[Senate Prints 110-44]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT S. Prt.
110-44
_______________________________________________________________________
MANAGING CHAOS--THE IRAQI REFUGEES OF JORDAN AND SYRIA AND INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS IN IRAQ
__________
STAFF TRIP REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Tenth Congress
Second Session
APRIL 2008
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-773 WASHINGTON : 2008
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Introduction..................................................... 2
The Crisis Through Iraqi Eyes.................................... 3
Returnees--a Trickle or a Flood.................................. 6
The Humanitarian Response........................................ 7
U.S. Humanitarian Efforts........................................ 10
Resettlement..................................................... 11
Recommendations.................................................. 13
Conclusion....................................................... 17
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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April 8, 2008.
Dear Colleagues: There are as many as 2 million Iraqi
refugees in Jordan and Syria, the vast majority of whom have
been displaced from their homes since the war in Iraq began in
2003. Another 2 million refugees are displaced inside Iraq. In
January 2008, we directed two of our staff members, Sharon
Waxman of Senator Kennedy's staff and Perry Cammack of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to visit Jordan and Syria
and report on the conditions of Iraqi refugees and on American
and international efforts on their behalf.
Their findings suggest a startling lack of American
leadership in a crisis that much of the international community
considers a result of our intervention in Iraq. Acknowledging
that the war in Iraq has resulted in one of the greatest
humanitarian crises of the post-cold-war era is a bitter pill
to swallow. Ensuring that this refugee population receives the
humanitarian treatment and dignity that it deserves requires
American leadership of a kind not seen to this point.
We believe that more must be done by the United States to
deal with this crisis. An appropriate action by President Bush
at this time would be to appoint a senior official in the White
House to coordinate our overall policy on the Iraqi refugees
and internally displaced persons. As President Ford stated in
appointing the late Julia Taft to be Director of the
Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees, our country's
response to the refugee crisis caused by the Vietnam war was
``a reaffirmation of American awareness of the roots and ideals
of our society.''
We hope that this report and the recommendations contained
in it will be useful to our colleagues in Congress and to the
public in considering this important issue.
Sincerely,
Edward M. Kennedy,
Chairman, Senate Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Immigration,
Refugees and Border Security.
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Chairman, Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations.
(v)
MANAGING CHAOS--THE IRAQI REFUGEES OF JORDAN AND SYRIA AND INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS IN IRAQ
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Executive Summary
In January 2007, we traveled to the Middle East and spent 2
days in Jordan and 3 days in Syria evaluating the status of
Iraqi refugees and the American and international responses to
their plight. This report is based on meetings in Washington,
DC, Amman, and Damascus with senior American, Iraqi, United
Nations, Jordanian, and Syrian officials, humanitarian workers,
refugee experts, and, most importantly, Iraqi refugees. The
Iraqi refugee crisis is not limited to these two countries;
Iraqi refugees are dispersed inside Iraq and throughout the
entire Middle East and beyond. Since approximately 80 percent
of these refugees are thought to reside in Jordan or Syria, we
made them the focus of our trip and study. However, many of our
conclusions are pertinent to the wider region. Our key findings
are:
The influx of as many as 2 million Iraqi refugees to
Jordan and Syria has created an enormous burden on
these countries and is a massive humanitarian crisis
that will require sustained international attention for
many years. The number of new arrivals, although down
sharply since the summer of 2007, still exceeds the
number of returnees. Refugees report little or no
desire to return to Iraq anytime soon, if ever, and
those who have returned cite economic desperation as
the primary factor.
American leadership is fundamental to rallying the
international response. The international community
generally views the Iraqi refugee crisis as a direct
result of our intervention in Iraq and humanitarian
assistance professionals see the American response as
far from commensurate with the magnitude of the
problem. The United States should, as a matter of
policy, fund 50 percent of the United Nations and other
international organizations' emergency appeals for
Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons rather
than its standard 25 to 30 percent contribution.
Dramatically increasing American support for the
refugees will increase our ability to solicit
contributions from the international community and
demonstrate a commitment that will make it easier for
host countries to increase legal protections.
The administration should appoint a high-level White
House coordinator to oversee the United States
humanitarian response. This person should immediately
design and implement a more robust assistance effort
for Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons.
The coordinator should be responsible for soliciting
international donor contributions, coordinating the
response with international and nongovernmental
organizations, and ensuring that U.S. assistance
supports a cohesive international strategy.
The goals set by the Bush administration to resettle
7,000 Iraqi refugees in the United States in fiscal
year 2007 and 12,000 Iraqi refugees in fiscal year 2008
have created expectations among the refugees and an
obligation to meet those expectations. Despite the
clear need, the United States resettled only 1,608
Iraqis in fiscal year 2007 and will be hard-pressed to
meet this year's goal. Most experts agree that Syria,
host to the most vulnerable Iraqi community, should be
the primary target of U.S. resettlement efforts, and
the administration needs to think more creatively about
alternative mechanisms to increase our processing
ability there.
Host countries, such as Jordan and Syria, should
take steps to regularize the legal status of Iraqi
refugees on their soil. It is unreasonable to expect
Jordan and Syria to permanently integrate Iraqi
refugees into their societies. However, only small
fractions of Iraqis are working or attending schools
and many are running out of resources. Their status
needs to be regularized so they can work legally and
come out of the shadows. Without these changes,
economic and psychological pressure on the refugee
community will increase. Increased marginalization
could breed radicalization unless proactive steps are
taken to provide refugees with increased educational
and economic opportunities.
Introduction
Although several hundred thousand refugees fled Iraq in the
years before the war began in 2003, the overwhelming majority
of the displacements have occurred since February 2006, when
large-scale sectarian violence erupted in the aftermath of the
al-Askariyah mosque bombing, a sacred Shiite shrine in Samarra.
