[JPRT 110-1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



110th Congress 
 1st Session                COMMITTEE PRINT                            
                                                                  110-1
_______________________________________________________________________

 
     REPORT OF THE DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON
                           ETHICS ENFORCEMENT

                               __________

                       One Hundred Tenth Congress

                             First Session

                             December 2007




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        Printed for the use of the Special Task Force on Ethics

                     Available via World Wide Web:
              http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html








                SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON ETHICS ENFORCEMENT

                 Rep. MICHAEL E. CAPUANO (D-MA), Chair
               Rep. LAMAR S. SMITH (R-TX), Ranking Member

Rep. DAVID E. PRICE (D-NC)*          Rep. DAVID L. CAMP (R-MI)
Rep. ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT (D-   Rep. DAVID L. HOBSON (R-OH)
    VA)                              Rep. TODD TIAHRT (R-KS)
Rep. BETTY L. McCOLLUM (D-MN)

*Rep. Price was appointed to the Task Force in July 2007 to replace 
Rep. Martin T. Meehan, who resigned from Congress July 1, 2007.
  



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                               Formation

    The Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement was 
established on January 31, 2007. Speaker of the House Nancy 
Pelosi and House Republican Leader John Boehner appointed 
Representatives Michael E. Capuano and Lamar S. Smith as Chair 
and Ranking Member, respectively. Speaker Pelosi also appointed 
the following Democratic Members of Congress to serve on the 
Task Force: Martin T. Meehan, Robert C. ``Bobby'' Scott, and 
Betty L. McCollum. Republican Leader Boehner appointed the 
following Republican Members of Congress to serve on the Task 
Force: David L. Camp, David L. Hobson, and Todd Tiahrt. Rep. 
Meehan resigned from Congress in July 2007, and Rep. David E. 
Price was appointed to fill the vacancy on the Task Force. None 
currently serve on the House Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct (commonly known as the ``Ethics Committee''), though 
some have served on this committee in the past.
    A number of staff members greatly assisted the work of the 
Task Force in the course of its duration: Christina Tsafoulias, 
Legislative Assistant to Rep. Capuano; Paul Taylor, Chief 
Republican Counsel to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties; Bernard Raimo, 
Counsel to the Speaker; Ed Cassidy, Senior Advisor & Floor 
Assistant to the Republican Leader; and Robert F. Weinhagen, 
Jr., Senior Counsel in the Office of Legislative Counsel. In 
addition, the following staff aided Members of the Task Force: 
Jean Louise Beard, Chief of Staff, and Kate Roetzer, 
Legislative Assistant to Rep. Price; Allison Havourd and Rob 
Guido, Legislative Assistants to Rep. Camp; Christopher 
Hickling, Legislative Director to Rep. Meehan; Ben Taylor, 
Legislative Assistant to Rep. Hobson; Carla Murrell-Hargrove, 
Staff Assistant, and Rashage Green, Legislative Assistant to 
Rep. Scott; Jeff Kahrs, Chief of Staff to Rep. Tiahrt; and 
Emily Lawrence, Legislative Director to Rep. McCollum. The Task 
Force would also like to thank the offices of the 
Parliamentarian and General Counsel, the Committee on Standards 
of Official Conduct, and the Congressional Research Service for 
their assistance.

                           Executive Summary

    Over the past eleven months, the Task Force has considered 
the questions of whether to create an independent ethics 
enforcement entity within the House of Representatives and how 
best to increase transparency and accountability within the 
ethics process.
    As a result of months of study and discussion among Task 
Force members and stakeholders, the Task Force proposes the 
creation of an Office of Congressional Ethics as an independent 
office within the House. The office will be composed of six 
board members, jointly appointed by the Speaker and Minority 
Leader, and a staff. It will be the responsibility of the board 
to review information on allegations of misconduct by Members, 
officers, and employees of the House and make recommendations 
to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct for the 
Committee's official consideration and action.
    Two board members may initiate a review by notifying all 
other board members in writing. The board will then have 30 
calendar days to consider the matter in a preliminary phase and 
may vote to either terminate the review or progress to a 
second-phase review. Once in the second phase, the board has 45 
calendar days (with a possible one-time extension of 14 days) 
to complete consideration of the matter and refer it to the 
Standards Committee with a recommendation for dismissal, 
further review, or as unresolved due to a tie vote. The board's 
referral may not contain any conclusions regarding the validity 
of the allegations upon which it is based or the guilt or 
innocence of the individual who is the subject of the review. 
All matters that enter into a second-phase review must be 
referred to the Standards Committee.
    Once the Standards Committee receives a matter through this 
process, it will have 45 calendar days (with one possible 
extension of the same duration) to deliberate and decide on a 
course of action. All final authority and responsibility to 
either dismiss a case or empanel an investigative subcommittee 
continues to lie with the Standards Committee. In most cases, 
the Committee will publicly announce its disposition on the 
matter at the end of the applicable time period, along with a 
report and findings from the board. However, no public 
announcements are required when neither the board nor the 
Ethics Committee has found substantial wrongdoing.
    Through the implementation of these recommendations, the 
Task Force expects to significantly increase transparency in 
the process through greater reporting on a timely basis and to 
provide for an independent element of consideration by 
individuals who are not current Members of the House of 
Representatives.

                                Purpose

    During the 109th Congress, several Members were involved in 
controversies ranging from improper use of their office to 
inappropriate contact with participants in the House Page 
Program. In response to these well-documented incidents, one of 
the first actions of the 110th Congress was to pass changes to 
the U.S. House of Representatives Code of Official Conduct and 
other Rules of the House. In follow up to strengthening the 
rules governing the conduct of Members, Speaker Pelosi and 
Republican Leader Boehner announced that they would establish a 
Task Force to study enforcement of ethics rules. The Special 
Task Force on Ethics Enforcement was charged with determining 
whether the House should establish an independent ethics entity 
to serve as part of the ethics enforcement process. Currently, 
the Standards Committee is the sole ethics entity within the 
House, overseeing the receipt of all complaints, inquiries, 
investigations, and adjudication.
    Many Members of Congress and constitutional scholars have 
expressed concerns regarding the constitutionality of 
establishing an independent entity to supplement the existing 
House ethics process. The two commonly cited passages are as 
follows:
     Article I, section 5, clause 2 of the United 
States Constitution: ``Each House may determine the Rules of 
its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, 
and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.''
     Article I, section 6, clause 1 of the United 
States Constitution: ``Senators and Representatives . . . for 
any Speech or Debate in either House, . . . shall not be 
questioned in any other place.''
    Task Force members were cognizant of these issues as they 
considered policy recommendations, and were careful to ensure 
that any proposal strictly adhere to constitutional precepts.

