[Senate Prints 110-33]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress S. Prt.
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 110-33
______________________________________________________________________
EMBASSIES GRAPPLE
TO GUIDE FOREIGN AID
__________
A Report to Members
of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Richard G. Lugar, Ranking Minority Member
One Hundred Tenth Congress
First Session
November 16, 2007
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Overview......................................................... 1
Findings..................................................... 1
Recommendations.............................................. 3
Introduction..................................................... 8
Purpose of Study............................................. 8
The Dilemma.................................................. 8
A Strategic Approach......................................... 9
Developments in U.S. Embassies................................... 10
The ``F'' Process............................................ 11
Multiple Programs............................................ 14
MCC..................................................... 14
PEPFAR................................................... 16
President's Malaria Initiative........................... 17
MEPI..................................................... 17
FSA/SEED................................................. 18
Democracy Fund........................................... 19
DOD Activities........................................... 19
USAID........................................................ 21
Additional Observations.......................................... 23
The Role of Ambassadors...................................... 23
Staff Challenges............................................. 24
USAID Administrator.......................................... 25
Regional and Country Findings.................................... 25
Sub-Saharan Africa........................................... 25
Botswana................................................. 26
Ethiopia................................................. 27
Ghana.................................................... 27
Liberia.................................................. 28
Mozambique............................................... 29
Rwanda................................................... 30
South Africa............................................. 31
Tanzania................................................. 32
Zambia................................................... 34
Latin America................................................ 35
Bolivia.................................................. 35
Honduras................................................. 36
Nicaragua................................................ 37
Peru..................................................... 38
East and South Asia.......................................... 39
Bangladesh............................................... 39
Indonesia................................................ 40
Mongolia................................................. 41
Regional and Country Findings--Continued
East and South Asia--Continued
The Philippines.......................................... 41
Middle East and North Africa................................. 42
Jordan................................................... 42
Lebanon.................................................. 44
Morocco.................................................. 44
Europe and Central Asia...................................... 45
Armenia.................................................. 45
Georgia.................................................. 46
Kazakhstan............................................... 47
Ukraine.................................................. 48
Appendixes....................................................... 51
Administration Responses to Questions from SFRC Members...... 51
Framework for Foreign Assistance: Country Categories and
Objectives................................................. 71
Distribution of U.S. Official Development Assistance by
Agency..................................................... 73
Reports Prepared by Embassy Staff............................ 75
Operational Plan Program Matrix.............................. 79
Acronyms..................................................... 85
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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November 16, 2007.
Dear Colleagues: Americans have long supported their
government's work to save lives and alleviate human misery
around the world. Since 9/11 and the harboring of terrorists in
Afghanistan, we have acquired new insights into how failing
states can provide fertile ground for global terrorism. The
Bush administration has taken on the challenge by making new
commitments to international economic development. It has
increased foreign aid spending and created new funding
mechanisms. It has boosted America's focus on crises, such as
the HIV-AIDS epidemic, that can set developing societies back
decades. It is preparing a response capability to rush
civilians and reconstruction expertise to countries devastated
by conflict. And it has sought to promote good government,
sound economic policies, and strong social programs focused on
human development in poor nations around the world.
Secretary Rice's instinct to seek greater coordination and
provide clarity in the new firmament of foreign assistance is
on the mark. We need to meld new activities in a constructive
way with our traditional approaches. We need to prioritize our
goals and design our strategies in a way that is transparent to
policymakers, legislators and recipients alike. We need to be
able to measure, analyze and assess outcomes so that we can
tell when we are making a difference.
The policy community naturally focuses on developments and
debates here in Washington, D.C. But an equally important focus
is the field where foreign aid programs are actually carried
out. Are our embassies up to the task of managing new programs
and increased funding? Are we striking an appropriate balance
between the need for strategic direction from headquarters and
operational flexibility in the field? Are we addressing the
unique challenges presented by each recipient country as we and
they search for common solutions to poverty, political
instability, and violent extremism?
To inform our views, I recently sent Senate Foreign
Relations Committee minority staff to 24 countries in Latin
America, Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East to
examine how increased funding and new programs are being
implemented in the field. I asked our staff to pay particular
attention to how Secretary Rice's new coordination process run
by a senior official dual-hatted at State and USAID is mirrored
in the field.
This report contains findings and recommendations that form
the basis for continuing committee oversight. I look forward to
working with committee members, executive branch officials, and
experts in the development field as we collectively work to
help design and support a foreign assistance effort that
reflects our humanitarian instincts and furthers our interests
around the world.
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations
EMBASSIES GRAPPLE
TO GUIDE FOREIGN AID
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Overview
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has created a
number of new mechanisms for the delivery of foreign
assistance. For example, the Middle East Partnership Initiative
(MEPI) was created in 2002, the President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was announced in January 2003, and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was established in
January 2004. In June, 2005, the President's Malaria Initiative
(PMI) was launched. In January 2006, the State Department
initiated a new foreign assistance decision-making process and
created the position of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA),
nominating the same person to serve concurrently as USAID
Administrator. The process was designed to provide strategic
focus and priorities for foreign assistance and was
subsequently called the ``F process,'' named after the new
foreign assistance function headed by the DFA. The purpose of
this study is to see how the proliferation of programs and the
``F process'' is affecting operations overseas and to gather
new perspectives from the field.
findings
(1) From the field, it is clear that we have failed as a
government and as a community of international development
supporters to agree on either the importance or the content of
a foreign aid strategy. Field-headquarters disconnects, NGO
criticisms and complaints, and sporadic and narrow
congressional attention to foreign aid illustrate this dearth
of common purpose.
(2) Overall agreement between headquarters and the field on
foreign assistance is at low ebb and communications have been
complicated rather than improved by the State Department's
efforts to provide strategic direction. From the field,
policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches can
appear demanding, deaf and sometimes schizophrenic. New
enthusiasms from democracy promotion to HIV/AIDS prevention
erupt regularly even though, from the field perspective, they
have long been a priority. Headquarters talk of ``listening to
the field expert,'' ends in greater central control of ever
more tactical decisions. Requests for information are reversed,
reordered, continuously revised and, in the end, information
provided by the field can appear unread and overlooked as
decisions contrary to field advice go unexplained.
Congressional cuts to executive branch requests for foreign aid
funding reinforce the field view that Washington provides too
few resources to do too many jobs.
(3) Field complaints about the ``F process'' at State focus
on the lack of transparency, the weeks of extra paperwork, the
differing priorities between post and headquarters, as well as
inconsistent demands, but the underlying, only sometimes
unspoken, fight is about money. The initial implementation of
the ``F process,'' which was done hurriedly and could have been
better thought through, reinforced the perception that it was a
State Department grab for expenditures from foreign assistance
coffers at the expense of USAID and State geographical bureaus
running individual programs.
(4) Despite what the field sees as uneven leadership and
communications from Washington, embassies believe they are
coping well with the management difficulties caused by the
proliferation of new foreign assistance programs. For the most
part, we agree. Embassy coordination of foreign aid succeeds as
long as all actors work as team players under the leadership of
a strong and well-informed ambassador. In every embassy where
ambassadors were present, they were judged by staff reporters
to possess a good grasp of the foreign assistance programs in
country. But in five of the 24 embassies visited, staff
reported that a good mechanism for coordination was lacking.
(5) New programs that bring additional funding to the host
country are welcomed by ambassadors despite the management
challenges they present. The MCC and PEPFAR have brought
significant new funding into the field. Less welcome is the
decline of traditional programs as new programs open. Staff
found that as MCC programs in Mongolia and Honduras got
underway, USAID core programs declined. In Mozambique, both
PEPFAR and MCC programs promise new money while USAID
traditional programs are closing down. In Zambia, PEPFAR has
taken over USAID's traditional HIV/AIDS portfolio and USAID is
implementing a significant proportion of PEPFAR programs.
(6) USAID may be viewed as the neglected stepchild in D.C.
but in the field it is clear that USAID plays either the
designated hitter or the indispensable utility infielder for
almost all foreign assistance launched from post. In addition
to running its core programs, USAID staff provides advice,
contacts, and implementation support for other programs. For
example, in Ghana, the MCC is building on a USAID project as
one of the major components of its compact. USAID implements
all MCC threshold programs and was doing so in six of the
countries visited. In Ethiopia, Tanzania, Rwanda, South Africa,
Mozambique and Zambia, USAID is either the main or supporting
implementer of PEPFAR program funds. In many countries, it is a
USAID officer who acts as the ambassador's right-hand foreign
aid adviser. In Georgia, the USAID mission director steps in as
acting Deputy Chief of Mission when the ambassador is away. And
it is USAID that ambassadors turn to when ``feeding the
beast,'' i.e. writing and submitting the many reports on in-
country foreign assistance required by headquarters and the
Congress. While such work has increased in the past five years,
staff found that in 13 embassies visited, the number of USAID
staff has decreased. USAID staff had increased in seven
embassies, although not to the level country teams considered
adequate to address increased foreign aid demands.
(7) Agency rivalry for recognition has diminished public
understanding that programs are funded by the United States.
Posted outside each assistance project are now numerous logos
from sponsors who want to claim credit for the activity and
reinforce that the funding comes from the United States. These
are understandable goals but the best known of these
``brands''--the USAID ``handshake'' logo--now competes with a
plethora of others from the Centers for Disease Control, Health
and Human Services, the MCC, the Office of the Global AIDS
Coordinator, as well as some of the contractors and NGOs that
work as implementing partners. Several are difficult to read
and sometimes they all appear next to one another on the same
wall or on the same letterhead. It makes for confusion when one
clear and simple message would suffice to let recipients know
that the program is sponsored by the American people.
(8) Some new programs such as the Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI) run by the State Department and the foreign
assistance programs run by the Department of Defense and by the
non-foreign affairs agencies are in need of strong guidance
from the embassies if they are to be coordinated with other
programs the U.S. Government is supporting and are to be
consistent with U.S. foreign policy priorities.
(9) Throughout the countries visited, hundreds of Americans
working for non-governmental organizations spend years of their
lives working to save lives and promote development. Many of
their organizations receive grants or contracts from the U.S.
Government, sometimes from several different spigots. Those
interviewed expressed strong though often contradictory views
about how to run and how to prioritize foreign assistance. They
are dedicated to their expertise, whether it is water, health,
housing, education, effective governance, refugees, women's
advancement, human trafficking, religious freedom or democracy
promotion. When their funding is threatened for whatever
reason, they see their investments made in local people,
processes, and programs foundering. Inevitably, they protest.
Sometimes, their voices carry all the way to Washington, D.C.,
to the ears of sympathetic Members of Congress where they end
up as mandated earmarks. Such earmarks often mean that other
programs will not receive funding that the administration or
post believes are necessary. No matter how intent the executive
branch is on developing a worldwide strategic planning
capability and mission focus in recipient countries, this
phenomenon is part of the democratic process and will continue
to create rigidities and hurdles, complicating the endeavor.
recommendations
(1) The President should design a national foreign
assistance strategy that explains both the national security
requirement and the humanitarian imperative that drive our
government's investments in foreign aid. Such a strategy should
be designed to put to rest lingering and out-of-date distrust
between security advocates and those who focus on humanitarian
concerns.
(2) The President should task the Secretary of State to
work closely with the Administrator of USAID to implement the
President's foreign assistance strategy, giving the Secretary
explicit authority to ensure that all foreign aid to individual
countries and regions, including those from the State
Department, USAID, the MCC, PEPFAR, the Department of Defense,
and other U.S. Government agencies, are in the foreign policy
interest of the United States and conform to the strategic
goals determined by the President. The goal is not to
micromanage budgets of individual programs and other agencies
but to provide leadership and coordination and have the
authority to weigh in with adjustments when necessary.
(3) The Secretary of State, working closely with the
Administrator of USAID, should work within the executive branch
and with the legislative branch to garner the foreign
assistance funds necessary to carry out the President's
strategy. Efforts to achieve a sound and balanced foreign
assistance budget that includes all foreign aid spigots should
equal the Secretary's commitment to securing a strong State
Department budget.
(4) The Secretary of State should provide strategic
direction, transparency, and overall accountability to foreign
assistance. Her efforts to do so through the ``F process'' were
long overdue but flawed in implementation. The process should
be redesigned to garner understanding and support from within
and outside government. Specifically:
a. The Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) should
effectively break funding decisions into strategic,
tactical and operational components and find ways to
bring appropriate actors into decisions, as well as
make clear who the appropriate decision maker is at
various stages.
b. The DFA should be made a confirmable position as a
second Deputy Secretary of State commensurate with the
importance economic development has in national
security.
c. The DFA should referee funding disputes that take
place at the strategic level. It is important to assert
the Secretary's role in determining funding priorities
and making trade-offs but it is equally important for
there to be flexibility in the field and communications
and shared decision-making among all actors. Otherwise,
implementation will be flawed and the most sensibly
designed strategy will, in the end, fail.
d. The DFA must not attempt to become another USAID
nor should it become another layer of bureaucracy that
slows rather than speeds decision-making. As one
interviewee put it, DFA should be ``management light
and transparency heavy.'' The DFA should collect and
analyze data in a way that gives policymakers and
others in the development community information on
where U.S. taxpayer dollars are being spent overseas
and to what ends. The DFA should prepare with USAID a
unified budget for State and USAID expenditures after
extensive consultation with interested parties
including country ambassadors.
e. The DFA's responsibilities should be expanded to
include oversight of all government agencies' foreign
aid programs so that inconsistencies or gaps can be
brought to the attention of the Secretary of State and,
if necessary, the President. The Department of Defense
(DOD) and the domestic agencies should be involved in
``F process'' deliberations of country-level goals and
funding. Disagreements that cannot be resolved by the
Secretary of State should be taken to the President.
f. The Secretary of State would be better served by
the replication of the office of the U.S. Assistance
Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE) for each
regional bureau, perhaps in the form of ``deputy
assistant secretary for programs.'' DFA's macro-
decisions as to regional and thematic priorities can,
thus, flow down to assistance coordination offices
within the regional bureaus, where country-specific
expertise is vastly superior and decisions would be
better informed. The regional coordinators at State
should partner with Assistant Administrators at USAID
to ensure the most effective use of foreign assistance
funds in the region.
