[Senate Prints 110-50]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress S. Prt.
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 110-50
_______________________________________________________________________
NORTH KOREA AND ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM--A REALITY CHECK
__________
A Report to Members
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Tenth Congress
Second Session
OCTOBER 2008
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Introduction..................................................... 1
The Americans and Our Itinerary.............................. 2
Background....................................................... 2
The Five Parties Have ``Not Delivered''...................... 3
Three Points for Capitol Hill................................ 3
Visit to the Yongbyon Complex................................ 4
Japan Abductees.............................................. 5
Meeting With Swedish and Other Officials..................... 5
Concluding Remarks............................................... 5
Appendix
Report of Visit to the Democratic People's Republic of North
Korea (DPRK), Pyongyang, and the Nuclear Center at Yongbyon,
February 12-16, 2008. Prof. Siegfried S. Hecker, Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.... 7
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
October 23, 2008.
Dear Colleagues: In February of 2008, I directed my Senate
Foreign Relations Committee staff member for East Asia, Keith
Luse, to visit North Korea to determine the status of the
disablement of North Korea's nuclear facility at Yongbyon.
In addition to visiting the Yongbyon complex and meeting
with officials of the General Department of Atomic Energy, Mr.
Luse had an opportunity to interact with officials of the North
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also met with Ambassador
Mats Foyer, Swedish Ambassador to North Korea, and other
European diplomats. Mr. Luse also visited the Pyongyang Foreign
Language University.
The resulting staff report and attachment from Dr.
Siegfried Hecker of the Center for International Security and
Cooperation at Stanford University, who accompanied Mr. Luse,
contains significant detail about the disablement activities at
Yongbyon, and provides other insights on the negotiations
between North Korea and the United States.
While many developments have occurred with North Korea
since the February trip, this report contains information which
will be timeless in its applications.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
(v)
NORTH KOREA AND ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM--A REALITY CHECK
----------
INTRODUCTION
The February 12 to 16, 2008 trip to North Korea was taken
with the intent to answer and inform discussion on a number of
pending questions, the following included.
Why did the North Koreans not provide a complete and
correct declaration of their nuclear program? What is the
status of disablement at the Yongbyon nuclear complex? Is
additional information needed for North Korea's consideration
of the future redirection of workers at the Yongbyon complex?
How secure is North Korea's nuclear arsenal? What
safeguards are in place to protect against someone within the
North Korean infrastructure with malicious intent, or for
personal profit, from obtaining access to weapons or materials?
Many North Korean workers at Yongbyon are displeased with their
country's willingness to disable Yongbyon facilities. What
quality control mechanisms are established throughout North
Korea, so that authorities will know if plutonium, highly
enriched uranium, or other materials related to nuclear
research and technology are missing?
While focus has largely been placed on North Korea's
nuclear program, what is the status of other components of the
overall weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal? Does North
Korea's effort to access outside molecular and biological
research relate to that country's weapons program or other
projects?
In the United States we learned that some North Korean
officials are concerned about a possible Chinese intervention
impacting North Korea's Government. Under what circumstances
might the Chinese take such action?
Does North Korea's eventual declaration of their nuclear
inventory necessarily suggest a willingness to disarm, and
truly eliminate all nuclear weapons and fissile materials?
In 2003, North Korean officials were of the mind that they
were more likely to achieve a ``nuclear deal'' with a
Democratic President? Does this continue as prevailing opinion
among North Korean leaders?
What constraints are placed on Chairman Kim Chong-il by the
North Korean military? Under what conditions will this military
machine which has been formed and programmed for decades to
confront the United States, consent to complete nuclear
disarmament?
The Americans and Our Itinerary
Dr. Siegfried Hecker, Codirector, Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Mr. Joel Wit,
Visiting Fellow, United States-Korea Institute of the John
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and I
concurrently travelled to the DPRK. While rare accommodation is
made for United States aircraft landing in Pyongyang, or to
travel by way of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), going to North
Korea typically requires traveling through Beijing. Travelers
go to the North Korean Embassy to obtain the necessary visa,
and then on to the office of the North Korean airlines--Air
Koryo, to purchase tickets for one of the bi-weekly flights to
Pyongyang. As my request to travel by train from China to
Pyongyang was denied, Air Koryo was again the option of
necessity.
Our time in North Korea included three sessions with
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials, a day-long visit
to the Yongbyon nuclear complex, meetings with English language
students at the Pyongyang Foreign Language University, and a
North Korean-prompted visit to the School of Music. Dr. Hecker
scheduled separate meetings with North Korean education and
health officials.
A request to meet with North Korean military officials was
again denied. Repeated and intense discussions occurred with
MFA officials regarding the lack of a complete and correct
declaration of North Korea's nuclear program by December 31 of
last year. Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan was unavailable
to meet.
BACKGROUND
On October 3, 2007, President Bush affirmed the six-party
agreement, of the same date, in Beijing, which ``reflects the
common commitment of the participants in the six-party talks to
realize a Korean Peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons.''
Under the agreement, North Korea ``agreed to disable all
existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment under the
September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 agreement;
agreed to provide a complete and correct declaration of all its
nuclear programs by December 31, 2007, and reaffirmed its
commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or
know-how.''
