links of getting information, 
communication and feedback to guarantee unblocked channels for 
democratic supervision and enhance the quality and efficiency of 
democratic supervision. Full play will be given to the role of CPPCC 
bills and proposals in democratic supervision, and government 
departments concerned shall handle them seriously, and give formal 
replies without delay.''
    \44\ ``Full Text: Speech on Implementation of National Human Rights 
Action Plan of China (2009-2010),'' Xinhua, 3 December 09 (Open Source 
Center, 3 December 09).
    \45\ Ibid.
    \46\ ``Next Step in Equal Rights for Urban and Rural [Areas]'' 
[Chengxiang tongquan xia yibu], Century Weekly, reprinted in Caixin Net 
(Online), 15 March 10.
    \47\ ``Deyang: The Country's First Professional People's Congress 
Deputies Will Without Delay Take Office in Luojiang County'' [Deyang: 
quanguo shouge zhuanzhi renda daibiao luojiangxian zou mashang ren], 
Sichuan People's Net (Online), 12 July 10; Yu Jianrong, ``Professional 
People's Congress Deputies Is Socialist Democracy's New Path'' 
[Zhuanzhi renda daibiao shi shehui zhuyi minzhu de chuangxin], Oriental 
Morning Post (Online), 19 July 10; ``Professionalization of People's 
Congress Deputies Is the Direction of Basic Level Political 
Development'' [Renda daibiao zhuanzhihua shi jiceng zhengzhi fazhan de 
fangxiang], Sichuan Daily, 30 June 10 (Open Source Center, 30 June 10).
    \48\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 2(6)-(8). 
The Human Rights Action Plan states that ``[t]he Law on the Supervision 
by the Standing Committees of People's Congresses at All Levels shall 
be implemented to strengthen supervision by the people's congresses 
over administrative, trial and procuratorial organs focusing on 
conspicuous problems that have a bearing on the overall situation of 
reform, development and stability, affect social harmony or cause 
strong public resentment.''
    \49\ ``Wu Bangguo: This Year NPC Will Make Inquires of State 
Council Ministries'' [Wu bangguo: renda jinnian jiang dui guowuyuan 
bumen kaizhan zhixun], Southern Weekend (Online), 10 March 10.
    \50\ Yang Tao, `` `Two Highs' Reports Advance Amid `High Opposition 
Votes' '' [``Lianggao baogao'' zai ``gao fandui piao'' zhong jinbu], 
Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 15 March 10.
    \51\ ``National People's Congress Closes, Total of 506 Motions 
Raised'' [Quanguo renda huiyi bimu gongti 506 jian yi'an], Southern 
Weekend (Online), 14 March 10.
    \52\ Mimi Lau, ``Mainland Newspapers Speak Out on Muzzling 
Delegates on Sensitive Issues,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 08 
March 10.
    \53\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, Preamble (``Multi-party 
cooperation and political consultation system under the leadership of 
the Communist Party of China shall continue to exist and develop for a 
long time to come.'').
    \54\ Guangzhou Municipal Communist Party Central Committee, Rules 
on Political Consultation (Trial Implementation) [Zhengzhi xieshang 
guicheng (shixing)], issued 3 September 09, arts. 3-6. Article 3 
provides for ``consultation before deciding important policies and 
during the implementation of those policies.''
    \55\ Ibid., arts. 4, 5, 8.
    \56\ Ibid., arts. 6, 9.
    \57\ ``Guangzhou Issues Political Consultation Regulations in New 
Political Reform Scheme'' [Zhenggai xinyou sui chutai zhengzhi xieshang 
guicheng], Wen Wei Po (Online), 9 August 09.
    \58\ PRC Organic Law of the Villagers Committees, enacted and 
effective on 4 November 98. According to Article 2 of this law, village 
committees are ``the primary mass organization of self-government'' 
through which ``villagers manage their own affairs, educate themselves 
and serve their own needs and in which election is conducted, decision 
adopted, administration maintained and supervision exercised by 
democratic means.'' According to Article 3, the Party branches at the 
village level should play ``the core leading role'' [in village 
governance]. Article 4 states that the village committees ``shall 
assist the said [township] people's government in its work.''
    \59\ Mao Lei and Qin Peihua, ``Organic Law of Village Committees 
Implementation Problems Need To Give Rise to Serious Attention'' 
[Cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa shishizhong cunzai wenti xu yinqi zhongshi], 
People's Daily, reprinted in National People's Congress (Online), 22 
December 09. According to this report, in some villages, 
``organizations pay little attention to self-governance, do not 
support, or have delayed holding village committee elections for a long 
time.'' In other villages, Party committees have controlled everything 
and not ``brought elected village committees into play'' and have held 
village representative meetings in form only.
    \60\ Hui Ji, Zhejiang Normal University Village Research Center 
(Online), Research Report on Guizhou Province Open Government Affairs 
and Democratic Management ``Difficult Villages'' Governance Work [Dui 
guizhousheng cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli ``nandiancun'' zhili 
gongzuo de diaoyan baogao], 11 December 09. Guizhou province reportedly 
had a total of 542 ``difficult villages'' with various problems.
    \61\ Ibid.
    \62\ ``(Ministry of Civil Affairs) National Open Village Affairs 
and Democratic Management `Difficult Villages' Governance Work 
Experience Exchange Conference Opens'' [(Minzhengbu) quanguo cunwu 
gongkai he minzhu guanli ``nandiancun'' zhili gongzuo jingyan 
jiaoliuhui zhaokai], People's Daily, reprinted in Wenzhou Bureau of 
Civil Affairs (Online), 15 December 09.
    \63\ Ibid.
    \64\ Central People's Government, Open Village Affairs and 
Democratic Management Difficult Villages Governance Work Plan (2009-
2011) [Cunwu gongkai he minzhu guanli nandiancun zhili gongzuo jihua 
(2009-2011)], issued 16 July 09; Ministry of Civil Affairs, Opinion 
Regarding Developing Open Village Affairs and Democratic Management 
`Difficult Villages' Governance Work [Guanyu kaizhan cunwu gongkai he 
minzhu guanli ``nandiancun'' zhili gongzuo de ruogan yijian], issued 24 
February 09.
    \65\ ``China Considers Law To Give Rural Residents More Power in 
Village Affairs, Elections,'' Xinhua, reprinted in National People's 
Congress (Online), 23 June 10; Wei Minli et al., ``Guarantee Hundreds 
of Millions of Villagers Will Be the Masters of Their Own Affairs, 
Organic Law of Villagers' Committees Draft Revisions To Resolve `Three 
Difficulties' '' [Baozhang yiwan nongmin dangjiazuozhu cunmin 
weiyuanhui zuzhifa xiuding caoan pojie ``sannan''], Xinhua (Online), 22 
December 09; Wang Weibo, ``Strengthen Party Leadership: China's Village 
Self Autonomy Facing a Change? '' [Wang Weibo: qianghua dang de 
lingdao: zhongguo de cunmin zizhi mianlin zhuanze?], China Newsweek, 
reprinted in China Elections and Governance (Online), 15 July 10; Li 
Huizi and Yu Xiaojie, ``Law Changes To Give Chinese Villagers Greater 
Say in Removing Officials,'' Xinhua (Online), 23 December 09.
    \66\ Wei Minli et al., ``Guarantee Hundreds of Millions of 
Villagers Will Be The Masters of Their Own Affairs, Organic Law of 
Villagers' Committees Draft Revisions To Resolve `Three Difficulties' 
'' [Baozhang yiwan nongmin dangjiazuozhu cunmin weiyuanhui zuzhifa 
xiuding caoan pojie ``sannan''], Xinhua (Online), 22 December 09; 
``China Considers Law To Give Rural Residents More Power in Village 
Affairs, Elections,'' Xinhua, reprinted in National People's Congress 
(Online), 23 June 10; Li Huizi and Yu Xiaojie, ``Law Changes To Give 
Chinese Villagers Greater Say in Removing Officials,'' Xinhua (Online), 
23 December 09.
    \67\ Wang Weibo, ``Strengthen Party Leadership: China's Village 
Self Autonomy Facing a Change? '' [Wang weibo: qianghua dang de 
lingdao: zhongguo de cunmin zizhi mianlin zhuanze?], China Newsweek, 
reprinted in China Elections and Governance (Online), 15 July 10.
    \68\ Chinese Communist Party (Online), ``Public Invited To Comment 
on Draft Revision of Organic Law of Villagers' Committees,'' 28 
December 09.
    \69\ Yao Lifa and Han Ye, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
`` `Village Officials' From Four Chinese Provinces Convene News 
Conference'' [Zhongguo sisheng `cunguan' zai beijing zhaokai xinwen 
fabuhui], 27 February 10.
    \70\ ``China To Extend Anti-Corruption Fight to Non-Public 
Entities,'' Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 22 February 
10.
    \71\ Transparency International (Online), ``Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2009,'' November 2009.
    \72\ Ministry of Supervision (Online), ``2009 Discipline Inspection 
and Supervision Agencies Case Investigation and Management Work 
Situation Press Conference'' [2009 niandu jijian jiancha jiguan chaban 
anjian gongzuo qingkuang xinwen tongqihui], 07 January 10.
    \73\ ``Chinese Lawmakers Urge Amplified Anti-Corruption Efforts To 
Maintain Social Stability,'' Xinhua (Online), 10 March 10.
    \74\ ``China Reveals Stimulus Graft,'' Associated Press, reprinted 
in Wall Street Journal (Online), 20 May 10.
    \75\ Ibid.
    \76\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. 2(8). The 
Human Rights Action Plan states that ``[l]aws and regulations on the 
prevention and punishment of corruption will be strictly implemented, 
so will rules that require leading cadres to be clean and self-
disciplined . . . . Full play will be given to the role of 
administrative supervision to resolutely stop unhealthy practices that 
hurt the fundamental interest of the public, and effective measures 
will be taken to deal with major issues that cause strong public 
resentment.''
    \77\ Dai Zhiyong, ``If the People Can Learn To Compromise, Please 
Learn To Govern Honestly'' [Ruguo minzhong neng tuoxie, qing ni xuezhe 
zuo qingguan], Southern Weekend (Online), 23 September 09. In September 
2009, the Party Central Discipline Inspection Commission reportedly 
announced that officials must disclose their personal records related 
to housing, investments, and the employment status of their spouse and 
children. He Huifeng, ``Guangdong Officials To Disclose Assets--But Not 
to the Public,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 15 October 09. 
Several provinces and cities have initiated similar asset reporting 
requirements for select categories of officials including, a city in 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, cities in Hunan and Guangdong 
provinces, and the municipality of Shanghai, although in many cases 
reported information remained within the Communist Party unavailable to 
the public.
    \78\ Raymond Li, ``Liaison Offices Face Closure in Anti-Graft 
Drive,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 25 January 10; General 
Office of the State Council, Opinion Regarding Strengthening and 
Standardizing Management of Local Government Liaison Offices in Beijing 
[Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jiaqiang he guifan gedi zhengfu zhu 
Beijing banshi jigou guanli de yijian], 19 January 10, sec. 2. Beijing-
based liaison offices reportedly are the source of lobbying efforts of 
local and regional governments and state-run companies, and according 
to the South China Morning Post may number as high as 10,000 based on 
``official media reports.'' In January 2010, the central government 
mandated that by June, county-level government ``liaison offices'' in 
Beijing must close, city-level offices could remain after approval of 
the government at the relevant administrative level, and provincial-
level government and agency liaison offices could remain open.
    \79\ ``The Party Central Committee Issues Clean Government Norms 
[With] 52 `Prohibitions' To Standardize Party Cadre Behavior'' 
[Zhongyang banbu lianzheng zhunze 52 ``buzhun'' guifan dangyuan ganbu 
xingwei], Xinhua, reprinted in Ministry of Supervision (Online), 24 
February 10. See especially Articles 5, 7, 8; ``Chinese Communist Party 
Issues New Ethics Code,'' Associate Press, reprinted in New York Times 
(Online), 23 February 10.
    \80\ Woods Lee, ``Party Website Opens To Expose Corruption,'' South 
China Morning Post (Online), 30 October 09. The Internet address of 
this particular Web site is 12388.gov.cn.
    \81\ Zhao Yang, ``Supreme People's Procuratorate: More Than 70 
Percent of the Cases of Work-Related Offenses Originate From Citizen 
Reports'' [Zuigaojian: qicheng yishang zhiwu fanzui anjian yuanyu 
qunzhong jubao], Legal Daily (Online), 21 June 10.
    \82\ Du Meng, ``70% of Whistleblowers Subject to Retribution, Trend 
Toward Concealed Methods, Difficult To Establish Scope'' [70% jubaozhe 
zaoyu daji baofu shouduan riqu yingbi nanyu jieding], Legal Daily 
(Online), 17 June 10.
    \83\ Mandy Zuo, ``Amendment To Shield Informants,'' South China 
Morning Post (Online), 23 June 10.
    \84\ Du Meng, ``70% of Whistleblowers Subject to Retribution, Trend 
Toward Concealed Methods, Difficult To Establish Scope'' [70% jubaozhe 
zaoyu daji baofu shouduan riqu yingbi nanyu jieding], Legal Daily 
(Online), 17 June 10.
    \85\ Zou Le, ``Internet Critic Vows To Zip His Mouth,'' Global 
Times (Online), 11 March 10.
    \86\ Yan Jie, ``Detention Order Is Revoked,'' China Daily (Online), 
11 March 10.
    \87\ Mandy Zuo, ``Amendment To Shield Informants,'' South China 
Morning Post (Online), 23 June 10.
    \88\ Wang Jinbao, ``Thoughts on Political Reform Behind the 
Training of `County-Level Officials,' '' China News Weekly, 29 March 10 
(Open Source Center, 19 April 10). Other signs include promotion of a 
personnel system that would have provincial Party committees appoint 
(or approve of) county-level Party committees (instead of Party 
committees at the next highest level), continuous rounds of training of 
county-level officials at the Communist Party School throughout the 
year, and measures promoting fiscal reform at the county level, among 
others.
    \89\ Ibid.
    \90\ ``Supreme Court Requests Elimination of Localities' `Local 
Policies' To Resolve Difficulties With Bringing Administrative Lawsuits 
[Zuigaofa yaoqiu qingchu gedi ``tuzhengce'' jie xingzheng susong 
gaozhuang nan], Xinhua (Online), 23 May 10.
    \91\ `` `Hunan Provincial Administrative Procedure Provisions' 
Appearance Wins Central Approval'' [``Hunan sheng xingzheng chengxu 
guiding'' chutai huo zhongyang kending], China News (Online), 14 May 
10.
    \92\ Ibid.
    \93\ Lian Qingqing, ``Guangdong Drafts Provisions on `Red [Letter] 
Head Documents,' Effective Period May Not Exceed Five Years'' 
[Guangdong ni guiding ``hongtou wenjian'' you xiaoqi zuichang 5 nian], 
Guangzhou Daily, reprinted in Dayang Net (Online), 11 December 09. 
Trial regulations may only remain effective for two years.
    \94\ China Transparency (Online), ``Experts: Large Advances in Open 
Budgeting, Distance to Public Expectations Is Still Wide'' [Zhuanjia: 
yusuan gongkai jinbu henda juli gongzhong qidai shanggyuan], 28 March 
10.
    \95\ ``National People's Congress Requests State Council 
Departments Make Budgets Public'' [Quanguo renda yaoqiu gongkai 
guowuyuan ge bumen yusuan], People's Daily, reprinted in Netease 
(Online), 11 March 10.
    \96\ Jiang Yanxin, ``Next Year Beijing Government Departments Will 
Make Budgets Completely Public'' [Beijing zhengfu bumen mingnian jiang 
quanbu gongkai yusuan], Beijing News, reprinted in People's Daily 
(Online), 1 June 10.
    \97\ Guo Aidi, ``Budgets Made Public by Beijing Municipal 
Ministries and Commissions Considered Too General and Unclear'' 
[Beijingshi buwei gongbu yusuan bei zhi taicu fang kanbudong], Beijing 
Times, reprinted in Phoenix (Online), 21 May 10.
    \98\ Liu Zichao, ``Pushing Open the Door to Public Budgets'' 
[Tuaikai gonggong yusuan zhimen], Southern Weekend (Online), 7 January 
10.
    \99\ Ibid.
    \100\ Ibid.
    \101\ He Yingsi, ``Guangzhou Makes Public Online the Financial 
Budgets of 114 Government Agencies'' [Guangzhou wangshang gongkai 114 
ge zhengfu bumen caizheng yusuan], Guangzhou Daily (Online), 23 October 
09. Li Detao reported that in 2009, the Shenzhen Ministry of Finance 
allowed citizens to view its budget in its reading room.
    \102\ Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open 
Government Information [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai 
tiaoli], issued 5 April 07, effective 1 May 08. For more information, 
see ``China Commits to `Open Government Information' Effective May 1, 
2008,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, May 2008, 2.
    \103\ Ibid.
    \104\ Opinions on Several Questions Regarding the People's Republic 
of China Regulations on Open Government Information [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli ruogan wenti de yijian], issued 
29 April 08.
    \105\ State Council General Office, Opinions on Performing Well the 
Work of Disclosing Government Information on Request [Guanyu zuohao 
zhengfu xinxi yi shenqing gongkai gongzuo de yijian], issued 12 January 
10, art. 1.
    \106\ Ibid., arts. 2 (scope of government information), 3 (handling 
a request affecting multiple agencies), 5 (increasing disclosure to 
decrease volume of requests), 6 (improve services), and 7 (secrecy of 
information).
    \107\ Supreme People's Court, Measures on Several Issues Concerning 
Adjudication of Administrative Cases Involving Open Government 
Information (Public Comment Draft) [Guanyu shenli zhengfu xinxi gongkai 
xingzheng anjian ruogan de guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao)], released 3 
November 09.
    \108\ Wang Doudou, ``Open Government Information Judicial 
Interpretation Solicits 411 Suggestions'' [Zhengfu xinxi gongkai sifa 
jieshi zhengqiu yijian 411 tiao], China Court Network (Online), 3 March 
10.
    \109\ Wang Doudou, ``Supreme Court States Open Information Scope 
Will Not `Shrink' '' [Zuigao fayuan cheng xinxi gongkai fanwei buhui 
``suoshui''], Legal Daily, reprinted in China Court Network (Online), 3 
March 10.
    \110\ Supreme People's Court, Opinion Regarding the Protection of 
Plaintiffs Right To Sue in Administrative Litigation Cases [Guanyu yifa 
baohu xingzheng susong dangshiren suquan de yijian], issued 11 November 
09, art. 3.
    \111\ Jamie P. Horsley, China Law Center, Yale Law School, ``Update 
on China's Open Government Information Regulations: Surprising Public 
Demand Yielding Some Positive Results,'' 23 April 10. According to this 
report, ``Substantial challenges continue to frustrate realization of 
the Chinese people's `right to know,' '' including conflicts with 
China's state secrets laws, and ``[w]hat was less predictable was the 
dynamism of the Chinese people's response to this new channel for 
interacting with their government, evidence of the increasing awareness 
of their rights and interests as citizens and taxpayers . . . .''
    \112\ Beijing officials reported receiving 6,889 OGI requests in 
2009. Beijing Municipal People's Government 2009 Open Government 
Information Work Annual Report [Beijing shi renmin zhengfu 2009 nian 
zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], PRC Central People's 
Government (Online), 6 April 10, 9. Shanghai officials reported 
receiving 11,773 OGI requests in 2009. 2009 Shanghai Open Government 
Information Work Annual Report [2009 Shanghai zhengfu xinxi gongkai 
gongzuo niandu baogao], Shanghai Municipal People's Government 
(Online), March 2010, 11. Guangzhou officials reported receiving 
798,279 OGI requests in 2009. Guangzhou Municipality 2009 Open 
Government Information Work Annual Report [Guangzhou shi 2009 nian 
zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], Guangzhou Municipal 
People's Government (Online), 25 March 10. The figures from the three 
Open Government Information reports included above are inclusive of the 
requests reportedly received by municipal-level government agencies as 
well as the requests received by district and county administrative 
areas within the municipality. Jamie P. Horsley, China Law Center, Yale 
Law School, ``Update on China's Open Government Information 
Regulations: Surprising Public Demand Yielding Some Positive Results,'' 
23 April 10. Guangzhou was the first municipality to adopt Open 
Government Information provisions.
    \113\ Liu Zichao, ``Pushing Open the Door to Public Budgets'' 
[Tuaikai gonggong yusuan zhimen], Southern Weekend (Online), 7 January 
10.
    \114\ ``Tearing Down Your House, It Has Nothing to Do With You? '' 
[Chai ni fangzi, yu ni wuguan?], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 
23 June 10.
    \115\ Alexa Olesen, ``China Activist Demands Quake Recovery Budget 
Info,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post (Online), 3 
March 10.
    \116\ Huang Yijun, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Lawyer Yan Yiming Seeks the Whereabouts of 40 Billion Yuan Ahead of 
the `Two Sessions' '' [Yan yiming lushi ``lianghui'' qian zai zhui 4 
wanyi touzi quxiang], 25 February 10.
    \117\ Han Haikuo and Li Hailing, ``Yunnan Province Administrative 
Transparency Score 0, Response: Relevant Departments Did Not Respond'' 
[Yunnan xingzheng toumingdu de 0 fen, huiying: xiangguan bumen dou mei 
huihan], China News Net, reprinted in Legal Daily (Online), 18 June 10; 
Jamie P. Horsley, China Law Center, Yale Law School, ``Update on 
China's Open Government Information Regulations: Surprising Public 
Demand Yielding Some Positive Results,'' 23 April 10; Center for Public 
Participation Studies and Support, Annual Watch Report on China's 
Administrative Transparency--2008 (Abridged Version) [Zhongguo 
xingzheng toumingdu niandu guancha baogao--2008 niandu (jieben)], 2 
April 10; Suzanne Piotrowski et al., ``Key Issues for Implementation of 
Chinese Open Government Information Regulations,'' 69 Public 
Administration Review, Issue 1, 129, 133 (2010).
    \118\ Center for Public Participation Studies and Support, Annual 
Watch Report on China's Administrative Transparency--2008 (Abridged 
Version) [Zhongguo xingzheng toumingdu niandu guancha baogao--2008 
niandu (jieben)], 2 April 10; Suzanne Piotrowski et al., ``Key Issues 
for Implementation of Chinese Open Government Information 
Regulations,'' 69 Public Administration Review, Issue 1, 129, 133 
(2010).
    \119\ Ibid.
    \120\ Beijing Municipal People's Government 2009 Open Government 
Information Work Annual Report [Beijing shi renmin zhengfu 2009 nian 
zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], PRC Central People's 
Government (Online), 6 April 10, 11; 2009 Shanghai Open Government 
Information Work Annual Report [2009 Shanghai zhengfu xinxi gongkai 
gongzuo niandu baogao], Shanghai Municipal People's Government 
(Online), March 2010, 13; Guangzhou Municipality 2009 Open Government 
Information Work Annual Report [Guangzhou shi 2009 nian zhengfu xinxi 
gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], Guangzhou Municipal People's Government 
(Online), 25 March 10; Chongqing Municipal People's Government 2009 
Open Government Information Work Annual Report [Chongqing shi renmin 
zhengfu 2009 nian zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], PRC 
Central People's Government (Online), 6 April 10.
    \121\ 2009 Shanghai Open Government Information Work Annual Report 
[2009 Shanghai zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], Shanghai 
Municipal People's Government (Online), March 2010, 13.
    \122\ Ibid.; Beijing Municipal People's Government 2009 Open 
Government Information Work Annual Report [Beijing shi renmin zhengfu 
2009 nian zhengfu xinxi gongkai gongzuo niandu baogao], PRC Central 
People's Government (Online), 6 April 10, 11.
    \123\ Jamie P. Horsley, China Law Center, Yale Law School, ``Update 
on China's Open Government Information Regulations: Surprising Public 
Demand Yielding Some Positive Results,'' 23 April 10.
    \124\ Kong Lingquan, ``Lawyer Requests Information Disclosure From 
80 Provincial and City Governments, Receives Cold Response'' [Lushi 
xiang 80 ge sheng shi zhengfu shenqing xinxi gongkai jiedao lengdan 
huifu], Democracy & Law, reprinted in Jin Yang Net (Online), 19 June 
10.
    \125\ Li Yizhong, ``Wuhan Municipality's First Open Government 
Information Case Concludes, Illegal Administrative Action Affirmed'' 
[Wuhan shouli zhengfu xinxi gongkai an shenjie queren xingzheng xingwei 
weifa], Changjiang Daily, reprinted in Eastday (Online), 30 January 10.
    \126\ ``Beijing Resident Sues Environmental Protection Bureau for 
Illegal Approval, Loses Lawsuit'' [Beijing jumin gao huanbao ju weigui 
shenpi baisu], Jinghua Times, reprinted in Sina (Online), 22 May 10.
    \127\ Li Li, ``Outline of Achievements of 6-Year `Open Door 
Legislation' Issued, State Council Solicited Public Comments on 67 
Administrative Regulations'' [Gangyao banbu 6 nian ``kaimen lifa'' 
cheng changtai guowuyuan yi dui 67 jian xingzheng fagui gongkai 
zhengqiu yijian], Legal Daily (Online), 25 March 10.
    \128\ Ibid.
    \129\ Ibid.
    \130\ U.S.-China Business Council (Online), ``PRC Transparency 
Tracking,'' updated April 2010.
    \131\ Ibid.
    \132\ Ibid.
    \133\  For more information about public hearing topics in China, 
see Section III--Institutions of Democratic Governance in CECC, 2009 
Annual Report, 10 October 09, 208-216; Peng Zongchao et al., Public 
Hearing Systems in China: Transparent Policymaking and Public 
Governance [Tingzheng zhidu: touming juece yu gonggong zhili], 
(Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2004), 3, 5. According to Article 
42 of the PRC Law on Administrative Punishment, a qualified party may 
request a public hearing regarding orders to stop production, 
revocation of permits or licenses, and administrative fines. PRC Law on 
Administrative Punishment, enacted 17 March 96, effective 1 October 96, 
art. 42. In the late 1990s and in the current decade, public hearing 
systems have been added to a variety of other administrative, 
legislative, and judicial laws and regulations. By the end of 2004, 
nearly one-third of China's provinces, cities, and district courts 
established a public hearing system in state compensation cases. 
``Public Hearings: Driving Engine of Democracy in China,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 5 October 06. One Chinese scholar remarked that ``people are 
more willing to cooperate with the authorities in implementation of 
public policy if they can contribute to the policy-making process.'' 
Human Rights in China (Online), ``Chinese Lawyer Challenges Filtering 
Software Order and Requests Public Hearing,'' 15 June 09; State 
Council, Decision Regarding Strengthening Municipal and County 
Government Law-Based Administration [Guanyu jiaqiang shixian zhengfu 
yifa xingzheng de jueding], issued 18 June 08. The State Council 
directive states that government agencies may ``hold hearings for 
issues subject to examination and approval which concern the major 
public interests or the vital interests of the people.'' Colin Knox and 
Zhang Qun, ``Building Public Service-Oriented Government in China,'' 20 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, No. 5, 449, 449-464 
(2007). One finding of this study is that in the case observed, the 
decisionmaking process was not ``improved'' by the hearing process 
because of the lack of valuable debate.
    \134\ Yangjiang Municipal Development and Reform Commission, 
Yangjiang Municipal People's Government Administrative Policy Procedure 
Provisions [Yangjiangshi renmin zhengfu xingzheng juece chengxu 
guiding], issued 8 February 10; Huangshan Municipal Government, 
Important Administrative Policy Procedure Provisions [Zhongda xingzheng 
juece chengxu guiding], issued 16 December 09; Suzhou Municipal 
Government Legislative Affairs Office (Online), ``Analysis of `Suzhou 
Municipal People's Government Key Administrative Policy Procedure 
Provision' '' [``Suzhoushi renmin zhengfu zhongda xingzheng juece 
chengxu guiding'' jiedu], 21 February 10.
    \135\ Chen Fei, ``China Will Pursue Public Hearing Systems for 
Major Administrative Policies at Both Municipal and County Levels'' 
[Zhongguo zai shixian liangji zhengfu tuixing zhongda xingzheng juece 
tingzheng zhidu], Xinhua (Online), 18 June 08; State Council, Decision 
Regarding Strengthening Municipal and County Government Law-Based 
Administration [Guanyu jiaqiang shixian zhengfu yifa xingzheng de 
jueding], issued 18 June 08.
    \136\ ``Outlandish Situations at Water Hearings Around the Country 
Productions Just for Show Are Incessant, [Lead to] Calls for 
Accountability System'' [Gedi shuijia tingzhenghui guaizhuang buduan 
zaojiafeng huyu wenze jizhi], China News Net, reprinted in Xinhua 
(Online), 24 December 09; Guo Wenjing, ``Put in Place: There Is a 
Demand for the Appearance of Justice but an Even Greater Demand for 
Substantive Justice'' [Chutai: yao xingshi zhengyi gengyao shizhi 
zhengyi], Xinhua (Online), 22 December 09; ``Beijing Denies Public 
Hearings Just for Show,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 9 January 
10.
    \137\ Ibid.