(5) USAID should be recognized for the indispensable role
it plays in the effectiveness of U.S. development policy. The
agency should hone its development expertise and work to make
its operations as flexible and practical as possible. It should
be strengthened and provided resources to achieve the ultimate
goal of creating a streamlined agency that can keep and attract
the most experienced, technically proficient, and worldwide
savvy development experts in the world. Specifically:
a. The position of Administrator of USAID should be
restored to its former status as a position separate
and distinct from the DFA. The jobs are substantively
different, with the DFA providing strategic direction
to all foreign assistance and the Administrator
responsible for the USAID budget and its programs and
personnel. Each job is highly demanding and they cannot
be filled by one person.
b. Just as the uniformed military's judgments on
capacity and feasibility bring them to the tables where
strategic decisions are made, USAID must be part of the
high-level decision-making on U.S. development
directions and policy. The Administrator should
continue, as previously, to report to and serve under
the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State
but, as the President's top advisor on the operational
aspects of economic development, the Administrator
should have an independent presence on the President's
highest level inter-agency councils on foreign aid
issues.
c. USAID Assistant Administrators bring unique
regional, country, and functional expertise to the
decision-making. They should be an integral part of the
planning, execution and oversight of all foreign
assistance in the region.
d. Career paths that include ambassadorships should
be created for USAID professional staff and USAID
personnel should be considered for more
ambassadorships. This is particularly appropriate in
countries where the major U.S. mission is economic
development.
e. The operating budget of the agency and its
staffing levels should more accurately reflect the high
priority that the President places on international
economic development in his overall national security
strategy. Cuts to operating budgets and reductions in
staff undermine the efficiency of almost all foreign
assistance programs run from embassies.
(6) Ambassadors are the President's representatives
overseas. They should take personal responsibility in their
countries of assignment for the implementation of the
President's foreign aid strategy, making certain that the
assistance is balanced and spent effectively, in coordination
with the host country and with other donors. Internal embassy
coordinating mechanisms, whether one point person, working
groups, or direct front office supervision, should be set up to
share information, seize opportunities, and to rein in those
who intentionally or inadvertently skirt embassy oversight.
a. Training for ambassadors and prospective DCMs,
particularly for those with no inter-agency government
experience, should include the full spectrum of foreign
assistance functions undertaken by the U.S. Government
and the ambassador's role in overseeing them.
b. Training for all Foreign Service Officers,
including ambassadors and DCMs, should include course
material that prepares them for effective interaction
with the military. A variety of judgments--from the
level of security assistance, the most effective
counterterrorism cooperation, the role of military
psychological operations, and communications and
cooperation with combatant commands--are dependent upon
experience or the training one has received prior to
assignment at post.
(7) The executive branch should request and the legislative
branch should fund security assistance in the foreign affairs
budget, as has traditionally been the case, with some security
assistance continuing to be implemented by the Department of
Defense. Foreign assistance functions and authorities should
not be migrating to the Department of Defense due to inadequate
executive branch requests for funding in the proper budget
account. The Secretary of State should streamline security
assistance decision-making to make certain that there is ready
flexibility and means to address emerging threats and
unexpected opportunities.
(8) Congress has an important role to play in making
certain that foreign aid is well spent. It is a Congressional
prerogative and, indeed, responsibility to provide robust
oversight, policy guidance, and a sense of the American
people's collective judgment on important foreign assistance
decisions. The Congress should work to bolster its own positive
impact. Specifically:
a. Ambassadorial and other nominations should be
dispensed with quickly, either through confirmation or
timely rejection when deemed appropriate. The holds of
individual Senators should not prevail indefinitely;
votes should be taken after a period sufficient for any
engaged Senator to inform his or her vote. Many
formerly quiet embassies have jumped to the forefront
of U.S. interests and must be led appropriately. The
need was clear in Mozambique where there has not been
an ambassador for nearly 14 months. It took the
executive branch seven of those months to name a
replacement, and the nomination has languished in
Congress since January of 2007. At the time of the
staff visit, the DCM had just arrived, the MCC and PMI
were just ramping up, and PEPFAR funding was increasing
substantially. Keeping track of all these moving and
evolving parts required ambassadorial leadership.
b. The Congress should fund the President's foreign
aid budget, at a minimum, at the overall level
requested. During this administration's period in
office, the Congress has denied some $7.6 billion that
the President requested in his regular foreign aid
budget. Too little money to do too many jobs, all
coming at the last minute in an omnibus appropriation,
creates havoc with field planning, coordination, and
ultimately undermines the entire foreign aid effort.
Equally damaging, insufficient funding for foreign
assistance in the civilian agency budgets reinforces a
migration of foreign aid authorities and functions to
the Department of Defense.
c. Congress, in cooperation with the executive
branch, should undertake an overhaul of the Foreign
Assistance Act, which has not been rewritten since its
inception in 1961, to reflect the new structure of the
foreign aid apparatus and to give cohesion to foreign
assistance strategy.
d. Too often, Members of Congress narrow their
foreign aid focus to favorite or least-favorite
countries, specific NGOs or programs, and other unique
enthusiasms that end in earmarks or reporting
requirements in appropriations bills. Dialogue between
the two branches in hearings, Member and staff
briefings, and oversight travel--in essence, steady,
transparent and firm oversight--are much preferable to
the unanticipated rigidities of earmarks and the
massive reports that nail embassy staff to their desks
when they should be out overseeing projects and
interacting with the people we are paying them to
assist. On the other side, the executive branch must
provide detailed justifications for its requests and a
sound strategic rationale for its priorities in order
to stave off congressional directives.
e. Congress has a critical role to play in balancing
broader executive branch decisions. For example, this
year, the administration requested funding for the
Global Fund to Fight HIV-AIDS at approximately half the
level Congress appropriated last year. Such funding is
a significant and strongly supported priority in both
houses of Congress, something the administration should
recognize and accommodate in its own budget requests.
f. Authorizing committees should consider and pass,
and congressional leadership should find floor time
for, a foreign aid authorization bill as a routine
matter at least every two years. Committee and floor
deliberations and debate on foreign assistance would
give Members the opportunity to offer amendments, set
broad legislative priorities and develop better
understanding of strategic goals and individual
programs.
g. Members of Congress should agree on reprogramming
levels below which decisions can be made at the embassy
level without requiring legislative branch
notifications. If this were undertaken as a three-year
pilot program, it could be closely monitored to
determine whether it should be made permanent.
Introduction
purpose of study
The study is intended to gather perspectives on foreign aid
from government experts in the field and to examine how
embassies are organizing and responding to recent developments
in foreign assistance programs and their management. Efforts
were also made to interview non-government organization (NGO)
experts who design and carry out projects in the countries
visited. The purpose is to provide insights to SFRC Members
into how new funding, new programs, and a new strategic
approach in Washington is affecting foreign assistance
implementation in the field.
It should be noted straightaway that resource and time
constraints limited minority staff visits to only 24 countries,
whereas U.S. foreign assistance is provided to some 140
countries around the world.\1\ Travel took place over a period
of four months. Pre-travel briefings and interviews in
Washington provided information on overall purpose and
management of individual programs and processes. The
Congressional Research Service supplied excellent background
papers and individual country aid tables that gave context to
the information gathered.
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\1\ Countries visited were Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda, South Africa, Zambia, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, Bolivia, Honduras, Peru, Nicaragua, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Morocco.
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Findings and recommendations are offered as a best effort
to draw commonalities and themes from the hundreds of
interviews conducted and to suggest ways in which obstacles
that are being encountered in the field could be overcome.
This work follows and builds on a related Committee staff
effort published under the title ``Embassies as Command Posts
in the Anti-Terror Campaign'' in December 2006.
the dilemma
The dilemma inherent in formulating foreign assistance
policy becomes obvious when spending any time in developing
countries. The need seems infinite and the resources to address
them are finite.
American generosity and hope for a better world as
expressed through both public and private giving has been
growing. The Bush administration has not only increased the
number of programs but it has also increased overall funding
for development. Its requests for significant boosts have not
been fully embraced by the Congress. Over President Bush's term
in office, the Congress has denied $7.6 billion that he
requested in non-supplemental foreign assistance. Even so,
excluding emergency war supplementals, the foreign aid budget
grew from $14.9 billion in 2001 to a record executive branch
request this year of some $24.5 billion.\2\ American private
giving to international causes has also been rising.
International giving from private sources increased 147 percent
from $4.6 billion ten years ago to $11 billion in 2006.\3\
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\2\ Source: Congressional Research Service.
\3\ Center on Philanthropy, Indiana University, Bloomington,
Indiana.
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Of course, assistance is not the only way America touches
the developing world. Generosity of purse, unfortunately, can
abide side-by-side with policy incongruities. For example, we
are spending the largest amount of money ever to address health
needs in developing countries while we recruit doctors and
nurses from those same countries to work in U.S. hospitals and
clinics. We provide food aid that undercuts the livelihood of
poor farmers because we want to send our farm surpluses on U.S.
ships instead of buying food locally. We subsidize our own
farmers while trying to convince governments in other countries
to let the market system work, and those same subsidies reduce
the income of farmers in poor countries who would otherwise be
able to export to America. We send some $143 million in
assistance to Peru while the U.S. Congress stalls ratification
of a free trade agreement that would give a bigger boost to the
economy and do more to create jobs.
The news from abroad, however, is not always bad. UNICEF
reports that for the first time since record keeping began in
1960, the number of deaths of young children around the world
has fallen below 10 million a year, a number much too large but
moving in the right direction. In Liberia, a former economist
with the UN Development Program holds promise to be a
successful President after free and fair elections in this war
torn country. Likewise, Sierra Leone and Mozambique seem to
have turned the corner toward peace. And a recent poll in
Africa shows a plurality saying they are better off today than
they were five years ago and they are optimistic about the
future and that of their children.\4\
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\4\ ``Poll Shows Africans Wary, But Hopeful About Future,'' Lydia
Polgreen and Marjorie Connelly, New York Times, July 25, 2007, p. A6.
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Nonetheless, it is clear that the number of taxpayer
dollars that can go to international development, as needed as
they may be, is finite. The United States has its own economic
challenges. Developing strapped urban neighborhoods, rebuilding
in the post-Katrina south, and strengthening health care
delivery to both the rural and urban poor are just a few among
the many priorities we have for our own citizens. So how does a
country decide how to spend finite amounts of money in a world
with infinite needs?
a strategic approach
The United States is motivated to provide foreign
assistance by both serious security challenges and a deep
humanitarian commitment to alleviate suffering, save lives, and
fight endemic poverty. Since September 11, 2001, these two
instincts--self-defense and humanitarian--are seen as more
mutually reinforcing than in the past. Good governance,
sustainable and equitable economies, and just societies are
worldwide objectives that all Americans can support.
Protecting American citizens from harm in the face of an
aggressive worldwide movement intent on violent action against
Westerners and their interests is a strategic priority for the
U.S. Government. The June 2007 National Intelligence Estimate
judged that the United States ``will face a persistent and
evolving terrorist threat over the next three years.'' \5\ Al
Qaeda is seen as enhancing its capability through greater
cooperation with regional terrorist groups and continuing to
try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear material for attacks. Beyond Al Qaeda, the report
assesses that ``globalization trends and recent technological
advances will continue to enable even small numbers of
alienated people to find and connect with one another, justify
and intensify the anger, and mobilize resources to attack.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ National Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council,
released in July 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The danger is being addressed both short-term and long-
term. The immediate effort is a worldwide attempt to detect and
expose individual terrorists and their cells. Akin to finding
hundreds of needles in millions of haystacks, it requires
government-to-government cooperation, local intelligence, and
effective law enforcement. Governments with extremist elements
in their populations are especially important in this effort.
Post-conflict countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, that are
slow to stabilize and where reconstruction falters are clear
magnets for terrorists. Poorly patrolled border areas, remote
regions in otherwise well-governed countries, or failed states
such as Somalia can be sought out by terrorists looking for
freedom to gather, plan, and train without detection. To be
successful, the United States needs governments to be convinced
that they should help undercut and expose the designs of
terrorists who may be transiting or residing in their
countries.
In the long term, a Middle East, where neighbors respect
each other's search for the right balance between modernity and
tradition and favor tolerance over violence, will dampen the
flames that fuel terrorism. Over time, in the Middle East but
elsewhere too, economic development is seen as an antidote to
violent extremism. The executive branch has placed development
along with defense and diplomacy as one of the three pillars of
U.S. national security strategy:
Development reinforces diplomacy and defense,
reducing long-term threats to our national security by
helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful
societies. Improving the way we use foreign assistance
will make it more effective in strengthening
responsible governments, responding to suffering, and
improving people's lives.\6\
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\6\ The National Security Strategy of the United States, Fact
Sheet, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, March 16, 2006.
Standing on the side of a better future for all the world's
people is increasingly viewed as an important aspect of our
long-term counterterrorism policy. Societies that are able to
raise their children to be healthy and broadly educated are
less likely to foster extremism. Young adults who see a wide
array of open opportunities for advancement and fulfillment are
less likely to be recruited as foot soldiers by terrorists. And
governments that are just, democratic, and inclusive are less
likely to see their citizens abide the pursuit of political or
religious agendas through violence.
Developments in U.S. Embassies
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has created a
number of new mechanisms for the delivery of foreign
assistance. The multiplicity of new programs and new funding
has complicated but not overwhelmed embassy management. Rather,
it is the headquarters effort to organize itself and provide
strategic focus to both the new and old programs that has
thrown embassy operations into fits of frustration and
bureaucratic agony.
the ``f process''
With the new focus on development as a strategic goal, it
made sense for the executive branch to better come to grips
with the quality and quantity of U.S. foreign assistance. An
ability to set strategic goals and to shift resources to first
priority regions, countries, and purposes is dependent on a
clear knowledge of current expenditures. What are we spending
now and to what purpose? It also depends on an ability to
understand how successful we are in pursuing those goals. What
works best and how can that be measured?