North Korea and the United States expressed their
commitment to moving toward a full diplomatic relationship, and
that bilateral exchanges would increase. Regarding removal of
North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and advancing ``the
process of terminating the application of the Trading with the
Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, the United States will
fulfill its commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's
actions based on consensus reached at the meetings of the
Working Group on Normalization of DPRK-United States
Relations.''
Also, ``in accordance with the February 13 agreement,
economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance up to the
equivalent of one million tons of HFO (inclusive of the 100,000
tons of HFO already delivered), will be provided to the DPRK.
Specific modalities will be finalized through discussion by the
Working Group on Economy and Energy Cooperation.''
The Five Parties Have ``Not Delivered''
During our meetings in Pyongyang, MFA officials stated they
had slowed the disabling process, and that a complete and
correct declaration of their nuclear program had not been
forthcoming, due to ``technical reasons.''
The DPRK definition of ``technical reasons'' breaks down
into a couple of categories:
(1) DPRK officials insist that the other five parties
have not provided HFO or the agreed-upon ``HFO-
equivalents'' according to schedule.
(2) The United States has not proceeded with
``political compensation,'' meaning removal of North
Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and
terminating application of the Trading With the Enemy
Act to North Korea.
On the latter issue, we affirmed to MFA representatives
that Bush administration officials held consultations with
Congress and were prepared to proceed with changes related to
the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the Trading With
the Enemy Act. However, the absence of a complete and correct
declaration by December 31 prevented U.S. officials from
proceeding.
Upon returning to Washington, the State Department's
perspective was requested in response to DPRK claims that HFO
and HFO-equivalent shipments had not arrived on schedule.
According to the Department, ``the five parties have accepted
in principle the DPRK's aim to receive monthly tranches of
50,000 tons per month, on a rotational basis, and have made
efforts to keep to that schedule.'' In reality, North Korean
claims about tardiness in delivery are correct. However, what
North Korean officials are not factoring, is that significant
administrative and structural challenges faced the countries
providing HFO and HFO-equivalent materials. The timeliness of
delivery was and is consequently impacted. (Was the issue of
how timeliness of delivery might be impacted by the
``challenges,'' aired at the time of the original agreement?)
Three Points for Capitol Hill
On the matter of North Korea missing the December 31, 2007
deadline to submit a ``complete and correct declaration'' of
its nuclear program, North Korean officials conveyed a similar
theme, with an assortment of words and phrases during our three
meetings. The Americans stressed that the eventual declaration
should include comprehensive information related to the export
of any component of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, as
well. Following are some quotations from those meetings.
``We fulfilled our obligations under disablement
terms. The discharge of spent fuel rods is being
delayed for technical reasons. Your U.S. partners
understand.''
``The obligations by the five parties are
significantly delayed. The United States was to take
action for action political compensation. We don't know
what the United States has done and have no schedule of
what it will do.''
``One million tons of HFO was committed, with one-
half to be delivered in-kind. Five hundred thousand
tons of HFO (in equivalent), should have been delivered
in equipment and materials. Only 200,000 tons of HFO
has been delivered so far. We are adjusting the speed
of disablement to the speed of the five parties.''
``We'll adjust the speed of settlement as much as the
United States moves forward. We don't know when the
other 300,000 tons of HFO will be delivered.''
``There will be no complete disablement until
political compensation occurs by the U.S. side.
Compensation actions by the five parties are very slow.
We hope the October 3 agreement will be fully
implemented.''
``Syria has been declared per the October 3 agreement
(meaning there would be no transfer of nuclear
technology, etc.) The uranium enrichment program does
not exist. We have provided clarification on the tube
issue.''
``We've given plan information to the U.S. side. We
have declared all of our other facilities to the IAEA
in the 1990's . . . don't need to declare this time. We
have already declared Syria.''
In response to encouragement from an American that North
Korea should ``get as far down the road as possible,'' in
negotiations with the Bush Administration, a North Korean
official said, ``Negotiations are deadlocked, not due to a lack
of will of both sides, but due to technical reasons. This will
be resolved through more consultations.''
When asked by an American to clarify, ``. . . in terms of
export, what is a complete declaration?'' a North Korean
official responded ``North Korea will declare all.''
North Korean officials were informed that Members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee were deeply concerned
regarding the missed December deadline to submit a complete and
clear declaration. Given Member concerns, the North Koreans
were asked for a message to convey to the Committee. In
response, they offered three points for conveyance to Capitol
Hill.
(1) Both the United States and the DPRK negotiators
understood each other very well.
(2) The delays (with the declaration), are caused by
technical reasons.
(3) Both sides are working hard to resolve those
technical issues.
Visit to the Yongbyon Complex
Dr. Hecker's summary of our visit to the Yongbyon nuclear
complex is attached. In addition to visiting sites where
disablement actions have occurred, we met with Dr. Ri Song Hop,
former director of the Yongbyon complex, who retired from that
position and now serves in the capacity of counselor to the
General Department of Atomic Energy. During our time at the
Yongbyon complex, North Korean officials commended the American
technicians present during the disablement process. The North
Koreans also consented to our taking photos.