    \138\ Wang Jingbo, ``Professor Says Public Hearings Have Little 
Meaning as Government Holds Them After Policies Are Decided'' [Jiaoshou 
cheng zhengfu juece hou zai juxing tingzhenghui yiyi buda], People's 
Daily (Online), 28 December 09.
    Notes to Section III--Commercial Rule of Law
    \1\ A complete and up-to-date compilation of information on China's 
participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), including 
principal accession documents (Working Party Report, Protocol of 
Accession, General Council decision), schedules, trade policy reviews, 
and dispute case documents can be found on the WTO Web site, at 
www.wto.org. 
    \2\ World Trade Organization (Online), ``Understanding the WTO: 
Basics, Principles of the Trading System,'' last visited 27 September 
10.
    \3\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the 
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(C).
    \4\ ``U.S., EU Cite Policy Backsliding by China in WTO Trade Policy 
Review,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 7 June 10. For Chinese trade 
statistics, see Ministry of Commerce (Online), ``Top Ten Trading 
Partners (2008/10),'' 12 January 08.
    \5\ ``U.S., EU Cite Policy Backsliding by China in WTO Trade Policy 
Review,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 7 June 10. For additional reports 
of protectionism, see Paul Mooney, ``Hurdles Get Higher for Foreign 
Firms,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 16 May 10; Keith Bradsher, 
``Foreign Companies Chafe at China's Restrictions,'' New York Times 
(Online), 16 May 10; ``Shift Underway in U.S. Corporate Attitudes 
Toward Chinese Economic Policies,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 17 
March 10; Andrew Browne, ``U.S. Businesses Wary About Protectionism in 
China,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 26 April 10.
    \6\ ``U.S., EU Cite Policy Backsliding by China in WTO Trade Policy 
Review,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 2 June 10.
    \7\ AmCham-China, American Business in China 2010 White Paper, 
2010, 26-27.
    \8\ Ibid., 27-28.
    \9\ ``U.S., EU Cite Policy Backsliding by China in WTO Trade Policy 
Review,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 2 June 10.
    \10\ World Trade Organization, DS340, China--Measures Affecting 
Imports of Automobile Parts, Reports of the Panel, WT/DS339/R, WT/
DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, WT/DS339/R/Add.1, WT/DS340/R/Add.1, WT/DS342/R /
Add.1, WT/DS339/R/Add.2, WT/DS340/R/Add.2, WT/DS342/R /Add.2, 18 July 
08, and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/
DS342/AB/R, 15 December 08.
    \11\ For discussions of industrial policies in China, see Alexandra 
Harney, ``Where's the Chinese Toyota? '' Foreign Policy (Online), 8 
December 09; China's Industrial Policy and Its Impact on U.S. 
Companies, Workers and the American Economy, Hearing of the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 24 March 09, Testimony of Alan 
Wm. Wolff, Partner, Dewey & LeBoeuf, Washington, DC.
    \12\ World Trade Organization, DS340, China--Measures Affecting 
Imports of Automobile Parts, Reports of the Panel, WT/DS339/R, WT/
DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, WT/DS339/R/Add.1, WT/DS340/R/Add.1, WT/DS342/R /
Add.1, WT/DS339/R/Add.2, WT/DS340/R/Add.2, WT/DS342/R /Add.2, 18 July 
08, and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/
DS342/AB/R, 15 December 08. See also CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 
October 08, 160.
    \13\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the 
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 2(C)2. 
For information on the WTO principle of transparency, see World Trade 
Organization (Online), ``Evolving Trade Increases Need for `Active 
Transparency,' Lamy Tells Lawyers,'' 22 October 07; World Trade 
Organization (Online), ``Principles of the Trading System,'' last 
visited 27 September 10.
    \14\ ``China Adopts Plan To Promote Cultural Industry,'' Xinhua, 
reprinted in China Daily (Online), 23 July 09. For background 
information on China's cultural industrial policy, see Guan Ping Hing, 
Hao Wei, and Xi Wang, ``Culture Industry Policy in China and the United 
States: A Comparative Analysis,'' Dissertations, Theses and Capstone 
Projects, Kennesaw State University, Paper 18 (2009).
    \15\ PRC Central People's Government (Online), Plan To Invigorate 
the Cultural Industry [Wenhua chanye zhenxing guihua], issued 26 
September 09.
    \16\ Ibid., sec. 1, art. 3, para. 1.
    \17\ PRC Central People's Government (Online), Plan To Invigorate 
the Cultural Industry [Wenhua chanye zhenxing guihua], issued 26 
September 09.
    \18\ World Trade Organization, DS363, China--Measures Affecting 
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS363/R, 12 
August 09.
    \19\ Ibid. See also Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 
December 09. See also ``WTO Rules Against Chinese Trade Restrictions on 
Books, DVDs, Music, and Films,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 4.
    \20\ Ministry of Culture, Guiding Opinion Concerning Speeding Up 
Development of the Cultural Industry [Jiakuai wenhua chanye fazhande 
zhidau yijian], issued 10 September 09.
    \21\ PRC Central People's Government (Online), Plan To Invigorate 
the Cultural Industry [Wenhua chanye zhenxing guihua], issued 26 
September 09, sec. 4, arts. 4-5.
    \22\ Li Yanzheng, ``10 Billion Cultural Industry Investment Fund To 
Be Launched Soon'' [Bai yi wenhua chanye touzi jijin jijiang tuichu], 
Shanghai Securities News (Online), 26 September 09; ``Central 
Propaganda Department: China Film Recommended for Listing After 
Restructuring'' [Zhongxuanbu cheng wenqi gaizhi hou tuijian shangshi 
zhongdian tui zhongying jituan], Oriental Morning Post, reprinted in 
Phoenix Net (Online), 29 September 09; Zhu Yin, Zhou Songlin, and Chen 
Guang, ``Cultural Enterprises To Speed Up Entering Capital Market'' 
[Wenhua qiye yu jiasu maixiang ziben shichang], China Securities 
Journal (Online), 30 March 10.
    \23\ Zhu Yin, Zhou Zonglin, and Chen Guang, ``Cultural Enterprises 
To Speed Up Entering Capital Market'' [Wenhua qiye yu jiasu maixiang 
ziben shichang], China Securities Journal (Online), 30 March 10.
    \24\ Wang Ziyu and Cao Zhen, ``China Cultivates Culture--by Raising 
Cash,'' Caixin (Online), 28 April 10; ``Cultural Industries To Get More 
Financial Support,'' Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 8 April 
10.
    \25\ PRC Central People's Government (Online), Plan To Invigorate 
the Cultural Industry [Wenhua chanye zhenxing guihua], issued 26 
September 09, sec. 2, art. 2.
    \26\ ``13 Printing and Reproduction Enterprises Becoming Major 
Culture Export Enterprises'' [13 jia yinshua yuzhi qiye chengwei wenhua 
chukou zhongdian qiye], China Print Net (Online), 25 November 09.
    \27\ ``General Administration of Press and Publication Issues 
Guiding Opinions for the Establishment of Five Key Tasks, Cultivating 
Six or Seven Enterprises That Surpass 10 Billion Yuan in Sales in Five 
Years'' [Xinwen chuban chanye fazhan zhidao yijian chutai wu da renwu 
queding wu nian peiyu liu qi jia zichan guo bai yi qiye], Xinhua, 
reprinted in Legal Daily (Online), 5 January 10.
    \28\ ``China Establishes First Batch of Animation Enterprises, Five 
Tax Reductions and Exemptions To Support Innovation'' [Quanguo rending 
shoupi dongman qiye wu zhong shuishou jianmian zhichi yuanchuang], 
National Business Daily (Online), 8 January 10.
    \29\ ``General Office of State Council Encourages Financial 
Institutions To Raise Support for Film Enterprises'' [Guoban: guli 
jinrong jigou jiada dui dianying qiye de zhichi lidu], China News Net 
(Online), 25 January 10; State Council General Office, Guiding Opinion 
on Promoting the Development of a Flourishing Movie Industry [Guanyu 
cujin dianying chanye fanrong fazhan de zhidao yijian], issued 21 
January 10.
    \30\ Chen Fang, ``General Administration of Press and Publication 
To Work Out International Best Seller Plan'' [Zhongguo xinwen chuban 
zongshu jiang zhiding guoji changxiao shu jihua], China Net, reprinted 
in General Administration of Press and Publications (Online), 26 March 
10.
    \31\ See, e.g., Clarence Tsui, ``Chinese Filmmakers Are Struggling 
To Have Their Documentaries Shown on the Mainland--Where It Counts,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 18 June 10; Committee to Protect 
Journalists (Online), ``Attacks on the Press 2009: China,'' 16 February 
10.
    \32\ Ministry of Culture General Office Circular Concerning 
Carrying Out Special Governing Action in the Cultural Market During the 
2010 New Year and Spring Festival Period [Wenhuabu bangongting guanyu 
kaizhan 2010 nian yuandan, chunjie qijian wenhua shichang zhuanxiang 
zhengzhi xingdong de tongzhi], issued 4 December 09; ``Ministry of 
Culture To Carry Out Special Governing Action in Cultural Markets'' 
[Wenhuabu jiang kaizhan wenhua shichang zhuanxiang zhengzhi xingdong], 
China Cultural Industries (Online), 18 December 09.
    \33\ Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National 
Development and Reform Commission, Automotive Industry Development 
Policy (Revised) [Qiche chanye fazhan zhengce (xiuding)], reprinted in 
China Law & Practice (Online), issued 15 August 09, effective 1 
September 09; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and 
National Development and Reform Commission, Order No. 10 [Zhonghua 
renmin gonghe guo ye he xinxi bu he zhonghua renmin gonghe guo guojia 
fagai ge weiyuanhui ling di 10 hao], issued 15 August 09, effective 1 
September 09; PRC Central People's Government, Auto Industry 
Restructuring and Promotion Plan [Qiche chanye tiaozheng he zhenxing 
guihua], 20 March 09. See also ``China Revises 2004 Auto Policy,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3; 
``China Issues Auto Stimulus Program To Boost the Auto Sector,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3-4.
    \34\ Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National 
Development and Reform Commission, Automotive Industry Development 
Policy (Revised) [Qiche chanye fazhan zhengce (xiuding)], reprinted in 
China Law & Practice (Online), issued 15 August 09, effective 1 
September 09; For a discussion of the policy, see ``China Revises 2004 
Auto Policy,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 
February 10, 3.
    \35\ Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and National 
Development and Reform Commission, Automotive Industry Development 
Policy (Revised) [Qiche chanye fazhan zhengce (xiuding)], reprinted in 
China Law & Practice (Online), issued 15 August 09, effective 1 
September 09; Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and 
National Development and Reform Commission, Order No. 10 [Zhonghua 
renmin gonghe guo ye he xinxi bu he zhonghua renmin gonghe guo guojia 
fagai ge weiyuanhui ling di 10 hao], issued 15 August 09, effective 1 
September 09. For a discussion of the policy, see ``China Revises 2004 
Auto Policy,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 
February 10, 3.
    \36\ World Trade Organization, DS340, China--Measures Affecting 
Imports of Automobile Parts, Reports of the Panel, WT/DS339/R, WT/
DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, WT/DS339/R/Add.1, WT/DS340/R/Add.1, WT/DS342/R /
Add.1, WT/DS339/R/Add.2, WT/DS340/R/Add.2, WT/DS342/R /Add.2, 18 July 
08, and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/
DS342/AB/R, 15 December 08.
    \37\ Ibid.
    \38\ Ibid.
    \39\ Ibid.
    \40\ Keith Bradsher, ``Despite Trade Rulings, Beijing Gains From 
Delay Tactics,'' New York Times (Online), 30 August 09.
    \41\ See, e.g., National Development and Reform Commission, 
Automotive Industry Development Policy, National Development and Reform 
Commission Order No. 8 [Qiche chanye fazhan zhengce, zhonghua renmin 
gonghe guo guojia fazhan he gaige weiyuan hui ling di 8 ce], 21 May 04, 
art. 7.
    \42\ Nelson D. Schwartz, ``Chinese Company Buys Rights To Make Old 
Saab Models,'' New York Times (Online), 14 December 09.
    \43\ Norihiko Shirouzu, ``China's Geely Lines Up Bank Loans for 
Volvo Bid,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 1 December 09; ``China's 
Geely To Put $900 Million More Into Volvo,'' Associated Press, 
reprinted in New York Times (Online), 30 March 10; Li Fangfang, ``Geely 
Buys Volvo in Biggest Overseas Foray,'' China Daily (Online), 29 March 
10.
    \44\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the 
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 2001, Part I, 2(C).
    \45\ United States Trade Representative, 2010 National Trade 
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers: China, 2010.
    \46\ Ibid.
    \47\ US-China Business Council (Online), ``PRC Transparency 
Tracking,'' April 2010.
    \48\ See, e.g., US-China Business Council (Online), China's JCCT 
Commitments, 2004-09, May 2009.
    \49\ United States Trade Representative (Online), ``U.S.-China 
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade Fact Sheet,'' 2009.
    \50\ Ministry of Finance (Online), ``Advance the Standards and 
Perfect the Government Procurement System'' [Jinyibu guifan he wanshan 
zhengfu caigou zhidu], 7 May 10.
    \51\ World Trade Organization (Online), ``General Overview of WTO 
Work on Government Procurement,'' last visited 27 September 10.
    \52\ World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 01, paras. 337-341.
    \53\ United States Trade Representative (Online), ``U.S.-China 
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade Fact Sheet,'' 2009.
    \54\ PRC Government Procurement Law, enacted 29 June 02, effective 
1 January 03; State Council Legislative Affairs Office, PRC Government 
Procurement Law Implementing Rules (Comment Draft) [Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo zhengfu caigou fa shishi tiaoli (zhengqiu yijian gao)], 11 
January 10. For an English translation, see ``Implementation Rules for 
Government Procurement Law of the People's Republic of China,'' China 
Law Professors Blog (Online), 24 January 10.
    \55\ Yu Ran, ``Govt Purchasing Laws To Tighten,'' China Daily 
(Online), 20 January 10.
    \56\ Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, National 
Development and Reform Commission, and General Administration of 
Customs, Notice on Collecting Public Comments on Administrative 
Measures for Government Procurement of Domestically-Made Products 
(Comment Draft) [Guanyu zhengfu caigou benguo chanpin guanli banfa 
(zhengqiu yijian gao) gongkai zhengqiu yijian de gongao], 21 May 10.
    \57\ For additional information, see US-China Business Council 
(Online), ``US-China Business Council Comments on Draft Implementing 
Regulations on the PRC Government Procurement Law,'' February 2010.
    \58\ See, e.g., Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and 
National Development and Reform Commission, Automotive Industry 
Development Policy (Revised) [Qiche chanye fazhan zhengce (xiuding)], 
reprinted in China Law & Practice (Online), issued 15 August 09, 
effective 1 September 09, arts. 7-12.
    \59\ ``Currency, Indigenous Innovation To Top U.S. Economic Agenda 
for S&ED,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 5 May 10; Stanley Lubman, 
``China Modifies Government Procurement Policies, but Foreign Concerns 
Remain,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 19 April 10; ``Industry 
Comments on the Draft Notice Launching the National Indigenous 
Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010,'' China Trade Extra 
(Online), 10 May 10.
    \60\ See, e.g., Circular of the Ministry of Finance of the People's 
Republic of China on Printing and Distributing the Measures for the 
Administration of Government Procurement of Import Products, reprinted 
in Invest in China (Online), issued 27 December 07.
    \61\ Ministry of Science and Technology, National Development and 
Reform Commission, and Ministry of Finance, Circular Concerning 
Launching 2009 National Indigenous Innovation Products Accreditation 
Work [Kaizhan 2009 nian guojia zizhu chuangxin chanpin rending gongzuo 
de tongzhi], issued 30 October 09.
    \62\ Ibid. Article 4 of the National Indigenous Innovation Products 
Application Instructions (2009) [Guojia zizhu chuangxin chanpin shenbao 
shuoming (2009 niandu)], appended to the Circular, provides that, in 
order to qualify for certain preferences in government procurement, 
covered products (1) must be produced by an enterprise in China that 
owns the intellectual property; (2) be covered by a trademark that was 
first registered in China by a Chinese company; (3) be innovative and 
internationally competitive; and (4) meet Chinese technical standards.
    \63\ Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of 
Science and Technology, Ministry of Finance, and State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, Catalogue Guiding Domestic 
Innovation in Major Technology Equipment [Zhong da jishu zhuangbei 
zizhu chuangxin zhidao mulu], issued 25 December 09; ``Chinese Agencies 
Lay Out New Policies To Favor `Indigenous Innovation,' '' China Trade 
Extra (Online), 6 January 10.
    \64\ ``China Defends Innovation Policy, but U.S. Industry Wants 
Overhaul,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 3 March 10.
    \65\ See, e.g., ``China Defends Innovation Policy, but U.S. 
Industry Wants Overhaul,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 3 March 10.
    \66\ Ministry of Science and Technology, National Development and 
Reform Commission, and Ministry of Finance Announcement of Open 
Solicitation of Comments on ``Circular Regarding Launch of the National 
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010 (Comment 
Solicitation Draft)'' [Kejibu, fazhangaige wei he caizhengbu gongkai 
zhengqiu dui ``guanyu kaizhan 2010 nian guojia zizhu chuangxin chanpin 
rending gongzuode tongzhi (zhengqiu yijian gao) yijiande gonggao], 
issued 10 April 10.
    \67\ Stanley Lubman, ``China Modifies Government Procurement 
Policies, but Foreign Concerns Remain,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 
19 April 10.
    \68\ ``Industry Comments on the Draft Notice Launching the National 
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010,'' China 
Trade Extra (Online), 10 May 10.
    \69\ United States Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Report, 
30 April 10, 19.
    \70\ Ibid.
    \71\ Decision of the National People's Congress Standing Committee 
Regarding Amendments to the PRC Patent Law [Renda changweihui guanyu 
xiugai ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhuanlifa'' de jueding], adopted 27 
December 08, effective 1 October 09; State Council Decision Concerning 
the ``Amendment of the PRC Patent Law Implementing Rules'' [Guowuyuan 
guanyu xiugai ``zhonghua renmin gonghe guo zhuanlifa shishi xize'' de 
jueding], adopted 30 December 09, issued 9 January 10, effective 1 
February 10.
    \72\ United States Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Report, 
30 April 10, 22.
    \73\ PRC Copyright Law, enacted 7 September 90, effective 1 June 
91, amended 27 October 01 and 26 February 10, art. 5. See also Gao Yu, 
``Slow Death for China's Copyright Controversy: A WTO Ruling Targeting 
China's Copyright Protection System Sounded the Death Knell for a Long-
Criticized Legal Loophole,'' Caixin (Online), 4 March 10.
    \74\ National Copyright Administration, Measures for Registration 
of Copyright Pledges (Comment Draft) [Zhuzuoquan zhiquan dengji banfa 
(zhengqiu yijian gao)], Xinhua (Online), 26 April 10.
    \75\ Supreme People's Court, Annual Report on Intellectual Property 
Cases (2009) (Abstract) [Zuigao renmin fayuan zhishi chanquan anjian 
niandu baogao (2009) (zhai yao)], 22 April 10, reprinted in China Law & 
Practice (Online), May 2010.
    \76\ Supreme People's Court, Annual Report on Intellectual Property 
Cases (2009) [Zuigao renmin fayuan zhishi chanquan anjian niandu baogao 
(2009)], 26 April 10.
    \77\ Kathrin Hille, ``Chinese Court Rules Against Microsoft in IPR 
Case,'' Financial Times (Online), 17 November 09.
    \78\ ``Microsoft Wins Software Piracy Lawsuit in China,'' Global 
Times (Online), 23 April 10.
    \79\ Loretta Chao, ``China Company Plans To Appeal Microsoft 
Decision,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 23 April 10.
    \80\ Ministry of Commerce, Measures Regarding the Declaration of 
Concentration of Business Operators [Jingying zhe ji zhong shen bao 
banfa], adopted 15 July 09, issued 21 November 09, effective 1 January 
10; Ministry of Commerce, Measures Regarding Investigations Into 
Concentrations of Business Operators [Jingying zhe ji zhong shencha 
banfa], adopted 15 July 09, issued 24 November 09, effective 1 January 
10.
    \81\ State Administration for Industry and Commerce (Online), 
``Online Request for Comments on a Set of Three `Measures of the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce on Preventing Monopolistic 
Agreements or Conduct' Implementing the Antimonopoly Law'' [Wangshang 
zhengqiu yijian: ``gongshang xingzheng guanli jiguan jinzhi longduan 
xieyi xingweide guiding'' deng sange fanlongduan fa peitao guizhang], 
25 May 10.
    \82\ Sundeep Tucker and Patti Waldmeir, ``The People's Police,'' 
Financial Times (Online), 29 November 09. See also Ministry of 
Commerce, Decision Concerning Conditional Approval in Antimonopoly 
Investigation of American Automaker GM's Acquisition of Delphi [Guanyu 
fu tiaojian pizhun meiguo tongyong qiche gongsi shougou de'erfu gongsi 
fanlongduan shencha jueding], 28 September 09; ``Anti-Monopoly Ministry 
Tells Panasonic To Divest Overseas Assets,'' China Law & Practice 
(Online), 10 November 09; ``China's MOC Sets Conditions on GM-Delphi 
Deal,'' Xinhua (Online), 28 September 09.
    \83\ Julia Kong, ``China's Merger Review System Evolves,'' China 
Business Review, May-June 10, 38; Ministry of Commerce, Decision 
Concerning an Antimonopoly Law Investigation Decision on Conditional 
Approval of Novartis's Acquisition of Alcon Laboratories [Guanyu 
futiaojian pizhun nuo hua gufen gongsi shougou ai'erkang gongsi 
fanlongduan shencha jueding], issued 13 August 10.
    \84\ Sundeep Tucker and Patti Waldmeir, ``The People's Police,'' 
Financial Times (Online), 29 November 09.
    \85\ 85 Wentong Zheng, ``China's Antimonopoly Law--One Year Down: 
Part 6. Bigger Is Better? Tensions Between Industrial Policy and 
Antitrust in China,'' Law Professor Blogs Network, Antitrust & 
Competition Policy Blog, 11 January 10. See also Automobile Industry 
Development Policy (Revised), which calls for the development of large 
auto enterprise groups, and the 2009 Program for the Adjustment and 
Rejuvenation of the Auto Industry, which calls for the formation of two 
to three large auto groups and four to five smaller ones through a 
process of takeovers and reorganization. Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology and National Development and Reform Commission, 
Automotive Industry Development Policy (Revised) [Qiche chanye fazhan 
zhengce (xiuding)], reprinted in China Law & Practice (Online), issued 
15 August 09, effective 1 September 09; State Council General Office, 
Program for the Adjustment and Rejuvenation of the Auto Industry [Qiche 
chanye tiaozheng he zhenxing guihua], 20 March 09.
    \86\ Zhan Hao, ``The PRC Anti-Monopoly Law: One Year On,'' China 
Law & Practice (Online), September 2009.
    \87\ For a discussion of the Food Safety Law and its implementing 
legislation, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 222-23.
    \88\ ``China Holds a Public Hearing on `Administrative Regulations 
on Supervision of Food Additive Production' '' [Zhongguo tingzheng 
``shipin tianjiaji shengchan jiandu guanli guiding''], China News 
Service (Online), 23 January 10; Ministry of Health, Administrative 
Measures on New Types of Food Additives [Shipin tianjiaji xin pinzhong 
guanli banfa], adopted 15 March 10, issued and effective 30 March 10; 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce, General Administration 
of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, and State Food and 
Drug Administration, Administrative Regulations of Risk Monitoring of 
Food Safety (Trial) [Shipin anquan fengxian jiance guanli guiding 
(shixing)], issued and effective 11 February 10; ``State Food and Drug 
Administration Issues Implementing Plan on Rectification in Catering 
Service Food Safety in 2010'' [Guojia yaojianju fabu ``2010 nian shiyin 
fuwu shipin anquan zhengduan gongzuo shishi fang'an'' mingque jinnian 
zhengduan renwu quebao yinshi anquan], Legal Daily (Online), 22 March 
10; State Council Circular Regarding the Establishment of the Food 
Safety Commission of the State Council [Guowuyuan guanyu sheli 
guowuyuan shipin anquan weiyuanhui de tongzhi], issued 6 February 10; 
``State Council To Set Up Food Safety Commission: Li Keqiang Named 
Director'' [Guowuyuan sheli shipin anquan weiyuanhue li keqiang churen 
zhuren], China News Service (Online), 9 February 10.
    \89\ ``The Hidden Dangers Within China's Food Safety'' [Zhongguo 
shipin anquan you yinhuan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 April 10.
    \90\ Ibid.
    \91\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 221.
    \92\ ``Rights Defender Zhao Lianhai Wears Fetters to Court as 
Tainted Milk Victim Becomes Defendant'' [Zhao lianhai weiquan dai 
jiaoliao chuting du naifen shouhaizhe cheng beigao], Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 30 March 10; ``Tainted Milk Activist Goes on Trial in 
China,'' Associated Press (Online), 30 March 10.
    \93\ Wang Duan, ``Tainted Milk Victims Take Fight to Hong Kong,'' 
Caixin (Online), 6 May 10; ``Sanlu Milk Powder Victims Go to Hong Kong 
To Seek Justice'' [Sanlu naifen shouhaizhe dao xianggang xunqiu 
gongdao], Radio Free Asia (Online), 9 April 10.
    \94\ ``Hong Kong Court Refuses `Tainted Milk Powder Case,' Family 
Members Indicate [Children's] Irreversible Kidney Damage'' [Xianggang 
fayuan ju shouli ``du naifen'' suopei jiazhang zhi shen sunshang buke 
nizhuan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 27 May 10.
    \95\ ``English Consumers Receive Compensation for Toxic Sofas 
Manufactured in China'' [Yinhan du zhongguo zhe shafa shouhaizhi 
yingguo xiaofeizhe huo peichan], Radio Free Asia, 27 April 10; ``China 
Will Look Into Report of Cadmium in Children's Jewelry,'' USA Today 
(Online), 10 January 10; Karen Sloan, ``A Second Award in Chinese 
Drywall Litigation,'' National Law Journal (Online), 29 April 10.
    \96\ ``China To Implement `Blacklist' System for Enterprises With 
Illegal Quality Behaviors'' [Wo guo jiang quan mian shishi zhiliang we 
fa wir gui qiye ``hei mingdan'' zhidu], Xinhua (Online), 11 January 10; 
``AQSIQ To Issue Recall System for Home Appliances Within the Year'' 
[Zhijian zongju ni nian nei chutai jiadian zhaohui zhidu], China Legal 
Information Center (Online), 23 April 10.
    \97\ PRC Tort Liability Law, enacted 26 December 09, effective 1 
July 10.
    \98\ Ibid., chap. 5.
    \99\ Ibid., chap. 5, art. 47.
    \100\ General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 47, 61 
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XV(4).
    \101\ Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 22 
July 44, entry into force 27 December 45, art. IV--Obligations 
Regarding Exchange Arrangements, Section I--General Obligations of 
Members, subsection (iii), International Monetary Fund (Online).
    \102\ Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, Congressional Research 
Service (Online), ``China's Currency: An Analysis of the Economic 
Issues,'' 18 August 10, 1.
    \103\ Paul Krugman, ``Chinese New Year,'' New York Times (Online), 
1 January 10.
    \104\ Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, Congressional Research 
Service (Online), ``China's Currency: An Analysis of the Economic 
Issues,'' 18 August 10, 1; Jason Subler and Lu Jianxin, ``China Loosens 
Currency Grip as G20 Summit Looms,'' Reuters (Online), 21 June 10; 
Michael Casey, ``Showdown Looms Over China's Currency at G-20,'' Wall 
Street Journal (Online), 11 June 10.
    \105\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to Congress on 
International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, 8 July 10, 5.
    \106\ United States Trade Representative, ``WTO Case Challenging 
China's Export Restraints on Raw Materials Inputs,'' June 2009.
    \107\ World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the 
People's Republic of China, WT/L/432, 10 November 01, Part I, 11.3, and 
Annex 6; World Trade Organization, Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China WT/ACC/CHN/49, 1 October 01, paras. 162, 165.
    \108\ United States Trade Representative, 2010 National Trade 
Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers-China, 67.
    \109\ World Trade Organization, DS394, China--Measures Related to 
the Exportation of Various Raw Materials; ``U.S., EU, Mexico File Panel 
Request on China Raw Materials Curbs,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 4 
November 09; United States Trade Representative, 2010 National Trade 
Estimate on Foreign Trade Barriers-China, 67; United States Trade 
Representative, ``United States Requests WTO Panel Against China Over 
Export Restraints on Raw Materials,'' November 2009.
    \110\ World Trade Organization, DS394, WT/DS394/8, WT/DS395/8, WT/
DS398/7, China--Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, Constitution of the Panel Established at the Requests of the 
United States, the European Communities and Mexico, Note by the 
Secretariat, 30 March 10.
    \111\ World Trade Organization, DS394, WT/DS394/8, WT/DS395/8, WT/
DS398/7, China--Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, Communication From the Panel, 18 May 10.
    \112\ ``U.S., EU, Mexico File Panel Request on China Raw Materials 
Curbs,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 4 November 09; Ambrose Evans-
Pritchard, ``Backlash Over China Curb on Metal Exports,'' Telegraph 
(London) (Online), 29 August 10.