The Secretary of State set out to reform the foreign aid
process in order to answer what seemed to be fairly simple
questions as part of an effort to make the most strategic use
of limited resources. In January 2006, the State Department
announced the new foreign assistance reform plan, appointing
Randall Tobias to serve as the Director of Foreign Assistance
(DFA) with Deputy Secretary rank. He was nominated to serve
concurrently as USAID Administrator and was assigned authority
over all Department of State and USAID foreign assistance
programs, as well as responsibility to provide guidance and
coordination for all assistance delivered by other U.S.
Government agencies. The office that Mr. Tobias headed was
called the ``F bureau'' and the process that he designed is
called the ``F process.''
The DFA designed a Strategic Framework for Foreign
Assistance within which foreign aid was to be planned and
organized. \7\ It designated five strategic objectives: peace
and security; governing justly and democratically; investing in
people; economic growth; and humanitarian assistance. Countries
were grouped according to the development challenges they face
and the reasons why U.S. assistance could make a difference.
The five categories are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See Appendix II.
1. Rebuilding--countries emerging from internal or
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external conflict;
2. Developing--poor and lower-middle income countries
that are not meeting key performance criteria;
3. Transforming--poor and lower-middle income
countries that are meeting important performance
criteria and seem poised for strong economic progress;
4. Sustaining--upper middle or above income countries
where U.S. assistance supports progress in partner
countries important to peace; and
5. Reforming--countries where there are serious
governance issues that have led to legislative
restrictions or prohibitions against assistance.
Institutional resistance to any reform touching on programs
and money that some offices and bureaus had come to see as
their own was to be expected. But, as the process was
accelerated to meet budget deadlines, there never developed a
sense of common purpose. Pitched battles ensued on just about
everything. The rushed and muddled start, including the
uncertainty due to congressional appropriations delays and the
need for a continuing resolution, and the abrupt departure in
April 2007 of the first Director, has added to the impression
that the effort may be doomed, no matter how much sense it may
make from a strategic point of view.
In already strapped embassies, demands from headquarters
and the time required to respond were met with disbelief. As
professionals, all staff appeared to make best efforts to be
responsive and many agreed that a more organized and strategic
approach to foreign assistance is necessary. But that
recognition did not keep the prospect of mutiny entirely from
their minds. The complaints are numerous:
DFA appeared to be staffed by a hodge-podge of detailees
and temporary staff rotating in and out at a dizzying
pace. The result was muddled directions, constantly
changing requests and unclear or constantly shifting
points of contact. When the embassy staff from
Honduras, for example, called the ``F'' Bureau to query
cuts in two categories, the official in Washington was
mystified. She said that according to her notes both
areas were to have received plus-ups.
There was little opportunity for field input into decision-
making. The field is theoretically represented in
headquarters discussions by their respective State and
USAID bureaus, but this is clearly seen as inadequate.
In the case of Bangladesh, the USAID staff happened to
be in Washington at the time of the DFA country meeting
and was invited to attend, a development viewed very
positively in the embassy in Dacca.
With the embassy under-represented, host country input is
also slighted. The field's efforts to respond to
priorities set by the countries themselves and their
citizens are undermined when goals for development seem
to be determined from afar. It is the wrong message to
be sending when country buy-in is essential for
progress.
What was once only a complicated matter of shifting
resources toward an unexpected opportunity or away from
a suddenly less promising endeavor became virtually
impossible, as all requests needed the DFA's personal
approval which was months in coming if it ever came at
all. For example, in Armenia, an embassy-initiated
shift in funding in favor of democracy promotion prior
to the ``F process'' was quickly approved by
headquarters. Today, the embassy official involved said
he would not have any idea how to get such a request
approved by ``F,'' nor even whom to contact there.
The Operational Plans (OP) required by DFA come in for
especially heavy criticism. OPs are detailed
descriptions of every assistance project, including
purpose, vendor and budget. They differ from Mission
Strategic Plans (MSPs) that set goals and describe
embassy plans to reach such goals over several years.
The new OPs are disparaged for covering both too much
and too little. Some specifics:
--The OP's required too much detail at too great a
length. Reports ended up having to be huge-- for
example, some 233 pages from Ghana, 287 pages from
Liberia, and 450 pages from Jordan.
--The OP's do not include funding provided by DOD,
MCC, PEPFAR or other U.S. Government agencies, thereby
creating an incomplete picture of what was going on in-
country. For example, in Liberia the OP did not include
a Department of Labor child labor program that sought
to keep children in school. Neither did it include a
rice importation program run by the Department of
Agriculture. In Zambia, the OP covered only 17 percent
of the foreign assistance coming into the country, as
PEPFAR had brought in resources that surpassed other
programs by multiple amounts.
--The OP focuses on a one-year outlook as preparation
for the budget. As a result, its preparation sapped
time and energy from the embassy's long-term planning,
an essential component of coordination with other
bilateral and multilateral donors.
--The deadlines did not permit, nor did DFA seem
interested in, embassy consultation with trusted NGOs
and other private non-profit partners who are
implementing many foreign assistance programs.
In a number of embassies, both government officials and
NGOs warned against the DFA's reliance on what they saw
as the false clarity of numbers. Such a focus can be
self-deceiving, they argue, when economic development
spurts and lags in an intricately complex web of
related but independently moving parts. New indicators
and tracking mechanisms, databanks, and scorecards
where countries can compare their performance with each
other are all useful. But incomplete or obsolete data
can skew the numbers. Also, some measurements give a
false sense of certitude. While the number of children
vaccinated or graduating from eighth grade is
illuminating, the number of those trained to teach or
vaccinate does not measure the quality of the training,
whether the most qualified people are chosen, or
whether good medical personnel or teachers are
retained. In Armenia, for example, an NGO was asked to
provide the number of female first-year journalism
students in a program designed for experienced
journalists. ``Zero'' was the correct answer provided,
an inaccurate reflection of the program's success in
the eyes of the NGO. Such critics urged a measurement
of outcomes rather than outputs.
Glitches in the software and operating systems added to the
onerous task of collecting, reorganizing, and reporting
information. In Honduras, data was deleted due to
program fault after it was entered and some data could
not be easily saved. Re-entering data multiple times
became a routine part of the ``F process'' experience.
In Jordan, the systems were so overloaded that data
could be entered only between midnight and 6 a.m.
DFA-assigned country categories are questioned. In both
Nicaragua and Honduras, embassy staff questioned
whether two countries with such systemic poverty and
underperforming economies should be classified as
``transforming.'' Embassy officials questioned whether
it was an unintended consequence of their MCC status:
because they had been designated MCC countries, they
were automatically kicked up a level. If consulted,
embassy officials would have recommended the
``developing'' category for both countries.
From the field, DFA's decision-making seemed arbitrary and
was never explained. The embassy in Tanzania, for
example, requested more money for peace and security
and instead received $4 million for a water project,
even though Tanzania had just negotiated a huge MCC
compact with water as a priority. The budget for a new
counterterrorism center, a top priority for the
embassy, was cut. The mission also received an extra $9
million for education at the last minute after being
told its education funding was being cut. It had just
passed up hiring an excellent candidate to work in the
education sector and then had to scramble to hire a new
person and design good programs with this last minute
plus-up.
In sum, the ``F process'' was seen as painfully time
consuming and generally viewed as adding no value to
field operations, planning, or coordination.
multiple programs
President Bush has created a number of new programs with
development, security and humanitarian missions. He has
increased the amount of assistance managed by the State
Department, increasing it from $2.6 billion in FY2000 to $5.3
billion in FY2006.\8\ He has requested and received authority
and funding for new Defense Department foreign assistance
programs. Previously created programs have received new money
and non foreign affairs agencies have increased assistance to
foreign countries from their own budgets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO report. Department of State: Human Capital Strategy Does
Not Recognize Foreign Assistance Responsibilities, September 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only about half of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance is now
distributed through USAID. As of 2006, roughly 20 percent of
bilateral aid was given through the Department of Defense, 12
percent through the Department of State, 8 percent through
Health and Human Services and the rest through the Department
of Agriculture, Peace Corps, Department of Labor, Department of
Treasury and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.\9\ Of the
funds disbursed through USAID and the Department of State, some
are funneled through specific programs such as the President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President's Malaria
Initiative and the Middle East Partnership Initiative.
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\9\ See Appendix III.
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One of the outcomes of all these efforts has been the
arrival of new actors, new programs, and sometimes new missions
being undertaken from posts all over the world.
MCC
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) mission is to
reduce global poverty by promoting sustainable economic growth.
Established in January 2004, the MCC carefully selects
recipients by evaluating their performance according to 16
objective indicators. While poor, recipient countries are
judged to be well governed and on the right track toward
harnessing the power of markets.
Appropriations so far have totaled some $6.5 billion and
compacts worth over $4.8 billion have now been signed with 15
countries. MCC funding can significantly increase U.S.
assistance to a country and is a major investment of taxpayer
money in a small number of countries. The lead time between
obligation of funding and actual expenditures in country can be
long, and compacts are carried out over a period of up to five
years.
Countries that have fallen short of qualifying for MCC
assistance by failing one or two policy indicators may be
eligible for the MCC threshold program. Threshold programs
provide smaller grants designed to help improve performance on
specific indicators.
The hope is that MCC countries can become models,
showcasing the rewards of sound policies and good government.
MCC compacts cover the full panoply of economic development
activities. Staff visited seven countries with MCC compacts
(Armenia, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Morocco, Mozambique, and
Nicaragua), and seven with MCC threshold programs (Indonesia,
Jordan, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia).
MCC relies on USAID to organize and implement threshold
programs. In two countries, Jordan and Tanzania, the decision
not to wait for the completion of threshold programs before
announcing compact eligibility were seen by embassy staff as
unnecessarily undermining the ability to leverage policy
reforms. It would be better in their view to pursue the
threshold program goals full throttle and see some improvement
in targeted areas before deflecting the attention of the
government into new areas of focus demanded by compact
negotiations.
The MCC sometimes builds on programs that USAID and other
donors have pioneered. In some cases, this causes resentment.
USAID officials complain that their agency could do such
projects, particularly in infrastructure, if they only had the
funding. In other cases, USAID officials seem pleased to see
their projects picked up by the MCC and boosted with additional
resources. In still other cases, MCC is investing in important
new areas and undertaking projects that would otherwise have
gone unfunded.
In some countries, MCC and USAID officials have developed a
division of labor where MCC invests in removing impediments to
growth while USAID emphasizes policy reform and targeted
projects. In other countries, coordination between MCC and
USAID is weak. Problems stem from an MCC desire to have a new
and different identity. This streak of independence should be
tempered with the recognition that embassy officials,
especially USAID personnel, have deep knowledge and experience
in the country. USAID, on the other side, should recognize that
MCC brings enormous resources to countries where USAID has been
working with scarce resources for a long time. A poor
relationship between the two inhibits the effectiveness of
overall U.S. Government assistance to the host country. Worse,
it could actually have a negative impact on compact
implementation. A strong ambassador who insists on coordination
and communication between the two agencies should be supported
by headquarters.
PEPFAR
During his January 2003 State of the Union Address,
President Bush proposed that the United States spend $15
billion over five years to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB),
and malaria through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR). With PEPFAR, the United States leads the world
in its level of support for the fight against HIV/AIDS. PEPFAR
funds are used for prevention, treatment, and care services in
15 focus countries where the administration estimates 50
percent of all HIV-positive people live. PEPFAR funds are also
channeled as U.S. contributions to the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.
The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, responsible
for PEPFAR coordination, was created in January 2004 within the
Department of State. USAID and the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) are primarily responsible for implementing
PEPFAR programs in the field.
PEPFAR countries visited were Botswana, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. PEPFAR
is welcomed in embassies, as it provides a substantial increase
in funding. In some countries, however, it is seen as too
narrowly focused on anti-retrovirals (ARVs) and the prevention
of only one disease. Some officials are also concerned that the
sheer size of PEPFAR assistance in some countries causes
decision makers to cut USAID funding as they try to spread U.S.
development investments to as many countries as possible. Such
cuts are inducing embassies to craft USAID projects in such a
way as to be able to tap into PEPFAR funding. ``USAID is
turning into the U.S. Agency for Health,'' said an embassy
official in Tanzania, reflecting a general concern in African
posts that other pursuits are being crowded out.
Doctors and nurses in many PEFPAR countries are being
enticed into HIV/AIDS care at the expense of primary and
maternal health. A broader definition of use would prevent the
unintended consequence of weakening a country's overall health
infrastructure. A broader definition would also allow for
complementary programs such as food aid. PEPFAR does coordinate
with the World Health Program and with U.S. PL-480 programs.
However, staff witnessed a program in Rwanda that provided food
to only a small fraction of the eligible needy people on
PEPFAR-provided ARVs. Without food assistance, the benefits
from medication are wasted.
Given that PEPFAR is intended as an ``emergency response,''
there has been little focus on how to make the interventions
sustainable. Given that ARVs are a lifetime need and many
recipients are children who contracted AIDS in utero, the
United States is committing to a decades-long program. The
President has requested a follow-on 5-year $30 billion program.
Whatever problems still need addressing, PEPFAR is clearly
making a significant impact. PEPFAR has supported:
antiretroviral prophylaxis for HIV-positive women during
533,700 pregnancies, thereby averting an estimated 101,500
infant HIV infections; life-saving antiretroviral treatment for
approximately 1,101,000 men, women and children through
bilateral programs; care for more than two million orphans and
vulnerable children; and over 18.6 million counseling and
testing sessions to date, through prevention of mother-to-child
transmission and other counseling and testing activities.