In response to a question from the Americans about the
security conditions of North Korea's nuclear weapons and
material arsenal, North Korean officials insisted that their
weapons and materials are securely maintained, and that it
would not be possible for access to be gained by someone with
malicious intent or purpose of profit.
Japan Abductees
North Korean officials refused to discuss matters related
to abductees from Japan in North Korea.
Meeting With Swedish and Other Officials
The Embassy of Sweden represents United States' interests
in North Korea. Swedish Ambassador Mats Foyer scheduled a
luncheon meeting at his residence with several diplomatic
colleagues, including Roman Iwaszkiewicz, Ambassador of Poland;
Dr. Thomas Schafer, Ambassador of Germany; Martin Tomco,
Ambassador of the Czech Republic; John Everard, Ambassador of
Britain; Ovidiu Liviu Iancu, Charge d'Affaires for Romania;
Yordan Pamukov, Charge d'affaires, Bulgaria; and Ingrid
Bergman, First Secretary, Sweden. Primary points of discussions
focused on Dr. Hecker's impressions of the Yongbyon disabling
process and possible application of a Nunn-Lugar cooperative
threat reduction project in North Korea. The Americans inquired
about the status of European Union discussions with North Korea
on human rights issues.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chairman Kim Chong-il may be the only person in North Korea
who truly knows the basis for North Korea not submitting a
complete and correct declaration of its nuclear weapons program
by December 31, 2007. Endless speculation circulates regarding
North Korean intentions for the short-term, as well as future
prospects of eliminating the nuclear weapons program. There are
other issues and questions regarding dismantlement and eventual
elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons inventory.
Is the North Korean military resisting MFA efforts to
substantively engage with the United States and the other five
countries? Chairman Kim's best efforts to orchestrate a balance
among competing interests within the North, may be a ``stretch
too far'' for North Korean military hardliners. Declaring and
discarding the jewel of their arsenal will be difficult for
those viewing it as the ultimate deterrent.
A P P E N D I X
----------
Report of Visit to the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea
(DPRK), Pyongyang, and the Nuclear Center at Yongbyon, February 12-16,
2008. Prof. Siegfried S. Hecker, Center for International Security and
Cooperation, Stanford University
My visit was sponsored by the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation and the Nuclear Threat Initiative. I was
accompanied by W. Keith Luse, staff member for Senator Richard
Lugar, and Joel S. Wit, former State Department official. This
was my fifth visit to the DPRK, and the third to Yongbyon.
Discussions in Pyongyang were held with officials from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At Yongbyon, we were hosted by
officials from the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and
officials from the General Department of Atomic Energy. This
report is confined to the nuclear issues. I also met with
officials from the Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry
of Education to explore cooperation in those areas.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Our visit leads me to conclude that the DPRK leadership has
made the decision to permanently shut down plutonium production
if the United States and the other four parties live up to
their October 3, 2007 commitments. However, they have retained
a hedge to be able to restart the facilities if the agreement
falls through. We verified that the disablement actions taken
to date will effectively delay a potential restart of plutonium
production. Cooperation between the United States and DPRK
technical teams has been excellent, and until the recent
slowdown, the two sides struck the proper balance between doing
the job expeditiously and doing it safely. By their definition,
the DPRK has completed 10 of 12 disablement actions. They have
slowed down the last two to actions to allow the other parties
to catch up.
The current six-party process has put within reach a
permanent shutdown of the Yongbyon plutonium production
complex. To do so, highest priority must be placed on
completing the disablement (discharging the reactor fuel and
disabling or selling the existing fresh fuel rods) and
proceeding to the dismantlement stage. If this is accomplished,
then the DPRK will not be able to make more bombs and, without
additional nuclear tests, it will not be able to make better
bombs.
It is important to understand and to be prepared for the
fact that the DPRK will have to restart the reprocessing
facility some time in the next year or so to allow for the safe
disposal of its high-level radioactive waste and the remaining
low-level uranium waste. I also strongly urge reconsideration
of the decision to ship the current load of spent fuel out of
the DPRK. Technically, it is much more advisable to allow one
more reprocessing campaign under IAEA supervision and ship out
12 kg of plutonium rather than 50,000 kg of highly radioactive
spent fuel that will have to be processed somewhere.
If the DPRK decides to break out of the six-party agreement
and restart operations, it will have only limited capacity for
plutonium production. After a delay of 6 to 18 months,
depending on how far disablement proceeds, they would be able
to regain their prior production rate of six kilograms (or
roughly one bomb's worth) of plutonium per year. The 50 and 200
mW (electric) reactors do not appear salvageable and, hence,
the DPRK will not be able to ramp up plutonium production over
the next 5 to 10 years. If the process proceeds to
dismantlement, then no plutonium production is likely for the
same time frame.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials stated that they will
not proceed with a more complete declaration list until the
other parties meet their October 3 commitments. They told us
that they reported a total separated plutonium inventory of 30
kilograms (sufficient for four to five bombs) to the United
States in November 2007. In response to my comment that this is
less than my estimate of 40 to 50 kg based on previous visits
and, hence, this would require substantial cooperation on their
part to verify the smaller number, MFA officials stated that
they are prepared to do so. In response to my question about
declaration of their weaponization facilities, they said they
are also not prepared to do so until the other parties meet
their commitments.
