[Senate Prints 110-20]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                         S. Prt. 110-20
 
                       EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE
                   SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
                 TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE
                    SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
                          (HISTORICAL SERIES)
=======================================================================

                               VOLUME XIX

                               __________

                           NINETIETH CONGRESS

                             first session

                                  1967


                            MADE PUBLIC 2007

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations




                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

31-436 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2007
------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax:  (202) 512-2250. Mail:  Stop SSOP, 
Washington, DC 20402-0001



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                      90th Congress, First Session

                   J.W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama               CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana              EUGENE J. McCARTHY, Minnesota
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon                  BOURKE HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee               GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio               FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho                  JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri           KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut          CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOSEPH S. CLARK, Pennsylvania        JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
                       Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                     110th Congress, First Session

                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut     RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California            BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida                 GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois               JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey          LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania   JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
                   Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
            Kenneth A. Meyers, Jr., Minority Staff Director

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                      90th Congress, First Session

                 RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi            MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri           STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington         JACK MILLER, Iowa
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina    JOHN G. TOWER, Texas
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada             PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
STEPHEN M. YOUNG, Ohio
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Virginia
                     Charles B. Kirbow, Chief Clerk
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                     110th Congress, First Session

                     CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island              PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   SAXBY M. CHAMBLISS, Georgia
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York     LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK J. PRYOR, Arkansas              ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia                   JOHN CORNYN, Texas
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
                                     MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
                   Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
                  Mike Kostiw, Minority Staff Director

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                  Pages
Preface..........................................................    IX
Future Hearings, January 11......................................     1
The World Situation, January 16..................................    39
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Subcommittees and Hearings Procedures, January 24................   113
Minutes, January 24..............................................   129
Minutes, January 25..............................................   130
Minutes, January 26..............................................   131
The Situation in Indonesia, January 30...........................   133
    Testimony of Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia
Background Briefing on Disarmament Problems, February 3..........   159
    Testimony of Richard Helms, Director of the Central 
      Intelligence Agency
Status of Development of Ballistic and Anti-Ballistic Systems in 
  U.S., and Briefing on Non-Proliferation Treaty, February 6.....   193
    Testimony of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense 
      Research and Engineering; and Hon. William C. Foster, 
      Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Military Assistance to Latin America, February 6.................   217
    Testimony of Gen. Robert Porter, Southern Military Command
Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile Defense 
  Deployment/Limitations on Use of Chemical and Bacteriological 
  Agents in Warfare/Sales of Military Equipment by the United 
  States, February 7.............................................   245
    Testimony of Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and 
      John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
      International Security Affairs
Minutes, February 27.............................................   274
Minutes, February 28.............................................   275
Minutes, February 28.............................................   276
Minutes, March 1.................................................   277
Sales of Military Equipment by United States, March 2............   279
    Testimony of John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of 
      Defense for International Security Affairs
Policy Implications of Armament and Disarmament Problems, March 3   289
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Adrian S. 
      Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament 
      Agency
Minutes, March 6.................................................   311
Minutes, March 13................................................   312
Arms Sales to Iran, March 14.....................................   313
    Testimony of Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
      Defense for International Logistics Negotiations
Minutes, March 16................................................   330
Minutes, March 20................................................   331
Briefing on Africa, March 28.....................................   333
    Testimony of John Palmer II, Assistant Secretary of State for 
      African Affairs
Minutes, March 30................................................   366
Minutes, April 3.................................................   367
Additional Military Assistance to Pakistan, April 5..............   369
    Testimony of William J. Handley, Acting Assistant Secretary 
      of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, April 6.................................................   391
Minutes, April 13................................................   392
Minutes, April 13................................................   393
Minutes, April 14................................................   394
Minutes, April 18................................................   395
Minutes, April 19................................................   396
Minutes, April 20................................................   397
Minutes, April 21................................................   398
Minutes, April 24................................................   399
Minutes, April 25................................................   400
United States Troops in Europe, April 26.........................   401
    Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; and 
      Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of State
Minutes, April 26................................................   414
Briefing on Yemen and Greek Situations, April 28.................   415
    Testimony of Lucious D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State 
      for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, May 2...................................................   442
Minutes, May 2...................................................   443
United States Troops in Europe, May 3............................   445
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Eugene V. 
      Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Minutes, May 4...................................................   457
Discussion of Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, May 5...   459
    Testimony of Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense 
      Intelligence Agency
The Situation in Poland, May 15..................................   471
    Testimony of John A. Gronouski, U.S. Ambassador to Poland
Discussion Regarding the Secretary of State's Testimony, May 16..   505
Minutes, May 16..................................................   520
Minutes, May 16..................................................   521
Briefing on Deployment of Antiballistic Missiles and Non-
  Proliferation Treaty, May 18...................................   523
    Testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control 
      and Disar- mament Agency
United States Foreign Policy With Respect to the Middle East and 
  Vietnam, May 23................................................   539
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 1....................   587
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Robert S. 
      McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, June 5..................................................   624
Minutes, June 5..................................................   625
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 7....................   627
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 8..................................................   657
Briefing on Vietnam, June 8......................................   659
    Testimony of William J. Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Korea
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 8....................   697
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 9....................   705
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 20.................................................   729
Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, June 22...............   731
    Testimony of Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Secretary of State 
      for Politico- Military Affairs
Minutes, June 22.................................................   738
Minutes, June 27.................................................   739
Briefing on Glassboro Talks, June 28.............................   741
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 29.................................................   775
Minutes, July 10.................................................   776
Minutes, July 11.................................................   777
Briefing on the Congo Situation, July 11.........................   779
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, July 12.................................................   825
Minutes, July 13.................................................   826
Minutes, July 25.................................................   827
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, July 26..........................   829
    Testimony of Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, July 27.................................................   854
Minutes, August 1................................................   855
Minutes, August 22...............................................   856
Minutes, September 12............................................   857
Minutes, September 22............................................   858
Minutes, October 2...............................................   859
Minutes, October 6...............................................   860
Minutes, October 10..............................................   861
Minutes, October 11..............................................   862
Minutes, October 23..............................................   863
Minutes, October 23..............................................   864
Minutes, October 31..............................................   865
Minutes, October 31..............................................   866
Minutes, November 1..............................................   867
Minutes, November 2..............................................   868
Need for Open Hearing with Secretary Rusk on U.S. Policy Toward 
  Southeast Asia, November 7.....................................   869
    Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, November 16.............................................   926
Briefing on the Vietnam Situation, November 16...................   927
    Testimony of Elsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to South 
      Vietnam
Minutes, November 17.............................................   972
Motions Regarding Testimony by the Secretary of State, November 
  30.............................................................   973
Minutes, December 7..............................................   991
Minutes, December 8..............................................   992
Minutes, December 12.............................................   993
Briefing on Greece and the Middle East, December 14..............   995
    Testimony of Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State 
      for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Briefing on News Stories on the NLF in Saigon and the U.N., 
  December 14....................................................  1027
    Testimony of Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of 
      State
Minutes, December 15.............................................  1065

                               APPENDICES

A. Committee on Foreign Relations Publication for 1967: Hearings, 
  Committee Prints, Senate Documents and Reports.................  1067
B. Volumes Published to Date in the Historical Series............  1071
                                PREFACE

                              ----------                              

    ``You certainly are getting more than your share of 
crises,'' one senator commiserated with Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk during an executive session of the Foreign Relations 
Committee in 1967. Although national attention necessarily 
focused on the war in Vietnam, where the United States had sent 
a half million troops and spent billions of dollars to fight a 
war that had come to seem endless, foreign policy crises were 
erupting around the world that year at an alarming rate.
    Members of the Foreign Relations Committee displayed 
mounting skepticism about Vietnam, discounting the overly 
optimistic reports they received from the State Department and 
from U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Elsworth Bunker. 
Increasingly, committee members looked toward a negotiated 
settlement as more likely than a military victory in Vietnam. 
Because of such attitudes, the administration of President 
Lyndon B. Johnson kept the committee at arm's length on 
anything related to the war. Secretary Rusk cancelled scheduled 
appearances to testify so often during the year that Senator 
Albert Gore, Sr., complained of seriously impaired 
communications between the committee and the State Department. 
Instead of Vietnam, therefore, the committee devoted its 
hearings to the state of the world, from a coup in Greece to a 
war in the Middle East and a rebellion in the Congo. However, 
members always kept in mind the potential connections between 
the Vietnam war and events occurring elsewhere.
    Committee members worried that America's preoccupation with 
Vietnam could serve as an invitation to troublemaking in Asia, 
Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Committee chairman J. 
William Fulbright cited involvement in Southeast Asia as having 
hindered the United States' response to the ``Six-Day War'' 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. ``I do not hesitate to 
make a decision that the Middle East is far more important to 
the security of this country than Vietnam,'' Senator Fulbright 
lectured Secretary Rusk--who earlier that year had assured the 
committee he did not foresee a war in the Middle East. In his 
own explanation of the world situation, Secretary Rusk insisted 
that the United States was fighting communist aggression where 
it existed, not communism as an ideology in the abstract. He 
wanted to assure the committee that despite the war, the 
Johnson administration sought detente with the Soviet Union, 
but committee members remained dubious. By the year's end, 
Senator Claiborne Pell chided an assistant secretary of state 
that the administration seemed to see everything that happened 
anywhere as ``one vast Communist plot, and that what went on in 
any part of the world had its effect in any other part of the 
world because the strings are all being pulled from one 
place.''
    Through its hearings, the committee also demonstrated 
concern over the ``militarization'' of U.S. foreign policy. 
Subcommittees devoted a great deal of time to examining arms 
sales in the Middle East and in the Indian-Pakistani 
territorial disputes, and followed closely the development of 
anti-ballistic missile systems and the negotiations for nuclear 
non-proliferation. Senator Eugene McCarthy complained that the 
Johnson administration had embraced an arms sales philosophy 
that unless the United States sold arms to other countries it 
would lose its influence over the policies of those countries.
    Vietnam and its larger implications caused committee 
members to ponder the Senate's constitutional responsibilities 
over foreign policy. When President Johnson sent planes to the 
Congo, Senator Fulbright raised the possibility of the 
president sending as many troops as he wanted without 
congressional authorization. ``I do not see that it would be 
entirely inconsistent with Vietnam or any other place,'' the 
chairman said to Secretary Rusk. ``How many did you send to the 
Dominican Republic? You sent 22,000. You could have sent 
100,000 if you wanted. I do not know why you could not sent 
100,000 or 200,000 into the Congo if you thought it 
desirable.'' He added, ``I do not know where you draw the line 
here.'' During another closed committee meeting, Senator 
Fulbright complained to his colleagues: ``I get fed up with 
being told we are committed to something all the time,'' simply 
because the president said the nation is committed. That was 
not what he meant by commitment, Fulbright asserted: ``I think 
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and 
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.''
    Committee members of both parties agreed that a Republican 
Policy Committee report had asked the single pertinent question 
of the year: what is our national interest in Southeast Asia? 
For all their efforts, the committee could never get a 
satisfactory response from the Johnson administration. 
Admitting his mistake in supporting the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution and his assumption that President Johnson had not 
intended to widen the war, Fulbright lamented that the war had 
``grown so gradually that we never have been able quite to get 
the full impact of where we are going.'' That sense of drift 
and helplessness pervades these hearings.
    The selection of transcripts for these volumes represents 
the editor's choice of the material possessing the most 
usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads, 
editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings, 
are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material 
deleted (other than ``off the record'' references for which no 
transcripts were made) has been noted in the appropriate 
places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes 
of those sessions, in chronological sequences. Unpublished 
transcripts and other records of the committee for 1967 are 
deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to 
researchers under the access rules of that agency. Some 
transcripts may require further declassification procedures.
    In accordance with the general policy of the series, 
portions of the volumes were submitted to the Departments of 
State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for 
review and comment.
    The Foreign Relations Committee extends its appreciation to 
the Senate Committee on Armed Services for its cooperation in 
approving the release of those sessions in which its members 
participated.
    This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A. 
Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.
                                       JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.


                            FUTURE HEARINGS

                              ----------                              


                      Wednesday, January 11, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:20 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, 
Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. 
Henderson of the committee staff.
    The Chairman. I think the committee will come to order. We 
have a quorum here.
    Congratulations to everybody and the committee in 
particular. We have a quorum the first morning.


                   reduction of u.s. forces in europe


    Well, gentlemen, the main purpose of this is just to 
discuss a variety of things. One of the letters I suppose we 
ought to take up first is Senator Mansfield's. I have a letter 
here signed yesterday addressed to me about Senate Resolution 
300 which was introduced last summer regarding how a 
substantial reduction in U.S. forces permanently stationed in 
Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our 
resolve or agreement to meet our commitments under the North 
Atlantic Treaty.
    This letter was addressed to me personally, asking if I 
wished to join in its sponsorship, but the reason I bring it up 
here----
    Senator Mundt. Who wrote the letter?
    The Chairman. Mike Mansfield. He introduced the resolution 
last summer.
    The reason I am bringing it up here is not whether I should 
sign it or not but is about its procedure. He proposes, I 
think, to take this up on the floor without any committee 
dealing.
    Now, when this matter was considered before on increasing 
from two to six, we had extensive hearings. This committee and 
Armed Services.
    As a procedural matter it seems to me very bad not to send 
this kind of resolution to some committee because, well from 
your point of view, no Republicans participated. This came out 
of the Democratic Policy Committee. If we start the precedent 
of resolutions going direct to the floor from the Policy 
Committee, it seems to me it is very objectionable.
    What I thought, if the committee thought well of it, was 
for the committee to authorize me to write a letter requesting 
that it be submitted to this committee.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a very 
brief comment that I have prepared on this matter. It is my 
hope that we can confirm the Mansfield resolution relative to 
troop assignment to NATO----
    The Chairman. Speak a little louder. I cannot hear you.
    Senator Morse. It is my hope that we can confirm the 
Mansfield resolution relative to troop assignments to NATO and 
that it will be referred to this committee. Since the committee 
held extensive hearings last year on NATO, additional hearings 
may not be necessary although there have been rather dramatic 
changes in Germany and in German attitudes toward Eastern 
Europe since our hearings. In any case, I think the resolution 
should be referred to this committee and reported out before it 
goes before the Senate.


                      role of the policy committee


    The Party Policy Committee should not become a substitute 
for a standing legislative committee, and I agree with the 
Chairman that I think that a resolution of this importance 
should be submitted to the committee first and not go to the 
floor of the Senate.
    As you know, that has been my position for many years in 
the Senate, that committees should not be by-passed. You always 
have the protection, if it becomes necessary, of sending a 
legislative matter to a committee under instructions and you 
always have the protection of discharging a committee if the 
committee seeks to bury the legislation.
    But I speak respectfully, I think if this is still the 
position of the majority leader, and I am surprised it is, 
because I thought I read in the paper some time ago a statement 
attributed to him that he was not insisting on the matter going 
directly to the floor.
    The Chairman. I make it clear this letter does not insist 
on it. But I thought it was his idea before that it do that, 
and I was anticipating this question and that is why I brought 
it here. He did expect it to be taken up, I think, last summer 
without going to the committee.
    Senator Morse. He did. He made this argument, but I only 
want to say, and I close, that I would support the suggestion 
of the chairman that the letter be sent to the majority leader 
advising that it go to the Foreign Relations Committee to hear 
it.
    In fairness to the Armed Services Committee, I want to say 
it may very well be that it should go to the Foreign Relations 
Committee and then to the Armed Services Committee or possibly 
that we have joint hearings on it, but I do not think that the 
Foreign Relations Committee should give up what I think is its 
right to pass on this resolution because of its clear foreign 
policy import.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with what has 
been said, with what you say and what Senator Morse says.


                      problems with joint hearings


    Personally, I would just like to see it referred to this 
committee with the idea that we could act on it and then refer 
it to the Armed Services Committee, if we felt proper, rather 
than having joint hearings. Those hearings were pretty painful 
proceedings.
    The Chairman. There are too many people.
    Senator Sparkman. Yes, and if it is authorized I will make 
a motion to the effect that the chairman be instructed to 
follow that course.
    The Chairman. Yes, that is in order.
    Is there any further discussion?
    Senator Hickenlooper?


                       military v. foreign policy


    Senator Hickenlooper. I have some reservations on this. 
First, I thoroughly agree that under no circumstances should 
this--if we can prevent it--resolution go directly to the floor 
from a strictly party committee such as the Republican Policy 
Committee or the Democrat Policy Committee, or anything else. I 
think it is a terrible practice.
    Number two, I would like to hear a little bit more 
justification why it should go to this committee rather than 
the Armed Services Committee. I think maybe it should, at least 
we should have something to say about it, but it seems to me 
that the question of the reduction in force in Europe under an 
alliance agreement, and that is what it is over there, that is 
primarily either a professional area or a top executive area 
discussion on national defense.
    Senator Morse. Would you yield, Bourke, on that point?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I just want to have some 
discussion, I am not committed.
    Senator Morse. I only make a one sentence comment. The 
original commitment came from this committee. The original NATO 
commitment was a Foreign Relations Committee matter.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We do not handle the military conduct 
of the war; we may sign a treaty.
    Senator Morse. But there is no question of military under 
this treaty because it is the relationship to foreign policy.
    Senator Sparkman. I think this is wrapped up in foreign 
policy implications.


                           a political matter


    The Chairman. I think so, too. To me this is not a war. 
This is political judgment as to the relationship between 
Western Europe, ourselves, and Russia. The reason for NATO 
really was fear of invasion of Western Europe by Russia and 
this entails, in my view, essentially a political judgment as 
to what those relations are now and whether or not there is 
justification for the continuation of, well, NATO as such, and 
certainly how much you do in pursuance of NATO.
    I would think as between the two this is far more a 
political matter at this stage than it is military.
    Frank was the NATO man last year. What do you say?
    Senator Church. Well, I would agree with that, Mr. 
Chairman, particularly inasmuch as the level of troops to be 
maintained there turns on political considerations fully as 
much as military considerations. In fact, the major arguments 
for retaining so large a force had been based in recent years 
not upon a military assessment, but rather upon the political 
consequences of reductions, particularly West Germany, and of 
course the whole Gaullist attitude toward the disposition of 
American forces is a political one.
    It seems to me that it is all inextricably bound into 
foreign policy considerations.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

                        INTERNAL SENATE POLITICS

    Senator Clark. I would certainly support this motion, but I 
am a little bit concerned about the internal Senate politics of 
this and wondering whether we cannot get off on perhaps a 
little better foot in this session than we have sometimes in 
the past. Whether it would be desirable for the chairman before 
he writes a letter to sit down with Dick Russell and Senator 
Mansfield and see if some amicable arrangement agreeable to all 
three could be worked out.
    Now, Stuart is not here; he wants to come. Maybe I am not 
as good a mind reader as I think I am, but he is on both Armed 
Services and this committee, and I suspect that he would be a 
little bit upset if we were to assert sole jurisdiction.
    John Sparkman will remember that at that meeting of the 
NATO Parliamentarians in Paris in November, which he and I both 
attended, there were a couple of pretty belligerent fellows 
from the House of Representatives who really kind of took the 
point of view that NATO is primarily a military alliance. They 
were not much in favor of any efforts to get a better 
relationship either with de Gaulle--you remember at that 
briefing, John, those fellows gave Chip Bohlen and Cleveland 
such a bad time, and I know that the NATO Parliamentarian group 
is kind of split on the political committee which would rather 
switch than fight and the military committee which wanted to 
relieve tensions. I believe it might be worthwhile to see if we 
cannot work out an arrangement with the Armed Services.
    I agree that joint hearings are kind of rough. There are 
too many people. But maybe some sort of genius can come along 
which would work out a friendly relationship, either refer it 
here first and there second, or get some kind of an agreement 
that a committee of the two committees should sit, just in the 
interests of hoping that the 90th Congress will not get off on 
yackety yack between the Armed Services and the Foreign 
Relations Committees which we are going to have on Vietnam 
anyway.
    The Chairman. That is a good suggestion. I would like to 
work it out, and I do not think you meant to be exclusive.
    Senator Morse. Not at all. I made the point maybe we ought 
to have joint meetings.
    The Chairman. I would object because they are unwieldy and 
difficult to conduct when you have got that many people. And I 
would think it would be better to have it here and then Armed 
Services.
    What do you think about that? I think Joe has a point.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it is a good idea.
    The Chairman. I do not want to have a row and have a 
contest right off the bat. Do you think it would just be better 
I talk to Mike Mansfield about it? But I would like to be able 
to say the committee feels it ought to come here.
    Is there anybody who does not feel that way?

                         ADVISE THE LEADERSHIP

    Senator Morse. I think, Mr. Chairman, that you ought to 
talk to Mike and also talk to Everett Dirksen and probably the 
two of them together. I am sure they do not agree but 
nevertheless I think that it is important that the minority 
leader be advised, too.
    Senator Clark. Do you not think you ought to talk to Dick, 
too?
    Senator Morse. I think that was agreed.
    The Chairman. How do you feel about that? I do not want to 
say. Do you feel they ought to come here?

                    USURPATION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES

    Senator Hickenlooper. I feel we have an interest in it, but 
I feel that probably 60 percent of the interest is in the Armed 
Services Committee or should be, and I go a step further. We 
have noticed in the last year or two or three the usurpation of 
certain fields of activity that ought to be in the Foreign 
Relations Committee taken up by other committees, and we get 
our tail over the dashboard a little bit on that. I guess there 
is not much we can do about that. But we can, of course--this 
may be the committee's area of responsibility, but we are 
getting into other fields, I suppose. I just feel that 40 
percent of it is probably here and 60 percent belongs to Armed 
Services Committee. I think both committees ought to take a 
look at it, but not with a joint meeting. I agree it is almost 
impossible to get any satisfactory results.

                        CREATE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES

    Senator Morse. It is possible, Mr. Chairman, to have one of 
Joe's suggestions where you can have two subcommittees or a 
subcommittee of each of the two committees hold the hearings 
and report to their full committee.
    The Chairman. That is a possibility. What does the 
committee think about that?
    Senator Clark. Why do you not explore it with Mike and 
Dick?
    The Chairman. I will be glad to explore it. I wanted an 
expression of how you feel about it. Do you all, Karl, do you 
think we have an interest?
    Senator Mundt. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think in this 
particular instance we have a better claim to jurisdiction than 
the Armed Services Committee.
    The Chairman. That is what I wondered.
    Senator Mundt. What Frank says is exactly right. It is the 
political implications we are going to listen to mostly. They 
are not going to talk about the fear of an immediate invasion 
from Russia. If there have been any military affairs 
implications it must be connected with the war in Vietnam in 
some way, about the deployment of troops. But I do not want to 
get into a quarrel with the other group either.
    I would think we could pass some kind of a resolution 
saying that the Foreign Relations Committee feels that there 
should be hearings, whether we want to have participation or 
something, and I do not know how far we have to go in 
nursemaiding the Armed Services Committee on these matters.
    It is perfectly all right to consult, but I think you would 
be fortified if you went there and said, ``We are going to have 
them. We didn't want to have a quarrel. Do you want to have 
subcommittees, joint committees?''
    Do you want them to come in tandem or how, but I definitely 
feel we ought to have a hearing.
    Senator Carlson. I agree with the chairman on it.
    Senator Aiken. We ought to look it over. The military 
aspect, as Karl says, will probably relate to deployment of 
troops that might be taken out there.
    The Chairman. It is just more what you do with the troops, 
whether or not you go here or over to Vietnam. That is a matter 
which is military.
    Senator Aiken. We have a political and economic situation 
involved.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I think this idea of having 
two subcommittees could work, but I think it would be 
preferable to have it before the full Foreign Relations 
Committee, although that could be explored.
    The Chairman. Well, then, if I understand it correctly I 
will take it up and talk to the majority leader about it, and I 
assume we will probably then talk either with him or separately 
with Dick Russell and the Republican leader.
    Well, that disposes of that.

                      TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY RUSK

    I think you have already had notice that the Secretary, 
Secretary Rusk, has agreed to come in executive session on 
January 16 and in open session on January 23. He called me and 
asked, requested, that our hearings not go longer than a full 
morning, that is when it is in open, because of the strain and 
the lights and so on. He is assuming there will be television--
I do not know whether there will or not. I guess there will; 
there usually is when he appears. And I said that I thought 
that was a reasonable request. He said he would rather, because 
of the strain and the lights. So I said we would agree to have 
it run one day up until 1 o'clock, say.
    Mr. Marcy brings up a question that is always a difficult 
one. He says that Senator Symington cannot come on the 16th. He 
wishes it to go on the 17th, and this creates a problem that if 
we wanted to run over in executive session--what I said about 
going in the afternoon applies only to open session with lights 
and all that. It does not apply to executive session. He would 
not be free on the afternoon of the 17th.
    Senator Pell. Excuse me, I would like to bring up a point 
here, too, if I can.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Pell. And that is I realize it is a good idea for a 
few people questioning because it goes through with greater 
ease, but when meetings are scheduled for Monday morning at 10, 
it is very difficult sometimes for those of us who, if we have 
a speaking engagement--I may be in the minority on this, I do 
not know if anybody else shares the same view, and as a matter 
of routine when we have the choice and initiative, could not 
meetings be scheduled for Tuesday mornings and not Monday 
mornings?
    The Chairman. Well, Tuesdays are our regular meetings for 
the conduct of our regular business such as I have got--I have 
got several other items I am coming to; for example, the 
consular agreement mentioned last night. Katzenbach came and 
said he wanted us to take it up, and we have hearings. If you 
mean we will not just utilize Monday, it is going to make it 
very difficult. That means Friday, too.
    Senator Pell. Fridays it does not mean because people do 
shove off, they shove off in the afternoon but maybe I am the 
only one, in which case I withdraw my point, but----
    The Chairman. I would like to accommodate the members. How 
do you members, all of you, feel about Monday? We are going to 
have an awful heavy schedule because there are a number of 
things I am going to mention in a minute.
    Senator Mundt. I would rather have Monday than Friday.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We have other meetings and it could 
be Tuesday.
    Senator Aiken. Get it over with.
    Senator Pell. I am in a minority so I withdraw.
    The Chairman. You do not live far away so you cannot get 
back on Monday.
    Senator Pell. I made two speaking engagements that day.
    The Chairman. You do not speak on Sunday, do you?
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Pell. So I am in the same condition on the 23rd 
where I probably will not be able to be here.
    The Chairman. Well, you know, as big a committee as this 
is, there is going to be somebody, I think, nearly every day, 
and we just almost have to proceed in some way.
    Senator Pell. Yes.
    The Chairman. With that understanding, the executive is on 
the 16th and open on the 23rd.

                         SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE

    By the way, did the Steering Committee take action on the 
size of the committee?
    Senator Clark. Yes; this has to still be off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                    APPEARANCE BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA

    The Chairman. McNamara, we have contacted McNamara. His 
position is simply that he would like to appear before Armed 
Services before this committee, and I wrote to Russell and he 
feels that way. So he will appear there first and the date has 
not been set, has it, Marcy, you have not heard any further 
about it?
    Mr. Marcy. No, sir.
    The Chairman. It is not that he does not want to come, but 
simply he would like to appear in public before that committee 
and then we will have him as it is agreeable after that.
    I mentioned the consular agreement. The President, as you 
know, mentioned it last night. Katzenbach has already----
    Senator Hickenlooper. He mentioned so much last night I 
must have missed that.
    The Chairman. It was buried down----
    Senator Sparkman. With east and west trade.
    The Chairman. But Katzenbach came up and said they are 
anxious to proceed with it.
    The question is what do you think about hearings? We have 
had some hearings. It is my understanding that--in fact, I have 
some letters here, limited to official use, from Douglas 
MacArthur referring to Mr. Hoover's attitude toward this, and I 
understand Mr. Hoover feels that his former testimony may have 
been--I do not know whether you would say distorted a bit. He 
is not adamant against this at all. If I understand it 
correctly he simply made the observation that it would entail 
additional surveillance, I guess you would say. But he is not 
of the view that it should not be done is the way I understand 
it. You can look at it if you like.

                   MISINFORMATION ON CONSULAR TREATY

    Senator Carlson. I want to say on this consular treaty, our 
people may be getting misinformed. I am getting a lot of mail 
and we ought to have some additional hearings.
    The Chairman. The Liberty Lobby has mounted a strong 
campaign against it, relying I think primarily on the former 
testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.
    Senator Carlson. If we have a hearing, it may clear up some 
of this.
    The Chairman. I think we should, too. Does everybody 
believe that?
    Senator Sparkman. I do.
    The Chairman. Any objection?
    Senator Clark. If I may make one very brief comment, when I 
was in Russia in November and before I went, when I talked with 
Dobrynin\1\ in a briefing, the Russians really could not care 
less about this consular treaty because they think it is so 
much more to our advantage than it is to theirs, with which I 
agree, that they are not pushing particularly hard. I think it 
is very much to our advantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Chairman. I do, too. I think it is to our advantage.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it would ease a lot of pain if 
you could get a modification of Hoover's statement because it 
has been----
    Senator Dodd. Is this on the troop commitment to Western 
Europe?
    The Chairman. We have discussed that. We wanted to bring it 
up after you got here. We discussed that at some length.

                     SENSE OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I almost mentioned in the 
caucus yesterday but I did not, the Democratic caucus, that I 
am fairly certain that it was the sense of the majority, if not 
all of the members of the Policy Committee, that this should be 
referred to a joint committee of the Armed Services and Foreign 
Relations Committee, and when the majority leader did not bring 
it up, I mentioned it to somebody who was sitting there, who 
was on the Policy Committee, and he said he understood 
Mansfield was going to take it up with you as to what would be 
the preference. But I know that my feeling, as the only member 
of both committees, was that it should go before a joint 
committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations.
    It is clear that it involves both committees very 
fundamentally and very definitely, and in their mission, you 
might say, so I hope it would be agreeable to this committee.
    The Chairman. We have just discussed it. It is agreeable, I 
mean in the sense of jurisdiction. There was quite a strong 
sentiment if you got both full committees together it is 
unwieldy. We suggested that it either go to the committees 
successively, one and then the other, or a joint subcommittee 
so you do not have so many people at one time where it is 
unsatisfactory.
    Senator Symington. I only wanted to report to you the way 
it was left in the Policy Committee.
    The Chairman. What would you think of it going to this 
committee first and then that committee?
    Senator Symington. I think that would be wrong. I would 
rather see a joint subcommittee.
    The Chairman. You would rather have a joint subcommittee.
    Senator Symington. Yes, because there is so much work 
involved.
    The Chairman. Take eight or ten of this committee and join 
with them together.
    Senator Symington. That is right; this committee has a 
tremendous amount of work and we have this draft law, as well 
as appropriations and authorizations. There was some 
resistance, I think it is fair to say, to doing it at all 
because of the amount of work involved. This time I think we 
ought to either fish or cut bait, because of these tremendous 
expenses abroad. They are absolutely incredible under the 
circumstances in the amount of money they are asking for in the 
Far East and the amount of bodies they are asking for.

                        A PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER

    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, may I say--Tom and Stu were 
not here--I would much prefer the joint subcommittee to going 
to one committee or the other first because, let us face it, 
there is a psychological barrier there, people being what they 
are, and if it comes here first, people on the Armed Services 
Committee, some, will psychologically be disturbed. If it is 
the other way, there will be some here. I think a joint 
subcommittee would be much better than going to one committee 
first and then the other. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that 
having a joint hearing of the two full committees is very 
unwieldy. I do not think it is necessary
    After all, each full committee will take it up on the basis 
of the report of their subcommittee.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, can I put in a plug, in 
passing, for a more frequent use of subcommittees, either ad 
hoc or the standing subcommittees, in order to expedite our 
work?
    The Chairman. Mr. Marcy and I have been talking about that 
and we will talk about it further, I mean with the committee. I 
think you are right, we ought to use that more. If I understand 
it and everybody is agreeable to the Senator from Missouri's 
suggestion preferring the joint subcommittee meeting.
    Senator Morse. On Joe's subcommittee comment, I would like 
to say that later in the morning I have on my agenda to raise 
with the committee a subcommittee matter. I will cover it then, 
and I quite agree with Joe.

                RESCHEDULING SECRETARY RUSK'S TESTIMONY

    Senator Symington. Can I bring up something you passed on? 
I have a very important engagement next Sunday, almost as 
important as the U.N. organization in 1945, when the Kansas 
City Chiefs are going to show the National Football League they 
have got the thing sewed up as much as they think they have. 
With that premise, I was hoping that perhaps Secretary Rusk 
could come on Tuesday. I talked to Carl about it and I talked 
to the Secretary about it, because it is impossible for me to 
get back here in time in the morning. I just thought, I would 
hope, that you could because there is no way I can get back at 
10 o'clock on Monday morning. I could get back in the 
afternoon, but I would hope--the Secretary said it would be all 
right with him if it would be all right with you. He did on the 
17th. I spoke to him and he spoke to Carl, and I asked Carl to 
speak to you.
    Senator Pell. I subscribe, for the reason I already said, 
to what Stuart said. Monday morning at 10 is very difficult. 
Friday mornings at 10 we are around. But Monday morning is very 
difficult.
    Senator Symington. I am going to try to hold all my 
engagements to weekends the way this thing happened last year, 
but this makes Monday morning difficult.
    Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me any member of 
this committee who cannot be here Monday morning can afford to 
buy a Sunday paper and learn everything that we will be told 
Monday morning.
    Senator Sparkman. Did you see Bart Starr's picture, you 
know, big color?
    Senator Symington. I would like to ask this question. If it 
is going to be a question that he could come back in the 
afternoon on Monday but he could not do it on Tuesday, then if 
I can get here in time for Monday afternoon, could we have an 
agreement that he will be back Monday afternoon?
    The Chairman. Oh, sure.
    Senator Symington. I withdraw my objections.
    The Chairman. That was one of the main reasons we preferred 
Monday was the fact he could be here in the afternoon because 
it is likely we would not get through with him in any case.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I be the devil's 
advocate for just a moment?
    The Chairman. Yes.

        SENATORS ACCOMMODATING THEMSELVES TO COMMITTEE SCHEDULE

    Senator Morse. I am very fond of the Senator from Missouri, 
as he knows. I am talking now of any relationships to any 
requests that have been made. It is my opinion that the 
efficiency of this committee was greatly interfered with last 
year because of the generosity of our chairman in trying to 
accommodate the personal requests of members of the committee. 
I think this is the time for us to adopt a procedure policy at 
the beginning of the session as follows: Namely, that although 
we would like to have people at our meetings that cannot be 
there, we have just got to accommodate ourselves to the 
committee schedule, and, if we cannot be there, we cannot be 
there. But I do not see, Mr. Chairman, how you can run this 
committee if you never knew whether or not a date you have set 
is one that you are going to be able to carry out.
    I would like to suggest that as a matter of policy, we 
decide this morning that if we cannot be at the meetings, that 
if just too bad, but we are going to have to accommodate 
ourselves to the schedule.
    Senator Symington. There is one point about that if the 
Senator will bear with me, because a great many of this 
committee are members of the Finance Committee on both sides of 
the aisle, which I am not, and I find there is a great deal of 
adjustment of the dates on the Finance and Foreign Relations 
Committees. Inasmuch as I am the sole member on Armed Services, 
I hope my beloved friend from the State of Oregon will not 
object to working it out. Even when I am here, I get badly 
stuck between two----
    Senator Morse. You missed my point. My point is that the 
chairman has got to work out what should be our schedule of 
hearings. He has to do it with other committees and find out 
what our membership and conflict is with other committees. But 
my point is he has to work out a schedule and we have to follow 
the schedule.
    Every time you get an exception, may I say, for X or Y on 
this committee, you inconvenience A and B. They may not say 
anything, but every time you change it A and B are discommoded 
and I think we have to have a schedule to follow.

                    CONFLICTS WITH OTHER COMMITTEES

    The Chairman. May I say I talked to Marcy at length about 
this. One reason for Monday is that it is one of the days where 
practically no other committees meet and we thought--Tuesday is 
a favorite day for all committees, and you run these conflicts 
you are talking about, membership in other meetings.
    Take Senator Gore. He is a very high ranking man on 
Finance. He likes to be there, and I like to have him there 
because I cannot go to it. They always meet on Tuesday, is that 
not correct, practically always, on other days. Mondays was one 
of the reasons why it looks inconvenient from your point of 
view. It is free from those other conflicts more than most days 
of the week.
    Senator Pell. The only question that comes to my mind is 
the planning ahead. Sometimes you want to make one day in your 
home area; should it be a weekday, should it be a Monday, or 
should it be a Friday? We have to weigh these things. As a rule 
I thought--I have always got the feeling that Monday was 
probably the better day to choose as opposed to Friday. Monday 
morning, as happens in Senator Symington's case, is the 
earliest to get back.
    The Chairman. He is only going to be out there once. He 
will be very disillusioned about that.
    Senator Pell. Friday, on the other hand, people may leave 
but they always leave in the afternoon.
    Senator Morse. We have to cancel some meetings. I canceled 
a meeting up in George Aiken's state. I was supposed to lecture 
up there in the university. I notified them I could not do it 
and I canceled it.
    The Chairman. I would like to do the best I can with the 
committee. I need guidance. We thought this was an idea. I will 
do anything that the consensus believes in.
    Senator Carlson. I just want to say this. I want the 
chairman to set the meetings. I am going to have to miss some. 
But I do not want anything to interfere with this meeting next 
Sunday in San Francisco. I want the Senator from Missouri to be 
there and bring back the bacon.

                     PROBLEMS TRAVELING TO THE WEST

    Senator Mundt. I think what Wayne said makes a lot of 
sense. I would like to add one little codicil. If you will 
follow the practice of what you have done here of giving us a 
little advance notice, like a week, we can adjust to your 
schedule. I agree you cannot change your schedule for an 
individual member without interfering with some other member. 
We have an altogether different problem out West from what Clay 
has. He cannot be back Monday morning. I cannot get back home 
unless I leave Friday morning, so it varies. Set it and give us 
a week or so notice and we will adjust, like Wayne canceled a 
meeting.
    The Chairman. I am certainly open to suggestions, and Mr. 
Marcy has been around here a long time. He sort of thought 
Mondays and Tuesdays--Tuesdays are our regular days and Monday 
would fit in as well as any day with anybody. But I do not want 
to be arbitrary about it. As far as I am concerned, it is about 
half dozen of one and six of the other.
    Senator Symington. One more point I have following Karl's 
point, too. If we do try to go out on weekends, which is what I 
am going to do this year, then I respectfully say because of 
the problem of getting back from your state and my state that 
Tuesday and Wednesday would be better than Monday and Tuesday. 
If you come back Sunday, you fly all day Sunday night which 
cripples you a little bit and you can get back sometime Monday, 
and then Tuesday and Wednesday it gives you a chance to get out 
Friday. It takes you a little longer than it does me.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are you establishing a Tuesday to 
Thursday club?
    Senator Symington. Thursday is Armed Services.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    The Chairman. I will talk to Mr. Marcy further. Personally, 
it does not make much difference to me. I am perfectly 
agreeable to any way. I would just like to accommodate as many 
as possible and get as many people here. We did pretty well 
last year.

                            THE SPACE TREATY

    Let me go over a few other things. The space treaty is one 
which we anticipate will be signed this month and they will, I 
know, they have already mentioned it, want it acted on quickly 
because of their--they think it is psychologically important. 
Katzenbach has mentioned it, and so that is another matter 
which I am sure we will have hearings on. This is what I meant 
a moment ago. We are going to have to utilize more than Monday 
and Tuesday. This is just starting with Rusk. I think we are 
going to be Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday very likely when you 
get into these other matters that I mentioned.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                          HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

    The Chairman. Then we have a few other things. These things 
bother me, no end. I wonder what you all think or should we 
just forget about them. I get these letters all the time. They 
come here you know, there are--I mean on the human rights 
things, what do you all think about those? Should we forget 
them or should we act on them? You have been to the U.N.--by 
the way, I think we ought to have a time set aside--I want to 
hear what the Senator from Idaho has to say about his 
experience in the U.N. But this is a matter particularly 
relating to the U.N. What do you think about it?
    Senator Church. Of course there is a good deal of feeling 
up there that is adverse to the United States on this matter 
because although we have voted finally for the approval of 
these conventions, we have never ratified any of them. As time 
has passed, more and more comment, adverse comment, has 
developed against us on the ground that we are not really for 
these conventions and the proof of it is that, although we go 
through the motions in the U.N. where they have been approved 
by very large majorities, we have failed to ratify these 
conventions and make them a part--make them binding treaties.
    I have not studied the conventions very carefully, but I 
think with the possibility of certain reservations that may be 
necessary, we could proceed with hearings, obviously secure the 
ratification of some of the conventions without any difficulty.
    Senator Dodd. Is the Genocide Convention one of those?
    Senator Church. Yes, it is one of those. But I think if we 
were to move on any one, perhaps the one that would encounter 
the least difficulty, it would be helpful to us with the U.N. 
We really do not care about these and we know the African and 
Asian countries are quite--they put a lot of store in these 
conventions.
    Senator Sparkman. When you refer to the human rights 
convention, is that an old one or was it passed in the U.N. 
either this or last year?
    Senator Church. This relates, it relates back several 
years.
    The Chairman. It is an old one, the one I had in mind.
    Mr. Marcy. There are three of those that have been up here 
since, in the Kennedy regime--yes, they came July of '63. There 
is one on the convention of political rights for women. There 
is another one, the convention concerning the abolition of 
forced labor. There is a third, a supplementary convention on 
the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, an institution of 
practices similar to slavery, and then there is the genocide 
convention, which has been with us since 1949.
    Senator Sparkman. Those three that you mentioned 
specifically though, they are relatively new.
    Mr. Marcy. They are, yes.
    Senator Sparkman. I think they were adopted in that 
preceding session of the General Assembly. The genocide is old, 
and I think there is a human rights with it also, adopted way 
back in '57.

        DIFFICULT FOR OTHER NATIONS TO UNDERSTAND U.S. POSITION

    Senator Church. Just a reading of these, particularly 
reference to slavery and women's rights and that kind of thing, 
it is very difficult for many of these countries to understand 
why the United States with all our talk of democratic rights 
and individual liberties and equality and so forth cannot find 
it possible to ratify conventions against slavery.
    Senator Hickenlooper. One reason they do not understand 
some of those things, they do not understand the American 
system of government. They do not understand these treaties can 
abrogate or replace under certain conditions some of the 
provisions of our Constitution.
    Senator Church. I know.
    Senator Hickenlooper. For one I am not for letting the 
African countries run this country through emotion or 
otherwise. They have been doing it for a little while, and I 
think it is time we stopped letting them be influential on 
these things.
    May I say most of these conventions, I think, can be worked 
out, as Frank said, and made satisfactory.
    Senator Sparkman. I was going to ask if we should act 
favorably on these last three, and I understand or from what I 
have heard about them, they are more or less--they are more or 
less unobjectionable. Would that ease your situation?
    Senator Church. John, I think anything that would break the 
ice to show that we are prepared to follow through, and we will 
hold hearings, and I think ratification of one or two of these 
would be extremely helpful to the United States.
    Senator Sparkman. I think a couple of them could be done, 
maybe three of them if I heard correctly about them. But so far 
as the old human rights and the genocide, those old ones, there 
are about three of them are there not, two or three, I just do 
not believe there is any chance.
    Senator Church. Forget the old ones and take the three most 
recent ones.
    Senator Church. We have some constitutional problems, as 
Bourke said, and we have to look at them. But there is a 
possibility of ratification of some of them.

           THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

    Senator Pell. I would like to also, Mr. Chairman, having 
had some contact with the U.N., put in a strong plug of support 
for Frank's view, and I would like to particularly hope we 
would not put out a hand on considering the genocide convention 
because I think it is the most important one in the whole 
crowd. I think the genocide convention is as important as it 
was when it was considered in the late forties, and I would 
hope very much indeed we would consider it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Have you studied what it will do to 
the Federal Constitution?
    Senator Pell. I studied it, I read it, and I realize the 
problems.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is what has been holding it up 
all these years.
    Senator Pell. I am well aware of it.

                         SUBCOMMITTEE SITUATION

    Senator Morse. I think here is the place where you could 
assign to a subcommittee the consideration of this matter to 
report to the full committee, for example, under the direction 
of Senator Church. Let us face it, you cannot begin to handle 
all the things that are going to come before this full 
committee, if the full committee retains jurisdiction over all 
of them. I think this is as good a place as any for me to renew 
my proposal of last year that the full committee should approve 
and authorize a program of activity for its subcommittees. The 
Mansfield resolution, the Vietnam hearings, the outer space 
treaty are items that will occupy the full committee, along 
with others. The final report of the Committee on the 
Reorganization of Congress shows this committee held far more 
full committee hearings in the 88th Congress than any other 
Senate committee. We held 196. The next high number was the 
Commerce Committee with 127. But Foreign Relations had only 33 
subcommittee meetings in the 88th Congress whereas Commerce had 
116.
    The full committee will have a heavy schedule of major 
business in 1967. But I do not think our activity should be 
limited to what the full committee can handle.
    The arms races in Latin America and the Middle East are 
possibilities for such a subcommittee. So is a full review of 
the Alliance for Progress and many other items that could be 
handled either under existing subcommittees, or special ad hoc 
committees.
    Mr. Chairman, let us face it with the kind of a setup we 
have in this committee for your subcommittees, they are going 
to be appendages, in my judgment, with very little 
effectiveness. I speak most respectfully because of my high 
regard for our staff, but this staff cannot handle full 
committee business and subcommittee business.
    This committee has, in my judgment, unlike most committees 
in the Senate, never sought to get the financial support, the 
staff support, that a Foreign Relations Committee ought to 
have. I renew my suggestion that you take these subcommittees, 
you recognize that their staffs be enlarged, that they be given 
staff, under the supervision of the chairman and the 
professional director of the staff, Mr. Marcy.

                      LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE

    But let me as a special pleader tell you about my problem 
in the Latin American subcommittee. I cannot possibly carry on 
what needs to be done on the Latin American subcommittee if I 
am going to have to rely on the existing staff. Carl Marcy and 
Pat Holt and Lowenstein and the rest of them cannot possibly 
give to me the professional assistance that I need to conduct 
the kind of hearings that ought to be conducted on Latin 
America. Alliance for Progress ought to be gone into.
    I want to say that I have already had two conferences with 
Assistant Secretary Sol Linowitz, who by the way, has made a 
tremendously favorable impression on me. He talked to me before 
the President sent him to Latin America. He talked to me after 
he came back. I want to have an early meeting of the 
subcommittee in the late afternoon in which I would invite the 
full committee, to which I would always invite the full 
committee if I am given jurisdiction to conduct some of these 
things, and have him brief us. I think he is terrific in his 
understanding already of Latin American policy.
    But I want to say, Mr. Chairman, we are just kidding 
ourselves if you think that these subcommittees of this 
committee are more than facades. We have no real jurisdiction. 
We have no staff, we have no financial resources, and I would 
propose a complete reorganization of the subcommittee setup, 
under the control of the Chairman, but with authority for us to 
go ahead and conduct the studies that the full committee will 
never get around to conducting.
    I think what is needed, Mr. Chairman, we cannot do it this 
morning, but you ought to get Carl Marcy and his staff to work 
with some of us on various plans for a reorganization of 
subcommittees. I would like to see not only my committee, but I 
would like to see the NATO committee, I would like to see the 
other subcommittees, start subcommittee hearings this year that 
amount to something.
    Senator Clark. Would you yield for just a second?
    Senator Morse. I am all through. I yield.

                     COMPARISON TO LABOR COMMITTEE

    Senator Clark. I would like you to comment to the chairman 
about the experience you and I both had with the Labor 
Committee where we could not possibly get through the workload.
    Senator Morse. That is probably why it makes me a biased 
witness. We have on the Labor Committee real jurisdiction given 
to the subcommittees. We have our staff, and I think, for 
example, you check them for security, you approve of them on 
this committee, but you give these subcommittees the needed 
staff they need to do this job.
    Let us face it. Marcy and his associates just cannot be of 
service to these subcommittees and be of service to the full 
committee to the degree that we are going to need their service 
unless you are willing to make the fight to enlarge the 
subcommittee staffs with some jurisdiction given to the 
chairman of each subcommittee under your direction, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Sparkman asked to comment. He has to 
go. Did you want to comment on it?
    Senator Sparkman. Well, I merely say this. I have always 
inclined toward as many meetings by the full committee as 
possible for the consideration of matters. But I realize there 
is a lot of truth in what the senator says, particularly with 
reference to the time element and also with this problem that 
we have of getting a quorum present because of conflict with 
other committees.
    But any way we go at it we are going to have our hands 
full.
    Senator Morse. Sure.
    Senator Sparkman. That is all I care to say.
    The Chairman. Senator Gore?

                      THE DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

    Senator Gore. I wanted to raise a question about a 
subcommittee, the Disarmament Subcommittee, of which I happen 
to be the chairman. The most interesting and entreating 
paragraph in the president's speech last night was the one 
which seemed to me to be addressed directly to the Soviet Union 
rather than to us, and that is on the antimissile program. Here 
is a disarmament question per se, and if it would be agreeable 
with the subcommittee, with the full committee, I would propose 
to have some hearings on this. However, it is matter of such 
overweening importance, I would not wish to go into it if the 
full committee wishes to do so. If the full committee can find 
time to do so, fine. But it seems to me here is something of 
mutual interest to the United States and to the Soviet Union, 
the two countries being the only ones with the technological 
competency to create such systems, and yet this has been a 
decision that has been procrastinating now for many, many 
months. How long it can safely be postponed without reaching 
some agreement is a matter, I think, of urgency.
    Of course in my view it would be far preferable that the 
United States and the Soviet Union mutually agree to abstain 
from such a costly and wasteful expenditure, but it is very 
dangerous to this country, in my view, to procrastinate until 
the Soviet Union may suddenly have a fait accompli and we are 
left second.
    So it seems to me this is a subject which either the full 
committee or the subcommittee should examine. I am willing to 
see either done, and I want to submit it to you.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support Albert 
as a member of this subcommittee. I think this is probably the 
most important single foreign policy matter that confronts us 
today, a good deal more important than things that are 
considered to be vital.

                     ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

    If we get ourselves into another escalation of this arms 
race by the placement of antiballistic missiles around Moscow, 
Leningrad, and Washington, and New York, the total cost is 
going to be well over 20 billions of dollars.
    Senator Symington. Eight months of the Vietnamese war.
    Senator Clark. It is absolutely and fully for either 
country to do it, and I think a skillful agreement pushed by 
this committee could get us off the hook because it is not 
outside of the Soviet's interests either.
    The Chairman. That is one thing that pleased me last night 
because he decided two things. From the intelligence community 
it is my best information they do not believe that the Soviets 
are very far along on this ABM at all. The only one that is 
being currently pushed is around Moscow. It has very limited 
possibilities and it is the only one, and I think he is quite 
right in taking a further look. It is my impression that is 
what he has in mind in the meantime, to do the best he can 
diplomatically to try to----
    Senator Gore. I raise no critical comment. I say this is 
just a matter of such overweening importance that either this 
committee or the subcommittee should go into it.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word?

                           THE AMOUNT OF WORK

    First I agree without any reservation of any kind with the 
position taken by the Senator from Oregon. In fact, the Chair 
will remember I presented this to him sometime back.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Symington. Because in my opinion this is the most 
important committee, so long as it does not get subordinated to 
the executive branch, in the Congress of the United States.
    Now knowing Senator Gore, I think it would be a wonderful 
thing if he could really get his teeth into this disarmament 
thing.
    You can do it as well as anybody around, but you have so 
doggone much else to do.
    The Armed Services Committee is a very important committee, 
especially because it authorizes well over 60 percent, I think, 
now of the budget, the United States budget. We could not do 
anything that really meant anything if we did not have some 
major subcommittee like Stennis's Military Preparedness 
Subcommittee and Jackson's Military Construction Committee. The 
Military Preparedness Subcommittee has a complete staff, with a 
great many members, and they are all excellent people.
    Now, everything is done just like when we testified. I used 
to testify from the executive branch to committees. The 
chairman of the committee is always the chairman of any 
subcommittee, if he wants to be there. At times the chairman 
would come in. If Mahon has a meeting and Cannon would come in, 
he immediately would chair the meeting.
    But from your standpoint, your health, the amount of work, 
the way the world is today, I just do not think you can take it 
and at the same time do a good job without impairment to your 
health. I just could not be more serious about this.
    One other point; just before I left, Doug MacArthur came 
down to see me, and he was very upset about the Middle East. 
That is the little subcommittee I happen to be the chairman of, 
and he told me all about it and he said he felt that the 
Israelis made a very serious mistake.

                        VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

    Well, I came back from the Far East last week through the 
Middle East, and putting it mildly, in my opinion, they sure 
did make a serious mistake. I spent a couple of days with Luke 
Battle in Cairo, who is a very bright fellow and seemed to be 
fully up on it, and has an excellent staff and then I went up 
and had a long talk with Hussein in Jordan, who in my opinion 
fully expects to be assassinated. He is our one great friend we 
have out there.
    I talked to Levi Eshkol and I did not pull any punches, and 
I said, ``This is going to hurt you a lot more than anything 
you have done since the state was formed in 1948.''
    I talked to Abba Eban, I talked to General Moshe Dayan who 
is out, the military hero.
    I then stopped to talk in Athens--I spent a good many hours 
with Walworth Barbour, the ambassador to Israel.
    I went to Athens, and I had another break. In Athens is an 
ambassador, a seasoned fellow who was formerly an assistant 
secretary of state. Phil Talbot, our ambassador, and I spent a 
good many hours with him, and he said, ``You see, the story 
going around the Middle East and based on my experience is just 
plain murder,'' he said. ``The Israelis attacked Jordan because 
they knew Jordan was a friend of the U.S., but they did not 
attack Syria or UAR, especially Syria, because they felt they 
were friends of the Soviets,'' and also my impression was very 
definitely that the UAR is moving quietly but definitely into, 
further into, the Soviet bloc.
    Well, these things are the kind of things, just thinking 
out loud, if you could have some hearings on and just to get 
information, because I noticed since I have got back that 
everything that I did in Israel was very well covered by the 
press, pictures in my own home town paper and that kind of 
stuff, whereas there was none of it, you might say, on the Arab 
side.
    I am not choosing up sides. I do think they made a bad 
mistake on this and their arguments are very specious as to why 
they did it. I do think if we have any friend in the Arab 
world, it is Hussein, and I do think he is in very serious 
trouble.
    So these are the kinds of things that if you held some 
hearings, I think you could bring out and get a better grasp 
of.
    Just like I would sure like to see Albert get into this 
disarmament thing and have some hearings about this situation, 
because actually, without violating any security or anything, 
the hearing that you, Bourke, and I went to the other day, I 
was impressed with the fact that the information we got was not 
coordinated or was not the same as the information released 
recently by the Secretary of Defense to the American people on 
that particular subject.
    So you just have a lot of information floating around, and 
if you do not fragment this committee into subcommittees with 
some authority and some staff, always subject to the approval 
of you and the full committee, I just do not think you can do 
the job the way the world is today. End of statement.

                    COMMITTEE'S USE OF SUBCOMMITTEES

    Senator Morse. I would like to have further discussion of 
it at our meetings after the evidence is brought in. I want to 
stress what Stu said in his last statement. My proposal does 
not involve any independence of the subcommittees. My proposal 
involves your approval in your capacity as chairman, and it 
involves the approval of the full committee with regard to the 
subject matters taken up. But once assigned to the 
subcommittee, then the subcommittee will do what it does in 
other committees, it acts for the full committee and reports 
back to the full committee.
    You know I never have hearings without sending each one of 
you a letter inviting you to come to the hearings. I have not 
talked to the staff. I have my information from other sources, 
so I do not think it would be proper for me to involve the 
staff in the inquiries that I have made. But I would like to 
get all sides of it and all the facts.
    I think you will find that of the major committees of the 
Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee is the most 
understaffed. The Foreign Relations Committee in a sense has 
sort of a closed staff, a very small number of people, highly 
qualified. There is no reason why a subcommittee should not be 
authorized to select a subcommittee staff of two or three 
people representing--serving both the majority and the minority 
of the subcommittee as qualified as the people on the full 
committee staff, with an expertise on the work of that 
subcommittee, in the jurisdiction of that subcommittee.

                      SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF

    My question to you is: Why is it that the Foreign Relations 
Committee maintains as small a staff as we maintain when we are 
up against the State Department and the Pentagon building with 
almost unlimited staff to draw on? Why have we kept this staff 
as small as we have kept it in comparison with other staffs? 
Take the Labor Committee. We far exceed this committee, Armed 
Services Committee, Stu has already stated.
    I just want to say part of our problem is we do not have 
the assistance that we need as members of this committee to do 
our job, and I think we ought to change the staff policy of the 
committee.
    The Chairman. Well, I am very glad to hear this discussion. 
What do you think over here on this side about it, Bourke and 
George?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think you run a tremendous danger 
just like other committees have run. I think a lot of these 
committees have run just clear out of the reservation on their 
subcommittees, vast staffs that they have set up, and they 
become autonomous subcommittees practically. I think it is hard 
to justify it except to give a lot of jobs to a lot of people 
and a lot of autonomy to a lot of folks.
    That is just the practical answer. You have asked me and I 
tell you.
    The Chairman. I want to know----
    Senator Symington. Would you feel that way about it if you 
had a Republican President and were chairman of this committee?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I had thought about it during eight 
years of the Eisenhower Administration.
    The Chairman. George, what do you think?
    Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, I try to practice what I 
preach. I find in my own office that if they pushed up a little 
bit to get their work done, they do a whale of a lot better 
work than they do if there are too many people in the office. 
Nobody wants to do it if they have one too many. But if they 
are pushed up they take it and go and do it.

               REPORTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE

    Senator Hickenlooper. What Senator Morse said about his 
Latin American Subcommittee, I have been on that subcommittee. 
I have been on it ever since it was set up. I read every report 
Pat Holt has put in about the investigations of these countries 
in Latin America. I think they are more profound and more 
penetrating than any subcommittee hearing that we could have 
here on that subject.
    Now, I don't mean to say we should not----
    Senator Morse. But those very reports ought to be the basis 
for a thorough and intensive study and investigation of the 
subcommittee.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He is very thorough and his 
observations over the years have been very accurate.
    Senator Morse. With all due respect to Pat Holt, he is no 
substitute for the Senatorial responsibilities of the members.
    Senator Hickenlooper. No.
    Senator Morse. That is what you are going to make it if you 
are going to turn the investigation over to the staff members.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Not until there is reason to think 
the staff member is inaccurate.
    Senator Morse. But the point is he doesn't begin, his 
reports don't begin to cover the type of study I am talking 
about.

                 BACKGROUND ON STAFF AND SUBCOMMITTEES

    Mr. Marcy. Senator, I might just remind the committee on a 
little background on this.
    In 1958, a subcommittee was created, of which Senator 
Sparkman was chairman, to look into the whole staff problem. At 
that time the committee, that is the subcommittee, recommended 
to the full committee, that the present structure continue to 
exist. At that time, it pointed out that the staff had six 
professionals and eight clerical employees. The final 
conclusion, except insofar as the subcommittee recommended the 
addition of one employee to assist in the coordinating 
functions in connection with the visits of distinguished 
foreign visitors, that is Miss [Milrae] Jensen, it did not 
believe that there should be any additions to the staff at the 
present time.
    Now, that was in 1958.
    Senator Clark. Nine years ago. The world has sure changed 
since then.
    The Chairman. May I say, last year we utilized, I thought 
very effectively, five ad hoc subcommittees, assigning certain 
jobs to them, and they did a lot of work and reported a lot of 
bills. The tax conventions, in particular, and claims 
convention, legislation under Senator Sparkman.
    I think we have got to move in some degree in this 
connection. It is a question of how much, in my opinion, and 
also it is not easy to get good qualified staff people. You 
look around here and it is hard to get them, the ones that are 
really qualified for this kind of work like our professional 
staff.
    Senator Pell?

                  BRINGING STAFF TO COMMITTEE MEETINGS

    Senator Pell. There is another problem here along the line 
of what Wayne said, which is that this is the only--it maybe a 
very good idea, I haven't made up my own mind--but this is the 
only committee, I believe, in the Congress where you can't 
bring your own staff people in with you, and so when you have a 
continuing responsibility on a specific subject that you are 
following it leaves you a little scattered, because there is no 
staff man you can talk to.
    The Chairman. Harry Byrd never allowed one of my staff to 
go to the Finance Committee. I don't think they do under any 
circumstances.
    Isn't that right?
    Senator Dodd. We don't in Judiciary.
    The Chairman. It is the custom.
    Senator Dodd. We don't do it in Judiciary.
    The Chairman You do not?
    Senator Dodd. No.
    The Chairman. I don't think it is peculiar at all.
    Senator Pell. I am sorry.
    The Chairman. Senator Dodd?

                  FOCUS ON BIG PROBLEMS AS A TOTALITY

    Senator Dodd. I don't know whether it is improper or not 
but I would like to hear from the staff, what they think about 
this.
    The Chairman. Sure, it is not improper. We have talked 
about this before.
    Go ahead.
    Mr. Marcy. Well, Senator, this, as the members know, comes 
up about every two or three years and it seems always to boil 
itself down to a very fundamental question as to whether the 
committee wants to focus on fairly big kinds of problems as a 
totality, which is the way the committee has generally done, or 
whether it wants to break up into sort of a series of 
subcommittees, each going in sort of a different direction.
    Senator Symington. That is not so.
    Mr. Marcy. I might say that the staff has for some time 
thought that it might be advisable to set up one or two, we 
thought mostly in terms of one, one subcommittee which would be 
kind of a continuing thing with a separate staff. It would be 
assigned to specific kinds of things.
    I think, for example, the problem would be illustrated if 
we tried to hold hearings during the next two months on, say, 
the subject of the Middle East, disarmament and the Alliance 
for Progress. I think they need to be approached in sort of 
separate way.

               AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL

    Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, I am generally in sympathy 
with the position of the Senator form Oregon and the Senator 
from Missouri. I think the experiment of the ad hoc committees 
has been a rather successful one.
    Furthermore, I don't think this committee is getting its 
work done functioning as it has been functioning over the 
years. I think that is quite evident in terms of the things we 
haven't taken up, and in terms of the extravagant amount of 
time we have had to spend on foreign aid and that sort of 
thing.
    So that we are not really penetrating many of these 
questions as thoroughly as we should.
    I think that in light, and this is no reflection on the 
staff, I think this is the finest professional staff that I 
know anything about, but in light of our experience with the ad 
hoc committees, I don't see why we couldn't retain for the full 
committee the most important things that we want to look at as 
a whole committee, and give some of these subcommittees 
assignments of a substantive character. Let them conduct 
hearings; let them bring in their recommendations, and print 
hearings for the full committee to review.
    Senator Morse. Certainly.
    Senator Church. And the full committee has the final say. 
Set it up in such a way that we won't proliferate all over the 
place. Establish the limits and give the chairman of the full 
committee the final say concerning the work of the 
subcommittees which they would take up.
    Senator Morse. That is all I have asked for.
    Senator Church. I mean this is a perfectly reasonable 
request.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?
    The Chairman. Yes.

                    COMMITTEE HAS GAINED IMPORTANCE

    Senator Gore. I think we are picking ourselves to pieces 
here. I think introspection is good, but I would like to call 
attention to one thing. We had a quorum this morning. Two years 
ago the Chairman was complaining nobody ever attended meetings. 
This committee has attained an importance in the last year that 
it hasn't had in a long time. I think hearings before the 
American people not only rehabilitated this committee in its 
importance, but did more than anyone thing has done in a decade 
to restore the co-equal status of the Legislative Branch with 
the Executive. The public hearings we had, whether you agree 
with what was said here or there or disagree, had an impact on 
the American people no other committee of either house of 
Congress has done since I have been a member of the body, which 
has been 28 years now.
    So I think that while we are finding fault with ourselves, 
let us recall that what the committee as a whole did last year 
was the single most important thing that this or any other 
committee, in my opinion, has done in a long time.
    So let us improve through ad hoc, through subcommittees, 
through staff, but let us not forget that the most important 
thing is this committee as a whole, playing its constitutional 
function in the open before the American people.
    Senator Church. I agree with that.

                HAVE A SUBCOMMITTEE HANDLE NATO MATTERS

    The Chairman. Let me say one thing. Last year I was more 
than willing to have a subcommittee handle NATO and we got to 
talking about it and it looked like we were downgrading NATO if 
we don't have a full committee.
    Remember that?
    Should it be a full or subcommittee? I was for it and I 
intended it for it. You went over there and when we got down 
there they put it up to me, ``If you do that, it will look as 
though you are not really interested in NATO,'' so they put the 
pressure on me. I had to do it. That is what happened. I was 
all for it.
    Senator Church. That may have been a subject----
    The Chairman. I mean this is what you often run into. On 
these other things, the things I mentioned, there were five 
subcommittees. No one thought those were so important that it 
had to be full, and they went off very well and you did the 
work well.
    We can do that more. I am perfectly willing to do it. We 
have already talked about this morning a subcommittee to meet 
with Armed Services on these troops in Europe. I am all for it. 
I think it would be a good idea.
    Senator Church. I just wanted to say one thing. I should 
think some of these U.N. conventions, for example, could be 
taken up by a subcommittee.
    The Chairman. I do, too.
    Senator Church. And hearings held and printed hearings 
distributed.
    The Chairman. I do, too. I am all for this.
    I do think if we move in this direction--last year I said 
we will try these ad hoc and see how they work and if they work 
well, we will do more of it.
    I am all for it. I think we do have a couple of more staff 
men, but they are hard to get. The committee did look over a 
lot of them and you would be surprised how difficult it is to 
get good ones.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make two 
points.

                      EXERCISE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION

    First, I would thoroughly agree the committee is not 
getting its work done as expeditiously as it could and I think 
the ad hoc device is an excellent thing, two or three members 
well-informed and then report to the full committee for action. 
So, as Senator Mansfield pointed out to all committee chairmen 
including you, he believes this is a session where we ought to 
exercise our oversight function, and a large part of this 
committee is not legislative but oversight--Vietnam. NATO 
hearings are an example.
    The Chairman. That is an example.
    Senator Clark. You cannot carry on more than one or two of 
those things a year if you are going to have the full committee 
do it, if you, Mr. Chairman, have to be the fellow out there in 
the front all the time.
    Now, it is true, the argument is made and to some extent it 
is downgraded. But I call on my colleague from Oregon to point 
out whenever they have a problem involving education they go to 
the Senator from Oregon and not to the chairman of the 
committee, Senator Hill, who is a wonderful magnificent 
committee chairman I serve under. When they went to go to the 
man on manpower problems, they come to me. But in the course of 
a not too long period of time, you get the press oriented to 
the fact the committee is organized so that most of the 
committee work is done at a subcommittee level.
    When you come to the full committee you have the most 
gracious and able man in the Senate, of course present company 
excepted, but we have to break down so the subcommittees can 
have more status than they have now. It won't be done 
overnight.

                         INACTIVE SUBCOMMITTEES

    I have one more point. I serve on three subcommittees--
Disarmament, Economic Institutions and Tom Dodd's economic aid 
problem. Those subcommittees have been pretty darned inactive 
during the last two years I have been on the committees and why 
have they been inactive--to some extent because the chairmen 
have been too busy, but to a very large extent they have no 
staff to organize witnesses, to handle it.
    I think if you take those three subcommittees, 
International Institutions, Disarmament, and Financial and 
Economic Interests Overseas, one good staff man could start off 
serving those three subcommittees as a start.
    Now, Mr. William Bader has competence in that particular 
area, and if we find that he can't do it by himself with those 
three subcommittees maybe we ought to get more staff.
    I don't have a shadow of a doubt that Wayne Morse has got 
to have at least one man and maybe more to handle this Latin 
American problem because Pat Holt can't do it.

                GIVE FOREIGN AID BILL TO A SUBCOMMITTEE

    The Chairman. Let me make one observation. You know the 
Foreign Aid bill is long with this committee. What percentage 
of those hearings were on foreign aid, you mentioned a great 
number. About 30 or 40 percent. And it has disrupted this 
committee for years. You know how much time it takes.
    Senator Dodd. Couldn't you give that to a subcommittee?
    The Chairman. Well, it has always been considered so 
controversial and so difficult that the full committee handles 
it. I would be perfectly willing to try a subcommittee.
    Does everybody think that could be done with a 
subcommittee?
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, 
first, my remark to Bourke was pretty fresh and I didn't mean 
it that way and I regret saying it that way. I think he knows 
how I feel.
    I want to apologize for that crack. It really wasn't a 
crack.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Then there is no need to apologize 
for it.
    Senator Symington. Well, bless your heart.
    The thing that worries me is, I am not a lawyer and nearly 
everybody else here is, but I used to have a lot of experience 
in management. For a good many years of my life, I went into 
sick businesses and tried to work them out and they are still 
going, if I may make that immodest remark.

                         ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH

    There comes a time when anything you do grows to a point 
where you have to make major basic changes in organization, and 
I say organizational structure along with it, functional 
structure. You have to have an organization, reorganization of 
your chart, and then you have to have a functional 
reorganization. I know that they put a book out, the 
Metropolitan Club had its 100th Anniversary and it said all the 
members of the State Department were founders of it, and I 
think 37 was the total members of the State Department in 
Washington.
    When my wife's grandfather was Secretary of State, John 
Hay, at the turn of the century, there were just over a hundred 
people in the State Department at that time.
    The Chairman. The whole department?
    Senator Symington. The whole department.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They did pretty well.
    Senator Aiken. That is good.
    Senator Symington. We had the two greatest allies the world 
has known, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, too.
    But to me it just seems as we watch the growth by hundreds 
and hundreds of thousands, I think millions would be fair, of 
the administrative branch and nobody has more respect for this 
staff than I do and I always get a good rapid answer from Carl 
Marcy or anybody else on the staff. It isn't that at all to me. 
It is just a case of getting organized to handle the workload 
which is infinitely more today, plus what Albert said about the 
interests of the people.

         THE COMMITTEE GOT PEOPLE INTERESTED IN FOREIGN POLICY

    The one great thing that this committee did last year, it 
got the people interested in the foreign policy of the United 
States to an extent that they never even dreamed about, in my 
opinion, that is when I get back to the hustings. It is going 
to be much more, it is not going to be less, because now the 
people are really interested in it and there is a lot of doubt 
about this tremendous ground war in Asia, and a lot of 
nervousness about this situation in the Middle East, and a lot 
of work which has been done incidental to our occupation in 
Europe and so on.
    I know it is hard to get staff people, but I would say it 
is a lot easier to get staff people into this problem today 
than three or four years ago because there is a lot of interest 
in it and good people follow where the interest goes. And I 
hope this could be considered not as a criticism of the staff 
and not as a criticism of the committee and, above all, not 
criticism of you because you are the one more than anyone else 
in the United States who has gotten the American people 
interested in foreign policy.

                          A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM

    I would hope it would be recognized on a management basis. 
There is nobody I respect more than Bourke. He is your ranking 
member, people like George Aiken next to him, nearly all over 
there feel the way you do about most of these problems, the 
senior members of the committee. We just have a management 
problem on our hands and it was the kind of thing I was deep 
in, it was my life's work 20 years ago, and I think we have got 
to face up to the management problem.
    The staff situation, a lot of things that could be done, 
you could approve, have people, final approval, you could have 
the top of your own staff consulted with your own final 
decision on members of the subcommittee staff. Just thinking 
off the top of my head it might be an excellent idea not to put 
the subcommittees on television. God knows I wouldn't like to 
try to get some real facts and dig in on the Arab-Israeli 
problem on television and so forth and so on.
    The Chairman. That would be explosive.
    Senator Symington. There are a lot of ways that you could 
bind this thing and the way the thing ran. This isn't the 
committee with the least staff by any means, with all due 
respect to my friend from Oregon.
    The Agriculture Committee is a committee that has got for 
my money much the least staff as against the money involved and 
so forth and so on.
    The Chairman. Finance has had no staff until this year.
    Senator Symington. My experience on the Agriculture 
Committee, I mean on the steering committee, and I know, Joe, 
they spend their time up there, instead of fighting to get on 
the committee, they spend their time fighting not to get on the 
Agriculture Committee.
    The Chairman. George wanted to say something. He has been 
waiting here.
    Senator Symington. I am all through now. But I think it is 
a management problem here we are discussing today at least as 
much as anything else.
    The Chairman. George?

                       AD HOC VERSUS AD INFINITUM

    Senator Aiken. I have been listening very attentively to 
the discussion relative to ad hoc committees and the staffing 
of ad hoc committees, and I am sure if they were well staffed 
they would have some very interesting staff meetings.
    But I also have a great regard for the intelligence and 
education of my chairman and I wanted to ask him what is the 
distance between ad hoc and ad infinitum.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, getting back to the overall 
thing----
    The Chairman. I don't know.
    Senator Gore. I guess you assigned me more ad hoc duties 
last year than anyone.
    The Chairman. I think more individual bills you handled 
than any of them.
    Senator Gore. Well, some of them we reported and the 
committee acted upon in the Senate and some of them we reported 
on unfavorably, and I think events have sustained us. I am 
willing to do whatever you want me to do in that regard.

                      PROVOKING PUBLIC DISCUSSION

    But, again, I repeat, the overall function of this 
committee, as Stu Symington said, touched the American people. 
It stimulated an awareness and a study. It provoked study and 
discussion groups all over the United States.
    I would like to see us conduct another hearing of a level 
that would challenge the intelligent and public spirited people 
of the country.
    For instance, what are the valid indices of the great 
decisions today of a preeminent world power. Are we stuck with 
shibboleths, are there abstractions that have emotional and 
political appeal on which we should not base decisions? Where 
are we? What is our position in the world, and why?
    It seems to me if you could get some of the eminent 
scholars of the country once again, not to examine whether we 
should or should not be in Vietnam, that is past, but to 
examine the position of this country in the world of today's 
technology, that we could once again play an important role in 
public education and once again assert the constitutional 
importance of the Senate.

         STATE DEPARTMENT OPPOSITION TO AN EFFECTIVE COMMITTEE

    Senator Morse. I want to say the Senator from Oregon is not 
going to take the rap that he gets from certain quarters 
because the subcommittee on Latin America is not conducting the 
hearings it ought to be conducting. They should be conducted 
and conducted under your jurisdiction. I am not asking the 
subcommittee appoint staff but asking that you and the full 
committee appoint them. I am pointing out that nothing I have 
heard this morning justifies keeping the staff at its small 
number. We can get people. Sure it is hard to get them. Sure we 
can enlarge the staff by getting qualified people and we should 
do it.
    I want to say no member of this staff in my judgment can 
serve as a substitute for the responsibilities of the 
committee. Pat Holt makes very fine reports, but those reports 
ought to be conducted under the direction of the subcommittee 
and they ought to be subject to review by the subcommittee, and 
we ought to be able to call people in and determine whether or 
not they stand up.
    I think they will stand up. But the State Department would 
love to have some of these subcommittees continue to be 
ineffective.
    The last thing Rusk and Rostow and Gordon want is a vital 
working effective subcommittee on Latin America, but you had 
better keep your eyes on Latin America, may I say to this 
committee, because you have got great problems and trouble 
stirring themselves up in Latin America, and the subcommittee 
should do the job on the subject and not Pat Holt, in effect 
operating somewhat independent of the subcommittee. All I am 
asking for is that you enlarge your staff, that you can take 
complete jurisdiction over the subjects that will be taken up 
by your subcommittee and that we get on with the job of doing 
what--let's face it, this full committee is never going to do 
in regard to the Latin American problem because you haven't got 
time to do it, but the subcommittee can.
    You would know when we would have our meeting, we wouldn't 
be interfering with your jurisdiction. I would have them at 
night, if necessary, but we would do the work.
    But I only want to say as chairman of this subcommittee 
that the full committee is letting down the subcommittee, in my 
judgment, speaking as its chairman. I don't care how many 
members on the subcommittee want to let the present 
arrangements continue. It is not a good arrangement, and you 
are not going to do the job on Latin America and you either get 
a new subcommittee, if you want to get a new chairman, go ahead 
and get him, but I want to say I am going to continue to 
express why this subcommittee is not doing its job. It is not 
doing the job because it isn't properly staffed.

               AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITIES AS A GREAT POWER

    The Chairman. Well, I certainly am glad to have this 
discussion, and I will talk with the staff and see if we can 
come up with some concrete suggestion and maybe look into the 
matter of getting some more.
    I don't want to go too far, but I certainly think we ought 
to move in this direction and we will do it better.
    I want to make a comment here, Senator Gore brought up a 
question which was the last item on my agenda and the time is 
almost running out.
    The staff and I have been discussing this during this 
interim and I think you are quite right. We had a general 
subject that we are talking about called American 
responsibilities as a great power, a general subject to survey 
in some open hearings--of course we expect to start out in the 
usual way with whatever the administration wishes to say on 
this with Secretary Rusk and McNamara and others, that is the 
foreign policy prospects for '67. In that anything may be 
discussed, and this subject, general subject would be involved.
    I wanted to raise this question with you, a subject, for 
example, of this which we kicked around here at some length, 
the nature of our commitments, this nature of our being 
committed all the time.
    A number of these treaties, the President last night 
referred to them, and he is going to live up to all of them. We 
made a great many treaties during the 50's, a review of this as 
a part of this overall review of our relations as the greatest 
power in the world today and what that means.
    Another one was this man Edwin Reischauer is back. I have 
been thinking about, I would certainly personally like very 
much to have him. He ought to be as well qualified as anybody, 
for example, to discuss our relations with the whole Pacific 
area, not just Vietnam but he is especially qualified, it seems 
to me, to testify about our relations with Japan, China, the 
whole area of which Vietnam is simply one part.
    Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.

                  AN EXAMINATION FOR OUR OWN EDUCATION

    The Chairman. This is the way we have been thinking about 
it and it is what I wanted to bring up.
    What does the committee think about it?
    I think it is on all fours with what the Senator from 
Tennessee stated. I completely agree with that. This is an area 
in which the full committee----
    Senator Gore. But an examination----
    The Chairman. That is correct. My own view is not at all we 
are attacking anybody. This is an examination for our own 
education, our own benefit as well as the public as to what 
kind of a role should the United States play under these 
present circumstances, and this is a complicated matter. It 
sounds vague but it is very real.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, could I make one brief 
comment?
    The Chairman. Does this appeal to you?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Senator Clark. It appeals to me very much.
    I would like to make one brief comment to my very good 
friend Carl Marcy for whom I have the most profound admiration 
as a magnificent chief of this committee, but I hope when he 
starts to look around for a new staff man, Carl, we won't have 
as one of the criteria a timid little Ph.D. who is prepared to 
wipe the dandruff off the shoulders of members of this 
committee. I think that is what you mean.
    The Chairman. I don't know what you mean. Maybe Mr. Marcy 
does.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                  A COMBINATION OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCES

    Senator Symington. I think it would be a wonderful thing to 
get Reischauer. I stayed twice with him in Tokyo.
    The Chairman. He is an example. I hope we can get other 
people.
    You necessarily, when you get outside of the government, 
are going to be confronted with the difficulty of getting 
people who have a combination of actual experiences, as he has, 
plus a sufficient historical, political, social background and 
so on, and that he can relate it to us. This is difficult to 
get those people.
    Senator Clark. We have no finer fellow on the staff than 
Jim Lowenstein, with whom I spent a month with in Europe who is 
absolutely terrific. He came to this committee from a good spot 
in the State Department because he thought he could be more 
useful here.
    The Chairman. We have a new one we haven't used much who 
will turn out the same way, and he is Bader. He was in the 
State Department and it was partly because of Jim Lowenstein 
and everyone seemed to agree.
    Senator Pell. I came in and became a Senator. [Laughter.]

                  TESTIMONY FROM LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS

    Senator Morse. Bill, I don't know whether you can get--
whether protocol stops you or other restrictions do, but I wish 
we could get in Edward E. Rice, who is our consul general in 
Hong Kong, if our State Department will come and let him 
testify in executive session.
    The Chairman. It is a great problem.
    I would like to have some of these lower level people. The 
State Department seems to take the view the Secretary ought to 
talk for them. They don't want their underlings to testify. I 
hate to embarrass the underlings because they might fire them. 
I would like to do it, personally. I agree with you.
    Senator Morse. Carl Marcy can tell you if you get a 
briefing that we got in Hong Kong from Rice, it is far 
different from what the Secretary tells you when he comes in 
here.
    The Chairman. Well, I have the same feeling.
    What can we do about it, as a practical matter?
    Senator Symington. I can tell you what we can do about it. 
We ran into exactly the same thing in the Armed Services 
Committee, and I think I was the one who suggested first that 
we put the witnesses under oath. Then we had the Preparedness 
Subcommittee, under John Stennis, an able, fair, efficient 
fellow, and these fellows come in and we tell him who we want 
as witnesses. We don't let them tell us who we want as 
witnesses, and we pull in two or three fliers in Vietnam and 
they are under oath so they can go right back and say, ``You 
don't want me to perjure myself, do you?'' And they come up 
there and they give us more information in less time as against 
all this stuff that we get from the Joint Chiefs, you see.
    We really begin to cut the mustard as to what the facts 
are.

                            DOVES AND HAWKS

    One thing I don't know and that worries me a very great 
deal, based on my relationship with this government, is whether 
there is any accuracy in the fact that essentially McNamara is 
a dove and essentially Rusk is a hawk and the degree of it. I 
do know that when I talk to Walt Rostow who is now in a 
protective position as part of the Executive Branch that he was 
pretty darned hawkish, you see.
    Well, I think it might be, I certainly would subscribe to 
what Neil Sheehan wrote in the New York Times the other day 
after this last trip of mine, not a dove but no longer a hawk.
    When these fellows come down like the JCS they can't cross 
a ``t'' or dot an ``i'' that isn't approved by higher 
authority.
    So it seems to me if we had a subcommittee operating on the 
theory of getting the facts from less important people, and you 
come in and run the committee any time you want to handle it 
and call the people in here, I think to call in some of these 
ambassadors from outside this country and if necessary put them 
under oath.

                       TESTIMONY FROM JOURNALISTS

    The Chairman. Let me ask you--I am glad to have this angle. 
The other angle that bothers me--I would like to have 
newspapermen. We went over this in the Dominican thing.
    Does the committee feel that this is unfeasible?
    Some of these people have more experience.
    Senator Symington. I don't know, but I know one thing. You 
have the right as chairman of this committee to ask anybody in 
this government because we put the money up.
    Senator Pell. I think you have the right to ask foreigners, 
too.
    The Chairman. We have never done it. These are the 
precedents which this committee has had long before I came 
here. It seems to me that we ought to have a little greater 
freedom to ask anybody who appeals to us.
    Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.
    The Chairman. These have been traditions, and I thought it 
ought to be the decision of the committee.
    Do you think we ought to contemplate, I will certainly 
submit any of these changes to the committee, but shall we 
investigate it, for purposes of discussion?
    Senator Morse. I think so because we are entitled to give 
the American people the facts they are entitled to receive from 
any source.

                   JEOPARDIZING SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS

    Senator Hickenlooper. This is the old story with this 
committee and other committees to try to get in subordinate 
officials to try to get them to testify when their own necks 
are out eight feet. If they offend their superiors, they will 
get their heads chopped off and you just put them there and put 
them under the guillotine.
    Look at [Otto] Otepka, sitting there in the State 
Department being there for two years because he told the truth 
to the [Thomas] Dodd committee and they just, they have got him 
sitting over there, nothing to do and they are trying to get 
rid of him, but they don't have a case against him.
    You have got----
    Senator Symington. In 1948, I bucked the Secretary of 
Defense as Secretary of the Air Force. In 1949, Mr. Truman had 
a meeting in the cabinet room and he said, ``I want everybody 
here to support this budget whether they like it or not and if 
they don't want to support it I want them to say so now.''
    A lot of people in the room, but he looked at me the whole 
time he was saying it, and I said, ``I just want to ask you one 
question and then I will make up my mind. Are you asking me to 
go up on the Hill and perjure myself?''
    And he looked at me for about 15 seconds and he said, 
``Will you give me your word of honor you didn't instigate the 
question?''
    And I said, ``I will,'' and he said, ``Go up there and tell 
them what you believe.''
    If you get these fellows and put them under oath and put 
them--it is pretty tough if anybody above them, and we will 
know about it soon enough if they are castigated for perjuring 
themselves before this committee in order to follow a party 
line.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Stu, nobody knows better than you do 
it doesn't happen the next week after they do it. It happens 
two years later when they find themselves going down the hall 
and pretty soon the door opens and they fall off and you can't 
go back and prove it.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. That has been a helpful session.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                         PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES

    The Chairman. I am going to ask Mr. Marcy to try to contact 
these people along these lines, if you have any suggestion 
about it. Some of them I mentioned, if this meets with your 
approval, the Communist world in '67, some hearing on this 
subject. I would like to have men like George Kennan and 
Schulman who are the recognized authorities on that subject.
    Does that suit you?
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    The Chairman. And Asia, the Pacific.
    Senator Gore. We not only need to examine ourselves in this 
world, but we need to examine our adversaries in this world.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Gore. In order to determine our place.
    The Chairman. And our relations to them, what they are like 
and our relations.
    Senator Gore. What are our dangers, prospects and 
limitations.
    The Chairman. For example, this subject has been suggested, 
Asia, the Pacific, and the United States, that type of thing 
may have a man like Reischauer, he is the best type of man I 
can think of to best describe what is presently the situation 
in Japan, the Far East. He is a long time scholar of China. If 
anybody could interpret that situation, it seems to me he would 
be as good as anybody.
    But that is the type of hearing.
    This is strictly educational, not intended to attack 
anybody at all, simply the information of what it is like out 
there, what these people think and what our relations to them 
ought to be.
    Does that make sense to you?
    Senator Gore. Yes.

           CHANGING AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY

    The Chairman. And on down, the changing American attitudes 
towards foreign policy. I mean what is going to here, our 
attitude, what we are afflicted with, what limitations and so 
on, and the nature of U.S. commitments.
    We talked about this last year. It seems to me we ought to 
clarify this matter.
    I get so fed up with being told we are committed to 
something all the time, which I don't think is so. What makes 
the commitment is having the President say we are committed, 
and I don't think that is what I mean by commitment. I think 
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and 
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.
    Senator Gore. SEATO committed us to confer.
    The Chairman. I think they absolutely misrepresent what 
SEATO is. He repeated it again. Of course that is what Rusk has 
been saying over the past couple of years. He didn't say it in 
the beginning, but he is saying it now.
    When you read what Dulles said SEATO meant it isn't what 
they now say it means.
    Senator Gore. It isn't what Rusk said at the beginning.
    The Chairman. Well, if I understand it, that is the way we 
will proceed. Who can we get on some of these? I would like to 
have James Gavin again on that----
    Senator Pell. Matthew Ridgway maybe.
    The Chairman. And Ridgway. Who we can get.
    Senator Pell. I think Ridgway is more coherent in his 
arguments.

                         SCHOLARS AND GENERALS

    The Chairman. Gavin we had, and I thought he did a very 
good job. It is perfectly all right to have them both. The 
reason I do is we naturally have to have so many scholars 
because they are available and I would like to use whatever 
generals we can to offset the attitude we are stacking these 
hearings and not having generals.
    Whatever generals that are called at all reasonably I would 
like to have them not because I have such respect personally, 
they are wiser than others, but to offset the emotional 
prejudice in some quarters against the scholars.
    Does that make sense to you?
    Senator Pell. Perfectly.
    The Chairman. The same with this fellow Griffith. He is a 
scholar. He was as good as you can find among the generals, and 
lived in China and he has a reasonable attitude. It offsets the 
criticism they offered toward people like Fairbank and Bartlett 
and others.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ John K. Fairbank, Professor of Asian History at Harvard, and 
Ruhl J. Bartlett, Professor of Diplomatic History at The Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Marcy. Do you want to mention----
    The Chairman. Did either one of you see Alf Landon's speech 
that he made in Kansas three months ago?
    Well, it is a remarkable speech. I couldn't believe it, and 
I am all for having him. I never dreamed of having a fellow 
like that but he made a speech I think you would thoroughly 
approve of, and I think it would be very good politically to 
have him sandwiched in among these scholars. The speech is 
available if either one of you have time to read it. I am sure 
you would approve it, and coming from that quarter it 
absolutely knocked me out of my chair.
    It is amazing, he is quite a fellow, at least from this 
speech.

                    INVITE SUGGESTIONS FOR WITNESSES

    Senator Gore. Why don't you invite all members of the 
committee to suggest possible witnesses. We would not be 
obligated to invite all, but out of the suggestions might come 
a very helpful suggestion?
    The Chairman. I have no objection other than the personal 
relations. They have a feeling if they submit some, we have 19 
members and if you don't take them they will be offended.
    Senator Pell. I think you are right.
    The Chairman. If they put in a friend or a fellow----
    Senator Gore. I withdraw it.
    In other words, I am asked to submit a man and then you 
didn't invite him. I withdraw the suggestion.
    The Chairman. You can get into awful serious trouble.
    Last year the way we did it was this way, Albert, after 
thinking about it. The way that was done--I didn't know a lot 
of the people--I asked Carl and the fellow Robertson who is the 
China expert in the Library, Far East, and Barnett of Columbia 
who is a recognized authority. I didn't have anything really to 
do with it. I didn't know most of those people. They got 
together, surveyed the situation and tried to fit the man to 
the subject and that is the way they were selected until the 
very end when Bourke said to me, ``I think we ought to have 
somebody on our side,'' and I said, ``These aren't on my side, 
they are supposed to be the best there are.''
    Well, anyway, that is the way we got the other three. It 
didn't work too bad in this sense, Albert, because after we got 
through these, then Bourke, we satisfied--he submitted those 
three names and he was satisfied.
    If we started out, I imagine we would have had 15 names, 
Mundt's and various ones, all of them had submitted them and we 
hadn't got them, I am afraid they would be mad.
    But those three satisfied him.
    What we want is not quantity but quality if we can get it, 
the very best that we can get. I don't want to get just one 
point of view. I would like to get people who have had 
experiences who can give both points of view or whatever points 
of view there are.

                       A NEW POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE

    Senator Gore. Well, just as last year, as more or less of a 
tangential effect of our Vietnam hearing, the hearing created a 
new political atmosphere in which the administration had some 
maneuverability with respect to China, it seems to me if we 
could get the proper erudition on the subject many of the World 
War II dogmas could be examined and I have an idea many of them 
are not very valid any more.
    The Chairman. I agree with you, I am sure.
    Senator Gore. And yet we need the study ourselves, but 
perhaps even more importantly for the American people.
    The Chairman. That is right. That is what I meant. We ought 
to be the forum for, the sounding board for these scholars and 
thoughtful people who have no other way of reaching the 
American people. I mean these people we had, Fairbank, nobody 
ever heard of him. He could write a book or article or write a 
speech and he wouldn't get beyond the 200 people who read him 
but with this forum, in a way he reached millions of people, 
and that is what I think we can do. It is a question of getting 
people who really know this subject. I thought we did pretty 
well: we had darned good people.

                        BUSINESSMEN AS WITNESSES

    Senator Pell. In this connection, most of the witnesses we 
had were scholars. I was able to get a passport validated for 
an American businessman from Textron, a friend of mine, a 
businessman. If he succeeds in getting in, somebody who can 
speak firsthand as a man with considerable intellectual 
curiosity, a lawyer, and he believes in opening up contacts 
there, that would have even more of an impact.
    The Chairman. You remember this man Blackie who was head of 
Caterpillar? We had him on East-West Trade. He was smart and he 
made a good witness. That is a top businessman in this country.
    Senator Pell. Even better than a general.
    The Chairman. He is one of the most successful businessmen 
in the country with worldwide business and he made a good 
witness on East-West trade. That is a thing which I think could 
well be involved.

                      EDUCATING THE ADMINISTRATION

    Senator Gore. Not only do we educate the American people 
and ourselves but again referring, adverting to the China 
hearings, I think the Administration got a little light on it 
as much as we did.
    The Chairman. The Administration needs it as much as we do.
    Senator Gore. I believe they welcomed the effect and 
reacted to it.
    The Chairman. They do on China. They got miffed on Vietnam 
because they thought it challenged their policy.
    Senator Gore. I mean China.
    The Chairman. I think that is correct.

                            TRIP TO CAMBODIA

    Senator Pell. Speaking on firsthand knowledge, too, is 
there any more on the trip to Cambodia? I talked to Carl about 
it. I don't think there was. As I understand it, we are waiting 
now a little bit on our dignity. Shouldn't we reactivate it?
    Mr. Marcy. The latest on that was that the Cambodians 
advised that we not press it, not respond affirmatively to 
their invitation to come until Prince Sihanouk was back from 
some medical treatment in Paris.
    The Chairman. That is right.
    He went to France.
    Mr. Marcy. He is still in Paris. They expect him back some 
time in February.
    Senator Pell. Late January.
    Mr. Marcy. I am sure we really can't get a reply from them 
until he really does get back, but in late January or early 
February it would be appropriate either for us or for them, I 
think, to open the question again. We can do it simply by 
telephoning New York.
    Senator Pell. The reason I wanted to raise it is just 
simply to get three senators to make plans to go two or three 
weeks. The best time would be in January during a slack period, 
and I didn't know.
    The Chairman. Can I try out another idea?
    Senator Pell. Couldn't we agree on this before leaving 
this? Would it seem agreeable about making a phone call before 
the end of the month?
    The Chairman. Yes, inquire as to when.
    Mr. Marcy. I think we ought to wait until the Prince is 
back, because what they will do is to fire off an inquiry to 
Cambodia.
    Senator Pell. Let's find out from the State Department so 
we will know when he is back.
    The Chairman. State Department when he is back, and then 
put the inquiry. Sure, that is right.

                        HAVE A HISTORIAN TESTIFY

    We had a subject here, changing American attitude toward 
foreign policy. This is kind of a historical thing, what do you 
think about a man like [Henry Steele] Commager or [Arthur] 
Schlesinger?
    Senator Gore. Change and the need for change.
    The Chairman. In connection with it. If it is not changing 
enough, how it ought to change. This is more or less a 
historical review type of thing in which I think is the process 
of self-analysis along the line you are thinking that in order 
to change, in order to see we have to analyze what we have 
thought as to how relative it is to present conditions and how 
it originated, the kind of a forum of self-analysis.
    Senator Gore. May I make a suggestion? Does this appeal to 
you----
    [Discussion off the record.]

              JUSTIFICATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

    The Chairman. Let me try another thing on you.
    I say this if we have these hearings you can't keep from 
appealing our involvements, and I think the issue for the 
justification about our involvement is still the crucial one. 
What bothers me and a lot of the people who don't like this is 
I don't feel there is valid justification for our ever having 
become involved and, therefore, the way they pursue it and so 
on just doesn't go down with me. I think we are in a false 
position, and the quicker we liquidate it in a reasonably 
dignified manner the better. I don't think it is a matter 
purely of manners, you might say, and dignity of a great 
country. You just drop it and get out. You have to have an 
acceptable form of negotiation to get yourself out, to 
extricate yourself. As far as the hearings, Albert, I don't 
want to announce them and don't want to say this is just 
another Vietnam hearing. I want that to be developed as a part 
of an overall examination of our relations and our 
responsibilities as the most powerful country in the world to 
the rest of humanity, is more or less the way I want it to come 
up.
    Does that make sense?
    Senator Gore. Yes, you can't ignore it. It is a part.
    The Chairman. It is a part but I don't wish to have it said 
we are just again attacking this problem because the 
administration will get its back up and the people will say I 
am trying to pursue an old vendetta.

                        A LITTLE SELF-CRITICISM

    Senator Pell. Couldn't we do it with a little bit of 
modesty and criticism and self-criticism by suggesting we are 
doing now what we should have done five years ago as far as 
Thailand goes by doing that saying we should have done this in 
Vietnam in '61 and didn't but we are going to do it, by God 
now?
    The Chairman. I have tried to be as contrite as I can in 
the Tonkin Gulf and others. I didn't realize what we are 
getting into, and I am quite willing to say I was shortsighted. 
I had no idea that we were going to go this way.
    Senator Pell. This would be a good opening.
    The Chairman. That is honest with me. I had no idea. I 
thought when I was on this and with this President, I thought 
he was just as determined as I was to keep out of a major war 
out there. That is what I believed in 1964.
    Senator Gore. I assume that what the President said last 
night--since we decided to send troops to Vietnam he was using 
an editorial ``we.''
    The Chairman. I think so. [Laughter.]
    Does that meet with your general idea of how we should 
proceed on this, on the people? I have got some others here. 
Hutchins is very outspoken on this. These are people. Bob 
Hutchins. This Eric Fromm has written a lot on this. Some 
people think he is a Communist, I don't think he is, but I 
don't know whether it would be safe to have him or not. He 
lives in Mexico.
    Senator Pell. Hutchins.
    The Chairman. We will try to see what we can do.
    [Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee recessed, subject 
to call of the chair.]


                          THE WORLD SITUATION

                              ----------                              


                            January 16, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, 
Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: Senator McGee, Assistant Secretary Douglas 
MacArthur III, Deputy Assistant Secretary H.G. Torbert, Jr., 
Mr. Ernest Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
State, Major A.B. Outlaw, Department of Defense.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman, 
Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.
    Mr. Chairman. Well, we will come to order.
    We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of 
State, but before we proceed, I want to welcome the new member, 
Senator Cooper, from Kentucky.
    We are very pleased, indeed, to have you on the committee, 
and we are sure you will make a great contribution to the 
deliberation of the committee.
    Senator Carlson. We are delighted.
    The Chairman. After seeing the new Republicans yesterday, I 
am bound to congratulate them on the quality of their new crop.
    Senator Aiken. We accept the congratulations.
    Senator Cooper. I am glad to be on the committee.
    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you 
and assume you would like to give us a kind of a rundown of the 
general situation before we have questions, if that is 
agreeable.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I 
would like to start by paying my personal compliments to 
Senator Cooper. Not only has he had a very distinguished 
service as a Senator, but he was one of our great ambassadors 
in an earlier day, and I am proud to be associated with him on 
this committee.
    If it is agreeable, Mr. Chairman, I might comment fairly 
briefly on certain important developments that have occurred 
since the Congress adjourned and then go as promptly as 
possible into comments and discussions and questions.

                            TURMOIL IN CHINA

    First, I think perhaps the most important single thing that 
is happening in the world today is happening in mainland China. 
We believe that it is very important even though we do not know 
exactly what is happening there. It is the kind of ignorance 
which does not embarrass us too much because it seems fairly 
obvious that the leadership in China is not exactly clear on 
what is happening.
    But the combination of a struggle among individuals with 
regard to the succession to Mao and some ideological debates 
within the top leadership that occurred last summer that we are 
gradually becoming aware of, and perhaps some revival of 
regional difference and regional influences in China have 
created a situation of considerable turmoil.
    I would caution members of the committee about drawing too 
many conclusions too rapidly about the news, that is, the 
normal press dispatches, particularly those that are based upon 
posters in Peking, but we do know that there seems to be a 
considerable struggle between the apparatus of the Communist 
Party in China, or considerable elements of the apparatus of 
the party, and the so called Red Guards under the leadership of 
Mao Tse-tung, with the army playing a somewhat equivocal role, 
perhaps in between.

                      SHIFTS IN CHINESE LEADERSHIP

    Just to indicate the confusion that exists there reflected 
in our own lack of understanding of exactly what is happening, 
Lin Piao has not been heard from for about two months, since 
November, even though Mao had nominated him to be his successor 
and had highlighted his role up to this point. He has dropped 
out of the picture temporarily. I can be incorrect by the end 
of the day because he may reappear.
    There was a report this morning that Liu Shao-chi, who was 
demoted in the party, the chief of state, so-called, is out in 
western China. If this is so, this could be of some importance 
because we have had some indication that the regional armies 
are playing something of an independent role here. We are 
keeping this point in mind because Lin Piao has his army around 
Peking and presumably he would have had a considerable 
advantage in the Peking area. But Chen Yi, who was under attack 
by the Red Guards, has long connections with an army which is 
in the southwest of China, and the supposition is that he has 
at least some independence of position because he has the 
support of his own former army in another part of the country.
    We do know that Chou En-lai seems to be trying to play a 
mediating role among the different elements, and he is a fairly 
key figure to keep your eyes on in this situation. If he is 
able to bring Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi and some of these 
different elements in some standdown on hostilities, then it 
may be that the regime could be reconstituted, perhaps somewhat 
weakened, on the basis that it existed say two weeks ago. But 
the leadership, undoubtedly they are eyeing each other among 
themselves.
    We do know that there have been considerable acts of 
violence in different parts of the country, that railways have 
been interrupted, that factories have been shut down because of 
strikes, that very large numbers of workers seem now to be 
moving into Peking itself with divided loyalties, and almost 
anything can happen.

                      POSTPONEMENT OF WARSAW TALKS

    The most immediate impact upon us is that they have asked 
us to postpone our next talk in Warsaw for two weeks for what 
they call administrative reasons. It may be that the ambassador 
there is going back to Peking or has gone back for a visit. It 
may be there is some difficulty about what line he is to take 
in issuing his instructions.
    It is interesting to note that Peking's diplomats in about 
25 countries have been going home in considerable numbers in 
the last two weeks, indicating that they expected to be back in 
their post in about 60 days. We, of course, are watching this 
very carefully to see whether it might in any way be connected 
with some foreign adventure somewhere. But the pattern does not 
seem to indicate that, and it looks more like something 
connected with the cultural revolution, perhaps indoctrination 
of the diplomatic corps or purge of the diplomatic corps. We 
just cannot yet say. But we would expect to have our next talk 
with Peking in Warsaw in February. If that is postponed again, 
I think that perhaps will be a reflection of the disturbances 
going on in China.
    Senator Aiken. When was the last talk?
    Secretary Rusk. The last talk was, I think, in September.

                     NO ROLE FOR NATIONALIST FORCES

    There is one point that has come into public attention I 
would just mention in order to discount completely. That is, 
any suggestion that the Nationalist forces on Taiwan have any 
role to play here, or intend to play any role here, or have any 
capability of moving onto the mainland to interfere in this 
situation. This talk out of Taiwan is talk, and they have now 
said publicly in the last few days that they acknowledge the 
requirement of an agreement with us before they make any move 
under the security and arrangements we had with them in the 
middle of the fifties. They know we are not going to give them 
that commitment, and I think that that situation is more talk 
than anything else.
    We have not yet seen any direct connection between the 
events in China and in moves outward from China. There is 
always the possibility that people who are in that kind of 
trouble at home might try to unify themselves or try to divert 
attention from their own problems through some international 
adventure, but we do not see the displacement of military 
forces or other indications suggesting that they plan to 
intervene in South Vietnam.

               RISK OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR

    I noticed over the weekend a report from a French editor 
that there was some sort of an agreement between Peking and the 
United States on the basis of which they would stay out of 
Vietnam, that is, if we would not attack China, that we would 
not ourselves invade North Vietnam and we would not bomb the 
dikes. I do not know of any such agreement. There has never 
been any exchange on that between ourselves and Peking.
    We have assumed that, of course, if we attack China we 
would be at war with China. We have assumed if we were to move 
land forces north of the 17th Parallel that that would raise 
very substantially the risks of a Chinese intervention, but for 
reasons of our own, including humanitarian reasons, we have not 
had the intention of bombing those dikes in the Red River 
Valley. They could cause very, very heavy flooding and ruin a 
great many civilians up there.
    But we have had the impression from time to time through 
third parties that Peking's basic attitude was if we leave them 
alone, they will leave us alone, and that certainly is all 
right with us, but we do not know to what extent we can rely on 
that.
    All I am saying on the merits is there is something in 
those three points mentioned by the French editor, but we are 
not aware of any agreement or any communication from Peking to 
that effect.
    The closest thing to it was a comment passed along by a 
third-country diplomat shortly after a press conference in 
which I had said that the idea of a sanctuary is dead. I was 
referring there to North Vietnam, but Peking said--told a 
third-country diplomat, in essence, that if the United States 
leaves Peking alone, they would leave us alone, but that was 
about a year and a half ago, and coincides somewhat in time 
with the events allegedly spoken about by the French editor.

                   EFFECT OF CHINESE EVENTS ON HANOI

    Now, on Vietnam, Mr. Chairman, we do not see that the 
events in mainland China have significantly affected the 
Vietnam situation with possibly two exceptions. One is that 
there seems to be some reaction in Hanoi against the events in 
China. The speculation is to the point as to whether events in 
China are giving Hanoi any larger freedom of action in this 
situation, whether that might open up possibilities for 
contacts that did not exist before.
    Secondly, we do have contacts and----
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. I cannot report----

                       HANOI'S READINESS TO TALK

    Senator Hickenlooper. May I ask the Secretary, has it not 
been characteristic of wars in the past when one side is losing 
and feels it is on the verge of collapse, then it wants to talk 
and is willing to talk? Is there anything significant in the 
fact that the rumblings out of Hanoi seem to be a little more 
conversational than they were in the past?
    Secretary Rusk. I would not want to leave the impression, 
Senator, that the contacts that have existed lately really are 
pointed toward a readiness or desire to talk. There are a good 
many things that have been put to the other side from our 
direction that have had no response. That might change at 
almost any time.
    There are those who think they may be somewhat more willing 
to talk, but we have not been able to dig that out in any fully 
satisfactory way, and, in general, the answer to your question 
is yes.

               WHETHER THE UNITED STATES REFUSED TO TALK

    The Chairman. How about our situation, we were told two 
years ago that you--we refused to talk because we were losing. 
It was just the opposite.
    Secretary Rusk. That is not correct, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Which is not correct, that we were told it or 
it was not true?
    Secretary Rusk. I mean what you were told was not correct. 
The full story of that is not on the record, and one of the key 
witnesses there is now dead, Adlai Stevenson. There were 
contacts before, during, and after that particular episode with 
the other side. We were misled as to the channels that were 
being used during that period.
    I was told, for example, that the Soviet Foreign Office 
knew nothing about this, that this was not known to the Soviet 
ambassadors and Mr. Gromyko and so forth. Then a year or so 
later I was told this had been actively discussed with Mr. 
Andrei Gromyko during a period when I was regularly in touch 
with him and the matter did not come up, and I was told under 
no circumstances should we raise it. Further, we did tell the 
Secretary General if he had a channel to go back and explore it 
and try to develop it further and see more about the situation 
with whom one talks and what about. Insofar as I know, he never 
did that.
    Adlai Stevenson, the week before he died, on the BBC in 
London said that he was never very clear about with whom the 
talks were supposed to be held and on what subject.
    Now the problem about surfacing that whole business is that 
it would get in the way of contacts through the Soviet Union. 
Hanoi has flatly and categorically denied it. The possibilities 
of channels of the sort that were discussed at that time have 
been further explored without results, and we prefer to deal 
with this kind of a question with regard to the future rather 
than trying to just rehash the past.
    But the story, as I knew it, is not the one that is 
generally talked about in regard to that episode.

                        CESSATION OF THE BOMBING

    The principal point that is being raised now in contacts is 
the question of a--is an unconditional and permanent cessation 
of the bombing. I point out those two words because this is 
rather different from what was said last autumn. Last autumn 
the suggestion was made in a number of quarters, including 
Communist quarters, that a suspension of the bombing for a 
period of time might make it possible to develop the basis of 
discussion of some more toward negotiations, and we suspended 
the bombing for twice as long as had been suggested to us by 
key elements on the other side, and without result.
    Now, the price has gone up very considerably. They are 
saying unconditional and permanent or they say unconditional 
and definitive or, in that Harrison Salisbury view, 
unconditional and for good. That is a rather different problem 
than a temporary suspension.
    The other side has told us that the temporary suspension is 
nothing but an ultimatum; that this matter has to be taken up 
on the basis of a complete and permanent stoppage.
    At the same time we are not able to get anything from the 
other side at all about what they would do if the bombing 
stopped, and we have been probing on that point, continue to 
probe it, are doing so now, as to what the effect would be.

                         U THANT'S THREE POINTS

    Secretary General U Thant has his three points. The first 
that we stop the bombing. The second, there be a mutual de-
escalation, and the third, there be negotiations with the Viet 
Cong.
    We have said so far as the first point is concerned, okay, 
what about the second point? On that there has been nothing, 
Hanoi has rejected U Thant's second point, mutual de-escalation 
of the violence, and has said with regard to U Thant's third 
point that the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front, is the 
sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people.
    Those who call upon us to accept U Thant's three points 
usually do not take into account the fact that Hanoi has 
already categorically rejected points two and three. We 
continue to try to find some sort of an indication or 
suggestion, informal or otherwise, private or public, as to 
what the result will be if we stop the bombing and no one yet 
has been able or willing to tell us what that could be.

                         FIVE YEARS SUSPENSION

    The fact that they are calling for a permanent stoppage of 
the bombing makes it a very serious problem, because we have 
had now, experiences with three periods in which there was no 
bombing, five years, five weeks, five days, and we know that 
the infiltration simply continued.
    Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary--Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Mansfield. What do you mean five years suspension?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there was no bombing for five years 
from 1960 when they announced publicly they were going to seize 
South Vietnam. They moved the entire 325th Division of the 
North Vietnamese Regular Army into South Vietnam before we 
started the bombing. During that five-year period when there 
was no bombing of North Vietnam, we went to the Laos 
Conference, we made major concessions, as some persons saw it, 
took the Soviet nominee to be prime minister of Laos and 
accepted the coalition government worked out among the three 
elements there. We got no exchange for that, no performance 
whatever on the other side with respect to North Vietnamese 
troops in Laos or the use of Laos as an infiltration route to 
the south, or ability of the coalition government to function 
in Laos or the ability of the ICC to function in Laos. During 
all that period there were literally hundreds of contacts with 
the--in South Vietnam and there we did not see any peace in 
South Vietnam.
    Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, I think you are going 
back a long way and stretching it pretty thin when you use the 
five years, five weeks, and five days analogy, because in 1960 
how many troops did we have in Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. We had----
    Senator Mansfield. Very few.
    Secretary Rusk. We had about 600 and a military aid mission 
there.
    Senator Mansfield. We had no air forces of any kind, and I 
am not at all sure we were even instructing the South 
Vietnamese air force. If my information is correct, and it is 
from the Defense Department, the organized cadres did not come 
down from the north until 1964. At that time they were 
identifiable, and I think I can reinforce those figures and 
that fact.
    Secretary Rusk. You mean organized units of the North 
Vietnamese Regular Army?
    Senator Mansfield. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that is different than cadres, I 
think, Senator, because they were infiltrating cadres including 
North Vietnamese long before 1964. Organized elements of the 
North Vietnamese Army, I think I would agree with you.
    Senator Mansfield. Cadres and organized units and, if my 
memory is correct, the figure was 400 at the end of 1964, and 
that figure was supplied to me by the Department of Defense.

                   U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

    I note that you call Souvanna Phouma the Soviet nominee for 
prime minister of Laos who we decided to accept after we had 
rejected and kicked him out two years previously, which was a 
serious mistake on our part, as a result of the Geneva Accord 
on Laos.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Mansfield. Was Souvanna Phouma not our nominee, 
too?
    Secretary Rusk. He came to be when we accepted him, but 
there was another prime minister that the Eisenhower 
Administration had recognized in 1960.
    Senator Mansfield. That is true, and during that time I 
think we had a very large part to play in ousting Souvanna 
Phouma, undermining his position, and helping to create the 
situation which developed in Laos in those years, is that 
correct? I think your ambassador had something to do with it at 
the State Department.
    Secretary Rusk. I think there is something in that, yes.
    Senator Mansfield. That is all, Mr. Chairman. I will have 
something else later.
    The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

                       STEPS TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS

    Secretary Rusk. Well, the key question in Vietnam at the 
present time is the question of whether we can get steps taken 
by both sides to move this matter towards a peaceful solution 
either at the conference table or through negotiations or de 
facto. And at the present time I cannot report to the committee 
we have had any indication from the other side what any 
reciprocal step might be, although there are many 
opportunities, many ways, many channels by which that could be 
taken up.

                            FRANCE AND NATO

    As far as that is concerned, there is a pretty clear 
understanding now between the 14 on the one side and France on 
the other as to where the dividing line is and those NATO 
matters in which France will participate and will not 
participate. The 14 have constituted themselves into a defense 
planning committee. France does not attempt to interfere in the 
activities of the 14, or to veto or obstruct what the 14 feel 
that they must do.
    France, on the other hand, does take part in the political 
discussions that go on in the council of the 15, and there 
seems to be a pretty clear understanding now as to just where 
one starts and the other leaves off.
    At our last NATO meeting it was a good business-like 
meeting, and I think we transacted our business more 
efficiently than we have for some time, the 14 dealing with the 
military and the 15 taking up the political matters.
    I think the most interesting thing is the full exploration 
which is being made by practically all of its members on 
relations with the east.
    We had before us at our last NATO meeting a report, I 
think, that has been made available to the committee, a report 
of contacts between members of NATO and Eastern European 
countries of a period of about six months, and there were about 
185 of those contacts in terms of exchanging visits or exchange 
of visits or exchange of delegations and things of that sort.

                       GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE

    It is quite interesting to see that the new government in 
the Federal Republic apparently has decided it is going to 
explore the possibilities of improved relations with Eastern 
Europe. There are delegations in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and 
Poland to look at that situation. They apparently have come to 
the conclusion that 20 years of harsh confrontation has not 
moved them any nearer reunification or settlement of the German 
question, and they are prepared now to explore the possibility 
of improved relations to see whether that might not reduce the 
fear of the Germans among some of the small Eastern European 
countries, open up better contacts between West and East 
Germans and perhaps bring about a political situation 
atmosphere in which some movement can be made in the direction 
of reunification.

                         SOVIET ROLE IN VIETNAM

    Let me say as far as we are concerned, we were interested 
that when Gromyko came to the United Nations Assembly last year 
and visited Washington briefly, as well as from contacts we 
have had with him since then, is that the Soviet Union has not 
taken the view that because of Vietnam there is nothing to 
discuss. They have been prepared to sit down and talk about 
particular issues with us despite Vietnam.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. If you want to refer to this problem on the 
public record, you can go back to the Bucharest communique of 
the Warsaw Pact countries in July in which the Eastern European 
countries called upon the U.S. to comply with the 1954 and 1962 
agreements. Our answer to them was, ``all right, we agree to 
that, let's get going.''
    The difficulty is that Moscow does not feel that it is in a 
position to take a public political initiative with Hanoi in 
such things as calling a conference or authorizing the ICC to 
take up some of the chores that we would hope it would take up, 
because it seems to be immobilized by the problem with China 
and also somewhat handicapped by its relative lack of influence 
in Hanoi itself.
    So we have felt that we ought to go ahead and try to 
discuss other subjects with the Soviet Union, to see whether we 
find other points of agreement.

                           CONSULAR AGREEMENT

    As you know, we did conclude a civil area agreement, We 
hope very much that the Senate will find it possible to approve 
the consular agreement during the present session. In passing, 
Mr. Chairman, let me repeat here, from our point of view at the 
present time what is important about that treaty is not the 
possibility that we might open up consulates. That we could do 
today under existing legislation, one consulate in one place 
and one consulate in another. Ninety-five percent of our 
interest in this treaty is in those provisions providing 
consular access and protection for American citizens traveling 
and living in the Soviet Union. I told the committee when we 
were discussing that earlier that as far as consulates are 
concerned, we would be prepared to consult further with the 
committee before moving to establish the consulates, but we do 
have need for consular access to American citizens. They are 
traveling in the Soviet Union in larger and larger numbers. 
Many of our tourists, despite certain education we try to give 
them before they go, do some of the things in the Soviet Union 
that tourists do in many countries such as manipulating 
currency and picking up souvenirs and things of that sort, and 
it makes it very difficult for us to give them reasonable 
protection without the formal agreements of a consular 
convention.
    Senator Hickenlooper. At that point, Mr. Secretary, if you 
would care to comment----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir?

                GIVING RUSSIA MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS

    Senator Hickenlooper. With me, the one hurt under the 
saddle of this consular treaty is why do we have to give the 
Russians under the Most Favored Nations clause extend to all 
other countries, 20 or whatever it is, immunity from 
prosecution for crime by the employee nationals of a country. I 
could go as far as the consular official, something of that 
kind, although we do not do it to any other country. We will 
have to extend it under the Most Favored Nations clause, as I 
understand it. Why do we have to do it with the Russians?
    Secretary Rusk. I think the point on which a judgment will 
have to be made, Senator, is whether our interest in the 
reciprocal privilege is not stronger than their interest on 
this point. You see, our problem with our own employees in the 
Soviet Union is a far more severe one than problems we would 
have here, but this is one of those questions on which----
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is the thing that is unclear to 
me.
    I cannot rationalize that in my own mind nor can I quite 
understand the reason for it. Go ahead.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right. Let me get some material 
down on that in the terms of numbers and in terms of our 
interest on----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think we have numbers on it. I 
think I have numbers in my files on the thing and that is what 
mystifies me. The more information I get, the more I am 
confused, so I do not know, maybe I had better just stay as I 
am.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I do think he ought to provide 
the rest of us, however, with the memorandum, because I do not 
have the figures.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. We had some figures, but maybe we ought to be 
brought up to date. We had some.
    Senator Morse. In the committee file?
    The Chairman. Yes, about the number of Americans going 
there and Russians here, showing in my view we had much more to 
gain than they did by giving this protection.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Also the number of immunities we 
grant. It is my understanding that there would be 400 and some. 
I do not mean to get into an extended discussion of it, but 
there would be 400 and some other employees.
    The Chairman. That could be mutually controlled.
    Senator Hickenlooper. By other countries which we would 
have to extend to consulate officials and employees who are 
nationals of the sending country.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, the point--I realize you do 
not want to go into that in great detail, but on the matter of 
Most Favored Nations treatment for other countries, that would 
only occur where they would be prepared to give us reciprocal 
arrangements. We know some of these other countries are not 
interested in giving us that privilege. Therefore, this would 
not come into operation. So, we will have to try to find out 
informally if we can----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Perhaps some of them would not ask 
for it.

                      GERMAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

    The Chairman. Were you going to say something more about 
the Germans?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    The Chairman. I thought you were going into this recent 
meeting of Kurt Kiesinger and Charles de Gaulle. What is your 
interpretation?
    Secretary Rusk. Our interpretation of that is that the new 
German government wants to find out whether it can get a more 
relaxed relationship with President de Gaulle. They felt that 
they were caught up--the Germans felt they were caught up in 
some sort of special bilateral issue between Paris and 
Washington. There probably were some feelings on President de 
Gaulle's part about the role of the United States in Europe as 
well as in other world affairs, but basically the issue was 
between President de Gaulle and the other 14.
    It is our impression that the new German government will 
try to move on those points where it can move with France, but 
within the limits of a basic commitment to NATO, and without 
creating a big gap between Bonn and the United States and some 
of the largest issues.
    We ourselves have told the Germans and the French that the 
United States has a basic interest in good relations between 
Germany and France. After all, two world wars came about 
because these two countries started fighting each other.
    We do believe that it is important that Germany improve her 
relations without going down the same route as President de 
Gaulle in certain subjects, particularly, for example, NATO, 
but we will have to see.
    I think the atmosphere at this last meeting was good, but I 
do not have the impression that the Germans changed underlying 
basic policy toward NATO.
    What was important, I think, Mr. Chairman, is that de 
Gaulle, as well as we, have encouraged the new German 
government to explore the possibilities of improved relations 
with the East on the ground that we have tried over a period of 
20 years another approach, the Adenauer approach in effect. Now 
another approach might be more promising for the longer range 
future, depending a good deal, of course, on what the reaction 
of Eastern Europe would be.
    I would like to come back to that from two or three 
different points of view, if I may, and I am going to try not 
to take too much of your time, but I think the committee would 
be interested in the present state of play of the 
nonproliferation treaty.

                    NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

    The parliamentary situation is that there is no agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union as yet on 
particular language for a nonproliferation treaty. However, 
there is some language which we think the Soviet Union would 
probably accept which might be acceptable to us, depending upon 
the consensus we might reach among allies. It is very important 
that you understand that we have not agreed with the Soviet 
Union, but that we are discussing this language with our 
allies.
    The language itself, and I will pass this around the table 
for anyone to see, the language itself stems right out of our 
own national legislation in this field. Each nuclear weapons 
state, party to this treaty, undertakes not to transmit to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices 
or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or 
indirectly.
    As I say, that is what our national legislation at present 
says.
    I think it is quite important that if this language becomes 
acceptable to note that a good deal of underbrush has been 
worked out and cast aside. For example, the Soviets agree that 
we are talking about warheads and we are not talking about 
delivery vehicles and that is a very important advance. 
Secondly, they agree that they are not talking about what 
happens in case of war, in which event a treaty of this sort 
disappears. The Soviet allies in Eastern Europe have delivery 
vehicles and, in the event of war, presumably warheads would be 
made available to them. The same thing would happen in NATO if 
that terrible situation ever came about. Third, they are not 
talking about how an alliance makes the overriding political 
decision to go to war, which seemed at one point to be part of 
the problem.

                          A METAPHYSICAL POINT

    We have discussed centering around an almost metaphysical 
point. Mr. Gromyko illustrated it with a little diagram in 
which he said that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear 
weapons to a non-nuclear power.
    All right, no difficulty about that.
    Secondly, that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear 
weapons to non-nuclear powers through an alliance.
    No problem on that.
    Then we got into difficulty when he said and cannot 
transfer weapons or control over them to an alliance itself, 
that is stopping there. And this got into all sorts of 
metaphysical problems about just what is the alliance apart 
from its members, and got confused with the question of the 
political decisions of an alliance, about whether to go to war 
or not and matters of that sort.
    This language here that I just mentioned seems to cut 
through that and concentrate on the hardware, the actual 
nuclear warheads.
    Now, we have discussed this and I would appreciate it very 
much if members of the committee would make no reference to 
this outside because we have discussed this with the four 
members of NATO who are members of the Geneva Conference, that 
is, the other three, Britain, Italy and Canada.
    We are also discussing it with the Germans, and we are also 
discussing it in a preliminary way with the Japanese.
    We will shortly be discussing it with the rest of the NATO 
members.

                         ACCEPTABLE TO GERMANY

    I am encouraged to believe that at least as far as the NATO 
countries are concerned, including Germany, this is probably 
going to prove acceptable and, therefore, I think we can 
assume----
    Senator Lausche. Did you say it will be acceptable to 
Germany?
    Secretary Rusk. That is the present indication. They have 
had some problems about such things as the European Clause, 
reserving a right for a unified Europe to have its own nuclear 
force. But it now seems clear to them that if a unified Europe 
comes about through the political consolidation of the present 
European members that it would be a nuclear power through 
direct succession from France and, say, Great Britain. That if 
there are other arrangements which may come 10, 20 years in the 
future that they could invoke the review clauses that would be 
in such a treaty or if necessary, actually withdraw from the 
treaty.
    Let me say, that we will be in consultation with the 
appropriate committees of the Congress on this before any 
agreement is given to any language that might be developed 
here.
    But I just wanted to let the committee know we think there 
has been some movement.

                  PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

    But there are two other problems that are of major 
importance in the nonproliferation matter that you should know 
about. One is that the non-nuclear countries, such as India and 
Japan, are going to raise or likely to raise some very, very 
difficult problems. For example, both of them say, ``Well, now, 
it is all very well to get rid of nuclear weapons or for us to 
foreswear nuclear weapons, but we need to reserve the right to 
have nuclear explosives available for peaceful purposes.''
    Nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is a bomb for all 
practical purposes. We hope to be able to work out among the 
nuclear powers, at least some of the nuclear powers, a 
procedure by which we can make peaceful uses of explosives 
available to non-nuclear countries, under some arrangements by 
which you make a judgment on its feasibility and desirability 
and so forth. So, if Mauritania wants a harbor and applies to 
the nuclear powers to explode a device there and dig them a 
harbor, there will be some way in which this can be done. 
Otherwise, some of the non-nuclear countries are likely to use 
this at least as a pretext for not coming into this treaty.
    Secondly, there is a very difficult question about 
safeguards. We feel ourselves that this non-proliferation 
treaty would be a very important instrument which to deal with 
the safeguards problem. When you look ahead over the next 
several years, with the rapid developments of nuclear power, 
there is going to be enough fuel lying around to make a 
considerable number of bombs a day within the next decade or 
so, or by 1980, and so a general application of a safeguard 
system is extremely important.
    The Soviets are more or less disinterested in safeguards in 
this situation. But they, I think, would take it, provided we 
could all take the IAEA safeguard, the Vienna safeguards.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ International Atomic Energy Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          THE EURATOM PROBLEM

    Then we run into the Euratom problem because the five 
members who are members of Euratom are unwilling to accept IAEA 
rather than their own safeguard, worked out among them. In that 
matter France has a veto. So, I want to alert you to the fact 
even though we got agreement on Article I, there are tough 
problems remaining. We need to do something about.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, are all five of those 
countries strongly opposed to IAEA?
    Secretary Rusk. No, Senator, you are quite right. I think 
four out of the five would probably accept IAEA safeguards.
    Senator Clark. Are you sure France would not?
    Secretary Rusk. This is being tested, now. But the trouble 
is their attitude toward a non-proliferation treaty is frigid.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. The present indication is they would not 
now sign a non-proliferation treaty although they might do it 
at a later stage. They tell us they won't get in the way of a 
non-proliferation treaty, but that is about as far as we can go 
along this line.
    Mr. Chairman. I talked a little longer that I had planned 
to.

                          SITUATION IN ISRAEL

    The Chairman. Just one other subject before you go on. I 
wonder about Israel. There seems to be, from this morning's 
press, a very dangerous situation there. Could you say a word 
about it?
    Secretary Rusk. The issue at the present time centers along 
the Israeli-Syrian border. There are three elements in the 
problem in terms of repose in the area. One is the activities 
of a Fatah organization of terrorists, who we think are not 
directly and actively supported by any of the governments 
concerned. Particularly not by Jordan, who has been trying to 
operate against them but who use Syrian and Jordanian territory 
for acts of sabotage and terror over the Israeli border.
    On that particular point, Jordan and Israel have greatly 
increased their police action on their respective sides of the 
border to try to deal with that activity as a police matter.
    There is a more complicated matter between Israel and 
Syria. At the time of the armistice, Syrian forces were 
occupying a strip within the historical boundaries of the 
mandate. Under the armistice, Syrian forces withdrew from that 
strip under demilitarized regulations. Israel claims since this 
was territory within the mandate and is Israeli territory, and 
they claim to exercise sovereignty over the subject as to 
demilitarized regulations.
    The Syrians claim this has never been legally established, 
and so you have both Israeli and Syrian farmers in this strip. 
Arms are fired into the area from the Syrian side typically, 
with response from the Israeli side. Israelis patrol on 
occasion in this area with their own armored vehicles, so you 
have a continuation of this particular kind of struggle.

                       DO NOT EXPECT A MAJOR WAR

    I don't myself, think, sir, that this is likely to lead to 
a major war.
    The Chairman. You do not?
    Secretary Rusk. Athough--because I don't think, for 
example, the Syrians are particularly interested in it. We know 
the Israelis are not interested in a major war in this 
situation, but it is a very troublesome problem as to how you 
handle these repeated acts of terror back and forth across the 
border, particularly in that area.
    General Bull, the head of the U.N. force out there, is 
trying to make some arrangement--the Arabs would say, ``Let the 
U.N. forces take charge in this demilitarized area and provide 
the police forces,'' while the Israeli and Syrian farmers go 
ahead with their agricultural work. As a matter of fact, 
farmers on both sides apparently get along pretty well until 
somebody from outside the demilitarized zone starts shooting in 
from outside the area.
    But that is about the situation, Mr. Chairman. It is tense, 
but we don't----
    The Chairman. You don't expect a major war?
    Secretary Rusk. We don't expect a major war.

                    U.S. OBJECTIVES REGARDING CHINA

    The Chairman. I wonder, you started out on China and you 
said you thought it was probably the most important matter at 
the moment, I wonder if you could briefly say what our attitude 
or policy is toward China. What is our objective with regard to 
China at the moment or to put it another way, is our policy to 
continue nonintervention and to continue all possible means to 
exclude them from the U.N. and so on? Would you say just very 
briefly what our attitude is?
    Secretary Rusk. I think our principal problem we have with 
China is the one which a foreign minister of an eastern 
European country described as moving Peking to peaceful 
coexistence and the issue we have in trying to organize a 
durable peace in the Pacific Ocean basin.
    But as far as Peking is concerned, the key question turns 
out to be always the attitude toward Formosa. In our bilateral 
talks with them, as I have indicated to the committee, before 
they start and end with a statement by the Peking 
representative that ``There is nothing to discuss unless you 
are prepared to surrender Formosa,'' and when we say we can't 
surrender these 13 or 14 million people contrary to their will, 
then nothing else happens. That is, we have tried to talk about 
disarmament, tried to talk about Southeast Asia, exchanges, 
exchange of plant material, for example, relevant to the food 
problem and things of that sort, scientists, scholars, newsmen, 
and so forth.
    The same issue remains in the United Nations. The question 
of what to do about Peking is coupled with the question of what 
to do with the Republic of China. If we are not prepared to 
surrender Formosa, then Peking is not going to talk to us 
bilaterally about serious matters in any responsible sense. If 
the United Nations is not prepared to expel the Republic of 
China, then the problem remains about where it is.
    We are continuing our contacts with Peking, but it comes 
back to that question as to what you do about the 13 or 14 
million people there, as well as in the longer run, what their 
attitude is going to be toward what the Soviets call peaceful 
coexistence.
    The Chairman. You sum up there is no change in that 
situation, no movement?
    Secretary Rusk. No present change indicated.
    The Chairman. No present change.
    Secretary Rusk. For the reasons I stated.

                   U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

    The Chairman. Could you restate for the record the 
objectives of our policy in Southeast Asia? What is it we are 
seeking now to achieve there?
    Secretary Rusk. We should like to see an accord with our 
treaty commitments there through a situation in which in the 
first place our allies are safe and secure, in which the 
smaller countries of Southeast Asia are free to live their own 
national existence under what policies they wish, but living in 
peace with their neighbors across their frontiers. We have said 
many times we consider that as far as what used to be Indo-
China is concerned, we consider the 1954 and 1962 agreements to 
be an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. That if the 
movement of men and arms from North Vietnam to South Vietnam 
would stop, we could work out the peace very quickly, and we do 
believe those '54 and '62 agreements do provide such a basis.
    But that the countries with whom we are allied in Southeast 
Asia, that means the Philippines and Thailand, ought to be free 
from molestation.
    We have no objection to their being non-aligned if that is 
their wish. We supported the non-alignments of Laos and of 
Cambodia, of Burma, any of those countries that want to be non-
aligned, but we are concerned about the stability of peace in 
the area.

                          THE FOURTEEN POINTS

    I have, Mr. Chairman, made a few notes on the so-called 14 
points that were used last year as they have developed during 
the course of the year, and I will be glad to pass those around 
for anyone who wishes to have a look at them.
    We have not released these to the press in their present 
form, although I think everything that is on these three pages 
has been said publicly at one time or another, but Mr. Marcy 
might want to have these.

                           SEATO OBLIGATIONS

    The Chairman. One reason I asked you that was because I 
heard a part of your appearance on that early morning show, I 
think a week or maybe ten days ago.
    Secretary Rusk. Today Show.
    The Chairman. Perhaps, and you correct me if I misstate 
this, you said one of the reasons we are there is in accordance 
with obligations in the SEATO Treaty. But beyond and above that 
is the necessity for stopping the, I think, tendency or 
inclination to aggression. Was that a correct statement or not? 
Do you remember how you put it?
    Secretary Rusk. I don't recall that I put it just that way. 
I did point out----
    The Chairman. You put it correctly.
    Secretary Rusk. I did point out that we ourselves have a 
very important stake in the organization of a durable peace in 
the Pacific. We have alliances with Korea and Japan and the 
Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New 
Zealand. And our interest in a stable peace in the Pacific 
compares to our interest in such a peace in the Atlantic.
    I would be glad to get--I don't happen to have a transcript 
with me, Mr. Chairman, but we have not set ourselves up to play 
the role of general policeman in the world. I think the last 
time we gave an account of various crises there were about 
seventy, and we took an interest in about six of them over the 
various years, but we do have specific commitments and we do 
feel these specific commitments are very important to the 
possibility of organizing peace.
    The Chairman. I thought perhaps I misunderstood you, that 
there was something beyond those specific commitments in the 
way of aggression that was, I thought you gave in detail. I 
could be wrong about that.

                    SECRET REPORT ON BOMBING POLICY

    Mr. Chalmers Roberts recently had a story from which I 
quote:

    There is a top secret report by the Central Intelligence 
Agency and Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency casting doubt 
on the military efficacy of bombing.

    Is there such a report?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that--there are many examinations of 
that question. I don't think there is a report that is looked 
at frequently.
    The Chairman. A recent report.
    Secretary Rusk. I think the key points that are made in 
these examinations is that the bombing has not stopped the 
infiltration, that it has not brought the other side to the 
conference table, but that from an operational point of view in 
terms of lines of communication and the capacity of the other 
side to sustain his effort, the expense to him of sustaining 
his effort, shows that the bombing does impose upon him a very 
substantial additional burden.
    The Chairman. Is that the principal reason for maintaining 
the bombing, the burden it imposes on the North?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that is an important reason. I think, 
also, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at a situation where North 
Vietnam could be safe and comfortable, and undisturbed while it 
sends its armed forces and arms into South Vietnam, that the 
prospect that this war would last a long time is greatly 
strengthened.
    I don't know what the incentive would be for North Vietnam 
to stop doing what it is doing if it could be completely 
comfortable.
    The Chairman. It is an ideal situation for it to occupy, 
sit there safe without being afraid of any damage being done to 
them while our men and South Vietnamese men are being killed.

                 NOT FIGHTING COMMUNISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

    This question has been asked me on one or two occasions 
along this line: In the State of the Union Message the 
President used the word ``Communist'' six times in discussing 
the situation in Vietnam. But in talking about the Soviet 
Union, Eastern Europe, and China he did not use the word once. 
If it is United States policy to fight communism as an ideology 
in Vietnam, what is the position with regard to building 
bridges with Communists in Eastern Europe?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think the point is that we are 
not fighting communism as an ideology. We are not undertaking a 
world crusade to do that. What we are doing, as we have done 
before, is resist aggression by these Communist countries 
against those with whom we have commitments and/or in whom we 
have a vital stake. I said that because we did go to the aid of 
Greece without a treaty obligation. We went to the aid of Korea 
without a treaty obligation.
    But this point arises, for example, in connection with the 
question as to whether we are at the front edges of a detente 
with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. We think we well 
might be, we hope we are, and we will explore every possibility 
of contributing to that detente.
    But we didn't get there, we didn't get to this present 
position by giving away Azerbaijan or Greece to the guerrillas 
or the eastern provinces of Turkey or Berlin or Korea or the 
Congo and some of these other situations. It has been a long 
and difficult path to the point where there is considerable 
prudence on both sides.
    What we would hope to see is a corresponding prudence of 
the eastern wing, the Asian wing; of the Communist Party, which 
has isolated itself even within the Communist world, largely 
because of its excessive militancy, and there is some 
possibility of that when we see the shape of the second 
generation of leadership in Peking, and this may come sooner 
than sometimes we think, there may be a little more prudence 
there.

                    NEW GENERATION OF SOVIET LEADERS

    We do have a second generation now present in the Soviet 
Union. There is no longer an old Bolshevik in the government of 
the Soviet Union. Mr. Mikoyan was the last one.
    There seems to be some prudence there.
    I don't want to exaggerate that because when we look at 
what the Soviets are doing in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and 
Somalia, we still have some problems, but we are prepared to 
contribute to that possibility of detente if we can manage it. 
So, this is not a general question of ideology. These are 
specific acts taken against countries with whom we have treaty 
commitments.

                          COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

    The Chairman. Is it fair to say if the North Vietnamese 
were not Communists that we would have intervened in this case? 
Do you think we would or would not?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think when you gentlemen approved 
the Southeast Asia Treaty, when it was signed, it was made 
clear by the government at that time that treaty referred only 
to Communist aggression. I think the thinking behind that was 
that neighborhood quarrels across frontiers are not the 
problems that are going to inflame the entire world. We didn't 
get involved when Algeria and Morocco were shooting each other, 
and we haven't gotten involved in a lot of these neighborhood 
disputes, but where you have pressures outward from a regime 
which proclaims that it is going after the world revolution and 
supported by militant minds, then you have the possibilities of 
a momentum of aggression that deeply threatens the 
possibilities of the peace of the world.
    The Chairman. Do you think that this is realistic to apply 
to a country of 14 million people that were about to take over 
the world or even planning to?
    Secretary Rusk. It is not just these people. Their big 
brothers to the North have also announced they are going after 
some of these other countries, like Thailand.
    The Chairman. Then it is the Communists--what I am trying 
to clarify is, is this the overshadowing reason because they 
are Communists or not? Is this in your opinion, and the 
Department, or the government's opinion, the principal reason 
we are there because they are Communists and part of an 
international conspiracy?
    Secretary Rusk. That is what the SEATO Treaty----
    The Chairman. What do you think? I was trying to pick your 
brains.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, sir, there is a difference 
between those quarrels which have a built-in insatiable 
appetite on one side, and there is a world revolution----
    The Chairman. Is that characteristic of North Vietnam in 
your opinion?
    Secretary Rusk. And Peking, yes. I mean----
    The Chairman. Then, if you change it a little, then it is 
Peking, is this Peking's aggression we are dealing with? I am 
just trying to take one step at a time.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we haven't made a special point that 
this is Peking's aggression, but Peking's support of Hanoi in 
this matter is crucial to Hanoi's position, and if Peking 
showed the slightest interest in peace in this situation my 
guess is that peace could be arranged rather quickly.

                    CONFUSION OVER U.S. INTERVENTION

    The Chairman. But this is the point that I think is behind 
much of the confusion and perhaps the dissent that you--I 
think, the government objects to. If we can clarify it, I think 
it would be very useful to those of us who are called upon to 
clarify it nearly every day. To our constituents and otherwise, 
as to just why it is we are there, what makes this quarrel so 
important.
    You have already said you didn't intervene in these other 
areas, Tunisia, Algeria. You didn't intervene in other places, 
but you did here.
    Now, why is it that this is so peculiar?
    First, let me, let's eliminate it, it isn't because North 
Vietnam is so powerful that it threatens the peace of the world 
in itself as a country, is it?
    Secretary Rusk. It threatens the peace of Southeast Asia, 
Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.
    The Chairman. But if it wasn't Communist, what in your 
opinion would we have done, would we have intervened?
    Secretary Rusk. My guess is if it were not Communist it 
would not be doing what it is doing. If you look at the 
actions----
    The Chairman. Why would you guess that? I don't follow that 
at all. I mean, the Germans haven't resorted to force, but they 
certainly are eager for reunification of their country, and 
there are very substantial reasons. But here I think it would 
be natural that these people would want to reunify their 
country. Every country seems to want to do that.
    Secretary Rusk. And if the people themselves deciding these 
questions freely on their own in the two parts of the countries 
involved were to agree on reunification, we would not object to 
that.
    It is the attempt to impose reunification by force that we 
objected to, we would in Germany and we would in Korea.

                 U.S. OPPOSITION TO VIETNAMESE ELECTION

    The Chairman. We did object to an election in '56, didn't 
we? We objected to an election being held at that time, and I 
understood from what people have written about it because we 
thought if you had an election it would be reunified under Ho 
Chi Minh.
    Secretary Rusk. Incidentally, I have not been able to find 
in the record instructions to our embassy saying that we 
opposed elections out there. I have been trying to find what 
the instructions were during that period. But at that time, Mr. 
Chairman, it seemed to be obvious to everybody that there was 
no possibility of a free election in the North and, therefore, 
the question was do you have free elections in the South only 
with everything rigged in the North?
    General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1956, I think it is in your 
committee report, I have brought up at a public hearing last 
year, General Giap in 1956 described what was happening in the 
North during that period and the mistakes they made in terms of 
terror and intimidation and torture and things of that sort. He 
was very frank about it. And it was the judgment at that time 
in Saigon that under those circumstances a free election was 
simply not possible, apart from the problems they might have 
had in South Vietnam about free elections.
    The Chairman. That makes free elections, I guess--I don't 
know any other way, however, to bring this to issue.

                   GRADUAL NATURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

    Senator Lausche. Will the chairman point out to me so that 
I will be able to better understand what he is aiming to prove, 
is it your position that we should pull out?
    The Chairman. No, I don't think that is feasible. I wish we 
never had been involved.
    Mr. Max Frankel said the other day, he is one of the people 
more or less sympathetic with our position there. He says if 
the matter was up today for our sending five hundred thousand 
troops from ab initio--from the beginning--to save Saigon, we 
wouldn't do it. The reason we are there is because of the very 
gradual nature of the involvement, a little at a time, a little 
more and a little more and finally we find ourselves there.
    This is his theory, and I was trying to really see if the 
Secretary could give me information that is better able to 
answer questions as to why we are involved here.
    Is it fear of Vietnam? No. Is it because of China, and if 
so, is there evidence China is a very aggressive nation, and 
should we be fearful of China and try to destroy her now? I 
don't know what we want to do with her. I just wondered.

                            A LARGER CONTEXT

    Secretary Rusk. I don't want to take up an undue amount of 
time, but I would just like to pull back a step or two and take 
a look at this in a somewhat larger context.
    The Chairman. I think that is good.
    Secretary Rusk. President Kennedy, President Johnson and 
their Secretary of State have not come to the Senate with 
additional alliances. President Kennedy came down here with a 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. President Johnson has concluded the 
Civil Air Agreement. He presented you the consular agreement, 
and he hopes we can present you with an East-West Trade 
Agreement. He presented you with a space treaty, and we hope we 
can present you with a nonproliferation treaty.
    But after the war during the 50's at a time when the 
Communist world was pressing almost on all fronts, and 
resorting to armed force and a number of circumstances, we made 
some alliances in the interest of building a stable peace in 
the world.
    Now, in the case of the SEATO Treaty, the administration at 
that time, and the Senate said that each party recognizes that 
aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would 
endanger its own peace and safety and agrees it will in that 
event act to meet the common danger and so forth.
    Now, if this matter were presented afresh today, I mean if, 
say, yesterday there was the kind of an invasion of South 
Vietnam that occurred in Korea by organized divisions publicly 
and formally coming across the demarcation line, I am not at 
all clear that Mr. Frankel is right in saying that we couldn't 
do it. I think that is something that the President and the 
leadership would have to look at and look at in terms of what 
happens in the world if we fail to meet one of these solemn 
treaty commitments in the organization of peace.

                         WORKING TOWARD DETENTE

    I point out since 1947, we have spent something on the 
order of $900 billion in defense budgets and fantastic 
resources. And we have only barely by the skin of our teeth 
been able to come to a position where there may be some 
possibility of enough prudence on both sides to work toward 
some sort of a detente, say, between ourselves and eastern 
Europe. We are only four or five years away from a major crisis 
over Berlin and only five years ago from a most horrible crisis 
over Cuban missiles. It only has been a very narrow thing that 
we begin to see the possibility of something like peaceful 
coexistence with some sort of real content in the expression 
opening up here.
    I think the overriding question is how do you organize a 
durable peace. And it is not for me to be presumptuous, Mr. 
Chairman, but I think it is worth your committee's considering 
whether it might wish to address itself to that problem, taking 
into account such changes as might have occurred since 1945, 
since the United Nations Charter was signed, to see what the 
changes are, if any, what they mean and how these changes bear 
upon the general problem of organizing a durable peace in the 
world.

               APPREHENSIONS ABOUT ESCALATION OF THE WAR

    The Chairman. Well, of course, what bothers me is I think 
we are more apprehensive, I am today, than at any other time. I 
am more apprehensive than 20 years ago. I am apprehensive about 
this war and its escalation. I don't want to prolong this.
    I want to call on Mr. Mansfield. I want to again recall for 
the record in your own Department of State memorandum of March 
8, 1965 which was entitled ``Legal basis for U.S. action in 
Vietnam,'' that your own statement refers to the U.N. Charter 
and the Geneva Accords and didn't even mention the SEATO 
Treaty. This is what causes so much trouble with us, trying to 
understand it.
    It wasn't until recently that the SEATO Treaty has been 
given in justification for this involvement, and I am still 
very puzzled about it.
    Mr. Mansfield?

                            THE SEATO TREATY

    Senator Lausche. Will you re-read that SEATO Treaty 
declaring why these nations have joined in the compact? That is 
considered as a challenge to their own security.
    Secretary Rusk. In the preamble they said, among other 
things:

    Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and 
to uphold the principles of democracy and individual liberty 
and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well being and 
development of all peoples in the Treaty area, intending to 
declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any 
potential aggressor will appreciate that the parties standing 
together in the area, and desiring further to coordinate their 
efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace 
and security.

    But there was added by the United States the understanding 
in the treaty, that the United States, in executing the present 
treaty, does so with the understanding that its recognition of 
the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement 
with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only 
to communist aggression.
    The reason for that was that it was not the desire to 
become involved in other kinds of neighborhood disputes, 
particularly, for example, the Pakistan-India dispute and I 
gather Senator Mansfield may recall this better than I. And I 
gather when Mr. Dulles made it clear that this was the 
interpretation of the United States, that there was a period of 
24 hours or more when the Pakistan representative was very 
uncertain about whether Pakistan would sign it or not. That is 
my recollection of what the record shows.
    The Chairman. I don't think it was contemplated that we 
would intervene in a civil war on account of this, either.
    Senator Sparkman?
    Senator Sparkman. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have been in and 
out.
    I noticed some other items we have on this suggested agenda 
here,\2\ I don't know whether you have seen them or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ MEMORANDUM
    Suggested Areas of Questioning for Secretary Rusk, January 16, 1967
    1. Vietnam
    a. Effectiveness of bombing in North Vietnam;
    b. Indications of willingness to negotiate on part of North Vietnam 
and National Liberation Front;
    c. Progress of pacification;
    d. Political developments in South Vietnam;
    e. United States military activity in the Mekong Delta;
    f. Basis for statistics on incidents, casualties, desertions, etc.
    2. Thailand
    a. Scale and targets of counterinsurgency efforts;
    b. United States role in counterinsurgency;
    c. United States military buildup on Thailand;
    d. Are Thai troops being sent to Vietnam?
    3. Significance of Current Uproar in China
    4. Prospects for a Non-Proliferation Agreement
    5. Soviet Deployment of a Limited Anti-Ballistic Missile System
    6. Prelimary Findings of the Tripartite Working Group on NATO Force 
Levels in Europe
    7. Reasons for Delaying Food Shipments to India and Estimate of 
Future Indian Requirements
    8. Situation in Rhodesia and Southern Africa Generally
    9. Implications of Military Aid and Sales in Latin America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Secretary Rusk. I haven't seen it.
    Senator Sparkman. That I might ask you rather briefly 
about.
    First, have you asked questions about Thailand?
    The Chairman. No, I did not.
    Go ahead.

                       THE SITUATION IN THAILAND

    Senator Sparkman. I wonder if you can give us something 
about the Thailand situation, first of all. Just what are we up 
against there and what are the prospects?
    Secretary Rusk. At the present time, there are several 
hundred, rather than several thousand trained guerrillas 
operating in the northeastern part of the country. This is a 
rather remote area, and has been difficult for the government 
to organize its police and security forces on as tight a basis 
as would be necessary to deal with such small numbers of 
guerrillas.
    We also know in North Vietnam there is a training camp for 
Thais who have been trained in North Vietnam to enter Thailand. 
We know that Thailand is under pressure from its north and 
northeast, but we feel unless there is a major increase in the 
effort made by the North Vietnamese or the Chinese coming 
directly down from China that the Thais seem to have the 
capability of dealing with this. They have been very careful 
themselves not to have U.S. soldiers involved in their 
activities in the villages. We have helped them with 
transportation into the general areas on occasion through 
helicopter lifts. But beyond that, Thailand is a member of the 
SEATO Treaty, is supporting the effort in Vietnam, has made 
certain of its facilities available to us and to our armed 
forces, and is contributing certain forces to South Vietnam.
    On the internal side, they are doing reasonably well on the 
economic side. They are now working on a constitution 
acquisition that is led by Prince Huan, who served here once as 
ambassador. In the months ahead, it is possible they will 
promulgate that constitution and move toward a more elected 
government than they have at the present time.

              HANOI'S OPPOSITION TO U.S BASES IN THAILAND

    Senator Sparkman. I notice the New York Times had quite an 
article in a recent issue, as did the Washington Evening Star. 
The New York Times article is entitled ``Hanoi Demands Thai Ban 
on U.S. Use of Bases.'' Just how strong is their demand and do 
they threaten action in the event that----
    Secretary Rusk. Well, they are taking action at the present 
time within the limits of these guerrilla operations that I 
mentioned.
    Senator Sparkman. Are they under the direction of Hanoi?
    Secretary Rusk. Well they are being trained in North 
Vietnam.
    There is a Thai training camp there. We have taken pictures 
of it. We have prisoners who tell us where it is and what goes 
on there.
    They then apparently infiltrate through the northern part 
of Laos into the northeastern part of Thailand.

                           THE MEKONG VALLEY

    Senator Sparkman. Just as a matter of curiosity, I saw 
somewhere reference to that northeast section of Thailand along 
the Mekong River saying it was the poorest section of the 
country. I thought that was a very fertile valley.
    Secretary Rusk. The Mekong Valley itself is reasonably 
fertile. They were damaged by the heavy floods that occurred 
along that part of the Mekong this past year, both in Laos and 
in northeast Thailand. But I think one of the principal reasons 
for the backwardness of northeast Thailand when you look at it, 
is more generally, rather than just in the river valley where 
there is communication by river, is lack of communications and 
mountain jungle, undeveloped in the usual sense. I think it's 
the lack of communications that is the principal problem in 
terms of both development and security. It is somewhat like the 
northeast corridor of Cambodia in that respect where we know 
the Viet Cong are using Cambodian territory. We don't think 
with the approval or the permission of Prince Sihanouk but yet 
it is remote and rugged terrain into which his own security 
forces can't go to monitor the situation in any way.

                PRESS COVERAGE OF A HUSH-HUSH OPERATION

    Senator Sparkman. In that same issue of the The Star there 
was a headline ``14 million dollars annual savings possible by 
the B-52 use of those bases,'' Is that a pretty reasonable 
evaluation?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there are some operations advantages 
in the short run compared with the several hours from Guam. The 
bases there are not at the present time fitted for B-52 
operations. This is a question for the future. No decision has 
been made. The Thais apparently would be agreeable but we 
ourselves have not made a final decision on that point.
    Senator Sparkman. Why have we had such little discussion 
publicly of what we are doing in Thailand? Is it a hush-hush 
operation? The papers seem to get hold of it somehow.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there are two or three reasons. One 
is that we do not wish officially to talk about which 
particular operations go from which bases, but more importantly 
the Thais themselves feel that the settlement of the situation 
in Southeast Asia would be facilitated if these matters are not 
made major matters of public prestige and things of that sort. 
We are in Thailand. The Thai Government has a veto on that. We 
think they themselves will say more about this fairly shortly. 
But they have been very insistent upon not going into details 
because they say that in the Southeast Asian situation it is 
better to try to keep the Vietnam situation from a political 
point of view in as narrow channels as possible in order not be 
get the problems of a settlement too complicated.
    These are open secrets. The only problem is how far we go 
in confirming officially what goes on.
    Senator Sparkman. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. In order to avoid the Thai sensibilities.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have lots of questions 
but everybody around the table wants a chance to ask, so I will 
pass.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

                         RESTRAINTS ON BOMBING

    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the 
question which Senator Fulbright asked you and which was 
discussed with respect to the bombing, whether or not that had 
any effect of lessening or diminishing the activities of the 
North Vietnamese, does the fact that we don't bomb a lot of 
military targets up there lessen the probability of quieting 
them down? In other words, the stories we get here are that 
Russian MIGs sit on the airfield up there and our pilots are 
forbidden to bomb those airfields or destroy those Russian MIGs 
sitting there.
    Then we get the argument which doesn't appeal to me very 
much, if we bomb these they will just move into the air bases 
in China and if we bomb those then the fat will be in the fire. 
Is it not a fact we are not bombing many targets in North 
Vietnam which would really hurt their military efforts?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the list of important targets that 
could be called military targets that have not been bombed is 
really relatively small, Senator.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Quite important, though, aren't they?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I suppose in one sense the most 
important of these would be the Haiphong harbor and there are 
one or two plants inside the perimeter of Hanoi. For example, 
there is a steel plant, a cement plant which would have some 
direct relationship to their operations.
    We have kept the airfields outside of the immediate Hanoi 
area out of our operation because it takes a great deal of 
striking to do it, and the repair of an airfield is not too 
complicated a matter.
    Senator Hickenlooper. But the destruction of MIGs would be.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. Actually, the MIGs have not been all 
that much of a problem in terms of our own forces. We have felt 
that, and I don't want to preclude what the future might hold 
in this in either direction, but we have felt we ought to try 
to keep the situation within certain limits, if we can find 
some possibility that the other side is prepared to talk sense 
about peace in this situation.
    You know we have had some recent MIG 21 engagements in 
which I think some nine MIGs were shot down. Which were at 
least about half of what they had there. The MIGs have not 
given us much trouble nor indeed have the SAM sites in the 
main. The principal problem has come from the conventional 
anti-aircraft scattered all over the place. There are other 
factors to be taken into account about the airfields. They are 
very, very heavily protected by anti-aircraft. The prospects of 
substantial losses on our side are pretty good, and the 
question is as to whether the losses would be larger if we held 
our hand and took on these follows in the air. But, again, 
these are tactical decisions the Commander in Chief would have 
to make at the end of the day, and I wouldn't want to foreclose 
the future.

                 TARGETS ARE AUTHORIZED FROM WASHINGTON

    Senator Hickenlooper. Are those decisions made in South 
Vietnam or are they made over here at the pentagon?
    Secretary Rusk. The principal fixed targets are authorized 
from Washington.
    Now, there are certain areas in what is called route 
reconnaissance authorized for the purpose of hitting trucks and 
barges and other things that are moving supplies to the south. 
But the principal fixed targets are authorized from here in 
light of the recommendation from the field and from the Joint 
Chiefs.
    One of the factors, I might add that are taken into account 
in regard to those fixed targets is the prospect of civilian 
casualties and one of the columns in which you take up these 
questions shows the probable civilian casualties, and there 
have been some targets which have been taken off the list 
because of the prospect of significance of civilian casualties.

                   IMPACT OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you this question. I want 
to hurry on because I have a good many questions to ask here: 
Would you care to venture an opinion as to what would have 
happened by now in Indonesia under Sukarno's leadership if we 
had not stood fast in South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. It is very hard to be precise about that--
--
    Senator Hickenlooper. I know you can't----
    Secretary Rusk. I am inclined myself, Senator, to think 
that there was a connection but not a decisive one, that in the 
event of October a year ago, in Jakarta this was a PKT 
operation with some Chinese help, that did not expect to rely 
upon the presence of Chinese armed forces from China. They 
almost succeeded and came within a gnat's eyelash of 
succeeding. They got six generals and had they gotten two more 
the thing would have been over.
    But I think the presence of U.S. and British forces in 
Southeast Asia, a combination of them there, did lead these 
generals to believe they at least would not be subject to major 
intervention from China. Now, saving Haidsah----
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Hickenlooper. Would you say if we had not been in 
South Vietnam, communism would have made tremendous strides in 
Indonesia.
    Secretary Rusk. That would be the implication of what he 
said, of his remark; but I would be inclined to discount his 
remarks somewhat.
    I do feel, Senator, that what is--that the stand we have 
taken in Vietnam has made a considerable difference to all of 
those free countries in Asia, the ten, for example, who met in 
Korea this past year and affirmed their support of South 
Vietnam and expressed their appreciation for those giving help, 
both Asian and non-Asian, and from Korea and Japan right around 
through, all the way to India, there is a confidence that, I 
think, would not have been there, that is making some 
difference as to how they comport themselves.

                        THE RHODESIAN SITUATION

    Senator Hickenlooper. I want to move on for just a quick 
question or two here: As you know, and I have talked to you 
about this, the Rhodesian situation troubles me very greatly, 
and I was greatly disturbed when the President signed the 
executive order of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on 
January 5th.
    I fail to agree with him in my own mind. I suppose I can 
rationalize it if I go way-round rationalization, as to why did 
he undertake to attempt to destroy one of the most progressive 
and successful governments and economies in all Africa by this 
kind of action. I understand the sovereignty theory and all 
that that is being advanced. I don't happen to agree with it, 
but I understand it, I understand what it is. What are we 
trying to do there?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, first, Senator, we feel that this is, 
in the first instance, a problem for the Commonwealth, 
Britain----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Why did we get into it?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we didn't buy into it ourselves, on 
our own initiative. We didn't go around drumming up business on 
this one. It was presented to us in the first instance by joint 
action and joint position by some 18 members of the 
Commonwealth, and a reference of this question to the Security 
Council by the Commonwealth.
    Now we are sitting in the Security Council, and when it 
comes before the Council we have to ourselves decide what 
attitude we take. The United Kingdom introduced a resolution. 
We had to vote yes or no or abstain. We did help to fend off 
much more extreme resolutions in the Security Council, for 
example, the use of force, but we have felt that basically, 
quite frankly, that the attitude of the Commonwealth is sound 
in this situation, that the Rhodesian question is, in fact, a 
threat to the peace in the longer run unless there is some 
modification of view. What we have been hoping all along was 
that discussions would lead to a peaceful settlement of the 
situation. They came very close in the conversations on the 
cruiser Tiger between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Ian 
Smith, but it broke down apparently on the issues as to which 
side was going to trust the other during the interim period of 
about three months.
    Now the hope is that when the present Rhodesian leadership 
looks down the longer range of the future, that they will 
become convinced that further negotiations and talk are 
required, and that the British would also take that view, 
although both sides have become very grumpy about further talks 
at the present time.
    This is not a matter which has to be settled overnight, but 
there surely has to be some movement toward a settlement with 
which the 4 million Africans in Rhodesia can live and with 
which their neighbors can live. Otherwise you are going to have 
a situation in which all sorts of people would be mobilizing 
themselves to try to prevent the movement into this part of 
Africa of an apartheid approach.
    The Communist world will seize these issues and exploit 
them to a very considerable extent. So we feel that the Ian 
Smith regime must make some adjustments here in order to get 
this on the track of peaceful settlement that its own 4 million 
majority can live with.

                  THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. The net result of the British 
position and ours would seem to me to be--or would seem to me 
to be the destruction of Southern Rhodesia, that is, in other 
words, for a viable going economy to be turned over to the 
natives over there, who mentally are not capable of running a 
government with the same success that it is being run now.
    Secretary Rusk. Excuse me----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Go ahead.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, please.
    In the first place, Senator, I do not believe that the 
Africans either in Rhodesia or outside Rhodesia would require 
that the government of Rhodesia be required to be turned over 
overnight all of a sudden to blacks.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That has been the case in most other 
countries in Africa, has it not?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that has been true--well, they have a 
white member of the cabinet in Tanzania; I think they have 
white members in Kenya, and Liberia, they have worked out 
relations between the races in a rather constructive fashion.
    One of the problems in the Rhodesian matter is that it is 
the kind of an issue that could destroy the working 
relationships between the whites and blacks in that government 
even in those countries where the working relationships are 
sound and in reasonably good order. But we do feel that--and 
this is the Commonwealth view--that there needs to be some 
movement in this matter. There are many interim steps to be 
taken which would bring more repose in this situation.
    Now, if Ian Smith were to permit some of those interim 
steps, the stake could be worked out.
    Again let me say that the Tiger agreement represented some 
of those interim steps and apparently the key point on which 
that broke down was the question of who would be responsible 
for law and order in the country during an interim period when 
a new constitution would be promulgated and on the basis of 
which Rhodesia would become independent. That constitution 
itself would itself have included interim steps rather than a 
final solution and apparently the cabinet in Salisbury would 
not agree to let the Governor General have control of the 
security forces of the country during that brief interim period 
before a new constitution might be promulgated and that is 
where it broke down.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think my time is up.

                            LEGAL MEMORANDUM

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief memorandum 
here on some of the legal aspects and charter aspects. I might 
give this to Mr. Marcy in case any members of the committee 
might wish to have a look at it.
    The Chairman. Senator Morse.
    Senator Lausche. Could copies be provided of that legal 
memorandum?
    Senator Morse. The committee can provide them.
    The Chairman. The committee can make copies if you want 
one.
    The Senator from Oregon.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I shall confine my questions 
to certain problems that I think have arisen as a result of U 
Thant's proposals. I shall read this legal memorandum that you 
have just referred to with great care.

                        DISAGREEMENT OVER SEATO

    I only want to say in passing, by way of a caveat, of 
course, I do not share in any degree the State Department's 
position on SEATO. I think that the chairman has pointed out 
here the March 8, 1965, memorandum as to the administration's 
legal justification for its involvement with North Vietnam. It 
does not even whisper about SEATO within the realm of sound 
international law.
    I think all the rationalization, in my judgment--that is my 
characterization of the State Department on SEATO in recent 
times--is an afterthought, and I think completely unsound in 
international law, but I shall discuss that in further detail 
elsewhere.

                         CONFIDENCE IN U THANT

    But what does bother me, Mr. Secretary--and you can be very 
helpful to us in what I think is a growing confusion in the 
country in regard to our relations to U Thant, I do not sit 
here holding any brief for him. I want your help on it, 
however.
    We certainly took the position that we wanted him to be 
continued as Secretary General. We were one of those who urged 
it upon him, some would say did more than urge, but we urged 
it. He has been proposing variable formats for trying to pave 
the way for negotiations and every time he does, it seems that 
we get into controversy with him. It seems that we are the ones 
that get into controversy with him. I do not find any other 
nations that have been in controversy with him, at least it has 
not been reported. Perhaps you can tell us if they do, and that 
is one of the things I want to find out.
    If we have the confidence that we expressed in him when we 
urged his reappointment as Secretary General, why do we not 
take the position that if he will set up a procedure for 
triparty negotiations, we will look with great favor on it. Why 
do we take the position that, as you expressed again this 
morning, that we will not stop the bombing unless he can come 
in and give us assurance of some kind of reciprocal action on 
the part of North Vietnam? Is that a price that we should exact 
until we have first found out what he can do with cessation of 
bombing? I do not know whether he can deliver anything or not. 
But I seriously doubt whether a continuation of our bombing is 
justifiable on the basis of the argument you make this morning 
when U Thant is telling the world that the United States ought 
to stop bombing first.
    U Thant is telling the world now that he disagrees that 
Vietnam is of vital security interest to the United States. It 
seems to me he has put us in a pretty bad light in the world, 
and I wonder if the proper response is for us to simply reject 
him or reject his ideas rather than make a plea here again 
through the procedures of the United Nations for a United 
Nations' manifestation backing him up and assuming their 
peacekeeping obligations under the Charter.
    That is broad outline. I only want to raise----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Morse [continuing]. The question so you can talk to 
this committee about why we are taking the attitude toward U 
Thant that the public statements of you and our Administration 
have been taking.

                   U THANT'S POSITION ON THE BOMBING

    Secretary Rusk. Senator, first, on the question of stopping 
the bombing, bear in mind that the other side is now very 
specifically saying that this must be unconditional and 
permanent, and this is a major step. There are three divisions 
in and just north of the demilitarized zone today.
    Senator Morse. Does he agree with that?
    Secretary Rusk. Agree with that?
    Senator Morse. Does U Thant agree with that? Is that what U 
Thant means when he says we should stop the bombing?
    Secretary Rusk. We have said--but U Thant is not the man 
who makes this judgment. It is the other side who has to make 
the judgment.
    Senator Morse. He is the one who is making the proposals to 
both sides, and we immediately reject his proposal about 
stopping the bombing which I have not understood. If it is 
true, I would like to have you tell me.
    Secretary Rusk. I beg your pardon, we have not rejected his 
proposal of stopping the bombing. We have said, ``Okay, that is 
possible, what about point two,'' which is the mutual de-
escalation of the violence on both sides, and on that he has 
not had anything whatever from the other side.
    Senator Morse. I understand that.
    Secretary Rusk. And the other side says, ``It is none of 
your business.''
    Senator Morse. I understand that. But my point is you have 
to have a starting point here, and my point is when we say we 
are not going to stop the bombing until U Thant delivers 
reciprocity, we give the impression--I understand our points--
but we give the impression that we are the ones that right off 
the bat throw in a block that makes it impossible for him to 
act.

                   OPPOSITION TO U THANT'S PROPOSALS

    Secretary Rusk. You mentioned one point about other 
countries. The ambassadors of seven Asian nations, including 
Japan, Malaysia, Laos, called on him the other day to take 
strong exception to what he said in his press conference about 
the security significance of Vietnam in this present 
situtation. I might say they did that without any encouragement 
from us. We did not stimulate them to do that, and I gather 
that Australia and New Zealand are also doing the same thing 
when they heard about the Asian move.
    But Hanoi has rejected strongly U Thant's second and third 
points, second point, mutual de-escalation of the violence, 
and, third, on U Thant's point about the Liberation Front they 
have said the Liberation Front is the sole spokesman for the 
South Vietnamese.
    Now, Senator, it seems to me there are two, as far as peace 
is concerned, as it affects the United States. There are two 
most elementary facts in this situation. One is substantial 
numbers of the North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam 
and our bombing in North Vietnam. All right, why can we not get 
rid of both of those at the same time, why can we not get rid 
of both of those together? We have not been able--and I can 
assure you, sir, we have scoured the earth on it--to get 
anybody to give us any indication as to what would happen. They 
do not even say they would come to a conference without doing 
anything on the ground. They do not--let me illustrate the 
point.

                          THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE

    Very recently, during the two-day Christmas truce, when the 
hour arrived, hundreds of vessels, most of them small, but 
about 18 of them fairly good sized, suddenly made a dash along 
the coast of North Vietnam to resupply their forces north of 
the DMZ. They were all loaded and ready to go, just as Olympic 
dash men at the starting point. They came down, they unloaded 
several thousand tons of supplies and then scattered again 
before the truce is over, you see.
    Now, we need to have some indication that that is not going 
to be the effect of stopping the bombing, that something is 
going to happen on the ground that moves this toward peace. 
Otherwise, we simply give them an unlimited and an indefinite 
capability of doing it the comfortable way of sending their 
people south and taking their time and being safe and secure 
and not have anything to worry about at home.
    This, I think, would be a very serious thing.
    Now, we are trying to find out the answer to a secondary 
question. If people cannot tell us what Hanoi would do if we 
stopped bombing, they at least can tell us what they would do. 
Moscow, Eastern Europe, U Thant and the rest of them, India, 
what they would do if we stopped the bombing. There is no 
response from the other side.
    I would be interested in your own view as to whether this 
would make any difference to your own position, Senator, if we 
stopped the bombing and there was no response. Quite frankly, 
we have not----

                  U.S. SHOULD NOT BE FIGHTING U THANT

    Senator Morse. You ought to take judicial notice that would 
make a difference with me. You ought to know me well enough for 
this. My difference with you is we are laying down conditions 
precedent that are not going to be accepted apparently even by 
U Thant, and if we are going to try to work through U Thant, we 
ought to give--make some attempt to see what he can deliver. If 
we have made a bad bargain on U Thant, if we are now already 
discovering that he cannot give us the leadership because of 
the conditions he imposes, then let us face up to that.
    I think we are getting a bad image created around the world 
in regard to our relationships with U Thant. I think we should 
not be fighting with U Thant at the present time.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, when U Thant says, for example, that 
he does not believe that the security of Southeast Asia is of 
strategic importance to the West, there is nothing in his 
present responsibility or his background of experience that 
makes his judgment on that matter of very much importance. He 
is not responsible for the strategic interests of the West.
    Senator Morse. He certainly comes from a country that sits 
on the front door of China, and Burma does not seem to be as 
concerned about China as we are.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                           THE DOMINO THEORY

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. U Thant also said that he does not 
believe in the domino theory. I do not believe in the domino 
theory myself, and I have said that many times. The theory is 
the theory of the world revolution pursued by militant means. 
He mentioned countries X, Y, and Z. Hanoi, with the help of 
Peking, has already named the countries X, Y, and Z. Vietnam is 
X, Laos is Y, and Thailand is Z. So, I personally do not feel 
when Mr. U Thant makes a statement of this sort by silence we 
indicate that somehow we agree with him. We supported him for 
Secretary General not because he and we would agree on every 
one of the hundred or more items that might be on the agenda of 
the U.N. or on an item like this which is not on the agenda of 
the U.N. and he opposes putting it on the agenda of the U.N., 
but because he has on the whole done a good job as Secretary 
General and the prospect was that he would be a considerably 
better Secretary General than any of the alternatives that 
seemed to be around.

                      ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

    Senator Morse. I will not take more time other than to make 
a comment on the last observation you made. Sure he is 
Secretary General of the United Nations, but he is not 
independent in his responsibilities to the organization, to 
both branches of the organization, and I repeat, I would like 
to bring this before the Security Council. After all, I think 
the Security Council ought to sit down and go over his 
proposals, because they relate to the image of the United 
Nations, but I think we, on the other hand, ought to insist 
that that Security Council stand up and be counted, either with 
a veto or with a vote, an affirmative vote. I want to get 
ourselves out of the position where we seem in many quarters to 
be giving the impression that we are holding the United Nations 
off. I would like to put the heat on that Security Council and 
get a vote up or down, and I think the Secretary General ought 
to be asked to sit down with that Security Council and go over 
these proposals of his. He sits there as Secretary General and 
makes these announcements that are going to affect the members 
of the organization, and then a nation individually and 
unilaterally, the United States in this instance, takes him on. 
I do not think we should be in that position. I think the 
United Nations, to whom he is responsible and of whom he is an 
agent, ought to be taking him on.
    Secretary Rusk. You know, I would not dispute that point 
with you too much, Senator. There is pending before the 
Security Council a resolution by which the Security Council 
would call upon the parties to engage in negotiations for a 
peace in Southeast Asia. It does not have the votes on the 
Security Council for a variety of reasons. The Soviets would 
veto. But there are others influenced in part by U Thant who 
say----
    Senator Lausche. Why not let the Soviets veto?
    Secretary Rusk. But there are others who say that since 
Hanoi and Peking say this is not the business of the United 
Nations, that if the Security Council takes up this question, 
and tried to get into it, that this would get in the way of a 
use of the machinery which Hanoi and Peking say is the 
appropriate machinery, namely, the Geneva machinery.
    When this point was made by the Soviet delegate, Mr. Arthur 
Goldberg said that is fine with us, let us use the Geneva 
machinery, in which case the Soviet ambassador said, ``No, no, 
we can't use that.''
    This matter has been one way or another before the United 
Nations at least a dozen times, and I have an up-to-date 
memorandum on this point which I will be glad to furnish Mr. 
Marcy for the committee.

                 A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

    The Chairman. Will the Senator yield for one clarifying 
thing?
    You said no one would be more alarmed than Burma, unless it 
be Thailand, if we pull out of Southeast Asia, which seems to 
imply that you feel we have a permanent presence there.
    Secretary Rusk. No.
    The Chairman. That is the interpretation of it.
    Secretary Rusk. No, I meant under present circumstances. I 
am not saying what you would do if we have peace. Our Manila 
declaration on that is quite specific on that point.

            FORMAL ACTION RATHER THAN BACK SCENE NEGOTIATING

    Senator Morse. You must not take more time on that, and if 
you will only pardon me, I want to make this observation. I 
just do not buy the argument that Hanoi and Peking should be 
telling the United Nations what to do. The Charter makes 
perfectly clear if there was a threat to the peace by a non-
member, the members, the signatories, have the job of enforcing 
the peace. It is the primary purpose of the Charter. All the 
other things that the United Nations do are ancillary to it. 
The real reason for it was to enforce the peace.
    I would put France and Russia, as the Senator from Ohio 
said--with a veto, if they want to veto it, let them do it. But 
the important thing is it would help clarify the situation. 
Instead of giving the impression that the United States is 
doing a lot of back scene negotiating, which isn't what the 
Charter calls for--the Charter calls for formal action under 
the juridical process thereof, and we ought to insist on it.
    Secretary Rusk. I have some sympathy with that point.
    The Chairman. Senator Aiken.
    Senator Morse. The sad part of it is if we could closet 
ourselves longer we might find ourselves in more agreement.
    Senator Aiken. First, let me say I agree with the Secretary 
that not only would Burma but every other country in Southeast 
Asia be alarmed if we pulled out completely from that area.
    My questions will be short and along a different line.

                        U.S. TRADE WITH CAMBODIA

    Mr. Secretary, to what extent is our trade with Cambodia--
to what extent has it been increasing?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not have the trade figures. Our 
tourism has been more or less holding up. I would have to get 
the figures on trade.
    Senator Aiken. And we are now supplying some oil to 
Cambodia?
    Secretary Rusk. American companies----
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Provide oil in Cambodia and up 
the Mekong River to South Vietnam.

                             CHINESE STEEL

    Senator Aiken. That is right. But in that connection I read 
last month the United States, through Bombay, had purchased a 
very substantial amount of steel manufactured in China for use 
in South Vietnam.
    Then about two weeks ago there was another news item to the 
effect that a freighter carrying steel from Bombay to the 
United States had gotten into trouble or been sunk or 
something.
    Are American companies buying Chinese steel through Bombay 
for use in this country?
    Secretary Rusk. No. We tried to look into that. I think the 
allegation was that this was a transaction through Singapore.
    Senator Aiken. No question--no one questions that.
    Secretary Rusk. But the information we have is that this 
did not occur; that the steel was resold at Singapore to known 
customers; these were not in Vietnam. I can't find any 
substance to that.
    Senator Aiken. The ship that got into trouble was 
reportedly headed toward the United States. I did not know that 
India had a surplus of steel.
    Secretary Rusk. This sounds--I had not put my attention on 
this shipping from Bombay to the United States.
    Senator Aiken. But isn't it true that Communist countries 
and Western countries do conduct considerable business with 
each other through third parties?
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is true.
    Senator Aiken. There is no question about that, and that--
--
    Secretary Rusk. Let us leave this off the tape.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                    ESTABLISHING A BASE IN THE DELTA

    Senator Aiken. I notice there was quite a lot made in the 
news lately about establishing a base in the Delta. Is that 
being constructed as a permanent base?
    Secretary Rusk. I saw a report this morning that one of the 
amphibious operations was off-loading to go back to its main 
base. I think there may be some U.S. forces at some point in 
the Delta.
    Part of the Delta is in the immediate Saigon area. For 
example, Long An Province, we have had some forces there for 
some time. But I think the major effort at the present time is 
in the Saigon area and particularly northwest of Saigon to try 
to break the flow of men and supplies that might be coming from 
the Delta up into the Third, Second and First Corps.
    I just do not know what the future will hold on this. There 
is no policy problem in my mind about doing in the Fourth Corps 
what we are doing in the First, Second and Third. But there are 
practical problems of how you best use your forces, under what 
circumstances.

                         GUANTANAMOS IN VIETNAM

    Senator Aiken. Isn't it quite likely when the situation 
over there quiets down--I do not mean comes to an end, but 
quiets down--or phases out, fades out somewhat, that we will 
have one or two Guantanamos along the Coast of Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, no. On that, sir, we have no interest 
in maintaining a permanent position in South Vietnam.
    This Cam Ranh Bay facility is a very substantial facility, 
but David Lilienthal is on his way over there now to help work 
out plans for conversion to civilian use in case of peace.
    We have no desire, and we publicly have committed ourselves 
to this many times, to maintain neither bases or troop presence 
in South Vietnam if there is peace there.
    Sentor Aiken. We have presence in Cuba. The difference is 
we do not try to run the Cuban government from Guantanamo.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Aiken. But why isn't a permanent base at Cam Ranh 
Bay or some other place just as logical as Guantanamo?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have bases in the Philippines and 
in Okinawa, and we thought this might be a contribution towards 
the possibilities of peaceful settlement to make it clear we 
were not looking for a permanent position, a permanent 
presence, military presence, in South Vietnam.

             RUSSIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

    Sentor Aiken. Another thing that puzzles me somewhat is the 
fact that while the President is trying to get on friendlier 
terms with Russia, that we are furnishing the Russians with the 
most beautiful target practice they ever had in perfecting 
their new antiaircraft weapons, as I understand it. We have had 
nearly 600 planes shot down over North Vietnam. Don't we ever 
talk to the Russians about that?
    Secretary Rusk. Not very much about that precise point. The 
SAM missiles have been fired over 1,000 times, and I think that 
only 30 of them have effected a hit.
    Purely in military terms, I am not drawing any political 
implication from this at all. I think that technical or the 
tactical advantages, perhaps, are on our side in terms of 
learning how to handle surface-to-air missiles.
    Senator Aiken. Of course, if they only get a missile out of 
a thousand shots----
    Secretary Rusk. They have sent their top missile men out of 
Vietnam to find out what is the matter, and we know this is a 
major discovery they have made, and that is that their SAM 
missiles are not very effective.
    Senator Aiken. They must have fired 600,000 shots to get 
those 600 planes.
    Secretary Rusk. No. Most of the planes that have been lost 
have been lost to conventional anti-aircraft fire as the plane 
goes in for particular targets.
    Senator Aiken. Have the Russians been furnishing anti-
aircraft guns to them?
    Secretary Rusk. Some of it, and some come from China.
    Senator Aiken. And they have been perfecting their anti-
aircraft weapons without any risk themselves.
    Secretary Rusk. Possibly.
    Senator Aiken. I thought it might be well to speak to them 
about it quietly, in a soft tone of voice, maybe of what they 
will be doing wrong.
    Secretary Rusk. If they could translate their position 
there into influence on Hanoi, to get going on the 1954 and 
1962 agreements, there would be very substantial advantages to 
us.

                        INCREASE IN NATIONALISM

    Senator Aiken. There really is an increase in political 
nationalism throughout the world, is there not? Aren't the 
countries really more nationalistic than they have been for 
some time?
    Secretary Rusk. If you would look at the world as a whole, 
perhaps slightly, but I do not think it has changed too much 
over the decades.
    Senator Aiken. In most cases where it puts up barriers, 
international economics have a tendency to knock them flat, do 
they not?
    Secretary Rusk. That is right, sir.
    Senator Aiken. In other words, trade is important, and the 
greatest potential wealth of the world, the trading area of the 
world, is Southeast Asia, assuming that their purchasing power 
can be developed.
    Secretary Rusk. There has been a pretty steady growth in 
regional economic arrangements, not just in the Common Market, 
but in Central America particularly. Now they are talking very 
actively about a broader Latin American free trade. You get 
that same movement now among the free countries of Asia, so 
that you have that over against the national feelings.
    Senator Aiken. I have no more questions, but I have an idea 
it is going to take a while to get out of Southeast Asia as it 
did in the Philippines, and that was some time. We were there 
50 years officially.
    The Chairman. Senator Lausche.

                       THE THINKING BEHIND SEATO

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, I want to explore through 
questions and your answers what the predominating thinking in 
the fifties when we signed the various treaties related to 
Southeast Asia in inducing us to sign those treaties.
    Secretary Rusk. I think the most succinct statement--pardon 
me, excuse me.
    Senator Lausche. I begin with the Southeast Asia Collective 
Defense Treaty signed September 8, 1954. I understand, of 
course, my colleagues understand, that the President of that 
year, Eisenhower, sent that treaty to the Senate to be 
approved; is that correct?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And that treaty contained Article IV which 
reads:

    Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed 
attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against 
any State or Territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement 
may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and 
safety, and agree that it will in that event act to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

    Senator Dodd. Is that the SEATO Treaty?
    Senator Lausche. That is the Treaty.
    Secretary Rusk. Article IV, paragraph 1.
    Senator Lausche. Yes. In other words, when that treaty was 
signed, the President of the United States, the Secretary of 
State, and the Senate declared to the world that our security 
was involved whenever armed attack was made upon any one of the 
nations that subscribed to that treaty, is that correct?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And the nations that signed the treaty 
were the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, Cambodia, 
Laos.
    Secretary Rusk. Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were 
protocol states. They did not sign the treaty but were covered 
by the special protocol.
    Senator Lausche. I see, there is a note there.

                              ANZUS TREATY

    Now then, I go to the next treaty, and that is ANZUS, that 
is a treaty made with Australia, I suppose, New Zealand, and 
the United States?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. That treaty was signed in September 1951, 
and at that time Truman was President?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Do you recall who was Secretary of State?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Dean Acheson.
    Senator Lausche. And that treaty came up to the Senate for 
confirmation.
    Now, I read from Article IV of that treaty:

    Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific 
area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace 
and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

    In order words, in 1951 on September 1, it was the firm 
thinking of the Senate, President Truman and Secretary Acheson 
and, I suppose, the government in general, that our security 
was involved if any one of the signatories to that treaty were 
attacked. Am I correct in that?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.

                  MUTUAL COOPERATION TREATY WITH JAPAN

    Senator Lausche. I now go to the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan 
signed January 19, 1960, at which time Eisenhower was 
President. Who was Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Christian Herter.
    Senator Lausche. Herter.
    Secretary Rusk. In 1960.
    Senator Lausche. Article V of that treaty reads:

    Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either 
party in the territories under administration of Japan would be 
dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it 
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional provisions and processes.

    That was again a declaration of our interest in Southeast 
Asia and the relationship that it had to our own security.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, pardon me just a moment. I think 
in the Japan treaty, that was limited to attack on Japan. I do 
not think that treaty got into Southeast Asia, did it?
    Senator Lausche. Well, whatever it is----
    Secretary Rusk. I think so.
    Senator Lausche. That is the language. You are familiar 
with it.

                   MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN

    Now then, here is the next treaty, the Mutual Defense 
Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China. 
Article V reads:

    Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the West 
Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the 
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.

    That was signed December 2, 1954; Eisenhower President, 
Dulles Secretary of State.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. I suppose the Senate, made up of members 
who are at this table today--and I will want the staff to put 
in the record how the votes were cast at that time----
    Senator Morse. I voted against it.
    Senator Lausche. Then you are consistent.
    Senator Morse. I did not want to put the staff to work.

                    MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH KOREA

    Senator Lausche. I now go to the Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October 
1953, Article III:

    Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific 
area on either of the Parties in territories now under their 
respective administrative control or hereafter recognized by 
one of the Parties is lawfully brought under the administrative 
control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and 
safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger.

                   THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

    Now, I ask you, has there been a single treaty entered into 
with Asian nations and Southeast Asia that did not declare that 
our security was involved and that, therefore, we entered into 
those agreements?
    Secretary Rusk. That underlying concept is in each of the 
treaties we have in the Pacific Ocean area, in Asia.
    Senator Lausche. Now, Eisenhower was President under most 
of them. When Truman went into Korea, what was the motivation 
for going into Korea at that time? Did it have underlying it 
this same principle about the security of the United States 
being involved?
    Secretary Rusk. The basic view as to where the security 
interests of the United States lay was the same. It had not 
been put in treaty form at the time of the North Korean attack 
on South Korea.
    Senator Lausche. It was put into the treaty, in treaty 
form, after Eisenhower took office.
    Secretary Rusk. In 1953, yes, sir.

                   KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND VIETNAM

    Senator Lausche. Now we have Truman and Eisenhower, and I 
now come to Kennedy.
    When Kennedy became President, how many troops were in 
South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. There were about 650 U.S. military there as 
a part of the military assistance mission.
    Senator Lausche. How many were there when he tragically 
lost his life?
    Secretary Rusk. Approximately 20,000, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Did he, by expanding the number of troops 
that were there, give indication of his judgment that we could 
not allow South Vietnam to be taken over by the Communists 
through aggression?
    Secretary Rusk. He did, sir. The first thing he tried to 
do, if I might take a moment, is to explore fully the 
possibilities of a peaceful settlement. He talked about this 
with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. It appeared that 
the two of them had reached agreement on Laos on the basis that 
everybody get out of Laos and leave this small land-locked 
country to take care of themselves.
    He was unable to get agreement on South Vietnam at the 
Vienna meeting, and you remember he sent some special missions 
out there, among them General Maxwell Taylor, to take a look at 
the situation to see what needed to be done in the light of the 
situation, and so when he examined it fully and he had on the 
one side no prospect that there was agreement with the 
Communist world on Vietnam, and on the other side our 
commitment, and the situation, he moved substantially to 
strengthen our participation there.
    Senator Lausche. So you have Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
and Johnson of the belief that our security and safety is 
involved in what happens in Southeast Asia.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And you have Acheson, Dulles, Herter--was 
there any other Secretary of State----
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And yourself.

                       THE POSSIBILITY OF DETENTE

    Now then, that goes back 15, 20 years ago, what has changed 
since that time that should induce us to believe that our 
nation's security and safety have no relationship to what 
happens in Southeast Asia?
    Secretary Rusk. I think the principal changes in this 
regard have not yet been fully developed. But I would say there 
are the beginnings of the possibility of a detente and peaceful 
co-existence with the countries of Eastern Europe. That is one 
element of the situation which affects the problem.
    Secondly, the authorities in Peking are coming to the 
watershed of the transfer of power to the next generation, and 
have found that a policy of extreme militancy has isolated them 
within the Communist world, and that has had its repercussions 
inside China.
    Third is the development of nuclear weapons by Peking and, 
therefore, the increasing importance of stabilizing the 
situation and trying to organize a peace in the Pacific and to 
induce there some of the same prudence that we begin to see 
with our relations toward Eastern Europe. Those are the 
principal changes since that period.

                    UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES UNCHANGED

    Senator Lausche. All right. But with those changes can you 
take those changes as the basis of saying that all that was 
declared in these treaties by the Senate and by the President 
and the Secretaries of State was erroneous and that those 
reasons no longer exist for our being in Southeast Asia?
    Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so. I think the 
underlying principles remain the same. They would, over time, 
Senator, be reduced in importance if there were some peace. In 
other words, the way not to have an alliance to come into 
operation is for nations to leave each other alone in 
situations of this sort.
    Senator Lausche. All right.

                       CHINA'S POLICY ON VIETNAM

    Now I go to just one more question and then I will close. I 
have the four points that have been submitted by Mao. Point 
number four:

    The internal affairs of South Vietnam should be settled by 
the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the 
program of the NFLSV.

    I suppose that is the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. Has there been any yielding on that point 
four by Mao?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think it might be avoiding 
confusion if we referred to that as Ho Chi Minh's point three, 
however it might have appeared there in what you have.
    Senator Lausche. All right.
    Secretary Rusk. We have not seen a revision of that, and if 
I could say this off the tape----
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Lausche. This final question.
    Senator Mundt. Will you yield? What has happened?
    Secretary Rusk. We have not had a reply on that particular 
point. We have offered them alternative language, and we have 
had no reply.

                         THE LAOTIAN AGREEMENT

    Senator Lausche. Now, the Laos Treaty or protocol, whatever 
you call it, was signed in 1962?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. The agreement provided for the withdrawal 
of all troops of all foreign nations?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Specific points were designated where the 
departure was to be made so that the three countries, I assume 
Canada----
    Secretary Rusk. India and Poland.
    Senator Lausche [continuing]. Poland and India would be 
able to tell whether they had left.
    Have United States troops left Laos?
    Secretary Rusk. They left as soon as that agreement was 
concluded, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Have the Communists complied with that 
agreement?
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir. Our estimate is that the level of 
North Vietnamese forces in Laos never dropped below 6,000.
    Senator Lausche. That is all.
    Senator Pell. May I just interpolate to clarify the record. 
Aren't there still elements of American activity in Laos that 
are not of a formal military nature, that would balance that 
6,000?
    Secretary Rusk. As a matter of fact, we now carry out 
certain military operations in Laos, but the point is that we 
complied with that agreement and would be prepared today to 
comply with it 1,000 percent if we can get anybody else to.
    The Chairman. Did you give the alternative language to 
point three that the Senator asked you about?
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir; I did not, and I would prefer not 
to, Senator, if I may. As a matter of fact, what we suggested 
was very much like----
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to 
point six at the bottom of the first page where we have added 
to the original point, ``We will be prepared to accept 
preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points 
as a basis for negotiations.''
    I think that is all we should say about that at the present 
time in order to keep open the possibilities they just might 
come back.
    The Chairman. Senator Carlson?

                         WHEN THIS WAR IS OVER

    Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I shall be brief. I was 
interested in your comments in response to Senator Aiken's 
question about at the end of hostilities this war is over and 
our boys are coming home; we are moving out of Southeast Asia. 
Based on the past in Korea and Cuba, and our great investment 
in this area where we have now probably the finest docking 
facilities of any place in the Southeast Asia area except 
Japan--we have great airfields; great air bases, do you think 
the surrounding countries would permit us to move out any more 
than they would permit us to move out now?
    Secretary Rusk. The seven nations, Senator Carlson, which 
have forces in South Vietnam, said in the Manila communique 
that allied forces shall be withdrawn, after close 
consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the 
North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus 
subsides; that those forces will be withdrawn as soon as 
possible and not later than six months after the above 
conditions have been fulfilled.
    We have since World War II, or including World War II, had 
very large and important military facilities in connection with 
various enterprises that we have gone into, and we have 
demonstrated a capability of withdrawing from those facilities 
at the end of the period when they were needed.
    Our hope is that Cam Ranh Bay, for example, which is a 
spectacularly effective and beautiful natural harbor, could 
become a major port for the service of the upper two-thirds of 
South Vietnam, and it should be converted to civilian, 
industrial and trading purposes.
    Mr. David Lilienthal is going to be helping us on 
developing those plans. I think the seven nations who are most 
directly involved in this situation have agreed among 
themselves on this point.
    Now, if at some time in the future the assault on South 
Vietnam were renewed, then the governments at that time would 
have to decide what to do about it. But we want to make it 
clear that we are not after any special military position in 
Southeast Asia as far as we are concerned.

                   MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM

    Senator Carlson. With that last statement I fully agree, 
and I can see that we are not. But also I can see, looking 
further into the future, if we do not maintain substantial 
forces in that area, what is there to prevent the Red Chinese 
from going down and taking over the greatest facilities ever 
constructed in that area, and they could do it very easily?
    Secretary Rusk. The prospect that the United States would 
once again meet its treaty commitments and would join with 
others to prevent that occurring.
    Senator Carlson. That is the point I am making. We do not 
want to get committed to a position here where after a few 
years, after terrific loss of life and great expenditures of 
funds, we have to get back, and some day soon I trust we will 
reach agreement when that war will end, and whenever it does 
end, that decision is going to have to be made despite your 
Manila agreement.
    I think we have to look that one over because we have 
invested men and material in this operation, and it just looks 
to me, I think we are making a big mistake if we go out and 
tell the people of the United States--I know it was made, I 
read your Manila declaration--that we will soon move out of 
there. I do not think we should do that.
    Secretary Rusk. Under certain conditions.
    Senator Carlson. Well, those conditions, I think, will 
develop very rapidly after the conclusion of this war. I hope 
they do not, but I think we have again assumed the 
responsibility in Southeast Asia, I don't say whether we should 
or should not, but I think we are going to have to meet that 
issue, and I hope the administration and the government itself 
does not lead our people to believe on the day this war is 
over, six months after, the declaration says we are coming 
home. I hope we do, but I can see another issue.
    You know, I have been interested in the tone of the Hearst 
publications on this war, and they have been in thorough 
support of the President and in its operation. But in this last 
issue--and I assume you may have read it--they said they were 
fearful that world opinion is having too much influence on the 
operation of this war.

                        U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

    I think there is some danger of world opinion, NATO--we 
have discussed all these projects, NATO, Rhodesia--I think we 
are in Rhodesia because of the African opinion, not because of 
Great Britain. I do not think we are obligated. I think we made 
a mistake, and I think if world opinion enters into this 
Vietnam situation we will be caught in a bind. I hope we are 
not.
    I cannot help but bring it up this morning because I am 
fearful of the future.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, perhaps what I said earlier was 
too broad on the Rhodesian matter. I believe that in the U.S. 
national interests and our own interests in the entire 
continent of Africa, as to what happens in that country, I 
think it was necessary for us to take a stand as we did on 
Rhodesia. I did not want to----
    Senator Carlson. I appreciate your position, Mr. Secretary, 
but you and I and the Commerce Department have had about 14, 
16, 18 months of discussion on some of our problems in South 
Africa when it comes to selling airplanes. I know you are 
familiar with it, selling planes for dollars to the Republic of 
South Africa, and it was finally resolved in favor of the 
United States, but only after, I would say, 18 months of 
bickering and discussions, and it was resolved because Great 
Britain was going to sell those planes and use U.S. engines.
    I appreciate the Secretary's action in this. I think it was 
right, but I know this situation, if we get involved and too 
carried away by pressure from other countries and forget our 
own nation, I do not like to say that, but we get carried away 
in this world opinion matter. I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
    Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                      NORTH VIETNAMESE CONDITIONS

    I have two questions, Mr. Secretary. I thought I heard you 
say that North Vietnamese had proposed three different sets of 
conditions, unconditional with respect to the bombing, 
unconditional and for good, unconditional and definitive, but 
the third one escaped me.
    Secretary Rusk. These were three different ways of what 
appear to us to be saying the same thing, permanent, 
definitively, and for good. Whether these are differences in 
different translations of the same Vietnamese words I am not 
quite sure. Harrison Salisbury said in an interview 
unconditionally and for good. Another statement put in 
definitively. But the word ``permanently'' is the most frequent 
word they use in that regard. At all times they say 
unconditional.
    Senator Dodd. I see.

                        THE INDONESIAN SITUATION

    The second question I would like to ask is with respect to 
the Indonesian situation. I am not clear what your position is. 
I understood you to say that you would not go so far as to say 
our presence in Vietnam was decisive.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would quite frankly be very 
comfortable about saying to you that what we are doing in 
Vietnam was the decisive influence on the events in Indonesia. 
I cannot in candor say that.
    Senator Dodd. Would you say----
    Secretary Rusk. But what I said was that I thought it had 
some influence. How much I am not quite sure. I did say that 
prominent officials of Indonesia said to us that it did have a 
decisive influence, but it is hard to answer that question 
accurately and specifically.
    I did not want to be in a position of exaggerating that 
particular point as far as we look at the situation. I have no 
doubt that it had some influence, and it might have had even 
more influence if the Chinese had attempted to send their own 
armed forces by sea to reinforce the PKI during that period, 
you see.
    The fact that the Seventh Fleet was there and the British 
Fleet was there, and so forth, this could have made quite a 
difference, of course.
    Senator Dodd. Would you say that a long term effort to help 
Indonesia in our aid program, in, I assume, other respects 
certainly helped those or, Ices in Indonesia to compel the 
efforts to overturn the government?
    Secretary Rusk. I think it proved in hindsight to have been 
very useful for the United States over the years to keep some 
sort of contact going and alive even though there were times 
when it was painful to do so.
    Senator Dodd. Yes, I was critical of it, so I am giving you 
an opportunity to get even. But I take it that it did pay off 
and that with our presence in South Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. I think it is just not on the military 
side, although that turned out to be useful, but our labor 
unions have had very important and constructive relationships 
with some of the labor unions in Indonesia, and our university 
people in the same way. There were times when it was very 
difficult to keep those going for reasons on both sides, some 
of which you will remember.
    But I think, on the whole, it has demonstrated that in that 
instance certainly patience and a little persistence turned out 
to be a good thing.

                 INFLUENCE OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA

    Senator Dodd. I put it essentially that it seems to me our 
policy with respect to Indonesia, and in continuing to try to 
give them assistance in all of the respects you have mentioned 
and others, and our presence in South Vietnam, did have a very 
strong influence on the outcome of the struggle in Indonesia 
between the Communist forces or pro-Communist forces, and those 
other forces more friendly to the West, is that right?
    Secretary Rusk. I think it has an important influence, 
Senator.
    I think it had an important influence.
    Senator Dodd. It certainly did appear to the people in that 
respect.
    Secretary Rusk. I think I ought to say when the moment of 
truth came in Indonesia, as it did, between these opposing 
troops, we were not involved in that in any way. Maybe these 
people would ask the question, ``If you were not, why weren't 
you?'' But there was a wholly Indonesian problem here, and we 
were not involved in it surreptitiously or otherwise, except 
for these overt reasons, the public reasons, we were in Vietnam 
and had maintained the contacts, and everybody would know we 
would be sympathetic if the Indonesians found a way to fend off 
the attempt of the PKI to seize power.
    Senator Dodd. It certainly would be fair to say, would it 
not, that all of the things we did do and tried to do in 
Indonesia itself, and our presence in South Vietnam, certainly 
influenced the thinking of the Indonesian people in this 
critical hour.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is fair, sir.
    Senator Dodd. That is all I have.
    The Chairman. Senator Williams.

               U.S. AND BRITISH POLICIES TOWARD RHODESIA

    Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, in general, I have been 
supporting your positions that you have taken in South Vietnam. 
It is a little hard for me to understand why we have just 
joined Great Britain in imposing economic sanctions on 
Rhodesia, but I noticed in the press the other day that Great 
Britain is selling fertilizer and chemicals to Castro, going to 
finance a plant, and also continuing to trade, as we 
understand, with both North Vietnam and China. How can we 
reconcile those two positions, particularly when Great Britain 
itself is one of the members of SEATO?
    Secretary Rusk. First, sir, on the Rhodesian matter, this 
is not a matter which was purely bilateral between us and 
Britain, a commitment by the United States in support of 
Britain because it was Britain. We have, in fact, at times had 
some margins of difference with Britain over the Rhodesian 
question, both in the direction of pursuing the talks more and 
in the direction of being careful about the general attitude of 
the African countries.
    We were acting in the Rhodesian thing as a matter of 
national interest in respect of the total continent there, as a 
factor over and above different from the attitude of Britain.

                       FLAGSHIPS OUT OF HONG KONG

    Secondly, Britain is not itself trading with North Vietnam, 
with the exception of an occasional flagship out of Hong Kong 
controlled by a company in Hong Kong.
    Senator Williams. Isn't that to a certain extent like some 
of our American companies owning under a Panamanian flag?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, it is possible, sir. But they do not 
feel they have the kind of control in that situation in the 
colony there and, Senator, one reason, since this trade is 
almost minuscule, one reason that I personally feel somewhat 
relaxed about it, is I do not want to have the question put to 
us if we do those things to Hong Kong which causes the people 
on the mainland to go after Hong Kong, is the U.S. going to 
help them in Hong Kong, and I do not want to have anything to 
do with that problem.
    Senator Williams. To the extent we understand, and I have 
seen this excuse before, but Great Britain has control over the 
ships going into Hong Kong.
    Do I understand these same ships, using the flag from Hong 
Kong, British-owned ships, can continue to trade with Rhodesia 
and not be subject to this blockage and Great Britain has no 
control over those companies and cannot stop them?
    Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so.
    Senator Williams. It has stopped them in Rhodesia.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    Senator Williams. And they would stop them in North Vietnam 
on the same basis if they wanted to, couldn't they?
    Secretary Rusk. It would require legislation, I believe.
    Senator Williams. It did not require legislation in 
Rhodesia.
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, it was an Order in Council 
with respect to Rhodesia.
    Senator Williams. Now, the fertilizer plant which she is 
financing for Mr. Castro.
    Secretary Rusk. We do not like that and other countries in 
this hemisphere do not like it and have expressed our views 
very strongly in London. Britain has a different policy than we 
do on this, and we haven't been able to prevail. That is the 
way it is. Here is a point in which we and they simply disagree 
on.

                        CHINESE STEEL SHIPMENTS

    Senator Williams. One final question. I notice it was first 
reported in the London Observer, in which these steel shipments 
to which another member referred----
    Secretary Rusk. Right.
    Senator Williams. I read that story and, as I read the 
story, we gave the official explanation that this steel was in 
short supply and that it had been purchased and we were going 
to stop it. Did we----
    Secretary Rusk. No.
    Senator Williams. Did we completely deny there was any such 
transaction at all and that story was false?
    Secretary Rusk. When something like that comes in we first 
try to find out what the facts are. We investigated this. The 
Singapore Government has denied it and has accounted to us for 
the steel shipments that they got out of China through Hong 
Kong, and where that steel went, and the record shows that the 
steel went to places other than Vietnam. So that my answer to 
you today is, to the best of our ability to proceed to find 
out, there was nothing in that story.
    Senator Williams. And it did not ultimately end up in South 
Vietnam at all?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir. I am not suggesting 
that all the trading that goes on there may not be some things 
brought out of China through Hong Kong that may not turn up 
anywhere, including this country, through a third or fourth 
country trading. But we did look into the steel matter, and we 
have been able to locate where that steel went. It did not go 
to Vietnam.
    Senator Williams. Thank you.
    Secretary Rusk. I will get the committee the details.
    Senator Aiken. It did not go to Wilmington.
    Secretary Rusk. Not to Wilmington. [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Senator Clark.

                  THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SITUATION

    Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your 
comments on the antiballistic missile situation with respect to 
the policy of the Department. Also, how much can you tell us 
about what Ambassador Thompson is up to, what you and Mr. 
Dobrynin have been able to achieve, and generally speaking 
whether you have read Roswell Gilpatric's article in the New 
York Times of yesterday, and whether you are generally in 
sympathy with the point of view he expressed, which is we ought 
to do everything feasible to prevent an escalation of the arms 
race by either Russia or ourselves of the ballistic missiles.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, could we, perhaps, leave this 
part of it off the tape?
    [Discussion off the record.]

             TAKING OVER THE WAR FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

    Senator Clark. I would like to move into one more question. 
What is the rationale, Mr. Secretary, behind or, perhaps, are 
the press reports true, that we are committed to moving in 
force into the Mekong Delta in order to take over the 
responsibilities in that area that South Vietnam has hitherto 
attempted to carry on? What is the rationale behind the search 
and destroy massive maneuvers in the Iron Triangle? Are we 
still committed to an increasing policy of taking over from the 
South Vietnamese the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and what is 
our own view as to whether this will not result in casualties 
far beyond any productive results?
    Secretary Rusk. First, on the Iron Triangle, this has been 
an area near Saigon which has been a major Viet Cong 
headquarters and supply center for a long time, and out of that 
come raids and operations against communications as well as 
against the city itself.
    It is a relatively lightly populated area. As you know, we 
are moving the civilians out as the operation proceeds. But as 
far as the U.S. taking over the main battle is concerned, I 
just noticed in the daily military report this morning that I 
see every day, that the operations of battalion size or larger 
going on yesterday, I have the figure here exactly, I think 
there were 11 U.S., 2 allied, other allies, and something like 
18 or 20 South Vietnamese.
    The South Vietnamese are engaging in full operations. We 
are trying to get them moved toward pacification, which is 
something of a misleading term in this sense, that does not 
mean the South Vietnamese are going to take fewer casualties. 
This pacification effort is a very mean part of the war, but it 
is something the South Vietnamese may be better able and fitted 
to do than we in working in the villages and rooting out the 
Viet Cong from the rest of the population.
    The Mekong Delta, part of this is immediately adjacent to 
Saigon. We are interested very much in securing the Saigon 
area. The Delta is a source of rice and men for the Viet Cong 
in Corps One, Two and Three. I think it is a tactical matter as 
to which of the 43 provinces our forces operate in primarily, 
and which are primarily for the South Vietnamese forces.

                       A 100 PERCENT AMERICAN WAR

    Senator Clark. I would suggest, Mr. Secretary, it is much 
more strategic than tactical, and it is another obvious 
indication, if it is true we are moving in for the first time 
in force in the Mekong Delta, that we are slowly but surely 
making this a 100 percent American war, and I would like your 
comments on that.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the record of operations, the record 
of casualties, the missions performed just do not show it, 
Senator. As I say, I have the figure here----
    Senator Clark. Well, they certainly did a few months ago, 
Mr. Secretary, when American casualties increased, and they 
have drastically increased all through 1966, and the South 
Vietnamese casualties for several weeks were less than ours.
    I would find it a little surprising if you would deny that 
we have been more and more involved in search and destroy 
operations in South Vietnam with an ever-increasing list of 
American casualties--that is true, is it not?
    Secretary Rusk. I did not say that. I was saying yesterday 
in operations of battalion size or larger there were 11 U.S. 
and 22 South Vietnamese. They were carrying on twice as many 
operations in numbers.

                     U.S. SUFFERING MORE CASUALTIES

    Senator Clark. I do not want to get into an argument with 
you. I have this map here. You remember the fuss I made about 
this matter a year ago. It looks like we have not any more 
ground, and we have suffered many casualties. The casualties 
are what bother me. We talk an awful lot about the strategic 
value. What gets me down is we are not really paying enough 
attention to how many American boys are getting killed.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, you are not more concerned with 
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young men 
who were betrayed into World War II because the governments 
refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in the world. 
I hate these casualties just as much----
    Senator Clark. Would you mind if I give my entire attention 
to you, and let your staff assistant postpone his comments?
    Secretary Rusk. I say you are not more concerned with 
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young 
people that was betrayed into World War II with tens of 
millions of casualties all over the world because the 
governments of that day, including the Government of the United 
States, refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in 
the world.
    Now, we have taken 190,000 casualties since 1945 all over 
the world, and it is bloody and difficult and burdensome, but 
the effort has been, and is beginning to show some signs of 
paying off that we can organize a peace before we let this go 
down the chute-the-chute to World War III. This is what it is 
all about, and these casualties being undertaken out there are 
highly relevant to the question of whether we are going to 
organize some peace, or whether most of the world is going to 
go up in flames one of these days.
    Senator Clark. Well, I think that is where you and I find 
ourselves in disagreement, and I do not think it desirable, Mr. 
Chairman, to pursue it any further at this point. I think we 
can organize the peace without getting all these Americans 
killed.
    The Chairman. Is that all?
    Senator Clark. Yes.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

                    NUCLEAR WARHEAD DELIVERY SYSTEMS

    Senator Mundt. Did I understand you to say in this proposed 
proliferation or non-proliferation treaty, it would not include 
the delivery systems?
    Secretary Rusk. It concentrates on the nuclear warheads and 
does not try to deal with the question of delivery systems.
    Sentor Mundt. Why not?
    Secretary Rusk. Because the effect is to prevent the spread 
of warheads, whereas delivery systems can be everything from 
ordinary aircraft to artillery, to anything else, and it would 
be awfully hard to combine a delivery system into a non-
proliferation treaty.
    Senator Mundt. From our standpoint vis-a-vis, China isn't 
there a problem of getting a delivery system? They have got the 
bomb.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we would be interested in finding a 
way to keep them out of the ICBM business or IRBM business. But 
they have got delivery systems now, ordinary aircraft or the 
most shortranged missiles or presumably they will eventually 
develop atomic capability with artillery. So the delivery 
problem is a different problem from that of the warhead.
    Senator Mundt. The problem is they do not have a delivery 
system from their standpoint, but they are going to get one.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.
    Senator Mundt. And I think a non-proliferation treaty that 
ignores that is good for others but no good for us.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think the problem of delivery 
systems is a special and, in some respects, a more complicated 
question. For example, if you get into the delivery system 
business, should we go back to the Baruch proposals or not? 
This sounds these days like a rather wild idea, but would the 
security of the United States be enhanced if the world went 
completely conventional again? Now, if we say, no, we have got 
to have missile deterrence ourselves, then getting some control 
of these on the part of other countries is going to be 
extremely difficult.
    Senator Mundt. Don't you think we have to say yes to that 
question?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think we ought to think about it 
more than we have thought about it in the last few years 
because we sort of have taken it for granted that somehow we 
have to have a nuclear force ourselves.
    I think one of the great tragedies myself was--well, so 
much has happened since--that the Baruch proposals were not 
accepted.
    Senator Mundt. I agree.

                      NO QUID PRO QUO WITH BRITAIN

    Like most of others who have commented on Rhodesia, I am 
rather completely disenchanted with the way we have been sucked 
into the situation over there. Let me ask you this direct 
question: Before we yielded so quickly to the persuasiveness of 
Great Britain, as if we were still a colony of theirs as we 
were before 1776, have we ever tried to make an agreement in 
which we would obtain a quid pro quo with her relative to this 
business in Cuba, with respect to the trouble in Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we did not make a condition with 
respect to a quid pro quo. We have discussed this in relation 
to other questions where we would hope to get some more 
cooperation from them, and one reason for it is there are 
nineteen members of the Commonwealth involved in this, and the 
general membership in the United Nations, so a quid pro quo by 
a particular member would not be responsive to our national 
interests in dealing with problems in Africa or our problems 
relating to the very existence of the Commonwealth, or our 
interests as expressed in the United Nations.
    Senator Mundt. Except that they needed us for the sanctions 
program.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think if we had taken the other 
view on this that, perhaps, some of our friends in Britain 
would have simply used that to say, ``Well, you see, we were 
prepared to do this, but the Americans are not going to back us 
up,'' and they would have used it to get them off the hook.
    Senator Mundt. Do you really think in your own mind a 
program of sanctions, short of a military blockade, can ever 
bring Rhodesia to its knees?
    Senator Mundt. Well, I think, sir, the problem is not so 
much bringing them to their knees in that sense.
    Senator Mundt. Trying to get them to do what we want.
    Secretary Rusk. So much as bringing them into a discussion 
where they would be willing to make more sense than they have 
thus far.

                          ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA

    Senator Mundt. It seems to me the most you can hope for if 
our sanctions proceed is bringing a consolidation of South 
Africa and Rhodesia into a compact or making them one country, 
and then you magnify the problems.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. I do not believe South Africa is going to 
substitute itself for the rest of the world in Rhodesian trade. 
This is a very serious problem for South Africa. I do not think 
the Portuguese will do it. The Portuguese do say, if sanctions 
are applied, that they must apply them at the source and not 
try to use Portugal as the policeman simply because they have 
an adjacent territory.
    Senator Mundt. Do I interpret your statement that you 
believe South Africa is not going to send oil to Rhodesia?
    Secretary Rusk. The question is whether they will send oil 
in quantities additional to the normal flow, which was not 
particularly large, and that is the question.
    We had hoped South Africa would stay out of this so there 
cannot be raised the fairly serious problems of sanctions 
against South Africa. We objected to those at the United 
Nations.
    Senator Mundt. Do you think South Africa is going to 
continue or discontinue shipping oil?
    Secretary Rusk. I would be surprised if they cut off the 
oil below the levels which were going in before the sanctions 
were applied. I would be somewhat surprised on that. What I do 
not know the answer to is whether they would increase that 
supply of oil.
    Senator Mundt. If they continue at the same rate this is OK 
with Rhodesia. They got by before this.
    Secretary Rusk. Rhodesian oil is coming in through other 
channels, Mozambique as well.

                       SOME REDUCTION IN TENSIONS

    Senator Mundt. Let me ask you a hypothetical question. Just 
how do you define, let us say we have got countries A and B--I 
do not have to identify them--any particular countries who have 
been quarreling and are suspicious of each other, and you have 
a detente. What do you have?
    Secretary Rusk. I got trapped on that one in a press 
conference. They asked me that, and I said I did not think we 
could see a detente, but I can see some reduction of tensions, 
and one of the reporters looked it up in the dictionary and 
said that detente means reduction of tensions.
    But I think, in the first instance, the notion of detente--
to pull away from each other on those matters--that could mean 
war. That is in connection with which it was intended, and I 
think we are beginning to see some more prudent attitude in 
Eastern Europe, and I am speaking of the thinking of the 
smaller Eastern European countries, some.
    It takes a good many swallows to make a summer, and you 
have to probe this pretty carefully, but we would like to keep 
up with the possibilities on our own side----
    Senator Mundt. Let me put it this way: Suppose country A is 
at war with country C, and we are trying to get a detente with 
country B. Country B is hoping that country C defeats country A 
or kills country A's boys. Can we conceivably have a detente 
under those circumstances?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it is applying that specifically to 
the Soviet Union and to North Vietnam----
    Senator Mundt. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. And the United States.
    Senator Mundt. And the United States.
    Secretary Rusk. Because if, as I think it would be true--I 
think the Soviet Union would be satisfied to see this South 
Asian matter settled on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 
agreements--then we have a more complicated situation than a 
more harsh all-out--I hope myself that attitude on the part of 
the Soviet Union can be translated into some effective 
influence or effective international action to help to bring 
this matter to a peaceful conclusion.

                      SOVIET AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

    I do not think we ourselves on our side should say that 
because the Soviet Union is giving assistance to North Vietnam 
and----
    Senator Mundt. She is supplying every sophisticated weapon 
they use in Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. Whatever sophisticated weapons they have, 
such as SAM missiles and MIG 21, radar----
    Senator Mundt. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Those things particularly. I 
think it would be to our advantage not to let this get into a 
completely black and white, implacable hostility kind of 
situation and thereby reduce our room for some maneuver and, 
indeed, some assistance when the time comes. When the time 
comes----
    Senator Mundt. You have got, on the one hand, the theory, 
how well-grounded and how firm you never told us, that the 
Russians would really like this thing settled on the basis of 
the time before it started. That is the theory. How well-
documented it is I do not know.
    But the fact that they are continuing to supply every 
sophisticated weapon, that needs to be stubborn to the 
fulfillment of that theory. If the theory is sound, it seems to 
me, the Russians have it so easily available to sort of talk to 
Hanoi saying, ``We are about fed up supplying all these 
sophisticated weapons, we are going to reduce the supply or cut 
it off,'' and I see no support for the theory in terms of the 
action. I do not know where you get your theory. Maybe it is 
whispered in your ear by some diplomat, maybe he is sincere and 
maybe not. But I see no overt evidence at all.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it is hard to get the overt evidence, 
Senator, and in dealing with these people one has to recognize 
that you can be wrong tomorrow morning at nine o'clock on a 
proposition like that.
    But one of the questions to which we have not got a full 
answer to is this pause in the cessation of bombing. If these 
people cannot deliver Hanoi and say what Hanoi can do, perhaps 
they can at least tell us what they can do, so it is in this 
context that your question comes up, and we have not found out 
what the answer to that is yet, but this is the kind of 
question we are working on all the time.

                   DIVIDENDS FROM THE WAR IN VIETNAM

    Senator Mundt. One other point. Speaking as a supporter of 
the State Department's foreign policy, I have been a little bit 
disappointed in your testimony today on two points. You have 
sort of shot out of the saddle two of the justifications which 
I have made publicly at home, which are in my own mind reasons 
for supporting the foreign policy and the war in Vietnam, and I 
was a little bit disappointed when you said that you did not 
believe that one of the dividends from our efforts in Vietnam 
was the rather salutary developments which have been occurring 
in Indonesia. I have said I thought they were connected.
    You have been very careful to point out you feel if there 
is any relationship it is very remote.
    The other disappointment is I supported reluctantly the 
plea that you made when you came into the Senate and to the 
House and said that Sukarno says, ``The hell with American 
aid,'' and they voted against it in the House, and you came 
here and said that we have to continue some of our aid to keep 
certain government functions going if we were either to prevent 
a Communist takeover from China or to get a good leader who 
would be more neutral from the standpoint of isms, Americanism 
and communism, if something happened to Sukarno and he died or 
was replaced.
    Now, you have told us that you do not believe that that aid 
that you induced us to give you--the Senate wrote some nice 
ambiguous language--could be continued.
    Now you tell us you do not think that was very important in 
building up the stable elements over there enabling them to 
survive and get some kind of government which is not controlled 
by Sukarno.
    You shot out of the saddle two of the bases of my support. 
I may not be as enthusiastic----
    Secretary Rusk. There may be some misunderstanding on your 
second point. I did not want to diminish the second point at 
all. I did add the comment that it was not in the military 
channels that these relations are productive, but through the 
trade unions and the universities.
    Senator Mundt. All of which could have gone on without your 
coming here and pleading with us to override the House of 
Representatives, that we were going to save the situation, we 
had better support it, and we did.
    Secretary Rusk. I had not supposed I had minimized in my 
discussions----
    Senator Mundt. I am sure you minimized it in my mind when 
you put it to what the labor unions and the cultural exchanges 
had done. You certainly minimized it to me.

                         A QUESTION OF EMPHASIS

    Secretary Rusk. On the first question, there is a question 
of emphasis. My own inclination on most of these questions is 
to be a little moderate about claiming direct results from 
particular things, particularly when the situation in Indonesia 
was very complicated.
    There was a connection. I am sure there was a connection. I 
am sure the present Indonesian leaders felt there was a 
connection. I just did not want to say to you that because--I 
do not believe that our being in Vietnam played a decisive role 
at the key time in Indonesia. There were good Indonesian 
explanations for much of this. I am sure that had a 
constructive and helpful influence, but at least as Secretary 
of State I ought to feel that I ought not myself to exaggerate 
this.
    Now, look at the possibilities. Sukarno is still there. We 
think that he is under control. We think that the new 
government will remain in power, but if that should change----
    Senator Mundt. Do you think our pulling out of Vietnam 
would enhance or decrease Sukarno's chances?
    Secretary Rusk. I think it would greatly enhance it; it 
would enhance it. Let me go back to my mood of moderation.
    Senator Mundt. That is all.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell?

                    U.N. ROLE IN RHODESIAN SANCTIONS

    Senator Pell. I think I sympathize with you when I see all 
the foreign policies represented around the table here.
    Is not our imposition of sanctions in Rhodesia basically 
the result of our membership in the United Nations?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Pell. I think this is a point which should be on 
the record. We have received many benefits, including the 
avoidance of civil wars through the U.N., and it involves 
certain responsibilities, too.
    I understand from press reports that a new Under Secretary 
of State for Administration will be appointed, and I would like 
to leave with you the thought, obviously in this executive 
session it can be said but not in the open session, perhaps--
that I would hope that the appointment would be a man of very 
broad gauge, not a professional administrator or a man in that 
line, but a man who could give to whatever changes are 
necessary the internal direction rather than relying for 
external direction.
    I did not know that that or if that would coincide with 
your views. I realize it may be a little premature to discuss 
this.
    Secretary Rusk. This is a matter that is under 
consideration by the President, and presumably a nomination 
will be coming forward in due course.
    Senator Pell. I would hope a broad gauge non-professional 
administrator would be chosen.

                   RESULTS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

    Next, if we get to the conference table in Vietnam and 
reach an agreement with the North, and follow out our present, 
which I think are correct, intentions, withdrawing from 
Southeast Asia, would it not be a problem of fact that in 
several years Vietnam would be unified, probably under a 
nationalist, technically Communist leadership, and would that 
not be the probable result through peaceful means?
    Secretary Rusk. I would not think so, Senator.
    Over this period of time, the last twenty years, North 
Vietnam has become thoroughly consolidated as a Communist 
system. South Vietnam has rejected the Communist system for 
itself. You have the same problems in the two parts of Korea 
and the two parts of Germany.
    I think North Vietnam is not going to be interested in 
reunification on a non-Communist basis and, by and large, I say 
that may be an oversimplification, but I think that is true, 
and I think South Vietnam is not going to be interested in 
reunification on a Communist basis. These Buddhists and 
Catholics and Montagnards and Cambodians and northern refugees, 
apparently while disagreeing among themselves on many other 
things, seem to agree on that. So if this is left to the free 
choices of the people in the two parts of Vietnam, I think it 
is rather unlikely that there will be reunification any time 
soon.

                  LET PEOPLE DECIDE THROUGH ELECTIONS

    Senator Pell. You would not think some sort of government 
like that in Yugoslavia, where each side gives in the other 
direction, would probably emerge, and to my mind it would not 
be a bad thing from the viewpoint of American national 
interest.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, time factors, I can think if there is 
moderation of Communist organization and techniques and peace 
coexistence coming out of Mainland China and that sort of 
thing, that in the longest run you may have some drawing 
together, just as we hope that somehow the West Germans and the 
East Germans can find ways to draw together despite these large 
ideological conflicts. But I do not see that as anything that 
is going to contribute to the settlement of this present 
situation other than the willingness, as we have expressed it, 
to let that question be decided by the people themselves in 
their own way through free elections.

                      THE ADVANTAGE OF NEGOTIATING

    Senator Pell. Then would you believe there is any validity 
to the theory that the North Vietnamese really do not wish to 
come to the conference table, that they would see the 
possibility to achieving the objectives becoming, but that they 
consider their achieving the results of world revolution better 
by continuing the military level of activities, and it is to 
our advantage to get them to the conference table more than 
theirs?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, clearly they do not see much 
advantage to them in coming to the conference table because 
they have had hundreds of chances to and have consistently said 
no.
    Senator Pell. Excuse me, and also at least in my own view, 
the possibility of attaining success in coming to a conference 
table, from what their overt objectives are?
    Secretary Rusk. That is right. I do not believe they make 
the judgment if they came to the conference table they would 
get what they said they wanted to get in 1960. I think that is 
right.

                      DANGEROUS SITUATION IN CHINA

    Senator Pell. Do you believe the situation is extra 
dangerous in Vietnam now where we see in China the opposing 
forces struggling with the Mao forces, of an effort being made 
to divert the attention of the Chinese people from internal 
difficulties and to attempt external intervention such as they 
did in India several years ago?
    Secretary Rusk. This is a possibility one has to watch. 
Quite frankly, we do not see the situation in China developing 
that way at the present time, but we are keeping a very close 
eye on it. We do not see troop movements. We do not see 
statements from leaders, either privately or publicly, 
indicating that that is what they have in mind. But it is 
theoretically a possibility, and we are watching very closely.

                       NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER

    Senator Pell. What would be the present proportions of new 
increments of manpower on the opposition side in South Vietnam 
of local recruitment versus infiltration? Would it be about 60-
40 ratio?
    Secretary Rusk. For the most recent three or four months, I 
would have to check the figures on that. I would think that 
probably 60-40 is not too far off.
    Senator Pell. Sixty local, forty from the North?
    Secretary Rusk. Probably.
    Senator Pell. And the weapons we have captured, are they 
divided up what percent between West and East?
    Secretary Rusk. I would have to check the latest figures on 
that. Most of the weapons we are getting now are Chinese 
manufactured, but I would have to check that.
    Senator Pell. The substantial majority would be, you say?
    Secretary Rusk. That is right. You see, the Liberation 
Front Forces and the North Vietnamese Forces unified their 
weaponry about a year ago, went to the same caliber. It 
happened to be caliber for which our ammunition is not 
suitable, so they not only brought in the weapons buy they have 
to continue to bring in the ammunition to keep them supplied. 
These are submachine guns, the rifles, the carbines, light 
machine guns, things of that sort.

                          CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

    Senator Pell. As you know, we have had some interest for 
some time in this question of civilian casualties, and I am 
well aware of the horrible tortures, murders of our friends in 
South Vietnam.
    Why has it proved so difficult to get anywhere near so 
general an estimate now for a year and a half, where we have 
been sparring on this question, as to the real extent of the 
civilian casualties in South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, one of the problems is we do not have 
exact information on who might be in a particular place when it 
is struck. For example, on a POL dump, there are no houses 
around it, and that kind of thing, who happens to be there at 
the time.
    Another problem is whom would you classify as civilians for 
this purpose? The truck drivers in a convoy coming down the 
road toward the South, a line of coolies bringing in packs on 
their backs, coming into the--toward the--South? If you hit a 
railway bridge and there are people there working on the 
bridge, are they Chinese construction engineer soldiers or are 
they civilians? There are some very difficult questions of 
classification.
    But I would comment, Senator, that I do not know that there 
has ever been any struggle anywhere in which such extraordinary 
efforts are made, both in the field and back here, to try to 
minimize or eliminate what might be called innocent civilian 
casualties.
    Now, they have occurred. But on the fixed targets, that is 
as compared with the route reconnaissance along the routes of 
infiltration, the fixed targets have produced a surprisingly 
small number of civilian casualties.
    Senator Pell. I would agree with everything you have said, 
but I think those of us who have been pressing this question 
really wanted education.

                       COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ACTIONS

    I noticed the latent hostility in Germany, what hostility 
there is to the United States, which is based on the effect of 
civilian casualties from raids, and it still remains a certain 
amount. It is never expressed.
    I am wondering if these casualties are large, as they would 
seem to be, if, perhaps, some of our actions are 
counterproductive, and to arrive at that, that we press for an 
estimate, merely in terms of thousands. But when we get a 
figure of 100 civilian casualties in a six-month period, there 
is obviously something a little off.
    Secretary Rusk. The only figure of that kind I heard was 
identifiable civilian casualties inflicted by operations of our 
own forces.
    Senator Pell. In South Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. In South Vietnam.
    Senator Pell. Even that seems modest.
    Secretary Rusk. That you can be somewhat more accurate 
about than what is happening in North Vietnam.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.

                         A REFERENDUM IN TAIWAN

    One final question, trying to see a way out of our present 
impasse in our relations with China: In your view, and you have 
much knowledge in this area in the light of your previous 
responsibilities and work--what would be the result of a 
referendum in Formosa or Taiwan between--an open referendum 
between--the Chiang Kai-shek government and some other 
government?
    Secretary Rusk. Some other government in Formosa?
    Senator Pell. A local Taiwanese government, Taiwan 
candidates. You know, the figures are about ten percent of the 
Taiwanese are represented in the Parliament, whereas they make 
up about 80 percent of the people, et cetera, 90 percent or 80 
percent.
    Secretary Rusk. I would think at some point such a 
plebiscite might indicate that the Formosans would like to have 
more of a Formosan control over their own affairs.
    As you know, the theory of the present government there is 
based upon the theory that it is a Mainland, an all-China 
government, in which the Formosan Province is one of the 
provinces.
    But my impression is that the purely Formosan Nationalist 
feeling, on the one side, and in its relation to the 
Mainlanders, on the other, is somewhat more relaxed in the ten 
years certainly than it was at the very beginning when there 
were some pretty harsh feelings there.
    I suppose about 80 to 90 percent of the enlisted personnel 
of the present armed forces, the present army, of the Republic 
of China are now Formosan personnel.
    Senator Pell. Might not this be one of the eventual 
approaches to getting us off our present wicket when the time 
comes, and there is need for a change of administration there 
anyway?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not think it would make the slightest 
difference to Peking.
    Senator Pell. It would not?
    Secretary Rusk. No. They want it and they just say, ``It is 
ours and we have got to have it.'' There never has been any--
and they won't even renounce the use of force in the Straits of 
Formosa. You remember the Eisenhower Administration in the mid-
fifties began talking with the Chinese and tried to get a 
mutual declaration of the renunciation of force in the Straits 
of Formosa. We continued that ever since. Never the slightest 
indication of Peking that they would be interested in that
    Senator Pell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Case.
    Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                  QUESTIONING THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA

    Mr. Secretary, following Senator Pell's suggestion implicit 
in one of his questions as to whether the North Vietnamese and, 
presumably, the Chinese might be quite uninterested in 
negotiations because they expect to get more out of continuing 
their current operation than through any negotiations. It seems 
to me there is a relation between that possibility and the 
possibility that I have not heard our policy contemplate, that 
in the end it may not be what we hoped, Russia and the U.S. 
against China, but rather Russia and China against the United 
States, and that we are falling into, unfortunately--I am 
thinking of the broadest terms now--maybe a trap, if you will, 
maybe nothing as explicit as this, but this may be the 
consequence, and I am not at all sure that we are right.
    Even those liberals who say the ancient antagonisms between 
China and Russia are going to make everything all right for us, 
I am not at all sure that they are concerned about destroying 
the only obstacle to world Communism, the United States of 
America, that that may not override these things, at least in 
the short run or in the middle time.
    I wonder if you would just talk a little about this. Maybe 
we, in our own interests, including, of course, the interests 
of world peace, too, are on the wrong track here in thinking 
that containment of China, which I have supported, as you know, 
up to now, is a desirable thing, on the analogy to the position 
in Western Europe, defense against--I mean standing, creating 
the bulwark against expansion of Russia, believing as you have 
suggested too, with you, if we had done something about Hitler 
we would not have had World War II and all the rest of it.
    I wonder if I am right about this, and whether we may not 
be getting bogged down and trapped into doing a thing which is 
going to take more and more of our strength and render us in a 
position where we will be really vulnerable to this other 
combination which we do not contemplate.

                RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

    Secretary Rusk. One of the real possibilities is an 
eventual reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union.
    Senator Case. I do not mean to just be happy with each 
other, I mean they would be after us.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand.
    The key point would be on what general basis of policy 
would that reconciliation occur. There are a good many in 
Eastern Europe who insist it would not be possible because of 
the dynamics between the Communist world for that 
reconciliation to occur on the basis of the militancy of 
Peking; that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would not and 
could not move in that direction. I am not so sure of that. 
That is a possibility.
    The other would be a reconciliation on the basis of what 
might be called the peaceful co-existence. Now, we just have no 
way of knowing these things.
    I do feel, Senator Case, that if Hanoi and Peking could 
demonstrate to the Communist world that the policy of militancy 
is the way to get ahead successfully with the world revolution, 
that we are in greater danger of having the combined Communist 
world getting together directly and fundamentally opposed to 
the interests of the free world. That would be a very dangerous 
situation.
    No, I limited my own remarks to what I believe to be the 
present attitude of the Soviet Union on Vietnam, and to a 
somewhat moderately optimistic view as to the possibilities of 
some further improvement of relations with Eastern Europe.
    But these other possibilities are very much there and very 
much in our minds.
    It seems to me that the possibility of a combination that 
is militantly hostile to the United States would be encouraged 
by a demonstration by one or another of these members of the 
Communist world that an aggression in the face of a security 
treaty of the United States can successfully be carried out.
    Senator Case. This is an effect.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I know.

                 GETTING INVOLVED IN A PERIPHERAL AREA

    Senator Case. I just wonder if we are taking into account 
the other possibility sufficiently as to get ourselves more and 
more involved in this particular area that is rather peripheral 
to them and really not at all hurting them at all, not hurting 
Russia one bit. They are not much involved.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have had some of the same 
considerations to deal with in connection with the Greek 
guerrillas and the Berlin blockade and other such issues where 
the combined weight of the Communist world posed a threat that 
we had very much in mind at that time.
    Senator Case. Indeed we have. But we never have gotten 
ourselves involved with a half million men or whatever the 
numbers.

                ANTAGONISM WITH THE TWO COMMUNIST POWERS

    The Chairman. Would the Senator yield there on that 
question of their policy. Wouldn't the obvious reason be their 
antagonism to us? That is the policy they could get together 
on, not on one of these ideological reasons.
    Senator Case. Yes indeed, and I think the Secretary 
understood that was the thrust of my remarks.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Will the Senator yield? Isn't their 
antagonism toward us generated by their political philosophy, 
that is, the international Communist philosophy? I do not think 
it is a personal antagonism generated from anything except 
their ideology.
    Senator Case. This is my belief. This is my concern, based 
on their desire to destroy the only real block in their way.
    Secretary Rusk. You see, if all the countries lived between 
us and these two Communist powers, were genuinely secure and 
were not living under fear, and some of them have not been 
subjected to attack by these countries, we would not have 
anything to fight these two countries about. We are not going 
to fight the Soviet Union over polar bears in the Arctic, and 
we are not going to set off missiles against each other merely 
because there are missiles over there.
    The principal issues on which we and the Soviet Union could 
get into a war under present circumstances have to do with the 
security of Western Europe.
    There are some in Western Europe who think they are somehow 
part of a third world that unfortunately has been caught up in 
a great controversy between us and the Soviet Union. To me, 
this is a great misunderstanding of the situation.
    If Western Europe were secure--Western Europe is the 
issue--if Western Europe were secure we would not have put $900 
billion in the defense budgets since 1947, and the same thing 
will be true of Mainland China.
    If Korea and Japan and the Philippines and these other 
countries had a reasonable chance of living peacefully next 
door to this giant there without being subjected to the 
pressures of the world revolution, and they are there, I think 
we ought not to decide prematurely that they are not there, 
they could live peacefully there and then we have no problems 
out in that part of the world except trade and other kinds of 
relationships.

                            WORLD REVOLUTION

    The Chairman. I get lost on that phrase ``world 
revolution.'' You tried to describe detente. What is the world 
revolution?
    Secretary Rusk. The Communist doctrine that the world 
should be and is going to be reorganized on a Communist basis 
under the leadership of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
    Now, you see a very primitive form of this out of Mao Tse-
Tung. It is getting to be more sophisticated in Eastern Europe, 
but these fellows still are pretty serious about this business.
    Now, this revolutionary force has lost, perhaps, some of 
its clan in Eastern Europe. They are a little more middle-aged, 
and have got more of a stake in what they have been able to 
build up, and they may be getting a little tired with the more 
military aspect of what they have been doing.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You mean they have two pigs?
    Secretary Rusk. They have two pigs. [Laughter.]
    But this is not true of the others, apparently these 
veterans of the Long March in China, although one would have to 
take into account they have been more prudent in action than 
they have been in their words and doctrine.

                IS WORLD REVOLUTION ACTIVELY THREATENED?

    The Chairman. What have they done to support your theory 
that the world revolution is actively threatened? What do you 
consider the Chinese have done? I do not wish to interrupt you, 
I do not know----
    Senator Case. I think we are probing really the same 
purpose.
    The Chairman. I am just trying to probe what this world 
revolution is that you have in mind. Is there any doctrine or 
any actions which have been taken in support?
    Senator Case. I would not want to take a chance that there 
is not. Frankly, I think there is. In general, I have a 
somewhat different view than you do as to the desirability of 
protecting ourselves about a Russian treaty.
    The Chairman. It is not what you are thinking about it, but 
it is what the Secretary is thinking about it.
    Secretary Rusk. You are not asking questions about the 
doctrine, at the moment, I mean----
    The Chairman. If I understood you, the world revolution 
here is a major reason for our involvement, that is the way the 
Senator put it. I was very intrigued by the way the Senator put 
It. We might be falling into a trap. This has occurred to us 
when we saw that article out of China some time ago in which it 
was said, ``We are very obliged to the U.S. for bringing their 
men and treasure. We couldn't get at them if they stayed at 
home. It is the only way we can get at them, their coming here 
and getting bogged down. We should be very appreciative to the 
government of the United States for giving us the opportunity 
to destroy it.''
    That is what reminded me of what the Senator said.
    Secretary Rusk. Is this Hanoi or Peking?
    The Chairman. That came out of Peking. It was a very long 
article which came out a couple of months ago. You saw it?
    Senator Pell. No, I did not. Who wrote it?
    The Chairman. It came out of People's Daily. It was picked 
up in the usual way. Don't you have that, Mr. Marcy? Anyway, I 
know we can find it.
    Senator Pell. I would like to see it. This is exactly the 
theory I was advancing.
    The Chairman. It was picked up from the People's Daily and 
reprinted in the New York Times. I thought that is exactly what 
you had in mind.
    Senator Case. I had this in mind.

                        AMERICAN OVERCOMMITMENT

    The Chairman. It has occurred to me. Are we being drawn 
into one place where we can be destroyed? This is what some of 
our witnesses said last year. Are we becoming overcommitted to 
where our great wealth and manpower are being bogged down in an 
area which, as the Senator so well said, is not costing the 
opposition any substantial manpower or money? It is a very 
serious question.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, when one looks back to some of 
these other crises, when the guerrillas were thirty miles from 
Athens in great strength from Athens, Greece, and the winter 
weather fell in on the Berlin airlift, and we were in that tiny 
perimeter in Pusan or even in the first week of the Cuban 
missile crisis, the situation is more manageable.
    Senator Case. It was said we only won that one because 
Yugoslavia took a turn.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it took a turn. Maybe this one is 
going to be influenced by the presence of the problems in 
Mainland China.
    The Chairman. It did not take a turn by bombing but for 
entirely different reasons.
    Senator Case. I know. This is the only reason firmness 
suggests. I must profess that I am for all this. I want to be 
reassured we are not getting in so deep that we are in a bog.
    The Chairman. Well, you asked a very pertinent question.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not believe Peking is glad to see us 
in Southeast Asia. I do not believe that for a minute.
    Senator Case. In one sense, no.

                 NOT HAVE TREATIES DISRUPTED BY A BLUFF

    The Chairman. I am sure in one sense, no. But if they must 
have it out this is the way. If they are convinced we are going 
to attack them any way, this is a good way.
    Senator Case. I am sure what you did, Mr. Secretary, in 
answering this man from South Dakota, upset this man, and it 
upset me, too. I have regarded what we have done as pretty 
important to our success in holding the line all over the 
world, taking a stand here and making your position more 
credible with the Russians and with everybody else, and also in 
having some rather specific effects and giving tone to the 
whole free effort in an effort to keep the world free in 
Southeast Asia.
    Secretary Rusk. I hope I did not detract at all from that 
view. I certainly----
    Senator Case. Say it again because, you know, if you did 
detract.
    Secretary Rusk. No. I was commenting specifically about its 
relation to Indonesia.
    Senator Case. You mean just cause and effect, one, two, 
like that?
    Secretary Rusk. No. On the larger question as to what these 
great security treaties mean in terms of keeping the peace, to 
me the greatest danger in the world would be to have these 
treaties be interpreted by the other side as a bluff, because 
we have been tested at times when had they judged we were 
bluffing great catastrophe would have resulted. The Berlin 
crisis of 1961-1962, the Cuban missile crisis were two recent 
examples of this.
    The most utter dangers are involved in that problem, and we 
are all--we all have to approach them, it seems to me, on our 
knees because it is awfully hard to be absolutely certain on 
such questions.
    Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Cooper?
    Senator Cooper. Am I allowed to ask questions?
    The Chairman. Yes, sir.

               NORTH VIETNAM'S TERMS ON BOMBING CESSATION

    Senator Cooper. Mr. Secretary, my question goes to the 
declaration of North Vietnam that there must be a cessation of 
bombing of North Vietnam. I am not clear as to the exact 
wording of the declaration, if it is an exact wording. Did 
North Vietnam expressly state that there must be a permanent 
cessation of bombing or did it just state that there must be a 
cessation of bombing without the fixing of any limits upon the 
cessation of bombing?
    Secretary Rusk. The most--the usual phrase there is 
unconditional and permanent. Now in the phraseology that you 
get in different ways, public and private, the permanent part--
unconditional was always there. The permanent has been 
described another way as definitively which, I suppose, is 
permanent; and, as Harrison Salisbury in his interview put it, 
for good, which is the same thing, I suppose, as permanent. In 
other words, this framing of the issue has been put to us as 
unconditional permanent, and this is coupled with the excuses 
that were given to us when the thirty-seven-day pause was 
finished earlier this year, when nothing happened, when we 
paused for twice as long, as had been suggested to us that we 
pause.
    They said, ``Well, a suspension is an ultimatum. You can't 
expect people to pick up the question of peace under an 
ultimatum of that sort,'' and the general attitude now on the 
other side seems to be that unless it is unconditional and 
permanent, anything less than that as a stoppage of the bombing 
would be interpreted as an ultimatum.
    Now, of course, one can look at the question as to whether 
you simply stop without saying, but they would either insist 
upon a clarification of that point or would interpret for 
themselves as unconditional and permanent, and then if we found 
we had to resume the bombing for military reasons, then we 
could carry the burden of having acted in breach of faith, you 
see.
    So we feel that these are issues of such importance that we 
ought to have some indications on the other side as to what 
would happen if we stopped the bombing, and thus far we have 
not been able to get any.

                  VIETNAMESE REUNIFICATION BY ELECTION

    Senator Cooper. I will be brief on this question because I 
am sure you have developed it in sessions at which, of course, 
I was not present. But, as I understand it, the United States 
has said it would accept this basis of negotiation, the 
adherence to the 1954 Geneva Accords.
    As I remember, those accords called for general elections 
throughout all Vietnam two years later and, I assume, with the 
idea that a government would be established for all Vietnam.
    Beginning with the French and then with the United States, 
it seems to me, our course has been to establish a separate 
government for South Vietnam, and for many reasons. But how 
would the United States resolve that question when it now 
states that it would not adhere to the Geneva Accords? How 
would it resolve the question of the government for all of the 
South Vietnamese as distinguished from what would seem to have 
been our policy and the French policy before to establish a 
government in South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. I think we have two elements there. First, 
we have said the South Vietnamese ought to have a chance in 
free elections to determine what their own government should 
be, and that the question of reunification should be decided by 
the peoples of the two parts of Vietnam through free elections 
or free choice.
    The 1954 agreements, by providing for elections on that 
issue, presumably meant that this was to be by consent of the 
peoples concerned.
    The same issue arises both in Korea and in Germany, where 
you have other divided countries.
    I do not myself think, Senator, that in terms of settling 
the problem that we now have in Vietnam that the question of 
reunification by peaceful means is likely to be the great 
obstacle to a possible settlement. The problem is whether we 
can get the other side to hold its hand in trying to bring 
about reunification by force.
    Senator Cooper. That is all.
    The Chairman. I have one or two questions.

                         THE QUAKERS IN CANADA

    Do you know, Mr. Secretary, about a case that was sent to 
me involving the Quakers in Canada, that the Treasury of the 
United States issued a circular to all the banks in the United 
States directing them not to honor a check payable to the 
Quakers of Canada? Are you familiar with that?
    Secretary Rusk. No sir; I am not. I had not heard of it 
before.
    The Chairman. Well, it came to me with a photostat of the 
order, and I wondered if there is any authority for such an 
order from the Treasury.
    Secretary Rusk. It sounds to me as though this might be one 
of the foreign assets control problems. If the Quakers were 
using these funds to send assistance to North Vietnam----
    The Chairman. That is correct. Is there such authority that 
the Quakers--well, the Quakers state they are sending it North 
and South. They do this--they are not involved in this 
political thing. They are doing humanitarian work, and a friend 
sent me the letter. I don't have the letter anyway. I forgot 
how it went--I wrote a letter to the Treasury, but have had no 
response. Is that as far as you know, within the power, the 
authority of the Treasury?
    Secretary Rusk. I would think so, sir, under the foreign 
assets control legislation.
    Sentor Hickenlooper. What kind of a check?
    The Chairman. I did not send a check. Anyway this person, 
an American citizen, writes a check on the First National Bank 
of Washington, sends it to the Quakers in Canada, and the bank 
here is directed by the Treasury not to honor a check payable 
to the Quakers of Canada.
    Secretary Rusk. I would have to look into the specific case 
because I just am not informed about it.
    The Chairman. I was a little surprised that we had that 
authority. I thought you could donate money to the Quakers.
    Secretary Rusk. I believe donations outside the United 
States are not income tax deductible in the usual case.
    Senator Pell. That is absolutely correct.
    The Chairman. Well, they are to Israel, aren't they?
    Secretary Rusk. That is a legal sense, that is to the 
organized charities organized in this country under the laws of 
this country.

                DRAWING THE U.S. INTO A LAND WAR IN ASIA

    The Chairman. In response to Senator Case's question--he 
has disappeared--but the staff just handed me an article \2\ 
which I had not seen, from the War/Peace Report of October 1966 
which says:

    \2\ ``Peking and the U.S. Are Both Winning.''

    It is frightening as well as paradoxical that almost 
identical political assessments are being made in Peking and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington concerning the war in Vietnam.

    I won't read it all. It says:

    On the other side, well-informed U.N. Eastern European 
diplomats report the perception of the same reality is quite 
different when viewed from Peking. These observers state Maoist 
Peking has had, from the beginning, a three-fold strategy based 
upon the assumption of an ultimate inevitable war with American 
imperialism: First to draw the U.S. into a major land 
engagement in Asia, preferably not on Chinese soil (these 
observers believe Korea was China's, not the Soviet's 
initiative); second, to shift the American-Chinese 
confrontation to an American-Soviet confrontation; third, to 
use Vietnam and the underdeveloped world as a vehicle to change 
Russian foreign policy, or failing that, to discredit it.

    I had not seen it but it is on all fours with this other 
idea that this----
    Secretary Rusk. They said that Korea was on China's 
initiative and not the Soviets'?
    The Chairman. Just the opposite.
    Secretary Rusk. These observers believe----
    The Chairman. Yes, the observers believe that Korea was 
China's not the Soviets' initiative. I also had thought it was 
the Soviets'.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not believe that at all.
    The Chairman. But in any case, the first point, they feel 
since a conflict is inevitable, this is the best thing for them 
on the same theory as the Senator from New Jersey advanced.

                            DULLES ON SEATO

    The Chairman. I want to come back to one thing, one very 
interesting thing, you said. But before I do that I want to 
read a very short statement of Mr. Dulles.
    You had, and the administration, correctly I think from its 
point of view, is now dwelling upon SEATO, but this is what 
Secretary Dulles said to us, and it has some bearing on our 
interpretation of it, and I think the way you should use it now 
is saying what the Senate did. Here is a quote from Secretary 
Dulles.
    Secretary Rusk. Is that from your committee report?
    The Chairman. That is right.
    Secretary Rusk. What page?
    The Chairman. Page 8.

    We do not intend to dedicate any major elements of the 
United States military establishment to form an arm of defense 
in this area.

    He is speaking about SEATO.

    We rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking 
power. That we made clear to our associates in the treaty and 
that is our policy.
    It would involve in the opinion of our military advisers an 
injudicious over-extension of our military power if we were to 
try to build up that kind of an organization in Southeast Asia.
    We do not have the adequate forces to do it, and I believe 
that if there should be open armed attack in that area the most 
effective step would be to strike at the source of aggression 
rather than to try to rush American manpower into the area to 
try to fight a ground war.

    I always put it in the record to show that some of us who 
were here and voted for those treaties voted for them in view 
of the interpretation given to us by the Secretary of State at 
that time which, I thought, and I know others must have been 
influenced by the idea, that it was not an engagement to put in 
a land army in a big war on the land. This was about the same 
time that some of our leading military authorities were also 
saying, such as Gen. Douglas MacArthur, that the last thing we 
ought to do is mount a big land war on the Continent of Asia.
    So I would submit that the conditions are very different 
today in what we are doing from what many of us legitimately 
understood was involved in that treaty.

                   ALTERNATIVE TO MASSIVE RETALIATION

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I comment briefly on 
this?
    Mr. Chairman. Yes, you may. I was just trying to put 
another point of view, but go ahead. You may comment.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that discussion, it seems to me, goes 
to the point as to whether, as in NATO, it was proposed in 
SEATO to build up standing forces of the alliance in the area 
in time of peace, and it was pointed out not.
    Secondly, I would point out that at that time the 
alternative defense notion was massive retaliation, and had 
that been explored more fully at the time, I would suspect that 
the alternative Mr. Dulles had in mind as to the kind of thing 
we were doing here was massive retaliation, which we have 
stayed away from in this present situation.
    The Chairman. That may be, but the point is to me that 
those of us who were here in voting for this, our judgment, I 
feel, certainly mine, was influenced by the representations as 
to what we were engaged in, what undertaking we were actually 
making.

                  COMPARISON TO TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

    I would say the same way with the Tonkin Gulf thing. I 
think the changes, as today, the circumstances are very 
different from what they were then. We had a very small group. 
Today we have nearly approaching, I guess, 400,000 to 500,000 
men in the area. It is costing $20, $25 billion, and so forth. 
I think the change in the circumstances today as of the time of 
the Tonkin Gulf are very dramatic indeed, and I, for one--I 
have already confessed my error--was influenced very greatly by 
the political situation at the time, and I was supporting the 
President, who was the then candidate for 1964, and that he was 
then advocating a policy of not enlarging the war and, 
therefore, I supported his recommendation on the Tonkin Bay.
    You are legitimately correct in saying, yes, you supported 
it. It is legitimate to respond that I certainly did not 
anticipate doing what we are doing. I do not particularly like 
to have this always thrown up, ``Well, look, you voted for 
this.'' I do not consider we did vote for what we are doing now 
at all. The circumstances were very, very different.

                          U.S. TROOPS TO NATO

    Senator Hickenlooper. If the Senator will yield to me, I 
will call his attention to the fact when we were considering 
the NATO organization we were told very emphatically, and the 
word ``emphatically'' was used in the testimony, that we were 
not going to send any troops to Europe or anything like that.
    The Chairman. I think that is correct.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Within four months, we had four 
divisions on the way.
    The Chairman. Yes. But we did right after that, the very 
question of whether we should send additional forces was 
submitted to the Senate, and the Senate had a long and thorough 
and acrimonious debate on the subject and specifically 
authorized it. You remember that.
    Senator Hickenlooper. After the troops went.
    The Chairman. Well, they at least paid some attention to 
the constitutional idea that we participate in these things.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I am just saying these things happen 
at times.

        PRESIDENT JOHNSON DID THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WAS EXPECTED

    The Chairman. I do not particularly like the Tonkin Bay 
being thrown up at this time that that is the authority for you 
to do what you are now doing. In fact, I thought in supporting 
the President as of that date in August of 1964, that I was 
supporting a man who was going to do exactly the opposite. Now 
he is doing precisely what his opponent said he would do, and 
this is a very curious turn of fate. There is not much I can do 
about it publicly, at least, but anyway that is a fact of the 
matter.
    Secretary Rusk. One of the key elements, of course, in that 
problem is what the other side is doing all the time. These 
fellows keep marching down from the North. At some point 
somebody has to make a decision that ``You get out of the 
way,'' or you shoot them.

                 A GENERATION BETRAYED BY WORLD WAR II

    The Chairman. These are interesting subjects you brought 
up. I think the one Senator Case brought up is very interesting 
and worth further thought. Here is one you make. I think this 
is what you said a moment ago. You belong to a generation that 
was betrayed into World War I----
    Secretary Rusk. World War II.
    The Chairman. World War II, I am sorry, because the 
governments refused to organize the peace of the world.
    The question, however, it seems to me, is, the big 
question, does this war, as we are now prosecuting it, does it 
obstruct or does it promote the organizing of peace. You assume 
that this war is an essential and important part that is 
designed to organize the peace of the world. Well, my own 
feeling is in view of developments that were beginning to take 
place when this war got really hot, that it more likely would 
prove in the light of history to obstruct the detente that you 
mentioned, certainly with the Russians, and detente generally 
in Europe as between Western Europe and the Russians, not just 
between us, and the very question is, you assume it, I think 
the question at issue is, does this war, as we now prosecute 
it, does it help organize the peace.
    You say the reason you are so interested in pursuing this 
is you felt betrayed, and you do not want to do that again. I 
think you are assuming the question at issue.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not think it is an assumption that was 
just pulled out of the air. In 1961, Chairman Khrushchev said 
to President Kennedy, in effect, ``Get your troops out of 
Berlin or there will be war,'' and President Kennedy had to say 
to him, ``Well, Mr. Chairman, then there will be war,'' and it 
was extremely important that Mr. Khrushchev believe the 
President of the United States on that point, otherwise we 
might well have had war.
    The same thing at the time of the Cuban missile crisis 
where it was necessary to say to Chairman Khrushchev, ``The 
missiles will have to go, Mr. Chairman. We hope they can go by 
peaceful means, but they must go.''
    If the Chairman, if Chairman Khrushchev had not believed 
President Kennedy in that situation, we could have had an even 
greater catastrophe than in the Berlin matter.
    Now, it is a very serious thing to create the impression 
that our mutual security treaties are bluffs.

              HOW ARE CUBA AND BERLIN RELEVANT TO VIETNAM?

    The Chairman. But there are two cases that I think most of 
us--I never did question your correctness in both cases because 
there was a valid reason for it. Now, go ahead, here is South 
Vietnam. Why is it relevant? Why is what you did in Berlin 
relevant as to the case in Vietnam? I do not see the relevancy. 
I believe they do not believe you because you are in there on a 
false basis. They respected what you said in Cuba and in 
Berlin. Why is it they do not do it in Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. The relevance, the first instance, it seems 
to me, Mr. Chairman, that if you make a commitment like the 
SEATO Treaty, and then demonstrate that it is a bluff, there is 
a great risk that they will consider as bluffs your attitude in 
these other crises.
    The Chairman. You see, you are assuming the question at 
issue again. The Senator from Oregon and myself and a lot of 
other people do not believe the SEATO Treaty covers this case, 
and neither did you until the last two years.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I beg your pardon. If you 
want the full record on this----
    The Chairman. Well, the State Department did not. I just 
gave you the reference.
    Secretary Rusk. I am talking about what was said at every 
SEATO Ministers meeting since I have been Secretary of State 
and the communiques of the SEATO Ministers and the statements 
made by President Kennedy. I have not looked at that memorandum 
that you referred to of March 1965.
    The Chairman. This is a State Department memorandum, not 
mine.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand. There were a good many other 
memoranda in which the SEATO Treaty was talked about along the 
way and in public statements and in communiques, and in press 
conferences of President Kennedy, and so forth, and there was 
certainly no possibility of doubt that in the case----

                         CLIENT STATES IN SEATO

    The Chairman. Isn't it odd that the other SEATO Members do 
not agree with you as to its applicability here? None of them 
have felt obliged because of this SEATO Treaty to come and 
discharge their duties. Are we the only people who have respect 
for our international----
    Secretary Rusk. Five of them are there, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I admit outside of our clients, I mean the 
independent countries.
    Secretary Rusk. If you call the clients those that agree 
with us, and non-clients those that do not agree with us----
    The Chairman. I call a client the ones you put so much 
money in them that you dominate their policies and they will do 
anything to continue to get enormous aid from you, that you 
buy. That is what I call a client.
    Secretary Rusk. We have not bought Australia and New 
Zealand. They are not client states.
    The Chairman. They are not paid very much either. I am 
talking about Korea in which you paid vast sums, and I am 
speaking of the Philippines in which you not only gave them 
very large commitments but I was told two days ago you are now 
coming up for a new item for the Philippines in the AID program 
and, of course, Thailand, in which you are simply covering them 
up with gold. Those are the client states, and they are the 
ones that are doing most of the burden.
    Secretary Rusk. But they are also the states that live 
under the gun of danger out here and have the greatest interest 
in resisting what is being done there by Hanoi.
    The Chairman. I suppose India and Japan are not interested. 
They are not in danger, if there is a danger.
    Senator Aiken. I do not understand why you call them 
clients. They do not pay us for our services. We pay them. I 
would say they are beneficiaries instead of clients. 
[Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Well, it is both ways. They dominate our 
policy, I guess. We are the captives of the government of the 
Philippines, Thailand and Formosa.

                       HOW TO ORGANIZE THE PEACE

    Well, I wanted to get to--I got diverted--what is your idea 
of how to organize the peace today?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that is a very long subject, but in 
essence I would say look at Article I of the United Nations 
Charter where it talks about the necessity for suppressing acts 
of aggression and breaches of the peace, settling disputes by 
peaceful means. Article II, the next paragraph, goes on to talk 
about self-determination. Surely, if we draw anything at all 
from our experience in the last decade, it is that those who 
start a process of aggression develop the momentum of 
aggression if it is not checked. And no one has been able to 
demonstrate to me that the things which these events have in 
common are irrelevant.
    Now, everyone knows that every human action has its unique 
aspects. One burglar is John Doe, and another burglar is 
Richard Roe, and each action is unique in some respects. But it 
is what they have in common that puts them in prison.
    The Chairman. I was hoping you would say the U.N., and I 
would hope that we would rely on the U.N. But what we are 
really doing is going on our own. These are our own programs. 
It is not the U.N. The U.N. has nothing to do with it. This is 
a big difference between this and Korea.
    One reason, I think, there was little dissent about Korea 
is that it was a collective action. It is true we furnished 
most of the sinews because we had it, but we had the support 
and approval of the United Nations. That is the only idea I 
have about organizing the peace is the U.N. But this does not 
seem to be in accord with that policy. That is one of the 
things why I asked that question.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, again the Korean matter was unique in 
the U.N. system because of the accident that the Soviet Union 
was absent from--they were absent from the Security Council 
when the decisive decisions were taken there.
    The Chairman. But the Soviet Union has not vetoed any 
action here.

                   DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEATO AND NATO

    Secretary Rusk. But NATO is not subject to formal action by 
the United Nations. If there is an attack on a member of NATO--
--
    The Chairman. But, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Dulles specifically 
distinguished this from NATO. He said it is not like NATO.
    Secretary Rusk. But not in every respect. It was 
distinguished from NATO in the formulation that was used for 
these later treaties, and I think you will find in the record 
that he says that the differences are insignificant; that the 
difference in the wording arose out of the issue raised, I 
think, by Senator Taft and others as to whether the language of 
the NATO treaty itself would, in effect, repeal the 
constitutional processes here, that an attack on one is an 
attack on all, and in order not to have that occur, they went 
to the formulation, which Senator Lausche read in these other 
treaties, which was somewhat different from the NATO language. 
But Secretary Dulles in one of these hearings indicated that 
the difference was insubstantial.
    The Chairman. Well, I will stop with one last thing. I 
wondered, because I am always asked this, and I am always asked 
by the press, what is the response to the question, are you 
optimistic or pessimistic about the situation? They will ask 
it. They always do, nearly the first question, when they say 
was the Secretary optimistic or pessimistic. How did he feel 
about this?
    Secretary Rusk. Usually at press conferences when that 
question is put to me I usually do not answer it in those 
terms.
    The Chairman. What do you say?
    Secretary Rusk. Because it is much too complicated a 
situation altogether.

                    A REQUEST FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION

    Senator Morse. I have one question and one request for 
information and, Mr. Secretary, it may involve a matter of 
policy and, as you know, if it does I follow your decision on 
policy.
    Before I make the request, we can certainly have it on a 
secret basis, I would like to get it on a public basis, if 
possible, because we cannot avoid the fact that in public 
discussion among our people in this country these days great 
concern is expressed over whether this is becoming 
predominantly an American or an Asian war. In fact, there are 
certain political points of view within the ranks of the 
Republican Party that it ought to be turned over to the Asians.
    I have not taken that position completely, but I do think 
the American people are entitled to the information that I now 
would like to have you supply for public discussion, but if you 
decide after consultation with the administration that it 
cannot be supplied publicly, at least I would like to have it 
made a part of this record, and I would like to use it for the 
public, if possible.

                        STATISTICS ON CASUALTIES

    What were the Vietnamese casualties in 1964, 1965 and 1966, 
including their fatalities and their wounded?
    What were the U.S. casualties during the last three years?
    Supply the number of Vietnam infiltrating in 1964, 1965, 
1966.
    Four, the number of Viet Cong recruited in South Vietnam in 
1964, 1965, and 1966.
    Five, the desertion rates from the South Vietnamese army in 
1964, 1965, and 1966, compared with the Viet Cong's desertion 
rates.
    Now, we have some of these figures provided to the 
committee by the Defense Department, but they are classified. 
They show that in 1966, and this is the point Senator Clark was 
talking about, that the number of Americans killed in action 
quadrupled while the number of Vietnamese killed in action was 
less by way of 20 percent, and that despite bombing North 
Vietnam infiltration almost tripled in 1966.
    Of course, these figures also have to be compared in 
relationship to the number of personnel in the American forces 
and the South Vietnamese forces, and what is known about the 
number of personnel in the Viet Cong forces.
    The thrust of my request is obvious. I would like to have 
the statistical material bearing on the question of great 
public concern these days as to whether or not the United 
States is taking over the war and the South Vietnamese, as far 
as fighting is concerned, are being let out more and more of 
responsibility, because if we are going to have a drive for the 
war to be taken over by Asians, an all-Asian conference, as has 
been proposed by some, I think the American people ought to 
have the statistical material that I asked for.
    Secretary Rusk. We will see what we can do on that. I think 
we have much harder information on certain of those points than 
we have on the others. For example, on the defections from the 
Viet Cong, we can count somewhat more than 20,000 in 1966 who 
come in to get their cards in the Chiu Hoi program and go on to 
get resettled and get jobs.
    They tell us for every one who comes over officially, maybe 
three or four others simply go off to their farms, and the 
desertions are not desertions from the South Vietnamese to the 
Viet Cong, but simply people who go back to their farms, 
people, like people in this country during the Civil War at 
frequent intervals. But we will try our best to get you the 
figures and see whether we can make them public. I think a good 
many of these figures can be made public. Some of them are 
public, but I will try to pull them together for you.

                         THE U.N. AND RHODESIA

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question: If I 
understand when we were talking about Rhodesia you were stating 
that was not a bilateral action, that we were pulled into 
Rhodesia because of our obligations under the U.N. charter; is 
that right?
    Secretary Rusk. I said it was not just a bilateral matter, 
that we had important national interests of our own involved in 
this question under the charter in relation to the United 
Nations structure, in relation to our own interests in Africa, 
as well as our interests in the Commonwealth.
    Senator Mundt. How do you respond to Dean Acheson's 
statement--I know you have read this--in which he said that 
such a situation in the U.N. charter is plain. Chapter I, 
Article II, paragraph 7 applies unequivocally that the United 
Nations shall not intervene in matters which are within the 
internal jurisdiction of any state.
    Secretary Rusk. I gave--did I give you that, Mr. Marcy--
that memorandum on the legal--I think the key point here is 
that Article II, paragraph 7, the charter provision does not 
brand as illegal intervention. The action of the Security 
Council taken at the request of a member state concerned, in 
this case the United Kingdom--from a legal point of view, the 
responsibilities for Rhodesia continue to rest with the United 
Kingdom. No one has recognized Rhodesia. I do not think any 
country in the world including South Africa has recognized 
Rhodesia as an independent state, and Article II, paragraph 7--
--
    Senator Mundt. It says any member state or does he say any 
state?
    Secretary Rusk. Article II, paragraph 7--do you have a copy 
of the Charter--expressly provides that the principle of non-
intervention contained in that article shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under chapter 7. So from 
the Charter point of view there seems to be little doubt about 
that, but I will leave this memorandum for you to study, 
Senator. You may not agree with all of it.
    Senator Mundt. I hate to see student and teacher disagree.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it is a matter of some pain to me, 
Senator.
    Senator Mundt. Probably more to you than to me. It has 
raised a lot of questions in my correspondence, but I cannot 
answer them.
    The Chairman. Any other question?
    Senator Mundt. No.
    Secretary Rusk. I am talking about the last sentence.
    The Chairman. I guess that is all.

              INDONESIAN VIEWS ON BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

    One thing I did have, I do not know whether it is 
important. Maybe you can clear it very quickly. You mentioned a 
prominent official of Indonesia. Did he express himself on the 
bombing in the north? What was it you said about him?
    Secretary Rusk. It had to do with whether our being in 
Vietnam had any bearing on the situation in Indonesia.
    The Chairman. You said he did.
    Secretary Rusk. He said it was a very important thing.
    The Chairman. Didn't I see where he thought it would be 
very wise to suspend the bombing in the North? Is that correct 
or not? I thought he did.
    Secretary Rusk. It is possible. I have not noted what he 
said.
    The Chairman. He denied that he said it. It was reported, 
was it not, in the press?
    Secretary Rusk. Could we check that point, Mr. Chairman?
    The Chairman. That is all, unless you have anything further 
to say.
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
    The Chairman. All right.
    I believe you are scheduled to come in open session next 
week, Monday, is that right?
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen.
    The Chairman. All right. The committee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 2:35 o'clock p.m., the committee was 
adjourned.]


                 SUBCOMMITTEES AND HEARINGS PROCEDURES

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, January 24, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:00 noon, in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, 
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. 
Lowenstein of the committee staff.

                      CONFIRMATION OF NOMINATIONS

    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    First, is there any motion on the people we just heard,\1\ 
that is----
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Committee heard in open session the following nominations: 
Clarence A. Boonstra to be Ambassador to Costa Rica; John F. Henning to 
be Ambassador to New Zealand; David S. King to be Ambassador to the 
Malagasy Republic; Robert L. Payton to be Ambassador to the Federal 
Republic of Cameroon; William B. Buffum to be Deputy Representative to 
the U.N.; and Arthur E. Goldschmidt to be Representative to the 
Economic and Social Council of the U.N.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that from small a to 
small f inclusive be recommended for confirmation.
    Senator Morse. Second it.
    The Chairman. You heard the motion and the second. Is there 
any discussion? Any questions? All in favor of the motion say 
``aye.''
    [Chorus of ``aye.'']
    The Chairman. Opposed, ``no.''
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. The ``ayes'' have it.
    As I said, we will take the other two tomorrow. We have Mr. 
William S. Gaud. I will announce that the committee will meet 
tomorrow at 10:30. We do not think it will take too long, but 
we had already agreed. Mr. Gaud has a matter to present to the 
committee.
    There are two or three other matters.

                ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE STAFF AND EXPENSES

    First, on the committee.
    Mr. Marcy, will you present the bill. It has to be approved 
and get on its way to go through the procedures.
    Mr. Marcy. Yes.
    Normally at this time of the year the committee approves a 
sum for additional staff and expenses for the balance of this 
year.
    Last year, the committee approved and the Senate approved 
$200,000 for committee expenses. Of that $200,000, the 
committee spent $144,289, so we have a balance of $55,000 left.
    This would mean that the committee could get along next 
year on the same amount, $200,000, but if there is any 
inclination for special kinds of activities to be undertaken, 
the committee might want to request $250,000.
    The Chairman. The reason for that was the discussion that 
took place at the last meeting where there were several people 
who desired that we try to find some extra staff members. They 
do not have to spend it, but if you want to leave it, I mean 
make available an amount we could use, and if we possibly can 
find somebody, why, we will.
    Senator Lausche. Carl, was the full appropriation for the 
whole fiscal year $200,000?
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
    Senator Lausche. And we got along with $200,000?
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
    Senator Lausche. Now you say we can get along the next year 
unless we expand our staff and services.
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
    Senator Mundt. Did I misunderstand your word, Carl, I 
thought you said we got along with $160,000.
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct. We have $55,000 unexpended at 
the end of the year.
    Senator Lausche. Where do you get the money for the next 
six months of the fiscal year?
    Mr. Marcy. We do not operate on a fiscal year.
    Senator Sparkman. We are on a calendar year, January 30 to 
January 30.
    Senator Lausche. You have $50,000 left?
    Mr. Marcy. That is correct.

                     MONEY TO HIRE ADDITIONAL STAFF

    Senator Church. You mean by that, Carl, there is room in 
the present budget to hire additional staff people without 
enlarging it over the amount we spent last year?
    The Chairman. It depends on the hearings and the travel. It 
was lower last year than usual, but there was such vigorous 
complaint the other day that I said if the committee means what 
it said we would give them some leeway. We do not spend it 
anyway. Mr. Marcy, I think, has been extremely careful. I do 
not know of any major committee that spent as little as this 
one.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I raise two questions?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Morse. Carl stated we had some left. We do not have 
any left, do we? Didn't that revert?
    Mr. Marcy. That reverts.
    The Chairman. That reverts. What he meant is we did not 
expend it. That is correct.
    Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, there is going to be an 
effort----
    The Chairman. Senator Morse. He was about to say something.

                      EXPANDING THE SUBCOMMITTEES

    Senator Morse. I want the attention of Senator Clark and 
some others who expressed to me an interest in expanding the 
programs of some of our subcommittees.
    I have pending--I won't have time to take it up this 
morning--my first draft of a proposal for doing some work on 
the Subcommittee on Latin America that I think we have got to 
do or we are going to be open to two problems.
    One, you have got other committees of the Congress doing 
it; you have got a jurisdictional problem here. I do not want 
to go into that now, but we have some other committees in the 
Congress that, in my judgment, are invading the prerogatives of 
the Foreign Relations Committee in Latin America; and, second, 
I think we ought to do it as a matter of Senate duty.
    I do not think you can let this Latin American area go 
without more interest being expressed in it by the Foreign 
Relations Committee, and I certainly would not favor our 
spending any money that we do not need to spend.
    On the other hand, whatever you ask for now is the maximum 
that you are probably going to get. I do not think we ought to 
come in later supplementarily, and asking for more money, and I 
would suggest that to play safe we ask for $250,000.
    The Chairman. It does not commit us to spend it. We have 
not spent it for last year or any year previously, but if we 
need it, it is there. There is no commitment that you have to 
spend it.
    Senator Morse. No.

            A REASONABLE PRESENTATION TO THE RULES COMMITTEE

    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pell and I are on the 
Rules Committee, and these money appropriations come up there.
    Senator Pell. Senator Cooper also.
    Senator Clark. Yes, Senator Cooper. I thoroughly agree with 
Senator Morse, but before we go in for $250,000, which we may 
not spend, Carl ought to have a reasonable presentation to the 
Rules Committee as to how we spend it, otherwise there will be 
criticisms.
    Senator Morse. My only feeling is we can probably do it on 
$200,000 in view of what we did not spend last year. We 
probably could do it on $200,000.
    At the same time, I would not want to ask for $200,000 and 
then in the next few meetings of this committee, the committee 
agrees there ought to be increased staff of the subcommittees.
    Senator Clark. would like to see Mr. Marcy make up a 
presentation which can be presented to the Rules Committee.
    Senator Marcy. I do have such a budget here, but it will 
not deal with the particular investigation. For example, last 
year of the full amount of $200,000, the committee budget 
showed $163,000 for salaries; employee contributions $21,000; 
reimbursement payments to agencies $4,000; travel $6,000; 
witnesses for hearings $6,000; office expenses $4,600; and 
another amount of $3,000.
    That was for the full amount of $200,000.
    Now, actually, the way the amounts were expended, I will 
just give you a few illustrative amounts here. While we asked 
for $163,000 for salaries, we spent $118,000. While we asked 
for $6,000 for travel, we actually spent $17,000. That was 
because at the time that the committee appropriated the funds 
or authorized the amounts last year, the committee had not 
decided to hold hearings on Vietnam, NATO, and China.

                        AREAS FOR INVESTIGATION

    Senator Clark. Of course, Mr. Chairman, we really ought to 
make the basic decision as to what we want to do with the 
committee this year before we prepare the bill, which is 
probably going to be impossible to do in this meeting in ten 
minutes.
    I would certainly like to strongly endorse the position of 
the Senator from Oregon that we ought to have a pretty 
comprehensive look at Latin America. I believe Senator Gore, 
the chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee, and I certainly 
agree with him, think we ought to take a good hard look at the 
Disarmament Agency, and I have no doubt there are other areas 
of countries as a result of my trip to Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East. Some Senators will feel we ought to be conducting 
much more effective oversight than we do at present. But my own 
point is we ought to make this policy decision and then ask 
Carl to make up a budget. We have the cart before the horse, 
and since we have to do it this way, I would rather see us ask 
for $250,000, and if we do not have to spend it, we will not 
spend it.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, may I say just this: It may 
be the cart is before the horse, but it is just something that 
cannot very well be avoided because this present fund expires 
January 30, and we need to get action before the end of the 
month.
    Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman.

                       CAREFUL HANDLING OF FUNDS

    Senator Sparkman. Wait a minute.
    Now, the experience of this committee in the past, I think, 
and Carl will bear me out on this, has been one of very good 
husbanding of the funds that we have gotten. I think it will 
show that some years we have turned back a very large amount. 
Other years it has been a lesser amount. You cannot predict it 
with any precision. But what we do not spend goes back into the 
Treasury, so it seems to me that certainly we can trust the 
careful handling of the funds, but that we ought to allow 
ourselves elbow room so that we can do what we decide we ought 
to do in this committee and, therefore, I would recommend the 
larger amount. If it is in order, I would like to make a motion 
to agree on that.
    The Chairman. Senator Lausche.

                           SUBSTITUTE MOTION

    Senator Lausche. I offer a substitute, and that is that the 
amount be kept at $200,000. We are faced with the 
responsibility of answering to the people of the United States 
whether we are going to keep expenses at present levels or 
reduce them, on the one hand; or extend them, on the other, and 
impose new taxes.
    When the time comes for imposing new taxes, the probability 
is that there will be a wave of opposition to it. My belief is 
that we ought to begin with the committee's indicating that we 
are exerting every effort possible to escape the obligation of 
imposing new taxes, or if we have to do so, impose them in the 
least amounts possible.
    We had $200,000 last year; we spent $150,000. That would 
indicate to me that there is a latitude of $50,000 with which 
to do the work that might be in excess of what was done last 
year.
    I make this proposal also because it has become thoroughly 
apparent that if there has been neglect, and I am not saying 
that it prevails in this committee, because another committee 
on which I serve has increased its amount by $200,000 in the 
last three years. We should begin here, and that is where I 
propose to begin.
    The Chairman. You heard the motion. The substitute motion 
is to ask for $200,000. Is there any further discussion?

                    GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I was late for this committee 
because I was detained in the committee presided over by your 
distinguished colleague from Arkansas, Mr. John McClellan.\2\ 
The staff had prepared a proposed spending program, and by 
unanimous action our committee there, operating pretty much on 
the philosophy that Frank Lausche has mentioned, cut it down.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Government Operations Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Morse. How much is the total?
    Senator Mundt. It is a big committee, a quarter of a 
million dollars. They asked for about $1,250,000, and we cut it 
down.
    Senator Morse. It is the very committee, may I say most 
respectfully, which, in my judgment, is planning some work in 
Latin America that ought to be subordinated to the Foreign 
Relations Committee.
    Senator Mundt. Not that I know of. They never mentioned it. 
You are thinking of Vietnam.
    Senator Morse. You have the Judiciary Committee with 
$2,600,000 plus, with some of the subcommittees with $500,000.
    Senator Mundt. I am talking about Government Operations.
    Senator Morse. I know, but I also bring in the other 
Committees.
    Senator Mundt. So far as I know, they are not talking about 
Latin America. There is a possibility of investigating AID in 
Vietnam.

                        WHOSE OX IS BEING GORED

    Senator Cooper. Mr. Chairman, you remember--I am rather 
reluctant to give my views on this--but serving on the Rules 
Committee we do have this experience: when the committee 
chairmen come in for additional funds, if they are supported by 
a plan of what is intended to do, I think the Rules Committee 
is very generous in approving their request. But I think if 
some budget is not made out, there will be a tendency to cut it 
out somewhat, and that has been our practice in the Rules 
Committee. So I would say if you are going to ask for $250,000, 
it ought to be supported by some plan.
    The Chairman. May I ask you members of the Rules Committee, 
are you likely to cut back? If he only asked for $200,000, are 
you going to cut it back along with everybody?
    Senator Cooper. Not $200,000.
    The Chairman. Because this committee asked for very little. 
For example, the committee he mentioned was $1,000,000.
    Senator Clark. I would like to say something about the 
tactics, if you do not mind. It depends on whose ox is being 
gored. There are certain committees which are absolutely 
sacrosanct, and they get whatever they want, and other 
committees do not get what they want. This does not represent 
my philosophy, but it does that of the Rules Committee. I think 
this committee's requests are extremely modest.
    The Chairman. I think so, too. The Judiciary Committee is 
$2,670,000. And they have subcommittees: the Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly asks for $560,000; Constitutional 
Rights, $205,000; Internal Security, $437,000; Juvenile 
Delinquency, $260,000.
    Senator Clark. Which is not within their jurisdiction.
    The Chairman. They total $2,670,000. I do not want to do 
anything outrageous.

               CONDEMNING OTHER COMMITTEES' EXTRAVAGANCES

    Senator Lausche. The weakness of our position is that in 
this room we condemn this, but when we go to the floor nobody 
utters a word. I think that we can justifiably and honestly 
defend our position. I think that that expenditure is 
completely unjustified, and it sort of corroborates the 
extravagance in the committees.
    Senator Pell. No one had the gumption to say so.
    Senator Lausche. No one complains. We consider each 
committee sacrosanct. Allen Ellender goes up on the floor and 
makes the argument, and only the walls listen to him.
    Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, the question here is how much 
money should this committee have. I think that it is perfectly 
clear that we did not have the kind of staff help we could 
efficiently use in the various subcommittees, and we are not 
getting the job done that we should get done. I mean there is 
no reason why we should limit ourselves with a staff that is 
inadequate.
    The Chairman. If the committee will have order. I was sorry 
to arouse such a big controversy. I did not know there would be 
such a big row. We did not spend the $200,000. Obviously we 
have room there. If people feel so strongly about it, I would 
rather go on $200,000, and if we need it, why, we can ask for a 
supplemental. I think the Rules Committee people--I am 
perfectly willing to abide by what your advice is because we 
can ask for more. I have asked the staff to try to follow out 
what was suggested here the other day to look for some people 
and see--we have already appointed two new subcommittees, and 
we are going to try to staff them and get some people. We are 
moving in that direction. If you think this is outrageous, I am 
perfectly willing to stay with it.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, let us vote.
    The Chairman. All right, let us vote.

        SUBCOMMITTEES NEED A COMMITMENT FROM THE FULL COMMITTEE

    Senator Morse. One minute, before you vote. I would like to 
have one minute.
    We have started a discussion, and a very fruitful 
discussion in this committee about expanding the work of the 
subcommittees.
    The Chairman. That is right.
    Senator Morse. Because we feel they ought to be expanded. 
You cannot expand the work of the subcommittees unless the 
chairman of the subcommittees can get some commitment from this 
full committee as to what the budget is going to allow them. 
You are not going to be able to do that on the basis of the old 
judgment, in my opinion, because your $153,000 expenditure last 
year was low for the reason we did not undertake the type of 
program in the subcommittees that ought to have been 
undertaken. I certainly think that if you just ask for $200,000 
you are going to encourage encroachments upon the jurisdiction 
of this committee from other committees, and I think we ought 
to ask for $250,000 or $225,000. You ought to go before that 
committee and make the case before the Rules Committee. This is 
what we intend to do that we have not been doing, and that 
ought to be done. If you do not do that, you are going to be in 
a position where they would be justified in cutting back on 
your budget.
    If you say you were going to ask for no more money, and we 
are going to do a larger program, the Rules Committee would 
have a basis for cutting back. I think you ought to ask for the 
$250,000 and make your case before the committee.

                    DEFEAT OF THE SUBSTITUTE MOTION

    The Chairman. All right, let us vote on it.
    Senator Cooper. Let me say this, if I can.
    I am on both committees. If this committee does appear and 
sustain its request for $250,000, of course, I will vote for it 
today. I just will say that.
    The Chairman. Do you want to call the roll?
    Senator Pell. What are we voting on exactly?
    The Chairman. The substitute of the Senator from Ohio. He 
wishes to stay at $200,000.
    Senator Pell. If you want it $250,000, you vote no.
    The Chairman. You vote no.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    Senator Lausche. And when you do that you are mistaken.
    Senator Pell. I often am.
    The Chairman. Call the roll.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
    Senator Sparkman. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
    Mr. Morse.
    Senator Morse. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
    Mr. Lausche.
    Senator Lausche. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
    Senator Church. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
    The Chairman. I will vote Symington no. He did leave his 
proxy.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
    Mr. Clark.
    Senator Clark. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Pell.
    Senator Pell. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
    Mr. Hickenlooper.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Carlson.
    Senator Carlson. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
    Mr. Mundt.
    Senator Mundt. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
    Senator Case. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
    Senator Cooper. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Ten nays and four ayes.
    The Chairman. The substitute failed.

                         ADOPTION OF THE MOTION

    Now can we vote. Do we need a roll call or can we go by a 
voice vote?
    Senator Lausche. I wanted to be registered as voting no.
    Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, in view of my vote, I want 
to state this. The Post Office and Civil Service Committee, 
which really is a small committee, and I am a member of it, is 
asking for $225,000, and I just could not conceive that this 
committee should get less.
    The Chairman. We won't spend it unless we need it.
    Senator Lausche. Will you assign someone to work for me 
especially with this extra $50,000 as the chairman of the 
Southeast Asia Subcommittee, a very important one?
    Senator Morse. You bet it is.
    The Chairman. I have some other questions here now.
    Ambassador Goldberg----
    Senator Clark. We did not vote.
    The Chairman. All in favor of the motion of the Senator 
from Alabama say aye.
    [Chorus of ``aye.'']
    The Chairman. Opposed, no.
    Senator Lausche. No.
    Senator Hickenlooper. No.
    The Chairman. The record will show the Senator from Ohio 
votes no.

             INVITATION FOR THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE U.N.

    Ambassador Goldberg--let me go back. Mr. U Thant sent me an 
invitation inviting the committee to come to New York and have 
lunch with him, and so on.
    Goldberg came here right after that and we had a 
conversation about it. He strongly recommends that it be 
enlarged rather than just go for a luncheon with U Thant. He 
would like for the committee to agree to come up there and he, 
if I understood him correctly, offered to make the arrangements 
for transportation, and to spend a day and to meet with a 
series of delegations or people from various parts; in other 
words, perhaps two or three from Western Europe, and two or 
three or more.
    He is going to undertake to set this up, if we agree. He is 
going to manage this for us, with the idea of giving us an 
opportunity to hear the views and exchange views with people 
from various parts of the world. Latin America would be a 
group; one from Western Europe; one from Eastern Europe; the 
Middle East, and so on. I cannot give you all the details.
    What I wanted to do today is to find out whether or not the 
committee is interested. It would entail going up and spending 
the day, all day, in these various meetings, among other 
things, as I understand it, a luncheon with Mr. U Thant.
    The suggested period would be--and this has got to be 
subject, of course, to negotiation, but I could not be very 
specific because I had not had an opportunity to ask you--March 
15th to 16th or the 22nd and 23rd. I just wanted to know 
whether the committee is interested or not. I do not want to 
get out on a limb and say we are, and not have but one or two 
go.
    What is the sentiment of the committee?
    Senator Morse. I think we ought to have the advice of Case 
and Church first.
    The Chairman. It is purely for our information.

