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CHAIN REACTION:
AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
__________
R E P O R T
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Tenth Congress
Second Session
February 2008
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39-674 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2008
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Executive Summary................................................ vii
Chapter 1: Introduction.......................................... 1
Chapter 2: Historical Lessons on Nuclear ``Roll Forward'' and
``Rollback''................................................... 4
Chapter 3: Saudi Arabia.......................................... 9
The Worst Case Scenario...................................... 9
Saudi Perceptions of Iran and the Iranian Nuclear Program.... 10
The Saudi Nuclear Energy Program............................. 15
Will the Saudi Seek a Nuclear Weapon?........................ 16
Policy Considerations........................................ 21
Chapter 4: Egypt................................................. 25
Egypt's Nuclear Power Program: Past and Present.............. 25
Egypt and Iran............................................... 27
Egypt and Nuclear Weapons.................................... 28
The Two Wild Cards........................................... 30
Policy Considerations........................................ 32
Chapter 5: Turkey................................................ 35
Major Irritants in the United States-Turkey Relationship..... 36
Turkey and NATO.............................................. 39
Turkey and Nuclear Weapons................................... 40
Policy Considerations........................................ 41
Appendix 1: Status of Relevant Nuclear Agreements................ 45
Appendix 2: U.S. Non-Immigrant Visas Issued in Saudi Arabia...... 46
Appendix 3: U.S. Non-Immigrant Visas Issued to Egyptian, Saudi,
and Turkish Nationals.......................................... 47
Appendix 4: Map of the Middle East............................... 48
Appendix 5: Map of Arabian Peninsula and Vicinity................ 49
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
February 27, 2008.
Dear Colleagues: In July of 2007, I directed my Senate
Foreign Relations Committee staff member for the Middle East,
Bradley Bowman, to undertake an examination of the factors that
could motivate states of the Middle East to acquire nuclear
weapons.
Between July and December 2007, Mr. Bowman conducted
research and interviewed hundreds of individuals in Washington
DC, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the
United Arab Emirates. In addition to pursuing the question
regarding ``nuclear drivers'' in the Middle East, he also
focused specifically on the regional ramifications if Iran were
to acquire nuclear weapons.
The resulting staff report contains policy considerations
that represent the independent judgments of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of members of the committee.
However, in the wake of the December 2007 NIE and in light of
recent announcements by Arab states regarding nuclear energy,
the observations and analyses presented here are timely. They
are offered as one contribution in the effort to understand
Middle East politics and the challenges the U.S. will confront
going forward.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Foreign Relations.
(v)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
----------
Iran's nuclear program remains one of the most serious
threats to U.S. interests and Middle East peace, despite the
December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) conclusion
that ``Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003.''
Iran continues to enrich uranium-the most difficult component
of a nuclear weapons program-and continues to conduct work that
could contribute to nuclear weapons development. As the NIE
states, Iran now possesses the ``scientific, technical, and
industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it
decides to do so.'' Consequently, the NIE judges ``with
moderate confidence'' that Iran will have enough highly-
enriched uranium (HEU) to produce a nuclear weapon by 2010-
2015. Furthermore, because the motivations inspiring the
Iranian drive for nuclear weapons remain unaddressed, Iran
remains unlikely to fully abandon its long-term drive to obtain
a nuclear weapon capability. If in fact Iran halted the other
aspects of its nuclear weapons program in 2003, this action
almost certainly represents a tactical pause rather than a
strategic change of course. In short, Iran now possesses the
means as well as the motivation to develop nuclear weapons.
Consequently, it is entirely possible that the United States
could confront a nuclear-armed or nuclear weapons capable Iran
in the next decade.
If such an undesirable scenario were to occur in the next
decade, despite the international community's best efforts, the
U.S. must not be caught unprepared. U.S. decision-makers must
seek to understand the regional dynamics that would accompany
an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and be ready to
implement policies to prevent a bad situation from becoming
worse. An Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon or a nuclear
weapons capability would dramatically shift the balance of
power among Iran and its three most powerful neighbors-Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. This shift in the balance of power
could spark a regional nuclear arms race as Iran's neighbors
seek to redress the new power imbalance. This raises important
questions: How are these three countries currently responding
to the Iranian nuclear program? How would Riyadh, Cairo, and
Ankara respond if Tehran were to cross the nuclear threshold
and acquire nuclear weapons? Would they pursue nuclear weapons
of their own? What factors would influence their decisions?
What can the U.S. do now and over the coming years to
discourage these countries from pursuing a nuclear weapon of
their own?
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contain staff's findings related to
these questions. Each chapter touches on the respective
country's relationship with Iran and the United States,
identifies the incentives and disincentives that would
influence the state's response to a nuclear-armed Iran, and
provides policy considerations that would reduce the chances
the state would respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Based on 5
months of research and interviews with hundreds of officials
and scholars in the United States and seven Middle Eastern
countries, this report comes to the following conclusions for
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey:
SAUDI ARABIA (CHAPTER 3)
The development of a Saudi nuclear weapon represents one of
the most serious and most likely consequences of an Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons. If Iran obtains a nuclear
weapon, it will place tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia to
follow suit. The only factor that would likely dissuade the
Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon would be a restored
United States-Saudi bilateral relationship and a repaired Saudi
perception regarding the reliability of the U.S. security
guarantee. If the United States does not take deliberate
actions in the coming years to achieve both of these
objectives, an Iranian bomb will almost certainly lead to a
Saudi bomb.
The vast majority of individuals interviewed believe that
Saudi Arabia represents the country most likely to pursue a
nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb. Significant
disagreement among many parties exists regarding the Saudi's
final decision, as well as their capability to obtain a nuclear
weapon. However, high-level U.S. diplomats in Riyadh with
excellent access to Saudi decision-makers expressed little
doubt about the Saudi response. These diplomats repeatedly
emphasized that an Iranian nuclear weapon frightens the Saudis
``to their core'' and would compel the Saudis to seek nuclear
weapons.
Those who believe Saudi Arabia would not respond to an
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons by pursuing a weapon of
its own usually emphasize one of three arguments. The first
suggests the value the Saudis place on their relationship with
the United States would dissuade them from taking a nuclear
decision that would severely damage their most important
bilateral relationship. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia values its
relationship with the United States. The United States has
served as Saudi Arabia's most important security guarantor
since 1945. However, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with
the United States because the United States has served Saudi
Arabia's interests. If Saudi Arabia comes to believe the United
States cannot or will not protect the Kingdom and its core
interests, the Saudi regime will not hesitate to develop the
independent means to deter its enemies. If the United States
does not take assertive steps now to restore Saudi faith in the
U.S. security guarantee, this will increase the likelihood that
the Saudis will respond to a perceived decline in the
reliability of U.S. security guarantees and the emergence of an
Iranian nuclear threat by pursuing an independent nuclear
deterrent.
The second argument frequently cited relates to the
character of the regime. Some argue the Saudi regime is too
conservative, too timid to take such a bold and controversial
step. However, the Saudi regime's undoubtedly conservative and
occasionally timid approach to foreign relations has not kept
Saudi Arabia from taking covert and controversial measures in
the past in order to protect its interests. The Saudi
acquisition of 50-60 CSS-2 missiles, 10-15 mobile launchers,
and technical support from China at a cost of about $3 to $3.5
billion in the late 1980s provides an example. These missiles,
which represent some of the longest-range missiles in the
world, were acquired by the Saudis after the U.S. decision not
to sell the Saudis surface-to-surface missiles. This Saudi
move-apparently conducted without the knowledge of Israel or
the United States-reflected anything but a conservative or
timid approach. While the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would
represent a much greater challenge to the bilateral
relationship, the CSS-2 affair demonstrates that in order to
ensure its own security, Saudi Arabia will not hesitate to
aggressively bypass or risk alienating the United States in
order to protect Saudi interests.
The third argument often cited relates to Saudi Arabia's
nuclear technology capabilities. Saudi Arabia lacks the human
expertise and the technical knowledge necessary to develop a
nuclear weapons program on its own. Experts consistently
describe Saudi Arabia's nuclear infrastructure and know how as
far inferior to Egypt and Turkey. However, many individuals
emphasize that the U.S. should not underestimate Saudi Arabia's
ability to buy the technology required. Many scholars and U.S.
diplomats believe Saudi Arabia may have some sort of formal or
informal understanding with Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have common interests and
complementary assets. Pakistan has a nuclear capability and
limited money, while Saudi Arabia has no nuclear capability and
virtually unlimited money. While no solid evidence exists to
confirm the formalization of such an agreement, some
circumstantial evidence suggests an agreement or
``understanding'' may exist.
EGYPT (CHAPTER 4)
An Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would ignite a
heated debate in Cairo as to whether Egypt should pursue
nuclear weapons. Although such a development in Iran would
hasten Egypt's nuclear energy efforts, in the view of almost
all of those interviewed, Egypt would most likely choose not to
respond by pursuing its own nuclear weapons. The potential
Israeli response and the impact on Egypt's relations with the
United States represent the most important reasons. Two pillars
undergird Egyptian national security strategy: peace with
Israel and a security partnership with the United States. While
both Israel and America remain very unpopular with the Egyptian
people, the Egyptian regime relies on peace with Israel and aid
from the United States to maintain its security and its power.
An Egyptian pursuit of nuclear weapons would destabilize--if
not topple--the Israeli and American pillars of Egypt's
national security strategy. Egyptian leaders considering a
pursuit of nuclear weapons would need to consider the Israeli
response. If the past is any indication, there is no reason to
believe a new Egyptian nuclear weapons program would evade
Israeli attention. Such an Egyptian program and the Israeli
response could reignite open hostility between the two states.
Additionally, an Egyptian nuclear weapons program could
severely damage the bilateral relationship between Egypt and
the United States. Egypt leans heavily on U.S. aid, as well as
U.S. military assistance, and an Egyptian nuclear weapons
program would endanger both. Therefore, as long as peace with
Israel and a security relationship with the United States
remain in Egypt's interest, the disincentives for an Egyptian
nuclear weapons program appear to outweigh the incentives.
However, two wildcards--the response of Israel and Saudi
Arabia to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon--could
decisively shape Egypt's response. If Iran were to acquire a
nuclear weapon in the next few years, this would represent a
major strategic and political shock to Israel. As a result, the
Israeli Government would face tremendous domestic political
pressure to respond in an explicit and bold way. The nature of
the Israeli response could prove decisive in shaping Egypt's
response to an Iranian bomb. Secondly, a Saudi acquisition of a
nuclear weapon would substantially shift Egypt's cost-benefit
analysis regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Egyptians see themselves as the natural leaders of the Arab
world, based largely on Egypt's proud history, its dominance of
Arab culture and media, its large population, and its relative
military prowess. However, staff frequently encountered a
feeling among Egyptian officials and scholars that Egypt's
leadership role has deteriorated in recent years. Egyptians
view Saudi Arabia as the country attempting to replace Egypt as
the leader of the Arab world. While Saudi Arabia has only one-
third of Egypt's population, Saudi Arabia's oil wealth and its
role as ``guardian of the two holy mosques'' give it a unique
position from which to challenge Egypt's leadership.
Within this context of competition between Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, a Saudi acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent
a uniquely threatening challenge to Egypt's self-conception and
regional influence. While Egypt would view an Iranian bomb as a
negative and disconcerting development, in the end, Iran does
not represent an Arab or Sunni power. Thus, despite Tehran's
efforts to blur ethnic and religious differences, it is
unlikely that Iran will ever be able to unify Sunni Arab powers
beneath its leadership. The same cannot be said of the Saudis.
The Saudis are Arab and they are predominantly Sunni, and in
sharing these two important characteristics with Egypt, a Saudi
nuclear bomb would represent a more proximate and more serious
threat to Egypt's prestige and national identity. In short, the
manner with which Israel and Saudi Arabia respond to the
potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons will have a
potentially decisive influence on Egypt's decision regarding
nuclear weapons.
TURKEY (CHAPTER 5)
If Iran acquires nuclear weapons in the next decade, this
would also place significant pressure on Turkey to follow suit.
Turkey and Iran do not see themselves as adversaries, but
Turkey believes the centuries of peace and relative stability
between the two states and their predecessor empires derive
primarily from the rough balance of power between them. A
nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the balance in Iran's
direction. Turkey believes this increased Iranian power would
lead to a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy and a
marginalization of Turkey. Such a development would
significantly undercut Turkey's desired role as a respected and
powerful mediator between east and west. In such a scenario,
there would be strong voices in the Turkish General Staff, as
well as among ultra-nationalist politicians, arguing for Turkey
to respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Thus, the possibility
still exists that Turkey would respond to Iranian nuclear
weapons by developing nuclear weapons as well.
At the same time, there are significant disincentives to a
Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. First, doing so would
severely damage United States-Turkish relations, which
represent an essential component of Turkish national security.
Second, such a development would endanger Turkey's good
standing in NATO, another key component of Turkey's national
security. Third, a Turkish pursuit or acquisition of nuclear
weapons would seriously undercut any remaining chance of
Turkish accession into the European Union. Fourth, powerful
popular voices within Turkey would likely oppose a Turkish
attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Unlike Egypt, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia, the democratic system in Turkey would enable
these popular forces to influence Turkey's decisions on these
issues.
Staff believes U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish
perceptions regarding the reliability of NATO will serve as the
decisive factors in Turkey's decision regarding nuclear
weapons. If the bilateral relationship with the United States
is poor and Turkey's trust in NATO low, Turkey would be more
likely to respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by pursuing
nuclear weapons as well. However, a fully restored bilateral
relationship with the United States and a renewed Turkish trust
in NATO provide the best means to discourage a Turkish pursuit
of nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, staff found evidence of strain in the U.S.-
Turkey relations and skepticism regarding the reliability of
NATO security assurances for Turkey. Prior to President Bush's
meetings with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan on November
5, 2007, Turkish-United States relations were at one of the
lowest points in memory. Since this visit, relations between
the two countries have begun to rebound, but much work remains.
Also, real and perceived delays and failures of NATO in
fulfilling its commitments to Turkey in 1991 and 2003 have
contributed to a widespread Turkish disenchantment with NATO.
If these Turkish perceptions toward the United States and NATO
do not significantly improve, an Iranian bomb could lead to a
Turkish bomb.
CHAIN REACTION:
AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
----------
Chapter 1: Introduction
In 1984, George Shultz wrote, ``It is no exaggeration to
say that controlling the spread of nuclear weapons is critical
to world peace and, indeed, to human survival. It is a cause
that deserves and receives top priority in our foreign
policy.'' In the years since Secretary Shultz's observation,
the threat posed to the United States by nuclear proliferation
has only grown worse. The diffusion of scientific knowledge
related to nuclear weapons and reactor technology in the last
two decades has dramatically increased the danger to the United
States and its interests.\1\
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\1\ The author would like to thank the Congressional Research
Service generally and Paul Kerr, Christopher Blanchard, and Jeremy
Sharp specifically for their research assistance. The author would also
like to thank Jay Branegan and Robert Einhorn for their helpful input.
However, the views expressed here are the author's alone.