President's Malaria Initiative
In June 2005, President Bush launched the President's
Malaria Initiative (PMI) which increases support for
international malaria programs by more than $1.2 billion
between FY06 and FY10. PMI's goal is to reduce deaths due to
malaria by 50 percent in 15 countries by focusing on the most
vulnerable groups--children under five and pregnant women. PMI
supports four key areas--indoor spraying of homes with
insecticides; insecticide-treated mosquito nets; anti-malarial
drugs; and treatment to prevent malaria in pregnant women.
PMI is led by USAID and includes efforts from the
Department of Health and Human Services (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention), the Department of State, the White
House, and other agencies.
Staff visited three PMI countries: Mozambique, Rwanda, and
Tanzania. In the field, PMI is considered better coordinated
than PEPFAR, having had the opportunity to learn from the
PEPFAR's challenges. PMI provides local communities with a
health benefit while also supporting employment by hiring
sprayers from the communities. They support the manufacture and
selling of bed nets so that, after PMI has concluded its work,
the local market can continue to supply them.
PMI has been particularly successful in Tanzania, helping
to almost eliminate malaria on the island of Zanzibar.
Sustainability of the effort is important, as malaria was wiped
out twice before in Zanzibar's history.
MEPI
The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was created
in December 2002 with the purpose of promoting political and
socio-economic progress in the Middle East and North Africa.
Using Economic Support Funds, it works to fund entrepreneurs,
organizations, and projects that hold promise of providing a
strong, multiplier effect. It is placing a special focus on
women, working with lawyers, NGOs, and other women's
organizations to support candidates and other leaders working
to strengthen women's voices and participation in public and
private decision-making. Managed by the State Department's
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, MEPI's funding stream has gone
from $29 million in FY02 to averaging approximately $100
million per year since. For FY08, the administration requested
$75 million.
MEPI is administered from Washington with embassy input at
some posts but not others. In Jordan, the MEPI program is
overseen by the embassy's public affairs office. In Lebanon,
when the embassy acquired an additional political officer under
the Global Repositioning Initiative, the ambassador appointed
the officer as his special assistant and assigned him the task
of coordinating MEPI programs with USAID and the public
diplomacy section. In both Lebanon and Jordan, MEPI programs
are welcomed and seem for the most part well-integrated. It
should be noted, however, that embassy officials complained
that some U.S. grantees were attending a MEPI regional
conference in Amman that the embassy had never heard of, much
less been invited to attend. It appears that the regional MEPI
office in Tunis had failed to inform the embassy.
Across a number of North African posts, MEPI's reputation
ranges from uneven to abysmal. Embassy officials roundly
express reservations for the approach, implementation,
leadership and evolution of the program. In Morocco, MEPI is
accused of ``sneaking around incognito.'' MEPI programming in
Morocco has apparently tested the edge of host country
tolerance and one MEPI media project apparently bordered on
breaking Moroccan law. The Moroccan government, among others,
has indicated its distaste for foreign programs that seem to
have ulterior motives. MEPI programs that the embassy described
to Washington as weak or worse were sustained through several
complaints, though most eventually were terminated.
The regional field offices in Tunis and Abu Dhabi appear to
make conscious efforts to fly above or below the radar of
individual U.S. embassies in the region. It is not useful for
MEPI to be run outside the purview of post oversight.
FSA/SEED
In response to democratic developments in Eastern Europe
and Eurasia in the final days of the Soviet Union, the Freedom
for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets
(FREEDOM) and Support Act (known as FSA) and Support for
Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Acts were passed in 1992 and
1989, respectively.
In the Europe/Eurasia bureau (EUR) the office of the U.S.
Assistance Coordinator to Europe and Eurasia (EUR/ACE) was
created to coordinate virtually all foreign assistance monies
(excluding certain Department of Defense programs) flowing to
27 states in the region. A dedicated assistance coordination
office is unique only to the Europe/Eurasia bureau, and EUR/
ACE, in its bureaucratic structure, served as a mini-DFA for
assistance to the region, with most foreign assistance funds
under EUR/ACE's authority.
In FY06, FSA monies expended totaled $601 million out of a
total of $1.8 billion in U.S. Government assistance to Eurasian
countries. Similarly, SEED monies totaled $424.12 million in
FY2006 out of a total $733.48 million in U.S. Government
assistance to Central and Eastern European countries. As these
countries have improved their capacity for democratic
development, FSA and SEED monies have been on a steady decline.
Staff reporters visited four countries under EUR/ACE:
Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Compared to non-EUR/
ACE countries, these countries seemed to have a much easier
transition into the ``F'' process. Posts were accustomed to
working with a centralized EUR/ACE authority, as opposed to the
situation in other regional bureaus where disparate keepers of
smaller pots of money protected funds tenaciously.
Assistance officers at post reported that they always knew
exactly whom to contact in Washington for changes in assistance
disbursements as events at post warranted, and EUR/ACE had the
ability to quickly move money from one fund to another. For
example, a senior U.S. official in Armenia recounted that in
2005, the embassy decided to shift emphasis to democracy
promotion strategies in response to political developments in
Armenia. Embassy officials brought this request to EUR/ACE and
were able to shift money from an assistance account for
``Economic Growth'' to one for ``Governing Justly &
Democratically'' very easily.
Senior U.S. embassy and assistance officials in Armenia
felt the ``F'' process was already beginning to impact the
hitherto efficient EUR/ACE process by now making ``F'' the
final arbiter of assistance, leaving EUR/ACE's role less clear.
Expectedly, officials insisted that this sort of shift in funds
would be much more cumbersome, if not impossible, with the new
layer of bureaucracy from the ``F'' process.
Democracy Fund
Funding for the State Department's democracy programs
managed out of its human rights bureau (DRL) has risen from
$7.82 million in 1998 to approximately $94 million in the 2007
regular budget for its Democracy Fund and other programs. As
well, some $260 million has been made available from
supplemental appropriations largely for Iraq, Lebanon, and
Somalia. Congress has routinely supported Democracy Fund
programs well beyond the President's request and has earmarked
funding to support democracy in China, Iran, and Burma. The
administration did not request appropriations for the Democracy
Fund for FY08. Nearly all of DRL's grantees are U.S.-based,
non-profit organizations. Most grants from the Democracy Fund
average $500,000 for one to three years, though some grants can
be as high as $1 million.
Democracy Fund monies support individuals and groups around
the world who are working to build civil society, recruit and
train new leaders, and carry out free and fair elections. There
is clearly tension in some embassies surrounding Democracy Fund
projects. Embassy efforts vary in trying to get a handle on the
kinds of U.S.-funded democracy programs in the host country.
Termed variously ``the outliers'' and ``the cowboys'' by
embassy officials, some democracy advocates can be seen as
single-minded, driven, and not particularly amenable to embassy
guidance. In Jordan, Democracy Fund implementers appear to make
decisions without consultation with the embassy. Members of the
embassy staff often hear about DRL grants after they have
already been promised and are beginning to be implemented. DRL
funding is included in the ``F process'' in Washington: it
needs to be a team player in embassies as well.
DOD Activities
Department of Defense authorities in the foreign assistance
field have expanded across the board over recent years. In
calendar 2001, DOD expenditures represented only 7 percent of
U.S. economic bilateral assistance. They were estimated to be
20 percent in 2006.\10\ In Honduras, for example, DOD foreign
aid is now nearly as large as USAID's program.
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\10\ Official Development Assistance (ODA) figures provided to the
Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) by USAID.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The expansion has taken place in a number of areas, many of
which were previously funded in the civilian foreign affairs
budget. Pentagon counterdrug assistance was originally
authorized to be provided only to Peru and Colombia. It has
expanded to a total of 14 countries and now includes vehicles
and aircraft. In addition to some $1 billion expected in FY08
for humanitarian relief and reconstruction in Iraq, DOD's
humanitarian assistance is growing in other parts of the world
as well. For example, the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
(CCIF), originally dedicated to supporting military training
and education, can now be used to provide humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance. DOD Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance (HCA) funds supported 320 projects in 43 developing
countries at a cost of approximately $9.2 million in 2006, up
from $7 million in 2001. DOD disaster relief was approximately
$63 million in FY06, with much of that going to provide relief
in the wake of the earthquake in Pakistan.
In the area of security assistance, Section 1206 train-and-
equip funding has expanded from a cap of $200 million set in
2005 to a current cap of $300 million, and the number of
recipient countries has expanded from a total of 14 the first
year to an additional 28 countries in FY07.\11\ DOD authority
to reimburse countries such as Pakistan and Jordan who are
providing logistical support to U.S. military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan in connection with the war against terror
has grown to $1.2 billion annually.
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\11\ Section 1206 refers to the section in the 2006 National
Defense Authorization Act that gives the Secretary of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, authority to design and carry
out programs jointly formulated with the Secretary of State to train
and equip foreign military forces. This authority previously resided
solely with the Secretary of State.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With such an increase in funding and programs coming
directly from the Department of Defense, albeit ostensibly with
the concurrence of the Secretary of State, even greater embassy
scrutiny is needed to ensure that the foreign aid is
coordinated at post. Informed judgments need to be made that
such assistance is in keeping with overall U.S. Government
policy toward the host country and U.S. interests therein.
Findings from country visits for this study confirm the
need for continued embassy oversight and attentiveness.\12\ In
one Middle East/North African country, military officials
focusing on counterterrorism and military training demonstrated
little sensitivity to anti-American sentiment in the country
and the level of radicalization among the local populace. With
significant numbers of American soldiers in country, they said
they try to address ``a State Department issue'' by having
soldiers maintain a low profile when off-duty. The team
stressed its close relationship with the host country's
military: ``We walk in the Ministry like it's our own,'' one
defense official declared proudly. Sensitivity to the impact a
high U.S. military profile can have in a country needs to be
shared embassy-wide. Even more important, the number of
military personnel and activities must be reined in when their
profiles and activities are judged by the ambassador to be
detrimental to U.S. interests.
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\12\ For previous findings, see Embassies as Command Posts in the
Anti-Terror Campaign, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
December 2006, S. Prt. 109-52.
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Further evidence of the need for a thoughtful approach is
seen in the reservations that continue to be expressed in
Africa about the establishment of a new combatant command for
Africa, AFRICOM. The new command has generally been supported
by American officials with expertise in Africa. But a number of
reasonable Africans voice concerns that it portends an
exclusively military approach to the terrorist threat or a new
competition between China and the United States to be fought on
African soil. U.S. foreign policy must continue to be led, and
be seen to be led, by the diplomats rather than the generals or
it will create its own resistance.
Section 1206 funding was established to address emerging
terrorist threats and is required to be jointly formulated by
the Secretaries of Defense and State. But this is not always
the case. In Morocco, for example, Section 1206 proposals are
generated by the European Combatant Command rather than
reflecting a bottom-up approach that includes host country
preferences. A focus on coastal security in the 1206 program is
being accepted by Morocco but it is clearly not on the
country's own counterterrorist agenda nor does it appear to
address an urgent threat. There is far more diplomacy necessary
in these cases. A lack of country buy-in has caused problems in
the past. A program in North Africa due to be implemented in
2007 was terminated at the last minute by the embassy when the
host countries had negative reactions to the level of regional
cooperation it entailed.
EUCOM's interest in battling terrorism across the board in
North Africa has resulted in a plethora of recommendations,
briefings, and meetings with senior host country military
officials. While new resources are always welcome, embassy
officials cite a certain heavy-handedness and lack of knowledge
of the local context resulting in ill-informed or poorly vetted
programming ideas. Humanitarian assistance is an area that has
embassy staff particularly concerned from a number of different
angles. ``For one thing, USAID can build a school a whole lot
cheaper than DOD can,'' an embassy official in Tanzania pointed
out. EUCOM hosted in Tunisia in 2007 a regional conference on
humanitarian assistance that was, in name, cosponsored by
USAID. The conference was called to discuss inter-agency
issues. EUCOM provided funding and transportation for American
officials across the region. Without such support, the
conference might never have taken place but the arrangement
provided another tangible indication of the resource imbalance
between the military and civilian agencies. Such meetings are
helpful and should provide our military with some of the
knowledge they need to work effectively in the region.
Nonetheless, they do not and cannot substitute for effective
embassy oversight with respect to DOD activities in country.
The expanding role of DOD in foreign aid, if the decision
is made to sustain it, makes it imperative that it be included
in the overall strategic plan for foreign assistance. It should
be part of a reformed ``F process'' and factored into decision-
making on both priorities and planning at headquarters as well
as in embassies.
usaid
As other programs have multiplied, USAID traditional core
programs have become a smaller share of the total, though they
are still almost 50 percent of bilateral U.S. calendar year
official development assistance.\13\ In its traditional
programs, USAID focuses on long-term economic development. The
agency works with governments to identify and overcome
development obstacles, strengthening education, health, and
other public sector activities, and supporting American and
indigenous NGO's in their social, economic and political
development activities.
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\13\ See Appendix III.
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In addition to carrying out its own programs, USAID in the
field has become the essential ``go to'' agency for
implementing a number of the new programs. USAID manages MCC
threshold programs, administers a significant portion of the
PEPFAR funding, and utilizes Economic Support Fund money to
carry out programs that in previous times would have come from
its own budget. USAID officials, with development experience,
country knowledge, and personal contacts in the host country's
development community, often serve as advisors to the
ambassador on all foreign assistance questions.
USAID's reputation in Washington does not reflect the key
role its individual experts are clearly playing in the
countries visited. One of the reasons Washington has turned to
multiple new programs designed to carry out specific missions
is precisely because the agency is seen as multi-layered,
bureaucratic, and slow to react. An ability to adjust to
quickly moving events, changes in the country or region, or new
strategic objectives has never been seen by either branch of
government as USAID strengths. Congressional formal and
informal tugs at the agency's programs and projects have also
taken a toll. As a result, the agency's staffing has decreased
and its operating budget has suffered. In 1980, there were
approximately 4,000 direct hires in the USAID workforce; today
there are 2,000.\14\ More recently, since 2001, the operating
budget has remained essentially flat while the increase in
programs that the agency is implementing has gone from
approximately $7.4 billion to some $13 billion today.\15\
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\14\ Testimony of USAID Administrator-Designate Henrietta H. Fore
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 24, 2007.