                               Background

    Ethics reform in the House has been an ongoing process 
since the creation of the Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct in 1967. On average, the House has adopted significant 
ethics reforms, usually at the recommendation of a special task 
force, once a decade. Such reforms occurred after significant 
study of the ethics process, generally coupled with heightened 
public concern due to contemporaneous scandal.
    In 1977, the House adopted changes to the ethics process as 
proposed by the House Commission on Administrative Review. This 
Commission was led by Representatives David R. Obey (D-WI) and 
William E. Frenzel (R-MN), and charged with reviewing the 
administrative structure of the House. A number of reforms were 
implemented as a result of this initiative, including increased 
financial disclosure obligations for Members, limits on 
Members' outside earned income, and the abolition of 
``unofficial'' office accounts which Members often used to 
supplement official monies.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Financial Ethics (H. Doc. No. 95-73).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1989, the House Bipartisan Leadership Task Force on 
Ethics convened, co-chaired by Representatives Vic Fazio (D-CA) 
and Lynn Martin (R-IL). This Task Force's work culminated in 
the passage of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which banned 
honoraria, instituted a one-year post-employment waiting period 
before lobbying, tightened gift rules, established the Office 
of Advice and Education, and provided for bifurcation between 
the investigative and adjudicatory duties of the Standards 
Committee.\2\
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    \2\ Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (Public Law No. 101-194).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, in 1997, the House established the Ethics Reform 
Task Force. This group was co-chaired by Representatives Robert 
L. Livingston (R-LA) and Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD). A number of 
recommendations were implemented, including the first creation 
of a supplemental pool of Members from which to draw for 
investigative subcommittees, restrictions on the filing of 
complaints, limits to Members' service on the Standards 
Committee, and the adoption of a rule providing for 
professional, nonpartisan Committee staff.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ H. Res. 168--To implement the recommendations of the bipartisan 
House Ethics Reform Task Force (105th Congress).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In light of the fact that Congress worked for 178 years 
without formal rules on ethics or ethics procedures, the Task 
Force believes that Congress has come a long way in the 40 
years since the establishment of the Standards Committee in 
1967. Members of the Task Force also recognize that such 
matters are constantly in need of review and updating.

                                Process

    The Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement met with 
current and former Members of Congress, advocacy and reform 
groups, scholars, current and former Standards Committee staff, 
and other stakeholders. The purpose of the exchanges was to 
familiarize Task Force members with varying viewpoints on the 
ethics process in the House of Representatives, as well as with 
proposals for reform of the current system. Throughout this 
process, the Task Force focused solely on the central question 
of whether to create an independent ethics enforcement entity. 
Numerous preliminary meetings took place in executive session 
in order to facilitate frank discussion among Task Force 
members and those asked to share their views.
    Members met in executive session on February 9, 2007 and 
March 1, 2007 to discuss matters relating to process, 
scheduling, and research.
    Members met in executive session on March 6, 2007, with Ken 
Kellner, Senior Counsel to the House Committee on Standards of 
Official Conduct.
    Members met in executive session on March 8, 2007, with 
Thomas Mann, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and 
Norman Ornstein, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise 
Institute.
    Members met in executive session on March 13, 2007, with 
Meredith McGehee, Policy Director for the Campaign Legal Center 
and Fred Wertheimer, President and CEO of Democracy 21. Both 
represent a larger coalition that supports the establishment of 
an Office of Public Integrity.
    Members met in executive session on March 15, 2007, with 
former Representatives Robert Livingston, who served as co-
chair of the 1997 House Ethics Task Force, and Louis Stokes, a 
former Chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official 
Conduct.
    Members met in executive session on March 20, 2007 with Tom 
Fitton, President of Judicial Watch and Melanie Sloan, 
Executive Director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington (CREW).
    Members met in executive session on March 22, 2007, with 
Senator Ben Cardin, Co-Chair of the 1997 House Ethics Task 
Force, and Don Wolfensberger, Director of the Congress Project 
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
    Members met in executive session on March 27, 2007, with 
Sarah Dufendach, Chief of Legislative Affairs for Common Cause, 
Gary Kalman, Democracy Advocate for U.S. PIRG, and Lloyd 
Leonard, Senior Director of Advocacy for the League of Women 
Voters.
    Members met in executive session on March 29, 2007 with 
Patricia Harned, President of the Ethics Resource Center, 
Bradley Smith, former Federal Elections Commission Chairman, 
and Judge Anthony Wilhoit, Executive Director of the Kentucky 
Legislative Ethics Commission.
    Members met in executive session on April 17, 2007 with Rob 
Walker, Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Senate Select 
Committee on Ethics and former Chief Counsel and Staff Director 
of the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.
    The Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement held a public 
hearing on Thursday, April 19, 2007. The following individuals 
appeared as witnesses to offer testimony: Tom Fitton, President 
of Judicial Watch; Meredith McGehee, Policy Director for the 
Campaign Legal Center; Fred Wertheimer, President and CEO of 
Democracy 21; and Don Wolfensberger, Director of the Congress 
Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars. Mr. Fitton, Ms. McGehee, and Mr. Wertheimer all 
testified in support of the general concept of an independent 
ethics enforcement entity though some proposal details 
differed. Mr. Wolfensberger offered his perspective on this 
process based on years of service as an employee of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, and stated his opposition to the 
creation of an independent entity. Task Force members had the 
opportunity to pose follow-up questions to witnesses at the 
conclusion of their testimony. The Task Force hearing was open 
to all interested parties and a full transcript of the hearing 
was produced. The transcript is available on Rep. Capuano's 
website at http://www.house.gov/capuano/.
    Members met again in executive session on April 24, 2007, 
to begin substantive discussion of Task Force proposals and 
recommendations.
    Members continued to meet in executive session to expand on 
those internal discussions and deliberate matters further on 
the following dates: April 26, 2007; May 1, 2007; May 2, 2007; 
May 3, 2007; May 10, 2007; May 22, 2007; June 6, 2007; June 7, 
2007; September 27, 2007; October 4, 2007; October 10, 2007; 
October 30, 2007; November 1, 2007; November 8, 2007; November 
14, 2007; November 15, 2007; December 4, 2007; and December 19, 
2007.
    In addition, the Chair and Ranking Member of the Task Force 
held six meetings early in the process with many of those named 
above, as well as with Craig Holman, Legislative Representative 
for Public Citizen; Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney for the 
Congressional Research Service; and R. Eric Petersen, Analyst 
in American National Government for the Congressional Research 
Service.
    In June 2007, the Task Force developed a proposal for an 
independent entity that would accept submissions from the 
general public regarding alleged ethics violations and, after 
an initial inquiry, refer them (with recommendations) to the 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct for final action. 
This proposal was crafted based on a number of discussions of 
historical concerns with the ethics process in the House, and 
incorporated many suggestions given to the Task Force over the 
course of its meetings. Two main elements of the initial plan 
became problematic due to opposing concerns of some Members of 
Congress and ethics reform groups: the acceptance of 
``outside'' submissions from the general public, and the 
requirement that any group filing a submission (or 
significantly aiding in the filing of a submission) disclose 
financial donors over a certain threshold. In deference to the 
concerns of both Members and various ethics reform groups, the 
Task Force decided to withhold its proposal at that time and to 
develop a new proposal. Regardless, the Task Force has always 
maintained its focus on accountability and transparency in the 
ethics process.

                            Recommendations

    The following section contains the Special Task Force on 
Ethics Enforcement's recommendations based on months of study, 
meetings, and discussion among members. The entity described 
below is created within the House of Representatives, to be 
established through a House resolution. The proposed resolution 
is included as Attachment A in this report. The Task Force 
recommends that an Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) 
supplement the House ethics process by providing an independent 
review of alleged violations of standards of conduct by 
Members, officers, and employees--thereby reassuring Members of 
Congress and the general public that a clear ethics system is 
in place and will respond to possible ethics violations. Among 
the goals the Task Force hopes to accomplish are to introduce 
an independent review element by non-Members and significantly 
increase transparency of the process. The formation, procedure, 
and ancillary details of the OCE are described below.