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A global nuclear energy ``renaissance'' appears to be
underway due in large part to concerns over greenhouse gas
emissions that accompany fossil fuel consumption and the
inability of oil and natural gas supplies to meet the
burgeoning global demand for energy. In the Middle East, these
energy dynamics, as well as a desire to match Iran's nuclear
progress, have ignited and renewed widespread interest in
nuclear energy. In addition to Iran, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Yemen,
have all expressed interest in nuclear energy. While some of
these states appear more committed to pursuing nuclear power
than others, the growing demand for energy, combined with
strategic calculations related to Iran, virtually guarantee
that the Middle East of 2025 will be populated by at least 3-4
states engaging in nuclear power generation.\2\
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\2\ For purposes of this report, the Middle East is defined by
Egypt in the west, Turkey in the north, Iran in the east, and Yemen in
the south. This definition specifically excludes the countries to the
west of Egypt (the Maghreb) and countries to the east of Iran (Pakistan
and Afghanistan).
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This growing presence of nuclear energy in the Middle East
will exacerbate current global trends in which nuclear
materials and technology are becoming increasingly available.
Without comprehensive international reform, this increased
availability of nuclear materials and technology will reduce
the supply-side obstacles to acquiring a nuclear weapons
capability, thereby shifting the cost-benefit analysis of many
states in a dangerous direction. Increasingly, states that seek
a nuclear weapons capability will have access to the knowledge
and materials necessary to obtain it. This is not to suggest
that technical hurdles to the development of nuclear weapons
will cease to exist, but only that the proliferation of nuclear
energy technology and know-how will lower these hurdles. For
many states, this development will reduce the time and
resources required to obtain a nuclear weapons capability.
Since the supply-side obstacles to nuclear weapons
proliferation continue to decrease, the international community
must place greater emphasis on the demand-side of the issue. In
other words, U.S. policy must place a greater emphasis on
identifying and addressing the ``nuclear drivers'' that
motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons. The international
community should continue its efforts to control and regulate
nuclear technologies and materials, but must take its efforts
further. An effective nuclear nonproliferation strategy must be
comprehensive, focusing on both the availability of nuclear
materials and technology, as well as the demand for nuclear
weapons. Unfortunately, since the end of the cold war, U.S.
nuclear nonproliferation policy has been decidedly one-sided--
often neglecting to evaluate the reasons states pursue nuclear
weapons. If U.S. policy continues to neglect the ``nuclear
drivers'' that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons, U.S.
efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the
Middle East will almost certainly fail.\3\
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\3\ Gawhat Bahgat, ``Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East,''
the Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies (Winter 2005).
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Since the advent of nuclear weapons in the last months of
World War II, 29 states have pursued nuclear weapons. However,
18 of these states willingly abandoned their programs--a
decision often called nuclear ``rollback.'' \4\ These 18 case
studies provide ample evidence that states can be dissuaded
from pursuing nuclear weapons when the international
community--and often the United States in particular--addresses
the state's motivations behind its quest for nuclear
weapons.\5\ The history of nonproliferation does not teach that
states eyeing nuclear weapons inevitably get them. Rather, the
history teaches that nonproliferation efforts succeed when the
United States and the international community help satisfy
whatever concerns drove a state to want nuclear weapons in the
first place. In other words, if the United States can
accurately identify and address the motivations--or ``nuclear
drivers''--that compel or encourage Middle Eastern states to
pursue nuclear weapons, it may be possible to interrupt the
nuclear proliferation momentum in the region.
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\4\ Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, ``Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons
From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,'' Center for the
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27
June 2007).
\5\ The countries that have ``rolled back'' are Norway, Italy,
Indonesia, Egypt, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Brazil, Argentina,
Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Libya. The Iraqi program was discovered and
reversed by force and the Iranian program continues.
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the ramifications of an iranian nuclear bomb
In light of this global nuclear energy ``renaissance'' and
with the benefit of these historical lessons, this study
attempts to identify the ramifications of a potential Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons. More specifically, this report
assesses the likelihood that neighbors of Iran would respond to
an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon by seeking nuclear
weapons of their own. Furthermore, this study seeks to identify
the steps the U.S. can take now, as well as in the future if
Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, to prevent a regional
nuclear arms race.
Such a study may seem unnecessary to some in light of the
December 2007 NIE, but Iran's nuclear program remains one of
the most serious threats to U.S. interests and Middle East
peace. Iran continues to enrich uranium-the most difficult
component of a nuclear weapons program-and continues to conduct
work that could contribute to nuclear weapons development. As
the NIE states, Iran now possesses the ``scientific, technical,
and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons
if it decides to do so.'' Consequently, the NIE judges ``with
moderate confidence'' that Iran will have enough highly-
enriched uranium (HEU) to produce a nuclear weapon by 2010-
2015. Furthermore, because the motivations inspiring the
Iranian drive for nuclear weapons remain unaddressed, Iran
remains unlikely to fully abandon its long-term drive to obtain
a nuclear weapon capability. If in fact Iran halted the other
aspects of its nuclear weapons program in 2003, this action
almost certainly represents a tactical pause rather than a
strategic change of course. In short, Iran now possesses the
means as well as the motivation to develop nuclear weapons.
Consequently, based on Iran's acquired capabilities and Iran's
continued motivations, it is entirely possible that the United
States could confront a nuclear-armed or nuclear weapons
capable Iran in the next decade.
If such an undesirable scenario were to occur in the next
decade despite the international community's best efforts, the
U.S. must not be caught unprepared. The U.S. must know what to
expect and must know what steps to take to prevent a bad
situation from becoming worse. An Iranian acquisition of a
nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons capability would
dramatically shift the balance of power among Iran and its
three most powerful neighbors--Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey.
This fact raises many questions, including: How are these three
countries responding today to the Iranian nuclear program? How
would Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara respond if Tehran were to cross
the nuclear threshold and acquire nuclear weapons? Would they
pursue nuclear weapons of their own? What factors would
influence their decisions? What can the U.S. do now and over
the coming years to discourage these countries from pursuing a
nuclear weapon of their own? Based on 5 months of research and
interviews with hundreds of officials and scholars in the
United States and seven Middle Eastern countries, this report
attempts to answer these questions. In order to do this, each
chapter touches on the respective country's relationship with
Iran and the United States, identifies the incentives and
disincentives that would influence the state's response to a
nuclear-armed Iran, and provides policy considerations that
would reduce the chances the state would respond by pursuing
nuclear weapons.
Chapter 2: Historical Lessons on Nuclear ``Roll Forward''
and ``Rollback''
If Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons
capability in the next decade, preventing a nuclear chain
reaction in the region would represent one of the most
difficult and complex challenges the U.S. has confronted in
years. Fortunately, a significant case study history already
exists that provides invaluable information on why states make
decisions with regard to the development or relinquishment of
nuclear weapons programs. According to a comprehensive study by
the National Defense University's (NDU) Center for the Study of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 29 states have pursued nuclear
weapons (``roll forward'') since 1945. Of these 29 states, 18
of them willingly abandoned their programs--a decision often
called ``rollback.'' \1\ This substantial sample size offers
four particularly valuable patterns and lessons that can inform
U.S. policy in the Middle East.
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\1\ The countries that have ``rolled back'' include Norway, Italy,
Indonesia, Egypt, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Brazil, Argentina,
Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Libya. The Iraqi program was discovered and
reversed by force and the Iranian program continues.
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First, there rarely exists a single explanation for a
nation's decision to pursue nuclear weapons. According to the
NDU study, the most influential ``roll forward'' factors have
been: assessment of threat, breakdown of global
nonproliferation norms, national pride and unity, personal
leadership, strategic deterrent, and perceived weakening of
security alliances. The most influential ``rollback'' factors
have been: foreign pressure, impediments to development,
international standing, personal leadership, net loss of
security, and a reassessment of the threat.\2\ While this list
clearly underscores the preeminent role of security
calculations in the decision of states regarding the
development of nuclear weapons, other factors consistently
impact the nuclear decision as well. Scott Sagan, a respected
nuclear proliferation scholar, highlights the importance of
security considerations in the nuclear ``roll forward''
decision, but he also emphasizes the influential role of
domestic sources. According to Sagan, the parochial interests
of actors in the nuclear energy establishment, important
interests within the professional military, and domestic
interests of politicians can increase the likelihood that a
country will pursue nuclear weapons.\3\ Other scholars agree
that one can not dismiss the importance of domestic factors,
but place greater emphasis on individual political leaders. For
example, it is difficult to ignore the pivotal role of Nasser
(Egypt), Gaddafi (Libya), Ben-Gurion (Israel), and the Shah
(Iran) in their respective country's nuclear decision.\4\
Regardless of the factors one chooses to emphasize, the overall
point is clear. Although security considerations usually play a
preeminent role in the nuclear proliferation of states, a
number of other factors play a decisive role as well.
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\2\ Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, ``Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons
From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,'' Center for the
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27
June 2007).
\3\ Scott D. Sagan, ``The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,''
Current History (April 1997).
\4\ Gawdat Bahgat, ``Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East,''
The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies (Winter 2005)
408.
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The South African case study underscores this point. South
Africa established its Atomic Energy Corporation in 1948. By
the end of the next decade, South Africa was conducting
indigenous nuclear research and development. In the mid-1970s,
South Africa decided to develop a nuclear weapon capability.
According to some reports, South Africa tested a nuclear device
in 1979. By 1989, South Africa had built six crude atomic bombs
and was at work on a seventh. According to F.W. de Klerk, South
Africa decided to build nuclear bombs for a ``credible
deterrent capability,'' with the decision being made ``against
the background of a Soviet expansionist threat in southern
Africa,'' and ``South Africa's relative international isolation
and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance,
should it be attacked.'' \5\ In addition to these publicly
cited explanations, there were nine major motivations for this
South African nuclear program, according to the NDU study.
Among these incentives were a perceived threat from communist
and African nationalist power, the personal interest of Prime
Minister P.W. Botha, a sense of political isolation, and the
weakening of civilian oversight of the military.\6\ South
Africa only relinquished its nuclear weapons after the
coincidence of four developments, each of which appear to be
critical to the South African decision. These include:
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\5\ Bill Keller, ``South Africa Says It Built 6 Atom Bombs,'' New
York Times (March 25, 1993).
\6\ Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, ``Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons
From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,'' Center for the
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27
June 2007).
Reassessment of Threat. The end of the cold war reduced
feelings of insecurity as 50,000 Cuban troops withdrew
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from the region.
Desire for International Standing. After the end of
Apartheid, the South African regime sought to normalize
relations with the rest of the world in order to
achieve the political and economic assistance that
would accompany such a move. The normalization of
relations required South Africa to relinquish its
nuclear weapons.
Personal Leadership. President F.W. de Klerk's personal
leadership represented a critical factor in the South
African decision.
Regime Change. As the Nationalist Party prepared to
relinquish power to the African Nationalist Congress,
the Nationalist Party feared the ANC might share
nuclear weapons or technologies with its allies in
Libya, Cuba, the PLO, or Iran.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid. South Africa Case Study.
Although, some explanations are more important than others,
these case studies demonstrate that a single reason cannot
explain a country's decision to ``roll forward'' or
``rollback'' its nuclear weapons program.
Second, a state's decision regarding the development of
nuclear weapons should not be viewed as a single, distinct,
irreversible decision. On the contrary, history consistently
demonstrates that the proliferation decisionmaking process of
states can be better understood as a series of decision points
in which states ``dial up'' or ``dial down'' their programs in
an effort to keep options open. Decisions related to
proliferation evolve slowly and incrementally. Undoubtedly,
leaders make specific policy decisions in response to a
particular set of initial motivations, but these decisions are
frequently reassessed and reversed as the program progresses in
response to new developments. While this finding provides hope
for those who seek to reverse nuclear weapon programs, it also
suggests that the international community can never ``rest on
its laurels,'' trusting that a state has irreversibly turned
its back on nuclear weapons. In other words, the U.S. can never
declare victory in nonproliferation, either with regard to a
particular country or a set of countries. Nonproliferation will
have to remain a permanent fixture of U.S. policy. In the
future, the increasing diffusion and availability of nuclear
technology and know-how will make it easier for states to
``dial up'' their nuclear weapons programs.
Third, the ``drivers'' of a state's nuclear weapons program
should not be viewed as constant. In other words, the
motivations that catalyze a state's nuclear program probably
differ from the motivations that help to sustain that nuclear
program. The ``drivers'' propelling the program forward
continue to evolve over time. Often, as a state's nuclear
program develops, constituencies emerge, momentum builds, and
people ``rally around'' the program. As a result, stopping a
program that has already begun presents more of a challenge
than preventing the onset of a program in the first place. Once
leaders make the decision to pursue nuclear weapons and work
begins, discontinuing the pursuit in the face of international
pressure would promote an image of weakness that could likely
result in political difficulties. Although the initial
motivation may have had an overwhelmingly security-centric
focus, the political desire to create a domestic and
international image of strength may motivate the decision to
continue nuclear weapons development.
Fourth, due to its relative power and global influence,
U.S. policy often has a strong influence on the decisionmaking
of states regarding nuclear weapons. Whether the state
represents a potential adversary or a consistent friend,
policies of the U.S. often play a decisive role. With potential
adversaries, U.S. respect and recognition, the extension of a
nonaggression pact, or the credible promise of economic and
political benefits can sometimes convince potential adversaries
to ``rollback'' their nuclear weapons programs.
U.S. policies have played an even more decisive role in
dissuading allies from pursuing nuclear weapons by extending a
reliable U.S. or U.S.-led security umbrella over the
``vulnerable'' ally. Several countries began nuclear weapons
programs and decided not to see these programs through to
completion due in large degree to a U.S. or U.S.-led security
guarantee. These countries include Australia, Italy, Norway,
South Korea, and Taiwan.\8\ This is not to suggest that the
U.S. security guarantee represented the only factor in the
``rollback'' decision of these countries, but the extension of
a reliable U.S. security umbrella appears to have influenced
each state's ``rollback'' decision. In the cases of Germany and
Japan, both countries can easily obtain nuclear weapons but
have chosen not to because of their integration beneath a NATO
(Germany) or an American (Japan) security umbrella.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, ``Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons
From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,'' Center for the
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27
June 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, all of these countries have the technical capacity
to obtain nuclear weapons in a matter of months or a few short
years. Yet, they chose not to because of their respective cost-
benefit analyses. Pursuing nuclear weapons demands a large
amount of finite money and other resources and could invite
punishing international political pressure and economic
sanctions. At the same time, little need exists to pursue such
an undesirable policy because these countries do not view
nuclear weapons as necessary for their national security. This
belief derives primarily from the fact that these countries
rest comfortably beneath a U.S. or U.S.-led security umbrella.
If these countries ever begin to question the reliability of
this security umbrella, they would almost certainly reassess
past nuclear weapons decisions.
One can envision three scenarios that could prompt such a
``roll forward'' decision by U.S. allies and friends. In the
first scenario, a state relying on a U.S. or U.S.-led security
umbrella can begin to question the reliability of that
guarantee due to an escalating perceived threat not matched by
a proportional increase in the reliability or capability of the
U.S. security guarantee. This relationship between threat
perception and the perception of the U.S. security guarantee is
more subjective and psychological than objective and
quantifiable. Nonetheless, in a growing threat environment, a
static U.S. security guarantee can lead to a reassessment of a
state's nuclear decision. In the second scenario, states could
also begin to question the reliability of the U.S. security
guarantee in a static threat environment if the protected state
perceives a decline in the capability or will of the U.S. to
serve as a security guarantor. In the third and most
problematic scenario, a mounting threat perception accompanied
by a simultaneous perceived deterioration in the reliability of
the U.S. security guarantee, creates the most intense incentive
for a state to reassess its nuclear decision. In any of these
three scenarios--an increase in the perceived threat, a
decrease in the perceived reliability of U.S. security
guarantee, or both--the result can be the same; the state looks
elsewhere to defend itself. If another security guarantor can
be found, the state may seek a new security relationship to
replace the U.S. If a partner with both the capability and will
to perform as a security guarantor does not exist, the state
will seek to improve and expand its internal defense
capabilities--likely via nuclear weapons.