\15\ Testimony of Sean R. Mulvaney, nominated to be an Assistant
Administrator of the United States Agency of International Development,
at his nomination hearing, October 30, 2007.
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In embassies too, in the past, USAID has had the reputation
of ``doing its own thing,'' protecting its long-term programs
from the ``political interference'' of either headquarters or
the ambassador. But its reputation in the embassies is now
changing as USAID officials take on new assignments and provide
assistance to all the new programs.
With more assignments in the field than staff to perform
them, USAID has increasingly turned to contractors, many former
USAID employees, and NGO's to implement its traditional core
programs. USAID officials often act as managers of programs
rather than as hands-on experts in one or two specialized
fields of development. In some countries, such as Rwanda, all
USAID assistance is implemented through third parties.
Additional Observations
the role of ambassadors
A good ambassador has a keen sense of the landscape,
figuratively and literally. The ambassador knows what tactics
fit best into the puzzle of the country and its economy,
maintains a strong working relationship with the host
government, and keeps a firm hand on all U.S. Government
activities in country. In the foreign aid area, ambassadors
have addressed the need for coordination in a number of ways.
Some have appointed economic officers to lead, others have
established working groups with leadership varying depending on
the specific function, and still others have put USAID
officials in charge. In Lebanon, the ambassador took advantage
of the increase of staff under the Global Repositioning
Initiative to give the job to his new special assistant. In
Bolivia, the Ambassador named the USAID country director the
acting Deputy Chief of Mission to fill a staffing gap. In 19 of
the 24 embassies visited, there did seem to be an adequate
coordination mechanism with strong oversight by the ambassador.
Domestic agencies that enter the foreign assistance arena
need to be convinced both in Washington and in the field to
consult with the embassy team. Embassy officials had to set
things right after the Department of Homeland Security
organized a border security program with Lebanese officials
that competed with a German effort already agreed to by
international donors. In Liberia, a domestic U.S. agency
contracted with a proscribed vendor to import rice for a child
feeding program without first consulting with the Ambassador or
the country team. It was the embassy who had to explain to the
Liberian government and extricate the agency from the contract.
On the other hand, good results can emerge when domestic
agencies are looped into embassy activities and deliberations.
The Department of Agriculture has provided two American
forestry experts to assist the Liberian government in the
creation of a more transparent and accountable system of
logging rights. Working with USAID, the agriculture experts
have made an important contribution to helping sort out timber
concessions, a major source of income for this very poor
country. Zambia is another example where embassy coordination
has worked. A high-level Zambian official approached the U.S.
Treasury while on official business in Washington and
identified financial sector reform as a much needed component
in the country's anti-corruption program. Treasury responded by
providing technical staff to work in the Zambian ministry and,
at the time of the staff visit, funding issues were being
resolved to send an additional resident advisor from Washington
to work with the Zambian government.
In one of the two embassies staff visited that have been
without an ambassador's leadership for more than a year,
coordination efforts were much more fractious than in embassies
with ambassadorial leadership. USAID complaints were more
numerous, newcomers were more likely to be resented than folded
into the embassy team, and there was a greater likelihood of
different programs pursuing separate agendas. In every embassy
visited, Ambassadors leading a strong front office were seen as
clearly indispensable to a coordinated foreign aid program.
Not only is the ambassador's leadership important. It is
also the ambassador's judgment that should be brought to bear.
Ambassadors must have a sophisticated understanding of the
tensions that can exist among competing U.S. goals. When a U.S.
funded activist group is using tactics that are sure to create
a backlash and set back the cause of democracy, the ambassador
needs to know about it and curtail the activity. Likewise, the
ambassador needs to take action when the U.S. military profile
is becoming too large or U.S. assistance is becoming imbalanced
or when it is unwise to further strengthen the security sector.
In all of these sensitive judgments, the ambassador is not
always guaranteed to be right. But it is only the ambassador
who represents the President of the United States in country
and who has the broadest view of American interests.
staff challenges
In a perfect embassy, the professionalism of the foreign
aid staff always wins out. The new PEPFAR program builds
seamlessly on the success of USAID health programs. USAID
provides a long-term grant to a highly worthy and successful
MEPI recipient. The MCC brings an astounding amount of
resources to an agricultural project that was designed by USAID
but could never go beyond a pilot project due to lack of
resources. Economic Support Funds (ESF) funding is amicably
divided up among programs competing for the ambassador's
approval.
There are, of course, no perfect embassies. Inter-agency
rivalries are easily apparent to visitors interested in hearing
the complaints. It is the long-term USAID staff that is most
unhappy. They see themselves doing a lot of the backstopping
for the new programs and getting none of the credit. They
question the experience of the newcomers, whether projects are
being successfully vetted and evaluated, and whether, in the
end, they will be successful. For example, a young staffer with
PEPFAR flew into a conference in Rwanda and reportedly brought
a host country foreign expert to tears with some insensitive
and rigid pronouncements. In Mozambique, USAID has been
directed by PEPFAR at headquarters to implement programs that
the embassy team had recommended against as inappropriate and
ill-suited to the country. Such episodes are galling to U.S.
aid professionals who are working to craft appropriate local
programming. Overall, USAID officials see the new programs
getting the funding and their own programs struggling and
sometimes losing in the competition for resources.
In the best run embassies, the underlying disgruntlement is
not all-consuming. There is clearly plenty of work for everyone
in the new foreign aid firmament. USAID professionals should
see their work as the important contribution it is, whether or
not their agency is getting proper credit. But employee morale
is an issue that needs to be addressed over the long term.
Losing our most experienced foreign aid professionals or our
most promising recruits to other endeavors at a time when we
have raised development to the highest level priority would be
self-defeating.
usaid administrator
Discontent in USAID with the current situation has led some
non-governmental and other experts to argue that the
Administrator of USAID should be raised to a cabinet-level
position.\16\ The preponderant view on this staff is that such
a change would weaken rather than strengthen U.S. foreign
assistance. The perception that development is intrinsically
linked to national security would fade and Congressional
support for funding would diminish still further. A foreign aid
cabinet minister would be no match for the Department of
Defense, the Department of the Treasury, or other cabinet
departments in the effort to coordinate foreign aid. Equally
important, at a time when the civilian side of the national
security team needs strengthening, it would be split in two,
with all the potential for rivalry and division of purpose that
two cabinet agencies in foreign policy implies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Lael Brainard, ``Organizing U.S. Foreign Assistance to Meet
Twenty-First Century Challenges,'' pp. 62-63 in Security by Other
means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty and American Leadership, The
Brookings Institution, 2007.
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When the DFA position was created, it was dual-hatted as
both a State Department position with rank comparable to the
level of Deputy Secretary and as the USAID Administrator. In
the view of most but not all staff working on this project,
this arrangement has not worked. The DFA has been too consumed
with the coordination process to manage USAID and its programs
and USAID has lost a prominent and high-level spokesperson to
argue its case when there are differences between State and
USAID. As a result, this report contains the recommendation
that the USAID Administrator should revert to its previous
status as a separate position.
Some members of the staff working on this report disagreed.
They favored continuing the dual-hatting of the Administrator
of USAID and DFA. The argument rests on the view that such
duality is the best way to preserve a USAID role in the
coordination of all foreign assistance provided by U.S.
Government agencies. The insights and experience of USAID staff
are indispensible in formulating development policy. It was
argued that a separation of the two positions would effectively
relegate USAID to operations-only, diminishing the policy
impact of development experts. To complement the dual-hatting
of DFA and USAID at headquarters, it is also argued that other
agencies should be required to obtain approval from USAID in
the field before proceeding with their development projects.
That opinion rests on the observation that USAID staff
generally has a better sense of the opportunities and
limitations on the ground than do other officials who are
developing projects from Washington.
Regional and Country Findings
sub-saharan africa
Foreign assistance to Africa has swelled significantly over
recent years due to increases in HIV/AIDS funds, the
President's Malaria Initiative, Millennium Challenge Account
grants and humanitarian needs in conflict countries, including
Darfur, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Africa's share of bilateral
aid was 8.8 percent in FY01 and will be some 30 percent in FY08
if the administration's request is granted. Responding to the
AIDS epidemic has been a critical focus, with funding in the
health sector going from $344 million in 2001 to a proposed
$3.9 billion in 2008. Traditional USAID programs funded under
the Development Assistance account have been increasing, going
from $424 million in 2001 to $490 million requested for 2008.
Botswana
Botswana, with a population of 1.8 million people in an
area almost the size of Texas, has had the fastest income
growth in the world since its independence in 1966. Per capita
income now stands at $5,530. Botswana's progress has been
achieved through conservative fiscal policy and sound
management of resources. Botswana has essentially transformed
itself from a poor country to a middle-income country. Some of
its success is due to its wise use of diamond mine revenues to
fuel economic development. Mining, mainly diamonds and copper,
is an important economic activity in the country, accounting
for about 33 percent of the GDP. Financial services,
subsistence farming, and cattle raising are also important.
Tourism is quickly becoming one of the most important economic
activities. Much like South Africa, Botswana must also deal
with high unemployment and income disparity.
Botswana has one of the highest HIV/AIDS rates in the
world. There are an estimated 350,000 people living with HIV or
AIDS, approximately one-sixth of the population. Botswana is
fighting the disease with one of the most progressive and
comprehensive programs in the region. Regardless of the
progress made in treatment, however, the number of infected
people continues to escalate.
The U.S. Government considers Botswana to be a sustaining
partnership country. For FY07, Botswana received $38.19 million
in U.S. foreign assistance, of which $37 million is for HIV/
AIDS ($35.54 million through PEPFAR and $1.46 for the Peace
Corps which is solely focused on HIV/AIDS). Smaller sums
included $500,000 allocated for Foreign Military Financing, and
$690,000 for International Military Education and Training
under Peace and Security. The International Law Enforcement
Academy (ILEA) has a branch in Gaborone that opened in 2003.
The Government of Botswana has invested $5 million in the
facility. The United States spends approximately $1.2 million
on training elite police officers from 23 African and Indian
Ocean nations.
The Department of Defense has contributed to infrastructure
needs by committing to build ten HIV/AIDS voluntary counseling
and testing sites and a number of daycare centers for orphans
and vulnerable children. Funding comes through DOD Humanitarian
Assistance and is not represented in the ``F-process,'' the
Operational Plan (which is a very small document due to lack of
USAID presence), nor the Country Operational Plan (COP) which
is a 580-page document.
A major problem in the country is the lack of health care
professionals. Botswana does not presently have a medical
school and, since it is a relatively new country, there are no
generational lineages of doctors. Botswana, unlike many other
countries, does have the ability to pay doctors that come into
the country, but immigration doesn't come close to meeting the
demand. Language barriers and cultural differences with foreign
doctors has also posed some problems. A number of U.S.
hospitals and medical schools have collaborative programs in
the country to not only treat patients, but also to help train
medical personnel.
Another hurdle to progress is the increase in the number of
orphans. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
estimates that by 2010, more than 20 percent of all the
children in Botswana will be orphaned due to HIV. Staff members
were consistently informed that a future HIV/AIDS
reauthorization should be clean of earmarks, with the exception
of the 10 percent set aside for orphans and vulnerable children
(OVC).
Overall, it appears that U.S. resources are making a
difference in the country. However, in the long run, with
technical assistance from the United States, Botswana should be
able to maintain its HIV/AIDS program independently and should
no longer need to be a PEPFAR Focus Country.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia is a poor country with a per capita income of
$160, and a population of 77 million people in an area larger
than the states of Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico combined.
Unique among African countries, Ethiopia maintained its freedom
from colonial rule with the exception of the 1936-41 Italian
occupation during World War II. A constitution was adopted in
1994, and Ethiopia's first multiparty elections were held in
1995 with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi elected as Prime
Minister. Meles has served as Prime Minister since then. A
border war with Eritrea late in the 1990's ended with a peace
treaty in December 2000 monitored by a UN peacekeeping mission
(UNMEE). Elections in 2005 saw widespread violence in the
capital Addis Ababa after parties opposing Meles accused the
government of fraud. In the ensuing demonstration, government
security forces opened fire on protestors, killing some 200
people.
Access to sufficient food is a major day-to-day issue for a
vast number of Ethiopians. In an effort to meet the challenge,
USAID is targeting assistance toward improving agricultural
productivity and marketing capabilities.
Policy makers must decide how to balance Ethiopia's
generally supportive and productive efforts in the Global War
on Terrorism (GWOT) with its deficiencies in democracy and
governance. Whether the United States can effectively use
mutual interests in GWOT activities and stability in the Horn
of Africa as entree and leverage to improve the domestic
political environment in Ethiopia is an open question. As a
result of the government's repression of political opposition,
little U.S. assistance has been targeted towards the military
for either equipment or training.
The U.S. Government considers Ethiopia to be a developing
country. The bulk of U.S. assistance has been for the treatment
of HIV/AIDS. It will top $409 million in FY08.
Ghana
Ghana is a country of 23 million people in an area slightly
larger than the states of Indiana and Illinois combined. Well
endowed with natural resources, Ghana has roughly twice the per
capita income of the poorest countries in West Africa at $450.
Even so, Ghana remains heavily dependent on international
financial and technical assistance. Gold, timber, and cocoa
production are major sources of foreign exchange. The domestic
economy continues to revolve around subsistence agriculture,
which accounts for 37 percent of GDP and employs 60 percent of
the work force, mainly small landholders.
The United States hopes to help Ghana solidify democratic
gains. Beginning in the 1990's, successful elections have
established a trend toward peaceful and democratic transitions
of government. Because of such strides, the country has
received an MCC compact valued at over half a billion dollars
over five years. This funding is focused on improving
agriculture, infrastructure, and education. Such efforts, if
successfully managed, will go far toward achieving Ghanaian
goals of greater ``democratic dividends.''