MFA officials also stated that they view the uranium
enrichment issue settled. They explained that the extraordinary
access U.S. specialists were given to the aluminum tubes in
question at a missile factory demonstrates that the DPRK has no
such program. They dismissed allegations that they received
centrifuges from Pakistan. They also denied nuclear cooperation
with Syria and other countries. When pressed on this issue,
they reiterated that they stand by their October 3 commitment
not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how to
other countries.
In my view, the most important risk-reduction actions now
are to stop the production of more plutonium and to stop export
of existing plutonium and nuclear technologies. The current
situation puts us within reach of stopping plutonium production
for the foreseeable future. The five parties should do
everything in their power to get the DPRK to finish the
disablement expeditiously and to move on to dismantlement.
Whereas the United States should continue to press for a
``complete and correct'' declaration, it is more important to
stop additional production than it is to substantiate whether
the current inventory is 30 kg or 50 kg and to find out to
exactly what level they developed uranium enrichment. However,
it is imperative that the DPRK leadership understands that any
previous or future export of fissile materials (or of nuclear
weapons) represents a red line and cannot be tolerated by the
United States and the other parties.
Although the DPRK has put nuclear worker reorientation on
the back burner waiting for the next stage, we had substantial
discussions about potential prospects. We learned much about
the current status of the IRT-2000 research reactor, which
could be reconfigured for research and medical applications.
Yongbyon Nuclear Complex: Shutdown and Disablement
On July 15, 2007, the DPRK shut down and sealed the key
nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and allowed IAEA inspectors back
to monitor the shutdown. DPRK workers began to disable these
facilities under U.S. technical supervision a few months later.
The shutdown halts the production of additional bomb fuel
(plutonium) and the disablement makes it more difficult to
restart plutonium production should the DPRK decide to do so.
On February 14, 2008, our delegation was given access to
the Yongbyon nuclear facilities to independently verify the
disablement actions. We found the level of cooperation between
the DPRK nuclear specialists and the U.S. team that is
supervising the disablement to be excellent. The United States
has supplied a large amount of equipment, including protective
clothing and radiation monitors, to allow the DPRK to disable
the facilities expeditiously and safely. Until the recent
slowdown, the two sides struck the proper balance between doing
the job expeditiously and doing it safely. The discharge of the
spent fuel was initially delayed because the cooling pool water
level was low and the chemistry was not acceptable to allow
safe storage of the magnesium alloy-clad spent fuel rods.
Moreover, the water treatment facility was not operational. The
initial speed of discharge also was a good compromise between
political expediency and safety.
The American presence and equipment supplied has also
significantly changed the health and safety practices at the
Yongbyon facilities. Unlike during prior visits to Yongbyon, we
were required to wear protective clothing in all buildings.
Improved health and safety practices were evident in all of
them.
Yongbyon officials defined 12 disablement actions. These
actions were taken at the three key nuclear facilities--the
fuel fabrication facility, the 5 MWe reactor, and the
reprocessing facility (radiochemical laboratory). DPRK
officials took the unusual step of allowing us to take
photographs of the disabled equipment. Photos of the disabled
equipment can be found at: http://cisac.stanford.edu/news/
hecker.
The following constitute the 12 disablement actions as
defined by Yongbyon officials: \1\
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\1\ The United States has apparently defined 11 disablement actions
that are somewhat different from the DPRK list. The United States' list
does not include No. 4 and combines No. 5 and No. 6. It also includes
one additional action--the disablement of fresh, unclad fuel rods
fabricated prior to 1994 and stored at the fuel fabrication facility.
By U.S. count, 8 out of 11 actions have been completed as of February
14, 2008.
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Fuel Fabrication Facility
(1) Removal and storage of all three uranium ore
concentrate dissolver tanks.
(2) Removal and storage of all seven uranium
conversion furnaces, including storage of refractory
bricks and mortar sand.
(3) Removal and storage of both metal casting
furnaces and vacuum system, and removal and storage of
eight machining lathes.
(4) Storage of the remaining UO3 powder in bags with
monitoring by IAEA (this constitutes nearly five tons
of powder).
5 MWe Reactor
(5) Cut and removal of portions of steel piping of
the secondary cooling loop outside the reactor
building.
(6) Removal of the wood interior structure of the
cooling tower.
(7) Discharge of 8000 spent fuel rods.
(8) Removal and storage of the control rod drive
mechanisms.
Reprocessing Facility
(9) Cut cable and removal of drive mechanism for
trolley that moves spent fuel caskets from the fuel
receiving building into the reprocessing facility.
(10) Cut two of the four steam lines into the
reprocessing facility.
(11) Removal of the crane and door actuators that
permit spent fuel rods to enter the reprocessing
facility (at level 1).
(12) Removal of the drive mechanisms for the fuel
cladding shearing and slitting machines (at level 1).