These broad historical observations and potential scenarios
suggest U.S. policymakers should be concerned about recent
developments in the Middle East. In the eyes of countries such
as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey in particular, Iran's
nuclear program has heightened threat perceptions, while the
U.S. intervention in Iraq has damaged Arab and Turkish
perceptions regarding the reliability of the U.S. security
guarantee. As a result of this dangerous synergy, these three
states in particular appear to be moving deliberately in the
direction of a nuclear hedging strategy that would position
them to obtain a nuclear weapons breakout capability in the
next two decades. A Middle East populated by a Saudi, Egyptian,
and/or Turkish nuclear weapons capability could dramatically
reduce regional security and could significantly endanger U.S.
interests. The U.S. must take in the next 2 to 3 years to
reduce Arab and Turkish threat perceptions and to restore their
confidence in the U.S. or U.S.-led security guarantee. Absent
deliberate U.S. action in the next few years, the future Middle
Eastern landscape may include a number of nuclear armed or
nuclear weapons capable states vying for influence in a
notoriously unstable region.
Chapter 3: Saudi Arabia
The development of a Saudi nuclear weapon represents one of
the most serious and most likely consequences of an Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons. If Iran obtains a nuclear
weapon, it will place tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia to
follow suit. The factor most likely to dissuade the Saudis from
pursuing a nuclear weapon would be a restored United States-
Saudi bilateral relationship and a repaired Saudi perception
regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. If
the United States does not take deliberate action in the coming
years to achieve both of these objectives, an Iranian bomb will
almost certainly lead to a Saudi bomb.
This chapter will support these arguments in five sections.
The first section will describe the possible ramifications of a
Saudi nuclear weapon. The second section will explore Saudi
perceptions of Iran and the Iranian nuclear program. The third
section will describe the nascent Saudi nuclear energy program.
The fourth section will set out the arguments as to why an
Iranian bomb will likely beget a Saudi nuclear weapon. This
section will discuss the centrality of the United States
security guarantee in Saudi thinking. The fifth section will
suggest those policy actions that might help discourage the
Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon.
THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
Of any Middle Eastern state, Saudi Arabia is the state most
likely to pursue nuclear weapons in response to the development
of an Iranian nuclear weapon. While acknowledging the
difficulty inherent in accurately predicting the ramifications
of a Saudi nuclear weapon, one can envision a host of likely or
possible outcomes that would dramatically undermine peace and
stability in the Middle East and severely endanger U.S.
interests and security. At some point in the Saudi process of
developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon capability, Israel
would likely detect the Saudi nuclear activity. Israel might
strike a small number of Saudi targets in order to eliminate
the program in its infancy. Even if the Saudis could obtain a
nuclear weapon without Israeli knowledge, it is difficult to
imagine a passive Israeli acceptance of a Saudi nuclear weapon,
which the Israelis would likely view as an existential threat.
If the Israeli response to a Saudi nuclear weapons program took
the form of a military attack it would be seen in the Arab
World in the context of an attack from the Jewish state against
the Islamic holy land and home of the ``two holy mosques.''
Such an Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia would represent one of
the greatest offenses to Muslims in history and would incite an
unprecedented level of radicalization directed against Israel
and the United States, possibly resulting in a regionwide
conflict between Arab States and Israel.
A Saudi nuclear weapon might also spur a regional nuclear
arms race. Iran would likely respond by increasing the number
of nuclear weapons in their arsenal, the accuracy of their
delivery systems, and the variety of their launch platforms. If
Israel took either of these steps--especially in an overt and
explicit manner--it would place tremendous political pressure
on Egypt to respond.\1\ The Egyptian response could consist of
a renunciation of its peace treaty with Israel, a repudiation
of its relations with the United States, or the initiation of
an Egyptian nuclear weapons program. The Egyptian people would
undoubtedly demand the government take some forceful and
substantial action. This interaction between Israel and Egypt
would also be exacerbated by the existence of a Saudi nuclear
weapon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This report does not take a postition on the existence of
Israeli nuclear weapons. Although Israel has not officially
acknowledged it possesses nuclear weapons, a widespread consensus
exists in the region and among experts in the United States that Israel
possesses a number of nuclear weapons. For Israel's neighbors, this
perception is more important than reality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even if Israel didn't react in this overt way to a Saudi
move, a Saudi nuclear weapon would put great pressure on the
Egyptians to follow suit. Egypt views itself as the leader of
the Arab world and a Saudi nuclear weapon would directly
challenge this self conception. Moreover, a Middle East that
includes a nuclear-armed Iran and Saudi Arabia would also place
significant pressure on the Turks to respond in kind. While
this ``nuclear cascade'' or chain reaction may represent the
worst case scenario, it is not outside the realm of possibility
if Saudi Arabia responds to Iran by pursuing a nuclear weapon.
While it is unlikely that such a nuclear cascade would unfold
exactly in this manner, the odds that some of these
developments may occur requires that the United States assess
the likelihood that Saudi Arabia would pursue a nuclear weapon
and take steps to decrease this likelihood.
SAUDI PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN AND THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, the United States would
be wise to immediately focus on the Saudi reaction. If Saudi
Arabia demonstrates restraint and does not pursue nuclear
weapons, it might be possible to forestall a regional nuclear
arms cascade, thereby allowing the United States to focus on
containing and potentially rolling back Iranian nuclear forces.
Conversely, if Saudi Arabia does respond by pursuing nuclear
weapons, this could well ignite a regional nuclear arms chain
reaction as described above. This would also significantly
reduce the likelihood that the international community could
convince Iran to relinquish its nuclear weapons. Staff
interviews confirm the findings of Rand researchers Dalia Dassa
Kaye and Frederic Wehrey that ``Saudi Arabia's reaction is a
leading concern among all regional states,'' and the ``Saudi
reaction is likely to be the pivot around which inter-Arab
debates resolve.'' \2\ Therefore, the United States must take
note of what the Saudis say and what may influence their
decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, ``A Nuclear Iran: The
Reactions of Neighbors,'' Survival (Summer 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What the Saudis Are Saying
When asked about the Iranian nuclear weapons program,
senior and mid-level Saudi officials express an apparently
unanimous belief among the upper-echelon of the Saudi
Government that the Iranian nuclear program does not solely
exist for peaceful purposes. One senior Saudi official told
staff confidently, ``Iran is determined to get a nuclear
weapon.'' While staff found a significant degree of doubt among
other GCC states as to whether Iran was pursuing nuclear
weapons, Saudi officials conveyed no sense of doubt regarding
Iran's intentions. One senior, long-serving U.S. diplomat in
Riyadh said he had ``never met anyone from the King on down who
didn't think it was a nuclear weapons program.'' According to
one senior Saudi official, the Saudis have even told the
Iranians that the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) believes Iran
is pursuing a nuclear weapon.
Saudi officials believe Iran wants a nuclear weapon in
order to become a regional superpower, to alleviate a sense of
marginalization, to serve as a deterrent, and to be a more
dominant force in the Gulf. While senior Saudi officials
describe a nuclear-armed Iran as ``an existential threat,''
most Saudi officials do not believe Iran would actually use
nuclear weapons against Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia worries that
Iranian nuclear weapons would encourage and enable the Iranians
to pursue a more aggressive, hegemonic foreign policy in the
region. However, it would be inaccurate to completely
characterize SAG anxiety regarding Iranian nuclear weapons as
purely a ``balance of power concern.'' Based largely on Iran's
subversive activities directed against the Saudi regime in the
1980s, some senior Saudi leaders find a nuclear-armed Iran
especially disconcerting. Such past Iranian subversion efforts
has imbued the senior Saudi leadership with an intense distrust
of Tehran. Saudi Arabia currently fears Iranian influence, and
finds the notion of a nuclear-armed Iran all the more
disconcerting.
When asked about the U.S. response to this apparent Iranian
drive for nuclear weapons, Saudi officials encourage the United
States to place greater emphasis on diplomatic initiatives,
while opposing a quick resort to violence against Iran. Several
senior Saudi officials appear to hope that stronger
international sanctions, combined with face-saving means for
the Iranians to change course, could resolve the nuclear
crisis. When presented with a hypothetical choice between a
nuclear-armed Iran and a U.S. attack, a significant number of
Saudi officials interviewed explicitly or implicitly preferred
a U.S. attack. A correlation seems to exist between the
seniority of Saudi officials and views on Iranian nuclear
weapons. More senior Saudi officials tended to be more
``hawkish'' in their viewpoint toward Iran. Some key Saudi
officials believe a U.S. attack could set the Iranian nuclear
program back over a decade. More cautious members of the senior
inner circle express concern that a military attack would
affect ``everything and will not be easy to pull off,'' and
doubt whether a U.S. attack could destroy all key components of
the Iranian nuclear program. Based on U.S. actions in Iraq,
some key Saudi officials feared a ``nightmare'' scenario in
which the U.S. attacks Iran but fails to keep Iran from
obtaining nuclear weapons.
When asked if Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons in
response to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, senior and
mid-level Saudi leaders echo the official Saudi line,
dismissing the notion as ``ridiculous'' and saying Saudi Arabia
would be the ``last country to get nuclear weapons.'' Several
senior Saudis suggest that Saudi Arabia would rather rely on a
U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, when pressed, some senior Saudi
officials candidly state that SAG would seek to obtain nuclear
weapons or rely on a nuclear guarantee from Pakistan while
simultaneously buying parts on the market. It is entirely
possible that such statements simply represent an effort by the
more hawkish members of the Saudi inner circle to promote a
U.S. attack on Iran. However, too many other factors suggest
Saudi Arabia would take these steps to dismiss these comments
as disingenuous.
While the senior members of the Saudi regime have an
especially ``hawkish'' perspective on Iran, in a meeting with
several members of the Majilis ash-Shura (the Saudi
Parliament), staff found a perspective quite distinct from the
opinions expressed by senior and mid-level officials of the
Saudi regime. While these Majilis members have limited
influence over the decisions of the Saudi government, their
views provide some insight into viewpoints outside the royal
family. This group of Majilis members unanimously questioned
the reliability of U.S. claims that Iran was pursuing nuclear
weapons (this meeting took place before the 2007 NIE),
dismissed the threat posed by Iran, and opposed a U.S. attack
on Iran. One Majilis member appeared to summarize the consensus
view saying ``Haven't we had enough wars . . . war is not in
the interest of anyone.'' Another member predicted that a U.S.
attack on Iran would cause the Shia to ``stand with Iran'' and
would cause the Sunni to hate America even more. Members
unanimously decried a perceived U.S. double standard when it
comes to Israel and Iran, asking why the United States turns a
blind eye to alleged Israeli nuclear weapons while opposing the
alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program. Members unanimously
supported Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy and questioned why
the United States would talk directly and unconditionally with
the North Koreans, but would not do so with Iran.
Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Sunni-Shia Dimension
While much of the Saudi perspective toward Iran and the
Iranian nuclear program can be understood from a traditional
security and balance of power perspective, a complete
understanding of the Saudi viewpoint requires an appreciation
of the sectarian dimension as well. Despite public diplomatic
niceties exchanged between the two powers, Saudi officials view
Iran as a ``global ideological threat'' and a dangerous
potential adversary. The Saudis base their view on 3,000 years
of history and the events of the last few decades. However, a
large portion of the Saudi perception of Iran is rooted in
sectarianism. The Saudis view the Iranian threat at least
partly through a Sunni-Shia lens.
If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, the Saudis will, to a
large extent, view it as a ``Shia bomb.'' The Sunni-Shia divide
would represent a major incentive for the Saudis to respond to
an Iranian nuclear weapon by pursuing one of their own. To
understand how this Muslim religious divide could play a role
in the Saudi nuclear decision, it is essential to have at least
a cursory understanding of the sectarian differences between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the Saudi regime's relations
with the Saudi Shia and Iran.
The sectarian differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia
represent one of the central causes of the tensions between the
two countries. Religious ideology plays a large role in
informing Saudi foreign policy and would likely represent a key
aspect in the Saudi decision on nuclear weapons. The Iranian
population is 89 percent Shia and only 9 percent Sunni.\3\ A
Shia religious hierarchy headed by Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali
Khamenei controls the reins of power in Iran and views itself
as the spiritual vanguard and shepherd of Shia worldwide. In
contrast, Saudi Arabia is overwhelmingly Sunni, with a Saudi
Shia population of only 10-15 percent.\4\. The Saudi royal
family is Sunni and has maintained a long alliance with the
leadership of a particularly strident wing of Sunni Islam
founded by Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Iran,'' CIA Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html
#People.
\4\ ``Freedom in the World 2007: The Annual Survey of Political
Rights and Civil Liberties'' (Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, 2007)
687.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This form of Wahhabi Islam has dominated Saudi Arabia since
the nation's founding. It views the Shia as rafida (those who
reject the faith). This religious classification of the Saudi
Shia later served as justification for Ibn Saud's decision to
enforce the payment of jizya (an Islamic tax imposed on non-
Muslims) against the Shia residing in the eastern province of
Saudi Arabia.\5\ As a result of this widespread view of the
Shia as pseudo-Muslims or non-Muslims, the Shia in Saudi Arabia
have suffered from a severe lack of religious freedom and civil
rights. To complicate matters for the Saudi regime, the
concentration of Shia in Saudi Arabia happens to be colocated
with Saudi Arabia's major oil fields. As the Saudi oil industry
matured, an increasing number of Saudi Shia transitioned from
working on farms to working in menial jobs in the burgeoning
oil industry in Saudi Arabia's eastern provinces. In 1950, it
is estimated that 60 percent of ARAMCO employees were Shia.
According to a senior U.S. diplomat in Saudi Arabia, that
number now stands at roughly 70 percent. While King Abdullah
has taken steps to improve the plight of Shia in Saudi Arabia,
staff meetings with various members of the Saudi Shia community
clearly demonstrate that a widespread perception of inequality
persists among Saudi Shia. This Shia predominance in ARAMCO and
in the vicinity of the oil wells that represent the well-spring
of Saudi wealth and power represents a major source of concern
and potential vulnerability for the Saudi regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Madawi al-Rasheed, ``A History of Saudi Arabia'' (Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, 2002) 41, 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The domestic tensions between the Saudi regime and the
Saudi Shia impact Saudi-Iranian relations and would influence
the Saudi decision on nuclear weapons due to a number of
specific events in the last few decades. The 1979 Iranian
Revolution had a profound impact on Saudi Arabia's sense of
insecurity and its perception of the Saudi Shia. As already
detailed, the House of Saud's insecurities did not just appear
in 1979, and tensions between the Sunni ruling family and the
Saudi Shia date to the birth of the Saudi state. However, the
1979 Iranian Revolution dramatically exacerbated both of these
problems. The new Iranian regime questioned the Islamic
credentials of the Saudi regime, criticized the Saudi regime's
relations with the United States, and emboldened the Shia
residing in Saudi Arabia. In 1979, encouraged by the Iranian
Revolution, the Saudi Shia took to the streets in Saudi
Arabia's eastern provinces to commemorate Ashura--a Shia rite
outlawed by the Saudi regime that mourns the death of Hasan and
Husayn. The Saudi regime responded by dispatching 20,000
National Guard soldiers. The following year, the Saudi Shia
held large demonstrations and a series of strikes in Qatif to
commemorate the first anniversary of Khomeini's return to
Iran.\6\ The Saudi National Guard responded aggressively,
killing some demonstrators and dispersing the rest. Following
these uprisings, the Organization of the Islamic Revolution
developed. This clandestine Shia organization representing the
Saudi Shia in the eastern province was comprised primarily of
students from the University of Minerals and Petroleum in
Dammam and workers in the oil fields. This organization
broadcasted from Iranian radio stations in an attempt to reach
the Saudi Shia and opened an information office in Tehran to
promote political activism among the Saudi Shia.\7\ The anti-
Saudi rhetoric of the Iranian Government promoted agitation
among Saudi Shia and escalated tensions between Iran and Saudi
Arabia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Ibid, 143-147.