U.S. non-MCC assistance decreased after the announcement of
the $547 million MCC compact signed in August 2006. Total U.S.
assistance, exclusive of MCC funding, peaked in FY06 at some
$70 million, dropped to $60 million in FY07, and dropped to a
request of $41 million in FY08. The bulk of the FY08 drop
results from a significant decrease in PL-480 food aid. Ghana
is considered by the U.S. Government to be a transforming
country.
MCC funding will focus on improving Ghana's agricultural
output and infrastructure related to transporting crops to
Accra for export. In the area of rural development, the compact
assistance is intended to bolster basic community services and
service delivery. This will be done with, among other things,
construction and rehabilitation of educational facilities,
water sanitation and rural electrification. There is some
concern that the five year time-line for the compact may be too
short to complete the proposed projects, in particular the
infrastructure improvements. In the area of education, USAID
officials expressed the view that the MCC's focus on facilities
is somewhat misplaced as the more serious problem is low
teacher salaries, causing recruitment, attendance, and
retention problems. They lacked full confidence in what they
called the MCC's ``build it and they will come'' approach.
Liberia
Liberia was founded as a republic in 1847 by freed slaves
from the United States, thus establishing the close historical
links between the two countries. The country of 3.8 million
people is slightly larger than the state of Ohio.\17\
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\17\ Per capita income comparable to data supplied for other
countries, via the World Bank Atlas Method, is not available.
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After more than a decade of authoritarian rule and civil
war, democratic elections in late 2005 brought President Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf to power. A former World Bank staffer and
United Nations Development Program director, she is the first
woman elected to lead any African country. Civil war and
government mismanagement have destroyed much of Liberia's
economy, especially the infrastructure in and around the
capital, Monrovia. Following the destruction and looting of the
hydro-electric plant, electricity is virtually non-existent and
supplied only by individual generators. The lack of hydro-power
is particularly appalling given that Monrovia is the world's
wettest capital, with some 200 inches of rain falling each
year. Many businesses have fled the country, taking capital and
expertise with them. The country is heavily dependent on
international support and remittances. The unemployment rate is
roughly 85 percent.
The U.S. Government considers Liberia to be a rebuilding
country. U.S. policy in Liberia is to help create a stable,
functioning democratic state on the ashes of a country rent by
civil war. The United States, working closely with the United
Nations and the 15,000 UN peacekeepers in the country, seeks to
create viable government institutions. As such, U.S. assistance
addresses all aspects of Liberian civil society from the
judiciary to the police force to rebuilding Liberia's military.
It is also aimed at Liberia's shattered economy and is
logically focused on those areas where the country can produce
revenue the fastest--through diamond and timber exports.
U.S. assistance is fully in line with Liberia's own goals
and has risen dramatically since the demise of Charles Taylor.
In FY06, Liberia received $126 million and in FY07 $138
million, a ``democracy dividend'' intended to help rebuild the
country. Economic assistance is two-thirds of the total with
military assistance as the remainder being spent on the
professionalization of the armed forces.
Mozambique
Mozambique has emerged from a debilitating thirteen-year
civil war to become a recipient of significant amounts of U.S.
and international assistance. It is a country of 20 million
people who live in an area almost twice the size of California.
The per capita income is $310. Despite strong economic growth
since the end of the civil war in 1992, 54 percent of the
population lives at or below $1 a day, while agriculture
supports 80 percent of the population. Following three decades
of conflict, Mozambique has remained among the poorest of
countries but has shown economic dynamism in the last decade,
averaging 8 percent annual growth. A severe, generalized HIV/
AIDS epidemic, with 16 percent prevalence rate among adults, is
an overwhelming challenge for the country's limited health
system and constrains further economic growth. \18\ With a
1500-mile coastline, Mozambique has also been identified as a
significant strategic partner on regional security issues.
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\18\ Mozambique ranks 168 out of 177 countries on the 2005 United
Nations Development Program Human Development Index.
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The country and people of Mozambique face challenges
similar to their African neighbors, including poverty,
joblessness, and weak institutions, as well as occasional
humanitarian emergencies, including the threat of refugee flows
from Zimbabwe. Mozambique lacks the capacity for coastline
policing and patrols and cannot contend with the challenges
posed by illegal fishing and transit of vessels suspected of
carrying illegal immigrants, drugs and weapons.
Vestiges of the violent civil war remain as barriers to the
fiscal and bureaucratic reform necessary following decades of
colonial and socialist mismanagement. The government's
limitations in effectively responding to social, political, or
economic upheaval or natural disaster are evident. This was
seen most recently in the massive explosion in the capital
Maputo of a remnant weapons stockpile, igniting shells and
rockets that rained down across the city killing dozens of
people and destroying scores of buildings. Reflecting past
suspicion and insecurity, initial international offers of
assistance were rebuffed before the government finally allowed
a degree of technical support to arrive from abroad.
Three of the newer programs--PEPFAR, MCC, and PMI--are all
present in Mozambique. In FY2006, Mozambique received
approximately $143.3 million in U.S. assistance, an approximate
doubling of U.S. assistance since FY01. These FY06 funds
included $94.4 million for PEPFAR; $17.3 million in Child
Survival and Health; $13.4 in Development Assistance; $2.34 in
Non-Proliferation, De-Mining, Anti-Terrorism, and Related
Programs (NADR); $250,000 in International Military Education
and Training (IMET); $15.6 million in P.L. 480 Food Aid. In
FY07, in addition to signing a 5-year, $506.9 million Compact
with MCC, Mozambique received U.S. foreign assistance of $174
million, including $17 million in anti-malaria assistance
through PMI.
In FY08, Mozambique is expected to receive nearly $300
million in addition to MCC funds. Other U.S. Government funding
includes State Department, a Treasury Department program
training local police, Peace Corps, and occasional funding from
the Departments of Justice and Labor. The U.S. Government
considers Mozambique to be a transforming country.
Rwanda
Rwanda is a poor landlocked country with rolling hills in
east-central Africa. It is Africa's most densely populated
country with almost 10 million inhabitants and a per capita
income of $230 in an area roughly the size of Maryland.\19\ The
primarily Catholic country is still recovering from a civil war
and an eruption of genocidal rage in 1994 that killed nearly
one million people and created close to two million refugees
and thousands of orphans. Many women who were raped in the
course of the civil war and genocide are now living with HIV/
AIDS.
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\19\ http://www.cia.gov/lirary/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/rw.htm
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Despite substantial international assistance, the country
continues to struggle to boost investment and agricultural
output. Ethnic reconciliation is complicated by the real and
perceived minority political dominance.\20\ Despite the
government's attempt to create a new Rwanda that sees the
population as ``Rwandans first,'' ethnic divisions and the
psychological scars of the genocide still undermine progress.
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\20\ Ibid.
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The main U.S. foreign aid objective for Rwanda is helping
the country overcome the legacy of its civil war and genocide.
The country's under-five mortality is among the worst in
Africa, with malaria the primary cause of death. Life
expectancy for Rwandans is approximately 40 years. The country
has a 3 percent HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, lower than was
initially estimated by the international community.
Rwanda is a PEPFAR focus country, a PMI focus country, and
is being considered for an MCC threshold program. Under the new
Strategic Framework, Rwanda is characterized as a developing
country, a low- to lower-middle income country that is not yet
meeting certain political and economic performance criteria.
The ambassador maintains a table of all the assistance that
U.S. agencies provide Rwanda. The total figure is $179.7
million. His staff noted that it is difficult to track down
some numbers as not all agencies are required to report the
amounts directly to the ambassador. Ideally, every embassy
should be tracking all U.S. foreign aid disbursed in country.
At headquarters, the ``F process'' should be providing
transparent, worldwide comparisons of such country-based
information. It is difficult to obtain such information now.
For example, a CRS estimate of U.S. foreign aid spending for
Rwanda came up some $35 million short of the ambassador's
accounting.
Of the total, PEPFAR/Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI)
funding totals $116 million for FY08. Economic Growth programs
are to receive $10.3 million, Governing Justly and
Democratically $2.3 million, and Peace and Security $0.4
million.
U.S. policy goals for Rwanda are clear but do not match
U.S. funding priorities. The overall U.S. priority for Rwanda,
as stated by the embassy, is to move the country from genocide
recovery to peaceful growth. This was broken down into sub-
priorities: infrastructure, rural development, education, and
health.
Rwanda was reportedly designated a PEPFAR country without
being consulted. However, the Rwandan government does not want
to turn away U.S. assistance just because it doesn't address
its priorities, because needs also exist in non-priority areas.
South Africa
South Africa is almost the size of Texas, California and
Michigan combined. It has been inhabited for thousands of years
and has attracted immigrants from all over Africa, as well as
Europe, China and South Asia. Apartheid, which assured that the
white minority would control political power, dominated the
political system until 1991. In April 1994, the first nonracial
elections were held, and Nelson Mandela was elected president
of the interim government.
After Mandela stepped down in December 1997, his successor,
Thabo Mbeki, began switching the government's focus from
reconciliation to transformation, especially on the economic
front. South Africa is now considered a middle-income country.
It has an emerging market with abundant natural resources, a
modern infrastructure, the tenth largest stock exchange in the
world, and well-developed transportation, legal, financial,
communications, and energy sectors.
Nonetheless, South Africa still struggles with several
economic problems which stem from the apartheid era. Per capita
income is $4,820. Unemployment and poverty among disadvantaged
groups are two of the biggest contemporary problems. Rampant
crime, high HIV rates, and uneven access to basic services add
to the development challenge.
There are two South Africas. The first segment of the
population has satellite television, goes to shopping malls,
and uses the internet. A second larger segment lives in shanty
towns with limited electricity and running water. The official
unemployment rate is 26 percent, but is realistically closer to
40 percent. The crime rate in South Africa is one of the
highest in the world.
South Africa is deeply afflicted by the AIDS epidemic.
Around the millennium, President Mbeki denied that HIV/AIDS was
a problem in South Africa. He started to acknowledge the
presence of the disease among his people only three or four
years ago. Currently, more than 5.5 million South Africans are
infected with HIV, some 12 percent of South Africa's total
population of 43 million, one of the highest concentrations in
the world. An estimated 40 percent of all deaths are AIDS
related. The long term economic stability of the country
depends on getting the HIV infection rate under control,
working out a treatment strategy to eventually take care of
those infected, and establish a comprehensive plan to care for
1.2 million orphans.
The United States considers South Africa to be a sustaining
partnership country. For FY07, South Africa received $362.94
million in U.S. foreign assistance. Of this amount, $336.38
million is allocated for the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative
(PEPFAR). Development Assistance was $19.28 million in FY07 and
ESF funding $980,000. Much of the focus is on economic growth
among small and medium business enterprises that boost
employment. Counternarcotics funding is $500,000 and the
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Program
will spend $100,000 for FY07. Military aid is only $50,000 from
the International Military Education and Training program. As
of now, South Africa has not signed an Article 98 agreement to
allow for military assistance. Until there is legislative
relief from the requirement that countries sign pledges that
U.S. military personnel will not be referred for prosecution to
the International Criminal Court, South Africa is prohibited
from receiving U.S. security assistance to improve its
military's strategic airlift, disaster response, and
peacekeeping capabilities.
Tanzania
Tanzania is a country in East Africa twice the size of
California with roughly the same population, 37 million people.
The large country has a primarily agricultural economy with
coffee, cashews and spices (cloves) comprising the main
exports. Per capita GDP is $340 and average life expectancy
hovers around 50 years of age.\21\ Over one-third of the
population lives in abject poverty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comprised of mainland Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar
(actually made up of two different islands--Unguja and Pemba),
the country has a unique political framework with a President,
Prime Minister and Parliament that governs the United Republic
of Tanzania. Zanzibar has its own President and Parliament that
make policy independently of the United Republic on such
domestic issues as education, social policy, and taxes, while
leaving foreign policy and defense to the central government.
The U.S. Government considers Tanzania to be a transforming
country. Currently, the U.S. is giving Tanzania roughly $300
million in aid for FY07 and the FY08 request is $393 million.
Tanzania is a unique recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in
that it currently receives funding from USAID, the PEPFAR, PMI,
and the Department of Defense. Tanzania is an Millennium
Challenge Corporation (MCC) threshold country and recently
finalized an MCC compact of almost $700 million, making it one
of only two countries to concurrently have an MCC threshold
program and an MCC compact. The Ambassador provided a table
summarizing all U.S. Government assistance.
Tanzania is an important U.S. partner in the war on terror.
The 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy demonstrated the impact
only small numbers of extremists can have against U.S.
interests. The number one mission priority in the FY09 Mission
Strategic Plan (MSP) is enhancing Tanzania's counterterrorism
capabilities.
Significant challenges facing Tanzania include corruption,
access to clean water, provision of electricity/energy, weak
infrastructure, inflation and food shortages. In addition, the
country faces problems in the area of health with a 7 percent
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. Tanzania has made major strides in
the fight against malaria, bringing the malaria prevalence rate
in Zanzibar to under 1 percent. Although it has enjoyed
democratic elections, the most recent election in Zanzibar was
marred by charges of irregularity and fraud from international
election observers.
U.S. policy goals for Tanzania are complex given the
variety of competing organizations and actors. The bulk of U.S.
assistance (over 80 percent) is going to fund health related
projects, predominantly HIV/AIDS via PEPFAR with a significant
amount also going toward malaria eradication programs under
PMI. However, U.S. funding levels do not match up with the
priorities as laid out under the Ambassador's mission plan:
enhancing counterterrorism capability;
improving health and education;
strengthening democracy;
promoting regional stability;
spurring economic growth;
influencing public opinion among Muslims; and
efficient resource management.
Counterterrorism assistance is the top priority under the
mission plan but receives a negligible amount of total funding.