The operational definition of ``disablement'' is to make it
more difficult, but not impossible, to restart the nuclear
facilities. As of February 14, 10 of the 12 disablement actions
identified by the DPRK had been completed. The discharge of the
reactor fuel rods from the 5 MWe reactor (No. 7) was
intentionally slowed down by the DPRK. The removal of the
control rod drive mechanisms (No. 8) will be completed once all
fuel rods are discharged.
5 MWe Reactor. Several sections of pipe in the secondary
cooling loop had been cut and were lying on the ground. The
internal wooden structure of the cooling tower had been taken
down and disposed of (some 240 cubic meters of wood). The chief
engineer told us that it would take 1 year to rebuild this
structure, although it most likely could be done much more
rapidly, if necessary. The initial discharge of fuel began in
mid-December 2007 at a rate of 80 fuel rods per day. At this
rate it would have taken 100 days to finish the job. However,
the DPRK has since slowed the rate to 30 per day to allow the
other five parties to catch up with their commitments per the
Oct. 3, 2007 second-phase actions agreement. On February 14,
2008, we were told that 1,440 of the 8,000 fuel rods had been
discharged. Hence, the reactor fuel discharge may not be
complete until late September 2008.
Should the DPRK choose to restart the reactor, they would
have to rebuild the interior of the cooling tower or find
alternative paths to release steam from the reactor. In
addition, the more of the current fuel in the reactor is
discharged, the longer it will take them to reload the reactor
with new fuel. They have in storage less than a quarter of a
reactor load of clad fuel rods. They also have in storage a
full load of bare uranium fuel rods (our best estimate is
12,000) for the 50 MWe reactor. It appears that these can be
used for the 5 MWe reactor, but may require some machining, and
would have to be clad with magnesium alloy cladding. These
operations would require the reconstitution of parts of the
fuel fabrication facility, including the machine shop. Such
actions would most likely take close to 1 year.
One of the most notable actions at the reactor is the
installation of radiation monitors in the reactor building that
remotely monitor the removal of the fuel rods. This instrument
package contains gamma ray detectors and a neutron detector
built at Los Alamos National Laboratory and installed by its
technical specialists.
Fuel Fabrication Facility. The front end of fuel
fabrication (Building 1) had been operating making uranium
dioxide (UO2) from uranium ore concentrate right up to the time
the facility was shut down on July 15, 2007. The back end was
operational with seven conversion furnaces, two casting
furnaces, and eight machining lathes. However, the middle part,
the fluorination facility, had deteriorated so badly during the
freeze (1994 to 2003) that the building has been abandoned (as
we were shown in August 2007). However, the DPRK had recently
completed alternate fluorination equipment (using dry rather
than wet techniques) in one of the ancillary buildings.
However, this was a makeshift operation that has limited
throughput potential. It was not put into full operation by the
time of the shutdown on July 15.
The disablement steps taken at the fuel fabrication
facility focused on those buildings and equipment that were in
reasonable working order. The removal of the three uranium
dissolver tanks and the disassembly of the seven conversion
furnaces (with thousands of refractory bricks) are serious
disablement steps. The removal of the casting furnaces and the
machining lathes also constitute significant steps. The DPRK
has not been willing to take steps to render the fresh fuel in
storage not usable for a reactor restart. These fuel rods could
be bent, making it necessary to recast and remanufacture the
rods to precise tolerances. Or, since the uranium metal content
is substantial (close to 100 metric tons of natural uranium
metal), the fresh fuel rods could be sold to one of the five
parties, which could use the uranium as feed material for
light-water reactor fuel. DPRK officials say that they await
additional corresponding measures by the United States before
they are willing to take actions on the fresh fuel rods. If the
fresh fuel rods are bent, the DPRK would have to recast and
remachine, which would add several months to a restart time. If
the fresh fuel were sold, then the DPRK would have to restart
the entire fuel fabrication facility and produce new uranium
metal, which would add approximately a year to a restart time.
Reprocessing Facility (Radiochemical Laboratory). The
disablement actions at the reprocessing facility were
restricted to the front end--the fuel transfer building and
fuel transfer areas in the main building. The hot cells and the
plutonium laboratories have not been affected. At this time, no
new spent fuel can be transferred and processed at the plant.
The four disablement actions at the facility are substantial,
but could most likely be reversed in a matter of months.
The principal reason for leaving the hot cells intact for
now is that they still contain all high-level radioactive waste
(a volume of 80 cubic meters) from their reprocessing
campaigns. In addition, the facility also contains low-level
uranium waste from previous campaigns. The high-level waste
represents the most hazardous product of the reprocessing
operations. It is important that it be treated, stored, and
disposed of properly. The DPRK has very little experience with
such waste. When questioned about their disposition plans, they
told us that they have only done a few experiments on waste
disposal. They have explored vitrification of the waste and
separation of cesium and strontium with subsequent disposal of
what remains as mid-level waste. They have done some small-
scale vitrification experiments. When questioned about their
plans to disable the hot cells or the plutonium laboratories,
they said they had no such plans because they considered the
entire reprocessing facility disabled if the front end is
disabled.