    \113\ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ``Backlash Over China Curb on Metal 
Exports,'' Telegraph (London) (Online), 29 August 10. See also, 
Ministry of Commerce, ``U.S. Media Believe China's Strict Control of 
the Rare Earths Market Is Not Worth the Effort'' [Mei ti renwei 
zhongguo yankong xitu shichang debuchangshi], 20 August 10.
    \114\ ``Key China Commission Recommendations Aims at Trade 
Frictions,'' China Trade Extra (Online), 15 November 09. See also 
United States Trade Representative, 2010 National Trade Estimate on 
Foreign Trade Barriers-China, 67, 82.
    \115\ ``Foreigners Invest in Rare Earth Deep Processing in China,'' 
People's Daily (Online), 9 August 10. (In 2009, China's rare earth ore 
output hit 129,400 tons and refined and separated rare earth product 
output stood at 127,300 tons, supplying over 95 percent of the global 
demand.) Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ``Backlash Over China Curb on Metal 
Exports,'' Telegraph (London) (Online), 29 August 10.
    \116\ ``China Dangles Rare-Earth Resources To Lure Investment,'' 
Wall Street Journal (Online), 15 August 10. See also Zhang Qi'an, 
``Five Ore Industry Associations: Do Not Excessively Restrict Rare 
Earths Exports'' [Wu kuang shanghui: buying guofen xianzhi xitu 
chukou], Caijing (Online), 23 August 10. For details on the quotas, see 
Ministry of Commerce, Circular Concerning Transmitting the Second 
Tranche of Rare Earth Export Quotas for 2010 [Shangwubu guanyu xiada 
2010 nian di'er pi yiban maoyi xitu chukou pei'e de tongzhi], 5 July 
10.
    \117\ Zhang Qi, `` `Bigger Say' Set on Rare Earths Market,'' China 
Daily (Online), 10 August 10.
    \118\ Ministry of Commerce, Foreign Investment Industry Guidance 
Catalogue (Revised 2007): Prohibited to Foreign Investment Catalogue 
[Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu (2007 nian xiuding) jinzhi waishang 
touzi chanye mulu], 5 May 09, art. (II)(3)(ii).
    \119\ Ibid., art. (III)(10)(iii).
    \120\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 10.
    \121\ PRC Property Law, enacted 16 March 07, effective 1 October 
07, art. 47.
    \122\ PRC Granting and Assigning Leaseholds in State-Owned Urban 
Land Tentative Regulations, issued and effective 19 May 90, art. 12.
    \123\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 10; PRC Property Law, 
enacted 16 March 07, effective 1 October 07, arts. 61-64; PRC Law on 
Land Contract in Rural Areas, enacted 29 March 02, effective 1 March 
03, arts. 5, 12, 20; Steve Dickinson, ``China Real Estate Laws, Part 
I,'' China Law Blog (Online), 1 May 07.
    \124\ See, e.g., Qian Yanfeng, ``Shanghai Residents Fight Forced 
Demolitions,'' China Daily (Online), 26 February 10; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (Online), ``Thrown Out: Human Rights Abuses in China's 
Breakneck Real Estate Development,'' 9 February 10; Qin Zhongwei, 
``Partial Victory in Demolition Fight,'' China Daily (Online), 9 March 
10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``On the Eve of the World 
Expo, Shanghai Resident Meng Shaojie and Family Encounter Violent 
Forced Demolition'' [Shibo hui qianxi shanghai meng shaojie yijia zaoyu 
baoli qiangchai], 19 April 10; Wang Xiang, ``Forced Demolition Leads to 
11 Years in Jail,'' Shanghai Daily (Online), 21 April 10; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (Online), ``Violent Forced Relocation in Beijing'' 
[Fasheng zai beijing de bao li bi qian], 26 April 10; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (Online), ``Police Open Fire on Villagers Trying To 
Stop Forced Demolition in Fangcheng, Guangxi'' [Guangxi fangcheng 
jingcha kaiqiang dashang zulan qiang chai de minchuang], 26 April 10.
    \125\ International Federation for Human Rights (Online), ``Written 
Statement on the Right to Housing in China,'' 25 June 07. See also 
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (Online), ``Submission to the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,'' September 2008.
    \126\ Zhu Keliang and Roy Prosterman, Center for Global Liberty & 
Prosperity, Cato Institute, ``Securing Land Use Rights for Chinese 
Farmers: A Leap Forward for Stability and Growth,'' Development Policy 
Analysis, No. 3, 15 October 07, 1; China Urgent Action Working Group, 
``Papering Over the Cracks: Reform of the Forced Eviction Regime in 
China,'' 29 March 10, 6.
    \127\ Michael Vines and Jonathan Ansfield, ``Trampled in a Land 
Rush, Chinese Resist,'' New York Times (Online), 26 May 10.
    \128\ Ibid.
    \129\ William Ide, ``Analysts: US-China Debate Over Currency Misses 
Larger Issues,'' Voice of America News (Online), 15 April 10; Derek 
Scissors, Heritage Foundation (Online), ``10 China Myths for the New 
Decade, Backgrounder 2366,'' 28 January 10.
    \130\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Thrown Out: Human 
Rights Abuses in China's Breakneck Real Estate Development,'' 9 
February 10.
    \131\ Ibid.; ``Prevent Violent Demolition,'' China Daily (Online) 
10 April 10;
    \132\ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (art. 
11(1)) 13 December 91, para. 18.
    \133\ China Urgent Action Working Group, ``Papering Over the 
Cracks: Reform of the Forced Eviction Regime in China,'' 29 March 10, 
9.
    \134\ PRC Property Law, enacted 16 March 07, effective 1 October 
07, art. 42.
    \135\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Thrown Out, Human 
Rights Abuses in China's Breakneck Real Estate Development,'' 9 
February 10.
    \136\ PRC Law on Administration of Urban Real Property, issued and 
effective 30 August 07.
    \137\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Thrown Out: Human 
Rights Abuses in China's Breakneck Real Estate Development,'' 9 
February 10; Qian Yanfeng, ``Shanghai Residents Fight Forced 
Demolitions,'' China Daily (Online), 26 February 10; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (Online), ``On the Eve of the World Expo, Shanghai 
Resident Meng Shaojie and Family Encounter Violent Forced Demolition'' 
[Shibohui qianxi shanghai meng shaojie yijia zaoyu baoli qiangchai], 19 
April 10; Wang Xiang, ``Forced Demolition Leads to 11 Years in Jail,'' 
Shanghai Daily (Online), 21 April 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(Online), ``Violent Forced Relocation in Beijing'' [Fasheng zai beijing 
de baoli biqian], 26 April 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Police Open Fire on Villagers Trying To Stop Forced Demolition in 
Fangcheng, Guangxi'' [Guangxi fangcheng jingcha kaiqiang dashang zulan 
qiang chai de minzhong], 26 April 10.
    \138\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Thrown Out: Human 
Rights Abuses in China's Breakneck Real Estate Development,'' 9 
February 10, 5-7.
    \139\ For a report on several specific cases, see Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (Online), ``Thrown Out: Human Rights Abuses in China's 
Breakneck Real Estate Development,'' 9 February 10. See also Qian 
Yanfeng, ``Shanghai Residents Fight Forced Demolitions,'' China Daily 
(Online), 26 February 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Police Open Fire on Villagers Trying To Stop Forced Demolition in 
Fangcheng, Guangxi'' [Guangxi fangcheng jingcha kai qiang dashang zu 
lan qiangchai de minzhong], 26 April 10; Malcolm Moore, ``Chinese 
Granny Buried Alive by Property Developers,'' Telegraph (Online), 6 
March 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Violent Forced 
Relocation in Beijing'' [Fasheng zai beijing de baoli biqian], 26 April 
10.
    \140\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Thrown Out: Human 
Rights Abuses in China's Breakneck Real Estate Development,'' 9 
February 10, 1; Huang Zhiling and Liu Weitao, ``Burning Issue,'' China 
Daily (Online), 8 December 09; Michael Wines and Jonathan Ansfield, 
``Trampled in a Land Rush, Chinese Resist,'' New York Times (Online), 
26 May 10; Roger Cohen, ``A Woman Burns,'' New York Times (Online), 25 
January 10.
    \141\ Huang Zhiling and Liu Weitao, ``Burning Issue,'' China Daily 
(Online), 8 December 09.
    \142\ China Urgent Action Working Group, ``Papering Over the 
Cracks: Reform of the Forced Eviction Regime in China,'' 29 March 10, 
9; Tania Branigan, ``China Moves To Stop Developers Forcing People From 
Homes With Violence,'' Guardian (Online), 28 January 10;
    \143\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Provisions 
Governing the Requisition and Compensation of State-Owned Land (Comment 
Draft) [Guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli (zhengqiu 
yijian gao)], issued 29 January 10.
    \144\ Ibid., arts. 2, 3.
    \145\ State Council Legislative Affairs Office, Provisions 
Governing the Requisition and Compensation of State-Owned Land (Comment 
Draft) [Guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang tiaoli (zhengqiu 
yijian gao)], issued 29 January 10, art. 40; ``Demolition Law 
Criticized,'' China Daily (Online), 2 February 10.
    \146\ Tania Branigan, ``China Moves To Stop Developers Forcing 
People From Homes With Violence,'' Guardian (Online), 29 January 10; 
``Demolition Law Criticized,'' China Daily (Online), 2 February 10; 
``Laws for Seizing Land May Change,'' China Daily, reprinted in Sina 
(Online), 30 January 10.
    \147\ Mandy Zuo, ``Revision of Demolition Law Put on Back-Burner,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 26 July 10.
    \148\ Ibid.; State Council General Office Emergency Circular 
Regarding Improving Strict Management of Land Requisition and 
Demolition Work and Earnest Protection of the Legal Rights of Citizens 
[Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu jin yibu yange zheng di chaiqian guanli 
gongzuo qieshi weihu qunzhong hefa quanyi de jinji tongzhi], issued 15 
May 10; Ministry of Land and Resources Circular Concerning Improving 
the Accomplishment of Land Requisition Work [Guotu ziyuan bu guanyu 
jinyibu zuohao zheng di guanli gongzuo de tongzhi], issued 26 July 10.
    \149\ ``New Demolition Payment Rules Are Coming,'' China Daily 
(Online), 26 May 10.
    \150\ Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, ``Papering Over the 
Cracks: Reform of the Forced Eviction Regime in China,'' 29 March 10, 
39-40.
    \151\ Ibid., 40.
    \152\ PRC Law on Land Contract in Rural Areas, enacted 29 August 
02, effective 1 March 03, art. 20.
    \153\ Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, ``Papering Over the 
Cracks: Reform of the Forced Eviction Regime in China,'' 29 March 10, 
44.
    \154\ Ibid., 47.
    \155\ PRC Property Law, enacted 16 March 07, effective 1 October 
07, art. 42.
    \156\ Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, ``Papering Over the 
Cracks: Reform of the Forced Eviction Regime in China,'' 29 March 10, 
48.
    \157\ ``China Issues Rules To Prevent Officials Meddling in Real 
Estate Affairs,'' Xinhua (Online), 18 May 10.
    \158\ Aaron Back, ``China Should Adopt a Property Ownership Tax--
Think Tank,'' Dow Jones, reprinted in Wall Street Journal (Online), 4 
May 10.
    \159\ State Council General Office Circular Concerning Promotion of 
Stable and Healthy Development of the Real Estate Market [Guowuyuan 
bangongting guanyu cujin fang di chan shichang, ping wen jiankang 
fazhan de tongzhi], 7 January 10; ``Chinese Gov't Tightens Property 
Rules,'' Global Times, reprinted in Sina (Online), 11 January 10.
    \160\ State Council Circular on Determined Suppression of the 
Exceedingly Rapid Rise of Certain Urban Housing Prices [Guowuyuan 
guanyu jianjue ezhi bufen chengshi fangjia guokuai shangzhang de 
tongzhi], issued 17 April 10.
    \161\ ``Bank of China: In Principle Temporarily Stop Issuing 
Housing Loans for Third Homes and Above'' [Zhonghang: yuanze shang zan 
ting fa fang di san tao yishang zhu fang daikuan], Xinhua (Online), 23 
April 10.
    \162\ ``China Said To Block Real Estate Fund-Raising,'' New York 
Times (Online), 28 April 10.
    \163\ Ministry of Land and Resources Circular on Issues Relevant To 
Strengthening the Supply and Regulation of Land Use for Real Property 
[Guotu ziyuan bu guanyu jiaqiang fangdichan yongdi gongying he jianquan 
youguan wenti de tongzhi], issued 8 March 10.
    \164\ ``Beijing To Prohibit Sales of `Hotel Apartments' Beginning 
Next Month'' [Beijing xia yue qi jin shou ``jiudian shi gongyu''], 
Caijing (Online), 20 May 10; Yu Bingbing, ``Beijing To Issue New Real 
Estate Policy on April 28, Limits Set on Number of Houses in the Name 
of Local Residents'' [Beijing jiang tui shou ge defang loushi xinzheng 
chuan xianzhi jumin gou fang tao shu], Xinmin Evening News, reprinted 
in China Securities Network (Online), 28 April 10; Sandy Li, ``Shanghai 
Plans Tax To Slow Down Home Prices, City Follows Chongqing's Lead in 
Effort To Curb Speculation,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 9 
April 10; ``Real Estate Rules Prove Effective in Hainan,'' China Law & 
Practice (Online), April 2010.

    Notes to Section III--Access to Justice
    \1\ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed 
by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 8.
    \2\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 
by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry 
into force 23 March 76, art. 2. China signed the ICCPR in 1998. The 
Chinese Government has committed to ratifying the ICCPR and says it is 
taking concrete steps to prepare for ratification. In November 2009, a 
Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit said, ``The EU welcomed 
China's commitment to ratifying the [ICCPR] as soon as possible.'' 
Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit, reprinted in China 
Internet Information Center (Online), 30 November 09. In October 2009, 
Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, said, ``At present, legislative, judicial and 
administrative reforms are under way in China with a view to aligning 
our domestic legislation with the provisions of the [ICCPR] and paving 
the way for its ratification.'' Permanent Mission of the People's 
Republic of China to the UN (Online), ``Statement by H.E. Ambassador 
Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United 
Nations, at the Third Committee of the 64th Session of the General 
Assembly on the Implementation of Human Rights Instruments (Item 
69A),'' 20 October 09. In its 2009-2010 National Human Rights Action 
Plan issued in April 2009, the Chinese Government stated that the ICCPR 
was one of the ``fundamental principles'' on which the plan was framed, 
and that the government ``will continue legislative, judicial and 
administrative reforms to make domestic laws better linked with this 
Covenant, and prepare the ground for approval of the ICCPR.'' State 
Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action Plan of China 
(2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, introduction, sec. V(1). In 
February 2009, during the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic 
Review of the Chinese Government's human rights record, the Chinese 
Government supported recommendations made by Member States that China 
ratify the ICCPR. Chinese officials said China was in the process of 
amending domestic laws, including the criminal procedure law and laws 
relating to reeducation through labor, to make them compatible with the 
ICCPR. UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, 
paras. 63, 114(1).
    \3\ According to Article 41 of the PRC Constitution, ``Citizens 
have the right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges 
against, or exposures of, violations of the law or dereliction of duty 
by any state organ or functionary, but fabrication or distortion of 
facts with the intention of libel or frame-up is prohibited. In case of 
complaints, charges, or exposures made by citizens, the state organ 
concerned must deal with them in a responsible manner after 
ascertaining the facts. No one may suppress such complaints, charges, 
and exposures, or retaliate against the citizens making them. Citizens 
who have suffered losses through infringement of their civil rights by 
any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in 
accordance with the law.'' PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, 
amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 41.
    \4\ For more information on Chinese human rights lawyers and 
defenders in China, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--
2009, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 25 February 09; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Annual Report on the 
Situation of Human Rights Defenders in China (2009),'' 25 April 10.
    \5\ Jamil Anderlini, ``Punished Supplicants,'' Financial Times 
(Online), 5 March 09; Human Rights Watch (Online), ``An Alleyway in 
Hell,'' 12 November 09, 3; Foster Klug, ``Rights Group Claims Chinese 
Abuse of Critics,'' Associated Press (Online), 21 January 10.
    \6\ See, e.g., ``Impartial Administration of Justice Is the Tool 
for Maintaining Rights and Stability'' [Gongzheng de sifa cai shi 
weiquan he weiwen de liqi], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 24 
May 10.
    \7\ Supreme People's Court, Opinion on Protecting the Procedural 
Rights of Administrative Litigants [Guanyu yifa baohu xingzheng susong 
dangshiren suquan de yijian], issued 9 November 09.
    \8\ You Wei, ``Courts Are Reluctant To Accept Difficulties of 
`Citizens Sue Officials' Cases'' [Fayuan bu yuan shouli ``min gao 
guan'' de kuzhong], Legal Daily (Online), 25 May 10; ``Supreme People's 
Court Requests Resolutely Resisting and Eliminating `Local Policies' of 
Administrative Litigation'' [Zuigao fayuan yaoqiu jianjue dizhi he 
qingchu xingzheng susong shou an ``tu zhengce''], Xinhua (Online), 22 
May 10.
    \9\ ``Impartial Administration of Justice Is the Tool for 
Maintaining Rights and Stability'' [Gongzheng de sifa cai shi weiquan 
he weiwen de liqi], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 24 May 10.
    \10\ Ibid.
    \11\ Chen Fei, ``Administrative Reconsideration Law Revisions To Be 
Included in the State Council Legislative Agenda; Legislative Affairs 
Office Provides Detailed Explanation'' [Xingzheng fuyi fa xiugai lie ru 
guowuyuan lifa jihua fazhi ban xiangjie], Xinhua (Online), 10 June 10.
    \12\ PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law, enacted 29 April 99, 
effective 1 October 99, arts. 6, 14. The Chinese administrative law 
system speaks in terms of ``concrete'' acts, which refer to actions by 
a government official or agency against a specific target with regard 
to a specific matter. ``Abstract'' acts refer to universally binding 
documents issued by administrative agencies to regulate behavior.
    \13\ Li Li, ``Revisions to the Administrative Review Law Are Bound 
To Expand the Scope of Cases Accepted'' [Xiugai hang zheng fuyi fa shou 
an fanwei shibi kuoda], Legal Daily (Online), 29 June 10.
    \14\ Chen Fei, ``Administrative Reconsideration Law Revisions To Be 
Included in the State Council Legislative Agenda; Legislative Affairs 
Office Provides Detailed Explanation'' [Xingzheng fuyi fa xiugai lie ru 
guowuyuan lifa jihua fazhi ban xiangjie], Xinhua (Online), 10 June 10.
    \15\ PRC State Compensation Law, enacted 12 May 94, effective 1 
January 95, amended 29 April 10, effective 1 December 10; ``China 
Adopts Amended State Liability Compensation Law,'' Xinhua (Online), 29 
April 10.
    \16\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing April 27-May 3, 2010,'' 4 May 10; PRC State Compensation Law, 
enacted 12 May 94, effective 1 January 95, amended 29 April 10, 
effective 1 December 10; ``China Adopts Amended State Liability 
Compensation Law,'' Xinhua (Online), 29 April 10.
    \17\ PRC State Compensation Law, enacted 12 May 94, effective 1 
January 95, amended 29 April 10, effective 1 December 10, arts. 3(3), 
26, 35.
    \18\ Cheng Zhuo and Li Huizi, ``China Adopts Amended State 
Compensation Law To Better Protect Human Rights,'' Xinhua (Online), 30 
April 10; ``Interpretation of the Amended Law on State Compensation'' 
[Jiedu xiuzheng hou de guojia peichang fa], Xinhua (Online), 30 April 
10.
    \19\ Du Ming, ``Let the Saying `The State Compensation Law Is the 
Non-Compensation Law' End Here'' [Rang ``guojia peichangfa shi bu pei 
fa'' de shuofa congci xiaoshi], Legal Daily (Online), 3 May 10; Cary 
Huang, ``Controversial Compensation Law on Detainees Approved,'' South 
China Morning Post (Online), 30 April 10.
    \20\ According to the Supreme People's Court's ``2009 National 
Court Statistics on the Circumstances of State Compensation Cases,'' 
there were a total of 1,531 compensation cases accepted and 450 cases 
received compensation. Supreme People's Court, 2009 National Court 
Statistics on the Circumstances of State Compensation Cases, 8 April 
10.
    \21\ ``From Psychological Comfort to Psychological Compensation'' 
[Cong jingshen fuwei kaishi, xiang jingshen peichang nuli], Southern 
Metropolis Daily (Online), 30 April 10.
    \22\ Cary Huang, ``Controversial Compensation Law on Detainees 
Approved,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 30 April 10; ``Law 
Revision Falls Short,'' China Daily (Online), 30 April 10.
    \23\ PRC Administrative Supervision Law, enacted and effective 9 
May 97, amended 25 June 10, effective 1 October 10; ``China's 
Amendments Will Increase Power of Administrative Supervision; New Law 
To Be Implemented on October 1'' [Zhongguo xiufa jia da xingzheng 
jiancha lidu xinfa jiang yu 10 yue 1 ri shixing], Xinhua (Online), 25 
June 10.
    \24\ ``China Mulls Law To Increase Protection of Informants,'' 
Xinhua (Online), 22 June 10.
    \25\ ``SPP Documents Show 70% of Complainants Have Suffered 
Retaliation'' [Zuigao jian cailiao xianshi 70% jubao zhe ceng zao daji 
baofu], People's Daily (Online), 19 June 10.
    \26\ Zhao Yanrong, ``More Mediation Offices Coming,'' China Daily 
(Online), 31 March 10; Ma Limin, ``Sichuan: `Great Mediation' Allows 
Society To Be More Harmonious'' [Sichuan:``da tiaojie'' rang shehui 
gengjia hexie], Legal Daily (Online), 22 March 10; ``NPC Standing 
Committee Reviews Many Laws'' [Quanguo renda changwei hui shenyi duo bu 
falu an], Xinhua, reprinted in Global Times (Online), 22 June 10.
    \27\ ``Role of Mediation,'' China Daily (Online), 30 August 10; 
Chen Fei et al., ``People's Courts Strengthen Mediation for `Litigation 
Explosion' '' [Renmin fayuan jiaqiang tiaojie yingdui ``susong 
baozha''], China Internet Information Center (Online), 12 March 10.
    \28\ Dengjun Ming and Xie Mu, ``Construction of the `Great 
Mediation' System To Promote Three Key Tasks'' [Goujian ``da tiaojie'' 
zhidu tuijin san xiang zhongdian gongzuo], Court News Network (Online), 
12 June 10.
    \29\ ``Bright Spots Frequently Appear in People's Mediation Law'' 
[Renmin tiaojie fa liangdian pinxian], Legal Daily (Online), 30 August 
10; Guo Xiaoyu, ``Milestone in the Development of the Mediation 
System'' [Renmin tiaojie zhidu fazhan de lichengbei], Legal Daily 
(Online), 6 September 10.
    \30\ Zhou Yingfeng et al., ``China Will Pass Legislation To Improve 
People's Mediation System To Build `First Line of Defense' in Stability 
Maintenance'' [Woguo jiang lifa wanshan renmin tiaojie zhidu gouzhu wei 
wen ``di yi dao fangxian''], Xinhua (Online), 22 June 10.
    \31\ Pei Zhiyong, ``Harmony Valued, Mediation First--Sichuan 
Completes Building of `Great Mediation' Work System'' [He wei gui diao 
wei xian sichuan quanmian goujian ``da tiaojie'' gongzuo tixi], 
People's Daily (Online), 23 March 10.
    \32\ ``Zhou Yongkang: Firmly Grasp the Full Services of Three Key 
Economic and Social Development Work'' [Zhou yongkang: renzhen zhua hao 
san xiang zhongdian gongzuo quanli fuwu jingji shehui fazhan], Xinhua 
(Online), 6 January 10.
    \33\ ``NPC Standing Committee Reviews Many Laws'' [Quanguo renda 
changwei hui shenyi duo bu falu'an], Global Times (Online), 22 June 10.
    \34\ Wang Doudou, ``Mediation Law Allows `Flowers of the Orient' To 
Deliver More Gorgeous Bloom'' [Renmin tiaojie fa rang ``dongfang zhi 
hua'' gengjia xuanlan zhan fang], Legal Daily (Online), 29 August 10; 
``Chinese Legislature Passes People's Mediation Law,'' Xinhua (Online), 
29 August 10.
    \35\ Zhu Zhe and Lan Tian, ``Mediation Draft Law Could Ease 
Tension,'' China Daily (Online), 23 June 10.
    \36\ ``Chinese Legislature Passes People's Mediation Law,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 29 August 10.
    \37\ Ibid.; PRC Mediation Law, enacted 28 August 09, effective 1 
January 10, arts. 8, 9.
    \38\ PRC Mediation Law, enacted 28 August 09, effective 1 January 
10, art. 13.
    \39\ Ibid., art. 14.
    \40\ Ibid.
    \41\ Ibid.
    \42\ Ananth Krishnan, ``China Passes Mediation Law To Aid Strained 
Judiciary,'' The Hindu (Online), 30 August 10.
    \43\ Li Gang, ``Courts Can `Mediate,' but Enforcement Is Another 
Matter'' [Fayuan ``tiaojie'' rongyi zhixing nan], Beijing Youth Daily 
(Online), 7 July 10.
    \44\ Marianne Barriaux, ``China's Human Rights Lawyers Face Uphill 
Struggle,'' Agence France-Presse (Online), 11 May 10. For additional 
examples of the ``clampdown'' on lawyers and activists, see the 
following sources: Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China 
Human Rights Briefing May 25-31, 2010,'' 31 May 10; ``Tang Jitian Meets 
With U.S. Officials To Talk About Human Rights and Religion; Lawyer Li 
Xiongbing Not Allowed To Leave Home'' [Tang jitian tan jian mei 
guanyuan tan renquan zongjiao li xiongbing lushi bei jinzhi chumen], 
Radio Free Asia (Online), 25 May 10.
    \45\ Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Activist Surfaces After a Year in 
Custody,'' New York Times (Online), 28 March 10; Chris Buckley and 
Bejamin Kang Lim, ``Well-Known Missing Chinese Rights Lawyer Alive,'' 
Reuters (Online), 28 March 10.
    \46\ After his reported release in late March, Gao spoke with 
Western media outlets. Chris Buckley and Benjamin Kang Lim, ``Well-
Known Missing Chinese Rights Lawyer Alive,'' Reuters (Online), 29 March 
10; Andrew Jacobs, ``Chinese Activist Surfaces After a Year in 
Custody,'' New York Times (Online), 28 March 10; ``Missing Lawyer Says 
He Is in Northern China,'' Associated Press (Online), 28 March 10.
    \47\ Michael Wines, ``Chinese Rights Lawyer Disappears Again,'' New 
York Times (Online), 30 April 10; Michael Wines, ``Chinese Rights 
Lawyer Disappears After Release,'' New York Times (Online), 14 April 
10.
    \48\ Jerome A. Cohen and Beth Schwanke, ``The Silencing of Gao 
Zhisheng,'' Wall Street Journal (Online), 31 May 10.
    \49\ ``Law Firm That Defends Dissenters To Be Closed, Say 
Activists,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in South China Morning 
Post (Online), 22 February 09; Lei Huo, Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(Online), ``When Does `Suspension for Rectification' End for Beijing 
Law Firm'' [Beijing yitong lushishiwusuo ``tingye zhengdun'' heshi 
liao], 2 February 10; ``Yitong Law Firm Begins Its Six-Month Reform, 
Who Will Protect the Interests of the Clients/ '' [Yitong kaishi tingye 
zhengdun liu ge yue lushi bei zheng dangshi ren liyi shui lai weihu?], 
Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 March 09.
    \50\ Xia Yu, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Administrative Officials Secretly Order Landlord Not To Renew 
Contract, Drawing Beijing's Anhui Law Firm Into Hopeless Situation'' 
[Xingzheng ganyu miling fang zhu bu xuyue, beijing anhui lushi shiwusuo 
xianru juejing], 25 March 10.
    \51\ Raymond Li, ``Lawyer Recovers From Setback in Women's 
Rights,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 6 June 10.
    \52\ Edward Wong, ``AIDS Activist Leaves China After Government 
Pressure,'' New York Times (Online), 10 May 10.
    \53\ Amnesty International (Online), ``Chinese Activists Under 
Threat After Obama Visit,'' 20 November 09.
    \54\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Beijing 
Human Rights Lawyer Jiang Tianyong Illegally Taken Away by Public 
Security Officers,'' 11 November 09; Julia Duin, ``China Holds Lawyer 
Who Tried To See Obama,'' Washington Times (Online), 24 November 09.
    \55\ Amnesty International (Online), ``Chinese Activists Under 
Threat After Obama Visit,'' 20 November 09.
    \56\ `` `Fuzhou Internet Users' Defamation Case' Lawyer's Law Firm 
Closed Down Because of Director's Suspended License'' [``Fuzhou wangmin 
feibang an'' daili lu suo zao jiesan bei tingye lushi ceng shi lu guan 
chu zhang], Southern Weekend (Online), 28 April 10; China Human Rights 
Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Fujian Lawyer Lin Hongnan and His Law 
Firm Punished; Retaliation for Taking Up the `Three Fuzhou Netizens' 
Case,'' 3 May 10.