General overview

    The Task Force recommends that an entity named the Office 
of Congressional Ethics be established as an independent office 
within the House of Representatives to provide a review of 
alleged ethics violations. The OCE will be composed of six 
board members. The board will then appoint a staff to carry out 
the daily work of the office.
    The new Office of Congressional Ethics will act as an 
origination point for independent review of possible violations 
of standards of conduct, but will not prevent the Standards 
Committee from accepting complaints filed by Members. Any two 
OCE board members will be able to initiate a preliminary review 
of any matter by the board in order to better assess its 
validity. The board will then vote to either terminate the 
preliminary review or proceed to a second-phase review of the 
matter. By the end of a mandated time period, the OCE must 
refer all matters under second-phase review to the House 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct--with a 
recommendation for dismissal, for further inquiry, or as 
unresolved due to a tie vote--for official Committee action. 
The Standards Committee will then consider the referral 
according to current Committee rules, but, for the first time 
in history, will be required to make a public announcement of 
its disposition for most referrals within a specified time 
period. The Standards Committee may dismiss or further 
investigate a matter as it sees fit once it has received the 
referral from the OCE.
    This new, independent office will open up the ethics 
process by allowing the OCE to self-initiate reviews of alleged 
violations, providing an avenue for both preliminary and 
second-phase reviews, and triggering a procedure by which 
official public comment is required within a specified time 
frame.

Entity

    The Office of Congressional Ethics is to be established by 
resolution as an independent office of the House of 
Representatives consisting of board members and a staff. Board 
members are to be appointed jointly by the Speaker and Minority 
Leader to ensure bipartisan balance. Vacancies on the board 
will be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term by the 
process delineated below. Once established, the board shall 
appoint a nonpartisan, professional staff to carry out the 
daily duties of the OCE. The staff members are to be employees 
of the House of Representatives and subject to all applicable 
rules and standards for such employees.
    During Task Force meetings, some ethics reform groups 
suggested that the Task Force create an ``outside'' entity 
which would be separate from the House. Its staff would not be 
considered House employees, nor would its director (or board 
members) or rules operate under House control. Some proposals 
included provisions to allow this outside entity to receive 
complaints, dismiss complaints as appropriate, conduct its own 
investigations, and recommend sanctions of Members. The Task 
Force recognized that the establishment of this type of entity 
would require a vote of both the House and Senate, and the 
signature of the President, and could also run afoul of 
constitutional responsibilities. Many outside groups and 
scholars with whom the Task Force consulted agreed with this 
assessment and proposed models for an entity within the House 
that would act as an independent office much like the Office of 
the Inspector General or the Office of the Chief Administrative 
Officer. The Task Force approved of such an approach for an 
office within the Legislative Branch as the most feasible.
    The OCE will be established by a resolution which must be 
readopted at the start of each new Congress to remain in 
effect. Given that the Rules of the House, which the resolution 
in part amends, are traditionally carried over from one 
Congress to the next, the Task Force anticipates that the 
continued existence and effectiveness of the OCE will be given 
due respect and consideration.

Board

    The board members of the OCE will be charged with 
initiating reviews, assessing all matters under review, and 
referring second-phase reviews to the Standards Committee for 
action. They must make a decision whether to recommend (in the 
case of a second-phase review) that the Committee dismiss a 
matter or that the matter requires further inquiry. The board 
will be able to independently initiate ethics reviews and, for 
this reason, must be comprised of individuals of distinction 
and high qualification. As the OCE is to be an independent 
entity within the House, it is clear that no current Members of 
Congress may serve on its board. Rather, OCE board members 
shall be private citizens with extensive experience with one or 
more of the following fields: legislative, judicial, 
regulatory, professional ethics, business, legal, and academic. 
This list is not exhaustive and is meant to provide examples of 
the background and qualities the Speaker of the House and 
Minority Leader may take into account when considering 
individuals to appoint to the board. In addition, Task Force 
members believe it would be appropriate to consider former 
Members of Congress, former Congressional staff, former state 
legislators, former judges, etc. No current registered 
lobbyists may serve on the board. Former Members of Congress to 
be considered for the board must be out of office for at least 
one year prior to their appointment.
    It is the intention of the Task Force that the OCE should 
run as smoothly as possible following its establishment within 
the House. Board members will each serve presumptive four year 
terms and may be reappointed for one additional term. The 
Speaker and Minority Leader will jointly appoint board members 
to ensure bipartisanship in the operation of the OCE. If, after 
90 days, a board position has not been filled by joint 
appointment, then the position will be filled by either the 
Speaker or Minority Leader, as appropriate, acting alone. The 
Task Force encourages the two leaders to work cooperatively to 
appoint a full board; however, in the event that they are 
unable to agree on a full complement, the Task Force believes 
it is essential that the OCE proceed to conduct its business in 
a timely manner and should therefore have a system in place to 
account for such a possibility. In a practical sense, the 
Speaker and Minority Leader will most likely appoint two board 
members at a time, to guarantee that any slots remaining open 
after the 90-day period (mentioned above) exist in even numbers 
for potential partition along majority-minority lines.
    To ensure continuity of OCE functions, the terms will be 
staggered so that the Speaker and Minority Leader will appoint 
or re-appoint at least two board members at the start of a new 
Congress. At the establishment of the OCE, the Speaker and 
Minority Leader will appoint four board members to serve 
through the remainder of the 110th Congress and two board 
members presumed to serve through the 111th Congress. 
Accordingly, at the start of the 111th Congress, the leaders 
must make four new board appointments through the duration of 
the 112th Congress.
    OCE board members shall be paid for their service on a per 
diem basis at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the 
minimum rate of basic pay payable for GS-15 of the General 
Schedule. As of December 26, 2006, this rate equaled $93,063 
per year. Board members shall also be reimbursed for reasonable 
and customary expenses associated with travel, lodging, and 
meals necessary to carry out their official duties. To provide 
for full participation, however, the Task Force anticipates 
that the board may, when necessary and appropriate, and 
pursuant to its rules, conduct meetings via telephone 
conference call. The board will draw up a code of conduct to 
which its members must adhere that addresses conflict of 
interest and other concerns. The Task Force expects that board 
members will be professional and responsible men and women who, 
though working part-time on a per diem basis, will account for 
their duties in a conscientious manner. Board members shall 
only be paid for days in which substantive OCE work is done. At 
no time shall board members engage in ex parte communications 
with any Member, officer, or employee of the House who is the 
subject of a review by the OCE, or any other interested party.
    In order to ensure that the OCE is as protected as possible 
from politics and political campaigns, no board members shall 
be allowed to seek federal office and each must agree not to do 
so within three years of service. The Task Force looks 
unfavorably on any individual who would capitalize on a 
position with the OCE for personal political gain.
    Removal of board members for cause at any point prior to 
the completion of their appointment will require the agreement 
of both the Speaker and Minority Leader to ensure that such 
action is rare and taken only when necessary.
    The Task Force would like to address one point that 
discussion with ethics reform groups yielded relative to the 
OCE board: the suggestion that a new ethics entity be created 
with its own professional staff and be overseen by one director 
rather than a board. It was argued that such an arrangement 
would provide for greater accountability within the entity and 
of the entity to the House.
    This concept proved dubious for a number of reasons. The 
primary concern is the amount of power vested in one individual 
to oversee the process. While such a Director would no doubt be 
vetted by both parties and, by necessity, approved by both 
parties' leadership, the distinct potential exists for an 
individual in this position to overreach his or her authority. 
The Task Force encountered instances in the history of the 
ethics process where, for example, special counsel was hired, 
either by the Standards Committee or some other Congressional 
entity, who was widely seen as having overstepped the 
appropriate extent of his or her authority. Concerns were 
raised about investigations that stray from the original 
allegations of misconduct, and about individuals who use such 
unique positions of power to lay the foundation for their own 
future careers. The Task Force does not approve of the use of 
the ethics process for partisan or personal gain and believes 
the amount of power given to a sole director of the entity 
would pose significant potential for abuse.
    In addition, a board composed of an equal number of members 
appointed jointly encourages bipartisan cooperation and reduces 
concerns of partisan prosecution or protection. Each party must 
take seriously its responsibility to act conscientiously with 
respect to the appointment and comity of board members.