                             A USEFUL TRIP

    Senator Church. I am strongly, I am very favorably, 
disposed. I think that the more this committee can learn as a 
committee about the situation in New York, the more familiar we 
are with the U.N. and with our own mission, and with the 
Secretariat and with U Thant, with the views that are so 
pervasive there on matters that are critical to our own 
national interest, the better. Since I think this is the most 
appropriate way to do it and the most effective way to do it, I 
would hope that the committee would be interested in Goldberg's 
invitation.
    I have told Goldberg I am strongly in favor of this. I 
would hope that as many members of the committee as possible 
would go. I think it would be useful.
    The Chairman. I sort of felt that unless as many as ten 
wanted to go it would not look right. If as many as ten wanted 
to go--not everybody has to go.
    Senator Clark. I wonder if we would not want to ask the 
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee also.
    The Chairman. Then you get too many if they all went.
    Senator Case. They will take care of that.
    The Chairman. What do you think about the idea? Do you wish 
me to work out a day, and would you say as many as ten would 
go?
    I would like all of them to go, but I do not want to just 
have three or four go and have all this sort of trouble.

                        INVITATION FROM U THANT

    Senator Lausche. From whom is the principal invitation? Is 
it from U Thant?
    The Chairman. It started with U Thant. I had a letter over 
there. It came some time ago. He would be glad to have a 
luncheon, invite us all to luncheon, and this kind of grew out 
of it.
    Senator Lausche. I do not want to dignify U Thant, and 
especially on the basis of what Senator Morse said the other 
day, of his statements around the world, and if we are going to 
go----
    Senator Morse. What statements?
    Senator Lausche. The other day in our discussions you 
pointed out that U Thant is our choice and he was making 
attacks upon us.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I cannot hear what you are saying, 
Frank.
    Senator Case. He is everybody's choice, Frank, is what you 
are saying.
    Senator Lausche. U Thant has been making statements that 
are not helpful to our cause in the world as it stands today, 
and I do not want to dignify him by going to New York with him 
being the principal inviter. I look upon it differently if the 
principal invitation comes from Goldberg.
    Senator Church. May I say something on that?
    My understanding on that is the principal invitation comes 
from our Ambassador to us.
    Senator Lausche. If we go there we ought to put U Thant in 
the background.
    Senator Church. Yes. During the fall, a group of 
Congressmen did come up at Goldberg's invitation. They did come 
to the American Mission for briefings. They then lunched with U 
Thant, and went through the Secretariat and visited the 
principal U.N. buildings, and this is what Goldberg has in 
mind.
    The Chairman. That is my understanding, that it would be 
one of a whole series of meetings that would take place 
practically all day. My guess would be we would want to leave, 
we will say, around 8:00 or 8:30. We would come back that 
night. We do not spend the night there. You do not have to 
register in hotels or anything else is the way I understand it 
is to be done.
    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. I am in favor 
of the idea, and I will go.
    Senator Pell. So am I.
    The Chairman. Let me have a show of hands of who would be 
willing to go who are here.
    [There was a showing of hands.]
    Senator Case. Could I just say one thing. I suggest we keep 
down the social side of it.
    Senator Mundt. You are going to have to adjust to the 
Senate schedule.

                  THE TEN-MINUTE RULE FOR QUESTIONING

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, I move that in the open 
public hearings that there be applied the ten-minute rule. I 
will not discuss the issue, and let this whole body act upon 
it.
    The Chairman. Of course, I am perfectly willing for the 
committee to act on it. We tried it last year and we have also 
had two meetings this year without it, and in my view it worked 
better without it than it did with it. Yesterday the total time 
consumed was less than an average of ten minutes for everybody 
there. Now practically everybody was there yesterday, and I 
would prefer to try it without it. If it becomes intolerable, 
why, we can revert to it.
    We also tried it when the Secretary was here and it went 
very smoothly, which is the normal way. But if you wish----
    Senator Lausche. What did you mean yesterday when you said 
to me in private that you had so many complaints about the 
application of the ten-minute rule----
    The Chairman. You were one who complained last year about 
how unsatisfactory it is in circumstances that you only have 
ten minutes.
    Senator Lausche. No, I never complained about that.
    The Chairman. Last year you did and so did others.
    Senator Lausche. No, I did not.
    The Chairman. But anyway if you wish to vote on it----
    Senator Morse. I think we ought to have discussion on it. I 
am a great believer in self-discipline.
    The Chairman. That is what we tried yesterday, and I would 
prefer to go that way.

                      THE MINORITY NEEDS MORE TIME

    Senator Case. I think, as a matter of fact, Frank, you 
spoke to me about this before. There are times when you are in 
the minority and you would need and require more than the ten 
minutes that would be attributable to one member to present 
that minority position fairly, and I think this is a good idea.
    Senator Lausche. I will not argue the matter. Each one 
knows how he has--the juniors how much they sit back and 
finally leave the meeting because they never get to them.
    Senator Case. Sometimes we ought to start at the bottom. 
That is the only change.
    Senator Pell. Maybe we could have a compromise. The 
chairman could present a little bell to us and ring it after 
ten minutes. We do not have to stop, but at least we would not 
forget that ten minutes had gone by.
    The Chairman. I thought yesterday everybody was very, 
very----
    Senator Lausche. Yesterday there was self-imposed adherence 
to the rule.
    The Chairman. That is right. So was their----
    Senator Lausche. Are you recommending a substitute?
    Senator Pell. No. I was being flip.
    Senator McCarthy. What is the substitute?
    Senator Lausche. Let us have the question.
    Senator Pell. Do you want a vote, really?

                            TABLE THE MOTION

    Senator Case. I move the motion be tabled for the time 
being.
    The Chairman. The Senator moves it be tabled for the time 
being.
    Senator Morse. Second.
    The Chairman. All in favor of the tabling say ``aye.''
    (Chorus of ``aye.'')
    The Chairman. Call the roll, Mr. Kuhl.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
    Senator Sparkman. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
    Mr. Morse.
    Senator Morse. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
    Mr. Lausche.
    Senator Lausche. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
    Senator Church. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
    The Chairman. No--aye, I mean.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
    Mr. Clark.
    Mr. Pell.
    Senator Pell. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
    Senator McCarthy. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Hickenlooper.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
    Mr. Carlson.
    Senator Carlson. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
    Mr. Mundt.
    Senator Mundt. No.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
    Senator Case. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
    Senator Cooper. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Aye.
    Mr. Kuhl. Eight yeas and five nays.
    The Chairman. The motion is tabled.
    Senator Lausche. All right, you poor junior, weep.

                  INVITATION TO JOURNALISTS TO TESTIFY

    The Chairman. I want to ask the guidance of the committee 
on this.
    There have been two members who raised this question, and I 
have raised it, too, about having some witnesses in Executive 
Session.
    What would be the committee's view about asking one or more 
of the three Americans, Harrison Salisbury, Harry S. Ashmore 
and William C. Baggs, who have been in North Vietnam, to come 
to executive session and answer questions and brief the 
committee?
    Are you interested or not? I can have them with coffee, 
without it, or does the committee wish to have it as an 
informal executive session without any publicity?
    Senator Pell. As one member I would strongly support it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Who are the three?
    The Chairman. The three who have been there--Salisbury, 
Baggs and Ashmore. One is a former editor who is now working 
for the center, but Baggs is the editor of a Florida paper. 
Salisbury is on the New York Times. Ashmore has been on various 
papers, but is not presently on a paper. They are all 
newspapermen.
    Senator Lausche. Why do you want them in executive session?
    Senator Morse. Why in executive session?
    The Chairman. I do not care, but if you want it in open----
    Senator Morse. If you want them in executive session for 
security reasons, that is something else.
    The Chairman. I was personally curious to hear their 
reports and details, and minor details that they have not had 
in their reports. I have read what has been in the paper, but 
these are the only Americans of this caliber--there have been 
Women's Strikes for Peace, and so on, that I thought they might 
not have quite the same attitude.
    Senator Cooper. A minister.
    The Chairman. These people are trained observers. 
Regardless that their views may be on policy, they are 
observers, and I would be interested in hearing them. I want to 
know if the whole committee is interested, and should I ask for 
a--I can have either kind, whatever the committee wishes.

                     WITNESSES SCHEDULED TO APPEAR

    Senator Lausche. May I ask what witnesses you have 
scheduled to appear.
    The Chairman. In open?
    Senator Lausche. There are certain witnesses that will take 
one side. Those names I have seen scheduled. Now, what 
witnesses do you have other than the State Department 
representatives who will take the side affirming what is being 
done in South Vietnam now?
    The Chairman. Well, I don't know what side these people are 
going to take on that. The only two that are firmly set are for 
next Monday and Tuesday, Kennan and Reischauer.
    Senator Case. George Kennan?
    The Chairman. George Kennan, and former Ambassador 
Reischauer. They are both former ambassadors.
    Senator Lausche. Outside of the State witnesses.
    The Chairman. We have asked the Secretary of Defense, and 
the Secretary of State agreed to come yesterday, but then, you 
know about that, he wrote a letter and requested it be changed 
from that hearing to the one we had. He still is in the 
position of coming at a later date, and McNamara has asked to 
be delayed until after he had finished his other hearing.
    Senator Lausche. That is not an answer to my question. You 
have outsiders. Kennan, I know how he will testify.
    The Chairman. Well, I do not.

               DO THEY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION?

    Senator Lausche. But what outsiders are there that you can 
know in advance they are supporting the government's position? 
We have not----
    The Chairman. I do not ask them, any of them, are they 
going to support the government's position. In fact, Mr. 
Reischauer is not testifying directly. I cannot control what he 
testifies to because I cannot control the committee's 
questions, but it is generally on our relations with the Far 
East, Japan and--well, the Far East. He has been a long-time 
scholar of China.
    Senator Lausche. Bill, may I suggest that you hold this 
over until tomorrow's meeting, the decision on these three men.
    The Chairman. On Salisbury, Ashmore and Baggs?
    Senator Lausche. Yes. I may want to offer other names to 
come in.
    The Chairman. Well, this is certainly not intended to be 
exclusive. These are just people who have been there.
    Senator Lausche. We can decide the whole thing tomorrow.
    The Chairman. Of course, these other hearings, there are 
several other names that are under consideration that have not 
been invited yet.
    Senator Lausche. Who are they?
    The Chairman. Mr. Alf Landon is one of them who I think 
might be----
    Senator Hickenlooper. When did Alf come back from South 
Vietnam?

               A BROADER SERIES OF HEARINGS THAN VIETNAM

    The Chairman. This is not on South Vietnam alone. These 
hearings, as I have tried to make very plain in the paper, are 
not just hearings on South Vietnam. They are on the overall 
general position of the United States in the present world.
    Now, some of them will be asked questions about Vietnam. 
But yesterday, much to my surprise, nobody asked the Secretary 
of State any questions on Vietnam, and it might be the same 
with other witnesses, but it is much broader, a much broader 
series of hearings than just Vietnam.
    But, as I say, I cannot guarantee that people won't ask 
about Vietnam. If they want to they can ask anything they like.
    Senator Lausche. I think it was a good thing nobody opened 
the thing up.
    The Chairman. It was all right with me. But when you say 
Vietnam, the subject matter with Kennan is not Vietnam. Now, 
you may ask him about Vietnam. The subject matter is the 
relations of this country with the Communist world. He has long 
experience in this area, and if you want to ask him about 
Vietnam, all right. But you do not have to.
    My main interest with Kennan is what is his attitude about 
how our relations with Russia, in particular, and the Communist 
world in general as they are developing, and what is our 
policy. Is it promoting it or not.

                            OTHER WITNESSES

    Senator Lausche. You mentioned Alf Landon. Who else?
    The Chairman. He is one who Senator Carlson----
    Senator Carlson. I want to say this for Alf Landon. We had 
a lecture series started under his name at Kansas University. 
We are going to have some outstanding people following him in 
the last two or three months. Alf made an excellent statement, 
and some day I want to put it in the record.
    The Chairman. I read it, and I want to endorse what you are 
saying. I thought it was a remarkably intelligent piece.
    Senator Carlson. I have asked Governor Landon about coming 
back here, and he called me just before I came back to 
Washington that he has had a bad back problem. I hope the 
Chairman won't invite him until later.
    The Chairman. Of course it would have to be at his 
convenience.
    Senator Case. I would like to ask for one more. I would 
like to hear McGeorge Bundy.
    Senator Pell. How about General Curtis Le May, to get 
another view, and an extreme view. I think it might be 
interesting.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He is no more extreme on his side 
than some of these people.
    Senator Pell. That is what I am saying.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We are asking a bunch of extremists 
to come in here.
    The Chairman. I sent a letter the other day asking the 
ranking minority member for suggestions of who he wanted for 
witnesses.
    Senator Lausche. Who else?

                            FORMER CIA AGENT

    The Chairman. There is another who came to see me. This is 
in the Executive record--I would just throw it out for your 
consideration. An unusual fellow as far as I am concerned, and 
I never heard of him before, but he was born in Korea. He came 
here in 1930. He is a naturalized American, and he spent 20 
years as a CIA agent largely in research, but he is in the CIA, 
or he was in the CIA, from 1946 to 1965. I have never before 
run into a man with this kind of particular experience, and he 
is a Korean by birth, but an American by naturalization.
    I was going to raise him just because I thought you would 
find him interesting; I did, because I never had seen a fellow 
with this kind of experience.
    Senator McCarthy. Can former CIA members talk to this 
committee?
    The Chairman. I asked about this. He asked to see me; I 
never heard of the fellow. He wrote me a letter a month ago and 
asked to come and talk to me. His name is Chowe.
    Senator Lausche. What is his name?
    The Chairman. Chowe. Anyway, there are a number of people 
of this kind. I think the fellow was very interesting. He can 
give you a different slant on many different things. He does 
not undertake to say you are right or wrong in Vietnam. I did 
not ask him about that. I asked him about a lot of other 
things. He volunteered them. As a matter of fact, he came and 
volunteered the story about a great deal of information I had 
never heard about in the CIA.
    Senator Lausche. Hold these over until tomorrow.
    The Chairman. These are not final decisions. I am asking 
for guidance. What I really wanted to know is, because the 
staff has to get in contact, whether the committee generally is 
interested in Salisbury because, if not, I do not want to 
invite him to the committee. If we have him at all I will have 
him to tea or lunch or something of that kind. That is all in 
the world I want to know. If you want him in open session and 
the committee feels that way, that is also possible.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that we have these 
witnesses that the chairman has mentioned, and that the 
chairman and Senator Hickenlooper do as they did last year, 
serve as a screening committee for any additional witnesses 
that anyone may suggest, and that you two decide on the type of 
people to have and set the time.
    The Chairman. It is not exclusive. If you want someone 
else, all you need to do is suggest him, Frank.
    Senator Lausche. I challenge the right to act on this at 
this time. We do not have a quorum.
    The Chairman. I do not know if that takes action, but that 
is all right. I was simply seeking the sentiment of the 
committee on these people.
    [Whereupon, the committee adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
             Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:04 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Morse (subcommittee chairman), Fulbright, 
Sparkman, Mansfield, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.
    The meeting was held to discuss proposed amendments to the 
OAS charter and the current treaty negotiations with Panama, 
and also to discuss the prospects for the OAS summit meeting. 
Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary for American Republics 
Affairs, accompanied by John N. Irwin, Special Ambassador for 
negotiation of Panama Canal Treaty; Sol Linowitz, Ambassador to 
the OAS; and Robert F. Woodward, Assistant to Ambassador Irwin, 
appeared before the group.
    For a record of the proceeding, see the official 
transcript.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 5:55 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 12:30 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, 
Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    The committee discussed whether to hold further hearings on 
Ex. D. 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union. It 
was agreed that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover would be asked to come 
before the committee and also that time would be set aside to 
hear public witnesses.
    William S. Gaud, Administrator of AID, accompanied by 
Daniel Steiner, William C. Gibbons, and Charles D. Paolitto, 
testified on the subject: ``Presidential determination to 
increase the number of countries receiving development and 
technical assistance.''
    For a record of the proceedings, see the official 
transcript.
    [The committee adjourned at 1:30 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee), 
Clark, Pell, and Aiken.
    The subcommittee discussed the content of hearings to be 
held and possible witnesses.
    For a record of the proceedings, see the official 
transcript.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 10:55 p.m.]


                       THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA

                              ----------                              


                        Monday, January 30, 1967

    [Editor's Note.--On September 30, 1965, junior level 
military officers staged a coup against the Indonesian high 
command, killing five generals and wounding the chief of staff, 
Gen. Abul Haris Nasution. Other military forces under Gen. 
Suharto suppressed the coup, blamed the uprising on the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and set about eliminating it 
in a bloody counter-coup. President Achmed Sukarno, who had 
ruled Indonesia since 1945, remained in office following these 
events, but in January 1967, the Armed Forces Information 
Center published an article accusing Sukarno of complicity with 
the Communist plotters. The Provisional People's Consultative 
Congress investigated the charges and on March 12, 1967 removed 
Sukarno's executive and ceremonial powers, making Gen. Suharto 
the acting president.]

                               U.S. Senate,
                Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Frank Lausche (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Lausche, Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, 
Gore, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.
    Also Present: Senator McGee.
    Carl Marcy and Norvill Jones of the committee staff.
    Senator Lausche. I think we might as well get started.
    Mr. Green, this is a meeting of the members of the 
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and such other senators 
who will appear.
    We want to hear from you your observations on what the 
conditions are in Indonesia. If you will proceed with the 
presentation of your views, and later open yourself to 
questions, we will appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MARSHALL GREEN, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR 
  TO INDONESIA; ACCOMPANIED BY H.G. TORBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
             SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

    Ambassador Green. Thank you very much, Senator. I 
understand I am speaking in closed session or executive 
session.
    Senator Carlson. Yes.
    Ambassador Green. Because I want to speak with candor.
    Well, I think as Senator McGee will testify--he has just 
been out there--there has been a tremendous change around in 
the past year. I was confirmed in the next room here in June, 
1965. I went out there the next month and at that time the 
whole country was slipping towards the Red camp. Some people 
thought it already had joined the Red camp.
    Senator Lausche. When was that?
    Ambassador Green. That was July 21st that I arrived in 
Jakarta.
    This was a time when they were stoning our consulates and 
Embassy and we were harassed at every turn. The communist power 
was growing. Sukarno on August 17, 1965, spoke about the 
Jakarta-Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis. That is how far this thing 
had gone.

                        GREAT CHANGE IN ONE YEAR

    Well, the whole situation, of course, as you know, has 
changed in the course of this past year due to events which I 
will come back to, and today the Communist Party in Indonesia 
has been banned. The relations with Peking are almost at a 
breaking point. In other words, they share our assessment of 
Peking's menace to that part of the world. They have ended the 
confrontation. They have rejoined the United Nations. They have 
rejoined all of these specialized agencies of the United 
Nations. They are participating actively in the new regional 
community in Southeast Asia and they are looking for good 
relations with all the countries that can help them.
    Now, that means Eastern European countries as well as, of 
course, the Western countries and Japan. This has not been very 
easy in terms of their relations with the Soviet Union because 
they have banned the Communist Party. But the Soviets have 
helped them in the past, particularly in military assistance, 
and they hope to receive that assistance.
    So this has been the great change that has taken place in 
one year.
    I suppose that there is no place in the world in modern 
times where there has been such an abrupt shift around as there 
has been in Indonesia in the last year and a half. Certainly I 
say that on the basis of 23 years of working in the Far East.
    Now, the big event that changed all this, as you know, was 
the abortive coup that was launched by the Communists and some 
of their friends on September 30, 1965.

                            COMMUNIST ALLIES

    Senator Lausche. When you say by some of the Communists, 
whom do you mean?
    Ambassador Green. By the Communist Party, and I said some 
of their friends who were working on the outside.
    Senator Lausche. Who were they?
    Ambassador Green. Well, for example, Subandrio, who is not 
a declared member of the Communist Party but, according to the 
trials that have taken place now, he was involved in this plot.
    Senator Lausche. Were there any other outside nations 
involved?
    Ambassador Green. No. Well, Communist China may well have 
been involved. We have not proved it, But there is 
circumstantial evidence that points to involvement.

                             ABORTIVE COUP

    Now, what happened in this abortive coup was that the PKI, 
which is the Communist Party, moved swiftly in an effort to 
kill the top seven generals. They succeeded in killing five of 
them two of them escaped, General Nasution and General Suharto. 
That was a mighty lucky thing because these two surviving 
generals moved fast and brought in the Siliwangi Division which 
is the local division up there in Bandung, and they suppressed 
the coup in the Jakarta area within a matter of days.
    They then faced a tremendous task of how to move against 
the Communists who were all over the country. It was an 
enormously powerful party, as you know, the largest in the 
world outside of the Communist bloc or the Sino-Soviet 
countries, with the possible exception of Italy.
    They face an enormous task, but they have proven themselves 
capable of meeting that challenge.
    Now, in the course of the next month, month and a half, 
there now appears to have been a very bloody aftermath to this 
abortive coup. The pictures of the killed generals and how they 
were killed; the accounts of how they were tortured by the 
Women's Communist Organization; how their bodies had been 
heaved into the crocodile hole, which is up near the air base. 
These bodies then being exhumed. They were photographed and the 
photographs were sent all around the country and this touched 
off a very sharp wave of reaction in the local communities.

                      BLOODY AFTERMATH OF THE COUP

    As a result of this, the Moslems and others moved against 
the local Communist organization, the farm levels and villages, 
not so much in the cities and towns. This all happened in the 
countryside and I estimated when I came back here in February 
that 300,000 people had been killed in this bloody aftermath, 
which had been many times the number that have been killed in 
South Vietnam since the war started. Since that time, I think 
we would up that estimate to perhaps close to 500,000 people 
that have been killed in this aftermath. Of course, nobody 
knows. We merely judge it by whole villages that have been 
depopulated.
    The Island of Bali, for example, which is a small island, 
4,000 square miles, there were about perhaps 100,000 people 
that were killed there alone. There was something of a holy war 
reaction. In the case of Bali, it is not Moslem. It is Hindu. 
But they had a religious way of life. The Communists tried to 
secularize it and this was the reaction of the people once they 
realized the Communists were on the run and the army was on 
their side.
    In the case of East Java, it was the reaction of the 
Moslems more than any other religious group that resulted in 
this decimation. So the military had definitely gained the 
upper hand. It squashed the Communist coup effort and by 
November and December they were really in a position to take 
over the reins of government.

                         THE PROBLEM OF SUKARNO

    However, they had counted on President Sukarno moving over 
either on to their side or keeping quiet, moving into the 
background. But Sukarno at that time more or less thumbed his 
nose in their face and has been doing it ever since. So they 
were then faced with the problem, are we going to move against 
Sukarno and all the people that support Sukarno--you know, he 
has been called the George Washington of Indonesia--or are we 
going to move against him with all the consequences that might 
be entailed in a civil war?
    They decided they would not do so. They still hoped that 
the President could be brought around. Well, he wasn't. And the 
minute that Sukarno realized that Nasution and Suharto were not 
going to move against him, he was then emboldened to come back 
and begin to get back some more of his friends into the top 
places of government. As a matter of fact, in February of 1966, 
he dismissed Gene Suharto and he named one of the worst 
cabinets in Indonesia. Of course, there are no Communists, but 
it is nevertheless one of the worst cabinets that has ever been 
named in Indonesia. This started off, touched off, the large 
scale student demonstrations. Where there have been hundreds 
and thousands before, you know, there were tens thousands that 
were out on the street and that atmosphere.

                      SUHARTO GIVEN SPECIAL POWERS

    Then Suharto went to President Sukarno and said: I cannot 
be held responsible for the security of this country unless you 
give me broad responsibilities for handling all security 
matters in this country. He was given those special powers by 
Sukarno who had no choice.
    Since that time, Suharto has broadly interpreted these 
powers to run the country and he has done it just that way. The 
only thing he hasn't done is that he has not moved abruptly 
against President Sukarno. He has pressured him. He has reduced 
his powers. He has chipped away his power base and he has done 
it very successfully, but he hasn't totally eliminated it.
    Well, we are faced today with I would say two principal 
problems, one on the political side and one on the economic 
side.

                        POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES

    On the political side is this power struggle that 
continues, or you could rephrase it, the problem of what to do 
with President Sukarno. His power is going down and down and I 
just saw a news ticker that indicates that the palace is 
surrounded with students at this moment. What they are going to 
do, I don't know. They apparently have switched the guards. 
This may be for the President's own protection rather than they 
are going to take any sudden movement against him. I do not 
think that General Suharto will move abruptly against the 
President, to arrest him or to exile him or to shoot him or 
anything like that. I think he will continue to pursue what he 
calls the constitutional course of action to get the MPRS, 
which is their super Parliament, to pass some kind of law 
against the President or to take some action against the 
President by impeachment, but he is not going to act outside 
the constitutional framework.
    The reason I think partly is because he wants to avoid 
civil strife. He doesn't want to start a tradition of coups and 
counter-coups. He wants to establish as far as possible the 
constitutional base and preserve that tradition in his country.

                       SUKARNO IS A COMMON TARGET

    But also I think that Suharto has been very wily. He 
realizes that as long as the President is around, that he 
becomes the target of the students, of their army, of the 
intelligentsia, of the commercial groups. He is the common 
target and this keeps the new order, as we might call the group 
around General Suharto--it keeps them together with a common 
focus. He can also make a scapegoat of the President. As long 
as he is around, everybody is critical of Sukarno for being 
responsible for the economic chaos of the country and this, of 
course, has happened. So he has his reasons for handling the 
job the way he does.
    In any event, the retention of Sukarno, although it does 
involve a number of problems, has not prevented the new 
government from moving ahead and doing the things that are 
required in the circumstances. He has been a drag. He has 
pulled the clock back sometimes, but the clock nevertheless has 
moved forward and a lot of things have been changed in 
Indonesia, almost all of them for the better.

                       QUESTION OF STABILIZATION

    This raises the second major problem that is facing 
Indonesia today, and that is the question of stabilization. The 
economic chaos left by 10 or 15 years of Sukarno's jingoism was 
one of the worst that I know of in modern history. They were 
left with a debt of $2.7 billion, about half of that owed to 
the Soviet Union, about $200 million or so owed to the United 
States.
    Of course, there are a lot of other creditor countries as 
well. The infrastructure of the country had deteriorated during 
this time. The roads, railroads, airlines are in miserable 
shape. Only about 30 percent of the shipping tonnage is 
operable today. Meanwhile, the cost of living has shot way up 
under runaway inflation.
    Between mid-1965 and mid-1966 the cost of living went up 20 
times, 2,000 percent.
    Senator Lausche. Since when?
    Ambassador Green. In that one year's time, between the 
middle of 1965 and the middle of 1966, the cost of living went 
up 20 times. The money inflated in that same period by 7\1/2\ 
times. The exports which had been $800 million a year back in 
1965 had all slumped down to about $500 million a year in 1965, 
over that 10-year span. Everything was running downhill. It was 
one of the few countries in the Far East, that and Burma, I 
guess, where there has been a deterioration in the per capita 
or GNP over the last 10 years.
    So this is the situation that General Suharto inherited.
    Now, he had the wisdom to turn to a group of first-rate 
economists who worked in the University of Indonesia. All of 
them I would say had been trained in the United States, three 
of them at the University of California, one at Harvard--he 
overcame that handicap. I went to Yale. And one from MIT.
    Now, these men are all first-rate economists. They gave him 
sound advice on how to approach the problem. One of the things 
they urged was that Indonesia should rejoin the International 
Monetary Fund and IBRD. They should get a team of IMF men out 
there to help out with their problems. This would be a sure way 
to restoring some confidence in Indonesia in the international 
banking and governmental circles.
    So Suharto turned to these people. They drew up a 
stabilization plan and I say that plan has been a first-rate 
plan in every sense of the word.

                      STABILIZATION MEANS HARDSHIP

    Now, this is not easy to accomplish because stabilization 
means hardship. It means stringencies and it always is 
accompanied by a certain political risk, particularly with 
Sukarno around, where he might be able to take advantage of the 
objections and feelings of the people and their political 
leaders. But that has not happened. The stabilization plan that 
calls for a balanced budget in calendar 1967 has passed the 
Parliament without any objections. They have instituted the 
plan now and, as a result of it, prices of foodstuffs have been 
level for the last 3\1/2\ months, even though----
    Senator Lausche. I think we had better go upstairs.
    Senator Sparkman. This is a roll call. We will be back in 
just a few minutes.
    [A short recess was taken.]

                         WILL SUKARNO BE TRIED?

    Senator Sparkman. Is there any likelihood that Sukarno will 
be tried?
    Ambassador Green. He will be tried in a certain sense. He 
may be tried in a certain sense by the MPRS which is sort of 
the super parliament, constituent assembly, in March. Whether, 
as I say, it will be impeachment proceedings or censure, 
whether it will be calling for the resignation of the 
President, whether it will be a call for his exile or not, no 
one knows. Nobody knows what action will be taken.

                     A SOUND PLAN FOR STABILIZATION

    Senator Lausche. You were discussing the economic 
situation, I think when we left.
    Amssador Green. Yes, I am not sure exactly at what point I 
broke off, but I was describing the fact that General Suharto 
had turned to a group of good economists as well as to the 
International Monetary Fund for advice. They came up with a 
sound plan for stabilization. They moved ahead with their plan, 
as a result of which the cost of food has stabilized. The cost 
of textiles has actually gone down. Some other costs have gone 
up. But that was anticipated because they were withdrawing 
subsidies--electricity, transportation--and, of course, that 
was passed on to the consumer. That was all part of the 
stabilization plan.
    Anyway, we think they are doing very well on this plan, 
moving ahead in a determined way, and obviously this relates 
very directly to whether or not other countries are going to be 
able to assist Indonesia, because people do not want to put 
money into any economy where it just goes down the rat hole of 
inflation.

                      INDONESIANS NEED DEBT RELIEF

    Now, assuming that the Indonesians continue to manage their 
economy well and there is the right managerial follow-through, 
which is always uncertain, they are still going to be dependent 
upon whether or not they can get adequate debt relief because, 
as I said, they built up this huge debt of $2.7 billion. If you 
service that debt in one year, that would be almost as much as 
their total foreign exchange earnings for that year. Therefore, 
they obviously have got to reschedule the whole debt.
    They have had meetings now, in Tokyo, in Paris, another one 
in Amsterdam. There seems to be general agreement among the 
Western creditors' group--that includes the United States, 
Japan, Holland, Germany, France, Italy, a number of other 
countries--that Indonesia should be given rather sweeping, 
almost standstill debt relief this coming year.
    Senator Aiken. Private creditors, too?
    Ambassador Green. The private credit has not yet been 
resolved, but presumably it will be along the same lines. Then 
at the end of this year, calendar 1967, there will be another 
meeting to see whether or not it has to be extended. It 
probably will. Meanwhile they will resolve the future long-
range debt by rescheduling over a longer period of time.
    Now, no one knows what the East European group will do, but 
it looks as though they will be giving them liberal debt relief 
as well. Therefore, if all goes according to Hoyle, as it seems 
to be going, that problem will be satisfactorily resolved.
    In addition to that, even if they get virtually total debt 
relief this year, this calendar year, they are going to need 
something between $170 million and $300 million--let us say 
$225 million of new net foreign aid in order to balance their 
budget. And our approach to this problem is that we want to be 
sure, first of all, that there is a liberal debt relief and, 
secondly, with regard to net aid, that other countries do their 
fair share.
    Now, what fair share is I don't know. But we will be 
talking in Amsterdam at the end of February about the general 
principles of future assistance. We will not probably go into a 
pledging session with them, but we will talk about the general 
principles that will guide us.
    So those are the two main problems--the political and the 
economic problems.

                      THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN ASIA

    I think sometimes that our focus is so much on the 
immediate problem, let us say on the Communist menace in some 
countries, or in the case of Asia, how you deal with Sukarno, 
that if you were to remove that immediate problem you would 
have beyond it another range of mountains. It would be a big 
and vast one and, in the case of Indonesia, once this problem 
of Sukarno is out of the way and stabilization programs move 
ahead satisfactorily, there will still be a lot of problems.
    The whole question of how you bring a traditional society 
into the modern age is involved here, problems of corruption 
and nepotism, what we call baptism, which is the adulation of a 
man like Sukarno, a charismatic personality.
    The problem of how to reach agreement--mushiwara--people 
talking back and forth and reaching a consensus, which is fine 
in the village council, but in the modern state is a rather 
painstaking, lengthy process. All those problems.

                       THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY MIX

    How is the new government going to establish a political 
base when two or three of the major parties now outlawed--how 
are they going to get back on the political scene? Will they 
become a part of the political base of this new government 
under General Suharto? The problems of how--what kind of a mix 
between civilians and military should you have in the 
government? These are all parts of this overall problem of 
moving from the traditional into a modern state.
    Now, if I could just touch on one of those problems, the 
problem of the civilian-military mix, this is a military 
government in many ways. General Suharto is the First Minister 
and he is obviously calling the signals. But he is drawing on 
the advice, as I just pointed out, now in the economic field of 
these economic specialists at the University of Indonesia and 
on outside consultants.
    General Suharto also turns to Adam Malik who is the Foreign 
Minister and head of the political section of the government. 
Adam Malik is in my opinion one of the outstanding leaders in 
East Asia today. There are other good civilian leaders, too.
    So what we have today is the best carburetorization between 
the civilian and military, just about the right mix, because 
the military are just enough involved in the government--it is 
not a junta government--just enough involved so that they take 
a responsible attitude towards the total operations of the 
government. Yet they are not so far in the government that they 
have taken it over and monopolized it themselves and have 
excluded good civilians which, of course, would lose for them 
the support of the students, the intellectuals, and some of the 
commercial types.
    Now, there are nevertheless problems, of course, for a 
government made up of civilians and military this way when you 
run into difficulties in the economic front, or when some of 
the politicians talk out of turn that oppose you. There is a 
natural temptation for military leaders to try to suppress the 
civilian segments. I don't think that General Suharto will do 
that. I think he recognizes the importance of maintaining this 
kind of mix that I just referred to now. So far these three 
leading men--we call them the Triumvirate--made up of General 
Suharto, General Nasution and Adam Malik, and the Sultan of 
Djogjakarta, make a good team indeed and General Suharto has 
the wide respect as a leader. Malik commands widespread 
admiration for his tactical brilliance and for how to get 
things done as well as for his general views and philosophy. I 
think the Sultan of Djogjakarta is widely liked if not beloved 
because he comes from central Java where indeed most of the 
resistance to the modernization takes place and where President 
Sukarno has most of his strength.
    Senator Aiken. He speaks for industry.
    Ambassador Green. He does, indeed, and he is a very nice 
gentleman and I think anyone here would agree. Together they 
make up a very good team, I think.

                      QUALITIES OF THE NEW LEADERS

    As far as our overall--I must just say one more thing about 
this team. One of the qualities that seems to me that they all 
have in common is that they are working for the country and not 
for themselves. In general, President Sukarno, if he is ever 
held up in the judgment of history, it will seem to me his 
greatest failing was that he was out for his own glory, a 
policy of self-glorification, and the people were the victims 
of this policy. These people are approaching their tasks not 
for their own personal gain, but for the gain of the country.
    Another thing about them is determination. Because there 
had been so many people killed in this last year or two in 
Indonesia, and because in a way there is a terrible retribution 
if the Communists or their friends ever get back again, they 
are more determined that they have to succeed. Human survival 
is at stake here.
    Another quality it seems to me is moderation, pragmatism. I 
have seen the same thing throughout East Asia in the last few 
years. It has been the movement from the ideological attachment 
of the first generation of revolutionary leaders to the 
modernists who are basically pragmatists and are concerned with 
the problems of modernization and development as opposed to the 
problems of a country winning its independence. This country 
has gained its independence now.
    These are qualities of leadership and to me they are very 
important ones. They are men we can talk with and deal with 
reasonably.

                     U.S. POLICIES TOWARD INDONESIA

    Now, as far as our own policies towards Indonesia are 
concerned, basically we believe exactly what the Indonesian 
leadership believes in. We believe in the unity of Indonesia. I 
started right out with that because there has been some 
question in the past. We believe in the unity. We believe in 
the progress and stability, political-economic stability, of 
Indonesia. These are basic policies. Those, of course, are the 
policies of the new government, too, and when we say why do 
Indonesians and Americans get along, it seems to me one of the 
basic reasons we get along with the new government is we are 
basically attached to the same objectives and principles.
    I think if I may say so, as a matter of personal judgment, 
very privately, of course, I think they appreciate what we are 
doing in Vietnam. Certainly they are deadly opposed to the 
Communists and they are opposed to Peking's policies. As far as 
the policies for carrying out these broad objectives are 
concerned, obviously they need assistance badly as I have just 
said.
    It falls principally in the economic sector. And also I 
think certain civic actions support, not with lethal weapons, 
but for certain spare parts and other things to help them get 
with the civic action program. These are going to be involved.
    Now, we have a great opportunity in Indonesia because we 
started with the tabula rasa--all the aid was practically wound 
up--of trying to approach our problems on as broad a 
multilateral basis as possible. This may not be possible the 
first year or the second year, but because we are already 
talking with these other creditor group countries in Tokyo, 
Paris, now Amsterdam, and since you have to approach the whole 
problem of the debt rescheduling and further assistance, really 
it is one single problem. We are getting more and more 
agreement on the principles involved in assistance to Indonesia 
and we want Indonesia to come up with the help of the 
International Monetary Fund, again part, you might say, of a 
multilateral approach, with what are indeed their most urgent 
needs, have these things carefully reviewed by the INF, and 
then these things put up to the other countries so they can 
decide in what ways they can assist Indonesia in the most 
meaningful way possible.
    I am very hopeful that this approach will work. If we do, I 
think we can avoid lots of the troubles and pitfalls of the 
past.

                           A SENSE OF MISSION

    I mentioned specific action just now. It seems to me that 
there is particular relevance to the needs for civil action 
programs in Indonesia because the military have all this 
knowhow. They have all this equipment, and, of course, they 
have the authority as well.
    Meanwhile they have ended confrontation. They had to 
mothball almost all this fleet they have got from the Soviet 
Union and a result of all that is that a lot of officers are 
without jobs. It is important that they have a sense of mission 
and that the mission relates the needs of the people, and they 
have turned to us and asked us for help in that regard. I have 
discussed this thing in Washington. I think there is increasing 
recognition of the importance of helping them out on a low-
cost, high-impact program, especially in central and Eastern 
Java where most of the people live.
    I might say that 70 percent of the Indonesian people live 
on the island of Java which you can see is but a small slice of 
the geography of the vast sprawling country, larger than the 
rest of Southeast Asia put together. And I think that we will 
have other advantages as well, tactical advantages, in our 
personal relationships with the military and of helping 
preserve the same kinds of approach and attitude.
    Well, if I could just wind up because I know you have lots 
of questions, Senator. I just wanted to end up by saying, as I 
said to you in the beginning before some of your colleagues 
arrived, it has been a tremendous year and a half of transition 
and the transition in my opinion has been almost uniformly for 
the good: the confrontation over; the rejoining of the United 
Nations; the launching of what so far has been an effective 
stabilization program; the banning of communism from Indo-China 
and, of course, it has problems, as I said, with their 
relations with the Soviet Union and for the overall; the new 
leadership and qualities of the new leaders; for those things I 
think we have much to be thankful. I think we have a good group 
we can work with. I don't think there is any group we can 
expect on the present scene or in the predictable future that 
will be as good as this one. I hope we will be able to give 
them the requisite help, along with other countries, doing it 
as much as possible with this multilateral approach that I know 
you have discussed in this committee.

                   AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL IN INDONESIA

    Senator Lausche. Thank you. I just want to put a few 
questions to inform those members who were not present when you 
began to testify about what you said.
    What is the significance of July 21st that you mentioned?
    Ambassador Green. That is simply the date I arrived in 
Indonesia, having been confirmed in the next room.
    Senator Case. What could be more pertinent?
    Senator Lausche. Now, then, you stated there was a 
tremendous and miraculous change between what you saw when you 
came and what the condition is now.
    Ambassador Green. For which I bear no responsibility.

                        CHINESE-INDONESIAN AXIS

    Senator Lausche. Now, then, you spoke about an axis. The 
Peking-Hanoi----
    Ambassador Green. Pyongyang-Jakarta axis.
    Senator Lausche. And that was in the making.
    Ambassador Green. Sukarno announced this on August 17, 
1965. He said that we had this axis. I am not sure it was ever 
worked out in any formal way, but he was boasting that there 
was such an axis.
    Senator Lausche. Peking-Hanoi,----
    Ambassador Green. The axis actually had five countries 
involved. Indonesia, China, Red China, North Vietnam, North 
Korea, and Cambodia. But I might say he never consulted 
Cambodia and Monsignor was quite angry when he heard about it.
    Senator Lausche. That was the axis that was being 
discussed.
    Ambassador Green. He announced it when Chen Yi was there as 
his distinguished advisor.

                            INDONESIAN COUP

    Senator Lausche. When did the coup occur?
    Ambassador Green. September 30, in the wee hours of the 
morning. Actually, October 1st.
    Senator Lausche. And the object of the coup was to 
eliminate the seven military leaders.
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Lausche. They eliminated five, but two survived?
    Ambassador Green. Correct.
    Senator Lausche. And the survival of the two produced this 
encouraging situation that now prevails.
    Ambassador Green. If two generals had not survived, 
Nasution and Suharto, it is possible that no one would have 
moved rapidly and quashed the coup.
    Senator Lausche. Now, then, after that they took pictures 
of the hideous brutalities that were committed upon these five.
    Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And the nation became informed about it 
and with that there was seething indignation and a purpose to 
eliminate the Communists. You estimate 300,000 were killed. The 
present calculation is that there were 500,000.
    Ambassador Green. Some people think there were 500,000. 
Some think there were more. Some think less. But I would up my 
estimate from 300,000.
    Senator Lausche. Now, there was economic chaos produced by 
Sukarno leaving a debt of $2,700 million.
    Ambassador Green. Right.
    Senator Lausche. The nations who are creditors have 
extended the time of the payment of debts, but in addition to 
that, there is need of $225 million of new foreign aid.
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Lausche. And it is a purpose that that foreign aid 
may be provided by us and other nations of the world.
    Now, all right. Mike?
    Senator Mansfield. I have no questions.

                 U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

    Senator Sparkman. Just a question. Is there any military 
included in that request? Military assistance?
    Ambassador Green. In that figure of $225 million? No, sir.
    Senator Sparkman. Does Indonesia look for military 
assistance?
    Ambassador Green. It does.
    Senator Sparkman. Ought we to give it?
    Ambassador Green. Now, I must correct my statement. When I 
said $225 million, if you are including in that figure 
assistance from the Soviet Union as well, which I believe it 
would be, the Indonesians would like to get some spare parts 
for military equipment that they had already received from the 
Soviet bloc. So that would be part of it. But not a major part, 
a small part.
    Senator Sparkman. Now, let me ask you----
    Senator Case. In this $225 million calculation--is that 
overall or just for----
    Ambassador Green. That is overall. And that $225 million, 
as I say, I was hitting between two outside figures of $160 
million to $300 million, something in that range. But $225 
million would be acceptable.

                         ROLE OF GEN. NASUTION

    Senator Sparkman. We used to hear a good bit about a man 
named Nasution.
    Ambassador Green. Yes.
    Senator Sparkman. What has happened to him?
    Ambassador Green. General Nasution, who was one of the two 
surviving generals----.
    Senator Sparkman. Is he one that you named?
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Sparkman. He and Suharto were the two that 
survived.
    Ambassador Green. That is right. But Suharto has moved out 
into the No. 1 position and General Nasution is the president 
of this MPRS, constituent assembly, or super Parliament, 
whatever you want to call it.
    Senator Lausche. John, may I ask him to redescribe what 
they showed to the people of the country that infuriated them 
into taking the lives of these 300,000. You spoke about the 
bodies and the alligator pits and so on.
    Ambassador Green. Yes. What had happened was that these 
murdered generals--there were five of them--one or two had been 
shot and killed right at the beginning, but three of them at 
least were not dead when they picked them up. They took them up 
to the Halim Air Base and there these three surviving generals 
were tortured to death, slashed slowly to death by Gerwani, 
which is the Communist women's organization. When their 
lacerated bodies, which meanwhile had been dumped into the 
crocodile hole which is the name of sort of a pit down there, 
when they had been exhumed three or four days later, the army 
saw to it that pictures of this grisly scene were widely 
publicized all around the country. Meanwhile, in the 
countryside where the village folk had been living under the 
increasing pressures of the Communists, the atmosphere was 
already one of dry tinder and this was the spark that lit the 
whole thing and sent it into such violent conflagration.
    Senator Sparkman. Some of General Nasution's children were 
killed.
    Ambassador Green. His daughter was killed, and this is very 
material, Senator, because this produced something of an 
emotional reaction. This little girl was an innocent victim, 
shot to death.
    Senator Lausche. Frank?

                        FOREIGN AID TO INDONESIA

    Senator Carlson. Just one or two questions. How much 
foreign aid are we giving now, if any?
    Ambassador Green. We are.
    Senator Carlson. Grants in aid and loans?
    Ambassador Green. We are giving the Indonesians about $48 
million or $49 million in P.L. 480, Title V assistance. These 
are dollar sales.
    This represents mostly cotton, 225,000 bales plus 100,000 
tons of rice. This already has been agreed to. All of it hasn't 
arrived yet, but most of it is there by now.
    In addition to that, there is $10 million in a spare parts 
loan again, to be repaid in 20 years, I believe.
    In addition to that, maybe there is a million dollars or so 
in grant assistance for educational purposes as well as for a 
food-for-work program which is really grant in aid, although it 
is provided in the form of cracked corn and vegetable oil.

                         REASONS FOR SOVIET AID

    Senator Carlson. In view of the fact that so many of the 
Communists were killed during the blood bath, how can we expect 
the Soviet Union to give aid or continue to give aid?
    Ambassador Green. Because they have put such a tremendous 
investment in Asia I suppose they want it covered. It is a 
terribly important country, the fifth largest in the world. 
Some people say the third richest in the world. And the Soviets 
have, as I pointed out, invested $1.4 billion in aid. They want 
to cover that.
    Also I think they are hopeful that in the long run there 
will be a recovery of the Communist Party. Meanwhile they damn 
the Chinese for having driven the Communist Party in this 
direction and they sort of damn us in a very faint way for 
being imperialists, and maybe we are getting in too close with 
the new government. They keep making rumbles on this from 
Moscow, but I think if I were in the Soviet position, I would 
be acting very much the way they do.
    Now, they are obviously deeply perplexed. It is not easy 
for them to give assistance to Indonesia when Indonesia is 
banning the Communist Party.

                       FOREIGN INVESTMENT WELCOME

    One thing I would like to mention, Mr. Chairman, is that 
one of the things the new government is welcoming is foreign 
investment. This is another 180 degree change in policy. The 
first conversation I had with General Suharto on May 27, 1966, 
he raised the question of how they were going to develop the 
outer islands. I said I felt private investment, foreign 
investment, was the soundest way. There wasn't that kind of 
money. The government didnt have that kind of money. Well, not 
as a result of that, but I merely mention it, this was the 
first time the subject was discussed with the General. Now they 
have changed their foreign investment policy to attract foreign 
capital investment, as a result of which the Hotel Indonesia is 
jam packed with potential foreign investors out there looking 
into the possibilities.
    Meanwhile, the law has been changed to favor foreign 
investment and protect foreign investors, and they have 
discovered, they think, oil in the Java Sea, no point deeper 
than 180 feet, and if this oil finding turns out to be what 
they think it is, maybe a second Gulf of Mexico.
    Senator Lausche. Mike.
    Senator Mansfield. Nothing.
    Senator Lausche. Karl?

                 RELATIONS BETWEEN SUHARTO AND NASUTION

    Senator Mundt. Curiously enough, of all places, we have a 
lot of South Dakota businessmen out in Indonesia. How they ever 
found it I don't know, but I have been in close touch with them 
and they are pretty high on this Nasution. They seem to feel 
that if elections were held, he might wind up as the President, 
as the best counter against the Communists rather than Suharto, 
a fine fellow and honest, but who doesn't seem to have the 
outgoing personality that appeals to the masses.
    Would you comment on that?
    Ambassador Green. General Nasution has a bit of this 
charisma quality maybe, and certainly Mrs. Nasution does, too. 
They are both highly popular. But I think there is no question 
that General Suharto is very much the man the people are 
looking to these days for leadership, that General Nasution has 
been in charge of the army many years and he is senior in the 
army ranks. The relation between Suharto and Nasution is good. 
Nasution comes from Sumatro for one thing, and Suharto comes 
from Java. Since 70 percent of the people come from Java, this 
is an important factor.
    I would hope very much that Nasution and Suharto could 
continue their harmonious relationship. It is productive, 
helpful. One thing Nasution has lost a bit of standing with 
students for is because in November-December, 1965, when he was 
in charge, he stood back from facing down Sukarno. Then Sukarno 
dismissed him in the cabinet shift of February 23, 1966, and 
that was quite a blow to his prestige. He recovered a good deal 
of that prestige. He is more outspoken in his opposition to 
Sukarno than is Suharto.

                     COULD SUKARNO RETURN TO POWER

    Senator Mundt. Can you envision any contingency whereby 
Sukarno might get back into power?
    Ambassador Green. Oh, I could. It is conceivable that he 
could come back if their whole stabilization program should go 
on the rocks and they couldn't make a go of things, and if the 
new order, as they call the group around General Suharto, was 
not able to maintain the unity, which is terribly important. If 
things began to slip up, then Sukarno might look pretty good in 
retrospect. So that there is a possibility of coming back.
    I think the chances are definitely against him, but I don't 
think we should rule it out.
    Senator Lausche. Will you tell Senator Mundt what you 
stated a moment ago about there being a bit of craftiness in 
the operation of Suharto in allowing Sukarno to still remain in 
the picture.
    Ambassador Green. Yes. His reason for keeping Sukarno on is 
partly this. He doesn't want to risk civil war, although I 
don't think that that would be the result of moving sharply 
against Sukarno today. Nevertheless, that has been one reason, 
partly because Sukarno was the old commander-in-chief, the 
George Washington of Indonesia, as they always say.
    But I think it is also because he wanted to use Sukarno as 
a scapegoat, to have him there so that he could be the focus of 
resentment. After all, he is the man who is responsible for 
this mess. Leave him on and people are reminded of that fact. 
If he goes in exile, by this time people might be criticizing 
the new government for some of the problems which really are 
described as Sukarno's folly.
    Also you maintain better unity in what you call the new 
order, which is made up of rather disparate forces like the 
military and the students, the business community, if they have 
a common target and they are all against Sukarno, most of them. 
This helps to make unity.
    So I think in his rather clever Javanese way Suharto has 
handled this thing quite well. But, you know, you can't go on 
playing that game forever. There comes a time when your 
administration can suffer, you might say almost from tired--
when you have to spend so much time putting out the fire 
Sukarno lights, hand-holding, going to palace functions which 
are interminable, and also because students begin to get pretty 
angry if you haven't moved against him in a final way.
    It is also confusing to the outside world--I have been 
around the country just now talking with a lot of people--that 
Sukarno is lingering on this way. It does confuse a lot of 
people as to what the new Indonesia adds up to.
    Senator Mundt. That is all.
    Senator Lausche. Al.

                         STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

    Senator Gore. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you speak of the 
students in the sense of organization, of unity. Is this a 
rabble or is there some organization in this?
    Ambassador Green. The students are extremely well 
organized, not throughout the country but in the West Java area 
and some of the other main population centers of Indonesia. 
They are very well organized. There are two principal 
organizations, the Kami--not our kind of Commies--these are the 
university students, and the Kappi which are the high school 
students.
    These two groups are very violently anti-Sukarno and anti-
Communist, and so forth. You will find slogans put out by the 
students that are the same throughout the country on the same 
day, which shows you how well they are organized.
    They are in close touch with General Suharto and the 
military. They have been working very closely with him. They 
haven't always agreed. Sometimes they are restrictive, but I 
would say they had acted in a very responsible way so far. They 
haven't been a rabble.
    Now, there are other students that aren't members of these 
groups, particularly in a place like Surabia, Eastern Java, 
that are under the domination of other elements that are 
against the Kami. But the Kami and Kappi, these two huge 
student organizations, nevertheless represent the increasing 
view of the student population of Indonesia and today command 
good slice of the student population's support.

                           A VOLATILE ELEMENT

    Senator Gore. The reason I asked the question, we see ``the 
students'' in many parts of the world being propagandized and 
utilized. It seems to be a very volatile element and might be a 
source of danger as well as strength.
    Ambassador Green. Suharto recognizes that very point. He 
doesn't want to have Parliament in the streets. He recognizes 
the students' feelings, on the other hand. This is one of the 
reasons why Suharto has wanted to move in a constitutional way. 
This is a very important consideration, that he wants to have 
enough forward motion against Sukarno and his ilk to chip away 
from their power and debase them eventually, but he wants to do 
it in a constitutional way, partly so that the students don't 
get the idea that this is the way to change governments.
    Senator Gore. Of course, we see another example of 
students, youth, in the Red Guard in Red China. Now, they can 
be put to evil as well as good purposes.
    About two or three years ago, Mr. Ambassador, we were told 
in executive session that we had continued small amounts of 
military aid to the military leaders largely to keep liaison 
with them, that several of this group that were liquidated had 
received their military education in the United States, and 
that this aid at the proper and crucial time might prove to 
have been very valuable to us.
    Can you shed any light on that now?

                     PARTICIPANTS TRAINING PROGRAM

    Ambassador Green. I think our Participants Training Program 
in the past has been very useful. There were about, oh, I 
guess, 8,000 or so Indonesian students in the United States, 
and this included several thousand of the military. And I do 
think this had a very important result. As I look back over our 
old aid program, it wasn't so bad after all. In fact, we did a 
pretty good job, I think. And there were some scatteration 
projects and all that kind of stuff. But one area where we did 
the best of all is in the human resources field, training of 
people.
    Senator Sparkman. One of those----
    Ambassador Green. This would be the Participants Training 
Program bringing people under either our AID program, or under 
the State Department Cultural Program, or under the Military 
Assistance Program.
    Senator Sparkman. One of those hangover programs was also 
one of communications which I believe served a good end with 
the Armed Forces.
    Ambassador Green. Yes, that is right.
    Senator Sparkman. During the revolution.

                      PHILCO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

    Senator Lausche. Speak on that because they came before us 
specially in this room----
    Senator Sparkman. To continue it.
    Senator Lausche [continuing]. Urging that we provide them 
with money to install a communications system which was 
presented to us as being essential to keeping a line in 
Indonesia. You know of what I speak?
    Ambassador Green. I know exactly what you are referring to. 
You are referring--you are talking about the Philco 
Troposcatter System. Well, this system--I am not enough of a 
specialist to judge this one. This is up to the Indonesians to 
judge on their own account.
    The trouble with Philco was it was very expensive and it 
would take a long, long time to build it. There may be cheaper 
and better ways of building a communications network for 
Indonesia. I grant that the building of a good communications 
network is essential and it is true that the link that was 
already established under Philco between Jakarta and Bandung 
was a fairly important factor in the quick reaction of these 
two surviving generals.
    Senator Lausche. That is the point.
    Senator Gore. Yes. So overall you say----
    Ambassador Green. But I think you have to be careful on 
this one because there are other kinds of communications 
networks. Some of them may be considerably cheaper and more 
within the means of the Indonesians to support.

                        CONTINUATION OF U.S. AID

    Senator Gore. To come back to the overall question of aid, 
is it your conclusion that the continuation of U.S. aid 
programs even in miniscule amounts had considerable 
significance ultimately in the showdown?
    Ambassador Green. I think that the aid program which we had 
of $800 million of U.S. assistance--maybe in the 10 or 12 year 
period up until 1965--I think it was a good aid program by and 
large. There were some things that obviously weren't as good, 
but by and large it was a good aid program. The Indonesians 
knew it and today in retrospect it looks darn good because out 
of the $800 million that we gave Indonesia at that time, only 
29 percent of it was repayable in dollars. So that we didn't 
leave them saddled with a debt the way the Soviet Union did, 
for example.
    Therefore, that is one factor.
    Our training program, as I said before, left a long term 
good result. The turnkey plus projects we had for helping to 
build a factory with another one of our loans, and then we saw 
to it that that factory was managed by our people until they 
were prepared to take it over. Then they took it over, and when 
they took it over, they were able to operate it as indeed they 
are today.
    The two big projects that we helped them with in fertilizer 
and cement are operating at almost 100 percent capacity and 
they are the only two big factories in the country of that size 
operating anywhere near 100 percent capacity because of the way 
this thing was handled.

                            MULTILATERAL AID

    Senator Case. Mr. Ambassador, I don't know whether I missed 
something coming in late or not, but have you laid out a 
specific program or is this general background on the role of 
foreign aid?
    Ambassador Green. What I was talking of was in just general 
terms, but we haven't reached a point of setting out 
specifically what we will do in this calendar year of this next 
fiscal year. We are talking about it still in the Department, 
but as you can see from my remarks, I think it is very 
important that we lend a helping hand to Indonesia, but we do 
it as far as possible in consultation with other countries, 
other creditors, and that we do our share, but we see to it 
that other countries do theirs as well.
    Senator Case. This is an ideal time, isn't it, to get 
multilateral operations going because we are doing nothing now.
    Ambassador Green. Yes, it is. To the extent that it is 
possible to do.
    Senator Case. We have to realize----
    Ambassador Green. We are already discussing these things 
with other creditors and we don't want, for example, a country 
to give Indonesia short term credit because that is just going 
to compound the problems of the debt rescheduling two or three 
years from now. We want to be sure that the terms of assistance 
other countries give to Indonesia comports with their overall 
debt problem and rescheduling problem and our own assistance, 
and we are hopeful that the Soviet bloc will give Indonesia the 
kind of debt relief that we are giving. I think they will from 
what I have heard.
    Senator Mundt. If they don't, are you going to change your 
mind about giving relief?
    Ambassador Green. Well, I think this is going to raise a 
very serious problem obviously, and I think the Indonesians 
know that.

                      INDONESIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY

    Senator Case. How close are they to being self-sufficient 
in food?
    Ambassador Green. Well----
    Senator Case. Is this one of the----
    Ambassador Green. The growing population of Java is the 
reason why they are in a food deficit position today. The 
population increases there over 2\1/2\ percent every year. It 
is one of the most overcrowded bits of real estate in the world 
today. And they live in the illusion that people can move to 
these outlying islands. They don't figure the tremendous cost 
of resettlement which makes this prohibitive. Also people that 
go to these islands find it forbidding and they tend to come 
back.
    Senator Case. You mean cold?
    Ambassador Green. No. They find that there is no rice--
other kinds of food. They miss their old homestead, rather 
typical.
    Now, as the population of Java increases, it has moved from 
a position of at one time exporting rice to the outlying areas 
to a position where it exports nothing except officials and 
problems. And obviously there is a major problem in facing up 
to family planning, or whatever you want to call it.
    The Indonesians are too preoccupied with other questions 
right now that they really haven't done much in this field.
    Senator Case. This is a good time to get going on that, 
too.
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Lausche. Senator Cooper?

                 COMMUNISTS KILLED DURING COUNTER-COUP

    Senator Cooper. You said an estimate of 300,000 to 500,000 
were killed. Is it correct that 25 percent of the population in 
Indonesia is Communist?
    Ambassador Green. You could argue that at one point there 
were as many as 25 percent of the Indonesians who in one way or 
another supported either the Communist Party or one of its 
front groups.
    Senator Cooper. The Communist Party at one time did have 
support of many peasants, people in the countryside, also the 
army.
    Ambassador Green. The Communist Party itself had 3 million 
at one time. It now appears that some of those members weren't 
very strong members, but anyway, it had 3 million membership, 
and then outside that 3 million, there were about 22 million or 
so who supported these different front activities.
    Senator Cooper. Java was one of the chief seats of 
Communist strength.
    Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.

                         SUKARNO IS DISCREDITED

    Senator Cooper. What you said a while ago, they couldn't 
hold up the fact that Sukarno still had some strength, that 
plus the large number of Communists remaining--would you say 
there is still some danger of a return of Sukarno?
    Ambassador Green. I doubt the danger of Sukarno's return is 
very great. I would say that the odds were almost overwhelming 
against Sukarno getting back on the scene again. He is very 
widely discredited and the very fact that things were so bad in 
the past--he let things run so badly down hill and they are 
suffering so much as a result. It has tended to discredit his 
image even further.
    He has refused to denounce the Communists and this, of 
course, has affected him even more.
    Now, these 25 million people who supported the Communists 
one way or another, a lot of those were people just sort of 
being on the bandwagon for their own safety. They were 
anticipating a slide into the Communist camp and they wanted to 
protect themselves come the events.

                         PROBLEMS WITH MALAYSIA

    Senator Cooper. Has the problem with Malaysia been settled?
    Ambassador Green. I think it has been settled. There are 
somethings, loose ends that have to be tied up. They don't have 
normal diplomatic relations now with Malaysia, but the 
relationships between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur are I must say 
very, very close indeed. They are fellow Moslem countries and 
in a way they are two brothers who have discovered the folly of 
their having been at each other's throats for so long.
    Senator Cooper. You think the present government is making 
progress economically and in a fiscal way to give some strength 
to Indonesia.
    Ambassador Green. Yes.
    Senator Cooper. To correct some of the chaos that you 
described.
    Ambassador Green. Very definitely. And better than I would 
have anticipated three or four months ago.
    Senator Lausche. Do you have another question?

                     DEFINING INDONESIAN COMMUNISM

    Senator Case. Just one question. You used--you use it all 
the time--what do you mean by Communist? I am not being funny. 
I really mean when you say this you have a specific thing in 
your mind. Are you talking about the influence of China, the 
influence of Russia?
    Ambassador Green. Well, each time I use it it might be in a 
little different context, but when I was talking about PKI, the 
efforts to seize power, I was referring to the organization, 
the leaders. The leaders in Indonesia, but operating I think 
with the aid and comfort and fiscal support in some ways from 
Communist China.
    Senator Case. Pretty much Chinese? Is Russia in there at 
all?
    Ambassador Green. No, I do think Russia has been 
disillusioned, became increasingly disillusioned with the PKI, 
the Communist Party of Indonesia, because it came very 
definitely under Peking's influence and Russia therefore moved 
from a position of supporting the PKI to a position of 
supporting the Indonesian government. This happened in about 
1963, 1964, 1965, in that period.
    Senator Case. Was Russia involved in the coup?
    Ambassador Green. No, in no way.
    Senator Case. Thank you.

                   WAS THE U.S. INVOLVED IN THE COUP?

    Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the coup?
    Ambassador Green. No, sir.
    Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the previous attempt 
at a coup about four years ago?
    Ambassador Green. No. I don't think so.
    Senator Fulbright. CIA played no part in it?
    Ambassador Green. You mean 1958?
    Senator Fulbright. Yes.
    Ambassador Green. Well, I think there was definitely some 
sympathy for the break-away group.
    Senator Fulbright. We had no part in that?
    Ambassador Green. I was not involved in the events and I am 
afraid I cannot answer.
    Senator Fulbright. You don't know about it. You haven't 
heard about it?
    Ambassador Green. I don't know for sure what happened.
    Senator Fulbright. They don't tell you about any of the 
past history in these places when you are assigned to a 
country?
    Ambassador Green. Well, I can glean a number of things, 
Senator.
    Senator Fulbright. You don't know whether CIA was involved 
or not. And we were not involved in this coup.
    Ambassador Green. No, sir. Definitely not.
    Senator Fulbright. We have been told that this would not 
have taken place had we not been doing what we were doing in 
Vietnam. Is that correct?
    Ambassador Green. Oh, I wouldn't say it is correct to say 
it wouldn't have taken place. I think that as I was saying 
perhaps before you came in----
    Senator Fulbright. I'm sorry I was late. I had another 
engagement and I couldn't be in on time.

                      A FORWARD FLOW OF A RED TIDE

    Ambassador Green. I think when these two surviving generals 
faced this tremendous Communist menace, several days after the 
abortive coup, that they had a tremendous problem because not 
only did you have this important Communist Party and all these 
sympathizers we were just talking about here, too but the 
Communists had infiltrated into the armed forces. As a matter 
of fact, one of the first things that the military had to do 
was to relieve several battalions in central Java and put them 
into obscure locations where they couldn't be in harm's way. 
And, of course, the air force commander was involved in the 
coup. And so was all of that, and Sukarno's feelings being what 
they were suspected of being, sympathetic to the Communists, 
the new emerging government, Suharto and Nasution, were faced, 
as I say, with a tremendous problem. Had there been at that 
point a forward flow of a Red tide which might have been the 
result of our not being firm in Vietnam, then I think events 
could have developed in a somewhat different way.
    I think for one thing the generals might not have been so 
determined and I think the Communists might have been more 
emboldened to resist.
    Senator Fulbright. What do you mean by the forward flow of 
the Red tide? That is very colorful language. What is the Red 
tide?
    Senator Case. You have to write books if you are going to 
use language like that.

                      CHINA AND RUSSIA IN VIETNAM

    Ambassador Green. I don't write books, but what I meant was 
that if there hadn't been any interposition of American 
strength between the Communist pressures from the north and 
Indonesia itself, if the Indonesian leadership had felt that 
there was no protection and in fact China was the wave of the 
future and that there was a threat from the north----
    Senator Fulbright. Is it China you believe that is 
occupying Vietnam?
    Ambassador Green. I don't think it is occupying Vietnam, 
but I think it is supporting North Vietnam.
    Senator Fulbright. Yes, it is. And so is Russia. Russia is 
supporting them more than China now, isn't it?
    Ambassador Green. I don't know.
    Senator Fulbright. Wouldn't you say the Russian support 
today is greater, more valuable to Vietnam than the Chinese?
    Ambassador Green. I don't know the answer to that.
    Senator Fulbright. You said a moment ago the Russians had 
shifted from supporting the Chinese in Indonesia to supporting 
the government, is that right? Didn't you say a moment ago that 
the Russians had shifted their position from support of the PKI 
to the support of the government?
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Fulbright. Or did I misunderstand?
    Ambassador Green. That is correct.

                       CHINESE OBJECTIVES IN ASIA

    Senator Fulbright. Don't you consider the Russians part of 
the Red tide, or is it only the Chinese?
    Ambassador Green. Not the way I was using the words Red 
tide then--figuratively.
    Senator Fulbright. Are only the Chinese Communists bad and 
not the Russians?
    Ambassador Green. I look upon the Russian and the Chinese 
objectives in this part of the world as quite different. I look 
upon the Chinese purposes as more expansionist than Russia in 
this part of the world.
    Senator Fulbright. Why do you?
    Ambassador Green. Because I don't see any evidence that the 
Russians are on the move to take over any of this part of the 
world.
    Senator Fulbright. Well, what is the evidence that the 
Chinese are moving to take it over?
    Ambassador Green. I think that they are supporting directly 
or indirectly, for example, the troubles in the Northeast 
Thailand front and their broadcasts and statements are all of 
an incendiary nature to support the so-called wars of 
liberation in this part of the world.
    Senator Fulbright. Do you think that broadcasting 
statements are in themselves aggression?
    Ambassador Green. Well, if they say it and if they appear 
to mean it, why wouldn't it be so, particularly since they are 
giving aid and comfort to the so-called Thai liberation 
movement?
    Senator Fulbright. The Thai liberation. You shifted to the 
Thais. How many Chinese do they have in Thailand in this 
attack?
    Ambassador Green. I don't know of any Chinese that they 
have.
    Senator Fulbright. No.
    Ambassador Green. But this is the question of giving 
support by radio broadcasts, propaganda, and I don't know what 
kind of agents they have operating down there. It is because 
this Thai--this group that they have in Hunan Province, the 
Thai liberation group there, that has been under the Chinese 
Communist wing for some time now and have intentions for taking 
over Thailand.

                        NO USE OF CHINESE TROOPS

    Senator Fulbright. Do you know of any Chinese troops that 
are outside of their border in this area?
    Ambassador Green. No.
    Senator Fulbright. Outside of their border in any area?
    Ambassador Green. Well, they have been in the case of India 
but they came down----
    Senator Fulbright. Presently?
    Ambassador Green. At present, I don't know of any Chinese.
    Senator Fulbright. Well, I don't know what you mean by the 
Red tide is slowing over their area.
    Ambassador Green. Well, I didn't say that the Red tide was 
just China. I said that the Red tide was Hanoi, Peking. I 
didn't--I said I didn't think it was Russia.

                   IS VIETNAM A THREAT TO INDONESIA?

    Senator Fulbright. Well, then, leaving out China and 
Russia, do you think that Vietnam as such, either North or 
South, is a threat to Indonesian security?
    Ambassador Green. Indirectly. I think if North Vietnam were 
to take over by force South Vietnam, have success in that 
endeavor, that it would have an impact upon----
    Senator Fulbright. What would----
    Ambassador Green.--Indonesians.
    Senator Fulbright. Do you think there would be a threat to 
Indonesia?
    Ambassador Green. Well, it is hard to say. It is a 
speculative situation.
    Senator Fulbright. Well, if you can't say----
    Ambassador Green. I can't say in exactly what way.
    Senator Fulbright. I can't either, but you leave the 
impression that there is a great threat. I am just trying to 
develop why you think so. Do they have any navy or air force? 
Could they attack Indonesia?
    Ambassador Green. I think if they succeed in their 
aggressive efforts and take over South Vietnam, if this is the 
condition which you propose to me, if they get away with it, I 
think that other countries in the area will feel that much less 
secure, that is all. They will not act with the same degree of 
determination that in the case of Indonesia your Communists, 
pro-Communist groups there, would be the more emboldened and it 
will have a certain sapping affect.

                     BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AID

    Senator Fulbright. On the aid, you are advocating a 
bilateral program with Indonesia? Direct aid from the United 
States?
    Ambassador Green. I said I believed that to the maximum 
extent possible we should approach this problem on a 
multilateral basis. I didn't think we would be able to achieve 
that maybe this year or even the next, but we should make every 
effort to do so. I therefore thought this year we would have to 
approach it on a bilateral basis, but to pursue a policy of 
maximum coordination of our information; disclosure of what we 
intend to do and other countries are intending to do, and to 
try to bring multilateral organizations like the Asian 
Development Bank, the IMF, into the act as far as possible.
    Senator Fulbright. How much are you advocating? Do you know 
what they are asking for?
    Ambassador Green. They haven't asked us for a specific 
figure, but I said that their requirements might run in the 
range, let us say, of $225 million in net new foreign aid this 
calendar year and that I thought we should do our fair share, 
and I didn't attempt to say what that would be. And we should 
approach the problem in such a way to try to maximize foreign 
contributions.
    Senator Fulbright. How much military aid? Is that economic 
or both?
    Ambassador Green. I was talking there about economic aid. I 
am not recommending any military hardware; that is to say, any 
lethal weapons, but I do think a modest support of their civic 
action program would be desirable.
    Senator Fulbright. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Lausche. Any other questions?

                REIMBURSEMENT OF AMERICANS FOR PROPERTY

    Senator Aiken. I would like to ask one question.
    To what extent has Indonesia reimbursed Americans for 
expropriated property?
    Ambassador Green. Well, there has been no reimbursement of 
expropriated property simply because they haven't claimed to 
have expropriated any property. There were certain American 
companies that were forced out and in the case of the rubber 
companies actually they bought those assets of Goodyear and 
U.S. Rubber. They forced Goodyear out of the Bogor tire 
factory, but now Goodyear is talking about resuming management 
of the factory.
    They have established a board, interagency board, to 
discuss claims of any American investor who claims that his 
property has been forced out of his hands either with a view to 
compensation or with a view to restoration.
    Senator Aiken. Is the oil finding a ready market? Does what 
oil they produce find a ready market now?
    Ambassador Green. Yes, it does.
    Senator Aiken. Produced by American companies for the 
Indonesian government?
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Aiken. What do the oil people mean when they say 
they felt they could handle that business better than the 
government could?
    Ambassador Green. Well, the American oil companies--there 
are two big ones, Caltex and Stanback--they have been studying 
operations now although they were almost forced out of business 
the year before last, and they are operating as a private 
company. They give the Indonesians 60 percent of the profits.
    Senator Aiken. And they are quite optimistic about not 
extending any serious loss, aren't they, in the long run?
    Ambassador Green. That is right. I think they were very 
worried at one time, one of our principal problems.

                            USE OF U.S. AID

    Senator Aiken. I was just wondering if we give the 
government their material aid, cash aid, whether that would be 
used to pay off, to pay for some of the expropriated property.
    Ambassador Green. No. I think that----
    Senator Aiken. You think it wouldn't. Not even the rubber 
people.
    Ambassador Green. No.

                       SUKARNO'S PLAN FOR AN AXIS

    Senator Lausche. To get the record complete, you began to 
state earlier the statements made by Sukarno about this axis of 
Indonesia, Hanoi and Cambodia, Peking and a fifth.
    Ambassador Green. Pyongyang, North Korea.
    Senator Lausche. What did Sukarno say on that subject? Did 
you say that he had made a statement?
    Ambassador Green. Oh, yes. He made it on August 17th. He 
merely announced where the country was going and that now they 
are establishing this axis. He mentioned those five capitals as 
being partners working together. He said it in the presence of 
hundreds of thousands of people, tens of thousands, in the 
physical presence, and over the radio and television to the 
whole country.
    Senator Lausche. That was a statement made----
    Ambassador Green. By him.
    Senator Lausche. Over the radio to all of the people of his 
country.
    Ambassador Green. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. That this axis was established.
    Ambassador Green. That is right.
    Senator Lausche. Identify the countries again in the axis.
    Ambassador Green. Communist China, North Korea, North 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia.
    Senator Lausche. Five countries.
    Ambassador Green. But he did it without ever asking 
Cambodia.
    Senator Lausche. Anything further?
    Senator Cooper. No. I think it was very fine to hear from 
you, so clear, so helpful.
    Senator Lausche. Thanks. Thanks very much for a very 
thorough report, and I am grateful to you.

                        U.S. POSITION IN VIETNAM

    I would like to put this question. In your opinion, would 
our position in Southeast Asia, if we pulled out of south 
Vietnam, be as formidable as it is now in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Taiwan and Japan?
    Ambassador Green. I think that it would be. Our strong 
stand in South Vietnam has provided a kind of shield behind 
which these countries have felt capable, emboldened to move 
ahead with trying to put their houses in order the way in fact 
this happened in Indonesia. Had there not been this 
interposition of American strength--people may not like this 
term--the Red tide, but I still do, I do not think that it is 
likely that the Indonesian leaders, the new military leaders, 
would have acted in as determined a way as they did.
    Now, I think it is very important that we not say this 
publicly because Indonesia wants to take credit for its own 
actions. We don't want to look as though we are always taking 
credit. That is why we haven't said it, but that is the way I 
feel.
    Senator Lausche. Yes, and I think you have exactly stated 
the position that we are in. But to me it seems that to claim 
that our presence did not give courage and strength to those 
people is absurd and cannot be maintained.
    Thanks very much.
    [Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


              BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

                              ----------                              


                        Friday, February 3, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright (chairman of 
the full committee), Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Dodd, 
Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, and Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl and Mr. Bader, of the 
committee staff.
    Senator Gore. The committee will come to order.
    This afternoon the Subcommittee on Disarmament begins a 
series of hearings on the current disarmament and armament 
problems. It would appear that we have come to a critical 
moment in this general area. The country has before it 
enormously important decisions affecting not only our national 
security and allocation of our resources, but the whole 
organization of our economic and national life. I refer 
specifically to the immediate anti-ballistic missile question, 
but there are also important issues developing in the 
nonproliferation area as well as the sale of conventional arms.
    Chairman Fulbright shares the belief of the subcommittee 
that the subjects I have mentioned are of great importance and 
that it might be useful for the subcommittee to hold hearings.
    Because these issues are extremely complex, I believe it 
would be useful to explore the question of what we know--that 
is, what our government knows and what we do not know about 
what others are doing as a necessary background of knowledge to 
an examination of the policy implications of the decisions now 
under consideration. In order to ensure that we have a sound 
and accurate base of information on which to base our 
discussions and possible judgments, I have invited Mr. Helms of 
the Central Intelligence Agency to give to the subcommittee a 
thorough briefing.
    Mr. Helms, we are pleased to have you here this afternoon. 
Please be assured that we appreciate the sensitivity of the 
information you bring. Please proceed in your own way.

 STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, 
ACCOMPANIED BY CARL E. DUCKETT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND 
      TECHNOLOGY, AND JOHN S. WARNER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

    Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 
introduce Mr. Carl Duckett, who is the Deputy Director for 
Science and Technology in the Central Intelligence Agency, who 
has come with me in the event you desire to ask me any highly 
technical questions about missiles and weapons and so forth.
    Senator Gore. Maybe for the sake of the record, he should 
give his full name and title.
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. Mr. Carl Ernest Duckett, and I am 
the Deputy Director for Science and Technology of the CIA.
    Senator Clark. D-u-c-k-e-t-t?
    Mr. Duckett. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, I understand you wish me to 
discuss today the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and 
Communist China, touching on the related economic and political 
considerations. I would also like to cover in very brief form 
some of the problems of nuclear proliferation in other 
countries.
    I want to give the general thrust of the present situation 
and also to cover what we believe to be the future trends.
    Now, we all recognize that we could spend an entire day on 
a detailed discussion of the strengths and the hardware of the 
Russian and Chinese military establishments. So I will attempt 
to cover this in the briefest compass I can and I hope will 
give it enough information so that it will enable you to ask 
the kinds of questions that will be of interest to you.

                     SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES

    First, I would like to cover the Soviet strategic attack 
forces.
ICBM's
    I. The new Soviet ICBM's--which we call the third 
generation--are coming into operational status now at a rapid 
rate.
    A. At this time last year, the count had been stable at 
about 225 for a good year and a half.
          1. The Soviets at that point had completed their 
        deployment of the first and second generation missiles.
          2. In 1964, however, they began their new program, 
        comprising two new missile systems.
    B. One of these, we call the SS-9. It is a large and 
accurate missile which can carry a [deleted] megaton warhead 
5,000 miles, or a [deleted] megaton warhead about 7,000 miles.
    C. The other, the SS-11, is less accurate and smaller. We 
estimate the maximum yield of its warhead at [deleted] 
megatons.
    II. The silos for these new ICBM's become operational, at 
present rate of construction, two years or little more after 
they are started. As a result, the estimated number of 
operational launchers has already moved up from that plateau of 
225, which I just mentioned, to about 385.
    A. Our current National Intelligence Estimate, issued about 
60 days ago, concludes that by the middle of this year the 
Soviet Union will have about 425 to 485 ICBM's ready to launch. 
By mid-1968, the figure should be 670 to 765.
          1. These short-term estimates, of course, can be 
        based on the number of silos already under 
        construction, making allowance for acceleration or 
        delay in the pace of completion.
    B. At longer range, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM force 
will have somewhere between 800 and 1,100 operational launchers 
four years from now, in mid-1971 to be specific.

                CHANGING CHARACTER OF SOVIET ICBM FORCE

    III. The numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. The 
present deployment is also changing the character of the Soviet 
ICBM force.
    A. First, it is going to be harder to knock out. All of the 
new launchers are in hardened silos with each silo at least 
three miles from its nearest neighbor.
          1. Two-thirds of the first and second generation 
        ICBM's were exposed on launching pads. [deleted]
          The new mix means that by the middle of next year, 
        about 80 percent of the operational launchers will be 
        hardened, and there will be [deleted]
    B. Secondly, the main emphasis of the new deployment is on 
the SS-11 system. By mid-1968, there may be as many as 400 of 
these, making up more than half of the Soviet force.
          1. The SS-9 system has the accuracy and the big 
        warhead needed to attack hardened military targets.
          2. The contrast, the SS-11, with less accuracy and a 
        much smaller warhead yield, is more suitable for large, 
        soft targets. In other words, it has been referred to 
        as a city buster.
          The Soviets, by putting their missile force in silos 
        and concentrating on the SS-11, are working for what we 
        call ``assured destruction''--that is, the capability 
        to destroy a significant portion of the population and 
        resources of the United States even if U.S. missiles 
        should strike first.
    IV. This improvement of strategic attack capabilities is 
bound to give the Soviet leaders greatly increased confidence 
that they have achieved a sufficient ``assured destruction'' 
capability to serve as a deterrent.
    A. We do not believe, however, that between now and the 
mid-1970s the Soviets themselves expect to be strong enough to 
consider the deliberate initiation of a war against the United 
States.

                      SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR ATTACK

    V. Let me review briefly the status of the remainder of the 
Soviet capability for strategic attack.
    First, Medium Range and Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missiles:
    A. There have been no major changes during the past year in 
the Soviet Intermediate-range and Medium-range ballistic 
missile force.
          1. There are about 100 intermediate and 600 medium-
        range operational launchers.
          2. About 90 percent of the sites are in the Western 
        USSR, constituting a massive threat to Europe.
          3. We do not expect much change over the next 10 
        years in the size of the MRBM/IRBM force, but, again, 
        the character will probably change.
          4. As the existing systems become obsolete, launchers 
        on soft pads will be phased out. Present research and 
        development also suggests that the Soviets are working 
        for mobile systems, and solid fuel. They have paraded 
        prototypes of mobile missiles, including one which they 
        called a mobile ICBM, and they have tested a solid-
        fueled missile to about 3,000 miles, which is right on 
        the borderline between Intermediate and 
        Intercontinental range.
    Now, for the Soviet Submarine Force:
    B. It has a growing missile capability.
          1. A nuclear-powered submarine now under construction 
        is the first unit of a new class which will apparently 
        carry eight or more tubes for submerged launch of a new 
        missile with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles, and this 
        is a brand new submarine.
          Senator Gore. Is this single head or multiple head?
          Mr. Helms. Single head. We know of no multiple 
        warheads in the Soviet Union inventory.
          2. A few operational submarines have been converted 
        to fire a 700-mile ballistic missile while submerged.
          3. The rest of the missile units have to launch from 
        the surface.
          4. There are 36 submarines, with about 100 launchers 
        altogether for ballistic missiles, in the Soviet 
        submarine inventory. Most or these missiles have a 
        range of 350 miles.
          5. Another 47 submarines carry a total of about 250 
        cruise missiles, with the primary mission of attacking 
        naval task forces. This missile has a range of about 
        450 miles.
          6. About 45 of the 360 Soviet submarines are nuclear-
        powered. The power plants are noisier than ours, and 
        Soviet skippers slow down to less than 10 knots they 
        want to try to avoid detection.

                         SOVIET BOMBER PROGRAM

    Long Range Aviation:
    C. As for strategic air threat, Soviet Long Range Aviation 
now consists of 950 to 1,000 bomber and tanker aircraft. The 
number is declining slowly, and there has been no evidence of 
any new Soviet heavy bomber program.
          1. The Soviets have about 200 heavy bombers, some of 
        which are used as tankers. We estimate that they could 
        mount a strike of about 100 aircraft on two-way 
        missions against the United States.
          2. The rest of Long Range Aviation consists of 
        medium-range aircraft, featuring the super-sonic-dash 
        BLINDER medium bomber. We expect the mediums would be 
        used primarily to attack U.S. and allied targets on the 
        Eurasian landmass.
          3. The Air Force, however, has two major 
        reservations--that is our Air Force. One is that we 
        believe that long range aviation is likely to have a 
        new heavy bomber in the next few years. The other is 
        the Air Force calculation that in all-out war, 300 
        medium bombers could be used to supplement the 100 
        heavies in an attack on targets in the United States.
          I cite this because this is an Air Force disagreement 
        in the intelligence estimates, and I wanted you to be 
        aware of it.
          4. The Soviets have developed air-to-surface missiles 
        to extend the operational usefulness of manned 
        aircraft. They appear to be having trouble, however, 
        with the missiles designed for the BLINDER. The 
        principal operational missile at present delivers a 
        nuclear warhead about 350 miles, with a terminal speed 
        approaching twice the speed of sound.

                        SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

    Now, may I turn to Soviet strategic defense.
    I. The status of Soviet strategic defense is the subject of 
a sharp difference of opinion in the intelligence community 
over Soviet anti-missile capability. So that we can have a 
clear understanding of the controversy, let me point out that 
it involves two separate missile systems.
    The first system is referred to as the Moscow System.
    A. Around Moscow, the Soviets are indeed deploying an array 
of missiles and radars conclusively demonstrated to be an ABM 
system.
    B. Part of the system should be operational this year and 
the entire complex by about 1970.
    C. When it is finished, Moscow will be protected by about 
100 solid-fuel missiles that can reach out several hundred 
miles and explode a nuclear warhead above the atmosphere.
          1. We think the system would have a good capability 
        against a limited number of existing missiles, but it 
        doesn't have what it takes to cope with a major attack, 
        or with the penetration aids that incoming missiles 
        will have in the future.
          2. The intelligence community is agreed on this 
        evaluation of the Moscow System.

                          EARLY WARNING RADARS

    D. The system starts with early warning radars in 
northwestern Russia that cover the avenues of approach for 
missiles coming from the continental United States. They can 
probably detect a missile as much as 1,600 miles away.
          1. These radars are now being calibrated, and should 
        be operational this year or early in 1968.
    E. Nearer Moscow, there is a big radar which acquires the 
incoming missile from the early warning facilities, tracks it, 
and probably assigns targets if there are a number of them 
coming in.
    F. Finally, at a dozen sites forming a ring about 50 miles 
from the center of Moscow, are the engagement radars, which aim 
the missiles on their nearby launchers and track them to the 
target.
    G. We have recently calculated that this system--including 
all of the radars but not the developing and testing--will have 
cost the Soviets the equivalent of about three billion U.S. 
dollars, from the start of construction through 1970.
    H. This system I have just described is unique to Moscow. 
You only have to think for a minute about what Moscow has meant 
in Russian history to realize that the Soviets will defend 
Moscow with any system that might help, regardless of cost, 
effectiveness, or feasibility.
    I. We have seen no indication that this system will be used 
anywhere else in the Soviet Union.

                           THE TALLINN SYSTEM

    Now, let us leave Moscow and look at the other defensive 
missile deployment.
    This one is being deployed extensively. We call it the 
Tallinn System after the city in Estonia where the first such 
complex was built.
    The Tallinn System is the object of controversy that I have 
just mentioned because so far there just isn't enough hard 
evidence to be positive of its purpose.
    A. CIA believes that this system is more likely to be a 
defense against high-flying, high-speed aircraft and other 
aerodynamic vehicles. This is the conclusion of the current 
estimate.
    B. The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile, with a secondary mission against aerodynamic 
vehicles. This is the view of DIA, the Army, and the Air Force.
    Senator Gore. Would you read that sentence again?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
    The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile with a secondary mission against aerodynamic 
vehicles.
    This is the view of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army 
Intelligence, and, Air Force Intelligence.
    C. Both views rely on inferences drawn from deployment 
patterns, the nature of associated radars, Soviet requirements, 
and, other similar factors.
          1. Neither side can line up enough evidence to 
        disprove the other view.
    II. So far we have evidence of 26 complexes for the Tallinn 
System. Some of them form a forward defense against the 
northwestern Soviet Union, while others are situated for local 
defense of specific targets.
    We think that more than 20 of these complexes can be 
operational this year. At the present pace of deployment, the 
Soviet Union would have about 75 of them by 1972--I say could 
have.
    A. Most of the complexes have three sites, with six 
launchers at each site. The 26 complexes now under construction 
will apparently have a total of about 550 launchers.
    B. On the basis of the evidence at hand we believe the 
Tallinn System missile will probably reach to a ceiling of 
about 100,000 feet, with a slant range of as much as 100 
nautical miles.
    It could engage manned aircraft flying at three-and-a-half 
times the speed of sound.
    Further, some of the Tallinn System locations do not have 
the early warning and long range radar coverage that an 
effective antiballistic missile system would have to have.

              REST OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PICTURE

    III. The rest of the Soviet strategic defense picture is 
relatively static.
    A. New jet fighter aircraft which are now becoming 
operational will give the Soviet Union improved all-weather 
capability, and greater interceptor range.
    B. There are about 1,000 sites in the Soviet Union for the 
SA-2 surface-to-air missile system. Performance in North 
Vietnam has not been particularly impressive--more than 1,500 
missiles have been fired to bring down a maximum of 44 manned, 
American aircraft. The SA-2 has an inherent blind spot against 
aircraft operating below 1,000 feet.
    C. The SA-3 system is supposed to be more effective at low 
altitudes, but the Soviets have deployed it to only about 110 
sites in the Soviet Union. This suggests that it has not come 
up to expectations.
    General Purpose Forces:
    About two thirds of Soviet military manpower--some 2 
million men--are in what we call general purpose forces: the 
ground forces, tactical air, and tactical navy.
    A. The number of divisions has remained fairly constant. 
There are 109 divisions almost completely equipped and ready 
for early commitment to battle.
          1. Their manning ranges from about 60 percent of 
        wartime levels in the Soviet interior, to 90 percent in 
        Eastern Europe
          2. Another 32 cadre divisions have only about 20 
        percent of full strength.
    B. The Soviets are gradually but steadily improving the 
ground forces weapons.
    C. They are also making a start in developing strike forces 
which they could use for action at distant points--a Soviet 
shortcoming until now.
          1. Airlift is being improved, a marine corps has been 
        created, and there has been an increase in airborne and 
        amphibious maneuvers.
    D. The Soviets continue to help the modernization and 
improvement of the East European satellite forces. The East 
Europeans can now contribute about one million men in 42 
divisions for Warsaw Pact needs.

                         SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING

    I. [deleted]
    A. The Soviets have run their underground test program at a 
leisurely pace--slightly over one shot a month over the past 
two years. [deleted]
    C. In early 1965, the Soviets conducted the first test in a 
program to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.
          1. This test, the most spectacular of the series, was 
        a [deleted] explosion which dammed the Shagan River 
        near the Semipalatinsk test site.
    D. [Deleted.]
    E. There were underground shots at Ufa, just west of the 
Urals, in 1965, and at Azgir, north of the Caspian, in 1966, 
which probably tested a technique for stimulating the flow from 
oil and gas deposits.
    II. [Deleted.]
    Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, is it orderly to ask a 
question?
    Senator Gore. Yes, sir.
    Senator Dodd. Should we wait until the end?
    Senator Gore. I believe it might be better to wait until 
the end.
    Senator Dodd. I did not want to make notes because then I 
will forget.
    Senator Gore. I think it might be well to make notes with 
the understanding of the staff that the notes will be destroyed 
after the briefing.
    Proceed.

                     PROBLEMS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

    Mr. Helms. The Soviet Economy.
    I. The Soviet economy continues to have problems, notably 
with the allocation of critical resources. Over the next few 
years we do not expect that the growth of the Soviet GNP will 
match the performance of the 1950's.
    A. The Soviet GNP and total Soviet industrial production 
are each a little less than half of ours,
    B. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union virtually matches our 
defense effort, mainly because the Soviet consumer is way down 
in the pecking order when it comes to allocating output.
    C. Military and space spending remained fairly constant 
between 1962 and 1965, but we estimate that outlays in 1966 
were up about 7 percent.
          1. The state budget for 1967 includes an admitted 
        increase of 1.1 billion rubles for defense, and hidden 
        allocations elsewhere in the budget may make the actual 
        increase considerably larger.
    D. For our purposes today, let me just say that we conclude 
that the Soviet economy will come up with whatever expenditures 
are considered desirable for defense, no matter what the 
condition of the rest of the economy.

                             SOVIET POLICY

    I. In the Kremlin today, the General Secretary of the 
Party, Leonid Brezhnev, seems to have the most important voice 
in making key assignments, and he is getting more and more of 
the spotlight.
    A. The Soviet leadership, however, was brought into power 
in reaction to Khrushchev's erratic personal leadership, and it 
is still functioning by and large as a collective government.
    B. That means that it is a relatively cautious government, 
not given to radical departures from established policies and 
procedures.
    C. The present leadership stands better with the military, 
as far as we can judge, and this is largely because it has 
dropped Khrushchev's attempts to cut back on military spending.
    II. Domestic pre-occupation centers on the economy. It has 
been so hard to reach decisions on resource allocations that 
the Soviets are in the second year of their present Five-Year 
Plan, and the plan itself has not received final approval yet.

                       SOVIET DISPUTE WITH CHINA

    III. In foreign affairs, the overriding concern right now 
is the dispute with Communist China.
    A. Tension between Moscow and Peking has intensified 
markedly in recent months, as you all have seen in the 
newspapers. The Soviets feel they have gotten the upper hand in 
the world Communist movement, and they are beginning to behave 
somewhat more boldly.
          1. For instance, they are again trying to convoke an 
        international meeting to condemn the Chinese.
          2. The Soviets have exploited Peking's rejection of 
        appeals for united Communist action in support of North 
        Vietnam.
          3. Peking's retort has been that Moscow is secretly 
        conspiring with the United States against the Asian 
        Communists.
          4. Moscow, to avoid giving any substance to the 
        Chinese charges, has been taking the line publicly that 
        there can be little advance in U.S.-Soviet relations 
        until the Vietnam conflict is settled.
    B. The Kremlin has made it clear in private, however, that 
the Soviet Union wants to keep lines of communication with 
Washington open, despite the strains and constraints imposed by 
the Vietnamese fighting and sensitivity to charges of Soviet-
U.S. collusion.
          1. If it were not for Vietnam, the Soviet leaders 
        would probably prefer to resume the dialogue with 
        Washington on matters which are of greater concern to 
        Soviet national interests, such as European security, 
        arms control, and East-West trade.
          2. The agreements recently reached on civil air 
        routes and the peaceful use of outer space showed that 
        limited cooperation is still possible.
    Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks on the Soviet 
weapons systems, on their economy and political approach, and I 
would now go over to China.

                  CHINESE COMMUNISTS' NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    I would first like to talk about Chinese Communist advanced 
weapons.
    I. The Chinese Communists are making a concerted effort--on 
their own and with overriding priorities--to develop modern 
weapons for strategic attack. They are devoting increasing 
resources to missiles and nuclear weapons.
    A. [Deleted.]
    B. We estimate that they could begin to deploy a medium-
range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead this year, and 
their first crude ICBM's in the early 1970s.
    II. [Deleted.]
    C. The tests indicate that the Chinese can manufacture 
nuclear bombs which can be carried by their medium bombers--
about a dozen old TU-4 BULLS similar to our B-29, and two TU-16 
BADGER jet bombers.
          1. [Deleted.]
          2. Their likely immediate goals, however, are 
        probably warheads for short- and medium-range missiles, 
        and possibly a weapon for the IL-28 BEAGLE light jet 
        bomber. The Chinese have about 250 of these aircraft, 
        which have a better chance of reaching a defended 
        target than the BULLS.
    D. In the present state of Chinese technology, any weapons 
they might make now would be crude and inefficient by our 
standards. By Far Eastern standards, however, they are a 
significant addition to Chinese military prestige.

                      CHINESE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

    III. The Chinese probably started their missile development 
by test-firing Soviet MRBM's given them before the Sino-Soviet 
split in 1960.
    A. They may have begun testing their own native versions as 
early as 1963.
    B. Now they are apparently working on several surface-to-
surface missile programs.
          1. The pace of activity at Shuang-cheng-tzu has 
        increased sharply since the fall of 1965. They 
        apparently are conducting more MRBM firings, and they 
        recently built a new launch complex, possibly for 
        training troops in the launching procedures.
    C. During the past year they have also built a very large 
launch complex, which we call Complex B. The reports we have on 
the size of the facilities indicate that this complex is for a 
large missile, probably an ICBM. This missile could also be 
used as a space booster.
          1. Complex B probably will be ready for firings by 
        the latter part of 1967, but we have no evidence that 
        the Chinese have any ICBM components so far. Therefore, 
        we cannot say whether an ICBM vehicle will be ready for 
        test flights that soon.
          2. If the Chinese inaugurate a reasonably successful 
        flight test program, within the next year or so, they 
        probably could have a few ICBMs deployed by the early 
        1970s.
          3. These probably would be inferior in reliability 
        and accuracy by U.S. standards, and also by Soviet 
        standards, but they could--in Chinese eyes--constitute 
        a limited inter-continental deterrent.
    D. The Chinese Communists have built one copy of the Soviet 
G-class submarine. In the Soviet fleet, this class is armed 
with three ballistic missiles 350-mile range. We have to assume 
that the Chinese are working on a missile to fit the submarine.

                      CHINESE CONVENTIONAL FORCES

    I would like now to turn to Chinese conventional military 
forces.
    I. Despite Chinese progress in advanced weapons, the 
military power of Communist China for some years to come will 
derive primarily from the numerical strength of its enormous 
ground forces--about 2,300,000 men--and great reserves of 
manpower.
    II. There are more than 100 infantry divisions and about a 
dozen armor and artillery divisions in the Chinese Communist 
Army, concentrated in the heavily populated regions of eastern 
China.
    A. The Chinese Army has the capability to overrun any of 
its mainland neighbors in short order, provided it does not run 
into significant opposition from a major power.
          1. It has demonstrated its ability to move and fight 
        with primitive transportation and rudimentary logistic 
        support.
          2. If it should come to all-out war, however, the 
        Chinese will be badly hampered by shortages of armor, 
        heavy ordnance, mechanized transport, and fuel.
    III. The Chinese Air Force and Navy are oriented primarily 
toward defensive missions.
    A. The bomber force at present consists of 250 jet light 
bombers, which I mentioned a few moments ago as BEAGLES. We 
believe the Chinese will start producing BADGER jet mediums 
about 1968.
    B. The bulk of the jet fighters consist of about 1,900 MIG-
15s and MIG-17s, obtained 10 or more years ago.
          1. Over the past two years, the Chinese have begun 
        assembling supersonic MIG-19s in an aircraft plant at 
        Shen-yang, known better as Mukden, in Manchuria which 
        was provided by the Soviets before 1960. The Chinese 
        inventory of MIG-19s has risen from 150 to about 350, 
        and they have been able to supply another 50 to 
        Pakistan in 1966.
          2. The Chinese have about 35 of the Mach-two, delta-
        wing MIG-21s, supplied by the Soviet Union in the early 
        1960s.
    IV. Peking's Navy is the weakest element of the Chinese 
armed forces.
    A. It has the world's fourth largest undersea fleet, with 
34 submarines, most of them medium-range torpedo attack boats. 
They have no experience in extended operations, however, and 
most of their training appears to take place within 20 miles of 
the coast.
    B. The Chinese are building submarines, destroyer escorts, 
and guided-missile patrol boats. They have four obsolete 
destroyers, six new DEs, and 11 patrol boats.

                    POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

    I would like now to turn to Chinese political developments.
    I. Communist China is being racked by the greatest 
political convulsions since Mao Tse-tung took control in 1949.
    A. Mao, at 73, is aging, sick, and more and more 
inflexible.
          1. He is clearly concerned that his Communist Party 
        is losing the revolutionary zeal of its early days, and 
        cannot be relied on to keep China on the right track 
        after he is gone.
          2. The teenaged millions of the Red Guard are 
        supposed to rekindle that zeal with their youthful and 
        unbridled enthusiasm.
          3. When Mao reappeared last summer after a protracted 
        absence from public view, he passed over the men who 
        had been the heads of the party hierarchy and named 
        Defense Minister Lin Piao as Number Two Man--in effect, 
        Mao's designated successor.
    B. To Mao Tse-tung, the cultural revolution is probably 
primarily a drive to reshape the Communist Party, or replace it 
with a more reliable, more fanatical, and younger version.
    C. But for the men who aspire to succeed Mao, it has become 
a naked struggle for power and for survival.
    II. It is difficult to determine from day to day where the 
cultural revolution stands, who is on which side, or who is 
going to come out on top. The struggle seems to have entered a 
critical phase in January.
    A. The most dramatic development has been Mao's call for 
the Red Army to back up the Red Guards and eliminate resistance 
to the cultural revolution.
          1. We had been speculating when the resistance first 
        developed that the army would have been called in even 
        earlier if there had been no doubts about its 
        reliability.
          2. Now there is evidence that the armed forces are 
        considerably less than monolithic in their loyalty to 
        Mao and Lin.
    III. When and how will the turmoil in Peking finally be 
resolved?
    A. We have no idea. The opposing forces, judging by the 
protracted struggle, must be quite evenly matched. If the clash 
between workers and Red Guards spread--particularly if the 
army's loyalties are divided--then we may soon see something 
for which there is no other term but Civil War.
          1. Some days, it looks as though the opposing 
        elements are digging in for a long winter of political 
        trench warfare.
          2. The next day, a war of movement and a showdown 
        appears imminent.
          3. I would say it is still too early to speculate 
        usefully on the outcome.
    B. There are two points, however, which we can make.
          1. First, as long as China's leaders are pre-occupied 
        with this internal wrangling, they will find it 
        difficult to reach agreement on any new policy lines. 
        So, we do not expect any radical departures from 
        existing policies.
          2. Second, whoever wins, we can see no reason for 
        suspecting that there will be any dilution of Peking's 
        implacable hostility to the United States.

                            CHINA'S ECONOMY

    I would like to now turn to the Chinese economy.
    A. China has regained only part of the ground lost when the 
Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1960 and Soviet aid was 
withdrawn.
          1. Prospects to regain the momentum of the 1950's 
        appear remote, even without the disruption of the 
        ``cultural revolution.''
          2. The longer the political upheaval lasts, the 
        greater the likelihood of severe damage to the economy.
          3. There have already been extensive strikes, 
        shutdowns, and disruption of transportation.
    B. It has taken an overriding priority on defense to permit 
the progress China has made in advanced weapons.
          1. One of the ministries hard hit by the waves of 
        political purges and poster denunciations has been a 
        ministry directly related to the missile effort.
    C. Stagnation in agriculture remains the chief obstacle to 
a resumption of adequate economic growth.
          1. Peking claims a record harvest in 1966, but actual 
        grain production was somewhat lower in 1966 than in 
        1955.
          2. It was not much above the level of 10 years ago, 
        when there were almost 150 million fewer people to 
        feed.
          3. There were localized ration cuts, and it was only 
        thanks to grain imports that the average ration could 
        be kept above the lean levels of the poor year of 1960.
          4. China imported more than 5 million tons of grain 
        from the Free World in 1966, and will probably have to 
        import substantially more this year.
    I now would like to turn, Mr. Chairman, to the subject of 
nuclear proliferation.
    [Deleted.]

                INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    II. The Indian attitude toward development of nuclear 
weapons has been complicated by Peking's nuclear capability.
    A. Prime Minister Gandhi has maintained the government's 
``no bomb'' nuclear policy despite criticisms in Parliament.
          1. Both the Prime Minister and the new Chairman of 
        the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Sarabhai, have 
        stated that India's present economic and industrial 
        position does not permit launching a nuclear weapons 
        project, particularly from the viewpoint of developing 
        delivery systems.
    B. [Deleted.]
          1. An agreement with Canada, however, stipulates that 
        plutonium produced in the one reactor now operational 
        will be used only for peaceful purposes.
          2. Two other reactors which will be operational in 
        1969 and 1970 are covered by safeguards.
    Other Countries:

                           ISOTOPE SEPARATION

    III. I would like to end the discussion of proliferation 
with a brief mention of isotope separation.
    A. [Deleted.]
    B. U.S. experience has shown that for the production of 
moderate quantities of uranium-235, the centrifuge process is 
economically attractive in comparison with the gaseous 
diffusion process.
    C. [Deleted.]
    D. We believe however, that none of the countries working 
on the process has yet developed a centrifuge to the point 
where an economical plant of production size could be built.

                    CHINA'S SUPPORT OF NORTH VIETNAM

    Mr. Chairman, I have, or I am prepared, to discuss two 
other matters, if you choose, these having to do with the 
Chinese contribution to North Vietnam and the possibility of 
Chinese intervention in North Vietnam, It is not strictly the 
topic that we have agreed that I would discuss, but if you had 
any interest in this, I would be glad to cover it.
    Senator Gore. What is the pleasure of the committee?
    I would like to hear it. Yes, we would.
    Mr. Helms. We estimate that there are 26,000 to 48,000 
Chinese Communist military personnel in North Vietnam.
    Senator Gore. What is the figure?
    Mr. Helms. 26,000 to 48,000. There is a wide spread there 
because we have no way of actually counting the number of 
individual Chinese. We simply know the units that are there and 
what the units are for, and these units are of a kind that do 
not have a very specific table of organization and personnel. 
They can be larger or smaller, depending on how you want to use 
them. And we have been trying to narrow this figure, but the 
only thing we can say now is that the range is between 26,000 
and 48,000.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in 
context?
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Senator Symington. Are they, Mr. Helms, logistic or combat 
troops or both?
    Mr. Helms. No, sir. This is what I wanted to cover, Senator 
Symington.
    Senator Symington. I am sorry.
    Mr. Helms. Thank you.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    Mr. Helms. As far as we can determine, there are no ground 
combat formations.
    B. Evidence shows that there are two antiaircraft artillery 
divisions and possibly elements of two more, manning the 85-
millimeter and 100-millimeter guns defending some of the key 
targets.

                           LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

    C. The rest of the Chinese personnel are mainly railway, 
engineer, and logistic units, building airfields, bridges, and 
the like, laying track, and keeping the supplies moving. In 
other words, there are no combat personnel, I repeat.
    Senator Gore. You would not regard the manning of anti-
aircraft guns as combat?
    Mr. Helms. Well, not in the sense that it is used in the 
military technology.
    Senator Gore. I understand.
    Mr. Helms. In other words, these are not fellows manning 
guns shooting at other soldiers.They are fellows manning anti-
aircraft guns.
    Senator Gore. Shooting Americans down.
    Mr. Helms. That is the idea, but they are not combat forces 
in the way the military uses the terms.

                EFFECTIVENESS OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

    Senator Aiken. Our witness stated yesterday, that what he 
could learn from the time he was there, Russian SAM's are 
comparatively ineffective, and most of our planes are brought 
down by conventional weapons.
    Mr. Helms. That is correct.
    Senator Aiken. If that is correct, I have to reverse my 
opinion.
    Mr. Helms. The reason for this, Senator Aiken, if I may 
take just a moment, is that by having a mix of surface-to-air 
missiles and antiaircraft guns, the surface-to-air missiles are 
quite effective at certain altitudes. Therefore, our planes, to 
avoid them, go in on the deck, and in that way they just run 
into the antiaircraft fire. And there is enough of it so there 
is just no way of missing it, and this is why so many have been 
brought down by AA rather than surface-to-air missiles.
    Senator Aiken. But you do not think I am too far wrong in 
not crediting the Russians for their firing.
    Mr. Helms. I do not.
    Senator Gore. It is for the purpose of avoiding the SAM 
fire that they come in on the deck, so to speak.
    Mr. Helms. That is right. So, I think the question comes 
down as to who is manning the antiaircraft guns, and they are 
being manned by a variety of personnel.

             POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

    Now, may I discuss just a moment our beliefs about the 
possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam.
    VI. We believe that there are three situations in which 
Peking would feel obliged to intervene in force in the 
Vietnamese fighting.
    A. One of these would arise from U.S. air strikes against 
targets in China. In May 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi 
asked the British Charge in Peking to pass along a warning to 
this effect.
    B. The second circumstance which would trigger Chinese 
intervention would be a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam. 
Chinese leaders passed this word to a visiting delegation from 
Ghana, shortly before Chen Yi talked with the British.
    C. In addition, if the collapse of the Hanoi Government 
should seem imminent, China might probably move into North 
Vietnam to ``restore order.''
    VII. It is always dangerous to assume that the Chinese are 
going to be guided by rational decisions, but we believe that 
Peking is bound to feel that the domestic political turmoil and 
the intensification of the dispute with Moscow leaves China 
less ready than it might otherwise be to engage in direct 
hostilities with the United States.
    A. Another factor which would contribute to increased 
Chinese caution would be a growing belief in Peking that the 
United States is determined to persevere, over the short run at 
least, in the Vietnamese war.

                THRESHOLD OF SENSITIVITY HAS BEEN RAISED

    B. We think, therefore, that the threshold of sensitivity--
the level at which Peking would feel forced to fight--has 
probably been raised a degree or two.
          1. For example, a shallow incursion by U.S. troops 
        into the Demilitarized Zone between North and South 
        Vietnam might be less likely today to trigger a Chinese 
        reaction than it would have in 1965.
    C. Chinese statements concerning the ``inevitability'' of 
war with the U.S. now appear only infrequently.
          1. Peking has made no mention of ``volunteers'' for 
        Vietnam since the fall of 1965, except for brief 
        flurries last summer and again in December, after 
        bombings in the area of Hanoi and Haiphong.
          2. Peking has always said that the Vietnamese must 
        bear the primary responsibility for fighting; in recent 
        months this theme has been given additional emphasis.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Thank you very much, Mr. Helms.

             SOVIET ADVANTAGES IN ANTI-MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

    Beginning where you began, with a few questions, will you 
or your assistant give us an estimate of the lead or advantage 
which the Soviets may have over the United States in the 
development and deployment of anti-missile missiles at this 
time? I would want to know the extent of the tests of anti-
ballistic missiles which they conducted before entering the 
test treaty, concluding the test treaty, and also if you think 
their underground tests, particularly the last ones, had some 
bearing upon anti-ballistic missiles.
    Now, this is a big question. Divide it into about three 
parts.
    Mr. Helms. I understand and I would like very much to have 
Mr. Duckett answer it.
    But, before I do, sir, may I explain one thing. We in the 
Agency are not competent to talk about the United States 
forces. In the first place, we have never kept track in the 
Agency of what the United States has in its arsenal. We have 
not made what are referred to as net estimates--in other words, 
a comparison of where the Soviets stand and where the United 
States stands in various weaponry, for the very simple reason 
that our charter is to take care of countries outside of the 
United States and not to involve ourselves in these comparisons 
in the United States.
    That is for the Department of Defense or the State 
Department or for somebody else to do, so I would like us, if 
we may, to confine our remarks to the Soviet systems rather 
than the U.S. systems.
    Senator Gore. I agree.
    Mr. Duckett. Sir, if I could discuss the Soviet anti-
ballistic missile capability in two contexts.
    First, the development or the technical capability of the 
system; and secondly, its development status, because both are 
pertinent and are different.
    From a developmental standpoint, the test program has been 
a long one, starting certainly by 1960.

                        VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK

    The components which we can now identify in that system we 
described as around Moscow, are components which we feel limit 
the system in two key ways: One, it appears there will be a 
rather limited number of interceptor missiles involved, at 
least in this initial deployment, and that means by definition, 
therefore, only a limited number of targets can be attacked.
    So this would make it vulnerable, if you will, to what you 
would call a saturation attack.
    Secondly, we believe that the kinds of radars we see are 
the types which cannot contain much of the sophistication which 
the United States has felt would be desirable to handle a 
complex type of attack, and by complex here I mean an attack 
including decoys, penetration aids, and other devices to make 
the radar have a difficult time separating out the actual bomb.
    We do not believe the system has any appreciable capability 
to handle that type of attack.
    Senator Gore. You mean when you refer to separation out of 
the actual bomb, the incoming missile being fired at Russia?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir, that is correct.
    In other words, if there are in that attack, not only 
bombs, but also various penetration devices to attempt to hide, 
if you would, or to prevent the radar determining which is the 
real bomb, we think this system would have difficulty handling 
that type of attack.
    So, those are the limitations. The limitation with regard 
to number of interceptors, and its apparent lack of ability to 
handle what we would call a sophisticated attack.

                    DEPLOYMENT OF THE MOSCOW SYSTEM

    Now, as to deployment status, it is difficult to pick 
particular dates here and the reason is that the deployment of 
the Moscow System has not gone at a steady pace. As best we can 
determine, and for reasons we cannot determine, possibly 
technical, the deployment has not started and proceeded at a 
steady rate from the beginning. Rather, there have been periods 
when there was relative inactivity around these installations 
suggesting that there was some modification or change taking 
place.
    You see, therefore, sir, until we know that one of these 
sites is totally operational, we cannot say that there will not 
be other delays or changes in the pace of construction.
    We do recognize, however, that at least the first of these 
Moscow installations will probably be ready, if there is no 
further disruption, by sometime during the latter part of the 
year.

                     HOW AN ABM DEFENSE WOULD WORK

    Senator Gore. Now, just here. Senator Aiken and I have some 
small advantage over other members of the committee in that we 
have heard the technicians in the Atomic Energy Commission 
describe the manner of operation of an anti-ballistic missile 
missile defense.
    Would you, for the benefit of the committee, describe 
theoretically how this system will operate? First, I think you 
would perhaps agree that this system was tested by the Soviets 
in perhaps 1961.
    Mr. Duckett. Yes.
    Senator Pell. Also, how classified is this?
    Mr. Helms. As far as the classification is concerned, 
Senator Pell, what we are talking about now has about the 
highest classification we have.
    Senator Pell. Thank you. I was wondering if some of these 
theories have been in the press.
    Mr. Helms. But when we are talking about this anti-
ballistic missile system, it involves all the collection 
devices at the disposition of the United States Government and 
some of these we are trying very hard, at least as to their 
quality, to keep as secret as we possibly can, so nothing can 
be more highly classified than what we are talking about now.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    Mr. Duckett. Sir, I think if I may, I could best treat the 
question of how the systems work by giving a very brief 
description and then being most happy to amplify on any part of 
that that I could.
    May I again remind the chairman that I am referring to the 
Moscow System only in this conversation.
    That system we are certain employs a very large, long-range 
type of missile. Although we cannot give precise numbers as to 
range and altitude, we do believe its range and altitude both 
are measured in hundreds of miles, and that would say that one 
of the characteristics of this system would be that it would 
intercept the incoming missiles well outside of the atmosphere.

                      THE MEANING OF INTERCEPTION

    Senator Gore. When you use the word ``intercept'' many 
people have an idea that they are going to have a head-on 
collision. You don't mean that at all?
    Mr. Duckett. No, sir. Obviously, the question of the 
relative closeness that is required for killing the incoming 
missile is a function of the type of kill mechanism which this 
missile will employ, and my honest answer is we do not know the 
precise kill mechanism and thus cannot describe precisely how 
close an intercept would be required for a kill.

                            KILL MECHANISMS

    Senator Gore. Well, what are the possible kill mechanisms?
    Mr. Duckett. The possible kill mechanisms which we have 
studied are what I would call normal nuclear effects, meaning 
gamma rays and other forms of radiation. X-rays have caused 
more concern, I believe, because X-ray effects are far more 
pronounced outside of the atmosphere.
    Senator Gore. In terms of distance, say their radar detects 
an incoming missile, and they wish to fire an interceptor 
missile, and it explodes in the projected trajectory of the 
incoming missile. By use of gamma and ordinary nucleonic rays, 
what would be the range of destruction?
    Mr. Duckett. Sir, I will say in all honesty I don't believe 
that we in the United States know from our own measurement 
programs a very precise answer to that question.
    I think there is a considerable uncertainty based on the 
advice we could get from the experts, but certainly if one is 
talking about the gamma radiations, the kind of numbers that we 
are advised by our experts are, in fact, measured in ones, or 
at most, tens of kilometers for any of these effects. In other 
words, a fairly close intercept is required for these types of 
mechanisms.

                      DEFENSE AGAINST THE POLARIS

    Senator Aiken. I was going to ask whether you would 
estimate that the defense against the ICBM was more effective 
than the defense against the Polaris.
    Mr. Duckett. I see.
    Senator Aiken. I think that is important. I have had a 
feeling that the Polaris can hit them if they get too bold.
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir, I believe I can answer, Senator, in 
this way: The radar systems which I have referred to, that are 
part of this Moscow System, and also the radars which are 
situated to the north of Moscow, are not situated in such a way 
that they could cover more than a small part of what we would 
call the Polaris threat zone. That is, there are no radars 
which we have identified which are pointed, for example, 
towards the Mediterranean or towards Spain, and thus if Polaris 
were fired from that area today, we do not have identified, at 
least, any Soviet radar which would be likely to detect them.
    Thus, I would have to say that our best evidence today is 
that the Moscow system is deployed primarily, if not entirely, 
towards the ICBM threat.
    Senator Aiken. And the Polaris is possibly our major 
deterrent to avoid a war?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. We do not see what we would identify 
as a capability against Polaris.
    Senator Aiken. Yes.

                      DEFENSIVE AREA AROUND MOSCOW

    Senator Gore. Well, proceeding with the possible mechanism, 
do I deduce from what you say that if the defending missiles' 
detonation depends upon gamma, and for want of a better word 
orthodox nucleonic rays, you would have a defense area ranging 
from a four to a hundred square mile area?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, sir, if you are 
referring to the entire area around Moscow defended--I am not 
sure that I understand.
    Senator Gore. Now, here is the detonation----
    Mr. Duckett. Around any detonation.
    Senator Gore [continuing]. Of the anti-missile missile in 
the calculated trajectory of an incoming missile.
    Mr. Duckett. I understand.
    Senator Gore. How large an area is created by a ball of 
fire, a ball of rays? Would this be, you say, a mile if you go 
a mile in all directions----
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Or if it is 10 miles in all directions?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, again here I would re-emphasize 
that I don't believe that we have agreed figures even in the 
United States on these kinds of questions. But I know of no one 
who believes that what I think we are both agreeing we could 
refer to as conventional radiation, would be likely to afford a 
kill of an incoming weapon for any distance greater than, say, 
one mile. And that would be a one-mile sphere, actually, one 
mile in any direction.
    Senator Gore. A sphere two miles in diameter?
    Mr. Duckett. Two miles in diameter, correct, sir.
    Senator Gore. All right.

                      EFFECT OF X-RAYS ON WEAPONS

    Now, if they depend upon X-rays, what would be the area?
    Mr. Duckett. All right, sir.
    I think, again, Mr. Chairman, this is an even more 
controversial figure, and may I say that certainly I am well 
aware we feel that it is an important thing to be aware of, 
that there are figures by various U.S. scientists that extend 
out to hundreds, to literally thousands of miles with various 
theories of how X-rays might affect a weapon.
    So, we simply do not have from the advice we have been able 
to acquire any number which I can quote to you as a figure 
representing X-ray effects.
    I would add, therefore, that we do not believe today that 
we have any mechanism available to use that allows us to state 
with any certainty what kill distance the Soviets might achieve 
with X-rays.
    I believe it is accepted, however, by most U.S. scientists 
that this would be, in fact, a distance measured in tens and 
possibly even out to a hundred miles or more, and it is 
certainly a far greater distance than the conventional kill 
technique.
    Senator Sparkman. You mean in diameter or radius?
    Mr. Duckett. Senator Sparkman, I am referring here to the 
actual distance from the burst to the actual warhead.
    Senator Sparkman. Oh, yes.
    Mr. Duckett. And that distance, as I am saying, and in some 
people's minds, is tens of miles and in others it is in 
hundreds of miles, and we don't know the answer.
    Senator Gore. So, within the order of estimates, you would 
have a ball of X-rays with estimates of its extent ranging from 
a ball of X-rays with a radius of 20 miles up to a radius of 
two to three hundred miles?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Of course, if this were perfected, why then, 
the defense is calculated to come within the proximity of an 
incoming missile much more readily.
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.

                          SOVIET MISSILE TESTS

    Senator Gore. Now, I don't want to ask too many questions 
myself, but I think a very crucial question here is whether or 
not the Soviets tested X-rays or gamma rays in their tests in 
1961. They did, as I understand it, fire a missile through the 
ball of rays with radar observation.
    Can you give us a description of that?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, there were tests conducted in 
the fall of 1961 and again in the fall of 1962 which did 
involve nuclear explosions in the area where the developmental 
work on the antiballistic missile program has been conducted. 
Those tests involved a series of bursts. However, our best 
information is that all of the nuclear bursts were, in fact, on 
the missile that was fired into the area rather than bursts 
that were on the interceptor missile coming out of the 
antiballistic missile combination. So, I would like to express 
first that we have no knowledge of any tests where, in fact, an 
interceptor missile carrying a nuclear warhead has been 
conducted by the Soviets.
    However, in these tests, it is true that in addition to the 
missile which was on the actual warhead, which did burst, it 
was followed in some cases by one additional missile and in 
other cases by two additional missiles, which were simply 
following along the same trajectory so as to pass through, if 
you will, the area where the detonation had occurred.
    [Deleted.] We believe that the most likely reason for these 
tests was to determine the effect of this nuclear explosion on 
the radar equipment on the ground.
    I base that on----

                      TESTING THE BLACKOUT EFFECT

    Senator Gore. In other words, the test may have been 
testing the blackout effect?
    Mr. Duckett. Precisely.
    Senator Gore. Interference with communications?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I refer specifically to the 
testing to determine if, in fact, the radar on the ground could 
see through the nuclear cloud and pick up an incoming missile 
through that cloud.
    I stress here, however, that whereas we state we believe 
this is the most likely purpose of these tests, we certainly 
much accept that depending on how extensively they monitored 
and measured these tests, it is certainly possible effects data 
could have been acquired even though this would not have been 
the primary purpose.
    [Deleted.]

                  U.S. NEWS ARTICLE ON SOVIET TESTING

    Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, may I point out for just a moment, 
that in the February 6 issue of U.S. News and World Report, 
there is an article on this subject which starts on page 36 and 
runs across the top of the page and which is rather a scary 
article. We have examined this very carefully and can find no 
evidence that anyone has in support of this article which says 
the Soviet know about the X-ray effects, and they were testing 
it and so forth. We have analyzed it very carefully and we 
believe what Mr. Duckett has just told you and not what appears 
in this article and other publications.
    Senator Gore. I certainly don't want to over-step my time. 
I suggest that we first conclude our questions with respect to 
the Soviets and take them up topic by topic as Mr. Helms 
presented them.
    Senator Sparkman?
    Senator Sparkman. No questions right now.
    Senator Gore. Senator Symington?
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                  NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

    Mr. Helms, I want to ask one question. I was rather shocked 
to see the size and caliber of the United Arab Republic Air 
Force, the number of first-class MIGs they had, et cetera.
    I was also surprised to see their relatively heavy 
development in submarines, especially because of their getting 
closer to the Communists and, therefore, the availability to 
their submarine developments, two Russian submarines, et 
cetera.
    With that premise, it looks to me as if there could be some 
trouble there. [Deleted.]
    As far as the aircraft are concerned, they figure they can 
stand off what the Egyptians have now and also on the ground.

              KEEPING INDIA FROM BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    Senator Symington. There is only one other question that 
interests me. And I am very interested in these hearings that 
Senator Gore is conducting because if you do not put the cork 
in this proliferation, I think we are going to blow ourselves 
up in due course.
    When we continue to feed those cows in India, do we have 
any specifications about what they should or should not do in 
nuclear fashion? Do we discuss it with them? Do you know of any 
discussion in your agency or in the State Department about it, 
letting us know what they are doing if we continue to feed them 
and their cattle. I say that in a somewhat snide manner, but I 
see 2 million more tons going out today and so forth.
    Mr. Helms. Well, sir, this is probably not my proper field, 
but I do sit in meetings in the executive branch. And you do 
know that the Administration is very conscious of this problem 
[Deleted.] and doing everything they can to keep track of any 
activity in this field, and I think we are pretty well 
informed, Senator Symington.
    Senator Symington. When do you think they will have some 
nuclear weapons that they could deliver on their friends, the 
Pakistanis, or the Chinese?
    Mr. Helms. I do not think they have started to build them.
    Senator Symington. Yes.

                            U.S. ABM SYSTEM

    One more question, which if you do not want to answer, I 
would be regretful, but understanding, perhaps--there is quite 
a discussion going on now in a good many different places among 
a good many different experts about whether we should build an 
antiballistic ballistic missile or whether we should proceed on 
it. Based on your knowledge of what you have been testifying 
about, would you think we should go ahead now or do you think 
we should wait until these discussions are over, which is the 
position of Dr. Foster, or do you think we should not go ahead 
or do you think it is beyond your province? There are four of 
them.
    Mr. Helms. Senator, I believe that is beyond my province. I 
beg your indulgence.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark.

                    COLLAPSE OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT

    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have to go. I wonder if I 
may ask this rather quick and rather innocuous question.
    I was interested in your giving the three conditions under 
which China might enter the Vietnam war.
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it was Harrison Salisbury 
yesterday, was it not, who gave three conditions. I noticed a 
little variation, but not very much. You said, or I believe he 
said, an attack on the Chinese territory, invasion of the 
north, or an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war. Were 
those not the three that he gave, as I recall?
    Senator Gore. Mr. Helms gave as the third one the imminent 
collapse of the Hanoi regime. Maybe, they were about the same 
thing.
    Senator Sparkman. I said there was very little difference. 
I just wondered whether you meant the same thing. I think he 
related it to an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war.
    Mr. Helms. Senator Sparkman, to me it is not the same 
thing.
    Senator Sparkman. Not the same thing.
    Mr. Helms. When we talk about the collapse of the Hanoi 
government, we mean it's going out of business, the collapse of 
order and government and all the rest of it in Hanoi. In other 
words, that they have had it, to use the vernacular. I do not 
think the Chinese would come in because Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh 
decided he wanted to alter the course of the war, change its 
character or stop it.
    Senator Sparkman. He said an effort to make Hanoi continue 
the war.

                      COLLAPSE OF MAO'S GOVERNMENT

    Talking about the collapse of the Hanoi government, is 
there any likelihood that Mao's government might collapse?
    Mr. Helms. We do not know, sir. There is always that 
possibility.
    Senator Sparkman. Thank you.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, Senator Clark said he 
would yield to one more question.

                 EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

    When I was out there a year ago, Mr. Helms, I talked to 
everybody in the windows, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, above all 
Hong Kong, Mr. Wells, et cetera. I could find nobody in the 
State Department or military or the Agency that felt any amount 
of bombing including civilian bombing of Hanoi would bring in 
the Red Chinese into North Vietnam and, therefore, I have been 
especially intrigued with all this--well, I will not use the 
word, because we are on the record, but about the dangers of 
the bombing.
    On the other hand, I found about half of the people who 
felt they would come in if we went into North Vietnam, and all 
the people felt they would come in if we went into North 
Vietnam with ground troops, around Haiphong or Hanoi, because 
that would show we were trying to take over a government, 
instead of taking over land.
    Is there any change in that position now as far as your 
Agency is concerned?
    Mr. Helms. No, sir. The way you gave this, I am not sure 
which was Agency position, and which was State, and which was 
Defense and so on.
    Senator Symington. I want to be sure. I do not want in any 
way to have a trap question. I found nobody, either in State or 
the military, who felt any amount of bombing or any amount of 
air attack would bring in the Chinese.
    Mr. Helms. That is our belief, unless it collapsed the 
Hanoi government.
    Senator Symington. Your last answer is the reason I asked 
the question.
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark.

                   U.S. WEAPONS COULD DESTROY MOSCOW

    Senator Clark. Mr. Helms, I have drawn a tentative 
conclusion from what you and Mr. Duckett have testified to, and 
I wonder if I am right, that despite the Moscow system the 
various United States weapons systems could today destroy 
Moscow.
    Mr. Helms. That is correct.
    Senator Clark. That is right.

                      CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY

    Now, you spoke of the Chinese conventional threat, and if 
they had a capability outside their borders to attack 
successfully their neighbors unless a military power, such as 
the United States, intervened. In your judgment, does the 
present political turmoil in China affect their external 
military capability, or is it likely to, if that turmoil 
continues?
    Mr. Helms. Senator Clark, until now we have not seen any 
evidence that it has affected their military capability. I 
think it has--it could. I do not think there is any doubt about 
it. I think the extent to which the army gets involved in 
domestic matters with the Red Guard and other things could very 
well affect their capacity to move in an assertive and an 
aggressive way. We rather have the impression that the Chinese 
are inward these days. That does not mean they are not manning 
their radars, flying their aircraft, marching their troops, and 
all the rest of it. They are. That goes on as it always has. 
But it could be affected over the long term by this increasing 
amount of disorder.
    Senator Clark. But do you think at the present time, and I 
am thinking more of logistics than I am of their firepower, do 
you think they have a logistical capability of moving 
successfully pretty far outside their own borders in the 
absence of resistance from a major military power?
    I was thinking about the Indians.
    Mr. Helms. I would not like to leave that impression, 
because the Chinese army has a very limited truck park, and 
when they extend their logistic lines as far as Tibet and over 
into the area where they would have to go down into India, they 
are stretched pretty thin, indeed. I think there is a very real 
question as to how far they could go in India and maintain 
their forces.
    Senator Clark. How about northeast Thailand?
    Mr. Helms. That is a different problem. They could walk 
down there rather than in India.

               CURTAILING INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM

    Senator Clark. Our friend, Mr. Joseph Alsop, from day to 
day expresses his views about the situation in the Vietnamese 
war. What can you tell us as to the accuracy of his recent 
views that the rate of infiltration from North to South Vietnam 
has been very seriously curtailed as a result of various steps 
which we have taken? And what can you also tell us as to the 
accuracy of his view that, I think it is his view, by 
implication at least, that we have so successfully curtailed 
that rate of infiltration that our enemies in Vietnam are going 
to have to rely from here on in primarily on Viet Cong 
guerrillas who, in turn, are becoming younger and younger and 
less and less effective, and they are running out of troops?
    Mr. Helms. Senator Clark. I want to answer your question as 
forthrightly as a man can answer it. So, let me step back just 
a minute and say that we in the administration have permitted a 
situation to develop in which the same sets of figures are used 
by different people in different ways by adding them up and 
subtracting from them and so forth to the point where there is 
such a confusion about infiltration rates that an honest man 
has a very hard time laying his hand on anything that makes 
very much sense.
    So, rather than answering Mr. Alsop's contention, I would 
like to answer your question this way: We believe that the 
North Vietnamese have the capability of infiltrating into the 
South the number of troops that they need, require, or think 
they need to maintain their forces there.
    Senator Clark. Just a couple of more questions.

                      ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    I am just as concerned as Senator Symington about the 
danger in the arms race in the Middle East. I, too, have just 
come back from there, although I did not go into the matter in 
nearly as great a depth as Senator Symington.
    I got the general impression based on conversations I had 
with politicians, and with one conversation I had with the 
Israeli chief of military intelligence, that the UAR does not 
presently want to go to war with Israel because they are afraid 
they would get licked. The Israelis know this. And that the 
balance of power for the foreseeable future, as between the 
Arab states, which more or less ring Israel, and the Israelis, 
is such, that there is no present danger of an Arab attack on 
Israel. How would you explain that?
    Mr. Helms. I think that is correct. I would subscribe to 
that. I do not think there is any doubt that the Israeli army 
is far more competent than the Egyptian or any combination of 
Arab armies. Their air force is much better and much better 
manned.
    I recognize that one should be very careful in using 
characterizations, but the Egyptians have not shown any great 
capability to man very well the sophisticated equipment which 
the Soviets have given them. The Israelis are far better at 
this and, therefore, I do not believe that any single Arab 
state or probably any combination of them intends to attack 
Israel these days.

                    RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Clark. I also got the view over there that the 
Russians, as a political matter, were looking with rather 
covetous eyes on the other end of the Red Sea, the Aden area 
and the Somalia area. And that their support of the UAR in 
Yemen and their view that the British pretty soon are going to 
get out of Aden, and the thought that de Gaulle was shortly 
going to conduct a plebiscite to see whether he should give up 
French Somaliland, posed a pretty considerable threat that the 
vacuum thus created might be filled, not directly by the 
Russians, but by Russian--if at least not satellites, at least 
allies who would be Russian oriented.
    Would you comment on that?
    Mr. Helms. We agree with your assessment.

                      SUBCOMMITTEE'S JURISDICTION

    Senator Gore. With due apologies to my colleagues, could we 
not stay a little more along the line of the jurisdiction of 
this subcommittee.
    Senator Clark. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, if you will 
excuse me saying so, and I hope you would agree with me, that 
the conventional arms race in the Middle East is a problem for 
the Disarmament Subcommittee of a high order of priority. These 
questions of mine were intended to develop what could be done 
to terminate an arms race in the interests of arms control and 
disarmament.
    Senator Gore. All right, proceed.
    Senator Symington. Maybe it is my fault, because I was 
trying in the conventional--this growing conventional danger of 
the UAR with the reaction on the part of the Israelis 
[Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. Well, I certainly do not mean to imply that 
the arms race in the Middle East is not of great importance. I 
guess I had just overly anticipated that we would stay on the 
ballistic and antiballistic development today. But if members 
desire to go elsewhere, proceed.
    Senator Clark. No, I only had one more question.
    Senator Symington. It is probably my fault.
    [Deleted.]
    Senator Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Senator Cooper? Senator Pell?

                         JET AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN

    Senator Pell. One question, along the line of Senator 
Symington and Senator Clark, is we were informed by the 
committee, and I am sure everybody else knows, that we were 
giving a rather large supply of brand new jet airplanes, I 
think, to Jordan. Would that not very much upset the present 
balance from an intelligence viewpoint? Is Jordan at the low 
end of the balance of terror, or whatever it is called, in that 
part of the world?
    Mr. Helms. The jet aircraft that we give to Jordan is not 
going to upset the balance of power in the Middle East in a way 
that would be dangerous in our opinion. In the first place, the 
Jordanians have been one of the Arab countries that has taken a 
rather moderate road, as you know, and has stood for peace and 
quiet in the area. These jet planes, obviously the Israelis 
object to it, and come in and make comments about it, and put 
all the pressure on our government they can about it, but they 
are not fearful of them.
    Senator Pell. Thank you. No further questions.

                     MOSCOW MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

    Senator Gore. Well, I have a few more questions on the 
question of ballistic defense before going to the Chinese 
situation.
    Now, you have indicated your judgment that, even with the 
operational deployment of the Moscow System, that with a 
multiple attack of sophisticated weapons without question the 
screen could be successfully penetrated. Do you mean 
sufficiently to destroy Moscow?
    Mr. Helms. We believe so, sir. Yes.
    Senator Gore. You believe so.
    Now, if the Soviets successfully deployed one system around 
Moscow, to what extent would this imply that the deployment of 
additional systems or a multiplication of that system, or an 
integration of that system with others, could possibly 
neutralize or minimize the effect of an offense against them?
    Mr. Helms. Well, sir, as I mentioned, we do not see any 
evidence whatsoever that this Moscow System exists anywhere 
else in the Soviet Union, or that they intend to install it 
anywhere else in the Soviet Union. Therefore, we are of the 
opinion that in the year 1967, if the United States were to 
attack the Soviet Union, we would obliterate the Soviet Union.
    Senator Gore. Well, that is not the purport of my question.

                           THE TALLINN SYSTEM

    My question was, is the nature of this system such that if 
it, in fact, should be multiplied----
    Mr. Helms. I see.
    Senator Gore [continuing]. What would be the defense 
potential?
    Mr. Helms. Well, it would be better than the Tallinn System 
that they are presently installing. It would do a better job 
than the Tallinn System which they are installing, but we 
believe it would have the same defects that the Moscow System 
presently has and that, therefore, we would be able to 
penetrate it.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Now, coming to the Tallinn system, I have heard scientists 
express the view that it is primarily for ballistic defense. 
Others, as you say, including your judgment, say that it is 
primarily for high defense against high, fast-flying planes.
    Now, assuming that it had both capabilities, which I think 
from all I have heard is likely to be the case, to what extent 
it has capability is a matter of disagreement. But assuming 
that it has dual capability, to what extent would it serve as 
an initiation or a beginning of deployment of more so-called 
Moscow Systems? Are they radically different, or are their 
radars and other components, computable and supplementary?
    Mr. Helms. They are sufficiently different that we do not 
believe that they would be interchangeable and that you could 
mix one with the other.
    Senator Gore. Then, to bring this to a conclusion, you do 
not now foresee a sufficient deployment of either the Moscow 
System or the Tallinn system, or a multiplication or merging of 
these two which would compromise seriously our strategy of 
deterrence, our ability to destroy?
    Mr. Helms. No, sir.
    Senator Gore. Before going to the Chinese situation, are 
there other questions with respect to the Russian?
    Senator Symington?
    Senator Symington. No, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Senator Cooper?

                    IF RUSSIA MADE THE FIRST STRIKE

    Senator Cooper. Would it be the same answer if Russia made 
the first strike?
    Mr. Helms. I beg your pardon, sir?
    Senator Cooper. Suppose Russia made the first strike, would 
your answer be the same?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, it is my understanding of American 
capability that we could still do the job even if they made the 
first strike. That is the basis on which our forces are 
deployed at the present time.
    Senator Cooper. With the added factor of the installation 
of this system?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Now, going----
    Senator Symington. Just one point. I think the questions 
that you have raised are terribly pertinent because our problem 
is to gauge, as the ABM decision comes up for decision by 
people--Senator Gore, as you know, serves on the Joint Atomic 
Energy Commission--the nature and the degree of the anti-
ballistic development in the Soviet Union, correct?
    Senator Gore. Yes.

                       FRIGHT-MONGERING ABOUT ABM

    Senator Symington. With that premise, what you say to us 
today, as I understand it, is that they have a very high degree 
of development, very possibly around Moscow, but it is not 
carried out in the rest of the country.
    Mr. Helms. Correct.
    Senator Symington. Is that correct?
    Mr. Helms. Correct.
    Senator Symington. And that does not bear out a lot of the 
fright-mongering that has been going on.
    I am not saying we shouldn't have an ABM system, but I am 
saying you cleared that completely to me this afternoon, that 
their very highly developed unit is only around one city, is 
that correct?
    Mr. Helms. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Pell. May I ask a question?
    Senator Gore. Yes.

                 RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT AIMED AGAINST U.S.

    Senator Pell. Are there any signs of any development vis-a-
vis China or is the whole defense to ICBM's launched from the 
Continental United States?
    Mr. Helms. So far the deployment looks to us as though it 
was designed: (a) against the United States, in other words, 
the normal missile path over which we would fire our missiles; 
and (b) to defend certain particular industrial complexes 
inside the Soviet Union.
    We see no deployment thus far that we believe is directed 
specifically at China.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.

                             GANTRY DEVICES

    Senator Gore. Now, coming to the Chinese situation, you 
gave some adjectives, which I don't recall, in describing the 
size of the complex for missile firing and weaponry 
development. Would you break this down into gantry size? What 
size thrust, what size launching pad, what size gantry do you 
find?
    Mr. Helms. May I ask Mr. Duckett to answer that? I have 
forgotten the numbers.
    Senator Pell. The what?
    Senator Gore. Gantry.
    I believe ours at Cape Kennedy run to--what height?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, the gantry device involved for 
the Saturn V, which, of course, is the very monstrous space 
launcher, is something over 500 feet in height. However, the 
more conventional missile associated or weapon associated 
gantries would be customarily in the two to three hundred foot 
height for our, say, Titan-Atlas type systems.
    Senator Gore. In other words, if we were going to test an 
ICBM of five to seven thousand miles, we would use a gantry of 
in the order of 200, 250 feet?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. I would add, Mr. Chairman, however, 
that that in itself wouldn't, we would feel, be a guide of good 
criterion because the Minuteman is launched with little, if 
any, sort of a gantry at all. But I believe if I have captured 
the sense of the Chairman's question, that I could best answer 
the Chinese one this way. [Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. In other words, to elaborate this point----
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Do you think insofar as the gantry device is 
concerned, or the launching pad complex, that they are now 
constructing or have constructed such facilities to test an 
ICBM?
    Mr. Duckett. We do believe, sir, that is the most likely 
function for this new launch facility, [deleted.]
    [Discussion off the record.]

                         PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

    Senator Pell. Wouldn't it be sound psychological warfare 
for the Chinese to build at very little expense a bamboo 
illusionary gantry to make us think they have this capability 
when they really didn't?
    Senator Gore. Again, off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. Back on the record.
    Will you proceed?
    You said that there were two measurements that you were 
undertaking to determine. One was the size and height. What is 
the other one?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, if I may go off the record again 
for just a moment.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. Back on the record.

                       NUCLEAR THREAT FROM CHINA

    In the committee hearings earlier this week, I felt it 
necessary on two occasions to express some reservation to the 
statements of two eminent elder statesmen of the country, whose 
statements seem to me to downgrade the nuclear threat from Red 
China.
    From what you gentlemen have said to us, they are nearing 
the test stage of an intercontinental ballistic missile. They 
have had several tests of nuclear devices. Have those devices 
been equal to the device with which we destroyed Hiroshima?
    Mr. Helms. You answer that.
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, certainly the devices, and 
particularly the last one, are well beyond the capability of 
our Hiroshima bomb.
    Senator Gore. That ran to the order of [deleted] as 
powerful?
    Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. My understanding of the Hiroshima 
bomb was on the order of 20 kilotons and in the case of the 
most recent Chinese tests we believe that its yield was on the 
order of [deleted].
    Therefore, more than a factor of [deleted] in terms of 
yield.
    Senator Gore. Then, if China had one intercontinental 
ballistic missile, with a warhead equal to [deleted] the weapon 
that obliterated Hiroshima, and it should be trained on Tokyo 
or New Delhi or even toward a Soviet city, it would surely be 
something that could not be ignored.
    Mr. Helms. It could not be ignored in any sense.
    Senator Gore. Or for that matter on Saigon.
    Mr. Helms. Or on Saigon.

                       CHINA'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

    Senator Gore. Now, what is your projection of the nuclear 
stockpile which China has now or will have two, five, seven 
years from now, in that order?
    Mr. Helms. Would you answer that, Carl, if you can.
    Mr. Duckett. I would like to answer part of the question 
and then I will have to get the specific projections.
    I would answer that part of the question dealing with 
today's stockpile, and, that is, that we believe that it is 
most likely that [deleted].
    Senator Gore. How large a gaseous diffusion plant do they 
have?
    Mr. Duckett. This part, sir, I am willing to check some 
documents or offer to give you the numbers because I would hate 
to have those wrong. I don't trust my head to give you that, so 
I would prefer either to give you this later or attempt to dig 
it out of my material.
    I don't have that clearly in hand.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. May I ask 
one question?
    Senator Gore. Yes, indeed.

                   CHINA AS A SERIOUS NUCLEAR MENACE

    Senator Symington. Mr. Helms, in a very broad way, when do 
you think the Chinese will be a serious nuclear menace to the 
security of the United States? What time period, very broad 
guesstimate.
    Mr. Helms. Well, sir, as best we can estimate it, and I 
want to say I am terribly anxious not to mislead you, and I am 
making these estimates with the information we have available. 
But it is not adequate, in my opinion. We are talking about the 
middle 1970's, but I don't know whether that is a good estimate 
or not.
    Senator Symington. That is what I wanted to know.
    Senator Gore. Excuse me, I was talking to somebody else.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. Well, back on the record.

               DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

    The Chinese are giving top priority, are they not, to the 
development of a nuclear capability?
    Mr. Helms. This they are certainly doing.
    Senator Gore. [Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. Do they have reactors to make plutonium?
    Mr. Helms. Yes.
    Senator Gore. When would they have----
    Mr. Helms. [Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Now, just in a general way, when would you estimate that 
the Chinese would have a stockpile of weapons in the order of a 
number, say, from one to 500?
    Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, we have to date been unable to 
actually estimate that they will stockpile numbers in the 
hundreds. I say that not to infer that we do not think they 
will at some date stockpile numbers such as that. Rather, to 
illustrate that we believe that into the, well, into the 
1970's, they will be forced to use those facilities which we 
now know about. We do not see those facilities producing 
numbers in the hundreds of stockpiled weapons as far ahead as 
we can project from those with reasonable confidence.
    So, I would simply say that our estimating to date is on 
much lesser numbers. And we will certainly provide to you, 
preferring to do it in a more precise way, those numbers in 
this nearer term period up into the early and mid `70's. But 
this does not include the hundreds of weapons in any case, sir.

                        THE DANGERS OF GUESSING

    Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, if you will forgive me, I would 
just like to congratulate the witnesses on the conservation of 
their statements and their bearing upon on what is really 
known. We have seen in the past the temptation to make real 
guesses into guesstimates, and I congratulate you on not 
guessing. This is one of the greatest dangers on which 
decisions are somewhat untenable.
    Mr. Helms. Thank you, sir.

             THE U.S. IS LIGHT YEARS AHEAD OF EVERYONE ELSE

    Senator Cooper. What are the factors which inhibit an early 
developmental capability to strike the United States?
    Mr. Helms. Sir, they just have got to develop the 
industrial equipment and the knowhow and all the rest of the 
things to do these things, and they are in a pretty primitive 
state. I think it is important that we realize that the Soviets 
and the United States are light years ahead of anybody else in 
the world in these fields, particularly when it comes to the 
industrialization that is necessary to do this. The Chinese are 
just going to have a very difficult time catching up.
    But we believe that they have the capacity, the manpower 
and so forth to do it, and they will get there eventually.
    Senator Gore. Of course, this is a factor, it seems to me, 
which may be a very troublesome and perhaps a limiting one upon 
the Soviets in reaching the feeling of freedom to conclude an 
agreement with us with respect to ABM vis-a-vis the United 
States and Russia. That is why I was particularly interested in 
developing this at this point, not so much as to when it would 
be a threat to the United States, but as to its immediate 
effect upon this drive by our government to conclude an 
agreement with the Soviets.
    Mr. Helms. Of course, this is quite possible, Mr. Chairman. 
I mean what is going on in the Soviet mind on this problem is 
very hard to get at, but I think you put your finger on 
something that may turn out to be the case. They may say this 
isn't directed at you, but we still have a problem, and that is 
on our landmass, and we don't have the Pacific Ocean protecting 
us.
    Senator Gore. Yes. In other words, if they have a hundred 
weapons aimed at the cities of Russia, and if they set up a 
deterrence of their own vis-a-vis China and Russia, then all 
this will be in addition to their huge land army.
    Obviously, we haven't gone into the proliferation 
negotiations at all.

                           AN ABM MORATORIUM

    Now, if the United States and the Soviet Union do agree to 
a moratorium on ABM, what assurances could we have, what 
verification, what type of verification could we have that they 
were complying with this?
    Mr. Helms. Well, Senator Gore, I think that this 
verification problem, as you know, has been about as 
controversial in the disarmament field. I confidently feel that 
we could in the intelligence community tell whether or not the 
Soviets were complying about an anti-ballistic missile system. 
This is the kind of system, in order to operate, that has to 
have some exposure, and I think we could keep track of that 
pretty well. This is not to say, if I may say so, that I would 
necessarily like to go into a meeting of the executive branch 
of the Government and put my hand in the fire for this because 
there are certain problems which could develop in our lives 
that might make this difficult for us. But in the state of the 
art in 1967 we could verify it.
    Senator Gore. You think you could verify it?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, I believe so.
    Senator Gore. Particularly the installation of a system of 
the sophistication of the Moscow System?
    Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, because these radars are big, and they 
are exposed.
    Senator Gore. They have to be exposed to operate.
    Mr. Helms. That is right, and they have to be big.
    Senator Gore. Well, it is 25 until 5 and I suppose--Senator 
Cooper, do you have a question before we conclude?
    Senator Cooper. No, thank you.
    Senator Gore. We want to thank you. It is entirely possible 
that other members of the subcommittee would have some 
questions, and, in fact, we will want to talk with you about 
the non-proliferation situation a little further.
    We will have to call you when we can arrange a date.
    Mr. Helms. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to appear at any 
time.
    Senator Gore. Thank you. You have been very helpful.
    Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, 
subject to call of the chair.]


STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT OF BALLISTIC AND ANTI-BALLISTIC SYSTEMS IN U.S., 
                AND BRIEFING ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

                              ----------                              


                        Monday, February 6, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The, subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., 
in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Lausche, Clark, Pell, 
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: Lt. Col. E. L. Harper, USAF; Lt. Col. A. B. 
Outlaw, USAF; Col. Wm. B. Arnold, USAF; Maj. Christopher, ACDA, 
Congressional Liaison; Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency; Herbert Scoville, Jr., 
Assistant Director, Science & Technology Bureau; and Charles N. 
Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the committee staff.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

   STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN S. FOSTER Jr., DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE 
RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       CONTROVERSY OVER VALUE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 4]

    The first controversy arose around the question, ``Could a 
bullet hit a bullet?'' This phase passed, first when 
calculations showed the feasibility of such an intercept, and 
later and most definitely when successful intercepts of actual 
ICBM targets fired from Vandenberg AFB were accomplished by the 
old NlKE ZEUS system in 1962-63. We had 10 out of 14 successful 
intercepts with the average miss distance less than 470 feet--a 
distance at which destruction is assured from a nuclear burst.
    After this ``simple'' problem was solved, it was realized 
that the offense would replace the easy-to-intercept single 
warhead with clouds of objects, or take other deceptive 
measures. Examples of these objects were decoys designed to 
look like warheads to the radar, and chaff designed to conceal 
the warhead in a cloud of light objects. Against those more 
sophisticated targets there was a necessity for the defense to 
discriminate among them so as to know which objects to take 
under fire. Hence, many objects might have to be tracked and 
observed simultaneously. Also, it might be necessary for the 
defense to wait for atmospheric reentry of the targets and rely 
on slow-down and burn-up of the lighter objects before this 
discrimination could be accomplished.
    If you turn to the page and then turn the whole assembly 
sidesways, you will see a figure which depicts the kind of 
things that go on under the worst conditions during an attack.
    Up in the right-hand corner, you see a cloud. This is 
intended to represent the situation when there are large 
numbers of objects coming in a very large distribution of 
chaff. The radar, and looking at it at a distance of several 
hundred miles, sees it merely as a cloud, and can acquire and 
track that cloud as it comes into the vicinity of the target.
    When the cloud has reached a distance of about a hundred 
miles, it then is possible for the radar to distinguish 
different objects within the cloud, and to make a designation 
on several of them.
    Subsequently, however, if you get to the lower left-hand, 
you will see that the cloud itself stops, and at ranges of 25 
to 50 miles one would expect to see individual objects 
penetrating through the atmosphere toward the target. As you 
see in this case, some of them are indicated as radiating.--
radar jamming--and others are merely decoys looking like 
reentry vehicles. Still others must be considered to be reentry 
vehicles including thermonuclear war heads.

                DEFECTS OF NIKE-ZEUS SYSTEM WERE REMOVED

    Turn now back to the middle of page 2. The old NIKE ZEUS 
system, when confronted with these more sophisticated targets, 
had two fatal defects. One was that it used what are now 
considered to be old-fashioned mechanical radars, which had to 
be mechanically slewed or pointed at each target in turn. This 
required a matter of seconds.
    One practically had to have a radar for each target. The 
ZEUS missile could not be delayed in firing until atmospheric 
reentry of the targets took place, because it was too slow. 
Hence, discrimination could not be aided by atmospheric 
filtering.
    Because of these defects, the NIKE X concept was born. 
First, the mechanical radars of NIKE ZEUS were replaced by 
phased array radars, which by varying the electrical phase of 
the power over the face of a fixed antenna array could change 
the direction of the radar beam in a matter of microseconds 
(Figure 2). This imparted a capability of tracking many objects 
simultaneously, and thus removed one of the ZEUS defects. 
Second, a very high-performance short-range interceptor 
missile, the SPRINT was introduced, capable of flying to 80,000 
feet in 10 seconds. It was smaller, cheaper, and had much 
higher acceleration than ZEUS, and thus could afford to wait 
until reentry of the targets before being committed to fire. 
Atmospheric filtering was now feasible, and the remaining 
targets could be attacked with the high firepower SPRINT'.
    The old ZEUS interceptor was retained in the system for 
long range attacks on simple targets. We now had two 
interceptors--the ZEUS weighing 24,000 pounds, three-stage, 
carrying a nuclear [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept 
out to about 75 miles; and the SPRINT, 7,400 pounds, two-stage, 
carrying a [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept out to 
about 20 miles.
    The NIKE X development, initiated in 1963, was thus much 
more effective than the old ZEUS system. It must be noted, 
however, that it was essentially a ``terminal defense'' system. 
The SPRINT effective radius was about 20 miles, which meant 
that it could only defend cities or selected sites. Hence, 
since it is obviously impractical to deploy terminal defenses 
at every small city or village in the United States, it was 
subject to a by-pass attack. That is to say, an enemy could 
always target the undefended cities and obtain high casualties. 
This option was available even to unsophisticated opponents. 
The sophisticated opponent, by concentrating his firepower, 
could overwhelm the defense at any selected defended site.

                    DEVELOPMENT OF ``AREA DEFENSE''

    The next important development in defense effectiveness 
came with the introduction of ``area defense'' in the period 
1964-65. I would like to define the term ``area defense.'' The 
concept is presented pictorially in Figure 3.
    The detection sensor is the Perimeter Acquisition Radar 
(PAR) which detects ballistic missiles at long ranges of 
approximately 1,600 n.m. This is about the range at which an 
incoming missile appears above the horizon. The PAR radar 
tracks the incoming missile and predicts its future path. To 
intercept the incoming missile, we employ the SPARTAN missile 
which is a long range interceptor developed from the old NIKE-
ZEUS. Once the PAR radar has predicted the future path of the 
target, a SPARTAN missile is fired so as to intercept it.
    Senator Clark. Well, it is a missile, isn't it? It is also 
a target.
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.
    Senator Gore. It is your target.
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.
    Senator Clark. It is their missile.
    Dr. Foster. Well, their missile is a complete system on the 
pad. Shortly after boost the re-entry vehicle and multiple 
object if there are to be multiple objects are severed off.
    Senator Clark. It is semantics, but I want to clear what 
you are talking about. What you mean is that the object which 
is intended to explode on American target is what you are 
talking about when you say you are going to intercept it at 
1,660 miles.
    Dr. Forster. Yes, that is correct. Acquire at 1,600 miles 
and subsequently intercept it at some shorter distances.
    Senator Clark. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. This interceptor has a range of over 400 miles, 
and intercepts the incoming missile well above the atmosphere. 
Because of its long range, the SPARTAN can intercept incoming 
missiles directed at targets several hundred miles from the 
SPARTAN battery location. Thus, because each SPARTAN battery 
can defend a fairly large area, it requires only about 14 
batteries to provide coverage of the entire continental United 
States. The SPARTAN missile is guided by a missile site radar 
(MSR) which is associated with each battery. The PAR radars 
would be defended with short range high performance SPRINT 
missiles to prevent their being targeted first to blind the 
defense.

                 CHANGE IN CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS

    The advance which made area defense feasible was a change 
in the concept of the nuclear warhead. The SPARTAN warhead is a 
high-yield nuclear warhead with a high-energy X-ray output 
(``the hot bomb''). Such a warhead, and particularly a large-
yield warhead, substantially increases the kill radius of the 
interceptor at altitudes of, say, 300,000 feet.
    Senator Clark. When you say kill radius, you are talking 
about killing the missile and not killing a lot of people?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct. It is the radius at which we 
can be confident of killing----
    Senator Clark. Destroying?
    Dr. Foster [continuing]. An incoming warhead.
    Senator Gore. Well,----
    Dr. Foster. Destroying it.
    Senator Gore. Since Senator Clark has made this 
interruption, I Wonder if you could indicate here just what 
would be the kill radius from X-rays?
    Dr. Foster. The kill radius from X-rays takes place above a 
hundred thousand feet as the major mechanism for kill of enemy 
warheads, and above these altitudes the kill radius is assumed 
to be about 10 miles against hardened Soviet warheads.
    Senator Gore. When you say, let's understand what you mean. 
If we are speaking of the same term when we are saying radius, 
are you speaking of five miles each way from the detonation?
    Dr. Foster. I mean 10 miles each way.
    Senator Gore. Then you are speaking 20 miles radius?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, I am speaking of a sphere 20 miles in 
diameter. If there are any objects within that sphere with our 
explosion at the center, then we would believe that they are 
destroyed.
    Now, in actual fact today the community would agree that we 
would destroy the existing--the system we are talking about, 
could, if it were deployed destroy the existing Soviet warheads 
at much greater distances.
    Senator Gore. When you reduce your diameter of the sphere 
to 20 miles you think that would be the minimum of any 
foreseeable sophistication of incoming weapons?
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is 
possible in time to configure re-entry vehicle and the 
thermonuclear warheads within them so that they could sustain 
even greater x-ray intensities than those I have indicated. The 
number of 10 miles I associate with the kind of hardening that 
can be achieved by the Soviets during the few years after our 
initial deployment of such a system.
    Senator Gore. What do you mean a few years, just an order?
    Dr. Foster. Five years.
    Senator Gore. And say it would take us three years to 
deploy.
    Dr. Foster. We could have a system, say, by 1973 and I 
would claim that the effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic 
missile defense would be about 10 miles against Soviet radar--
excuse me, Soviet reentry vehicles in the field through until 
1978.

                 LENGTH OF TIME TO IMPROVE U.S. OFFENSE

    Senator Gore. A very pertinent question here is the time 
element with respect to our own improvement of reentry of our 
own missiles. The Soviets are now deploying a system, the 
Tallinn System, over some 26 other areas. How long will--if we 
proceed upon the tactical philosophy of improving our offense 
as the best defense, in what period of time will we be able to 
accomplish this hardening and improvement which you think it 
would take the Soviets five years to accomplish?
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have, as you know, been 
working aggressively on this general area ever since 1961, and 
currently have in our missiles the products of the program. We 
are, however, continuing to increase the hardness of the 
reentry vehicle so although the systems deployed by 1969 will 
be harder than those currently deployed and those by 1971 will 
be still harder. I believe I may have given the committee some 
misunderstanding with respect to your earlier question.
    It is not so much-- the kill radius that we talked about 
for the U.S. high-yield warhead associated with SPARTAN is not 
so much to make sure that we can kill the object we are aiming 
at. We can surely do that because, as I indicated, we had been 
able in 1962 and '63 to bring a missile to within a few hundred 
feet of an incoming ICBM.
    It is important, however, because it forces the enemy, if 
he wishes to attack with many objects coming in simultaneously 
from one missile, to put each of these objects a large distance 
from its neighbors, and so in trying to kill them all at once 
we can only be sure of killing things out to a radius of 10 
miles.
    Senator Clark. From where?
    Dr. Foster. From the point of detonation. All of the other 
objects, if they are to still survive, must be outside of that.
    That then forces the enemy to either use lighter warheads, 
lighter objects that he can throw to larger distances, or more 
propellant to throw them to larger distances, or more 
propellant to throw them to larger distances.
    Well, to continue----

            DEVELOPMENT OF PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR (PAR)

    Senator Aiken. May I ask you one question there? Is it 
possible to change direction of a missile at specified 
distances from the target?
    Dr. Foster During flight, Senator?
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, it is.
    Senator Aiken. And have you developed a PAR so that it will 
adapt itself to change in the direction of the missile?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, we have, Senator.
    Senator Aiken. Our defenses, will they change with the 
direction?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, that is a particular feature of the PAR 
radar.
    Senator Aiken. That is a particular feature of PAR?
    Dr. Foster. That it can track essentially instantaneously 
over a large volume of the sky.

                            POSEIDON MISSILE

    Senator Gore. Doctor Foster, as I recall it, the C.I.A. was 
unable to verify that the Soviets had accomplished a multiple 
warhead missile such as our Poseidon. How far are we along in 
the development of a multiple warhead missile?
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have 
already deployed in the Polaris system the A-3 missile--excuse 
me, the A-3 contains three separate warheads.
    Senator Gore. Yes. But the Poseidon has----
    Dr. Foster. The Poseidon could have as many as 14 separate 
warheads.
    Senator Gore. That is what I thought. When will this be----
    Dr. Foster. That is to be deployed beginning 1970.
    Senator Gore. And our nuclear submarines will be redesigned 
to carry the Poseidon instead of the Polaris?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, that is correct.
    Senator Clark. Is this a big job of redesigning?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, it is a fairly thorough redesign.
    Senator Aiken. You want to change the design of the 
submarine?
    Dr. Foster. No, it is not so much----
    Senator Aiken. Torpedo tubes or what?
    Dr. Foster. It is not so much the redesign of the 
submarine. The boats are essentially the same.
    One uses new equipment in the control of the missile.
    Senator Aiken. I see.
    Dr. Foster. And, of course, a brand new missile that is to 
go basically in the same tubes.
    Senator Gore. There are, of course, some differences in 
assessment of our intelligence units. I wonder in this instance 
if the Armed Services intelligence would agree with the C.I.A. 
that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have developed 
a multiple head.
    Dr. Foster. I believe the intelligence community is in 
agreement that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have 
developed a multiple warhead capability.
    Senator Gore. Has their science academy announced such? 
Have the Soviets made claims of such?
    Dr. Foster. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to draw your attention to a terribly important 
difference between multiple warheads and the so-called MIRV. 
Multiple warheads as it is used in the A-3 missile simply means 
three, in this case, three warheads on a single missile. And a 
plan----
    Senator Gore. Will you say that again?
    Dr. Foster. The current missile aboard Polaris submarines--
--
    Senator Gore. You are speaking of our missiles now?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct; yes--has three warheads on the 
top of the missile.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. The design is such that after the missile is 
fired and the reentry vehicle section is separated from the 
rest of the booster system the separate warheads and their 
reentry vehicles are directed to separate trajectories in 
space, such that they would fall on the ground at different 
times but make approximately an equilateral triangle with their 
aim point, with their impact points around the central aiming 
point. This separation----
    Senator Gore. In other words, they would arrive on the same 
target but with different trajectories and, therefore, 
different times?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct. They burst with a 
separation distance of about two kilometers on a side.
    Now, that separation, that deployment arrangement, is 
designed in at the factory, so to speak.
    Now, there is a quite different system to be aboard the 
Poseidon and the Minuteman III. This system involves an 
entirely separate propulsion system after the burnout of the 
last stage. This propulsion system has guidance and a program 
to take each of its payloads to a different target that is put 
on the guidance by the commander of the vehicle.
    Senator Gore. This is the MIRV?
    Dr. Foster. This is the MIRV.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. This propulsion system, then, under the 
direction of guidance, orients the whole vehicle on a 
trajectory which will load to impact on a specified point. At 
that stage, it eases off one of the payloads, which will then 
subsequently go to that impact point. The propulsion system, 
then, again under the direction of the guidance, reorients the 
remainder of the payload on to a new target. When it is on the 
course toward the new target, it eases off a second payload, 
and so on, until it is discharged, in the case of Poseidon, as 
much as 14 different reentry vehicles.
    Senator Gore. One of the 14 is discharged?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct. But not at high velocity.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Senator Cooper. May I ask a question?
    The A-3 then is directed toward one target?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.
    Senator Cooper. The other systems you talk about, the 
Poseidon and the Minuteman----
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    Senator Cooper [continuing]. The payloads, as you call it, 
could be separated and they could be directed to----
    Dr. Foster Different cities.
    Senator Cooper [continuing]. As many targets as it is 
desired.
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.

                          MISSILE ACQUISITION

    And continuing, Mr. Chairman, this high yield warhead in 
the SPARTAN has a substantially increased kill radius for the 
interceptor at altitudes about 300,000 feet. The lethal range 
increases from a few hundred feet to several miles.
    Consequently, the offense is unable to rely on relatively 
small clouds of confusing objects a few miles in radius.
    To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor----
    Senator Gore. What do you mean clouds? You don't mean 
natural clouds?
    Dr. Foster. No. sir.
    Senator Gore. The cloud created by the----
    Dr. Foster. A dispersal of the large mass of tinfoil. Call 
it chaff.
    Senator Gore. In other words, artificial clouds?
    Dr. Foster. Yes. Artificial.
    I believe you can see it on Figure 1.
    Senator Gore. I saw that. But I wanted to be sure--you are 
not speaking of any sort of possible natural phenomenon?
    Dr. Foster. No, sir, I am not.
    Senator Gore. No matter how intense it might be?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct.
    Senator Gore. Okay.

                       SPARTAN REPLACED THE ZEUS

    Dr. Foster. To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor 
than the old ZEUS missile was required. The SPARTAN missile 
weighs about 35,000 pounds, is three-stage, carries a [deleted] 
warhead, and is designed to intercept at about 300 miles or 
more.
    With the introduction of SPARTAN, the ZEUS interceptor was 
no longer required--in effect, the SPARTAN replaced the ZEUS.
    Figure 4 shows the ``footprint'' on a map of the U.S. 
defended by a SPARTAN battery. A footprint is the area defended 
by SPARTAN from a specific direction of attack. The SPARTAN 
might intercept directly overhead an ICBM aimed at a point 
several hundred miles away.
    Comparatively few SPARTAN batteries can defend the whole 
United States from simple attacks. Figure 5 shows an example of 
14 SPARTAN batteries, with four PAR radars located across the 
northern U.S. border, defending against an ICBM threat from the 
Chinese Peoples Republic.
    Senator Clark. That is what CPR means?
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    You will note I said simple attacks. It is still possible 
for a sophisticated opponent, by warheading hardening and by 
separating his incoming clouds of objects into widely separated 
clumps, to confuse the defense and make the firepower demands 
on SPARTAN too high. In this case, terminal defense SPRINT's 
must be relied upon if we are to furnish a defense.
    Senator Gore. I am violating may own suggestion, but maybe 
we had better reconsider. I find this so difficult that it may 
be helpful to others as well as me to ask a few questions as we 
go along.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

                    DEFENSE AGAINST A SIMPLE ATTACK

    Senator Gore. Now, do I correctly understand that this 
defense against a so-called simple attack described here on 
Figure 5 that that would be roughly what is referred to in the 
press, otherwise as the thin defense?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. That is the system, the cost of which would 
be anticipated, say from four to six billion dollars?
    Dr. Foster. For the defense of the United States only would 
be in the vicinity of three to four billion.
    Senator Cooper. How much?
    Dr. Foster. Three to four billion.
    Senator Gore. That is the defense against the relatively 
unsophisticated weapons which the Chinese are now developing?
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.
    Senator Clark. Would you yield, Albert?
    Senator Gore. No, anybody. Let's just ask some questions as 
we go along.

                        COST OF CITIES' DEFENSE

    Senator Clark. The thing that bothers me is he says on page 
6, which he hasn't got to yet, that the cost of the 25-city 
defense would be $10 billion of the 50 cities defense $20 
billion. So, I wondered how that correlated with the very much 
lower figure which you just mentioned.
    Of course, he has not gotten to it.
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, if I may I would like to read 
that point and then answer the question.

                        DEFINITION OF A BATTERY

    Senator Cooper. May I ask a question here? Will you define 
battery?
    Dr. Foster. A battery, Senator, is a site. A location where 
one has a radar and a number of defensive missiles.
    Senator Cooper. I notice in your first drawing on page 4, 
what you call the SPARTAN footprint.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, that indicates----
    Senator Cooper. Would it need more than one battery to 
protect that footprint area?
    Dr. Foster. No, sir. Rreferring again to Figure 4, you see 
an area outlined there in the central portion, in the northeast 
portion, of the United States. In the upper region of that 
area, you will notice a dark triangle. That is intended to 
indicate the point at which the radar and the SPARTAN missiles 
are located.
    Senator Cooper. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. From that point then the missile can defend the 
area indicated by the surrounding line.
    Senator Clark. What do those little plus signs mean?
    Dr. Foster. I believe, Senator, those are the intersection 
of the lines of longitude and latitude.
    Senator Cooper. Would a battery have several missiles?
    Dr. Foster. Oh, yes. It could have, for example, 20 or 30 
missiles.
    Senator Cooper. To protect an area such as designated on 
the map, do you have any idea how many missiles would be 
required?
    Dr. Foster. We would plan on 20 to 30.
    Senator Cooper. Twenty to thirty?
    Senator Clark. Looking at Figure 5 which you mentioned, 
would you define what the phrase at the top of the figure means 
``Minimum Energy (23) Attack from E. China.'' What does that 
mean?
    Dr. Foster. It refers to an attack coming from the eastern 
portion of China, attempting to get maximum range from the 
missile, which, in turn, would amount to a reentry vehicle 
coming into the United States at an angle of 23 degrees from 
the horizon.
    Senator Clark. What does minimum energy mean?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, I am afraid I forgot to take that----
    Senator Clark. I thought it meant 23 missiles.
    Dr. Foster. I forgot to take that technical designation off 
the graph.
    Senator Gore. I hope that my colleagues will now see why 
twice last week I felt the necessity of raising a reservation 
at the hearing with Ambassador Kennan and Ambassador Reischauer 
who tended to downgrade the importance of the Chinese 
development.
    When the Secretary of Defense tells us that he anticipates, 
and the C.I.A., and the Atomic Energy Commission tell us that 
they expect the Chinese to test an intercontinental ballistic 
missile of from five to seven thousand mile range this coming 
summer, and that we see from satellite pictures that their 
laboratories for nuclear development are as large as ours, in 
some cases larger, than it is anticipated that the Chinese will 
have the capability of making just such an unsophisticated 
nuclear ballistic missile attack on the United States as this 
defense in Figure 5 is calculated to provide a defense against.
    It that true?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The defense position as 
indicated by Figure 5 as designed to provide defense of the 
United States against Chinese attack amounting to tens of 
missiles successfully reaching the area of the United States.
    Senator Gore. Well, for the benefit of my colleagues, the 
Atomic Energy experts estimated that within five years the 
Chinese would likely have both missile and warheads in the 
order of hundreds.
    I don't know that--now, the C.I.A., may I say, the other 
Friday did not agree with that estimate. They did not exactly 
put an estimate upon time, and since you----
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, I will check for the record. I 
believe we cannot give you hard evidence to support several, to 
report a statement, saying that, to the effect that the Chinese 
could have several hundred warhead in five years.
    Senator Gore. I didn't say several!
    Dr. Foster. A hundred.
    Senator Gore. They were asked the question, not by me but I 
think by Senator Pastore, whether in five years their stockpile 
would be termed in dozens and hundreds or in thousands. There 
were three experts there and, as I recall it, they conferred 
among themselves and thought it more nearly would be measured 
by hundreds rather than dozens or thousands. That is a very 
inexact estimate, but if this is designed to protect, say, 
against tens----
    Dr. Foster. Successfully reaching the United States.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. That means one would have to multiply by two or 
three to take care of reliability, lack of reliability.
    Senator Gore. I am not trying to specify the danger, but I 
am trying to indicate to my colleagues this certainly is not 
something that can be taken lightly.

                   TESTIMONY OF INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS

    Senator Clark. Albert could you clarify for the record who 
these experts were; were these Atomic Energy employees?
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Senator Clark. And not CIA and not Pentagon?
    Senator Gore. One of them is the head of the Los Alamos 
Laboratory, and the other was Dr. Brandbury. I can get that for 
you, if you would like.
    I think we should have them here, too.
    Senator Clark. I think so, too. Because I take it from what 
you say, and I didn't know it, that the Atomic Energy 
Commission has its own bunch of intelligence experts who may 
not agree with either DOD intelligence or CIA intelligence. Is 
that correct?
    Senator Gore. Well, I think--well, the Atomic Energy 
Commission has a great deal of intelligence work which they 
have done with respect to detonations by any country. They play 
a very little role in the intelligence effort with respect to 
proliferation.
    Senator Clark. Which would overlap the covering of the same 
subject by DOD intelligence and CIA intelligence.
    Senator Gore. I think that is a reasonable statement.
    Do you agree with that, Doctor?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    [Deleted.]
    Senator Clark. But sometimes don't agree. At least, I 
gather from what you said----
    Dr. Foster. That is correct, yes.
    Senator Gore. But, by and large, [deleted].
    Dr. Foster. Yes, when Mr. Helms or Mr. McNamara gives a 
statement on what the community's position is, it has always 
included a full treatment of the opinions and thoughts and 
ideas of the technical members of the Atomic Energy 
Commission's laboratories.
    Senator Clark. Were those the only three who do this 
detailed technical intelligence work for our Government--DOD, 
CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission? For example, nobody over 
at ACDA does any of this?
    Dr. Foster. No, sir, I believe the answer to your question 
is correct.
    Senator Gore. What about NASA?
    Dr. Foster. They do not generally get into this work.
    Senator Gore. You have then these three agencies.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct.
    Senator Gore. If it is agreeable with the subcommittee, 
since we have had the CIA and the DOD, it might be well to have 
the AEC.
    Senator Clark. I would think so.
    Senator Gore. Would you agree, Senator Cooper?
    Senator Cooper. Yes.

                         MINIMUM ENERGY ATTACK

    Senator Clark. Before you leave this, Dr. Foster, I wonder 
if you could define a little more in layman's terms than you 
have so far what this phrase on figure 5, ``Minimum Energy (23) 
Attack from East China.'' means. I have particular reference to 
what you mean by minimum energy, and again because I did not 
get it the last time, what 23 stands for.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Senator. Imagine stepping back 5,000 or 
10,000 miles from the earth and see what is happening from a 
point on earth. One can launch a missile and have it cover a 
trajectory of a few thousand miles and land at another point. 
One has the option of deciding just how the missile reentry 
vehicle reenters the atmosphere. One can, so to speak, loft the 
missile. One can point it up to a very high angle, and have it 
go rather far from the earth, and then come in to the target 
very steeply.
    Senator Clark. Like a lob in tennis as opposed to a drive.
    Dr. Foster. Exactly. However, if you wanted to get maximum 
range, you would not lob it quite so highly. So this refers to 
angles that are of a trajectory that are set to give you the 
maximum range, and hence--or to reach those targets, use 
minimum energy. That is what the minimum energy refers to. 23 
degrees refers to the angle between the line left by the 
reentry vehicle and the horizon, horizontal.
    Senator Clark. And your opinion is, I think I have got it 
right, you opinion is that such an attack is a definite 
possibility from the Chinese People's Republic with a total of 
missiles in the general vicinity more or less of a hundred 
within how long a time?
    Dr. Foster. I do not recall the intelligence estimates on 
this for a hundred missiles.
    Senator Clark. Just give us a wide range.
    Dr. Foster. For example, I will correct this for the record 
if I may. I recall that one could have--the estimate is that 
one could have about ten missiles by 1972 to '73, and 30, a 
significant number of missile, by 1974 to '75.
    Senator Clark. That is good enough for me.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, I believe Mr. McNamara's posture 
statement treats that subject very, very carefully. Let me try 
to help here.
    From the point of view of providing assured destruction of 
the Soviet Union, that is to say from the point of view of 
having enough military capability in the United States so that 
our strategic forces could absorb an all-out attack by the 
Soviet Union and to, in turn, deliver destruction that we would 
consider totally unacceptable to them on to the Soviet Union, 
it is Mr. McNamara's position, and I agree, that the deployment 
of ballistic missile defenses by the United States is not 
required.
    Senator Gore. That is vis-a-vis the United States and the 
Soviet Union.
    Dr. Foster. Or for that matter China.
    Senator Gore. Well, China's power of defenses as of now is 
nowhere in the order of the Soviets.
    Dr. Foster. So, from that point of view of maintaining 
assured destruction capability of the United States, there is 
no need to deploy new or for the foreseeable future ballistic 
missile defenses.

   DEFENSE SECRETARY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ANTIBALLISTIC DEFENSE [P. 10]

    Senator Gore. What you are really saying here, it seems to 
me, is that the Soviet deployment of the Moscow and Tallinn 
systems do not compromise our power of retaliation. Therefore, 
it does not compromise the strategy of deterrence.
    Dr. Foster. The Soviet deployment of ballistic missile 
defensive systems does affect the ability of equipment to 
penetrate and so as we see them deploy----
    Senator Gore. You said that.
    Dr. Foster [continuing]. Initiate whatever changes are 
necessary to make the penetration.
    Senator Gore. I understand. But you say that we are capable 
of making such improvement in our missiles that regardless of 
the defenses now envisioned within their capability----
    Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct.
    Senator Gore [continuing]. That we will continue to have an 
assured capacity of sufficient destruction in the Soviet Union 
that we would have a retaliatory threat, even after the Soviets 
made a first attack, of sufficient magnitude that it would not 
seriously compromise our strategy of deterrence.
    Dr. Foster. Yes. That is correct.
    Senator Gore. Now, what I am trying to understand is the 
position of the Department of Defense. As you know, of course, 
Mr. Vance will be here and you referred to him before. What I 
am trying to get at is what is the position of the Department 
of Defense, or what is your own view of the necessity of 
building at some appropriate time a defense against a Chinese 
threat such as is contemplated within that possibility of your 
figure 5? Do I make myself clear?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     ADEQUACY OF U.S. SILOS [P. 11]

    Dr. Foster. Well, Senator, the ballistic missile defense 
system--excuse me, components that we have developed over the 
last several years can be used to protect the United States 
population, as I have indicated, against Soviet attacks, if 
they are light, and they can be used to protect us against 
Chinese attack.
    They, however, can also be deployed to protect our 
MINUTEMAN-silos.
    The reason we might want to do that is simply because in 
the last two years the Soviets have concentrated on increasing 
the number of their hardened and dispersed ICBMs. As a 
consequence, they can soon--could soon have the capability to 
destroy a large number of U.S. MINUTEMEN if they chose to put 
accurate guidance in their current designs. They do not at the 
moment have accurate guidance. So the Soviets cannot, in my 
opinion, have any substantial effect on MINUTEMAN deployment.
    If however, in the future they were to get an accurate 
delivery capability, then they could indeed begin to take out 
substantial numbers of our MINUTEMAN force.
    Our response to this degradation could take a number of 
forms. One that is being seriously considered is the deployment 
of a ballistic missile defense system of those silos.
    Senator Gore. Another are submarines.
    Dr. Foster. Yes. We could put in additional or improved 
submarines.
    Senator Gore. Another possibly would be a moveable 
launching pad?
    Dr. Foster. On land.
    Senator Gore. On land?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Are there others?
    Dr. Foster. Yes. We could deploy a larger missile in or 
near the current fixed MINUTEMAN sites and provide defense 
again for that.
    Senator Gore. I do not understand.
    Dr. Foster. One of the concerns about the current MINUTEMAN 
in the event of a substantial increase in Soviet capabilities 
is its limited payload, and so one might think of an improved 
capability involving a 5,000 to 10,000 pound payload missile 
installed essentially in the current MINUTEMAN network. Such a 
missile would have a substantially higher value than the 
current MINUTEMAN, and hence would--the defense of such missile 
would be far more attractive
    Senator Gore. I understand. You said larger missiles with 
better defenses.
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Okay. So you have these four ways in which 
you might react if the Soviets developed or perfected a 
guidance system which would give them the capability of taking 
out MINUTEMAN silos.
    Dr. Foster. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Any further questions, Senator Cooper?
    Senator Cooper. No.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Dr. Foster. Penetration aids program.
    You will note that I have described a flexible set of 
building blocks consisting of PAR and MSR radars and two types 
of interceptor missiles, SPARTAN and SPRINT. We also have a 
very large, sophisticated radar called TACMAR, designed 
specifically against sophisticated attacks. They can be put 
together in various ways to provide varying levels of defense 
against different threats.
    For example, if we wished to defend the United States 
against a large Soviet attack, we would provide an overlay of 
an area defense such as I have described. As I mentioned 
earlier, however, it would be necessary to depend primarily on 
terminal SPRINT defenses, including TACMARS, at selected 
cities. A 25-city defense (including the area component) would 
cost about $10 billion. A 50-city defense would cost almost $20 
billion.

       TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 12]

    As a matter of technical judgment, I believe that these 
larger deployments carry with them technical risks. The 
likelihood of large and sophisticated attacks with the 
deployment of significant U.S. defenses increases the technical 
uncertainty of the defensive system. In the absence of 
atmospheric nuclear tests, we simply cannot calculate all the 
effects of many simultaneous nuclear explosions. We would have 
to expect that in an all-out exchange, dozen of their warheads 
would likely explode in our cities.
    By the way--this is likely whether or not we have 
atmospheric tests.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe that sums up the technical 
assessment of BMD. It has changed greatly in recent years and 
no doubt will continue to change. That is why, even in the 
absence of a deployment decision, a high-priority R&D program 
is so necessary.

              BIOLOGICAL DAMAGE RESULTING FROM DETONATIONS

    Senator Gore. I would say to the subcommittee that Dr. 
Foster has requested, if possible, he would like to be excused 
pretty soon. How urgent is this, Doctor?
    Dr. Foster. It is not very urgent, Mr. Chairman. I am at 
your convenience.
    Senator Gore. Thank you, Doctor.
    I would like explore one question with you and then yield 
to my colleagues. At our last tests in the atmosphere over 
Johnson Island, communication was knocked out for a period of 
hours. I realize that this communication may not have been at 
frequencies which our signal system in the missiles may operate 
at, but it does raise a very serious problem, a very serious 
danger, it seems to me, that the detonation of a nuclear 
explosion designed specifically to conglomerate communication 
might compromise our own radar signal systems. Do I 
sufficiently describe the problem to elicit an answer?
    Dr. Foster. You certainly do, Mr. Chairman.
    We were aware in the 1958 period and subsequently that 
detonations at high altitudes could give rise to 
electromagnetic signals of rather high intensity and hence we 
planned those experiments in 1962.
    As a result of the measurements that were taken, all of the 
subsequent studies of our assured destruction forces, as well 
as our ballistic missile defense examinations, have included a 
thorough consideration of these effects. Specifically, for 
example, we have chosen the frequencies of the ballistic 
missile defense systems in the NIKE-ZEUS program so as to 
minimize these effects. Our communications program involving 
satellites is designed in large measure to avoid disruption of 
the service because of this effect. In our offensive forces, 
the MINUTEMAN and POSEIDON are being configured so that 
warheads in those missiles can be burst at very high altitude 
so as to maximize the difficulties that are inherent in any 
Soviet systems.
    Senator Gore. Let us see if I understand what you said in 
your last statement. Our own offensive missiles are being 
configured and designed so as to explode at varying altitudes, 
thus complicating, if not compromising or minimizing, the 
effect of the Soviet antiballistic missile defense system.
    Dr. Foster. No, Mr. Chairman. I am afraid I was not 
sufficiently clear on that point.
    Senator Gore. Is that true? Are we seeking to?
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, to maximize the disturbance on 
communications, one must burst the warhead not near the ground 
but near the top of the atmosphere. To do so, however, requires 
that you have the necessary command mechanisms in the missile 
system, and what I indicated was that in our advanced POLARIS 
and MINUTEMAN systems we are going to have a procedure and a 
configuration such that if desired we can burst the warheads at 
the optimum altitude to cause the greatest electromagnetic 
disturbance to communications in the Soviet Union.
    Senator Gore. Well then, the answer is yes.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Now, turning it again to our defense problem, 
will you describe the possibility of the Soviets and possibly 
later the Chinese utilizing electronics in the same way to 
disturb our own detection defense, if we relied upon such a 
system?
    Dr. Foster. All right. This is in the event we deployed a 
ballistic missile defense.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. What measures are we taking, have we taken, or 
would we take, to minimize the possibility of disruption.
    Senator Gore. With what possible success or failure.
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have recently, on 
considering the NIKE X system, changed the frequency of the PAR 
radar, the perimeter acquisition radar, which I described 
earlier, so as to minimize the difficulty from this particular 
tactic.
    At the very outset the frequencies of MSR and TACMAR radars 
were sufficiently high so that the disturbances that could be 
caused by such tactics were very temporary.
    Senator Gore. Well, very temporary--if it is a matter of 
seconds it might be fatal.
    Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, the whole engagement takes 
place over 5 to 10 minutes on any one threat, and the blackout 
to our high frequency radars occurs over a few tens of seconds 
to a minute. It is that kind of a time scale.
    Senator Gore. I know on one of your tables here we are able 
to--the missile, a possible hostile missile, would appear over 
the horizon at, say, 300 seconds from the time of our earliest 
possible interception. If you have say in the case of a 
multiple warhead, and there is this cloud of tinfoil or chaff 
as you refer to it, and then there is a period of detecting 
which is the decoy and which is the real McCoy, you have a 
matter of seconds, very few seconds involved. That is why I 
asked you the possible duration of this electronic blackout.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    I do not want to try to predict the final tactical solution 
that we will have for this threat you describe. One of the 
solutions is as follows:
    If we see coming over the horizon at a range of 1,500 miles 
a steady stream of chaff and even possibly can see objects 
within the chaff, one tactic we have is as follows: We wait for 
two or three minutes until the chaff has come perhaps halfway, 
and if we are attempting to--and then we might attempt to 
attack the whole length of the chaff simultaneously. So, we 
would first send a missile that would go out to, perhaps, 500 
miles range, and then subsequently others at shorter ranges all 
timed to burst at once. So, it would be in a sense like Bunker 
Hill, and the whole threat, volume would be taken out at one 
time. We would then wait for----
    Senator Gore. Is this going to be a human decision sitting 
at a key or is this going to be an electronic decision 
predetermined?
    Dr. Foster. I think a bit of each, Mr. Chairman. You are 
however, describing an extremely advanced threat.
    Senator Gore. I understand----
    Senator Aiken. They depend on computers, Mr. Chairman. It 
probably will get there three months late like social security 
checks.
    Senator Gore. I hope not.
    Dr. Foster. Any objects which remain, the hard objects 
would subsequently then come and reach the atmosphere and would 
have to penetrate. Those that appeared as real objects would 
then be attacked by SPRINT. The SPRINT has a nuclear warhead.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Dr. Foster. The warhead, however, has a very low yield and 
is mainly fusion and so there is little blackout and, as a 
consequence, there is esentially no blackout associated with 
this aspect of the engagement.
    Senator Gore. Well, I am overstepping my allotment of time. 
I wanted to ask one perhaps less technical question, but one 
which has disturbed me a great deal in thinking about this, and 
yet I have not heard anyone discuss it for a long while.
    Another result of I believe our last atmospheric test in 
the Pacific was that it blinded rabbits hundreds of miles away. 
We are speaking here of a possible defense system of SPRINT 
missiles which have a maximum range of 20 miles and if we are 
defending our cities with SPRINT missiles, and a multiple 
attack comes in, and we have this series of nuclear explosions 
overhead, just coming to the biological question, what is the 
danger of blindness or other effects of blast and radiation?
    Dr. Foster Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be concerned 
with two kinds of effects. The first, as you indicate, is 
blindness. There, I believe, the problem was not SPRINT but the 
SPARTAN explosions.
    If the SPARTAN missile were to be commanded to detonate its 
warhead at altitudes above 350,000 feet, we have no serious 
problems. If, however, for some reason, and this is not in the 
general plan, it is forced to detonate it, at, say 100,000 
feet, then we could have some serious cases of blindness, 
although, of course, that difficulty would be minor compared 
with the consequences of having had the enemy warhead penetrate 
to the ground. So in the current use----
    Senator Gore. It would be a hard choice between being 
killed or blinded.
    Dr. Foster. I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman. The 
individual----
    Senator Gore. I would choose to be blind for a while.
    Dr. Foster. Yes. The individual would have to be looking up 
at that time in about the right direction to cause serious 
trouble.
    Senator Gore. How did it happen that these rabbits were 
looking up? Did they not--with the detonation instinctively 
flicker in that direction?
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, the damage is caused 
substantially before the eye can close, and we arranged to have 
the rabbits despite their desires, looking up in that 
direction.
    Senator Gore. That is a technical question.
    Dr. Foster. In summary, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that 
in the normal deployment and tactics of the NIKE X system that 
there would be any serious damage either to our population or 
to the Canadians north of us in the event we had SPARTAN 
detonations, detonations of the SPARTAN warhead.
    The other question, of course, is the fallout, and in this 
case also the bursts are at heights well above the ground, so 
that there is no problem with fallout at least in the nearterm. 
It would nevertheless raise the activity in the atmosphere. It 
would be subsequent activity, and radiation damage.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
    Senator Clark. Dr. Foster, how far away are we from 
deployment of both SPARTAN and SPRINT if we were to make a 
decision right now to go ahead and deploy them?
    Dr. Foster. I believe, Senator, that with an orderly 
deployment, that is to say doing it right, and that being the 
guiding rule in the deployment, we would not have an initial 
operating capability of the first battery until 1971.
    Senator Clark. And in order to create the situation 
revealed by your figure 5, how long would that take?
    Dr. Foster. That could be completed by mid-1973.
    Senator Clark. And could you state precisely what the cost 
of deployment of the SPRINT and SPARTAN would be on that time 
schedule to the extent indicated by our figure 5?
    Dr. Foster. Yes. That would be $3 billion to $4 billion, 
and then if one wanted to, in addition, deploy, extend the 
equipment to give the necessary coverage of the MINUTEMAN 
system, that would take, extend it, another six months and 
would increase the costs another billion dollars.

                        FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM

    Senator Clark. This is exclusive of any fallout shelter 
program, is it not?
    Dr. Foster. Yes that is correct.
    Senator Clark. Would you recommend such a fallout shelter 
program if we decided to deploy?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, I believe I would, and that amounts to 
about $800 million above the current plan.
    Senator Clark. For the entire country.
    Dr. Foster. Yes that is correct.
    Senator Clark I take it from the answer to the questions 
addressed to you by Senator Gore that you are not particularly 
disturbed about the radioactive fallout aspect of a deployment 
and actual use of SPARTAN and SPRINT. Is that correct?
    Dr. Foster. That is correct, Senator. However, I would be 
very disturbed with the fallout associated with the all-out 
thermonuclear exchange.
    Senator Clark. Of course, I assume that would be 
devastating.
    Dr. Foster. Yes. To be more specific, I do not believe that 
blindness or fallout are aspects of our current concept of NIKE 
X which should be considered in any way as a serious 
limitation.

                         DEPLOYMENT OF NIKE X'S

    Senator Clark. Have we deployed any NIKE X's yet?
    Dr. Foster. No, sir. We have not. We are in the process of 
deploying prototype models to Kwajalein so that we can check 
out a system. That will not be completed until 1967.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    ESTIMATED U.S. DEATHS IN EVENTS OF ALL-OUT ENEMY ATTACK [P. 14]

    Senator Clark. If you would turn to page 6 of your 
statement and the last sentence on page 6 which I quote: ``We 
would have to expect that in an all-out exchange dozens of 
their warheads would likely explode in our cities.'' With what 
estimate of human casualties?
    Dr. Foster. Tens of millions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Dr. Foster. Let me try to start anew. In the event of no 
defense and an all-out attack by the Soviet Union on the United 
States, 150 million could be killed.
    If we deployed a very large ballistic missile defense 
system----
    Senator Clark. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT.
    Dr. Foster. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT and all the radar 
and so forth--let us say it involved $20 billion so that we 
would have 7,000 or 8,000 SPRINTS and 1,000 or more SPARTANS, 
and if the Soviets took no measures to penetrate that defense 
of ours, then we could cut our losses to a few tens of 
millions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  TESTING OF INCOMING MISSILES [P. 23]

    Senator Gore. I have one question about research and 
development that I can just hardly resist asking here. I 
realize that even though we decide against the deployment of--I 
say we, the government, decides against the deployment of an 
ABM system, it is absolutely necessary to continue research and 
development both with respect to ascertaining as much as 
possible of what improvements in ballistic defense the Soviets 
may be able to make, and what hardening and improvement of our 
own offensive capability is necessary, and also this latter 
about which I wish to ask a question.
    What would be within our technical capability by way of 
deployment of ballistic defense in the event that we later 
decided upon such an installation? Now, with that background to 
my question, how do you test, how do you measure, say, over 
Kwajahein and over Johnson Island you have the firing 
theoretically of incoming missiles, and from another island or 
from another location you fire an interceptor missile. I 
realize or I think I realize that by telemetry of the various 
kinds you can measure the proximity of the exchange. But how 
would you measure the possibility of X-ray or gamma ray 
penetration of the incoming missile when you neither generate 
the X-ray or gamma ray by your interceptor missile nor have the 
effect of such on the theoretically attacking missile?
    Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, that is an extremely critical 
question. As you indicate, we do plan to direct against 
Kwajalein Minuteman and Poseidon missiles configured so as to 
represent the most effective means of penetrating ballistic 
missile defenses. We will be able to see on the radar, with 
several radars, just how that attack looks.
    We can, at the same time, direct one or more SPARTANS and 
SPRINTS into the general area and simulate an attack, the 
intercept of an attack, at several altitudes.
    That, as you indicate, however, is not enough because we do 
not know the effectiveness of these defensive warheads without 
actual nuclear explosions.
    It is for that reason that a fair fraction of our current 
underground test program involves the detonation of specially-
tailored nuclear warheads so as to provide the X-rays and the 
gamma rays and the neutrons of the various types for radiation 
of our hardened reentry vehicles, and for that matter our own 
SPARTA and SPRINT warheads, so as to make sure that they do not 
destroy one another.
    In the last three years we have had a whole series of very 
complicated experiments which prove, first, that our offensive 
warheads will work and, second, that they are as hard as we say 
or if we find them to be vulnerable we fix them, and then 
measure to see that they are, indeed, repaired.
    So, this underground program is a very vital part of 
maintaining the effectiveness of our offensive force to provide 
a sure destruction.
    Senator Gore. Can you measure underground the potentiality 
for generating X-rays and gamma rays and also measure the 
deposition of those X-ray on various types of missiles?
    Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We can and we do.

                       SOVIET ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

    Senator Gore. Now, one question leads to so many. The 
Soviets in 1961 did conduct, and with multiple radar 
observation, the actual atmospheric detonation of a nuclear 
weapon and the penetration of that sphere of influence, for 
want of a better word, by another missile with radar 
observation in it in 1961.
    Now, to what extent do those atmospheric tests on ballistic 
defense which they conducted give them an advantage over what 
we can do with underground tests?
    Dr. Foster. One cannot know what the Soviets learned in 
detail from their atmospheric experiments. We can only form a 
judgment. In my judgment what they learned in those tests is 
very small compared with what we have subsequently learned in 
our underground program.
    We, ourselves, had a number of experiments in the 
atmospheric series, as you know, and we learned some things 
which have turned out to be of great importance in the design 
not only of our offensive but our defensive systems. I suspect 
it is the same way with the Soviets.
    Senator Gore. Senator Clark?
    Senator Clark. May I ask one question that will take only 
thirty seconds?
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Senator Clark. Would I be justified in assuming that a 
comprehensive test ban between ourselves and the Soviet Union, 
adequately policed and enforced, could bring further research 
and development into antiballistic missile system pretty much 
to a halt on both sides?
    Dr. Foster. I cannot speak for the Soviet Union. However, I 
do not think it would bring ballistic missile defense research 
and development to a complete halt in this country.
    Senator Clark. Would it cripple it?
    Dr. Foster. It would have a very serious effect on it, yes.
    Senator Clark. Presumably, it would have the same effect on 
the Soviets.
    Dr. Foster. Yes; and, of course, it would seriously affect 
our confidence in its effectiveness particularly against 
sophisticated attack.
    Senator Clark. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gore. Well, rather arbitrarily we must say thank 
you.
    Dr. Foster. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to leave 
that last question without----
    Senator Gore. Let the record show that you were excused, 
but were unready to go.
    Dr. Foster. No, Mr. Chairman, I am worried because the 
question of complete cessation involves to my mind, not so much 
its effect on a ballistic missile defense program, but its 
effect on the maintenance of our assured destruction 
capability.
    Senator Clark. Yes. But at that point, we turn to reliance 
on international cooperation, adequately policed, as opposed to 
conflict, as evidenced by further research in lethal weapons of 
destruction.
    Dr. Foster. Yes, I understand. If one can be sure that we 
are no longer relying on an assured destruction capability, 
then my concern would disappear.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Of course, you would have a very 
interesting section to your question, adequately policed.
    Senator Clark. That is what we are going to ask Mr. William 
Foster about.
    Senator Gore. The committee thanks you very much. You have 
been very forthright, and I think very able. There are many, 
many unresolved questions. I dare say before we finally 
conclude, we will request you to come back for a return 
engagement.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



          UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                      Subcommittee on Disarmament

                            STAFF MEMORANDUM

    Suggested Questions for William C. Foster, Director of the 
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
Non-Proliferation Treaty
    1. How will a non-proliferation treaty help to keep those 
nations you believe closest to the threshold of nuclear weapons 
from deciding to build a bomb? In other words, why do we want a 
non-proliferation treaty?
    2. In 1965 the Indian delegate to the ENDC said that it is 
an ``unrealistic and irrational proposition that a non-
proliferation treaty should impose obligations only on non-
nuclear countries while the nuclear powers continue to hold on 
to privileged status or club membership by retaining and even 
increasing their deadly stockpiles . . .'' How would you answer 
this charge that a non-proliferation agreement without other 
disarmament measures is an unrealistic and irrational 
proposition? Do you think India will sign a nonproliferation 
treaty?
    3. What is the Germans' problem with a non-proliferation 
treaty? How could we meet their objections?
    4. What are the prospects for denuclearized zones--such as 
in Africa or the Caribbean? There are reports that the United 
States is insisting on the right to transit nuclear weapons 
through the Panama Canal in any such zone. Is this true?
Comprehensive Test Ban
    1. Would you agree that the most meaningful way to stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons is a comprehensive test ban?
    2. Has the United States or the Soviet Union technically 
violated the partial test ban by spreading debris from an 
underground test beyond territorial boundaries? If so, why 
haven't such charges been brought by one side or the other?
Conventional Arms Sales
    1. A recent study of conventional arms sales done by the 
staff of the Committee said that ACDA did not have a 
significant role in the arms sales process. Do you agree?
    2. Do you agree with another conclusion of the study that 
policy coordination in the arms sales field is weak?
    3. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, as I understand it, 
is the forum established by the Secretary of State for the 
coordination of major foreign policy decisions. Last week this 
group discussed a major arms sale to Morocco. Did a 
representative from ACDA attend that meeting?
    4. How many professionals in the Arms Control & Disarmament 
Agency work full time on conventional arms control?
Anti-Ballistic Missiles
    1. What effect would an ABM arms race have on arms control 
measures now under consideration, such as a non-proliferation 
treaty or an underground test ban?


                  MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA

                              ----------                              


                        Monday, February 6, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
          Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in 
room S-116 the Capitol, Senator Wayne Morse (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Sparkman, Gore, 
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Holt of the committee 
staff.
    Senator Morse. Gentlemen, this is a long standing tradition 
in this committee. We meet informally. We take a record, but it 
is an executive record, and it is available to you and to us 
only from the point of reference. No announcements are made as 
far as this committee is concerned. I have found--I don't know 
what Frank would say--that I would rather have one of these 
meetings than three or four formal meetings. This is where you 
learn what is really going on in the executive branch. As far 
as I am concerned, we will do more of it this year, Frank, when 
we get together with the AID people.
    I met a scientist down at the White House this afternoon. 
They are going to send up his name and a memorandum to me, 
Pat--a man who will be in charge of the agricultural program in 
AID in Latin America. He has had a long and distinguished 
service in the Department of Agriculture. I think his last name 
is Wilcox.
    Senator Carlson. We had Wilcox over here in the 
Congressional Library for years, and he moved down to the 
Department.
    Senator Morse. No, not that Wilcox. This man used to be a 
professor in Minnesota. It is this kind of a meeting that helps 
us. That is why we thought that you ought to chat with us first 
about whatever you care to in regard to the great Panama 
experience you had, and then the command that you have no. What 
you think of this military aid program in Latin America. What 
you think the problems are. We have one or two questions to ask 
you later, but I would rather have you visit with us first.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT PORTER, SOUTHERN MILITARY COMMAND, 
 ACCOMPANIED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT S. SMITH, PLANS AND 
 POLICY OFFICE, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND ROBERT R. CORRIGAN, 
 POLITICAL ADVISOR TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

    General Porter. First, I think I should tell you a little 
bit about my background. I have heard of Senator Morse, and I 
have known Senator Carlson over the years.
    I went to West Point in 1926 from Nebraska, and I have been 
on military duty since that time. I have lived in every part of 
the world except Southeast Asia. That is the part I don't know 
anything about. Most of my time was either in Europe or in the 
Middle East, until I was sent down to Panama two years ago. I 
have just finished two years in Panama. I have traveled a great 
deal, studying the problem, getting acquainted with our people, 
the ambassador as well as the local people. I guess we have 
clocked altogether over 250,000 miles of travel in the last two 
years.
    The thing that has startled me about Panama and about the 
whole area was, frankly, how little I knew about it from having 
worked here. I thought I knew the problem from the military 
point of view because I had working plans and policy in the 
Pentagon, and I worked in the National Security Council 
Planning Board for two years when President Eisenhower was the 
President, and have seen things. I thought I knew what was 
going on. I didn't realize that these countries are so 
different. It is just astounding.

                         SITUATION IN VENEZUELA

    The situation is--dynamic isn't a very good word, but the 
situation is changing so rapidly in these countries that the 
situation today, I know, for example, in Venezuela, will be 
different in three or four months.
    Just as an example, the Minister of Defense was up here as 
a guest of Secretary McNamara the first of November, Minister 
Gomez from Venezuela. He told McNamara, ``We have no problem as 
far as internal security is concerned. Well, within ten days 
all hell had broken loose again.
    Of course, this time it culminated with them going into the 
university, and they found in the university that this was 
really the headquarters for the guerrillas. The arsenal was 
there. I had heard a joke on this Venezuelan situation from an 
educator friend. I have two brothers who are professors, and I 
met this man through my brother. He said he was in Venezuela, 
and he saw a sign indicating an art class. He was lost, and he 
had little time anyway. He went up to the top floor to see 
where this art class was, and found that they were painting 
``Yankee Go Home'' signs, and they were actually getting credit 
in the university.
    Senator Morse. It is a public scandal.
    General Porter. And they were teaching commercial art 
there.
    Well, this was last year that this happened. But it just 
shows the situation. Well, of course, Gomez had said that he 
had no problem.
    I think a lot of this problem is what the head committee 
that is working for the guerrillas, if they decided they are 
going to stay in the background, or whether they are going to 
go into an act of insurgency.

                          CUBANS IN VENEZEULA

    Senator Morse. Pat points out to me that ten days or two 
weeks ago, a group of Cubans was alleged to have landed in 
Venezuela, and they haven't been apprehended yet. Apparently, 
it is pretty reliable that they landed, isn't it?
    Mr. Holt. So I am told, but the general would know a little 
better than I do, I am sure.
    Senator Morse. Why wouldn't the military establishment of 
Venezuela, I suppose this is possible--you would think they 
would get some trace of them, wouldn't you?
    General Porter. No, I am not certain. With the size and the 
long coastline of Venezuela--people can come ashore in Oregon, 
and you wouldn't know about it. Actually with our Coast Guard, 
we are as well organized if not better than the Venezuelans. I 
made landings on beaches where we had gotten supplies in time 
of war. If you come in at night, you can just disappear, 
particularly if you have got friends there that have things 
organized.
    Senator Morse. Yes, they could have advance agents there.
    General Porter. And right now, from what I can understand 
about the situation in Venezuela, the Cubans are supporting 
Douglas Dravo and his faction of the FALN,\1\ and if the thing 
has all been taped, and where I read, things that have been 
said at the Havana conference, there is extensive coordination 
beginning to come from Cuba.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This could well have been worked out, and they would know 
where they were coming.
    Senator Morse. General, this is Senator Gore of Tennessee, 
General Porter. The general has just started to chat with us. 
We started with Panama, but we got off and were talking about 
the Venezuelan situation. He thinks it will have its effect.

                   ATTITUDE OF THE PANAMANIAN PEOPLE

    What do you think about the general attitude on the part of 
the Panamanian people as different from their government toward 
the United States? Do you think the conditions have improved 
over what they were a couple of years ago?
    General Porter. Well, of course, I am still learning in 
Panama. I do feel that the Panamanian people as a people, the 
little man, has a tie with the Panama Canal, and he has a lot 
of good image of us and of Americans because of his tie with 
the Panama Canal.
    For example, the President started out as a truck driver, 
President Robles. He was a truck driver. That was his first 
job. The first money he got was as a truck driver. Well, he is 
really one of the best friends we have got down there. He is 
having a hell of a time now because he is trying to hold the 
coalition government together, and most of the people in the 
coalition think they would make a better President than he is.
    Senator Gore. You know we are afflicted with a little of 
that now and then here.
    General Porter. But his instincts are good. He is a 
religious man, and he thinks the students ought to be 
responsible. He backed Zaguardia law and order.
    Senator Morse. Senator Hickenlooper, this is General 
Porter.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Hello, General. Nice to see you 
indeed.
    General Porter. We were just talking a little bit about 
Panama. It is a tricky situation, because the press is hostile 
to us.
    Senator Morse. Senator Cooper, this is General Porter.

                     THE RIOT IN PANAMA WAS PLANNED

    Senator Hickenlooper. General, I was in Panama. I left 
about 7 o'clock on the morning that bloody riot broke out down 
there.
    General Porter. This was in January '64?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. I came on to Washington.
    General Porter. It looked spontaneous. It was planned by 
someone, and this is part of the problem, particularly with the 
university down there, and the group in the university planning 
these things to take advantage of what well could be a 
legitimate grievance.

                     MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA

    Senator Morse. Am I correctly advised, General, that it 
falls under your jurisdiction to make recommendations to the 
administration regarding the whole question of the military aid 
program to Latin America? Does that fall under your bailiwick?
    General Porter. Yes. I am sort of the field man, I guess 
you would say, for the Department of Defense in the Latin 
American area. I am the senior military man in the area, and we 
get the country programs together as they come out of each of 
the countries, put them into a package and send them to Defense 
with our recommendations.
    Now, of course, there are guidelines which are provided not 
only by the Congress, but by the administration as to how we 
are going to proceed, but I tried to make a program out of 
these.
    Senator Morse. That is why we would like to have your frank 
appraisal of the situation. Within the committee, I think this 
is a fair statement to say, there is a division of point of 
view in regard to military aid to Latin America, in these 
general respects. Not that there is any difference of opinion 
that aid isn't needed.
    There is a difference of opinion as to the type of aid, and 
as to the amount of aid, and as to whether or not the 
governments themselves are doing all they can for themselves. 
For example, we have been cutting aid on this committee less 
than the House. It works out as a compromise in conference with 
the House each year. We got it down to $85 million, didn't we, 
Carl?
    Mr. Marcy. That was the cash amount.
    Senator Morse. One of the questions they suggested I ask 
you, that you are free to discuss, is where are the cuts to be 
made to come within the $85 million statutory ceiling on sales 
and grants. Are all sales handled from Washington, or does the 
General have a voice in them?
    General Porter. Well, you have asked me about four 
questions.
    Senator Morse. I know. I just wanted to throw it out on top 
of the table. You kick it around in your own way.

           MILITARY ASSISTANCE VARIES FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY

    General Porter. Okay. Let me begin by saying that as far as 
the Military Assistance Program is concerned, it took me about 
a year to make up my mind on the Military Assistance Program as 
to just what it was doing and what it could contribute in Latin 
America, because there the situation varies so from country to 
country.
    I can see a country like Colombia, where there is an active 
insurgency which has been going on actually as a result of the 
Bogatacia in 1948. It has been going on and originally you 
couldn't tell whether these were bandits or people that were 
just outside the pale, because of the acts that they had 
committed in the early fifties, or just what it was.
    But in the two years I have been down there, it is very 
obvious that much of this so-called banditry throughout the 
countryside in Colombia, and most of these countries, has been 
stopped. And what we are dealing with are actually groups that 
are trying to pull the government down and get the support of 
the people to begin bringing communism into these countries.
    Now, also, as I have gone around and looked at the 
countries and gotten acquainted with the military, these people 
are quite different from the men that I knew when I was a young 
lieutenant at Reilly, and the Chileans would come up and go to 
school with us and so on. The playboy is gone from the younger 
military people, and the impression, as I have gotten 
acquainted with senior commanders, they are really in the 
twentieth century. They are working very hard and are very much 
interested in the nation-building problems that they have got 
in their countries.

                     DISCIPLINED MILITARY OFFICERS

    Now I had always thought of the Latin American military, 
based on what I had read and what I had been taught when I was 
in school, that they were a bunch of parasites and were really 
beyond the pale. This isn't the case at all, and particularly 
the younger officers, the officers that have been through our 
school here during the last twenty years. They think pretty 
much the way an American military man does.
    They are a disciplined group, and their interest is in 
supporting their country. They have many of the same instincts 
I have when somebody says something about the United States 
which I don't like. Why my blood pressure goes up. They have 
that same instinct.
    In these countries where their literacy rate is low, they 
are hard at work teaching the youngsters that come in. And most 
countries have the draft, teaching them to read and write, and 
they are working now, most of the countries are beginning to 
have a program where they are teaching the man a trade, so when 
he finishes, he has a trade and can go back to being a plumber, 
electrician, carpenter.
    Otherwise when they get out of the service and they haven't 
anything to do, they have been taught to fire a rifle. Of 
course, they probably knew how to do that, or at least throw a 
machete or a knife, as a youngster, because the law of survival 
is pretty much the rule down there.
    But they are teaching these people a useful trade, so that 
they aren't suckers for somebody that has some money who is 
going to recruit a private gang or get themselves involved, and 
it turns out he is in a guerrilla action too. So, I think this 
is a constructive thing that I didn't know existed when I went 
down to Panama two years ago.
    Senator Morse. May I interrupt you. This is Senator 
McCarthy, General Porter, and Mr. Corrigan and Colonel Smith.

                        MOTIVATION AND EQUIPMENT

    General Porter. One of the problems that we face in all of 
these countries is to give these men, if they have gone into 
the military service, they must have the same motivation I had 
when I went to West Point in 1926. I wanted to be a soldier, 
and I have really never quite gotten over it. I can't explain 
quite why. Some people become ministers, and I sometimes wonder 
why they do that.
    They have a motivation in this regard, but unless they have 
the equipment with which to train, and they have had the basic 
education and technical knowledge that can teach men to stand 
and be shot at in time of struggle and strife, you haven't got 
much to deal with.
    One of the problems that I have seen down there is that 
unless these youngsters are motivated to train their men, they 
are going to become a bunch of bums eventually. From what I 
have seen and heard----
    Senator Morse. Senator Sparkman, this is General Porter.
    Senator Sparkman. Yes, sir, General. Glad to see you again. 
I am not going to be able to stay long. I wanted to come in for 
such time as I could.
    General Porter. The motivation of these people has to be 
kept in mind, particularly if you are trying to deal with them 
as the senior commander. And all of these people are now having 
problems with equipment which they bought from us, either at 
the end of World War II, or which was given to them at that 
time, or it came in under the Military Assistance Program after 
we had such a program, because it is getting to be about twenty 
years old.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are you talking about the people in 
Panama?
    General Porter. I am talking generally.
    Senator Morse. About Latin America.
    General Porter. Now I trained at the beginning of World War 
II with a broom in a Jeep. That was an anti-tank gun. It worked 
all right out on maneuvers, but when you tried to fire, 
assuming you were firing with it, you are in trouble. I am just 
using that as an illustration.
    It is a question of getting these people on motivation more 
than anything else. All these countries have problems now of 
trying to hold a high quality man in the military. The next few 
years are going to be very critical.
    Senator Morse. Come up here, Senator. Senator Aiken, this 
is General Porter. Behind you is Colonel Smith. You know the 
secretary across from you.
    Senator Aiken. I have seen him around.

             QUESTIONS THE EQUIPMENT SENT TO LATIN AMERICA

    Senator Morse. One of the things that we kick around up 
here, and I have discussed frequently, is the type of equipment 
that we are supplying. Questions are raised why tanks, why late 
model military aircraft, why so much heavy equipment? Why 
submarines and destroyers?
    Why not the type of equipment that they need for 
maintaining internal disorder rather than the type of equipment 
that it is alleged we supply them which is used between 
nations? Everybody knows they are not going to war against each 
other down there, for many reasons, and that the type of our 
equipment is subject to question.
    The argument is made, take the Argentine Military 
Establishment there, is all out of proportion as to the number 
of officers to the rank and file. That is typical of some other 
military establishments, it is alleged.
    Now it is questions such as that that you could help 
clarify very much, because we don't claim to have the expertise 
that qualifies us to say. But, nevertheless, it gets into your 
debates on this whole matter of military aid. You get the 
argument that if we don't supply the equipment, they will go to 
Russia, France or Czechoslovakia. Some take the position, well, 
let them go. Let us supply them with the things that will help 
develop them economically rather than militarily.

                           SITUATION IN PERU

    The charge is made that some of the countries like Peru, 
the Indians fill the rank and file, and the sons of the 
families of the wealthy fill the officership. You know the 
argument. But I have the job as chairman here of throwing them 
out on the table and you commenting on them.
    General Porter. Let me take this last one first. Actually 
the Minister of Defense, General Arbelu, is a full-blooded 
Indian. Now there was a time in Peru when what you say was 
true, but there is great change taking place in all of these 
countries, and right now in Peru the Indian is beginning to be 
brought into the fringes of the money economy.
    For example, up at Cusco, where I was in August, the Army 
is running an experimental farm where they have 60 families 
teaching them agriculture, and they have some men who were 
doing their service up there, and they are training them in the 
trades courses. It is potato country, but also they are 
teaching them to handle livestock, chickens.
    In two years, they have taken these Indian families--cocoa 
was one of their sources of getting through the day, and of 
course it has a numbing effect. It is a form of drug. Cocoa, 
liquor and beans were pretty much all they had to eat. Now 
these people are beginning to wear the clothes that they wear 
down in the low countries. In other words, they are beginning 
to get away from the Indian clothes and are beginning to wear 
western clothes.
    They are going into a protein diet. And this hacienda, 
which is a big one, and it never paid its way in the last 25 
years, is in the black, through methods that are being taught 
these people.
    It is interesting that as they come in, all of them, whole 
families are learning to read and write. So that these are 
things that are taking place.
    Now the officer corps in all of these countries is no 
longer from the oligarchy. It is coming in from the middle 
class, and this Indian I am telling you about, who is the 
number one military man in Peru today, he worked his way up 
through the ranks. But what you say was true 15 years ago.

                          SITUATION IN BRAZIL

    We are in a state of change down there, great change. This 
is one of the encouraging things to me, that the officers are 
beginning to come up from the ranks, or they are coming up from 
the middle class, or the lower middle class, and they have the 
interests of their people very much at heart.
    For example, in Brazil, I was in Northeastern Brazil last 
spring. We were up in the area where the sugar plantations are, 
and these big land holdings, and the most critical people of 
the slowness of Castelo Branco with his land reform program 
were the military officers. We were going out to see a road 
project. We had an engineer building a farm-to-market road, so 
they get their produce out of the interior.

                      ``YOUR FORCES ARE TOO BIG''

    When you look at all of the projects, everybody has his pet 
project that he wants to get pushed to the front. There is 
about 25 or 30 years' progress, and they are trying to get it 
all done in one or two years. It is a question of how much you 
can force things like this, and come out without anything 
besides chaos and strife.
    Now on the side of the military establishments, I have 
worked with foreign military forces before I went down there. I 
was out in the Middle East and worked with Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan for two years in this organization, and I know pretty 
much the problem in that area, and you hear these criticisms 
there too. The threat, as we see it, to these countries, and 
the reason they need forces, and what they say the threat is, 
and why they have forces, is quite different.
    I haven't been able to rationalize with them to the extent 
that I can come right out and say, ``Your forces are too big.'' 
I have brought out this subject several times. But I am really 
not in a position, in spite of the fact I can see the threat to 
them pretty well, to say move over, and I will tell you how to 
run your Army, or I will tell you how to run your Air Force or 
your Navy, because my usefulness is done if I did that.
    When you look at the problems in Argentina and the 
communications problem they have in areas between Corrientes 
and Mendoza, and when you go down to the south country, it is a 
hell of a big country. Communications are not too good. And by 
our standards of what would be required if we had mobile 
reserves and transports to get them around, and what they need 
are quite different.
    Then in Brazil, I brought up this matter of size of forces, 
and they said, ``Well, these men that we are getting into the 
Army, we are teaching them to read and write. If they weren't 
in the Army, where would they be? They would be unemployed, and 
they wouldn't be learning a trade. They wouldn't be learning to 
read and write.''

                   AN ALTERNATIVE TO MILITARY SERVICE

    Senator McCarthy. General, could I raise a question at that 
point. This is one of the questions that bothers me. You make 
the Army really the best profession in the country. You said 
earlier that if you didn't give them advanced equipment that 
the best men would be lost.
    Where would they go, to other professions? If so, would 
that be bad? Do you have to put them in the Army in order to 
teach them to read and write? I think this was one of the basic 
questions that concerns those of us who are really looking at 
this thing. You say they wouldn't learn to read and write if we 
didn't put them in the Army.
    General Porter. You have three questions here. Let's take 
one at a time.
    Senator McCarthy. I know it. They are all questions you 
made. I just wanted to back you up on it to see if there isn't 
an alternative.
    General Porter. And your questions are darn good questions, 
and I am not sure whether I can answer to your satisfaction. 
All these countries have something like a draft law, and they 
will get the men. Now the men that normally they are drafting 
into the Army, if they are already students, they have 
exemptions the way we have in our country, and they are not 
going to be drawn into the Army.
    Senator McCarthy. Of course, we are doing the same thing in 
our draft now.
    General Porter. That is right.
    Senator McCarthy. Teaching them to read and write.
    General Porter. And I worked that a hell of a lot of my 
time.
    Senator McCarthy. That is right.
    General Porter. But a lot of these people are outside of 
the money economy. A lot of them have never worn shoes. Their 
basic habits of sanitation and so on are very primitive.
    Now if these people aren't drawn into the Army and pulled 
out of their farm community, they would probably never get out 
of it, because the school situation in a country like Brazil is 
really quite discouraging. You have been down there. You have 
seen it. Wouldn't you agree with that, Bob?
    Now what we are doing with a lot of these boys that are 
coming out, we are bringing them into the twentieth century. In 
the coastal country I would agree with what you say. When you 
get into Sao Paulo, the Rio complex, and up to Belo Horizonte, 
I think that in that area, yes, they would have an opportunity. 
But you get into the northeast, up into the back country of 
Recife, they are just going to exist there all their lives. 
This is one way of helping prime this pump. Teach them a trade 
and bring them along.

                  TEACHING SOLDIERS TO READ AND WRITE

    Senator Hickenlooper. General, is it fair to say that when 
they go into the Army, they are under a discipline to read and 
write?
    General Porter. That is right.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And if they are not in the Army, 
their own discipline is not sufficient to give them any 
stimulus to learn to read and write?
    General Porter. That is absolutely right. Not only that, 
but when they began to get hope, and a lot of these people, you 
look at them, they are not well when they are small, and they 
grow up and have been undernourished all their life. I was 
talking to people down in the Amazon about this. I was asking a 
doctor in Peru about the health of the people in the Amazon 
Basin. She said a lot of these people endemically, by the time 
they are old enough to live and do a man's work, haven't the 
strength to do it because of the ailments that they have got.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Do you know Dr. Popano who ran that 
agricultural farm? He died here a short time ago.
    General Porter. I have read about him.
    Mr. Corrigan. Yes.I knew him very well.
    Senator Hickenlooper. When I was down there I stayed all 
night at the farm, just about that very thing you are talking 
about. He ran that school, getting these youngsters in from all 
over Central America theoretically. He had some from Colombia. 
He said a startling thing. He got them in there; they would 
come in as freshmen. It would take them about four to six weeks 
to get the worms out of them. That is number one.
    Then he said within three months they would gain 40 to 60 
pounds just by getting a reasonable diet. Then he said they 
were ready to learn. He said before that they were indolent. 
They didn't have the stimulus.
    General Porter. To go back to Senator McCarthy's question, 
I feel that probably, and this is just off the top of my head, 
15 or 20 percent of the people that go into the Army might go 
ahead and get a third grade education or a fourth grade 
education anyway. The group that is being called into the Army. 
But the rest of them would not, and they would have less than a 
50/50 chance of meeting a decent wage during their lifetime 
unless they could learn to read and write.

                           LENGTH OF SERVICE

    Senator Cooper. What is the length of service in these 
countries? What does it average, and what do these men do when 
they get out of the Army? Does what they learn there carry on 
in civilian life?
    General Porter. It varies. The minimum tour is a year. In 
some countries it is two years.
    For example, in some of the countries, if a man shows an 
interest in getting a trade, they will extend his service until 
he can become a plumber or a bricklayer or a carpenter. The 
Army has vocational schools where they are training them to do 
this. They are getting ready to do this in Guatemala, for 
example. They are doing this in Peru. They are doing this in 
Colombia. But it varies, Senator, from country to country.
    Now these people will normally go back to their village 
initially. How long they will stay there depends on whether 
they can make a contribution when they get back. But if they 
have a trade and can do such things as bricklaying, they are 
short of people that can do this all over the country or if 
they can fix a radio set or do primitive electrical wiring.
    So the chances are better that they are going to stay and 
work in the countryside and make a decent living there, or 
begin to, if they have the trade. Otherwise, their having seen 
the city, they are going to drift back.

                        MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS

    Senator Morse. I think it would be helpful to the 
committee, if you gentlemen of the committee agree with me, if 
the general would explain to us how the sales programs are 
handled.
    You have got an $85 million ceiling, so-called. How are the 
sales programs handled? Are they handled in Washington? Does 
the General Staff handle them? Who makes the selection? To what 
extent do we turn down their requests for purchase? I think we 
are pretty ignorant about that up here, at least I am. I wish 
you would explain that to us.
    General Porter. Well, the sales program is handled pretty 
much out of Washington. We are just in the throes of changing 
now actually, and I think Mr. McMillan is coming over here to 
testify tomorrow. At least, I was told that. He is to come over 
here tomorrow.
    Senator Morse. Before Armed Services.
    General Porter. I think that is right. The sales program 
has been handled directly from Washington. It has been that way 
for a long time, principally because from the very beginning, 
when the Latin American countries wanted to buy something in 
the United States, the military attache went over to State, 
talked to them in State. Then referred them to people in 
defense, and passed on the shopping list of the things that 
they said they needed. Then they would indicate encouragement 
or discouragement. I will be very honest and say that in the 
two years I have been down country, I have felt that the Latin 
Americans felt very discouraged about trying to buy from us, 
feeling that we did everything we could to slow down selling 
them anything, even spare parts for equipment they had.
    It has come about in part because of the procedures we 
have. They have to get an export license, and they come up. 
They go over to the Pentagon and get a quotation if they want 
to buy from the military. Then they send that down country. At 
that time. we are notified in Panama, my headquarters, that 
they are going to buy or want to buy. Normally then we make a 
comment as to whether we think that is needed or not. There are 
cases where I have found out about it afterwards.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Don't they submit it to you first?
    General Porter. No.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They don't say, ``We have the 
recommendation''?
    General Porter. No, because it comes in through their 
attache, you see. Now this is in a state of flux, and they are 
beginning to draw our people in country into it, but this has 
been handled this way in the last 40 years, and we are just in 
the state of trying to change it.

                          $85 MILLION CEILING

    This $85 million ceiling that the Senate put on this year 
is forcing us to do that. You see the policy that Mr. McNamara 
has announced is that if they will buy, we will take it out of 
the grant program. So this is an oversimplification of the 
ground rules. It would take 15 minutes with a prepared paper to 
give you an accurate statement. But this is pretty much the 
intent.
    That anybody who has the money and will buy, they would 
take priority. Well, this is throwing my programs for these 
countries, making them damned complicated, because I am not 
certain as to just how much of this money is going to be 
available to buy spare parts and to buy weapons and the things 
that I need in these 20 programs.
    I will say this: That every request to buy that has come in 
here in my 20 years down country has really been looked at 
carefully by both the people in State and Defense, to see 
whether it was in our interests to sell.

                          A LOT OF LOST MOTION

    Senator Hickenlooper. It seems to me there is a lot of lost 
motion in that--probably there is a good reason for it, I don't 
know. It would seem to me that the best way to do it is if 
Country X wants certain equipment, they should submit it to the 
local people, and there should be a recommendation that this is 
either excessive or it has utility, or if available and if 
compatible with other programs, it should be granted. Then come 
up here and get the job done, instead of rushing up here and 
back three or four times, and so on.
    General Porter. I think that the procedure you are 
suggesting is one that is under consideration now, but we 
haven't had this fully established.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We haven't abolished the Commission 
for the widows of the War of 1845, I guess. It takes a long 
time to get these things done.
    General Porter. You run into additional things. There are a 
number of purchasing missions, for example, here in Washington 
from these countries. I feel that people down country would 
prefer to come in, the military people would be very happy and 
prefer to come in this way, but this is the way they have been 
doing it for 25 years.

                        GRANTS CAN BE A WINDFALL

    It would be useful to us, because we could get a better fix 
on what the requirements were, and our people in country would 
know about them too. But in some of these countries where they 
have limited means and they get a windfall of $100,000, the 
equivalent of that in foreign exchange, they are going to get 
it spent and committed before the end of the fiscal year, just 
the way some of our people do here, particularly when you have 
crying needs. They are going to get the first thing that they 
can.
    Senator Morse. They come up here from State and the 
Pentagon Building through their officials. The State and the 
Pentagon Building get in touch with you then to get your 
recommendation before you go ahead and make any arrangements 
with them?
    General Porter. That is right. Normally I know about it. 
There have been cases where I haven't, but I think this is the 
exception.
    Senator Morse. I think it is so important if you are going 
to do it, as Senator Hickenlooper says, it is the cart before 
the horse. If you are going to do it that way, they certainly 
ought to get back to you for your recommendation.
    General Porter. Actually, what I have found out in my two 
years down there is that the Latin American is not a program or 
a plan, whatever he is, whether wearing a civilian or military 
suit. They sort of live from hand to mouth. One of the things I 
have been trying to do is get these people working, and I know 
they are working through the Alliance for Progress to do the 
same thing, to try to get them to chalk out where they are 
going to be in five years, and how they will get there in the 
most economical way. We are just beginning to make some 
progress.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They can always do it manana.

                    A NEW BREED OF MILITARY OFFICERS

    General Porter. But we are getting a new breed down there 
now. Truly there are a lot of people that are beginning to see 
that unless they program ahead, they are going to be blown by 
the wind, and they are never going to get to their destination.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think they have a lot of capable 
people in each of these countries, but the question of the 
percentage of the influence and control that those capable 
people have realized, what you are saying, how much authority 
they have from time to time.
    General Porter. Well, it has been encouraging in the two 
years I have been down there to see that the military are doing 
better now than they were two years ago, and not so much 
through anything I have been able to do except to just beating 
away on them. And this matter that unless you know where you 
are going, how you are ever going to get there. You just start 
out in a certain direction, and you wander and are blown around 
by the winds.

                         SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

    For example, in Argentina, we had just gotten the Argentine 
military to develop for themselves a five-year program to try 
to improve their forces. In doing that, it was interesting to 
see from the beginning what they needed.
    They were beginning to cut back in the size of forces and 
equipment. For example, this A4B deal. They were going to 
retire, as I recall, two planes for each A4B that they were to 
get, and they were to get 50.
    Actually, we began to show them that they could do better 
than that, because the maintenance problems in trying to train 
the pilots, they do the same training program and keep their 
pilots proficient with less planes than what they planned to 
buy. But they had never faced up to these things until we began 
talking to them and getting this sort of thing worked out.
    Going back to my life as a young lieutenant in the early 
days here, we were pretty provincial in those days too. When 
you face up to the fact that most of these countries are about 
50 years behind us in planning and programming techniques, and 
in their sense of responsibility and in their schooling, it is 
pretty hard to bring them up to 1967 when they are in 1920 or 
1927 in a lot of their thinking and in a lot of their 
activities.

                     FORMULA FOR CUTTING OFF FUNDS

    Senator Morse. When Congress put a ceiling on, speaking 
hypothetically now, like the $85 million ceiling, and State and 
the Pentagon have to cut under that ceiling, is there any 
particular formula that is followed as to whether the cut will 
be taken off of grants or taken off of sales?
    General Porter. Well, let me explain how our programs are 
put together.
    Senator Morse. That is what we need.
    General Porter. We have a table that shows the money amount 
under the $55 million ceiling that was on before the $85 
million was put on. We had a table which showed the amount. 
They put in what was called defense articles for each country 
under that $55 million ceiling. Added to that was a certain 
amount for training. And then the overhead and administrative 
costs and the program were involved.
    At that time under the $55 million ceiling on defense 
articles, there was no ceiling on sales, you see, the amount of 
credits that could be developed. I want you to listen to this, 
Bob, because he helps put the programs together in country. I 
am explaining how we put the program together.
    Now under that table 36, as they call it, that is showing 
what money could be available, based on programs and 
discussions that come out of the countries. Then we go ahead 
and put a program together.
    Now with the $85 million ceiling that had been put on, this 
actually was about a 60 percent cut in each of these programs, 
if you took it right across the board, because of the sales 
that would have to be accommodated under this $85 million 
ceiling. So, we went back to work and began to see what we 
would do, what programs we would defer, based on the 
programming ahead.

                           TRAINING PROGRAMS

    Mr. McNamara requires us to have a 5-year program for each 
of these countries. The only thing we could do would be to take 
certain types of equipment that weren't as much needed for 
modernization, and looking at the threat that was in the 
country and the state of training of people, and people that 
had gone into the program, get them trained. Start training, 
for example, on communications equipment or something like 
that, so it wouldn't create complete chaos in these countries 
due to this change in policy, which came from the $85 million 
ceiling.
    For example, it takes about 50 weeks' training to get a 
radio operator trained to run a military radio these days. We 
have to put him in training far enough ahead so that when the 
equipment gets there, we can marry him up with this piece of 
equipment.
    Now in doing that, we fixed up some articles or lists from 
each of the countries to get a deferred list of items that 
would not be funded in each of these countries until we could 
see how the sales program worked out. It is pretty difficult 18 
months ahead of time to see what foreign exchange they are 
going to have available in country, and what the credit is 
going to be from country to country.
    This list is being held together intact over in the 
Department of Defense now, but it is not being funded under the 
'67 program until we see what money is available for grant aid. 
But the Pentagon agreed, I pushed them, to go ahead with the 
grant program higher than the sales figure in that the material 
that was in the grant program was so important, particularly 
during this year, to the continuity of operations in country. 
For example, where there are spare parts; some replacement 
vehicles; communications vehicles; certain aircraft that are 
needed; batteries, a lot of things. Batteries, for example, for 
a submarine which needs to be fixed. If we just stop this in 
mid-stream, it would do nothing but create chaos in all twenty 
countries.
    My interest is in trying to get in any change of policy to 
get an orderly change so that we don't completely wreck their 
military establishments in one or two years. Now this list that 
we have now, that we have what, $11 million?
    Colonel Smith. $11.1 million. Yes, sir.
    General Porter. In checking today and talking to the people 
in the Pentagon on what the military purchasing commissions 
here are talking to them about, it looks as if we are going to 
have to go back into our grant aid programs again to try to see 
what more we can get out of them. In other words, the grant 
program is going to take another beating. I don't know whether 
I have answered your question.

                            THE LOAN PROGRAM

    Senator Morse. It helps very much. Before I call on Pat for 
a supplement, there is another facet of this that I would like 
to have you explain to us. You have got the grants, and you 
have got the purchases, grants and sales.
    Now, we have the loan program. That is causing some 
confusion up here. Last year at the last session a bill was 
offered for the calendar, and went over, and it will be up 
shortly. As I recall, Pat--Carl, this is that loan bill that 
came out of Armed Services--it was three destroyers for Brazil, 
two for Argentina, one for Colombia, and a submarine for Chile 
and a submarine for--it was Colombia, I guess.
    Mr. Holt. Three destroyers for Argentina, two for Brazil, 
one submarine for Chile, one destroyer for Colombia, two 
destroyer escorts for----
    Senator Morse. No airplanes?
    Mr. Holt. This is just naval.
    Colonel Smith. This is what?
    Mr. Holt. This is the '66 bill that didn't pass.
    Senator Morse. It didn't pass. It was held up. We took the 
position it ought to get into Foreign Relations for review too. 
They got it on the calendar the last week as I recall, and it 
raised some questions. Now I understand that there is a 
proposal, based upon the 1965 Loan Act, for a destroyer to be 
loaned to the Argentine.
    Mr. Holt. If I understand it correctly, there was 
legislation passed in '64 or '65.
    Senator Morse. Sixty-five.
    Colonel Smith. That is correct.
    Mr. Holt. Authorizing the loan of destroyers for Argentina.
    Colonel Smith. Three for Brazil, two for Argentina. Chile 
was cut out and so was Peru.
    Mr. Holt. Right. But this has never been fully implemented, 
and it is not proposed to do so.
    Colonel Smith. It has never been fully implemented, and it 
is being considered for implementation. As a matter of fact, 
they have gone for the one destroyer for Brazil as of today. 
The situation is about halfway through the rebuild for Brazil.
    General Porter. These destroyers, the U.S. offered the 
Brazilians and Argentina destroyers which were of early World 
War II vintage, and the cost to them of repairing these 
destroyers was how much, Bob, a couple of million dollars?
    Colonel Smith. About $5 million.
    General Porter. I know, but between the A, B and C type, 
there is about $1 or $2 million more to repair a C type than a 
B type.--
    Colonel Smith. That is right.
    General Porter. To get it so it would be of any use to 
them. Of course they were trying to get C and O to give them, 
make D type available. And he said no they are out in Vietnam. 
So there has been a lot of study of this type C destroyer on 
the part of both Brazil and Argentina, to try to find the 
destroyers that are in the best condition.
    They have been studying these ships for six to eight 
months, trying to find a ship that they thought would be worth 
rehabilitating, you see, because we have taken out of mothballs 
naturally the best and put them back in the fleet to use them 
out in Vietnam.
    Colonel Smith. Senator, it doesn't cost the taxpayer now on 
these loans. The country receiving the loan, for example, 
Brazil, pays this rehabilitation activation cost. In fact, on 
the $85 million ceiling-- a few words about title X. The value 
of the hull itself is charged against this ceiling. There is no 
U.S. money spent on these destroyers when they are loaned, and 
we have a recapture clause at any time.

                  WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT IS NECESSARY

    Senator Morse. What can we say about the nature of this 
equipment in answer to the charge that this is the type of 
equipment that we shouldn't be making available? That we should 
make a different type of military equipment available to them?
    Who am I to say? I don't know what type of equipment they 
ought to have. The argument is that this kind of equipment 
isn't necessary to maintain internal order. It isn't necessary 
to protect them from a Communist coup. They need helicopters 
and light equipment for that, and personnel for that, rather 
than this heavy equipment constantly building up the military 
establishment.
    It goes back to the first point, however, that the General 
made very early here in the day. If we are going to get the 
class of personnel that you want, referring to what you say, 
you have got to have training in all the various aspects of 
military operation.
    General Porter. Let's just talk a minute about the Navy 
problem in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. They 
are the countries that are the leaders down there as far as the 
Navy is concerned.
    These countries live by the sea. When we started in with 
this, under the Rio Treaty--and are talking about Western 
Hemisphere defense--this was going to be a partnership, and all 
of our bilateral with them back in the early fifties was to be 
a joint effort.

                      SWITCHING INTERNAL SECURITY

    Now we started during the Kennedy administration, right 
after Cuba, we began switching over to internal security. But 
we never really went down to renegotiate these bilaterals.
    In some of these countries, they still are thinking in 
those terms. But actually you look at the situation in Brazil, 
or Argentina, with their long coastline and the responsibility 
that the Argentina navy has for the south country in Argentina. 
I don't say that the destroyer is what is actually needed. I am 
not sure what they need because they are doing all sorts of 
things. They are the administrators for that southern area of 
Argentina.
    But they need destroyers to deal with the policing of their 
maritime provinces in the south. The seas are bad. Their Navy 
is something like ours. They have Air, they have Marines, they 
have pretty much a complete force, but they are trying to 
police these maritime areas principally with their forces.

                        THE PANAMA CANAL PROBLEM

    From where I sit in Panama looking at the Panama Canal 
problem, we have taken the Panama Canal as a commerce route 
that will always be open. If anything did happen there, and I 
should probably cross myself and knock on wood because 
hopefully we will never get into this situation, then all of 
our shipping between the east and west coasts is going to have 
to make that long route down there. The smaller craft are going 
to go through the Magellan Straits and a the big craft are 
going to go around the Cape. Then because of the weather, 
Navies of Argentina and Chile are going to have to lead a lot 
of these merchant ships by the hand, because there is no coast 
guard as such.
    The Navy handles the coast guard operations for the whole 
country, and then destroyers are about the smallest craft that 
can live in some of the high seas you get down in the south 
country there around the Cape of both sides.

                   NAVAL ROLE IN CHILE AND ARGENTINA

    Yet, for example, in Chile, down in the straits of 
Magellan, I was down in December and studied that thing because 
of its strategic position. You have 49 knot winds. That is the 
ordinary, day in and day out blow that they have down where the 
Straits of Magellan exit into the Pacific Ocean. There are 
terrible storms there all the time.
    I really feel, and I didn't feel strongly on this until I 
went down there on this and studied these problems, that there 
is a deep water role for the Navy of Argentina and Chile.
    That doesn't mean they need aircraft carriers or cruisers, 
but they need destroyers. They need craft that will stand up in 
bad weather because merchant ships get into distress and they 
have to police the southern waters.
    Brazil with its big coastline and its problems is really a 
maritime power because of overseas trade. The same way with 
Peru. Between 95 and 100 percent of their trade goes by ship, 
and the other less than 5 percent by air.
    That is the only way they can get the stuff out. These 
countries have a tradition, a naval tradition. As a soldier it 
is sort of hard for me to explain what a Navy tradition is, but 
they have very capable people, and Peru is probably the best. 
Chile comes next. But these destroyers are really needed by 
these countries, not for the guns on them, but for the role it 
permits them to provide as far as their country is concerned.

                              BAD STRATEGY

    Senator Morse. What are we going to say to the argument--
and I am just putting this out in our own executive session 
before it goes to the floor--that if we expand the loan 
program, which is what this '66 bill allegedly attempts to do, 
and therefore was a runaround the $85 million--and there was a 
demand to block it until we looked at it longer--what are we 
going to say to the argument that if you are going to put a 
ceiling on for grants and sales, then subsequently come around 
with a loan program that loans a great deal of equipment, 
whatever its value is, that amounts in fact, to increasing the 
ceiling. Therefore, the legislation ought to put one ceiling 
and say to the Pentagon Building that this covers loans, and it 
covers grants and it covers sales.
    I think it was bad strategy, just giving you my opinion. 
Carl, you listen to this. You were in on this discussion we had 
at the end of a year when they brought up at the last minute 
this loan bill, and it stirred up such a hornet's nest around 
here.
    General Porter. This is on the Navy ships?
    Senator Morse. Yes, on the Navy ships. What are we going to 
say to meet the argument that the Pentagon Building should come 
in with one package, and that legislation in a given session 
shouldn't wait until after the foreign aid bill is passed. Then 
they lose out, say, in the foreign aid bill by getting a lower 
ceiling than they wanted, and then subsequently give us an end 
run play with a proposal for a lot of loans of equipment, which 
in effect breaks the ceiling? How are we going to meet this 
next year?
    Mr. Marcy. Let me add one thing, Senator. The other fact 
that is added there is sales. You see, in effect, when you make 
a sale of military equipment, you are using part of the 
economic strength of that country to buy the military equipment 
which in turn means perhaps you have to increase the economic 
aid. So sales, grants and loans are all combined.
    Colonel Smith. I don't believe Senator Morse's point here 
is that your present, the last Fulbright amendment, included 
grants, sales and these ship loans.
    Senator McCarthy. It didn't include the ships.
    Colonel Smith. They all counted under your $85 million 
ceiling.
    You must be referring to a bill with which we are not 
familiar.
    Senator Morse. This is a question of fact that I didn't 
cover. I am glad I raised it. The $85 million also included the 
loans.
    Colonel Smith. It included ship loans unless there is 
wording in this new bill that exempts it from the ceiling.

               VALUE OF SHIPS COUNTED AGAINST THE CEILING

    Senator McCarthy. I thought the ships were granted by a 
separate act that had no relationship to the ceiling.
    Colonel Smith. They are granted, Senator, by Title 10 code 
as a separate act. However, by the Fulbright amendment, their 
value counts against the ceiling.
    Senator Corrigan. And their rehabilitation.
    Colonel Smith. The rehabilitation would count if the U.S. 
does it. If they do it, it does not count.
    Senator Morse. The Colonel says they must do it.
    General Porter. We are telling them they must do it, but 
this is still being worked out because they are so short of 
money.
    Colonel Smith. If they borrow money to do it, it counts 
under the ceiling or even if we guarantee the loan.
    Senator McCarthy. You mean if the Defense Department does.
    Colonel Smith. That is correct, sir.

                          EXPORT-IMPORT LOANS

    Senator McCarthy. Are the Export-Import loans guaranteed by 
the Defense Department or are they separate?
    Colonel Smith. No, sir. Export-Import guarantees certain 
reverse loans.
    Senator McCarthy. They don't count, the Export-Import 
loans, for the shipment of military equipment would not be 
included.
    Colonel Smith. If it is military equipment sponsored by 
DOD, it counts against the ceiling.
    Senator McCarthy. I see, but if it were an entirely private 
sale?
    Colonel Smith. Private sales do not count.
    Senator McCarthy. Approve it, you would still have to 
approve the private sale.
    Colonel Smith. If they were to get an Export-Import loan 
without Defense Department guarantee, which is almost 
impossible, it would not count. But that has never happened. 
Export-Import will not touch this normally.
    Senator McCarthy. Didn't they buy some arms from this 
fellow over in Alexandria because it was cheaper to buy from 
him than from the Defense Department, last year, Venezuela did?
    Colonel Smith. Venezuela? If they did, and they didn't get 
a loan through the DOD----
    Senator McCarthy. That would be outside the scope.
    Colonel Smith. It would be outside the scope.

                SALE OF AIRPLANES TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA

    Senator McCarthy. Let me ask about a specific sale or 
transfer. The 50 airplanes, what are they getting, 25?
    Colonel Smith. Twenty-five.
    Senator McCarthy. They asked for 50, and they will probably 
get the other 25. You don't think so?
    Colonel Smith. I don't think so.
    General Porter. We don't see where they are going to come 
from.
    Senator McCarthy. We originally approved 50 though. So the 
reason we are not selling them 50 is that we don't have them?
    General Porter. That is right.
    Senator McCarthy. At the time, the Chileans argued that 
anything you could do to cut it down was good from their point 
of view. They said, ``If they get 50, we have got to have 30 
just for political purposes.'' Now why couldn't we have said 25 
in the first place instead of 50, so the Chileans could then 
say, ``They got 25, we have to buy 15.'' We went for 50, and 
now we say they really don't need 50, 25 will do. This is the 
kind of game they play, and I don't understand.
    General Porter. This interplay between Argentina and Chile, 
from where I sat, didn't look the same way to me.
    Senator McCarthy. That is what the Ambassador told me.
    General Porter. He was trying to make a case and make a 
name for himself by using Argentina as a lever to get us to go 
ahead and sell F-5's.
    Senator McCarthy. His first position was don't sell to 
Argentina; we won't buy any.
    General Porter. He was speaking for himself.
    Senator McCarthy. I thought he was speaking for the 
Christian Democrats. He is the number two man.

                      AIRCRAFT FOR PILOT TRAINING

    General Porter. I know, but actually the military had to 
have replacement aircraft to keep their pilots in training. 
They were so short of aircraft that they had to find aircraft 
from some place. General Rosavitz, when I first went down to 
Chile, was talking about trying to find an aircraft that he 
could use for pilot training, and we offered him an F-86. Well, 
the F-86 has some wing problems. By the time they got through 
with the wing modification, they would have a lot of money tied 
up in those aircraft, more than he felt they were worth.
    Now this was the reason that the Argentine went to the A4B, 
instead of the F-86.
    Rosavitz, though, was prepared to take an aircraft that 
would keep the pilot training going. But Tomich up here got 
into the act. The first thing you know, this had political 
overtones, and we had a so-called arms race, competition 
between Argentina and Chile. This would never have happened had 
this been handled only on the military circuit, and had we been 
able to say, ``Look, come 1970 there will be a new aircraft 
that you can go ahead with, put your money in for 10 or 15 
years available, so you can keep your pilots going.''
    A lot of these pilots go into civil air work down there, 
and they have used the military as a recruiting ground for 
their civil air fleet which makes sense. We are doing it here 
if we can. We are having trouble keeping military pilots in the 
Air Force now, flying DC-6's and 7's.

                      ARMS RACE WAS JUST A DEVICE

    I will be very honest with you, and please don't ever use 
this. But this whole business of an arms race between Chile and 
Argentina was a device used on the part of the Chileans, hoping 
that they could shake us loose from F-5 earlier. It was picked 
up by the newspapers because the newspapers down there are 
pretty much hostile to Frei, and the first thing you know, it 
is taken from one country to another and the thing just 
snowballs.
    Senator McCarthy. Who wanted to shake loose the F-5's, the 
government or the military?
    General Porter. These Air Forces in South America would 
like very much to have the F-5 because they see it as an 
airplane that is easy to maintain over the long term, in the 
next 15 year. They feel that within 15 years a propeller-driven 
airplane in the commercial world is going to be pretty much a 
thing of the past. They are looking to their pilot training, as 
General Rosavitz said to me, trying to keep the seed alive.
    Also we are working to try to get some sort of a counter-
insurgency aircraft going, which would be a propeller-driven 
job. But that hasn't been coming along too well, and we 
couldn't offer them and suggest that they put their money into 
an F-5 or something like that because we didn't have anything 
we could promise them.

                       HOW THE FIGURE WAS REACHED

    Senator McCarthy. What about the question of the number, 50 
as against 30 in Chile, which was the Chilean number they 
insisted they would need to offset 50 advanced jet aircraft in 
Argentina? Why not 25 and 15? I mean what are they worth, $2 
million a piece roughly?
    General Porter. Here is the way the 50 figure was arrived 
at.
    There were certain squadrons of aircraft in Argentina that 
needed to be replaced. In doing that, they had a certain number 
of aircraft, and I can't recall the exact figure, I think 
something like 80, that they were going to replace, either 100 
or 80, that they were going to replace with these 50 aircraft.
    They figured with the pilots, if they stood down from these 
80 aircraft, they could keep their training going with the 50 
aircraft.
    Senator McCarthy. I want it clear I don't think there is 
danger of military action between Chile and Argentina.
    General Porter. No, and the military down there knows this 
is not going to be.

                       A QUESTION OF APPEARANCES

    Senator McCarthy. It becomes a question of appearances and 
of politics and of the economic consequences of this sort of 
thing. You talk about training in these F-5's and whatever 
other jets they have got. The word I get is that the experience 
of these pilots in these hot fighter planes doesn't qualify 
them for commercial use. Our airlines are short of pilots, but 
they are saying they are not getting the kind of men out of 
these hot jets that they used to get out of the military. They 
don't make good pilots on a commercial jet.
    General Porter. I think that is a matter of opinion. As a 
soldier I am not qualified to answer that sort of question.
    Senator McCarthy. I don't know whether that is true or not, 
but that is what I am told. Then they say we go to South 
America and they want to train them on hot jets so they can 
transfer them to commercial flying. It would be better to 
transfer them to jet transports or something like that.
    General Porter. This speed of aircraft, this A4B is below 
Mach 1, so it really isn't a supersonic plane. The F-5 is just 
over. So we are not talking about these really advanced jets, 
and so on. This 30 versus 50, this is the first time I have 
heard that, Mr. Senator.
    Senator McCarthy. That was the Tomich ratio as I heard it 
the first time. That if it was cut down they wouldn't need as 
many.
    General Porter. I really think this ploy on the part of the 
Chileans shows how desperately they want us to sell them 
aircraft. They would have bought the A4B. They would have 
bought anything that would fly if it would get them a 
reasonable aircraft, but we didn't have it, you see, and with 
procedures and our policy, the F-5 was not in sight for at 
least five years.

                             BRITISH PLANE

    Senator McCarthy. How good a plane is this British one they 
are buying now?
    General Porter. Well, our people say it is a pretty good 
plane. It won't do the things actually that the F-5 will do for 
them.
    Senator McCarthy. It is supersonic?
    General Porter. No, it isn't. It is subsonic. In a dive it 
will break the sound barrier.
    Senator McCarthy. You can do that with most any airplane, 
can't you? You mean it can go supersonic and come out of it?
    General Porter. That is right. It has to go into a dive to 
do it, but it isn't truly a supersonic plane. We haven't got 
any down there. Now going to newspapers, the Peruvians have 
been looking at some that the British have, this Electric.
    Senator McCarthy. The lightening? That is what they sold 
Saudi Arabia.
    Colonel Smith. The aircraft is good, Senator. The question 
is how long they will continue support of the aircraft.
    General Porter. This is a problem. Now on this particular 
thing of support, the thing that the Latin American military is 
concerned about, they feel if they can't come to us and buy and 
they go to Europe and buy, they are going to pay more to begin 
with. Then there isn't the assurance that there will be the 
spare parts, and they know that they are going to have to tool 
up again to get the spare parts, which means another contract. 
The maintenance of it will be much higher than it would be if 
they can get into our market.

               MC NAMARA'S HARD-NOSED POSITION ON GRANTS

    Senator Morse. You have been very generous with your time. 
I only have three quick questions to ask now.
    It has been reported to us, though not reliably, that the 
Secretary of Defense has recommended against the continuation 
of the grant program for the military equipment to Latin 
America. I would like to know whether or not that is true. 
Second, has the State Department agreed with him?
    General Porter. I am not certain that you should ask me 
that question.
    Senator Morse. All right. That is all I need to know.
    General Porter. Because I am a subordinate over there. I 
could tell you what my view was as to the importance of the 
military program down there, but I am not in the policy-making 
business. I make recommendations.
    Mr. Corrigan. Could I say--I am with the State Department, 
and I am Political Advisor to General Porter. I think I can 
merely tell you that I have been in the State Department for 
the last few days talking with some people about a lower level 
over there in the Latin American section, and they tell me that 
this is true.
    That apparently Mr. NcNamara is taking a hard-nosed 
viewpoint that grant military assistance should stop rather 
precipitously within a year or two. ARA, the Latin American 
section, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, is taking very strong exception to 
this. He thinks that such abrupt stoppage of the grant military 
assistance program would be mischievous and counterproductive 
at a time when we don't know exactly where we are going in our 
relationship with Latin America. He thinks eventually that 
perhaps there should be a diminution of it, but it should be 
more orderly and not a meat-ax approach.
    I understand that last Friday there was a meeting on this, 
a so-called interdepartmental regional group meeting, IRV, and 
there Mr. Lincoln Gordon did take a strong position that he 
disagreed with the McNamara position, which was expounded at 
that meeting by a representative of Mr. McNamara's office.
    I understand Mr. McNamara's representative, on the other 
hand, did hold to his guns, and that this matter is being 
referred up to what we call the senior interdepartmental group, 
which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. If they don't 
come to an agreement there, the matter would be referred to the 
President.

                          GRANTS VERSUS CREDIT

    Senator Morse. This is a hot one up here you know, this 
grant versus credit.
    General Porter. You know from where I sit I think the grant 
program is terribly important to us down there, because the 
only way we really are going to influence and control the 
introduction of weapons into South America in my judgment, 
considering the nationalistic attitude of the people and their 
Spanish temperament, is through collaboration, where we are 
working together and we can give them advice, and say ``Look, 
we will help you get this equipment if you need it and if you 
can justify it.''
    Now the way we are going to go, the way things are 
developing now, we are not going to be able to do this. 
Venezuela is a good case in point.
    In Venezuela now where there are advisers, when they ask us 
our views, we can tell them, but we are not privy to what is 
going on in Venezuela. But if you look at the grant aid program 
and look at how much budget in most of these countries is 
available for modernization, replacement of old rifles with the 
M-1 and things like that, you will find that the 5 percent or 
so of their budget that our military assistance grant program 
provides is over 50 percent of what they have for modernization 
of their equipment. When you look at the trends, what this does 
in the way of giving new radios to them, new equipment of that 
nature, and the vehicles that will carry the radios so you can 
use them out in the field, helicopters and things like that, 
this is the difference between having a force which will be 
able to do the job and not having it. They are pretty well 
mixed up. Their budget is pretty well tied up to about 85 or 90 
percent in all of these countries on fixed charges of cost of 
personnel, maintaining their plant, or civic action activities, 
if they are committed to road building, these educational 
programs, and it is hard to smoke these things out.

                  NON-MILITARY COSTS FOR CONSTRUCTION

    For example, in Brazil, it shows if you just look at their 
budget, about 60 percent of the Brazilian budget goes into the 
military. But if you actually could break out the non-military 
cost of the Brazilian forces, you would find that less than six 
percent of the money, looking at their overall budget, actually 
goes for internal security, pure internal security or national 
defense projects. About ten percent of that is going into 
roadbuilding, railroad building, and other civil action 
projects that they are in.
    Senator Morse. Airfields.
    Mr. Corrigan. And running the service up and down the 
Amazon. The Navy does that, you see, and going into the back 
country, the airfields and the air service, running the medical 
service into those back areas. One of the most difficult things 
that I have gotten into is trying to figure out just exactly 
what goes into their defense appropriation and how much is 
used.
    It varies from country to country. In Argentina quite a lot 
of the budget goes into civil action type stuff there, but the 
Argentine has never admitted it was civic action, but it is up 
in the northwest.

                        MILITARY ADVISORY GROUPS

    Senator Morse. Senator McCarthy, we have one other 
question, as you know, that we discussed here that I thought 
the General could help us with. That deals with the military 
advisory groups in these various countries.
    I wanted to discuss with him if he would from the 
standpoint of Nicaragua. First, what do you think is the 
situation down there, and how large is our military advisory 
group? To what degree, if any, do the critics which are 
attributed to the military getting involved in military coups, 
working with an American military advisory group. And I think 
we ought to have ammunition to answer those criticisms.
    Senator McCarthy. Are there any other countries that have 
military advisory groups in major countries in Latin America, 
or is it only United States groups there?
    General Porter. In Paraguay, there is one from Argentina 
and there is one from Brazil. But they are working on specific 
things.
    Senator McCarthy. These are Latin American countries?
    General Porter. That is right.

                           EUROPEAN ADVISORS

    Senator McCarthy. Any of the European countries?
    General Porter. No. Up until World War II, yes. Germany and 
France had all of them. We started in 1940 or '41.
    Senator McCarthy. What is the tradition of the Brazilian 
Army? Was that German-trained or not? Do you know?
    General Porter. Bob, can you answer that?
    Mr. Corrigan. Prior to World War II, it was. Since World 
War II, it has not been.
    Senator McCarthy. What about Argentina? That was German, 
wasn't it?
    General Porter. Bolivia was German; Chile was German.
    Senator McCarthy. I know Chile was German. I thought 
Argentina was not German. I wondered whether you noted any 
difference in the way in which their army responded in 
political crisis on the basis of whether they were German, 
French or British trained.
    General Porter. I think actually in Argentina the French 
were there, because they are still sending French----
    Senator McCarthy. I think so. Generally, where the French 
are, the army is a little more political.
    General Porter. Peru is French also.
    Senator McCarthy. Chile was German.
    General Porter. Chile is German.
    Senator McCarthy. They are loyal to any administration, 
aren't they?
    General Porter. Yes. Bolivia was German also. But the 
reasons that the Chileans are loyal to their administration is 
for other reasons.
    Senator McCarthy. You don't think it has anything to do 
with being trained by Germans?
    General Porter. No.
    Mr. Corrigan. So was Brazil. They weren't too loyal when 
they kicked out Goulart.
    Senator McCarthy. I was thinking of that. You think most of 
the army there is becoming Americanized?
    General Porter. Oh yes. The German Ambassador in Panama, 
who had been in Bolivia, told me he was sorry the Germans 
didn't leave Bolivia sooner, because there were still some bad 
effects in the Bolivian Army.
    Senator McCarthy. German tradition?
    General Porter. From the days of German tradition. He was 
getting after me because we hadn't been able to change all of 
these things. I don't think that is a very good analogy.
    Senator McCarthy. It isn't analogy, but a question. 
Sometimes the things run deep. But the point is now, so far as 
the military advisory groups, they are either from other Latin 
American countries or they are all from the United States.

                         SITUATION IN NICARAGUA

    Senator Morse. That last ticker was that the election had 
gone better than three to one for Somoza.
    Senator McCarthy. Where did they get that one third?
    General Porter. I think Nicaragua. This is probably as 
difficult an area for me to understand as there is. I frankly, 
from what I have seen of the situation there, feel that we are 
dealing with probably the most backward country. I put this and 
Bolivia as the two most backward countries in the area.
    I think that things are much more limited there than they 
are in the other Central American areas, even Honduras 
included. I say this because the rule of the machete is still 
pretty much the rule in Nicaragua. For example, I think I told 
you this, Colonel Francisco was coming back from inspecting a 
unit on the coast here about four months ago, and about 40 
miles from Managua, he ran into a road jam. He got out of the 
car and went walking to find out why these cars were stopped. 
There were over 50 cars that were halted.
    He got up at the head of the column and discovered that 
there were two families that were shooting it out across the 
road. This had been going on for about six hours. This was a 
private feud, the Hatfields and McCoys or something like that. 
By dark there were well over 100 cars that were waiting there 
until dark came and the people went home and they went to 
Managua.
    I don't know just how you deal in our terms, in our 
political life, with this sort of going on in the countryside, 
you see. From what I have seen of Nicaragua, it is pretty much 
a peculiar place from the word go. I just don't know how to 
rationalize what goes on there.
    I will say this. That La Guardia is pretty well-trained by 
our standards. But when you take a Nicaraguan who is used to 
this sort of life I was just telling you about, and you give 
him a life, and he is provoked, up to a point he is pretty 
well-disciplined. He is not going to take the brickbats on his 
helmet. He is going to use his bare bayonet much more quickly.

                       ASSESSMENT OF GEN. SOMOZA

    I really feel from what I have seen that Somoza will 
probably give them a good administration. This is just my own 
judgment. I don't know Somoza well. The president that had died 
of a heart attack was a very, very fine man. He was loved by 
the people. Aguerro, I don't know him. I don't know whether you 
know him or not. He ran last time and withdrew. Do you know 
Aguerro at all?
    Mr. Corrigan. No. But only this morning, General, I was 
reading at the State Department an analytical telegram from our 
Embassy in Managua, where, reporting the results of numerous 
conversations Embassy people had had with people of different 
political beliefs and opinions, and even among the conservative 
people of substance like in the professions and whatnot, a 
number of people, these conservatives, of course, are very 
unhappy about Somoza.
    They feel that Somoza has exaggerated and insisted on 
keeping power too long, and they are sorry that Samoza decided 
to run. They would rather see the thing evolve in a way from 
where maybe the Samozas would let people like Schick, who are 
good people not associated with the family, but nevertheless 
did move ahead and insist on running for the presidency. These 
people said therefore they were not too sanguine about the way 
things may develop in Nicaragua, particularly because they felt 
that this fellow Taucheau is a bit of the Aryan side, that he 
may be more suppressive than his brother Luis. But they all 
went on to say, these opponents of Somoza, talking of the 
political party who is the opposition party, they all went on 
to say Aguerro would be terrible.
    The point I wish to make is that apparently these people of 
substance feel that this wasn't the time. They didn't have the 
fellow of sufficient stature and ability to move in and change 
the situation.
    Senator Morse. This hotel episode would show that.
    Mr. Corrigan. It was scandalous and outrageous.
    Mr. Holt. You know the old saying. You can't beat somebody 
with nobody. This is a lot of what is involved in Nicaragua. 
This Aguerro is nobody----
    Mr. Corrigan. This situation that is evolving has to 
evolve, and I think this situation in the past two days will 
temper this, rather than the reverse. I am inclined to hope 
that he will become a little more politic, a little more bland 
and a little more clever in building up his relationships than 
being oppressive. This is the question. We have to see how he 
evolves with power once he has power.

                          EXERCISING INFLUENCE

    General Porter. In our military advisory group, we have 
between 25 and 30 people in our mission there, Army, Navy and 
Air Force total, and they are dealing with advising the 
military academy.
    They are working, trying to teach them how to use 
communications. Teaching them to maintain their equipment. They 
are working on training to try to teach them how to train 
soldiers so they will stand when people are shooting at them 
without running. And it is a minimum number there. I really 
feel it is a benefit to us because these people are talking to 
the military people, and are feeling their pulse, and it gives 
us a way of restraining them.
    Senator Morse. Exercising influence.
    General Porter. That is right.
    Senator Morse. General, you have been very, very generous. 
You have too, Mr. Corrigan, and I appreciate it very much.
    [Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]


   Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile Defense Deployment

                              ----------                              




  Limitations on Use of Chemical and Bacteriological Agents in Warfare

                              ----------                              




            Sales of Military Equipment by the United States

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, February 7, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore, Sparkman, Symington, Clark, Pell, 
McCarthy, and Aiken.
    Also present: Senator McGee.
    Captain Hibler; Mr. Knaur; Jack Stempler, Special Assistant 
to Secretary of Defense; Mel Christopher, Congressional Liaison 
to ACDA.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF CYRUS R. VANCE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


DR. FOSTER'S CONCLUSION ABOUT NIKE-X BEING READY FOR PRODUCTION [P. 35]

    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, before you go further, I 
wonder if I may break in. What was Dr. Foster's conclusion 
about Nike-X being ready for production?
    Mr. Vance. He indicated that we had components which would 
permit us to commence the production and deployment of a Nike-X 
system at this time, but he also came to the very strong 
conclusion that from a technical standpoint he did not believe 
that the deployment of a Nike-X system to protect against 
Soviet attacks upon our population was a wise and sound course. 
He thought it presented grave technical difficulties.
    Senator Sparkman. Thank you.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION [P. 35]

    Senator Gore. So as of now your decision is to defer any 
deployment but to continue with research and development.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct, and we have also asked this 
year, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress appropriate $377 million 
for FY 1968 which, together with the $168 million already 
appropriated in FY 1967, could be used for production should 
the talks with the Soviets fail. If they failed, the issue 
could then be reconsidered and a new decision would be possible 
at that time should the President choose to make it.
    Senator Gore. What is the status of those discussions?
    Mr. Vance. Communications have started between our two 
countries. No substance has as yet been discussed between the 
two countries. They have indicated an interest in such 
discussions.
    Senator Gore. No actual conference has occurred on it.
    Mr. Vance. There has been one or, I believe, two 
preliminary discussions.
    Senator Gore. I see. Of reasonably high officials?
    Mr. Vance. Of high officials, in which there was an 
indication that they were interested in further exploring this 
problem with us.
    Senator Gore. Fine.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        ESTIMATED COST OF TOTAL DAMAGE-LIMITING PACKAGE [P. 38]

    Mr. Vance. To test the contribution that each of these 
Nike-X deployments might make to our damage limiting 
objectives, we have projected both the U.S. and Soviet 
strategic nuclear forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets 
to the U.S. ABM deployment) to fiscal year 1976, by which time 
posture B, the heavier defense, could be fully in place. These 
forces are shown on the tables.
    With respect to another table in my classified statement, 
there is one very significant number--that is the total number 
of ballistic missile warheads, which is the third item on this 
table. That shows that in 1976 the total number of ballistic 
missile warheads which the U.S. would have is 7,328. In 
contrast, it is estimated that at that time the Soviets, 
assuming no reaction on their part to an ABM deployment by the 
United States, would be between 1,133 and 1,598.
    Senator Aiken. What size warhead?
    Mr. Vance. They would vary.
    Senator Aiken. What is an average, would it be mostly 
small?
    Mr. Vance. They would be, primarily, small. I can give you 
that in terms of megaton equivalents if you would like; it 
would be 1,825 equivalent one megaton weapons.
    Senator Aiken. Medium range or ICBM?
    Mr. Vance. These are all ICBM's and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles.
    Senator Aiken. Never mind.
    Senator Gore. Now in your estimate of 7,000 plus for the 
United States----
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir?
    Senator Gore. [continuing] In the event of the Poseidon 
missile, are you counting that as one warhead or 14 warheads?
    Mr. Vance. 14 warheads, sir.
    Senator Gore. So you are really in many respects, so far as 
actually the ballistic missile is concerned, the number would 
be smaller.
    Mr. Vance. Quite right, sir.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.
    Senator Sparkman. Does that mean the 400 would be 5,600 out 
of that 7,328?
    Mr. Vance. There are 400 large submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (Poseidon class)----
    Senator Sparkman. 14 times that would be--14 times 4.

                      RUSSIAN POLARIS DEVELOPMENT

    Senator Symington. Following the chairman's question, Mr. 
Secretary, have you made any provision for the logical 
development of a 14-headed tube on a Polaris submarine by the 
Russians in your figure?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir. We have made computations which I will 
come to later on.
    Senator Symington. My point is you have 1,133 and 1,598 
here. Does that include 16 times 14 in it?
    Mr. Vance. This assumes no reaction on the part of the 
Soviet Union to a U.S. ABM deployment, which I think, as I said 
before, is a most unrealistic assumption. I believe they will 
react, Senator Symington.
    Senator Symington. I do not mean to be short about it, but 
actually these figures do not mean a lot if they have a lot of 
Polaris submarines with 14 in each tube.
    Mr. Vance. I am going to point out later on that I do not 
think this is the posture the Soviet Union will be in if we 
deploy an ABM. I think they will be forced to react and will 
have substantially more warheads than shown on this table.
    Senator Symington. I do not mean to labor it. But certainly 
you do not mean they will develop a 14-weapon Polaris missile 
just because we do not put up an ABM, do you?
    Mr. Vance. They may develop a multi-warhead Polaris-type 
missile. Whether it would be able to have 14 warheads or not, I 
do not now know, Senator Symington; they might decide instead 
simply to proliferate land-based ICBM's which also could have 
multiple warheads.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    Senator Gore. As I believe the CIA told us, as of now we 
have no information that they have developed or are developing, 
attempting to develop a multiple warhead.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct. We have no information at this 
point in time which leads us to believe that they are 
developing multiple warheads. They may be, but we have no 
information at this point.
    Senator Symington. It was not too long ago that we did not 
have information that they were developing Polaris submarines.
    Senator Sparkman. May I ask this one question, sir?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.

                       RUSSIAN SAM DEFENSE SITES

    Senator Sparkman. SAM sites, we have 112 and they will have 
between 1,360 and 2,006. Why that great difference?
    Mr. Vance. It is a difference of emphasis which they place, 
as opposed to us, on defense. They have always been very, very 
strong on defense, as you may know, Senator Sparkman. We feel 
that they have wasted billions of dollars on their SAM defense. 
Both the military and the civilians in the Defense Department 
agree that despite the Soviets' massive deployment of surface-
to-air missiles, our bombers could still penetrate and that at 
least 85 percent of them would get through. So that we feel 
that this vast expenditure of billions of dollars by the 
Soviets on SAMs in the past has been essentially a waste of 
money on their part.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 ESTIMATES OF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES FIRST STRIKE FATALITIES [P. 41]

    Mr. Vance. We believe that even if we struck first they 
would still have the capability to come back and inflict that 
amount of damage upon the United States. And we have reviewed, 
not because we ever intended to do so, the question of whether 
or not the United States could ever launch a pre-emptive strike 
on the Soviet Union and receive an acceptable level of damage 
in return. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and we are all in 
agreement that we could not do so, even if we struck first.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Senator Gore. You and Secretary McNamara take the position 
that the best, most fortuitous balance of terror so far as we 
are concerned is to pay relatively small attention to defense 
and maximize our power of assured destruction.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it was Winston Churchill's 
analysis that the development of atomic and nuclear weapons 
would prevent a third world war; was it not?
    Mr. Vance. I believe he did comment to that effect.
    Senator Sparkman. Because of the horror and terror of it.
    Senator Symington. I do not think that is quite right. The 
development of nuclear weapons, according to a conversation I 
had with him in 1954, made him feel that the British were 
helpless in the future against an all-out attack. He also felt 
it gave greater advantages to Russia because of the size of 
their land mass, and the time involved if there was ever 
another war. Therefore, it was important for us--he always 
classified himself with us--to be sure that we never lowered 
our deterrence.
    I am inclined this morning to support the decision not to 
have the ABM. I did not have the privilege of hearing Mr. 
Foster yesterday. But I did hear him before the Armed Services-
Appropriations Joint Committees, and, based on his position, I 
am inclined to support it. But in supporting it, I am in no way 
reducing my conviction that the best way to prevent a future 
war is to be sure we have adequate deterrence against Russia, 
so that they know they would be destroyed if they attacked us.
    Mr. Vance. I am absolutely in agreement with that. We must 
assure our destruction capability.
    Senator Sparkman. I am given a quote by the staff, 
``Security will be the sturdy stepson of terror.''
    Mr. Vance. Will be the what, sir?
    Senator Sparkman. ``Will be the sturdy stepson of terror.'' 
I am sure that he advocated the maintenance of the deterrent 
forces. But he said the maintenance of that deterrent force 
would prevent World War III. I am sure he said that.
    Senator Symington. An equally famous quotation is his 
characterization of the ``balance of terror.'' The word 
``balance'' is the important one.
    Senator Sparkman. Yes.
    Senator Gore. I would like to put a question here that has 
been troubling me. Suppose we are convinced that despite 
whatever defense systems the Soviets install, we can still 
wreak this havoc in such horrible proportions as described 
here. Suppose that they are convinced that their system is 
impregnable. Then has not our strategy of deterrence been 
compromised?
    Mr. Vance. Mr. Chairman, during the last several years we 
have released more information of a formerly classified nature 
than ever before, because we wanted the Soviet Union to know 
our capability so that they would not misinterpret our power, 
and our capability to destroy them as a viable nation should 
they attempt to attack us.
    We have been criticized for releasing so much information, 
but I think it is vitally important that the Soviet Union 
should know what our capability is so they do not miscalculate.
    Senator Gore. I was not referring to their information 
about the number of our warheads and even the nature of the 
improvements. But suppose that they have a confidence in their 
defense which we do not share but which they hold? Is not the 
crucial question their conception of our power of retaliation 
rather than our conception of it?
    Mr. Vance. It is, sir; no question about it.
    Senator Symington. In other words, what the Chairman is 
saying, as I understand it, it is better for us not to have the 
deterrence and have them feel we do, than to have it, and have 
them feel we do not.
    Mr. Vance. I think it is better that we have it and they 
know it.
    Senator Symington. That is best.

                   OUR STRATEGY OF DETERMENT [P. 44]

    Mr. Vance. I think that this is one valuable thing that can 
come out of discussions with the Soviet Union. If we can sit 
down and go through these matters with them and sit down and 
very frankly discuss our capability to penetrate such system.
    Senator Gore. We are going to tell them that we have 14, 
multiple, 14-head warheads that can go different directions and 
different trajectories.
    Mr. Vance. Exactly what we would tell them I cannot say 
precisely at this point. But we would be making it as clear as 
clear could be that we have that capability to penetrate.
    Senator Gore. Okay.
    Senator Sparkman. If they have been reading our papers and 
listening to radio, they would know it anyway.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  COSTS OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM [P. 44]

    Senator Symington. I understand. But it worries me. The 
cost of the project is so heavily emphasized in the defense of 
the civilians, it might cost--for example, a figure given us 
was $40 billion in 10 years. At the same time the civilian 
heads are so determined to pursue a war that is costing us, 
according to the staff of the Appropriations Committee, $30 
billion a year chasing these little people around the woods 
over there in Vietnam. So if it comes down to a question of 
price, I am perfectly willing to consider the civilian heads 
probably better informed and better in a position to make a 
decision. But it is hard for me to see why the ABM system is so 
heavily defended in not being put up because of the price, $40 
billion over 10 years, when we are spending somewhere between 
$2 billion and $2.5 billion a month in this little country over 
in Southeast Asia. That is the one thing that runs through my 
mind as I read these details of the heavy costs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           INCREASE OF SOVIET SECOND STRIKE POTENTIAL [P. 45]

    Mr. Vance. If the Soviets are determined to maintain an 
Assured Destruction capability against us and they believe that 
our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in 
the ``U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate'' case to the 
levels shown in the table above, they would have no alternative 
but to increase the second strike damage potential of their 
offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways, 
by deploying a new large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or 
hardened and defended), or a new submarine-launched missile 
like our Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but 
undefended SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability 
to deploy any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads) 
by the mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative 
costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM 
deployment with a land-mobile ICBM system. I think the table is 
self-explanatory.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic
                                                               Exchange (in millions)  (ASSUMES SOVIET REACTION
                                                                            TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT)
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
                        U.S. Programs                           Soviets Strike First,      U.S. Strikes First,
                                                                   U.S. Retaliates          Soviets Retaliate
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
                                                               U.S. Fat.    Sov. Fat.    U.S. Fat.    Sov. Fat.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved (no response)......................................          120         120+          100           70
Posture A...................................................          120         120+           90           70
Posture B...................................................          120         120+           90           70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the Soviets choose to respond to our ABM deployment with 
MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200 missiles 
against Posture A and 650 against Posture B) the results would 
be as shown below, and this is a very significant table. It 
shows very simply----
    Senator Gore. We are back where we started.
    Mr. Vance. [continuing] That we are back where we started.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                SOVIET INCREASE OF SECOND STRIKE [P. 46]

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, if I may, before we go to 
the next subject; these assumptions can be very wrong. For 
example, several years ago some of us were criticized, 
including President Kennedy, about a missile gap.
    The fact is, if there was a missile gap it was created by 
Mr. Dulles and destroyed by Mr. Dulles; eliminated would be a 
better word.
    Senator Gore. You mean Allen?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Between December 1959, the record will show, and August 
1961, the Central Intelligence Agency, at both times under the 
direction of Mr. Dulles, in four separate reductions, reduced 
the number of ICBMs on launching pads in Russia 7.5 percent.
    Therefore, sometimes I always worry, regardless of the 
efforts made, as to the ability of any of us to know exactly 
what is going on behind the Iron Curtain, although I understand 
we have better results now because of satellite information.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Symington. But when you say that they would have no 
alternative but to increase the second strike, which they would 
do, for example, by developing new missiles for their Polaris-
type submarines, surely you do not mean to imply they won't do 
that anyway, do you?
    Mr. Vance. No, I do not mean to imply that. They might very 
well.
    Senator Symington. I would say that they would do it on any 
basis, wouldn't you? They would make the best weapon they could 
for their new Polaris submarines.
    Mr. Vance. I think what they will do is assure themselves 
that they maintain a sufficient capability for Assured 
Destruction, so that they feel that we will not strike them 
first. I think that they will do whatever is required to put 
themselves in that posture, in the same fashion that we have 
done in the past and will continue to do.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.

                    DEFENSE AGAINST CHINESE CAPACITY

    Senator Gore. In my view, Mr. Secretary, if we could 
succeed in dissuading the Soviets from deploying their system, 
this would be a very great accomplishment. I have wondered if 
they were in a position to do so or would be willing to do so 
in view of the Chinese--the very rapid strides they are making. 
You are coming to that later?
    Mr. Vance. I am coming to that, but I would be glad to 
comment on that now.
    I think that in any discussions we have with the Soviet 
Union, both of us would reserve our rights to do what each of 
us might have to do with respect to China.
    Senator Gore. Could I ask a technical question right here?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Now, the deployments that are being made in 
the Soviet Union now, we have been told, are aimed at or 
instrumented--I have difficulty in talking in this field--
designed, I guess is a better word, to protect them against 
missiles that would be coming in on trajectories which the 
United States would be calculated to use in case of an attack.
    Mr. Vance. That is correct. That is the way their present 
system appears to be designed.
    Senator Gore. Now, my question is to what extent is it 
feasible and, if feasible, at what cost, for the same systems 
to be designed or redesigned to provide protection against 
missiles coming from the land mass of China?
    Mr. Vance. I do not have an exact cost figure, but the 
Soviets would have to change the placement of their radars, 
they would probably also have to change the placement of some 
of their missile sites, and the small missile site radars that 
go with them.
    I do not have an exact cost figure, but I think it would be 
quite low because, as I will indicate later on, for us to build 
a system which would be quite effective against the Red Chinese 
would cost, we estimate, only about $3.5 billion.
    Senator Gore. That is a light defense?
    Mr. Vance. That is a light defense; that is right.
    Senator Gore. But this does not, as I have understood this 
estimate, contemplate a submarine capacity on the part of the 
Chinese.
    Mr. Vance. We would take care of any submarine capacity of 
the Chinese through our regular antisubmarine warfare 
components.
    We know that they have at this point only one missile 
submarine. There are no indications that they yet have any 
missiles for that one submarine. They may be working on 
missiles for it. But we feel confident that we could take care 
of that one submarine with our current ASW forces, and we are 
also confident that if they move to a bigger submarine program 
that we would be able to take necessary steps to contain that 
particular threat.
    But, as I say, we have made no final decision with respect 
to whether or not we should deploy an ABM system against the 
potential Red Chinese threat because the lead time is such that 
we do not have to make the decision now.

                    SOVIET MISSILE AND RADAR SYSTEMS

    Senator Gore. One other question that is so elementary but, 
nevertheless, those of us who are elementary in our level of 
knowledge can only ask elementary questions. Are the silos, the 
hardened silos, in which the Soviets are placing their 
interceptor missiles, perpendicular or are they slanted toward 
the trajectories of the missile lanes it is anticipated the 
United States will use? Do the missiles take off 
perpendicularly? This will give some measure of how difficult 
it would be, some measure of the difficulty, if they wanted to 
redesign, replace their radars and use the same missiles that 
are now being installed as a defense against ours for defense 
against the Chinese.
    Mr. Vance. I think the determining factor is the way their 
radars are placed.
    Senator Symington. You have to go out of the ground 
vertically.
    Senator Gore. I thought so. This is what I would want to 
know. This would have a bearing, this could have a bearing, if 
they could use the same silos or same missiles by changing the 
direction of their radars and the telemetry.
    Mr. Vance. I think the critical thing is the placement of 
their radars, and they would have to change the placement of 
some of their radar facilities to reorient their system against 
the Chinese and away from the United States.
    Senator Gore. How difficult would this replacement be? I 
know this must be a big installation.
    Mr. Vance. It is a big installation, sir, and it is quite a 
costly installation. They have two of these so-called Hen House 
radars up in the northwest section of the Soviet Union, giving 
coverage to the threat corridor of ICBMs coming in from the 
United States, and they have one under the process of 
construction called the Dog House down southwest of Moscow.
    One would expect that they would have to put either Hen 
House or Dog House types over to the east to take care of the 
threat corridor for missiles coming in from China.
    Some of the radars, such as those emplaced around Moscow, 
essentially protect the city from any direction and 
consequently would not have to be changed to defend against the 
CPR. But the large Hen House radar, for example, essentially 
covers a sector. If the Soviets were defending against China we 
would expect such a radar to be oriented in that particular 
direction.
    Senator Gore. Now, this committee would be concerned in the 
case of, including myself, of the question of the verification.
    Mr. Vance. Yes.
    Senator Gore. Supposing the Soviets said the silos they 
were constructing, supposing they said, ``The defenses we are 
deploying are safeguards against the Chinese whose hostility is 
increasing toward us.''
    Now, could we be reasonably certain that this would be true 
or untrue?
    Mr. Vance. As you know, we have a considerable and growing 
unilateral capability through our satellites to determine both 
the deployment of missiles and the deployment of radar systems.
    As to whether or not it would be necessary to have some 
form of on-site inspection in addition to our unilateral 
capability is not yet clear, and this is probably one of the 
issues we will have to discuss with the Soviet Union in any 
talks we have with respect of a moratorium on or a cessation of 
ABM deployment.
    Senator Gore. One other question and then I will let you 
proceed with your statement.