\7\ Ibid, 147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980, Saudi
Arabia sided with Sunni-led Iraq against the Shia-dominated
Iran. Saudi Arabia felt threatened by both states. Both Iran
and Iraq had larger populations and more powerful militaries
than Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein's efforts to promote pan-
Arabism and Iran's attempt to export its form of Islamic
revolution threatened the Saudi regime. However, Saudi Arabia
provided an estimated $25.7 billion in aid to Iraq because
Saudi Arabia saw Iran's export of Shia Islamic revolution as
the greater of the two threats.
As the Iran-Iraq war continued throughout the 1980s, the
annual pilgrimage to Mecca for the Hajj became another source
of religiously grounded tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Each year, thousands of Iranians made the trip to Mecca to
participate in this important Muslim tradition. While in Saudi
Arabia, many Iranian pilgrims would organize demonstrations and
denounce the Saudi regime for its relations with the United
States. Clashes between the Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security
forces became a regular fixture of the annual pilgrimage to
Mecca during the decade. In 1987, major clashes occurred
between the Saudi security forces and protesting pilgrims in
which 400 people were killed, including 275 Iranians.\8\ After
this incident, tensions mounted dramatically between the
Iranian regime and the Saudi Government, with the Iranian
leadership calling for the ouster of the Saudi royal family.
The Saudi regime responded to the hostile Iranian rhetoric and
suspected incidents of Iranian sabotage and subversion by
introducing a quota system partly intended to reduce the number
of Iranian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj. While
Saudi Arabia and Iran enjoyed a period of detente in the 1990s,
the Sunni-Shia animosities and insecurity still continue to
resonate deeply in the thinking of the Saudi regime. This Saudi
history with Iran and the Saudi Shia has imbued the Saudi
ruling family with a deep skepticism regarding the intentions
of the Iranians and the loyalty of some Saudi Shia. This
troubled past with Iran and the Saudi Shia figures prominently
in Saudi thinking and would significantly shape the Saudi
response to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Michael Ross, ``Gulf Supply Ship Hits Mine; Sinks Another;
Blast Rocks Saudi Plant on Coast; Iranian Sabotage Hinted,'' The Los
Angeles Times (Aug. 16, 1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE SAUDI NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM
In December 2006, Saudi Arabia joined the five other
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to announce their
intention to explore the development of a shared nuclear power
program. These six countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) join Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and
Turkey as countries who have expressed interest in developing
nuclear energy programs in the wake of Iran's nuclear
activities. The GCC states have taken great pains to cooperate
with the IAEA fully and to progress in a transparent manner. At
the initial announcement, the Saudi Foreign Minister said,
``This is not a secret and we are doing this out in the open.
Our aim is to obtain the technology for peaceful purposes, no
more no less.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Abdullah Shihri and Diana Elias, ``Arab States Study Shared
Nuclear Program,'' Associated Press (Dec. 11, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these assurances, numerous individuals interviewed
by staff expressed a belief that the GCC announcement should be
seen primarily as a response to Iran's nuclear program.
Analysts and scholars in the United States and the Arab world
interviewed by staff believe the Saudi-led announcement was
intended to communicate to the Iranians, ``we can play this
game too,'' while building a foundation of nuclear knowledge
and expertise that would be useful should Saudi Arabia decide
to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.
This is not to suggest the Saudis do not have an energy-
based argument for their interest in nuclear energy. According
to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Saudi Arabia's
Water and Electricity Ministry (WEM) predicts that the
country's electricity demand will double by the years 2023-25.
Saudi Arabia already uses large amounts of its oil for domestic
energy needs. In fact, 7 years ago, 16 of every 100 barrels of
Saudi oil were consumed in Saudi Arabia. This year the amount
of Saudi oil consumed in-country has grown to 22 of every 100
barrels, even as the global oil market has become tighter. As
the Saudis seek to build an industrial infrastructure and
employ more Saudis, consumption demands will continue to
grow.\10\ Given the high price of oil and gas, the Saudis would
rather export their fossil fuels than burn them. A nuclear
power capacity would allow the Saudis to export more oil and
gas and consume less. However, the timing and the forum for the
Saudi-led announcement suggests the primary purpose of the
decision was to warn the Iranians and begin the process of a
nuclear-hedging strategy that will keep Saudi Arabia's nuclear
options open.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Neil King, ``Saudi Industrial Drive Strains Oil-Export Role,''
Wall Street Journal (Dec. 12, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This does not mean that Saudi Arabia and the other GCC
states will have a nuclear power generation capability in the
next 5 years. Since the December 2006 announcement, several
rounds of GCC meetings have been held, but little tangible
progress appears to have been made. In the case of the GCC
states, tangible progress toward a nuclear energy program lags
far behind the political rhetoric and ambition. In other words,
a shared GCC nuclear power generation capacity remains at least
a decade in the future if not longer. Most of the government
individuals interviewed by staff in the GCC seem to be unaware
of the magnitude of the task involved in developing a nuclear
power program.
Nonetheless, the GCC rhetoric, and especially the Saudi
rhetoric, should be considered as more than mere political
positioning. A genuine desire to develop a nuclear power
program exists in the Middle East. This desire appears to be
partially motivated by energy considerations and mostly
motivated by a desire to match the Iranian nuclear program and
to keep options open regarding nuclear weapons. If current
trends continue, U.S. decisionmakers should expect to see a GCC
nuclear power generation capacity within the next two decades.
While this development may be unwelcome to many U.S.
observers, the U.S. Government has supported the GCC
expressions of interest in nuclear energy. As the GCC program
progresses, the United States should monitor closely the degree
to which the GCC states cooperate with the IAEA and whether
these states express an interest in enrichment or reprocessing.
WILL THE SAUDIS SEEK A NUCLEAR WEAPON?
One of the central questions staff attempted to answer
throughout this study was whether Saudi Arabia would respond to
an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon by pursuing a weapon
as well. In addition to the responses detailed above from Saudi
Government officials, staff interviewed a large number of U.S.
officials and Saudi scholars in Saudi Arabia, as well as a
significant number of U.S. scholars in Washington. While
responses varied, virtually every person interviewed by staff
believed that Saudi Arabia would be the country most likely to
pursue a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb.
Significant disagreement existed regarding the Saudi's final
decision, as well as their capability to obtain a nuclear
weapon, but almost all individuals agreed that the United
States should monitor Saudi Arabia, specifically. One senior
U.S. diplomat said a Saudi nuclear weapon would be the ``real
downside'' of an Iranian nuclear weapon, predicting that a
Saudi pursuit of a nuclear weapon would be ``virtually
certain.'' Referring to the Saudis, another senior U.S.
diplomat with excellent access to the highest levels of the
Saudi Government said that the idea of an Iranian nuclear
weapon ``frightens them to their core'' and would lead the
Saudis to pursue a nuclear weapon of their own. Some
acknowledged these Saudi fears, but argued that the importance
of the bilateral relationship with the United States would
dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon.
Most individuals interviewed argue that any future Saudi
decision regarding nuclear weapons would be primarily based
upon the Saudi assessment of the reliability of the U.S.
security guarantee. If the Saudis believe the United States
lacks the will or capability to defend Saudi Arabia against a
nuclear-armed Iran, Saudi Arabia is more likely to pursue a
nuclear weapons capability of its own. To appreciate the
importance of U.S. security guarantees in Saudi strategic
thinking, it is necessary to briefly review the history of
United States-Saudi relations.
Since the creation of Saudi Arabia in 1932, the Saudi
regime has harbored a deep sense of vulnerability to foreign
invasion or attack due to a number of factors. The vast,
sparsely populated country of Saudi Arabia has vulnerable
borders and coastlines along with the world's largest reserve
of oil. These factors, combined with the traditional weakness
of the Saudi military and the frequently tense relations with
its neighbors, compelled the Saudis to seek and maintain a
security relationship with a trustworthy foreign power. In
February 1945, the Kingdom's founder, Ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud,
reached out to Franklin Roosevelt and the United States to
forge a strategic relationship. The strategic relationship that
evolved over the next 55 years essentially revolved around a
simple agreement: Saudi Arabia would provide the United States
and the international community with a reliable source of oil,
and in return, the United States would support the Saudi regime
and guarantee Saudi Arabia's security. To be sure, between 1945
and 2001, the threats to the Saudi ruling family changed, and
the strength of the United States-Saudi bilateral relationship
waxed and waned, but this grand strategic pact remained
essentially in tact.
The events of September 11, 2001, directly challenged the
United States-Saudi strategic relationship. The fact that 15 of
the 19 hijackers had Saudi backgrounds significantly increased
anti-Saudi popular animosity in the United States. The Saudi
regime was simultaneously embarrassed that its citizens had
committed such an act and dismayed by what it perceived to be
the unjustified and vitriolic response of many Americans toward
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime believed Americans should have
differentiated between ``a few bad apples'' and the majority of
the Saudi people and the Saudi regime. While one can question
the degree of Saudi commitment against al-Qaeda prior to the
2003 al-Qaeda bombings in Riyadh, those bombings marked a
significant turning point for the Saudi regime. These 2003
bombings eliminated any lingering doubt in the Saudi regime as
to whether al-Qaeda represented a threat to the Saudi ruling
family. As a result, since 2003, the Saudis have taken
comprehensive steps to defeat al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and to
cooperate with U.S.-led international efforts to curtail al-
Qaeda's international financing and identify members of al-
Qaeda. As one senior U.S. diplomat in Saudi Arabia explained,
in the wake of the 2003 al-Qaeda bombings in Saudi Arabia, the
Saudi security forces engaged in running street battles with
al-Qaeda and have subsequently made great strides in
confronting al-Qaeda in the Kingdom.
Iraq and Saudi Perceptions of the U.S. Security Guarantee
While the U.S. security guarantee will play a central role
in Saudi Arabia's nuclear decisionmaking, according to numerous
individuals interviewed, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the
manner in which United States has conducted the Iraq war since
2003 eroded Saudi perceptions of U.S. political wisdom and
military capability. The Saudis believe the U.S. performance in
Iraq, and the manner in which U.S. decisions were made, have
dramatically increased Iranian influence in Iraq, unnerving the
Saudis and reducing the reservoir of trust the United States
built up in Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm in 1990-91. While the Saudis strongly supported
the 2007 U.S. ``surge'' in Iraq and welcomed the U.S. strategy
to work with Sunni tribal leaders to establish order and oppose
al-Qaeda, these steps have not fully remedied the significant
loss of U.S. credibility. Saudi frustration with U.S. actions
in Iraq and a perceived failure of the Bush administration to
listen to Saudi counsel have reached such a threshold that King
Abdullah often refuses to discuss Iraq with visiting senior
U.S. officials. The Saudis want the United States to commit
whatever number of soldiers and resources necessary to achieve
success in Iraq. The Saudis define success in Iraq as a durable
end-state that consists of a peaceful, stable, and unified Iraq
ruled by an Iraqi regime that fully incorporates Iraq's Sunnis,
adamantly opposes Iranian meddling in Iraq, and assiduously
seeks peaceful relations with its neighbors. As U.S.
decisionmakers debate U.S. policy in Iraq, they should fully
appreciate the second-order effects that the outcome in Iraq
will have on United States-Saudi relations and U.S. efforts to
prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
Anticipating the Counter Arguments
Those who believe Saudi Arabia would not respond to an
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons by pursuing a weapon of
its own usually emphasize one of three arguments. The first
argument suggests the value the Saudis place on their
relationship with the United States would dissuade them from
taking a nuclear decision that would severely damage their most
important bilateral relationship. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia
values its relationship with the United States. The United
States has served as Saudi Arabia's most important security
guarantor since 1945. However, Saudi Arabia values its
relationship with the United States because the United States
has served Saudi Arabia's interests. If Saudi Arabia comes to
believe the United States can not or will not protect the
Kingdom and its core interests, the Saudi regime will not
hesitate to develop the independent means to deter its enemies.
The fact that no state can fully replace the United States as
Saudi Arabia's security guarantor for the next two decades will
shape Saudi decisionmaking. If the United States does not take
assertive steps now to restore Saudi faith in the U.S. security
guarantee, this fact will increase the likelihood that the
Saudis will respond to a perceived decline in the reliability
of U.S. security guarantees and the emergence of an Iranian
nuclear threat by pursuing an independent nuclear deterrent.
The second argument frequently cited as to why the Saudis
would not pursue nuclear weapons relates to the character of
the regime. Some argue the Saudi regime is too conservative,
too timid to take such a bold and controversial step. However,
the Saudi regime's undoubtedly conservative and occasionally
timid approach to foreign relations has not kept Saudi Arabia
from taking covert and controversial measures in the past in
order to protect its interests. The Saudi acquisition of 50-60
CSS-2 missiles, 10-15 mobile launchers, and technical support
from China at a cost of about $3 to $3.5 billion in the late
1980s provides a preeminent example.\11\ These missiles, which
represent some of the longest-range missiles in the world, were
acquired by the Saudis after the U.S. decision not to sell the
Saudis surface to surface missiles.\12\ This Saudi move
apparently reflected anything but a conservative or timid
approach. Apparently conducted without the knowledge of Israel
or the United States, General Khaled bin Sultan, who served as
commander of Arab forces during Desert Shield and Desert Storm
and who oversaw the Saudi acquisition of the Chinese missiles,
visited China four times to close the deal. Detailing his
responsibilities, he said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Richard L. Russell, Weapons Proliferation and War in the
Greater Middle East (Routledge: New York, 2005) 114.
\12\ James A. Russell, ``Saudi Arabia in the Twenty-First Century:
A New Security Calculus?'' Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
in the Middle East, Edited by James A. Russell (Palgrave Macmillan: New
York, 2006) 121.
My task was to negotiate the deal, devise an
appropriate deception plan, choose a team of Saudi
officers and men and arrange for their training in both
Saudi Arabia and China, build and defend operation
bases and storage facilities in different parts of the
Kingdom, arrange for the shipment of the missiles from
China and, at every stage, be ready to defend the
project against sabotage or any other form of
attack.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Richard L. Russell, Weapons Proliferation and War in the
Greater Middle East (Routledge: New York, 2005) 113.
The Saudis have denied U.S. requests for an onsite
inspection of the missiles. Responding to such a request, Saudi
Defense Minister Prince and now Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdel
Aziz al-Saud said, ``Many people think that we're dependent on
the United States for arms, and even say we're subservient to
American policy. The acquisition of Chinese missiles proves the
opposite.'' \14\ In short, the Saudi acquisition of the Chinese
CSS-2 missiles in the late 1980s strongly suggests that the
Saudis are willing to bypass or risk alienating the United
States in order to protect Saudi interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Ibid, 114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third argument often cited to suggest that Saudi Arabia
would not pursue nuclear weapons relates to Saudi Arabia's
nuclear technology capabilities. There exists a relatively
strong consensus regarding the immature state of Saudi Arabia's
nuclear technology infrastructure. Saudi Arabia lacks the human
expertise and the technical knowledge necessary to develop a
nuclear weapons program on its own. Experts consistently
describe Saudi Arabia's nuclear infrastructure and know how as
far inferior to Egypt and Turkey.