    \57\ Li Bao, ``Fujian Court Opens Second Instance Trial in 
Defamation Case Against Fujian Netizens'' [Fujian kaiting ershen 
wangyou feibang an], Voice of America (Online), 13 June 10.
    \58\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Lawyers Meet With 
Wang Yonghang; Family Calls for End to Persecution'' [Lushi huijian 
wang yonghang jiashu xu tingzhi pohai], 18 January 10; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights Briefing January 14-22, 
2010,'' 27 January 10.
    \59\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Human Rights Lawyer Banned From Entering 
Linfen Court, Barred From Travel,'' 13 July 10; ``Christians Come Under 
Attack in China,'' Toronto Star (Online), 7 August 10.
    \60\ Ibid.
    \61\ ChinaAid (Online), ``U.S. Ambassador Meets With Chinese Rights 
Lawyer Zhang Kai Following Ban,'' 20 July 10.
    \62\ ChinaAid (Online), ``Human Rights Lawyer Banned From Entering 
Linfen Court, Barred From Travel,'' 13 July 10. For more information on 
the Linfen-Fushan Church raid, see Section II--Freedom of Religion.
    \63\ Ibid.
    \64\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Online 
Petition: Support Human Rights Lawyers Who Failed the `Annual 
Assessment and Registration,' '' 24 July 09; ``Lawyers' Licenses 
Withheld,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 July 10; CECC, 2009 Annual 
Report, 10 October 09, 234.
    \65\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 234; China Human 
Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Online Petition: Support Human 
Rights Lawyers Who Failed the `Annual Assessment and Registration,' '' 
24 July 09; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), 
``Concern Over Human Rights Lawyers Snatched of Their Legal Practice 
Qualification, Demand Scrapping the Annual Inspection and Annual 
Registration System,'' 16 July 10.
    \66\ China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Concern 
Over Human Rights Lawyers Snatched of Their Legal Practice 
Qualification, Demand Scrapping the Annual Inspection and Annual 
Registration System,'' 16 July 10; ``Lawyers' Licenses Withheld,'' 
Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 July 10.
    \67\ ``Lawyers' Licenses Withheld,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 
July 10.
    \68\ Ibid.
    \69\ Beijing Bureau of Justice, Administrative Penalty Decision--
Beijing Bureau Penalty Decision [2010] No. 2 [Xingzheng chufa jueding 
shu jingsi fajue (2010) 2 hao], issued 30 April 10; Beijing Bureau of 
Justice, Administrative Penalty Decision--Beijing Bureau Penalty 
Decision [2010] No. 3 [Xingzheng chufa jueding shu jingsi fajue (2010) 
3 hao], issued 30 April 10; Human Rights in China (Online), ``Beijing 
Judicial Bureau Revokes Licenses of Two Rights Defense Lawyers,'' 7 May 
10; Lucy Hornby, ``China Disbars Two Rights Defense Lawyers,'' Reuters 
(Online), 9 May 10.
    \70\ Human Rights in China (Online), ``Lawyers Facing License 
Revocation Detail Irregular Courtroom Activities Permitted by Judge,'' 
20 April 10.
    \71\ Edward Wong, ``2 Chinese Lawyers Are Facing Disbarment for 
Defending Falun Gong,'' New York Times (Online), 21 April 10.
    \72\ For commentary on the two measures, see ``Ministry of Justice 
Issues Two Measures To Strengthen the Supervision of Law Firms and 
Lawyers' Activities'' [Sifabu chutai liang banfa jiaqiang dui lushi 
lusuo zhiye huodong jiandu], Legal Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 
9 April 10; Measures for the Annual Inspection and Evaluation of Law 
Firms [Lushi shiwu suo niandu jiancha kaohe banfa], issued 7 April 10, 
effective 9 April 10; Measures on Punishing Illegal Acts of Lawyers and 
Law Firms [Lushi he lushi shiwu suo weifa xingwei chufa banfa], adopted 
7 April 10, effective 1 June 10.
    \73\ ``Ministry of Justice Department of Lawyers and Public 
Notaries Spokesperson Answers Questions on the Revised `Measures on 
Punishing Illegal Acts of Lawyers and Law Firms' '' [Sifa bu lushi 
gongzheng si fuze ren jiu xiuding hou de ``lushi he lushi shiwu suo 
weifa xingwei chufa banfa'' da jizhe wen], Legal Daily (Online), 5 
April 10.
    \74\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ``China Human Rights Briefing 
April 7-12, 2010,'' reprinted in Amnesty International UK--Blogs 
(Online), 14 August 10.
    \75\ Cara Anna, ``2 China Lawyers Who Defended Falun Gong Face 
Ban,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Seattle Times (Online), 21 April 
10.
    \76\ Carl Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese 
Legal Institutions,'' 42 Stanford Journal of International Law 103, 
104-06, 116-17 (2006). Since the founding of the People's Republic of 
China, the xinfang system, in theory, has ideally functioned to enhance 
relations among the Communist Party, the government, and the people. 
Sun Weiben ed., PRC Administrative Management Encyclopedia [Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo xingzheng guanli dacidian], (Beijing: Renmin Ribao 
Chubanshe, 1992), 329. The practice of submitting grievances to local 
authorities has existed in China since imperial times. Carl Minzner, 
``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,'' 41 
Stanford Journal of International Law 103, 111-120 (2006).
    \77\ According to Article 41 of the PRC Constitution, ``Citizens 
have the right to make to relevant state organs complaints and charges 
against, or exposures of, violations of the law or dereliction of duty 
by any state organ or functionary, but fabrication or distortion of 
facts with the intention of libel or frame-up is prohibited. In case of 
complaints, charges, or exposures made by citizens, the state organ 
concerned must deal with them in a responsible manner after 
ascertaining the facts. No one may suppress such complaints, charges, 
and exposures, or retaliate against the citizens making them. Citizens 
who have suffered losses through infringement of their civil rights by 
any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in 
accordance with the law.'' PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, 
amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 41. 
The right is also protected by the more recent 2005 National 
Regulations on Letters and Visits. Regulations on Letters and Visits 
[Xinfang tiaoli], issued 5 January 05, effective 1 May 05, arts. 1, 3.
    \78\ Carl Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese 
Legal Institutions,'' 42 Stanford Journal of International Law 103, 107 
(2006).
    \79\ Regulations on Letters and Visits [Xinfang tiaoli], issued 5 
January 05, effective 1 May 05, arts. 9-13, 15; Sun Weiben ed., PRC 
Administrative Management Encyclopedia [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
xingzheng guanli dacidian], (Beijing: Renmin Ribao Chubanshe, 1992), 
257; Human Rights Watch (Online), `` `We Could Disappear at Any Time': 
Retaliation and Abuses Against Chinese Petitioners,'' December 2005, 
17-18.
    \80\ Jamil Anderlini, ``Punished Supplicants,'' Financial Times 
(Online), 6 March 09; Human Rights Watch (Online), ``An Alleyway in 
Hell,'' 12 November 09, 3. According to the Human Rights Watch report, 
``The majority of black jail detainees are petitioners--citizens from 
rural areas who come to Beijing and provincial capitals seeking redress 
for abuses ranging from illegal land grabs and corruption to police 
torture.''
    \81\ Jamil Anderlini, ``Punished Supplicants,'' Financial Times 
(Online), 6 March 09.
    \82\ Zhou Yongkang, ``Promote the In-Depth Resolution of Social 
Contradictions, Be Innovative in Social Management, and Enforce the Law 
Fairly and Honestly, Providing Even More Powerful Rule-of-Law Support 
for Both Good and Rapid Economic and Social Development'' [Shenru 
tuijin shehui maodun huajie, shehui guanli chuangxin, gongzheng lianjie 
zhifa, wei jingji shehui youhao youkuai fazhan tigong gengjia youli de 
fazhi baozhang], Seeking Truth (Online), 16 February 10.
    \83\ Ibid. ``The center of gravity in the effort to resolve social 
contradictions is at the grass-roots level. . . . [The] villages and 
towns (neighborhoods) must integrate their forces with regard to . . . 
upholding stability, complaints, etc., . . . and striving to see that 
`minor matters do not get out of the villages, major matters do not get 
out of the towns (or townships), and that contradictions are not passed 
up to higher levels.' ''
    \84\ ``78% of Grassroots Courts Have Case Petitioning Offices,'' 
People's Daily (Online), 4 November 09.
    \85\ ``New Focus of Efforts To Maintain Stability Strike Hard 
Against Unions, Farmers, and Military [Internal Three Forces]'' [Weiwen 
xin zhongdian daji gong nong bing (nei sangu shili)], Ming Pao, 13 
March 10 (Open Source Center, 13 March 10). The other two threats are 
military personnel rights protection groups and underground labor 
unions.
    \86\ ``Central Document Reveals: Reprimands of Petitioners Will Be 
Intensified'' [Zhongyang wenjian baoguang: dui fangmin yao jiada xunjie 
lidu], Boxun (Online), 16 August 09. The Boxun article revealed that, 
in May 2009, the Central Prominent Xinfang Problems and Mass Incidents 
Joint Conference Office issued a circular urging relevant official 
offices to strengthen implementation of a 2008 opinion mandating 
increasing admonishments ``according to law'' for ``abnormal 
petitioning.''
    \87\ ``Shenzhen Authorities Issue Circular Outlining Punishments 
for `Abnormal Petitioning,' '' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 2; Huang Guan, ``Handling `Abnormal 
Petitioning,' Persuade, Do Not Just Block'' [Duidai ``feizhengchang 
shangfang,'' zaishu buzai du], Xinhua (Online), 13 November 09.
    \88\ Ibid.
    \89\ ``Shenzhen Expands Measures Against `Abnormal Petitioning,' '' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 3. 
For examples of measures issued in other cities and provinces, see, 
e.g., ``A Government Document Clearly Shows the Basis for Stern 
Approach Toward Petitioners: Inner Mongolia Document'' [Dui fangmin 
yanli youyin, zhengfu wenjian mingshi: neimenggu wenjian], Boxun 
(Online), 13 November 09; ``Jiangsu Province Four Departments Take 
Stage With Secret Document Cracking Down on Petitioners Who Take 
Grievances to Beijing'' [Jiangsusheng sibumen chutai mimi wenjian yanda 
jinjing shangfang], Boxun (Online), 14 January 09; ``Wuhan `Manage 
According to Law Abnormal Petitioning Behavior in Beijing Propaganda 
Statement' Revealed'' [Wuhan ``yifa chuzhi jin jing fei zhengchang 
shangfang xing wei xuanchuan ci'' puguang], Boxun (Online), 20 July 08.
    \90\ ``Shenzhen Expands Measures Against `Abnormal Petitioning,' '' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 3; 
``Shenzhen Residential Permit Office: Habitual Petitioners Added to 
Blacklist'' [Shenzhen ban juzaizheng chaoji shangfangzhe bei lieru 
heimingdan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 April 10.
    \91\ Wang Junxiu et al., ``Petitioner Who Went to Higher-Level 
Authorities Detained Files Administrative Suit Against Police Station 
for Illegal Detention'' [Shangfangzhe beiju zhuanggao gonganju 
xingzheng weifa], China Youth Daily, 14 November 09 (Open Source 
Center, 14 November 09).
    \92\ He Xianwen, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Liuzhou, Guangxi Petitioners Sent to One Year Reeducation Through 
Labor for Petitioning'' [Guangxi liuzhou wu fangmin yin shangfang bei 
liaojiao yinian], 24 January 10; Lei Mingxian, Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders (Online), ``Liuzhou Petitioner Series (9): Zeng Zhaokuang 
Sent to Reeducation Through Labor for Petitioning in Beijing'' [Liuzhou 
fangmin xilie (9): zeng zhaokuang yin shangfang bei laojiao], 24 
February 10; Lei Mingxian, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), 
``Liuzhou Petitioner Series (8) Petitioner Jin Li Sent to Reeducation 
Through Labor for One Year'' [Liuzhou fangmin xilie (8) fangmin jinli 
bei laojiao yinian], 10 February 10; Lei Mingxian, Chinese Human Rights 
Defenders (Online), ``Liuzhou Petitioner Series (7) Misdiagnosis and 
Missed Diagnosis Results in Patient's Death'' [Liuzhou fangmin xilie 
(7) wuzhen louzhen zhizhe siwang], 10 February 10.
    \93\ Yueyang County Measures on 2010 Xinfang Work Responsibility 
Target Evaluation [2010 nian xinfang gongzuo mubiao guanli kaohe 
banfa], 6 April 10. Officials in Yueyang have partial points deducted 
if there is more than one petition per 10,000 population per month and 
have 10 points deducted any time mass petitions are taken to Beijing. 
Human Rights Watch (Online), ``An Alleyway in Hell,'' 12 November 09, 
9.
    \94\ Carl Minzner, ``Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese 
Legal Institutions,'' 42 Stanford Journal of International Law 103, 154 
(2006); Human Rights Watch (Online), ``An Alleyway in Hell,'' 12 
November 09, 9.
    \95\ ``Families of 200 Students Killed in Sichuan Earthquake Storm 
City Government, Blocked by Special Police'' [Chuan zhen liang bai li 
nan xuesheng jiashu chuang shi zhengfu bei tejing zuzhi], Radio Free 
Asia (Online), 25 June 10.
    \96\ Ibid.
    \97\  ``Retribution for Representatives Who Organized Teachers To 
Kneel and Present Petitions in Hubei'' [Hubei zuzhi min shi xia gui 
qingyuan daibiao zao qiu hou suan zhang], Radio Free Asia (Online), 25 
June 10.
    \98\ Liu Feiyue, Civil Rights and Livelihood, ``Gongan County, 
Hubei Organizer Yang Huanqing Sent to Reeducation Through Labor for 
Organizing Teachers To Petition'' [Hubei sheng gongan xian yang 
huanqing bei yi zuzhi minshi shangfang laojiao], reprinted in Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders (Online), 28 November 09.
    \99\ Tania Branigan, ``Shanghai 2010 Expo Is Set To Be the World's 
Most Expensive Party,'' Guardian (Online), 21 April 10.
    \100\ According to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, Shanghai 
officials estimate that ``70-80 percent'' of petitioning cases 
originating in the city are related to forced evictions or housing 
demolitions. See Tania Branigan, ``Shanghai 2010 Expo Is Set To Be the 
World's Most Expensive Party,'' Guardian (Online), 21 April 10; Amnesty 
International (Online), ``China Silences Women Housing Rights Activists 
Ahead of Expo 2010,'' 30 April 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(Online), ``Chinese Government Silences Activists Ahead of Shanghai 
World Expo,'' 29 April 10.
    \101\ ``China's Forced Evictions Cause Instability,'' Reuters 
(Online), 28 March 10; Amnesty International (Online), ``China Silences 
Women Housing Rights Activists Ahead of Expo 2010,'' 30 April 10; 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Chinese Government Silences 
Activists Ahead of Shanghai World Expo,'' 29 April 10.
    \102\ Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``China Human Rights 
Briefing Weekly June 8-14, 2010,'' 15 June 10.
    \103\ Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
prohibits ``arbitrary arrest (and) detention'' and guarantees ``full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent impartial 
tribunal.'' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and 
proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 
48, art. 9. Article 37 of the PRC Constitution stipulates that arrests 
must be conducted ``with the approval or by decision of a people's 
procuratorate or by decision of a people's court, and arrests must be 
made by a public security organ. Unlawful deprivation or restriction of 
citizens' freedom of person by detention or other means is prohibited; 
and unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited.'' PRC 
Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 
15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 4.
    \104\ ``Veteran Starved in Black Jail,'' Radio Free Asia, reprinted 
in Agence France-Presse (Online), 11 June 10.
    \105\ Qi Wuji, Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ``Beijing 
Activist Li Jinping Detained in Black Jail'' [Beijing weiquan renshi li 
jinping beiguan heijianyu], 10 May 10; Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(Online), ``China Human Rights Briefing May 4-10, 2010,'' 11 May 10.
    \106\ Hu Guohong reported being detained in mental hospitals on 
multiple occasions during politically sensitive dates in China. 
``British Journalist Detained in Wuhan, Interviewee Doesn't Dare Return 
Home'' [Yingmei jizhe wuhan caifang bei kou bei fangzhe bugan huijia], 
Radio Free Asia (Online), 2 December 09. Peng Baoquan was committed to 
a mental hospital for several days after he was detained for taking 
pictures of a petitioner protest. ``The Truth Behind Petitioning, 
Taking Pictures and Being Labeled as `Mentally Ill' '' [Shangfang, 
paizhao, ``bei jingshenbin'' de zhenxiang], Huangqiu Net (Online), 28 
April 10; ``Shiyan `Psychiatric Patient' Discusses Before and After the 
Hospital, Hopes To Take Off the [Mental Illness] Hat'' [Shiyan 
``jingshenbingren'' jianshu ruyuan qianhou xiwang zhaidiao ``maozi''], 
Nanfang Daily Net (Online), 17 April 10. Yang Jia's mother, Wang 
Jingmei, reportedly was detained in a mental institution in Beijing for 
months while authorities investigated and interrogated her son. 
``Sending Petitioners to Psychiatric Hospitals Is One Way To Pressure 
Them'' [Song jingshenbingyuan shi daya fangmin de yizhong fangshi], 
Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 February 10. For a case of a petitioner 
being committed for a longer period of time, see Wang Yibo, ``Suit 
Against the Township Government; Luohe Peasant Locked in Psychiatric 
Hospital for Six-and-a-Half Years'' [Zhuang gao xiang zhengfu luohe yi 
nongmin bei guan jingshen bing yuan liunian ban], China Youth Daily 
(Online), 23 April 10; ``Nation Rapt by Detained Petitioner's Story,'' 
South China Morning Post (Online), 22 May 10.
    \107\ Wang Yibo, ``Suit Against the Township Government; Luohe 
Peasant Locked in Psychiatric Hospital for Six-and-a-Half Years'' 
[Zhuang gao xiang zhengfu luohe yi nongmin bei guan jingshen bing yuan 
liunian ban], China Youth Daily (Online), 23 April 10; Wang Yibo, 
``Henan Luohe Villager Sued Township Government for Being Locked in 
Psychiatric Hospital Six-and-a-Half Years'' [Henan Luohe nongmin 
zhuanggao xiang zhengfu beiguan jingshenbingyuan 6 nianban], Xinhua 
(Online), 23 April 10.
    \108\ ``Hundreds of Lawyers Sign Proposal for Prosecution To Stop 
False `Mentally Ill' Judgements'' [Baiyu lushi qianming jianyi jiancha 
jiguan daji ``jingshenbing'' zaojia], Xinhua (Online), 27 April 10.
    \109\ ``Sending Petitioners to Psychiatric Hospitals Is One Way To 
Pressure Them'' [Song jingshenbingyuan shi daya fangmin de yizhong 
fangshi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 February 10; Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders (Online), ``Silencing Complaints: Human Rights Abuses 
Against Petitioners in China,'' 14 March 09. This report presents 
findings from a previous survey of more than 3,300 petitioners in 
October 2007 that asserts approximately 3.1 percent of them had been 
sent to psychiatric institutions at some point because of their 
petitioning activities.

    Notes to Section IV--Xinjiang
    \1\ For detailed information, including information on China's 
domestic obligations toward ethnic minorities, see Section II--Ethnic 
Minority Rights, as well as the section on ``Ethnic Minority Rights'' 
in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 105-106, and ``Special 
Focus for 2005: China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law,'' CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 
05, 13-23.
    \2\ See the subsections that follow, as well as Section II--Freedom 
of Religion--Islam--Islam in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region--for 
examples of violations of such rights as those to free expression, 
assembly, religion, and fair criminal trials and the linguistic, 
religious, and cultural rights of ethnic minorities. For protections in 
international law, see, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 
10 December 48, arts. 11, 18, 19, 20; International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76, arts. 9, 18, 19, 
21, 27. For detailed information, see also Section II--Ethnic Minority 
Rights, as well as the section on ``Ethnic Minority Rights'' in CECC, 
2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 105-108, and ``Special Focus for 
2005: China's Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional 
Ethnic Autonomy Law,'' CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 13-23.
    \3\ See, e.g., ``Hu Jintao's Important Speech Delivered at the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Cadre Meeting'' [Hu jintao zai 
xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu ganbu dahui shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua], 
Xinhua (Online), 25 August 09; Cheng Lixin, Wang Xinhong, and Li Hua, 
``Eighth (Enlarged) Plenary Session of Seventh Regional CPC Committee 
Calls for Unifying Thinking, Enhancing Understanding, Firming Up 
Confidence, and Clearing Away Difficulties To Forge Ahead,'' Xinjiang 
Daily, 25 October 09 (Open Source Center, 20 November 09); 
``Painstakingly Prepare for Central Work Forum on Xinjiang'' [Jingxin 
choubei zhongyang xinjiang gongzuo zuotanhui], Xinhua, reprinted in 
Tianshan Net (Online), 28 January 10; ``Government Work Report Made by 
Nur Bekri (Summary)'' [Nu'er baikeli suo zuo zhengfu gongzuo baogao 
(zhaiyao)], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 13 
January 10.
    \4\ ``Main Restructuring of Duties for Leading Comrades in Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Committee'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu 
dangwei zhuyao lingdao tongzhi zhiwu tiaozheng], Xinhua (Online), 24 
April 10.
    \5\ Cheng Lixin, ``Zhang Chunxian Stresses: Stability Is the 
Expectation of People of All Ethnicities'' [Zhang chunxian qiangdiao: 
wending shi ge zu renmin de qipan], Xinjiang Metropolitan News, 
reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 7 May 10. On past statements, 
see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 245.
    \6\ See box titled Free Expression Punished in Xinjiang for 
information on cases of people detained on security-related charges for 
criticizing the government or otherwise exercising their right to free 
expression. For information on efforts to politicize security concerns 
and single out Western human rights organizations and advocates in the 
aftermath of events in July 2009, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 
10 October 09, 245-248.
    \7\ Cui Jia, ``Xinjiang Security Funding Increased by 90 Percent,'' 
China Daily (Online), 13 January 10; Su Junya, ``40.6 Billion in 
Financing Budgeted for Projects To Protect People's Livelihoods'' 
[Xinjiang 406 yi caizheng yusuan bao minsheng gongcheng], Tianshan Net 
(Online), 14 January 10; Han Xiaoyi, Huang Yan, and Zhang Xinjun, ``3rd 
Session of 11th Xinjiang Autonomous Region People's Congress 
Concludes'' [Xinjiang zizhiqu shiyi jie renda sanci huiyi bimu], 
Tianshan Net, reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 17 January 10.
    \8\ Compare the most recent version of the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region Regulation on the Comprehensive Management of Social 
Order [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili tiaoli], 
issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97 and 29 December 09, 
effective 1 February 10, arts. 5, 11, 16, 25, 31, 42, to the 1997 
version of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the 
Comprehensive Management of Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu 
shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili tiaoli], issued 21 January 94, amended 11 
December 97, effective 11 December 97. For a detailed comparison 
between the two versions, see ``Revised Regulation From Xinjiang Places 
New Emphasis on State Security,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 3.
    \9\ For examples of such cases, see, e.g., ``Number of Trials for 
State Security Crimes in Xinjiang Increases in 2009,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3.
    \10\ For a detailed comparison between the XUAR regulation and 
other provincial-level regulations, see ``Revised Regulation From 
Xinjiang Places New Emphasis on State Security,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 3.
    \11\ ``Xinjiang Beefs Up Special Police Unit for Safety,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 3 February 10.
    \12\ ``At End of This Year Video Cameras in Urumqi Proper To Reach 
60,000'' [Jinnianmo wulumuqi chengqu shipin shexiang tou jiang dadao 6 
wan zhi], China News Service (Online), 15 January 09.
    \13\ ``Urumqi To Establish 10,000 Person Full-Time Patrol Team'' 
[Wulumuqi shi jiang jian wan ren zhuanzhi xunluodui], Xinjiang Daily, 
reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 24 September 09.
    \14\ ``Urumqi Public Security Organs Deploy Special Social Order 
Prevention and Control Operation'' [Wu shi gong'an jiguan bushu zhi'an 
fangkong zhuanxiang xingdong], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 18 June 10.
    \15\ Li Xing, ``Wang Lequan Speaks at Meeting To Summarize, Commend 
Stability Maintenance Work in the Autonomous Region, Stresses Need To 
Consolidate and Expand Further What Has Been Achieved,'' Xinjiang 
Daily, 9 February 10 (Open Source Center, 25 February 10).
    \16\ Based on Commission search of legal databases in China.
    \17\ See, e.g., Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on 
Ethnic Unity Education [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jiaoyu 
tiaoli], issued 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10, arts. 12, 18, 
22. For detailed analysis of the regulation, see `` `Ethnic Unity' 
Regulation Imposes Party Policy, Restricts Free Expression,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \18\ Ibid., art. 37.
    \19\ ``Those Who Fabricate and Spread Harmful Information Will Be 
Severely Punished in Accordance With Law'' [Bianzao chuanbo youhai 
xinxizhe jiang yifa yancheng], Urumqi Online, reprinted in Xinhua 
(Online), 26 January 10; ``Public Security Organs at All Levels in 
Xinjiang Strike Hard Against Cases of Fabricating and Intentionally 
Spreading Harmful Information'' [Xinjiang geji gongan jiguan yanli daji 
bianzao guyi chuanbo youhai xinxi anjian], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 
February 10.
    \20\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang To Strengthen Education on National 
Unity Among Youth,'' Xinhua (Online), 12 October 09; ``Xinjiang Normal 
University Uses Various Means To Launch Ethnic Unity Education, Over 
10,000 Students and Staff Participate in the Studies'' [Xinjiang shida 
duozhong jucuo kaizhan minzu tuanjie jiaoyu wan yu xuesheng zhigong 
canjia xuexi], Legal Daily, reprinted in State Ethnic Affairs 
Commission (Online), 15 October 09; Wang Fei, ``Content on Ethnic Unity 
Education Brought Into Next Year's High School Entrance Exams'' [Minzu 
tuanjie jiaoyu neirong mingnian naru wulumuqi zhongkao], Xinhua 
(Online), 21 October 09.
    \21\ See analysis in ``Xinjiang Authorities Continue Detentions, 
Announce Arrests Connected to July 5 Incident,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 2009, 2.
    \22\ See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, ``Countering Riots, China Rounds Up 
Hundreds,'' New York Times (Online), 19 July 09; David Eimer, ``As 
China Reels From 184 Deaths in Urumqi Riots, a Beaten Woman Fears for 
Her Husband,'' Telegraph (Online), 11 July 09; ``Tight Security in 
Xinjiang,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 6 July 09; Kathrin Hille, 
``Xinjiang Widens Crackdown on Uighurs,'' Financial Times (Online), 19 
July 09. See also analysis in ``Xinjiang Authorities Continue 
Detentions, Announce Arrests Connected to July 5 Incident,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 2009, 2.
    \23\ Ibid.
    \24\ Human Rights Watch (Online), `` `We Are Afraid To Even Look 
for Them': Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang's 
Protests,'' October 2009, 5.
    \25\ Uyghur Human Rights Project (Online), ``Can Anyone Hear Us? 
Voices From the 2009 Unrest in Urumqi,'' 1 July 10, 28-30.
    \26\ ``Xinjiang High People's Court Establishes Leading Group for 
Trying `7-5' Cases'' [Xinjiang gaoyuan chengli shenli ``7-5'' anjian 
lingdao xiaozu], Legal Daily, reprinted in Gansu Daily (Online), 16 
July 09.
    \27\ ``Xinjiang Completed Trials Last Year in 437 Cases of 
Endangering State Security'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai guojia 
anquan fanzui anjian 437 qi], Xinhua (Online), 15 January 09.
    \28\ Beijing Judicial Bureau Lawyer Work Management Division 
(Online), ``Beijing Judicial Bureau Lawyer Work Management Division's 
Urgent Notice Regarding Requiring All Lawyers in the City To Be 
Cautious in Offering Legal Services in the Urumqi `July 5' Beating, 
Smashing, Looting, and Burning Serious Violent Criminal Incident'' 
[Beijing shi sifaju lushi gongzuo guanlichu guanyu yaoqiu quanshi lushi 
shenzhong wei wulumuqi shi `7.5' da za qiang shao yanzhong baoli fanzui 
shijian tigong falu fuwu de jinji tongzhi], 8 July 09; ``Xinjiang 
Lawyers Indicate All Legal Arrangements in Relation to July 5 Incident 
Will Be Made by Authorities'' [Xinjiang lushi zhi 7.5 shijian xiangguan 
susong you guanfang tongyi anpai], Radio Free Asia (Online), 14 July 
09; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ``Concern over 
Mainland Lawyers' Freedom To Legal Practice [sic] on Urumqi Protest 
Cases,'' 15 July 09. See also ``Defense Attorneys Free for Riot 
Suspects,'' Global Times (Online), 24 July 09. Following the first set 
of trials in October, Li Fangping, a human rights lawyer in Beijing, 
said he was not aware of any Beijing lawyers who were representing 
defendants in the Xinjiang trials. ``China's Xinjiang Trials Fail 
Global Standards: Rights Group,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in 
Yahoo! (Online), 16 October 09.
    \29\ Amnesty International (Online), ``China: Authorities Widen 
Crackdown After Xinjiang Riots,'' 10 July 09.