                  PROTECTION AGAINST THE EAST OR WEST

    What is the relative time element in deployment of the 
construction of the missile and the silo, the launching 
mechanism, on the one hand, and the radar installations which 
you say would be necessary to change as to location if this 
cellar be, silo be, in which a missile is on station, is to be 
used as protection against the East or against the West?
    Mr. Vance. Are you asking me how long it would take the 
Soviets or how long it would take us?
    Senator Gore. Well, I am trying to get some idea, just for 
my own satisfaction, if we reach such an agreement as is being 
sought, which I hope we can conclude, how much reliance could 
we safely place upon the Soviet word that they were deploying 
as a defense against China if, in fact, the silo and missile 
could be used for either, and it would require a shifting of 
the radar from here to there. What I am trying to get at is 
what time element would be involved in re-installation of the 
radar or the necessary facilities to use this silo and this 
missile as an antiballistic defense against us?
    Mr. Vance. I will give you my best estimate, and I would 
like to correct it for the record. I believe it will be two to 
three years.
    Senator Gore. Two to three years?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. If the deployment of the entire, the overall, 
system runs from five to seven.
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. That is what I wanted to get.
    Mr. Vance. I would like to get that for the record.
    New radars and interceptor missiles, if already in 
production, could probably be installed in 2-3 years.
    Senator Gore. So this will be an extremely important part 
of the negotiations.
    Mr. Vance. I would think it would be an extremely important 
part.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   RED CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT [P. 49]

    Mr. Vance. With regard to the Red Chinese nuclear threat, 
an austere ABM defense consisting, for example, of four PAR and 
15 Missile Site Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200 
Sprint missiles (the latter to protect the principal radars), 
might offer a high degree of protection to the nation against a 
missile attack, at least through the 1970's. The total 
investment cost of such a program might amount to about $3.5 
billion, including the cost of the nuclear warheads.
    The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. 
fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970's is shown in 
the table below:

                             U.S. FATALITIES
                              (In Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Chinese Strike First
                                                 (Operational Inventory)
                                               -------------------------
                                                 25 Missile   75 Missile
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without ABM...................................           .5           10
With ABM......................................           0+            1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                             

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
            SENSE OF URGENCY REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS [P. 50]

    Mr. Vance. It is very hard to give any precise figure on 
this, Senator Symington. I wish I could. I think it all depends 
on how the discussions seem to proceed.
    If we are making progress then we would be willing to wait 
longer than otherwise. But if it becomes obvious that nothing 
is going to come out of these discussions, then I think that we 
would have to reconsider our position more promptly. It is just 
very hard to put any precise time on this.
    Senator Symington. Within a year?
    Mr. Vance. I think that there would be a good chance that 
within a year we could know one way or the other on this.
    Senator Gore. Well, that is giving us an order of time.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  PRACTICABILITY OF ABM SYSTEM AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINE ATTACK [P. 52]

    Mr. Vance. Antisubmarine tactics are to get the submarine 
before it can fire, in other words, to track it and be on top 
of it so that when it gets ready to fire, why, you can kill it.
    Senator Gore. Do we know where the Soviet submarines are 
all the time?
    Mr. Vance. We do, with a few exceptions, We have really 
extremely good information with respect to Soviet submarines.
    Recently one submarine did get in close to the U.S. coast 
without our knowing it was there. We had one similar case in 
the Pacific where we lost one of their submarines for a while 
and then picked it up. But, by and large, we have really 
excellent information with respect to where Soviet submarines 
are. This is done by a number of different procedures.
    We have our so-called SOSUS stations, which are long-range 
listening stations which can detect things hundreds of miles 
away under the water. [Deleted.]
    Senator Symington. Will the Senator yield? But it is much 
more difficult to track a nuclear submarine than a non-nuclear 
submarine, is it not?
    Mr. Vance. The answer to that is no, quite frankly, 
Senator, because the Soviet nuclear submarines are really quite 
noisy. The most difficult ones to track right now are the 
Soviet submarines which are diesel and battery powered. When 
they go down to three knots on battery, then it is virtually 
impossible to hear them.
    Senator Symington. When I was out at Guam two months ago, I 
went out on a Polaris and they tell me they are dead for sixty 
days. They receive but they do not broadcast, and that they 
were practically impossible to detect.
    Does that mean our nuclear submarines are much easier to--
--
    Mr. Vance. Our submarines are much quieter than the Soviet 
submarines.
    Senator Symington. But then following their development of 
the art, they will be more quiet.
    Mr. Vance. There is no question but we must plan on them 
becoming more quiet. But at the same time we are trying to 
increase our capability to detect either kind of submarine. We 
are devoting a lot of effort to this.

  U.S. ACTION IN EVENT OF ENEMY SUBMARINES POSITIONING OFF OUR COASTS

    Senator Gore. What would we do if we discovered that a 
significant number of Soviet or Chinese submarines were taking 
suspicious positions off our coasts? We would become quite 
alarmed and might just provoke an exchange.
    Mr. Vance. If we saw such a situation developing, we would 
deploy the necessary forces to contain such a threat.
    Senator Symington. But if the Senator will yield, if they 
want to hit you they do not have to have submarines. They could 
put twenty different ships in our harbors with false bottoms, 
and drop them and disappear, and nobody would know, and they 
would all go off at the same time, and they would destroy 
twenty ports the same as if they had dropped a delayed fuse in 
the water. It is interesting from the stand-point of attack, 
but it does not have to be done that way, if we want to get 
technical.
    Sentor Gore. This is a frightening world.
    Mr. Vance. It is a frightening world, Senator; I agree.
    Senator Sparkman. It becomes more so as we move along.
    Mr. Vance. It does indeed.
    Senator Sparkman. Let me ask one question, talking about 
the ABM: Where would it fit in with the defense of Western 
Europe or would it fit in? Could it be made to fit in?
    Mr. Vance. It would have, in my view, a limited capability.
    On the other hand, I doubt that it would prove an effective 
defense just as it would not prove an effective defense here. 
They could saturate it and, therefore, I think it would be an 
unwise move on the part of our European allies to expend the 
funds trying to protect their population, just as I feel it 
would be an unwise move on our part. It just simply would not 
do it.
    Senator Sparkman. Then we are to regard this as a defense 
of our continental nation?
    Mr. Vance. Yes.
    The deployments I have been discussing this morning are 
protections for the continental United States, designed to 
protect the continental United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


       CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER BY 1980-85 IS QUESTIONED [P. 53]

    Senator Symington. To me it is a pretty tricky sentence.
    Senator Gore knows more about this than I do. But, as I 
remember it, the Russians were four years behind us, roughly, 
on the explosion of the hydrogen weapon, and had a more 
sophisticated hydrogen weapon than we did and I do not think 
you can talk in any sense of the term today, the theory of it 
anyway, about 1980-85 before China is a full nuclear power.
    Mr. Vance. I would be the first to say that predictions 
more than five years in the future are extremely risky, 
Senator.
    Senator Symington. I thank you for that. That was my only 
point, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Vance. I was trying to present it as we best saw it at 
this time on the basis of the intelligence estimates which have 
been made in the government.

         FUTURE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY COULD ALTER BALANCE OF POWER

    Senator Gore. Now, I have heard CIA, the Atomic Energy, and 
your own experts on this subject. My impression of the 
consensus is that by the--and indeed, Secretary McNamara said 
by the mid-1970's say 1975, that the Chinese will have a 
significant nuclear and intercontinental ballistic capability. 
It is estimated that they will test their first ICBM this 
summer in a range from 5,000 to 7,000 miles.
    Should that test be successful, then one would assume it is 
a question of building more of what they are testing. They have 
tested nuclear weapon to the extent of 10 or 20 times in power 
of the one with which we destroyed Hiroshima.
    So if they, say, if by 1975 they have 100 capable of 
attacking the United States, this is, it seems to me, a 
significant alteration of the balance of power in the world. We 
then face a threat which we have not previously faced, and they 
have a deterrence not only against us but against the Soviets, 
and they have a power of intimidation over their neighbors that 
they had not previously had.
    Would this not be a significant alteration of the balance 
of power and have a significant effect upon the whole strategy 
of deterrence?
    Mr. Vance. It might well have a significant effect on the 
balance of deterrence, and that is why I have carefully 
differentiated between a system designed against the Soviet 
threat and one designed against the Chinese threat.
    I have merely said that as of this time, the lead times are 
such that we do not feel that we have to make a decision this 
year with respect to the deployment of a system oriented 
against the Chinese threat.
    Senator Gore. But you are holding all options with respect 
to the Chinese.
    Mr. Vance. We are indeed, sir.
    Senator Gore. And you would expect in the negotiations the 
Soviets to do the same thing.
    Mr. Vance. I would, sir.
    Senator Gore. Is this not possibly one of the most 
complicated factors which makes it really impossible for 
Russia, and more impossible, I guess, than the United States, 
to negotiate and reach an agreement vis-a-vis the United States 
and the U.S.S.R.? Here is this third complicating factor which 
both powers must take into account and, perhaps Russia with her 
proximity and her existing hostility, I do not know that the 
hostility is any greater than against us, but it is certainly 
an immediate thing with their border troubles and their history 
of hostilities between the Chinese and the Russian people?
    Mr. Vance. It is clearly a complicating factor and one 
which would be a very delicate one in connection with the 
discussions which we expect to have with the Soviet Union.
    Senator Gore. Senator McGee, would you like to have a 
question before we go to another phase of his testimony?
    Senator McGee. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, inasmuch 
as the chairman put the elementary questions because of his 
elementary school understanding of this, I am at pre-school, 
and maybe getting into the kindergarden today. I appreciate 
your courtesy in letting me attend.
    Senator Gore. Senator Aiken?

                      FRANCE'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

    Senator Aiken. I have not heard France mentioned at all.
    Mr. Vance. In what respect, sir?
    Senator Aiken. In regard to achieving capability, ICBM or 
anything else. Do you write them off?
    Mr. Vance. I think that in time they will achieve a limited 
capability. I do not think that this limited capability will 
really be a credible deterrent to the Soviet Union, and I 
really do not think that the French nuclear force can be 
anything but, quite frankly, a destabilizing influence in the 
whole world.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CYRUS R. VANCE BEFORE 
                THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT 
OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 7, 1967 [P. 
55]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed their 
recommendation that a decision be made now to deploy, with an 
initial operational capability in FY 1972 a NIKE-X system which 
would provide for area defense of the continental U.S. and 
local defense of 25 cities against a ``low'' Soviet threat.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             POSTURE A                       POSTURE B
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Invest. Cost                    Invest. Cost
                                                      Number        ($ Billion)       Number        ($ Billion)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radars:.........................................
    MAR.........................................               0               0               8            $2.8
    TACMAR......................................               7            $1.9               3             0.6
    PAR.........................................               6             0.8               6             0.8
    MSR.........................................              26             3.8              95             8.4
        Invest. Cost............................  ..............            $6.5  ..............           $12.6
Missiles:.......................................
    SPARTAN.....................................            1200            $1.7            1200            $1.7
    SPRINT......................................            1100             0.7            7300             3.1
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Invest. Cost................................  ..............            $2.4  ..............            $4.8
DoD Invest. Cost................................  ..............            $8.9  ..............           $17.4
AEC Invest. Cost................................  ..............             1.0  ..............             2.0
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total Invest. Cost (ex-R&D).............  ..............            $9.9  ..............           $19.4
Annual Operating Cost...........................  ..............           $0.38  ..............           $0.72
No. of Cities w/Term. Def:......................              25  ..............              50  ..............
IOC with Decision 1/67:.........................           FY 72  ..............           FY 72  ..............
Deployment Completed:...........................           FY 75  ..............           FY 76  ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is worth noting, in connection with the costs shown in 
the foregoing table, that had we produced and deployed the 
NIKE-ZEUS system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated 
cost of $13 to $14 billion, most of it would have had to be 
torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by 
the new missiles and radars of the NlKE-X system. By the same 
token other technological developments in offensive forces over 
the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade 
the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned.We can predict with 
certainty that there will be substantial additional costs for 
updating any system we might consider installing at this time 
against the Soviet missile threat.
    The deployment of a NIKE-X system would also require some 
improvement in our defense against manned bomber attack in 
order to preclude the Soviets from undercutting the NIKE-X 
defense; and we would want to expand and accelerate the fallout 
shelter program. The investment cost (including R&D) of the 
former is estimated at about $1.5 to $2.4 billion and would 
provide for a small force of F-111 or F-12 type interceptors 
(e.g., 48 F-11s or 32 F-12s) and about 42 airborne warning and 
control aircraft (AWACS). The expanded fallout shelter program 
would cost about $800 million more than the one we are now 
pursuing. We would also need some of our anti-submarine warfare 
forces for use against Soviet missile submarines, but we are 
not yet clear whether these ASW forces would actually have to 
be increased over the currently planned levels. In any event, 
the ``current'' estimates of the investment cost of the total 
Damage Limiting package would amount to at least $12.2 billion 
for Posture A and at least $21.7 billion for Posture B.
    To test the contribution that each of these NIKE-X 
deployments might make to our Damage Limiting objectives, we 
have projected both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear 
forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets to the U.S. ABM 
deployment) to FY 1976, by which time Posture B, the heavier 
defense, could be fully in place.

                                              PROJECTED U.S. ANO SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, MID-1976
                                             (Assuming no reaction by the Soviets to U.S. ABM deployment) *
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                 U.S.                                USSR
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs (Hard Launchers)..........................................................
    Large (TITAN II/SS-9 Class).................................................                                   0                             276-249
    Small (MINUTEMAN/SS-11 Class................................................                                1000                             500-950
    Mobile......................................................................                                   0                                50-0
SLBMs...........................................................................
    Large (POSEIDON Class)......................................................                                 400                                   0
    Small (POLARIS/SSN-5 Class).................................................                                 128                             307-399
Total No. of 8M Warheads........................................................                                7328                           1133-1598
Bombers (for Intercontinental Attacks)..........................................
    Heavy.......................................................................                                 255                              70-110
    Medium......................................................................                                 210                             300-500
ABM (Anti-ballistic Missile Defense)............................................
    Area interceptors...........................................................  ..................................                            800-3250
    Terminal Interceptors.......................................................  ..................................                            300-1500
Air Defense.....................................................................
    Fighters....................................................................                                 697                           1700-2400
    SAM Sites...................................................................                                 112                           1360-2006
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*The Soviet forces are based on extrapolation of the latest intelligence estimates.



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
    If the Soviets are determined to maintain an Assured 
Destruction capability against us and they believe that our 
deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the 
``U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate'' case to the levels 
shown in the table above, they would have no alternative but to 
increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive 
forces. They could do so in several different ways, one of 
which is reflected in the table below: by deploying a new 
large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or hardened and 
defended), or a new submarine-launched missile like our 
Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but undefended 
SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability to deploy 
any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads) by the 
mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to 
the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment with a 
hand-mobile ICBM systeem:

LEVEL OF U.S. FATALITIES WHICH SOVIETS BELIEVE WILL PROVIDE DETERRENCE a
                               (Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Cost to the Soviet of Offsetting U.S. Cost to Deploy an ABM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        40   $1 Soviet cost to $4 U.S. cost
        60   $1 Soviet cost to $2 U.S. cost
        90   $1 Soviet cost to $1 U.S. cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ U.S. fatalities if U.S. strikes first and Soviets retaliate.

    If the Soviets choose to respond in that way to our ABM 
deployment with MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200 
missiles against Posture A and 650 against Posture B), the 
results would be as shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic
                                                       Exchange (in millions) 1976 (Assumes Soviet
                                                            Reaction to U.S. ABM Deployment)
                                                  ---------------------------------------------------
                  U.S. Programs                      Soviets Strike First,      U.S. Strikes First,
                                                        U.S. Retaliates          Soviets Retaliate
                                                  ---------------------------------------------------
                                                    U.S. Fat.    Sov. Fat.    U.S. Fat.    Sov. Fat.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved (no response)...........................          120         120+          100           70
Posture A........................................          120         120+           90           70
Posture B........................................          120         120+           90           70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In short, the Soviets have it within their technical and 
economic capacity to offset any further Damage Limiting 
measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to 
maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual 
certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain thelr deterrent 
which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our 
deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities 
against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they 
could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would 
accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense 
expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to 
either side.
    2. Defense Against the red Chinese Nuclear Threat
    With regard to red Chinese nuclear threat, an austere ABM 
defense consisting, for example, of 4 PAR and 15 Missile Site 
Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200 Sprint missiles 
(the latter to protect the principal radars), might offer a 
high degree of protection to the nation against a missile 
attack, at least through the 1970s. The total investment cost 
of such a program might amount to $3.5 billion, including the 
cost of the nuclear warheads.
    The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. 
fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970s is shown in 
the table below:

                             U.S. FATALITIES
                              (In Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Chinese Strike First
                                             (Operational Inventory)
                                        --------------------------------
                                           25 Missiles      75 Missiles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without ABM............................               5               10
With ABM...............................              0+                1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This austere defense could probably preclude damage in the 
1970s almost entirely. As the Chinese force grows to the level 
it might achieve by 1980-85, additions and improvements might 
be required, but relatively modest additional outlays could 
probably limit the Chinese damage potential to low levels well 
beyond 1985.
    It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China. 
In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant 
Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S. 
ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not 
be made now.
    3. Defense of Our-Land-based ICBM Forces Against a 
``Higher-Than-Expected Soviet Threat''
    As I indicated earlier, our Assured Destruction capability 
is of such crucial importance to our security that we must be 
prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats which are 
greater than those projected in the latest intelligence 
estimates.
    The most severe threat we must consider in planning our 
Assured Destruction forces is an extensive, effective Soviet 
ABM deployment combined with a deployment; of a substantial 
ICBM force with a hard-target kill capability, in the form of 
highly accurate ICBMs. To date, Soviet missile accuracy has 
been substantially inferior to our own, and we expect it to 
remain so. However, if the Soviets develop accurate Multiple 
Independently-Aimed Reentry vehicles (MIRVs), they might, by 
equipping their SS-9 boosters with 6 MIRVs (each with a CEP of 
0.3 n. mi. and a yield of 3 MT), be able to destroy large 
numbers of our Minuteman missiles. An extensive, effective 
Soviet ABM system much better than the one we consider 
probable) might then be able to intercept and destroy a large 
part of our residual missile warheads, including those carried 
by submarine-launched missiles. (The Soviet offensive and 
defensive threats assumed here are both substantially higher 
than expected.
    Under the assumption that the Soviets have started the 
development of highly accurate reentry vehicles (including 
MIRVs) a reasonable upper limit on the build-up in their threat 
would be the following:

                                       GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED SOVIET THREAT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Soviet Threat to Minuteman \a\                 FY 70      FY 71      FY 72      FY 73      FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-9.....................................................        180        180        180        150        100
SS-9 MIRV................................................          0         50        100        150        200
    (Six 3-megaton.
    RVs/Missile).
SS-11 (improved accuracy)................................        160        260        360        460        660
Total No. of BM Warheads.................................        340        740       1140       1510      1960
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\The older Soviet ICBMs, the current SS-ll and the submarine-launched ballistic missiles are excluded because
  they do not have sufficient accuracy to post a threat to our hardened and dispersed Minuteman force.

    The effect of such a deployment could be to reduce the 
number of U.S. Minuteman surviving attack to the levels shown 
below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             FY 70      FY 71      FY 72      FY 73      FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minuteman Surviving \b\..................................        800        590        390        245        160
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\b\ In addition, the Polaris and Poseidon force would survive.

    To hedge againt the possibility of such a threat to our 
landbase missile forces, we have authorized the development and 
production of the Poseidon. Should still additional offensive 
power be required, and such a requirement is not now clear, we 
are considering the development and deployment of a new 
Advanced ICBM (a large payload missile with an as yet 
undetermined basing system designed to reduce vulnerability to 
such a Soviet threat.
    The deployment of the NIKE-X as a defense for our Minuteman 
force, however, would offer a partial substitute for the 
possible further expansion of our offensive forces. The 
contribution one illustrative NIKE-X deployment might make to 
the survival of our Minuteman force against the greater-than-
expected Soviet threat, compared with the ``No Defense'' case 
is shown below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    FY 70        FY 71        FY 72        FY 73        FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No Defense Case
    MM Surviving...............................          800          590          390          245          160
NIKE-X Defense
    ABM interceptors...........................            0           55          395          475          475
    MM Surviving a.............................          800          590          515          465         390
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a The number of Minuteman ``surviving with NIKE-X Defense'' assumes the Soviets attack the defended Minuteman
  silos first. They might attack our radars first if they felt they had enough information on our defenses and
  were willing to gamble that we would delay launching our Minuteman for at least 15 minutes while their attack
  proceeded. In that case, the number of surviving Minuteman might be 100 fewer.

    But I want to emphasize that we have absolutely no direct 
evidence that the Soviet Union is developing MIRVs with such 
low CEPs, or, in fact, that they are developing MIRVs at all. 
Indeed, the tests we have seen to date indicate a far lower 
order of accuracy for Soviet ICBMs. Nevertheless, the 
intelligence lead time would be relatively short--about two 
years between the first indication of such a development effort 
and the start of deployment of the systems. Therefore, in 
examining the worst case, we have assumed that they could have 
such an operational capability as early as FY 1971. But even 
against this higher than expected combined Soviet, MIRVed 
missile/ABM threat, and even without a NIKE-X defense of 
Minuteman, our proposed strategic missile and bomber forces 
could still inflict 40 percent or more fatalities on the Soviet 
population throughout the 1969-1976 period.
    More extreme threats are highly unlikely. In any event, the 
changes we are now proposing in our strategic offensive forces 
would make it dangerous and expensive for the Soviets, to move 
in the direction of more extreme threats to our Assured 
Destruction capability. If we assume, as I believe we should, 
that the Soviet Union would want to reduce the vulnerability of 
their own offensive forces against the possibility of a first 
strike by our very accurate forces in the FY 1972-73 period, 
they must further disperse and harden their strategic missiles, 
which is exactly what they appear to be doing now. To do so is 
expensive and for the same budget outlay results in reduced 
missile payloads. Not to so would leave the Soviet force highly 
vulnerable to a first strike.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES [P. 63]

    Mr. Vance. Let me give both 1967 and 1968.
    Senator Symington. Fine.
    Mr. Vance. I will give them to you in terms of new 
obligational authority. For research, development test and 
evaluation concerned with chemical and biological warfare, 
there is $103 million in the 1968 budget; there is also $248 
million for procurement and $12 million for operations and 
maintenance, for a total FY 1968 program of $363 million.
    Now, let me give you some breakdowns.
    Senator Symington. I do not care about that unless you 
wanted to do it. I was just thinking, I think I am right in 
saying, that on chemical and biological warfare, just a quick 
mathematical interpretation in my head, that you are spending 
between one-fifth and one-tenth of one percent of your total in 
that field.
    Mr. Vance. I think that is correct. I can give you the 
figures for 1967 on that.
    Senator Gore. I would like to have it, if you don't mind.
    Senator Symington. I just want to develop the thought. Let 
me finish. I think it was about 1955 that I got a briefing on 
this subject. It was not covered in the committee, and we were 
spending about $50 million. I think the figures will show in 
1955, or a little less, maybe $48 million in this field. I am 
glad to hear we have doubled that, although we have more than 
doubled our military expenditures. I am very glad this subject 
has come up here this morning because I think it is one thing 
that, we have gotten so interested in nuclear problems that 
then the problems of a general limited war we may well have 
sloughed this off a bit, and yet it seems to me that it is 
terribly important, especially in the fields of killing animals 
and killing people.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            FISCAL YEAR 1967 AND 1968 BUDGET FIGURES [P. 64]

    Senator Symington. Would you give us those figures.
    Mr. Vance. Yes. With respect to 1967 the total funds are as 
follows: For research development, test and evaluation, $109 
million; for procurement, $169 million; and for operation and 
maintenance, $12 million--for a total of $290 million.
    I would like to point out one other thing if I might, and 
that is the distribution of these procurement funds in the FY 
1968 budget. I think it might be interesting to you. They have 
gone up quite substantially this year, and the reason is that 
they break down as follows: For smoke, flame and incendiary, 
$160 million; for riot control agents, $7 million; for 
defoliants, $46 million; for defense materiel, $15 million; and 
for other chemical and biological, $20 million.
    But the big increase is the result of the smoke, flame and 
incendiary category which is caused by our operations in 
Southeast Asia.
    Senator Gore. I would like to ask a question about a 
somewhat related matter here, and that is the possible use of 
radioactive agents, radioactive metal pellets.
    As you know, a city can be depopulated as well with 
radioactivity as it can with blast.
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. What is the status of that art? What are you 
spending on that or is this in the Atomic Energy field?
    Mr. Vance. There has been some work done in the past on 
very clean bombs which would have little blast effect but a 
very heavy short-term radiation effect.
    As to the amount of money which is being expended on such 
weapons at this time, I simply do not know, sir. I think that 
the best thing for me to do would be to supply that figure for 
the record.
    Senator Gore. Very well, I wish you would. It may be just a 
wild dream or nightmare, but is it not technically possible to 
shower a city with radioactive agents, and that any person who 
stayed in the city over a period of twenty-four hours would 
have a lethal dose. Therefore, if the people were adequately 
warned and notified, once such city is showered with such 
agents, the whole place could be depopulated; however, it might 
be important industrially.
    Mr. Vance. I am not an expert in this field. I know that 
there are people who have done a good deal of work and who hold 
a theory somewhat similar to that which you have expressed.
    I hesitate to speak on how effective this could be because 
I simply do not know what the state of the art is with respect 
to such weapons at this point.
    Senator Gore. Of course, we know that the armed services 
bought some watches, wristwatches, that they had to discard in 
large numbers because there was a little too much radioactivity 
on the dial, but if you are not prepared on this, why, it is a 
part of the whole armament and the threat today.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue 
on that if I may.
    Senator Gore. I did not mean to break in.
    Senator Symington. The thought I wanted to express, at 
first I was excited about those figures, but then when you read 
them I got less excited because of the tremendous additional 
effort that is being devoted to chasing these little people 
around the woods. You will pardon the expression, but I am 
getting a little apprehensive about the price.
    I believe about twelve years ago when we had a briefing on 
this, a special briefing for me and my legislative assistant at 
that time, we were very interested in certain diseases, 
anthrax, I remember, for cattle; tularemia, whatever the name 
of that rabbit disease was.
    Mr. Vance. Tularemia.
    Senator Symington. Is that right?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And you had great hopes for that type 
and character. But from what I have read we are only spending 
around $20 million a year as against a possible hedge in a 
multi-billion nuclear picture in this chemical and biological 
warfare. Am I correct, based on figures you read?
    Mr. Vance. Yes, sir; on that type of thing. However, we 
have substantial stocks in many of these items. If you would 
care to I can go through the various types of stocks we have.
    Senator Symington. I do not want to take too much time on 
it but, Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully suggest that some time 
in the future, that some time we might have a hearing on 
chemical and biological warfare.
    Senator Gore. Maybe we had better set a time for that.
    Mr. Vance. Fine.
    Senator Symington. On anything that could be lethal 
delivered by a missile or any other way, suitcase, that would 
not be nuclear.
    Senator Gore. Is that agreeable with you, Senator Aiken?
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    I was wondering about the neutron bomb, wondering what Dr. 
Teller's progress is, what progress he is making with that.
    Mr. Vance. That is what I was talking about before.
    Senator Aiken. That is what you were talking about.
    Mr. Vance. Yes.
    Senator Aiken. Is he making any progress with it?
    Mr. Vance. I do not know where he stands on the neutron 
bomb.
    Senator Aiken. I know his eyes used to shine when he 
mentioned that.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS [P. 66]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    3. Military sales to developing countries have amounted to 
about 10 percent of the total. I should underline the fact that 
the Department of Defense does not respond independently to 
requests from countries of the Middle East, Latin America, 
Africa or other underdeveloped areas for the purchase of arms. 
These requests are subject to the most intensive review and 
debate within the U.S. Government; usually, serious efforts are 
made to reduce the requests in either quantitative or 
qualitative terms; non-U.S. alternative sources of supply are 
often sought for foreign policy reasons, Mr. Chairman; that is 
when the U.S. does not want to be involved in the case.
    Senator McCarthy. Is that when you have the Germans ship 
the tanks for you to Israel?
    Mr. McNaughton. Senator McCarthy, we did not do that. I beg 
your pardon. I thought you were talking about Iran--the Iran 
case.
    Senator McCarthy. No.
    Mr. McNaughton. The German case to Israel about two years 
ago, this was involved in that case, yes. This attempt, this 
desire not to have the United States as a source of supply, and 
later on, Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will want to have 
questions about this delicate situation in the Middle East, and 
the extent to which the United States is involved.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               TANK AND AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL [P. 67]

    1. The first is our recent tank or aircraft sales to Israel 
(1964 and 1966) were concluded primarily to prevent the 
development of an arms imbalance in the area which would have 
had a seriously destabilizing effect. The imbalance was being 
created by a heavy infusion of modern Soviet equipment 
(principally tanks and MIG 21's) to the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq. 
Our negotiations with Israel were protracted, and a serious 
American effort was made to have them meet their requirements 
from European markets. In the end, however, and especially with 
respect to aircraft, available European equipment proved either 
too sophisticated or too expensive; we at length acceded to 
Israel's request [Deleted.] assurances from the Israelis.
    [Deleted.]

                    SALE OF SMALL AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN

    Our recent, 1966, sale of a small number of aircraft to 
Jordan was the result of a similarly protracted and reluctant 
process. The United States Command had levied on Jordan a 
requirement to acquire three squadrons of supersonic aircraft 
as Jordan's contribution to the all-Arab military posture. The 
U.A.C. would provide a limited sum of money (contributions from 
member states); Jordan could buy western aircraft if it chose, 
but the U.A.C. showed a clear preference for MIG 21s, which 
were available at a cut-rate price. The pressures in the Arab 
world were such that Jordan was compelled to comply. The 
pressures were such that Jordan asked the U.S. to sell suitable 
aircraft on generous credit terms. Over a period of 18 months, 
we repeatedly insisted that Jordan explore all possibilities in 
the U.K., France, Sweden and other markets; but European prices 
and the credit terms proved far too severe--far beyond 
purchasing power of the limited funds available from the U.A.C. 
In the end, when it appeared that Jordan would be forced to 
accept MIG 21s, and thus to open its country to a large Soviet 
training mission and also to U.A.R. military influence--a move 
which we regarded as inimical to the integrity of Jordan and a 
grave danger to stability in the Middle East--we agreed to sell 
Jordan a small number of F-104's from our MAP inventory. In 
concluding the arrangement, we successfully reduced the 
Jordanian request from 60 to 36, and consummated ultimately an 
initial sale of only 12 of the 36.

                         MILITARY SALES TO IRAN

    [Deleted.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         AMOUNT OF ARMAMENT GERMANS HAVE SOLD OR RESOLD [P. 69]

    Senator Gore. The Germans say they cannot afford to buy 
more arms from the United States, as I understand it, unless 
they are able to sell their own surplus of old used equipment.
    The question I wanted to ask you is how much armament have 
the Germans sold or resold?
    Mr. McNaughton. I do not have the exact figures on that, 
Mr. Chairman. Let me see, I have--they both grant and sell, Mr. 
Chairman. Germany both grants and sells. They also have a grant 
program, and I have the figures for Turkey, for example, and I 
do not have any further figures on what they have done by way 
of transfer of equipment. I can get this for you.
    Senator Gore. Fine. Will you supply that to us.
    Mr. McNaughton. I will submit it for the record.
    The information requested is classified and was furnished 
separately to the committee:

                                   MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF U.S. ORIGIN SUPPLIED TO A THIRD COUNTRY BY THE FRG, 1954-1966
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                             Estimated
  3rd Country Receiving              Item Description                 Quantity         How Originally Acquired    How Provided by FRG?    Transfer Value
                                                                                              from US?                                      ($Millions)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAD.....................  Submachine gun, cal.45, Thompson...  500.................  Nash List \1\...........  Sales...................  ..............
                           81mm Mortar........................  30..................  Nash List...............  Sales...................             0.8
                           Transceivers PRC 6.................  48..................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           VRC 7..............................  24..................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
GREECE...................  F-84F Aircraft.....................  69..................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Machine gun, .50 cal, Browning.....  Unk.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Communications Equipment...........  Unk.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................             9.5
                           F-84 Spare Parts...................  Unk.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Prime Mover, M-4, 18-ton...........  91..................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
INDIA....................  Trainer a/c, T-6G (Harvard)........  34..................  Nash List/Sales.........  Sales...................             1.5
IRAN.....................  F-86 Sabre VI Aircraft \2\.........  90..................  ........................  Sales...................  ..............
                           Machine guns, cal.30...............  858.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Submachine gun, .45 cal............  4,092...............  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Rifle, Recoilless, 75mm............  339.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................            14.5
                           Rocket Launcher, 3.5"..............  658.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Ammunition.........................  Misc................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Machine gun, cal.50, Browning......  200.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
ISRAEL...................  Anti-aircraft guns, 40mm...........  54..................  Nash List/Sales.........  Grant...................  ..............
                           Tanks, M-48........................  60..................  Sales...................  Grant...................            20.0
                           Helicopter, H-34...................  30..................  Sales...................  Grant...................  ..............
JORDAN...................  Ammunition.........................  Misc................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Rifles, M1.........................  30,100..............  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           BAR's..............................  1,412...............  Nash List...............  Sales...................             1.1
                           Mortars, 81mm......................  250.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
SUDAN....................  Rifles and Carbines................  32,600..............  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Rocket Launcher M1A3...............  1,200...............  Nash List...............  Sales...................             2.0
                           Mortars, 81mm......................  380.................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Ammunition.........................  Misc................  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
TURKEY...................  Aircraft, Fighter, F-84F...........  116.................  Nash List...............  42 Grant & 74 Sales.....  ..............
                           Rocket Launcher, 3.5"..............  5,000...............  Nash List...............  Sales...................  ..............
                           Mortar, 4.2".......................  100.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Howitzer, 105mm, SP................  50..................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Tank, medium, M48..................  108.................  Sales...................  Sales...................            25.0
                           Tractors, Bulldozers, etc..........  115.................  Sales...................  Grant...................  ..............
                           Commo Equipment....................  Unk.................  Nash List...............  Grant...................  ..............
                           Machine gun, .30 cal, Browning.....  2,250...............  Sales/Nash List.........  Grant...................  ..............
                           Ammunition.........................  Unk.................  Sales...................  Grant...................  ..............
VENEZUELA................  F-86K \3\..........................  74..................  Sales...................  Sales...................             2.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Nash List comprises all the military equipment and services which the U.S. has supplied the FRG under grant aid. This equipment was provided as
  a part of 1954 US/FRG agreements to organize and equip German forces. Eight years later, in 1962, U.S. reversionary rights to this equipment were sold
  to the FRG for $75 million. Conditions of this sale require the FRG to coordinate and obtain U.S. agreement in the transfer (sales or grant) of any
  equipment to non-NATO third countries. For NATO countries, sales or grant must be coordinated for selected major items and, by subsequent agreement,
  FRG aid for Greece and Turkey is coordinated to assure integration of U.S. and FRG support.
\2\ These planes were manufactured in Canada under U.S. license. Prior to provision to Iran, the FRG obtained assurance from GOI that the aircraft were
  solely for Iranian use. In late 1966, it was reported that some of the planes were in Pakistan. Both the FRG and Canada protested. Iran stated that
  the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair.
\3\ Produced under U.S. license in Italy for U.S. MAP use subsequently paid for by the FRG.



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
              DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR COMPETITORS [P. 72]

    Mr. McNaughton. Senator Symington, you had asked why we 
draw a distinction between our competitors.
    When it comes to balance of payments, of course, the 
difference may not be so great, but if you are talking in terms 
of whether, for example, a determined Chile, which wants jet 
aircraft, is going to get aircraft from one country or another, 
there is no, so far as I know, there is no real push for 
Soviets sales, for example, in Latin America, although the 
committee has learned there is some intelligence that there are 
some overtures in this regard recently. But we do not mind much 
having the British fill that need for an inexpensive aircraft 
in Latin America, which is under the level that we are trying 
to keep Latin America to with the Hawker Hunter in Chile.
    We are trying to keep Latin America below the supersonic 
aircraft at an economic level, and we have so far succeeded, 
and the Hawker Hunter, in effect, was sold to Chile. We could 
have had that business easily. It would have been easy to have 
the business in Chile by selling more expensive F-5s which were 
exactly what Chile wanted.
    Saudi Arabia is a case in which the balance of 
considerations, everything taken into account, we, in effect, 
allowed part of that deal with Saudi Arabia to go to the United 
Kingdom.
    Senator McCarthy. Wasn't it on condition that they buy $300 
million of F-111 from us?
    Mr. McNaughton. It was more than that. I mean----
    Senator McCarthy. I mean the British bought from us and you 
let the British sell in Saudi Arabia.
    Mr. McNaughton. $400 million worth of business in Saudi 
Arabia.
    Senator McCarthy. $300 million.
    Mr. McNaughton. No, it was more than that, $2 billion.
    Senator McCarthy. Saudi Arabia?
    Mr. McNaughton. No, the whole deal was, the British deal--
--
    Senator McCarthy. I mean you let the British sell to Saudi 
Arabia.
    Mr. McNaughton. About $400 million worth.
    Senator McCarthy. Yes, sir.
    Mr. McNaughton. Phased over a ten-year period it comes to 
over $400 million.
    Senator McCarthy. How much would they pay for the F-111?
    Mr. McNaughton. They actually have not paid, but the deal, 
as I recall it, runs in the neighborhood of $2 billion, 
including the phantom and C-130 aircraft.
    Mr. Vance. Approximately $2 billion, the F-111 and the 
followon spares.
    Senator Gore. $2 billion.
    Mr. McNaughton. It is broken down into several pieces. 
There is a total deal of which the F-111s are a piece.
    Senator McCarthy. How much?
    Mr. McNaughton. Which adds up to $2.5 billion.
    Senator McCarthy. How much are they?
    Mr. McNaughton. The F-111 part of this I have listed as 
about $725 million.
    Senator McCarthy. That is quite different.
    Mr. McNaughton. Of the $2.5 billion package, there is a $2 
billion package with the British, and this $2 billion package 
they wanted some business running the other way. We ultimately 
agreed that provided they could meet competitive terms on 
price, delivery, quality, that we would buy from them or find 
things to buy from them, $325 million, and the $400 million, 
Senator McCarthy, that was part of that package.
    Senator McCarthy. And the Hawker Hunter is part of it, too.
    Mr. McNaughton. No, it is not.
    Senator McCarthy. Well, you said you could have gotten the 
business if you wanted to.
    Mr. McNaughton. All we had to do was sell F-5s.
    Senator McCarthy. Why did you not?
    Mr. McNaughton. We do not want Latin America to have that 
airplane.
    Senator McCarthy. Well, you said the F-5 was no worse than 
the Hawker Hunter.
    Mr. McNaughton. No, it is a supersonic plane.
    Senator McCarthy. I thought you said it was the same.
    Mr. McNaughton. It is hotter.
    Senator McCarthy. I thought you said it was roughly the 
same kind. We have some subsonic planes.
    Mr. McNaughton. The subsonic planes are wearing out, 
Senator McCarthy.
    Senator McCarthy. I think the point is that you do let some 
of our allies sell, don't you, when you really could get the 
business away from them if you wanted it.
    Mr. McNaughton. That is correct.
    Senator McCarthy. Saudi Arabia is a clear case.
    Mr. McNaughton. That is a case for one reason. Chile is a 
case for another reason.

                MILITARY DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

    Senator McCarthy. What I am concerned about is the 
manipulations concerned in the Defense Department. We sit 
around here trying to be foreign policy experts, and all of 
this kind of stuff is going on
    [Deleted.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               POWER IMBALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 73]

    Senator Symington. Right. There was a question of balance.
    I want to make this point to you. I have just come back 
from the Middle East. The situation in Jordan is extremely 
serious. I personally hope we do everything and anything we can 
to help this fellow in his problem in Jordan, but in my opinion 
there is a tremendous imbalance out there as a result of what 
has been going on, and I think it is operated on too classified 
a basis from the Congress. I am not talking about from the 
people.
    For example, there is no question about it, you check it 
when Mr. Battle comes back, because he briefed me at length on 
it, and he is a very brilliant fellow and is coming back here 
as assistant secretary. Now, today the quality of the U.A.R. 
air force is fantastic as against the number and quality of the 
Israeli air force.
    They bought their airplanes from France because we were too 
high toned to sell them, for various reasons that I have never 
been able to figure out, and get the business over here. So 
they buy the Mystere from France, and the new plane, whatever 
it is, the Mirage, and the Russians, who are, our embassy tells 
us in the highest classification, moving very rapidly into the 
U.A.R., they now ship there just as an illustration. The U.A.R. 
today has over four times more MIG's than the Chinese and the 
North Vietnamese combined, and sixty of those MIG's are 
considered the most modern that they have. This is the 
information I got only last month.
    Now, it is all very well to say that the Israelis can 
handle the U.A.R. because of pilot security, et cetera, but any 
day that the Soviets really get annoyed or there were any other 
mercenaries who really knew how to fly came in to run those 
U.A.R. airplanes, in my opinion, Israel is dead.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Whereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee was 
adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1967

                                   U.S. Senate,    
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met in public executive session at 10:00 
a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, 
and Case.
    William M. Roth, nominee to be Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations, and William B. McComber, nominee to be 
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, were 
heard in public session and then ordered reported. William S. 
Gaud, to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and Maurine B. Neuberger, to be a member of 
the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, were also approved.
    S. 623, the International Bridge Act of 1967, was discussed 
and carried over.
    The following treaties were ordered reported: Customs 
Conventions: Ex. J, 89/2, on Containers; Ex. K, 89/2, on the 
Temporary Importation of Professional Equipment; Ex. L, 89/2, 
on the A.T.A. Carnet for the Temporary Admission of Goods; Ex. 
M, 89/2, regarding E.C.S. Carnets for Commercial Samples; Ex. 
N, 89/2, on the International Transport of Goods under cover of 
T.I.R. Carnets.
    Fisheries Conventions: Ex. H, 89/2, Exploration of the Sea 
Convention; Ex. T, 89/2, notes Amending the Convention on Great 
Lakes Fisheries; Ex. U, 89/2, International Convention for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas.
    Maritime Conventions: Ex. Q, 89/2, Inter-American 
Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne 
Transportation (Convention of Mar del Plata); and Ex. R, 89/2, 
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Tariff.
    Discussion followed on whether or not to hold public 
hearings on the Foreign Aid Bill.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, February 28, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                    Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, 
Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Ex. D, 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union 
was discussed and ordered reported, with minority views, by a 
vote of 15-4.
    S. 990, to establish a United States Committee on Human 
Rights for International Human Rights Year-1968, was considered 
carried over.
    Discussion on educational trip to Vietnam by some members 
of the committee.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, February 28, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met in executive session at 2:25 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee), 
Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Case, and 
Cooper.
    General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
accompanied by Captain Louis L. Meier (USN), appeared to 
testify on the development of the Nike-X Antiballistic missile 
system.
    [The committee adjourned at 4:00 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        Wednesday, March 1, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Lausche, Clark, Pell, 
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
    The subcommittee heard testimony from Gerald F. Tape, 
Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, 
Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; and Dr. 
Michael M. May, Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, 
Livermore.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]


              SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY UNITED STATES

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, March 2, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in 
Room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright, Morse, 
Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the 
committee staff.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF JOHN T. MCNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
               FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

          DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S MILITARY SALES PROGRAM [P. 134]

    Mr. McNaughton. I want to double check this figure because 
our total sales program runs about one and a half billion per 
year, and how it could be a billion dollars in profits out of 
one and a half billion dollars of business is a little 
difficult for me to understand. I will double check that 
number.
    But, on the question of Senator Morse's proposal, you 
cannot discuss the question of, for example, sales to Jordan, 
sales to Israel, sales to Pakistan or India in open session 
without risking very serious problems with the countries 
involved. This is why we have requested a closed hearing on the 
subject. The State Department would feel even stronger than we 
do about this.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Senator Fulbright. I just did not want you to leave the 
record, in answer to Senator Lausche, as if CENTO amounted to 
something. The way he asked it, and you said yes, there is 
CENTO, it sounded as if it was of some significance, and it 
really is not.
    Senator Lausche. Well, the fact is it was at one time, and 
I was going to follow up with the question whether or not the 
significance did exist when Russia was trying to move in on the 
Congress or sometimes by press reports of speeches by my 
deputy, Mr. Kuss. Generally, by the critics of the sales 
program.
    Mr. McNaughton. The image that is given, for example, all 
the way through the committee staff report, is one of the 
United States energetically seeking business.
    Senator Fulbright. The same way right here.
    Mr. McNaughton. This is untrue, and I think it should be 
fully understood that this is untrue.
    The efforts that we put into this program by a factor of 
five to one are efforts to avoid selling.
    Senator Fulbright. I can guarantee that is not true here.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         ARMS SALES TO HELP BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SYSTEM [P. 137]

    Mr. McNaughton. I can guarantee that it is true in fact. It 
is my program, and this is where most of our efforts go--such 
as the Iranian program, trying to find--ways to keep a country 
from spending its resources on things it should not spend them 
on. This is not always the case, but in no case do we practice 
the hard sell, and I think that should be fully understood.
    Almost 90 percent of our sales are to the industrialized 
nations anyway where the problem on the first sale it does not 
arise, but we do not press sales.

              EXAMPLE OF A CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY

    Let me read you what happened just two, three days ago when 
the Air Minister Gomez from Brazil was here. Brazil is a 
perfect case of what Senator Fulbright refers to where I think 
almost a half billion dollars of economic grants or loans may 
go in a very short period of time.
    Senator Fulbright. Yes.
    Mr. McNaughton. The Air Minister was here, and he told me 
that Brazil is the largest country in South America. It has the 
largest Air Force, but it has old and outclassed fighters and 
aircraft. He wants to upgrade his Air Force, to keep it 
current. To improve the morale of his pilots, he wants just 12 
F-5's, the supersonic light Northrop airplane, to be delivered 
within one year. He wants them by the middle of next year, and 
he told us, he said, ``I don't want your grant, I don't want 
your credit. All I want is an agreement that Northrop can sell 
them to us,'' and the implication is, ``If you don't sell them 
to us we are going to get them somewhere else.''
    What I told him was, here is an extract from the memorandum 
of conservation:
    ``When Mr. McNaughton joined the group the Minister 
recounted his reasons for early acquisition of the F-5. Mr. 
McNaughton stressed the following points: (a) We place emphasis 
on economic and social development and were against the 
diversion of resources from this important sector at this time.
    ``(b) That the acquisition of the F-5 by Brazil would 
inevitably lead to a chain reaction demand for it by other 
Latin American countries who are not able to afford such 
expenditures at this time.''
    This morning I find the pressure is still on. He is still 
in town. The question is what do you do about it. Now, this 
gets into the whole policy question of our relations with 
Brazil, the State Department, AID----
    Senator Fulbright. It does.
    Mr. McNaughton.--DOD, who are all dealing in this problem 
trying to slow down, to prevent, these proud people from buying 
something they do not need, they have no business having, and 
this is where I spend my time to avoid selling them and, 
hopefully, to avoid having them drooling their money off 
somewhere else buying Mirages or Lightnings from the British--
Mirages from the French or Lightnings from the British. This is 
where the effort goes, and I would like to point out----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Is your point that if we do not sell, 
leaving aside entirely the aid we put into Brazil, they will 
find the money some place and buy from the British and the 
French. It looks like we are giving to them on the one hand, 
and taking away with the other.
    Mr. McNaughton. Senator Hickenlooper, this is a part----
    Senator Hickenlooper. That money might as well come back 
home as to go to Britain or France.
    Mr. McNaughton. This is entirely correct.
    What is going on there obviously is an internal political 
fight within the country.
    We had the same thing happen in Chile where they ended up 
buying the Hawker Hunters from the British. You have an 
internal fight going on there where for political reasons the 
government decides they have to allocate something for this 
purpose, and then the question comes up of one of restraint, 
trying to hold this thing down, and Chile wanted F-5's. We 
refused to sell them F-5's. We tried to sell them something 
that they considered too antiquated, which would have been a 
non-upgranting of their present force, and they eventually went 
to Hawker Hunter.
    Venezuela ended up buying aircraft from Germany. We did not 
veto this. It is an F-86, not a great step forward.
    Senator Lausche. Can you veto sales by Germany?
    Mr. McNaughton. Well, we have a veto over resales by 
Germany to non-NATO Countries.
    Senator Lausche. That is our equipment that sold to 
Germany?
    Mr. McNaughton. That is right. But one point I think you 
should understand, that these efforts, imperfect as they may 
be, Senator Fulbright, are paying off in Latin America, for 
example. In Brazil----
    Senator Gore. In dictatorships?
    Mr. McNaughton.--they are paying off in terms of military, 
the size of the military establishment.
    By using restraint, for example by agreeing to allow them 
to have 25 A-4B's in Argentina they are replacing two squadrons 
of Meteors of 50 aircraft.
    In Brazil, for example, we gave them 54 T-33's to replace 
50 plus 33 aircraft. They have smaller Air Forces.
    There is a human, psychological, political, internal 
problem that these governments have a deal with, just as you 
have a deal with who sits where around the table or who is 
where in the Pentagon. These problems are important to these 
people and, therefore, we move slowly to contract their 
expenditures on sophisticated types of equipment which, in our 
view, are unnecessary to the Latin Americans.
    The figures I wanted to give you, in Brazil, for example, 
in 1961, they had 165 combat aircraft. The 1967 figure shows 
122-165 down to 122.
    Argentina has reduced combat aircraft from 275 to 125 
combat aircraft.
    Bolivia, from 15 down to 8 in that period.
    Chile, from 57 to 48.
    Now, what we have is a case in which the old Mustang, the 
P-51, which used to be the airplane--well, when we finally sold 
these to Latin America, they kept them for a long time. And 
then they moved to the F-80, the F-86. They are now looking for 
the F-5, how long can we postpone the F-5? They do not need it 
at all.
    Senator Gore. Why does Chile need an F-5?
    Mr. McNaughton. Chile does not need an F-5.
    Senator Gore. Why does Argentina need one?
    Mr. McNaughton. Argentina does not need one. No one in 
Latin America needs one.
    Senator Gore. Why should we either give or sell them one?
    Mr. McNaughton. Because you have got the French, the 
British--Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some point when the 
F-5 is--their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it 
becomes more expensive even to maintain the old equipment than 
to buy new, there will be a break point, and this could come in 
1969.
    Mr. McNaughton. Because you have got the French, the 
British--Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some when the F-5 
is--their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it becomes 
more expensive even to maintain the old equipment then to buy 
new, there will be a break point, and this could come in 1969.
    Senator Lausche. If I may interrupt, the principle which 
Senator Gore is now enunciating, that is, why should we sell it 
to them, in trade with Red Russia, the proponents of trade 
argue that unless we engage in trade with them, other nations 
will, and that is about the same principle that you are up 
against.
    Mr. McNaughton. But not in Latin America. The Soviet 
problem is not a problem in Latin America.
    Senator Lausche. But if we do not help them along in this 
internal contest, they will go to France or they will go to the 
United Kingdom to acquire their planes.
    Mr. McNaughton. That is correct.
    Now, Frei in Chile obviously had a very serious problem, 
and he ended up having to decide that something of this nature 
had to be done, some sophisticated aircraft had to be 
purchased. His Air Force had to be upgraded to some extent in 
order to maintain the political fact of balance the way he 
would like it.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            PUBLIC HEARING ON MILITARY EXPORT SALES [P. 140]

    On the question of public hearings you, of course, should 
address this question to the Secretaries involved, but my own 
view is that it would be very difficult to answer the specific 
questions that come up as to why sales in this case, why not in 
that case. What were the other agreements that the country made 
that made this a more sensible deal than appears by just a 
transfer of arms, this sort of thing. This can hardly be done 
in public session without gravely injuring our relations with 
the countries involved.
    [Deleted.]
    Senator Gore. Aren't we?
    Mr. McNaugthon. We are in fact, but there is an explanation 
for it that cannot be given in public.
    What we are trying to do is to keep this Jordan separated 
from the Nasser group which is being, in effect, subsidized by 
the Soviets. We are trying to keep Jordan, which is trying to 
behave vis-a-vis Israel; we are trying to keep them from 
falling into the grasp of a Nasserite group and, therefore, we 
have to provide some arms to Jordan under various 
circumstances. Israel then finds herself surrounded by the 
Nasserite group, and, likewise, needs arms.
    Senator Gore. Meanwhile, Jordan will not cooperate in 
solving the Palestine refugee problem to which we have provided 
subsidy all these years. Jordan, has no prospect of ever 
becoming a viable economic state. It will be a permanent 
American subsidized entity.
    What is its justification?
    Mr. McNaughton. Do I gather that----
    Senator Lausche. May I interrupt here? I was in Israel in 
November of 1955. Please take this off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                        MILITARY SALES BY RUSSIA

    Senator Lausche. Do you have full information to what 
extent Russia is selling military equipment to the different 
nations of the world?
    Mr. McNaughton. We have. I do not have it with me, Senator 
Lausche.
    Senator Lausche. But you have it?
    Mr. McNaughton. We have, I think, fairly reliable 
information on this.
    Senator Lausche. Is Russia restraining itself from selling 
to countries that want to buy from her?
    Mr. McNaughton. It is hard, just as it is difficult for the 
Senators to see from the data, that the United States is 
restraining itself, I cannot say that we can see from the 
evidence we have that Russia is restraining herself for 
political reasons.
    All we can see are the items that show up, and it runs into 
$2 billion just around the Mediterranean, the southern edges of 
the Mediterranean.
    Senator Lausche. It has been selling to Pakistan, has it 
not of late?
    Mr. McNaughton. I do not have information on that in my 
mind.
    Senator Lausche. Maybe I am confused.
    Mr. McNaughton. Let me check on that for you, Senator 
Lausche, on Pakistan.
    Senator Lausche. Ayub was talking about going to Russia, 
was he not?
    Mr. McNaughton. He was talking about going to China.
    Senator Lausche. China?
    Mr. McNaughton. We do have information of his getting 
equipment from China.
    Senator Lausche. You do not have to check it. My thought is 
that while we are reviewing the military equipment we are 
selling, we should also obtain detailed information about what 
Russia is doing.
    Mr. McNaughton. Senator Lausche, we could do that.
    Senator Lausche. I am talking about our committee.
    Mr. McNaughton. Not only Russia and China, but we would be 
glad to make available to you what we have on this.
    Senator Lausche. The issue is we do not sell whether 
someone else will.
    Mr. McNaughton. In some cases.
    Senator Lausche. In some cases others have sold.
    Mr. McNaughton. That is right.
    Senator Lausche. And they are prepared to sell?
    Mr. McNaughton. And in some cases we do not care, and in 
some cases we do.
    Now, the Pakistan case is a case of getting equipment from 
China, not from the Soviet Union.
    Senator Lausche. I see.
    Mr. McNaughton. One hundred and seventy medium tanks and 60 
MIG-19's from China to Pakistan.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      EFFORTS AT BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS [P. 146]

    Mr. McNaughton. The second point I want to make, though, is 
one I think you might discuss with witnesses from State. Not 
this question about ACDA or State participation, but the 
question of whether any efforts have been made to get bilateral 
deals with the Soviets to cut out arms races.
    Senator Clark. I think you know that my interest in affairs 
of this kind. We have tried on one or two occasions to make 
some progress in having them stop these sales, and we stop the 
sales.
    They just get incredibly linked together, and they say, 
``Well, if you will take everything out of Turkey'', or 
something of that nature, and where our national interest 
cannot permit this to happen, so they become very, very 
difficult.
    Senator Clark. You agree this is a State Department and not 
a Defense Department responsibility to negotiate with the 
Russians?
    Mr. McNaughton. That is correct. But I made a statement in 
response to your statement that nothing has been done, and I 
want you to know that we have made efforts along this line, and 
the Committee might be interested in talking to State about it.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   COPRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS [P. 146]

    Mr. McNaughton. I would like to confirm that this is the 
specific legislation which applies to Senator McCarthy's 
question, but I suspect that is the root of the authority from 
Congress.
    Senator McCarthy. It is probably right. [Deleted.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICY ON ARMS SALES AND GRANTS [P. 147]

    Mr. McNaughton. I am prepared to answer the question, 
Senator McCarthy. In cases in which we have given grant 
assistance, for example, Nationalist China, if we had given 
grant assistance, the country comes along, the time arrives, 
when we can shift the sales along the line that Senator 
Symington was talking about, then we maintain the same 
relationship that we had with that country but instead of 
granting equipment we sell equipment.
    This will begin to happen in Greece, perhaps soon. Maybe in 
3 or 4 years from now in Turkey; maybe some time in the future 
in Korea. It is already happening in the Republic of China; in 
Iran we see it happening.
    These are cases where this shift is taking place, and the 
last time I testified, Senator McCarthy, you will recall I 
pointed out that the total involved of the two is remaining 
about the same.
    Senator McCarthy. Well, he says this has to be maintained 
through the sales media.
    Now, couldn't we maintain these if we simply granted the 
arms to them?
    Mr. McNaughton. Certainly.
    Senator McCarthy. Why does he say you have to do it through 
the sales media?
    Mr. McNaughton. Because we assume that the grants will be 
reduced as the countries become more able to pay for what they 
use.
    Senator McCarthy. We might be better off giving granting 
them. This makes a formal commitment. Where would Nationalist 
China go, for example, if we did not maintain this 
relationship? Through the sales media? It is just a kind of a 
wild statement, it seems to me, that does not stand up under 
any kind of testing.
    Mr. McNaughton. I can tell you where China would go, 
Senator McCarthy. They would dig down into their socks and take 
it out of their development program.
    Senator McCarthy. I am talking about Nationalist China.
    Mr. McNaughton. I am talking about that.
    Senator Gore (presiding). What would be wrong with that?
    Mr. McNaughton. Because we are interested in the economic 
development of Nationalist China. This is an argument against 
buying more.
    Senator McCarthy. If they are going to buy it from somebody 
else or not from us----
    Mr. McNaughton. Or anybody.
    Senator McCarthy. Anybody.
    Mr. McNaughton. This is one reason why in Nationalist China 
we do not insist that the whole program be sales, Mr. Chairman.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             PUBLIC HEARINGS ON ARMS SALES PROGRAM [P. 148]

    Senator Gore. The Secretary expressed the view from his 
standpoint it would be inadvisable for the Executive Department 
to testify publically on many matters. I take it that if the 
full committee, insisted upon a public hearing, this would be a 
matter which would address itself to your superiors and, 
perhaps, even to the President.
    Mr. McNaughton. I would think so, Mr. Chairman. I hope you 
would consider very seriously the impact on our relations with 
every country mentioned today if the whole--the deals that had 
to be arranged in each of these cases, which almost necessarily 
would have to be surfaced to give the full picture in each 
case, were brought out in public session or if a person had to 
take the Fifth, so to speak, with respect to half of each of 
these pictures, because the inferences could be drawn from that 
as well, I just hope you consider this, Mr. Chairman, before 
you make this recommendation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                ARMS SUPPLIES TO RIVAL NATIONS [P. 149]

    Senator McCarthy. What really saved us in India and 
Pakistan is that the British were supplying most of the Indian 
equipment and we were supplying arms to Pakistan. We did not 
have to prove our superiority or they prove theirs over ours. 
But if you had had Russian equipment in India and American 
equipment in Pakistan, we would have said we have got to test 
our equipment, we have got to prove our weapons are better than 
theirs.
    I think the British claimed their Centurion tank did prove 
to be better than our tanks in the India-Pakistan War.
    Our explanation, I understand, was that the British tank 
crews were better trained. But if it had been Russian equipment 
against American equipment, you would have had a hard time 
settling it.
    So now you get this thing up. I think you are better off if 
Morocco and Algeria both were supplied by the French, or by the 
Russians, or maybe both supplied by the United States, so we do 
not have to prove anything if there is a border incident 
between Algeria and Morocco. But we are giving airplanes and 
tanks and American equipment right there today, so when the 
test comes who is going to prove out to be, to have, the better 
equipment or the better ally.
    The test is going to be between the Centurions and the 
Pattons.
    The Defense Department seems to feel this is all good. With 
this policy we have political control, they say. And without 
it, we would lose everything.
    Mr. McNaughton. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make clear 
for the record that I disagree with Senator McCarthy's 
interpretation of the defense Department's position----
    Senator McCarthy. I just read it.
    Mr. McNaughton. I am shocked at the suggestion that we 
would encourage a war to test equipment.
    Senator McCarthy. I did not say a war.
    Mr. McNaughton. Or a continuation of a war.
    Senator McCarthy. I did not say a war.
    Mr. McNaughton. In order to prove our equipment is better 
than someone else's.
    Senator McCarthy. I did not say that. I said there is a 
temptation to do it. It would be much harder to draw off.
    Mr. McNaughton. I am shocked at the suggestion that we 
would be tempted to encourage a war or continue a war.
    Senator McCarthy. I did not say we would. I said we would 
be tempted to prolong it in order to prove the superiority of 
weapons and even to test them.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. I suggested a few days ago that in my view 
you would not succeed in persuading the Russians to limit the 
deployment of defensive systems so long as we were rattling our 
offensive missiles and bragging about having superiority.
    It seems to me if we are going to succeed in preventing 
this intensification of the arms race we must negotiate some 
modification of our own offensive stockpile; that offensive and 
defensive measure must be taken together.
    To what extent this can be accomplished, I do not know. But 
I personally welcome this response from the Soviets that I just 
read off the record. I want to say that.
    [Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., subcommittee adjourned.]


        POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

                              ----------                              


                         Friday, March 3, 1967

                               U.S. SENATE,
                        Subcommittee on Disarmament
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche, 
Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, 
and Cooper.
    Also present: Senator McGee.
    Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY 
ADRIAN S. FISHER, ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
AGENCY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    SERIOUS THOUGHT NOT GIVEN TO A NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 152]

    Now that we are getting to a point where there might be a 
treaty, they are having to face the fact that they may be 
expected to close off the nuclear option by formal treaty 
indefinitely into the future and, therefore, some of the 
misgivings which we might have known about earlier are now 
coming to the surface, because this is a major step for certain 
countries in certain situations, and in this regard I would 
refer to India, for example.
    Here is a country looking across the mountains on Mainland 
China, which is building nuclear weapons, and so the Indian 
Government recognizes that this step would be for it a very 
major and important decision.
    We think it will make the decision in favor of the 
nonproliferation. I do not think we ought to underestimate the 
importance of it to them.
    So it is not, I think, surprising that, when you get up to 
the hurdle, there is some hesitancy about taking the hurdle. We 
saw that in a minor way in the Latin American discussions of 
the Latin American nuclear-free zone. When they finally got up 
to the point of say, ``Let us put it on paper and signing it,'' 
then there were two or three countries that just were not sure 
they wanted to close off this option indefinitely into the 
future. They all did, but it was an illustration here in this 
hemisphere of a phenomenon that is going to be observable in 
other parts of the world.

          POSSIBLE PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

    A second point has been the reluctance of some governments 
to forgo the possible peaceful application of nuclear 
explosives. Let us put aside for the moment whether in some 
cases this might be a pretext rather than a reason, and accept 
the fact that there is a valid concern about being denied the 
possibilities of the use of peaceful explosions for peaceful 
purposes, for civilian purposes, indefinitely into the future.
    Senator Aiken. May I ask you: Is that covered in the Inter-
American Agreement?
    Secretary Rusk. It was quite frankly not covered fully to 
our own satisfaction because in the Inter-American Treaty they 
did have some language which seemed to say if peaceful 
explosions can be developed in a way that does not produce 
weapons through some technical advances in the future, we do 
not wish to close off that option.
    In the present state of the art, we do not see that 
distinction coming along. But I would like to emphasize that, 
as we see this problem, peaceful explosions are, in fact, 
weapons, and explosions that can dig a harbor can destroy a 
city. So we do not see how you can stop proliferation by 
leaving open the possibility of developing explosive 
capabilities for engineering and civil purposes.
    The state of the art theoretically, I suppose, could change 
some time where there might be certain types of explosions that 
would not have anything to do with weapons, but we do not see 
it at the present time. So we feel that we cannot except 
peaceful explosions from such a treaty.
    However, this is a valid interest on the part of a good 
many countries. We ourselves, as you know, are contemplating 
the possibility of using such explosion for an Isthmian Canal.
    It might well be that a country like Mauritania might wish 
to have a harbor dug. It is short of a good harbor. It may be 
that a good many things in many parts of the world might happen 
in this connection.
    We have discussed with the Soviet Union and with a good 
many other governments, the possibility of trying to make some 
international arrangement under which existing nuclear powers 
could furnish the services of a nuclear peaceful explosion in 
situations where it would be feasible from an engineering point 
of view-but to do that either through IAEA in Vienna, or 
perhaps, through the Security Council of the United Nations, or 
through some other international arrangement, which would make 
it possible for us to say to the non-nuclear countries around 
the world, ``If the time comes when you need an explosion for 
peaceful purposes, we would ensure that you have this service 
available to you.'' That is what we would like to do.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          TECHNOLOGICAL SPINOFF FROM THE WEAPONS FIELD [P.154]

    Senator Rusk. Those of you on the Joint Committee, I think, 
would probably agree with that. The gadgetry of weapons 
introduces very little into industry as such, and has any 
peaceful or industrial or commercial application. So that we 
think that that is a concern that can be met on the merits, and 
the German attitude seems to be reasonably relaxed on that at 
the present time and in the light of technical explanations, 
which have been provided.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          PROBLEM OF SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS IN TREATY [P. 154]

    Secretary Rusk. There is a major complication at the moment 
in Euratom because Euratom has set up its own safeguards. Those 
safeguards are, from a technical point of view, comparable to 
the IAEA safeguards and, from the point of view of inspection 
alone, would be satisfactory.
    But the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example, and 
possibly some others, take the view that inspection of allies 
by allies is not adequate and, therefore, there ought to be 
more general international safeguards in order that all could 
have equal assurances about the non-use of these materials for 
weapons purposes.
    The Euratom countries are divided on this at the present 
time. It is now being studied in Euratom, and they will be 
having discussion of this at a ministerial level, I understand, 
later this month.
    There are two or three possibilities in which this matter 
might be solved. One would be for the IAEA to put in effect a 
Good Housekeeping stamp of approval on the Euratom safeguards.
    Another might be for the IAEA to safeguard the safeguard 
system, to test it periodically to be sure that the Euratom 
safeguards are working adequately.
    A third might be for the members of Euratom to approach 
this from a national point of view, rather than from a group 
point of view, and each one of them, the non-nuclears--this 
would exclude France--the non-nuclears to say, ``Well, we are 
in Euratom, but where there is a Euratom facility in my country 
we will accept the IAEA safeguards for that facility,'' even 
though there may not be unanimity in Euratom itself.
    Now, we do not exclude the possibility that France will 
vote with the others and accept IAEA safeguards in Euratom, but 
if France does not there still is that possibility.
    I would like to raise with the committee for thought, and I 
will be doing it also with the joint committee, one point that 
could make some difference in the attitude of other governments 
in this matter because there is a sense of discrimination if 
the IAEA safeguards are to be applied solely to the non-nuclear 
countries.
    Now, if we, for example, were in a position to say that we 
ourselves will accept IAEA safeguards on the peaceful uses 
installations in our country, this could relieve the political 
situation considerably with respect to this sense of 
discrimination, and it might encourage some of the others to 
move more forthrightly in this field.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Our only trouble there would be 
inspection, would it not? Do we consider our safeguards more 
stringent than those of IAEA, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency?
    Secretary Rusk. Nevertheless, if IAEA had access to all of 
our peaceful uses installations----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I say that is the trouble, which is 
inspection. There is the access.
    Secretary Rusk. My understanding of the IAEA safeguards is 
that they are so constructed as not to get into such things as 
industrial secrets. Our Atomic Energy Commission has no 
difficulty with this so far as our peaceful installations are 
concerned. Now, weapons installations would be another matter.
    But we will go into that in some detail because it has some 
technical aspects. But my understanding is that the character 
of the safeguards is such that you apply them at a critical 
point to determine what is being done, and you do not have to 
get into the question of how it is being done from a 
technical----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think there are some technical 
difficulties if we do get into industrial operations that 
violate the rules.
    Secretary Rusk. I will get Dr. Seaborg and others to 
consult.
    Senator Gore. In any event, the existence of the IAEA is, 
despite its limitations, a definite plus. We have something 
agreed upon with which to start.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Now, it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union would accept 
IAEA safeguards instead of its own country, or that France 
would accept it. Britain has a special problem and, perhaps, 
this could be left off the tape for just a moment.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. The Soviet Union would be prepared to see a 
treaty go forward without a safeguards article.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I make a respectful 
suggestion that the Secretary complete his statement before we 
question him, if possible, so that we will be sure we can all 
be here.
    Senator Gore. The Chair thinks it is a very pertinent 
suggestion and agrees with it. Is there objection on the part 
of the committee?
    Proceed, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, my remarks are quite informal at this 
point, Mr. Chairman. I will bring them to a conclusion on this 
matter of the nonproliferation treaty.
    I was just saying that the Soviet Union would probably 
accept a treaty without a safeguards provision.
    We feel that a safeguards provision is very important, and 
we understand that the committees here in the Senate feel that 
it is very important, so we have a good deal of work to do 
still on that point.

          EFFECT OF TREATY ON POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

    On another subject, which is potentially a source of very 
great difficulty, is the effect of a nonproliferation treaty on 
the political unification of Europe. Now, this involves a 
matter which we have been talking with the Soviets about for 
literally four or five years.
    It has to do with political arrangements in Western Europe 
that may or may not have anything to do with the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. I think our friends in Western Europe would 
be unwilling to sign a proliferation treaty which barred the 
possibility of a political unification of, say, the six states 
now in the present EEC.
    We ourselves do not wish to bar European unity through such 
a treaty.
    Senator Lausche. Who does?
    Secretary Rusk. But the attitude of the Soviet Union is 
likely to be very severe on this point.
    Looking at it from their point of view, they would say, 
``Look, how do you expect us to accept the notion of a 
politically-unified Europe in which there would be Germans and 
the Unified Europe would be a nuclear power by succession,'' 
say, from France or France and Britain if Britain is a part of 
it by that time?
    This is a very serious question, and one that we are likely 
to have to face fairly soon now because we are getting to the 
point of making clear what our respective interpretations are 
on the language which your subcommittee has already had, if, 
indeed, that language survives the present discussion, that is, 
the present international discussion.
    There are theoretically two or three ways of dealing with 
this. One would be to say if you do not have a common 
interpretation on so fundamental a point, then you go back to 
the drawing board because you have not had a sufficient meeting 
of the minds to claim that you have a treaty.
    A second would be for us and other signatories to make 
clear our own interpretation of that point publicly, as we 
would in any event have to do in presenting such a treaty, say, 
to the Senate, and then hope that the Russians would at least 
be silent. We do not know whether they would be silent or 
whether that would be a satisfactory solution, but it is this 
point which we have had in mind when we have said to you and to 
our allies that we do not have an agreement with the Soviet 
Union yet on the text of a nonproliferation treaty, because the 
words which you have in front of you, perhaps, conceal the 
possibility of a basic misunderstanding of what the words mean.
    Now, it is true that political unity of Europe is some 
distance off, at best. It is possible that it may never come 
into existence for other reasons entirely. It seems at this 
stage to be a rather hypothetical obstacle, but we may be faced 
with the problem: Do you have a treaty if the words can be 
agreed at a time when beneath the surface there is a major 
difference of interpretation by at least a number of the 
principal signatories?
    I do not want to minimize the difficulty of that problem, 
and I do not want to pretend that we can see any answer at the 
present time until we explore further what the Soviet attitude 
on that point is likely to be. If they are willing to gamble, 
this is a hypothetical question long in the future, and sign 
the treaty with the full knowledge of the interpretation which 
the rest of us put on it, this point, then there may be no 
great difficulty.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             ASSURANCES AGAINST NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL [P. 155]

    Secretary Rusk. A further point that has come into the 
discussion is the question of assurances, assurances to non-
nuclear countries who may think they will be subject to nuclear 
blackmail. This is not so much a problem with those who are 
allied, say, with the United States, countries like Japan or 
our NATO allies. It is more of a problem with countries who do 
not have such an alliance, such as India living next door to a 
nuclear China.
    This is very troublesome because for us to give anyone, for 
example, the kind of assurances which might give them complete 
comfort would involve a very far reaching extension of American 
commitments. It could only be done by a treaty, and it would 
have to be done almost on the NATO formula, that an attack on 
one is an attack on all.
    If a country like India is to feel that it is the 
beneficiary of ironclad guarantees--and I am not at all sure 
that we ourselves want to entertain the idea--that if there is 
to be a nuclear exchange anywhere, from anywhere in the world, 
that we insist on being a part of it.
    So, this is a major problem, and it may be the key question 
upon which the Indian decision would be made as to whether or 
not to sign.
    I do not want to suggest to this committee that we ought to 
go racing down the track of providing these assurances to 
individual countries in connection with a nonproliferation 
treaty, but it is something which is very much worth 
considering, very much worth consideration.

                     REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF TREATY

    On the question of review and amendment, the duration of a 
treaty is a matter that has been discussed. I believe you, Mr. 
Chairman, have suggested a possible ten-year duration clause. 
There have been suggestions from other quarters that there 
might be a five-year duration clause.
    One of the advantages of a shorter term--that is, some term 
such as five or ten years--would be that it would tend to 
eliminate certain of these hypothetical problems such as what 
do you do about explosions for peaceful purposes; what do you 
do about the European unity clause, and things of that sort.
    But, on the other hand, if there is a termination date 
there is considerable prospect that a number of countries would 
race during that period--perhaps I could amend this language on 
the tape--race during that period to become eight months 
pregnant, and that you then might find that at the end of that 
period you would have an epidemic of nuclear powers, new 
nuclear powers, arriving on the scene. So, it is a troublesome 
question.
    It seems to me that there will be some advantages in our 
having an open-ended treaty subject to periodic review. In the 
present text we are talking about a review every five years. 
But it may be difficult to achieve a permanent treaty, and at 
some stage we may have to come back and discuss with you 
whether it is better to have a treaty for a period of years 
than no treaty at all, given the attitudes of a considerable 
variety of governments on this subject.
    At the present time, the momentum is toward a permanent 
treaty, but there are one or two problems that do point back to 
the possibility of, to the possible desirability of, a shorter 
term treaty.
    We will ourselves favor an open-ended treaty as far as time 
is concerned.
    Mr. Chairman, those are the key issues that are under 
discussion at the present time.

                       PROCEDURES OF DISCUSSIONS

    Procedurally, we are now discussing these matters closely 
with our allies. We should hope during the course of the next 
two to three weeks to bring those allied discussions to a 
conclusion soon, test the allied interpretation of this 
language with the Soviet Union, and then table, if possible, a 
treaty in Geneva for the consideration of the Geneva 
Conference, and then submission to other governments.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        ABM MATTER TIED IN WITH NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 157]

    Senator Rusk. You know that the President yesterday 
announced that he had received from Mr. Kosygin a letter which 
said that the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss both 
offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, and was prepared to 
enter into negotiations with us to see whether steps of 
disarmament could be taken in both fields.
    There was no detail in the letter. It is our impression 
that the Soviet Union is working on these matters within its 
own structure. It, too, may have some interdepartmental 
negotiations underway on this, and that they are in the process 
of preparing a position on which they would enter into any 
detailed discussions with us.
    But we do have some impressions, not spelled out in Mr. 
Kosygin's letter which was very short, and said, ``We are ready 
to have discussions,'' not spelled out in his letter but 
nevertheless a present picture.
    You remember they rejected the notion of a freeze on 
offensive and defensive weapons which we proposed in Geneva 
last year.
    I suppose the reason they rejected the freeze was because 
they considered the existing situation unfavorable to them. 
They, at the present time, seem to make it clear that they are 
not interested in talking about freezes, but in mutual 
limitations to an agreed level on both sides.
    It is my impression--although we have no specific proof of 
this--that they would expect numerical equivalence between the 
Soviet Union and the United States in such negotiations. That 
is a pretty difficult and complicated thing for us to accept or 
to bring about or to inspect because if you get into the 
questions of that sort, you get into questions of what kinds of 
warheads, what kinds of megatonnage, what kinds of deliveries, 
what types of missiles, a great deal of fine print which is 
almost impossible to monitor in any event inside of a society 
which does not accept inspection.
    So that I do not want to leave any false optimism before 
the committee on this matter.
    We are encouraged to know that they are prepared seriously 
to discuss the matter, and we will be discussing it with them. 
But we do not have any reason at this point to suppose they 
will think about it in terms of a freeze, nor do we have any 
clear indication as to what they would do about the ABM's which 
they have already deployed in the Soviet Union, in the Moscow 
area.
    So all that I can report on this point is that they have 
agreed to talk in a more systematic and official way than had 
been communicated to us earlier.
    They have asked us to make any further proposals that we 
might have on this matter, and those are being now prepared in 
the executive branch.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF OUR STOCKPILE [P. 158]

    Senator Gore. It seems to me that with the superiority 
which we have publicly asserted, which may be more apparent 
than real, it would be unrealistic to expect the Soviets to 
agree to stop their defensive buildup. The first question I 
would like to ask you relates to the public disclosure of our 
stockpile.
    We have been informed in the committee that megaton-wise 
the stockpile vis-a-vis the US and the USSR is roughly equal. 
In the number of warheads and missiles we have about a three or 
three and a half to one superiority. Secretary McNamara has 
publicly announced our stockpile of missiles.
    I can understand he thought he would impress the Soviets 
that no matter how much they deployed a defensive system our 
missile offensive stockpile was so great that their defense 
would be overwhelmed.
    But, on the other hand, it seems to me that this gives a 
weapon to the Soviet military to insist upon a defense because 
we are waving our bombs and bragging about our superiority.
    I wonder if you would give us your views with respect to 
that.
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that in the course of NATO 
discussions it was felt necessary to go into these matters in 
considerable detail with our allies, and under those 
circumstances the matter of--these things do tend to become 
public in general orders of magnitude.
    We have no doubt that the Soviet Union has known for a long 
time the general order of magnitude of our stockpiles and our 
weapons situation, and the fact that they have added certain 
new information-gathering techniques, with which members of the 
committee are familiar--some which we also have--we do not 
think that this is a matter of disclosing information to the 
Soviet Union, but rather telling our own people and other 
peoples in the alliances the approximate situation. I doubt 
that that would influence very seriously the actual negotiating 
position because they know that.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


DECISION TO DEPLOY ARMS DEFERRED UNTIL FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS 
                                [P. 160]

    Senator Gore. I seem to detect from your statements this 
morning that the essence of the Administration decision now is 
to perhaps defer a decision to proceed with deployment. I have 
understood Secretary McNamara to be in opposition to deployment 
even though the Soviets did not agree. Has the administration 
reached a decision in that regard?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that, as you know, there are 
substantial funds in the present budget for continuing with an 
active research and development program for ABM's, but no final 
decision has been taken with respect to deployment until we can 
test a little more fully the possibilities of some agreement 
with the Soviet Union.
    I would not want to leave the impression that a final 
decision has been made that come what may we should not deploy 
anything. It may well be that in any event certain light 
deployments may be felt required, for example, to protect the 
strategic strike force and to maintain its deterrent 
capability. But those are matters on which the executive and 
the appropriate committee of Congress will be in full touch 
with each other.
    I think what has been done thus far is to defer a final 
decision on that point until we can find out where we are in 
our discussions in this matter with the Soviet Union.
    Senator Gore. Senator Fulbright.
    Senator Fulbright. Mr. Secretary, I think it has been a 
very interesting statement. I will ask a few questions 
pertinent to this matter.
    I understood from our briefings with the CIA and the 
military that there is some difference of opinion about the 
character and effectiveness of the ABM system around Moscow. 
The CIA gave me the impression they did not think anything very 
serious--that it was not very advanced, and that they doubted 
its effectiveness. Do you have any view about this?
    Secretary Rusk. My own impression, and I do not have the 
exact technical reports in front of me, is that as far as the 
Moscow system is concerned, it is a first generation system 
which is likely to become operational within the next year or 
two and that there is no doubt among the different members of 
the intelligence community that this is an ABM system.
    There are some other installations in other parts of the 
Soviet Union about which there is some discussion as to whether 
those are, in fact, serious ABM systems, or whether they are an 
antiaircraft or other type system.
    Senator Fulbright. That is right. I understood that, too. 
But even as to the Moscow one, I gathered from Mr. Helms he was 
not too upset. He left the impression with me it was a 
difference in view as to its importance between him and the 
military, and it could be, it is kind of a utilitarian concept 
around Moscow, it could be very effective or effective against 
planes but also has some capability against missiles, but they 
were not too excited about it in contrast to the military.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ABROAD
                                [P. 161]

    Senator Fulbright. In addition to that, you might give us 
information--if you do not have it immediately, perhaps, you 
could supply it for the record--on the CIA, and AID, State 
Department, Agriculture, Labor employees abroad. In other 
words, I think it is significant if there is going to be any 
agreement either on ABM or nonproliferation or almost any field 
that the Russians feel there is some degree of equivalence. We 
must realize that they are not going to sign an agreement if 
they think we have an insurmountable advantage. Do you agree 
with that on principle?
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is probably correct, Mr. 
Chairman. I think that there is another possibility. Let me 
contrast two situations.
    Senator Fulbright. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. The one would be a formal agreement signed 
by the two sides on this question. That is going to be 
extremely difficult and complicated, in my judgment, because 
that sort of an agreement has to be written against the 
prospect of violation, and the fine print becomes extremely 
complicated, and we run into the difficulty of inspection 
straight away.
    It is not inconceivable that there is an alternative, and 
that is we both proceed by mutual example, with neither side 
giving up its freedom of action, but each side acting in 
relation to what the other side is doing.
    Now, we did that during a period of about two years on the 
Defense budgets until the situation in the Far East brought 
that process----
    Senator Fulbright. And you were making some progress.
    Secretary Rusk. We were making some progress on that.
    Senator Fulbright. I am inclined to think for the 
preliminary stages this is the area where you are most likely 
to make progress.
    Secretary Rusk. In view of the capabilities of both sides 
to keep a general eye on the situation, something like a mutual 
example may be a way to get started. But I do not want to 
prejudge the results. If we can work out something with the 
Soviet Union, maybe it should be more precise.
    Senator Fulbright. I understand.
    I wonder if you would undertake to do what the military has 
already done, to give the committee an estimate of the number 
of persons included in these activities abroad in all of these 
fields. Is there any reason why you cannot say how many CIA 
agents we have abroad?
    Secretary Rusk. There is some problem on that.
    Senator Fulbright. Even in view of the revelations that 
have been made recently?
    Secretary Rusk Yes. [deleted]
    Senator Fulbright. Well, I will abide by your judgment.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY [P. 163]

    Secretary Rusk. Well I think you are right, Mr. Chairman. 
On the nonproliferation matter, for example, the IAEA ought to 
play a major role in regard to safeguards, perhaps in regard to 
the provision of explosions for peaceful purposes.
    Whether the Eastern Europeans would cooperate on a basis 
that would be generally acceptable--in other words, what would 
they do about a veto. We do not know what that would do. We are 
prepared to go a long way in this ourselves.
    Senator Fulbright. For example, when you were speaking of 
the blackmail problem, of what a terrible problem it was, and I 
agree with you, I would certainly hesitate about the United 
States unilaterally making any assurances on protection, 
because this, in a sense, puts you up as a kind of antagonist 
to the Soviet Union. It seems to me in this case that some 
utilization of the U.N., an agency in which both the U.S.S.R. 
and the United States are influential members, will be 
required. I do not see how you are going to get around those 
very dilemmas you already mentioned if you do not utilize some 
form of international machinery.
    I was told in Sweden that there was very strong feeling 
about this proliferation treaty.
    There would be some public feeling against an agreement in 
which the nuclear countries maintain their status quo. They 
want an agreement, but they want us and the Soviet Union to at 
least make some undertaking for the gradual transfer of 
responsibility to an international organization.
    Secretary Rusk. That is, to me, a reasonable attitude on 
the part of a good many non-nuclear countries. It is a very 
hard objective to achieve.
    Senator Fulbright. Very.
    Secretary Rusk. And, therefore, the question is do you wait 
until the nuclear powers find some way to begin some nuclear 
disarmament before you try for a nonproliferation treaty. What 
we have tried to do with that, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to 
take that problem somewhat into account in a preambular 
declaration in which we all repeat the commitments we have made 
to make the effort, in the United Nations resolutions and 
elsewhere, and we will be sure that you have, if you do not 
already have, the text on it. We are trying to work something 
out on that. This is a reasonable concern of the non-nuclear 
countries.
    Senator Fulbright. It seemed so to me and being reasonable 
they are in a position to thwart us if we do not make a gesture 
by simply not signing. There is no way for us to make a country 
like Sweden sign if we do not do something in this case.
    Secretary Rusk. You remember in the case of Sweden, Mr. 
Chairman, when they signed the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty they 
reserved the right to have nuclear weapons in the future. In 
other words, they said, ``We won't test, but we want the 
right''----
    Senator Gore. Who said that?
    Secretary Rusk. Sweden.
    Senator Fulbright. They are capable of making it, too. They 
are very ingenious people.
    Secretary Rusk. I am not sure whether it is a completely 
real argument on their part. It is a good idea, but I am not 
sure it is a real argument or a little defensive apparatus as 
they come up to the hurdle of making a final commitment that 
they won't go nuclear. I am just not sure in their particular 
case.
    Senator Fulbright. I imagine others though--you already 
mentioned the Indians--have the same, but I expect they are not 
unique among the non-nuclear powers, are they, in this 
attitude?
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is correct.
    Senator Fulbright. I was told that several others had 
exactly the same view.
    I do not wish to occupy the time, although there are many 
other aspects of it that I am sure can be discussed.
    In conclusion, I do want to urge you to use all the 
ingenuity you can, to determine whether some kind of 
international organization could participate; perhaps a new 
committee, within the U.N. in which the U.S.S.R. and ourselves 
can have confidence. I can understand the difficulty of 
involving too many countries and the difficulties that have 
resulted from such large membership. But surely some devices 
within that organization can be developed in which there is not 
that problem, to which some of these functions can be given.
    I really do not see any alternative to it. I cannot imagine 
that the rest of the world will sit by idly, and even if the 
Russians are not disposed to agree with us entirely at the 
moment, they appear to be coming along.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that the 
subcommittee has been told, and I may have to take this off the 
record when the time comes, the Soviets have agreed to hold 
technical talks with us on PLOWSHARE type activities.
    Senator Gore. At Geneva?
    Secretary Rusk. Bilaterally, and we would hope that, 
perhaps, this might be an additional way in which we could get 
into the question of how they and we, and maybe Britain, could 
provide PLOWSHARE type services to--
    Senator Fulbright. Jointly.
    Secretary Rusk. Through non-nuclear countries, jointly, 
through some joint arrangement.
    Senator Fulbright. I would urge you to go as fast as you 
can in this direction, with the least important and least 
difficult step to begin with, if there is one. I had the same 
thought about the importance of the Antarctic Treaty, not that 
it in itself solved a lot, but a start in the right direction 
was made, and I hope we will do something in this case.
    Senator Gore. Senator Hickenlooper.

                 HAVE SOVIETS EVER MADE ANY CONCESSIONS

    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, do you know of any 
time in recent history that the Soviets have agreed to anything 
that in any way stood in the way of their advancing to at least 
full equality or superiority over the United States? In other 
words, have they made any real concessions of any kind? I am 
not talking superficially.
    Secretary Rusk. No, I understand, Senator. It was the 
judgment of our experts at the time that the conclusion of the 
atmospheric test ban treaty would, in fact, work to our 
advantage relatively. Now, that is an arguable and debatable 
point.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It is so far as I am concerned.
    Secretary Rusk. But this was the view that we had in front 
of us at the time.
    I think, broadly speaking, the answer to your question is, 
No.
    Senator Symington. What was the question?
    Senator Hickenlooper. It was a rather long-winded and 
complicated question, and I do not know that I can repeat it, 
but I will try to.
    Senator Symington. I would appreciate that. I could not 
hear you.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I asked the Secretary if he knew of 
any occasion in recent history, since the Soviet Union has come 
to major world power, when they have made any concessions of 
any kind other than superficial ones for incidental 
accommodations, where they in any way impaired their ability to 
at least come equal, or superior, to the United States in 
various major fields.
    I understood his answer to be in the main, no, with the 
exception of the Test Ban Treaty, and I have argued that point 
with him. I do not quite agree with the fact that it was of any 
advantage to us.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   REASONABLE PARITY ASSUMED [P. 165]

    Secretary Rusk. We would have great difficulty in accepting 
arrangements which we felt were putting us at a disadvantage. 
What we are trying to work on in these matters--and differences 
of views can differ on it--is to try to get some sort of 
ceiling and downward turn in the arms race in a way that does 
not change the relative position of either side.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        EFFECT OF BOMBING PAUSES ON NEGOTIATION EFFORTS [P. 166]

    Secretary Rusk. We sent the North Vietnamese a message 
which was returned to our embassy on the first day as though it 
were unopened. On the first day Peking said that even if we 
stopped bombing there would be no negotiations. I happened to 
be in Vienna with Mr. Gromyko at the tenth anniversary of the 
Austrian State Treaty on the third day of that suspension and 
he told me that the pause was an insult, that it was an 
ultimatum.
    So that was our experience at that particular time. We did 
send the other side a message, which was returned to us, trying 
to elicit some response from them.
    Senator Lausche. Well, then the pause was intended 
definitely to lead toward an understanding that we would go to 
the negotiating table.
    Secretary Rusk. That was the hope at the time.
    Senator Lausche. And there were communications between the 
two countries in which North Vietnam completely rejected the 
efforts which we made.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, they returned the communication.
    Senator Lausche. Now, they returned it without opening it.
    Secretary Rusk. I have no doubt they took off a copy before 
they sent it back, but they gave it back to us in the same form 
in which we had given it to them, sealed in the envelope.
    Senator Lausche. Am I correct that in the beginning of 1966 
there were 37 days of cessation?
    Secretary Rusk. Running from Christmas, 1965, through----
    Senator Pell. Will the Senator yield for a moment on this?
    Senator Lausche. Yes.
    Senator Pell. There is one further point, and, as you know, 
I have been very reticent of any discussion of this subject. 
But it has since come out in the press; and that is in 
connection with the '65 short cessation. I think the record 
should show, because as I say it has been in the press, that 
there was a communication, it may have been meaningless--the 
Secretary and I have discussed this privately--it may not have 
been meaningless, but there was a communication from the North 
Vietnamese Government at the end of that cessation of bombing 
period, would that not be correct?
    Secretary Rusk. In the five day?
    Senator Pell. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. No.
    Senator Pell. In Paris.
    Secretary Rusk. Are you not perhaps thinking of the 37 day?
    Senator Pell. No, I am thinking of the five-day period in 
Paris when it was in the press afterward. I have never said 
anything about it, but I read it in the press later.
    Secretary Rusk. I know of the discussion of this subject in 
connection with the 37-day suspension, but I do not recall that 
this happened in the five and a half day. I will look this up.
    Senator Pell. We had phone conversations, one phone 
conversation or two, and the question was the communication at 
the end of the period which came a few hours before the end of 
the cessation of its bombing, which was resumed by the time we 
got it. It had already resumed, but we were concerned about 
this matter. I have never discussed this matter.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, let me check back on this. I think 
we are talking about two different pauses.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             HO CHI MINH COMMUNICATION TO THE POPE [P. 167]

    Senator Lausche. Was there anything essentially significant 
that happened with respect to this last stoppage, and that is 
by way of a statement made by the ambassador of North Vietnam 
to France, and a communication sent by Ho Chi Minh to the Pope.
    Secretary Rusk. That came at the end of this period of six 
days. You recall, Senator, that the two countries who are the 
co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference were then in conference in 
London; Mr. Kosygin was there with Prime Minister Wilson, and 
they took certain initiatives, communicating with the parties 
to see if they could move the situation off center, but without 
success. The Hanoi response was as contained in President Ho 
Chi Minh's message to the Pope on February 13, and I will be 
glad to put the text of that in the record if the Senator 
wishes.

               DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN ABM SYSTEM [P. 169]

    Senator Williams. If we decide to deploy them, how long 
would it take us to get them actually installed?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Fisher tells me--I am not familiar with 
this point myself--that to deploy these missiles in suitable 
arrays, with all the facilities that would go with them, would 
require four to five years.
    Senator Williams. What I was trying to determine is, how 
far ahead in deployment are the Russians at this point, two or 
three years?
    Mr. Fisher. My understanding, Senator Williams, is they 
have about a year to go before the initial operational 
capability of a limited system around Moscow. There is 
considerable argument what the other systems are. They have 
about a year to go around Moscow. We have four to five to go 
before our system would reach an operational capacity. That 
would put them three or four ahead of us with the qualification 
on it that the system around Moscow is not considered effective 
against the totality of U.S. missiles. It does not provide 
adequate radar coverage to protect against POLARIS missiles, 
and that automatically starts an argument in the intelligence 
community of what have they done it for if it is not any good, 
but there is an understanding that it would not be effective 
against POLARIS missiles because the radar coverage now 
existing just does not cover certain segments from which 
POLARIS missiles will come.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          REPORTS OF U.S. ``CRISIS'' FOR WEST GERMANY [P. 175]

    Secretary Rusk. Senator Symington, I think the committee 
should know from the beginning of the Geneva Conference we have 
had the most intimate consultation among the four NATO members 
who are part of that conference, plus the German liaison 
representative who is present in Geneva, that this matter has 
been discussed frequently in NATO itself, and that at the 
present time we are consulting with our allies before there is 
an agreement with the Soviet Union.
    Now some of our allies doubt what I just said. Some of them 
seem to think there is an agreement under the rug we are not 
disclosing. Now, for reasons that I explained to the committee 
earlier this morning, this just is not true. There is a major 
question of interpretation still outstanding between us and the 
Soviet Union, so this is not a case of our having an agreement 
with the Soviet Union under the rug on which we are consulting 
with our allies in the spirit that nothing can be changed. We 
are, in fact, now in process of consulting our allies prior 
to--we hope to be--a final stage with the Soviet Union, and 
before a treaty text is actually presented in Geneva.
    Senator Symington. Well, this article worried me.
    Secretary Rusk. There have been, Senator--and I may have to 
deal with the record a little bit on this--there have been 
certain kinds of resistances in Germany to the whole idea of a 
nonproliferation treaty. First, they say that they have already 
renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons, therefore they do 
not need a treaty. Secondly, some of them say that ``In any 
event, we are prepared to take these obligations to our allies, 
but we do not want to undertake obligations of the Soviet Union 
and thereby give the Soviet Union a right to interfere with our 
affairs here.''
    Some of them have said that this would sentence them to 
permanent inferiority to France inside the alliance in Europe. 
Some of them have hoped that maybe this issue could be used as 
a card to play in bargaining with the Soviet Union with respect 
to a settlement of the German question. There have been a 
combination of ideas on this subject.
    Now, Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt have 
brushed aside most of these problems in their own views about a 
nonproliferation treaty, but they do have some internal 
political problems with respect to it.
    We will do our best to satisfy them on the fair question 
such as effect on industry and peaceful uses and questions of 
that sort, but there is built into a nonproliferation treaty--
there is inherent in such a treaty--a discrimination between 
nuclear powers and nonnuclear powers.
    The whole purpose is not to let further countries become 
nuclear powers. So there is not much we can do about that, but 
I think it is quite clear, Senator, that within NATO itself, 
and within European NATO, leave out the United States, if the 
Federal Republic of Germany should become a nuclear power, NATO 
would disintegrate because the other European allies in NATO 
would not be prepared to see this happen. I think the Germans 
understand that, and my guess is that at the end of the day 
they will sign, perhaps grumpily, but I think they will sign.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        MUTUAL INTERESTS EXIST WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION [P. 176]

    Now, there are some people who forget about that when they 
raise questions about why we are trying to probe for points, 
even small points, of possible agreement with the Soviet Union.
    Now, in the case of trade, for example, Senator, basically 
what we are doing, if the Congress will give us permission, is 
to agree with our friends in Europe.
    You will notice that for 15 years we were in a minority of 
one in COCOM.
    Senator Symington. Yes, sir.
    Secretary Rusk. And our friends in Europe kept pushing down 
the COCOM list and trading and so forth, and we were resistant 
to it and finally we said, ``We will agree with you then.''

                            EAST-WEST TRADE

    Well, that immediately created a what does this mean, you 
say. In the case of trade, Eastern Europe has 24 percent of its 
foreign trade with Western Europe, 1.6 percent of its trade 
with us. When we say to our Congress, ``Will you give us 
permission to enter into agreements where we can change our 
arrangements somewhat,'' then some of our friends in Europe 
say, ``Well, you are going way out of our way to make overtures 
to Moscow,'' when in fact all we are doing is agreeing with our 
friends in Europe.
    Senator Symington. Several years ago the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce both testified in open 
hearings the United States was the last developed country in 
the world not doing its best to sell everything it could behind 
the Iron Curtain, except in most cases sophisticated war 
materials.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.
    Senator Symington. And yet when we try to improve our 
position through trade, as I understand your point, we are 
criticized by a die-hard group over here as being in effect 
overly friendly with Moscow.
    Secretary Rusk. I have added another point, Senator. I have 
said to some of our friends in Europe of course what you would 
really hope is that we continue our policy of no trade while 
you continue to develop the Eastern European market without our 
competition, and they have and sometimes they will say, ``Yes, 
I expect that is right.''
    Senator Symington. I will correct my use of the word there, 
but we understand each other.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               ROLE OF ACDA IN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS [P. 177]

    Secretary Rusk. The Committee of Principals is made up of 
those whose advice the President inevitably will want to have 
and have to have before the President makes decisions on these 
very important questions. That includes Defense for obvious 
reasons; CIA is heavily involved because some of these issues 
turn crucially on our ability to be assured that arrangements 
we may propose can be monitored and inspected and verified.
    So that I do not believe that the composition of the 
Committee of Principals creates any distortion. The Committee 
of Principals are those whose advice any president would feel 
he would have to have before he made any final decision.
    On the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Mr. Foster is 
carrying the principal negotiations on those. He is in Geneva 
now, and I am not sure that I should put this on the record, he 
will shortly be visiting certain of the capitals in Europe to 
go into these matters further to try to bring the NATO matter 
to a conclusion.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                [P. 178]

    Senator Clark. Now, when you say the people at the top 
level, will Ambassador Thompson stop at the Gromyko level or 
will he move right up?
    Secretary Rusk. No, he has talked--we would certainly think 
this would certainly go to Mr. Kosygin, and, as a matter of 
fact, Senator, I would probably want to take this out of the 
record----
    Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, this record will be closely 
held, and, so far as any public release is concerned, you will 
have complete discretion to change it.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, sir.
    The real people on this subject, Senator Clark, are 
probably in the back room of the Kremlin, those people who 
almost never expose themselves internationally, but who really 
join the Presidium in the actual determination of policy on 
important subjects.
    Senator Clark. I imagine that would include their own 
equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, that would include them----
    Senator Clark. Their intelligence sections.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. And key members of the 
Presidium, who are represented publicly by Kosygin and 
Brezhnev.

                                [P. 178]

    Senator Clark. You will remember the very strong 
recommendations in that regard made by Mr. Wiesner's committee.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Clark. During the ICY.
    Secretary Rusk. And we pressed the regional representatives 
to consider coming forward with proposals affecting their 
regions; for example, Mexico and Brazil for Latin America; 
Egypt and Ethiopia for the Near East and Africa and otherwise.
    Very little has been done on that. But, more importantly, 
Senator, I myself have discussed this on more than one occasion 
with Mr. Gromyko, hoping that we and the Soviet Union quietly--
and I must take this out of the record--hoping that we and the 
Soviet Union quietly could begin to concert our policy to level 
off and turn downward this unfortunate neighborhood arms race 
in the Near East.
    Unfortunately Mr. Gromyko has said that action in the 
nuclear field is the limit of their interest. They have not 
been willing seriously to take up the race in conventional 
arms. As you know, they are supplying substantial arms to 
Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and now----
    Senator Clark. Iran.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. And now selling arms to Iran.
    We regret this very much because we think this is an arms 
race that ought to be unnecessary and that something ought to 
be done about it.
    If we could get some help from the Soviet Union on that, I 
think we could make some headway.

               AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS

    Senator Clark. This might be worthwhile taking up at Geneva 
at that level to start with. We would at least like to see the 
Russians join with us in halting that arms race in the Middle 
East.
    Secretary Rusk. There may be some point in our making some 
public proposals along these lines so that everybody 
understands what the situation is. We would be prepared to 
encourage and cooperate in any such effort, but there are 
others who will not.
    Senator Clark. I understand you want to get out of here by 
12.
    Secretary Rusk. It is up to you. It is up to you.
    Senator Clark. It occurs to me that this business of the 
political union of Europe as an objection to the 
nonproliferation treaty might be handled, might it not, by an 
escape cause and will you not have an escape clause in the 
treaty anyway so that if political union became a pragmatic 
matter of some urgency, they could, if they want to, get out 
from under?
    Secretary Rusk. A withdrawal clause.
    Senator Clark. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. They could utilize a withdrawal clause.
    We would like to be able to find an answer that is somewhat 
better than that because that makes the proliferation treaty 
itself somewhat fragile in theory anyhow.
    But, Senator, I think there is an understanding among all 
concerned that the political unification of Europe is quite a 
distance ahead, and I hope we can find some way not to let that 
presently hypothetical question bar present advance on 
nonproliferation.
    Senator Clark. Would you agree that if we can make some 
progress with respect to the ABM discussion between the USSR 
and ourselves, including the discussions for some curtailment 
of offensive weapons and missiles, this might well remove the 
major objections by the non-nuclear powers to the nuclear 
proliferation treaty because then the presence of ourselves 
would have made those concessions in terms of reducing their 
own capability, which I understand India and Sweden and some 
others have been asking for some time.
    Secretary Rusk. I would think if we and the Soviets could 
make any progress at all either in putting a ceiling on the 
nuclear race or turning it down somewhat, that this could have 
a very stimulating effect on the non-nuclear areas, no question 
about it.
    Senator Clark. This, of course, is a matter in which the 
ACDA is very much interested.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Clark. The final question--how long, in your 
judgment, can we make--this is a diplomatic and political 
matter guided, of course, by proper military advice with 
respect to deployment of ABM's. I could hope we could wait long 
enough for a negotiation with the Soviets along the lines of 
the Kosygin letter to proceed at the usual leisurely pace with 
which the Soviets always engage in such negotiations.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not want to be categoric about the 
decision that the President will have to make in consultation 
with congressional leaders. But it is my present view that we 
would be able to wait during a very, very substantial period of 
active and promising negotiations. In other words, I do not 
think we are going to hurry if there is any possibility that we 
can reach some result with the Soviet Union on this.
    Senator Clark. I am happy to hear that. The chairman will 
recall that General Wheeler testified that there was enough 
money in the budget, which is coming up, to enable them to go 
as far ahead as the Joint Chiefs thought they needed to with 
the development and even perhaps the initial deployment of an 
ABM without making a public fuss about it.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is true for the present and 
under the budget that is now before the Congress.
    As you know, it is now publicly known there is a difference 
of view on this matter between General Wheeler and the 
Secretary of Defense, and General Wheeler has spoken about the 
ABM's on television, for example.
    This has been a friendly disagreement, but it is an 
important disagreement on that particular point. But this is a 
matter where the President and the civilian leadership will 
make the decision at the end of the day.

     ATTITUDE OF NON-NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

    Senator Clark. What is your view as to the diplomatic 
desirability if India gets too difficult, giving a bilateral 
guarantee to India because of the possible Chinese threat which 
would seem to be a good deal greater than that against any 
other country?
    I can see this might cause a lot of diplomatic flap, but I 
am concerned that India may balk on this nonproliferation 
treaty.
    Could you comment on that?
    Senator Gore. He commented on that while you were out.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think this is one----
    Senator Clark. Do not repeat what you said.
    Secretary Rusk. It is a very, very serious question for us, 
quite apart from this question for India. I do not think, 
first, that India would be interested in a unilateral guarantee 
by the United States alone in this matter. They would, I think, 
say that it would have to be at least by the United States and 
the Soviet Union acting together.
    Senator Clark. This should not be too difficult for the 
Soviet Union point of view.
    Secretary Rusk. That could create some problems. Apparently 
they have discussed that with the Soviet Union apparently 
without much encouragement. But for us, Senator, there is also 
a very, very major problem as to whether we ourselves want to 
extend our own commitments that far. Do we pledge the lives of 
a hundred million Americans in the first two hours to this end?
    Senator Clark. I certainly think not.
    Secretary Rusk. It is a very grave decision for us to take.
    Senator Clark. Just let me interrupt, and I would think 
that the Indian guarantee, if it came forward at all, would be 
merely against China and not with respect to the Soviet Union, 
which hopefully would join with us.
    I do not think you have to worry about France and Britain 
attacking India, but if the Soviet Union and ourselves were 
prepared to guarantee against China, in my opinion, maybe I am 
wrong, this does not confront you with the difficulty you spoke 
of because, as I understand it, China has no effective air 
force and our manned bombers could destroy the Chinese nuclear 
capability overnight.
    Maybe it raises the question of first strike.
    Secretary Rusk. I would hope, Senator, that some way could 
be found for the United Nations to strengthen what has been 
said on this subject in such a way that countries like India 
would feel sufficient reassurance to be willing and able to go 
ahead with a nonproliferation policy.
    Senator Gore. Senator Pell.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, first I regret not having been here when Mr. 
Macomber's name was up for confirmation, and I am delighted to 
see such an old friend and competent officer as he is 
accompanying you for the first time. The record will show what 
is said even though he is out of the room.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Senator. I am 
delighted to have Mr. Macomber with me.

                       ABM NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

    Senator Pell. Secondly, in connection with the ABM's, I am 
delighted to hear that Ambassador Thompson will be occupying a 
leading role as a negotiator.
    Do we intend to move right into those discussions, or will 
there be a time lag?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that we would like to begin 
them soon rather than late. We have the impression that the 
Soviets are still in the position of preparing their own 
position. I do not think I said this a little earlier, but this 
latest communication we had from them was an invitation for us 
to present some additional views on the subject. We do not yet 
have from them any that gives us a real feel of what their 
approach to it is going to be, except that offensive and 
defensive weapons will have to be discussed together; and, 
secondly, this should be in the framework of disarmament rather 
than in terms of freezes.
    Senator Pell. Right.
    Secretary Rusk. So that is about the only major clue we 
have at the present time.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.

                          1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL

    Another question I had here was in connection with the 
disarmament subject, and this is, do we ever intend to ratify 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol on which I believe the U.N. Assembly 
passed a resolution calling on all nations to refrain from the 
use of gaseous warfare and bacteriological materials in 
warfare? What is our position on that?
    Secretary Rusk. May I ask Mr. Fisher to comment on that?
    Mr. Fisher. Yes, the U.N. resolution, I believe the term 
was, invites people to ratify the 1925 protocol. We voted for 
it, in the explanation of the vote considered by various 
countries through their own constitutional structures. That 
convention is not now before the Senate. It was recalled, I 
believe, shortly after World War II, in sort of a review by the 
Foreign Relations Committee of things that had been up here for 
a long while.
    The real consideration, Senator Pell, is whether or not it 
is best to invest the substantial effort that would be required 
to get that through on the basis of the 1925 convention or 
whether we should consider the problem of bringing it up to 
date, try to negotiate an up-to-date treaty which takes into 
account many developments since 1925, which, for example, deals 
with all forms of biological warfare which are not by its terms 
covered in the 1925 convention.
    Senator Pell. But to interrupt for the moment, the only 
thing on the table in a multilateral matter would be the 1925 
convention, would it not?
    Mr. Fisher. That is correct, and our feeling would be, 
however, we have discussed this frankly with 5,000 scientists 
who visited the President's science adviser and myself two 
weeks ago, that perhaps it might be better to consider 
undertaking a major study in this context looking at all the 
control problems of BW and CW in a 1967 context rather than the 
context of ratifying the 1925 convention.
    Senator Pell. I would hope the reason that is inhibiting 
you is not the fact we are occasionally using tear gas in 
Vietnam.
    Mr. Fisher. No. We would be perfectly clear in our own view 
that incapacitants, nonlethal incapacitants, are not covered by 
the 1925 convention, and any ratification, if they would have 
taken place, would have made that perfectly clear.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    In connection with the words in Senator Lausche's 
colloquy----
    Senator Clark. Would the Senator yield for one moment?
    I would like to supplement in the strongest possible way 
the view Senator Pell has expressed about the high degree of 
desirability of moving into the problem of arms control, in 
radiological, chemical, and biological warfare. I think we have 
neglected it.
    Mr. Fisher. If I can comment, we have had to put the cart--
the horse research before the cart, because in many people's 
minds there has been the view that this was an insoluble 
problem because of the difficulties of control that the 
theretofore 1925 convention was a mere paper promise and 
therefore forget about it.
    [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, MARCH 6, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, 
Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper 
and Case.
    Michael Wood, former Director of Development, National 
Student Association, and Phillip Sherburne, former President, 
National Student Association, testified on the National Student 
Association and the C.I.A.
    [The committee adjourned at 5:45 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Church, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Carlson and Case.
    Arthur Goldberg, Ambassador to the United Nations, 
accompanied by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of 
State, testified further on Ex. D, 90/1, the Treaty on Outer 
Space.
    The proposed Latin American Resolution and the question of 
staff members going on trips while the Senate is in session was 
also discussed.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]


                           Arms Sales to Iran

                              ----------                              


                        Tuesday, March 14, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
       Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
            Affairs, of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Symington, Fulbright, Gore, Clark, 
McCarthy and Hickenlooper.
    Also present: Peter Knauer, Assistant for Congressional and 
Special Projects, Office of the Director of Military 
Assistance, Department of Defense; and Lt. Col. Albertus B. 
Outlaw, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
(Legislative Affairs).
    Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee 
staff.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

 STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY J. KUSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS NEGOTIATIONS; ACCOMPANIED 
BY MR. W.B. LIGON, DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST NEGOTIATING DIRECTORATE 
AND ECONOMIC PLANNING-COORDINATION OASD (ISI) FOR ILN

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISION IN IRANIAN CASE [P. 4]

    Mr. Kuss. First of all, this machinery included intensive 
and detailed discussions with the country itself. For several 
years, we have agreed with the Government of Iran that military 
supplies will not be sold or bought by them, by any country, 
without clear analysis of their need and the economic 
capability to support the impact of such purchases.
    Secondly, a U.S. military team bringing in our unified 
command and joint staff machinery, worked with the Imperial 
Iranian forces in analyzing the threat and recommending the 
types of equipment which would be desirable.
    Simultaneously, our State Department and AID machinery, at 
the embassy level, worked with the Central Bank, not just with 
their defense ministry, but with the Central Bank of Iran, to 
determine financial resources which would be available to meet 
total Iranian development and consumption requirements as well 
as the effects of contemplated military procurement on such 
resources.
    Both these military and economic analyses were reviewed by 
the Shah, and his prime minister and other governmental 
agencies of Iran, and discussed with our ambassador.
    All of this information was then made available in 
Washington to the State Department, AID, and Defense machinery 
for further consideration.
    There were many adjustments made in the application of this 
machinery. Needless to say, they didn't all adopt my 
recommendations. There were many changes.
    On the basis of these views, a decision was made at the 
highest level in the United States Government concerning the 
program which we would be willing to undertake.
    From the time that the Shah gave indication of his first 
need for additional equipment, to the time that my office was 
informed of the program to be specifically negotiated, over 
nine months elapsed with consultative machinery operating in 
Iran and the United States.
    In the final analysis, the most surprising thing to me is 
that the Shah waited nine months since he was financially 
independent; certainly he is politically independent and had 
achieved the approval of the Majlis in November 1965 for the 
purchase of $200 million outright from any source.
    This waiting period only proves to me to some extent that 
he really preferred the United States to continue as principal 
military supplier even though he had to wait through all of the 
time for the machinery to be processed, and even though he did 
not get all that he was capable of purchasing in the process, 
in the first analysis.
    I should like to conclude my opening remarks with a 
highlight summary of the situation taken from reports by people 
in our AID, Defense and political machinery, who are a lot 
closer to the situation than I personally can confess to be.
    These statements from our AID, political, Defense people on 
the scene are as follows:
    1. While Iran's economic situation is basically sound, the 
United States would greatly prefer that it limit the 
expenditure of further resources on military equipment. This is 
an important element of what was the basis for our final 
decision.
    The impression is that we wished to limit the amount of 
military supply that we provide.
    However, there is no prospect of convincing the Shah that 
Iran need not develop what he considers an adequate defense 
establishment to protect his fully exposed vital oil 
installations in the south. Moreover, it is in the United 
States interest to maintain a close military relationship with 
Iran in order to protect our interests and to enable us to 
maintain a dialogue with the Shah on the broader issues of 
Iranian economic development and their relationship to military 
expenditures.
    The United States has made significant progress in the last 
two years in stimulating the Government of Iran to examine this 
relationship.

                        ECONOMIC GROWTH IN IRAN

    For its own part, the Government of Iran has made great 
strides in promoting economic growth in Iran, whose GNP 
increased nearly 10 percent last year. Iran is credit-worthy 
and, given its inability to rapidly absorb large amounts of 
foreign financing for its development program, there is room 
for additional military credits on reasonable terms.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Given its inability?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes. In other words, it can't grow up overnight. 
All revenues are coming in faster than it can really spend them 
on development projects.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Therefore, they have some extra money 
left over to buy arms?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. That is the point I am making here.
    The United States government has constantly tried to apply 
brakes to Iranian military spending. Last year, although the 
Shah planned $200 million in just one year from us in 
purchases, in accordance with the requirements as confirmed by 
the special U.S. military survey team, the U.S. government 
limited the Shah to $50 million a year, with the possibility of 
similar tranches over the next three-year period.
    Limitations upon limitations have been placed on what he 
can do with military programs.
    2. Recent months have seen the steady--and I am quoting 
now--continuation of a clearly visible trend toward a more 
independent Iranian posture on the world scene. Developments 
affecting Pakistan, one of Iran's closest allies, have 
reinforced the Shah in his conviction that Iran must be 
prepared to stand on its own feet. In setting his twin goals of 
economic development and national defense, the Shah has linked 
military security to economic and social progress, and believes 
that he cannot have the latter without the former. Partly also 
because of a deep-seated Iranian Nasserist antagonism and 
partly because of the USSR's new policy of friendliness toward 
Iran, Iran has shifted the focus of its major concern from the 
threat of communism in the USSR in the north to Nasser and Arab 
nationalism in the south. The Shah is acutely aware of the 
vulnerability of his oil lifeline in the south to surprise 
attack and the susceptibility to subversion of the Arab 
minority, in Khuzestan.
    The Shah feels compelled to maintain an adequate defense 
establishment in face of a large-scale Soviet arms supply to 
UAR, Iraq and Syria. He believes strongly that it is in the 
interest of the United States, as well as Iran, that Iran be in 
a position to deter or cope with regional threats rather than 
calling on us a la Vietnam.
    Egypt has several times Iran's arsenal.
    The reason for the Shah's insistence on aircraft of the 
type of F-4, and he did insist, was that even neighboring Iraq 
already has delivered 18 of the all-weather Mach 2.3 MIG-21's, 
whereas Iran has nothing better than day-flying Mach 1.3 F-5's.

                      SHAH'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

    He has expressed his desire to meet his military 
requirements from the United States, but he has made it 
abundantly clear also that if the United States is unwilling or 
unable to meet his major military requirements, he is 
determined to go elsewhere to acquire what he needs.
    3. The Shah's arms purchases from the Soviets are in 
relatively non-sensitive areas such as trucks, armored 
personnel carriers and ack-ack guns; his payments are primarily 
in natural gas which for 60 years have been flared off. The 
Shah's purchasing from the Soviets seems to him, and I am 
reporting, seems to him, to be not without some value. He is 
convinced that it will undercut Soviet propaganda about the 
United States being solely arms merchants to Iran, and about 
Iran's being an American puppet.
    He also believes it will cause difficulties in the Soviet 
relationship with Nasser and other radical Arabs.
    Gentlemen, I deliberately didn't try to answer all the 
questions in my opening statement but that poses a lot of 
questions, I am sure.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               END-USE AGREEMENT WITH WEST GERMANY [P. 7]

    Mr. Bader. While you are getting that--let me ask you a 
question. As I understand it, we include in our military sales 
or grant agreement with West Germany a so-called end-use 
agreement. Is that correct? That is, we have total veto, as Mr. 
McNaughton said, over the final disposition of American 
military equipment.
    Mr. Kuss. That is right.
    Mr. Bader. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. I negotiated them; yes, that is correct.
    Mr. Bader. Fine.
    So in the case of the these F-86, if they are not in Iran--
if they actually belong to Pakistan--then the West German 
government and perhaps the Iranian government, if they were the 
middleman in this case, have turned aside what was American 
desire and policy with regard to Pakistan. Would that be 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. I believe that would be correct.
    May I continue my answer?
    Mr. Bader. Certainly.
    Mr. Kuss. To supplement what you said, let me put it in the 
record that the United States was supplying military equipment 
through grant and sales to Iran at the time that this 
circumstance arose.
    The United States approval of the German sale to Iran was 
influenced by the fact that there appeared to be legitimate 
requirements and the experience of the purchase would not 
unduly upset the Iranian defense budget.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Senator McCarthy. I just want to know, what is the game? 
Why do the Canadians do it for Germany under our license? The 
Canadians don't have a serious balance of payments problem with 
Germany. We do.
    What are the politics of it?
    Mr. Kuss. The Canadians have--I am not sure the balance of 
payments is the consideration at all.
    Senator McCarthy. Why? That is the question.
    Mr. Kuss. The Canadians have as serious a balance of 
payments problem as ourselves, if one is to talk balance of 
payments, and the Canadians having financed a production line 
for F-86's for themselves were in a position to provide F-86's 
for Germany during the build-up period.
    Senator McCarthy. Is that because we couldn't do it?
    Mr. Kuss. We could have done it.
    Senator McCarthy. Why didn't we? I want to know why the 
Canadians with our license produced and sold it to Germany. Who 
arranged this? Did this involve cooperation on the part of the 
Defense Department and our manufacturers of F-86's? What I want 
to get at is the process by which these complicated decisions 
are made, like the one involving the sale of Lightning fighters 
to Saudi Arabia, for example. We sell F-111's to England and 
they in turn sell Lightning fighters to Saudi Arabia. Northrop 
Aviation, however, says really what the Saudis should have are 
F-5's, but, in the end, the Saudis are told: ``You really can't 
go out and do the kind of thing you are urging them to do, 
compete in the open market really for arms sales because 
somebody just said you have got to take Lightning fighters and 
we are in turn going to supply F-111's to England.''
    Mr. Kuss. My answer to the first question, to start with, 
first of all, the North American Aircraft Corporation has the 
right to license foreign manufacturers to produce F-86 aircraft 
in this case.
    Senator Symington. F-86 is a North American; not Northrop?
    Mr. Kuss. North American, right.
    I understood the question to be F-86--has the right to--
this was some years ago, of course, with the F-86--they have 
the right to license other countries to produce the F-86 
aircraft with the approval of the United States Government. 
They obtained that right through their contractual arrangements 
with the Defense Department.
    They then obtained the approval of the Office of Munitions 
Control, who would also check it out with Defense, to license 
Canada to produce, not only for themselves, but for other 
countries as they were able to work out mutually-agreeable 
sales arrangements.

             TOTAL U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN [P. 8]

    The United States Government, in reviewing that license, 
approved it but insisted that the license itself contain a 
clause that if the Canadians were to sell those airplanes to 
any other country that they must get the approval of the United 
States Government, specifically for that other country, number 
one.
    And, further, in that particular agreement, that if the 
other country were to ever sell it to any other country, they 
must also get the approval in succession of the United States 
government.
    Senator Symington. If you will yield to me a minute, 
Senator--as I understand it, then, some 90 F-86's were sold by 
Canada to West Germany, correct?
    Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. And those were sold by West Germany--
    Mr. Kuss. Maybe more, sir.
    Senator Symington. All right, we are talking about these 
90.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            MOVEMENT OF F-86'S FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN [P. 8]

    Senator Symington. I understand about the initiation; I am 
just talking about these planes.
    They moved from West Germany into Iran, then from Iran to 
Pakistan. Did we know that they had moved from Iran to Pakistan 
when they did, or did we find out later?
    Mr. Kuss. When we knew, and we consulted with the 
Government of Canada, both the----
    Senator Symington. Let me ask the question again to be sure 
you understand my point.
    Did we know at the time the planes moved from Iran to 
Pakistan that they were going from Iran to Pakistan, after they 
were sold to Iran by West Germany? Did we know it at the time?
    Mr. Kuss. No.
    As a deliberate plan of our own. No, we did not know.
    Senator Symington. We did not know.
    Senator McCarthy. I think he is saying that we didn't know 
it was going to be through these three stages when we first 
licensed them in Canada.
    Senator Symington. Just bear with me.
    Mr. Kuss. We expressed no objection to a sale to Iran, not 
Pakistan.
    Senator Symington. We licensed the sale to Iran.
    Senator McCarthy. You approved that one, not the next one?
    Senator Symington. When did we discover Iran had moved them 
into Pakistan by sale, barter or gift?
    Mr. Kuss. I don't have a date here. I will be glad to 
supply it for you.
    Senator Symington. Roughly how many weeks or months was 
it--was it some months after they went into Pakistan that we 
found out that they had gone to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. It was some months, and after consultation with 
Germany and Canada, both countries protested. Iran stated that 
the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair. Action was taken 
to try to influence the return of the aircraft to Iran. The 
Federal Republic of Germany held up further sales which they 
had pending at that time to Iran as a result.
    At the moment on this transaction we have two points of 
information which I believe that you have seen, sir. The 
Washington Daily News had indicated that the aircraft had been 
returned as a result of strong U.S. pressures. This return of 
the aircraft is generally confirmed by DIA but we are still 
waiting for specific confirmation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    BRITISH SALE OF AIRCRAFT [P. 10]

    Mr. Kuss. The Lightning is a British air defense aircraft 
and solely usable for that purpose and no other purpose.
    Senator Symington. Right. And that plane went from 
Britain----
    Mr. Kuss. To Saudi Arabia.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         SALE OF F-86 AIRCRAFT BY WEST GERMANY TO IRAN [P. 11]

    Mr. Bader. Is this also the case, as I have heard reported, 
of some 200 to 400 M-47 tanks that have gone through Merex to 
Pakistan via Iran.
    Mr. Kuss. There have been no M-47 tanks that have gone from 
Iran to Pakistan, to my knowledge.
    Mr. Bader. Fine.
    The West German Government has----
    Mr. Kuss. As a matter of fact we have had that under 
discussion with the West German Government, and we both have 
held up any sale to Iran for the very purpose that we thought 
they might----
    Mr. Bader. They might go there.
    Mr. Kuss. That they might go there.
    Mr. Bader. Thank you.

                            F-4 SALE TO IRAN

    I would like to go to the F-4 sale, Mr. Chairman, with your 
permission.
    Senator Symington. Very well.
    Mr. Bader. Mr. Kuss, as I understand it, there are two 
basic agreements between the United States Government and the 
Iran Government with regard to military assistance, that is 
agreements to talk about what you call in the Defense 
Department hardware. First is the September 1962 memorandum of 
understanding, and the second is the July 1964 memorandum of 
understanding, is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
    Mr. Bader. Now, in the memorandum of understanding of 1962, 
we--in the major grant items there were 52 F-5's, is that 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, that is correct.
    Mr. Bader. That is roughly correct.
    Now, would you explain to the subcommittee the terms of 
this July 1964 memorandum of understanding? As I understand 
it--and I must say I am quite confused about it--it has been 
amended in August of 1966, is that correct, to allow for the F-
4 sale? Am I correct in the information that the July 1964 
memorandum of understanding, as amended in August of 1966, 
permits the sale to Iran of roughly $400 million of military 
equipment, including the supplemental $200 million that covers 
the F-4 sale?
    Mr. Kuss. That is right.
    Mr. Bader. That is right.
    Mr. Kuss. May I say, there is one basic sales agreement and 
that is the 1964 agreement. In that agreement we acquired 
promises from the government of Iran that they would not 
proceed at any independent pace on the purchase of this 
military equipment, but that it would be subject to an annual 
review of the economic availabilities of foreign exchange to 
their development program as well as for other purposes. And we 
did not wish to destroy that arrangement that we had achieved 
from them in 1964. Thus, when we came to the conclusion that it 
would be necessary to add $200 million of credit to the 1964 
agreement, we thought it best to add it to an agreement under 
which we had far more links, controls, reviews, analyses, if 
you will, agreed to by the Government of Iran than if we were 
to establish an entirely new agreement.
    Mr. Bader. When did the Shah of Iran first approach the 
United States about his requirement for an aircraft with the 
capability beyond that of the F-5?
    Mr. Kuss. From my personal knowledge, he was talking about 
aircraft well beyond the F-5 before the 1964 agreement was 
established.
    Mr. Bader. With direct reference to the F-4's, was this in 
the beginning of 1966?
    Mr. Kuss. F-4s, and other aircraft, well beyond the F-5.
    Senator Symington. Let me ask what counsel is interested 
in, and what we are interested in: Was there mention in any of 
these agreements of the F-4, the ones that they eventually got?
    Mr. Kuss. No, sir.
    Senator Symington. When was the decision made to ship F-
4's? When was the decision made and why was it made?
    Mr. Kuss. May I review that----
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Kuss--For the record?
    As we have pointed out on numerous occasions, there is a 
tremendous amount of machinery in existence.
    Senator Symington. We understand that.
    Mr. Kuss. In the executive branch. One part of this 
machinery was the military machinery, the joint staff 
machinery, that we sent to Iran to review with the Iranian 
armed forces what they stated as their requirements.
    Mr. Bader. This is the so-called Peterson mission.
    Mr. Kuss. This is the so-called Peterson report.
    Mr. Bader. When was that issued?
    Mr. Kuss. The Peterson report was issued in approximately 
early '65.
    Mr. Bader. The Peterson report was the basis of the 
military justification for F-4's.
    Mr. Kuss. Excuse me, early '66.
    Mr. Bader. That was the basis for the military 
justification.
    Mr. Kuss. March 1966.
    Mr. Bader. March 1966.
    Mr. Kuss. March 1966, and in the Peterson report they 
recommended that it would be necessary for F-4D aircraft, D 
aircraft, be provided to combat the Mig 21's that were 
available in the southern regions that the Shah was--to meet 
the threat that was established.
    Mr. Bader. And this was in March of 1966.
    Mr. Kuss. This was in March of 1966, right.
    Mr. Bader. Did the Peterson report recommend two squadrons 
of F-4s which we have now sold to Iran?
    Mr. Kuss. I do not recall; I would have to check.
    Mr. Bader. According to the Peterson report, as I read it, 
they recommended six squadrons of F-5 aircraft and one squadron 
of F-4C aircraft during the fiscal year '67-'71 time frame.
    Mr. Kuss. You have got to read the Peterson report in two 
ways. First of all, we were anxious to keep things as 
restricted as possible. The Peterson report not only gave a 
report on what was within, shall we say, a constricted level, 
but it also indicated that many hundreds of millions of dollars 
more worth of equipment could have been justified if one were 
dealing with the kind of threat that the Shah was talking about 
in Iraq, Syria, and the U.A.R.
    Mr. Bader. When was the decision made to go from one 
squadron of F-4's, which the Peterson report recommended, to 
two squadrons of F-4's which was the final agreement?
    Mr. Kuss. This decision was communicated to the Shah on the 
10th of August.
    Mr. Bader. On the 10th of August.
    Mr. Kuss. The decision was made, of course, within our own 
executive branch shortly before that at the highest levels of 
government.
    Mr. Bader. Will we also deliver to Iran the original----
    Senator Symington. Excuse me just a second. You say the 
highest levels of government. By that, do you mean the 
President?
    Mr. Bader. Yes, sir. I do.
    Senator Symington. Is it true that Secretary McNamara 
opposed this sale?
    Mr. Kuss. Proposed?
    Senator Symington. Opposed it.
    Mr. Kuss. Opposed the sale?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Kuss. No, not to my knowledge, sir.
    Senator Symington. Not to your knowledge. Thank you.
    Mr. Bader. Will we also deliver to Iran the 13 squadrons of 
F-5's that were called for under the 1964 agreement?
    Mr. Kuss. I would have to check that.
    May I put that in the record? There is a substitution of F-
4 squadrons for F-5 squadrons, and I just want to be sure about 
the numbers, and I would like to insert them.

           F-5 AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES TO IRAN

    Mr. Bader. It was the decision of the highest levels, that 
is the President, that this would be F-4D's rather than F-4C's, 
as well, that would be the latest and most sophisticated----
    Mr. Kuss. F-4D's
    Mr. Bader (continuing). Models coming off the line and 
later models coming off the line.
    Senator Symington. Who is the one who knows about these 
sales?
    Mr. Kuss. It all depends on which question you ask, sir.
    Senator Symington. I see.
    Mr. Kuss. If you want to ask the question about the model 
of the F-4, I can answer that.
    Senator Symington. What was the day the decision was made 
to ship the F-4's?
    Mr. Kuss. I believe I said it was communicated on the 10th 
of August.
    Senator Symington. Fine.

             CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION ABOUT SALE TO IRAN

    Now, when was the Congress notified that F-4's were going 
to be shipped to Iran?
    Mr. Kuss. I do not believe the Congress was notified, 
Senator, until Mr. McNaughton spoke on the subject.
    Senator Symington. That was after it was in the press.
    Mr. Kuss. Correct, sir.
    Senator Symington. And we talked about governmental 
machinery.
    Is it the policy of the Defense Department to tell the 
press before it tells the Congress about these sales?
    Mr. Kuss. As a matter of fact, I do not believe we told the 
press. I believe the British leaked it because of competition. 
It was not our doing.
    Senator Symington. So the British leaked it to the American 
press.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Do you know who first published it in 
the United States?
    Mr. Kuss. No, I do not.
    Senator Symington. Do you not think that, if we sell the 
most sophisticated fighter to a foreign country, that 
information should be supplied to the Congress?
    Mr. Kuss. I would like to answer that question this way: 
The F-4D, as we sold it to the Iranian Government, was not the 
most sophisticated fighter that we were dealing with in terms 
of sales to other countries. For example, it is not the same 
airplane we sold to the British.
    Senator Symington. Well then, let us say the second or the 
third or the fourth most sophisticated airplane.
    Mr. Kuss. I would like to answer that question by saying 
that in addition to considering the problem, there were many 
security meetings held at which we reviewed the switches, the 
panels, black boxes of the F-4D, which related to nuclear 
capability. They were taken out. We reviewed the missile which 
was related to the F-4D and substituted SIDEWINDER missiles 
which had been released already.
    We eliminated the SHRIKE which is used on the F-4D. We 
eliminated the WALLEYE missile which is used there. We 
retrofitted some of our F-4D's with CORDS and DCM and 
eliminated that.
    So on balance we took a decision that we felt that this 
would not be a security lapse here or any sensitivity, if 
things went wrong.
    Senator Symington. Let me repeat my question, please.
    Mr. Kuss. All right.
    Senator Symington. Do you not think, if you make a sale of 
a sophisticated, modern airplane to a foreign government, the 
Congress should be informed of that?
    Mr. Kuss. I think I can best answer that question by saying 
it is not my function to determine that answer, sir.
    Senator Symington. Well, then you could say this also, 
could you not; that you did not inform the Congress?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And you do not know anybody who did 
inform the Congress.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And to the best of your knowledge it 
would have remained a secret unless a foreign country had not 
leaked it to the press.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         FOREIGN AND MILITARY POSITION CHANGED BY SALES [P. 14]

    Senator Symington. So you knew that the sale was going to 
be made before you agreed to sell them the F-4's.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir, and we protested against it 
considerably. We made a major point of it in our negotiation, 
and made sure that the Shah was clear that our willingness to 
sell sophisticated and sensitive equipment was conditional 
pending clarification of Iran's position with respect to the 
purchases from the Soviet bloc.
    Now, the Shah responded to us on that and noted that he 
wanted to reaffirm that if it came to Soviet equipment, he 
would limit it to nonsensitive equipment. He went on further in 
our discussions with him on the subject to note that he had 
declined to send Iranians to the U.S.S.R. for training----
    Senator Symington. I understand those points.
    Mr. Kuss. I think these are important.
    Senator Symington. We have had that information given to us 
in great detail.
    Mr. Kuss. I do not think the last group were.
    He has limited the Soviet technicians, only a few, to go to 
Iran to instruct Iranians on maintenance. The Soviets wanted 
the team to remain two years. He gave them six months. And, as 
a consequence, it was on balance when you consider the 
tremendous position we have there, the number of technicians we 
have there, the large predominance of $1.4 billion, I think, 
that it will add up to, of the military equipment that we have 
provided, that we still maintained our position in a changing 
world, a world in which he was growing more independent, and in 
a world in which he had gas to sell that he could not sell 
anywhere else.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              STEEL MILL SALE BY U.S.S.R. TO IRAN [P. 15]

    Senator Symington. If they are building a $280 million 
steel mill and a $400 million pipeline plant, and they are 
purchasing over $100 million in military equipment, would you 
not say, inasmuch as all this has happened in recent months, 
that the position of the Russians from an economic standpoint 
was rapidly moving at least into an equilibrium with our own in 
Iran?
    Mr. Kuss. No, sir, I do not believe so. I have certainly 
pointed out very clearly on the military side that it is not 
anything like an equilibrium. It is a man trying to dart in 
through the armor with a little pin.
    On the economic side, I can only say that when in 1962 we 
decided, the Congress, along with the Executive Branch, to 
eliminate development aid for Iran, it was inevitable that Iran 
was going to turn to business means in the area to find its 
way. And that in 1964, the 1964 military agreement was 
essentially an agreement to phase out military assistance as 
well, and when you move into a situation where you no longer 
are giving it away, you find that you have got to find 
different ways and means of handling your problem, and you no 
longer have the absolute control that we had when we were in 
the position of largesse to everybody giving it away.
    Senator Symington. At any time did we suggest to the 
Iranians that they purchase what they needed in the way of 
additional military equipment somewhere else?
    Mr. Kuss. Absolutely not. We, number one, opposed the 
Russian program, made a major point of this.
    Senator Symington. Yes, you answered the question, if it is 
no, and you explained to us that you did oppose the Russian 
plan.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          EVENTUAL AIRCRAFT SALES TO IRAN AND PAKISTAN [P. 16]

    Mr. Kuss. We expressed no objection to a Canadian-German 
arrangement which would get them to Iran for the use of the 
Iranian armed forces.
    Senator Symington. Right.
    How did they get to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. We found out through intelligence channels that 
some of the airplanes were in Pakistan.
    Senator Symington. You are going to let us know how many.
    Mr. Kuss. And we are going to let you know how many, and we 
also have found out that upon remonstration on our part, the 
Canadian part, the German part, the newspapers have reported 
that they have been returned. DIA has reported they have been 
generally returned, but they are not sure about the number.
    Senator Symington. Returned from where to where?
    Mr. Kuss. From Pakistan to Iran.
    Senator Symington. To Iran.
    Did we ask the Iranians for an explanation of how they got 
from Iran to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. We dealt, since our arrangements were with the 
Canadians and the Germans, through the Canadians and the 
Germans.
    Senator Symington. Did we ask the Canadians and/or Germans 
how they explained how the planes got from Iran to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, that is where the Germans stopped selling 
any more equipment to Iran.
    Senator Symington. What did the Germans say as to how they 
got from Iran to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kuss. The Germans indicated that the first Iranian 
explanation was that they were in Pakistan for overhaul. As you 
know, Pakistan does a great deal of overhaul for most countries 
in that area. This was not satisfactory to anyone, and that is 
why we have been pursuing this further.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMS SALES [P. 17]

    Senator Fulbright. But who makes the decision to sell arms? 
Who determines the country's capacity to purchase without 
endangering their economy? Do you as an official of the Defense 
Department?
    Mr. Kuss. It is my responsibility since the management for 
funds must be put somewhere to see to it that that is managed 
in a viable way.
    But we have a government that has many elements to it and 
in almost every case, and particularly in the Iranian case, the 
machinery operated from the Teheran Embassy, economic aid 
people, with the Central Bank people, to the AID people in 
Washington, and it was as a result of their actions that the 
program was reduced, the Shah requested, to a much, much 
smaller program.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            RATIONALE BEHIND SALE TO IRAN QUESTIONED [P. 18]

    Mr. Kuss. Well, as you say, I probably wouldn't agree with 
you.
    Senator Fulbright. I don't think you would.
    Mr. Kuss. But only because it is the machinery, the very 
machinery that you propose to exercise which came to the 
conclusion to provide the kind of arms and to eliminate 
economic aid in 1962, to eliminate military assistance in 1964 
on a phased basis, to provide arms on a very stringent basis, 
and to not supply everything that the Shah wanted. It is this 
very machinery that you speak of that came to that conclusion.
    Senator Fulbright. I am sure Iran wants it.
    I was there with Mr. Douglas Dillon in 1959. I suggested to 
the Shah that if he spent money on the improvement of the 
ordinary citizens, he would be more secure than trying to 
protect himself with arms. But there is nothing I can do about 
it, and I don't know that it does any good to bedevil you about 
it. I realize you are an official in the Department of Defense. 
I only hope you do not go too far in loading everybody down 
with arms that can't afford it.
    Mr. Kuss. Let me repeat again, Senator, that as far as the 
underdeveloped country, arms sales are fairly meaningless to 
us. They amount to 10 percent of our total program. My office 
is occupied with doing things with people with whom we used to 
be giving billions in foreign aid in our alliances.
    When it comes to the application to these non-developed 
countries, my responsibility is to see to it that if we do 
extend credit they have got the money to repay it, that we 
manage it on an appropriate basis.
    Senator Fulbright. I am not arguing about their having the 
money for purchases. I expect you will get it.
    What they are doing is taking it out of the hides of poor 
peasants. That is what is creating a politically explosive 
situation.
    The Shah will get the money from the Majlis. You don't 
dispute that?
    Mr. Kuss. Let me make that clear. The Majlis has, as you 
pointed out, voted $200 million that he could spend in one 
year. We didn't agree with that. We didn't agree with that at 
all. We dealt with the Central Bank, Mr. Sami, whom you 
probably know is a very capable man there.
    Next we dealt with our economic mission in Teheran; next 
with the AID group. What we dealt with was a situation which 
compared what each tranche of military equipment would involve 
in the way of debt pre-payment against any balance of foreign 
exchange that was left over after all of the feasible projects 
could be administered for the economic development program. We 
dealt with that as a given factor by our AID people who did not 
take the Shah's estimates of all revenues, reduced them and who 
did not take all of the Shah's estimates on what his economic 
programs were feasible, and the programs that we are dealing 
with here, all through it have a ceiling something like this, 
and this curve here is the debt pre-payment capability which 
our economic advisers told us was possible after covering the 
other programs.
    Senator Symington. If the chairman will yield.
    Senator Fulbright. I will.
    Senator Symington. It would seem clear from your testimony 
that you felt the Shah had a right because of danger to his 
country to make arrangements to obtain these airplanes. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. All right. Now, in the Peterson report--
--
    Senator Fulbright. Danger from whom?
    Senator Symington. I was going to get to that. In the 
Peterson report it says, and I quote: ``The combined forces of 
these latter three countries represent a overwhelming military 
capability vis-a-vis Iran. But for the foreseeable future the 
possibility of their making such a combined assault on Iranian 
forces seems quite remote. A unilateral attack of Iran by UAR 
forces is unlikely. But if it should come, it would be limited 
to naval action unless the Israeli issue were first resolved or 
unless the UAR achieved hegemony over the minor states of the 
area, a circumstance not readily foreseen.''
    Now, as I understand it, therefore, you believe that the 
threat comes from Syria, the UAR, and Iraq primarily, is that 
correct? The Pentagon feels that way?
    Mr. Kuss. That is a result of the Peterson report, yes.
    Senator Symington. All right. How many Mig 21's has Iraq 
got roughly? I think this is very important.
    Mr. Kuss. They have 18 on hand, and I believe another 18 
coming.
    Senator Symington. That is 36. How many has Syria got?
    Mr. Kuss. Actual order of battle on hand, 18 for Iraq, 
Syria 26, 102 for UAR.
    Senator Symington. Wait a minute, you are ahead of me. How 
many has Iraq got?
    Mr. Kuss. Eighteen.
    Senator Symington. And how many do you say they are going 
to have?
    Mr. Kuss. My records indicate they will have 18 more.
    Senator Symington. That is 36.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. How many has Syria got?
    Mr. Kuss. The order of battle indicates 26 here.
    Senator Symington. Twenty-six. That is a total of 62, 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Right.
    Senator Symington. Now how many did you say Egypt has?
    Mr. Kuss. 102. Those are just Mig-21's.
    Senator Symington. But the SU-7 is an improved Mig-21, is 
it not?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. That is 38 additional SU-7's in the 
UAR.
    Senator Symington. Well, I mean do you not want to include 
the best they have got? The figure I got in Cairo last month 
was 60 SU-7's. But you have got 38; you have 102 and 38.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. I would like to check.
    Senator Symington. That is 140 and 62. That is over 200 of 
the latest model fighters that those three countries have. Why 
do you not sell more F-4's to Iran if you want to put them in a 
balance of power position against these three countries? In 
other words, what do you really do for the Shah by giving him 
one or two squadrons of F-4's if your premise is correct that 
these three countries are enemies and they have over a hundred 
of the most modern Russian fighters. I am following Senator 
Fulbright's thinking on this.

                     OUR MILITARY POSITION IN IRAN

    You have been to Iran and so have I. It is a country where 
there are very rich people and very poor people. What good does 
it do to let them take their resources, and buy these airplanes 
from us, if they get them at all, as against what they could do 
with that money for the betterment of their economy because the 
number of planes that you have agreed on does not make them 
safe against these countries. Incidentally, all these latter 
countries are really satellites of the Soviet Union, are they 
not?
    Mr. Kuss. They certainly are.
    Senator Symington. Therefore, if the Soviet Union wanted to 
move against Iran, the military imbalance is still stronger, is 
it not?
    Mr. Kuss. It certainly is. May I answer the question?
    Senator Symington. I am just asking a few as we go along.
    As I understand it, we are selling military equipment to 
them, sophisticated military equipment; and the Soviet Union is 
selling them unsophisticated military equipment, plus a 
tremendous steel mill, for which they are going to be paid in 
natural gas, and in oil. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. Would you say that in our effort to 
preserve a military position which is at best theoretical, we 
are passing over the economic control of the country to the 
Soviet Union?
    Mr. Kuss. I do not see it that way. With a few projects, I 
do not see it at all. I would believe that the relationship of 
our western influence in both the economic area and the 
military area is probably about on the order of the $1.4 
billion military to $100 million Soviet.

                        SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN

    Senator Symington. But we are putting the Soviet Union in 
about equilibrium when it comes to economic control.
    Mr. Kuss. I do not believe so.
    Senator Symington. You do not think so?
    Mr. Kuss. No, sir.
    Senator Symington. You think we still control the economy 
of Iran?
    Mr. Kuss. First of all, I do not believe that the word 
``control'' is one that the Soviets use.
    Senator Symington. What do you think the word should be?
    Mr. Kuss. I believe that the good influence, if you will, 
that we have in Iran is sufficiently great, in a preponderance, 
in a majority, to warrant the course of action that we took, 
and that was the on balance decision of both our economists, 
our political people, and our military people.
    Senator Symington. You told the subcommittee this afternoon 
that we did our best to prevent the sale of the Russian 
military equipment to Iran, but we were unsuccessful. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And at the same time you also told the 
committee that the Iranians are working out with the Russians a 
big steel mill, and that they are going to have, with the help 
of the British and the Russians, a $400 million gas pipeline 
with which they are going to pay for this military equipment, 
along with gas. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. That is right.
    Senator Symington. So there is a major recent economic 
influx of the Soviet Union into Iran, and also a major and 
unprecedented movement of military equipment into Iran from the 
Soviet Union, correct?
    Mr. Kuss. Not in proportion to our influence.
    Senator Symington. But there is a major influx.
    Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir; there has been a change.
    Senator Symington. And all told, the operations of the 
Soviets, economic and military together, for say the last 18 
months, is greater than our own; so in effect we are moving 
more out of the picture with our grant-in-aid and our military 
sales, and our economic sales; and the Soviets are moving more 
into the picture.
    Mr. Kuss. We are----
    Senator Symington. Is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. No, sir. We are hardly moving out of the picture 
militarily. We have found other monies have been given away to 
substitute for the military side of the equation.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   ARMS SALES TO WEST GERMANY [P. 21]

    Senator Fulbright. You said the decision to sell in Teheran 
was made at the highest level after considering all aspects. I 
assume you mean the relative need of their domestic economy, 
and you finally came up with a decision that they needed these 
arms, is that correct?
    Mr. Kuss. As well as the politics of whether we can stand 
the Russian situation.
    Senator Fulbright. Politics.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                [P. 22]

    Mr. Kuss. All of these have to be considered. It has to be 
required, must be more economically purchaseable in the United 
States. Then they will endeavor to do it. Now, the problem 
today is not in meeting the basic part of that agreement. The 
problem today is essentially the basic internal German economic 
problem, a budget that cannot be changed materially because of 
a revenue system that is dependent upon revenues from the 
States, a requirement for a complete tax reform system.
    Today the German armed forces have one-half the procurement 
budget in 1967 that they had in 1963. So you can imagine just 
that kind of a change. Why? Because they have not been able to 
go along with the increases that would have been necessary to 
keep up their total establishment because of the revenue 
limitations in the total federal program.
    Now, this is something we cannot control It is something 
that they must control, and I want to make clear that our 
agreement with them is that yes, they will balance, they will 
endeavor to procure equipment, if it is required, and if it is 
economical to do so, and for five years they have done so.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to 
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in 
Room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
and Case.
    Eugene Groves, President, National Student Association, 
accompanied by Richard Stearnes, International Affairs Vice 
President, testified on the association of the National Student 
Association with the C.I.A.
    [The committee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
Room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Pell, 
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case and Cooper.
    S. Con. Res. 16, extending greetings to Canada on the 
occasion of its Centennial, was ordered reported favorably.
    S. 623, International Bridge Bill, was ordered reported 
favorably.
    S. 1029, to improve certain benefits for employees who 
serve in high risk situations, and for other purposes, was 
discussed and no action taken.
    Ex. E, 89/1, 90/1, Amendments to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, was ordered reported 
favorably.
    Ex. O, 89/2, International Telecommunication Convention, 
was discussed and carried over.
    Ex. D, 90/1, Treaty on Outer Space, was discussed and it 
was decided to have some items clarified by someone from 
downtown before further consideration.
    S.J. Res. 53, recommending increased assistance to Latin 
America, was discussed and a hearing set for Thursday p.m. was 
moved up to Tuesday, March 21, p.m.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]


                           BRIEFING ON AFRICA

                              ----------                              


                        Tuesday, March 28, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                    Subcommittee on African Affairs
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3: 10 p.m. in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (chairman 
of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators McCarthy and Hickenlooper.
    Also Present: Senators Symington and Carlson.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Bader of the committee 
staff.
                              ----------                              

    Senator McCarthy. Do you want to just talk to us, Mr. 
Palmer? This is kind of a new committee, and we have no policy 
with reference to Africa. If you do not have one, why we are in 
good shape.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH PALMER II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
  AFRICAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY: FRED L. HADSEL, DIRECTOR, 
 OFFICE OF INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS; AND WILLIAM E. LANG, DEPUTY 
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AFRICAN AND FOREIGN MILITARY 
                            RIGHTS)

    Mr. Palmer. Maybe between the two of us we can devise one, 
Mr. Chairman.
    Senator McCarthy. We ought to hear what it is. If you would 
like to talk to us generally about two or three items that we 
have indicated in the letter, why I think that would be a good 
beginning.
    Mr. Palmer. Fine.
    You had mentioned that you would like to discuss the 
military programs in Africa. Would you like to start on that, 
Mr. Chairman?
    Senator McCarthy. I guess that is as good as any.
    Senator Hickenlooper. There are only two things I want to 
discuss in Africa: Rhodesia and South Africa.

                     NORTH AFRICAN MILITARY PROBLEM

    Senator McCarthy. Why do we not do a quick one on the North 
African military problem, and then we will go to South Africa.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, of 
course this situation in North Africa has been one of 
continuing concern for us. As you know, there have been 
tensions in the area in the past, but they have been kept under 
fairly manageable control, with the exception of one clash 
between the Algerians and the Moroccans back in 1963. On the 
whole, our military program in North Africa until just a couple 
of years ago was a fairly modest one. We have been supplying 
both Morocco and Tunisia for some time since independence with 
military assistance.
    Mr. Lang can give you the figures if you would like them.
    But what has given the problem increased importance in the 
last two or three years has been the very massive Soviet 
buildup, supply of arms to Algeria. This again, of course, 
during the Ben Bella regime. It has continued on under 
Boumedienne and has achieved very, very substantial 
proportions, about $180 million worth of military assistance to 
Algeria since 1963.
    It is not only the quantity of it, but it is the types of 
weapons that have given both the Moroccans and the Tunisians 
concern--jet bombers, fighters, surface to air missiles and 
other very advanced types of equipment--with the result that 
quite an imbalance has been created between the armed forces of 
Algeria and those of Morocco on the one side, and Tunisia on 
the other.
    Now, we have done a lot of skull practice to try to get our 
best estimates as to why this has come about and how it has 
come about.

                           ALGERIA AND EGYPT

    I think our best estimate involves a number of factors. 
First of all, under the Ben Bella regime Algeria was, of 
course, committed to export revolution. They were training 
guerrillas. We have good reason to believe they trained them 
for the Congo and for other areas, and it was a very 
revolutionary government. Boumedienne----
    Senator Hickenlooper. And an ally of Nasser.
    Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And an ally of Nasser.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    When Boumedienne came to power he downplayed this, and the 
direction of his policy has been much more toward trying to 
develop Algeria internally. Nevertheless we think that most of 
these commitments were made during the Ben Bella period and 
have been continued during the Boumedienne period.
    As you know, Algeria emerged into independence with a Maqui 
type force, and the Algerian government was faced with the 
necessity of converting that into a more traditional and modern 
standing army.
    There was a certain amount of speculation that what may 
well have happened is Ben Bella took a look at what the Soviets 
were doing for Egypt and said, ``I don't really know what I 
need, but you tell me what I need.'' The Soviets used this at a 
time when their relationships with Algeria were extremely 
favorable to try to put in a lot of equipment hoping to 
ingratiate themselves and buttress their influence that really 
was over and above Algeria's needs.
    Then, of course----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Do you mind if I interrupt?
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Is it possible that this is a squeeze 
play on the part of the Russians with Egypt on the one side and 
Algeria on the other, to squeeze out Libya and Tunisia.
    Mr. Palmer. I think this may have been one--an original 
part of the strategy.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And eventually isolate Morocco and so 
on.
    Mr. Palmer. I think this could have been an original part 
of the strategy, Senator. However, I think that Boumedienne's 
relations with the Soviets have not been nearly as close as Ben 
Bella's were, and I doubt if it is--nor Boumedienne's 
relationships with Egypt, with Nasser are as close as Ben 
Bella's were, although Boumedienne will be attending a meeting 
in the next few days in Cairo along with some of the other so-
called progressives in Africa.
    But thus far----
    Senator McCarthy. What are the cultural differences between 
Algeria and Egypt? They are considerable, are they not?
    Mr. Palmer. They are considerable, yes. There is, of 
course, very great, strong Berber influence on the Algerians.
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    Mr. Palmer. They do consider themselves as Arabs, but as a 
different type and a different part of the Arab world.
    I think there are other factors, too, that led to this 
massive Algerian buildup. First of all, the fact they did get a 
rather bloody nose in this 1963 conflict with Morocco and also 
the fact that the government in Algeria is a military regime, 
and the man in power has to be in a position of reasonably 
satisfying the military commanders to continue to get their 
support.
    So that I think the rationale, I think, and the explanation 
for all of these things is found in this combination of 
factors.

                        NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS

    Now, we do not really think that the present government of 
Algeria has any aggressive intentions with respect to either 
Morocco or Tunisia.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Why are they building up their 
military forces?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, as I say, I think this is partly an 
inheritance of the past from the Ben Bella regime, partly 
transformation of their military forces into a more traditional 
army. I think it is partly an overreaction to the beating they 
took in 1963. I think it is generally part of their suspicions 
as a revolutionary regime that somebody may try to take their 
revolution away from them. I think it is partly because they 
are a military regime in and of themselves.
    As I say, we do not really think that Boumedienne--who is 
quite different, we think, from Ben Bella--really has any 
present intention of taking a crack at either Morocco or 
Tunisia, nor do I think that the Moroccans or the Tunisians 
really think this is a serious present possibility. But what 
worries them very much is the future.
    Algeria is still not an entirely stable government by any 
means. There is internal dissidence within the country. One 
cannot be sure that there may not be further changes within the 
country.
    Furthermore, about 2,000 Algerians have gone to the Soviet 
Union for military training, and although I think there is good 
reason to believe that not too many of these have been 
indoctrinated, nevertheless it may well be and could easily be 
that a number of them have been. In the event that there was a 
change of government, and given this huge military machine that 
is being built up, this is what really concerns the Moroccans 
and the Tunisians and has caused them to look to their own 
weaknesses and to come to us in terms of assistance.
    There is, of course, always the danger in the meanwhile, 
too, that there may be a mishap. The border between Morocco and 
Algeria is, of course, a disputed border. There has been 
trouble there in the past, but since 1963--and particularly 
since Boumedienne came to power--they have usually found a 
peaceful means of reconciling their differences.
    Moreover, the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, has 
set up a commission to try to deal with this problem and to try 
to bring about a reconciliation between the two. I think this 
has had a deterrent and helpful effect in minimizing the 
possibility of mishaps.

                     CONDITION OF THE MOROCCAN KING

    Nevertheless, the problem of an arms race is very much 
there. As you are all aware, I know, when the King of Morocco 
was here very recently, he did again reiterate to us a request 
that he had made some months before, which we had tried to 
resist at that time, for further defensive weapons. At the time 
we were resisting, of course, the full extent of the Algerian 
buildup was not clear, but in view of the intervening period 
and greater clarity about the extent and the quality of this 
buildup, we felt that there were legitimate defensive 
requirements.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It seems I saw a story in the paper 
that he had a heart attack just recently.
    Mr. Palmer. I do not believe it was a heart attack. This is 
Bourguiba, I think, that you are talking about.
    Senator Hickenlooper. No, both of them.
    Mr. Palmer. Well----
    Senator Hickenlooper. The story I saw.
    Mr. Palmer. In Hassan's case, I do not think it really can 
be characterized as a heart attack. It was apparently a 
circulatory ailment, and they say it was short of a heart 
attack but enough to constitute a warning, so----
    Senator Symington. It was an attack on the blood that did 
not reach the heart.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Only the red corpuscles.
    Senator Symington. They do not believe in integration. 
[Laughter.]

                          A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM

    Mr. Palmer. So this is essentially the program that we have 
at the present time. We have agreed to sell $14 million worth 
of arms to the Moroccans. The Tunisians have also made requests 
on us for additional assistance to build up a minimal deterrent 
force in Tunisia. Their armed forces are extremely weak at the 
present time. At their request, we have under study a program 
of about $25 million spread over five years, to build their 
armed forces up to give them a minimal, as I say, deterrent.
    We have only committed ourselves to one year's tranche of 
this, the first year for $5 million.
    Senator Symington. You say ``tranche,'' that lovely little 
word. You give them five years to draw on.
    Mr. Palmer. No, we have only said that we would supply them 
$5 million worth of equipment this year.
    Senator Symington. What is the tranche aspect of that?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, as I said, it is a five-year program, but 
the only thing we are committed to is the first year of that at 
the present time.
    Senator Symington. Can I ask a question there?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Go ahead. You are chairman.
    Senator Symington. When you have a first year commitment 
and only agree to come through with the money for the first 
year, how do you define the rest of the four years? Semi-
commitment, or is there some tricky word that describes that?
    Mr. Palmer. Tranche was perhaps not a good word for me to 
use.
    Senator Symington. I was not thinking of tranche so much, 
but I was thinking of how can you have a five-year agreement if 
you only agree to give them the money for one year?
    Mr. Palmer. No, we have not got a five-year agreement. We 
gave them a report that would provide them with a minimal 
defense capability over a period of five years.
    Senator Symington. Who made the report?
    Mr. Palmer. We did.
    Senator Symington. Who is ``we''?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, the Department of Defense--Bill, do you 
want to speak to this?
    Mr. Lang. Yes, Mr. Senator.

                        MILITARY TEAM IN TUNISIA

    A military team went to Tunisia at the request of President 
Bourguiba to see what changes or modifications of the Tunisian 
armed forces would be needed to give them the best defensive 
capability they could have taking into account their limited 
resources.
    Senator Symington. When was this?
    Mr. Lang. This was a year ago last November.
    Senator Symington. What was the name of the general who 
headed it up?
    Mr. Lang. It was not a general, but a colonel by the name 
of Clowes.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, while you were gone I took 
the liberty of asking a couple of questions, and I would like 
to pursue them a minute.
    Senator McCarthy. Go ahead.
    Senator Symington. The question was a five-year agreement 
with Tunisia, as a result of an investigation made by the 
Department of Defense presumably, Mr. Secretary, at the request 
of the State Department.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. By a Colonel Clowes, and he went over 
and told Tunisia they need $25 million to have a modern----
    Mr. Lang. If I may complete the discussion, Mr. Senator----
    Senator Symington. Let me just see if I got it straight up 
to this point: at his request we tell him he needs $25 million, 
which we are going to give them on the basis of a five-year 
agreement. But we only put up the money for the first year, $5 
million for the first year; is that right?
    Mr. Lang. I think it might be helpful, Senator, to go into 
a bit more detail as to what happened to the report.
    The study was made, as I said, at the request of President 
Bourguiba. Colonel Clowes headed a military team which stayed 
in Tunisia about three weeks, prepared a report which was 
reviewed by headquarters EUCOM, Commander, European Forces, 
also by the Joint Staff, and was endorsed by both.
    Colonel Clowes' report made a number of recommendations 
that the Tunisians should follow or carry out in reorganizing 
their forces, increasing the size of their forces to a 
relatively small extent, but also changing the size and 
composition of their units.
    The report also indicated that Tunisians would need 
additional equipment which they could absorb best over a five-
year period. This was not equipment that should be poured in at 
one point in time.

                            PLANES TO LIBYA

    Senator Symington. Are you in the State Department or 
Department of Defense?
    Mr. Lang. I am in the Defense Department.
    Senator Symington. Whom do you work for?
    Mr. Lang. John McNaughton.
    Senator Symington. You work for Mr. McNaughton.
    Mr. Lang. Yes.
    Senator Symington. You also sold some planes to Libya, have 
you not?
    Mr. Lang. Not as yet, sir.
    Senator Symington. But you plan to.
    Mr. Lang. The negotiations will be begun fairly shortly. 
Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. I thought we decided we were going to 
sell F-5s to Libya.
    Mr. Lang. The decision has been pretty much made, but the 
negotiations not.
    Senator McCarthy. Is this part of a general strategic plan 
for North Africa? I mean Tunisia and Libya?
    Mr. Lang. When you speak of a strategic plan, sir----
    Senator McCarthy. What you have recommended for Tunisia, 
did you conduct the same kind of study in Libya and make these 
recommendations?
    Mr. Lang. No. The Libyan sales agreement is not the result 
of a survey team report.
    Senator Symington. What is it the result of?
    Mr. Lang. The request of the Libyan government, sir.
    Senator Symington. You see, some of the people in the 
Department of Defense were very glad this committee was getting 
into this because they did not know what was going on 
themselves. So by golly, if people in your own building do not 
know, then I think we are entitled to find out. I say this with 
great respect, but it gets pretty complicated. At any rate, Mr. 
Chairman, would it be in order, as long as we are discussing 
the north littoral of Africa, that you give us a report on what 
you plan in Libya?
    Mr. Lang. Fine, sir. We have completed the discussion, I 
take it, on Tunisia.
    Senator Symington. No. I think they are all together. 
Exactly. What you are doing on Libya, the information that was 
volunteered to my office was that you had agreed to sell the F-
5's to Libya. So I would like to find out whether the 
information I got from Mr. McNaughton's department is correct. 
Would you check that out and let me know?
    Mr. Lang. Yes. I can recount now.
    Senator Symington. No, that is all right, but it seems to 
me you said we were planning on doing it. I understand we have 
done it, so I would like to have that point checked for the 
record and we can supply that.
    On Tunisia, as I understand, there is a team in Tunisia; in 
Morocco, I have been listening to----
    I am almost through, Mr. Chairman. I just want to try to 
understand. We are running right across here now. It looks like 
Rommel. We are moving right over here now to get this thing 
organized.

                           ROLE OF THE FRENCH

    The Algerians, when de Gaulle let them go, were French 
citizens; were they not? Is that correct?
    Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Algerians were French citizens before 
their independence.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator McCarthy. They were eligible for French 
citizenship.
    Senator Symington. I think they actually were.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Part of Metropolitan France.
    Mr. Palmer. The northern departments were part of 
Metropolitan France.
    Senator Symington. My last question or group of questions: 
We are discussing what has been done in Morocco; we will skip 
Algeria for the moment anyway. We are discussing what is being 
done in Tunisia. We are discussing--what is being done in 
Libya. Have we discussed with the French at the diplomatic 
level what we are doing in the north littoral of Africa?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, we have. They are aware----
    Senator Symington. Are they aware of what we are doing in 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya?
    Mr. Palmer. I think they understand the reasons for it. Of 
course, their relationships with Morocco are not good at the 
present time. They have not been good with Tunisia although 
they are improving, and I think the French have been 
understanding of the reasons why we have given assistance to 
these countries.
    Senator Symington. How are they with Libya?
    Mr. Palmer. So far as Libya is concerned, I do not think 
they have professed any interest in this.
    Senator Symington. How about Algeria?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, of course we have not been giving 
assistance to Algeria.
    Senator Symington. I just wondered what their relationship 
with Algeria was.
    Mr. Palmer. Oh, I see. Their relationships are clouded by a 
number of financial problems at the present time. They have not 
had since independence much of a military relationship with 
Algeria, although they are now resuming the training of 
Algerians at St. Cyr, which is the beginning of a renewed 
French interest. They have sat back--we have thought somewhat 
too much--and watched this Soviet buildup going on. We have 
talked to them very frankly about it.
    They have professed not to be concerned about it. I have 
talked several times in the Quai about this myself. The last 
time I talked in January, I had a feeling they were becoming 
increasingly concerned about it.

                   FRENCH OPINION OF AMERICAN POLICY

    Senator Symington. One final question. I do not want to 
take too much time, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to get sort 
of the package feel of this part of the world.
    You say the French have understood what we are doing. Well, 
I understand what we are doing, I think, especially after the 
testimony. At least I understood most of what we are doing, but 
do they agree to this? Do they think we are following the sound 
course there? Do they approve of our arming Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Libya against Algeria?
    Mr. Palmer. I am not aware of any objections that they have 
interposed. Are you Bill?
    Mr. Lang. No.
    Senator Symington. Are they putting anything up themselves 
in order to help along a little bit? It is closer to them than 
it is to us.
    Mr. Palmer. If I can say, Senator, I would like to come 
back to the Tunisian one again, too, because, as I said, we 
have encouraged the Tunisians to look elsewhere for assistance 
as well. We would like to spread this. We do not want to become 
the sole suppliers, and so forth, and the Tunisians are talking 
to both the French and the Turks. We are hopeful that they may 
obtain assistance in those directions.
    We would hope very much, too, the Moroccan-French 
relationships would improve to the point that the French would 
find it possible to do more in Morocco as well.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                            SOVIET INFLUENCE

    Senator McCarthy. Mr. Palmer, I do not know if you can do 
this under two or three general concepts, but do you look upon 
the arms buildup down there primarily as kind of a North 
African problem, probably psychological and traditional and at 
least contained in the North African context? Egypt, Algeria, 
Morocco--I believe this is the old game they have played for a 
long time. You are just using slightly more sophisticated 
instruments of war instead of horses and rifles.
    Mr. Palmer. I would say so, yes.
    Of course what is giving it an alarming dimension are the 
types of equipment that the Algerians are acquiring.
    Now we have got a similar sort of situation, of course, in 
the horn of Africa where again the Soviets are building up the 
Somalia forces in that area. This again gives us concern, 
although there, of course, the disparities are on Ethiopia's 
side, but of course Ethiopia is a much larger and more complex 
country.
    The question that arises is what the Soviet motivations are 
in all of this. I think they are probably the obvious ones of 
influence. I think it may also suit their purposes very well to 
create pressures on the adjoining states. This is one reason we 
have been so anxious to minimize U.S. supply of arms to the 
adjoining states so that they will not fall in the trap, and 
they recognize the trap here, too, I think.
    Senator McCarthy. What do the Algerians give in exchange 
for arms or the people in Somaliland?
    Mr. Palmer. I am sorry, sir.
    Senator McCarthy. What do they give in exchange for Soviet 
arms? Are these pretty much grants? The Algerians do not have 
much, do they?
    Mr. Palmer. I think in the case of Algeria it is half.
    Mr. Lang. It is either half and half or two-thirds, two-
thirds cash. When I say cash, credit, two-thirds credit and 
one-third grant.
    Senator McCarthy. How about Somalia? They do not have 
anything, do they?
    Mr. Lang. I think perhaps the terms are roughly the same. 
We do not have really too much information on the terms.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What kind of credit is it? This 
credit that is used is a loose term. And the cash, what kind of 
credit? Is that foreign exchange, acceptable foreign exchange, 
international foreign exchange such as dollars? What is the 
credit?
    Mr. Lang. It may be barter arrangements, sir. As I 
mentioned earlier, Senator, we really do not have that much 
hard information about the terms of the agreement between the 
Soviets and the Algerians.
    Senator McCarthy. They do not have much to give in 
exchange, do they?
    Mr. Palmer. Somalia does not.
    Senator McCarthy. Somalia does not have anything.
    Mr. Palmer. Algeria has somewhat more because there is a 
considerable amount of petroleum.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They get exchange out of oil.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator McCarthy. But the Russians do not need that kind of 
oil.
    Mr. Palmer. No, but it does in hard currencies.

                            WHEELUS AIR BASE

    Senator McCarthy. What about the overall strategic plans? 
You said we made a study in Tunisia and made these 
recommendations. Is this simply in terms of this North African 
complex or do our recommendations there and our concessions 
with reference to Libya involve somewhat more comprehensive 
strategic planning than just this self-contained North African 
complex?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, in the case of Tunisia, of course, we are 
interested in stability in the area. We are interested in the 
very prowestern orientation of Tunisia. Bourguiba has been 
extremely courageous in speaking out on a great many political 
issues of importance to us. He supported us on Vietnam. He has 
taken a very forward stance. This put him at odds with the rest 
of the Arab world with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict, and 
he has stood for a great deal in Africa and the Middle East.
    In the case of Libya, of course, our interests there are 
much more direct. We do have an extremely important facility 
there in Wheelus.
    Senator Symington. What is important about the Wheelus 
airbase?
    Mr. Palmer. In the Wheelus airbase?
    Senator McCarthy. Is it just a base or is it more than 
that?
    Senator Symington. I have been there, and I would like to 
hear the modern version.
    Mr. Palmer. As the Senator knows, the importance of the 
facility right now, it is supporting all of our U.S. NATO-
committed air forces in Europe, in terms of year-round gunnery 
training.
    Senator Symington. So if we decided to reduce our forces in 
Germany, for example, that would reduce the need for the Air 
Force base, would it not, at Wheelus, because that is where 
they do the staging?
    Mr. Palmer. In terms of the percentage that it would be 
used, but you would still have the requirement of forces in 
Europe that would need that type of facility.
    Senator McCarthy. Fleet support, in the Mediterranean.
    Mr. Palmer. No, these are basically in support of the U.S. 
Air Force units in Europe.
    Senator McCarthy. Is that right?
    Senator Symington. In other words, as I got the story when 
I was in Germany, Wheelus was very important because they could 
fly to Wheelus and fly around the desert when the weather would 
not let them fly in Germany.
    Mr. Palmer. Precisely.
    Senator Symington. You wonder, inasmuch as the weather in 
England is not as good as Germany, why they built about the 
greatest air force in the world in their day, but I suppose it 
is more comfortable this way.
    Senator McCarthy. When they decided peace will stay for a 
while, they decided to establish places in good climates.
    Senaor Symington. The thought occurs to me very seriously 
to see it all ties in together if you are going to maintain 
this picture over there, keeping these troops in Germany to the 
extent that we are keeping them and not following what 
President Eisenhower recommended years ago, pulling a lot of 
them out, and to the degree that you do not pull them out, 
Wheelus is important.
    When we had the staging base complex, which was long before 
the intercontinental ballistic missile, then these bases were 
terribly important. They were militarily important. Now I 
understand you say they are logistically important, but if 
there is nothing over there to support, then they become 
relatively unimportant. Is that not correct?
    Mr. Lang. If there were no forces in Europe to support.
    Senator Symington. Right. And we have spent a good many 
hundred million dollars in Spain where we are behind the 
Pyrenees. The bases there are great and the weather is just 
about as good. The bases are better as a whole; more bases 
there than one base at Wheelus and so forth.
    So this really ties into the whole operation over there.

                          THE PRIMARY THREATS

    I would like to ask this question: Based on what you are 
saying about Somaliland, and what we really are doing is, Mr. 
Chairman, we are arming all the countries that we think are for 
us in case they get attacked by Somalia or Algeria--or the UAR, 
of course--that is about the long and short of it, is it not?
    Mr. Palmer. What we are hoping there to do is to assure a 
minimal defensive posture.
    Senator Symington. Let me repeat my question.
    We are arming these countries in order to help them defend 
themselves in case they are attacked by Somalia, Algeria, or 
the UAR. Is that not correct?
    Mr. Palmer. Those are the primary threats to them, yes.
    Senator Symington. Or anybody else that wants to attack 
them.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. Even France.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir. But when we say arming them, Senator, 
I would like to point out that we have held back and held down 
very much the quantities of arms that we have made available to 
these countries.
    Senator Symington. We are only arming------
    Mr. Palmer. To assure that they were minimal just to give 
them a deterrent capability, a defense capability so they would 
not be overrun before the matter could get to the U.N.

                    OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT

    Senator Symington. How do you know whether an F-5 airplane, 
which is a supersonic fighter and extremely able, can be used 
offensively or defensively? That is what I do not understand. 
Do you have anything in the contract that says the plane cannot 
go out of Tunisia?
    Mr. Lang. All of the military assistance agreements, sir, 
do specify that the equipment will be used only for internal 
security or self-defense.
    Senator Symington. Well, suppose they figured they were 
pretty confident that Libya was going to, that Algeria was 
going to attack them. Does the contract say they cannot attack 
Algeria unless Algeria attacks them?
    Mr. Lang. Self-defense, sir, usually means that you are 
attacked first.
    Senator Symington. Well, I know, but you are going to arm 
all these countries, and every time that happens we end up in a 
war.

                         SOVIET ARMS IN ALGERIA

    Mr. Lang. Senator, it may be helpful to give some 
dimensions to the Soviet buildup or the buildup of Soviet arms 
in Algeria.
    Senator Symington. I will tell you what I wish you would do 
for the record, Mr. Chairman, if it is in order.
    I wish you would give the details of the agreements and the 
wording of the agreements, if that is agreeable.
    Senator McCarthy. That would be fine. Also, if we could get 
a kind of total really as to what the Soviet has in this area 
in contrast with what we have got here.
    Mr. Lang. Would you care for some of that now, sir? I have 
some of the statistics.
    Mr. Palmer. I think it would help.
    Senator McCarthy. I think it would. I do not know, maybe 
you ought to swing it on around what we have got in other Arab 
countries. So far as Egypt is concerned, it plays both ways, 
does it not?
    Mr. Lang. Let me speak briefly, sir, to the buildup in 
Algeria and compare it to what the Tunisians and the Moroccans 
now have.
    Senator McCarthy. All right.
    Mr. Lang. In the case of Algeria and Morocco, the size of 
the armies are not too far apart; Morocco about 50,000 and 
Algeria 60,000. The Tunisians have 18,000.
    In terms of tanks, the Moroccans have 75. The Algerians 
have 429. The Tunisians have 17.
    In terms of artillery, the Moroccans have 191. Algeria 681. 
I do not have the statistics for Tunisia.
    Armored vehicles, Morocco 120. Algeria 535.
    Jet bombers, IL-28s. Algeria 27. I think close to 30 now, 
and we think they are going to 36. Morocco, none at all.
    Algeria, 97 Migs including the Mig-21 series.
    Senator Symington. How many?
    Mr. Lang. At least 25 or more.
    Senator McCarthy. Twenty-five of the 21s.
    Mr. Lang. That is right. There are 97 Migs in total.
    Senator Symington. Any SU-7s?
    Mr. Lang. No, sir. The Moroccans now have a grand total of 
13 aircraft, nine of which are Migs. You recall the Soviets had 
a program in Morocco in the late fifties and early sixties, so 
this is the type of imbalance that exists in Morocco.

                  AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AGAINST ALGERIA

    Senator Symington. I would like to make this comment on the 
basis of that plus the figures you have given like $25 million. 
It is just a spit in the ocean what you are doing so far as 
giving them an adequate defense against Algeria, especially if 
the Soviets continue to build up in Algeria. Is that not a fair 
statement?
    Mr. Lang. The objective, Mr. Senator, is to give the 
Moroccans and the Tunisians a defense capability which they 
could employ taking into full account the advantages they have, 
given their defensive terrain, which would enable them to hold 
a major thrust for a period of some days until the U.N. or 
another international body could consider the problem.
    Senator Symington. Let me be straight on this, because I do 
not think there is anything more important in our foreign 
policy than what we are discussing today. It certainly has been 
an awfully ignorant subject around the Armed Services 
Committee.
    I do not know how much the Foreign Relations Committee 
knew, but we knew little or nothing about it on the Armed 
Services Committee. Are you saying that with these amounts that 
we are giving these countries that over a period of days or 
weeks, whatever is necessary, that they would defend themselves 
against the buildup in Algeria that you have just told us 
about.
    Mr. Lang. It is the judgment of the Joint Staff, sir, that 
with the type of equipment and the quantities which we have 
been speaking of, that the Moroccans and the Tunisians would be 
able to hold against an Algerian thrust for a period of days.
    Senator Symington. For how long?
    Mr. Lang. This would vary, sir, where the attack would take 
place. The minimum estimates are four to seven days.
    Senator Symington. So we are giving them four to seven days 
of hold until we can get to the United Nation. Is that it?
    Mr. Lang. Yes.
    Mr. Palmer. Until they can get to the U.N.
    Senator Symington. When you say the Joint Staff, you mean 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Mr. Palmer. The joint organization which supports the Joint 
Chiefs. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And these are the figures they have 
approved now to make it possible for these countries to defend 
themselves against Algeria, is that correct?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What is the comparative strength in 
hardware between Algeria and Morocco?
    Mr. Lang. If I can just----
    Senator Hickenlooper. As of now as against the time when 
the Algerians were not successful against the Moroccans.
    Mr. Lang. I do not have the statistics, Senator, with me, 
but I would say----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I mean the balance. Is the balance 
about the same now as it was then?
    Mr. Lang. No, because the Soviet buildup has taken place in 
Algeria since 1964. There have been large--huge quantities of 
arms going into Algeria from '64 through the present.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thanks.

                         COMMITMENT TO TUNISIA

    Mr. Palmer. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I can clarify just 
one other statement that related to Senator Symington's summing 
up. We do not have a five-year commitment to Tunisia. What we 
have given the Tunisians in response to their request is a 
report that is based upon a five-year buildup of the Tunisian 
armed forces. The only thing that we have committed ourselves 
to is one year's assistance to them, and, as I say, we have 
encouraged them to look to other countries to assist in 
supplying equipment for the remainder.
    Now, that is not to say we would not do something more in 
subsequent years. But I just wanted to make that clear. We do 
not a have a five-year commitment to Tunisia at the present 
time.

                            NO DEFENSE PACT

    Senator McCarthy. Mr. Palmer, could I ask, back eight or 
ten years ago when we were bent on working out treaties like 
CENTO and SEATO, there was some talk about an African 
arrangement of some kind, as a kind of a southern tier which 
would have involved what, Ethiopia, Libya, and kind of close 
off Egypt, the Sudan. I think we were talking about that. Is 
that idea still around?
    Mr. Palmer. No. The idea is not current, Mr. Chairman, at 
the present time, and I think that the nonaligned posture of 
all of these countries----
    Senator McCarthy. No plans for the Sudan then at the 
present time.
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What were you about to say about the 
nonaligned posture?
    Mr. Palmer. I think the nonaligned posture of these 
countries would not make such a defense arrangement possible, 
even if we wanted to assume additional obligations which we 
have not wanted to in that context, in that area.
    Senator McCarthy. Frank, I do not know whether we need to 
press this North Africa.
    Senator Carlson. I have been very interested in this. I 
just see a picture on this map, and I can see these countries 
where the Soviet Union has been building up. I can see also 
where we have our military posture.
    It gets back to when, I think it was Secretary Rusk was 
before our committee, he talked about the balancing of arms 
between nations. In other words, if one country got a little 
ahead, it was our policy to build up the neighbors. I do not 
know how far we can go. Maybe we should be going more 
extensively than we are, I do not know. It is a problem.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, it is a difficult problem, Senator. We do 
not want to see them lose their independence. At the same time, 
we do not want to see them dissipate resources that should be 
going into economic development, and I should add to that that 
the countries themselves do not want to. Both Bourguiba and 
Hassan have given very high priority to their economic 
development programs, but both of them do feel that this 
imbalance does threaten their security.

                       COMPARISON TO VIETNAM WAR

    Senator Symington. Let me ask this question, if I may.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator Symington. You have heard of the Vietnam war.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And we put in heaven knows what, great 
tens of millions of dollars, and the people supplying the Viet 
Cong have put in not even a small fraction of what we have put 
in money and equipment. For example, they put in no air forces 
at all really to speak of, except in North Vietnam. They have 
nothing in South Vietnam.
    If these people want to be independent down here, is it 
necessary for us to supply them with these--with all this 
equipment? Is there not a little Viet Cong in their hearts, 
too, that they want to be independent and they are willing to 
fight and die for what they think is right in those countries?
    Mr. Palmer. I think there is that feeling, but I think that 
they feel that they need a minimal capability in order to do 
this. I think what we have been supplying, Senator, is a pretty 
minimal capability.
    Senator Symington. If we want to support the regimes in 
this country, for example, as I have told the full committee 
already and the Armed Services Committee, the biggest shock I 
think I have ever had in armaments is the degree of the 
armament of the United Arab Republic by the Soviets.
    I was just in Cairo a few weeks ago, and I was surprised 
the same before. They have tremendously increased their arms. I 
do not think there is any remote chance if they made an all-out 
attack there that anybody has the ability to defend themselves. 
I would stake that on everything I have learned, assuming they 
can operate the equipment.
    If we are going to arm these people, and we have got a much 
bigger gross national product that the Defense Department is 
always talking about and justifying the budget, why do we not 
really arm them?
    I am only asking. Why just give them a little minimum 
business to make them last a few days and then go down the 
mine?
    Mr. Palmer. Of course that involves a lot of recurrent 
costs, Senator, that we had thought that our best posture here 
was to give them a minimum capability. That is the best 
judgment of our people. They should place their real reliance 
on the United Nations.

                    EVALUATING THE EGYPTIAN BUILDING

    Senator McCarthy. How do you evaluate the Egyptian buildup, 
Mr. Palmer, and the Algerian one? Is this the Soviets showing 
off and saying ``These are our friends,'' and saying ``Look 
what we give to them''?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think that is a large element.
    Senator McCarthy. They do not anticipate they will be used.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think it is a large element.
    Senator McCarthy. So we take a calculated risk that this 
power will not be brought into action, or, if it is, why we can 
hold long enough for the U.N. to take some action.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator McCarthy. Is the U.N. concerned about this? Is 
there any special action there?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. I started to say that King Hassan, when he 
was last here in the United States, did have a talk with the 
Secretary General of the United Nations in which he followed up 
with a letter asking the Secretary General to intervene with 
both Morocco and Algeria to see if it would not be possible to 
reach some sort of an understanding to hold the level of 
armaments down.
    I would have to say in all confidence that I do not think 
that this was handled as skillfully as it should have been by 
the Moroccans because before the Secretary General had an 
opportunity to explore this at all with the Algerians, where 
the Moroccans published the letter, and this inevitably 
resulted in a reaction from the Algerians who have taken the 
position that there are a number of differences between the two 
of them.
    It is not only the level of armaments, but there is the 
question of the disputed border. The disputed border is in the 
hands of the O.A.U., and therefore----
    Senator Symington. O.A.U.?
    Mr. Palmer. Organization of African Unity, which is the 
continental organization of African states. And that, 
therefore, they did not think the United Nations was a proper 
place for this.
    We have been hopeful nevertheless, that at some point, if 
it is not in the U.N. forum maybe in the O.A.U. forum or some 
other forum, that some means can be found of trying to reach 
some sort of an agreement, some sort of an accommodation with 
respect to levels of forces, not only in this area but in the 
area of the Horn.
    But it will not be an easy thing to bring about or to 
encourage.
    Senator McCarthy. Well, I think maybe for today we probably 
ought to leave this stand as it is. A request has been made for 
additional information which I am sure you will supply.

                            CASH AND CREDIT

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one thing more, 
just for a minute?
    What are the terms of the deal with Morocco and what are 
the terms of the deal from the standpoint of what Senator 
Hickenlooper was referring to? We talk about credit. Could we 
have the details of the deal language?
    Mr. Palmer. Fine, sir.
    Senator Symington. As to what we agree to take in the way 
of credit terms and how much cash is involved and whether we 
are using counterpart funds and whether the loans, if they have 
any incident to the materials, bear an interest rate and if so 
how much?
    Mr. Palmer. I can give you details on the Moroccan 
arrangement now, sir.
    Senator Symington. You go right ahead and put it in the 
record if you want, because the Chairman would like to go.
    Mr. Palmer. The Moroccan package, 1965, involved 12 F-5s, 
spare parts and AGE, totaled $11 million.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What? How much?
    Mr. Palmer. $11 million, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.
    Mr. Palmer. Of that $11 million, the United States made a 
grant for components of $5 million; $6 million is extended in 
credit. Terms, 3 percent, ten years, repayable in hard 
currency, 20 semiannual payments of the same size, sir.
    Senator Symington. And Tunisia?
    Mr. Palmer. Tunisia the negotiations have not been 
completed, sir.
    Senator Symington. And Libya?
    Mr. Palmer. Libya the negotiations have not started, sir.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.

                       SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

    Senator McCarthy. Do you want to start on South Africa with 
a statement or just a question? Do you want to give us a kind 
of review on that Rhodesian sanction problem and where it is 
leading and what we really have in mind?
    Senator Hickenlooper. South Africa, if I may interject--
first I would like to have an explanation for the fiasco of the 
Enterprise or whatever it was in Johannesburg or in Capetown.
    Mr. Palmer. Capetown.
    Senator Hickenlooper. To me that is the most unconscionable 
thing we have done in a long time. I would like to have an 
explanation that makes me feel more kindly toward our own 
people for pulling that kind of a thing down there.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, as you know, Senator, in 1965 the 
aircraft carrier Enterprise was due to put in to South Africa 
for refueling.
    Senator Hickenlooper. 1965?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, just to give a piece of background on 
this.
    At that time, the government of the Republic of South 
Africa imposed certain racial restrictions on certain 
operational aspects of the visit.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They did that at the time the visit 
was proposed.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, in 1965.
    Senator Hickenlooper. At the time the visit was proposed.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is right.
    Mr. Palmer. Specifically they required that the flight 
crews that would be operating planes from the ship to shore and 
so forth would have to be subject to South Africa's apartheid 
regulations.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I understand that.
    Mr. Palmer. As a result of that, a decision was made at 
that time not to put Enterprise in, but to refuel at sea.
    This year or last year, when the question of the FDR 
transiting from Vietnam to the United States came up, the 
Department of Defense took the position that there was an 
operational need to go into Capetown for refueling at that 
time.
    I believe, and Mr. Lang can confirm this, that there were 
Atlantic maneuvers going on at the present time and tankers 
were not readily available to refuel at sea. Moreover, there 
would have been a cost of some $250,000, I think, to refuel at 
sea.
    Now, at that time we made inquiries of the South African 
Government as to whether or not they would impose racial 
restrictions with respect to the operational aspects of the FDR 
visit.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Operational aspects. What do you mean 
by operational?
    Mr. Palmer. Flights from the carrier to the shore.
    Senator Symington. What about those flights? What is the 
apartheid significance of those flights?
    Mr. Palmer. That they would have had to go into South 
African airports, airfields, and so forth, and that any crews 
on board, if there were Negroes on board, would have to use the 
African facilities and would not be allowed to use the white 
European facilities.

                   SOUTH AFRICA'S APARTHEID POLICIES

    Mr. Lang. If I might, in '65, the South African Government 
in effect placed a condition on us that we could not have Negro 
crew members aboard the aircraft coming from the carrier to the 
airfield facilities.
    Senator McCarthy. Oh, the problem did not arise.
    Mr. Lang. Because they did not have the apartheid 
facilities for them.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    In any event, on the basis of those assurances that they 
would not attach such conditions, the FDR was authorized to go 
in. But shore leave was only authorized on the basis that it 
would be for integrated activities, and quite a range of 
integrated activities had been worked out by our embassy down 
there and with various people in the community.
    The commanding officer of the vessel, however, felt--and 
there many other arrangements that were worked out by local 
citizens and so forth that would have been segregated.
    Under the circumstances it was decided that shore leave 
would only be authorized on the basis of integrated activities.
    The commander of the ship, with the concurrence of our 
ambassador, felt that this was not really practicable and that 
he could not give--if he authorized shore leave on this basis, 
one could not be sure that certain members of the crew would 
not be subject to South Africa's apartheid laws. Consequently, 
he decided, with the ambassador's concurrence, to cancel shore 
leave.

                          A CALCULATED INSULT

    Senator Hickenlooper. Therefore, it seems all the blame for 
this--the buck is being passed to the commander of the vessel.
    I have had some information from South Africa, not only 
from Americans but others, who said that some of the newspaper 
stories said it was an absolute and astounding surprise to 
these people who went on board to welcome them to find out, 
when they went on board for the first time, the commander of 
the vessel had to tell them that all leaves would be canceled. 
That was after several days of preparation, several days of 
discussion, several days when the arrangements were made.
    I do not care whether they landed at South Africa or not, 
or went into Capetown. That is beside the point. But to go 
through all of this and then do what to me appears to be--and I 
would like to be straightened out on it--a calculated insult to 
South Africa. I think it has all the earmarks of an actually 
calculated insult.
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir. It was not a calculated insult. I can 
assure you categorically.
    Senator Hickenlooper.. It has that appearance to me.
    Mr. Palmer. Senator, the problem arose from the fact, I 
think, that the instructions were sent to the captain of the 
vessel. I do not think the captain of the vessel should be 
blamed. I certainly do not blame him--pretty much at the last 
minute.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I thought you said it was his 
decision.
    Mr. Palmer. It was his decision.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What were the instructions sent to 
him?
    Mr. Palmer. But I think what gave rise to his problem, 
Senator, was the fact that it was rather late notification to 
him that the crews should only go ashore under integrated 
circumstances, and he felt that this was too difficult. He felt 
that this was impossible really to carry out.
    Senator McCarthy. So they never told him not to put them 
ashore, but merely told him if they go ashore they would have 
to be integrated.
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct. They could only go ashore for 
integrated activities.

                REACTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

    Senator McCarthy. Why was that order so late in coming?
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is the point.
    Senator McCarthy. Was it after the congressional resolution 
or whatever it was that was introduced up here? What set if 
off? Anything in particular, or was it just slow in coming 
downtown?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, Bill, do you want to say anything?
    I think it was--I am trying to reconstruct something that 
took place while I was not here. As a matter of fact, I was 
overseas.
    Senator McCarthy. There was an earlier incident similar to 
this. There was a congressional protest against landing.
    Mr. Palmer. There is no doubt about it.
    Senator McCarthy. Two or three years ago.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is what he was talking about.
    Mr. Palmer. There is no doubt about it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. The Enterprise.
    Mr. Palmer. There was a lot of concern expressed in this 
country about the possibility of men who had been fighting 
together in Vietnam being placed in a position of then having 
to subject themselves to the practices of apartheid in South 
Africa. And, as I say, the decision that they should only go 
ashore on an integrated basis was a rather last minute 
decision. It put the captain, there is no doubt about it, in a 
difficult position. He had a judgment to make. He made it with 
the concurrence of our ambassador.
    Senator Symington. Could I ask a question why this was not 
thought out before?
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is the whole burden of my 
concern about this thing.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, there were two things: there was this 
aspect of it; and there was the operational aspect of it. The 
fact that the tankers were not available; the fact that there 
was a considerable sum of money involved here in refueling at 
sea.
    Senator Hickenlooper. But if you say it cost $250,000 not 
to refuel there, have you figured out what it cost as a result 
of what we did, aside from what the cost in good will was?
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You might get that up sometime.
    Where did we ultimately end up by refueling?
    Mr. Palmer. We refueled there, but the crew was kept on 
board.
    Senator Hickenlooper. So we saved the money.
    Mr. Palmer. So we saved the money. Yes, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And set back relations between our 
two countries and the possibility of settling the apartheid 
business by several years, I think.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, we are now reviewing, as we have 
indicated, the whole question of port facilities in South 
Africa.

                        DIVERSION OF OTHER SHIPS

    As you know, subsequent to that, we did divert another 
vessel to Mombasa while this review is going on. We are 
undertaking this with the Department of Defense and will be 
reaching some policy decision.
    Senator Symington. Where is Mombasa?
    Mr. Palmer. In Kenya, Senator.
    Senator Symington. If you could divert one to Kenya without 
any danger of trouble, why could you not divert the Enterprise 
to Kenya?
    Mr. Palmer. The FDR?
    Senator Symington. Or the FDR.
    Mr. Lang. The port facilities were not adequate, sir, to 
handle a ship the size of the FDR.
    Senator Symington. It was the size of the ship.
    Mr. Lang. Yes, the draft of the vessel.
    Senator Symington. Could you not run a line out, keep her 
in deep enough water to refuel it? You do not have to bring a 
ship to port to refuel it.
    Mr. Lang. They do not have that type of facilities in 
Mombasa, sir.
    Senator Symington. I see.

                     PROMOTING BETTER UNDERSTANDING

    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I still do not know. I still 
say that my whole inquiry goes not to the point that we did not 
have them land at Capetown. It is the fact that for days ahead 
of time they made arrangements, I am told by people who were on 
the ground down there. They said the South Africans had bunting 
and welcome groups.
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct; they did.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It was going to be a great thing for 
them. And the idea around in that area was that this would do 
more to get a little better understanding between South Africa 
and the U.S. They tried to treat the colored people right, and 
they would not isolate them off in compounds and all this sort 
of stuff. Yet they just had a wet sock thrown in their faces, 
not the day before or the morning before, but at the time when 
they went on board the carrier to welcome them. That is the 
first time they heard.
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct. It happened when some of the 
officials were on board.
    Senator Hickenlooper. On the deck of the ship.
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct.
    Senator Hickenlooper. To me it was the most outstandingly 
boorish thing I heard of from an international standpoint. In 
other words, if they wanted to pass up Capetown or just go in 
there to fuel and have it known in advance they were not going 
to let anybody have shore leave, that is a matter of decision.
    Mr. Palmer. I think all of us would agree, Senator, that 
the matter was not handled as well as it should be.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is utterly inexcusable, 
and I would like to go on a little bit also, if we are all 
through asking about it. I do not want to stop this. I want to 
go on to Rhodesia and find out some of the things we are doing 
in Rhodesia. I did not want to interfere with any other 
question.

            U.S. FAVORS MAJORITY RULE AND SELF DETERMINATION

    Senator McCarthy. That is the same question everybody is 
going to ask. I will put it in these terms. Do we have a policy 
of our own there, or are we really kind of riding out the 
British position now hoping somehow or other this will work 
out?
    Mr. Palmer. In Rhodesia?
    Senator McCarthy. Yes, in South Africa, in that area.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think we have very much of a policy of 
our own on this, Mr. Chairman.
    I think that we have historically stood for certain values 
and for certain principles, including majority rule and 
including self-determination, including the genuine 
independence of states, including government by consent of the 
governed.
    Senator McCarthy. How do we implement it?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, we implement it in such ways as we can. 
It is certainly not uniform. Different situations call for 
different means of trying to realize these objectives, I think.
    Senator McCarthy. We are not prepared to go beyond the 
British position, are we, on anything in this area now?
    Mr. Palmer. We are not simply prepared to go beyond an 
effort to resolve the situation in Rhodesia by peaceful means. 
This much is very clear, and we have made this very clear to 
everyone concerned, I think, Mr. Chairman.
    What we have here is a declaration of independence that has 
not been recognized by any country in the world, by those who 
represent, say they represent, 220,000 whites in opposition to 
4 million Africans. The whole thrust of the British effort in 
the negotiations that have gone on now for quite some time is 
to try to assure that there will be orderly and sustained 
progress toward majority rule.
    The British have never said that there must be, or had not 
said until after the Tiger talks, that there had to be 
immediate majority rule, that there could not be independence 
before majority rule. But what they have said is that there 
must be an understanding, there must be arrangements that would 
assure that there would be unimpeded progress toward majority 
rule.

                      ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

    Senator Hickenlooper. Is majority rule more important than 
economic and social progress in a country?
    Mr. Palmer. I think that they are all important, Senator. I 
think that when we have economic and social progress in 
Rhodesia, we have it in South Africa. But when it results, I 
think, in the denial of the ability of the vast majority of the 
inhabitants to be able to have some prospect of being able to 
conduct their own affairs, then I think it does become a very 
grave moral issue.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are they in any degree----
    Mr. Palmer. And political issue.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are they in any way capable of 
conducting their own affairs?
    Mr. Palmer. No, not at the present time. I want to make 
this clear again, Senator, that what we are talking about is 
not immediate majority rule, but unimpeded progress toward 
majority rule. This has been the issue that has been at stake. 
It is not immediate majority rule. Of course there would have 
to be a transition period before there was majority rule, and 
the question that has been at issue here has been the return to 
legality, the return to British rule in a very light sense, to 
something akin to the previous arrangements until such time as 
it is assured that there will be unimpeded progress toward 
majority rule.
    Senator Symington. I would like to ask one question on 
this, if I might, Mr. Palmer.

                 U.S. INTERVENTION IN RHODESIAN AFFAIRS

    Secretary Acheson had a letter that impressed me a great 
deal in the Washington Post in which he said that under the 
United Nations Charter, as I remember it--I have not read the 
letter for some weeks now--but we had no right to interfere 
with the internal affairs of Rhodesia.
    Has that letter ever been answered by the State Department?
    Mr. Palmer. Ambassador Goldberg answered that letter and I 
think answered it very effectively, Senator, in a letter that 
he wrote to the Washington Post on January 8.
    Senator McCarthy. He used the Civil War, did he not, as the 
principal defense?
    Mr. Palmer. Ambassador Goldberg?
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    Mr. Palmer. I do not recall.
    Senator Symington. Which civil war?
    Senator McCarthy. Our Civil War.
    Senator Symington. The one in Rhodesia or the one in the 
U.S.?
    Mr. Palmer. One of Mr. Acheson's main arguments ran, of 
course, to Article 27 of the Charter, the Domestic Jurisdiction 
clause. Ambassador Goldberg, in replying to this, pointed out 
that this is not intervention in the internal affairs of a 
state because Rhodesia is not a state. It has not been 
recognized as a state by anybody in the international 
community.
    Senator Symington. Just a rebellious colony.
    Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
    Senator Symington. Just a rebellious colony.
    Mr. Palmer. Just a rebellious colony.
    Senator Symington. Did he quote George III, too?
    Senator McCarthy. Secession.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, but at least we were recognized by people 
as being an independent nation.
    Senator Symington. Not by a lot of people.
    Mr. Palmer. Not by a lot, but we were recognized----
    Senator Hickenlooper. What would be wrong with us 
recognizing Rhodesia?
    Mr. Palmer. But we were recognized by quite a number, 
Senator, and in this case nobody has recognized Rhodesia.

                     U.S. AS POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD

    Senator Symington. One other question I would like to ask 
here. Do you think that the mantle has fallen on the United 
States now to be the policeman of the world, of the free world?
    Mr. Palmer. To be what?
    Senator Symington. To be the policeman of the free world.
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir, I do not.
    Senator Symington. Do you know of any country that we are 
not defending or protecting that is supporting us and our 
policies in Vietnam?
    Mr. Palmer. Do I know of any country----
    Senator Symington. That we are not either defending or 
financing that is supporting us in Vietnam? I am just 
wondering. I looked the map over and we are apparently taking 
on the defense of all these countries with either money or 
troops or both. I just wondered if there was any internal paper 
that we have not seen like the F-4s to Iran, for example, that 
there has been some decision made that we are going to be the 
defenders of the free world and that we are going to finance 
them as much as possible through various international 
organizations and so forth.
    Have there been things written on that that is established, 
an American policy in this field that we do not know about?
    Mr. Palmer. Not that I am aware of, Senator.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, sir.

                          SPECIAL SUPPLY SHIPS

    Senator McCarthy. Could I ask on that point, the Senate 
Armed Services Committee turned down a proposal for these 
special supply ships last week. I think there were three of 
them that were being proposed, but the overall plan called for 
30. Do you know whether it was planned that any of the 30 
should lie adjacent to any of these areas in Africa?
    Mr. Palmer. I do not know.
    Do you know?
    Senator McCarthy. Maybe you would know.
    Mr. Lang. No.
    Senator McCarthy. You know the ships we are talking about.
    Mr. Lang. I do, sir. I know of none that were intended for 
the African area.
    Senator McCarthy. Are they all related to Europe?
    Senator Symington. 30 to Europe?
    Senator McCarthy. I understand there were about three ships 
to supply a division which would mean ten divisions somewhere 
around the world that was going to be supplied when the full 
plan--I assume when the full plan became operative, and I am 
sure we did not plan to have ten divisions in Europe.
    We do not have to press this, but when we were talking 30 
ships, was it three to supply a division or was it more than 
that?
    Mr. Lang. I do not know, sir.
    Senator McCarthy. I thought it was three was my 
recollection. Was it three or was it more than that?
    In any case, they were asking for three, and I assume they 
had to supply divisions somewhere because we do not move----
    Mr. Palmer. I would like to make it clear in this 
connection----
    Senator McCarthy. In any case there was no plan to have 
these ships lie off the coast of South Africa or Somalia.
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir. Our basic policy remains as stated by 
Secretary McNamara when he appeared before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on the 
Department of Defense Appropriations. He said that ``We have 
made it clear that our policy is to avoid active military 
involvement in Africa, and we will exert all our influence to 
achieve peaceful resolution of these problems.''
    This remains very much our policy in this part of Africa 
and all over the continent. We do not want to get militarily 
involved.

                       SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

    Senator Carlson. Getting back to Rhodesia, press dispatches 
and reports from overseas, at least, indicate that the 
sanctions of Great Britain are not bringing any results, that 
they are going to fail. Have you any plans as to what we should 
do if they do fail because we are committed to them?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I do not think it is demonstrable yet, 
Senator, that they will fail.
    Senator Carlson. I see.
    Mr. Palmer. The program of voluntary sanctions that 
preceded the program of mandatory sanctions has had 
considerable effect. Granted that it is difficult to get good 
large figures. Nevertheless, I think the indications are that 
exports from Rhodesia dropped from about $400 million to about 
$224 million in 1966, which is about a 40 percent drop. It is 
expected that under the mandatory sanctions program they will 
probably drop another $55 million in the first five months of 
this year.
    It is estimated that the gross domestic product of Rhodesia 
has fallen by about 15 percent in 1966, and there will probably 
be a further drop of about 10 percent this year.
    I would say the two key products really are tobacco and 
sugar. So far as tobacco is concerned, about 60 percent of last 
year's crop remains unsold. The government has had to buy this 
and has to store it, and this has created considerable 
financial strains on the government.
    As this year's crop, which is already being reduced as a 
result, comes in and does not find a market, this will increase 
the pressures.
    The hope is, of course, that this will bring the Rhodesian 
Government back to the negotiating table again and that it will 
be possible to obtain a peaceful resolution of this problem.
    Senator Carlson. Are efforts being made to do that?
    Mr. Palmer. To negotiate?
    Senator Carlson. Bring them back to the negotiating table.
    Mr. Palmer. I do not think there are any active efforts 
right at the moment, but it is certainly in everybody's mind.

               SETTLING RHODESIA MATTER THROUGH THE U.N.

    Senator McCarthy. Could I ask Mr. Palmer just on this one 
point, Senator Hickenlooper, and I will recognize you next.
    Is there any reason why Acheson's position was answered by 
Goldberg and not the Secretary of State or the State 
Department?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, because I think that the major 
argumentation that was adducted by Mr. Acheson really ran to 
positions that were taken in the United Nations.
    Senator McCarthy. Does it mean we want to try to settle it 
through the United Nations rather than by direct intervention?
    Mr. Palmer. That is correct.
    Senator McCarthy. This does not reflect a division in the 
State Department which could not be presented in a statement by 
the Secretary?
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir. These are positions which Ambassador 
Goldberg had taken as our representative.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What was the reason given or the 
reasons taken by the United Nations in this--granting that 
Rhodesia was recognized as a dependency or a colony of 
Britain--what business have we got in there in Britain's 
internal affairs or the United Nations either?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I think Britain does bear certain 
responsibilities to the United Nations under Article 73 of the 
Charter with respect to nonself-governing territories, and so 
that there is a U.N. interest.
    Secondly, the British themselves took the program to the--
--
    Senator Hickenlooper. In the first place, Rhodesia was 
self-governing for all intents and purposes over the years.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. Was self-governing until such time as it 
declared itself independent and at that time, at that point, 
the United Kingdom, through orders in council and so forth, 
reasserted their authority over the country. So----

                 DID THE U.S. PRESSURE BRITISH POLICY?

    Senator Symington. Always the British all over the world 
have been willing to approve the caste system of a country in 
order to control it up until they began losing countries. They 
have no basic color problem like we have in this country. Were 
their policies in Rhodesia originally formulated or developed 
under our coaching while the pound was in very serious trouble 
as in Henry Brandon's book, ``In the Red,'' for example, 
showing how twice we fished them out?
    Did we put any pressure on Great Britain with respect to 
her policies in Rhodesia, or were they all Mr. Wilson's ideas 
as to how they should be handled?
    Mr. Palmer. They were not only Mr. Wilson's ideas but his 
predecessors, I guess, as well, Senator.
    Senator Symington. There has been no pressure on our part.
    Mr. Palmer. There has been no pressure on our part. The 
whole concept of the Central African Federation, the federation 
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, when that still was in being, was a 
British concept.
    Senator Symington. I am just being educated. I have no 
criticism, no implied criticism in any sense.
    One other question.
    Mr. Palmer. We approved that.

                        THE STABILITY OF AFRICA

    Senator Symington. Do you think, based on your saying in 
answer to Senator Hickenlooper it is not going too well, do you 
think the British are going to bring Rhodesia to their knees in 
due course?
    Mr. Palmer. I could not say that with any confidence, 
Senator. I think only time is going to prove whether this 
happens or not.
    Senator Symington. Do you think it would be a good thing 
for the stability of Africa if they do?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. I think it would be a good thing if they 
came back to constitutional rule.
    Senator Hickenlooper. If the Rhodesians came back to 
constitutional rule.
    Senator Symington. My question was will it bring Rhodesia 
to their knees.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What do you mean by constitutional 
rule?
    Mr. Palmer. Not to their knees, Senator. If they came back 
into constitutional rule, and if they would agree to guarantees 
that would result in unimpeded progress toward majority rule.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I do not understand what you mean by 
constitutional rule. There was no constitutional rule in 
Rhodesia about one-man one-vote business down there at all, was 
there?
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What constitutional rule do you want 
them to come back to?
    Mr. Palmer. When I say constitutional rule, I mean come 
back into their association with Great Britain.

                       DUAL FRANCHISE IN RHODESIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. I see. Well, the only two viable 
economies, really progressively developing viable economies in 
all of Africa, I do not care where you go, are Rhodesia and 
South Africa. It seems to me we are doing everything we can to 
alienate them, to discourage them and to discourage their 
further development, and I think both of them are trying to 
make progress with some success.
    They do not have apartheid in Rhodesia by law. They have 
franchise, as I understand it, which anybody can qualify for, 
black or white. It does not make any difference what it is.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, but it is a dual franchise, Senator, 
whereby the Africans can only qualify. In practice the great 
bulk of Africans, because of educational and income 
qualifications, can only qualify for the B roll.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is right, but when they get the 
income and educational qualifications, they qualify just the 
same as the white man qualifies with education and income 
qualifications. Is that not true?
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, they can theoretically, but the 
qualifications----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I am not talking theoretically, but 
legally.
    Mr. Palmer. But the qualifications are put pretty high.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, $300 a year income or something 
like that, and certain minimal level of education, and it 
really applies to the white man.
    I am told that more land in South Africa is owned by blacks 
than white, or in Rhodesia, is owned by blacks than white.
    Mr. Palmer. It is about evenly divided there.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They have a land reform program going 
there, and as fast as these people will take the education and 
the training, they get land, and so on.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, a lot of these things, I think, 
get lost in what the Rhodesians say and in what they do.

                     MISINFORMATION ABOUT RHODESIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. I am not going on what the Rhodesians 
say. I am going on what citizens from Iowa who have been down 
there say. We have had several of them down there, and some 
other places, and the most recent one was a man who is not 
connected with government, and not connected with my state, but 
has spent a great deal of time in Rhodesia and Zambia. He said 
it is just unbelievable the misinformation which we get here in 
this country about that situation, and nothing about the 
slaughter in Zambia, that is the murders and the mass killings 
in Zambia and the revolts there. Also, for instance, he said in 
Rhodesia for 60 years the policemen have not carried pistols or 
guns. They have got peace there, and people are satisfied. They 
are making progress, and yet we kick them in the teeth.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave now.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I have to, too.
    Senator Symington. If the Senator would yield, I would like 
to ask a couple of questions.

                        MILITARY SALES IN AFRICA

    Mr. Chairman, if it was in order, I would like to ask 
unanimous consent that we have the amount of military sales 
and/or gifts that we have made on the continent of Africa in 
the last five years. Could we have a listing of that so we get 
a feel for it?
    Mr. Lang. Certainly, sir.
    Senator Symington. That would include such countries as 
Nigeria and Liberia; some of it I am sure is small, but I think 
it might be interesting to note how it has been handled on that 
basis.
    Mr. Lang. Fine, sir. This for the past five years?
    Senator Symington. We will make it ten years if you want. 
That will cover the whole development.
    Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.

                     UNREALISTIC PROGRAMS IN AFRICA

    Senator Hickenlooper. I feel we have been undergoing for 
some years a calculated and a definite program--I may be wrong 
about this--of what we call liberty in Africa which is just as 
unrealistic as it can be. But we have it on our hands now, and 
all these little tribes with two huts and four yak tails have 
gained independence.
    Mr. Palmer. Well Senator, there is no doubt about it, the 
continent is going through an extremely difficult period.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We have to live with it and try to 
solve it.
    Mr. Palmer. A difficult period of time.
    I would like to say, if I could, just in response to 
several things that you have said, that I think that there are 
black African states also who are making good progress towards 
economic development and social development. I think the Ivory 
Coast is certainly a good example of this. Tunisia, I think, is 
a good example.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, you cannot say Tunisia is black 
Africa. It is Arab.
    Mr. Palmer. No. But I am just saying of independent Africa. 
Kenya is making good progress.
    Senator Hickenlooper. So long as Kenyatta stays in there 
maybe we have some hope, but the old man is going to die some 
day.
    Mr. Palmer. But only a few years ago a lot of the Europeans 
in Kenya were saying, ``You know we can never stay in Kenya 
because of Kenyatta.'' Now these same people are saying, ``We 
are worried about what is going to happen if something happens 
to Kenyatta.''
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, we were going to have a great 
time in Tanzania with Nyerere, too, but it has gone about as 
far left as it can go down the drain and it is a most 
disappointing place.
    The Congo is a chaos and still is.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, I would like to speak to the 
Congo, if I could, because I think there are some encouraging 
developments that are taking place.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, everything is always 
encouraging, I realize that, when we are projecting ourselves 
into the picture.
    Mr. Palmer. No, we have lots of discouraging ones, and I 
would be delighted to talk about those, too.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Nigeria is having its troubles.
    Mr. Palmer. Nigeria is having terrible troubles, and it is 
a very anxious situation.

                   THE BASIS OF U.S. POLICY IS COLOR

    Senator Hickenlooper. We are trying to chase the Portuguese 
out of Angola, and so far as I can find out the Angolans do not 
want them to be chased out. But we may chase them; we may 
prevail there.
    Mr. Palmer. I think it is very difficult to ascertain what 
the Africans want in Angola. It is very difficult to find out.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We are going to teach them what they 
want. I do not know.
    Of course Ethiopia is a great self-determining country. I 
think they have one man--one vote there. One man is the 
emperor.
    Senator McCarthy. I think they only have one vote.
    Senator Hickenlooper. One vote, a great ally of ours.
    Mr. Palmer. But I think the fundamental difference here is, 
Senator, none of the distinctions are drawn on color except 
when you get down into this area.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is drawn on color. I think 
the basis of our policy in Africa is color and probably to 
affect American elections.
    Mr. Palmer. No.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think there is an awfully lot to 
that. I think there is a lot of humanity in what we are trying 
to do, too.
    Mr. Palmer. There is.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think there is a lot of it, but I 
think there is an awfully lot to influence American elections 
based on color. Otherwise, there are a lot of things that we 
would not need to do if we wanted to really promote these 
things on the basis of long-range, sound, progressive policies.
    I am not blaming you for this, do not misunderstand that.

                   HARDENING OF ATTITUDES IN RHODESIA

    Mr. Palmer. I would like to send you, Senator, if I may, a 
copy of a recent speech that I have given on Rhodesia that 
will, I hope, explain some of our concerns about the internal 
situation in Rhodesia. I have lived there for two years, 
Senator, and I must say I saw just one tremendous gap in what 
people professed and what people did, such things as the Land 
Apportionment Act. It does divide the land almost equally 
between 220,000 whites and 4 million Africans. This is not the 
whole story either, because I saw European grazing land being 
burned off because of the fact that it was excess to the 
grazing requirements, and just across the road saw African 
cattle being slaughtered because the land could not support 
them.
    Now, believe me, I am not a revolutionary on matters of 
this kind, and I know perfectly well that there is capital and 
skills and so forth that have gone into these European 
enterprises that are extremely important to the development of 
that country in that part of the world.
    To my mind, the important thing in that part of the world 
is to try to create an atmosphere that is going to enable the 
European to stay there and to continue to play his part in the 
development of the country. I think this is vital in South 
Africa, too.
    But I am convinced, too, Senator, that unless there is more 
movement, and again let me emphasize I am not saying immediate 
independence by any means----
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is what we are moving toward. Is 
that not the whole connotation of what we are doing instead of 
working along with these people to bring them up to the point 
where there will be some responsible government there?
    Mr. Palmer. But this is the problem, Senator, in Southern 
Rhodesia, that the trend has not been in that direction. The 
trend has been entirely in the opposite direction.
    If you go back to Garfield Todd when he was prime minister 
about eight years ago, ten years ago, I guess it is now, they 
were trying to work on a policy of partnership. He was too 
liberal for the white Rhodesians, and he was replaced by Edgar 
Whitehead. Edward Whitehead again tried to do something about 
the Land Apportionment Act, and he was replaced because of this 
effort by Winston Field who was further to his right.
    Winston Field in turn was replaced by Ian Smith.
    Again the whole trend in Rhodesia has been toward the right 
and not toward cooperation amongst the races, but to a 
hardening of attitude among the races.
    Now it is quite true----

                           TROUBLE IN ZAMBIA

    Senator Hickenlooper. What is happening in Zambia?
    Mr. Palmer. In Zambia there is trouble on the Copper Belt, 
but a lot of this trouble arises from both communities. It is 
not only from the black community but it is from the white 
community. A lot of the problem in Zambia is that in the Copper 
Belt a great many of the whites come from Rhodesia and come 
from the Union of South Africa. So that----
    Senator Hickenlooper. How many whites have they got in 
Zambia?
    Mr. Palmer. They have got about 70,000 or 80,000, I think, 
at the present time. And I do not think that the fault all lies 
on one side or all lies on the other, but Kaunda has had as a 
basic tenet of his policy to try to encourage, to try to 
promote good race relations in Zambia. He has tried just as 
hard as Kenyatta has in Kenya.
    One of the great dangers----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Does he not claim he is the captive 
of the revolutionary group in----
    Mr. Palmer. No, sir. I think Kaunda is still very much of 
an independent and very much devoted, both in words and in 
actions, to good race relations in Zambia.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think so. I do not mean that.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes. But the problem is that on both sides, 
because of the Rhodesian problem, relationships amongst the two 
races in Zambia are beginning to polarize, and this is one of 
our great concerns about this. If this continues in Zambia, it 
continues in Tanzania. It goes up further into East Africa, and 
the same thing happens on the other extreme in South Africa. 
You will have a polarization along racial lines that will 
result increasingly in the thing that is to be avoided, I 
think, at all costs, and that is a racial confrontation in 
Africa. This is what the direction of our efforts and I think 
the direction of the British efforts have been intended to help 
prevent.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I have taken too much time.
    Senator McCarthy. I think probably we will have another 
session on these in-between countries we have not taken up.

                         COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

    What about Tanzania? What is the situation? Do you see the 
Communist infiltration there as significant in terms of other 
countries?
    Mr. Palmer. In Tanzania?
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    Mr. Palmer. It is significant.
    Senator McCarthy. Beyond that country or just within the 
country itself?
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I think the influence is strongest in 
Zanzibar, less strong, I would say, on the mainland, but I 
would like to add to that that I think that Nyerere is still 
very much of an independent African, and I do not think that he 
is under any sort of control or likely to allow himself to be 
placed under a position of control.
    He does have certain ideas, certain concepts that I would 
be critical of. He is a socialist. He wants to move Tanzania in 
a socialist direction. I do not think he wants to move it in a 
Communist direction. He has resorted to extensive 
nationalization of the banks, of export-import houses, and to 
other enterprises, particularly in the agricultural field, and 
I think there is no doubt about it. He has, however, promised 
to pay compensation for these.
    It remains to be seen what--how this is going to work out 
in practice, whether it will be--whether it will accord to our 
criteria of being full and fair and prompt.
    Senator McCarthy. He sat right in that chair shortly before 
independence, this one right there, that spot, with a few of us 
in here talking to him--in fact he was here twice, and he gave 
the most stirring private enterprise discussion you ever heard 
of in your life. He has apparently changed his mind 180 
degrees.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, there are----
    Senator McCarthy. And I just think basically he believed 
what he said when he was here, but I think that he possibly was 
taken into camp with this fellow from Zanzibar or whoever it 
was who took him over.
    Mr. Palmer. Senator, I know that this is a theory, and----
    Senator McCarthy. Well, somebody took him over from 
Zanzibar.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I think a lot of it derives from the fact 
that resources have been slow in coming into Tanzania. I think 
he has been struck with the great disparity between the civil 
servants and people who live in the urban areas, and those who 
live in the rural areas.
    Incidentally, all of his program of nationalization has 
also been accompanied by some very stringent measures to place 
restrictions--to cut down government salaries, to place 
restrictions on ownings by civil servants, and other steps of 
this kind, and I think--I am sure he is taking an ill-advised 
step here. But I think he has done it essentially for Tanzania 
and reasons that this is the path to take and that Tanzania has 
got to look increasingly to its own resources for its 
development and less to external aid.
    Senator McCarthy. I think we had better finish up this 
hearing.

                       MILITARY TROOPS IN AFRICA

    Could you submit for the record a list of the countries in 
which we have military aid troops in Africa and the extent of 
those missions if they are not classified?
    Mr. Lang. Right, sir.
    Senator McCarthy. And also that aid program as it is now 
contemplated and recommended. I assume it is all in the budget 
somewhere. If you can take it out and send it up to us for the 
record, I would appreciate it.
    I appreciate very much your coming up. I do not know 
whether you feel better now that there is an African 
subcommittee which has been reactivated here or not. We 
probably will have to wait and see, and maybe worry along with 
you. It may be worse instead of better.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, we have a lot of problems, and I 
myself greatly welcome the fact that this committee is active 
again. I think it is terribly important that we talk about our 
mutual concerns, and I do want you to know that I am always at 
your disposition and delighted to have these opportunities.

                         CONFUSING INFORMATION

    Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is a highly complicated 
political, economic, and social problem. There is no question 
about that. But I am not so sure that what we are doing in 
Africa, that is the whole pattern, the whole complex, is 
necessarily bringing us out on the right road. It may and it 
may not. We have to rely upon two different sources of 
information, those who are on the ground and see it and who are 
not connected with government, and very often those who are 
connected with government on the other side, and sometimes the 
information does not quite dovetail.
    Mr. Palmer. No, I know that.
    Senator McCarthy. It is very, very confusing. I have some 
letters in my file from people, as I say, in my own state who 
have been over there.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, I know.
    Senator McCarthy. And I have letters from others, and so 
on. Some of these people I know personally. Others, I do not. 
But these are good people; they are honest people. Maybe they 
are not trained observers, but they simply cannot understand 
it. They know what the problem is in a way. They know there is 
a racial problem involved, but they seem to have the feeling 
that if we gave as much patience to some of these as we do to 
others we might be able to work it out.
    Mr. Palmer. I think, Senator, if I would say so, I would 
hope in--and in some cases I know this has been done--but I 
think to understand South Africa and to understand Southern 
Rhodesia, somebody also has to have some exposure to the other 
states in the area in East Africa and West Africa. The reverse 
of this is equally true.
    I have had experience. I had four years in East Africa, and 
I have two years in Rhodesia. I had three and a half years in 
West Africa, in Nigeria, and I think that, as you quite rightly 
say, people who are in government oftentimes get a limited 
point of view.
    Senator McCarthy. They may be right. I do not say they are 
wrong.
    Mr. Palmer. I know that. But many of these problems do tend 
to merge, and what happens one place inevitably affects 
another, and you do have a problem of integrity of policy and 
you cannot profess certain things in some areas and not in 
other areas. So all of this does present a very complicated 
mosaic, I quite agree, and there are no easy or ready answers 
to any of these problems.
    Senator Hickenlooper. May I just ask one more question?
    Senator McCarthy. Right.

                 SURROUNDING RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

    Senator Hickenlooper. Do you have any sensing that there is 
a long-range policy in this country to surround Rhodesia and 
South Africa by other states such as taking over Southwest 
Africa and, Mozambique, and Zambia and so on, and squeezing out 
South Africa?
    Mr. Palmer. I can----
    Senator Hickenlooper. And Rhodesia.
    Mr. Palmer. I can assure you categorically, Senator, that 
there is no such thought or no such effort within the United 
States Government that I am aware of. There may be individuals 
in the United States. I am sure there are.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Oh, probably.
    Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Probably. We had the reconstruction 
people right after the Civil War that wanted to kill everybody.
    Mr. Palmer. But as I indicated earlier, I think one of the 
major tasks here is to assure things develop in that part of 
the world so that everybody in the society plays their full 
role in the development of the society.
    Senator McCarthy. We will make the whole record classified. 
If there is anything that you want to send up----
    Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
    Senator McCarthy [continuing]. We will be glad to classify 
the whole record if you want it that way.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes.
    Senator McCarthy. Anything else you might send up will be 
subject to that reservation.
    Mr. Palmer. Thank you.
    Senator McCarthy. We will not call you in two or three 
weeks.
    Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to 
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
         Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Hickenlooper and 
Carlson.
    Discussion with Pat M. Holt of the committee staff 
regarding a survey of the Alliance for Progress.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 11:25 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                    Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case and Cooper.
    S.J. Res. 60, an original resolution regarding the Latin 
American Summit Conference, was ordered reported by roll call 
vote, 9-0. It was decided by a voice vote to make public the 
proceedings of the meeting.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]


               ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

    [Editor's Note.--In 1965, when India and Pakistan clashed 
over their claims to Kashmir, the United States suspended arms 
shipments to both countries. The next year, it resumed shipment 
of ``non-lethal'' equipment. Concerned over an escalating arms 
race, the State Department announced on April 12, 1967 that the 
U.S. would cease shipping military weapons to both countries, 
except for spare parts for weapons already in their possession. 
However, lifting the ban on spare parts aided Pakistan, whose 
armed forces were largely supplied with American-made weapons, 
in contrast to India, which relied on British- and Soviet-made 
weapons.]
                              ----------                              


                        Wednesday, April 5, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
       Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
             Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Symington, Sparkman, McCarthy, and 
Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee 
staff.
    Senator Symington. We will call the Subcommittee on Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs to order.
    Mr. Handley, your first name is William, is it not, sir?

  STATEMENT OF HONORABLE WILLIAM J. HANDLEY, ACTING ASSISTANT 
  SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And your title?
    Mr. Handley. Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Near East 
and South Asia.
    Senator Symington. We wish to ask some questions about aid 
to India and to Pakistan, primarily Pakistan.
    As I understand it, all aid to India and Pakistan was 
suspended in December of 1965 as one means of bringing the war 
between the two countries to a halt; is that correct?
    Mr. Handley. September of 1965, sir.
    Senator Symington. September of 1965. And following the 
Tashkent Agreement, however, which I believe was January 10, 
1966----
    Mr. Handley. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Symington. [continuing]. The President authorized a 
relaxation of the total ban of military shipments to both India 
and Pakistan, permitting some commercial and MAP credit sales 
of non-lethal military equipment; is that right?
    Mr. Handley. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Symington. John, any time you would like to 
interrupt, please do.
    Senator Cooper. Thank you.

                          NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT

    Senator Symington. You may interrupt at any time or you may 
comment as you would like.
    As I understand it, the Department of Defense defines non-
lethal as follows: Trucks, trailers, miscellaneous wheeled 
vehicles and spares; communications, radar and signal 
equipment; transport, observation and trainer aircraft; unarmed 
helicopters, support equipment and spares; engineering 
equipment and machine tools; medical and quartermaster 
equipment; and training equipment. Is that correct?
    Mr. Handley. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Symington. Those are lethal?
    Mr. Handley. Non-lethal.
    Senator Symington. Non-lethal; I meant non-lethal.
    Suppose you furnish a helicopter without any armament. You 
could make it lethal by putting armaments on it after you 
received it, correct?
    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir. As you could with a Jeep, which we 
consider non-lethal.
    Senator Symington. So the term is fairly technical, is it 
not?
    Mr. Handley. Well, it excludes fighter aircraft; it 
excludes ammunition.
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Handley. It excludes guns, armored personnel carriers, 
tanks, things of that kind.
    Senator Symington. All right.

                            LETHAL EQUIPMENT

    Now, lethal items, as I understand it, are defined as 
combat aircraft and armed helicopters, armed or armored 
vehicles, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers; 
infantry weapons, artillery and ammunition; and spare parts in 
support of all the foregoing items; is that correct?
    Mr. Handley. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Symington. Of course, you could have an unarmed 
personnel carrier, and all you have to do is arm it, and it 
becomes lethal, is that it?
    Mr. Handley. Actually we have defined armored personnel 
carriers as being lethal.
    Senator Symington. What I am thinking of is you could buy 
one unarmed, and they could buy the guns from Russia and put 
them together, and you would have a lethal weapon, right?
    Mr. Handley. Except we are not selling that type of 
equipment.
    Senator Symington. You sell an unarmed personnel carrier 
though, do you not?
    Mr. Handley. I'm afraid I might be a little bit out of my 
depth on the defense side, but I do not know what an unarmed 
personnel carrier is. They usually are called armored personnel 
carriers.
    Senator Symington. All right.
    Just for the record, I want the record straight as we 
pursue this subject.

                  PAKISTAN REQUESTED RELAXATION OF BAN

    Operating under these restrictions, it is our understanding 
that Pakistan asked to buy transport aircraft and spares, 
unarmed helicopters, communications equipment, hand tools and 
trucks, and that the further relaxation of the President's ban 
on military equipment to Pakistan lifts the restriction on 
spare parts for so-called lethal items listed above.
    Mr. Handley. That is correct, but it is broader than that.
    Senator Symington. All right.
    Mr. Handley. May I----
    Senator Symington. You say it any way you like to.
    Mr. Handley. Since September 1965, when Secretary Rusk told 
the House and Senate that new economic aid and military aid 
shipments to India and Pakistan would be suspended, we have 
gradually resumed economic aid as you pointed out, sir. We have 
resumed the sale of non-lethal equipment as has been defined on 
a case-by-case basis, every case being specifically examined.
    We find at this particular moment, after having studied and 
pondered this problem for a very long time, that perhaps the 
best thing that the United States could do in the interest of 
arms limitation, limitation of the expenditures on the defense 
side, relaxation of tensions in the subcontinent, and a better 
application of resources toward economic and agricultural 
development, would be to modify somewhat our present extremely 
restrictive arms policy.
    The policy we are proposing will still be restrictive and 
will be scrutinized most carefully.

                  REMOVAL OF FORMAL MILITARY MISSIONS

    This policy has the following elements in it: We will at 
the appropriate moment in the next few weeks pull out our 
formal military missions in India and Pakistan. In their place, 
we will have a small team working with the Ambassador, but not 
as a formal military mission, which will carry out requirements 
for inspection, advice to the Ambassador and advice to the 
government in terms of procurement of items.
    Senator Symington. When you say you will pull out a 
military team and put somebody in its place, will the people 
you put in their place be military people?
    Mr. Handley. Yes, they will be military.
    Senator Symington. How many military people have you got in 
India now?
    Mr. Handley. We have moved from about a hundred in each 
country down to about twenty, and we see something probably in 
the neighborhood of ten in each country, officers and men.
    Senator Symington. What is the highest rank of the ones you 
have got there now?
    Mr. Handley. The highest rank we have there is a major 
general.
    Senator Symington. What will you have in the future?
    Mr. Handley. I would think a one star general as a lead man 
for prestige purposes, for contact purposes, supported by two 
or three officers and several enlisted men.
    Senator Symington. Senator Sparkman, if you have comments 
or questions at any time, please interrupt. I just want to make 
this record, and please interrupt at any time.
    Senator Sparkman. Go ahead.
    Senator Symington. Not interrupt, just please ask any time.
    Mr. Handley. We have----

                       DEFINING MILITARY MISSIONS

    Senator Symington. Let us get back on track. You are making 
a statement, and we appreciate it. But, as I understand it, you 
are talking about reducing the number of military people in 
India and Pakistan, and I was talking about selling spare parts 
of lethal weapons to Pakistan.
    Mr. Handley. Yes, that is right.
    Senator Symington. Would you tie them together?
    Mr. Handley. I will tie them together, sir.
    Senator Symington. All right.
    Mr. Handley. One of the first steps we will take is to 
change our military missions in India and Pakistan to very 
small advisory groups under the Ambassador.
    Senator Symington. Well now, clear me up.
    Mr. Handley. A military mission----
    Senator Symington. What is the difference between a 
military mission and a smaller military group?
    Mr. Handley. A military mission has a special role with the 
local government in terms of training; it is accredited to the 
local government. The government provides quarters for them, 
and the rest.
    Under the setup that we envisage, which still has to be 
worked out in all the details, we will no longer have what is 
known as a military mission. In other words our physical 
military presence in both India and Pakistan will be 
substantially reduced.
    Senator Symington. The way you plan this in the future, is 
all of this planning, you have sold yet no spare parts or 
given----
    Mr. Handley. No, sir.

                           A PROPOSED CHANGE

    Senator Symington. This is just a proposed change, is that 
it?
    Mr. Handley. It is a proposed change which we hope to 
inaugurate within the next few days.
    Senator Symington. And you are discussing that with us, is 
that right?
    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And the proposed change is to ship spare 
parts for lethal equipment, is that correct?
    Mr. Handley. May I put it another way, sir. We are going to 
continue to take the most restrictive view of the sale of spare 
parts for previously supplied American equipment in India and 
Pakistan. And there will only be sales. There will be no 
grants.
    Senator Symington. Lethal?
    Mr. Handley. Lethal.
    Senator Symington. Have we sold much lethal equipment to 
India?
    Mr. Handley. Not very much, sir. We have sold guns, 
recoilless rifles, and machine guns, but it has been largely 
communication equipment, transport equipment, and the like.
    Senator Symington. All right.
    Mr. Handley. But, as you know, since 1954 we have been the 
major supplier of across-the-board military equipment to 
Pakistan, and ever since 1954 it probably has amounted to $720 
million, $730 million total.
    Now, as I was saying about spare parts, our policy will be 
to entertain on a case-by-case basis requests for the sale of 
spare parts for previously supplied U.S. military equipment. We 
will approve these only where we are convinced that the sale of 
these spare parts will not add to the defense expenditures of 
the country and will, in the larger sense, be helpful in arms 
limitation. So that is the second point of our proposal.

                        SALES BY THIRD COUNTRIES

    The third aspect is that we have up to now attempted to 
enforce a plan--I would not say we have been completely 
successful on this--on the sale by third countries of surplus 
American equipment to India and Pakistan.
    We will continue to discourage the sale by third countries 
of surplus American equipment to India and Pakistan, but we 
will examine special cases where we believe that the sale of 
this equipment might, in fact, result in arms limitation or 
reduction of defense expenditures.
    Let me give you a hypothetical case.
    Senator Symington. Don't give us a hypothetical case; give 
us a case that has resulted in your change of policy.

                           TANKS FOR PAKISTAN

    Mr. Handley. Well, we are facing at the moment the question 
of tanks for Pakistan. It is quite clear that Pakistan has been 
seeking in the last few months through third countries, through 
Iran, through sales, purchases, the possibility of purchases in 
Germany, to buy a number of tanks which are surplus in Germany.
    The figures here have ranged anywhere from 50 to 600 in 
terms of requests. At the same time, we know that Pakistan is 
also shopping for tanks elsewhere in Western Europe, new tanks.
    If it is possible to sell Pakistan X number, what it is I 
do not know at this point, which in fact would be accompanied 
by a phasing out in Pakistan of old tanks, and if this would 
discourage Pakistan from going out and paying a lot of money 
for new equipment, then we might look somewhat favorably on 
such a transaction.
    Senator Symington. On what kind of a transaction?
    Mr. Handley. A transaction permitting the sale by Germany, 
let us say, of a certain number of tanks to Pakistan if in our 
judgment this would be accompanied by a resulting phasing out 
in Pakistan of old tanks, and would be enough of an incentive 
to Pakistan to prevent it from going out into the open market 
and buying new expensive, and perhaps even more modern tanks, 
such as might in fact escalate the arms race in the 
subcontinent.
    Senator McCarthy. May I ask a question?
    Senator Symington. Senator McCarthy, will you, please, at 
any time.

                COMPARISON OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI TANKS

    Senator McCarthy. Is the Indian tank considered superior to 
the Pakistan tank?
    Mr. Handley. The Indians are making their own tanks. They 
have a line of tanks and they have, of course, Soviet tanks, as 
well. It probably, of course is, Senator McCarthy, that the 
Indians have in their inventory a variety of tanks, but they 
have been moving more towards making their own tanks, which is 
a Centurion type which would be the equivalent of the Pakistan 
tank.
    Senator McCarthy. Did they find the Centurions were 
superior to the tanks the Pakistanis used in the war?
    Mr. Handley. I do not think----
    Senator McCarthy. At least the Pakistani fighters came off 
well.
    Mr. Handley. I think it was a matter of tactics to a large 
extent, although I hope the other side would never hear me say 
this.
    Senator McCarthy. I have heard some of the military people 
explain that. If that is the case, why would we want Pakistan 
to have better tanks, if they have better tanks, even as 
incompetent as the operators were of the Indian tanks, and----
    Mr. Handley. What we were talking about in the case before 
us are some M-47 tanks which are not even as good as the M-48 
tanks. The Pakistanis have the most modern Pattons in their 
inventory, but these would be better than some of the M-4 tanks 
that date back many, many years, which might be replaced.
    Senator McCarthy. You think with good operators this 
inferior tank would be more than a match for----
    Mr. Handley. You know the Indians did pretty well with some 
of their old Sherman tanks, too.
    Senator McCarthy. Yes. How do you equalize this thing? I 
mean, how do you explain why the Pakistanis with our tanks and 
with our tank instructors were not able to stand off the 
Indians with inferior tanks and British instructors, I assume?
    Mr. Handley. Well, I am not that much of a military man, 
sir, to explain that. It sure happened.
    Senator McCarthy. It sure happened.

                    SALE OF GERMAN TANKS TO PAKISTAN

    Senator Symington. Let me ask you then what we are talking 
about now is the sale of German tanks to Pakistan, is that 
correct?
    Mr. Handley. That is the specific case that is before us at 
the moment.
    Senator Symington. Is there going to be a sale by the 
German government to Pakistan or a private corporation?
    Mr. Handley. That is a good question. The Germans 
approached us on this back last year, and I discussed this with 
the Germans. They had a team over here and I discussed it, and 
I told them our policy was not to supply, to give permission 
for tanks to be shipped to the subcontinent at that time, and 
this coincided pretty much with the way the German government 
was feeling.
    Senator Symington. You lost me. My question is are you 
going to sell it through the government or are you going to 
sell it through a private company?
    Mr. Handley. I do not know.
    Senator Symington. That is what I want to know.
    Mr. Handley. I do not know because the first request we had 
was the German government came to us and asked us to do this. 
In the meantime----
    Senator Symington. To do what?
    Mr. Handley. To permit the sale of a number of M-47 tanks 
to Iran.
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Handley. Now, in the meantime, we have found, of course 
that----
    Senator Symington. The Germans came to you and asked that 
you sell some 47 tanks to Iran.
    Mr. Handley. That we permit Germany to sell.
    Senator Symington. Permit Germany to sell.
    Mr. Handley. M-47 tanks to Iran.
    Senator Symington. Right.
    Mr. Handley. And based on the experience we had, the 
Canadians and the Germans had, with the sale of F-85's to Iran, 
there were reasonable grounds for belief exactly as to where 
these tanks would go.
    Senator Symington. Right.

                             SALES TO IRAN

    Mr. Handley. We have now in the Office of Munitions Control 
a request from a firm for permission to sell spare parts for 
tanks to Iran up to 600 of these tanks, and we have had 
reports--this is through a private organization.
    Senator Symington. What private organization?
    Mr. Handley. This particular one is called Levy.
    Senator Symington. How do you spell it?
    Mr. Handley. L-e-v-y.
    Senator Symington. Is it owned in Germany?
    Mr. Handley. This is a Canadian owned company, as I 
understand, which is tied in, as I understand it--I am not 
completely sure because it is very difficult to sort out some 
of the relationships with the arms people of the world--with 
the Merex Company.
    Senator Symington. I hope it is as difficult for them to 
sort it out as it is to us.
    Senator McCarthy. Is that the same company that sold the F-
86's?
    Mr. Handley. The Merex Company.
    Senator McCarthy. Is that a real company?
    Mr. Handley. Yes, it is.
    Senator Symington. Is that a Canadian company?
    Mr. Handley. Levy may have a connection with Merex. As of 
this moment I cannot tell you exactly what this is. I am still 
trying.
    Senator Symington. The Canadian company is Levy?
    Mr. Handley. Levy.
    Senator Symington. And they may have a connection with 
Merex?
    Mr. Handley. They may have a connection with Merex.
    Senator Symington. Do you know who owns the stock of these 
companies?
    Mr. Handley. No.
    Senator Symington. You do not know whether Canadians or 
Germans or Americans or who own any of the stock?
    Mr. Handley. I do not. Merex, I assume, is a German 
company.
    Senator Symington. Well, but you do not know who owns the 
stock.
    Mr. Handley. No.
    Senator Symington. It could be owned by the Swiss or the 
Greeks or anybody.
    Mr. Handley. It could be. I really do not have--I do not 
know, sir.
    Senator McCarthy. Could someone in the State Department 
give us a line?
    Mr. Handley. I am digging into it as best I can. It is a 
cobweb.
    Senator McCarthy. It gets pretty interesting.
    Senator Symington. Yes, it certainly does.
    While we are on this, as I understand it, Iran has bought 
600 M-47 tanks from a private U.S. firm exporting through 
Canada. Do you know about that?
    Mr. Handley. No, sir. I believe, to my knowledge, they have 
not bought. To my knowledge, they are seeking to buy.
    Senator Symington. To buy.
    Mr. Handley. And right before us at the moment in, as I 
said, the Office of Munitions Control is a request to sell 
these tanks, and one of the----
    Senator Symington. A request from whom?
    Mr. Handley. A request from the Levy Company.
    Senator Symington. In Canada?
    Mr. Handley. In Canada, but they went to Canada first----
    Senator Symington. Levy is a Canadian company.
    Mr. Handley. That is right, but there is an American 
affiliate, as I understand it.
    Senator Symington. I see. I asked is this an American firm. 
I asked you whether it was Canadian or American.
    Mr. Handley. It is an American affiliate of a Canadian 
firm.
    Senator Symington. Is it a separate corporation from the 
Canadian?
    Mr. Handley. I will have to check.
    Senator Symington. Then the question would be have they got 
a sales office in this country or is it an incorporated 
subsidiary or co-partner in this country? I'm just speaking for 
the record. And who owns the stock of the Levy Company.
    Mr. Handley. I do not know, sir.
    Senator Symington. You do not know that?
    Mr. Handley. I do not.
    Senator Symington. Who approached you from Levy?
    Mr. Handley. They did not approach me personally.
    Senator Symington. Whom did they approach?
    Mr. Handley. There is a request now before the Office of 
Munitions Control of the Department of State.
    Senator Symington. Who made the request?
    Mr. Handley. The Levy Company.
    Senator Symington. Yes, but who is the Levy Company?
    Mr. Handley. I do not know, sir.
    Senator Symington. Give us a name, will you do that?
    Mr. Handley. I will do that.
    Senator Symington. Supply it for the record.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The record should indicate that the Office of Munitions 
Control, Department of State, now has pending an application of 
Levy Auto Parts, Inc., Dupont Circle Building, 1346 Connecticut 
Avenue, Washington, D.C. for the sale to Iran of spare parts 
for 600 M-47 tanks, and not for the sale of tanks themselves. 
The application is dated March 29, 1967 and was signed by Fred 
Williams.

    Senator McCarthy. Give us the whole procedure of how Levy 
comes from the Canadian government. Why does it have to come to 
the U.S. Government, and also who owns Merex.
    Mr. Handley. Merex is a German company.
    Senator McCarthy. How does the Canadian company come across 
here to get permission to sell? Do they have patents that 
somehow are affected? Let us have the story on it.

                   AMOUNT OF SILVER HELD IN PAKISTAN

    Can I ask two questions because I have got to go to another 
committee meeting?
    Senator Symington. Yes, indeed, please do.
    Senator McCarthy. Could you for this same record check out 
what is the best estimate that we have about the amount of 
silver or how much is held in Pakistan?
    Mr. Handley. Silver in Pakistan?
    Senator McCarthy. Since we are giving them credit, we are 
giving them wheat for nothing, the estimate of India and 
Pakistan is together they may have 7 or 8 billion dollars.
    Senator Symington. In India, they estimate they have 6 
billion ounces of silver at $1.29 an ounce.
    Senator McCarthy. And Pakistan has got, I think, about a 
third of that, if you can find out whether this is the case.
    Senator Symington. Would you do that?
    Mr. Handley. Yes.
    Senator Symington. Gene, is it all right if we have the 
estimated amount of gold that is in hoarding, too?
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    [The information referred to follows:

    The Indian Government's official gold reserves are relatively 
modest--about $240 million at the present time. No information is 
available on the official silver holdings. Various guesses have been 
made regarding the quantity of gold and silver (bullion or otherwise) 
in private hands in India, but we are not aware of any estimate by the 
Indian Government or of any reliable estimate by any other source.
    It has been traditional for the people of India to put their 
private savings into one form or another of precious metal. The Indian 
Government is trying to channel savings out of precious metals and into 
banks. Progress is being made and, as banks become more popular, the 
private demand for gold and silver should one day decrease.
    The Government of Pakistan has official gold holdings of $52.9 
million. As in the case of India, we have no information from any 
source on official silver holdings, nor any reliable estimate of 
private holdings of either gold or silver.

                          PRESSURE ON GERMANS

    Senator McCarthy. The other question is how does this tie 
into the announcement that we are not pressuring Germany to buy 
additional arms from us? Does it mean the Germans sell off 
these old tanks, and will we replace them with superior tanks? 
They announced the withdrawal of 150,000 troops. What do you 
have in mind as to selling weapons to Germany to make up for 
that withdrawal?
    Mr. Handley. I cannot say offhand whether there is any 
connection.
    Senator McCarthy. I do not want you to answer that now.
    Mr. Handley. I see. But offhand I would say so far as my 
particular headaches are concerned, these are quite apart, 
because my headaches are how to find some way to control the 
arms situation between India and Pakistan.
    Senator McCarthy. We will give you something else to 
explain to us, what they are going to do with Germany.
    Senator Symington. Let us put it this way: When we ask a 
question of you that has to do with State, that does not have 
to do with you, then you can say that you simply do not know, 
and you can supply it for the record, because we figure when we 
are talking with you we are talking to the State Department.
    Thank you, Gene.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The degree of U.S. control over military materiel of U.S. origin in 
Germany which is excess to FRG requirements depends upon the manner in 
which the FRG acquired the materiel and the proposed ultimate 
destination of the materiel. One category includes the military 
equipment acquired by the FRG through grant military assistance from 
the U.S. The FRG purchased the residual or reversionary rights to this 
materiel by agreement with the U.S. in 1962. By the terms of the 
agreement, the FRG must consult with the U.S. Government and secure our 
approval for disposition of materiel to other than NATO countries. The 
tanks in question fall in this category.
    Another category of military equipment of U.S. origin is that 
purchased by the FRG under the terms of our foreign military sales 
arrangement, which require that the FRG obtain USG concurrence prior to 
disposition to a third country, whether NATO or non-NATO. The ultimate 
destination and end-user country must be approved by the United States 
Government even when the FRG decides to make sales to a third country 
through a private munitions dealer or organization. The FRG obtains 
assurances from the third country that no transshipment will be made 
across national boundaries without consultation with, and consent of, 
the FRG; in turn, the FRG is under obligation to obtain the agreement 
of the U.S. Government in such cases.
    The FRG has agreed to purchase certain of its military equipment 
requirements from the United States to help offset the foreign exchange 
cost of maintaining U.S. military forces in Germany. However, there is 
no requirement that the FRG buy any particular equipment; it itself 
determines what it should purchase. Furthermore, we have no agreement 
with the FRG to sell or otherwise supply equipment to replace any U.S.-
origin equipment which may be disposed of by the FRG.

                  DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING SPARE PARTS

    Mr. Handley. May I continue with the general line of our 
supply policy as we see it?
    One is pull out the military missions in India and 
Pakistan. Two is to continue to take a very negative view of 
spare parts for lethal equipment unless we are quite convinced 
that this will not add to the problem.
    Senator Symington. You have mentioned that three times, at 
least, and it inspires me to ask a question. You say unless you 
are convinced. How do you obtain that conviction?
    Mr. Handley. Well, we will have to look into each case.
    Take the case of Pakistan which has 104's and B-57's for 
which they cannot really get spare parts anywhere, so far as we 
can tell. For their F-86's or for some of their tanks we have 
been able to, but for the 104's and the 57's, it is 
extraordinarily difficult to get spare parts except directly 
from the United States.
    If it reaches the point where it seems to us that the 
Pakistanis may consider just junking their 104's and 57's, and 
then going on to a new expenditure of money for new aircraft, 
and maybe more aircraft and more sophisticated aircraft, it 
might make sense to sell spare parts.
    Senator Symington. It might. But then you have a lot of 
things to consider in a case like that. For example, we are 
flying 104's today against Vietnam, so it is not an obsolete 
aircraft in any sense of the word. The question would be what 
you would get that would be more sophisticated, and the 104 is 
a major aspect of all European holdings.
    Mr. Handley. It is a temptation to get them.

                    CHANGING POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN

    Senator Symington. What it looks to us is that you are 
changing your military sales policy toward Pakistan, and 
inasmuch as India does not get this type and character of 
equipment from us, that you may not be changing it toward 
India. Is that a fair surmise?
    Mr. Handley. May I go around the line?
    Senator Symington. Well, just answer the question.
    Mr. Handley. I do not think so.
    Senator Symington. We do not sell India any aircraft.
    Mr. Handley. No, sir.
    Senator Symington. Therefore, there is no question of 
whether they would buy a more sophisticated aircraft if they 
did not buy from us.
    Mr. Handley. But India has had access to Britain, to the 
Soviet Union.
    Senator Symington. Yes. But we do not sell them any 
aircraft, so it would not be a question of spare parts.
    Mr. Handley. But what we have in mind for India in terms of 
this military supply policy, I think, is compensating in terms 
of what India needs.
    Senator Symington. Well now, are you saying that you would 
sell spare parts to India of the things that India has bought 
from us?
    Mr. Handley. Yes, but in fact it is not the same dimension.
    Senator Symington. Well, that is right; that is right. I 
know a little bit about this, too. I have been out there in 
both countries and looked at it in great detail.
    Mr. Handley. That is right. What India might want from us 
is much more on the credit sales side of certain equipment, and 
we would plan to continue the credit sales program that we have 
had.

                        A DECISION HAS BEEN MADE

    Senator Symington. I do not want to labor it with you, 
understand me, but the point is what you are doing, inasmuch as 
we have not sold any sophisticated military equipment to India 
and have sold a great deal of very sophisticated military 
equipment to Pakistan, is that you are going to sell lethal 
spare parts to keep the Pakistani sophisticated lethal 
equipment going and it does not mean very much to India whether 
we do or whether we do not do it. That is the only----
    Mr. Handley. Yes, I understand your point, sir.
    Senator Symington. That is the only inference you can draw 
from it.
    What you are doing is you have decided that you are going 
to sell spare parts to Pakistan for their sophisticated lethal 
military equipment, that you either are or are not. That is 
what is up now.
    Mr. Handley. That is the particular thing that is up now, 
yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Let me go on here just for the record a 
bit. We have just had a few points we wanted to present to you 
here by the staff which they brought up.
    In September of 1965, the Secretary of State made the 
following commitment in a message read to the House of 
Representatives:
    The United States has suspended military aid shipments to 
both India and Pakistan, in keeping with its announced policy 
of full support for the efforts of the Security Council and of 
the Secretary General. The executive branch will consult fully 
with appropriate Members of the Congress about the situation in 
the subcontinent and the conditions under which military aid 
might be resumed.
    Do you feel that is what you are doing now; you are telling 
us that military aid might be resumed?
    Mr. Handley. Actually the military aid part has been the 
credit sales for non-lethal equipment, and we consulted earlier 
on that.
    Senator Symington. All right.
    Mr. Handley. In fact, the sales, cash sales for dollars, 
cash on the barrel head for spare parts, are not aid in the 
strict sense. There are no aid funds, military aid funds, that 
will be used in that, but since it is an important policy, 
sir----
    Senator Symington. Right, I understand that. I think this 
is an important hearing. I want to make the record here and 
just so we understand what it is we are getting at.
    Secretary Rusk renewed this commitment to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on September 13 and October 13, 
1965.
    On April 20, 1966, Secretary McNamara told the Senate 
Appropriations Committee that the United States had decided to 
renew aid to Pakistan and India of ``non-lethal military 
equipment on a case-by-case basis.'' That is April 20, 1966.
    Now, during the September 13, 1965 briefing of the 
Committee on the Indian-Pakistan war, Secretary Rusk said that 
Pakistan and India had violated the law and were no longer 
eligible for assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
    Secretary McNamara testified in 1966:

    Well, I think it should be conditioned primarily on an 
understanding that Pakistan would live at peace with her neighbor, 
India, and secondarily, upon understanding that Pakistan would devote 
the majority of her own resources to what is and can be the only 
permanent foundation to stability in her own country--economic 
development. I think those two conditions should take priority over any 
others.

                      RED CHINA'S AID TO PAKISTAN

    Now, some questions we would like to ask here. According to 
the press, Pakistan has received from Red China 200 tanks and 
125 aircraft, including MIG-19's and IL-28 bombers. Do you know 
anything about that?
    Mr. Handley. On the tanks I think the figure given as far 
as our intelligence tells us is essentially accurate. I have a 
range of 170 to 230, something like that, so 200 is a fairly 
good figure.
    On the planes, I think that is high. Our figure is somewhat 
lower than that. It is a combination of IL-27's, I think. This 
is one squadron, I believe, 12, however you figure it. It may 
be two squadrons, but 12, and I think around 60 MIG-19's, 60, 
70 MIG-19's. So it is somewhat less than the total you have 
given there. But the tank figure seems essentially to 
correspond with our intelligence figures.
    Senator Symington. Now, we also understand that since the 
India-Pakistan War, Pakistan has acquired around 100 F-86's. Is 
that roughly right?
    Mr. Handley. I understand that it is around 90 that they 
presumably were able to obtain through this arrangement between 
Iran, Germany, and Canada.

                           CORPORATE INTEREST

    Senator Symington. That is the one where the Merex 
Corporation comes into it?
    Mr. Handley. The Merex Corporation comes into it.
    Senator Symington. Is the Levy Corporation in it, too?
    Mr. Handley. I do not know. I am still not sure. I go back 
again to the relationship between the Levy Corporation and the 
Merex Corporation. They may, in fact, be competitors.
    Senator Symington. Yes. But you are going to find out about 
the Merex Corporation.
    Mr. Handley. We will do the best we can, sir.
    Senator Symington. Those airplanes were sold by Canada to 
Germany?
    Mr. Handley. That is correct--no, Canada to Iran, sir. I 
beg your pardon, they were sold by Canada to Germany, and then 
Germany sold them to Iran after----
    Senator Symington. But Merex was in there, was it not?
    Mr. Handley. Yes.
    Senator Symington. Did the Canadian government buy them 
from Canada?
    Mr. Handley. The German government bought them from Canada 
originally.
    Senator Symington. I mean the German government.
    Mr. Handley. The German government bought them from Canada 
originally.
    Senator Symington. Who did they buy them from in Canada? 
Did they buy them from the Canadian government?
    Mr. Handley. The Canadian government. It is a NATO 
arrangement, and I suppose that is how----
    Senator Symington. I would like to know. But they could 
have bought them from a Canadian corporation, could they not?
    Mr. Handley. They could have, but may impression is that 
this was a part of the establishment in Germany of an air 
capability supplied by the government of Canada under a NATO 
arrangement, and that these planes became surplus, and that the 
Germans got permission from the Canadians to sell them to the 
Iranians.
    Senator Symington. But then the Germans sold them to Merex, 
is that right?
    Mr. Handley. Through Merex, as I understand it.
    Senator Symington. Well, I mean, what is Merex?
    Mr. Handley. To Iran.
    Senator Symington. Is Merex a company?
    Mr. Handley. M-e-r-e-x.
    Senator Symington. Is it a company to make a profit, or is 
it just a screen? In other words, when the German government 
sold them to Merex----
    Mr. Handley. Merex bought them, was the intermediary 
between Iran and the German government.
    Senator Symington. Did Merex pay the German government for 
them?
    Mr. Handley. I do not know. I presume so.
    Senator Symington. In other words, is Merex an agent of the 
German government or is it a corporation separate from the 
German government?
    Mr. Handley. As I said, I'm not quite sure of the exact 
corporate structure.
    Senator Symington. All right. Then you find out about that 
for us.
    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    MEREX AG Rheinstrasse 156-158, 5302 Bonn-Beuel, West Germany is a 
private corporation established in 1963, and is controlled by MEREX AG 
of Vevey, Switzerland. The major shareholder of the Swiss corporation 
is reported to be Mr. Gearhard Mertins, who is also head of the German 
firm.
    Levy Auto Parts Company, a division of Levy Industries Limited, 
1400 Weston Road, Toronto 15, Ontario, Canada, is a limited company and 
was established in 1927.
    A U.S. affiliate of the Canadian parent firm, Levy Auto Parts, Inc. 
of 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., was incorporated in 
the State of Delaware on June 16, 1949, and is registered with the 
Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State. Fred Williams, 
of the same Washington address, represents the firm here.
    Information is not available as to any direct corporate ties 
between MEREX AG and Levy Auto Parts.

                     TRANSFER FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN

    Senator Symington. When Merex sold them to Iran, did they 
sell them at a higher price than they bought them from the 
German government?
    Mr. Handley. That I do not know.
    Senator Symington. You do not know that.
    When Iran sold them to Pakistan, did they sell them for a 
higher price than they bought them for?
    Mr. Handley. Of course, the Iranians would not admit that 
they have been transferred to Pakistan. In other words, we have 
no understanding of what kind of arrangement, who has the 
title, etc., between Iran and Pakistan.
    Senator Symington. They may be rented by Iran to Pakistan.
    Mr. Handley. They may be, whatever the arrangements are, 
but we assume the Pakistanis feel that they have some kind 
control over these aircraft.
    Senator Symington. Well then, in other words, they could be 
sold--what we would like to know is the nature of the sale and/
or the lease between Iran and Pakistan.
    Mr. Handley. That, sir, would be extraordinarily difficult. 
I just do not see----
    Senator Symington. The Iranians would not tell us that?
    Mr. Handley. Well, that opens up a wide range of diplomatic 
questions. This began with the Canadian sale, the Canadian 
permission to Germany. From Germany, then it was sold to Iran 
and, presumably, from Iran, transferred to Pakistan.

                      U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN

    Senator Symington. But don't we have any sort of 
relationship with the Iranians? We were very close to them at 
one time, the last time I had been out there. If we have given 
them nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars of military 
equipment, would it not be in order for us to ask what kind of 
a deal they made with Pakistan on 100 F-86's that ``We wouldn't 
sell you and that you bought from Canada through Germany.''
    Wouldn't that be a fair question to ask, being partners in 
the business of protecting freedom?
    Mr. Handley. I think it would be a very difficult question 
to put across.
    Senator Symington. Wouldn't it be a fair question, don't 
you think, to ask them? Here we are giving them----
    Mr. Handley. An interesting question.
    Senator Symington. Here we are giving them hundreds of 
millions of dollars in airplanes and equipment, and we thought 
we had an arrangement worked out. We told the world and the 
Indians, too, and then they are violating that agreement by 
letting planes slide into Pakistan from Iran on terms that we 
do not know about. Wouldn't it be fair to ask them what the 
terms were?
    Mr. Handley. Well, I think in the process of doing so you 
break quite a bit of crockery, Senator, with the diplomatic 
relations.
    Senator Symington. All they would have to say is, ``No, we 
won't tell you.''
    Mr. Handley. All right. They could say, ``No.''
    Senator Symington. Why would you have to break any 
crockery?
    Mr. Handley. That then if you happened to believe that they 
are not telling the truth, there is a certain kind of problem 
there. You understand the difficulties.
    Senator Symington. Are you saying you do not think they 
would tell us the truth?
    Mr. Handley. I do not know, sir. I would just hate to 
speculate on exactly how you go through that particular kind of 
diplomatic exchange.
    Senator Symington. I think you lose me on this. I do not 
quite follow you on it.
    Mr. Handley. Let me say this, Senator. We will do the best 
we can to find out through every possible means exactly what 
has gone on in this transaction.
    Senator Symington. All right, fine, sir.

             DISCUSSIONS AT SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

    When this matter came up of changing the policy incident to 
the sale of lethal spares to Pakistan, was this discussed at 
all with the Senior Interdepartmental Group?
    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Was it gone over extensively by them?
    Mr. Handley. The whole policy has been gone over 
thoroughly.
    Senator Symington. And their decision is to do it?
    Mr. Handley. The decision is to carry out, among other 
things, our total policy which we hope is aimed at giving us 
control, some influence, I should put it, over arms procurement 
in the subcontinent.
    Senator Symington. Under the terms of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, do you feel that Pakistan is now eligible for 
assistance of this character?
    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Does the United States intend to move 
from supplying Pakistan with lethal spares to supplying some of 
this lethal equipment? Is there any plan?
    Mr. Handley. New lethal equipment?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Handley. No, sir.
    Senator Symington. Just spares?
    Mr. Handley. Just spares.
    Senator Symington. I understand.
    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.

                REPLACING PLANES ACCIDENTALLY DESTROYED

    The one qualification I would say is that we have no case 
of this kind before us at the moment, but should there be an 
accident, and one plane be totally destroyed, we would consider 
replacing that plane, but we have no case of that kind before 
us. We preserve that for the future.
    Senator Symington. How do you know you would consider that?
    Mr. Handley. We have considered that possibility, and 
should it come up----
    Senator Symington. Suppose the Iranians told you they had 
lost a plane to Pakistan, but they had actually moved it into 
Pakistan. How would you decide that?
    Mr. Handley. You mean not Iran, sir. We are talking about 
Pakistan.
    Senator Symington. I know. But I meant suppose Pakistan 
slides a few back to Iran and said they had lost them.
    Mr. Handley. But I am talking we would have to verify it. 
We would have to see it. We would have to see the wreckage.
    Senator Symington. The reason I asked that was you did not 
know how many Iranian F-86's had gone into Pakistan or how many 
had gotten back.
    Mr. Handley. I see. There is going to be a tough one there, 
but I want to be absolutely candid with you. Our policy is not 
to sell new lethal equipment. We have no case of this kind 
before us at the moment, but we can see a possibility of this.
    Senator Symington. What you are really saying is you would 
be willing to consider maintaining the Pakistan air force, 
etc., at the same level it is today but not increasing it, is 
that correct?
    Mr. Handley. At the same level as we know to be U.S.-
supplied equipment.
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. But not increasing it.
    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. So if they drop 10 planes, they all had 
been caught in a storm, we would consider replacing those 10 
planes?
    Mr. Handley. I think unit by unit we would take a look at 
it.

                        BALANCING THE SITUATION

    Senator Symington. I am only asking. I just want to get the 
feel of it, you see, because we have been told here we are 
balancing the situation. We balanced the strength against 
Israel against the strength of the UAR, and we balanced the 
strength of Pakistan against the strength of India. We balanced 
the strength of Nasser against the strength of Iran, and we are 
doing a lot of balancing. You all are; we are not. We are just 
trying to follow the act, and I just wondered if that is what 
was in your mind, that we, at the U.S. supply level of 
sophisticated lethal military equipment, it is your 
understanding that we will consider maintaining it at that 
level.
    Mr. Handley. That is essentially correct; yes, sir. I am 
not quite sure that you can make a 100 percent statement of 
that kind, but that is generally----
    Senator Symington. But not increasing its sophistication.
    Mr. Handley. At this stage, no, sir. We have no intention 
at this particular moment to sell any new equipment, much less 
more modern equipment in terms of lethal equipment to either 
India or Pakistan.
    Senator Symington. To either India or Pakistan.
    Mr. Handley. That is right.
    Now, on the non-lethal side, it would be different.
    Senator Symington. I understand.

                  A CO-SUPPLIER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

    As in the Iranian case, have we now put ourselves in the 
position of being a co-supplier of military equipment to a 
country also receiving military aid? I guess the answer is yes.
    Mr. Handley. Yes, because they received equipment from 
Communist China. But obviously it is totally different from 
what it was between 1954 and 1965 when we were the major 
suppliers.
    What we would like to do, Senator, and this is part of our 
policy here, is to try to get Pakistan in a position to 
maintain what it considers to be its legitimate security needs 
that it will buy from the West.
    Senator Symington. What you consider their legitimate 
security needs they do not consider their legitimate security 
needs, you see. What impressed me is, first, Nehru says that he 
is never going to be an armed country, and so we ship him blank 
billions of dollars of wheat. Then he goes and buys the biggest 
air force in the Middle East from Britain. Then Pakistan milks 
us, and I think that is a fair term after listening personally 
to Ayub Khan many times, for all they can get out of us in the 
way of military equipment. They then buy a lot more of it from 
behind the Iron Curtain; and then Iran, who I have been so fond 
of that I hardly would like to use the word ``Milk,'' but they 
do the same thing. They bought all they could from us, and then 
they buy a lot from behind the Iron Curtain.
    So what interests me from my limited military background is 
the balancing act that the State Department puts on with the 
Department of Defense as to what is the balance. Where is the 
balance and, as I understand it, from what you have said today, 
we intend to maintain this balance. I get very interested in 
the rules as to what is balance, you see.
    For example, if we sell a lot of 104 airplanes, which today 
is a very good, modern interceptor fighter, to Pakistan in 
order to balance with India, and then Pakistan buys a great 
many more or a good many more MIG planes from China, if we 
agree to replace what we sold them after knowing that they 
bought planes from Russia or China, aren't we increasing 
automatically the balance against India?
    Mr. Handley. We are not going to sell any 104's. We sold 
them--
    Senator Symington. Let me be sure you understand my point. 
We put 100 104's into Pakistan.
    Mr. Handley. No, sir.
    Senator Symington. Then we put 10 in.
    Mr. Handley. Twelve.
    Senator Symington. All right. We put a squadron in, I 
remember. So we put 12 in there to balance against India.
    After we put those 12 in there, then they buy or are given 
or get on some basis, some more fighter planes. If we agree to 
replace any of the lost F-104's, don't we automatically 
increase by the replacement the balance against India as to 
what we thought was the balance when we sold them the original 
12?
    Mr. Handley. Senator, that point I made was to tell you 
everything exactly, the last thought that we had as to the 
total range.
    Now, I can assure you that all the people I have been 
talking to in the State Department, including myself, would 
take a very limited view of how this would be applied. But to 
think of every possible contingency where you might have a 
situation come up where there was--
    Senator Symington. I just want to be sure we understand 
each other. We say the Indians have 20 of something, and we 
say, therefore, we are going to give the Pakistanis 12. That 
makes a balance, right? And after they have milked us for all 
they can get, and I was in on those negotiations, which were 
12, then they buy six MIG's, which gives them 18. So they are 
in balance right away. They have got 18 as against India's 20 
unless India gets some more.
    Mr. Handley. But India has been buying from the Soviet 
Union and has a production line, a MIG production line.
    Senator Symington. That is what I am getting at. Are we 
trying now to equalize Pakistan's balance?
    Mr. Handley. Not in that sense, sir.
    Senator Symington. Not in that sense.

                THE TEMPTATION TO ACQUIRE A NEW SQUADRON

    Mr. Handley. Not in that sense. The idea would be this, if 
there is a principle behind it: If there were a plane lost, and 
you could not make a wing or a squadron, then there might be a 
temptation to go out and get a new squadron from some place 
else. If by replacing one plane we could sort of keep this 
phased down for a year or two--
    Senator Symington. You mentioned that temptation several 
times. I know if I want a drink, it is a temptation to see the 
bottle. But I am not quite sure how you define a temptation to 
them. What do they say, ``Either you give us another plane or 
we are going out and buy another squadron?'' How would that 
temptation work out?
    Mr. Handley. Well, there is pressure, any time you have a 
military situation, on the politicians, and in this particular 
case the politicians, at least the top politician, happens to 
be a military man, too, and I think it is not--
    Senator Symington. The top politician, the Shah and his 
brother-in-law, have the Air Force. I guess that is right.
    Bill, have you any questions you would like to ask?
    Mr. Bader. No, sir; I think you covered them all.
    Senator Symington. John, have you any questions you want to 
ask?
    Senator Sparkman. No. This thing is a great puzzle to me. 
It is hard to follow.
    Senator Symington. I think it is one of the greatest 
balancing acts I have ever seen, and I want to get in on it to 
understand how you balance it.
    Mr. Handley. We are going to try our best.
    Senator Sparkman. You are going to do what?
    Mr. Handley. To try our best to do what we can to encourage 
restraint in the military expenditures of the subcontinent, 
using every device we can, diplomatic device, with our allies, 
with the World Bank or economic aid, our own policies, so that 
the resources go into food, economic development, and not into 
this type of hardware. This policy gives us that much more 
flexibility.

                      TRAINING MILITARY PERSONNEL

    Now, there is one point I did not cover, sir, which I think 
I should cover. We have no grant money. We are asking for grant 
money except in one area, and that is to provide, if they want 
it, continental training in the continental United States for a 
limited number of military personnel from India and Pakistan. 
That might run $100,000 a year, $200,000.
    Senator Symington. Training pilots?
    Mr. Handley. Officers, military people.
    Senator Symington. Train pilots?
    Mr. Handley. I do not know, sir.
    Senator Symington. Train pilots or mechanics or 
electronics?
    Mr. Handley. Electronics; that is right.
    Senator Symington. You do not know what kind of training?
    Mr. Handley. I do not know yet, but we are putting this 
aside as a possibility.
    Senator Symington. As long as you are putting this aside as 
a possibility, let me put this aside as a possibility. How do 
you think some of the people who beat on us for being merchants 
of death for supplying these arms to Pakistan and India would 
feel if the Dallas News busted out that we are training 50 
Pakistan pilots in Texas? How would you feel about that?
    Mr. Handley. Frankly, I do not think that problem will 
arise that way.
    Senator Symington. But you brought it up, that is the only 
reason. You ``arose'' it, so I would like to ``arise'' it with 
you.
    Mr. Handley. I just do not know what kind of training that 
will be. But obviously it will be infantry training, 
intelligence training, engineering training.
    Senator Symington. Infantry, intelligence, engineering. 
That leaves everything aside. They have no navy, so you are 
saying it will be everything except air.
    Mr. Handley. It could be all of these things, but I do not 
know what it will be at the moment.
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Handley. But as we sketch out rather than nibble here 
and there, we are trying to frame an overall approach, too--
    Senator Symington. When you say ``we,'' who do you mean?
    Mr. Handley. That is the U.S. Government, the State 
Department, the Defense Department, the policy of the U.S. 
government.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Handley, who do you work for?
    Mr. Handley. My new boss is going to be Mr. Battle. I used 
to work for Mr. Raymond Hare, who was Assistant Secretary of 
State.
    Senator Symington. You are in State. You are going to work 
with Mr. Battle?
    Mr. Handley. Yes, sir.

                    RATIONALE FOR TRAINING MILITARY

    Senator Sparkman. Let me ask this question: Why would we 
train at our expense military officers and personnel of India 
and Pakistan? We sell them the materials, do we not?
    Mr. Handley. Yes.
    Senator Sparkman. Hard money. Then why should we establish 
a grant to train their officers for them? What obligation is 
there from us to them in how they might use their trained 
personnel?
    Mr. Handley. Well, I think, sir, this is as much on the 
political side as it is actually on the training side. The 
contacts between the officers of India and the United States, 
and contacts between U.S. and Pakistan. India has, I suppose, 
the second largest army in the free world at the moment. 
Certainly--
    Senator Symington. But what is the answer to the question?
    Mr. Handley. Well, the answer to the question, I think, is 
contacts between the Indian Armed Forces and the United States 
Armed Forces.
    Senator Sparkman. It seems to me our interest over the past 
several years is to keep them from fighting each other, and we 
cut off the arms aid with that in mind.
    Mr. Handley. That is right.
    Senator Sparkman. Now, if we start building up trained 
forces, isn't that an incentive to fight rather than 
discouragement?

                       INDIA, PAKISTAN AND CHINA

    Mr. Handley. Senator Sparkman, I take it that India's major 
apprehension today is still Communist China.
    Senator Symington. So?
    Mr. Handley. That there is a partial interest here.
    Senator Sparkman. If we give training to India looking 
toward the Chinese frontier, then we have to give a similar 
amount to Pakistan to balance the act, is that right?
    Mr. Handley. I do not know how much of this training they 
will really want, but I am----
    Senator Symington. That is not the answer to the question. 
What is the answer to the question?
    Senator Sparkman. It seems to me it is not a question of 
what they want, but it is a question of what obligation is 
there on our part.
    Mr. Handley. It is in our interest, sir.
    Senator Symington. To give them training.
    Yes, in what way does it serve our interests?
    Mr. Handley. Our interests, as I said earlier, are in 
contacts with the officers corps of India and Pakistan, 
opportunities for them to be in the United States, to train in 
the United States, opportunities in the case certainly of India 
to think about the possibility of what might happen if the 
Chinese came over the border.
    Senator Symington. Let me ask the question again that 
Senator Sparkman just asked because I am not clear on the 
answer.
    Senator Sparkman asked you if India increased their army, 
or we agreed to help train their army in order to fight 
Communist China, which you said you felt was their primary 
enemy, would they then feel obligated in balancing off a 
situation to do the same for Pakistan? Could you give us an 
answer, ``Not necessarily,'' or ``Yes,'' or ``No,'' on that 
one?
    Mr. Handley. I would say that you have to offer training to 
both sides if you are going to----
    Senator Symington. There is your answer.
    Mr. Handley. If I may qualify that after I have made the 
yes answer, I think we are talking about actually a very small 
range of training. But there is just this possibility that I 
mentioned.
    Senator Sparkman. So far as I am concerned, I could see 
justification in helping India train officers aimed at the 
Chinese attack. But I do not see that that would require us 
then to train that number of Pakistanis, and I do not see that 
it would get away from the old problem of greater danger for 
war the stronger we make them.
    Senator Symington. John, if I may go off the record a 
minute.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Symington. John, have you anything else?
    Senator Sparkman. Nothing more. It has been interesting.
    Senator Symington. Thank you very much. All we wanted to 
get is information. We are not looking for any trouble.
    Mr. Handley. Thank you, sir.
    [Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
    Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Human Rights Conventions
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper and Cooper.
    Ex. J, 88/1, Convention on the Political Rights of Women; 
Ex. K, 88/1, Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced 
Labor; and Ex. L, 88/1, Supplemental Slavery Convention; were 
discussed and it was decided to wait until the American Bar 
Association could express themselves before taking action.
    [The ad hoc subcommittee adjourned at 10:30 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
 Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations
               and Armed Services Committees on the
                 Subject of United States Troops in Europe,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The combined subcommittee met in executive session at 9:40 
a.m., room S-208, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Mansfield (Chairman), Fulbright, 
Sparkman, Church, Hickenlooper and Aiken, representing the 
Committee on Foreign Relations; Senators Stennis, Symington, 
Jackson, Miller and Pearson representing the Armed Services 
Committee.
    The first order of business was to elect Senator Mansfield 
as chairman, and Senator Stennis as vice-chairman.
    The group discussed when the first subcommittee meeting 
should be held and who should be heard.
    [The combined subcommittee adjourned at 10:00 a.m.]



                               MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
               Subcommittee on Near Eastern
                           and South Asian Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 3:00 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Symington and Fulbright.
    Samuel Cummings, President, International Armament 
Corporation (INTERAMCO), accompanied by Richard S. Winter, vice 
president, testified on Additional Military Assistance to 
Pakistan.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 4:15 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         FRIDAY, APRIL 14, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, 
and Cooper.
    C. Hoyt Price, Department of State, answered questions of 
the committee on Ex. O, 89/2, International Telecommunications 
Convention, and it was then ordered reported favorably by voice 
vote.
    The routine Foreign Service Lists dated March 9, 22, and 23 
were discussed and carried over.
    Ex. D, 90/1, Treaty on Outer Space, was ordered reported 
unanimously by a roll call vote.
    The following nominees were ordered reported favorably: 
Rutherford M. Poats, to be Deputy Administrator, AID; Claude G. 
Ross, to be Ambassador to Haiti; and John C. Bullitt, to be 
Assistant Administrator for the Far East, AID.
    The committee also discussed the following: hearings on 
foreign aid; hearings on the U.N.; further hearings on Vietnam; 
a briefing by Vice President Humphrey on his recent trip; 
letter re: appointment of ambassador to Hungary; and the IMG.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:20 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, 
Case, and Cooper.
    The Foreign Service Lists of March 9, 22, and 23 were 
ordered reported by voice vote.
    The nominations of Arthur J. Goldberg, William B. Buffum, 
Richard F. Pedersen, Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, and Samuel C. 
Adams, to be representatives of the U.S. to the Fifth Special 
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and 
Garland R. Farmer and Michael Iovenko, as alternates, were 
ordered reported.
    S. 624, providing for increases in annuities payable from 
the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund, was ordered 
reported with amendments, subject to the approval of Senator 
Williams.
    S. 1029, providing for increased benefits for government 
employees serving in hazardous areas, was ordered reported with 
amendments.
    S. 1030, Informational Media Guaranty Bill, was considered 
but held over for further hearings.
    [The Committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
 Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations
                      and Armed Services Committees
          on the Subject of United States Troops in Europe,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The combined subcommittee met in executive session at 12:35 
p.m., in room S-208, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Mansfield (Chairman), Fulbright, 
Sparkman, and Hickenlooper, representing the Committee on 
Foreign Relations; Senators Jackson, Miller, and Pearson 
representing the Armed Services Committee.
    The purpose of the meeting was to discuss trying to get 
Secretary of Defense McNamara to appear alone before the 
subcommittee next week.
    [The combined subcommittee adjourned at 12:45 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
               Subcommittee on Near Eastern
                           and South Asian Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:35 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Symington, McCarthy, Pell, Aiken, and 
Cooper.
    Townsend W. Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, 
accompanied by Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Regional Director, 
Near East and South Asia, Department of Defense, and Lt. Col. 
John Black, Department of Defense, testified on military 
assistance to Pakistan and India.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 3:45 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         FRIDAY, APRIL 21, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
               Subcommittee on Near Eastern
                           and South Asian Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:05 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Symington, Sparkman, Pell, Hickenlooper, 
and Aiken.
    Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs, accompanied by John Owens, Greek Desk, and 
Kay Folger, Special Assistant for Congressional Relations, 
briefed the group on the Greek situation.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 4:50 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, APRIL 24, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
        Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:05 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Fulbright, 
Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Mundt.
    Briefing on the meeting of American Chiefs of State at 
Punta del Este by Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State 
for InterAmerican Affairs; Sol Linowitz, U.S. Representative to 
the Council of the OAS. Joseph W. Barr, Undersecretary of the 
Treasury, and Winthrop Knowlton, Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for International Affairs, testified on the Inter-
American Development Bank.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 5:20 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
               Subcommittee on Near Eastern
                           and South Asian Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:10 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Symington and Hickenlooper.
    Townsend W. Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, 
accompanied by Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Regional Director, 
Near East and South Asia, Department of Defense, and Lt. Col. 
John Black, Department of Defense, continued discussion of 
military assistance to Pakistan and India.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 4:55 p.m.]


                     UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE

                              ----------                              


                       Wednesday, April 26, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
        Combined Subcommittee on Foreign Relations
                        and Armed Services Committee on the
                 Subject of United States Troops in Europe,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Mike Mansfield (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present representing the Committee on Foreign Relations: 
Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and 
Aiken.
    Representing the Senate Committee on Armed Services: 
Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Miller, and Pearson.
    Also present: Senators Lausche and Cooper.
    Mr. Marcy and Mr. Lowenstein of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations staff; Mr. Braswell of the Committee on Armed 
Services staff; and Miss Stabler of the Library of Congress.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                 [P. 5]

    The trilateral discussions were precipitated, as you 
recall, by the difficulties encountered last fall with the 
German-U.S. and German-U.K. offset arrangements. For the past 
six years, the United States and the Federal Republic have had 
military offset arrangements of approximately $675 million a 
year covering the foreign exchange costs of U.S. deployments in 
Germany. I provided details of the arrangement in my letter to 
you, Mr. Chairman, in my letter of last week. The net of the 
situation is that, after fulfilling the 1961-62 and 1963-64 
agreements, the Germans ran into serious difficulties in the 
1965-66 two-year period: They met only a little more than one-
half of the contemplated level of orders by December 31, 1966, 
the end of the two-year period for orders; and, for the 
payments period, which ran for the two fiscal years ending June 
30, 1967, they are as of now approximately $335 million short 
in payments. They have assured us they will make up that 
shortage by the end of the period before July 1. But, because 
their payments to the U.S. Treasury will have outpaced 
disbursements required to U.S. manufacturers on account of 
their orders, the Federal Republic will find itself with pre-
payments on the military account, or ``overhang,'' of perhaps 
$950 million on July 1 of this year. The ``overhang,'' combined 
with a serious budgetary situation in Germany, has led them to 
predict only minimal new payments to us in our fiscal year 1968 
and not much more in our fiscal year 1969.
    This obviously has created a serious problem for us.

          WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

    At the same time, we were faced with what appeared to be a 
slackening of effort by our Allies. (Germany, for example, 
after increasing her military budget 50 percent between 1961 
and 1963, then leveled off its defense budget.)

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                 BURDEN SHARING IN THE ALLIANCE [P. 6]

    In this environment, the question of burden-sharing in the 
Alliance had to be examined. The United States has a per capita 
gross national product at least 50 percent higher than that of 
any of its European NATO allies; still, that taken into 
account, our allies appear to ask less of themselves than they 
do of us. They devote a much smaller percent of their gross 
national product to their armed forces and they have fewer men 
per thousand in uniform. Their forces are weaker in firepower, 
weaker in endurance, and less ready than ours.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              U.S. PROPOSALS FOR ROTATION OF TROOPS [P. 7]

    Regarding the Army, we have, as you know, 5 division 
forces, or 224,000 men, in Germany. The one division involved 
in the rotation plan is the 24th Infantry Division. At least 
one brigade of that division and some divisional command and 
control units--some 4,000 to 5,000 men--will be in Germany at 
all times. The other two brigades and an appropriate share of 
divisional and non-divisional support units--totaling 
approximately 28,000 men, about two-thirds of a U.S. division 
force--will be removed from Germany to the U.S.
    Once a year, all three brigades will be in Germany for 
exercises involving the entire division. The rotation plan 
provides that the three brigades will succeed each other in 
Germany--each brigade in turn remaining in Germany, on 
temporary duty status, for a period of six months. The forces 
redeployed to the U.S. will be maintained in a high state of 
readiness, and equipment will be maintained in Germany in 
sufficient quantity and readiness to ensure that the forces can 
be redeployed to Germany within 30 days.

                      BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SAVINGS

    I expect this plan to save the United States more than $70 
million in balance-of-payments costs annually.
    On the Air Force side: We have 676 fighter, reconnaissance, 
and air defense aircraft in Europe; and, of those, 486 are 
tactical fighters. The Air Force units involved in the rotation 
are the three tactical fighter wings, totaling 216 aircraft, 
now based in Germany. Five squadrons of each of the wings, or 
72 of the 216 aircraft, will be in Germany at all times, (they 
will be located on two or three bases, with the remainder of 
the four bases maintained as dispersed operating bases); 144 of 
the aircraft and up to 6,500 men will be redeployed to the U.S. 
All 216 of the aircraft will be together in Germany once a year 
for exercises. The aircraft in the U.S. will be at a high state 
of readiness to assure their rapid deployment to Europe, within 
five days, if necessary.
    We estimate the balance-of-payments saving resulting from 
the plan to be $16 million a year.
    First movements under the Army-Air Force rotational program 
are planned to take place soon after January 1, 1968. We expect 
to have the plan fully in operation by June 30, but we shall do 
so only to the extent that we can return the units in the times 
I have described.
    The ground and air units affected by the move, whether at 
their U.S. or German bases, will remain fully committed to 
NATO.