Notwithstanding these apparent facts, observers should not
underestimate Saudi Arabia's ability to obtain the technology
required. Many scholars and U.S. diplomats believe Saudi Arabia
may have some sort of formal or informal understanding with
Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
have common interests and complementary assets. Pakistan has a
nuclear capability and limited money, while Saudi Arabia has no
nuclear capability and virtually unlimited money. While no
solid evidence exists to confirm the formalization of such an
agreement, some circumstantial evidence suggests an agreement
or ``understanding'' may exist. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, both
primarily Sunni countries, both have a history of tense
relations with Iran. Also, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan enjoy a
long history of military cooperation. In fact, Pakistani
deployed troops to Saudi soil from 1979 to 1987, and the two
countries cooperated extensively in the 1980s to fight the
Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan. Furthermore, then-Crown
Prince Abdullah visited Pakistan a few months after Pakistan's
1998 nuclear tests, raising some eyebrows.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Thomas W. Lippman, ``Saudi Arabia: The Calculations of
Uncertainty,'' The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their
Nuclear Choices. Edited by Kurt M. Campbell, et al. (Brookings
Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
None of this proves the existence of a nuclear
understanding between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but if such an
agreement exists, the transfer could manifest itself in four
different forms. First, in the eventuality of an Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Pakistanis could transfer
nuclear technology or materials to the Saudis. This transfer
could jump-start the Saudi nuclear program and would
dramatically reduce the time between a Saudi political decision
to move forward on nuclear weapons and the Saudi development of
a nuclear weapons capability. This transfer could take place at
the official government to government level or at the
subnational level, reminiscent of the A.Q. Kahn network.
Pakistan could also deploy Pakistani nuclear forces to Saudi
Arabia. This scenario may not incur the same international
condemnation of the other two options and arguably would not
violate the NPT.
A third option might take the form of a Pakistani nuclear
umbrella over Saudi Arabia utilizing missiles in Pakistan. The
Pakistani transfer of a finished nuclear weapon to Saudi Arabia
represents the fourth, and probably the least viable, option.
As a general rule, the contemporary popular discussion of these
options underestimates the difficulty of transferring nuclear
weapons and the construction of a nuclear weapon. While
adoption of this last option may be unlikely, a transfer of
nuclear technology, a stationing of Pakistani nuclear forces in
Saudi Arabia, or a Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia
would be quite plausible.
Therefore, based on this analysis, an Iranian acquisition
of a nuclear weapon would place extraordinary pressure on the
Saudis to follow suit. If the United States does not take
deliberate steps in the next few years to improve United
States-Saudi relations and restore Saudi trust in the U.S.
security guarantee, Saudi Arabia could respond to an Iranian
bomb by obtaining one of its own or seeking some sort of
security understanding with Pakistan. The following steps would
help reduce the likelihood of such a response.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Reiterate U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Weapons. The
United States needs to clarify and communicate its
policies and attitudes toward nuclear weapons
proliferation. Traditional U.S. policy toward nuclear
proliferation essentially stated that no nuclear
proliferation was acceptable or desirable. However, in
recent years, some U.S. Government statements and
policies have promoted an international perception that
America tolerates nuclear proliferation among its
friends, but not among its enemies. In Saudi Arabia, a
few scholars and government officials half-jokingly
predicted to staff that the United States would end up
encouraging Saudi Arabia to obtain nuclear weapons in
response to an Iranian bomb. Therefore, the United
States should deliberately and explicitly clarify its
attitudes regarding a potential Saudi nuclear weapons
program. The U.S. should not wait for Iran to cross the
nuclear threshold before taking this step. The United
States should privately reiterate in an unambiguous
manner that its interests would not be served by a
Saudi nuclear weapons program.
Understanding the Relationship Between a Peaceful
and Stable Iraq and the Credibility of any U.S.
Security Guarantee to the Saudis. The step most likely
to dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon
in response to an Iranian bomb would be a strong and
tangible reiteration of the U.S. security guarantee.
The degree to which the Saudis would be willing to
trust these U.S. security assurances will be affected
by the outcome in Iraq. As detailed above, U.S.
missteps in Iraq have seriously shaken Saudi confidence
in the wisdom of U.S. decisionmakers and the
capabilities of the U.S. military. As U.S.
decisionmakers debate U.S. policy in Iraq, they should
fully appreciate the second-order effects that the
outcome in Iraq will have on United States-Saudi
relations and U.S. efforts to prevent a nuclear arms
race in the Middle East.
Fix the Non-Immigrant Visas (NIV) Problem. Between
fiscal year 2000 and 2004, the number of U.S.
nonimmigrant visas issued in Saudi Arabia declined 80
percent, from 78,599 to 16,070. For fiscal year 2007,
the number was 32,909, only 41 percent of the pre-9/11
amount. (See Appendix 2) \16\ From a security and
homeland defense perspective, one can appreciate the
need for a significant reduction in the number of NIVs
issued to Saudis immediately after 9/11. The events of
that day demanded a thorough review of U.S. policy and
procedures to ensure the United States could filter out
the small number of Saudis with bad intentions from the
large pool of Saudis who wish to come to the United
States to study, vacation, and do business. However,
more than 5 years later, the number of U.S.-issued NIVs
remains at less than 50 percent of pre-9/11 levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State. These numbers
include all visas issued in Saudi Arabia, some of which are non-Saudi
citizens. However, Saudis represented the large majority of these
visas. The 2007 number is only through December 15th.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A surprising number of current Saudi leaders have
attended university in the United States. This past
accessibility for Saudis to the United States has led
to a government, business, and military elite in Saudi
Arabia which generally speak English and view America
positively. This common language and common experience
with U.S. officials represents an intangible--yet
vitally important--factor that promotes strong ties
between the United States and Saudi Arabia and helps
secure U.S. interests. In meeting after meeting in
Riyadh, staff encountered senior Saudi officials,
businesspeople, and military officers who, based on
their undergraduate, graduate, or military studies in
the United States, spoke fluent English and thought
well of America and Americans. In one meeting, staff
met with a senior member of the Saudi military who had
spent years attending U.S. military schools, including
the U.S. Army War College. As a result of this
experience, the officer spoke fluent English, held
progressive viewpoints, and joked that he considered
himself as much American as Saudi. It is difficult to
overestimate the value of having such an individual at
the senior decisionmaking level within the Saudi
military.
Since 9/11, the inability of many Saudis to obtain NIVs
has resulted in a major shift in this valuable dynamic.
Making matters worse, seemingly every Saudi either has
or claims to know someone who has a ``horror story''
about his own post 9/11 treatment at U.S. airports.
This has resulted in an increasing number of Saudi
students, businesspeople, and military officers who
either cannot come or do not want to come to the United
States to study or conduct business. (See Appendix 3)
Instead, this next generation of Saudi leaders will
either stay in Saudi Arabia or go elsewhere. At one
meeting, staff met a highly successful Saudi
businessman who said that he and many of his fellow
Saudi businessmen were no longer willing to travel to
the United States. As a result, these Saudi
businesspeople will only sign contracts with non-U.S.
companies, or when a U.S.-based company is involved,
the Saudis insist that the contract contain a clause
that states that all meetings must be held outside of
the United States.
Other countries are taking advantage of the U.S. failure
to fix its visa-related problems. According to U.S.
Embassy personnel in Riyadh, the British issue 98
percent of their NIVs in 48 hours and even go to the
homes of Saudis to facilitate the process. In contrast,
U.S. Embassy officials in Riyadh report that the CEO of
Saudi ARAMCO waited months for a visa to visit the
United States. The British officials, unlike some of
their American counterparts, understand the long-term
ramification of NIVs on their bilateral relations with
Saudi Arabia. In short, unless the United States fixes
its NIV--issuance process, the next generation of
Saudis will increasingly look elsewhere to attend
school and do business. This somewhat intangible short-
term impediment will have increasingly tangible long-
term consequences for U.S. strategic relations with a
country that sits on top of the world's largest reserve
of oil. While never losing sight of the central
responsibility to protect Americans, the United States
needs to increase the number of NIVs issued to Saudis
and reduce the waiting period.
Cooperate With the Saudis on Nuclear Energy. From a
security and counterterrorism perspective, a Middle
East devoid of nuclear power plants is preferable to a
Middle East dotted with them. However, if the
governments of the region are determined to pursue
nuclear power--and staff believes they are--the United
States can do little to stop them. If the U.S. and U.S.
companies do not work with the states of the Middle
East in developing their nuclear energy programs, other
countries will step in to take America's place. If
countries such as Saudi Arabia are determined to pursue
nuclear energy, the U.S. and U.S. companies should
immediately offer to help them. By having American
nuclear energy companies--instead of Russian, French,
or Chinese companies--working with Saudi Arabia, the
United States secures several advantages. First, the
U.S. Government can work with U.S. companies to ensure
the Saudi nuclear power plants incorporate the best
quality safeguards possible. Second, the involvement of
U.S. companies provides the U.S. Government a degree of
indirect oversight that helps ensure a peaceful nuclear
program remains that way. Finally, the involvement of
U.S. companies represents another way to solidify the
bilateral relationship with the country that controls
the world's largest reserve of oil.
Mind the Succession. King Abdullah, the current
ruler of Saudi Arabia, was born in 1920. The next
family member in line to take the throne, Crown Prince
Sultan, was born in 1928. While Saudi Arabia appears to
have taken some steps to ease the impending succession,
the country will likely endure significant turmoil in
the next decade or so when both of these individuals
pass away. These individuals, and a small group loyal
to them, retain a veto over any nuclear decision. In a
decade, it is not difficult to imagine a different
ruler in Saudi Arabia with different thinking regarding
nuclear weapons. With that said, most of the dynamics
detailed in this chapter would influence future Saudi
rulers as well as current ones.
Address Saudi ``Releasability'' Concerns. During the
staffs research in Saudi Arabia, one of the most
consistent concerns related to the ``releasability'' of
U.S. weapons. This term refers to the process in which
a U.S. company and a U.S. administration attempt to
sell U.S. weapons to the Saudis. Congress has an
oversight role in these sales and has the right to
delay or block any sales it perceives as counter to
U.S. interests. Often these concerns have revolved
around a desire to maintain Israel's qualitative
military advantage. In other words, American policy has
consistently attempted to ensure that Israel--America's
close friend in the region--maintained a qualitative
military advantage over its Arab neighbors given the
history of Arab-Israeli war and conflict.
Regardless of the specific Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia
or the current inventory of Saudi weapons, U.S. arms
sales to Saudi Arabia serve three primary purposes:
First, the arms sales to Saudi Arabia represent a
tangible symbol to the Saudis of the U.S. security
guarantee. When the United States responds positively
to Saudi weapons requests, it provides visible
confirmation of the U.S. security guarantee. On the
other hand, if the United States is not willing to sell
Saudi Arabia many weapons systems, this negatively
impacts the Saudi perception of United States
reliability.
Second, selling U.S. weapons systems to Saudi Arabia
represents much more than a single business
transaction. When the United States sells a fighter,
tank, or other high-dollar weapons system to a foreign
country the benefit is much greater than a financial
windfall for a U.S. company. A logistical, maintenance,
and training package that usually extends for the life
of the system almost always accompanies the weapon
system. In other words, when the United States sells a
weapons system to a foreign country, it secures a 20-
year relationship that helps cement the bilateral
relationship.
Third, selling U.S. weapons to America's allies and
friends enables the future interoperability of U.S.
military forces and the forces of the nation that
purchases American hardware. Either now or in the
future, if the United States seeks to create a seamless
defense network with friendly and allied nations,
common weapons systems greatly facilitate this
objective.
Legitimate concerns exist regarding the qualitative
military advantage of Israel and some of the weapons
included in proposed arms packages. However, Congress
should understand that stalling or rejecting the sale
of selected U.S. military systems to Saudi Arabia will
strengthen perceptions in the Arab world that the
United States is an unreliable security partner. This
is especially true in the case of missile defense
systems. This is not to suggest the United States
should unquestioningly give the Saudis anything they
request. The United States should approach such arms
sales in a cautious and judicious manner. However,
delay or rejection of Saudi arms purchases will
complicate the long-term bilateral relationship and
will lead Saudi Arabia to turn to Russia, China,
France, or Britain for weapons.
Chapter 4: Egypt
Egypt represents another one of the three countries most
likely to respond to the development of an Iranian nuclear
weapon by developing one of its own. Undoubtedly, an Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons would ignite a debate in Cairo
as to whether Egypt should pursue nuclear weapons as well.
However, based on research, as well as interviews and meetings
in Egypt, staff believes that although such a development in
Iran would hasten Egypt's nuclear energy efforts, Egypt would
most likely choose not to cross the nuclear threshold and
obtain a nuclear weapon. With that said, two variables relating
to Israel and Saudi Arabia could shift Cairo's thinking,
potentially tilting the scales in the direction of the
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
This chapter will consist of five sections. First, this
chapter will discuss Egypt's past and present nuclear power
program. The second section will explore Egyptian-Iranian
relations. The third section will directly analyze whether
Egypt would pursue a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian
bomb. Fourth, the chapter will explore the Israeli and Saudi
variables that could influence the decision in Cairo. Finally,
this chapter will end with some policy considerations for
protecting U.S. interests and dissuading Egypt from pursuing
nuclear weapons.
EGYPT'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM: PAST AND PRESENT
Egypt started its nuclear energy program in 1955, with
President Gamal Nasser's creation of Egypt's Atomic Energy
Authority (EAEA). The Egyptians began to operate a 2 megawatt,
Soviet supplied research reactor in 1961. Over the next 5
years, Egypt negotiated its first nuclear power plant with GE
and Westinghouse before the 1967 war brought these efforts to
an end. President Anwar Sadat revived Egypt's nuclear power
program in the 1970s, working with Westinghouse once again. In
1981, after the Camp David Agreement, Egypt signed the NPT.
This second major effort came to an end in 1986 due to safety
concerns in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the
Soviet Union.\1\ In 1997, an Argentine company completed
construction of a 22-megawatt research reactor north of Cairo.
Both the Soviet and Argentine reactors, as well as a nuclear
fuel manufacturing pilot plant, are under IAEA safeguards.
Between 1997 and 2002, Egypt participated in a series of
Technical Cooperation projects with the IAEA, conducting work
directly relevant to nuclear power generation. Some of the work
included: uranium exploration, a feasibility study for small
and medium nuclear power plants, and training of Egyptian
personnel. Since 2002, Egypt has conducted similar projects
with the IAEA related to uranium exploration and the training
of Egyptian personnel. Today, Cairo refuses to sign the
Additional Protocol, until Israel signs and complies with the
NPT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Dan Murphy, ``Middle East Racing to Nuclear Power,'' Christian
Science Monitor (Nov. 1, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unlike some of the other states in the Middle East that
have announced plans to build nuclear power plants, Egypt has a
pressing need to develop alternative domestic sources of
energy. Egypt has a limited supply of domestic energy sources,
and the country's energy demand continues to grow as quickly.