    \30\ Journalists present at one day of the trials, cited in a 
December 23 article from the Australian, said that authorities told 
them ``not to write detailed reports or conduct their own 
investigations into the murders or the accused,'' according to a 
paraphrasing of their remarks. The journalists also said they were 
notified of the trials less than one day in advance, according to the 
article. Michael Sainsbury, ``More Uighurs Sentenced to Death in 
China,'' Australian (Online), 23 December 09. On criminal procedure, 
see PRC Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 
effective 1 January 97, art. 151(5).
    \31\ Michael Sainsbury, ``More Uighurs Sentenced to Death in 
China,'' Australian (Online), 23 December 09.
    \32\ On failure to publicize judgments in the trials, see the 
analysis in ``198 People in Xinjiang Reportedly Sentenced in Trials 
Marked by Lack of Transparency,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of 
Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2. On criminal procedure, see PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 17 March 96, 
effective 1 January 97, art. 163.
    \33\ ``Xinjiang Official Stresses Fighting Separatism, Says 198 
Sentenced for Deadly Riot,'' Xinhua (Online), 7 March 10; ``198 People 
in 97 Cases Already Tried and Sentenced in Urumqi `7-5' Incident'' 
[Wulumuqi ``7-5'' shijian yi shenli xuanpan 97 an 198 ren], Xinhua 
(Online), 7 March 10. See analysis in ``198 People in Xinjiang 
Reportedly Sentenced in Trials Marked by Lack of Transparency,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2.
    \34\ Information in this table is based on CECC analysis of Chinese 
media reports on the Internet and on PDFs of hard copy articles from 
the Xinjiang Daily made available through Open Source Center. See ``198 
People in Xinjiang Reportedly Sentenced in Trials Marked by Lack of 
Transparency,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 
21 April 10, 2.
    \35\ ``Xinjiang Completed Trials Last Year in 437 Cases of 
Endangering State Security'' [Xinjiang qunian shenjie weihai guojia 
anquan fanzui anjian 437 qi], Xinhua (Online), 15 January 09; Cui Jia, 
``Xinjiang Courts Handle Rising Security Cases,'' China Daily (Online), 
16 January 09. For additional background and analysis, see ``Number of 
Trials for State Security Crimes in Xinjiang Increases in 2009,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3.
    \36\ For information on the 2008 statistics, see ``State Security 
Cases From Xinjiang Appear To Surge in 2008,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 2009, 3.
    \37\ See generally analysis of the July trials, including 
information on the charges involved, in ``198 People in Xinjiang 
Reportedly Sentenced in Trials Marked by Lack of Transparency,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2. For 
Chinese reporting on the trials, including information on charges 
involved, see, e.g., ``Judgment Pronounced in Three Cases in Urumqi 
Incident of Serious Violent Crimes of Beating, Smashing. Looting, and 
Burning'' [Wulumuqi da za qiang shao yanzhong baoli fanzui shijian san 
anjian yishen xuanpan], Xinhua (Online), 12 October 09; Rena Wubuli, 
``Urumqi Openly Tries Three Cases of Serious Violent Crimes of Beating, 
Smashing, Looting, and Burning'' [Wulumuqi gongkai shenli sanqi da za 
qiang shao yanzhong baoli fanzui anjian], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in 
Xinhua (Online), 15 October 09; ``Urumqi Intermediate Court Openly 
Tries and Pronounces Judgment in Five Serious Violent Criminal Cases of 
Beating, Smashing, Looting, and Burning'' [Wulumuqi zhongyuan gongkai 
shenli xuanpan wu qi da za qiang shao yanzhong baoli fanzui anjian], 
Xinhua (Online), 3 December 09; ``Urumqi Intermediate Court Again 
Openly Tries and Pronounces Judgment in Five Serious Violent Criminal 
Cases of Beating, Smashing, Looting, and Burning'' [Wulumuqi zhongyuan 
you gongkai shenli xuanpan wu qi da za qiang shao yanzhong baoli fanzui 
anjian], Xinhua (Online), 4 December 09; Cao Huijuan, ``Urumqi 
Intermediate Court Publicly Pronounces Judgment in Five Serious Violent 
Criminal Cases'' [Wulumuqi zhongyuan gongkai xuanpan wu qi yanzhong 
baoli fanzui anjian], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang Bingtuan 
Net (Online), 24 December 09.
    \38\ As discussed in this section, it appears likely that not all 
trials related to July 2009 events were reported in the media, meaning 
some trials related to alleged crimes committed in July 2009 could have 
involved state security crimes but were not publicized. It is also 
possible that the number of trials connected in some way to events in 
July 2009 exceeds the number officially categorized as related to the 
July events and publicized as such.
    \39\ See, e.g., CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 168-171; 
CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 2009, 243-248.
    \40\ ``Official: Internet Cut in Xinjiang To Prevent Riot From 
Spreading,'' Xinhua (Online), 7 July 09.
    \41\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Government News 
Office, ``Announcement Concerning Progressive Opening of Related 
Communications Service [Guanyu zhubu kaifang xiangguan tongxin yewu de 
gonggao], 28 December 09, reprinted in Xinhua Bingtuan Net (Online), 29 
December 09.
    \42\ See, e.g., ``Urumqi Tense, Quiet After Violence,'' Radio Free 
Asia (Online), 5 July 09; Cui Jia, ``More Web Sites Back Online in 
Xinjiang,'' China Daily (Online), 8 February 10. For additional 
analysis, see ``Xinjiang Authorities Forcefully Suppress Demonstration, 
Restrict Free Flow of Information,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 4, 2009, 2.
    \43\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
66, entry into force 23 March 76, art. 19.
    \44\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region People's Government News 
Office, ``Announcement Concerning Progressive Opening of Related 
Communications Service [Guanyu zhubu kaifang xiangguan tongxin yewu de 
gonggao], 28 December 09, reprinted in Xinhua Bingtuan Net (Online), 29 
December 09; Cui Jia, ``SMS Returns to Xinjiang,'' China Daily 
(Online), 18 January 10; ``China Lifts Ban on International Calls in 
Xinjiang,'' Agence France-Presse, 20 January 10 (Open Source Center, 20 
January 10); ``Across China: Xinjiang,'' China Daily (Online), 10 
February 10; ``Nur Bekri: All Commercial Web Sites in Xinjiang Already 
Fully Open'' [Nu'er baikeli: xinjiang suoyou shangye wangzhan yi quanbu 
kaifang], Xinhua (Online), 7 March 10.
    \45\ Xinjiang News Office, ``Xinjiang Internet Services Completely 
Resumed on the 14th'' [Xinjiang hulianwang yewu 14 ri quanmian huifu], 
reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 14 May 10.
    \46\ See, e.g., ``Xinjiang Online, Controls Remain,'' Radio Free 
Asia (Online), 19 May 10; Reporters Without Borders (Online), ``Open 
Letter to the [sic] Xinjiang's Party Secretary,'' 20 May 10.
    \47\ ``Xinjiang Strictly Limits Outside Information, Prohibits 
Online Discussion of July 5'' [Xinjiang yankong jingwai xinxi jinzhi 
wangluo tanlun qi wu], Radio Free Asia (Online), 22 June 10; ``Close to 
Riot Anniversary, Heavy Forces in Urumqi `Strike Hard' '' [Linjian 
saoluan zhounian wulumuqi zhongbing ``yanda''], Ming Pao, reprinted in 
Yahoo! (Online), 19 June 10; ``Xinjiang Authorities Prohibit Public 
From Accepting Interviews With Foreign Media Without Authorization'' 
[Xinjiang dangju jinzhi minzhong shanzi jieshou wai mei caifang], Radio 
Free Asia (Online), 15 June 10; China's Far West: Conditions in 
Xinjiang One Year After Demonstrations and Riots, Staff Roundtable of 
the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 19 July 10, Written 
Statement Submitted by Kathleen E. McLaughlin, China Correspondent for 
BNA, Inc., and Freelance Journalist.
    \48\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Informatization Promotion 
Regulation [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu xinxihua cujin tiaoli], issued 25 
September 09, effective 1 December 09, art. 40. See additional analysis 
in ``Xinjiang Government Issues Internet Regulation, Keeps Strict 
Controls on Information,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 3-4.
    \49\ For a comparison of the XUAR regulation to regulations 
elsewhere in China, see ``Xinjiang Government Issues Internet 
Regulation, Keeps Strict Controls on Information,'' CECC China Human 
Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 9 December 09, 3-4.
    \50\ Wen Linuo, `` `Autonomous Region Informatization Promotion 
Regulation (Draft)' Submitted for Deliberation'' [``Zizhiqu xinxihua 
cujin tiaoli (cao'an)'' tijiao shenyi], Xinjiang Metropolitan News, 
reprinted in China Xinjiang (Online), 23 September 09, paraphrasing the 
remarks of XUAR People's Congress Legal Committee Vice Chairman 
Abdurazak Tomur.
    \51\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Informatization Promotion 
Regulation [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu xinxihua cujin tiaoli], issued 25 
September 09, effective 1 December 09, art. 41.
    \52\ Kashgar District Public Security Bureau, Kashgar District 
Procuratorate, Kashgar District Intermediate Court (Online), 
``Announcement Concerning Striking Hard in Accordance With Law Against 
Using the Internet, Cell Phone, Etc. To Carry Out Criminal Activity'' 
[Guanyu yifa yanli daji liyong hulianwang, shouji deng jinxing fanzui 
huodong de tonggao], 10 March 10.
    \53\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Ethnic Unity 
Education [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu minzu tuanjie jiaoyu tiaoli], 
issued 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10. For details on specific 
stipulations related to controls over free expression, see, e.g., 
articles 12, 13, 14, 18, 22, and 23, as well as detailed analysis of 
the regulation in ``Xinjiang `Ethnic Unity' Regulation Imposes Party 
Policy, Restricts Free Expression,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \54\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the 
Comprehensive Management of Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu 
shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili tiaoli], issued 21 January 1994, amended 11 
December 1997, revised 29 December 09, effective 1 February 10, art. 
25. For detailed analysis of the regulation, see ``Revised Social Order 
Regulation in Xinjiang Places New Emphasis on State Security,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 3.
    \55\ ``Firmly Capture the Cultural Battlefield for Socialist 
Thought: Summary of Autonomous Region's 2009 `Sweep Away Pornography 
and Strike Down Illegal Publications' Work'' [Laolao zhanling 
shehuizhuyi sixiang wenhua zhendi zizhiqu 2009 nian ``saohuang dafei'' 
gongzuo zongshu], Tianshan Net (Online), 19 January 10.
    \56\ ``Firmly Capture the Cultural Battlefield for Socialist 
Thought: Summary of Autonomous Region's 2009 `Sweep Away Pornography 
and Strike Down Illegal Publications' Work'' [Laolao zhanling 
shehuizhuyi sixiang wenhua zhendi zizhiqu 2009 nian ``saohuang dafei'' 
gongzuo zongshu], Tianshan Net (Online), 19 January 10.
    \57\ See, e.g., ``Build a Firm Line of Defense Against Separatism 
and Infiltration, Interview With Zhou Huilin, Deputy Director of 
National `Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications' 
Office'' [Gouzhu fan fenlie fan shentou de jiangu fangxian fang quanguo 
``saohuang dafei'' bangongshi fuzhuren zhou huilin], Tianshan Net 
(Online), 16 December 09; ``National `Sweep Away Pornography and Strike 
Down Illegal Publications' `Tianshan Project' Forum Opens in Xinjiang 
[Quanguo ``saohuang dafei'' ``tianshan gongcheng'' zuotanhui zai 
xinjiang zhaokai], China Press and Publications Net, reprinted in 
Liaoning Province Press and Publications Bureau (Online), 25 November 
09.
    \58\ ``Build a Firm Line of Defense Against Separatism and 
Infiltration, Interview With Zhou Huilin, Deputy Director of National 
`Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications' Office'' 
[Gouzhu fan fenlie fan shentou de jiangu fangxian fang quanguo 
``saohuang dafei'' bangongshi fuzhuren zhou huilin], Tianshan Net 
(Online), 16 December 09.
    \59\ ``Two Held for Leaks,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 23 September 
09; ``Standoff Over Death in Custody,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 
September 09.
    \60\ Amnesty International (Online), ``UA 252/09 Risk of Torture. 
China: Haji Memet (m), Abdusalam Nasir (m),'' 25 September 09.
    \61\ ``Uyghur Held in Leak Case,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 
June 10. Based on information reported in the article, the current 
status of Haji Memet appears unclear.
    \62\ See, e.g., Alexa Olesen, ``China Sentences Uighur Writer to 15 
Years in Jail,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington Post 
(Online), 23 July 10; ``Uyghur Journalist Gets 15 Years,'' Radio Free 
Asia (Online), 22 July 10. For information on the charge against him, 
see ``Many Scholars Make Appeal: Release Xinjiang Reporter, Respect 
Freedom of Speech'' [Zhong xuezhe huyu: shifang xinjiang jizhe zunzhong 
yanlun ziyou], Chinese Human Rights Defenders, reprinted in Boxun 
(Online), 30 July 10.
    \63\ ``Uyghur Webmasters Sentenced,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 28 
July 10; Uyghur American Association (Online), ``Uyghur American 
Association Strongly Condemns the Sentencing of Three Uyghur 
Webmasters,'' 29 July 10; Andrew Jacobs, ``China Imprisons 3 Men Who 
Maintained Uighur Web Sites,'' New York Times (Online), 30 July 10.
    \64\ Andrew Jacobs, ``China Imprisons 3 Men Who Maintained Uighur 
Web Sites,'' New York Times (Online), 30 July 10.
    \65\ Uyghur American Association (Online), ``Uyghur American 
Association Strongly Condemns the Sentencing of Three Uyghur 
Webmasters,'' 29 July 10. The Uyghur American Association article notes 
that the precise dates Nijat Azat and Nureli were taken into detention 
are not known. Unidentified men took Dilshat Perhat from his home on 
August 7, 2009. In addition, authorities previously had detained 
Dilshat Perhat from July 24 until August 2 to interrogate him about 
events on July 5. Amnesty International (Online), ``Manchester Student 
Appeals for Brother's Release From Detention in China,'' 22 October 09; 
``Call for Uyghurs' Release,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 December 
09.
    \66\ ``Call for Uyghurs' Release,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 15 
December 09; ``Founders of Uyghur Web Sites Such as Diyarim and Selkin 
Are Being Detained in `Black Jails' (1)'' [Diyarim we selkin qatarliq 
uyghur tor betlirining qurghuchiliri `qara turmiler'de tutup turulmaqta 
(1)], Radio Free Asia (Online), 10 December 09; ``Founders of Uyghur 
Web Sites Such as Diyarim and Selkin Are Being Detained in `Black 
Jails' (2)'' [Diyarim we selkin qatarliq uyghur tor betlirining 
qurghuchiliri `qara turmiler'de tutup turulmaqta (2)], Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 11 December 09.
    \67\ Alexa Olesen, ``Chinese Economist Missing, Apparently 
Detained,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Guardian (Online), 9 July 
09.
    \68\ Amnesty International (Online), `` `Justice, Justice': The 
July 2009 Protests in Xinjiang, China,'' 2 July 10, 25; ``Uyghur Web 
Moderators Get Life,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 8 August 10; Uyghur 
Human Rights Project (Online), ``Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices From the 
2009 Unrest in Urumqi,'' 1 July 10, 16.
    \69\ Xinjiang Public Security Department Information Office, 
``Those Who Fabricate and Spread Harmful Information Will Be Severely 
Punished in Accordance With Law'' [Bianzao chuanbo youhai xinxizhe 
jiang yifa yancheng], reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 26 January 10; Li 
Qin, ``Public Security Organs at All Levels in Xinjiang Strike Hard 
Against Cases of Fabricating and Intentionally Spreading Harmful 
Information'' [Xinjiang geji gongan jiguan yanli daji bianzao guyi 
chuanbo youhai xinxi anjian], Tianshan Net (Online), 7 February 10; 
``Xinjiang Investigates and Handles Over 100 Cases of Fabricating and 
Spreading Harmful Information'' [Xinjiang chachu bai yu qi bianzao 
chuanbo youhai xinxi an], Tianshan Net, reprinted in Xinhua Bingtuan 
Net (Online), 25 February 10.
    \70\ ``Creating and Spreading Rumors, Harming Public Rights and 
Interests Will Receive Legal Punishment'' [Zaoyao chuanyao weihai 
gongmin quanyi yao shou falu chengchu], Xinjiang Legal Daily (Online), 
19 May 10.
    \71\ For comprehensive reporting on the Forum, see, e.g., Zou 
Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ``The CPC Central Committee and State Council 
Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important 
Speeches; Zhou Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia 
Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and He Guoqiang Attend 
the Conference,'' Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 23 May 10). 
For information on past development efforts, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 
Annual Report, 10 October 09, 263-264.
    \72\ Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ``The CPC Central Committee and 
State Council Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give 
Important Speeches; Zhou Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu 
Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and He 
Guoqiang Attend the Conference,'' Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source 
Center, 23 May 10). See also Cui Jia and Zhu Zhe, ``Xinjiang Support 
Package Unveiled,'' China Daily (Online), 21 May 10.
    \73\ See, e.g., Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ``The CPC Central 
Committee and State Council Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, 
Wen Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Zhou Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up 
Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, 
and He Guoqiang Attend the Conference,'' Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source 
Center, 23 May 10).
    \74\ Wang Jing, ``Natural Resource Tax Reformed, Xinjiang Precedes 
Others'' [Ziyuan shui gaige xinjiang xianxing], Caixin (Online), 21 May 
10.
    \75\ See, e.g., Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, ``The CPC Central 
Committee and State Council Hold Xinjiang Work Conference; Hu Jintao, 
Wen Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Zhou Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up 
Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, 
and He Guoqiang Attend the Conference,'' Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source 
Center, 23 May 10). See also Cui Jia and Zhu Zhe, ``Xinjiang Support 
Package Unveiled,'' China Daily (Online), 21 May 10.
    \76\ Cui Jia and Zhu Zhe, ``Xinjiang Support Package Unveiled,'' 
China Daily (Online), 21 May 10. See also Zou Shengwen and Gu Ruizhen, 
``The CPC Central Committee and State Council Hold Xinjiang Work 
Conference; Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao Give Important Speeches; Zhou 
Yongkang Gives a Summing-Up Speech; Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Li 
Changchun, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, and He Guoqiang Attend the 
Conference,'' Xinhua, 20 May 10 (Open Source Center, 23 May 10).
    \77\ Ibid. For more information on the population make-up in the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, see Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps (Online), ``Inquiry into Issues Regarding 
Development of Bingtuan Units With Ethnic Minority Inhabitants, Against 
a Background of Economic Assimilation'' [Jingji ronghe beijing xia 
bingtuan shaoshu minzu juju danwei fazhan de xiangguan wenti tantao], 
20 April 10; State Council Information Office, White Paper on the 
History and Development of Xinjiang, May 2003.
    \78\ Cui Jia, ``New Measures To Boost Xinjiang Livelihoods,'' China 
Daily (Online), 28 May 10. See Language Policy and Bilingual Education 
in this section for more information on bilingual education.
    \79\ ``Zhang Chunxian: Focus on Grasping 7 Aspects of Work To 
Extend to Xinjiang People'' [Zhang chunxian: zhongdian zhuahao qi 
fangmian gongzuo huiji xinjiang renmin], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 28 
May 10.
    \80\ For examples of the Mandarin focus of bilingual education in 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, see, e.g., Shen Yaping and Duan 
Zhu, ``Results of Xinjiang's Promotion of `Bilingual Education' 
Remarkable'' [Xinjiang tuijin ``shuangyu jiaoxue'' chengxiao xianzhu], 
Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Tianshan Net (Online), 7 December 05; Cui 
Jia, ``Mandarin Lessons in Xinjiang `Help Fight Terrorism,' '' China 
Daily (Online), 4 June 09; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Ethnic 
Affairs Commission, ``This Fall Ethnic Minority Language-Track Middle 
Schools in Urumchi, Xinjiang, Try `Bilingual' Education'' [Jin qiu 
xinjiang wulumuqishi minyuxi chuzhong changshi ``shuangyu'' jiaoxue], 
reprinted in State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Online), 9 May 08.
    \81\ Li Dehua and Yan Wenlu, ``Xinjiang's Ethnic Minority Students 
To Master Putonghua by 2020'' [2020 nian xinjiang shaoshu minzu 
xuesheng ke tong guoyu], China News Service, reprinted in China 
Xinjiang (Online), 28 May 10.
    \82\ See, e.g., PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 
April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, art. 4, and PRC 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 31 May 84, effective 1 
October 84, amended 28 February 01, arts. 10, 37. 2005 Implementing 
Provisions for the REAL affirm the freedom to use and develop minority 
languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin by promoting 
bilingual education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council 
Provisions on Implementing the ``PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law'' 
[Guowuyuan shishi ``zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa'' 
ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art. 22.
    \83\ Jing Bo, ``750,000 Ethnic Minority Students in Xinjiang 
Receive `Bilingual' Education'' [Xinjiang 75 wan shaoshu minzu xuesheng 
jieshou ``shuangyu'' jiaoxue], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua 
(Online), 12 January 10.
    \84\ Ibid.
    \85\ ``China To Invest Over 5 Billion To Strengthen Xinjiang 
`Bilingual' Education'' [Zhongguo jiang touzi yu 50 yi jiaqiang 
xinjiang ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu], China News Service, reprinted in NetEase 
(Online), 3 December 09; ``Xinjiang Universalizes Ethnic Minority 
Preschool Two-Year `Bilingual' Education by 2012'' [2012 Xinjiang puji 
shaoshu minzu xueqian liangnian ``shuangyu'' jiaoyu], Tianshan Net 
(Online), 12 January 10. See also ``Xinjiang's Ethnic Minority Students 
To Master Putonghua by 2020'' [2020 nian xinjiang shaoshu minzu 
xuesheng ke tong guoyu], China News Service, reprinted in China 
Xinjiang (Online), 28 May 10.
    \86\ See citations that follow, as well as, e.g., ``Education 
Department 2010 Education Work Meeting Puts Forth New Multipronged 
Policy'' [Jiaoyuting 2010 nian jiaoyu gongzuo huiyi chutai duoxiang 
xinzheng], Xinjiang Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 2 
February 10.
    \87\ CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 259; Xinjiang 
Education Department, Circular Concerning Organization and 
Implementation of 2008 Fall Quarter Secondary and Elementary Ethnic 
Minority `Bilingual' Teacher Training Project [Guanyu zuzhi shishi 2008 
nian qiuji xinjiang zhong xiaoxue shaoshu minzu ``shuangyu'' jiaoshi 
peixun gongcheng de tongzhi], issued 5 June 08.
    \88\ Zhang Xinjun, ``Xinjiang Implements Free Education for 
Students at Teachers Colleges, This Year Plans To Recruit 6000'' 
[Xinjiang shishi mianfei shifansheng jiaoyu jinnian jihua zhaosheng 
6000 ming], Tianshan Net, reprinted in Xinjiang News Service (Online), 
3 March 10.
    \89\ Du Guanrui, ``Xinjiang To Recruit 66,000 in 2010 College 
Entrance Exams'' [Xinjiang 2010 nian gaokao zhaosheng 6.6 wan], 
Xinjiang Metropolitan Daily, reprinted in Xinjiang News Service 
(Online), 3 March 03.
    \90\ ``Xinjiang Government Job Candidates Required To Be 
Bilingual,'' Xinhua (Online), 30 April 10; Li Minyan, ``Xinjiang 
Government Employees Pass Through Bilingual Barrier Before Taking Up 
Posts'' [Xinjiang gongwuyuan shanggang xian guo shuangyu guan], 
Xinjiang Metropolitan News, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 28 April 10.
    \91\ See, e.g., ``Autonomous Region's First Term of `Bilingual' 
Capacity Strengthening Class Concludes'' [Zizhiqu shou qi ``shuangyu'' 
nengli qianghua ban jieye], Xinjiang Daily (Online), 17 July 10; 
Kashgar District Government (Online), ``Shufu County Carries Out 
`Bilingual Exam' for Township and Town Cadres'' [Shufu xian dui 
xiangzhen ganbu ``shuangyu'' jinxing kaohe], 12 July 10.
    \92\ ``National Population and Family Planning Commission Starts 
Series of Operations To Support Xinjiang'' [Guojia renkou jishengwei 
qidong zhiyuan xinjiang xilie xingdong], China Population News, 
reprinted in National Population and Family Planning Commission 
(Online), 3 November 09. For additional analysis, see ``Authorities 
Begin New Incentive Initiative To Continue Population Control in 
Xinjiang,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 
January 10, 2.
    \93\ ``State Supports 26 Xinjiang Counties in Starting `Family 
Planning Special Rewards Policy' '' [Guojia fuchi xinjiang 26 ge xian 
qidong ``jihua shengyu teshu jiangli zhengce''], Xinhua (Online), 2 
November 09. For additional analysis, see ``Authorities Begin New 
Incentive Initiative To Continue Population Control in Xinjiang,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 1, 8 January 10, 2.
    \94\ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on Population and 
Family Planning [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu renkou yu jihua shengyu 
tiaoli], issued 28 November 02, effective 1 January 03, amended 26 
November 04 and 25 May 06, art. 15.
    \95\ Fang Yunjing and Gao Cong, ``Nuerlan Abudumanjin Calls for 
Tighter Control on Population Growth, Sense of Urgency About Growth 
Which Is Too Fast," Xinjiang Daily, 20 March 10 (Open Source Center, 23 
April 10).
    \96\ See, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 2009, 262; 
``Xinjiang Focuses on Reducing Births in Minority Areas To Curb 
Population Growth,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
April 2006, 15-16.
    \97\ See Population Planning Policies in this section for more 
information.
    \98\ ``Uyghur Grandfather Detained,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 30 
October 09; ``Arzigul Tursun's Dad, Tursunjan Hesen, Is Arrested'' 
[Arzigul tursunning dadisi tursunjan hesen qolgha elinghan], Radio Free 
Asia (Online), 29 October 09. For more information on Arzigul Tursun, 
see ``Authorities Cancel Plans To Subject Uyghur Woman to Forced 
Abortion (Update),'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
November 2008, 3; ``New Son for Uyghur Woman,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 13 February 09.
    \99\ ``Arzigul Tursun's Dad, Tursunjan Hesen, Is Arrested'' 
[Arzigul tursunning dadisi tursunjan hesen qolgha elinghan], Radio Free 
Asia (Online), 29 October 09; ``Uyghur Grandfather Detained,'' Radio 
Free Asia (Online), 30 October 09.
    \100\ Kelly Chan, ``Urumqi Acts Against Migrants,'' South China 
Morning Post, 10 August 09 (Open Source Center, 10 August 09); 
``Xinjiang To Clean Up and Reorganize Disorderly Flow of Floating 
Population'' [Xinjiang jiang qingli zhengdun liudong renkou wuxu 
liudong], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 9 August 09.
    \101\ ``Xinjiang To Clean Up and Reorganize Disorderly Flow of 
Floating Population'' [Xinjiang jiang qingli zhengdun liudong renkou 
wuxu liudong], Xinhua, reprinted in People's Daily (Online), 9 August 
09.
    \102\ ``Shuimogou District, Urumqi, Implements Three Grades of 
Control on Housing Rentals'' [Wulumuqi shi shui qu fangwu chuzu shixing 
sanji guanli], Xinhua (Online), 2 December 09.
    \103\ See generally Urumqi Municipality Regulation on the 
Management of Room Rentals [Wulumuqi shi fangwu zulin guanli tiaoli], 
adopted 23 April 10, issued 10 June 10, effective 1 July 10.
    \104\ ``Urumqi Puts Forth Regulation To Standardize Management of 
Rental Housing'' [Wulumuqi chutai fagui guifan fangwu zulin guanli], 
Tianshan Net (Online), 26 April 10.
    \105\ Compare the most recent version of the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region Regulation on the Comprehensive Management of Social 
Order [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili tiaoli], 
issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97 and 29 December 09, 
effective 1 February 10, arts. 5(7), 14, 19, 36 to the 1997 version of 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on the Comprehensive 
Management of Social Order [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu shehui zhi'an 
zonghe zhili tiaoli], issued 21 January 94, amended 11 December 97, 
effective 11 December 97, art. 29. For a comparison between the XUAR 
regulation and other provincial-level regulations, see ``Revised 
Regulation From Xinjiang Places New Emphasis on State Security,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \106\ ``Slum, Shanty Towns To Be Removed From Urumqi,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 11 July 10.
    \107\ ``Heijiashan, Urumqi, Realizes Total Coverage in Management 
of Floating Population'' [Wulumuqi heijiashan shixian quan fugai guanli 
liudong renkou], Tianshan Net (Online), 6 July 10; Mao Yong, 
``Rectification Activities in Areas Heavily Hit in Urumqi `7-5' 
Incident, Over 900 `Uninvited Tenants' Advised To Leave'' [Wu shi `7-5' 
shijian zhong zaiqu zhengzhi quan li 900 yu ming `busu fangke'], Xinhua 
(Online), 23 November 09.
    \108\ ``Slum, Shanty Towns To Be Removed From Urumqi,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 11 July 10.
    \109\ Autonomous Region Party Committee, Autonomous Region People's 
Government Opinion Concerning Employment Promotion Work [Zizhiqu 
dangwei, zizhiqu renmin zhengfu guanyu cujin jiuye gongzuo de yijian], 
issued 11 September 09, art. 2(2).