                  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMENDATION

    The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended against any 
redeployments now, including those I have just outlined, 
emphasizing their belief that in some contingencies the warning 
may not be sufficient to permit the forces to be returned to 
Europe in times I have specified.
    The Germans have expressed concerns about our proposed 
rotation plan, which we are now discussing with them. These 
concerns stem from the combination of a number of their views. 
They tend to give the Warsaw Pact forces more credit, and NATO 
forces less credit, than we do; they tend to expect less 
warning time than we do; and they associate physical presence 
of U.S. forces with the U.S. political commitment and therefore 
fear that the redeployment of some of these forces implies 
reduction in the U.S. commitment. The Germans are particularly 
concerned about the Air Force aspects of the plan, and that 
part especially is still under active discussion.
    My own view is that--because of the political warning time 
and the speed with which reinforcements can be made--we can 
operate under the rotational plan I have described without 
significantly reducing our military effectiveness. It is 
possible that, if we left critical political factors aside--
which we of course cannot--but if we can, it is possible that a 
rotation plan of perhaps twice the magnitude I have described 
could be put into effect without reducing the effectiveness of 
our military forces. I feel confident that adjustments going 
beyond that level of magnitude, twice, that I have outlined, 
would result in cutting U.S. combat power--a move that would be 
dangerous because I am convinced that one of the main reasons 
East-West relations have improved is the strength of the West 
and the demonstrated will of the West to use that strength if 
necessary in defense. It is the Secretary of State's judgment 
that a redeployment of a magnitude greater than the one-
division three-air wing rotational plan could not be made at 
this time without traumatic psychological impact in Germany 
and, as a matter of fact, throughout NATO. Therefore, putting 
together the political and military factors involved, the 
Administration cannot now recommend more than the rotation plan 
that I described earlier.
    Any redeployment of U.S. forces involves a risk of Soviet 
misinterpretation. There is a possibility, however, that a 
small redeployment of the kind that I proposed might be used to 
help induce a corresponding Soviet move, in line with the 
suggestion in the President's speech of October 7, 1966. Some 
experts believe that for political and military reasons the 
Soviets will not be willing to reduce their military presence 
in Eastern Europe in the near future no matter what we do. But 
the first move on our part in the direction of troop reductions 
would be politically significant in itself, as a step away from 
the cold war atmosphere. And it would give the Soviets some 
incentive to respond.
    These, Mr. Chairman, are the ingredients of the package 
being discussed in the trilateral talks. We do not now have any 
plans for any redeployment beyond those I have described today; 
we do not consider that the international situation justifies 
any further redeployments at this time. We would, of course 
consult with the Congress as well as our NATO allies before any 
further redeployments.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           POSSIBILITY OF TROUBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 16]

    Senator Jackson. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the 
possibility of the Soviets making, say, a limited move in 
Western Europe in light of developments in Asia, isn't there 
also the possibility of trouble in the Middle East?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, Senator Jackson. I think that we 
should be sensitive to the possibility that the Soviets would 
move on any one of several different fronts for a variety of 
reasons, among them, perhaps, being the desire to put greater 
pressure on us at the time we are involved in Southeast Asia.
    Senator Jackson. Well, the reason I mentioned the Middle 
East--I was not excluding, of course, other areas of the 
world--but I had in mind the possibility of having to move 
troops from Europe as we did in the Lebanon crisis.
    My recollection is that we moved troops from Germany by 
airlift into Lebanon during that particular period, was it 
1959? Therefore, the fact that we have a good force in Europe 
is of equal importance to problems that might occur on the 
flanks, is it not?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, although I think that we might 
prefer in that situation to move troops from the United States, 
and we are seeking to maintain our readiness to do so if 
required.
    Senator Jackson. I was thinking of airlift problems and 
other matters that might, from a time point of view, 
necessitate the movement of some forces from Germany to the 
Middle East should that situation arise.

       WISDOM OF RESOLUTION ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS AT PRESENT TIME

    In your judgment, would it be wise for the Senate to take 
action on a resolution calling for a reduction of forces in 
Europe at this time in light of present conditions?
    Secretary McNamara. I believe it would be unwise, Senator 
Jackson.
    I think there is such a ferment in Europe at this time that 
such action by the Senate might well be misconstrued.
    The foundation of the defense of Europe is, of course, the 
political commitment of the United States to that defense. For 
either the Western Europeans or the Soviets to begin to doubt 
the force of that political commitment, I think our own 
security would be impaired, and it would be almost as serious 
for the Western Europeans to doubt it as it would be for the 
Soviets to doubt it.
    Let me read to you a cable that I brought with me, which 
just came in a day or two ago. This is a report of a German 
Cabinet meeting of a week ago, and to show you the mood in 
Europe today as it might be affected by a Senate Resolution, I 
read these sentences. This is reporting the German Cabinet 
meeting itself:

    There was vociferous and, at times, emotional debate over 
the proposed withdrawal of U.S. aircraft.
    This is a proposal I just read to you.
    Kiesinger, the Chancellor, contended that American motives 
behind this move which would entail the withdrawal of a limited 
number of personnel, and only a limited savings, had little to 
do with the American offset problem but was more likely part of 
a scheme to denuclearize Europe. That is the scheme they have 
charged me with before.
    This analysis by the Chancellor found nearly unanimous 
support in the Council and encouraged some of those present to 
voice misgivings of the American intentions and the general 
dependability of the Americans as an ally. It was agreed to 
inform the Americans that the massive withdrawal of American 
fighter-bombers from Germany was totally unacceptable.

    I mention this simply to indicate that they are very much 
concerned by our actions, and they are concerned not only as to 
their military impact but as an indication of our political 
decision. I think, therefore, that a resolution by the Senate 
at this time urging withdrawals substantially larger than those 
we are proposing would have serious political disadvantages to 
us.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               BURDEN-SHARING OF EUROPEAN NATIONS [P. 19]

    Senator Jackson. Are some European nations paying more of 
their part than some Americans give them credit for?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, I think they are. And I said, in 
general, their contribution as a percentage of GNP is a measure 
of their general contribution to defense. But having said that, 
I must say that, in my opinion, the Europeans are not 
contributing their own fair share, and in making that statement 
I know I provide ammunition to those of us who wish to reduce 
our support of the common defense.
    But I make that statement not on the basis of the 
percentage of GNP contribution that they are making but the 
percentage of our men in uniform. I think this is, perhaps, a 
more valid measure of our individual contributions to our joint 
defense, and here we find that the major European countries 
such as the United Kingdom and France and the Federal Republic, 
have roughly half as many men in uniform per thousand of 
population as we did before the expansion of our forces 
associated with Southeast Asia.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  SOVIET STRATEGY AND TACTICS [P. 24]

    Senator Hickenlooper. Do you consider that our presence in 
Europe in strength, as at present, is an integral part of the 
Southeast Asia situation, or is it a separate and unrelated 
matter?
    Secretary McNamara. I think they are linked together by the 
Soviet strategy which is to put pressure on the West wherever 
it perceives weakness.
    In this particular situation there is a further problem 
brought about by the pressure on the Soviet Union by North 
Vietnam and China to relieve the U.S. pressure on Southeast 
Asia by a diversionary move some place else in the world.
    So that we have the normal Soviet strategy of probing for 
weakness wherever they find it in the West, accentuated in this 
case by pressure from their own allies to relieve the pressure 
of the U.S. military forces on them by diversionary political 
or military attacks against us elsewhere.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL WEST EUROPE COUNTRIES [P. 27]

    Secretary McNamara. I do not believe there is any 
significant move under way by any major countries to reduce 
their military establishments.
    I think there is great pressure on the defense budgets to 
try to reduce them as a percentage of gross national product. 
But I do not believe that need entail, nor do they plan that it 
will entail, a reduction in the actual military force.
    Now, that is a general statement. There are a few, perhaps, 
exceptions to it. I think, perhaps, Belgium, a very small 
power, is planning a possible reduction in strength. But there 
is no major reduction in military strength planned by any of 
the major NATO countries that I know of.
    Senator Symington. The table of defense expenditures as a 
percent of GNP for NATO countries you have submitted to the 
combined subcommittee shows that taking the figures from 1950 
to the present of GNP devoted to defense reached a new low in 
1966 for Belgium, France, Greece, The Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and Canada, and was within 0.3 percent of a new low in 
the case of Denmark and Norway.
    Doesn't this trend indicate a diminishing desire within 
NATO to maintain troop strength at the present level?
    Secretary McNamara. No, sir; I do not think so, because 
troop strengths can be maintained at the present level without 
maintaining defense expenditures at a constant percentage of 
gross national product and, I think, by the way, that article 
overstates the reduction of defense expenditures as a 
percentage of gross national product.
    Roughly they have been constant in recent years. They have 
not been increasing as we have thought they should. There are 
some indications of some of the nations, Germany included, who 
would like to reduce the percentage of defense as a percentage 
of gross national product, but not reduce the strength of their 
forces.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                CHANGE OF NUCLEAR POWER BALANCE [P. 28]

    Secretary McNamara. I would like two or three points in 
response. First, it is true that at the time we entered NATO we 
did not have the strategic nuclear forces that we have today. 
We did not have the Polaris missiles and we did not have the 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
    But, of course, at that time we had a near monopoly of 
strategic nuclear power, a monopoly we no longer possess, 
because while we have increased the efficiency of our strategic 
nuclear forces during this 15-year period the Soviets have 
actually acquired a strategic nuclear force. This significantly 
changes the military utility of our force and narrows the 
extent to which that force is both a deterrent and a response 
to potential Soviet aggression, and increases, therefore, the 
requirement for conventional forces of the kind we presently 
have in Western Europe.
    Furthermore, I think the point that Senator Fulbright made 
a few minutes ago is very important. It is essential that we 
recognize it today, that the operations in Southeast Asia do 
put pressure on the Soviet Union because of their interest in 
and support for North Vietnam, and possibly China, to engage us 
in operations elsewhere in the world, and to apply political 
and/or military pressure against us to that end, and beyond all 
that, as we know, the Soviet basic strategy does not appear to 
have changed and as recently as my tenure as Secretary of 
Defense, they applied military pressure against us in Western 
Europe.
    So for all these reasons I think the force that we have 
there today is not only required today but I think it will be 
required in the near term future as well.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              GERMAN ARMS SALES TO THIRD COUNTRIES [P. 28]

    It has now been determined that much of this equipment has 
been resold through an international arms broker to countries 
such as the Chad, Iran, Israel, the Sudan, and Pakistan. These 
countries have apparently paid a great many times more for this 
equipment than the price the United States received from West 
Germany.
    Most of these surplus arms have been sold through the Merex 
Corporation, a German company operating out of Bonn. Merex 
operations extend around the world. They have been closely 
connected with Interarmco, a large American arms dealer. In 
addition, it is believed by some that Merex serves as part of 
the West German Intelligence apparatus. It would appear that 
Germany uses this private corporation for two reasons: (1) to 
spare its government the embarrassment of selling arms of 
American origin directly to countries where the United States 
is telling its people it is attempting to control the arms 
race; and (2) to prevent the United States from knowing what 
actually happens to the arms after the sale to Merex so the 
Germans can live up to their agreement with us to let us know 
of ultimate disposal.
    As but one example of Merex operations is the sale of some 
90 F-86 aircraft to Pakistan. The sale was arranged at a time 
when the United States was trying to prevent arms from entering 
Pakistan. The West German government told the United States 
that these aircraft were going to Iran. Nevertheless, people in 
our government are confident that the West Germans knew these 
aircraft were actually going to Pakistan; hence it would appear 
deliberate deception on West Germany's part.
    The evidence suggests that the West German government, in 
its desire to make a profit off its surplus equipment, has 
acted and is continuing to act in a way that is against the 
United States' efforts to dampen arms races. With its great 
reservoir of surplus military equipment of American origin, 
West Germany has the means to stimulate arms races throughout 
the underdeveloped world. The irony is that the East Germans 
are making a heavy profit on the sale of U.S. equipment, not 
only that sold to them but also that given to them.
    Would you care to comment on those observations?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes. May I do so for the record, 
Senator Symington? I am not familiar with the operations of the 
Merex Corporation to which you refer. I do know something about 
the alleged sale of F-86 aircraft to Pakistan. I do not believe 
any such sale did occur in the form in which you outlined it or 
in which the statement refers to it.
    But I would like to check the details and respond fully for 
the record.
    I will say simply one thing in passing. I know of no effort 
by the German government or no evidence of any effort by them 
to mislead us as to sales of arms to other nations. There is at 
times a difference of opinion between us, perhaps, as to 
whether such arms should be sold to other nations, but this 
difference of opinion results from their discussion with us of 
potential sales and from our exercise of our right to prevent 
such sales.
    Senator Symington. Well, maybe it is because I used to be 
in business, but I hate to be badly outtraded, and I think we 
have been in this case.
    Secretary McNamara. I do, too.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               REDEPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL FIGHTERS [P. 33]

    Senator Miller. Though what you are proposing would reduce 
the number of our tactical fighters by about 30 percent, do you 
think it is still consistent with not reducing our military 
effectiveness?
    Secretary McNamara. I do, indeed, because those fighters 
can be returned to Europe within five days, which is less time 
than the estimated period of military warning estimated at 
between 11 and 15 days.
    Senator Miller. One thing that bothers me about the 
redeployment is that if the Soviet Union wishes to harass us, 
all they have to do is start building up some pressure which 
would mean probably calling back these redeployed forces. We 
would have the leadtime necessary to have them ready, and then 
the pressure or the tension could be relaxed. But I can 
visualize an on-again off-again situation which would be very 
harassing and very expensive.
    Secretary McNamara. Of course, it would be equally 
harassing and expensive to the Soviets.
    It would be negligible. It would not be a major military 
operation, and it would not involve major costs, and we would 
be prepared to do it at such times as it appeared necessary.
    Senator Miller. I understand that the JCS are opposed to 
your plan.
    Secretary McNamara. That is correct; on military grounds, 
that is correct.
    Senator Miller. I mean they are not in favor of this 
redeployment of 30 percent of our fighters, and I think this 
28,000 members of the brigades.
    Secretary McNamara. They do not recommend it.
    Senator Miller. What is their reason for it?
    Secretary McNamara. They believe, particularly with respect 
to the ground forces, that the period of warning may be less 
than the time required to redeploy the forces to Europe.
    We have stated that we will be capable of redeploying them 
to Europe within 30 days. The Joint Chiefs state that the 
period of warning may not exceed 11 to 15 days. In that case, I 
think their statement is subject to question because while the 
period of military warning may be only 11 to 15 days, almost 
surely there will be political tension over an extended period 
in excess of 11 to 15 days, and this constitutes warning as 
well.
    So from my point of view, I think we can redeploy the 
forces within a period of political and military warning. They 
do not, and they, therefore, do not recommend the rotational 
program I have outlined to you.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              PRACTICAL POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE [P. 35]

    Senator Pearson. What effect did the British withdrawal 
have upon their idea--of their psychology, and so forth?
    Secretary McNamara. I think that they will recognize it for 
what it is, a very, very small change in a very small force, 
thereby not affecting in any fundamental way the balance of 
power between the East and West.
    In any case, the political leaders of Western Europe have 
just very practical political problems. There is great pressure 
on them to meet these unfulfilled demands of their people.
    It is recognized their contribution under any reasonable 
set of assumption of our common defense will be small. It is 
believed that the period of relative peace over the past five 
years will continue and, therefore, that they can avoid 
increasing their budget in proportion to their gross national 
product.
    I am not supporting this. I am simply trying to explain it, 
because, quite frankly, for those of us who have to deal with 
it everyday, and who are charged by the President with trying 
to change those attitudes, it is a very frustrating role.
    But I would point out we have made some progress. It is a 
fact that the effectiveness of the non-U.S. divisions in 
Western Europe has increased dramatically in the past six 
years. Norstad said it increased 50 percent between 1961 and 
1964. It is a fact that the Germans increased their budget 50 
percent between 1961 and 1963. It is a fact that the Germans 
bought from us $3 billion worth of new equipment in the last 
six years, so they have made progress.
    Senator Pearson. I think so.
    Secretary McNamara. The military strength has increased, 
and I think it would be very shortsighted were we, in a fit of 
pique, and I recognize the basis for the fit of pique, but were 
we in a fit of pique to begin to tear down our common defense.

                CONVENTIONAL RATHER THAN NUCLEAR WARFARE

    Senator Pearson. Let me ask you just this: Incidentally, 
the commander of the Seventh Army in Heidelberg, probably in 
February some time, indicated to me that it was his judgment 
that any military action would open with a nuclear shot in a 
race to the sea across the traditional invasion boundary across 
the North. But he also said something else that really set me 
back, and that was the maintenance of a large conventional 
military force in Western Europe might be necessary because a 
nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States 
would destroy the industrial capacity of both nations, leaving 
only Western Europe as the industrial prize of the world.
    Would you comment on that?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, I would. May I say, first, that 
his view that----
    Senator Pearson. I think he is retired now, incidentally.
    Secretary McNamara. He would have been retired earlier if I 
had ever heard that, I can tell you that. But may I say that 
his view as to the most probable form of initiation of military 
contact between East and West is not shared by the Joint 
Chiefs. They do not believe that conflict between East and West 
will break out initially by a nuclear exchange. They think 
quite the contrary, that non-nuclear action will almost surely 
precede nuclear action, and we must be prepared to deter such 
non-nuclear action by the maintenance of adequate conventional 
forces.
    Secondly, I never heard a more absurd statement than his 
statement to you that a nuclear war between the Soviet Union 
and the West would preserve Western Europe unscathed. I think 
that is the least likely of the series of possible outcomes.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     IMPACT IN GERMANY AND NATO OF U.S. TROOP REDEPLOYMENT [P. 36]

    Senator Pearson. Just for the record, I take it that, Mr. 
McNamara, you agree with the Secretary of State's estimate that 
any redeployment beyond that which is presently contemplated 
would, as I take it, as a direct quote, ``have a traumatic 
psychological impact in Germany and in NATO.''
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, I do agree with that at this time. 
I do think, however, and I think he would agree, we should 
begin to move in our conversations with our allies so that over 
a period of time they will find politically-acceptable moves 
that we think are in our common military interest.
    The problem is they attach a political significance to the 
move that it is not intended to have, and that makes it 
militarily unacceptable as well as politically unacceptable, 
and it is that misinterpretation of a potential military move, 
I think, we must seek to overcome in the months and years 
ahead.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    REQUESTS TO THE GENERAL [P. 38]

    Senator Mansfield. Senator Miller, you had a question?
    Senator Miller. Just one brief one.
    I notice that you say the Germans are particularly 
concerned about the Air Force aspects of that plan, and that 
part is still under active discussion. Is it your evaluation 
that possibly the plan might be modified to eliminate the Air 
Force aspect?
    Secretary McNamara. I do not see any reason why it should 
not be from a military point of view. These discussions are 
going on. I do not try to anticipate their conclusion. So I 
really cannot give you an answer, but militarily it is sound.
    Senator Miller. Thank you.
    Senator Mansfield. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS DeB. KATZENBACH, ACTING 
  SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY EUGENE V. ROSTOW, UNDER 
SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         IS THERE A DANGER IN PURSUING WAR IN VIETNAM? [P. 48]

    Senator Fulbright. Do you think there is a danger that, if 
we pursue the war in Vietnam to a military victory, this might 
precipitate China----
    Mr. Katzenbach. I think the Administration has recognized 
the fact that Communist China is right there supporting the 
government of Vietnam, and Soviet Russia has been throughout 
supporting the government in Vietnam, and those are 
considerations which have to weigh importantly on decisions to 
be made. In answer to your prior question, Senator, I think I 
understand what you mean. I have no indication that the Soviet 
Union would stand aside if China came in. I would be rather 
surprised if they stayed aside. I think they would stay where 
they are.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             MUTUAL RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION [P. 52]

    Senator Miller. Mr. McNamara testified first, and I quote 
him now: ``A first move on our part in the direction of troop 
reductions''--and by that he was referring to the recommended 
redeployment figures--``would be politically significant in 
itself, and a step away from the cold war atmosphere. And it 
would give the Soviets some incentive to respond.''
    Then he went on, in my colloquy with him, and indicated 
that he did not have much confidence that there would be such a 
response from the Soviet Union.
    Do you agree with that assessment?
    Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, Senator, I do agree with it.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          MEANS OF EFFECTING A MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTION [P. 53]

    Mr. Rostow. There is very active work and thought and 
preparation going on in NATO, Senator Miller, both in the 
context of these talks and the next stage of these talks in the 
Defense Planning Committee, and in the re-thinking about the 
future tasks of NATO and of the procedures for carrying out 
those tasks. We are now actively discussing whether bilateral 
approaches or collective approaches to the subject of Soviets 
in this regard are better, whether discussions with them of 
troop levels should come first, second, or third in connection 
with other activities toward achieving a detente in Europe. It 
is an extremely active area on the whole Alliance front and 
when we say here that studies are going on, we don't mean to 
brush it under the rug. This is something to which we and our 
allies are giving intense consideration, and I think rather 
hopeful consideration.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      RISK OF GIVING THE SOVIET UNION AN INCORRECT SIGNAL [P. 55]

    Senator Miller. One last question, Mr. Chairman, and I will 
be brief.
    While Mr. McNamara and you shared the belief that you did 
not have much confidence that the plan that he set forth was 
going to result in some kind of a mutual reduction, at the same 
time he expressed confidence that there would not be a reverse 
response, such as a probe. Do you share that assessment?
    Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, I do. I agree with him that a 
rotational system of this type despite some reservations of the 
Joint Chiefs would not be sufficient to permit the Soviet Union 
to miscalculate on this. I would go further on this and say in 
terms of just what you were asking, Senator, to establish some 
capacity, to experiment with a movement of troops of this type, 
I would regard as an affirmative step that even could be 
helpful in terms of looking at it down the road as another 
measure with respect to withdrawals as far as the Soviet Union 
and we were concerned without losing the essential capacity.
    So I am interested in it because I think it is an 
interesting experiment from which we can learn a good deal 
about the movement of troops and how long it does really take 
and how effective this is, and what public attitudes towards 
this may be.
    I think it would be good to adjust the European thinking to 
the fact that we could move rapidly in this way, where they can 
visibly see our capacity, to move in this way. I think it would 
be helpful on the political and psychological problems.
    [Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to 
reconvene on Wednesday, May 7, 1967.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Clark, and 
Pell.
    Informal briefing from Vice President Humphrey on his trip 
to Europe.
    No transcript was made of the meeting.


                 BRIEFING ON YEMEN AND GREEK SITUATIONS

                              ----------                              


                         FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1967

                                   U.S. Senate,    
                       Subcommittee on Near Eastern
                                    and South Asian
             Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in. 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Fulbright, Gore, 
Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Cooper and Javits.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee 
staff.
    Senator Symington. The subcommittee will come to order.
    The Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs is 
meeting this morning to hear the Assistant Secretary of State 
who is charged with that part of the world, to discuss the 
latest developments in Yemen, Greece and other aspects of his 
domain that he would like to talk about.
    We are very glad to have you with us this morning, Mr. 
Secretary. Have you a prepared statement, or would you care to 
discuss this orally?

  STATEMENT OF HON. LUCIUS D. BATTLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
STATE, NEA, ACCOMPANIED BY H. DANIEL BREWSTER, COUNTRY DIRECTOR 
FOR GREECE; WILLIAM D. BREWER, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR ARABIA; AND 
  MISS K. FOLGER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, 
                      DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared statement, as 
I understand that this is to be an executive session, to be 
very frank with you.
    Senator Symington. Nothing will be published that you do 
not want to have published.
    Mr. Battle. I wish to be very frank with the committee, as 
I always try to be.
    As mentioned in my confirmation hearing, at our last 
session, I told you that I was deeply disturbed about the 
number of problems in the Middle East. I would like to 
particularly emphasize this morning the new serious situation 
in Yemen and, secondly, to bring you up to date on the Greece 
situation that I discussed in detail a week ago today.
    As far as Yemen is concerned, we have had a series of 
developments over the last few days that are very disturbing. 
For many months there have been harassments of the Americans in 
Yemen of various kinds, some of them trivial, some thoroughly 
irritating. Occasionally, we have had serious developments, 
such as beginning the night of the 25th, two nights ago, in 
which there was a charge that a bazooka was fired into an 
ammunition dump near Ta'izz, and as stated in the later press 
statements, that it practically destroyed the city.
    We have in Ta'izz an AID Mission--that is not the capital 
of the country--and military officers and men came over to the 
compound which had been closed for several hours under the 
curfew, and all of our people had checked in. They came with 
dogs, and went directly to the house of one of our Public Roads 
Bureau men named Stephen Oppalous. They then arrested four of 
our people. A mob formed--a very large mob, numbering at its 
height about 3,000 people. They went to our embassy, sacked the 
place, pulled out the plumbing, destroyed automobiles, and 
broke windows. They did everything that you could think of.
    Our four people were detained----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Do we have Marine guards there?
    Mr. Battle. Have we?
    Mr. Brewer. This is the branch office, in Ta'izz. We only 
have one embassy proper in Sanaa.

                      WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. PERSONNEL

    Mr. Battle. Last night, we had a news ticker that the Yemen 
Republican Government wanted to terminate the AID agreement 
under which we were operating there, and a departure of our AID 
Mission; that there was a plan to bring charges against these 
people--to try two of the four people that they had arrested. 
And this, obviously, created a very serious situation.
    We have concluded that we must move as quietly and as 
quickly as we can to withdraw our people from the area. And we 
must, I think, do this. Of course the problem now is to try to 
assure that these two men who are still under arrest--two have 
been released; there are two still under detention--and there 
is not complete clarity as to the intentions with respect to 
them. Public statements are that they are to be tried. The 
statements that we have had are that it is something less than 
that. It has been said that they will be retained for further 
investigation. We have been given a notice which is in the 
process of translation, and we do not have the note, so this is 
not completely clear whether they are to be tried or not. But 
the evidence would certainly point to their intention to 
humiliate us. Justice in Yemen is a fantasy--it could not be 
more ridiculous.
    I think we have a very delicate situation to protect our 
people. I think it is our first and primary concern at the 
moment. We have approximately sixty official Americans there. 
The total Americans in the country are around 100, including a 
few missionaries, 94 to 95, and we are doing----
    Senator Symington. There are 100 Americans including 
missionaries. What about the 94 and 95, just to be sure?
    Mr. Battle. As nearly as we can give that to you; they are 
not absolutely clear for the following reasons. There are a few 
Yemeni board people who have American passports. We do not know 
exactly how many. There are no clearly stated facts. One, for 
example, some time ago came back here, and changed his mind at 
the airport. There are a few in that category. We have nine 
Baptist missionaries, a few miles north of Ta'izz. There are 
one or two Catholic missionaries. There may be a few others in 
this area. These are the approximate numbers, as best as I can 
give them to you.
    We will try to give you a complete breakdown, but I doubt 
if we can.
    Senator Symington. What is the total number of Americans?
    Mr. Brewer. The total is of the order of about 160 or 165.
    Mr. Battle. That is including the missionaries. This is in 
Yemen.
    I think that we must maintain enough of a staff in our 
embassy to do what we can to protect our own people.
    Our instructions last night--we got them in the middle of 
the night--were to begin to prepare to get them out of there, 
and we are trying to arrange transportation as best we can. We 
are not saying that we are evacuating. We are simply 
withdrawing as rapidly as we can.
    I think it is our hope, of course, that Yemen will let us 
withdraw people peacefully without any difficulty. It is a 
highly volatile situation. They are very unpredictable people.
    We are considering several ways of getting them out. The 
most desirable and the most likely is to charter an airplane, 
probably one of the Ethiopian airplanes, if the Yemenis will 
let it in. We are also checking ships. Over the night we tried 
to locate American shipping in the area that might have come 
through the canal heading south, or either way, for that 
matter. There is, for example, an American destroyer in the 
vicinity. There are other ways in which we might be able to 
offer assistance.

                  EGYPTIAN INVOLVEMENT IN YEMEN CRISIS

    Let me talk a little bit about the background of this and 
give you as much of an assessment as I can.
    I think there is absolutely no doubt that the local 
Egyptians are back of this. I think that there is room for 
uncertainty as to whether it is Cairo-directed or not. I had 
the Egyptian Ambassador in yesterday morning and informed him 
that it was absolutely clear that these people were in the 
hands of the Egyptian military. There could not be any argument 
about this; this could not be argued. Both the Egyptian, the 
civil and the military in Ta'izz are engaged in this.
    We have had several conversations in Cairo. We have several 
bits of information on this. It is not clear whether it was 
directed by them or not. They are both in Yemen and in Egypt, 
those who would like nothing better than to have the United 
States thrown out of both places, for that matter. There are 
others who have tried over the past to try to keep us in Yemen 
with the hope that we would not withdraw our recognition of 
Yemen and would stay there.
    At this stage, the evidence is about 50-50, according to 
our intelligence people. I think we have to be very careful, to 
deal very firmly with the Egyptians, whether they have directed 
it or not. They alone have the authority to bring about a 
change in it, and I think that we must take a very firm 
position with them.
    Our charge d'affaires, under instructions from us, informed 
the foreign minister last night that this would have a very 
direct bearing on our relations with the Egyptians for years to 
come. We are not trying to deal with whether they started it or 
not, but I think that without any doubt they have the 
authority--they have sufficient leverage there to help us deal 
with the situation effectively and to permit our people to 
leave.

                         CONDITION OF KING SAUD

    King Saud is in Cairo. As you know, it is a rather 
ridiculous situation. King Saud is old and has pretty well had 
it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He is nowhere near as old as I am. 
[Laughter.]
    Mr. Battle. I apologize for the comment. [Laughter.]
    Senator Aiken. He has had it--that is the difference. 
[Laughter.]
    Mr. Battle. He is much, much older than you are. He did not 
even remember where he was, who had him there. He forgot the 
name of the Vice President of Egypt who took him down there. He 
is nothing. He has no status with the Saudi Arabians. He has 
for years fought with Nasser. They threatened to assassinate 
each other at various times, but they have made up now. It is a 
very cold, calculating kind of relationship. And that is all it 
is.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It is the Middle East.
    Mr. Battle. It is the Middle East, yes, sir. But for the 
moment, I think that what we want to try to do is do what we 
can to protect our people there, to withdraw as quietly and 
with as little sensation as possible, to try to get out those 
people that we have there, to try to keep this from getting out 
of hand.
    We must not, I think, break relations at this point, 
because it is important that we have somebody there to protect 
our own people. Our people have diplomatic immunity. If anybody 
will be safe in the country, I am certain that our charge 
d'affaires and one or two people protecting him will be 
protected. I feel that we cannot at this stage walk out of the 
situation.
    I would like to withhold my judgment on whether it is wise 
for us to break relations in the days ahead. Clearly at this 
moment we must try to pull out all of these people whose lives 
may be in danger. The situation is such that it may be very, 
very difficult. But to break relations, no.
    Obviously, aid is finished. It has not amounted to a great 
deal. It has been $2.4 million for this current fiscal year. It 
is completing a road project begun some years ago, and various 
water well diggings, sanitation, things of that sort.
    That, sir, is it in a broad sense.

                      AMERICANS ARRESTED IN YEMEN

    Senator Symington. They arrested four people?
    Mr. Battle. They arrested four. They released two. Their 
public statement says that they are going to try them. I do not 
want to ask for that public statement.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It says what?
    Mr. Battle. That they will try these two. That is what came 
on the ticker last night, but this is not the phrase that is 
used in the message that we have so far. Before we respond 
publicly, I do not want to get them in the position where they 
have to charge them. The phrase they used in the telegram that 
we received this morning indicates that these two, that is, 
their cases, will have to be studied further. If this is an 
effort on their part to withdraw from the trial, I should think 
it likely, because a trial there would be a mockery and a 
disgrace. I hope that we can avoid having our people go through 
with it.
    Senator Cooper. Who are the two?
    Mr. Battle. One is named Hartman and another Liapis, both 
Bureau of Public Roads people.
    This is the most obviously trumped up charge that I have 
seen in a long time. These people, according to the telegrams 
that we have, were locked in our own campsite in the compound, 
under the curfew law. They brought a dog in, and it went 
directly to the house that they wanted. There was something 
there. It is pretty malicious and ridiculous. It is even more 
ridiculous, because in the interrogation of this man, they 
brought in what was obviously a moron, an idiot, who was said 
to be in the last stages of some kind of disease. They asked 
him if he could identify the two people whom he had seen 
engaged in bazooka firing, and he pointed to Liapis and then he 
pointed to the general who was holding the investigation which, 
I think, pretty clearly proves that he did not know what was 
going on.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He probably was right.
    Senator Aiken. Anyway, in that respect.
    Senator Symington. Have you any questions that you would 
like to ask, Senator Fulbright.

                          EXECUTIONS IN GREECE

    Senator Fulbright. First, before I ask any questions, let 
me say that I received in the mail at seven o'clock a special 
delivery, this communication from a resident of the Twin City 
area, and I thought that I would convey this to you. These are 
people who are disturbed about the execution of people in 
Greece. So I could not think of anything better than to give it 
to you.
    Mr. Battle. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Fulbright. It came from the vicinity of 
Minneapolis-St. Paul.
    Mr. Battle. I hope very much to deal with this problem when 
we finish with Yemen.
    Senator Fulbright. I might follow that up. I had telephone 
calls the night before last, about 10 o'clock, from a lawyer 
who said that his wife was acquainted with Papandreou who 
taught at the University of California. They were extremely 
concerned that he was going to be executed for having tried to 
maintain a democratic government in Greece, and asked if there 
was anything that I could do. I said that I could not do 
anything other than to put it up to the State Department; I 
have no possible way of influencing that government. He said 
that he was sending this to me in the morning mail, material 
which, I believe, is sufficient so that they can make a plea to 
their government. It seems to me that they are preparing to 
execute him. That is all I know. They sent it to me for the 
reason that I am the chairman of the committee. And that is the 
same reason why I am giving it to you this morning. This man 
feels that maybe just because of personal vengeance it will be 
done.
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on that, sir. We 
have been very concerned about all of these things. Obviously, 
if Andreas Papandreou is executed, there will be a tremendous 
problem both here and in Greece. He is very widely known here. 
He has many friends here. We have on eight occasions sent 
messages to our embassy there. We have taken this matter up 
with various people in the top structure of the government. We 
have been assured, although not specifically said--as to 
Andreas--we have been assured that no harm will come to either 
of them. To our best knowledge he is clearly under arrest, but 
we have no reason to believe at the moment that he is being 
mistreated.

                    U.S. PREOCCUPATION WITH VIETNAM

    Senator Fulbright. What has happened as to Yemen and in 
Greece to me has a bearing on Vietnam. I think that our 
preoccupation with that and our concentration of forces of all 
kinds on Vietnam will be an invitation to many people--not just 
Russians, but anyone who has resentment or a problem against 
our interest--to take steps, because they feel that there is 
nothing that we can do about it. I think that this is a perfect 
illustration of what Gavin told the committee last year, that 
this will expose us in any number of places around the world, 
to provide occasions for people of various kinds. I would 
recommend to the high echelon in our government that they might 
possibly reconsider our war in Vietnam and to consider what 
influence you have and means you have available to do 
something.
    Mr. Battle. May I respond to that?
    Mr. Chairman, in my confirmation hearing you will recall I 
told you and told the committee that I was very disturbed by 
many things going on in my area. I am very hopeful of getting 
as much time from this subcommittee and the full committee as 
possible to look into this. I have been very pleased to have 
the opportunity to get up as quickly as I was permitted to do 
on the Greek situation, and again, this morning, the Yemeni 
situation, so that we can work together on the problem.
    I would like to bring the committee up-to-date on Greece, 
if I may, Mr. Chairman.

                      U.S. OVER-COMMITMENT ABROAD

    Senator Symington. Before you do that, I want to associate 
myself with what the chairman has said. I want to state that 
after being in Japan and in Europe in April, that I am 
completely convinced that we are over-committed. I would like 
to leave this comparison with you.
    It looks like the United States was in the ring, let us 
say, in a fight, and everybody says, ``This is the greatest 
fighter that the world has ever known.'' Round after round, he 
is totally ineffectual, after putting in one-half million 
people and a giant fleet, and a good many billion dollars. As 
the rounds go on you feel, ``Heh, we thought that this fellow 
was the champ. We are beginning to think''--and I do not want 
to use the expression about my country, and I got a very 
definite impression of that in Europe a year ago--I got a more 
definite impression when I went to Greece in January that they 
cannot figure out why we cannot do better if we are going to 
stay out there, after all of these people and all these 
gigantic sums of money are being spent. So here it is.
    I think, if you will look at the report that I made to 
Senator Fulbright and to Senator Russell last January--a report 
that is not yet declassified--you will find that I predicted 
that this would happen. I think that we have just got to get 
ready for it.
    If I may respectfully say so, I think that we have got to 
figure out where we are going to get the additional people and 
equipment to handle these additional problems. We have not got 
much left, unless we truly go on a mobilization basis, to take 
care of many more of these.

                         FIGHTING WITH ONE ARM

    Senator Hickenlooper. I do not want my silence to mean that 
I agree with everything that has been said here. I think that 
your illustration of the champ in the ring is a very apt one, 
but I do not think that the champ can fight with one arm taped 
to his back. He can only fight contenders if he has both hands, 
but not with one hand.
    I believe that Senator Fulbright was there, if I remember, 
when we were talking about Laos--that meeting with Senator 
Kennedy.
    We are there. The trouble there is that we are not allowed 
to win it. That is not the champ's fault, necessarily; somebody 
has bound his ankle.
    Senator Symington. They do not know all of those things. 
They just see him working at it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I know that.
    There is the fact that we cannot attack the harbors, and 
the like.
    Senator Fulbright. You can. They can attack anything that 
they want to. He can bomb Peking.
    Senator Hickenlooper. The military arm cannot use what they 
have got.
    Senator Symington. I do not think that we have any 
difference here about what is happening to the so-called champ. 
Maybe it is because they have bound his arms; maybe because 
they bound his nose; maybe it is because he is not much good 
fundamentally anyway against people who want to fight in their 
own country. I do not know what the reason is. I think it ought 
to be considered. One of the things that I would like to have 
asked General Westmoreland is why out of the five bases they 
attacked, they attacked the regions first and left the big base 
for the last, which means that they will have a great many more 
aircraft and small arms around if you have a policy that you 
are not allowed to attack. Now we have broken the policy and 
maybe in a certain number of days or weeks, we will attack 
these places. It will cost us just that many more American 
planes, because of the nature of the way the operation is being 
conducted.
    I just wanted to associate myself with the general 
unhappiness about accomplishments. I did not want to get into a 
dialogue.
    Senator Hickenlooper. If we do not do something pretty 
quickly about Yemen we will be in the same kind of a position 
there where we can be justifiably criticized.
    Senator Symington. What do you think we should do?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I do not know, from all of the 
information that is available. We sit here at this great 
distance and try to mastermind this, these military and sea 
operations. There was a time when we could send a couple of 
cruisers over there and would say, ``Look, you violated all of 
the comity of all international conduct here. You either put up 
or shut up.''
    Now I do not know whether that is justified, but I do not 
know whether it is overall feasible in a general operation, 
once we sit around and let these people kick us all over the 
place and do not do a thing about it. We talk, talk, talk, 
talk. They keep running right over us, and expect to continue 
doing so. They can do it next week, and the week after.

                            FORTRESS AMERICA

    Senator Symington. I would like to ask the Chairman, what 
would you do?
    Senator Fulbright. In Yemen?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Senator Fulbright. I am not at all sure, because I do not 
know what we can do. What do we have available to do it with? 
If we send in cruisers, I do not know why the Russians cannot 
do it, too. This is not like it was in the old days. I think I 
do not know right off the bat what to do, preoccupied as we 
are.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Just succumb to the Reds and the 
subversives and everybody else in the world and retire into the 
fortress of America, and build a wall around here and say, 
``Let the rest of the world go any way they want to.''

                     OTHER MISSIONS HAVE WITHDRAWN

    Senator Symington. What do you think that we should do?
    Senator Aiken. I said a year ago to fight a war with 
restrictions and regulations and things that go with fighting 
and winning a war. If those who sell materials want profits 
from the war, they do not want to pay for the war in any way, 
it seems.
    Senator Symington. I meant specifically on Yemen.
    Senator Aiken. Oh, Yemen.
    Senator Symington. Yes, sir.
    Senator Aiken. Well, there are a lot of people there today, 
I know.
    Mr. Battle. There are only a few missions there. The 
Italians are there.
    Senator Aiken. Have they just gotten out?
    Mr. Battle. The Germans and the British have gone. Who else 
is there now? There are a few left there. The French are not 
there.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They have more sense than we do.
    Senator Aiken. We are the only ones in the whole area 
there.
    Senator Symington. What would you do?
    Senator Cooper. How many are there? Are we doing all we can 
to get them out?
    Mr. Battle. May I tell you one thing that we have done? I 
must be very careful about this.
    Senator Symington. We will go off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Symington. Back on the record.

                        U.S. OVERTURES TO EGYPT

    Mr. Battle. Our efforts in Egypt at this time are limited. 
There are still things they want from us.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They are not yet hungry, but they 
will be hungry.
    Mr. Battle. They will be hungry, right, but they are 
looking for some things. They would like to see us at this 
stage help them on a few things. They are particularly eager to 
get this stabilization agreement with the IMF.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We have pressure on it right now.
    Mr. Battle. Through some oil companies, because of 
contracts, they want some concessions. That is American 
enterprise, the American system. There are a lot of other 
things that are necessary to support industrial contracts.
    The oil is a possibility. They are in a very vulnerable 
situation there. Because Egypt needs them and they will let 
them go on operating. They will let them stay, I believe they 
will, for the time being.
    The only hope I have, the thing that troubled me when I 
first got to Egypt, was that I could not see an end in sight to 
the Public Law 480 program, an artificial relationship which we 
did not like. And the Egyptians did not like it. But when the 
oil was struck, that is the first time that it could see a 
natural tie to us based on economic factors of trade rather 
than aid. I hope that the oil project has and will in time tie 
more to the West by natural trade processes and give them the 
money to buy their own food. This is to me the only hope that I 
can see to normalize our relationship.
    I do not think that the oil at the moment is quite enough 
to solve their economic problems, but it will help. It may come 
very close to equalling what our food was worth at the maximum 
point that we put it in there, in the neighborhood of $100 
million a year.

                           SITUATION IN ADEN

    Senator Symington. The purpose of this meeting is a report 
from you in Yemen. I think that we are clear as to what the 
situation is in that sector. We are also clear what you plan to 
do about it.
    Now as to the question of Aden being very important in this 
whole picture, could you explain that before we get out of this 
subject and turn to Greece for a minute?
    Mr. Battle. Well, Aden, as you know, the British have been 
there. They are pulling out. Their departure, I think, is 
projected and that departure has created a vacuum that both 
Faisal and Nasser are concerned about, Faisal with very good 
reason. I have some doubt that Nasser wants to make a direct 
military effort in Aden. I think he wants a government there 
that is friendly to him, responsive to him and as nearly in his 
direction as possible, but he hopes to achieve it through other 
than military means, if at all possible.
    In the last analysis, I do not know what will happen. This 
is my view on the situation as of this time.
    The only hope that I have been able to see if the British 
pull out--I agree that is a sad thing--but if the British go--
and I am told that they are going--I think that we have got to 
try to work in an international presence, if we can possibly do 
it.

                    RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE REGION

    Senator Hickenlooper. If something does not happen the 
Russians will move in, as sure as the sun will come up.
    Mr. Battle. Or the Egyptians under the direction of the 
Russians.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He has been under their control for a 
long time.
    Senator Aiken. Have they not some provision at Djibouti?
    Mr. Battle. They have not followed that. I have not 
followed the geographical problem there. I am not familiar with 
the area.
    Mr. Brewer. I think that it is true that Djibouti can 
provide some bunkering facilities that were formerly provided 
by Aden, but they get their own bunkering in Djibouti from the 
refinery, a substantial portion of it. This could be changed 
over time, but if there is a serious situation?
    Senator Aiken. They can go through there.
    Mr. Brewer. In a sense, that is something that Djibouti 
cannot meet.
    Mr. Battle. To continue on Aden, Mr. Chairman, I see the 
chance of chaos there, which is very great, once the British 
withdraw. There are many elements there. There are various 
political forces at work there, which make it very confusing. 
It is very difficult to be sure who is backing whom at any 
given time. For example, I just heard yesterday of an anti 
anti-terrorist group which shows how many groups there are 
there working. The most important one, and the most active one, 
is the Egyptian one. They have been, I think, as much as anyone 
group responsible for the terrorism and for the difficulty. The 
relationship of Ta'izz to Aden is fairly close. It is closer to 
the south. Ta'izz is to the south of Aden. And in the presence 
of some of these groups that have been responsible for some of 
the actions taken is one of the reasons that we had hoped to 
maintain a place there. This obviously is going to be a long 
and, I think, tedious one, and if we have to get out of there, 
we will, unless we do something very quickly--we will not have 
anything there shortly otherwise.
    We are going to lose a little bit in terms of our 
development in what is going on there. This is an important 
center of the Egyptian activity.
    Senator Symington. In Aden?
    Mr. Battle. Ta'izz where we have these people.

                     APPEALS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

    Senator Hickenlooper. What about these other affiliations?
    Mr. Battle. You mean in terms of what?
    Senator Hickenlooper. These affiliations in the whole 
complex--what about that?
    Mr. Battle. Well, sir, the Saudi Arabians----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I mean the South Arabians.
    Mr. Battle. The South Arabians. There is no agreement on 
what ought to happen. There is a split between these various 
protectorates and various groups throughout the south portion 
there, but we have hoped that we could get some kind of a 
coalition with the United Nations to pave the way for free 
elections and some kind of United Nations presence that would 
keep these various forces that you are concerned about from 
moving in and trying to take over.
    Senator Fulbright. That is up to the United Nations?
    Mr. Battle. It is not up to us. We have supported every 
action that has been taken. The recent United Nations mission 
that was sent out accomplished nothing, sir. I went out. It was 
an absolute fiasco.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They were there about three days.
    Mr. Battle. After an incredible series of places.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They were supposed to be in there for 
quite a while, but they left in three days.
    Mr. Battle. It is so complicated that it is hard to say. I 
think that everybody feels badly. One issue was whether they 
would get----
    Senator Symington. Are you talking about the United Nations 
mission?
    Mr. Battle. The United Nations mission that went there 
about three weeks ago.
    Senator Symington. Who were they?
    Mr. Battle. They are still in being.
    Senator Symington. Who was on the mission?
    Mr. Brewer. Venezuela, Mali and Afghanistan. Venezuela is 
chairman.
    Senator Fulbright. Mali and who?
    Mr. Brewer. We had a very great difficulty in getting 
anybody.
    Senator Symington. Let me get that. I want to remember 
that. They represented Ambassador Goldberg and Secretary U 
Thant. What were they going to do when they went there?
    Mr. Battle. They were there under a United Nations 
resolution that had almost unanimous agreement. I think that 
there were two or three abstentions. Egypt bought it. Everybody 
bought it. They were to go there to study the situation and to 
make recommendations to the United Nations with respect to the 
future of that area. Nothing came of it. They got into a series 
of incidents, in some cases over trivial matters, for example, 
the inspection of their baggage--the question of whether they 
could go on television came up. There were all sorts of 
ridiculous things.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They got out in three days?
    Mr. Battle. They went to Geneva and stayed there for a few 
days, I think, 13 hours with George Brown who told me. I 
happened to see him when he was here for the SEATO Conference 
there. He said it was in terrible fashion. He spent 13 hours. 
They are still in existence.
    Senator Symington. Let us go off the record for a moment.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Symington. Back on the record.
    Senator Aiken. Why do we not turn some of them over to 
Russia?

                      OFFICIAL DATE OF WITHDRAWAL

    Senator Symington. Will you continue?
    Mr. Battle. It is the intention of the Executive Branch of 
the government, through a series of meetings with all agencies, 
to see what we can do about Aden. I have no cure-all for it, 
Mr. Chairman. I wish I could tell you that I did. We are 
working on it. I have been deeply disturbed about it before I 
left Cairo. I think it is a very serious problem and closely 
related to Yemen, but I do not know what the answer is.
    Senator Symington. What is the date for getting out?
    Mr. Battle. The official date is by 1968. There is a 
possibility of advancing this.
    Senator Symington. There is no intention on our part of 
getting in there.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We could get in there by furnishing a 
little money to keep the people there.

                         AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE

    Senator Symington. We have just come up with $35 million to 
keep the people in Yemen. Let me ask you this question: Is it 
possible for the United Nations to put a team in there of some 
sort?
    Mr. Battle. This has been my hope, Senator. I thought that 
the presence of an international force, even an entire Arab 
force, would help. This is what we have to consider. I think a 
United Nations presence is the only thing that I can think of, 
but given the experiences that we have had with that 
distinguished mission that has just been out there, I am 
discouraged. It is not over yet. I think that we still have to 
point to the United Nations. We still have to try to build an 
international presence that will permit a coalition government 
of some kind on an interim basis with the United Nations 
presence in the hope that in time we can have free elections. 
And if we can, if a coalition. government can be created that 
has any chance of interim survival--if we can recognize a 
United Nations-blessed coalition government, with the weight of 
the international community behind it, I think that we can keep 
ourselves from a direct commitment but to back up such a 
structure as we are able to get in these which, I hope, will 
keep it from having chaos after the British withdraw.
    It is a hope. I can give you no guarantee of it myself. But 
I have the hope, as you know, by Monday or Tuesday--this is 
completely a hope--we will have some ideas that we have not had 
yet.
    Senator Symington. Does anybody have any comments or 
questions further with respect to Yemen or Aden?
    We will go off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Symington. Back on the record.
    Mr. Battle, I share your comments. I think that we have to 
be for something. If we can put an interim thing in there with 
the United Nations blessing and hold the line and try to keep 
chaos from developing, even the chances of a free election at 
the moment are very slim--we have got to point a direction.
    Senator Aiken. I think that King Faisal possesses a good 
share of common sense.
    Mr. Battle. And common sense is a rather rare commodity.
    Senator Symington. Keep us posted on this, Mr. Secretary. 
Do you have a question?
    Senator Cooper. When did this government come into being?
    Mr. Battle. In December of 1962.
    Senator Aiken. It was the United Nations before that.
    Mr. Battle. We recognized fairly soon after the revolution.
    Mr. Brewer. We recognized it, that is, the earlier royalty 
government.
    Mr. Battle. That is right.

                     AIR MILES FROM CAIRO TO TA'IZZ

    Senator Symington. How many air miles is it from Cairo to 
Ta'izz, roughly--200 miles as a guess?
    Mr. Brewer. It is more than 500 miles. I would say around 
1,000.
    Mr. Battle. I would guess that it would be about that, 
because it is a four-hour air flight.
    Mr. Brewer. It is three hours from Yemen.
    Mr. Battle. I can find out exactly, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is not that important.
    Senator Aiken. That is quite a substantial distance.
    What is the present force that is there from Egypt?
    Mr. Battle. It is down now to around 37, 38 thousand--a 
reduction from 70 thousand down to around 30 thousand, but this 
does not mean that he is withdrawing his troops. He has 
consolidated them. That is better from his point of view. They 
are not spread out as much as they were.
    Senator Cooper. It is the same distance from Cairo to 
Rome--about the same distance.
    Mr. Brewer. About 1,500 miles.
    Mr. Bader. It is about 1,500 miles.
    Senator Fulbright. Do you want to say some more about 
Greece?
    Senator Symington. Will you keep us posted on this?
    Mr. Battle. I will.
    Senator Symington. On the developments in Yemen. All right, 
now, will you tell us about----
    Senator Hickenlooper. 1,500 miles?
    Senator Symington. Is that not amazing, these distances. It 
is hard to believe.

                             COUP IN GREECE

    We will leave the subject of Yemen and Aden. Tell us a 
little bit about Greece.
    Mr. Battle. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I met with this subcommittee 
a week ago today, which was the morning after the coup occurred 
in the afternoon. I gave you a number of statements that were 
based then on the situation as we knew it. They have proved 
fairly accurate, as I told you.
    In a general way, at that time as to the situation these 
statements have been proved to be correct. Those factors are 
the following: This is a coup of the Colonels and a Brigadier 
General. They are oriented to the right politically. They have 
had little experience in government.
    The coup occurred. It was very carefully planned. They 
executed it in a very effective manner from their point of 
view.
    It is absolutely clear to us now that the King did not know 
anything about it, and, in fact, until recent days has been 
rather critical of the proposition, the way it was handled and 
many other aspects of the coup. The coup group have affirmed 
most vigorously in public and in private statements its desires 
to continue its relationship with NATO, which is the 
cornerstone of its policy. It is pro-western. In fact, one 
member of the government said, ``We are with you whether you 
want it or not.''
    The King's situation in this is as follows: He has not yet 
signed the decree suspending various provisions of the 
constitution. He has refused to sign the decree, putting into 
effect martial law.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I thought that he had.
    Mr. Battle. It has been claimed from the beginning that he 
did do this, Senator, but up until the last conversation that 
our Ambassador had with him he said that he still had not 
signed the decree, even though they had said publicly, ``I have 
done so.'' He made a great point as to two or three articles 
that were suspended, one regarding capital punishment. We are 
assured by him that he has not done it. It was done in his 
name. However, they tried to put the entire coup efforts as 
originally done in the name of the King. However, in the 
statement yesterday, Papadopoulos admitted publicly that this 
was arranged by them and without the King's knowledge; that 
there was no foreign element involved in it.
    As far as our position in this is concerned, here is what 
we believed. The coup was obviously accomplished, and any 
resort to any other constitutional process is very disturbing 
to us. The coup has occurred, however.
    The first few days, I cautioned this committee when I 
talked with you last week that any statement by us criticizing 
the coup or appearing to lend support to any dissident elements 
within the country could well bring about an effort towards a 
countercoup, and even possibly a civil war which would be very 
bloody. It would result, in my judgment, in either an extreme 
left wing dictatorship or an extreme right wing dictatorship.
    I think the chances of that occurring lessen each day as 
time goes on, but it is still present.

                    THE KING SHOULD REMAIN IN GREECE

    As far as our position on this is concerned, we believe 
that the King's position is that he remain in Greece and in a 
very, very difficult situation. In the initial stages, we have 
taken the position that the King is the most stable element we 
have there. We have felt that he must try to exercise his own 
impact on the situation as rapidly as possible to get this 
stamp on the government and its actions and composition.
    For example, we have had in mind a civilianization of the 
cabinet which he has succeeded in doing. The cabinet is not a 
distinguished one. There is very little reason that it is 
particularly good, but it looks a little bit better as time 
goes on.
    He has brought in a wider representation of the country. It 
is made up of a combination of military figures, a few senior 
civil servants, including the Supreme Court Justices who are 
less important than they are in this country, but one of them, 
at least, has a certain popular following and a certain 
distinction.
    We believe that the coup group needs the King. We believe 
the coup group needs us, if it means what it says publicly. We 
believe that we must try to exercise caution, without taking 
such actions as to bring about these dangers of a civil war in 
the situation.
    The suggestion was made to more and more representatives of 
the country, hopefully, to get a return to the constitutional 
process as soon as possible.
    The King has made a statement that he hopes that there will 
be a return to constitutional processes.
    There has been one press report that Papadopoulos has made 
a similar statement. It's probably not true, or we would have 
known about it by this time.

                      U.S. COOL TO COUP GOVERNMENT

    So as far as our own actions are concerned, we have been 
extremely cool towards the coup government. We only yesterday--
I think we have done it--I authorized yesterday the Embassy to 
respond to a routine note from the Foreign Ministry simply 
informing us that they were in business. That is the first 
official communication that we have had with them, but the 
British and others are going ahead. We felt that this was no 
question of recognition involved, from the legal point of view; 
that we are better staying there, trying to maintain such 
efforts as we can and to hope that we can influence the 
situation.
    It will be noted that in the two or three days which have 
elapsed, we made a statement that we were reviewing the 
question of the military assistance program. What we have 
actually done is that we have stopped all major equipment 
shipments.
    Senator Fulbright. How large is that?
    Mr. Battle. $65 million, sir.
    Mr. Brewer. $65 million, sir.
    Senator Symington. And what does that amount to? In what 
kind?
    Mr. Battle. The kinds are the major equipment. We are 
trying to locate all of the equipment that is about to go 
there. We have not made a basic decision with respect to 
military assistance. For the information of the committee, the 
practical effect is that the reason we have said that I wanted 
to do as much as we can--I want to keep dangling the question 
of what we are going to do. The effect, so far as we are 
concerned, is that we have stopped tanks, we have stopped the 
airplanes, to the extent that we control that.

                    U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN GREECE

    Senator Fulbright. How large a military presence do we have 
there--how many military personnel?
    Mr. Brewer. There are over 6,000, including families.
    Senator Fulbright. I mean military personnel--3,000, are 
there?
    Mr. Brewer. Just about.
    Senator Symington. The military themselves. Not the people 
who are civilians, but the military--is it 3,000?
    Mr. Brewer. I can get you the exact figures. [Note: 3,285]
    Senator Fulbright. How many [deleted] would that be?
    Mr. Battle. I do not know.
    Senator Fulbright. Are you sure they have nothing to do 
with this?
    Mr. Battle. I am. I am absolutely sure.
    Senator Fulbright. I was thinking about the takeover. Is 
there any indication there?

                           ROLE OF PAPANDREOU

    Mr. Battle. I would not put it in those words. As you know, 
an election was called for May 28. The largest party is the 
party headed by George Papandreou, who has been a moderate. He 
has not been an extreme moderate. He has not taken an extreme 
position. His health, however, is not good. He is not a young 
man. His son, Andreas, around whom much of the center of the 
storm has centered, has been exactly, well, what his political 
thoughts are no one can be sure. He has, however, based on the 
view of those people who know, been drifting steadily to the 
left for some time.
    Senator Gore. Who is that?
    Senator Fulbright. You named Andreas.
    Mr. Battle. He has been drifting steadily to the left.
    Senator Fulbright. He is anti-American.
    Mr. Battle. Also, anti-American.
    Senator Fulbright. Do you equate anti-American with being a 
Communist?
    Mr. Battle. What I am trying to say, Senator, is that at 
least as to the question of what he is doing, in the eyes of 
the conservative party--in the eyes of the King--he is their 
enemy. Now Communist, I hate to say that--I do not think that 
he was.
    Senator Fulbright. At least, in the views of the King?
    Mr. Battle. He was in the eyes of the conservatives and in 
the eyes of the King there, he was their enemy.

                        ROLE OF THE QUEEN MOTHER

    Senator Fulbright. Is the Queen Mother in Athens?
    Mr. Battle. To the best of our knowledge she is there.
    Senator Fulbright. Do you know anything about whether she 
was in this?
    Mr. Battle. We have no knowledge about anything whatever. 
We have heard very little about her in any of the official 
telegrams or communications that we have had about the Queen 
Mother.
    Mr. Brewer. She has been standing well away from it. The 
inference we have gotten is that her influence over the last 
few years has been certainly on the downgrade.

              SPLIT BETWEEN GEORGE AND ANDREAS PAPANDREOU

    Senator Symington. When I was there in January, I am almost 
certain that the Ambassador told me that there was a major 
split between George and Andreas.
    Mr. Battle. There was, indeed, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Symington. With both of them in jail. Did they meet 
in the van or what happened? As I understand, George is as 
opposed to the King as anyone, but that there was a great deal 
of respect for him in the country.
    Mr. Battle. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. Andreas was supposed to be opposed to 
his father, because his father was not enough opposed to the 
King. There was not much respect for him in the country.
    Mr. Battle. Your statement is generally correct, sir. As 
George over recent months has become more defiant, the two have 
tended to make up and they have come together both personally 
and politically over recent months. It was generally believed 
that if the Center Union won an election, that while George may 
be the head--the titular head of the party--Andreas would be 
the leader of that party.
    Senator Fulbright. And try to get rid of the King, is that 
it?
    Mr. Battle. That is what they suspected. Was there ever a 
flat statement about that?
    Mr. Brewer. The campaign took the form in the last few days 
of stating, ``You are not King of the Hellens--you are King of 
the Conservative Party.'' This was stated both by George and 
Andreas in the last week.
    Senator Symington. What this really gets down to is that 
the military coup was to prevent an election, does it not?
    Mr. Battle. To prevent an election of what they thought 
would be a clearly anti-monarchist and very left wing group in 
their opinion.
    Senator Gore. Which they thought would win.
    Mr. Battle. Which they thought would win, yes, sir. The 
Center Union Party is the largest party. We think, probably, 
they would have won.
    Senator Symington. Let me ask a very delicate question. I 
mean it very sincerely, however. If it looked as though they 
were going to lose this election, it would be smart for the 
King to approve clandestinely the overthrow and have it appear 
that he did not want it.
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, yes, it would have been, but we 
do not think that is what happened. If you will let me go off 
the record here.
    Senator Symington. Yes, off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                             ROLE OF TURKEY

    How about the Turks?
    Mr. Battle. The Turks have been very cool and detached, 
waiting to see. They are obviously concerned about this. At the 
first blush of this thing, we got off a message to our 
ambassador to caution them about doing anything that would 
exacerbate the situation. We have been watching the situation. 
We have found no effort of any kind of move in on top of what 
is happening in Greece. There are rumors, of course. But there 
is no indication. We suspect that everybody is a little 
nervous. We expect that the coup in Greece does not want to 
take on any more than it has. It has ahead of it economic and 
political problems. We doubt that they want to get into the 
Cyprus thing.
    Senator Symington. Have you any questions, Senator Gore?

                   U.S. AMBASSADOR CALLS ON THE KING

    Senator Gore. I have a high regard for Phil Talbot. I would 
expect him to add to the coolness and the discretion.
    Has there been any publicity in Greece of his calling upon 
the King? I saw something about it in the press.
    Mr. Battle. There have been numerous accounts here of his 
calls on the King. The press in Athens is completely under the 
control of the coup group.
    Mr. Brewer. He has made three calls on the King. That fact 
is known, but the contents of his calls, if any reports have 
gotten out, is pure speculation.
    Mr. Battle. I have not seen any report in the press as to 
his calls--any attention to it in Athens.
    Mr. Brewer. Other than the fact that he has made the calls, 
nothing further.
    Mr. Battle. The foreign press has reported it, but the 
Greek press has not.
    Mr. Brewer. It is a censored press and they are not talking 
about it.
    Senator Gore. Have we maintained any contact through 
[deleted] or otherwise with Papandreou?
    Mr. Battle. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
    Mr. Brewer. Margaret Papandreou has been herself to the 
Embassy on a number of occasions. She is an American citizen. 
She came in with her father and her son on the very first 
morning. We have been in touch with her repeatedly about what 
the status is of Andreas. She has been sending him clothing. He 
has asked for sunglasses and she sent those out to him. We have 
been in close touch that way, but otherwise not.

                    KEEPING CONTACT WITH BOTH SIDES

    Senator Gore. We may be fortunate to have this contact, 
because obviously there is widespread support for this majority 
party, and for this leader who is now, I suppose, out. In the 
event that they have a civil war it might be well that we keep 
some contact with both sides.
    Mr. Battle. I agree thoroughly. The thing that we want if 
possible is to have something to obviate a civil war and a 
great upheaval there. The consequences of that would be 
disastrous.
    Senator Gore. It could be a touchstone for a war.
    Mr. Battle. Yes. I think that we have to be very cautious 
about this. We do not want to go too far in either approving or 
disapproving the current regime. If we are too disapproving of 
it we will stimulate reaction which will be an excuse for 
somebody to try to do something.
    Mr. Brewer. We have had contacts with George Mavros, who is 
a member of the Center Union Party, one of the co-leaders of 
this group, who came to the Embassy and gave us his idea of 
what we should do about the coup and so on. So we are 
constantly in contact with both sides.
    Senator Gore. What were his ideas?
    Mr. Brewer. Well, they were much like the ideas that were 
expressed by the King; namely, that we have got to work from 
here--maybe we can get participation of all sides and make what 
would be called an ecumenical government. He would like to be 
Prime Minister of that.

                         RESISTANCE TO THE COUP

    Senator Gore. Has the Embassy had any indication from any 
of the leaders of the party that hostile, physical military 
action was contemplated? Do we have any information of any 
organized resistance to the coup?
    Mr. Battle. No.
    Senator Gore. Does the military have a monopoly on weaponry 
in the country.
    Mr. Battle. The bulk of it certainly is in their hands. I 
am sure, however, there are guns in caves and what have you in 
typically Greek way, but the bulk of the military weaponry is 
controlled by the coup group.
    Senator Gore. Are any of the deposed military, senior 
military leaders of a political bent that might encourage them 
to supply a movement with weapons, sufficient for such a 
proposed movement?
    Mr. Battle. I am not aware of any.
    Mr. Brewer. The military, by and large, those who have been 
deposed, are just as conservative as the others. I do not think 
that they would go to the Russians for support for arms.
    Senator Gore. In the event that someone like Albania, or 
some other group--I do not want to rule out another function of 
the Communist Party moving in--in the event that the Communists 
saw fit to exploit this, do we have any indication of any 
leadership through which they would do such?
    Mr. Battle. I would imagine, Senator Gore, I would judge 
that over the period that led to this you will find a 
polarization of the right and the left. And you would feel the 
effects of this. What group, if any, could emerge as the leader 
of this counter-effort, if it was made, whether it would be 
supported by Communists or not is anybody's guess. We know who 
a great many of the top leaders are, and as we have said, they 
are under arrest. Do you have any comment?

                      POPULAR SUPPORT FOR MILITARY

    Mr. Brewer. Maybe the answer to this is that the military 
can be identified in their vote in any national election. In 
the last election the military vote nationwide was 12 percent, 
with 1.3 percent among the 180,000 being military. That was the 
vote. The rest was divided between the Center Union Party and 
the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party ran about 65-66 
percent, and the Center Union 35 percent, at a time when the 
Center Union won the national election it was 53 percent. So 
that gives you the relation in the army of the people who are 
trained in that respect.
    At one place there have been a couple of shots fired. 
Reportedly, there was very little resistance and that was put 
down immediately.
    Without making any guess, Crete is the place, the center of 
the Republican forces; that is, the center of the anti-
monarchist forces. Most of the deputies from Crete are close 
Andreas and George Papandreou supporters. That is the island 
where you have the vote running about 75 percent for that 
group, and if someone were to get something started--if I were 
picking a mountain top like this one, that is the island.
    Senator Gore. When you say ``force,'' you mean political 
force?
    Mr. Brewer. That is right. On the military side, I do not 
see it in the army as such.

                     SOVIET REACTION TO GREEK COUP

    Senator Gore. One other question. What has been the 
reaction of the Soviets to this?
    Mr. Brewer. So far as we know--I will check this out 
further--it has been very quiet. They do spread the sort of 
stuff that we had last night that Glezos was about to be shot. 
This is the Communist type of thing. He is a pro-Communist 
Deputy who was liberated and won a seat in Parliament. His name 
is the only Greek Communist name that means anything worldwide. 
In East Berlin about six years ago they were carrying signs to 
free him from jail. This is a name that has international 
stature. They have started that campaign.
    I am sure that the Soviets are in on that.
    Mr. Battle. The Russians have put out the charges that we 
were behind the coup--not the Embassy in Athens, to my 
knowledge.
    Mr. Brewer. The Moscow Radio is saying it all of the time 
and this is one reason that I think that Papadopoulos met this 
head-on by saying the King is not involved--nobody is 
involved--I did this on my own.
    Senator Symington. He is the head man?
    Mr. Brewer. He is the head one.
    Senator Symington. Is he a military man, and how old is he?
    Mr. Battle. He is about 48, I believe.

                       EGYPT, THE U.S. AND YEMEN

    Senator Gore. One more question. Do you think that they 
want our AID officials out in Yemen? Is this because of 
Nationalism or is this Cairo, or is this anti-Americanism? How 
about AID officials becoming persona non grata? Is it for some 
particular involvement or some activity?
    Mr. Battle. We know of no reason whatever for this 
particular incident. It is the most clear-cut case of a trumped 
up charge. The direction from which this came we do not know. 
It is perfectly clear that the local Egyptians, both military 
and civil, are involved in this in Yemen. Whether this is 
Cairo-directed, we cannot be sure. However, as I said before 
you came in, Cairo has leverage to do something about this with 
Yemen. In my talks yesterday with the Ambassador and in the 
follow-up talks with the Foreign Minister in Cairo, we have 
made it very clear to them that we look to them to try to help 
us in this situation, and that if they fail to do so this is 
going to have a very bad effect between them and us. We cannot 
pin anything down but we know that locally they are involved. I 
have some doubt that they have directed it from Cairo. I think 
that the Cairo government itself, however, is divided and has 
been for many months. I have had many talks with them as to 
whether they want us in Yemen or not. One faction would like 
nothing better than to see us thrown out of there. Another 
faction, I think, is the faction that would like to see 
relations between Egypt and us improved.
    They are more cautious and would not want to see us forced 
out of there. They are split in Cairo. I think they are split 
in the same lines in Yemen, but without any doubt local 
Egyptians are involved and without doubt Cairo had the 
leverage, if they wished to use it, to bring about help.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.

                      DIFFERENCES WITH THE BRITISH

    Senator Symington. In reviewing the staff's analysis of 
Yemen, as I understand it, we are on a different side than the 
British, so far as governments are concerned?
    Mr. Battle. The British have never recognized the Yemen 
Government that came into power.
    Senator Symington. No, according to this memo I have the 
Argentines, Belgium and Canada. Why is that--why is that? Tell 
me why would we recognize along with the Red Chinese, the 
Ethiopians, Iraq, and so did Russia? Why did we recognize the 
government and have this split? Therefore, we are supporting 
the republicans, and the British are supporting the royalists. 
Is that not a strange situation because of the Aden situation 
right next to it?
    Mr. Battle. It goes back almost five years. At the time 
that recognition was made, the thought was that this was a 
truly liberal response to an unpalatable regime, and that there 
were reasons for the change--that the Republican regime was a 
truly liberal government that was going to try to respond to 
the needs of the people and help a very bad situation. The 
British never agreed with it, and many others did not.
    Senator Symington. In this case, we are on the side of 
Nasser, and the British are opposed to it.
    Mr. Battle. I would not say on the side of Nasser. We 
recognize them, but I think that our goal and purpose there is 
very different. We are not on the side of Nasser.
    Senator Symington. I may have over-simplified it. We are 
supplying materials and aid to the same government that Nasser 
is supplying soldiers to.
    Mr. Battle. That is right. Our aid has, however, been 
primarily, as I said, $2.4 million in this fiscal year, mainly 
in the completion of a road project begun a long time ago and 
well digging, sanitation help and things of that sort.
    Mr. Brewer. These are all prior to the revolution.

                    MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ROYALISTS

    Senator Symington. I have three staff questions that I 
would like to ask:

    Which Middle East countries were giving military assistance 
to the royalists in Yemen?

    Mr. Battle. The military assistance--the bulk of it, comes 
from Saudi Arabia. There have been reports of the Iranians 
putting in equipment there. There have been so many cases that 
the Jordanians were helping one degree or another. Is there 
anybody else?
    Mr. Brewer. No.
    Senator Symington.

    Which Arab countries are giving military assistance to the 
republicans?

    Mr. Battle. The bulk of it is very largely coming from 
Egypt, and I think it is fairly clear that the Russians have 
underwritten part of it.
    Senator Symington. It is absolutely amazing the way that 
these are cork-screwed around.
    The second question:

    Is any sizable amount of American-made military equipment 
being used by either side in the conflict? Is the Shah of Iran 
sending American equipment into Yemen?

    Mr. Battle. Sizable, no, sir. I do not think that there 
have been reports or, rather, I do believe that there have been 
reports at various times of individual rifles and things of 
American origin popping up, but not, certainly, in sizable 
amounts.

                     SUPPORT FROM THE SHAH OF IRAN

    Senator Symington. Now the second part of the question 
which I have already read----

    Is the Shah of Iran sending American equipment into Yemen?

    Mr. Battle. I have had no reports of that. Will you answer 
that?
    Mr. Brewer. This is very obscure. There have apparently 
been caches of equipment which originated in the United States 
which have been taken from royalist caves. The republicans have 
said, and the allegations have been made that it was from Iran, 
but there has been no substance to show that.
    Mr. Battle. It has been small--it has not been large. There 
have been many rumors that the Shah was becoming increasingly 
interested in this, was helping it. Perhaps, that might be.
    Senator Symington. This is extremely important, and I know 
that many of the senators are interested in this, as well as 
the Chairman. Just what is going on in Iran from the standpoint 
of arms. But as I see it now it is getting to be a real 
crossword puzzle, because the Shah is receiving $100 million of 
Russian military equipment because he is afraid of Nasser, yet 
he is slipping him some military equipment into Yemen in 
support of Nasser.
    Mr. Battle. No, in support of the Royalists.
    Senator Symington. He supports the Royalists--he and the 
British are on one side in Yemen?
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And we and the Egyptians are on the 
other side in Yemen.
    Mr. Battle. I do not like to put it on the side of the 
Egyptians. We are not.
    Senator Symington. We are giving them help, supporting the 
same people that they are giving arms to.
    Mr. Brewer. We are not giving them.
    Mr. Battle. The only aid project is the one I mentioned.
    Senator Symington. What do we give them in the matter of 
aid?
    Mr. Battle. $2.4 million for this fiscal year which will, 
obviously, over now, which is the completion work on a road 
that we started some years ago, some well digging equipment, 
sanitation equipment, health, that kind of thing.
    Senator Symington. We are giving them a road so that they 
can move fast and making them healthy, and the others are 
giving them guns that shoot, but we are not supporting them. I 
am being a little sarcastic on purpose.

                  RUSSIAN AND CHINESE EFFORTS IN YEMEN

    Mr. Battle. Let me make one other point. This is a terribly 
complicated situation. The Russians and the Chinese have been 
making quite an effort in Yemen. The Chinese and the Russians 
we think may be competing with each other.
    Senator Symington. And us.
    Mr. Battle. And us, yes. The reason that the Soviets have 
been interested in keeping the Egyptians in there is for their 
own interest, obviously. Over recent weeks they have been 
evidencing a desire to deal directly with the Yemeni 
government, rather than through the Egyptians, which the 
Egyptians appear not to have liked and have gone along with 
them. One of the reasons that we have thought that we ought to 
stay in there in a modest way is to keep from abdicating the 
situation to the Chinese and the Russians. That is our aid 
program; it is in that modest way. It was to counter and not 
walk off a situation where we thought for a lot of reasons it 
would be better to be off-stage there and not abdicate 
completely to either the Soviets or the Chinese domination. We 
are coming off awfully close to having exactly that now.
    Senator Symington. With the committee's permission, I would 
like to insert as part of the record this excellent statement 
made in the staff memorandum as to the situation in Yemen which 
verifies this as being accurate and of major importance. I will 
not bother you any more at this time, Mr. Secretary, it getting 
closer to the time for adjourning. There are nine questions 
here about Greece. Would you be good enough to answer those for 
the record. I think we have covered many of them. I know that 
we have covered some of them. I am not sure that we have 
covered all of them. They are very well put together.
    Mr. Battle. I will do that.
    Senator Symington. That is all I have. We will make this a 
part of the record then at this point.
    [The staff memorandum referred to follows:]

                          United States Senate

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                             April 28, 1967

           Subcommittee on Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs

                            STAFF MEMORANDUM

The Political Situation in Greece
    The leaders of the military coup, which took place on April 
20, 1967, seem to be in full control of the Greek Government. 
King Constantine presided over a cabinet meeting on April 26, 
1967, thus giving the regime an aura of constitutional 
legitimacy.
    The military junta is reportedly led by Colonel George 
Papadopoulos. There is no evidence of dissension within the 
ranks of the armed services.
    According to Colonel Papadopoulos, the King was unaware of 
this coup. The King now seems to be in a position somewhere 
between the military on the one hand and the conservative 
civilian opposition on the other. How much influence he has in 
either directing the present government or guiding political 
events in the near future is not clear.
    Most of those arrested on political charges last week have 
been released. Former Prime Minister George Papandreou and his 
son, Andreas, are still in prison, along with about a thousand 
people considered to be left wing.
Questions
    1. Were American officials in contact with any members of 
the new military government immediately before the coup? Did we 
have any indications that the King was going to move against 
Papandreou but was beaten to the punch by the new military 
rulers?
    2. The statements of the new government as to what is wrong 
in Greece--such as corruption, and unrest among the farmers--
sound very much like the complaints of Andreas Papandreou. What 
is the difference between what this military government thinks 
is wrong with Greece and what the Papandreous think?
    3. Now that the military government is installed, what are 
the major problems with which it must deal?
    4. What will the United States reaction be if the new Greek 
government sends delegates to the NATO Parliamentarian's 
meeting or the Interparliamentary Union?
    5. Greece has been in a state of political crisis for 22 
months. Has there been a major policy review of our relations 
with Greece during that time?
    6. What is the status of our military aid program at this 
covered time?
    7. What consultation over the Greek situation has taken 
place to date in the North Atlantic Council? Do you expect the 
subject to be brought up?
    8. How will we react if the King is removed or becomes a 
puppet of the junta?
    9. Since the military men who staged the coup are mostly 
American trained and the equipment they used of American 
origin, isn't our silence on Greece generally taken as a sign 
that we support the new leaders?

    Senator Symington. Is there anything that you would like to 
ask, Senator Pell?

                        OPPOSITION TO ALL COUPS

    Senator Pell. Just one particular point.
    Senator Symington. You go right ahead.
    Senator Pell. I do not think that this has been covered.
    There was another situation that I think should be covered. 
Some years ago, I remember that there was going to be an 
election held in a certain country, and when the election was 
held that you wished to have held--I made this prediction at 
that time--that they would go ahead and have their putsch, 
which they did. And it seems to me that this is a very real 
analysis of what happened in Greece. Now there will be a very 
real analogy of what has happened in Greece. Now there will be 
an election in a month or two and as a result in the probable 
election is the attitude on the part of some would not have 
affected but very few votes of the majority of the people.
    I cannot get through my dull brain what the difference is 
between these two. We protested the one to the high heavens, 
and are not intended to protest the other. I think we should 
protest it. We are up to the point that we are against a coup 
either way.
    If it had resulted in blood being shed, blood is being shed 
all over the world equally for other reasons. Why are we not 
making a protest here?
    Mr. Battle. In the first instance, we did not want the coup 
to occur. I reviewed it just before you came in.
    The second point is that our response is contained in the 
information that you asked the last time we were here to check 
where coups have been had. I have a list of those. We have had 
the historian working on this since you raised the question. In 
many instances we have refrained from statements, depending on 
what we thought about the situation. I have that list for you. 
I have the statement for the record. That will list the number 
of cases where we failed to respond.
    The reason I feel that we do as we do, particularly in 
this, in the first stages of this if we had, in fact, said that 
we did not like the coup, we ran the risk of being the reason 
for a counter effort with a coalition of liberal and leftist 
forces which could have caused great civil unrest and have 
resulted in a civil war in Greece. That is the reason. We do 
not like it. The desire to simply say something that reflected 
our own thoughts on it was very great, but if we had made such 
a statement I think that the consequences of it in the initial 
stages might very well have been the means of civil war in 
Greece with the possibility of a dictatorship of the left or of 
the right emerging from this, neither one of which we wanted.
    Senator Symington. You might have gotten some Turkish 
interest in the situation.
    Mr. Battle. I think as to Cyprus, the consequences of this 
were very bad. I think that we have had some success on this. I 
am in no way saying that I am happy with any of it. We have 
tried to get the King to take the lead. We have tried to get 
the King to broaden the government and the cabinet. The King 
has stood up to the coup by refusing to sign the original 
papers, the decrees that would have suspended the constitution 
and declared martial law. He still has not signed them. The 
press says that he has. Yesterday the coup admitted publicly 
that this was not known to the King--it was not backed by the 
King--they went ahead by themselves.
    I think we have managed to distinguish the King's position 
from the coup's position.
    Senator Symington. As I said, also, what the Secretary told 
us this morning is that the position is completely fluid. We 
are not taking any firm position, we are just waiting and 
watching. It is a very good question, a very logical question.

                        NEED FOR U.S. STATEMENT

    Senator Pell. I do not like Russia. I do not like the 
situation in some places. But the reason that we are willing, 
apparently, to shed blood and to shed other people's blood is 
so that we can produce a government that can presumably have 
the capacity to perform effectively in the area. If we are 
faced with civil war and blood being shed or a right-wing 
dictatorship, do we prefer the right-wing dictatorship and not 
having blood being shed for it?
    Mr. Battle. I prefer this, too.
    Senator Pell. Should we not make a statement?
    Mr. Battle. They have written two or three statements. I do 
not prepare how we say this without having effects there that 
would be unknown and we could see the end of the line.
    Senator Pell. It might be extremely possible to do so.
    Mr. Battle. Not if it brings about a civil war and a left-
wing dictatorship.
    Senator Pell. You believe that a left-wing dictatorship is 
worse? We might not have a sheer democracy?
    Mr. Battle. We are perfectly certain that the King has made 
a statement calling for a return to the constitutional 
processes. I think we can endorse that statement. We have been 
pressing them to make their own statement. Instead of saying 
that the coup is bad, we have come out and said or will say 
that we are for the constitutional processes, which, in effect, 
to anyone who reads carefully would be about the same thing.
    I think that the dangers of a counter coup, the thing that 
I talked about, will lessen each day, but, particularly as long 
as the King is making his own effort to get the government 
moving in the direction that he wants it to move and that we 
want it to move, I think that we have made some progress. I do 
not find it very attractive just sitting and saying nothing, 
either. On the other hand, the consequences seem to us worse 
than the statement. The statement relieves us of, perhaps, a 
desire to comment on the situation. I hope that we are going to 
be able to endorse the very specific steps they take which will 
affect them, and that we will say that we are in favor of 
constitutional processes, not coups, rather than taking the 
risk of a statement, the consequences of which we did not see.
    We can make an argument for that.
    Senator Pell. Just one more question.
    I would hope that the administration could express its 
views.
    I would request that the historian also, if you would, dig 
up a collection of the right-wing coups that the United States 
has refrained from publicly criticizing, and if you will, to 
submit that statement to us.
    Mr. Battle. It will take a few weeks.
    Senator Pell. I thank you for it.
    Mr. Battle. I will feel free to make this statement when I 
see that.
    Senator Symington. Senator Javits would like very much to 
talk with you. That is all for today.
    Senator Pell. That is all I have in my mind.
    Senator Symington. The hearing is terminated subject to the 
call of the Chair.
    [Whereupon, at 11:55 o'clock a.m., the subcommittee 
recessed, subject to the call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                          TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, 
Church, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, and Hickenlooper.
    S. 1029, to improve certain benefits for employees in high-
risk situations, came up for further consideration and was 
carried over.
    An original resolution (S. Res. 115) authorizing members of 
the Senate to respond to official invitations was considered 
and ordered reported without objection.
    H.R. 3399, to authorize the extension of the life of the 
Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission to November 6, 1968, was 
ordered without objection.
    Ex. G, 90/1, Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, was 
ordered reported by voice vote.
    S. 1030, the Informational Media Guaranty Bill, was 
discussed and carried over.
    Ex. G, 88/1, Conventions Concerning International Exchange 
of Publications and Documents was ordered reported.
    Ex. A, 90/1, Amendment to Article 109 of the United Nations 
Charter was also ordered reported.
    Ex. C, 87/2, ILO Convention No. 116; Ex. G., 89/2, ILO 
Convention No. 122 concerning employment policy; and S.J. Res. 
71, were all carried over.
    Senator Gore asked and received permission to print the 
hearings of the Disarmament Subcommittee.
    The committee discussed the nomination of Rutherford M. 
Poats before adjourning.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                          TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 2:30 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, 
Symington, and Cooper.
    Asian Development Bank affairs briefing by Eugene R. Black, 
Special Advisor to the President, accompanied by Joseph W. 
Barr, Under Secretary of the Treasury.
    [The committee adjourned at 4:25 p.m.]


                     UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE

                              ----------                              


                         Wednesday, May 3, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
 Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations
                and Armed Services Committee on the
                 Subject of United States Troops in Europe,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Mike Mansfield (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present representing the Committee on Foreign Relations: 
Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, Hickenlooper, 
and Aiken.
    Representing the Senate Committee on Armed Services: 
Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Miller, and Pearson.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Lowenstein of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations staff; Mr. Kirbow and Mr. Braswell of the 
Committee on Armed Services staff; and Miss Stabler of the 
Library of Congress.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY 
   EUGENE V. ROSTOW, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            IMPORTANCE OF A CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY [P. 58]

    Secretary Rusk. The first has to do with the matter of 
deterrence. By the middle of the 1950's a nuclear exchange 
became an operational possibility. President Eisenhower in his 
second term, and President Kennedy and President Johnson, have 
had to think about problems that no other President has ever 
had to think about.
    Now both we and the Soviet Union understand a great deal 
about what a nuclear exchange would mean. We are not sure that 
other governments, including many governments in NATO, have 
really entered deeply into that question, but I am convinced--
and, as I say, who knows what the right answers are--I am 
convinced that nuclear power alone is not a deterrent to less 
than all-out war, because moving promptly to nuclear war is so 
irrational that none will believe it. The Russians won't 
believe it, we won't believe it, and our allies won't believe 
it.
    Therefore, unless there is a conventional capability to 
deter the less than all-out nuclear war, we run the risk of not 
having a deterrent at all. So that is one point I just wish to 
suggest for the subcommittee to think about.
    The second has to do with a point that was mentioned 
briefly, I believe, in your earlier hearing with Mr. Katzenbach 
and with Mr. McNamara that I would like to emphasize very 
strongly, and that is that in the event of a crisis, it is 
extremely important for the chiefs of government of their time 
to have a number of options open to them.
    The problem of managing a crisis is much more crucial today 
than ever before in our history, and it would be most 
unfortunate if in a matter of hours or even in a matter of a 
very few days the chiefs of government of NATO were faced with 
a choice between nuclear war on the one side and surrender on 
the other.
    Now, U.S. forces in the central front of NATO are 20 
percent of the ground forces. It is very important, it seems to 
me, to preserve for the President of the United States some 
options in the opening stages of a crisis, to gain some time to 
find out for certain what the purposes of the other side are, 
to give the processes of contact and consultation some chance 
to resolve the crisis before it is too late.
    These two points mean to me quite frankly that those who 
talk about a ``plateglass'' doctrine are just not really in 
touch with reality. I do not believe that the chiefs of 
government of NATO would move to nuclear war in the first 48 
hours if there were a conventional clash for then it means the 
last decision they will make. It will mean utter destruction of 
their countries, and it would mean the loss in this country of 
probably 100 million people in the first hour or so. Chiefs of 
governments simply are not going to rush into that decision.
    So I would hope that we would relate the conventional--we 
and our European friends--would relate the conventional forces 
of NATO with, first, deterrence, a realistic view of 
deterrence; and, secondly, maintaining the options so that 
crises can be managed without the destruction of a good part of 
the Northern Hemisphere, if possible.

                     PROPOSED TROOP ROTATIONAL PLAN

    Now, we have been consulting, as the Members know, about 
the possibility of utilizing mobility and testing the dual 
basing concept in order to bring back to this country certain 
ground and air units.
    As the chairman has pointed out--and, Mr. Chairman, I very 
much appreciate your comments on that subject--we have in mind, 
as Secretary McNamara expressed here the other day, that we 
would rotate back to this country roughly two-thirds of one 
division element of strength. That includes the brigades 
themselves plus certain support, comparable support units, and 
rotate back a portion of our fighter-bomber air wings.
    Since that meeting we have had further discussions in the 
tripartite groups, and because of the high proportion of our 
fighter-bombers to NATO total fighter-bomber strength, we did 
think that it was wise, in view of the political and military 
reactions among our allies, to reduce the number of aircraft 
that we expected to rotate back to this country from 144 to 98, 
and to make comparable upward adjustments in the ground force 
rotation. The total rotational plan would be approximately the 
same, but the mix between ground and air would be somewhat 
different.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (The prepared statement of Secretary Rusk follows:)

    For political and military reasons, we have therefore 
concluded that substantial, balanced NATO forces, including 
United States forces, are still required. I believe this 
proposition is generally accepted in this country as elsewhere.
    The question, therefore, has arisen not in terms of whether 
American forces are still needed on the ground in Europe. The 
question has been posed in terms of whether the present levels 
of those forces could not be safely reduced.
    The Administration seriously examines this question each 
year. Last year it undertook a special and intensive review in 
the Trilateral discussions among the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the Federal Republic. Those Trilateral discussions 
ended last week in London. They were successful in providing a 
good basis of understanding. The matter will be discussed 
further, as it should be, within NATO. We believe it important 
that the final agreement be reached in this Allied framework.
    Our own redeployment plan has been explained in detail by 
Secretary McNamara. What he told you of the Army and Air Force 
rotation plan--the units and men involved, the timetable--still 
holds with one exception.
    The German authorities were concerned about the 
redeployment of a substantial portion of the three tactical 
fighter wings now based in Germany, and as a result of further 
discussion with them, we have amended that portion of the plan.
    It is now agreed that 120 of the 216 aircraft involved will 
remain in Germany. 96 of the aircraft will be redeployed to the 
U.S. All 216 of the aircraft will be together in Germany once a 
year for exercises. A compatible adjustment will be made 
upwards in the redeployment of the ground forces which Mr. 
McNamara described.



           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
    LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES DEPENDS ON SOVIET RESPONSE [P. 63]

    Senator Stennis. Mr. Secretary, as I understand now, your 
position is to stop where you are now after you have covered 
this 18,000 plus the 21,000 dependents, 35,000 additional 
military, as I get your figure.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we think, sir, that this level of 
conventional forces in NATO is about where we ought to be. When 
you say stop now, this depends upon one very important factor, 
and that is what the response, if any, of the Soviet Union will 
be on this issue.
    Senator Stennis. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. I will submit to the committee a statement 
which Mr. Kosygin made in London on this point which seemed to 
harden their position on the question of mutual withdrawals of 
forces from Central Europe because he seemed to connect the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces with the final confirmation of the 
existing boundaries in Central Europe, meaning particularly the 
stabilization of the German Democratic Republic and the 
consolidation of the status quo.
    If that is their position then this is somewhat of a 
retreat from some of the impressions we have had before.
    Now, quite frankly, I do not know at this point whether the 
Soviets will react either by a direct approach, as one or 
another member of NATO will almost surely make in the weeks and 
months ahead, or by the process of what has come to be called 
mutual examples.
    We will watch that very closely. I am inclined to believe 
that the Soviets will not negotiate at this point on mutual 
withdrawal of forces because they are apparently nervous about 
being charged with negotiating a mutual withdrawal in Central 
Europe in a way that would release U.S. forces for Vietnam and 
bring them under the fire of China.
    My guess is that if there is any prospect of any movement 
on this it is likely to come without agreement, but through 
what is called mutual example, that they simply take certain 
steps. We have had one or two intelligence rumors that there 
might have been some movement of Soviet forces out of East 
Germany. We are trying to check that. We have no confirmation 
of that at the present time. But I think, sir, that if the 
Soviets were to show some real interest in this problem this 
could, in turn, be taken into account by NATO as to what forces 
are required in NATO.

               BASIS OF DECISION TO REDUCE TROOP STRENGTH

    Senator Stennis. I have not had much to say about this 
matter. Frankly, I have felt for some time that perhaps we 
could reduce some of our supply troops over there and a lot of 
the dependents and help this balance and payments situation. 
You could perhaps withdraw some of the military. But I have 
been opposed to the idea of just going in and doing it 
arbitrarily, particularly with this war going on. As I see it, 
it is getting worse, and I have thought, with the greatest 
deference, that it is a mistake to bring up a resolution, to go 
any further than you gentlemen have gone. But I am glad that 
you have seen fit to do what you have because I know you 
thought it was safe to do it.
    Now, how much of your decision though was based on saving 
money and how much was based on lessening tensions, if I may 
put it that way? You have already mentioned both.
    Secretary Rusk. There was a mix. There were a good many 
elements that went into the picture.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM ADEN [P. 69]

    Next to Yemen is Aden, and in Aden when the British pull 
out in 1968, there is going to be nothing left but the 
Communist countries.
    My point is why isn't it much more important for us, if we 
support British troops anywhere, if we are going to continue 
this subsidizing of British troops somewhere, to subsidize them 
in Aden instead of Germany?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we are very much disturbed about 
Britain's pulling out of Aden before there is some stability in 
that area. I do not have the impression that this is a matter 
that the British are treating solely as a financial problem. 
They have not indicated to us that financial help would solve 
the problem as far as they are concerned.
    We would hope that they would not pull out in the middle of 
this order and pressures against Aden from the Yemen. We 
continue to consult with them on that, to emphasize that point 
to them.
    Secondly, we do believe that the other members of NATO, the 
European members of NATO, ought to get more interested in the 
Near East, which is immediately adjacent to their own NATO 
European area, and the resources of which are important to 
Europe, even though we ourselves have major investments there.
    So I would not quarrel with your concern about what is 
happening in the Middle East in that particular spot right at 
this moment.
    Whether we can get the British to continue to pack the load 
there until there is some assurance of real stability, very 
frankly today I cannot say.
    On the European side, what we have tried to do is to come 
to a trilateral arrangement which would make sense among the 
three governments involved.
    Now, in this package, for example, it has been very 
important for us to be told by the Bundesbank that it will 
continue its practice of not converting dollars into gold as a 
part of a policy of international monetary cooperation.
    Senator Symington. I saw that statement this morning.
    Secretary Rusk. And working with our own Treasury in trying 
to do something about the whole question of monetary liquidity. 
These things all merge into each other.
    I would suppose that the trilateral discussions would stand 
on their own merits both on the financial side and on the 
military side.
    But, Senator, I wish I could give you some comfort about 
the Middle East this morning. But I just cannot, quite frankly, 
and that question is not resolved.
    We ourselves would not want to be called on to fill a 
vacuum.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             BASIS FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM ADEN [P. 71]

    Senator Symington. Do you think the British would stay in 
Aden if the United States offered to offset the foreign 
exchange cost of the British presence in Aden for the purchase 
of military equipment?
    Secretary Rusk. I would doubt it; I would doubt it very 
strongly.
    Senator Symington. Why is that? Their economy could fold up 
if they lose their Middle East oil.
    Secretary Rusk. We have made that argument to them very 
strongly.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                U.S. STATURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 71]

    Secretary Rusk. On the matter of the Yemen: Again I would 
not want to argue with you very hard on that point, but I would 
urge you to consider withholding such a resolution until we see 
whether we can get these two fellows out of the pokey whom the 
Yemenis are holding, because we ourselves have this point very 
much under consideration as to whether we ought to try to 
maintain relations with the Yemen. But we have not said 
anything about it. And I think it would be rather dangerous to 
say anything about it until we get these two men out of jail 
because we would like to rescue them.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You had better get them out very 
quickly because I am going to file the resolution before very 
long. I considered filing it today.
    Secretary Rusk. As you know, our relations with Egypt have 
been deteriorating pretty badly because of the attitude of 
Nasser himself. In his speech yesterday it was about as bad a 
speech as he has made in two years.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I was going to suggest that speech 
yesterday was just a continuation of the vituperation.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.

                       RUMORED IMF LOAN TO EGYPT

    Senator Hickenlooper. What is there to the rumor that the 
International Monetary Fund is going to make Nasser an $80 
million loan, or something like that, to tide him over.
    Secretary Rusk. May I ask Mr. Rostow to comment?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.
    Mr. Rostow. We have been approached over a period of months 
by the government of the UAR for improvement of relations and 
indeed for preparing a list of conditions that we would think 
appropriate on the basis of which we could encourage private 
investment, private American investment, in the UAR, and to get 
their debt situation----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Would any private investing companies 
be foolhardy enough to invest there as long as this situation 
exists?
    Mr. Rostow. Well, I mean there are two American oil 
companies that have contracts and are proceeding for the 
development of oil there, but we have told them in the last few 
days that the developments in Yemen and the change in the 
situation now precipitated by this new speech of Nasser are 
very serious indeed and would require us to reconsider all the 
steps that have been considered so far, and we have just 
stopped working on those.
    The fund--they have resisted negotiations with the fund for 
a long time. We urged--we said it was inexpendable for 
improvement of relations, and the fund has worked out 
tentatively a deal with them and some of the other European 
creditors which was by way of preparation for a program of 
encouraging private investment in Egypt.
    Of course these things are all superseded now by the 
political development to which you and Senator Symington have 
referred, but the government of the UAR seems to have been 
proceeding on two paths and the two paths were totally 
inconsistent.
    We were perfectly willing to talk with them about the 
possibility of improving relations on terms we regard as fair. 
But now, of course, we are taking a totally different line. At 
the same time we are in active consultation with other 
governments about the possibility of joint concerted diplomatic 
action in that whole area in the interest of containing these 
dangers to which you refer.
    Secretary Rusk. I would have to report, Senator, that there 
has been a curious inattention on the part of our European 
friends in NATO to this area even though it is right next to 
them. At the last ministerial meeting of NATO, I proposed there 
be an immediate meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the 
Near East. The response was, ``Well, Christmas holidays are 
coming and then New Year's holidays are coming and maybe we can 
have a meeting sometime maybe a month from now,'' that kind of 
thing.
    We are trying to stir up our Western European friends to 
this problem because they have at least as much interest in 
this as we have and perhaps more in the longer run.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      RUMORED SOVIET DIVERSIONARY MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 74]

    Senator Jackson. What do you see as the most likely thrust 
which they might get us engaged in in the Middle East at this 
point? Like my colleagues around the table, I am terribly 
concerned about the Middle East, and I think this is a likely 
area in which they could move with some profit, as well as a 
diversion.
    Secretary Rusk. I would think it is rather unlikely, 
Senator, that they would move with their own armed forces in 
the Middle East. I think they might support or encourage 
Nasser. That has some complications in it. Nasser is not all 
that reliable from their point of view. There seems to be some 
rivalry within the Arab world between Algeria and Egypt 
although both seem to be reasonably friendly with the Soviet 
Union.
    I think the situation is much more volatile than that. We 
know that there are differences of view among some of the 
leaders in Cairo as well as differences of view among leaders 
in the Yemen, and there is one possibility, and one does not 
rely on this, that Nasser will find that those leaders who 
neglect their own people and the economies of their own 
countries to go adventuring abroad to get in trouble. He is in 
a very desperate situation from an economic point of view and 
will have to be very careful about the conditions on which the 
World Bank or anybody else, the Monetary Fund, would bail him 
out.
    So I think the likelihood is that the problem is going to 
be primarily Egyptian policy supported by the Soviet Union 
rather than overt moves by the Soviets themselves.
    Senator Jackson. Are the Soviets gaining more and more 
influence within the United Arab Republic?
    Secretary Rusk. I would think as far as Nasser is 
concerned, yes, and there are a good many others in Egypt that 
we hear from from time to time who are very much concerned 
about this. One of the problems is to get access to Nasser and 
to get moderate voices heard by Nasser.
    There are a number of people who have talked to us, top 
Egyptians who have talked to us--and I would have to take this 
off the record----
    [Discussion off the record.]

           WISDOM OF RESOLUTION ON TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

    Senator Jackson. Do you think it would be wise, Mr. 
Secretary, at this time for the Senate to pass a resolution 
calling for a substantial reduction of American forces in 
Europe?
    Secretary Rusk. I would think, sir, that a resolution which 
would go beyond the measures that have already been discussed 
could be quite disadvantageous and could get in the way, for 
example, of the possibility of getting comparable steps taken 
by the Soviet Union.
    About a year ago I would have said that there was some 
possibility that the Soviet Union would get seriously 
interested in a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. 
Some of their own Warsaw Pact countries were getting restive 
about the costs of some of these forces. You know, Rumania has 
quit paying their share of those forces, at least that is my 
understanding.
    But I think the combination of pressure from China and the 
charge that they would be reducing forces to relieve pressure 
on American forces so that we could move them to Vietnam, and 
the idea that if they just sit tight we will be reducing our 
forces anyhow, has put the Soviet possibility somewhat in the 
background.
    Senator Jackson. They have been on notice for this event 
for a long, long time.
    Secretary Rusk. And I would think that a resolution, for 
example, that went beyond what we are doing would greatly 
reduce the chances of getting any serious interest in the 
Soviet Union in reducing their forces.
    Senator Jackson. Well, the example problem is a difficult 
one. You will recall that we did suggest to the Soviets that 
they cut back on their fissionable material production after we 
made our announcement about the cutback on the fissionable 
material and the closing of certain reactors. The fact of the 
matter is, as I recall, Mr. Khruschev had announced that there 
would be a cutback because they were not going to complete 
certain facilities in the Soviet Union. Instead, they went 
ahead and finished their facilities and actually increased 
their production of fissionable material.
    I would agree with you. It would seem logical at this point 
in time, with the ideological feud between the Soviets and the 
Chinese, that if they do move any troops from Europe, rather 
than agree to any kind of a mutual bilateral understanding, the 
Chinese are causing so much trouble that they had to move some 
of their troops to that area.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, we understand that they have moved 
some of their forces to the Far East along the China border, 
with limited numbers still, but those have come from within the 
Soviet Union and not out of East Germany.
    Senator Jackson. Not from Central Europe.
    Secretary Rusk. But we are trying to check on occasional 
rumors we get about some occasional forces out of East Germany. 
Whether these are simply reduction of forces or just what they 
would be, we just do not know. We have not been able to confirm 
it as yet.

     U.S. RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

    Senator Jackson. There is one other point I wanted to 
allude to. Is it not true that if we get ourselves into a 
situation where the West Germans are making too large a 
contribution of forces in Central Europe that the opportunity 
of improving relations with Eastern Europe will be somewhat 
jeopardized and any hope of trying to work out any unification 
of Germany will be likewise jeopardized?
    Secretary Rusk. I think that will be true, sir, if the West 
German forces were to go significantly beyond the general level 
of 12 divisions and forces of that order of magnitude.
    We do not expect that despite the slowdown that the Soviet 
Union and East Germany have recommended to other countries of 
Eastern Europe, that in the months ahead there will be some 
additional agreements between the Federal Republic and certain 
of the other Eastern European countries along the lines of the 
Rumanian agreement.
    But this is not only a problem for Eastern Europe, Senator, 
it would be a real problem for Western Europe.
    Senator Jackson. It would be a problem within NATO.
    Secretary Rusk. It would be a problem within NATO because 
there are a good many members who would be nervous about 
Germany having the dominant position inside NATO.
    Senator Jackson. There are two aspects here.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Jackson. The impact on Eastern European countries 
as well as on the NATO community.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    Senator Jackson. The idea of an integrated force was in 
substantial part to deal with the German problem.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    Senator Jackson. And it was in this way that Germany could 
make a contribution of forces to Europe's defense yet avoid the 
ancient fears of the German General Staff. Is this not correct?
    Secretary Rusk. It is a very important political fact in 
NATO that all German forces are assigned to NATO. This is a 
very important political fact with NATO quite apart from 
Eastern Europe.

               ROTATION OF DIVISION RETURNING FROM EUROPE

    Senator Jackson. As I understand it, and this point has 
been raised a couple of times there during the hearings, is it 
not correct that the division coming back to the States would 
be available for Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. It is not correct, sir.
    Senator Jackson. As I understand the situation, all we are 
really doing is bringing the division back here, with one 
brigade in Europe at all times, and instead of having them 
located and housed in Germany, they will be in the United 
States. In that way there will be a continuing commitment to 
NATO, with the ability to move them literally overnight into 
the pre-positioned areas with the supporting elements 
available.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, to be confirmed by my defense 
colleague, my understanding of the arrangement is that the 
brigades would succeed each other in periods of about six 
months.
    Senator Jackson. Rotated.
    Secretary Rusk. There will always be one brigade there, and 
the Division Headquarters, once a year the entire division 
would be together, but because this six-month period is at 
least that short, it is possible for all of the dependents to 
be back in this country. Naturally under those circumstances 
the other two brigades must be always available to return 
immediately to NATO if required.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


             DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN TRILATERAL AGREEMENT

    Senator Sparkman. Was there any difficulty inside the three 
countries in arriving at this agreement or was it pretty well 
agreed to?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there were times when it was 
difficult in detail, particularly on the financial arrangements 
between the Germans and the British. They were bargaining with 
each other pretty hard just where they would come out on that 
situation and each moved substantially toward each other before 
it was over. The gap was rather wide.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH WEST GERMANY [P. 79]

    Senator Church. This then is an abandonment of what had 
been our position that the Germans ought to pay for the out-of-
pocket costs--that is, for the gold drain costs--of the 
maintenance of American forces in Europe.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the problem was never whether they 
would pay as a budget matter, but whether they would deal with 
the foreign exchange ramifications of it.
    Senator Church. But we did have an agreement with them, did 
we not, in which they said they would do this?
    Secretary Rusk. For a period of 6 years we had an agreement 
on that. They now have a backlog of what, $900 million of 
deposits here in this country under those arrangements from 
which they are taking steps in the monetary field to assure 
that the balance of payments is not loaded on the United States 
under these arrangements.
    Senator Church. Well, although I am trying to follow your 
argument, nonetheless it seems to me to be the truth that the 
Germans have receded from a position that they had heretofore 
taken concerning taking care of our gold drain costs.
    Secretary Rusk. By purchases of hardware.
    Senator Church. Right, by purchases of hardware.
    Secretary Rusk. By purchases of hardware, that is right.
    Senator Church. And we are now entering into a new 
arrangement which is less advantageous to us in terms of the 
gold drain. If the Germans believed that the maintenance of any 
army of this size was really essential to their security, they 
would be willing to continue it to pay for the gold drain costs 
of the United States. That is the point I make.

                   EFFECT OF THE ARRANGEMENT [P. 80]

    Secretary Rusk. Well, they have some problems too about the 
other side of this, you see, as to whether they can, in fact, 
both as a budgetary matter and as a matter of utilizing the 
hardware reasonably efficiently, continue indefinitely on the 
two-year arrangement that we had which was frankly very 
favorable to us.
    Do you want to comment additionally on this, Mr. Rostow?
    Mr. Rostow. We regard, and the Treasury regards, the 
monetary arrangements that have now been made by way of 
modification of the old offset plan as extremely advantageous 
to us, and to our general monetary position in the world.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          DETERRENT VALUE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS [P. 86]

    Senator Miller. I do not believe I would categorize the 
Cuban missile crisis as one of the greatest crises facing 
mankind. I heard President Kennedy make a statement that one 
nuclear missile alighting on the United States would mean a 
nuclear missile would land on the Soviet Union. I thought he 
handled the situation very well. Because he handled it that way 
and indicated our resolve, I frankly did not think it was an 
earth shattering crisis as some people have said, because I 
never felt that the Soviet leaders were about to commit 
suicide. I give them credit for being rather cool, calculating, 
logical people. They understood loud and clear President 
Kennedy's statement that that is exactly what would happen if 
they pressed the situation into a nuclear exchange.
    Senator Rusk. Senator, it turned out that that was the way 
it was. We were very conscious of the possibility of irrational 
action on the other side. There was a moment there when Mr. 
Krushchev appeared to be very distraught, and you always have 
to leave some room for irrational conduct on the other side. 
These are things which they have to emphasize as well as we on 
our side.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               ENCOURAGEMENT OF A MUTUAL RESPONSE [P. 87]

    Senator Miller. Assuming there is no overt act as to 
willingness to negotiate, and I am sure you have considered 
this very carefully and given this your evaluation, would it 
not be a practical step to provide that within one year these 
forces will be returned to let the Soviet Union know that if 
they have a mutual reduction then we will let it stay here; if 
they do not, then we are back over there, and a sort of a one-
year invitation for this mutual response from them.
    I am thinking in terms of the long-range results, not so 
much from the standpoint of preserving the NATO military 
capability as encouraging a mutual response that you talk 
about, and here we give them one year, and if they do not 
respond, then back to Europe go these forces.
    Then maybe six months later we might try it again, the idea 
being to encourage the mutual response showing that if they do 
not respond then we are back where we started.
    I am wondering if you might have pursued this.
    Senator Rusk. Senator, I am sympathetic with the idea of 
trying to find ways and means of stimulating mutual response. I 
am not at all sure that two-thirds of a division, for example, 
would pack enough weight to make this difference in Soviet 
policy. There are some 26 divisions of NATO in Central Europe; 
there are very large Warsaw Pact forces.
    If we were talking of five divisions or something, it is 
conceivable this might have that kind of negotiating weight. 
But we will test the Soviets in the next several months and see 
what happens.
    I do not believe this will pack enough weight to make a 
difference with it.
    Senator Miller. Perhaps you could bring this out in 
discussions with the other NATO states or ministers. If the 
Soviets do not make a response, then we will consider bringing 
back rather than just leaving alone, so they will know or have 
the assurance that if there is no response, then we may even 
bring them back over.
    I recognize if we have a large reduction this might provide 
for more of a mutual response than a smaller one, but we can 
still try a smaller one.
    I have nothing further.
    Mr. Rusk. It is an interesting idea, and we will mull over 
it a bit.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee recessed, to 
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., room 
S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Gore and Carlson.
    Also present: Senator McGee.
    Jack Hood Vaughn, Director, Peace Corps, accompanied by Mr. 
Brent Ashabranner, Acting Deputy Director, and Mr. Eric 
Stevenson, General Counsel, testified on S. 1031, the Peace 
Corps Authorization Bill.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:35 a.m.]


        DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

                              ----------                              


                          Friday, May 5, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
               Subcommittee on Near Eastern
                                    and South Asian
             Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Aiken, and 
Carlson.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee 
staff.
    Senator Symington. The meeting will come to order.
    We have convened the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs this afternoon to continue our inquiry into some 
of the most difficult problems facing the United States in that 
troubled area of the world. As these hearings have progressed, 
it has become apparent that the illicit flow of military 
equipment of American origin into the area is a serious 
problem. We have discovered that information on how these arms 
get to the Middle East, who profits from these deals, and where 
the equipment eventually winds up, is very hard to find. We 
have therefore asked Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to join us this 
afternoon in the hope that he can enlighten the subcommittee on 
these matters.
    General Carroll, it is a special privilege and pleasure for 
me to see you again, sir. We have been friends for about 25 
years, and we all know of your superb record in this and other 
fields.
    I might add General Carroll was formerly with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and perhaps is the only person who Mr. 
J. Edgar Hoover approved leaving the agency permanently, which 
was to the benefit of the Air Force.
    Have you a prepared statement?

 STATEMENT OF LT. GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 
 INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY CAPTAIN FRANK M. MURPHY, 
  U.S.N., CHIEF OF WESTERN AREA OFFICE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY; AND CHARLES H. FORE, JR., MIDDLE EAST ANALYST, DEFENSE 
                      INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    General Carroll. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not. I was not 
cognizant exactly of what it was that the committee might like 
to question me about.
    Senator Symington. May I ask my senior colleagues here, 
would it be in order if I asked some questions, Senator Aiken?
    Senator Aiken. I would think so. I like to have him come up 
without a prepared statement and then he does not have to clear 
it with any security officers.
    Senator Symington. I believe we will leave that remark 
right on the record.

                       MILITARY SURPLUS IN EUROPE

    General Carroll, can you give us the details on the numbers 
and kind of surplus military equipment of American origin now 
in the European surplus market?
    General Carroll. Mr. Chairman, I can present to you the 
estimate which we have in DIA relative to this surplus, and our 
estimate is predicted upon our cognizance of the kind of 
equipment which is required in the tables of organization, and 
equipment of the forces of the particular countries concerned.
    West Germany has a considerable amount of U.S. military 
equipment, which it considers surplus, and which incidentally 
it is anxious to sell.
    I could list the major items for you, sir.
    Senator Symington. If you would just run through them and 
then furnish any details for the record.
    General Caroll. All right, sir.
    106 105-millimeter howitzers; 55 155-millimeter howitzers; 
16 8-inch howitzers; 193 light tanks, 76-millimeter guns; 200 
medium tanks; 90-millimeter guns; 300 recoilless rifles; 75-
millimeter; 14,200 rocket launchers, 3.5-inch; and, in the Air 
Force items, 47 F-86K fighters; 41 F-84F fighter bombers; 48 
RF-84F fighter reconnaissance planes.
    As to France, France has a considerable amount of military 
equipment of U.S. origin, but only the following is believed to 
be surplus: In Army equipment, 100 120-millimeter and 4.2-inch 
mortars; 252 light tanks, M-4; and 7,000 trucks, two and a half 
tons and over.
    In Air Force items, 50 NlKE missiles; 47 F-84F fighter 
bombers; and 15 RF-84F fighter reconnaissance planes.
    Belgium has approximately 25 to 30 F-84F aircraft which are 
believed surplus.
    The Netherlands is believed to have had about 20 surplus F-
84F aircraft. All, however, are believed to have been 
redistributed to Turkey.
    A former U.S. PC-468 subchaser was loaned to Nigeria and 
subsequently sold to it.
    Norway has about 30 F-86F aircraft believed surplus and 
about 30 more, we believe, will become surplus when sufficient 
numbers of F-5s are received.
    Portugal has about 38 F-86Gs in storage due to lack of 
spare parts but, so far as we know, has no plans to sell them.
    Spain has 40 F-86Fs in storage as logistic backup. All of 
its 130 F-86s are to be phased out by 1971. But no evidence is 
available concerning their eventual disposition.
    Italy has 40 F-86Es which are nonflyable and being 
cannibalized; 8 F-84Fs are inactive. About 65 F-86Ks will be 
phased out in 1969, and at this time would be considered 
surplus.
    Those represent the major items as known to us which we 
feel fall in the surplus categories.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    How much additional equipment can we expect to flow into 
that market over the next five years? Would you like to furnish 
a figure for the record on that?
    General Carroll. I believe that I could come up with an 
estimate of it, Senator.
    Senator Symington. Would you do that? Furnish it for the 
record.
    [The material referred to follows.]

                ESTIMATE OF ADDITIONAL SURPLUS MATERIAL

    Additional military equipment of American origin that is 
estimated to become surplus to West European needs over the 
next five years follows:

                                BELGIUM

    Army: 503 Medium Tanks (5 M-4, 150 M-26, 8 M-46, 340 M-47)
    Air Force: 141 Aircraft (85 F-84F, 20 RF-84F, 25 C-119g, 5 
C-47, 2 C-54, 4 C-118)

                                 FRANCE

    Air Force: 72 F-l00 Aircraft

                                 ITALY

    Air Force: 240 Aircraft (66 F-86K, 40 F-86E, 74 F-84F, 20 
C-119J, 40 C-119G)

                            THE NETHERLANDS

    Air Force: 75 F-84F Aircraft

                                PORTUGAL

    Air Force: 50 F-86F Aircraft

                                 SPAIN

    Air Force: 150 Aircraft (125 F-86F, 25 T-33)

                              WEST GERMANY

    Army: 407 Light Tanks, M-41; 600 Medium Tanks, M-47; 356 
Tank Recovery Vehicles, M-47; 2,150 Armored Personnel Carriers 
HS-30; 500 80-mm Mortars; 331 Howitzers (216 105-mm, towed 
M2A1; 64 105-mm, SP M-52; 41 155-mm, SP M-44)

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Deleted.]

                        FLOW OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN

    Senator Symington. How much equipment of American origin 
has been sold, to the best of your knowledge, by private firms 
to Iran over the last two years, and who handled the sales?
    General Carroll. The largest sale that I know of that was 
made to Iran by private firms over the past couple of years was 
the sale of the 90 F-86 Sabre aircraft to Iran.
    As I know you are aware, Mr. Chairman, these F-86 aircraft 
which were surplus to the German inventory were Canadian-
manufactured aircraft, and the sale was consummated on the 
basis of an end use agreement certification which was given by 
Iran through a lieutenant general of the Supreme Iranian 
General Staff to the Federal Government of Germany.
    I know you are also aware of the fact that Iran was merely 
the ostensible purchaser and recipient and that the aircraft 
flowed rather rapidly through Iran to Pakistan.
    Senator Symington. Do we know anything about the details of 
prices on these sales?
    General Carroll. All I know about that, sir, is that it was 
supposed to be a $10 million sale [deleted].
    Senator Symington. You do not know what General Toufanian 
received, if anything.
    General Carroll. My information is that General Toufanian 
was to receive 5 percent of the sales price, which would have 
amounted to $500,000. It is also my understanding that he 
received $60,000 of this amount and was pressing for the 
remainder, but Merex was rather slow in responding on the 
grounds that they had lost money on the sale, that actually 
they had underestimated their costs in conjunction with it.
    Senator Symington. Is General Toufanian still with the 
Iranian armed forces?
    General Carroll. So far as I know, yes, sir.

                 SOVIETS AND CHINESE IN YEMEN AND ADEN

    Senator Symington. I would like to skip a minute now and go 
down to the question of Yemen and Aden. Would you have any 
thoughts when the British move out of Aden in 1968 about what 
the Soviets and the Chinese would do?
    General Carroll. Well, I would feel, first of all, that the 
prime frontrunner in endeavoring to capitalize upon the moveout 
of the British from that section of the world at that point in 
time would be the UAR, with the Soviet Union rendering a 
combination of support and instigation to them.
    So far as the Chinese are concerned, thus far they have not 
been active in Yemen from a military assistance standpoint, 
although they have to a limited economic extent, and I feel 
that they would endeavor to flow into the vacuum that would be 
created, but I feel also that they would be maneuvering in an 
area where the UAR and Soviet Union, through the UAR, would 
have an opportunity to predominate.
    Senator Symington. We are talking about Yemen now.
    General Carroll. That is correct, sir. Yemen and Aden.
    Senator Symington. Both.
    General Carroll. Both.
    Senator Symington. Just as a matter of interest, how did it 
come that we were backing, with the Chinese and Nasser and the 
Russians, one government in Yemen, and the British were backing 
the other, with the Canadians?
    General Carroll. I am afraid that is a question that 
involved political consideration, Mr. Chairman. That would be 
beyond my ken competence to judge.

                  AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN YEMEN

    Senator Symington. How much military equipment of American 
origin is being used in Yemen now?
    General Carroll. Well, first of all, the Yemen-Arab 
Republic forces have, so far as I know, no U.S. origin military 
equipment since in the main they are being supplied by the UAR, 
and arms and munitions available to the UAR in the main are 
supplied by the Soviet Union.
    Insofar as the royalist forces are concerned, I do recall 
that some time ago the Egyptian commander in Yemen exhibited to 
our embassy personnel, including our defense attache there, a 
50-caliber machine gun and some boxes of ammunition which bore 
a MAP insignia and indicated an off-loading at a Saudi Arabian 
port. The purpose of this, of course, was to contend that U.S. 
equipment was finding its way via Saudi Arabia into the hands 
of the royalists for sabotage and other purposes.
    [Deleted.]
    About a month after the arrival of an Iranian port, this 
equipment was transshipped to Saudi Arabia. I do not know the 
amount, but we have reports to the effect that a certain amount 
of this ultimately found its way into the hands of the 
royalists in Yemen. That is about all, sir.

                      SOURCE OF EGYPTIAN EQUIPMENT

    I do know that in Yemen the Egyptians are currently 
training a liberation force of the Front for the Liberation of 
South Yemen and that they are supposed to have some 81-
millimeter mortars of U.S. origin. Where they were acquired, I 
do not know, although there has been a substantial amount of 
that kind of equipment available in various places in the 
world.
    Senator Symington. So what it amounts to is that Merex 
would sell it to either side, finance, anywhere they wanted to.
    General Carroll. No, sir, I am sorry if I conveyed that 
impression.
    [Deleted.]
    Senator Symington. Where did Nasser get the--where did the 
Republic army get the American 81 equipment?
    General Carroll. I do not know, but I would doubt very, 
very much that it was associated in any way with the sale of 
surplus equipment out of Germany.
    Senator Symington. I see.
    Well, I have one final question, and then I am going to ask 
if you could excuse me, if Senator Aiken would chair this a 
little longer, or Senator Carlson. If not, would you answer 
questions for the counsel for the record, because I promised 
that I would be at his hearing at 3:30 because he had something 
he had to do and if I would chair that for him.

                             TANKS TO IRAN

    But I would like to ask this question: One other thing we 
have not covered are the tanks to Iran, but I would like to 
ask, the idea, as I understand it, is that the State 
Department, the Pentagon or both together tried to balance this 
situation, and I was terribly shocked to find how magnificently 
modern the UAR air force was when I went through there in 
January 1966. That was nailed down and verified in January 
1967.
    For example, they have 49 of the new SU-7, which is better 
than the best Migs.
    General Carroll. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. There are none of those in the Far East 
at all, and they had over 101 Migs which are as good as those 
in the Far East.
    Under these circumstances, who does this balancing act, 
because I am convinced they are much superior to the equipment 
of the Israelis, who, as you know, are having trouble with the 
other countries.
    Who is the one who does the balancing, is that done in 
State, to the best of your knowledge, or is that done in 
Defense, or do you not know?
    General Carroll. This involves policy determinations that I 
do not participate in, although I do make contributions to the 
information being considered insofar as order of battle is 
concerned.

                      SOVIET MILITARY AID TO EGYPT

    It has been well known, of course, in the past ten years 
that well in excess of a billion dollars' worth of military 
assistance has been provided to the UAR by the Soviet Union, 
and they are being provided by the Soviets with very modern 
equipment in air as you have just mentioned, sir, also in their 
naval forces as well as in their ground forces.
    On the other hand, I think one should bear in mind that the 
Egyptians have not demonstrated a capacity to utilize the 
equipment in a manner proportionate with the performance 
characteristic effectiveness of the equipment as is 
demonstrated by the 71,000 troops which they have had in Yemen, 
without----
    Senator Symington. Of course they could always get people 
to operate them for them on a lend-lease basis, as happened in 
North Korea.
    General Carroll. That is correct.
    Senator Symington. I would like to mention, if I may, to 
you, Senator Aiken and Senator Carlson, that our next step is 
to State Department--correct, Mr. Bader?--as we want to pursue 
this to find out some of these questions.
    In the meantime Senator, I promised John Stennis I would go 
over to this hearing and chair it, and if you or Senator 
Carlson could stay here, I would appreciate it, and Mr. Bader, 
will you ask any questions that you want to in order to make 
the record clear as long as we have the good fortune to have 
General Carroll with us.
    Senator Bader. Yes, sir, I would be delighted to.
    Senator Aiken. This is all Greek to me, Stu.
    Senator Symington. You handle it any way you want to.

                          HOLDING OF HOSTAGES

    Senator Aiken. There are political philosophies which I 
would be more interested in.
    Do you have any information on Tai'zz, in regard to our two 
hostages? I assume they were hostages.
    General Carroll. They have still in detention, Senator.
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    General Carroll. And ostensibly they are to be tried. On 
the other hand, we do receive indications to the effect that 
the powers that be in Cairo have urged caution on the part of 
their military commander in Yemen in the treatment of these 
prisoners.
    [Deleted.]
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    General Carroll. At this time, I believe 3,500 Egyptians 
over the past ten years have been trained in the Soviet Union, 
and this training is continuing. Soviet instructors also head 
up the staffs in the armed forces academies, and so there are 
substantial efforts underway to improve the level of training 
of the Egyptian forces.
    Senator Aiken. Do you see anything to indicate that the 
British may not pull out of Aden?
    General Carroll. On the contrary, so far as my 
understanding is concerned, they intend to.
    Senator Aiken. Fast, I would suppose.
    General Carroll. I suppose so.
    Senator Aiken. I would not blame them.
    What about Djibouti?

                          SITUATION IN SOMALIA

    Senator Aiken. The situation over around Djibouti in 
Somalia and in there. Have you followed that? Is there trouble 
brewing in that area, too?
    General Carroll. Well, since the election in French 
Somaliland has come out the way that it has, the situation has 
quieted to some extent.
    Senator Aiken. It has not been fully accepted though, has 
it?
    General Carroll. Not by all parties concerned, no, sir.
    Senator Aiken. No.
    General Carroll. Of course the Ethiopians are most happy 
with the manner in which the election evolved. As for the rural 
population in French Somaliland, I believe the solution which 
has been arrived at thus far is acceptable to them. However, a 
substantial portion of the population in the main city is not 
particularly happy.

                        MILITARY JUNTA IN GREECE

    Senator Aiken. Have you had any recent information on 
Greece? It seems almost like a disturbing quiet at present.
    General Carroll. I believe that is attributable to the firm 
grip that the military junta has on the country at this time.
    Senator Aiken. But every Greek in this country seems to be 
disapproving, and it seems to me if they are disapproving, 
their relatives back home are equally upset.
    General Carroll. I am sure this must be true because there 
must be substantial segments of the Greek population who feel 
the coup was a blow to the democratic philosophy of Greece and 
the democratic aspirations of that country.
    On the other hand, the source of trouble to the present 
rulers would be expected primarily to stem from some of the 
more radical groups, and particularly the leftists, and they 
have undertaken to remove from current circulation those that 
they could identify as representing a current danger to the 
regime.
    Senator Aiken. Frank, have you any questions?
    Senator Carlson. Just one or two questions.

                       VALUE OF SURPLUS EQUIPMENT

    In this illicit movement of all these arms material and 
equipment, where do these folks who are in this business 
[deleted] secure this type of weapons? Is some of it U.S. 
surplus material that has been disposed of and given to other 
countries, sold, or is this other countries' surplus?
    General Carroll. Well, surplus equipment, Senator, happens 
to represent a very desirable source of supply not only because 
of its availability but generally because of its less costly 
aspects.
    The kind of equipment which is surplus today would not be 
sought with any special effort by countries with advanced 
military capabilities.
    In the main, it is the relatively under-developed countries 
that are most desirous of acquiring equipment which is surplus 
to other nations, bearing in mind that it is surplus to other 
nations primarily because of the fact that they consider it 
obsolete. But everything is relative in this field, and it 
happens to represent highly desirable equipment to the 
underdeveloped countries.
    It so happens that the spotlight tends to be focused at 
this point in time on surplus materials because a substantial 
amount of it is generating especially in Western Europe at this 
time, because of the modernization of the forces there. A 
substantial amount of the military equipment which comprised 
the equipment of the forces had been provided to them by the 
United States during the buildup of NATO under the military 
assistance program. It is this equipment which is now becoming 
surplus because of the modernization of the forces of these 
nations.
    At the same time, because of the interregional disputes and 
conflicts, which the chairman mentioned when we first started, 
there is sort of an arms race particularly in the Mid East, and 
certain countries are casting covetous eyes on this equipment 
which appears to be available in Western Europe.
    However, surplus equipment is only one of the sources of 
such equipment, and the purchasing country as well as the arms 
brokers who might be used, seek to make purchases of newly 
manufactured equipment from other countries, although in such 
instances frequently one has to wait perhaps a protracted 
period of time because of manufacturing lead time requirements.

                             SURPLUS TANKS

    Senator Carlson. You mentioned, for instance, that 
Germany--you mentioned several European countries, but Germany, 
I made some notes here, 193 tanks were, you said, surplus.
    General Carroll. It must be----
    Senator Carlson. Did I write it down wrong?
    General Carroll. A good deal more than that. The 193 
referred to one particular type of tank.
    Senator Carlson. Was this German?
    General Carroll. But Germany has many more tanks than that 
in surplus.
    Senator Carlson. The question I wanted to ask now, were 
those surplus American tanks, German tanks, or what?
    General Carroll. The ones I was referring to, sir, are 
surplus U.S. origin tanks.
    Senator Carlson. U.S. origin tanks.
    General Carroll. In addition to that, they well could have 
many more which are of German origin.
    Senator Carlson. I see.
    Well, my thinking was these tanks, while they may call them 
surplus and they may be outmoded, they are still probably very 
good, useful pieces of equipment for certain places.
    General Carroll. They certainly are. That is why they are 
sought after so persistently.
    Senator Carlson. Well now, you mentioned--and I believe 
that I would be interested in it--that these people who traffic 
in the sales of military equipment, they also sell new 
equipment. I assume they can get people to buy them.
    General Carroll. That is correct.
    For example, Interarmco has exclusive sales rights to newly 
manufactured equipment produced in a couple of the Scandinavian 
countries and Holland.
    Senator Carlson. And out of the United States?
    General Carroll. No. I doubt that they have any such 
exclusive rights out of the United States, but I do not know.

                       INTERNATIONAL ARMS DEALERS

    Senator Carlson. I had an interesting experience along this 
line a few years ago. I was down at the Dominican Republic when 
we placed limitations of shipments of weapons into that 
country, and I spent about a week down there at the sugar 
operations. I was out to a beach on a Sunday afternoon and here 
comes an American citizen--of course everything was so 
secretive down there they said do not talk in an automobile 
because it may be bugged, and you had to be awfully careful--
and this American comes along with one of the classiest dames 
you ever saw on the beach, and she was French they told me. 
They said, ``Well, he is in the Dominican Republic selling arms 
from Czechoslovakia.'' I just wondered how general that was 
over the world as you run into it, where we try to put 
limitations on it.
    General Carroll. I would say it is quite active all over 
the world.
    Senator Carlson. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Aiken. I thought the Dominican Republic had its own 
small arms plant.
    General Carroll. That is right, sir.
    Senator Aiken. General, I have no more questions. I am here 
trying to learn a little. I am not even a member of Senator 
Symington's subcommittee.
    Senator Carlson. I am not either.
    Senator Aiken. Because my interests happen to be the 
Western Hemisphere, but I realize there is a very short 
distance around the world now.
    General Carroll. That is right, sir.
    Senator Aiken. And when we get the supersonic, it will be 
even shorter.
    I have nothing further.
    Do you have anything, Carl?
    Mr. Marcy. Mr. Bader, just to make the record complete.
    Mr. Bader. Senator, I have just three questions.

                        TANKS TO BECOME SURPLUS

    Senator Symington wanted to make the record clear on 
certain points, and I thought I might ask this just for the 
record.
    General, we have heard estimates as to the number of 5,000 
tanks of American origin which would be on the international 
market by 1970. I wonder if you might verify that. The question 
has been raised before early in the testimony.
    Senator Aiken. You are speaking of surplus.
    Mr. Bader. Surplus in Europe alone.
    General Carroll. I am not in a position to respond to that 
question at this time. I could undertake to see if I could 
accumulate that kind of data.
    Mr. Bader. Could you, sir, for the record? I think it would 
be of interest.
    [The material referred to follows.]

              ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TANKS TO BECOME SURPLUS

    Of the approximately 7,500 tanks of American origin in the 
inventories of West European nations, 646 are now believed to be 
surplus and 1,510 more are expected to become so within the next five 
years. Thus, a total of 2,156 tanks are expected to be surplus by 1972, 
and of this number only about 1,500 tanks are expected to be surplus by 
1970.
    [Deleted.]

                   INSPECTION TEAMS APPRAISING TANKS

    Mr. Bader. I have a contract here dated 19 January 1967 
between the Levy Autoparts Company, which has been mentioned, 
and General Toufanian, who has just been mentioned as the 5 
percenter in Iran. This is for 600 M-47 tanks to be sold to 
Iran through General Toufanian.
    [Deleted.]
    Mr. Bader. So if this contract were fulfilled, it would 
mean that 600 tanks of American origin would go from West 
Germany to Pakistan.
    General Carroll. I would feel that it is the U.S. 
government's surplus tanks that this contract is referring to 
because the Iranians were endeavoring at the same time to 
acquire the M-41 and M-47 tanks out to German surplus.
    I do not know if a particular source is specified in the 
contract. I would assume that it is not.
    Mr. Bader. It is not.
    General Carroll. The particular type tank----
    Mr. Bader. Just a particular type tank.
    General Carroll.----would of course in the main represent 
U.S. origin tanks in the surplus West German inventory.
    Mr. Bader. According to your figures, just one last 
comment.
    If that deal is consummated, General Toufanian will receive 
$400 for his----
    [Deleted.]

                      CANADIAN ROLE IN ARMS SALES

    Senator Aiken. Now, I think you have helped me more than I 
thought at first. Some of us are going to Ottawa next week with 
Canadian officials and all members of the legislature, too, and 
they are likely to be a little critical of us, our army's 
disposal and so forth.
    [Deleted.]
    General Carroll. Yes sir.
    Senator Aiken. The Canadian government, as a whole, is not 
a big supplier of arms anywhere.
    General Carroll. I do not believe so, sir.
    Senator Aiken. They are not. I am glad to hear that so we 
will not misjudge them if they criticize us. They are likely to 
criticize us in our sales of arms, though.

                   PAYMENTS TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

    [Deleted.]
    General Carroll. Usually the arms broker, either by taking 
the initiative himself or on the basis of being contacted by a 
prospective buyer, will undertake to formulate an agreement 
with the buyer and thereafter go out to get the equipment.
    Senator Carlson. Well, this is, of course, I assume, part 
of our equipment we have given Germany in order to build up 
their defenses. Am I right?
    General Carroll. I am sorry, sir, I missed that point.
    Senator Carlson. I am wondering if this some of the 
military equipment we have furnished the German government or 
their defense administration in order to strengthen them 
militarily? I mean we have given it to them or have we sold it 
to them or have they bought it----
    General Carroll. First of all, this is equipment which the 
United States government did furnish under the Military 
Assistance Program to the West German government, and I believe 
the committee has previously been advised that a few years ago, 
I believe it was 1962, the United States government sold its 
reversionary rights in that equipment to the West German 
government.
    Senator Carlson. I see.
    That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Aiken. Anything further?
    We thank you, General Carroll----
    General Carroll. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Aiken.--For talking to at least one rank amateur.
    Senator Carlson. That is right. That is true here, too, but 
it is interesting, and I want to say many thanks.
    General Carroll. Well, thank you, Senator. It is a pleasure 
to see you, sir.
    [Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to 
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]


                        THE SITUATION IN POLAND

    [Editor's Note.--In November 1966, Poland's representative on the 
International Control Commission, Janusz Lewandowski, proposed to U.S. 
Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge that Poland serve as an 
intermediary to set up a meeting between U.S. and North Vietnamese 
officials. In early December, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki 
reported that Hanoi had agreed to hold discussions in Warsaw. However, 
after U.S. warplanes bombed an area near Hanoi on December 13-14, North 
Vietnam withdrew its acceptance.]
                              ----------                              


                          Monday, May 15, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                  Subcommittee on European Affairs,
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator John J. Sparkman (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Fulbright, 
Symington, McCarthy, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and 
Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Lowenstein 
for the committee staff.
    Senator Sparkman. The subcommittee will come to order.
    The Subcommittee on European Affairs this morning is 
holding an informal session with the Honorable John A. 
Gronouski, United States Ambassador to Poland. Ambassador 
Gronouski has been in Washington for consultation and he kindly 
expressed his willingness to meet with interested committee 
members.
    Mr. Ambassador, we are very pleased to have you here with 
us today. I expect that you already have in mind the kinds of 
topics for discussion which you believe will be of most concern 
to us. And I certainly have no intention of trying to restrict 
your operating freedom in this regard. At the same time, I am 
sure that all of us will be particularly interested in your 
views in connection with the much advertised, but futile 
efforts last December to arrange contacts with the North 
Vietnamese through the Warsaw mechanism. You will, of course, 
have noted Mr. Hightower's Associated Press article of May 9, 
and quite possibly the letter of Richard Hudson of the New York 
Times of May 12. We would welcome any clarification of this 
episode which you might be able to provide for us.
    Beyond that, we would be glad to have your views on the 
current scene in Poland, with particular reference to Polish 
policies toward the Soviet Union and toward developments in 
other Eastern European countries. In addition, we would expect 
to discuss such elements of our foreign policy as the East-West 
trade issue and the encouragement of an atmosphere leading 
towards detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.
    With this very general guidance, Mr. Ambassador, I hope 
that you will launch into these subjects in any way you please. 
You handle it in your own way. We are very glad to have you 
come here.

    STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JOHN A. GRONOUSKI, UNITED STATES 
 AMBASSADOR TO POLAND; ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR H.J. TORBERT; 
AND WILLIAM A. BUELL, JR., EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT 
                            OF STATE

    Ambassador Gronouski. I am very glad to be here, Senator. 
Being an old Postmaster General, being on the Hill in that 
capacity, and this is a different problem.
    Senator Sparkman. A new setup of cooperation.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Which, by the way, is a good idea.
    I do not have any prepared statement. I will try to cover 
these things that you have raised in an informal way. There are 
a lot of elements. I am very glad to be here. I will come to 
the Vietnam business a little later, if that is all right.
    Senator Sparkman. That is all right.
    Ambassador Gronouski. There are a lot of elements in the 
whole Eastern European situation that I think we ought to 
continue to try to develop. It has almost become a truism to 
say now that things are not quite so monolithic as they once 
were. But I hasten to add that they are not quite so 
independent as some people hopefully wish and think they were. 
Yet I think that there are some very fundamental changes going 
on, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia and in Hungary, 
which is regarded as the old bloc area, that is to say, and not 
to say anything about Yugoslavia which, I understand, you are 
leaving out of this discussion--except to say that they have 
gone so far beyond anything of the rest of Eastern Europe that 
they are a separate subject unto themselves.
    I will intersperse, however, a comment on Yugoslavia, only 
insofar as it has an impact on Eastern Europe. One of the 
things that is of continual interest and discussion in Poland, 
particularly among the younger groups and the people working 
for the planning authorities, foreign trade, the younger 
economists----
    Senator Sparkman. Did you say ``younger economists'' or 
``Communists''?
    Ambassador Gronouski. The younger economists, yes.
    Senator Aiken. Economists?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Economists, yes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Who are also Communists?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Also Communists.
    Senator Sparkman. That is what I was trying to understand.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Actually only five percent of the 
people of Poland are members of the Communist Party. Whether 
they are Communists or not is academic. That is one thing in 
that they are part of the bureaucratic structure, and they 
support it.

                       FRUSTRATIONS OF THE POLES

    The other side of the coin is that among many of the 
younger Poles who are well-trained in this generation, that 
have gone to college since the war, et cetera, there is not the 
same ideological commitment that you find with most of the 
older ones. And you find a wide variety of people who are 
basically existing with frustrations for the lack of progress 
in the economic area and who see opportunity for change and 
look across to the other side, who are, in fact, pushing some 
changes, but who recognize that there are other men up in the 
Politburo who are very conservative and that those like 
Gomulka, that his ideology is regarded as ultrareactionary in 
contrast to the others, and in turn are being imposed to 
change, and yet imposed with the necessity for change in order 
to make the economy viable at all, that there must be change. 
There are a good many people who are certainly not in control, 
but in junior positions in that part of the operation who are 
very anxious for very substantial changes and are pushing for 
them and are doing this. They have not been terribly 
successful, but it is highly interesting to see them there, to 
see them pushing for the change that I have spoken of.

                    LOOKING TO YUGOSLAVIA AND MOSCOW

    What I wanted to mention about Yugoslavia is that I do not 
regard Yugoslavia in the area as being that which is 
categorized as the Eastern European countries. Part of them are 
looking to Yugoslavia, hoping that Yugoslavia will fail, and 
part of them are hoping that Yugoslavia will succeed. And I 
think that----
    Senator Hickenlooper. What is the rationale of those who 
hope that Yugoslavia will fail?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Those are the conservatives who do 
not want to see the kind of liberalization of the economy that 
the other group wants to see. And I think that one of the 
things which I always have in mind is important in terms of the 
long-term impact on Eastern Europe of the success in the kind 
of changes that are going on which are very fundamental in 
Yugoslavia.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Excuse me for having interrupted.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Surely.
    Senator Hickenlooper. If I may continue, do these people 
who want to see Yugoslavia fail--do they want to see them 
reoriented towards the Moscow discipline?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Not necessarily. Not towards Moscow 
discipline, but rather they are very concerned about the 
decentralization of not only the economic control, but other 
controls that are going on there. You do not quite get the 
feeling that you did before in Poland or in any of these other 
countries, that they want countries to be Moscow oriented. They 
are Moscow oriented, but they are very concerned about their 
independence.
    Senator Aiken. By Moscow, you mean Moscow as the 
decisionmaking center, the Lenin Moscow, pure communism?
    Ambassador Gronouski. It has gone beyond that. They use 
Lenin as the symbol.
    Senator Aiken. Lenin as the symbol?
    Ambassador Gronouski. A symbol for the movement. Lenin is a 
symbol of goodness. But there is talk about the procedures that 
are going on.
    Of course, what they have come to realize in the Eastern 
European countries--and I presume to some degree in the Soviet 
Union--but I see it more in the three countries that I have 
just mentioned, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary--they have 
come to realize that the economic system that they have is not 
a very viable system. It does not work very well. It has worked 
well in the post-war period because this was the period of 
building up after the war. Poland was literally destroyed. They 
could not make an error during this period--and they put their 
resources, their transportation, their utilities, their 
apartments or their factories, all had a high marginal rate of 
return and, consequently, represented a move towards high 
growth--8 or 9 percent growth rate in the last twenty years in 
Poland which is a very successful rate of growth.
    The productivity of labor is very low. Interest in trading 
with the West is very high with them. And the output is such 
that quality output is very difficult for them, to enable them 
to sell in the West. And they recognize, at least a good many 
of them, the inefficiencies that are developing.

                       COMPARISON TO WEST GERMANY

    Senator Hickenlooper. How do they reconcile the difference 
between the development of their system and that of West 
Germany and West Berlin?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Partly because in Poland----
    Senator Hickenlooper. What is the rationale there?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Partly because they started from 
scratch.
    Senator Hickenlooper. So did West Germany and West Berlin.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Probably not as much from scratch as 
they did--as it was in Poland--not as much destruction in 
Germany. Poland had one out of five killed. Their people in 
engineering and the professions, all of the educated categories 
were pretty well wiped out. Warsaw was about 80 percent 
destroyed.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Also, very definitely in West 
Germany, highways and everything else were destroyed.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Secondly, they sustained losses. They 
make the point that the Marshall Plan and United States aid 
made contributions, plus the fact that the Marshall aid was 
turned down by them. That is something that they do not talk 
about, but nonetheless it is a fact.
    Senator Sparkman. Poland tried to take it.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Poland wanted to take it.
    Senator Sparkman. And Czechoslovakia.
    Ambassador Gronouski. And the Soviets did not want them to 
do so.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is true. The Russians turned it 
down.
    Ambassador Gronouski. They cannot make a case for it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I do not think they can make a good 
case for doing that, but I just wondered how they rationalized 
it.

                        SLOW PROGRESS IN POLAND

    Ambassador Gronouski. There was the destruction of the 
population by the war. And there were those who wanted to move 
towards reconstruction and the like, who wanted to move ahead. 
Beyond that, your younger people, to make it very clear, they 
feel that it is the lack of incentive--it is the lack of 
authority at the plant level--it is, in effect, political 
rather than technical management of the economy. And so you 
find that in the last few years, that is, the last couple or 
two or three years, they are slowly moving forward--some think 
much too slowly. Obviously it is much too slowly, but they are 
adopting some of the ideas that we have had over here for many 
years. For instance, profits used to be a dirty word, but 
profits are now the basis for judging the effectiveness of a 
program. It is pretty much the same type that we have, except 
that it is a public enterprise. They have introduced the whole 
concept of interest rates. And they talk about bankers 
controlling, whether or not they can invest or not.
    They realized a great deficiency, but they have not done a 
whole lot in the pricing system. That is actually idiotic. 
Therefore, it does not contribute much towards the total 
organization. It does not contribute. It rather holds back the 
efficient organization of the economic system, because the 
management of a firm or an industry is dealing with quite an 
unreal prospect. It is administering the price structure that 
goes back over the years, that has a pricing structure which 
has very little relationship one to another. They have not done 
much in Poland to improve the pricing structure. But 
nonetheless, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, they are 
officially now taking the position that they have got to move 
to greater incentives for labor and management. They have to 
decentralize economic controls. They have to give more to the 
firms and the industries engaging in national trade. They have 
got to reorient their economy in the direction of quality, 
rather than quantitative measures that were set, because they 
have come to realize that it does no good to produce 100,000 
pairs of shoes that people will not buy--that just making 
100,000 pairs of shoes does not help.

                            EAST-WEST TRADE

    Senator Aiken. What about trade between the East and the 
West--what does that amount to?
    Ambassador Gronouski. About 35 percent West.
    Senator Aiken. 35 percent West?
    Ambassador Gronouski. It is a little higher than the 
average.
    Senator Aiken. Yugoslavia is nearly 70 percent.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. One of the figures I was trying 
to bring up. There is a great desire to move. That is one of 
the problems that they have.
    There is a great interest in western technology as there is 
through all of Europe. There is great interest in Poland in 
greater effort right now towards that.
    Senator Aiken. What percentage of the grain is required to 
be sold to the government now? At one time is was 80 percent. 
It went down--it went down to about 15 percent, did it not?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. It is something between 10 and 
15 percent.
    Senator Aiken. That is about where we are.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Actually, Poland is unique in that 
they do have 85 or 90 percent of agriculture that is private 
agriculture.
    Senator Aiken. Any government operations in agriculture 
were given up voluntarily?
    Ambassador Gronouski. After 1956, yes, that is right. After 
1956, when Gomulka took over, there was an entirely new policy 
to sell off the farms.
    Senator Aiken. They did not have to go in and take it.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Actually we do not find anybody in 
the government who is interested in state ownership or anybody 
in the party who is.

                  CLOSER RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE

    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Ambassador, in the May 13 newsletter 
it was written, ``We are trying now to save something from the 
ruins by promoting closer relationships between Warsaw, East 
Berlin and Prague.''
    Would you care to comment on that?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Well, the so-called West German moves 
toward the East which culminated in relations with Romania. At 
this point in time it looked like it would include Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but it was very much slowed down in 
terms regarded as nationalism. Poland played a big role along 
this line at the Warsaw meeting in February, on the 8th, 9th, 
and 10th. Poland took the lead in that meeting, with Soviet 
backing and at the insistence of Ulbricht of East Germany, to 
put a halt to the rather rapid movement that was happening in 
that part of the world. They never did expect that Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania would long remain away from relations with 
the Germans. They explained it on the basis that these three 
countries have a concern for Germany that Poland did not have 
in the war, that it was a question of survival on the part of 
Poland. But in a sense, that the southern tier, these three 
southern states, even Czechoslovakia, are becoming very 
interested in relations with West Germany in developing along 
these lines. I suppose that there is something to that judgment 
on the part of Poles, because of their inherent fear of West 
Germany and the Soviets, because Poland and East Germany are 
acting as buffers as to West Germany and the Czechoslovakians, 
partly because their border is common with Germany. They have 
problems with Germany, and they have developed a little bloc 
within the bloc at this point in time. I think there is 
something, therefore, to the point that was made.

                     POLISH VIEWS OF U.S. POLICIES

    Senator Sparkman. Do you detect any feeling on the part of 
the Poles that the United States in its policies toward Europe 
places undue emphasis on our relations with West Germany?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Oh, yes.
    Senator Sparkman. Is this a sore spot with them?
    Ambassador Gronouski. It is a sore spot with them. It is a 
burning question with them. They feel very strongly that the 
United States has a policy that does not put pressure on 
Germany but on them. I tried to convince them from time to time 
that sometimes when one country tries to impose its will 
directly on another country publicly, that sets back a 
development that might happen if the pressure was not there. It 
is not at all certain that the United States will be in that 
position to be of help to the German and Polish situation. But, 
basically, they feel that we have been much in supporting the 
Germans and the rearmament, and this sort of thing. That is 
understandable, because, after all, Germany has gone in that 
direction before.

                        POLAND AND EAST GERMANY

    Senator Sparkman. What distinction, if any, do you make 
between the policies of Gomulka in Poland and Ulbricht in East 
Germany in reference to the domestic political situation in our 
relationships with Moscow?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Unfortunately I have never been in 
East Germany to go into that, so I do not have any first-hand 
feeling about it. You will find in Poland, more so, I think, 
than any of the Eastern European countries, a considerable 
relaxation ever since 1956 in the attitudes towards this in 
personal expressions of an individual. We have no difficulty, 
for example, associating with anybody that we want to associate 
with and in asking any questions or in having to confine any 
dinner conversations or cocktail party conversations with the 
people. There are various expressions and viewpoints on a 
variety of many issues without any concern. Everybody feels, of 
course, that they may have bugs all over the living room. They 
assume that. And yet you will find Poles, rather responsible 
government people, in responsible government positions, 
expressing freely attitudes that are quite different.
    Senator Aiken. There are some very good anti-Communist 
jokes.
    Ambassador Gronouski. There are millions of them. You hear 
them all over.
    Senator Aiken. They are about the best I have heard 
anywhere.

                 POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

    Senator Sparkman. What about Poland's position in regard to 
the ambassadorship to the United States? Is there likely to be 
any change in their attitude?
    Ambassador Gronouski. They have appointed an ambassador.
    Senator Sparkman. They have now?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. There is a technicality in 
Poland. It has to go to the council to be finalized, but they 
have appointed, a month or so ago, one of the most able 
diplomats to Washington, the Director General of the Foreign 
Office, who was the Ambassador to the United Nations. This is 
something that we cannot talk about publicly until they 
announce it.
    Senator Sparkman. Very good.
    Are there any other questions before we move to the Vietnam 
matter?

                      TAKING TROOPS OUT OF EUROPE

    Senator Symington. I would like to ask a question and to 
present a view to you, sir. What is your position with respect 
to the growing problem that we have with regard to such matters 
as that of Mr. Ashmore,\1\ having come back from North Vietnam 
saying that they say that they could handle two million 
Americans if necessary in this war. I think that if we are 
going to utilize the technological expertise that we have, they 
might be right, that is, unless we do so. We need trained 
people very badly. That is consistently brought up in the Armed 
Services Committee. We have been cannibalizing heavily 
equipment all over the world in order to take care of Vietnam. 
We are very short, for example, in Germany and in Europe of the 
required number of helicopters. Therefore, some of us have felt 
that if that point developed within the cold war that it might 
justify taking troops out of Europe. We have so many other 
places that we have to cover. We have 85,000 Americans in Japan 
and over 60,000 troops in Korea. We have over 900,000 total 
people in Europe. That is a heavy financial drain. But the main 
thing is that we need certain types of people very, very badly 
if we continue the war in its present stage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Arkansas journalist Harry Ashmore had visited North Vietnam in 
January, 1967.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are some of us who have felt that we could take 
troops out of Europe. When we do that, we run into the 
Europeaneers.
    What is the reaction in Poland, behind the Curtain, for 
that matter?
    There are two angles. First, would there be any change, 
some Senators talk about, commensurate reduction of Russian 
troops. Secondly, is it of great interest over there whether we 
do it on any basis in Poland?
    Ambassador Gronouski. It is of great interest, but the most 
constructive conversation I have had on the reduction happened 
about a week ago. I went into this whole discussion with some 
of the foreign office people. It was stated that, really, they 
are very interested in this kind of thing to get the Soviets 
and United States to pull back. While Vietnam is going on it 
was stated, ``We really cannot do this sort of thing. And the 
reason we cannot do it is that if in any way we let the United 
States withdraw troops from Germany, then in a sense you are 
using the withdrawals of more troops for Vietnam, and Hanoi is 
very upset with us because we are taking the pressure from 
Europe off the United States and providing the United States 
with more troops available for Vietnam--for the Vietnam 
situation.''
    So they conclude that this is not the time to talk about 
these things, because they cannot do it in terms of their 
relationship to Hanoi. It was an interesting proposition.

                    REDUCTION OF SOVIET TROOP LEVELS

    Senator Symington. I will ask one more question. Do you 
think that they would do it if it was not for the Vietnam war--
that they would not have any objection and that they might 
actually take troops out themselves?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I do not know, because they are very 
capable in talking about the possibility of what they might do, 
and then when the situation arises, they do not do it. I am not 
at all sure that they would. I am not at all sure that the 
Soviet Union's best interests would be to reduce the twenty-two 
divisions they have in Germany, because I think that they feel 
very strongly that they have got to maintain a pretty large 
troop concentration next to West Germany. I am not sure that 
they would. I think that there is a possibility that it would 
be much greater with the Vietnam thing out of the way, but I 
would not predict that they would.

                      IMPROVING TRADE WITH POLAND

    I want to make one other observation, if I may. There is a 
whole series of legislation, proposed legislation or idea, 
which I think is of vital interest to our national interest in 
all of Eastern Europe. I am talking about the matter of a week 
or two or so ago on the Import-Export Bank which was voted out, 
and the issuance of trade credits bill which was voted out, 
something that probably is not as big as others. From the point 
of view of Poland, however, it is tremendously important. We 
were very pleased to see it was voted out of this committee 
last week. It is the program which is vitally important to 
Poland where we will have something like $1.5 million a year in 
the field of news media, magazines, movies, books, and the 
like, books which can be read and seen and understood and 
discussed by the Poles. They could not have without this 
program which I think is fundamentally a program which is as 
good as we have in terms of improving the situation and in 
moderating their views. It is something that ultimately comes 
up for appropriation again, and I think it is of critical 
importance.
    We have just negotiated with the Poles $500,000 for English 
language teaching, which requires an appropriation which I 
think is something that has been as good as anything in the 
last ten or fifteen years having to do with Poland. It is just 
now that we have been successful in getting the program 
started, and I think it will be vitally important over the next 
ten years. There will be a great demand for the English 
language there.
    All of these programs, it seems to me, aim at giving 
fundamental support to the kind of measures that are developing 
in all of these countries towards liberalization of their 
economic aspects of their society.
    When you talk about liberalization of their economy, it is 
only economics that we are talking about. But as I think we can 
see in Yugoslavia, it has gone considerably further than 
anywhere else. As the economy is liberalized, there is the 
change in everything that is going to occur in the whole fabric 
of their society. It develops a concept of being a manager who 
is a technical man, who is not an ideological man, and thus he 
is given authority. And these kinds of leadership help. I think 
it is vitally important in terms of our own long-term national 
interests to develop programs such as evolved in the East-West 
trade policy which does not affect Poles particularly, such as 
the favored nation treatment. It will affect the rest of 
Eastern Europe, in the availability of export-import guarantees 
to American manufacturers in many areas in developing trade in 
Eastern Europe.
    Senator Aiken. Are there any manufacturers who have any 
branch plants which have opened up there?
    Ambassador Gronouski. No, none at all. But I think that the 
development of the trade connections would be tremendously 
important, because it orients the whole trading pattern towards 
the West. It has a tremendous impact on their trade.
    Senator Sparkman. Are you through?
    Senator Symington. I was just going to ask another 
question.

                       TRADE AND THE WARSAW PACT

    Senator Sparkman. What effect would that have upon the 
Warsaw Pact?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Poland will continue to be a key 
member of the Warsaw Pact.
    Senator Sparkman. That involves the trade situation, too, 
does it not?
    Ambassador Gronouski. The Eastern trade?
    Senator Sparkman. Yes.
    Ambassador Gronouski. The point is that so many of these 
countries have found that they are competing rather than being 
complementary. There is a great interest, even though they give 
all kinds of lip service to it and work towards it--and the 
Poles do more than most to try to encourage it--nevertheless 
they are aware that their system is not enough for them and 
they are tremendously interested in looking westward. It seems 
to me that we ought to help them look westward. I think it is 
not just good in our relations to Eastern Europe that this is 
important, but in terms of our leadership role in West Germany. 
I think that this is important, because if the United States 
does not take the lead in this area, somebody else will. 
Western Europe is not going to keep the wall up in this area. I 
think Western Europe is wise in not doing it.
    Senator Sparkman. Thank you.
    Go ahead.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Ambassador, I could not agree with 
you more. You have answered my questions. For years around here 
I have been saying more trade for many different regions would 
help.
    Ambassador Gronouski. What strikes me is that every 
businessman who comes over to Poland has this same impression.
    Senator Symington. We had the Secretary of the Treasury and 
the Secretary of Commerce before this committee, let me say, 
two or three years ago. I asked both of them if there was any 
developed country in the world except the United States that 
was not doing its best to develop to the best of its ability to 
buy and sell behind the Iron Curtain. Are we not the only ones 
who do not? We are defending most of them and financing a lot 
of them. And the answer of Secretary Dillon and of Secretary 
Hodges was, ``Not one.'' Whether it be Communist or otherwise, 
some day we will need the volume to get the price and to 
improve the market that these people can offer once developed. 
And if so, we are going to have contributed something that is 
going to be helpful. Otherwise, it will be very damaging to 
capitalism if we do not.
    Ambassador Gronouski. I think what is so important in this 
whole thing is that it is sometimes overlooked in our relations 
with Western Europe that it is important to move in these 
directions, not just in Eastern Europe but otherwise.

               TRADING WITH COMMUNISTS DURING VIETNAM WAR

    Let me raise one more point, if I may. This is a question 
that I often get--very often. How can we talk in the terms of 
trade and development with Eastern Europe when Eastern Europe 
is helping Vietnam and sending munitions, killing our boys, and 
so forth. My answer to that, I think, is pretty simple.
    Basically our policy is aimed or should be aimed certainly 
at the long-run problem of avoiding World War III. It sounds 
mundane, but it is a fact, to avoid that--reducing the tension. 
And the real fundamental strain is still centered in Europe. If 
we are going to have World War III, it will be one way or 
another in Europe.
    Senator Symington. You can give them another reason. We 
have increased the sale of arms to anybody who will pay for 
them or has a reasonable good credit standing, or even if they 
do not. We have increased it from $300 million to $1.7 billion 
in the last five years all over the world. So any criticism by 
Americans that the Russian stuff is being shipped into Vietnam 
can be pretty easily answered by the policy of this 
administration and the previous administration, which is to 
sell all of the war materials they can get their hands on, 
providing they can make a profit on it.
    Ambassador Gronouski. At any rate, if because of the 
Vietnam war we build a wall and create tensions and try not to 
reduce the chances in Europe, what we are doing, ultimately, is 
creating a condition for something that is going to be much 
more damaging and much more explosive and more costly in lives 
than Vietnam happens to be today. So it is a very short-sighted 
notion, it seems to me, to think in terms of forgetting this 
whole power concentration in Europe because of the Vietnam war 
that is going on. It is a self-defeating proposition.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Pell wants to ask you some 
questions.

                          ODER NIESE BOUNDARY

    Senator Pell. What is the reaction now in Poland that the 
Eastern Frontier is up for grabs by the West?
    Ambassador Gronouski. You are talking about the Niese Oder 
boundary?
    Senator Pell. Yes.
    Ambassador Gronouski. There are two things that I can say 
about that.
    In the first place, despite the fact that they really do 
not expect any of the nations, even the United States or 
anybody else, to permit any change right now in that boundary, 
they certainly think that the Soviet Union would not permit it 
if anybody did. Nevertheless, they look towards the future. 
Until the Germans flatly assure them that there is no change 
contemplated, they are concerned that in the future the whole 
pattern of the world relationships may change. They remember 
the 1939 pact between Hitler and Stalin. They are not at all 
ultimately confident that the Russians would--they would not 
say this publicly--but they have a latent fear that it may 
change, even though at the present it doesn't look like it 
might. They have a genuine fear of Germany. It is not all 
public relations and propaganda. Every family has lost 
something in World War II--some five or six million killed out 
of 30 million. So there is a genuine fear. But beyond that, if 
Gomulka did not have the Niese Oder line, he would have to 
invent something, because it is the one area where he gets a 
very real rapport with the church, with the Polish people, with 
the American Poles--with the Poles around the world--and it is 
the one area that he has that he uses all of the time. In every 
speech, it is the Niese Oder or Germany fascism. Had this been 
recognized by the Germans, say, ten years ago, I am convinced 
that there would not be the present situation. Gomulka would 
have had a lot more difficult time selling himself, selling his 
relationship with the Soviet Union which is basically sold to 
the Poles on the basis of the defense against the Germans.
    I think that the whole situation would be a lot more 
untenable for Gomulka at this point.

                           GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR

    Senator Pell. As you may recall, I am not the only one who 
felt that we must keep this line. Would you agree with my view 
that this is probably the cement that keeps the Soviet Union 
and Poland under Soviet Union domination in foreign relations 
more than any other single factor, that they are the sole 
guarantor of the Western Frontier?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Well, there are two things. That is, 
in itself--but, also, even among Poles who are anti-Soviet and 
there are a lot of Poles who do not like the Russians--
actually, there are jokes on that--I will not take the time to 
tell them, but the Poles are not terribly keen on the Russians. 
They do not say it publicly, but they say it privately.
    I think there are two things. One, the Oder Niese line 
itself; and two, the long-run concern of the revival of 
militarism in Germany.
    Even if the Niese Oder line was settled it would not 
destroy the whole fear, because they have had two recent 
occasions, in World War I and World War II, which they remember 
very vividly, especially World War II.
    I do not think that the Niese Oder line would resolve this 
thing, but it would lower the level.
    Senator Pell. Would you or would you not agree with my 
thought that it is the biggest single factor keeping the Poles 
under Soviet domination in foreign policy?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I do not think I would. I think that 
it is an important factor, but I think that the boundary 
between Poland and Russia----
    Senator Pell. What would be a greater factor that would 
keep them under Soviet foreign policy?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I think that the geography is 
concerned--they are sitting right next to each other.
    Senator Cooper. What was the answer?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I think it is a matter of the 
geography. They are sitting right next to each other.

                      ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

    Senator Pell. Along the same line, with reference to the 
Catholic bishops, with the Catholic dioceses being redrawn so 
that the bishops in the Niese Oder part now report to 
Wyszynski, and the others to Germany, do they still have the 
confusion with the new bishops reporting to Germany?
    Ambassador Gronouski. The condition is not in this respect, 
because the bishops in the Western territory report to 
Wyszynski, but the real thing is that of the Vatican, that the 
Vatican has not made them permanent. I cannot remember the 
terminology here, but they are kind of temporary bishops. They 
do not have the permanence of a bishop in the old Polish 
territory. And it would be tantamount to Vatican recognition of 
the Niese Oder line if they changed the status of it. They do 
report to Wyszynski, but they do not have technically the same 
status as the bishops throughout the Western part, and this is 
part of the argument that is going on between the Vatican and 
Poland.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    Senator Mundt. Do you have any unanswered questions?
    Senator Sparkman. I suggest that we later go into this 
other program.
    Senator Mundt. How much of a military establishment do they 
have?
    Ambassador Gronouski. They have a very substantial military 
establishment. The equipment is quite modern. This is 
integrated with the Warsaw Pact.
    Senator Mundt. Is it completely controlled by the Polish 
government?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Oh, yes. It is controlled by the 
Poles, but nonetheless it is integrated with the Russians and 
the others in the Pact.
    Senator Sparkman. It is led by a Russian General, is it 
not?
    Ambassador Gronouski. He was thrown out in 1956. That was 
one of the Gomulka changes.

                    POLISH SUPPORT FOR NORTH VIETNAM

    Senator Mundt. What is the extent of their aid to North 
Vietnam, that is, by Poland?
    Ambassador Gronouski. It is pretty hard to nail it down. 
Basically, from all I can gather it is relatively small. The 
reason for that is that they talk a lot more than they do. 
Every speech they give, they talk about helping Vietnam in the 
North. I think it is easier said than done. It is a rather poor 
country. They have tremendous development problems internally. 
I think that they give as little as they can get away with. 
That does not mean to say that they are not doing it, but I do 
not think that it has any effect.
    Senator Mundt. It is an issue.
    Ambassador Gronouski. I have tried to nail it down. I have 
been told point blank by them that it is not military. I do not 
necessarily believe it. I do not think it is anything big. It 
has been said it is so and so. As I say, I do not take that at 
face value, but I am convinced, nonetheless, it is very small.

                 IMPROVEMENTS IN U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS

    Senator Mundt. In connection with the understanding to 
establish more East-West trade, have you noticed any lessening 
of resistance to such East-West relationships?
    Ambassador Gronouski. We have a good program. Two things 
happened in the last six weeks that no one predicted would 
happen during this period of Vietnam.
    One, they have agreed to use Public Law 480 currency for 
the language program, a very major program which will be run 
jointly by American universities and Polish educational people. 
This is going to have an extraordinary impact in Poland. And, 
as I say, it was greatly unexpected. I was sort of pessimistic 
myself. They agreed to it.
    Secondly, the Ford Foundation program in Poland was ended 
in 1964. It was broken off. A month or so ago, the Ford 
Foundation revived it and there will be about 60 Poles coming 
to the United States every year on this program, something that 
I think is quite striking in this period of time.
    Senator Mundt. How about the USIA exchange program?
    Ambassador Gronouski. The only limitation that has happened 
is that our cultural exchange budget has been cut. Last year, 
we had 274. This year, it has been cut down to 74. The problem 
really is that we are lessening the program, not them. We have 
a lot of students both ways. We have three professors full-
time, three major universities in Poland. We have lecturers 
coming over all of the time. One was the Council of Economic 
Advisers, the chairman under President Eisenhower--I cannot 
think of his name.
    Senator Sparkman. Arthur Burns.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Burns was over there. The Professor 
of International Law from Harvard was there a while back. There 
is a continuous stream coming over. Every day I get a checklist 
of Poles coming to the United States for one reason or another. 
I get a list every day that long (indicating).

                         USIA LIBRARY IN POLAND

    Senator Mundt. Do you have the USIA there? That is, any of 
their libraries?
    Ambassador Gronouski. We have a library there. We show many 
films. We have a big film library, and a quarter of a million 
students borrowed these last year.
    Senator Mundt. How do you go into that?
    Ambassador Gronouski. They come into this library of ours, 
which is open ten hours a day, all day long. It is used. We 
show films about once a week, both in Posen and in Warsaw. They 
are standing in line there. Under the IMB program, we have one-
half million American books of all kinds.
    Senator Mundt. The IMB program was put into operation when 
I was in the House. I think it was primarily operated in areas 
where we did not have information libraries, so that they could 
get books, American newspapers and the like.
    Ambassador Gronouski. We only have a library. It is very 
limited. All over the country there is about one-half million 
dollars worth of books, newspapers and magazines. ``Dr. 
Kildare'' is very much liked. Maybe he is not the head of it, 
but the fact is that he is a favorite with them, and that is 
very important.
    We had someone go up to a little town and he heard rumors 
that it was going to be cut off. We had not already notified 
them. This little guy said to Fisher, one of our attaches, 
``You are not going to take that out, are you?''
    These have tremendous impact. There is no program at all 
that I can think of that is more important than this.
    Senator Mundt. Have you made a study of the USIA programs?
    Ambassador Gronouski. They are very widely used. The IMB 
and all of them. In fact, I am always intrigued by the fact 
that despite, for instance, the fact that there was just a 
little line in our English language program in the newspapers, 
everywhere I go people know about it.
    I had a newspaperman explain to me that we should not worry 
so much about what is in the paper, for the simple reason that 
the Poles have become sophisticated and they know that they 
have only one line in all of the papers, and they listen to all 
of these other sources, and they make up their minds. You see 
it all of the time.
    Senator Mundt. One final question.
    Ambassador Gronouski. If I may, I might say, by the way, 
that I talked with Leonard Marks about this. I think that it 
would be more effective if he had a little more power to get 
in.

                           RADIO TRANSMITTERS

    Senator Mundt. How about the transmitters--from what 
transmitter do you get this?
    Ambassador Gronouski. It comes, I think, from--I am not 
sure.
    Senator Mundt. If they would have more power it would help.
    Senator Fulbright. It comes in from North Carolina, I 
believe.
    Ambassador Gronouski. I am not sure where it comes from. I 
have never gotten into the technical side of it.

                  GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

    Senator Mundt. What experience, if any, or knowledge have 
you, if any, as to the church and its relationships?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Cardinal Wyszynski does just about 
what he pleases. There are a lot of churches. They are filled 
every Sunday, with a good mix of ages. There is a continual 
battle going on between the Cardinal and the government, but 
basically it is pretty vigorous.
    Senator Mundt. Does the government per se operate any 
antichurch programs to discourage church attendance and the 
like?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Not obviously, no.
    Senator Mundt. No?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Their big fight with the church is as 
to certain things. You heard it back here, the thousand years 
of Polish history that the church celebrated. They got into a 
big conflict over there about it.
    When the Polish Bishops last December sent a letter to the 
German Bishops, there was a big flap over that. Why? Because 
the government officials took the position that this was 
interfering in politics.
    There is a continual harassment operation going on, but the 
church survives very well. It is the biggest church in Eastern 
Europe.

                          DUPLICATIVE SERVICES

    Senator Fulbright. There is one other thing. I did not get 
your answer to Senator Mundt's question. Why can they not do 
under the USIA whatever they are doing under IMB? The reason I 
ask is that Senator Ellender in the Committee on Appropriations 
had voted to stop the IMB. They have not voted to stop the 
program under USIA for the supplying of books and magazines. In 
fact, they make the point that you are duplicating--that the 
USIA is authorized to do anything that the IMB can do. What is 
the answer to that?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Where do they duplicate? The IMB is 
quite a different program.
    Senator Fulbright. I know it is a different program, but it 
is a matter of money that they are asking for now, for $10 
million in a revolving fund. If you gave the USIA the 
equivalent amount of money, why can they not do it?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Because the Poles deal with the 
publishers here. They buy the books for their normal 
distribution channels. The USIA has no access to those channels 
and could not possibly get access to those channels. We do not 
act as a purchaser of books and put them in the stores and the 
like.
    Senator Mundt. You put out book programs in many instances.
    Ambassador Gronouski. The Poles, I am sure----
    Senator Fulbright. They buy books.
    Senator Mundt. They have subscriptions.
    Ambassador Gronouski. I am sure that the Poles would not 
let the USIA operate in this way. It is one thing for the book 
dealers to do it and the people in the theater to buy 
playwrights, et cetera. They deal directly. And in what except 
for the financial arrangements in a kind of commercial-like 
deal.

                   GOVERNMENT VERSUS PRIVATE INDUSTRY

    If the USIA came in and tried to replace this, you have the 
United States government agency trying to dominate the reading 
that is going on in Poland. The government would not buy it at 
all. Yet we are getting the thing across.
    Senator Fulbright. Offhand, since they do everything 
through the government, they do not have private industry, why 
do they prefer to do business with private companies here, 
rather than the government? It has not occurred to me that it 
was the real reason. Well, why, if that is the case, I do not 
care about it.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Also, if we did it we would have to 
appropriate the money.
    Senator Fulbright. We are appropriating the money anyway. 
We are asking now to appropriate about $10 million in a 
revolving fund to be kept at that level by an appropriation of 
dollars. This figment that it is done otherwise is not going 
down so well. It has not been accepted by the people. It is 
just a dollar appropriation that they are asking for. Senator 
Ellender appeared before the committee. He was very much 
concerned about it. The committee has voted. Rather than 
precipitate a big squabble about it, I wonder if it could not 
be done in any other way. If you say it cannot, all right.
    Ambassador Gronouski. I am sure that the program does not 
operate in this kind of way, that is, if it does not, it will 
not operate. The USIA will not be permitted to do it. I think 
it is the better way, at least it gets them the books, their 
plays in these various areas, developing the kind of contacts 
with American publishers, American firms which, in the long 
pull, may well have a real effect.
    Senator Cooper. They buy direct?
    Ambassador Gronouski. They buy direct. We give them the 
outlets. The USIA people in Poland manage this program and 
negotiate the areas in which they can buy. So it is in terms of 
the broad outlook something that is done between the USIA and 
the government, but in terms of the specifics it is done by the 
people. There is a teacher who wants a planning book of the 
United States, and we put in an order for it. It is a 
diversified thing among all of the people who are involved in 
this sort of thing. It is not shoved down their throats. They 
get the book.
    We are going to have a book fair going on at the end of 
this month. There will be over fifteen publishers there to 
display their books. They have these teachers come in and they 
get ideas for textbooks.
    The writers can see these novels and what-have-you. It is a 
very diversified approach. I think it is the best approach.
    Senator Fulbright. That was one thing. Does anyone wish to 
proceed with this other matter?
    Ambassador Gronouski. The chairman raised a question 
earlier.

                  POLISH ROLE IN VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS

    Senator Sparkman. Have you read Hightower's article?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I have not read the other one.
    Senator Sparkman. The letter in the New York Times takes a 
different tack with this. I think the principal difference is 
that it was on December 3rd and 4th--whereas Hightower does not 
mention that.
    Senator Fulbright. The main difference is that he mentions 
the bombing on the 2nd and the 3rd--let me read----
    Ambassador Gronouski. Actually, the bombing on the 3rd is 
the question that was raised.
    Let me get at the beginning of this. I was not involved in 
all of the pieces of this whole Vietnam affair, but I think 
that it is in December from the things that occurred.
    The Lodge talks were in Saigon. I will tell you my 
impressions of that. I think that the Secretary is going to 
talk about this whole picture later in the week with you. I am 
not competent to talk beyond what I participated in. By the 
way, the Hightower story, except for a certain degree of 
details, covers pretty well what happened.
    Senator Fulbright. It is fairly accurate?
    Ambassador Gronouski. It is fairly accurate. I quarrel with 
the details, but in terms otherwise it is all right. 
Essentially, I got into the act on a Saturday night, on 
December 3rd, I believe, when I got a wire from the department 
indicating that the Poles, Mr. Lewanowski and Mr. Lodge, had 
been talking about a meeting on the 6th of December between the 
North Vietnamese and a representative in Warsaw which would be 
myself. It began, approximately, to talk about negotiations. 
And they said that I should expect a call from the foreign 
office. I did get a call on Monday morning and met with Mr. 
Rapacki who is the Foreign Minister. In the meantime, I got a 
whole lot of stuff briefing me on what the conversations had 
been that had gone on in Saigon. Mr. Rapacki then simply 
recounted to me the conversations that they thought had gone on 
and raised two questions.

                            BOMBING OF HANOI

    One, what we had said in Saigon were the basis that we 
expected to draw the principles, the ten points that Lewanowski 
had presented to Lodge, that is, when he came back from Hanoi. 
We made the point that this, of course, is to have negotiations 
until some of the points would have to be interpreted and 
clarified.
    Either that day or the next day, in talking about the 
bombing, the bombing of Hanoi had occurred, and that Hanoi had 
received a bad effect in the situation--at any rate, we talked 
between the 3rd and the 4th, and after that we had a whole 
series of talks up to the 10th or the 12th.
    I think I satisfied them that the question of clarification 
or interpretation was something that we always have to do--that 
we tend to generalizations that would be interpreted 
differently by any two people, and that we were entering it in 
good faith and that, inevitably, I used the example from our 
past conversations about it, I pointed out that the same thing 
does not mean the same thing to people at any time. This is 
what negotiations were all about, one of the things.
    I was very disappointed during that period ten or twelve 
days after the 3rd, because there seemed to be a kind of 
feeling that we were going to have this meeting, and we had 
many conversations about it, and yet nothing was materializing. 
The body had not been produced. And the bombing had not been 
reduced.
    Each time I tried to pin them down, ``If there are any 
problems, we can start talking about them. And you and I can 
never solve this in doing this.'' He put me off. And I so 
reported to Washington.
    Senator Symington. Who put you off?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Rapacki. I could never get him pinned 
down.
    Senator Mundt. For what reason--what did he say?
    Ambassador Gronouski. He mentioned the bombing 
clarification. At one point he seemed to be resolved with the 
clarification and that there was no bombing going on. He 
probably thought that was not the problem at that time, at any 
rate.
    He had made the point very strongly that we ought to be 
very careful on the bombing at this time--Hanoi gets very 
nervous and is not likely to look upon this as conducive to 
carrying this out, or the talks.
    There was a period after that when we had--I do not know 
how many conversations, but I am sure it was at least one a 
day--we almost lived together--and I kept trying to pin him 
down. I tried to get him to say, ``What has Hanoi said?'' I 
could never get him to say it. He is a diplomatic artist. I 
like him. But doggone, I never could get him pinned down. He is 
an expert in circumlocution. You never quit or you never walk 
away saying, ``He answered my question.'' He is very, very 
adroit.
    At any rate, this went on until the 13th. Of course, the 
bombing happened on the 13th which resulted in him calling me 
the next day and saying, ``This breaks off our conversations.''

                 POLES WERE TALKING WITH THE VIETNAMESE

    Of course, we have not been very close to him up to then. I 
could not get to him. I kept wanting to know, for instance, 
``Just what is Hanoi saying so that maybe I can interpret it to 
my government and maybe we can get a better answer.''
    He was never where he would tell me, or what Hanoi was 
saying. He never did at any point in the whole conversation 
tell me directly that he ever talked to Hanoi. I felt that he 
was talking to Hanoi. I do not know it for a fact. It was very 
difficult in this whole series of conversations.
    I felt that he was talking to Hanoi. I felt that he was 
trying to do something with the good-will. I could see a lot of 
reasons why ending the Vietnam war was useful to the Poles in 
terms of their own diplomatic position. They are really 
concerned with Central Europe. They do not want the Soviet 
Union distracted from Central Europe. They even want us 
involved in Central Europe, really, when it comes right down to 
it. They do not want this kind of distraction. During that 
period of long meetings every day, from the 3rd to the 13th, I 
was never successful in getting him pinned down on any one of 
these various questions. He would allude to the attitudes of 
Hanoi. He would allude to the possibilities of the meeting, but 
I could not get him to say, ``Well, this is exactly what Hanoi 
said. This is Hanoi's position.'' I could not get him, of 
course, to produce the body. I pressed it very hard, because I 
repeated many times that, ``If we are going to get moving, we 
have got to get the ground work laid. Let us have one meeting 
to see if it will work. What can we lose? We have gone this 
far, let us move on.''
    It never happened.
    On the 14th he called me in and said that he would break--
that this was the last with Hanoi and the Poles agreed with 
him. The situation was very bad.

                  TEN-MILE BOMBING LIMIT AROUND HANOI

    Subsequently, after discussing it telegraphically with the 
department--I did come home on December 23rd to discuss it; I 
was here one day--I came back from Washington feeling that I 
really needed to get this thing off dead center, because there 
was this bombing of Hanoi where they lived that was continually 
emphasized that I got from Rapacki. So I arrived in Warsaw at 
six o'clock--that was in the evening--and got a meeting with 
him at seven o'clock. I told him that afternoon or the 
afternoon I had left, yes, that afternoon I had left 
Washington--this was Christmas eve--that we had already put in 
orders not to bomb within a ten-mile limit surrounding Hanoi. 
We had a very good hour and a half discussion. I walked away 
from that meeting thinking, ``We are on track.''
    Senator Symington. Ten miles?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Ten miles, circle.
    Senator Cooper. A radius of ten miles?
    Ambassador Gronouski. A ten-mile radius. I walked away from 
that meeting feeling very good and so reported to Washington 
that Rapacki made it very clear to me in many ways, including 
the fact that he thanks me for going to Washington and 
everything--he said, ``Now, this is really something I can go 
to Hanoi with and talk to them about.''
    I felt at the time that Rapacki was very optimistic, that 
the thing was on the road; at least that was my impression--
that is what I reported back to Washington.
    I did not hear anything until the 20th. That was when Mr. 
Michalowski, who is going to be the Ambassador here and is very 
much involved in the Vietnam question, called me and asked me 
if it was statute or nautical miles. I told him nautical miles. 
I think I felt that, ``We are now on the track.''
    Then I waited until the 30th, I believe. I think it was the 
30th of December when, at six o'clock in the evening, I was 
called in by Rapacki. I never saw Rapacki and Lewanowski so 
crestfallen in countenance as they were. They started out by 
saying that the Polish government would have no alternative but 
to withdraw from the discussion and expressed the thought, 
perhaps, that this will be helpful anyway, in the future. But 
he gave me the clear feeling that while they have felt that 
this was an out, it was not. He also gave me some talk about if 
we had done this on the 3rd, maybe it would have happened. I 
felt that Rapacki was very much disappointed, that he had 
thought that we had enough now to convince Hanoi. Publicly, you 
will never get this out of them, but this was my genuine 
feeling after I walked out of that meeting. I was crestfallen 
myself.
    Other things happened at this time that we do not know 
about. I think that there was some contact in Moscow in this 
period, but I only know this kind of second-hand. I did not get 
any report on it.

                            POLISH SINCERITY

    Senator Cooper. Can you give us any specific reasons why at 
this time?
    Ambassador Gronouski. He said that Hanoi just said stop.
    Senator Cooper. He did not say why Hanoi asked him to stop?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Except he did talk about the bombing 
and the clarification situation.
    Senator Symington. Do you think that he was insincere 
anytime in negotiations, or he was trying to get us to stop the 
bombing?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I felt that there was a degree of 
sincerity on the part of the Poles. These things are always 
mixed. They are not with us, either, you know. I thought that 
there was a degree of sincerity by the Poles, but the Poles 
probably had a very thin thread to rely on in their talks with 
Hanoi and that there really was not--that they were better that 
they were hoping that if they could get a good enough package 
and nail this down well enough from the point of Hanoi, that 
they had enough contact with Hanoi that they could convince 
them to meet. I do not think they had it, but, again, you never 
know. I have a feeling that the Poles were hopeful, but did not 
have much to go on, but they were trying.
    Senator Cooper. He had been to Hanoi?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Who?
    Senator Cooper. Lewanowski.
    Ambassador Gronouski. He was the Commissioner. In fact, he 
is just leaving there now. But Lewanowski back in the Harriman 
days, in the bombing pause, Lewanowski was the foreign officer 
who was delegated to the Vietnam situation, and he is going to 
be the Ambassador here. He had gone to Hanoi for about 
seventeen or eighteen days during the bombing pause. I was 
convinced then that they were doing their damndest to talk 
Hanoi into meeting with us. I do not know what this is worth, 
but I met Lewanowski the day he came back, on a Saturday, and 
the first thing he said to me, ``Goddamn those Chinese.''
    Senator Cooper. What?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Lewanowski.
    Senator Sparkman. Go ahead.
    Ambassador Gronouski. ``Goddamn those Chinese.''
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Rapacki did not go to Saigon.
    Ambassador Gronouski. No, not at any time.
    Senator Sparkman. Or his intermediary--it was the 
commissioner?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Yes.
    Senator Sparkman. All right. Do you have some more 
questions?
    Senator Cooper. I have some more questions, but I have to 
leave.

                        A FORTUNATE APPOINTMENT

    Senator Fulbright. Before I forget it, I just want to say 
that everything that I have heard from the people, newspapers 
and other places, it is to the fact that you have done a very 
good job in Poland. One does not always have that opportunity 
to say that. I want to compliment you on your work. It has been 
a very fortunate appointment.
    What you said earlier I thought was extremely good. At this 
point I do not think there is much more that we can do, unless 
you can read their minds.

                          VIETNAMESE IN WARSAW

    So far as you know, there were never any representatives of 
Hanoi in Warsaw during this time?
    Ambassador Gronouski. The Ambassador was there all of the 
time, the North Vietnamese Ambassador. The two ambassadors were 
going to meet.
    Senator Fulbright. Who was that?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I cannot remember his name.
    Senator Fulbright. That was the plan?
    Ambassador Gronouski. That was the plan. I was standing in 
the wings and he was, as I was.
    Senator Fulbright. You never had met with him?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I never have, no.
    Senator Fulbright. You have never seen him?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I have seen him at cocktail parties.
    Senator Fulbright. But never officially?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Never officially.
    Senator Fulbright. The most surprising thing that I do not 
understand is why they would have made the move. If I 
understand it correctly, the Polish diplomat, Lewanowski, was 
in Saigon together with, I believe, the French Ambassador.
    Ambassador Gronouski. It was Orlando, the Italian.
    Senator Fulbright. Orlando called and discussed this matter 
with Lodge, is that it?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. In fact, my recollection is that 
Orlando really got Lodge and Lewanowski back together in June.
    Senator Sparkman. You understand that the Polish gentleman 
was a member of the Commission.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Yes, of the Commission.

                      AMBASSADOR LODGE'S BLESSING

    Senator Fulbright. And then as I understand it, if I do 
correctly, Lodge gave his blessing and said to the Pole, ``Why, 
yes, if you can do anything, do it. We would be interested.'' 
Is that about correct?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Yes.
    Senator Fulbright. Then he went to Hanoi?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Prior to that Lodge explained in a 
fairly long conversation what our attitudes were and answered a 
lot of questions. I cannot remember the specifics of it now, 
but it is the so-called ten points. Lodge did not present ten 
points. He discussed them, but Lewanowski summarized these into 
ten points. He went to Hanoi.
    Senator Fulbright. He went to Hanoi?
    Ambassador Gronouski. And talked to Hanoi, and came back 
and told Lodge that there was a possibility of this meeting in 
Warsaw.

                       NEGOTIATING A SECOND STAGE

    Senator Fulbright. At that time they laid down those 
conditions about stopping the bombing?
    Ambassador Gronouski. No, no. One of the propositions of 
the ten points which was appealing to both the Poles, and I 
thought to Hanoi, too, was that there would be a two-stage 
proposition, the A and the B stages.
    The ``A'' stage would be to stop the bombing of Hanoi and, 
consequently, in terms of face and all of that. And previous 
commitments, statements that Hanoi had made this would happen 
without any necessity of saying ``This is it.'' But in these 
negotiations we were going to carry out in Warsaw, this two-
stage proposition would be developed where we would agree ahead 
of time what this second stage would be which would be that 
both sides would pull back, which was rather indeterminate. But 
we would negotiate some way to indicate maybe two or three 
weeks after the bombing stopped that something else would 
happen and both sides would pull back.
    The action that Hanoi made would be what we did with regard 
to the bombing on the ground. I think this was the thing that 
was very intriguing to the Poles. I thought it was a good 
thing, because it would avoid Hanoi which has become so 
committed to this. ``We will not do anything until the bombing 
is stopped''--the bombing is stopped unilaterally and, 
therefore, we have agreed to take these two steps. It was very 
clearly pointed out to them that this would be a highly secret 
thing and there would be no leaking of the proposition ahead of 
time.
    Senator Mundt. Was this bombing all over or what?
    Ambassador Gronouski. The bombing of the North.
    Senator Mundt. Rather than the ten-mile radius or all of 
North Vietnam bombing?
    Ambassador Gronouski. All bombing in the North.
    Senator Sparkman. May I bring this up? I have to leave. In 
your talks with the Chinese has this matter ever been 
discussed? Have they ever thrown any light on this regarding 
North Vietnam?
    Ambassador Gronouski. The Chinese, unfortunately, I think 
it is important to say, that they go on. I enjoy the talks; we 
have good conversations with them. It is kind of fun for me, 
but not much happens in these talks. They are even tougher than 
Hanoi, because they say that all troops must leave before we 
even start talking.
    Senator Sparkman. I am sorry that I have to leave, but I 
have a matter here that I have to attend to on the floor.
    Ambassador Gronouski. I have enjoyed having met you.
    Senator Sparkman. I join with the chairman in what he said 
about the reports regarding your excellent work. Thank you very 
much.
    Ambassador Gronouski. Thank you.

                       WHY THE U.S. BOMBED HANOI

    Senator Fulbright (presiding). One last point on the 
meeting while you are on that point. Did Rapacki tell you, 
after we had bombed Hanoi--was it on the 3rd or the 2nd--that 
while there was no condition that we would stop bombing, they 
certainly understood that it was not an escalation of the 
bombing. Is that what he told you?
    Ambassador Gronouski. That is right. He said that certainly 
this is not going to do you any good in getting these 
negotiations going, and----
    Senator Fulbright. What did our government tell you? Why 
did we bomb Hanoi at that time?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Essentially that it was unrelated to 
the peace talks; that this area had been bombed some time 
before--I think it was back in April or May or June--somewhere 
in there; that there was positively the pattern of bombing--it 
has not gotten in there before--but it was certainly unrelated 
to the peace talks; and also--or I may have interjected this 
myself--I made the point that we must realize on both sides 
that things are going on. The war still continues. Let us get 
the meeting going and we can stop all of this very quickly, 
because some were worried about that time that there was a 
bridge blown up near Saigon. There was a bomb thrown into some 
barracks or a theater or something. I said, ``This is something 
that inevitably happens. The war is going on and both sides are 
going to be irritated.'' There certainly was no attempt, no 
notion that this was an attempt to throw cold water on the 
negotiations. That is absolutely wrong. Let us get the meeting 
on the 6th going and I am sure that we can in a day or two get 
all of the bombing in North Vietnam stopped.

                   BOMBING UNRELATED TO NEGOTIATIONS

    Senator Fulbright. When you say it was unrelated to it, 
what that means is that our government did not do that 
intentionally in order to stop the bombing talks, is that it?
    Ambassador Gronouski. That is right. It was part of a 
general military plan which had been in effect for some time, 
because there was a suggestion raised--Rapacki made the point 
that he felt personally that Johnson was very well intentioned 
in this. He wondered if maybe some military commander did not 
want the talks to go on, which was not the case, that this was 
a target that had been put in the general plan for some time, 
that this happened--conditions were right to bomb it at that 
particular date.
    Senator Fulbright. Was it on the 16th?
    Ambassador Gronouski. On the 13th.
    Senator Fulbright. The next bombing, that is the same 
attitude?
    Ambassador Gronouski. After that bombing it broke off the 
talks with Rapacki.
    Senator Fulbright. Our attitude was that that had no 
relationship?
    Ambassador Gronouski. That is right.
    Senator Fulbright. That may or may not be hard to take. 
They had no relationships to these two?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I went back on my own at the 15th or 
so to see Rapacki again and I told him that--Rapacki and I have 
pretty good personal relationships--I told him that in every 
kind of situation like this things are fouled up in the 
process, but that they had no point--and I was in discussion 
with Washington. I was hopeful that we could make some progress 
along some of the lines that he suggested, to keep cool for a 
while, and let us go back to this thing. Then I did get the 
message from Washington very shortly thereafter indicating that 
we would not bomb around Hanoi, but that we should get some 
assurances from Hanoi that they would not be blowing up shops 
in Saigon, so that the whole series of discussions thereafter--
we finally ended up, as I said, on the 22nd, when I was back 
here the 23rd, unilaterally, which would not go beyond the----

                   INSTRUCTIONS FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT

    Senator Fulbright. Did our government ever supply you with 
any minimum or with any instructions as to what to talk about 
in case you did have conversations?
    Ambassador Gronouski. They supplied me with instructions on 
several of the ten points in the event that we had the first 
meeting, that I should discuss about four or five or ten points 
and schedule further meetings. I did not have discussions 
beyond that, but I had plenty to talk about the first several 
meetings. There were about four points that they gave me, very 
detailed run-down, for the clarification process. In that 
Hightower story, there is a minor point, but when we talked--
every time we talked about interpretation and clarification I 
made the point that this is what these meetings are all about, 
to get them going and we will do it in the meeting. Hightower 
seemed to think that we wanted to clarify it before the meeting 
started, which is wrong. We were talking in terms of 
clarification during the first meetings.

                    WORK DONE DURING BOMBING PAUSES

    Senator Symington. I have seen some pictures of what has 
happened in Hanoi and down through South Vietnam in the four 
days of the holiday season which are the most outstanding 
things that I have ever seen in my life.
    Ambassador Gronouski. All of those ships.
    Senator Symington. The way the steel mills, the pictures of 
the steel mills show some of the new steel barges that they 
have built, under construction--it was interesting to me that 
in the last two days that they did nothing, just clean as the 
day before they started the holiday. It showed that they made 
all of that preparation. Possibly they are killing Marines 
right now with the stuff that they brought down.
    I do not agree with my colleagues that we ought to stop the 
air bombing. If we hit them on their military targets that will 
bring success to us. I have been there three times in eighteen 
months and in my own opinion we are getting absolutely nowhere. 
The slight military advantage that we may be getting, I think, 
is more offset than what we are losing politically and 
economically. The only chance we have is doing the same that so 
many Americans want us to do or to stop doing. I want to be 
very frank about it. That is my position.
    What I would like to know from you is there anything that 
would lead you to feel that there was any sincerity in the 
North Vietnamese approach, or was there any approach to you. In 
other words, that we merely stopped for four months because 
they were looking for something or they were not?
    Maybe that they thought that we cheated them, but we 
stopped six times and nothing has ever come out of it. It gives 
them a tremendous opportunity to resupply themselves which is 
the guts of all good movements of armed forces.

                       WAS THE BOMBING A MISTAKE

    Is there anything in your opinion that would lead you to 
feel that a mistake was made to a point where we did bomb on 
the 13th of December, or was it just the start of a charade, in 
your opinion, from the beginning, without the Poles--I am not 
talking about the Poles, I am just talking about Hanoi?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I think that we have a period there 
of 7 or 8 days where we had a very calm reasonable discussion 
with Rapacki. I feel that during these 8 or 10 days he would 
like to have gotten something going. I do not think that he 
could.
    Senator Symington. You think that extended back to Hanoi?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I was the greatest wishful thinker in 
the world. The hope was father to my thoughts. I thought that 
maybe we had it. But two things make me think not.
    In the first place, we had about 8 or 9 days before the 
13th when something could and I thought should have happened. 
There was not any bombing of Hanoi in this period, and it did 
not happen.
    I got all kinds of circumlocution on this.
    The other thing is that I thought the two stage proposition 
was a magnificent out for Hanoi where we would actually 
unilaterally stop the bombing. Of course, there would be prior 
agreements privately that something would happen in a couple or 
three weeks, but it would happen on both sides. And, therefore, 
that Hanoi would be off the hook in terms of reacting to the 
stopping of the bombing and that business. It seems to me that 
this should have been tremendously appealing. I felt it was 
tremendously appealing to the Poles, but nothing happened.
    So despite all of my wishes and hopes--and I will have to 
admit that some of my telegrams were wishful thinking--I have 
come to the conclusion that I really do not think that there 
was a lot of sincerity from Hanoi's side. I think there was 
less from Hanoi's side than the Poles hoped there was.
    Senator Symington. That was the thrust of my question. Let 
me ask you one more question.

                    MERITS OF ANOTHER BOMBING PAUSE

    Senator Fulbright. Before you get off that. Does he think 
anything can be done?
    Senator Symington. I was going to ask that.
    Senator Fulbright. Okay.
    Senator Symington. From your standpoint, based on your 
background, you know what this war is doing to the American 
people--from the standpoint of our political conditions around 
the world and our economy and from the standpoint of the 
division in the country--I had a letter the other day from my 
good friend General Gavin--I do not agree with some of his 
thinking--in which he said that this country was more divided 
than it has been since the Civil War. I think he is right from 
what I get in my own State. In any case, I would like to ask of 
you this question. Do you yourself feel that another bombing 
pause voluntarily on our part would have some quid pro quo and 
that it would be in the best interests of the United States?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I have explored this over and over 
again with the Poles.
    Senator Symington. I ask with the greatest sincerity.
    Ambassador Gronouski. I have told the Poles in the past 
many times. I said, ``I cannot guarantee anything.'' I have 
done this on my own. I have said, ``I cannot guarantee 
anything, God knows I do not make foreign policy but, at least, 
I can talk to people who do. And if you can give me an 
indication of some reciprocal action that will be taken by 
Hanoi, I think that I can get the bombing stopped in 24 hours. 
And I, certainly, will get in an airplane and fly home and try 
to convince the President. So give me some reaction--just give 
me something to talk about.''
    I said, ``There are all kind of pressures in the United 
States on the President. There is some for stop and some for 
continuing. Give me a little ammunition to support those who 
want to stop it. Do you have the contacts with Hanoi--get 
something from them.''

                 POLES CANNOT EXPLAIN HANOI'S POSITION

    And it was disappointing. With regularity I would get the 
reaction, ``We cannot do this--nothing will happen unless you 
stop. We cannot tell you what will happen if you stop or if 
anything will happen.''
    I did get that. I had this statement from every level, from 
Rapacki on down for at least 50 times since I have brought it 
up since the time of the visit in last June. I have got nothing 
to indicate that the Poles have any confidence in anything 
happening. All they do is say, ``Nothing will happen unless you 
do this,'' but they cannot throw in the other half of it and 
they will not and they say it. My own feeling is that the best 
of both worlds is represented by the A and B proposition in the 
10 points. I hope sometime we can go into that.
    Senator Symington. The only reason I asked the question, I 
am a neophyte on this diplomatic proposition. The fight in the 
air is the only thing that is hurting them. We are not doing 
very well, because of the limitations on us--maybe that would 
not do well even if we took the limitations off. My personal 
impression is that they put in these tremendous concentrated 
efforts to stop the air affair, because it is the only thing 
that hurts them. They do not have very much respect for human 
life, any more than for a dog--probably less than for a good 
milk cow.
    Ambassador Gronouski. We cannot get to an intermediary. I 
have stayed awake nights thinking about it--why we cannot get 
at least some indication on their part. I told Rapacki, ``Do 
not tell me what Hanoi will do--give me something very specific 
what you think Hanoi will do.''
    Senator Symington. According to some good writers they are 
trying to put us on the ground which I think would be 
disastrous. Thank you very much.
    Senator Fulbright. Senator Pell has some questions.
    Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                        PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION

    There are just two questions. One, are you familiar with 
the round robin letter sent about January 24 to----
    Ambassador Gronouski. Yes.
    Senator Pell. Are you familiar with the expression droit 
reconnaitre, concerning its translation?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I sure am, but I cannot remember what 
the words are now.
    Senator Pell. Droit reconnaitre. Now the question here is 
as you know that the Vietnamese translation into English gave 
the hard version of it, and they said that we must accept it. 
We went back to Vietnam on that and said, ``Is this really what 
you mean?'' Or, ``Do you mean the alternative? What do you 
consider it to mean?''
    Did it come to you in Warsaw?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Rapacki raised that question. He 
thought that there was a difference. We so reported it to 
Washington. They checked it with the British. I do not know all 
that went on here, but I do know that the British were asked to 
investigate it. They investigated it with Moscow--that would be 
the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow. I do not know where 
else we might have checked. I know that there was a lot of 
query about that. The answer we got which I went over Monday--
this was on Saturday--I went over Monday and talked to Rapacki 
and I said, ``All of our indications are that this distinction 
that you draw is not considered a distinction by the North 
Vietnamese.''
    Senator Pell. Did the North Vietnamese come back to you, to 
Rapacki or to the Polish delegate in Hanoi, indicating that you 
ought to consider it, that it would be acceptable?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Nothing happened in Warsaw with the 
North Vietnamese. Simply Rapacki expressing his own views.
    Senator Pell. But it ought to be considered?
    Ambassador Gronouski. We ought to look at this as the 
softer one. I, frankly, do not think--I thought it was a 
mountain made out of a mole hill. I do not think either 
formulation--I mean, when you read the whole context of the 
letter, I did not feel that it made that much difference in the 
letter. Perhaps it did. So that we did investigate. I do not 
know how far we went. I know from the British Ambassador who 
was in Moscow at the time that he was the one who went to check 
with the Ambassador--I know from him that he is the one that 
called on the North Vietnamese late that Saturday night to find 
out officially which interpretation was correct. And Grimelow, 
who I regard as one of the most able British diplomats I have 
met, reported back to London, which went to Washington. ``What 
you have termed the hard language was the proper language to 
use.''
    Senator Pell. I am not sure that I would agree with you on 
that, in this letter--that the single guiding point from the 
American standpoint----
    Ambassador Gronouski. There is another section in that 
letter.
    Do you have the whole letter there?
    Senator Pell. Yes.
    Ambassador Gronouski. There is another section to that 
letter.
    Senator Pell. I would like to put it into the record, if 
you will permit it.
    Senator Fulbright. Yes, you may do so. It will be made a 
part of the record.
    [A related document follows:]

                     A Probe for Peace That Failed


                          BY JOHN M. HIGHTOWER

            Associated Press Staff Writer
    For more than four months, from mid-December to late April, 
President Johnson held U.S. bombers away from the North 
Vietnamese capital of Hanoi in an effort to find out whether 
President Ho Chi Minh would open secret peace talks or take 
steps to scale down the war.
    North Vietnam was informed of what Johnson was doing and 
was invited to respond.
    The story of what happened, beginning last November with a 
Polish maneuver, now can be told as it is known in official 
Washington. It has been pieced together in a weeks-long check 
of various sources. It can be told now because the episode is 
closed, although officials believe some of the work done may 
contribute eventually to peace in Vietnam.
    Through Polish and other diplomatic channels word was sent 
to Hanoi last December that if Hanoi would take some parallel 
step to de-escalate the fighting, the United States would be 
prepared to make other moves, Hanoi, campaigning to halt all 
bombing of North Vietnam, never accepted the offer.

                        STRUCK AGAIN 2 WEEKS AGO

    The gambit thus failed and two weeks ago U.S. bombers 
struck again inside the previously forbidden Hanoi circle--10 
nautical miles from the center of the city.
    The last previous time the bombs exploded so close to 
Hanoi's center, it was during a peace probe initiated by 
Poland. Polish diplomats claimed that that bombing, Dec. 13-14, 
wrecked one of the most hopeful approaches to peace in the 
recent history of the war. U.S. officials refute the claim, but 
can't be sure.
    Out of that failure, however, arose the four-month Hanoi 
bomb limitation.
    Events began with Januz Lewandowski, a Polish diplomat on 
the International Control Commission in Vietnam.
    Late last November Lewandowski went to Hanoi and spent 10 
days talking with diplomats and North Vietnamese officials. 
When he returned to Saigon about Dec. 1, he met secretly with 
U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the Italian Embassy.

                           10 POINTS PROPOSED

    Lewandowski told Lodge he believed North Vietnam was 
prepared to open secret exploratory discussions with the United 
States. He did not interpose the condition that the United 
States would have to call off unconditionally the bombing of 
the North.
    The Polish diplomat gave Lodge a 10-point statement of 
topics and principles for the proposed talks. The statement 
constituted a Polish summary of what the United States would be 
willing to talk about, presumably based on published 
declarations and previous talks Lewandowski had with Lodge. 
Lewandowski said the North Vietnamese were also willing to talk 
about these points.
    The 10 points covered such topics as halting hostilities, 
the independence of South Vietnam, the principle of U.S. 
willingness to withdraw its forces when that independence was 
assured and the role of elections in organizing the government 
in the South.
    There was also provision for discussing Hanoi's terms for a 
peaceful settlement as well as any other peace terms that might 
be thrown into the talks.
    President Johnson and his advisers, quickly notified by 
Lodge, were interested in the possibility a serious opportunity 
for negotiations might be at hand. Polish diplomats had already 
told Americans they believed Hanoi was about ready to hold 
secret exploratory talks even though the bombing continued.
    President Johnson decided that with some clarification the 
10-point statement could serve as a basis for talks with North 
Vietnam.
    In about 48 hours Rusk instructed Lodge to inform 
Lewandowski that the United States was ready to talk and was 
interested in clarification. He also told him the United States 
was prepared to shift the contact to Warsaw and to meet there 
with a representative from North Vietnam.
    One point stated the United States would not insist that 
North Vietnam acknowledge publicly the presence of its forces 
in South Vietnam. The Johnson administration decided this 
should be clarified to require that if the troop issue was to 
be covered up for facesaving purposes, then the North 
Vietnamese forces should be withdrawn from the south.''

                      GRONOUSKI MADE CHIEF CONTACT

    Lewandowski was informed of this and other clarification 
points. The others seemed mainly matters of wording. But this 
one was obviously substantial.
    In Warsaw, President Johnson's ambassador, John A. 
Gronouski received instructions making him the U.S. 
representative and briefing him on U.S.-Vietnamese policy.
    Gronouski met with Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki and 
found Rapacki strenuously objected to any clarification on any 
of the 10 points. Rapacki warned against wrecking the whole 
action at the outset.
    Between Polish and U.S. versions of the incident there is 
some difference at this point. The Polish view has been 
reported to be that the United States wanted to get its 
clarification before the secret talks opened. The Washington 
version is that the United States was making known its desire 
for clarification in the talks.

                       RESISTANCE CAUSED CONCERN

    Rapacki's strong resistance to the clarification proposal 
caused some concern in Washington where officials were not sure 
the Poles had any commitment from North Vietnam to go into the 
talks. Some high officials here doubted that Rapacki was in 
fact relaying U.S. views and readiness for talks to Hanoi.
    So far as can be determined from responsible informants, 
President Johnson sometime earlier approved air strikes close 
in to Hanoi with raid and truck centers as targets. Generally 
the United States had avoided strikes at the city.
    Informants now say an important element in the 
administration decision not to suspend the bombing plan was an 
attack by Communist forces on Saigon's main airfield and an 
unsuccessful try to blow up a major bridge in Saigon.
    Officials said diplomats are always moving about on one 
peace hope or another and that lack of a firm commitment for 
talks also was influential in the bombing decision.

                      INFLUENCED BY BASIC STRATEGY

    Furthermore, Johnson administration policymakers presumably 
were influenced by their own basic strategy of keeping heavy 
military pressure on North Vietnam.
    Before any North Vietnamese representative showed up for 
the meeting, U.S. planes carried out the Dec. 13-14 raids on 
the outskirts of Hanoi. Some planes, at least, flew directly 
over the heart of the city. Antiaircraft fire was heavy and 
North Vietnamese fighters rose to the defense. Some explosives 
fell in the city proper.
    Thereupon, North Vietnam raised a protest--which stirred up 
angry demonstrations in many countries--that the United States 
had deliberately bombed the civilian population of Hanoi. U.S. 
denials fell on skeptical ears and did little to quiet the 
worldwide uproar.
                       hanoi no longer interested
    It later became known in Washington that one or two planes had in 
fact jettisoned their bombs over the city when they were attacked but 
officials insisted heatedly that no civilian bombing was ever 
deliberate.
    Shortly after the Dec. 13-14 incident, Rapacki reportedly told the 
United States that North Vietnam had made clear it no longer was 
interested in the planned talks because of the bombing of Hanoi. Soon 
afterward this Polish version of the collapse of the plan was made 
public informally by diplomats of the United Nations.
    U.S. officials publicly refuted the charge but privately said that 
while the attack at Hanoi might have collapsed the Polish plan, it also 
might have presented Hanoi or Warsaw with a convenient excuse for not 
going through with it.
                      felt chances were over-rated
    Some officials here felt the Warsaw government had overrated the 
chances of Hanoi's agreeing to talk.
    At that point President Johnson had two obvious interests so far as 
further attacks on Hanoi were concerned. Assuming he still hoped the 
Polish plan might work he needed to get it active again if possible. He 
also needed to avoid fueling further worldwide indignation.
    The United States sent word to Rapacki through Gronouski, according 
to diplomatic sources, that it would not bomb inside the circle of 10 
nautical miles around Hanoi and that this should get the Polish plan 
back on the track. According to these sources, Rapacki went back to 
Hanoi, but Hanoi said no.
    Here again U.S. officials are skeptical that Warsaw ever had a firm 
commitment or Hanoi a serious intention to open secret talks.
                         johnson sends new word
    Johnson decided to make the Hanoi no-bomb ring something more than 
simply an effort to revive the Polish plan. He sent word to North 
Vietnam through various channels that the United States was not only 
interested in opening peace talks but also was interested in practical 
steps to scale down the war.
    No responsive action was asked of the North Vietnamese. But they 
were informed that if they wished to make any move in any area of the 
war to curtail military operations, the United States would be alert 
and responsive. U.S. officials say North Vietnam never picked up the 
offer.
    The Hanoi bomb limitation extended over the most intense period of 
peace probing in which the United States had engaged since the long 
bombing pause during the Christmas-New Year season of 1965-66.
    There were truces at Christmas and New Year but the real focus of 
peace hopes was toward the lunar new year holiday in February. 
Beginning in January the United States sent four messages to Hanoi 
containing peace proposals.
    The climax came in early February when President Johnson personally 
sent to Ho Chi Minh a letter making a new proposal for secret talks and 
offering to halt all bombing of North Vietnam if Ho would stop 
infiltration and military supplies from north to south.
    The President's letter constituted a personal rejection of Ho's 
demand for unconditional stoppage of the bombing. Ho, in reply, renewed 
his call for an unconditional halt in the bombing of the north.
                                 ______
                                 

                   Effect of Bombings on Warsaw Talks

    To the Editor:
    The Washington news dispatch of John M. Hightower of the Associated 
Press published May 9 throws new light on the events of last November 
and December, when the United States and North Vietnam seemed the 
closest yet to direct, secret negotiations.
    I have also written about these events, on the basis of very well-
informed sources in and around the United Nations. However, in some 
important respects the story I got is different from Mr. Hightower's.
    There is agreement that on or about Dec. 1 Polish Ambassador Janusz 
Lewandowski informed U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon that 
Hanoi was ready to hold secret talks with the United States in Warsaw 
without demanding prior cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. But 
Hightower does not mention the bombings in the Hanoi area of Dec. 2 and 
4, and leaves the impression that only the bombings of Hanoi on Dec. 
13-14 caused the North Vietnamese to lose-interest in the talks.
                             major attacks
    As I got the story, on Dec. 3 Lewandowski complained strongly to 
Lodge about the bombing of Dec. 2, stating that although Hanoi would 
talk while the bombing was going on, it would not accept escalation at 
the same time. (The Times reported on Dec. 3: ``Waves of United States 
fighter-bombers made their second closest strike to Hanoi. * * *'') 
Lodge replied that such attacks were planned long in advance.
    On Dec. 4 another major attack was made on the Hanoi area. During 
this period the first talk between United States and North Vietnamese 
representatives, which had been set for about Dec. 6, was postponed.
    In Warsaw, in a series of talks between Polish Foreign Minister 
Adam Rapacki and U.S. Ambassador John Gronouski, two main problems were 
discussed: Hanoi's protests over the Dec. 2 and 4 bombings and 
Washington's request for clarification of the tenpoint statement which 
the Poles said Hanoi would accept as a basis for the U.S.--North 
Vietnamese meetings.
    Hightower's account indicated that only the latter problem was at 
issue, and he reported, ``Officials commented that diplomats were 
always involved in pursuing one peace hope or another and said that 
lack of a firm commitment for talks also was influential in the 
decision to go ahead with the bombing.''
    But since, according to my information, Hanoi had agreed to talk 
but was protesting against escalation, it is hard to believe the Dec. 
13-14 bombing of Hanoi was not closely connected with the negotiations. 
One can speculate that the bombing was carried out either deliberately 
to disrupt the talks or to bring pressure on North Vietnam to accept 
some pre-condition to the talks.
                            troops in south
    The most important new element in Hightower's account was on the 
nature of the clarification sought by the United States. He reported: 
``One of the ten points provided that the United States would not 
insist that North Vietnam acknowledge publicly the presence of its 
forces in South Vietnam. The Johnson Administration decided this should 
be clarified to require that if the troop issue was to be covered up 
for facesaving purposes, then the North Vietnamese forces would be 
withdrawn from the South.''
    Such a ``clarification'' was in reality a demand that the North 
Vietnamese cease aid to the Vietcong, without in any way limiting 
United States action in the South. Thus it may well be that the Dec. 
13-14 bombing of Hanoi was an effort to force North Vietnam to accept 
this ``clarification.'' As of now, this seems the most logical 
explanation of this strange episode.
                                            Richard Hudson,
                  Editor, War/Peace Report, New York, May 10, 1967.

                         RECOGNITION OF THE NLF

    Ambassador Gronouski. Where are we looking for this? I kind 
of lost this a little bit.
    Senator Pell. It is about the recognition of the National 
Liberation Party.
    Ambassador Gronouski. What was the other item?
    Senator Pell. This is the hard line what was considered.
    Ambassador Gronouski. That is the single guiding point in 
that letter.
    Senator Pell. Here is another one that ought to be 
considered. My understanding was that Hanoi had come back and 
said, ``We can take the soft translation'' or, maybe, in view 
of the situation, we can take it either way you want--should we 
not then have taken the softer one is what is really meant.
    Ambassador Gronouski. The talks definitive on this, and 
that is, to be able to do so, I would have to review my notes. 
I do not have them here. They are in Warsaw. I, particularly, 
the conversation that I had with Ambassador Brimelow, who was 
the guy in London who actually went to call on him----
    Senator Pell. He went to Hanoi?
    Ambassador Gronouski. No, no, Brimelow was the Minister in 
Moscow. He is now the Ambassador in Poland. I have gotten to 
know him personally.
    Senator Pell. Is he Polish or British?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Brimelow is the man who will get his 
instructions from London to talk to the Ambassador or the 
Embassy in Moscow for clarification on that terminology. And my 
recollection--and God knows it is a long time ago--but my 
recollection is that Brimelow reported back that it was the 
proper interpretation out of the Moscow Embassy of Hanoi. I do 
not want to swear by that. I want to check on it first.

                        NO DIRECT QUERY TO HANOI

    Senator Pell. Do you have any recollection that Rapacki 
went out to check this out?
    Ambassador Gronouski. No, I do not believe they did. After 
the bombing resumed they asked us why didn't we ask Lewanowski 
to do it, but they did not do it on their own hook.
    Senator Pell. Right. So that there is no further light that 
you can shed on this particular incident?
    Ambassador Gronouski. No. I do not know what all went on 
after I sent this telegram in on Rapacki asking us to consider 
this.
    Senator Pell. I sort of come back to this point, because 
the information I had was a little different. I may be informed 
incorrectly.
    I had understood that a direct query went back to Hanoi.
    Ambassador Gronouski. No. I remember very specifically that 
after the whole thing was over and the bombing had been resumed 
on Tuesday morning, I saw Rapacki, and he said--I must have 
raised the question with what their people said, and he said, 
``Why did you not ask us to ask them?''
    Senator Pell. A good question. And to repeat the question 
that you got out of Moscow, it was the hard line?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I will check my records on that, if 
you prefer.
    Senator Pell. I am very much interested.
    Ambassador Gronouski. I will send it back when I get back 
to Warsaw--I will go through it and send it back to the 
department. I cannot remember specifically now.
    Senator Pell. It disturbs me, because we have had other 
incidents where it seemed that if we wanted to follow the 
softer interpretation it might have been different.

                      KEEPING CHINA OUT OF THE WAR

    My other question is much more specific. What action do you 
think it would take to bring the Chinese into the war in 
Vietnam, in the light of your conversations?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I frankly think that I am about--I do 
not even feel embarrassed by saying I do not know, because I do 
not think that anybody else knows. Certainly, there is nothing 
in my conversations that I have had that would indicate either 
that they would come in or not. They talk about that they will 
support them all the way. I think it is really polemics.
    Senator Pell. You have given them certain assurances which 
they have you feel kept them out?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Not as many as the newspapers say we 
have. We have had no agreement with them over in Warsaw that 
people talk about. I do not know anything about that. It must 
have happened when I was not there.
    Senator Pell. Would you hazard a guess that a land invasion 
would bring them in--would you hazard such a guess?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I believe that would be a calculated 
risk. I would be worried about it.
    Senator Pell. Do you think that complete annihilation of 
Hanoi would bring them in?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I do not want to guess on that.
    I do not think that I have the basis for judging that. I 
really do not know.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    Ambassador Gronouski. I do get the notion that the land 
invasion might bring them in.

           NORTH VIETNAMESE INTEREST IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

    Senator Fulbright. Do you get the notion that they do not 
wish to make any compromise and that there is not much point in 
having negotiations?
    Ambassador Gronouski. I do not know. Let me tell you a 
conversation that I had about two weeks ago with Lewanowski. I 
went over and asked him to intercede on the prisoner business 
when they were parading prisoners through their streets. They 
have in the past interceded in time of trial. They agree with 
us and flatly say that they agree with us, that Hanoi ought to 
abide by the Geneva Convention, but this last time I talked to 
him he said, ``Look, we would like to do it, but I cannot tell 
you whether we will, because we have to judge whether we ought 
to use our good offices with them for the purpose when there 
might be a possibility that we can engage ourselves in a larger 
question, which is resolving the war itself.''
    The Poles are, interestingly enough, even after the two 
times they have tried, last January and this December, they 
have indicated that they have tried and nothing has happened. 
They still leave open the door to participate as one does not 
always know what they mean by the things, but, certainly, they 
have given every impression to me that if they thought that 
there was any possibility that they would be involved in this 
again themselves.
    Senator Fulbright. Did they give you the impression that 
after the bombing on the 13th they would believe that North 
Vietnam, that they, the Poles, would believe that North Vietnam 
is not really interested in further efforts to negotiation 
because they do not believe that the United States seriously 
wishes to negotiate--that they only expect a surrender--is that 
why they bomb?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Well, I think that you will get--I do 
get that line of thought from the Poles very often. I do not 
think that they fully agree with it themselves, but I think 
that in terms of their relationships with Hanoi they must 
maintain their relationships in what they regard as necessary 
in maintaining the credibility with them. I think that they 
must go along a certain line. And I think that this line is one 
that presents itself. I do not believe they feel it. I think 
that the Poles do.
    Senator Fulbright. Do you think that they do?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Yes. I am absolutely certain.
    Senator Pell. What about terms?
    Ambassador Gronouski. Well, I think that is a little 
uncertain because it seems to me that if we do not want to 
negotiate entirely on their terms, as I said a little while 
ago, I think that the proposals contained in the ten points are 
a logical and reasonable approach to negotiation where we would 
solve their problems with respect to a unilateral cessation of 
bombing, but have an understanding earlier than that, that 
something will happen later, after a time has passed. And when 
you say on their terms, on our terms--I do not know any terms 
that we can offer them, because I do not even know that we can 
stop bombing as they ask for. And the Poles will not in any way 
tell me that. This is what flusters me.
    Senator Fulbright. Do you have anything further? We could 
go on. There is much more to try to understand, although I 
think that we would be rehashing it.
    Thank you very much for coming here. I think that you have 
done a good job with the Poles. It is too bad that we cannot do 
something about Hanoi. Maybe we can.
    Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


        DISCUSSION REGARDING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TESTIMONY

                              ----------                              


                         Tuesday, May 16, 1967

                                   U.S. Senate,    
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in 
Room S-116, the Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright 
(chairman) presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Gore, Church, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Williams, Mundt and Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Holt of the 
Committee staff.
    [S. 1030, the Information Media Guaranty bill was again 
reported.]
    The Chairman. Any other votes?
    I wanted to bring up another matter. I have already 
explained to most of the people about Rusk withdrawing this 
morning. He has offered to come back on Friday or Monday. 
Monday is out because of a unanimous consent on another matter 
of the Senator from Connecticut. I don't know about Friday. I 
am a little inclined to feel he is so reluctant to come and so 
on. What does the committee wish to do?
    Senator McCarthy. Tell him to send up that tape recording.
    The Chairman. This is perhaps the second or third time that 
he has this year agreed to come and then very near the last 
minute said he couldn't come for one reason or another of his 
own choosing. So that is the situation. Is it the sense of the 
committee that we will not urge him to come any more?
    It is understood. I have written him a letter we would be 
glad to hear him any time.
    Senator Williams. Is that Secretary Rusk?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Williams. He is in another room along the corridor.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is the Kennedy Round report.
    The Chairman. The morning paper had a very thorough 
briefing.
    Senator McCarthy. The whole thing is of no consequence 
anyway.
    Senator Sparkman. Is this what he was going to talk to us 
about?
    The Chairman. No.
    Senator McCarthy. He would rather talk about the Kennedy 
Round.
    Senator Sparkman. Was there a Kennedy Round discussion this 
morning at 9:30?
    Senator Hickenlooper. One at 9:30 and one at 10:30.

                  COMMUNICATION IS SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED

    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, for whatever it is worth, I 
think the communication between this committee and the 
Department of State is seriously impaired and I don't wish the 
committee further demeaned. If the Secretary of State has 
something which he wishes to communicate to us, let him request 
a time when he can appear, at the pleasure of the committee.
    The Chairman. Well, of course, I don't like this situation. 
I suppose I or others may think it is due to my disagreement 
with his policy, but I have tried not to go beyond that, and I 
say as politely as Marcy knows how to write a letter for him to 
come.
    Senator Sparkman. Does that raise a question?
    Senator McCarthy. Why don't you try Pat Holt on the next 
letter? [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. I really have and we have tried to give him 
an opportunity and he has accepted it twice.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Milrae [Jensen] writes pretty good 
letters. [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. He himself suggested today, in response to 
another proposal that he made, he would be available today. We 
said okay, and then he comes up--it disrupts our plans; you 
can't schedule something else on it.

                            FOREIGN AID BILL

    I wanted to bring up another question. We don't have much 
left on our schedule except foreign aid. We will try to get 
some--we hoped, I hoped, that the House would do something 
about that bill. There was such a difference between the 
House's idea and the administration that we hoped that the 
committee, at least, would report a bill to see where we stood.
    The staff wasn't a bit pleased with the complete rewrite of 
this bill. They preferred the way the House has undertaken to 
do it which is simply amending the existing bill.
    In any case we will have that before us.

                      HEARINGS ON THE VIETNAM WAR

    Now, about other hearings, if the Secretary isn't coming 
what does the committee think about having some other hearings, 
general hearings, on particularly the war and its implications, 
the economic situation or anything else we would like.
    Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, usually I agree with Albert. In 
this case I think the issues are far too important for face and 
dignity over what our function is, for those of us who disagree 
with the Administration have even a greater responsibility to 
be brainwashed. I really believe we should stay in 
communication with him and ask him to come up as frequently as 
he will and for us to say ``you are wrong''. But you have got 
to ask him to change our mind if that is incorrect. I think we 
should keep pressing the Secretary to show us where we are 
wrong.
    I would also like to suggest that as a committee, we now, 
it seems to me, have become a majority of us where we disagree 
with the course of the country, of the administration. Can't we 
somehow coalesce this majority around a minimum point 
expressing committee disapproval with the resolution, because I 
think this would precipitate a real debate and might 
precipitate an actual withholding of funds at some point.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Which resolution is that?
    Senator Pell. To come up with one which meets with the 
approval of the majority of the committee expressing our 
disapproval of Asia.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You may have some difficulty with 
that.
    Senator Pell. But in the committee we would have a majority 
to get it out and I think this would have an effect in holding 
down policy. I may sound as if I am talking at odds to the 
maximum exposure of the Administration, maximum brainwashing, 
but we should in our own responsibility, and I also would like 
to see us as a result of our exposure come out with a majority 
positions, instead of this business of writing letters, round 
robin letters, or taking individual positions. I think this 
could have an effect on policy.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reply to that.
    The Chairman. Yes, Senator Gore.

                      AN AFFRONT TO THE COMMITTEE

    Senator Gore. I think Senator Pell has taken a view that 
has much merit and ordinarily I certainly would agree with 
that. But, frankly, it seems that the occurrence of today is an 
affront to the committee, and I am not at all sure it isn't 
intended to be an affront to the committee.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I would have to.
    Senator Gore. I beg your pardon?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I would have to respectfully 
disagree.
    Senator Sparkman. So do I.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I don't know anything about it. But 
this review on the Kennedy Round was suddenly called. I assumed 
it was called at the direction of the President who doesn't 
brook any interference with his programs, and he has told the 
entire cabinet to be there this morning for this review by the 
Vice President. I am not supporting the Democratic party, don't 
misunderstand me. But I think that probably that is what 
happened, and I think Rusk was told to be there this morning as 
Secretary of State in connection with the Kennedy Round 
explanation to these people in Congress. I would guess that he 
didn't have any choice nor did any of the rest of the cabinet 
members. That would be my interpretation, Albert.
    Senator Gore. I am not sure the President feels any more 
kindly toward the committee than Secretary Rusk does.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Then we might direct some of this 
criticism at the President, too, but personally I just feel 
that Rusk should not get the entire blame for this.

                          RUSK'S BUSY SCHEDULE

    Senator Sparkman. I agree with Senator Hickenlooper. I 
think we ought to keep this in mind. Secretary Rusk is probably 
the busiest man in government. I don't see how the man lives 
under the job that he has, and I think he has respect for this 
committee. I think he has shown so in the past, and I don't 
believe that he would have stayed away if he could have been 
here.
    The Chairman. It could be coincidence. I don't know why. 
Really what puzzles me, Bourke, is the reason for this morning, 
I mean this briefing, when everything, I think, that happened 
you read in the morning paper. But that is neither here nor 
there. I agree with Senator Pell's idea. I don't want to break 
off this, if possible. If it is agreeable with the committee, 
we will send word he will come on Friday. Will you all come on 
Friday if he will come? I don't want to be the only one here.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I have something set for Friday.
    Senator Williams. I will tell you a simple solution off the 
record.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    The Chairman. What do you think about it? You won't be here 
Friday?
    Senator Gore. I can't; I am sorry.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I will be in town, but I have set it 
for something else. I think it may be Friday afternoon that I 
have set it. I leave the Capitol at 10 o'clock, and I won't be 
back here until late in the afternoon.

                         ATTENDANCE OF SENATORS

    Senator Church. I think one thing that Rusk objects to is 
not coming to this committee and testifying, but as I have 
understood him correctly in the past in conversations I have 
had with him, he does resent coming to testify before this 
committee and having only three or four Senators, and I can't 
blame him. His time is very valuable and he doesn't reach us 
because we don't show. I think that if we are going to put an 
invitation over until Friday under circumstances which mean 
that only four or five Senators are going to be here, we ought 
not to do it. We ought to find a time when most of us are here.
    The Chairman. He has made this point, and I think with some 
justice.
    Senator Sparkman. I agree with you and unless we can get a 
fair attendance Friday, we ought not to have him.

                      REHASHING FAMILIAR POSITIONS

    Senator McCarthy. I don't think we ought to invite him for 
general briefings until he knows what his general position is, 
and we know what his is, and he doesn't tell us anything that 
he hasn't told the press. If we wait until we get specific 
legislative material before us, then he could come up anyway 
and give him something to talk about. We don't want to listen 
to him and he doesn't want to talk to us.
    Senator Church. He is going to rehash his position and is 
so familiar with us and we are so familiar with him.
    Senator Gore. I don't want to dismiss this situation this 
morning quite so lightly. Maybe it is a coincidence, but 
certainly with the whole cabinet there, the President must have 
been advised that Secretary Rusk had an appointment before this 
committee to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia. With war 
clouds with China certainly looming, I don't know why a 
briefing, why the whole cabinet must be at a briefing with 
select members.

                        KENNEDY ROUND DISCUSSION

    Senator Williams. Secretary Rusk was the only member of the 
Cabinet at the meeting. Yes, I just left there.
    The Chairman. You had been down there?
    Senator Williams. He had some undersecretaries.
    The Chairman. Was he telling you anything that wasn't in 
the paper about the Kennedy Round?
    Senator Williams. Yes, he did tell us this. He didn't know 
what they had done and the paper indicated that they did.
    Senator McCarthy. That is pretty helpful.
    The Chairman. That is pretty frank.
    Senator Williams. We couldn't get any information as to any 
of the statistics----
    Senator Gore. Was there any particular reason why this 
briefing had to occur this morning on the date that he was 
supposed to be at this committee. Was the information given to 
you of that urgency?
    Senator Williams. I agree with what Gene has just said 
here. I think it is just a propaganda movement to have us all 
around there and give the idea that they achieved something 
great when in reality neither they nor any who attended the 
meeting know what they have achieved yet.
    The Chairman. This is a very frank statement which I think 
is true.
    Senator Williams. I was there and if they wanted me to tell 
you what they achieved over there, I would know less than I did 
before. I read the paper this morning and I think I learned 
more than I did there.
    Senator Sparkman. What did the corn and wheat people think?
    Senator Hickenlooper. They don't know.
    Senator Gore. Yet this is given priority over a scheduled 
hearing before this committee on the question of war or peace.

                  VICE PRESIDENT SPONSORED THE MEETING

    The Chairman. This is what irritated me, but I still think 
there is a lot Mr. Pell has in his favor regardless of his 
feelings about it, and I think you are both right in the sense 
I don't think there is any justification for this reason that 
has just been described that cancels this meeting here after 
the long time we have had setting it and at his suggestion.
    Senator Williams. Of course, the Vice President was the one 
who sponsored the meeting and if he told the Secretary to be 
there he would feel obligated to be here.
    The Chairman. That is the only thing; they probably 
overrode him. They said, ``This propaganda value is too great 
and we can't let it not create the impression we did a great 
thing.'' They may have overridden him.
    Let me put it this way: There is a valid point not asking 
him to come to three or four people and it does make him mad. 
Shall I ask Mr. Marcy of the staff to poll the Senators and 
unless at least 8 or 9 of them promise to be here on Friday, we 
not ask him. Or shall we just drop it?
    Senator McCarthy. Let it go for this week.
    The Chairman. All right. Let it go.
    How about some other hearings----

                      SCHEDULE OF FOREIGN AID BILL

    Senator Church. When do we finish our hearings on foreign 
aid, Mr. Chairman?
    The Chairman. Next week is going to be on Dodd and then 
comes the Memorial Day. It will be right after Memorial Day.
    Mr. Marcy. The House does not expect to finish the foreign 
aid until about the middle of June.
    The Chairman. But the committee will finish it.
    Senator Church. Do we have to wait until the House 
finishes?
    The Chairman. No, we are not going to wait that long.
    Senator Sparkman. We decided to wait until the committee 
reports.
    The Chairman. We decided to wait until the committee acted 
because there was such a divergence between what the committee 
over there had in mind and what the administration wanted.
    Senator Church. My only question is because we usually 
start too late and it goes too long.
    The Chairman. It hasn't been because of our hearing, but it 
has been over the controversy over our bill.
    Senator Church. It has gotten to be quite late.
    The Chairman. We have reported it far in advance of the 
action on the floor, isn't that right, Mr. Marcy, practically 
every year. We haven't been late on the completion of our 
hearings and reporting it.
    Then we will have those probably scheduled as soon as we 
get back from Memorial Day, that is about the earliest time. 
Next week is practically out because you know what the 
situation is on the floor next week.
    That is the only major legislation.

                      FURTHER HEARINGS ON VIETNAM

    Is the committee interested in hearings with outsiders, any 
further hearings particularly on Vietnam and also on the 
economic situation and so on?
    If we are going to have any more we ought to begin thinking 
about them and have the staff contacting people. I personally 
would like to have some further hearings. I would like to keep 
some kind of discussion going. I am not at all satisfied with 
what I read about the Administration's views about the war and 
the statement that somebody just related if the Chinese 
continue to be hard-nosed why we can't avoid confrontation. I 
don't know what this means. It is in the nature of a threat, it 
strikes me, and if the Secretary doesn't wish to come, I think 
we ought to explore it with other people.
    Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Yes.

                    TAKING A POSITION ON ESCALATION

    Senator Pell. I wondered what you would think or would it 
have merit to have a couple of sessions in Executive Session 
where we could coalesce. I realize it would not, as Senator 
Hickenlooper suggested, it might well not go through. But 
whether we could arrive at a committee majority position 
obviously without regard to party lines, and whether a majority 
of the committee really opposes escalation. I think it would 
have a good effect on the country if the majority of the 
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate actually passed out a 
resolution of that sort. It may be a rather difficult thing to 
get out or it may be rather dangerous to the national interest. 
I throw it out as an idea, knowing your views, and wondering 
what you thought both in your responsibility as chairman of the 
committee with the responsibility of the national interest and, 
at the same time, with your own personal views with regard to 
what is right.
    The Chairman. Well, it is a very difficult matter. I have 
thought about it a great deal. A resolution unless there is a 
fairly good agreement on it, it strikes me, would not be of 
much value, you know, if we just exhibited to be what we know 
to be differences of view. If you think there is a formula that 
you have in mind or could be developed, I would be glad to 
explore it. I think it is our duty and I would like to perform 
it as best I could to understand where we are going out there, 
and to try to influence it if there is any view in the 
committee. I have tried to do it as an individual and I would 
also like to do it as a committee if there is any feeling in 
the committee that it goes in one direction. If we are split 
nine to ten----
    Senator Church. That is the split.
    The Chairman. It isn't going to be very impressive.
    Mr. McCarthy. On what?
    The Chairman. On a resolution or a statement.
    Senator Pell. I am saying if we could come out with a 
majority position opposing escalation. No more than that, but 
something that would be a method of blowing a whistle on the 
administration.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Why don't we wait until Katzenbach 
gets back from Africa? I don't know what he is doing over 
there. But we had Soapy Williams over there.
    Senator Williams. There is an idea if we got Soapy----
    Senator McCarthy. That is my continent now, be careful. 
[Laughter.]
    Senator Hickenlooper. I am on that committee, too.
    Senator McCarthy. Yes, but I am the chairman.
    Senator Sparkman. I don't believe that this committee can 
very well claim for itself the right to determination on the 
power to determine the conduct of the war, and that is what it 
amounts to. Furthermore, there are all kinds of definitions on 
escalation, whether or not there should be more manpower, 
whether there should be stepped up activities or not. Those are 
military questions that I don't think we are qualified to pass 
on. I can have my own individual opinion, but I certainly would 
not want to feel that I was called on to set policy.

                 REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I wish to promote another great 
debate, so I move that we adopt the Republican Policy Committee 
statement as a policy statement of this committee.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ On May 1, 1967 the Senate Republican Policy Committee staff 
released a white paper on Vietnam that urged Republican senators, 
before deciding to support or differ with the President's policies, to 
question ``what precisely is our national interest in Thailand, 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos and to what further lengths are we prepared 
to go in support of this interest?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Chairman. Well now----
    Senator Pell. I second that motion.
    Senator McCarthy. Bourke, do you want to make a statement?
    Senator Gore. I will write ``be it resolved'' at the 
beginning.
    Senator Williams. I will second that motion and I think it 
is wonderful.
    The Chairman. You second the motion that we adopt that as 
the policy of this committee.
    Senator Hickenlooper. There are no more copies available.
    Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent 
that the document be inserted in the record at this point.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It is already in the Congressional 
Record twice, once in the House and once in the Senate.
    Senator Pell. I withdraw my request.
    Senator McCarthy. I think it ought to be printed every week 
so that people read it. Why take official action, maybe some 
kind of a commendation.
    The Chairman. Maybe you ought to put that as a motion of 
commendation to be voted.
    Senator McCarthy. To the authors.
    Senator Gore. I will not press for a vote this morning. 
Let's wait until the Secretary appears. May we have that the 
pending business and let him testify.
    Senator Church. Make that the pending business and he will 
be up here very quickly.

                          EDUCATIONAL HEARINGS

    The Chairman. Let me come back to this other question. I 
think maybe what you have in mind may be premature. What I 
would like, my own idea, would be to have some further 
hearings. I have found them very educational both last year and 
this year because we brought people that have spent their 
lifetime studying these things, some of them did and others had 
experience. At least it was educational for me. I would like to 
put some others in along with the other hearings that we have. 
About the only serious hearings on legislation are on foreign 
aid and I would like to have some other hearings. What is the 
feeling of the rest of the committee? Then after that, maybe, 
if there is any coalescing of any views at all you might offer 
some kind of a motion. That would be the idea of having the 
hearings. If there is anything to come out of it it would be an 
expression of opinion if the people succeeded in creating an 
opinion.

                         A CHANGE IN OBJECTIVES

    Senator Sparkman. Is there anything new and fresh available 
or are we going to have just a rehash of the same thing? Won't 
it be cumulative?
    The Chairman. The developments there, I would say, are 
fresh. I mean they are going on every day. The significance of 
these statements of the executive, I think, ought to be 
considered. I read them here and there and one reason I wanted 
to have the Secretary here, I don't know that he would tell us, 
was to find out if there is a change in their ultimate 
objective there.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Did you see that statement in the 
speech in New York yesterday?
    The Chairman. About the confrontation with China and we are 
going to be there a very long time.
    Senator Sparkman. Whose speech?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Until the end of this century.
    Wheeler and Rusk.
    Senator Gore. I suggest we start with General Wheeler on a 
matter of his own statement of what the policy is about.
    The Chairman. John, it seems to me this thing is going 
through a change in objectives. I don't think there is any 
more----
    Senator Sparkman. I think it is perfectly all right to 
explore those, but I would hate to see a list of witnesses 
brought in that would just say what the others said before, why 
we are in there, how we happen to be in there. It would be a 
mistake to be in there and we had to be in there and so on and 
so forth. To discuss these things, fine.
    The Chairman. Well, I think these demonstrations are 
perfectly legal, except for those burnings and all that. The 
demonstrations are a form of a substitute for the discussions 
that ought to be going on before the committee and in the 
Senate.
    Now, the discussion yesterday, I thought, was useful. The 
Senator from Kentucky raised a question and several chimed in 
and I think this is all a good thing in our kind of government 
to have a discussion going on about a matter which is as 
dangerous as this is.
    You say there is nothing fresh----
    Senator Sparkman. No, I asked a question.
    The Chairman. Another thing, you saw this morning, I think 
it was this morning, they are now prophesying a $20,000,000,000 
deficit.
    Senator Gore. $24,000,000,000.
    The Chairman. It wasn't, but a few weeks ago, two or three, 
that Senator Stennis said he thought they had underestimated it 
by $4 to $6,000,000,000,000, I believe, wasn't it, but this 
thing, I don't know where I am. I think it is worthwhile giving 
that some discussion.

                 MILITARIZATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

    Senator McCarthy. I think there are two things that are new 
that we could get some testimony on. One is the militarization 
of our foreign policy. This Wheeler thing, this is putting 
everything in Vietnam under Westmoreland. There is the Kuss, 
the arms sale philosophy going on saying if you don't have our 
arms there and if you don't have us supplying the people who 
are using our arms we lose our position in influence on the 
policy of the country. I think this is an issue that ought to 
be talked about publicly. It goes back to Eisenhower warning of 
an industrial-military complex.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I thought he was responsible for all 
this.
    Senator McCarthy. No, he warned us. And the only thing is, 
I think we could hold some hearings and help educate ourselves 
and the public.
    The Chairman. I think such hearings along this line, while 
they are not directly on foreign aid, they are related to it.
    Senator McCarthy. That is right.
    The Chairman. And they wouldn't be irrelevant to that even 
though we wouldn't bill them as being just foreign aid. In 
other words, the kind of policy you are talking about does have 
a barge upon the size of the foreign aid program, particularly 
in military assistance or support assistance.

              CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SENATE

    Senator McCarthy. The other thing is this whole conception, 
even Senator Mansfield said it yesterday, the sole burden for 
foreign policy is the President's. This is not true. I think we 
ought to get somebody in talking about the constitutional 
responsibility of the Senate, and the way in which you change 
the procedure so this can have some influence on policy, not 
after the Act, but in the process of policy formation. Get in 
some of the constitutional experts, Richard Neustadt and these 
people, and let's talk about it.
    The Chairman. I think that is a good idea. I would like to. 
I noticed that myself when he said it was the sole 
responsibility.
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    The Chairman. Well, the Constitution doesn't quite read 
that way.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Who said that?
    The Chairman. Mansfield on the floor yesterday.
    Senator Sparkman. It is primarily his responsibility.
    The Chairman. Mansfield said it was sole.

            STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY RUSK AND GENERAL WHEELER

    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, in line with Gene's suggestion 
I would like to read here what the Secretary is quoted as 
having said. I do not know whether this is an accurate 
quotation. If so, it would seem to be--to confirm the charges 
of the enemies of this country that we are bent upon 
imperialism. Let me read you: ``Rusk said it will be useful for 
some time to come for American power to be able to control 
every wave of the Pacific if necessary. If Communist China 
stays militant and hard-nosed, he added, it is difficult to see 
how a confrontation can be forever avoided.''
    Wheeler was quoted as saying he finds the present situation 
in Thailand which the United States is committed to defend 
highly reminiscent of South Vietnam in 1960 and 61.
    Here is another quote from Wheeler: ``We will be involved 
out there to the end of this century.''

                   REQUIRE SECRETARY RUSK TO TESTIFY

    When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretary of State make these kinds of statements publicly, it 
is time for the committee to examine the policy. If the 
Secretary wishes to appear then fine; if not, maybe we should 
require his appearance.
    The Chairman. We can't require it. However, if we started 
to discuss these things in hearings, just along the line you 
are saying, I think, are the only things that will cause them 
to want to testify to give their views about it.
    Senator Pell. Excuse me, I don't really understand the 
question of protocol. If we really want the Secretary, why 
don't we send for him. Don't we have that constitutional right?
    Senator McCarthy. He doesn't have to come.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I am not so sure about that.
    Senator McCarthy. He has every right to say ``no,'' as the 
President has.
    Senator Pell. Certainly otherwise he has to come.
    The Chairman. If that is what you mean, but ultimately he 
can say, ``no.'' When you say can you compel him to go, that is 
what I thought you said.
    But I think those statements are ominous, they strike me as 
being so. He makes those publicly, and this is what bothers me: 
Why wouldn't he come before this committee and make them 
publicly and explain just what he has in mind. He does it in 
public in New York or he writes it in an article. But he does 
not wish to come before this committee, as I read you the 
letter he said, he wrote, because it involves specific 
countries. Well, he talks about specific countries here in a 
rather threatening way, I would say.

                  TESTIMONY ON THE ROLE OF THE SENATE

    Before we get away from it, I think that question you 
raised is extremely interesting and I would like to have two or 
three experts on the question of the role of the Senate and 
this committee in this area because I think it is confusing to 
many people. Some people think we have a lot of authority, and 
others think we don't have any at all, and I am not so sure 
just how much we do have. I think it is primarily educational, 
and on certain specific cases of treaties where you have a 
specific thing, we have a power of obstruction which has been 
demonstrated many times.
    But to play a role in the formulation of policy is another 
matter. I don't know how you can do it other than through 
educating the public. That is, you can't make the President do 
anything you want him to do.
    Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, do you think we should be as 
reluctant as we are, I probably sound naive in this thought, 
but shouldn't we be more forthcoming in our own advice? It can 
be taken or not. The function, our constitutional function is 
advice, and yet as we know the other day in the question we 
discussed about Hungary, the administration said ``don't give 
us advice because the President will do just the opposite,'' 
and therefore we don't do it as a committee action. Shouldn't 
we do this as a function?
    The Chairman. What was that?
    Senator Pell. It was whether we were trying to get a really 
good man to go to Budapest, and they said if we do it as a body 
that will make the President send somebody absolutely the 
opposite.
    Senator McCarthy. Get another lawyer from Dallas.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, we couldn't get many worse than 
a lot we have got already in many places in the world.
    The Chairman. Well now, let me bring this down, that what 
you had in mind.
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    The Chairman. Some hearings on that. Does everybody agree 
they would be interesting or at least a majority?
    Senator Gore. I would.

                  COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

    The Chairman. So we can give some guidance to the staff. 
This will be over a considerable period, but they have to have 
some guidance and I want some guidance myself.
    In response to what you say, Senator Pell, I think it is 
our duty, and that is why I make speeches and public 
statements. The only reason I hesitate is because the committee 
is so split. I am perfectly willing if the committee is 
willing, if it can develop any statement that the committee 
wishes to make, why, of course. I am assuming we agree, have to 
agree with it if I am going to join in it and everybody else 
has to. I am perfectly willing, there never has been a case, at 
least on the part of the chairman, that I didn't think it was a 
proper role. It simply was we couldn't play that role under 
existing conditions because the committee is split wide open 
and is unable to agree upon any statement I can think of.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be 
careful about not setting up a Committee for the Conduct of the 
Civil War.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The controversial Joint Committee on Conduct of the War (1861-
1866) that scrutinized the Union army's tactics and second-guessed the 
Lincoln administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Chairman. I don't want to conduct the war. I think the 
distinction is between conduct of the war and broad policy, 
while it is hard to draw sometimes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I say we must be careful not to do 
that.
    The Chairman. I agree with that. The thing about the 
conduct of the war, if he has got to have more men, I am not 
about to say he shouldn't have more men. But I certainly think 
it is my duty and opportunity to say I don't wish to be there 
until the year 2,000, or that I don't think it ought to be 
escalated, that I don't believe we ought to have a 
confrontation with China. These are policy matters, I think. I 
don't think we should press this to a point----

                     WHAT IS THE NATIONAL INTEREST?

    Senator Pell. Even more to the point, isn't it up to us 
determine whether we have a true national interest 
responsibility in Southeast Asia. I think we all would agree 
probably on that.
    The Chairman. Exactly.
    The question raised in the report of the Policy Committee 
is a darned good question. What is our national interest in 
what we are doing?
    Senator Sparkman. I think the first thing that I would like 
to know, I don't like Wheeler's statement as it appears in the 
press. I don't know what might have been wrapped around it. I 
would like to know what his definition of involvement would be. 
Certainly we shall continue to have an interest there, but I 
would like to know what he meant by involvement.
    Senator Gore. I agree, John, and you know I said I didn't 
know whether they were quoted out of context or not, but these 
are ominous statements.
    Senator Sparkman. Standing alone.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    I think coming back to the Policy Committee report. I think 
they really asked the crux of the matter: What is the national 
interest of the United States in Vietnam?
    Senator Gore. Maybe we should have a hearing on that.
    The Chairman. I think we should. I thought of that when I 
first read that. What is the national interest there?
    Senator McCarthy. I think we ought to find out what it is 
because if you are going to pledge the national interest that 
is pretty serious, and the national honor.
    The Chairman. And the national honor in support of it. 
Well, the next two questions asked there are what is it and how 
far are we prepared to go defending it?
    Senator McCarthy. Once you put the national honor on the 
scales you have to declare war to preserve it.

                       A HEALTHY NATIONAL DEBATE

    The Chairman. I think it would be healthy to have a 
discussion and a public debate about it. I think it might even 
help some of the people demonstrating. If we had a discussion 
it might clarify it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You can't help some of the people 
demonstrating.
    The Chairman. Well, some of them.
    Senator Pell. Why couldn't we have a discussion in the 
committee where we might find some would go one way or some 
another.
    The Chairman. Absolutely you could have it.
    Senator Pell. But a committee with 16 of us you would be 
sure that Senator Hickenlooper's ideas are not different from 
some of my own.
    The Chairman. He says he is bothered about Wheeler's 
statement. Supposing we have Wheeler and he says, he backs up 
along the line that we think he may have in mind, that he is 
staying there, this is going to be a colony and so on. That 
might influence a lot of people.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think we ought to ask Wheeler about 
it, but I don't think we ought to put television cameras and 
everything else and have a three ring circus about it and 
confuse the public all over the place.
    Senator Pell. What I am thinking about is 16 or 18 men on 
problems we could take privately. Could we not come out with a 
sensible point of view since we are all starting with the same 
facts and have the national interest in mind?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think we ought to have them in 
Executive Sessions.
    The Chairman. I would be perfectly willing to make it in 
executive. But he makes this statement publicly. It seems to me 
if after having him in executive, well whatever your 
understanding is, it ought to be publicly ceased because that 
is one of the functions of the committee.
    Senator Pell. These are two different thing. Wheeler's 
statement is a public statement that should be answered 
publicly. But what I am talking about is a private discussion 
except the Senators arguing back and forth trying to convert 
each other.
    The Chairman. I would be delighted to have those exchanges 
particularly when we have a full meeting here and they are very 
useful and they can take place at any time the committee is 
ready, willing and wants to.
    Senator Pell. And we can get bodies.
    The Chairman. If you get the bodies here. But I think those 
questions raised are very important.

                        WAR HAS GROWN GRADUALLY

    John, I think what has happened, at least from my point of 
view, is this thing has grown so gradually that we never have 
been able quite to get the full impact of where we are going. 
Generally speaking, you don't oppose the hearings.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, if you are going to have some 
Executive hearings first and then decide.
    The Chairman. I didn't mean Wheeler. I mean on the matters 
that Senator McCarthy suggested, on what our role is, and also 
the broad policy with Wheeler. I am not insisting that Wheeler 
be open, but I think at some point he ought to explain.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think Wheeler made the statement 
and we ought to have him in Executive Session and see what he 
meant by it.
    Senator Sparkman. You said a while ago that you couldn't do 
anything for these demonstrators and so forth. Chuck Percy told 
me he was out in Berkeley last night and spoke to 5,000 
students and he said they booed him time after time. Regardless 
of what he said they booed him.
    Senator McCarthy. I spoke at Berkeley six weeks ago and 
didn't get booed. [Laughter.]
    Senator Sparkman. You must be labeled; you had better look 
out.
    Senator Williams. They thought you were one of them. 
[Laughter.]
    Senator Sparkman. I go along with any hearings you want to 
set up. I always believe in hearings.
    The Chairman. I think discussion is healthy. Very often if 
the people who are not in the Senate, if somebody is saying 
what they think ought to be said, it is a safety valve. It is 
part of our system.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it would be well to start off 
with Wheeler and in Executive Session.
    The Chairman. That is the new one.
    Senator Sparkman. And, of course, we could talk with him 
about escalation of the war.
    The Chairman. I am embarrassed, not only with the 
Secretary, I am embarrassed when we insist on someone coming 
and then we only have four or five. It looks bad.
    Anything else?
    The committee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon at 11:20 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, and Case.
    Also present: Senator McGee.
    The committee heard from Eugene Groves, president of the 
National Student Association, and Richard Stearns, 
International Affairs vice president, concerning National 
Student Association ties with the Central Intelligence Agency.
    [The committee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
        Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:35 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Morse, Aiken, Carlson, and Copper.
    Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs; accompanied by Charles R. Burrows, Country 
Director, Central America; and Richard A. Frank, Assistant 
Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs; testified on the 
subject of the Swan Islands.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 5:05 p.m.]


BRIEFING ON DEPLOYMENT OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES AND NON-PROLIFERATION 
                                 TREATY

                              ----------                              


                         Thursday, May 18, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                 Subcommittee on Disarmament of the
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in 
room 8-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the 
Subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gore and Cooper.
    Also present: Mel Christopher, ACDA, Congressional Liaison, 
and Herbert Scoville, Jr., Assistant Director, Science & 
Technology Bureau.
    Mr. Marcy of the committee staff.
    Senator Gore. The committee will come to order.
    Mr. Fisher, would you give us a report or bring us up to 
date on two things: One, the status of communication in our 
negotiation, if there has been some, with respect to the 
deployment of antiballistic missiles; and second, the 
nonproliferation conference that is underway.

 STATEMENT OF ADRIAN S. FISHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL 
                     AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

    Mr. Fisher. Well, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the first, 
the problem of the antiballistic missiles discussions, 
following some presidential discussions Ambassador Thompson 
presented, whether it was in the form of a working paper or 
talking points I am not clear, but presented to the Soviet 
Union at the end of March of this year, a suggestion that we 
might want to begin talks dealing with the limitation on the 
deployment of fixed ballistic missiles, offensive character, 
and defensive missiles that had a substantial anti-ballistic 
missile capability.
    He indicated in this communication that what we were 
thinking of was something that could be verified primarily by 
unilateral intelligence. He indicated further that while we 
were prepared to consider the mobile offensive missiles, that 
raised verification problems that would have to be the subject 
of the exploration.
    He indicated further that whether what came out of this was 
a formal treaty, a modus vivendi, just each taking action based 
on what the other was doing, would depend on what discussions 
took place, but at the moment it was purely exploratory.
    In an explanatory instruction to Ambassador Thompson, it 
was indicated that we thought it unlikely that the Soviets 
would agree to the dismantling of their present system and that 
he, Ambassador Thompson, should know that we maintained 
flexibility as to whether we would want to have a limited 
deployment.
    Senator Gore. Was this said to the Soviets?
    Mr. Fisher. It was not. This was just Ambassador Thompson--
what he had in the preliminary discussions, what he had in the 
back of his own mind, whether we wanted to retain flexibility.

               EMPHASIS ON LAUNCHERS RATHER THAN MISSILES

    There was extensive consideration but no resolution going 
into the problem as to what the various counters might be, as 
to how you would deal with the problem of what we call MIRV, 
the multiple independently guided re-entry vehicles, whether we 
would or would not deal with maintaining an option to have a 
light ABM system and a variety of things we have discussed 
within the executive branch and reached no resolution on.
    This was merely a request that talks take place on the 
limitation of deployment of the offensive, fixed offensive, 
missiles and defensive missiles with a substantial ABM 
capability, relying on unilateral intelligence with an 
indication that if some other way could be worked out to verify 
it, we would be prepared to consider the mobile offensive as 
well.
    Would you care to--am I correct on it?
    Mr. Scoville. The only point I might make, it was launchers 
we were talking about rather than missiles.
    Mr. Fisher. That is right. We emphasized launchers rather 
than missiles because when one speaks of deployment, what you 
are really aware of by our unilateral intelligence is the 
launcher which is a rather complicated thing. The missile might 
be in a warehouse or something else, and I stand corrected on 
that.

                     SOVIETS STUDYING THE PROPOSAL

    Now, there has been no answer to that. Once or twice, 
Ambassador Thompson has said, ``What about it? When are you 
going to answer this communication?''
    The response has been, ``This is a very serious matter, and 
we are studying it.''
    One does not know--one cannot continue this, obviously, 
forever, but this has been approximately two months since the 
suggestion was made. It does seem at first blush like a fairly 
longer period of time, but when I consider the amount of time 
occasionally in the executive branch that people spend making 
up their mind whether to make a proposition like this, two 
months assumes a somewhat shorter look in that perspective.
    Senator Gore. Have there been any questions for 
clarification?
    Mr. Fisher. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
    Senator Gore. In other words, nothing has been said except, 
``Thank you. We have received it.''
    Mr. Fisher. Well, a little bit more: ``We are looking at 
it, and we are studying it.''
    Senator Gore. Well, tell us exactly what has been said in 
regard to that?
    Mr. Fisher. Just that, ``When can we expect an answer.'' I 
cannot give you the precise date, it was three, four weeks ago, 
and the reply was, ``This is a very serious matter, and we are 
giving it very deep and intensive study.''
    Senator Gore. You do not have the impression it is being 
thrown down, shelved.
    Mr. Fisher. No, sir. In the context of the way the Soviets 
move, I think we ought to give them a little more time before 
we decide that they are stalling because from their point of 
view this is a very serious thing to undertake discussions of 
this kind, and I think they might want to study it pretty 
heavily.

                         QUESTIONS ABOUT TERMS

    Senator Gore. Would you have anticipated that in the 
ordinary course of consideration that by now there may have 
been some questions as to meaning of certain terms?
    Mr. Fisher. I would think the questions, since this was 
very exploratory and merely suggested we start talking, if 
there were to be questions, I think the questions would be, 
``Send over your delegation and let's talk.''
    I am frank to say, Mr. Chairman, that the initial 
suggestion was for a discussion to begin sometime in April, I 
forget the precise date. I think it was somewhere around the 
middle of April. A date was given. That date has obviously 
passed and the talks have not begun.
    I would have expected about around now that they would have 
said, ``If you want to talk about it, let's talk.''

               FORMAL AGREEMENTS AND UNILATERAL DECISIONS

    These talks are conceived of as leading to a variety of 
possibilities. At one end of the spectrum would be some kind of 
a formal agreement limiting deployment not just of ABM, but we 
have never considered it except offensive and defensive linked 
together and so have they. They have always made it clear that 
any limitation on defense would have to be offered by a 
limitation of defense.
    On the other end of the spectrum would be each making its 
own unilateral decisions with hopefully a somewhat better 
understanding of what the other fellow was up to.
    One of the things we would hope to discover in these talks 
would be to persuade them that it is not in their national 
interests to keep us in the dark as to what is the capability 
of the so-called TALLIN System. If there is substantial doubt 
as to whether or not it really is an ABM system, they should 
know that we will probably have to react on the assumption that 
it is.
    Now, precisely how we would assume we could clarify our own 
minds on this without having them think this is purely a 
fishing expedition--as they would say, ``This is espionage''--
is one of the problems that will face the delegation if at some 
unexpected date the reply comes: ``Send them over.''

                     NOT HEARTENED BY DEVELOPMENTS

    Senator Gore. I know it is difficult and at best inexact to 
use terms like ``encouragement'' and ``discouragement,'' and I 
do not wish to have you take a hard and fast estimate one way 
or the other. But I gather from what you say at least you are 
not overly heartened by developments.
    Mr. Fisher. Well, put it this way, Mr. Chairman, since the 
middle of April has come and gone, I have not felt it necessary 
to keep my suitcase packed. I would have hoped for some 
reaction prior to this of a more definite nature, and we have 
not gotten it.
    Senator Gore. I guess the fact that it has not been thrown 
down would lead to the conclusion that the door is open and 
possibly that the matter is being considered. But there is not 
much upon which we can base encouragement.
    Mr. Fisher. Well, I find it hard to disagree with that, 
sir, and my estimate of time has to be tempered by the fact 
that the communication in March was not the first this has been 
discussed. There had been some quite generalized discussions, 
``should we talk about this general problem on a one-level 
higher communication,'' that is a head of state communication 
earlier. So this was not the first time they had thought about 
it as the bolt out of the blue when Mr. Thompson talked with 
them in March.
    So it is hard to say whether you are encouraged or 
discouraged, as you have indicated, sir. I would have hoped for 
a response prior to this time.
    Senator Gore. Senator Cooper.

                   PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES WITH SOVIETS

    Senator Cooper. Have you had any experience in a similar 
situation where proposals in this field have been made to the 
Russians and you got no discussion at all?
    Mr. Fisher. No, sir. The only similar proposal was the 
limited test ban when it was proposed in August of '62. 
Formerly, it was one of two alternates. Kuznetzev said, ``No, 
absolutely no.'' He did not give it the silent treatment. He 
just said, ``No, never, never, never.''
    And then, well this was in August of '62, and in July of 
'63 we were all sitting around in Moscow initialing just almost 
the same document.
    But usually their ability to turn quickly is not--if they 
can turn quickly when they have said ``never.''
    Senator Cooper. In that case, how long was it before the 
Soviets indicated their willingness to talk?
    Mr. Fisher. To talk on this subject?
    Senator Cooper. Yes, the test ban.
    Mr. Fisher. It was either late May or early June, 1963. 
There had been active discussions of a comprehensive test ban 
in the meantime and they had come to nothing.
    There had been considerable senatorial discussion of the 
test ban on a rather, not terribly--encouraging in the 
comprehensive, but there had been an introduction of a 
resolution dealing with the atmospheric test ban, and I think 
they interpreted that perhaps as a signal.
    Senator Cooper. The reason I ask this, it is not entirely 
strange that you would not get an earlier answer.
    Mr. Fisher. No, sir, it is not.

            CONSIDERATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS

    Senator Cooper. Was it Kosygin who made a statement in 
England or some place earlier in which he said he did not 
consider a defensive system one which should be limited or 
controlled?
    Mr. Fisher. I am not sure whether Kosygin had said that. 
Many Soviet political and military people have said that, and 
in this context, in one of the previous exchanges, they have 
said defensive systems should not be controlled alone--they 
should be controlled only in connection with the control of 
offensive systems. They hinted with something that was not in a 
letter, but was accompanied by a personal statement of the 
foreign minister when delivering a head of state letter, that 
what they really meant was the abolition of all offensive 
systems, but if we wanted to settle in the meantime for a 
Gromyko umbrella, that might be all right too, and in that case 
the defensive problem would cease to exist.
    But they are traditionally--Dr. Scoville has followed this 
longer than I have--but traditionally they have been defense 
minded, and many of the intelligence community have many 
statements of them of what is wrong with defense.
    Senator Cooper. Senator Gore, do you remember that? I think 
it was----
    Senator Gore. Kosygin was quoted in London.
    Mr. Scoville. Kosygin did say----
    Senator Gore. Kosygin in London.
    Mr. Scoville. I think the context was that he was defending 
defensive systems and they wanted things to be planned by the 
offensive.
    Senator Gore. And he was drawing a distinction between 
defensive and offensive.
    Senator Cooper. Yes.

                    TWO INCREASINGLY NERVOUS SYSTEMS

    Mr. Fisher. I am not sure that part of the discussion which 
we had hoped take place--it is hard for me to see--I have not 
explained it fully to my family yet--that defensive systems per 
se are bad. It is what follows from them, that a decision to 
deploy might lead to both sides reacting against that decision 
to deploy and would end up with two increasingly nervous 
systems, so to speak, against each other. Neither of us having 
the defense but just all of us in a jumpier frame of mind and 
another trigger of the arms race with all that would involve, 
with the Europeans saying what about our ABM system. One would 
hope that if the discussion ever were to get going, the full 
implications of this kind would be explored.
    I do not think you would ever get a Soviet to say there is 
anything wrong with defense per se. In fact, I do not think 
there is myself. It is what it leads to that is bad and also 
the other things that might have to accompany it. You might 
have a shield that you think is a shield but has got an awfully 
lot of holes in it in the sort of sense of false security that 
might be involved.

                        NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

    Senator Gore. Will you go to the question of the 
nonproliferation conference?
    Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir, I can be quite brief on that.
    You have a text in front of you, a text of a 
nonproliferation treaty given the Soviets on April 25, 1967. 
The Soviets have also given us a text that they gave to us in 
Russian which is quite fair as we gave ours to them in English. 
We just got our own translation of it a few days ago and we can 
make that available to you.
    [The documents referred to follow.]

      Draft Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 
Parties to the Treaty,
    1. Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all 
mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort 
to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the 
security of peoples,
    2. Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would 
seriously increase the danger of nuclear war,
    3. In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General 
Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention 
of further dissemination of nuclear weapons,
    4. Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear 
activities,
    5. Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful 
applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-
products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the 
development of nuclear-explosive devices, shall be available for 
peaceful purposes to all States Parties to this Treaty, whether 
nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
    6. Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties 
are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of 
scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation 
with other States to, the further development of the application of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
    7. Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any 
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions shall be available through 
appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon Parties to 
this Treaty, on a non-discriminatory basis,
    8. Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible 
date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,
    9. Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this 
objective,
    10. Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the 
strengthening of trust between States, thus facilitating the 
elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of 
their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control,
    11. Noting that nothing in this treaty affects the right of any 
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the 
total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, Have 
agreed as follows:
                               article i
    Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to 
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, 
either directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, 
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to produce or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices.
                               article ii
    Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not 
to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such 
weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; not to 
produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
                              article iii
    Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to 
accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all 
its peaceful nuclear activities. Each State Party to this Treaty 
further undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material, or 
specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for the processing or use 
of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable 
material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless 
such material and equipment are subject to such safeguards.
                               article iv
    1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. 
The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository 
Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. 
Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to 
the Treaty, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to 
which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such 
an amendment.
    2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of 
the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all 
nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter 
into force for all parties to the Treaty upon the deposit of 
instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties to the 
Treaty, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon 
States Parties to this Treaty.
    3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a 
conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, 
Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a 
view of ensuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are 
being carried out.
                               article v
    1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State 
that does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any 
time.
    2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory 
States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall 
be deposited with the Governments of ___, which are hereby designated 
the Depository Governments.
    3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all 
nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty, and ___ Parties to this 
Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.
    For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one 
which has produced and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device prior to the date this Treaty became open for 
signature.
    4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are 
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall 
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or accession.
    5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory 
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit 
of each instrument of ratification and instrument of accession, the 
date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of 
any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
    6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
                               article vi
    This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
    Each Party to this Treaty shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides 
that extra-ordinary events, related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall 
give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and 
to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such 
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards 
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
                              article vii
    This Treaty, the Russian, English, French, Spanish, and Chinese 
texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the 
archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this 
Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the 
Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
    In witness whereof, the undersigned duly appointed 
Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
    Done in ___ copies, at ___. on the ___ day of ___, 1967.

    Text of Non Proliferation Treaty Given Soviets on April 25, 1967


               (Revised Provisions Have Been Underscored)

    The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to 
as the Parties to the Treaty,
    (1) Considering the devastation that would be visited upon 
all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make 
every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take 
measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
    (2) Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
    (3) In conformity with resolutions of an agreement on the 
prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
    (4) Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the 
application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on 
peaceful nuclear activities,
    (5) Expressing their support for research, development and 
other efforts to further the application of the principle of 
safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special 
fissionable materials by use of instruments and other 
techniques at certain strategic points,
    (6) Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest 
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,
    (7) Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment 
of this objective,
    (8) Desiring to further the easing of international tension 
and the strengthening of trust between States, thus 
facilitating the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear 
weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control,
    (9) Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of 
any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to 
assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories,
    (10) Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful 
applications of nuclear technology, including any technological 
by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from 
the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be 
available for peaceful purposes to all Parties, whether 
nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
    (11) Declaring their intention that potential benefits from 
any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be 
available through appropriate international procedures to non-
nuclear-weapon Parties on a non-discriminatory basis, and that 
the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used 
should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for 
research and development,
    Have agreed as follows:

                               ARTICLE I

    Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes 
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way 
to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices.

                               ARTICLE II

    Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty 
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor 
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and 
not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

                              ARTICLE III

    For the purpose of providing assurance that source or 
special fissionable material covered by this Article is not 
diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices:
    1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty 
undertakes to have international safeguards meeting the 
requirements of this Article on all source or special 
fissionable materials for peaceful purposes within its 
territory or under its jurisdiction. In cooperating with any 
non-nuclear-weapon State with respect to peaceful nuclear 
activities within the territory or under the jurisdiction of 
such State, each Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide
    (a) source or special fissionable material unless the 
material shall be subject to such safeguards; or
    (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared 
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable 
material unless the special fissionable material shall be 
subject to such safeguards;
    2. After the original entry into force of this Treaty, each 
non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has source 
or special fissionable material subject to any international 
safeguards system other than that of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, and each other Party to the Treaty which is a 
member of that Agency, undertakes to facilitate agreement, as 
provided for in this Article, on verification by that Agency of 
the effectiveness of the international safeguards system 
applied to such material;
    3. To meet the requirements of this Article, international 
safeguards (a) shall be either those of the IAEA or such other 
international safeguards generally consistent therewith as are 
accepted by the IAEA under verification procedures mutually 
agreed by the authorities of the IAEA and the authorities of 
the other international safeguards system concerned, and (b) 
shall be applied as soon as practicable but no later than three 
years from the date of the original entry into force of this 
Treaty;
    4. Agreement on the implementation of IAEA verification of 
another international safeguards system, as provided for in 
this Article, shall be reached as soon as practicable but no 
later than three years from the date of the original entry into 
force of this Treaty; and
    5. The international safeguards required by this Article 
shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering 
the economic or technological development of the Parties having 
them. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the 
Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, (i) to use nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic 
development and social progress, (ii) to participate in the 
safeguarded international exchange of nuclear material and 
equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear 
material for peaceful purposes, and (iii) to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to 
contribute alone or in cooperation with other states or 
international organizations to, the further development of the 
applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

                               ARTICLE IV

    1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this 
Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted 
to the Depository Governments which shall circulate it to all 
Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one 
third or more of the Parties, the Depository Governments shall 
convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the 
Parties, to consider such an amendment.
    2. Amendments shall enter into force for each Party to the 
Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a 
majority of the Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each 
remaining Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.
    3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a 
conference of Parties shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 
order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to 
assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are 
being realized.

                               ARTICLE V

    1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. 
Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into 
force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede 
to it at any time.
    2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by 
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments 
of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ____, 
which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.
    3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its 
ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this 
Treaty, and ____ other signatories to this Treaty, and the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes 
of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has 
manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.
    4. For States whose instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of 
this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the 
deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
    5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all 
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, 
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of 
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and 
the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference 
or other notices.
    6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository 
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.

                               ARTICLE VI

    This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party 
shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to 
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary 
events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have 
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give 
notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty 
and to the United Nations Security Council three months in 
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the 
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its 
supreme interests.

                              ARTICLE VII

    This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and 
Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly 
certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the 
Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and 
acceding States.

                     MIRRORING CHANGES BY CONGRESS

    Mr. Fisher. There are a series of standard conforming 
changes and some things are in the preamble in one that are in 
the articles in the other, but reduced to its essentials, they 
are different in only two particulars. These two texts 
represent--for their difference, what their similarity is. They 
represent vast changes from the texts that were on the table at 
Geneva when the Geneva Conference resumed, broke up, in August 
of last year. As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic 
articles, 1 and 2, really mirror U.S. domestic legislation 
under which the executive branch is committed by the Congress 
not to give U.S. weapons to anybody or transfer control of them 
to anybody, but keep them in our own hands. The Soviet language 
on that is the same. We and the Soviets are not apart on the 
basic obligations of the nuclear weapons states or--and this is 
not in our full power to control--what we think the reciprocal 
obligations of the non-nuclear weapon states ought to be.

                          VERSIONS OF EURATOM

    Where we are apart are in two particulars, and I will deal 
with the important one first. That is the article dealing with 
safeguards, and you will find that on page 4 of the document in 
front of you, going over to the top of page 7. We have a 
provision under which we would propose that basically the 
peaceful activities of the nonnuclear weapons states, and that 
would include exports to them by the nuclear states, would be 
safeguarded either by the IAEA or any other international 
organization under arrangements agreed to with the IAEA as 
being adequate verification.
    Now stripped of diplomatic gobbledygook, this really means 
Euratom, and it means also the possibility--it recognizes the 
possibility that there might be mirror images of Euratom among 
the Warsaw Pact countries who would play a role in----
    Senator Gore. What do you mean, ``mirror images''?
    Mr. Fisher. Well, the Warsaw Pact countries if they desired 
would be able to create versions of Euratom.
    Senator Gore. And it would be assigned----
    Mr. Fisher. It would be assigned a role of verification 
only if it could come to an agreement with the IAEA, the truly 
international body, under which the IAEA with such inspection 
as it felt was necessary and agreed to, which the organization 
could accept as involving adequate verification.
    Senator Gore. Would this contain assurances of safeguards 
that the Iron Curtain counterpart to Euratom would have a 
comparable competency and reliability?
    Mr. Fisher. We would assume that the IAEA would not give it 
its seal of approval, so to speak, unless it were satisfied 
that it did.

                      A RECIPROCAL TYPE OF TREATY

    Now, the reason I raise this mirror image point is not to 
poke holes at a U.S. proposal, but this is a reciprocal type of 
treaty in which we and the Soviets are jointly sponsoring it, 
and we cannot say our regional organizations are good per se 
and theirs are bad per se. We have to say that both of them 
would, if they--we do not know that they would create one, but 
if they were to--it would have to stand the test of acceptable 
procedures agreed to by the IAEA, and three years to work those 
out.
    This is not as complicated as it sounds because the IAEA 
does not verify any country without entering into a bilateral 
arrangement with that country, and that would be the same even 
say in the case of India or in the case of Peru or anybody 
else. The IAEA does not have extraterritorial power to come in 
Peru and say, ``Let's take a look at your reactors.''
    Now, the Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a provision 
that provides for IAEA safeguards on all the peaceful 
activities of the non-nuclear weapons countries and on all 
things exported by the nuclear weapons countries to any non-
nuclear weapons country whether or not party to the treaty.
    But the only difference between us and the Soviets really 
is that we have a provision under which the other international 
organizations can play a role in the verification process if 
they do so in a way which is satisfactory to the supervisory 
body. This is not unrelated, although the responsibility for 
this is on the executive branch. This is not unrelated to the 
type of safeguards outlined in the speech by the chairman of 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Pastore, a few 
months ago.
    Now, this is one difference.

                     MANNER OF AMENDING THE TREATY

    There is one other difference, and this represents the 
Soviet concept of the way the treaty is amended. The Soviet 
treaty, and we initially concurred in this and we changed our 
minds, we concurred in this on an ad referendum basis and 
indicated second thoughts on it, as we reserved the right to do 
since the negotiations are exploratory. It is based on the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty which says if the three principal 
powers--U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.--decide to amend the treaty, 
and a majority of the parties, including those three, in 
counting of a majority agree, the amendment is effective, bang, 
that is all there is to it. No ands, ifs and buts.
    Now, I would, Mr. Chairman, not be critical of that clause 
in the Limited Test Ban Treaty for two reasons: One is, at the 
risk of sounding vain, I helped negotiate it. But, secondly, it 
fit the problem of the Test Ban Treaty which was primarily an 
inhibition on the nuclear powers, and it made it possible for 
those powers either to extend the treaty in some way or to 
relax it as had been suggested in covering the peaceful 
explorations if they agreed and could persuade enough countries 
making up a total majority to go along. It is quite a different 
problem when you are dealing with a treaty whose preliminary 
impact is upon the non-nuclear weapons powers.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Mr. Fisher. And the non-nuclear weapons powers, 
particularly those concerned that this treaty might in some way 
affect their peaceful activity, say, ``Look, you can't possibly 
expect us to sign a treaty in which the prime article affects 
us. Then you, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom get 
together and get a majority, and the nature of our obligations 
has changed.''
    And that seemed to us in the consultative process to be a 
good, sensible approach.

                     MODELED ON OUTER SPACE TREATY

    So we then are suggesting to the Soviets, and I think we 
can work this one out--this should not be too hard--a treaty 
language based on the outer space treaty which you will find on 
page 7 of the material before you which says that amendments 
enter into force on the basis of a majority, but are only 
effective as to those who accept them.
    So you cannot ram an amendment down anyone else's throat, 
so to speak.
    The Soviets have agreed to that in the outer space treaty. 
The language is taken from the outer space treaty.
    Now, so much for the areas of disagreement.
    We have suggested, and have been over the last couple of 
weeks on an exploratory basis and firmly recently, to the 
Soviet Union that ``Let us table the articles on which we have 
agreed and say that there are sections where we have not 
agreed, and the two co-chairmen, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., are 
negotiating out their differences.''

                  SOVIETS PREPARED TO REJECT LOOPHOLE

    This morning at 10 o'clock Geneva time--which I regret to 
report is 5 o'clock Washington time--and I am afraid I am 
sufficiently far away from Shelby County so I am not used to 
getting up at that time any more--the Soviets said that they 
had no instructions authorizing them to proceed along this 
line. So when the conference opened this afternoon at 3 o'clock 
Geneva time, both the statements made by both parties were, 
shall we say, somewhat general indicating that we are still 
working on trying to get an acceptable treaty, and in a sense 
stick with it. At 10 today we had to knock down, with a little 
assistance from the Mexicans, a Brazilian proposal that they 
should in no way be prevented from developing explosive devices 
so long as they were solely peaceful, and the Soviets are with 
us on this. They are prepared to say no.
    Senator Gore. Good.
    Mr. Fisher. For a long period they took the position that 
since--they agreed with us that this would be a loophole, but 
they were prepared to have us carrying the laboring oar in 
saying so. Now they will say so in partnership, so to speak.
    Their statement today was surprisingly mild. The usual 
complimentary references to the Federal Republic of Germany--
surprisingly mild, sir, and although I think the general press 
reports may be a disappointment, if one analyzes the problems 
we are really very close to an agreement with the Soviets on 
this.

                  PROBLEM OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS

    Now, this does not mean that we have a generally acceptable 
worldwide nonproliferation agreement since the agreement with 
the Soviets on a joint table is merely another one of a series 
of rivers that have to be crossed. The whole problem of dealing 
with potential nuclear powers such as the Indians talking about 
the peaceful nuclear explosions with the Brazilians, all those 
have to be crossed still.
    Senator Gore. As a matter of fact, they are the important 
ones.
    Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. After all, there is nothing to be signed 
really from a purely bilateral treaty between the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. We have got to get these. If nonproliferation 
is effective, it must include these others.
    Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Because it is they we wish not to 
proliferate.
    Mr. Fisher. That is correct, sir. So there still remains a 
river to cross but I think we are very close to having crossed 
this one, that is the one of a joint recommendation with the 
Soviet Union. The differences between us are amazingly small.

                        FORESEEABLE DIFFICULTIES

    There are two things: The role which regional organizations 
have to play with respect to the Euratom--should they play any 
role, even though Euratom has to be satisfied with what that 
role may be? The Soviets say no; we say why should they not 
play a role just like national systems play a role.
    The second is what seems to me to be a cultural lag so far 
as the mechanics for an amendment. I cannot imagine the latter 
of any extended difficulty if we are this close. I can imagine 
some problems with the former and we will have to see whether 
we can reach a compromise, persuade the Soviets to accept IAEA 
inspection or drop safeguards. Those are the alternatives we 
have, and then we will have the problem of addressing the non-
nuclear countries. As you say, Mr. Chairman, that is by far the 
most important of this task, but it is the earliest one to deal 
with if you do it with the more or less united U.S.--U.S.S.R. 
approach, particularly where the countries you are dealing with 
are countries that maintain a policy of nonalignment and would 
find it difficult to enter into any particular arrangements 
with us that they would not enter into with the Soviets at the 
present time. That is the present status, sir.
    There are those who think that the failure of the Soviets 
to have an answer to this problem may be due to broader based 
differences with us. They may perhaps be assessing the whole 
relationship with us or trying to give us that impression.

                          REFERENCE TO VIETNAM

    Now, I cannot look into their minds, but I could only say 
if that is the case, they have not advised Ambassador Roschin 
to act that way because his statement today was within the four 
walls of the treaty itself. There was a reference to Vietnam, 
but a one-sentence statement that regrets that Vietnam might 
have a harmful effect on this type of negotiation.
    Compared to what is usually said on this subject, if they 
are trying to give us any signal of broader basis there, they 
have changed their method of signaling, because they are not 
usually understaters on this sort of thing.

                     A RELAXED SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

    Senator Gore. How long do you think this conference will be 
underway?
    Mr. Fisher. Well, it is hard to say, sir. I would hope, 
even though it may be frustrating, that we could stay with it 
until August, until the end of August, and----
    Senator Gore. Are meetings being held almost daily now?
    Mr. Fisher. No, sir. It is now a somewhat more relaxed 
schedule, and I say this with a modest amount of shame in the 
face of one who used to write a speech a day. They are 
primarily Tuesdays and Thursdays, with co-chairmen meetings in 
between. But they are not being held almost daily. They are 
held twice a week, and I think the prime subject is going to be 
this: I would hope that the Soviets would agree to tabling the 
treaty with the two disagreed sections left blank because we 
have a great deal of work to do with respect to the non-nuclear 
weapons states that are not related to those two sections. The 
notion that we keep our tentative agreement purely a U.S.-
U.S.S.R., NATO-Warsaw Pact matter, and keep it secret--of 
course it is not possible first--I mean this entire treaty has 
been discussed in the North Atlantic Council. That means sooner 
or later its contents are going to get out, and I would hope 
that the Soviets would agree, we could persuade them, that it 
was in the interests of getting on with it to table what we 
have agreed to and continue private discussions on the two 
unagreed articles. I think we should be able to settle the 
amendments one on a fair basis. They have incidentally 
indicated some give on the amendments clause, not in terms of 
giving up their veto, but they say, ``Look, we do not mind 
giving other people vetoes as long as we have got one ourselves 
on amendments,'' and that might indicate they are going to come 
off the test ban clause and come to some formulation that 
amendments not affecting people that do not agree or some other 
thing of that kind which I think should be negotiable.
    Somehow with all the treaty technicians that this 
government has got if we cannot tie up a decent amendment 
clause, we ought to go back to the showers, so to speak; that 
is, turn in our uniforms.
    Now the question of IAEA, Euratom arrangements, is a little 
bit different for one reason because of the deeply-held views 
of some of our NATO allies.

                        NATO SUPPORT FOR TREATY

    One final thing, Mr. Chairman, at least on this subject, 
outside of any other questions you might have, there has been a 
good deal of discussion about support of NATO for the treaty, 
and I would like to say this proposal that we put to the 
Soviets has been discussed exhaustively with our North Atlantic 
Treaty allies, and a consensus that we should go ahead on this 
basis was obtained quite freely as a result of these 
discussions.
    Now, there are varying degrees of enthusiasm. Strangely 
enough, the one that is making--in NATO the one that seems to 
be making the most ``why do you do this'' type noises is Italy, 
and not the Federal Republic of Germany. We received a message 
from the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany a 
couple of days ago saying as far as he was concerned he was 
satisfied with the method we were proceeding by, and he thought 
we were taking his considerations adequately into account.
    But we still have the nut we have to crack before a 
complete treaty is arrived at: the IAEA regional arrangements.
    But again--I am afraid I am repeating myself--we hope we 
can persuade them to solve that by tabling the treaty without 
that, while we work on it and then work with the Indians, the 
Brazilians and others on these other large treaty issues at the 
same time we and the Soviets work on their other.
    Senator Gore. You have to cross this stream first and then 
get to the more difficult one.
    Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Thank you very much, Mr. Fisher.
    Mr. Fisher. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the committee recessed, to 
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]


   UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
                                VIETNAM

    [Editor's Note.--In June, 1967 Israel won a six-day war against its 
Arab neighbors, seizing the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the 
Jordan River, and Syria's Golan Heights. The crisis started on May 5, 
when El Fateh terrorist raids into its territory caused Israel to 
threaten military retaliation against Syria, where the terrorists were 
based. On May 14, Egyptian and Syrian troops began amassing on Israel's 
borders. On May 19, the U.N. Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip withdrew 
at Egypt's request, a move that Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol 
protested as increasing the danger of war. The U.N. Security Council 
met in emergency session from May 24 to 30, but reached no decision 
other than appealing to all sides for peace.
    On June 5, Egypt, Jordan and Syria simultaneously launched military 
attacks on Israel. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared that 
they fought to ``eliminate the shadow of Zionism from Palestine and 
restore it to Arabism.'' However, Israel's ability to destroy the Arab 
states' air forces permitted Israeli troops to win swift and sweeping 
victories on the ground. Israel took the Gaza Strip and then the entire 
Sinai Peninsula, the Jordanian portions of Jerusalem and other 
territories on the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the high grounds 
from which Syria had bombarded Israeli territory. Although the major 
powers stayed out of the conflict, the United States supported Israel 
while the Soviet Union sided with the Arab nations.]
                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MAY 23, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 
S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators 
Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, 
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.
    Also present: Senator Javits.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. 
Jones of the committee staff.
    Mr. Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    We will try to move along because the Secretary has a 
luncheon with the President, and there are so many things 
happening.
    Mr. Secretary, I am very glad to have you with us this 
morning. I want to, just for the record, put in the record an 
exchange of letters with the Secretary regarding open hearings. 
I still wish to urge once more on the Secretary that he try to 
arrange for some open hearings on both what we are speaking 
about today which, I assume, will be the Middle East primarily, 
and Vietnam, not so much for the benefit of myself or the 
committee, but to try to allay the difficulties and the 
dissention or misunderstanding of the public, because I have to 
spend lots of time trying to enlighten them, as I am sure you 
do. But in any case I will put in the record, Mr. Reporter, an 
exchange of letters with the Secretary.
    Mr. Chairman. I will say the Secretary has said he has to 
go to see the President. What time do you have to leave, Mr. 
Secretary?
    Secretary Rusk. Perhaps twenty minutes to one, that sort of 
thing.
    Mr. Chairman. Then at 12:30 we will want to adjourn, at 
least 12:30.
    Secretary Rusk. That will be fine.
    Mr. Chairman. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary. We have plenty to 
talk about.

     STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK SECRETARY OF STATE; 
 ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 
                  FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

    Secretary Rusk. Yes, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately we do.
    I would like to take up immediately the Near East situation 
because that is in a very dangerous position, and I should go 
into considerable detail here in executive session.
    The present chapter really starts with a stepped-up series 
of raids along the Israeli frontier primarily by the Fatah 
organization, a terrorist group organized basically in Syria, 
but these raids were also delivered across the Lebanese 
territory into Jordanian boundary.
    I might say that our information is that both Jordan and 
Lebanon have taken very severe measures in an attempt to stop 
these Fatah raids, but we cannot say the same thing about 
Syria.
    These raids themselves led Israel, the Israeli government, 
to make a statement that if they continued Israel would take 
action against Syria. That, in turn, stimulated the Syrians to 
a high state of excitement and caused Nasser or, at least, was 
the occasion for Nasser to move additional forces into the 
Sinai Peninsula.
    Normally he has about 30,000 troops in the Sinai area. At 
the present time he probably has about 50,000 there, so he has 
reinforced his troops and moved them forward up toward the 
Israeli frontier.
    That itself created a situation of tension because Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon called up their forces and alerted their 
armed forces, and seemed to indicate that the Arabs would act 
together if Israel attacked anyone of them.

                NASSER DEMANDS WITHDRAWAL OF U.N. FORCES

    The next step in the episode was Nasser's demand that the 
United Nations Emergency Force withdraw from the Egyptian-
Israeli border. That force had been established, you will 
recall, by action of the General Assembly. We ourselves have 
supported it for a period of about ten years. Nasser based his 
position on the notion that a sovereign country has the right 
to require that foreign forces leave and that the United 
Nations forces could not remain there without his consent, and 
he was withdrawing his consent.
    U Thant, acting on which he considered to be the authority 
of the Secretary General, precipitately accepted this demand 
from Nasser.
    Senator Symington. What was that demand? I did not catch 
that.
    Secretary Rusk. That the United Nations Emergency Force 
withdraw from Egyptian territory.
    Now, we took strong exception to that. We did not think 
that was a wise thing to do under those circumstances. We did 
not think it was necessary for U Thant to move that rapidly.
    We felt that he should have instead gone to the General 
Assembly and, if not to the General Assembly, then at least to 
the Security Council to refer that question to the Assembly or 
the Council before he issued instructions to the United Nations 
force to withdraw, and the situation on the ground was delicate 
in the sense that the United Nations force was not capable of 
fighting. It could not defend itself; it was lightly armed. It 
did not have a mission of waging hostilities, so that there was 
no question they could have been pushed out if Nasser decided 
he was going to use his own armed forces to push them out or to 
force them to concentrate in a particular area pending 
evacuation.
    Nevertheless, we thought that the General Assembly, at 
least, could bring pressures to bear on the situation, could 
use procedures such as sending a commission into the area which 
would tend to put a poultice on the fever, and try to resolve 
the matter without further inflammation.
    Israel was, of course, very much disturbed by the action 
taken by U Thant, and by the removal of the U.N. forces.

             ISRAEL PROHIBITED U.N. FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY

    You will recall that Israel has never permitted U.N. forces 
on its own territory. It took that view back after Suez on the 
ground that Israel was a sovereign state and that foreign 
forces should not be permitted to locate themselves there. That 
original position of Israel tended to strengthen Nasser's 
argument that as a sovereign state he had the right to require 
them to withdraw.
    But we felt that U Thant's handling of it was much too 
quick and inept, and that he would have been better advised to 
take the matter up with one of the two constituted bodies of 
the U.N. dealing with such questions.
    The most recent development----
    The Chairman. Were they there at the invitation of the 
U.A.R.?
    Secretary Rusk. By agreement with U.A.R., Hammarskjold-
Nasser agreement, in fact, worked out on the basis of a General 
Assembly resolution.

                       A HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE STEP

    Then yesterday, President Nasser was up in the Sinai making 
a speech to his troops, and in his speech he declared that the 
Strait of Tiran was being closed to ships carrying the Israeli 
flag.
    This is a highly provocative step because the support of 
Aquaba is a major port for Israel; it is a principal supply 
port. It is their principal contact with Africa and Asia.
    It is a thriving city. Several hundred ships a year come in 
there from all over the world, and Israel has made it known 
privately that this was, and indeed in the Knesset just two 
days ago, that this is a Casus Belli, that Israel would have to 
resist this by force.
    We are not completely sure that Nasser's speech to his 
troops was a considered judgment of the Egyptian government as 
such. It might have been, he might have been moved by the 
occasion to go beyond what he might have done had he given it 
more considered thought. But nonetheless he has done it, he has 
said it, and this precipitates the issue in a very important 
way.
    Looking at the general situation there, it is our view that 
no one of the governments involved there, with the possible 
exception of Syria, seems to want a major military engagement. 
We are not at all that certain today about Nasser because of 
his action on the Strait which is, as I said, a very 
provocative matter.
    We are quite sure that Lebanon and Jordan do not want any 
part of an engagement here, and it has been our view up until 
last night that, on the whole, this situation could be kept 
under control unless some major incident by irresponsible 
elements triggered something which the governments could not 
feel they could take or accept without some sort of counter 
action. In other words, the situation was subject to action by 
the Fatah organization or by elements of the Palestine 
Liberation Army, who are present in such places as the Gaza 
Strip.

                     THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY

    Shukairy, the head of the Palestine Liberation Army, has 
been making very inflammatory speeches lately, and on one 
occasion he had the Chinese Communist Ambassador with him, and 
referred to him as being his companion.
    Now, we have been in close touch with----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Excuse me, where does the Palestine 
Liberation Army get its supplies?
    Senator Lausche. I did not hear your question, Bourke.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I said where does the Palestinian 
Army get its supplies and equipment?
    Secretary Rusk. I would suppose primarily from Egypt.
    Senator Mansfield. He said from China. How he gets it I do 
not know.
    Secretary Rusk. It may get it from China, but I would think 
the small arms come from Egypt. They are not a heavily armed 
group, but they could be a nuisance.
    Senator Symington. Where are they located?
    Secretary Rusk. Chiefly in the Gaza Strip. They are spread 
among the Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, Jordan and 
Lebanon. We estimate there are about 8,000. But we have been in 
touch with all of the governments concerned, including the 
Soviet Union, Britain, France, the other members of the 
Security Council, the states with troops in UNEF and, of 
course, with Israel and Arab capitals in the area.

                   SOVIETS ARE TAKING A MODERATE VIEW

    The Chairman. What response did you get from the Soviet 
Union?
    Secretary Rusk. There is a very great interest to us as to 
the attitude of the Soviet Union.
    The Chairman. What response did you get?
    Secretary Rusk. I would have to say, Mr. Chairman, that in 
their discussions with us they seemed to take a moderate view. 
But two of the Arab states, Syria and Egypt, are saying that 
they have been told by the Soviets that the Soviets would 
support them against the imperialists. So now we are talking 
with them further to date.
    By the way, I hope we can keep some of these procedural 
steps private because it could affect what happens on the other 
end.
    We are seeing the Russians again, both in New York and in 
Moscow today. At the moment, the members of the Security 
Council are meeting informally at the Danish Mission in New 
York to consider the situation and the possibility of a 
Security Council meeting perhaps later today or in the morning.
    I think U Thant would prefer that the Security Council not 
meet until he has had a chance to talk with Nasser. But the 
situation is so inflammatory that it may be that the members of 
the Security Council would feel that they ought to begin to 
meet before U Thant gets back or before they hear from U Thant. 
That is our own view, by the way, and I think the British and 
Canadians feel that way, and I think some of the others are of 
that inclination.

                    ISRAEL COULD TAKE CARE OF ITSELF

    Senator Lausche. What is our government's appraisal of 
Nasser's honest judgment in the matter?
    Secretary Rusk. We have thought that he would realize, 
unless he has some major secret weapon or military capacity of 
which we are uninformed, that he would be in deep trouble at 
least in the short run in an all-out engagement with Israel.
    Our own estimate is that in a short engagement the Israelis 
would take care of themselves very handily against the forces 
that are now opposed to them, but we are not sure that Nasser 
thinks that.
    Senator Lausche. Up until now Nasser has been pictured as 
not wanting to become involved, but probably being coerced by 
the Syrians.
    Secretary Rusk. I think there is a good deal to that, 
Senator. I think that in terms of the Israel-Arab issue as such 
over a period of time he has been one of the more moderate in 
terms of wanting a military engagement. But, of course, he 
probably also feels that with the challenge to Syria, which is 
the way they interpret the Israeli statement that Israel would 
attack Syria if these terrorist raids continued, he may feel 
that his position as head of the Arab world, as he sees it, is 
at stake here and that he would have to demonstrate that he is 
prepared to make good on that Syria-Egyptian alliance.
    The most immediate question, of course, is the Strait. My 
guess is that Israel would use force to keep that Strait open, 
and the international maritime countries will have to consider 
among themselves what their attitude is toward it.
    Our view has been all along, and this has been true since 
the settlement of the Suez affair, that that Strait is 
international waters, and that it should be opened to shipping 
of all countries.

                    CONTACTS WITH BRITAIN AND FRANCE

    Senator Lausche. Secretary Rusk, I interrupted you. You 
were talking about your contacts with the different nations at 
this time.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. I do not think you finished your thought.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that the British, for example, are 
very much concerned about the use of force to close that 
international waterway and, further, they feel themselves 
committed to the support of Israel if there is a clear 
aggression against Israel, working primarily, in the first 
instance, through the United Nations.
    France follows the same general policy, reflected in the 
tripartite statement, although they prefer to deal with this 
question not on a tripartite basis, hopefully on a 
quadripartite basis, including the Soviet Union and the 
Security Council. But in any event not restoring the tripartite 
declaration of 1950.
    I think at this point----
    The Chairman. I did not get that last. What did you say?
    Secretary Rusk. Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman, of what 
the tripartite declaration of 1950 said:

    The three governments, the United States, the U.K. and 
France, take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest 
and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance 
of peace and stability in the area, and their unalterable 
opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any 
of the states in that area. The three governments, should they 
find that any of these states, was preparing to violate 
frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their 
obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take 
action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent 
such violation.

                    MACMILLAN AND KENNEDY STATEMENTS

    Now, just yesterday, George Brown said on television in 
Britain that he felt that the tripartite declaration had been 
substituted for by----
    The Chairman. Substituted for by--what do you mean?
    Secretary Rusk. By Prime Minister Macmillan's statement of 
1963. In other words, that it had been replaced by Prime 
Minister Macmillan's statement in 1963.
    Senator Mansfield. Applicable just to the U.K. or to the 
tripartite group?
    Secretary Rusk. The U.K.'s participation in the tripartite 
declaration had been overtaken by Prime Minister Macmillan's 
declaration of 1963.
    Senator McCarthy. Which said what, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Rusk. That was based upon a May 8 statement by 
President Kennedy. The question was:

    Mr. President, do you consider the situation in the Middle 
East, the balance of power there, to have been changed as a 
result of recent developments, and what is the U.S. policy 
towards the security of Israel and Jordan in case they are 
threatened?

    President Kennedy said:

    I don't think that the balance of military power has been 
changed in the Middle East in recent days. Obviously there are 
political changes in the Middle East which still do not show a 
precise pattern and on which we are unable to make any final 
judgments. The United States supports social and economic and 
political progress in the Middle East. We support the security 
of both Israel and her neighbors. We seek to limit the Near 
East arms race which obviously takes resources from an area 
already poor, and puts them into an increasing race which does 
not really bring any great security.

    And this is his conclusion on that:

    We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force 
in the Near East, and we also seek to limit the spread of 
communism in the Middle East which would, of course, destroy 
the independence of the people. This government has been and 
remains strongly opposed to the use of force or the threat of 
force in the Near East. In the event of aggression or 
preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we 
would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt 
other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop 
to such aggression which, of course, has been the policy which 
the United States has followed for some time.

    Now, that was on the 8th of May. On the 14th of May Prime 
Minister Macmillan was asked----
    Senator Aiken. What year?
    Secretary Rusk. 1963.
    Prime Minister Macmillan was asked whether he will publicly 
associate Her Majesty's Government with the recent officially 
declared United States policy to the effect that, should Israel 
or any of the Arab States appear to violate frontiers or 
armistice lines, the United States of America would take 
immediate action both within and outside the United States to 
prevent such violation.
    And the Prime Minister said:

    Yes, sir. I am glad to endorse the President's statement. 
Her Majesty's Government is deeply interested in peace and 
stability in this area, and is opposed to the use of force or 
the threat of force there as elsewhere in the world. We are 
equally opposed to the interference by any country in the 
internal affairs of another whether by the encouragement of 
subversion or by hostile propaganda. I cannot say in advance 
what action we would take in a crisis since it is difficult to 
foresee the exact circumstances which might arise. We regard 
the United Nations as being primarily responsible for the 
maintenance of peace in the area. If any threat to peace 
arises, we will consult immediately with the United Nations, 
and will take whatever action we feel may be required.

           TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT NOT AN OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENT

    Senator Lausche. How does that differ from the tripartite 
agreement?
    Secretary Rusk. In the first place, it would mean that 
Britain and France do not look upon the tripartite declaration 
as an organic three-power operational instrument at the present 
time. After all, that came before the Suez, and there have been 
some complications.
    Senator Aiken. Do we?
    Secretary Rusk. I beg your pardon?
    Senator Aiken. Do we?
    Secretary Rusk. I think again the policy which President 
Kennedy announced or reaffirmed in May 1963 is, for all 
practical purposes, identical with the policy of the tripartite 
declaration:

    In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, 
whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate 
measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action 
on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression 
which, of course, has been the policy which the United States 
has followed for some time.

                 A DECLARATION RATHER THAN A COMMITMENT

    Senator Aiken. If one party of a tripartite understanding 
disagrees with the other two, the one party goes ahead 
representing the whole?
    Secretary Rusk. I think the policy situation is that 
France, Britain, and the United States have since the 
tripartite declaration or since Suez reaffirmed the underlying 
policy of the declaration. But I do not think that the British 
and the French are prepared to operate on this policy simply as 
a tripartite matter.
    The Chairman. This morning's paper----
    Senator Mansfield. It appears to me that a declaration is 
quite different from a commitment, very different. I see no 
commitment there. It is just a declaration of what might be 
done.
    Secretary Rusk. I think it was a declaration of policy, and 
I think that is what I called it.
    Secretary Mansfield. But no commitment.
    Secretary Rusk. There was no treaty commitment.
    Senator Clark. But you do not foresee the British or French 
troops going in there, do you, under any circumstances? Maybe 
U.N. That is pretty remote.
    Secretary Rusk. This is a problem which everybody has got 
to think hard about. It depends, of course, on the 
circumstances and who does what to whom and how the matter 
develops.

                 AN AGREEMENT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT

    Senator Clark. Do you think there is any possibility of 
persuading Israel not to attack Syria and to permit a U.N. 
force to go back in the Gaza Strip, perhaps half on their side 
or half--let me finish----
    Secretary Rusk. Excuse me, Senator.
    Senator Clark [continuing]. If Egypt would agree to leave 
the Straits open? What, in your judgment, would be the Russian 
reaction to something like that?
    Secretary Rusk. I think if Egypt were to agree to leave the 
Straits open, and Israel were to agree to accept U.N. or 
international forces in Egypt, I think the Russians would 
probably accept it.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, we have a meeting of the 
Central Intelligence Agency committee, as you and Senator 
Mansfield know, and I would like to get over there before the 
meeting is over. I have questions I would like to ask as 
chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over that area, 
and I would like to request the regular order until the 
Secretary finishes.
    The Chairman. Maybe we had better. If the Secretary would 
wind up his preliminary statement on this subject. Should we 
proceed to questions after the Middle East and leave Vietnam 
for later?
    Senator Symington. I would hope so.

                 POSITIONS TAKEN BY AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

    The Chairman. Do you have anything more to volunteer before 
we have questions on the Middle East?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, Mr. Chairman, I might say on what 
has been said as a matter of policy since President Kennedy's 
press conference of May 8, 1963, that President Johnson said in 
a joint communique with Prime Minister Eshkol:

    He (President Johnson) reiterated to Prime Minister Eshkol 
U.S. support for the territorial integrity and political 
independence for all countries in the Near East and emphasized 
the firm opposition of the U.S. to aggression and the use of 
force or the threat of force against any country.

    Again, on August 2, 1966, he said:

    As our beloved, great, late President John F. Kennedy said 
on May 8, 1963, as a declaration of the leader of this country 
and as spokesman for this land: `We support the security of 
both Israel and her neighbors * * * We strongly oppose the use 
of force or the threat of force in the Near East * * *
    We subscribe to that policy.

    So what I have read to you this morning has been the 
essence of what the different Presidents have said.
    I have some statements here that I could put into the 
record, including President Truman's, President Eisenhower's, 
during that period. But the most recent ones are the statements 
by President Kennedy which President Johnson reaffirmed.

                 THE SITUATION COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL

    I think the key question here for us to be thinking about, 
and I do not come here today with recommendations on it but in 
hopes that we can get some expressions of opinion in the 
committee, as to what the attitude of the U.S. and other 
countries in the West ought to be if there is a major onslaught 
by the Arab countries against Israel. I mean, that is the most 
serious contingency and one which we cannot completely brush 
aside although, as I said earlier, some of you were not here 
when I said it, I do not think that the governments of the 
area, as governments, are particularly hankering for large-
scale military operations.
    I have the impression they are prepared to have their 
coattails pulled and held in position. But they are the victims 
of possible incidents and emotions, and the situations could 
move out of control.
    I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to stop at this point because 
I know members have comments or questions they might wish to 
ask.
    The Chairman. I think maybe we will move along on that. I 
only have two or three questions.

                             GOING IT ALONE

    I want to make it, I want to try to be very precise about 
our policy with regard to this tripartite agreement. Would we 
today enforce that if the British and the French are not 
willing to, by our own forces? I want to ask later about the 
U.N., but first on that subject, is this our policy?
    Secretary Rusk. I would not be able to tell you what the 
President's decision on that would be. You see, our policy has 
been stated on the public record. We have spent all of our time 
thus far urging calm upon everybody, Israel, the Arab States, 
the Soviet Union, and have been working very strongly in the 
Security Council--they are meeting now, as I told some of you 
who were here earlier--in an informal meeting to take up this 
question.
    That is a question on which I am sure the President will be 
in touch with the leadership if any decision had to be made on 
that point. We are hoping to avoid that question if we possibly 
can by holding the situation under control in the Near East.
    The Chairman. Well, just as a comment, if we should 
undertake to do that we would be hard put to find forces to go 
it alone in this area at the present time, wouldn't we?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not think the question of going it 
alone would come up. My guess is that----
    The Chairman. If it did.
    Secretary Rusk. This would have to be a matter of general 
action by a considerable number of countries, not ourselves.

                    THE NEED FOR INVOLVING THE U.N.

    The Chairman. I do not want to take much time--I would like 
to urge that here is a case that if ever the U.N. should be 
brought in, this is it. It does not directly involve the major 
countries. You intimated you would like some advice or at least 
you would not resent any advice from this committee--that this 
is an example of where you should go the limit in involving the 
U.N. as far as you can.
    Secretary Rusk. We would agree to that, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. All the way.
    Secretary Rusk. I would say we do not know how much of a 
need we have to lean on as far as the Secretary General is 
concerned because he has not been very staunch in supporting 
the position and the action of the U.N. in a number of these 
situations.
    The Chairman. Much more important, I think, are the 
Russians, what their attitude would be.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    The Chairman. And I do not know what they replied to you 
either. I imagine they would be willing if they get any kind of 
consensus.
    Secretary Rusk. Could I leave this off the tape, Mr. 
Chairman?
    [Discussion off the record.]
    The Chairman. Senator Mansfield?

                        AVOID UNILATERAL ACTION

    Senator Mansfield. I am pleased with the reaction, Mr. 
Secretary. I certainly hope that this country does not act 
unilaterally in the Middle East. We have enough troubles in 
Vietnam now, more than enough.
    Is there an agreement between, a security arrangement 
between France and Britain with Israel in addition to anything 
you have mentioned so far?
    Secretary Rusk. We do not know of any specific and direct 
tripartite agreement between Britain, France, and Israel. It 
might have come after the Suez affair. We just do not know of 
one, if one exists. I would doubt it.
    Senator Mansfield. I am pleased to note that you place the 
emphasis on the U.N., and the U.N. is taking it up; that you 
are carrying on conversations with the Soviet Union, and I 
would place more credence in what you have been told than what 
the Egyptian newspapers carried.

                         MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

    What is the status of the Middle East resolution of 1961?
    Secretary Rusk. That is so far as I know still law, but its 
applicability here, I may have to say something different later 
if we examine it further, but on the face of it, it would seem 
that its applicability here is somewhat fuzzy because that 
resolution was applied to countries under Communist domination.
    Senator McCarthy. When you went into Lebanon there was no 
Communist domination in there.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right; in Lebanon and Jordan.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Which Middle East resolution?
    Senator McCarthy. The Eisenhower doctrine.
    Senator Mansfield. 1961. The Middle East resolution.
    Secretary Rusk. The Middle East resolution was under 
President Eisenhower. That was the resolution on the basis of 
the----
    Senator Mansfield. I mean 1957.
    Secretary Rusk. That was the resolution on the basis of 
which we put some forces into Lebanon.
    Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, if I can go on, and I am 
just going to be brief. I would express the strong personal 
feeling, and that is all I can express, that the President does 
not act unilaterally in this area. Pressure is exerted on the 
U.K. and the French, who have vital interests there in one form 
or another, to take the lead outside the United Nations. We 
should do all that we can to simmer this down because I think 
that basically the statements made by Colonel Nasser are 
provocative and inflammatory. Morally he is in the wrong, that 
he made a mistake in requesting that the United Nations 
Emergency Force be withdrawn from the Gaza Strip, and I would 
hope that something could be done to bring about an accord on 
the suggestion made by Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel to the 
effect that they both withdraw their forces back----
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I cannot hear the Senator.
    Senator Mansfield [continuing]. From a certain area from 
the border.
    The Chairman. Let us have order, please.
    Senator Mansfield. The one thing I want to emphasize, 
speaking personally, is I hope we do not become involved 
unilaterally.
    The Chairman. I want to associate myself with those 
remarks.
    Senator Morse. So do I.
    The Chairman. Are you through?
    Senator Mansfield. Yes.
    The Chairman. Senator Aiken?
    Bourke, do you want to ask a question before you leave?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I have to go to this other meeting.
    The Chairman. Do you have any questions?

                     NO COURSE OF ACTION PRESENTED

    Senator Aiken. What you have been suggesting, Mr. 
Secretary, is a suggestion for unilateral action if it is 
desirable?
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir; I have not presented anything.
    Senator Aiken. I missed the first ten minutes.
    Secretary Rusk. I have not presented any course of action 
this morning. I am consulting with the committee; trying to 
bring the committee up to date on the situation; to give you a 
feel of the various governments we are in touch with; to tell 
you that this is being discussed right at the moment by the 
members of the Security Council at an informal meeting; and 
also to let you know that about an hour ago U Thant was 
supposed to have arrived in Cairo to talk to Nasser, and we 
feel that it would be useful to spread the situation out in as 
much detail as possible and get the reactions of members of the 
committee to it.

                   DISMAY OVER REMOVAL OF U.N. FORCES

    Senator Aiken. Why was U Thant in such a hurry to get the 
U.N. forces out of the area?
    Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, we do not know. I think that 
he was advised that as a legal matter----
    Senator Gore. What was the question? I could not get that 
question.
    Secretary Rusk. The question was why was U Thant in such a 
hurry to get the forces out.
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. I expressed earlier our dismay that he did 
act with such speed here. But I think he was advised as a legal 
matter if Egypt wanted those forces out of Egypt they had a 
right to request that they go out. They were the host country, 
a sovereign country, and that these forces could be there only 
with Egypt's consent.
    Our view was this was action that should be taken by the 
General Assembly. It was just not a unilateral action by Egypt. 
Those forces are there by agreement with Egypt, and this 
agreement should not be broken unilaterally by the country, the 
host country, without full opportunity for the United Nations 
to act on its side of the agreement.
    Senator Aiken. It almost looks as if he had advance 
information that this demand was going to be made.
    Secretary Rusk. I would be inclined to doubt that, but I 
cannot be sure of it; I could not be sure of it.
    Senator Aiken. Or else he was a very fast thinker.
    Secretary Rusk. I have the impression that his Soviet 
Deputy strongly urged him to accede to Nasser's request 
immediately.
    Senator Aiken. The Soviets never did approve this 
peacekeeping force there.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct. This is the only peace-
keeping force established by the Assembly. As you know, the 
Soviets have taken a strong view in any event they should not 
do this.
    Senator Aiken. Yes, and Yugoslavia took the lead in asking 
to have the force maintained.
    Secretary Rusk. So did Canada.
    Senator Aiken. Against the opposition of Russia.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    Senator Aiken. Yugoslavia and Canada.
    Secretary Rusk. And Yugoslavia has some troops there as 
part of the force.

                         IF ISRAEL SHOULD FALL

    Senator Aiken. However, if Israel should fall, her entire 
interests in the Middle East would be jeopardized, wouldn't 
they, sir?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that the picture of the 
Israelis being driven into the sea is a picture that I just 
think people just cannot contemplate.
    Senator Aiken. No.
    Secretary Rusk. The whole world cannot contemplate that.
    I agree with Senator Mansfield on the unilateral aspect of 
this. But this is not a phenomenon that the world can sit for, 
it seems to me.
    Senator Aiken. You get any indication that France and 
England would consider it their problem?
    Secretary Rusk. We are in touch with them now. I can tell 
you that their own views are pretty strong at the present time 
on this matter. But I would not want to try to be precise about 
it because we are talking further with them today, this 
morning. There is a cabinet meeting in Britain going on, I 
think, at the present time.
    Senator Aiken. Strong in what direction, that they want to 
put their own forces in there or they want the United States to 
do that for them?
    Secretary Rusk. No, this is a matter that everybody has to 
be interested in.
    Senator Aiken. You think they would be----
    Secretary Rusk. I think the chances are that they would be, 
but I do not want to speak for them on that point because our 
own President has not fully been informed, and does not himself 
have a conclusion to recommend to you at this time. This is an 
opportunity for me to be able to reflect to the President at 
lunch today the views expressed at this table by this 
distinguished committee, and I would be very glad to have any 
views anyone would wish to offer on this because this is on a 
day-to-day basis, maybe even an hour-to-hour basis.
    The Chairman. Senator Morse?

                           U THANT'S ACTIONS

    Senator Morse. I will be very brief. I have three or four 
very brief questions I want to get your comment on.
    George's question covers the first one, as I was going to 
bring up, but I wanted to expand a bit, and that deals with U 
Thant's action.
    I am at a complete loss to understand why he acted so 
parentally. It is true it is a United Nations matter, but being 
Secretary General does not relieve him of the responsibility on 
this General assembly. Being Secretary General does not relieve 
him of the responsibility and the obligation to move through 
the General Assembly and seek advice from the General Assembly.
    Furthermore, under the charter there not only is there 
anything to prevent him, but I think clearly it was his 
obligation when you have got a matter of war or peace at stake 
to have sought advice from the Security Council, too.
    I am at a loss to understand why he acted so parentorally. 
Had he not done it, that would have given us more time, too, 
and time is so important. Therefore, I think he has got to take 
a long, hard look at the jurisdiction prerogatives of the 
Secretary General because this is not the only time that U 
Thant, in my judgment, has gone off, may I say politely, giving 
the image he is the United Nations, when he is only, after all, 
but a servant of the United Nations in this procedure.
    Senator Lausche. I concur.
    Senator Morse. And, therefore, I shall not be at all 
surprised if you have got here a considerable amount of 
influence from that Communist Deputy of his. I am not going to 
take the time now, but I think you also have some of the same 
influences involved in his attitude in Southeast Asia. I have 
not shared the view that this man is impartial.

             MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION AND SOVIET INTERVENTION

    Now I come to the 1957 resolution which has been mentioned 
here which says:
    ``Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the 
national interest and world peace the preservation of the 
independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. 
To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, 
the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any 
nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against 
armed aggression from any country controlled by international 
communism,'' as you pointed out, Mr. Secretary, ``Provided, 
that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty 
obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of 
the United States.''
    I think it takes that resolution out of the applicability 
to the instant case, because you are not involved here, unless 
Russia gets in, you are not involved here, in my judgment, with 
the Communist aspect of the resolution.
    Senator McCarthy. Will the Senator yield at this point? But 
this was used for the Lebanon intervention, and there was no 
threat of intervention of international communism there.
    Senator Morse. I know. But I am only citing what the other 
countries will say what the purpose was and what it was other 
countries particularly approved of there.
    But now I come, and you may have talked on it before I got 
here, and if you did I am sorry to be redundant. You do not 
know it, but I am in this very serious railroad emergency here 
that somehow we still have got to face up to a lot faster than 
we are facing up to it here on the Hill. That is why I was 
late.

                    TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT INOPERATIVE

    But am I correct in my recollection that Great Britain and 
France and the United States have not a security pact but we 
have an agreement among the three of us in which if there is a 
threat of war in the Middle East we will act in concert against 
the aggressor. Is there such a thing?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think it would be saying too 
much to say that Britain and France look upon the tripartite 
declaration of 1950 as still being operative. As a matter of 
fact, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain said on television 
just last night that he thought that the tripartite declaration 
had been supplanted by Prime Minister Macmillan's statement of 
1963 which I read to the committee.
    Senator Morse. Which I missed.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. May I see that?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Morse. There is no obligation on the part of France 
or Great Britain to act in concert with us in case----
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, let me say that the tripartite 
declaration was a joint declaration of policy, as Senator 
Mansfield pointed out.
    Now, the question is does their policy remain approximately 
the same. I think it is very important that matters of this 
sort not be commented upon or quoted outside by anybody because 
we are in a very delicate situation, and I do not want to speak 
for other governments.
    It is my present view that the policies of Britain and 
France are in accord with the tripartite declaration of 1950; 
that is, they consider this is a very serious matter.
    As you know, France and Israel have had very close ties, 
and Britain has given their support to Israel and is very much 
concerned as a maritime power about the attempt to close the 
Strait of Tiran leading to the Port of Aqaba. So I would have 
to shade it a little because I cannot speak for either one of 
those governments.
    My impression is today, after a week of intensive 
consultation, as a matter of policy they still are in the 
framework of that policy which was announced in the tripartite 
declaration.

                      NOT A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

    Senator Morse. Do we consider we are under any 
international understanding, obligation other than the 
tripartite understanding of 1950 to help Israel or any Arab 
state that might be attacked?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, if you could borrow from 
Senator Lausche at some stage the statement in the press 
conference made by President Kennedy in May 1963, he, as late 
as 1963 reaffirmed the underlying policy of the tripartite 
declaration, and President Johnson later referred to the May 
press conference and said that he supports that policy.
    Senator Morse. That was my understanding.
    Secretary Rusk. For this is a matter of policy. It is not a 
matter of treaty commitment. It is not a matter of contractual 
obligation.
    Senator Morse. It is not a treaty. It is really not a 
matter of signed agreement either, going back to 1950, but it 
was a restatement of a commitment there that linked with France 
and Britain at that time.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. Wayne, would you yield so that I could 
read into the record what the operative words are of the 1950 
declaration?
    Senator Morse. Yes.

    Senator Lausche. The three governments, should they find 
that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or 
armistice lines, would consistently with their obligations as 
members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both 
within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such 
violation.

    What those words mean I will not try to interpret at this 
time.
    Senator Morse. That is what I am talking about, around this 
question that I am asking, and I have got my answer that France 
and Great Britain as of now apparently will not consider 
themselves bound by the 1950 agreement, but we do not know.
    Secretary Rusk. But seem to be pursuing the same attitude 
or policy reflected in that agreement.
    Senator Morse. That is right.
    But as far as we are concerned, based upon the Kennedy 
statement of 1963 and the subsequent Johnson statement, we 
still consider that we have some obligation to try to get a war 
stopped by some joint action on the part of England and France 
if they would join us.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think it might be worth, since we 
are putting certain things in the record--this is the mid-
fifties--President Eisenhower stated in a press conference:

    I would recommend that the U.S. join in formal treaty 
engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to 
alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors.

    That is November 1955.
    Then in January 1957 he said in a speech to Congress, in a 
State of the Union Message:

    We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to 
the principle that force shall not be used internationally for 
any aggressive purposes and that the integrity and independence 
of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate.

                           A MORAL OBLIGATION

    Senator McCarthy. Will the Senator yield at this one point? 
I accept that we have a moral obligation and we have four or 
five statements by a series of Presidents. But the only formal 
obligation that you still think is our obligation is within the 
United Nations.
    Secretary Rusk. The general treaty obligations of the 
United Nations Charter.
    Senator McCarthy. No other treaties.
    Secretary Rusk. Of course, they apply here, but no other 
treaties apply to this problem.
    Senator McCarthy. Just Presidential statements and the 
Eisenhower doctrine which is our unilateral obligation, and 
there is nothing left of the tripartite agreement except our 
statement we would support it.
    Secretary Rusk. And the enunciations of policies by what 
amount to four Presidents.
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.

                     CONVERSATIONS WITH GOLDA MEIR

    Senator Morse. I will ask, Mr. Secretary, to be permitted 
to make this statement. The last official contact I had with 
the tripartite agreement was in December 1965 when, under the 
President's request, I took my delegation home by way of 
Israel. We had a series of conferences over there, and two of 
those conferences were with Golda Meir. Frank will recall that 
in our conference with Golda Meir, a very long conference, both 
of them long conferences, we were talking about the criticisms 
we were getting from Israel concerning military aid in the 
Middle East.
    She expressed quite a bit of concern, as I remember. It is 
my recollection, I remember Frank Lausche said to her very 
frankly--these were not his exact words, but I paraphrase him, 
and I think he will agree, accurately, he said, ``Mrs. Meir, I 
am at a little loss to understand your concern because you know 
that you have our pledge that we will come to your assistance 
if you are attacked.''
    She said, ``Yes, Mr. Senator, I know.'' This, of course was 
in reference to the tripartite agreement. She said, ``Yes, I 
know,'' but, she said, ``I am not so sure that there would be 
any Israel left by the time you came to our assistance.''
    What Frank was talking about was we have taken this 
position in the Middle East. We are not going to stand by if 
either the Arab countries or Israel is attacked. Is that a fair 
recollection of the conversation?
    Senator Lausche. No. I think my point was, I said ``Why are 
you complaining because our government has fully informed you 
about the aid that we were then sending into Jordan at Eilat, 
Aqaba, we were there, and it was said, `Look across the bay and 
you will see ships unloading equipment.' ''
    Well, I had been previously told that our government told 
Israel that we were giving this aid and that Israel knew about 
it, and the excuse for giving it was that unless we gave it 
Russia would. I cannot confirm----
    Senator Morse. I do not want to take the Secretary's time 
other than in that conversation you were also--and I thought 
you made a very good point--you also told her that you did not 
see why she was so concerned because she knew that if a war did 
break out that under existing international understandings that 
we would come to her assistance in case they were attacked.
    Senator Lausche. I do not think I went that far.
    Senator Morse. She said, ``My concern there wouldn't be an 
Israel left by the time the attack took place.''
    Anyway, I will exonerate my friend from Ohio from being the 
one that raised the point. I know the point was raised in the 
discussion.
    But my point is at that time she was then still foreign 
minister. At that time she recognized, she thought they had an 
understanding with us, and I think with Great Britain and 
France, too, that we were not going to be letting her be 
attacked, aggressed upon, but she was concerned with whether or 
not we would get to their assistance fast enough. I just cite 
that point.
    The last point I wanted to ask you is, you know, that this 
matter will be a matter of discussion all over the entire 
Senate. Have you any advice to us as to how we can be of 
greatest help to the State Department and to the White House in 
any public discussions that may break out on the floor of the 
Senate this afternoon?

                        U THANT NEEDS STIFFENING

    Secretary Rusk. There is one point that occurs to me, 
Senator, and that is to emphasize the responsibilities of the 
United Nations for peacekeeping in this area, because U Thant 
may need some stiffening on this point, and I may know before 
the meeting is over whether they agreed to actually call a 
formal meeting of the Security Council.
    Mr. Macomber, would you be in touch with the office when 
Ambassador Goldberg calls back?
    So I would think that would be one point that could be very 
helpful.
    Secondly, general advice to all hands to keep calm in this 
situation. You see, Israel is in a very, very difficult 
geographic position, and Mrs. Meir's comment to you in that 
conversation is relevant here. They are surrounded by Arab 
States who declare periodically or publicly their hostility 
towards Israel.
    They have not got much wriggle room in there. Therefore, 
they feel that they have got to bristle like a porcupine to 
fend off these neighbors if anything ever starts, so they tend 
to be a little jumpy. This is partly because of the military 
problem of space.
    We have urged them to be extremely cautious and patient 
here in regard to these boundary incidents in this situation, 
and that Israel make it quite clear that if anything happens 
here it is not Israel's responsibility; that this is a clear 
aggression from the outside.
    Just yesterday the Prime Minister proposed that there be a 
neutral withdrawal of forces between the Israel-Egyptian 
frontier. That was a most sensible and sober suggestion to 
make.

                      CLOSING THE STRAITS OF TIRAN

    But again I am concerned about this morning, about the 
effect on Israel by the announcement by Nasser that he was 
closing the Straits of Tiran. That is an extremely serious 
thing.
    Senator Symington. Doing what?
    Secretary Rusk. Closing the Straits of Tiran that lead up 
to Aqaba. That is a very serious step, and we are concerned 
about that.
    Senator Morse. We have never said at any time that we 
considered those international waters the closing of which 
would involve our rights?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, we have said we consider them 
international wars and that is our view on that. There are four 
countries that were served by that Gulf of Aqaba.
    The Chairman. Senator Carlson?
    Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I have two or three 
questions.
    Secretary Rusk. Excuse me, Senator, may I just read into 
the record here a portion of an aide memoire handed by Mr. 
Dulles to Prime Minister Eban:

    With respect to the Gulf of Aqaba and access thereto--the 
United States believes that the gulf comprehends international 
waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and 
innocent passage in the gulf and through the Straits giving 
access thereto. We have in mind not only commercial uses but 
the passage of the pilgrims on religious missions, which should 
be fully respected.

    So our view has been that the Gulf of Aqaba is 
international waters and the passage through the Straits is an 
international right.
    Senator Symington. Do you want to read the next paragraph 
in that statement?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not have it with me.
    Senator Symington. I will give it to you.

    The United States recalls that on January 28, 1950, the 
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States 
that the Egyptian occupation of the two islands of Tiran and 
Senafir at the entrance at the Gulf of Aqaba was only to 
protect the islands themselves against possible damage or 
violation and that `this occupation being in no way conceived 
in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through 
the stretch of water separating these two islands from the 
Egyptian coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only 
practical one, will remain free.
    In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary 
as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on 
behalf of vessels of the United States registry, is prepared to 
exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join 
with others to secure general recognition of this right.

    That sounds like a pretty firm commitment at that time----
    Secretary Rusk. Right.
    Senator Symington [continuing]. By Mr. Dulles.
    The Chairman. Senator Carlson?
    Senator Symington. This is dated February 11, 1957.

                      NASSER'S THREATS TO THE U.N.

    Senator Carlson. I have just two questions. The press 
dispatches have carried the story that U Thant, the Secretary 
General, was advised by Mr. Nasser that if he did not withdraw 
the troops they were going to be disarmed. Does the State 
Department have any views on that?
    Secretary Rusk. We do not have the text of what Nasser 
might have said to U Thant. At least, if so, they might have 
escaped my attention. I think I probably would have seen them. 
It would not surprise me if Nasser did say that.
    Senator Carlson. I was going to ask if you do not think he 
might have done that.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think it is possible.

                            BRITISH POSITION

    Senator Carlson. Second, the last official statement we 
have from Great Britain, outside of the statement by Mr. Brown 
\1\ yesterday in London, would be the Macmillan statement of 
1963 which you read into the record. I gathered from your 
reading of that statement that they pretty much withdrew and 
left it to ourselves, at least they were in position where they 
could move either way based on the statement. What is your view 
of that?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ British Foreign Secretary George Brown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, sir, that it depends on what 
weight you give to the opening words of Prime Minister 
Macmillan's statement because it was based upon President 
Kennedy's press conference statement. Senator Lausche, I 
believe, has that exchange.
    Senator Lausche. Yes, right here.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, sir. The Prime Minister began 
his statement by saying--remember the question was ``Would you 
publicly associate Her Majesty's Government with the recent 
officially declared United States policy?'' That was referring 
to President Kennedy's press conference statement. He said:
    ``Yes, sir. I am glad to endorse the President's 
statement.'' Then he goes on to put heavy emphasis on the 
United Nations aspect on it. Then, of course, he said as far as 
specific action was concerned that would require examination of 
the situation at the time.

             REASONABLE RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND ISRAEL

    Senator Carlson. Are you implying this morning that our 
nation does not have any formal obligation or commitment, but 
merely implies these commitments are tripartite treaties we 
have been into?
    Secretary Rusk. We do not have a treaty obligation directly 
except to the extent the United Nations Charter is applicable. 
We do not have a specific treaty obligation.
    Over the years I think that question has been raised from 
time to time, but it was concluded that such a treaty would not 
be in the interests of peace in the general area nor in our 
interests because it was important for the West to be able to 
have reasonable relations with both the Arabs and with Israel, 
if possible.
    Now, this is a policy question which was posed to four 
Presidents, and it goes back to the day when the United States 
played a major role in the creation of the State of Israel.

                       OPERATING FROM DAY TO DAY

    Senator Carlson. Then we get to a place--and I think 
everyone must be concerned about the unilateral agreements--
would you say that we do not have any unilateral agreements in 
this field?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have some unilateral declarations 
of policy by the Presidents.
    Senator Carlson. And these policies imply a great deal more 
than just what is in the written word.
    Secretary Rusk. I think the statements stand by themselves. 
I think they should not be looked upon as empty statements. I 
think they do have some content. But how and when and in what 
way we give effect to such a policy is something to be 
considered in the circumstances.
    Senator Carlson. In other words, we are operating right now 
from day to day. Do you, as the State Department, have any 
contingency plans? In other words, this situation to me based 
on your statement this morning, is very critical. What are your 
plans? Do you have plans that you could divulge as to what you 
are going to do tomorrow?
    Secretary Rusk. At present, quite frankly, no decisions 
have been made about actions to be taken by, say U.S. forces. 
But we have been consulting with all of the governments 
involved in the area, in the Security Council, those with the 
United Nations Emergency Force troops, the Soviet Union, and 
specifically with the British and the French on the situation 
and, of course, one has to think about various contingencies, 
but no decisions have been made.
    Senator Carlson. In other words, you are looking forward to 
if one thing happens tomorrow, that you have something serious, 
you would at least have in mind something you might be trying 
to do?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, yes, sir. But that depends upon what 
happens tomorrow and what the President's judgment in 
consultation with the leaders and others will be.

                   CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

    Senator Carlson. You mentioned consultation with the Soviet 
Union. I think we all agree around the table that they, no 
doubt, are deeply involved. They are practical international 
politicians.
    Have you analyzed what their stake would be, whether they 
should be with us as a nation; whether they should stay with us 
or go with the Far East internationally. Have you got any 
thoughts on that?
    Secretary Rusk. As to the Soviet Union?
    Senator Carlson. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. I think before you came in, Senator, I said 
that in our own consultations with them we get the impression 
that they would like to moderate the situation, but we get a 
different impression from Syria and from Cairo as to what the 
Soviet attitude is.
    Senator Carlson. They play both sides against the middle.
    Secretary Rusk. So either the Arabs are overstating what 
the Soviets have said or the Soviets are saying something 
rather different to them than they are to us. But we are 
talking further with them and we will try to clarify that 
point.
    Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Gore?
    Senator Lausche?
    Senator Lausche. Here is Senator Gore.
    The Chairman. I thought you had gone.
    Senator Gore. I changed my seat the better to hear what the 
chairman was saying.
    The Chairman. I looked down and I thought you were gone.

                           SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

    Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, I share many of the feelings 
expressed by members, but I would suggest there would be danger 
in any equivocation on our part. I do not wish to elaborate 
upon it except to say that because of the tripartite agreement, 
because of the statements of the President, because of the 
domestic political pressures in this country, the chances are 
overwhelming that this country would not see Israel destroyed. 
I doubt if it would be in the interests of our Executive to 
leave any question about that open to conjecture. That is all I 
wish to suggest.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Senator Williams?

                           UNILATERAL ACTION

    Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, in the event the worse 
developed, and they did invade Israel, would we act 
unilaterally or would we wait for the United Nations, insist 
upon France and Great Britain joining us?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, you understand that this is the 
most serious of all questions in this situation, and I am a 
little reluctant to try to anticipate what the President would 
feel we ought to do in a particular situation of that sort.
    One thing that I can assure you of and that is that every 
possible effort will be made to see that any action that is 
taken or becomes necessary will be taken by a maximum number of 
countries, and we fully supported what Senator Mansfield said 
earlier about the very serious disabilities and difficulties of 
unilateral action by us in this situation.
    Senator Williams. That is all.
    Secretary Rusk. There are a considerable number of--just to 
illustrate the point, Senator, there are a considerable number 
of maritime nations who have tremendous interests in the 
principle of the international character of the Straits there, 
the Straits of Tiran, and they certainly ought to be interested 
in that if anybody is going to have to do anything about it.
    Senator Williams. That is all.
    The Chairman. Senator Lausche?

                           CREATION OF ISRAEL

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, I would like to set down in 
chronological order the statements made by the Presidents and 
Secretary Dulles, the resolution of 1957, so that the record 
will show what has been done in the past with respect to this 
problem.
    It looks to me that the material that was discussed today, 
attempting to show what our obligations are, begin with the 
tripartite declaration regarding security in the Near East 
dated May 25, 1950. Am I correct in that understanding?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, sir, in order to complete 
the record one would need to refer back to President Truman's 
very strong role in assisting in the creation of the State of 
Israel and certain things that he said at that time.
    For example, in a speech at Madison Square Garden on 
October 28, 1948----
    Senator Lausche. October 28, 1948?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    Senator Lausche. What did Truman say?
    Secretary Rusk.

    I wish to speak now upon a subject that has been of great 
interest to me as your President. It is the subject of Israel. 
Now, this is a most important subject and must not be resolved 
as a matter of politics during a political campaign. I have 
refused consistently to play politics with that question. I 
have refused--as a matter of fact, there was at that time 
campaign sort of an agreement between the two sides to try to 
keep this out. I have the impression it sort of broke out into 
the campaign in the last few days, but I remember that very 
well because Mr. Foster Dulles who was also involved in it on 
the other side. But to resume:
    I have refused, first, because it is my responsibility to 
see that our policy in Israel fits in with our foreign policy 
throughout the world; second, it is my desire to help build in 
Palestine a strong, prosperous, free, and independent 
democratic state. It must be large enough, free enough, and 
strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure.

    Now, there may have been other statements, but I think we 
should refer to the Truman administration's role.
    Senator Lausche. What is that date?
    Secretary Rusk. October 28, 1948.

                         HIGH STATE OF TENSION

    Senator Lausche. Well, then follows the tripartite 
declaration of May 25, 1950, and at this point I want to read 
into the record the substantive language embracing the 
declaration of the three countries:

    The three governments take this opportunity of declaring 
their deep interest in and their desire to promote the 
establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the 
area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or 
threat of force between any of the states in that area. The 
three governments, should they find that any of the states was 
preparing to violate the frontiers or armistice lines, would, 
consistently with their obligations as members of the United 
Nations, immediately take action, but within and outside the 
United Nations, to prevent such violations.

    What was the background with respect to which this 
declaration was made?
    Secretary Rusk. That had to do with the high state of 
tension that existed with the state of Israel in relation to 
its frontiers and the attempts by the Arabs to upset the de 
facto frontiers that had been established at the time of the 
creation of Israel.
    Senator Lausche. I now go to the next item that has been 
mentioned here this morning, and this is dated February 11, 
1957. It is an aide memoire handed to Israel's Ambassador Abba 
Eban by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
    Secretrary Rusk. I think, sir, if you are establishing a 
little chronology it might be useful to insert here a section 
from a radio address by Secretary of State Dulles on June 1, 
1953, in which he reaffirmed the tripartite declaration of 
1950.
    Senator Lausche. All right.

                    OCCUPATION OF TIRAN AND SENAFIR

    I want to read here what material was already read:

    The United States recalls that on January 28, 1950, the 
Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States 
that the Egyptian occupation of the two islands of Tiran and 
Senafir at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba was only to 
protect the islands themselves against possible damage or 
violation and that this occupation being in no way conceived in 
a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through the 
stretch of water separating these two islands from the Egyptian 
coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only 
practical one, will remain free as in the past, in conformity 
with international practice and recognized principles of the 
law of nations.
    In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, 
as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on 
behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to 
exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join 
with others to secure general recognition of its right.

    Are these two islands the ones that are now occupied by 
Nasser to block ingress and egress?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. But, you see, the United Nations force 
had a contingent of Swedes on the mainland just opposite the 
straits in order to prevent the possibility that the Egyptians 
might emplace artillery there and try to stop passage through 
the Straits. That United Nations force has now been withdrawn.
    Senator Lausche. Yes. All right.

                       THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

    Now I get down to the Middle East resolution as amended, 
which was passed on March 9, 1957. Am I correct that this 
resolution, under date of March 9, 1957, follows all of the 
other declarations and resolutions which we, you and I, have 
thus far discussed?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. This particular one----
    Senator Lausche. I think it does.
    Secretary Rusk. This particular resolution was aimed at 
aggression by countries under Communist domination.
    Senator Lausche. That is correct.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. After the statements by Dulles, after the 
tripartite declaration, after the statement by Truman, this 
resolution was passed by the Congress of the United States.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. And in this resolution of March 9, 1957 it 
was stated, among other things:
    ``To this end, if the President determines the necessity 
thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to 
assist any nation or group of such nations requesting 
assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled 
by international communism,'' and the important aspect is to 
assist against aggression by any country controlled by 
international communism.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, Senator. But I think also 
the introduction to what you have just read does contain a 
declaration of a vital interest to the United States.
    Senator Lausche. All right; okay. Let me put the whole 
section in there.
    Has there been any other action taken by the Congress of 
the United States on this Middle East subject subsequent to 
this resolution of March 9, 1957?
    Secretary Rusk. Nothing comparable in terms of a specific 
resolution that I am aware of, Senator.
    Senator Lausche. So the last congressional declaration with 
respect to the Middle East is this resolution of March 9, 1957?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. I would not want to overlook the 
possibility that there is a good deal of preambular material in 
other legislation that has a bearing on the issues that could 
arise in the Near East, declarations----
    Senator Lausche. All right.

                      PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S POSITION

    Subsequent to March 9, 1957 we have had statements by 
Eisenhower and by Kennedy and Johnson.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Now, the pertinent one discussed here 
today was the statement made by President Kennedy in----
    Secretary Rusk. May 8, 1963.
    Senator Lausche. As a consequence of Kennedy's statement 
dealing with Israel and the Arab Republic, and the tripartite 
declaration, Prime Minister Macmillan was asked in the 
Parliament a certain question, and I will read:

    To ask the Prime Minister whether he will publicly 
associate Her Majesty's Government with the recent officially 
declared United States policy to the effect that, should Israel 
or any of the Arab States appear to violate frontiers of 
armistice lines, the United States of America will take 
immediate action both within and outside the United Nations to 
prevent such violation.

    That, in substance, what I have just read, is Kennedy's 
statement?
    Secretary Rusk. It was a summation. There is a slight 
difference in wording, but in substance, yes.
    Senator Lausche. Summation.
    Now, the United States Government received the following 
written reply from the Prime Minister.
    Secretary Rusk. No. This was an answer to a question--this 
is a question in the House of Commons.
    Senator Lausche. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. And the Prime Minister answered the 
question in the House of Commons.
    Senator Lausche. And this is how he answered.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. Yes, sir. I am glad to endorse the 
President's statement. Her Majesty's Government are deeply 
interested in peace and stability in this area, and are opposed 
to the use of force or the threat of force there as elsewhere 
in the world. We are equally opposed to the interference by any 
country in the internal affairs of another whether by the 
encouragement of subversion or by hostile propaganda.

    Now:

    I cannot say in advance what action we would take in a 
crisis since it is difficult to foresee the exact circumstances 
which might arise.

                         A STATE OF UNCERTAINTY

    My question is: Doesn't this last sentence leave the matter 
in a state of uncertainty because Macmillan says that he cannot 
say in advance what action ``we would take in a crisis since it 
is difficult to foresee the exact circumstances which might 
arise.''
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would not attach too much policy 
importance to that. I think any chief of government would be 
very reluctant to say in advance exactly what steps he might 
take.
    For example, in a NATO crisis, I think the President would 
be very reluctant to pin himself to a particular action even 
though the commitments of the treaty are to treat an attack on 
one as an attack on all.
    Senator Lausche. Is it correct to conclude that there is 
only one piece of direct legislation dealing with the subject, 
and that is the Middle East resolution of 1957? There may be, 
however, some preliminary statements in other official 
documents that may have a bearing upon it.
    Secretary Rusk. I will have this examined to see whether 
there are any direct references to the Middle East in other 
legislation which would have a bearing on the present 
situation.

                  HAVE THE UNITED NATIONS TAKE CONTROL

    Senator Lausche. Now, then, I want to conclude. In my 
opinion, every effort imaginable should be made to have the 
United Nations take control of this subject. No efforts should 
be spared toward the achievement of this end. This item is one 
peculiarly fitted for disposition by the United Nations.
    Two, our government should not, under any circumstances, 
take unilateral action in the matter.
    Three, we have to explore the ability to become involved 
beyond our already existing involvement in South Vietnam where 
we now have 425,000 men, I believe.
    Secretary Rusk. Somewhat more than that.
    Senator Lausche. 450,000.
    Senator Gore. Will the Senator yield; with a much less 
specific commitment than we have in Israel. I do not know how 
we can act unilaterally in one case and then say we will not 
act otherwise.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, would you repeat what you said? We 
ought to explore----
    [The statement of Senator Lausche was read by the reporter, 
as requested.]
    Senator Lausche. Four, I cannot approve the speed of U 
Thant and his failure to consult with the principal agencies of 
the United Nations in his action in withdrawing the United 
Nations troops from the area.
    I think that concludes it.
    The Chairman. Are you through?
    Senator Lausche. Yes.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt?

                 U THANT'S ABILITY TO ACT UNILATERALLY

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, I am glad that you came here 
to discuss our problems with us in advance of action being 
taken. I hope this becomes a precedent.
    I recall what happened in Vietnam. I was not here when you 
came before the committee, but I think this is a proper 
function of the advise and consent constitutional 
responsibility which we have.
    We are in a war now, and all foreign wars are bad. A two-
front war is always bad no matter where you fight it, and it 
seems to me a two-continent war at the same time is almost 
beyond the power of the mind of man to comprehend as to the 
status of his country. So I share Senator Lausche's conviction 
that you should proceed with all force and vigor to put before 
the United Nations the moment of truth. If there ever was a 
controversy which it can solve, this ought to be it.
    Up to now they have done a very commendable job, I think, 
in maintaining this peace force. I do not know enough about the 
Constitution of the U.N. to know whether U Thant can, by a 
simple statement of one man, pull out this peacekeeping group 
properly as he did or whether it was actually beyond his 
authority. It seems to me there must be some authority in the 
U.N. greater than U Thant that could put it back into being by 
some kind of action.
    Am I right or am I wrong?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have had a very sharp discussion 
with him on just this point. He claimed, on the advice of his 
lawyers, that he had both a duty and a responsibility to act as 
he did. We felt he had an obligation to bring this to the 
General Assembly or the Security Council before he answered.
    Senator Mundt. Assuming he is right--I doubt that he was 
right--but assuming that he was right, isn't there some plenary 
power in the U.N. that is stronger than his that can put them 
in by a United Nations act?
    Secretary Rusk. I think there is undoubtedly power under 
the charter. The Security Council clearly has such authority of 
action. That is vulnerable to the Soviet veto.
    It is our view, as you know the Soviets disagree with this, 
that the General Assembly also has such power if the Security 
Council is unable to act. That could bring a direct clash 
between the U.N., as such, and Egypt as such if Egypt said, 
``No, you are not going to have your troops on our territory,'' 
so they are going to have to fight for themselves if Egypt 
should resist.
    But all things exist in between, and did not give U Thant a 
chance to search for it, and this is our strong complaint. 
There are things in between.

                    IS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE POSSIBLE

    Senator Mundt. I would assume correctly that there was some 
claim, a valid claim by the U.N., that it should not be on one 
side of the border. Is it possible to have a demilitarized 
zone, so to speak, to include part of the Israeli border and 
part of the Egyptian border and part of all neighboring 
borders?
    Secretary Rusk. Prime Minister Eshkol proposed just 
yesterday that the two armies withdraw from the border, and I 
would suppose he would have no objection if U.N. observers and 
inspectors were able to insure that this, in fact, occurred.
    Senator Mundt. Why was this curious arrangement made in the 
first place that the peace force should be on one side of the 
border?
    Secretary Rusk. This was part of the settlement of the so-
called Suez affair, and this was worked out that way because, 
as a part of the settlement, Israel withdrew its very 
substantial forces from many places deep in the Sinai 
Peninsula. So this was part of the settlement at the time, and 
if there was any inequity about it in a theoretical sense, the 
fact is it was a part of a settlement of the Suez business.
    Senator Mundt. Were we in on the settlement?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, as a member of the U.N., and 
worked out in the U.N., as you will recall.
    Senator Mundt. Wouldn't it have been better, looking 
forward and learning from mistakes in the past, if we are going 
to have a peace patrol, is it not better to have it on both 
sides of the border so that one cantankerous fellow cannot 
throw them out, just throw out the part on his side and have a 
shield there?
    Secretary Rusk. I think as a general proposition there is 
some merit in that idea.

                            AMERICAN OPTIONS

    Senator Mundt. What are our options in this? Are we 
committed, obligated, by specific treaties to go in and handle 
this thing alone if the worst comes to worse?
    Secretary Rusk. No, there is no treaty.
    Senator Mundt. Are we obligated by any other----
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would say this, that the United 
Nations Charter, Article 51, clearly says that ``Nothing in 
this charter prevents the exercise of individual and collective 
self-defense,'' and that would give any nation the right to 
exercise its self-defense and to call upon others who are 
willing to help in that self-defense.
    Senator Mundt. I understand that. But do we have any moral, 
specific or legal commitment by treaty or any other device, 
administrative or legislative, which obligates us to go in 
alone if worst comes to worst?
    Secretary Rusk. That is a matter of how this nation would 
respond to the policy declaration made by four Presidents 
pointing to our interest in the security of the states of the 
Near East, both the Arab States and Israel, and we have said 
these things rather specifically about Israel.
    Senator Mundt. Have we ever said if trouble breaks out and 
nobody else comes to the rescue, the United States will get up 
an expeditionary force and send them in alone?
    Secretary Rusk. No, we have not.
    Senator Mundt. Then the answer is negative.
    Secretary Rusk. The answer was read by Senator Lausche. We 
would take action within and outside the U.N.
    Senator Mundt. Which we certainly are prepared to do.

                        IF WORST COMES TO WORST

    This committee would be prepared to support with the U.N., 
or with the British and the French, and a reasonable number of 
associate members of the U.N. But the question we confront, it 
seems to me, the only place where we have got a real problem to 
solve, is what do we do if worst comes to worst? That is the 
question; that is where we are--you, the President, and us. We 
have not had much success with the British and French fighting 
communism in Asia.
    Secretary Rusk. I hope the gentlemen of this committee will 
be thinking and worrying about that question because that 
contingency could arise. We are doing everything we can to 
prevent that question from arising. But that question could 
arise, and so everyone ought to be thinking about it, certainly 
everyone in the Executive Branch is.
    Senator Mundt. You ought to be thinking about it now 
because it is happening awfully fast. You pick up the newspaper 
and see that Egypt has gone into this area, or Syria, which 
seems to be even more irresponsible than Egypt, might go in, so 
there you are confronted with a snap judgment.
    Is there something we are going to read about in the 
newspaper that the President has decided that troops are on 
their way, or are you coming back to Congress, or what are our 
obligations? As I understand your answer, and I want to be sure 
I am right, we have not any moral, legal obligation to go on 
our own.
    Secretary Rusk. I am not sure----
    Senator Mundt. We have an option to make.
    Secretary Rusk. I said we do not have a precise treaty 
commitment on this situation other than, say, in the United 
Nations Charter. I would not be prepared this morning to say we 
do not have a moral obligation or we might not have other kinds 
of obligations in view of the role played in the establishment 
of Israel and the statement made by four Presidents. Those are 
things you will have to weigh. I would not say we do not have a 
moral right.

                       CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS

    Senator Mundt. What I am trying to get at, are we having a 
discussion for the fun of it because we already have some 
obligations that you are going to act on as an administration 
regardless of what the attitude is, or are you really 
consulting?
    Secretary Rusk. My understanding of the President's view is 
that he would, of course, be in touch with the leadership if 
any action were required in the situation, and he and the 
leadership would then discuss this problem as far as the 
Congress was concerned. But since I had the privilege of being 
before this committee today, I am sure the President is going 
to be extremely interested in knowing what the reaction of the 
members of the committee is.
    I would not look upon this as the President's formal 
consultation with the Congress.
    This is a fast-moving situation, and we have to move fast 
and do whatever such consultation suggested we ought to do. But 
this is not the last chance of the Congress to consult.
    Senator Mundt. This is not the last incident to break out. 
We may find the same kind of thing coming up with Rhodesia, and 
there are other troubled areas. I think it is kind of 
interesting to sort of hammer out the rules of the game now. 
There are a lot of people around the Senate who have been 
arguing about the rules of the game surrounding Vietnam. That 
is five years old. I happened to have participated.

                            THE USE OF FORCE

    But here now we are looking ahead, and we ought to have the 
rules of the game, in my opinion, clearly understood between 
the Congress and the administration. That is why I am pressing 
to see whether or not the door is already closed. Certain 
contingencies trigger off certain actions initiated by the 
President, and then we are told about it in a message 24 hours 
after the troops are in a war.
    Secretary Rusk. I think perhaps that occurred in the 
Dominican Republic affair because of the time period. But I 
think in these other matters we have had a lot of consultation.
    Senator Mundt. Do you and your studies----
    The Chairman. I wonder if the Senator will allow, before he 
leaves that, if the Secretary would be willing to give us what 
his recommendation was on this point.
    Senator Mundt. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. You mean on the question of consultation?
    The Chairman. No, on the question of the use of force. You 
said, and I am only trying to clarify what you do, you are 
making a very important point, just what is our obligation. You 
finally said a moral obligation, you believed, and not a treaty 
obligation. Is that correct?
    Secretary Rusk. I said I did not want to say today we did 
not have a moral obligation.
    The Chairman. I assume it may be said that we have a moral 
obligation; is that correct?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. What your own recommendation will be if it 
comes, as he says, would you be willing to go that far?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I really think I owe that to the 
President in the first instance. I really do not think I ought 
to go into that at this point.
    The Chairman. I only wanted to go as far as we could. Okay.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand.

                CONSULTATION WITH BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP

    Senator Mundt. When you say the President would consult 
with the leadership, are you talking about the Foreign 
Relations Com-
    Secretary Rusk. We have not, the President has not told me 
what his own thoughts would be. He is----
    Senator Mundt. You could tell us what your thoughts would 
be.
    Secretary Rusk. I would think that the consultation with 
the bipartisan leadership, the question of what action, if any, 
what kind of further consultation with members of Congress, the 
House and the Senate, would be indicated in a situation of this 
sort. The leadership would want to take into account the prime 
factors, the nature of the action.
    I could imagine, for example, if a large number of maritime 
nations said that ``We are not going to accept closing of the 
Straits of Tiran,'' the likelihood would be or the possibility 
would be that that particular situation would be isolated from 
the rest of the area, and that would be one thing.
    But if the situation looked as if it was moving into 
general hostilities that would be quite another thing. So I 
think this is a matter on which the President would be in touch 
with the leadership, and in that consultation would be the 
question of how to consult with the Congress in an appropriate 
way as the situation develops.

                        SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

    Senator Mundt. Do you in your rationale see any connection 
between this action inspired, I believe it is, by Russia, a 
Communist complex in the Middle East, and the situation in 
which we are involved in Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, I do not see any connection 
myself. We do not have any evidence that the Russians were at 
the bottom of this. There are enough obvious and good reasons 
in the area to----
    Senator Mundt. Then they should not veto Security Council 
action.
    Secretary Rusk. What is important here--Mr. Chairman, may 
Mr. Macomber tell the committee what he just told me about the 
informal meeting of the Security Council members?
    The Chairman. Certainly.
    Mr. Macomber. This informal meeting was attended by all 
members of the Security Council except the Communist members.
    Senator Mundt. This morning.
    Mr. Macomber. This morning, an informal meeting, and 
Ambassador Goldberg has just called Secretary Rusk's office to 
report. The non-permanent members, the non-Communist members 
that were present urged that a meeting take place attended by 
the U.S., U.K., France, and the Soviet Union. Ambassador 
Goldberg said we were prepared to attend such a meeting and the 
British said they would be prepared to attend such a meeting. 
The French representative said he would be prepared in 
principle to attend such a meeting. He is checking with Paris, 
but he assumed he could come.
    At that point the non-permanent members of the Security 
Council took off to go consult with the Russians to urge that 
they come and they are hoping to set up this quadripartite 
meeting at 12 noon today.
    We have not got final word back from the French or word 
back from the Soviets yet, but they are hoping to have a 
meeting at 12 o'clock up there of the Soviet Union, France, 
U.K., and United States to discuss this situation.

              WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE SAYING TO THE SOVIETS

    Secretary Rusk. It is my impression from Paris, the talk we 
had in Paris, they would welcome a quadripartite discussion.
    Senator Mundt. If by noon, if the Soviets come into the 
meeting, you might be correct there is no relationship. If they 
do not, I think it could be.
    Secretary Rusk. They may not come for a variety of reasons. 
In the first place they may not be able to get instructions by 
noon. So he may not wish to do anything without instructions.
    Senator Mundt. Allowing for time.
    Secretary Rusk. But the real answer to your question will 
come from what the Russians are really saying to the Syrians 
and the Egyptians. For example, both Syria and Egypt have sort 
of indicated the Russians have said that they would support 
them. But it would be very important to know whether that would 
be in the event of an Israeli attack, or would support them for 
the so-called ``Holy War'' against Israel.
    There is a tremendous difference between those two 
situations and we may have something more during the course of 
the day on what the Russians are saying to us directly on this 
subject.
    Senator Mundt. I do not want to take any more time. Let me 
just cap it off by saying, as far as I am concerned, I think 
this is a multilateral challenge.
    The Chairman. Speak the least bit louder, please.
    Senator Mundt. This is a multilateral challenge which 
should be met multilaterally and we should not move in on our 
own precipitously getting ourselves committed and then come in 
with a fait accompli without a chance to look at the whole 
picture.

                           THE ROLE OF FRANCE

    Senator Aiken. You do not believe France would desert 
Israel completely, do you Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Rusk. Beg pardon, sir?
    Senator Aiken. France would not desert Israel at this 
stage, would they?
    Secretary Rusk. If I were speaking for the corporate body 
called France, I would think, I would say, that I cannot 
imagine that France would. But when you ask me precisely about 
what President de Gaulle as an individual would do, which is 
France now for all practical purposes, I cannot be all that 
sure, Senator, quite frankly at that point.
    Senator Williams. He would have no objections to our taking 
the burden alone if we were foolish enough to do it.
    Secretary Rusk. I would have serious objections?
    Senator Williams. No, de Gaulle.
    Secretary Rusk. France. I am not sure of this in this case. 
France and Israel have been very close to each other in a 
variety of ways. Some of you on the Joint Committee will 
understand some of the ways in which they have been close to 
each other. So I am not at all sure of that.
    Senator Aiken. Yes.

                          NASSER'S INTENTIONS

    The Chairman. Could I ask one following question? You said 
you did not see any connection with Vietnam. Do you think 
really Nasser would have acted as he has if we were not pre-
occupied with Vietnam? Would he have dared do it?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, I think--in the first place I am not 
sure what he has in mind doing. If he is moving his troops up 
to the frontier and this is a rather exaggerated and pretty 
dangerous game of bluff, that is one thing. If he is talking 
about real hostilities, he has got plenty of problems with the 
forces facing him right there in Israel, quite apart from what 
we do.
    I do not believe Nasser--well, I will be surprised if 
Nasser underestimates what Israel could do, say in the first 30 
days in this situation. I just do not believe this is a major 
part of it, Senator, quite frankly.
    The Chairman. Senator Symington.
    Secretary Rusk. I can be wrong, of course. I have been 
wrong before.

                     UNITED STATES IS OVEREXTENDED

    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, first I want to thank you 
for your assistance and your courtesy and constant method of 
keeping us informed on this rapidly developing situation. I, in 
turn, have been very grateful for it.
    Naturally I am more interested in this part of the world 
inasmuch as I am chairman of the subcommittee, and I would just 
like to report that after coming back from Europe a year ago I 
said as a result of this more recent trip to Europe these 
observations and conclusions I reached last January appear at 
least as sound today.
    It may be difficult to decide whether or not the United 
States is overcommitted politically or overextended from a 
fiscal standpoint. But if military commitments are an important 
part of political and economic commitments, then this nation is 
overextended in all three categories.
    Rich and powerful though we are, the U.S. cannot continue 
indefinitely to both finance and defend the so-called free 
world with such little support from our friends and allies. 
They should live up to their commitments as we have to ours.
    In addition, unless we change the normalcy approach now 
characteristic of our policies and programs incident to 
handling these worldwide commitments, there should be a 
reduction in the nature and scope of these commitments, and 
even some reductions would be desirable.
    Under current plans and programs there is little chance of 
maintaining adequately trained personnel, military personnel, 
to handle our present world commitments even if those 
commitments do not involve us in further trouble in some other 
parts of the world.
    That was a letter that I sent to Chairman Fulbright and 
Chairman Russell upon returning from Europe about a year ago.
    I would like to ask just a couple of questions here. I 
would just like to make this statement: Based on the recent 
activities of Mr. U Thant, I am somewhat surprised at the 
tremendous effort that we joined in in keeping him in as 
Secretary General of the United Nations. For what it is worth, 
I would like to just present that observation.

                   U.S. NAVAL STRENGTH IN MIDDLE EAST

    Now, do you know, is any of the Seventh Fleet south of the 
Suez Canal?
    Secretary Rusk. The Sixth Fleet.
    Senator Symington. Sixth Fleet, I mean.
    Secretary Rusk. We have----
    Senator Symington. The Seventh is in Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. We have some destroyers in the Red Sea 
area.
    Senator Symington. In the Red Sea area.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Symington. How many have we got?
    Secretary Rusk. I would have to double check that. I think 
three.
    Senator Symington. Any submarines?
    Secretary Rusk. I would have to look. But our principal 
forces are the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
    Senator Symington. We have cannibalized some of our 
equipment of the Sixth Fleet because of Vietnam. Has that been 
taken into consideration? Presumably it would be.
    Secretary Rusk. I am sure it would be. I am not familiar 
with the facts on that, Senator.

             ANTICIPATION OF A BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG HARBOR

    Senator Symington. Do you feel that there might be, 
inasmuch as we have been kicking around the question of 
blockading the Haiphong harbor, where some people feel we 
should, other people believe we should not. It is now on the 
record publicly the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe we should 
take the harbor out on some basis--blockade it, bomb it, mine 
it--and the Administration does not. Do you think there is any 
chance that the Russians have got a ploy going on with Nasser 
so that a position we take in what we do with respect to this 
port they can put back on us with respect to Haiphong?
    Secretary Rusk. We see no evidence of it, Senator, but 
since we do not see any evidence one way or the other, I just 
do not know. This is a matter of what maybe a half dozen people 
in the Kremlin say to themselves, and that is the crucial 
information which is so difficult for us to get. No one has 
mentioned this to us. There has been no indication by the 
Soviets they are linking this in any way with Vietnam, so I 
just cannot answer your question, quite frankly, sir.

               RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM AND ISRAEL

    Senator Symington. Well, now my final question, which I 
might want to expand on: We know that we have a limited number 
of trained military personnel, at least in some categories, 
that comes up time and again before the Armed Services 
Committee and the Preparedness Subcommittee. If you had to make 
a choice as to which country, from the standpoint of the 
interests of the United States, is more important to defend, 
Vietnam or Israel, which country would you say was the more 
important?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would not want to assign a 
priority between those at this point. I do feel we have a great 
interest--the Congress has declared our vital interest in both 
the Near East and in Southeast Asia. I think that priority 
between the two would not be for me to assess at this point.

                            HAWKS VS. DOVES

    Senator Symington. The question behind the question is if 
there was a boat that was going to be built, or a ship I should 
say if there are any Navy people present, Senator Pell, and it 
was going to sort of be a boat, a ship, that we could put 
around the world and tanks and Marines would pour over 
anywhere, a police action, and it was recommended by the 
Defense Department.
    In this case, both the so-called Hawks and their leaders 
and so-called Doves and their leaders united and said, ``The 
hell with this. We have had enough with this. No such ship 
shall be built because, in effect, it guarantees that the 
United States wants to police the world,'' and that was the 
position taken by the Senate and it was stricken out of the 
bill, and there was surprisingly little support for it on the 
part of the House when it came up in conference.
    So that to me is the first time that I have seen, you might 
say the Hawks and the Doves or the various grades of those two 
birds together as saying, ``In any case, let's not go any 
further in this concept of unilateral policing of the world by 
the United States,'' because probably one reason is we have not 
got enough trained people.
    Another might be we have not got enough money. In that 
case, let me put the question to you in a different way: Is 
there not an excellent possibility that even though you would 
not want to make that choice because of the nature of our 
commitments, no reserve call-ups, no guard call-ups, no 
arbitrary limitations of wages or prices, no recognition of the 
fact that we are in a major war, whether we like it or not?
    The Senator from Ohio brought out we have 450,000 troops or 
thereabouts in Vietnam; we have killed over 10,000 Americans; 
over 60,000 have been wounded. This is a major war, in addition 
to which we are very badly short--this is an executive hearing, 
I am sure--of certain types and character of trained military 
personnel that are essential to the successful prosecution of 
any war anywhere regardless of terrain. So might it not be 
necessary for you to make this choice, unless you want to get 
into a nuclear war which, of course, would bring up other 
problems?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not believe that it is 
important for the United States to be the world's policeman and 
I have tried to emphasize that on a number of occasions. We do 
have some specific commitments and any president or future 
president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, and the 
future congresses may be faced from time to time with 
situations in different parts of the world in which simply as a 
matter of prudence and national interest we will do one thing 
rather than another.
    I think this pre-disposes any secretary of state to hope 
that we could have maximum mobility in our Armed Forces in 
order to give the United States in the future some choices, 
some options.

               VIETNAM RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. POWER

    Senator Symington. I understand that, but this LDL ship, 
nobody could see why it was being built at very heavy cost 
unless it was to police the world or the concept of it. And, 
secondly, you yourself have been very frank with the committee. 
You have told us that we have got, I think your figure was, 40 
military commitments around the world.
    For many months now I have been saying look out about 
Vietnam. I am not one of these playboys and never have been--
either we should shove this war ahead or get out of it. As long 
as we are in the ring with 200 million people, a $750 billion 
year gross national product, spending $2.5 billion a month 
chasing these little people around the woods, the longer we are 
in this ring, the audience, which in this case is the world, is 
beginning to doubt we have any real power. Therefore, when the 
question is asked, as I believe it was, do you think that 
Vietnam is the reason for Nasser--I know that you have little 
respect for my opinion just as you know I have great respect 
for yours--I would think it is a very pertinent question.
    It is my personal impression after having spent a 
considerable time in Jordan, Israel, Greece and Egypt, in South 
Vietnam, the question is pertinent and true. I happen to think 
it is, because of the way we control our power in this war, and 
I am not talking about any bombing of civilians or nuclear 
weapons. I am just talking about trying to obtain success by a 
full application of our power. A lot of the countries in the 
world, I hate to say this about my own country, they are the 
audience with ringside seats, and they said, ``We thought this 
was a great powerful country. Throw the bum out. He has been in 
the ring now for years and he is not getting anywhere.'' The 
result is that you have got this simmering all over Europe and 
all over the Middle East. You have got the Iranian situation. 
We have had some very interesting testimony on that in this 
subcommittee.

                    NATO SHOULD PLAY MORE OF A ROLE

    So I ask with great sincerity: First, do you not think we 
have got to make a choice between Israel and Vietnam, unless we 
have very hearty support from the other members of the 
tripartite agreement? Secondly, which one is the most important 
to the security of the United States, because I know we will 
both agree you should not send American boys now especially 
when we draft them and they fight and die, unless you believe 
in your heart, as I believe you do, that it does involve the 
security of the United States?
    Secretary Rusk. As I indicated, Senator, I would not want 
to try to make a choice between the two, but I would add one 
postscript to what you said, because it also fits some comments 
made here this morning.
    We feel that the NATO countries on the other side of the 
Atlantic ought to take a much more serious interest in these 
places that are 20 minutes jet flying time away from NATO 
Europe, and a good many of them are now doing so. I pressed 
this very hard at the last ministerial meeting of NATO and 
still there is some reluctance in NATO to get concerned about 
the Near East and even Africa, this huge continent, just across 
the water there from NATO, Europe.
    Senator Symington. Is that not because they feel it is 
better to not let George do it but let Uncle Sam do it, based 
on the record?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have been trying to disabuse them 
of that in those places where one or more of the western 
countries are pulling out.
    Senator Mundt. Will the Senator yield?
    Senator Symington. I will be glad to yield.

                        IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT

    Senator Mundt. The Senator from Missouri brought up a point 
which has been troubling me increasingly in the last several 
months. I think he expresses a concern which I have when he 
implied that since we have made the decisions as a country that 
we are not going to accept defeat in Vietnam, and I have 
supported that fully, are we not reaching a stage in five years 
of indecisive fighting where the longer we delay defeating the 
enemy the less significant our victory is going to be in terms 
of the world. That is what concerns me.
    If finally we, as the greatest country in the world, cannot 
succeed in stopping the fighting in half a country which is 
completely non-industrialized, are we going to win any credits 
from the world if we delay this victory interminably?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, we have tried in all 
administrations since 1945 to deal with crises in such a way 
that it would result in a peace and not lead into a general 
conflagration. There was restraint at the time of the Greek 
guerrillas, the Berlin airlift, Korea, Lebanon, an attempt to 
get the Suez matter under control very quickly.
    We kept the doors wide open for the peaceful removal of 
missiles in Cuba.
    It is true in Southeast Asia we waited five years before we 
bombed North Vietnam. It is not entirely clear that enlarging 
in any significant way the level of violence would bring it to 
an end sooner.
    You might have a much larger conflagration on your hands, 
and this is something on which a judgment has to be made and 
the greatest issues ride on it, of course.

                     ECONOMIC ISSUES IN MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be on the 
floor to say something. But I would like to make one more 
observation on this, if I may: As I see it, the security of the 
United States and its well being has three legs to that 
platform--one is military, one is political, and one is 
economic. The economic is not talked about much. It is 
dismissed quite casually by the Defense Department. However, at 
Bretton Woods we tied the pound in just as tight with gold as 
we did the dollar.
    Whether it was right or wrong, it was done. Based on my 
knowledge of it, I do not see how the British economy could 
survive without its Mid East oil income and, therefore, it is 
very difficult for me to think that you all in the State 
Department in our relationship with Great Britain and with all 
that is involved in Europe today incident to the Common Market 
and EFTA, it is very difficult for me not to think that the 
Middle East is not considerably more important than Vietnam as 
far as the basic security involving the United States is 
concerned.
    However, I would like to associate myself with the chairman 
of this committee and other members who are anxious not to 
pursue this one unilaterally. I think we have a choice to make.
    Secretary Rusk. I see. Thank you.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your 
patience.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Clark.

             RUSSIA IS THE KEY TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, you have been kind enough to 
ask us for our advice and our consent in this difficult matter, 
and I would like to make the following comments which I have 
incidentally written out and given to Bill Macomber.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Clark. In the first place, I concur with the views 
of the chairman and Senator Mansfield, Senator Lausche and 
Senator Mundt, and, perhaps, a number of others, that by all 
means we should take this to the United Nations and not act 
unilaterally.
    In the second place, while I do agree that U Thant acted 
precipitously and possibly even unwisely in pulling the U.N. 
peace force out of Egypt, I do not share your possible 
disillusionment with him. I think he is our one peace force in 
this situation if we are going to rely on the United Nations at 
this time.
    In the third place, in my opinion, Russia is the key to 
peace in the Middle East, and I would hope that all the force 
of our most skillful counseling can be brought to bear not only 
at the United Nations but Moscow and Washington to persuade 
Russia, with almost the same urgency we did at the time of the 
missile crisis, that they should cooperate with us in 
stabilizing the situation to bring about peace.
    In my opinion, France and England, noble allies though they 
are, are going to be weak reeds in this situation. Their 
military power is pretty eroded, and their zeal and interest in 
this area may be keen enough, although I do not believe it will 
be effective. While I am sure we need their votes in the 
Security Council, I would not feel that they were reeds that we 
could rely on with much hope of having anything very successful 
come out of it.

                       LEGALITIES ARE UNIMPORTANT

    Next, in my opinion the legalities are relatively 
unimportant. I do not think it is the kind of a situation where 
you make a good legal case before the International Court of 
Justice or anywhere else. Having been a lawyer myself, I say 
that with some hesitation, but I think pragmatically the 
legalities are relatively unimportant.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, would you illustrate that last 
point a little bit as to an example or two?
    Senator Clark. Well, some have gone back to the 1950 
agreements.
    Secretary Rusk. I see.
    Senator Clark. Some have talked about the tripartite 
agreement.
    Secretary Rusk. Right.
    Senator Clark. Sure, I know if you are going to make a case 
for posterity that is important. But pragmatically it seems to 
me it would be mildly ineffectual.
    Secretary Rusk. I see.
    Senator Clark. Next, it seems to me that the American 
people will not permit the Israelis, to use the old cliche, and 
I know it is a cliche, to be driven into the sea. This is a 
pragmatic political fact we have to take into account, whether 
we agree with it or not, and I happen to agree with it.
    Next, I would think that our objectives, which in a 
situation where obviously our reach may exceed our grasp, but 
our objective should be, first, to get the U.N. force back into 
the Gaza Strip, if possible, on both sides of the frontier. I 
have no patience with Israel for having refused to let the 
forces on their side of the frontier.
    Secondly, we should try to persuade the Israelis not to 
engage in any reprisals against Syria in return for the 
Egyptians reopening the straits.
    Then I would work very hard to create an effective U.N. 
peace force of the same magnitude as the force that is in the 
Gaza Strip to move between Israel and Jordan and between Israel 
and Syria in the hope that its presence there, considerably 
more force than what has been there before, would be in a 
position to seal the border against these raids, full well 
realizing they could not seal it a hundred percent, but maybe 
they could seal it 85 percent.
    Then, I would hope, and there is----
    Secretary Rusk. This is on the Syrian, Jordan and Lebanese 
borders as well as Egypt.
    Senator Clark. I do not know about Lebanon, but certainly 
Syria and Jordan and I would hope--and maybe this is just a 
pious hope--that we could maybe persuade the Russians to 
guarantee maybe with us, hopefully through the Security Council 
and the U.S., the existing Israeli borders.
    I know that Bill Macomber has read and perhaps you have 
seen my report on war or peace in the Middle East. I remain 
convinced that the long-range objective must be, first, to get 
rid of Nasser and try to refurbish the Egyptian economy with an 
international consortium which hopefully could rely on some 
less belligerent Egyptian. Whether they will or not I do not 
know.
    My own view is that the Egyptian economy is on its way to 
disaster.

                 STOP THE ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    And finally, in order to do any of this, we have got to 
persuade the Russians to stop the arms race in the Middle East, 
which I imagine they are very reluctant to do. But it does seem 
to me we ought to make it clear to them that they are playing 
with fire.
    Thank you.
    Secretary Rusk. We have taken up that last point with them 
on a number of occasions. They have shown no interest in 
discussing the conventional arms race. They would be interested 
in a denuclearization of the area. But we have gone at them 
many times on that and it is a great shame they have not been 
willing to join. I agree with you.
    Senator Clark. We just have to keep trying, Mr. Secretary.
    Senator Lausche. Will you yield to a question?
    Senator Clark. I am all through.

                 U.N. FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE

    Senator Lausche. Does your statement suggest that U.N. 
forces be placed on both sides of the line?
    Senator Clark. Yes.
    Senator Lausche. In Israel, in Syria, and in Jordan and the 
Gaza Strip.
    Senator Clark. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Senator Clark.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell.
    Senator Pell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

                       NAVAL RIGHTS IN THE STRAIT

    I find myself in agreement very much with Senator Lausche 
and Senator Clark and others that we should not get ourselves 
in a unilateral position, whereas we recognize the special 
relationship of the United States with Israel and this is on 
the horns of a dilemma on which we are, and there is nothing 
much we can do about it except do as much as possible to push 
it towards the U.N.
    One question here in connection with the closing of the 
strait, international law does come into this, and I believe 
that the width of that strait is more than the six nautical 
miles. I do not see how we can possibly accept the fact that 
the Egyptians say they can close the strait, because then many 
other waterways around the world could then be closed. I would 
think this in itself would be action to put ships in there.
    Secretary Rusk. I have asked for a further report on that 
factual matter, and my first report was that the territorial 
waters of Saudi Arabia and Egypt converge at the point where 
ships have to go through. It is somewhat a little bit like one 
part of the Strait of Malacca. You do have to go through waters 
as an international passageway which otherwise would be 
territorial waters, but I cannot confirm that at the moment.
    It may have to do with those islands and extension of 
territorial waters beyond the islands.
    Senator Pell. This is a point that can open up in many 
other parts of the globe if you once permit any nation to do 
that which has a strong naval power.
    Secretary Rusk. This would be a strong power 
internationally if Egypt would be able to establish this was 
not an international waterway.
    Senator Pell. We would have to close up some waters in 
Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula. We would justify sending our 
own ships into it.

                       A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE

    Another question of the Security Council, has any request 
been made to hold a session of it and be seized of the problem?
    Secretary Rusk. Did you hear the report of Mr. Macomber 
just a few minutes ago?
    Senator Pell. No, I did not.
    Secretary Rusk. The non-Communist members of the Security 
Council met informally this morning, and the non-permanent 
members strongly urged the Big Four to meet. We agreed, the 
British agreed, the French agreed in principle, they are 
getting instructions, and then the non-permanent members left 
the meeting to go off and talk to the Russians to see if they 
would agree.
    They were hoping to have a meeting by 12 o'clock. My guess 
is the Russians would not get instructions by then.
    Senator Pell. One thought is if we do not get Security 
Council action, would you be inclined to the view to get it 
under articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Charter, the Military 
Staff Committee, where these forces should be rather than as a 
special separate force?
    This would be true particularly if the Soviet Union were 
willing to bear with us.
    Secretary Rusk. The articles you refer to, Senator, I 
believe anticipate that there already would have been worked 
out formal agreements bringing forces under the jurisdiction of 
the Security Council and, as you and I can remember from the 
old days, our negotiations on that in 1946 and 1947 failed to 
produce any result.
    I think the Security Council could ask U.N. members to 
contribute forces within a framework that is different than 
articles 42, 43, and 44 if it chose to do so. It is not 
restricted to those particular articles.
    So that I think if we were to lean on the concept of a 
formally established United Nations force the Military Staff 
Committee and so forth, we would probably find that was 
impossible in the timeframe we are talking about.

                VIETNAM AND THE PACEM EN TERRIS MEETINGS

    Senator Pell. Then finally, speaking for myself, and there 
are others of us who will be abroad next week at this Pacem En 
Terris meeting; this will undoubtedly come up. Vietnam will 
come up.
    I for one certainly do not intend to be critical publicly 
of our foreign policy outside the United States in Vietnam, but 
I would hope that the Administration would have somebody, not 
relying on us, to defend those aspects of it with which we may 
disagree in this environment because there may be people from 
all shades of opinion, right and left and center, in Geneva.
    My understanding is Arthur Goldberg is not going now, and I 
would hope somebody was.
    Secretary Rusk. We are trying to send a substitute for him 
now.
    Senator Pell. You are?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Pell. I think it is terribly important. It is too 
much to ask us to defend it.
    Senator Clark. I would support Senator Pell. Those of us 
who are going tend to be critical of our position in Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand that.
    Senator Clark. It seems to me we should not be put under 
the burden of defending it over there within the limits of our 
obvious national loyalty.
    Secretary Rusk. There will be, quite apart from Americans 
who might be present, Thanat Khoman of Thailand and the foreign 
minister, Tran Van Huong. But there will other voices present 
at Pacem En Terris.

              REEMPHASIZE THE MULTINATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

    Senator Pell. Is there anything we can do to be of help in 
this Near Eastern problem, because this again will take the 
focus of attention which is probably good from the viewpoint of 
American interests, will center toward the near East for a 
change?
    Secretary Rusk. I would think if the U.N. responsibility 
could be emphasized and re-emphasized, if the multilateral 
responsibility should be re-emphasized, and the necessity for 
calm in all the capitals of the area--I mean those are the 
three things that are most important at this point it seems to 
me.
    Senator Mundt. Will the Senator yield?
    Senator Pell. Certainly.

                           BRITISH INITIATIVE

    Senator Mundt. Now that Bill is back in the room, I would 
like to inquire about the genesis of this meeting this morning 
of the non-Communist members of the Security Council. My 
question is: One, who called this morning's meeting? Secondly, 
why were not the Communist nations represented? Did they refuse 
to come or were they not invited?
    Secretary Rusk. I think this was an informal consultation 
in which happily the British took the initiative. They had a 
cabinet meeting this morning before we got up. They asked Lord 
Caradon to meet us at the crack of dawn to see if we would join 
in getting such a meeting together, and so I was encouraged by 
the fact that the British were taking some initiative on this.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Mundt. I think it is important to establish whether 
the Communist countries were invited, otherwise it would look 
like a de facto recognition of the fact that Communists are in 
this thing on the Egyptian side which makes it more difficult 
to get to go later.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. Until Mr. Macomber reported to 
us, Senator, I did not have any information on that point.
    Senator Mundt. I think it is very important.
    Secretary Rusk. Do you know whether they were invited or 
not, Bill? I just do not know.
    Senator Mundt. I think it is important for the purpose of 
having it for the record.
    The Chairman The Secretary can supply it for the record.
    Secretary Rusk. We can supply it for the record.
    The Chairman. Are you through?
    Senator Pell. I have no more questions.

                   U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS TO MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Morse. When we talk about the refusal of Russia to 
engage in talks, we are talking about a nuclear engagement in 
the Middle East, not with regard to conventional arms. Have we 
not shipped about as much conventional arms into the Middle 
East under sales as the Russians have?
    Secretary Rusk. I would not think so, sir.
    Senator Morse. You would not think so.
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir. If you put Egypt and Syria and 
Algeria together, those have been very large shipments, and we 
have tried to become, tried to be, a very junior supplier of 
arms. As a matter of fact, we have helped Jordan, as you know, 
over the years. Israel has had most of its supplies from 
Western Europe rather than from this country, and the problem 
for us arose when these very large shipments of arms to Egypt 
created a great imbalance between them and their Arab neighbors 
quite apart from Israel. We are interested that Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan not be completely overwhelmed by fear and we have 
tried to keep a delicate balance there by some assistance to 
Jordan and some assistance to Israel.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. So I think Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
are elements of certain calm and stability in this situation. 
Syria is just as jittery as it can be, and Nasser is playing a 
game that he may not have fully disclosed as yet.
    Senator Morse. How about Iraq and Iran, have we supplied 
some there?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think Iran has; yes.

                         DANGER IN VACILLATION

    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, since I asked no questions--I 
confined myself to a very brief statement--I would like to take 
the time to express appreciation to the Secretary for this 
hearing and consultation. I particularly do so because at the 
last meeting I expressed some impatience, if not criticism, of 
what I interpreted, perhaps erroneously, as reluctance on the 
part of the Secretary to keep the committee currently and fully 
informed. So with a background of that, I particularly want to 
express appreciation.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Gore. And I want to add this, Mr. Secretary. 
Although I share the sentiment that has been so generally 
expressed around the table as to the inadvisability of 
unilateral action, I know that one error does not justify 
another, this being one of the possible consequences that I 
have envisioned of our deep involvement in Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, the practicalities are such that I think and wish 
not to reiterate, after all I have heard, that there would be 
very grave danger in vacillation. The United States in my view 
must take the firmest possible leadership here to possibly 
avoid a conflict in which we would inevitably be involved if it 
occurred.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, that is a very important and very 
strong point. We have tried to be very clear privately with 
governments that we consider this a most serious situation, and 
the problem is how far do you go publicly in the absence of a 
particular factual situation to work on, and how far do you go 
in raising such questions of prestige. The prestige factor 
makes it more difficult to keep the thing under control, which 
in effect is deterrence, is a very powerful one and we are 
giving that a deal of attention.

                      A MORAL OBLIGATION TO ISRAEL

    Senator Morse. That is what I want to stress, Mr. Chairman, 
and I will stop with this. I share Albert Gore's comment just 
now, and the Secretary's too. We know what we are skirting, 
what we have to face up to.
    As far as I am concerned, I want the record to show if you 
get to a point where these Arab states really do make war on 
Israel, and start trying to demolish Israel, let us face it, we 
do have a moral obligation and a very important moral 
obligation to come to her assistance. We can give her 
assistance under those circumstances, but I pray it is not 
going to be on a unilateral basis. We have to make the other 
free nations understand the relation of freedom in this matter 
because if they do get into a war, then you have got 
totalitarianism seeking to drive this country into oblivion.
    If they get by with it there, and other free nations do not 
join through United Nations action, we are going to force the 
withdrawal ourselves, because they are going to attack freedom 
elsewhere in the world, and we cannot do that unilaterally. But 
I think here we were more responsible than any other nation in 
the world in creating a climate that permitted the 
establishment of Israel in 1948. This is pretty much a United 
States move; we got other nations to come along, but we took 
the initiative.
    We are dealing here with totalitarian nations, and if 
they--I am inclined to think they are closer linked to Russia 
than they may surmise at the present time.
    If we get to that precipice where it is these totalitarian 
nations against Israel, I think there are various forms of aid 
we are going to have to supply Israel to keep her in a position 
to do most of the fighting, but give her whatever she has to 
have in order to fight back.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell.
    Senator Pell. One further request of the Secretary. I gave 
to Bill Macomber a little speech and some suggestions with 
regard to Vietnam. I would like very much when I am over there 
to try them out either on Mai Van Bo in Paris or whoever is 
amongst our adversaries in Geneva. I would like to have you 
give me a reading and tell me whether they are all wet or will 
be acceptable. I do not think they will be acceptable from the 
other side's view, but I thought it would be interesting to 
have your reaction.
    The Chairman. Senator McCarthy, do you have any questions?
    Senator McCarthy. No.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman----
    The Chairman. I want to say one word

                           THE KENNEDY ROUND

    Secretary Rusk. Before other senators leave, I might just 
tell you, I do not know whether Ambassador Roth has been in 
touch with you.
    Senator Pell. Who?
    Secretary Rusk. Ambassador Roth, ambassador at the Kennedy 
Round. He will be in touch with you and he is available before 
the committee if you want to hear about the Kennedy Round.

                     NOTIFICATION OF THE COMMITTEE

    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could have an 
understanding that you would notify the committee and come to 
see the committee before any really serious step is taken. I 
think you have seen the interest this committee has in this 
matter, and I hope we can have at least an informal 
understanding to try to keep the committee as such advised of 
developments because the committee is deeply interested in this 
matter.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I would do my best to do so, Senator.
    The Chairman. That is all I want.
    Secretary Rusk. It may be necessary to have a meeting at 
some odd hours in order to permit that consultation.
    Senator Gore. He will be ready.
    The Chairman. One thing purely on my own, I have already 
said I hope you get to the U.N. I would entreat you to perhaps 
reappraise our Vietnam situation because I join the Senator 
from Missouri and some others here in believing that this is 
all part of an overall ball of wax, as they say. It may not be 
directly and specifically the cause of this, but I am quite 
sure it contributes to the attitude of those involved as to the 
effectiveness of this country.
    I think everybody, because of this historical basis that 
you discussed at length here, everybody knows that, the 
countries know it, and they know about this moral commitment. 
They feel fairly sure in their bones that we will react. I 
believe they do. We do not have to talk too much about that. 
That is a matter that has been said time and again.

             THE MIDDLE EAST IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN VIETNAM

    But they feel if we are preoccupied elsewhere, it puts us 
in a terrible bind, makes it very embarrassing to us, and it is 
embarrassing to me, I know, and I think it is embarrassing to 
the country, to be caught now, preoccupied as we are, in a 
place which at least I do not hesitate to make a decision that 
the Middle East is far more important to the security of this 
country than Vietnam. I do not think there is any comparison, 
not only because of strategic bases, but because of our own 
investments if for no other reason. That is one of the reasons; 
but because of our cultural relationship, political 
relationship, all these relationships that have been mentioned 
this morning, speeches by Truman and others and so on, and 
various tripartite agreements. To me they are far more 
persuasive than anything that has ever been revealed with 
regard to Vietnam.
    All I am trying to say is I do hope the administration will 
perhaps reconsider its attitude toward stopping of the bombings 
and effort toward bringing Vietnam to a close.
    I agree with what the Secretary said about enlarging that 
war. I do not go along with the idea that you can bring it to a 
quick conclusion by destroying North Vietnam. I believe that is 
the way you will have a third world war. That is one part of 
your policy I agree with, and I am not for a third world war 
over that or any of these other places if we can possibly avoid 
it.
    So I would like to recommend at least, for whatever it is 
worth, that this is an example of what we are going to be 
confronted with, we are now and may otherwise, if we do not 
liquidate that war in some reasonable way, and within the 
reasonable future.
    The only way I can see is a compromise. We cannot expect to 
get a victory. I know you know what I think, and I will not 
burden you with a reiteration of my attitude toward that 
situation. I do not think it is too late to still perhaps 
consider this proposal about stopping the bombing without 
making any agreement. Just stop it and see what happens. Put it 
to a test without any announcement or anything else, the theory 
that Kosygin and, well, others, members of this committee and 
others, have had--U Thant--that possibly it would create a 
condition for negotiation.
    I realize that at this particular moment it might look as 
if we are scared to death if you did it precipitately, but you 
would have to do it with some reason in spacing. I do not know 
what will happen in the next few days. I only urge that.
    You seem to give us the feeling this morning that you 
welcome some suggestions. So I come back to that one. I am 
feeling very sad about things.
    Senator Carlson--this is nothing directed to that, but he 
just whispered in my ear as he was leaving, early this morning, 
one of his secretaries was murdered in her apartment. It just 
sort of highlights how we have neglected the conditions here at 
home that this can happen right here in the capital of the 
country, of our country, and we know how this has gone on. It 
does not have any direct relation to this, but underneath all 
of my concern, all of this, is that our preoccupation with 
Vietnam and others has caused us to neglect things that 
absolutely must be done here in the United States.
    That is a little lecture, but anyway I do hope you will 
consider possibly a reappraisement of this policy of continued 
bombing.

           SHIFT OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS TO MILITARY CONTROL

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, since we are 
on Vietnam, I would like to ask a question about the 
pacification because today you were supposed to come and talk 
about that, and you were to have talked about the Kennedy 
Round. You may have explained this to the satisfaction of all 
other members of the committee. At the time it was made I 
wanted to reserve my judgment until I got more information. I 
have not got any more information and I really have--am going 
this week to say something about it. I wish you would tell us, 
for me and perhaps the rest of the committee, specifically what 
were the reasons why you felt the pacification program had 
failed under civilian control and you moved it under the 
military control and what the indications are.
    Secretary Rusk. I think, first of all, Senator, it is 
important to keep in mind that this reorganization of 
pacification is solely a reorganization of the U.S. 
participation in pacification. It is not a substitute of the 
U.S. pacification operations for the South Vietnamese.
    The change was made for two or three purposes: One, the key 
necessity for pacification is local security, and the 
coordination of the security operations in the military forces 
on the one side and the pacification teams on the other are a 
very high priority and we thought it had better be done after 
experimenting with the other and if both were the 
responsibility of the military commander.
    Secondly, there was a very important logistic reason why 
the military--that this was a direct responsibility engaging 
their serious attention, would be able to remove supplies, move 
people at the right place, at the right time to give maximum 
momentum to the program.
    And, third, in a good many of the outlying districts our 
own little AID teams and other support operations were running 
short of personnel, civilians recruited on a civilian basis, 
and the Army can assign its people to do some of their jobs for 
which no civilians were available and it makes it possible to 
expand somewhat in that direction.
    But this is basically a reorganization solely within the 
U.S. structure. It is not in any sense a taking over by us of 
the pacification effort of the entire country.

                       ROLE OF AMBASSADOR BUNKER

    Senator Mundt. Does this mean that the Vietnamese aid 
program appropriation will come to us now as a part of the 
military budget?
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir; no, sir. The support from here 
through the normal civilian agencies, AID, P.L. 480, things of 
that sort, would be as here, and a civilian office out there 
was put directly under General Westmoreland. That is a civilian 
office with Mr. Komer as General Westmoreland's deputy for 
pacification.
    Senator Morse. Also the Ambassador over all.
    Secretary Rusk. Also the Ambassador over all.
    Senator Mundt. Over Westmoreland you mean.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. Ambassador Bunker is the No. 1 
man in the country for all.
    Senator Mundt. He is determining the military maneuvers.
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, no, he does not determine the direct 
military moves, but if there are military operations on which 
he has any problem from his general responsibilities, he is not 
only free to comment but he frequently is invited to comment so 
that his judgment can be taken into account along with the 
President's, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.
    Senator Mundt. In case of a military maneuver like the 
recent entry into the demilitarized zone----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Mundt [continuing]. Does that mean that Ambassador 
Bunker, had he thought it unwise.
    Secretary Rusk. He could have said so.
    Senator Mundt. He could have. He would have been the top 
man.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right. On a matter of that sort, 
the Commander-in-Chief has the full responsibility, and----
    Senator Mundt. Somebody has to be the top man. Who finally 
has the veto? In this country, the Ambassador has?
    Secretary Rusk. No, I did not say he had a veto on a matter 
for the President to decide.
    Senator Mundt. If he thought General Westmoreland should 
not go into the demilitarized zone, would the ambassador--would 
the General not have gone?
    Secretary Rusk. I need a little better example on this 
matter.
    Senator Mundt. Well, I mean, supposing----
    Secretary Rusk. If Ambassador Bunker, for example, felt 
that it would not be a good thing to put an American battalion 
down in the Cao Dai sect's area in a given circumstance he 
could advise General Westmoreland of that and advise us of 
that. If General Westmoreland wanted to refer that back to 
Washington, he could do so and we would look at it with the 
judgment of both brought to bear. But the Joint Chiefs--the 
Commander-in-Chief sends his military orders through the Joint 
Chiefs to General Westmoreland, but Ambassador Bunker is 
expected and required to keep us alerted at all times to any 
factors in the military operations that affect his 
responsibilities for the country as a whole and particularly 
the political side of it and those have to be continually 
matched. This is no different from World War II or Korea or 
anything else in that respect.

                     THE GENERAL AND THE AMBASSADOR

    Senator Mundt. World War II? What ambassador could have 
told Eisenhower what he could do?
    Secretary Rusk. Beg pardon?
    Senator Mundt. In World War II what ambassador could have 
told Eisenhower what to do with troops at the time of the 
battle?
    Secretary Rusk. The Government of the United States said a 
good many things to General Eisenhower about what he would do 
with his troops and alternatives.
    Senator Mundt. The President of the United States.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.
    Senator Mundt. But you said the ambassador had the same 
position. I cannot think of who he will be.
    Secretary Rusk. Maybe I am not being very clear about 
something on which I do not feel confused, Senator; if I 
confuse you, I apologize.
    Ambassador Bunker is the top representative in Vietnam of 
the President of the United States. Obviously he is not a 
military man and does not have the responsibility for the 
deployment of forces as a military matter, whether we have this 
particular operation today or that particular operation 
tomorrow.
    But his judgment is regularly consulted on everything 
affecting Vietnam including the character and the general shape 
of military operations. The ambassador and General Westmoreland 
work very closely together as a team. They are constantly 
talking about these things with each other locally, and we have 
not had friction or difficulties arising from this.
    But take, for example, on a mission such as how you deal 
with these Vietnam forces just across the Cambodian border. 
Naturally the American ambassador is a major, major factor.
    Senator Mundt. Because that goes into international things.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not want to leave the impression that 
Ambassador Bunker is trying to be a military man running the 
military part of the war. But also it is just as equally true 
that the military forces in Vietnam are there for a political 
purpose to protect Vietnam from this thing, from going to the 
north and to assist in the political reconstruction of the 
country in a period of elections and things of that sort. So 
that we need both judgments brought to bear at both times.

                       TRANSFERRING PACIFICATION

    Senator Mundt. Back to the question that generated this: 
Specifically can you tell us whether it was Ambassador Bunker's 
original recommendation that we switch the pacification 
responsibility or was that suggested by Westmoreland?
    Secretary Rusk. This was discussed for some time before 
Ambassador Bunker got there. We thought that the decision on it 
ought not be made until he got there and that he would 
recommend on what seemed to him to make the most sense after he 
saw the situation. He recommended that this transfer be made. 
General Westmoreland was just a little reluctant because it was 
an additional considerable responsibility, but he accepted it 
in good heart and is proceeding to go ahead with the operation.
    The Chairman. Is the Senator through?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I see you just a moment?
    The Chairman. The meeting is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the committee recessed, to 
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

                               Department of State,
                                                Washington,
                                                      May 30, 1967.
Hon. J. William Fulbright,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: During his testimony before the 
Committee on May 23, Secretary Rusk was asked to obtain further 
information in response to questions from several Members. I am 
pleased to submit the requested information below. For 
convenience, the inquirer and the question are also shown.
    1. Senator Carlson: Did Nasser threaten to disarm the 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) if the Secretary General 
of the United Nations did not agree to remove them?
    Reply: (Confidential) Nasser said in his speech on May 22 
that, had the UNEF not been withdrawn, they would have been 
forcibly disarmed. However, we have no evidence that the United 
Arab Republic made this threat directly to the United Nations, 
or indeed that it was even necessary to do so.
    2. Senator Symington: Are there any United States 
submarines in the area east of Suez?
    Reply: (Confidential) As of May 29, there were no United 
States submarines in that area.
    3. Senator Lausche: Asked the Secretary to see if there 
were a preambular or other statements in existing legislation 
which might have a bearing on our commitment to Israel other 
than the Middle East Resolution of March 9, 1957.
    Reply: (Unclassified) There are no such preambular or other 
statements known.
    4. Senator Hickenlooper: Who is supplying equipment to the 
Arab (i.e., Palestine) Liberation Army (PLA)?
    Reply: (Unclassified) Most of the PLA's equipment is of 
Soviet bloc manufacture, and has been supplied by the UAR, 
Syria, and Iraq, from stocks received by these countries from 
the bloc. There have been reports of weapons supplied by 
Communist China (though not necessarily of Chinese 
manufacture); but we have no solid information to confirm such 
reports.
    I hope the foregoing information will be of use to the 
Committee, and invite you to call upon me any time you believe 
we can be of service to you.
            Sincerely,
                                  William B. Macomber, Jr.,
                   Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.


                 BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

                              ----------                              


                         Thursday, June 1, 1967

                                   U.S. Senate,    
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in 
Room S-116, The Capitol, Senator John Sparkman presiding.
    Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Mansfield, Gore, 
Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Mundt, Case, 
and Cooper.
    Also present: Vice President Humphrey.
    Senators Hayden, Russell, Stennis, McClellan, Byrd of West 
Virginia, Dirksen, Kuchel, Smith, Javits, and Thurmond.
    William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for 
Congressional Relations; Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Kathryn N. Folger, 
Legislative Management Officer; and John Reilly, Assistant to 
the Vice President.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the 
committee staff.
    Senator Sparkman. Let the committee come to order, please.
    We are very glad to have the two Secretaries with us this 
morning and, Secretary Rusk, I understand you are to lead off. 
We will be glad to hear from you at this time.

     STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; 
   ACCOMPANIED BY HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE; AND LEONARD C. MEEKER, LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF 
                             STATE

    Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and 
distinguished Senators.
    Let me make two preliminary remarks. One is that I would 
hope that this could be considered a secret consultation. There 
is a tinderbox in the Near East. We have, on the one side, a 
Holy War psychology. We have, on the other side, an apocalyptic 
psychology, and it is particularly important that discussions 
with an official like the Secretary of State be held very 
private in this situation.
    Secondly, I would like to express the President's and my 
own very deep appreciation for the restraint which has been 
shown in the discussion of this matter here at this end of 
Pennsylvania Avenue. It is a highly dangerous matter, and we 
very much appreciate the soberness of the discussion thus far.
    One of the problems about the Near East is to know where to 
begin when one discusses it. The Arabs would like to begin with 
the birth of Israel.

        U.S. SUPPORT OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    Let me make an introduction by calling your attention to a 
simple proposition that President Johnson had in his statement 
of May 23, in which he quoted other American Presidents that 
the United States is firmly committed to the support of the 
political independence and territorial integrity of all the 
nations of that era.
    When we look at the history of this post-war period, it is 
interesting to note that in 1956 and 1957 President Eisenhower 
strongly objected to the attack by Israel, Britain, and France 
on Egypt. In 1958 he put troops into Lebanon to protect Lebanon 
against threats from Syria and Iraq.
    President Kennedy has continued the support of Jordan whose 
principal threat came from Egypt. President Kennedy put a 
squadron of fighter planes into Saudi Arabia at one point as a 
demonstration of solidarity against a threat from Egypt.
    We intervened very heavily in Cairo diplomatically to try 
to bring about a cessation of subversive and propaganda attacks 
by Egypt against Libya and, at that time, were reasonably 
successful in that effort.
    We have tried to encourage and support Tunisia and Morocco 
against a buildup of threat, as they saw it, from Algeria.
    In other words, our policy in that area has not been simply 
a pro-Israel, anti-Arab policy. It has been a balanced attempt 
to assure the territorial integrity and the independence of the 
states of that area.
    When Israel has been subjected to terror raids from across 
its borders, we have again intervened in capitals and expressed 
our strong view of that in the Security Council of the United 
Nations.
    When Israel, on the other hand, delivered what we 
considered to be a much heavier than necessary retaliatory 
attack on the Jordanian village of Samu in November of last 
year, we criticized Israel severely for that in the U.N. So we 
have tried to make good on that simple declaration policy in an 
even-handed way.

                          THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS

    Now, the present chapter I think opens with the increase of 
terrorism along the Israeli frontiers with Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon.
    We suppose--we have ourselves known that these terrorist 
attacks were organized by an organization called the Fatah. We 
know that the Lebanese and Jordanian governments have been 
acting vigorously within their means to try to eliminate such 
attacks from their territory, although we know the Syrian 
government has not acted with similar restraint. In any event, 
there was a buildup of those terrorist raids into Israel in 
March and April. In early May certain Israeli statements were 
made by the Air Force Commander, and news accounts appeared of 
statements by high Israeli sources the first ten days of May, 
that if these raids continued Israel would have to take action 
against Syria.
    That, in turn, prompted Syria to call upon their defense 
agreement with Nasser. Nasser started moving forces into the 
Sinai Peninsula, and on May 17 requested the United Nations 
forces to withdraw from Egyptian territory.
    As you know, the Secretary General, we think much too 
precipitously, agreed to that withdrawal.
    Secretary General Hammarskjold said that it would be for 
the General Assembly or the Security Council to take up the 
matter of, whether they should take up the question of their 
withdrawal.
    The Secretary General agreed to the withdrawal and, 
perhaps, agreed in broader terms than the requests, 
particularly with regard to the Gaza Strip.
    In any event, within the next few days, on May 22, while 
the Secretary General was on his way to Cairo, Nasser announced 
the closing of the Strait of Tiran.
    That is the present shape of the immediate crisis.

                      THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

    The role of the Soviet Union: We know that the Soviet Union 
has been supporting and encouraging what the Soviets call and 
the Arabs call the progressive states--Egypt, Syria, Algeria--
over against the more moderate and conservative Arab states.
    We think that the Soviet Union would encourage the 
political response to the Syrian-Egyptian reaction to the 
Israeli threat.
    We suppose that they might have also agreed to the request 
for the removal of United Nations forces. As a matter of 
general policy, the Soviet Union has always strongly objected 
to the creation of U.N. forces by the General Assembly, saying 
that that is a monopoly of the Security Council, where they 
have a veto.
    We have reason to believe that they were not informed in 
advance of Nasser's announcement of the closing of the Strait 
of Tiran.
    I would state that much more categorically except for 
always the possibility of some misinformation or error on a 
point of that sort, but it is our strong impression that the 
Soviets were not consulted by Egypt on the closing of the 
Strait of Tiran.

            U.S. AND U.S.S.R. USING INFLUENCE FOR MODERATION

    I would like to tell you in the utmost secrecy, and I am 
relying very heavily on you on this, that we ourselves, in a 
very short message to the Soviet Union, suggested to them that 
they would use restraint in this situation. Their reply to that 
was a longer reply, pleading with us to use our influence in 
Israel, and promising that they themselves would use their 
influence in Syria and in Cairo for mutual restraint, so that 
neither side would start the shooting.
    We have----
    Senator Gore. I did not get that last remark.
    Secretary Rusk. Both would use their influence in the area, 
we in Israel and they in Syria and in Egypt, to insist that 
neither side start the shooting.
    We have ourselves advised moderation in Israel----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Excuse me, did the Kremlin agree in 
that?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, now, they came back and proposed to 
us----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I see.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. That we undertake this 
diversion of labor in terms of counseling moderation.
    We have done so on our side and have kept the Israelis 
fully informed about our conversations with the Russians, and 
we have good intelligence reasons to believe that the Soviets 
have, in fact, counseled moderation upon Egypt and Syria.
    Senator Dirksen. When was that reply received?
    Secretary Rusk. That has been in the last eight days.
    I am going far beyond my brief in telling you the Soviet 
exchange, but I believe it is highly relevant in this 
situation.

                   IMPORTANCE OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

    Now, we think that there may be the possibility for a 
breathing space here as far as major hostilities are concerned, 
subject to one very specific problem, and that is the Strait of 
Tiran.
    A breathing space raises a problem of what the status quo 
is during the breathing space, and if Nasser insists that the 
status quo involves the closure of the Strait of Tiran, then we 
have a major crisis indeed. If he would agree that the status 
quo should be that prior to his statement about the closing of 
the strait, then more time is available and people can litigate 
the problem and discuss differences and perhaps, keep the 
boundaries of the Israeli-Arab states under some control.
    This is a major issue of principle with Israel, and is one 
which they take with the utmost seriousness.
    The strait itself has been open to international shipping, 
as a matter of general principle, since 1957.
    About 120 ships a year go through that strait, about half 
of them tankers, about half of them dry cargo ships.
    Practically all of Israel's import of oil comes through the 
strait from Iran. What comes in and out of their port of Eilat 
on the Gulf of Aqaba represents three to four percent of their 
exports and imports, but it is their principal contact, their 
only contact with the Afro-Asian world looking toward both the 
present and the future, and in a trade which has been growing 
and is particularly important to them because the Suez Canal 
has been closed to them during all this period.
    Nevertheless, despite the fact that the right has been 
there since 1957, the Israelis have not utilized it very fully 
with regard to their own flag ships.
    For example, since 1955 only one Israeli flag merchant 
vessel has gone through, and there are four or five Israeli 
fishing trawlers that go in and out, have gone in and out, 
fishing in the Red Sea, and returning to Eilat for supplies, 
water and things of that sort.

                    PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

    Senator Lausche. What was the status prior to 1955 and 
1957?
    Secretary Rusk. As far as Israel was concerned, there was 
no access through the gulf.
    Mr Meeker, what about international shipping prior to that 
period. Do we have much information on that?
    Mr. Meeker. There was a small amount of cargo going to the 
Jordanian port of Aqaba in that early period. Israel had not 
yet developed the port of Eilat, and that development really 
came after 1956.
    Secretary Rusk. Now, in terms of where we are in this 
situation, I think it is of some significance that the Soviet 
Union has not stated a categorical position on the Strait of 
Tiran.
    I say that with some caution because when we leave this 
room we may hear one. We cannot guarantee it, but they, as a 
maritime power, have some interest in the general principles 
involved here.
    The territorial waters, the combined territorial seas, of 
Saudi Arabia and of Egypt across that strait meet in the middle 
of the strait.
    The combined territorial waters of Malaya and Indonesia 
similarly would cut off the Strait of Malacca, of Denmark and 
Sweden access to the Baltic Sea.
    We believe that it is a firmly established principle of 
international law, confirmed by the Convention of the Law of 
the Sea in 1958, that where two bodies of international waters 
are joined by narrow waters of this sort, there is an 
international right of passage through that strait.
    Mr. Len Meeker, the Legal Advisor to the State Department 
is here and can develop that in some detail for you if you 
would wish to go into that.
    So we feel that it is important that Nasser acknowledge 
whatever the territorial water situation is, that there is an 
international right of passage for shipping through that 
strait.
    We do not accept the view that Nasser or, for that matter, 
Israel, is entitled to call upon rights of belligerency in 
order to refuse such rights of passage.
    Secretary General Hammarskjold made it quite clear that 
those rights ought not to be available. We have not accepted 
the exercise of rights of belligerency between Arab states and 
Israel since the armistice agreements were entered into.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, let me interrupt you.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, please.

                        BASIS OF EGYPTIAN CLAIM

    Senator Symington. That language is a little too hightone 
to me. Does that mean that we do not believe the Israelis 
should go to war if they are stopped from using the Port of 
Eilat?
    Secretary Rusk. No sir; I am not commenting on that 
particular point at the moment. I am saying we do not believe 
in this instance, for example, that Egypt can rely upon the 
fact that it is in a technical state of war with Israel to 
close the strait to international shipping going through there.
    Now, there are certain obscurities----
    Senator Sparkman. While you are talking about that----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Sparkman [continuing]. Does Egypt claim--there is 
an island out six miles from the coastline--this map does not 
show it.
    Secretary Rusk. We will have a large-scale chart down here, 
hopefully before our discussion is over. I tried to bring one 
with me, and we lost it in the corridors of the department on 
my way down here.

                 EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION OF ISLAND OF TIRAN

    Senator Sparkman. There is an island about----
    Secretary Rusk. The island which is offshore from Egyptian 
territory is actually owned by Saudi Arabia.
    Senator Sparkman. It is?
    Secretary Rusk. The Egyptians occupied it for the time, but 
told us in 1950 at the time that they occupied it, that they 
were occupying the island solely for the protection of the 
island, and that their occupancy would not interfere in any way 
with international rights of passage through the strait. But 
those islands are Saudi Arabian islands, and we understand at 
the moment they are not occupied, although it is possible that 
the Saudis may put somebody ashore.
    Senator Sparkman. The large Island of Tiran.
    Secretary Rusk. The nearest one is Tiran.
    Senator Sparkman. Is there no passage between Tiran and 
Sanafir?
    Secretary Rusk. No. The waters are too shallow, and it is a 
very widening and dangerous passage.
    Senator Sparkman. In other words, this is the only passage?
    Secretary Rusk. There are two passages between Egypt and 
the Island of Tiran. One is the Enterprise Passage, which is 
about a mile off-shore from Egypt, and it is very deep and is 
one customarily used.
    The second is Grafton Passage which is adjacent to the 
Island of Tiran, which also is some 260 feet deep, but it is 
somewhat more hazardous because of certain rocks, and it is 
much narrower. But there are two passages there, one wholly 
within Egyptian territorial waters; the other, its state is 
somewhat obscure because of its location, probably in Saudi 
Arabian territorial waters.
    Senator Clark. Didn't Egypt lease the island from Saudi 
Arabia?
    Secretary Rusk. Not so far as we know.
    Mr. Meeker. Not so far as we know.
    Secretary Rusk. I think they occupied it, even though it 
wasn't Saudi, did not claim it to be Egyptian territory at the 
time they occupied it.

                           WHAT NASSER MEANS

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, is Nasser claiming two 
things or one only? One, that is, this is an inland waterway, 
and it is within the jurisdiction--it is within their 
jurisdiction and, two, that a state of war exists, and even 
though it is an international seaway, in a state of war he has 
the right to blockade it?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, yes, Senator, in general.
    But I would like to call your attention to the fact that 
there are certain points that are still obscure, and there may 
be some advantages in obscurity pending further clarification 
and negotiation.
    In the first place, we do not know exactly what it is he is 
saying he is going to do in closing the strait. He has talked 
about barring Israeli flag ships and ships carrying strategic 
goods, for example.
    Now, the only material that goes through that strait that 
comes close to being a strategic good is crude oil.
    The Egyptians have referred to application of the items 
under our Battle Act.
    Our Battle Act does not include crude oil. So, query: Is he 
saying that he will blockade only Israeli flag ships for all 
practical purposes or is he saying that he would blockade it 
with respect to all other ships including tankers, and what 
kind of material is he prepared to let go through?
    I want to distinguish this de facto situation from the 
issue of principle, which is very, very important indeed, and 
is of greatest possible importance to Israel in this situation.
    We are not completely sure that he is talking about both 
channels that I mentioned. In their public statements they have 
concentrated on the Enterprise Channel, the one that is a mile 
off Egyptian territory. We are not completely sure that they 
are also talking about the Grafton Channel, which, perhaps, in 
a technical sense, is outside of Egypt's territorial waters, 
but where joint action by Saudi Arabia and Egypt might bring 
about the same result.

                      NASSER'S CALL FOR A HOLY WAR

    I would like to point out that Nasser has called upon the 
only issue on which all Arabs can be united. This has cut 
through some of the major differences between him and the more 
moderate and conservative Arab states. But, at the same time, 
he has mounted a tiger.
    The man in the street in the Arab world is inclined to 
think that the Holy War is here and, secondly, the man in the 
street has heard nothing but that he has closed the Strait of 
Tiran.
    That has given Nasser a great boost of prestige within the 
Arab world at this point.
    Now if, in fact, the Tiran Strait can be opened, and it 
becomes apparent that the Holy War is not on, then he faces the 
possibility of very serious disillusionment among the men in 
the street in the Arab world, and he perhaps knows that. So 
this is one of the elements that makes it a more difficult 
situation to handle.

                          MODERATING PRESSURES

    We ourselves have tried to engage the Soviet Union in a 
specific discussion of the Strait of Tiran. Thus far they have 
not replied on that particular point, because some of us feel 
if the strait issue can be resolved, that the other aspects of 
the problem can be brought under some control; that is, some 
sort of U.N. presence along the borders, some possibility of 
demobilization of some of the forces that have been called up.
    We know that there have been moderating pressures put in on 
Syria to do a better job in cutting down on these terrorist 
raids coming out of Syria either directly into Israel or 
through Jordan and Lebanon into Israel.
    We do not believe that most of the Arabs want a war in this 
situation; in fact, it may well be that none of them want a 
war. We believe that Israel would prefer not to have war if its 
vital interests are properly protected.
    I would like to emphasize that I am not here this morning 
to talk about the problems that might lie at the end of the 
road. I assure you that the President will be in fullest touch 
with Senators and the Congress along the way.
    We are not here contemplating, that is, we are not here 
deciding to take the particular step of action involving the 
use of armed force.

                  DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE

    As you know, the President's view would be that the 
Executive and Congress move together on a matter of that sort. 
But I would like to consult with you about a step which 
reflects the attitude of the maritime powers back in the late 
fifties with respect to the right of international passage, and 
if Mr. Macomber would pass out to you a copy of a brief 
declaration we would contemplate consulting among governments 
to get the maximum number of governments to join in issuing 
such a declaration with respect to the right of passage.

                    Limited Distribution Declaration

    The Governments of maritime nations subscribing to this Declaration 
express their grave concern at recent developments in the Middle East 
which are currently under consideration in the United Nations Security 
Council. Our countries, as Members of the United Nations committed to 
the Purposes and Principles set forth in the Charter, are convinced 
that scrupulous respect for the principles of international law 
regarding freedom of navigation on international waterways is 
indispensable.
    In regard to shipping through the waterways that serve ports on the 
Gulf of Aqaba, our Governments reaffirm the view that the Gulf is an 
international waterway into and through which the vessels of all 
nations have a right of passage. Our Governments will assert this right 
on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags, and our 
Governments are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with 
others in seeking general recognition of this right.
    The views we express in this Declaration formed the basis on which 
a settlement of the Near East conflict was achieved in early 1957--a 
settlement that has governed the actions of nations for more than ten 
years.
    These views will guide our policies and action in seeking to assure 
peace and security in the Near East.
    This declaration itself does not commit anyone as to the 
means by which they individually or collectively assert the 
right of international passage.
    When one asserts a right one can use diplomacy, one can 
assert it in the U.N., or one can do it through protest; one 
can do it through various retaliatory economic measures or, as 
a possibility, through the use of armed force.
    But the issue of the use of armed force does not itself 
pose specifically in this declaration.
    We want very much to go over this declaration with you and 
get any observations or comments which any of you might have.
    Perhaps Mr. Len Meeker could just comment on the two 
principal paragraphs here from a legal point of view. Mr. 
Meeker?
    Senator Symington. Before you do that, Mr. Secretary----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, Senator.

                            MARITIME NATIONS

    Senator Symington [continuing]. Just so we can get it in 
context, what governments are we referring to when you say 
``the governments of maritime nations?''
    Secretary Rusk. We would hope to have as many governments 
as possible on this. I think there are twelve, for example, who 
made a similar statement in 1957, was it?
    Mr. Meeker. 1957.
    Secretary Rusk. At that time there were individual 
statements in the General Assembly and elsewhere.
    If there were fifteen to twenty nations that might be 
included in such a group, we feel that this would, could make a 
very useful contribution and give some of those who are trying 
to work between the parties something to work on in terms of 
leverage, and the attitude of the maritime countries.
    Now, on the issue of force, I remind you we would hope very 
much that Liberia and Panama would sign this declaration. It is 
obvious that they are not in any event going to use any force 
to assert the rights exerted here.
    But, and it may well be, you see, that the issue here is 
one which could be subject to negotiation, mediation, 
arbitration, litigation, provided there is a satisfactory 
status quo established pending such litigation or diplomatic 
action.
    I want to again remind you that the key question here is 
what is the status quo in the strait pending or during further 
discussion of the direct international issue involved, and that 
is the most sensitive, the most dangerous, and most serious 
question which we are not now discussing with you in terms of 
practical action other than diplomatic and political at this 
point, but one which you should be fully aware of as the really 
explosive element in this situation.

                 PUTTING THE DECLARATION TO THE BRITISH

    Senator Sparkman. This is now just a proposal, is it not, 
sir?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, this is a declaration which, I think 
I should tell you, we have discussed this declaration with the 
British as one of the alternatives.
    We have in mind putting this to a good many other 
governments--the British, the Dutch and others--and there may 
be some counter proposals from some of them about particular 
wording. We do not know.
    But we want you to know that we have in mind the issuance 
of a declaration by the maritime powers on this international 
right that is involved in this situation.
    Mr. Meeker, would you comment on the underlying--by the 
way, may I say because of the sensitive nature at this point, 
that this is a secret paper. I would appreciate having these 
papers back. There will be copies here in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee for you to consult, but it is very 
important that this be considered secret at this point.
    Senator Sparkman. Is this in line with what Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson said to the House of Commons yesterday?
    Secretary Rusk. As far as the declaration is concerned, he 
pointed further toward the future as far as some armed action 
than we are prepared to go today in terms of consultations with 
the Congress.
    He hinted at it and, of course, we are looking at all 
contingencies here. But the President himself would want very 
much to explore fully the possibilities of the U.N. Security 
Council as well as some private diplomacy that is going on to 
see whether those alternatives are necessary or whether we have 
to get to that point at all. We just do not know yet, quite 
frankly.
    Senator McClellan. Mr. Secretary, is your assistant now 
going to discuss this?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.

                         ORIGINS OF THE WORDING

    Senator McClellan. May I ask, I would like to have some 
emphasis on this aspect of it--I note, and I quote: ``Our 
governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping 
sailing under their flags.'' I would like an interpretation of 
what you mean by that.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker?
    Mr. Meeker. The essence of this declaration is contained in 
the second paragraph. The first statement there says:

    In regard to shipping through the waterways that serve 
ports on the Gulf of Aqaba, our governments reaffirm the view 
that the gulf is an international waterway into and through 
which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage.

    I would like to say just a word about the origin of that. 
This statement, in content, is based directly on what the 
representatives of some fourteen United Nations members stated 
in the General Assembly on March 1, 1957.
    Now, those countries included, besides the United States, 
Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland 
and Costa Rica.
    That first sentence is a statement about the view of the 
declaring governments as to the legal status of the strait; 
namely, that it is an international waterway, and there is a 
right of passage throughout for the vessels of all nations.
    The second statement in the paragraph is the one to which 
you just referred, Senator:

    Our governments will assert this right on behalf of all 
shipping sailing under their flags, and our governments are 
prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with others 
in seeking general recognition of this right.

    I would like to say a word about the origin of that 
language as well.
    This is based almost word for word on the statements which 
were made by Ambassador Lodge and by the representative of the 
United Kingdom in the General Assembly at that time.

                 ASSERTING THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE FOR ALL

    The statement that we would assert the right of passage on 
behalf of all shipping sailing under flags of the two 
countries, that statement was made both by Britain and the 
United States to the United Nations General Assembly in March 
of 1957.
    What it meant was that in regard to both British vessels 
registered in Britain, and in regard to United States vessels 
flying the United States flag, we would assert that those ships 
of our own would have the right to go through the strait and 
the gulf to ports at the head of the gulf.
    Now, the second paragraph goes on in that sentence to make 
one further statement, which is that the declaring governments, 
in addition to making this assertion of a right for their own 
ships, would cooperate among themselves and also join with 
other states who might not be signatories to this declaration, 
in order to seek a general recognition of the right.
    This declaration, as the Secretary has already stated, does 
not indicate what particular means would be employed. Indeed, 
that question is one which lies in the future. It has to be 
considered as the governments go along.
    The purpose of this declaration is to set forth, first, a 
legal view as to the status of the strait and the gulf and, 
secondly, to make the general declaration that we would assert 
that right of passage for ships of our own flag and would join 
with others in trying to secure a general recognition of the 
right.
    Senator McClellan. Then the word ``assert'' does not carry 
with it any implication of enforcement of the right, just 
merely to say it is our right?
    Mr. Meeker. It carries no implication at all. It is neither 
a commitment to use force nor does it exclude it. This is a 
subject that simply is not covered, not dealt with, by the 
declaration.

              CLARIFY MEANING BEFORE OTHER COUNTRIES SIGN

    Senator McClellan. Now, the thing that strikes me--and I do 
not know much about diplomacy--but you get fifteen or twenty 
countries to sign this, and then they disagree on what is 
meant. That is why I think these things should be settled 
before we sign them.
    Senator Stennis. Spelled out.
    Senator McClellan. We are going to sign something here that 
I would interpret one way and fifteen other countries, 
governments, interpret another.
    Secretary Rusk. I would assume, Senator, that that matter 
would be clarified in discussions among governments because 
they will be asking the same questions which you have and, as 
Mr. Meeker has pointed out, it is our view that the assertion 
of a right does not itself prescribe the means.
    There are many means. It does not require the use of force, 
but it does not exclude the use of force. There are many ways 
in which one can assert a right.
    Yes, sir, Senator?

                              FUTURE TENSE

    Senator Case. Mr. Secretary, why do you use the word 
``will''? Why don't you just assert it if that is what you are 
doing, assert it now and not say threaten to do something in 
the future? I think that would clarify somewhat the Senator's 
point about it.
    Senator McClellan. Then I have another question.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    Senator McClellan. What about that?
    Secretary Rusk. That is an interesting point, Senator. This 
was based on the language used in 1957. From a legal point of 
view it probably does not make any difference. But we will 
certainly take that under advisement as a suggestion.

                     OTHER NATIONS DRAG THEIR HEELS

    Senator McClellan. Now, one other question. This is what 
concerns me about these international agreements. We are over 
here fighting a war now, where some other folks ought to be 
there with us, if we should be there at all. I do not want to 
get ourselves in a position in this where again we are going 
out and taking the lead and the others drag their heels and let 
us do all the fighting. That is what concerns me. And before I 
subscribe to something, I want to know what the others are 
going to do, and not leave it up in the air as this does.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, this does not get to the question 
of who would join in using force to assert this right.
    I had a long and very useful discussion with the Foreign 
Relations Committee a few days ago, and reported back to the 
President the practically unanimous view of the Foreign 
Relations Committee and, I gather this has been held very 
widely in the Congress outside the committee, that we should 
give maximum weight to the effort in the United Nations; that 
we should in any event emphasize the multilateral character of 
this problem; and that we should do our very best to avoid the 
unilateral action by the United States in this situation.
    The President is very much concerned with that, and very 
much persuaded that that is the right course. Before any 
forceful action would be seriously contemplated, he would be 
back here consulting with the Congress on that issue.
    He has made it very clear that our action in this is within 
our constitutional processes, and there is no question about 
the fact that on that point there would be further, most 
serious consultation with the Congress.
    Senator McClellan. I am not in disagreement about that at 
all.
    Senator Rusk. I understand.

                    DOES ASSERTION MEAN ENFORCEMENT?

    Senator McClellan. What concerns me is that sixteen nations 
or fifteen nations join in this phrase ``We will assert,'' and 
does it mean to them or does it mean to the world, does it give 
the impression that when we say we assert we mean to enforce 
it? In asserting a right do we mean to enforce it, and that is 
one of the troubles with diplomacy in my book today, it leaves 
so much uncertainty.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think one would not want at this 
point to, quite frankly, clarify that point, because to make a 
declaration now saying that we are going to assert this right 
by force if necessary would greatly impede the possibilities of 
settling it by other means.
    Senator McClellan. I am not arguing that this is not right. 
I just point out to you----
    Secretary Rusk. I understand, sir.
    Senator McClellan. What gives me concern, because I think 
in the past we find ourselves today in positions where we have 
gotten into situations without the assistance and cooperation 
that we had a right to anticipate from agreements of the past, 
and I do not want to find ourselves in that situation in this 
crisis.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I can assure you that I certainly 
would not want to find ourselves in that situation.

            NATIONS WITH MAXIMUM INTEREST IN MARITIME RIGHTS

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, why was it that you only had 
fourteen signers at the time this was originally brought up? 
This is a pretty small minority of the rest of the nations of 
the world. Did the rest of them refuse to sign it or say they 
were going to go it alone?
    Secretary Rusk. It was my understanding those were the ones 
who had the maximum interest in maritime rights.
    Mr. Meeker, would you comment on the relevant article of 
the Convention of the Law of the Sea?

                        FLAGS FLOWN IN THE GULF

    Senator Clark. In that connection, could I ask, while he is 
answering, how many flags were flown on those 120 ships? How 
many flags were there?
    Secretary Rusk. I have it here.
    Mr. Meeker. I do.
    Secretary Rusk. There has been almost a total absence of 
Israeli flags, except Israeli trawlers. One Israeli merchant 
ship visited Eilat during the period from January 1965 up to 
the present. Four or five visits a year are made to Eilat by 
Israeli flag fishing trawlers which operate in the Red Sea.
    Secondly, we do not have any Communist shipping going in 
there.
    Third, dry cargo shipping accounts for something less than 
fifty percent of all calls made since January 1965. Nine 
countries, Greece, Liberia, the U.S., the Netherlands, Panama, 
the Philippines, Sweden, Norway, and Italy. There have been 
very, very few U.S. flag ships going there.
    Senator Clark. Are those the tankers?
    Secretary Rusk. No. The tankers are primarily under 
Panamanian and Liberian flags. They account for between 60 and 
70 percent--I am sorry, they account for practically all of the 
tanker tonnage going in there.
    As a matter of fact, tankage has now been pretty well 
concentrated in five or six large tankers operating under 
Liberian and Panamanian flags.
    Senator Clark. They get the oil from Iran?
    Secretary Rusk. They get the oil from Iran. By the way, 
this is not something that is generally publicized because Iran 
claims that it is the consortium that sells the oil, and Iran 
does not acknowledge that it is selling oil to Israel. There is 
a little fuss going on now between Egypt and Iran on just that 
point.
    But these are large tankers, 20,000 to 30,000 gross tons, 
and about a half dozen tankers are involved in that trade.
    Then there are some Israeli-owned vessels flying under 
foreign flags that are encompassed in the numbers I have 
already given you.
    Senator Clark. Well, from that it would appear that very 
few of the maritime nations that you are asking to sign this 
declaration have ships under their flags that use the gulf.
    Secretary Rusk. There are about nine or ten of them which 
are directly involved to one degree or another.
    Senator Clark. One or two ships each.
    Secretary Rusk. But then there are other, there are 
maritime nations which have a great stake in the principle 
involved here.
    For instance, Japan brings huge tankers to the Straits of 
Malacca that have a draft of one foot less than the draft of 
the strait, and they get all of their oil from Iran, 
practically all of it.
    Senator Clark. Okay. Just one more question and then I will 
subside. Are there any British or French registered vessels 
using the gulf or the strait?
    Secretary Rusk. The U.K.--I do not see France on the list. 
The United Kingdom certainly.
    Senator Lausche. Will you again identify----
    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I did not come anywhere near 
getting an answer to my question when I got diverted.
    Secretary Rusk. I am sorry.

                           AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB

    Senator Mundt. My question is why, back in 1950-something, 
fourteen nations signed this declaration, such a small minority 
even of the maritime nations signed it? Did a group of fourteen 
get together and were doing this as an exclusive club. Did they 
ask the others and did they reject it?
    Secretary Rusk. I would think those that signed it, 
excluding the Communist countries, would represent a very, very 
high percentage of the maritime shipping.
    Now, Japan--Japan was not----
    Mr. Meeker. Japan was not a member.
    Secretary Rusk. Japan was not a member of the U.N.
    Senator Mundt. Read those fourteen again.
    Mr. Meeker. Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Costa Rica, 
the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.
    I might just say a word about the origin of those 
statements made to the General Assembly which will, perhaps, in 
part, answer your question, Senator.
    Senator Lausche. May I interrupt at this point? Was that a 
written declaration signed by people or were they oral 
statements made----
    Mr. Meeker. Individual oral statements made on the floor of 
the General Assembly.
    Secretary Rusk. But parallel statements.

                   NEGOTIATIONS AT END OF SUEZ CRISIS

    Mr. Meeker. There have been in the preceding few days, and 
concluding on February 28, very active consultations between 
the U.S. government, the government of Israel, and others as to 
exactly how the peace settlement and armistice would be 
arranged at the end of the Suez conflict.
    At that time it was agreed that there should be a series of 
statements to this effect concerning the Strait or Tiran and 
the Gulf of Aqaba as part of the overall set of arrangements 
under which forces would be withdrawn and under which the 
United Nations Emergency Force would be put in its positions, 
both in the Gaza Strip and also at the entrance of the Strait 
of Tiran.
    The United States made a statement on that day--Ambassador 
Lodge was our representative in the Assembly--and we, and I 
think also the government of Israel, spoke with a number of 
other countries asking them whether they would be prepared to 
make parallel statements.
    I am not aware that we approached any countries who said 
they disagreed with this point of view and, therefore, declined 
to make a statement.
    I think the shortness of time may be responsible for the 
fact that there were not more than fourteen. But I think that 
it is noteworthy that among this group are some of the 
principal shipping nations of the world.
    Senator Sparkman. May I ask this question?

                      HOW WILL RIGHTS BE ASSERTED?

    Senator McClellan. If I may have this one other question, 
and then I am going to quit. I just want to satisfy myself.
    When you say that these governments will assert a right, 
the right is presumed to make that claim without any 
reservation. Now you propose to assert it. That means we are 
going to take some action; assert means to act. How are we 
going to assert it except for the ships to go up there and 
demand to pass through? How do you assert it?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, there are many--I am not a 
lawyer, and I will ask Mr. Meeker to comment on this. But my 
understanding is that there are many ways to assert a right. If 
a trespasser comes on your land----
    Senator McClellan. I know there are other things, but when 
you----
    Secretary Rusk. If a trespasser comes on your land you try 
to talk him off it; you can call a cop in certain 
circumstances; you might even shoot him. But there are many 
ways to assert a right, and there are a good many possibilities 
open here as to how the right can be most effectively asserted. 
This is silent on the question of how.

                DECLARATION DOES NOT EMBODY A COMMITMENT

    Senator McClellan. I know it is. That is the point. Is it 
going to be interpreted by Israel that we are going to assert 
it, we are going to see that these ships get through, or are we 
leaving her open to that hope or expectation?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker, would you read the Senator that 
sentence of interpretation which we would propose to use if 
other governments--some of them undoubtedly will ask us the 
same question that you just asked.
    Senator McClellan. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. Do you have that sentence there with you?
    Mr. Meeker. Yes, I do.
    What we would say in answer to this very question from 
other governments is roughly the following: That the language 
of the declaration in itself does not embody a commitment as to 
the particular means by which the right would be asserted in 
order to give effect to the purposes of the declaration.
    The declaration starts with two things. First, an assertion 
of international status in the waterway and, second, a 
statement that the governments participating in the declaration 
will assert this right and will seek to gain general 
recognition for it.
    Now, the question of how these purposes are going to be 
effectuated, that is simply not covered in this declaration, 
and it is a question which the governments themselves are going 
to have to continue to consider as they proceed.
    As the Secretary has said, there are many different ways of 
proceeding: in the United Nations; through diplomacy; by indeed 
sending one or more ships through the strait for the purpose of 
entering the Gulf of Aqaba. There are many different ways, and 
those will all have to be considered.

                  USE OF FORCE IS A SEPARATE QUESTION

    Secretary Rusk. Senator, may I just add one word of 
clarification on this?
    Senator McClellan. I am going to quit.
    Secretary Rusk. We ought to be clear around this table on 
this point.
    The Executive Branch is not going to come back to you 
gentlemen at any time in the future to say that this word, this 
declaration commits us to the use of force. That is a separate 
question which the President and you would have to talk out 
among yourselves and make a decision on it.
    Senator McClellan. That ought to be made very clear. I 
appreciate your saying that.
    Now, one other thing. You said there are different ways to 
assert it. Is not the most direct way to assert this right to 
move your ships out there and demand passage through?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that might be the most direct way.
    Senator McClellan. I said direct.
    Secretary Rusk. It might be the most direct way.
    Senator McClellan. And if shooting starts over there would 
we not expect a direct effort made?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, this, it might be the most direct 
way. It may not be the most effective way or the wisest way 
under certain circumstances.
    Senator McClellan. I apologize, and I thank you. I am 
through.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand.

                        STRAITS AROUND THE WORLD

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, will you reidentify the 
straits around the world where this principle becomes involved. 
You mentioned the Malacca Straits. Which are the places? I do 
not have--in the Baltic?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not have it. Perhaps Mr. Meeker has 
it, sir.
    Senator Lausche. I want it for information.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. Here is a list that I will be glad 
to----
    Senator Lausche. Is it a large list?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. It involves two pages with two or 
three lines each.
    Senator Lausche. It ought to be placed in the record.
    Secretary Rusk. We will put it in the record of the Foreign 
Relations Committee. But the Strait of Dover, the Strait of 
Gibraltar, the Magellan Straits, the Straits of Malacca, the 
Martinique Channel. The two most dramatic ones, I would 
suppose, would be the Straits of Malacca, the Singapore 
Straits, and what do you call this between Denmark and--the 
Sound between Denmark and Sweden where territorial waters come 
right up and occupy the entire passage.
    Senator Clark. You have the case in Corfu.
    Secretary Rusk. The Corfu case in the World Court is very 
opposite here with respect to the principle involved.

                     SOVIET INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM

    So we feel--and, by the way, the Soviet Union might have 
some real interest in this problem. The Bosporus is covered by 
the special convention, Montreux Convention, but the Soviet 
Union, as a maritime nation, has got a tremendous interest in 
this. This may be one of the reasons why they are just being a 
little careful about this issue of the Strait of Tiran.
    Secretary Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, why didn't Russia have 
to ask Turkey for permission to go through the Dardanelles?
    Secretary Rusk. That is under the regulations of the 
Montreux Convention. By the way, on that point, Secretary 
McNamara might wish to comment, but the movement of these 
vessels into the Mediterranean brings their forces about where 
they were--about two or three ships more--about June a year 
ago. This may or may not be connected with the Middle East 
crisis, but it is not a major naval movement.
    Bob, do you want to comment on it?
    Secretary McNamara. I think they are trying to make it 
appear that it is connected with the Middle East crisis and to 
give the peoples of the world the impression they are moving 
forcefully to support the Arab position. But the fact is that 
the movement was planned separate and apart from the Middle 
East crisis and, as Secretary Rusk pointed out, brings their 
total fleet in the Mediterranean to slightly more than the 
strength that it had a year ago.

                         ISRAEL'S OIL RESERVES

    Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, could you comment on how much 
time, in your opinion, we have got in this area. I have 
particular reference to how much reserve oil Israel has got, 
and how long can we reasonably expect them to cool it.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there is not a lot of time here, 
because this is a major issue for Israel, and Israel has made 
it clear, both in 1957 and since, that they would protect their 
own rights of access through the Strait of Tiran.
    Senator Clark. As long as they have got some oil you can 
probably cool them. But if they are running out of oil they are 
going to act. Is this not a fair assumption?
    Secretary Rusk. I would hesitate to ask Israel to give, to 
specify the number of days. But their patience is going to run 
out pretty fast.
    Senator Clark. I would ask then how much oil they have got.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not know what their stocks are. If we 
have that information----
    Mr. Battle. We do not have it.

                      ESTABLISHING THE STATUS QUO

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to infringe 
on the rights of any Senator, but we have the Secretary of 
State here and the Secretary of Defense, and I would hope that 
we would make a reasonable effort to preserve the regular 
order. There are many questions I would like to ask.
    Senator Sparkman. Well, Senator Symington, I appreciate 
that. I have been trying for some time to get in a question 
myself.
    If I may ask it now, and ask Mr. Meeker to explain--no, to 
ask this general question about page two of this proposal: The 
views we express in this declaration formed the basis on which 
a settlement of the Near East conflict was achieved in early 
1957--a settlement that has governed the actions of nations for 
more than ten years.
    Now, is that borne out by facts and documents and 
historical records or is that just a statement of opinion?
    Mr. Meeker. No, I think that is borne out by the record 
very clearly.
    In 1957, at the end of the Suez conflict, one of the things 
that was done to resolve the conflict and to deal with this 
issue about navigation through the Strait of Tiran, was to 
station an element of the United Nations Emergency Force at a 
place called Sharm el-Sheikh in Egyptian territory at the 
southern-most tip of the Sinai Peninsula.
    The stationing of that force was for the very purpose of 
seeing to it that navigation through the strait and into the 
gulf would be unimpeded. This was agreed to by Egypt and it was 
also accepted by Israel as a satisfactory set of arrangements 
under which they would withdraw their forces from certain 
territory which they had occupied.
    Now, in fact, for the next ten years from that time until 
very recent days when Egypt again occupied Sharm el-Sheikh, 
there was no interference with navigation through the waterway.
    We thought that it would be useful in this declaration to 
point out that there had been a status quo undisturbed for ten 
years, and that any effort to block navigation through the 
strait and gulf now was an effort to upset something, upset a 
set of arrangements, which have lasted for more than ten years.
    Secretary Rusk. And a status quo based upon an agreement of 
ten years ago.

                       REMOVAL OF THE PEACE FORCE

    Senator Sparkman. What effect did the removal of the peace 
force from there have upon this agreement?
    Mr. Meeker. We do not think that it has any legal effect 
whatever because the right of passage was one which we asserted 
and believed to exist quite independently of the stationing of 
an element of UNEF at Sharm el-Sheikh.

                  1958 AGREEMENT ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

    I should mention that one year after the settlement of the 
Suez conflict, there convened at Geneva a conference on the Law 
of the Sea in the spring of 1958, and this very issue was 
addressed by the conference. The Netherlands made a proposal 
for a provision to be inserted in the treaty and, in fact, it 
was inserted in the treaty. It reads as follows--this is 
Article 16, paragraph 4 of the Treaty on the Territorial Sea:

    There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of 
foreign ships through straits which are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas and another part 
of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state.

    Now, that fits just perfectly the situation on the Strait 
of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.
    Secretary Rusk. And the Soviet Union acceded to this 
convention without entering a reservation on this particular 
article.
    Senator Kuchel. Have we approved this treaty?
    Secretary Rusk. We have, and Egypt has not.
    Senator Lausche. When was that approved?
    Secretary Rusk. 1958.
    Senator McCarthy. 1958.

                      GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

    Senator Sparkman. I think here is something that might be 
well to put into the record. This is General Assembly 
Resolution 1125 of February 2, 1957, operative paragraph number 
three:

    Considers that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the 
Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas the scrupulous maintenance of 
the armistice agreement requires the placing of the United 
Nations Emergency Forces on the Egypt-Israel armistice 
demarcation line.

    It seems to me that would be well to put in the record at 
this point.

                    ATMOSPHERICS OF THE U.N. DEBATE

    Secretary Rusk. By the way, just to comment a little bit on 
some of the atmospherics in the U.N. debate, the Arabs in New 
York have called for complete compliance with the armistice 
arrangements. One of the problems about this is that they want 
to be selective about it.
    Under the armistice arrangements Israel could use the Suez 
Canal, but they do not mean that. So they are trying to be 
quite selective about which arrangements it is that they want 
to have maintained.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Hickenlooper?

                         EGYPTIAN FOOD SUPPLIES

    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, as a corollary to the 
question about the amount of oil in Israel, how much food does 
Egypt have for the future? How long can Egypt feed itself?
    Secretary Rusk. We believe they usually run from six weeks 
to two months' stocks in the country. As you know, they have 
not been receiving food from us for some time.
    We understand they have made arrangements with the Soviet 
Union that will probably take them to the first of the year.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Hayden, do you have any questions 
of the Secretary?
    Senator Hayden. No.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Stennis?
    Senator Stennis. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I feel 
like I ought to pass in favor of members of your own committee. 
Thanks very much.
    Senator Sparkman. We are all meeting together.
    Senator Stennis. I pass for the time being.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Kuchel?
    Senator Kuchel. No questions.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Mundt?

                       ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, if I understand your opening 
statement, the nature of this document is something which you 
propose to circulate among maritime countries----
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Mundt [continuing]. Without handling it through the 
United Nations.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, let me say----
    Senator Mundt. That is within your program.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. This is a very early 
consultation with the Senators on this particular document.
    We undoubtedly will have from some governments some 
suggestions for amendments or some additions or something of 
that sort. Nor has there been a final decision as to just when 
and how to use it. In any event, if it is used it would 
presumably be referred in the first instance as a declaration 
to the United Nations.
    But there is a great deal of discussion going on in the 
corridors. We have a new President of the Security Council for 
the month of June, a Dane, who is not under the same 
limitations that the representative of China was under there 
because he was not--he has no contact with a good many members 
of the Security Council, and so we do not--I cannot tell you 
today exactly who would adhere to this declaration, nor when 
and how it would be used.
    But we feel that this is a matter of some urgency to pull 
together a maximum group of countries who have an interest in 
this maritime right we are talking about here.

                      NEED FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION

    Senator Mundt. If I might follow up what I have in mind. I 
am a little bit dubious about going around the United Nations 
to contact these countries and get them to sign it, because 
historically every time we have proceeded in some area of the 
world without the sanction of the U.N., it has gotten to be an 
American task, an American job.
    Korea, while we did it legally, we went around the Russians 
because they were not there, and it was our war. In Vietnam, we 
edged into it without the U.N., and it has become our war.
    It seems to me in this kind of thing, if we do agree upon 
it, it should in the first instance be submitted for U.N. 
action instead of something that is promoted outside. That was 
the purport of my original question about the fourteen 
countries, because that does not even represent a fraction of 
the U.N. support.
    Secretary Rusk. That issue is right now before the Security 
Council because yesterday Ambassador Goldberg put in a 
resolution calling on the parties concerned to comply with the 
Secretary General's appeal. The Secretary General's appeal was 
to urge all the parties concerned to exercise special 
restraint, to forego belligerence; that is, the exercise, 
attempted exercise of belligerent rights; and to avoid all 
other action to increase tension, to allow the Council to deal 
with the underlying causes of the present crisis and seek 
solutions.
    Now, that resolution, which involves the same principle as 
this declaration, is right now before the Security Council.
    There is also an Arab resolution which takes another view. 
So this issue is before the Security Council now.
    Senator Mundt. Then where does this fit in? Is this 
proposed to be done if the Security Council does not act? I am 
just not clear. You started out by saying you would circulate 
this to as many countries as would be willing to sign it.
    Secretary Rusk. It would be a multilateral support of the 
assertion of this right which we are now asserting in the 
Security Council.
    Senator Mundt. Well, I do not want to take any more time, 
but I want to reiterate my skepticism about the United Nations 
by running around it.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Mansfield?

                         FRANCE'S DETACHED ROLE

    Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, I note that France is 
hardly even mentioned. What is its position vis-a-vis the 
situation in the Middle East.
    Secretary Rusk. France has been trying to play a detached 
role. It has taken two steps which are relevant. We are 
consulting with them now and, as you know, consulting with 
France is rather difficult until other Frenchmen know exactly 
what one man has in mind, and that is sometimes hard to 
ascertain.
    France has been giving, expediting its arms assistance to 
Israel. France has been the principal supplier of Israeli arms.
    Senator Mansfield. Still?
    Secretary Rusk. Still, And they have been expediting those 
shipments. We should keep that very quiet.
    Secondly, they publicly as well as privately called upon 
the Soviet Union, ourselves, and the United Kingdom to join in 
quadripartite consultations on this matter.
    The Soviet Union has turned that down, although we just 
hear this morning that the Soviet Union is apparently prepared 
now for the first time to discuss these matters within the 
framework of the Security Council. So that there will be 
discussions with Fedorenko and Seydoux and Caradon at the 
Security Council. Ambassador Goldberg is pursuing that today.

                    POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT MEETING

    Senator Mansfield. One more question. Referring to the 
French suggestion, could the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
issue a call for a summit meeting of the maritime states to 
include, one, consideration of the declaration which has been 
laid before us today for an immediate decision and, secondly, 
consider an agreement based on the Montreux Convention to 
illustrate indirectly the situation which the U.S.S.R. finds 
itself in in the Bosporus?
    Secretary Rusk. That is a possibility, Senator. I would 
think that that would be a little premature at this time until 
we explore further with the Soviets what their view is on the 
strait.
    I think if we came to a summit where the court of last 
resort is in session, only to break up in severe disagreement, 
that would set everything back.
    We would hope very much that the Soviets will show some 
flexibility on this question of the strait insofar as their 
support of the Arabs is concerned. However, that is something 
we will keep very much in mind as a possibility.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Dirksen?

                      SHIPS UNDER FOREIGN REGISTRY

    Senator Dirksen. I would like to ask Mr. Meeker a question. 
I notice on the last part of page one where you say:
    ``Our governments will assert this right on behalf of all 
shipping sailing under their flags.'' What about governments 
whose vessels are under foreign registry, Israeli vessels, for 
instance, flying the Liberian flag or the Panamanian flag?
    Secretary Rusk. If I may comment first on that, Senator, on 
these matters the government of the flag has the overwhelming 
predominant role.
    Now, I do not know whether this has been made public or 
not, but President Tubman, for example, of Liberia, has asked 
his flag ships to come around Africa into Haifa rather than run 
through the strait and have them sunk before this question is 
clarified.
    But you have two different authorities operating in a 
matter of this sort: The government of the flag in the first 
instance and, secondly, the owners.
    Now comes Lloyds of London. They have cancelled insurance 
on ships going through the strait, and so owners simply as a 
matter of ownership prudence are reluctant to challenge the 
situation until it is clarified further. That is the principal 
reason why, perhaps, there have not been actual ships going 
through there in the last few days, that is, to Eilat.
    Senator Dirksen. Using the word ``their'' you really limit 
this, don't you, to their flags?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, in that particular phrase. But the 
second phrase ``to cooperate among themselves and to join with 
others in seeking general recognition of this right'' broadens 
it somewhat.
    Senator Dirksen. That is all.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Gore?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker, do you want to add anything?
    Mr. Meeker. No.

                      PARALLEL WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, well, I shall confine myself to 
a very brief statement.
    I wish to commend the administration for its prudence and 
caution in this matter, but also its firmness, and to express 
appreciation for the close consultation with the Senate.
    I would add one word of caution with respect to the use of 
the present tense which Senator Case suggested. If you speak in 
the future, you reserve the right to future assertion, you 
leave more options, more choices open.
    The most encouraging thing you bring is, however secret it 
is, that there is close communication, mutual effort, on the 
part of the United States and the Soviet Union.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would like to emphasize the 
secrecy of that because that would disappear----
    Senator Gore. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. If from our sources this got 
to be known.
    Senator Gore. I accept.
    Now, my one question is: Since there is a possibility of a 
parallelism with respect to this gulf and this port and 
Haiphong, and since you report to us this does encompass a 
matter of major importance, a mutuality of effort to cool a 
dangerous situation in the Middle East, if that in any way 
could be coupled with a mutuality of effort in Southeast Asia. 
I do not wish to divert you particularly into that, but it 
seems to me that this might be a major break in cooperation 
between the two great powers. I would hope that we would not 
lose the opportunity, if such existed, in extending this 
cooperation to an effort of deescalation in the Far East.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, there is nothing we would like 
better.
    I would doubt the wisdom of trying these two questions 
together organically, because it is hard enough to sort out 
conflicting interests in each question standing alone.
    However, we are in pretty regular contact with the Soviet 
Union on Vietnam. I think the big problem there is that their 
influence in Hanoi does not put them in a position to negotiate 
seriously about it.
    I do not believe Vietnam at this stage can be settled 
between Washington and Moscow because Moscow cannot deliver 
Hanoi. I think myself there is a basis for agreement between us 
and the Soviet Union on Vietnam, based upon our recognition of 
their stake in North Vietnam and their recognition of our stake 
in South Vietnam.
    We have had many, many long discussions with the Soviet 
Union along these lines.
    I would hope that given the parallel action that we and 
they showed during the India-Pakistan fighting and, indeed, at 
the Tashkent Conference, where we encouraged all three of them 
to go ahead with the Tashkent Conference, that if there could 
be some parallel action here this might encourage a little more 
parallel action on some other problem.
    Senator Gore. The whole purpose of my question was to 
entertain such a hope.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Smith?
    Senator Smith. Yes Mr. Chairman.

                          MINING OF THE STRAIT

    Mr. Secretary, Nasser has been quoted as saying that the 
strait, the entrance of the strait or the gulf, I do not recall 
which, was mined. You referred to continuing shipping. How can 
shipping be continued if the mining has taken place without a 
lot of trouble?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we doubt very much--and the Secretary 
might wish to comment on this--would you comment and take that 
one, Bob?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes. We have no indication that they 
have mined the strait itself. As a matter of fact, we have some 
indication that they have not. They may have mined in a 
defensive way the entrances to their own naval facilities near 
the strait. We think that is what he might have alluded to.
    But the mining of the strait itself would be extremely 
difficult because it is very deep, some 900 feet deep, and the 
current passing through it is quite swift. We doubt that he has 
the capability to mine waters of that kind.
    We have no evidence he has. There have been a number of 
ships that have passed through since he was alleged to have 
made that statement, and it is our firm conclusion that the 
strait is not mined as of today.
    Secretary Rusk. Apparently shipping goes through normally 
to the Jordanian port of Aqaba through the strait, so it is 
unlikely that the strait itself is mined in a way that would 
close it.

                 AUTHORITY FOR WITHDRAWING U.N. TROOPS

    Senator Smith. One other question, Mr. Secretary. On what 
authority were the U.N. troops or forces withdrawn?
    Secretary Rusk. The Secretary General felt on the basis of 
legal advice he had from his own Secretariat that he, as 
Secretary General, had authority to withdraw those forces 
basically on the ground; that the forces were there with the 
consent of Egypt, and if Egypt, as a sovereign country, 
withdrew that consent, the forces had no right to be there.
    Now, we might not have contested the right which might have 
existed at the end of the day, but we did think that the 
Secretary General would have been much wiser, indeed had an 
obligation, to consult the General Assembly or the Security 
Council before taking that action, because the force was 
established by the General Assembly.
    But he used that. He exercised what he considered to be the 
executive and the legal power of the Secretary General as sort 
of the commander-in-chief of the U.N. forces.
    Senator Smith. Have we protested?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, indeed we have, very strongly, both 
publicly and privately. The President's statement on May 23 
said that we were dismayed about that action.
    Senator Smith. Could he return the U.N. to that area then 
without action by Colonel Nasser?
    Secretary Rusk. He probably could if he and the parties 
were willing to as a matter of law. My guess is that he would 
not make the attempt, and also my guess is that Egypt would not 
accept it. But it is not completely outside the possibilities 
that some sort of U.N. presence, less than the United Nations 
force, more than just a handful of commissioners, might be put 
along that border before this matter is finished.
    Senator Kuchel. On what side?
    Secretary Rusk. On both sides, perhaps.
    Senator Smith. Such action then makes the United Nations 
rather useless, does it not?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator Smith, this is a personal 
view. I do not want to speak for the entire administration on 
this, but I have felt that the Secretary General has on three 
occasions, on three issues, not supported the U.N. and 
supported the charter in a way that one would expect the 
Secretary General to do so: On the article 19 issue; on his 
great resistance to consideration of the Vietnam situation by 
the United Nations; and now on this particular matter of the 
U.N. forces in the Middle East. We have been disappointed in 
all three of those.
    Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Lausche?
    Senator Lausche. Yes.

                     COMPARISON TO BOSPORUS STRAIT

    Are France and Great Britain signatories to the convention 
defining international waters?
    Mr. Meeker. The United Kingdom is a party to the 1958 
convention; France is not.
    Senator Lausche. Why didn't France subscribe to it?
    Secretary Rusk. They have never indicated any reasons.
    Senator Lausche. Did either France or England make 
statements on the floor of the United Nations comparable to the 
ones that were made by the nations that you identified a moment 
ago?
    Mr. Meeker. Both of them did, and those statements were 
along the lines of this very draft declaration.
    Senator Lausche. Why is the Bosporus Strait considered 
different than all other straits which are mentioned as being 
parts of the high seas in the convention?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker?
    Mr. Meeker. There is this difference, what a treaty has 
been concluded among a number of countries, the Montreux 
Convention governing passage through the Bosporus and the 
Dardanelles.
    Now, there is not any comparable treaty addressed 
specifically to this strait.
    Senator Lausche. Well, was the treaty on the Bosporus 
Strait executed before the convention?
    Mr. Meeker. Long before, yes.
    Senator Lausche. I see.
    Secretary Rusk. The 19th Century at first, wasn't it?
    Mr. Meeker. I think it was 1924.
    Senator Lausche. Looking at the map it would seem that the 
body of water that is connected by the Bosporus Strait with the 
Mediterranean has more of the attributes of an inland body of 
water.
    Is there any rationalization for keeping the Bosporus 
Strait out of the general principle declared in the convention?
    Secretary Rusk. It is subject to a special regime of 
international law based upon a treaty. The same issues might 
arise if there were no special treaty governing it.
    Senator Clark. You still have the Dardanelles.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, both together.
    Senator Clark. Both under one?
    Mr. Meeker. Yes.

            REACHING AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION ON VIETNAM

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, you stated that Russia 
recognizes our interest in South Vietnam as well as we 
recognize their interest in North Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. No, Senator, excuse me, I did not go quite 
that far.
    I said there ought to be the makings of an agreement 
between us on Vietnam based upon our willingness to recognize 
their interest in the security, and so forth, of North Vietnam, 
and their recognition of our interest in South Vietnam.
    Senator Lausche. What is the basis of that interest? How do 
we conclude that it is in their interest to have North Vietnam 
and in our interest to have South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, they have very close relations with 
other socialist countries, and we have a treaty involving South 
Vietnam. It is a protocol state to the SEATO Treaty.

                             LANGUAGE USAGE

    Senator Lausche. Now, you recognize the importance of the 
words ``will assert'' as indicated by the memorandum which you 
have already prepared containing your explanation of those 
words. Did you give consideration to the use of some other word 
than ``assert'' in preparing this declaration?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Meeker?
    Mr. Meeker. The reason that we chose that particular 
language was that it is the very language used by both the 
United States and the United Kingdom in their statements to the 
General Assembly in 1957. We felt that the wording was 
expressive of what we meant to say.
    It is also the same wording that was used in the aide 
memoire given to the government of Israel explaining our 
position. Secretary Dulles a few days before in February had 
given to Israel, the Israeli Embassy in Washington, an aide 
memoire which contained these very words as expressing a part 
of our attitude toward the Strait of Tiran. It has a good deal 
of history, and we thought we would probably maximize the 
support for this declaration by expressing a declaration in 
terms that are familiar, that would be recognized by other 
governments as something that they had already subscribed to 
earlier.
    Senator Lausche. Now, I observe in the declaration, you say 
that we affirm--``In regard to shipping through the waterways 
that serve ports on the Gulf of Aqaba, our governments reaffirm 
the view that the gulf is an international waterway into and 
through which the vessels of all nations have a right of 
passage.''
    Did you think. of using the word ``reaffirm'' instead of 
the word ``assert'' in the second sentence of the second 
paragraph: ``our governments reaffirm this right on behalf of 
all shipping.'' Did you give any consideration to that? You use 
``reaffirm'' in one instance and ``assert'' in the other, and 
my question is why.
    Mr. Meeker. I think perhaps the two words are used in a 
slightly different context. In the first case, the governments 
are stating, and in some cases restating, a view that they have 
expressed before; and in the second sentence what the 
governments would be doing would not be stating a view but 
saying that they would pursue, they would assert, they would 
maintain, they would do things to make effective their right of 
passage.
    I think the two words are used in a slightly different 
sense, and that is why we used ``reaffirm'' in one case and 
``assert'' in the other.
    Senator Lausche. Was the word ``will'' instead of ``shall'' 
used advisedly?
    Mr. Meeker. ``Will'' is exactly the language that was used 
in 1957; ``will assert.''
    Senator Lausche. Well, ``shall'' in this context would mean 
a determination and a purpose. ``Will'' has a different 
connotation when used in connection with the third person.
    Now, my question is was the word ``will'' instead of 
``shall'' used advisedly?
    Mr. Meeker. It was used because it was the exact same 
expression which governments have used before, ten years ago.
    Senator Lausche. Now, then----

                       MANY WAYS TO ASSERT RIGHTS

    Secretary Rusk. Senator, may I just intrude for a second 
here? I am sorry Senator McClellan left--oh, Senator McClellan, 
you are here. I made the point that this language neither 
commits us to nor prohibits the use of force here, and that I 
told you that the Executive would be back with you later if 
that situation should arise.
    But I want to be completely frank on this. The language 
``will assert'' does not mean that we will do absolutely 
nothing. There are many ways to assert rights, and so that if 
there is anyone who feels that we ought to pay no attention to 
this right in the Gulf of Aqaba or the Strait of Tiran, we 
ought to treat it with indifference, we ought not to lift a 
finger on that, then this language goes beyond that.
    Senator McClellan. Will you yield?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, Senator.
    Senator McClellan. You mean by ``assert'' you will assert 
it in one instance and if you are not successful in achieving 
your objective you will assert it another way. Does it not 
imply, I get the implication from it, that when you say 
``assert it'' you mean to assert it to the point of gaining the 
objective?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the assertion of the right itself is 
not a final obligation to go all the way, but it is not trivial 
language, Senator. I do not want to be----
    Senator McClellan. I know it. I just wanted everybody else 
to be----
    Secretary Rusk. And you are quite right to want to know 
what it means.
    What I am saying is we will assert it in every way we can--
in the first instance without the use of force, but on the 
question of the use of force, it is not a commitment here. The 
President will surely be in consultation with the Congress 
before we get to that point.
    Senator McClellan. What I was concerned about, Mr. 
Secretary, was that we all agree to ``assert.'' We give one 
interpretation to what we mean by ``assert.''
    Someone else signing it, some other government, gives 
another. Therefore, when we say ``assert'' we mean we are going 
in there to gain this right; to make it secure and to exercise 
this right. The other government might say, ``Well, we didn't 
mean that. If that is what you meant, go ahead.'' We will get 
out again on a limb with nobody supporting us. That is what 
concerns me, because I think we are there in Vietnam now, 
assuming we are there, and have a right to be and it is our 
place to be there, we have an obligation to be there, I think 
there are many others who have a greater obligation to be there 
than we have who are not there.

                 THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS

    Senator Lausche. I want to conclude. Based upon my own 
observation of the high seas and supported by the convention 
which has been described, to me it appears clear that these 
waters, this strait leading into the Gulf of Aqaba, connects 
two bodies of international waterways. I subscribe fully to the 
rationalization given by Senator Rusk. [Laughter.] Secretary 
Rusk. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Lausche. Yes, by Secretary Rusk.
    Demonstrating that a principle is involved there dealing 
with many straits throughout the world.
    I have no hesitation about declaring by myself as a member 
of this committee that these straits are international waters. 
That is my view at the present, and I now conclude my 
questioning.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Cooper?

                      INTENTION TO ENFORCE PASSAGE

    Senator Cooper. Some of the questions I have perhaps have 
been asked. But I think it is important that we consider every 
facet of the declaration. I think it is important to say that, 
if these straits are not opened, it is our intention to enforce 
the passage. I think that is the position.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    Senator Cooper. From your information and knowledge, would 
this declaration inhibit or prevent Israel from attempting to 
force a passage because if they attempt, I think we all have to 
think there is going to be a war.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think there is nothing in this 
declaration which in itself would prevent that, particularly 
action by Israel to protect or defend the passage of its own 
vessels through a strait of this sort.
    I do believe, if there are a substantial number of maritime 
powers that assert this principle, this might have a delaying 
effect upon a cataclysmic decision which the Israeli government 
may feel it has to make because of the vital importance of this 
strait to it. In that sense, I think this declaration provides 
a little more moderation because there is a sense that the 
international community is interested in it and is trying to 
make good on the rights which are so vital to Israel and, for 
that matter, to Jordan, if the Nasser-King Hussein affair were 
to flare up in a hostile way at some point.

                         AN ASSURANCE TO ISRAEL

    Senator Cooper. I can understand that. It might for the 
time being inhibit Israel from taking action to open the 
strait. But if Israel accepted that, it goes along that Israel 
would expect the governments who might sign this declaration at 
some point to open the strait, isn't this an assurance to 
Israel that if the strait is not opened by action of the United 
Nations or some diplomatic means that these governments who 
then signed the declaration will take action to open the 
strait?
    Secretary Rusk. In that sense, sir, the situation is no 
different from what it was ten years ago in 1957 when the basic 
agreement was made on these arrangements. Israel at that time 
understood that it had the right, just as other countries did, 
with respect to their own ships going through these waters. I 
do not think that situation has changed, although at the moment 
it is more enflamed.
    Senator Cooper. My point is that I think the key to 
Israel's position now is that the strait would be opened. If it 
does not take action to open the strait itself, then it will 
assume that those who signed this declaration have implied, if 
not promised, to open the strait.
    Secretary Rusk. I think Israel will be prepared to see a 
maximum effort made by the maritime nations on this issue 
before they made a final decision with respect to self-help on 
a unilateral basis.
    Senator Cooper. I notice in the second paragraph, the 
second sentence: ``Our governments will assert this right on 
behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags, and our 
governments are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to 
join with others in seeking general recognition of this 
right.''
    Would Israel be asked to sign this declaration?
    Secretary Rusk. That matter has not been finally decided. 
There are some pluses and minuses on that. At the present time, 
I cannot give you a final answer on that, Senator.

                          CONSULTING CONGRESS

    Senator Cooper. I went through those documents in 1957, and 
I noticed the Secretary of State at that time said that the 
United States, of course, considering this to be international 
waters, would assert its own right to put ships of our registry 
through the strait, but it would not assert them in favor of 
other ships except by resolution of the Congress.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Cooper. Now, this declaration would go farther. 
That would say there that we assert this right not only on 
behalf of the United States, but we are prepared to cooperate 
among themselves and to join with others in seeking general 
recognition of this right.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think if a matter of the use of 
force arose, the President would be in full consultation with 
the Congress, and we have very much in mind the constitutional 
processes here throughout this situation.

                          SENDING A TEST SHIP

    Senator Cooper. One other question. Of course, the best way 
to test it would be to send a ship up there, and if that ship 
passed without any difficulty, why, at least it has been 
asserted as to that particular country and ship.
    But suppose the United States sends a ship up and it is 
stopped; it is fired upon. The United States would then have to 
make a determination to go through against hostile action or 
withdraw. It would be a pretty difficult question.
    Now, it was said that the President would consult, you have 
said that the President would consult with the Congress before 
using force. Well, under the situation I have indicated, you 
might be using force simply--you would have to use force or 
back off if the ship is up there. Would the government consult 
with the Congress before sending a ship up to test such a 
situation?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I will certainly----
    Senator Cooper. Because you would be----
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Take that question under 
advisement.
    I think I am not able today to give a final categorical 
answer, because we are talking here about giving merchant 
vessels which are at the disposition of their owners, and the 
movements of which are not necessarily under our control; quite 
frankly I do not anticipate, we do not know of a U.S. flag ship 
at the present time that is planning to go into that strait, do 
we, Bob?
    Secretary McNamara. No, we do not.
    Secretary Rusk. We do not have many in there because I do 
not think this contingency is likely to arise. I do not think 
this will be the first contingency to arise in this situation.
    Senator McClellan. Would you yield?
    Senator Cooper. Yes.

                       CLARIFY MATTERS IN ADVANCE

    Senator McClellan. Would you not think generally, there 
might be exceptions, that you would make your determination 
about what you intended to do before you sent the ship up 
there?
    Secretary Rusk. What we are intending to do, Senator, in 
connection with U.N. business is to get these things clarified 
well ahead of time and avoid the problem because some of the 
statements President Nasser has made have indicated that, 
except for Israeli flag ships, he may not change what has been 
happening here over the past years.
    Now, the principle involved----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Does he assert the right to do it, 
however?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, he has talked about closing the 
strait to foreign flag vessels carrying strategic goods. Now, 
in fact, strategic goods have not been going through that 
strait other than the possibility of considering crude oil. But 
in doing so he has also referred to the Battle Act list of 
strategic goods, and crude oil is not on the Battle Act list.
    So these are elements of obscurity here which need to be 
clarified, and we are trying to find out exactly what it is 
that Nasser says he will and will not do, so we will know 
what--how we proceed from there.
    Senator McClellan. I was not pressing the thing except----
    Secretary Rusk. I understand.
    Senator McClellan [continuing]. Except before we send a 
ship up there we ought to know what we intend to do----
    Secretary Rusk. I agree with you.
    Senator McClellan [continuing]. Before we send it up there. 
We might agree to send it up there and to do nothing. I do not 
know. But I do not think that a decision should be made 
generally--at least there might be an exception--before we send 
a ship up there, as to what we intend to do.
    Senator Sparkman. Any more, Senator Cooper?
    Senator Cooper. One more question.

                  DANGER OF EXACERBATING THE SITUATION

    As I understand it, the U.S., through its resolution in the 
Security Council, is proposing a dampening down of the 
situation.
    In your judgment, would this declaration, if issued, have 
any effect upon exacerbating the situation, knowing Nasser's 
disposition, in view of his declaration that he would not let 
any of the ships through?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, Senator, in terms of the timing of 
the declaration, we want to take into account the then state of 
discussion at the Security Council and through private 
diplomacy.
    Certainly the Arabs will not like this, but if you have 
twelve to twenty countries signing it, it has considerable 
weight, and in those, such as the President of the Security 
Council or, perhaps, the Secretary General, would have more 
muscle in their talks with the other side, with the Arabs, to 
try to get an answer to this question of the strait, because 
this will have, I think, very considerable weight in any such 
discussions.

              POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

    Senator Cooper. I will ask one more that goes beyond this. 
Do you anticipate in any way or believe that this situation 
there could bring the United States into a confrontation with 
the Soviet Union?
    Secretary Rusk. I think it is possible, sir.
    I did indicate to the Senators earlier, I think you were 
here when I said that we had had certain exchanges with the 
Soviet Union.
    One cannot reply upon anything absolutely in matters of 
this sort, but it is our impression that they are not 
themselves now reaching out for a military confrontation; that 
they do not want major hostilities in the area. Although we 
should be under no illusion about it, they would like to make 
as many Brownie points as possible in supporting the so-called 
progressive states, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, against the more 
moderate Arab states, against Israel, and undoubtedly they hope 
to pick up prestige in the Arab world.
    Now, let me say on that, sir, I mentioned earlier that 
President Nasser has climbed on the back of a tiger here. If 
when we get through with this thing the strait is opened, and 
the Holy war has not occurred, then there is going to be a 
rebound from there as far as the Arab man in the street is 
concerned.
    Senator Cooper. I do not think he can back down. That is 
the problem.

                  CLOSING OF STRAITS MAY BE SELECTIVE

    Senator Hickenlooper. Will the Senator yield for one 
question? Going to a very important part of this, has it been 
determined that Nasser asserts the right in his complete 
discretion to close the strait to anyone, any shipping, all 
shipping?
    Secretary Rusk. He has not yet said that categorically.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Or selectively closing it.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that the Arab answer to that would 
be selectively; that is, it seems that their attitude--and Mr. 
Meeker, will you check on this--it seems to me they are talking 
about closing it to Israeli flag ships and the flags of other 
nations carrying strategic goods.
    Senator Hickenlooper. If he can close it selectively, then 
he asserts complete sovereignty over the strait.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    Senator Hickenlooper. How does that affect Jordan's rights?
    Jordan's only outlet to the sea is by way of Aqaba.
    Secretary Rusk. It could affect Jordan's rights if Cairo 
wished to exercise themselves against Jordan.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And Saudi Arabia fronts on the sea.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right. There are four riparian 
countries involved in this Gulf of Aqaba thing, plus the 
general international rights of maritime nations.
    Now, three of those riparian countries are together because 
the issue is Israel, but they may not be together next time 
when this question comes up.

                  VALIDITY OF THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT

    Senator Kuchel. Senator, may I ask one quick question, 
please? Senator Sparkman. Bearing on this? Because I wanted to 
call on Secretary McNamara.
    Senator Kuchel. Just one quick question.
    Mr. Secretary, does the department consider that there is 
any validity in the old tripartite agreement? Is there any 
obligation to the three signatory countries?
    Secretary Rusk. The principle under the tripartite 
agreement has been restated by American Presidents, and was 
essentially the language used by the President in his statement 
of May 23.
    As far as Britain is concerned, and there are--you should 
look over the record of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
in my last appearance, Senator Kuchel----
    Senator Kuchel. Okay.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. As far as the British are 
concerned, they consider the tripartite declaration has been 
overtaken by a press conference statement by President Kennedy, 
reaffirmed by the British Prime Minister in the House of 
Commons in 1963.
    The French are very uncertain on this point. I would think 
we would have to assume, though, as far as the organic 
tripartite character of that declaration is concerned that 
Britain and France would think that was overtaken by the Suez 
affair.
    Senator Kuchel. Thank you.
    Secretary Rusk. Although the policy may be continued by all 
three.

                      LANGUAGE OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE

    Senator Sparkman. I want to ask Secretary McNamara to make 
some comments.
    Senator McNamara. I only wanted to comment on one question 
raised by Senator Cooper, Mr. Chairman.
    He asked: Does the proposed declaration go beyond the 
statement of 1957, specifically with respect to stating that 
the U.S. government is prepared to join with others in seeking 
general recognition of this right. I think the answer is, no, 
it does not, Senator Cooper.
    The specific language of the aide memoire delivered by our 
government to Israel on February 11, 1957 is, and I am going to 
leave out one or two clauses, but the essence of it is, ``The 
U.S. is prepared to join with others to secure general 
recognition of this right.'' I think, therefore, the language 
of the declaration parallels that of the U.S. government's 
statement to Israel in February of 1957.
    Senator Cooper. I do not want to get legalistic, but I 
think this ought to go in the record. Later on February 19, 
1957, the Secretary of State, commenting on that aide memoire, 
said, as I read it, that it only applied to the United States, 
that it would assert that right for vessels under its own 
registry, but it had no right to assert it for any other 
country.
    Senator McNamara. I think this specific language was that--
this was on the 19th of February:

    The President has inherent power to use the forces of the United 
States to protect American ships and their rights all over the world, 
but he has no power, in my opinion, to use the forces of the United 
States on behalf of vessels of another flag unless he is given that 
authority by some congressional resolution or by a treaty.

    The distinction between the----
    Senator Lausche. Whom are you quoting?
    Senator McNamara. I am quoting Secretary Dulles speaking to 
a news conference on February 19, 1957.
    I think this is the language that Senator Cooper was 
alluding to, and the distinction between that language and the 
aide memoire language of February 11, 1957 related to the use 
of force in support of the recognition of the right as opposed 
to joining with others in seeking general recognition.
    I only wanted to point out the language of the declaration 
parallels that of the statement to Israel on February 11.
    Senator Cooper. I think that is a correct interpretation.
    Senator Sparkman. Secretary Rusk is going to have to leave 
within a few minutes.
    Senator Case?

                      IN CASE ISRAEL TAKES ACTION

    Senator Case. I have one question.
    Senator Sparkman. I am sorry, I thought you were still out 
of the room when I called on Senator Cooper.
    Senator Case. Mr. Secretary, what will the United States do 
if Israel moves by land or sea or by air? Have we got a 
contingent plan?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, quite frankly we are trying 
to look at all of the contingencies in the situation. But I 
think it would be quite irresponsible for me to try to come up 
with an answer to that question. It would be for the President 
to make a determination in that situation and to discuss the 
situation with the leadership to decide what the attitude of 
the Congress will be.
    I just think that is much too far-reaching and serious a 
question for me to try to answer casually, quite frankly.
    Senator Case. It is a serious question, very serious.
    Secretary Rusk. And it is a question we have very much in 
mind, of course.
    You might want to review, if you have not done so, a good 
deal of the record here that is in the Foreign Relations 
Committee on the occasion of my last appearance in executive 
session on what has been done and said in the past on this 
point.
    Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Thurmond?

                    SOVIET GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Thurmond. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask if you are 
of the opinion or partially of the opinion that I am, that one 
of the causes of this trouble in the Middle East is the desire 
of the Soviets to possibly cause us to lose our contacts with 
the Arabs. I just started to say, knowing that the Soviets 
desire to stir up trouble over the world, and their goal is 
still to dominate and take over the world, if they can create 
an incident there and get the Arabs all together, it seems they 
have been very successful from what has happened with King 
Hussein and Nasser have been at odds and now are joined 
together. All the Arab countries it seems are consolidating and 
working together now, and if they do, and throw Israel on the 
other side, then they may feel we will defend Israel. That will 
cause the Arabs to go against us, causing them to cancel our 
oil contracts with them. I just wonder if you have any 
information on that.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think there is no question but 
that the Soviet Union has been working for some time to 
increase its own position in the Arab world by supporting 
these, particularly these four progressive states, and that the 
confrontation between Nasser and the more moderate and 
conservative states has been a part of that controversy.
    This has been enhanced because Nasser has now been able to 
pose an issue with Israel on which all Arabs apparently have to 
speak together. This is a matter for internal survival for most 
of them on this particular issue.
    But I would point out that this is the only issue on which 
they can speak together, and although the Arabs publicly are 
saying a good many things these days in terms of unity on this 
point, I do not believe the moderate and conservative Arabs are 
under any illusion about some of the other elements involved in 
this situation.
    I think that is true of Hussein. I think it is true of King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and I think it is true of Tunisia, 
Lebanon, Morocco.
    So I would not take too tragically a view at this point of 
the possibility that the entire Arab world suddenly is going to 
move into the arms of the Soviet Union over this particular 
issue.
    It is very important for us to get this straight, this 
situation straightened out, so that the other issues in the 
Arab world will come to the surface again.

                       DENYING THE WEST ARAB OIL

    I think the Soviet Union is more interested in perhaps 
denying the West the Arab oil than it is in getting the oil for 
themselves. But that is very much a two-edge sword. It would 
cause some major disruption in the free world if Arab oil were 
denied, say, to Western Europe. But it also means that the Arab 
countries themselves would lose their basic resource. They 
cannot drink the oil. They cannot do anything else with it but 
sell it, and the Communist Bloc is not--does not need it in 
terms of oil supply.
    It would cause great disarrangement for all the rest of us, 
but it certainly would have a large effect on the Arab world if 
they lose world markets in the sale of their oil.
    Senator Thurmond. If they can deny the West that oil they 
would certainly accomplish a big objective they have in mind.
    Secretary Rusk. I suppose perhaps in the short run. I do 
not quite see reducing the Middle East, even from their point 
of view, to subsistence and complete dependence upon their 
support in lieu of Arab sales of oil to the entire world. I 
think there are some limitations on their side as well as on 
ours in that situation.
    Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, on account of the shortness 
of time I will not ask any further questions.
    Senator Stennis. Mr. Chairman, may I have one minute?
    Senator Sparkman. Okay, Senator Stennis.
    Senator Stennis. I was going to take but one minute.

             U.S. PEOPLE WILL NOT SUPPORT UNILATERAL ACTION

    I want to thank you for being among those invited here. Mr. 
Secretary, I want to commend you for trying to get some kind of 
agreement and committal from other nations.
    I judge you think that nothing effective is going to come 
out of the U.N. on it. So I think we ought to reach someone 
else. I do not believe our people--I want you to remember, at 
least one Senator thinks our people are not going to support 
another undeclared war, a shooting war, alone, of us going in 
alone. I just do not believe that it can be over.
    I think, therefore, you ought to tell England and France 
and others that is the situation. That they need not think that 
they can stand by and wait for us to go in alone. I believe, 
though, that is in the back of a lot of their minds, at least, 
that they will hold back until they are convinced of that fact.
    Senator McClellan. Exactly what I was trying to determine 
about this word ``assert.''
    Senator Stennis. Yes. I think I ought to say that here.
    I do not want to say it on the floor, not yet, because I 
think you are working hard and making some headway. I was glad 
to see you are trying to get these other nations.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I say just a word about 
the U.N. security aspect of this.
    Senator Stennis. I was not trying to discredit them. I 
think you----
    Secretary Rusk. I think it is unlikely that this matter is 
going to be settled by a resolution of the Security Council, 
that is, a formal resolution, because there are vetoes and 
there are voting problems and things of that sort.
    But if you will remember the Cuban missile crisis, it 
proved to be very important that that question was officially 
before the U.N. because that helped to take certain of the 
prestige factors into custody, to the ice box, for a period, 
while other processes reached a solution.
    Now, the same thing may well be true here, the fact that it 
is before the Security Council gives other processes of 
discussion a somewhat better chance to operate. So we just do 
not know.
    Senator Stennis. I was not suggesting that you abandon 
them.
I am just glad you are going another route.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand.
    Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, when Israel----
    Senator Sparkman. Wait a minute.
    Senator Stennis. Thank you.
    That is all, Mr. Chairman. I just want to make that 
statement.

                    IF ISRAEL QUESTIONS THE MEANING

    Senator Lausche. If and when Israel asks what is the 
meaning of the words ``will assert'' what answer will be given 
to them?
    Secretary Rusk. As far as this declaration is concerned, 
the same answer Mr. Meeker read that we will give to all other 
governments.
    Senator Lausche. Yes.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Javits?

                      ASSESSMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

    Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, I am a guest of the 
committee. I appreciate it very greatly. If the chair allows me 
to ask one question I will, but only because it has not been 
covered. It is essentially a question of Secretary McNamara, 
and the question is this. Is there any reason to revise the 
U.S. appraisal of either the valor, the capacity or the 
fidelity of the forces of Israel in this situation?
    Secretary McNamara. No, sir; there is not. We believe they 
are well-equipped, well-trained, well-led and highly motivated.
    Senator Javits. Thank you.

                       ATTACKS ON U.S. FLAG SHIPS

    Senator Lausche. This further question, and I wish it would 
be put following the last one. Do I understand that before any 
affirmative action having the relationship to actual shooting, 
the administration will come before this committee or before 
the Congress?
    Secretary Rusk. That is my clear understanding, sir.
    Senator Lausche. Yes.
    Now, then, what would the attitude be of the administration 
about sending a ship up there and not knowing what is going to 
happen and if it is shot at?
    Secretary Rusk. A U.S. flag ship?
    Senator Lausche. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. We do not have a U.S. flag merchant vessel 
scheduled there for the indefinite future.
    We would like to avoid that situation again by getting the 
question settled before we get there. But I cannot give you a 
precise answer to that question at the moment, Senator.
    Senator Lausche. Well, I would assume that you would not 
undertake to do that while you are aiming toward negotiations 
and some amicable way----
    Secretary Rusk. A similar incident may arise by some other 
flag ship going through there. The owners have been rather 
skittish in the present state because they do not see clearly 
what would happen to their ships, and Lloyds has taken the 
insurance away.
    Mr. Chairman, if I may say so, I greatly appreciated the 
invitation of the Foreign Relations Committee on my last 
appearance here to feel entitled to call upon the committee at 
any time of the day or night for further consultation. I hope, 
perhaps, that invitation can remain because we may need to 
consult with you very promptly on very short notice.
    Senator Sparkman. It certainly does remain.

                   PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ABBA EBAN

    Senator Lausche. Are you able to tell us what the President 
said to Eban in the meeting the other day? If you are not, just 
say so.
    Secretary Rusk. May I just have a word with the Vice 
President?
    [Discussion off the record.]

                 IN THE HIGHEST INTERESTS OF THE NATION

    Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, may I just say one word with 
reference to the administration. I think what they have done so 
far has been in the highest interests of our nation, and for 
one senator I would like to say so privately and publicly.
    Senator Sparkman. Thank you, Senator Javits. Secretary 
McNamara? [Laughter.]
    Secretary McNamara. I feel privileged and complimented.
    Senator Sparkman. That is the result of what somebody else 
did.
    Senator Lausche, I believe.
    Well, we appreciate the attendance of both of you 
gentlemen. May I say this, that speaking on behalf of the 
committee, and I am sure for the Chairman, we stand ready at 
any time--I am sure Secretary Rusk remembers back during 1950 
and 1951 when we were trying to work up the Japanese peace 
treaty, our Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs was ready, and 
we held meetings, morning, noon, and night.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, at the risk of being boring, 
I want to emphasize that I am trying to be frank today, and 
that we have to exercise discretion in what we say.
    [Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the committee adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                          MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
                   Ad Hoc Human Rights Subcommittee
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The ad hoc subcommittee met in executive session at 10:55 
a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper and Cooper.
    Executives J, K, and L, 88th Congress, 1st session, the 
Human Rights Conventions, were ordered reported to the full 
committee.
    [The ad hoc subcommittee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                          MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1967

                                   U.S. Senate,    
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 4:10 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Symington 
(presiding), Morse, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, 
Carlson, Williams and Cooper.
    Also present: Senators Allott, Anderson, Baker, Bennett, 
Boggs, Brooke, Byrd of Virginia, Byrd of West Virginia, Cotton, 
Dirksen, Dominick, Fannin, Griffin, Harris, Hatfield, Holland, 
Hollings, Hruska, Javits, Jordan of Idaho, Kennedy of 
Massachusetts, Long of Louisiana, McClellan, McGee, McIntyre, 
Metcalf, Miller, Monroney, Montoya, Morton, Moss, Murphy, 
Muskie, Pastore, Pearson, Prouty, Proxmire, Scott, Smith, 
Spong, Thurmond, Tydings, Williams of New Jersey, Yarborough, 
and Young of North Dakota.
    Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs; accompanied by William B. Macomber, Jr., 
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of 
State, briefed the group on the Middle East situation. All 
members of the Senate were invited.
    [The committee adjourned at 6:30 p.m.]


                 BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

                              ----------                              


                        Wednesday, June 7, 1967

                                   U.S. Senate,    
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:10 p.m., in 
room S-207, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams, 
Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: Senators Allott, Baker, Bennett, Boggs, Byrd 
of Virginia, Byrd of West Virginia, Cannon, Cotton, Dirksen, 
Dominick, Fannin, Fong, Griffin, Hansen, Harris, Hatfield, 
Hayden, Hruska, Javits, Jordan of Idaho, Kennedy of New York, 
Kuchel, Magnuson, McGee, Miller, Mondale, Monroney, Montoya, 
Morton, Moss, Murphy, Muskie, Pastore, Percy, Prouty, Randolph, 
Ribicoff, Russell, Scott, Smith, Spong, Stennis, Thurmond, 
Tydings, Yarborough, and Young of North Dakota.
    William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for 
Congressional Relations, Department of State.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the 
committee staff.
    The Chairman. We will come to order. The Secretary has 
another meeting at 6:30, and we have to start on time. Close 
the doors, Mr. Kuhl.
    The briefing this afternoon on the situation in the Middle 
East for all members of the Senate was arranged at the request 
of the administration. In view of the widespread interest of 
members of the Senate in developments there, the administration 
thought it would be helpful for this briefing to take place at 
this time.
    For those members of the Foreign Relations Committee who 
are present, I want them to know that I am seeking to arrange 
for the Secretary to meet with us tomorrow or Friday for 
consultation and an examination in greater depth of our 
policies in the Middle East. I am sure all members of the 
Senate appreciate the fact that a briefing of the kind we have 
arranged for today does not permit the free exchange of ideas 
and the examination of policy in depth which is essential if 
the Senate as an institution is to handle its business in such 
a way as to discharge its constitutional responsibilities in 
the field of foreign policy.
    Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you. I hope you 
will proceed as you wish.
    If you are willing and have time to entertain questions 
after your statement, I shall do my best to recognize members 
of the Senate in order of their seniority of that body.
    Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.

      STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

    Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and 
distinguished Senators.
    I do not come today with a prepared statement, but rather 
notes on the basis of which I want to bring you up to date on 
where we are at the moment, and to invite your questions and 
comments on the situation as it may unfold.
    The Security Council of the United Nations has just held 
its meeting, called for by the Soviet Union today, and it has 
passed a second resolution on the cease-fire designating 4 
o'clock today Eastern Standard Time as the time for cessation 
of firing and all military activities.
    Upon the cease-fire, the situation as we understand it is 
that Israel has said it would welcome a cease-fire, but for 
that, with the exception of Jordan, we do not have a clear 
expression from the other Arab governments as to whether they 
are willing to accept it.
    We do have resistance, publicly expressed by countries like 
Iraq, who are not in direct touch with Israeli forces. But the 
situation is somewhat obscure on the Arab side.
    That itself is of some interest because the Soviet Union, 
beginning yesterday, has been pressing for an immediate cease-
fire, and has not been able to produce Arab agreement to the 
cease-fire. Indeed, the general Arab view, expressed in the 
corridors last evening at the end of that long evening session, 
was that the unanimous resolution of the Security Council was a 
sellout to Israel, and that the Soviet Union's support for that 
resolution was a betrayal of their support for the Arabs.

                         THE MILITARY SITUATION

    As far as the military situation is concerned, for all 
practical purposes I think we can assume that Israel has 
established military superiority throughout the Sinai 
Peninsula, that it has gained complete air supremacy, and that 
it is on the verge of having full military control of the West 
Bank of the Jordan river as far as that portion of Jordan is 
concerned.
    We have heard reports during the day that Eastern European 
countries are rushing equipment to Egypt. We do not see mass 
movements of equipment. We doubt very much that such equipment 
will make much difference in the present military situation.
    The report of flights of aircraft from Algeria to Egypt are 
not likely to change the military situation substantially. So, 
in terms of assessing the situation, I think it is a reasonable 
assumption as a factual matter that the Israeli forces have 
succeeded up to practically the canal itself, have seized Sharm 
el-Sheikh at the Straits of Tiran, and are in command of the 
West Bank.
    I would like to comment briefly on the costs to us thus far 
in terms of our situation in the Near East.
    We have now had breaches of relations from nine countries. 
Those are Egypt, Algeria, Syria, the Yemen, the Sudan, Iraq, 
Mauritania, Lebanon and, I believe, Burundi down in Central 
Africa.
    I think we need not at the moment try to speculate as to 
how far this diplomatic action goes and how long it is likely 
to last because the situation in the different capitals seems 
to be somewhat obscure.

                          LIMITING THE BREACH

    On the assumption that this is a very private meeting, Mr. 
Chairman, and what I am saying here will not be quoted outside, 
a number of these governments which are breaking relations have 
discussed ways and means of limiting the breach.
    For example, Egypt has talked about our leaving behind a 
number of diplomatic and administrative officers to carry on 
functions under the technical supervision of a protecting 
power.
    The Sudan has talked about finding arrangements to continue 
economic, cultural and business relationships, and we think 
that there are other ways in which they can translate this into 
what has now come to be called a soft break rather than a hard 
break in diplomatic relations, somewhat the way they did in 
Germany over the recognition in Israel, somewhat in terms of 
the break, breach, where Great Britain holds Rhodesia.
    Nevertheless it is true that we are suffering at the 
present time significantly as far as Arab public opinion is 
concerned.
    This is related to the general view that Israel committed 
aggression in this situation, and that the United States is in 
sympathetic support of Israel. More specifically, it has been 
radically inflamed by the direct charges which have been widely 
circulated throughout the Arab world that U.S. aircraft 
participated in the attacks on Egypt, and from Damascus that 
U.S. infantry forces are involved in the operations.
    We do not know anyone who believes it except--that is as 
far as governments are concerned. We know the Soviets know 
better. They have their own vessels alongside practically our 
own carriers, and they know perfectly well that our aircraft 
have not taken part in these operations.
    The Libyans know we have not used Wheelus Airfield for any 
such purposes. But as Arabs have explained it to me in the last 
24 hours, President Nasser has felt that it was necessary for 
him to make a case that he was defeated not by Israel but by a 
combination of Israel and two great powers, the U.S. and the 
U.K.
    But the cost to us in Arab public opinion in the short run 
is, of course, substantial.

                            THE OIL PROBLEM

    As far as oil is concerned, the situation at the present 
time is fluid. Some of the production has been stopped as a 
means of protecting the actual production facilities 
themselves.
    For example, at Bahrain, the facilities are closed for 
protective purposes.
    ESSO Libya has stopped production in exports.
    Saudi Arabia has joined those who stopped exporting to the 
U.S. and the U.K.
    Oil sanctions applied just to the U.S. and U.K. are not 
likely to have very far-reaching effects because if they 
continue to send oil into Western Europe generally we and the 
U.K. can get along reasonably well with other arrangements and 
shifting sources.
    But, nevertheless, the oil problem remains touchy, and we 
have a full-time team working on that with the oil industry, 
both our own and international oil industries, in order to keep 
the situation under review and take the protective steps that 
may be necessary.
    The closing of the Suez Canal, of course, affects the 
shipment of oil into Europe, adds about 16 days to the passage 
of oil tankers. But the fact that in recent years tankers have 
gotten to be very large has reduced the impact of that problem 
upon supplying Western Europe.

                      A STUNNING SETBACK TO NASSER

    The costs to others also are high. Nasser has had a 
stunning setback. We already see signs of considerable 
disillusionment in the Arab world about the predicament into 
which Nasser has led them.
    Quite apart from the question of who might have started 
this affair, the Arabs, including many in Cairo, now apparently 
are saying, ``Well, in any event, he should have own better in 
terms of the military situation or should have known more about 
the attitude of the Soviet Union or more about the dangers 
which might have been created by action taken over against 
Israel.''
    We have nothing to confirm the newspaper report out of 
London this morning that the general of the forces in Sinai has 
taken over command of the armed forces, and that Nasser is 
expected to be finished.
    We just have nothing pointing in that direction at all, and 
it is the kind of newspaper story that could be written out of 
an armchair in London without any special information to go on.

                         SOVIET INEFFECTIVENESS

    The Soviet Union has, I think, in the longer run suffered a 
considerable setback here. There has been a considerable Arab 
reaction against the, what they consider to be, support, 
encouragement and pledges from the Soviet Union which, in the 
showdown, did not prove to be effective.
    I might say to you very privately that we do not see 
indications thus far from our Watch Committee that the Soviet 
Union is engaging in any military moves that might indicate a 
military intervention in the situation. Of course, we would be 
extremely interested in that if any such indications came 
along.
    But, in looking at the situation, we are puzzled as to 
whether the Soviet Union had quite a different military 
estimate of the situation than we and other governments in the 
West have had for some time about the relative capacity of the 
armed forces as between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
    Indeed, I think the speed with which the Israeli forces 
prevailed surprised their own estimators, as well as our own. 
But we are puzzled about whether the Soviets really thought 
that in this kind of a clash the Arab forces would be able to 
prevail.
    You would suppose that they felt that they knew a good deal 
about the Arab forces since they had equipped many of them with 
a lot of their equipment, and had trained a lot of them to fly 
in airplanes and run their tanks.
    But if this did arise out of a miscalculation, then I 
suppose that somebody in Moscow is in some difficulty at the 
present time.

                  PRIVATE EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET UNION

    We also are somewhat puzzled by the fact that the tenor of 
the private exchanges which we have had from the Soviet Union 
over the past 10 days or so are quite different from the public 
attitude of the Soviet Union as reflected in their broadcasts 
and their statements even in the United Nations.
    Their private exchanges have shown a much better, a much 
greater, degree of moderation in terms of an interest in 
restraining the two sides, in terms of bringing the fighting to 
a conclusion when it started than one would read from their 
public broadcasts.
    So we cannot ourselves yet make a very good judgment about 
just what the Soviet Union considers its gain to be.
    We do know they are giving advice to the Arabs at the 
present time which the Arabs are not yet prepared to accept in 
terms of how to bring the situation to a close.

                       ISRAEL'S STUNNING SUCCESS

    As, far as Israel is concerned, if Nasser has had a 
stunning setback, the Israelis have had a stunning military 
success.
    We, I think, can expect Israel to take a very strong 
position on a very simple notion put forward by Foreign 
Minister Eban when he said that Israel will not withdraw to a 
state of belligerence, but will withdraw to a state of peace.
    I think we can expect Israel to insist very hard that just 
the restoration of some temporary arrangements, supervised by 
the U.N., is not good enough.
    I think we can expect them to take the position that they, 
too, are one of the 122 members of the United Nations; that 
they are a sovereign state; that their existence will have to 
be acknowledged; and they will have the prerequisites of any 
other sovereign state. I think we will find that they may be 
very resistant to any kind of U.N. supervisory machinery, as 
indicating some discrimination against Israel among the 122 
members of the U.N.
    I think we can be very sure the Israelis will insist upon a 
permanent solution to the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of 
Aqaba situation.
    I think they very well might insist upon an opening of the 
Suez Canal, in other words, the attributes of everybody in this 
situation.
    Of course, what Israel has in mind is going to be extremely 
difficult for the Arab side to take, at least under the present 
governments of the Arab countries.
    Now, whether there will be changes among some of these 
governments we cannot at the present time know for certain. But 
you all know the deep feelings on both sides in the situation, 
and the problems which the Arab governments have had in making 
sense in certain occasions, given the attitude of the mobs in 
the street and the ease with which high passions can be whipped 
up in connection with the relationships with Israel.

                   OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING

    Now, we hope very much that out of this crisis, which we 
tried to prevent, that there can come an opportunity for some 
much more far-reaching solutions to some of these problems than 
have thus been achieved.
    It may well be that this is a time to make some real 
headway on the Arab refugee problem. It certainly is the time 
when this question of standing people apart with rights of 
belligerence will have to be dealt with.
    The claim of the Egyptians that they could close Straits of 
Tiran because they were in a state of war with Israel and can 
exercise rights of belligerence is the sort of claim that just 
cannot endure in the future if there is to be peace in that 
area.
    We would hope that out of this could come a more solid, 
regional approach to economic and social development in the 
area, and under such cooperative ventures, such as 
transportation and water developments, things such as that.
    We would hope at long last the Soviet Union might be 
willing to talk some sense about getting the arms suppliers 
together in getting some limitations on the race in 
conventional weapons.
    As I have told some of you before, we have had occasional 
contacts with the Soviets on that subject. They have been 
willing to cooperate with respect to nuclear weapons, but have 
never been willing to talk seriously about finding some 
limitations on a level of conventional arms. It may be that 
rather than spend an additional billion dollars to try to 
restore what has been lost in the fighting in the last three 
days, in reequipping, say, Egypt, that they might be willing to 
let the Geneva Conference, for example, get together a group to 
talk seriously about some sort of arms limitations in the area 
as a whole.

                      WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES

    The most immediate next question for the Security Council, 
if the Arabs do come in and accept the cease-fire, will be to 
work on the problems of withdrawal, and that will immediately 
involve us in the nature of a permanent settlement.
    I would not want to predict that it is going to be easy to 
get a quick withdrawal of Israeli forces unless they see more 
clearly than they do now the picture of the eventual settlement 
which will come out of this present situation.
    We can expect considerable instability and fluidity in the 
area. I would hesitate to try to predict today how many of the 
Arab governments can survive this situation.
    I do want you to know that behind the scenes there is a 
good deal more moderation in the Arab world and among Arab 
governments than would appear on some of the broadcasts, and 
that very much behind the scenes there is a considerable 
satisfaction that President Nasser, who has caused so much 
trouble among the Arabs themselves, has had a very significant 
setback in this situation.
    Mr. Chairman, that is a very brief summary of where we are 
at the moment. I will be glad to take questions and try to 
elaborate any particular points that might come up.
    Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    If it is agreeable, I would like to call on members in 
order of seniority.
    Senator Hayden, do you have any questions?
    Senator Hayden. No.
    Mr. Chairman. Senator Russell?
    Senator Russell. Yes, I have one or two.

                        IMPACT OF OIL SANCTIONS

    Mr. Secretary, I happen to have been in France in 1956 when 
they closed the canal, and it was very disagreeable with the 
French. Even the hotels broke down in cooking and heating.
    Do the French have adequate oil from Algeria and other 
places without coming through the canal now?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the French are at the present time 
not being specifically subject to oil sanctions by the Arab 
countries.
    Senator Russell. I know. But how about the canal, is it 
closed?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the canal is closed. They have 
important oil resources in both Algeria and in Libya.
    Senator Russell. And they are adequate?
    Secretary Rusk. So we think as far as France is concerned 
they will be in reasonably good shape.
    There will have to be some readjustment involving ourselves 
and the United Kingdom.
    As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have been getting certain of 
our Far Eastern oil out of there, out of some of those 
countries. But we think that adjustments can be made without 
causing us any trouble.

                 U.S. AID TO THOSE WHO BREAK RELATIONS

    Senator Russell. You are talking about this soft breaking 
of relations. If they break relations and withdraw their 
ambassadors and, I assume, make ours come home, and yet they 
still want to stay on the dole and the aid program and all 
that, it would seem to me to be a rather gentle way to run a 
breach of relations.
    Secretary Rusk. No. I would think, Senator, in the case of 
those who break relations with us that the U.S. Government aid 
programs would not go forward under the rug. But I do bring to 
your attention the fact that we do participate, for example, in 
the FAO's world food program, and I think there might be some 
very serious difficulties if we were to drop out of the FAO's 
world food program, which is somewhat limited in scope, because 
a particular country has broken relations with us.
    There is a more--there is a second problem we will have to 
think about, and I do not want to--we do not have a final 
decision on this, and that is in those countries where there is 
a breach of relations but where American private citizens are 
welcome to remain, and where some of our voluntary agencies 
such as Church World Services or missionary groups, and things 
of that sort, remain behind, whether they should be permitted 
to go ahead with their own relief work based on Title III of 
P.L. 480. That is a rather complicated problem in relation to 
our longer range interests in those countries.
    Senator Russell. We stopped it in Egypt without any 
difficulty.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. I am not now suggesting an answer. I 
am just saying----
    Senator Russell. Frankly, I do not think if a nation severs 
relations with us that we ought to go out of our way to ship 
them anything.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Russell. I do not think that should be just 
considered a kind of subject that does not really mean 
anything, because that is one of the things that gets the world 
into too many troubles, because we gloss over these things.
    Secretary Rusk. I want you gentlemen to know that this is a 
problem we will have very shortly, and that is what we do about 
our church charitable groups which have been operating 
privately in these countries and have used relatively limited 
amounts of food in connection with our work in these countries.
    I do not disagree with the feelings you express, Senator, 
but I am just saying it is somewhat complicated.

                U.S. PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FOR A CEASE-FIRE

    Senator Russell. Apparently we have put a good deal of 
pressure on Israel with respect to the cease-fire. Why do we do 
that when they were gaining a great victory over people like 
Nasser, to whom we say we do not owe any obligations at all? 
Did the Israelis ask us to intercede?
    Secretary Rusk. I think the Israelis were very pleased with 
the resolutions passed by the Security Council, and you will 
notice also that the Arabs called the resolution of the 
Security Council a sellout to Israel.
    Senator Russell. Yes, I am aware of that. But I cannot 
believe that Russia would have gone so far if they had not had 
some intimation from Nasser that he was about to call it quits.
    Secretary Rusk. What we were not able to agree upon in the 
Security Council was the idea that the Security Council would 
order a withdrawal on the basis of a status quo of June 5 that 
would have been----
    Senator Russell. The Israelis have not indicated any 
willingness to do that. If they do, they ought to have their 
heads examined.
    Secretary Rusk. Nor do we because we have, as a maritime 
nation, an interest in the straits of Tiran, and some of the 
other countries----
    Senator Russell. And so with the Suez Canal.
    Secretary Rusk. The withdrawal of the forces is necessarily 
going to get caught up in the nature of the settlement. It is 
going to take some time, and I hope----
    Senator Russell. If the Israelis gained a more complete 
victory, it would be more simple, would it not?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, they have a complete victory now 
unless they crossed the canal. I do not know whether they want 
to try that or not.
    Senator Russell. They may not want to over-extend 
themselves.

                     PROTECT ISRAEL'S INDEPENDENCE

    The Chairman. I may overlook somebody, but according to my 
estimates, next is Senator Magnuson.
    Senator Magnuson. I wanted to ask the Secretary this. 
Naturally a lot of us have been contacted by many people 
interested in this whole matter since this happened, 
particularly the Jewish people in America, who have done so 
much to help Israel become what it is, which you and I know so 
well, and I would hope that we would not be a party to any kind 
of withdrawal, number one, to the status quo.
    Number two, I would hope we would not become a party to 
withdrawal and leave something hanging, but we ought to now 
make as much permanence as we can for the independence of 
Israel for a long, long time, and get all maritime nations in 
concert on this old, real serious problem, leaving out the 
political, ideological problem of freedom of the seas.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. I think that----
    Senator Magnuson. I hope--I was going to ask you--are we 
pretty much not formally, but are we pretty much committed to 
that generally?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think we ourselves have got an 
interest, as we have explained in earlier briefings down here, 
in this problem of the Straits of Tiran, and I myself have no 
doubt that that question is going to get settled in connection 
with the present situation.
    Senator Magnuson. Yes. I think the Israeli people have got 
to know there is some kind of permanency of Israel.
    Secretary Rusk. But I think, sir----
    Senator Magnuson. In other words, I would go right on to 
Cairo if I were the Israelis.

                 ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT

    Secretary Rusk. There would be some advantage in letting 
the President of the Security Council, a Dane, Mr. Tabor, and 
the Secretary General, have the first whack at negotiations 
between the two sides on the basis of a final settlement.
    There are some reasons why it is better for us not to 
ourselves take on that job as a volunteer.
    Senator Magnuson. I understand that.
    Secretary Rusk. Although we have vital interests in many of 
the questions concerned, and we would be following it very 
closely with the Security Council. But we are not a very good 
party now to talk to the Arabs.
    Senator Magnuson. No.
    Secretary Rusk. And Mr. Tabor, President of the Security 
Council, probably is in a better position to do so.
    Senator Magnuson. Yes.
    Senator Russell. How long will he be there?
    Secretary Rusk. I beg pardon?
    Senator Russell. How long will Tabor be there?
    Secretary Rusk. Throughout the month of June.
    Senator Russell. That is what I thought. Who succeeds him?
    Secretary Rusk. Then Ethiopia, and I think in the case of 
Ethiopia they have interests very close to ours. They have 
relations with both Israel and the Arabs, and again, very 
privately, the Ethiopians have let it be known to us if this 
Straits of Tiran issue was not settled, Ethiopia was finished 
as a Red Sea owner, and they have a vital stake in this 
question of freedom of navigation in there.
    Senator Magnuson. I just want to say it seems to me a 
meeting point for a great number of people in the world would 
be this maritime problem, the freedom of the seas.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. I think there is no question about 
that.
    Senator Magnuson. Bring them in.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

                      RUSSIAN ULTIMATUM TO ISRAEL

    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, reports have come over 
the air since the 4:00 o'clock meeting this afternoon 
indicating that Russia has sent some kind of a notice in the 
nature of an ultimatum that if Israel or if the Israelis do not 
stop shooting, Russia will withdraw recognition, with no 
mention of the fact that the Egyptians should stop shooting, 
too.
    Now, can you verify that or give us any details on that?
    Secretary Rusk. I saw a press ticker, Senator, that the 
Russians said to Israel if they did not cease fire immediately 
that Russia would break relations.
    Well, in this day and age that is not a very severe 
sanction, and I do not believe that Israel is going to be too 
upset about that particular kind of threat.
    We have not seen thus far signs of any action that the 
Soviet Union might take on the ground in this situation, with 
the possible exception of sending in some additional supplies, 
military supplies, if they can find anybody to give them to 
when they get there.
    I should think that sending in more military supplies in 
this situation would be a rather unattractive project right 
now.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is interesting.

                     A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO ISRAEL

    Well, I do not know, I would not dispute your view on this, 
but I think we have a great opportunity to do something with 
the Arab world now, and I do not agree that we have a special 
obligation to serve Israel. But I think we have a special 
obligation to serve the integrity of Israel, along with every 
other country over there. I would not single Israel out against 
any other country, if we can save the peace of the world there.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, in that connection, if you 
look back over the last decade, the U.S. in a variety of ways 
has taken action on behalf of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco in pursuance of 
this notion that we are committed to the independence and the 
territorial integrity of all the states in this area.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I think that is our proposition, 
and I think we make a tragic mistake if we choose up sides for 
any one country unless our own vital interests later indicate 
that we have to do it of necessity. I do not think we have come 
to that point yet.
    Secretary Rusk. We are inclined--and I think I ought to 
mention this because if there are those who have a strongly 
different view it would be helpful to know it--we are inclined 
in this matter of the breach of relations to let these other 
countries determine the extent of the breach in the sense that 
if they want to maintain consular, cultural relations, we will 
do it. Let us exclude aid from that, because breaking 
diplomatic relations and maintaining aid programs--but consular 
relations or cultural relations or those who say in the case of 
Egypt ``We want your officials and people running the oil 
companies to stay,'' we are inclined to do so on that basis.
    But we are inclined to let them set the level of the breach 
and proceed on that basis in order to make it easier to restore 
the situation exactly.
    Senator Russell. As long as there is any quid pro quo, that 
is all right. But if it is one-sided----
    Secretary Rusk. No, they would have the same type of 
relationship that we would have there.

                   CHANGE OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

    Senator Hickenlooper. Just one question in the nature of an 
observation. I think it is entirely possible in the settlement 
of this situation that there may have to be certain territorial 
rearrangements, at least so far as claims are concerned, 
involving the freedom of the seas in the Gulf of Aqaba, and the 
freedom of the use of the canal, and things of that kind, which 
might be considered to be territorial alterations.
    But I, what I meant was a massive or substantial change of 
territorial sovereignty.
    Secretary Rusk. At the beginning of this recent fighting, 
Prime Minister Eshkol and General Dayan both said Israel did 
not have territorial ambitions.
    My guess is that they are going to want to have some pretty 
hard guarantees on the Straits of Tiran, and that this is not 
necessarily their last word on this particular point.
    But if they were to go for larger territorial changes in 
that area, the problem would be there that they probably would 
be sowing the seeds for another conflagration at that point.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Young?

                      ISRAELI CONTROL OF WATERWAYS

    Senator Young of North Dakota. Is Israel in about a 
position to take over the Tiran Straits or to control the Suez 
Canal? I would think after having gone this far it would be 
possible for them to do so, and in their own interest they 
would go to take control of the Tiran Straits, and then they 
could dictate----
    Secretary Rusk. Well, they have occupied Sharm El Sheikh, 
which is the position opposite the Straits of Tiran on the 
southeastern corner of the Sinai Peninsula. So as far as the 
Gulf of Aqaba is concerned, they control it at the present 
time.
    Senator Young of North Dakota. And they are pretty secure 
and would be hard to dislodge?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, yes. I think they are very secure from 
a military point of view.
    Senator Young of North Dakota. I mean, the Arabs do not 
have any sizable force?
    Secretary Rusk. No. The truth seems to be, gentlemen, that 
the Arab Air Forces have been, for all practical purposes, 
destroyed, and that for the last twenty-four hours, the Israel 
Air Force has been able to operate not against Arab air, but 
against Arab ground forces, tanks and things of that sort.
    Senator Young of North Dakota. How near are they to 
controlling the Suez Canal?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, they are on the east bank of the 
canal. They probably could deny the use of the canal. But in 
terms of seizing it and operating it, that is quite another 
matter.

                          SEEKING A CEASE-FIRE

    Senator Young of North Dakota. How would you get a nation 
like Israel to stop now, to get them to have a cease-fire when 
there is such bitter hatred?
    Secretary Rusk. They are prepared to cease fire if the 
Arabs will. But the question of cleaning up afterwards in terms 
of a final settlement is another question.
    Senator Young of North Dakota. They could agree to it. 
Whether they would do it or not----
    Secretary Rusk. No. We are a long ways away from a final 
settlement of this yet, Senator.
    The Chairman. Senator Sparkman?
    Senator Sparkman. I do not believe I will ask any 
questions.
    The Chairman. Senator Williams of Delaware?
    Senator Williams. I will skip.
    The Chairman. Senator Stennis?
    Senator Stennis. Mr. Secretary, you said that Israel was 
ready to cease fire. But to what extent are they continuing to 
advance militarily, territorially?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, they are continuing right 
straight along in the absence of a cease-fire with the Arabs.
    Senator Stennis. I see.
    Secretary Rusk. Now again, I can tell you that we have for 
48 hours had some part in contacts between Israel and Jordan 
with respect to a cease-fire, because both sides apparently 
would like to have one. But it has broken down because local 
commanders, probably local Jordanian commanders, have not, in 
fact, stopped shooting, and the question was whether the 
Jordanian command had control of all of its own forces.
    But while the other side is still shooting the Israelis are 
going ahead. Now they are prepared to cease fire if the Arabs 
will.

                      ISRAEL'S MILITARY OBJECTIVES

    Senator Stennis. Do you expect them to physically take the 
Canal, all of it? You say they have a negative on it now. But 
do you expect them to----
    Secretary Rusk. I do not have any information on what the 
Israeli military objectives are. They have been pretty close-
mouthed on this situation. The situation is quite different 
than in Vietnam where everybody is able to report anything they 
want to report out of there, and put it all on television. Both 
sides in this situation put a censorship on it immediately, and 
both sides have been rather close-mouthed in talking to other 
governments about their military plans and purposes.

                 MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM EASTERN EUROPE

    Senator Stennis. Quite briefly, what was that you said 
about the equipment coming out of Eastern Europe, the military 
equipment or supplies? You said that that was vague and 
uncertain.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have heard some reports that 
additional military supplies were being sent from Eastern 
Europe to Egypt. But whether they, in fact, unload or will 
arrive, I should think is qualified somewhat by the very fast-
moving situation on the ground.
    Senator Stennis. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

                        COMPELLING A CEASE-FIRE

    Senator Mundt. I think you said, Mr. Secretary, that the 
cease-fire is to begin at 4 o'clock today.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. But that turns upon the willingness of 
both sides to take it.
    Senator Mundt. Right.
    Secretary Rusk. And they do not have anything very hard 
from the Arab side on this point, with the exception of Jordan.
    Senator Mundt. My question is, assuming the possibility of 
no cease-fire today or tomorrow at 4 o'clock, have we any other 
suggestions to propose to the Security Council such as, 
perhaps, economic sanctions against Egypt to compel them to 
cease fire and, if so, would the Russians join us?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, quite frankly we have not 
gotten to that point yet. We think the President of the 
Security Council and the Secretary General ought to be in touch 
with both sides to try to work out a cease-fire.
    We think if they did that they would have the cooperation 
of the Russians in the present situation, but query whether 
some of the Arab governments could feel they could accept a 
cease-fire and survive.
    I am not sure what the situation is in Cairo at the present 
time, for example. I just do not know.
    Senator Mundt. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Smith?
    Senator Smith. No questions. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Carlson?
    Senator Carlson. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, in relation to the remark you 
made about the Foreign Relations Committee, I will be very 
happy to come tomorrow at a time, a mutually convenient time, 
so we will try to get a further briefing tomorrow.
    The Chairman. Fine.
    Senator Monroney.

               REESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH ARAB NATIONS

    Senator Monroney. Mr. Secretary, what gain would we have to 
make any hastening or rushing the re-recognition of the Arab 
countries that broke off relations to justify apparently their 
story that our planes were attacking them?
    Secretary Rusk. It is not a question of our rushing, but 
the question is simply not pressing the gap any further than 
they themselves insist upon pressing it at this time.
    We do have important interests in these countries. We would 
like to have a presence, if one is feasible, and representation 
there.
    My own guess, Senator, is that there is going to be a 
considerable revulsion against the Soviet Union in the Arab 
world here during the next several months, and if we have a 
presence there it would come in rather handy for us to be 
there.
    Senator Monroney. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Pastore?

                       ISRAEL AND THE SUEZ CANAL

    Senator Pastore. I am a little concerned with the 
possibilities of our involvement in that part of the world. You 
have already said that there may be a cease-fire.
    I would assume if that did happen the Israelis would stay 
pretty much in Egyptian territory that they now occupy, is that 
correct?
    Secretary Rusk. Until there is the shape of a final 
settlement which is known.
    Senator Pastore. Then you went on to say that you would 
suppose that the Israeli government would want to assert itself 
as a sovereign state like all the other nations of the world, 
and that they would want free and innocent passage in the 
Straits of Tiran and, at the same time, would want the same 
concession made with regard to the Suez Canal.
    Now, my question is this: Let us assume, as you have said, 
that the present rulers of the Arabic world will not agree to 
this for political reasons. What is the possibility of Russia 
beginning to assert itself, and then what would be our position 
in that respect, and what are our commitments with regard to 
that?
    I would assume, before you begin answering, I would assume 
that Israel would be a darned fool at this time if it did not 
assert its rights to go through the Suez Canal like other 
nations of the world. They are there now.
    Secretary Rusk. That was a part of the armistice 
arrangements which they were never able to collect on.
    Senator Pastore. That is right. And now they are there.
    Secretary Rusk. They are the Canal, that is right.
    Senator Pastore. They are the Canal, and I would assume 
that they would insist upon that.
    Now, let us assume they do insist, and the Arabic world 
won't agree. What is the possibility of any further assertion 
on the part of Russia and what does that mean to us?
    Secretary Rusk. There is that possibility, Senator, that 
the Russians may take much more action practically than they 
have thus far. We do not see signs of it, and we do not believe 
they intended to back the present play by force in this 
situation.
    I think the principal problem there would be between the 
mediators for Israel and the Arabs to try to find an answer 
that both Israel and the Arabs would be willing to accept. It 
is going to be tough because at the present time it is hard to 
see exactly where this point is going to be reached and when.
    But I think you would expect Israel to be pretty forthright 
in demanding its full rights as a power to access to these 
passages.
    Senator Pastore. In your secret diplomacy, has Russia 
indicated any inclination as to the right of Israel to go 
through the Suez Canal?
    Secretary Rusk. We have not, quite frankly, talked about 
the Suez Canal. We do believe----
    Senator Pastore. I mean in the past.
    Secretary Rusk. I think they would recognize an 
international right in the Straits of Tiran. But, for heaven's 
sake, gentlemen, please no one say anything about this kind of 
question because it would be just murder. But I do not think 
the Straits of Tiran are going to be a problem when this thing 
is wound up.
    Senator Pastore. I would not suppose that, but I am worried 
a little bit about the Suez Canal.

                   THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL

    Now, another question: Have you been approached at all by 
the Jewish-American community?
    Secretary Rusk. I have not myself, but I gather there are a 
good many letters. But no one has asked to see me.
    Senator Pastore. Well, groups are coming to see us, and 
they are insisting that America live up to its commitment. If 
you were in our position what would be your answer to that?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think we have to talk about which 
commitments and what it is we are talking about.
    I do think--quite frankly, if you go back over this record 
since 1947, there is a whole basketful of understandings and 
U.N. resolutions. You find, generally speaking, that each side 
has tended to pick and choose out of those resolutions those 
things which they wanted at one time or another, and that there 
are a good many things on both sides which have been rejected 
out of these U.N. resolutions.
    Now, at the time of the original resolution creating the 
State of Israel or on the settlement of Palestine, the Arabs 
bitterly rejected that resolution and fought against it, in 
fact.
    Their present position is there is nothing they want more 
than that original U.N. resolution. There was a resolution from 
which the Arabs got certain benefits, which gave the Israelis 
passage through the Suez Canal, but they have never gotten 
passage through the Suez Canal.
    President Eisenhower made a specific commitment in the 
General Assembly at the time of the 1957 settlement about the 
Straits of Tiran being international waters. That was done at a 
time when he was acting on behalf of Egypt to get Israeli 
troops out of the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt did not formally 
accept that at the time as a matter of legal doctrine, but they 
got the benefits of the arrangements; namely, the withdrawal of 
Israeli troops.
    So the past here is a jungle of resolutions which have in 
them many elements which each side along the way has refused to 
comply with.

                       NO OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENTS

    Senator Pastore. Well, they are having a big rally here at 
Lafayette Square, and I am wondering what it is all about, and 
what we, as elected officials, say to these constituents of 
ours on the enforcement of these commitments.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, again, I think one ought to be 
precise about the commitments. The President's statement of May 
23 is a pretty comprehensive statement of our commitments in 
this situation. There he reaffirmed the general commitment to 
the political independence and territorial integrity of all the 
states in the area, and the specific commitment on the Straits 
of Tiran.
    But we do not have vague, unorganized, open-ended 
commitments to either side in this situation. We do not have a 
treaty commitment, for example, that spells these things out.
    Now, we have a major involvement stemming from the role we 
played in the creation of Israel, and our support for various 
types of United Nations action and settlement, and some 
specific commitments on the Gulf of Aqaba.
    But I think we need to be fairly precise, at least people 
in my position, in talking about what commitment it is we are 
talking about.
    Mr. Chairman. Senator Bennett?

                        RESTORATION OF RELATIONS

    Senator Bennett. I have just one question. Now that these 
Arab countries have taken the lead in breaking diplomatic 
relations, are we going to wait for them to take the lead in 
restoring them?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it would be normal for the country 
that took the original initiative to take the initiative to 
restore them. But I think our general attitude ought to be that 
we are relaxed about having relationships with those countries 
that want relationships and are prepared to guarantee rights of 
legation, because we have relations with a good many countries 
with whom we are not in agreement on every point. I would think 
we would be relatively relaxed about that in the future, and 
some of this restoration of relations, I think, might come in a 
matter of weeks rather than in a matter of months.
    Some of the local officials in certain of these countries 
have said to our people, ``Well, we will see you in about 2 or 
3 weeks' time,'' that kind of thing. So we do not know exactly 
what this means yet.
    Senator Bennett. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman. Senator Gore?
    Senator Gore. I will defer until tomorrow.
    The Chairman. Senator Symington?

                         COMPARISON TO VIETNAM

    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, I have a few questions.
    When I came back from Vietnam in early January this year, I 
reported that scores of our pilots were pleading that they be 
allowed to do what apparently Defense Minister Dayan instructed 
General Weitzman and his pilots to do.
    One pilot said that four out of the last five missions he 
had flown over the airport at Fukien were to hit much less 
important targets closer to Hanoi and, therefore, I carried 
their plea, and I find out that last week the military airfield 
at Fukien has never been put on the target list, let alone 
struck.
    In the last 12 hours, in 12 hours, I think it is fair to 
say, that against much heavier opposition, although under 
different circumstances, General Dayan has really accomplished 
more against three or four countries, and in one sense more 
than that, than we have in two years in Vietnam, and I see it.
    My question would be, as a result of staving off this, to 
me and a number of my growing number of my colleagues, 
denigration of airpower, and this almost unbelievable success 
that they have had through the right use of airpower, the 
saving of lives and treasure. Do you think this is going to 
have any effect on the way we are handling the situation in 
Vietnam or do you think we will continue to make it a major 
land war without the use of our naval air, our seapower, I mean 
of Air Force air and our seapower? We are just going to go 
ahead to the tune of $2 billion a month or whatever it is, a 
very heavy cost, or will this perhaps almost unprecedented 
military success in modern times affect the way we are handling 
the Vietnamese War?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, if we were fighting 
primarily tanks and aircraft in open desert, the pattern of war 
would, of course, be different.
    It is not quite the same problem in Vietnam. I can talk 
about that further. I think you know some of the problems we 
feel we are involved with there. But I think the situation is 
quite different from a military point of view, and I would 
doubt that any of these airfields in Egypt are as heavily 
defended as this particular airfield is up in Hanoi.
    Senator Symington. Well, airpower is airpower regardless of 
the nature of the terrain underneath it, and it seems to me 
unfortunate that if we are going to use it at all, we do not 
use it properly.
    I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman. Senator Ervin has gone.
    Senator Kuchel, you just came in?
    Senator Kuchel. No, I have been here, but that is all 
right.

                      USE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

    Mr. Secretary, I watched the Security Council last night, 
and I think everyone is most proud of the fact, even at the 
last minute, the Security Council passed a resolution.
    Apparently it passed another one today, and I assume, 
therefore, that our policy has been to use the machinery of the 
United Nations to a maximum extent possible.
    Now, if there is going to be a cease-fire, which I assume 
there will be, if not this afternoon, tomorrow afternoon or the 
next, there is no victor and no vanquished, so the problem of 
territory, of free access to any waters of egress and ingress 
along any land is going to have to be the result of an 
agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis which, I guess, is 
not going to take place or there are going to have to be 
additional decisions made in the Security Council.
    Will it be our policy to bring to the Security Council such 
resolutions as clothing the President or U Thant with the 
responsibility of asking, of making decisions to bring about a 
peace rather than a truce?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not believe that the matter of 
decisions on these matters will be turned over to the Secretary 
General, and I doubt very much that a resolution could pass the 
Security Council that has not already been agreed to by the two 
sides.
    The situation in the Security Council is such that unless 
you got agreement on the two sides, there is not a majority 
vote. That sounds contradictory to what has happened in the 
Security Council last night when the Security Council was 
unanimous on a ceasefire, even though the Arabs were not 
prepared to step up and say, ``We accept it.''
    But in the terms of the long-range settlement, I do not 
believe that the Security Council can legislate and impose upon 
the parties a settlement which has not been worked out by 
negotiation.
    Senator Kuchel. So what would our policy be with respect to 
negotiating a peace? Would our policy be to participate in the 
negotiation unilaterally, in concert with other nations? I 
mean, if you could help us on that point, I think it would be 
most valuable.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we would very much hope that the 
Security Council would be the principal forum in which these 
things are dealt with.
    Now, quite obviously there are going to be a lot of 
consultations in capitals behind the scenes, as there was all 
day yesterday and the day before.
    But we think there would be great advantage in keeping this 
matter in the framework of the Security Council just as much as 
possible.
    In our earlier consultations down here it was my strong 
impression that that was almost the unanimous view of the 
people at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

                    U.S. WAS NOT MILITARILY INVOLVED

    Senator Kuchel. One more question. Are we going to pursue 
what Arthur Goldberg raised last night, and nail the Arabs to 
the cross on that falsehood of our military participation?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have been trying to do that with 
all the means at our command.
    The Arabs, however, continue to circulate this story 8, 10 
hours a day.
    As you know, we invited U.N. observers aboard our carriers, 
and urged them to investigate the whole thing and look at our 
logs and talk to pilots.
    The Syrians added an item to that today and they charged 
U.S. infantry were involved in these operations.
    Senator Russell. I thought you said the Jordanians.
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir. It was Damascus, Syrian radio. 
Damascus had charged us with having infantry.
    Senator Kuchel. Will we follow through, however, and 
request the President of the Security Council to appoint an 
impartial board?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we would like to see them do it, but 
the trouble is that nobody believes these stories and, 
therefore, they think it is undignified to accept our 
invitation.
    You see, it is almost humiliating for the Security Council 
to send observers in the face of such outrageous lies.
    Senator Russell. I thought you did a good job, Mr. 
Secretary, on television.
    The Chairman. Senator Morse?
    Senator Morse. I have a couple of questions.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.

                 SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

    Senator Morse. The first one relates to the reference you 
made twice in response to a question about some information 
that supplies were being sent into the Arab countries.
    Let us assume that they are not, but there is a probability 
they will be, say, from Russia or from Eastern European 
countries and others. What is our position with regard to 
supplies to Israel? We already have some outstanding 
commitments in regard to the sale of airplanes, and we are not 
talking here about commitments, but there is no question about 
what the understanding of Israel has been for quite some years 
that they can rely on the United States to come to their 
assistance in protection if they tried to drive her into the 
sea. There is no question, but this was a movement to do that.
    Are we going to stand by while Arab countries get their 
supplies replenished from Russia and other countries, and not 
proceed to provide Israel with supplies? Because if we do not 
supply her, she is not allowed to get supplies; she cannot hold 
out against a replenished supply if you are going to give the 
opposition breathing time, and I happen to disagree with some 
of what I think are the connotations brought in this 
conversation this afternoon in regard to our obligations.
    I think we have very definite obligations, and we have 
assumed them, and restated them over and over again, including 
not only moral obligations but statements of our public 
officials to Israel that we are not going to stand by and have 
her driven into the sea.
    My question is what are we going to do if the Arab 
countries are resupplied? Are we going to wait for further 
negotiations and further talk, or are we going to deliver some 
supplies?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have not interrupted our own 
shipments to Israel.
    As far as Soviet shipments to the Arab countries are 
concerned, we have not ourselves taken action to interrupt 
them.
    Now, my guess is that if there is not a cease-fire, that 
any aircraft, for example, coming into any Arab countries will 
be subject to Israel air attack.
    The situation after a cease-fire is, of course, different.
    We, at the present time, are not considering using military 
action to stop arms from going from Eastern Europe into the 
Arab countries, to answer your question directly, Senator.
    Senator Morse. Well, it is an answer, but I still do not 
know what the supplies are that we are going to send in to meet 
the needs that are created by this war.
    She lost a lot of equipment. She lost a lot of planes. What 
I want to know is, is it going to be the policy of my 
government that we are going to stand by and see the Arab 
countries replenished and we are not going to proceed to supply 
Israel with supplies that she is going to need for 
replenishment to keep her military force going?
    Secretary Rusk. All I said thus far, Senator, is we have 
not stopped our shipments to Israel, and the question of 
further aid or resupplies has not come up yet. It has not been 
brought up to us yet by Israel.

                     OPPOSE TERRITORIAL ENLARGEMENT

    Senator Morse. I quite agree, and this will be my last 
point. I quite agree that we should not be involved in 
participating in territorial enlargement or encouraging 
territorial enlargement by Israel.
    I understand they themselves do not seek manpower, that 
they may seek support. But certainly I think we have a clear 
duty now to get established once and for all these questions in 
regard to international waters, including the Straits of Tiran, 
and certainly made perfectly clear we are going to be on the 
side of those that recognize that this Suez Canal ought to be 
operated without discrimination against any country, including 
Israel, and these are some of the troublesome problems that are 
involved in the settlement of peace.
    But, Mr. Secretary, I think it would be very unfortunate 
for us if we did not make clear at all times that now we are 
going to insist on a peace settlement, not on a truce 
settlement, because the truce settlement simply means we are 
going to postpone another war for two or three or four years. I 
think it is very important, for whatever it is worth, and I 
speak most respectfully, as you know, but I think the State 
Department has got to make much clearer statements than have 
been made yet in regard to what we are going to do in insisting 
that the existing procedures of international law be used to 
bring about peace over there and not a truce.
    Secretary Rusk. I had the impression we had done that in 
the Security Council, Senator, but we will go from there.
    Senator Morse. I listened to it, and I do not form that 
impression.
    Secretary Rusk. But in terms of detailed desiderata, the 
parties have not come in with theirs at the present time.
    Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, this is a question where we 
have got to exercise clear leadership in giving news to the 
world as to exactly where we stand in regard to negotiating a 
peace.
    Mr. Chairman. Senator Cotton?

           ISRAELIS MAY REQUEST A DECLARATION OF U.S. INTENT

    Senator Cotton. Mr. Secretary, as you have said, our own 
unilateral commitments to Israel are of a rather informal 
nature, statements of the President and of his predecessors. 
Certainly there is a basketful of declarations, but no formal 
treaty.
    If Israel, victorious, is going to be insistent on some 
safety and security of her rights in the future and does not 
feel disposed to accept, to rely on the U.N. for safety, and 
regards us with some satisfaction as, in a sense, a patron, 
isn't it likely that before the Israelis relinquish the ground 
they have won, that they may expect from us, by formal treaty, 
a real declaration of just exactly what our commitments are to 
them so that it will no longer be nebulous or vague? I am not 
asking what we would do.
    Secretary Rusk. It is possible that they might raise that 
question. They have not put that to us in connection with the 
present crisis. That has come up from time to time over the 
years, but it has not been a part of the conversation during 
this present--during this year.
    Senator Cotton. But if we were sitting where they are 
sitting before we withdrew, it would not be unlikely, would it, 
Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Rusk. We have acted at various times in a variety 
of ways to support the security and the territorial integrity 
of a number of these states in the area.
    Our general statement of policy there has applied for all 
of the countries in that area, including Israel and, of course, 
we have had a very close tie with Israel.
    I would suppose that the attitudes and statements of four 
Presidents in this matter have been pretty well supported in 
the country, and whether you want to get into an additional 
alliance, treaty or alliance, at this point is something on 
which your views would be of interest. But I rather had the 
impression that alliances were not particularly popular these 
days.
    Senator Cotton. The only reason I presume to raise the 
question, Mr. Secretary, was that at the last briefing I tried 
to find out what our actual commitments, either legal or moral, 
unilaterally were with Israel.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. I would be very glad to----
    Senator Cotton. And I had some difficulty in finding out 
what they were.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, we had a meeting of the Foreign 
Relations Committee in which I tried to review those, and 
Senator Morse and Senator Lausche and others helped prepare a 
record on that. I do not know whether you had a chance to look 
at the transcript of that executive session, but you might ask 
Mr. Marcy to make that available, because we tried to spell 
those out in some detail.\1\ If not, I would be very glad to 
see that you get a special briefing on that point, sir.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See transcript of May 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Mr. Chairman. Senator Hruska?
    Senator Bible?
    Senator Allott?

                      ACHIEVING A PERMANENT PEACE

    Senator Allott. Mr. Secretary, what I have to say I say 
with all respect. But the situation in the Near East, as all of 
us know, has been coming to a boil for approximately two years.
    Secretary Rusk. Excuse me, Senator Allott.
    Senator Allott. Has been coming to a boil for approximately 
two years, and I have attended what briefings we were able to, 
and it appears that the United States was completely surprised.
    We found ourselves in an absolutely untenable position when 
the UAR closed the Straits of Tiran.
    Now, fortunately for the United States, a courageous 
people, with guts and foresight, have saved our bacon, and I 
might say also Great Britain's, in the eyes of the world.
    I am very interested that in these next few weeks we do 
whatever is necessary to get a permanent peace there, and in my 
present thinking it amounts to three things: Suez, Tiran, and 
borders, and in this same connection with the remarks that 
Senator Monroney made, it would seem to me that there would be 
a definite advantage since the Arabs are distinctly 
disenchanted with the Russians, in being a little reluctant and 
in just going back into complete diplomatic relations with 
these people.
    The situation of their thinking at the moment, because of 
the Russian vote last night, is not going to change their 
feelings toward the Russians overnight. It seems to me that at 
this time we should show some reluctance and not go back in 
there and say, ``All right, boys, this was fun while it lasted, 
but now let us go back to where we were before.''
    That is a comment. You may have a comment to make to both 
of them, but I think that we have to take somewhere down the 
line a much firmer and definite position than we have with the 
Israelis, and I would hope that we would make the resumption of 
diplomatic relationships a little bit difficult to procure, not 
that I say we should refuse, but we should make them a little 
more difficult.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, our attitude in certain other 
situations like Cambodia and the Congo Brazzaville, where they 
have broken relations in the past, has been not to resume 
unless there is a full and bonafide resumption, and we have no 
intention of begging for restoration.
    But, on the other hand, if there is an opportunity to 
restore them on a full and reasonable basis, with full rights 
of legation, it has been our tradition to do so. But I 
certainly will keep your remarks in mind, Senator.
    Senator Allott. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Case?
    Senator Case. Not today.
    The Chairman. Senator Cooper?
    Senator Cooper. No questions.
    The Chairman. Senator Morton?
    Senator Javits?

                     PUTTING THE CHIPS ON THE TABLE

    Senator Javits. Mr. Secretary, I will make two statements 
of fact and then ask you a question based upon them.
    The first statement is that I detect a certain satisfaction 
and, perhaps, even elation in the President and the Secretary 
of State that the Israelis have done as they have.
    The second point is that unlike Vietnam, here is a tough 
army, well able to look after itself.
    Now, I think the question that is troubling many of us is 
what is the United States prepared to do to back it up? What 
risks is it prepared to take?
    Now, we know the Russians have said they will give the 
Arabs all-out support, and we know that the United States has 
fuzzed around with the words ``neutral in thought, word and 
deed'' which you have done your best to explain, and bless you, 
and the President has, and I am not even complaining about what 
you say. But what are you going to do? Are we prepared to match 
the Russians, in fact, if they begin to put their chips on the 
table, notwithstanding what they have said or done in the U.N., 
or are we not?
    Are we going to pussy-foot around with this one, too?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, on that question, putting 
the chips on the table is something that involves a 
consultation with the Congress and the President and the 
Congress acting together. That is the point I told you we were 
not here to discuss in our earlier consultations, but that 
would be a matter of the Congress and the President acting 
together in a situation of that sort.
    Secondly, I would say that I would not value the chips that 
the Russians have put on the table very highly at this point.
    Senator Javits. May I just ask one follow-up question?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.

                    ISRAEL'S LINES ARE VERY EXTENDED

    Senator Javits. I agree with you thoroughly. I think you 
have every reason for satisfaction, and I am all with you. I am 
only asking for the future, because if we are going to play 
this very cozy and very safe, then we are going to go one way. 
I think we are going to get the pants trimmed off of us. But if 
we are going to take a few risks here, where we have a great 
army, and when we are taking enormous risks in Vietnam where we 
have a very, very weak reed to lean on----
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, you do not have any indication 
that the Russians are preparing to intervene in this, do you?
    Senator Javits. No, sir. I am not saying this, but you have 
got enormous problems of supply which Senator Morse has raised, 
and that is a big thing for the Israelis. The Secretary knows 
they are immobilized, which means their country can get very 
poor very fast. All the fellows who work are away, and so these 
are going to be very real problems. Their lines are very 
extended. This knifing through is by no means the whole ball 
game. The Secretary knows that at least as well as I do, and 
that is the point of my question.
    We are going to be called upon to evidence some 
implementation of our statement about the presentation of the 
territorial integrity and political independence of the only 
state who is being threatened really on that score, and that is 
when performance will really count.
    Now, the will to perform is going to be just as important 
as the deed.
    Secretary Rusk. I am supposed to be at a meeting at 6:30 at 
which some of these questions will be discussed.
    Senator Javits. I thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Yarborough?

                   ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF THE WEST BANK

    Senator Yarborough. Mr. Secretary, this is a question of to 
what extent has the Jordan territory west of the Jordan River 
been occupied by the Israelis?
    Secretary Rusk. They have for all practical purposes 
military control of the West Bank. They are not completely 
occupied--they have not yet completely occupied every 
neighborhood in it.
    The Jordanian army is in complete disarray on the West 
Bank.
    There are a million inhabitants on the West Bank, a good 
many of them refugees from the other part of--from the 
territory that is now Israel. So it is a very large population 
which the Israelis now have, for which they now have 
administrative responsibility.

               REESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

    Senator Yarborough. My other question was properly a 
statement as much as a question. I want to approach what the 
Secretary said about the reestablishment of relations with the 
Arab states if they ask for it. I am very sympathetic to 
Israel, as I think nearly all Americans are. Most of us are 
either of the Jewish or Christian faith, and we feel very close 
ties, and we have sympathy with Israel.
    But these Arabs have been so completely defeated and are so 
down, that my experience is that when a person is down 
psychologically, and the whole world is looking down at them, 
that we ought to pat them on the back, and not pull them down 
further. I do not think it is any time to kick them when they 
are down.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, despite all the problems 
that Nasser has caused, and perhaps some others have caused, 
looking ahead here for the next twenty-five years, there are 
going to be 200 million Arabs in this part of the world. This 
area is adjacent to NATO. It is a vitally important area, and I 
think that we have a great interest in the prosperity and the 
safety of Israel. But we cannot neglect this vast area that is 
inhabited by the Arabs, and be consistent with the long-range 
interests of our own country.
    So we are interested in having a settlement here with which 
both sides can live permanently. That is the important thing.
    To put it into Mr. Eban's own words, you do not withdraw to 
a state of belligerence, you withdraw to a state of peace.
    Senator Yarborough. I agree, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Rusk. So we have no problem with that.
    The Chairman. Senator Prouty?

                             ARAB REFUGEES

    Senator Prouty. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that 
this might be an opportunity for us to do something with 
respect to the Arab refugees, which has been a great irritant, 
of course, to the Arab nations, even though they have done 
nothing to help.
    Were you suggesting that there be the possibility of a 
financial confrontation for property loss?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, if we could get a settlement of 
that problem between the parties at the expense of paying a 
substantial amount of money for winding it up we would be down 
here very fast asking for it.
    I personally believe that there is a basis for settling the 
question on the basis of the individual secret choices of the 
individual refugee as to where he wants to live, and if a way 
could be found to give them that secret choice, the practical 
result would be one with which Israel could live.
    I doubt very much that many of these refugees are going to 
say they want to live in Israel. There will be a fraction of 
them who would, and Israel will take a fraction of them. But 
the theory is such that the Arabs won't accede to the fact that 
anything less than a million of them must have the right to 
live in Israel, you see. So the theory has complicated the 
practical arrangements.

                   THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND VIETNAM

    Senator Prouty. I won't ask you to comment on this, but I 
think it is something you should be thinking about. The rumor 
is becoming somewhat widespread, I think it was even reported 
on a broadcast or TV from Vietnam, that Russia's cooperation 
and the buildup by this action in the Security Council might be 
attributable to the fact that we are trying to work out some 
arrangement with them vis-a-vis Vietnam and the situation 
there.
    Secretary Rusk. No. These two situations have not been 
linked at all in our discussions with the Russians.
    Senator Prouty. Thank you.
    Secretary Rusk. Those rumors were just sheer speculation 
with no basis.
    The Chairman. Senator Cannon?

                  SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN ARAB NATIONS

    Senator Cannon. Mr. Secretary, do we have reports of any 
assaults on American citizens in the Arab world other than the 
two men who were hospitalized in Libya yesterday?
    Secretary Rusk. There have been a good many stonings of 
embassies and consulates. In one place in Benghazi, our embassy 
personnel locked themselves in their own vault overnight until 
a company of British troops came in and got them out.
    We have not had, I think, deaths to report other than those 
that you have seen reported publicly about people who got 
caught actually in the cross-fire.
    We have a very large-scale evacuation of Americans going 
on, and our principal problem at the moment is in Amman because 
of communications. Elsewhere it seems to be going reasonably 
well.
    Senator Cannon. Have you recommended that Americans who 
were in those areas evacuate?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, we have.
    Senator Cannon. Is that true in Libya?
    Secretary Rusk. Libya is--well, we have about 8,500 people 
at the Wheelus Base, and they will be taken out by the Air 
Force if required. But we are not making an emergency 
evacuation of those people at the present time, at the present 
moment.
    Senator Cannon. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Muskie?
    Senator Muskie. No question.
    The Chairman. Senator Fong?
    Senator Fong. Yes.

                   THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN FRONTS

    Mr. Secretary, do you have any intelligence on the material 
and personnel at the various fronts?
    Secretary Rusk. On the what?
    Senator Fong. The various fronts. It seems in just the 
Egyptian sector and the Jordanian sector there is fighting, and 
the Syrian and Iraq sectors have been quiet.
    Secretary Rusk. There has been very little shooting along 
the Lebanese front. There has been some cross-frontier shooting 
along the Syrian frontier that has not amounted to very much.
    There has been a good deal of fighting between the Israeli 
and the Jordanian forces, the Jordanians being under the 
command of an Egyptian general or until very, very recently, 
and major fighting with the Egyptians.
    Lebanon, Syria and Jordan have not been the prime problem. 
The prime problem has been between Israel and Egypt.
    Senator Fong. Have you any intelligence as to the amount of 
material and personnel involved on the Egyptian front and the 
Jordanian front?
    Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, I do not have it with me. I 
can get that information to you if you would like, Senator, but 
I just do not happen to have it with me.
    Senator Fong. Another question: The question of volunteers. 
I notice there are 3,000 people already ready to go to Israel. 
What is the State Department's policy on that?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have barred travel of citizens 
into that area unless they get special permission with a valid 
passport. That applies to all the countries in the area, right?
    Mr. Macomber. Except the newsmen.
    Secretary Rusk. Except newsmen and certain special 
categories.
    Senator Fong. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell?

               IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

    Senator Pell. Mr. Secretary, the world is a pretty small 
place. The Soviet Union is in a position now of seeing its 
friends and allies in the Near East getting defeated, and it 
also involves North Vietnam, seeing its friends and allies 
taking a bit of a pasting.
    Has any thought been given to, one, following up the cease-
fire with sort of a degree of good feelings if we work with the 
Soviet Union in this part of the world and settle our problems 
in other parts of the world, and, two, has any thought been 
given as to how we can avoid pushing the Soviet Union into a 
corner where it can lash back, such as in Berlin and in other 
places?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the second point, there is not much 
we can do about that in this situation.
    We did not encourage the Arabs to create this critically 
dangerous situation or make some rather extragavant public 
promises to the Arabs about support.
    We have not been out of contact with the Soviets on Vietnam 
at any point during this period.
    But whether this situation in the Middle East will have an 
effect on the possibilities of a settlement in the Far East we 
just do not know yet. My guess is that they still are looking 
at these two things rather separately.
    The Chairman. Senator Miller?

                DANGEROUS EUPHORIA OVER ISRAELI VICTORY

    Senator Miller. Just a couple of comments, Mr. Secretary.
    I would hope that diplomatic relations would be preceded by 
some kind of a revocation of these false charges.
    Looking down the road and thinking of our relations with 
the Arab people, unless those charges are eventually revoked, I 
think we are going to have a difficult time of it. So I would 
hope that that would be a sine qua non in these diplomatic 
relations.
    The second point is that--I may be wrong--but I detect a 
sort of a euphoria going around Washington with respect to the 
success of the Israeli army.
    Now, I think that we had better be pretty careful that we 
do not count our chickens before they are hatched. Senator 
Morse has raised a very valid point.
    I would hope that we would be very careful that we not 
assume that everything is all over right now.
    Thank you very much for coming down.
    Secretary Rusk. Right, Senator.
    The Chairman. Senator Dominick?

                U.S. COMMITMENT TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

    Senator Dominick. Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding 
that we have a commitment to support the territorial integrity 
of the countries in that area.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right, sir.
    Senator Dominick. Now, Israel at the present time is on 
Egyptian-Jordanian territory. Suppose Israel says that in order 
to withdraw to a peace--this means the West Bank of Jordan or 
it means Gaza Strip--what do we do then?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, they have not said that yet, and I 
would have to reserve on that, if that situation comes up.
    They announced when the fighting started that they would 
not--they did not have territorial ambitions. But I would not 
want to answer that one in advance, Senator.
    Senator Dominick. Let me put it another way. Is that 
commitment that we have so binding that this administration 
would feel it would have to honor it if Israel took that 
position or can't you--you obviously do not want to answer that 
at the moment either.
    Secretary Rusk. That would be a very serious question, 
Senator. I think I will not try to answer that one off the 
cuff.
    We have supported the existing territorial arrangements in 
that area for a long time. That would create some very, very 
serious problems for the future and would almost guarantee 
there would be another round of conflict at some point, I would 
think. I do not know. But I am not trying--I would not want to 
try--to give you an answer on that one today, sir.
    Senator Dominick. My difficulty on this is to see how the 
Israelis can legitimately feel that they are going to withdraw 
to a peace unless they do make some substantive changes in 
their strategic and tactical decisions.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, looking ahead they have got the 
problem to live with 200 million Arabs in 25 years, so they 
have got to think about a lot of things. Reconciliation with 
the Arab world is a vital matter for them at some stage, and 
they have been ready for it during all this period when the 
Arabs would not even sit down with them at a table.
    But I think we should not suppose that they would think 
that their answers are going to be found by simply boundary 
adjustments in a major way that would guarantee the lasting 
enmity of the Arab world.
    The Chairman. Senator Robert Kennedy?

                  REPLENISHING ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Kennedy. Mr. Secretary, assuming that the cease-
fire does not come immediately, or assuming that we have a 
cease-fire in the period of the next 2 or 3 days, and during 
that period of cease-fire time goes by, a week goes by, two 
weeks, or three weeks go by, and we still have not reached a 
permanent peace, what will we be doing during that period of 
time to replenish the arms and the materiel of Israel, for 
instance, which, I suppose, would be in desperate need.
    The second part of that is if the Soviets really sent in 
some of these arms and goods at the present time--if there is a 
cease-fire, of course, the situation changes in the matter--at 
that period of time they might decide they wanted to replenish 
at least some of the arms that have been lost by some of the 
Arab countries, and perhaps regain some of the stature which 
they lost over the period of the last 2 or 3 days. What would 
we do?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, in the first case, we do 
expect to have some requests from Israel in the direction of 
replenishment, and we will certainly take a look at those when 
they come in, yes.
    Senator Kennedy. Could I just ask what that means exactly?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, you are familiar with the way these 
things go, where is the money, what sort of things is it that 
they want, have we got them, how----
    Senator Percy. Can we just assume we will have everything 
they ask for?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I do not know, Senator. I do not know 
anything--I do not know any government that is in that 
position.
    Senator Kennedy. I just think that question is going to 
arise for everybody.
    Secretary Rusk. We expect to see them reasonably soon.

                 SYMPATHETIC VIEW OF ISRAELI ARMS NEEDS

    Senator Kennedy. All of us would like to make a responsible 
decision on it in the Senate. Where would we be on that?
    Secretary Rusk. You mean on the first one?
    Senator Kennedy. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. I think we would take a pretty sympathetic 
view toward their essential requirements.
    Now, we have not been their major arms supplier, and this 
problem may be complicated by President de Gaulle's attitude. 
The French have given them most of their sophisticated weapons 
or sold them, and cut off spare parts or things of that sort 
right in the middle of this situation. But we will just have a 
look at it and see what is required.
    Their losses, quite frankly, have not been heavy. They have 
used a good many consumables and ammunition, but their actual 
loss of equipment has not been all that heavy.
    Senator Kennedy. But I suppose even they will have 
shortages of ammunition if the fighting continues for another 
ten days.
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, yes, yes, and we have already taken 
that into account in our own arrangements, that possibility if 
this thing should go on.
    On the other matter, on the Russian side----
    Senator Muskie. On that question, Mr. Secretary, does that 
mean you are going to try to work out assistance for them?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.

                      RUSSIAN AID TO ARAB NATIONS

    On the other side, what the Russians will do, I do not know 
that we will get into military prevention of some supplies 
going from the Russians to those countries. But my guess is 
that they would have to supply a lot more than equipment at 
this time to recoup the situation in certain of these Arab 
countries.
    Senator Kennedy. If they did take that kind of a step, if 
they decided they were going to furnish more planes or whatever 
it might be, if they decided that they were going to furnish 
some kind of equipment, would we be in opposition to that? 
Would we be prepared to offset whatever they do?
    Secretary Rusk. You mean in Israel?
    Senator Kennedy. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. I thought--do you mean we would interrupt 
the Russian supply?
    Senator Kennedy. No.
    Secretary Rusk. We would take that into account, and what 
we would do so far as Israel is concerned, we have tried to 
strike that balance all along. There have been a good many who 
felt we were underestimating Israeli requirements. Our feeling 
has been that Israel was in pretty good shape in relation to 
its neighbors, and I do not believe the events in the last few 
days have disproved that.
    So that we feel we have an interest in the security of the 
countries out there in relation to each other, and we won't be 
at all indifferent to the Israeli needs in this situation.
    Senator Javits. The Secretary said he is going to a meeting 
at 6:30 on this very subject. Is that going to be discussed?
    Mr. Chairman. I wonder, Senator Percy is the only one who 
has not asked a question. Do you have a question?

                   ISRAEL'S ACCESS TO THE SUEZ CANAL

    Senator Percy. You have indicated it would be dangerous in 
speaking about negotiating terms with Israel. I have already 
taken a position with some of my constituents that it would be 
reasonable for Israel not only to insist on access to the 
Straits of Tiran but also access to the Suez Canal.
    Secretary Rusk. I did not mean by that that I was 
suggesting that any of you are limited to expressing your own 
views on this matter.
    Senator Percy. I see.
    Secretary Rusk. It would be very difficult to quote me on 
the subject or attribute news to me at this point.
    Senator Percy. I think the question also as to whether 
there is any change in the State Department's attitude on 
bridge-building and East-West trade, and things of that type, 
will come out before us very quickly, whether you are going to 
continue, if it is proven the Soviets have been a little 
mischievous in this area, whether you will have the same 
attitude or not. Perhaps we need not talk about it now, but at 
some time it would be helpful to discuss that phase of it.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I would say my own present view on 
that, sir, is we ought to continue to try, and I would also add 
that the Soviets were more--have been more--restrained in this 
situation than we thought they might be.
    Senator Kennedy. Can I just finish the last question? Is 
our policy in the Middle East still to maintain the territorial 
integrity of the countries?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. How you do it depends on the 
circumstances.
    [Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:35 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, 
Case, and Cooper.
    The following nominations were ordered reported favorably: 
Covey T. Oliver, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Latin 
American Affairs; William J. Porter, to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of Korea; Benigno C. Hernandez, to be Ambassador to 
Paraguay; and the Routine Foreign Service List of May 24, 1967.
    S. 1577, a bill to complement the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, was ordered reported, with an amendment.
    S. 624, to provide certain increases in annuities payable 
from the Foreign Service retirement, and S. 1688, the Inter-
American Development Bank Act amendment, were carried over.
    The Human Rights Conventions: Executives J, K, and L, 88th 
Congress, 1st session, were discussed and carried over. S. 990, 
a bill to establish a United States Committee on Human Rights, 
was ordered reported with an amendment.
    [The committee adjourned at 11 a.m.]


                          BRIEFING ON VIETNAM

                              ----------                              


                         Thursday, June 8, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:35 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators Gore, 
Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and 
Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. 
Jones of the committee staff.
    The Chairman. If the committee will come to order.
    Mr. Ambassador, we will take up where we left off before, 
which I suppose is a good enough place to start, because you 
already have noticed that it is a repetition of the question 
that I gave you which you deferred.

 STATEMENT OF HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PORTER, AMBASSADOR TO KOREA

    Mr. Porter. I hope I have the article.
    The Chairman. Do you remember it?
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir; I think so.
    It was the paragraph----
    The Chairman. I will read the paragraph if you would like.
    Mr. Porter. If as much effort and money were put into the 
training of ARVN, etcetera, reforming the bureaucracy, forcing 
the generals to prosecute corrupt colleagues as are put into 
dropping bombs in the country, there is more than a fair chance 
that the Americans could pull it off. But in Vietnam the 
Americans have a leadership problem.
    I agree with the statement.
    The Chairman. You do agree?
    Mr. Porter. There is a very pronounced pervasive leadership 
problem, principally because we must rely on Army officers, or 
we have had to rely on Army officers, to provide leadership 
since the fall of Diem, and those officers----

                WHAT AID OFFICIALS ARE DOING IN VIETNAM

    Senator Hickenlooper. What are we doing with the thousand 
or so AID people we have got out there?
    Mr. Porter. The AID people, of course, are not dealing 
primarily with the Army officers, Senator. They are dealing 
with the civil administration, and while there are Army 
officers in that, too----
    Senator Hickenlooper. What do you mean by leadership?
    Mr. Porter. I mean the Army officers who compose the top 
elements of the government, the national leadership council, is 
composed almost entirely of Army officers, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I thought you meant out in the 
people.
    Mr. Porter. No, sir. I refer to all Army officers, both 
those at the head of the government and those in the field.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.
    Mr. Porter. At the head of their units.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They are all bad, are they?
    Mr. Porter. They are not all bad. There are some brave and 
dedicated men among them.
    But the problem with the Army and the officer class there 
is that a man becomes an officer or at least eligible for the 
officer training school simply by going to a university.
    The enemy does not worry about that. They take boys, train 
them, size them up, see if they have leadership qualities. The 
man who has what it takes, who will lead his soldiers well on 
his side, any time of day, follow his orders, is the man who 
will rise in their ranks. There is no question of having a 
diploma. In fact, in my view, on the enemy side it is a 
disadvantage to have one in Vietnam.
    We have not done a great deal about this system. We have 
accepted it. We have tried to train, through these officers, an 
Army in the image and likeness of ours and of Korea days, and 
we have not sufficiently struggled against a set of habits as 
well as attitudes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What are we doing with all the AID 
people out there? The woods are full of them out there.
    Mr. Porter. The AID people, in my opinion, there are lots 
of them, of course, are extended. Their numbers are great.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I agree something is wrong out there, 
don't misunderstand me.
    Mr. Porter. No, sir; I do not misunderstand you. But the 
AID people and the civil element in that country represent 
possibly one half of one percent of the total Americans. They 
are scattered throughout, doing their best to further various 
programs of pacification and reconstruction in 236 districts 
and 44 province capitals.
    They are dedicated men, many of them living in isolated 
areas, with considerable danger to themselves, and I really 
think, sir, that there is very little need to defend the effort 
on that side.
    Certainly there has been slippage, certainly AID has 
encountered problems both with individuals and problems of 
substance.
    But in my view, those men, all of them practically 
volunteers, are exposing themselves to great dangers and doing 
good work.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you. I did not mean to 
interpose.
    Senator Case. I am sorry, you were just commenting on what?
    What was the comment on?
    Mr. Porter. The Senator inquired what were the AID people 
doing in Vietnam.
    Senator Case. I see.
    Mr. Porter. There are a great many of them I pointed out, 
and I explained how widely dispersed they are, and my view of 
their performance.

                        VIETNAMESE OFFICER CORPS

    Senator Gore. Could I ask a question, Mr. Chairman, about 
the officer corps?
    The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.
    Senator Gore. You say that the officers, one becomes 
eligible to be an officer or a member of the officer corps, in 
the South Korean Army----
    Mr. Porter. South Vietnamese.
    Senator Gore. South Vietnamese, I see, merely by attendance 
at the university.
    Now, is attendance at the university open to all or is this 
an aristocratic sort of privilege?
    Mr. Porter. It tends to be aristocratic and urban. It is 
not everybody who can get to the university regardless of his 
brains.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.
    Mr. Porter. Position is required, family position, in many 
Cases.
    Now, in recent years, the last two or three years, an 
effort has been made to create officers through field 
promotions of enlisted personnel and from the ranks of the 
noncoms.
    But while some lip service has been, or there has been some 
performance in that connection, I think that the scale is 
unsatisfactory. I do not believe that the rural elements, the 
families, the peasant boys, have the possibility of getting to 
the armed forces and into responsible positions on our side to 
the same degree or anything like it that they have on the VC 
side.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.

               THE WAR CAN ONLY BE WON BY THE VIETNAMESE

    The Chairman. Mr. Porter, he goes on--I may say to those 
who came in late, these are a few paragraphs, a couple of 
paragraphs, taken from Ward Just's article on Sunday. Most of 
you, I expect, read that. I was just asking his comment on it.
    Senator Case. I think it is very important.
    The Chairman. That was the first one.
    The next one, he says:

    In the final analysis the war can only be won by the 
Vietnamese, but it is still the Americans' to lose by 
misapplication of power or by impatience or sheer unwillingness 
to do what needs to be done.

    Do you think that is an accurate statement?
    Mr. Porter. Yes. The Vietnamese have to win the war. The 
great struggle on our side and on the military side--when I say 
our side I meant the civil side, the civilian side--is to get 
the Vietnamese to do for the Vietnamese the things that have to 
be done if the war is to be won. This is one reason why, in 
developing the present concept of pacification, I refused to 
let any Americans go into the villages with the teams.
    The Vietnamese must perform the service required for their 
fellow countrymen in the villages, and the Vietnamese must 
protect the villagers while the pacification process is under 
way.
    Now, some people, and some of the civilians, too, involved 
in the program, point with pride to the fact that in a certain 
province in Vietnam pacification has proceeded very well. That 
is the province of Binh Dinh. This is not an acceptable concept 
to me because pacification has proceeded there under the 
protection of foreign troops, principally those of the Korean 
Republic and our own.
    Were we to take those troops out of there, the process 
would certainly slow down, and we might have retrogression, 
probably would have retrogression.
    I am convinced that certain things of that kind must be 
done by the Vietnamese, and should not be done by the 
Americans.
    Senator Cooper. May I interject there?
    The Chairman. Let me finish, and then I will go around. Let 
me finish this one.
    Do you believe that a military victory is possible or would 
that achieve our real purposes?
    Mr. Porter. May I preface my final sentence on the subject 
by recounting a little bit of my own experience. I have been 
with guerrillas, close to them, sometimes with them physically, 
over many, many years in various countries.
    I have never seen a guerrilla movement beaten if it had 
national support. I do not believe that we, on our side, have 
the training, brave as our people are, to cope with the kind of 
guerrilla movement on the scale that it exists in Vietnam, even 
though I do not believe that movement on the guerrilla side, 
the VC, have support on the scale which the nationalist 
movements of North Africa and the Near East enjoyed in their 
struggle against the French and the British.
    I therefore believe that we cannot win the war by military 
means alone. That is the answer, Senator.
    But I would like to go on for just one moment.
    The Chairman. Certainly.

                 COMPONENTS OF U.S. EFFORTS IN VIETNAM

    Mr. Porter. As I see our effort in Vietnam today, it is 
composed of five elements:
    The bombing of the North, which I consider necessary if 
done with restraint and care because for morale and for reasons 
of interdicting the flow of supplies connected with that, it is 
necessary to undertake such action. Additionally, the North 
Vietnamese are delivering very large weapons, powerful weapons, 
to the South by means at their disposal.
    The second element of our effort is, of course, the 
military campaign in South Vietnam itself.
    The third element is the pacification effort which is 
designed to meet the VC where he was strongest, and that is in 
the villages of South Vietnam. They were never an urban 
movement.
    The fourth element is the psychological warfare effort, 
which is producing results and brings in at times as many as a 
thousand or more VC a week, at least since the beginning of 
this year after the application----
    Senator Case. That is to create defectors on their side.
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
    And the fifth element which I consider to be the most 
promising of all in this array, is the return to constitutional 
government, although that is at the moment beset with 
difficulties and dangers.

               MILITARY EFFORT IS NOT THE DECISIVE ASPECT

    The military effort is a necessary part of the overall 
effort. But it is not the decisive aspect, because I have 
always felt since I went to Vietnam that we could win by 
acquiring their minds, by bringing them over to us, but that we 
could not win simply by killing them.
    I have seen massive power applied to other guerrilla 
movements. It won't do by itself, careful as we are to try to 
hit the enemy only. The French had 600,000 men applied to a 
much smaller movement when I was in Algeria. It did not work.
    Of course, the French were facing a totally hostile 
population, and we are not in Vietnam by any means.
    But those are the elements of the struggle, as I see them.
    The military element would not be sufficient by itself, and 
I personally place more reliance on the last three: the 
returning to constitutional government, provided we can emerge 
with a useful and representative government; pacification, to 
give the villagers something worth living for, to get them 
security, which is what they want more than any other ideology; 
and psychological warfare to reach the minds of these boys in 
VC units.
    Military, yes it is very necessary. It won't win by itself.

               WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE

    The Chairman. I find it difficult to believe that any 
white, rich, powerful Western country can ever be very 
sympathetic to these people and winning their minds and their 
feeling that we really are their friends and their benefactors. 
Not only here--it is not peculiarly Americans, I mean it was 
the same with the French or the British or the Germans.
    The whole picture seems to me utterly unfeasible, not 
because of any defect or inefficiency or any kind of thing on 
our part, it is just in the nature of things.
    Mr. Porter. May I comment on that?
    Mr. Chairman. Yes.
    Mr. Porter. I, perhaps, used a phrase inadvisedly if I 
talked about their minds, bringing them over to us.
    I never sent a team into a village with that thought in 
mind.
    Mr. Chairman. You said that.
    Mr. Porter. To reach their minds you first begin with their 
security and their family well-being, and you create 
conditions.
    Eventually, certainly not immediately, they would not know 
what you are talking about. The target eventually is their 
minds, so that if you get something that is representative of 
them in Saigon, you can begin the work of educating them about 
values.
    Now, you hear lots of phrases such as ``winning the hearts 
and the minds of the people.'' The hearts and the minds of the 
people are won initially, at least, if you provide them 
security and some degree of well being; their minds to the 
extent that they are with you, and their hearts, and their 
minds also, because they understand you are doing something for 
them.

               FRENCH EXPERIENCES IN VIETNAM AND ALGERIA

    Mr. Chairman. You have mentioned you have had long 
experience in Algeria and now in Vietnam. Before the revolution 
started, and for many years, at least since about 1885, the 
French gave them, I would think, a high degree of security. 
They were not being slaughtered and murdered, and so on, but 
still they wanted to get rid of those French, and they did get 
rid of the French, both in Algeria and there.
    The French are civilized people. Maybe they are not as good 
as Americans--nobody is--but next to us they are civilized 
people, we thought.
    Why is it that these people do not accept them?
    Mr. Porter. The French gave them very little security----
    Mr. Chairman. Really?
    Mr. Porter [continuing]. In the rural areas, and certainly 
security against the kind of movement which had its origins and 
its birth out there in the rural areas, and they gave them 
practically no social justice. That is the answer there.
    These people crave, and even those boys to whom I talked--
--
    Mr. Chairman. How about Algeria? There was no security 
there? I had read prior to the revolution there was some degree 
of prosperity and normalcy, and so on in Algeria, but they 
still wanted to get rid of the French.
    Mr. Porter. Here again it is a question of time. The French 
gave them security as long as they were willing to accept 
French protection----
    Mr. Chairman. Yes.
    Mr. Porter [continuing]. Or as long as they were forced to 
accept it. But they gave them very little social justice.
    Senator Symington. Will the Chairman yield?
    Mr. Porter. If I may say, sir, the term ``an Algerian 
election'' was coined in French days as the proverbial 
something crooked. It is the measure of something crooked, and 
the Algerians knew it. So you had a kind of security imposed 
which people did not want, but you had no social justice 
alongside it, which might have brought people, perhaps 
eventually, to accept this system. But in the meantime it would 
have, of course, forced the French to evacuate the country.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They had two classes of citizens in 
Algeria.
    Mr. Porter. Yes.
    Mr. Chairman. In all this colonial era, the British are 
said to have had some degree of social justice in places like 
India and some of their other colonies, and yet they wanted to 
get rid of the British. This does not add up to me.
    Mr. Porter. There are degrees of this.
    Mr. Chairman. Unless you think Americans have some special 
quality of kindness and consideration and empathy which no 
great powerful nation in the history of the world ever 
exhibited, I do not see how you think we are going to have a 
different response.

               WHITES CANNOT INFLUENCE VILLAGE ELECTIONS

    Senator Symington. Before you answer that, I want to ask 
you this question. I had a talk with Moshe Dayan in Tel Aviv, 
who had just come back from Vietnam, and I know you saw him out 
there----
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. And, based on my experiences out there--
I met him coming back from Vietnam--he said not less than three 
times in a couple of hours that we talked: ``Remember this. 
Don't ever forget it.'' He talked as a man experienced in 
guerrilla fighting.
    He said, ``No white man is ever going to sell their 
candidate for village chief to the villagers in Vietnam or 
anywhere else.''
    This he said after he had been there and, of course, 
naturally, it worried me because since I last had the privilege 
of seeing you, the whole pacification program has been turned 
over to the military.
    What do you think--everybody knows of his vast experience 
in this field, and what would be your reaction to that comment? 
He emphasized it and re-emphasized my words.
    Mr. Porter. He is absolutely right; he is absolutely right.
    But, may I say that, Senator, the pacification program has 
been turned over to the military primarily because of the 
feeling here of course, I do not mean in the committee but in 
Washington--that our military would not or could not or did not 
make the effort to invoke the necessary effort by the Army of 
Vietnam on the protection side of pacification, and would not 
do so until our military were totally responsible for the 
pacification program.
    Now, last September this was about to happen, and I came 
home and argued against it, but the ground, the approach, then 
was different. It was claimed it would be more efficient to put 
it under the military.
    This time when the change was made it was done so, as I 
understand it, on the ground that with complete responsibility 
our military would put their shoulders a little more heavily 
against the wheel, and get the necessary performance out of the 
people they had trained. Those people, of course, are the Army 
of Vietnam who must, as I was saying a while back, protect 
their people in the villages and the pacification teams while 
the process is going on.
    Now, let us hope for everybody's sake that this is going to 
work out. I hope so. Many of my civilian colleagues did not 
think it would, but they have to keep trying and accept the new 
state of things.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.

               USE OF MARINES IN AID PACIFICATION EFFORTS

    Senator Case. What do you think, if I may just interject 
there, of the effort they have been making around Danang, that 
is, the Marine idea of having a detachment of perhaps 12 of our 
soldiers join the team?
    Mr. Porter. I like that. The marines, in fact, in my view--
the Senator has been out there and perhaps has his own view of 
things which are perhaps different than mine--the Marines have 
shown a great deal of imagination in trying to cope with this 
problem. They have unfortunately been drawn off by the influx 
of North Vietnamese across the demilitarized zone and, as a 
result, the effort by these combined companies, those to which 
you referred, sir, have suffered--but it is a good idea.
    Senator Carlson. May I say they have been under the command 
of a great Kansan, General Lewis W. Walt.
    Mr. Porter. Walt, and, in fact, I obtained the services of 
several of the Marine officers, and brought them into my 
organization wearing civilian clothing, because they do have 
that sensitivity and feel, which is not to say the other 
services do not. But the Marines did show a particular talent, 
I think.

                   GREATER USE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY

    Senator Case. In this connection, can we use more of the 
Vietnamese Army more effectively not only in pacification 
protection programs, but also on a larger scale fighting? May I 
just throw this on the table? I do not think it is much of an 
idea to put another 150,000 Americans in an overloaded country 
already. This I just do not believe. Have you got a comment on 
that, too, in connection with this whole thing?
    Mr. Porter. I have an opinion.
    The Chairman. Well, go ahead and express it.
    Senator Case. Well, bless your heart. You know----
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir; I have an opinion.
    I would have to be shown before I would put more troops in 
there just what they are supposed to achieve.
    There are about 1.1 million men under arms. Another 
100,000, ten percent, does that mean we are within ten percent 
of victory? Of what? This is what worries me. I worry about 
this, and I do not want to criticize the generals with whom and 
alongside of whom I worked. But what is not needed--I do not 
believe it is needed there--are more troops.
    I would like to see a good deal of retraining. What is 
basically needed in that country to alter the situation 
dramatically is a night fighting force. The night fighting 
force is what is needed. We have not trained the Vietnamese to 
do this job. Maybe we cannot, maybe we are not trained 
ourselves for it.
    But after sundown, as the Senator knows, there is a 
different state of affairs there. In the daytime we can go 
anywhere, and our victories are real when we can detect the 
enemy or when he attacks us. But when night must fall, if you 
have the tanks out or you have the choppers out, you have to 
pull them back. Why? Because there is a different state of 
affairs, and you have an enemy who knows every inch of his 
terrain and who works best at night.

                   SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WILL FIGHT

    Senator Symington. Can I ask you a question right there?
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. How many more men do you think we need 
to put into Vietnam to get a really tight hold, a really tight 
handle, on the guerrilla problem?
    Mr. Porter. I do not know that we need to put any in.
    Senator Case. Americans?
    Mr. Porter. Senator, I do not know that we need to put any 
in. I would like to see--perhaps it would require a miracle--
something done to retrain, say, 50 percent of ARVN to move out, 
say at 5:30 at night instead of everybody moving in and holding 
up.
    We know they will fight at night if they have proper 
officers. We have some units on the civilian side which react 
to specific intelligence. There are men who know the terrain as 
well as the VC. But we have only a few of them because we 
cannot set up an army in competition with the Ministry of 
Defense in Saigon.
    But they are good boys. They are just as good as the VC if 
they are properly led.
    Senator Cooper. Who are you talking about, the South 
Koreans?
    Mr. Porter. No, sir. I am talking about the Vietnamese, the 
Vietnamese elements.
    Senator Cooper. I mean the South Vietnamese.
    Mr. Porter. We know they will fight.
    Senator Gore. Didn't you say a moment ago there were one 
million men under arms?
    Mr. Porter. There are 1.1, I should think, which is a 
nearer estimate, sir.
    Senator Gore. With only 15 million South Vietnamese, it 
seems that is one soldier, more than one soldier, to every 15 
men, women and children.
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Gosh.
    Senator Case. There are different kinds of soldiers. There 
are daytime soldiers and part-time soldiers.
    Mr. Porter. Yes. There are approximately, I think if I 
recall the figures of the Army of Vietnam in its three 
categories of the Regular Army, the Regional Force and the 
Popular Forces, they number 630-odd thousand, and we have 
pretty close to a half million ourselves. Then there are 30 
ROK's, and smaller units, of course, from the other troop 
contributors; yes, sir.

                        THE WAR IS NOT HOPELESS

    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper, do you want to ask a 
question?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I do not know whether I get the right 
impression or not, but I take it you think we ought to get out 
of there. It is a hopeless thing; we cannot win?
    Mr. Porter. No, sir. I do not think it is hopeless if we do 
the right thing. But I do not agree with Ward Just, my friend 
here, who says it is probably unwinnable or some such phrase. I 
think we are doing--we have a program, and if we persevere and 
do the things which have to be done on our side and, more 
important, induce the Vietnamese and especially the Vietnamese 
Army, to do the things which must be done by them, and should 
only be done by them--protection of the villages, the work in 
the villages, and the various other things I have mentioned--we 
have got a pattern here which will win for us.
    Senator Clark. What do you mean by win?
    Mr. Porter. I mean it will achieve at least temporarily, 
and I will explain the use of that word in a moment, sir, it 
will bring about a cessation of hostilities.
    Now I say temporarily because it will only be temporary 
unless there is a very great deal done on the side of social 
justice, and if it is permanent, if institutions are built to 
take advantage of what might otherwise be a temporary cessation 
of enemy activity. There has to be--institutions have to be 
developed in that country.