The mission's primary objective for FY09 is to establish a
national interagency counterterrorism center that will work
closely with Washington but as of yet there are no specific
plans in motion for breaking ground on such a center. The vast
majority of Tanzania's aid through USAID for FY08 was
concentrated in Investing in People that funds health and
education programs. Peace and Security, Economic Growth and
Governing Justly and Democratically received small amounts of
funding. Tanzanian officials and residents most often cite
education, economic growth, lack of educated workers and poor
infrastructure as the main challenges facing their country.
Health, however, was never mentioned as the number one problem
facing the country and yet this is where over 80 percent of
U.S. funding is going.
Zambia
Zambia is a southern Africa country of 11.5 million people,
roughly the size of Texas. It is a recipient favored by the
United States and other donors because of its stability and
moderate, reform-minded government. Since independence in 1964,
its economic development has been limited, barely surpassing
that of even its most unstable or war-torn neighbors. Its per
capita income is $500.
Apart from America's interest in fostering economic growth
and political stability in sub-Saharan Africa, the United
States has limited strategic interests in Zambia. Zambia is a
well-regarded voice in the region, however, on issues of
particular interest to the United States and continues its
helpful role as a regional arbiter. Zambian President Levy
Mwanawasa's posture towards Zimbabwean President Robert
Mugabe's economic mismanagement has been cautious, though he
has compared Zimbabwe to the ``sinking Titanic whose passengers
are jumping out to save their lives.'' Zambia has also issued
one of the strongest statements from an African country against
the mass killing in Darfur.
Zambia has become one of the largest recipients of U.S.
assistance in Africa due in large part to the emergency
response to the devastating AIDS epidemic. Recent high level
U.S. official visits, including that of First Lady Laura Bush
and former President Bill Clinton, have highlighted efforts to
combat AIDS as well as the increased interest in warm relations
between our countries. Additional assistance is flowing
following significant debt relief through the Highly Indebted
Poor Country (HIPC) program in 2005-2006. Zambia hopes to
become eligible for a Millennium Challenge Compact in the near
future.
As with its neighbors, Zambia's greatest challenge is HIV/
AIDS. It infects 16 per cent of the population and has caused
average life expectancy at birth to plummet to 32.7 years.
Corresponding to the challenge, U.S. assistance to Zambia's
health sector comprised over 83 per cent of total U.S.
assistance to Zambia for FY07; for FY08, this proportion is
expected to increase to 91 per cent. Total U.S. assistance to
Zambia has swelled over 380 per cent between FY01 and FY07; if
the FY08 request is approved, assistance will have expanded by
770 per cent over the same period.
The United States considers Zambia to be a developing
country. Total U.S. Government assistance obligated for Zambia
in 2006 was approximately $268 million. These funds provided a
variety of technical assistance and other support that is
managed by the Department of State, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) Threshold Program, Centers for Disease Control,
Department of Treasury, Department of Defense, and Peace Corps.
The majority of assistance was provided through PEPFAR. In
addition to supporting development projects, the United States
has provided considerable emergency food aid during periods of
drought through Title II.
USAID administered more than $141 million in obligated
funding for 2006. This included the management of over $70
million for PEPFAR and $22 million for the MCC threshhold
program assistance to Zambia to fight corruption, reduce
administrative barriers, and make customs clearance more
efficient to improve trade. During 2006, in addition to PEPFAR
and MCC, USAID focused on the following:
Increasing private sector competitiveness;
Improving quality of basic education for more school-aged
children;
Improving health status of Zambians; and
Mitigating the impact of HIV/AIDS through a multi-sectoral
response.
latin america
Foreign assistance for Latin America can vary from year to
year depending on budgets for large programs. With such
variations along the way, it has risen since the start of the
administration, increasing from $862 million in FY 2001 to a
requested $1.4 billion in FY 2008.\22\ Assistance to Colombia
has been a critical focus as the U.S. Government tries to help
the country work toward lasting peace and counter the role of
narcotics. The MCC is working with seven countries in Latin
America and has compacts with El Salvador, Honduras, and
Nicaragua and threshold programs in Guyana and Paraguay. Haiti
and Guyana are PEPFAR focus countries. There has been a modest
shift away from traditional USAID programs in education,
environment and humanitarian assistance, with the 2008 request
showing a 4 percent decline in such programs from the previous
year.\23\ The administration defends a gradual reorientation of
foreign assistance to some Latin American countries, arguing
that progress in those countries warrants a more intense focus
on economic growth and the creation of jobs to help consolidate
democratic gains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ USAID Administrator Tobias statement, House Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Agencies, March 8, 2007.
\23\ Congressional Research Service Report RL32487 U.S. Foreign
Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, March 28, 2006, Connie
Veillette, Clare Ribando Seelke, and Mark P. Sullivan, Foreign Affairs,
Defense and Trade Division, CRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in the Western
Hemisphere with a per capita income slightly more than
$1,000.\24\ It has a population of 9.8 million people in a
country the size of Texas and California combined. For the past
several decades, Bolivia has progressed significantly on both
political and economic fronts. In the last 5 years, however,
social and economic divisions have become more prominent, coca
cultivation has proceeded apace, and longstanding ethnic and
regional tensions are now occupying center stage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ GDP data in this section is from World Bank, Atlas Method.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. priorities in Bolivia are: strengthening institutions
of government and the consolidation of democracy; reducing
narcotics production and trafficking; and improving the climate
for private investment and making sure that the Andean Trade
Preference and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) is extended. U.S.
assistance is generally in line with the Bolivian government's
stated priorities, as projects are formulated with transparency
and host government consent.
The United States Government considers Bolivia a
transforming country and is providing economic and military
assistance totaling approximately $120.77 million during FY07.
The level of assistance has been going down for the past three
years. The USAID budget in Bolivia accounts for the majority of
U.S. bilateral assistance totaling approximately $85.7 million
in FY07. It supports activities that consolidate democracy,
help achieve broad-based equitable and sustainable development,
and reduce narcotics production and trafficking. USAID's
programs are intended to address the key issues of poverty and
social exclusion by focusing primarily (but not exclusively) on
the rural population.
For the last three years, MCC has selected Bolivia as
eligible to compete for funding, but no compact has yet been
signed. The Bolivian government is now in the process of
revising its 2005 proposal and hopes to have plans approved
soon so that compact negotiations with the MCC can begin.
Honduras
Honduras has a population of 7.3 million people with a per
capita income of $1,120 in an area slightly larger than the
state of Tennessee. It is one of the poorest and least
developed countries in Latin America with a GNP of $894 million
and nearly two thirds of the population living in poverty.
The country has enjoyed a relatively long history of stable
democracy compared to its neighbors. Unfortunately the country
is plagued by the same problems facing much of the region:
rampant and pervasive corruption at all levels of government,
malnutrition, poverty, high infant mortality and school drop
out rates, escalating crime, and drug trafficking. Arguably the
most violent country in the region with a murder rate more than
nine times that of the United States, Honduras is facing a
rapid rise in gang-related crime that threatens to undermine
progress made toward improving the climate for private
investment. The gangs are also increasingly linked to narco-
trafficking. Honduras is currently classified as a transit drug
country rather than a production country, but its geographic
location and port make it a critical link in the drug trade.
Honduras has been a long-time U.S. ally with a relationship
that dates back to the early 1900's when U.S. banana companies
began building up a sizable presence in the country. U.S.
influence in Honduras expanded in the 1980's when the U.S.
sought to leverage the positive relationship between the two
countries against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Total
U.S. assistance to Honduras during the 1980's reached almost
$1.6 billion. This amount of consistent, substantial foreign
assistance clearly did not boost economic progress to the
extent that might have been hoped. By the early 1990's, at the
end of the contra war, U.S. foreign aid began to decline. Peace
in the region diminished the attentiveness of U.S. policymakers
as other regions of the globe received higher priority for
funding. However, the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch in
1998 resulted in almost $300 million in U.S. recovery
assistance to Honduras. In addition, the United States has
provided substantial support through debt forgiveness: in
September 1991, it forgave $434 million in official bilateral
debt. In 2005, Honduras reached the completion point under the
HIPC initiative and qualified for multilateral debt relief.
U.S. Government priorities in Honduras are:
Regional security: focus on controlling the increase in
violence (mostly gang related) as well as using Soto
Cano military base as a way of coordinating security in
the region, specifically in terms of counter narcotics.
Good governance: focus on rule of law and critical judicial
reform in an attempt to combat rampant corruption. Also
increase accountability of public institutions.
Poverty reduction/economic development: specifically
relating to implementing and maximizing the impact of
the CAFTA and building trade capacity.
Investing in people: specifically education and health
related programs. Focus on expanding access to
education for all levels as well as developing
accountability systems such as standardized testing and
evaluations.
The U.S. Government considers Honduras to be a transforming
country. Honduras signed a compact with the MCC in June 2005.
The MCC program totals $215 million and is focusing on building
roads and developing the agricultural sector. The total USAID
budget for FY07 in Honduras was $46.8 million, down from $53.7
million in FY05 and $53.1 million in FY06. The request for FY08
is $42.5 million.
Nicaragua
Nicaragua is the second poorest country in the hemisphere
after Haiti, with a GNP per capita of $950 and a population of
5.1 million. Slightly larger than the state of Michigan, it is
a major transit point for drugs coming from Colombia and
elsewhere in South America. Democratic roots remain shallow
following the Sandinista government's war against the U.S-
backed contras in the 1980's, a conflict that devastated the
economy as well as many political institutions. Corruption is
endemic, especially in the court system. Malnutrition is a
serious problem, the literacy rate is 67 percent and the
educational system is considered weak. Electricity is
unavailable for about eight hours a day in the capital. The
nation faces a fresh political challenge with the election as
president last November of former Sandinista rebel leader
Daniel Ortega.
Nicaragua has made enough progress according to MCC
indicators to qualify in the first wave of MCC countries. As a
result, the country entered into an MCC compact in 2006 which
will provide $175 million for a regionally concentrated
economic development project, including infrastructure
development, land-titling and property rights and crop
diversification.
Given the political, economic, social and drug trafficking
concerns, U.S. assistance has included military, education,
nutrition and health, democracy and governance, and economic
development programs. Developed prior to MCC eligibility, a
USAID five-year plan, 2003-2008, called for $279 million in
total assistance, but in the end the money received fell short
by $42 million. All the cuts came in the economic growth
program.
The U.S. Government considers Nicaragua to be a
transforming country. Last year, owing to the elections, about
30 percent of USAID's budget for the country went for democracy
and election efforts, but that is now being scaled back to a
more normal 20 percent. The USAID budget for FY 2006 was $48.5
million, the planned FY07 figure is $35 million, and the
projected FY08 figure is $27.2 million. Embassy officials
attribute this drop in traditional USAID assistance to the MCC
and to the F-process classification of Nicaragua as a
``transforming'' country, better off than a ``developing''
country. Embassy officials said the halving of AID money and
staff could cause political problems for U.S. policy if
President Ortega chooses to make an issue of it. President
Ortega does support the MCC work in Nicaragua.
U.S. military assistance to Nicaragua is expected to be
$10.2 million in 2007 and was $4.4 million in 2006, much of
which went towards training and equipment in counter-narcotics.
Nicaragua has earned high marks for its drug seizure
operations, and the army is considered apolitical and a source
of stability. Its approval rating is around 90 percent.
Peru
Peru has a population of almost 28 million people with a
per capita income of about $2,640 in a country three times the
size of California. Between 2001 and 2006, the Peruvian economy
grew by an average of six percent, one of the highest growth
rates in Latin America. Though Peru has benefited from
sustained economic growth, almost half of Peruvians still live
in poverty and 18 percent live in extreme poverty. President
Alvaro Garcia is trying to lead Peru toward prosperity by
consolidating democratic gains and by tying the country's
economy to free markets and free trade.
U.S. Government priorities in Peru are: (1) Counter-
narcotics and alternative development; (2) Spreading the
benefits of economic growth, including improvements in the
public health and education systems, to the long-neglected
majority of Peruvians; and (3) Strengthening national
government institutions to address low levels of confidence in
democracy.
The U.S. Government provides assistance to the Government
of Peru totaling in FY07 approximately $143 million in economic
and military aid. Such assistance was $159 million in FY05 and
$142 million in FY06. The request for FY08 is only $90 million,
reflecting a drop in the narcotics control and Andean
counterdrug initiative account. The U.S. Government considers
Peru to be a developing country.
The USAID budget in Peru accounts for the most significant
portion of U.S. bilateral assistance. It totaled $80 million
for FY07 and is used for activities that emphasize trade-led
economic growth and increased market access for micro, small
and medium enterprises. Limited government presence in the
highlands and jungle allows illegal coca cultivation, drug
trafficking, and illegal logging. Remnants of the Shining Path
terrorist group continue to threaten and intimidate some
communities, and remote areas suffer from poor health care.
USAID programs offer alternatives to illicit coca and
strengthen government effectiveness to provide services in
health, education, and environmental management in areas most
affected by illegal drug cultivation. In the governance sector,
perceptions of unresponsiveness to citizens' demands and an
inability to deliver services effectively and transparently
result in a continuing low level of confidence in democratic
institutions. USAID works to improve the accountability and
effectiveness of selected regional and local governments and to
encourage constructive dialogue with citizen groups. A free
trade pact with Peru is still awaiting action in the U.S.