    \110\ Ibid.
    \111\ Ibid., art. 1(5).
    \112\ National Bureau of Statistics of China (Online), ``Communique 
of Main Data for Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region From 2005 National 1 
Percent Population Sampling'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu 2005 nian 
quanguo 1% renkou chouyang diaocha zhuyao shuju gongbao], 20 March 06.
    \113\ Autonomous Region Party Committee, Autonomous Region People's 
Government Opinion Concerning Employment Promotion Work [Zizhiqu 
dangwei, zizhiqu renmin zhengfu guanyu cujin jiuye gongzuo de yijian], 
issued 11 September 09, art. 2(2). See also descriptions of the opinion 
in, e.g., Zhang Xinyu and Liu Yuexian, `` `Autonomous Region Party 
Committee, People's Government Opinion Concerning Employment Promotion 
Work' Put Into Effect in October'' [``Zizhiqu dangwei, renmin zhengfu 
guanyu cujin jiuye gongzuo de yijian'' 10 yue shishi], Xinjiang Daily, 
reprinted in Xinjiang Economic Net (Online), 24 September 09; ``China's 
Xinjiang Orders Businesses To Recruit More Locals,'' Xinhua, reprinted 
in People's Daily (Online), 24 September 09.
    \114\ See references to adhering to the opinion, which do not 
include reference to taking steps to promote hiring of ethnic 
minorities, at, e.g., ``Baicheng County Vigorously Implements Activity 
for `Year for All the People To Undertake Pioneering Work' '' [Baicheng 
xian dali shishi ``quanmin chuangye nian'' huodong], Tianshan Net 
(Online), 23 February 10; ``Xinjiang's Kashgar District Urgently 
Requires 50,000 Construction Workers From Interior This Year'' 
[Xinjiang kashi diqu jinnian jixu neidi wu wan ming jianzhu gongren], 
China News Service, reprinted in Xinjiang News Service (Online), 8 
March 10.
    \115\ See, e.g., Bingtuan Personnel Testing Authority, 
``Introduction to General Situation for 2010 Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps Public Recruitment of Civil Servants'' [2010 nian 
bingtuan mianxiang shehui zhaolu gongwuyuan zongti qingkuang jieshao], 
reprinted in Huatu Education (Online), 15 May 10; Xinjiang PetroChina 
Pipe Engineering Co., Ltd., ``Ordinary Workers, Description and 
Qualifications for Positions'' [Pugong zhiwei miaoshu ji yaoqiu], 
Internet Recruiting Association (Online), 11 August 10. Also see 
analysis in ``Discriminatory Job Hiring Practices Continue in 
Xinjiang,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 8, 2010 
(forthcoming). For reports from past years, see, e.g., CECC, 2007 
Annual Report, 10 October 07, 107; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 
09, 264.
    \116\ See analysis in ``Discriminatory Job Hiring Practices 
Continue in Xinjiang,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
No. 8, 2010 (forthcoming). See also Bingtuan Personnel Testing 
Authority, ``Introduction to General Situation for 2010 Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps Public Recruitment of Civil 
Servants'' [2010 nian bingtuan mianxiang shehui zhaolu gongwuyuan 
zongti qingkuang jieshao], reprinted in Huatu Education (Online), 15 
May 10.
    \117\ For detailed information on the program and reports from 
previous years on the use of coercion to gain participation and on 
exploitative working conditions, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 
October 09, 264-266. For a report from the past year, see Choi Chi-Yuk 
and Ng Tze-Wei, ``Broken Promises, Broken Dreams for Migrant Workers in 
Guangdong,'' South China Morning Post, 30 December 09 (Open Source 
Center, 30 December 09). For information on the program as described in 
official Chinese sources, see, e.g., State Council Information Office, 
White Paper on Development and Progress in Xinjiang, 21 September 09; 
``Urumqi July 5 Incident Will Not Influence Xinjiang's Labor Export 
Policy'' [Wulumuqi ``7-5'' shijian buyingxiang xinjiang laowu shuchu 
zhengce], China News Service (Online), 10 July 09.
    \118\ See, e.g., A.S. Bhalla and Shufang Qiu, Poverty and 
Inequality Among Chinese Minorities (London: Routledge, 2006), 139; 
James A. Millward, ``Introduction: Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence Mark 
a Turning Point? '' 28 Central Asian Survey No. 4, 347, 349 (2009).
    \119\ ``Nu'er Bekri Refutes the Allegation That Women of Uyghur 
Ethnic Group `Are Forced To Work in the Interior of the Country,' '' 
Xinhua, 18 July 09 (Open Source Center, 20 July 09).
    \120\ A description of the Guangdong program as government 
sponsored is in Liang Qiwen, ``Rape Rumor Led to Brawl, 2 Killed,'' 
China Daily (Online), 30 June 09. For additional information, see 
``Xinjiang Authorities Forcefully Suppress Demonstration, Restrict Free 
Flow of Information,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
No. 4, 2009, 2.
    \121\ ``Urumqi `7-5' Incident Will Not Influence Xinjiang's Labor 
Export Policy'' [Wulumuqi ``7-5'' shijian buyingxiang xinjiang laowu 
shuchu zhengce], China News Service (Online), 10 July 09; ``Resolutely 
Drive Ahead With Projects for the People's Livelihood for On-the-Spot 
Labor Transfers and Employment in the Interior'' [Jiandingbuyi tuijin 
jiudi zhuanyi he neidi jiuye zhe xiang minsheng gongsheng], Xinjiang 
Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 30 July 09.
    \122\ ``Isolated Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Rural Workers March 
Toward Openness'' [Xinjiang shaoshu minzu nongmin'gong cong fengbi 
maixiang kaifang], Xinhua, reprinted in China Ethnicities News 
(Online), 25 January 10.
    \123\ ``Urumqi `7-5' Incident Will Not Influence Xinjiang's Labor 
Export Policy'' [Wulumuqi ``7-5'' shijian buyingxiang xinjiang laowu 
shuchu zhengce], China News Service (Online), 10 July 09.
    \124\ The XUAR Human Resources and Social Security Department 
replaced the XUAR Labor and Social Security Department. ``Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region Human Resources and Social Security Department 
Hangs Out Its Shingle'' [Xinjiang weiwu'er zizhiqu renli ziyuan he 
shehui baozhang ting guapai], Tianshan Net (Online), 23 June 09.
    \125\ ``Isolated Xinjiang Ethnic Minority Rural Workers March 
Toward Openness'' [Xinjiang shaoshu minzu nongmingong cong fengbi 
maixiang kaifang], Xinhua, reprinted in China Ethnicities News 
(Online), 25 January 10.
    \126\ Liu Shihe, ``Qaba County: Earned Income From Transfer of 
Surplus Woman Labor Force Exceeds Ten Million Yuan'' [Habahe xian: funu 
fuyu laodongli zhuanyi chuangshou chao qianwan yuan], Xinhua (Online), 
19 November 09.
    \127\ Zhao Jun, ``69 Girls From Peyziwat Go to Zhejiang To Work'' 
[Jiashi 69 ming guniang fu zhejiang wugong], Tianshan Net, reprinted in 
China Xinjiang (Online), 31 January 10.
    \128\ For general developments from the past year and background on 
the project, see ``Chinese Media Reports on Continued Demolition in 
Kashgar, Resettlement Numbers Vary,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 3, and ``Demolition of Kashgar's 
Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population 
Resettlement,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 
2009, 2.
    \129\ Abulimiti Suopiaji, ``Reconstruction of Kashgar's Old City 
Achieves Zero Petitions to Higher Authorities'' [Kashi shi laocheng qu 
gaizao shixian ling shangfang], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua 
(Online), 4 March 10. For analysis of this development, see ``Kashgar 
Authorities Announce `Zero Tolerance' for Petitioning Higher Level 
Authorities About Old City Demolition,'' CECC China Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, No. 4, 21 April 10, 2.
    \130\ Abulimiti Suopiaji, ``Reconstruction of Kashgar's Old City 
Achieves Zero Petitions to Higher Authorities'' [Kashi shi laocheng qu 
gaizao shixian ling shangfang], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua 
(Online), 4 March 10.
    \131\ Ibid.
    \132\ Zhu Mingjun, ``Kashgar Makes Files of Historic Architecture, 
Excavates and Protects Traditional Local Cultural Buildings'' [Kashi 
shi wei lishi jianzhu jiandang wajue baohu chuantong wenhua de minjian 
jianzhu], Xinjiang Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 1 November 09.
    \133\ See, e.g., Kashgar District Government (Online), ``District 
Launches Meeting To Report on the Comprehensive Administration of 
Kashgar Old City'' [Diqu zhaokai kashi shi laocheng qu zonghe zhili 
xiangmu huibaohui], 13 August 09; Michael Wines, ``To Protect an 
Ancient City, China Moves To Raze It,'' New York Times (Online), 27 May 
09. See analysis in ``Demolition of Kashgar's Old City Draws Concerns 
Over Cultural Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement,'' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 2009, 2.
    \134\ For assessments of the area's cultural heritage, see, e.g., 
``Demolition of Kashgar's Old City Draws Concerns Over Cultural 
Heritage Protection, Population Resettlement,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 2009, 2. For information on subsequent 
demolitions of historic property, see ``Xanliq Madrassa--Level-One 
Protected Cultural Relic in Kashgar--Is Destroyed'' [Qeshqerde 1-
derijilik qoghdilidighan medeniy yadikarliq--xanliq medrisi 
cheqiwetildi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 17 June 09; Ng Tze-wei, 
``Uygurs Decry `Reconstruction Project' Set To Change the Face of Old 
Town in Kashgar,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 30 December 09.
    \135\ See, e.g., ``Kashgar, Xinjiang, Old City Reconstruction 
Completely Conforms to International Practice'' [Xinjiang kashi 
laocheng qu gaizao wanquan fuhe guoji guanli], China News Service, 
reprinted in Xinjiang News Service (Online), 8 March 10; Kathleen E. 
McLaughlin, ``Unesco, China and a Uighur Mystery,'' Global Post 
(Online), 13 January 10.
    \136\ Kathleen E. McLaughlin, ``Unesco, China and a Uighur 
Mystery,'' Global Post (Online), 13 January 10.
    \137\ See past examples in CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 
176; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 261-262. See also cases 
cited in Amnesty International (Online), ``Open Letter on Uighur Asylum 
Seekers in Cambodia,'' 16 December 09.
    \138\ See, e.g., Sebastian Strangio, ``Uighurs' Fate Seen as Stain 
on Kingdom,'' Phnom Penh Post (Online), 21 December 09 (reporting three 
children among those deported, ages not provided); World Uyghur 
Congress (Online), ``World Uyghur Congress `Outraged' by Cambodia's 
Return of Uyghurs to China,'' 22 December 09 (noting the group included 
a one-year-old infant and a six-month-old infant); Frank Brennan, 
``Uighurs Failed by Cambodia's Sham Refugee Law,'' Eureka Street 
(Online), 3 March 10 (citing information from the Jesuit Refugee 
Service, which assisted the Uyghurs in Cambodia, and noting that two 
infants were in the group).
    \139\ In condemning the deportation of the group, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted that the 
deportation violated the principle of non-refoulement, which applies to 
refugees and asylum seekers, and breaches refugee law for returning the 
group before the UNHCR had made a refugee status determination. ``UN 
Refugee Agency Deplores Forced Return of Uighur Asylum-Seekers From 
Cambodia,'' UN News Centre (Online), 21 December 09. On the principle 
of non-refoulement, see Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
adopted 28 July 51 by the United Nations Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons 
convened under UN General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 
50, art. 33(1). In addition, under the Convention Against Torture, ``No 
State Party shall expel, return (`refouler') or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.'' Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted by UN General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 84, 
entry into force 26 June 87, art. 3(1). UN Special Rapporteur Manfred 
Nowak described the deportation as a violation of the Convention 
against Torture. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(Online), ``UN Expert on Torture Seriously Concerned About Forcible 
Return of Ethnic Uyghurs From Cambodia to China,'' 22 December 09.
    \140\ Sebastian Strangio, ``Uighurs' Fate Seen as Stain on 
Kingdom,'' Phnom Penh Post (Online), 21 December 09; John Pomfret, 
``Uighur Protesters Land in Cambodia,'' Washington Post (Online), 3 
December 09; ``Deported Uyghur Had Cambodian Visa,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 23 December 09.
    \141\ ``PRC FM Spokesman Warns Against UN `Haven' for Criminal 
Uyghurs in Cambodia,'' Agence France-Presse, 15 December 09 (Open 
Source Center, 15 December 09).
    \142\ See, e.g., ``UN Refugee Agency Deplores Forced Return of 
Uighur Asylum-Seekers From Cambodia,'' UN News Centre (Online), 21 
December 09; Sebastian Strangio, ``Uighurs' Fate Seen as Stain on 
Kingdom,'' Phnom Penh Post (Online), 21 December 09.
    \143\ Seth Mydans, ``After Expelling Uighurs, Cambodia Approves 
Chinese Investments,'' New York Times (Online), 21 December 09.
    \144\ ``China Says Handling With [sic] Citizens Deported From 
Cambodia Its Own Affair,'' Xinhua (Online), 22 December 09.
    \145\ Zhou Yingfeng and Cui Qingxin, ``Our Country Busts Major 
Terrorist Group Case, Details on Public Security Bureau Announcement'' 
[Woguo pohuo zhongda kongbu zuzhi an gong'anbu gongbu xiangqing], 
Xinhua (Online), 24 June 10.
    \146\ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Online), ``The 
Exclusion Clauses: Guidelines on their Application,'' December 1996, 
II(i)(10). See also Monette Zard, ``Exclusion, Terrorism and the 
Refugee Convention,'' Forced Migration Review (Online), June 2002.
    \147\ ``Uyghur Asylum Bid in Cambodia,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
3 December 09.

    Notes to Section V--Tibet
    \1\ For more information on Chinese Government plans, see CECC, 
Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 39-51.
    \2\ See, e.g., ``Chinese Vice Premier Urges U.S. To Respect China's 
Core Interests,'' Xinhua (Online), 15 March 10; Zhang Shuo, ``Exclusive 
Interview With China's Former Diplomat on Three Questions in China-US 
Relations,'' Xinhua, 9 March 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 9 
March 10); Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ``Transcript of Regular News 
Conference by PRC Foreign Ministry on 23 February 2010, Moderated by 
Spokesman Qin Gang,'' 23 February 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 
23 February 10). See also CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 
22 October 09, 5-8.
    \3\ Zhang Shuo, ``Exclusive Interview With China's Former Diplomat 
on Three Questions in China-US Relations,'' Xinhua, 9 March 10 
(translated in Open Source Center, 9 March 10) (``The US side should 
particularly handle the Taiwan and Tibet issues appropriately . . . 
stop doing anything that harms China's core interests and major 
interests . . . .''); ``China Expects Positive Results From Obama's 
Visit,'' Xinhua (Online), 10 November 09 (``In response to questions 
concerning Taiwan and Tibet, Qin . . . [said] the two countries should 
respect each other's core interests and concerns.''); Prepared 
Statement of Dai Bingguo, State Councilor of the People's Republic of 
China, ``Address at the Dinner Marking the 30th Anniversary of the 
Establishment of China-US Diplomatic Relations Hosted by the Brookings 
Institution,'' reprinted in The Brookings Institution (Online), 11 
December 08 (``Taiwan and Tibet-related issues concern China's core 
interests.'').
    \4\ ``Policy on Tibet Is Consistent,'' China Daily (Online), 17 
October 09 (United Front Work Department Executive Deputy Head Zhu 
Weiqun stated, ``However, the so-called `middle line' is still in 
nature `Tibet independence.' ''); ``Claiming `Fear in Tibet', Dalai 
Lama Tells Lies Again,'' People's Daily, reprinted in China Tibet 
(Online), 6 November 09 (``50 years have passed since the 14th Dalai 
Lama fled abroad. During that period, the Dalai Lama claimed himself to 
be a `religious leader,' but engaged himself in many political events 
aiming at splitting China and disrupting the development of Tibet.''); 
``China Urges U.S. To Respect Its Stance on Tibet,'' Xinhua (Online), 
12 November 09 (``[Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang] characterized 
the Dalai Lama as `the ringleader of feudal serf system,' saying his 
acts separated the motherland and breached the country's unity and 
territorial integrity.'').
    \5\ ``China Urges U.S. To Respect Its Stance on Tibet,'' Xinhua 
(Online), 12 November 09 (Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang: ``China 
is firmly opposed to the Dalai Lama's acts in international arena and 
opposed to any contact between the Dalai Lama and leading officials of 
foreign governments in whatever name or capacity.''); Wang Wei and Ge 
Xiangwen, ``Obama's Upcoming Visit to China Will Promote the 
Development of China-US Relations in the New Period--Exclusive 
Interview With Chinese Ambassador to the United States Zhou Wenzhong,'' 
Xinhua, 8 November 09 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 November 09) 
(Zhou Wenzhong [implied reference to the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan 
and Uyghur entities]: ``The Chinese side also hopes that the US side 
will fulfill its commitment with actual deeds on not providing any 
support or convenience for anti-Chinese separatist forces.''); ``China 
Urges U.S. To Respect Its Stance on Tibet,'' Xinhua (Online), 12 
November 09 (``[Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang] characterized the 
Dalai Lama as `the ringleader of feudal serf system,' saying his acts 
separated the motherland and breached the country's unity and 
territorial integrity.'').
    \6\ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Online), 
``Statement From the Press Secretary on the President's Meeting With 
His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama,'' 18 February 10.
    \7\ See, e.g., ``China Urges U.S. To Respect Its Stance on Tibet,'' 
Xinhua (Online), 12 November 09 (Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang: 
``China is firmly opposed to the Dalai Lama's acts in international 
arena and opposed to any contact between the Dalai Lama and leading 
officials of foreign governments in whatever name or capacity.''); ``If 
the United States Challenges China's Core Interests, It Will Pay a 
Heavy Price,'' Hong Kong China News Agency, 7 January 10 (translated in 
Open Source Center, 10 January 10) (``But viewing from the current 
China-US relations, the US Government has acted willfully regardless of 
China's interests. The United States may pay a heavy price for this, 
heavier than any time in the past.''); ``China-U.S. Relationship Enters 
`Dalai Round,' '' People's Daily, reprinted in China Tibet Online 
(Online), 5 February 10 (``The China-U.S. relationship has undergone 
drastic changes within a period of only 1 month in early 2010. The 
Dalai Lama, who is just like an old drum that has nearly been cracked 
by the west and China, is likely to bring this round of the China-U.S. 
conflict to a climax.'').
    \8\ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Online), 
``Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs,'' 6 October 09.
    \9\ ``Factbox: Obama Has Busy Itinerary on Whirlwind Asian Tour,'' 
Reuters (Online), 12 November 09.
    \10\ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Online), 
``Briefing by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs and CEA Chair 
Christina Romer, 2/11/10,'' 11 February 10.
    \11\ See, e.g., ``What's the Purpose of Dalai Lama's Incitement/ '' 
People's Daily, reprinted in China Tibet Online (Online), 5 November 09 
(``Recently, the Dalai Lama is going through a dramatically tough time 
in the international arena. He has been given the silent treatment, 
even U.S. President Barack Obama had quietly refused to meet him.''); 
``Wen Wei Po: Why `Dalai Card' Depreciated,'' People's Daily, reprinted 
in China Tibet Online (Online), 5 November 09 (``Certainly, the White 
House couldn't admit the open secret that President Obama bent to 
China's pressure, and said Obama hadn't refused to meet with the Dalai 
Lama and would do that later.'').
    \12\ See, e.g., ``Transcript of Regular News Conference by PRC 
Foreign Ministry on 27 March 2008, Moderated by Spokesman Qin Gang,'' 
Xinhua, 27 March 08 (translated in Open Source Center, 27 March 08) 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Qin Gang: ``Tibet affairs are 
China's internal affairs.'' Qin also said, ``I would like to point out 
here that the Tibet issue falls entirely within China's internal 
affairs and brooks no interference by foreign countries.'').
    \13\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10); ``Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010-2020 `Tibet 
Work' Priorities at `Fifth Forum,' '' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \14\ ``Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for 
Governing Tibet,'' Xinhua, 10 January 10 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 10 January 10); ``Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010-2020 
`Tibet Work' Priorities at `Fifth Forum,' '' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \15\ ``CPC Central Committee Political Bureau Convenes Meeting To 
Study, Promote Work on Tibet's Development by Leaps and Bounds and 
Long-Term Order and Stability,'' Xinhua, 8 January 10 (translated in 
Open Source Center, 8 January 10).
    \16\ ``Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for 
Governing Tibet,'' Xinhua, 10 January 10 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 10 January 10); ``Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010-2020 
`Tibet Work' Priorities at `Fifth Forum,' '' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \17\ ``Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for 
Governing Tibet,'' Xinhua, 10 January 10 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 10 January 10). CECC staff have determined that the phrase 
``Tibetan traits'' is more suitable than ``Tibetan characters'' as 
provided in the OSC translation. ``Hu Calls for Great Wall of Stability 
in Tibet,'' Xinhua (Online), 9 March 09. President Hu Jintao used 
similar language in March 2009 when he told Tibetan deputies to the 
National People's Congress that the TAR ``must stick to the development 
road with Chinese characteristics and Tibetan features.''
    \18\ See, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 
October 09, 25-28; Section IV--Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 in CECC, 
2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 187-191; Monitoring Compliance with 
Human Rights--Special Focus for 2005: China's Minorities and Government 
Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law in CECC, 2005 Annual 
Report, 11 October 05, 13-23.
    \19\ ``List of Political Bureau Members of 17th CPC Central 
Committee,'' Xinhua (Online), 22 October 07. Of the 25 Politburo 
members, one is listed as an ethnic Hui.
    \20\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10); ``Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010-2020 `Tibet 
Work' Priorities at `Fifth Forum,' '' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10.
    \21\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10). In addition to Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the other seven 
members of the Standing Committee are: Chairman of the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee Wu Bangguo; Chairman of the 
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference Jia Qinglin; Head of the Party Leading Group for Publicity 
and Ideological Work Li Changchun; Vice President of China Xi Jinping; 
Vice Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang; Secretary of the Party 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection He Guoqiang; and Secretary 
of the Party Central Committee's Politics and Law Commission Zhou 
Yongkang. Xinhua reported that a total of 332 officials representing 
the Communist Party and central government, the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR), other provincial-level areas, the People's Liberation Army, and 
the People's Armed Police attended the meeting.
    \22\ ``Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji Address CPC, State Council Tibet 
Work Meeting in Beijing,'' Xinhua, 29 June 01 (translated in Open 
Source Center, 29 June 01).
    \23\ Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of 
China, Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology 
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic 
Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic 
Publishing House, September 2003). Based on 2000 census data, 87.2 
percent of Tibetans were classified as ``rural'' population: Table 1-2 
shows the total Tibetan population in 2000 as 5,416,021; Table 1-2a 
shows the ``city'' population of Tibetans in 2000 as 221,355; Table 1-
2b shows the ``town'' population of Tibetans in 2000 as 473,467; Table 
1-2c shows the ``rural'' population of Tibetans in 2000 as 4,721,199.
    \24\ For more information on the wave of protests (and some 
rioting) that began on March 10, 2008, in Lhasa then spread across the 
Tibetan areas of China, see Section V--Tibet in CECC, 2008 Annual 
Report, 31 October 08, 182-204; ``Protests Fueled by Patriotic 
Education Continue Amidst Lockdowns,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China (Online), 10 April 08.
    \25\ National Bureau of Statistics of China (Online), China 
Statistical Yearbook 2008, last visited 26 March 10, Table 9-21. The 
national average per capita net income of rural households in 2007 was 
4,140 yuan; the Tibet Autonomous Region average per capita net income 
of rural households in 2007 was 2,788 yuan (67 percent of the national 
average).
    \26\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10).
    \27\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10). For information on the compulsory settlement of Tibetan 
nomadic herders, which, according to the Chinese Government, makes 
improved government services available to the herders, see Human Rights 
Watch (Online), `` `No One Has the Liberty To Refuse'--Tibetan Herders 
Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous 
Region,'' June 2007.
    \28\ Ibid.
    \29\ ``Tibet Parliament Session Announces Leadership Changes,'' 
Xinhua (Online), 15 January 10. Xinhua reported that Pema Choling 
(Padma Choling, Baima Chilin) was Vice Chairman of the TAR government 
until the TAR People's Congress ``unanimously elected'' him to the post 
of Chairman of the government. Pema Choling replaced Jampa Phuntsog 
(Xiangba Pingcuo) as head of the TAR government. (``Elections'' of 
officials by deputies to people's congresses are procedural 
formalities, not electoral contests.)
    \30\ ``Tibet Chairman Baima Chilin: It Is Necessary To Continuously 
and Vigorously Implement the Strategy of `Making the People Well-Off 
and of Invigorating Tibet,' '' Xinhua, 9 March 10 (translated in Open 
Source Center, 20 March 10).
    \31\ See, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 
October 09, 46-53; ``Sichuan-Tibet Railway Work To Start, Impact May 
Far Surpass Qinghai-Tibet Railway,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 5, 2009, 1.
    \32\ ``China To Achieve Fast-Paced Development, Lasting Stability 
in Tibet,'' Xinhua (Online), 23 January 10.
    \33\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10). Xinhua reported that the forum called on ``central 
authorities'' to ``provide greater policy support and promote new steps 
forward in the development of the Tibetan-inhabited areas in these four 
provinces'' and for provincial Party and government officials to 
``grasp [Tibet work] as a key task in their respective economic and 
social development, and mobilize forces of various quarters of the 
whole province to support the development of these areas.''
    \34\ Ibid.
    \35\ Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of 
China, Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology 
Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, and Department of Economic 
Development, State Ethnic Affairs Commission (Beijing: Ethnic 
Publishing House, September 2003), Table 10-4. The following are 
figures for the 2000 Tibetan population in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures (TAPs) and Tibetan autonomous 
counties (TACs) in other provinces. Tibet Autonomous Region 
(2,427,168). Qinghai province: Haibei (Tsojang) TAP (62,520); Hainan 
(Tsolho) TAP (235,663); Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (40,371); 
Huangnan (Malho) TAP (142,360); Guoluo (Golog) TAP (126,395); and Yushu 
(Yushul) TAP (255,167). Gansu province: Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (329,278), 
and Tianzhu (Pari) TAC, Wuwei prefecture (66,125). Sichuan province: 
Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (703,168); Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang AP 
(455,238); and Muli (Mili) TAC (40,312). Yunnan province: Diqing 
(Dechen) TAP (117,099).
    \36\ Steven Marshall and Susette Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: 
Control, Exploitation and Assimilation: Development With Chinese 
Characteristics (Washington, DC: self-published CD-ROM, 1997), Table 7, 
citing multiple Chinese sources. Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) (1.2 
million square kilometers, or 463,320 square miles). Qinghai province: 
Haibei (Tsojang) TAP (52,000 square kilometers, or 20,077 square 
miles), Hainan (Tsolho) TAP (41,634 square kilometers, or 16,075 square 
miles), Haixi (Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan AP (325,787 square 
kilometers, or 125,786 square miles), Huangnan (Malho) TAP (17,901 
square kilometers, or 6,912 square miles), Guoluo (Golog) TAP (78,444 
square kilometers, or 30,287 square miles), and Yushu (Yushul) TAP 
(197,791 square kilometers, or 76,367 square miles). Gansu province: 
Gannan (Kanlho) TAP (45,000 square kilometers, or 17,374 square miles) 
and Tianzhu (Pari) TAC (7,150 square kilometers, or 2,761 square 
miles). Sichuan province: Ganzi (Kardze) TAP (153,870 square 
kilometers, or 59,409 square miles); Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang 
Autonomous Prefecture (86,639 square kilometers, or 33,451 square 
miles); and Muli (Mili) TAC (11,413 square kilometers, or 4,407 square 
miles). Yunnan province: Diqing (Dechen) TAP (23,870 square kilometers, 
or 9,216 square miles). The Table provides areas in square kilometers; 
conversion to square miles uses the formula provided on the Web site of 
the U.S. Geological Survey: one square kilometer = 0.3861 square mile. 
Based on data in the Table, the 10 TAPs and 2 TACs have a total area of 
approximately 1.04 million square kilometers (402,000 square miles). 
The TAR and the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties are 
contiguous and total approximately 2.24 million square kilometers 
(865,000 square miles). Xining municipality and Haidong prefecture, 
located in Qinghai province, have a total area of 20,919 square 
kilometers, or 8,077 square miles, and are not Tibetan autonomous 
areas.
    \37\ Prepared Statement of Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, Special Envoy of 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``The Way Forward on Tibet,'' reprinted in 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Online), 5 March 10. In 
his statement, Lodi Gyari refers to ``the Memorandum on Genuine 
Autonomy for the Tibetan People that we had presented during the Eighth 
Round in November 2008.'' ``Statement of Special Envoy Kasur Lodi 
Gyari, Head of the Tibetan Delegation, Following the 8th Round of 
Discussions With Representatives of the Chinese Leadership,'' Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile (Online), 6 November 08. The eighth round of 
dialogue took place in China on October 30 to November 5, 2008. For 
analysis of the Memorandum, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-
2009, 22 October 09, 17-28.