                      RIVALRY BETWEEN THIEU AND KY

    One of the most worrisome things at the present time is the 
fact that the two men, Thieu and Ky, are now vying for the 
presidency. This could split the army which, after all, is a 
relatively stable institution. It would endanger the stability 
that we have had for the past two years instead of moving us 
toward the kind of situation we want to see exist there, a 
constitutional government, representative government.
    We knew about the risks when we urged them to do this. We 
thought there might be rivalry. Well, it is developing and it 
is very serious.
    If, however, the process goes well, and we get a 
representative government, preferably civilian in nature, which 
the military are willing to serve as protectors of the 
constitution and the country, then we could really move forward 
because such a government resulting or emerging from an honest 
election, observed by newspapermen and officials from all over 
the world, who are supposed to be invited to this next one, 
will effectively deal with the VC claim which the Communists 
push night and day, to be the sole representatives of the 
people of South Vietnam.

                     CHANCES OF AN HONEST ELECTION

    Senator Hickenlooper. Do you think there is any chance of 
getting a satisfactory election according to what we call 
honest standards or reasonably honest standards down there in 
the next two decades?
    Mr. Porter. We did it last September in the elections for 
the Constituent Assembly.
    Senator Hickenlooper. There are a lot of claims----
    Senator Case. There was a selected group of candidates, but 
the election itself was----
    Mr. Porter. The election itself was honest and above board 
between candidates.
    Of course, you go into this kind of thing----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Didn't somebody sort of ride herd on 
that election down there, hold them within the fence in some 
way?
    Mr. Porter. Mainly by insuring the presence of a great many 
observers, press and others, sir.
    Senator Clark. How about the franchise though, isn't that a 
real problem? How about who is being allowed to vote?
    Senator Gore. To seek office.
    Senator Clark. No, to vote.
    Senator Gore. And vote. A man who is neutral is not allowed 
to run.
    Senator Clark. Or allowed to run, isn't that right?
    Mr. Porter. They have progressed beyond the neutrality 
aspects. They have under our encouragement adopted a program of 
what they call national reconciliation.
    Senator Gore. I saw Marshal Ky this morning, Mr. Porter, on 
television in a U.S. helicopter out shaking hands with the 
children, campaigning. I wonder if anyone can come to any 
conclusion except that he is our candidate?
    Senator Case. He has got a helicopter. I think it is a good 
idea he is campaigning. He now is beginning to realize you have 
to pay enough money for the soldiers----
    Senator Gore. Are we going to provide a helicopter for his 
opposition?
    Senator Case. Look, the President of the United States 
takes the presidential plane and goes campaigning. [Laughter.]

                    NORTH VIETNAM COMMANDS OBEDIENCE

    Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you this question--I have 
to go. I cannot stay much longer and I would like to finish a 
couple of questions I have. But why is it that the North 
Vietnamese fight like the devil, and the South Vietnamese seem 
to run around at loose ends like chickens when a thunderstorm 
comes along? I know they will fight on occasions. I do not say 
they are not brave when properly stimulated. But what 
stimulates the North Vietnamese to keep coming in in waves and 
waves and waves? Ho cannot line them all up on the chopping 
block.
    Mr. Porter. I can only guess at it, Senator. In the North 
there is a system which commands obedience and punishes 
severely if it is not given.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is very true.
    Mr. Porter. And in the South it is not as rigid nor as 
compelling a system.
    Senator Hickenlooper. If people love liberty so much, I do 
not mean to say people do not love liberty, but if people love 
liberty so much, and these people get a chance, why don't they 
go into a system that is not so rigorous? A million of them did 
come down at the time of the French.
    Mr. Porter. And, in my opinion, would do so again if that 
frontier were open.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, they are down in South Vietnam.
    Mr. Porter. When you have the kind----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are they there for loot?
    Mr. Porter. No, they are down there, I think, because the 
southern elements, the VC, NLF, the military arm, at least, is 
now in considerable trouble because of pressure. Things are not 
the way they were, and while they are holding on, and they are 
punishing us at night, they have suffered heavy losses. I think 
that is the reason the northerners came down in such force or 
at least are turning on the pressure up in the northern 
provinces of South Vietnam. This is purely a personal guess.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, thank you. I have to go. I 
appreciate your coming here. I wish you well.
    The Chairman. I am glad you have gotten so much 
encouragement that you are glad about it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I did not get any encouragement. I do 
not feel any better, but I thank the Ambassador for coming.
    Senator Case. I think this has been the most useful session 
I have had since I have been a member of the committee.
    The Chairman. Senator Symington, do you have any further 
questions?
    Senator Symington. I have some.

                      THE SPIRIT OF SOUTH VIETNAM

    First, let me say what a privilege it was talking with you 
in Vietnam. I left my discussions with you feeling I understood 
a lot of things I had not understood before.
    I do not believe, I want to tell you this and just present 
it to you. After thinking over all the discussions I had with 
all the people there, I do not think that Premier Ky represents 
a majority of the people of South Vietnam, if you add the Viet 
Cong to the non-Ky South Vietnamese.
    It seems to me we have learned a lesson in the last few 
days in what people with a heart as well as a head can do in 
two and a half million people making this fantastically 
successful operation in that part of the world in which you are 
a true expert, against 80 million, take on everybody, and the 
next thing you know obliterate their military power to the 
point that they have done to date.
    With a premise of that type and character of thinking, do 
you remember when I was out there, two weeks before I got 
there. They assassinated perhaps the leading civilian opponent 
to Premier Ky. I remember I called you up to confirm our first 
date, and you said they have just nearly killed the second 
leading opponent. Do you remember?
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Now, also when those 30 people hit the 
TonSonNhut Air Base there right in town, they knew they were 
dead. Whether they were successful or not or worse than dead, 
they would be tortured if they were caught. We would turn them 
over to the South Vietnamese. Isn't it true that the spirit of 
South Vietnam is more truly represented in the Viet Cong than 
it is in the majority of the South Vietnamese? That is my 
question.

                      ZEALOUSNESS OF THE VIET CONG

    Mr. Porter. You mean are the VC more representative of the 
people of South Vietnam than----
    Senator Symington. Well, I will put it to you this way: 
Aren't the Viet Cong, looking back to what has happened in the 
Middle East in the last few days, aren't they the people of 
dedicated courage as against the South Vietnamese?
    Mr. Porter. There is no question about the courage of 
certain of their units.
    Senator Symington. Zealous, aren't they more willing to die 
for a cause, let us put it that way?
    Mr. Porter. Yes, Senator, some of them. But if they were 
solid in that respect we could not peel off a thousand a week 
as we are doing now from their units. It is not a solid 
organization.
    My own opinion is, and here again I am giving opinions, I 
am not----
    Senator Symington. Do you think a thousand a week is worth 
$2 billion a month?
    Mr. Porter. I paid for each of those 1,000 the sum of $125. 
That was my overall cost per head for these people as I walked 
them out. That is all I can say.
    Senator Symington. I am not going to pursue it any more.
    Mr. Porter. It is not a very expensive thing.

                      FACELESSNESS OF THE VIETCONG

    Senator Case. What you really mean is there is not in South 
Vietnam, except for certain highly organized units and 
disciplined and trained people, there is not any great passion 
for the Viet Cong or for the Communists.
    Mr. Porter. I was about to say in an open election today, 
if it could be controlled, that is to say, in the sense of 
being protected from pressure, armed pressure, my own judgment 
would be that the VC might get 15 percent of the vote. I have 
tried to reach out to this movement.
    Senator Mundt. Is that all of Vietnam or South Vietnam?
    Mr. Porter. South Vietnam.
    I have tried to reach out to this movement, as I have to 
others in other places, to see who is what, and what astonishes 
me about them is their facelessness. There is nobody who stands 
out there who amounts to anything in the community. They are 
not led by the respected elements of the community as were the 
nationalist movements of North Africa and the Middle East that 
I knew.
    It is a very odd business. They do not seem to have any 
control over the workers. We could be harassed in North Africa 
building the bases in Morocco by a single order from the 
underground movement.
    The VC have tried a general strike. They would obviously 
like to hamstring our effort there in construction of the base, 
and so forth.
    They tried that tactic twice, a complete failure, zero. 
Nobody responds. I have not ever encountered a movement quite 
like this before.''

                        VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE

    Senator Case. They talk about the Viet Cong infrastructure, 
and then they do not mean a head man and the village chief and 
all the rest of it sitting down somewhere behind the screen 
somewhere, and if they do not, what do they mean?
    Mr. Porter. They mean the chap who is with them. He might 
be a member of a village council. There might be two members. 
There might be another man in the village, a regular farmer, 
carrying on intelligence functions, notifying them of this. 
This is what they mean by the infrastructure. This is what we 
have to try to get at after we start the pacification of the 
village.

                     FAILURE OF STRATEGIC VILLAGES

    Senator Gore. When I was out there ten years ago we were 
spending vast sums of money on the strategic villages. This was 
going to be the salvation for pacification.
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. They were utter and complete failures.
    Mr. Porter. That is correct.
    Senator Gore. Ten years later we have other innovations. 
What will it be ten years from now, in your view?
    Mr. Porter. When I was told to take over pacification, 
Senator, I found no precedents except those of failure, the 
kind of thing you mentioned, the strategic hamlet program and 
others.
    Senator Mundt. Is that what Roger Hilsman told us about at 
that time?
    Mr. Porter. Possibly. I am not sure what Hilsman said.
    Senator Mundt. Yes.
    Mr. Porter. But the strategic hamlet, we found the error. 
People were coerced into living in it. They were taken out of 
their villages and they were given arms to defend what? 
Nothing. And even if they were inclined to, say it was a 
Catholic village and they wanted to oppose the VC or the Viet 
Minh, it was a principle or a religion or what have you. First, 
in the case of those who did wish to oppose them, the reaction 
was, the protective reaction by the government was often 
delayed, and frequently non-existent; the reaction force too 
far away, no choppers in those days, no planes, no guns or what 
have you that could be brought to bear.
    The VC set up their sand table. They figured how far away 
the reaction force was, how many people were in this resisting 
hamlet. They devoted the force, they applied the force, 
required to reduce the hamlet. They posted, as they still do, 
their ambush force between the objective and the reaction 
element, and simply cut it down.
    As you said, sir, you are quite right. The ruins of these 
hamlets are strewn all over the place. We decided that we would 
expand only from secure areas, already secured; that nobody 
would be forced to leave his village and live in a barbed wire 
entanglement. We tried to take advantage of those errors.

                   A WINNING CONCEPT OF PACIFICATION

    I am convinced that we have emerged with a concept of 
pacification which will work if all of the elements, the 
ingredients, are in the package, and those ingredients can be 
simply stated.
    You must first have a well-trained team which knows what it 
is about, and which must be from that village or district area.
    They must be known in there to help the economic 
improvement, security and general training, and reparation of 
civil functions in the village itself.
    You must then have the understanding of the province and 
district officials' support. Without that the things that are 
needed from on top won't come down to the village, the lumber 
for the bridge or the pigs or whatever is needed to start up 
life again.
    You must then have your economic wherewithal in position to 
insert into the area once you go in to support the team.
    Then you have got two things that are intangibles. You must 
have your prospective force of the Vietnamese Army somewhere in 
the neighborhood on a 24-hour basis, not holing up at half past 
five, and not waiting until eight o'clock in the morning when 
the village is struck at midnight.
    And, finally, if you get your protective force acting 
properly in that sense, they must have the right attitude with 
the villagers. They can be a good protective force, but if they 
go in there and grab the girls and steal the chickens and do 
all this other stuff, which has been all too common, the people 
say to their friends, us and others, ``Take them away. We would 
rather have the VC.''
    But when you have got all those things going on in a 
village area, we know from experience it can be done, but you 
must expand from secure areas. You cannot pick and you must not 
force people into so-called strategic hamlets.

                       CURRENT STATUS OF VILLAGES

    Senator Mundt. What percentage of the villages do we have 
with all these ingredients operating now?
    Senator Case. Ten percent?
    Mr. Porter. I would say--no, sir; more than that. We have a 
goal of taking 1,100 hamlets, not villages but hamlets, this 
year with 1.3 million people in them.
    We have not yet applied teams and the other elements to all 
of the 1,100, but I would say that in possibly 40 to 50 percent 
of the villages or the hamlets where we are, where pacification 
is underway, the ingredients are there in sufficient quality to 
further the process.
    It shifts. You know, some time or other a province chief or 
district chief is on his good behavior, and he puts up quite a 
show for a few weeks. But you have to keep watching or there 
will be some backsliding. This is a fluctuating process. The 
movement is forward.
    In 1966, if I may continue for a minute, sir, in 1966, 
which was really a year of organization, we were putting this 
concept together. We took over about 500 hamlets, and we are 
now moving, as I say, up.
    The teams are being refined, the leadership improved, 
etcetera. It will go. But what has been lacking up to now is 
that required around-the-clock protection. Too many teams in 
villages cooperating with us have been struck at midnight with 
no reaction until eight a.m. A team or village cannot stand up 
against a company of VC.
    This is what is missing, and this is what the new team in 
Saigon is supposed to try to evoke from the Army of Vietnam.
    We have been trying, of course. Being aware of the problem, 
we managed to get 60 battalions of their 120 battalions of the 
Army of Vietnam allocated to the job of protecting those 
villages.
    Senator Gore. But they are still a daytime Army.
    Mr. Porter. They are still a daytime Army all too often. We 
were hit 25 times, last year. Villages in which teams were 
working were hit 25 times by the VC last year.
    But by the end of this year the pacification threat became 
so great, the enemy, that is the VC, raised it to top priority. 
Up to the time I left Saigon in May we had been hit this year 
about 400 times, and there are special decorations now 
announced by the VC. They fear this process, and I am glad they 
do, in a sense, because it tends to prove that we now have 
something that might work.
    But we are still evolving. Nobody has got all the answers, 
and I can only hope that the new team----

                  INSPIRING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY

    Senator Carlson. What you are saying, Mr. Ambassador, is 
that for some reason we cannot inspire the Vietnamese Army, the 
Southern people, who should be doing it. Why aren't they 
inspired? They just serve in the Army and draw their salaries, 
and don't we try to encourage and try to help the people? Is 
that the idea?
    Mr. Porter. Well, sir, the officer class is the key to it 
all. Now, General Westmoreland, for whom I have great respect, 
has a different opinion of them than I.
    Senator Carlson. I see.
    Mr. Porter. He thinks they are good. He came back here and 
made a speech and devoted part of it to praising the Vietnamese 
Army, and there are good men in it.
    But as far as I am concerned, in this pacification thing 
there have been some glaring deficiencies.
    Now, everybody is trying to get this thing changed.
    Why we cannot inspire them, why we have not been able to, 
is because there is an officer class which has acquired bad 
habits. The war is over at 5:30. There is no war on Sunday, you 
know, that kind of thing.
    It is just not applicable to this kind of situation. Now 
maybe if you had a fixed line with a lot of trenches and great 
defenses there would be no problem except the enemy coming at 
you from one direction, and you could maybe take a little time 
off to do this. But you cannot. You have to fight right around 
the clock in Vietnam, and nobody can fight at night.
    Senator Gore. Senator Cooper.
    Senator Case. Are we getting anywhere in correcting this; 
are we starting?
    Mr. Porter. We are trying. Our military and everybody out 
there are doing their damndest to get it. Please don't feel 
from what I have said that there are not good units and not 
good Vietnamese. The Vietnamese trooper on our side is just as 
good as the VC, but he is not operating in his own territory 
very frequently. He cannot get out at night. He is not setting 
booby traps for the enemy at night or ambushes, and he has got 
a different kind of training. He is a conventional trooper, 
brave as they come, when the enemy is coming across the field 
at him perhaps. But at night it is a different business.
    Senator Carlson. Is this a fixed bad habit or is it bad 
morale on the part of these people? What do you think?
    Mr. Porter. I think it is just a bad habit. I do not think 
it is anything that is unchangeable, except that it is going to 
take time, Senator, to do it.
    Senator Carlson. I am through.
    Senator Cooper. Might I ask a couple of questions, Senator 
Gore?
    Senator Gore. Go ahead.

              IMPLAUSIBILITY OF MAKING OVER SOUTH VIETNAM

    Senator Cooper. I certainly appreciated hearing you, 
Ambassador Porter. But it seems to me in a way what you have 
said, one could say that it brings into question the very 
premise upon which we are operating in South Vietnam.
    We would say we are there to help the people fight for 
their freedom and help them resist aggression. But from what 
you said they do not seem to be doing very much, and if you 
extend your suggestion, it seems to me, what we are saying, we 
have to make over the whole country. We have to make over the 
military forces. You have to, the people themselves have got to 
believe there is social justice. You say you have got to get 
the government in the attitude of providing social justice. It 
seems that the Americans are stimulating or trying to inspire 
the making over of a country economically, militarily. I just 
wonder if a country can do that to another country? No colonial 
country has ever been able to do it. The British did very well 
in India and did very well in other places, but they could not 
do it.
    I think it questions the very premises which we are there 
for. I want to ask you two or three very specific questions.

               SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY'S LACK OF MOTIVATION

    Take the Army, I read this--of course you have made it 
clear--they do not fight at night.
    I can remember four or five years ago when we heard one of 
the purposes of our advisers out there, as stated on the floor 
a number of times, was to train these South Vietnamese in 
night-time fighting and guerrilla fighting. Apparently we never 
did.
    Then you say they cannot even protect the security of the 
hamlet; they are driven off.
    Well, it does go back to what is the reason--part of it may 
be training--but isn't it also the fact that it is lack of 
motivation?
    Mr. Porter. Motivation in many cases, yes.
    I did not say, I do not think I said, Senator, that they 
won't protect a hamlet. What I said is that the reaction is 
delayed beyond reason. That a hamlet, after a signal goes in, 
should not be expected to wait eight hours before the local 
force or the force in the vicinity reacts.

             GET THE VIETNAMESE TO DO THINGS FOR THEMSELVES

    Senator Cooper. You changed your system now to put 
Americans in there or with Americans and South Vietnamese to 
provide the security. It is evident that they would not secure 
the hamlet at night; is that correct?
    Mr. Porter. To put Americans in to react instead of South 
Vietnamese?
    Senator Cooper. Yes.
    Mr. Porter. But then we would be changing our basic 
philosophy. You mentioned the British and what they tried to 
do, and so on. But they tried to do it directly to these people 
or for these people; make them do things. We are trying to get 
the Vietnamese to do things for Vietnamese.
    Senator Cooper. The fact is we have not been able to get 
them to do it. We have not been able to get them to do the 
fighting that they ought to do.
    Mr. Porter. That is right.
    Senator Cooper. It is their country, to protect the 
villagers, to engage in night fighting. The Viet Cong engage in 
night fighting, but these people have not, and part of it must 
be because they will not. Do you agree with that?
    Mr. Porter. Yes.

                ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

    Senator Cooper. Then I think it is a question that they are 
not fighting for something in which they believe.
    Now, what about the people themselves? You said, first they 
must have a feeling of security, and that has been answered by 
your statements about the failure of their own people to 
protect them, the Army people.
    Second, they must have a belief that this social justice 
will be accorded them. Then that goes for their government. It 
would follow then their government has not taken any large 
steps to accord them what you call and what we generally 
understand are the elements of social justice. Is that correct?
    Mr. Porter. They have taken some steps, but there is a very 
great deal to do in that field. It is hoped that many things 
will be done under a constitutional form of government which 
would be representative and would give the people a chance to 
raise their voices against injustice.
    Senator Cooper. I am going to quit. But if I may pursue my 
line for just a moment, following Senator Gore's observation, I 
have seen time after time long lists of things that have been 
provided to the people of South Vietnam through our money and 
our effort. Only this year the President, in one of his 
speeches, one of his messages to Congress, had a tremendous 
list of things that have been done because of our aid and our 
money--schools, roads. I just cannot name all of them. But that 
has not accomplished very much, has it?
    Mr. Porter. I think it has in the areas that are secure.
    Senator Cooper. It has?
    Mr. Porter. Yes, I think it has. The program has produced 
in the secure areas a feeling on the part of the Vietnamese 
generally that they would like--outside those areas, too--that 
they would like to have the same benefits and security. 
Security brings with it tangible benefits.
    Yes, I do believe there has been a definite and good 
reaction to these programs.

                        SOUTH VIETNAMESE LOYALTY

    Senator Cooper. Is there any feeling of loyalty or 
attachment on the part of the people in South Vietnam toward 
the government?
    Mr. Porter. Yes, in many cases, there is.
    What we have noted is the willingness of the people 
throughout South Vietnam to cooperate with the government 
provided the security is not transient.
    Too many times in the past the VC have been swept from a 
village area, and then the military unit went off to do 
something else, and the VC came back to punish the village for 
cooperating during the brief period when it was secured. They 
have learned. They have had many bitter lessons in that 
connection.
    Now, we find they want to be sure that that security is in 
as a basic ingredient of the program. It must be there; must 
stay there. Once they are sure of that, it takes about two or 
three months to calm their fears. Then the intelligence about 
the VC begins to come in, not quickly, because of the history 
of it, but they do cooperate. In that sense they are loyal.
    They will respond despite VC threats to participate in the 
election appeal. We have seen that definitely on several 
occasions, now, and there is no particular loyalty to a 
government in a party sense. But there is a feeling that there 
are great advantages to be derived if only peace and security 
could be achieved, can be achieved.

              DISLIKE BETWEEN SOUTHERNERS AND NORTHERNERS

    Senator Cooper. One other question: What is the attitude of 
the people toward North Vietnam? When I was there I was told 
that there was a great feeling toward Ho Chi Minh, but they did 
not like the North, and it was chiefly the basis for being 
willing to continue to make such efforts as they could 
fighting.
    Mr. Porter. There is a disease called regionalism in that 
country. The southerners and the northerners do not like each 
other, and the Centrists do not like either.
    Senator Case. It goes back for centuries.
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir; and that is one cause of the 
friction.
    There is then, of course, a big Catholic element which 
dislikes the North for other reasons, although many of them, 
Catholics in the South are foreign, are of northern origin.
    On the other hand, many officers came down from the North 
because they were afraid of Communists and did not like them, 
or their families had suffered, people like Ky himself. That is 
his weakness in this forthcoming election as a northerner. He 
will run, and will have great difficulty unless he finds a 
strong southerner to go with him.
    Senator Cooper. I thank you.

                IF THE ELECTION SPLITS THE ARMED FORCES

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, you said earlier that if--
there are a lot of ifs--if the election went over well, if they 
got a civilian who did a good job for social justice, and then 
maybe a constitutional government and election which was to be 
held in September, it would alleviate the situation.
    You did not discuss the other contingency, except to say 
there is a rivalry between the two popular military leaders 
that might split the Army.
    Mr. Porter. Yes.
    Senator Mundt. So if that happens where are we? If that is 
in the realm of possibility, and I gather it could be, what 
happens?
    Mr. Porter. There could be considerable dissension. There 
is a feeling by many of us that what is required at this point 
is a civilian government with the support, loyal support, of 
the Army.
    Ky and Thieu, young men, have been in power now for a 
couple of years, and have gotten to like it. Neither wishes to 
yield to the other, and both will be candidates apparently.
    If this splits the armed forces, we may have a tendency to 
revert to the business of a coup d'etat, which were frequent 
before Lodge and I went in there.
    Somebody is going to have to be pretty firm somewhere, it 
seems to me, because the coup d'etat was bad enough in the old 
days. But now with 500,000 Americans in the country, the rules 
of the game have got to be changed accordingly, and I think 
somebody is going to have to tell them.

                    PERILS OF AN ELECTION IN WARTIME

    Senator Mundt. Is this a contingency? Is it going to 
provide any loyal support on behalf of the South Vietnamese if 
we superimpose on them an American-made selected government? 
Wouldn't that antagonize them right off the bat?
    Mr. Porter. Senator, we have been backing away from doing 
just that despite everybody, all kinds of people, approaching 
us saying, ``You have to say what you want and then people will 
know.'' That is a very dangerous position to get into.
    Senator Mundt. I was a little concerned in my own mind when 
I first heard we were going in there in the middle of a war and 
holding an election. We might be creating a fracas. We might go 
from bad to worse, because it is a little unprecedented in our 
American wartime history to have elections and wars going on at 
the same time and at the same place, and we having instigated 
it. We have got to assume some responsibility for the results. 
And what could happen, seems likely to happen, to me, and I am 
not an authority on Vietnam because I have not been there, but 
it seems to me what could very well happen is that the split 
that you mention between these two charming and rather 
successful military figures who have a loyal following in their 
sub-officers, if they split up, and the one who loses is not 
going to support the one who wins, there is no alternative but 
just to superimpose a ``made in Washington'' government. I 
think that is the worst of all eventualities.
    Mr. Porter. Yes, or to act in time and reason firmly with 
them.
    My own tendency would be not to wait, to get at this thing 
sooner rather than later, because the effect in the country 
will be very bad.
    We have a lot to gain by a good election, and a respected 
figure, preferably civilian, emerging. The whole image of 
Vietnam throughout the world will change, and we will feel 
easier with them, I think, as a result.

                         THE AMERICAN CANDIDATE

    Senator Gore. It seems to me from all that you have said, 
particularly with respect to Senator Cooper's observation, that 
Ky here is a key to success, which must be motivation. The 
French were unable to motivate these people to defend 
themselves. We have been trying, since 1954, and we have not 
been very successful.
    You agree with the observation of General Dayan that no 
white man's candidate will succeed as village chief. What 
reason do we have to believe that the white man's candidate 
would be accepted? How much is this yellow man against white 
man's exploitation?
    Mr. Porter. Sir, I would never propose a candidate as such.
    Senator Gore. Well, this man is our candidate. He comes to 
Honolulu; he comes to the Philippines. He campaigns in an 
American helicopter. He has a plane with a bar in it. He wears 
a baseball cap he got over here. How can he be more a white 
man's candidate than he is?
    Mr. Porter. Well, I tend to think that the trip to Honolulu 
and the plane, etcetera, are the perquisites and trappings of 
office. I do not know----
    Senator Gore. They are our trappings though. We provided 
the trappings.
    Mr. Porter. I know. But any soldier--we had them there, Big 
Minh had them, and others had them before Ky showed up, because 
we were supplying these kinds of items.
    But the mission has been extremely careful to make it clear 
to everybody in Saigon that there is no American candidate. 
This has been said to Ky himself; it has been said to all the 
others.
    Now, in exerting our influence in the place, I think it 
should be in the direction of getting them, as we have done on 
sort of a minor scale from time to time, to pull together; to 
get together again, and pull together, and make up their minds 
on a course of action that will not split the country or split 
the armed forces.
    Maybe they could compromise now that both are candidates or 
have announced their candidacy in favor of a civilian.
    You know in Vietnam there is no foregone conclusion that Ky 
can win. Ky is a northerner; he is a young fellow. He has not 
got any southerner of prominence to run with him that I know of 
yet. He is opposed by a couple of respected but not outstanding 
personalities, and it is just barely possible that he and/or 
Thieu would be beaten, despite the advantages which accrue from 
being in office.
    Senator Gore. Let me make this observation. If I were his 
public relations officer, the first thing I would do is to take 
the American baseball cap off him and give him one of these 
little round hats that goes up to a peak.

                      THE SITUATION IS INTOLERABLE

    Senator Case. Tell me how do we exercise influence? We 
ought to influence them to eliminate corruption or cut it down. 
We ought to influence them to pay the civil servants and the 
army more. We ought to do a thousand things. How is this done? 
Do we go in and say, ``Ky, you little jerk, will you get some 
sense in your head or else we will get the hell out of here''?
    Now, how can you--I understand, I have seen papers from 
downtown or to each other downtown, that we have such a great 
stake in this place, and we are absolutely at the mercy of the 
Vietnamese because we know we cannot pull out.
    Well, I say we can pull out, although I am against it. I 
think that the effect, except on the basis of the South 
Vietnamese demonstrating to the world that they are not worth 
saving, I think it would be a disaster if we pulled out as far 
as the periphery goes and as far as many of the people in South 
Vietnam who have come along with us and all that.
    But this is intolerable, to have American boys killed while 
people get rich, etcetera, etcetera, for very much longer.
    Tell us how it works. Do you talk to Ky? Did Cabot talk to 
Ky?
    Mr. Porter. Oh, yes; yes, sir. We do not have any 
hesitation about taking up delicate matters or problems that 
might be delicate in other countries with people like Ky.
    In the matter of corruption, we had some frank discussions 
and conversations with him. He did manage to remove two of the 
highest ranking generals in the country from office as a 
result.
    Senator Case. One guy is still in there though.
    Mr. Porter. Well, there are several other characters 
around, but at least the Minister of Defense was taken out, and 
the commander of the Fourth Region, the Delta.
    In matters pertaining to an army raise or pay raise or 
civil servants, much the same process goes on. Ky is not 
difficult about that kind of thing.

                     ELIMINATING KY AS A CANDIDATE

    Senator Case. Well, what I mean to say specifically now, 
you were just talking with Senator Gore and Senator Mundt about 
the matter of the desirability of eliminating Ky as a 
candidate. Can you talk to him about this kind of thing? You do 
not select a candidate, but can you persuade Ky and the 
military to put in a responsible civilian figure who will 
himself add a little legitimacy to the government, which is the 
main thing that Ky lacked because he is regarded by most people 
still, as I understand it, as one of a bunch of thugs who have 
come down from the North and except for Big Minh, who had a 
little standing because he was the instrument to overturn a 
dictator and a tyrant, the rest of these people have had no--
they inspire no loyalty or no affection. They are in no way a 
force to draw a country together, this kind of thing.
    Mr. Porter. That is why I said, sir, a civilian candidate 
might well win.
    Senator Case. What can you do to help this?
    Mr. Porter. But in the matter of what do you say to Ky, and 
so on, I do not know what is being said at the moment. I have 
been out of touch.
    The pitch when I left was for Ky and Thieu to settle 
between them, and this was being made directly to them, to 
settle between them which of them would be the candidate, since 
they seemed to be both talking about running if a split in the 
armed forces was to be avoided.
    They gave assurances that no split in the armed forces was 
going to happen, but no more than that. Since they have 
announced their candidacy, this has weakened both.
    The conversations are straightforward and frank when we 
have reason to talk to them.
    Senator Mundt. Have you ever tried to talk an American 
politician out of running for office? It is not easy.

                 POSSIBILITY THAT A CIVILIAN MIGHT WIN

    Mr. Porter. There is something in that sense, Senator. But 
they will split their support, and I would not be unhappy to 
see a civilian emerge, provided he has some kind of a working 
arrangement with the military. The military make a hell of a 
lot of difference.
    Senator Case. Of course, of course. But it might happen 
that way.
    Mr. Porter. Ky, I sense in Vietnam, naturally perhaps on 
the part of the people, some hesitation about backing military 
candidates, and I don't--he is too young, he is northerner, and 
he has not got a good southerner to run with him so far, and 
there are great weaknesses.
    If a respected southern figure emerges from the Delta, the 
Delta will vote southern, and that great conglomeration outside 
Saigon is unmanageable but probably would not vote military.
    Senator Mundt. Let me ask you this. You were in such a 
position, you and Cabot who were there, and your successors who 
are there. Couldn't you call in Ky and this other fellow in the 
same room and say, ``Look, fellows, we are trying to win this 
war. Will you agree on a civilian?'', That kind of thing, might 
conceivably be withdrawn, you might get either to withdraw for 
the other. It is my inclination to believe in a war-time 
situation that one or the other is more likely to win than a 
civilian.
    The Chairman. That is the way you are going to do it in the 
Republican convention in the back room. [Laughter.]
    Senator Mundt. Yes. ``Look, agree on some civilian and 
everybody will pitch in and help.''

                           NEED FOR A RUN-OFF

    Senator Case. Up to now it does not look too good. When you 
left, the assembly had just defeated the effort some of the 
civilians had been making to provide for a minimum vote in 
order to win on the first election, and----
    Mr. Porter. This was at the behest of the Ky elements. This 
is a very troublesome aspect.
    Senator Case. That is right.
    Mr. Porter. Very troublesome. Because, we have pointed out 
to Ky, if there is no run-off and there are four or five 
candidates, and a man emerges with 15, 20, or 25 percent of the 
vote, where will be his prestige domestically or 
internationally? We are hoping for something here that will 
look like a national mandate, whoever is put into office.
    Senator Case. They turned this down.
    Mr. Porter. They turned this down, and Ky later said--well, 
we took this up with him again, and it seemed to us to be a 
good procedure. But he said he thought that he probably would 
get, or that the winner would probably get 40 percent of the 
vote, which would not be bad, of course, in a field of five 
candidates or so. But it is not a healthy business that way.
    The Chairman. Senator Clark, have you posed any questions?

                      VIETNAM CLOSE TO A STALEMATE

    Senator Clark. I would like to ask a couple.
    Mr. Ambassador, I came in late, and I hope I won't be going 
over ground that has already been covered. But I understand you 
did not have any serious quarrel with Ward Just's article in 
The Washington Post on Sunday. Am I wrong about that?
    Mr. Porter. No. Ward reflects, or the article reflects a 
number of incidents primarily. He is a very sensitive man, and 
in certain respects I can agree fully. I am not sure--I do not 
go along with him when he says the war is probably unwinnable. 
This was printed in the paper, and this was not my thought. I 
think it is winnable if, and then, of course, the ifs come into 
the picture.
    Senator Clark. Yes. But I get the impression at the present 
moment we are pretty close to a stalemate. Is that wrong?
    Mr. Porter. Well, you are right in the sense that we can do 
what we like in the daytime and damned little at night.
    Senator Clark. Yes. But I mean if we are close to the 
stalemate we finally got in Korea, maybe it is a good time to 
start talking.
    Mr. Porter. No, because there is no line, you see. It is 
not like Korea. It is quite different, sir. If there were a 
line you got stalemate on that would be great.
    Senator Clark. I understand that, but it does not seem to 
us it makes sense. So many die. We kill so many of them and 
they kill so many of us. This goes on and on. We do not take 
any more territory; they do not win. I do not want to argue 
with you, but it seems to me whether there is a line or not is 
not important.

                          VICTORY BY ATTRITION

    Mr. Porter. Westmoreland is counting on pure attrition. You 
kill enough of them and it eventually will quiet down. I have a 
different approach.
    Senator Clark. He also says five or six years.
    Mr. Porter. I do not know. The military do their own 
figuring.
    The Chairman. How many years do you say?
    Mr. Porter. Well, I could not say. At the present time I 
would want to see how this election turns out, because I think, 
sir, after this election, if we get something reasonable with a 
good image, world image, as a result of a popular mandate and 
all that, I think they ought to be pushed to open negotiations 
with the other side. They are Vietnamese. We are locked in.
    We have said we won't negotiate with the VC. We cannot stop 
the bombing unless we get a gesture, all these other gestures. 
They are not locked in by anything. They can and should, it 
seems to me, after the election, say to the VC. ``Now, look, 
there is no question this has been a decent election. Everybody 
in world opinion says so. Now, what do you want to do? Do you 
want to talk or not?''
    I also believe that this is what we are very likely to see 
because the spirit in the constituent assembly tends to reflect 
or indicates this possibility. This may be the way to go.
    The Chairman. That is providing Ky is not elected.
    Mr. Porter. Well, if a soldier is elected----
    Senator Case. You are going to have a congress; you are 
going to have a legislature, which is going to be a factor.
    Mr. Porter. If a soldier is elected it would take rather 
more urging on our part to make this direct contact. But I 
would not want to give up.

               FAILURE TO PRODUCE A STRONG MILITARY FORCE

    Senator Clark. Do you know a Japanese reporter from the 
Christian Science Monitor whose name is Takashi Oka?
    Mr. Porter. Yes, I have met him.
    Senator Clark. So far as you know, is he fairly reliable?
    Mr. Porter. Yes. He is an interesting reporter. Sometimes 
he tends to write things without checking them.
    Senator Clark. This letter which Carl Marcy has handed me, 
written on May 20, has some interesting observations in it. I 
would like your comment on one. One of them is:

    It is pertinent to ask why, with all the material help 
provided by the Americans, the non-Communist Vietnamese so far 
have not been able to create a military force half as good as 
that of their Communist compatriots.

    Is that a fair comment? Is that a fair question?
    Mr. Porter. Yes, it is a fair question, but it is not 
entirely a Vietnamese fault. We have been training them for ten 
years.
    Senator Clark. He comes to the conclusion it is the fault 
of their officers.
    Mr. Porter. That what, sir?
    Senator Clark. He comes to the conclusion that it is the 
fault of their officers, which bears out something which you 
said earlier about the nine-to-five hours, and also something I 
saw in the paper that in three years there has only been one 
field grade officer in the South Vietnamese army wounded in 
combat.
    Mr. Porter. I am seriously concerned about the officer 
corps for a number of reasons. But I think there have probably 
been a few wounded.
    I must say the civilian elements in Saigon seem to be much 
more the object of--the police particularly whom we on our side 
trained--much more the object of VC attack than the officers of 
the army.
    Senator Clark. Which would seem to indicate they are happy 
with the officers of the army.
    Mr. Porter. Well, there is something there.
    Senator Case. They do not expose themselves.
    Mr. Porter. We get hit much harder, our officers.

                A CORRUPT ARMY LED BY POLITICAL GENERALS

    Senator Clark. I won't detain you much longer. But here is 
another one that Takashi Oka says:

    Promotion in the Vietnamese army still depends on a complex 
of personal family, regional, religious and educational ties on 
the generals and wives an officer knows, on his behavior during 
the innumerable coups and purges that have shaken the army 
during the past several years. The result is an army led by 
political generals willing to accept American advice only at 
the most technical level of logistics, new weapons, and 
sometimes of strategy. The corrupt and creaky, clubby structure 
of the Vietnamese army itself remains a sacred cow. Foreigners 
fiddle with it at their peril. Even the well-intentioned 
members of the Vietnamese military fraternity hesitate to touch 
it, and so the Americans fight the war.

    Is that unfair?
    Mr. Porter. It is harsh, but it is not unfair. The first 
part of it, yes, the list of factors.

                 REORGANIZATION OF PACIFICATION PROGRAM

    Senator Clark. Now, Joe Kraft, who is a pretty 
controversial figure, I happen to like him and respect him, but 
others do not, had an article in the Post--and this is my last 
question, Mr. Chairman--on the 12th of May, in which he is 
talking about the reorganization under which the American army 
took over the pacification thing, and he says:

    Reorganization is bound to work a subtle change in mood of 
the pacification effort. Originally the program was conceived 
as a means for winning over people in the villages, including 
people on the other side, by meeting their needs. As an adjunct 
to the military, however, pacification will be inextricably 
intertwined with the goal that comes so naturally to soldiers, 
victory. The dominant theme will shift from winning over those 
on the other side to killing them.

    That is a little rough. Do you think the army can do a 
better job than the civilians in pacifying the Vietnamese, whom 
I would be afraid are not going to permit themselves to be 
pacified by white men?
    Mr. Porter. Well, I assume you were speaking of our army. 
Could our army do it?
    Senator Clark. Yes, I was speaking of our army.
    Mr. Porter. I happen to feel and believe strongly that this 
must be done by civilians.
    First of all, to begin with, the technical aspect, the army 
tour of duty, is too short. The civilian, the American civilian 
will live in and observe the village and its environs for two, 
three, or four or more years. The army man is in there perhaps 
for six months, because the feeling is that this is sort of 
secondary, the advisory work is of a secondary character, and 
he wants to be, for his own good if he is a career man, even if 
not an officer, he wants to be in a battle unit.
    This is a question of sensitivity. I have--I think that the 
army boys would have as much as civilians if they were devoted 
entirely to that kind of work for the same length of time.
    Senator Clark. Well, I spent----
    Mr. Porter. Then, of course, there are problems of command.
    Senator Clark. Sure.
    Mr. Porter. The civilian is given, at least was, a great 
deal of flexibility, and he can use his own judgment as to what 
is needed, and a civilian is generally convinced of the need to 
keep an American presence out of those villages. I am not sure 
that that is the case with the army.
    Senator Clark. Well, I was in the Air Force for four years 
many years ago, during World War II, and I had the most 
enormous high regard for the West Pointers and the 
professionals that I worked for. They were really magnificent 
military men.
    But, boy, when they got to military government, they did 
not know which end was up.

                        RATIONALE FOR THE SWITCH

    Senator Case. I guess, Joe, perhaps, you were here, perhaps 
you were not here, when the Ambassador was saying that he 
understood the rationale for this switch, which I have very 
great doubts about, was primarily the providing of security for 
the program in the hamlets.
    Senator Clark. I am sure it was.
    Mr. Porter. The rationale at the time the switch was made, 
if our army, if it had complete responsibility for the 
pacification army as carried on under me previously, would then 
feel the compulsion or greater compulsion to evoke the 
necessary protective attitudes and actions out of the army of 
Vietnam.
    Senator Case. By the Vietnam, and we would see that this 
was done.
    Mr. Porter. And now we have people in there who are charged 
with evoking that Vietnamese action.

                            THE LINE COMMAND

    Senator Case. When I was over there they had not worked out 
this line of command really, the integration side of it.
    Mr. Porter. No sir.
    Senator Case. We have, what is his name, Bob Komer, who is 
Deputy for Westmoreland for this purpose, a civilian.
    Mr. Porter. Yes.
    Senator Case. But it has not really been very clear as to 
what the chain of command was going to be.
    Mr. Porter. Komer was in effect to take over that part of 
my job which was concerned with the structure and operation of 
pacification, the training of teams, the choice of the villages 
to be pacified, etcetera.
    No, General Abrams, as I understand it, is to be the one 
who evokes from the army of Vietnam, as Westmoreland's other 
deputy, the proper protective action and the right attitudes, 
etcetera, toward this process.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, could I go off the record for 
just half a minute?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    The Chairman. On the record.

                    FIGHT INDEFINITELY OR NEGOTIATE

    Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if I can ask you one or two 
questions.
    Probably in the interest of time I will over-simplify them.
    It seems to me in a very broad way we have two 
possibilities.
    One is to continue the fight indefinitely, some say six 
years, some say ten, some say twenty, however that may be.
    The other is to negotiate.
    Why is it impracticable to seek negotiation? At one time, 
our own government, and certainly others, have said a return to 
the essentials of the Geneva Accords could be an acceptable 
starting place to see if some basis for a non-military solution 
can be found.
    Would you care to comment on that?
    Mr. Porter. I think there will be a more propitious moment 
during which we can move toward negotiations if these elections 
come off properly.
    Now, there are problems, and I suppose this government, in 
moving toward a direct contact with the MLF-VC, in view of the 
things we have said, would not do this. Those problems do not 
apply to the upcoming new government of Vietnam next September.
    Mr. Chairman. The reason I raise that question----
    Mr. Porter. It seems to me they have more liberty of 
action, Mr. Chairman. Excuse me.

                   ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE SEEN AS FAIR

    The Chairman. I hope I am wrong about it, but this 
election, it cannot possibly be considered by the world as a 
fair election because everyone won't be out voting.
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir; everyone who is not bearing arms will 
be allowed to vote; yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Who is going to supervise it?
    Mr. Porter. There will be, of course there will be great 
dependence on the presence of the world press, and they are 
inviting official observers from many countries, as I 
understand it, to observe, not to supervise, but everyone can 
vote provided he has not got a gun in his hands.
    We have managed to get to the VC to come into the VC 
center, and within two months he will be integrated if he 
wishes into the Vietnamese society, and he may vote. More 
recently they have accepted the thought that the higher-ups in 
the VC may also reenter society, resume their professions and 
take part as individuals in the political process.
    What they have not accepted is the thought of VC-MLF 
participating as a party nor, of course, have they accepted the 
idea that armed units of the enemy side may come in to vote. 
That, of course, would not happen anyway. But they may vote. 
They have done so.

             CHANCES OF THE COMMUNISTS WINNING AN ELECTION

    The Chairman. Then you do not think it is feasible to 
return to the Geneva Accords--just supposing, just for 
speculation, to try to make the point I am trying to make, if 
you did have a cease-fire and you had an election supervised by 
the ICC instead of the American army, whoever the officials 
are, that this would make--do you think that the Communists are 
bound to win such an election?
    Mr. Porter. I think not.
    The Chairman. If not, why don't we take that route and make 
it more in accord with the concept of the Geneva Accords?
    Mr. Porter. Elections supervised by the ICC would require, 
of course, the agreement of the Communist element.
    The Chairman. That is right.
    Mr. Porter. And I think there is good reason to believe 
that they would themselves not agree, and that on the 
Vietnamese side the Ky government might not agree.
    We would not know about the latter point until we exerted 
our influence and pressure. But it is not an easy route to take 
by any means. It is not easy.

               FACED WITH A SECOND WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    The Chairman. What I am leading up to, I suppose, now we 
are faced with this second war in the Middle East which God 
willing is coming to an end as far as the violence goes. But 
the end is a long ways off as far as a real settlement is 
concerned.
    You could tell in this body itself this last week there was 
a much higher degree of apprehension as a result of this war in 
the Middle East breaking out on top of another war which is a 
very major war. Some are considering the proposition that it 
may, time may be here that we ought to consider trying to bring 
about a settlement involving, of course, the Russians and the 
other interested parties, of both the Middle East and Vietnam; 
that if we cannot settle Vietnam the Russians are not going to 
be satisfied to just sit by and be good and play ball in the 
Middle East while we are continuing to escalate and pursue the 
war in Vietnam.
    I think there is some logic in that, a matter of 
psychology. I know the administration insists that there is no 
connection between these two.
    I think, I sense, a great many of my colleagues believe 
there is a connection, particularly from the attitude of the 
Russians. They are still a pretty important element in the 
overall picture.
    Now, you say it is not a propitious time. It may not be 
with looking only at Vietnam. But it seems to me, looking at 
the whole world situation and, particularly, our relations with 
the Russians, they have received a very serious setback now in 
their prestige and their allies in the Middle East, and 
possibly they could be disposed to consider a package 
agreement.
    The reason I mention the Geneva Accords is simply because 
these governments--one common thread, I think, has been in the 
various pronouncements by Communists as well as our own 
government in the past, that this would be a reasonable place 
to begin. I am much more interested really in settling Vietnam 
than I am in the Middle East, not that we are not interested in 
both, but the one that is really hurting this country at the 
moment is Vietnam. I mean financially we are getting into very 
serious trouble. You saw where the House refused to up the 
limit. You know what that is. It is resentment against the 
distortion of our economy rising from the Vietnamese war.

               CONSIDER A BROADER FRAMEWORK THAN VIETNAM

    We had the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee saying 
in a speech the other day he anticipated there could be a 
deficit, on top of what we already have scheduled, of $29 
billion this coming year. That was from Wilbur Mills, the 
chairman of Ways and Means.
    We are getting into very serious difficulties, I think, 
economically, domestically. We have the distortion of our 
domestic programs.
    You read in today's paper about a riot, a racial riot, in 
Boston, which has not heretofore been particularly subject to 
that. Seventy people were injured, and so on.
    Everyone feels that this summer we are going to be plagued 
with many more domestic difficulties in this area, all of 
which, I think, reflect the Vietnamese war, not just the 
monetary part, but the distraction of the attention of most of 
our political leaders. They are thinking the war. They are not 
thinking about the poverty program or the urban program, and so 
on. You know they cannot possibly be.
    I was wondering if those of you, and particularly you, who 
have been so close to this out there, feel whether this should 
not be considered in a little broader framework than just 
Vietnam. Because if we are going to get anywhere with peace 
with the Russians or detente, I think we have to consider our 
doing something about Vietnam if they are going to be 
reasonable about other parts of the world.
    This thing has blown up in their face in the Middle East. 
If we do not make any movement towards some kind of 
reconciliation, they can also make it difficult in Berlin or a 
number of other places.
    Is this unreasonable to try to bring these two in focus, 
whether or not, in the words of the Secretary, there is an 
organic connection. I think there is certainly a psychological 
connection between the two in the minds of the Russians.
    Mr. Porter. The package, Vietnam----
    The Chairman. That is right.
    Mr. Porter. [continuing]. And in the Middle East?
    The Chairman. That is right.
    Mr. Porter. And, of course, the matter of the people who 
will eventually have to give, not only to us in Vietnam, but 
perhaps we could find some means of doing that, but some very 
tough people I was associated with for many years, meaning the 
Israelis.
    The Chairman. That is right.
    Mr. Porter. I do not know.
    In general appearance, of course, it seems attractive. The 
work seems very complicated.
    The Chairman. It is complicated.

                      VIETNAM IS A PERIPHERAL AREA

    What bothers me really, I know when you were there, and I 
know what I call good technicians and people, they are 
interested in accomplishing their particular job. But, 
honestly, I do not see in the overall picture if we spend five 
or ten years bringing about a democratic regime there, in the 
first place, it would be a very tenuous regime if we impose it 
or if we manage it, if it does not develop of its own roots 
there. It is not to me the kind of position that is nearly as 
dangerous to the peace of the world over a long period as the 
Middle East can be because of the juxtaposition of so many 
different interests.
    I have always been impressed by [General John] Gavin's idea 
that while it is important, it is not the most important or 
most strategic area, and so on. It is a reasonably peripheral 
area.
    I wonder, we pursue it with all this money and effort and 
manpower and the attention of our people, and the neglect-we 
are neglecting Latin America; we are neglecting our domestic 
programs; we are neglecting Africa because we do not have but 
one mind, and the President can think of only one thing at a 
time.
    I do not know. I think we are riding for a very serious 
problem if we do not bring these two together in some focus, 
and get some kind of a detente and stop this slaughter. That 
endless slaughter, it seems to me, is very dangerous.
    I was struck today, the Secretary was here this morning, 
and he left--there had been word that one of our ships had been 
torpedoed. Well, you know how it turned out.
    Supposing by mistake they had torpedoed a Russian ship. 
Would they have accepted the excuse that it was a mistake? I do 
not know whether they would have or not. They are mad as hell 
about our bombing their ship in the harbor.
    The Ambassador to Czechoslovakia came to see me and he said 
good-by, and he said the Russians were furious about our 
bombing their ship, and they do not begin to buy that we did 
not do it. They know we did, he said. These mistakes are very 
dangerous.

            GIVING THE VIETNAMESE A CHANCE TO MAKE A CHOICE

    Senator Case. This is a very important question in our line 
of questioning. We all know you have concerns and have 
expressed them, and we all hold, and I think this is a real 
hard question, what would happen if we made the kind of a deal 
that we can make now? First of all, can we make a deal that 
does not involve turning over South Vietnam to the Communists, 
except by immediately or short steps? If that is desirable then 
we should do it. If because of all the things that have 
concerned----
    The Chairman. I am not proposing we just turn it over to 
them.
    He is saying if they had a fair election he does not think 
they would vote for it. But I am saying it is up to them if we 
give them a fair opportunity that they make the decision.
    Senator Case. I think we are hoping that this will be 
regarded by the civilized world as, broadly speaking, a fair 
election.
    The Chairman. I do not believe they will when it is under 
our control. I think you have to have more participation by 
outsiders.
    Mr. Porter. You mean, sir, the country, our control of the 
country, or the election?
    The Chairman. Well, I mean the means of communications. The 
fact of the availability of transport, and all of this. The 
part that is going to function in this election is bound to be 
attributed to our control.
    Mr. Porter. Well, whatever the case may be, communications 
or transport, we have made it perfectly clear to them that we 
will not permit our transport to be involved in any of their 
election.
    The Chairman. You or somebody said Mr. Ky campaigns in his 
helicopter. Where did he get the helicopter?
    Mr. Porter. Well, there are helicopters there, and there 
are machines which belong to the Vietnamese government.
    The Chairman. We made it available. We made available 
everything they have.
    Mr. Porter. Yes.

                            A PHONY ELECTION

    The Chairman. Nobody is going to buy this kind of phony 
business. We are really running the show and Ky is our man. I 
do not think you can ever convince anybody he is not our man.
    Senator Case. I think it is really a hard problem for any 
civilian to campaign against him, don't you, with all the 
censorship and everything going on? We are constantly trying to 
help this out, but I think to get a civilian man in we probably 
would have to persuade Ky and his colleagues in the military 
that it is desirable in the long run. That is the only way we 
can get him out.
    The Chairman. I did not mean to put you on the spot to 
answer this question or not.
    Senator Case. I am going to put him on a spot by sharpening 
it.

             POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

    The Chairman. What I meant to do is this: You have the 
confidence of the administration, I know. Would it be 
feasible--I won't even put it in the form of a question, I 
would rather put it this way--I would appeal to you and plead 
with you, without your answering yes or no, to inspire them to 
think about it, at least the possibility of private 
negotiations with the Russians and then with the French and 
British, before major powers, at least, who have an interest in 
this area, to consider under these present circumstances in 
which the Russians and the Arabs are humiliated, and it could 
be dangerous if we pushed this.
    There is too much bragging. I regretted the statements made 
yesterday that this was a great victory for the West. This is 
the most infuriating way you can put this thing in the Middle 
East, but this was published as attributed to the Secretary.
    I do not really think he ever said it, or certainly 
intended to say it that way, but these things happen.
    I think during this interim if the Russians could be 
approached, if our government, and I certainly cannot do it, 
and it will have to be the administration, along this line, and 
they could see some prospect of a settlement in Vietnam, they 
would be greatly--their feelings would be helped a lot to go 
along in the Middle East and elsewhere if they thought they 
could get that off their back, because it is a burden to them, 
too. It is a burden and it is a dangerous one because of their 
relations with the Chinese.
    All I am doing is appealing to you to inspire them to think 
about it along this way and not be too frozen in their attitude 
that this has nothing to do with the Middle East, and we do not 
want to consider it at all.
    I think it is one of the things that might appeal to the 
Russians to consider seriously this approach.

                  COMMUNIST FEARS OF AN ESCALATING WAR

    I had a conversation with some of the Europeans at Geneva 
last week, and this sort of thing came up, and by and large 
those people--some were Communists, some were non-Communists--
felt that the time has come where something ought to break 
about the continuation of the escalation in Vietnam.
    They are all very apprehensive about it, you know all the 
Europeans are, for fear that it will escalate into a war that 
involves them. They are genuinely fearful.
    Everybody is worried about it is what comes out of this 
thing. Are we going to get into a war with the Russians, the 
Chinese and/or the Russians? It is always simple to say oh, no, 
that cannot happen. It is exactly what they said about Korea.
    We do not know obviously, but it is possible. Anytime you 
are slaughtering people wholesale there is always a danger.
    I was hoping you would, at least, plan to see that they 
consider it, whatever they do. I would hate for them to miss an 
opportunity if it is here. I do not know whether it is here or 
not, but it is worth looking into.

                PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

    Senator Case. Bill, do I understand you really--because I 
do not see as a matter of logic how the Middle East thing is in 
conjunction with Southeast Asia. How it makes it any more easy 
to make an agreement, unless what you have in mind in a way is 
that you get the Russians to ease off and to use their 
influence, whatever it may be, on the Arabs to ease off on 
Israel; settle that in a fair way, on a fair basis for the long 
term which, you know, I am all for in connection with our 
agreeing to withdraw somewhat our support or put pressure on 
the South Vietnamese. Is this what you have in mind?
    The Chairman. It is awfully late to try to do it.
    Senator Case. I just want to get some idea.

                  DAMPEN THE FIRES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    The Chairman. Maybe in a few words I will try to do it this 
way.
    What I would propose to do, and this is, of course, very 
over-simplified. We are now engaged in the Security Council 
with the Russians.
    They have agreed for the first time in a long time on this 
cease-fire. They supported it, all the Security Council did.
    We are doing business for the first time in a long time in 
the Security Council.
    Just to illustrate what I mean, I would propose to do with 
the Russians--they have joined now in this, and we welcome that 
assistance. This business in the Middle East has been very 
troublesome; it still is. The emotions are high, the resentment 
is bound to be terrible, and two or three things should be 
done.
    Let us not first engage in rebuilding the armaments. Let us 
come to some understanding on conventional arms in this area 
and see if we cannot dampen down the fires.

                 REFER THE WAR TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

    In addition to that, we have this other war over here that 
is very dangerous. Why can't the Security Council, with all of 
its prestige, unanimously recommend that the war in Vietnam be 
referred back to the Geneva Conference. That is where most of 
the parties, I think all of them, at one time or another have 
said it should go for reevaluation of the Accords of 1954 and 
see if they cannot find a basis upon which this matter can be 
brought to a negotiation.
    This is the forum in which the North Vietnamese, China, the 
United States, de Gaulle and others have said is the only 
forum, not the United Nations. The Security Council does not 
attempt to deal with it, but they recommend that this be done 
with the prestige of that agency, with the participation of the 
Russians, and that the bombing in the North should be stopped, 
and we, of course, agree with this; pending this we will just 
agree to do this, to get some movement in this thing.
    We are absolutely at a stalemate on this negotiation. After 
the last exchange of letters with Ho Chi Minh, everybody said, 
``Well, let's out. We are just going to fight it to the end 
now.'' That is the general attitude.
    I do not think there is the slightest hope until the moment 
there are going to be any negotiations at all. It is going to 
be a military solution. Yet, at the same time, many of the most 
knowledgeable authorities say it is not subject to a military 
solution. You virtually said that yourself. You do not think 
the military can do the job. It requires a very complicated, 
long, drawn-out system of pacification.
    The point would be to get some movement in it, a new 
approach, and a feeling that we are dampening down the fires of 
war instead of escalating them.
    This is largely, I think, a psychological point that I am 
trying to make, that we get a movement into this terrible 
confrontation that seems to be building up.

                         USE THE UNITED NATIONS

    The obverse of that, if we do not do it, it seems to me, 
the resentment of the Arabs is going to be very great. The 
Russians, after they lick their wounds, will say, ``Well we 
can't be pushed around like this forever.'' They can think of 
other things to do to cause us trouble and to stir up trouble. 
They are quite capable of it, if they do not change their 
attitude that we want to cooperate. You either go one way or 
the other. They never stand still.
    So this is a proposal, to use the U.N. to get it off dead 
center, and the U.N. would continue as the forum for the 
various details of the Middle East, such as what to do with 
Aqaba, the opening of the Suez, whatever readjustments of the 
withdrawal, and all the details of implementing a cease-fire, 
and bringing about a peace and, hopefully, a genuine treaty of 
peace rather than a truce.
    This is all I am trying to explore. I think that it makes 
sense to bring the two together, because then it is a really 
important matter, if it could be done, and if the Russians were 
encouraged to take a part in this.
    They reacted very favorably to their little experience in 
Tashkent, which was a minor matter compared to this.
    You never know, it might appeal to their sense of history. 
They have been fairly restrained on the whole up to recently. 
They have been getting pretty tough recently, to me exhibiting 
a kind of impatience of, well, there is no hope of a 
negotiation with the Americans. I must say I felt that 
publication of the matter of Ho Chi Minh that his government 
had just given up all hope of any negotiations, that there has 
got to be a military victory, and I honestly do not think it is 
feasible.

                 POSSIBILITY OF CHINA ENTERING THE WAR

    Before you get that I think the Chinese will come in, just 
as a matter of human knowledge, without any more knowledge than 
anyone else. I think it is a matter of human nature that before 
they surrender and give in they will come to the aid of these 
people, just as they did.
    Senator Case. I understand--I know it is late, but I have 
been waiting a few hours to say a few words myself, and I want 
to be sure I understand what you mean there.
    Do you mean if we are at the point or it seems as though 
there is a real chance that the momentum in the South Vietnam 
war is going to carry us through to our objective, that of 
establishing a government and a society there that are 
independent and non-Communist, that then inevitably the Chinese 
will come in or do you mean if we attempt to defeat Ho Chi Minh 
in the North?
    The Chairman. Oh, yes. Ho Chi Minh, if we continue to where 
we make him surrender.
    Senator Case. I do not mean surrender. I am talking about 
winning the war in the South. Do you think that will produce 
Chinese intervention so that we are just hitting ourselves, we 
are chasing our tail, because if we lose we lose, and if we win 
we lose?

                    AN UTTERLY UNFEASIBLE OBJECTIVE

    The Chairman. I do not think we will win the war in the 
South as long as the North continues to support them. I do not 
see any change. I do not gather from this change there is any 
substantial difference in the military situation. We control it 
during the day and not at night.
    Mr. Porter. Yes, sir.
    Senator Case. This is because of the fact that we have not 
been very intelligent about it. Is this correct or maybe I 
misunderstood?
    The Chairman. Of course, I questioned that further. I 
indicated further I do not believe it is possible for a rich, 
white, American country to go over and give, manufacture a 
nice, democratic system for anybody, for these people. I do not 
think they are going to accept it at all. I think it is an 
utterly unfeasible objective. But I was not trying to argue 
that now. There is a difference of opinion on that.
    Senator Case. I would think this is the whole point, Bill. 
If we are engaged in something that is impossible----
    The Chairman. I think we clearly are; absolutely clearly 
are. There is no doubt about it.
    Senator Case. Ambassador Porter does not agree with that.
    The Chairman. Mr. Porter cannot possibly agree with that in 
his position. It would be utterly impossible for him to.
    Senator Case. He is a man who has got to the point in life 
where his only desire is to be true and honest, and even if 
that means his losing his career he will do it.
    Mr. Porter. Right.
    The Chairman. I would not for a moment question his 
truthfulness and honesty.
    Senator Case. The way he has talked today he has been the 
most refreshing thing we have had this year, and it makes 
sense.

                        HOW ASIANS VIEW THE WAR

    May I say this, Bill. You are a little bit arguing a 
priori, that is, you take an assumption that, you know, this is 
a war of the Americans, the white race against the yellow. I do 
not think this is the way in this context the thing is going.
    The Chairman. You do not think that is the way they look at 
it?
    Senator Case. I really do not. What do you think about it?
    Mr. Porter. I do not think they look at it that way at all. 
I believe the presence of other Asiatics in Vietnam----
    Senator Case. They hate the Chinese and Koreans much worse.
    Mr. Porter. One aspect----
    The Chairman. How do you explain the constant repetition in 
people like Bernard Fall and De Villiers----
    Senator Case. He is a pro-French fanatic. Fall is 
absolutely----
    The Chairman. You dismiss these people as of no 
consequence. I cannot argue with you.
    Senator Case. I know. But he suffered a trauma when the 
French were beaten, and he could not possibly be anything but 
anti-American. I think this is true. I am trying to be----
    The Chairman. You cannot do anything but possibly be pro-
American either, neither can I. But I do not happen to think 
Americans are God and able to do things no white man has been 
able to do in the history of the world.
    Senator Case. The last best hope of freedom is the United 
States. I happen to believe that, and I think it is, and it 
applies.
    The Chairman.. That is in the United States.
    Senator Case. Abraham Lincoln was talking about the world.
    The Chairman. What did Abraham Lincoln have to say about 
this kind of a war?
    Senator Case. Abraham Lincoln had plenty to think about.
    But, seriously, I do not think this racial thing is the 
problem, that is one point.
    The Chairman. What I mean, these people--I do not know 
whether you call it racial, maybe cultural is the better word--
but I do not think they are sympathetic to the American concept 
of how to organize a society or of our sense of values. I do 
not know why they should. If they did they would be most 
unusual.
    The Japanese and Chinese are not very sympathetic to that, 
and rightly so, in my opinion.
    Senator Case. Well, now, may I just start another----
    The Chairman. I think you and I had better argue this some 
other time. It is 6:30, and the Ambassador has other things to 
do. You can do whatever you like.

                    PLAY THE HAND IN A SENSIBLE WAY

    Senator Case. Give me five minutes, or three minutes. I 
seem to sense not only in Vietnam but briefly in some of these 
other countries a very strong feeling that our presence in 
Vietnam had first come to be accepted as for real and for 
permanent.
    The Chairman. Permanent?
    Senator Case. Not our presence but our resistance to the 
Communist take-over, that we meant it and that, as a result, a 
whole new tone in this whole area was going to be established, 
beginning to be established, of hope that it was possible to 
develop the area, to reconstruct nations in more modern fashion 
and what-not without falling into the Communist system.
    Now, and that if we backed out now, whether we should have 
gotten into it in the first place or not, there was very grave 
danger that this whole thing would fall down, and that the 
consequences would be probably more serious. This is a kind of, 
I suppose, belief in the domino theory. And if we stay and 
attempt at least to play the hand out along the sensible way, 
that we are now refining and coming to do it, that that would 
be the better way. Do you feel that this is--is this your 
general feeling?
    Mr. Porter. That is certainly the sentiment in East Asia 
today.
    Senator Case. Do you think it makes sense? Do you think--
well----
    Mr. Porter. Yes, I do. I think it makes sense. I believe 
that our departure from Vietnam in a humiliating or 
dishonorable circumstance would have a disastrous effect on 
those countries.

                   A DISASTER TO PULL OUT OF THE WAR

    Senator Case. Reischauer agreed with this, and he did not 
agree with our going in. He said that in an article. He would 
not have gone in. He would not have taken this on this way. He 
thinks it was a mistake that we did. But having done it, it 
would be a disaster if we pulled out on any basis except, in 
effect, attempting to win the war in the South.
    This, Bill, I just wanted to get down--this was confirmed 
by such observations as I made, and I did not just let myself 
listen to our military or even our ambassadors or whatnot. I 
made a point before, during or after the trip to talk to Ward 
Just, and to talk to Dave Halberstam up in New York or Moore, 
now in----
    Mr. Porter. Charley Moore.
    Senator Case [continuing]. In Hong Kong, but who was so 
long in Saigon.
    I found only one of the whole bunch of them, and that was 
Stan, who thought we ought to get out. He had been out there 
for years, and he had seen frustration after frustration. But 
the great majority of all these people say----
    The Chairman. They want us to stay there.
    Senator Case. They want us to try.
    The Chairman. In other words, have another colony on our 
hands.
    Senator Case. Again I would think myself once this gets 
started that it will have an accelerated effect, a cumulative 
effect. I would say I do not feel we should stay, if these guys 
are not going to do the right thing, make sense and work at 
corruption and work at building a government and whatnot. I 
would say no matter what happened, we ought to get out, and we 
have good reason to do it. I do not think there is any chance 
of a deal until after the next presidential election. That is 
my honest view.
    Thanks a lot for coming up here.
    Mr. Porter. It is my pleasure.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Porter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    [Whereupon, at 6:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]


                 BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

                              ----------                              


                         Thursday, June 8, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (Chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, 
Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary 
for Congressional Relations, Department of State.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Bader of 
the committee staff.
    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have 
you this morning.
    There are a number here who say they will be late, but I 
hope we will get a much better representation. They did not 
know, of course, until late, that you would come this morning.
    Do you have anything you would like to add before we have 
questions, anything more to add to our briefing yesterday, 
anything new or different? We all heard what you had yesterday.

      STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I want to add 
very much to what was said yesterday.
    I would like to have a good discussion this morning. If I 
could make one remark off the record.
    The Chairman. Off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                  PROBLEMS WITH ACHIEVING A CEASE-FIRE

    Secretary Rusk. Well, on the matter we discussed yesterday, 
the situation today still remains that Israel has announced 
that it would accept the cease-fire if the other side would. 
Egypt, Syria and Iraq have announced that they are not 
accepting the cease-fire, and it is our impression out of Cairo 
that they do not intend to.
    We think this is going to complicate the situation a great 
deal because the Russians have been pressing us very hard to 
get the Israelis to accept the cease-fire, and they are not 
able to deliver the other side. So it does not look as though 
this thing is going to clarify very quickly except on a purely 
military basis along the Canal and the West Bank of the Jordan.
    I did not yesterday, in view of the large attendance, I did 
not get into some possibilities that ought to dampen down any 
sense of general elation here in this situation.
    We do not yet know what the effect of this situation will 
be on the governments concerned. It is hard to see how Nasser 
can survive this situation. We are not at all sure that King 
Hussein can survive it.
    If there are changes in these governments, the 
possibilities of getting an enduring settlement would turn a 
great deal on the nature of the leadership that might come to 
power. The political situation itself is very flexible, fluid 
at this present time.

                    WATCHING SOVIET UNION ELSEWHERE

    Further, we cannot assure that the Soviet Union is just 
going to cut its losses and take its lumps here in this 
situation. It may feel----
    Senator Mundt. You said what?
    Secretary Rusk. I say we cannot assume that they will.
    Senator Mundt. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. On the present basis they face a very 
serious setback, and they may feel that it is necessary for 
them to do something to try to recoup their position.
    We are watching it very carefully, and we have not seen 
specific moves which they might possibly make. We are watching 
all situations, such as the Berlin corridor, to see whether 
there is any indication that the Soviets are likely to stir 
something up somewhere in order to take some of the pressure 
off of them on this particular situation.
    There have been, so far as we know, no more breaches of 
diplomatic relations since the meeting yesterday afternoon. But 
the reiteration by Cairo of the charges that our forces have 
participated continues to inflame the mob in a number of 
places.
    Senator Hickenlooper. At that point, might I interrupt?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, please, Senator.

           JORDANIANS FIND NO EVIDENCE OF U.S. PARTICIPATION

    Senator Hickenlooper. At that point, I heard over the radio 
this morning a report, this is a radio report, that at a 
conference in Amman, either last night or this morning--
afternoon their time, whatever time it is--that their military 
people said they agreed there was no evidence of any 
participation by American or British forces in this military 
action.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, that is quite right. Without prodding 
from us, the Chief of Military Intelligence in Jordan announced 
they had no information that any U.S. military aircraft were 
operating over Jordan. That will go a long way, because some of 
the Arab countries attributed this evidence from hard evidence 
they had from Jordan, and Jordan's denial will go a long way, I 
think, towards helping us at least on the propaganda side.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, may I just ask a 
question?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, please.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                   THE SHAPE OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT

    Secretary Rusk. Because we are all thinking about the shape 
of a general settlement. But I want to emphasize the point that 
this is not something that can be ground out in Washington and 
imposed upon the other capitals. We certainly are not in a 
position to command Israel about a settlement, and it has 
become apparent to us that the Soviet Union is not in a 
position to command the Arab countries.
    So naturally we ought to have some ideas of our own, and 
that is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, why I welcome this 
chance to be with the committee this morning.
    We had a very good discussion here about ten days ago which 
was, I thought, extremely helpful to me because we had a 
general discussion in the committee about some of the policy 
issues involved.

                     STRAITS OF TIRAN MUST BE OPEN

    Senator Mundt. I take it that issue is no longer with us.
    Secretary Rusk. The particular issue of the Straits, I 
think, is pretty well behind us.
    We understand that the Soviets have told the Egyptians we 
have got to accept a cease-fire with the Straits of Tiran open.
    Now, the Soviets, as I told you before, had not committed 
themselves on the Straits of Tiran, and we were very sure that 
the Egyptians had not consulted the Soviet Union before Nasser 
made his speech closing the Straits.
    The Chairman. Had not consulted.
    Secretary Rusk. Had not been consulted. As a matter of 
fact, Nasser probably did not consult anybody. I have seen a 
number of Arab foreign ministers in the last two weeks, and I 
have not found anybody that he consulted on that subject.

                    BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS

    The Chairman. Could I ask in that connection----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Are the Soviets willing to talk to you 
frankly about this and other matters now? Are they being as 
standoffish or not? What are our relations?
    Secretary Rusk. They are willing to talk to us bilaterally 
very frankly.
    The Chairman. That is what I mean.
    Secretary Rusk. They are unwilling to go into that four-
power discussion even at the U.N. that President de Gaulle 
asked for.
    The Chairman. When you said they cannot command the Arabs 
and we cannot command Israel, I mean I can appreciate that. But 
if we could together, agree upon any line of action of things 
to get, I would think it would be pretty difficult to stand out 
against over a period, if we can agree with the Soviets.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that would be true, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Individually they play each other off and all 
that.
    Secretary Rusk. The difficulty is that at the moment 
everybody's nerves are very raw, the Arab nerves and the Soviet 
nerves.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. And so it is going to take a little time, I 
think, to get this back to a point where we and they can talk 
about a final solution.

                      AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DIPLOMACY

    The Chairman. Would it be consistent with your policy to 
approach the Soviets that we are perfectly willing to be very 
reasonable in this area, to try to achieve our ultimate 
objective of the integrity of Israel--I think that is clear; 
they ought to know that is clear and combine it with some 
movement in Asia?
    It seems to me it was a great shock that this has brought 
on everybody. It obviously shocked this country worse than 
Vietnam, that it would be an opportunity for diplomacy, quiet 
diplomacy, certainly between us and the Russians, to combine 
these two? They surely are interested in Vietnam, and we are 
interested in the Middle East. It seems to me the evidence is 
clear that this country emotionally and politically is more 
interested in Israel, the Middle East, than they are in 
Vietnam. I mean you watch the turnout here in the Senate, the 
great furor that has resulted.
    I wondered if it is beyond reason to expect that there 
might be an opportunity for a general agreement in which you 
could work it with the Soviets privately, and if you could 
agree, I do not know why with a little patience this could not 
be made acceptable to both sides.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, we have talked to--and I 
would like to emphasize the top secret character of this tape.
    The Chairman. Well, you can take this particular thing off 
the record. It will be top secret.
    [Discussion off the record.]

             TIME FOR AN UNCONVENTIONAL DIPLOMATIC APPROACH

    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up what you 
said in this very brief colloquy with the Secretary, and I want 
to preface it, Mr. Secretary, by saying that we are all in this 
problem together. You and I have had differences on policy, but 
we have not had differences on a personal level. I want you to 
know that I not only have a very high regard for you, but the 
suggestion I am going to make is just not expecting acceptance 
of it necessarily, but I hope consideration of it bears out the 
feeling I have towards you personally.
    I think we have got to get out of our stereotype channels 
of diplomacy in regard to this matter. I do not think they will 
resolve it because there are a good many things you yourself 
have said about this spot that Russia is in.
    I do not think face should mean much to us if we are 
willing to go not half a mile or three-quarters of a mile, but 
all the way.
    I think that now is the time with Russia in the position 
that she is in for us to resort to quite an unconventional 
diplomatic approach in regard to this matter.
    You talk about bringing our ambassador back to Washington. 
My suggestion is that careful consideration be given by the 
President and by you and others and that you proceed without 
delay to Moscow yourself; that you announce to Moscow, our 
government announces to Moscow, that because of the problems 
that both great powers have, and the responsibility of both 
great powers more than all the others combined to maintain 
peace in the world, you are going to Moscow for conversations 
with the Russian leaders, if they want to receive you.
    You can say right away suppose they slap us in the face and 
tell us to stay home. All right. That is not going to hurt us. 
Those slaps do not hurt. The world will know what we are trying 
to do, and my confidence in you is such that I believe if you 
could sit down there, first with our ambassador for his 
briefing in Moscow, and then put these Russians really on the 
spot by demonstrating our good faith, and have that top level 
conference in Russia--we do not know what the result might be--
but I cannot see any loss in trying it.
    I just think we are going to make a mistake if we just wait 
for the passage of time that it is going to take--you yourself 
pointed out that we probably have got two weeks ahead of us. I 
do not think we can wait. I think we have the right and the 
duty for us to try to have some diplomatic intercourse directly 
with the Russians.

                    A CASE OF DIPLOMATIC AGGRESSION

    You know the attitude of the Russians. If we go to Moscow, 
they will think that is some great concession on our part. It 
is no concession, in fact, because that leads me to the second 
point, and then I will be through--I raised it briefly in our 
colloquy yesterday upstairs. I may not understand it, but I am 
not too happy about what you said yesterday concerning our 
attitude in regard to reestablishing diplomatic relations with 
these countries that have broken diplomatic relations with us 
while they destroy our embassies and threaten our people and 
seek to coerce us.
    I think we have to put handcuffs on them. I want to 
reestablish relations with them, but not on their terms but on 
ours, because here is a case of diplomatic aggression, at least 
on their part.
    I think they have got to understand we are not going to 
stand by and have our ships sunk. We are not going to stand by 
and have them continue to threaten peace in the Middle East.

                        NEED FOR A PEACE TREATY

    That brings me to the last point I made upstairs. I think 
we ought to make perfectly clear in this situation now, Russia 
has got to understand it, and one of the things you can talk 
about in Moscow is we are not going to let Israel have to 
survive from now on without a peace. We have to have a peace 
treaty and we have got to have an understanding that there is 
not going to be a repetition of this, and that our future 
relations by way of aid to them is dependent upon their working 
out a peace settlement.
    I know the government does not like to hear me say it, but 
in my judgment if we had not given the aid to the Arabs or go 
along with aid to the Arabs while they were continuing to 
threaten the survival of Israel, I do not think we would be in 
the position we are today.
    I never have bought the argument, if we do not do this, 
they would have gone to Russia. I think they realize now what 
it cost them to go to Russia.
    It may be just a completely unacceptable idea, but I want 
to link it to what the chairman says. I made a very short 
statement on the floor of the Senate yesterday about Vietnam. I 
am sure the State Department won't like it, as they do not like 
much of what I say on Vietnam, but you cannot separate Vietnam 
from the settlement over here in the Middle East. The Russians 
are not going to let us, for one thing. I do not think it is in 
the cards. I think we have got to hitch them together, but not 
directly at first.

                 SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD GO TO MOSCOW

    I think we need some dramatic and, you may not like the 
word ``dramatic'' but, after all, it is important, too, in 
times of crisis, some dramatic change in the format of our 
diplomacy.
    I think, six, there is no one better qualified to do it 
than you. I hope you will understand that it illustrates my 
feeling toward you personally. I think you are the one to do 
it. I think you can do it. I think the President ought to send 
you to do it.
    If you wait for two weeks, God knows what we are going to 
be faced with in two weeks.
    I would like to see you go on to Moscow on a basis you can 
set it up, and put them on the spot. We cannot lose anything by 
it.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not in any sense rule out the 
possibility of my going to Moscow, and I certainly will give 
that further thought.
    We are in very close touch with the Russians. The problem 
with the Russians is not, you know, lack of communication at 
very serious levels. But, nevertheless, if a trip of this sort 
would appear to be promising, I do not rule it out at all.
    Senator Morse. It may be something to their prestige. We do 
not have to worry about our prestige.
    Secretary Rusk. They may be very sensitive at the moment 
about a thing of this sort. However, let me say, I think what I 
would like to do is to have a very long talk with Dobrynin when 
he gets back this week, and try to get some feel for it.
    Ambassador Thompson is here now, our Ambassador to Moscow, 
and when their Ambassador gets back, Thompson and I will sit 
down with him and go over these things.
    We are, I am, in touch with Mr. Gromyko very frequently, 
and we are in touch through other channels.

                      A COMMISSION TO GO TO HANOI

    Senator Morse. One more thing. I am not only thinking about 
the relationship of the U.S. and Russia, but I am thinking of 
the image that that would create with the rest of the world. 
That is important, that the rest of the world know that the two 
great powers, both great powers, recognize the seriousness of 
the crisis, and we are trying to find a basis on which we can 
reach an understanding.
    I think it would have a terrific psychological offensive 
around the world.
    I have another wild idea if you want it, if anybody wants 
to call it a wild idea. I think we ought to follow that also 
with an offer for an extraordinary commission of some kind to 
go to Hanoi, call their bluff, to go to Hanoi, to send an 
extraordinary commission under the auspices of our government 
to Hanoi.
    If they want to sit down, not with any authority to make 
any commitments at all, but to talk--and I think you would be 
applauded around the world.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, the contingency I have 
predicted has come, and they have asked me to come straightaway 
on this other matter, so if the committee will forgive me I 
will have to withdraw. Perhaps we can do it in the morning or 
some other time.
    The Chairman. All right. We will consult, and the staff 
will be in touch with your office.
    Secretary Rusk. I want you to understand the confidential 
character of what I said.
    The Chairman. What are we going to say about why you had to 
go, just an emergency meeting?
    Secretary Rusk. I think you had better say that I was 
called back to my office.
    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a good idea 
that we restore the program, that once in a while the Secretary 
comes and talks to us as a committee. I think it is all right 
to have a certain sponsoring group for the whole Senate now and 
then. I think that is good.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    [Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the committee adjourned to 
proceed to other business.]


                 BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

                              ----------                              


                          Friday, June 9, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m. in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, 
Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary 
for Congressional Relations, Department of State.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the 
committee staff.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    We are resuming our discussion with the Secretary.
    Mr. Secretary, just as I came in the press asked if I have 
heard there has been a renewed outbreak of fighting. Is that 
correct; have you heard anything?

   STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE--
                            RESUMED

    Secretary Rusk. The information we have this morning is 
that along the Syrian frontier there is fighting. Each side has 
charged the other one with violations, and the Syrians have 
asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council.
    We do not have the facts in detail.
    One of the complications might have been there is an Iraqi 
brigade on the Syrian-Jordan frontier, and Iraq has refused to 
accept a cease-fire.
    We do believe that the Syrians have been throwing artillery 
shells across from the high ground to their side of the border 
into the valley of Israel territory and shelling some of those 
villages there.
    But, quite frankly, we just do not know enough to give me a 
chance to take an official position on just what has occurred.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, on the boat incident 
yesterday, which brought our meeting to a conclusion, I may say 
that as soon as I found out the real facts, I came on back 
down, but the committee had adjourned.
    The situation--the incident was extremely distressing, not 
only because of the dead and the wounded which were involved, 
but because it was a very reckless act.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It seems to me it was completely 
inexcusable.
    Secretary Rusk. It was a vessel configured as a merchant 
vessel. It was a U.S. Navy ship flying the U.S. flag, 
relatively unarmed with 450 caliber machine guns. It was ninety 
miles off Port Said, 14 miles off of the Gaza Strip territory, 
and was attacked by six strafing runs by aircraft and by motor 
torpedo boats.
    Now, when I left here, I thought that it might well be an 
Egyptian attack. You can imagine that would have raised the 
most serious problems. But suppose it had been an Israeli 
attack on a Russian ship.
    The Chairman. Yes.

                            ISRAELI APOLOGY

    Secretary Rusk. I called in the Israeli ambassador and 
protested in the strongest possible terms and pointed out to 
him the dangers that were involved in this kind of an operation 
in that area. He had no explanation. We have had nothing but an 
apology from the Israeli Government. But there it is, and we 
will be in touch with Israelis further about it.
    After all, there are some damages and there are dead and 
wounded, and we will follow up on that with them.
    Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, on that very point, one of 
the families in our state is affected, and, of course, that 
will be true of many others because of the dead and injuries. 
They are not happy with just an apology. They are really 
complaining. Is there anything more that can be done on this?
    Secretary Rusk. I understand.
    Senator Carlson. It was, I imagine, as I understand, 
surface PT boats.
    Secretary Rusk. Plus six strafing runs by aircraft.
    Senator Carlson. I cannot understand it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think we should file for 
reparations. We should press for them, for the families, the 
people that were killed, and I am not sure but what I am 
impressed with the cavalier attitude of--it looks like a 
cavalier attitude--of Israel on this thing. They can do that 
with impunity.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the next move is at the moment up to 
them to come back with a better statement of fact than they 
have given us thus far. I will say this. We were very pleased 
that Israel immediately notified us that they had done it, and 
here in this room I can say that we did use the ``Hot Line'' 
for the purpose for which it was invented on this one, to flash 
a message to Moscow to inform Cairo, because at that moment we 
thought that the probabilities were it was an Egyptian attack 
and we would take the steps necessary to defend the ship. We 
were able to use the ``Hot Line'' to cancel that, and inform 
the Soviets immediately that it was an Israeli attack, and 
that--but in any event, as far as the international side of it 
is concerned, it proved not to be the kind of crisis that could 
have caused far greater trouble, either Egyptian attack or a 
Russian victim.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Has the Israeli Government indicated 
any real sorrow about this thing, or is it a perfunctory 
apology?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, yes, they have been profuse.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Have they said whether any 
disciplinary action will be taken against the stupidity of this 
crew or----
    Secretary Rusk. I asked for that yesterday.
    Senator Hickenlooper [continuing]. Or the commanding 
officers of the area or anything?
    Secretary Rusk. We have not heard any more except what I 
have told you.

                   OUTSIDE POWERS CANNOT GIVE ORDERS

    Mr. Chairman, when we were breaking up yesterday, we had 
gotten to the point of trying to look ahead a little bit as to 
the general structure and shape of a settlement in this 
situation. With feelings inflamed as they are, settlement is 
going to be extremely difficult and may take considerable time, 
and I want to emphasize the point I made yesterday that outside 
powers are not in a position to give orders in this situation. 
We cannot give final commands to Israel and be sure they will 
take our advice. The Soviet Union cannot give commands to the 
Arabs, and so the heart of the problem is to bring the two 
sides to a situation with which they are willing to live and 
that is going to be extremely difficult.
    However, the general shape of settlement that emerges, I 
think, drawing both from the problems in the past, which have 
inflamed the situation, and from the prospect for the future--I 
emphasize this prospect for the future because Israel has a 
vital national interest in finding some way to live at peace 
with what are going to be 200 million Arabs in the next 25 
years--so that their willingness to make their contribution to 
a reconciliation with the Arabs is going to be a very, very 
important element here.
    Now, with the bitterness of the psychology of shocking 
defeat among the Arabs, and the exuberance of a stunning 
victory in Israel, it is going to take a little time, I 
suspect, to bring about a lasting settlement.
    We feel that it is very important that the state of 
belligerence be removed. Now, whether one does that formally 
through peace treaties or in some other way, I would still 
leave open, a little flexible at this point. There is not much 
of a way to force people to come to a table and put their 
signatures on a piece of paper that will be enduring, and it 
may be that some of these governments simply will refuse to do 
that even though they may accept the situation contained in 
such document.
    So I would concentrate on the policy point of eliminating a 
state of belligerency without at the moment emphasizing how 
that is done.
    I noticed there is a good deal of speculation about putting 
emphasis on peace treaties as such. I do not think it is a 
treaty that is important. Look at Japan and the Soviet Union. 
They do not have a peace treaty, but they exchange ambassadors. 
They have normal relations. They have considerable trade 
between the two of them, and they are not challenging each 
other's territory.
    I just mention that as a first point.

              ISRAEL WILL INSIST ON USE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

    Secondly, Israel is going to insist upon being treated like 
any other sovereign country without special derogations of that 
sovereignty. My guess is that they will insist upon right of 
passage of the Strait of Tiran. My guess is that that question 
is already accepted as far as the other side is concerned. It 
certainly is accepted as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.
    I am telling you this very privately. I think Israel will 
insist upon its normal right to put peaceful traffic through 
the Suez Canal. That will be more difficult for Egypt to 
accept, but that is a point that has already been covered in 
earlier United Nations resolutions.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Was that not covered in the armistice 
agreement?
    Secretary. Rusk. Yes, that is right; that is right.
    The territorial question could become a little tricky. 
Prime Minister Eshkol and General Dayan both stated at the 
beginning of this affair that they had no territorial 
ambitions. Generally we have supported the boundaries, the 
existing boundaries, in that area. If Israel raises far-
reaching boundary claims, then that is going to be a very, very 
difficult element in any solution. I think Israel is entitled 
to some assurance that whatever rights are established in this 
settlement be a fact accorded to them and not be subject to 
unilateral action by the Arabs.
    One of the things we will have to expect is that somewhere 
along the way there are going to be some demands for 
international guarantees of some sort. Whether the four 
principal permanent members of the Security Council can agree 
among themselves that the Security Council will guarantee X, Y, 
and Z in a way that is not subject to a veto remains to be 
seen. But in a settlement which, against the background of this 
particular history, and with a small country surrounded by 
potentially hostile countries, with all of the possibilities of 
pre-emptive attacks and all that sort of thing hovering over 
everybody, this question of how you stabilize the situation is 
a very important one.

                     LIMIT ARMS RACE IN MIDDLE EAST

    Next, I do believe that there is a major opportunity here 
for the principal powers to get together on some sort of 
understanding about the levels of arms in this area. I have 
told the committee before that we have tried from time to time 
to open this question with the Soviet Union and although they 
are willing to work on it in the nuclear field, they have been 
unwilling to work on it in the conventional arms field.
    Perhaps psychologically this is not the very best moment in 
terms of Soviet dismay at some of the things that have 
happened. But nevertheless they put very large quantities of 
arms into Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and we have some little reason 
to believe that they might have a new interest in this subject. 
If so, that could be very important.
    But, you see, this arms race sort of took the form of large 
Soviet arms supplies to Egypt, Algeria, Syria. Hostility 
between Egypt on the one side, Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the 
other; hostility between Syria and Jordan, some necessity on 
the part of other suppliers, Britain, ourselves, to assist 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan to the extent necessary to give them 
some assurance against their own Arab neighbors; the 
combination of Arab arms causing problems with respect to 
Israel's security----

                        SOURCES OF ISRAELI ARMS

    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, may I just say----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes?
    Senator Symington [continuing]. We have been running 
hearings for a good many weeks, and we would have had one 
yesterday with Mr. Kitchen except for this.
    It is a fact, is it not, that neither Soviet Russia nor the 
United States has given any material amounts of arms to Israel, 
and, if that is true, are they not relatively independent in 
their thinking at this point?
    Secretary Rusk. No, we have provided tanks and Hawk 
missiles and certain other kinds of equipment to Israel, but 
their principal arms supplier has been France. And I am 
assuming that France, Britain, the Soviet Union, ourselves, 
would have to be involved in any discussion on this subject.
    The Israeli air force is almost all French supplied.
    Well, there is another element, if we could inject 
something on that into a final settlement it would be helpful.

                    TRAGEDY OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

    Then, there is the problem of the refugees, this 
intractable issue which has resisted settlement despite many, 
many efforts to do so.
    The tragedy of the refugee problem is that some of us are 
convinced that there is a practical solution which would be 
acceptable to both sides, but which in theory is unacceptable 
to both sides. What I mean by that is that if you could get 
each refugee into the privacy of a confessional booth and let 
him make a personal and secret judgment as to where he wants to 
live, many of us believe, are convinced, that their own 
personal and secret choices would produce a practical result 
which Israel could accept.
    I mean if the gentlemen around this table were Palestine 
refugees, would you all want to live in Israel? I doubt you 
would. But if one out of ten wanted to live in Israel, we could 
persuade Israel, I think, to accept that number, and we could 
find compensation and resettlement for those who are wanting to 
live in other places.
    What has stood in the way of that, and we have tried this 
several times, is the political fact that if you have a 
machinery which is known, the Arabs pass the word among the 
Palestinians, ``Now you go in there and tell them you want to 
go in Israel or you are going to get your throat cut,'' and the 
Arabs insist as a matter of principle Israel would have to 
accept how many would opt to go to Israel.
    Israel can take 150,000, 200,000, but they are not going to 
take a million.
    But Arabs insist as a matter of principle a million must 
have a chance to opt to go to Israel.
    Now, it may be out of this will come some settlement of 
that problem.
    I heard one report out of Tel Aviv that the Israelis are 
thinking about insisting that the West Bank of the Jordan be an 
autonomous province of Jordan and the home for the refugees. 
Well, that will not settle the problem politically entirely, 
but some fresh thought can be----
    Senator Hickenlooper. It would be another Gaza Strip, would 
it not?
    Secretary Rusk. It would tend to be if they go there simply 
as a way station on the way back to Israel, rather than accept 
it genuinely as a final solution.
    Senator Symington. Could I ask one question here?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, Senator.

                  U.S. HAS LIMITED LEVERAGE ON ISRAEL

    Senator Symington. When the Israelis, as you know, were 
anxious to have declarations that we should go in with Israel 
unilaterally, Mr. Secretary, that we should support them 
unilaterally, I did not think we could do it because we were so 
heavily committed in Vietnam. I did not see where the trained 
people come from, especially if we are going to accede to more 
people in Vietnam, and, thereafter, after waiting to find out 
whether anybody would help them, in effect they have struck by 
themselves and have been markedly successful. Does it not mean 
we have relatively little leverage on what they want to do now 
that they have physically occupied these countries by utilizing 
their military equipment intelligently?
    Secretary Rusk. We have some limited leverage on them. I 
told the committee earlier that we felt we had a commitment 
from them that they would not move during this time period in 
which they did move.
    Now, the situation on the Egyptian side built up in such a 
way that it put great pressure upon the Israeli Government, and 
I have no doubt that on the day they decided to shoot the works 
that they felt that they were in danger of an imminent attack, 
based upon information that they thought they had in front of 
them.
    But I think the real pressures on them, Senator, are going 
to be the necessity for their finding some way to live with 
these now hundred million, soon to be 200 million, Arabs, 
because if they try to remain a little armed camp there forever 
in a sea of bitter hostility, they have got some major problems 
for their own long-term survival.

                     SUBSIDIZING THE REFUGEE CAMPS

    Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, I realize that we do not have 
power, as Senator Symington has punctuated, to give 
instructions and directions there.
    There is one problem, it seems to me, about which we can 
have a say, and that is continued subsidization of this refugee 
camp. I went there ten years ago and found it an impossible 
situation in which they have continued all the while to feed 
and clothe, support those people, and there are some 200,000 
more than when they went into the camp. So surely we can have 
something to say about no longer continuing to subsidize this.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that constitutes some pressure on the 
Arabs. It does not constitute any pressure on Israel.
    Senator Gore. Well, Israel has taken over some of them, in 
the Gaza Strip and also in Jordan. They are now claiming 
sovereignty. So it seems to me it might be a pressure on both.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I do think that the refugee matter 
should be raised and looked at wholly anew in connection with a 
settlement of this present situation.
    Senator Gore. The point I am trying to make is this is one 
subject on which we can have a say, and that is how long we are 
going to continue to pay a very heavy cost of these refugees if 
they are not dispersed into the countryside.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I do not want to underestimate 
influence in this situation, but I just want to point out that 
it is not necessarily decisive when you are talking with 
countries about what they consider the life and death issues 
for them.

                 TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR DONATIONS TO ISRAEL

    Senator Hickenlooper. Do we not give tax forgiveness for 
moneys contributed to Israel, which is rather unusual? We could 
stop that.
    Secretary Rusk. I believe contributions to the UJA are tax 
exempt, yes.
    The Chairman. That is right.
    The only country. Do you think you have the votes in the 
Senate to revoke that?
    Senator Case. Are you in favor yourself?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think we ought to treat all nations 
alike.
    Senator Case. That is correct. But are you in favor of it?
    Senator Hickenlooper. As long as we do not give it to other 
nations, I do not----
    The Chairman. The trouble is they think they have control 
of the Senate and they can do as they please.
    Senator Symington. What was that?
    The Chairman. I said they know they have control of the 
Senate politically, and therefore whatever the Secretary tells 
them, they can laugh at him. They say, ``Yes, but you don't 
control the Senate.''
    Senator Symington. They were very anxious to get every 
Senator they could to come out and say we ought to act 
unilaterally, and they got two, three.
    The Chairman. They know when the chips are down you can no 
more reverse this tax exemption than you can fly. You could not 
pass a bill through the Senate.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I do not think you could.
    The Chairman. Changing that tax exemption contribution to 
the UJA. I would bet you ten to one you could not begin to pass 
a bill You do not believe they could under any circumstances.
    Senator Symington. A bill to do what?
    The Chairman. To revoke the tax exemption of gifts to the 
UJA. That is one of their major sources of income. You yourself 
have pointed out the money they paid for the French arms they 
got from the U.S.
    Senator Symington. Each year the money we give annually for 
this is less than 1 percent of the cost of Vietnam.
    The Chairman. I agree with that.
    Senator Hickenlooper. There you go.

                U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS PAY THE ISRAELI ARMS

    The Chairman. But you know very well, you said yourself, 
that the arms they buy from France are largely paid for by 
contributions that come from this country.
    Senator Symington. Because we would not sell it to them, so 
instead of selling them the arms----
    Senator Gore. Has the President recommended that this be 
repealed?
    The Chairman. No, he has not. I do not wish to make the 
point except the Secretary is quite correct when he says his 
leverage on Israel is very limited because of the political 
situation.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I am sorry I brought it up.
    Secretary Rusk. I did not say it.
    The Chairman. If you did not say it, you do not disagree 
with it anyway.
    Secretary Rusk. I think it should be pointed out though on 
this tax exempt matter that there are many other organizations, 
institutions, that would fall into the same principle, private 
foundations in their expenditures abroad, churches, the 
voluntary agencies; there are very large sums of money going to 
foreign countries that are tax exempt in this country as the 
origin.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I do not think it is analogous.
    Senator Gore. It is tax deductible; you said tax exempt.
    Secretary Rusk. Except the organizations are exempt. 
Contributions to them are tax deductible.
    Senator Cooper. I suggest--it is possible after this that 
Israel may ask that this be removed as a sign of showing they 
are not absolutely dependent on the U.S.

               IF ISRAEL KEEPS THE TERRITORY IT CONQUERED

    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, I have just one other 
question I wish to ask. They have been hating the Jews ever 
since there was a country, and they are hating them, and they 
kept on saying they are going to drive them into the sea. 
Finally, when nobody else would come in, the Israelis said, 
``Well, we had better not let them drive us into the sea,'' so 
they hit them and knocked their brains out and they got a 
tremendous amount of additional territory.
    Why on the basis of the way things are going, inasmuch as 
the Arabs still say that they are going to drive them into the 
sea and that they hate them, why should they not keep what they 
have taken, which will at least make it easier for them to 
support the refugees, etcetera, etcetera, and make their 
position as a nation more viable? Why should they not just keep 
what they have taken? Who has any right to tell them? They have 
done it by themselves against this steady hate that has been 
growing, and certainly we have not in any way done anything 
effective to block it or stop it. Why have we any right to tell 
them to give up anything unless they are getting something for 
what they give up?
    Secretary Rusk. The point there, Senator, is that they can 
play that game on a geopolitics basis and prepare for 
themselves fantastic problems for the future.
    Senator Symington. Have they not got them anyway? That is 
my only point. They have them.
    Secretary Rusk. The alternative may be, and I would think 
that it would be, in Israel's vital national interest to try 
the other alternative. The alternative may be a reconciliation 
on the basis of Arab acceptance that Israel is there to stay 
and a condition of hostility need not exist between Israel and 
its Arab neighbors.
    When you look ahead to 200 million Arabs, with the vast 
resources that are coming rapidly into that area, the oil and 
all the rest of it, the possibility that Eastern Europe may 
then wholly align themselves with all these people, and pour in 
stuff in a position there, over time, five years, ten years, 15 
years, Israel will have to do it all over again, and under 
conditions that may be much more difficult next time because 
next time the Arabs will probably strike first.
    The Chairman. I think you are quite right.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I agree with that thoroughly.
    The Chairman. The only hope for Israel for the long term.
    Secretary Rusk. As a matter of fact, we have a very 
difficult problem facing us right now, Senator.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                       INDEMNIFICATION BY ISRAEL

    Senator Mundt. I would like to ask a question deriving out 
of phone calls as I was coming over this morning.
    A friend of mine who believes that he had a son on this 
ship that was shot at, torpedoed or whatever happened, to the 
best of the information that we can get, he may be wrong, but 
he thinks he has, but he is pretty bitter. He said to me, and I 
say to you, What happened? What is the position of the United 
States when somebody shoots one of these ships down on the high 
seas? Do we just say, ``Well, you are sorry, it's all right 
with us,'' or is there some indemnification?
    Secretary Rusk. No problems of damage and indemnification 
have been raised. We do not have a report of the condition of 
the ship itself or the damage, but we have laid the basis for a 
very strong protest for going back to them on that kind of 
thing. We have not had anything by way of explanation from 
Israel, communications, that could explain that within 24 
hours. They, too, I am sure, are investigating, but the only 
thing we have had from them is a flash report that it occurred. 
We are very glad they told us right away because if they just 
laid low on this situation and we did not know who did it, 
there would have been a strong inclination here to believe the 
Egyptians did it, you see. But we will be going back to that 
question when we get more facts.
    Senator Mundt. We just do not settle it at this point.
    Secretary Rusk. No, it is not settled at this point.

                        U.S. INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL

    Senator Mundt. I was a little bit disturbed when I heard 
all this discussion around the table this morning that we do 
not control Israel, and Israel controls the U.S. Government and 
the Senate. I kind of hate to accept this philosophy. I do not 
believe it. I think we have a lot of influence over Israel if 
we decided to exercise it in the present circumstances.
    Put yourself in the Israeli's position. They found out that 
the Russians are not their friends; that is sure. They found 
out France would not even sign their little maritime 
declaration as I understand it. Where would they be next week 
if the U.S. took the same kind of attitude, and this trouble is 
not going to be resolved, the bitterness eliminated, no matter 
what kind of settlement.
    So I think we are in a strong position to reason with them 
and to talk with them if in fact they are not running the 
United States, and I do not think they are. I would deny we 
have no influence with them. I think we can lead from strength 
in discussing the various settlements proposed. I am very 
fearful if we are going to support a guarantee of international 
borders of a whole new country of Israel spread out with all 
the lands picked up in the war, that we have sown the seeds of 
another conflict, like Alsace Lorraine and what is this little 
place in between India and Pakistan, Kashmir. So far as I know, 
they never settled the situation between Turkey and Syria.
    Secretary Rusk. This is where I came in 20 years ago. I was 
Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs when the Palestine problem 
was before the U.N., and I would emphasize the importance, as 
this matter moves ahead, of developing a very strong bipartisan 
U.S. position on this problem.
    Senator Mundt. I think it is important.
    Secretary Rusk. Because it is only on that basis that we 
can proceed with major influence in this situation.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Karl, I merely suggest that you take 
up the hearings on the Foreign Agents Registration Act if you 
want to find the 19 ramified, concealed and camouflaged Jewish 
organizations in this country that have their tentacles all 
through this whole situation. It is in there; it is in the 
record.
    Senator Mundt. That must have happened before I became a 
member.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I sat through these hearings.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman.

              NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON ABM DEPLOYMENT

    Mr. Secretary, first I want to congratulate you, and 
through you the President, upon the handling of a very 
difficult and delicate situation in a commendable manner.
    Next, it seems to me that the most encouraging thing that 
has come out of this tragedy is the equation between perhaps 
the maturing use of the equation between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Perhaps it has some hopeful elements, both 
with respect to the Middle East and other places.
    As a preface to my question, I would like to say that I 
have been shocked, and I believe the world was shocked, at the 
quick, dramatic results of the first strike. If that be true 
with conventional arms, then the subject on which the 
Disarmament Subcommittee held a hearing, the question of 
deployment of ABM, is certainly a very pertinent question now.
    As you know, our committee held an extensive hearing. There 
were no leaks from the committee. In fact the subcommittee did 
not even attempt to reach any conclusion yet.
    I wish now by question to reopen with you the question of 
negotiation with the Soviets on ABM deployment. It becomes a 
pressing matter in view of this demonstration of blitzkrieg 
warfare. Can you give us a report on the status of that?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. I think there is a very big difference 
between a first strike which has a reasonable chance of 
paralyzing the other side's armed forces and a first strike 
which cannot do so, and this is particularly applicable to the 
missile field. To the extent that the Israelis got the first 
strike against the Arab forces, they did succeed in 
establishing air superiority apparently in a matter of four 
hours because they caught most of the Arab air forces on the 
ground.
    Now, with missiles we do not see any way in which a first 
strike by either side can deny to the other side a devastating 
second strike.
    I think the ABM problem therefore is not necessarily 
affected by this particular situation in the Near East, 
although it raises the issue in general.

                SOVIETS STILL DETERMINING THEIR POSITION

    I might tell you, Senator, that we have been waiting for 
the Soviets to respond to our latest suggestion for serious 
talks on these matters. We have the impression that the Soviet 
Union is still in the process of determining its own position. 
Now this may be because it is a highly complicated matter and 
they may not have done the kind of depth studies that we have 
been doing over a period of a year. It may be that there are 
serious differences of view within their leadership. I have no 
doubt their military, for example, want to go for ABMs, and in 
that sense they are not much different from other military.
    Now, we hope that they will come back and get into serious 
talks with us on this. They have not said no, but they have not 
yet announced a time. We have said, ``We have our fellows who 
are ready to sit down with you at any time either in Moscow or 
Washington to go into this further,'' and they said, ``Well, we 
are ready to talk about it, but we will let you know.''
    Our own impression is they are still trying to decide what 
it is they would say in these discussions, but we are trying to 
follow through on that.
    Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit, in view 
of Karl Mundt's statement----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes?
    The Chairman. Are you finished with that?
    Senator Carlson. I did want to get back to this ship again 
because of Karl Mundt's statement.
    The Chairman. Had you finished with this?
    Senator Gore. If you will wait just a moment until I 
finish.
    Senator Carlson. Yes.

                  DEVASTATING EFFECT OF A FIRST STRIKE

    Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, is there any way at your 
command or the President's to reach some conclusion or ask the 
Soviets if they either will talk or not talk before this 
session comes to an end.
    I have said nothing publicly on this subject except that I 
did not think we ought to be strung along on this, and I am 
greatly impressed with this devastating effect of a first 
strike. I am not ready to accept that it will not be equally 
devastating, even more so, with missiles. I have the feeling 
that this Congress ought to know before it adjourns whether or 
not there are going to be serious negotiations on this subject. 
If not, I venture the guess that the Congress will want to make 
an appropriation to initiate deployment.
    I only urge you to convey to the President, at least, my 
view, which I believe is concurred in unanimously by members of 
the subcommittee--although I am not sure unanimously, but 
mostly to--that we should either come to serious negotiation on 
this or proceed with our own deployment.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I will be glad to see that those views 
are given to the President and to Secretary McNamara.
    Senator Gore. Now, in response to the question, do you see 
any way to elicit a more definite answer from the Soviets? Will 
they be impressed with the blitzkrieg character of this war 
over there?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that the world-wide strategic 
issue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is so very large in 
size and so much more devastating in the stakes that I just 
doubt that the Soviets will draw any conclusions from this Near 
East situation on that particular point. I just doubt they 
will.
    The Chairman. Senator Carlson.

                        LOCATION OF THE LIBERTY

    Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, just in view of what 
Senator Mundt has raised again--and I raised it at the 
beginning of this session because most every member of the 
Senate and many of Congress are going to have families involved 
as a result of the deaths and the casualties in this 
unfortunate situation about this ship. We are going to have to 
answer some questions.
    I believe you stated it was 15 miles off the coast of 
Israel. Is that correct?
    Secretary Rusk. And 90 miles north of Port Said.
    Senator Carlson. Was it there on the orders of the Defense 
Department?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Carlson. Did the State Department know about it, 
and were they familiar with its location?
    Secretary Rusk. I am not clear, but I would not draw any 
distinction on that. This was a communication ship, and during 
the period in which our embassies and consulates were being 
closed down and we were having to resort to all sorts of 
improvised communications, it was there to help in the relay 
process of messages that our people wanted to go back and 
forth.
    Senator Carlson. Had it been there for a great length of 
time?
    Secretary Rusk. No, it had moved in just very shortly 
before that.
    Senator Carlson. Were we intercepting or receiving messages 
for Israel on this ship?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not think so.
    Senator Carlson. These are questions that have come to me 
from families----

                     TYPE AND CHARACTER OF THE SHIP

    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, I would think pretty soon 
somebody had better talk about what type and character of ship 
this was. I think this is a rather important situation as far 
as----
    Secretary Rusk. It has the capacity to listen, but we were 
not involved in transmitting messages from one side to the 
other, if that is what you have in mind.
    Senator Carlson. Well, the people out in the country are 
asking questions, and we are going to have to answer whether--
this can all be off the record as far as I am concerned now--
but we are going to have to have answers to those questions 
from the parents of those boys.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think you should understand on 
the question of what it was doing there, it was there under 
proper orders, on behalf of the United States Government, in 
the high seas.
    Senator Mundt. International waters.
    Secretary Rusk. And therefore, from our point of view, was 
not subject to attack by anybody.

                            U.S. CASUALTIES

    Senator Hickenlooper. Has the casualty list been published?
    Secretary Rusk. The last I saw was ten dead.
    Senator Hickenlooper. No, I say has the list of names been 
published?
    Secretary Rusk. No; I am not sure.
    The Chairman. Senator Cooper.
    Senator Cooper. Yes, I would like to--I have been wanting 
to ask a question. I have been waiting my turn.
    The Chairman. All right, he is ready.

                     EASTERN EUROPEAN ARMS TO EGYPT

    Senator Cooper. First, I would like to thank the Secretary 
for all the information he has given us, and I think it is very 
valuable.
    Also I appreciate very much what you said, we are not out 
of the woods yet even as far as hostilities may be concerned. 
We talk about the possibility of replenishing Egypt by Eastern 
European countries. I read in the paper either last night or 
this morning, it said there was a rumor, but nevertheless there 
was a story that prior to yesterday----
    The Chairman. Will the Senator speak up a little. I cannot 
hear.
    Senator Cooper. I will do the best I can. I have difficulty 
with my throat.
    The Chairman. Do the best you can. The Senators down at the 
end cannot hear.
    Senator Cooper. What I was saying, there were stories in 
the papers yesterday and this morning that Egypt was being 
replenished by arms from Eastern Europe. Does the Department 
have any information on that subject at all?
    Secretary Rusk. We have heard reports and rumors. We do not 
have anything very hard about significant replenishment 
actually arriving in Egypt.
    Senator Cooper. There were also stories that Russia had 
flown in some supplies.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I was thinking about replenishment 
from Russia. I do not know of any arms. Well, Algeria may be 
sending some planes to Egypt and some of the others may be. 
Iraq may be sending some planes to Syria. But we have heard the 
reports. We do not have very hard information at the moment as 
to what has arrived on the scene.
    Senator Cooper. Is there any indication that Egypt was able 
to pull back and save a good deal, a good many, of its tanks?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. They will have undoubtedly several 
hundred tanks left. But they lost several hundred in the Sinai.

                      MANEUVER OF RUSSIAN VESSELS

    Senator Cooper. One other question: On this possibility of 
some incident which might cause great trouble, particularly 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, is it a fact that--you 
said it has been--very difficult for Egypt to hit this vessel. 
What do you make out of this maneuver of the Russian naval 
vessels against which naval commanders there protested, 
according to the papers.
    Secretary Rusk. The Soviet forces there at the present time 
in the eastern Mediterranean are about what they were in June 
of last year. They usually send out a few more ships in June.
    Senator Cooper. I do not mean this ship, I mean the report 
that they have been moving in and out of our naval formation 
against which a protest was made by a naval commander.
    Secretary Rusk. I have seen that. I have not had operation 
reports on just what they have been doing. This is something we 
would like to sort out sometime with the Soviet Union because 
that happens on both sides, quite frankly, and we are not in a 
very good position to be all that indignant about their having 
naval vessels in the vicinity of our naval vessels because we 
do that both ways. I can assure you, when Soviet ships go into 
the Gulf of Tonkin, they think they are being harassed pretty 
badly by our vessels nearby and planes buzzing them and taking 
pictures and things of that sort, so I would hope we would not 
get too excited over this particular kind of problem. We ought 
to sort it out some day with them, but it is a bilateral kind 
of problem.
    Senator Cooper. You think our ships would be moving as 
close to this area as they seem to be, like 14 miles off this 
vessel, and the fleet is not too far away.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, our fleet has been up south of 
Cyprus, at least portions of it, and other portions further to 
the west. Actually our carriers have been some distance away. 
But it is not abnormal at all for us to have this type of 
vessel in that kind of a situation.
    Senator Cooper. Well, that is all I have.
    I would like to say this for the record. I thank you, Mr. 
Secretary, and your associates, and I thank the President, in 
the restraint and patience with which you have worked in this 
situation, for which you deserve tremendous credit.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator.

                  RESCUING AMERICANS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

    Senator Hickenlooper. May I ask the Secretary--our 
nationals were practically ordered out of several of these Arab 
countries.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Egypt, and is it not perfectly 
natural that our ships would be in there, airplanes or 
something, to see if we could aid or to prevent undue damage to 
our nationals as they are being moved out?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, we have had an extremely dangerous 
and difficult problem with regard to our nationals out there in 
this situation, some 25,000 in the area, and we could not be at 
all sure that normal rights of legation would apply against all 
these problems.
    Our contingency plans for rescuing Americans who might be 
caught, even against the wishes of the local governments, had 
to be very extensive and it was very important for us to have 
the most immediately available information. Some of our 
communications equipment could not reach very far from the 
fellow who had a little pack on his back. So it was perfectly 
normal for us to have a ship of this sort in there.
    Now, we still are not out of the woods yet on this question 
of taking care of American nationals in the area.
    Senator Case. Could you give us a little rundown on that?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. The most difficult problem has been in 
Amman because of the lack of easy communications to safe haven, 
but we think the situation is now under reasonable control with 
the other governments.
    In the case of those who have broken relations with us, 
they are taking governmental steps to protect American 
personnel. We made it very clear to them on this matter we 
would apply the principles of reciprocity. We would expect to 
treat their people there with the same consideration we 
expected from them, and I think that that situation is 
clarifying.
    But we still are not over the dangers of possible mob 
action.
    Wheelus Airbase could be a little sticky. We have about 
8,000 Americans that have been collected to the Wheelus base.
    The Chairman. Civilians?
    Secretary Rusk. And military and dependents.
    Now, we think we can take care of that because we have a 
fair amount of local force of our own if the Libyan Government 
does not have enough force to do it itself. The Libyan 
Government has been trying, but it has limited capabilities 
against mobs. But in general, I am somewhat encouraged about 
the threat to American citizens in the area this morning.

                   TRANSCRIPT OF NASSER CONVERSATION

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, have you been able to prove 
or disprove that curious story in the Star last night, 
allegedly a transcript between Nasser and the king, about 
``Come on, get behind us and prove the British and 
Americans''--
    Secretary Rusk. We are analyzing that recording and 
comparing it with earlier recordings of these two gentlemen to 
see how authentic it was. I have no reason at the moment to 
doubt the authenticity of it.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell, do you have any questions?
    Senator Pell. One.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell.

                    SLOWDOWN IN FIGHTING IN VIETNAM

    Senator Pell. Mr. Secretary, I would like also to say how 
much I admire the restraint which you and the administration 
have shown.
    Secretary Rusk. Thanks.
    Senator Pell. And also again advert to the point I 
mentioned before, and that is the slowdown in the fighting in 
Vietnam. You may not wish to enlarge on this, but it would seem 
to me there might be a relationship between the slowdown there 
and the improved relations, improvement of communications with 
the Soviet Union.
    Is there any way, now that the Soviet Union has suffered a 
rebuff in the Near East, that we might be able to relate that 
to some part of de-escalation on our part in Vietnam and reach 
some kind of a solution there, too?
    I am sure you were thinking about the whole picture, and I 
was wondering if you could tell us about your thoughts in that 
regard.
    Secretary Rusk. We are in touch frequently with the Soviet 
Union on Vietnam. Their problem and ours is still with Hanoi. 
We keep a very close check on what happens on the ground in 
Vietnam to see whether any slowdown has a political 
significance.
    Actually, in terms of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
initiative, there has not been a significant slowdown in the 
last week or ten days as sort of reflected in the press.
    There has been some information indicating that they are--
they continue to build up for that offensive, the June 
offensive, that we are expecting in the DMZ.
    I think there is a slowdown. At the moment it is for some 
regrouping on the part of our own side and the absence of 
large-scale fighting, but not a slowdown in the rate of Viet 
Cong or North Vietnamese incidents or attacks in the 
countryside.
    So we cannot draw political conclusions from it. But we 
are, and continue to be, in touch with the Russians, and will 
follow up on Vietnam with them. But their problem is that it is 
still with Hanoi.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator McCarthy, do you have a contribution?
    Senator McCarthy. Not right now.

                   RUSSIAN ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE ARABS

    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would like to go on and 
explore a little further this same question.
    There was an interesting article this morning in the 
Washington Post. I do not know whether you had time to read it 
or not. I would like to read just a couple of paragraphs. It 
says:

    In the early stages of the Middle Eastern crisis, the 
suspicion was freely voiced that Russia had encouraged the 
Arabs in order to get back at the United States for Cuba, 
Vietnam and other failures of Soviet policy.

    Senator Mundt. We cannot hear you.
    Senator Cooper. I want to lodge a protest.
    The Chairman. ``But it is now clear that the Kremlin had no 
such intention. It has worked with the Western powers''--and I 
presume that means us--``behind the scenes to mitigate the 
conflict, at the cost of appearing to forsake its Arab allies, 
instead of issuing the kind of vociferous and saber-rattling 
promises of support which it gave so readily in the past.''

    As a sign of political maturity, this is much more 
convincing than the ``Tashkent spirit'' following the India-
Pakistan war in the fall of 1965.

    Then I skip over to another paragraph.

    Support for the Arabs has been expressed in the most 
generalized and vague assurances. The Soviet Union has been 
aware of the dangers of the situation, and has not wished to 
encourage Arab recklessness by promises of support.

    It is a rather long article. But that again leads me to ask 
you and again hopefully to suggest that the Department give 
very serious consideration to trying to use this occasion, 
which I am sure is a great shock to the prestige, the ego, of 
the Soviet Union, to enlist their assistance through the 
Security Council, where they have cooperated apparently in 
recent days, to open up Vietnam. If we are to get anything of 
any value out of this, it seems to me it could be to get a 
negotiation on Vietnam.
    I cannot help but think there is a possibility of utilizing 
this. I think the Soviets have been extremely restrained in 
their promises.
    You remember how Krushchev threatened everybody at the time 
of the '56--well, in nearly every occasion he was always 
threatening that he would not stand idly by. This calls 
attention to it, how Khrushchev said, ``We won't stand idly 
by,'' and so on, which was absent in this particular instance.
    But I would feel there is some parallel interest, and these 
present people, Kosygin in particular, being an engineer and a 
technician, I do not believe is nearly as interested in big 
political gestures as his predecessor was.
    I would like very much to urge that this be explored, 
utilizing their present presence and interest in the Security 
Council, to see if the Security Council might not make 
recommendations.
    I am not suggesting they can handle Vietnam because the 
other side has insisted, and I suppose still will, it has no 
jurisdiction, but to use it to perhaps reopen and reconvene the 
Geneva Conference, which the other side and ourselves have in 
times past said would be a proper forum for a negotiation.
    You say the trouble is Hanoi. It has been the trouble has 
been Hanoi. But if that could be coupled with a recommendation 
to stop the bombing, that would ease our own political 
situation and might open it up.

                    BRINGING VIETNAM WAR TO A CLOSE

    I just offer that as a suggestion, because I am very 
anxious and very interested in bringing the Vietnam thing to a 
close, because of the effect it is having on our domestic 
economy, our political situation. I think this is going to be 
most serious if this war continues through to the next 
election, and that is about the only benefit, affirmative 
benefit, I can see we can get out of this.
    We have all the troubles here, and we will do what we can, 
and I join the others about what we have done so far in the 
Middle East.
    Of course our problem has been made rather easy by the way 
the military thing went, up to this point. We still have some 
terrible problems. But do you not think there is a possibility 
that this might shake loose the frozen attitude that has grown 
up?

                        SOVIET ROLE EXAGGERATED

    Secretary Rusk. Senator, first let me make a few comments 
on my own personal impressions of the role of the Soviet in 
this Middle East situation because I think that story you read 
from exaggerated it from both directions.
    I do not believe that the Soviet Union was strongly 
encouraging what they called the progressive Arab states--
Cairo, Syria, Algeria particularly--to move against the 
moderate and conservative Arab states, and to work against U.S. 
influence in the Middle East, and to support the U.S.S.R.'s 
influence there.
    I think they encouraged the Arabs up to the request for the 
removal of UNEF.
    Then I think Nasser jumped out ahead of the Soviet Union 
considerably when he announced the closing of the Straits of 
Tiran.
    Now----
    The Chairman. You think that was done without their 
approval.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.
    The Chairman. I see.
    Secretary Rusk. And we have very good reason to believe 
that Nasser did not consult the Soviet Union or indeed anybody 
else when he closed the strait.
    Senator Symington. How about U Thant, did he consult him?
    Secretary Rusk. No, he did not on the closing of the 
straits.
    Now, I think what has happened, this sort of parallel 
action by us and the Soviet Union in the Security Council, from 
their point of view was an attempt to stabilize the situation 
as quickly as possible in the face of a prospective stunning 
defeat of Arab forces by Israel.

                ARAB FAILURES IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

    One of the curious things about this situation over the 
last 20 years has been that the Arabs seemed to have a genius 
for just being too late to take care of their own interests. I 
will give the earliest example and the latest example.
    At the instruction of President Truman and General Marshall 
during the mandate of Palestine, I was negotiating with the 
then Zionists and the Arabs about a military and political 
standstill so there could be at the termination of the mandate 
a further period in which a genuinely agreed solution could be 
found.
    The Chairman. What year was that, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Rusk. That was 1947. I was up in the Savoy Plaza 
Hotel. I had the Arab delegation down one end of the hall and 
the Zionist delegation at the other end of the hall, and we got 
practically everything put together except the question of the 
number of Jewish immigrants that would be admitted into 
Palestine during the standstill.
    We got the Jewish side to accept 3,000 a month, which was 
very small compared to the numbers that they thought and hoped 
would want to come in. It is 36,000 a year.
    Then Prince Faisal, now King Faisal, who was the spokesman 
for the Arab side, refused to accept that 3,000 figure on the 
grounds that if you accepted 3,000 they would send in 3,000 
pregnant women and that would make it 6,000.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is one way to do it.
    Secretary Rusk. Now, you see, had they accepted that figure 
of 3,000, this whole thing might have taken a different shape 
over a period of time, you see. That is an early example of 
being too late.
    Now, the big example is that they fought on the ground to 
oppose the basic U.N. resolution establishing Israel whereas 
now there is nothing they want more than the original 
resolution.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Who?
    Secretary Rusk. The Arabs.
    The Chairman. The Arabs.
    Secretary Rusk. You see, they want that original resolution 
which provides much less Israel territory than Israel has since 
then obtained.
    Now, here in this, since the fighting broke out----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I thought they were unalterably 
opposed to the recognition of sovereignty of Israel.
    Secretary Rusk. But they are now demanding the application 
of the original U.N. resolution too late. Had they taken it at 
the time, they would have had it.
    Now, when the fighting broke out, had they taken 
immediately the first Security Council resolution on a cease-
fire, they would have been far better off than they are today. 
I think the Soviet Union understood that and tried to press 
them to take the ceasefire two days ago. Now, with 48 hours of 
fighting, they have lost the Sinai and the west bank of the 
Jordan, so I think that the Soviets were taking a practical 
view.
    Now, from here on out, I think you can expect the Soviets 
to do everything they can to stimulate the most radical among 
the Arabs, through propaganda and otherwise, perhaps to try to 
find some basis on which they can recoup the situation.
    So I am not sure we will not find that the Soviets and we 
are going to have real difficulties in the Security Council 
about a final settlement here. I think for very practical 
reasons----
    [Discussion off the record.]

                 U.S. BALANCING ACT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Senator Symington. In 1953 when I first came to the Senate, 
Mr. Herzog was military attache, brother-in-law of Abba Eban, 
and he said to me, ``If you give arms to Yugoslavia, who you 
know won't fight for you, why don't you sell them to us, who 
you know would fight for you?''
    Nobody answered that question, and I have been following 
closely for 15 years this whole situation even before I came on 
this committee.
    I would like to ask this question: You have this balancing 
of arms in this government. There are not many Americans who 
know, realize, that we not only had F-I04s in Jordan but we had 
American pilots in Jordan when this business began to flare up. 
We have done a balancing act. I say this with great respect, 
but I would not say it if I did not think it was fair. But we 
have been very unfair to the Israelis the way we handled 
economic aid to Egypt, and at the same time, while they have 
gotten a lot of money from this country, it has gone to buy 
this air force from France.
    Under all these circumstances, it seems to me that foreign 
policy, and Senator McCarthy and I have been very interested in 
this in hearings and we have got the chairman interested, and I 
think we ought to wrap the hearings up. It seems to me we have 
been setting foreign policy, at least as far as the Middle East 
is concerned, in the Department of Defense in a fairly low 
echelon.

                       INCREASE THE SALE OF ARMS

    We have increased the sale of arms in the last five years 
from $300 million a year to $1.7 billion a year. We do this 
with a fellow who, to be honest, a few months ago I never knew 
existed. I never heard of him. He seems to be the biggest shot 
around these parts, and so forth and so on, and I think it is 
better if we are going to start talking about working out with 
the Soviets some arrangements. I think we just, Mr. Secretary, 
and I say this with great respect, to me it is just as clear as 
light the Defense Department at low levels has been setting 
foreign policy in this field.
    I know and you know General Weitzman, who could not be more 
interesting and obviously a very able man, runs their air 
force. He has been promoted to deputy. He was over here 
pleading for the type and character of arms that we refused to 
give him and did give some of his enemies. Under these 
circumstances again, I say, I can see the hate angle and I can 
see the oil angle, and the future Soviet angle, but it looks to 
me like they have a country that they pretty well got this part 
of Jordan stuck in there. They have got the Sinai Peninsula and 
I do not see why we should be so anxious to see them give up a 
lot because they gave up an awful lot when we agreed and Nasser 
agreed to let them use the canal and the Gulf.
    So we have been knee deep in this arms thing, and I think 
our record on the way we have handled it would be open to a lot 
of world criticism if it is to be opened.
    But for what it is worth, I would appreciate your giving me 
your comments on these observations.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, first I think it is only in NATO 
that Mr. Kuss has practically a blank check to sell arms to 
help with the offset problems in NATO, within the general 
structure of NATO limits.
    As far as other parts of the world are concerned, those 
come up to Cabinet level, and I will have to take the lumps.

                        ARMS SALES THROUGH IRAN

    Senator Symington. Is Iran part of NATO?
    Secretary Rusk. No, but those matters come up to Cabinet 
level.
    Senator Symington. Did you know about the sale of F-86s to 
Pakistan through Iran and the German private corporation?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, and we have tried to pull a string on 
that.
    Senator Symington. I do not say----
    Secretary Rusk. No, but we have to follow this pretty 
closely.
    In the case of the Near East, we have tried for years not 
to become a principal arms supplier in the Near East. But here 
with these massive Soviet buildups in Syria and Egypt, we knew 
that Nasser was out to get King Hussein. We knew Hussein had to 
have some sort of protection against Nasser. Now, that ramifies 
into a problem with Israel.
    We have----

                          U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL

    Senator Symington. If Nasser was out to get Israel, we 
never would give any sophisticated war material to Israel. That 
is what I have never been able to understand.
    Secretary Rusk. I think some of the stuff we have given to 
Israel has been very sophisticated. Our view was that Israel's 
defense establishment was in pretty good shape against the 
Arabs. They came in for some requests from time to time, they 
went far beyond some things we generally supplied them, but our 
general estimate was they were pretty reasonably balanced and 
this was far in excess of their requirements, and the last few 
days have not proved us wrong.
    Senator Symington. They have a secretary of defense over 
there who happens to be a military man and listens to his 
chiefs of staff, so they did pretty well when they got rolling. 
They did more in four days than we have done with our air power 
and sea power in Vietnam. That is another matter. I did not 
want to get away from their capacity to handle a war 
brilliantly. All I am getting back to is the first premise, 
considering the way we have acted with them, I do not see where 
we have the leverage to tell the to go back from what they have 
conquered in order to protect themselves.
    They are going to get the hate from the Arabs whether they 
do or do not. That is my only point.

                    USE OF U.S. ARMS AGAINST ISRAEL

    Senator McCarthy. Will the Senator yield?
    Is it not true that more of our arms, if they had been put 
into use, would have been used against Israel than would have 
been used against the Arabs, Saudi Arabia and Jordan?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, I would think not.
    Senator McCarthy. We have not given much to Israel. We may 
have helped them buy French arms.
    Secretary Rusk. They had tanks from us, and I do not want, 
you know, to brag about how much we gave to everybody, but the 
Saudi Arabian arms have not been involved in this situation.
    Senator McCarthy. They did not get organized.
    Secretary Rusk. Beg pardon?
    Senator McCarthy. They were not ready.
    Secretary Rusk. And for other reasons.
    Senator McCarthy. If they had gotten those Hawk missiles 
in.
    Secretary Rusk. And for other reasons I think Saudi Arabia 
was taking their time because of their relations with Nasser.
    Senator McCarthy. I wanted to ask what does this mean in 
the general re-evaluation of the arms sale with Saudi Arabia?

                 FINDING A SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    Secretary Rusk. Before you came in, I was trying to 
indicate some of the elements we feel ought to go into a final 
solution here. One would be some agreement among the principal 
arms supplying countries including the Soviet Union about the 
level of arms in the area, and, if we could achieve something 
of this sort, it would be very important.
    Senator McCarthy. Does this open a way to doing something 
real about the Arab refugees or does not a disturbance of this 
magnitude make a difference?
    Secretary Rusk. We would hope so. I indicated earlier that 
if the Arab refugees could be given a chance to go into the 
privacy of a confessional booth and make a personal decision 
about where he wants to live ten years from now, that the 
practical effect of that secret consultation with the refugees 
would probably be something that Israel could accept because 
perhaps only one in ten would elect to live in Israel.

                        FUTURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

    Senator McCarthy. What about the canal? Are you going to 
let the Egyptians take it over again and give them a chance to 
shut it off any time they want to as they have done twice in 
ten years. Or is this the time to move in a way that President 
Truman indicated back in '45 about the Panama Canal, the Suez 
and all these things?
    Secretary Rusk. I have no doubt that the opening of the 
Suez will be a major issue in the settlement of this affair.
    Senator McCarthy. Continued opening, the question of how it 
would be kept open.
    Secretary Rusk. It may be on this, you see, that some--
instead of relying upon general rules of international law--it 
may be possible to work out a special regime of international 
law for these two waterways, roughly similar to the Montreux 
Convention affecting the Bosporous. Yes, we are working on that 
pretty hard.
    The Chairman. Senator Clark has not had a chance. I wonder 
if he could be recognized.
    Senator Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                        THE NEED FOR DISARMAMENT

    Mr. Secretary, I would like particularly to have Senator 
Gore and Senator Symington listen to this. Mr. Secretary, it 
seems to me that our government has an opportunity to do 
something which comes once in a lifetime, to do something 
effective about the disarmament, and I use the word 
``disarmament'' instead of arms control advisedly, as a result 
of what has happened in the Middle East.
    The Russians, as I understand it, have poured over the 
years something in the neighborhood of $2 billion in armaments 
into the Middle East about which around $1 billion, Mr. Bader 
tells me, went to Egypt.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    Senator Clark. An awful lot of that has gone down the 
drain.
    I would not think that a hard-boiled people like the 
Russians would be deeply interested in making the same mistake 
again.
    Secretary Rusk. Add $1 billion to Indonesia.
    Senator Clark. Yes, sure.
    Now, the Israelis have always proudly boasted that they 
were very much in favor of disarmament in the Middle East, but 
they could not do anything about it because the Arabs would not 
go along.
    Well, now, maybe with the Arabs significantly, although not 
certainly totally disarmed, with Russia disillusioned, this is 
a time when our government would move pretty rapidly in that 
direction. I am sure that Senator Gore, the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Disarmament, and Senator Symington, as chairman 
of the Subcommittee on the Middle East, might look with favor 
on this suggestion.

                  SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

    Now, yesterday I think it was announced that you were the 
chairman of a special committee on the Middle East, and McBundy 
has been brought back out of the mothballs to be the executive 
director. I, frankly, am a little bit disappointed. In fact, I 
go further and say I am quite disappointed that there is nobody 
from the agency which has the statutory responsibility for 
dealing with arms control and disarmament, mainly the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, under that subcommittee.
    I talked to my good friend and yours, Joe Sisco, at the 
White House yesterday at a luncheon, and he said, ``You don't 
need anybody from that outfit on that committee. I am on it.''
    He said there is nobody from AID on it either. Well, I 
respectfully suggest to you that it may be that that point of 
view does deserve some upgrading. They should not be treated 
exactly like lackeys who are sent over to Geneva from time to 
time and gotten rid of, but that Bill Foster ought to be on 
that committee.
    I was going to make another suggestion, which is one that I 
wrote for this committee not too long ago, that we ought to 
give this whole disarmament effort, or if you are going to 
downgrade it to arms control, a much higher priority in the 
Middle East than you have done. I would recommend to you, sir, 
that you ask the President to turn the Vice President loose on 
this. He used to be chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee 
down here. This has been one of his babies for many a long 
year. I do not need to tell you the energy that he has got, the 
zeal with which he can approach this task, and I would suggest 
unhampered by some of your restrictions which might impede some 
of the rest of them.
    I guess that is a question, isn't it?
    Secretary Rusk. I will report back your views, Senator. I 
am not sure about the Vice President in this particular role.
    Senator Clark. He might get us disarmament.
    Secretary Rusk. The functions of a Vice President are 
beyond my level.
    It is true that this committee does not have on it the 
Director of ACDA, the Director of AID, the Secretary of 
Interior and a number of others who have a major stake in what 
happens here, and we expect to draft them when questions come 
up.
    But ACDA has been working for some time on the possibility 
of conventional arms limitation in the Near East.
    In the opening statement of the Geneva Conference I myself 
will be a recognition by the NATO countries that they have an 
important interest in the Near East, and will help out a little 
bit more.
    I am going to have to go at least for a day or two to the 
NATO Ministers Meeting in the middle of next week, and for the 
first time in a long time the NATO countries are beginning to 
get interested in something outside of NATO.

              LET THE MIDDLE EAST SETTLE ITS OWN PROBLEMS

    The Chairman. Yesterday, some people called on me, and they 
thought that now--they did not put it that way--now that Israel 
has prevailed, that we ought to let them alone to settle this 
among themselves.
    What should I say to them when they say that to me?
    Secretary Rusk. I would think the best way to deal with 
that one at the present time would be to say that this is in 
the Security Council and it ought to stay there for a while.
    The Chairman. The U.N. can do it. I said if they can do it, 
I am all for it.
    Secretary Rusk. By the way, may I make just one brief 
remark. We have had some indication in the last three days, 
Senator Gore, that we are making some more progress on the 
nonproliferation treaty.
    Senator Gore. Wonderful.
    Secretary Rusk. So we may be able to table a joint draft in 
Geneva shortly.
    Senator Gore. Good.
    Secretary Rusk. But that is just--I cannot guarantee that 
yet, but we have been encouraged by what has happened in the 
last three days.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 12:05 o'clock p.m., the committee was 
adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
         Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs
                     of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Morse (presiding), McCarthy and Carlson.
    Fulton Freeman, Ambassador to Mexico, accompanied by 
Terence Leonhardy, Director, Office of Mexican Affairs, 
Department of State, briefed the group on the Dykes Simmons 
case.
    (Reporter present at request of Senator Morse.)
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 4:40 p.m.]


               MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1967

                           U.S. Senate,    
       Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
             Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:15 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of 
the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Symington, Lausche, Pell, McCarthy, 
Hickenlooper, and Aiken.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee 
staff.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


STATEMENT OF JEFFREY C. KITCHEN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR 
POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH WOLF, DIRECTOR 
  OF OPERATIONS, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS; AND H.G. TORBERT, 
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO PAKISTAN [P. 85]

    Senator Symington. Speaking of Pakistan, the subcommittee 
has been told by the Defense Intelligence Agency that there was 
no doubt within the intelligence community that the F-86's in 
question were going to Pakistan, and reports to this effect 
were circulated before the aircraft left Germany.
    Did you see those reports?
    Mr. Kitchen. I saw some intelligence reports after the 
aircraft arrived in Iran. I did not see intelligence reports 
prior to their departure from Germany.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Senator Symington. Well, may I repeat that the Defense 
Intelligence Agency said that it was clear to them that they 
were going to Pakistan. Without in any sense getting into 
controversy as to whether we did or didn't know about it, when 
we found out they had gone, did we make any protest to Iran, or 
to Pakistan?
    Mr. Kitchen. Well, as far as Iran is concerned, the degree 
of protest centered around inquiries as to whether when they 
gave the certification that the aircraft were to be used in 
Iran, whether or not this really constituted Iranian Government 
policy.
    There was never, to my knowledge, an approach to the Shah, 
who really determines Iranian policy, and no point-blank 
question to him as to whether or not they had in fact been 
turned over to Pakistani control.

             POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF SALES AGREEMENT BY IRAN

    Senator Symington. I am a great admirer of Iran, but 
wouldn't it be logical to ask them if they were violating the 
agreement that the U.S. Government had told the people of the 
United States they intended to carry out with Pakistan and 
India?
    Mr. Kitchen. Well, we did discuss this in the sense, 
Senator, that when we announced the new policy in April for 
Pakistan and India, we laid that before the Shah and made very 
plain what our policy objectives were and that included the 
element of control and our sincere desire that he cooperate in 
making a contribution to our policy in the sense of maintaining 
that control.
    Senator Symington. Was it made clear to us that there was 
no intention to abide by our suggestion or without our 
knowledge until we found it out?
    Mr. Kitchen. Well, I think in reverting to what I 
immediately said with regard to our new policy, he indicated 
that he thought that our approach was not unrealistic, that it 
was a fairly good approach. He felt that if we, in fact, 
monitored it in terms of balance between India and Pakistan, 
that this was a reasonable proposition.
    I personally believe that his action in permitting the 
aircraft to go on to Pakistan really centered around his 
personal persuasion that in effecting the cut-off at the time 
of hostilities we were in fact penalizing Pakistan.
    He had certain relationships with Pakistan which allowed 
him to draw the conclusion that this was an unfair proposition 
at that stage.
    I think he regards our policy now as a fair policy, and I 
think he would give it his general support.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            IRANIAN PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIET UNION [P. 86]

    Senator Symington. The testimony that we have had, to the 
best of my recollection, to justify this policy is their fear 
of the United Arab Republic. Do you think Iran will continue to 
buy arms from the Soviet Union now that Nasser has been given 
his comeuppance, you might say, by the Israelis?
    Mr. Kitchen. My personal estimate would be, Senator, that 
he will continue to buy non-lethal equipment, generally non-
lethal, and what I would call common user equipment from the 
Soviet Union.
    It is my view that he saw that in our policy of cutting off 
aid to India and Pakistan in the event of hostilities, the 
dangers, as he sees them, of being dependent on a single source 
of supply.
    I think that that was one of his strongest motivations for 
this purchase, as well as the fact that he was able to take a 
wasting economic asset, the gas which he was flaring, and trade 
it for this basic equipment.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           U.S. POLICIES REGARDING ARMS SALES ABROAD [P. 87]

    Senator Symington. Do we consider there are any developed 
countries in the Middle East?
    Mr. Kitchen. The criteria here might go again back to the 
problem of Iran. Iran now has a surplus of income from oil. 
When I use the word surplus I mean it has a substantial income 
from oil that gives the government certainly a wider range of 
choice than it had up to the last three or four years. It has 
been our policy to try to persuade the Government of Iran to 
hold its defense spending down. We have, in fact, approved 
sales to Iran only about a quarter of what the Shan has 
requested. We work not only with the budgetary authorities in 
the Ministry of Defense but actually with the Central Bank and 
other experts to develop what we believe is a real economic 
picture of Iran and we have done our best to persuade the Shah 
that he should not go over certain levels in his defense 
spending.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   U.S. POLICY TOWARD GREECE [P. 89]

    Senator Symington. What do you now plan to do about Greece?
    Mr. Kitchen. Well, Greece is still fulfilling a NATO 
commitment. Her military establishment is committed to NATO 
objectives. That basis commitment hasn't in any way been 
changed by the new regime.
    The question is whether we should continue to provide 
certain heavy equipment to Greece more as a measure of our 
concern about the political nature of that establishment rather 
than any doubts about its military problems.
    Senator Symington. I understand.
    What do you mean by heavy equipment?
    Mr. Kitchen. Well, at the present time certain artillery 
and, I believe, aircraft.
    Senator Symington. What type of aircraft? F-5's, perhaps?
    Mr. Kitchen. Well, I believe it is F-5's.
    Senator Symington. F-5's. What size artillery?
    Mr. Kitchen. I would have to check again. I think it is 
howitzers.
    Tanks, as well?
    Well, all right, tanks.
    Senator Symington. What type of tanks?
    Mr. Kitchen. 47's or 48's.
    Mr. Wolf. I believe it is 48 or modernization of their 
present holdings.
    Senator Symington. Are we continuing to ship that to Greece 
now?
    Mr. Kitchen. Not those heavy items.
    Senator Symington. And when did we stop?
    Mr. Kitchen. We stopped a few days after the coup.
    Senator Symington. And we have not yet decided whether or 
not we will continue?
    Mr. Kitchen. We have not yet decided.
    Senator Symington. I see. That clears that up.
    Does this involve in any way our relationship with our 
other NATO partner, the Turks?
    Let me put the question to you this way: Would we discuss 
this with the Turks, recognizing the Cyprus problem before we 
made the decision?
    Mr. Kitchen. To resume?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Mr. Kitchen. I don't believe we would. I think this, again, 
is a unilateral policy question with regard to the political 
nature of that government and not about the basic military 
situation.

       AMERICAN CONTROL OVER RESALE OF SURPLUS MILITARY EQUIPMENT

    Senator Symington. Mr. Kitchen, you mentioned the fact that 
you worked with Mr. McNaughton as well as Mr. Kuss and Mr. 
Hoopes in the Department of Defense.
    Mr. McNaughton told this committee that the United States 
had complete control over the resale or other transfer of 
military equipment of United States origin. But when the 
subcommittee asked the Defense Department for a list of sales 
and commitments that the German firm, Merex, has made in 
reselling U.S. equipment, Mr. McNaughton replied, ``This 
specific information is not available within the Executive 
Branch.''
    Can you explain this apparent contradiction?
    Mr. Kitchen. We are aware of some of the Merex transactions 
through intelligence sources. Merex has not been the only sales 
agent which the German government has employed once we 
indicated that we did not wish to recapture certain equipment. 
We have some knowledge through, as I say, intelligence sources 
of what the Merex transactions have been.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              CANADIAN SALES DESTINED FOR PAKISTAN [P. 91]

    Senator Symington. And they were not going to send them to 
the Pakistanis?
    Mr. Kitchen. There was no such statement that they might 
send them, but the point was they were to be used properly by 
Iran.
    May I go on and say, sir, when I was in Munich a month ago, 
I had a very full and frank discussion with representatives of 
both the German ministry of defense and foreign ministry, made 
very clear to them without citing specifics because most of our 
specifics came through intelligence channels that we were quite 
aware that there had been irregularities in their handling of 
American surplus disposal and we did not wish to run into those 
irregularities again.
    Senator Symington. Why did the German Government throw over 
Merex and take over the new company whose name is so long I 
can't pronounce it?
    Mr. Kitchen. I don't know the real answer to that. It may 
be partly their recognition that we were quite aware of this 
and had had knowledge of it, did not want to see it repeated.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              FOREIGN FIRMS ENGAGED IN ARMS SALES [P. 96]

    Senator Lausche. Obviously, this Levy Company is of the 
belief that it can in some way get military surplus equipment, 
and it is telling its clients that it will get it for them 
through some manipulation. Is that correct?
    Senator Symington. Mr. Kitchen would agree to that.
    Mr. Kitchen. I agree to that.
    Senator Lausche. It is a dangerous thing.
    Mr. Kitchen. Before you came in, sir, I said I had 
conversations with the German Government. Recently it was made 
very plain that we were aware of the irregularities that 
occurred in that transaction with Iran, and, as a matter of 
fact, I understand that Merex, as the Chairman has suggested, 
has been dropped by the German Government.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                JUSTIFICATION FOR SALES TO IRAN [P. 98]

    Senator Symington. The nature of the job the man has does 
not make any difference. He can be a dentist, and then he 
begins to operate.
    In any case, after they did buy it, after they did say they 
were going to buy this what-you-call unsophisticated equipment 
from the Soviets, we agreed to sell our most sophisticated 
airplane, minus some parts and so forth, but the frame was the 
F-4. Why would they not buy any military equipment from the 
Soviets unless we apply pressure to them to cut it out; and how 
can we apply pressure if we are selling them sophisticated 
equipment at the same time they are buying other military 
equipment from the Soviet Union?
    Mr. Kitchen. Well, sir, I would like to respond on the 
first part of this with regard to the explanation. They did not 
let Soviet technicians in. This was their own description of 
this and so far as I am concerned, I for one would not use this 
in justification of their move. I merely wanted to describe 
what they said.
    I think there have been thousands of Soviets in Iran since 
the end of World War II, and I quite agree with your point of 
their being in there in connection with their other industry 
and so on.
    The point is I think the Shah felt there was a real 
difference between having that and having them as technicians 
within his military establishment, to where he developed some 
dependency on Soviet technicians in terms of his ability to use 
his military establishment, and I think that that is of some 
consequence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Senator McCarthy. Did you people at the time you approved 
the A-4 transfer know that the Iranians were going to buy the 
Russian equipment, or did that come to you as a surprise after 
you approved the airplane transfer?
    Mr. Kitchen. I do not quite recall the sequence on that. I 
would have to check the record, Senator.
    I would put it this way. I thought the knowledge of the 
Russian transaction actually preceded our decision to supply 
the F-4.

             KNOWLEDGE OF IRANIAN-SOVIET ARMS DEAL [P. 100]

    Senator McCarthy. I do not say McNaughton made any denial. 
As I remember, he made a general statement about our selling it 
from keeping the Russians from putting military equipment in 
Iran. There was no indication, as I remember his testimony, 
that this--because the public announcement of the sale of 
trucks and so on came after the hearing we held on this matter.
    Mr. Kitchen. I want to say that we felt the sale of the F-
4's to Iran was less in a sense related to the provision on the 
Soviet equipment, the type of Soviet equipment that the Shah 
bought and the amounts, as it was to the fact that we had 
successfully held the Shah to a program of about $50 million a 
year when he wanted about four times that.
    The Shah came to us and said that he was rapidly, 
increasingly, concerned by the range of the MIG-21 operating 
out of Iraq. The equipment which we provided did not have the 
range of the F-5 and was not suitable to take off from his 
interior fields and engage them approximately at his national 
border. He wanted an aircraft that was capable of doing that.
    Because of the $50 million figure and because of the 
expense of this aircraft, we reluctantly concluded that this 
was not, in his terms, an unreal requirement or an unreal 
request. We made the sale in a sense on its own merits, and 
less connected with the Soviet transaction.
    Senator McCarthy. The Soviets are being paid pretty much in 
oil, are they not?
    Mr. Kitchen. Gas, sir.
    Senator McCarthy. How are we being paid?
    Mr. Kitchen. It is a transaction where we will be repaid--
it is a credit arrangement.
    Senator McCarthy. It is a credit arrangement.
    Mr. Kitchen. Yes, because of his royalties when they fall 
due and so on.
    Senator McCarthy. It is not a direct sort of barter 
arrangement such as the Russians have.
    Mr. Kitchen. No, sir.
    Senator McCarthy. What would have happened if the $400 
million worth of arms that we and the British are supplying to 
Saudi Arabia, in addition to what we were supplying to Jordan, 
had been operational, and used by the Jordanians and the Saudi 
Arabians in the recent Mideast crisis?
    Mr. Kitchen. You would like to have our views on how it 
might have been applied?
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    Mr. Kitchen. Of course we are in an executive session. I 
think the Saudi equipment was and is being bought for 
protection against Nasser and had little to do with its 
relationships to Israel.
    Senator McCarthy. It would not have been used.
    Mr. Kitchen. I doubt very much that it would have been 
used. A lot of that money for instance is in the Hawk system 
which is defensive. I think it has come largely out of the 
irritations and genuine concerns of the Yemeni conflict, the 
presence of the Egyptians in the Yemen.
    As far as Jordan was concerned, sir, a dozen F-104's 
against what we say the Israelis dispose of, I think they would 
have tried to take the air. I think that would have been about 
it.
    Senator McCarthy. What was the status of the agreement to 
sell F-104's?
    Mr. Kitchen. My understanding is, and I am subject to 
checking the record, that approximately only a third of them 
were there--four aircraft, some transitional training was being 
accomplished. The aircraft were removed from Jordan several 
days before hostilities, moved out at the request of the King.
    Senator McCarthy. Where did the King put them?
    Mr. Kitchen. He simply turned them back to us and we moved 
them out. I do not know where they went.
    Mr. Wolf. They were, as I recall, our aircraft on loan at 
that time.
    Senator McCarthy. He did not have title to them. We got 
them out?
    Mr. Wolf. We got them out. Where they are now, I do not 
know.
    Senator McCarthy. I see.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           HEAVY ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AMERICAN POLICY [P. 101]

    Senator McCarthy. Well, I think that is the danger, and I 
see principally it is coming in Europe.
    Do you have any reasonable discussions or communications 
with the Russians now with reference to possible limitation on 
their arms sales in North Africa and the Middle East?
    Mr. Kitchen. We are attempting such communication right 
now. We are concerned that the Russians not be recommitted to 
programs of the size they were committed to. We feel that the 
amount of material which has been supplied quickly on a fill-in 
basis does not constitute any indication of such a deep 
commitment.
    Senator McCarthy. You mean what they are doing right now.
    Mr. Kitchen. Yes. It is to keep some leverage with the 
Arabs during the U.N. phase and to perhaps fill the losses and 
we are very concerned that we get that communication.
    Senator McCarthy. They have a problem as to what to do with 
their semi-obsolete equipment.
    [Whereupon, at 10:20 a.m., the committee recessed, to 
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Carlson, Williams, Case, and Cooper.
    S. 1688, the Inter-American Development Bank bill, was 
discussed and it was decided to take an overall view of the AID 
bill, plus S. 1688, before making a decision.
    S. 624, to provide certain increases in annuities payable 
from the Foreign Service retirement and disability fund, was 
ordered reported without the Pell amendment.
    The committee heard James Pineo Grant, nominee to be 
Assistant Administrator, AID (Vietnam) and then ordered him 
reported favorably by a voice vote.
    Short discussion on the Human Rights Conventions, before 
agreeing to begin markup on the AID bill on Tuesday, June 27.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, 
Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt, 
Case, and Cooper.
    The committee began markup of S. 1872, the Foreign Aid 
bill. Roll call votes were taken on Senator Cooper's substitute 
(to limit development loans to 15 countries, with Presidential 
discretion to extend to an additional 8 countries if President 
reports to the Congress) to Symington motion to limit 
development loans to 15 countries, with authority to extend to 
additional countries only after passage of concurrent 
resolution. The Cooper substitute was defeated by a vote of 10 
to 3, and the Symington motion was approved by a vote of 11 to 
2.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]


                      BRIEFING ON GLASSBORO TALKS

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright 
(chairman) presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Gore, Lausche, 
Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Williams, Mundt, Case and Cooper.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader 
of the committee staff.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    We had originally scheduled a hearing on foreign aid, but 
in view of the very interesting activities that have been going 
on in recent days the Secretary thought he would like to brief 
us some on those activities first.
    Of course if someone wants to ask foreign aid questions 
later on, he wouldn't mind, although he informs me he has a 
Cabinet meeting and has to leave at 20 minutes to 12.
    Is that correct?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    The Chairman. All right, Mr. Secretary. I hope you will 
give us a little statement before we interrogate you.
    Senator Aiken. Where was he at 8:30 last night?
    The Chairman. Talking with Gromyko.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK SECRETARY OF STATE

    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I thought I might try to draw together a good many threads 
here of the last two weeks to include what is going on in New 
York, the summit discussions, and to bring you up to date on my 
talk with Mr. Gromyko last evening which was the most recent of 
our exchanges with the Soviet Union.
    Much of our time was spent on the Middle East, and I think 
we ought to keep in mind that there are three sets of issues in 
the Middle East which tend to merge, overlap, which tend to 
break up the notion that there is a solid community called 
``The Arabs,'' in which our interests vary from issue to issue.
    There is the Israel-Arab issue, which involves very deep-
seated emotions on both sides, emotions which were inflamed 20 
years ago with the creation of the State of Israel, and which 
have not really subsided--issues on which almost all Arabs 
speak with a single voice.
    Then there is a very serious contest going on between the 
self-styled progressive Arab states, countries like Egypt, 
Syria, Algeria, and the moderate or conservative Arab states 
which comprise almost all the rest.
    The third is a serious effort by the Soviet Union to 
penetrate the Middle East to establish an effective presence 
there at the expense of the West, which carries with it very 
heavy overtones affecting the total world situation.
    At the fringe is a minor Chinese Communist effort in the 
area, but I haven't found anyone among the Arabs particularly 
that I have talked to in recent weeks who take the Chinese 
activity very seriously, although they have been busy with the 
Palestine Liberation Army and a few minor groups here and 
there.

                MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL

    I think the committee was briefed in great detail up to the 
point where the Middle Eastern question moved from the Security 
Council to the General Assembly. We had no enthusiasm for that 
transfer of the forum because in the first instance we felt 
that in the Security Council the voting situation was such that 
it required that any result be a negotiated result. It was not 
possible for the Security Council to pass a wholly one-sided 
resolution or a resolution which had not been at least in part 
negotiated between the two sides, and the Security Council had 
succeeded in passing four unanimous resolutions and had been 
able to bring about a cease-fire when the hostilities actually 
began.
    Further, we anticipated that the Soviet Union would use the 
General Assembly for a major propaganda effort to reaffirm its 
support of the Arabs and cast the United States in the role of 
the enemy of the Arabs, partly as a part of its long range 
strategy and partly to recover from the very serious setback 
which the Soviet Union itself had suffered when, in the face of 
a striking Arab defeat, the Soviet Union was considered by many 
Arabs to have let them down.

                      KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO THE U.N.

    It was against this background that we heard that Mr. 
Kosygin was coming.
    Despite the fact that we were in regular touch with him on 
the ``Hot Line'' there for several days, he did not give us any 
private information that he was coming. It was simply announced 
he was coming to the General Assembly.
    When we heard that, Mr. Christian, the Press Secretary for 
the White House, made a short statement indicating that he 
would be welcome and that we hoped that he would enjoy his 
visit to this country and that the President and he might meet 
while he was here.
    After his arrival, we let it be known to him that the 
President would be glad to extend him hospitality in Washington 
or Camp David with whatever degree of formality or informality 
he might be able or willing to accept.
    But he took the view that he was coming to the United 
Nations and not to the United States, that he could not visit 
the United States as such and, therefore, he did not believe it 
would be appropriate for him to come to Washington.
    Well, that led to consideration of other places, and we 
finally decided upon Glassboro on the recommendation of the 
Governor of New Jersey.
    Just before the announcement of the Glassboro meeting was 
made, I had gone to see Mr. Kosygin and told him there were a 
number of points which the President would be ready and glad to 
have a chance to discuss and if he, Mr. Kosygin, thought such a 
talk would be worthwhile the President would be glad to meet 
him in New York, in New York State or in New Jersey.
    Those four points were: Non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, the ABM problem, the Middle East, and Vietnam.

                    KOSYGIN'S MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

    Now, as far as the Assembly is concerned, on the opening 
day, Mr. Kosygin not only made his speech but also put in a 
resolution which had in it three key points: One, a 
condemnation of Israel; secondly, a demand for the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces immediately and unconditionally; and, third, 
reparation or compensation by Israel to the Arabs for the 
damage inflicted and a return of captured property including 
captured arms.
    I think it is worth noting that in recent days discussion 
of a condemnation of Israel and the matter of reparations has 
pretty well dropped out of the picture and the Soviet Union is 
concentrating now on an immediate and unconditional withdrawal 
of Israeli forces back to the so-called armistice lines.

                    PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FIVE POINTS

    The following day, Ambassador Goldberg put in a United 
States resolution built around the five points in the 
President's speech of June 19: The recognized right of national 
life, justice for the refugees, innocent maritime passage, 
limits on the arms race, and political and territorial 
integrity for all the states in the area.
    We did that partly to broaden the agenda of the Assembly 
itself because up until that point the item on the agenda was 
Israeli aggression. But when we put in our resolution calling 
for steps to stabilize a general and more permanent peace in 
the area, then that was by arrangement with the Secretariat 
included on the agenda of the General Assembly.
    The situation at the present time is that neither the 
Soviet resolution nor the U.S. resolution is likely to pass 
with the necessary two-thirds vote. What is likely to happen is 
that there will be some third resolution, still unsurfaced, 
around which some sort of consensus might build, combining the 
idea of withdrawal with some of these broader principles of 
stabilizing a permanent peace.
    In our talks with Mr. Kosygin and two additional talks 
which I had with Mr. Gromyko, we took up the Middle East 
situation in great detail. I suppose 80 percent of the 
President's time with Kosygin was spent on the Middle East. 
Kosygin's very tough press conference on the subject is a 
pretty accurate reflection of what he said in private. He is 
pressing very hard for a simple and unconditional withdrawal of 
Israeli forces to the armistice line, and is unwilling to talk 
seriously about other issues until that question of withdrawal 
has been resolved.

                    AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY

    Having said that, it is, I think, correct to say that there 
are important, indeed major points of agreement between 
ourselves and the Soviet Union on the Middle East.
    For example, the Soviet Union accepts Israel as an 
independent national state. It voted for its creation, and Mr. 
Kosygin reaffirmed that in his speech to the General Assembly.
    The Soviet Union, I think, would support the idea of an 
elimination of the state of belligerence.
    Now, this is a very important, indeed a fundamental point 
involved in this present situation, because the Arab states, 
particularly those immediately neighboring Israel, have 
proceeded on the basis that they are in a state of war with 
Israel and have the right to exercise the so-called rights of 
belligerence in their dealings about or with Israel.
    When President Nasser, for example, closed the Strait of 
Tiran, we were immediately in touch with him, and he based the 
closing of the Strait of Tiran on rights of belligerence 
stemming from the state of war with Israel. That raises some 
interesting points of a reciprocal character because the 
Egyptians tend to overlook the fact that if Egypt is in a state 
of war with Israel, Israel is in a state of war with Egypt. The 
Latin Americans have pointed out from a legal point of view, 
around New York, that if Egypt is in a state of war with 
Israel, Israel cannot commit aggression against Egypt, and that 
the question of withdrawal takes on a special and less 
insistent role if a state of war is insisted upon.
    But I think the Soviet Union would agree to find some way 
to remove the rights of belligerence at some stage, after 
withdrawal has been accomplished.

                     END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCE

    Mr. Gromyko volunteered the interesting remark that whereas 
Japan and the Soviet Union do not have a peace treaty with each 
other, they did join 10 years ago to remove the state of 
belligerence between the two countries, and that is an 
interesting precedent for this kind of problem here in the 
Middle East.
    I think also that the United States would have no 
particular problem with the Soviet Union on rights of maritime 
passage.
    Senator Aiken. Is that public knowledge, the state of 
belligerency?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, it is. Would you like to have the 
documentation on that?
    Senator Aiken. No, I just want to know whether it is safe 
to refer to it.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Aiken. It would be helpful.
    Senator Clark. It would be safer to refer to the fact that 
the Russians would approve ending the state of belligerence.
    Secretary Rusk. No, I don't think you had better put words 
in their mouths on it. I think you can point out that Russia 
and Japan removed the state of belligerence between them 10 
years ago even though there is not a peace treaty between them, 
and I would urge out of this no one put words in the Russians' 
mouths because I would like to talk rather freely about the 
Russians' views on some of these things.
    I don't think we will have much problem with the Russians 
on the question of maritime passage.

                      OPENING THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

    I can tell the committee that Egypt has let it be known 
that the Strait of Tiran problem can be resolved; that the 
Strait can be opened. The sticking point is that they want to 
do it informally and as secretly as possible. In other words, 
it is not the kind of thing that you can handle secretly. Ships 
pass through, and unless there is some real assurance, an 
assurance would have to be public, it is very hard to see how 
this could be managed.
    But I think we can assume that in all of this business the 
Strait of Tiran will be opened.
    I don't believe the Soviets would object to Israeli ships 
going through the Suez, but we are a long way from having the 
consent of Cairo for the passage of Israeli flag ships through 
Suez.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Have they started clearing the 
channel yet?
    Secretary Rusk. I haven't had information that they have. I 
understand that there is about a 30 day job to clear the 
channel with three or four ships that have been in trouble 
there.
    Senator Aiken. Who sunk the ships?
    Secretary Rusk. There was one with cement in it that I 
understand the Egyptians sunk. There is another one that ran 
aground, whether it was trying to dodge or something. I just 
don't know of individual ships, but at least one with cement in 
it was sunk by Egyptians.

                      ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    We went into the question of the arms race with the Soviet 
Union, and I must say that I think I detect more interest among 
the Arabs in finding some limitation to the arms race than I do 
on the part of the Soviet Union. I think we ought to bear in 
mind that this question of arms in the Near East is not 
something which we are likely to be able to manage by our own 
unilateral efforts, particularly so long as the Soviet Union 
continues to send very large supplies of weapons in there, 
because it is a three-cornered problem.
    With the massive Soviet arms build-up in Egypt, Syria, and 
Algeria, that creates problems in the first instance for their 
own Arab neighbors, the moderate or conservative regimes who 
feel under pressure from Cairo or in the case of Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco. So that we have in the past tried to make 
moderate amounts of arms available to Jordan, for example.
    We have sold some arms to Saudi Arabia although the British 
are their principal supplier, and we have given some very 
modest assistance to countries like Tunisia and Morocco.
    But that, in turn, creates a problem with Israel. We did 
have some well understood balanced arms supplies both to Jordan 
and to Israel to the knowledge of both in a situation in which 
they were reasonably content on both sides with what was being 
done.

               KEEPING AN HONEST CONTACT WITH BOTH SIDES

    Senator Lausche. At this point, Mr. Secretary,----
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Lausche.--May I state that when a delegation was in 
Tel Aviv, we were told by Mrs. Meir that they knew from the 
State Department that U.S. military equipment was going in 
there. That is, she corroborates what you have just said that 
Israel was fully familiar with what you were doing.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have tried to keep in honest 
contact with both Jordan and Israel on this question, because I 
think each one of them knew that such arms as we were putting 
in there were not aimed at the country across the border, but 
in each case had a different purpose.
    So that I think we should have in our minds if we withdraw 
completely from the area and leave the area completely to 
Soviet supplied arms to Egypt and Syria, then we expose a good 
many of these countries, Arab as well as Israel, to a build-up 
and dangers and threats which could work very much against our 
interests and those of the western world.
    I don't want to get into that in any more detail than the 
committee wishes to, but I just wanted to mention it in 
passing.
    The Soviets did not give us much encouragement, however, on 
the question of limitation of arms to the Near East. Our 
present information, and I think perhaps we could leave this 
off the tape at the moment----
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have got to go to 
another hearing at 10:30 and I wonder as long as this subject 
has been brought up if I can ask the Secretary one or two 
questions.
    Senator Lausche. May I say, Mr. Chairman, I have another 
meeting to go to, too.
    All right.
    Senator Clark. I have another meeting at 10:30.
    Senator Lausche. Go ahead. I have no objection.
    The Chairman. You take two or three minutes, whatever you 
want.

                   THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD OFFENSE

    Senator Symington. There is just one question I have to 
ask. I have heard that the build-up is considerably more from 
another branch of the government than what you have stated, and 
my only single question is what will be our position if the 
Israelis decide that the best defense is a good offense again?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I was just given this information 
this morning. My information is that this is an all-department 
judgment at the present time.
    Senator Symington. In any case, my question is, if they 
decide the best defense is the best offense again, what would 
be the position of the United States?
    Secretary Rusk. I think we would advise strongly both sides 
here not to initiate another round of hostilities just as we 
did before this last round started.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    The Chairman. All right, continue, Mr. Secretary.

                       NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

    Secretary Rusk. Well, I have tried to summarize briefly the 
general attitude of the Soviet Union on the Middle East. As I 
say, that took up about 80 percent of the time in the 
discussions between the Chairman and the President.
    On the question of non-proliferation, I think we did make 
some significant headway. On June 7, our two representatives in 
Geneva, the two co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, put their 
heads together and recommended to their governments ad 
referendum a joint draft which, if it were to be approved by 
the two governments, would be submitted to the Geneva 
Conference without Article III on safeguards.
    We looked over that and were satisfied with it as a basis 
for further negotiation with the other members of the 
conference, and with governments not members of the conference, 
and authorized our man to proceed.
    The Soviets have not yet authorized their man to join in 
tabling that resolution, that draft treaty.
    We talked about that in some detail with Mr. Kosygin and 
Mr. Gromyko, and it is my impression, I cannot guarantee this, 
but it is my impression that within a very few days the Soviet 
Union will agree in Geneva to table the draft that has now been 
prepared, minus Article III on safeguards, leaving Article III 
blank for further negotiation between the two co-chairmen.
    I think that represents some significant headway, and we 
can be, I think, reasonably pleased that that step may be in 
sight.

                  PROBLEMS IN ESTABLISHING SAFEGUARDS

    On safeguards, the issue continues to be one not between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, but between EURATOM and 
practically everybody else on the issue as to whether EURATOM 
safeguards are to be accepted as a substitute for IAEA 
safeguards, the Vienna safeguards in effect, or whether all 
nations, including the EURATOM members, would accept a single 
set of safeguards under the IAEA system.
    Our information on this point has been that France, 
particularly, was objecting to the acceptance of IAEA 
safeguards in EURATOM.
    Mr. Gromyko tells me that is not what Couve de Murville 
said to him, so we are trying to clarify that particular point.
    I think it is possible that the safeguards question can be 
resolved.

                           DISCUSSIONS ON ABM

    On the ABM question, the President pressed Mr. Kosygin very 
hard on that to set a time and a place for discussions, this 
week, next week, because this matter has been pending now for 
three months since the Soviet Union said they would be prepared 
to discuss offensive and defensive missiles with us.
    Mr. Kosygin was not willing to set a time, although he 
indicated that they would be prepared to discuss the matter 
further at some stage. He rather indicated before too long, 
whatever that means.
    He pretended to believe that one of the problems was that 
we were willing to discuss only defensive missiles, and he made 
a pretty strong case against that. But in fact for a very long 
time we have told him that we do want to talk about both 
offensive and defensive missiles, and I don't quite understand 
why even in his press conference after all of our talk he left 
the impression that somehow we were prepared to talk about only 
defensive missiles. He knows better in terms of the most direct 
statements by us over a period of the last several months, and 
by what the President said at Glassboro.
    My guess is that there will be some further talks on that 
subject. I think it is entirely possible that the Soviet Union 
has not completed its own staff work, its own preparations. It 
is a very complex matter.
    We had spent perhaps a year working on this matter among 
our departments before the proposals were made to the Soviet 
Union, so that we were pretty well along the way before we 
raised it with them.
    If they have not gone through the same exercise, the more 
they get into it the more complicated they undoubtedly have 
found it, so I think there is a reasonable possibility that 
they simply have not completed their work and they may have 
some military views to take into account as the gentlemen 
around this table know we have had to do.

                 SOVIET UNION WILL NOT SPEAK FOR HANOI

    On Vietnam, the principal problem there is the one we have 
long been familiar with. The Soviet Union either is unwilling 
or unable to try to speak for Hanoi and, therefore, is not able 
to sit down with us to do business on Vietnam. They are 
unwilling to commit themselves as to what they might do if by 
that it means going out beyond what they understand to be the 
position of Hanoi.
    I think the discussion on that, however, was extremely 
useful in terms of clarifying the situation, and to make 
apparent to Mr. Kosygin a wide range, a very wide range, of 
possibilities for moving this matter toward peace if there is 
any way to get Hanoi to pick up any one of the possibilities 
and the alternatives and begin to move.
    I don't know whether we will hear more from them on that 
subject or not. We would hope so.

                  CLOSING THE GAP ON IMPORTANT ISSUES

    I would think that on the whole the talks were very much 
worthwhile on the simple point that the difference between 
having the talks and not having the talks was a very 
substantial difference. I think there would have been general 
disappointment if these two men had been that close to each 
other geographically and not been able to sit down and exchange 
views.
    I also think that the talks helped to improve 
understanding, in the original sense of the word understanding; 
that is, it helped each side to get a fuller, more detailed 
understanding of each other's points of view.
    I can't say that I think that the talks brought about an 
understanding in terms of closing the gap on some of the 
important issues which we have before us. But I must say that I 
think it also improved considerably the sense of contact 
between these two individuals, and may make it somewhat easier 
for them to be in direct touch with each other again when it 
becomes desirable and necessary to do so.

            SOVIETS WARN OF RENEWED FIGHTING IN MIDDLE EAST

    There were no polemics on either side. There were no 
threats. There was an indication by the Soviet Union that they 
thought fighting would break out again in the Middle East if 
there was not a prompt withdrawal of Israeli forces. But that 
was about as close as discussion came----
    Senator Case. Would you say that again?
    Secretary Rusk. I said the Chairman, Mr. Kosygin, indicated 
that he thought there was a very high prospect of fighting in 
the Middle East if the Israeli forces did not withdraw promptly 
and unconditionally, but that was as close as the conversation 
got to a threat, and the meaning of that is a little hard to 
understand.
    I think it was made quite clear if they got into it 
themselves that would be a very serious matter indeed. We would 
ourselves be much concerned about that, and we fully expected 
that they would not themselves get involved in the situation. I 
didn't get the impression that they were saying they were just 
about to.

                      ASSESSMENT OF THE ARAB SIDE

    Whether the Arabs themselves are able to contemplate a 
further round at this point, I think is very doubtful. But 
there are additional aircraft that have been brought back in 
there lately. The Arabs have seen the value of a tactical first 
strike so one can't be sure as to exactly what would happen.
    More generally in the area, we are not completely sure just 
what is happening in Cairo; who is really in charge; who is 
giving instructions.
    I had two long talks with Dr. Fawzi myself in New York, 
preceded by a talk which Averell Harriman had with him. I did 
not get too much impression that he was acting under any clear 
instructions from his own government, and the talks proved to 
be rather tentative in character.
    The government in Syria is very fragile at the moment and 
there could be political changes in Syria at almost any minute.
    King Hussein of Jordan has increased his stature 
considerably during this period within the Arab world because, 
of all the Arabs, the Jordanians at least fought with 
considerable courage. The King himself was there and lost five 
members of his family. He gained additional respect among the 
Arabs for having, in effect, as they saw it, acted like a man 
compared to the way some of the others acted.
    We are going to have a great deal of trouble in trying to 
bring together the various principles on which a permanent 
peace can be established there.
    The Arabs are going to be extremely sensitive about making 
major concessions which appear to be made under the impact of a 
dramatic Israeli military success.

            ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM

    On the Israeli side, it is going to take them a little 
while longer, I think, for the second thoughts to take hold, 
and get them focusing on what is necessary to effect some sort 
of reconciliation with the Arabs for the long run.
    I have to say that, from the national point of view, I 
think the action they seemed to be taking yesterday and today 
to annex the old city of Jerusalem is going to be deeply 
resented by many members of the United Nations who look upon 
that as presenting them with a fait accompli. I think that is 
going to cost the Israeli a good many votes up there before 
this present session is over.
    We strongly urged the Israelis not to take any action of 
that sort that would present everybody else with a fait 
accompli, because the problems are difficult enough at best, 
but apparently they have gone ahead at least to the extent of 
electing a government for the old city.
    On how permanent a basis, I am not quite sure. I haven't 
actually seen the details. But that action, I think, is going 
to cost them considerably in the General Assembly.
    Mr. Chairman, I have wandered, rambled around quite a bit 
in order to open up a number of points that the members of the 
committee might wish to get into. I am at your disposal to 
pursue these matters in more detail.
    The Chairman. Well, fine.

                    SUSPENSION OF BOMBING IN VIETNAM

    Could I ask a little more about the Vietnam situation? Was 
there anything said by them about a suspension of the bombing 
or a standstill for any period of time? Did they encourage you 
to believe that if this could be done there might be a 
negotiation?
    Secretary Rusk. They repeated, in effect, what Kosygin had 
said publicly in London, that a stoppage of the bombing could 
lead to a negotiation. But they were not able to say anything 
at all about what action would occur; what the effect would be 
on the ground; what would result in fact as distinct from what 
might be happening at the conference table.
    The Chairman. They couldn't give us any assurance, I 
suppose, about what Hanoi would do?
    Secretary Rusk. That is the problem. He was not able to 
speak for Hanoi.
    For example, he was not able to say whether or not those 
three or four divisions in and near the demilitarized zone 
would attack our marines up there while such talks were going 
on.

                      POSSIBILITY OF A CONFERENCE

    The Chairman. Did he express the belief that if we did have 
a standstill that they would have a conference?
    Secretary Rusk. No, he didn't--well, he indicated if we 
stopped the bombing that there could be negotiations. He did 
repeat what he said in London on that matter.
    The Chairman. It was my understanding that at one point he 
indicated that if we could get a conference, stop the war in 
Vietnam, everything else would fall in place. Is that an 
accurate statement of his attitude?
    Secretary Rusk. I don't have that. I don't--I would have to 
review the transcript.
    The Chairman. The morning paper.
    Senator Lausche. In connection with this, he said that we 
should stop the bombing and pull our troops out of South 
Vietnam.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think that is the standard public 
position.
    Senator Lausche. But that is not what he said----
    The Chairman. That is the public position?
    Secretary Rusk. That would be a retreat in fact from what 
he said in London on the subject, because in London he didn't 
say anything about pulling our troops out.

                     A MAJOR ESCALATION OF THE WAR

    The Chairman. I understand we may be on the verge of 
sending one or two more divisions to Vietnam. Would this not be 
considered a major escalation of the war in a long term sense 
of a further determination, or sign of determination, to remain 
for a longer period. To put it another way, an indication we 
have given up any hope whatever of any kind of negotiation?
    Secretary Rusk. I am not familiar with----
    The Chairman. Well, the rumor is in the paper that we are 
about to send either one or two more divisions; a hundred 
thousand men have been mentioned in some cases. Ky requested 
140,000 men. So it is true that publicly at least we have 
variations of the amount.
    Secretary Rusk. I haven't been in the discussions myself 
involved in that problem. It is my understanding that such 
questions in any event will not arise until Secretary McNamara 
has been out and talked over the situation.
    The Chairman. These are figures that have been in the 
paper. What I was wondering is, I think this comment about if 
the war could be stopped, if we could get a negotiation, came 
from the briefing of the President to the leadership. He 
indicated he thought--of course, this is a theoretical way to 
put it, I don't think it was pinned down to something very 
specific--but that the real major problem was the war in 
Vietnam. Many other outstanding problems which you have 
mentioned, proliferation, arms control, etcetera, are 
influenced by this. Even the question which caused a little 
concern in the paper about whether or not there was arrangement 
for a further meeting is influenced by this, and it is 
obviously there.
    I just wondered if you felt that this man has any 
inclination to go further.

                 KOSYGIN'S STATUS IN SOVIET GOVERNMENT

    One thing I particularly wanted to know, what is your 
feeling about Kosygin's responsibility in this government? I 
mean compared to Brezhnev and Podgorny and as a triumverate, do 
they have any independence of action as a trio comparable to 
our President, for example? I mean was this man really free to 
take any initiative or was he just strictly following orders 
from the trio, and they were following orders from the Central 
Committee? Could you explain this a little bit?
    Secretary Rusk. I have the impression that the three 
together make up the authoritative leadership of the Soviet 
government but that you have to take the three together, and I 
have the impression that the views which Mr. Kosygin presented 
here were the views which the three of them had agreed on.
    The Chairman. He had really no discretion to depart from 
them, is that correct?
    Secretary Rusk. No discretion to depart from them without 
consultation with the other two.
    The Chairman. That is what I mean.
    Secretary Rusk. But I don't think that means Mr. Kosygin 
himself is just a mouthpiece. He is one-third of the 
leadership.
    The Chairman. Sure.
    Secretary Rusk. So he is just not repeating something that 
somebody else tells him.
    The Chairman. Oh, yes.
    Secretary Rusk. These are positions which he and Mr. 
Brezhnev and Podgorny reached as a collective, as a committee.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. Now, to what extent he was in touch back 
home while he was there, I have no way of knowing, but I have 
no doubt that there was a lot of telegraphic traffic going back 
and forth while he was in this country getting ready for the 
meeting and also perhaps in between the two meetings.
    The Chairman. Sure.

                     SHARING THE TOP RESPONSIBILITY

    Secretary Rusk. But I would think that Kosygin is a man who 
does share the top responsibility, but he only shares it. He is 
not like Khrushchev who would go off on his own.
    The Chairman. Nor like our President.
    Secretary Rusk. Not quite in the same constitutional 
position as our President.
    The Chairman. That is what I mean and he could be removed 
tomorrow if the Central Committee desired it; all three of them 
could.
    Secretary Rusk. They could, although I think three of them 
together pretty well control the Central Committee.
    The Chairman. But if they did something that fell out of 
sympathy with the Central Committee.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.
    The Chairman. They can fire them, just like a parliamentary 
body can kick out a prime minister at a moment's notice.
    Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, I had the impression the 
tone of his press conference was for home consumption.
    The Chairman. That is--I had it, too, and that is why I 
asked the question.
    Secretary Rusk. The tone was more rigid in its formulation. 
The tone in the press conference was more rigid in its 
formulation than the press talks.
    The Chairman. Senator Lausche?
    I have a lot of other things, but I don't want to take up 
all the time.

           HANOI'S DEMANDS FOR UNCONDITIONAL HALT TO BOMBING

    Senator Lausche. Why can't we accede to Kosygin's demands 
that we stop the bombing in the north?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, so far as we know, we have not heard 
to the contrary from Hanoi. They are insisting that it be 
unconditional and definitive.
    Now, there are various explorations going on to find out 
whether in fact that is their view. We have tried, as you know, 
on a number of occasions, short pauses, but on each of those 
occasions they come back and say the pause is an ultimatum.
    ``You have to have a commitment this is unconditional.''
    We are not going to say now talk and we will start the 
bombing again if we are not satisfied.
    These are matters that can change from time to time. We 
have not yet seen clear signs of any change as far as Hanoi is 
concerned. Undoubtedly, they are thinking about these problems 
just as we are. But whether Mr. Kosygin will make any effort to 
ascertain whether Hanoi's position on any of these points has 
changed, I just have no way of knowing at the present time.

                       THE PERILS OF NEGOTIATING

    Senator Lausche. What are the dangers if we stopped the 
bombing of the North and went to the negotiating table. What 
perils are there in that course?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the principal problem on that is the 
practical problem that if they are relieved of bombing, they 
can rest there in safety and relative comfort and continue to 
supply men and arms into the South to carry on the war on their 
side full scale without any interference by us north of the 
17th Parallel, and without any major incentive toward peace.
    Senator Lausche. Did Kosygin's statement imply that if we 
did stop the bombing and did go to the negotiating table that 
the war would still go on in South Vietnam?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we have no indication to the 
contrary. In other words, no one thus far has been able to tell 
us what, in fact, would happen on the ground during a period of 
discussion. You see, we can't completely forget the experience 
at Panmunjom when we took more casualties after the talks 
started than before the talks started. There can be prolonged 
talks during that period, and we could not hit anything north 
of the 17th Parallel, and they could reinforce and supply and 
continue to infiltrate without interruption or even discomfort. 
I think the possibilities of peace would be postponed 
considerably.

                         OPENING THE SUEZ CANAL

    Senator Lausche. I have no further questions--by the way, 
has there been any talk about setting up some plan that would 
make the Suez Canal permanently open to all peaceful sea-moving 
vessels?
    Secretary Rusk. Egypt thus far has been very resistant to 
the idea of opening up the canal to the flags of all nations, 
including Israel. However, if one could remove this state of 
belligerence, this state of war between Egypt and Israel, it is 
possible that in time, and perhaps not too long in the future 
as a practical matter, Israeli flag ships might go through the 
canal because the legal basis for keeping them out of the canal 
is the state of war.
    Senator Lausche. I have no further questions.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I have no questions on this 
particular phase of this at the moment.

                         ASSAULT ON THE LIBERTY

    I did want to ask you if you are prepared to make any 
statement on it at the moment, it may be out of your bailiwick, 
about the assault on the Liberty Ship in the eastern 
Mediterranean killing the Americans.
    The Chairman. Here is a letter about it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I didn't know about this letter.
    The Chairman. This man wrote a letter----
    Senator Lausche. Are you two having a private conversation?
    The Chairman. No, it is about a Liberty Ship. He started to 
ask and I thought maybe he would like to see it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He told me I had bad breath. 
[Laughter]
    Secretary Rusk. I was just informed, Mr. Chairman, after my 
arrival back in Washington this morning, that the report of the 
Naval Court of Inquiry has now been received, and that the 
Department of Defense will make public this afternoon a summary 
of that report.
    I have not had a chance, myself, to see it or to study it, 
but the two opening paragraphs of the summary are as follows:

    A Navy Court of Inquiry has determined that USS Liberty was 
in international waters, properly marked as to her identity and 
nationality, and in calm, clear weather when she suffered an 
unprovoked attack by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats 
June 8, in the eastern Mediterranean. The court produced 
evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to 
identify Liberty correctly. The Court had insufficient 
information before it to make a judgment on the response for 
the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to 
attack.

    Now, we have given the Israelis a very stiff note on this 
subject. When we get the results of the inquiry and some 
estimates of the damage and the compensation required, we 
expect to be filing for full compensation as is customary in 
such cases.
    It is my understanding that it is considered to be an 
accidental attack insofar as the intent of the Israeli 
government is concerned.
    The Chairman. The government, as distinguished from----

                 ISRAELI INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT

    Senator Hickenlooper. How about the people who ran the 
attacking ships?
    Secretary Rusk. They are themselves conducting a companion 
inquiry into it, and the Israeli military advocate general is 
holding a preliminary judicial inquiry by a legally qualified 
judge who is empowered by law to decide on the committal for 
trial of any person.
    So it looks as though that indicates that they think there 
may be some culpability on the part of individuals who might 
have been involved in this attack.
    Senator Hickenlooper. What does the investigation show? The 
rumor, and statements we have had thus far, indicate that 
Israeli planes made two or three passes over the ship as much 
as at least 30 minutes or more before the attack occurred at a 
low altitude apparently for the purpose of identification of 
the ship. Also that at least one torpedo boat of the Israelis 
came up very close to the ship before the attack was made, and 
then backed away, and then fired at the ship.
    Secretary Rusk. Again, I don't consider myself a very 
expert witness on this point at the moment, Senator, but I do 
see here on the summary that I have in front of me: ``The Court 
heard witnesses testify to significant surveillance of the 
Liberty on three separate occasions from the air at various 
times prior to the attack, five hours and 13 minutes before the 
attack, three hours and 7 minutes before the attack and two 
hours and 37 minutes before the attack. Inasmuch as this,'' 
that is the U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry, ``was not an 
international investigation, no evidence was presented on 
whether any of these aircraft had identified Liberty or whether 
they had passed any information on Liberty to their own higher 
headquarters.''
    You see, we do not have in front of our own Naval Court of 
Inquiry Israeli personnel or officers or anything of that sort 
so the Court of Inquiry under those circumstances could not, I 
suppose, properly make a finding on that point.

                  SURVEILLANCE OF SHIP PRIOR TO ATTACK

    Senator Hickenlooper. Anyway, they did establish from 
whatever testimony they had, they established the fact that the 
passes had been made over this ship?
    Secretary Rusk. That there was significant surveillance of 
the Liberty on three separate occasions.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Three separate occasions as much as 
two hours before?
    Senator Williams. Five hours.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Five hours; two hours.
    Secretary Rusk. Five hours, three and two and a-half.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Over this ship, five, three and two 
and a-half over this ship.
    Incidentally, this lad who gave this interview in the New 
York Post is from my home country, Palo, Iowa.
    The Chairman. Is he bound to be a straightforward, honest 
virtuous fellow?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yeoman Brownfield is his name.
    This is the first I have seen of this story.
    Senator Lausche. Was he a man on the ship?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, he is a yeoman on the ship.
    Secretary Rusk. I think I should add here, I see also in 
this same paragraph this statement by the Court, our own Court:
    ``It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the 
culpability of the attackers and no evidence was heard from the 
attacking nation. Witnesses suggested that the flag,'' that is 
the U.S. flag, ``may have been difficult for the attackers to 
see, both because of the slow speed of the ship and because 
after five or six separate air attacks by at least two planes 
each, smoke and flames may have helped obscure the view from 
the motor torpedo boats.''
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, the time to identify the flag 
was before they shot.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. Whether the flag was out or limp on 
its mast, that is part of the point they were talking about 
here.
    But I haven't had a chance to study it, Senator, and I 
wouldn't want to----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I hope we get a full report on 
this, because I can't help but draw the conclusion at this 
moment, subject to such evidence as may develop later, that all 
of the known facts, at least to me, indicate that they were 
either blind or utterly stupid, or they deliberately identified 
this ship and deliberately attacked it with the purpose of 
sinking it, and I think in any event, it is very bad.

                        DEFINING INDEMNIFICATION

    Senator Mundt. Will the Senator yield on that point?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.
    Senator Mundt. When you say you sent them a stiff note to 
ask for indemnification, in international parlance is that just 
asking them to restore the ship or pay some kind of indemnity 
to the families of the people killed?
    Secretary Rusk. My understanding is it is indemnity of 
personnel as well.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You have not gone through that so I 
will not attempt to have you do it piecemeal on that.
    Secretary Rusk. There will be a statement made by the 
Department of Defense today, and I have no doubt full 
information can be made available to this committee.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell, do you have a question?
    Senator Pell. Yes.

                 TAKING THE INCIDENT TO THE WORLD COURT

    Following up Senator Mundt's question there, you have no 
idea as to the amount of indemnity of people killed? I have a 
constituent killed there.
    Secretary Rusk. No. I do not have any information on that 
at the present time. There is considerable practice on that 
point. I just do not know what it is. I am not sufficiently 
informed at the present moment.
    Senator Pell. Another question in connection with the 
Israeli crisis: Would there be any possibility or any merit to 
the idea of advocating a position of referring these points of 
issue between Israel and the Arab nations to--some of them at 
least--to the World Court for an advisory opinion, to put it on 
ice for a little bit? It would give each side an opportunity to 
make its arguments and give each side a face-saving excuse to 
accept retrenching to a degree.
    Secretary Rusk. The possibility of referring the Strait of 
Tiran to the World Court was considered and discussed 
internationally before the fighting started, and the great 
difficulty there was that we could not get an agreement on the 
status quo during the appeal to the World Court. Would the 
strait be open or not while the matter was before the Court?
    There is a second aspect to it and that is from a purely 
legal point of view, if Egypt went to the Court and said, ``We 
are in a state of war with Israel, and the closing of the 
strait'' is an exercise of our rights of belligerence,'' that 
would have been a very strong position in the Court as a matter 
of law.
    So I think that on that particular point we are better off 
today than we would have been in referring it to the Court 
because I think we are going to get the strait open.
    Senator Pell. Right.
    Actually, from a conversation with the Department of 
Justice, I understand even if it is not a state of belligerency 
we are on thin ice so far as the straits.
    Secretary Rusk. Quite frankly, our own estimate on that, 
given the composition of the Court, our own estimate on that is 
that a decision either way might be an 8 to 7 decision and that 
is not a very encouraging prospect in order to resolve a 
problem that is a cassus belli to one side and a very 
inflammable issue to the other.
    Senator Mundt. We have that every week.
    The Chairman. Every Monday morning.

                        THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM

    Senator Pell. From the viewpoint of the United States now, 
though, might it not be of merit to advocate this? Maybe it 
cannot be achieved, but it would be a position to advance, not 
just for the straits but for the question of the Jordanian land 
west of the Jordan or the status of the Gaza Strip, or the 
status of Jerusalem. Would this not have merit?
    Secretary Rusk. I doubt the parties would permit such 
political questions to be settled by the Court.
    Senator Pell. I would agree with you. But from the U.S. 
viewpoint, might it not have merit to advance it as a public 
position?
    Secretary Rusk. The status of Jerusalem, under the original 
U.N. resolution, the entire city was supposed to have been 
internationalized, you will recall, and indeed we have not 
recognized the occupation of the new city of Jerusalem by 
Israel. We keep our embassy in Tel Aviv. But I am not at all 
sure that the issue would be considered by the Court to be 
justifiable as opposed to being a political question. I do not 
know. I would have to think more about that, Senator.
    Senator Pell. I was just thinking under article 65 of the 
Court's mandate if we could advocate that an advisory opinion 
be given and secure acceptance of it, at least it would give us 
a good propaganda position in the world as advocating a 
juridical position.
    Secretary Rusk. As I have talked to different sides in New 
York, I have the impression that the old city of Jerusalem is 
going to be the most difficult of the questions involved here 
and it is possible that there could be some way to have some 
aspects of that considered in the Court at some stage. I do not 
believe that Israel has major territorial claims other than the 
old city of Jerusalem.
    Senator Pell. And also it divides in the hills where they 
can throw the rocks down.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. But the U.N. truce machinery is now 
working on that, and we have had some encouragement to think 
they are getting somewhere with both sides on the Syrian hills 
on the border between Israel and Syria.
    Senator Lausche. Senator Pell, will you allow me to put a 
question?
    What do you envision as involving the old area of 
Jerusalem? Is it the whole bulge that pushes itself into the 
main body of Israel?
    Secretary Rusk. No, not the west bank as a whole. Simply 
the old walled city of Jerusalem.
    Senator Lausche. All right.

                       DEFINING THE BOMBING PAUSE

    Senator Pell. One final point on Vietnam: As I read the 
press reports of Kosygin's statement, he emphasized publicly 
that a bombing pause need be unconditional and definitive. 
Unconditional, I think, was the word that was used. But never 
did he say it need be permanent. In other words, if in the 
course of some weeks nothing happened, and the fighting 
continued, we would be at perfect liberty to resuming it. Was 
this reflected in his private conversations, too, or not?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I hope I can be forgiven for not 
getting into that aspect of the conversation in detail. We 
noted that, and we would be interested in knowing whether there 
are any consequences. We will have to wait and see.
    Senator Pell. Thanks.
    Secretary Rusk. It is potentially an important point.
    Senator Pell. Yes.
    The Chairman. Senator Williams.

                    ABM SYSTEM DEPLOYED NEAR MOSCOW

    Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the fact 
that they were willing to talk about the ABM programs, willing 
to postpone it. In the meantime, are they developing their own 
antiballistic missile program and rushing full steam ahead?
    Secretary Rusk. I would have to get an up-to-date briefing 
as to what has happened in the last, say, 30 to 60 days on 
that. We know they have been deploying an ABM system in the 
general vicinity of Moscow. There has been some argument in our 
own intelligence community about whether there might be some 
additional ABM sites along the northern part of the country.
    But I think we have to assume that they are proceeding with 
whatever it was they had planned to build, particularly in the 
Moscow area.
    Senator Williams. Do you think it is possible they are 
going to just keep postponing these talks until they get theirs 
done and then agree that we will all stop it, or would they 
include dismantling their own then as a part of it?
    Secretary Rusk. They have rejected--if you put together 
offensive and defensive missiles, I think they would not agree 
to a freeze. On several occasions we proposed a freeze. It 
would be in our advantage to have things frozen as they were, 
say, six months ago or even today. But they have rejected the 
idea of a freeze because of the considerable margins we have in 
the offensive weapons field, so I would be a little surprised 
if they came in and said,--``Let's freeze them where they 
are.''
    Senator Williams. How about freezing this particular 
program?
    Secretary Rusk. I would be frankly surprised if they would 
dismantle whatever ABMs they might have put up around Moscow. 
So I think we have to give some thought as to what that means 
in terms of what we do.

                    DELAY IN U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF ABM

    Senator Williams. Well, the question in my mind was whether 
or not we are, by delaying, we are getting caught in a box 
here. If we agree not to advance the program, they would be 
fully protected.
    Senator Case. It all depends on what kind of a system it 
is.
    Senator Williams. That is right.
    Senator Case. I think that is the question.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not feel fully qualified to go into 
this, but my understanding from Secretary McNamara is that we 
now have in our budget funds for what we in any event would be 
doing this next year in this field. In other words, somebody on 
the Armed Services Committee may have more details on this than 
I. Is there anybody here?
    Senator Case. Stuart is our expert.
    Senator Gore. Stuart is not here.
    Secretary Rusk. But it is my understanding if there was no 
agreement, Senator Williams--you see, it is my understanding if 
there were no agreement of any sort, or no prospects of any 
agreement and we were going to make certain deployments that we 
are doing in this next year's budget, whatever it is that we 
would be doing under those circumstances. So we are not 
deliberately holding our own program back on the prospect that 
somehow we will have an agreement with the Soviet Union, as far 
as this year is concerned.

             RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO A BOMBING HALT IN VIETNAM

    Senator Williams. In return for us, if we would stop 
bombing North Vietnam, would Russia hold up some of her 
supplies, or was there any mention made about what we would do 
about the Port of Haiphong? Could we stop bombing and blockade 
that later?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the question of stopping and then 
resuming is, of course, at the heart of the matter. It would be 
extremely difficult for us to give up our freedom of action to 
do what is necessary in relation to what they are doing 
militarily on the other side, the North Vietnamese.
    I think the question would be whether, if there were some 
talks, you could move promptly toward a settlement or whether 
it becomes clear at the early stages of talk that no settlement 
is possible, and we do not have information from the Soviet 
Union as to what they would do if we stopped the bombing. We 
have asked them that question several times. We have said, 
``Now we understand that perhaps you can't speak for Hanoi, you 
can't say what Hanoi will do, but you can at least say what 
you, the Soviet Union, would do if we stop the bombing. Tell us 
what that is.'' They have never answered that.
    Senator Cooper. About supplies or Geneva Conference?
    Secretary Rusk. Supplies, or calling a conference, but they 
have not been willing to tell us what they would do, quite 
apart from what Hanoi would do if we stopped the bombing.
    Senator Williams. That is all.
    Secretary Rusk. We put that to them several times very hard 
over the period of the last year.
    The Chairman. Senator Gore.

                   CHINESE EXPLOSION OF HYDROGEN BOMB

    Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, in the discussion between the 
President and Mr. Kosygin or between yourself and Mr. Gromyko, 
or as a group, on the deployment of antiballistic missiles, was 
reference made to the Chinese detonation of a hydrogen bomb and 
the bearing this would have on the Soviet position and on ours?
    Secretary Rusk.. There was relatively little discussion, 
direct discussion, about China. I think broadly speaking it is 
still true, as I have told the committee before, the Russians 
in general are pretty reluctant to discuss China with us.

                           NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

    I was interested, Senator--this is not quite an answer to 
your question, but it is related--in talking about the non-
proliferation problem. Mr. Gromyko raised the desire of the 
Indians to have some sort of assurance in the event of a 
nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail directed against them if 
India signed the nonproliferation treaty.
    The Soviets produced a draft which would anticipate that 
the Security Council would say, ``We, the Security Council, 
will take action in the event that a nuclear power either 
attacks or uses nuclear blackmail against a non-nuclear 
country.''
    I pressed Mr. Gromyko pretty hard on whether he meant that 
the permanent members of the Security Council would act 
together if such a statement by the Security Council ever had 
to be faced and had to be acted upon, and he used some pretty 
categorical language on that point, which was the closest he 
came to saying that we----
    Senator Gore. I think the chairman ought to hear it. If you 
do not mind repeating it.
    Secretary Rusk. The question is to what extent we and the 
Soviets have talked about China in this exchange, and I 
indicated they are still reluctant to talk to us specifically 
and directly about China.

             RETAINING A VETO THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL

    Senator Gore. But in the case of our discussion about the 
nonproliferation treaty and India's request for assurances in 
the event of a nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail which I 
believe you said Mr. Gromyko initiated.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, he brought this subject up, and 
referred to a recent talk he had had with Mr. Chagla, the 
Foreign Minister of India. The Soviets have a draft statement 
which they would contemplate making in the Security Council at 
the time of the signing of a nuclear test ban treaty in which 
the Security Council would commit itself to act as a Security 
Council in the event of a nuclear attack, nuclear blackmail 
against a non-nuclear country. I pressed him very hard about 
whether they were serious in supposing that the permanent 
members of the Security Council, particularly the four who have 
nuclear weapons, could or would, in fact, act together in that 
situation. For what it is worth, he was pretty categorical in 
his contemplation that they would act together.
    Now that could only mean that China would be the problem.
    Senator Gore. Well, this seems to me quite significant.
    Did he propose--this statement which he drafted, which he 
submitted, was this merely a statement on the part of the 
Soviet Union or did he propose it be a statement of the 
Security Council?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, he first--the Indians began by hoping 
that we and the Soviet Union would make separate but parallel 
statements, in effect of assurances. We have explained both to 
the Soviet Union and to India that assurances that have any 
substance in them are for us a treaty problem, and that we 
could not casually make a declaration of that sort without 
going through the treaty procedure.
    We do have a legislative base for the Security Council to 
say as a Security Council, where we would retain a veto, along 
with the other permanent members, that the Security Council 
would act to support a country that is being attacked by 
nuclear weapons or subject to nuclear blackmail, you see. But 
none of this is going to happen without complete, full 
consultation down here. I am not--has your subcommittee seen 
this draft Soviet statement?
    Senator Gore. No, we have not.
    Secretary Rusk. I think, Mr. Chairman, the committee might 
want to have a look at that because we have not yet ourselves 
been prepared to go that far.
    Senator Gore. This is the first we had heard of it.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    We have been told indeed by the Indians a few months ago 
that they were going to separate the question of assurances 
from the question of the nonproliferation treaty. But Mr. 
Gromyko told me last evening that the Indians have apparently 
now come back to this question of assurances for the non-
nuclear powers in the event they signed the non-proliferation 
treaty. But it is an important point, and it is a very 
difficult point.
    [Discussion off the record.]

               PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEM REGARDING MISSILES

    Senator Gore. Coming back to the ABM question, as you know 
the Disarmament Subcommittee had extensive hearings. We have 
delayed making a report, in fact delayed trying to reach a 
decision as to what the subcommittee would recommend, in the 
hope that somewhere, sometime, the Soviets would agree to 
initiate actual talks and discussions. I understand that before 
I arrived you expressed the hope that discussion would begin. 
Could you be--would you mind repeating that and upon what you 
base your hope?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, first, I think it is entirely 
possible that the Soviet Union simply has not completed its own 
interdepartmental work, if you like, its own staff work on the 
positions which they would take in these discussions. As you 
know, this is a very, very complicated business and we had at 
least had the benefit of more than a year of staff work behind 
us when we led off on this subject.
    Secondly, I think that they run into the same problem that 
we run into in this country, and that is a kind of public 
opinion problem that it is hard for people to understand why 
you do not build a defensive missile if there is any 
possibility that that defensive missile can do any good 
whatever, and the notion that defensive weapons would simply 
produce a multiplication of offensive weapons to put you in a 
position to saturate the defense is a little sophisticated for 
the man in the street in their countries as well as in ours.
    One of the Russians said to me, ``It will be very hard for 
us to persuade our people that we should not have defensive 
missiles if there is any possibility that the defensive missile 
will hit an incoming missile.'' That is an understandable 
reaction, you see.
    [Discussion off the record.]

               RUSSIANS ARE TENDER FOOTED REGARDING CHINA

    Senator Gore. In the exchanges between the President and 
the chairman on the ABM, I think it would be very significant 
if he recognized that they had a threat from both sides, a 
nuclear threat from both sides; if there was reference to 
China, they are bound to be aware of it, and I know you have 
told us several times that they are very tender footed to 
referring to China in any respect. But this reference to 
assurances to India is certainly an indirect reference to it, 
and I just wondered if there was any reference at all to the 
fact that China had now unexpectedly soon achieved a hydrogen 
weapon and a large one.
    Secretary Rusk. No, that came up only in my own talk with 
Gromyko about the nonproliferation treaty and the Indian 
problem of assurances.
    Senator Gore. What impression did you have of Gromyko's 
reference to it?
    Secretary Rusk. That India's request for assurances----
    Senator Gore. No, the Chinese achievement of a hydrogen 
weapon.
    Secretary Rusk. That was not specifically discussed as 
such; the fact that they had exploded a hydrogen weapon was not 
discussed as much.
    Senator Gore. Did Gromyko give you an indication more 
specific than Mr. Kosygin's to the President that they would be 
back in touch?
    Secretary Rusk. No, this was Kosygin to the President.
    Senator Gore. Gromyko did not add to it.
    Secretary Rusk. No, because the President and Mr. Kosygin 
had talked at such length and in such detail about the ABM 
problem, I spent my time with Gromyko on the nonproliferation 
problem.
    Senator Gore. Well, our Disarmament Subcommittee met this 
morning and we again agreed to defer coming to any report or 
conclusion until we had your report, and maybe we should wait 
some further. This is so important----
    Secretary Rusk. I would suggest, Senator, that we might see 
whether in the next two weeks we get something further with 
them, and we can be in touch with you about that.
    Senator Gore. All right, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. We have about 20 minutes. Can we divide it 
up?
    Senator Mundt.

                MEANING OF AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING HALT

    Senator Mundt. Many, many times, Mr. Secretary, we have 
talked about stopping the bombing in the north and you used a 
phrase that I cannot understand. Hanoi says that bombing has to 
be unconditional and definitive. The way I understand those 
terms they are self-contradictory. Will you tell us what you 
mean? You obviously do not mean that.
    Secretary Rusk. Our understanding of what that means is: 
Unconditional is we would not require as a condition for 
stopping of the bombing that they take corresponding military 
moves on their side. For example, that those divisions at the 
DMZ would not attack our Marines while the bombing would stop. 
That is what I think they mean by unconditional.
    Senator Mundt. I can understand that. But when you say 
unconditional and definitive, definitive makes it some 
conditions apparently.
    Secretary Rusk. They have used three different expressions 
having to do with the duration of the stopping. They have said 
definitively, they have said for good, and they have said 
permanently.
    Senator Mundt. Those are conditions.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, but have to do with duration, you 
see. I am not sure that I get your point, Senator.
    Senator Mundt. Because when you say unconditional, that 
means open sesame, stop, sit down and talk. But if along with 
unconditional you say they are going to stop for two years or 
forever, for 15 minutes, that is a condition. It seems to me 
the two terms contradict each other. I do not see how you can 
have an unconditional arrangement which is definitive. As soon 
as you crank in definitive you put in a condition.
    Secretary Rusk. I see. I suppose you could look upon the 
item of permanency itself as a condition which they put on it.
    Senator Mundt. Is it your phrase or their phrase?
    Secretary Rusk. No, it is their phrase.
    The Chairman. Gentlemen, that is a vote, and maybe someone 
can continue and can come back, but that is a vote.
    Secretary Rusk. I will be here until 20 minutes to 12.

                 CASTRO'S CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION

    Senator Mundt. To me, the most discouraging part of the 
whole summit was the fact that my reaction was that either 
side--he was going to thumb his nose deliberately by visiting 
Cuba unless he tried to figure out some way to insult us as it 
were, to have an affront. He knows this is our tender spot. 
This is our neighbor. Did you get that reaction, or would you 
say that is another friendly gesture?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would not quite interpret it 
that way because of a good deal of intelligence information we 
have which throws another different cast on it.
    Senator Mundt. I would like to hear the different cast.
    Secretary Rusk. Castro has been publicly criticizing Moscow 
for not being vigorous enough about supporting revolutions in 
Latin America. Castro's public position is somewhere between 
Moscow and Peking. Castro has publicly acknowledged that Cubans 
were involved in that landing on the Venezuela coast 90 miles 
east of Caracas, and we also note that the Soviets are not very 
happy about the cost of this Cuban business and the relative 
nonperformance of the Cubans in their own economy.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Secretary Rusk. We do know the reception in Havana was 
modest. I think he was anticipating at least some difficulties 
in Havana. I do not look upon it as an attempt to affront us as 
much as their having serious problems they wanted to discuss in 
Cuba. What they were I do not know.
    On our side we pressed them very, very hard on this 
business of Cubans sending arms and men into other countries as 
in the Venezuela case.
    Senator Mundt. He gives you the old business that you give 
them on Hanoi.
    Secretary Rusk. They say, ``We don't have the same 
information that you have.''

                  SOVIET INFLUENCE OVER NORTH VIETNAM

    Senator Mundt. Which leads me to my most important question 
and the part I cannot buy at all, and you seem to accept it as 
holy writ. ``We are sorry; we have no control over Vietnam. We 
would like to help; we are not interested in continuing the 
war. We would kind of like to shorten it, but we have no 
influence.''
    Now, realistically you and I know and they know if they 
shut off the supply of arms the war is over because they have a 
lot of influence if they want to exercise it. I cannot get away 
from the facts of life on that.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not think that we are under 
that much of an illusion. We would not--you and I would not be 
that far apart on this point.
    They do not have enough influence in Hanoi to deliver Hanoi 
to whatever it is that we and they would agree to.
    Senator Mundt. Unless they use their muscle in shutting off 
their supply.
    Secretary Rusk. But using their muscle would simply mean 
Hanoi would squirt fully into the arms of Peking, and it is 
Peking that is furnishing the kinds of material that are 
actually being used in South Vietnam.
    Senator Mundt. Not the petroleum.
    Secretary Rusk. But they do not use petroleum in South 
Vietnam in the sense of----
    Senator Mundt. They use it to get there.
    Secretary Rusk. Sure, they use it in North Vietnam and in 
the line of communication, but that means more bicycles and 
more piggyback and that sort of thing.
    I do not believe that the North Vietnamese would stop the 
war if they, the Soviets, cut off supplies. I may be wrong.

                   MOSCOW CANNOT GIVE ORDERS TO HANOI

    Senator Mundt. I just hope that in your talks with them you 
do not give them the impression that you give me, to say, 
``Well, that is certainly a valid argument. We realize you 
haven't got influence on Cuba although you are financing them 
and giving them the supplies that they need.''
    Secretary Rusk. I did not say that about Cuba.
    Senator Mundt. ``The same way about Hanoi, they are a good 
friend of yours, they are doing well, you have given them 
antiaircraft weapons,'' and you have to press them on this. I 
think in talking with them you have to assume my position.
    Secretary Rusk. But that is not the way the talks go. On 
Laos, for example, we press them very, very hard on their 
commitment to us about Laos in 1961 and 1962, and that it is 
their problem to find a way to make Hanoi comply with that 
agreement. But I think that we would somewhat misunderstand the 
situation if we think that Moscow can give an order to Hanoi 
and Hanoi will obey it. That is not the situation.
    Now, we have raised the point that you have just raisd in 
terms of, ``Well, if we stop the bombing what will you do? You 
can't tell us what Hanoi will do perhaps, but what will you do? 
Will you take some of these steps,'' such as you mentioned, and 
they do not answer.
    Senator Mundt. I have to go vote.

                     U.S.-U.S.S.R. NAVAL INCIDENTS

    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, there are two things that are 
not directly here, but I would like to have either your comment 
or some memorandum about it. Senator Church received a letter 
from a member of the S.S. Walker's crew indicating in his 
opinion that the--our destroyer deliberately bumped the Russian 
ship in the Sea of Japan. He is not here. I hoped he would be 
here, and I may be going further than he anticipated, but 
anyway he showed it to me, and I would like very much to have 
you, if you are not prepared to make a positive statement about 
it, to have a report on it.
    The other was a report on the U.S. bombing of the Russian 
ship Turkestan in the Harbor of Cam Pha, whether that was 
deliberate. I think it is significant in trying to get a 
picture about how these either accidental or intentional acts 
take place in trying to reach an impartial or objective 
judgment as to just what our relations are.
    Could you do that if you do not want to take the time now?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I will do that.
    The Chairman. I think we ought to have it in committee. I 
was going to bring it up anyway at some other time.
    Secretary Rusk. Does the committee have the letter that was 
referred to?
    The Chairman. Senator Church has it. It came to him. It was 
like this man from Iowa on the Liberty. This fellow who wrote, 
it was a constituent and a member of the crew, and it is a very 
persuasive letter. I read it. I cannot imagine that it was a 
fabrication. In fact, it has a tone of great validity.
    Secretary Rusk. I do know----
    The Chairman. He is a little nervous about revealing the 
boy's name for the fear of retaliation from the services, you 
can understand that.
    Secretary Rusk. Let me have a couple of the paragraphs out 
of the letter.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. But on that I do not have details in mind. 
I think what was happening there was that our vessels were in 
normal training exercises.
    The Chairman. I understand that.
    Secretary Rusk. And the Soviet vessels came in very close, 
and, as a matter of fact, I gather that on one of the bumpings 
our people thought that the Soviets had not intended to bump, 
but that winds and waves and so forth caused them to bump. 
Well, that is getting awfully close just as a matter of----
    The Chairman. Well, this letter is to the contrary, and 
that is why I wonder if you have a report because it is very 
clear that this fellow believed that we deliberately did it and 
prepared for it before it occurred.
    Secretary Rusk. There was an argument about rules of the 
sea, rules of the road and things of that sort, and I will be 
glad to have an answer.
    The Chairman. I do not want to delay the committee because 
Senator Cooper has not had an opportunity.

              POTENTIAL OF RENEWED WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Cooper. I would appreciate it if I can. I have 
about three or four questions.
    The first I would go to is this question of any possibility 
of resumption of war in the Middle East. You said that Kosygin 
suggested war might break out again in two or three situations. 
If the Soviet Union is rearming Egypt and Algeria and Syria, do 
you think that carries with it any suggestion that at any time 
in the near future Egypt and Syria might start aggressive 
action and be supported by the Soviet Union other than just by 
the supply of arms? Is there any possibility?
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is a possibility one cannot 
fully discount.
    My own hunch is that they have had it for a while, and it 
would be very difficult for them to. We do not at the present 
time have information indicating that the Soviets contemplate a 
direct military intervention on their side.

          ISRAELI COMPLIANCE WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS

    Senator Cooper. I know it is speculative. But the second 
point is growing out of any action in the U.N. Now in the event 
that the General Assembly called upon Israel to withdraw, would 
it refer this to the Security Council or would the General 
Assembly try to establish its own enforcement procedures?
    Secretary Rusk. The basic constitutional position is that 
the General Assembly recommends.
    Senator Cooper. To the Security Council.
    Secretary Rusk. To the parties or to the members or to the 
Security Council. My guess is if the General Assembly 
recommends a general withdrawal by Israel, Israel would not 
comply and it would go to the Security Council.
    Mr. Kosygin indicated in his press conference he thought 
the recommendations of the Assembly would go back to the 
Security Council for implementation.
    Senator Cooper. Russia does not accept the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution.
    Secretary Rusk. Only for the purpose of bringing this 
matter to the General Assembly because they did use that 
procedure to get it to the General Assembly. But I would think 
that the recommendations of the General Assembly would wind up 
again in the Security Council.
    Senator Cooper. Then if the Security Council agreed upon 
some method of, I would say, enforcement, to try to secure 
consent on the part of Israel, would there then be any 
possibility that Russia would say, ``Well, the Security Council 
will not act. Then we are going to act. We are going to support 
the resolution.'' It has been indicated in statements they said 
if you construe them very liberally. This is a lot of 
speculation but everybody felt so fine a couple of weeks ago, 
the war, the possibility of war had ended, and in considering 
Kosygin's very strict position, I wonder if it has any holding 
of possibility of war.
    Secretary Rusk. I think the dangers are not by any means 
completely ended. I think perhaps the guerrilla technique is a 
real possibility, and that might, in turn, start more normal 
operations by Israel, for example, if they ran into more 
guerrilla action.
    But, quite frankly, we just have no way of being sure.

                         QUIET HARD NEGOTIATION

    Senator Lausche. John, what is our government to do if it 
goes back to the Security Council with the recommendation?
    Senator Cooper. I suppose we will have to wait and see what 
it was. That would be the answer.
    Secretary Rusk. My guess is, Senator, that what would come 
out of the Security Council would be based upon a lot of quiet, 
hard negotiation among the different sides, otherwise you could 
not get a resolution passed by the Security Council.
    Senator Case. May I just interrupt on this point?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, Senator.

                CHANCES OF A RUSSIAN MILITARY OPERATION

    Senator Case. On this question that Senator Cooper asked, 
the chance of Russia taking it upon itself or the application 
of sanctions for the violation of the Security Council 
recommendation, have we made clear, or is it or would we make 
clear, that we would oppose, interpose ourselves in such a case 
so as to check Russia from any such adventures?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not think the Soviets are in any doubt 
about that.
    Senator Case. That is all I wanted to be sure of.
    Secretary Rusk. Let me point out, Senator Case----
    Senator Case. I am not talking about public posture.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand. Let me point out that this is 
not a case where the Russians could put in a battalion or two. 
This is a major military effort if they made a military effort. 
In the first place, the support they would have from Arab 
assistance would be rather flimsy. That has already been 
demonstrated. This is a long way for them to operate in a major 
military operation with their communications as they are, their 
sea routes as they are.
    So this is not a very attractive military expedition from 
their point of view.
    Senator Cooper. I did want to raise a question----
    Secretary Rusk. The more serious question would be some 
Russian pilots.
    Senator Gore. Would be what?
    Secretary Rusk. Russian pilots.
    Senator Cooper. If the Security Council called upon 
Israel's withdrawal and perhaps they had some trouble in 
establishing some kind of enforcing agency, and Russia could 
say we support the U.N. under certain of those sections and we 
will take whatever action we think is necessary to support the 
U.N., of course that could lead to war with us.

                RESTRICT BOMBINGS TO INFILTRATION ROUTES

    There is one other question. We were talking about this 
question of bombing, and what you meant by unconditional and 
they definitive and whatnot. I did propose and have thought and 
still think that it would be worthwhile to restrict bombing to 
the infiltration route as they enter South Vietnam, and that 
unconditional to my mind would simply mean that we did it 
without requiring in advance any action on the part of North 
Vietnam, but always with the recognition that if nothing came 
out of it, of course our country, like any other country, has 
the right and duty to protect its people. But my point was, and 
has been, that I have thought that unconditional should mean 
that we do not exact or require any prerequisite, any prior 
requirement, and that has been my thought and I still believe 
it is worth a chance with all the things we have.
    Secretary Rusk. We tried, Senator. I do not want to exclude 
any possibility or combination in the future, but you will 
recall we tried to do this by infiltration at one point. Last 
December we told the other side that we would hold our hand in 
a ten nautical mile area around Hanoi, 300 some square miles. 
We said, ``We are not asking you directly for a quid pro quo. 
We will be impressed if you did something comparable in the 
south, Saigon or DMZ or somewhere else, that if this turns out 
to be a good idea we can expand this concept, we can build on 
it, let it grow.'' But we did not get any response, and waited 
for four months to see if we could get something back.
    The Chairman. I wonder if Senator Case can be allowed to 
ask a question.
    Senator Case. I am interested in this.
    The Chairman. All right, you will have a chance.
    Secretary Rusk. When we look to the future, I do not want 
to be categorical about what can or cannot be done. I think we 
need to hear more than we have heard thus far about what the 
possibilities are, but we continue to explore these 
possibilities.

            CHANGE EMPHASIS TO TRAINING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE

    Senator Case. I would like to add my voice to Senator 
Cooper's and some others. I do not know what we have to define 
exactly the same limitation we think it is desirable to put on 
ours, but very close to it, not for the sake we get 
negotiations but because it is the wise and right thing to do.
    I am not one of those who thinks we have failed to 
negotiate any possible chance, that we were not smart enough to 
catch a glint in somebody's eye of what was there, but because 
it makes sense to limit the war and give evidence of some 
limitation.
    I think there are other things we want to consider limiting 
and one is a very serious question of whether we should put any 
more armed forces of our own in.
    The Chairman. That is an immediate question.
    Senator Case. I think we ought to do a lot better in 
training the ARVN and insist upon things that they are going to 
have to do and not be so timid about throwing our weight 
around, because, after all, we are killing American boys. This 
is not going to go on very much longer, I would think, with 
impunity, and well, bless your heart, this the kind of thing I 
am going to be talking about these days.
    The Chairman. Is that all?
    Senator Case. That is all.

                   WITHDRAWAL TO NATIONAL TERRITORIES

    The Chairman. I have one other question before you leave. 
Do we have a position on the resolution requiring withdrawal to 
the armistice line? The reason I have asked that, the President 
has stated he believes in the territorial integrity of all 
states in the Middle East. What is our position on that in a 
resolution where you have to vote on whether or not they 
withdraw?
    Secretary Rusk. We have taken a position that a single 
unconditional withdrawal to a state of war is not good enough. 
For example, it will make a difference if they would say 
withdrawal to national territories.
    Senator Case. What would that mean?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it would mean Israel exists and has 
some national territory. These are not just boundaries or 
armistice lines and a state of war, do you see?
    Senator Case. I see.
    Secretary Rusk. Or if you could hook it on to a state of 
belligerence. But just to go back to armistice lines where 
Egypt considers itself at war with Israel, but Israel must not 
lift a finger because it is at war with Egypt is not going to 
bring peace.
    Senator Case. If you couple conditions with it you would 
support it, similar----
    Secretary Rusk. We are not objecting to withdrawal. But 
what we are saying is you ought to withdraw to peace and not a 
state of war.
    Senator Mundt. Territorial is that difference.
    Secretary Rusk. The territorial problem is going to be--the 
most difficult one is the city of Jerusalem.
    Senator Case. How about Syria?
    Secretary Rusk. I think they are working on that in the 
U.N. machinery. Israel has no interests in Syrian territory.

                   INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM

    Senator Gore. You will bear in mind, too, if you withdraw 
to conditions one of the conditions might be implementation of 
the U.N. resolution about internationalization of the old city 
of Jerusalem.
    Secretary Rusk. This is a very, very serious problem 
because members of the Jewish faith feel very, very strongly 
about the city of David and Solomon; so do the Moslems for 
reasons stemming from their religion; so do the Christians, and 
feelings run very high on it.
    I think this is going to be the most troublesome, 
inflammatory and difficult part to resolve of the whole 
business here--what happens in the old city of Jerusalem.
    Senator Lausche. What about the other part of the area west 
of the Jordan?
    Secretary Rusk. I cannot speak for Israel and I am not 
trying to. My impression is that Israel is not too happy about 
the prospect of trying to annex the West Bank with a million 
Arabs in it. And I think they might well be ready for that not 
to be a part of Israel.

                       ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

    Senator Mundt. I would like to ask one question about South 
Vietnam. I am very much disturbed by what I read and hear on 
television about the way this election campaign is going. Can 
you tell us anything about what is happening?
    The Chairman. Mr. Ky you mean.
    Senator Mundt. Well, Ky and the whole business. It seems to 
me we may come up with a pretty sour kettle of fish.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we were----
    Senator Mundt. This is our idea so we have got to try to 
make it work.
    Secretary Rusk. We were very much disappointed that Thieu 
and Ky both elected to run.
    Senator Mundt. We read where Big Minh is coming in, too.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Big Minh is a further complication. 
Ambassador Bunker is working very hard on the question of free 
and fair elections and trying to insure that this does not 
involve a split within the military as such as far as the corps 
commanders and the organized divisions and things of that sort 
are concerned. But we are troubled, too.
    Senator Mundt. It is a real situation. Here you have 
500,000 men who may come up with a government which is not with 
us.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is not so much the problem as 
the disorder and disarray among themselves and the turbulence 
of this electoral period. I do not believe there will be a 
government that wants to throw us out or wants to accept Hanoi.
    Senator Mundt. Could they defer that until next year?
    Secretary Rusk. I beg pardon?
    Senator Mundt. Could they defer that until next year?
    Senator Case. They are not supposed to campaign except for 
30 days.
    The Chairman. Ky is ignoring all the rules.
    Senator Case. Using the press, censorship.
    The Chairman. Censored the press.
    Senator Case. This is another case where I think our 
influence ought to be very heavily used.
    The Chairman. I was going to say Karl thinks the Russians 
ought to control Hanoi. Can we control Saigon any better? He 
does not seem to do anything we want him to do.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, this is something we are working very 
hard on down there and Mr. McNamara and Mr. Katzenbach will get 
fully into that when they are there.
    I am not going to say everything is fine on this one.
    Senator Mundt. Okay.
    Secretary Rusk. We have got some problems.

                 U.S. FUNDS FOR MIDDLE EASTERN REFUGEES

    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question?
    The Chairman. One last question while he is getting his 
papers together.
    Senator Gore. I notice the President has made, according to 
the press, $5 million available for refugees. Is this available 
to the United--UNEF--or available to Jordan, or to whom is it 
made available?
    Secretary Rusk. It would be made available to the UNRWA 
organization or to the relief agencies working in the 
governments. One of the serious things that has happened here 
is that a new refugee problem is being created across the 
Jordan. Lots of the refugees from the West Bank have been 
pouring out of there. We have tried to get both Jordan and 
Israel to keep the people in place so that we do not create 
this new problem. But large numbers have been moving. I think 
perhaps as many as 100,000 have left the West Bank across the 
Jordan. So we thought that on the basis of humanitarian grounds 
we ought to chip in something on that.
    Senator Gore. We already chipped in about $400 million over 
a period of time.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.
    Senator Gore. And we are paying 60 percent. Will our $5 
million be matched by any other member of the United Nations?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that you will find that that 
$5 million will be more than matched by the time the other 
contributions that we know are underway get there. I mean a lot 
of people are sending in things. It is urgent. As a matter of 
fact, some of the Arab governments have more than matched the 
$5 million and help to Jordan in this situation, but I have to 
get the details. I am not familiar with the details.

                         ISRAELI RELIEF EFFORTS

    Senator Lausche. Are there any more of the Arab troops in 
Gaza or out in the desert who have not been brought in?
    Secretary Rusk. You mean from the point of view of relief 
suffering and that sort of thing?
    Senator Lausche. Yes, out there without food and in the 
sunshine and nobody seemed to be concerned about them.
    Secretary Rusk. The Israeli armed forces--we went into that 
very hard because we had planes standing by that could drop 
food and water to these people. We got them as far as Athens 
ready to go. The Israeli armed forces and the Egyptian Red 
Cross put together joint teams, too, and used a lot of 
helicopters and things of that sort to scour over the desert. 
The problem turned out to be not half as large as it was 
feared, and when Nasser opened up the water under the canal to 
make water available in that part of the Sinai, it went a long 
way toward relieving that problem, so I would think that is 
reasonably under control.
    Senator Lausche. All right.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I have to run.
    The Chairman. Gentlemen, in view of the situation on the 
floor, I do not think we can have a meeting this afternoon. 
There will be a meeting in the morning now on the Panama Canal. 
Everybody knows that.

                   PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM

    Secretary Rusk. You might wish Mr. Macomber to inform you 
of a statement the President just made on Jerusalem.
    The Chairman. Okay.
    Mr. Macomber. It was just put out. There are two key 
sentences in it. First of all, he talks about the importance of 
this city to the three great religions. But the two operative 
statements just released from the White House, the two key 
sentences are, one, ``First of all we assume that before any 
unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there 
will be appropriate consultations with religious leaders and 
others who are deeply concerned.''
    And then later in the statement the President in talking 
about the need for a fair solution says, ``That,'' meaning the 
fair solution, ``could not be achieved by hasty unilateral 
action, and the President is confident that the wisdom of good 
judgment on the part of those who are immediately involved will 
prevent this.''
    This is a statement which the press secretary put out in 
the White House on behalf of the President just about five 
minutes ago.
    [Whereupon, at 11:55, the committee recessed, to reconvene 
at 10 a.m., Thursday, June 29, 1967.]
                               Department of State,
                                                Washington,
                                                     July 13, 1967.
The Honorable J.W. Fulbright,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, 
    Washington, DC
    Dear Senator Fulbright:
    Secretary Rusk has asked me to reply to your request to him during 
his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 
28, 1967 for a complete report on the bombing of the Soviet Ship 
TURKESTAN in Cam Pha Harbor, North Viet-Nam.
    On June 2, 1967, a flight of US Air Force F-105 aircraft passing 
over the area of Cam Pha directed suppressive 20 mm fire against a 
North Vietnamese anti-aircraft site near Cam Pha. It appears that some 
of this fire may have struck the TURKESTAN. According to the Soviet 
Government, several crew members were wounded, one of whom subsequently 
died, and the ship was damaged.
    A Soviet note dated June 2, 1967 protested the incident. Our 
investigation at that time revealed that two flights of US Air Force 
aircraft had operated over the Cam Pha area at the time and date of the 
allegation but pilots reported all ordnance delivered was on legitimate 
military targets. Thus, at this time, it appeared that fallout from 
intense North Vietnamese anti-aircraft fire was probably responsible. 
Our reply of June 3 to the note rejected the Soviet version and while 
expressing regret for casualties and damage also expressed regret for 
the hundreds of Vietnamese, Americans, and citizens of allied countries 
who die each week as a consequence of the aggression of North Viet-Nam 
against the Republic of Viet-Nam. We also pointed out that all possible 
efforts are taken to prevent damage to international shipping but that 
accidental damage is an unfortunate possibility wherever hostilities 
are conducted and that the Soviet Government must recognize that 
shipping operations in these waters under present circumstances entail 
risks of such accidents.
    Subsequently, we received the information that a third flight of US 
Air Force aircraft possibly struck the TURKESTAN while delivering 
suppressive fire against nearby North Vietnamese anti-aircraft 
positions. By note delivered June 20, 1967 to the Soviet Embassy in 
Washington, we acknowledged this possibility and reiterated in the note 
the instructions to our pilots to avoid engagement with vessels which 
are not identified as hostile and assured the Soviet Government that we 
will make every effort to insure that such incidents do not occur. On 
June 26 Soviet Counselor Chernyakov made an oral statement to Assistant 
Secretary Leddy in which he stated that the Soviet Government reserved 
the right to return to the question of compensation in connection with 
the incident and repeated the Soviet demand for punishment of the 
guilty parties. Mr. Leddy took note of the Soviet points but expressed 
the view that it would be very difficult for the US Government to 
accept legal liability for any damage. On June 28 the Department 
spokesman stated that the US Government considered that its position on 
the incident was fully expressed in its note of June 20 to the Soviet 
Government and saw no merit in further exchanges on the matter.
    A later Soviet assertion that United States aircraft damaged the 
MIKHAIL FRUNZE and other Soviet vessels in the vicinity of Haiphong on 
June 29, 1967 has also been examined. A Defense Department statement on 
June 30 noted the possibility that certain ordnance from two United 
States aircraft may have fallen on the MIKHAIL FRUNZE. These aircraft, 
which were assigned to protect bombing planes, attacked an actively 
firing air defense site approximately 500 yards from the location of 
the ships. Other reports indicate that damage may have been done to a 
British ship, the KING FORD, at the same time. All of these incidents 
are still under investigation.
    I hope the above provides you with the information you desire.
            Sincerely,
                                  William B. Macomber, Jr.,
                   Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
                               Department of State,
                                                Washington,
                                                     July 19, 1967.
Honorable J. W. Fulbright
United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510
    Dear Senator Fulbright:
    The Secretary has asked me to send you a report on the recent 
collisions of the USS WALKER with two Soviet ships in the Sea of Japan, 
which you requested during his recent appearance before the Foreign 
Relations Committee. I delayed my report to you until we had an 
opportunity to see an excerpt from a constituent's letter to Senator 
Church which you mentioned to the Secretary. The constituent states 
that he was aboard the USS WALKER at the time of the collisions and 
considers that broadcast accounts of the incidents were inaccurate.
    The two collisions in which the USS WALKER was involved were 
obviously a matter of immediate and deep concern to the Department, and 
we requested at once full details from the Navy. The summary of the 
facts given below is drawn from information provided by the Navy 
concerning the circumstances in which the collisions occurred.
    According to the Navy's report, the fundamental cause of the 
collisions was the persistent and close harassing surveillance by 
Soviet naval and air forces of a U.S. anti-submarine task group. This 
task group of which the USS WALKER was a member was at the time of the 
collisions conducting routine training exercises in the Sea of Japan, 
more than 100 miles from the Soviet coast. While engaged in this 
activity the group was subjected for several days to continuous close 
surveillance by Soviet destroyers and aircraft, which on a number of 
occasions approached dangerously close to the U.S. ships and interfered 
with the exercises. On May 10 and 11 two different Soviet destroyers 
struck the USS WALKER glancing blows doing very minor damage and 
injuring no one.
    The May 10 incident occurred when the Soviet destroyer 022, having 
come dangerously close to the USS WALKER a number of times earlier, 
approached her from astern and brushed her starboard side in passing. 
Under Article 24 of the International Regulations for preventing 
Collision at Sea, a vessel overtaking is obliged to keep clear. In this 
case the Soviet ship did not do so. On May 11 the Soviet destroyer 025, 
continuing the tactics of the 022 in repeatedly approaching too close 
for safety, suddenly turned across the WALKER's bow and slowed down 
while being overtaken, rather than maintaining course and speed as 
required by the rules of the road. A glancing collision resulted.
    Shortly after information about these events was relayed to the 
Department of State, Assistant Secretary Leddy made oral protests to 
the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Washington; these were followed by 
diplomatic notes calling attention to the serious consequence which 
could result if such activities by Soviet vessels are not stopped. 
Ambassador Thompson made a parallel protest on May 13 to the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, and the Soviet Government 
simultaneously delivered a note of protest to him, maintaining that the 
U.S. vessels had violated the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea. Ambassador Thompson made it clear that he could not 
accept the Soviet allegations.
    You will note that the above account differs significantly from the 
views expressed by Senator Church's constituent. We in the Department 
of State are unable to judge the accuracy of his observations or the 
degree of his understanding of all that was happening during the 
exercises. There is nothing, however, in the Navy's report to support 
the opinion that the USS WALKER deliberately collided with either 
Soviet destroyer. On the contrary, the report indicates that the Soviet 
ships were at fault in both cases, and that in the second case the 
Soviet destroyer may have acted deliberately.
    The issue raised by these events goes beyond the question of 
technical violations of the rules of the road. Judging from the 
information at our disposal, the incidents resulted from Soviet efforts 
not merely to observe but also to interfere with routine U.S. Navy 
exercises on the high seas well distant from Soviet waters. The dangers 
inherent in this sort of situation are obvious, and it is for this 
reason that we have emphasized to the Soviet Government the serious 
consequences which would flow from operations of this type. We hope 
that the diplomatic steps we took upon this occasion will help reduce 
the likelihood of such incidents in the future. At the same time we are 
fully cognizant of the need for mutual restraint in encounters between 
U.S. and Soviet naval ships at sea, and we are informed that our naval 
commanders are under strict orders to observe the international 
regulations involved and to exercise forbearance on such occasions.
    If you need further details about the actions of our ships during 
these episodes you may wish to get in touch with the Department of the 
Navy. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance in this 
matter.
            Sincerely yours,
                                  William B. Macomber, Jr.,
                   Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, 
Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Cooper.
    Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special United States 
Representative for U.S.-Panamanian Relations, accompanied by 
Ambassador John N. Irwin, II, Special U.S. Representative for 
Interoceanic Canal negotiations, briefed the group on three 
proposed Panama Canal treaties.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, JULY 10, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee and other members of the Senate met in 
executive session at 11:30 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Sparkman, Morse, Church, Carlson, and 
Mundt. Also Senators Allott, Dominick, Holland, Miller, Murphy, 
Pearson, Percy, and Young of North Dakota.
    Ambassador John N. Irwin, II, Special United States 
Representative for Interoceanic Canal negotiations, accompanied 
by Edward W. Clark, Country Director for Panama, Department of 
State, returned to brief the members who were not present at 
the June 29 briefing, and other senators, on the three proposed 
Panama Canal treaties.
    [The committee adjourned at 1:05 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JULY 11, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Morse, Church, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, 
Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and Case.
    To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill.
    Senator Symington asked for and received permission to 
publish sanitized version of his Near East and South Asia 
subcommittee hearings on arms sales.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]


                    BRIEFING ON THE CONGO SITUATION

    [Editor's note.--On June 30, 1967, a plane carrying former 
Congolese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe was hijacked over the 
Mediterranean. Taken to Algeria, Tshombe remained there under arrest 
until his death two years later. Tshombe's capture triggered a revolt 
by the mercenary soldiers and gendarmes he had once employed in the 
Congo's Katanga Province. The Congolese government under President 
Joseph Mobutu eventually crushed the rebellion.
    Expressing support for Mobutu's government, the United States sent 
three cargo planes for logistical aid and to be ready in case American 
citizens had to be evacuated. In response to congressional protests 
over American involvement in the Congo, the United States removed one 
of the planes on July 26 and another on August 3. The third plane was 
used to transport government troops.]
                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JULY 11, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:00 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, 
Church, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: Senators Russell, Stennis, Jackson, Cannon, 
Young of Ohio, McIntyre, Byrd of Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, 
Miller, and Dominick.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, of the 
committee staff.
    Mr. Darden and Mr. Kirbow of the Senate Armed Services 
committee staff.
    The committee will come to order.
    We are very pleased to have the Secretary of State this 
afternoon to talk to us a bit about the recent activities in 
the Congo. He will give us a short statement of the factual 
background and then be prepared to answer questions.
    Mr. Secretary, will you proceed?

     STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; 
ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH PALMER, II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 
                      FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. It 
is a privilege to be here.
    I think it might be worth bearing in mind at the very 
beginning we are talking about a country in the part of Africa 
which is as large as the U.S. east of the Mississippi, because 
the size of the country and its primitive communications have 
something to do with the questions before us today.
    About July 4 we had information that a group of 
mercenaries, French, Belgian and Spanish, had seized positions 
in the Eastern Congo, particularly Bukavu and Kisangani which 
used to be called Stanleyville.
    We might pause at this moment and speculate as to what was 
behind these mercenary movements, perhaps a total of 150 or 180 
of them; we have no effective contact with them at the present 
time, and no real basis for making much of a judgment as to 
what their motivations might have been.

                        MERCENARIES' MOTIVATIONS

    We have heard rumors that there were differences among the 
mercenaries themselves, and this caused certain groups to move 
contrary to the wishes or the views of other foreign 
mercenaries working with the Congolese forces.
    We have heard rumors that they felt they were going to lose 
their jobs by the beginning of September and wanted to impress 
upon the central government for whom they had been working that 
they were needed, and that the arrangements should continue.
    There have been reports that their motivation was primarily 
loot, that they had estimated that the safes and the cash 
registers had filled up again after the violence of a year or 
so ago, and that they might come in and make a haul.
    We had not been able to confirm any political arrangement 
between them and Mr. Tshombe who was kidnapped on June 30, nor 
do we have any confirmed information that they were working 
specifically on behalf of any foreign governments.
    But the seizure of these positions with some casualties, 
the number and the nature of which we have not been able to 
confirm, set off a very large wave of feeling throughout the 
Congo, and indeed among most of the officials of the Congolese 
government--public charges that they were trying to bring down 
the government of the Congo; that they were being backed by 
international high finance; that this represented a conspiracy 
on the part of quite a few governments to undermine the Congo. 
I think the most immediate result of the operation was to set 
off a wave of anti-white feeling throughout the Congo.

              CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN THE CONGO

    Now, we had a very serious interest in this because we have 
something over 3,000 personnel there scattered all over the 
country. More than half of them are in the general neighborhood 
of the capital, Kinshasa, plus several hundred others are 
scattered throughout the rest of the country on business 
activities, or as missionaries or teachers, or providing 
medical services, or in some posts representing the Government. 
There are a few Americans, I believe, in the U.N. organizations 
scattered around the country.
    About the sixth and seventh of the month, our Ambassador 
there, Ambassador McBride, who is a very able and experienced 
professional officer----
    Senator Symington. Where does he live, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Rusk. I beg pardon?
    Senator Symington. Where does he live, his residence there?
    Secretary Rusk. He is in the capital, in Kinshasa.
    Senator Symington. Thank you.
    Secretary Rusk. He began to take up with us very urgently 
the great danger to the Americans in the country arising from 
the antiwhite sentiment that was rapidly building up.
    There were reports that anti-white rallies would be held in 
what used to be called Elizabethville down in the Katanga; that 
there were some white killings by enraged Congolese.

                PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE

    The situation looked very murky indeed, and he strongly 
recommended that we take some action pending President Mobutu's 
appeal to other governments, including African governments, for 
assistance; that we take action to demonstrate publicly that 
this was not a conspiracy by white governments aimed at 
bringing down the Congo, but would tend to reinforce the 
efforts being made by the government to calm this kind of 
racial outburst.
    The telegrams were very strong on the subject. He pointed 
out for all practical purposes all Americans in the country 
were hostages to the situation of rage, and that the morale 
among the American community there was very weak indeed; that 
they were terror-stricken and nervous and fearful of their own 
position.
    We went back to him and pointed out that that was not a 
simple or easy thing to do; that this is not a matter that one 
can do lightly or for a temporary or transient reason, and we 
urged him to give the most serious consideration to the need 
before he pressed us for moving forward on the three C-130s.
    He did come back on Saturday and pressed again very hard. 
He said that it was very important for purposes of reassuring 
the American population, and very important for the morale of 
the government of the Congo and its ability to go to its own 
people and reassure them that this is not an anti-white 
conspiracy against the Congo, and to reinforce a television and 
radio campaign throughout the country calling for decent and 
careful treatment of all foreigners.
    There was scheduled for Sunday morning in what used to be 
Elizabethville in the Katanga a mass rally of local people 
aimed at--it was considered--the extermination of the whites, 
and a very, very dangerous and explosive situation developed.
    He also pointed out that the problem was not purely 
psychological, and this gets us into one problem on which there 
is a conflict of interest between our requirements here in 
Washington and our requirements in the Congo, and that is that 
if it became necessary to evacuate the Americans from the Congo 
it was important to have some lift of this type immediately 
available.
    Now, it is readily understandable here that the protection 
of American citizens abroad is an ancient, indeed one of the 
first obligations of the Department of State, and has been 
since Benjamin Franklin first went abroad to represent the 
Colonies of the United States, the American Colonies.
    But he cautioned us and urged us not to make any particular 
point here about the possibility of evacuating Americans 
because he said if that became known to the Congo, or it was 
made a point of in the Congo, that it would inflame and make 
more difficult the very problem we were trying to avoid.
    So we felt that we ought to provide three C-130's to carry 
out certain non-combat operations in support of the central 
government in a large country which has primitive 
communications.

                  U.S. WILL NOT BE INVOLVED IN COMBAT

    We did make it very clear that we were not involving 
ourselves in combat; that we were not going to provide combat 
forces. We sent these three planes with 126 personnel on board. 
Forty of those were members of the air crews themselves; 
another 45 were an Army platoon to guard the planes themselves 
on the airfield; three planes, 45 men, 15 men to a plane, five 
men for three shifts of eight hours each.
    Then, 33 men in general support, such as communications and 
medical aid personnel, and a few people of that sort, and a 
little headquarters group for these three planes made up of 
eight officers and men, a total of 126 men.
    These planes seemed to us to be a continuation of a type of 
support which we have given the Congo over a period of many 
years. We gave very large transport support to the United 
Nations Forces when they were in there. In 1964-1965 we had, I 
think, four C-130's in the Congo for a year supporting the 
efforts of the central government to deal with the extreme left 
revolt over in this same area, where the Simbas, so-called, 
were armed.
    You will recall the difficulties we had in Stanleyville at 
that time, and it did not appear to us that the return of the 
three C-130's to the Congo would be a major problem insofar as 
our major attitude and our major policies were concerned.
    I would like to add that requests have gone to other 
governments. We think that in the next day or two there will be 
public announcements of certain assistance provided by other 
governments in the situation, including certain African 
governments, and we think that will be for the advantage of the 
total situation.
    We are inclined to believe that this mercenary effort will 
be circumscribed. Our latest reports from Bukavu today have 
been that the situation there is relatively quiet. There is a 
very mean situation still existing at Kisangani, formerly 
Stanleyville, where the government forces are in command 
generally of the city, and the mercenaries, with a large number 
of hostages, both Africans and whites, are holding the air 
strip. An effort has been made to obtain a cease-fire to 
arrange evacuation of those not involved, particularly the 
women and children and the wounded.
    The Red Cross is working on that and has sent their man 
from Rhodesia up to the Congo to try to make effective Red 
Cross contact with the mercenaries to work out the evacuation.

                  MERCENARIES HAD BEEN IN THE MILITARY

    The Chairman. Could you describe who the mercenaries are? 
What is their origin? I am not clear who they are?
    Secretary Rusk. These particular ones are Belgian, French, 
and Spanish nationals who have been employed from time to time 
by different elements in the Congo, but in more recent months 
these mercenaries were in the employ of the central government, 
President Mobutu's government.
    The Chairman. They were part of the government's armed 
forces?
    Secretary Rusk. Part of the government's armed forces, and 
then they apparently went off on this escapade of their own.
    The Chairman. They are white people?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct; that is correct.
    Senator Mundt. Paid by whom?
    Secretary Rusk. Up until recently paid by the government of 
President Mobutu. Unless there is some connection with outside 
forces that we do not yet know about, they appear to be acting 
pretty much on their own.

                  MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT U.S. MISSION

    Now we are concerned about some misunderstandings which 
apparently occurred as to what this was all about. It was a 
favorable response to President Mobutu's request for long-range 
logistical support in a country that is very short of 
communications and transport capability.
    It was not the supplying of combat forces, and everybody 
over there, as well as back here, at least among those 
officials who are responsible, are thoroughly aware of the fact 
that we do not intend to supply combat troops. We were not 
asked to supply combat troops, and the only combat elements 
involved are this platoon of security men for the planes 
themselves.
    It is not the first step in a growing U.S. military 
commitment. My guess is that President Mobutu will not seek 
significant outside military assistance. If he were to go for 
any additional ground troops, he has about 30,000 already, he 
almost certainly would go to neighboring African countries for 
any additional ground troops that he would need. He may get 
countries like Ethiopia and Ghana to assist him in some fighter 
planes if the situation continues.
    It is not an indication that the United States intends to 
leap into every problem that develops anywhere. We did not get 
into Indonesia or the Hong Kong or Burma or the India-Pakistan 
fighting or the Middle East, or a great many other situations 
with our own troops or by direct involvement of our own 
personnel.
    This a continuation of a general policy which we have 
followed since 1960 when President Eisenhower first urged that 
this matter of the Congo be taken into the United Nations, and 
supporting the territorial integrity of the Congo.
    It continues an effort which we have exercised in a variety 
of ways, both through economic assistance and by providing 
aircraft on different occasions, first, in support of the U.N., 
and then in support of the government of the Congo during the 
left-wing revolt of 1964, 1965.
    We felt that it was a very important action for us to take.
    I would say, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that again we are 
faced with a situation where the alternatives do not unfold 
themselves and what might have been is not readily apparent. We 
are not yet out of the woods. We ought to be rubbing our 
rabbits' feet about the situation in Kisangani, and whether the 
people there can be extracted without serious loss of life, 
because the fighting gets pretty bitter on both sides in these 
clashes in that part of the world. But I must say that if the 
anti-white wave had swept the Congo, and there were large 
numbers of white people, including the Americans, killed off in 
that wave of high feeling, I think I would have found it much 
more difficult to come down here and answer the questions in 
that situation than I feel today in answering questions about 
why we did what we did.
    So I will pause at this point, Mr. Chairman, for your 
questions and comments on the committee.

                         AMERICANS IN THE CONGO

    The Chairman. Just a few points. The mercenaries, did you 
say about 150 rebelled?
    Secretary Rusk. 150 to 180 so far as we can determine.
    The Chairman. And they were troops of the government?
    Secretary Rusk. They were employees of the government.
    The Chairman. Did you say there were 3,000 Americans there?
    Secretary Rusk. My figures are----
    The Chairman. I heard 500.
    Secretary Rusk.--about 3,230; roughly 1,734 in the area of 
the capital, the general area of the capital, Kinshasa, which 
used to be Leopoldville.
    The Chairman. How about Bukavu?
    Secretary Rusk. 1,284 in Kisangani, that is Stanleyville. 
These are the areas surrounding these towns.
    The Chairman. These are government employees?
    Secretary Rusk. No. These are all missionaries, teachers, 
medical people, tourists, some alien residents, a number of 
press men apparently were caught in there as tourists; about 
188 down in Elizabethville in the Katanga, and about 124 in 
Bukavu.
    The Chairman. How many Americans have been killed?
    Secretary Rusk. We have not yet had any report of Americans 
being killed.
    The Chairman. Have any been molested?
    Secretary Rusk. We think some have been caught in the 
struggle. We had one report that one sergeant who has been on a 
training mission on truck transport training in the Congo might 
have been wounded in the leg and might have been in a hospital, 
but we have not been able to confirm any numbers of that sort.
    We think there have been perhaps up to 20 or so whites 
killed so far in different parts of the country during this 
particular episode.
    The Chairman. But no Americans?
    Secretary Rusk. No Americans that we know of.

                     CONSULTING THE UNITED NATIONS

    The Chairman. Was the United Nations consulted about this 
move?
    Secretary Rusk. This was before the United Nations, the 
Security Council, on Saturday. They had adjourned to Monday. 
Ambassador Buffum reported to the Security Council yesterday 
afternoon on the provisions of these transports, and there was 
no question raised, no criticism or no adverse comment from any 
quarter when he reported.

               POLICIES OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

    The Chairman. Did I understand you correctly that you feel 
this is a continuation of a commitment made by President 
Eisenhower to protect the territorial integrity of the Congo?
    Secretary Rusk. No, it is not in that sense a commitment, 
Senator.
    The Chairman. What is the significance of the Eisenhower 
action?
    Secretary Rusk. When the Congo situation descended into 
complete anarchy in 1960, this Government was asked for 
assistance, along with other governments, and President 
Eisenhower urged that the matter go before the United Nations.
    Then for a period of about 4 years this matter was in the 
operational hands of the United Nations, and you will remember 
the substantial amount of assistance, both in transport and in 
funds, which we provided to that United Nations effort.
    That was phased out partly because of a great difficulty 
that had arisen in financing the United Nations efforts, except 
on economic and technical assistance, except on that side, 
where several hundred technical assistance people have been 
working up until the present in the Congo on behalf of the 
United Nations.
    The Chairman. In that connection, I wanted this Eisenhower 
aspect because in your testimony before the Committee in 1962, 
this is a quote to our Subcommittee on African Affairs, you 
said:

    President Eisenhower rejected from the start any direct 
intervention by the major powers. In reply to the Congo 
government's request for United States forces, the United 
States stated that any assistance should be through the United 
Nations and not by any unilateral action by any one country, 
the United States included.

    Secretary Rusk. That is correct as far as combat forces are 
concerned. And during the Congo affair you will recall that the 
five so-called great powers, the five----
    The Chairman. It does not say combat forces. Is this a 
change in our policy, or isn't it?
    Secretary Rusk. It is not a change over the last six years, 
Mr. Chairman. We put in transport capabilities in support of 
the United Nations, and then after the United Nations withdrew 
its forces, we put them in in support of the central government 
of the Congo in the face of that extreme left revolt and 
rebellion in 1964-1965. We had four C-130's there for a period 
of a full year in 1964-1965.
    The Chairman. Well, I do not wish to take too much time. 
Senator Russell brought this matter up, and I wish Senator 
Russell would ask questions.
    Senator Russell. I do not have many questions.

                          THE SPREAD OF RUMORS

    What has happened to the plane that Mobutu sent up there to 
Stanleyville to see if he could get those newspaper men out?
    Secretary Rusk. We have not been able to establish any 
contact with the mercenaries. The mercenaries have not been 
responding. What they are trying to do is to establish contact 
through the Red Cross. But unless there is some sort of 
response from the mercenaries on the ground it is extremely 
hazardous for any kind of a plane to land there in the hopes 
that they can take people out rather than have the plane itself 
hijacked by the mercenaries.
    Senator Russell. Who spread this rumor that the white, some 
white power was going to take over down there? Did they 
designate what power it was, the United States, or what?
    Secretary Rusk. There was very bitter criticism of the 
Belgians particularly, and of the French. I think this stems 
from the natural kind of reports that would come based upon the 
nationality of the mercenaries themselves, and also, as you 
know, the fair amount of tension that has existed from time to 
time between the Congolese and some of the Belgian economic 
interests in the Congo.
    Senator Russell. Of course, you never know about what you 
read in the papers. I am reading now from a newspaper article, 
the Associated Press, which says that the Katangese or the 
Congolese, I assume, mutinied against the regime of Mobutu, and 
the mercenary officers, heavily outnumbered, apparently had no 
choice but to join the movement. This is according to informed 
sources, it says.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it is true that there were some 
Katangese elements with these mercenaries. But I would not 
myself think that the mercenaries had no choice in the matter. 
I would think that they had freedom of action on their own and 
could have made their own decisions in that situation.

                        GOALS OF THE MERCENARIES

    Senator Russell. Just as a matter of curiosity, Mr. 
Secretary, what is your theory as to what these mercenaries 
could gain, 150 to 180 of them there in a country as vast as 
you say, as this country east of the Mississippi River, and in 
a nation of 15, 18 million population? You do not suppose they 
thought they were going to conquer the whole thing, do you?
    Secretary Rusk. This is something that, as I indicated in 
the beginning, we can only speculate about because we do not 
have any firm information about what was in their minds.
    Now, some of them did borrow a plane and go down to 
Rhodesia. What they took with them in terms of funds or 
anything of that sort, we do not know. Whether they were out to 
see what they could pick up by way of cash or valuables or 
whether they had some more far-ranging political purpose, we 
just cannot say at this point.
    There were some indications that they wanted to put on a 
demonstration that would cause them to be employed by the 
Mobutu government for a longer period under more favorable 
circumstances, in other words, a little bit of collective 
bargaining they were putting on in this situation.
    Senator Russell. Pretty tough goon squads though from what 
you said.
    Secretary Rusk. Pretty rough; pretty rough.

                        WHAT FIGHTING TOOK PLACE

    Senator Russell. But even at that the press accounts say, 
and I read again from the press, ``The mutineers and 
mercenaries took over the town,'' that is Bukavu, ``without 
firing more than a few shots and the Congolese garrison fled 
into the bush.''
    So there was not very bitter fighting there as you said 
took place.
    ``Thursday afternoon, a little more than 24 hours later, 
the mutineers left Bukavu as suddenly as they arrived. 
Witnesses said the city was then calm and there was little 
damage.'' Then it goes on to recount that the Congolese 
soldiers in the bush heard that these mercenaries had left, and 
they came into town and proceeded to tear the town up and shoot 
people right and left, including women and children, and they 
are the people we are going down there to help. It is a little 
confusing to me.
    Secretary Rusk. We have had reports of casualties on both 
sides. We have not been able to confirm them because, as I say, 
we do not have people on the spot who can give us reporting.
    It is true, I think, that when the Congolese forces, 
particularly in the Kisangani area, engaged in heavy fighting 
there, that they themselves were pretty brutal. I think both 
sides have acted with considerable brutality here.
    One of our concerns, quite frankly, is that if the fighting 
goes on and the mercenaries, who are now surrounded, are 
gradually sort of hemmed in and worn down, that the hostages, 
both black and white, which the mercenaries are holding, will 
be in very severe danger indeed from the Congolese armed forces 
as they move in, as well as from anything the mercenaries might 
do.
    Senator Russell. So the Congolese would kill the 
mercenaries and the hostages that we are fighting to recapture.
    Secretary Rusk. That is one of the dangers we have to worry 
about, Senator.
    Senator Russell. I do not see how you ever possibly can 
hope to deal with a country of that kind. It is impossible for 
you to do anything about it, if it is that kind of a paradox.
    Secretary Rusk. It is true that a cease-fire was arranged 
for a period of a couple of days in this Kisangani area in 
order to try to establish some sort of contact with the 
mercenaries in order to relieve these hostages. But how long 
that cease-fire can be maintained I am not sure.

               ESTABLISHING A STRIKE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

    Senator Russell. Mr. Secretary, you are not only 
distinguished in the field of state craft, you have an enviable 
military record. What was the significance of establishing a 
headquarters of the STRIKE Command there in the Congo? This 
press account here is referring to a STRIKE Command and says 
the command is comprised of Army and Air Force elements capable 
of rapid deployment, especially in Africa and Southern Asia.
    Is the purpose of that statement to intimidate and frighten 
these mercenaries into surrender or are you ready to send 
people down there to support it?
    Secretary Rusk. I think it is a case of misreporting or 
misinterpretation. The only people I know about are these eight 
members of a command group that went with these C-130's as the 
command group for the C-130s.
    Now, they came, I suppose, from the STRIKE Command, because 
STRIKE Command is the general headquarters that would have 
responsibility for this kind of a military movement.
    Senator Russell. Primarily an Army organization.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Russell. Whereas you sent the Air Force down there.
    Secretary Rusk. But this in no sense is a first echelon of 
a deployment of combat forces to the Congo. I think that point 
ought to be made very clear because it has never been 
contemplated, and that is not involved in this situation at 
all, Senator.
    Senator Russell. This was certainly calculated to leave a 
different impression on the minds of anybody who knew anything 
about the Army.
    Secretary Rusk. I think I should say that because again 
some misinterpretation might arise, that this force will be 
supplied, we expect it to be there, perhaps, between two weeks 
and a month. By that time, we expect the situation to have 
shaken down. It will be supplied for its special requirements 
by air while it is there.
    For example, I believe that a C-130 is on its way now with 
certain propellers and other special equipment, but it will 
unload those in Kinshasa and come back. The force will be 
supplied by air. But I hope the people won't get excited that 
the three are becoming six or eight or ten.
    There is a fourth C-130 on the way that carries supplies 
for these three, and it will come home when it delivers its 
supplies.

                      A VERY MEAN KIND OF A FIGHT

    Senator Russell. Frankly, I am concerned about any of them 
being there under these conditions with the implications of the 
composition of this unit, small though it may be. I am even 
more confused that we are concerned--those that we have gone 
there to help are going to kill the hostages, and are those we 
are going to try to eliminate. Apparently they are in no danger 
from people who have them as hostages, but the people we are 
going to help are going to kill them unless we do something 
about it. That is what confuses me.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, this is a very mean kind of a fight 
there in the Stanleyville area. Whether there will be enough 
discrimination on both sides, or whether the mercenaries will 
take vengeance on some of the hostages they are holding, or 
whether the Congolese soldiers will be sufficiently disciplined 
to draw distinctions if they do close in on the mercenaries, 
these are the problems we just have to keep our fingers crossed 
on. It is a very tough situation.
    Senator Russell. You do not really believe these 
mercenaries, with all the vile implications that go with these 
words, are going to turn off and kill these civilians that they 
are holding as hostages, do you, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Rusk. They have been very rough, and they are 
holding a good many Congolese hostages as well. So I do not 
know what they are going to do, Senator.
    Senator Russell. You do not know what the Congolese are 
going to do either.
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir.

                   U.S. TRYING TO CALM THE SITUATION

    Senator Russell. Are we just intervening in that kind of a 
position--we have no idea what is going to happen or who is 
going to kill who or why, but we have gone in here 
nevertheless?
    Secretary Rusk. What we are trying to do is calm down the 
situation so you do not have an entire population aroused to do 
violence to all whites in the country, including 3,000 
Americans.
    Senator Russell. If this country, as remote and as bad as 
communications are as you say they are, how are you going to 
get the word around if you are not going in to capture the 
country?
    Secretary Rusk. They are going systematically on the radio 
and such television as they have. Sunday morning the Governor 
of Katanga----
    Senator Russell. How much television do they have?
    Secretary Rusk. I think they have three systems altogether.
    Senator Russell. Do you know how many sets there are?
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
    Senator Russell. Receiving sets.
    Secretary Rusk. But Sunday morning they got the Governor of 
Katanga, personally at our urging, he went out in a sound truck 
around the city calling on everybody to be quiet; cancelled a 
rally the object of which was clearly anti-white in character; 
and did a good deal to calm the situation. This kind of thing 
was possible on the basis of some tangible evidence of support 
from us to get over the idea that somehow all the blacks were 
on one side and all the whites were on the other.
    Senator Russell. Well, it will take some time to try to 
unravel this situation as to who is killing who and why we are 
on the side we are on when that is apparently where the danger 
comes from.

                        U.S. POSITION IN NIGERIA

    I do want to ask you some questions about another matter. 
Yesterday, I happened to be looking at the ticker and I saw 
where the press representative of your department had said that 
we had the same interest in Nigeria and would do the same thing 
there.
    In a few minutes another statement came in saying that it 
was a different situation in Nigeria; that this was purely an 
internal war. Finally, at a much later hour, he said that we 
had refused to go into Nigeria. Just what is our position with 
respect to Nigeria?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think the first report to which you 
referred was a press interpretation of his effort to say as 
little as possible about Nigeria, and that was because he did 
not close the doors at that point, and speculation went off in 
the other direction.
    We have not been asked for troops or assistance of this 
type by Nigeria. We would not be furnishing any if they did.
    Nigeria has not been before the United Nations as an 
international matter. We do not have the same lines of policy 
with respect to Nigeria we have with respect to the Congo. 
Quite frankly, as far as the United States is concerned, we 
feel that if anyone else is to take any part there at all by 
way of assistance, this is clearly a British responsibility, 
and we are leaving this pretty much in the hands of the 
British. We are not getting mixed up in it.

                   LEAVING THE CONGO TO THE BELGIANS

    Senator Russell. We should leave this in the hands of the 
Belgians in the Congo. They have plenty of people to be able to 
handle it, and have shown beyond peradventure when they had the 
first terrible massacres there.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the Belgians are not able to handle 
this one, Senator. They are not able to take care of their own 
people, let alone these 3,000 Americans who are in the country. 
I do want to emphasize again our real concern and our 
responsibility for what happens to these 3,000 American 
citizens in the Congo.

                      HEATED SITUATION IN NIGERIA

    There is another reason for saying as little as possible 
about Nigeria, because they are also in a heated situation.
    We have got 6,000 Americans there; about 5,000 in the 
federal areas of Nigeria, and about 1,000 in Biafra. We are 
trying now to evacuate a number of these Americans, and 
anything that is said here about Nigeria could seriously 
endanger some of those people.
    Senator Russell. Did somebody tell them the white people 
are getting ready to take over Nigeria?
    Secretary Rusk. That has not been the issue in Nigeria. 
That has not been the issue there.

               MOBUTU'S EFFORTS TO DE-RECRUIT MERCENARIES

    Senator Russell. Well, have you got any agreement with Mr. 
Mobutu that he is not going to recruit any more of these 
mercenaries that caused this trouble and having you send some 
more Air Force people down there, paratroopers and 
headquarters? We did not put these mercenaries on him. He hired 
them himself.
    Secretary Rusk. We have no agreement with him at all about 
putting more people, or planes, or anything of that sort in. We 
understand that his own plans were to steadily de-recruit these 
mercenaries, and as the training of the Congolese forces 
improved, as there has been improvement under Belgian, Israeli 
and Italian training teams, that he would steadily get rid of, 
cut down the mercenary involvement of his own forces. This may 
be one of the things that caused some of these mercenaries to 
take things in their own hands the other day.
    Senator Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper.

                 PREVIOUS POLICY OF HIRING MERCENARIES

    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Rusk. Was Tshombe the first head of government in 
the Congo that hired a substantial number of mercenaries to put 
down the insurgents? Mobutu was not the first, was he?
    Secretary Rusk. No, that is quite right. Before him, 
Tshombe had hired a considerable number drawn from a variety of 
countries. But before that the Belgians had provided a 
considerable number of officers for the Congolese armed forces. 
So there have been outsiders present with the Congolese armed 
forces almost continuously throughout this period.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Now, what do you sense to be the 
connection between the abduction of Tshombe, who is now in 
Algeria in jail, and the situation in the Congo under Mobutu?
    Secretary Rusk. We have not been able to thus far establish 
any connection between these events. It is possible that there 
are--that the kidnapping of Tshombe led to some reaction on the 
part of these mercenaries, but we have nothing at all to 
indicate that.
    We have been very interested in press reports from Algeria 
today that the Algerian press is severely criticizing those, 
what they call, adventurers who were with Tshombe on the plane, 
and this tends to point in the direction that the Algerians may 
be reluctant to turn Tshombe over to the Congolese.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, what basis would they have, if 
they are reluctant to turn him over, what basis would they have 
for holding him? Has he committed any crime in Algeria?
    Secretary Rusk. No. We do not know what the interaction on 
that will be. Other governments are working on that. As you 
know, we have no relations with Algeria at the present time. 
They do not have an extradition treaty with the Congo, and we 
just have no information today as to what the final disposition 
of him was.
    I do not think they expected him there. This was a surprise 
to them. But when he got there, there he was; what to do with 
him.
    We have all had problems of that sort.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They have got a bear by the tail.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.

                        NO THREATS AGAINST U.S.

    Senator Hickenlooper. Has the Mobutu government threatened 
to prevent overflights of commercial and military aircraft if 
our assistance were not provided in this instance?
    Secretary Rusk. No, sir. I think there were some 
regulations placed generally throughout the Congo on such 
things as border closings and things of that sort, applied to 
everybody including our own people. I am not aware of any 
threats to take any action against us, Senator, if we did not 
provide these planes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Aside from----
    Secretary Rusk. May I just check that with Mr. Palmer? Do 
you know of any?
    Mr. Palmer. No, I am not aware of it.
    Secretary Rusk. No, I have had no impression of any threats 
on this.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Were there any conditions demanded 
either way by us or by the Mobutu government involved in the 
supplying of these planes down there?
    Secretary Rusk. The principal thing that we----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I mean substantial conditions.
    Secretary Rusk. No. The principal thing we insisted upon 
was that the government and all of its component agencies 
around the country would make a maximum effort to calm down 
this wave of anti-foreign and anti-white feeling that was going 
on, because this was a very important part of the whole purpose 
of putting these planes in there, and they have been performing 
on that, I think with some success. But this was the principal 
thing that we linked with the furnishing of these C-130's.

                   SPECIAL MEANING OF ``LIBERATION''

    Senator Hickenlooper. Now, doesn't it seem to have been the 
history of this situation in the last several years that 
looting and periodic murder and other crimes even worse have 
been characteristic of both sides in this matter when they 
happen to win a village or take over an area?
    Secretary Rusk. I think on the whole that is a fair 
statement; yes, sir.
    Senator Hickenlooper. So that----
    Secretary Rusk. Of course, that is not unknown on the part 
of other armed forces in other wars. This term ``liberation'' 
has gotten to have a special meaning.
    Senator Hickenlooper. The poor people caught in the middle 
are between the devil and the deep blue sea when this happens.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.

                     CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONGO

    Senator Hickenlooper. Do you have any evidence of any pro 
or anti-Castro Cubans involved in this fighting in the Congo 
now or in this disturbance there?
    Secretary Rusk. None at the present time. There have been 
some Cubans from time to time flying for Air Congo and under 
contract with the Congolese government.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Are those military planes?
    Secretary Rusk. I think both civilian and military. The 
Congolese civilian and military planes. They had some T-28's, 
and then they also had the civilian planes of Air Congo, C-
47's, and things of that kind.
    One of them was reported to have escaped over into Rwanda, 
an adjoining country, out of the Kinshasa area--the Kisangani 
area, the old Stanleyville area, just recently. But we have 
very little on just what happened to those Cubans.

                   WHY AMERICANS RETURN TO THE CONGO

    Senator Hickenlooper. Why do these people go back into the 
Congo, 3,000 of them, after a bloody situation and history of 
murder and everything else in there? Americans and others rush 
back in there literally by the thousands.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I suppose there must be 35 or 40 
thousand Europeans altogether, Europeans and Americans, 
outsiders, in the Congo of 15 or 20 nationalities. Many of our 
Americans are missionaries, and missionaries are very 
persistent about getting back into areas where they have been 
active. As a matter of fact, they are usually rather slow to 
take our advice about getting out of most places in the world. 
So they went back in. Then we have business people in there and 
many European origin personnel are there for the various 
investment companies.
    A good many of them are actually working for the Congolese 
government, a great many technical assistance people in there, 
several hundred. They are there for the purpose of furnishing 
technical assistance, so they go back in.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I know they did.
    Secretary Rusk. Just as people go back after a volcano has 
destroyed a place. They will go back and build.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. But normally people who put 
their hands on a hot stove once, they do not put it on there 
for a while. But others seem to rush back in.
    Secretary Rusk. Most of these Americans who have gone into 
these outlying places away from the capital apparently are 
American missionaries.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think I will desist. Thank you very 
much.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you.

                 U.S. TROOPS ON ALERT FOR CONGO SERVICE

    The Chairman. If Senator Sparkman will pardon me, I had a 
question here, a very brief one. I was informed last night by 
the aunt of a member of the Armed Forces, who has been in 
Vietnam and is now at Fort Bragg, that he had been put on alert 
to go to the Congo at a moment's notice. Is that true?
    Secretary Rusk. I have no way--if you want me to find out--
--
    The Chairman. You do not know whether our troops, any 
troops in the Special Forces, in Fort Bragg----
    Secretary Rusk. You mean after the dispatch of these? I do 
not know of any troops that are on alert to go to the Congo.
    The Chairman. That is what she said. He was upset about 
that because he had already served his term in Vietnam and 
thought he was going to get out, and they put him on alert to 
go to the Congo. He was not very pleased.
    Secretary Rusk. On Saturday, we alerted people in 
connection with the C-130's, but I do not know of any other 
alert.
    The Chairman. Senator Sparkman.
    Senator Sparkman. I will pass.
    The Chairman. Mrs. Smith.
    Senator Smith. I have no questions.
    The Chairman. Senator Stennis.
    Senator Mansfield.
    Senator Symington.

                  U.S. PLANES DISPATCHED TO THE CONGO

    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, how many planes were 
sent?
    Secretary Rusk. Three C-130's.
    Senator Symington. Where did they land?
    Secretary Rusk. They went through South America over 
Ascension Island, and landed in Kinshasa, the capital. There is 
a huge, very large, international airport there in the capital 
of the Congo.
    Senator Symington. Are they still there?
    Secretary Rusk. So far as we know, yes, sir. That is, as of 
when I left the office. I believe they might have flown one 
mission to try to establish radio communication with these 
people at the airfield in Kisangani, although that might not 
have been a C-130. I think it might have been one ammunition 
drop about 500 miles away from Kisangani, but they are based in 
Kinshasa.
    Senator Symington. Were there any other white countries 
that put in any planes besides ours that we know of?
    Secretary Rusk. Not as yet. We know that some requests have 
been made, and that this is being now worked out with the 
Congolese government. We do not know what the result of that 
will be.

                   U.S. CITIZENS' RIGHT OF PROTECTION

    Senator Symington. Based on the question that somebody 
asked, don't Americans in the Congo, with all this tribal 
unsettlement and instability, don't they realize that they are 
there at their own risk?
    Secretary Rusk. I think they realize that there are some 
risks there, Senator. But we have over the last 190 years 
experimented from time to time with the idea of getting 
citizens to waive any claims to our protection. It does not 
work. I mean a sovereign government cannot waive its 
responsibilities for its own citizens, and once in a while over 
many years when somebody purports to waive our responsibility, 
and then he goes abroad anyhow and gets in trouble, that waiver 
does not amount to anything. He can still ask for help.
    Senator Symington. Are the three United States aircraft 
there under our command?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. From Washington or from a commander in 
the field?
    Secretary Rusk. The local operational command is with a 
command of the group itself. But they are under the Ambassador, 
and the Ambassador has very strict instructions about the kind 
of missions that they may or may not engage in. Any question on 
that would be referred back to Washington.

                      SENDING OF U.S. PARATROOPERS

    Senator Symington. If the United States trusts General 
Mobutu enough to place three aircraft at his disposal, along 
with a presumed requirement that they not land in the areas of 
the fighting, why do we send 150 American paratroopers to 
protect the planes?
    Secretary Rusk. These paratroopers are to provide guards 
for the planes themselves while they are, among other places, 
in the capital city.
    When I take a plane abroad I take along guards with me and 
they keep a guard on the plane at all times. So this will be 
five guards per plane on three eight-hour shifts roughly. It 
seems to be minimum under those circumstances.
    Senator Symington. I would like to just make one 
observation, Mr. Chairman, if I may, because it will come up 
later. It does not have to do with this particular subject.

                       U.S. ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL

    But, getting back from the Middle East, I reported to 
Chairman Russell and Chairman Fulbright that I thought, based 
on the quality of the Egyptian Air Force, it was only a 
question of time before there would be a blow-up out there.
    The Israelis saved themselves by hitting first. Their air 
force is 95 percent French. The French have refused immediately 
to sell them anything or work with them, just like they have 
done to us in the past, and the Russians apparently are 
rebuilding rapidly the Egyptian Air Force, and whoever hits 
first out there generally wins because of the nature of the 
terrain, et cetera.
    I would hope that you would be considering what we would do 
if the French continue to refuse to send any military 
assistance to Israel or, perhaps, if there are any friendly 
Arab countries left--sell planes would be better--and give what 
our policy will be towards Israel, if they have the ability to 
buy defenses from us if the French continue to run out on them.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, this is a question that is very, 
very much on our minds with the renewal by the Soviet Union of 
their substantial arms shipments to Egypt, Syria, and Algeria 
because--and I know the committee does not want to get into 
this in detail today--but we do have once again the problem 
which that posed for us before, because these three so-called 
progressive states heavily furnished with arms by the Soviet 
Union create threats not only to Israel as a possibility, but 
their own Arab neighbors--Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, 
and Morocco.
    We have tried in the past reluctantly because we have not 
wanted to become a major arms supplier in that part of the 
world, we have tried, with the help of some other governments, 
such as particularly France and Britain, to do a certain 
balancing there between the moderate Arab states and these 
three so-called progressive states, and then, in turn, to have 
some balance between the forces on the Arab side and Israel 
itself.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Aiken.

               FRENCH AND BELGIAN POLICY TOWARD THE CONGO

    Senator Aiken. What action have France and Belgium taken 
with regard to the Congo?
    Secretary Rusk. The Belgians have made certain offers of 
assistance which are now being worked on in the Congo. There 
are some Belgians in the Congo who are being withdrawn from the 
country because they are considered to be potential trouble-
makers and might be too much connected with the mercenary kind 
of interest.
    However, I am not able to get into specifics today because 
this is a matter that is still under discussion between the 
governments concerned.
    Senator Aiken. So far as you know, neither France nor 
Belgium have sent any military assistance in there to help 
maintain order?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Belgium has had a substantial 
training force with the Congolese forces all along, 
particularly with their ground forces.
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. Israel is training their paratroopers, and 
Italy is giving some help with their small naval forces, and 
things of that sort.
    Senator Aiken. France and Belgium, either or both, do they 
have material investments in the Congo now?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes. Belgian investments are very 
substantial. Ours, by the way, are relatively minuscule.
    French investments, Mr. Palmer, do you know about that?
    Mr. Palmer. No, I do not think they have very much.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not have the impression that the 
French investments there are very substantial.
    Senator Aiken. Well, do we, in effect undertake--have we, 
in effect, undertaken to protect the Belgian investments?
    Secretary Rusk. That is not the purpose of the exercise 
here, Senator. We are primarily concerned about what would 
happen in that country if the country itself, with this 
government and its people, felt that the white world was 
opposed to it and trying to break it up, which would lead them 
to provide all sorts of elements into the situation; and, 
secondly, to make a reasonable response to the threat to our 
own people in the Congo and find ways and means of allaying the 
dangers which they face with this wave of anti-white feelings 
sweeping the country.

                    LENGTH OF STAY OF U.S. PERSONNEL

    Senator Aiken. How long do you expect to keep our 150 
people there, the troops in there?
    Secretary Rusk. The present thinking is somewhere between 
two weeks and a month.
    Senator Aiken. You had them in there once before to bring 
out refugees that were threatened with the----
    Secretary Rusk. The Simbas.
    Senator Aiken. --cooking pot.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.
    We had four C-130's there for a period of about a year in 
1964-1965.
    Senator Aiken. Yes. It will take somewhere between two and 
four weeks?
    Secretary Rusk. That is the present situation. We think the 
prospect is that the Congolese army is better trained and in 
better shape than it was three or four years ago. We think the 
prospect is that this mercenary affair will be wound up before 
too long.
    Senator Aiken. But if real trouble should develop, our 
forty-odd combat troops would hardly be sufficient, would they, 
sir?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, these forty-odd combat troops are 
there just to guard the planes and the airfield. They are not 
there to fight.
    Senator Aiken. I thought you said there were some forty 
others besides the ones you designated.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, forty Air Force crews and forty-five 
Army personnel to guard the planes.

                     U.S. INVESTMENTS IN THE CONGO

    Senator Aiken. How much investment do we have in the Congo?
    Secretary Rusk. Relatively small, very small indeed.
    Senator Aiken. Do we have----
    Secretary Rusk. In terms of economic investment.
    Senator Aiken. Is the Union Miniere, I believe that is what 
it was called, something like that, is that the big investment 
in the Congo?
    Secretary Rusk. That is the, I suppose, largest single 
investment. They have reorganized that whole operation in 
recent months. But that is the copper operation.
    Senator Aiken. Are Americans heavy stockholders?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not think so.
    Mr. Palmer. No, not particularly.
    Senator Aiken. Then we are in there protecting our 
missionaries, and you would say what, about 40,000 other white 
people?
    Secretary Rusk. How many Belgians would you estimate are 
there, Mr. Palmer?
    Mr. Palmer. About 30,000.
    Senator Aiken. Why aren't they interested in protecting 
their people?
    Secretary Rusk. About 30,000.
    They have personnel with the Congolese armed forces.
    Senator Aiken. I see.
    Secretary Rusk. And they----
    Senator Aiken. They do not apparently think it is wise to 
have a number of white Belgians in excess of the number of 
native troops then.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not know that they relate these two, 
Senator.
    Senator Aiken. I think you get the idea. [Laughter.]
    All right.
    The Chairman. Senator Morse. He is not here.
    Senator Jackson.

                 THE MISSION OF AMERICANS IN THE CONGO

    Senator Jackson. Mr. Secretary, under what instructions is 
the commander of the three planes operating under?
    Secretary Rusk. He is operating under the direction of the 
Ambassador, who is under the direction of Washington, and 
basically those instructions are that these planes are to be 
used for logistics purposes, and not for combat purposes; not 
to get into situations where combat is likely or to attempt to 
involve themselves in situations of violence.
    Senator Jackson. Is it clear, because I think it is 
important that we get this thing straightened out, that his 
overall mission is to protect American lives, or could that 
mission include the moving of Congolese troops?
    Secretary Rusk. It could include the moving of Congolese 
troops from, say, the capital area where some of the better 
trained troops are over into the eastern part of the Congo, 
including into the country of Rwanda. Rwanda has made its air 
base available to receive troops. So that the movement of 
military supplies and, perhaps, even the movement of troops 
would be----
    Senator Jackson. For what purpose?
    Secretary Rusk. For the Congolese forces.
    Senator Jackson. Yes. But to utilize Congolese forces 
limited to protecting American lives?
    Secretary Rusk. No, for the general reestablishment of the 
authority of the Congolese government throughout the country.
    Senator Jackson. This is, you now, what seems to me to sort 
of contradict what was said at the outset; namely, I understood 
we were there to protect American lives. Now maybe you cannot 
say this publicly because that might offend the government.
    Secretary Rusk. It is protecting American lives that we 
ought not to say much about publicly, Senator.
    Senator Jackson. I understand that.
    Secretary Rusk. That is the difficulty.

                           AN AMBIGUOUS ROLE

    Senator Jackson. But now what they are doing here, as I 
understand it, it goes beyond that. The planes can be used in 
supporting the effectiveness of the government of the Congo.
    Secretary Rusk. I wonder----
    Senator Jackson. I wonder if we can get this. This is the 
crux of this problem.
    Secretary Rusk. Do you have the text of the announcement we 
made, Mr. Palmer? The announcement was made in terms of 
logistics support to the Congolese government.
    Senator Jackson. I think what the American people are 
disturbed about is that it is sufficiently ambiguous so that it 
can include our military involvement in the Congo without 
relation to the protection of American lives and property.
    Now, I had the impression at the outset of your remarks 
that we were simply following the tradition established in 
Benjamin Franklin's time on up to protect American lives.
    Secretary Rusk. We should have here--I am sorry I do not--
the text of the announcement that was made at the Department of 
State. The announcement said that in response to a request from 
President Mobutu, the United States Government has dispatched 
three C-130 aircraft to Kinshasa, and that they will be in a 
noncombatant status.
    Senator Jackson. Yes. But if you move troops and you get 
shot at you are suddenly combatant.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the orders are that they not put 
themselves into combat situations, Senator.
    The other side does not have--that is, these mercenaries do 
not have--means of going after this airfield in Rwanda, for 
example, and they do not have means of dominating the entire 
Eastern Congo. There are many things these planes can do that 
would not get them into a combat situation.
    Senator Jackson. Except we cannot get to Stanleyville where 
they have got the hostages.
    Secretary Rusk. That is right, and they are not going 
there.

                         PUTTING DOWN A REVOLT

    Senator Jackson. Well, Mr. Secretary, I realize you have a 
problem here. But I think it is unfortunate that the American 
people cannot be told that the primary mission is to protect 
American lives. Now, the American people understand that, and I 
think this can be explained.
    As you say, if you had not done that, why then, there would 
have been a disaster down there. They would be crawling all 
over you in the State Department for not having lived up to one 
of the No. 1 responsibilities of the State Department, to 
protect American lives and property.
    But now I gather that actually the mission is beyond that. 
It goes to the support of the Congolese government and their 
ability to maintain law and order generally. Law and order 
meaning, of course, to put down a revolt.
    Secretary Rusk. I think it would have been very hard to 
make full contribution to the first point had they not been 
available to support the government on the second point because 
this was tied into a nationwide effort in the Congo to 
demonstrate that rumors were not correct that white governments 
in different parts of the world were in some conspiracy against 
the Congo to bring down the government. The fact that we had 
tangible support there in the shape of these planes made it 
possible, with considerable credibility, for the government to 
go to the people and say, ``Look here, you see what has 
happened here, this is not the case. Let us take care of all of 
these foreigners. This is not an international conspiracy aimed 
at the Congo.''
    So that one purpose meshes into the other.

                          WHAT MOBUTU EXPECTS

    Senator Jackson. What is our understanding with Mobutu?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, those planes are not under his 
command.
    Senator Jackson. No, sir; I understand that. But what is 
our diplomatic understanding with him? All orders, I gather, 
that are beyond what the commander in the field has been given 
emanate directly from the President.
    Secretary Rusk. Presumably his people would request 
assistance from the C-130's, and our people would look at it 
and see whether it was within the terms of reference or the 
purpose for which the planes were put there and, if they are, 
grant or deny the request.
    Senator Jackson. Does he understand we are not, our forces 
are not to be involved in any combat type of situation?
    Secretary Rusk. Absolutely, no type of combat situation; no 
question about that.
    Senator Jackson. What does he really expect from us?
    Secretary Rusk. I think he wanted, in the first instance, a 
tangible representation of political support as far as his own 
people were concerned.
    Senator Jackson. It is more symbolic maybe?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Jackson. Somehow the powerful United States of 
America is with them as indicated by three planes that are out 
there.
    Secretary Rusk. I mentioned earlier the matter of getting 
on radio and trying to settle down this racial feeling. This 
was a second requirement that I forgot, in answer to, I think 
it was, Senator Russell's question. That was that they continue 
to make maximum use of their own aircraft. They have some 
aircraft in the air in the Congo and in other resources, and we 
want them to take as much of this job, of course, as they can.

                      EVACUATION PLANS FOR NIGERIA

    Senator Jackson. How can we avoid, if the situation becomes 
as serious in Nigeria as it is in the Congo, coming to the 
assistance of Americans in Nigeria?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, in all countries, in practically 
every country, outside of a few of the most stable, we have 
over time worked out contingency evacuation plans.
    We are now trying to move, and we should not say anything 
about this outside because these things are awfully dangerous 
locally. We are moving some Americans out of Nigeria now. We 
have had a major movement of Americans out of the Middle East 
here in recent weeks, and it went with remarkable efficiency, 
on the whole, including the use of American military aircraft 
to go in and get these people out.

                  AVOID BEING ACCUSED OF INTERVENTION

    Senator Jackson. It seems to me that if one of the, from 
our standpoint, at least, I take it--the primary mission is to 
protect American lives. If we are confronted with a political 
problem with the Congolese government in that you have to allow 
Mobutu to use the color of, at least, military strength as a 
psychological device to hold his government together in this 
crisis, that is about what it boils down to, is it not?
    Secretary Rusk. I think on the matter of concern about 
Americans who might face a very dangerous situation, it is not 
unusual in these situations for us to have to be quiet for a 
period of time in order to think, in the first instance, about 
the safety of the people in some remote and difficult part of 
the world. I suppose that maybe on this point we simply have to 
wait for a period and let the American people understand it was 
involved at the end of the story rather than at the beginning 
of the story.
    Senator Jackson. Well, I can appreciate the need to avoid 
being accused of intervention, that is in a Yankee 
imperialistic way, just coming in to pull Americans out.
    I think this creates some real political problems. But I am 
concerned especially with our problems in Vietnam and 
elsewhere, that we cannot tell the American people that, 
``Look, we are not about to follow the business of trying to be 
the gendarme for the world, but that we are carrying out a 
traditional policy of the United States to support its 
citizens.''
    This complicates our problem at home in order to save the 
face of the head of the government, General Mobutu, in the 
Congo; isn't that about it?
    Secretary Rusk. And, perhaps, to save the lives of American 
citizens in the Congo.