In response to my question, Yongbyon officials stated that
they are not able to do any equipment maintenance. They said
all of the facilities in question are under IAEA seal and
monitoring. When asked how long they can do without maintenance
and still be able to salvage the facilities, they said that the
ability to restart the facility vanishes if maintenance
restrictions last for a long time (they did not define what
they mean by long). In any case, they have a limited time to
treat the high-level waste or wind up with a significant safety
problem. They estimated that it would take them 1 year to
finish the waste treatment job.
It is important to understand and to be prepared for the
fact that the DPRK will have to restart the reprocessing
facility some time in the next year or so to allow for the safe
disposal of its high-level radioactive waste and the remaining
low-level uranium waste. I also strongly urge reconsideration
of the decision to ship the current load of spent fuel out of
the DPRK. The spent fuel rods are now being discharged into the
cooling pool where they would have to be recanned for safe
transportation outside the DPRK. It is still possible to
reinstall the disabled equipment on the front end of the
reprocessing facility and to conduct one more reprocessing
campaign with IAEA monitoring. Although diplomatically this may
be considered a step backward, technically it would be a giant
step forward. Technical considerations strongly favor
reprocessing the spent fuel under IAEA monitoring and dealing
with the disposition of 10 to 12 kilograms of plutonium. The
current plan of recanning 50,000 kg of highly radioactive spent
fuel for interim storage and eventual shipment is a monumental
job. Moreover, eventually this spent fuel will have to be
reprocessed somewhere due to its unstable nature. DPRK
officials stated that the final disposition of the fuel rods
has not yet been decided in the six-party process. They are
taking the disablement, dismantlement, and final abandonment
one step at a time.
My overall assessment is that the disablement actions are
significant. I believe that the DPRK leadership has made the
decision to permanently shut down plutonium production if the
other parties do their part. However, they have retained a
hedge to be able to restart the facilities if the agreement
falls through. All of the equipment removed as part of
disablement is being stored. A key question is how much of a
time delay to restart the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex is incurred
by the disablement actions and to what level could the DPRK
reconstitute or enhance plutonium production.
At this point, all actions could be reversed and the
facilities restarted. With only approximately one quarter of
the reactor fuel having been discharged to date (end of
February 2008), it may take 6 to 12 months to restart all
facilities. If the reactor fuel discharge is completed and the
fresh fuel in storage is disabled or sold, the time for restart
would most likely increase to 12 to 18 months. In any case,
none of these actions can be taken without the knowledge of the
U.S disablement team and IAEA technical monitoring team. Also,
since no maintenance is allowed, the longer the facilities
remain disabled, the more difficult it will be for the DPRK to
restart them.
However, even if the DPRK decides to break out of the six-
party agreement and restart operations, it will have only
limited capacity for plutonium production. In the scenario
described above, it may be possible to replace the discharged
fuel and reload one more reactor core with fresh fuel.
Consequently, the DPRK could continue to produce approximately
six kilogram of plutonium (or roughly one bomb's worth) per
year for the next 4 to 6 years. If they reconstitute all fuel
fabrication facilities, then they could produce additional fuel
for future reloading and continue to produce that much
plutonium into the foreseeable future. Although the 5 MWe
reactor had some operational difficulties before the shutdown,
it can most likely be kept operational for quite a few years.
The DPRK would not be able to scale up its plutonium
production any time soon. Based on discussions and observations
from my previous visits, I believe that the 50 MWe and 200 MWe
reactors are not salvageable. The DPRK would have to start
over. It has limited industrial capacity to build these
reactors in the near future. Therefore, the most that a
restarted Yongbyon plutonium production complex could produce
over the next 5 to 10 years is one bomb's worth of plutonium
per year.
The current six-party process has put within reach
permanently shutting down the Yongbyon plutonium production
complex. To do so, highest priority must be placed on
completing the disablement (discharging the reactor fuel and
disabling or selling the existing fresh fuel rods) and
proceeding to the dismantlement stage. If this is accomplished,
then the DPRK will not be able to make more bombs and, without
additional nuclear tests, it will not be able to make better
bombs.
Discussions With Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Declaration of Nuclear
Programs
Although Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials initially
claimed that they met their declaration responsibilities in
November, when pressed about a ``complete and correct''
declaration, they stated that they are not prepared to provide
such a list until the five parties complete their corresponding
obligations according to the October 3 agreement. We discussed
what I consider to be the three principal components of a
complete and correct declaration: (1) Plutonium and
weaponization, (2) uranium enrichment, and (3) nuclear
cooperation and export.
MFA officials claimed that they told the U.S. Government
that they have 30 kilograms of reprocessed plutonium. I told
them that this amount is lower than my estimate of 40 to 50 kg
based on findings from four previous visits to the DPRK. It
will require substantial cooperation and transparency on their
part to verify the lower number. Such actions will require
access to reactor production records, reactor components and
products, reprocessing plant records and facilities, and waste
products and sites. MFA officials said they are prepared to
provide such access once we move to the next stage. I asked
about declaration of the weaponization facilities, such as
those in which the plutonium pits are cast and machined, the
explosives are produced and assembled, and the weapons
themselves (all of which I believe are outside the Yongbyon
nuclear complex). MFA officials said they are not prepared to
declare these facilities until the five parties meet their
October 3 obligations.