According to United Nations and United States data, over 2
million Iraqi refugees have fled their country and over 2
million more are internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside
Iraq.\1\ Given the security challenges in Iraq and the
difficult working environments in the region, reliable data on
Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons do not exist,
and some estimates have placed the total number of displaced
Iraqis as high as 5 million. An estimated 80 percent of the
refugees are in Syria or Jordan with smaller populations in
Egypt, Lebanon, and beyond. Officially, there are 1.5 million
in Syria and 500,000 in Jordan, though some observers think the
actual numbers may be lower.\2\
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\1\ The Department of State estimates that there are 2-2.4 million
refugees and 2.2-2.4 million IDPs. Source: Department of State, ``Iraq
Weekly Status Report,'' March 5, 2008, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/
rpt/iraqstatus/c24957.htm. The 1951 International Convention on
Refugees defines a refugee as ``a person who, owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted is outside the country of their nationality.''
IDPs while not protected by the 1951 Convention, are defined by the
United Nations as those who have been forced to leave their homes, but
who have not crossed an international border.
\2\ In Jordan and Syria, we heard numbers both significantly higher
and lower than the official estimates. According to Refugees
International, there are additionally approximately 130,000 Iraqi
refugees in Egypt, 57,000 in Iran, 50,000 in Lebanon and a total of
200,000 in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.
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Whatever the precise numbers, these refugees are
significant burdens on both countries. Jordan and Syria are
middle-income countries lacking the petroleum wealth of many of
their neighbors.\3\ Refugees are a sensitive issue in the Arab
world. There are some 4.25 million Palestinian refugees in the
Middle East, most of them children and grandchildren of those
originally displaced, and the issue is particularly acute in
Jordan, where a majority of the population is believed to be
Palestinian.\4\ The internal security agencies in both
countries have concerns about the security risks posed by Iraqi
refugees, given the violence in Iraq and the terrorism threat
throughout the region. These are not hypothetical concerns. In
November 2005, coordinated suicide bomb attacks by Iraqis at
three hotels in Amman, Jordan, killed at least 60 people and
injured more than 100 others.
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\3\ Although the Iraqi refugee communities are coming under
increasing financial strain, the net financial flows are thought to be
out of Iraq and into host countries, particularly Jordan. Iraqis able
to deposit $150,000 in Jordanian banks have a relatively easy time
gaining residency, which apparently was the case for significant
numbers in the early years of the war, though newer arrivals usually
have far fewer resources. Nonetheless, many refugees--44 percent of
those in Jordan, according to the FAFO's survey--receive remittances
from Iraq. See FAFO, ``Iraqis in Jordan 2007: Their Number and
Characteristics,'' http://www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/jordan/IJ.pdf
\4\ Officially, 1.8 million of Jordan's prewar population of 6
million is registered by the United Nations as refugees, although most
experts believe Palestinians actually constitute between 50 and 60 of
the population. Syria, with a prewar population of about 20 million
persons, has about 440,000 registered Palestinian refugees. For
official numbers, see United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). http://www.un.org/unrwa/
publications/
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The flow of refugees out of Iraq has slowed since last
fall, although there are no reliable data. In the aftermath of
the November 2005 Amman bombings, Jordan gradually restricted
Iraqi entry. By early 2007, very few Iraqi refugees could enter
Jordan. Syria began severely restricting border access in
October 2007, although significant numbers of Iraqis continue
to seek refuge in Syria. Additionally, the reduction of
violence in Iraq and possibly the increasing difficulty in
moving between internal Iraqi provincial borders have reduced
the rate of displacement inside Iraq. Sectarian cleansing has
effectively been completed in many neighborhoods of Baghdad and
elsewhere, homogenizing local populations and reducing
sectarian fault-lines. But the consensus in the region is clear
and unequivocal. Humanitarian needs will continue to increase
for the foreseeable future and assistance will be required for
some time, even if Iraq's violent and political conflicts are
resolved.
The Crisis Through Iraqi Eyes
The most important part of our trip was the opportunity to
interact with Iraqi refugees.\5\ Iraqis in Syria and Jordan
form invisible communities that only reluctantly make
themselves known to the authorities and humanitarian workers.
They typically live in cramped, barely heated basement
apartments in neighborhoods that show no outward signs of an
Iraqi presence. They are diverse in terms of ethnicity,
religious affiliation, and geographic and socio-economic
background. Those individuals who left Iraq earlier in the
conflict were wealthier in the aggregate, and less desperate
than newer arrivals, who are disproportionately located in
Syria.
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\5\ Our interactions with Iraqis, facilitated primarily by UNHCR in
both Jordan and Syria, included home visits, focus group discussions,
visits to schools and health clinics and observations of UNHCR
registration and U.S. immigration interviews.
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The vast majority live in urban centers--Damascus and
Amman--where they seek to keep as low a profile as possible for
fear of deportation. We were told repeatedly that both cities
are expensive for refugees. Said one refugee: ``Our rent and
heating bills keep going up. We simply don't have enough
money.'' As a result of dwindling resources, secondary
movements are increasingly common. In Jordan, Iraqis are now
migrating from the wealthier neighborhoods of West Amman to the
less affluent East Amman, and from East Amman to still more
affordable suburbs and villages beyond. In Syria, most Iraqis
are thought to live in the vicinity of Damascus, but increasing
numbers are moving outside the capital where it is less
expensive.
The refugees' greatest concerns are their lack of legal
status and inability to work legally without risking
deportation or exploitation. They are tolerated but not
welcomed, and face declining, and often desperate, economic
conditions.\6\ In both countries, Iraqis complain that
employers harass and refuse to pay refugees who, because they
work illegally, have no legal recourse. For many Iraqi men,
their refugee status is a symbol of shame--for relying on
humanitarian assistance, for not being able to provide for
their families, and for having been displaced in the first
place. More worryingly, the presence of hundreds of thousands
of angry and idle young men provides potentially fertile ground
for extremist ideologies. As one refugee said, ``If we don't
take care of them, someone else will.''