    \38\ ``Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,'' 
Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 16 November 08.
    \39\ For information on the Chinese and Tibetan dialogue positions, 
see, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 
13-29; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 273-277; ``China 
Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional Preconditions to 
Dialogue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 17 
November 08; Section IV--Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 in CECC, 2007 
Annual Report, 10 October 07, 184-191.
    \40\ For more information on the Communist Party's anti-Dalai Lama 
campaign and efforts to end the Dalai Lama's influence on Tibetans in 
China, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 270, 278, 
283; CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 185-186; CECC, 2007 
Annual Report, 10 October 07, 192-205; and CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 
September 06, 83-84.
    \41\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10).
    \42\ The explanation is available in an academic abstract available 
on the Web site of Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou city, Guangdong 
province. Liu Senlin, ``Abstract: Contradictions Within Modern 
Dialectics--Reflecting on the Marxist Dialectic Group'' [Maodun de 
xiandai xingsi--dui makesizhuyi qunti bianzhengfa de yi zhong sikao], 
Sun Yat-sen University (Online), Department of Philosophy, 6 May 03. 
(Scroll down the Web page for an English translation.)
    \43\ ``State Council Information Office Holds News Conference on 
Contacts and Discussions Between Concerned Central Departments and the 
Dalai Lama's Private Representatives,'' Xinhua, 2 February 10 
(translated in Open Source Center, 3 February 10). Zhu Weiqun, 
Executive Deputy Head of the Party's United Front Work Department, used 
the term ``separating the motherland'' (i.e., splittism, separatism) in 
listing the Party's principal demands of the Dalai Lama.
    \44\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10).
    \45\ ``Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji Address CPC, State Council Tibet 
Work Meeting in Beijing,'' Xinhua, 29 June 01 (translated in Open 
Source Center, 29 June 01) (``The CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council held the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in Beijing on 25-27 June.'').
    \46\ Cao Deshung, ``Tibet Rail Construction Completed,'' China 
Daily (Online), 15 October 05; CECC Staff Analysis. Building several 
additional railways through rugged, high-elevation terrain, and paying 
costs that may be higher than during the 2001 to 2005 construction 
period of the Qinghai-Tibet railway, could reach a total cost that is a 
multiple of the cost of the Qinghai-Tibet railway. For information on 
planned railways linking Tibetan autonomous areas to adjacent 
provincial-level administrative areas, see ``Sichuan-Tibet Railway Work 
To Start, Impact May Far Surpass Qinghai-Tibet Railway,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 2009, 1; CECC, Special 
Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 45-51; CECC, 2009 Annual 
Report, 10 October 09, 285-286; and CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 
October 08, 193.
    \47\ CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 08, 184-185 (``Peaceful 
Tibetan protesters called for Tibetan independence, the Dalai Lama's 
return to Tibet, the release of the Panchen Lama, and freedom of 
religion generally.'').
    \48\ ``China To Achieve Fast-Paced Development, Lasting Stability 
in Tibet,'' Xinhua (Online), 23 January 10. The Fifth Forum took place 
from January 18 to 20.
    \49\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``Press 
Statement,'' 25 January 10. According to the January 25 press 
statement, the Dalai Lama's envoys would arrive in China ``tomorrow'' 
(i.e., January 26).
    \50\ ``Press Conference on Central Govt's Contacts With Dalai Lama 
(Text),'' China Daily (Online), 11 February 10 (UFWD Deputy Head Zhu 
Weiqun: ``This was the longest interval after we resumed contact and 
talks in 2002.''). ``China-Dalai Lama Dialogue Round Ends: Party 
Restates Hard Line, Tibetans Begin Meeting,'' CECC China Human Rights 
and Rule of Law Update, November 2008, 2. The report discusses the 
seventh round of dialogue in July 2008 and the eighth round in November 
2008. ``Dalai Lama's Envoys To Begin China Visit on May 3,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 5 May 08. The 
report lists the first six sessions of dialogue: September 2002, May-
June 2003, September 2004, June-July 2005, February 2006, and June-July 
2007. All of the rounds of dialogue took place in China except in 2005, 
when the envoys met their counterparts in Bern, Switzerland.
    \51\ ``Du Qinglin Receives Dalai Lama's Private Representatives,'' 
Xinhua, 1 February 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 February 
10).
    \52\ For information on the Chinese and Tibetan dialogue positions, 
see, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 
13-29; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 273-277; ``China 
Demands That the Dalai Lama Fulfill Additional Preconditions to 
Dialogue,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 30 
July 08; Section IV--Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 in CECC, 2007 Annual 
Report, 10 October 07, 184-191.
    \53\ ``Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 
Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation Which Visited China in January 
2010,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 2 February 10 (``[The 
Chinese side] also provided us with a detailed briefing on recent 
developments relating to Tibet, particularly on the important Fifth 
Tibet Work Forum.''). ``Press Conference on Central Govt's Contacts 
With Dalai Lama (Text),'' China Daily (Online), 11 February 10. UFWD 
Deputy Head Zhu Weiqun said that UFWD Head Du Qinglin told the Dalai 
Lama's envoys that the ``Fifth National Conference on Work in Tibet'' 
(Fifth Tibet Work Forum) ``established the strategic target for Tibet 
to achieve leap-forward development and long-lasting peace and 
stability.''
    \54\ ``Zhu Weiqun: The Recent Talks With the Dalai Lama's Private 
Representatives Had One Thing Different From the Past,'' Zhongguo 
Tongxun She, 4 February 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 4 
February 10).
    \55\ Prepared Statement of Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, Special Envoy of 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, ``The Way Forward on Tibet,'' reprinted in 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Online), 5 March 10.
    \56\ ``State Council Information Office Holds News Conference on 
Contacts and Discussions Between Concerned Central Departments and the 
Dalai Lama's Private Representatives,'' Xinhua, 2 February 10 
(translated in Open Source Center, 3 February 10); ``Statement by 
Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of 
the Delegation Which Visited China in January 2010,'' Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile (Online), 2 February 10. In his statement, the 
Special Envoy referred to the new conditions as ``the four not to 
indulge in,'' but he did not list them.
    \57\ ``Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 
Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation Which Visited China in January 
2010,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 2 February 10; 
``Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,'' Tibetan 
Government-in-Exile (Online), 16 November 08.
    \58\ ``Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 
Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation Which Visited China in January 
2010,'' Tibetan Government-in-Exile (Online), 2 February 10.
    \59\ ``Press Conference on Central Govt's Contacts With Dalai Lama 
(Text),'' China Daily (Online), 11 February 10.
    \60\ ``State Council Information Office Holds News Conference on 
Contacts and Discussions Between Concerned Central Departments and the 
Dalai Lama's Private Representatives,'' Xinhua, 2 February 10 
(translated in Open Source Center, 3 February 10).
    \61\ Cui Jia, ``Tibet's Development on Course,'' China Daily 
(Online), 11 March 10.
    \62\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10).
    \63\ Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, translated in China 
Elections and Governance (Online).
    \64\ Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the 
``Regulation on Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu 
shishi ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 
06, effective 1 January 07; State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Measures for Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record 
[Zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan bei'an banfa], issued 29 December 06, 
effective 1 March 07; State Administration for Religious Affairs, 
Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in 
Tibetan Buddhism [Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], passed 
13 July 07, issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07.
    \65\ Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the 
``Regulation on Religious Affairs'' (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu 
shishi ``zongjiao shiwu tiaoli'' banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 
06, effective 1 January 07. For more information on the measures, see 
CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV--Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, 10 
October 07, 193-196.
    \66\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures for 
Putting Professional Religious Personnel on Record [Zongjiao jiaozhi 
renyuan bei'an banfa], issued 29 December 06, effective 1 March 07, 
arts. 2-8.
    \67\ State Administration for Religious Affairs, Measures on the 
Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism 
[Zangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], passed 13 July 07, 
issued 18 July 07, effective 1 September 07. For more information on 
the measures, see CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV--Tibet: Special 
Focus for 2007, 10 October 07, 196-197; ``New Legal Measures Assert 
Unprecedented Control Over Tibetan Buddhist Reincarnation,'' 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China (Online), 22 August 07.
    \68\ The Buddhist Association of China is a ``patriotic religious 
organization'' established under Chinese Government regulation and 
charged with serving as a ``bridge'' linking Buddhists to the Chinese 
Government and the Communist Party. See, e.g., ``At the CPC Central 
Committee Political Bureau's Second Collective Study, Hu Jintao 
Stresses the Need To Comprehensively Implement the Party's Basic Policy 
on Religious Work and Actively Do a Good Job in Religious Work Under 
the New Situation,'' Xinhua, 19 December 07 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 20 December 07). Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao 
discussed the role of ``patriotic religious organizations'' in 
performing the Party's ``religious work.'' Regulation on Religious 
Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, effective 1 
March 05, art. 6, translated in China Elections and Governance (Online) 
(``The establishment, alteration, or cancellation of registration, of a 
religious body shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of 
the Regulations on Registration Administration of Associations. The 
articles of association of a religious body shall comply with the 
relevant provisions of the Regulations on Registration Administration 
of Associations.''). Lazhen, ``Tibet Leader Speaks on Dalai, Regional 
Stability,'' Tibet People's Radio, 27 October 99 (translated in Open 
Source Center, 27 October 99). Jiabao, Vice Chairman of the TAR 
government, told ``regional leaders'' attending the seventh congress of 
the Tibet Branch of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), ``The BAC 
is a patriotic religious organization under the leadership of the party 
and the government and is a bridge for linking believers with the party 
and the government.''
    \69\ Buddhist Association of China, Measures for Confirming the 
Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel [Zang 
chuan fojiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], issued 8 May 09, 
effective 10 January 10.
    \70\ Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 
issued 30 November 04, effective 1 March 05, art. 17, translated in 
China Elections and Governance (Online).
    \71\ Buddhist Association of China, Measures for Confirming the 
Credentials of Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious Personnel [Zang 
chuan fojiao jiaozhi renyuan zige rending banfa], issued 8 May 09, 
effective 10 January 10, arts. 3, 14. Article 3 lists, among other 
things, political prerequisites: ``Support the leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party and the Socialist system, love the country and 
love religion, uphold the laws, regulations, rules and policies of the 
state, have a clear-cut stance on upholding the unification of the 
Motherland, oppose ethnic splittism, and uphold concord between 
religions and a harmonious society.'' Article 14 stipulates: ``The 
professional religious personnel already confirmed prior to the 
implementation of this Measure do not need to perform anew the 
confirmation procedures. The `Tibetan Buddhist Professional Religious 
Personnel Certificate' may be issued after the professional religious 
personnel's Democratic Management Committee had put forth an 
examination opinion according to the provisions of Article 3 of this 
Measure, reported to the local Buddhist Association for approval, and 
reported to the local county-level People's Government Religious 
Affairs department for recording.''
    \72\ Ibid., art. 14.
    \73\ ``Tibet To Complete Registration and Record Keeping of Places 
of Religious Activities and Qualifications of Living Buddhas This 
Year,'' Xinhua, 10 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 11 
January 10). According to the article, then-Chairman of the TAR 
government, Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo) ``disclosed'' that 
authorities would complete ``registration and record filing of places 
of religious activities and the qualifications of living Buddhas, monks 
and nuns this year.'' (Chinese officials and media often refer to a 
trulku, a teacher whom Tibetan Buddhists believe is part of a lineage 
of reincarnations that can span centuries, as a ``living Buddha.'')
    \74\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on Freedom of 
Religious Belief in China [Zhongguo de zongjiao xinyang ziyou 
zhuangkuang], 16 October 97. ``Currently China has 13,000-some Buddhist 
temples and about 200,000 Buddhist monks and nuns. Among them are 
120,000 lamas and nuns, more than 1,700 Living Buddhas, and 3,000-some 
temples of Tibetan Buddhism and nearly 10,000 Bhiksu and senior monks 
and more than 1,600 temples of Pali Buddhism.''
    \75\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2009, China (includes 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 26 October 09. According to the report: 
``According to the June 21, 2009, People's Daily, there are 3,000 
Tibetan Buddhist monasteries with 120,000 monks and nuns in the TAR and 
Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces. In the TAR, there are 
1,789 religious venues with 46,000 monks and nuns.''
    \76\ The Chinese Government accuses the Dalai Lama of 
``splittism,'' a crime under China's Criminal Law. PRC Criminal Law, 
enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 
25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 
February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 103. CECC Staff 
Interview, September 2003. A Chinese judicial official explained that a 
photograph of Gedun Choekyi Nyima is illegal because the Chinese 
Government had already approved a legal Panchen Lama (Gyaltsen Norbu). 
According to the official, disseminating photos of an illegal Panchen 
Lama can endanger the sovereignty and unity of the country, and aims to 
split the country.
    \77\ P. Jeffrey Hopkins, ``The Identification of the Eleventh 
Panchen Lama,'' University of Virginia, Center for South Asian Studies 
Newsletter, Fall 1995. ``May 14, 1995. After extensive analysis of over 
thirty children is performed, four prophecies are consulted from 
oracles, and nine divinations including the dough-ball ritual are 
performed, the Dalai Lama formally recognizes a six-year-old boy, 
Dedhun [Gedun] Choekyi Nyima, born on April 25, 1989, in the Lhari 
District of Nagchu, Tibet, as the eleventh Panchen Lama.''
    \78\ The Welcome message on the home page of the 17th Karmapa 
contains this greeting: ``Welcome to the site of H.H. 17th Karmapa 
Trinley Thaye Dorje, the spiritual head of the Karma Kagyu tradition of 
Tibetan Buddhism.''
    \79\ The Dalai Lama has made a statement on the anniversary of the 
1959 Lhasa uprising on March 10 of every year that he has lived in 
exile, beginning in 1960. Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
(Online), ``Chronology of Events,'' last visited 1 April 10 (refers to 
the March 10, 1959, events as the beginning of the ``Tibetan People's 
Uprising''); Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), 
``Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 51st Anniversary of 
the Tibetan National Uprising Day,'' 10 March 10 (title of speech 
refers to the March 10, 1959, events as the ``Tibetan People's 
Uprising'').
    \80\ Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Online), ``Statement of 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 51st Anniversary of the Tibetan 
National Uprising Day,'' 10 March 10.
    \81\ ``China Says Missing Panchen Lama Is Living in Tibet,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 7 March 10.
    \82\ Ibid.
    \83\ ``Baima Chilin: Dalai's Designated So-Called Reincarnation 
Soul Boy Is a Victim and Now Lives Like an Ordinary Citizen,'' Xinhua, 
7 March 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 March 10).
    \84\ ``New Panchen Lama Enthroned at Ceremony, 8 December Events 
Summarized,'' Xinhua, 8 December 95 (Open Source Center, 8 December 
95). The enthronement ceremony in Rikaze (Shigatse) was on December 8, 
1995. ``The ceremony was jointly presided over and monitored by Li 
Tieying, the representative of the State Council and a State Councilor, 
Gyalcan Norbu [Gyaltsen Norbu], special commissioner and chairman of 
the Tibet Autonomous Regional People's Government, and Ye Xiaowen, 
special commissioner and director of the State Council's Religious 
Affairs Bureau.'' (The Chairman of the TAR government and the boy whom 
Chinese officials installed as the Panchen Lama were both named 
Gyaltsen Norbu.)
    \85\ ``11th Panchen Lama Makes Debut in China's Political Arena,'' 
Xinhua (Online), 4 March 10.
    \86\ ``Lama Feared China's Control,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 13 
January 10.
    \87\ Kagyu Office of His Holiness the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa 
(Online), ``Press Statement From His Holiness the 17th Karmapa Ogyen 
Trinley Dorje,'' 27 April 01 (flight into exile); Kagyu Office of His 
Holiness the 17th Gyalwang Karmapa (Online), ``His Holiness the 17th 
Gyalwang Karmapa,'' last visited 27 May 10 (age at flight into exile).
    \88\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10). For more information, see ``Communist Party Leadership 
Outlines 2010-2020 `Tibet Work' Priorities at `Fifth Forum,' '' CECC 
China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \89\ ``The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the 
Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important 
Speeches,'' Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 25 
January 10). ``By 2015 . . . the construction of the infrastructure 
will have made great progress . . . . By 2020 . . . the conditions of 
the infrastructure will have been comprehensively improved . . . .'' 
(Reports seen by Commission staff on Hu's Fifth Forum remarks did not 
include mention of a network of railways planned for the Tibetan 
plateau.)
    \90\ Ibid. ``Hu Jintao pointed out that in promoting Tibet's 
development by leaps and bounds, it is all the more necessary to . . . 
turn Tibet into . . . an important strategic resources reserve base. . 
. . Hu Jintao emphasized that it is necessary to . . . strengthen the 
construction of the infrastructure and the development of the energy 
resources . . . .''
    \91\ Ibid. ``Continue to push forward the building of a socialist 
new countryside with the comfortable housing project as a breakthrough 
point . . . .'' For more information on compulsory settlement, see 
``Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010-2020 `Tibet Work' Priorities 
at `Fifth Forum,' '' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 
No. 3, 16 March 10, 2; Human Rights Watch (Online), `` `No One Has the 
Liberty To Refuse'--Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, 
Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region,'' June 2007.
    \92\ State Council Office for the Development of the West Region, 
Opinions on the Implementation of Certain Policy Measures for the 
Large-Scale Development of the West Region, issued 28 August 01 
(translated in Open Source Center, 20 December 01). (The opinion 
provides 2000 as the date of a State Council circular on implementation 
of the Great Western Development campaign.)
    \93\ ``Political Bureau Done Mapping Out New General Strategy for 
Governing Tibet, Tibet Finishes Painting `Warm Spring Picture' of New 
Year,'' Xinhua, 10 January 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 10 
January 10); ``Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010-2020 `Tibet 
Work' Priorities at `Fifth Forum,' '' CECC China Human Rights and Rule 
of Law Update, No. 3, 16 March 10, 2.
    \94\ PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, enacted 31 May 84, effective 
1 October 84, amended 28 February 01, effective same day. For 
information on implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, see, 
e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 25-28; 
Section IV--Tibet: Special Focus for 2007 in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 
10 October 07, 187-191; Section III--Monitoring Compliance With Human 
Rights--Special Focus for 2005: China's Minorities and Government 
Implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law in CECC, 2005 Annual 
Report, 11 October 05, 13-23.
    \95\ See, e.g., subsection titled Officials Acknowledge Tibetan 
Resentment Against the ``Floating Population,'' but Call for More, 
Better Migrant Services in CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 
22 October 09, 43-46; subsection titled Economic Development vs. Ethnic 
Minorities' Autonomous Rights in CECC, 2008 Annual Report, 31 October 
08, 192-194; subsection titled Tibetan Culture Under Chinese 
Development Policy and Practice in CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 
07, 200-207; subsection titled Culture, Development, and Demography in 
CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 165-170.
    \96\ The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to Peace, Hearing of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 23 April 08, Written 
Statement Submitted by Steven Marshall, Senior Advisor, Congressional-
Executive Commission on China (``Increasing Tibetan resentment against 
Chinese policies that impact diverse areas of Tibetan life--religious 
and economic, urban and pastoral--sheds light on why monks, townsfolk, 
and nomads risked participating in protests across a wide swath of the 
Tibetan plateau.'').
    \97\ CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 10, 46-
53; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 09, 285-286.
    \98\ Sichuan Provincial People's Government (Online), ``A Series of 
Major Projects To Kick Off in 2010,'' 25 January 10; ``Work on the 
Chengdu-Kangding Railway Planned To Start Next Year, Travel Time From 
Chengdu to Erlang Shan To Be 1.5 Hours'' [Chengkang tielu yuji mingnian 
donggong cong chengdu dao erlangshan 1.5 xiaoshi], Huaxi Metropolitan 
News, reprinted in Sichuan Online (Online), 2 April 10. According to 
the Huaxi Metropolitan News report, the length of the Chengdu-Kangding 
link would be 344 kilometers.
    \99\ ``Work on the Chengdu-Kangding Railway Planned To Start Next 
Year, Travel Time From Chengdu to Erlang Shan To Be 1.5 Hours'' 
[Chengkang tielu yuji mingnian donggong cong chengdu dao erlangshan 1.5 
xiaoshi], Huaxi Metropolitan News, reprinted in Sichuan Online 
(Online), 2 April 10.
    \100\ Du Qingfeng and Zhang Mingha, ``Pre-feasibility Study 
Underway for Lhasa-Linzhi Railway Construction'' [Lasa zhi linzhi tielu 
jianshe jinxing yu kexingxing yanjiu], Tibet Daily, 13 April 10, 
reprinted in China Tibet News (Online), 15 April 10.
    \101\ Ibid.
    \102\ Edward Wong, ``Dalai Lama To Visit Indian Region Claimed by 
China,'' New York Times (Online), 22 October 09. The article describes 
the area as ``heavily militarized'' and ``the focus of an intense 
territorial dispute between China and India.'' Wang Yueh, ``India Plans 
To Independently Develop a Disputed Area of Southern Tibetan Region,'' 
Wen Wei Po, 20 August 09 (translated in Open Source Center, 24 August 
09). Michael Richardson, ``Assuaging China's Expanding `Core' 
Concerns,'' Japan Times (Online), 14 March 10 (``Beijing insists that 
around 90,000 square kilometers of territory in India's mountainous 
northeast, covering virtually the whole of the state of Arunachal 
Pradesh, is part of China.''). For information on the link between the 
China-Dalai Lama dialogue and the China-India territorial dispute over 
Arunachal Pradesh, see, e.g., ``China Demands That the Dalai Lama 
Fulfill Additional Preconditions to Dialogue,'' Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China (Online), 30 July 08.
    \103\ Du Qingfeng and Zhang Mingha, ``Pre-feasibility Study 
Underway for Lhasa-Linzhi Railway Construction'' [Lasa zhi linzhi tielu 
jianshe jinxing yu kexingxing yanjiu], Tibet Daily, 13 April 10, 
reprinted in China Tibet News (Online), 15 April 10.
    \104\ ``Tibet Starts Building 5th Civil Airport,'' Xinhua (Online), 
30 April 09 (``China is also building a 254-km railway linking Xigaze 
with the regional capital Lhasa. Construction on the 11-billion-yuan 
[US$1.61 billion] Qinghai-Tibet railway's extension line started in 
2008 and was expected to be completed in 2010.''). See also 
``Government Announces Extension of Qinghai-Tibet Railway to Rikaze,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 15.
    \105\ Baqiao Wangjie, ``An Expert From the Ministry of Railways 
Conducts On-Site Inspection of Preparatory Work for Lhasa-Shigatse 
Railway'' [Tiedaobu zhuanjia shidi kaocha la ri tielu qianqi gongzuo], 
Tibet Daily, reprinted in China Tibet News (Online), 10 March 10 
(``Shigatse Prefecture administration office leaders pointed out when 
reporting on preparatory work for the Lhasa-Shigatse Railway that the 
Lhasa-Shigatse route plan has already been confirmed and that they 
fully support it, and that they would do a good job of coordination, 
propaganda, land acquisition, demolition, relocation and compensation, 
logistical support and security management etc in order to create a 
good external environment for the project's construction.'').
    \106\ ``China Begins Extending Plateau Railway to Tibet's Second 
Largest City,'' Xinhua (Online), 26 September 10.
    \107\ ``Tibet To Step Up Exploitation of Mineral Resources, Vowing 
To Be `Rational,' '' Xinhua (Online), 12 March 10.
    \108\ Ibid. According to the report, Dorje, a senior official with 
the TAR Land and Resources Department, said that resource exploitation 
would be ``rational'' and ``minimize its impact on the environment.''
    \109\ ``Clash Over Cement Factory,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 
May 10. According to RFA sources, 15 Tibetans were injured and 4 were 
detained. The factory began operation in 1985 but processing and 
excavation areas have been expanded recently. Villagers petitioned 
government authorities in May 2010 for redress, claiming that the 
factory was ``polluting the environment, severely damaging farms and 
pastures, disrupting villagers' normal life, blocking village roads, 
and forcibly annexing village property, roads, religious sites, etc.''
    \110\ ``Villagers Renew Mine Protests,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
12 May 10. According to an RFA source, ``thousands'' of Tibetans had 
``attempted to block the Chinese from resuming mining activities,'' and 
5,000 People's Armed Police were in the area. For information on the 
2009 agreement to cease mining, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 
October 09, 287; ``Mine Standoff Said Resolved,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 28 May 09.
    \111\ Qin Jiaofeng, Gama Duoji, and Quan Xiaoshu, ``Make Every 
Effort To Promote Leapfrog Development in Tibet Through Adherence to 
`Chinese Characteristics and Tibetan Traits'--Interview With National 
People's Congress Deputy and Tibet Autonomous Region Chairman Padma 
Choling,'' Xinhua, 10 March 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 10 
March 10).
    \112\ ``Claiming `Fear in Tibet,' Dalai Lama Tells Lies Again,'' 
People's Daily, reprinted in China Tibet Online (Online), 6 November 
09.
    \113\ Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2008 (Beijing: China Statistics 
Press, June 2008), Table 3-4, ``Population Nationality.'' In 2007, 
Tibetans made up 2,602,788 (95.1 percent) of the total TAR population 
of 2,735,867. ``Claiming `Fear in Tibet,' Dalai Lama Tells Lies 
Again,'' People's Daily, reprinted in China Tibet Online (Online), 6 
November 09. According to the report, approximately 1.33 million TAR 
farmers and herders would have been moved into new housing by the end 
of 2009.
    \114\ State Council Information Office, White Paper on China's 
Ethnic Policy and Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic 
Groups, 27 September 09.
    \115\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Top-Level 
Meeting in Beijing Sets Strategy on Tibet,'' 29 January 10 (settlement 
threatening livelihoods); International Campaign for Tibet (Online), `` 
`An eco-friendly tourist city': China's Emerging Reconstruction Plans 
for Kyegu,'' 5 May 10 (``ghetto-like'' conditions arising in 
settlements).
    \116\ Cui Jia, `` `Tibet's Development on Course,' '' China Daily 
(Online), 11 March 10. Lhasa Mayor Dorje Tsedrub (Doje Cezhug) made the 
remarks.
    \117\ CECC Staff Analysis. The mayor's remarks do not indicate 
whether official concern was focused mainly on non-Tibetan itinerant 
workers, whose presence some Tibetans resent, or on Tibetan itinerant 
workers, whom government officials may suspect of having participated 
in the rioting. See, e.g., subsection titled Officials Acknowledge 
Tibetan Resentment Against the ``Floating Population,'' but Call for 
More, Better Migrant Services in CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-
2009, 22 October 09, 43-46.
    \118\ For a discussion of official Chinese reports on the number 
and characterization of passengers traveling on the Qinghai-Tibet 
railway into the Tibet Autonomous Region, and of the views of some 
Tibetan residents of Lhasa toward the increase in non-Tibetans in 
Lhasa, see subsection titled Qinghai-Tibet Railway Carries 1.5 Million 
Passengers Into the TAR in First Year in Section IV--Tibet: Special 
Focus for 2007, CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 203-204.
    \119\ ``Transcript of Tibet Officials' 6 Mar Interview With 
Reporters During NPC Session,'' Xinhua, 6 March 09 (translated in Open 
Source Center, 15 March 09); Lan Jinshan, ``Zhang Yijiong's Emphasis on 
the Promotion of Services and Management for Floating Population Sets a 
New Platform'' [Zhang yijiong qiangdiao tuidong liudong renkou fuwu he 
guanli mai shang xin taijie], China Tibet News (Online), 3 September 
08. See also ``Unavoidable Internal Problems, Separatists Blamed for 
Lhasa Riot,'' China Daily (Online), 19 March 09.
    \120\ Xu Changan, ``Wen Jiabao Explains China's Ethnic Policy With 
Its Firm, Soft Aspects in Work Report,'' Xinhua, 5 March 10 (translated 
in Open Source Center, 14 March 10).
    \121\ Ibid. According to the report, ``Analysts say this is the 
first government work report that raises the issue of reviewing 
services for and the management of the minority floating population.''
    \122\ CECC Political Prisoner Database. Based on Political Prisoner 
Database data as of September 3, 2010, 98 political detentions of 
Tibetans were recorded for the portion of the Commission's 2010 
reporting year included in September 2009 through August 2010. In 
comparison, the PPD records the political detention of 181 Tibetans 
during the same period included in the Commission's 2009 reporting year 
(September 2008 through August 2009).
    \123\ PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, art. 103 (``splitting the State or undermining unity of the 
country''), art. 111 (``unlawfully [supplying] State secrets or 
intelligence for an organ, organization or individual outside the 
territory'').
    \124\ PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 
29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 35 (``freedom of speech, 
of the press, of assembly, of association''), 36 (``freedom of 
religious belief'').
    \125\ ``China Jails Tibetan Filmmaker,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
6 January 10. According to RFA, Tibetans discussed on camera ``their 
views on Tibet's exiled leader the Dalai Lama, the Beijing Olympics, 
and Chinese laws.''
    \126\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Founder of 
Tibetan Cultural Website Sentenced to 15 Years in Closed-Door Trial in 
Freedom of Expression Case,'' 16 November 09; Woeser, ``Tibetans 
Currently Suffering the Calamity of Imprisonment'' [Zhengzai jingshou 
laoyuzhizai de zangren], Middle Way Blog, 19 December 09; Tibetan 
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``A Tibetan Writer-
Photographer Sentenced,'' 19 November 09; ``Chinese Courts Use 
`Secrets' Law To Sentence Tibetan Online Authors to Imprisonment,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10.