According to the Department of Energy's Energy Information
Agency, Egypt's production of oil has declined from its 1996
peak of 922,000 (bbl/d) to 579,000 in 2005. According to the
Egyptian government, the current total installed capacity of
electricity generation in Egypt is roughly 21.3 GW, and last
year's peak load was approximately 18.2 GW. If this situation
remained constant, Egypt would be in relatively good shape.
However, Egypt's electricity demand increased at an average
annual growth rate of 7 percent over the last decade, while
increasing 10.3 percent last year. With economic growth of 4.8
percent and a population growth of 1.75 percent, Egypt's energy
demand is likely to increase rapidly in the coming years.\2\
Recent discoveries of natural gas will satisfy some of this
growing demand, but Egypt will need other sources of energy as
well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Mostafa El-Asiry, ``The Introduction of Nuclear Power in Egypt:
An Overview.'' PowerPoint presentation by Egyptian Government official
at IAEA Technical Meeting in Vienna, Austria, 5-9 November 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recognizing its limited amount of fossil fuels and its
growing demand for energy, Egypt continues to aggressively
pursue hydro, wind, and solar energy. According to the Egyptian
Government, Egypt has almost fully utilized its hydroelectric
sources of energy. In addition, Egypt has a wind energy
installed capacity at the Red Sea coast of 230 MW (about 1
percent of total installed capacity), and this wind energy
contribution to the nation's energy production capacity is
expected to grow to 3 percent by 2010. Egypt is also evaluating
an integrated solar-thermal power plant that would contribute
150 MW. While these efforts are impressive, the Egyptian
Government believes they will not be able to meet Egypt's
future energy needs.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This growing need for energy is not the only motivation
behind Egypt's interest in a nuclear power program. The
presence of an Iranian nuclear program also motivates Egypt to
establish its own program. As Antoine Basbous, Director of the
Arab World Observatory, says, Mubarak's actions tell Iran that
Egypt ``will not allow Tehran to be the sole regional power to
control the atom.'' Most individuals interviewed by staff over
the last few months shared this response. Egypt sees itself as
the leader of the Arab world; therefore, a decision to pursue
nuclear energy serves political purposes internationally as
well as domestically.
Based on this desire to increase its domestic energy
production capacity, Egypt appears to be moving decisively to
construct nuclear power plants. In 2006, Mubarak initiated a
national dialogue to discuss electrical energy resources,
including nuclear power. In October 2007, President Mubarak
announced his decision to initiate a program to build nuclear
power stations in Egypt. Throughout this process, Egypt has
worked closely and transparently with the IAEA, emphasizing
that it only seeks a ``peaceful nuclear program.'' While Egypt
appears to be serious about developing nuclear power plants,
much work remains to be done. Some of the more onerous tasks
that lie ahead for Cairo include developing the legal and
legislative framework, selecting sites, improving the
infrastructure, and developing the necessary human resources.
While Egypt has periodically toyed with the idea of nuclear
energy in the past without success, the future energy needs of
Egypt and the current Iranian nuclear program suggest that this
time might be different.
EGYPT AND IRAN
To gain a better understanding of how Egypt views the
Iranian nuclear program and how Egypt might respond to an
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, it is necessary to
briefly review the state of Egyptian-Iranian relations. In many
respects, the respective self conceptions, demographics, and
political relations pit the two countries against one another.
Egypt sees itself as the leader of the Arab world and is
overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. Iran, on the other hand, views
itself as a ``Persian power'' and has a population that is
overwhelmingly Shia Muslim. Iran acts as a leading anti-
American and anti-Israeli voice in the Muslim world. In
contrast, Egypt enjoys a close security and political
relationship with the United States and represents the first
Arab State to make formal peace with Israel. These underlying
dynamics have resulted in specific events in the last three
decades that have exacerbated relations between Iran and Egypt.
Egypt's relationship with Iran has been especially strained
since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. One of the first crises in
the relationship occurred when Egypt granted the Shah of Iran
exile after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. This decision,
combined with Egypt's decision to sign the Camp David Peace
Accords with Israel, led Iran to break relations with Egypt in
1979. When the Shah died in 1980, he was buried in Al-Rifa'i
Mosque in Cairo. In October 1981, President Anwar Sadat of
Egypt was assassinated during a military parade in Cairo,
apparently in response to Sadat's role in making peace with
Israel. The Iranian leadership responded by naming a street in
Tehran after Khaled Eslamboli, Sadat's assassin. During the
1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, Egypt supported Iraq.
Today, the Egyptian leadership views Iran as a threat with
or without nuclear weapons, but Egypt would perceive a nuclear
armed Iran as especially threatening. However, Egypt sees Iran
as a political and strategic threat and not an existential or
military one. Staff found no Egyptian official or scholar who
feared a nuclear or conventional attack from Iran. Rather,
Egyptian decisionmakers and scholars see Iran as a threat to
Egypt's prestige, national identity, and political stability.
Iran's efforts to expand its power and assert its regional
leadership role directly threatens Egypt's national identity as
the leading Arab power. Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas
endangers Egypt's political stability. Furthermore, from the
Mubarak government's perspective, Iran's hard-line against
Israel and the United States provides an unwelcome contrast
with Egypt's relations with these two unpopular powers.
Interestingly, it was widely reported that the two most popular
individuals on the Sunni streets of Cairo during the 2006 war
between Israel and Hezbollah were Hassan Nasrallah (The head of
Hezbollah) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (President of Iran), both
outspoken Shia leaders. The Egyptian regime fears Sunni Islamic
radicalism in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and
also fears Iranian political power and ideological appeal.
Based on staff interviews and research, many Egyptians view
the Iranian nuclear program largely through the lens of Israel
and Israel's purported nuclear weapons.\4\ Egypt has long
called for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.
While Cairo has lived with an assumed Israeli nuclear arsenal
for decades, the continuing Israeli possession of nuclear
weapons represents a major irritant to Egyptian leaders as well
as a source of anger among the Egyptian public. While Mubarak
views Tehran with great suspicion and contempt, it is difficult
for Cairo to speak out strongly against Tehran's nuclear
program due to the ongoing Arab-Israeli crisis and Israel's
possession of nuclear weapons. It is not politically
sustainable for Cairo to oppose Iran's nuclear program more
loudly than it opposes Israel's possession of nuclear weapons,
even though the Egyptian regime may view the Israeli nuclear
weapons as a defensive deterrent of last resort. In fact, some
reporting has suggested that some Egyptian leaders view the
Iranian nuclear program as an opportunity to place pressure on
Israel to relinquish its nuclear weapons and sign the NPT.
However, more thoughtful Egyptians recognize that the apparent
Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons makes any Israeli concession
on its purported nuclear weapons next to impossible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ This report does not take a position on the existence of
Israeli nuclear weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EGYPT AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
As with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, if Iran were to obtain
nuclear weapons in the coming years, it would place significant
pressure on Egypt to follow suit. To assess the likely Egyptian
response to Iranian nuclear weapons, it is helpful to catalog
the incentives and disincentives that would influence the
Egyptian decision. In terms of incentives, if Iran were to
acquire nuclear weapons, the leading motivation for an Egyptian
pursuit of nuclear weapons would not necessarily be a fear of
Iran, but rather a fear of marginalization. An Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons would tempt Egypt to follow suit
in order to reclaim and maintain Egypt's traditional role as
regional power and reassert its position as leader of the Arab
world. Egyptians would view a nuclear armed Iran as a threat to
Egypt's power and influence in the region. In other words, an
Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would shift the balance
of power away from Egypt and toward Iran. Many Egyptians would
undoubtedly conclude that Egyptian possession of its own
nuclear weapons would most effectively redress the balance of
power. As discussed below, these Egyptian motivations would be
greatly magnified if Saudi Arabia responded to an Iranian bomb
by pursuing one as well.
As powerful as these incentives would be, the disincentives
appear greater. Two pillars undergird Egyptian national
security strategy: peace with Israel and a security partnership
with the United States. While both Israel and America remain
very unpopular with the Egyptian people, the Egyptian regime
relies on peace with Israel and aid from the United States to
maintain its security and its power. An Egyptian pursuit of
nuclear weapons would destabilize--if not topple--the Israeli
and American pillars of Egypt's national security strategy.
Egyptian leaders considering a pursuit of nuclear weapons would
need to consider the Israeli response. In the past, Egypt has
had difficulty concealing and protecting its nuclear activities
from Israeli surveillance and intervention. There is no reason
to believe a new Egyptian nuclear weapons program would evade
Israeli attention. Such an Egyptian program and the Israeli
response could reignite open hostility between the two states.
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, an Egyptian nuclear
weapons program could severely damage the bilateral
relationship between Egypt and the United States. Egypt leans
heavily on U.S. aid, as well as U.S. military assistance, and
an Egyptian nuclear weapons program would endanger both.
Therefore, as long as peace with Israel and a security
relationship with the United States remain in Egypt's interest,
the disincentives for an Egyptian nuclear weapons program
appear to outweigh the incentives.
As important as the relationship with the United States
remains to the Egyptian regime, the United States would be wise
to not take this bilateral relationship for granted. The
current relationship between Egypt and the United States has
seen better days. Mubarak and other Egyptian leaders have
uncharacteristically lashed out at the United States in recent
years.\5\ Mubarak and the inner-circle of Egyptian
decisionmakers have expressed deep frustration with U.S.
policy. The Egyptians believe the United States has behaved
rashly and incompetently in Iraq and has served as a
destabilizing influence in the region. They also resent the
conditioning of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) on democratic
reform and public statements from high-level officials
condemning the humanitarian track record of the Mubarak
government. The Egyptians see the Middle East as unstable,
placing much of the blame on the United States. Referring to
the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the 2003 U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq, and the 2006 war between Israel and
Hezbollah, one Egyptian official said, ``wars are coming closer
and becoming more numerous.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\Michael Slackman, ``Egypt, Under Stress, Sees United States as
Pain and Remedy,'' New York Times (Oct. 22, 2006).
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The Egyptians also bemoan America's unwillingness to press
the Israelis to achieve a two-state solution with the
Palestinians. In fact, the persistence of the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the Palestinian crisis at its foundation--
represent the Egyptian regime's central strategic liability.
The Egyptian regime's unpopularity at home and its inability to
lead Arabs abroad derives to a large extent from Egypt's peace
with Israel and its alignment with the United States--the two
countries blamed by Arabs for the ongoing suffering of the
Palestinian people. Thus, Egypt's association with Israel and
the United States--combined with the ongoing Palestinian crisis
for which they take blame--weakens the Egyptian regime's
domestic credibility and undercuts Egypt's attempt to regain
its traditional role as leader of the Arab world.
As identified above, an Iranian nuclear weapon--and
certainly a Saudi nuclear weapon--would further reduce Egypt's
regional power and influence. The desire to regain this power
and influence would represent the most important incentive for
a prospective Egyptian nuclear weapons program. If the United
States seeks to increase the domestic credibility and the
regional influence of the Egyptian Government so as to reduce
the likelihood of an eventual Egyptian decision to pursue
nuclear weapons, a durable two-state solution between Israel
and the Palestinians would represent one of the most effective
means to accomplish this objective.
THE TWO WILD CARDS
If the preceding analysis is correct, in the event of an
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, Egypt would be tempted
to pursue nuclear weapons, but most likely, Egypt would
ultimately decide against it because the costs would outweigh
the benefits. However, there are two variables that could
substantially shift this cost-benefit analysis and possibly
result in an Egyptian decision to pursue nuclear weapons. The
Israeli response to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons
represents the first variable. If Iran were to acquire a
nuclear weapon in the next few years, this would represent a
major strategic and political shock to Israel. As a result, the
Israeli Government would face tremendous domestic political
pressure to respond in an explicit and bold way. Staff
envisions two possible Israeli responses related to Israel's
purported possession of nuclear weapons. The first would
consist of an explicit acknowledgement of Israel's nuclear
weapons and an unambiguous warning that Israel would respond to
any Iranian nuclear attack--or a nuclear attack from an Iranian
proxy--with a devastating nuclear counterattack. This Israeli
response would directly state that an Iranian nuclear attack
would result in the destruction of Iran. The second possible
response would make it clear that an Iranian nuclear attack
would result in the destruction of Iran, without explicitly
acknowledging Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. A
response along these lines might say: ``Iran should not
entertain any doubt as to how Israel would respond to a nuclear
attack by Iran or any of its proxies. If Iran or any of its
proxies use nuclear weapons against Israel, Israel will respond
with all weapons in its arsenal to ensure that Iran could never
conduct such an attack again.'' In short, the first response
would acknowledge Israel's nuclear weapons, whereas the second
would not.
In the event of an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon,
the character of the Israeli response will have an important
influence on Egypt's nuclear weapons decision. The first
response, which consists of an explicit acknowledgment of
Israel's nuclear weapons capability, would be more emotionally
satisfying to many Israelis and would satisfy the short-term
domestic political pressure within Israel. However, such an
explicit public statement by the Israeli Government would place
tremendous political pressure on the Egyptian regime to respond
in some tangible way. Admittedly, an Israeli announcement
regarding nuclear weapons would not represent a major
revelation for regional governments, but it would create a
groundswell of Egyptian public protest, demanding a tangible
response from the Egyptian Government. The most consequential
options for an Egyptian response include a renunciation of its
peace treaty with Israel, a repudiation of its relations with
the United States, or the initiation of an Egyptian nuclear
weapons program. As a leading nonproliferation scholar told
staff, ``If the Israelis declared [their nuclear weapons],
Egypt would have to react. I am not sure how, but Egypt would
be forced to react.'' However, if Israel responds more
prudently to an Iranian nuclear weapon, Israel can convey the
necessary message to Tehran without inciting a strong Egyptian
response. Therefore, if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, the
United States would be wise to strongly encourage Israel to
respond in a prudent and measured manner that does not make a
bad situation worse.
A Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons, as discussed in
Chapter 4, would represent the second variable that could
substantially shift Egypt's cost-benefit analysis regarding the
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Such a development would have a
major impact on Cairo and could likely result in an Egyptian
decision to pursue nuclear weapons. To appreciate why such a
development would jar Egyptian decisionmaking, one must
understand Egypt's self conception in the Arab world, and the
associated rivalry between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
While other Arabs frequently scoff at the notion, Egyptians
see themselves as the natural leaders of the Arab world, based
largely on Egypt's proud history, its dominance of Arab culture
and media, its large population, and its relative military
prowess. However, staff frequently encountered a feeling among
Egyptian officials and scholars that Egypt's leadership role
has deteriorated in recent years. One high level Egyptian
official echoed this common theme saying, ``Egypt needs to
restore its standing.'' He suggested that Egypt's prestige and
leadership role in the region was ``great 50 years ago, but not
so much now.''
Egyptians view Saudi Arabia as the country attempting to
replace Egypt as the leader of the Arab world. While Saudi
Arabia has only one-third of Egypt's population, Saudi Arabia's
oil wealth and its role as ``guardian of the two holy mosques''
gives it a unique position from which to challenge Egypt's
leadership. From the point of view of many Egyptians, the
February 2007 Saudi-brokered Mecca Conference between Hamas and
Fatah provided the most recent symbol of Saudi Arabia's
ascendance and Egypt's decline as the leader of the Arab world.
While this ``Mecca deal'' ultimately fell apart, many Egyptians
view the Saudi role as one that Cairo should have been playing
instead. More generally, from the perspective of Egyptian mid-
level and senior leaders, the desire to reclaim Egypt's
leadership role in the Arab world remains acute, and Saudi
Arabia represents the leading challenger to this ``rightful''
Egyptian role.