Staff

    The staff of the OCE will be hired and overseen by OCE 
board members, and will be full-time employees of the House of 
Representatives.
    Staff members shall be hired by the board for the duration 
of a Congress and may be retained by a vote of the OCE board. A 
majority of the board (i.e. four members) must vote 
affirmatively to hire staff and, in such a case where it 
becomes necessary, to terminate staff prior to the end of a 
Congress.
    It is essential that the Office of Congressional Ethics 
remain nonpartisan in design and function. All staff must be 
professional and conduct themselves in a strictly nonpartisan 
manner. Consequently, the Task Force recommends that 
restrictions similar to those placed on the political and 
outside activities of Standards Committee staff be implemented 
for OCE staff as well. These include requiring that no staff 
``engage in any partisan political activity directly affecting 
any congressional or presidential election'' and that no staff 
``accept public speaking engagements or write for publication 
on any subject that is in any way related to his or her 
employment or duties.'' \4\
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    \4\ See Standards Committee Rule 6(d) and (e).
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Prospective consideration

    Reviews undertaken by the OCE may only pertain to acts 
alleged to have occurred on or after the date of adoption of 
the resolution. The Task Force wishes to allow for a smooth 
establishment of the OCE in which it will not be overburdened 
by a backlog of matters from previous Congresses. The OCE is 
intended to supplement and open up the ethics process in the 
House by moving forward. The customary Standards Committee 
process will remain available to accept complaints--according 
to its existing rules as adopted on February 16th, 2007--for 
any conduct taking place in any of the three preceding 
Congresses. The Standards Committee shall retain such authority 
as granted under House rule XI.
    In order to allow adequate time for appointments, hiring of 
staff, office placement, and other such matters, the OCE is 
given 120 days from the date of adoption of the resolution 
before it is expected to commence any review.

Authority and duties of the OCE

    As the OCE is designed to enhance and supplement the House 
ethics process by allowing for independent initial 
consideration of possible ethics violations, it will exist to 
initiate and conduct reviews, gather information, and advise 
the Standards Committee as to board members' recommendations 
regarding alleged violations. Any final action to dismiss or 
establish an investigative subcommittee to further examine 
alleged violations must be taken by the Standards Committee 
itself, pursuant to its Committee rules.
    The staff and board of the OCE are empowered to gather 
information regarding potential violations, as stated above. 
The purpose of this review of each allegation is to help board 
members decide which matters to refer, and how best to refer 
them, to the Standards Committee. Through fact-gathering, the 
board and staff should be able to establish which allegations 
lack merit or are de minimis and thus do not necessitate 
second-phase review by the OCE or referral to the Committee for 
consideration. The Task Force envisions certain circumstances 
under which the board may seek to interview individuals 
believed to have further information regarding an alleged 
violation and ask to see documents presumed to be connected to 
the case. However, should the board feel it has not been able 
to gather accurate information due to lack of cooperation with 
its initial inquiry or unavailability of requested information, 
it shall state so in its referral of a given matter to the 
Standards Committee. The Committee is encouraged to take such 
factors into consideration during deliberations.
    At no time shall any board member or staff member of the 
OCE comment publicly on any matter within its jurisdiction, 
unless requested to do so by the Standards Committee in order 
to participate in a public proceeding of that Committee. To 
ensure confidentiality and responsibility in the opening steps 
of the ethics process, the OCE will conduct all its proceedings 
and deliberations in executive session.
    The Task Force also recommends that the OCE produce a 
yearly statistical report detailing, without name or subject 
attribution, the work of the office. The report should give the 
public an understanding as to how many matters were reviewed 
both in the preliminary and second-phase stages, along with the 
number of meetings of the board and other related activities.
    The above section describes the authority and duties 
delegated to the OCE at this time. Current rules require 
Members and certain House staff to file financial disclosure 
forms and travel reports with the Office of the Clerk. The 
Clerk also receives Lobbying Disclosure Act filings. In the 
discourse of ethics reform, it was suggested to the Task Force 
that the independent entity be responsible for overseeing and 
receiving such filings as part of its mandate. It is, however, 
the desire of the Task Force that the entity be initially 
charged only with the responsibilities outlined in its 
recommendations. The creation of a new element within the 
system will require certain adjustments and a period of time to 
become fully operational. The entity should not be overloaded 
at its implementation. This speaks to one reason why the Task 
Force later recommends a continuing review of the ethics 
process while such changes are realized.

Review process

    The Task Force feels strongly that part of any reform to 
the ethics process must include a more transparent system that 
contains recognizable and predictable timeframes, along with an 
independent review of alleged ethics violations by individuals 
who are not Members of Congress. The process detailed below 
adheres to strict timelines and guarantees public comment by 
the Standards Committee in most cases once a second-phase 
review is initiated. The public, as well as Members of 
Congress, have a right to know that the process is working and 
that pressing matters are being reviewed by the OCE and 
Standards Committee. It is with this goal in mind that the Task 
Force lays out the following review process for the OCE.
    Once two board members of the OCE jointly initiate a 
preliminary review by notifying all other board members in 
writing, board members shall have 30 calendar days or 5 
legislative days, whichever is later, to conduct the 
preliminary review. This phase is intended to provide an 
opportunity to explore any alleged ethics violations in order 
to establish whether further review is merited. Within 7 
business days of the start of a preliminary review, the OCE 
must transmit notification to both the subject of the review 
and the Standards Committee, along with a statement of the 
nature of the review. The names of the board members initiating 
the preliminary review shall never be made public.
    By the close of the preliminary review phase, the board 
must vote on whether to terminate the review or commence a 
second-phase review of the matter, though such a vote may occur 
at any point in the preliminary phase. The OCE must notify both 
the subject of the review and the Standards Committee of the 
vote's result, but not the names of board members indicating 
which member voted a particular way. A preliminary review may 
only be terminated by an affirmative vote of four or more board 
members. If the review is terminated, all OCE inquiries into 
the matter shall cease and it is considered closed. The OCE is 
not required to transmit any further information regarding a 
terminated matter to the Standards Committee; however, the 
board may vote at its discretion to transmit any information it 
sees fit.
    If the board does not terminate a preliminary review, then 
the OCE will proceed to a second-phase review of the matter. 
During the second phase, the board will have 45 calendar days 
or 5 legislative days, whichever is later, to gather 
information, obtain witness testimony, examine documents, and 
generally probe the alleged violation. The board may vote to 
grant a one-time extension of 14 calendar days in the second-
phase review. At the close of the second-phase review process, 
the board of the OCE must refer the matter to the Standards 
Committee with its report and findings.
    Any Member, officer, or employee of the House who is the 
subject of an OCE review has the right to present to the board, 
verbally or in writing (at the board's discretion), a statement 
responding to allegations prior to the board's referral and 
recommendations to the Standards Committee.
    During the review (preliminary or second-phase) of a given 
matter, the OCE may collect relevant documents and interview 
individuals who may have knowledge of the alleged violation. In 
the course of such inquiries and interviews, the OCE shall make 
any individuals providing information verbally or in writing 
aware of federal criminal statutes concerning false statements 
made to Congress,\5\ the penalty for violation of which carries 
a fine and/or imprisonment. Those individuals will be asked to 
sign a statement attesting that they understand the law and 
will comply with it. The OCE will be directed to develop its 
own set of rules to govern Office functions beyond what is set 
forth in the accompanying resolution. Among those rules will be 
one stating that all witnesses must sign the above statement. 
The Task Force expects the OCE, in addition, to develop 
guidelines for OCE action if a witness refuses to sign the 
statement, which should include, but not be limited to, 
incorporating information to that effect within the board's 
findings of fact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001.
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    If OCE staff and board members have reason to believe that 
statements made in the course of its reviews are false, or that 
requested information or documents have been withheld, the 
board may take this into consideration during its deliberations 
and note this among materials submitted as ``backup documents'' 
to the Standards Committee for its consideration. The Committee 
is expected and encouraged to make note of such information and 
take it into consideration during its deliberations.
    The end product of the second-phase OCE process is to be 
the referral of a matter from the OCE to the Standards 
Committee. Each matter under second-phase review by the OCE 
must be referred to the Committee for a final decision by 
Standards Committee Members. Matters may be referred with a 
recommendation to dismiss (as de minimis, insignificantly 
substantiated, or for some other reason), a recommendation for 
further review, or as unresolved due to a tie vote. Board 
members, based on the information gathered by themselves and 
staff, shall issue materials to accompany each referral. These 
materials will include:
    1. Report: A short written Report stating only that the 
board recommends the matter be dismissed, recommends that the 
matter requires further review, or refers the matter as 
unresolved; delineating the vote of board members (e.g. 6-0, 4-
2, etc.), but no board member names; and including a statement 
of the nature of the review and the name of the individual who 
is the subject of the review.
    2. Findings: Preliminary factual Findings based on the 
information available to the board at the time of its inquiry, 
if any. Such findings shall not contain any conclusory 
statements regarding the validity of the allegations upon which 
the review is based or the guilt or innocence of the individual 
who is the subject of the review. The findings may contain 
statements as to what necessary information was unavailable at 
the time, including, but not limited to, a list of potential 
witnesses the OCE was unable to interview or of requested 
documents it was unable to obtain. In addition, the board may 
include recommendations for the issuance of subpoenas where 
members feel it is appropriate. Finally, the Findings shall 
contain citations of any relevant laws, rules, regulations, or 
standards of conduct.
    3. Other materials forwarded to the Committee may consist 
of ``backup'' or supporting documents such as records, 
testimony, research, staff notes, and commentary detailing 
either why a dismissal is recommended or why a matter is 
referred for further inquiry. Cooperative witnesses, who will 
not be named by the board within the Findings in order to 
preserve confidentiality, should be listed within the 
supporting documents for the Committee's information. These 
materials shall not be published unless the Standards Committee 
deems it necessary and appropriate.
    Nothing in these recommendations shall preclude a second 
review by the board of the OCE of any given matter. The Task 
Force foresees certain uncommon circumstances in which the 
board may have terminated a preliminary review of a specific 
matter, or recommended dismissal of a matter to the Standards 
Committee, only to come across new evidence in the future which 
suggests the allegations merit another review. There will be no 
``double jeopardy'' considerations preventing subsequent 
reviews.
    Complaints offered by Members of Congress shall continue to 
be submitted directly to the Standards Committee for 
consideration under the existing process.