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\6\ Good economic data does not exist for Syria. FAFO surveyed
Iraqi refugees in Jordan and found that despite severe international
economic sanctions on Iraq between 1990 and 2003, 63 percent of the
refugees reported being worse off economically than they were before
the war. 18 percent reported being better off, so clearly a small
minority has managed to benefit from the relocation. See FAFO, ``Iraqis
in Jordan 2007: Their Number and Characteristics.'' http://www.fafo.no/
ais/middeast/jordan/IJ.pdf.
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Iraqis told us they want safer access for their children at
local schools. Some mothers told us their children fear
attending school because of harassment and ridicule. Iraqi
children are also blamed for overcrowding in schools, although
their numbers remain relatively low. Concerned parents often
forbid them from playing outside or showing themselves
publicly. Jordan and Syria have theoretically opened their
health care systems to Iraqis for primary care, but in
practice, Iraqis told us they are turned away and are reluctant
to seek it.
The population is extraordinarily traumatized, greatly
contributing to their sense of vulnerability. We met a few
Iraqis in Jordan who had fled Baathist persecution in the
1990s. However, almost all of the refugees we interacted with
had arrived within the last two years. Most had experienced the
violent death or disappearance of an immediate family member,
typically a father or a son. In some cases, families were given
only hours or even minutes to prepare for departure. A mother
we met in a Damascus health clinic told us that her son had
seen so much death and destruction in Iraq that he would not
leave her side. A woman in Amman relayed terrifying details of
her kidnapping by militia members. A family told us their 8-
year-old son had seen a man assassinated on the street. We saw
art drawn by young children depicting scenes of insurgents,
American tanks and murdered children.\7\
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\7\ According to an IPSOS survey of Iraqis who were in the process
of registering with UNHCR in Syria, 89 percent suffered from depression
and 82 percent suffered from anxiety. Additionally, ``68 percent
reported interrogation or harassment by militias or other groups with
threat to life . . . 23 percent had been kidnapped, 72 percent had been
eye witnesses to a car bombing, and 75 percent knew someone close to
them who had been killed or murdered. Note that because of the
convenience sampling methodology used, the results are not necessarily
representative of either the total refugee population or registered
refugee population. See, IPSOS, ``Second IPSOS Survey on Iraqi
Refugees,'' January 22, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=4795f96f2.
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Iraqis complain of ostracism, discrimination, and
exploitation by host communities. The refugee community is rife
with rumors of Iraqis being rounded up, detained, and expelled.
Refugees told us repeatedly that they feel scape-goated for a
variety of perceived and real socioeconomic grievances, from
rising real estate prices and high inflation to an alleged rise
in criminality and prostitution. We heard stories of neighbors
threatening to report Iraqis to the authorities for expulsion.
Human trafficking, domestic violence, and prostitution are
on the rise, particularly in Syria. Some refugee women
expressed concern about sexual exploitation of those working
illegally. In Amman, we observed a classroom discussion of 7-
and 8-year-olds on ``why domestic violence is harmful.''
According to one international worker: ``An increasing number
of women in Syria are choosing prostitution. It's far more
lucrative than the $150 monthly stipend from the United
Nations.'' \8\
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\8\ Because of cultural sensitivities, fear and the criminality
involved, data on prostitution simply does not exist. Estimates are as
high as 50,000, although we did not hear figures this high during our
visit. See Hassan, Nil, ``'50,000 Iraqi refugees' forced into
prostitution,'' The Independent, June 24, 2007.
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Iraqis referred to the U.S. Government by UNHCR for
resettlement complain of excruciating delays and are often
exasperated by the process. One man we met in Syria had worked
for the United States in Baghdad in 2004, and he has family in
the United States. He had been waiting for more than 6 months
for a Department of Homeland Security interview and felt lost
in the bureaucracy and abandoned by the process. He did not
know how to obtain information for his application, either from
the U.S. Government or the United Nations. ``First we fled
chaos in Iraq,'' he said, ``and now we are waiting, always
waiting.''
The refugees are also disappointed with the Iraqi
Government. Rather than as an ally or advocate, the Iraqi
Government is seen with hostility. In the words of one Iraqi,
the Iraqi Government ``hates the refugees because we are a
shameful reminder of its failures.'' The refugees say the Iraqi
Embassies in Jordan and Syria are unresponsive, unreliable, and
unsympathetic to their troubles. Embassies are unable to
provide humanitarian assistance or pensions. It costs about $25
dollars to renew a passport even for refugees, which for a
family of six or eight can be prohibitively expensive.
The refugee community feels profoundly aggrieved at the
turn their lives have taken, and many are palpably despondent
about their future. Mothers despair that there is ``no joy'' in
their children's lives. Some Iraqis believe that, over time,
the host governments will gradually ratchet up the pressure
against them until they are forced back into Iraq against their
will. Others simply expect to run out of money. In the words of
one woman: ``Our children are lost, waiting for the situation
in Iraq to improve. They are not in school and they lack any
opportunities. If our children are not educated, who will
rebuild Iraq?''
Returnees--A Trickle or a Flood?
Beginning last fall, great attention was paid to reports
that tens of thousands of refugees had begun returning to Iraq
from Syria. The Iraqi Government claimed last December that
60,000 Iraqis had returned, while the Iraqi Red Crescent
estimated the figure at 47,000.\9\ Some interpreted these
reports as evidence that the Iraqi refugee crisis was beginning
to abate, a narrative that the Iraqi Government readily
promoted.
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\9\ Agence France Press, ``More Iraqis heading to Syria than
returning home,'' February 7, 2008.
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A precise accounting of the returnees proved impossible in
Syria during our visit, but it seems clear that the rate of
returns subsided in January and February. A recent UNHCR report
cited Syrian data that 1,200 Iraqis entered Syria daily in
January compared with 700 who returned to Iraq.\10\ The
International Organization for Migration estimated that as of
late February the number of new displacements remained somewhat
above the level of returnees.
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\10\ Ibid. We received similar information from Syrian officials.
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For the foreseeable future most officials and Iraqis
believe the flow of returnees is likely to be only a trickle.