                     BELGIANS OUGHT TO TAKE ACTION

    Senator Jackson. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman. How 
many whites are there in the Congo? You said there were 
approximately 3,230 Americans.
    Secretary Rusk. About 30,000 Belgians. What others, Mr. 
Palmer, would you suggest?
    Senator Jackson. 30,000 Belgians?
    Secretary Rusk. About 30,000 Belgians; I would think, 
perhaps, 10,000 or so of other nationalities.
    Mr. Palmer. I would imagine there are quite a number of 
Greeks, 3,000 or 4,000 Greeks.
    Secretary Rusk. Greeks, French, a few British.
    Senator Jackson. Why aren't they doing something? It is the 
old, old question that we get asked.
    Secretary Rusk. As I say, the Belgian response on this is 
now being worked on in Kinshasa with the Congolese government.
    Senator Jackson. Certainly the Belgians ought to. I realize 
they may have special political problems because of the Tshombe 
situation. But, goodness gracious, with that many whites there, 
we only have ten percent of what the Belgians have. They ought 
to be doing something. This is one place where they could 
certainly come in and help without having to get involved maybe 
directly in the kind of fighting that we are engaged in in 
Vietnam.
    That is all.
    The Chairman. Senator Thurmond.
    Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                      PLANES HAD NON-COMBAT STATUS

    Mr. Secretary, let me clarify just a moment. Is the main 
purpose we went in there to protect American lives or to 
bolster the existing government there by sending in 
paratroopers in uniform. I guess they were in uniform, were 
they? Or were they wearing civilian clothes?
    Secretary Rusk. I think they are in uniform, uniformed.
    Senator Thurmond. Sending in paratroopers in uniform in 
planes which might indicate that we are going to give further 
aid, if necessary. In other words, was the real purpose to 
protect the Americans, to bolster the existing government or 
was it to play politics, give the impression to the world that 
we are going in to save this colored government from being 
taken over by white people?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the two purposes cannot be totally 
separated. Both were very much in our minds at the time that 
the decision was made. The position of the Americans there was 
very high in our minds. But there was no effort made to create 
the impression that this was just the impression of a first 
flight of American military who were on their way to the Congo 
to engage in combat operations in the Congo.
    As a matter of fact, the announcement emphasized that these 
three planes were in a non-combatant status. These paratroopers 
that you referred to are guards for the planes on the airfield, 
nothing more than that.
    Senator Thurmond. Couldn't the guards have worn civilian 
clothes and not given the impression that America was sending 
uniformed people over there, especially paratroopers?
    Secretary Rusk. I would think that guards in uniform would 
be more suitable under the circumstances with the military 
aircraft on the field.

                     NO POLITICAL FACTORS INVOLVED

    Senator Thurmond. As a matter of fact, wasn't the real 
purpose of sending these people over there either one of two 
things: To let the world know that we are bolstering that 
government and we are sending a contingent of troops, the 
implication being that we will send others if necessary?
    Secretary Rusk. I would accept the first part of it but not 
the second. There is no implication we would send others.
    Senator Thurmond. Or was it the fact, in view of our 
attitude toward the Ian Smith government, was it the fact that 
we are making a play for the colored vote here and we are 
sending troops and continuing over there to protect the colored 
government after being taken over by white mercenaries?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not know about any political factor 
here. I do know that there is a broad political factor in the 
Continent of Africa here in this situation, and if Mobutu 
should turn to the most radical and the wildest leaders in the 
African Continent for help on the grounds he could not get any 
help of any sort from anybody else, I think that would be very 
adverse to our interests here.
    Mobutu has been one of the more moderate of the African 
leaders. He has worked with the moderates rather than the 
extremists. The Chinese in the Congo, for example, are Chinese 
Nationalists rather than Chinese Reds.
    We have some stake, of course, in his general orientation 
toward the West rather than towards the more extreme Arabs or 
off to Eastern Europe.
    Senator Thurmond. The general impression has been 
expressed, I might as well tell you in my State, and some of it 
around here, too, that we are intervening where we have no 
business, and either we are playing politics in this matter to 
make it appear to the colored people that we are going to 
defend a colored government against white mercenaries. Now, it 
turns out the white mercenaries were part of the colored 
government. They were soldiers under the colored government. I 
mean, after thinking this thing through well, if you had to do 
it again would you do it again?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, I think, I would indeed, sir, because 
of the very urgent considerations that were in front of us by 
one of our ablest and most experienced ambassadors on the 
ground, concerned about what was, what could happen in that 
country if it set off on a wave of anti-white feeling; if the 
Americans themselves were in jeopardy; if there was a total 
breakdown of confidence in the government; and creating a 
situation in which all sorts of people might come in and fish 
in troubled waters. I would have no hesitancy at all about the 
decision that was taken.

                       TREATMENT ON MOISE TSHOMBE

    Senator Thurmond. Now, Moise Tshombe has been a friend to 
the United States. He is one of the most literate and best 
educated men in Africa, and we are treating him rather 
shabbily.
    Was there any understanding with Mobutu or the Congolese 
government that by doing what we did they would not harm 
Tshombe, or was he discussed?
    Secretary Rusk. We hope that situation will not arise 
because we hope that the Algerians will not go further with 
this kidnapping business.
    I do not know that we have treated Tshombe shabbily. When 
he was the government of the Congo we gave him full support at 
a time when many African countries were rather critical of us 
for doing so. Our view was that his government was the 
government of the Congo and we supported the government of the 
Congo.
    Mobutu became the government of the Congo, and we support 
this government of the Congo.
    Senator Thurmond. What we did is a long story. But we did 
not have any understanding with the Congolese government that 
they would protect Tshombe or would not harm him?
    Secretary Rusk. We have no understanding in connection with 
the C-130's; no, sir.
    Senator Thurmond. In other words, Tshombe did not come into 
this picture at all?
    Secretary Rusk. Not in our discussions with the Congolese 
government; no, sir.
    Senator Thurmond. His name was not mentioned at all?
    Secretary Rusk. So far as I know he was not.
    Senator Thurmond. Although you know he is under sentence of 
death in the Congo if he returns there, and you know it is 
possible that he maybe turned over by the country where he is 
now.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, if that happens, sir, we will try to 
get to that when it happens.
    Senator Thurmond. Would you take steps to try to save his 
life?
    Secretary Rusk. I think it would be important for the 
present government of the Congo not to take action against 
Tshombe and not to execute him because this business of regular 
and frequent killing off of political opponents is not a very 
profitable undertaking. It just keeps a country all stirred up.
    Senator Thurmond. I am glad you feel that way. Will you 
express that to the Congolese government?
    Secretary Rusk. If the occasion arises; yes, sir.
    Senator Thurmond. If the occasion arises?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    Senator. Thurmond. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Church. He was here a minute ago.
    Senator Church.
    Senator Church. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                     U.S. AID PROGRAM IN THE CONGO

    With respect to these three thousand Americans who are 
presently in the Congo, how many of these are there as our 
cadre to carry out our various AID programs?
    Secretary Rusk. There are 303--1 think these figures are 
correct--303 U.S. official personnel; 276 dependents of 
American officials. The rest of them are residents, mostly 
missionaries, and some 117 or so tourists and alien residents 
and miscellaneous groups.
    Senator Church. Well, about 20 percent of them then, 
considering dependents, are there in connection with either the 
American Embassy or in connection with the American AID 
programs. The balance are not.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that is correct, sir.
    Senator Church. How do these planes protect these 
Americans? I mean----
    Secretary Rusk. I think the two principal things would be 
first, that their being there was of great assistance in 
calming down public opinion and the building up of a racist 
public opinion aimed at white people.
    Senator Church. I understand that part.
    Secretary Rusk. That is the political factor.
    Secondly, they are there, they could be used for prompt 
evacuation if evacuation should be called for. They have no 
combat capability in the event of any struggle occurring.

                 ESTABLISHING A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

    Senator Church. Well, the reason I ask this question is 
because it occurred to me that we may be talking about a 
doctrine that I am not familiar with regarding the 
responsibility of the American Government to confer or extend 
protection to American citizens abroad.
    I have understood the practice in the past to move in and 
to evacuate American citizens in a situation of danger abroad. 
But to move in and establish an American presence in a foreign 
country under the color of this doctrine seems to me to be at 
least an extension of the doctrine, a form of the doctrine with 
which I have not previously been familiar.
    Secretary Rusk. I think the presence has been there with 
these 3,000 Americans we are talking about.
    Senator Church. What I mean is--no, no--what I mean is they 
are the citizens we have gone in to protect. In the past the 
United States and other countries have sought to protect their 
citizens abroad by moving in and evacuating them from dangerous 
situations.
    Secretary Rusk. Right.
    Senator Church. But here we have gone in and established a 
kind of military presence which may last two weeks or a month, 
or if a problem is not settled in that length of time, may last 
much longer, and that military presence in the Congo is 
justified on the theory that it is but an application of the 
doctrine of protecting American citizens abroad.
    Secretary Rusk. It has more than one justification.
    Senator Church. I do not follow this.
    Secretary Rusk. It has more than one justification in our 
minds. But we, on many occasions, put American aircraft or 
American ships into situations where evacuation of American 
citizens is called for, and sometimes we take precautionary 
dispositions in the event of possible crisis or possible danger 
to American citizens. We move aircraft or ships around.
    We sometimes--we have done that on many occasions where 
evacuation did not become necessary, but we just got through, 
as I said, with a very large scale evacuation of personnel out 
of the Middle East, and in some of those situations in the Arab 
countries we used American military aircraft on a substantial 
scale.
    Senator Church. Well, I can see that aircraft of this kind 
can be used for the purpose of evacuating American citizens 
from a situation of extreme danger, and that we may be on the 
brink of that in the Congo. We have them there for that 
purpose.
    But we could not just keep them there in the Congo 
indefinitely on the ground that American citizens might be in 
danger.
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    Senator Church. And not have that an extreme distortion of 
the doctrine.

             AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN THE CONGO WAS FRIGHTENED

    Secretary Rusk. No. But, you see, our Ambassador reported, 
Senator, that the American community was in an acute morale 
situation. They were frightened; they were expecting anti-white 
demonstrations; they were expecting the possibility of 
massacre. There had been about 20 white people killed in this 
kind of situation already, roughly 20. They were expecting a 
big demonstration down in Katanga, for example, where they were 
calling for people to assemble, bringing their bows and arrows 
and machetes and things of that sort to go after the white 
people. There is a very large white community down there, 
including a good number of Americans. It was to try to get that 
sort of a situation under control, that was one of the 
principal reasons why we put these three C-130's in there. The 
government, on the basis of knowing that this kind of political 
as well as practical help was coming, was able to get out and 
make a convincing case apparently to most of the population 
that these mercenaries did not represent a big white 
international conspiracy to do in the government of the Congo, 
and that had a good deal to do with settling down the 
atmosphere in the country.
    Now we are not out of it yet, gentlemen. I want to make it 
very clear that the situation is still pretty touchy. It is 
touchy in Kisangani. It is touchy still in the Katanga to some 
degree, although that is pretty well under control now. There 
may be outlying areas where we can still run into--and if we 
run into this period without significant loss of American life 
we will be fortunate, and we are working on it day and night.

                   A POTENTIALLY LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

    Senator Church. With respect to the other aspect of the 
Americans, that is, to give logistical support to the Congolese 
government, suppose that your anticipations do not materialize 
and the situation does not grow better in two weeks or a month, 
but grows worse. Having made a commitment to give logistical 
support to the Mobutu government, if the Mobutu government 
calls upon us to extend that support and triple the number of 
planes in order to expedite the movement of Congolese troops, 
aren't we then in a position where it becomes quite difficult 
not to proceed with the commitment on the ground that we always 
keep our pledges?
    Secretary Rusk. No, I think a request to other governments 
including other African governments, will begin to take effect 
here in some of these matters. In the case of troops, I would 
myself think that under the general practice which has been--we 
have seen examples of in the last six years in the Congo--they 
would certainly call on other African states for additional 
troops for assistance.
    I do not anticipate that we will be getting requests for 
any significant buildup of our effort.
    There was a very clear understanding there was a precise 
request for three aircraft. These have a very special 
capability in terms of logistics support. They have no combat 
capability.
    Therefore, we certainly would not expect to commit them 
into any combat situation. But they are long range. They have 
short landing capability. They have large tonnage capacity. 
They can take large numbers of people. So they are very well 
adapted to this particular kind of thing.
    Senator Church. We have made no commitment, and you feel no 
obligation nor anticipation that we are going to enlarge the 
number of planes we have sent?
    Secretary Rusk. Our expectation, Senator, is that this 
effort, which is primarily an effort of about 150 to about 180 
mercenaries, is going to peter out either through a combination 
of its own lack of momentum and pressures from the government 
forces. If you think of a country as large as the U.S. east of 
the Mississippi, if you think of a raiding party of 150 people 
moving into, say, the outskirts of Louisville one day, and then 
in two or three days getting on to Chattanooga, they are not 
going to take over the Congo. They are not going to take over 
the Congo.
    Senator Church. No. But in that situation one also wonders 
about the need of the Congolese government to rely upon us to 
effectively take care of a threat of that proportion.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, these are matters of 
judgment. We had a very severe situation portrayed to us by our 
Ambassador reflecting the views of the general American 
community there.
    If we had waited two or three days, and these massacres had 
developed, substantial numbers of Americans had been killed, I 
would be down here answering another set of questions. I would 
prefer to answer the ones I am answering now rather than that 
other set which I would be answering in that circumstance, 
quite frankly.
    Senator Church. I think your answer to these questions is 
very able, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you.
    Senator Church. That is all.
    The Chairman. Senator Carlson.

                       THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY

    Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, in view of this discussion 
this afternoon, of course, everyone is obligated to protect our 
own citizens. But when it gets to dealing with another 
government, sending troops and planes to protect or preserve a 
government, I just ask this one question: If it is the position 
of the administration that the President can order U.S. forces 
to give logistics support to a government or to rebels, for 
that matter, without a treaty, legislation, or a commitment?
    Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, from the internal 
constitutional point of view, the Commander-in-chief does have 
authority to use the armed forces of the United States within 
broad limits, and he has exercised that a hundred times.
    I might tell you that the protection of the territorial 
integrity of the Congo has been of major concern to the United 
Nations. There continue to be outstanding resolutions in the 
United Nations calling upon all nations not only to refrain 
from interfering with the Congo, but also to give it assistance 
in maintaining its territorial integrity.
    Those resolutions are still in force, and were the 
background for the meeting of the Security Council on the Congo 
Saturday, and again yesterday.
    We reported these planes to the Security Council, and no 
one, including the Russians, raised any problems or objections 
to the dispatch of these planes there.
    So I think that the Congo has been a matter of 
international concern for many years, and I think there is no 
question in my mind about both the international environment in 
which these planes went in there and the internal 
constitutional situation.
    Senator Carlson. Admitting that is correct from a U.N. 
standpoint, we still get back to the question of whether our 
Nation, whether the President of the United States and the 
administration can, without a treaty or legislation or 
commitment, go out and take over the United Nation's 
obligations.
    Secretary Rusk. It has not taken over the United Nations' 
obligations. All we did was to put in three planes.
    Senator Carlson. I know.
    Secretary Rusk. And these questions did not come up two 
years ago when we put in four planes. They did not come up 
earlier in the same form when we were putting transport to 
support the U.N. efforts there at the earlier stage.
    Senator Case. Times have changed, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Rusk. So I gather.
    Senator Carlson. That is all.

                        NO RUSSIANS IN THE CONGO

    Secretary Rusk. Any Russians in the Congo?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. The Congo does not have relations with the 
Soviet Union. There are three or four countries of Eastern 
Europe that have embassies in the Congo.
    The Chairman. Senator Stennis.
    Senator Stennis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I came in so late 
that I have hardly warmed up to the subject.
    Senator Case. See what you can do.
    The Chairman. Do you want a little time?
    Senator Stennis. I am going to have to go, that is the 
trouble.

                         COMPARISON TO VIETNAM

    I am concerned, you are talking about two years ago, Mr. 
Secretary--first, I want to commend you again, though, for your 
Middle East handling--the way you handled yourself.
    Two years ago the war was not going like it is in Vietnam. 
We did not have all these men over there. We are supposed to be 
a little wiser than we were two years ago.
    I do not object to going in there to bring out our people. 
But Senator Church brought out that we are going in there and 
we set up in a way. I do not know. You said, as I understood, 
there is no obligation, though, or any promise or anything to 
stay or to augment under conditions----
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Stennis. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. No commitment with respect to----
    Senator Stennis. Have you made any statement about your 
expectation of pulling out to the committee this afternoon, 
sir?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. I indicated to the committee, and 
we have indicated to the Congolese government, we expect these 
planes to be there for a period of from two weeks to a month.
    Senator Stennis. Well, I don't want to go over what you 
have already told. I thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Miller.

                      CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS

    Senator Miller. Mr. Secretary, how many paratroopers went 
on board the planes?
    Secretary Rusk. Forty-five. Three planes; 15 men to a 
plane; five men to a ship on guard.
    Senator Miller. Now, when did Mobutu make the request?
    Secretary Rusk. The request for these C-130's came up on 
the 6th of July.
    Senator Miller. Did he make the request of our ambassador?
    Secretary Rusk. Of our ambassador which was referred back 
to Washington.
    Senator Miller. When was the decision made to dispatch the 
three aircraft?
    Secretary Rusk. On late Saturday night. They had been 
alerted and displaced forward, but the decision was made late 
Saturday night.
    Senator Miller. And I presume by the President?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Miller. Was there any consultation with any member 
of Congress before that decision was made?
    Secretary Rusk. We discussed it with some members of the 
Congress at the time that we displaced the planes forward to 
Ascension Island, and we notified a good many more at the time 
that they were ordered on in from Ascension Island to the 
Congo.

                        COMPARISON WITH NIGERIA

    Senator Miller. I note that you said that we would not have 
sent these planes to Nigeria. I believe you said something to 
that effect?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Miller. I cannot understand why we would not if we 
had 6,000 Americans in Nigeria, and there was a need to protect 
them, and we only have 3,000 in the Congo, why wouldn't we send 
three planes to Nigeria if the President of Nigeria asked us 
for them.
    Secretary Rusk. He did not ask us.
    Senator Miller. But if he had.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that is--I do not want to confuse two 
circumstances. If a full-scale evacuation program from Nigeria 
had to be undertaken, it is entirely possible that we would use 
such aircraft and such ships as might be available to move out 
these 6,000 Americans over there.
    Senator Miller. But suppose there is not a full-scale 
evacuation, but just a comparable situation of some mercenaries 
and the President of Nigeria contacts our ambassador and says 
he would like to have three aircraft with guards. I understood 
that you indicated we would not furnish those aircraft.
    Secretary Rusk. I am not sure that you were here at the 
beginning, Senator----
    Senator Miller. I was, yes.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I tried to distinguish between the 
two cases, first, on the basis of a very large international 
interest in and expressed interest in the situation in the 
Congo and, secondly, I indicated that we look upon Britain as 
having the primary role in any requirements of Nigeria in this 
situation.

                NATURE OF THE AMERICAN ROLE IN THE CONGO

    Senator Miller. Well then, does that mean that we have a 
primary role--that Britain can look to the United States as 
having the primary role for the Congo?
    Secretary Rusk. I think the problem is more generalized. I 
think there will be other countries giving assistance there. I 
suppose there must be 15 to 20 countries involved in the Congo 
at the present time giving assistance one way or the other. The 
Israelis have been training their paratroopers; the Belgians 
their ground forces; and the Italians some of their naval 
units. There are very substantial numbers of economic and 
technical assistance missions from various countries.
    I think you will see in the next day or two some 
announcements will be made about other countries giving 
particular assistance in this situation that we are talking 
about today.
    Senator Miller. Well, we did not apparently think that it 
was prudent to wait until these other countries joined with us 
in this assistance.
    Secretary Rusk. No. Our ambassador made it very clear 
during the day that there was a most urgent situation, based 
upon this rapidly growing racial feeling throughout the Congo 
and the real threat that that would get out of hand to the 
jeopardy of, among others, the American community there.
    Senator Miller. Well then, it gets down to where the timing 
of it, if not the act itself, the timing of it revolved around, 
the protection of Americans.
    Secretary Rusk. I think the urgency and timing are very 
closely related to that; yes, sir.

               SAYING AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ABOUT NIGERIA

    Senator Miller. If there was a similar timing and urgency 
with respect to Nigeria we still would not do it. Is that 
correct? Do I understand you correctly?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, if we get into Nigeria--and 
again I am not going to try to foreclose whatever might have to 
be done in an evacuation situation in Nigeria--we have those 
evacuation plans for many countries in different parts of the 
world. I do not want to inhibit those in any way.
    But I do point out that Nigeria is in a very delicate 
situation, and anything that we say from here about Nigeria one 
way or the other could endanger one or another group of 
Americans, and possibly both----
    Senator Miller. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. --who are in Nigeria. So we have tried to 
say as little as possible about Nigeria. We do not think 
Nigeria is in the same situation as the Congo, among other 
things because the territorial integrity of the Congo has been 
a major international interest in the last seven years.

               DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NIGERIA AND THE CONGO

    Senator Miller. What I am trying to do is get the precise 
essential difference here, and I believe I would gather from 
what has been said this afternoon that the establishment or the 
reinforcement of the Congolese government would tip the scales 
as distinguished from reinforcement of the Nigerian government.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, and there are other things that work 
in the Nigerian problem. The situation of the two sides is 
rather different than the situation in the Congo, to start 
with.
    Secondly, there are those, including heads of African 
states, who are working with the Nigerian government and the 
head of the government in Biafra to see if they can get some 
palaver started to resolve this problem by peaceful means. You 
have got quite a different situation in Nigeria than you have 
in the Congo.
    Senator Miller. And a different situation with respect to 
our continuing commitment to reinforce that government.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there is another major difference, 
and that is that in Nigeria, although it is split into two 
parts at the present time, in both parts there is a responsible 
government which has general control of all elements of the 
areas within each part, whether in Biafra or in the rest of the 
Federation.
    Here in the Congo you have a situation where there are two 
or three spots at the present time that are not under the 
control of the government, where nobody exercises control. This 
was one of our problems in the rescue operations in 
Stanleyville two years ago. There were wholly irresponsible 
elements there in Stanleyville holding a large number of 
hostages who were not responsive to any authority. No one could 
take responsibility in that situation. It was simply almost 
wild terrain in those circumstances.
    You do not have that. You have responsible authorities in 
both parts of Nigeria to whom you can look to such things as 
protection of your Americans under present circumstances.
    Senator Miller. Did Mobutu request just three aircraft 
originally or did he ask for more?
    Secretary Rusk. His specific request was for three 
aircraft.
    Senator Miller. One last question.
    Secretary Rusk. You see, he had had--there were four back 
there in 1964-1965. This time he asked for three.

                 WHY THE U.N. DID NOT TAKE JURISDICTION

    Senator Miller. One last question: Senator Fulbright asked 
you if the U.N. had been contacted on this, and I believe that 
you answered that they had been notified and there was no stir 
about it.
    But the question I would have would be why was not the 
United Nations asked to take jurisdiction over this?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, the Security Council met on Saturday 
on the Congo situation, and put it over--was it Saturday or 
Friday? I think it was Saturday.
    Mr. Palmer. I think it was Saturday.
    Secretary Rusk. And put it over to Monday for a second 
meeting. I think it is just primarily a question of time, 
Senator.
    Senator Miller. You do not think the Secretary General 
could have undertaken to authorize the dispatch of three 
aircraft----
    Secretary Rusk. No. This would have gotten into a great 
wrangle in the Security Council on the whole issue of peace-
keeping and the question of financing and the question of 
whether the Soviet Union would insist upon its special view of 
the peace-keeping operations. I think this would have, by that 
time, meant the events in the Congo could well have been 
completely out of hand from our point of view, from the point 
of view of the racial feelings that were building up.
    Senator Miller. This is a case where you, I presume, have 
preferred to go through the U.N. machinery, but because of the 
situation you really felt that you could not do it and meet the 
requirements.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we did feel that we could go through 
that process and meet the requirements.
    Now, when you----
    Senator Miller. I mean in time.
    Secretary Rusk. If there got to be a requirement, for 
example, on the part of the Congo for additional, say, ground 
troops, I think they would go direct to neighboring African 
countries for that assistance rather than go through the United 
Nations machinery, because the United Nations operations pretty 
well closed out, because of the almost impossible problems of 
financing and the problems of legislation in the U.N. I think 
they would do that bilaterally with their neighbors under the 
general rubric of the resolutions that are still standing on 
the U.N. books, and I think we will probably see certain 
African countries giving the Congo some help in the next few 
days on that very basis.

                   MOBUTU'S APPEALS TO OTHER NATIONS

    Senator Miller. Do you know whether or not Mobutu had 
requested such assistance from any other country before he came 
to our Ambassador?
    Secretary Rusk. He addressed an appeal to the members of 
the Organization of African Unity, that is, all the African 
states. He also sent an appeal to the Security Council to try 
to get the Security Council to hold the line around the Congo 
and not have others taking part in a conspiracy against the 
Congo. That resolution was passed yesterday, so he has been 
asking other governments for that help.
    Senator Miller. Thank you Mr. Secretary.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell?
    Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                          GREAT DANGER FOR ALL

    Mr. Secretary, you certainly are getting more than your 
share of crises. My own views are pretty well expressed, my own 
concern has been expressed by Senator Stennis in his own words.
    One query though. If there are 30,000 Belgians and 3,000 
Americans, why aren't they in just as great a danger, and why 
was there not concern for all the white people there and not 
just our own people?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, there was great danger for all of them. 
As a matter of fact, the fact that the mercenaries were 
Belgian, French, and Spanish nationals created great dangers 
for all the whites, but perhaps especially for the Belgians.
    Senator Pell. Then why should not the Belgians, who I am 
informed have similar type airplanes, why should they not also 
get involved and help us with these planes there, be ready to 
evacuate them?
    Secretary Rusk. This was discussed immediately with them at 
the same time the questions came up with us, that the Belgians 
have offered certain help in the Congo in this situation, but 
it has not yet been worked out with the Congo government. This 
has to do with crews and things of that sort.
    You see, there are a good many Belgian crews working in the 
Congo up to a point, and there is a question of sorting out 
which of these crews are thoroughly reliable and which of them 
might not do the job.
    Senator Pell. I was struck by one point you mentioned which 
seemed to me to be of some use to the administration from the 
domestic side, and that is the fact that by having white people 
supporting Mobutu's government, it takes a little of the sting 
away from the fact that he is opposed by white mercenaries. I 
am wondering why this point has not been emphasized more by the 
Department? It seems a pretty valid point.
    Secretary Rusk. I am not quite sure, Senator--you mean more 
emphasis ought to be put on the white mercenaries?
    Senator Pell. What I was driving at, you said one of the 
reasons for sending our planes in there was to show that some 
people in the white world were supporting the legitimate 
government of Mobutu, and this was not part of a white plot to 
throw them out.
    Secretary Rusk. Right.
    Senator Pell. This makes a great deal of sense from the 
world's viewpoint, and I was wondering why we had not made it 
harder.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I think this came out in the Security 
Council's discussions yesterday. Perhaps we ought to say more 
about it.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

                    MOBUTU'S RELATIONS WITH TSHOMBE

    Senator Mundt. Where was Mobutu when Tshombe was at one 
time a revolutionary and then head of the Congo government? Was 
he pro-Tshombe or anti-Tshombe?
    Secretary Rusk. I think Mobutu was a part of the coup that 
unseated Tshombe. But what was his job during the Tshombe 
period?
    Mr. Palmer. He was Commander-in-Chief of the Congolese 
forces.
    Senator Mundt. I thought they were on the same side.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, they were.
    Secretary Rusk. They were during a period of two years 
during the Simba affair in the East. They were working 
together.
    Senator Mundt. What has Mobutu's record of friendship been 
in the U.N. and other places? Has he been a steadfast friend of 
ours?
    Secretary Rusk. He has been very helpful internationally 
toward us. More importantly, he has worked with the moderate 
leaders of Africa in competition with the more extreme leaders 
of Africa, and has helped to increase the voice of the 
moderates in African affairs as well as in U.N. affairs.
    Senator Mundt. Where does he line up in the U.N.? Is he 
part of the Asian-African anti-American bloc or is he on our 
side?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, he is a part of the Asian-African 
community. I do not think one talks about its being a bloc much 
more because they divide up on most issues now.
    I would not call him, put him in an anti-American bloc; no, 
sir.
    Senator Mundt. You think he is a pro-American?
    Secretary Rusk. He is pro-Western in his general 
orientation.

                         IF HOSTAGES ARE TAKEN

    Senator Mundt. I would like to take the question Jack 
Miller was asking and put it before you straight.
    Secretary Rusk. Right.
    Senator Mundt. Assuming, as the ticker tape upstairs 
indicates, that the rebels are losing out in this contest--I do 
not know which side is right--but assuming they are losing out 
in accordance with the tape, and as they get squeezed into a 
narrower corner they get desperate, and seeing what we are 
doing over here, and they would pick up American hostages. What 
do we do on that? I am putting it on all fours.
    Secretary Rusk. They got to that point before there was any 
whisper of C-130's to get out there. They have occupied an 
airfield at Kisangani which is old Stanleyville, and they have 
a large number of non-combatants there under their control, 
Congolese, Europeans. We do not have very good information 
about exactly who is there, particularly about how many 
Americans are there, if any.
    We think there may be some. We think there may be some 
American news reporters who were out there on a tour when these 
things broke.
    There may be a member of, a sergeant member of our ground 
transport training team that was there to show them how to run 
trucks and maintain trucks, things of that sort. We just do not 
have much information because we are not----
    Senator Mundt. All right. We have some. They get desperate 
and they get pushed into a corner and they announce to us and 
the world, ``Either you come out there and pull the federal 
troops out of here and come to our assistance or we are going 
to blow the brains out of the Americans.''
    Then you have it squarely before you as to what you had in 
the Congo.
    Secretary Rusk. Could I comment briefly on this off the 
record?
    [Discussion off the record.]

                      SUPPORT FOR THE MERCENARIES

    Senator Mundt. You have got a lot of irritation left in the 
Congo other than that between Mobutu and the mercenaries. It 
would seem to me incredible that a couple of hundred harum-
scarum soldiers of fortune gathered together as mercenaries 
from four or five different countries could aspire to take over 
a country which is engaged in this kind of a venture unless 
they had some kind of support in the Congo. You said nothing 
about that. How about that? There must be some natives 
supporting them.
    Secretary Rusk. There were some Katangese forces with two 
or three of these mercenary groups. I do not believe those are 
going to amount to very much. But again out there in that part 
of the world, and particularly in the eastern Congo, a handful 
of mercenaries can go a long way from a military point of view, 
in the first instance.
    Now, relatively few mercenaries succeeded in breaking the 
back of that extremely leftist revolt in the eastern Congo two 
years ago when the Simbas and others were at war there, getting 
help from Sudan.
    Senator Mundt. They were on the side of the government?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Mundt. Now they are on the other side. They have to 
have some native support, some indigenous support.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there are at the present time--we are 
not even sure that some sort of palaver might not solve the 
problem.
    As I said earlier, I am not sure whether you were here, 
there were reports that this whole exercise was an exercise in 
collective bargaining for better pay for mercenaries, and we 
just do not know what their motives are, very frankly.
    Senator Mundt. What thought have you given though to the 
possibility that they are recruiting dissident indigenous 
people who do not like Mobutu for one reason or another or who 
may have been sympathetic to Tshombe or somebody else, so they 
have gotten together now, 500, and then 5,000, and then 50,000 
supporters, and are we going to get into this war to put down 
that kind of revolution?
    Secretary Rusk. I have not seen very much on that. My 
impression is that these people at Kisangani are surrounded by 
government forces. They do not have access to the countryside 
to do a lot of recruiting.
    Do you have anything, Mr. Palmer, on this question?
    Mr. Palmer. No. I think your impression is correct, Mr. 
Secretary. Most of them are in Kisangani and surrounded.
    Secretary Rusk. This does not appear to be any major 
political move with any roots in the country or that sort of 
thing.
    Senator Mundt. Granted that is so, surrounded by government 
forces and only 200 of them, why doesn't the government go in 
and push them out? 200 people in an enclave cannot hold up an 
army very long.
    Secretary Rusk. I suppose if nothing breaks on this shortly 
that is what will happen. But they have gone through a period 
of a couple of days of cease-fire trying to find a better 
answer because they are holding large numbers of people there 
at the airport as hostages, and that could be very rough on 
those people.
    Senator Mundt. Have they issued statements in the nature of 
a threat that ``Either you come to terms with us or we are 
going to cut the heads off the hostages?''
    Secretary Rusk. No, but they have not responded to a good 
many appeals being made to them to permit, say, aircraft to 
take out the hostages; take out the women and children and 
noncombatants who are there. So we literally do not know what 
their attitude is because they have not been responsible to 
efforts to communicate with them.
    Senator Mundt. But you do not think there is any 
possibility that they may be in charge of a developing 
revolution that can become a civil war?
    Secretary Rusk. I cannot preclude any possibilities in that 
situation, but it does not look that way now.
    Senator Mundt. Okay.
    The Chairman. Senator Byrd.

                     NOT WHOLLY A UNILATERAL ACTION

    Senator Byrd of Virginia. Thank you, Senator Fulbright.
    Mr. Secretary, one question principally for clarification. 
A primary mission or, if not, the primary mission of the planes 
is to support the government of the Congo, including the 
movement of military supplies, the movement of troops, and even 
the movement of troops to a third country--Rwanda, I believe 
you mentioned.
    Secretary Rusk. Rwanda as a part of its response to aid to 
the Congo has made its principal airfield available to the 
government of the Congo for transport purposes.
    Senator Byrd of Virginia. No, my question is this: Is it 
your judgment that this Congo operation should be unilateral 
action by the United States rather than by United Nations 
action?
    Secretary Rusk. I think that we will find that it is not 
wholly unilateral because there will be others who will be 
assisting in one way or another.
    I think it is within the framework of United Nations policy 
and resolutions which, among other things, include requests to 
all members to be of assistance to the Congo in maintaining its 
territorial integrity. But in terms of administering an 
operation of this particular sort and providing three aircraft 
in a hurry for the purposes for which I have stated here today, 
I just do not think the U.N. was in a position to do it.
    Senator Byrd of Virginia. Our government did not seek the 
approval of the United Nations?
    Secretary Rusk. Not prior approval before the planes were 
put in there. We did report it to the Security Council 
yesterday and there was no objection by anybody.
    Senator Byrd of Virginia. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Case.

               A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT

    Senator Case. Mr. Secretary, I have been trying to--every 
one here has, as the colloquy on the floor indicated--has been 
trying to assert some ideas on the problem of arriving at some 
sort of working arrangement or understanding about a working 
relationship between the President, the Secretary of State, on 
the one hand, and the Congress, on the other, in matters of 
this kind.
    What is your conception about the way this ought to be? You 
mentioned here, and you mentioned before a number of times, 
that the President has moved troops in without asking for 
Congress' agreement to a declaration of war.
    What is your conception about that?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it is not easy to generalize on a 
matter of this sort.
    But, in the first place, the Congress was not here when the 
decision had to be made. The committee was not available.
    I had hoped--I had taken up the possibility of meeting with 
the committee yesterday on another subject, and the 
understanding was there would not be enough members to make it 
possible; there would not be enough members present to make it 
possible--to schedule it that way.
    Now, we, I think, probably what we did here, was to under-
estimate what you refer to as changed conditions with regard to 
an action which seemed to us to be a repetition of an action we 
had taken several times before with respect to the Congo.
    Senator Case. I am not criticizing that.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand, but we did not have a 
resolution of Congress, for example, when we put the four C-
130's into the Congo in 1964-1965.
    Senator Mundt. You had a U.N. resolution.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, this was after the U.N. period. Of 
course, we have the same U.N. resolution today, for that 
matter.

                    STATING AMERICAN POLICY PUBLICLY

    Senator Case. I think what I am groping at, if we can just 
have an informal back and forth here, you know, trying to get--
I am not trying to write a doctoral thesis about it--but I 
think it is important. In all of these things, there is the 
insipient danger to American lives, the background of the 
United Nations interest and actions, the nature of the threat 
against a country. It seems to me that all of these things are 
things--and I put this to you--that could be said out loud and 
to the public and, at the time and in a way that--and again you 
have your own ideas as to what you can do without raising 
difficulties and that sort of thing--but it seems to me the 
American people would accept this. I accept what you did here. 
I think it makes sense for the reasons that you have given. Why 
can't most of these be stated publicly?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, the principal reason why our 
announcement on this was so terse and couched in the phrase in 
which it was couched, was that there was an extremely volatile 
and dangerous situation in the Congo. I hope the senators 
present and who have already left did not go before television 
out there and talk about these planes to evacuate Americans, 
because that is a very, very delicate situation in the Congo at 
the present time.
    We had to act promptly but in low key, and without 
disclosing all of the elements in the situation. To disclose 
all of the elements would have contributed to the very problem 
we were trying to avoid and prevent. So it is that kind of a 
problem we were faced with.
    Senator Case. I think it is a question though as to how 
much people think information broadcasted generally is good or 
bad. I cannot think of anything much that you have said that 
would be strange or surprising to anybody. Isn't this the 
reason for an understanding of this by the members of the 
United Nations, the government themselves?
    Secretary Rusk. I think the principal point that I had 
reference to was the relation to the possible evacuation of 
Americans. This is one of the greatest dangers and of great 
sensitivity.
    Senator Case. But the danger of a racial eruption.
    Secretary Rusk. I think that can be mentioned, yes.
    Senator Case. Yes.

                         A STATE OF NEAR PANIC

    Senator Mundt. Tell us why. I accept your word, but why 
would it be dangerous to say that we are going to evacuate 
Americans to protect their lives if that is necessary?
    Secretary Rusk. The judgment of our ambassador on the scene 
there was that the American community was in a state of near 
panic. If we had launched evacuation moves prematurely, this 
would have added to the panic and would have left the 
impression in the Congo that we were abandoning the Congo to 
whatever conspiracies of other white people they thought they 
were being subject to, whereas if we created the impression of 
calm, we were going to give the Congo government this tangible 
demonstration of our support and settle down the nerves of our 
own people. That, in turn, would help settle down the general 
situation and public opinion. It also gave the Congolese 
government and their officials something to lean on when they 
went to their own people and said, ``Well, now, you see it is 
not what many people have said. This is not a general white 
conspiracy against the Congo and its government. Treat the 
foreigners well. We do not think the governments of the world 
are in support of these mercenaries. Go home and get your work 
done and treat foreigners correctly.''
    The Chairman. Wasn't the origin of this so-called panic the 
government broadcasts?
    Secretary Rusk. At the very beginning.
    The Chairman. They are the ones who stirred it up and 
created the atmosphere of panic.
    Secretary Rusk. At the very beginning the government 
contributed to this because at that time they did not know what 
was behind this. They did not know whether a lot of people were 
waiting outside the country, waiting to come in behind these 
fellows, and they got very much disturbed about it when the 
affair first occurred.
    They have calmed down considerably since and have gone the 
other way in trying to calm down the other people. You are 
quite right, Mr. Chairman. The government's original broadcasts 
did help stir this up.
    Senator Case. That is all.
    The Chairman. Senator Morse.

                    PRESIDENTIAL USE OF ARMED FORCES

    Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, first I want to express my 
regrets in not being here all afternoon, but I was one of the 
conferees in a conference with the House on the railway case 
and, therefore, I missed the benefit of hearing your full 
discourse. Therefore I shall limit myself to the parts that I 
have heard.
    My questions will be few. Do you believe that the President 
has the power, acting alone in his Executive capacity, to order 
five, ten, fifteen, twenty more C-130's to the Congo if he is 
requested to do so?
    Secretary Rusk. I think if one looks back to these hundred 
instances in which Presidents have used the armed forces of the 
United States for a great variety of purposes, as a 
constitutional matter, I think he would have.
    I think now that the Congress is here, he would keep in 
touch as this situation developed. But I think, as a 
constitutional matter, he would have.
    The Chairman. If the Senator will yield on that----
    Senator Morse. I want to say good naturedly I do not think 
bad precedents ever make a good law. It would be bad precedent 
to give a constitutional right, nor does the practice of an 
unconstitutional course of action create a constitutional 
right.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not pretend, Senator, to be a real 
expert on this particular point.
    Senator Morse. I am not either. I am just seeking 
information and enlightenment on it.
    Secretary Rusk. I suppose that it varies greatly with the 
situation. We moved more planes than that into the Middle East 
to evacuate American citizens in the recent crisis, far more 
planes than that on the authority of the American President.
    Senator Morse. So far as I can read the record, although I 
hope we are going to have it, and you are quite right, we are 
entitled to make ourselves available to you for discussion of 
the Middle East. I hope we are going to have a detailed 
briefing on some of the aftermaths of that, which raises this 
very point. It is one thing to evacuate and it is another thing 
to say what we are going to do about the government.
    Senator Fulbright, you asked me to yield.

                   AMERICAN FORCES ON STAND-BY ALERT

    The Chairman. Before you came in, I had information that a 
number of Special Service troops at Fort Bragg had been put on 
the alert to be taken to the Congo in case of need.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, is your information--this is after 
the C-130's went there?
    The Chairman. Well, this call was yesterday, and this 
person said one of her relatives had called them and said he 
had come back from Vietnam and hoped to be getting out, and now 
had been put on the alert to go to the Congo, stand-by alert to 
go to the Congo, at a moment's notice.
    Just for your interest, that is put out by the State 
Department. That is an expression of their policy as of that 
moment.
    Secretary Rusk. I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to look into 
that point you raised. I think it is possible since we have----

                     NOT INCONSISTENT WITH VIETNAM

    The Chairman. The only reason I raise it is that clearly 
the government does believe it has authority to send any amount 
of troops it wishes to the Congo if it so desires.
    Secretary Rusk. No, not at all, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Why not?
    Secretary Rusk. Any amount of troops to the Congo?
    The Chairman. Certainly.
    Secretary Rusk. I do not understand that.
    The Chairman. I do not see that it would be entirely 
inconsistent with Vietnam or any other place. How many did you 
send to the Dominican Republic? You sent 22,000. You could have 
sent 100,000 if you wanted. I do not know why you could not 
send 100,000 or 200,000 into the Congo if you thought it 
desirable.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, it was not until seven months after 
the Tonkin Bay resolution that the number of troops in Vietnam 
were substantially above what President Kennedy had authorized 
to go in there.
    We have had long discussions on that point before, but that 
was not, in my judgment, without authority.
    The Chairman. I did not say it was without authority. You 
say you have authority. I do not know where you draw the line 
here. I do not want to interfere and take your time here.

                        A RULE OF REASONABLENESS

    Senator Case. If the Chairman would permit me to inject 
what I was trying to develop was a kind of rule of 
reasonableness or suitability that involves, among other 
things, close consultation with the Congress.
    Senator Morse. Might I suggest to my friend from New Jersey 
that if you have authority to pass the Tonkin Bay resolution 
granting power, you have the authority to pass a resolution 
restricting the power.
    Senator Case. Your last clause I did not hear.
    The Chairman. Restricting the power.
    Senator Morse. Now, Mr. Secretary, I am going to limit 
myself to what I heard in the discussion.
    I will ask you to co-sponsor my resolution, Senator.
    Senator Case. I am greatly honored to be asked. [Laughter.]
    Senator Morse. It would be a great honor to have you 
accept. [Laughter.]

              CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT

    Mr. Secretary, I heard you talk about Nigeria. Suppose the 
President, instead of following the course of action that he 
apparently followed in regard to Nigeria, had taken the other 
route and decided to send some reinforcement into Nigeria.
    If I understand you correctly you think he has the 
authority to do that. He would have had the authority to do 
that.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not feel that I am here to 
dispose of the constitutional prerogatives of the President 
without full consultation of the President and the Attorney 
General.
    Now, I would suppose----
    Senator Morse. I made my point.
    Secretary Rusk. To try to make it as precise as possible on 
one feature of it, I would suppose that if a situation in 
Nigeria got to a point where our evacuation plan, standing 
contingency plan for evacuation of American citizens become 
operative, that the President would, as he has done on many, 
many occasions before, all Presidents would have the authority 
to activate that evacuation plan.
    Senator Morse. Well, that raises the very point I want to 
raise. It is one thing for a President of the United States as 
Commander-in-Chief meeting an emergency that involves the 
protection of American lives to proceed, limiting his operation 
to the protection of those lives and the evacuation of the 
people, that is one thing. It is quite another thing for the 
President to assume that he has the power to send American 
troops abroad to bolster a foreign government, without 
Congressional authority, and I think that is one of the great 
constitutional issues that is before the American people at the 
present time. It disturbs me because I really think it is so 
unnecessary to create the split that the President is creating 
in this Republic at the present time.

                   MOVING AWAY FROM CO-EQUAL BRANCHES

    When Senator Stennis says things have changed in two years, 
they sure have, in regard to this split of opinion in our 
country as to whether or not we are moving in the direction not 
of three coordinate and co-equal branches of government, but 
one in which the Executive is step by step, and rather rapidly, 
taking on some of the characteristics of what, for want of a 
better descriptive term, we call government by executive 
supremacy.
    I do not think it is necessary. I never have thought it was 
necessary, for us to get into this kind of a conflict. We 
cannot listen to the discussions around this body without 
knowing it is a very serious matter, and that is why I was not 
engaging in any jocularity when I said to the Senator from New 
Jersey that we have to start thinking of different types of 
resolutions than the Tonkin Bay Resolution because I think a 
case can be made for the power of the Congress to restrict the 
President by way of resolutions.
    I do not think we ought to get into that kind of a hassle 
with the executive branch of government. I think you know me 
well enough to know that no matter what differences exist 
between me and the executive branch of government they are 
completely professional and derive only from my very sincere 
beliefs about what I think is a veering away from the true 
meaning of the separation-of-powers doctrine in this Republic.
    I think we are dealing here with an administration, many 
emergency situations have given rise to it, I realize that, but 
I think we are dealing with an administration that has gone 
further than any administration in our history in the exercise 
of what I think is pretty much arbitrary power on the part of 
the White House.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I have the impression that this 
administration has tried to consult the Congress, not always 
successfully, more frequently than any administration I know 
about.
    The last time I was involved in a colloquy of this 
particular subject, the issue was that some Members of the 
Congress felt we were trying to consult them too much. So it 
may be we need a little philosophy on both sides on this 
particular point. I can recall, too----

                     BRIEFINGS ARE NOT CONSULTATION

    The Chairman. May I say at this point, since I think I am 
involved in that, that I do not consider briefings in which the 
committee, such as you have had this afternoon, briefings in 
which we have had no opportunity to talk is consultation. That 
is lecturing under circumstances where examination and 
discussion are not appropriate. That is what I had in mind.
    I think you have reference to this kind of consultation 
which I consider to be the kind that was intended. I do not 
think there has been any undue amount of that. But we have had 
an awful lot of briefings at the White House which I do not 
consider to be the equivalent of that at all.
    Secretary Rusk. No. Frankly, I was referring to the 
discussion we had at the time of the Punta del Este Resolution.
    The Chairman.Well, that was all right. It was very good.
    Secretary Rusk. I can remember when Mr. Truman consulted 
the leadership at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War. 
He was advised to proceed on the basis of the power of the 
President, and then shortly after that, one of the leaders said 
he supported what he did but he did not support the way he did 
it. He should have come for a resolution. These are things that 
need sorting out, further discussion.
    Senator Morse. I agree.
    The only purpose of my comment here is to raise a situation 
that I know exists up here. I am not alone in this point of 
view. That is why you are getting, I think, the kind of 
critical reaction up here, because we have, I think, not 
established the relationships that are necessary.

                   U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BOLIVIA

    I will ask you one question dealing with this indirectly, 
and I think I owe it to you to ask it, and I owe it to myself 
to get the information. Can you tell the committee what 
military personnel the United States has, United States 
military personnel in any capacity, as advisers or in any other 
capacity, in Bolivia?
    Secretary Rusk. I will have to get the exact information. 
We have a small group there training, particularly a new 
battalion that is being organized for counter-guerrilla 
operations.
    Senator Morse. Guerrilla operations?
    Secretary Rusk. That is right.

                PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE UNLIMITED POWER

    Senator Morse. That gives concern to some--whether or not 
that should be done by executive action, or whether there ought 
to be not only consultation but advice and consent before we 
start sending American troops for any kind of military action 
into another country, be it Bolivia, the Congo or anywhere 
else. I think that what is developing here in this discussion 
this afternoon, and we are indebted to you for doing it, is the 
outlining of a framework of what I think is bound in the weeks 
ahead to open very important constitutional debate in the 
Congress as to how far the President should be allowed to go in 
exercising this discretionary power without a resolution passed 
by Congress approving it or without the Congress passing a 
resolution rejecting it if he attempts it.
    Even in the Tonkin Bay Resolution we had the rescission 
clause in Vietnam in which he was to be granted the power only 
as long as the Congress continued it, subject to rescission.
    Now, that seems to involve recognition on the part of both 
the Executive Branch and the Congress that this was not an 
unlimited power on the part of the President. That is all I 
wanted to raise, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, this is a very interesting 
point. I felt myself that President Johnson had wanted to 
consult the Congress more frequently on major matters that most 
Presidents have done outside the framework of, say, normal 
legislation.
    Now, in the case of the Food for India business, the 
President had authority under existing law, but because it was 
of a substantial size he said, ``I want to be sure the Congress 
and we move together on this before we move, even though I have 
the legal authority under the law,'' and so he came down and 
asked for the Food for India consideration.
    In the case of the Middle East, as you know, we were 
consulting pretty intensively on that situation as the matter 
developed, particularly prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

                     EXAMPLE OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

    I would be interested in knowing whether you felt that if 
the President sent a ship through the Strait of Tiran--I 
believe you were in favor of that at the time--whether that 
should have been preceded by a resolution of the Congress?
    Senator Morse. I am very glad you raised it.
    Secretary Rusk. You see, these are things which, by the 
time--this could make it very complicated, because if we were 
to expose that action ahead of time, there might be other ships 
waiting there and greatly complicate the issue on the ground.
    Senator Morse. I am very glad you raised the point. First, 
let me say that I do not know of anybody on this committee who, 
on the record, has praised President Johnson more than I have 
for the consultations that he has engaged in. I can give you 
Congressional Record citation after citation, as well as the 
records of this committee.
    My high approval of consultation, Punta del Este was an 
example of it, the Middle East was an example of it, I have 
said many times that the President, based upon his experience 
up here as Majority Leader and his other senatorial capacities, 
always recognized what I think is the true meaning of the 
advice and consent clause of the Constitution. But it is advice 
and consent before the fact, not after the fact.
    In regard to the Strait of Tiran, if you will read the 
entire speech I made on the floor of the Senate after a 3-hour 
briefing by you, and I take responsibility for the speech, but 
I want to say that as I listened to you, I thought the best 
service I could render was to make that speech on my own.
    Secretary Rusk. I am not criticizing the speech. I am just 
thinking of the procedures involved.
    Senator Morse. I went up and made it. Part of the speech 
would have to be read in light of what I said about the Strait 
of Tiran. I said this was a violation of international law 
rights of maritime nations, including our own. We cannot let 
Nasser get by with a violation of our rights to the high seas. 
He should be notified that we are going to send a commercial 
ship in there, and if he seeks to block the commercial ship 
and, of course, we have to exercise our naval rights by sending 
a naval vessel through or attempt to send it through, I would 
take the same position now.

                       JOINT ACTION WITH CONGRESS

    My direct answer to you is if the President had decided 
following that course of action, of course I think he ought to 
have consulted with the Congress, and given advance notice as 
to his plans to do that. You say there might be other ships 
waiting. I think just his announcement to the Congress of the 
United States that he was planning to do that if this blockade 
continued would have caused Mr. Nasser to stop blocking the 
Strait of Tiran. At least we ought to have tried it.
    But my point is that would have been in joint action with 
the Congress and not on the basis of what I think is a too 
extensive exercise of the Commander-in-Chief's power of the 
President doing it at his own discretion.
    I do not think he has the right to make war at his own 
discretion, and that could have led to making war.
    I think the Congress has to be consulted in that matter so 
that they know the course of action.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Well, in any event these three transport aircraft in the 
Congo do not involve the business of making war.
    Senator Morse. Well, not yet, not yet. But if we go on, 
anybody can build up a hypothetical. If you go on to the point 
of supporting a government, and the government should be 
subject to attack, and you have to move in to defend the 
government, you are at war and American soldiers start dying.
    I just happen to think that there is growing concern in 
this country about American soldiers dying abroad in carrying 
out the exercise of the Executive discretion. I think that is 
part of this issue.
    This is all I have.
    Secretary Rusk. I would not myself include Vietnam in that 
category.
    Senator Morse. I know you would not. But, of course----
    Secretary Rusk. There is great concern about Vietnam.
    Senator Morse. I know you would not, but you know I would.
    Secretary Rusk. I know.

                             AID TO ISRAEL

    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, there was one other matter 
that the committee discussed this morning, but since most of 
them have gone, I would think it is inappropriate maybe to 
raise it. This morning in the discussion of foreign aid they 
did send word or authorized the Secretary to give us a full 
report on the Israeli sinking of our ship. The matter of aid to 
Israel arose and, perhaps, we will just say now that at a later 
date, particularly on Friday, I am sure some of the members 
will want to raise that question.
    Secretary Rusk. All right, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Because they raised the question what about 
the aid in view of the attack on the Liberty ship.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, I will be glad to discuss that.
    I might just say at the moment that all the facts we are 
going to get, I think, are pretty well in, and we still have no 
satisfactory explanation of how it occurred.
    We will be putting a bill in to the Israeli government for 
reparations and damages for both personnel and for damage to 
the ship, and that will be coming along as soon as we get all 
the data together. That will be a very substantial bill.
    The Chairman. Well, I just wanted you to know it was raised 
this morning.
    Well, thank you very much.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. The hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Lausche, 
Church, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, and 
Cooper.
    To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. The 
Church motion to reduce Supporting Assistance from $720 million 
to $600 million and one year was approved by a roll call vote, 
9-2. Mundt motion to cut the Contingency Fund from $100 million 
to $50 million and one year was approved by a roll call vote, 
11-0.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JULY 13, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams, 
Mundt, and Cooper.
    To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JULY 25, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, 
Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and 
Cooper.
    The nominations of Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr., to be 
Ambassador to Pakistan, and Kennedy M. Crockett, to be 
Ambassador to Nicaragua, were ordered reported favorably.
    Ex. H, 90-1, Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations, was 
ordered reported favorably, and the Committee continued markup 
of S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. Senator Jack Miller testified 
on an amendment to the Aid bill.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]


                     FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1967

                              ----------                              


                        Wednesday, July 26, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 
S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, 
Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, 
Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    [This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for 
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions 
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the 
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the 
published hearings.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; 
 ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN OF 
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          BASE RIGHTS [P. 244]

    Now, the total on the first page of $596 million for 
military aid for 1968 is broken down into the six categories 
that you see there. The first category is base rights. For all 
practical purposes, these are rental payments. $45 million for 
rent. These bases are important to us. We believe we should 
continue to occupy them. If you feel otherwise, we can cancel 
the rent. If not, we must pay that.
    We think we have negotiated agreements that are as 
economical as practicable under the circumstances. Any 
significant change would, I think, lead to removal of our 
facilities from those particular base areas.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES [P. 244]

    The next, category three, summarizes the military aid 
program for 18 Latin American countries--$13 million of 
training and $32.5 million of equipment. A total of $45.5 
million in grant aid for 18 countries in Latin America. That, 
too, is down from the average for '61 and '62 of $63 million.
    We hope by 1971 to further reduce that $45 million to about 
$15 million, and, at that time, we hope to have eliminated all 
materiel aid and to be providing training only.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         POSSIBLE DEACTIVATION OF OUR BASE FACILITIES [P. 254]

    Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question on 
category 1? Have we been requested by any of these countries 
who are in category 1 to disband or deactivate or move out?
    Secretary McNamara. Libya has asked that we enter into 
discussions possibly leading to removal of some or all of our 
activities from our Libyan base.
    We believe that this was a move made for domestic, ie., 
Libyan political purposes. Since we received the request, we 
have entered into negotiations. We have been told privately 
that it is hoped we will move out of our facilities. I cannot 
tell you how these negotiations will conclude.
    In the case of Portugal, they have expressed considerable 
resentment over the restrictions we have imposed on the use of 
military aid equipment in Angola, and at various times----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Why did we oppose that?
    Secretary McNamara. Because we felt the military aid 
equipment has been distributed to Portugal for use in the 
common defense under NATO auspices, and NATO command, and it 
would be a diversion from the intended purpose for it to be 
used in Angola.
    Senator Hickenlooper. France used a lot of it in Algeria 
before de Gaulle got--went up in the luminous cloud in heaven.
    Secretary McNamara. Senator Hickenlooper, I am not familiar 
in detail with the use of French equipment in Algeria, and I do 
not want to comment on it, but I do know that we prohibited the 
use of military aid equipment in Angola by Portugal, and that 
this has raised some questions about the formal removal of our 
base rights in Portugal. This is in answer to Senator Carlson's 
question.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We seem to look with indifference on 
the use of Congolese equipment against Angola, as I read the 
papers, and that is about the only place I can get information.
    Secretary McNamara. I do not believe so, Senator 
Hickenlooper. I am not familiar with any failure on our part to 
restrict the use of Congolese equipment in Angola. I will be 
happy to look into it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think the equipment is used. I do 
not know about our restricting it. I do not know what we can do 
about it.
    Secretary McNamara. If it is furnished under military----
    Senator Hickenlooper. I just wonder whose ox is being gored 
over there is all. It is strange political----
    Secretary McNamara. We believe our ox will be gored if we 
furnish equipment to Portugal under a military aid program for 
use in NATO operations and it is diverted to use against 
Angola. In any case, I am answering Senator Carlson's question 
as to whether any of these countries asked us to restrict our 
occupancy rights. The answer is that, although the Portuguese 
were irritated by our position on military equipment in Angola, 
they have not asked us to deactivate our bases.
    Senator Carlson. How about the Philippines?
    Secretary McNamara. The Philippines have not asked that we 
restrict our occupancy but that we provide joint occupancy of 
one base, providing on the base for Philippines military 
headquarters, for example, and other activities. We have 
resisted this because the base does not permit joint occupancy.
    Senator Carlson. Thank you very much.

              ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THE PHILIPPINES

    The Chairman. With regard to the Philippines, is not $22 
million all the aid we give them?
    Secretary McNamara. The $22 million is all of the aid 
programmed for the Philippines, Mr. Chairman, excepting the 
assistance to Philippine forces in Vietnam which is not 
provided for under the military aid bill but under the 
legislation passed by the Congress and funded by the defense 
budget. I can give you that amount.
    The Chairman. How much is it?
    Secretary McNamara. For fiscal '66 it was $6 million. In 
fiscal '67, $17 million, and in fiscal '68, $4 million.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          BASE RIGHTS [P. 256]

    Senator Cooper. The total of your category one shows $45.3 
million.
    Secretary McNamara. Yes.
    Senator Cooper. I have added the figures for 1967 and they 
indicate $62.9 million. There is a reduction then in category 
one for fiscal year 1968?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, there is a $2.5 million reduction 
in Ethiopia, and I think Libya is down.
    Let me just check very quickly. Libya is down. Portugal is 
not. Spain is the big item which is down. It is really not a 
fair comparison, and that is why I did not show the '67 figure.
    It is true that the total is down, but the Spanish figure 
for '67 in a sense paid part of '68, so you would have to 
average the two, I think, Senator Cooper, but you are quite 
correct in pointing out that the payments are down.

             PHILIPPINE ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS

    The Chairman. I understand that in June of this year, Mr. 
Bundy telephoned and said that when President Marcos was here 
last spring the President committed the United States to equip 
engineering construction battalions for domestic Philippine 
use. The President also said in due course we would consider 
whether to equip an additional five battalions. The first 
operation has gone so well that the President now plans to go 
ahead with his second five battalions at a cost of about $9 
million. He says he needs no new money as the administration is 
counting on saving from deobligations in the Middle East.
    Is that your understanding of the situation?
    Secretary McNamara. The first three battalions have been 
MAP-supported for a number of years. When the Philippines sent 
their engineering unit to Vietnam, we agreed to fill out the 
equipment of these three construction battalions to help 
compensate for the loss of the engineers in the Philippines. 
The equipment was funded by the services as a Vietnam related 
cost. The fourth and fifth battalions were then squeezed into 
the FY 67 MAP by eliminating other items previously scheduled 
for Philippine military aid. Mr. Bundy's call referred to the 
President's decision to go ahead with the second ECBs. We 
recently increased the FY 67 Philippine MAP to $26.6 million to 
begin financing this decision.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
    The Chairman. Certainly.
    Senator Gore. If this is strictly for internal security, 
internal use, why is it not properly characterized as economic 
assistance? Is it not purely economic assistance?
    The Chairman. I assume that this is part of the 
consideration for sending those 2,000 troops to Vietnam, but I 
do not know. I cannot prove it.
    Secretary McNamara. Strictly speaking, not, Mr. Chairman. 
Let me give you my recollection. If it proves in error after I 
check the details, I will correct the record.
    My recollection is that the Philippine president was very 
much concerned by the Huk threat--Communist guerrilla groups 
beginning to become active in the rural areas. He wanted to 
build roads into those areas using military construction 
battalions in order to open them up, both to advance the 
economic welfare of the people and also to permit security 
forces to operate in such areas more effectively.
    He wanted the military aid program to be expanded by the 
amount necessary to establish the construction battalions, and 
when he came over here to discuss a number of items, including 
the movement of forces to Southeast Asia, he raised these 
issues. We were very reluctant either to add to his military 
aid program or to finance these construction battalions through 
any other source of funds. We had earlier agreed to fill out 
the TO and Es of the existing three ECBs using service 
``Vietnam related'' to compensate for the loss of the 
Philippine engineering folks going to Vietnam. During his 
visit, we did agree that, from a purely security point of view 
and without any consideration of forces going to Southeast 
Asia, it was wise for him to activate two additional 
construction battalions and use them for the purpose for which 
they were planned.
    We financed the 3rd and 4th ECBs from within the limits of 
the then-approved FY 67 Philippine military aid program of $22 
million.
    We have planned the financing of battalions 6 through 10, 
for which we made only a contingent commitment, by raising the 
FY 67 Philippine MAP to $26.6 million and by using 1968 funds.
    I will want to check all this, but that is my recollection.
    Senator Gore. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Mr. Chairman, I do not raise in this connection the 
advisability of the aid or inadvisability of it. It just seems 
to me from all the Secretary has said that it is almost purely 
economic aid, unless it was a quid pro quo for sending the 
troops to Vietnam. Whether good or bad, it seems to me that it 
ought to be characterized as economic aid. This provides no 
military assistance to the western defense, it seems to me.

         TOTAL U.S. AID IN FISCAL YEAR 1967 TO THE PHILIPPINES

    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I do not know how to phrase 
these questions precisely, because I do not know as much about 
the program as you do. Is it feasible for you to give us a 
figure of the total amount of money that either you or that the 
United States government gave to the Philippines in fiscal 
1967?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, surely, this goes far beyond my 
responsibility, Mr. Chairman, because it involves economic aid 
and distribution under P.L. 480.
    The Chairman. It is very difficult for us to get the 
information. We have had a long experience with the 
Philippines, and my impression is that we have continued to 
support a very corrupt regime there. The wisdom of our program 
bothers me in the Philippines, because they have from time to 
time been able to milk us of many millions of dollars, hundreds 
of millions of dollars, and I am a little bit impatient about 
them continuing to get it in this fashion.
    You are familiar with some of those past examples, are you 
not?
    Secretary McNamara. Well, I am familiar with the military 
aid portion of it, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. You are familiar with it.
    Secretary McNamara. I would be very happy, if you wished to 
ask me to do so, to collect from the other agencies of the 
government the data on economic assistance and other assistance 
to the Philippines to add to the $22 million of military aid 
that we are proposing.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           CRITERIA APPLIED IN TRANSFERRING PROGRAMS [P. 258]

    Senator Gore. I can see where you anticipate an expansion 
in Thailand because you now have got them almost directly 
involved in the Vietnam war, but I do not see that has any 
application in Laos.
    Secretary McNamara. It is even worse in Laos.
    Senator Gore. They are not involved in the action.
    Secretary McNamara. They are involved.
    Senator Gore. In Vietnam?
    Secretary McNamara. They are involved.
    Senator Gore. Not in Vietnam, however.
    Secretary McNamara. But they are involved in very 
substantial combat operations.
    Senator Gore. Largely internal. It seems to me--I do not 
quite see that it would be directly related to the Vietnamese 
war and I can see the prospect of the expanding of it.
    Secretary McNamara. It is very directly related to the 
Vietnamese war.
    Senator Gore. They will have trouble anyway.
    Secretary McNamara. The combat in Laos is affected by the 
volume of movement from North Vietnam to South Vietnam of men 
and materiel through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The amount of 
ammunition expended, for example, and the number of combat 
engagements is very directly related to the infiltration by 
North Vietnam into South Vietnam, and we found it almost 
impossible to predict accurately 18 months in advance the 
expenditures of ammunition in Loas. They became very, very 
heavy.
    As you can see, expenditures of ammunition and equipment 
almost are running $100 million in a year now. It was to take 
account of this unpredictable character of the Laotian 
expenditures that we suggested Loas be removed from the 
military aid program.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               F-111 SALE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM [P. 264]

    Out of our $11 billion of foreign sales and commitments 
between '62 and '67, the total involved in that single sale is 
on the order of $800 million. I have forgotten whether it is 
$800 million or $1 billion, but it is in that area. And quite 
frankly, I recommended against it to the Prime Minister. He had 
Defense Minister Healy, Foreign Secretary Brown, as I recall, 
and the British ambassador at the meeting with me on the 
subject. It was a very delicate issue involving all of the 
British Cabinet and the British Cabinet which met on it several 
different times. The reason it was delicate was that it 
involved the potential cancellation of the TSR-2 aircraft on 
which they had already spent over $400 million of development 
costs and on which, at that time, they had employed some 24,000 
British citizens. The question was whether they should 
terminate that operation--the TSR-2--disemploy the 24,000 
British citizens, and buy the F-111, or whether they should 
not.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            POSSIBILE FURNISHING OF ARMS TO JORDAN [P. 265]

    Secretary McNamara. Yes. May I comment on three points. Who 
will approve it? What has been the past action? Where do we 
stand today?
    First, there will be no military assistance, grant or 
sales, to Jordan that is not personally approved by the 
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. That has been the 
practice in the years that I have been associated with it, and 
it will be the practice in the future.
    Secondly, what was the past policy? I want to speak on a 
very delicate matter and ask your cooperation in withholding 
this information from public forums.
    The fact of the matter is that the recent agreements with 
Jordan--and when I say recent, I mean extending back, say, two 
or three years during which time agreements were made that 
totaled something on the order of 60 odd million dollars worth 
of supplies for an extended period of delivery--have, generally 
speaking, been made pursuant to the decision of the Israeli 
government. I want this clearly understood. There are some 
qualifications to this, and I do not mean to say that they 
approved every single transaction. But on the more important 
transactions, they were asked to make the decision. I 
personally negotiated with Eban and, as a matter of fact, I 
insisted that the Israeli government sign a statement 
indicating their approval of the supply of arms to Jordan.
    Now, why did we do this?
    Because we didn't want to feed the fires of an arms race in 
the Middle East. Our policy is quite the contrary. Nor did we 
want one of the parties publicly objecting to the supply to the 
other party.
    Beyond that, we felt that the independence of Jordan and 
the character of its political life was a matter of primary 
concern to the Israelis, not to us.
    As you pointed out a moment ago, we do have interests in 
the Middle East. Our private corporations have oil interests 
there and financial interests. The Western European nations 
depend on Middle Eastern oil to a considerable degree.
    But, nonetheless, we felt that the primary interest was 
Israeli interest, and the primary responsibility must be that 
of Israelis.
    So we said in effect to Israel, ``You decide''----
    Senator Gore. What do you mean by primary?
    Secretary McNamara. The primary responsibility for the 
decision as to whether we would or would not supply arms to 
Jordan must be Israel's and we said to them in effect, ``You 
decide. We have been requested to supply arms to Jordan. Those 
arms might be used against you. If the arms are not supplied, 
almost surely the current government will be overthrown. It 
will be replaced by another government. The Soviet Union will 
be the arms supplier to Jordan and may have important influence 
in this country that is on your border.''
    And a very extended border indeed.
    ``But this matter is of so much greater importance to you 
than it is to us we are not going to act unless you certify we 
should act in a certain way. We want to tell you also that you 
must bear the responsibility for your decision. And if you 
decide we should not supply arms to Jordan, and King Hussein is 
overthrown, and the Soviets do become the primary supplier, and 
they do introduce military personnel or otherwise affect the 
security of your border, that is your decision and we don't 
want afterwards to have you claiming it is ours.''
    Quite frankly, we put it just that directly, and after it 
was all over I said, ``Sign here.'' I don't want this 
discussed; and if it is to be discussed, I will deny it, 
because the very life of some of these people is involved.
    Senator Symington. If the Senator will yield, you don't 
have to deny it. I want to completely confirm it with the 
gentleman in the room who was Ambassador to Jordan. I had asked 
the Israeli representative if he had any objection to selling 
the F-104's to Jordan and he said none whatsoever.
    Mr. Macomber was in the room.
    Secretary McNamara. These are delicate matters and, as I 
say, I would have to deny it. These are extremely delicate and 
obviously cannot be carried out without the Secretary of State 
and Secretary of Defense.
    Senator Mundt. The same with Saudi Arabia?
    Secretary McNamara. That instance is different. And I don't 
recall that we asked Israel to pass on Saudi Arabian matters; 
but I do know Israel is interested in, I will say, driving a 
wedge between the moderate Arabs among whom one would sometimes 
classify Saudi Arabia, and the radical Arabian nations, which I 
would say are Syria and Iraq and Egypt. So that I believe that 
Israel would favor the Saudi Arabian policy we followed, 
although I personally have not discussed it with any 
representatives of that government.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY [P. 266]

    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman--I hope from--the Secretary has 
misspoken himself a bit.
    Secretary McNamara. I hope not, but I may have.
    Senator Gore. Because I can understand why in such delicate 
matters we would obtain the advice of the Israeli government. I 
don't really think we ought to relegate to them the decision-
making on a matter of this delicacy, but I have used my time 
and Senator Symington is chairman of the Middle Eastern 
subcommittee, and I want to defer.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY [P. 268]

    Secretary McNamara. Yes, there is no question but what we 
have more evidence here of lack of intent to consciously attack 
a U.S. vessel than we had there.
    May I finish by taking just one second to say I would like 
to go back and examine the record of the Tonkin Gulf incident 
which occurred three years ago, and on which my memory is a 
little hazy, to determine the evidence of conscious intent of 
attack. I think it is very clear. I think the evidence is that 
our communications intelligence intercepted orders that 
indicated intent to attack.
    There was no evidence of that in the case of the Liberty.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               U.S. MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR [P. 270]

    Senator Hickenlooper. I think this comes under the heading 
of a little international humor maybe, or military humor. In 
the period of 1950-1967, El Salvador, which has a total of 
4,300 men in its armed forces, received $5.3 million in 
military assistance, considerably more than a thousand dollars 
per man.
    A research memorandum of the Department of State on the 
recent border hostilities between El Salvador and Honduras 
includes this statement:

    The Salvadoran government displayed considerable 
understanding and tolerance of Honduran domestic problems, 
although it is somewhat red-faced by the performance of its 
army which, according to our Ambassador, would surely 
annihilate itself by starvation if it attempted to camp out for 
more than a week.

    Has our military aid to El Salvador gone down the drain or 
what?
    Secretary McNamara. Senator Hickenlooper, the military 
assistance proposed for El Salvador in Fiscal 68 totals 
$700,000. It would provide two light helicopters, certain 
training ammunition and miscellaneous minor supplies. Beyond 
that, I can't tell you what the $700,000 is for.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I am not going to make an issue out 
of it. Apparently they tried to get a quick battle and get back 
to the kitchen for meals. [Laughter]
    Senator Hickenlooper Well, I think that is all. I will not 
take any more time.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           DEFENSE DECISION ON IMPORTANT ARMS SALES [P. 274]

    Secretary McNamara. I, myself, had serious questions about 
each of them. I believe I am correct in saying that, in every 
instance, we substantially modified the request, and these were 
requests from foreign governments for these sales. I know that 
in the case of Iran, I personally cut the Iranian request back 
to the level at which it was ultimately settled contrary to the 
advice of our ambassador, who by the way was personally 
involved in this, and contrary to the advice of some other 
representatives of the government, but with the clear support 
of the Secretary of State.
    In the case of F-5's to Morocco, my recollection is that we 
substantially reduced the number, again with the support of the 
Secretary of State.
    In the case of A-4's to Argentina, there was a long, 
extensive negotiation and, I think, a very controversial one. 
The Secretary of State and Defense participated directly in 
that negotiation.
    The sale of F-104's to Jordan, I alluded to earlier.
    I personally handled this with the foreign minister of 
Israel, as well as with the King of Jordan and the official who 
serves him as both defense minister and chairman of the joint 
chiefs. I did so with the full knowledge and support of the 
Secretary of State.
    These are typical sales agreements, every one of which, if 
it is of any importance, comes to my direct personal attention.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            SENDING OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO GREECE [P. 276]

    Senator Symington. Did the Defense Department decide to 
keep sending light equipment to Greece after the coup?
    Secretary McNamara. The Secretaries of State and Defense 
discussed the flow of military aid equipment to Greece after 
the coup, and agreed that it should be substantially reduced. 
We have since that time withheld deliveries of such items of 
equipment as tanks, combat aircraft, combat naval vessels, and 
other major items. We are continuing to deliver such things as 
spare parts and some items of light equipment such as radios 
and rifles.
    I know that all the major items have been held up, but I am 
not entirely confident of what is moving in the way of light 
equipment other than spare parts.
    Senator Symington. Well, my memory is not too good, but I 
think that at one time Secretary Battle, for whom we have great 
respect down here, told us there had not been any tanks 
delivered, but then we found out or he found out, I forget 
which came first, the chicken or the egg, that some did. He was 
quite upset about it, but based on the previous testimony, I 
think we straightened it out. Did you know that heavy tanks 
were delivered after the coup, even though they had been loaded 
before the coup?
    Secretary McNamara. I do not believe I knew it, Senator 
Symington, and I am not absolutely positive of it even now.
    My understanding was that we stopped all deliveries that we 
could. I happened to be in Paris a few days after the coup--I 
would say within four or five days afterward--at a NATO meeting 
attended by the new Defense Minister of the Greek government. I 
told him that we could not continue the military aid program as 
we had initially planned it, and as we had agreed to, unless we 
had assurances that the constitutional processes would be 
reestablished and the constitutional guarantees reaffirmed. 
This was the initiation of the program to restrict deliveries 
of what I will call heavy equipment or sophisticated equipment 
to Greece.
    I believe that we took every action that was within our 
power to stop such deliveries. Whether or not a vessel that had 
been loaded was in transit, or then being unloaded, or about to 
go into dock to be unloaded, I frankly do not know.
    Senator Symington. Could you have somebody on your staff 
give us the story?
    Secretary McNamara. I will check it and let you know. I do 
know we diverted vessels that were on the water already loaded 
and moving to Greece. I do not know that we diverted all, and I 
do not know whether there were some being unloaded at the time.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

                MILITARY SALES AND AID TO LATIN AMERICA

    Secretary McNamara. There is one point not related 
specifically to the basic issues of the Export-Import Bank that 
I hope we can discuss later because I would like to comment on 
it, and that is sales and aid to Latin America.
    As the committee knows, these are governed by a maximum 
limit established by the Congress which requires that we not 
deliver either through grant aid or sales, a total of more than 
$85 million worth of equipment to the twenty countries of Latin 
America. That is a well-established limit that we, of course, 
adhere to.
    Senator Symington. A question has been handed me by Senator 
Gore, presumably from the staff. It is understood that the 
Senior Interdepartmental Group has recommended to the President 
the present embargo on all shipments to Greece be lifted. Is 
that a matter of Executive privilege or----
    Secretary McNamara. Well, I guess it is a matter of 
executive privilege, but I won't stand on that, Senator 
Symington.
    One of the problems involved in understanding the 
authorities for grant aid and sales was in the interpretation 
given in the testimony on the role of the senior 
Interdepartmental group. The senior Interdepartmental Group 
does not act independently of the Secretaries of State and 
Defense and the recommendation, if they made one, has not yet 
come to me. I will be quite frank to tell you that we have had 
continued resistance from the Greek government to our policy, 
and very recently some suggestion that we reconsider it by our 
Ambassador to Greece. But we have not made any decision on it 
yet.
    I think it was Secretary Rusk's feeling, as it is mine, 
that we should use this as a lever to move them toward some 
program of developing a constitution and putting it before the 
people to be voted upon, and some program for moving back 
toward constitutional government.
    They are beginning to move in that direction. They have 
developed some tentative plans for preparing a constitution and 
submitting it to the people. Whether this should be sufficient 
basis for reexamination of our policy, I do not know. I will 
have to examine it some time in the next few weeks when these 
papers come to my attention.
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS IN VIETNAM [P. 278]

    Senator Aiken. Would you say that military assistance 
programs in these other countries attest to the failure of the 
programs as South Korea attests to the success of it?
    Secretary McNamara. Senator Aiken, I think that is a 
reasonable question. In the case of the Taiwanese, the South 
Vietnamese have not asked the Taiwanese to provide military 
forces, because if they were provided, it would enlarge the 
conflict between Taiwan and Red China. It is that kind of 
action which has differentiated Taiwan from South Korea.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     CATEGORY 1 ASSISTANCE [P. 279]

    Senator Carlson. But I did want to mention one other thing. 
You brought up this morning this category one, and I would like 
to ask, because of these countries you mentioned, for instance, 
Libya. I heard reports that they would be very happy if we 
removed our operations in that country, and you stated that 
there had been some discussions which you thought were maybe 
political rather than actually their desire. But there is 
another problem there that enters into that, as I see it, and 
this is an executive session here, and I have a classified 
paper in which we are supplying them or selling them or through 
grants a substantial amount of military equipment this year; is 
that correct?
    Secretary McNamara. The grant program is $3.6 million and 
the FY '68 credit sales program is on the order of $12 million, 
Senator Carlson. I am giving you this from memory, and I may be 
somewhat off.
    Senator Carlson. My point was this----
    Secretary McNamara. I may have overstated it.
    Senator Carlson. I am going to read the first paragraph. 
This is an executive session. This is a letter dated April 6, 
1967, signed by Mr. Gaud:

    I recommend that you make the determination necessary to 
permit the furnishing to Libya of certain defense services on a 
grant basis. The defense services to be so provided are a 
portion of the maintenance services element of a proposed $5.1 
million sales transaction under which Libya, at a cost to it of 
$43.1 million, would purchase on a cash basis ten F-5 aircraft, 
spares, training and parts of the maintenance services not 
covered by the grants.

    I raise this question because here we have $3.6 million for 
an air base and for gunnery training, and just looking at it 
from a country boy's standpoint, you get the impression we are 
maintaining that base in order to sell aircraft.
    Secretary McNamara. No, sir; quite the contrary.
    On the Libyan transaction, I said this was $3.6 million in 
grant aid and $12 million in sales in 1967. I think it may be 
$14 million in sales in 1968. There is strong opposition to 
selling aircraft.
    Secretary Rusk and I struggled with this for weeks before 
we approved the transaction. Not only do we have a question 
about the $14 million, but we would like to hold it much lower. 
There is no feeling among any of us that we would maintain a 
base there to sell aircraft.
    I would be absolutely frank with you. To turn it around, I 
would like to get rid of the base so we would not have to sell 
supplies to them.
    Senator Carlson. You did sell them, did you not, if you 
follow through----
    Secretary McNamara. The $51 million does not strike a 
responsible chord. I do not mean to say it is in error, but I 
just do not remember that particular amount. The amounts I do 
have here are for 1967 and 1968. There was no credit sale in 
1967, and a $14 million credit sale is planned for 1968. It is 
possible, in fact I am sure, it extends beyond 1968.
    I will be absolutely frank with you, if I knew any way to 
get rid of that base and operate without it, I would propose to 
do so and avoid the pressure that they put on us for either 
grants or sales aid.
    There is, however, one other matter to consider in 
determining whether we should make sales to them, and that is 
the relationship of Libya to Egypt. At times Egypt has been 
quite hostile to Libya, and there has been indication that she 
was seeking to lay groundwork for military action against 
Libya, which would be, I think, contrary to our interests. 
Therefore, under certain circumstances it might, in the opinion 
of the Secretary of State, be desirable to provide either grant 
or sales assistance to Libya to allow her to protect herself 
against her neighbors. But short of that, I would like to see 
us try to work out of that base and avoid these pressures on us 
for both grants and sales assistance to Libya. I do not know 
when we can do that.
    Senator Carlson. Well, this paragraph I just read was dated 
April 6 and signed by Mr. Gaud to the President.
    Secretary McNamara. I am sure it is correct. I just do not 
happen to recall beyond 1968.
    Senator Carlson. On April 8, here is a Presidential 
determination, so this went to the very top, and the President 
recommends that this sale be made, and on that basis, as I 
understand it, this is a cash sale.
    Secretary McNamara. I believe it is a credit sale, Senator 
Carlson. I would be----
    Senator Carlson. Would that be through the Export-Import 
Bank?
    Secretary McNamara. Let me see if I can tell you--no, it is 
a cash sale.
    Senator Carlson. I bring this up for the very reason that 
here we have $3.6 million to maintain the base and, at the same 
time, following through on this letter and the President's 
recommendation of it--the President recommends it--it is signed 
here, that we sell them a total of $51 million.
    Secretary McNamara. We have a clear policy of shifting from 
grant aid to sales where we can do so.
    If it is decided that a country must have military 
equipment, and it is decided that it can afford it, to the 
maximum extent possible we shift from grant aid to sales. But, 
at the same time, we hold the total to the absolute minimum 
consistent with our other objectives.
    In this instance, our other objectives are: one, to 
maintain occupancy of the base in the short-run; and, two, in 
certain circumstances to permit Libya to deter aggression by 
her neighbors.
    Senator Carlson. Just one question. You said there were 
great objections to the sale. Was that from the departments? 
Who were the objectors to the sale?
    Secretary McNamara. I would rather not comment on it.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    The Chairman. Back on the record.
    Senator Gore. I just have a quick question. I understand 
you to say a few moments ago that you would like very much to 
be rid of the Wheelus Air Base.
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, I would, Senator Gore.
    Senator Gore. Then why do we stay there?
    Secretary McNamara. Well, it is a gunnery range, plus a 
communications facility, plus----
    Senator Gore. Whatever it is we would like to get out; they 
have asked us to get out.
    Secretary McNamara. We have not been able to develop a 
satisfactory substitute gunnery range. Possibly, as the years 
go by and we change our equipment in Europe, we can exercise 
those planes elsewhere than in Africa. But we have not had 
planes, for example, that can fly from bases in Europe back to 
U.S. gunnery ranges, and the North African gunnery range has 
been of inestimable value in carrying out our training there. 
This is one of the major reasons why the Libyan base has been 
essential.
    Quite frankly, I keep hoping that, if and when we replace 
the European equipment with F-4's and F-111's, we can find 
other gunnery ranges than the Libyan one. I must confess that 
the consensus of the experts in the department is against me on 
this, but I continue to hope that it may be possible; and I 
will guarantee you it will be in three to five years.
    Senator Gore. Thank you, Senator Carlson.
    Senator Carlson. Would you put in the record, if it is not 
too classified, what this $51 million is?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, I would be delighted to. I think 
an important element of it is F-5 aircraft. I have forgotten 
the number, something like twelve or twenty, some such number 
as that.
    The Chairman. Are you through?
    Senator Carlson. Yes.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt?
    Senator Mundt. Will you give us a little more information 
of what you were alluding to on page two when you said that the 
Laotian forces are now constantly engaged in combat operations 
mostly associated with the free world effort in Vietnam.
    How sizable is the Laotian force fighting on our side?
    Secretary McNamara. May I ask General Wheeler to comment on 
that?
    General Wheeler. What the Secretary was referring to, 
Senator Mundt, is the fact that the North Vietnamese, in order 
to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex that leads from North 
Vietnam to the Panhandle of Laos, have introduced combat troops 
there to protect these lines.
    Furthermore, over a period of a number of years, they have 
been conducting an annual dry season campaign to take over the 
plain area contiguous to Luang Prabang, which would eventually 
lead them down to the Mekong. So, really, you have two 
activities going on. You have a defensive action by Laotian 
forces in the North--that is in the Plains area--where they are 
protecting their own territory. In the South, in the Panhandle 
area, they continue to hold under Laotian control about one-
half of the Panhandle area--the western portion of it--and they 
are resisting the efforts of the North Vietnamese to expand 
that area.
    Now, as to the number of Laotians that might be involved at 
any given time in actions directly related to the Vietnamese 
effort, this would be hard to say. I would say that probably 
today there are on the order of 6,000 or 7,000 Laotians who are 
engaged in the Panhandle area in hanging on to what they have.
    Further to the North----
    Senator Mundt. Friendly Laotians now?
    General Wheeler. These are friendly Laotians.
    As I am sure you know, you have a combination of hostile 
forces, particularly in the North. You have what they call the 
Pathet Lao. These are the Communist-oriented Lao who are 
stiffened up by a sizable infusion of North Vietnamese 
battalions.
    In the North, there must be something on the order of 
20,000 troops involved at all times.

                        U.S. POLICY IN THE CONGO

    Senator Mundt. Tell us why the Congo, Mr. Secretary, is so 
important to our national security, our overall posture in the 
world. We have a little sizable contribution here, we have some 
planes over there, which are almost engaged in military 
activities now, and I guess you were not here when we had our 
colloquy with Secretary Rusk, manifesting some committee 
disenchantment over this idea of playing at war over there in 
the Congo.
    Secretary McNamara. I think this is a matter of judgment, 
Senator Mundt. Perhaps we have a difference of judgment on it.
    There were three transport aircraft, C-130's, moved to the 
Congo. The danger----
    Senator Mundt. We were told they would be out in two weeks. 
Are they out?
    Secretary McNamara. I cannot speak for what you were told. 
I never made that statement.
    Senator Mundt. Secretary Rusk said they would be out in two 
weeks.
    Secretary McNamara. One is out, and the other two are 
scheduled for removal in the near future.
    In any case, there may be a difference of judgment, as 
there may be with respect to many matters of foreign and 
defense policy, and my judgment is very clear on this.
    In retrospect, it was an excellent move. Our ambassador 
there believes it was the introduction of these three transport 
aircraft that deterred the murder of large numbers of Western 
Europeans and U.S. citizens. I believe there were ten to twenty 
individuals murdered as it was. There were large numbers of 
Americans whose lives were at risk.
    It is said today that it was the introduction of the three 
transport aircraft that changed the plans of the opponents of 
the government and, particularly, the mercenaries. I can only 
repeat to you what I received through the intelligence services 
and through the diplomatic channels. My judgment today is that 
it was a very wise move indeed.
    Senator Mundt. I was not trying too much to interrogate you 
about the planes as to inquire as to what we are going to do 
with the $3.5 million or $3.6 million, whatever it is, that you 
plan to put into the Congo in this bill, because it looks to me 
like Mobutu is not the kind of fellow we would be supporting if 
he were the head of the government of Greece. You have got some 
pretty good criteria about that, but we do not seem to have any 
criteria about supporting him.
    Secretary McNamara. We are trying to provide a minimum of 
support to introduce some stability into that government. $3.5 
million, as you point out, is the amount involved. It provides 
vehicles and communication equipment, certain spare parts for 
the units that he has.
    Senator Mundt. Any weapons?
    Secretary McNamara. I think there are some weapons, but it 
is primarily vehicles and communications equipment and spare 
parts.
    I will be happy, if you wish, to examine the details and 
let you know whether there are any weapons involved.
    Senator Mundt. Are we going to look pretty bad before the 
world if we are supporting that kind of an administration, 
which then results in murdering Tshombe when he gets over 
there, without a fair trial?
    Secretary McNamara.Yes, I think so. But I am not at all 
sure I know what the better policy is. I myself believe we have 
saved American lives by this policy.
    Senator Mundt. By the three planes.
    Secretary McNamara. By the three planes.
    Senator Mundt. There is no use arguing it. It is pure 
speculation.
    Secretary McNamara. By the three planes and past actions. I 
think we also prevent a coup from developing by our $3.5 
million program. But I am prepared to admit that the government 
of the Congo is in many respects an irresponsible government. 
Obviously, I would deny it, if it were stated in a public forum 
that I said so. I do not, however, know personally of a better 
policy to follow than the one we are following.
    Senator Mundt. No, but I would insist, as far as we 
possibly can, that Tshombe, if he goes back there, should have 
a fair trial--a man, as I understand it, who was a friend of 
the United States.
    Secretary McNamara. I can tell you that we certainly will 
insist as far as we can. But we do not control the government, 
and I do not want to predict what will happen to him.
    Senator Lausche. I concur with what you have said, Senator. 
It would be tragic to have Tshombe, who has definitely been our 
friend, deemed guilty.
    Senator Mundt. I feel like an accessory to the crime.
    Senator Lausche. Without a trial, tried in absentia.
    Secretary McNamara. I can only tell you that we will use 
every influence we have at our command to prevent it. But I 
cannot predict that we will succeed.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            PROPOSED FLAT LOAN FOR AUTOMOBILE PLANT [P. 289]

    Senator Mundt. I do not totally disagree with you. But it 
seems to me you have a great gap when you say an automobile 
complex like that has no military significance to Russia.
    Secretary McNamara. I do not believe it does, sir.
    Senator Mundt. That has not been our experience in this 
country.
    Secretary McNamara. It has in the sense that you cannot 
convert an auto factory to produce military equipment. You can 
stop production of the automobiles, with great resistance from 
the public, and take the people who produce the automobiles, 
and after a long time convert them to producing something else; 
but it is a long time indeed, as all of you know who have 
watched Ford Motor Company convert to B-24 production in World 
War II.
    General Wheeler. May I add something?
    Secretary McNamara. General Wheeler asked if he might add 
something.
    General Wheeler. Senator Mundt, this was a question 
discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because we wanted to 
determine to what degree this might improve the Soviet 
capability. We came down to the view that the accretion of 
strength was not appreciable, and the reason is that the 
Soviets have plenty of industrial resources today to turn out 
all of the military equipment that they need.
    In other words, they have no shortage, so far as we can 
determine, of a capability to produce tractors, and that means 
they can produce tanks because they have treads. They turn out 
all the artillery and all the trucks they need for military 
purposes, so our corporate judgment was that probably this 
would, as the Secretary said, in the long term, divert 
resources that would be available for military programs into 
domestic civilian programs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                      FUTURE TROOP LEVELS [P. 297]

    Secretary McNamara. Let me put this aside and comment on 
the more specific questions you have asked, as to what 
decisions have been made regard to future troop levels.
    No final decisions have been made. General Wheeler, General 
Westmoreland and I have discussed possible troop levels with 
the President. I think it is clear that they will have to be 
increased above the levels that had been considered this 
spring. Exactly how much is not clear. Part of it depends on 
the actions of the South Vietnamese government and other allied 
nations.
    Since we had these discussions with the President, you may 
have noticed that the South Vietnamese government has stated 
publicly that it plans to increase the size of its forces.
    Senator Case. It has made that announcement. The question 
of the adequacy, 600,000, and so forth.
    Secretary McNamara. Yes. I think that should be addressed.
    But I want to point out, first, that one of the reasons no 
final decision has been made by the President is that the South 
Vietnamese government had not made a final decision. He felt, 
and I think rightly so--and certainly I recommended to him--
that any final decision on U.S. troop strength should depend, 
in part, on what the South Vietnamese government was prepared 
to do.
    They have since indicated they are prepared to raise their 
troop strength by about 65,000 men. This will require that they 
modify their draft, extend the terms of service, and that they 
take certain other actions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              EFFECTIVENESS OF VIETNAMESE FORCES [P. 300]

    The Chairman. I do not know what the truth is, but these 
private reporters certainly do not agree with you. That is not 
the only article I have read to the same effect, many of them.
    Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I do not know any private 
reporter that I have ever talked to who believes the South 
Vietnamese won't fight--none.
    The Chairman. I think Ambassador Porter made a statement 
not so long ago that they are eight-hour soldiers. They won't 
fight at night.
    Secretary McNamara. I have never seen a statement such as 
that attributed to Ambassador Porter. He never made such a 
statement to me.
    I want to distinguish between----
    Senator Case. Excuse me, I did not understand that.
    Senator Gore. Daylight.
    The Chairman. They are only daylight soldiers, and the 
implication of his statement was they are not very effective 
soldiers.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      EFFORTS TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF VIETNAM TROOPS [P. 301]

    Senator Case. What are the desertion rates?
    Secretary McNamara. It was on the order of 125,000 annually 
a year ago, and at the present rate will reach about 74,000 
this year.
    The desertion rate is down almost 50 percent in the year 
and, in part, this reflects the improved compensations.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                [P. 302]

    Secretary McNamara. While we have not determined finally 
how many additional U.S. troops we will send, we know we will 
send additional U.S. advisors. I would say something on the 
order of 1,500 to 2,500.
    General Wheeler. Between 1,500 and 2,500, and they are 
working on the exact details and the number of men.
    Secretary McNamara. These men will advise the popular force 
and the regional force, as well as the ARVN, but particularly 
the popular and regional forces.
    I tried to say publicly, gentlemen, that I feel there is 
much room for increasing the effectiveness of those forces, 
that our action should be contingent upon the action taken to 
increase the forces. So I do not want in any way to mislead you 
on this, or deny the validity of your question or the 
implication that the forces are not fully effective at the 
present time.
    But let me ask General Wheeler to comment further on this.
    General Wheeler. The problem within the Vietnamese forces 
is primarily leadership, and it has been for several years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                [P. 303]

    General Wheeler. I visited with this one division when I 
was out there recently with the Secretary. I talked to the 
division commander; also, I got the report of Colonel Kelley, 
U.S. senior advisor, and Kelley says they are first class 
troops.
    Now, they are under strength. Why are they under strength? 
Because they have lost people fighting the North Vietnamese. 
These are the reasons.
    There are three divisions in the Delta, three South 
Vietnamese divisions. All three are well led, and all three are 
performing effectively against a pretty high level of Viet Cong 
strength down there.
    The ratio of strength of government forces versus the Viet 
Cong in that area is just a little above the 2.5 to 1 ratio, 
and this is about as low as you can get and operate 
effectively.
    There are other units, and I could name several of them by 
number, that are recognized by our U.S. personnel, General 
Westmoreland and his people, and by the South Vietnamese as not 
being fully effective, and General Westmoreland has means of 
improving their performance.
    The first thing he does, of course, is advocate the removal 
of less than effective leadership and their replacement by good 
officers, and I might add that he constantly reviews the 
performance of units and makes recommendations to General Vien, 
who is both Minister of Defense and Chief of the Joint General 
Staff, to get better leadership in these marginal units.
    The second way that he exerts an influence is that if a 
unit is rated by the U.S. advisors as being less than 
effective, he takes them off military assistance support. He 
writes a formal letter to General Vien and says that at such 
and such a date, such and such a battalion is no longer 
eligible for military assistance support and will not be placed 
back on, its eligibility will not be renewed, until such time 
as their performance is improved.
    The Secretary has already mentioned these numerous actions 
to improve leadership. One course of action is to place combat 
tried veterans from the enlisted ranks into the junior ranks of 
the officer corps.
    The program is progressing and they are getting a better 
infusion of experienced leadership at that level.
    Another means to improve the quality of the output of their 
military academy is to make sure that these young officers, 
instead of being sent to some headquarters staff in one of the 
big cities, must go to a combat unit and perform combat service 
as their first assignment, very much the same thing as we do. 
They have a half dozen other programs along the same line.
    General Westmoreland, when he was here, said that South 
Vietnamese leadership was so thin that he did not feel that 
they could expand and still retain their effectiveness.
    During the past year, with this improvement in output of 
leaders, he now considers that a modest expansion of the South 
Vietnamese forces is possible, and he has so recommended, and 
his recommendations and proposals to the South Vietnamese are 
embodied in a recent announcement, Senator Case, regarding 
their upcoming action to expand their forces.

                 U.S. INFLUENCE WITH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT

    Senator Case. I do not think I have to tell you. You know 
pretty much my feeling with respect to this war. I have not 
opposed it on moral grounds.
    I do think there is a very grave question as to the 
achievability, and I am sure that to withdraw now might result 
in disaster. But this is still an open question. I am only 
trying to find out whether this is an interval or whether we 
are engaged in something that ought to be stopped, and this 
relates to that question that is uppermost in my mind.
    One of the things that troubled me more than anything that 
happened in the last year was that we get a government report 
which says, in substance, that we had no leverage on the South 
Vietnamese. Our prestige was so deeply involved that we could 
not tell them what to do, and that is, if they do not perform, 
that we are through, because there is no point in killing 
American boys in a hopeless cause. That is the only way to do 
it.
    Secretary McNamara. Senator Case, I think if the report 
said that, it was in error.
    Senator Case. The report that I am talking about was given 
to Dave Lilienthal for his planning purposes, and this is a 
high-level report.
    Secretary McNamara. I do not think I have seen the 
document.
    But in any event, I strongly disagree with the statement if 
that is the statement.
    Senator Case. But, Mr. Secretary, it has to be true not 
only in your mind and General Wheeler's mind, but it has to be 
true in the minds of everybody who deals with this matter.
    Secretary McNamara. I know General Westmoreland feels he 
has strong influence with the South Vietnamese, and I know 
Ambassador Bunker feels that way. That does not mean we can 
lead them to do everything that we ask. Many of the things that 
we ask are probably in error. They may be beyond their 
capability. But in any event with respect to things that they 
are capable of doing, we have power of persuasion.
    General Wheeler. The Port of Saigon is an example.
    Secretary McNamara. The Port of Saigon.
    Senator Case. There is a great improvement there.
    Secretary McNamara. It is now as good as the Port of New 
York.
    Senator Case. But it took a long time.
    Secretary McNamara. We met with Premier Ky, and we said to 
him, ``You make up your mind to clean it up, or help us to 
clean it up, or the shipments are going to stop.''
    We have leverage, and General Wheeler and I personally did 
this last July or last September. It is one minor indication of 
our leverage.
    Senator Case. This is one issue of what I am talking about. 
This is again not--I am only critical in the sense that I am 
trying to get at the truth.
    Secretary McNamara. Surely. I understand your concern, and 
I think it is an appropriate concern. But I do emphasize that 
we have this leverage, and we exercise it. Maybe we have not 
exercised it enough at times; but we have it, and it is 
available in a number of subtle forms.
    There are individuals there over whom we have the power of 
life and death and, occasionally, we choose to exercise that 
power, just by the degree of our association or our support. We 
make it perfectly clear we are not going to support----
    Senator Case. You more than anybody else know the answers 
to these questions.
    Secretary McNamara. I know the answers to some. Some of the 
others----
    Senator Case. I mean more than anybody else. Nobody knows 
them all.
    Secretary McNamara. The question of how this will develop, 
how long this will take, I cannot answer. I have nothing that I 
think I could add to your own judgment on the matter.
    The Chairman. How do you exercise the power of life or 
death?
    Secretary McNamara. We won't support certain individuals 
under certain circumstances, and they know if we do not----
    Senator Case. They would be assassinated.
    Secretary McNamara. --they will be assassinated.
    Senator Gore. Ky, for instance?
    Secretary McNamara. I am not speaking of particular 
individuals, and I would want to take this out of any published 
record, as I am sure you would want me to. I simply want to 
emphasize that the U.S. government should have power to 
influence the South Vietnamese government. We do have the 
power, and we do exercise it.

                       VIEWS OF OTHERS ON VIETNAM

    The Chairman. I do not want to take the time of the Senator 
from New Jersey, but I would interpret Ambassador Porter, who 
testified here only a few weeks ago--June 8--as not being very 
much in agreement with this view about the effectiveness of the 
South Vietnamese. I will put it in the record.
    Senator Case. I think so. Would you disagree with anything 
that he said? This is my impression; this is what I am----
    The Chairman. Do you want me to read it?
    Senator Case. If you would.
    The Chairman. I will not read it all, but I will have it 
put in here.

    There are about 1.1 million men under arms. Another 
100,000, ten percent, does that mean we are within ten percent 
of victory? Of what? This is what worries me. I worry about 
this, and I do not want to criticize the generals with whom and 
alongside of whom I worked. But what is not needed is--I do not 
believe it is needed there--are more troops.

    Are you familiar with that sentiment on his part?
    Secretary McNamara. I do not recall having seen that.
    The Chairman. This is page 17 of our hearings here.
    Secretary McNamara. I have not seen that particular one.
    The Chairman.

    It would like to see a good deal of retraining. What is 
basically needed in that country to alter the situation 
dramatically is a night fighting force. The night fighting 
force is what is needed. We have not trained the Vietnamese to 
do this job. Maybe we cannot; maybe we are not trained 
ourselves for it.
     But after sundown, as the Senator knows, there is a 
different state affairs there. In the daytime we can go 
anywhere, and our victories are real when we can detect the 
enemy or when he attacks us. But when night must fall, if you 
have the tanks out or you have the choppers out, you have to 
pull them back. Why? Because there is a different state of 
affairs, and you have an enemy who knows every inch of his 
terrain and who works best at night.

    Then Senator Clark was asking questions and he was reading 
to him a statement, and I am going to skip down to where Clark 
says:
    He comes to the conclusion--he was quoting from a Japanese, 
I think Oka, the Oka Report--he comes to the conclusion that it 
is the fault of their officers, which bears out something which 
you said earlier about the nine-to-five hours, and also 
something I saw in the paper that in three years there has only 
been one field grade officer in the South Vietnamese army 
wounded in combat.

    Mr. Porter: I am seriously concerned about the officer 
corps for a number of reasons. But I think there has probably 
been-there have been a few wounded.--

    And he goes down--I am going to skip, but I would like the 
Reporter to put this all in, I do not want to take the time. He 
reads, Senator Clark reads, as a basis for a comment that I 
think is very significant. This is Mr. Oka's statement:

    Promotion in the Vietnamese army still depends on a complex 
of personal family, regional, religious and educational ties 
and the generals and wives an officer knows, on his behavior 
during the innumerable coups and purges that have shaken the 
army during the past several years. The result is an army led 
by political generals willing to accept American advice only at 
the most technical level of logistics, new weapons and 
sometimes of strategy. The corrupt and creaky, clubby structure 
of the Vietnamese army itself remains a scared cow. Foreigners 
fiddle with it at their peril. Even the well-intentioned 
members of the Vietnamese military fraternity hesitate to touch 
it, and so the Americans fight the war.

    That is the statement. Clark asks, ``Is that unfair?''
    Mr. Porter says, ``It is harsh, but it is not unfair.''
    Secretary McNamara. He is absolutely wrong.
    The Chairman. The first part of it, yes, the list of 
factors.
    Nearly every single non-administration witness, such as 
this Taylor and others, concur in Mr. Porter's view. This is 
what bothers us.
    Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that 
every non-administration witness will concur in that view.
    The Chairman. Well, the reporters who write about it--I do 
not know Frederick Taylor.
    Secretary McNamara. I just want to address myself to the 
statements made. I do not believe every non-administration 
witness will concur in that view. I know Ambassador Lodge and 
General Taylor won't. I know Ambassador Bunker won't.
    May I disagree for just one second in order to comment 
fully on all the material put in the record, which I have not 
read?
    The Chairman. I think so.
    Secretary McNamara. I want----
    Senator Case. This is in substantial accord with what I got 
from practically everybody except from the military, and the 
military briefing was correct but very formal.
    Senator Gore. Did you get it from our own soldiers?
    Senator Case. Individuals.
    The Chairman. I have had letters.
    Secretary McNamara. I think we need to address ourselves 
specifically to what has been said. I do not have it in front 
of me, but I jotted down some language which said that the 
South Vietnamese are only willing to accept advice at the 
technical, logistical level. Now, this is just absolutely 
untrue, and I will tell us why. They actually function under 
our command in many, many circumstances. I do not know what you 
call it. I call it more than advice when they are taking 
commands from us.
    Beyond that, General Westmoreland advises with their 
Defense Minister, advises on matters at more than the technical 
or logistical level--strategy, tactics, whatever you want to 
call it, but it is far more than the technical or logistical 
level.
    This was about all I could write down, Mr. Chairman, but it 
just is not true.
    The Chairman. I would have thought Mr. Porter is a 
competent witness, and he certainly is part of the team, so to 
speak. He has been recommended----
    Secretary McNamara. I do not know what part he was 
commenting on, and I say it is not true. The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff is here. Let him comment on it.

                  NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE OFFICERS KILLED

    General Wheeler. In the first place, that is a 
generalization. Whoever wrote this article takes the worst 
elements in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, and lumps them 
with the best, and assesses them as being equal to the worst.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                        ESTIMATED SALES [P. 309]

    Senator Cooper. The chief volume of those sales would be to 
India and Pakistan.
    Secretary McNamara. No, sir, although India and Pakistan 
might buy some, the chief volume in fiscal 1968 will be to 
Iran, to Saudi Arabia, and to Israel.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    NATURE OF DOD GUARANTEE [P. 312]

    Senator Cooper. If these countries cannot pay, why don't 
you just list them in grants. Is it because you believe they 
can pay in time?
    Secretary McNamara. Yes, sir. They very definitely can pay 
it back in time. Iran, for example, is one of the major 
countries which would receive this kind of guaranteed loan. 
Israel is another. I think it is very clear that both Israel 
and Iran can pay over a reasonable period--five, seven or ten 
years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


EFFECT OF CANCELLATION OF REVOLVING FUND ON U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS [P. 
                                  312]

    Secretary McNamara. In most instances, we have no treaty 
commitments to the underdeveloped countries. The amount of 
military equipment we are supplying them under sales agreements 
does not give them a capability to fight along with our side in 
any significant fashion. Here, the objective is quite 
different. The objective is in many cases to hold down an arms 
race, to avoid destabilizing relationships among nations such 
as would occur were we to deny military sales to Israel. I 
think that Israel represents, perhaps, a good example of the 
problem we would face if the revolving fund authority were 
cancelled, or if our use of Export-Import Bank credit for 
undeveloped countries is cancelled.
    If that be the case, we cannot make military credit sales 
to Israel. If we cannot make military sales to Israel, the 
power balance between Israel and particularly the radical Arab 
countries will shift. This is a matter of concern particularly 
to our State Department and indirectly to the Defense 
Department.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        EFFECT OF ARMS SALES ON PURPOSES OF FOREIGN AID [P. 313]

    Secretary McNamara. We have very rigid standards that we 
apply to determine the extent to which the resources of a 
country may be diverted from its economic development to its 
military equipment.
    In the cases of India, I personally have put limits on the 
amount that we would accept from India in the way of diversion 
of resources from economic development to military sales.
    The same thing is true of Iran, and of several other 
nations.

                 POSSIBILITY OF PROMOTING AN ARMS RACE

    Senator Cooper. I will just make an observation on the sale 
of arms to Pakistan and India. If you provide arms to one 
country, the other will secure additional arms from another 
country, and the arms race goes on.
    The Chairman. There is $90 million in sales for that.
    Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I think that when that 
was put in it may have been a proper estimate, but my personal 
estimate is that the sales will not, need not, and probably 
should not exceed about $15 million to the two countries for 
fiscal 1968.
    The Chairman. I do not know where this came from.
    Secretary McNamara. I think the schedule you have shows 
perhaps $75 million.
    The Chairman. It says $90 million. I have it before me, for 
the two, India and Pakistan.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                 P. 314

    Secretary McNamara. I have tried over the years to hold 
down diversions, and we have consistently urged the Indians to 
reduce their defense budget. I think it is too high at the 
present time.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          BASE RIGHTS [P. 314]

    Senator Cooper. The money is provided by a MAP program. 
Does the United States have to contract for a term of years 
beyond the fiscal year 1968?
    Secretary McNamara. We do. Of course----
    Senator Cooper. For the payment of these sums to these 
countries for the base rights?
    Secretary McNamara. We have a treaty with the countries 
giving us occupancy rights beyond fiscal 1968. But we do not 
have commitments to them for payments of this kind other than 
commitments made subject to action by the Congress. No 
commitment beyond fiscal 1968 is made for any purpose 
associated with military aid other than with this 
qualification--subject to action by the Congress.
    Senator Cooper. This morning there has been discussion 
about the base in Libya, and some discussion about Portugal.
    Can you supply to the committee some statement about 
Ethiopia, the Philippines, Spain, and your judgment about their 
importance to the security of the United States?

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Senator Cooper. And three Latin American countries.
    Secretary McNamara. Yes.
    Senator Cooper. Military assistance and sales to Latin 
American countries.
    It is always stated that our purpose is to provide funds 
for internal security. Would you say that this is correct with 
respect to all of the countries, that it only provides internal 
security or in some cases it would provide offensive capacity.

      MILITARY SALES AND AID TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES [P. 317]

    Secretary McNamara. I think it provides an offensive 
capacity in some cases, Senator Cooper. May I supply for the 
record, because I do not want to take your time now, every 
major item of offensive equipment we have supplied in the last 
five years, and the number proposed for 1968--which is almost 
zero. I would also like to include both the military aid and 
military sales, because the Latin American military aid program 
and sales program is, I think, a program that acts as a 
dampener on offensive weapons rather than as a supplier. I 
would like to lay that out for you.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   MILITARY SALES TO FRANCE [P. 318]

    Senator Cooper. I see a notation of $25 million of military 
sales to France. Is that a correct item?
    Secretary McNamara. I do not recall it. It may well be. Our 
sales to France were running a little under $100 million a 
year, and I think they have recently declined to about $25 
million a year.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            ALLEGED RESALE OF TANKS BY WEST GERMANY [P. 319]

    Secretary McNamara. Except for one intra-NATO case, and a 
U.S. approved delivery in 1964 of tanks to Israel, we have not 
given our approval and no other transactions have been 
consummated. These were government to government transactions 
and no private firms were involved.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [Whereupon, at 2:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, 
Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. The 
Church motion to repeal the military credit sales authority 
(including elimination of revolving fund) was approved, 12-6, 
after the Cooper motion to provide $75 million to guaranty 
total sales of $150 million was defeated, 8-10. Church motion 
to cut military assistance from $596 million to $475 million 
was approved, 7-6. Morse motion to reduce military aid (sales 
and grants) to Latin America to $50 million was approved, 10-5. 
Morse motion to limit military assistance (sales and grants) to 
Africa to $25 million was approved, 8-7. Morse motion to add 
subsection on Central American Defense Council (requiring that 
all except $1.5 million of the military aid funds for Central 
America be used for regional integration of military forces) 
was approved, 8-6. Morse motion to cut off assistance to any 
country following a military coup was defeated, 6-10. Sparkman 
motion to reconsider earlier action, cutting Vietnam 
administrative expenses ($7 million out of Supporting 
Assistance) was defeated 7-7.
    Sparkman motion to reconsider earlier action (reducing to 
50% the coverage on extended risk guarantees) was defeated 6-7.
    Sparkman motion to report the bill as amended passed 10-2, 
after Church substitute to report without recommendation was 
defeated, 7-7.
    [The committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, 
Aiken, and Cooper.
    Leonard Unger, nominee to be Ambassador to Thailand and 
Sheldon B. Vance, nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of 
Chad, were heard and ordered reported favorably.
    S. 1688, the Inter-American Development Bank Bill, was 
ordered reported with an amendment on motion by Senator 
Sparkman, 14-2. Other votes taken were: Gore motion to postpone 
action lost 2-14; Lausche motion to cut to $200 million per 
year lost 5-11; Symington motion for no loans for arms was 
approved 16-0; Lausche motion to cut to $250 million per year 
lost 4-12.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, 
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
    Edward M. Korry, nominee to be Ambassador to Chile appeared 
before the committee and was ordered reported favorably. Short 
discussion on Ex. I, 90/1. The Human Rights conventions Ex. J, 
K, L, 88/1, were discussed and decision made to hold a hearing 
with the American Bar Association before proceeding.
    The following nominees were ordered reported favorably: 
William B. Dale, as Executive Director for the United States, 
IMF; Livingston Tallmadge Merchant, as U.S. Executive Director 
of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Homer 
Daniels Babbidge, Jr., Abram Leon Sachar, and Robert Anthony 
Scalapino, as Members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and Cultural Affairs for a term 
expiring May 11, 1970.
    It was decided to hear Brent Ashabranner as Deputy Director 
of the Peace Corps before taking action.
    Ex. P, 89/2, Treaty with Thailand was ordered reported.
    H.R. 3399, to extend the termination date for the 
Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission was also considered.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:00 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                      TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
         Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:30 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Church, Aiken, 
Carlson, Mundt, and Case.
    Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative to Council of OAS; 
accompanied by Ward P. Allen, Director of Office of Inter-
American Political Affairs and Richard A. Poole, Political 
Advisor, Office of InterAmerican Political Affairs, briefed the 
group on the Foreign Ministers' Conference and the current 
situation in Latin America.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 5:30 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Church, 
Dodd, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
    The committee approved the following nominees as United 
States Representatives to the Twenty-second Session of the 
United Nations--General Assembly: Arthur J. Goldberg, William 
B. Buffum, Lawrence H. Fountain, William S. Broomfield, and 
Adrian S. Fisher; with I.W. Abel, Robert S. Benjamin, Hector P. 
Garcia, Mrs. Patricia Roberts Harris and Herbert R. O'Conor, 
Jr., as alternates.
    S. Res. 151, Relative to U.S. Commitments to Foreign 
Powers, was discussed as to procedure.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
       Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
                   Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:45 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Fulbright and 
Church.
    Discussion of Military Assistance to Middle East and Greece 
with Townsend Hoopes, Under Secretary of the Air Force; 
accompanied by Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Logistics Negotiations (ISA), Harry 
Schwartz, Peter R. Knaur, and Lt. Col. T.H. Tackaberry, USA.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 3:40 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
              AD Hoc Subcommittee on USIA Personnel
               Legislation, Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The ad hoc subcommittee met in executive session at 10:10 
a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Pell (presiding), Mansfield, 
Hickenlooper, and Cooper.
    Without objection, S. 633, a bill to create a career 
personnel system for the USIA, was considered and ordered 
reported with amendments to the full committee.
    [The ad hoc subcommittee adjourned at 10:40 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
         Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:35 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Fulbright, Sparkman, 
Lausche, Church, Clark, and Hickenlooper.
    Covey T. Oliver, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 
Affairs, accompanied by Wymberly De R. Coerr, Ambassador to 
Ecuador, appeared to brief the group on the recall of 
Ambassador Coerr and a briefing on the sale of arms to Latin 
America.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 6:20 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, 
Hickenlooper, Williams, Case, and Cooper.
    Ex. L, 88/1, Supplementary Convention on Abolition of 
Slavery, was ordered reported favorably by a roll call vote, 
19-0.
    Ex. K, 88/1, Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor, 
with a suggested understanding, was tabled by a vote of 13-4.
    Ex. J, 88/1, Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 
together with an offered understanding, was tabled by a vote of 

12-4.
    S. Res. 151, Relative to U.S. Commitments to Foreign 
Powers, was discussed and no action taken.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Pell, 
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.
    Idar Rimstad, Deputy Under Secretary of State for 
Administration, Ambassador John M. Steeves, Director General of 
the Foreign Service, and James Hoffnagle, Deputy Director, 
appeared to discuss the lateral entries in the two Routine 
Foreign Service lists dated September 20, 1967. The two lists 
were then ordered reported without objection, Ex, B, 90/1, 
Supplementary Tax Convention with Canada, and Ex. F, 90/1, Tax 
Convention with Trinidad and Tobago, were considered and no 
action taken.
    [No transcript of the session was made.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
              Subcommittee on Near Easter and South
             Asian Affiars, Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Church, Pell, and 
Hickenlooper.
    Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, accompanied by John F. Root, 
Country Directors, North Africa, Department of State, discussed 
with the group Military Assistance to the Middle East and 
Greece.
    [The subcommittee adjourned at 3:35 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, 
Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
    Ex. F, 90/1, Tax Convention with Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Ex. B, 90/1, Supplementary Tax Convention with Canada, were 
ordered reported by a voice vote. S. 633, a bill to establish a 
USIA Foreign Service Personnel System, was reported by a voice 
vote. The group discussed an appearance of Dean Rusk in open 
session. Ex. J, 
90/1, Tax Convention with Brazil, was discussed and carried 
over. S. Con. Res. 49, commemorating the 50th Anniversary of 
Finland, was ordered reported by a voice vote.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 4:10 p.m., in 
room 
S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.
    William M. Roth, Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations, accompanied by John A. Schnittker, Under 
Secretary of Agriculture, and William Starkie, Foreign 
Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture, briefed the 
group on the proposed International Grains Agreement.
    [The committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Lausche, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and 
Cooper.
    S. Res. 151, Relating to National Commitments, was 
discussed and no action taken.
    [The committee adjourned at 12:25 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 9:35 a.m., in 
room 4219, New Senate Office Building.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, and 
Aiken.
    The group met early to have a preliminary conversation with 
Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative, United 
Nations, before he testified in public session on S. Con. Res. 
44 and S. Res. 180, expressing the sense of the Congress that 
the Vietnam conflict should be submitted to the United Nations. 
He was accompanied in open session by Joseph J. Sisco, 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 
Affairs.
    [The committee adjourned at 10:00 a.m. to go into public 
session.]


    NEED FOR OPEN HEARING WITH SECRETARY RUSK ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD 
                             SOUTHEAST ASIA

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, November 7, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in 
room 
S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (Chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Williams, Mundt, and Case.
    Also present: Senator McGee.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Jones, and Mr. 
Lowenstein of the committee staff.
    The Chairman. For the record, I will start out with a very 
brief statement to start the matter off. We might as well come 
forward. They will come in.
    The committee this morning is pleased to have the Secretary 
of State, who is appearing in executive session in response to 
our letter of October 31st as well as earlier exchanges. 
Committee members are aware that this session--as described in 
the letter--is ``designed primarily to elicit and consider'' 
the Secretary's reasons for preferring not to accept the 
opportunity to meet with us in public on the subject of United 
States policy toward Southeast Asia.
    Both in his letters to the committee, and specifically in 
his press conference of October 12th, Secretary Rusk has 
indicated his preference for what he terms ``close consultation 
behind closed doors.'' In the letters, he has roughly outlined 
the factors which influence his position. We welcome today a 
more detailed and profound explanation of the Secretary's 
attitude.
    I wish at the outset to express my personal belief that the 
issue we are considering together is of the highest importance 
to our representative form of government. Indeed, the question 
of whether or not a Cabinet officer in general should publicly 
respond to committee inquiries is a matter of constitutional 
significance. In this sense, the committee has a duty to uphold 
a legislative prerogative. For if it is not maintained and 
exercised, this power will be diminished and gradually 
eliminated, as have been so many functions of the legislature 
in this century.
    At this juncture, I do not wish to take the time from the 
committee and the Secretary to elaborate my personal views 
beyond stating a few brief points.

                      THE COMMITTEE'S JURISDICTION

    First, I believe the historical record fully supports the 
thesis that the senatorial powers of Advice and Consent to 
ratification of treaties and to presidential appointments have 
consistently been exercised in public as well as in closed 
session. These practices are so firmly established that I doubt 
that the Executive Branch would insist that this committee 
should consider an important treaty or examine a nominee for 
Secretary of State without an open hearing. I should think that 
the most important foreign policy issue facing us today would 
fall into that same category.
    Secondly, I believe that the committee's actions must be 
consonant with the provisions of the Legislative Reorganization 
Act of 1946. Not only does the Act enjoin the function of 
legislative oversight, which necessitates committee hearings, 
it also expressly provides that:

    All hearings conducted by standing committees or their 
subcommittees shall be open to the public except executive 
sessions for marking up bills or for voting or where the 
committee by a majority vote orders an executive session.

    Finally, I believe that the Secretary's press conference of 
October 12th has resulted in a change in the environment in 
which the public heretofore has considered the Vietnam War. 
While I recognize that the aim of the press conference was to 
clarify the arguments supporting United States involvement in 
Vietnam, the result would seem to have raised serious questions 
about priorities and the national interest.
    The factor of China is not a new one, but the emphasis 
given to that factor by the Secretary appears to have changed 
our policy approach to Asian affairs. And it seems to me that 
the Administration would wish to test this revised approach 
before the electorate as a matter of sound public policy.
    With these brief introductory remarks, Mr. Secretary, I 
invite you to give us your views about this issue as well as 
about the subject of public hearings.
    We are very pleased to have you, and will you proceed, if 
you have an opening statement.

      STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

    Secretary Rusk. I have a very short statement, Mr. 
Chairman, on this particular point.
    I am glad to discuss with the committee this morning the 
question of whether I should appear in public session for a 
discussion of Vietnam or whether such matters are better 
pursued in executive session.
    Let me say at the outset that I am not today discussing 
this matter as a matter of constitutional principle in the 
first instance, but rather from a practical and pragmatic point 
of view and from the point of view of wisdom.
    I think we all fully understand that the Congress as a 
whole plays an important and indispensable role in the 
determination of foreign policy in carrying out its 
constitutional functions, and this committee plays a very 
special role.
    I regard it as particularly important that in discussions 
with this committee I have the opportunity to be completely 
candid so that the views of the committee and its individual 
members can be based on a full understanding of how the 
Administration sees the facts and the Administration's point of 
view.
    I do not of course assume that such candor will necessarily 
result in agreement either between members of this committee 
and the Administration or among the members of the committee 
themselves.
    But it does seem to me important that whatever disagreement 
there may be is based upon as full a knowledge as possible of 
the position of the Administration and the reasons for that 
position.
    I do think that you will all agree that there are things 
the Secretary of State can say in private that he ought not to 
say in public, and that the more delicate the international 
situation involved, the greater the area of discretion. When 
the situation actually involves hostilities, the need for 
discretion is underlined.

                     PRECEDENTS FOR CLOSED HEARINGS

    I think the general practice of the past is illustrative 
particularly in these recent decades.
    Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull discussed problems of 
World War II in open session prior to Pearl Harbor. He did so 
in connection with Lend Lease and the arming of American 
flagships. But my information is that he did not discuss in 
public hearings the issues of World War II after Pearl Harbor. 
He did address a Joint Session of Congress on November 18, 
1943, on the results of the Moscow Conference of Foreign 
Secretaries.
    During the Korean conflict, my recollection is that the 
Secretary of State did not testify in open hearings about the 
conduct of the war. Some of you will recall that there were 
extensive hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee in executive 
session and that agreed-to transcripts were released as the 
hearings proceeded. It was this precedent which led me to 
suggest that we have as searching and as far-reaching 
discussion as the committee might wish in executive session and 
the release therefrom of a transcript on the basis of an 
agreement as to what would be consistent with the national 
interest.
    Precedents also suggest that where Vietnam is involved in 
legislation before the Congress, such as the Foreign Aid 
Program these matters are touched upon in the course of public 
hearings of such legislation. I have appeared publicly eight 
times before the committees of the Congress during its present 
session. Questions involving Vietnam arose in some of these 
hearings. I recall, of course, I did appear with this committee 
in a public discussion on Vietnam on February 18, 1966.

                 CONSIDERATIONS OF WAR AND NEGOTIATIONS

    There are some important practical considerations involved. 
We have substantial combat forces in the field engaged in a 
struggle with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. They are 
there for reasons which are familiar to you even though some of 
you may not now agree with these reasons. A public discussion 
of the conduct of military operations, involving the Secretary 
of State, cannot help but be of some advantage to our 
adversaries. This would be particularly true with respect to 
intentions, future plans, estimates of the military situation 
and other matters bearing upon the conflict itself.
    I am concerned lest such discussions hamper the Commander-
in-Chief.
    Second, It is not advantageous for the Secretary of State 
to be pressed publicly for details of positions which the 
United States might take in intergovernmental discussions or in 
negotiations to bring this situation to a peaceful conclusion. 
We need to be in a position to negotiate with those who can 
stop the shooting. It would seriously hamper such negotiations 
for us to be asked to disclose in advance many details which 
ought to be part of negotiation itself.
    As the committee knows, North Vietnam has been unwilling to 
engage in negotiations in any forum, public or private. I will 
be glad to go into that in as much detail as you wish in an 
executive session.
    Third, the Secretary of State faces a somewhat different 
problem than does a senator in discussing the policies, the 
performance and the deficiencies of other countries. Senators 
are free to say anything that is on their minds about other 
countries--and do so frequently on the floor of the Senate and 
in public speeches. But when this is done in the presence of 
the Secretary of State, then I am in a most difficult position. 
I cannot, at one and the same time, be completely candid with 
my colleagues in the Senate and carry out my public 
responsibilities as Secretary of State in discussing either the 
policies or the actions of other governments.
    It may well be that I would agree with some of the sharp 
criticisms which could be leveled at other governments. But for 
me to engage publicly in such criticisms would greatly hamper 
the ability of the United States to work effectively and 
quietly to remedy the situations which are of concern both to 
you and to me.
    It does not seem to me that the absence of a public 
discussion between the committee and myself represents any 
impairment of public discussion of the issues. Senators are 
free to discuss these matters on the floor of the Senate, on 
platforms throughout the country, in press conferences and on 
television. I myself take part in this public discussion in the 
press conferences which are expected of a Secretary of State, 
and in a limited number of visits to different parts of the 
country.

                  PRIVATELY EXPRESSED VIEWS OF MEMBERS

    Finally, Mr. Chairman, one of the values of discussion in 
this committee derives from the considered views of the members 
of the committee. I have been told by members from time to time 
that they do not wish to have privately expressed views made 
public or given dissemination in the Executive Branch of the 
Government.
    As you know, the committee has been very careful to keep to 
itself the transcripts of executive sessions. I wonder whether 
such consultations, in the best sense of the word, can occur in 
public session.
    These are the considerations which have led me to suggest 
to the committee that we have a thorough examination of the 
Vietnam situation in executive session and that we release to 
the public the transcript of those things which can be released 
consistent with the public interest.

                    SECRETARY'S REMARKS ABOUT CHINA

    I might add one brief comment, Mr. Chairman, one point to 
which you adverted in your opening remarks, and that is the 
reference to China in connection with my last press conference.
    I will point out as a procedural matter that this press 
conference lasted for an hour rather than a half-hour. Had John 
Hightower closed the press conference at the usual half-hour, 
the question would not have arisen. It came up at the end of my 
press conference, but I said basically four things about China.
    One was that there would be a billion people there and I do 
not know anyone who disputes that;
    Secondly, that they will have nuclear weapons, and I have 
no doubt that that is true;
    Third, that no one knows what their directions of policy 
are going to be in the next ten or 20 years, and I do not know 
anyone who does know;
    And, fourth, that the other nations of Asia are concerned 
about this.
    Now, I did call attention to the fact that we have 
alliances with Korea, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of 
China, Southeast Asia, Anzus, and that these alliances are 
concerned with organizing peace in the Pacific and that 
undoubtedly China played a very large part in the formulation 
and negotiation and the conclusion of those alliances.
    Now, I was startled and a little shocked, quite frankly, to 
have these remarks at my press conference picked up as though I 
were raising the question of a yellow peril. There is nothing 
to that at all. I did not discuss it in those terms, and this 
it seems to me, was a return to yellow journalism.
    In any event, these are the reasons why it seems to me that 
with the precedents established during the Korean War, in the 
so-called (Douglas] MacArthur hearings, there would be a sound 
basis on which we can have an exhaustive and complete 
discussion in executive session and release the transcript 
except for those portions which we might agree are not in the 
public interest to release.
    So basically, those are my thoughts on that subject, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.

                     A PROFOUND DIVISION OF OPINION

    Of course, I do not recall either personally or even from 
reading about former circumstances in our history outside of 
our own Civil War and Reconstruction period in which there has 
been such a profound division of opinion about the correctness 
of our policy, that is as to international interest, as there 
is now, which is one of the reasons that contribute to this.
    Do you not think that is true?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not know to what extent that would be 
true, Mr. Chairman.
    I recall, I would have to look it up and furnish it to you, 
but I recall that in about February of 1951, a Gallup Poll 
showed that 66 percent of those polled wanted to pull out of 
Korea. We do not have policy like that today wanting to pull 
out of Vietnam. So I do not know.
    I was in the Department of State during the Korean affair 
and I know it was a matter of considerable controversy around 
the country and I have no way of comparing it, but I think this 
phenomenon is not new.
    The Chairman. You do not think that the present conditions 
in the country are unprecedented?
    Secretary Rusk. I do not think they are unprecedented, sir. 
I think there is wide division. There are very sharp 
differences of view about this situation.

                      PUBLIC CONCERN AND CONFUSION

    The Chairman. I was under the impression there was a 
sharper division of view under present conditions than 
formerly, and I think the public is confused, I believe my own 
constituents are, as to the justification for the rising cost 
of the war in both lives and in money. I think that is being 
reflected in the situation in the Congress.
    Maybe my memory is bad, but I have been here 25 years, and 
I have never seen such difficulties as have arisen presently 
over such things as the tax bill, the poverty program, you can 
almost name anything. There is a great difficulty and it is bad 
for the country and it is bad for the Congress. We are 
criticized, the Congress as such, almost daily.
    I may be wrong about it, but it strikes me that we are in a 
considerable disarray within the country and the Congress, and 
it would seem to me that under such conditions public 
discussions would go a considerable way or help to resolve 
these differences and, hopefully, to allay the strife that is 
afflicting us both in the Congress and in the country. I may be 
wrong about it.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether in executive 
session it would not be possible to take up these sources of 
confusion and these points of confusion, and discuss them out 
thoroughly in the committee. I am not sure that it would be 
possible to remove this confusion in public discussion unless 
there can be a greater consensus here in the committee itself, 
and it may be that the range of disagreement can be narrowed 
and that there could be a wider range of agreement on some of 
the essential facts of the situation which itself might form 
the basis for a broader public understanding of what the issues 
are and where the differences properly lie.

                      GREAT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES

    The Chairman. Of course, I agree that executive sessions 
serve a purpose, but so do public.
    It was only whether or not we should have public ones. 
There is no one, I think, who feels we should not have 
executive sessions, which we do have and are willing to have at 
almost any time. But yesterday's was sort of an odd 
circumstance.
    We asked one of the professional career men who was being 
examined, Mr. Miner, how many countries in Africa, I forget why 
it came up, have a parliamentary system and he could think of 
only three. The democratic system, it seems to me, all over the 
world is having great difficulty, and I would regret to see us 
have too many difficulties. We are considered the leading 
democratic country of the world, and it distresses me very much 
to see that continued friction that exists within our country.
    I do not have to remind you of the difficulties in the 
House at the present time. There is much more in the House at 
the moment than there is here over domestic programs as well as 
foreign aid. We have struggled with foreign aid, finally 
reached an agreement with a conference, and the House has 
already taken action very drastically different from what we 
reached.
    I only mention it, not for the substantive point of view, 
but as evidence that I think we are in great difficulties 
politically, and I thought public discussions of the source of 
these difficulties would be helpful, both to the Congress and 
to the public generally, because ultimately they do have some 
influence upon the course of our policies.
    So that was really behind my own feeling that we should 
have it. But I do not wish to occupy all the time.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman I would be very glad----
    The Chairman. Do you wish to respond?
    Secretary Rusk. I would be very glad to hear the views of 
the members of the committee on this point. It is important.
    Senator Sparkman. I have no questions.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                          AN AURA OF CONFUSION

    Secretary Rusk, I will say at the outset that I think it is 
very dangerous to have you appear in public session before this 
committee and I think past experience has shown it.
    I think the questions that have been asked you, the 
statements that have been made, create an aura of confusion 
that contributes to the confusion of this country. While I 
think periodically you ought to appear before this committee on 
broad subject matters of policy, some of these meetings have 
been the occasion for some very confusing and rather caustic 
interrogations and statements with regard to your conduct of 
affairs, not by all members, I do not mean that, but those have 
not been of service to our country. I have been increasingly 
feeling that way.
    Now, so far as this ``yellow peril'' business is concerned, 
I can see nothing in your statement that would give rise to any 
thought, that you raised the so-called yellow peril idea at 
all.
    Certainly the Chinese are there and that is a fact of life. 
The Russians are there and we have talked about the Russians. 
But that did not raise any Oriental peril so far as I know, and 
with the Red Chinese having atomic weapons, of course it is a 
potential threat in the future, something we have to keep 
account of.
    I saw nothing that would raise that old bugaboo for the so-
called yellow peril which was not quite the yellow peril that 
was intended to be talked about in this context.
    I feel very sorry that our country is being subjected to 
this kind of emotional and socio-political conflict in the very 
area where we ought to be a little more cohesive and so on.
    I would be the last person in the world to say that people 
should not have their own ideas, they should not accept them, 
and should not discharge them, the responsibilities of their 
own; of course they should, and they do, and I respect those 
ideas. I may not agree with them, but I respect them. I may 
agree with some; I may disagree with others.

                     OPPOSED TO TELEVISED HEARINGS

    But I can see nothing but difficulty for our country, 
increasing difficulty in a public television demonstration for 
any appearance of yourself in connection with any inquiries and 
intimate discussion of what our plans are in the future. I can 
see nothing but a hampering of future negotiations which are 
without doubt very delicate and very unsatisfactory, not only 
to you, but to everybody else from time to time because of the 
intransigence of the other side on these matters. I just want 
to make that very clear.
    I think it is very helpful for you to appear here, and I 
would feel the same way about Secretary McNamara as head of the 
military. I do not always agree with everything that McNamara 
does. I do not always agree with everything that he says, but I 
do not think he ought to be put up in public and asked about 
the war plans of this government. While it is not couched in 
that term, nevertheless that is the effect on the public, and a 
denial of an answer and many things that can--the avoidance of 
an answer, or the statement, ``Well, I would rather discuss 
those things in secret,'' that gives a lot of answers to a lot 
of questions lots of times that the other folks would like to 
know. I just think it is a dangerous situation and I think we 
are treading on very dangerous ground.
    There are many areas where I think the Secretary of State 
is obligated to come in public session and discuss broad fields 
of operation, but in the past the tendency to put the Secretary 
of State, and put the Secretary of Defense, in positions where 
they have to rather back and file in public, where they know 
they cannot say certain things that might be categoric answers 
to questions, I think is not serviceable to our country.
    I do not have any questions to ask you at this moment. But 
I do want to make myself as reasonably clear as my limited 
ability will permit me. I do not want to furnish an excuse for 
a public official not appearing in public at all, but I think 
there are times and places and subject matters and conditions 
and circumstances. I think we are in difficulty at this time. 
So far as I know, the sentiment I get in my area is that the 
people are overwhelmingly for winning this war and they 
understand, they think, why we are in there.
    There are a lot of people who feel we are not running the 
show quite like it ought to be run. That is very true. But I 
just got back yesterday, and the sentiment I get is that ``For 
God's sake, let us win this thing.'' There are reasons why 
perhaps we cannot win it immediately, but the people want to 
win it rather than be defeated.
    Be that as it may, I just wanted to express myself on that 
score.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Can I make one comment before I call on you, 
Senator?

                    APPREHENSIVE OF A WAR WITH CHINA

    On this, we agree about the confusion, but I submit that 
since there has been no public session of this committee for 
some 18 months, February 18, 1966, that this difficulty or 
these conditions certainly do not arise from any public 
hearings the committee has had. The committee has not had any 
hearings in public. Whatever the reason may be, it is not 
attributable to any public hearings we have had for 18 months.
    Your bringing up China reminds me of a situation which I--
which is perhaps far-reached, but I know the original war that 
started the decline of China and I think contributes to the 
present difficulty with China grew out of the opium war in 
which Palmerston deceived the House of Commons for some eight 
months while he was preparing an attack on China. The House of 
Commons I doubt would have authorized it but it took place, and 
when he was asked about it in their question period in public 
he lied about it. I do not mean to say you are lying about it 
because you have not said anything to the committee for 18 
months in public.
    But many of us are very apprehensive, and I am one of them, 
that we may drift into a war with China just as they did and I 
think it led to circumstances of which we are reaping part of 
the benefit today. I think that if we are going to have a war 
with China the American people ought to know about it in 
advance before we get into it.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I am sure, I hope you will 
agree that although I can be wrong before this committee, I 
have not attempted to deceive this committee.
    The Chairman. Well, I am not--I did not so state.
    It is quite clear that Palmerston deceived the House of 
Commons. That is a matter of history. He lied to them in answer 
to public questions. He refused to answer and all the time he 
was preparing an attack on China which he brought about and 
which led to the Opium War and which I think led to the attacks 
of the West, including--we played a minor part but the British, 
the French--the French as a result of that really got into 
Vietnam later on, and the whole world is paying the penalty of 
a very unwise policy at that time.
    Senator Morse.
    Senator Aiken. That is where my credibility got strained. I 
do not think you can withdraw either politically or physically 
within six months, but it may be a worthy objective.
    Secretary Rusk. It would depend upon whether these 
conditions had been achieved, I think, Senator. At any rate, 
that is what the chiefs of government at Manila said on the 
subject.
    Senator, on the constitutional point, as I indicated 
earlier, I would hope that we could consult about this matter 
before we reached the constitutional issue as such.
    Senator Gore. I agree; I agree.
    Secretary Rusk. This is why I did not reply directly to the 
two questions asked by Senator Morse.

                        CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

    No one is more respectful for the Constitution than I am. 
But no one is more reluctant to reach the impasses of the 
Constitution. So I would hope that the committee would think 
carefully about the considerations I have advanced this morning 
and we certainly, I shall certainly think about what has been 
said in the committee. But I would, if we get to constitutional 
points I would need further counsel on that before I could, I 
would, attempt to make a statement with respect to the 
Constitution.
    Senator Gore. But you agree it is a matter not solely for 
the determination of the executive?
    Secretary Rusk. I think the constitutional problems are for 
all of the branches of the government whose prerogatives are 
involved in the Constitution.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.

                     A CONTINUOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

     The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would hope if this 
committee decides that it would request your attendance in 
public session that you would see fit to accept because I think 
that rejection would be misunderstood by a lot of people.
    However, I think that it is important that a continuous 
exchange of views between the Executive and the Legislative 
Branch continues and I am not so concerned whether that is to 
be in executive session or in public session.
    I do have a question in my mind that at a time when we are 
at war, and we are at war, whether or not any constructive 
purpose would be served by having a public session even though 
I recognize your right to refuse to suggest answering the 
question in executive session, which we would respect and which 
you have done. But I can picture a situation where I or some 
member of the committee unintentionally may ask a question 
which by the mere asking of the question itself would carry an 
inference which would be misunderstood by not so much the 
American people or by Congress but perhaps by the other side, 
and there is a question in my mind as to the wisdom of holding 
a public session at this time to explore all these factors.
    Secretary Rusk. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Do you wish to comment?
    Secretary Rusk. I think not, sir; I think I have the 
Senator's view.
    The Chairman. Senator Lausche.

               OPEN HEARINGS WILL NOT FOSTER UNIFICATION

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, it has 
been my belief that while our country and our people are so 
deeply divided on the course that we should follow in Vietnam, 
our primary objective ought to be to bring about a unification 
of thinking.
    With divided thinking known by Ho Chi Minh, the ability to 
get him to go to the negotiating table is nil.
    I have been turning over in my mind ways and means of 
analyzing the thinking of the people and, if possible, bringing 
them to a common judgment.
    The achievement of a common judgment I suppose is 
impossible. But you cannot win a war with a division that we 
are suffering.
    My judgment is that open hearings of the character 
suggested here will not tend towards a unification of judgment 
but will aggravate the disagreement that already exists.
    We talk about a hearing. Now I put this question: What is a 
public hearing at which the Secretary of State appears as a 
witness? Is it a public debate? Is it a genuine public hearing 
where you are soliciting information from the Secretary on a 
specific issue?
    If we are to assemble and generally debate, and the 
Secretary of State is silenced because there are matters which, 
if revealed, he believes will be hostile to the security of the 
country, can it even be called a debate?
    My own judgment is that we have not had genuine public 
hearings. A public hearing would be one in which there was a 
specific issue, and the Secretary was asked questions what 
shall we do about this issue. Should we not differentiate what 
is a genuine public hearing from what has turned into a public 
debate, and I submit to you that public debates are not in the 
interest of our country if they are conducted in the manner in 
which our hearings have been conducted in the past.
    If the so-called public hearing turns into a debate, and 
the Secretary is obliged to remain silent because the item 
discussed, if fully revealed, would not be in the best 
interests of the security of the United States, does the 
proceeding even fail to meet the true definition of a true 
debate?

                       A LONG DEBATE OVER VIETNAM

    The debate about what our course in Vietnam should be has 
now been in progress since the Tonkin Bay resolution. When was 
that, August 1964?
    Senator Morse. Long before that.
    Senator Gore. Long before that.
    The Chairman. Oh, yes, but that was the Tonkin Bay.
    Senator Lausche. For three years we have been arguing it, 
arguing for what purpose?
    Has it been to repeal the Tonkin Bay resolution? Has it 
been to establish justification for pulling out?
    In the three years, how many times has the Secretary 
appeared before us?
    Those hearings, those debates, in my opinion, have fully 
explored all of the aspects that you are speaking about without 
dealing with any particular issue.

                 A RESOLUTION TO WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM

    Now, this is rather rash, I suppose: If our presence in 
Vietnam is wrong, it is believed that we should pull out, 
should not some one of us present a resolution to the Senate 
that we should pull out, and if that resolution is presented, 
the Secretary is called to a hearing and asked to give his 
views on whether we should pull out. But then if that were one, 
we would have a specific issue. We would not be just sprawled 
all over the field, as we have been in the last three years.
    Let us look to what we are coming. I do not know whether 
this is true or not, Mr. Secretary, but I have the Washington 
Post of November 6. Here is what it states:

    Detailed instructions helped hecklers give Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk one of his roughest receptions at Indiana 
University last week. Order of battle instructions bearing the 
name of the Committee to End the War in Vietnam advised 
demonstrators that Rusk should be allowed to make his speech 
but with suitable heckling in the great American tradition.

    The leaflet giving instructions to these college students 
contained this statement further:

    At appropriate moments when Rusk says something 
objectionable to you shout ``Lie'' or ``Booh''. The shout of 
``Lie'' or ``Booh'' will be effective. At the conclusion of 
Rusk's speech yell ``Hell, no, we won't go''.

    I say to you that we are partly responsible for that type 
of conduct among the American students.
    Senator Morse. There are rightist groups who do the same 
thing. I can testify as to what they do.
    Senator Lausche. I think it is just beyond my understanding 
of what true Americanism is.
    Senator Gore. Would the Senator yield?
    Senator Lausche. And, Mr. Secretary, I have the deepest 
compassion for you. You have the toughest job in the United 
States except that of the President, and I say do not yield. 
Hold your post. When history is written you will go down as a 
man who stood true to your word, fearless in the expression of 
your judgment, devoted to the cause of the United States.
    Senator Gore. Will the Senator yield to me now?
    Senator Lausche. Yes, I yield.

                            PUBLIC EDUCATION

     Senator Gore. Senator, before your peroration, it seemed 
to me that you had somewhat arrived at a conclusion not greatly 
dissimilar to mine, and that is that it might be possible to 
refine the subject matter and rules of procedure to fulfill the 
function of public education and public exchanges between the 
Executive and the Legislative. Am I correct in that?
    Senator Lausche. I think there is one way of bringing the 
issue before the public. I am prepared to join with any one of 
you to offer a resolution to withdraw from Vietnam. Then he 
will come in and testify.
    Senator Case. Would the Senator yield?
    Senator Lausche. Yes, I yield.

                      PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

    Senator Case. I think you have, in another way, you have 
helped to point the way to what I think is desirable. I am not 
at all sure it is an excuse or desirable for the Secretary or 
the President or any public figure except a Member of Congress 
who is supposed to take a beating of this sort to go into 
certain situations in which this kind of organized, not debate, 
but organized protest and demonstration is possible and is 
getting to be more normal.
    I would keep out of that kind of thing. It does nothing 
help public understanding or anything else and it certainly 
does not help the country to have our Executive Branch upset by 
this kind of thinking and its strength and energy wasted.
    But it is still necessary to have a place in which this 
debate can take place, and where is it more suitable than in 
the Senate of the United States. Under circumstances such as 
Senator Gore has suggested and in which it is properly 
controlled, not necessarily, we can decide whether we should 
have television cameras or not.

                       A BRIDGE OF UNDERSTANDING

    Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I want you to know that I am 
very pleased that you are here this morning, and I am pleased 
we are in executive session on this matter. This is the kind of 
subject matter that ought to be discussed----
    Senator Mundt. Wayne, we can't hear you.
    Senator Morse. I said I am very pleased the Secretary is 
here, and I am pleased we are in executive session, because I 
think this is the type of subject matter that ought to be 
discussed in executive session. I shall be just as brief as I 
can, but being one of those who has been a public critic of the 
Secretary because he hasn't appeared in public hearing, I think 
I owe it to him and I owe it to the committee to briefly 
express my point of view because what I seek is a bridge of 
understanding between this committee and this Administration. I 
don't think it is only between this committee and Secretary 
Rusk.
    I think we need to do everything we can to build a better 
understanding between this committee and Administration.
    As the Secretary knows, divisions of opinion exist within 
the committee. For example, I do not share many of the points 
of view expressed by my good friend, Senator Hickenlooper, this 
morning, probably more a difference in the emphasis that he 
places on this point of view than anything else. But, and I 
don't expect, don't ask you, Mr. Secretary, to agree to my 
point of view. I only hope that this kind of an exchange will 
give each a better understanding of the other man's point of 
view.
    So I am going to say these things about why I think we 
should have both executive and public hearings. I think it is 
very important that in a democracy that the Cabinet officers 
appear in public hearings before a legislative committee. As I 
have said on the Senate floor, I think it is part of our 
checking system. I don't fear the people. They can judge if a 
Senator abuses a privilege in a public hearing. But we all know 
that any time you or any other Cabinet member are asked a 
question that you think involves the security of the Republic 
that you think should be better asked in executive session, it 
happens all the time, the Administration witness says, ``Well, 
Mr. Senator, I would prefer to answer that question in an 
executive session.''

                    PROTECTED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

    If a Senator at any time, and I take you back to the 
record, because it is replete with proof of what I now say, if 
a Senator pressed for an answer in a question that the Cabinet 
officer says he would like to answer in executive session, he 
is protected by executive privilege.
    I remember very well the MacArthur hearings where the 
Senator from Oregon several times on that occasion, as the 
record will show, when a Senator was insisting that the 
representative of, at that time of General [George C.] Marshall 
and General [Omar] Bradley, pressed for answers and they said 
they would prefer to answer in private, I arose and defended 
their right as a matter of executive privilege to answer in 
executive session.
    I think that right will always be guaranteed, and I think 
that is good for the public, too. I think it is part of their 
education. I think these public hearings are of great 
educational value, not only for the committee but for the 
public.
    You have never appeared in a public hearing, may I say, Mr. 
Secretary, in which in my judgment you didn't make a very 
constructive record; you came out of the hearing stronger than 
you went in, in my mind. I think you always will. I think a 
public hearing is a bridge between the committee and the 
Administration and the public.
    You can't understand my position in regard to public 
hearings unless you also understand that I feel that the 
American people are entitled to have the two branches of our 
Government, the Legislative and the Executive, meet in common 
meeting before the public for a discussion of those things that 
appropriately can be discussed in public. I say, too, the third 
branch, the Judiciary, of course, is not involved in this phase 
of the checks and balances system.
    I think the Administration has a clear duty to meet with a 
Foreign Relations Committee or an Armed Services Committee, or 
any other committee that has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, and to discuss those things that can appropriately be 
discussed in public. I don't think the Administration is hurt 
by it.

                         ONE DEDICATED PURPOSE

    I come to the point the chairman raises--it represents some 
difference that I have with Senator Hickenlooper. There is no 
question our being a divided nation. I don't think that 
executive sessions are going to promote unity if they are all 
executive sessions. I think you should welcome an opportunity 
to appear before this Committee in public and respect our 
judgment as we will respect yours as to what is appropriate.
    But now let's take the negative side of it. Suppose you get 
into a session someday and members of this committee suffer 
lapses of good judgment, and violate what we can all agree is a 
reasonable course of conduct. How many members of this 
committee do you think will come to their defense? Almost all 
of them if there is any inappropriate course of conduct on the 
part of any member of this committee. This is not a case of a 
contest. This is not a case of two opposing teams fighting 
across the table. This is a case of where every man around the 
table, including yourself, on such an occasion has one 
dedicated purpose. We may have different sights as to how best 
to reach that purpose, but we have one dedicated purpose and 
that is to serve our country. There isn't any question about 
that being the purpose of any member of this committee or of 
yours.

                           A CREDIBILITY GAP

    I think it is a great mistake for us to let this notion 
spread that for some reason this Administration, with you as 
its spokesman, isn't willing to come before this committee for 
a public hearing. I don't think your offer by way of a 
substitute is satisfactory; namely, that we have executive 
sessions and then we release a censored transcript of what took 
place.
    I think the American people are entitled to see and hear 
with their own eyes and ears and make their judgments with 
regard to what is going on in the field of foreign policy to 
the extent that they can be apprised.
    Furthermore, Mr. Secretary, it happens to be my view, you 
may not agree, you probably don't agree, some of my colleagues 
don't, but it is true that there is a feeling on the part of 
many that they are not, of the public, they are not being told, 
that there is a credibility gap. I think a public hearing will 
help bridge that.
    I think what we need is an increased confidence in the 
public at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue; an increased 
confidence of the public in their Congress, and they have got 
good reason to have some questions about the Congress; an 
increased confidence of the public in the Executive Branch, and 
I am sorry to say but it is my belief they have some reason to 
have a lack of confidence there, too. But we all have a common 
interest in eliminating that lack of confidence in respect to 
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.
    In a nutshell, this is my point of view. I think you are 
throwing away, if I may speak humbly and very respectfully, I 
think you are throwing away a great source of power that the 
Administration has in helping inform the public.
    You have got nothing to fear in a public hearing before 
this committee, because of the safeguards that the record shows 
always are available to you.
    I have heard you in some of our public hearings on many 
occasions say ``Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to answer that''--
I don't quote you but paraphrase you--``I prefer to answer that 
in executive session.'' And the chairman has always said, or 
the man who asked the question has always said, ``Very well. 
That is perfectly satisfactory.'' That is what he should say. 
You have the discretion. It will be in public and the 
disclosure of information to the degree that you think is 
proper to disclose it. I think it is a healthy thing in a 
democracy.

                         THE RISKS OF DEMOCRACY

    The last point I make is after all don't forget democracy 
has its risks. Its price is high, but it is worth both the 
risks and the price.
    I just am greatly worried about this trend that is 
developing in this country on the part of the opposition. I 
happen to think it is much more serious than the Administration 
recognizes. Sunday night I lectured at Purdue University. Part 
of my thesis was to defend my position in opposition to conduct 
on the part of the college students and non-college students in 
exceeding the limits of the law in their manifestations of 
protests against the war. They know that I have great 
reservations about this war. They also know that I never have 
countenanced and I never will violation of the law in respect 
to protests.
    It is very interesting to see what happened; I didn't know 
what was going to happen. But I thought here was a place to 
again--I have done it many times on campuses--draw the line on 
this. Sure, I had some questions in opposition to my position 
but, on the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the 
students as well as the town people made very clear they agreed 
with that major premise.
    Now I think we are throwing away, if we follow what I 
understand to be your position of not appearing in public 
hearings, a great educational force that the Administration 
can't justify.

                        A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION

    So, I close with these questions. I ask them, Mr. 
Secretary, in the greatest of respect, but I think the record 
should show and I will state all three, one after the other, 
and then you can comment now or later. I would like to have you 
state for the record whether we are to understand that you are 
refusing to testify before this committee in a public hearing 
in regard to not only Vietnam but other foreign policy matters. 
For example, I think the Congo matter, which Mr. Macomber 
called me about the other day in Lafayette, ought to be 
discussed before the committee. Here is one that I think could 
be very appropriately discussed in executive session first and 
then maybe at a subsequent meeting make any public statement 
that ought to be made. But I would like to have the record show 
that you are refusing to testify before the committee in public 
hearings with regard to foreign policy, with particular 
reference to Vietnam.
    Second, I would like to know whether or not this is a 
presidential decision.
    And lastly, I would like to know if, for example, if you 
would object to making this transcript public, because there is 
going to be a great deal of interest as to what happened here 
this morning in regard to our discussion of public hearings. It 
may very well be that the committee decides that it shouldn't 
be made public, but nevertheless I would like to know whether 
or not the Administration through you would have objections to 
making it public.

                         RELEASE THE TRANSCRIPT

    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, I can answer your first two 
questions together, I think. One is that I am not--I have not 
taken a constitutional position here of refusing.
    What I thought I had been doing was consulting with the 
committee on this question. I had an invitation from the 
committee. I came back with another recommendation that we do 
it in another way. I understood we were going to talk about 
that in the committee here this morning, so, as I indicated at 
the very beginning of my remarks this morning, I do not feel 
that I am today involved in the underlying, or the possibly 
underlying constitutional point.
    It seems to me that we ought, first, if the committee would 
wish it, to talk about the question of what is wise to do in 
this circumstance, in this situation. So the first two 
questions I would not accept as the framing of the issue that 
is in front of us now as I see it.
    On the third question, I would be glad to look at the 
transcript and certainly I don't think there is anything that 
has been said thus far that I would object to being released.

             NOT A DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY AS A WHOLE

    Senator Morse. I do hope, and I finish with this, but I do 
hope, I agree with you that the subject matter is the broad 
subject matter. But I do hope at the conclusion of the meeting 
this morning that we can find out what your position would be 
in answer to my two specific questions as to whether or not you 
are standing on what you think, which I disagree with, but that 
is all right, you are refusing to testify as Secretary of State 
before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate at a 
public hearing on foreign policy, including Vietnam.
    Second, I think we ought to know whether or not the 
position that you take is the position that is based upon a 
Presidential decision.
    Secretary Rusk. I would like to have one further comment to 
your first question. I had not looked upon this discussion as 
involving foreign policy as a whole. I have been, as I 
indicated in my remarks, I have been in public session, what is 
it, six or eight times--several times this session, and I 
have--I thought the issue had arisen rather specifically with 
regard to Vietnam.
    Senator Morse. Of course, if we use Vietnam as a precedent, 
and we accede to your refusal, you extend it to any other 
foreign policy matter any time you want to extend it to, 
whether it is the Congo----
    Secretary Rusk. Of course, in some of these other foreign 
policy matters, some of these same considerations would apply 
as you adverted to and as I did in my own remarks.
    For example, you and I might--I might want to have to look 
at the transcript on this if we release this testimony, you and 
I might agree on the tragedy of recent events in Greece.
    But my problem is not just to criticize but to find a way 
to help get Greece back on the track that other members of NATO 
would like to see them on. I can't do that by saying some of 
the things publicly that I may have in my own mind, that you 
may have in yours, in my particular job as Secretary of State. 
This is a real dilemma, not only for the Secretary of State in 
this country, but for foreign ministers in other democracies.

                 COMPARISON TO BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS

    In the case of the House of Commons, they give notice of 
questions so that the answers can be carefully thought about 
and they can be, I think, taken to account, the 
responsibilities of the foreign minister. Of course, there are 
supplementary questions so they can be elaborated, but we don't 
have the custom here of giving notice of questions. So that 
sometimes it isn't easy for a Secretary of State on the spur of 
the moment, particularly before a great committee of the 
Congress, to respond. At a press conference you can brush the 
question aside or just give a platitude and that is the end of 
it. But one doesn't do that with the committees of the 
Congress, not very readily.
    The Chairman. Are you through?
    Senator Aiken.

                            A UNITED NATION

    Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, I didn't understand that the 
scope of this meeting this morning was limited to the question 
of whether the Secretary should appear in executive or public 
sessions. So far as I am concerned, I think he should appear 
for the purpose of giving us information as to the thinking and 
the operations and objectives of our government in the fields 
of foreign affairs, and it is immaterial to me how I get that 
information.
    In the last few months we have been getting it largely 
from, as it relates to Southeast Asia, from people who have 
been there, from the armed services or otherwise and they come 
back and tell us what they know about it.
    I can well understand the President's disappointment that 
he doesn't have a united nation back of him. I don't know what 
the percentages are. In fact, the way questions are put, they 
are very difficult to answer anyway, like that referendum 
taking place in San Francisco today; I believe it is worded, 
``Do you want an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam?'' Well that 
word ``immediate'' would certainly kill it for me, because it 
is out of the question. You can't withdraw immediately.
    But if the President wants unity in this country, he 
certainly would have it if the Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, or 
Cuba or France or Russia or anybody else started dropping bombs 
on Front Royal or Silver Spring, we would have unity in this 
country very, very fast and there is no question about it.
    But, I regret that some speakers have by inference 
indicated they thought those who criticized their judgment in 
carrying the war 10,000 miles from home were not wholly loyal 
to the country. I don't go along with that. I agree, probably 
some of them have not, but the others you always have some of 
them, but I do think you can criticize the President's judgment 
and not oppose his policies.
    As I said, I want to get the information and it is 
immaterial how I get it, whether it is a private or executive 
or public hearing.
    I would say there are some things that ought not to be told 
in public hearings. But the question of China, and I think the 
public got the inference that perhaps our objective was to 
contain China and protect, certainly protect Southeast Asia 
from China. My own knowledge, I realize that every country in 
Southeastern Asia, including Cambodia and all the rest of them, 
are scared to death of being overrun by the Chinese.

                  WHEN THE U.S. WITHDRAWS FROM VIETNAM

    But that leads me to question the statement which the 
Administration has made that when we defeat the Viet Cong and 
North Vietnam in no uncertain manner, we will promptly withdraw 
from Southeast Asia. I believe the term six months has been 
given.
    The question I would like to ask is, if we withdraw 
immediately from Southeast Asia with our forces, how are we 
going to protect those countries from a billion Chinese Reds, 
assuming they are Red by that time. We can't withdraw, can we? 
As long as we remain a strong military nation, how can we 
withdraw?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, it has not been in our thought 
that we would withdraw from positions that we have been holding 
for some time in the Pacific. We have bases in the Philippines, 
in Okinawa, Guam. We have forces in Korea. We have not 
contemplated from the very beginning of SEATO we would maintain 
standing armies in Southeast Asia in the SEATO area.
    I think this would depend upon the solidity of the 
settlement there. We do have considerable mobility. I would 
think it would not be, at least the seven governments who have 
been carrying the battle there in Southeast Asia, felt that it 
was not necessary to maintain standing forces of other 
countries in South Vietnam, once certain conditions have been 
achieved.
    Now, there is no contradiction, I think, between that and 
the maintenance of alliance arrangements and guarantees.
    We have alliances in this hemisphere but we don't have 
standing forces in the countries that are protected by that 
alliance.
    I think that the answer to that would be that we do not 
anticipate that we would maintain a standing force in Vietnam 
beyond the time that the governments indicated they would do so 
following a statement of settlement, but we would have in the 
background forces in the Pacific and a high degree of mobility 
in case they were required again.
    Senator Aiken. And arrangements for naval bases.
    Secretary Rusk. No. We are not----
    Senator Aiken. None at all?
    Secretary Rusk. We are not planning bases in South Vietnam 
itself.

               ENDING THE WAR WITHOUT A FORMAL AGREEMENT

    Senator Aiken. Do you think it is impossible to end the war 
without the signed agreement between North Vietnam and the 
United States?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I do, Senator. That is one of the 
major alternatives which we not only have thought as a 
possibility, but we have experimented with it somewhat.
    Senator Aiken. As a probability?
    Secretary Rusk. That is, it may be that this situation may 
terminate more like the Greek guerrilla situation terminated 
rather than a formal agreement.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Did you say it is impossible?
    Senator Aiken. Impossible to end a war, it is impossible to 
end a war without a formal signed agreement?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, yes, it is possible to end it without--
--
    Senator Aiken. It is possible, that is what I thought you 
said.
    Secretary Rusk. It is possible without a formal signed 
agreement.
    Senator Aiken. Yes.

                       A PROCESS OF DE-ESCALATION

    Secretary Rusk. We have tried on a number of occasions to 
start a process of de-escalation. For example, in the first 
part of this year we did not bomb for a period of almost four 
months on a ten-nautical mile radius of the center of the City 
of Hanoi, that is 300-something square miles. We said to the 
other side, ``Now we are not asking you for an exact quid pro 
quo. We are going to do this. We will be impressed if you would 
do something comparable in the Saigon area or in the 
Demilitarized Zone or any other place where we could take 
notice of it, and if you think this is a good idea we can build 
upon that and increase the areas on both sides.'' But we didn't 
get any response from that.
    And there have been other efforts to try to start the 
process of de facto de-escalation to see if that would be 
possible even though it might be difficult on all sides to have 
a formal agreement to that effect.
    Senator Aiken. Would you be surprised if along in the 
Spring you saw indications that the Viet Cong, the North 
Vietnamese reached a point where it might be possible to de-
escalate? Would you be surprised?
    Secretary Rusk. We don't see indications of that at the 
present time but that is one of the things to which we are 
completely alerted at all times. We watch the incident rates. 
We watch the number of attacks. We watch the location of the 
attacks to see if there is any trend that has a political 
connotation to it.

                          VIET CONG DEFECTORS

    Senator Aiken. I notice you make a point of the increased 
number of defectors from the Viet Cong now. When did we stop 
calling them refugees?
    Secretary Rusk. Oh, the refugees are rather a different 
group. The so-called defectors, the Chu Hoi people, are people 
who were former Viet Cong and who come in and say, ``I was a 
Viet Cong. Here I am and I want to rejoin the body politic, the 
society.'' Then they are given some schooling, they are put 
back into jobs.
    I can tell the committee very privately that on Thursday 
the Saigon Government expects to announce a Cabinet and I think 
there is--I am told there may be an ex-Viet Cong member of that 
Cabinet in one of the Cabinet posts.
    Senator Aiken. Yes.

                         A WAR AGAINST IDEOLOGY

    I don't want to use too much time and quite refer to your 
press conference because I think people have referred to that 
frequently to soothe their own thinking, but in the press 
conference you referred a number of times to Asian Communism, 
implying what this was all about, and the rhetoric of the 
Administration is replete with the words ``communism'' and 
``communist.'' Yet the Administration tries to convince the 
other side it is not fighting a war against the ideology. And 
here is the question:
    Do you think the American people would support this war if 
Hanoi was not governed by a Communist regime. Would it make any 
difference to you if the North Vietnamese had a monarchy? Would 
we still be fighting them? That is more or less hypothetical.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I think if under the SEATO Treaty we 
had a commitment which covered South Vietnam and required us to 
take steps to meet the common danger in the events of 
aggression by armed attack that would apply regardless of the 
ideology of the country delivering the attack.
    Senator Aiken. These questions I am asking are more or less 
in a sense spot-checking.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I understand, sir.

                        SOVIET ORBITAL MISSILES

    Senator Aiken. For the last one I would say: In your 
opinion, does the Soviet orbital missile violate the spirit if 
not the letter, of the existing agreement pertaining to control 
of nuclear weapons?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, if the missile itself went into orbit 
and contained a nuclear warhead, this would be a clear 
violation of the treaty.
    Senator Aiken. But you would never know.
    Secretary Rusk. But we would have a pretty good idea if 
they orbited such missiles as to whether the pattern of them 
indicated there might be missiles involved. But these 
suborbital missiles are not strictly in orbit in the sense of 
the space treaty.
    Senator Aiken. No, they are not.
    Secretary Rusk. But I don't want to leave the impression 
that we are clapping hands about it or are thinking this is a 
good development.
    Senator Aiken. Well, as I remember----
    Secretary Rusk. But thus far, our examination of it 
indicates there is not a violation of the space treaty.
    Senator Aiken. I think it would be far less dangerous to an 
enemy than our underwater nuclear fleet.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, there are many technical problems 
that seem to me to impose some limits on such a capability. 
Orbiting nuclear weapons in space would open up the 
possibilities of technical malfunctions and all sorts of things 
that would add a new element of danger even from the point of 
view of the government that puts them there, and I would 
suppose that that would not be very far.

                            ASIAN COMMUNISM

    If I might make a very brief comment on your reference to 
Asian Communism, there has been a rather sharp difference since 
about 1960-61 between Communists in Asia and Communists in 
Eastern Europe on the question of the strategy for pursuing 
world revolution.
    In the case of China they have pressed a doctrine of 
militancy to the point where they are relatively isolated in 
the Communist world, and they have been doing something about 
it in a good many countries. It is this brand of militant 
Communism that we have sometimes referred to as Asian Communism 
in order to distinguish it from the peaceful co-existence 
doctrine with all its imperfections and qualifications that is 
being discussed in Eastern Europe.
    We don't, for example, at least I don't, see anything in 
Hanoi that points toward Titoism. It is true that the North 
Vietnamese themselves would not like to be swarmed over by the 
Chinese. But, on the other hand, Tito's relations with Hanoi 
are just abut as bad as between any two countries in the 
capitalist world, not quite as bad as between Moscow and 
Peking.
    Hanoi is moving on Laos and as been sending infiltrators 
into Thailand, so that to draw a closer analogy you would have 
to suppose that Yugoslavia was going after Austria and Greece 
before you could draw a parallel as to whether Hanoi might be 
another Tito.
    So we don't see any connection, except for the point that 
the Vietnamese, they clearly do not appear to be ready to be 
absorbed by the Chinese.

                            CUBAN COMMUNISM

    Senator Aiken. The morning papers report that at a party in 
Moscow yesterday, the American ambassador attended and the 
Cuban ambassador refused to attend. Where does that leave that 
situation? Do you know why Cuba would not go? Is she joining 
the Chinese or the Albanians or who?
    Secretary Rusk. There has been, we know, some argument 
between Moscow and Havana about the tactics to be pursued by 
Communist parties in Latin America, and there again the issue 
seems to be between militancy on the one side and a popular 
front technique which the Soviets rather supported in Latin 
America.
    There are important differences between some of the Latin 
American Communist parties and Castro and this has given rise 
to some frictions. The Cubans were not invited to make a speech 
along with others in Moscow. This led the Cubans to stay away 
from the party, and we hope this will develop somewhat further.
    Senator Aiken. It might be that some of the delicate 
arrangements which I believe you referred to in your press 
conference are working here or there.
    That is all; I have used my time.
    The Chairman. Senator Gore.

                      A MISTAKEN POLICY IN VIETNAM

    Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, you are not here to discuss 
Vietnam policy this morning and I shall not proceed upon that 
basis. Suffice it to say as a preface to my exchange with you 
on the subject of your appearance this morning, you are aware, 
I am sure, that throughout your incumbency and before, I have 
thought my country was involved in a mistaken policy in 
Vietnam. That policy has undergone a number of changes. I 
submit that your reply to Senator Aiken just a few moments ago 
about the retention of bases, of the removal of troops, appears 
to be considerably different from the statement from the 
Philippine conference in which the President referred to the 
removal of troops within six months. I won't go into detail but 
I just use that as a possible illustration of the fact, I 
believe, our policies there have undergone an enlargement, 
particularly since your last appearance before the committee in 
public session.
    Now, I would like to come to that particular question for 
which you are here, about which you are here.
    For your information, when we considered this in executive 
session alone a few days ago, I moved that the chairman be 
instructed to communicate to President Johnson the deep concern 
of this committee about the threat to public communication 
between the Executive and Legislative Branches on a subject so 
vital as war and peace, on a subject the cause for which 
American boys are sent to fight and die.
    When Senator Mansfield suggested the meeting which we now 
have, I promptly withdrew the motion because I thought it was 
much better that you come, as you have done today--if you are 
looking for the Philippine statement, I have it here, Mr. 
Secretary.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I am looking for the Manila, I am 
listening to you, Senator.
    Senator Gore. Just to save you looking for it; I have it. 
Will you hand it to him over there?
    I really didn't wish to make a point except it illustrated, 
I think, our whole program has been undergoing changes there. 
With each step of escalation there has been the broadening of 
the conflict and your recent statement about vital American 
interests being involved in Vietnam, it seems to me, is an 
enlargement of the policy and certainly enlargement of the 
issue.

                      A CONSTITUTIONAL PARTNERSHIP

    But to come now to the question, if I may have your 
attention: You said right in the beginning that you were not 
dealing with this as a constitutional matter in your appearance 
this morning. The constitutional question is involved, and I 
wondered if the Executive Branch alone should arrogate to 
itself the determination of that question. It seems to me that 
both branches of government have constitutional 
responsibilities and rights.
    The Senate has a limited constitutional partnership with 
the Executive, the President, with respect to the Nation's 
foreign policy. I am sure you concur in that.
    Now, in pursuance of our responsibility of advice and 
consent, we have, this branch of the government has 
responsibility and particularly this Committee, and then 
Section Five of the Constitution, it is for the Congress to 
determine what sessions of its committees will be made public. 
There is not only a constitutional question involved here but 
also a statutory one to which the Chairman has already 
referred.
    Then, Mr. Secretary, there is a third point I would like to 
make and that is our joint obligation in a democracy to public 
opinion, to public education, to public enlightenment. It is, 
after all, a government, as Abraham Lincoln described it, of, 
by and for the people.
    Now, I wish to suggest that it might be wise for you to 
consider a public appearance and particularly if this 
committee, after this consultation, should determine that in 
its view its constitutional responsibilities required a public 
session. I submit this is a question on which both of us have 
the duty and right of position.
    Now, if it be determined between the Executive and the 
Legislative that a public session is in the public interest, 
then I suggest, Mr. Secretary, that this committee, in my view, 
will be very reasonable, extremely reasonable, not only as 
Senator Morse has suggested, with every member refraining from 
pressing the point which you would prefer to answer in 
executive session but I think, and this is only an opinion of 
mine, the committee has taken no position so far as I know, I 
think it would be possible for your staff and the committee 
staff, subject to your approval and the committee's approval, 
to work out areas of sensitivity, to work out methods of 
procedure, to work out the modus vivendi of a public appearance 
which would safeguard the interests which you rightly consider 
relevant and difficult if not dangerous.
    Senator Lausche. Al, would you yield for a question?
    Senator Gore. I have finished.

                          ISSUES FOR HEARINGS

    Senator Lausche. On what issue would you hold the hearing? 
Would it be on pulling out of Vietnam? Would it be on stopping 
the bombing? On what issue would we hold the hearing?
    Senator Gore. Well, I would think the involvement of the 
national interest and the policy with respect thereto. I would 
not want to confine it to particular issues such as pulling out 
or bombing. So far as I am concerned I have never had a word to 
say about bombing. I considered that a tactical matter. Not one 
time have I referred to that, ever. So I would think, to answer 
your question, if we are to have a review of policy in Asia, it 
ought to include the whole question--China, Russia, future 
equation between the major powers, Southeast Asia, the smaller 
nations and the bigger nations. I would not want to be 
restrictive in it.
    I had concluded, Mr. Secretary. I just pass these views 
along for you to consider, and I think it is good that you come 
and I am delighted Senator Mansfield made the suggestion, 
because I consider it is a threat if you should finally, if 
this Committee should insist upon your appearance and you 
finally declined and the President supported you in that, then 
indeed, it would be a serious matter.

                           TROOP WITHDRAWALS

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, just one or two comments, if 
I may, on what Senator Gore has said.
    In the Manila Communique the statement was made with regard 
to troop withdrawals that--and allied force troop withdrawals:
    They shall be withdrawn after close consultation as the 
other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases 
infiltration and the level of violence there subsided. Those 
forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than 
six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.
    I don't recall anything that I said to Senator Aiken that 
seemed to cut across that in any way. It seems to me those two 
are quite consistent. I will be glad to review the record to 
see if by any chance what I said to Senator Aiken was ambiguous 
on that.
    Senator Aiken. No cameras.
    Senator Case. I think, however, it is a matter for us and a 
very serious matter to keep this debate to put it in the high 
level and to have it because the public has to have these 
things discussed. And they are not being discussed at the 
Pentagon, and they are not being discussed at Indiana 
University in circumstances like this, but let us provide the 
forum.

                         A HEARING WITH A GOAL

    Senator Lausche. I will yield after I make this statement.
    In my type of a hearing where you are wanting to reach 
decisions, it is essential at the very beginning to determine 
what the issue is. Then you have a hearing of affirmative or 
negative proof on the issue.
    But these hearings that we have been conducting have been 
an exchange of arguments with no goal sought.
    Now I yield to you.
    Senator Case. If the Senator would just yield once more, we 
could meet this point by having a series of questions presented 
ahead of time and I would not agree with your formulation of 
the issue; I think it is much too broad and provocative and 
what not. I do not think you meant it to be a final choice.
    Senator Lausche. What would the hearing be on?
    Senator Case. You can have your voice and I can have my 
voice. I have questions I would like to ask.
    Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest the Senator 
from Ohio has had far more than his fair time.
    Senator Lausche. I am just going to conclude in half a 
minute.

                        A HORRIBLY UNJUST ATTACK

    Now the matter of yellow peril, it was a horribly unjust 
attack made on you, and if the charge of yellow peril is to be 
made, is it not also to be directed at Truman, at Eisenhower 
and Kennedy?
    Truman felt that the Communists should not be permitted to 
move into South Vietnam. Eisenhower succeeded in achieving a 
peace. But after the peace was achieved, huge numbers of troops 
were kept in Korea to stop the Communists from moving 
southward.
    When Kennedy became President, there were 500 troops in 
Vietnam. When he died there were 19,000.
    Senator Clark. It is absolutely wrong.
    Senator Lausche. It is absolutely correct.
    Do you challenge the number I have given?
    Senator Clark. I certainly do.
    Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, let's get the figure and put 
it in the record.
    Do not squirm, Joe. I have the right to speak. If I am 
wrong in the figures, we will put them in and correct them.
    That is all I wanted to say. I am for a public hearing but 
not a public harangue and a public debate where one man is 
before us and 19 of us are shooting at him.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, if I might have a brief 
comment.
    The Chairman. Yes.

                     REGRETS FROM INDIANA STUDENTS

    Secretary Rusk. I thank Senator Lausche for his generous 
personal remark, but I think I owe it to the students of 
Indiana to put a postscript on what he read from.
    It is true that an instruction of that type was circulated. 
In the audience of about 4,000, there were about 150 who felt 
themselves subject to this instruction, and they did create, as 
some of you may have noticed on television, a considerable 
amount of disturbance in the course of my remarks. I am 
receiving a delegation of Indiana students on Thursday who have 
circulated a petition throughout the student body to express 
the regrets of the students of Indiana University over this 
episode.
    I think that ought to be in the record, because I do not 
think that this in any sense----
    Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, I do not think any type of 
apology is necessary. I saw you on television and you had my 
deepest sympathy. When you were finished with a sentence, they 
yelled, ``Lie, lie''.
    Senator Morse. I think the Secretary came out of it very 
well. Always that is the case when you deal with these 
extremists. Frank talks about this group of extremists. I have 
time and time again, I have been at least a dozen times in the 
three and a half years with this rightist student group 
parading through the auditorium while I was speaking, picketing 
outside, making all of these things; I came out stronger each 
time, stronger than I went in because the whole mass of the 
student body leaves them just as they did in Indiana. This is 
part of the price of freedom I talked about earlier today. That 
does not bother me.
    Senator Lausche. Will Carl get for the record the correct 
figures on the number of troops?
    The Chairman. Yes, he will get it.

                    STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT ON CHINA

    Secretary Rusk. And finally, Mr. Chairman, I might just 
pass along for the convenience of the committee and its staff, 
not necessarily to be put in the record, a compilation of 
statements made by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson and their Secretaries of State on the problems of peace 
in Asia, including many references to China along the way.
    Senator Morse. They ought to be in the record.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

                 SECRETARY'S VISITS TO COLLEGE CAMPUSES

    Senator Mundt. I think Senator Lausche made a very special 
point which may move us in the direction he suggested if we had 
a series of hearings on a very special point about the 
responsibilities of the Foreign Relations Committee and the 
Senate in world affairs, which I thought were very fruitful.
    We had one dealing with the Chinese situation which I 
thought proved very fruitful and in which I think you made your 
best presentation that could ever have been made.
    I am not convinced that just a public hearing on the war 
after we have been fighting it for five years would serve any 
public interest, although I must say that if it is going to be 
part of a package, to go to college campuses to subject 
yourself to a kind of dissention we have heard and get thrown 
at you questions which would be rougher to answer than the ones 
we would ask, I do not see how you figure out that the only 
place you can appear to answer questions would be the Foreign 
Relations Committee if you are going to do it publicly with 
them.
    I think it is a mistake to go and get into that situation, 
not because of the impact on the student body--I am prepared to 
accept that you did some modicum of good at Indiana University, 
but I think you created a great wave of dissention across the 
country as a whole, as a consequence of that, and I think you 
have to examine your whole card a little more carefully.
    If you feel part of the job of informing the public is to 
get into these debates with college students, I do not think 
you have very strong grounds to say, ``I do not want to do this 
with the Foreign Relations Committee.''
    I think perhaps you ought to get a new pattern of 
performance to carry this message that you should carry to 
convince conventions of people at formal meetings, of 
responsible people where you are going to get a tentative 
hearing, if the question is going to be asked would it be more 
circumspect than if you just subject yourself to what you know 
is a plant of a purposeful effort in order to create dissention 
across the country as a whole.
    It is not just what happened on the campus, but 
ramifications all over the place. So I am not convinced that, 
one, public hearings of a general nature even before our 
Committee will be in the public good, but I see no reason why 
we should be blackballed if we are going to have them all over 
the country in front of college campuses.
    I would like to say a word or two about this press 
conference which has been the subject of discussion before our 
Committee.
    I sympathize with you. I think this was a shameful 
distortion of what you said, but as one who earned a 
considerable proportion of his living on the public platform a 
decade and a half before he came to Congress and has watched 
what happens when we give talks and hold press conferences 
since I have been here, I can realize what happened because I 
think you did leave a vulnerable point.

                    PAST EXPERIENCES WITH THE PRESS

    I can appreciate the great difficulty. I had an experience 
in public life when I was acting chairman of the House 
[UnAmerican Activities] committee that was handling the Alger 
Hiss case, and one night the son of a dear friend of yourself 
and a good friend of mine, Larry Duggan, jumped or was thrown 
out of a high rise in New York City. I got called out of bed 
about 2:00 a.m. to come down to a meeting with detectives and 
policemen and FBI men and reporters at headquarters to see 
whether or not we had anything in the files about Laurence 
Duggan, which we did. He was on the list of five people we were 
expecting to call.
    So I told them that, and the thing dragged on into the 
middle of the morning, in the wee hours of the morning, and 
some reporter said, ``Give us the names of the other ones'', 
and I said ``I do not want to do that.''
    ``When will you give them to us?''
    I said, ``When they jump out of the window.''
    Well, all hell broke out; I was pilloried in all the 
papers. A man wrote a book against me. Frankly, I should have 
said, ``When we call them.''
    I suffered for a long time, not without embarrassment and 
not without criticism, but I survived and I am still here.
    But I think you made an error. If that happened in a press 
conference, I do not criticize you for it, but you should have 
said in your opinion, in my opinion, not something which would 
let a purposeful fellow distort what you said into yellow 
peril, but what you said this morning, as you said many other 
times, there are a billion Chinese under Communist control over 
there. You would have been a target, in my opinion, instead of 
letting the door open.
    I do not say this in criticism, but I think we all learn 
from our mistakes and I think you would have been better 
advised to tell the story more precisely and certainly could 
have eliminated that particular problem.

                       A FIELD DAY FOR PROPAGANDA

    I would like to say this, that I think our communication 
with the Administration is suffering not from public exchange, 
you are talking all the time and the President is talking all 
the time and we are talking all the time. This is part of the 
public exchange.
    I think we are suffering from not having enough meetings of 
this type, executive sessions, in which we can get into the 
matters which need to be discussed.
    I am not so much concerned about the fact that a public 
hearing might be divisive to the American public. I think it 
might or might not, but I do think that a public hearing might 
be very disturbing to the rest of the world. I think if we ask 
you a question and you have to duck it because it is not 
diplomatic to answer it, the mere fact that you cannot answer 
it conjures up for the propagandists to draw a whole 
opportunity to have a field day and make their own 
interpretation of what the situation happened to be.
    I think this dialogue is useful.

                          SELLING THE PACKAGE

    About 15 hours ago I was addressing a state meeting of 
bankers out in California which was also addressed by members 
of the panel, by three good friends of yours, so they said, and 
you would know better than I. The one was Mr. Foster, one was 
Mr. Prager, and one was Mr. Barnett; they did a tremendous job 
with these bankers of selling the administration position, and 
the national position, as to why I think we are in Vietnam, and 
why I think we cannot pull out of Vietnam. They put it not on 
the basis that we had some kind of commitment there, SEATO, or 
we had some kind of moral obligation. They did not get into 
that aspect. They did not get into the aspect that we were 
particularly concerned about trying to raise the standard of 
living by sacrificing tens of thousands of American lives over 
there or to have an election in which it would be appropriate 
to have the mayor of Saigon selected by American electoral 
standards.
    They said this is basic to our security and they did a 
wonderful job of selling their package on that.
    Senator Morse. Karl, could I interrupt for a moment? Joe 
Clark has to rush to Philadelphia to vote. Would you permit him 
to intervene for just a moment and then you resume when he 
goes?
    Senator Mundt. We can establish rules of the game as to how 
long it will take as to whether it takes away from my time.
    Senator Morse. I just thought he ought to say what he wants 
to say.

                     THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY

    Senator Clark. I appreciate what the Senator from Oregon 
has just said and the usual courtesy of my friend from South 
Dakota. I do have to go to vote for an important election in 
Philadelphia and I have appointments up there. I would like to 
say a couple of words and then I will be free.
    Mr. Secretary, in your opening comments you referred to the 
fact that the conduct of the war was not discussed either in 
World War II or in Korea, and I have no doubt you are correct. 
Personally, I do not want to hear about the conduct of the war 
for I can get that from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and if necessary from the newspapers. What I do 
want to hear about is our foreign policy: What it is; why it is 
that way; what is its justification; why has it changed so 
drastically since the election of 1964; what further changes 
can we expect almost week by week.
    I believe that we have almost reached the state in this 
country where the influences of the military are slowly but 
surely becoming a danger to our democratic values.
    One of the principal weapons of the military is secrecy. I 
do not like to see the Secretary of State contributing to what 
is essentially a totalitarian technique by refusing to appear 
in public session before this committee.

                    PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

    Among the questions I should think should be asked you in a 
public session would be some reference to the condition of 
pacification in the country. A very reputable reporter whose 
views I have a high regard for told me the other day that in 
his judgment the pacification was a mess. A group which I 
chaired had the opportunity to hear Mr. Luce discuss the 
problems of pacification and peace in Vietnam. What he had to 
say was disturbing to me and other senators who heard him.
    Ambassador Reischauer has just written a book about the 
Asian policy.\1\ I would like to hear the Secretary of State 
say what is his difference of points of view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Edwin O. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam (N.Y., 1967).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, in my judgment there can be no unification of 
thinking about Vietnam nor is there any relevance to a 
discussion about a debate. We are not interested in debate. We 
seek information. We do not want to conduct a debate upon the 
forum of a public hearing. Nobody is suggesting that.
    Senator Lausche. That is not suggested.
    Senator Clark. I am not yielding. Nobody is suggesting we 
should pull out of Vietnam. This is a straw man only put up to 
be knocked down.
    I would hope we could discuss these matters with some 
maturity and with a minimum of emotion.
    Mr. Secretary, you know the high regard in which I hold 
you. I do hope you will decide to come down here in public 
session under the appropriate safeguards which we are prepared 
to set up.
    Thank you very much.
    Thank you very much, Senator Mundt.

                   U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BEYOND VIETNAM

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, if there is a moment and I 
realize the Senator would not be able to stay, but I would like 
to make a very brief comment.
    As to the matter of what is our foreign policy and what it 
is all about, I think it is interesting to take note of what is 
happening in 1967 despite the pain and difficulty of Vietnam.
    The Kennedy Round was completed, the Monetary Funds 
agreement on liquidity was achieved, the Space Treaty was 
ratified unanimously by the Senate. The Consular Treaty was 
ratified with some difficulty, but nevertheless with a very 
strong vote. The Latin American presidents did decide to move 
to a Common Market in the next decade. The Asian Development 
Bank, thanks to the help of this committee----
    Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, I know you make a darn good 
case but I have to go.
    Senator Case. You should do it in public before the 
committee.

                   U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, do you happen to know 
the military personnel in Vietnam when Eisenhower went out; it 
was around 700 instead of 900.
    Secretary Rusk. Just over 600.
    Senator Clark. At the time of the assassination it was 
12,000.
    Secretary Rusk. President Kennedy made the decision to 
increase those forces to the level of about 17,000.
    Senator Morse. That is 17,000?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
    Senator Morse. Were they there at the time of his death or 
on their way?
    Secretary Rusk. That is true.
    Senator Morse. They were there?
    Secretary Rusk. As a matter of fact----
    Senator Morse. I am sorry, I apologize.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt really has the floor and he 
yielded it only for a limited time.
    Senator Case. He is not going to talk for an unlimited 
time?
    Senator Mundt. No.

                      THE U.S. AS A PACIFIC POWER

    It would seem to me, Mr. Secretary, if you are going to 
appear before our committee in public that you ought to 
concentrate on the basic objectives which we have. I do not 
know how you are going to eliminate this kind of debate to 
include that, but we are either there or we are not there 
because of the security interests of the United States. I think 
we are there for that reason. If we are not, you lose another 
supporter this morning.
    But I have heard you say you are there for that reason and 
that to me is a prevailing argument if it is true.
    I think we are there because, not, I do not care if there 
are a billion or ten billion people in China, if, they are 
under the Chinese Communist domination, and part of this whole 
movement of the Communists to take in their neighbors, move out 
by encroachment on territory, we have a legitimate interest.
    I think we are there because we have to maintain our 
position as a Pacific power and if we do I do not think you can 
isolate Southeast Asia.
    I think you emphasized altogether too much the fact that we 
have an interest in Southeast Asia. I think we have an interest 
in the Pacific. Our 50th state sticks out there quite a way in 
the Pacific. I think if we do not maintain the right area of 
accommodation, friendship with Japan, and Japan goes in either 
with China or Russia, we are in one hell of a fix in that 
situation and that is in our interest.
    We have a firm treaty obligation with Formosa in the 
Pacific. The greatest job of colonization in the world was done 
under the aegis of the U.S. in the Philippines, it is in the 
Pacific, and I think you should sell your argument that this is 
part of our responsibility as a Pacific power, and this is one 
of the areas but not the whole business, and not the whole 
thing to be concerned with. But if it is related to our being 
able to maintain ourselves as a Pacific power, that is my main 
point.

                          TRADE WITH THE ENEMY

     Have two basic criticisms and I am not going to close 
without saying them because I deplore the way there have been 
so many civilian injections into the military decisions in 
Vietnam, and you are immunized from that.
    I deplore even more completely the indefensible trade 
polices of supplying material to the enemy which is shoring up 
the capacity of Ho Chi Minh to fight, and I do not know whether 
it is your policy which you sold Johnson or Johnson's policy 
which you enunciate, but I think it is something we have and I 
have two questions.

                      CHINESE SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

    In the Pacific papers yesterday, the West Coast papers, and 
on the radio and television, I heard a lot of discussion in the 
last few hours that just recently they had found, some Chinese 
soldiers among the people who were killed in this last big, 
battle in Vietnam. I think if that is true we should know about 
it. If it is not true, we should be told it is not true.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, we have asked for clarification of 
any information they have out there locally. I heard those 
press reports. We do not have anything back officially. There 
are a good many ethnic Chinese, both in South Vietnam and in 
North Vietnam, and some of those are in the armed forces. We 
have never had any information that any personnel of the 
Chinese armies in China have been, in South Vietnam, but quite 
frankly, we do not have anything further on that.
    Senator Mundt. I know you have told us that before.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir. We do not have information on 
that.

                         PROPOSALS TO NEGOTIATE

    Senator Mundt. Secondly, how many times have we indirectly 
or directly requested to negotiate? I heard the figures 28.
    Secretary Rusk. Earlier this year, just as a matter of 
reminder, I put together a list of some 28 proposals that have 
been made by ourselves or the other governments or groups of 
governments or other personalities to which we had given what 
we thought was an affirmative response, to which Hanoi--which 
Hanoi turned down. That does not include large number of 
private contacts.
    So that the answer would be many dozens. I would have to 
count to be more precise. But the 28 are those that are on the 
public record.
    Senator Mundt. That is good enough for my final question. I 
want to ask that one based on my own experience based on a 
little I know about human psychology. I do not know very much 
about human psychology, but I know most of the fellow around 
this table have been in many political campaigns, some of them 
tough, some of them easy, usually in the process we have a 
series of debates. On some occasions my opponent halfway 
through the campaign has suggested to me directly or indirectly 
we call off the debates. He does not like the way they have 
gone.
    What has been my reaction? To try to schedule more of them 
because when my opponent wants to call them off, I figure he 
does not think they are going well.
    Is there a danger? I feel there is. A danger of going too 
frequently with cap in hand to Hanoi and saying, ``Let's 
negotiate''. Where the other fellow begins to feel, either 
because of a division of support at home or some other thing, 
he figures the tides of faith are going against us.

                         KEEP ALL CONTACTS OPEN

    Are we defeating our position by going there too 
frequently?
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, that is one of the factors that 
has to be taken into account by making judgment about these 
matters. We have felt that there are other considerations that 
would override that particular point. I would not deny that 
that is a point that has to be weighed, but we do believe that 
it is important to keep all the contacts open, to keep all 
forums open, to keep all channels open so that it will be easy 
and simple for us to hear the important signals when the 
signals are there to be heard.
    I think we also owe it to our own people and to our own 
troops in the field and to our allies not to have inadvertence 
or inattention delay stand in the way of a peaceful settlement 
when the times comes.
    This is a complex matter. The point you make is one that we 
have discussed. It is one that was expressed to me by a neutral 
Asian leader at one point in terms of the psychology of Asia. 
But I think these other considerations on balance point the 
other way.
    Senator Mundt. Well, I wanted to be sure you were giving it 
concern. The collateral thing is, even though you decide it is 
wise to continue it, there is some thought that should be given 
as to how wise it is to keep telling the world about it if we 
have a lot of uncommitted guys not on either side who also 
react with the psychology of human beings. I shudder to have 
you get up sometimes in front of Indiana University and say 45 
times we have it or 50 times, but I think this is something you 
have to keep uppermost in your mind as far as the neutrals and 
the uncommitted and the enemies that do not like us who are in 
the field against us. I think there is a danger that this will 
be interpreted as a weakness.
    I am certainly in favor of keeping the lines or 
communications open, but I just utter a note or caution in that 
connection.

                     PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON THE WAR

    Secretary Rusk. I think, Mr. Chairman, it might be worth 
noting that the President made a very important statement in 
his San Antonio speech at the end of September in which he 
said----
    Senator Mundt. The best speech he has given on the war, by 
the way.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. That the bombing could stop 
when it would lead promptly to productive discussions, and we 
assumed during such discussions North Vietnam would not take 
military advantage of the cessation of or limitation.
    Now, there is a public statement of an attitude which Hanoi 
knows about, knew about. Hanoi did not come back and say, 
``Well, now let's look at this. What does promptly and 
productive mean.'' They did not come back and say, ``What do 
you mean by not taking advantage?'' They simply rejected any 
such formulation out of hand because it was a condition on 
their condition, their condition being that we must stop the 
bombing permanently and unconditionally.
    But I think this formulation, it seems to me, to be just as 
reasonable and fair as one could be expected to go in any 
situation in order to get talks started, and these were 
rejected both publicly and privately.
    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the patient Mr. 
Pell.

                       U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

    Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, I have a note delivered to 
me from the Department of Defense.
    December 31, 1960, personnel in Vietnam, 900. December 31, 
1963, 16,300, and I ask that this discussion about the troops 
that just took place, Senator Hickenlooper's questions, be put 
in the record at the point where I was discussing the subject.
    The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Senator Pell.
    Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Mundt.

                      SUBORDINATING U.S. INTERESTS

    The Chair opened up with some references to Palmerston who 
is a great pragmatist, and I must say one of the quotations 
alluded to is when he said:

    We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual 
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those 
interests it is our duty to follow.

    When you read English history, you will find his objective 
was to follow the interests of the British, and as those 
interests changed he changed policies.
    The reason why this question has come up and the Secretary 
coming down here is that some of us believe that we are 
subordinating our interests to pre-established policies, and if 
we are wrong we want to find out why we are wrong and where we 
are wrong and see why the interests may change; why the 
policies do not change with those interests.
    Another historical point here that the Secretary raised was 
in connection with the question hour. Actually, as we all know, 
the real guts of the exchange in the Commons is not through the 
scheduled question that is submitted a week in advance, but the 
supplementary questions that come and everybody knows.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes, I referred to the supplementaries.
    Senator Pell. I know you did and that is really the whole 
meat of the exchange here.

                   ADVANCES IN TELEVISED PROCEEDINGS

    Another point to make it more pleasant, since you televise 
hearings for everybody, the Secretary and us, I have often 
wondered why we are not aware of the fact you do not have to 
have bright lights. Television equipment is such today that 
they can do it with this kind of lighting and they just need a 
little nudge from the appropriate committee chairman in order 
to avoid those bright lights that bore into the witness's eyes. 
He does not have the same privilege that the other men in the 
committee do have, being able to leave, at more frequent times.
    I would hope if we did have televised hearings, this 
thought would be borne in mind.

                        RUNNING AGAINST HISTORY

    The questions that I would like to see raised in such a 
hearing if it were held would be, one, the question of what are 
our real interests, and then, too, the thing that buffalos me 
completely is how it is that with the Soviet Union putting in 
two and a half percent of what we are in Vietnam, and China 
putting in .6 percent, basically this is a battle of Vietnamese 
versus Vietnamese and we have to overwhelm the opposition to 
the extent that we do. It would indicate that there is a 
certain lack of spirit on our side or lack of belief or 
dynamism, or whatever the word is.
    In the long run when you run against dynamism, you are 
running against history, I think, and I would like to see why 
we cannot either instill the same dynamism on our side or if we 
will not have to eventually accept a working out of the two and 
live with it.
    These are rather random thoughts. On balance, I had no 
closed view when I came into this meeting. I still think it is 
a close question. I would be inclined if it were put to a vote, 
I would support the idea there should be some kind of hearings 
with all the safeguards that can be set up.
    The Chairman. Do you wish to comment on that?
    Secretary Rusk. I wish to make a general comment before the 
committee concludes, Mr. Chairman. But I leave the timing of 
that to you, sir.
    The Chairman. WeIl, Senator Case had to go make a quorum 
and he said he would be right back. In the meantime, I will ask 
quite a few questions.

                         A GENUINE CONSULTATION

    I am not quite clear what your attitude is about appearing 
in public, whether it is on a constitutional or pragmatic 
basis.
    Just what is your attitude?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, I think the members of the 
committee know my great regard for this committee, and I would 
hope that the committee would allow me to think further about 
what has been said at the committee this morning.
    I am not--I did not come down here with a dictate. I did 
not come down here with a closed mind, and I wanted a genuine 
consultation with the committee on this problem. I think the 
nature of the problem has been thoughtfully and well explored 
here this morning from different points of view.
    If I could express one point that I think is important. It 
seems to me there are a good many elements in this problem that 
could be clarified and that the range of differences could be 
narrowed if we had a quiet, thoughtful give-and-take around 
this table about some of those points which have contributed to 
confusion, and also some of these far-reaching questions such 
as Senator Pell and others have raised.

                           ``NEGOTIATE NOW''

    Now, I have not heard in this committee anyone who says 
that we ought to pull out of Vietnam. There may be such a view 
but it has not been expressed this morning, and I recall a 
letter written by a group of senators, including some members 
of this committee, that, or a statement that made the point 
that they did not wish to pull out of Vietnam.
    Now, that is a very important point, and it causes some 
implications. We ought to examine, it seems to me, those 
implications and see where that brings us, where that leads us.
    There is a widespread slogan around the country, 
``Negotiate now.''
    Now that is something, it seems to me, that would be 
advantageous for the committee and the Secretary of State to 
examine in great detail on the basis of everything that has 
happened up to this point on the possibilities of negotiation 
and the attitude expressed by Hanoi and Peking and Moscow, and 
these are different--as we know them to be, or think them to 
be.
    There are such questions as the chain reactions which might 
exist among treaties. What is the effect upon other countries 
of our conduct under one treaty?
    This seems to me to be a very far-reaching question, and I 
would think that quite apart from this matter of a public 
session, and I would like to have a chance to reflect upon what 
was said and be in touch with the committee further about that, 
that there would be great advantage in a serious discussion, 
not just asking questions of me and listening to me, but 
genuine discussion around the table on some of these issues and 
see whether or not the matters can be pinpointed a little more 
specifically and some elements of misunderstanding eliminated.
    I would hope we could have that kind of discussion.
    We spent most of the time this morning on the problem of a 
public hearing rather than on Vietnam, and I would be glad to 
continue this discussion with the committee at the committee's 
convenience if it wishes to do so, or I will advise the 
Committee later as to reactions to what has been said here this 
morning about a session.

                  CONCERNS ABOUT THE REST OF THE WORLD

    Senator Morse. May I make a one-minute comment. I think the 
Secretary's suggestion that he needs further consultation with 
the Administration is very important. There are other things 
that I hope we can get into. I am very much concerned about the 
Congo. I think we need to be brought up to date. We talked to 
Bill Macomber over the telephone but we need an up-to-date 
briefing on that. But I want to say this, Mr. Secretary, again 
not asking for agreement but I am thinking about the President. 
I happen to think the President is in very serious difficulty 
in this country in many places over the very issue we are 
talking about this morning, whether or not this Administration 
is going to take the position that it is not going to have its 
chief spokesman, the Secretary of State, testify before the 
committee in some public hearing. We are not asking that all 
these hearings be public. I think the great majority of them 
will be executive. But I think that it is so important that we 
have some public hearings, and I do not think they should be 
straitjacketed hearings.
    Going back to my earlier statement, I think after all, as 
senators from our respective states we have to be judged by 
what we ask, and you can handle the questions. You have never, 
as I said, come out of a hearing but what you came out stronger 
than when you went in, in my judgment. But I do think it is 
proper for you to have notice in advance that certain questions 
are going to be raised, but that should not limit anybody from 
asking any question that he thinks ought to be asked.
    But I think we will make a great mistake from the 
standpoint of the President himself if we establish a policy 
here of no public hearings. That leaves, and you yourself have 
pointed out, I think, three or four times this morning, there 
is a basic constitutional question. If we cannot resolve it 
without getting into the constitutional question, the 
constitutional question is going to be raised, and raising the 
constitutional question on this point for whatever my judgment 
may be worth, I think will do the President further irreparable 
damage.
    I do not think that millions of people in this country are 
willing to go along with what they will interpret, no matter 
how much you deny them by saying we can discuss it in executive 
session, what they consider to be a serious trend toward 
government by secrecy in time of crisis.
    Senator Mundt. Will the chairman yield at that point?
    Senator Morse. I am all through.

                      PRECEDENTS IN PREVIOUS WARS

    Senator Mundt. Let me raise this question. We are not 
exactly a new country, and this is not our first war. There 
must be some precedents, maybe you know them, maybe a study has 
been made of the relationship of the executive to the Foreign 
Relations Committee in previous wars. Have we held public 
hearings?
    Secretary Rusk. In my opening statement I pointed out that 
after Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull had not appeared in public 
session.
    Senator Mundt. I remember that incident, but I am talking 
about the long precedent. What did we do in the Korean war? How 
about World War II?
    Secretary Rusk. Secretary [Dean] Acheson did not discuss 
the war in public session during the Korean war.
    Senator Mundt. I quite agree with you when you say it is 
essential to understand that division in the country on the 
Korean war probably was as great or greater than it is now, and 
they are pretty much compatible, both of them we got into 
without a declaration of war. I think there would be some 
interest in precedents available as to what kind of 
disagreements the State Department had with the Foreign 
Relations Committee.
    Senator Morse. I might say precedents of violating a 
constitutional right do not create lawful precedents.
    The Chairman. I wonder if we could allow Senator Case--I 
will return to this briefly. I will desist for a moment, but 
Senator Case has not had an opportunity.
    Senator Case. You are most thoughtful and I shall be very 
brief.

                           OPPOSED TO SECRECY

    Most of the points I wanted to make have been made. But 
there is one thing I would suggest and that is there is a very 
great difference, in my judgment, that ought to be recognized 
by all of us between short-term operating matters and long-term 
policy. I think there is a tendency on the part of the 
Executive Branch to want to have secrecy for both, and I think 
we ought to insist that that not be done, not in our interest 
but in the interests of the country.
    There is no way, in my judgment, that we can clear up the 
unhappiness in this country except by a full and free 
discussion of many things about South Vietnam. The people do 
not understand, I myself do not understand, the constant 
repetition of optimistic statements from downtown in contrast 
to the almost unanimous somber reports that come back from the 
reporters on the scene. Now this is just the plain fact.
    They do not understand why a group like for instance the 
Ripon Society says that our present course can only be 
successful if we wipe South Vietnam from the map and create a 
nation of refugees, the scorched earth operation.
    These things have to be discussed and they are not short-
term, they are long-term.
    [Adam] Yarmolinsky had a piece in the Post the other day on 
the anniversary of the Cuban missile business and he said he 
shuddered to think, I will get it right here, one shudders to 
imagine the cost of any national debate at that time, that is 
to say about decisions, about that immediate crisis ``being 
carried on against a rising volume of bird calls from the 
assorted hawks and doves.''
    This makes a distinction. This is a short-term operating 
matter as to which secrecy is absolutely essential and I would 
defend it, but not long-term policy and not long-term 
operations, not the facts, basic facts, as to how things are 
going, how we expect to win, what our broad policy is in 
Southeast Asia. I think that unless we do get in this committee 
the kind of discussion about this thing, there is likely to be 
no place where we can get it. We are not going to get it in 
public meeting.
    Senator Pell. Will the Senator yield?

                     DEFINE OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS

    I would like to support very much what you are saying 
because, when you were out of the room, that is what I was 
saying. What we are trying to define here; what are our long-
term interests. If we do not have a long-term interest 
remaining on the mainland of Asia, then are we right in 
maintaining the efforts we are at this point to make sure that 
the area does not go against us. I think these are the things 
that could be properly explored without getting into short-term 
numbers games or what is going to happen next December.
    Senator Case. I do think this is true, and I see no way of 
drawing the country together except by talking out these 
differences and these conflicts which I am not surprised the 
country is confused about. I am confused as to whether we are 
making any progress or whether we are not, and the way our 
arguments from downtown and from other places do not meet but 
go off on tangents from each other. I do think, Mr. Secretary, 
if there is some way we can work this thing out, the discussion 
of ground rules is absolutely in order. I think we ought to do 
it. It does not answer the kind of questions that I have had 
for months and years now to say we are in a good cause; that it 
is desirable to maintain a balance of power in Southeast Asia; 
that our friend Premier what is his name in Singapore, his life 
is in danger if we get out or as he says, we are going to have 
communism from the tip end of Indonesia through India up 
through the Middle East if we pull out. We are not arguing 
about that. Well, we just need a discussion of the facts as to 
what is going on on the long-term basis. The only other thing I 
would say is that there is a little bit of feeling that I have 
had that some people are trying to stir up opposition in order 
to get sympathy for the policies of the Administration. This is 
not a hard thing to do because you have got a bunch of jerks 
around who will come right up to the bait every time you tackle 
it there, and you will make them ridiculous and you will get 
sympathy. I do not mean you have done this, sir, but I think it 
is quite possible that unless we provide a dignified forum for 
thoughtful discussion, the thing is going to deteriorate into 
something which is going to lead to very bad trouble and 
greater division in this country.
    That is all, Mr. Chairman.

                     NEED FOR A SERIOUS DISCUSSION

    Secretary Rusk. Senator, I do not know what might be 
involved in the suggestion that some people are trying to stir 
up opposition in order to create sympathy.
    Senator Case. I do not say it as a matter of intention, 
that may be the wrong way to put it, and you are right to 
correct it. I say the effect is this and the effect is to 
remove from serious discussion the matters that I think must be 
seriously discussed. It is possible that the Administration is 
in error in certain matters, and I think it ought to meet 
serious criticism and discussion.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator, yes, we are involved in questions 
here that we all ought to approach on our knees from time to 
time.
    Senator Case. That is correct.
    Secretary Rusk. Questions that test the human capability to 
their limits, and that is why I made that suggestion that we 
have a quiet and thorough and sober discussion.

                      DELAYED RELEASE OF HEARINGS

    Senator Case. May I say one thing about the matter of 
executive hearings. I would be happy to come any time for any 
kind of hearings that anyone else wants, but I have felt in a 
sense this has added to confusion. We get Senate subcommittee 
hearings for instance on the bombing of North Vietnam. They 
buzz around each day about what was said. Then the matter goes 
into limbo for about two months and then the hearings come out 
as if it were said today, a lot of statements that have no 
bearing on current matters at all come in and further screw up 
the picture. This I think happens again and again when you have 
delayed release of executive committee hearings, and it is not 
your fault--it is not anybody's fault, but it does tend rather 
to confuse than to help clarify in the public mind facts that 
they should have.

                         CONTRADICTORY POLICIES

    The Chairman. You remind me or you raise a very important 
question about what the purpose of this is. Senator Mundt said 
he attended a meeting and representatives of the 
Administration--I understood he said to be your men; I guess 
they were from the Department--did not sell the war, the 
justification, on any of the bases of treaties or commitments 
but it was vital to our security that we stay there, as I 
understood him, and to control this area. Yet only last week we 
had a hearing with Mr. [Arthur] Goldberg, speaking also for the 
Administration, that we were willing to go to Geneva and to 
urging--in fact recommend by the Security Council to go to 
Geneva to return the Geneva Accords and have an election, and 
if and whenever that election is held, it of course would mean 
the withdrawal of our troops and our manpower from the area, 
and I believe he suggested a neutralization.
    Well it seems to me this is directly contradictory. You 
cannot both be there to restrain China and get out under the 
Geneva Accords. The Geneva Accords were designed to liquidate 
the war with the French and to remove the French and if we 
return, and if we should, and if he means what he says, and I 
assume he did, it seems to me you would have a direct 
contradiction of spokesmen of the Administration.
    I do not know how you resolve these. Of course another 
basic question to me is about this matter of national interest. 
You raised, or someone did, the question of we are spending $30 
billion a year roughly. We are losing--and we all know how many 
men in casualties compared to what the Russians and the Chinese 
are doing, the major Communist powers. If this goes on very 
long it strikes me we are weakening ourselves very 
substantially and we are not promoting our national interests. 
On the contrary we are weakening the United States relative to 
the Communists and that this role, if pursued long enough, 
would mean the demise of the United States as a great power.
    These are basic questions as to the wisdom of the course we 
are pursuing, and I had always assumed that the function of the 
Senate and the Congress generally was to participate in the 
discussions to resolve which is in the national interest.

                 AN ASSUMPTION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

    The assumption that it is in our national interest in the 
war is an assumption, that is just an assumption. And I cannot 
help believe that out of the 19 members of this committee or 
the hundred members of the Senate there could not be distilled 
a certain amount of wisdom.
    I agree with you that all the wisdom and infallibility does 
not exist in the executive in this or in any other executive. I 
thought the distinguishing characteristics of our system was 
that the participation of representatives elected by the people 
with the Administration would reach a, more likely reach, a 
wise policy than just leaving it up to them directly.
    If the Senate wishes to leave it up to the President, it 
can. Most of the countries in the world do that. The great 
majority today leave it up to what is the equivalent of the 
President.
    Senator Pell. Excuse me, but the President is also a member 
of the parliament in many parliamentary systems.
    The Chairman. That is the general basis, if we leave it up 
to the President, do we have a function to play or not? If we 
do not, all right. I think we do. But if the majority thinks we 
do not and we leave it up to the wisdom of the President, that 
is their privilege. Congress can abdicate its responsibilities 
if it likes.
    Secretary Rusk. Senator----
    The Chairman. There is this basic question of what is the 
national interest. Is it to pursue a war that is costing us 
roughly 30 times--leaving out the money, it is hard to 
calculate lives--or not, and the disruption that grows out of 
this--we all know what is happening here domestically, the 
conflicts that are going on right now in the Congress over 
domestic programs, some of which all of us or most of us only 
two or three years ago were supporting, are going down the 
drain.
    My view is that it is not in our national interest.
    Here is a little country, if you take Vietnam itself, we 
said originally at some time it was for self-determination and 
so on. My commitment is not to the people or South Vietnam, it 
is the people of Arkansas and the United States. That 
commitment overrides all the others. If I think it is against 
their interest I cannot see how I have a right not to say so. I 
think if we are doing something to the long-term detriment and 
safety of this country and of my own constitutents, I think it 
is my duty, if I am the only one to speak out, I think it is my 
duty to say that I think you are undermining the long-term 
strength of the greatest democracy in the world and one of the 
few democracies left. That is the way I look at it.

                  THE SENATE'S ROLE IN SENDING TROOPS

    Senator Case. If the chairman will just yield here for one 
final observation, I have to go to the Appropriations 
Committee. I think this is a matter of the utmost importance 
and utmost seriousness.
    The Chairman. I do, too.
    Senator Case. One of the reasons we are now told by a great 
many people who have doubts about whether you should have 
gotten into this in the first place is having committed so many 
people there, having put--strike that word ``commit,'' it is a 
terrible word--having put all the strength we have there, we 
have laid on the line the question of our prestige to the point 
where we cannot withdraw.
    Now, who put them there in those numbers, and why did the 
Senate not have something to say about it. It is said, I have 
heard it said--I am not asking for comment, if it is wrong, 
fine--that the Security Council met on this question years ago 
and decided to go in with force in great numbers up to more 
than we have there now already. We were constantly told all 
during the period from then to now that something of this sort 
was never contemplated.
    This is the kind of thing which is involved here, the long-
term policies of the United States of America, not short-term 
military operations, are we going to bomb up there tomorrow and 
talking about it is going to endanger pilots' lives. I am 
against this entirely. But somewhere along the line we have got 
to call a halt to this kind of thing by which the executive 
branch, by itself, without reference to and in fact denying 
that it is doing so, is putting this country into the sort of 
position that we are in today, and this is all part of the 
background.
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Secretary Rusk. First, there was no such meeting of the 
National Security Council.
    Senator Case. I am glad there was not.
    The Chairman. Did you mean recently?
    Senator Case. Years ago.

                    CONSIDERATIONS OF TROOP STRENGTH

    Secretary Rusk. No, the question of troop strength required 
has been considered in relation to what the other side does, 
and those questions have been decided as the decisions--as 
decisions to send particular troops out there. There never has 
been any overall projection in the future.
    Senator Case. There must have been some thoughts as to how 
far you would go before you put U.S. military on the ground.
    Secretary Rusk. Of course, President Kennedy faced that 
very directly, and he was the one who made the basic decision 
if we had to use military power in Southeast Asia we would do 
it in South Vietnam and not in Laos, Laos being a landlocked 
and difficult country, and this was a basic decision.
    Senator Case. I think it was, that was my impression.
    Secretary Rusk. It was not until seven months after the 
Tonkin Gulf resolution that the level of U.S. forces in Vietnam 
increased substantially beyond the level established by 
President Kennedy, and that was a very long time after the 
present President Johnson became President.

                 THE SENATE HAS EXERCISED ITS FUNCTIONS

    Mr. Chairman, on your comment it seems to me that these are 
not questions that just arose afresh in the last weeks or last 
months. Surely the Congress, and particularly the Senate, has 
addressed itself to these questions in the past, all along the 
way, and has exercised its function. The Senate has approved 
with overwhelming votes these various treaties that we made in 
the Pacific Ocean area. It did so because these treaties were 
considered to be in the vital interests of the United States.
    As far as the Secretary of State is concerned he must 
proceed on the basis that the security of Southeast Asia is 
vital to the national interests of the United States and to 
world peace because the Congress in 1964 declared that to be 
the case with two dissenting votes.
    I have no other guide from the Congress as a corporate 
body. That is the Congress' view.
    The Chairman. Are you speaking now of the Tonkin Gulf 
resolution?
    Secretary Rusk. I am speaking now about the second 
paragraph of it which was not Tonkin Gulf but Southeast Asia. 
Senator Morse voted against it so I cannot direct my statement 
to him on this, but this idea is not a new idea. It underlay 
the making of these treaties in the Pacific. President Kennedy 
and President Johnson and their Secretary of State have not 
come down here to the Senate with new alliances. What we have 
been trying to do is work things out like the nuclear test ban, 
the space treaty, the consular treaty, and the East-West trade 
and questions of that sort, if you will give us a chance. We 
are not trying to promote the U.S. into being some policeman of 
the world under some dogma and far-reaching for power's sake, 
but we do have a very serious question on our hands if we let 
the word get around that our treaty commitments may not mean 
what they say.

                    KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNDY IN VIENNA

    I must tell you in all seriousness that I have in mind an 
exchange which eats on my soul.
    Senator Symington. I beg pardon.
    Secretary Rusk. Which eats on my soul. In Vienna in June in 
1961 when Chairman Nikita Khrushchev said to President Kennedy 
in effect, ``Get your troops out of Berlin or there will be 
war,'' it was necessary for President Kennedy to say to him 
then, Mr. Chairman, there will be war and it is going to be a 
very cold winter.'' and with that expression the two shook 
hands and took their departure.
    Now if Chairman Khrushchev had said to him, ``Don't kid me, 
Mr. President, because I know your people won't stand up to it 
if I put the pressure on,'' there would have been war.
    Now the possibility of deterrence, the possibility of 
avoiding this notion of the credibility of the United States, 
it is true that we did not, and we perhaps ought to look back 
at the whole record in history of this. The alliance itself did 
not deter the efforts of North Vietnam to move into South 
Vietnam and into Laos. But this is not the only place where 
this question of credibility is very important.
    So these are things we ought to discuss around this table, 
it seems to me, as thoughtfully and as soberly as we can, to 
see where we are in terms of those underlying interests that 
Senator Pell mentioned and some of the other factors that are 
involved. But this is not a matter on which the Congress has 
not performed its function. It has performed its function in 
the key--when the key decisions were made, the key decisions 
were made along the way.

                GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION WAS A MISTAKE

    The Chairman. Well, Mr. Secretary, I regret you brought up 
Tonkin Gulf because I publicly apologized and stated I was 
mistaken. I think it is a great--Senator Case has also 
discussed this at length and I do not know that we have time to 
raise it again, but when I reviewed the record of the briefing 
we were given by the Secretary of Defense, in particular, and 
we spent, the combined committee spent an hour and 40 minutes 
considering it under an urgency that it had to be done 
immediately to have any effect, it is hard for me to believe, 
as the Senator from New Jersey has said in extenso, and I do 
not want to go over it all now, we do not have time, that that 
constitutes a deliberate judgment on the part of this committee 
and the Congress on the fundamental questions.
    Just frankly between you and me, I think we were had, we 
were put under pressure of an immediate action. We spent an 
hour and 40 minutes with almost no questions about that matter, 
and we voted it out under the impression that this was an 
emergency, and that if we expressed the degree of unity 
immediately this would have some mysterious effect of 
restraining the North Vietnamese. I have already gone into it 
in great extent.
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    The Chairman. I do not want to burden the record of why I 
did it. I am convinced I made a serious mistake not to oppose 
immediate action, to have had hearings at that time, to have 
gone through the kind of procedure that I have tried to follow 
and urged this committee to follow since that time, so that we 
do not take precipitate action under conditions that are 
represented to us to be of a great crisis nature by the leading 
spokesmen for the Administration.
    I regret that this kind of question as to the vital 
interests of the United States is based upon that particular 
action which under any, it seems to me, common sense 
consideration, would not be considered a deliberate, 
thoughtful, serious consideration of what our interests were.
    The debate on the floor only took place, I mean did not 
occupy but just a few hours. The Senator from Oregon, who, as 
you all have rightly said, has the clear record of being right 
on that occasion, was allotted almost all the time the second 
day. We had one day of debate in the afternoon. It did not 
last, I do not think, over three or four hours, and it was by 
unanimous consent the next day because of his position he was 
given, I think, two or three hours. He was entitled to it. That 
is all the debate was, if that is a deliberate decision of this 
body to judge the vital interests of the United States' staying 
in Southeast Asia, of controlling it, well, I think is a 
distortion of its meaning, I do not consider we have had that 
kind of deliberation.
    Yes, I will yield.

                    RECONVENE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

    Senator Lausche. If you were wrong in August of 1964 and 
you believe you are right now, what do you propose 
affirmatively we should do to remedy the wrong?
    The Chairman. I have proposed this in long written 
statements and in innumberable oral statements. Briefly what 
was proposed, as I had understood it the other day, and in the 
discussion by Mr. Goldberg, let us assume we are successful, 
just to illustrate what I would like to see happen, is that the 
Security Council would take affirmative action, as I would 
assume we have some influence with these people, and we would 
have to establish in their minds that we mean it, that they 
reconvene the Geneva Conference after recommendations of the 
Security Council because that would give it a prestige and an 
importance beyond anything we could do bilaterally. They would 
return to that. The President himself on past occasions has 
made statements that led me to believe he would be satisfied by 
returning to the Geneva Conference, and following the basic 
principles of that conference as to how to resolve our 
questions that have arisen in Vietnam and in which we in a 
sense have taken the position of the French, and that is the 
way--that is the procedure I would follow.
    But basic to that, Frank, is the decision in the mind of 
our own government on this vital one. Is it vital to our 
interests to remain in Vietnam to protect Southeast Asia and 
India and so on from the possibility of Chinese expansion in 
the future? That is a very--it seems to me, the guts of the 
question.
    Senator Lausche. Do you propose pulling out?
    The Chairman. If it is, then of course we should not go to 
Geneva. We should do what we are doing. If it is not vital that 
we remain and maintain a physical military presence in the 
area, then we ought to follow Geneva, it seems to me. It is an 
oversimplification. You said pull out. To pull out has the 
implication that we just drop our arms and walk out.

                      AN ORDERLY WAY TO NEGOTIATE

    What I am saying is that in an orderly way we negotiate 
through return to Geneva and accept the basic principles there 
of how to resolve it. In that sense we do get out of a physical 
presence on the mainland. This is by no means giving up any of 
your seapower or our airpower, the bases we have and and so on. 
This is, as I see it, the crux of the matter.
    Personally it does not at this moment seem to me a physical 
domination of Southeast Asia or any part of it or South Vietnam 
is in our national interests because the cost of this is way 
out of proporation to what we get for it.
    The Senator from Missouri has made the point time and time 
again that by our involvement there and by tying down our 
troops and the vast expenditures of funds and lives and money 
and especially attention, we are endangering other areas in the 
world of far greater importance to us. These are all matters 
you have to weigh to balance one against the other, and the 
Senator from Missouri made that point on several occasions and 
I thoroughly agree with him. I think it is very pertinent to 
this kind of issue. You balance off what is the most important 
to the long-term strength and security of our country, and to 
assume that it is in the national interest to stay there you 
are assuming the very question at issue. I do not accept that 
as it is yet. It has not been proven.
    Senator Symington. If I may----
    The Chairman. The Senator from Missouri really came in 
late. He is entitled to the next if he wishes. I yield.

                     NEGOTIATING WITH THE VIET CONG

    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, believe me, I have the 
most complete sympathy with your problem in every way. I do 
think that you have a problem yourself, if I may say so 
respectfully, as to how you cut the pie of our limited 
resources.
    With that premise, there is just one question I would like 
to ask at this time. My impression from Ambassador Goldberg was 
that if we got to the Geneva Conference through the Security 
Council, which I would most earnestly hope we do with this 
continued unfortunate business, the U.S. Government would be 
willing to have the Viet Cong, which therefore would mean the 
National Liberation Front or vice versa, participate as a full 
negotiating member at that Geneva Conference. Is that the 
position of the Administration?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, that is something to be negotiated in 
connection with the possibility of such a session because----
    Senator Symington. But you see here is the point, if I may 
go on. If that is subject to negotiation--I came in on a plane; 
I apologize for coming late. I read in Time or Newsweek that 
this is the position of the United States based on the 
testimony of Ambassador Goldberg before our committee in open 
hearing. Now if it is, to my mind it is a long step forward. 
The little plan that I advocated has been conspicuous by lack 
of comment on the part of the Administration no doubt because 
it was premature. But I did suggest that we have the South 
Vietnam Government, which is a little inclining forward, agree 
to negotiate with the Viet Cong or National Liberation Front.
    Now, the press through a weekly newspaper, not a morning 
report or the day after a hearing, feels, I read it this 
morning, that Ambassador Goldberg said that if we could get to 
Geneva that he would be willing that the United States, as our 
representative, would be willing to have the Viet Cong 
participate in the negotiations as a full participating member. 
One of the reasons why under the proper controls I think that 
an open hearing is now necessary because of the growing unrest 
in the country, is that if this is a matter for negotiation it 
certainly was not left that way with the Committee the other 
day by Ambassador Goldberg.

                     DIFFERENT WAYS OF NEGOTIATING

    Secretary Rusk. Well, I would have to look at the exact 
language he used because as a full participating member is the 
point I would raise because no one----
    Senator Symington. I just raise the point.
    Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Not even on the Communist side 
recognizes them as a government. If they sit at the table as a 
government with a veto on the result, then I query whether this 
advances us toward a solution better than to find ways to have 
them suitably represented and heard.
    Now, there are many ways of doing this. Remember the two 
Germanys sat at a Foreign Ministers meeting with their table 
six inches behind or something of that sort. Now these are 
things we are prepared to talk about with those who can stop 
the shooting but we have not gotten Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking 
to that table yet. They have not raised this as a condition for 
coming to the table, and indeed the noises from the other side, 
and I may not be able to leave this if this record is to be--
the part that might be released at some stage, there seem to be 
some indications that they believe there are two kinds of 
discussions that ought to take place, one between us and Hanoi 
with respect to the issues between us and Hanoi, because it is 
Hanoi that is responsible----

                     GIVING AWAY NEGOTIATING POINTS

    Senator Symington. I have been in a good many negotiations 
in my day and a good many business trades. Why do we always 
hedge it? Why do we not first try to sell it and then hedge it 
if necessary in the trade?
    What good is it for Ambassador Goldberg to tell the 
committee something in an open session that you have to say we 
have to negotiate.
    I will carry it a little further than that. One thing that 
disturbs me a great deal was that there was an editorial in the 
New York Times last January 26 and it said one of the worst 
kept secrets in the country was the difference of opinion on 
the one hand between the Secretary of Defense and on the other 
hand the President, the Secretary of State and the Chiefs of 
Staff.
    To me that was the most unfortunate comment. I think it is 
the type and character, as much as I believe the war has been 
badly plumbered from a military standpoint from the beginning, 
I believe this is the type and character of problem that shows, 
some way has to get before the people, under whatever rules 
would be advisable for a hearing. I have changed on that 
because I think the people are totally restless and have a 
great lack of understanding, and at least to some extent, I 
know this is not true of you. They are beginning to feel they 
are being misled.
    Perhaps it is fair to say they feel they have only been 
given part of the truth and, as the lawyers say, partial truth 
is an evasion of truth. This disturbed me because I got the 
very definite impression from Ambassador Goldberg if we could 
fight this very difficult thing to do, which for me looks about 
impossible with the Russians having a veto on the Security 
Council, nevertheless if we could get it through the Security 
Council to the point where we did get to Geneva that we would 
let the Viet Cong come there. Yet you as the Secretary of State 
and a more important person in the Administration said this 
morning this would be one of the things to negotiate. So we get 
mixed up is my point.

                     WHAT AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG SAID

    Secretary Rusk. May I make two points on that. My 
understanding of what Ambassador Goldberg said, the members of 
that conference could and would make the necessary decisions as 
to participation of the National Liberation Front and the form 
that that participation might take. He indicated----
    Senator Symington. Somebody has given you some notes can 
you read them. All I know is my impression was we can do it and 
I know it is confirmed in the press. It is just an illustration 
of the general misunderstanding of what is going on between the 
various countries.
    Senator Sparkman. Will the Senator yield to me very 
briefly?
    Senator Symington. Yes.
    Senator Sparkman. I want to say this: the record requires 
very careful reading.
    Senator Gore is the one who put these questions, followed 
them up very carefully. Ambassador Goldberg gave a peculiar 
sort of an answer. He first said we will not stand in the way. 
He said it in a more or less negative way, and he never said 
anything more than, I believe, if it gets to the point that our 
vote is required, it will be available.
    I believe those are almost the exact words that he used. I 
thought at the time that he was using rather peculiar language 
in answering, and I did not construe it as being our inviting, 
but if we are put up to it, put up against it, we would not 
refuse.

                    PUTTING YOUR CARDS ON THE TABLE

    Secretary Rusk. Well, the President said two years ago that 
the presence and the voice of the Liberation Front is not an 
insuperable obstacle, but, Senator, surely in a negotiation in 
the business field you do not start a negotiation by putting 
all your cards on the table.
    Senator Symington. You have not put any on in a couple of 
years. You have had a rigid position.
    Secretary Rusk. There have been 14 points, elements of a 
peaceful solution There have been 28 proposals made to get 
something started. There have been points by the dozens and 
dozens and dozens put forward on which we get no response from 
these fellows in Hanoi.
    Senator Symington. My statement is overstated. But I know 
they gave had four positions in there--and stop the bombing was 
only one of the four.
    But I also know we have had a very rigid position against 
negotiation with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, and 
the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front as a separate 
entity. After my fourth trip there in recent months I am 
convinced we are not going to get anywhere unless we just 
pulverize this group, and then you are not sure what is left 
unless we do negotiate with the National Liberation Front and 
the Viet Cong.
    Based on the questioning of the Senator from Tennessee my 
impression was just what the Senator from Alabama's impression 
was, that there was some give here and it is grabbed for by the 
people like thirsty people in the desert, as maybe there is 
some relaxation. I do not think we are going to get anywhere 
unless we did and that is why I put it in the suggestion that I 
made, and why I was so impressed with Ambassador Goldberg's 
remarks. If it was deliberately cryptic, I am sorry because I 
thought, he was being positive about it at least to some 
extent. But it is the type and character of the thing that I 
believe we have to clear up with the people if we are going to 
do anything about this increasing unrest.

                      PRESS HANOI ON NEGOTIATIONS

    Secretary Rusk. I would offer one brief comment in regard 
to the comments last made by the chairman as well as by Senator 
Symington here.
    It would be important for this committee to know, and I 
think we can go into that in great detail, whether the 
chairman's argument, for example, is with us or is with Hanoi. 
It will be very helpful for the chairman to say to Hanoi, here 
is what I think you ought to do in terms of coming to a Geneva 
Conference and trying to take some of these processes of 
peaceful settlement.
    I think the letter which you signed at one stage did in 
fact press Hanoi on that point, but we do not object to a 
Geneva Conference or the Security Council's dealing with this 
or any of these things. But there is no chair there for Hanoi. 
Hanoi says they are not going to do it.
    So we are still left with a problem.

                      THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS

    The Chairman. I cannot read Hanoi's mind but my impression 
is the uncertainty, it is in my mind, and I think in the minds 
of certain members of this committee who have already spoken, 
to what our real purpose is is one of the obstacles to a 
conference. They have had conferences before. They went to 
Geneva and they believe, and I think with some reason, that the 
conference, that they agreed to a settlement which was, it was, 
run out on, that was not carried out. That is ancient history.
    They also had an agreement with the French in 1946 which 
clearly the French backed out on. I think if it is uncertain as 
to what our purpose is, I can see where they would not wish to 
go to Geneva or anywhere else. He would just have to fight it 
out, if our purpose is that our control, military control of 
South Vietnam is in our vital interests, therefore we are going 
to stay there, then there is nothing to negotiate about.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I read, just to make 
my point on this?
    Secretary Rusk. But we have not said that.
    The Chairman. I do not know. I am uncertain about what this 
is.
    Senator Mundt a while ago said some of your spokesmen 
convinced him that, leaving out all the resolutions and 
treaties and everything else, it is in our national interest to 
stay there and he sold the bankers in California on this, and 
they all approved of it.
    Secretary Rusk. Well, to stay there while there is a fight, 
there is a question of security with the people coming in from 
the North, but that does not mean to stay there.
    The Chairman. That is not what I understood him to mean.
    As long as China is there and not in a friendly mood, which 
could be a very long time, depending upon how we treat China. I 
thought that is what he meant, not just during this fight.

                     AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S POSITION

    Senator Symington. Let me just read this for the record, 
Mr. Chairman, the last two paragraphs in Time magazine of 
November 10. Under the heading ``The War'', ``The Real 
Stalemate'', is the heading:

    On the Senate side, talk of turning the Vietnam question 
over to the United Nation rumbled on, with Majority Leader Mike 
Mansfield and Minority Leader Everett Dirksen both supporting 
such a move. The Foreign Relations Committee also heard UN 
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg clarify for the first time in public 
the Administration's willingness to allow the Viet Cong to 
participate in Security Council peace talks.
    While the UN to date has shown no interest in tackling the 
Vietnam dilemma, Goldberg said also that if the Geneva 
Conference is reconvened, the U.S. will not argue with the 
Conference Co-Chairmen, Russia and Britain, about invitations 
or agenda. Thus, the Viet Cong could participate in Geneva 
talks with no American objection--a significant softening of 
the U.S. position to date.

    Reading that, I was pleased. If it is not right, then the 
people have been misled either by Time magazine or by Arthur 
Goldberg or by both, or by somebody, or they just made a 
mistake. It is hard to figure. But if this is not right, I 
think that ought to be corrected fairly promptly.
    Secretary Rusk. I think the transcript of the Goldberg 
hearing is here, it is in front of you; in connection with the 
Security Council he referred specifically to Rule 39 of the 
Security Council under which they have in the past invited 
representatives of the Jewish Agency and representatives of the 
Arab Committee, and people of that sort. He was not specific in 
terms of the status either at Geneva or at the Security 
Council. That is something to be determined when we, if we, get 
that far. This has not been raised by the other side as the key 
that unlocks the door to a meeting of the Geneva Conference or 
to negotiations.
    We are, you would be interested, we are listening now to 
see whether Hanoi is going to make any comment on what 
Ambassador Goldberg said. As of this morning they made no 
comment.

                         LOOK AT THE TRANSCRIPT

    Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a couple of 
questions and I want to raise a couple of points of procedure 
here. I think the Secretary is right. Let's reread what 
Ambassador Goldberg said in the transcript. That speaks for 
itself.
    I remember he made clear several times talking about nine 
votes needed to make a majority and what he said was if our 
vote--we are not going to initiate it. We are not going to 
compose it. If we get to a point where our vote is required for 
the ninth vote, we will not stand in the way.
    I think I quote him exactly when I say, ``We will not stand 
in the way'', and that was brought out several times. So I know 
what it is to be quoted incorrectly by Time magazine as well as 
most of the other press of the country.
    Senator Case. Most of the people would give their right arm 
to be quoted at all.
    Senator Morse. I want to say first with Arthur Goldberg, we 
ought to look at the transcript.

                 PRESS THE UNITED NATIONS TO INTERVENE

    I have two other points I want to make. I want to associate 
myself with the chairman, with your general thesis that you 
expressed here just a very few moments ago, although as I said 
at the hearings the other day and the Ambassador said he wanted 
to limit himself to discussion of the Security Council and not 
the General Assembly, I want to add for this record, of course 
I do not think you are going to get it through the Security 
Council.
    You might, as I said in the hearing the other day, get them 
to refer it to the General Assembly, but suppose they do not 
even do that.
    I still would press for General Assembly intervention and 
have them lead us into the reconvened Geneva Conference. But 
all I have ever been insisting on or you have been insisting on 
is we tried this approach which leads me to the last point I 
want to make before I bring up the procedural matter.
    I am glad to have my memory refreshed again because I had 
heard it before, and I know it is a fact of that famous 
conference between Khrushchev and President Kennedy, and I 
think President Kennedy was exactly right. I think he made the 
correct reply to Khrushchev, because of the vital interests of 
the United States and because of what would be involved in 
connection with our position with Russia. But I do not think to 
argue analogously from that that the same situation is involved 
in Asia has any relevancy at all. That is where I leave the 
Secretary and the President.
    I do not think we have ever had any right to take the 
position that we were going to unilaterally as a military 
policeman set up our military posture in Asia, and say, ``We 
are going to enforce what we think ought to be the 
international policy in Asia.'' That is where I leave the 
Secretary.
    It is why I think we need the kind of discussion we are 
having here this morning.

                        A CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER

    I think in broad outlines there is a need for the 
Administration to explain to the American people its position 
in a public hearing. I just do not think you can possibly 
justify a continuation of the Secretary, and I think that is 
why I asked the question when I got up here, expressing a 
Presidential point of view, because I think, I do not know, I 
probably should strike the word ``think'' and substitute the 
word ``suspect'', that the Secretary's position that he has 
taken on public hearings is also the President's.
    So that does raise the constitutional issue. We will have 
to fight that one out on constitutional grounds. It is not 
going to promote the kind of bridge-building that I talked 
about in my opening statement this morning. But I certainly 
think that we should not draw that line now.
    The Secretary is absolutely right in saying that he does 
not want to get into the constitutional matter now. I do not 
think we should until there has been further consultation 
between the Secretary and the President and further executive 
conversation with the Secretary and this committee.
    I am not precipitous in these matters. I think you ought to 
do everything you can to find out if you can find a common 
ground of agreement and work from that ground if you can. I 
want to say very definitely, however, as a United States 
Senator, I will not stand by and not raise the constitutional 
issue in regard to a matter that I think is of vital concern to 
the welfare of the people of my country.
    I do not think that the advise and consent clause, 
according to my sights, can be emasculated the way it will be 
emasculated, the constitutional rights of the committee, the 
rights of the committee to determine what kind of hearings it 
is going to have under the Constitution, I am not going to 
stand by and permit this Administration or any other to 
emasculate it.
    I have already said to Clifford, he can cite all the 
precedents you want about Secretary of State Hull or Acheson or 
anybody else, that does not create a constitutional right. If 
it is a wrong precedent it continues to be wrong no matter what 
other Administration wants to make the same wrong.
    But I think the Secretary is entitled to have an 
understanding with us now. He is going to have to go out and 
face the press and I think we ought to try to reach a 
procedural agreement in the closing moments of this session 
this morning. We owe it to him not only as a matter of courtesy 
and decency, but we owe it to him because he is Secretary of 
State and through him owe it to the country, that we have an 
understanding that he will announce, I hope that we can reach 
an understanding, that he is going to further pursue this 
matter with the full understanding of the committee at some 
appropriate time next week.

                        CANNOT LET MATTERS DRIFT

    There is just one of these things that you cannot let 
drift. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you can obtain from the 
Secretary, it was my suggestion to the Chairman and members of 
the committee that we agree when we break up this morning to 
meet again at a time convenient to him, but in the reasonably 
near future, for discussion of this and resolution of it where 
we can agree to public hearings; that he be given our assurance 
that we respect his problems in those public hearings and will 
continue to respect them, but they are going to be public 
hearings unless the President, who is his boss, says no. If the 
President says no, then it removes the conflict from the 
committee with the Secretary as far as I am concerned, with the 
individual senators, the committee does not want to do it in 
conflict with the President of the United States.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say a very 
brief word.

         AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

    Mr. Secretary, first I want to comment on Ambassador 
Goldberg's appearance before the committee last week. I think 
every member of the committee felt that it was a very fine 
appearance. I think it did more good to the morale of the 
committee than anything we have had happen in a long time. I 
felt it was like a breath of fresh air.
    Senator Pell. Amen.
    Senator Morse. Right.
    Senator Sparkman. I believe that it met with approval 
throughout the country from various press reports I have seen, 
and so forth.

                  THE MAKE-UP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

    There is one thing that disturbs me and that is the 
difficulty of getting as many as nine votes. It appears we will 
be able to get eight, but there is difficulty about the ninth. 
When we look at the make-up of the Security Council and whether 
we consider some of them who ought to be some of our staunchest 
friends, it seems to me without arm-twisting but just with good 
moral suasion, we ought to be able to get that ninth vote which 
I think would have a terrific impact upon this whole situation. 
I hope that every consideration will be given toward an effort 
to get that ninth vote in the Security Council, and that this 
matter be pushed seriously and conscientiously in the Security 
Council. I think it would mean much, if we could get that 
resolution through.
    The Chairman. If I might add to that, I think one of the 
reasons that would bar maybe a country like Ethiopia is the 
uncertainty as to what our real long-term purpose is there, it 
would be in my view.
    But anyway, I think this is a matter that was helped if we 
really mean it. If we want Geneva, we have to clarify for their 
benefit, the members whose vote you are solicitating.

             SOVIET EFFORTS TO BRING HANOI TO NEGOTIATIONS

    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, under conditions of very 
great privacy, I would like to put my finger on what I think is 
the most difficult problem about this matter. We know that this 
year the Soviet Union has made at least two efforts in Hanoi to 
bring them into some sort of negotiation. We know they were 
rebuffed both times.
    At the present time the Soviet Union is rather quiescent on 
this matter, presumably waiting to see whether some other 
situation will develop. You will have noted when President 
Johnson and I speak about Vietnam, we do not unlimber our blast 
on Mosow; this is for a reason.
    The Soviets tell us that they hope very, very much that we 
will not press this in the Security Council and have a public 
eye-gouging debate there against this background. Now this is 
to me a troublesome point.
    Now the President, I, Ambassador Goldberg are going to try 
to do what we can on this U.N. consideration of this, but I 
think it is important for the committee to know that this is a 
very troublesome point.

               PRESSING THE SOVIETS TO CALL A CONFERENCE

    The Chairman. What reason do they give for not wishing, 
because they have publicly announced they thought the Geneva 
Conference provisions were the proper way to do it?
    Secretary Rusk. Their public problem is that Hanoi says 
this is not the business of the U.N., and the Soviet Union is 
very reluctant to go out publicly in advance of the position of 
Hanoi even though privately they may try to do a little 
something about it from time to time.
    Senator Morse. Does Hanoi say it is not the business of the 
Geneva Conference?
    Secretary Rusk. No, but they will not come to a Geneva 
Conference. Hanoi continues to say as between the U.N. and the 
Geneva Conference, this is the business of the Geneva 
machinery.
    Senator Morse. But, Mr. Secretary, we cannot stand by 
though and let Russia control us with her so-called unofficial 
veto power.
    Secretary Rusk. I understand.
    Senator Morse. We ought to get the Geneva Conference to go 
and she is co-chairman. She does not even join with Great 
Britain in calling for a Geneva Conference.
    Secretary Rusk. We have pressed them over and over and over 
again to call a Geneva Conference, either on the whole problem 
of Southeast Asia or any part of it. We tried it on Cambodia, 
on Laos, on Vietnam, on the DMZ, on any part of it or all of 
it, and they have been unwilling to join in calling them.
    The Chairman. I understand you to say that Hanoi has 
positively said she would not attend a Geneva Conference?
    Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
    The Chairman. At all?
    Senator Morse. You mean Geneva or U.N.?
    Secretary Rusk. Geneva.
    The Chairman. It is the first time I heard that.
    Senator Sparkman. Can not Russia influence them?

                    THE SOVIET UNION'S CHINA PROBLEM

    Secretary Rusk. Of course, there is another matter while we 
are in a very private conversation here. There is some 
indication that the Soviets do not want a Geneva Conference as 
a machinery because Peking is there. Now this is not our 
problem, that is their problem, it is Peking's problem, but I 
think it weighs in the balance here as to their attitude on 
this situation.
    Senator Sparkman. Why do they not work up some other 
conference such as France suggested?
    Secretary Rusk. We have suggested that the two co-chairmen 
and the three members of ICC meet, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bebler, 
the head of the World United National Association made that 
proposal. We would be glad to see these five countries. That 
gives them a machinery which does not have to include Peking, 
you see, or us, or Hanoi, see what they can do. We supported 
the idea that a group of Asian countries get together without 
us, without the Soviet Union, neutral Asian countries, to see 
if they could be in touch. We would be glad to see if these 
Nobel Peace Prize people could establish any contact that would 
lead to anything, but their initial contacts were, in Moscow, 
the group that went there, without our Mr. Kink, was very 
discouraging indeed, were very discouraging indeed.
    So we will fully explore this situation in the Security 
Council further.
    Ambassador Goldberg has discussed that several times this 
year at different occasions with different members of the 
Security Council, so we are not going to cheat on the 
resolution that is before it, that the committee has in front 
of it at all. But there are some very complex problems 
connected with it.

                 HANOI'S UNWILLINGNESS TO GO TO GENEVA

    The Chairman. Has Hanoi ever publicly stated she would not 
attend a Geneva Conference if it was reconvened?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, she is unwilling to give a go sign to 
Moscow to convene it, and presumably also to Poland.
    One intriguing--we reached one interesting point here 
about, when was it, two and a half years ago when a Hanoi 
delegation was visiting in Moscow, and in their joint 
communique they seemed to look with approval on a Geneva 
Conference on Cambodia and Laos. We said we thought this would 
be a very good idea. We understand that at that time Peking 
moved in in Hanoi and in Cambodia and broke up the 
possibilities of such a conference. So I suppose that Hanoi is 
also looking over its shoulder at Peking to a degree, although 
I would think Hanoi is now in a position to come to some sort 
of a conference without Peking's presence if Hanoi wanted to. I 
think they have that much independence at the present time.

                     A VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

    The Chairman. What would be wrong, however, with this being 
made public through a vote in the Security Council?
    It seems to me it would clear the air a bit if we made a 
genuine effort and they refused, all of the Russians and 
their--others simply refused to do it, it would improve our 
position in the public mind if we made a genuine effort to do 
it.
    Secretary Rusk. We sometimes have a dilemma as between 
those things which would strengthen our public position from 
the point of view of public opinion, and keeping certain things 
open as a means of solving the problem.
    There are a good many private exchanges which have taken 
place, which, if we made public, would reinforce the view that 
we have made extraordinary efforts to try to find a way to 
bring this to a conclusion. But to do so would mean to let 
Hanoi know that any contact they have with us is likely to be 
made public and scare them away from some of the contacts that 
could be very important
    It is a dilemma we have had, one has in diplomacy, and it 
is not the first time it has arisen.
    Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Yes.

                          A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS

    Senator Pell. A couple of comments, just to clear the 
record on the colloquy between the Ambassador and Senator Gore 
when Senator Gore very sagely brought out a shift in emphasis 
in my view, what the statements were, ``We would not stand in 
the way, we would not prevent it from happening'', which would 
bear out the Symington reference from Time magazine, but it was 
never stated in an affirmative way and would support the 
position of the Secretary of it being no, from the viewpoint of 
the record there has been no change. There has been a change in 
emphasis.
    The second point I wanted to make was that in connection 
with going to the United Nations, I was struck by the fact that 
all the witnesses except Ambassador Goldberg, and this includes 
those who had submitted written statements as well as those who 
came verbally, said there was no chance of the United Nations 
Security Council, General Assembly or anybody else taking up 
this resolution unless the bombing had ceased first. They were 
unanimous in that regard.
    This, Ambassador Goldberg did not agree with in that 
respect and he thought it would have no effect upon the 
permanent members of the UN.

                       A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING

    The question I wanted to ask the Secretary was whether he 
thought, and he is aware there have been exchanges on this 
subject, and I am struck by the strength with which the North 
Vietnamese predicate any move on a cessation of the bombing, 
and I was wondering if it is his view that Hanoi would not 
come, the answer that Hanoi would not come to the Geneva 
Conference was predicated in no change in our posture in this 
regard or upon a cessation of the bombing?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, these are matters that we ought to go 
into great detail on, Mr. Chairman, in executive session when 
there is more time. But let me summarize a great deal of recent 
business on this.
    Hanoi, in the first place, refuses to negotiate without 
conditions, that is just start talking as has happened in most 
of the crises since 1945 where the two sides made contact and 
talked about things to resolve the crisis. They have raised a 
condition of a permanent and unconditional stop of the bombing. 
They varied this word ``permanent'' a number of ways, sometimes 
they call it ``definitively'', sometimes they said ``for 
good'', sometimes they said ``once and for all'', sometimes 
they said ``permanent''.
    No one has been able to get for us from Hanoi any interest 
in the stoppage of the bombing that is not permanent.
    Now, it has been suggested that what we ought to do is stop 
the bombing without answering that question. But the trouble is 
that question will be put to us the next morning, and they will 
say, ``Is this permanent or not?'', and if we fail to say that 
it is permanent then we have the same problem.
    Yes, please.
    Senator Pell. Excuse me. I will not interfere.
    Secretary Rusk. Let me continue just a minute further.
    But even so, the President in San Antonio said we will stop 
the bombing when it will lead promptly to productive 
discussions and then we stated an assumption that during the 
discussions the North Vietnamese would not take military 
advantage of it.
    We thought that might at least elicit some repartee, some 
examination, a counterproposal or some discussion as to what 
these words meant. This was not a condition on our side with 
respect to negotiations. It was a qualification of their 
condition.
    Now, no one has been able to tell us, including--well Hanoi 
will not, therefore no one else can. Hanoi has not even said if 
we stop the bombing they will come to negotiations.

                          CREATING A SANCTUARY

    Senator Pell. May I make one point here, Mr. Chairman?
    I believe the Secretary would be inclined to agree with me 
that the point has been made to a representative of North 
Vietnam to the effect that if the cessation did not produce 
good results in a reasonable period of time, the bombing would 
be resumed and there was no denial of that fact, and that is 
accepted in their thinking. Would that not be a correct 
statement?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we tried to leave them the freedom of 
action of not addressing themselves to that question that they 
wanted to on the San Antonio formula, you see. Because we 
stated lead promptly to productive talks.
    Now, the ``promptly'' is fairly important because we have a 
good deal of evidence, including documents and otherwise, they 
have been discussing among themselves what they call a fight 
and negotiate strategy. Obviously that creates very great 
problems if they sit there in a sanctuary safe and secure 
indefinitely into the future while they send their men and arms 
into South Vietnam while there is meaningless talk, but they 
did not come back to explore those expressions.
    We were ready to talk about those things with them.
    Secondly, when we stated the assumption we were prepared 
for them to ask us what this meant, we could have told them. 
Now let me say, could I leave this off the record, Mr. 
Chairman?
    [Off the record.]

                         STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

    The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, the time is going on. I am 
still puzzled about what to say. We have to say something to 
the press. Shall I say that the decision about public hearings 
will be a presidential decision; it has not yet been resolved? 
We will have a further meeting and at that time we will get an 
answer; is that it?
    Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that you would 
not at this point point to the President on this matter. We 
have had, I thought, a very thoughtful and thorough discussion 
here this morning. There are different views on the committee. 
I have asked for the chance to reflect upon what has been said 
here in the committee. I wonder if we could not say we had a 
thorough discussion of the matter; that no final conclusion was 
reached; that the Secretary indicated that he wanted to reflect 
upon what had been said here, and the members of the committee 
will want to reflect upon the discussion; and that the 
committee and the Secretary will be in touch again.

                        FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

    The Chairman. Then there is no conclusion was arrived at. 
We had a discussion of the matter but that resolution of 
whether or not there would be public hearings on Vietnam is 
left for further consultation?
    Secretary Rusk. For further consultation.
    Senator Morse. I was going to say they will ask the 
chairman when and I do think we ought to have a time bracket.
    The Chairman. We can say as soon as convenient, and 
probably if they press me I would say next week; is that too 
soon?
    Secretary Rusk. Well, we hope promptly. But we do have----
    Senator Gore. That is good.
    The Chairman. Can I say this? They will ask me. I have to 
say something--whose next move is it. Will we hear from you? 
Will you notify us as to whether or not--what the decision is 
or shall we contact you?
    Secretary Rusk. I think on that you can say the Secretary 
indicated he will be in further touch with the committee.
    Senator Morse. Promptly?
    Senator Rusk. Promptly.
    Senator Pell, I wonder if it would be useful to say there 
is a difference between short and long term and if the 
Secretary did come up it would be on long term.
    The Chairman. I might get mixed up.
    The main thing this was announced for was whether there 
would be public hearings, and the whole point is I have to say 
something.
    I will say this: We discussed the matter and the Secretary 
wishes further time to consider the matter and the Committee 
will of course consider the matter further and no action was 
taken of any kind this morning. We had a discussion, and in the 
future we hope promptly.
    If they pin me down, I will say sometime next week; is that 
about right?
    Secretary Rusk. Yes.
    Senator Morse. Fine.
    Senator Gore. I think it has been very helpful, Mr. 
Secretary.
    Secretary Rusk. I have enjoyed it very much this morning.
    [Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in 
room 
S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, 
Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, 
Mundt, and Case.
    S. Res. 180, expressing the sense of the Senate that the 
Vietnam conflict be brought before the United Nations, was 
ordered reported by a vote of 19-0.
    S. Res. 151, relating to National Commitments, was 
considered and an original resolution was ordered reported by a 
vote of 17-0, Senators Dodd and McCarthy not voting.
    S. Res. 1418, the passport bill, was considered and no 
action taken.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]


                   BRIEFING ON THE VIETNAM SITUATION

                              ----------                              


                      Thursday, November 16, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, the Honorable J. William Fulbright 
(Chairman) presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Mansfield, Morse, 
Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, 
Mundt, and Case.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Jones, and 
Mr. Lowenstein, of the committee staff.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    The committee is very pleased to have with us this 
afternoon Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who is in Washington for 
consultation.
    I know I speak for all the committee in expressing our 
thanks to you for coming here today. I know your time is short 
and the demands on you are very great and very heavy. We will 
be glad to have any observations you wish to make, Mr. 
Ambassador.
    I believe you are accompanied by Mr. Robert Komer, your 
Deputy for Civil Operations.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    The Chairman. And you have others, Mr. Philip Habib, a 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, and John 
Negroponte, Executive Assistant to Ambassador Bunker.
    Proceed sir.

  STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLSWORTH BUNKER, UNITED STATES 
 AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, ACCOMPANIED BY: ROBERT W. KOMER, 
      AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S DEPUTY FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND 
  REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT; PHILIP C. HABIB, DEPUTY 
 ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS; JOHN NEGROPONTE, 
   EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER; AND WILLIAM B. 
   MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL 
                           RELATIONS

    Ambassador Bunker. Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be 
useful if I should give first just a brief summary of the 
present situation, as I see it, in Vietnam.
    Casting up the balance sheet is, obviously, a rather 
difficult, complicated undertaking involving as it does many 
factors, questions of judgment, some imponderables. I think in 
looking back no one would deny that we had come a long way in 
the last two years. Certainly that is the opinion of my 
colleagues in the diplomatic corps who are there and have been 
there for much longer periods than I.

                    MILITARY SITUATION HAS IMPROVED

    In the first place, the military situation has greatly 
improved. The North Vietnamese Army has not won a single major 
victory in the South. On the contrary, it has suffered heavy 
losses on the battlefield. At home, much of the infrastructure 
has been damaged or destroyed: An estimated half million people 
diverted to the repair of war damage; the movement of men and 
supplies made infinitely more difficult; food shortages have 
developed. It seems apparent that physically and materially the 
country has been badly hurt.
    At the same time, Viet Cong recruitment has declined since 
early 1966 by perhaps more than half. Our estimates were at 
that time the recruitment was some 6500 to 7,000 a month, and 
now our intelligence estimates are that it is between three and 
four thousand a month.
    The age of the draftees has declined. As an example, I 
visited a little while ago a hamlet in the delta which was 
attacked later by a battalion of Viet Cong who were beaten off 
by the popular forces. The Vietnamese Regulars responded 
quickly, caught up with them, killed 51 and captured 10 
prisoners and weapons; three of the prisoners were 12 years 
old, two of them were 14, and five were 17. This is being 
repeated, constantly, as we are taking prisoners.
    At the same time, the Viet Cong have progressively denied 
access to food, with the result that in areas they control they 
have extorted higher and higher taxes and thus are alienating 
the population.

                       PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

    By contrast, I think it is fair to say that South Vietnam 
has made substantial progress in a good many ways.
    On the political front, there has been a stable government 
for two years; the constituent assembly elected; a constitution 
drafted and promulgated; village and hamlet elections held last 
spring and summer; some 14,000 village and hamlet officials 
elected. Presidential and congressional elections took place, 
as you know, in September and October of this year.
    Thus, within a space of 14 months and under wartime 
conditions, five elections have been held.
    A new government has been inaugurated.
    From a statement made a few days ago by the Prime Minister, 
and by the president previously, vigorous action was in calling 
on the people for greater efforts and greater sacrifices.
    It has already taken two important steps. A decree 
providing for partial mobilization, expanding the draft ages 
from 18 to 33, requisitions of specialists and technicians from 
34 to 45 years of age and recalling to service men within the 
draft groups who have previously been demobilized and extending 
the service of those already in the service.
    Secondly, and I think a very important step, was a decree, 
law, to become effective January 1st providing that all land 
and property taxes will be administered by, and all the 
revenues collected for local governments, namely the villages, 
provinces and the municipalities and the prefectures.
    Transferring, as the decree does, virtually all land tax 
authority to the local units of government, I think this 
represents really a giant step forward.
    Inflationary pressures are severe, but have been kept under 
reasonably good control while prices have gone up; food 
supplies are ample.
    The Vietnamese Armed Forces are being steadily improved and 
in many instances have turned in excellent performances. 
Pressure on the enemy has been stepped up by both the United 
States and the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

                     PACIFICATION GAINING MOMENTUM

    Pacification has gained momentum.
    As Ambassador Komer can tell you, it was somewhat slow in 
getting started. A vast amount of planning, organization, 
training was involved in it. The reorientation and re-training 
of the Vietnamese Armed Forces; part of the Regular Forces 
being diverted to pacification; and most of the regional and 
popular forces having responsibility, also, for it. The 
revolutionary development forces had to be trained. More than 
30,000 individuals or cadres, as they call them, have been 
trained.
    I think as of the end of August, there were some 611 teams 
then operating, and we expect to have 700 by the end of this 
year.
    The roads and waterways are being opened up to traffic, 
another contribution to pacification. For example, in the Third 
Corps area, which includes Saigon, twice the mileage can be 
traveled during the day without military escort as could a year 
ago, and four times the mileage of two years ago.
    Defections under the open arms program or Chu Hoi program, 
as they call it, are running maybe 50 to 75 percent ahead of 
last year, I think.
    The population under the government of Vietnam has 
increased from January of '66 to date by approximately 13 
percent, according to the Vietnamese government figures, to 70, 
with 14 percent under Viet Cong control and the balance, 16 
percent, being contested. Our figures are a little more 
conservative. We estimate 68 percent under government control, 
17 percent under Viet control, and 15 percent are being 
contested.

                       ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

    I think one benchmark of progress are the elections which 
took place in September '66 for the Constituent Assembly, and 
those which took place September this year for the president 
and vice president and the senate.
    Registration increased by 5,250,000 in 1966 to 5,850,000 in 
1967.
    Of those registered in 1966, a little over 80 percent 
voted, and in '67, 83 percent of the registered voters voted.
    If you take the figure for the number of registrations in 
the September election this year, it represents about 75 
percent of the total population, indicating that that many, 
that portion of the population felt self-secure to vote in 
spite of massive efforts by the Viet Cong to disrupt it.
    Senator Hickenlooper would tell you, as he was there as an 
observer. The elections, I think, in the opinion of not only 
our observers but of observers from some 23 other countries, 
were carried out fairly, carried out extremely well organized, 
and, as I say, carried through in spite of efforts by the Viet 
Cong to disrupt them.
    One interesting incident occurred. Senator Murphy of 
California and Governor Guy, of North Dakota, were halfway up 
the coast at Tuy Hoa on election day, and someone threw a 
grenade into a polling booth and killed three people, wounding 
41. Someone said, ``We are now going to vote,'' and many of 
those wounded came back to vote, an indication, I think, of the 
great interest on the part of the people in the democratic 
processes.
    Perhaps another indication is the number of candidates. We 
had 11 presidential tickets. There were 480 candidates for 60 
senate seats, and there were 1,075 candidates for 137 seats of 
the lower house.

                          ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

    There is full employment today and in some cases a labor 
shortage.
    While this does make the economy prone to inflationary 
pressures, it also means a fundamental change in the conditions 
of life for many millions of Vietnamese workers and peasants.
    Prosperity is coming, too, to rural Vietnam. In the 
pacified areas and even in some that are contested, the 
standard of living is even higher now than it has ever been.
    Means by which prosperity is coming are quite clear. There 
is an urban demand generated, of course, by the full 
employment. The roads and canals have been secured, making it 
possible to move products to market. Jobs are available in the 
local towns and cities for all who want them, and this 
combination in many sections has produced something really akin 
to a rural boom.

                         HANOI'S DETERMINATION

    There are aspects, however, of the problem that one must 
consider.
    As I have said, the enemy offensive has been blunted, but 
it has not been eliminated. The infiltration continues from the 
North at an estimated rate of about 6,500 a month. Because of 
the decline in Viet Cong recruitment, which I mentioned, and 
general morale, more and more of the war effort has been taken 
over by Hanoi.
    Hanoi's determination does not seem to be affected by the 
severe punishment that it has taken. We have seen no apparent 
indication of its desire to enter into negotiations, and it 
seems apparent that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists are 
still willing to keep North Vietnam supplied with weapons and 
with materiel.
    While the enemy, as I said, has been badly hurt, and the 
Viet Cong encounters increasing difficulties on the South 
Vietnam side, there are also problems. The first is the task of 
organizing the new government; setting up the organs of 
democratic representative government; the organization of both 
houses of the Assembly; establishment of a supreme court; 
inspectorate; security council; passage of press laws; the law 
establishing--the law for political parties, all of which have 
to be undertaken now.

               GETTING THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM UNDERWAY

    The second task is getting the government's program 
underway, especially pushing ahead on the shorter phase 
priority objectives.
    As both Thieu and Ky have said to me, it is highly 
important that the new government should progress in the next 
six months to gain the support and enthusiasm of the people. 
Although the Vietnamese armed forces, I have said, have been 
greatly improved, there is still much to do. Leadership and 
ability to cope with the guerrilla warfare and security are 
areas where there are still deficiencies. Training is going 
ahead in many ways. New methods are being devised, particularly 
those of joint combat units where the United States and 
Vietnamese units are working together.
    General Westmoreland will tell you it often makes a better 
operating unit than each one operating separately.
    There still needs to be improvement in Vietnamese 
motivation, involvement, pacification, because in the last 
analysis this has to be done by the Vietnamese themselves. They 
must carry the main burden of the program.
    In this connection, I think the village and hamlet 
elections are really just as significant as those for president 
and vice president, and the assembly, because it marks the 
beginning of the initiation of local government which was 
largely destroyed by the French occupation and Diem regime, 
involving the people in their own developments and their own 
well being and their own government.
    As I mentioned, this first step of turning over the 
collection and administration of the land and property taxes is 
an important step in that process.
    These 14,000 officials who were elected are being trained 
now, too, in local government and the process is getting 
underway. But the aspirations of the people for security, for 
social justice, for the elimination of corruption, for economic 
and social development and improvement in their standard of 
living, especially in the rural areas, are only beginning to be 
fulfilled.
    There is obviously work to be done on many counts. There 
are many obstacles to overcome, but balancing out the pluses 
and minuses, I think none of the latter are insuperable.
    The Vietnamese are intelligent and hard-working people, and 
properly guided, encouraged and well led, they have 
demonstrated that they can perform effectively.

                      GRADUALLY ACHIEVING OUR AIMS

    It is my opinion that we have had a good measure of 
success, that we are making steady, not spectacular but steady 
progress, and that we are gradually achieving our aims in 
Vietnam.
    I believe that we are also at the point where the steady 
progress I have referred to can be accelerated in all of these 
fields, in the military aspect of it and the evolution of the 
constitutional process, in pacification, a word which, I 
confess, I don't like because I think it has connotations of 
the French. What is really a better term for it, and a term 
which both Thieu and Ky prefer to use, is nation-building or 
rural reconstruction. I think it much more accurately describes 
what the process is.
    In my view, the political aspect of the problem, the 
evolution of the constitutional process, the nation-building, 
rural reconstruction, revolutionary development aspects are 
just as important as winning the war, in solving the problems 
of Vietnam as the military aspect.
    In fact, I don't know that the war can be won militarily 
without success in either of these areas, and if it were, it 
might be meaningless.
    But I believe that, because of what has been accomplished 
today, we are now at the point of being able to not only 
maintain the rate of progress, but accelerate it.
    So I am convinced that if we stick with this problem and it 
is not a short-range proposition, we shall have success in 
achieving our objectives.
    Mr. Chairman, this is a very brief summary of the situation 
as I see it at the present time.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 
Perhaps it would be useful to ask a few questions.

                              A RURAL BOOM

    You indicate they are really having, if I understood you 
correctly, a rural boom.
    Ambassador Bunker. In some areas.
    The Chairman. In some areas.
    Ambassador Bunker. Not generally.
    The Chairman. Could you tell us how much rice you expect 
for us to supply to Vietnam this year?
    Ambassador Bunker. About 800,000 tons.
    The Chairman. Is that expected to come from this country?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well----
    The Chairman. Or purchased elsewhere?
    Ambassador Bunker. Most of it from this country.

                        U.S. SPENDING IN VIETNAM

    The Chairman. Do you know how much we are spending in 
Vietnam this year?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, on the economic assistance and the 
aid side, or overall?
    The Chairman. Overall.
    Ambassador Bunker. I do not know. I have not got that 
figure.
    The Chairman. Do you have an estimate to make?
    Ambassador Bunker. I would guess it is somewhere around $21 
billion, $22 billion, including the military.
    The Chairman. Including the military.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    The Chairman. And the economic, overall.
    Ambassador Bunker. Overall.

                         THE OPEN-ARMS PROGRAM

    The Chairman. Would you describe very briefly what you mean 
by the Chu Hoi program?
    Ambassador Bunker. It is what is known as the open-arms 
program, and that is the inducement to the Viet Cong to leave 
the Viet Cong and come in to the Vietnamese Government.
    The Chairman. There is 75 percent more than last year.
    Ambassador Bunker. I think it will come out about that. 
Last year the total was 20,000. At the end of September, we had 
25,000.
    Mr. Komer. 25,000. It is running about double last year.
    Ambassador Bunker. Roughly double last year.
    The Chairman. Does this include refugees?
    Ambassador Bunker. No.
    The Chairman. In neither year?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, neither year.
    The Chairman. In this last election, I have forgotten, what 
was the percentage of the total vote that the present 
government received?
    Ambassador Bunker. Thirty-five percent.

                          A LONG-RANGE PROBLEM

    The Chairman. You stated right at the end of your statement 
that this is not a short-range problem. Could you estimate how 
long-range problem you think it is?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, I could not, Senator. I do not like 
to put it in a time frame. I do not know. My own feeling is 
that we have been the victim in a way of over-optimism in years 
gone by. It is not a short-range program. I think that we are 
at the point now where in all of these phases which I have 
mentioned--military, political, constitutional, nation-
building--we are at the point where we can accelerate these 
programs. I think that we may begin to show more rapid 
progress.
    Certainly the situation with the Viet Cong has 
deteriorated. One never knows in these situations how close you 
may be to success.

                           DEFINING U.S. AIMS

    The Chairman. Well, lastly, you said you thought we were 
gradually achieving our aims in Vietnam. I wonder if you would 
clarify for the record as much as you can what our aims are in 
Vietnam.
    Ambassador Bunker. First, they are a political settlement 
through a just achievement of a just and endurable and 
honorable peace through negotiations. Negotiations leading to a 
political settlement, acceptable to the Vietnamese, to 
ourselves, to North Vietnam, the Front.
    Secondly, a chance for the Vietnamese people to choose 
freely the form of government under which they wish to live.
    Third, to help them build their own political institutions 
and a viable economy, and to make credible our obligations 
under the Charter of the United Nations and SEATO to resist 
aggression.
    Eventually when peace is secured, to develop regional 
organizations through which the Southeast Asian countries can 
carry on joint undertakings in economic development and mutual 
cooperation.
    The Chairman. Senator Mansfield, do you have any questions?
    Senator Mansfield. No questions.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

               WRITING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION

    Senator Hickenlooper. I think Ambassador Bunker certainly 
has covered any questions that I might have. I was very much 
impressed with the fact that there does seem to be an 
increasing amount of stability in South Vietnam. Certainly I 
can testify as to what he said about the elections. We told 
some of them over there if they wanted some tips on how to rig 
an election, come over and we will take you over to Chicago and 
a few other places in this country to give you some tips on how 
to rig an election, because we know how to do it. [Laughter.]
    But there was one significant thing they told me while I 
was there going through the legislative building in Saigon. The 
man who was with me, who was there when they were hammering out 
this constitution that they have now, said if anyone tells you 
that that constitution was a cold deck affair, he said, ``You 
should have passed this building every day for two or three 
months and heard them quarreling and shouting and yelling in 
their various attitudes, and everyone expressing his own 
opinion.'' He said, ``They expressed their opinion, and they 
hammered out a constitution in which everyone had a right to 
express themselves,'' He said, ``It was probably about as 
nearly a fair and equitable approach as anyone he had known.''
    I do not think it is perfect. Perhaps there might have been 
some places where there was some influence, but certainly when 
you go to almost any election booth or precinct voting place in 
the United States and see people out there importuning the 
voters, usually at a legal distance from a poll but 
nevertheless trying to put the pressure on them to vote their 
way, we did not see any of that in Vietnam. They might have 
been indoctrinated beforehand, but if they were it was very 
well concealed. It was not that evident.
    Just one thing I wanted to ask you, Mr. Ambassador. 
Incidentally, I want to testify publicly to your great courtesy 
to all of us while we were there.
    Ambassador Bunker. It was a great pleasure, Senator, to 
have you all there and have a chance to see what was going on.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You were very nice to us.

                     RELEASE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

    Do you have any views as to the reason or the propaganda 
value or what may be behind the release of these three military 
people through this pacifist representative in Cambodia?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, we have not.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Who came back with them? I wonder why 
some of the rest of them were not released.
    Ambassador Bunker. We have not really.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I know it is outside your bailiwick.
    Ambassador Bunker. No, it is not. But I just do not know. I 
do not think we formed an opinion about it. This happened just 
after I left.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I know.
    Ambassador Bunker. So far the embassy has not really, I 
think, come to any opinion unless Mr. Habib knows something 
about it. Do you?
    Well, Mr. Habib says that what speculation there is is to 
the effect that there may have been, perhaps because of the 
death of Gustav Hertz, to----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Because of the death of who?
    Ambassador Bunker. Gustav Hertz. He was the AID man who was 
kidnapped, you know. They said he had died of natural causes 
and perhaps also to induce reciprocal action, the release of 
some of their own people on our side.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Have we not made offers for some 
reciprocal exchange of prisoners?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, we have.
    Mr. Habib. We have indicated willingness to exchange.
    Senator Hickenlooper. And they have not shown any 
willingness.
    Ambassador Bunker. So far.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, this is all speculative, but 
one wonders whether or not they might have released these three 
people to this particular individual, this American that they 
released them to, in order to encourage the coterie of dissent 
in the United States which he represents, that is.
    Ambassador Bunker. It might be possible.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I say it is all highly speculative.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Bunker. We naturally hope this will lead to 
further exchanges.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, indeed.
    Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Morse.

                        SEEDS OF HATRED IN ASIA

    Senator Morse. Mr. Ambassador, I was very interested in 
some of your statistics. I would waggishly say that apparently 
in some of the areas where the militant intend to fight down to 
the bitter end they are apparently willing to fight down to the 
last child if you are capturing 12 and 14 year olds. But, you 
see, the interesting thing about all your discussion is the 
assumption we are right. Of course there are many of us in this 
country who do not think we are right. You speak to Senator 
Hickenlooper about elections. We are having some in this 
country, too. We had one the other day in a very conservative 
Republican area of California, a very interesting election, 
having some polls, too. I do not see how anyone can take any 
Administration--could take any great enthusiasm out of the 
results of those polls, and so I must say quite frankly and 
respectfully I am not all impressed with your statistics nor 
with your rationalizations as to what we are doing in Vietnam. 
I think you despoil it when you point out that, in spite of all 
the very favorable accounts you give in the first part of your 
statement, you end up by bringing out about the problems, and 
we have no indication when it is going to be over.
    I am talking now about the Viet Cong having a hard time 
recruiting--I am going to come to statistics on that in a 
moment--and that the North Vietnamese are continuing 
infiltrating about 6,500 a month. I noticed in your answer to 
Senator Fulbright bearing upon the last point I made, no 
reference to Secretary Rusk, unfortunately, in my opinion, 
press comments that we may be in there to contain China. Do you 
have any concern as to whether or not if we were to get through 
slaughtering the infiltration from the north there would be 
further seeds of hatred in Asia because of this course of 
conduct? We might then be confronted with Chinese infiltration.
    Does that concern you at all?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, Senator Morse, my feeling is that 
if the Chinese, while they would probably like to see Hanoi 
keep on fighting as long as possible, I don't believe the 
Chinese themselves will intervene in the war unless we went to 
the extent of attempting to overthrow the Hanoi government. I 
think then they might come in, but we have made it clear that 
we have no designs against the Hanoi government. We are not 
invading North Vietnam and my feeling is that this will--we are 
fighting a limited war, and keeping the war limited, toward 
limited objectives. My feeling is also, quite strongly, that 
with the possible exception of Cambodia--and I am not even so 
sure of that--that if you talk with all of the countries 
surrounding the mainland of China, beginning with South Korea, 
Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Vietnam, I say with the possible exception of 
Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, yes, India, too, they have a very 
real interest in seeing our efforts there succeed and, as I 
say, an honorable, just and durable peace secured.

                   WHAT IS SO LIMITED ABOUT THE WAR?

    Senator Morse. I am always interested in the use of the 
phrase ``limited war'' by you and other spokesmen for the 
Administration.
    What is so limited about it? With the devastating bombing 
record that we have made in North Vietnam, with thousands and 
thousands of refugees we have created, at a great loss of 
civilian life in this area, what do you mean limited? You mean 
limited only to direct bombing of China?
    When you speak about invasion, limited vis-a-vis Vietnam, 
is what you mean we haven't sent any troops in yet, a manpower 
operation in there yet? But how could you do more damage to 
North Vietnam than we are doing with this unbelievable bombing 
program?
    Ambassador Bunker. I think we could do a great deal more 
damage, Senator. We are bombing military targets in North 
Vietnam. We are not bombing cities.
    Senator Morse. Too bad that graves can't come to life and 
tell the American people how much damage you have done that 
isn't military damage in North Vietnam. Of course when you say 
that you believe China isn't going to come in, that is what 
creates the great disagreement among us. I think there is a 
great danger that China will come in. If you force a surrender, 
what else can she do but come in? I don't see how Russia and 
China can stand by and permit us to force a surrender, and that 
is the kind of risk that I think is so unconscionable on our 
part in our conducting of this war, and that is what this great 
debate in part is about over here, and the kind of 
rationalization we are getting here this afternoon, I think 
when it becomes public is going to intensify the debate and the 
determination on the part of those of us who do not share the 
views of this Administration, that can be justified morally or 
any other way.
    I don't intend to be silenced in carrying on this fight 
because I think you have got the public so split by this course 
of action that your killings over there are not going to unite 
us.

          SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL

    But the staff has prepared a memorandum here, and then I 
will be through, Mr. Ambassador. It is all right to talk here 
in closed session about a confidential report that the 
committee has received from the Department of Defense in reply 
to an inquiry that the committee made concerning handling the 
evaluation system. They set out the various categories, 
population control and hamlet control.
    Let me read a portion to you from the staff memorandum. It 
points out, we made this inquiry on October 31, got a reply on 
November 1st. The staff points out that in a San Antonio speech 
in September, President Johnson said the proportion of 
population living under communist control has been reduced to 
well below 20 percent. Ambassador Bunker is quoted in today's 
New York Times as having said yesterday that the proportion is 
now 17 percent. Both statements are generally correct. 
According to the Defense letter, the percentage of the 
population which was VC controlled as of August was 16.5 
percent, and the additional 2.2 percent of the population was 
found in Category E, which are hamlets in which Viet Cong 
military activities are affected, in which attacks and ambushes 
occur, and in which South Vietnamese administrative and 
political activities are freer and effective and present only 
in the daytime.
    Then the staff adds:

    However, it should be noted that the population control 
figure specifically, except the 20.8 percent of the population 
which does not live in hamlets, the claim that less than 20 
percent of the population is under communist control, assumes 
that none of the population living outside hamlets is under 
communist control.

    Do you think any of that 20 percent is under communist 
control?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, 20 percent, of the city 
population, which is under government control.
    Senator Morse. Well, the figures that you have given make 
no reference to the 20 percent.
    Ambassador Bunker. The figure that I gave for government 
control includes the cities, Senator Morse, as well as the 
rural areas, you see. It is the city population. I mean Saigon, 
Da Nang, Hue and the cities, provincial capitals, and so forth, 
which are under government control.

                    HAMLETS UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL

    Senator Morse. Isn't it true that the extent of Vietnam 
control is quite different if the figures on hamlet control as 
distinct from population control are examined?
    Ambassador Bunker. If you exclude the city population, and 
you take the population outside of the cities, the percentage 
changes, of course, but I am giving the figures for the total 
population.
    Senator Morse. I know. But the Defense Department figures 
show that 32 percent of the hamlets are VC controlled and an 
additional 3.8 percent are in Category E.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, that is true.
    Senator Morse. Thus the percentage of hamlets under hamlet 
control is about twice the percentage of population control 
under communist control.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes. Ambassador Komer can answer that 
because he is in charge of this hamlet evaluation survey.
    Senator Morse. Yes, go ahead.
    Mr. Komer. Senator, it is almost impossible to compare 
numbers of hamlets with amounts of population because the size 
of hamlets varies so considerably. There are some hamlets with 
only 75 percent in them. We found that there is another hamlet 
that has 13,000 people in it. So if you are talking about 
security of the people, we find that the population figures are 
much more useful than the hamlet figures because the hamlet 
figures sort of imply this is a symmetrical hamlet.
    Now, the reason for the difference in those percentages 
which you have cited, sir, is because the President was using 
figures, I believe, as of 30 June, 1967. The Defense Department 
answer to you has included the figure as of 30 August. 
Ambassador Bunker was using the latest figures we got. We try 
to put them together each month to see what the trend line 
figures are, figures as of the end of September.

                   DIFFICULTY IN MAKING CALCULATIONS

    Senator Morse. We need to make clear, don't we, Mr. Komer, 
that the Ambassador's figure and yours, too, apparently really 
cover a very limited part of the country?
    Mr. Komer. No, sir, they cover the total population of the 
country, hamlet and non-hamlet.
    Senator Morse. Then I get back to my premise. How do you 
know that in the hamlets that the Defense Department is talking 
about the government controls the cities apparently but the 
Viet Cong controls what--a third of the area? How much of the 
land area of Vietnam, South Vietnam at the present time, is 
Viet Cong controlled and how much is controlled by the junta?
    Mr. Komer. We don't have very good figures on area control 
because that is pretty hard to calculate. You know, what 
percentage of the fields of a hamlet are tilled by people who 
are Viet Cong, and what percentage are tilled by people who are 
loyal to the government. Besides which about 40 percent of 
Vietnam is mountain, swamp and jungle, which is basically 
uninhabited. There aren't any hamlets there. So it is very hard 
to come up with a sensible figure on the amount of territory 
that is controlled by one side or the other.
    So we decided we would stick with what is important in this 
war and that is the people.

                          PROBLEM OF REFUGEES

    Senator Morse. Of course my next one, I am through with 
this, but my next one is a hypothetical. It will probably never 
come to pass in the foreseeable future. I think it is perfectly 
obvious that the State Department and the Pentagon Building and 
the White House intend to maintain a military presence for many 
years until repudiated by the American people, which may not be 
so many years. But what do you suppose would happen if we did 
remove ourselves as far as the refugees are concerned? Do you 
include the refugees within your figures?
    Mr. Komer. Yes.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, those are included.
    Senator Morse. I suppose they are controlled, all right. 
But are you of the impression that they are enthusiastic about 
their being refugees and enthusiastic about the support that--
about the course of action we follow? The reason I raise this 
is that some of us around this table were briefed not so long 
ago by Mr. Luce and some others, and I understand that Mr. 
Bunker thinks that this organization ought to continue over 
there. We didn't get such a rosy picture, Mr. Ambassador, from 
Mr. Luce and his associates.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, Senator, I may say that most of 
Mr. Luce's associates in Vietnam don't agree with them because 
most of them are there and are working there. He and 65 others 
resigned, but there are some 150 there now who have elected to 
stay.
    Senator Morse. It has always been true of the difference 
between leaders and followers.
    Ambassador Bunker. I talked to Mr. Luce in Vietnam. I think 
he felt very emotionally disturbed by the situation, that war 
is a tragedy as it is, obviously, and that the innocent suffer, 
too, along with the participants. And he felt so strongly about 
it that he felt he had to resign.
    He did, unfortunately, give his letter to the President to 
the press, before he delivered it to me. I simply said to him, 
he is certainly entitled to his opinion. If he felt as strongly 
as he did, then he ought not to stay there. But the IVS has 
quite a large contingent there who are doing splendid work and 
who are determined to stay and to continue to do that sort of 
work, which is extremely valuable, in agriculture, among the 
refugees, and in education.
    Senator Morse. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the ambassador 
knows that it pains me to find myself in disagreement with him 
because for so many years we were in agreement on so many 
things.
    But, on the other hand, I would be flying under false 
colors if I didn't say enough here this afternoon to leave no 
room for doubt in the mind of the ambassador, I happen to think 
that we are writing such a sordid record in Vietnam that it 
will go down to the everlasting discredit of American history.
    Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Aiken?
    Senator Aiken. Yes, not much.

                           A NEGOTIATED PEACE

    Assuming that the war does end some day, is it your opinion 
that the war will be ended and the conditions of peace 
determined at the conference table?
    Ambassador Bunker. If it comes to negotiations, Senator, I 
would hope so.
    Senator Aiken. No. The question was will it come to 
negotiations. Will the war be ended and peace terms written at 
the conference table?
    Ambassador Bunker. Oh, well----
    Senator Aiken. What is your own opinion?
    Ambassador Bunker. I would----
    Senator Aiken. I have got your predecessor's opinion.
    Ambassador Bunker. I would say that as of now Hanoi has 
shown no inclination to come to negotiations. I think that is 
the present situation.
    Senator Aiken. I think you are right there. But if it does 
not come to the point of negotiations and the arriving at peace 
that way, how will the war be ended?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, I think it can be ended in a 
number of ways. I think the development of the nation-building 
process and the constitutional process, of the continuation, 
and I believe acceleration, as the last for each year of the 
open arms process, will gradually, I think, wean away the Viet 
Cong from the other side.
    If Hanoi withdraws its troops, as it may, the war can come 
to an end.
    Another alternative would be the fact that, as my 
predecessor Cabot Lodge, said, ``If they are played out, they 
may decide they have had enough and gradually withdraw.''

                        THE SCALE OF HOSTILITIES

    Senator Aiken. How will we know when such conditions have 
been reached?
    Ambassador Bunker. I think we know by the scale of 
hostilities. As a matter of fact, I would say that now in three 
quarters of the country except in the north--and there are 
certainly some indications that the enemy has resorted to what 
they call phase 2 of warfare, which is a guerrilla type way, 
small unit warfare, and there has been no--our indication 
indicated quite clearly that they intended to start the monsoon 
offensive at the end of May this year. It has never gotten off 
the ground. It never got started, and consequently it may be 
that as pressure accelerates, as I think it will, militarily--
--
    Senator Aiken. With more forces.
    Ambassador Bunker. With the forces which are programmed--
two things, I think: In the first place I think we ought to 
make a distinction between what happened before 1965 and from 
1965 on. Before 1965 we were there only in an advisory 
capacity. It was in 1965 that we decided to send troops there 
in force.
    Senator Aiken. Well, we had 17,000 troops there before 
1965.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, but they were not combatant troops, 
then, but in a training and advisory capacity.
    Senator Aiken. We didn't have them at Da Nang.
    Ambassador Bunker. We were not fighting.
    When we came there in force we discovered the fact that 
there was no logistical base, and we had to spend more than a 
year building a logistical base. We had relatively few combat 
troops. About three out of four troops were support troops, 
construction battalions, engineer battalions.
    The base took more than a year to build and it is only 
within the last year that I have been able to do more, and now 
the ratio is reversed and the ratio of combat troops to support 
troops is in balance. We are now not only maintaining pressure 
but to increase the pressure on the enemy, at the same time the 
performance of the Vietnamese troops is steadily improving in 
spite of what one reads in the press here, which I think is not 
fairly reporting the performance of the Vietnamese troops, and 
the combination, I think, is an indication that on the military 
side that progress certainly should accelerate.