Subpoena Power

    During the course of discussions amongst Members of the 
Task Force and with stakeholders outside Congress, it was 
suggested that the OCE be given either direct or ``indirect'' 
subpoena power (``indirect'' meaning access through requests to 
the Standards Committee that subpoenas be issued returnable to 
the OCE). Task Force members discussed these options vigorously 
and debated their feasibility. The final decision to exclude 
subpoena power was based on a number of factors.
    The professional opinions of the House Parliamentarian, 
General Counsel, and Congressional Research Service were sought 
so that the Task Force could better assess the legality of 
delegating such an authority through simple resolution. The 
overall consensus indicated that while it might be possible to 
do so, a subpoena issued by such a method would almost 
certainly be subject to a court challenge unless it was backed 
by some statutory authority. Consequently, as a statute would 
require both passage by the Senate and the signature of the 
President, Task Force members decided against attempting to 
pass a bill that was likely to be held up in the legislative 
process. It is the hope of the Task Force that its 
recommendations be implemented through a swift legislative 
process and that the establishment of the OCE take place 
equally quickly, so as to commence the improvement of the 
ethics process as soon as possible.
    Members of the Task Force believe that the timeline 
requirements instituted by the new process are critical: 
matters will spend at most three months under consideration by 
the board of the OCE before being referred to the Standards 
Committee for resolution. Due to the fast-paced nature of any 
OCE review, the Task Force feels subpoenas issued during that 
stage would not constitute successful leverage, as any court 
challenge to a subpoena would almost certainly carry on past 
the OCE deadline for referral to the Committee. In practice, 
subpoenas would not be able to be utilized effectively by the 
board and may unnecessarily complicate and delay the ethics 
process at that juncture.
    Most importantly, the Task Force proposal envisions 
significant communication of information from the OCE to the 
Standards Committee, including explicit wording recommending 
the Committee issue a specific subpoena in its review of a 
matter referred by the OCE. The Task Force believes that this 
inclusion within the findings transmitted by the OCE to the 
Committee strikes at the heart of the issue of compelling 
testimony or documents--the threat of a subpoena is likely to 
compel a witness to cooperate almost as much as the subpoena 
itself. When this fact is considered in light of the long 
period of time it takes to issue and enforce a subpoena, and 
the desire to move the process along at a reasonable pace, the 
Task Force believes it becomes clear why there is no true value 
added by issuing subpoenas at this stage in the process. The 
Task Force encourages the OCE to make witnesses providing 
testimony or those asked to produce documents aware that the 
board may recommend a subpoena be issued by the Standards 
Committee later in the process.
    The degree to which witnesses cooperate with the OCE in its 
reviews will play an important role in the decision of the 
board whether to recommend the Standards Committee issue a 
subpoena. Should the board feel that any witness asked to 
provide testimony or documents during the process has not been 
cooperative, it may reasonably determine that the Committee 
should obtain sworn testimony from that individual and 
recommend use of a subpoena to compel the sharing of pertinent 
information. The Committee is also expected to properly note 
such situations during its deliberations.