According to UNHCR, 72 percent of the returnees cited economic
necessity or expired visas as the primary reason for
returning,\11\ while only 14 percent of the returnees cited
improving security. As many as 50 to 70 percent of the
returnees were unable to return to their homes.\12\
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\11\ See, UNHCR, ``UNHCR Syria Update on Iraqi Refugees.'' February
2008, http://www.uniraq.org/documents/UNHCR%20Syria%20Update--
04.02.08.pdf. In November 2007, the Iraqi Government began paying $800
to refugees who returned to Iraq. Most experts agree that the vast
majority of returnees are from Syria, where Iraqis often receive an
exit visa prohibiting their return.
\12\ 70 percent according to a UNHCR official in early February; 50
percent according to an IOM official in late February.
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In February, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
Antonio Guterres said, ``We have clear criteria for the
promotion of returns--those criteria are not met by the
situation in Iraq now.'' \13\ This view is strongly held among
humanitarian relief professionals, and we concur. Effective
repatriation requires significant planning to ensure that
returnees have access to housing, jobs, and the like. Most of
all, it requires a stable security environment, which is
lacking in Iraq. Large-scale Iraqi repatriation in the present
conditions not only endangers the lives of returnees, it risks
reigniting sectarian conflicts.
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\13\ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, ``SYRIA: Not safe enough for Iraqi refugees to return--UNHCR
chief,'' February 15, 2008.
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The majority of Iraqis we met expressed no desire to return
to Iraq anytime soon, if ever.\14\ The psychological wounds are
still fresh and the sense of loss profound--of home and
material livelihood, of community, and of a connection to Iraq.
Many feel they have nothing to return to; others have concluded
that the security situation remains too tenuous and uncertain.
Militia groups still operate with impunity and many refugees
question whether security gains can be sustained. Because of
sectarian cleansing, many feel that they will never be able to
return to their old homes. We heard reports of Iraqis who had
been killed upon their return home. As one Iraqi put it, ``My
family in Iraq says it's not time to return. We have nowhere to
return to. Our home has been overtaken by militias.''
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\14\ The FAFO study found that 58 percent of all Iraqi refugees in
Jordan--and 72 percent of those who had registered with UNHCR--had no
intention of returning to Iraq. The lower the household wealth the more
resistance there was to returning; nearly 79 percent of the poorest
quintile of Iraqis did not intend to return. Of those who expressed
some desire to return, fewer than 4 percent expected to return within
the next year and 95 percent expected to return only when the
``situation allows for it.'' See FAFO, ``Iraqis in Jordan 2007: Their
Number and Characteristics,'' http://www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/jordan/
IJ.pdf.
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The Humanitarian Response
For the foreseeable future, only a minority of Iraqis will
return home. Barring dramatic changes in resettlement patterns,
less than 5 percent appear likely to be resettled in the West.
Thus, the majority of refugees will remain, for now, where they
are, mostly in Syria and Jordan. Addressing their needs and
relieving the pressure on the host governments will require a
more sustained and coordinated international humanitarian
response.
Jordan and Syria represent different environments for
humanitarian relief. Jordan has excellent relations with the
United States and other donor countries. As a longtime
recipient of American and other bilateral foreign assistance,
Jordan has a relatively good capacity for coordination of
assistance with the various donors. The United Nations and many
international and nongovernmental organizations are working in
Jordan. On the other hand, given its large Palestinian refugee
population, Jordan is cautious about taking steps that might
suggest permanent integration of the Iraqi population. Iraqi
children were only allowed to attend school beginning in
September 2007, and most refugees have no legal status in
Jordan.\15\
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\15\ See footnote 3.
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Nonetheless, there has been an encouraging evolution
towards pragmatism in Jordan's approach. When it closed its
borders in early 2007, Jordan was hesitant to even acknowledge
that it had a refugee problem. Since then, it has become more
open to international humanitarian assistance efforts for
Iraqis, so long as they do not lead to the creation of parallel
systems of social services. This means that while geographic
areas with high concentrations of Iraqis can be targeted,
humanitarian benefits must be available to both Jordanians and
Iraqis alike.
Syria has been relatively accommodating to the Iraqi
refugee population. It has roughly three times the number of
refugees as Jordan and the refugees are generally in worse
economic condition. Even now, although the borders are closed
to most Iraqis, Syria remains more accessible to Iraqis than
other countries in the region.
However, Syria's extreme political isolation and the nature
of the ruling regime greatly hamper international humanitarian
efforts. No direct American bilateral assistance programs exist
in Syria, and European donors have their own concerns about
dealing directly with Syria. Its civil society is extremely
limited and tightly controlled. Religious charities are able to
perform limited humanitarian work, but Syria poses an extremely
difficult environment for international nongovernmental
organizations to operate in.\16\ As a result, there are few
international humanitarian organizations operating beyond the
United Nations system.
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\16\ There is some hope that a long-awaited memorandum of
understanding announced during our visit between the Syrian Government
and a number international nongovernmental organizations, including one
American organization, will finally allow them to begin to be more
active.
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International attention to the crisis began in earnest with
the April 2007 UNHCR conference on Iraqi refugees and
internally displaced persons held in Geneva, Switzerland. In
2007, UNHCR budgets in Jordan and Syria increased by
approximately a factor of ten, to more than $70 million for the
two countries, not counting additional emergency appeals for
health and education. This growth continues--the Department of
State estimates that almost $900 million has been requested for
emergency humanitarian appeals for Iraqi refugees regionally
and internally displaced persons within Iraq in 2008.\17\
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\17\ The emergency appeals consists of $261m for UNHCR, $209m for
other U.N. agencies, $93m for the International Committee of the Red
Cross, $208m for other non-U.N. international organizations, including
the International Organization for Migration, and $120m for
nongovernmental organizations. Source: Department of State.