With regard to uranium enrichment, MFA officials told us
that they have resolved this issue with the Americans. They
gave U.S. experts access to the aluminum tubes in question at a
missile factory and demonstrated that these were not used for
enrichment purposes. In response to my question about reports
of A.Q. Kahn having sold them centrifuges, they said ``that's
your story.'' I told them that, in fact, it was Pakistani
President Musharraf's story since he stated this in his recent
book. They responded that they have no uranium enrichment
connections to Pakistan. We were told that DPRK military and
industrial officials were extremely unhappy with the access the
Americans were granted and with the fact that they were given
samples of the aluminum tubes in question. When I asked to
visit this factory, I was told that neither I, nor anyone else,
will get access again. Clearly, they were unhappy with the
consequences of having giving the United States access and
samples.
We discussed the issue of nuclear cooperation and possible
export of nuclear materials and technology. Specifically, we
stated that it is well known that the DPRK has dealt with
countries such as Pakistan, Iran, and Syria in the area of
missile technologies. I said that I cannot rule out that
similar cooperation has occurred in the nuclear field. I
specifically mentioned the concerns reported in the press that
the Syrian site bombed by Israel on Sept. 6, 2007 may have been
a nuclear facility and that the DPRK may have had a connection
to such a facility. I stated that it is quite likely that the
Syrian site was a nuclear site based on these reports and the
fact that Syria cleaned up the bombed site so rapidly and
completely. I also said that I find it conceivable that the
DPRK may have assisted Syria in such a venture. MFA officials
denied having any nuclear connections to Syria. When we
reiterated the importance of preventing nuclear exports, we
were told that the DPRK will abide by the Oct. 3, 2007
agreement not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or
know-how. We stressed our concern that should past transfers
come to light in the future, they may derail the diplomatic
process.
What we found in our discussion with MFA officials is that
at this point they justify not providing a complete and correct
declaration on the lack of progress by the other five parties
of living up to their October 3 commitments. Specifically, we
were told that instead of one million tons of heavy fuel oil
that was promised (500,000 tons in HFO and 500,000 tons in HFO
equivalent) only 200,000 tons have been delivered and South
Korea and China have provided very little of the HFO
equivalent. In addition, they expected the United States to
remove them from the states sponsoring terrorism list and drop
the application of the Trading With the Enemy Act. They
complained that neither of these has been done. Consequently,
they have slowed down their disablement actions and they are
not prepared to present a complete declaration.
Dealing With the Current Negotiations Impasse
In my view, the greatest threats posed by the DPRK nuclear
program are (1) the potential export of nuclear weapons,
fissile materials, or nuclear technology and know-how, and (2)
the possession of a limited nuclear arsenal and inventory of
fissile materials (specifically, plutonium). We had previously
estimated the DPRK inventory of plutonium to be quite small--40
to 50 kg. The DPRK's declaration of 30 kg is plausible, but
must be verified. The October 9, 2006 nuclear test was, at
best, only partially successful. Hence, their small nuclear
arsenal is most likely of primitive design. It is highly
unlikely that the DPRK has the confidence to mount a nuclear
device on a missile. Moreover, it is unlikely that they can
develop a more sophisticated weapon without additional nuclear
tests.
The most important risk-reduction actions are to stop the
production of more plutonium and to stop export of existing
plutonium and nuclear technologies. The current situation puts
us within reach of stopping plutonium production for the
foreseeable future. The five parties should do everything in
their power to get the DPRK to finish the disablement
expeditiously and to move on to dismantlement. It is more
important to stop additional production than it is to
substantiate whether the current inventory is 30 kg or 50 kg.
Not permitting the plutonium inventory to grow reduces the
likelihood of export or of additional nuclear tests. In other
words, no more bombs, no better bombs, and less likelihood of
export.
It will, of course, be important to verify the exact
quantities of plutonium produced and expended. DPRK officials
indicated they are prepared to do what is required for adequate
verification once the five parties meet their commitments.
Likewise, it will be important to determine the exact nature of
the uranium enrichment effort. MFA officials believed that the
extraordinary access allowed U.S. specialists to the aluminum
tubes at the missile factory was adequate to prove they do not
have a uranium enrichment program. However, this exercise
resulted in new questions since traces of enriched uranium were
reported to have been detected on the aluminum tubes. In
addition, the DPRK has not adequately addressed the Pakistani
connection. It is very likely that the DPRK had a uranium
enrichment research effort, but unlikely that it came close to
commercial scale. Therefore, the United States should continue
to press for a ``complete and correct'' declaration, but not
allow this to impede completing the disablement and moving on
to dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear complex.
The potential of nuclear exports from the DPRK represents a
serious risk. It is imperative that the DPRK leadership
understands that any previous or future export of fissile
materials (or of nuclear weapons) represents a red line and
cannot be tolerated by the United States and the other parties.