In addition to this Egyptian view of Saudi Arabia as rival
for leadership of the Arab world, many Egyptian leaders also
view Saudi Arabia's influence as largely negative. The secular
Egyptian regime resents the role Saudi Arabia has played in
promoting Islamist radicalism. When staff asked a high-level
Egyptian official about Iranian influence, he responded by
claiming that Saudi Arabian influence was ``vastly more
negative'' than that of Iran, referring to the Saudi roots of
al-Qaeda. (A claim that is not entirely fair given the role of
Egyptians in al-Qaeda as well). In short, many Egyptian leaders
view Saudi Arabia as a competitor for leadership of the Arab
world and some also see Saudi Arabia largely as a negative
influence in the region and within Egypt.
Within this context of competition between Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, a Saudi acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent
a uniquely threatening challenge to Egypt's self-conception and
regional influence. As already discussed, Egypt would view an
Iranian bomb as a negative and disconcerting development.
However, in the end, Iran does not represent an Arab or Sunni
power. Thus, despite Tehran's efforts to blur ethnic and
religious differences, it is unlikely that Iran will ever be
able to unify Sunni Arab powers beneath its leadership. The
same can not be said of the Saudis. The Saudis are Arab and
they are predominantly Sunni, and in sharing these two
important characteristics with Egypt, a Saudi nuclear bomb
would represent a more proximate and more serious threat to
Egypt's prestige and national identity. In short, the manner
with which Israel and Saudi Arabia respond to the potential
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons will have a potentially
decisive influence on Egypt's decision regarding nuclear
weapons. Therefore, in addition to working to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, U.S. decisionmakers must look ``a
few moves ahead in the chess game'' to ensure that decisions in
Tel Aviv and Riyadh do not lead to a nuclear weapons decision
in Cairo.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Impact of a Two-State Solution. The Arab popular and
governmental response to Iran's nuclear program has
been, for the most part, remarkably subdued. Given the
existence of long-term rivalry and suspicion between
Arabs and Persians, as well as the existence of Sunni
and Shia tensions, one might have expected a more
unified and robust Arab response to Iranian nuclear
ambitions. Several reasons motivate this muted Arab
response, but the primary reason is the ongoing Arab-
Israeli crisis. The purported existence of Israeli
nuclear weapons, as well as the fact that Tehran has
shrewdly positioned itself as one of the most outspoken
critics of Israel and defenders of the Palestinians,
creates sympathy among Arab publics for the Iranian
nuclear program. Much of the ``Arab street'' sees an
Iranian nuclear weapon as a welcome counterbalance to
Israel and a way to ``poke a stick in the eye'' of the
United States and Israel. Staff found this Arab
sentiment in all six Arab countries visited. Contrary
to this popular Arab sentiment, short of an existential
crisis, Arab governments do not expect the Israeli
government to use its nuclear weapons. This difference
between popular and governmental perspectives in the
Arab world largely explains the muted Arab response to
the Iranian nuclear program. An ongoing Arab-Israeli
crisis will decisively undercut any U.S. effort to
create a unified regional front against Iran's nuclear
weapons ambitions. The United States should work
aggressively to develop a durable two-state solution
between Israel and the Palestinians. Such an outcome
would enable the United States to construct a unified
regional front against Iran's nuclear weapons
ambitions. A durable resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis would also increase the Egyptian
regime's domestic credibility and its regional
prestige, thereby reducing the need for Egypt to
respond to an Iranian bomb by pursuing one of their
own.
Reiterate U.S. Policy Regarding Nuclear Weapons. The
United States should remove any Egyptian confusion
regarding U.S. policy and attitudes toward nuclear
weapons proliferation. Traditional U.S. policy toward
nuclear weapons proliferation essentially stated that
no nuclear proliferation was acceptable or desirable.
However, in recent years, some U.S. Government
statements and policies have encouraged an
international perception that the United States views
some nuclear weapons proliferation as acceptable or
even desirable and other nuclear proliferation as
unacceptable. In other words, nuclear proliferation
among America's friends is tolerable, while
proliferation among America's prospective enemies is
intolerable. The degree to which friends of the United
States subscribe to this notion, the likelihood of
nuclear proliferation among America's friends will
increase. The United States should privately reiterate
in an unambiguous manner that an Egyptian nuclear
weapons program would severely damage relations with
the United States.
Cooperate With the Egyptians on Nuclear Energy. As
previously stated, from a security and counterterrorism
perspective, a Middle East devoid of nuclear power
plants is preferable to a Middle East populated by a
number of nuclear power plants. However, if the
governments of the region pursue nuclear power, the
United States can do little to stop them. If the United
States and U.S. companies do not work with the states
of the Middle East in developing their nuclear program,
other countries will step in to take America's place.
If countries such as Egypt decide to pursue nuclear
energy, the United States and U.S. companies should be
first in line to help them. By having American nuclear
energy companies--instead of Russian, French, or
Chinese companies--working with the Egyptians, the
United States accrues several advantages. First, the
U.S. Government can work with U.S. companies to ensure
the Egyptian nuclear power plants incorporate the best
safeguards possible. Second, the involvement of U.S.
companies provides the U.S. Government a degree of
indirect oversight that helps ensure a peaceful nuclear
program remains that way. Finally, the involvement of
U.S. companies represents another way to solidify the
bilateral relationship with a country that controls the
strategically vital Suez Canal.
Mind the Succession. Mubarak, who is almost 80 years
old, appears to strongly oppose nuclear weapons, yet it
is not clear how much longer he will be in power. While
Mubarak served as Sadat's Vice President, rising to the
Presidency after Sadat's assassination, Mubarak has not
selected a Vice President. This vacancy suggests that
Mubarak may be positioning his son, Gamal, to assume
power after his death. Little is known regarding
Gamal's attitudes toward nuclear weapons or whether the
Egyptian elite would accept Gamal as the next President
of Egypt. The Egyptian Government's opposition to
weapons of mass destruction may simply reflect
Mubarak's personal beliefs. In the next decade, it is
likely that Egypt will have a new ruler, and it is
unclear whether this ruler will share Mubarak's
apparent aversion to weapons of mass destruction. The
United States should monitor this succession carefully,
fully aware that Egypt's policies regarding nuclear
weapons could change overnight based on a change of
leadership in Cairo.
Chapter 5: Turkey
A brief survey of relations between Turkey and Iran will
help U.S. decisionmakers understand how Turkey might respond to
a nuclear-armed Iran. Turkey and Iran enjoy a relatively stable
yet complex relationship. Turkey views Iran as both strategic
competitor and economic partner. The countries do not view each
other as enemies, yet there exists a significant degree of
Turkish suspicion regarding Iran's regional intentions. Turkish
military officers describe the border with Iran as Turkey's
``quietest border,'' yet most Turkish leaders and political
officers harbor a notable degree of distrust regarding Iran's
nuclear program. Turkey disapproves of Iran's support for
Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Iraq, yet Turkey and
Iran share a common concern regarding Kurdish extremists (PKK
and PJAK) in the north of Iraq and Iran, respectively. The
Turks (and the predecessor Ottoman Empire) have enjoyed a
stable and undefended border with Iran since the 1600s, yet
many Turks voice concern regarding Iran's expanding influence.
Turkey and Iran have not fought a war with each other in
centuries, yet Turks complain about Iranian attempts to
establish Sharia law in the secular Turkish state after the
Islamic Revolution.
To complicate this multifaceted relationship with Iran,
Turkey occupies a precarious geographic, political, and
economic position between Iran and the West. Turkey--a NATO
member--attempts to maintain the trust of its security partners
in Europe and the United States, while promoting stable
relations and economic trade with Iran. Turkey seeks to honor
U.N. Security Council Resolutions and the associated sanctions
against Iran, while not alienating its neighbor and one of its
most important economic partners.
Honoring international sanctions against Iran presents
difficulties for Turkey due to the significant economic
relationship between the two countries as well as Turkey's need
for Iranian oil and natural gas. After Russia, Iran serves as
the second leading natural gas supplier to Turkey. This Turkish
dependence on Iranian gas will most likely continue to grow.
Turkey views Russia as an unreliable energy supplier and
believes it will need to increase its energy imports from Iran
in order to decrease its energy dependence on Russia. As part
of this effort, Turkey concluded a $23 billion natural gas deal
with Iran in 1996 and recently agreed to two additional energy
deals with Iran. These deals will allow the Turkish Petroleum
Corporation to develop oil and natural gas in Iran and permit
Turkmenistan to pipe gas through Iran and Turkey to Europe.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ F. Stephen Larrabee, ``Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,''
Foreign Affairs (Jul./Aug. 2007)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding Iran's nuclear program, Ankara believes a
nuclear-armed Iran would represent a negative development for
Turkey and the wider region. Turkish officials and scholars
consistently label a nuclear-armed Iran a ``threat,'' but
regional actors or leaders do not view a nuclear-armed Iran as
an existential or military threat. All Turks interviewed
believe that Turkey would not be the target of a nuclear Iran.
By this, the Turks mean they do not envision an Iranian nuclear
or conventional military attack based on an Iranian possession
of nuclear weapons. However, the Turks interviewed unanimously
expressed a concern that an Iranian acquisition of nuclear
weapons would dramatically shift the balance of power between
the two countries, resulting in a more assertive Iranian role
in the region.
However, these Turkish commentators do not view Iran with
the same sense of urgency as the Bush administration--a
difference the 2007 Iran NIE will likely exacerbate. The
report's declaration that Iran had ended its nuclear weapons
program in 2003, as well as its prediction that Iran probably
would not have the HEU necessary for nuclear weapons before
2010-15, further depleted any sense of Turkish urgency
regarding Iranian nuclear weapons. The NIE has allowed Turkish
leaders to collectively exhale. Furthermore, especially after
the NIE, Turkey does not even see the Iranian nuclear program
as its leading foreign policy concern, but instead views it as
a distant and somewhat abstract threat. In contrast, Turkey
views the PKK violence and Kurdish separatism as immediate and
tangible threats.
One impact of Iran's nuclear program has been to catalyze
Turkey's nuclear energy development efforts. Turkey is moving
aggressively toward the development of domestic nuclear power
generation, but nuclear power plants will probably not come on
line before 2015. Much of Turkey's move toward nuclear energy
appears to be driven by legitimate energy needs, but Turkey
also seeks to match Iran's nuclear progress and to ensure
future flexibility that will allow adaptation to Iran's
actions. In the past, when the government has made initial
moves toward nuclear energy it has sparked strong domestic
opposition. As one Turk put it, ``Politically speaking, it
hasn't been possible to go ahead so far, but now because of
Iran, the nuclear energy option is on the table.'' In effect,
the Iranian nuclear program has strengthened the position of
nuclear energy advocates in Turkey. While significant popular
opposition to nuclear energy still exists in Turkey due
primarily to environmental concerns, the government seems
determined to move forward in its development of a nuclear
energy program. As a result of these developments, if Iran
crosses the nuclear threshold in 5 to 10 years, Turkey will
already have a significantly stronger technological foundation
should it choose to pursue a nuclear weapons capability.
MAJOR IRRITANTS IN THE UNITED STATES-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP
Prior to President Bush's November 2007 meetings with
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and January 2008 meetings
with Turkish President Abdullah Gul, Turkish-United States
relations were at one of the lowest points in memory. Two major
irritants have exacerbated the strain in the bilateral
relationship originally caused by the 2003 U.S. invasion of
Iraq: PKK and Kurdish separatism and the Armenian Genocide
Resolution (AGR). U.S. failure to address these irritants could
ultimately undercut Turkish perceptions of the utility of the
bilateral relationship with the United States.
Turkey's perception of the reliability of the NATO and U.S.
security guarantees will play a decisive role in Turkey's
response to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. An
Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon would dramatically and
historically shift the balance of power between Turkey and
Iran. Turkey's two major options would include a reliance on
U.S. and NATO security guarantees or the development of a
Turkish nuclear weapon to balance Iran. To the degree that the
two irritants degrade Turkish perceptions of its relations with
the United States and the reliability of the U.S. security
guarantee, they will have an indirect but significant impact on
Turkey's nuclear weapons decision. Therefore, these two
irritants to the bilateral relationship require additional
analysis.
Overwhelmingly, in meeting after meeting, Turkish officials
and scholars expressed sincere distress regarding PKK violence
and Kurdish separatism. The PKK has conducted periodic
terrorist attacks against Turkey, killing more than 1,500 Turks
since 2004.\2\ While the PKK represents an immediate and
tangible concern to Turkey, the deeper Turkish anxiety relates
to Kurdish separatism. Most Turks fear that an autonomous
Kurdish region in northern Iraq might evolve into a
``Kurdistan'' that would subsume much of southeast Turkey where
a large number of Kurds reside. Several individuals interviewed
expressed an apparently widespread concern that Kurdish leaders
Barzani and Talabani--despite their statements to the
contrary--view the current Kurdish semiautonomous region in
northern Iraq as a temporary stepping stone to establishment of
a ``Kurdistan.'' The recent foreign oil contracts signed by the
Kurdish regional authority, as opposed to the central
government in Baghdad, confirmed the fears of many Turks. When
Baghdad chastised the Kurdish regional authority for bypassing
the central government, the Kurdish oil minister responded by
calling for the resignation of the Oil Minister in Baghdad.\3\
From the perspective of many Turks, this incident confirmed
their fears regarding Kurdish separatism. Some Turks also
expressed the view that Kurdish efforts to control Kirkuk and
its associated oil resources provide evidence of a Kurdish
desire to move toward the establishment of a ``Kurdistan.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Soner Caqaptay and Mark Dubowitz, ``A Deadly Stumbling Block
Named PKK,'' Financial Times Deutschland (Feb. 26, 2007) http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID
=1034.
\3\ ``Iraqi Kurds Demand Oil Minister's Resignation,'' AFP (Sep.
13, 2007) http://afp.google.com/article/ALegM5haNFkil4-1s66QF0qB1tHMg-
RoWQ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A ``Kurdistan'' that encompasses the bulk of the Kurdish
population in the region would extract large chunks of
territory from Iran, Turkey, and Syria. For this reason, Turkey
has been working with both Iran and Syria to address problems
related to violent Kurdish separatists. In fact, from the
Turkish perspective, Iranian cooperation against the PKK served
as a contrast to the perceived U.S. unwillingness to act
against the PKK prior to Bush's meeting with the Turkish Prime
Minister.
Not only are PKK violence and Kurdish separatism the
leading perceived threats to Turkey, but they represent the
greatest source of friction in the bilateral relationship
between Turkey and the United States. One official in Turkey's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs told staff, ``The PKK is like a
snake in our bilateral relationship.'' Turkey opposed the U.S.
invasion of Iraq and refused U.S. requests to send U.S. forces
through Turkey largely out of fear that a U.S. attack could
lead to instability and Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq, a
prediction most Turks believe has been fulfilled. While the
Kurdish north has enjoyed relative stability, the U.S. invasion
has given a historic impetus to Kurdish separatism. Prior to
November 2007, the lack of U.S. action against PKK forces in
northern Iraq infuriated many Turks and caused ``deep
disappointment.'' The United States asked Turkey not to
intervene in any major way in northern Iraq. From Turkey's
perspective, Turkey agreed to abstain from large-scale
intervention in northern Iraq, and in return, the United States
would address the PKK threat. Turks widely believe the United
States did not hold up its end. This lack of U.S. action
against PKK has led to rampant conspiracy theories regarding
alleged U.S.-PKK cooperation and has contributed to high levels
of anti-Americanism in Turkey. A Pew Global Attitudes Project
survey released in September 2007 said only 9 percent of Turks
have a positive view of the United States. These anti-U.S.
conspiracies have contributed to the popularity of a television
series and associated movie in Turkey entitled ``Valley of the
Wolves,'' that features U.S. atrocities and intrigue in
northern Iraq. In fact, Many average Turks believe the United
States has armed the PKK in an effort to undermine the regime
in Tehran.