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But humanitarian assistance can only be provided for those
willing to accept it, and only a small fraction of refugees
have registered with UNHCR for humanitarian assistance. Because
most Iraqis are in hiding, the actual needs of the refugee
community far exceed the level of humanitarian services
actually delivered. There is an inherent tension in the appeals
process. On the one hand, appeals create expectations for
donors, and UNHCR is acutely aware that the expectations will
be hard to meet. On the other hand, emergency appeals test the
willingness of donors, and international organizations are
concerned that programs will be underfunded. Some officials
privately admit that the emergency appeals are based, in part,
on ``what the donor market will bear'' rather than the
anticipated needs of the refugees.
Protection: In Jordan and Syria, full-fledged efforts are
underway by UNHCR to register Iraqi refugees (for a renewable
period of 6 months to provide for better monitoring), provide
benefits, and resettle the most vulnerable. UNHCR's protection
efforts for Iraqi refugees have been focused on three key
areas: Protection from forcible returns, nonpenalization for
illegal entry, and access to basic services. The humanitarian
services offered to refugees include food, health services,
stipends for the neediest, and legal advocacy. As of February
2008, UNHCR had registered 50,000 Iraqis in Jordan and 170,000
in Syria.\18\ In Jordan, reregistration outpaces new
registrations, while in Syria, the registrations continue at a
rapid rate.
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\18\ Jordan and Syria are not signatories of the 1951 United
Nations Refugee Convention, so UNHCR registration does not carry formal
legal protections from the host government. UNHCR does have memoranda
of understanding with both countries and the 6-month renewable
registration allows UNHCR better access to the refugees, provides
information about the community as a whole, and allows for individual
cases to be tracked.
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The assistance is appreciated by refugees and is having a
significant impact for those accepting it. As one humanitarian
worker put it, ``the level of discontent has stabilized'' and
several Iraqis noted that their personal situations had
improved markedly as a result of the assistance. It is hoped
that continuing expansion of humanitarian assistance in both
countries will draw increasing levels of registration. However,
large numbers of Iraqis are so fearful of exposure to
government authorities and deportation that they do not take
advantage of the assistance benefits potentially available to
them. As long as their status prevents them from working
legally, their frustration will continue to increase. As the
principal nexus between the refugees and international
assistance efforts, UNHCR is working with Jordan and Syria to
ensure availability of protection.
Education: A large focus of U.S. and U.N. efforts in both
Jordan and Syria has been on increasing Iraqi children's school
attendance. In July 2007, a $129 million UNHCR-UNICEF joint
appeal was launched to get Iraqi refugee children into schools.
Syrian schools have been open to Iraqi children, and Iraqi
families with children in Syrian schools can register with the
Syrian Government for 1-year visas. In Jordan, Iraqi children
without legal residency did not have access to schools until
September 2007.
Iraqi enrollment rates, reflecting the confidence refugees
feel in publicly asserting themselves, are a useful proxy
indicator of their emotional well-being and sense of security.
Although there are thought to be as many as 500,000 school age
children among the refugee population in the two countries,
only about 25,000 Iraqi children are in schools in Jordan and
45,000 in Syria. Iraqis cite grave concerns that a ``lost
generation'' of uneducated and undereducated youth is being
created that will be ill-prepared to be economically
productive.
Certainly, psychological trauma and the fear of deportation
are important factors in the low enrollment numbers. But Iraqi
refugees also cite host community intimidation and child labor.
Although school is free in both Syria and Jordan, for some
Iraqi families the indirect costs, including uniforms, school
supplies, and transportation, are prohibitive.
Iraqi children's problems do not end once they arrive in
school. There are linguistic differences between the Iraqi and
Levantine Arabic dialects, different curricula, and
difficulties caused by the fact that Iraqi children have often
been out of school for extended periods of time. Iraqi children
can face severe ostracism by their local classmates, sometimes
to the point of withdrawing from school. One mother told us
that a teacher had publicly ridiculed her daughter for being a
Shiite after the execution of Saddam Hussein. Unless teachers
are trained and sensitized to the challenges facing Iraqi
children, efforts to encourage greater participation in schools
will be unlikely to succeed.
Health: Both Jordan and Syria have, in principle, opened
their primary health care systems to Iraqi refugees, but
government officials admit that Iraqis cannot depend on the
public systems. The Syrian Ministry of Health reported that
because the government does not make distinctions among their
``Arab brothers,'' it does not keep statistics on the number of
Iraqis seeking medical treatment at the 2,100 health clinics
and hospitals throughout the country.\19\ In Jordan there is
better data on the refugees' access to medical assistance,
although more information is needed regarding the health needs
for refugees of both countries.
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\19\ It seems likely that the Syrian Government would, in fact,
have data on such a closely watched population.
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With the increase of humanitarian assistance for refugees,
primary health care access improved significantly in 2007 for
refugees in both Syria and Jordan. Private health care clinics
have been established in the past year by nongovernmental
organizations and charitable organizations in Jordan, and by
the Syrian Red Crescent in Syria, where nongovernmental
organizations are far more restricted. In both countries, these
facilities provide free, or nearly free, primary health care
assistance for refugees, as well as for locals.
Nonetheless, the health needs of the Iraqi population
remain significant. Access to secondary health care is limited
and the costs are generally prohibitive. Health professionals
in the two countries cite chronic diseases such as
hypertension, diabetes, and cancer as significant concerns.
Although the prevalence of these diseases is difficult to
quantify, it is beyond the scope of the primary health care
clinics to systemically treat them. The Iraqi refugee
population also suffers from a high prevalence of psychological
ailments, such as post-traumatic stress disorder and clinical
depression, which the Jordanian and Syrian health care systems
are not equipped to treat properly. Pharmaceutical costs, even
for generic drugs, are expensive and modern medical procedures
such as dialysis and cancer treatment are not widely available.
Emergency obstetrics are often classified as secondary, rather
than primary, health treatments.