Referral to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct

    After completion of the OCE's second-phase review, and at 
or before the time limit specified above, the OCE will refer 
all matters to the Standards Committee for official 
disposition. The Committee must treat all matters referred by 
the OCE as properly received and must, upon receipt, commence 
consideration according to Standards Committee rule 16, 
subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e). Under such provisions, the 
Committee shall determine what action is warranted, including, 
but not limited to: agreement with any recommendations 
transmitted from the OCE, dismissal of the matter, further 
investigation through the request for one extension of the time 
period for consideration, or establishment of an investigative 
subcommittee. Any referral received from the OCE will 
automatically bypass the provision outlined in Committee rule 
16(a), which allows the Committee's Chairman and Ranking Member 
14 calendar days or 5 legislative days to jointly determine 
whether information offered as a complaint constitutes a 
complaint according to Committee requirements.
    In the case of referrals made by the OCE to the Standards 
Committee within the 60 days before an applicable election, the 
Committee may not accept referrals of matters in which the 
subject of the review is a candidate for election. The process 
will halt temporarily and proceed the day after the election. 
In addition, any reporting requirements placed on the Committee 
by this proposal that would occur within the 60-day blackout 
period shall be deferred unless the Committee votes otherwise. 
The Task Force expects that, in most cases, the Committee will 
choose not to disclose any information within the blackout 
period; however, should the Committee feel an announcement of 
any sort would be in the best interest of the institution and 
the public, it may publicize any information it wishes. 
Pursuant to its current rules, the Committee may publicize any 
information it sees fit within this window, though it has 
typically chosen to not to communicate with the public in the 
two months prior to an election.
    The Standards Committee may request that a board or staff 
member of the OCE ``present'' a matter that has been referred 
to the Committee. In such circumstances, one member of the OCE 
shall be designated to present in person the report and 
findings of the board to the Committee and be available to 
answer any questions Committee members may have relative to the 
matter under consideration. No presentation of the board's 
disposition and findings may take place without a request from 
the Standards Committee.
    Under existing Standards Committee rules, the Committee has 
a 45 calendar day or 5 legislative day period, whichever is 
later, in which to determine necessary action as outlined 
above. At the end of that period, or upon making a 
determination, whichever occurs first, the Committee must issue 
its own public statement regarding its action on the matter 
referred by the OCE and delineating the vote of the Standards 
Committee, and a copy of the OCE board's report and findings.
    The exception to the above is a case where the board 
recommends dismissal of a matter and the Committee concurs, or 
where the board refers a matter as unresolved due to a tie vote 
and the Committee dismisses it. Under such circumstances, the 
Committee is not obligated to release the OCE report and 
findings, though it may vote to do so at its discretion.
    The Committee may, either by joint decision of the Chair 
and Ranking Member or by vote of the Committee, extend the 
initial period of consideration by one additional period of 45 
calendar days or 5 legislative days. If the Committee so 
extends a matter referred by the board with a recommendation 
for further review, it must, on the day of such decision, make 
a public statement announcing the extension of the given 
matter. If the Committee extends a matter referred by the board 
with a recommendation to dismiss or as unresolved due to a tie 
board vote, the Committee is not required to publicly announce 
the extension.
    If the Committee deadlocks on a matter, the Committee must 
publicly release the board's report and findings but may 
otherwise adhere to its existing rules. This action will allow 
the public some cognizance of the facts of the matter even if 
the Committee is unable to resolve it officially.
    Should the Committee empanel an investigative subcommittee 
regarding a matter referred by the board, it must publicly 
announce that fact upon creation of the subcommittee, but 
otherwise shall not make public the report and findings of the 
board until the completion of the subcommittee process. If that 
process is not completed after one year from the date of 
referral, the Committee shall publicly release the report of 
the board. And if, at the close of the Congress in which the 
report was released, the investigative subcommittee has not 
completed its process, then the Committee shall publicly 
release the findings of the board.
    The Standards Committee maintains its current ability to 
resolve matters with private or public letters as it so 
chooses. Any sanction it may currently impose according to 
Committee rules will not be precluded by the Task Force's 
recommended proposal. In fact, members of the Task Force 
anticipate matters that may be best dismissed by the Committee 
as a de minimis technical violation but may also necessitate a 
private letter to a Member outlining obligatory future 
compliance with rules. Such situations are certain to arise and 
should be dealt with in a manner appropriate to their scope and 
significance.
    The Standards Committee, according to its current rules,\6\ 
may defer action on a complaint when requested by appropriate 
law enforcement or regulatory authorities. The Committee may 
continue this practice with respect to matters referred by the 
OCE as well. If the Committee does defer action on a matter at 
the request of such authorities, it shall make a public 
statement to that effect within one day of agreeing to the 
deferral. In the case of a matter referred by the OCE for 
further review, the Committee must also release the report of 
the board. If, one year after the deferral to law enforcement 
or regulatory authorities, the Committee has not acted on the 
matter, the Committee must make a new public statement 
announcing that it is still deferring taking action on the 
matter and must renew this statement each year as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See Standards Committee rule 15(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Task Force recognizes that this addition to the ethics 
process may increase the workload of the Standards Committee 
beyond the capacity of its current staff. Task Force members 
encourage and expect the House to respond as necessary and 
appropriate to provide sufficient staff to allow the Committee 
to meet its new obligations under this resolution.
    The process outlined above guarantees a public statement on 
nearly every matter that is reviewed in the second phase by the 
OCE. While a few matters will necessitate further, more 
expansive investigation by an investigative subcommittee of the 
Standards Committee, it is the goal of the Task Force to ensure 
that the public is made aware of information concerning each 
significant alleged violation in a timely fashion. As such, 
Members of Congress and the general public can be assured that 
the OCE and Standards Committee are aware of certain 
allegations and that the process for consideration of those 
matters has been triggered.
    The Task Force has included an attachment to this report 
which delineates the various steps associated with the OCE 
process and the possible outcomes (Attachment B).

Cooperation with the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct

    The Task Force intends the OCE and the Standards Committee 
to work cooperatively to ensure that allegations of misconduct 
are dealt with properly. The Standards Committee will be 
notified early in the process of all matters under review by 
the OCE and will be kept abreast of the status at each 
subsequent step.
    After receiving notification that the OCE is reviewing a 
given matter, the Standards Committee may, if it is already 
investigating that matter, request that the OCE cease its 
investigation and refer the matter directly to the Committee. 
The Task Force envisions certain cases where a matter may 
already be the subject of an undisclosed Standards Committee 
investigation in which the OCE may wish to avoid interference. 
In addition, it is possible that the Standards Committee may 
possess more complete information than the OCE regarding an 
alleged violation and may be better equipped to handle the 
matter.
    The board of the OCE must cooperate with such requests from 
the Standards Committee at any point in the process. Along with 
the early referral of the matter at hand, the board must 
transmit a Report stating simply that the matter is referred to 
the Standards Committee at the request of that Committee. The 
board will not transmit any findings, as board members will not 
yet have reached that stage in the process regarding the 
relevant matter. Such a referral shall be treated as any other 
from the OCE to the Standards Committee and will commence the 
45 calendar day or 5 legislative day period in which the 
Committee may consider the matter before releasing a statement 
on the committee's disposition, along with the board's report. 
The Committee must follow all reporting requirements in such 
cases, including a release of the board's report at the end of 
the applicable time period, even if the matter is dismissed or 
remains unresolved.
    If the Committee has not reached a final resolution, or 
properly deferred its review at the request of an appropriate 
law enforcement entity, by the end of the applicable time 
period (either after the Committee's initial 45 calendar day or 
5 legislative day period or after an extension), then the 
Committee must so notify the board of the OCE, which will then 
commence an automatic second-phase review of the matter (or 
recommence its suspended second-phase review, as applicable). 
For the purposes of this provision, final resolution shall 
include dismissal of the matter the Committee requested early 
from the OCE, establishment of an investigative subcommittee 
regarding the matter, or a conclusion or action which clearly 
indicates that the matter will no longer be considered by the 
Committee. In circumstances where the Committee notifies the 
board of the OCE that it has not reached a final resolution in 
such a matter, the OCE will follow its regular procedure from 
the second-phase review forward--by collecting evidence, 
interviewing witnesses, establishing a set of findings, and 
referring the matter to the Committee for its disposition. Once 
a matter that had been requested early by the Committee is 
returned to the OCE for an automatic second-phase review as 
detailed above, the Committee may not request another early 
referral. The matter must proceed through the regular process 
from that point forward.
    Nothing in this proposal shall prohibit general 
communication between OCE board members and the Standards 
Committee not relating to specific matters under review by 
either entity. The Task Force believes that board members 
should be able to convey certain ideas and advice to the 
Committee regarding, for example, recommendations as to which 
policies it might be helpful to outline for Members in ``pink 
sheets'' or guidance memoranda. Such communication would be 
both acceptable and useful to the process.
    The Task Force has been informed and believes that the 
accompanying resolution is joint and severable. Should any 
provision be found in the normal course of events to be invalid 
or unconstitutional, the remainder of the resolution will 
stand.

                       Observations and Comments

    This section details a number of issues that, while not 
directly within the purview of the Task Force, were discussed 
at multiple points in Task Force sessions and were consistently 
considered to be relevant to the work at hand. Task Force 
members formulated thoughts based on their observations of the 
Standards Committee process, and would like to offer the 
following informal commentary in addition to the formal 
recommendations detailed above.