Since the November 5 meeting between Prime Minister Recep
Erdogan and President Bush, the U.S. commitment to share PKK
intelligence with Turkey and to take tangible steps against the
PKK have significantly ameliorated the crisis in United States-
Turkish relations. In meetings with Turkish Parliamentarians
and with think tank scholars, Turks expressed great
satisfaction with the U.S. declaration of the PKK as ``a common
enemy'' and also approved of the steps the United States has
taken to help Turkey confront the PKK. However, most Turks have
taken a ``wait and see'' approach and it will take significant
reduction in the PKK threat and a significant amount of time
for United States-Turkish relations to heal.
While PKK violence and Kurdish separatism represent the
greatest irritants in the United States-Turkey relationship by
far, the Armenian Genocide Resolution (AGR) has also damaged
United States-Turkey relations. The introduction of an AGR in
the U.S. House of Representaives inflamed Turkish political and
public opinion. In October 2007, a House committee passed the
nonbinding resolution declaring the 1915 killings, which
occurred in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire, to be
genocide. If the full House passed the resolution, the Turkish
military chief, General Yasar Buyukanit, warned ``our military
relations with the United States can never be the same.'' He
continued, ``The U.S. shot its own foot.'' Two days earlier,
the Prime Minister Erdogan cautioned that bilateral relations
with the United States were endangered and recalled the Turkish
Ambassador from Washington. Last year, in response to French
passage of a similar resolution, Turkey halted all military
cooperation with France.\4\ While this AGR crisis has receded,
any future effort to pass an Armenian genocide resolution would
incite a similar Turkish response and would damage the
important bilateral relationship between the United States and
Turkey. During meetings, staff was warned that a future AGR
would result in tangible Turkish steps against the United
States, possibly including the exclusion of U.S. energy
companies from the participation in future Turkish nuclear
energy industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Brian Knowlton, ``U.S. House Speaker Vows Debate on Armenian
Genocide Resolution,'' International Herald Tribune (October 14, 2007).
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/10/14/news/turkey.php?page=1.
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TURKEY AND NATO
Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952 and has since served
as a strong member of the alliance since. In fact, Turkey
represents NATO's second largest military force, and Turkey has
contributed significantly to NATO operations in Kosovo and
Afghanistan. Turkey has commanded the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan twice and has
established a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The Turkish
Government believes that it has more than upheld its
commitments as a NATO member. However, numerous individuals
interviewed by staff expressed a dissatisfaction with NATO and
a feeling that Turkey has given more to NATO than NATO has
provided to Turkey.
Two events have served to undermine Turkey's perception of
the reliability of NATO in protecting Turkey's national
security. The first incident occurred in 1991. An inaccurate,
yet widespread, view exists that NATO failed to honor its
Article V commitments to Turkey in 1991 during the Persian Gulf
war. Many Turks--even educated Turks and some government
officials--believe that Turkey requested help from NATO and
that assistance never came or was slow in arriving. In reality,
NATO ended up deploying military forces to protect Turkey.
In February 2003, just prior to the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq, Turkey initiated consultations with NATO under the
authority of the treaty. These consultations initially took
place in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This forum, which
includes France, did not respond to Turkey's concerns.
Consequently, the deliberations were moved to the Defense
Planning Council (DPC), which does not include France, and
Turkey ultimately received support from NATO. While the NATO
flag and NATO forces ultimately deployed to Turkey, most Turks
only remember the initial rejection of their requests.
According to one Turkish government official, these events in
1991 and 2003 sent the message that Turkey was ``not a member
of this [NATO] family.''
In reality, the poor view of NATO common in Turkey is
really directed at specific members of the NATO alliance that
have consistently opposed Turkish requests within the context
of NATO, with much of Turkish ire directed at France. If France
fully reintegrates itself into NATO as some anticipate, this
will further negatively impact Turkey's perceptions regarding
NATO's reliability.
Turkey also fears that NATO's reliability and Turkey's
security are being undermined by the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP). Since Turkey is not a member of the
European Union (EU), Turkey feels threatened by any shift in
the locus of European defense planning and capabilities from
NATO to the EU. To the degree that this shift continues to
occur--or is perceived by the Turks to occur--it will promote a
sense of insecurity and dislocation from its Western security
partners that will increase the chances that Turkey would
respond to an Iranian nuclear weapon acquisition by pursuing
one of its own.
While staff heard numerous concerns regarding NATO, it is
important to place this finding in context. Undoubtedly,
Turkish perceptions regarding the trustworthiness and
reliability of NATO have declined. Interestingly, junior and
middle rank military officers and politicians who came of age
after the cold war, and who are not old enough to remember
NATO's apex during that period tend to have less faith in
NATO's loyalty. But this cohort does recall the 1991 and 2003
incidents in which Turks perceived NATO as failing to honor its
commitments. However, Turkey's membership in NATO and the
security assurances that accompany that membership remain the
core of Turkish national security strategy; senior political
and military leaders in Turkey fully appreciate this fact. As
today's junior and mid-level politicians and military leaders
move into positions of senior leadership in Turkey, they will
increasingly appreciate the central role of NATO in Turkish
security. However, it seems clear that the next generation of
leaders in Turkey will be more nationalist and less trusting of
NATO than the previous generation, a change that may have a
significant impact on a Turkish decision regarding nuclear
weapons.
TURKEY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
If Iran acquires nuclear weapons in the next decade, this
will place significant pressure on Turkey to follow suit.
Turkey and Iran do not see themselves as adversaries, but
Turkey believes the centuries of relative peace between the two
states derives primarily from the rough balance of power
between them. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the
balance of power in Iran's direction. Turkey believes this
increased Iranian power would lead to a more aggressive Iranian
foreign policy and a marginalization of Turkey. Such a
development would significantly undercut Turkey's desired role
as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west. In
such a scenario, there would be strong voices in the Turkish
General Staff, as well as among ultra-nationalist politicians,
arguing for Turkey to respond by pursuing nuclear weapons.
Thus, the possibility still exists that Turkey would respond to
Iranian nuclear weapons by developing nuclear weapons as well.
At the same time, there are significant disincentives to a
Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. First, a Turkish pursuit or
acquisition of nuclear weapons would severely damage United
States-Turkish relations, which represent an essential
component of Turkish national security. Second, such a
development would endanger Turkey's good standing in NATO,
another key component of Turkey's national security. Third, a
Turkish pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons probably
would eliminate any remaining chance of Turkish accession into
the European Union. Fourth, powerful popular voices within
Turkey would likely oppose a Turkish attempt to acquire nuclear
weapons. Unlike Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the democratic
system in Turkey would enable these popular forces to influence
Turkey's decisions on these issues.
In a closed door meeting, staff asked a group of
influential Turkish politicians how Turkey would respond to an
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. These politicians
emphatically responded that Turkey would pursue nuclear weapons
as well. These individuals stated, ``Turkey would lose its
importance in the region if Iran has nuclear weapons and Turkey
does not.'' Another politician said it would be ``compulsory''
for Turkey to obtain nuclear weapons in such a scenario.
However, when staff subsequently asked whether a U.S. nuclear
umbrella and robust security commitment would be sufficient to
dissuade Turkey from pursuing nuclear weapons, all three
individuals agreed that it would.
Based on meetings with Turkish officials and U.S. Embassy
personnel in Ankara, staff believes the state of United States-
Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions regarding the
reliability of NATO will serve as the decisive factors in
Turkey's decision regarding nuclear weapons. If the bilateral
relationship with the United States is strained and Turkey's
trust in NATO low, Turkey would be more likely to respond to
Iranian nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear weapons as well.
However, a restored bilateral relationship with the United
States and a restored Turkish trust in NATO could decisively
discourage Turkey from purusing nuclear weapons. The United
States and NATO would need to take tangible steps to reassure
and secure Turkey, but a healthy Turkish relationship with the
United States and NATO provides the best means to discourage a
Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The United States should not wait until Iran crosses the
nuclear threshold before seeking to influence Turkey's nuclear
decisionmaking, and would be wise to take steps now to restore
the bilateral relationship with Turkey. The following policy
considerations would help accomplish both of these objectives:
Take a Firm Stance on the PKK. As the Bush
administration stated in November 2007, the PKK
represents a ``common enemy'' of the United States and
Turkey. The PKK has killed many Turks over the years
and is currently listed as a terrorist organization by
the U.S. Government. Perceived U.S. inaction regarding
the PKK over the last 4 years has fueled anti-
Americanism in Turkey. As General Joseph Ralston, the
Special Envoy for Countering the Kurdistan Worker's
Party, testified before a House committee, ``I have no
doubt that if we can significantly reduce the PKK
threat to Turkey that it will do much to improve the
state of relations between the United States and
Turkey.'' \5\
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\5\ General Joseph Ralston (USAF, Ret.), Special Envoy Countering
the Kurdistan Worker's Party, ``U.S.-Turkish Relations and the
Challenges Ahead,'' Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee Subcommittee on Europe (Washington, DC, Mar. 15, 3007)
Understand the Policy Implications of the
Establishment of a Sovereign Kurdish State. While the
federal structure in Iraq and the Kurdish Regional
Authority probably represents the best possible
political structure for Iraq, some Kurds may seek to
establish a sovereign and independent state in northern
Iraq. A state of this kind--especially one seeking to
subsume Kurdish-dominated territory in Turkey--would
represent an existential threat for the Turkish state.
Any effort to break away from Iraq and certainly any
effort to subsume parts of adjacent states into a
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larger ``Kurdistan'' would be a casus belli for Turkey.
Understand the Implications of U.S. Iraq Policy for
Relations With Turkey. The outcome of the U.S.
intervention in Iraq will dramatically impact Turkish
security, as well as Turkey's perception of the U.S.
security guarantee. Instability in Iraq would likely
threaten the Turkmen population in Iraq, could lead to
heightened strife or even civil war between Shia and
Sunni, could increase violence in northern Iraq, and
could lead to heightened autonomy or even statehood for
Iraq's Kurds. In addition, for centuries, modern day
Iraq has served as the ``chess board'' for Ottoman and
Persian competition. Instability in Iraq could reignite
this competition in Iraq, with the Turks backing the
Sunnis and the Iranians backing the Shia. All of these
developments would represent serious concerns or even
existential threats for Turkey. These developments
would possibly compel Turkish intervention in Iraq,
dramatically undermining Turkish security, severely
damaging United States-Turkey bilateral relations, and
dangerously diminishing the Turkish trust in the U.S.
security guarantee.
Consider the Ramifications of Future Armenian
Genocide Resolutions. Future attempts to pass an AGR
could significantly damage United States-Turkey
bilateral relations, promoting a political estrangement
that could impact Turkish perceptions of the U.S.
security guarantee. Such a development could ultimately
affect Turkey's eventual decision regarding nuclear
weapons. This is not to suggest the United States
should wash its hands of all principled concerns
regarding the Armenian Genocide. However,
decisionmakers must recognize that a resolution passed
by Congress may not be the best way to honor American
values and interests.
Address Turkey's Missile Defense Concerns. In light
of Iran's continued development of ballistic missiles
that can strike all of Turkey, as well as the prospect
of an eventual Iranian nuclear weapon, Turkey has some
legitimate missile defense concerns. Turkey has
expressed its dissatisfaction with the fact that the
current U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe would
exclude Turkey. While recent events might persuade
Turkey to interpret this as a deliberate U.S. slight,
the U.S. decision to exclude Turkey is based on
physics. Turkey is too close to Iran for the proposed
missile defense system to work. However, the United
States should not simply state this fact and move on,
but instead should work with Ankara to develop
alternative means to provide Turkey the missile defense
systems necessary to protect itself. Turkey continues
to work with U.S. companies to design such a solution.
The U.S. Government should remove unnecessary obstacles
to the speedy development of a missile defense system
that addresses Turkey's needs.
Support Turkey's Effort to Join the European Union
(EU). The United States does not have a direct or
leading role in this EU decision. However, whatever
influence the United States does wield should be
utilized to support Turkey's accession effort. The more
Turkey feels integrated into the West and protected by
Western political and security institutions, the less
likely Turkey would be to pursue nuclear weapons in the
future.
If Turks become convinced that the EU accession process
will never result in EU membership, they will feel more
estranged and excluded from the West. Such dislocation
from the West will promote ultra-nationalism in Turkey,
as well as a desire to become less reliant on the West
by becoming more militarily self-sufficient. Such a
development would serve as a powerful impetus for the
development of a Turkish nuclear weapon in the coming
decade or two. In terms of timing, given that the EU
accession process will likely take years, some say it
will be irrelevant to Turkey's response to Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, the December
2007 NIE predicted that Iran would probably not have a
nuclear weapons capability until 2010-15. If this
judgment is ``in the ballpark,'' the EU decision and
Turkey's response to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear
weapons may be more proximate to one another than some
expect.
Further perceived drift in the locus of the European
defense regime from NATO to the EU would be of concern
to Turkey. To the degree that this occurs without
Turkey's membership in the EU, Turkey will be excluded
from European defense planning and cooperation. If NATO
recedes in perceived importance or value, and the
center of gravity of European defense shifts toward the
EU, a Turkey that is not an EU member will view itself
as increasingly marginalized and abandoned by its
Western allies.
In addition to the role EU membership might play in
discouraging Turkey from pursuing nuclear weapons, EU
membership would also facilitate Turkey's desired role
as a mediator between East and West. Turkey, on the one
hand, takes pride in its growing economy and its
secular Western orientation; on the other hand, Turkey
takes pride in its Muslim faith and its amicable
relations with most countries of the Middle East.
Turkey correctly believes these characteristics--along
with Turkey's geography--provide the country with a
unique and positive opportunity to have a foot in both
``worlds.'' From a Turkish perspective, rejection by
the EU would diminish Turkey's ability to serve as a
mediator between East and West and would further
increase Turkey's sense of marginalization. Real
challenges such as the Cyprus negotiations lie ahead
and Turkey still needs to undertake significant
reforms. However, the status of Turkey's EU accession
efforts will serve as one of a few potentially decisive
factors in shaping how Turkey would respond to an
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons.
APPENDIX 1
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\1\ Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
\2\ International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement.
All non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT are required to
conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Israel is
not a party to the NPT but does have a facility-specific safeguards
agreement for a nuclear research reactor.
\3\ Additional Protocol to IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Such
protocols give the IAEA additional authority to investigate a state's
nuclear activities.
\4\ Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Not yet in force.
\5\ Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
\6\ Small Quantities Protocol. Some NPT state-parties with small
quantities of fissionable materials have concluded a small quantities
protocol to their IAEA safeguards agreements. Certain IAEA verification
requirements are suspended for such states, but the agency's Board of
Governors in 2005 approved changes that were designed to bolster
verification obligations under the protocol. None of the states listed
here with Small Quantities Protocols have accepted the modified text.
\7\ Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.
\8\ Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or
Radiological Emergency.
\9\ Convention on Nuclear Safety.
\10\ Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
APPENDIX 2
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APPENDIX 3
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APPENDIX 4
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Map of the Middle East
APPENDIX 5
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Map of Arabian Peninsula and Vicinity