The export of nuclear technologies or know-how must be
acknowledged and assessed, and most importantly must be
terminated. Such exports are especially worrisome to states
such as Iran that are developing a robust nuclear
infrastructure under a civilian umbrella. DPRK officials
focused their discussion of exports on the future, stating that
they will abide by the October 3 agreement not to transfer
nuclear materials, technologies, or know-how. However, a
reconciliation of past activities must be included.
The final elimination of all nuclear weapons and weapons-
usable materials have been agreed to in principle in the
September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. However, the details have
not been worked out. I believe that denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula will require a transformation in relationships
between the DPRK and the United States. It appears possible,
but may be a long way off. The United States should not only
press China and South Korea to get the DPRK to comply, but it
should meet its own obligations and put the burden squarely on
the DPRK to proceed with denuclearization.
Nuclear Worker Redirection
We told our MFA hosts that we were interested in exploring
the future redirection of the Yongbyon nuclear workers. Since
the Soviet-built IRT-2000 reactor could potentially be used for
medical isotope production, I asked to visit the reactor and
determine key operational characteristics. We were told that
although the future of the nuclear workers is important, the
DPRK was not prepared to discuss this subject at this time.
They indicated that such discussions would be initiated once
dismantlement of the Yongbyon facilities had been achieved. We
were denied access to the IRT-2000 reactor.
At Yongbyon, we met with former Yongbyon Director, Dr. Ri
Hong Sop, other Yongbyon officials, and officials from the
General Department of Atomic Energy (GDAE). They repeated the
MFA comment that this is not the proper time to discuss worker
reorientation. However, they were willing to get our input and
they did respond to our questions. We were able to find out the
key operating parameters for the IRT-2000 reactor and its
operational status without a visit.
Dr. Ri said that in the future they would like the Yongbyon
workforce to be directed to energy--specifically peaceful
nuclear energy. They expect that an LWR will be introduced.
They could train their technicians and engineers for the LWR.
They are also studying how to train their nuclear engineers in
other areas. He said he is interested in my ideas. He wanted to
know how to keep a scientific base for the future. This could
be implemented after the agreement is fulfilled. To date, they
are still only thinking about this. They are not ready to do
anything.
I presented the following ideas for consideration:
In the near future, the focus will be on
dismantlement, which will require decontamination and
decommissioning of facilities. These activities will
engage a significant fraction of the Yongbyon
workforce.
The Yongbyon nuclear complex has significant needs
in radiation health physics and environmental
remediation. Their facilities contain a lot of
radioactive materials and there is heavy contamination.
It will be important for them to do the job safely. We
could develop collaborations in radiation monitoring
and assessment of health effects. The United States has
many years of experience in assessing the health
effects of radiation. Similarly, it has developed
significant expertise in environmental assessment and
remediation. Yongbyon officials agreed that these are
good areas for cooperation once dismantlement is
complete. They indicated that they have also been
thinking along these lines.
I discussed the potential use of the IRT-2000
reactor for research, medical, and industrial
applications. I told Yongbyon officials that we have a
lot of experience with research reactors. We had one at
Los Alamos while I was director. I also have worked
closely with colleagues from the former Soviet Union
who worked with reactors similar to the IRT-2000
reactor. I presented an extensive list of possible
applications for the IRT-2000 reactor and told them
that we need to know the specifications of the reactor
to judge what applications may be feasible. The list
included radioisotope production (primarily for medical
applications), neutron activation analysis, neutron
diffraction and radiography, neutron transmutation
doping, reactor fuel studies, and neutron radiation
cancer therapy.
Yongbyon officials responded that they have had experience
with some of the applications I had mentioned. They were
clearly pleased with my discussion of the possible options.
They said the key to the IRT-2000 reactor is the fuel. They
have not been able to get delivery of new fuel (Director Ri had
previously told me all fuel was supplied by the Soviet Union,
and that they had not received any new fuel since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union). The most recent fuel used in
the reactor was 36 and 80 percent enriched in U-235. I told
them that it would not be possible to get new HEU fuel because
of proliferation concerns. They indicated that it would be
possible to convert the core back to low-enriched uranium,
which is what the original fuel was when the reactor was
delivered by the Soviet Union. They also stated that the
reactor could be operated for several more decades with rather
minor enhancements.
Yonbyon officials stated that they have experience in the
production of medical and industrial isotopes. The Isotope
Production Laboratory (IPL) has channels that allows them to
extract targets and extract the radioisotopes of interest. They
have not done cancer treatments--said they could not get
results (it was not clear whether or not they actually tried).
He said it would be helpful to have exchanges in this area.
They have people who suffer from thyroid cancer, but can't
treat them.
Director Ri also indicated that they would like to put
their technical people onto projects for light-water reactors
(LWR). If Yongbyon is shut down, he and his colleagues will be
concerned about what their engineers will do. They have no LWR
experience now, but they would retrain them. They will need to
think about how to best accomplish that. I asked about what
Yongbyon workers could do outside the nuclear arena. I told him
that this has turned out to be difficult in the United States
and Russia. It depends on what skills and talents their workers
have. Ri said there will be time in the future to share that
kind of information about Yongbyon workers. He hopes that time
will come.