General transparency of Standards Committee work

    During the course of Task Force meetings, it became clear 
that members, none of whom currently serve on the Standards 
Committee, did not feel they had sufficient quantitative 
information on the day-to-day work of that Committee. Members 
frequently commented that they did not know whether the 
Committee was investigating certain cases presently being 
highlighted in news reports. This lack of transparency, 
discernable even to current Members of Congress, presents 
barriers to comprehension of, and trust in, the Committee's 
execution of its duties.
    The Task Force recognizes that the rules governing 
Standards Committee confidentiality and reporting were first 
created along with the establishment of the Committee in 1967, 
and have been refined by subsequent ethics reform efforts. As a 
consequence, many of the confidentiality provisions were put in 
place to protect Members' reputations from false claims in an 
age when such reputations could be protected. The media and 
public interest groups operated under a different set of 
standards than they do now, and information was not as readily 
available to the public as it is now with the advent of weblogs 
(or ``blogs''), which often operate with few or no standards. 
Constant allegations and press conferences announcing alleged 
unethical behavior were not de rigueur. Presently, however, it 
is common for allegations to appear in the media before an 
ethics investigation has concluded and often before it is known 
whether, in fact, a matter is being investigated. While the 
Committee may not comment publicly on any complaints it has 
accepted, the public is made aware of ethics allegations 
through other sources and can reasonably expect that the 
Standards Committee should consider or investigate those cases.
    In addition, both Members of Congress and the general 
public should be presented with information evidencing the work 
of the Standards Committee, even if that work is confidential, 
so that they may know the ethics process has not broken down. 
The Task Force believes that increased transparency in the 
statements and reporting of the Standards Committee will not be 
unduly burdensome, and will instead serve to inform interested 
parties of successful application of the ethics process.

Coordination with law enforcement and regulatory authorities

    Standards Committee rules provide for the ability to 
``defer action on a complaint . . . when . . . the Committee 
has reason to believe [it] is being reviewed by appropriate law 
enforcement or regulatory authorities. . . .'' \7\ This 
situation most commonly arises when an ethics complaint 
corresponds to alleged criminal conduct on the part of a 
Member, officer, or employee of the House. Frequently, 
authorities such as the U.S. Department of Justice will request 
that the Committee defer its review or investigation so as not 
to interfere with an ongoing criminal (or regulatory) 
investigation. The Committee usually abides by such requests to 
avoid jeopardizing the authorities' work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Task Force is comfortable allowing the Committee to 
decide whether to defer to other authorities when asked. 
However, Task Force members have observed general displeasure 
with the lack of transparency at this step in the ethics 
process. It is often unclear to Members and the public if the 
Committee has undertaken a review of well-known ethics charges 
when no public statement is made by the Committee.
    Therefore, the Task Force believes that the Standards 
Committee should publicly state, as standard procedure, that a 
matter before the Committee is deferred at the request of law 
enforcement or regulatory authorities. This proposal recommends 
many actions to increase transparency. Nonetheless, the Task 
Force encourages the Standards Committee to review its own 
procedure and rules, regardless of the suggestions in this 
proposal, to shed as much light on their process and workings 
as possible in order to increase respect for its work and faith 
in Congressional processes in general.

Reporting of Standards Committee activities

    After the close of each Congress, the Standards Committee 
publishes a ``Summary of Activities'' which provides 
information on Committee work from that Congress. Included in 
the report are lists of Committee publications, briefings 
offered, advisory opinion letters, markups of legislation, 
hearings, and some investigations. The material offered 
regarding investigations is only that which has been made 
public and pertains to a select number of cases. The committee 
does not include confidential information on investigations, 
nor does it include more general statistics on its work.
    Task Force members, during the course of their meetings, 
expressed interest in obtaining further statistical information 
from the Standards Committee. For example, members asked to see 
reporting regarding the number of instances where information 
was offered as a complaint (from Members and non-Members), the 
number of accepted complaints, the number of complaints 
dismissed as frivolous or de minimis, the number of 
investigative subcommittees empanelled, and the number of 
complaints resulting in sanctions. The Task Force understands 
that much of the substance of the Standards Committee's 
proceedings is, by necessity, confidential. However, 
statistical reporting--furnished without identifying 
characteristics which would tie it to specific Members--would 
help to assure Members and the public of the continued 
diligence of the Committee in overseeing the ethics process.
    The Task Force suggests that the Standards Committee work 
to increase the transparency of its work through greater 
disclosure of statistical information in its annual report.

Transparency in the Standards Committee's investigative process

    The Task Force was not charged with studying and proposing 
changes to the Standards Committee's process, only with 
considering the creation of an independent enforcement entity 
to supplement the process. While Task Force members understand 
that such study of Committee process is not strictly within 
their purview, they did observe that some cases appear to 
linger for prolonged periods of time. Given that the duration 
of any investigation is difficult to predict at its outset, 
Committee rules do not specify a timeframe in which certain 
actions must be taken, benchmarks achieved, or reports be 
issued. During these prolonged periods, the House and general 
public may be left with the belief that nothing is happening 
and that the process has broken down. This situation feeds 
further public distrust in the House ethics process.
    The Task Force suggests that issues of reporting, 
transparency, and finalization in the Standards Committee's 
process be considered during future ethics process 
deliberations.

Attorneys' fees

    The Task Force discussed the issue of reimbursement for 
attorneys' fees for those individuals who are the subject of an 
OCE review that is ultimately dismissed by the Standards 
Committee. Members agree that in those instances where the 
matter is dismissed, the Member, officer or employee of the 
House named in the review should not be penalized for seeking 
legal counsel. It would be useful to have, within reason, a 
certain recourse through which reimbursement could be obtained. 
However, the Task Force decided against the inclusion of the 
concept in this proposal so as not to overload the OCE and the 
process from the outset.
    The notion of granting reimbursement for attorneys' fees 
deserves further study to consider whether such an approach is 
feasible and capable of being implemented. Such a power would 
most likely require statutory authority and would perhaps best 
be vested in the Standards Committee. The Task Force finds that 
the concept has merit and believes that it should be considered 
in depth to supplement the ethics process in the future.

Continuing review of ethics process

    The Task Force recommends that the House establish a panel 
of Members to conduct an ongoing review of the ethics process 
during the 110th Congress and perhaps beyond.
    Since the start of the 110th Congress, significant changes 
to the Rules of the House were approved which aim to clarify 
acceptable conduct for Members in the exercise of official 
duties. These new provisions include a ban on gifts from 
lobbyists, a ban on travel provided for by entities that employ 
lobbyists, increased disclosure requirements, and strict 
prohibitions on Members' partisan influence in the employment 
decisions of private entities. These modifications were agreed 
to in broad, bipartisan fashion in order to ensure a more 
ethical Congress. However, it is both understandable and clear 
that implementation of those reforms leads to procedural 
difficulties. If the recommendations from this Task Force are 
adopted, it is certainly reasonable to expect that unforeseen 
adjustments will have to be made for the same reason. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the House may seek to expand 
the role of the OCE in the future to encompass duties such as 
overseeing Members' and staff's financial disclosure reports, 
travel forms, and lobbying disclosure forms.
    In addition, as stated above, there are Standards Committee 
rules and processes that, while they may warrant improvement, 
were not within the scope of the Task Force. Standards 
Committee rules with respect to timelines for action and 
decision-making merit further study and possible revision, with 
the goal of ensuring a timely consideration and resolution of 
matters before the Committee. Such further consideration would 
benefit the process by allowing for discussion of outstanding 
issues the Task Force was not able to address.
    It is for these reasons that the Task Force believes a 
continued presence in the review of ethics processes is 
desirable. Task Force members understand that they cannot 
foresee every potential scenario, and that they cannot account 
for every question that may be asked regarding the 
implementation of the above recommendations. In light of the 
evolving nature of the ethics process this historic session, it 
would be prudent to oversee implementation of all new rules and 
procedures with the goal of making further recommendations, if 
necessary, to ensure that the reforms intended are, in fact, 
achieved.