Food: The United Nations estimates that the number of
Iraqis in Syria with critical food shortages increased five-
fold between December 2006 and December 2007, to approximately
30,000. The food situation in Jordan is less dire, but public
health professionals in Jordan reported some evidence of
malnutrition among Iraqi children. Food assistance has been
increasing. Since 2006, the World Food Programme (WFP), the
food assistance agency of the United Nations, has distributed
food to Iraqi refugees in Syria every 2 months, with the United
States providing about a quarter of the commodities
distributed. The vast majority of registered refugees in Syria
receive food distributions, and WFP hopes to increase the reach
of the program to 350,000 refugees by the end of the year. To
accomplish this goal it will require a substantial increase in
donor support.
U.S. Humanitarian Efforts
American leadership is essential to sustain and expand the
international humanitarian response to this refugee crisis.
Much of the international community believes that the crisis is
a result of the U.S. intervention in Iraq. It was clear in our
meetings with foreign diplomats that many donors remain
unconvinced that the United States gives Iraqi refugees a
sufficiently high priority.
Currently, there is no coherent strategic vision at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government with respect to refugees
and internally displaced persons. No one has responsibility for
ensuring an overall humanitarian response and strategy within
the U.S. Government, with the United Nations, and with the
international community.
On assistance, the administration has requested
insufficient funding for Iraqi refugees and internally
displaced persons. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the
administration requested no funding for Iraqi refugees,
although Congress provided $67 million and $75 million,
respectively. In fiscal year 2007, the administration requested
$90 million in supplemental appropriations, a level that was
increased to $224 million by Congress. In the current fiscal
year, $274 million has been provided, although an additional
fiscal year 2008 supplemental request of $30 million is
pending.\20\ The fiscal year 2009 Federal budget request notes
that ``the administration will continue to review humanitarian
assistance needs, including costs related to Iraqi displaced
persons and Afghan refugees, as needs become better known.''
\21\ However, Department of State officials have privately
admitted that the fiscal year 2009 request includes no funding
for Iraqi refugees or internally displaced persons, meaning
that the Congress will need to add additional funds or the next
administration will need to request supplemental funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Source: Analysis provided for the authors by Rhoda Margesson,
Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy at Congressional
Research Service, March 2008. Funding for Iraqi refugees and IDPs comes
through a number of funding streams, including Migration and Refugee
Assistance, Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance, International
Disaster and Famine Assistance, P.L. 480 Title II Food Assistance,
Economic Support Funds, and Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds.
\21\ Source: The Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account of
the Department of State's Function 150 international affairs budget
request to Congress, FY2009, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/c6112.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) at
the Department of State is the lead U.S. Government agency for
refugees. The majority of PRM's funding goes toward the
operating budgets and emergency appeals of international
organizations such as UNHCR and the International Committee of
the Red Cross. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
within the Agency for International Development takes the lead
on internally displaced persons and works directly with
partners on the ground--contractors, nongovernmental and
international organizations--typically through a competitive
bidding process. Greater structural cohesion between the two
offices is needed. While the cooperation between the two
agencies is good, there is the potential for coordination
problems, especially as populations under each agency's mandate
are sometimes blurred, and it can be difficult to distinguish
among refugees, internally displaced persons, and returnees.
Additionally, because OFDA is an implementing agency, there is
some concern that appeals targeting Iraqi internally displaced
persons directly could be underfunded.
In Syria, the United States limited and poor relations with
Syria are undermining the humanitarian response. One
nongovernmental organization told us it would not accept U.S.
Government money because it would compromise their work with
the Syrian Government.
Resettlement
There is a clear perception in Amman and Damascus that the
United States has not committed sufficient resources to
resettlement given the magnitude of the problem. As of March
2008, approximately 4,900 Iraqi refugees had been resettled in
the United States since the war began in 2003. By contrast,
Sweden, a country with about 3 percent of the population of the
United States, admitted nearly twice that number of asylum
seekers in 2006 alone and received 18,500 asylum applications
in 2007.\22\ The administration's promises to resettle 7,000
Iraqi refugees in the United States in fiscal year 2007 and
12,000 Iraqi refugees in fiscal year 2008 have created
expectations, particularly among the refugees, and the United
States has an obligation to meet those expectations. The fact
that the U.S. Government resettled only 1,608 Iraqis in fiscal
year 2007 while more than 20,000 cases were referred by the
United Nations has created deep skepticism about American
efforts with the international community host governments, and
the refugees.\23\
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\22\ Admittances of Iraqi refugees to the United States are as
follows: FY03: 294, FY04: 65, FY05: 198, FY06: 202, FY07: 1608, FY08
(through 2/20): 1646. Sources: FY03--FY06: Department of State, Annual
Proposed Refugee Admissions Reports to Congress, http://www.state.gov/
g/prm/refadm/rls/rpts/. FY07-FY08, Department of State, Fact Sheet on
United States Humanitarian Assistance for Displaced Iraqis, February
25, 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/feb/101274.htm. For
Sweden figure, see Shelly Emling, ``Sweden debating its open door for
Iraqis,'' Cox News Service, February 10, 2008. The comparison with
Sweden is for illustrative purposes only; there is an obligation under
the 1951 U.N. Convention on Refugees to accept asylum seekers, whereas
resettlement is discretionary.
\23\ According to U.N officials and refugee experts, there are
thought to be roughly 100,000
Iraqi refugees throughout the region for whom resettlement may be
necessary. UNHCR defines eleven categories of refugees who are
prioritized for resettlement. For more information on these categories
and on UNHCR's resettlement referrals, see UNHCR, ``Resettlement of
Iraqi Refugees,'' March 12, 2007. http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/
vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=
SUBSITES&id=45f80f9d2.
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The Departments of State and Homeland Security have senior
coordinators for refugees working mostly on resettlement
issues. Their appointments have corresponded with increases in
the rate of resettlements to the United States. However,
decisions on key policy issues have been delayed, sometimes for
months, and the refugees have suffered as a result.