                      FAILURE TO STOP INFILTRATION

    Senator Aiken. Well, we started bombing North Vietnam 
February 1965, as I recall it.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    Senator Aiken. The purpose being to stop infiltration of 
men and materiel from the North.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    Senator Aiken. Yet I think you just said that infiltration 
was running about 5500 a month now.
    Ambassador Bunker. I said about 6500 a month.
    Senator Aiken. Which is the highest it has been.
    Ambassador Bunker. No, sir.
    Senator Aiken. How high has it been before that?
    Ambassador Bunker. It was up to 7,000, 7500.
    Senator Aiken. Well, that is the highest I have heard.
    Ambassador Bunker. No, no.
    Well, Mr. Habib said some months it has gone over 10,000.
    Senator Aiken. Well, yes, that could be.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well anyway----
    Senator Aiken. But it hasn't been----
    Ambassador Bunker. It fluctuates, too.
    Senator Aiken. Sure.
    Well, if there is no conference, no negotiation, if the 
North Vietnamese firmly are determined not to yield at any 
price, but are sending their 12-year-olds and even their 10-
year-olds into action, who will determine when the war should 
end, if they don't give up, or will it never end?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, my view is, Senator Aiken, that 
even if they do not come to negotiations the war will end. My 
belief is that if we continue on the course we are continuing 
now, as I said before, I think that, militarily, operations 
will become increasingly effective. I think on the political 
side this new government which has come in should be given a 
chance to show what it can do. Come in with, I think, a new 
feeling of confidence and determination and self-reliance. The 
government which preceded it for two years was in power for two 
years. The first year was spent in restoring order and 
stability. It has only been in the last year they were able to 
start any programs.

                     SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLICYMAKERS

    Now, the new government has come in with, I think, a very 
excellent platform and program on what they want to try to do. 
I think we will see the country starting to change.
    Senator Aiken. Has there been a great change in the key 
personnel of the government?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, there has been a considerable 
change. A considerable change.
    Senator Aiken. Well, who are the policymakers?
    Ambassador Bunker. There are only three military people in 
the government today.
    Senator Aiken. Thieu, Ky,--who are the others?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, I say in the cabinet. Thieu and Ky, 
who are president and vice president, but in the cabinet the 
minister of defense, the minister of revolutionary development, 
and the minister of the interior.
    Senator Aiken. Is Tran Van Do still in the cabinet?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir.

                         BENCHMARKS OF SUCCESS

    Senator Aiken. Well, I don't want to take up too much time. 
I don't see that in your statement you indicated any 
improvement indicators or benchmarks or whatever you call them. 
Have you got any indicators that show there has been 
improvement? Aren't there any minus figures anywhere, or have 
we improved in every single phase of the war?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, I don't pretend, obviously, that we 
don't have setbacks. The Vietnamese Armed Forces, they are not 
always successful; neither are we for that matter. We can get 
ambushed and so do they.
    I made up a list, however, at the time the Vice President 
came out, of performance of the Vietnamese Armed Forces simply 
because I felt that the record that came back here was entirely 
unfair and inaccurate.
    Between October 20th and November 6th, there were some 43 
engagements, some of them quite sizable, and in 35 of which 
they had a very great success. They had about three defeats and 
about five stand-offs.

                 MARINES' RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAMESE

    Senator Aiken. We get a good deal of unofficial information 
from many people who come back from Vietnam, and the reports I 
get are that the relationships between the American servicemen 
and the native population is much better in the territory 
occupied by the Marines than in other parts of the country.
    Do you get any such reports as that?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, I don't think so.
    Senator Aiken. You don't.
    Well, then----
    Senator Case. What was the point, George--I am sorry.
    Senator Aiken. That the relationship between the native 
population and our armed forces is better in the north than in 
other parts of the country.
    Senator Case. You mean where the Marines were?
    Senator Aiken. Didn't General Walt move the Marines out of 
the cities and Da Nang to a considerable extent, and aren't our 
forces concentrated in the other cities?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, it is our general policy to move 
them out of the cities everywhere.
    Senator Aiken. Everywhere?
    Ambassador Bunker. They are not all out of Saigon, no, but 
a great many of them are.
    Senator Aiken. I guess that is it.
    Well, do you have any trouble getting volunteers for aid 
work?
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't know of any. I think they are 
recruiting all the time.
    Senator Aiken. Yes. Do you get enough?
    Ambassador Bunker. Get enough? Yes.

                         MARINES DOING AID WORK

    Senator Aiken. You do. You don't ever call on the Marines 
to furnish personnel for aid work?
    Mr. Komer. Can I answer it?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Komer. As a matter of fact, in the aid recruiting 
drives in the major cities, the number of recruits held up. The 
number of volunteers held up very well.
    The Marines do try to help out on local security----
    Senator Aiken. They try, or they are told?
    Mr. KOMER. No, they are not told.
    Senator Aiken. Yes, they are. They are told and you know 
it.
    Mr. KOMER. I think----
    Senator Aiken. They are told, and you know it, to furnish 
men for aid work and do the work that you are supposed to do 
there.
    I had not intended to say this, but I am saying it now, and 
you know it and I know it and the Marines know it. That they 
have to take their men right out of the ranks and put into the 
aid work.
    Well, I shouldn't say it, anyway, but I have.
    Ambassador Bunker. Senator Aiken, if you mean they are 
engaged in some civic action activities, yes.
    Senator Aiken. Engaged in agricultural work to a 
considerable extent.
    Ambassador Bunker. It is news to me.
    Senator Aiken. If you get out on the farm and look around, 
you will find some of them there. I am not kidding; I know.
    That is all.
    The Chairman. Senator Gore?

                     HIGH LEVEL POLICY REASSESSMENT

    Senator Gore. Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you are at 
liberty to convey to the committee an assessment of the so-
called high level review of policy and program which, according 
to the press, has been underway with you here, with General 
Westmoreland and the President and the Secretary of State, et 
cetera.
    Are we to have another escalation which has followed all 
previous and reassessments----
    Ambassador Bunker. No, Senator Gore. In the first place, I 
may say that I have talked to the President, had two talks with 
the President since I returned, and Westmoreland has once. What 
we have reported on the situation as we see it today in 
Vietnam. That was the purpose of our coming back for normal 
consultation. I have been there six months and I felt it was 
time to come back and to report on what I had seen; what I felt 
the situation to be; what progress we had made.
    I think out of these consultations, and out of our mutual 
discussions and talks, we may then come to some conclusions, 
but we have not as yet.
    Senator Gore. So far as you know, no conclusion different 
from continuation of present policy has been reached?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, sir.

                      MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

    Senator Gore. Mr. Ambassador, in your statement to Senator 
Aiken a few moments ago you said, ``If Hanoi withdraws its 
troops, the war can end.''
    I find that extremely important, extremely interesting. It 
is somewhat akin to the statement that Secretary Rusk made in 
his press conference recently in which he said, ``We put our 
combat forces in there because North Vietnamese forces moved 
into South Vietnam.''
    Now, my question is: If North Vietnam did, in fact, 
withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, would the United States 
be willing to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam and permit 
self-determination by the people in South Vietnam?
    Ambassador Bunker. We have said at the Manila Conference, 
there is the exact wording in here somewhere. I might read, in 
particular, paragraph 29. They declared that all allied forces 
are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the 
object of aggression, and its government requested support in 
the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be 
withdrawn after close consultation as the other side withdraws 
its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the levels of 
violence subside.
    Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not 
later than six months after the above conditions have been 
fulfilled.
    Senator Gore. Well, this, if you will pardon me, this is 
not exactly clear. Throughout, our policy seems to have been 
based upon the fact or fancy that we are resisting aggression. 
I asked Secretary Rusk a few days ago about this six months 
proposition, and I will have his answer in a few moments. His 
answer, it seems to me, adds up that that didn't mean anything 
except it was a good propaganda phrase. What I am asking you 
now, if you know whether or not the United States would, in 
fact, be willing to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam 
within six months, if North Vietnam would withdraw her troops 
from South Vietnam.
    Ambassador Bunker. Senator Gore, I am not in a position to 
make that decision, obviously, and as far as I know the policy 
of the United States is still the policy based on the Manila 
Conference. I have not been informed of any other change.
    Senator Gore. All right. I don't wish to press you at all. 
I just asked you if you know.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.

                NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

    Senator Gore. I would like to ask a question about this 
which you may know. What is the present numerical strength of 
North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam?
    Senator Pell. Excuse me, may I ask, interpolate here, do 
you mean North Vietnamese troops mean more than in North 
Vietnam?
    Senator Gore. No, in units, North Vietnamese, military 
units now in combat in Vietnam.
    Ambassador Bunker. Our estimate is, Senator Gore, that 
there are 55,000 to 60,000 regular North Vietnamese Army troops 
in South Vietnam at the present time.
    Senator Gore. Now, does that then--then we have some 
500,000. What was the conclusion of the conference?
    Mr. Komer. I was just pointing out to the Ambassador the 
way we keep order of battle figures tends to understate the 
number of North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam 
because we have been including in the figures only those North 
Vietnamese troops that are in North Vietnamese units.
    Increasingly, North Vietnamese replacements have been going 
into South Vietnamese units, so that the Ninth Viet Cong 
Division up in Phuoc Long and Binh Duong provinces, while it is 
carried in military order of battle as a Viet Cong Division is, 
we believe, now about 50 percent or over North Vietnamese 
regular troops, you see. So this is a matter of the way order 
of battle people keep the books. We think there is an 
increasing proportion, no question, that an increasing 
proportion of the South Vietnamese, of the Viet Cong main and 
local forces are being filled up with North Vietnamese 
replacements because the Viet Cong recruiting rate is down so 
much. We are doing a survey of this now, and the figures will 
not be available, although it is simply a matter of adding them 
all up, for another couple of weeks. But it is possible that as 
many as two thirds or even three quarters of the total enemy 
organized units, now I would emphasize organized units, are now 
North Vietnamese.
    Senator Gore. How many would that be in your estimate?
    Mr. Komer. Instead of the figures that we are carrying now 
of 50,000 to 60,000, it might be as many as 65,000 to 75,000.
    Senator Gore. Sixty-five thousand to seventy-five thousand?
    Mr. Komer. Yes. My own personal judgment would be, and I 
have tried to study this very carefully, that the higher 
figures are much more accurate because we simply haven't been 
taking into account these replacements that have been coming 
down.
    Senator Gore. Then, to combat this 65,000 or 75,000, we 
have approximately 500,000.

              SHUTTING OFF INFILTRATION COULD END THE WAR

    If they would withdraw 65,000 or 70,000 or 55,000, 
whichever it is, all of them, what portion of our 500,000 would 
the United States withdraw, if you know the answer to the 
question. You have just said, Mr. Ambassador, that if Hanoi 
would withdraw its troops, the war can end. How can it end?
    Ambassador Bunker. I think it can end because I think the 
problem will be completely manageable if the infiltration----
    Senator Gore. Manageable by whom?
    Ambassador Bunker. By the Vietnamese and ourselves. I think 
we can end the war quite rapidly, because, as I have said 
previously, the Viet Cong itself is having more and more 
difficulty recruiting. Its morale is deteriorating. The 
population, the desertions, are increasing steadily. As 
Ambassador Kohmer says, it will be close to double this year 
what they were coming over to the government side.
    If the infiltration is closed off, or choked off, or 
withdrawn or stopped, my opinion is that the situation becomes 
readily manageable.
    Senator Gore. You say readily manageable by ourselves and 
the South Vietnamese. I am trying to draw your attention to a 
point of reciprocal action, reciprocal withdrawal.

                           AN AMERICAN COLONY

    Now, of course, if the North Vietnamese give up the 
struggle, if they call all their men home, and we keep 500,000 
there to, as you say, one of your objectives is to build 
political institutions, I take it, in our own image, then we 
are in fact really seeking to establish an American colony 
there.
    What I am asking you is, will the United States be willing 
to withdraw from South Vietnam if North Vietnam will withdraw 
from South Vietnam?
    Ambassador Bunker. We have said so in the Manila 
Declaration which I have just read.
    Senator Gore. Well, I would like to read you what Secretary 
Rusk said about that a few days ago before this committee.

    In the Manila communique the statement was made with regard 
to troop withdrawals that allied force troop withdrawals. They 
shall be withdrawn after close consultation as the other side 
withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration and the 
level of violence there subsides. These forces will be 
withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months 
after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

    He continues, but not reading from the Manila statement:

    I don't recall anything that I said to Senator Aiken that 
seemed to cut across that in any way.

    It seems to me those two are quite consistent. I want to 
find now what he said to Senator Aiken.
    Senator Aiken. I told him he was nuts in saying they would 
get out of there in six months, or words to that effect. It 
would be physically and politically impossible.
    Senator Case. Well, if the level of violence subsides.
    Senator Aiken. That is what I told him. Maybe I will help 
him find it.
    Senator Gore. Well the point is--I will go to another 
point, if I may, lest I overstep my time.

                      DEFINING SELF-DETERMINATION

    Another one of the objectives you outlined to the chairman 
of our policy there, was self-determination on the part of the 
Vietnamese people.
    Do you mean self-determination on the part of the 
Vietnamese people, or South Vietnamese people?
    Ambassador Bunker. I am referring to South Vietnam. I 
imagine that the North Vietnamese haven't much chance at self-
determination as a tightly controlled communist state to 
expressing their views very freely. I do not know. I am not 
concerned with the political system in North Vietnam. Neither 
are we; we are not trying to upset it. That is their business.
    What I am referring to is the situation in South Vietnam.
    Senator Gore. Then would it logically follow that our aim 
is to establish another country in South Vietnam, another 
nationality, another nation, fully independent of and 
politically unrelated to North Vietnam?
    Ambassador Bunker. I would say that our objective is to 
enable or help the South Vietnamese to determine the kind of 
government under which they wish to live.
    Senator Gore. You mean, then, by self-determination 
exclusively of South Vietnam?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir.

                   UNIFICATION THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS

    Senator Gore. Then, Mr. Ambassador, what is the meaning of 
the President's statement and the Secretary of State's 
statement that the Geneva Accord is an adequate basis for peace 
in Vietnam?
    Ambassador Bunker. I think the meaning is, Senator, that 
the Geneva Accords which provide for eventual determination of 
the status of both North and South Vietnam under free elections 
and under conditions which will permit free elections, it is my 
understanding--although I don't profess to be an expert on what 
happened at the Geneva Accords--is that the reason the South 
Vietnamese were not willing to enter into elections at that 
time was the obvious one that there were no provisions for free 
elections. That in a communist controlled state, where the vote 
is 99 percent, and where it is quite obvious that as Viet Minh 
had been left behind in South Vietnam, there was no question 
about free determination or how it would come out.
    I think that is the reason why the provisions for voting on 
the question of unification didn't take place and neither----
    Senator Gore. In other words, to put it another way, 
elections were not permitted because our side was going to 
lose?
    Ambassador Bunker. Because the conditions--well, the 
conditions didn't exist for free elections.
    Senator Gore. Well, that is the way you state it.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir, I think so.
    Senator Gore. But I wish to point out to you that the 
Geneva Accord is quite contrary to the description of self-
determination you have given us. I don't, I certainly have no 
desire to belabor you with policy because, as you say, you are 
there as a representative of the President. But I thought it 
might be enlightening to you a wee bit to know that there are 
some of us who recognize a great many inconsistencies and 
uncertainties of policy. The Geneva Accord specifically 
proclaims against two political entities in Vietnam, the 17th 
Parallel is but a truce boundary, not in any sense to be a 
political boundary. There is no reference whatsoever, as you 
indicated, there might be much self-determination in South 
Vietnam. There is no reference to two countries; it is all one 
country.
    Ambassador Bunker. That is correct, Senator, but I think it 
also provides, if I am not mistaken here, I haven't got the 
words here, that the question of unification shall be carried 
out through elections under proper safeguards and under proper 
machinery, and certainly it is the view of the South Vietnamese 
government, and I think it was ours at the time, that that 
machinery did not exist and it was not possible to create it 
under these conditions.
    I might give you a little sidelight on this off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                        THE SPIRIT OF THE ALAMO

    Senator Gore. The reason I press the point is it appears to 
me that where the United States got off track was in going 
contrary to the Geneva Accords, and instead of trying to pursue 
a self-determination, whatever it may have turned out to be, by 
the Vietnamese people, set out on a course to establish 
something in our own image, a separate country in South 
Vietnam. We sought and now seek, from your information, to 
sever the country into two, not to accept neutrality of the 
country under some genuine self-determination, again whatever 
it may be. I doubt very much if we are going to get a quick 
peace there.
    You might just find under those circumstances that the 
Vietnamese would have the same spirit that the men in the Alamo 
had, to fight to the last man. This is going to be a long time, 
maybe the last child.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, Senator, let me make it clear, I 
do not pretend to set policy for the United States government. 
I am there to carry it out. But I do not mean to say, as we 
have said, we were willing to use the Geneva Accord as a basis, 
that we would take a position that there could not be a 
provision for unification and for a vote on unification in any 
settlement.
    Senator Gore. But you are unable to say whether the United 
States would, in fact, be willing to withdraw her troops in 
South Vietnam if North Vietnam would withdraw all of her troops 
from South Vietnam.
    Ambassador Bunker. All I can say is I cite you the Manila 
declaration and that is as far as I can go.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Carlson?

                        RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

    Senator Carlson. Mr. Ambassador, this gives me an 
opportunity to again thank you for the splendid help I received 
and many courtesies extended when I was over there in July. I 
want you to know it was greatly appreciated and it was very 
helpful to me.
    Ambassador Bunker. I hope you will return again.
    Senator Carlson. I may do so. I want to ask you one or two 
questions about our refugee problem.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    Senator Carlson. As I gather, when I was over there we had 
hundreds of thousands of refugees who were refugees no doubt as 
a result of our military operations and our defoliating 
program. How many do we have at the present time? You may have 
discussed this before I came in. If you have----
    Ambassador Bunker. No, I did not. I have the figures right 
here, Senator. Temporary refugees: 786,532 as of September 30.
    Senator Case. What was the figure; what did you say?
    Ambassador Bunker. Temporary.
    Senator Carlson. Temporary.
    Ambassador Bunker. 638,428 had been resettled, and another 
638,000 returned to their original villages.
    Senator Carlson. In other words we have handled----
    Ambassador Bunker. Two million roughly.
    Senator Carlson. Yes, roughly 2 million refugees; 700 and 
some thousand presently.
    Ambassador Bunker. Presently.
    Senator Carlson. And----
    Ambassador Bunker. 786,000.
    Senator Carlson. What is the possibility of getting these 
people back into areas where they can become self-sustaining?
    Ambassador Bunker. That is exactly what we have been trying 
to do. Those who have returned to their original villages, for 
example, or those who have been permanently resettled--in each 
case 638,000-now this is what the objective is for all of them, 
the temporary ones as well. I think I would like Ambassador 
Komer to discuss that a little because he has been following it 
very closely and it is part of his----
    Senator Case. I wonder if you will, Mr. Bunker, indicate in 
the case of these resettled and returned people just where they 
come from and any broad categories so we will know just what 
the situation has been.

                     RESULT OF DEFOLIATION PROGRAMS

    Senator Carlson. While you are discussing that, Mr. 
Ambassador, tell us how many are refugees as the result of our 
own military operations and they are there for other reasons.
    Mr. Komer. That is very hard to say, Senator, but I think 
it is indisputable that most of the refugees have fled from 
areas of Viet Cong control. They have not been generated 
deliberately by us. This is not our policy, except in a few 
exceptional cases which are a very, very small fraction of this 
total number of refugees.
    Senator Carlson. Of course we defoliated great areas.
    Mr. Komer. But defoliation takes place, sir, in jungle 
areas; the whole purpose of defoliation, as I understand it, is 
to remove jungle cover.
    Senator Carlson. It does include hamlets, however, does it 
not, and probably some cities?
    Mr. Komer. No, sir, in no cities, and in very few populated 
areas. The purpose of defoliation is to get at the jungle areas 
where the Viet Cong had their bases and where they operate. So 
more and more defoliation operations are taking place. In fact 
we are reviewing that right now. Defoliation is taking place in 
the back country where people are not----
    Ambassador Bunker. I may state, Senator Carlson, that in 
each case of defoliation, that has to come to me to be 
approved. We look into it very carefully to see the least 
possible damage is done. As Ambassador Komer says, it is almost 
entirely in jungle areas, areas of heavy cover; that is the 
purpose.
    Senator Carlson. It was called to my attention when I was 
over there flying out to the 9th Division Headquarters that you 
did defoliate an area not far outside of Saigon which must have 
had population.
    Mr. Komer. This was probably the Hobo Woods, but if it was 
in the 9th Division, it was the Hop Sac Base area and that was 
all jungle; very few farming.
    Ambassador Bunker. The jungle comes very close to Saigon 
and very close to the seacoast actually.
    Senator Carlson. I see.
    How much are we----
    Mr. Komer. Could I say something----

                     BULK OF REFUGEES IN THE NORTH

    Senator Carlson. Yes, I wish you would, sir, because it 
greatly disturbs me. First, how are we going to get these 
people back where they belong, and, secondly, how can we win 
the hearts and minds of people there when we have a program 
that creates two million refugees?
    Mr. Komer. That is since 1961.
    Senator Carlson. Yes.
    Mr. Komer. But as to the locale, Senator Case asked, the 
great bulk of the refugee problem is in the I Corps where the 
North Viet Cong are strongest and the operations are the 
heaviest against the Marines. Of these, only 500,000 are in I 
Corps. Most of the new refugees come in the northern I Corps 
and northern provinces. This is during--all during 1967, and 
really during the last six months of 1966, too.
    It used to be that the bulk of the refugees came from down 
around Saigon and in the delta because then it was a VC war 
rather than a North Vietnamese war. But the trend in the delta, 
for example, in 1967 has been the other way. More refugees are 
being resettled or are returning to their original homes than 
coming in new, so the trend is the opposite down in IV Corps 
and III Corps and much more under control.
    The Vietnamese government quite candidly did not pay too 
much attention to its refugee problem until about 1966, and, in 
regard to this, the refugees, as casualties of war. Since 1966 
they established a refugee commissariat with a very able and 
energetic doctor at the head, and he is just now beginning to 
get on top of the problem. He still is not on top of the 
problem in I Corps, but he is trying awfully hard.
    My own personal view is that there will be fewer refugees 
in 1968, substantially fewer, than we had in 1967, and the 
direction we are giving to our people who are in an advisory 
role is to give much greater emphasis to resettlement and to 
return to their villages because as the security extends to the 
countryside it is possible that more of the refugees go home.

                        U.S. SPENDING IN VIETNAM

    Senator Carlson. How much are we spending at the present 
time, this government?
    Mr. Komer. The figures are very hard to come by, sir, 
because what AID is spending on direct account is available, 
but then you have to add in P.L. 480, Title II. Then you have 
to add in what our own military is providing in the way of 
refugee help through civic action. I have asked for the figures 
and they are being assembled now. They are substantially higher 
than I think the 25 million dollars that AID is directly 
spending.
    Senator Carlson. Did we not have about $87 million in our 
AID program for refugee work last year?
    Mr. Komer. No sir; I do not think it was that high.
    Ambassador Bunker. No, not that much.
    Senator Carlson. Maybe my figures are higher.
    Ambassador Bunker. Medical plus refugees. Also, Senator 
Carlson, I might say that the Vietnamese budget has also been 
very largely increased for refugees from $2 million to $5 
million for the coming year.
    Senator Carlson. I was hoping we could take care of them, 
and I was hoping it would not increase.
    Mr. Komer. I think they will be. This is just my view. I 
think it will diminish substantially as we emphasize 
resettlement or repatriation in 1968. I might add that on top 
of what the U.S. government does there are about 30 voluntary 
agencies and their work is largely oriented toward helping 
refugees. You see there are so many people involved in the 
refugee assistance program and it is pretty hard to break down 
what the total cost is because they do not break it down.
    Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Symington?
    Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                          THE COST OF THE WAR

    Mr. Ambassador, it is a great pleasure seeing you again, 
sir. I want to thank you again for all your kindness and 
frankness with me when I was in Saigon a few weeks ago.
    Ambassador Bunker. A very great pleasure.
    Senator Symington. As you can tell by some of the questions 
asked you by some of the members here, the Foreign Relations 
Committee is not in complete agreement with the policies and 
programs laid down in Washington that you are working on out 
there.
    Senator Morse. Did you say some?
    Senator Symington. I am glad you mentioned the point to the 
committee that you are carrying out the policies and not 
creating them, and I do not mean by that any implied criticism 
on your part of that.
    I was very glad this morning to have General Westmoreland 
tell us before the Armed Services Committee that he had not 
really started putting the pressure on militarily until this 
year. I only regret a good many billion dollars we lost when 
people thought we were putting pressure on. At least it did in 
this country, although those of us who went out there did not 
feel that way in 1965, 1966. My worries have to do with the 
political situation, sir, and above all with the cost, 
especially considering what is going on in the rest of the 
world.
    I was glad to get your observations about the bombing 
because, one day after I left you, I went out on the Coral Sea. 
The weather was very bad so they were not flying. One of the 
pilots asked me why some of my colleagues were more interested 
in preventing casualties in North Vietnam than they were in his 
life, or in that of Americans in South Vietnam. I thought that 
was a very good question based on the testimony of the ground 
general of the Marine Corps and the Army who pointed to us and 
to the pictures of how many additional casualties we had as a 
result of the bombing cessation, especially the one during the 
Tet holiday which resulted in the heavy mortars coming down.
    So I hope you do continue, if we are going to continue 
fighting out there at all--about which I have doubt from a 
political and economic standpoint--I hope we do continue to 
realize that it is at least as important to save American lives 
as it is to worry about North Vietnamese lives. I resent 
bitterly some of the intellectuals who have never run for 
sheriff who criticize people who bring up that point as a 
criticism of those who make it.
    I have been around this government one way or another, Mr. 
Chairman, for a good many years, and I have never seen anybody 
handling a situation, a delicate situation, with more courage 
and ability than Ambassador Bunker. It makes me very proud to 
be an American.
    I want to thank you for all you have done for your country.
    Ambassador Bunker. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt?

                      TRAINING OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

    Senator Mundt. Some time ago in your statement you said 
there were 14,000 local officials who had been elected and are 
now being trained in their jobs. Being trained how, where and 
by whom?
    Ambassador Bunker. Being trained by the Vietnamese 
government in the various parts of the country, provinces where 
they are elected and being trained in the duties of carrying on 
the work as councils. There are councils that run from 
villages, 5 to 11, depending on the size of a village. They, in 
turn, elect the council chief, which would be in effect the 
mayor of the village. They then set up the various 
subcommittees for various functions of government--education, 
for example, public health and agriculture--all of the local 
governmental functions and duties.
    The reason I say I think it is significant really in a way 
is that the elections for president and vice president and 
assembly, because I think the involvement of the people in 
their own government and subsequent political organization of 
the countryside is perhaps one of the best defenses against the 
Viet Cong that could possibly develop.
    Senator Mundt. I agree entirely with that point. I was 
curious to know whether they have the experience and competence 
in the business of local government to go out and give these 
people on-the-job training or call them in at some central 
place.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, actually the Vietnamese government 
does come to us for advice on this and other administrative 
functions of government.
    Senator Mundt. We do not have the personnel.
    Ambassador Bunker. No, we do not.
    Senator Mundt. Either in numbers or experience to train 
them.
    Ambassador Bunker. No, but we can give overall advice as to 
procedures, policies. We are working with them on the community 
development projects which are going to start now in ten of the 
provinces. I think we are making very substantial headway.

                     A WEAK POINT IN THE OPERATION

    Senator Mundt. Well, it seems to me as I hear you, and 
Lodge before you, this is one of the weak points in our 
operation and that is somehow or another either we are going to 
step in and select the right people, which I would be inclined 
to doubt, but it seems to me that if we do not get them 
trained, we have to do it, and I do not know how you can do the 
job without training them.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, I think, Senator, as I said, one 
has to remember that the government which has just been 
superceded, which was in power for only two years--the first 
year was occupied in restoring order really--it was only in the 
second year that we began these projects.
    Now, and considering those, I think they accomplished a 
good deal.
    As I say, the fact that five elections were held in the 
midst of a bitter war, it is quite a remarkable performance, 
and the fact----
    Senator Mundt. I agree with all that. That is not the point 
I am trying to make. The point I am trying to make, the result 
indicates that our military advisers have had pretty good 
success in operating the fighting of the South Vietnamese. They 
have performed rather creditably. I am just wondering whether 
we have put the intensive effort required in training these 
people who have had inexperience in the business of government 
to do the job.
    Ambassador Bunker. I think we are doing a pretty good job. 
I think we have to be careful not to overdo it because they are 
as a rule feeling now that they are a sovereign government and 
they want to do as much as they can of their own, too. But I 
think they are making good headway.
    Senator Mundt. 14,000 of them scattered in how many local 
governmental units?
    Ambassador Bunker. About, let us see, the elections took 
place in about a thousand villages and 2,500 hamlets.
    Senator Mundt. So you have 3,500 little local governments.
    Ambassador Bunker. That is right.
    Senator Mundt. Am I right in my assumption that most of the 
people elected are new to the business of government?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, not all of them. Some of them are; 
some were previously appointed officials.

                    PROVIDING EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL

    Senator Mundt. It would seem to me that the strength of our 
effort could be increased by providing you with the kind of 
experienced personnel who would be available upon request, not 
impose it upon them.
    Ambassador Bunker. We actually have experienced personnel 
who actually are working with them, not only in that but also 
in another phase of what we are proposing to do, which is 
reorganization of the civil administration. There we are 
working with them by giving them a great deal of advice which 
they are asking for.
    Senator Mundt. The central government.
    Ambassador Bunker. That is the central and provincial 
government.
    Senator Mundt. Can you give it in terms of figures how many 
people you have assigned to you that is your responsibility 
with it--maybe it is not--maybe it is the responsibility of the 
other ambassador--who handles the pacification program--that 
would include having stable, sensible, competent local 
government? 3,500 different locations. How many people do you 
have assigned to you who, if you got a request tomorrow for 500 
people to 500 localities, would you have more than enough 
manpower or not?
    Ambassador Bunker. 500 of our people?
    Senator Mundt. Yes, trained in the field.
    Ambassador Bunker. No.
    Senator Mundt. If you had 100 requests.
    Ambassador Bunker. What about the corps situation?
    Mr. Komer. We have about 3,000 advisers in all in the 
pacification end of things, but of whom about a thousand are 
civilian and the other 2,000 are military.

                    VIETNAMESE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

    Senator Mundt. Of those 1,000, how many have the expertise 
and the experience to give them competence in training?
    Mr. Komer. That would be very hard to say, sir. One of the 
big problems in giving advice on local administration down at 
the grassroots to the Vietnamese is the problem of 
communication. Actually the Vietnamese have had a pretty good 
civil administration. Their special commissariat for 
administration, which is the key part of the interior ministry, 
is again under the interior ministry. It has some very good 
people in it. They have a tradition of local autonomy. The 
village used to have a great deal of autonomy. I believe half 
of the officials Ambassador Bunker said were elected have been 
elected officials previously--village chiefs, village council 
members.
    The big problem is to get the authority back to them 
because the problems dealt with at the hamlet and village are 
pretty hardheaded problems of the town meeting kind.
    I was very encouraged by this new decree which was just 
passed which provides that local taxes will go to the local 
administration, either to the municipality or to the village in 
rural areas. This is very encouraging.
    When you have money to spend which you collect for your own 
constituents, then you have not only authority, but you have 
the ability to do something. This is going to be quite a 
desirable thing.
    Ambassador Bunker. Then in addition to that, Senator, as I 
described the organization, the village councils, subcommittees 
on agriculture, for example, if they want advice we have 
agricultural advisers; on health, public health advisers; on 
security and police, police advisers--so that we can supply 
assistance on these various aspects of local government.
    Senator Mundt. You feel then we are doing the very best job 
we are capable of doing.
    Ambassador Bunker. I do not say we cannot improve on 
anything we are doing.

                   SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY STRENGTH

    Senator Mundt. Among the critics of the Vietnamese war are 
some who say--and I keep reading it in papers; I do not know 
whether it is true or not--that the Vietnamese armed forces do 
not represent an adequate percentage of the Vietnamese 
population vis-a-vis the United States. I have a hunch it is 
not true, but I have not any facts and figures with which to 
answer it. I would like to have something.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I will give you the figures, 
Senator, of the Vietnamese armed forces. The strength of the 
armed units is 757,000.
    Senator Mundt. You are talking now about soldiers, not 
village home guard people.
    Ambassador Bunker. Not the home guard, no. Including the 
national police.
    Senator Mundt. 750,000.
    Ambassador Bunker. 757,000 to which they will propose to 
add 65,000 this year, this coming year.
    Senator Mundt. Of the 750,000, how many would you say are 
really----
    Ambassador Bunker. How many what?
    Senator Mundt. Units would be fighting as contrasted with 
the policemen. You said that included the police.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, the police are 66,000.
    Senator Mundt. So there are over 650,000 actually 
Vietnamese military people.
    Ambassador Bunker. That is right.
    Senator Mundt. The population is roughly 18 million.
    Ambassador Bunker. 17 million.
    Senator Case. Does that include popular, regional, and 
regular forces?
    Ambassador Bunker. The regular army is 290,300; the air 
force, 15,444; the navy, 16,000; marine corps, 8,100; regional 
forces, 143,000.
    Senator Mundt. Explain what is the marine corps.
    Ambassador Bunker. Those are forces largely used for 
defense and security of the----
    Senator Mundt. They are trained combat units.
    Ambassador Bunker. Oh, yes.
    Senator Mundt. Yes.
    Ambassador Bunker. The popular forces----
    Senator Mundt. That is what I mean.
    Ambassador Bunker [continuing]. 140,500.
    Senator Mundt. These are not----
    Ambassador Bunker. They defend the hamlets and the 
villages, and they are just as subject to attack as any regular 
force. And also do very good work, I may say.
    Senator Mundt. They are purely usable for defensive 
purposes.
    Ambassador Bunker. They are used for defensive purposes, 
yes.

                      ROLE OF THE REGIONAL FORCES

    Senator Mundt. So that what I call a fighting unit is used 
in defense in the case of attack and they are used in offense 
when attacked by others. That would add up to how many now, 
500,000?
    Ambassador Bunker. Do what?
    Senator Mundt. Would there be 500,000 of those?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, all these that I have mentioned 
except the police, the national police, are used in fighting 
one way or another.
    Senator Mundt. I know that. But the popular forces that 
surround the village and protect them, are they the kind of 
forces that are subject to fluid control? If you send them out 
on an offensive mission, they would be in the same category as 
our Americans to fight offensively and defensively depending 
upon the exigencies of the situation?
    Ambassador Bunker. That is right, yes. But I may say, too, 
you are quite right, the regional forces, the popular forces, 
perform an indispensable role because unless you have not only 
security, but a continuous security, you do not have 
pacification.
    Senator Mundt. I think this is right. But this does not 
give me what I need to answer somebody who asks how many troops 
have they supplied in the same category as Americans who fight 
in accordance with the needs of the occasion offensively and 
defensively. You have to take the popular forces out of that, 
whether you take the police out of it.
    Ambassador Bunker. Take the popular forces out of it, and 
the police. Popular forces are 140,000; the police are 66,000.
    Senator Mundt. You still come up with over 500,000 who are 
there for the same purpose that our people are. And they are 
brought in by draft, are they, by volunteers, conscription?
    Ambassador Bunker. Both, conscription, but everybody now 
aged 18 to 33 is subject to the draft.

                   UNFAIR CHARGES AGAINST VIETNAMESE

    Senator Mundt. The same people in the field of journalism 
say they go around Saigon and they see all kinds of able-bodied 
Saigonese, Vietnamese, who run around on motor vehicles.
    Senator Case. You can buy your way out, can you not? What 
is the volume. You cannot?
    Ambassador Bunker. Certainly there is no way of buying 
yourselves out; no legal way.
    Mr. Komer. There is a tough law.
    Ambassador Bunker. The law is tough.
    Senator Mundt. I really have to say from what you have 
indicated, I would think that this is a false charge that the 
Vietnamese are not supplying their fair share of the people.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I think it is an unfair charge just 
as I think a great deal of the reporting that comes back here 
is not accurate. I feel very strongly about it.

                        AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS

    Senator Mundt. Two other questions. I share with Senator 
Symington the feeling that this idea of having a bombing pause 
longer than it can be for Christmas day, but a bombing pause 
that certainly will be paid for by the American troops, I 
think, certainly had been demonstrated on the record. What 
would you think if instead of a bombing pause we made a 
suggestion we would make an exchange of X number of prisoners? 
Would that be conducive to the interests of this country in 
terms of saving American lives and putting the other fellow 
under an obligation to say yes or no? Would it be more helpful 
than just asking them to extend the cessation of bombing for 24 
hours, or 48 hours?
    Ambassador Bunker. I think the exchange of prisoners would 
be highly desirable.
    Senator Mundt. You said we have offered it several times.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    Senator Mundt. It certainly has not been as well publicized 
as the offers to stop bombing.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, I think the bombing cessation has 
had more publicity.
    Senator Mundt. Have we ever offered it in a public 
proclamation, certain terms?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, we have tried to do this through 
the International Red Cross and through other offers. Of course 
one problem is that the North Vietnamese do not deal with the 
International Red Cross. They do not accept the fact that our 
prisoners are really prisoners of war.
    Senator Mundt. I mention that because when I was home last 
week I was visited at the hotel by the wife of a prisoner who 
is someplace in Vietnam. She says, ``Why doesn't our government 
make an offer to exchange prisoners?'' I made a curbside guess 
and said we have.
    Ambassador Bunker. We have.
    Senator Mundt. She has not heard about it. It seems to me 
we should publish it and pick out a certain date. Christmas day 
would be a good day. If it is a bad day for the pagans, pick 
out some other day, but I think we ought to make it over even 
if for the propaganda effect.
    Tell me, what is your estimate of how many American 
prisoners we have up there?
    Ambassador Bunker. We have about 400, is it not?
    Mr. Habib. We do not know exactly because they will not 
give us any lists.
    Senator Mundt. Have we got an estimate?
    Mr. Habib. We have estimate of several hundred.
    Senator Mundt. Well, tell them we will exchange 500 or 
something. I think it would be much wiser.

                          THE FATE OF THAILAND

    My final question is, if we pull out or fail or lose this 
war, knowing the Oriental mind in that part of the world as you 
do, what do you think would be the fate of Thailand?
    Ambassador Bunker. It would be in an extremely difficult 
position. I think all of the countries in the area would be.
    Senator Mundt. Would Thailand not come in for special 
attack because she has given her all to be on our side?
    Ambassador Bunker. I would think so.
    Senator Mundt. We have occupied her territory and it would 
seem to me they are going to say here is a fellow who was a 
country that was a traitor to the cause, and the area, and 
color, and all the rest. I assume there would be tremendous 
vengeance to invade her country.
    Ambassador Bunker. Thailand already has her problems in the 
northeast.
    Senator Mundt. They would feel that in that part of the 
world that she had bet on the wrong horse.
    Ambassador Bunker. We are not going to lose the war.
    Senator Mundt. What?
    Ambassador Bunker. We are not going to lose the war.
    Senator Mundt. Not while we stay there, but if we pull out.
    That is all.
    The Chairman. Senator Clark.

               TESTIMONY AT VARIANCE WITH THE NEWSPAPERS

    Senator Clark. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to make a few 
observations and then ask you to comment on them. I am sorry 
Ambassador Komer had to leave. I do not know----
    Ambassador Bunker. He can return again any time.
    Senator Clark. We do not want to harass you.
    The Chairman. He had to go to the White House.
    Senator Clark. Yes.
    I do not know of any two men in the service of our country 
for whom I have a higher regard than you and Ambassador Komer. 
Yet I find myself in a state of almost complete frustration. 
Ever since I came to the Senate almost 11 years ago, we have 
been told by our ambassadors in Saigon that we are winning this 
war. First it was General Taylor who was ambassador. Then it 
was Ambassador Lodge. And now it is you. I suppose they could 
not be wrong all the time, and maybe you are right this time. I 
hope to goodness you are.
    Ambassador Bunker. I hope so.
    Senator Clark. But what you tell us is at complete variance 
with what we read in the newspapers.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, quite so. I agree with you.
    Senator Clark. What we are told by people coming back here.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I agree with you, Senator. I can 
give you a most recent example. What was said about the 
performance of the Vietnamese armed forces is to my mind 
inaccurately reported. There was a very substantial battle up 
about 80 miles near the Cambodian border, 80 miles north of 
Saigon, beginning October 27. I think the Viet Cong and the 
North Vietnamese were trying to have a propaganda victory at 
the time of inauguration. The first attack came at 1 o'clock in 
the morning on the Vietnamese forces who repulsed the attack 
and did a tremendous job. Our forces did not show up until 7 in 
the morning. Attacks recurred four successive nights and the 
Vietnamese took their full part in it and did a splendid job 
according to our officers and generals. An article appeared in 
Newsweek about it and you would never know there was a 
Vietnamese soldier present.
    Senator Clark. Well, that is the sort of thing that bothers 
me. You tell us the morale of the South Vietnamese troops is 
good; they are fighting better all the time. You just told us 
of an incident in which apparently they performed with some 
gallantry. Yet we are told they will not fight at night; they 
work a five-day week; the officer corps is poor and corrupt; 
most of the officers fought with the French against their own 
people; the AWOL rate is extraordinarily high; corruption is 
rampant and they do not have an effective conviction.
    Who is right? You would have to say you are right and I 
would want very much to believe you, but can you explain----
    Ambassador Bunker. I will tell you, Senator. We had 22 
observers out there, a broad cross section, very representative 
group of people who came out for the elections.
    Senator Clark. I am not talking about the elections.
    Ambassador Bunker. No, no, but I want to tell you about 
this reaction, talk about this reporting. Many of them said to 
the press, ``We really don't understand the kind of reporting 
you are sending back here after what we have seen.''

                              BRAINWASHING

    Senator Clark. Governor Romney says he has been 
brainwashed. I do not know who to believe.
    Senator Case. Leave that; strike that out; be serious about 
it.
    Senator Clark. I am being serious about it. He said it 
seriously, too. If I can just----
    Senator Case. This is the most crucial point I think we 
have been discussing all afternoon.

                        EVALUATING PACIFICATION

    Senator Clark. If I could make one or two more comments and 
I would be happy for you to reply. I would like to kind of get 
it off my mind, and I will be quite brief.
    Mr. Komer told us that pacification was going reasonably 
well. It was largely handled by civilians. I talked to a very 
knowledgeable reporter and TV commentator who came back from 
there recently and he said pacification is a joke. We had lunch 
with Mr. Luce, who said he considered it a failure.
    You say, Mr. Komer says, it is largely being done by well 
trained civilians. We had General Walt of the Marine Corps in 
for lunch the other day, and he was a marvelous man, and he was 
justifiably proud of the pacification I Corps. He told us it 
was all done by the Marines, such as Senator Aiken indicated a 
while ago.
    Ambassador Bunker. I think that is probably maybe slightly 
excess pride on the part of the Marines. I think they should be 
proud of their performance, and General Walt is very 
enthusiastic, of course.
    Senator Clark. He is a very great guy, but didn't they do a 
lot of pacification up in I Corps, the Marines, just the 
soldiers going out and pacifying these villages? That is what 
he told us.
    Ambassador Bunker. They did quite a little work there, yes, 
but they didn't do the major share of it, and the----

                  REPORTERS WITH PRECONCEIVED NOTIONS

    Senator Clark. I am going to cut this short because I don't 
want to harass you and I don't want to detain you.
    Ambassador Bunker. I am not harassed at all, and I will 
answer any questions. My own view is, and I will say to you 
very frankly, I had the same problem in the Dominican 
situation. We had reporters who came there with a preconceived 
idea. There wasn't anything I or anybody could say to change 
their mind, but only the facts changed their minds.
    Senator Clark. But they were wrong.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, they were wrong.
    Senator Clark. In my view.

                           VIET CONG STRENGTH

    Senator Clark. Finally, the Defense Department has just 
told this committee that there are 241,300 Viet Cong under 
arms, which is down 2,000 since the first of the year. Yet we 
hear about high diversion rates and people going AWOL. As far 
as one can read from the newspapers, the Viet Cong is going 
just as strong now as it was five, ten years ago. We hear, the 
Defense Department tells us, that there are only 50,000 North 
Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Now, you tell us there are 
a lot more because replacements are going into Viet Cong 
regiments. But in the end, if the Defense Department is right, 
there is a total Viet Cong and Hanoi strength of 291,300, 
whereas the total strength of our forces and of the South 
Vietnamese is in the neighborhood of 1.2 million, and from the 
newspapers we are not doing any better from a military point of 
view than we were 10 years ago.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, ----
    Senator Clark. You don't agree with that?
    Ambassador Bunker. I certainly don't agree with it.
    Senator Clark. The New York Times, this is one of the most 
frustrating things, and I am through with it, the New York 
Times on Sunday had a front page account which quoted the 
dispatches from Saigon of our military people and the embassy, 
too, which is just about what you told us this afternoon. On 
the front page of ``The Week in Review'' section was a headline 
saying, ``Tough enemy takes the offensive in Vietnam.'' The 
account was all about how our boys at Dak To were being blown 
up and ammunition dumps exploding and the siege at Con Thien. 
It looks as though the whole offensive was there on their side.
    I am not for search and destroy, but one gets from reading 
the newspapers we are pretty much having our backs against the 
wall and I can't understand it.
    Ambassador Bunker. I can't, either. It is just in my view a 
very inaccurate picture of what the situation is.
    Senator Clark. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Case?
    Senator Case. Thank you very much.

                       TALKING AT CROSS PURPOSES

    Mr. Ambassador, I repeat for myself what has been said by 
many others, thank you for your hospitality and for your 
courtesy in Vietnam. I was there very shortly after you 
arrived.
    The questions I have I am afraid are mostly repetitious of 
those which have been asked before. I am sure they are nothing 
new. You have heard them, and you have read them, and you know 
the newspaper fellows who say they doubt the war is winnable; 
it is not being won.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    Senator Case. And Ward Just says, ``Don't believe anything 
you hear about Vietnam,'' not because people mean to be 
deceitful, but because they are generally talking at cross 
purposes and there isn't much of a definition of what words 
mean.
    I wish there were some way that you could try to help us in 
bringing the discussion of Vietnam down to the point where we 
talk to each other in the same terms and understand what the 
facts are.
    I know the problem of doing that is just about as difficult 
a problem as winning the war.
    The Ripon Society presents a diagnosis which was not 
accepted by the administration the core of which I gather is we 
are really only successful in pacification where it isn't 
necessary. Where the Catholic population is Catholic, they are 
pacified. Where the population or one of these various sects 
who formerly were not recognized by the Vietnamese regime but 
now are, who are anti-communists, who are now recognized just 
by an act of ours and using different words to describe them, 
but our general program, I don't mean ours but the South 
Vietnamese program of bringing new groups into the support of 
this government, a trite old phrase, winning the hearts and 
minds of the people, is not happening. I know it is hard to be 
specific. You have given us figures about the number of people 
under government control, and under Viet Cong control, and 
under mixed control, but without some definition or some 
description of what we mean by control, these statistics are 
not very meaningful.
    When I was out there, I talked to one fellow who had been 
working in pacification for many years. He was asked by a group 
of newspaper people how long would it take and he said maybe 10 
years at the present rate. But he said this would accelerate if 
it was going well, if it went well at all.
    Then we get some of the generals come back here saying in a 
year and a-half, still saying within a year we are going to 
begin to withdraw our troops.
    I didn't mean to make a speech. I want to get you talking 
about these things, but you probably said all your answers. You 
just disagree with the newspaper guys.

                GOVERNMENT OPTIMISM VS. PRESS PESSIMISM

    How in the world does this disagreement exist? These are 
not people, I am sure I would not think so, you know them--for 
the most part they are certainly not anxious to be proven to be 
correct that we are not getting anywhere out there. I should 
think most of them would be wanting to be getting home and we 
would want to be winning this war. But I have never seen a 
situation in which there was almost a unanimous impression on 
the part of the newspaper reporters in the face of what has 
been more or less continuous, general optimistic reports by our 
agencies of government. This is something that people cannot 
understand and is the main cause of our difficulty.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I am inclined to agree with you 
that one of the main causes of our difficulties is this kind of 
reporting that we get out of Vietnam, frankly.
    There is a very big press corps there, as you know. Many of 
them are young and inexperienced people.
    Senator Case. Not all.
    Ambassador Bunker. No, not all, and I find the more mature 
people take a far more objective view of the situation than 
many of the people who are there.
    I can answer that some of the people have been there so 
long that they seem to be--I get the newspaper people, 
journalists and reporters in. I have tried to make a point of 
getting in half a dozen of them every week. Tell them we will 
have dinner; sport shirt; informal talks; get everything off 
their chest and everything they want to say.
    Senator Case. I have never heard any criticism of the way 
they were treated or the fact----
    Ambassador Bunker. Because I want to find out what the 
problem is; how they see it. I want to try to be objective and 
realistic about the situation. As I said to my staff when I 
first went there, if all I hear are success stories I will be 
suspicious. I know it is not all going to be successful. I know 
we are going to have setbacks, and I know we are going to have 
problems.

                        A DISENCHANTED REPORTER

    But, for example, when you get an article as we had once in 
Newsweek about the Vietnamese Armed Forces which began saying 
that one regiment had opted out of the war and supplied 
prostitutes to the American forces--I had Westmoreland run this 
down, and there was not one shred of truth in it. I mean, how 
do you account for this?
    Senator Case. I should be interested to know myself. What 
did the magazine say about it?
    Ambassador Bunker. This man, this fellow, I have had him 
for dinner at my house. He has been there a long time. He was 
completely disenchanted with the whole scene; it was a sick 
society and there is nothing you can do about it. That was the 
whole attitude.
    Senator Case. That wouldn't make it a lie.
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't know any more than you do, 
Senator, how we get what we do. But certainly as far as my 
objective view, as far as I can be objective, and I try to be, 
I just think the general impression that is created here about 
the Vietnamese Armed Forces, about pacification, gives a very 
distorted view.
    Pacification, as I said, was slow getting underway because, 
in the first place, the first year the government was taking 
over, trying to restore order and create some degree of 
stability. The program got underway the second year of the 
administration. It required a lot of planning, a lot of 
organization, a lot of training and the involvement of large 
numbers of people. It was slow.
    Now, the program this year was the pacification of 1100 
hamlets and we won't reach it because it was slow. We may get 
900 to a thousand.
    Next year we expect to do 1500 to 2000. So, as I say, in 
all these areas we are trying to be able to accelerate the rate 
of progress.
    Senator Case. Well, just on the question of pacification, 
again Komer would be the man we really should be asking the 
questions of, and I hope we will ask Mr. Komer to come up again 
when we can have some time, and especially the young fellows at 
the tail end of this performance----
    The Chairman. I would strongly recommend for your 
convenience and his that you have a subcommittee meeting any 
time.
    Senator Case. I would like to because we are only trying to 
get the facts.
    Senator Clark. I think you ought to say junior instead of 
young.
    Senator Case. Did I say young?
    Senator Clark. Yes, you did.
    Senator Case. That is the way you feel. Ambassador Bunker 
and I are the two oldest men here, and Clark.
    I do have questions about this matter, just a couple more, 
and then I will be finished with it.

                      HAMLETS PERMANENTLY PACIFIED

    Apart from those areas where you have sectarian groups of 
one kind or another, or the Catholics, the mountain people, 
whatnot, is there any situation in which we have taken a hamlet 
or a number of them and permanently pacified them? Or is the 
situation during the time we have all the places saturated with 
troops they are going to be amenable, but when the troops get 
out, our troops get out, as they must to go on to the next one, 
then we have lost them?
    I really would like to know about it.
    Ambassador Bunker. Where there is pacification, where there 
aren't these sects, you see, yes, there is, in Binh Dinh 
Province, for example, where there were no Catholics at all. 
And no Hao Hoa and mostly Buddhists, as far as I know.
    Senator Case. How many people are involved in this 
pacification; how many hamlets?
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't know how many of the hamlets. It 
is the second largest province. I think about 65,000-900,000 
population.
    Senator Case. How many hamlets?
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't know how many hamlets, one of 
the priority areas.
    Senator Case. I wonder if we could have for the record the 
number of hamlets and the number of population in the pacified 
areas.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, indeed.
    Mr. Habib. We will get that for the record, Senator.
    Senator Case. Thank you.

                   STOP INCREASING AMERICAN PERSONNEL

    Senator Case. It is not fair to ask you and, therefore, I 
won't, but I will just throw out a suggestion which has been 
made by a great many people that, if we had put as many people 
as we usefully should put into South Vietnam, then it is time 
to stop increasing the number of American personnel.
    Is this your general opinion?
    Ambassador Bunker. I think we are pretty well there, yes. I 
think we need some more advisers with the regional popular 
forces. We haven't very many with them because they are doing a 
very vital job and doing it increasingly well. I think we can 
help there, but, no, I think we are at about the limit.

          SLOWNESS IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON VIETNAMESE MILITARY

    Senator Case. This one last broader question, and this is 
not critical of you because I have sensed you are as tough a 
guy as has been operating for us out there, and I really mean 
this in the right sense, but a criticism of our slowness in 
putting pressure on the South Vietnamese military and the junta 
to do what they must do themselves in order to build an 
effective military force and a society and to develop a feeling 
for nationhood among the people and loyalty to the government.
    Have you been able to put as much heat on as you personally 
felt you would like to do?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, I have. Sometimes I think I may 
have overdone it, because it sometimes becomes 
counterproductive, as you know.
    Senator Case. Would you just explain why and in what way it 
becomes counterproductive?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes. I think the outstanding 
characteristic perhaps of all of the Asian--this is not just 
confined to the Asian countries but the under-developed 
countries--is the question of pride, and I think that you can 
put pressure on to the degree where you get simply no results 
at all. There are many ways of putting pressure on: persuasion, 
urging, withholding of funds, and all kinds of things. All 
these methods have been used, and I think that I have put all 
that the traffic will bear on Thieu, Ky, and on the government. 
I think they have responded very well, frankly.

              VIETNAMESE SHOULD NOT TAKE U.S. FOR GRANTED

    Senator Case. Is it your judgment that they, and by 
``they'' this is a little imprecise, but I am trying to be 
provocative rather than precise, that they have a feeling that 
no matter how little they respond to our suggestion that we 
have no option but to support them?
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't think so. I made it very clear 
to them they can't take us for granted.
    Senator Case. And do you think that they have a fairly 
clear idea it is not inconceivable that in the event of their 
failure to do what we believe is necessary we could pull out 
entirely?
    Ambassador Bunker. I think they may have, yes, and I think 
they----
    Senator Case. You say may.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, I can't answer this categorically, 
obviously, Senator.
    Senator Case. But I mean it is terribly important that we 
should know this, for some people in our government have said 
to me, and I guess I said to you out there, that we have no 
option and in effect that the people out there know we have 
none and, therefore, they can go their merry way----
    Ambassador Bunker. I made it very clear to them they cannot 
take our assistance for granted; they can't expect the American 
public to support their efforts if they are not pulling their 
own weight behind them. I think the measures which they have 
adopted and are adopting in this new government are an 
indication of their responsibilities--the attack on corruption, 
the extension of the draft, the insistence on austerity, the 
reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces, the organization 
of the civil administration--all of these things. Here is a new 
government, the former government having been in only for two 
years, and, as I said, only able to perform in the last year. I 
think they ought to have a chance of showing what they can do.

                     U.S. RICE SUPPLIES TO VIETNAM

    Senator Case. Just one factual question to be sure I 
understood you correctly. Did you say we were putting in 
800,000 tons of rice this year?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes; I think 800,000 tons. That is the 
estimate we will need.
    Senator Case. Unless I am crazy, it is a billion--no, a 
million--1,600,000,000 pounds, which is a hundred pounds per 
person. Is that right?
    Mr. Habib. Eight hundred thousand tons of grain; it is not 
all rice.
    Senator Case. But edible grain for human consumption.
    Mr. Habib. Yes.
    Senator Case. It is a tremendous amount of their food 
supply, isn't it? A tremendous proportion of their food supply?
    Ambassador Bunker. It is a big staple. Rice is the 
principal staple, of their food.
    Senator Case. What is their own production of grains and 
rice normally?
    Ambassador Bunker. What would it be?
    Mr. Habib. We would have to get the figure. I don't have 
the precise figure.
    Senator Case. Thank you. And we sell their for----
    The Chairman. We give it to them.
    Ambassador Bunker. Piastres.
    Mr. Habib. P. L. 480.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Food for Peace Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Case. We are not able to pay on the market for our 
expenses.
    Mr. Habib. We do a portion of it.
    Senator Case. How much?
    Mr. Habib. I think we are up to 20 percent.
    The Chairman. Before they used to export a large quantity 
of rice. This was an exporting nation until we occupied it.
    Senator Case. I just want to get roughly how much of the--
    Mr. Habib. I think we are up to 20 percent, but we will 
correct it for the record. We keep a certain portion for our 
own use and the proportion they use is, of course, used in 
their own budget.
    Ambassador Bunker. The last contract was 20 percent for our 
uses.
    Mr. Habib. Twenty percent.
    Senator Case. What do you mean by their own?
    Ambassador Bunker. For example, under P.L. 480, 15 to 20 
percent.
    Senator Case. Yes, but we weren't in Indian spending 
hundreds of millions of dollars on the local market for our own 
military.
    Ambassador Bunker. It is quite true.
    Senator Case. We are not permitted to use that for any of 
our expenses except for this 20 percent.
    Ambassador Bunker. This last contract was 20 percent, I 
think.
    We have had some contracts, the one before was, I think a 
hundred percent, if I am not mistaken. We can give that to you.
    Senator Case. Broadly speaking, they built up through these 
operations in South Vietnam something around $350 million 
surplus in American dollars; isn't that right?
    Ambassador Bunker. We have an agreement with them. It is to 
be held to $250 million.
    Senator Case. To be cut down?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    Senator Case. It is still above that.
    Ambassador Bunker. Presently it is about $300 million.
    Senator Case. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Pell?
    Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                      AN INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM

    I share the general admiration for you and your work and, 
obviously, my views on this are not intended as any criticism 
of you, but of our policy.
    I was just wondering in your own mind if you would feel 
that a land invasion of North Vietnam, or the bombing of the 
population centers, or the dikes, would be quite likely taken 
by China as a threat to its own security, from your diplomatic 
experience, your own view.
    Ambassador Bunker. I would guess that an invasion would 
depend on where the invasion took place and how near it was to 
China or Hanoi itself. I would guess that if we went into north 
of the demilitarized zone, for example, I don't think----
    Senator Pell. That is what I meant.
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't think it would draw in the 
Chinese. But if you went in near Hanoi I think it might be a 
different story.
    Senator Pell. Would you be opposed to either of these two 
actions, as ambassador?
    Ambassador Bunker. I would be opposed to going in Hanoi; 
yes, yes.
    Senator Pell. Or to the bombing of civilian centers, and 
the bombing of the dikes?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, I don't think--I would be opposed 
to the bombing of civilian centers, yes.
    Senator Pell. You would or would not?
    Ambassador Bunker. I would.
    Senator Pell. The reason I am asking this question, we have 
pretty well exhausted in the north the targets of military 
opportunity. You read the hearings with Secretary McNamara and 
there are not too many targets that are important, and the 
Administration is going to be faced with the choice next. I am 
wondering what your recommendation would be.
    Ambassador Bunker. My recommendation would be the bombing 
of military targets, interdiction bombing, which we are doing.

                   AMBASSADORS ARE ALWAYS OPTIMISTIC

    Senator Pell. One viewpoint, and I don't mean to press you 
too hard on this, but I would like to know, and it would be of 
great satisfaction to some of us, if civilian bombing were 
seriously contemplated as a means of additional pressure or the 
bombing of the dikes, or invasion considerably north of the 
demilitarized zone, would you feel strongly enough opposed to 
submit your resignation?
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't know, Senator.
    The Chairman. That is a personal question.
    Ambassador Bunker. It is a hypothetical question.
    Senator Pell. Very hypothetical. But this is what is in the 
back of the minds of myself, certainly, what happens at the end 
of a year or two, because I, as you can see from my position on 
the totem pole, is the last question to you, I have only been 
in this committee three years. I have never heard an ambassador 
who is not optimistic, and yet the problem remains that the 
course we are presently following, we will have followed that 
course, and what happens after it. This is why I am wondering 
what your views are. Or do you feel we will have victory, not 
victory, but peace before we reach the end of this present 
course?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, my own view is that this present 
course can be successful and will be successful. I say I don't 
put it, I haven't put it in any timeframe. People have asked me 
how long, and I am not willing to say, because I don't know.

                      POSSIBILITY OF DE-ESCALATION

    Senator Pell. I think there are very good views that could 
be advanced that we could have a 10 or 15 year operation there 
if we could lower the stakes, if we ceased the bombing in the 
north, if we adopted some of the de-escalation in the south. It 
would be to their advantage to negotiate us out.
    The problem is where we are passing a bearable limit for an 
indefinite period. I was wondering what your views were.
    Do you think that the de-escalating school would be a great 
mistake or not?
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't know how you get the other side 
to de-escalate, frankly.
    I have heard----
    Senator Pell. You just leave them alone in the areas where 
they are in South Vietnam.
    Ambassador Bunker. I certainly would be opposed to that.
    Senator Case. Would the Senator yield, because this is a 
question I would have liked to have developed just for a point.
    Senator Pell. Certainly.
    Senator Case. Would you distinguish between de-escalation 
of the war which would be desirable, but I am more worried 
about de-escalation of American participation, and I think we 
could perhaps separate those two matters. I see no reason to 
think that the American public is going to stand still for a 
much longer indefinite prospect of the continuance, the present 
rate of casualties and expenditures, casualties mostly. I think 
this is going to have to be reduced if it is to go on or to be 
regarded as an indefinite prospect, and I wonder, therefore, 
whether there is any prospect, in your judgment, of reducing 
the extent of the American involvement, the casualties and 
expenditures as opposed to the overall de-escalation.
    Ambassador Bunker. Of course I think this is a question of 
time, Senator. As I say, if we are successful, as I think we 
shall be and will be, obviously this will involve a reduction 
in American casualties and American presence, of course. When 
and just how long it is going to take, I am not prepared to 
say.
    Senator Case. You don't think we should increase the size 
of the American personnel there?
    Ambassador Bunker. I think we have sufficient, myself.
    The Chairman. Are you through, Senator?
    Senator Pell. I am not through.
    Senator Case. Thank you very much.
    Senator Pell. Thank you.

                    THE WAR SEEMS OUT OF PROPORTION

    Another question where you, I am sure, have some thoughts, 
is this question of the drive. How is it that when what we 
contribute taking it as a total to be a hundred percent, the 
Soviets are putting in about two and a-half percent of what we 
are in weapons and money, nothing in men, and the Chinese are 
putting in about .6 percent. How do you account for the 
apparently increased momentum, the drive, urgency of the Viet 
Cong and the North Vietnamese over the South Vietnamese where 
the balance to keep it even has to involve this huge American 
contribution far outweighing that from outside Vietnam and the 
other side?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, I think the nature of the war, 
Senator. I mean a guerrilla type warfare obviously takes a 
great many more. I think the British discovered that in Malaya. 
If you are fighting, opposing a guerrilla type war, it takes a 
great many more men, a great many more troops.
    Senator Pell. Doesn't that seem a little out of proportion 
to you?
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't believe it is, compared to, as I 
understand, the ratio in Malaya. It is about the same as this, 
if not higher; higher, I think.
    Senator Pell. What are the number of North Vietnamese 
divisions presently not committed; number of men in them. Do 
you have any idea of that?
    We have heard the figure something like 15.
    Mr. Habib. About 350,000 men under arms, regulars under 
arms and, of course, they have a large militia they can draw on 
and they have a conscription system they can draw on.
    Senator Pell. But it is still another 300,000 not 
committed.
    Mr. Habib. At least under arms.

              PROMOTE SELF-GOVERNMENT OR RESIST AGGRESSION

    Senator Pell. I was a little concerned earlier when you 
mentioned that the villages and the towns in South Vietnam had 
not had self-government since the French occupation, which is 
really more than, I guess more than a hundred years. Do you 
really believe it is this important that we should be fighting 
this hard to give these people who haven't had self-government 
for more than a century, to be giving them self-government?
    Ambassador Bunker. I think yes. I think they have to govern 
themselves if they are not governed by a colonial power.
    Senator Pell. But isn't this a pretty large order to say 
that all areas that were under colonial domination before will 
be underwritten in their right to self-government by the United 
States?
    I think it is a dangerous precedent we would be getting 
into.
    Ambassador Bunker. We are committed, aren't we, to the 
right to self-determination and if people have that they have 
got to learn to govern themselves somehow.
    Senator Pell. I would question that. I think there are many 
countries in the world where the right of self-determination 
does not exist, and I would hope we would not go to war to 
bring it about.
    Ambassador Bunker. I don't think we are going to war for 
that reason.
    Essentially, we are going to war to resist aggression.
    Senator Pell. That is a different reason.
    Ambassador Bunker. I know, but in the process of building 
up the country and of helping it to become viable politically 
and economically, I think that--and the Vietnamese are doing 
this themselves. This is not our motivation. I mean this is 
their own motivation, and this is what they want to do in the 
way of developing a government.
    Senator Pell. I know.
    Incidentally----
    Ambassador Bunker. Because if there was traditionally in 
the country--there is an old Vietnamese saying, the law of the 
emperor stops at the village gate. They used to run their own 
affairs and it is a tradition of the country.
    Senator Pell. I know that just as the Viet Cong had 
released three of our prisoners there that the South Vietnamese 
government is about to execute three of the VC. Doesn't that 
seem a little anomalous?
    Ambassador Bunker. They are not going to do it.
    Senator Pell. Good. I am delighted to hear that and very 
glad indeed.
    I think I will terminate my time on this happy note.

                        OTHER TROOPS IN VIETNAM

    The Chairman. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you have been very 
patient. I regret we have taken so much of your time.
    One or two questions that have occurred to me during the 
course of this: Are you aware of the terms on which Korean 
troops have been supplied to the war in Vietnam? Is that within 
your jurisdiction?
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, I am not completely, I think, 
aware of it.
    Have you got any information?
    The Chairman. Have you seen what is called the Brown letter 
setting out these terms?
    Mr. Habib. March 14th of last year.
    Ambassador Bunker. No, I have not.
    Mr. Habib. There is such a letter.
    The Chairman. Do you have a copy of it?
    Mr. Habib. No, sir.
    The Chairman. Could it be made available to the committee?
    Mr. Macomber. Let me look into it, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. The same on the Philippines, if you can give 
that to us.
    The paper reported a few days ago that the Thai government 
has offered to send 10,000 troops.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes.
    The Chairman. Is that correct?
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, that is correct.
    In addition----
    The Chairman. To what they now have.
    Ambassador Bunker. To what they now have, yes.
    The Chairman. What did they request in return for that? Do 
you know?
    Ambassador Bunker. No, I don't know. I know they did 
request something, but how much or what, I don't know.
    Mr. Habib. The terms are under discussion.
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, still under discussion.
    The Chairman. Could you supply to us, Mr. Secretary, what 
the proposal is?
    Mr. Macomber. Yes, sir, I will try to bring up to date that 
information that we supplied earlier.

                     AGREEMENT AMONG EMBASSY STAFF

    The Chairman. Is it accurate, Mr. Ambassador, to assume 
there is no difference of views about this matter within the 
embassy staff, or is that a proper question to ask you?
    Ambassador Bunker. About what matter, Senator?
    The Chairman. About the progress of the war and the 
prospect----
    Ambassador Bunker. No, I know of no difference.
    The Chairman. They all agree as to--there is no real 
serious difference of views in your advisers?
    Ambassador Bunker. I know of none.
    The Chairman. I know you said there is great pride in the 
underdeveloped countries. Am I to assume you don't think there 
is in the developed countries?
    Ambassador Bunker. No.
    The Chairman. It is the same; it affects everybody.
    Ambassador Bunker. I think there is a very interesting 
book, Eric Hoffer's Ordeal of Change. I think it is very 
worthwhile reading, it is not a very long book, about the 
attitude and sense of values of some of the developing 
countries.

                    THE NATURE OF THE U.S. OBJECTIVE

    The Chairman. One last question: You said they could not 
take us for granted, and that it is very clear to the 
Vietnamese officials that they have to perform, I take it, a 
moment ago in response to a question----
    Ambassador Bunker. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. If it should turn out to be the objective of 
this country to contain China rather than to just give self-
determination, it seems to me they can take us for granted. It 
depends a little upon what our objective is, doesn't it?
    Ambassador Bunker. Perhaps so.
    The Chairman. In other words, if we are there to contain 
China it doesn't really matter whether they perform or not. We 
cannot leave until we have contained China for an indefinite 
period.
    Ambassador Bunker. Well, that may be, Senator. But I say 
that is a matter of policy that is beyond my competence.
    The Chairman. That is right; you made that clear.
    Ambassador Bunker. And I simply report what I have 
indicated to them.
    The Chairman. I understand, and I didn't wish to raise it 
again.
    It has already been raised, but the answer to that question 
really does depend upon what our real objective is in this 
area, doesn't it?
    Ambassador Bunker. It goes beyond the situation in 
Southeast Asia.
    The Chairman. It would be a different answer.
    Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. We appreciate 
your coming here and giving us the advantage of your knowledge.
    Ambassador Bunker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am always 
happy to come before the committee, as I indicated when I came 
up before I went to Vietnam, and I hope to come back 
periodically because I think it is important to report on what 
the situation is, at least as I see it.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    That is a vote, I may say, for those present.
    [Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee recessed, subject 
to call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                       FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
Lausche, Clark, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.
    George R. Jacobs, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Resources and Food Policy, Department of State, 
accompanied by Tom O. Murphy, Director, Sugar Policy Staff, 
A.S.C.S., International Sugar Agreement.
    Robert F. Woodward, Interim Director of the Office of Water 
for Peace, Department of State, accompanied by Rodger P. 
Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs, testified on S. Res. 155, relating to 
Desalting Plants in the Middle East.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]


         MOTIONS REGARDING TESTIMONY BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

                              ----------                              


                      Thursday, November 30, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met pursuant to notice, at 10:22 A.M., in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, 
Williams, Mundt, and Case.
    Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Holt of the 
committee staff.
    [Ex. K, 90/1, International Sugar Agreement, was ordered 
reported unanimously.
    H.R. 9063, to amend the International Claims Settlement 
Act, was ordered reported with an amendment, after receiving 
testimony from Dr. Edward D. Re, Chairman, Foreign Claims 
Settlement Commission, accompanied by Andrew T. McGuire, 
General Counsel]

                      BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS

    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I have a motion I would like to 
submit.
    The Chairman. All right, the Senator from Tennessee.
    Senator Gore. I would like the staff to distribute some 
copies if they would. This is on Gore's motion. I believe I 
gave Carl the last copy I had. Will you bring me one?
    Mr. Chairman, I move that the chairman of the committee be 
instructed to communicate to the President of the United States 
the concern of the committee about the breakdown in public 
communication between the executive and the Senate which arises 
from the refusal of the Secretary of State to testify before 
the committee in public session on United States policy in 
Southeast Asia. I would like to be recognized.
    The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, may I make my position 
clear? I anticipate making a motion to table this motion at a 
later date, but I do not want to make it now. I do not want to 
cut off any debate on this, but at the proper time I will make 
a motion to table. I only want to state that for information.
    The Chairman. The Senator from Tennessee is recognized.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a mild motion--
--
    [Discussion off the record.]

           RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SENATE AND THE PRESIDENT

    The Chairman. Could we have order? I want to hear what the 
Senator from Tennessee has to say.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, I hope this motion, which I 
consider a very mild one, can be considered in the light of the 
relationship between the Senate and the President, rather than 
in terms of Vietnam or anti-Vietnam. A precedent is about to be 
established with the adjournment of this session which I think 
would be extremely damaging and of historic proportion.
    The Constitution, it seems to me, places the Senate and the 
President in the position of limited partnership with respect 
to foreign policy, both concerning formulation and conduct.
    What other meaning can be attached to the provisions of 
advise and consent, the provision relating to the raising and 
disposition of armed forces, ratification, confirmation, and so 
on? I will not get into a constitutional argument, except to 
conclude with that particular portion of my remarks by saying 
that, it seems to me, the Senate, this committee being the 
agent of the Senate, has a constitutional duty, right, and 
responsibility to the public and to itself to explore, and 
insofar as is consistent with the national interest, explore, 
in public, foreign policy issues, particularly those so 
important as war or peace.
    For almost two years now, the committee has requested--I 
put in the Record a few days ago the series of letters 
exchanged between the chairman and the Secretary of State--the 
public appearance of the Secretary of State--on the general 
subject of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia.

                     THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN PATIENT

    I have suggested that the committee has been extremely 
patient. It is more than three weeks now since the Secretary 
met here with us and told us he would promptly give us an 
answer on the request, which was further pressed at the 
committee meeting, regarding his public appearance.
    It seems to me that such treatment, without being 
personally critical of the Secretary, which I don't intend at 
all, is nevertheless contemptuous treatment of this committee.
    Further, if we do not press our point in this regard, I 
think it will further deny this committee and further establish 
the privacy of the executive in the formulation and the 
execution of the foreign policy of our nation.
    Of course, this motion would not undertake to require his 
appearance. It has no such connotation. It merely asks, directs 
the chairman to communicate to the President of the United 
States, not just to the Secretary of State, who is the 
President's agent, but directly to the President, the concern 
of this committee over this breakdown in public communications 
between the executive and the Senate.
    I hope that it has no partisan connotations, no political 
connotations. I certainly do not intend this. This is addressed 
purely to the subject of the equation which our constitutional 
forefathers undertook to provide between the executive and the 
legislative, specifically the Senate and the President, in this 
vital field. I do not wish, Mr. Chairman, to make an extended 
argument. That is in brief my views and my purpose in 
presenting this motion.

                      THE PRESS CREATES INCIDENTS

    The Chairman. If I may say one word, I have been, as you 
all know, in Arkansas quite a bit in the last two months, and I 
am very often asked why we do not have such discussions in 
public. This incident at the Bruton Parish Church which was 
widely publicized particularly attracted the attention of my 
constituents because that particular minister at one time was 
dean of the Trinity Cathedral in Little Rock, Arkansas. A lot 
of people know him down there, and so they asked me about it.
    I wrote to the minister and got a full statement, which 
maybe I should have brought over in connection with this, I 
didn't think about it, of his whole sermon, and I must confess 
it is a good example of the press picking out of a very 
moderate sermon, as a matter of fact, much of it was most 
sympathetic to the difficulties of the President and the 
country. It was a very moderate statement, but there was that 
one sentence in it which they picked out which suggested that 
in effect he was saying that he thinks it would be good for the 
country, for the President, and for everybody, if there was a 
clarification of our purposes. I think he meant it to be 
helpful, however it was. He was very embarrassed about it. The 
letter he sent to me, in the first paragraph, there was a 
paragraph that was written in, but the rest of it was obviously 
a form letter he had prepared to send to everybody who had 
criticized him. He was greatly disturbed because I think he 
genuinely did not intend to embarrass the President.
    He thought he was giving him good advice; that it would be 
very helpful to him and to everybody if he would clarify what 
our purposes are. They have asked me about it in Arkansas. Why 
doesn't the committee have the Secretary? I tried to explain as 
best I could just what have been the circumstances.

               SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD COME VOLUNTARILY

    I wish he would come on down voluntarily, of course, 
without such a letter. The only thing that bothers me about it, 
I am thoroughly in accord with what the Senator seeks to obtain 
here, is whether or not this would be the way to do it. It 
might be, if the judgment of the committee is, and I think I 
would certainly support it if the clear majority of the Senate 
wished to do it. I would hate to have this kind of a matter 
just a very narrow decision after there having been very 
vigorous dissent against it. This may not be the best way to 
bring it about.
    I would think it would be kind of embarrassing if we sent a 
letter and then a complete rejection and denunciation. It would 
only make matters worse. I am puzzled in my own mind as to how 
we can persuade the Secretary to come. He obviously now is in 
the position of awaiting the President's decision. We gathered 
from our liaison officer that this is a matter at the White 
House level now.
    It is not just the Secretary personally any longer who is 
making the decision. It is a presidential decision. It has been 
discussed at the White House level; we were informed.
    I do think it would be good for him. I agree with the 
minister that it would be very helpful, if it is possible, at 
least to precisely state what the objective of the present 
policy is, but I don't know how to go about it. This is one way 
to raise the question.
    I would support it if the committee wishes to support it. I 
would like to hear the views of all the members as to what they 
think about it, because it is embarrassing to be told, ``Well, 
why can't you get him'' and so on. It looks as if the chairman 
is delinquent in not getting him. It is hard for the people 
down home to understand why I can't get the Secretary of State.

                       STILL WAITING FOR A REPLY

    Senator Gore. Could I add one other thing that I had failed 
to call to the attention of the committee? I offered this 
motion more than a month ago, and it was at that time, you will 
recall, that Sentor Mansfield suggested that the committee 
invite Secretary Rusk to appear in executive session to discuss 
the question of his appearance at a public session. Thereupon, 
I withdrew the motion. The Secretary came, and as I related a 
moment ago, told us some three and a half weeks ago that he 
would give a prompt reply.
    Now, it was not specifically interpreted to mean the next 
week, but there was a discussion about the following week. But 
here it is now, the 30th day of November, the session nearing 
an end. So it just seems to me that either the committee is 
going to communicate to the man who is responsible or not. Now, 
if there is some better way to bring it about, my objective is 
to preserve and promote the equation of mutual responsibility 
in this field. I will desist from further remarks, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper.

                    NOT A QUESTION OF COMMUNICATIONS

    Senator Hickenlooper. I don't like to be in a position of 
disagreeing with my good friend, Albert Gore. He advises my son 
on how to raise black cattle and sell them for a good price, 
and I am sympathetic with him. It is better than I can do. We 
agree on a lot of things.
    But I cannot agree that this is an advisable thing to do, 
and I so told him.
    In the first place, this is not a question of communication 
in my judgment.
    Senator Gore. I said public communication.
    Senator Hickenlooper. This is a question of public 
appearance.
    We have no trouble getting the Secretary up here. He has 
quite a few things to do. How many countries are there in the 
world, 117 and 120 in the United Nations?
    Senator Case. Over 120 now.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You know, it is really quite a little 
job to keep track of those things. He has something to do. But 
I don't know of any occasion where he has failed or refused to 
come up here in executive session and talk these things over 
with us, frankly.
    Now, there have been a number of occasions when he has come 
up here and talked in executive session, and for some reason 
what he said here has got in the papers the next evening or the 
next day, to the disappointment of all the members who are 
here. I am sure that they regretted it very much. But 
nevertheless he has come. So it isn't a question of 
information.
    We are informed any time we want to be informed about any 
questions we want to ask him; he comes. The Lord knows, I 
disagree with Lyndon Johnson. I am not defending Lyndon Johnson 
particularly one way or the other. I expect to vote against him 
in the next election. And I suppose everybody knows that.
    I don't defend everything Dean Rusk does. I am just not a 
follower of this thing at all. But I do feel that this would 
tend to create an emotional, psychological situation in this 
country that would add to the confusion that already is 
bedeviling us in the world and especially within this country.
    Now, I feel strongly that it would.

                 RESPONSIBILITY LIES WITH THE PRESIDENT

    Getting down to the thrust of this motion, which I am sure 
Senator Gore doesn't mean it this way, I probably have 
misinterpreted it, but this is a thrust right at the heart of 
Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State. I don't think that is where 
the responsibility lies. I think it lies with the President of 
the United States.
    The Chairman. I think it does, too.
    Senator Gore. This is addressed to the President, not Rusk.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I know, but this is what I am getting 
at, Albert. I want to explain what I mean by what I said.
    I have no word from the horse's mouth. I have no direct or 
indirect second-hand communication one way or the other on this 
thing, but I put a few things together, over a long period of 
time. I don't think there is any question at all that if the 
President said for Rusk to come up here, he would come. But I 
think he is not coming, and, frankly, I am talking within this 
committee, I think he is not coming because the President tells 
him not to come.
    Now, Senator Fulbright talked about this minister down at 
Williamsburg. Personally, I think that was a rather arrogant 
and illadvised thing.
    The Chairman. Have you read the whole speech?
    Senator Hickenlooper. No, but----
    The Chairman. I would like for you to read it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I don't think that a person who 
singles out the President of the United States who comes there 
for worship should get into a political manipulation.
    The Chairman. Will you get that and bring it over here?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I may be wrong, but, anyway, that is 
the way I feel about it. But if the press will pick out, out of 
context, something like that, what will the press do, out of 
context, on some kind of a public statement and a give-and-take 
question-and-answer business from the Secretary of State in a 
delicate situation such as we have in the world today?
    And I think the same thing would apply there.

                        A DIRECT THRUST AT RUSK

    I get back to the question of why I think that this could 
well be interpreted as a direct thrust at Rusk. It is directed 
to the President of the United States; that is, it says he 
should communicate to the President the concern of the 
committee about the breakdown in public communication between 
the executive and the Senate. Now here it is, ``which arises 
from the refusal of the Secretary of State to testify.''
    Now, that is a direct dagger at the heart of the Secretary 
of State, I believe, as it will be interpreted in the papers, 
and I feel that it is not quite fair to him. He is a man of 
great capacity. I repeat again, there are a lot of things that 
he has done and said and positions that he has taken that I 
don't agree with at all.
    I have had my disputes with him.
    Senator Gore. What about failure instead of refusal?
    The Chairman. Or you could say the administration's 
spokesman.
    Senator Gore. I don't wish to aim anything at the Secretary 
of State.
    Senator Lausche. What if you would say his refusal to come 
before the committee in public to listen to the public 
diatribes of the committee members while few or no questions 
are asked of him on direct issues?
    Senator Case. Except by Mr. Lausche of Ohio.
    Senator Case. I had an important point to make and you took 
it right out of my hand here.
    Senator Lausche. Well, okay.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I was going to say this, Albert. The 
reason I said at the outset that I propose, whenever we are 
through talking, my plan is to make a motion to table this. I 
personally would prefer to do that rather than to make a motion 
just in diametric opposition. I think we are better off, the 
way I view it, we would be better off to table it, which means 
that we just don't act on it, rather than to vote it down, a 
negative vote. That is the reasoning behind my thought on 
tabling this thing.
    Senator Gore. Could I ask a question?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes.

                     PRESIDENTS HAVE USURPED POWER

    Senator Gore. Do you share my concern with the continued 
diminution of the power and influence of the legislative branch 
of the Government? Don't you think we should do something to 
assert the rights and responsibilities of this committee?
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I think so, but there are ways 
of asserting it and ways of asserting it. Now, I have a fairly 
substantial history--I have talked a little bit too much about 
it in this committee, I guess--but I have a fairly substantial 
history of expressing my view on that subject that I think the 
President has usurped his power, beginning back when I first 
came down here, and that was with the NATO troops. I have been 
quite consistent on that since then. I don't think the 
President has any right to send NATO troops over there without 
congressional approval.
    We later got around and approved it, and I will again 
repeat to ad nauseum, I think, but I will again repeat my 
question to Dean Acheson at that time, that were we expected 
to, or would we send any substantial number of troops over to 
implement the NATO program in Europe. We have been told that we 
would take care of the sea and the air and all that. I asked 
him that specific question, and his answer to that was, ``The 
answer to that, Senator, is a clear and emphatic no.''
    Now those were the exact words that he used. Within three 
months, we had four divisions going to Europe without any 
further authority of the Congress, and I have been on that 
little kick ever since. I mean, I think the President 
constantly goes under what he claims to be his Commander-in-
Chief powers, which this Supreme Court may say he has, I don't 
know. They will say anything over there.
    Senator Gore. Inherent powers.
    Senator Hickenlooper. But I don't think they are inherent 
powers. I don't think the Constitution conveys those powers. We 
do go ahead and we okay them afterwards many times, after he 
has done something. You go back into history, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's fifty destroyers business. I think that was an 
utter giveaway of American property without any authority at 
all, but Congress went ahead and authorized it by implementing 
it at a later date. So that became a moot question. That is the 
way it usually happens.
    But we are building up in this country, we are building up 
through the Meet the Press and these people that get on radio 
and say, ``Oh, but the President has the inherent right under 
the Constitution to do these things.'' I don't think he has any 
such a damn thing. I don't think he has that right at all. His 
constitutional powers are very limited in the Constitution, and 
many of his powers that go for international affairs have to be 
cooperatively exercised, such as confirmation, or that is 
advice and consent of the Senate.
    I agree with you. I don't go on the other side of the 
question. But I do think we are in a situation of tension at 
this present time. The question is whom do you believe? Do you 
believe Westmoreland, or do you believe some of these other 
fellows, or do you believe----

                SECRETARY DECLINES TO TESTIFY IN PUBLIC

    The Chairman. That isn't the question. These people who 
talk about their being busy. The Secretary makes speeches all 
over the country. He gives interviews in U.S. News and World 
Report. He prepares them or goes over them. He does it 
everywhere, except he doesn't want to come to this committee.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He comes here.
    The Chairman. He doesn't want to come in public. These are 
all public appearances. He appears in public, in statements. He 
makes speeches; he goes out to Indiana. You know as well as I 
how often he goes. He takes plenty of time to talk to everybody 
but this committee.
    Senator Hickenlooper. So does the President.

                          CALL FOR QUESTIONING

    The Chairman. I think Frank, in a very subtle way, Frank's 
suggestion that this committee asks questions which he doesn't 
like, do you agree?
    Senator Lausche. No; may I state my position?
    The Chairman. I think that is true.
    Senator Lausche. In my opinion, we have not conducted 
genuine hearings in which a witness is called to testify. This 
resolution says that he refuses to testify.
    In the British Parliament, Cabinet members are called for 
questioning.
    The Chairman. In public.
    Senator Lausche. Not to listen to speeches of twenty and 
thirty and forty minutes in length. Now, I would suggest that 
we clean our own house first, lay down rules of procedure. You 
call him to testify on a specific issue.
    Issue: Shall we pull out of Vietnam?
    Issue: Shall we stop the bombing?
    Issue: Shall we increase the bombing?
    We call him and we ask him to testify, and the members of 
the committee shall be permitted to ask questions and not to 
have Rusk as the public attraction for the committee members to 
make speeches on television and radio, and only for that 
purpose, while the poor Secretary has to listen, sit there and 
listen docilely to what is being said.

                      LIMITING TIME FOR QUESTIONS

    The Chairman. Of course, I don't agree with that at all. 
The secretary usually starts out, and with the limited time, he 
often takes up so much time with the initial statement that 
almost invariably it is at least thirty minutes, sometimes 
forty-five minutes; that has been the usual practice in all 
public sessions.
    It is occasionally true that one or two members may say, 
``I don't wish to ask a question,'' and make a statement, but I 
don't know how we are going to vary that. It would be a very 
drastic change to say members of the committee are not able to 
make a statement. I don't believe any of you are willing to do 
that.
    Senator Mundt. We can solve that problem by giving each 
member so much time.
    The Chairman. That is a very difficult problem. With the 
Secretary, with any Secretary or any witness who is at all 
astute, he knows you haven't much time. He knows it is very 
easy to make a long answer that takes all your time, and he 
gets absolutely nowhere. He knows if you are operating under a 
five- or ten-minute rule. We have tried that, and I think those 
meetings don't get you anywhere because no one person is able 
to pursue any question to its conclusion because of the time.
    I have asked the staff in the last several meetings we have 
had, not with him, but with other people, the average of 
everybody has run not over ten minutes, because there will be 
some people who won't ask any questions; they will skip by, but 
there are always two or three people who are interested in the 
subject particularly and pursue it for a longer time. But I 
think the staff will say this. I asked them to do that. I 
wanted to see the average time of so many members during a 
certain limit; how long it went. It worked out to just about 
ten minutes or a little less, although some would take as much 
as twenty; some would take only one or two minutes. Some would 
pass altogether. But I don't know how you make these hearings 
effective.

                REFINING THE VALIDITY OF THEIR POLICIES

    I have just been handed this which you may have seen, dated 
November 27. Here is a long interview that he gives to the 
Reader's Digest in the form of an interview. Well, of course, 
these are all created not to elicit what I think is the crux of 
the matter, but as a vehicle for the expression of his views 
without examination.
    It may be that the Congress doesn't have any role to play, 
but I think it does. I think that the participation of this 
committee, with all its faults, could be very helpful to this 
or any other administration in refining the validity of their 
policies.
    I agree with the minister. I think there is a great 
question in the minds of certainly my constituents as to what 
in the hell are we doing in Vietnam that justifies the cost. 
They are not all against it. They don't know. Some of them, 
they are divided like everybody else, but most of it is more 
confusion as to what it is rather than a positive view that it 
is right or it is wrong. They just don't know.
    I want to put in the record for everybody, I wish I had 
copies----
    Mr. Marcy. We will make some copies.
    The Chairman. This sermon, I think it is a very innocuous 
sermon, in which there was only this one sentence that was 
picked out that appeared and it was presented as if it was 
critical.
    It is a very moderate and nonpolitical approach based upon, 
I thought, one of the President's favorite prophets, Isaiah. I 
don't want to take your time to read it all, but I want to put 
it in the record, Mr. Reporter.
    Senator Mundt. Why don't you Xerox it and distribute it?
    The Chairman. I think it is interesting to show how a 
distorted version can be made of a very moderate statement.

                             TEXT OF SERMON

    The Chairman. This preacher starts out, he says, his theme, 
his text is, ``The people who sat in darkness have seen a great 
light. They that dwell in the land of the shadow of death upon 
them hath the light shone. Isaiah 9.2. Moses explores, 
``Leading the children of Israel'' and so on, and it goes on. 
It is a normal, what I call orthodox thing, except it gets down 
to this point. He talks about--I will read it, if you would 
like, one or two paragraphs.

    Today we seem surrounded by insoluble problems. 
Irresistible forces appear to be approaching collision with 
immovable objects. The most immediate and demanding conflict 
arises from the insistence of racial minorities to be given all 
the rights and privileges that the majority have achieved. The 
race problem can no longer be evaded either in this country or 
abroad.
    Seemingly impossible questions will require even more good 
will than brains. Probably the only effective way out will be 
to provide better schools for everybody and develop a more 
inclusive type of community life. The end result will benefit 
everybody. Our lives will be far richer as our society becomes 
more inclusive. Isn't this what our Lord Christ prescribed, 
love thy brethren, bear one another's burdens, to whom much is 
given.
    Now we are seeing the pragmatic necessity of what we once 
thought impractical idealism fortifying us as it did Moses; 
getting Catholic and Protestant together appeared ten years ago 
as wild idealism. Today the Holy Spirit is leading us into an 
increasing number of intimate contacts and a united force for 
good is becoming a possibility.
    Some deeply loved prejudices may have to be put aside, but 
God is working his purpose out, invalidating what seemed a 
stalemate.
    The overshadowing problem before us is the international 
realm. The political complexities of our involvement in an 
undeclared war in Vietnam are so baffling that I feel 
presumptuous even in asking questions. But since there is 
rather general consensus that what we are doing in Vietnam is 
wrong, a conviction voiced by leaders of nations traditionally 
our friends, leading military experts, and the rank and file of 
American citizens, we wonder if some logical, straight-forward 
explanation might be given without endangering whatever 
military or political advantage we hold. Relatively few of us 
plan even the mildest form of disloyal action against 
constituted authority. United we stand; divided we fall. We 
know the necessity of supporting our leader, but we cannot 
close our Christian consciences to consideration of rightness 
of actions as they are reported to us, perhaps erroneously, 
perhaps for good cause of which we have not been apprised.
    We are appalled that apparently this is the only war in our 
history which has had three times as many civilian as military 
casualties. It is particularly regrettable that to so many 
nations the purpose appears as neocolonialism. We are mystified 
by news accounts suggesting that our brave fighting units are 
inhibited by directives and inadequate equipment from using 
their capacities to terminate the conflict successfully.
    While pledging our loyalty, we ask humbly, why? And so on.

    I won't read it all. But I think it is a very moderate one. 
Here is what he says in his letter. As I say, you can see there 
is one paragraph--here is what he says:

    Perhaps some day it will be understood that my remarks in 
Bruton Parish Church November 12 were intended to give strength 
to the heart and the hands of the President. I felt the analogy 
of light shining in darkness, Isaiah 2.9 illustrated by ancient 
Moses and medieval Luther would be helpful. Religious and 
racial dilemmas apparently hopeless until recently are rapidly 
approaching solution because intelligent good will is being 
acted upon by God. All these seem to provide reasonable hope 
that when people are adequately informed as to rightness of our 
purpose and procedure in Vietnam, God will again resolve the 
impasse rapidly and honorably. The sermon was neither 
derogatory nor critical of Mr. Johnson, as many of those 
attending in a spirit of worship agree.

    He is assuming, referring, I suppose, to the people 
actually there.

    Deplorable misconstructions have been drawn from the 
occasion by lifting portions out of context, by impugning 
motives, and by imagining ideas which were never stated or 
inferred. My outline and intent was simple, kindly, and 
religious.
    One, when things seem hopeless and man does his righteous 
best, God gives victory. Since I was incapable of making 
specific recommendations, I sought by example from Scripture 
and history to give encouragement. A clear reading of the 
entire address will, I believe, bear out my motives as those of 
a constructive Christian gentleman speaking appropriately from 
an intelligent pulpit.
    Sincerely yours.

    I think the fellow is correct, if you read the whole thing. 
I don't see how you can take offense to it except just by 
picking that sentence and saying this is what the whole sermon 
is about.

                            A FALSE PREMISE

    Senator Mundt. I think what he forgot, Bill, is that a 
preacher is not supposed to prevaricate from the pulpit. I 
think he started his whole discourse on a false premise when he 
said there was a dominant point of view in this country that 
the thing was wrong. After that, I don't see what is wrong with 
it, except for the misstatement of fact, if you are going to 
accept the Gallup poll and various polls I have seen on the 
subject.
    The Chairman. He raises the question there in that 
connection.
    Senator Mundt. I thought he made a flat statement.
    Senator Case. I think he talks about the consensus being 
the consensus of nations rather than the consensus in this 
country.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think it goes beyond that.

                     COMMUNICATE WITH THE PRESIDENT

    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, in the light of the very able 
remarks of Senator Hickenlooper, I would like to modify my 
motion so as to avoid any thought of any personal thrust.

    I move that the chairman of the committee be instructed to 
communicate to the President of the United States the concern 
of the committee about the breakdown in public communication 
between the executive and the Senate, and that the committee 
respectfully suggest to the President the advisability of 
administration officials testifying before the committee in 
public session on United States policy in Southeast Asia.

    The Chairman. Would you mind reading that over?
    Senator Sparkman. Mine, too.
    Senator Gore. I strike out these words ``which arise from 
the refusal of the Secretary of State to testify,'' and 
substitute therefor ``and that the committee respectfully 
suggests to the President the advisability of administration 
officials testifying before the committee in public session on 
United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia.''
    I think that avoids anything except communication to the 
President whose responsibility it is, the advisability of 
continuing this mutuality of responsibility and also exercising 
our constitutional duty.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Would you give that last part again?
    The Chairman. Read the whole thing slowly, will you?
    Senator Gore. AIl right.

    I move that the chairman of the committee be instructed to 
communicate to the President of the United States the concern 
of the committee about the breakdown in public communication 
between the executive and the Senate, and that the committee 
respectfully suggest to the President the advisability of 
administration officials testifying before the committee in 
public session on United States foreign policy in Southeast 
Asia.

    In what less offensive manner can it be put?
    I wanted to make it as broad as possible.

                        MAKING THE ACTION PUBLIC

    Senator Case. Would this action be made public?
    Senator Gore. If the chairman writes a letter; it would be 
up to him.
    Senator Sparkman. Go outside there and look.
    The Chairman. There is no practical way to keep it from 
being public.
    Senator Case. What I was thinking of, Al, I agree with this 
one thousand percent. I have made speeches about it myself on 
the floor and will continue to do it, whether it is wise for us 
to take any action, or whether we will be put in kind of a box 
in spite of the very, I think temperate, changes that were made 
in your resolution, Bill. The average newspaper editorial, 
whether it be the Times or the Post or hawks or doves or what, 
they all climb down on us, and we got nowhere.
    The Chairman. Not all of them. The Post is the worst one, 
but some of them were very favorable.
    Senator Case. I know, but in general, everybody rushes to 
protect the President from being hurt by usurpers in the way of 
Congressmen and what-not. I just don't think that it is going 
to do any good to squawk publicly, as a committee.
    Now, I think individually, and I am going to continue more 
strongly myself to do it, Albert.
    Senator Gore. Will you yield there?
    Senator Case. Yes.

                         A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY

    Senator Gore. I have no desire to be precipitous about it. 
If the committee would rather wait, I have no desire to press 
for action. It seems to me, though, Senator Case, that we 
simply cannot take this by doing nothing. We have been snubbed 
for nearly two years, and it is the constitutional duty of this 
committee, as I see it.
    Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman----
    The Chairman. Senator Carlson.

                     COMMITTEE COULD DAMAGE ITSELF

    Senator Carlson. I want to say this. I rather concur in 
what Cliff Case has just stated. I don't like to vote for 
Albert's motion or for Hickenlooper's proposed motion. I think 
we damage ourselves if we come to a vote here today no matter 
what the outcome is. I regret this as much as any member of the 
committee.
    I would hope that the Secretary of State would come up here 
and testify, and I agree with Bourke Hickenlooper. I think he 
is not coming up here, because the President is the one man 
that tells him not to come.
    The Chairman. I think that is true.
    Senator Carlson. And I regret it.
    Senator Sparkman. Will the Senator yield there just for a 
comment?
    Senator Carlson. Yes.
    Senator Sparkman. And the President will do that regardless 
of whether we adopt this or not.
    Senator Carlson. Yes, he probably will do it. I sympathize 
with the Secretary of State, and while I disagree violently 
with the President and have on many occasions, and the 
Secretary of State, they have gotten themselves into a position 
in this emotional period in our country where they can hardly 
appear in public without some emotional situation developing, 
such as developed with the Secretary at this school.
    You mentioned the Reader's Digest and the United States 
News and World Report. I think the Secretary has got himself in 
such a position that that is about the only way he can 
communicate with the people now. He can't get out in these 
public meetings.
    On this last tour of the country, the President went to 
military establishments. He would have been embarrassed even in 
Kansas had he not done so, and I think it is regrettable.
    The Chairman. I think it is.
    Senator Carlson. I think this situation will inflame it 
further. I would hope we take no action today, and if we get to 
a vote, I shall, of course, support tabling, but I don't think 
that is good. I just don't like it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. If it is the consensus to continue 
this thing, I will not press the tabling motion. I would rather 
dispose of it.
    Senator Aiken. Hold it over for further consideration.
    Senator Hickenlooper. If it were for final consideration, 
then I would vote to table.

                      SETTING A HISTORIC PRECEDENT

    Senator Gore. I see the majority will of the committee. It 
just seems to me, though, gentlemen, that we are setting 
historic precedent here or allowing one to be set that will 
plague us throughout history, not us, but others.
    Senator Lausche. Will someone answer my question----
    Senator Sparkman. May I offer just this suggestion, Albert? 
I had to leave the room for a little while. Perhaps this has 
been suggested. Can we say that there is a failure of 
communication between the Secretary of State and the committee 
simply because he will not testify in public? Have we the right 
to insist that he testify in public? I personally--now you take 
on that series of hearings that we had last year that were 
televised. I thought they were good, and I endorsed them. But 
that was a general survey of the situation, including many 
outsiders that came in.
    I don't think we have got the right to tell the Secretary 
of State that he must testify in public.
    Senator Gore. Will the Senator yield?
    Senator Sparkman. I broke in on somebody.
    Senator Gore. The Constitution makes it very plain that it 
is for the Congress to decide which of its sessions shall be 
public and which shall be executive.
    Senator Sparkman. And I want to go further and say that the 
President has the right to say whether he will testify at all 
or not.
    Senator Gore. I think that is a dual responsibility.

                  COMMITTEE SHOULD INVESTIGATE THE WAR

    Senator Case. If I might just say this. I have been deeply 
concerned that we haven't as a committee been pursuing this as 
hard as we could. I have been trying to explore some way in 
which we could have our own investigation as to how the damn 
thing is going out there. The staff has not been favorable to 
this, as to whether it was feasible. But I am not happy about 
this. I think maybe what we ought to do is have a series of 
public hearings, have another series of public hearings on this 
and let anybody come who wants, and with our own careful 
selection of people. If the administration doesn't want to 
testify at those proceedings, then they will have to take their 
chances. I would like to go at it that way, Albert, rather than 
try to squeeze the President. We will not get anywhere, never 
will, trying to force the President into doing something.
    The Chairman. If we did that, it might be that they would 
voluntarily come.
    Senator Case. I think they would.
    Senator Lausche. I am of the belief that if you lay down 
ground rules as I have suggested, that you would have no 
difficulty in getting the man to come before this committee. 
But if I were in his place, and were subjected to the imbalance 
of the ability to present the picture, I would say to myself 
that the hearing is not conducive to the interests of the 
country.

                    PROCEDURES OF BRITISH PARLIAMENT

    Am I correct that in the English Parliament, cabinet 
members are called, and that the members of Parliament are 
limited to questions and not to the right to make speeches?
    Senator Aiken. No.
    Senator Mundt. It didn't work. They liquidated the Empire.
    Senator Lausche. I didn't hear you.
    The Chairman. They submit written questions, but in answer 
to the question, if it is not satisfactory or something, the 
member who submitted it has the right to make comment upon it 
at the time. They do submit, however, in advance, I think, 
written questions, and it is only if the question isn't 
satisfactory or for any reason, that is what happens, I think.
    Senator Case. They get a good heckling.
    The Chairman. They can be heckled. You talk about being 
unruly; you have never seen such an unruly place. They shout at 
them and boo them and everything else in a way that I have 
never seen take place either in committee or on the floor. It 
is the most unruly body I have ever seen on occasion.
    Senator Lausche. We talk about acquiring information that 
is sound, but do I go to the committee hearings to listen to my 
colleagues make speeches, or do I go there to get information 
from the witness?
    The Chairman. What do you go to the Senate floor for?
    Senator Lausche. That is why I go to the Senate floor, to 
hear my colleagues make speeches. But when a witness is called, 
I go to the meeting to hear the witness.
    The Chairman. You don't mean to say just hearing without 
any cross-examination.

                   INFLUENCE OF RADIO AND TELEVISION

    Senator Lausche. But I mean all I listen to is speeches, 
and especially when the television is there and the radio.
    Senator Gore. Senator, I don't think you are quite fair in 
that.
    Senator Lausche. Well, that is my judgment.
    Senator Gore. There has been some of that, perhaps too much 
of it. But I don't believe you can characterize all of our 
hearings in that manner.
    Senator Lausche. Well, they become especially so when you 
have the television there and the radio. The meetings are 
attended with far greater representation when the television is 
there than when it is not.
    Senator Gore. Including the Senator from Ohio.
    Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, this is all speculation that 
can be decided by fact. Just look at the abstract of the last 
hearings and you will see that the witnesses have more inches 
than do the senators.
    Senator Lausche. Well, of course, on the initial 
presentation. Pardon me.
    The Chairman. They take more time than any one senator.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You are talking about total.
    Senator Pell. I am saying that the witnesses take more time 
than the total Senators.
    Senator Hickenlooper. There have been some abuses of this 
in the committee.
    The Chairman. Well, there is no doubt but that is our 
system. I don't know how to control it. If you want to submit 
some guidelines, I would be interested to see what they were.
    Senator Case. Bill, we could start out with the bottom of 
the list instead of the top.
    The Chairman. As far as I am concerned, if the committee 
wishes it that way, we will try it. I think that ought to be 
submitted to a vote of the committee.

                       NOT AN ANTI-WAR RESOLUTION

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest a 
course of action.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt.
    Senator Mundt. I must say that I think Albert has made a 
great case. While I am not quite prepared to vote for his new 
resolution, if he could just change the end of it a little bit 
so that those who would deliberately try to misinterpret it as 
an anti-Vietnam war resolution couldn't do it, I don't think it 
is intended to be that. It is an honest search for information. 
I must say that I am also distressed by the fact that the 
Secretary goes before universities and magazines and talks and 
answers questions, and the only group he blackballs is this 
committee.
    Senator Hickenlooper. No, he doesn't.
    Senator Mundt. Yes, he does.
    Senator Hickenlooper. He appears here.
    Senator Mundt. In public he goes to every place except 
here.
    Senator Case. He goes before labor unions.
    Senator Mundt. I don't think he should have the unlimited 
opportunity to make statements which never are challenged and 
which are never examined in the penetrating way that we can do 
it. I think that is part of our function, and I think we are 
falling down on it through no fault of our own.
    On the other hand, I don't want to get involved in passing 
a resolution which the press is going to pick up and say the 
Foreign Relations Committee has resolved to make a critical 
approach to the war in Vietnam, let the facts come where they 
will. I would like to see that last part somehow broadened so 
it isn't just targeted on Southeast Asia.

                         TRY TO REACH CONSENSUS

    But I would say just this, Mr. Chairman, as a means of 
procedure. I agree with what you said earlier. It would be too 
bad to divide this up by a 7-to-5 vote, or however it goes. To 
try to bring about a consensus of the meeting, why don't we ask 
the chairman, let him do it on his own, to write a letter to 
Secretary Rusk, quoting what he said when he was here, when he 
pretty clearly indicated he would let us know very soon whether 
he would come or not. Just reminding him of that. Say we are 
running out of time; we are going to adjourn. The committee 
renews its invitation and hopes he will come in a public 
hearing, and would like a reply. He will get that in a few 
days, and then let's reexplore it to see whether some 
resolution might be necessary.
    I think possibly he might come. We have got a different 
ball game now. He can't avoid a public debate on foreign policy 
if what George Aiken says is correct, if one of our colleagues 
is going to run on the issue of Vietnam. It is going to be 
debated all over the country. Why should we just as the Foreign 
Relations Committee sit on the sidelines and not participate in 
the discussion?
    I do sense in my mail a feeling that while it is true they 
have told us time after time what the objectives are, it is a 
kind of varying presentation. It isn't always the same. I wish 
they would make up their minds some place along the line and 
stick to it.
    The Chairman. That is right.
    Senator Mundt. It would be a lot easier to defend or oppose 
it, but you have got a moving target. I would like to have him 
come before I go home and answer some questions. I don't 
object, Frank, except I get impatient, like you do, Frank, when 
the other fellow does it. But I think it is something to be 
said, to talk to the Secretary of State and say now here is 
what I think, present your viewpoint, and what is your reaction 
to it. That is one way of asking questions and getting 
information. I think, if Bill is right, if he just kind of 
keeps any of us from taking too much time, maybe we don't have 
to have a ten-minute limitation. I think a letter like that, 
without any publicity by the----

                PRIOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT

    Senator Gore. I think I agree with everything you have 
said, but I want to hear from Senator Aiken.
    Senator Aiken. I was just wondering how many members of 
this committee had communicated with the President about this 
matter.
    Senator Pell. You mean about Vietnam or about Rusk?
    Senator Aiken. About the matter under discussion. He may 
just be waiting to hear from us.
    Senator Pell. You mean about Rusk appearing?
    Senator Aiken. Aiken. Yes.
    Senator Pell. Or about disapproval in Vietnam?
    Senator Aiken. Yes.
    The Chairman. Which, George? I am not clear.
    Senator Aiken. The only man that can unite the sentiment of 
this country is DeGaulle. He has united it beautifully. We 
expect to have different opinions, but I was wondering, has 
anybody spoken to the President?
    Senator Case. About Secretary Rusk?
    Senator Aiken. About the situation.
    Senator Sparkman. He said, ``The matter under discussion.'' 
That is the Rusk matter.
    Senator Aiken. I don't think anybody has communicated with 
him. I don't think he communicates with anybody on the Hill.
    The Chairman. I don't know that anybody has.
    Senator Aiken. Perhaps he is waiting for us to call first.
    Senator Sparkman. I have not.

                       A SIMPLE FOLLOW-UP LETTER

    Mr. Chairman, if we are not going to have a vote on it, I 
need to go.
    The Chairman. I have got to make a statement on the floor.
    What do you think, Albert, about Karl's suggestion, just a 
simple follow-up letter?
    Senator Lausche. That is just as bad as passing on the 
other thing.
    Senator Pell. Let it simmer.
    Senator Gore. I am willing. There is nothing partisan in my 
view here. We have a duty, I think.
    The Chairman. Was there anything else on the agenda, Mr. 
Marcy?
    Mr. Marcy. We would like to get these two nominations 
passed.
    The Chairman. Gentlemen, are you willing to pass on this 
routine service list of November 20?
    Senator Mundt. I haven't heard your decision that you made 
on the other thing.
    The Chairman. We are going to hold it in abeyance and do 
nothing.
    Senator Mundt. Are you going to write a letter?
    The Chairman. I understood not.
    Senator Gore. I understood that you were accepting his 
suggestion and that this be held in abeyance.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper and others said let us 
do nothing for the moment.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Personally, I wish we would postpone 
it.
    Senator Mundt. You don't have to publicize it. Write him a 
letter.
    Senator Gore. The chairman can do that.
    Senator Mundt. The chairman has a right to write a letter.
    The Chairman. Without a motion or anything.

                          DEFER CONSIDERATION

    Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, since the Christmas season is 
approaching, and it is an era of good will, supposedly, I move 
that we defer consideration at this time.
    The Chairman. Of the routine nominations?
    Senator Aiken. No, no.
    The Chairman. On the other?
    Senator Aiken. On Albert's resolution.
    The Chairman. The committee takes no action on this matter.
    Senator Aiken. I don't think this is the time. Let us have 
a truce for the next--what, 37 days?
    Senator Hickenlooper. A bombing pause?
    Senator Aiken. A bombing pause for about 37 days.
    Senator Sparkman. How about over Tet.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [The Routine Foreign Service list dated November 20, 1967 
was approved by voice vote.
    Paul G. Clark, nominee to be an Assistant Administrator of 
the Agency for International Development, was ordered reported 
favorably.
    H.R. 3399, to extend the termination date for the 
Corregidor
Bataan Memorial Commission was ordered reported with an 
amendment.
    The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Clark, 
Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Case.
    Donald L. McKernan, Special Adviser to the Secretary of 
State for Fisheries and Wildlife, accompanied by Carl F. 
Salans, Deputy Legal Adviser, and Ernest Kerley, Assistant 
Legal Adviser for International Claims, testified on S. 2269, 
relative to the unlawful seizure of fishing vessels of the U.S. 
by foreign countries. No action taken.
    S. 1418, to make changes in the passport laws, was 
discussed and put over until the next day.
    William K. Miller, Director of the Office of Maritime 
Affairs, accompanied by Knute Malmbourg, Office of the Legal 
Adviser of the Department of State, testified on Executive M, 
90/1, Amendment to article 28 of the Convention of the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. No action 
taken.
    [The committee adjourned at 11:50 a.m.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                        FRIDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room 
S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, 
Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
    Ex. M, 90/1, Amendment to article 28 of the Convention of 
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, was 
ordered reported favorably without objection.
    S. 2269, relative to the unlawful seizure of fishing 
vessels of the U.S. by foreign countries, was ordered reported 
adversely by a 
13-5 vote.
    S. 1418, to make changes in the passport laws, was ordered 
reported favorably by a 16-2 vote, after rejecting Clark 
amendment by a vote of 7-11.
    S. Res. 155, relating to the construction and operation of 
nuclear desalting plants in the Middle East, was ordered 
reported.
    [The committee adjourned at noon.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
         Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in 
room 
S-116, the Capitol.
    To consider the University of Wisconsin study on problems 
of 
agriculture.
    [No transcript was made of the session.]


                   BRIEFING ON GREECE AND MIDDLE EAST

                              ----------                              


                      Thursday, December 14, 1967

                               U.S. Senate,
             Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South
       Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in 
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (Chairman of 
the Subcommittee), presiding.
    Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Fulbright, 
Sparkman, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Case, and Cooper.
    Also present: Sidney Sober, Director, Regional Affairs 
Bureau, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of 
State.
    Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, we know you are very 
busy, and, gentlemen, we will call the meeting to order.
    Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your coming down to talk to us 
about problems incident to the Middle East, and may I suggest 
that you start off by running through the situation of recent 
developments in Greece, and then perhaps there are other parts 
of the world that you would want to talk about. But in the 
meantime, after you give the position as you have it on Greece, 
perhaps other members of the committee would like to ask you 
questions.

  STATEMENT OF LUCIUS D. BATTLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR 
                EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

    Mr. Battle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very happy to 
have a chance to be here with you today.
    The situation in Greece at the moment is far from clear. 
There are many of the actual facts of the events of the past 
two days that are not known to us. I will tell you them as best 
I know them based on evidence as it stands at the moment.
    The King has for some time been deeply concerned about his 
relations with the junta crowd. He has said in the past that he 
thought one of these days a confrontation between himself and 
the junta was probably inevitable. Our advice to him has never 
encouraged a confrontation. We have always said we felt that 
perhaps his leverage could best be used in trying to make this 
crowd move in the direction that he wanted, but we have added 
in various conversations with him that, if there should be a 
confrontation, there must be very careful preparation so he 
must know exactly what was to happen.

                       THE KING ACTED ON IMPULSE

    Unfortunately, the confrontation occurred. It occurred, I 
think, without a plan and in a moment of emotion. If I can read 
a phrase that came in by telegram from the embassy today that 
their preliminary assessment is that the King acted on impulse 
rather than on a concrete plan, apparently with the full 
confidence that his mere presence in the north would rally 
support for his revolt.
    He moved forward, he apparently had--if he had contact with 
the military leaders in the area, it was obviously inadequate 
to assure they were with him. He appears to have had the 
support of a large part of the air force, some of the navy, but 
very, very little else.
    Even that support fell apart very quickly. It never came to 
any real meaningful group of meaningful support behind him.
    We are not sure during the course of yesterday even where 
he was. He went originally to Larissa, and then was reported as 
seen in Kavalla and elsewhere in the area, but we were not sure 
where he was or what he was in fact doing.
    He had issued this appeal. It was carried over the radio in 
Greece several times during the course of the day, but 
apparently brought little popular support and very little 
attention.
    He had with him Kollias, who is the prime minister of the 
present government in the government in Greece, and Kollias has 
continued on with him to Rome to which he went last night, less 
than 24 hours after he started.
    It is, I think, deeply regrettable that this came at the 
moment it did. I think we could attribute it perhaps to several 
things, although this is a guess. This is not based on any 
knowledge. I think that his relations with the junta had been 
strained. I might tell you very--since this is an executive 
session, I would not want this to leave the room--I talked to 
Fred Reinhardt in Rome just about an hour and a half ago. He 
said that the King had called him on the telephone. The King 
intended to have a press conference during the course of the 
day and to explain his actions.

                 A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

    As stated to Freddy on the telephone by the King, he became 
convinced that there was no intention to return to 
constitutional government. He also was pressed to take actions 
that he found impossible to take, and that he had no intention 
of returning. This is a telephone conversation, and I might 
point out a rather bad connection.
    He said he would not return until there was a clear date 
for a constitutional government, and a date for elections. He 
also made the statement that the swearing in of a regent was 
illegal in several respects. First, that it occurred while he 
was still on the soil of Greece and, secondly, that the oath 
was illegal. That was not explained, nor were the acts that he 
was allegedly asked to take explained.
    I am not aware that the press conference has occurred, but 
there may be one during the course of the afternoon.
    In Athens itself, the coup crowd has formed a new 
government; Papadopoulos is now the new prime minister. They 
have sworn in this little known agent whose name is Zoitakis, 
or that is as close as I can come. The exact legal position of 
the government is not yet clear. We are not in possession of 
full facts. Whether, for example, there is a new act of 
recognition necessary is not absolutely certain. We 
undoubtedly, I think, have ahead of us a very difficult period 
in terms of our relations with the junta. We have had not an 
easy time prior to this, but I think we have a most difficult 
period ahead of us.
    We have not decided what we will do with respect to 
relations with them.
    In the middle of the night, I received a message from Phil 
Talbot saying that he and several other ambassadors had been 
summoned to a meeting and he wondered whether he should attend 
this meeting with Papadopoulos. My advice was that he not 
attend; that we have pause for a day or two; reassess what our 
requirements were here. This would have constituted or could 
have been interpreted to constitute recognition. Whether a new 
act of recognition is required depends upon the ruling of the 
legal adviser of the Department of State, but it was my advice 
to him not to attend, and he joined with several others--the 
British, the French, the Germans--in staying away from that 
particular meeting.
    We have instructed him not to have any--to have a minimum 
of official relationships with the new government, until we can 
sort out what the legal position is and what we should do in 
this instance.

                  U.S. LONG-TERM RELATIONS WITH GREECE

    We still have before us the very searching questions we 
have had all the time. Our relations with Greece go back a long 
way. They are a member of NATO. We have important installations 
in Greece itself. I think the importance of Greece in the 
entire Middle East is very great, and we must not take lightly 
our own relations there. We must look upon it as a long-term 
thing and a problem as far as the Greek people are concerned, 
and I think that we must assess our interest in that light.
    I know some of the members of this committee have been 
deeply concerned about the political prisoners there. One of 
the first things we did was to send a telegram saying that we 
hoped that the embassy would bring to the attention of the new 
government--the new, new government as we are now calling it--
our deep concern about these political prisoners, our hope that 
they would not be pawns in this particular situation, and that 
nothing would happen to them.
    We have had no response to that, but a message has gone 
forward to that effect from us.
    I think we must look with real concern upon it, this new 
group in power. It is essentially the same elements of strength 
that were there before.
    I think there is no doubt that they have very firm control 
over the country. As best we know it now, and it was perfectly 
evident in the course of yesterday and particularly into the 
night last night that the King had very little support, and, as 
I said, that this was an unplanned, an unarranged effort that 
he had made. It is very unfortunate, but I think we have got 
simply at the moment to sit tight for a couple of days to 
decide what we can do, to do it in concert with our other NATO 
allies. I have been in touch with the British, for example, 
today. They have about the same attitude that we have. They are 
examining their legal situation, and I will be back in touch 
with them before the day is over.
    I think we must go very slowly here. I do not believe that 
any rash effort to end our relations in Greece--I think that 
would be most ill-advised. I think we have got to be pretty 
calm about it. There is no doubt about it, this is an 
unfortunate development and one that I deeply regret.

                       FOLLOWING A MIDDLE COURSE

    As you know, we have attempted over the past months to 
follow a middle course in terms of our relations with Greece, 
not to let our relations go completely sour with them, but 
neither in any way to give evidence that we approved of the 
junta crowd, which we most definitely have not. That problem is 
still with us and I suspect that this group will be with us for 
some time to come, and that we have to prepare for that 
eventuality.
    The situation within Greece itself is calm. I have many 
details on it. I have just messages coming in very steadily to 
me. The last one that I received just before I left says that 
calm prevails in Athens with the public proceeding about their 
business in a normal manner. That is substantially what those 
many paragraphs say.
    The people did not respond to the King's call. There has 
been a kind of apathy about the situation, and I think that is 
reflected in the total problem.
    That, sir, I think, sums up where we are with respect to 
Greece. I will be happy to talk about--I have several other 
crises I hope very much to touch upon this afternoon, this 
being probably the last chance I will have to talk with you for 
some time.

                          AMERICANS IN GREECE

    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, what do you think? Shall 
we ask him about Greece and then go to the others?
    Senator Fulbright. I would think so. It is much the most 
critical one.
    Senator Symington. Well, will you please go on.
    Senator Fulbright. Mr. Secretary, how many civilians and 
military Americans are in Greece?
    Mr. Battle. It is around 20,000, Mr. Chairman. I have got 
it specifically.
    Senator Fulbright. How are they broken down?
    Mr. Battle. As of the end of 1966, there were 7,167 
military-connected U.S. personnel. That word I would have to 
define. 2,800 military personnel of which 2,150 are air force.
    Senator Fulbright. I lost you. 7,000, what is that?
    Mr. Battle. 7,000 military-connected personnel. That would 
be military plus dependents, or civilian employees.
    Senator Fulbright. Military plus dependents.
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir, military-connected persons.
    Senator Fulbright. I see. How many civilians? I only want 
to get an idea of our people.
    Mr. Battle. In my mind, sir, it is a total of around 20,000 
Americans, business and everything, within Greece itself.
    Senator Fulbright. I see.
    Senator Gore. It is a lot of people.
    Mr. Battle. It is a lot of people.
    Senator Fulbright. You would not want to venture how many 
of those were governmental, aside from the military. You do not 
know how many CIA agents we have there. Is that a secret?
    Mr. Battle. It would be a secret. I do not have the figure, 
Mr. Chairman. I would be glad----
    Senator Fulbright. 20,000?
    Mr. Battle. Sir----
    Senator Fulbright. All right. I will not press that.

                   U.S. DID NOT ANTICIPATE GREEK COUP

    Were you aware of the first coup last year before it took 
place?
    Mr. Battle. No, sir, Mr. Chairman, I was not.
    Senator Fulbright. You mean our CIA did not know it either?
    Mr. Battle. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. There were at the time--
the first coup occurred the week I took office. There had been 
recurring rumors that coups would occur in Greece for some time 
preceding that.
    Senator Fulbright. Well----
    Mr. Battle. But this particular coup came as a surprise to 
everybody.
    Senator Fulbright. That is what I was getting at. This 
particular coup was a surprise to you, but you knew that 
another coup involving the senior officers was underway, did 
you not?
    Mr. Battle. No, sir, I did not. I knew there had been many 
rumors of coups, rumors that coups had occurred, but not of any 
specific, to my knowledge, any specific coup or any specific 
group.
    Senator Fulbright. I see.

                 Allegations of CIA Involvement in Coup

    Do you know a man named Rousseas who has written a book 
just published? \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Stephen W. Rousseas, The Death of Democracy: Greece and The 
American Conscience (New York: Grove Press 1967).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Battle. I know he has written a book, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Fulbright. A book on Greece. He is an American. He 
alleges that particularly our people, CIA, were cooperating 
with the senior officers in anticipation of a coup. What 
happened was that three weeks before that coup was to take 
place, the objective of which was to prevent the election, the 
junior officers got wind of it and, anticipating the senior 
officers, they had their own coup and took over. That is what 
he said.
    Mr. Battle. I think, Mr. Chairman, that there was a plan 
for a coup, as I understand it, that had existed for some time. 
I assure you, sir, I was unaware totally of any plan----
    Senator Fulbright. You mean you personally.
    Mr. Battle. As far as I know, our government.
    Senator Fulbright. But you would not necessarily know if 
the CIA was sponsoring it, would you?
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I make every effort to know what 
goes on in the countries of my----
    Senator Fulbright. I said you would not necessarily know, 
would you?
    Mr. Battle. I believe I would, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Fulbright. Well, this man makes it very positively; 
of course I do not know. He documents it. I have not talked to 
him; I am just asking you. This is his theory, and he lived 
there for a long time. He cites dates of meetings between 
people, names names, all of this. Of course, it may not be 
accurate. I was just asking you, but you are stating 
unequivocally that our government did not have anything to do 
with the design of trying to thwart the holding of the election 
on May 28.
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I assure you that I checked 
immediately after I was awakened in the middle--I was called in 
the middle of the evening on the coup, the first coup, and I 
checked very carefully and I was assured at very high levels 
that we had absolutely nothing to do with it.
    Senator Fulbright. He says that. He confirms that, that you 
did not know about the first coup, that nobody did much because 
these youngsters, these colonels, anticipated that the old boys 
would take over and they would be left out.
    But his story is that a coup--and he alleges, I would say, 
that this government did not want the election to take place in 
May, I think it was May 28, because they thought Andreas 
Papandreou would be elected.

                       U.S. WANTED ELECTIONS HELD

    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I would like on that point--you 
have to know about this one. I have not re-read this particular 
file. I have not had time the last few days. There was a 
discussion between our ambassador in Athens and the King some 
days before the coup in which we most emphatically said that we 
felt that the holding of elections was part of our--it was 
essential there, and most clearly, in our judgment, was an 
essential part of the----
    Senator Fulbright. That is what I want on the record.
    Mr. Battle. That point was made.
    Senator Fulbright. That point was that the elections should 
be held regardless of who was elected.
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.
    Senator Fulbright. That is all I wanted to find out.

                    U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD GREEK JUNTA

    Well, what is our attitude now toward this junta? Are we 
going to continue to give them aid? Are we going to continue 
the supply of ammunition or what else, or are we going to quit?
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, we have not really reached any 
basic decisions in these few hours since this current new 
development. I think we are faced with a very new situation. I 
think it is one that we have to examine very, very carefully.
    Senator Fulbright. May I say--go ahead. I want you to 
finish.
    Mr. Battle. We have not had, as you know, any economic aid 
in there for some time, and immediately after the coup of April 
21, we cut off all major equipment that was going in at that 
time. We got up to the supplies of tanks and planes that were 
going in there.
    Senator Fulbright. Distinguish between ``major'' and 
``minor.'' What have we given this coup since that time?
    Mr. Battle. A large part has been spare parts. There have 
been ammunition and other specifics, small arms, but it is 
not----
    Senator Fulbright. How much in value?
    Mr. Battle. Thirty odd million dollars.
    Senator Fulbright. Since they took over. Is that about 
right?
    Mr. Battle. It is about half what it would have been, if I 
am not mistaken.
    Senator Fulbright. I thought our total program----
    Mr. Battle. The annual level has been $65 million 
approximately, and it has been cut, was cut about in half. I 
can supply the exact figures for you, sir, if you would like to 
have them.

                     DANGER OF CIVIL WAR IN GREECE

    Senator Fulbright. Well, not exactly, but what I am really 
getting at is not the precise figures, but our policy. But I 
would gather from this we were not taking a position that we 
disagreed with the coup.
    Mr. Battle. In their opinion, we took a position and they 
found it very hard to understand because it was so disapproving 
of it. This is one of the peculiar dilemmas of this thing.
    Senator Fulbright. They took the position they could not 
understand it.
    Mr. Battle. They felt they had come in--they repeatedly 
stated in their earlier, the first days, that they were pro-
American; they were pro-King; they were pro-NATO. They were 
going to straighten out Greece. Why did we not like them? The 
answer was that we did not like them because they had not come 
into power in a legal and constitutional manner, and we found 
this highly objectionable in that situation. We were deeply 
worried in the very beginning. The same worries that I have had 
over the last couple of days--the danger of civil war in 
Greece--and it was our belief at that stage that rather than 
have a total break with them that a middle course was a proper 
course.
    I met with this committee about that time, and I remember 
saying I do not guarantee it is going to work, but I think we 
are better off trying to go the middle course than to let the 
totality of our relations really go downhill rapidly. We must 
try to see if we can bring this crowd around.
    The alternative at that stage seemed to us very likely to 
be, and it was the view of almost every observer, that it could 
well have been a civil war in Greece and that we felt we had to 
try to avoid it if we possibly could.
    Senator Fulbright. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Symington. Senator Hickenlooper?

                    WHAT TRIGGERED THE KING'S ACTION

    Senator Hickenlooper. Do you have any idea as to what 
triggered this operation, I mean of the immediate moment? I 
understand he was dissatisfied and fearful of the military 
group.
    Mr. Battle. I imagine, Senator Hickenlooper, and this is 
partly guess, we were very alert to this while he and the junta 
were signed on to the arrangement on Cyprus, they were both 
committed to it, that this represented a moment in which the 
King probably believed that the junta had less political 
support growing out of what the Greeks could well have 
considered a retreat on Cyprus and a defeat for them.
    Senator Hickenlooper. How much did his mother have to do 
with this?
    Mr. Battle. I suspect she was advising him. That is sheer 
guess; I have no basis for that statement.
    One other element is that Karamanlis, who is the former 
prime minister, made a statement in the middle of the Cyprus 
crisis in which he called for the overthrow of the junta crowd. 
That statement, I am sure, we are fairly certain that he and 
Karamanlis were not in touch with each other, still it was 
perhaps a political advantage that he thought flowed from that 
statement that he wanted to take advantage of it.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, the point of my question is not 
so much suspicion on each side over there but as to why it 
occurred yesterday, if there was anything that triggered the 
thing yesterday that you knew about.
    Mr. Battle. I am not aware of anything.
    Senator Hickenlooper. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Symington. Senator Sparkman?
    Senator Sparkman. I gathered from reading what we have read 
in the papers the same thing that you brought out, that it 
probably was an act of impulse, strengthened, perhaps, by his 
mother. However, when he appeared before our Foreign Relations 
Committee sometime back, I think we could get the same 
reaction. I felt he was impatient. I thought he was rather bold 
in some of the things that he said. I think it is a rather 
tragic thing that he acted so soon, but at the same time I 
think you are exactly right. We must be careful. We must choose 
our steps very carefully.

                  U.S. NAVAL VESSELS LOANED TO GREECE

    What about our naval vessels that we just re-loaned to them 
the other day?
    Mr. Battle. Well, those vessels, Senator Sparkman, were--as 
you know, they were there. This was just an extension of the 
loan.
    Senator Sparkman. I know it.
    Mr. Battle. To have recalled them would have raised a lot 
of problems including a financial one. I think we have got to 
remember, and this has been one of our dilemmas, that we have 
an overall commitment to NATO, to NATO force goals, and we are 
working within an overall pattern of the military supply of 
Europe. You cannot separate one country out of it.
    I think we are in a dangerous situation here now. I do not 
wish to be optimistic or in any way to lead this committee to 
think I know what the answers are. I do not know what they are. 
I think we have got to proceed very carefully, and I think we 
have to remember that NATO and the military commitment and the 
military structure is still a very basic part of our foreign 
policy. While I deeply regret what has happened in Greece, I do 
not think at this stage that we must be cavalier about our 
total relationships here. I think we have got to be very 
conscious of it.

                         THE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

    Senator Sparkman. You mentioned the Cyprus settlement. Did 
you intend to leave the impression that he was unhappy over 
that, or did he just say it was an opportune time?
    Mr. Battle. Senator Sparkman, I do not think he was happy 
at all. He endorsed what he was most eager to bring about. I 
think what he endorsed was that the junta had been blamed for 
the retreat on Cyprus and there was considerable speculation.
    While we had no reason to suspect this thing would occur 
yesterday, we had thought there could be a political result 
from this Cyprus decision; that there could be a weakening of 
the junta's political position in Greece and I suspect the King 
felt exactly the same thing.
    Senator Sparkman. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Symington. Senator Cooper?

                     STATUS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

    Senator Cooper. You said you wondered what our relationship 
would be to what you termed the new, new government. Is this 
not just another shake-up in the existing government? Why is it 
a new government?
    Mr. Battle. This raises, Senator Cooper, two or three 
questions we did not have before.
    Senator Cooper. Give us that.
    Mr. Battle. I am speaking without a final legal opinion in 
our own department, but let me tell you sort of the range of 
it, if I may, Sir.
    When the coup took power April 21, the King was still 
there. Our ambassador is accredited to the King, not to a 
government. Therefore, there was no question of recognition at 
all.
    The question now is whether that has changed and whether we 
have a new requirement for an act of recognition. There is not 
a final legal view on it. But if the regent had been legally 
appointed, which, as I understand it, under the Greek 
constitution requires the act of a parliament, there would have 
been a continuity of accreditation of ambassadors to the person 
of the regent rather than to the person of the King.
    The question now is whether the regent is legally 
appointed; whether the ambassadors are accredited to the 
regent; what the status of the King is. He has not legally 
abdicated. There are many legal uncertainties at the moment, 
but the best guess is it would take some sort of act.
    Senator Cooper. The King has conferred certain legitimacy 
on the conduct.
    Mr. Battle. That is right, sir.
    Senator Cooper. It seems to me it may be a technical legal 
question. But practically it is the same group of people.
    Mr. Battle. It is the same group of people substantially.
    Senator Cooper. Following what Senator Fulbright was 
talking about a while ago, I do not know whether I heard it or 
read it, but I had heard, too, that this group of senior 
officers, supported by the King, had planned to have a coup 
which was to take place later and which the young officers just 
anticipated, came into power.

                       NATO CONCERNS ABOUT GREECE

    I would say this. You are talking about our difficulties 
with them and the necessity of being careful because of the 
NATO situation.
    I just came back from this parliamentary group of NATO, and 
I admit they are just members of the different parliaments, I 
do not know how influential they are in their own parliament 
any more than I am in this one, but nevertheless they speak of 
the concern in their parliaments about Greece, and I would----
    Senator Sparkman. By the way, Greece did not have a 
delegation.
    Senator Cooper. No, they did not have any because they have 
no parliamentary representatives. I would say most of the 
people on the committee I was serving on were military people 
and are most conservative. They support NATO fully and want to 
keep it strong. But there is great distaste for this government 
in all these countries in Europe, and their concern was that if 
this government hangs on and does not take some steps toward 
elections and a parliament, they think it is going to shake 
NATO to the foundation on the southern flank and hurt NATO as a 
whole. It is very distasteful to them.
    Not only that, I talked to officials of the government in 
England and in Italy. They are very concerned about that, 
Fanfani and others, so I take another--I think we ought to look 
at it from another viewpoint as to whether this--if the United 
States does not use some influence for a democratic 
development, you are going to have NATO weakened perhaps rather 
than strengthened.
    Mr. Battle. Senator Cooper, I agree with that concern 
completely. The question is what leverage we have and how you 
can exercise it. I had hoped to go to Greece over the next 
weeks myself. I think the situation has now changed. I planned 
a trip there with a hope of having some really very firm talk 
with them about the need--they have a constitutional report due 
on the 15th of this month. This has been done by a 
distinguished group of jurists. I think what they do with that 
is going to be important. Whether this is the time framework 
which they have tentatively committed themselves to, to get 
back to constitutional government, whether they will adhere to 
this now remains to be seen.
    I might point out to you, sir, that I talked with Secretary 
Rusk two or three times during the course of yesterday when he 
was in Brussels, and he was reflecting the same concern in 
NATO. He was at the NATO meeting that you just expressed. He 
called me a couple of times and he said most of the NATO 
countries were highly sympathetic to the position of the King 
and would like to know what to do to help him, but, of course, 
in the first hours we did not know what support he had or who 
was behind him. But he said it was rather difficult to support 
someone when you really do not know where he was or what he was 
doing.
    There were rumors he left the country, all kinds of rumors 
in the course of yesterday afternoon, but the concern 
particularly on the part of the Scandinavians, the Dutch, have 
been evident for some time. It was discussed at great length 
with them.
    Senator Symington. Are you finished, Senator?
    Senator Gore?
    Senator Gore. I am satisfied with the report. No questions.
    Senator Symington. Senator Case?

                  NATO'S COOL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE COUP

    Mr. Case. Would you just tell us what actions the other 
countries in NATO took in regard to recognition, the 
relationships with the junta up to now?
    Mr. Battle. The relations, sir, of I think all the NATO 
countries since April have been about the same. It has been--
while you say we may not have been as disapproving as you would 
have liked, most of us had had very cold, very cool relations 
with them since the coup crowd took over. There were political 
problems within the Scandinavian countries that I think made 
them particularly concerned, but they did not change anything 
until fairly recently and, over another issue of a month or two 
ago, they withdrew their ambassador.
    At this stage I think the British, the French, the Germans 
and ourselves, we have approximately the same difficulty about 
the future.
    My own view is we should not take any act of recognition. 
We must have a minimum of contact for a few days and see what 
happens, but I do not again think we ought to lightly break 
relations here. I think there may be a way we can stay there 
legally without an act of recognizing as long as they permit us 
to do so even if a new act of recognition is required.
    Senator Case. But we will keep in touch, I take it, with 
other countries in NATO.
    Mr. Battle. Absolutely, sir. This is basic to what I think 
we have got to do.
    Senator Case. Thank you.
    Senator Symington. Senator Clark.
    Senator Clark. No questions. Thank you.
    Senator Symington. Senator Pell.
    Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                       NO QUID PRO QUO ON CYPRUS

    Mr. Secretary, just to get on the record a point that I 
know we talked about privately, would I not be correct in my 
statement that no quid pro quo was made by Mr. Vance in return 
for the acquiescence of the Greeks to their withdrawal from 
Cyprus?
    Mr. Battle. You are absolutely correct, Senator.
    Senator Pell. In any way or form.
    Mr. Battle. No manner of any kind.
    Senator Pell. Right.

                       SAFETY OF TRAVEL IN GREECE

    Another question, I have a constituent who is in the travel 
business and he represents a travel association and they wanted 
to know what the attitude was of the U.S. Government in regard 
to travel to Greece. Is there any particular view on it or not?
    Mr. Battle. During the Cyprus crisis?
    Senator Pell. No, I mean as of now.
    Mr. Battle. Now?
    Senator Pell. Yes.
    Mr. Battle. We have not taken a position on it. I do not 
think there is any at the moment. It does not appear there is 
any danger of civil war.
    Well, I will get the advice of our embassy steadily on this 
particular point. I do not think at the moment there is any 
particular reason for discouraging it.
    Senator Pell. Right.

                         BACKING A LOSING CAUSE

    I must say I would agree with you about the importance of 
not moving hastily and not breaking relations even if one 
disapproves. In the end, you are cutting off your nose so often 
to spite your face.
    As you know, we again talked a couple of times yesterday--I 
am still concerned that even though we recognized the fact that 
the King was on the ropes and did not know what he was doing, 
it seems to me we knew the King was doing the right thing, was 
doing what many of us had urged him to do, at least I as one 
individual had, and we had a certain responsibility here even 
if we came out backing a loser. To my mind there is a certain 
moral, I will not say bankruptcy, but a moral breakdown in that 
we who lecture the world so freely and easily many times came 
out with no statement of encouragement to the King for doing 
what we all wanted him to do.
    Without going into your own personal position on this 
matter, how do you account for this, recognizing we might have 
been backing a losing cause?
    Mr. Battle. The decision that was taken, Senator Pell, was 
based on the very great uncertainty of events yesterday. If it 
had appeared that there was a chance of the King having any 
support, or if we had even known he was going to remain in 
Greece and tried this, I think our attitude might have 
developed in a different way. But the attitude we took was the 
same attitude that Secretary Rusk reported the other NATO 
countries took. As he said, it is awfully hard to back 
something when you have not got anything to back. We could not 
find the King. We did not know where he was. We did not know 
who was supporting him. We were not even sure whether he 
remained in Greece. Therefore, it would have been a hollow 
gesture and we waited to find this out and it was all over. 
That is exactly what happened.

                      CONVERSATIONS WITH THE KING

    Senator Pell. Has anybody from the American side talked 
with the King since this thing started?
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir, I told--I guess before you came in--
this. I hope very much this will not leave this room. 
Ambassador Reinhardt called me a couple of hours ago, and he 
had had a telephone conversation with the King, and he is 
having a meeting with him perhaps now. He told me that he had 
had a telephone call from the King and the King had indicated 
he was having a press conference and would explain his own 
actions.
    What has come out of the meeting with him I do not know, 
but I see no reason for us not to have--I do not think this 
ought to be publicized because I do not--for a lot of reasons, 
but I would assume we would continue to have contacts with the 
King, and I see no early reason for us not to do so.
    Senator Pell. Do you feel the King feels let down by us in 
any way?
    Mr. Battle. Well, I would imagine he may very well, Senator 
Pell. I think he may very well. But I think the King in many 
ways let himself down. I must say there was no preparation; 
there was no plan. He just did this on an emotional impulse as 
we understand it. Again I do not know all the facts, but from 
everything we have, this is what it appears to be.
    Therefore, we have never encouraged him in taking on this 
kind of thing. Obviously, it is his own decision. We have 
believed that his own leverage in the country was of distinct 
advantage. There was a period when I think he considered once 
leaving. Our own view at that stage was it would have been bad 
if he had departed. This was many months ago.
    I regret what has happened very deeply, but it was his own 
decision and not one that we wished to enter into in any way, 
shape, or form.
    Senator Pell. Just to pursue this a little further, I 
realize we did not push him in it, but do you think he felt it 
implicit in the conversations he had with the Executive Branch 
while he was here that he might have received more 
encouragement and support than he received in fact?
    Mr. Battle. That is conceivable. I do not think there is 
any basis for it because he did refer, as I said earlier, to 
the fact that there would one day be a confrontation. We always 
said, ``You must be very careful to be sure your own plans are 
carefully laid if this is the case,'' and we had urged him, I 
did myself, because I felt his own leverage in the situation 
was very important in terms of keeping the group in power 
moving toward a constitutional government that he and we both 
felt and still feel important in the situation.
    Senator Pell. Right.
    But you say we were not forewarned of it.
    Mr. Battle. I believe, sir, it was the spur of the moment. 
Perfectly clear there was no plan or at least if it was a plan 
it was a very bad one. Nobody joined. I just do not think the 
evidence that he had any plan in being is very great. I could 
be wrong and it may be as we learn more about it. But based on 
what we know now, it appears to be a formless decision on his 
part.
    Senator Pell. Have you had a peak at the constitution or 
not?
    Mr. Battle. No, sir.
    Senator Pell. Thanks; that is all.

                        SYMPATHIES FOR THE KING

    Senator Symington. I talked at length with the King, for 
several hours with the ambassador, and then had breakfast with 
Papadopoulos seemed to me it was just a case of playing chess 
with each other and which one moved. If he moved first, if the 
yellow moved before black, why then--white before black--then 
the question was would white move successfully or if black 
moved if you call that, and apparently he moved too fast.
    Based on what I learned from Ambassador Talbot and just in 
the room, my impression was that his sympathies were completely 
with the King as well as his hopes.
    Mr. Battle. I think there is no doubt of this, Senator 
Symington.

                  INFLUENCE ON GREEK-TURKISH SITUATION

    Senator Symington. There are just two questions I would 
like to ask: First, how, if in any way, will this affect the 
Cyprus and Turkish situation, and, secondly, what our future 
plans would be with respect to any form of aid including 
military aid.
    Mr. Battle. The first question with respect to Cyprus, the 
Turks have told us since the events of yesterday that they 
still stand on the agreements. Our first act when we heard this 
had happened, I got in touch with the Secretary by phone 
immediately saying I thought it was very important that he tell 
the Turks to in fact keep their shirts on, not to take any 
action that would seize upon what appeared to be an 
opportunity. They appeared to go completely along with this and 
have reconfirmed their support of the Cyprus agreements.
    Secondly, on the second point you made, Senator Symington, 
we have not addressed ourselves, having reviewed now everything 
that is in the pipeline, there is no thought of economic 
assistance. There has not been for a long time. We have got the 
very difficult problem of NATO. I still have some hope that 
this crowd will turn itself around, and I think there may be 
new pressures on them.
    We were told in a telegram from Talbot that they appear to 
have considered instead of appointing a regent, announcing that 
they were now a democracy. This is the nature of the 
government. It shows the careful planning and the great 
experience that is brought to bear by this crowd. They are not 
a very good group, let us be honest about it.
    I think there might be some international pressures on them 
to go on with the constitutional reforms they have stated. I 
think at the moment--again I see nothing ahead but difficulty 
for us. I do not think we ought to rush in the next 24 hours or 
so on a decision on it. I am rather bearish on any prospect of 
aid there, but I do not wish to say at this stage that is my 
final attitude and there has been no decision by the 
administration at the moment.
    Senator Symington. Would you when you get a full report, 
even though we will probably be out of session, in case of that 
will you give to Mr. Marcy or anybody who is in charge of the 
staff here what you consider as much information as possible so 
if he wants to know what the information is he can be supplied 
unilaterally on a proper basis?
    Mr. Battle. Yes.

                         JAILING OF PAPANDREOU

    Senator Fulbright. One more question. What is the status of 
Andreas Papandreou. Is he in jail?
    Mr. Battle. He is in jail. We had one report which came in 
yesterday which was based with his wife who had talked either 
with Phil or an embassy officer, I forgot which. She was very 
upset that this present situation could work to his detriment. 
She had taken him supper and had seen him at a distance. Many 
people have seen him over recent months. His health appears to 
be all right.
    We have repeatedly----
    Senator Fulbright. He is alleged to have TB.
    Mr. Battle. That is right, but there were reports he was in 
very serious health and was about to die several months ago, 
but that is not the case. I believe he has had TB in the past. 
How active is it, I do not know. As I said, one of the first 
things--I think I brought the telegram, no I did not--that we 
did was to inform the coup group we would view with very deep 
alarm any action on the political prisoners.
    What is the future of Andreas Papandreou, Mr. Chairman, I 
could not tell you, but this is one we have acted on behalf of 
the political prisoners repeatedly, and we will continue to do 
so within the limits of leverage we have in the situation.
    Senator Fulbright. His father is also under house arrest.
    Mr. Battle. His father was freed from jail, is under semi-
house arrest. This may have changed over the last day.
    Senator Fulbright. That is all.

                     EFFECT OF CUTTING OFF U.S. AID

    Senator Symington. Anybody else have any questions on 
Greece?
    One more question. If we did not furnish military aid and 
we did not furnish economic aid of any kind, and if the King is 
over there saying he wants a constitutional government in 
Italy, would there be any chance, as you see it now, of that 
operating in favor of the fall of the junta or do you think 
that----
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I doubt it.
    Senator Symington. You see the thrust of my question.
    Mr. Battle. I think it has been pretty evident that the 
King has not any basic popularity with the people. This is one 
of the weaknesses. I think our denial of the military, a 
complete break on military, I do not think it will bring the 
junta down. I was awfully glad during the Cyprus crisis we had 
a reasonable relationship with him. If we had totally cut off 
every relationship in April, we would have had a war over 
Cyprus a couple of weeks ago, and, therefore, I think we need a 
certain leverage. We need a certain influence.
    I do not like this crowd any better than anyone in this 
room does, but neither can I take my responsibilities lightly 
of ending this relationship as important as this one is.

                             AVERTING A WAR

    Senator Symington. What next would you like to talk about?
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I have a whole chamber of horrors 
here--if the committee would like to hear it. I am just afraid 
I will not have another chance.
    Senator Symington. Let us ask the chairman.
    Senator Fulbright. Have you got any good news?
    Mr. Battle. I have a little in the sense we do not have a 
war in Cyprus.
    Senator Fulbright. O.K.
    Senator Symington. If we passed that one, we all know that, 
and we will hear about that.
    Mr. Battle. Just one word on Cyprus. I would only like to 
say while we have averted a war I do not think we have solved 
the problem. There is a lot more to be done. The issue is not 
removed and it will be before us again. That is the end of my 
comment on Cyprus if you followed it in the paper.
    Senator Clark. May I ask one? What was the relationship of 
Brosio Vance in the working out of the agreement which 
apparently has averted war?
    Mr. Battle. On Wednesday before Thanksgiving, Senator 
Clark, we had very clear intelligence that the next morning the 
Turks were going to move. This seems absolutely certain. We 
felt that at that moment we had attempted to interest NATO and 
the U.N. in taking an action. At the same time we felt that 
NATO could not operate with respect to Cyprus because Cyprus is 
not a member of the organization.
    We felt that NATO had a certain leverage with the Greeks 
and Turks over the NATO relationship.

                       SOVIET INFLUENCE IN YEMEN

    Senator Symington. Before we lose too many people, I want 
to ask about the Soviet Union going into Yemen and Aden.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I want to know about that. I 
think that is the most important thing before us right now.
    Mr. Battle. This is what I wanted to particularly talk 
about this afternoon. First, let me review the situation with 
respect to Yemen and a few of the things you have said at a 
couple of these hearings before.
    For a long time, the Soviets have had a role in Yemen, but 
an indirect role. Their role in Yemen has been expressed 
through the Egyptians. They have been supplying military 
equipment there for a very long time. It has been going on 
indirectly.
    While I was still ambassador to Cairo on several occasions, 
I got little indications, I mentioned this in one of our 
discussions down here, I had indications that the Egyptians 
were a little nervous about the Russians making a direct effort 
to get into Yemen without going through them and supplying 
military equipment.

                     EGYPTIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM YEMEN

    After the Arab-Israeli war and after the Khartoum 
Conference in which the moderate Arabs agreed--the oil rich 
countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya--agreed to pay part of 
the cost of the closure of the canal and the cost of the war to 
the Jordanians and Egyptians, King Faisal really had three 
purposes by that agreement, and he is paying a very large 
amount of money. He wanted three things: He wanted the 
Egyptians out of the Yemen; he wanted to get Radio Cairo off 
his back; and he wanted to establish himself as a good Arab 
because he had not fought in the Israeli war and he had no 
intention of fighting in the Israeli war, and he had no 
intention----
    Senator Symington. Who is this?
    Mr. Battle. Faisal. He did want to identify himself for 
political reasons as a member of the Arab club and he wanted to 
get Nasser out of Yemen which is a problem for him because it 
is so close to him.
    The Egyptians needed to withdraw from Yemen. They had had 
70,000 troops in there just before the Arab-Israeli war. They 
had about 25,000 reduced from a high of 70,000, had economic 
reasons for wanting to get out, and they began to withdraw and 
they are now out.
    As they pulled out and lessened their own numbers in Yemen, 
they also found themselves being supplanted directly by 
Russians.
    Now, as the Egyptians withdrew, and they had been steadily 
withdrawing since the Khartoum arrangement, they have been 
getting their money. Faisal has handled it very well. He has 
been handing it out to Nasser a little bit at a time and, as I 
might say, the Battle view of how to aid Nasser, he holds him--
--
    Senator Fulbright. So much a soldier. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Battle. Just about, sir.

                       INVITATION TO THE RUSSIANS

    So that the troops have withdrawn, and the last ones are 
now out. But at the same time the Russians have reinstituted 
their own interest in a direct involvement there.
    They had an invitation from the Yemen about two months ago. 
The Yemens said they would like to pay a military--send a 
military mission to Moscow, and the Russians said, ``Don't you 
come to us, we will come to you.''
    They sent several people down. They stayed for some days, 
and we have begun to see the results of this very clearly.
    Now, in the last weeks as the Egyptians have withdrawn, the 
royalists have also kicked up their heels. With some assistance 
from Faisal that they have had over the years, and from a few 
other assorted people including Iran, they have made it more 
difficult for the remaining Republican troops there. The 
Russians have responded to this very quickly. In the past 
month, the USSR has airlifted a number of MIG 15, 17 fighters 
as well as training aircraft in knock-down form into Yemen. 
These were being assembled by 40 Soviet technicians at Sana 
Airport, but the planes may have been moved to Hodeida to get 
away from this royalist shelling I mentioned a moment ago. 
There has been a crash program of small stuff going in NAN-12 
for some days now; it is hard to move any vast amount of 
equipment that way, but is does not take a lot to have an 
impact in this situation.

                         SOVIET PILOT SHOT DOWN

    What is disturbing is that a Soviet pilot was shot down 
there some days ago. We have gotten this pretty clearly 
established. There is no doubt, virtually no doubt, that this 
is accurate. This is the first time we had been aware of direct 
Soviet pilots in there.
    Senator Symington. Excuse me. This is the first time that a 
Soviet military person has been known to have been fighting or 
working in that part of the world, is that not correct?
    Mr. Battle. I think in direct fighting, yes, sir.
    Senator Symington. Advisers in Syria but indirect fighting.
    Mr. Battle. There were some reports of Russian officers 
captured during the Arab-Israeli war who were serving 
apparently as advisers. We have never had a complete 
confirmation of this, Mr. Chairman.
    There is no doubt that the Soviets are putting equipment 
in. They have put in about 30 military people which would 
support roughly six or eight pilots. The planes that they put 
down there, I do not think the Yemenis are capable of flying 
them, so I think we must assume that this is more than a one-
pilot thing.
    They have also been pouring in technicians, pouring them 
in; they have got several hundred in there.

                COMPETITION BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND CHINESE

    I think the Soviet interest in this area is several--I have 
been over this with the committee before, but I would like to 
repeat it. The Chinese have been active in Yemen for some time.
    I think there is a competition between the Chinese 
Communists and the Soviets over influence in that miserable 
place. There is only one reason for wanting to be there, and 
that is its location.
    Another interest is, as the British withdraw from the area, 
and I think this is deeply regrettable from our point of view, 
and I have urged them officially and unofficially for two years 
to reconsider their decision, but they are withdrawing. As they 
have withdrawn their power from Aden, this entire area looks 
more attractive to the Soviets than it has in the past. I think 
they see a vacuum there into which they are willing to make a 
commitment.
    I think the situation that exists with the new People's 
Republic of South Yemen, the Aden area and the immediate 
surroundings, is a very dangerous one.
    I think there are a couple of somewhat brighter spots than 
we thought possible a few months ago. The group that is in 
power there, the national liberation force, it is a far, far 
left organization, but it is not the Egyptian FFLOSY so-called, 
the Federation For the Liberation of South Yemen, which, I 
think, was even more radical in some respects and totally loyal 
to Egypt and would have created an Egyptian presence in that 
particular place.
    I think we have a momentary calm in Aden. It is not going 
to last. This is going to be a pressure point for some time.

                         TRYING TO INVOLVE NATO

    Now, your obvious question, I am sure, sir, is what are we 
able to do about it. The answer, sir, is not a great deal. We 
have tried repeatedly to involve NATO in this entire problem. 
The Mediterranean area and all this area seems to me a 
legitimate area for NATO to be concerned about. I went over to 
NATO in July and briefed the Council on our concern about this. 
Secretary Rusk has just been appearing before the Council this 
week. I have not had a full report on his talks, but we have 
been attempting to make them aware of the Soviet thrust in this 
area which I think is quite large, not just Yemen but 
throughout the Arab world.
    Senator Symington. Could I ask one question there?
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.

                         HOLD DOWN AN ARMS RACE

    Senator Symington. Do you think that with the Russians 
warning us about going into Cambodia, that they would pay much 
attention to what we wanted them to do in Yemen or Aden?
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to try it. I do 
not know how much attention they will pay to us, but we are now 
talking about another possible effort with the Soviets. We have 
tried several times over the last several years to reach some 
kind of understanding on arms limits in the area which is badly 
needed. So far it has had no effect, but I do not think we 
should give up on it. I think we have to keep on trying to hold 
down the arms race in that area. It is not easily done. I do 
not think they are going to--they may restrain themselves in 
Yemen, but I doubt if anything we say is going to make them 
reverse their course if you want an honest answer.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman?
    Senator Fulbright. I do not think I have any questions.
    Senator Symington. Senator Hickenlooper?

                 COMMUNIST ENCIRCLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Hickenlooper. Is there any question in your mind, 
Mr. Secretary, but that this is only the continuation of a 
farfetched and long-planned program to encircle the whole oil 
of the Middle East there and take over the Arabian peninsula? 
It seems to me it is so evident there is not any argument about 
it. When they get that, then Persia is gone. It is the 
encirclement puzzle and they will control the Red Sea, and all 
the approaches to that area, and in the meanwhile I do not know 
what we are doing about it.
    Mr. Battle. Senator, we have just had a study made of this 
called a--Julius Holmes did a study on the whole Russian thrust 
in the area. It comes up pretty much with the same conclusion 
you just enunciated.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I never read Julius Holmes' study, 
but it seems apparent on the face of it.
    Mr. Battle. You got the point without reading it, and I 
think it is quite true. I think their interests are several. I 
think it is oil; I think it is strategic location; I think it 
is political pressure.
    Let us never forget that there are three wars in this 
Middle East that we are fighting now, that the Arab-Israeli one 
goes on and on, the cold war goes on, and the struggle between 
the moderate and the radical Arabs goes on.

                    TAKING SIDES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

    Senator Hickenlooper. Of course we must be, I suppose, very 
careful about not taking too many sides but we have taken sides 
in the Middle East. We are supporting Israel a thousand 
percent, and we are kicking Faisal in the teeth. In that great 
area there is a chance that he, I think, would gravitate more 
and more toward a western orientation.
    I am not for him or against him one way or the other. That 
is not it. But I think we are making a terrible mistake there 
that is going to rise up to haunt us and cause us trouble.
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned about U.S. 
influence in the modern Arab states, particularly Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan. I think those are states in 
which we must not let our influence go.
    Senator Hickenlooper. We are rolling them over just as fast 
as they stick their heads up, I think.
    Mr. Battle. Well, sir, I assure you----
    Senator Hickenlooper. It looks to me that way.
    Mr. Battle. There is nothing I am more concerned about. We 
have had problems growing out of the Arab-Israeli war in terms 
of our relations with the moderate Arabs, but I think we have a 
great stake here and we simply must not ignore the importance 
to us economically and politically of those countries.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I could not agree with you 
more.
    Mr. Battle. Iran--I know the Shah of Iran has been very 
much concerned. He has been worried to death about Nasser and 
he is worried about the same line you are, Senator 
Hickenlooper, in terms of the thrust into the area.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It is not without its problems. I do 
not mean to say it is an easy solution, but there are too many 
influences pushing us just one way in that thing and that is 
going to rise up to smite you.

                    PROTECTING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

    Senator Fulbright. Do these Arabs ever remind you of our 
pledge to protect their territorial integrity of all the 
countries in the Middle East?
    Mr. Battle. Senator, I could not tell you how many 
discussions I have had with them. I try very hard to keep in 
touch with all the Arabs, even those countries we broke 
relations with. I might tell the committee after they had 
broken relations and during the General Assembly meeting I had 
the word passed in New York. We had several official and 
unofficial points of contact; we did not want to lose touch 
with them. I got Bob Anderson, Jack McCloy, several others, 
businessmen who have been very active in the Arab world, and I 
put two of our people in New York and sent word they were 
available to talk at any time. We have talked about every 
aspect of it including the question of territorial integrity.
    The general opinion of territorial integrity when defined 
in detail gets very complicated.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Well, they are hysterically emotional 
about this thing, and emotionally unreasonable in terms of our 
rights. It complicates the problem, no question about that.
    Mr. Battle. I think this mission that is out in the area 
now, Ambassador Goring is out there on behalf of the Secretary 
General of the U.N., and I am hopeful that not only will that 
mission be successful but that we can exercise such leverage as 
we have in two ways, well, both Arabs and Israelis, to bring 
about in time a settlement on this thing.
    I am not optimistic that it is coming quickly, but I think 
we have got to keep on trying and looking towards a permanent 
one and not a temporary cease-fire.
    Senator Symington. Senator Clark?

                      RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA

    Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, what evidence do you have of 
Russian penetration on the other side of the Red Sea either in 
French Somaliland or the Somalia Republic?
    Mr. Battle. Senator Clark, those are out of my area 
completely. The Chinese made a real effort in there for a time. 
I know the Russians have tried, but how broad it is or how 
effective it is, sir, I will have to refer you to my AF 
colleague. I have only the UAR on the African Continent.
    Senator Clark. Is it not important in terms of the 
administration of the State Department handling this thing that 
you are as concerned as you appear to be, and I share your 
concern, as to what the Russians are doing on the northeast 
shore of the Red Sea if there has been some----
    Mr. Battle. Well, I know a little bit about that. I am not 
quite as ignorant as I sounded. They have been active. I think 
the Chinese have not done awfully well in there, and the 
Russians continue to supplant them. They have tried to put in 
both aid and military assistance in there. I am not aware of 
any program at the moment that is active.
    Senator Clark. How about De Gaulle in Djibouti. I mean is 
he not in on the act?
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.
    Senator Clark. That seems too bad.
    One further question, Mr. Chairman.

                          ISRAELI REFUGEE PLAN

    Have you had a look at the five-year Israeli refugee plan 
which was in the paper this morning?
    Mr. Battle. I have discussed it generally. I have not seen 
that specific plan, but I had a long meeting with Comay, 
Ambassador Coman, last week on their attitude. I am generally 
familiar with what they have in mind, Senator Clark. I have not 
looked at that specific piece of paper.
    Senator Clark. Do you think it holds some hope for a basis 
for negotiation?
    Mr. Battle. I think you have got to cope with some of the 
political realities on this scene before you get very far on 
the refugees.
    There are some very deep-seated emotional problems that 
bring political problems. I think that unless you can get a 
basic understanding on a political settlement, it is going to 
be difficult indeed to get a real plan working on the refugees.
    Senator Clark. Is not the refugee problem one of the things 
that has to be solved as part of any political settlement?
    Mr. Battle. I think it has to be and my own view is that we 
ought to be whacking away at it as opportunity permits without 
ever saying we are solving it.
    This sounds like a non sequitur, but let me tell you 
specifically what I mean. If you talk about liquidating the 
problem of refugees, the Arabs get their backs up immediately 
because they have used it as a political weapon. They say there 
is only one solution and that is repatriation or compensation.
    However, many of those people could be placed, and I think 
capital projects--I talked with Jim Linen of Time Magazine who 
has been the leader in this project for Near East Emergency 
Donations--it is called NEED--and it has been suggested that 
while he never said he is trying to liquidate the problem that 
such funds they could put into it for capital projects that 
gave employment that gave permanence ought to be instituted 
without ever saying we are trying to liquidate or removing it, 
but simply do it.
    They have tried a certain amount of that. I hope the world 
can do a certain amount of this, but if you say we have a plan 
that is going to liquidate the problem, there is an immediate 
political difficulty, but you can go ahead with some projects.
    Senator Symington. Senator Case.

                      KEEPING THE BRITISH IN ADEN

    Senator Case. Back to Aden. That is over the hill now, but 
I wonder was there ever any discussion of the possibility of 
the British staying there if we helped pay the bill?
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir, there was. I cannot tell you--the 
Secretary had one or two conversations with the Foreign 
Minister that I am not completely informed about. They had a 
combination of a political problem and an economic one. The 
British--I do not quite know why, but the problem of 
colonialism has become a problem internally for them, and the 
pressure somehow this became a kind of symbol in Great Britain 
of colonialist policy, and the government wished to withdraw, 
so they told me, in London, for political reasons as well as 
economic ones.
    Moreover the cost was pretty heavy, and that was the main 
thing.
    We did indicate, I think they would have stayed if we 
picked up the bill. We explored it, but it did not get very 
far.
    Senator Case. I ask because there are other places, as in 
Singapore, where this same thing may come up again and you run 
into the same British political problem and we have to think 
about something else.
    Mr. Battle. Yes.
    Senator Case. I have no further questions.
    Senator Symington. Senator Pell.
    Senator Pell. No questions.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask along that line here. Has 
it not been pretty well bandied about that Britain has adopted 
a firm policy of getting out of everything east of Suez?
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir, or getting out bit by bit.
    Senator Hickenlooper. But that is their policy--
disassociate themselves politically from everything east of 
Suez.

                    CONNECTION TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM

    Senator Fulbright. Just a general question. I am just 
curious what the Secretary's view would be, if there is any 
connection between the war in Vietnam and the Russian movement 
in this and other places.
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I do not think so. I think the 
Russian movement in this area is not a new thing. This has been 
underway for quite a long time.
    Senator Symington. Yes, but if I may interject there and in 
context, it is known that we are short of people. It is known 
we are terribly short of engineers. It is known we are terribly 
short of helicopters in the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. 
It is known we have 475,000 people today, and tomorrow we will 
have 500,000 in Vietnam. We have got the Seventh Fleet out 
there; the head of NATO and CincPac in Naples; SHAPE in the 
south--they call it CincPac South; the southern part of NATO is 
worried sick about Mers-El-Kebir and the growing axis between 
France, Algeria, and the Soviet Union.
    On the western side of the Mediterranean they have got the 
best naval base in Alexandria. They are going to get maybe soon 
the best naval base in the western Mediterranean. Do you think 
they would be doing this if they did not know we were so deeply 
bogged down in the Far East? That is the gist of the chairman's 
question?
    Mr. Battle. They have had pressure on the UAR and Syria and 
Algeria for quite a number of years now.

                         BABYSITTING THE WORLD

    Senator Symington. But for 200 years, as the Senator from 
Iowa said, this is--I have not read the Holmes' report, but we 
have known for 200 years the czars have wanted the warm water, 
that has been tremendously increased as a prize as the result 
of the development of oil.
    Eighty percent of the oil for Europe comes from this part 
of the world. The British economy in my opinion is washed up, 
finished and done if they lose the Mideast oil based on what I 
have tried to find out about it, and therefore they certainly--
you remember how fast they dropped paratroopers into Kuwait, 
and yet now they are getting out of Aden, and here we are 
loaded down in Korea, loaded down in effect in Japan, Formosa.
    Senator Fulbright. Vietnam.
    Senator Symington. Above all in Vietnam.
    Mr. Battle. Loaded down in Europe, and we are babysitting 
the world.
    The question, as I see it, they wanted to do it for a long 
time; I think everybody would agree to that. But is it not the 
fact that we steadily get deeper and deeper mired down in 
Vietnam, in your opinion, the question is asked you, is that 
not one of the reasons why, when, what is it, when the cat's 
away, the mice will play or something. We think we are a pretty 
big cat apparently, and is there not a little more playing 
going on because we are down----
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, you can never entirely divorce 
one part of the world from another. The issue in one part of 
the world has an effect elsewhere. There is no doubt about 
that. I only was trying to say I think the Russians have been 
at this for some time and whether we had gotten involved in 
Vietnam or not, I think they would be going in in one degree or 
another.

                  DISASSOCIATING PROBLEMS FROM VIETNAM

    Senator Fulbright. Of course, I am afraid the chairman 
might have influenced your answer. I wanted to see what you 
would say. But because you do take the position these are 
disassociated--that is the official line, that these are quite 
disassociated, not only that it is disassociated from Vietnam 
but all of our domestic problems have nothing to do with 
Vietnam. That is the Administration policy line, is it not?
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, more or less. I am not 
responsible for Vietnam. I have got enough problems in my own 
area.
    Senator Fulbright. I know that. I was just speculating on 
what you would say.
    Mr. Battle. I am not going to engage with you in debate on 
this.
    Senator Fulbright. I do not want a debate. I wanted you to 
put on the record what the administration's attitude is.
    Senator Pell. Would the Senator yield there?
    I thought the Administration's view was it was not 
disassociated but one vast Communist plot, and that what went 
on in any part of the world had its effect in any other part of 
the world because the strings are all being pulled from one 
place.
    [Discussion off the record.]

                      ARMS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, again because I may not be here, 
I would like to inform the committee of one other small problem 
because I do not want there to be any danger of the committee 
not feeling I did not tell them something.
    As you know we enunciated a new arms policy for Pakistan 
and India some time ago. We have been trying very hard to 
adhere to that policy. The policy very basically is to supply 
spare parts. We closed the MAAG in both countries, and we have 
not put in any major tanks, planes, etcetera, in either 
country. We have been trying--we have been urging them to cut 
down their own defense expenditures. The only way in which we 
had any involvement with major equipment was through third 
country sales. I only want to inform the committee that the 
Pakistanis have been shopping around for some time for tanks. 
They have approached it, several other countries including the 
Italians who have been to us about selling, they wanted 200 M-
47 tanks. In line with the policy that this committee has been 
informed of, we have said that major equipment would be 
supplied even in a third country situation with our approval 
only if it replaced obsolescent material. We have told them 200 
tanks we felt were excessive. We would consider 100 provided 
several criteria were met. We had no intention of purchasing 
additional ones from China, and that they agreed these were 
replacements on a one for one basis. This deal has not gone 
through. It is still--they are talking not only--the Paks are 
talking with the Italians and with the Belgians, but I wanted 
you to know that this possibility is before us. We have made no 
decision that will be in line with that general policy and I 
was afraid if it happened while you were away you would wonder 
why I had not told you about it. I wanted you to know.

                IRANIAN ARMS PURCHASES FROM SOVIET UNION

    Senator Symington. Will you tell us now about the $40 
million in purchases by the Iranians from the Soviet Union?
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir. This is an extension of the earlier 
deal that you are completely familiar with.
    Senator Pell. May I interrupt. As just one member of the 
committee, I would hope you would not even approve 100. I 
realize that would just be maintaining the status quo. I would 
hope gradually there would be an attenuation of the military 
equipment both countries have, and I realize that is not a 
majority view, but I wanted to express my view.
    Mr. Battle. Senator Pell, we have tried to cut down their 
defense expenditures, and I can report that they reduced their 
budget by 3 percent since we instituted this policy. I have 
been talking with both of them about it. The Indians told me 
the Paks are cheating. They have not really reduced it, but 
based on what they submitted to us and showed us. I assure you 
we have been over this step by step by step. There is no 
opening of all the arms arsenals of this country or any other 
country that we have control of. We are simply trying to hold 
down the arms race on a realistic basis.
    Now, sir, on the question about the Iranians, in November 
of '67 we were informed of a $44 million extension of the 
earlier arms deal with similar payment terms. Those terms are 
ten years at 2\1/2\ percent interest whereby the USSR would 
supply 500 armored personnel carriers, 40 tank transports, 
2,200 trucks and jeeps, and six mobile maintenance shops. This 
is still not public knowledge. It is exactly the relationship 
to the original agreement we are not sure.
    I would like to point out that as soon as we heard about 
this we informed the chairman--and I do hope to have an 
opportunity to be meeting with you soon so the committee would 
know it. We have tried to discourage this.
    I would like to point out the Iranians have been very 
restrained in their acceptance of personnel which I think is 
the very great danger, and, from their point of view, this deal 
makes economic sense.
    I also must point out to you that the Shah is deeply 
concerned about the same thing that we were talking about this 
afternoon, which is the Russian thrust in the area. I suspect 
we are going to have further appeals from him for additional 
military equipment over the next few years.
    Senator Symington. If I may finally ask one question, 
please----
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir.

                 FRENCH REFUSAL TO SELL ARMS TO ISRAEL

    Senator Symington. Senator Javits made a speech on the 
floor the day before yesterday about arms. Apparently General 
de Gaulle has refused to give, or sell rather, to the Israelis, 
at least to this point, arms that they have already paid for, 
tens of millions of dollars, $42 million that France has taken. 
I read that he said that they disobeyed him. ``Israel disobeyed 
me,'' is a quote.
    There are only three countries making this kind of 
weaponry: one is the Soviet Union that is rearming the Arabs; 
one is General de Gaulle who is now rumored--and Senator Javits 
mentioned in his speech--to be sending to Iraq the planes he 
was going to sell to Israel; and the third ourselves. Nobody 
else, to the best of my knowledge, in production makes the type 
and character of sophisticated weaponry that the Israelis need.
    For the record, and before we leave, I have seen figures 
which show that the total number of modern Israeli planes 
today, combat planes, is 75. I have checked it and rechecked 
it, and I believe that is about right, and they have no 
bombers. The total number already of Arab planes, fighters, is 
around 580. Bombers, the figures are not important--the bombers 
they have considerable of including new bombers they have given 
Iraq which are beyond the two-way range of Israeli fighters.
    Their situation, therefore, according to Senator Javits, 
and I must say I have heard the same, I did not know he was 
going to make the speech and I was not in town when he made it. 
But their situation, therefore, means that Israel could be 
subject any time now, especially with borrowed pilots, and the 
Algerians put 40 pilots into Egypt in the last episode in June, 
they could be subject any time to an attack from the air, which 
would be dangerous because of the size of the distances 
involved.
    With the premise that these figures are reasonably accurate 
and the condition is reasonably stated, which was in the talk 
that I read that he made, what is our policy going to be about 
letting them buy military equipment from us?
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, let me make several comments on 
it.

                          THE CHURCH AMENDMENT

    Senator Symington. Before you do it, I want to say this: 
People high in the Administration have been telling other 
people that because we passed the Church amendment that we made 
it impossible to help Israel with arms. I want to say for the 
record that is not true. I have investigated it very carefully. 
The Church amendment had primarily to do with undeveloped 
countries that were being sold arms in South America that we 
did not know about, despite the fact when they came up for 
economic aid they assured us that the military aid was not 
going to go. Perhaps that is one of the reasons that the 
Defense Department tried so hard to keep the names of the 
country involved in the country X deal from being known. Mr. 
Bader knows this story backwards and forwards because the 
Chairman let him work with me on it.
    Now, the story has gotten around that because of what the 
Senate did, it is not possible for this country to supply arms 
to Israel.
    We know, you and I know, that that is false. What I would 
like to do would be to find out why. What is the reason for not 
supplying these arms quickly in the interest of the United 
States?
    So far as I know, with the possible exception of a few 
Australians, the Israelis are the only people who are doing any 
fighting at any place in the entire world for us unless they 
are paid--that is, against Soviet aggression, and if that is 
important.

                          ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL

    Now, that is just a premise which is really not pertinent 
to the thrust of my question. What are we going to do if these 
people come and ask us to purchase arms from us? You have told 
us about Pakistan. We know about Iran. We know about the five 
countries in South America. What is going to be our policy with 
respect to Israel if they put up the money?
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make several 
comments.
    As you said, the figures are less important than the basic 
issue.
    I think the question of the accuracy of the figures depends 
upon your definition of ``modern,'' but let us not argue that.
    Senator Symington. I will say 155 fighters all told for 
Israel, and 75 of those I would consider, namely the Super 
Mystere and the Mirage, modern fighters against MIG 21's or SU-
7's.
    Mr. Battle. I would like to say, sir, we are following this 
issue. I spent a great deal of time on this in recent days. I 
expect to spend a great deal more time on it in the days ahead. 
I was authorized to say this afternoon only that no decision 
has been made with respect to the future, but I would like to 
comment on two or three of the points made.
    First, as far as the French deal, the Israelis bought 50 
Mirages. Their traditional supplier of planes, from the French 
pre-war, you are quite right. They paid not for all but a good 
portion of it, and the Israelis prefer the Mirage and wanted 
it. We also over the years have preferred not to be the only 
supplier, and the Israelis concur with that view, and therefore 
we hoped that they would continue to supply it.
    Senator Symington. May I just in context--we preferred to 
be not a supplier. There are no modern American combat 
airplanes in Israel.
    Mr. Battle. No, sir, I meant all kinds of military 
equipment. There are other kinds of equipment, too, so we have 
supplied military equipment.

                    SPECULATION ABOUT FRENCH MOTIVES

    So far as the status of this order is concerned, it has 
been rather interesting to watch over the last few days. I 
talked with Mr. Eban in September when he was here. He told me 
then that he felt that the French would live up to the 
contract, having gone as far as it had including the money. 
Since that time, the Israelis have told us they had serious 
doubts that the French were going to live up to that 
arrangement.
    A few days ago there was a statement made and a good deal 
of speculation that the French were playing around in Iraqi oil 
and were going to commit military equipment to the Iraqis. At 
that same time that story came out, there were two other 
stories that accompanied it. One was an intelligence report 
that there were a hundred Mirages about to be sold to Belgium 
and that those included the 50 for Israel, the destination of 
them after that not identified.
    Second, the story was that 50 Mirages would go to Iraq of 
the group, of the ones that had been planned for Israel.
    A debate then began in France and after the first--heavily 
involving the question of anti-Semitism and following that the 
French were forced to a rather strange and hard-to-understand 
statement. That statement said that they had not diverted 50 
planes from Israel to Iraq. They did not say they were going on 
with the sale, however, but they made it very clear they had 
not diverted them.
    Now, in checking into the matter, I found that we had 
authorized export licenses for Sperry gyroscopes for those 
planes. On the basis that it was a contract for the sale of 
those 50 gyroscopes to Israel through commercial channels 
rather than governmental ones, which I will explain in a 
moment, I sent a message that those had been authorized on the 
basis those planes were being delivered to Israel, and that if 
they were not sent there we would consider this a violation on 
the terms of the original arrangement.
    At the moment our embassy in Paris believes--I am not sure 
this is not an overstatement--that probably the French will go 
through, after dragging their feet for a while, with their 
contract. The Israelis do not believe so. It is an open 
question. It is at least a possibility that has changed in the 
last two or three days.

                    THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IMBALANCE

    Now, we are concerned about the Israeli, the possibility of 
an imbalance. The military authorities in our country do not 
think there is an immediate threat. There is, however, a 
potential problem there.
    Senator Symington. They are the same ones who have been 
giving us information on the other war.
    Mr. Battle. I suspect pretty much the same, Mr. Chairman.
    We have made no decision on this, but we are watching this 
very, very closely and including the possibility of the French 
and their arrangement.
    We have talked in general terms with the French about arms 
policies, but they have not been very forthcoming so far. We 
are considering another demarche to them in the very near 
future.
    As you know, I reported to the committee some weeks ago we 
were providing 48 A-4s to--that number is not public knowledge 
and I hope it will be handled with care--to the Israelis, 
deliveries to start this month. It would be at about the rate 
of four a month and would be completed at the end of the year. 
All I can say to you is we are watching this most carefully, 
and I assure you it will get very, very careful attention. I 
will be very happy during the next weeks to keep in touch with 
you about it, Mr. Chairman, if that is the wish of the 
committee, or with Mr. Marcy or with anyone you designate 
because I think this is an area in which you have a very 
legitimate interest and I would hope I would keep you informed.

                     U.S. ARMS POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL

    Senator Symington. First, because my senior colleagues are 
interested in this, I wish any information you do get, you 
would give to Mr. Marcy so he could give it to the chairman, 
Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Gore, or any members of the 
committee.
    As I understand it, what you are saying is (a) we are going 
to deliver the planes to Israel that we had already agreed to 
deliver to them.
    Mr. Battle. That is right, which were held up after the war 
when all arms sales were suspended.
    Senator Symington. And (b), despite the development in 
France or anywhere else, we have not yet reached a decision to 
sell them any additional arms. In both cases I should use the 
word ``sale.'' We have not reached any decision to sell them 
any additional arms beyond what we agreed before the June war.
    Mr. Battle. That is substantially accurate. That is 
certainly accurate on planes. I think there is additional small 
stuff, spares, things of that sort.
    Senator Symington. But you know their problem----
    Mr. Battle. Your concern, sir, is entirely legitimate. All 
I can do at this moment, I tried to see whether a decision 
could be made before I had this hearing. I did not obtain 
clearance for one. I assure you we are watching this most 
carefully, and I will be in touch with you.

                         THE PROBLEM OF JORDAN

    I would also like to mention the problem of Jordan in 
passing. We have, I think, a very serious political problem 
there as well as a military one. Jordan is the only country 
that has had no additional equipment. While we had contracted 
for planes before the Arab-Israeli war, there is no thought at 
the moment of putting in planes. We do have before us a request 
for $6.5 million in miscellaneous spare parts, some ammunition, 
some recoilless rifles that we will have to consider. The main 
issue here is whether we are going to be a supplier or going to 
have the Soviets be a supplier of Jordan.
    Senator Symington. You decided, as I understand it, that 
you should give aid to other Arab countries if you gave the aid 
to Israel or rather sold-we should sell aid or give aid to 
other Arab countries if we sold to Israel what we agreed to 
sell to them before.

                        SALES TO ARAB COUNTRIES

    So that has been done. What are the Arab countries that we 
are now selling arms or giving arms to?
    Mr. Battle. Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, something for Lebanon, 
very little, but a little bit, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, but that 
is so small----
    Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman?

                       SALE OF TANKS TO PAKISTAN

    Senator Fulbright. I wanted to clear up about these tanks 
because this was a matter that Senator Symington had a good 
deal of hearings about. In this last hearing with Mr. Cummings, 
I read from it on page 40 in that Mr. Bader said, ``There is a 
minimum of 5,000 tanks,'' Western Europe.
    Mr. Cummings said, ``Available----''.
    Mr. Bader said, ``For resale around the world.''
    And Mr. Cummings said, ``Right, and that ignores MAP 
material. In Belgium there are tremendous quantities of tanks. 
The exact number is classified and not really known to me, but 
Italy the same way. Italy is the largest holder of M-47s. Mr. 
Kuss is presently discussing giving these German tanks to 
Italy. If that happens, I guarantee you Pakistan will meet 
their requirements.''
    And Mr. Bader informs me that presently Mr. Kuss is in 
Italy making arrangements to handle these M-47 tanks for 
Pakistan. Is that correct?
    Mr. Battle. No, sir, not to my knowledge.
    Senator Fulbright. Would you know?
    Mr. Battle. Well, this could not be done without my 
approval.
    Senator Fulbright. Without your knowledge.
    Mr. Battle. Yes, sir. I will tell you exactly where he is, 
Mr. Chairman. The Italian ambassador came in to me about a week 
or ten days ago asking what our attitude would be. I told him--
on this sale he said they wanted 200 tanks. I said that we 
would consider that an unnecessarily large figure, that we 
would entertain a request for 100. We would have to know a lot 
of specific things. For example, the origins of the tanks, the 
state, condition of them, the cost of them, the financing of 
them, and we would have to--we also have had talks in Pakistan. 
They have been on the trail of tanks for some time.
    We would also have to have assurances that for each tank 
they bought that it was a replacement from one they had on 
hand, and it would have to be shown.
    Senator Fulbright. Would Mr. Kuss handle these tanks 
without your approving or knowing?
    Mr. Battle. Sir, I do not see how it is possible. I have 
tried very hard to make sense out of this arms policy. It is 
difficult to do.
    Senator Fulbright. It sure is.
    Mr. Battle. But we are watching it on a point-by-point 
basis, Mr. Chairman, and I am trying--I hope to keep this 
committee informed and I am making a very honest effort to do 
so. This is why I wanted you to know this deal was around 
before because, if something should happen on it, this is 
within the lines of the policy we described to you. But I do 
think that we should keep you informed on these matters.
    Senator Pell. As a question of geography, Mr. Chairman, 
would it not be correct to say that tanks could only be used by 
Pakistan against India? They could not possibly be used against 
China because of the mountains.
    Mr. Battle. Senator Pell, I do not know my geography that 
well.
    Senator Pell. I think geography will show----
    Senator Hickenlooper. Because of the terrain.
    Senator Pell. You cannot get the tanks over the mountains. 
I think geography will show these tanks are intended for India.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, before the chairman 
leaves, I want to say to you that this committee has complete 
confidence in you.
    Senator Pell. Amen.
    Mr. Battle. I appreciate that.

                 THE PENTAGON AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

    Senator Symington. We get more information from you in less 
time, in my opinion, than anybody around.
    Now, what the chairman of this committee says is pretty 
fundamentally serious to me. Either Mr. Kuss is in Italy 
working on this deal and you do not know about it, or he is not 
in Italy, so then you should not know about it. If he is in 
Italy, without your permission or approval or knowledge, then I 
think that you have got a problem. There are going to be some 
changes, we understand, over in the Pentagon, and maybe this is 
the time--you know, this is a time you might move in there and 
say, ``By the way, if it is all right with you, the State 
Department would like to have something to do with foreign 
policy being set through the sale of purchase or renting of 
arms.''
    For what it is worth, it is just something to think about.
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, he might be in Italy without my 
knowledge, but, so help me, if there is any arrangement made 
without my knowledge of these hundred tanks, there is really 
going to be an explosion.
    There are other countries with whom the Paks have been 
talking, the Belgians among them. They mentioned Iran, which we 
tended to rather discourage, and the only one I have had any 
direct talk with has been Italy along the lines.

                        FRENCH-ISRAELI RELATIONS

    Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you about this: What 
caused the change in the relationship between France and 
Israel? France was supplying Israel before the war. France 
worked with Israel on the secret atomic plant that Israel had, 
and so on, and now they seem to not be buddies so much.
    Mr. Battle. Well, I think there are two or three factors in 
this. One, I think the French are playing the oil game here in 
several respects. Secondly, I think they have watched our own 
relationship with Egypt and others go into periods of decline 
and they would like to replace us as a major western influence.
    Third, their relations with the Soviets in this area, I 
think, are at least interesting to speculate about. They 
continue to talk in terms of a Big Four arrangement, for 
example, on peace in the area that sort of thing. But basically 
I think they are trying to increase their own influence with a 
minimum of outlay and with the oil in mind.
    As far as Israel is concerned, I strongly suspect that they 
have continued, at the same time they have denied it, the 
supply of small spare parts to them even though they publicly 
profess to have an embargo.
    Senator Hickenlooper. You mean at the same time the 
Israelis deny it also.
    Mr. Battle. The Israelis have not denied it to me, not the 
small spares. I think they have not denied it. I suspect that 
the French have gone on.
    I suspect the dollar or the Israeli pound has a good deal 
of influence in France, and I would not rule out the 
possibility they will find out a way to make--at the same time 
they profess in an effort to establish a very warm relationship 
with the Arabs, they may still work out some third country 
deal. I would not rule it out.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.
    Senator Symington. Mr. Secretary, we are always rewarded by 
the privilege and pleasure of listening to your mellifluous 
words and sound logic.
    Mr. Battle. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I think you have fully explained and 
clarified everything.
    Mr. Battle. I have not solved any of them. It is good to 
see you, sir.
    [Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]


        BRIEFING ON NEWS STORIES ON THE NLF IN SAIGON & THE U.N.

                              ----------                              


                      Thursday, December 14, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 o'clock 
a.m. in Room S-116, The Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright 
(Chairman) presiding.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators, Sparkman, 
Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, 
Carlson, Mundt, Case and Cooper.
    Also present: Senator Young of North Dakota.
    William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for 
Congressional Relations; Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary, 
State Department.
    Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Jones, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. 
Bader of the committee staff.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    There have been a number of news reports recently 
concerning an initiative made by the National Liberation Front 
to send representatives to the United Nations and of the arrest 
in Saigon of a Viet Cong agent alleged to be on his way to a 
meeting with American officials.
    This committee would like to have an explanation of what 
actually happened in these two incidents, and obtain 
information on our general policy about contacts with the 
National Liberation Front.
    We are very pleased to have this morning the Under 
Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach to give us any 
enlightenment you can.
    Will you proceed, Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS DeB. KATZENBACH, THE ACTING 
                       SECRETARY OF STATE

    Secretary Katzenbach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Much of the information that I am giving both in this brief 
statement and in answering questions is quite sensitive and is 
classified Top Secret.
    You have asked for information with respect to recent news 
stories. The first of these has to do with the fact that it has 
been reported that the NLF has sought to send representatives 
to the U.N. The second with the fact that a representative of 
the NLF was arrested recently while he was on his way to a 
meeting at the United States Embassy in Saigon.
    Let me say at the outset that while news stories on these 
two matters broke at approximately the same time, there is 
absolutely no connection between them. With respect to the 
first, I think Ambassador Goldberg has already clarified the 
essential facts for the press, but I will give you what 
supplementary information we possess. With respect to the 
second, I will give you the essential facts, but I would like 
to caution you now and later that this matter still involves a 
possibility for the exchange of prisoners and for that reason 
should be treated with complete secrecy.

                     THE NLF AND THE UNITED NATIONS

    The facts with respect to the NLF and the U.N. are simply 
as follows:
    On September 22, 1967, a high-ranking member of the U.N. 
Secretariat gave Ambassador Goldberg the following personal 
oral message----
    The Chairman. What was that date?
    Secretary Katzenbach. September 22, 1967. High-ranking 
member of the U.N. Secretariat gave Ambassador Goldberg the 
following personal oral message from the Secretary General. He 
said the Secretary General had received from an unnamed person 
an inquiry as to whether or not the United States would be 
agreeable to having ``two or three NLF representatives come to 
the U.N. in a private capacity to attend the present session of 
the General Assembly.'' Ambassador Goldberg told the U.N. 
official that without further information as to the purpose of 
the trip it would be difficult to give even a personal 
reaction.
    On September 26, the same official gave Ambassador Goldberg 
some additional information provided by the Secretary General. 
He said the NLF individuals had indicated they would need to 
know Washington's reaction to granting them visas, and if 
Washington would be receptive if the request were made through 
another government having relations with the United States. If 
Washington was negative, the NLF would wish the whole matter 
dropped without publicity.

                         QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

    The next day Ambassador Goldberg told the U.N. official 
that before the United States could reach a final judgment in 
the matter we would wish to know (1) who the intermediary is 
and how reliable the Secretary General feels him to be; (2) 
what kind of passports would be used and what kind of visas 
would be requested and for what duration; (3) who the NLF 
individuals were; and (4) what is the exact purpose of their 
visit and does it embrace conversations with the United States 
Government? With respect to the last point Ambassador Goldberg 
observed to the U.N. official that if there was any serious 
desire on the part of the NLF to have conversations with the 
United States it was his view that coming to the U.N. would 
probably be the least desirable way of guaranteeing the 
security and secrecy of such discussions. Nothing further was 
heard until November 3, 1967 when the U.N. official provided 
Ambassador Goldberg with the following answers to the last 
three questions posed:
    ``1. Number two: One leading Central Committee member and 
an aide. (Names to be provided when agreement is forthcoming in 
principle.)
    ``2. Passport: Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North 
Vietnam) preferred. Diplomatic passport--''
    Senator Gore. I didn't understand that word.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North 
Vietnam) preferred.''
    The Chairman. What does that mean?
    Secretary Katzenbach. As to what kind of passport they 
would prefer, they would prefer to travel on a North Vietnam 
diplomatic passport (must). If it is not acceptable, will get a 
passport from a U.N. member state.
    ``3. Duration. One year but may consider six months stay. 
Would like some assurances for possibly two years.
    ``4. Purpose: Work principally at U.N. but would not refuse 
radio/TV/press interviews.''
    The U.N. intermediary added that the SYG now assumed that 
the North Vietnamese were in fact aware of the request.
    Senator Lausche. What you are reading now, is that all in 
writing taken from documents or are these oral?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, the four points I gave you were a 
piece of paper that was handed on behalf of the Secretary-
General by a member of the Secretariat to Ambassador Goldberg 
as the response given to the questions that he had asked.
    Senator Gore. May I ask----
    Senator Lausche. Were Goldberg's questions in writing?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, Goldberg's questions were given--
presented them orally. He may have put the four questions in 
writing. I would have to check whether he put them in writing--
they were oral only.
    Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman?

                          ROLE OF RALPH BUNCHE

    Is there any particular reason, Mr. Secretary, why you do 
not identify the representative of the Secretary General?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, it was Mr. Ralph Bunche.
    Senator Gore. The reason I asked----
    Secretary Katzenbach. Simply because his name has not been 
entered.
    Senator Gore. He is, the reason I ask, Bunche is extremely 
close to U Thant.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes. There was never, may I say, 
Senator, there was never any questions in my mind that he was 
actively representing the Secretary General's views.
    Senator Gore. That is all I wish to clear up.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes.
    The U.N. intermediary added that the Secretary General now 
assumed that the North Vietnamese were in fact aware of the 
request.

               THE U.S. WOULD NOT OBJECT TO VISAS FOR NLF

    On November 15 Ambassador Goldberg gave to the U.N. 
official the following response: This is in quotes and this was 
given in writing:

    As the Secretary General is aware, Ambassador Goldberg has 
stated publicly that the United States would not object or 
stand in the way of NLF representatives Security Council 
discussion of Vietnam. We would be prepared to grant visas in 
connection with such Security Council proceedings.
    We note that North Vietnam passport preferred. This would 
be acceptable to us under the circumstances noted above.

    There are two footnotes to this story. On December 9 the 
Hanoi official radio stated that it had monitored the following 
statement from the NLF refuting a new lie of U.S. propaganda:

    The U.S. propaganda machine recently spread rumors that the 
NLFSV had expressed the desire to send its representative to 
the United Nations to give its views on the Vietnam question. 
Liberation Press Agency is authorized to declare that this is 
sheer fabrication.

    The NLF liberation radio finally broadcast the above 
statement forty-four hours after Radio Hanoi had supposedly 
``monitored'' it. Second, yesterday at the U.N. a document was 
circulated by the Roumanian Government purporting to give the 
NLF case for its activities in South Vietnam.
    And I will be happy to provide the committee copies of that 
document when I get it.
    Senator Cooper. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?
    The Chairman. Yes.

                          HANOI RADIO REPORTS

    Senator Cooper. Did the Hanoi radio report that the NLF had 
rejected this story?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, it reported it had 
monitored the NLF radio on this and it was quoting from what 
the NLF had said, only the NLF didn't get around to saying it 
until 44 hours later.
    Senator Cooper. Then the NLF finally did make a statement?
    Secretary Katzenbach. The NLF made the identical statement 
44 hours after Radio Hanoi had monitored it.
    I go on, Mr. Chairman, either I can answer questions on 
that aspect of it now or I can go on with the Saigon matter, as 
you please.
    The Chairman. Maybe you should proceed. The real point is 
on this matter as you go along.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Okay.

                   RELUCTANCE TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE

    Senator Gore. One clarifying question, not that it is 
particularly important, but I just wondered if our government 
knows, and if it knows, if there is any reluctance to 
identifying the source of the communication to the Secretary 
General. That may have a bearing, if you know it.
    Secretary Katzenbach. We do not know it. I put my second 
footnote to this as a possible inference.
    Senator Gore. Fine, thank you very much.
    Secretary Katzenbach. But I don't know it.
    Senator Gore. Thank you.
    Senator Lausche. Did you draw any conclusion as to the 
genuineness of the purpose of the communists of South Vietnam 
based upon these different things that transpired? Was there a 
conclusion reached that this had no relationship to a purpose 
to discuss peace or that it was only intended to use the United 
Nations as a platform for its propaganda?
    The Chairman. That ought to come at the end when he 
finishes, if I may suggest. He hasn't finished yet.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I finished on that particular one.
    The Chairman. What?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I finished on the U.N. contact but I 
will go on with the other and I will take your question, then, 
Senator Lausche, or whatever procedure you wish to follow.
    Senator Lausche. All right.

                           U.S.-NLF CONTACTS

    Secretary Katzenbach. I would like now to give you the 
basic facts of the so-called U.S.-NLF contacts in Saigon about 
which there has been so much speculation in the press. I would 
like to re-emphasize that this is a very delicate matter, not 
because it involves as has been said, important U.S.-NLF 
contacts, but because it involves a possible exchange of 
prisoners and therefore could be the means to securing the 
release of some of our sick and wounded in the hands of the VC.
    In my judgment, the unfortunate publicity already given to 
this matter, has seriously jeopardized its success, but it is 
still an ongoing possibility.
    The simple facts are these. Some time ago as a part of a 
routine police operation, a VC agent was arrested. On his 
person this agent had a message addressed to Ambassador Bunker. 
It suggested the possibility of U.S.-VC prisoner exchange, 
including the possibility of U.S. pilots held by Hanoi.
    This message was promptly turned over to our Embassy by 
Vietnamese authorities [deleted].
    In consultation and agreement with the high South 
Vietnamese officials we have made efforts to follow up this 
possibility [deleted].
    As you can imagine, this process is not only a delicate 
one, but a slow one. The NLF now wishes the South Vietnamese 
Government to release its so-called ``emissary'' and a number 
of VC cadre of ranging importance as a necessary preliminary to 
an exchange of prisoners. Such a unilateral release--at least 
in the first instance--raises difficulties for the South 
Vietnamese Government since it would have to explain to its own 
knowledgeable officials, and perhaps to the public, why it 
released known VC prisoners. Unfortunately the present 
publicity, which includes wild rumors now floating around 
Saigon, have greatly aggravated this problem. Any release, 
unless in the format of an exchange such as the Rudolph Abel-
Gary Powers exchange, would have to be kept secret. This has 
become harder to do since public revelation and speculation.
    Despite these difficulties, we are still hopeful that this 
operation will become possible and lead to the release of some 
American prisoners.
    This is our objective and it can only be prejudiced by 
further public speculation.
    Let me add that no high-ranking American official has at 
any time during this operation had any direct contact or 
discussion with representatives of the NLF; that Ambassador 
Bunker has, of course, been in full charge on the U.S. side of 
the efforts towards a prisoner exchange; that throughout this 
operation high officials of the South Vietnamese Government 
have acted with us in seeking to forward the objective. The 
United States has not taken--and was not in a position to 
take--any action without the full cooperation and consent of 
the South Vietnamese Government.

                      IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE CUSTODY

    The Chairman. Is this last statement to be taken that we 
have no influence with them? I mean, they have complete control 
of the situation?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, I don't mean we have no influence 
with them. I mean they are their prisoners. They are in the 
custody of the people----
    The Chairman. Did they take these prisoners or did we take 
them?
    Secretary Katzenbach. They took them. And as far as the 
people they now want released and some other people that they 
would have an interest in, these are VC cadre that have been 
picked up in one place or another and they are in the custody 
of the South Vietnamese authorities.

                   PRISONER RELEASES NOT RECIPROCATED

    The Chairman. I have not followed this as closely, of 
course, as I should have. I am told Newsweek said that these 
representatives of the NLF have been contacting us several 
times, frequently. Is that true or not, or is this the first 
instance?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, this is the first instance.
    The Chairman. We have never had one of this kind for 
exchange of prisoners or anything else?
    Secretary Katzenbach. We have made efforts in various 
places around the world to find out if there was any interest 
through the use of intermediaries in having any discussions 
with respect to prisoner exchange and we have always been 
turned down flatly. This is the first time there has been 
anything which indicated the possibility of prisoner exchange 
through any kind of work. There have been prisoners released, 
as you know.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Secretary Katzenbach. In the Christmas period, the Tet 
period, and this has been reciprocated by our releases.
    The Chairman. Without any negotiations.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Without any negotiations or 
discussion or understandings or direct or indirect or anything 
like that.
    The Chairman. Senator Gore, do you have any questions?

                            ROLE OF THE CIA

    Senator Gore. Yes. Pursuing the questions of contacts I 
notice you say--no high-ranking U.S. officials. Would you be a 
little more explicit about this? Please understand my questions 
are not critical. I would be inclined to be critical if I did 
not think or if you did not have [deleted] as much contact as 
possible with the dissident elements within South Vietnam. So I 
preface this just to say I am not asking critical questions but 
I am asking for information. To what extent do we have contacts 
with NLF?
    Secretary Katzenbach. On the basis where we have knowledge 
of the fact that they are NLF members almost nothing.
    Senator Gore. [deleted]
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, that is correct. I made the 
statement that I made here simply because obviously [deleted] 
we are not in position to say no, we have not had any contact 
with members of the NLF because we do have contacts with these 
people when they are picked up by Vietnamese authorities or as 
part of any kind of a joint operation or that kind of thing we 
have contact with. Beyond that, we simply do not.
    The stories that Saigon had said this fellow was on his way 
to meet Ambassador Bunker and they were meeting at the American 
Embassy and so forth. So I emphasize that point because the 
truth of the matter is [deleted]
    Ambassador Bunker and no other member of the Embassy staff 
has even talked with the fellow or seen him.

                    SECRET OPERATIVES WITHIN THE NLF

    Senator Gore. Do we not have secret operatives within the 
NLF apparatus itself? [Deleted.]
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. Do you know whether it is true?
    Secretary Katzenbach. To the best of my knowledge, it is 
not true. We get information, we get information from third 
parties who have contact. We don't have any direct.
    Senator Gore. Well, this is information which we can get 
from Mr. Helms.

                      ROLE OF AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

    I notice you did not relate any answer to one of the 
questions of Ambassador Goldberg, to wit, did the proposed 
visit entail or involve, or I don't remember your exact words, 
discussions or attempts to have discussions with the United 
States Government.
    Did they ever answer that question?
    Secretary Katzenbach. They did not respond to that 
question.
    Senator Gore. What significance did you read into this, if 
any?
    Secretary Katzenbach. To the fact they did not respond to 
it?
    Senator Gore. Yes, if any.
    Secretary Katzenbach. That that was not one of the purposes 
of their coming. If it was a matter of their seeking contact, 
Senator, as Ambassador Goldberg did point out to them, there 
are many places this could be done which could be more secure 
and less exposed to the glare of publicity than New York but he 
nevertheless asked, he expressed that observation, asked the 
question, got no response to the question or to the 
observation.
    Senator Gore. Well, I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have the 
impression that you have given us, told us fully, as you have 
it. If there is something else, would you volunteer it?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir. I have not given you 
operational details of this, but I have given you essential 
facts as honestly and as candidly as I can.
    Senator Gore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

                        AUTHENTICITY OF A RUMOR

    Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Katzenbach, I think Senator Gore 
raised this question a moment ago, he didn't pursue it in his 
question and if I may go ahead with it, what convincing proof 
is there of the authenticity of this rumor that has come 
through Bunche or something else have or is it like some of 
these other, just somebody in a drawing room making a lot of 
statements such as happened in Italy and so on? Apparently it 
was just somebody trying to be a busy-body.
    Secretary Katzenbach. We have no evidence of any 
authenticity on it. This was transmitted through the channels I 
indicated. We don't know who the person who spoke to the 
Secretary General was. I would have no reason to believe the 
Secretary General made this up out of the whole cloth.
    Senator Hickenlooper. I was not even suggesting that, no, 
no.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Whether that person was speaking on 
behalf of the NLF or not we have no----
    Senator Hickenlooper. The authenticity of the person who 
allegedly carried this message and spoke to the Secretary 
General?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Are you talking about the New York 
incident?
    Senator Hickenlooper. No.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Or the other one?
    Senator Hickenlooper. I am talking about the first report 
that the Secretary General gave that somebody approached him or 
that he had been approached on this proposition. I would hope 
we would have some idea as to whether or not the person who 
approached the Secretary General was speaking with some 
authentic background.
    Secretary Katzenbach. We would not be in position to answer 
that since he has never said who it was.
    The Chairman. Did you ask him?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. What did he say?
    Secretary Katzenbach. We got no answer. Originally 
Ambassador Goldberg asked what the Secretary General's views 
were as to the reliability of this, and we got no answer to 
that question, but by the fact that he pursued it, assumed that 
the Secretary General believed that the person he was talking 
to was a responsible and reliable intermediary on this. I think 
we assumed, without any facts to back it up, that it was a 
representative of an eastern European Government, but it might 
not have been.

                       UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION

    Senator Hickenlooper. Then, of course, the NLF just comes 
and disclaims this and says it is nothing but trickery on our 
part. The North Vietnamese come out and say it is nothing but 
trickery on our part, propaganda.
    Unfortunately, with our publicity media, we grasp at straws 
that apparently, and get everybody all excited about something, 
and we don't have any real proof about it, so far as the 
genesis of the matter is concerned.
    Secretary Katzenbach. That is correct. Of course, they did 
say in the initial message, Senator, if there was any publicity 
given to this, they would deny it.
    Now, that is a two-edged sword.
    Senator Hickenlooper. It all gets back to the point, I 
guess we are supposed to be righteous and the other fellow 
isn't. But I think there may be some exceptions to that rule. I 
think we are walking with a very thin reed here. I don't think 
you have gone overboard on this at all, but we don't know with 
whom we are dealing. It is sort of a domino operation down the 
lines some place. Maybe that is the path we have to take with 
these people, I don't know. It is a tribute, of course, to the 
uncertainty and confusion that is going on. That is all.
    The Chairman. Senator Lausche?

                       THE UNITED NATIONS EPISODE

    Senator Lausche. Referring to the United Nations episode, 
was there anything whatsoever in the exchange of communications 
between Goldberg and the intermediary indicating that the 
National Liberation Front wanted to use the United Nations as a 
middle agency to discuss the war problem with the United 
States?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, there wasn't. Both the NLF 
and Hanoi have repeatedly denounced the competence of the U.N. 
to deal with any of these problems, but, at the same time, they 
stated their own purposes on this as----
    Senator Lausche. Will you repeat them?
    Secretary Katzenbach. As work principally at the U.N. but 
would not refuse radio, TV, press interviews.
    Senator Lausche. From what you have said, it would seem 
that the National Liberation Front wanted to get to the United 
Nations not to discuss the war problem but to use that agency 
and the facilities that might become available to propagandize 
in the United States.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I would think that was their 
principal purpose. They may, as the press have speculated, 
wanted to do something on the line which the Algerian 
Liberation Movement did some years ago, which was essentially 
that purpose.

                          THE SAIGON INCIDENT

    Senator Lausche. Now, getting to the Saigon incident: Did 
our Ambassador, on the basis of what had previously happened, 
anticipate a visit from a Viet Cong representative about the 
exchange of prisoners?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir. Absolutely the first 
indication, knowledge, glimpse, glimmer, flicker or light, 
anything else was when the South Vietnamese police authorities 
came to the Embassy and said, ``We found this piece of paper on 
the fellow we picked up and it is addressed to Ambassador 
Bunker.''
    We had no prior indication, knowledge of anything, and in 
Saigon or elsewhere. And it was at that point we went back and 
they gave us permission to question the person with respect to 
this piece of paper and decided whether it had any authenticity 
or what it was and who he was and so forth.
    Senator Lausche. Can you say whether or not in the 
relationship with Saigon there has been a policy on the part of 
the United States of complete disclosure of what we are doing 
and in anticipation of a complete disclosure on the part of the 
Saigon Government of what it is doing?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, in terms of anything having to 
do with NLF that would be true, yes, sir.

                   NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MISSION

    Senator Lausche. Some inferences are drawn that there was 
an expectation on the part of our government of a visit to be 
made by the representative of the National Liberation Front, 
but that the Saigon Government was not informed and then by 
accident arrested this man not having knowledge of an 
understanding of that visit between him and the Government.
    What about that?
    Secretary Katzenbach. There is no truth to that, 
absolutely, Senator. We had no prior knowledge of this 
individual, his mission or purpose or anything of that kind, 
and as far as we have been able to ascertain the operation on 
which he was arrested was a perfectly routine police operation, 
and that is really the whole story. We had no prior knowledge 
of it.
    He was arrested, there was no reason not to believe he was 
arrested just as they said he was arrested.
    If I can make an editorial comment, he seemed to be rather 
clumsy about the way he was going about things, but that is the 
way it happened.
    Senator Lausche. [Deleted] was there any--were there any 
statements made by him indicating that he had any other purpose 
than to talk exchange of prisoners?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir. In the discussions they had 
with him he said this was the reason that he had come to Saigon 
was to deliver this message to the American Embassy. He said 
that was his purpose.
    Senator Lausche. I think that is all.

                      OBJECTIONS TO NLF EMISSARIES

    The Chairman. With regard to his questions, I don't quite 
understand why you think it would be so dangerous if these two 
NLF people came to New York. How would that hurt us? Why would 
you object to it?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well, I think the question is what 
their purposes are. We have taken the position, Mr. Chairman, 
that if they come in connection with anything, any U.N. 
activity, at the invitation of the U.N. or any of its agencies 
under the headquarters agreement, of course, they are entitled 
to visas or anything else.
    We have not taken the position that if they are not coming 
in any connection with that kind this country should under the 
present statutes and visa and passport laws admit people on 
passports of, whatever passports it may be, and I guess they 
would tend to make them phony passports, with visas to engage 
in any propaganda exercise that they want to engage in. We 
would have to make a finding in point of fact of people of this 
kind, that the Secretary of State and Attorney General would 
have to make a finding, that their admission was in the 
national interest and I think in the absence of some sincere 
purpose on their part other than what they have indicated, that 
it is not a question of danger but just a question of why 
should we let them.

                    EMISSARIES DID NOT WANT TO TALK

    The Chairman. I understand the technicalities, you don't 
have to let them in. But we have made, and the President has 
made, very repeated statements: just give us a warm body and we 
will confer with them and we will talk with them anywhere, on a 
neutral ship or anywhere.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. And here apparently two of them want to come 
to New York and we say, ``No, we don't want you to come to New 
York.''
    Secretary Katzenbach. They didn't want to come to talk, 
Senator.
    The Chairman. How do you know they didn't want to come?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Because that question was asked them 
and it was quite, it seems to me, ostentatiously not answered, 
because they started off with our four questions and they said 
in their answer, One, and then Number Two, ignoring the first 
question.
    The Chairman. Of course, I don't know. I have no knowledge 
at all of it.
    Do you know who the leaders of the NLF are?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. You don't know whether they were coming or 
not?
    Secretary Katzenbach. They didn't give us any names.

                          THE PROPAGANDA VALUE

    The Chairman. I don't know, but the propaganda of refusing 
them seems to me maybe to be as important as having them come, 
because we look as if we don't want to have any contacts with 
them.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well, might I say as far as the 
propaganda value of it is concerned, Mr. Chairman, I would at 
least quote the Hanoi Radio and NLF Radio that says the whole 
thing was a plot on our part and a figment of our imagination 
which, it seems to me, says something about the propaganda 
value of it.
    The Chairman. Well propaganda is a very difficult thing to 
judge.
    But, anyway, Senator Carlson?

                            ROLE OF ROUMANIA

    Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I believe it was a part of 
your prepared text or else you orally stated that the last word 
on this was as of yesterday from Roumania, was that right?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, I said--I put it as a footnote. 
Whether it is connected or not, Roumania yesterday circulated 
in the United Nations as a UN document the NLF position with 
respect to the war in South Vietnam and with respect to the 
future which is--I have not read the document myself. I 
understand that this is essentially their September 1 platform 
which has just been reproduced in the United Nations.
    Senator Carlson. In other words, it is not something 
current. It is something that goes back to September 1, that 
they yesterday called attention to the United Nations?
    Secretary Katzenbach. The Roumanian government called 
attention.
    Senator Carlson. I mean they did?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes.
    Senator Carlson. Is it reasonable to assume it might well 
have been Roumania that had the original contact with the 
Secretary General in view of the fact the first information you 
had on this was September 22nd?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think that is certainly a possible 
inference. I would guess it was an eastern European Government.
    Senator Carlson. Do you have any evidence it was Roumania?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.

                        unable to follow through

    Senator Carlson. It seems to me that there is some 
undercurrent there that we don't seem to be able to ferret out, 
or maybe we do and we don't seem to get the information here as 
to who is or who is not trying to contact either a 
representative of the U.N. through the Secretary General or 
possibly our own government, there is a great deal of confusion 
and concern in this nation, that is all I can say. People are 
writing and they ask, ''Why don't we make some contact? Why 
don't we have contacts?''
    It looks like maybe the Roumanian government may have come 
in to the Secretary General and we haven't been able or he 
hasn't been able, or Ambassador Goldberg hasn't been able to 
follow through.
    I don't know. I am at a loss.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well, Ambassador Goldberg, as I said, 
asked explicitly was it their purpose to have a discussion with 
the U.S. government officials, and then volunteered if that was 
their purpose there would have been better places than in New 
York with all the publicity with somebody coming with North 
Vietnamese passports and so on and so forth.
    But that question just floated out on the water, and it was 
never responded to.
    Senator Carlson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator McCarthy?

                         ROLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

    Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, I think this question may 
have been asked.
    The last sentence in your statement, ``The United States is 
not in position to take any action without the full cooperation 
of the South Vietnamese government,'' I understand your answer 
was that the prisoner you are talking about was taken prisoner 
by the Vietnamese.
    Secretary Katzenbach. In their control and custody.
    Senator McCarthy. Do we capture and turn them over to them 
and lose any right----
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, those were cadre.
    Senator McCarthy. What about prisoners we negotiate about, 
can we negotiate without reference to them or do we have to get 
clearance from the Vietnamese government?
    Secretary Katzenbach. We don't need clearance from the 
Vietnamese government. We would be in position to release any 
prisoners we had captured in exchange for release of our 
people.
    Senator McCarthy. To the NLF?
    Secretary Katzenbach. If this involved contact with the NLF 
or discussions with the NLF we would tell the South Vietnamese 
Government about it and discuss that with them.
    Senator McCarthy. What if they said no?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I don't suppose that they would say 
no, Senator.

              GETTING CLEARANCE FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

    Senator McCarthy. The Vice President recently said it was 
high-handed of me to suggest for us to talk to the NLF without 
getting clearance from the Vietnamese government.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Certainly without consulting----
    Senator McCarthy. He didn't say consult; he said clearance. 
Do you think we can negotiate with the NLF over there even 
though the South Vietnamese government said no to it?
    Secretary Katzenbach. On a prisoner exchange, with respect 
to our prisoners and prisoners of them that we held, I think--
--
    Senator McCarthy. We have never done it, have we?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, we have never been able to 
do it.
    Senator McCarthy. Have we tried?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, we have tried.
    Senator McCarthy. Independently?
    Secretary Katzenbach. We tried to make contact in many 
places for the purposes of prisoner exchange with the NLF and 
have been turned down absolutely flat on each occasion we have 
attempted to do it. The current one I am talking about is the 
first time that they have shown the slightest interest in 
proceeding along these lines. That is why we were hopeful we 
could somehow or other keep that alive despite the difficulties 
we run into.

                         NLF SEEKING PUBLICITY

    Senator McCarthy. What about other contacts? Why would the 
NLF have had to come to the U.N. through this very involved and 
roundabout sort of way to get its request to the United States 
with reference to the approval of visas?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Why would it do it?
    Senator McCarthy. Yes.
    Secretary Katzenbach. First of all, I think you have to 
make the assumption on that which I am perfectly willing to 
make with you although I don't know the fact, that the NLF did 
in fact want to do this, and this was not an intermediary going 
to the Secretary General and then proceeding in this way, but 
making that assumption, it would seem to me that their reason 
for coming there was that they thought, in view of some of the 
current opinion in the United States and in the U.N. that they 
could do some lobbying and perhaps get some publicity. There is 
no reason that I can see in that record, Senator, to indicate, 
one, that they wanted to have any serious talks about anything 
political, or secondly, that they had anything to do with 
prisoner exchange whatsoever.
    Senator McCarthy. Well, I think that is probably right. I 
just am concerned about the process they followed. It would 
seem to me that unless they thought they would get more 
publicity this way than if they checked with the U.S. 
Ambassador in Saigon to see whether the United States would 
approve instead of going through three or four exchanges before 
getting to the State Department, on the question of whether the 
visa would be granted or not.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well, I think at least one 
explanation of that, senator, is the one they gave from the 
outset, saying if this was not going to be done they wanted to 
deny it, that anything had occurred.
    If you want to deny something, you usually do it through a 
channel which makes it deniable.
    Senator McCarthy. It would seem to me it would have been 
easier to just stop it earlier, if they had gone through our 
Ambassador and gotten a turndown at that point instead of 
putting it through three or four exchanges. Maybe they didn't 
want it to go by that way.
    Thanks very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Mundt.

                         THE PRISONER'S MESSAGE

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, I read your statement, and I 
read it fast and I may have read it wrong, but I think I read 
it that the man arrested in Saigon was a Viet Cong heading for 
Bunker's office, is that right?
    Secretary Katzenbach. They do not know where he was.
    Senator Mundt. With a message.
    Secretary Katzenbach. He had a message on him at the time 
he was taken prisoner. How he proposed to have that message 
delivered or, I suppose even whether he proposed to deliver it 
is----
    Senator Mundt. In all events he was seeking, from the 
evidence, to convey a message to Bunker.
    Secretary Katzenbach. He was seeking to convey a message to 
Bunker.
    Senator Mundt. My question, this kind of disturbs me, if 
there are no ways in which we can get in communication with the 
government of Vietnam whether it is on peace--this was not, but 
on exchanges of prisoners which is also very important--if the 
Saigon government goes through an intermediary there and makes 
up that communication, I think that disturbs you if it----
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think the Saigon government behaved 
perfectly correctly in the situation. They had no knowledge as 
far----
    Senator Mundt. Arresting him, I agree.
    Secretary Katzenbach. As soon as they arrested him and 
searched him and found this communication, it was promptly 
turned over to the United States, and they then permitted us to 
question this man.
    Senator Mundt. They did?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    Senator Mundt. Well, that was my question. I understood 
they did not.
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, they did.
    Senator Mundt. They did allow us to question the man.
    Secretary Katzenbach. [Deleted.]

                         FURTHER COMMUNICATION

    Senator Mundt. Who now will make the decision whether the 
man can go back to wherever he came from with our reactions to 
the message?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well, we have had further 
communication through another person, which I said in here, 
through another intermediary on this, and this is the 
question--so far as the decision what to do with this 
particular fellow this is a decision we have to arrive at in 
agreement with the South Vietnamese for the simple reason that 
they have custody of him. The great difficulty of releasing him 
is that this is known to any number of people in Saigon, it is 
known to all the prison authorities and police who had 
something to do with it, and he is an identified medium level 
sort of GS-14 VC type, and with the publicity that has been 
given to it, Senator, they have got a problem in suddenly 
releasing this man, and that will be all over the place when 
they do it.

                    RUMORS AND SPECULATION IN SAIGON

    Senator Mundt. What does the publicity in Saigon say, say 
we have arrested a Viet Cong spy? Does it say we have arrested 
a Viet Cong agent who is over here talking about release of 
prisoners? Do they tell the whole story?
    Secretary Katzenbach. It tells that also but there are also 
all kinds of rumors and speculations that the Americans have 
been dealing behind the government's back, this fellow was 
going to a meeting with Ambassador Bunker, and this kind of 
thing. So that with certain elements in South Vietnam who are 
mistrustful of the Americans, that has been used to expose that 
part of it.
    Now, if this fellow were released I think it would be 
immediately known because there are so many people who know who 
he is and so forth. I am not putting that, Senator, I am not 
putting that out of the ball park and saying it cannot be done. 
It is just difficult to do while everybody's attention is 
focused on what is happening to this fellow.

                          RELEASING PRISONERS

    Senator Mundt. Were the prisoners involved in the message 
described as Vietnamese or Americans or not described at all?
    Secretary Katzenbach. The prisoners that they would release 
were described as Americans.
    Senator Mundt. That being the case----
    Secretary Katzenbach. The prisoners they wanted were 
political prisoners.
    Senator Mundt. Sure, we being partners in the war this is 
something we ought to pursue as diligently as possible.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    Senator Mundt. This business of releasing prisoners is 
vital to us, I suppose more vital to us because we place a 
greater premium on human life.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I could not agree with you more. But 
the reason I said the publicity which has been given to the 
matter has made it difficult and slowed it down--it is still 
alive and I am still hopeful we can work out a way to do it and 
certainly this is a matter which Ambassador Bunker has been 
personally concerned as a very high priority business, and it 
seems every time he tries to do something there are more 
stories in the Saigon press.

                   PRE-CONDITION TO PRISONER RELEASE

    Senator Mundt. We should stay in there, it seems to me, and 
not be pushed out. I do feel in a case like this we should 
exercise all the persuasion we can to call their bluff on this, 
if that is what it is, and let him go back, it is just one more 
Viet Cong, and go back and tell them, ``Yes, we would be 
willing to exchange prisoners,'' and get the word out to the 
home folks, as I got a call from a wife of a fellow who has 
been established as being a prisoner over there, and I have 
been telling them, which I think is right, we have been doing 
everything we can.
    Secretary Katzenbach. We have.
    Senator Mundt. And we are going to do everything we can, 
but she could not quite understand the stories, after she heard 
the stories.
    Secretary Katzenbach. But the difficulties that appear in 
the statement there they have now set as a pre-condition to 
having any communications of the release of prisoners that 
there would be a unilateral prior release of a number of VC 
cadre, it is not of tremendous importance, but all identified 
as such, known to be held by the South Vietnamese, and this 
raises an additional problem as to whether you are going to 
release half a dozen people for the possibility of getting on 
with some discussions, and it does raise a political problem 
for the South Vietnamese to do it. But again I am hopeful we 
can work this out and we are working on it.
    Senator Mundt. Well, I hope we will lean over backward even 
if it involves releasing a couple of Viet Cong prisoners, not 
too many of them, but a couple of them and say, ``Now what are 
you going to do next?''
    It is no great loss to us if a couple more Viet Cong go 
home if there is a chance to open up the prisoner exchange 
because this is pretty serious, and I wish you could go out--I 
realize you cannot tell the whole story probably, but I wish 
you would get out something a little more reassuring from the 
Department of State than they have read thus far because they 
do not seem to understand and there is nothing we can tell them 
on the basis of secret testimony that helps them.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Senator, the importance of it and our 
efforts on it we could not be more in agreement with you. Of 
course what we say, we would love to be able to say more than 
we can, and I simply say if we do it is going to make more 
difficult what we are trying to do. We would rather sit and if 
we can achieve the end objective----

               U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT

    Senator Mundt. Our overall prevailing relationships with 
the new government in Saigon, are they so sticky and are we so 
suspicious of each other that we cannot sit down with them 
across a cup of tea and talk like we are talking here?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir. We talk with them this way: 
We have had good cooperation from them on this on the highest 
level. It does make it more difficult, just the mechanics of 
how you do this and how you explain it, and Thieu has the 
additional problem on there that he is getting a good deal of 
static in the press in Saigon right now that he is just a 
puppet of the Americans. If the Americans say release somebody 
and he releases them and if the Americans say jump and he jumps 
there.

                          PARENTS OF PRISONERS

    Senator Case. It is on this--I think you have already 
answered this, Mr. Katzenbach--on the question of how much we 
can say on what you are talking about because I as well as the 
Senator from South Dakota have received a letter from the 
parents of a boy who is presumably a prisoner of war and they 
write and are very exigent about this thing.
    I feel as the Senator from South Dakota does we are not 
doing very much to help him and I just want to know whether 
there is anything you have said that we could pass along or 
not, frankly, to be specific.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Senator, I feel that we are doing 
everything we are able to. I can tell you as a fellow who spent 
a couple of years as a prisoner you could not get anybody more 
sympathetic to getting those guys out, wanting to do it, than I 
am. I see no reason why you should not say there are efforts 
being made--these things take time but they are being made--to 
try to get some sort of prisoner exchange.
    Senator Case. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Are you through?
    Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

                MILITARY MISSIONS INTO CAMBODIA AND LAOS

    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I will ask 
any questions because I am sure it would be repetitive. I have 
here a number of questions the staff has prepared. Have these, 
most of these been asked?
    The Chairman. No.
    Senator Sparkman. There are one or two I think that I would 
like to ask. One of them is this: Currently the policy on ``hot 
pursuit'' of Viet Cong units into Cambodia is to be revised. 
Does this mean that search and destroy military operations will 
be carried out in Cambodia and Laos? And if it is a new policy, 
would you explain it?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I do not think it is any new policy 
on it. There is nothing of that kind that goes on now.
    Senator Sparkman. I heard over the radio this morning that 
you came within two and a half miles of the Cambodian border in 
bombing raids today.
    Secretary Katzenbach. We have gone--yes, sir.
    Senator Sparkman. Very close.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I do not know, that may well be true.
    Senator Sparkman. And it was speculated by this commentator 
that that might urge a hot pursuit permission.

                           SPEECH BY SIHANOUK

    Secretary Katzenbach. The problem of sanctuaries in 
Cambodia is a perfectly real problem. We have made efforts, are 
making efforts, to see if that can be dealt with 
diplomatically. We have provided a good deal of evidence as to 
the use of sanctuaries to Sihanouk in the hope that either he 
will take some steps to the extent he is able to or, as you 
perhaps read in the paper yesterday in recent speech, to see if 
he can bolster up the ICC to do something to preserve that 
border and deny sanctuaries there.
    Senator Sparkman. Let me get that straight. You mean he 
said----
    Secretary Katzenbach. He was quoted yesterday in the press, 
and that is really the source of the first part that I gave you 
was in fact true although there has been no publicity given to 
it. We would not want any given to it because he can be a 
fairly erratic fellow and he may react exactly the wrong way. 
We provided a good deal of evidence to him as to where bases 
are located, where we think they are located, and so forth in 
the hope he would do something about it. I took his speech----
    Senator Hickenlooper. What can he do?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well, he could, for example, ask the 
ICC to come in and he could expose this. He could do that kind 
of thing. I think that would make life a lot more difficult. 
They did get the heck out of the base that the newspaper 
reporters discovered in there, so it may be possible to do 
something.
    Senator Hickenlooper. His army does not amount to much.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Not much, but something. I think if 
he could put some of his fellows in the right place I think it 
would cause some difficulties.
    Senator Mundt. John, will you yield?
    Senator Sparkman. Let me make this comment. Certainly it 
would help things if he had a change in attitude.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Certainly it would.

                          NEED FOR HELICOPTERS

    Senator Mundt. But he is supposed to have said in a press 
conference that he would let the ICC look around if we would 
send him some helicopters to carry them.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir. That is what he is reported 
to have said, and I think that is something which we are now 
exploring to see how it is possible to do this.
    Senator Mundt. Would that not be worth the helicopters to 
us?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Oh, yes, sir, I personally think it 
would.
    We now have to find where and how we could provide 
helicopters and whether or not the ICC is going to do it.
    Senator Case. You can take Senator Percy's.
    Secretary Katzenbach. What?
    Senator Case. You can take the one Senator Percy used. 
[Laughter.]
    Senator Mundt. The Canadians want to do it.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, it is a question of whether 
the Indians and Poles would do it.
    Senator Sparkman. I will not ask any more. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Cooper--Senator Case.

                AMERICAN PRISONERS HELD BY NORTH VIETNAM

    Senator Cooper. Do you know how many American prisoners are 
held by North Vietnam, the Viet Cong?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir. I can give you those 
figures as of December 1. By the NLF, 20 confirmed. Missing, 
possibly prisoners, 209. So there is a total of possible 
prisoners of 229, but only 20 we have confirmed.
    Senator Cooper. Are any of them held in North Vietnam that 
you know about?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes. I was going to give the North 
Vietnamese figures. Those are the figures. I do not know 
whether those people remain in South Vietnam or whether they 
are in North Vietnam. But the 20 we believe to be in South 
Vietnam.
    As far as North Vietnam is concerned we know of 203, and 
missing and perhaps prisoners 435.
    Senator Cooper. You said that the United States is making 
all possible efforts for an exchange of prisoners. I do not 
doubt that at all, but what means and pressures do you use to 
propose such exchanges? How do you go about it?
    Secretary Katzenbach. We go about it in different ways, try 
different ways of going about it, try to make direct contacts. 
We have made on one occasion a direct contact with Hanoi by a 
simple statement we would like to engage in this any way they 
want to do it.
    We have also explored indirectly with both Hanoi and with 
the NLF in various places through third parties who inquired of 
us whether there was any arrangement in any way that they would 
be willing to go about arrangements, discussions, or other 
means of exchange of prisoners. This has been done on a number 
of occasions and we have gotten a flat rejection everywhere. It 
is--the only means we have that has been affirmative is the 
incident that is under discussion.
    Senator Cooper. Is the Red Cross able to get into North 
Vietnam?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, they would not permit them. We 
have used, as an example of--whenever any person goes there, 
even if they are not a person you are very dearly in love with, 
we ask them to take this up and to discuss this and to try to 
check on the prisoners and to state our interest in doing this, 
any way whatsoever.

                   SOUTH VIETNAMESE HELD AS PRISONERS

    Senator Mundt. Do you have a reading in response to Senator 
Cooper's question about the American prisoners? Do you have any 
idea how many South Vietnamese prisoners are held up there?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I do not have any figures on that. We 
do not have any.
    Senator Mundt. This would have some bearing as to whether 
the Saigon government would be willing to exchange prisoners if 
they have got them up there.
    Secretary Katzenbach. They have some prisoners. There are 
not nearly as many in North Vietnam as our prisoners for the 
reason most of our prisoners in North Vietnam are air crews. So 
that----
    Senator Cooper. How many prisoners----
    Secretary Katzenbach. In North Vietnam we have confirmed 
105 Navy which is all off carriers, 93 Air Force, and 5 Marines 
which gives you an idea of where the prisoners are coming from.
    Senator Cooper. How many prisoners does the United States 
hold?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I do not have those figures.
    Senator Cooper. We do hold prisoners of war.
    Secretary Katzenbach. We hold prisoners of war, some we 
turned over and some we hold, is that right?
    Mr. Read. Yes, we have a few.
    Senator Cooper. About how many?
    Mr. Read. We could supply that for the record.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I would have to get the information.

                  THE LEVERAGE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

    Senator Cooper. The reason I ask this is we would have to 
have some leverage talking about an exchange, we would have to 
hold some prisoners and if we turn them all over to South 
Vietnam we would have to hold some.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Can I give at least a personal view 
on that? I think there is a difference of attitude and 
philosophy between the Americans and Vietnamese as to 
prisoners, as to the value and worth of human life and so 
forth. I think as far as the value to either Hanoi or the NLF 
of people held, the people that they are interested in are not 
soldiers, even to some extent officers that have been captured 
because we have not captured all that many. I think their 
interest is in the political infrastructure where these people 
have been taken prisoner.
    The Chairman. Have we captured any P.T. crews?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, I do not think so.
    The Chairman. Those crews of the P.T. boats, we sank some, 
did we not capture the crews or we reportedly sank some?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I do not know the answer to that, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. You do not know. Go ahead.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I have no recollection of having any 
knowledge of it.
    Senator Cooper. You were talking about political prisoners.
    Secretary Katzenbach. In terms of leverage they always 
indicate much more interest in the political people.
    Senator Gore. I did not understand in terms of leverage.
    Secretary Katzenbach. They are much more interested in the 
political people, the VC infrastructure than in terms of the 
soldiers.
    We captured very few officers who had any significance to 
them at all.
    Senator Case. But the cadre.
    Secretary Katzenbach. But the cadre is what they are 
interested in.
    Senator Gore. Senator Cooper, would you yield at this 
point?
    Senator Cooper. Yes.

                       NLF'S PRELIMINARY REQUESTS

    Senator Gore. I think Senator Cooper has put his finger on 
a sensitive item. You told us earlier that the NLF wished as a 
preliminary for further discussion of exchange of prisoners the 
release of the NLF man who was apprehended with a note to 
Ambassador Bunker. Now if they make this as a preliminary----
    Secretary Katzenbach. And more. They asked for more than 
that.
    Senator Gore. Even more, and the Saigon government refuses 
to grant that then we are up against--face to face with the 
question that Senator Cooper proposes that we are without 
leverage to go further.
    Excuse me, Senator Cooper, we are right at that.
    Senator Cooper. That is the point I raised.
    Senator Gore. Will you define the ``release of this 
prisoner and more''? I know what you said earlier, define ``and 
more.''
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well, they want----
    Senator Sparkman. Twenty, was it not?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well--no, sir. It is very hard to say 
precisely what they want because they did not name the people 
that they wanted.
    Senator Sparkman. You did have a number in your paper 
though, did you not?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I do not believe there is a number in 
there.
    Senator Pell. There is nothing specific.
    Senator Sparkman. I thought you said ``wanted him and 20 
others.''
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, the only figure I raised was the 
20 U.S. identified prisoners.
    Senator Gore. I did not understand, I am sorry. In your 
answer to him I did not quite get it. You say you referred to 
20.
    The Chairman. No, he said no.
    Senator Sparkman. He did not. That was 20 prisoners held.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I would like to make it clear that 
the Saigon government has not refused to do it. It is just that 
the current publicity is giving us some headaches on just how 
to go about not refusing to do it.

                       FEW PRISONERS FROM BATTLES

    Senator Mundt. While we are still on prisoners, the 
prisoners you have listed held by Hanoi, it would appear to me 
to be almost all some pilots who have been shot down or 
navigators or people picked up at sea.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    Senator Mundt. I cannot quite conceive how we fought these 
big battles along the DMZ and kill and wound a lot of people 
and nobody gets caught on either side as being a prisoner.
    Secretary Katzenbach. We take some prisoners, they do not 
take very many. They are a hit and run operation, and they 
simply do not take----
    Senator Mundt. No prisoners from all these battles that 
have been fought?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Very, very few, sir. We have five 
Marines listed as prisoners in North Vietnam that are 
confirmed. We have 11 Marines missing that might be prisoners. 
The rest are Air Force and Navy.
    Senator Sparkman. Navy. How many Navy?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Navy pilots.
    Senator Sparkman. Navy pilots.
    Senator Cooper. May I just finish on that?
    The Chairman. Yes, Senator Cooper.

               U THANT'S INTERPRETATION OF NLF INTENTIONS

    Senator Cooper. To return to the U.N., I think you said 
Ambassador Goldberg asked one whether they wanted to talk to 
the United States, whether they wanted to appear before any 
organs of the U.N. Did they respond specifically to that 
question?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, they did not to the question 
as to whether they wanted to have any relations, any talks with 
the United States. Their only response on that is what I quoted 
before, where it said purpose: ``Work principally U.N. but 
would not refuse radio, TV, press interviews.''
    Senator Cooper. This message, I understand, came from U 
Thant. Was he in a position to elucidate any more on this 
issue?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.
    Senator Cooper. That is all he knows.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    Senator Cooper. Have there ever been any other efforts, 
similar efforts made, by the NLF to come to the U.N.?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.

                 NLF REPRESENTATIVES IN WORLD CAPITALS

    Senator Cooper. The NLF has representatives throughout 
Europe, has it not, in different capitals?
    Secretary Katzenbach. In some countries, yes, sir.
    Senator Cooper. We read about some of them like Paris, 
Poland.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, Paris.
    Senator Cooper. Algeria.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Algeria.
    Senator Cooper. Romania.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Cairo, two or three other places; 
Prague, New Delhi.
    Senator Cooper. Has the United States any contacts with 
these representatives?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.
    Senator Cooper. Never?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Never been able to.
    Senator Cooper. So far as you know have any of these 
representatives of the NLF ever made any proposition through an 
intermediary to the United States toward negotiations?
    Secretary Katzenbach. They have not, sir, no.
    Senator Cooper. Has the United States tried to make 
contacts with their representatives in any way?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir, we have tried from time to 
time on the question of prisoner exchange. It has been our 
thought that that was the easiest thing to make some contacts 
on and if we had been able to make any contacts on it we would 
have, as I said before----

                      AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S VISITS

    Senator Cooper. Now in the newspapers over the year stories 
about ambassador Harriman visiting countries rumored that they 
may have contact with the NLF----
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    Senator Cooper [continuing]. North Vietnam, is that all 
barren, there has been no contact?
    Secretary Katzenbach. That is right.
    Senator Cooper. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Katzenbach. And whenever any approaches have been 
made in most really very indirect kinds of ways they have been 
very flat about an unwillingness to do anything.

                    U.S. POLICY TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS

    The Chairman. Is it our policy not to negotiate with the 
NLF or is it to negotiate with them or try to in order to 
possibly divide in some way at least temporarily from the Hanoi 
regime, divide NLF from the Hanoi regime?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think we have felt that 
negotiations would have to be with somebody that as far as we 
were concerned, somebody that was speaking in some sense for 
Hanoi, and the President has made clear on a number of 
occasions that if such negotiations took place the NLF would 
have no difficulty having its views presented.
    The Chairman. I understand. Then it is we do not wish to 
negotiate with the NLF.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think that the question of 
negotiations with the NLF is two-fold: In the first place we 
believe, with a good deal of reason to believe it, that the NLF 
is an instrumentality of Hanoi. We do not think that it is 
possible, even if one determined that it was wise policy, to do 
so, to negotiate with the NLF unless in fact they are capable 
of representing Hanoi and are doing so with the full authority 
of Hanoi in this.
    Secondly, the NLF wants to be--inisted publicly and every 
other way in any negotiations with it, have to recognize it as 
a government, and that is something that the government of 
South Vietnam is quite unprepared to do. I do not think that 
all of this means that in terms of trying to get the 
negotiations and so forth that it means that the NLF cannot be 
a party to this.
    The Chairman. I understand that.
    Secretary Katzenbach. But it largely, it seems to me, 
depends on attitudes towards this that the Hanoi government 
would have as to those negotiations and also as to time and 
circumstances and so forth as far as the South Vietnamese 
Government is concerned. It seems to me obvious, Senator, at 
some time, in some way, the government of South Vietnam has to 
find ways of settling its differences with those South 
Vietnamese who are fighting against it, who are part of the 
war, and I think that has been recognized by General Thieu and 
General Ky.

                         ROLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

    The Chairman. Is it fair to say that our policy is not to 
negotiate or accept representatives for negotiations from the 
NLF?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Not without discussion with the South 
Vietnamese government and with working with them on this 
problem.
    The Chairman. Well, they have made it very clear that they 
will not, they stated that publicly. They will not.
    Secretary Katzenbach. They stated they would negotiate with 
Hanoi. They have not quarreled with the fact that Hanoi would 
have ways of having the NLF represented in that.
    The Chairman. But haven't they said publicly and being 
printed time and again, they will not negotiate with the NLF, 
is that true or not?
    Secretary Katzenbach. General Thieu has made a number of 
statements on that. I think I can probably quote them to you.
    The Chairman. Well, I think I have read them. I think that 
is true. As far as you know, it is true, isn't it?
    Secretary Katzenbach. In general terms. It seems to me he 
has been forthcoming as far as negotiations are concerned, as 
far as a willingness to negotiate. He has pointed out that 
negotiating with the NLF which is an instrumentality of Hanoi 
would raise difficulties for him as such if it were done that 
way.

                           PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

    The Chairman. Well, I haven't got an answer yet. Is it fair 
to say, for me to say, for example, that if I were asked that 
it is the policy of our government not to negotiate with the 
representatives of the NLF, is that a fair statement?
    Secretary Katzenbach. If they are representing the NLF as 
the legitimate Government of South Vietnam and so forth, we 
don't recognize them as that.
    It is not fair, Senator, to say that we would refuse to 
negotiate with the NLF when the President has said repeatedly 
that in negotiations with Hanoi, the NLF could be represented, 
and I don't think it is fair to make the flat statement on 
this.
    And you are talking here, I suppose, peace negotiations, 
you are not talking about trying to work out some way of 
prisoner exchange.
    The Chairman. Talking about some possible way to settle the 
war.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes.

           SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHOULD SETTLE MATTERS THEMSELVES

    Mr. Chairman. For example, this is a statement the staff 
just handed me. This is from the December 6 Washington Post, 
Chalmers Roberts:

    The statement went on to say that ``Our position toward 
peace talks is that one should talk to the aggressors, that is 
the North Vietnamese and not the Viet Cong. It is a matter, of 
course, that we should object to the Viet Cong going to the 
United Nations.''

    And does that mean, that is the attitude of the South 
Vietnamese Government, is that our attitude, too, on this 
matter?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think with respect to negotiations 
among the South Vietnamese, our position has been that they 
should settle these matters themselves.

                   PRESIDENT THIEU'S PRESS CONFERENCE

    Let me quote from Thieu's press conference so that it will 
be accurate in terms of what is said. This is from General 
Thieu's press conference of August 25:
    ``In what way might the future government open talks with 
the NLF?''
    Thieu replied that ``The position of the GVN is that there 
can be no talks with the NLF if they insist on terming 
themselves representatives of the people of South Vietnam. We 
cannot accept that,'' he said.
    ``Would they hold informal talks with the NLF?''
    Thieu said, ``If they come to Saigon, I will talk to them. 
Such talks could bring good results.''
    ``Would he guarantee NLF members safe passage to Saigon?''
    Thieu said, ``Sure.''
    Senator Mundt. Will the Senator yield?
    The Chairman. Yes.

                     DEALING WITH HANOI AND THE NLF

    Senator Mundt. What is hard for me to understand, Mr. 
Secretary, is what kind of fruitful result might come of it. I 
can't just see how it is going to benefit the United States 
much to have a peace treaty with the NLF and a war with Hanoi, 
because you have got behind somebody you can't trust. It seems 
to me you have to bring Hanoi and NLF in together.
    Senator Gore. Will you include Saigon in that?
    Senator Mundt. Yes, I will include Saigon, I don't see how 
Saigon is benefitted if you stop the NLF and you still have a 
war going on with Hanoi. It seems to me you have a greater 
advantage in negotiating with Hanoi and the NLF than just with 
the NLF alone.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think there is. You can fudge up 
the situation. I mean just talking the U.N. instance, here are 
two particular people traveling with passports from Hanoi and 
saying they are prepared to speak and negotiate, they may be 
NLF members and presumably they will represent Hanoi, I suppose 
you will get mixed up in that kind of situation.
    The basis point I would make on this is that the NLF is in 
our judgment not a truly separate entity from the Hanoi 
Government. It is their instrumentality in the south. It was 
created to, if you go into the history of this it was created 
to be the instrumentality of this.

                  RELATIONSHIP OF VIET CONG AND HANOI

    The Chairman. That is a question upon which there is a 
difference of opinion. Many people have said the NLF while it 
is allied with, supported primarily by them, that there are 
many more people, fighting people, in South Vietnam, who, that 
are members of the Viet Cong that are regular soldiers from 
Hanoi, are there not?
    The figures we have seen would indicate there are far more 
members of the 200 or whatever it is thousands of communists in 
South Vietnam. As I remember, it was about 290,000, only about 
50,000 are North Vietnamese, the rest are NLF people or Viet 
Cong, is that about correct?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think that is about correct. Some 
of those people are people who came down from the north.
    The Chairman. Well, suppose, just for a hypothetical 
supposing they had had enough of it and wanted a cease fire and 
we would refuse to meet with them, if I understand you 
correctly, unless Hanoi joins and is the negotiating party, is 
that correct? Supposing they said, ``We would like a cease 
fire,'' and you said, ``No, we don't want it unless Hanoi 
joins.''
    Secretary Katzenbach. The NLF can speak for Hanoi in this 
situation and I don't suppose that there is any great problem.
    The Chairman. What if they just speak for themselves. They 
are the dominant people there in numbers.
    Secretary Katzenbach. There is, as you say, a difference of 
opinion on this. I am very clear in my mind as to who controls 
the NLF.
    The Chairman. I know you are.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think if you negotiated with one of 
these fellows on the NLF who came over under your hypothesis he 
would bring nobody with him. You would have another Chu Hoi.

                        A GENUINE REPRESENTATIVE

    The Chairman. If he was a genuine representative of the 
NLF, he represents a major number of the fighting men in South 
Vietnam who fight our soldiers.
    Secretary Katzenbach. That is correct. Maybe he would end 
up being a genuine representative, in that--self designated in 
that capacity like some of these other people who then end up 
in exile. I mean I don't think it is possible, Senator.

                              A CIVIL WAR

    The Chairman. I know you think that, but here they are 
taking the punishment, I mean they are getting killed lots more 
than the North Vietnamese, and it is possible that they have 
had enough of it and they would like to settle the matter 
regardless of Hanoi. It is possible, I know you don't agree 
with this because this doesn't fit your theory of the war, but 
not everybody agrees with your theory of the war, I guess you 
know that, as to how it started and what it is about.
    There are people who think this was a civil war and before 
we intervened, and that these are the major fighting units and 
they have had enough of it, they have lost enough people and 
would like to stop it.
    Assuming that, it seems to me what would be the 
disadvantage to us of meeting with them if you could get a 
cease fire.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think if that were the situation 
and you were correct in that, that the government of South 
Vietnam would have no difficulty trying to settle matters of 
that sort.

                       WHAT IS THE U.S. ATTITUDE

    The Chairman. I am talking about the United States, you are 
always shifting over. What is the U.S. attitude? We are doing 
most of the fighting.
    Secretary Katzenbach. To make that very simple: I don't 
think that the United States is in a position to or should be 
in a position to tell the South Vietnamese just exactly, ``By 
god, you are going to settle this war in this way, whether you 
like it or not.''
    The Chairman. You don't think so?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I don't think--if that is true, then 
we could turn the whole thing over to the NLF and say, ``That 
is the way it is and we now insist on that.'' We have gone 
through the process, it seems to me, of trying to create a 
government there that can speak for South Vietnam, it 
represents many more people in South Vietnam than the so-called 
government of the NLF and it just seems to me that in terms of 
the solution there, as I said before, they are going to have to 
work out their differences at some period of time, but I don't 
know what right we have to say, ``We are imposing this 
political system on you,'' that is what we are fighting for.

                     THE COST FOR THE UNITED STATES

    The Chairman. The reason, we are paying the costs and we 
are losing the men, is a very practical reason. The cost is on 
the United States and that government wouldn't last very long; 
if it isn't a puppet government, I never saw one.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Let me say, Senator, that the bridge 
you want to know whether or not we want to cross has not yet 
been constructed, because every single indication from the NLF 
has been just as flat and negative as any indication from 
Hanoi.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman----
    Secretary Katzenbach. I say if that situation you talk 
about comes into being in fact then let's see what we would do 
if that situation comes into being.
    Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask----
    The Chairman. Let me say you continue. I have another 
appointment.
    Senator Mundt. May I ask a question before you go?

                      NEGOTIATE WITH THE VIET CONG

    Senator Sparkman. I wanted to ask a question right on 
there, but I wanted to ask the same question a little 
differently, but on a different premise.
    The different premise is this. I agree, Mr. Secretary, as 
to the nature of the war. I don't agree with the chairman, as 
is well known, I presume. But it seems to me that the Viet Cong 
are in South Vietnam, and they are conducting the fighting 
there and, as a practical matter, if they ceased fighting North 
Vietnam, it seems to me, would have a pretty difficult time 
carrying on.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Right.
    Senator Sparkman. So it seems to me that we probably ought 
to have a kind of a receptive attitude to any proposal on their 
part, to negotiate, and if the opportunity ever presents 
itself, I think we ought to be in an attitude to be willing to 
negotiate with them without asking. Let them ask permission of 
Hanoi, if permission has to be given, but don't let us 
predicate our proceedings on what Hanoi says to them.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I don't disagree with that. One of 
the great difficulties with this is that the NLF has constantly 
claimed to be the legitimate government, and so forth, and so 
on. And one of the problems that obviously Thieu has or that we 
have on this, is when asked these kinds of questions to say, 
``Oh, yes, we will negotiate with the NLF'' assuming that were 
our position, is to build the NLF up and to build up the 
mythology of the independent NLF into a government and so forth 
so it becomes a political factor. They want to push for that 
kind of a statement not because they want to negotiate, but 
because they want that kind of public recognition. This is what 
makes life difficult for the government in Saigon.
    So I would say if the facts that the chairman says are 
true, here are people who can speak for 200,000, 150,000 
troops, who claim to do that, there is reason to believe that, 
they say, ``We want to make peace,'' at that point, let's cross 
that bridge when we have that sincerity in those circumstances.
    I don't think we have it now and I think it is very 
hypothetical and dangerous to try to answer it.

                           A SENSIBLE FORMULA

    Senator Mundt. You laid down in response to the chairman's 
question a sort of formula which to me sounds sensible, and 
that is that the United States against the opposition of the 
Saigon government could not very well negotiate with the NLF. 
If they said okay, yes, but if they said, no, no.
    Now, it seems to me to be consistent you have got to apply 
that same formula to Hanoi. I don't see how the United States 
can very well go in and negotiate a peace with Hanoi over the 
opposition of the government of Saigon without first shooting 
the Saigonese government out of the saddle.
    Would you apply the same formula as well as the formula for 
the NLF and a different formula for Hanoi?
    Senator Case. Saigon doesn't object to that so much, is 
that the point?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think all of our allies including 
Saigon we would want to consult before any negotiations occur. 
The basic reason we are in there is aggression by North Vietnam 
against South Vietnam. If that matter would be resolved then it 
would be possible to resolve our differences. We have 
differences with Hanoi which would be capable of resolution in 
terms of how we got in there.
    The government of South Vietnam has differences with the 
government of North Vietnam and with the insurgents that are in 
the south. These are going to have to be resolved sometime, by 
some mechanism, by some method.
    I don't think we would in either instance negotiate behind 
the backs of the South Vietnamese government.
    Senator Mundt. Any more than we would expect them to 
negotiate behind our backs to set up the conditions.
    Secretary Katzenbach. That is correct.

                         MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING

    Senator Case. Karl, may I make just a little comment here? 
It seems to me this point which has itched and irritated and 
annoyed me a year ago, and a year and a-half ago by someone who 
thought he had said something when he said we ought to 
negotiate directly with the NLF, it was just a matter of bad 
handling.
    If we said from the beginning we haven't tried to 
negotiate, we will cross that bridge when we come to it, we 
would have been much better off.
    And this business now we have a thousand people who are 
thinking they are saying something and thinking we are 
intransigent.
    Senator Mundt. Think of your impact of that on your elected 
government of Saigon.
    Secretary Katzenbach. This is the problem even with that 
kind of statement.
    Senator Case. There is something, you know, I am not happy 
about the way this war is going, as I have said, and the way we 
are conducting ourselves, but this kind of thing always seems 
to me like making much ado about absolutely nothing at all, and 
I would be glad to say so again and again.
    Senator Cooper. May I say something?

                         A VERY GLOOMY REACTION

    It seems to me one problem about all this is, as you say, 
there has been no indication of any attitude on the NLF 
negotiating, I assume that is correct--is that correct?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well, they have talked about 
negotiating on their terms.
    Senator McCarthy. So have we, that is not a real fault.
    Senator Cooper. Your attitude ought to have some weight as 
to whether or not they ever negotiate.
    All I can say after listening to you, it is a very gloomy 
reaction. I don't see any, any hope of any kind except to crush 
them with military force, that is about it.
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir, I think--I am not hopeful 
that there will be any negotiation in the immediate future on 
this. It doesn't seem to me it looks as though there will be. 
But it is not--we have indicated we would be willing to 
negotiate with Hanoi on an open agenda, that is anybody could 
raise anything they wanted to raise. Neither Hanoi nor the NLF 
has ever indicated any interest in negotiations except after 
certain pre-conditions had been accomplished. That is the 
difference between the two positions. Hanoi has put 
preconditions of bombing on it. It has varied from time to 
time, at least in the public statements as to whether you have 
to negotiate on the premise that the NLF was a legitimate 
government of South Vietnam, on the four points, the NLF five 
points.
    If the position which the chairman indicated somebody wants 
to speak for the NLF, I don't believe we are separated in that 
kind of a way, if this came to pass, and said they could do it, 
I would assume under these circumstances that they were doing 
it with the authority of Hanoi, and I can see many different 
scenarios so far as negotiations were concerned if people 
wanted to negotiate.
    The difficulty, as I emphasized a moment ago, and I think 
Senator Case, to some extent, the difficulty is what you are 
talking about, the very statements you make get into it, create 
political difficulties and it is very difficult to find a 
formula that doesn't serve the other fellow's political 
purposes when--I think you can appreciate the difficulty of 
that. Maybe bad handling or maybe it is just a tough problem to 
handle in a tough society.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator, Senator Pell has been sitting 
here rather patiently and hasn't engaged in any questioning. 
Let's recognize him.
    Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am very glad I followed your advice last night and didn't 
go to Athens.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Tragic.

                      CLOSING THE CAMBODIAN BORDER

    Senator Pell. Just going back to Cambodia for a moment, 
isn't it, my recollection is that once Sihanouk offered to 
maintain a tight border if we would pay for it. My recollection 
is not exact. I don't think he brought in the ICC. I think it 
was more a question if we would provide American soldiers, 
underwrite it, he would permit us to close the borders.
    As you know, in international law a blockade to be legal 
must be effective and he is willing for the border to be closed 
if we provide the means.
    Was that so, and if it was, what was our response, do you 
happen to recall?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I don't think--they were not talking 
about American soldiers, providing American soldiers to keep 
his border closed. He doesn't want that.
    Senator Pell. What was his proposal, do you know?
    Secretary Katzenbach. The only proposal that I can recall 
that Sihanouk has ever made outside of negotiating the problem 
as he frequently does, was the one that appeared in the press 
yesterday where he talked about giving the ICC some equipment 
to do it. Have there been any others?
    Senator Pell. I am sure there were. A couple of years ago, 
you could not recall it, but it was when you were still in 
Justice.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I don't recall any other offer.
    Mr. Read. Nothing recent now.
    Senator Pell. It was two or three years ago.
    Maybe for the record it could be submitted, the proposal he 
made and our response at that time.

                   GIVING THE CAMBODIANS HELICOPTERS

    Senator Sparkman. I am not sure your question embodied 
this. If we gave them those helicopters would they be piloted 
by their own pilots, Cambodian pilots?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I think we would have a problem 
finding compatible types and so forth. I think this is one of 
the things being looked at in view of his statement, we don't 
know what the ICC will do, we have to again, if we were going 
to give them helicopters we would have to find compatible 
types, for example, to be piloted by Canadians, Indians, or by 
Poles, and this is not easy to do, you know, before this time 
tomorrow. It gets complicated. Also, there are even some legal 
complications as to just how we provide, on what kind of a 
basis, you know, equipment to the ICC.
    Senator Sparkman. You could lend lease it to them.
    Secretary Katzenbach. I am not sure the legislative 
authority, but how you go about doing this even as it now sits.

               NLF COULD ATTEND SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES

    Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, returning to the question of 
the NLF going to the United Nations, as I read the paper and as 
I understand it, we have never denied them and said they could 
not come.
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.
    Senator Pell. For the purposes, for any reason whatsoever. 
We said the reason they could come is still being left open, is 
that correct?
    Secretary Katzenbach. We have gone further than that. We 
have really said they could come in connection with any debate 
in the Security Council and if you read the headquarters 
agreement, or for any other purpose that--the United Nation's 
purpose. They have to have passports and so forth to come, but 
we have not tried to deny their coming if the U.N. wants them 
to come. That is a simple statement of it.
    But if they just want to come on their own and nobody in 
the U.N. is asking them to come, we have taken the position 
that, I suppose, we haven't denied that.
    They haven't applied for visas. I don't mean to mislead the 
Committee. I would think unless we found some legitimate reason 
for that we wouldn't have a great deal much reason to give them 
visas to appear on a national network and do this, that, or the 
other thing.
    Senator Sparkman. I know they said they were willing to do 
that.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, yes.

                         COMPARISON TO ALGERIA

    Senator Pell. What is the difference in handling, or has 
there been any difference in handling of the NLF delegates from 
Algeria or whenever it was '58 or '59, and the handling of 
these NLF ones from Vietnam?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Sure, some Algerians came into this 
country on passports. I think they were on Pakistani passports, 
I have forgotten, they may have been on other passports. But 
they came in, they got visas to visit. I don't think there was 
any diplomatic status at all. They hung around New York and it 
was an Algerian freedom movement there and so forth. I think 
there is a slight distinction between Algeria's fight against 
France and what is presently going on in South Vietnam. I think 
that is a difficult case to make.

                  WHO CAN SPEAK TO THE UNITED NATIONS

    Senator Mundt. Mr. Secretary, I can't quite get through my 
mind, if you let the NLF come, Number One, who do they 
represent, how do they obtain membership in the U.N.? Is the 
U.N. open to any rump group that wants to participate in 
debate, whether they represent anybody or not?
    Could Stokley Carmichael go up there and say, ``I represent 
Black Power,'' and make a speech?
    Unless you recognize them as a government, how do they 
come?
    Secretary Katzenbach. That is my point. Under Rule 39 it 
does provide that the Security Council can hear persons----
    Senator McCarthy. They could hear him if they wanted to.
    Senator Mundt. They could even invite him in.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, that could be.
    Senator Mundt. Not in the plenary session of the General 
Assembly.
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, he doesn't have a vote and in 
that kind of situation and doesn't involve recognizing him as a 
government of any kind because I think the language is 
representative of persons or groups, persons.
    Mr. Read. The interested persons or groups.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Interested persons or groups.
    Senator Mundt. In other words, the only way the NLF could 
be would be by invitation by the Security Council, and then to 
appear only before the Security Council. Could they also appear 
before the General Assembly?
    Secretary Katzenbach. That would be true only under Rule 
39.
    Now, it is possible that other agencies of the U.N. could 
invite persons to appear before them, any of the specialized 
agencies, this is under the Headquarters Agreement. If they 
were invited that way, I think we would be obligated to invite 
them for that purpose, under the Headquarters Agreement which 
we do appear to have in effect.

                  A RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

    Senator Mundt. Suppose the Asia-Africa bloc which is not 
favorable to our war should introduce a resolution in the 
General Assembly inviting the NLF and it passes. Does it mean 
they could participate in the speeches?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, I think if the General Assembly 
did it, I think it would be this kind of a fashion: The General 
Assembly would be similar to either one of its activities or 
committees or pursuant to a resolution there which said it 
wanted to hear from a representative of this group, and I think 
if the General Assembly said, although there is no explicit 
article of that kind, if they wanted to do it, they haven't 
crossed this bridge, I would be inclined to believe if the 
General Assembly voted it, they wanted to hear a representative 
of this group and he wanted to make a speech and that was the 
view of the General Assembly, that the United States qua the 
United States under the Headquarters Agreement would be 
obligated to admit that person for that purpose whether they 
like him or not.
    We wouldn't have to admit them to go on CBS or NBC or this 
or the other thing.
    Senator Katzenbach. We did that with Cuba.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, but Cuba is a member.
    Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, but if the U.N. votes to ask 
these people here.
    Secretary Katzenbach. We gave them a passport visa to come 
in for that purpose.
    Senator Hickenlooper. For that purpose in the U.N.

                          AN OPEN SNOOKER GAME

    Senator Mundt. For that purpose, and if in the General 
Assembly the African-Asian bloc introduced a resolution 
tomorrow morning to have a representative of Red China come and 
give an address to the General Assembly, would it be covered by 
NBC and CBS? This is kind of an open snooker game, anybody can 
come in who gets invited and makes speeches.
    Senator Hickenlooper. They did at one time, they had the 
Red Chinese.
    Senator Sparkman. Yes, he came there on the question of 
seating Red China in the U.N.
    Senator Mundt. Gave a speech on the podium.
    Senator Sparkman. He was there and spoke.
    Senator Mundt. Being in New York is one thing, but being on 
the Floor of the Senate giving a speech or something is 
different.

                 U.S. OBLIGATIONS UNDER U.N. AGREEMENT

    Senator Gore. Ambassador Goldberg answered that question at 
the same time he answered the question about the NLF. He said 
we would not interpose objection if they were invited.
    Secretary Katzenbach. We have obligations under our 
Headquarters Agreement for U.N. purposes.
    Senator Sparkman. I think it might be well to cite that in 
the record right at this point, if I may. Article IV, Section 
11, reads, I won't read the whole thing but it reads to this 
effect: ``The Federal, State or local authorities of the United 
States shall not impose any impediment to transit to or from 
the Headquarters District of'' five different classifications, 
the fifth of which is, ``other persons invited to the 
Headquarters District by the United Nations or by such 
specialized agency on official business. The appropriate 
American authorities shall afford any necessary protection to 
such persons while in transit to or from the Headquarters 
District,'' and so forth.
    And then the first sentence in Section 12 is the ``The 
provisions of Section 11 shall be applicable irrespective of 
the relations existing between the governments of the persons 
referred to in that section and the Government of the United 
States.''
    Senator Mundt. John, my question is, I recognize we have to 
let them come.----
    Senator Sparkman. I recognize that but I thought we ought 
to have this in.
    Senator Mundt. Do they have the right to stand up on the 
podium of the General Assembly with the satellites covering for 
TV if they don't belong?
    Secretary Katzenbach. If the General Assembly so provides, 
I assume they would.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Pell hasn't finished his 
questioning yet.
    Senator Pell. Let me finish up here, if I may.

                     NLF VIEW OF U.N. JURISDICTION

    Why in your view did the NLF delegates who made the 
demarche or presumably made the demarche originally withdraw 
and not follow up and try to either press us in this and get us 
to specifically deny them entry or come, why did they back 
away, in your view?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I would suggest as one reason for 
this they have never admitted and have always denied that the 
United Nations had any competence whatsoever with respect to 
what they were doing. And, therefore, I think they did not want 
to be in the position of having their finger in this particular 
pie.
    Senator Pell. You don't feel----
    Secretary Katzenbach. And, of course, the other thing, 
Senator, is that we don't, as I said earlier, we don't know 
whether this was somebody else's idea or theirs. We have got 
the three steps removed.
    Senator Pell. Right.
    Going to the man who was caught in Vietnam, the VC--NLF 
man, do we take any precautions with people in that position, 
political prisoners, trying to make sure they are not 
susceptible to the maltreatment, which is pretty customary 
there, or do we just presume that once we turn them over to the 
South Vietnamese, South Vietnamese rules apply?
    Secretary Katzenbach. One, we didn't turn them over to the 
South Vietnamese; they caught them.
    Senator Pell. I mean prisoners of war.
    Secretary Katzenbach. But I will say in this instance, at 
least this fellow is not--he was interviewed by him, we didn't 
beat him and he had not been beaten up, maltreated in that way. 
But I don't want to give a clean bill of health to any 
government's treatment to all prisoners. I don't think it is 
something that we would be in a position to control certainly, 
or even to influence in all instances.
    Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Sparkman. Senator Gore has some questions.

                     INTERPRETATIONS OF NLF ACTIONS

    Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, I find it intriguing that an 
answer was not provided to Ambassador Goldberg's interrogatory 
as to whether they wished to contact the United States 
government. One can read into that different things, an 
admission or a statement on their part that they did wish to 
contact and have a talk with the United States government might 
subject them to the interpretation that they wished to 
surrender.
    There are various interpretations that can be put upon it.
    I don't think we can rush to the conclusion that because 
they didn't answer the question that that operates as a denial. 
I would be inclined to think that their omission of an answer 
to that question might very well indicate that this was one of 
the purposes.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Senator, most respectfully, I think 
you have to put that together with their refusal in many other 
instances even to talk about such things as prisoners, to have 
any contact with any official of the United States Government 
or indeed any other person that they might possibly be speaking 
for the United States Government, and I think taken against 
that background in other places and against the observations of 
Ambassador Goldberg if this indeed was their purpose it would 
not be difficult to accomplish in a number of other places and 
with a greater deal of secrecy and security I would say 
certainly they had not affirmed it and they did answer it in a 
way to the extent they answered it by saying they wanted to 
lobby in the U.N. and not refusing invitations to appear on 
various communications media, and I think putting that 
altogether it is pretty hard to make an affirmative out of it.
    Senator Gore. I would not attempt to make an affirmative 
but I don't think we can dismiss the possibility that an 
omission of an answer would indicate an interest in an 
affirmative. At least it is an unresolved question.

                 NOT ACTING BEHIND SOUTH VIETNAM'S BACK

    Is there any way, has the United States sought any other 
way, to bring and find a resolution of that question?
    Secretary Katzenbach. In this particular context, no, sir, 
we have not pushed it beyond that. In other contexts we have 
gotten projections of this. My own view is that if there is any 
interest--let me put it differently. My own personal view, if 
you can't discuss directly or indirectly such a subject as 
prisoner exchange that it does not bode very well for 
discussing more important matters than that.
    If it were possible to actually discuss prisoner exchanges 
there would have always been the possibility of discussing 
other matters on that, and let me be quick to say this is 
something we would do with the full knowledge of South 
Vietnamese Government and not behind their backs.
    I keep repeating that because it is a matter on which they 
quite understandably are very sensitive and those who would 
like to divide allies constantly give rumors to the effect that 
the United States is selling them out from behind their back, 
and this is what is happening in the Hanoi newspapers, and I 
want to be very clear on that point.
    Senator Gore. I am willing to leave it as an unresolved 
question, but I did wish to suggest that their omission of an 
answer cannot, in my view, be interpreted as a negative answer.
    It might mean the other.

                   NOT A HIGH-RANKING REPRESENTATIVE

    But, now, coming to the contact or attempted contact or 
alleged purported attempted contact in Saigon, can you give us 
some indication of the nature of the NLF official who was 
apprehended, was he lowly, was he a man of stature within their 
infrastructure?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I would say, if I wanted a rough 
equivalent, he was about a GS-14.
    Senator Gore. Well, that really doesn't mean much to me. 
Could you give us----
    Secretary Katzenbach. I was trying to find an analogy. He 
is the kind of fellow that we would have----
    Senator Pell. He is a lieutenant colonel.
    Senator Sparkman. I started to say full colonel.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Well, lieutenant colonel, full 
colonel. He is the kind of fellow we would have over there, for 
example, as an assistant district representative. I have no 
question, let me be clear on this, we were satisfied, [deleted] 
as to his genuineness and that he had contact with people who 
were more important than that but he himself was not a person 
of great stature.
    Senator Gore. He was not a high official?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, sir.
    Senator Gore. But [deleted] a genuine emissary?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.

                     THE NATURE OF HIS APPREHENSION

    Senator Gore. Now, can you give us something of the nature 
of his apprehension? Was he near the embassy?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, he was in Saigon, and he was 
picked up as part of a raid on some various people suspected of 
being VC members and he was one of them. It was an ordinary 
police raid. In fact, of a type that goes on very frequently.
    Senator Gore. Any indication of how long he had been in 
Saigon?
    Secretary Katzenbach. He had been in Saigon a few days. He 
said he had been there before and had been unable to make any 
contact. That is only his word on this.
    I don't know whether it happened to him or not.
    Senator Gore. According to him, he had sought to previously 
make contact.
    Secretary Katzenbach. According to him, he sought 
previously to deliver the message. I don't know why it can't be 
dropped in the mail.
    Senator Gore. But was the message dated?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, I believe the message was not 
dated.
    Am I correct in that?
    I am fairly sure it was not dated.

                          TEXT OF THE MESSAGE

    Senator Gore. Do you have the text of the message?
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Could you read it to us, or have your 
assistant?
    Secretary Katzenbach. I have been awfully hesitant in 
getting into operational details.
    Senator Gore. Well, we will take this off the record.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. You are very cooperative, Mr. Secretary, and 
this, of course, you understand, is for the information of the 
committee. I have but a very few other questions to try to get 
really at the mechanics and in order to reach my own conclusion 
as to the importance of this.

                       FURTHER CONTACTS WITH NLF

    You say that we have had further contacts via an emissary 
whom we regard as possessing sufficient contacts with the Viet 
Cong.
    Secretary Katzenbach. Yes, sir.
    Senator Gore. Would you give us some indication of his 
stature, [deleted].
    [Discussion off the record.]
    Senator Gore. I have no further questions.
    I want to thank the Secretary for being forthright with 
this committee in the matter.
    Senator Sparkman. All of us.

               UNWISE FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO MEET EMISSARY

    Senator Cooper. May I ask this: Would there have been any 
value, in your judgment, for this man actually to continue his 
mission and talk to Ambassador Bunker? Because the papers have 
said they gave----
    Secretary Katzenbach. It would have played actual hell with 
the raised hell with the South Vietnamese Government. Because 
there are people there who want to separate us, who are not all 
on the left, Vietnamese strong nationalists who would say he 
would just do what the Americans say. It would be most unwise 
for Ambassador Bunker himself to do that kind of thing.

                   VISITS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO U.S.

    Could I make one point?
    There are, I think--as you gentlemen know, in January and 
February a number of members of the Vietnamese Senate recently 
elected who will be visiting this country, and I think you will 
find this of considerable interest, and I wonder if I could be 
so bold as to hope that to some extent some of these people 
might be given some of the sort of courtesies that are given in 
view of the number of American senators and representatives who 
travel over there, I think it would be a helpful thing in terms 
of relationships between the two if this could be done and some 
of these people, I think you will find very interesting.
    Senator Sparkman. I am sure it can be done.
    Senator Gore. I am sure some of us will invite them.
    Let me ask, are any of them permitted to come or are they a 
delegation chosen by the junta?
    Secretary Katzenbach. No, any of them will be permitted to 
come. I think you will find that the senators and 
representatives over there, particularly as things go along, 
are going to have their own views on how things are going to be 
done. That is a part of democracy and it will be helpful in 
some instances and it will not be helpful in others.

                    A BROADER VIEW OF THE SITUATION

    Senator Case. Just one point, Mr. Chairman. I don't say 
this is a call for that purpose, but I would like to suggest at 
some time the committee ask the Secretary or anyone the 
Department says is competent to talk with us about some of 
these broader matters, such as the memorandum that was 
circulated out there in the Embassy on discouragement and 
pessimism and whatnot; the differences between Thieu and Ky, 
the problems with the press out there, which may reflect in 
part those differences, and all the rest, and a broader view of 
the situation, perhaps, early in the term.
    Senator Sparkman. Fine.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    You have got some people waiting to receive you outside.
    I request that there be inserted in the record a newspaper 
article from the New York Times, dated Wednesday, December 6, 
1967, and an item entitled, ``Limited Distribution for Internal 
U.S. Mission Use Only, Provincial Attitudes, dated November 26-
2 December 1967.''
    [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed, subject 
to call of the chair.]



                                MINUTES

                              ----------                              


                       FRIDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1967

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                     Washington, DC
    The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in 
room S-116, the Capitol.
    Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, 
Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, Carlson, Case, and 
Cooper.
    Charles E. Bohlen, nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs, was heard and then ordered 
approved by voice vote.
    Discussion followed on miscellaneous committee business 
(making excerpt public of 1966 Bundy appearance; Secretary Rusk 
appearances, etc.)
    [The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]


                               APPENDIX A

                              ----------                              


                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                         PUBLICATIONS FOR 1967:

        HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS, AND REPORTS
                        HEARINGS PRINTED IN 1967
 
Jan. 23, Feb. 3 and 8, 1967...............  Consular Convention with the
                                             Soviet Union.
Jan. 30, 1967.............................  The Communist World in 1967
                                             (Kennan).
Jan. 31, 1967.............................  Asia, the Pacific, and the
                                             United States (Reischauer).
Feb. 2, 1967..............................  Harrison E. Salisbury's trip
                                             to North Vietnam.
Feb. 3, 6, 7, 28, and Mar. 1, 2 and 3,      United States Armament and
 1967.                                       Disarmament Programs.
Feb. 20, 1967.............................  Changing American Attitudes
                                             Toward Foreign Policy
                                             (Commager).
Feb. 23 and Mar. 8, 1967..................  Human Rights Conventions.
Feb. 27, 1967.............................  Nomination of William M.
                                             Roth, Special
                                             Representative for Trade
                                             Negotiations.
Mar. 7, 13 and April 12, 1967.............  Treaty on Outer Space.
Mar. 14, April 13, 20, 25 and June 22,      Arms sales to Near East and
 1967.                                       South Asian countries.
Mar. 17 and 21, 1967......................  Latin American Summit
                                             Conference.
Mar. 21 and Apr. 25, 1967.................  U.S. Informational Media
                                             Guaranty Program.
Apr. 10, 1967.............................  Nomination of Rutherford
                                             Poats.
Apr. 26 and May 3, 1967...................  U.S. troops in Europe.
May 4, 1967...............................  Peace Corps Act Amendment of
                                             1967.
May 9, 1967...............................  Diplomatic Relations Act.
May 18, 1967..............................  Inter-American Development
                                             Bank Act Amendment.
June 12, July 14 and 26, 1967.............  Foreign Assistance, 1967.
Aug. 16, 17, 21, 23 and Sept. 19, 1967....  U.S. Commitments to Foreign
                                             Powers.
Sept. 13, 1967............................  Human Rights Convention,
                                             Part 2.
Sept. 28, 1967............................  USIA Foreign Service
                                             Personnel System.
Oct. 3, 1967..............................  Asian Development Bank
                                             Special Funds.
Oct. 5, 1967..............................  Tax Conventions with Brazil,
                                             Canada, and Trinidad and
                                             Tobago.
Oct. 19, 20 and Nov. 17, 1967.............  Construction of nuclear
                                             desalting plants in the
                                             Middle East.
Oct. 26, 27 and Nov. 2, 1967..............  Submission of the Vietnam
                                             conflict to the United
                                             Nations.
Nov. 29, 1967.............................  Governing the use of ocean
                                             space.
 
                            COMMITTEE PRINTS
 
Jan. 23, 1967.............................  East of the Elbe: Report by
                                             Senator Clark.
Jan. 25, 1967.............................  Arms Sales and Foreign
                                             Policy: Staff Study.
January 1967..............................  Legislation on Foreign
                                             Relations: Joint Committee
                                             Print.
Feb. 16, 1967.............................  Status of the Development of
                                             the Anti-ballistic Missile
                                             Systems in the United
                                             States: Statement of Dr.
                                             John S. Foster, Jr.,
                                             Director of Defense
                                             Research and Engineering.
Feb. 23, 1967.............................  Study Mission to East
                                             Berlin, Bulgaria, Rumania,
                                             Hungary, and
                                             Czechoslovakia: Report by
                                             Senator Pell.
February 1967.............................  The United Nations at Twenty-
                                             one: Report by Senator
                                             Church.
March 1967................................  Consultative Subcommittees.
Mar. 31, 1967.............................  Twelfth NATO
                                             Parliamentarians'
                                             Conference.
Apr. 10, 1967.............................  War or Peace in the Middle
                                             East: Report by Senator
                                             Clark.
April 1967................................  The United Nations
                                             Peacekeeping Dilemma:
                                             Report by Senator Case.
May 15, 1967..............................  Mexico-United States
                                             Interparliamentary Group:
                                             Report on 7th Meeting.
June 6, 1967..............................  A Select Chronology and
                                             Background Documents
                                             relating to the Middle
                                             East.
July 27, 1967.............................  Background Information
                                             Relating to Southeast Asia
                                             and Vietnam (3d revised
                                             edition).
Aug. 10, 1967.............................  The Charter of the
                                             Organization of American
                                             States, as proposed to be
                                             amended by the Protocol of
                                             Buenos Aires (Ex. L., 90th
                                             Cong., 1st sess.).
Sept. 18, 1967............................  Survey of the Alliance for
                                             Progress: The Political
                                             Aspects.
Sept. 25, 1967............................  Survey of the Alliance for
                                             Progress: Inflation in
                                             Latin America.
September 1967............................  The Rim of Asia: Report by
                                             Senator Mansfield.
Oct. 9, 1967..............................  Survey of the Alliance for
                                             Progress: The Latin
                                             American Military.
Oct. 30, 1967.............................  Survey of the Alliance for
                                             Progress: Foreign Trade
                                             Policies.
Dec. 22, 1967.............................  Survey of the Alliance for
                                             Progress: Insurgency in
                                             Latin America.
 
                            SENATE DOCUMENTS
 
S. Doc. 42, Aug. 7, 1967..................  Canada-U.S.
                                             Interparliamentary Group:
                                             Report on 10th Meeting.
                             SENATE REPORTS
 
S. Rept. 77 (S. Con. Res. 16) Mar. 20,      The Centennial of the
 1967.                                       Confederation of Canada.
S. Rept. 80 (S. 623) Mar. 23, 1967........  The International Bridge Act
                                             of 1967.
S. Rept. 83 (S.J. Res. 60) Apr. 3, 1967...  Latin American Summit
                                             Conference.
S. Rept. 190 (S. 1029) Apr. 20, 1967......  Benefits for employees in
                                             high-risk situations.
S. Rept. 207 (H.R. 3399) May 3, 1967......  Corregidor-Bataan Memorial
                                             Commission.
S. Rept. 223 (S. 1031) May 11, 1967.......  Amendment to the Peace Corps
                                             Act.
S. Rept. 234 (S. 1030) May 16, 1967.......  Informational Media Guaranty
                                             Program.
S. Rept. 235 (S. 1785) May 16, 1967.......  Benefits for employees in
                                             high-risk situations.
S. Rept. 344 (S. 990) June 13, 1967.......  U.S. Committee for the
                                             International Human Rights
                                             Year.
S. Rept. 346 (S. 1577) June 14, 1967......  The Diplomatic Relations Act
                                             of 1967.
S. Rept. 352 (S. 2003) June 23, 1967......  Foreign Service Retirement
                                             and Disability Fund.
S. Rept. 499 (S. 1872) Aug. 9, 1967.......  Foreign Assistance Act of
                                             1967.
S. Rept. 501 (S. 1688) Aug. 11, 1967......  Inter-American Development
                                             Bank Act Amendments of
                                             1967.
S. Rept. 715 (S. 633) Nov. 1, 1967........  USIA Foreign Service
                                             Personnel System.
S. Rept. 734 (H.R. 6167) Nov. 7, 1967.....  Extension of Naval Vessel
                                             Loans.
S. Rept. 797 (S. Res. 187) Nov. 20, 1967..  National Commitments.
S. Rept. 798 (S. Res. 180) Nov. 21, 1967..  Submission of the Vietnam
                                             conflict to the United
                                             Nations.
S. Rept. 832 (H.R. 3399) Dec. 4, 1967.....  Transferring to the American
                                             Battle Monuments Commission
                                             all authority of the
                                             Corregidor-Bataan Memorial
                                             Commission.
S. Rept. 836 (H.R. 9063) Dec. 4, 1967.....  International claims.
S. Rept. 919 (S. 2269) Dec. 11, 1967......  Unlawful seizure of U.S.
                                             fishing vessel.
S. Rept. 920 (S. Res. 155) Dec. 11, 1967..  Construction of nuclear
                                             desalting plants in the
                                             Middle East.
S. Rept. 926 (S. 1418) Dec. 12, 1967......  Changes in passport laws.
 
                            EXECUTIVE REPORTS
 
Ex. Rept. 1 (Ex. H, T and U, 89-2) Feb.     Fisheries conventions.
 27, 1967.
Ex. Rept. 2 (Ex. Q and R, 89-2) Feb. 27,    Maritime Facilitation
 1967.                                       Conventions.
Ex. Rept. 3 (Ex. K, L, M, J and N, 89-2)    Customs Conventions.
 Feb. 27, 1967.
Ex. Rept. 4 (Ex. D, 88-2) Mar. 3, 1967....  Consular Convention with the
                                             Soviet Union (with
                                             individual views).
Ex. Rept. 5 (Ex. E, 90-1) Mar. 30, 1967...  Amendments to the
                                             International Convention on
                                             the Safety of Life at Sea.
Ex. Rept. 6 (Ex. C, 90-1) Apr. 12, 1967...  Convention on the Service
                                             Abroad of Judicial and
                                             Extrajudicial Documents.
Ex. Rept. 7 (Ex. O, 89-2) Apr. 17, 1967...  International
                                             Telecommunication
                                             Convention.
Ex. Rept. 8 (Ex. D, 90-1) Apr. 18, 1967...  Treaty on Outer Space.
Ex. Rept. 9 (Ex. G, 88-1) May 3, 1967.....  Conventions on the
                                             International Exchange of
                                             Publications and Documents.
Ex. Rept. 10 (Ex. A, 90-1) May 3, 1967....  Amendment to Article 109 of
                                             the United Nations Charter.
Ex. Rept. 11 (Ex. G, 90-1) May 3, 1967....  Convention on Narcotic
                                             Drugs.
Ex. Rept. 12 (Ex. H, 90-1) July 27, 1967..  Partial revision of radio
                                             regulations.
Ex. Rept. 14 (Ex. P, 89-2) Aug. 25, 1967..  Commercial Treaty with
                                             Thailand.
Ex. Rept. 15 (Ex. I, 90-1) Sept. 13, 1967.  Consular Convention with
                                             France.
Ex. Rept. 16 (S. Ex. Res. 1) Sept. 14,      Withdrawal of certain
 1967.                                       treaties.
Ex. Rept. 17 (Ex. L, 88-1) Oct. 31, 1967..  Supplementary Slavery
                                             Convention.
Ex. Rept. 18 (Ex. B and F, 90-1) Nov. 1,    Tax conventions with Canada,
 1967.                                       Trinidad and Tobago.
Ex. Rept. 19 (Ex. K, 90-1) Dec. 4, 1967...  Further Prolongation of the
                                             International Sugar
                                             Agreement.
Ex. Rept. 20 (Ex. M, 90-1) Dec. 8, 1967...  Amendment to Article 28 of
                                             the Convention of the
                                             Intergovernmental Maritime
                                             Consultative Organization.
 



                               APPENDIX B

                              ----------                              


           Volumes Published to Date in the Historical Series

    Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine.
    Foreign Relief Act: 1947.
    Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948.
    The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty.
    Military Assistance Program: 1949.
    Extension of European Recovery Program: 1949.
    Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949-50.
    Reviews of the World Situation: 1949-50.
    Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee:
          Volume I, Eightieth Congress, First and Second 
        Sessions, 1947-48.
          Volume II, Eighty-first Congress, First and Second 
        Sessions, 1949-50.
          Volume III, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-second Congress, 
        First Session, 1951.
          Volume IV, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session, 
        1952.
          Volume V, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, 1953.
          Volume VI, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, 
        1954.
          Volume VII, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session, 
        1955.
          Volume VIII, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session, 
        1956.
          Volume IX, Eighty-fifth Congress, First Session, 
        1957.
          Volume X, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second Session, 
        1958.
          Volume XI, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session, 
        1959.
          Volume XII, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session, 
        1960.
          Volume XIII, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-seventh Congress, 
        First Session, 1961.
          Volume XIV, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session, 
        1962.
          Volume XV, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session, 
        1963.
          Volume XVI, Eighty-eighth Congress, Second Session, 
        1964.
          Volume XVII, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, 
        1965.
          Volume XVIII, Eighty-ninth Congress, Second Session, 
        1966.
          Volume XVIX, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 1967.

                                  