                               Conclusion

    The Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement understands 
that continuous review and improvement of the House ethics 
process is necessary to ensure a high standard of ethical 
behavior for Members of Congress and its employees, and to 
guarantee a practical and functional enforcement of that 
standard. Congress must constantly work to maintain public 
trust in the institution through oversight of the ethics 
process. The proposals outlined above will likely serve as the 
basis for improvements that the Task Force hopes will be 
ongoing, as Members learn to navigate an enhanced system that 
allows for increased transparency and accountability. The Task 
Force does not intend its recommendations to be punitive or 
unduly cumbersome. Modifications enumerated within this report 
endeavor to benefit both Members and the public by allowing for 
increased confidence in the process and measurable timeframes 
under which discernable action shall occur. The continued 
cooperation of all Members, regardless of party affiliation or 
partisanship, is essential in order to guarantee a successful 
and effective ethics process within the U.S. House of 
Representatives.

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    The chart included below is intended to aid in 
comprehension of the OCE process as envisioned by the Task 
Force. The steps enumerate the many possible actions to be 
taken by both the OCE and the Standards Committee according to 
the Task Force's proposal and illustrate the associated 
outcomes at the end of the process.

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


   Attachment C--Addendum to the Report of the Special Task Force on 
                           Ethics Enforcement

    H. Res. 895 was introduced in the House of Representatives 
on December 19, 2007 in order to give Members an opportunity to 
review the Task Force proposal and offer feedback. The Task 
Force Report was issued the same day. In February 2008, the 
proposal was scheduled for consideration in the House Committee 
on Rules, with consideration on the floor of the House expected 
to follow. By that point, many Members had raised concerns 
about certain aspects of the Task Force's recommendations that 
they felt could jeopardize the intended bipartisan nature of 
the proposal.
    Specifically, Members called attention to: the concern that 
the make up of the OCE board might encourage partisanship, the 
provision that would allow two OCE board members appointed by 
the same party leader to initiate a review in a potentially 
partisan manner, and the process by which only an affirmative 
vote of four OCE board members could terminate a preliminary 
review once begun. In addition, Members asked that provisions 
prohibiting disclosure of confidential information and 
requiring a strictly non-partisan OCE staff be strengthened. 
Task Force members wished to be responsive to the thoughtful 
concerns of their colleagues, and they thus amended the 
proposal to reflect a stronger call for bipartisanship and a 
professional process.

Joint appointments

    As originally proposed, H. Res. 895 provided for OCE board 
appointments to be made jointly by the Speaker and Minority 
Leader for up to 90 days. If a full complement of board members 
was not appointed within that timeframe, the proposal then 
called for the Speaker and Minority leader to separately 
appoint board members to fill the remaining vacancies.
    Members of Congress expressed concern that such an 
appointment process could lead to an unwanted element of 
partisanship on the OCE board. If any board members were 
appointed separately by either party leader, there could, in a 
worst case scenario, be an incentive to place those with 
partisan motivations on the board. The consensus among Members 
was that it would be preferable and result in a better 
functioning ethics process if board members were only appointed 
jointly by the Speaker and Minority Leader.
    H. Res. 895 was therefore altered to reflect this change. 
All appointments to the OCE board must be made jointly with no 
time limit. The Speaker shall nominate three board members, 
subject to the concurrence of the Minority Leader. Likewise, 
the Minority Leader shall nominate three board members subject 
to the concurrence of the Speaker. This process will encourage 
both leaders to nominate responsible, professional, and 
judicious individuals who will readily be approved on the basis 
of strong professional credentials.
    The Task Force recognizes that excessive partisanship could 
result in no joint appointments if one or both party leaders 
refuse to take their responsibilities seriously. Nonetheless, 
we also believe that such recalcitrance will be so obvious that 
the leader responsible for excessive partisanship will be known 
to the general public and his/her party will be subjected to 
public scorn. If public pressure is not sufficient, then no 
power on earth can restore public confidence in our process. If 
this is the fate of this endeavor, it should be known early in 
the process.
    In addition, the Speaker and Minority Leader shall each 
nominate at least one alternate member of the OCE board subject 
to the concurrence of the other leader. Alternate members are 
intended to ensure that the board functions smoothly during 
periods of transition. Any vacancy that occurs on the board 
shall be temporarily filled by the most senior alternate board 
member nominated by the same leader who nominated the person 
vacating the position. The alternate shall serve until a 
permanent replacement is selected. If no permanent appointment 
is made within 90 days, the alternate shall be deemed to have 
been appointed for the remainder of the term, and the 
appropriate leader shall nominate a new alternate subject to 
the concurrence of the other leader.

Initiation of preliminary reviews

     H. Res. 895, as introduced, called for the initiation of 
preliminary reviews in the OCE at the written request of any 
two board members. This provision would have presented the 
possibility that two board members could initiate a review 
based on partisan motivations, targeting a Member or staff of 
the other party. Members of Congress considered that scenario 
harmful to the governance of the institution, and asked that it 
be changed to ensure that no partisan ``witch hunts'' could be 
undertaken by the OCE board.
    The proposal was amended to require that any preliminary 
review be initiated only by a bipartisan request from two board 
members--one requesting member nominated by the Speaker, the 
other nominated by the Minority Leader. This change codifies 
the bipartisan working relationship that members of the board 
must adhere to in order to effectively execute their duties to 
the OCE. It also directly responds to concerns that partisan 
attacks could be launched within the OCE by blocking any 
potential for such action.

Advancement from preliminary to second-phase review

    In addition, OCE procedures regarding the advancement of a 
review from the preliminary stage to the second-phase came 
under scrutiny. In the original proposal, a preliminary review 
could only be terminated by the affirmative vote of at least 4 
board members. In effect, this meant that preliminary reviews, 
once initiated, could only be stopped from progressing to the 
second phase by a substantial effort of board members. All 
other reviews (not terminated) were to move forward 
automatically to the second-phase review, at which point their 
referral to the Standards Committee is compulsory.
    In order to ensure that a certain threshold of credibility 
is met in each review, the proposal was altered to require 3 
board members to vote affirmatively in favor of advancing a 
preliminary review to the second-phase. Essentially, the 
original two, jointly-appointed, bipartisan members must 
convince at least one more jointly-appointed member that more 
information is needed to in order to make a thoughtful decision 
on an allegation. This change effectively enforces that 
threshold while also making it impossible to use partisan 
stonewalling to thwart a reasonable review once it has begun.

Other amendments

    The Task Force wished to properly respond to a number of 
other general concerns that were raised regarding 
confidentiality of information and communications, as well as 
professionalism of OCE staff members. Language on these 
provisions was strengthened to reflect a commitment to the 
integrity and competence of the OCE and its processes.
    H. Res. 895 was amended to clarify the following aspects:
     House Members and staff are prohibited from 
inappropriately communicating with OCE board members or staff 
about a case that may be before the OCE.
     The ban on ex parte communications applies to OCE 
staff as well as board members.
     Board members and staff of the OCE will be 
required to sign the same pledge of confidentiality as 
currently required for Standards Committee staff.
     Board members and staff of the OCE will be clearly 
prohibited from leaking information pursuant to the same 
limitations that apply to Standards Committee Members and 
staff.
     OCE staff, as well as OCE board members, are 
subject to the three-year pledge not to seek federal elective 
office.
     OCE staff are subject to the same restrictions as 
Ethics Committee staff relative to non-partisanship, 
prohibition on political activity, etc.

Conclusion

    The redrafted version of H. Res. 895 is included in this 
report as Attachment D. It was adopted by the House on March 
11, 2008, by a vote of 229-182 (see Roll Call 122 of 2008). 

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