The Department of State has not sent permanent senior staff
to either Jordan or Syria to oversee the refugee effort, as
required by law, and the Department of Homeland Security has
not hired additional staff or permanently stationed staff in
the region to expedite processing. Within the United Nations
system, there is frustration that the United States has not put
more emphasis on resettlement numbers. One U.N. official was
very blunt: ``What your government needs to understand is that
resettlement is about protection for the most vulnerable.''
Implementing the New Refugee Law: More than 250
interpreters working for the U.S Government or U.S. contractors
have been killed since 2003 and thousands more have risked
their lives. In February, the United States temporarily ceased
processing special immigrant visas for these Iraqis, because
the annual quota of 500 had been exceeded.\24\ However, the FY
2008 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), signed into law
January 28, 2008, authorizes 5,000 special immigrant visas
yearly for Iraqis and their families who have worked for the
U.S. Government in Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Walter Pincus, ``Visas for War Zone Translators Halted,''
Washington Post, February 29, 2008.
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The law requires in-country processing in Baghdad,
Damascus, and Amman for Iraqis with a close tie to the United
States and special immigrant visas for Iraqis who have worked
with our government for a year. It also requires the Secretary
of State to appoint senior refugee coordinators in each embassy
to coordinate visa processing and address other needs of
refugees. The new refugee law requires an assessment of
videoconferencing to conduct interviews, an option that would
require more extensive use of consular officers.
At the time of our visit, that legislation had been sent to
the President, but had not yet been signed it into law. To our
surprise, the American Embassies in both Amman and Damascus
were unfamiliar with many of the specific requirements of the
law. At both locations, junior officers are responsible for the
refugee portfolios. Two mid-level positions will be created in
Amman, but they are not scheduled to be filled until summer
2008. A decision had not been made regarding Damascus.
Despite repeated requests from Congress regarding financial
requirements necessary to implement the relevant sections of
the new law, embassy staff had not been asked to identify what
additional resources would be necessary. The Department of
State has not formally identified these needs to Congress.
Likewise, despite a considerable backlog of cases referred for
resettlement, the Department of Homeland Security has not
stationed permanent staff in the region.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1: White House Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraqi
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
To coordinate our overall policy for displaced Iraqis and
assistance within our government and with the international
community, the President should appoint a White House
Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee and Internally
Displaced Persons.
A White House Humanitarian Coordinator would be
responsible for outlining the United States overall
policy response to the displacement crisis in Iraq and
the region. He or she must have the authority to
resolve interagency disagreements on policy.
The Coordinator would ensure unity of effort in U.S.
funding and increase confidence in the Congress and the
international community that priorities are being
established in a methodical way and that a coherent
strategy exists to consider refugees and internally
displaced persons in tandem and to coordinate efforts
effectively.
The Coordinator should have a mandate to engage with
the international community, host nations, and the
Government of Iraq on long-term strategies for managing
the crisis. This would include soliciting support from
the international donor community and working toward
better coordination of efforts, both between donors and
within the United Nations system.
The Coordinator should also work to increase donor
confidence by addressing legitimate concerns about
international humanitarian efforts. We heard
frustration from donors that there is insufficient
coordination between United Nations agencies, that
emergency appeals have not been adequately transparent
or consolidated, and that better data on the size and
socio-economic profile of the refugee communities are
needed. The Coordinator would complement the work being
done on resettlement by the refugee coordinators at the
Departments of State and Homeland Security.
Recommendation 2: Funding
The United States should fund 50 percent of all United
Nations and other international organizations' appeals for
Iraqi refugees, internally displaced persons, and for other
vulnerable Iraqis.
In 2008, a 50 percent commitment would amount to
approximately $500 million, somewhat less than one-half
of one percent of the costs of annual U.S. military
operations in Iraq.\25\ Providing this level of
assistance on an ongoing basis would match our
resources with our moral obligation to assist those
suffering and relieve the burden on host governments.
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\25\ According to data obtained from the Department of State, the
sum of all international emergency appeals for 2008 related to Iraqi
refugees and IDPs is less than $1 billion. The Congressional Research
Service estimates the U.S. military costs in Iraq at roughly $10
billion per month.
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Recommendation 3: U.S. Resettlement Policy
The United States Government needs to put a high priority
on meeting its fiscal year 2008 resettlement commitments.
The United States Government, and the Department of
Homeland Security in particular, needs to respond to
legitimate security concerns. But we cannot allow fear
to stand in the way of our obligation to resettle the
most vulnerable.
Although the number of resettlement arrivals to the
United States has increased in recent months, meeting
the fiscal year 2008 goal of 12,000 will be difficult
if the Departments of State and Homeland Security are
unwilling to think creatively and consider implementing
alternative mechanisms. Such mechanisms include video
conference interviews, third-country processing, and
greater use of State consular officers to supplement
the work of DHS adjudicators. In particular, processing
in Syria has been problematic. The Syrian Government
has been very slow in granting visas to DHS
adjudicators, and the lack of access for adjudicators
has affected the pace of resettlement adjudication.
United Nations officials and humanitarian relief
experts believe that Syria is the priority country for
resettlement. Unless more effective resettlement
methods are employed, the Syrian Government will
continue to retain too much control over the refugee
program.
The recent halt in processing special immigrant
visas underscores the need to ensure a smooth
transition in the programs. Congress needs to make a
technical adjustment to the new special immigrant visa
law to enable the administration to clear out the
backlog in the existing program by issuing some of the
quota of 5,000 visas during the current fiscal year.
The administration should issue policy guidance for the
new special immigrant visas without delay.
The administration should also provide information
to Congress about resource needs to process refugees
and special immigrant visas more expeditiously. If the
Department of State needs additional consular officers
to process special immigrant visas or implement the
refugee provisions, they should be hired immediately.
If the Department of Homeland Security needs additional
resources to hire more adjudicators for the Refugee
Corps, they should be provided immediately.
Congressional efforts to add funding to the DHS budget
for adjudicators should be supported.
Recommendation 4: Legal Protection
The regularization of the status of Iraqis in Jordan and
Syria should be made a first-order priority for American
diplomats.