Congress.
east and south asia
The United States has raised military, economic, and
development assistance primarily for counterterrorism
objectives in the East Asia-Pacific (EAP) and South Asia
regions, with Pakistan, India, the Philippines, and Indonesia
receiving the bulk of the increases. Average annual funding for
the EAP region (excluding North Korea) during 2002-2006 was
$494 million compared to $368 million in 2001. Annual foreign
aid spending for South Asia (excluding Afghanistan) during
2002-2006 averaged $953 million compared with $201 million in
2001.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Congressional Research Service Report RL31362 U.S. Foreign Aid
to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients, August 22, 2007, Thomas
Lum, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For FY08, South and Central Asia would see an increase of
nearly 7 percent, largely due to assistance to Afghanistan and
Pakistan. The Near East would receive a 5 percent increase,
mainly due to Iraq assistance. Funding to the East Asia and the
Pacific region would increase by 2 percent.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh, a primarily Muslim country, is one of the
world's most densely populated with 147 million inhabitants in
an area roughly the size of Wisconsin. Given the location of
the country on a flood plain, the nation is vulnerable to
repeated floods, droughts, and cyclones which routinely
devastate the largely agricultural economy. Infrastructure is
very poorly developed and only about 30 percent of the
population has access to electricity. It is one of the poorest
counties in the world with a per capita income of $470 per
year.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ http://www.devdats.worldbank.org/AAG/bgd
----------
Appendix IV
----------
Reports Prepared by Embassy Staffs
Upon request, one embassy compiled a one-year snapshot of
the time and staffing needed to prepare reports required by
headquarters or by Congress. The following table was submitted
by Embassy Maputo to illustrate its workload in preparing such
reports. The post in Mozambique has a 308-person staff,
including 242 employees hired locally, and is considered a
medium-size embassy. According to the embassy, the reports
require staff to collect and analyze a broad range of
information on a number of different topics from a variety of
different country sources. The reports vary in size. Several
are hundreds of pages and one exceeded a thousand pages. Report
preparation obviously reduces time available for such other
embassy activities as staff interaction with host country
nationals, U.S. development partners, and other international
donors. The table illustrates at least one reason why
additional reporting requirements are resisted at post.
Reporting Requirements and Associated Staff/Workload
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Staff Number of Work Days
Type of Report Involved to Complete Report
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (EMBASSY-WIDE)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission Strategic Plan...... 15 12
Operational Plan-- 15 55
Performance Report.........
Operational Plan--Fiscal 15 65
Year Planning..............
========================================================================
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL SECTION)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human Rights Report......... 5 20
Trafficking in Persons 5 15
Report.....................
International Religious 5 7
Freedom Report.............
Worst Forms of Child Labor 5 7
Report.....................
International Narcotics 5 7
Strategy Report............
International Narcotics 5 7
Strategy Report II.........
Country Commercial Guide.... 5 12
AGOA Eligibility Report..... 5 5
527 Report (Investment 5 2
Disputes Report)...........
AGOA--President's Report.... 5 3
Investment Climate Statement 5 4
USITC Information Requests/ 5 1-2
sector reports (various)...
957 Report.................. 5 1
========================================================================
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (MANAGEMENT/ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chief of Mission Statement.. 5 2
Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) 20 14
(Administrative Section
time/resources)............
Input into Other Post 5 6
Strategic Plans (Foreign
Assistance Plan,
Operational Plan, Country
Operational Plan, Mission
Operation Plan for other
Foreign Assistance)........
Post Report................. 2 2
Staffing Pattern Report..... 1 2
Post Profile................ 1 2
Education Allowance Report.. 1 0.5
Overseas Childcare Report... 1 10
Family Member Employment 1 10
Report.....................
Office of Overseas School 1 10
Summary Information Report.
CLO Activity Report......... 1 2
Retail Price Schedule....... 1 5
Cost of Living Allowance 2 20
Survey.....................
Inventory Report of 1 ongoing
Expendable and Non-
Expendable Supplies........
Real Estate Report.......... 1 ongoing
Vehicle Report.............. 1 5
Prompt Pay Act Reporting & 3 2
Certification..............
Certification of 5 3
Unliquidated Obligations...
Procurement Activities 1 ongoing
Reporting..................
Right-sizing Reports........ 10 6
Monthly Medical Statistics 1 1
Reports....................
Monthly Medical Utilization 1 0.5
Review.....................
========================================================================
USAID
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational Plan-- 38 55
Performance Report (USAID
time/resources)............
Operational Plan--Fiscal 38 65
Year Planning (USAID time/
resources).................
Performance and 11 10
Accountability Report......
Environmental Compliance 5 4
Report.....................
Disability Report........... 2 3
Global Development Alliances 8 2
Report.....................
Initiative to End Hunger for 11 15
African Report.............
Evaluation List Report...... 5 3
Closeout Report............. 15 25
Congressional Budget 38 20
Justification..............
Congressional Notification.. 5 8
Earmark Reports............. 38 15
PEPFAR--Country Operational 55 65
Plan (USAID time/resources)
PEPFAR--Annual Report (USAID 55 35
time/resources)............
PMI (Malaria Operational 7 25
Plan) (USAID time/
resources).................
Micro-enterprise Report..... 5 10
Mission Strategic Plan 15 12
(USAID time/resources).....
PL 480 Reporting Cable...... 4 10
FMFIA (Mission-wide 45 15
reporting).................
Environment Reporting IEE... 38 30
Program Audit Reporting..... 12 15
Report on Reports 3 2
(individual taskings)......
Global Climate Change 5 3
Reporting..................
Biodiversity Reporting...... 5 3
Water Report for Congress... 2 3
Country Strategic Plan 152 150
(every other year or so)--
Mission Wide...............
Donor Reporting............. 4 15
========================================================================
CDC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
COP Development............. 21 30
Response to Core Team 10 3
comments--COP review.......
Reprogramming COP (due to CR 5 15
for 2007)..................
Plus-ups (OGAC)............. 21 10
Reprogramming (OGAC and 13 5
headquarters)--each time...
Reprogramming/Carryover (CDC 17 5
or MOH)....................
SAPR (Semi-Annual Report)... 10 15
APR (Annual Report)......... 10 15
========================================================================
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressional Report on 1 2
International Military
Training (CRIMT)...........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USG Agencies Operating in Mozambique:
Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Center for Disease Control,
U.S. Trade and Development Agency, Department of Labor,
U.S. Trade Representative, Department of Commerce,
OPIC, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Ex-Im Bank,
Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture, Peace
Corps, Department of Interior.
Appendix V
----------
Operational Plan Program Matrix
The Standardized Program Structure table below is used in
each embassy's OP to demonstrate how foreign assistance is
being distributed in the host country. Only State and USAID
funding is included in the OP. MCC, PEPFAR, DOD foreign
assistance, and U.S. domestic agency foreign aid activities are
not included.
PEACE AND SECURITY A1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Area Program Elements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Counter Terrorism A01 1.1 Deny Terrorist Sponsorship,
Support and Sanctuary--A001
1.2 De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology--
A002
1.3 Governments' Capabilities--A003
1.4 Program Support--A004
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combating Weapons of Mass 2.1 Control WMD Proliferation and
Destruction (WMD) A02 Combat WMD Terrorism--A005
2.2 Program Support--A006
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stabilization Operations and 3.1 Operations Support--A007
Security Sector Reform A03 3.2 Disarmament, Demobilization &
Reintegration (DDR)--A008
3.3 Destruction and Security of
Conventional Weapons--A009
3.4 Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)--
A010
3.5 Immediate Protection of Civilians
in Conflict--A011
3.6 Defense, Military, and Border
Security Restructuring, Reform and
Operations--A012
3.7 Law Enforcement Restructuring,
Reform, and Operations--A013
3.8 Program Support--A014
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Counter-Narcotics A04 4.1 Eradication--A015
4.2 Alternative Development and
Alternative Livelihoods--A016
4.3 Interdiction--A017
4.4 Drug Demand Reduction--A018
4.5 Program Support--A019
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transnational Crime A05 5.1 Financial Crimes and Money
Laundering--A020
5.2 Intellectual Property Theft,
Coporate Espionage, and Cyber
Security--A021
5.3 Trafficking-in-Persons and Migrant
Smuggling--A022
5.4 Organized and Gang-related Crime--
A023
5.5 Program Support--A024
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conflict Mitigation and 6.1 Conflict Mitigation--A025
Reconciliation A06 6.2 Peace and Reconciliation
Processes--A026
6.3 Preventive Diplomacy--A027
6.4 Program Support--A028
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
GOVERNING JUSTLY & DEMOCRATICALLY A2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Area Program Elements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule of Law and Human Rights A07 1.1 Constitutions, Laws, and Legal
Systems--A029
1.2 Judicial Independence--A030
1.3 Justice System--A031
1.4 Human Rights--A032
1.5 Program Support--A033
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Good Governance A08 2.1 Legislative Function and
Processes--A034
2.2 Public Sector Executive Function--
A035
2.3 Local Government and
Decentralization--A036
2.4 Anti-Corruption Reforms--A037
2.5 Governance of the Security Sector--
A038
2.6 Program Support--A039
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Political Competition and 3.1 Consensus-Building Processes--A040
Consensus-Building A09 3.2 Elections and Political Processes--
A041
3.3 Political Parties--A042
3.4 Program Support--A043
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Civil Society A10 4.1 Civic Particiaption--A044
4.2 Media Freedom and Freedom of
Information--A045
4.3 Program Support--A046
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
INVESTING IN PEOPLE A3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Area Program Elements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Health A11 1.1 HIV/AIDS--A047
1.2 Tuberculosis--A048
1.3 Malaria--A049
1.4 Avian Influenza--A050
1.5 Other Public Health Threats--A051
1.6 Maternal and Child Health--A052
1.7 Family Planning and Reproductive
Health--A053
1.8 Water Supply and Sanitation--A054
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Education A12 2.1 Basic Education--A055
2.2 Higher Education--A056
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social Services and Protection 3.1 Policies, Regulations, and
for Especially Vulnerable Systems--A057
Populations A13 3.2 Social Services--A058
3.3 Social Assistance--A059
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ECONOMIC GROWTH A4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Area Program Elements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Macroeconomic Foundation for 1.1 Fiscal policy--A060
Growth A14 1.2 Monetary policy--A061
1.3 Program Support--A062
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trade & Investment A15 2.1 Trade and Investment Enabling
Environment--A063
2.2 Trade and Investment Capacity--
A064
2.3 Program Support--A065
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial Sector A16 3.1 Financial Sector Enabling
Environment--A066
3.2 Financial Services--A067
3.3 Program Support--A068
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infrastructure A17 4.1 Modern Energy Services--A069
4.2 Communications Services--A070
4.3 Transport Services--A071
4.4 Program Support--A072
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture A18 5.1 Agricultural Enabling Environment--
A073
5.2 Agricultural Sector Productivity--
A074
5.3 Program Support--A075
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Private Sector Competitiveness 6.1 Business Enabling Environment--
A19 A076
6.2 Private Sector Productivity--A077
6.3 Workforce Development--A078
6.4 Program Support--A079
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic Opportunity A20 7.1 Inclusive Financial Markets--A080
7.2 Policy Environment for Micro and
Small Enterprises--A081
7.3 Strengthen Microenterprise
Productivity--A082
7.4 Inclusive Economic Law and
Property Rights--A083
7.5 Program Support--A084
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environment A21 8.1 Natural Resources and
Biodiversity--A085
8.2 Clean Productive Environment--A086
8.3 Program Support--A087
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE A5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Area Program Elements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protection, Assistance and 1.1 Protection and Solutions--A088
Solutions A22 1.2 Assistance & Recovery--A089
1.3 Program Support--A090
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disaster Readiness A23 2.1 Capacity Building, Preparedness,
and Planning--A091
2.2 Mitigation--A092
2.3 Program Support--A093
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Migration Management A24 3.1 Protection and Assistance--A094
3.2 Institutional Support and Capacity-
building--A095
3.3 Program Support--A096
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBTOTAL
========================================================================
Cross-Cutting Management and 6.1 Program Support--A097
Staffing A25
---------------------------------------
Subtotal
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix VI
----------
Acronyms
ACI--Anti-Corruption Initiative
AFRICOM--African Command
AGOA--African Growth and Opportunity Act
AIDS--Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
APR--Annual Program Results
ATPDEA--Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act
ARV--Anti-retrovirals
CAFTA--Central America Free Trade Agreement
CCIF--Combatant Commander Initiative Fund
CDC--Center for Disease Control
CERP--Commanders Emergency Response Program
CLO--Community Liaison Office
COP--Country Operational Plan
COM--Chief of Mission (ambassador)
CR--Continuing Resolution
CRIMT--Congressional Report on International Military
Training
CRS--Congressional Research Service
CSH--Child survival and health account
DA--Development assistance account
DCM--Deputy Chief of Mission
DF--Democracy Fund
DFA--Director of Foreign Assistance
DOD--Department of Defense
DRL--Democracy Human Rights and Labor Bureau, State
Department
EAP--East Asia/Pacific Bureau, State Department
ERMA--Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance
ESF--Economic Support Funds account
EU--European Union
EUCOM--European Combatant Command
EUR/ACE--U.S. Assistance Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia
FMF--Foreign Military Financing
FMFIA--Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act
FSA/SEED--Freedom and Support Act/Support for Eastern
European Democracy
GHAI--Global HIV/AIDS Initiative
GDP--Gross Domestic Product
GNP--Gross National Product
GWOT--Global War on Terrorism
HCA--Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HHS--Health and Human Services Department
HIPC--Highly Indebted Poor Country
HIV--Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDFA--International Disaster and Famine Assistance
ILEA--International Law Enforcement Agency
IMET--International Military Education and Training
INCLE--International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
MCA--Millennium Challenge Account
MCC--Millennium Challenge Corporation
MEPI--Middle East Partnership Initiative
MOH--Ministry of Health
MRA--Migration and Refugee Assistance
MSP--Mission Strategic Plan
NADR--Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and
Related Programs
NATO--North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO--Non-Governmental Organization
ODA--Official Development Assistance
OGAC--Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator
OP--Operational Plan
OPIC--Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSCE--Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OVC--Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PEPFAR--President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PFP--Partnership for Peace
PKO--Peacekeeping Operations
PL 480--Food for Peace
PMI--President's Malaria Initiative
PRT--Provincial Reconstruction Team
SAPR--Semi-Annual Program Results
SFRC--Senate Foreign Relations Committee
TB--Tuberculosis
TI--Transition Initiative
UN--United Nations
UNDP--United Nations Development Program
UNICEF--United Nations International Children's Emergency
Fund
UNMEE--United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
USITC--United States International Trade Commission
USAID--United States Agency for International Development
WMD--Weapons of Mass Destruction