    \127\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: Drop Charges Against 
Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,'' 10 June 10 (``These people 
embody the characteristics the government says it wants in modern 
Tibetans . . . yet they, too, are being treated as criminals.''); 
TibetInfoNet (Online), ``Landmark Sentencing/ '' 30 June 10 (``. . . 
potentially a hard blow for the further development of the vigorous 
grassroots social and ecological activism that has spread over many 
parts of Tibetan regions.''); Cara Anna, ``China Now Pressuring 
Tibetans Outside Politics,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo 
(Online), 18 June 10 (``. . . activist groups say a growing number of 
Tibetan intellectuals are coming under pressure from authorities 
determined to squelch all forms of dissent.'').
    \128\ CECC Political Prisoner Database. See also International 
Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Fears for School Founder in Prison,'' 12 
September 05; Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ``Clemency Granted to 
Tibetan Monk, Labor Activist,'' 28 February 06.
    \129\ CECC Political Prisoner Database. See also Dui Hua 
Foundation, ``Criminal Verdict of the Sichuan Province Ganzi Tibetan 
Minority Autonomous Prefecture Intermediate People's Court, 2000. Ganzi 
Intermediate Court Verdict No. 11,'' in Selection of Cases from the 
Criminal Law, August 2003, 42-55; ``Party Congress Promotes Officials 
Linked to Harsh Policies Toward Tibetans,'' CECC China Human Rights and 
Rule of Law Update, January 2008, 2.
    \130\ CECC Political Prisoner Database. See also ``Relatives Visit 
Imprisoned Buddhist Teacher Tenzin Deleg, Officials Report Ill 
Health,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 6, 12 
July 10, 4; CECC, Topic Paper: The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the 
Case Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the Courts, and the Debate on 
Legality, 10 February 03.
    \131\ CECC Political Prisoner Database. See also CECC, 2009 Annual 
Report, 10 October 09, 142; CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 
22 October 09, 79-81; International Campaign for Tibet (Online), 
``Influential Tibetan Lama Sentenced to Eight and a Half Years in 
Prison,'' 4 January 10.
    \132\ TibetInfoNet (Online), ``Landmark Sentencing/ '' 30 June 10 
(Karma Samdrub ``establishment of an ambitious museum of Tibetan 
culture, in partnership with the [Party's United Front Work 
Department]''); Andrew Jacobs, ``Tibetans Fear a Broader Crackdown,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 23 June 10 
(Karma Samdrub was the ``kind of [Tibetan] who put the Chinese 
Communist Party at ease''); Cara Anna, ``China Now Pressuring Tibetans 
Outside Politics,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo (Online), 18 
June 10 (Karma Samdrub ``won national awards and praise, and he stayed 
out of the region's highly charged politics''; Tagyal was ``was seen by 
fellow Tibetans as an `official intellectual' for usually toeing the 
Communist Party's line''); ``Tibetan Quake Critic Still Held,'' Radio 
Free Asia (Online), 30 April 10 (Tagyal ``has written books that 
largely aligned with the Chinese government's views on modernization, 
religion, and culture in Tibet.''); High Peaks Pure Earth (Online), 
``Earthquake in Tibet, Leading Tibetan Intellectual `Shogdung' Detained 
in Xining,'' 26 April 10 (Tagyal ``argued that Tibetans should embrace 
modernisation and disassociate from traditional Buddhism learning as a 
means of overcoming their present condition.'').
    \133\  CECC Staff Analysis.
    \134\ Some reports observed that in Karma Dondrub's case, charges 
may have been revived as retribution for his efforts to obtain release 
from detention or imprisonment of his two brothers who founded an 
environmental organization that criticized local officials for hunting 
protected wildlife. In Taygal's case, detention followed veiled advice 
in a blog posting to which he was a signatory urging Tibetans who 
wished to contribute to relief funds for victims of the April 14, 2010, 
Yushu earthquake to do so through non-Party, non-government channels. 
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: Drop Charges Against 
Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,'' 10 June 10 (``relatives and 
friends believe revival of the decade-old charges stems from his 
efforts to gain the release of his two brothers''); High Peaks Pure 
Earth (Online), ``Earthquake in Tibet, Leading Tibetan Intellectual 
`Shogdung' Detained in Xining,'' 26 April 10 (``do not send your 
donations to the accounts of a certain organisation or a certain group 
as if you were paying taxes'').
    \135\ ``Old Charge Resurfaces Against Prominent Tibetan,'' Reuters 
(Online), 1 June 10; ``Tibetan Activist on Trial,'' Radio Free Asia 
(Online), 22 June 10; Andrew Jacobs, ``Tibetans Fear a Broader 
Crackdown,'' Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 23 
June 10.
    \136\ Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: Drop Charges Against 
Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,'' 10 June 10. According to the 
report, Karma Samdrub founded the Qinghai Three River Environmental 
Protection Group which won awards including ``a one million yuan (about 
US$130,000) grant as a `Model Project' from the One Foundation, a 
charity created by the Chinese martial art movie star Jet Li; and the 
Earth Prize, an environmental prize jointly administered by Friends of 
the Earth Hong Kong and the Ford Motor company.''
    \137\ Christopher Bodeen, ``China Puts on Hold Trial of Tibet 
Environmentalist,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Yahoo! (Online), 21 
June 10 (``accused local officials in eastern Tibet of poaching 
endangered species''). Human Rights Watch (Online), ``China: Drop 
Charges Against Tibetan Environmental Philanthropist,'' 10 June 10 
(environmental organization; Jigme Namgyal's sentence). According to 
the report, security officials accused Jigme Namgyal of offenses 
including ``interfering with state power organizations'' and ``harming 
social stability'' and ordered him on November 13, 2009, to serve one 
year and nine months' reeducation through labor. ``Tibetan 
Environmentalist Jailed for 5 Years,'' Reuters (Online), 3 July 10. The 
Changdu (Chamdo) Intermediate People's Court reportedly sentenced 
Rinchen Samdrub to five years' imprisonment for ``inciting splittism'' 
because an article supportive of the Dalai Lama was posted on his Web 
site. ``China `Jails Tibet Activist for Five Years,' '' BBC (Online), 3 
July 10. Rinchen Samdrub reportedly denied posting the article to his 
Web site.
    \138\ High Peaks Pure Earth (Online), ``Earthquake in Tibet, 
Leading Tibetan Intellectual `Shogdung' Detained in Xining,'' 26 April 
10 (``embrace modernisation and disassociate from traditional Buddhism 
learning''); Andrew Jacobs, ``Tibetans Fear a Broader Crackdown,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 23 June 10 
(``previously derided by many Tibetans for being `an official 
intellectual' '').
    \139\ ``Quake Critic Arrested,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 4 June 
10; High Peaks Pure Earth (Online), ``Earthquake in Tibet, Leading 
Tibetan Intellectual `Shogdung' Detained in Xining,'' 26 April 10. The 
High Peaks Pure Earth article provides a translation of a statement in 
a blog post to which Shogdung (Tagyal) was a signatory. The statement 
advised would-be contributors to Yushu quake victims, ``However, do not 
send your donations to the accounts of a certain organisation or a 
certain group as if you were paying taxes. The best thing to do is to 
send somebody one can fully trust to send one's contributions.''
    \140\ See, e.g., International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``A 
`Raging Storm': The Crackdown on Tibetan Writers and Artists After 
Tibet's Spring 2008 Protests,'' 18 May 10.
    \141\ ``Filmmaker's Family To Appeal,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 
January 10. According to the RFA article, which cited Reporters Without 
Borders (RSF), security officials detained Dondrub Wangchen on March 
23, 2008. ``China Jails Tibetan Filmmaker,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
6 January 10. RFA sources reported that a ``secret'' trial convicted 
Dondrub Wangchen of ``splitting the motherland.'' See PRC Criminal Law, 
enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 
25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 
February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 103 (``splitting the 
State or undermining unity of the country''). See the CECC Political 
Prisoner Database for more information on the case.
    \142\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Founder of 
Tibetan Cultural Website Sentenced to 15 Years in Closed-Door Trial in 
Freedom of Expression Case,'' 16 November 09; ``Chinese Courts Use 
`Secrets' Law To Sentence Tibetan Online Authors to Imprisonment,'' 
CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 5 February 10, 
2. CECC Staff Analysis. Based on the ICT report that ``disclosing state 
secrets'' was involved, the charge may have been based on Article 111 
of China's Criminal Law (``unlawfully [supplying] State secrets or 
intelligence for an organ, organization or individual outside the 
territory'').
    \143\ Woeser, ``Tibetans Currently Suffering the Calamity of 
Imprisonment'' [Zhengzai jingshou laoyuzhizai zangren], Middle Way 
Blog, 19 December 09. According to Tibetan blogger Woeser (Oezer, 
Weise), ``Kunchok Tsephel was both a co-founder and editor of the first 
Tibetan literary website in China. . . . The accusations against 
[Konchog Tsephel] are connected to essays he published on his website . 
. . .'' See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information 
on the case.
    \144\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``A 
Tibetan Writer-Photographer Sentenced,'' 19 November 09; ``Chinese 
Courts Use `Secrets' Law To Sentence Tibetan Online Authors to 
Imprisonment,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 2, 
5 February 10, 2. CECC Staff Analysis. Based on the TCHRD report that 
``disclosing state secrets'' was involved, the charge may have been 
based on Article 111 of China's Criminal Law (``unlawfully [supplying] 
State secrets or intelligence for an organ, organization or individual 
outside the territory''). See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for 
more information on the case.
    \145\ Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), 
``Chinese Court Sentences Serthar Monk to Lengthy Prison Term,'' 25 
March 10 (detained ``on suspicion of leaking information about Tibet's 
situation to the `separatist forces' outside [Tibet]); ``Nephew of 
Deceased Buddhist Master Held for Almost a Year,'' Phayul (Online), 23 
June 09 (``held on charges of leaking information to `separatist 
forces' through phone and other means''). CECC Staff Analysis. Based on 
TCHRD and Phayul reports of ``leaking information'' to ``separatist 
forces'' outside of China, the charge may have been based on Article 
111 of China's Criminal Law (``unlawfully [supplying] State secrets or 
intelligence for an organ, organization or individual outside the 
territory''). See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more 
information on the case.
    \146\ ``Tibetan Singer Gets Prison,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 5 
March 10.
    \147\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibetan Singer 
Tashi Dhondup Detained,'' 8 December 09. According to the ICT report, 
the lyrics of the CD entitled ``Torture Without Wounds'' expressed 
Tashi Dondrub's ``pain over the situation in Tibet'' and ``the widely-
held desire of the Tibetan people for the Dalai Lama to return home.''
    \148\ Human Rights Watch (Online), Trials of a Tibetan Monk: The 
Case of Tenzin Delek, 9 February 04, 12 (``Dalai Lama recognized him as 
a tulku (reincarnated lama)''); ``Two Tibetans Sentenced to Death in SW 
China,'' Xinhua (Online), 26 January 03 (``death sentence with a two-
year reprieve for inciting the split of the country and scheming 
explosions''; ``court did not hold an open hearing because some of the 
defendants' criminal acts were related to state secrets''); ``Tibetan 
Monk Death Penalty Commuted to Life in Prison,'' Xinhua (Online), 26 
Jan 05 (``commuted the death penalty with a two-year reprieve''). See 
also CECC, Topic Paper: The Execution of Lobsang Dondrub and the Case 
Against Tenzin Deleg: The Law, the Courts, and the Debate on Legality, 
10 February 03; Human Rights Watch (Online), Trials of a Tibetan Monk: 
The Case of Tenzin Delek, 9 February 04. See the CECC Political 
Prisoner Database for more information on the case.
    \149\ High Peaks Pure Earth (Online), ``From Woeser's Blog: The 
People of Yajiang in Kham Petition for the Retrial of Tenzin Delek 
Rinpoche,'' 9 December 09. The High Peaks Pure Earth article provides a 
translation of the petition that contains three sections describing 
objections to the verdict: ``No proof,'' ``A'an Zhaxi himself refuses 
to admit his guilt,'' and ``Officials plotted to frame.'' International 
Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibetans Defy Security Crackdown To 
Demonstrate in Support of Imprisoned Tibetan Lama,'' 17 December 09. 
The report states that the petition was ``signed by thousands of 
Tibetans, often with a thumbprint.'' ``Tibetan Monk Protests Innocence 
in Smuggled Audiotape,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 January 03. The 
RFA report states that the smuggled tape contains Tenzin Deleg's 
statement, ``Whatever [the authorities] do and say, I am completely 
innocent.''
    \150\ ``Tibetan Protest Numbers Grow,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
10 December 09 (``Between 500 and 600 Tibetans from the Golok and Othok 
areas of Nyakchukha who were detained during protests beginning Dec. 5 
are being held by Chinese forces . . . .''); Tibetan Centre for Human 
Rights and Democracy (Online), ``Tibetans Continue With Fasting and 
Protest, Situation Extremely Volatile in Nyachuka: Update,'' 11 
December 09 (``. . . the Tibetans are still pressing the County 
government officials, although the deadline for petitioners and 
protesters to retreat to their respective villages was expired on (3:00 
PM, yesterday, 10 December 2009) . . .''; ``Seven Released in 
Nyagchuka, Situation `Tense,' '' Phayul (Online), 18 December 09 
(``Around twenty Tibetans are still held in detention following 
protests by hundreds of local Tibetans . . . .''). See also ``Tibetan 
Protest Over Monk,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 7 December 09; Tibetan 
Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``Sixty Tibetans 
Detained in Kardze for Petitioning,'' 8 December 09; Tibetan Centre for 
Human Rights and Democracy (Online), ``China Sends Additional Military 
Forces To Contain the Situation in Nyachuka: Update,'' 9 December 09; 
International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibetans Defy Security 
Crackdown To Demonstrate in Support of Imprisoned Tibetan Lama,'' 17 
December 09.
    \151\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibetans Defy 
Security Crackdown To Demonstrate in Support of Imprisoned Tibetan 
Lama,'' 17 December 09 (``dozens of Tibetans have been detained and 
beaten after peaceful demonstrations''); Tibetan Centre for Human 
Rights and Democracy (Online), ``Sixty Tibetans Detained in Kardze for 
Petitioning,'' 8 December 09; ``Seven Released in Nyagchuka, Situation 
`Tense,' '' Phayul (Online), 18 December 09 (``Around twenty Tibetans 
are still held in detention following protests by hundreds of local 
Tibetans . . . .'').
    \152\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibetans Mark 
Uprising Anniversaries Despite Crackdown: Lhasa Like a `War-Zone,' '' 
22 March 10 (``20-30 students from the Machu Tibetan Middle School 
began a peaceful protest''; ``students were soon joined by more than 
100 local Tibetans (some sources say several hundred)''); ``Tibetan 
Students Stage Protest,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 16 March 10 
(``about 30 students from the Tibetan Middle School in Machu protested 
in streets close to the county center''; ``The student protesters were 
joined by 500 to 600 [other] Tibetans.'').
    \153\ ``Tibetan Students Stage Protest,'' Radio Free Asia (Online), 
16 March 10.
    \154\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibetans Mark 
Uprising Anniversaries Despite Crackdown: Lhasa Like a `War-Zone,' '' 
22 March 10. According to the report, ``Tibetan students from two 
middle schools in Tsoe . . . demonstrated peacefully in the streets on 
March 16. . . . [Around] 30 or 40 students took part in the protest 
[which was] quickly broken up after the students were surrounded by 
armed police. More than 20 students . . . were detained, and are 
believed to be still in custody for questioning and `education.' ''
    \155\ ``Primary School Students Stage Protest in Kham Driru,'' 
Phayul (Online), 24 March 10.
    \156\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Tibetans Mark 
Uprising Anniversaries Despite Crackdown: Lhasa Like a `War-Zone,' '' 
22 March 10; ``Primary School Students Stage Protest in Kham Driru,'' 
Phayul (Online), 24 March 10.
    \157\ Phurbu Tsering's case has been reported on by news agencies 
including the New York Times (25 April 09), the Wall Street Journal (27 
April 09), the Associated Press (21 April 09), Reuters (28 April 09, 31 
December 09), BBC (1 January 10), and Times Online (London, 27 April 
09, 30 December 09).
    \158\ For more information on Phurbu Tsering and his case, see 
CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 22 October 09, 79-81.
    \159\ Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (Online), 
``China Sentences Tulku Phurbu Tsering Rinpoche to 8 Years, 6 Months in 
Jail,'' 29 December 09; ``Tibetan `Living Buddha' Phurbu Tsering Jailed 
by China,'' BBC (Online), 1 January 10.
    \160\ Gillian Wong, ``Tibetan Lama on Trial for Weapons Charge in 
China,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Google (Online), 21 April 09 
(``illegally possessing weapons, his Beijing-based lawyer Li Fangping 
told The Associated Press in a phone interview''); Edward Wong, 
``Senior Tibetan Cleric Faces Prison in China,'' New York Times 
(Online), 25 April 09 (``charges of weapons possession and 
embezzlement, according to his two lawyers [Jiang Tianyong and Li 
Fangping]''); PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 
effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 
December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 
09, arts. 128(1), 271. Article 128(1): ``Whoever, in violation of the 
regulations governing control of guns, illegally possesses or conceals 
any guns or ammunition shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of 
not more than three years, criminal detention or public surveillance . 
. . .'' Article 271: ``Any employee of a company, enterprise or any 
other unit who, taking advantage of his position, unlawfully takes 
possession of the money or property of his own unit . . . if the amount 
is huge, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less 
than five years and may also be sentenced to confiscation of 
property.''
    \161\ CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008-2009, 10 October 10, 
79-81; International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Verdict on Tibetan 
Lama Deferred: Chinese Lawyers' Statement on Charges Against Phurbu 
Rinpoche,'' 27 April 09. The ICT report describes the defense statement 
as ``a document presented to the court.''
    \162\ International Campaign for Tibet (Online), ``Influential 
Tibetan Lama Sentenced to Eight and a Half Years in Prison,'' 4 January 
10. The ICT report cited a December 30, 2009, entry on the Tibetan 
writer Woeser's blog.
    \163\ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Online), 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention: Addendum, Mission to China, 29 December 04, 22; 
CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 112. Jigme Gyatso was 
sentenced in 1996 to 15 years' imprisonment for counterrevolution. 
Chinese officials told a UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
(UNWGAD) delegation in September 2004 that he was guilty of ``planning 
to found an illegal organization and seek to divide the country and 
damage its unity.'' Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(Online), Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinions Adopted by the 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 8/2000, adopted 17 
May 00, 67-70. The UNWGAD opinion on the case found that ``there is 
nothing to indicate that the `illegal organization' . . . ever 
advocated violence, war, national, racial, or religious hatred'' and 
that Jigme Gyatso was ``merely exercising the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly with others in order to express opinions . . .''
    \164\ CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 111-112. Choeying 
Khedrub, a monk of Tsanden Monastery in the TAR, was sentenced in 2000 
to life imprisonment for his role in a group of men who allegedly 
printed pro-independence leaflets. According to information that the 
Chinese Government provided to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention (UNWGAD), he was found guilty of endangering state security 
and ``supporting splittist activities of the Dalai clique.'' The UNWGAD 
reports that the Chinese response ``mentions no evidence in support of 
the charges, or if they used violence in their activities,'' and finds 
that the government ``appears'' to have misused the charge of 
endangering state security.
    \165\ CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 210. Bangri Chogtrul 
(Jigme Tenzin Nyima), who lived as a householder in Lhasa and managed a 
children's home along with his wife, was convicted of inciting 
splittism and sentenced to life imprisonment in a closed court in Lhasa 
in September 2000. ``Lhasa Court Commutes Life Sentence for Children's 
Home Director to 19 Years,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Update, April 2006, 18. The sentencing document lists evidence against 
Bangri Chogtrul that includes meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting a 
donation for the home from a foundation in India, and a business 
relationship with a Tibetan contractor who lowered a Chinese flag in 
Lhasa in 1999 and tried to blow himself up. Jigme Tenzin Nyima 
acknowledged meeting the Dalai Lama, accepting the contribution, and 
knowing the contractor, but he denied the charges against him and 
rejected the court's portrayal of events.
    \166\ CECC Political Prisoner Database. On August 1, 2007, Tibetan 
nomad Ronggye Adrag climbed onto a stage at a horse-racing festival in 
Litang (Lithang) county, Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, Sichuan province, and 
shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet, freedom 
of religion, Tibetan independence, and the releases of Gedun Choekyi 
Nyima (the Panchen Lama identified by the Dalai Lama) and Tenzin Deleg 
(a Buddhist teacher from the same area imprisoned in 2002 on charges of 
splittism and involvement in a series of bombings). The Ganzi 
Intermediate People's Court sentenced him on November 20, 2007, to 
eight years' imprisonment for inciting splittism (Criminal Law, Article 
103(2)). ``CECC Political Prisoner Data Shows Rise in Tibetan 
Detentions in 2007,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on China 
(Online), 31 January 08; ``China Sentences 4 for Spying, Secessionist 
Activities,'' Xinhua (Online), 20 November 07; ``Tibetan Sentenced for 
`Inciting To Split Country' at Sports Event,'' Xinhua (Online), 20 
November 07; ``Tibetan Nomad Calling for Dalai Lama's Return Convicted 
of Subversion and Splittism,'' Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China (Online), 1 November 07. The CECC report cites an October 30, 
2007, Radio Free Asia report that the Ganzi Intermediate Court 
convicted Ronggye Adrag on charges of splittism and subversion 
(Criminal Law, arts. 103, 105). (The court, however, did not sentence 
Ronggye Adrag on the charge of subversion.)
    \167\ In addition to the 732 Tibetan political prisoners believed 
to be currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or 
after March 10, 2008, the Commission's Political Prisoner Database 
recorded as of June 10, 2010, an additional 63 Tibetan political 
prisoners detained or imprisoned on or after March 10, 2008, who are 
known or believed to have been released, or who reportedly escaped or 
died.
    \168\ For the purpose of calculating average sentences, the 
Political Prisoner Database provides 20 years as a nominal length of a 
life sentence. Official Chinese information about the actual average 
time served by prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment is not 
available.
    \169\ Ibid.
    \170\ Ibid.
    \171\ Ibid.

    Notes to Section VI--Developments in Hong Kong and Macau
    \1\ U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Public Law No. 102-383, 
enacted 5 October 92; Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People's Republic of China, enacted by the National 
People's Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97; Joint Declaration of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong 
Kong, adopted 19 December 84.
    \2\ U.S.-Macau Policy Act of 2000, Public Law No. 106-570, enacted 
27 December 2000; Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Portugal on the 
Question of Macau, adopted 13 April 87; Basic Law of the Macau Special 
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, enacted by the 
National People's Congress 31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, art. 
83.
    \3\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's Congress 
31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, art. 83; Basic Law of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 
enacted by the National People's Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 
97, art. 85.
    \4\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's Congress 
31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, arts. 27, 34; Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of 
China, enacted by the National People's Congress 4 April 90, effective 
1 July 97, arts. 27, 32.
    \5\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's Congress 4 
April 90, effective 1 July 97, chap. IV, art. 45 (selection of chief 
executive), art. 68 (election of Legislative Council), and chap. 1, 
art. 2 (``high degree of autonomy'').
    \6\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's Congress 
31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, art. 23. For a discussion of the 
passage and terms of the legislation, see CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 
October 09, 302-304.
    \7\ Fanny W.Y. Fung and Gary Cheung, ``Macau Security Law Praised 
at Handover Event,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 5 December 09.
    \8\ Keith Bradsher, ``Emboldened Hong Kong Protesters Call for Free 
Elections,'' New York Times (Online), 9 July 03; ``Hong Kong Withdraws 
National Security Bill,'' China Daily (Online), 5 September 03.
    \9\ For additional information on the proposals, see ``Hong Kong 
Government Releases Proposals for Constitutional Reform,'' CECC China 
Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, No. 5, 4 June 10, 2.
    \10\ National People's Congress Standing Committee, Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Issues Relating 
to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on 
Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage, issued 29 December 07.
    \11\ Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
``Package of Proposals for the Methods for Selecting the Chief 
Executive and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2012: Consultation 
Document,'' reprinted in Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in the 
United States, 14 April 10.
    \12\ Tom Mitchell, ``Hong Kong By-Election Thwarted by Beijing,'' 
Financial Times (Online), 16 May 10.
    \13\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2009, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.
    \14\ Robert Keatley, ``Universal Suffrage Remains the Goal--but Not 
Yet in Sight,'' Hong Kong Journal (Online), April 2010.
    \15\ Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's 
Congress 4 April 90, effective 1 July 97, Annex II, Part II.
    \16\ Jonathan Cheng, ``Hong Kong Lays Out Electoral Changes,'' Wall 
Street Journal (Online), 19 November 09.
    \17\ ``Lawmakers Pass Political Reform Package,'' South China 
Morning Post (Online), 25 June 10; Robert Keatley, ``Beijing Bends--
Just a Little--and Brings a Hint of Hope to Hong Kong Politics,'' Hong 
Kong Journal (Online), June 2010.
    \18\ Polly Hui, ``Outcry as Hong Kong Adopts Democratic Reforms,'' 
Associated Press, reprinted in Google News (Online), 25 June 10; Regina 
Leung, ``Ho Says Democrats Will Join July 1 Protest,'' South China 
Morning Post (Online), 28 June 10.
    \19\ ``Democracy Rally Stand-Off Ends in Arrest of Student,'' South 
China Morning Post (Online), 20 March 10; Min Lee, ``Thousands Demand 
Democracy in Hong Kong,'' Associated Press, reprinted in Washington 
Post (Online), 1 January 10.
    \20\ James Pomfret, ``Hundreds Protest Costly Railway Project in 
Hong Kong,'' Reuters (Online), 8 January 10.
    \21\ Albert Wong and Eva Wu, ``Multitudes March for Universal 
Suffrage,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 2 January 10.
    \22\ Keith Bradsher, ``As Hong Kong's Political System Stalls, So 
Does Its Democracy Movement,'' New York Times (Online), 28 January 10.
    \23\ Fanny W.Y. Fung and Albert Wong, ``Beijing Warning Over HK 
Protests,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 7 January 10. See also 
``China Warns Again Against Hong Kong Democracy Push,'' Associated 
Press, reprinted in New York Times (Online), 07 March 10.
    \24\ Dan Kadison and Lawrence Chung, ``HK Rises in Press Freedom 
Index, but KMT `Interference' Hits Taiwan,'' South China Morning Post 
(Online), 22 October 09.
    \25\ Reporters Without Borders (Online), Press Freedom Index 2009.
    \26\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2009, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.
    \27\ Ibid.
    \28\ Ibid. See also Eva Wu, ``RTHK Chief Wants Charter Issues To Be 
Spelled Out,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 10 November 09; Danny 
Mok, ``RTHK Fears Impact of Editorial Advisory Body,'' South China 
Morning Post (Online), 5 January 10.
    \29\ Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China, enacted by the National People's Congress 
31 March 93, effective 20 December 99, Annexes I, II.
    \30\ Chia-Peck Wong, ``China's Hu Says Macau Should Diversify Its 
Economy (Update 1),'' Bloomberg (Online), 20 December 09.
    \31\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices--2009, China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 11 March 10.
    \32\ Fox Yi Hu, ``Vote-Buying Not as Obvious but Still 
Widespread,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 25 September 09.
    \33\ CECC Staff Interviews; Fox Yi Hu, ``Top Officials' Business 
Interests Pose Hurdle to `Sunshine Law' in Macau,'' South China Morning 
Post (Online), 11 January 10; Chia-Peck Wong, ``China's Hu Says Macau 
Should Diversify Its Economy (Update 1),'' Bloomberg (Online), 20 
December 09.
    \34\ Transparency International (Online), Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2009.
    \35\ See Chia-Peck Wong, ``China's Hu Says Macau Should Diversify 
Its Economy (Update 1),'' Bloomberg (Online), 20 December 09 
(concerning a survey conducted by the One Country Two Systems Research 
Centre).
    \36\ Fanny W.Y. Fung and Gary Cheung, ``Macau Security Law Praised 
at Handover Event,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 5 December 09. 
For detailed information on the law and its passage, see CECC, 2009 
Annual Report, 10 October 09, 302-304.
    \37\ Jillian Melchior, ``Macau May Day,'' Wall Street Journal 
(Online), 13 May 10.

    Notes to China's International Human Rights Commitments
    \1\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. V.
    \2\ Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN 
(Online), ``Statement by H.E. Ambassador Liu Zhenmin, Deputy Permanent 
Representative of China to the United Nations, at the Third Committee 
of the 64th Session of the General Assembly on the Implementation of 
Human Rights Instruments (Item 69A),'' 20 October 09.
    \3\ State Council Information Office, National Human Rights Action 
Plan of China (2009-2010), Xinhua (Online), 13 April 09, sec. V(1).
    \4\ UN GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun., 11th Sess., Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review--China, A/HRC/11/25, 3 March 09, 
paras. 63, 114(1).
    \5\ The information in the chart is based on information provided 
on the United Nations Treaty Collection Web site at http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx.
    \6\ The information in the chart is based on information provided 
on the International Labour Organization Web site at http://
www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm.

                                 
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