As long as Iraqis live in fear of deportation and
are prohibited from working in Jordan, Syria, and other
host countries, they will be increasingly dependent on
the international community's humanitarian efforts.
Easing labor restrictions will not be decisions that
either Jordan or Syria makes lightly, but both
countries should be encouraged to view this matter as
linked to their own security.
Jordan and Syria should consider offering temporary
protected status or some form of guest worker program
for Iraqi refugees. Allowing Iraqis to work will reduce
the economic pressure and reduce risks of radicalizing
the Iraqi population. Jordan already has hundreds of
thousands of guest workers.\26\ Over time these jobs
could be shifted to Iraqis. In February 2008, Lebanon
announced a registration program that gives Iraqis a 3-
month grace period to regularize their status in
Lebanon and the possibility to obtain work permits
through sponsoring employers. This program could
provide a model for Jordan and Syria.
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\26\ Jordan Times, ``Work Permit Fees Raised to JD180 for Arab
Nations,'' December 19, 1999
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Recommendation 5: Addressing the Problem in Syria
American diplomats in Damascus should be empowered to
engage more vigorously with Syrian officials on Iraqi refugee,
resettlement, and other issues.
Though American diplomats in Syria have a narrow
mandate to engage on humanitarian issues, they have
been severely constrained by the Bush administration in
their ability to engage with Syrian officials,
undermining the United States ability to develop
effective responses. Their mandate should be expanded.
Skillful diplomacy must allow for continued pressure on
Syria for its violations of Lebanese sovereignty and
support for terrorism, while simultaneously allowing
for a more robust engagement on the issue of Iraqi
refugees.
We met with senior officials in the Syrian
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Health and Education
during our visit. One of these ministries apparently
had not had any interaction with American diplomats
since 2005. In varying degrees, these officials
admitted that their capacity to deal with Iraqis
refugees was limited, and they expressed openness to
enhanced U.S.-Syrian cooperation on the issue of Iraqi
refugees. It is difficult to assess the sincerity of
these claims, but there is no convincing reason that
they should not be probed.
Bilateral American assistance to Syria is not an
option. However, substantial assistance can and should
continue to be provided to Iraqi refugees in Syria
through United Nations and humanitarian assistance
programs of nongovernmental organizations.
Recommendation 6: Returnees
Iraqis should not be encouraged or pressured to return to
Iraq while conditions there remain tenuous.
Under no circumstances should Iraqi refugees feel
pressured--legally or economically--by the Syrian,
Jordanian, or Iraqi Governments to return home
prematurely. The hasty return of large numbers of
returnees--without security, housing or employment--
could have serious negative consequences. The
administration must work vigorously against any such
effort.
It is important for the international community to
understand that the Iraqi refugee problem is not
winding down. Premature talk of return threatens to
ignore the fact that humanitarian needs in Jordan and
Syria are expected to grow with time. Rising economic
pressures are likely to create greater needs in Jordan
and Syria in the months and years to come.
Recommendation 7: Schools
The international community and host governments must be
more proactive and innovative in developing solutions to meet
the educational needs of Iraqi refugee children.
Priority has rightly been given to getting Iraqi
refugee children back in school. However, the United
States, the United Nations, host governments, and the
international community must be more proactive and
innovative in developing solutions to meet the
educational needs. While there have been some
successes, the vast majority of Iraqi children remain
outside the local school systems in Amman and Damascus.
A number of steps can be taken on this issue:
Iraqi teachers and volunteers could be used to
supplement the activities of local education
professionals. Having Iraqi assistants in schools
and classrooms with high percentages of Iraqis
could help to reduce tensions between Iraqi and
local children, raise the confidence of Iraqi
children, and help with linguistic differences.
Training could be provided for Jordanian and
Syrian teachers and administrators to sensitize
them to the concerns of Iraqis.
Counseling services for Iraqi students could be
expanded.
More vigorous public information campaigns could
be considered to welcome Iraqi children to Syrian
and Jordanian schools and to make clear that
enrolling will not increase the likelihood of
detention or expulsion.
Vocational and remedial education could be
implemented, especially for older Iraqi students
who have spent several years out of school.
At the university level, thought could be given to
scholarship programs for refugees both in Jordan
and Syria, as well as in the United States and
internationally.
Recommendation 8: The Government of Iraq
Iraq should devote more resources to internally displaced
persons within its borders and allocate more resources so that
Iraqi embassies can be more responsive to the needs of refugee
communities.
The Government of Iraq should devote significantly
more resources to humanitarian assistance for
internally displaced Iraqis and Iraqis in the region.
This assistance should be provided unconditionally
through United Nations emergency appeals. At the April
2007 UNHCR conference on Iraqi refugees, the Government
of Iraq pledged $25 million to help Iraqi refugees. The
amount was relatively small, but hopes were high in the
U.S. Government that the decision marked the beginning
of a more active policy on refugees. Yet, as of January
2008 visit, Syria had not received the funds. Jordan
apparently decided to return them because Iraq insisted
on working outside the United Nations framework.
The United States and the wider international
community should partner with the Iraqi Ministry of
Migration and Displacement to strengthen its capacity
and ensure that adequate systems are developed to
provide security, housing, financial assistance and
employment for Iraqis refugees and internally displaced
persons who choose to return to their homes.
Iraqi embassies need to be more responsive to
refugee needs. A number of services for refugees could
be administered at Iraqi embassies and consular
offices, although international support may be
necessary. Such services could include:
Payment of pensions and/or stipends in Jordan and
Syria, rather than Iraq.
Legal support.
Reduced fees for passports for refugees with limited
financial resources.
conclusion
The Iraqi refugee and displaced person crisis will not end
for many years, and millions of Iraqis are suffering
enormously. The United States Government's response to the
crisis and its efforts to minimize the suffering has been slow
and halting. The United States has a unique obligation to make
this issue a much higher priority. We hope the recommendations
in this report can result in a more proactive and effective
response by our Government.